GOOD GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY AS POLITICAL CONDITIONALITIES FOR FOREIGN AID: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE.

by

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DECLARATION

I declare that Good Governance and Democracy as Political Conditionalities for Foreign Aid: the case of Zimbabwe is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Nqaba Nkomana                     May 2005
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This study is an investigation of the relationship between political conditionality (subsumed under the euphemisms of good governance and democracy) and self-determination (autonomy) using Zimbabwe as a case study. The Zimbabwean land issue clearly illustrates the challenges posed by external influences on supposedly autonomous domestic policy decision-making processes. Indicative of this, the international donor community withdrew from Zimbabwe despite the joint ACP-EU parliamentary assembly recognition of the outcomes of the 2000 parliamentary elections in the country. The assembly also called on Britain to honour its obligations under the Lancaster House constitution. However, the international donor community, including the major Western industrialised countries, protested against the land reform policy pursued by the government of Zimbabwe. Instead, they called for good governance and democracy in exchange for development aid. Throughout Africa has been a demand for the implementation of the political ideals of neo-liberalism by Western industrialised countries, instead of resolving the insidious and contentious issue of the land question. These Western political ideals have become core issues and occupy a center stage in the land debate in Southern Africa. The shift of aid conditionality from economic to pure political demands is an interesting development that needs closer scrutiny. Political conditionality is a challenge to developing countries, as aid dependency tends to determine the degree of external influences in the domestic policy decision-making, which in turn has implications for self-determination (national autonomy). This thesis analyses the application of these conditionalities in Zimbabwe. It explores the political implications of tied aid by showing how aid was used to effect changes in the government’s land reform agenda.
CHAPTER ONE

1.1. Introduction

Good-governance and democracy have been used as conditionalities for development aid to recipient countries, the majority of whom are in the Third World. This thesis contends that the application of these conditionalities, by the international financial institutions (IFIs), namely, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and including the major Western industrialised countries, tends to limit the socio-economic and political transformation of Third World polities. The colonial legacy of socio-economic inequality, particularly inequities in resource ownership (land), remains an unresolved and contentious issue in Southern African. The preceding exposition resonates particularly in relation to Zimbabwe’s current political crisis. The government’s attempts to bring about socio-economic and political transformation, through land redistribution, was met with severe international sanctions. This has impeded the transformation process and inequities in resource ownership continue to be a decisive factor in the politics of Zimbabwe.

The primary objective of the post-colonial state, according to Eyoh, was to “nurture diverse political communities by elaborating institutions for the effective governance of the evolving political communities” (1996:43). Implicitly, the pursued project was nation and state building under the prescriptive paradigms of the post Second World War period. Despite immense guidance by the International Financial Institutions and their concomitant perspectives on capitalist transformation and development, Third World polities spiraled into socio-economic and political decay. Neo-liberalism became the rescue paradigm in the later part of the 1980s. The major pre-occupation of neo-liberalism has been the pursuit of economic and political liberalisation through the portals of the World Bank, IMF and major Western industrialised countries. This paradigm, the thesis, through an examination of Zimbabwe will illustrate, has limited and forestalled the prospects for meaningful processes of socio-economic and political transformation in Third World polities.
The linkage of good-governance and democracy with the development aid project emerged at the end of the Cold War. Prior to this the dominant notion was that democracy would only prevail when a certain level of economic development had been reached (Olsen, 1998; Tjonneland, 1998; Adejumobi, 2000). The development focus was on economic policy reforms and changes in the macro-economic frameworks of the countries concerned. According to Tjonneland (1998), in spite of the fact that economic reforms often had major political implications, there were no attempts to link these adjustment policies with the issues of political reforms. In the post-cold war era, aid became linked to political performance. Good governance and democracy were placed as conditionalities for the distribution of aid. Development aid was therefore used as a punitive measure by major Western industrialised countries to promote certain political objectives.

The aid regime has always been informed by the modernisation theory. This theory assumed that the economic growth of the Third World countries was repressed by the insufficient capital investments that in turn arrested any prospects of economic development (Matlosa, 2002). This view was reinforced by the successes of the 1947 Marshall Plan in the reconstruction of war-ravaged Europe and Japan. The theory posited Third world countries as primitive/traditional, while developed countries were seen as modern/advanced. Social change was therefore seen as unidirectional or linear, that is, a progression from the traditional phase to the modern state (Roxborough, 1979; Chilcote, 1983; Rostow, 1990). Its inferences failed to engender development in most of the global South. This led to a paradigmatic shift away from a linkage of aid with economic growth towards that of aid with economic redistribution. This was largely driven by the Dependency paradigm. This paradigm emerged as a response to the inadequacies of the modernisation theory.

Dependency theorists viewed underdevelopment in the Third World countries as a process, not as a condition. According to Cardoso and Falleto (1979), under-development was directly connected to the development of the core (developed countries) because of the unequal relations of exchange. The Third world was seen as
giving more than they got from the international economic system (Frank, 1967; Amin 1976; Wallerstein, 1980; Graaf and Venter, 2001). Both modernisation theory and dependency theory had little impact on the desired development of the Third World. Development theory soon reached an impasse. Illuminating this stalemate in the development discourse, Eyoh noted “that the dominant post-war paradigms have proven incapable of convincing explanation of the complexities in the structures and dynamics of the sharply differentiated development trajectories of Third World societies” (Eyoh, 1996:44). This stalemate was breached when neo-liberalism, which posited liberal democracy as the ultimate solution to the socio-economic and political development quagmire, gained hegemonic status.

Under the auspices of this paradigm Structural Adjustment Programms (SAPs) became the solution for economic growth. This paradigm diagnosed the cause of African development malaise as statism, that is, excessive state interventionism. Concomitantly, it prescribed a shift towards economic and political liberalisation. Capturing the opposition to the World Bank’s conception of adjustment, Eyoh stated “[it] focused on improvements in the managerial capabilities of authoritarian regimes which it deemed necessary to impose its draconian policies” (Eyoh, 1996:56). In face of much resistance to its adjustment programmes, the World Bank and IMF began to acknowledge the crucial role of states in the development process. The World Bank’s idea of governance and development was based on the conviction that “… only governments can provide two sorts of public goods: rules to make markets work efficiently and corrective interventions where there are market failures” (Campbell, 2001:157).

This thesis analyses the application of these conditionalities in Zimbabwe. In particular, it looks at its effects on the process of land reform. It contends that these conditionalities have blunted the potential for social transformation and lead to an erosion of the sovereignty of national states to determine their own socio-economic and political agendas. It probes the impacts of this on state legitimacy.

The specific aims of this research study will be to:
• Provide the study with an interpretive theoretical framework
• Provide an overview of foreign aid with reference to political conditionality
• Explore the political implications of tied aid using Zimbabwe’s land redistribution programme as a case study.
• To contribute to broader debates on good governance, sovereignty and aid.

This study employs a case study methodology. Zimbabwe’s land reform policies are used to show how political conditionalities thwart sovereignty and transformation. Data was primarily acquired through the use of secondary sources.

1.2. Theoretical Framework

Liukisla (1995) indicated that Africa remains highly dependent on external flows, while private flows continue to bypass sub-Saharan Africa. Embedded in this study is the acknowledgment that foreign aid is of crucial importance to the socio-economic development of the Third World countries. However, political conditionality is seen as an indication of the inadequacies of the international market system and a reflection of unequal power relations between the Western industrialised countries and the Third World countries. Various theoretical perspectives have evolved that seek to understand the problems of social change in Third World societies, and to determine the appropriate methods to induce development, these are, Modernisation theory, Dependency theory and Neo-liberalism. The theories of Nationalism and Democratisation also have a direct bearing on development. This section briefly highlights the major tenets of these theories. Chapter two elaborates on the theories of democratisation.

1.2.1. Modernisation Theory

In its formative years the aid discourse was underpinned by the propositions of modernisation theory. According to Calvert and Calvert (1996) and Matlosa (2002), the assumption was that there is a positive correlation between aid and economic development. Various authors such as So (1990), Leys (1996) and Bernstein (1997) have indicated that modernisation theory (influenced by social, economic and political changes, brought about by the industrial and French revolutions) assumed that all countries would develop in the same way.
Similarly, Haines (2000) and Coetzee (2001) argued that the basic proposition of modernisation theory was that economic growth, and in particular, industrialisation, would propel societies towards development. Rostow argued that modernisation can be promoted in traditional societies and, if the problem was the lack of investment, then the solution lay in the provision of aid (cited in Chilcote, 1983). Modernisation theory’s point of reference was implicitly Eurocentric. It operated on the assumption, “Look at us and do what we did, then you will become what we are now” (Calvert and Calvert, 1996: 16).

According to Frank (1967) and Leys (1996), the major criticism against modernisation theory was its unidirectional view of development and its faith on external factors to bring about change. Writers such as Chilcote disputed the traditional/modern dichotomy, stating, “preservation and even reaffirmation of traditionality is a crucial aspect of modernising societies” (1983:9). Although the theory was in widespread use during the 1960s, its propositions about development failed to emerge in most of the Third World countries.

1.2.2. Dependency Theory

In contrast to the modernisation paradigm, dependency theory located the problems of development in the structure of the international system. Dependency theorists argued that there were relationships of dependency in the international capitalist system, which stifled the development of the Third World (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; So, 1990; Isbister, 1993). They rejected the view that Third World countries could undergo the same form of economic development as industrialised countries as long as the capitalist system remained unreformed. While the modernisationists put their faith in the free-market, the dependency approach argued that the core set the terms on which the system operates. Preston (1996), Graaff and Venter (2001) argued that the Third World is seen as giving more than they got from international trading markets. With no possibility for development within the capitalist international system the dependency approach called for a revolutionary class struggle to bring about the necessary change.
Wallerstein (1980) divided the world capitalist system into core (developed states) and a periphery (underdeveloped states). Those states thought to be developing were placed into the category-semi periphery. This capitalist system produced a set of features characterised by capitalist accumulation in the core and surplus extraction in the periphery. Although Wallerstein (1983) conceded that at times opportunities for development were created, he maintained that it was essentially a movement from peripheral to semi peripheral status. The important point here was that the global capitalist system developed rather than individual societies. The theory was critiqued for not allowing enough space for development to occur. Hoogvelt (1982), Graaff and Venter (2001) noted that its emphasis on the economy neglected other dimensions of the system, such as, culture and politics.

1.2.3. Neo-liberalism

The central thesis of neo-liberalism is the abolition of government intervention in economic matters. According to Martinez and Garcia (1997), the free-market system is seen as the best possible way for a nation’s economy to develop. Its main features are the rule of the market, cutting of public expenditure, deregulation, privatisation and the elimination of public goods (DeMartino, 2000; Storper, 2001). Neo-liberalism has been criticised for the subordinate role it gives to government. Its postulations, too, have not led to significant social development in the developing countries. Instead, it catapulted these societies into political crises (Graaff and Venter, 2001; Weller, 2001). Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) argue that the IMF and World Bank’s imposition of neo-liberalism around the globe is tantamount to neocolonialism. They also noted, neo-liberalism aspires, in its ideology and practice, “to intensify the abstractions inherent in capitalism itself: to separate labor power from its human context, to replace society with the market …. Thus, neo-liberalism obfuscates the genesis of inequality in the structures of production, thereby rendering class to be understood as another trait or life style choice “(Comaroff and Comaroff, 2001:14-15).
1.2.4. Nationalism

Scholars generally agree that nationalism is derived from the concept of nation. According to Kacowicz, nationalism “refers to the feelings of attachment to one another that members of a nation have, and to sense of pride that a nation (nation-state) has in itself” (1999:532). He argues that nationalism can be expressed in various ways, either through the desire to win more sport awards than other nations or grab more land from neighboring nations. Thomson noted that nationalism could also be viewed as a desire that the nation should be housed in its own sovereign state, “nationalism arises when members of a nation wish to be united as one political unit” (2000:13).

There are three main theoretical perspectives that seek to understand the working of nationalism, these are, Primordialism, Modernism and Syncretic approach. Under the primordialist perspective, group identity is conceptualised as a given or natural factor (Geertz, 1973; 1994). Primordialists emphasise the existence, in all societies, of certain primordial attachments based on blood, language, race, region, religion or tradition. Therefore, the formation of ethnic groups and nations is on the basis of these primordial attachments. Primordialists believe that these primordial attachments are “ineffable and yet coercive ties, which are the result of a long process of crystallisation” (Shils, 1957:142). Harold Isaacs noted that group identity is frequently marked on the body, either naturally as racial characteristics, or carved on by other artificial processes, such as person’s name, language, religions, culture, etc (1975:143). Primordialists also maintain that “we as individuals and members of collectivities feel and believe in the primordiality of our ethnies and nations” (Smith, 2001:53-54), that is, these identities deal essentially with sentiments. Following from this, nations are seen as evolving primordial entities that are essential and a basic unit of social cohesion.

Similarly, Connor (1994) argued, that these body markers defines a group which acts like and claims to be a kin- group, hence, nationalism gets its force by drawing on
primordial factors. However, primordialism has been criticised for apriorism, that is, the given nature of primordial attachments. Smith noted that the emphasis on a prior nature and emotional content of these attachments seems “to preclude the rational, empirical analysis of why people share this sense of primordiality and attachments” (Smith, 2001:54). This perspective has also been criticised for its inability to account for the “genesis, change and dissolution of ethnic groups, nor their transformation through the modern processes of intermarriage” (Llobera, 1999:2).

Contrary to primordialism’s central thesis that the nation has existed for a long time and one can trace back its history over centuries, the modernist perspective maintains that nations and nationalism were of recent origin and modern inventions (Gellner, 1983; Breuilly, 1996). According to Gellner, nationalism emerges as a result of transition from traditional to modern society, hence, “nationalism is a ‘by product’ of the modern social order” (Gellner, 1983:37). Modernists argue that there are certain conditions that encouraged the rise of nationalism. “At the economic level it was the development of trade and commerce and the spread of industrialisation. At the political level it was the emergence of the modern national state, that is, a centralized, bureaucratic, territorial and sovereign state (a professionalised state)” (Gellner, 1994:56). Ernest Gellner emphasized the role played by a mass, standardised compulsory public education system, in developing nationalism, whilst Benedict Anderson (1983; 1994), concentrated on the role of print capitalism in creating and “imagined nation”. The work of these two authors was novel to the study of nationalism and succeeded in changing the way in which we perceived identities. Henceforth, they became viewed as social constructs.

Criticising this approach, Anthony Smith argued that the major flaw in the Modernist theory is that “nationalism as a product of modernisation overlooks the persistence of ethnic ties and cultural sentiments” (1996:13). Similarly, Brubaker noted, “the modernists restrict nationalism to being a series of adjustments demanded by entry into the era of modernity but they cannot account for the resurgence of nationalism in post-industrial societies” (1998:10). These modernists also tend to over-generalise. Modernists therefore were unable to account for the continuing assertions and re-assertions of nationalism. This led to the emergence of syncretic approach advocated
by Anthony Smith. He agreed with the modernist school that nationalism is of recent origin and a modern phenomenon.

But, in contrast to modernist scholars, Smith argues, “the modern nation also incorporates numerous features of pre-modern ethnic communities” (Smith, 1986:18). Though the syncretic approach recognises factors such as capitalism, urbanization and bureaucratization, but it focuses on ethnicity as the cultural basis of nationalism. It maintains that though ethnicity does not lead naturally to nationhood, it influences the shape and content of nations and nationalism. According to Smith the transition from pre-modern to modern society politicised culture, thus, “leading to a change in the function of culture within the modern society. The politicisation of culture meant both the elite and the lower strata were now members of one society” (Smith, 2001:57).

The relationship between the elites and the people is not a one-way relationship. “The non-elites, partly through their cultural traditions and partly in consequence of their vernacular mobilization, influence the intelligentsia, political leaders and bourgeoisie, by constraining their innovations within certain cultural parameters and by providing motifs and personnel for their cultural projects and political goals” (Smith, 2001:57). The relationship is a symbiotic one for elites to utilise culture and custom in the formation of nation states and they are simultaneously by them. It is this that leads the syncretist to argue that ethnicity is the ‘social glue of the nation’. This approach too has been critiqued. For example, Nikolas (1999:4) argues, “they do not allow for the possibilities of civic nations as culture still predetermines the nation. It appears to be little more than a populist description of ethnic nationalism”.

This study will reject the Eurocentric prescription of modernisation theory and neoliberalism, whilst reaffirming the centrality of traditionality as a vital aspect of modernizing societies. This thesis is indebted to the knowledge produced by the dependency theorists and arguments their work with current theories of nationalism. It does not subscribe to the primordialist view that sees national groups as natural human communities based on close relationships with one’s own kind, sharing the same origin and ancestry. Instead, it is closer aligned to the modernist perspective. In agreement with Anderson (1994), the thesis assumes that the development of national
consciousness is strongly tied with modernisation and the development of capitalism. As a result, nationalism will be conceived as a desire of members of a nation to control and govern the territory in which they live, that is, the emphasis will be on the control over domestic political systems and the ability to be responsible for one’s own destiny.

1.3. Overview of foreign aid regime

In order to fully understand the political conditionalities, it is necessary to put them into a context by providing a brief historical overview of development aid. It is acknowledged that foreign aid in the form of development aid emerged after the end of the Second World War in 1945. According to White (1974), prior to the war, any resources by colonial powers to their colonies could not be considered as aid, since colonies were not sovereign entities. The post war period created a condition of interdependence among the European countries. This culminated to the formulation of the Marshall Plan in 1947 by the United Stated (US) government. O’ Brien and Williams (2004) noted that, central to the Marshall Plan was the need for development, economic reconstruction and the rehabilitation of war torn Western Europe and Japan. This was mainly pursued through the US funding ($20 billion). This signified the birth of the development aid. The Third World, buying into these ideals, saw international public capital in the form of aid as a viable route to development (Spero, 1985; 1990; Frank and Baird, 1995).

It is imperative to note that the conceptualisation of aid entails diverse terms with various meanings. According to White (1974) aid could only be applied to actions taken by institutions from one country to another country with the intention to help the latter. White’s conception is deceptive and open-ended, as it portrayed aid as an act of generosity. It also allows any actions, irrespective of their intentions to be considered as aid. Similarly, the official conception of aid is those flows given by the organisation for economic co-operation and development (OECD) and multilateral institutions to developing countries with the objective of “promoting economic development and welfare with a concessional grant element of twenty five per cent” (Raffer and Singer, 1996:61). Irrespective of the grant element the official conception of aid is also open to abuse as it can be applied to any activities taken by the donor. It is often very
difficult, if not impossible, to prove the intentions or objectives of the donor concerned. This study will view development aid as public consessional financial transfers from Western industrialised countries to the developing countries, through OECD and multilateral institutions.

The marginalisation of the Third World by the international economic order provoked an interest in aid. Third World countries called for the establishment of a public international agency under the auspices of the United Nations to make soft loans and grants for economic development. However, this was totally rejected by the IFIs as it threatened their privileged position as the only multilateral lenders to the developing countries. Instead, they argued for domestic efforts enhanced by private international capital. Similarly, Raffer and Singer (1996) wrote: “the position by the World Bank was not only against the involvement of the United Nations in financial aid but even to the principle of soft loans”(1996:61).

During the Cold War era the idea of development aid became important to Western countries, not for economic development, but for political reasons. Economic aid converged with their political and economic desire to maintain the status quo in the structure of international relations. That is, to curb the Soviet Union from gaining access to the Third World countries (Spero, 1990). The notion of development aid was predicated on the assumption that economic growth of the Third World was repressed by insufficient capital investments (Matlosa, 2000; 2002). The link between aid and economic development arguments were reinforced by the successes of the Marshall Plan in the reconstruction of Western Europe. As a result, during this period “many economists led by Walt Whitman Rostow through his seminal writings on stages of economic growth championed what was, to all intents and purposes, a panegyrical perception of aid” (Matlosa, 2002:5). The aid regime was informed by the tenets of the modernisation paradigm, which posited the Third World as primitive/traditional and developed countries as modern/advanced.

The interest in aid was also incited by the collapse of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which led to oil price increases and eventually to the Third World debt crisis. It is the failure of the world market oriented development
model that led to the African development crisis. Based on this background the World
Bank and IMF initiated policies and programs designed as a response to Africa’s
development predicament, referred to as Structural Adjustment Programms (SAPs)
(Gibbon, 1992; Chakaodza and Vivekan, 1996). Through SAPs the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank became the main driving agents of aid
development in the South. The major components of SAP conditionalities are: “trade
liberalisation, such as removal of price controls, wage controls and subsidies.
Secondly, the fiscal and monetary policies, such as currency devaluation, privatisation
and reduced government expenditure” (Chakaodza and Vivekan, 1996:43). The
intention of adjustment policies was to integrate the national economy into the
international system. SAP required the borrowing government to carry policy
economic reforms and changes in the macro-economic frameworks and political
reforms as stipulated by the IMF and World Bank (Clapham, 1996:9 and Carvounis,
1986:3).

It is against this brief history of foreign aid that the study seeks to look at the
relationship between SAP conditionalities and a nation’s independence (self-
determination). As argued, the donor community including the World Bank and IMF
began to raise issues of good governance, democracy and human rights with rising
intensity after the end of super power rivalry in Africa. Initially aid was tied to
economic performances such as privatisation. However, with end of the cold war,
issues, which were never raised by Western governments and donor community such
as multi-party democracy, became overt political demands. When the former Eastern
block no longer posed a threat to the economic and strategic interests of the Western
countries, they began to expose the corrupt dictatorships in Africa and elsewhere,
positing themselves as the champions of human rights and ignoring their own role in
promoting previous dictatorships. Although good governance, democracy and human
rights are universally appreciated, including in Africa, what is questioned and rejected
by this study is the autocratic form in which these political values are being enforced
upon African governments through economic threats.
1.4. Aid regime in Zimbabwe

Development aid in Zimbabwe emerged when Britain and America agreed to drum up the international community to contribute to the funding of land acquisition at commercial value. According to Mushonga, “as part of the fulfillment of its obligations under the agreement, Britain was supposed to have contributed 75 million British pounds to the fund, with America contributing 600 000 US American dollars” (2002:18). However, Britain has only paid a quarter of the full amount, while America has not released any money promised. On the part of the white farmers, the Lancaster House Agreement meant, they were free to keep their land if they so wished and the general tendency was to offer land at expensive prices, away from the most fertile farming regions.

The purchase of land by the government fell drastically in 1983/84 periods, due to drought, international economic recession and expensive land prices. Mandaza notes, “with implementation of the economic structural adjustments from 1983, budgetary outlays for resettlement decreased, thus leading to decline in land purchases” (1986:185). This period was also characterised by the debate not about land distribution, but about the possible losses to the national economy. International actors such as the World Bank, IMF, EEC (European Union), OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), Whitsum foundation and USAID (United States Agency for International Development), all pushed the above view that ultimately led to the birth of ‘rural development’, under the Five Year Development Plan of 1985 (see: Moyo, 1986). The rural development plan propounded by and maintained through the donor support, ensured the continuity of the colonial legacy after independence. Illustrating this process, Chachage remarked, “there was massive donor support for rural development and cynical programmes such as participatory natural resources conservation, through loans from the World Bank and USAID” (2000:52).
Free from the severe constraints of Lancaster House Agreement in 1990, the government amended the constitutional provisions concerning private property and subsequently, adopted the Land Acquisition Act in 1992, allowing for compulsory acquisition of land for resettlement (Africa Report, 2004). This invoked a plethora of criticism not only from white farmers, but also from the whole of Western Europe. In response the British government and the international donor community threatened to withhold further aid for resettlement. As noted in the beginning, the nature of the land problem in Zimbabwe has been created, shaped, conditioned and reconfigured by external influences such as colonial rule, white minority government, and neo-liberal policies promulgated by Western governments, International financial institutions and the donor community.

1.5. Key Concepts

**Good-governance** became a buzzword in the political discourse in the late 1980s. It was initially propagated by the World Bank. According to the Bank, “the market economic reforms policies it recommends rarely work … due to internal bottlenecks and political ineptitude in terms of governance”(1989:60). Implicitly, therefore, it blamed Africa’s socio-economic on its political misrule. These actors argued for “the shrinking of the state and engendering support for non-state actors”(Adejumobi, 1999:36). This study will deviate from the Bank’s conception of good-governance as an instrument to be used in the interest of capital within the framework of neo-liberal ideology. Good-governance will not be limited to the central tenets of liberal democracy such as elections, political control, responsiveness and plural politics, but will encompass or reflect adequate social welfare policies for the majority of the people and ensure better living standards.

**Democracy** is commonly equated with multiparty elections, guarantees of certain rights, freedom of expression, and so forth. In this study its meaning is broadened from a limited procedural dimension to include the protection of political, social and economic rights.

**Development aid** is those “flows given by OECD countries multilateral institutions to developing countries with the objective of promoting economic development and welfare, with a concessional grant element of twenty five percent”(Raffer and Singer,
Development aid is seen by most of the developing countries as a means of rapid technological and economic progress, whilst the Western industrialised countries frequently used it to influence policies in the recipient countries.

**Political Conditionalities** will refer to the use of punitive measures by foreign governments and international donor organisations to promote certain political objectives, such as good governance and democracy in recipient countries. In other words, political conditionalities refer to “tied aid or linkage of development aid to political performances, with the suspension of aid to countries with poor performances” (Tjonneland, 1998: 186).

**Sovereignty:** will be conceptualised as freedom to self-determine what economic and political policies are suited to a particular country. A country is sovereign when it has control over its domestic economic and political systems, i.e. it is free of external interference.

1.6. Chapter Outline

**Chapter 1.** Introduces the research problem, aims of the study, methodology and theoretical framework.

**Chapter 2.** Is a literature review that concentrates on the debates of democracy. It assists in the conceptualization and contextualisation of the research question.

**Chapter 3.** Outlines the particularities of the land question in Zimbabwe through a detailed look at its genesis in the colonial period and its structuring in the post-colonial period. The intention is to show how socio-economic transformation of Zimbabwe has been configured and reconfigured by the external factors.

**Chapter 4.** Details the historical evolution of and contemporary policies and practices of foreign aid. It then shows how the foreign aid regime has attempted to limit land transformation in Zimbabwe.

**Chapter 5.** Concludes by drawing together the major arguments of this thesis.
CHAPTER TWO

2.1. Literature Overview

The collapse of communism and other centralised forms of government in the 1980s placed Western liberal democracy in a position of hegemony. Many scholars began to pronounce it as the most appropriate form of government for the contemporary globalised world. Francis Fukuyama (1992) boldly declared the superiority of liberal democracy in his famous/infamous ‘The end of History’ hypothesis. His basic argument was that liberal democracy was unsurpassed as a mechanism of political control and that it earned its legitimacy in the world. More contentiously, he argued, “liberal democracy may constitute the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the final form of human government” (Fukuyama, 1992:12). Central to this thesis is the conviction that liberalism is free from any flaws and internal contradictions that led to the demise of adversary ideologies. Similarly, Samuel Huntington (1993), in his ‘Clash of Civilisations’ noted, “the most authentic quest for freedom belongs to the West, that holds the copy right now and forever on the expression of democratic principles and their proper implementation” (Monga, 1996:34). Implicit in this largely Western consensus was the notion that other cultures (read-Third World polities) are inept to theorise about democracy and/or that the Western world is the exclusive owner of the democratic truths: truths with universal applicability. The development discourse of the 1990s had also bought into the view that liberal democracy was the final resolution of political development processes (Eyoh, 1996; 1998).

Democratisation in Africa has been characterised by tensions between the universalising inclinations of liberal democracy and the call for a model of democracy that takes into cognisance the intervening internal and external variables in the societies concerned, particularly those in transition (Osaghae, 2000:2). According to Monga (1996) and Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997), the latter group calls for a perspective that has no difficulty in conceptualising the ways in which Africans conceive of and experience democracy. Validating this argument, Lumumba-Kasongo inscribed, “…despite the fact that democracy has become a global desirable end of many social, economic, and political pursuits among different peoples the world over, no model of
democracy can claim to have universal acceptability” (2002:4). This contestation about the conceptualisation of democracy is at the heart of the debate on democracy in Africa and is key to our analysis. This chapter therefore outlines some of the major debates on democracy, especially its occurrence in the African context, as a departure point to situate the overall thesis on the impact of political conditionalities.

A host of writers such as Robert Dahl (1989); Lipset (1995); Diamond (1999); Robert Mattes (2002) and El-Sayed Dhala (2003) defined democracy as a political system divorced from the economic and the social realms. These authors emphasised multi-party competition, broad participation and involvement by the populace in the selection of political leaders, and a guarantee of civil and political liberties. Democracy, therefore, was in essence a political framework with multipartyism as a sacrosanct pillar for the regular constitutionally based opportunity to change governing officials. This conception of democracy has its roots from liberalism that can be traced back to the influences and ideas of early classical philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Charles Louis de Montesquieu and Alexis de Tocqueville. However, these early classical ideas were synthesised in the late twentieth century into what came to be known as neo-liberalism: a paradigm over zealously “committed to the view that political life, like economic life, is (or ought to be) a matter of individual freedom and initiative” (Held, 1987:243). Friedrick Hayek (1960; 1973) and Robert Nozick (1975) were central representatives and major proponents of neo-liberalism.

These authors vociferously argued for societies that were free from state intervention in all spheres of life, including the provision of opportunities (Held, 1987). Neo-liberalism viewed the state as a great ‘Leviathan’, which could threaten the basis of liberty. Nozick argued that there are only individual people with their own individual lives and the only justifiable mode of ordering human and material resources was through unhindered activities of individuals in competitive exchanges with one another. The only legitimate political frameworks suitable for such individualism are “those that contribute to the maintenance of individual autonomy or rights” (Nozick, 1975:325). He called for a political system that is against excessive planning, with active redistribution of resources and with the forcing of aid to others.
Accentuating the linkage between individual liberty, democracy and the state, Hayeck (1973) argued that to avert the dangers of representative mass democracies (tyranny of the majority) we needed legal democracy, that is, the rule of law. Hayeck attacked the welfare system arguing that the regulation of society in the name of social good through measures such as state economic management and redistribution of resources was an attack on individual liberty and was synonymous with coercive government. According to Hayeck, “government becomes coercive if it legislates in an attempt to alter the material position of a particular people or enforce distributive or social justice. A free, liberal, democratic order is incompatible with the enactment of rules, which specify how people should use the means at their disposal” (1960:231). Held argued that in Hayeck’s view therefore, the operations of democracy needs to be circumscribed by the rule of law in order to “safeguard the highest political end: Liberty” (1987:249).

Held, perceptively noticed an intrinsic contradiction in this school of thought, that is, while it holds dearly to the notion of liberty and of a minimalist state it expects the state to be strong enough to secure an enabling environment for free-market operations. In other words, liberal democracy pursues a strategy that simultaneously “increases the state power while restricting the scope of the state’s actions” (Held, 1987:252). These ideas emanate from the classical liberal tradition. For example, John Locke argued that the purpose of the state is very specific: “it is restricted to the defence of a set of natural or god given individual rights, namely, liberty and property” (cited in Heywood, 2002:89). The state was also perceived as a powerful entity that could effortlessly threaten citizen’s rights. The protection of the rights of citizens could, in turn, only be realised through constitutional and representative government. Neo-liberals, drawing on this conceptualization, therefore, also argue that liberals “ought to contain the power of democratically elected governments over individuals by putting constraints on state actions and by limiting the scope of permissible state action” (Sartori, 1987:386). Hence, the stress on representative democracy.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the neo-liberal doctrine had become the cornerstone of the political and economic policies of Western industrialised countries. Neoliberalism’s commitment to rigorous individualism underpins its overriding goal to “roll back the frontiers of the state” (Heywood, 2002:82). According to Heywood these ideas stem from an ontology that believes that the state has no management capability to ensure the best performance of the economy and its related institutions. The free-market is therefore, perceived as the appropriate key apparatus for both economic and social regulation (Heywood, 2002). With the Reagan and Thatcher administration neo-liberalism was pushed to the furthest part of the globe. Neoliberalism demonised anything that was public and (forcibly) encouraged the privatisation of the state assets. Shah (2004) noted that SAPs were used to open up the economies of the poorer countries primarily so that multinationals could gain access to cheap resources. The assumption was that democracy and free markets are two sides of the same coin since “both processes entail the dispersion of power and the emergence of a bourgeoisie or middle class both of which are said to be good for democracy” (Mkandawire, 2002:5). Neo-liberalism has no room for principles of social justice and political morality, as it is preoccupied with the preservation of political order to ensure the highest political end, that is, liberty.

Democracy in Africa has to ensure the attainment of social justice and public morality as the highest political good, which has been constantly undermined by the neo liberal framework in Africa. As Aseka noted “the realization of social justice is not best left to natural order of liberty and free marketist claims of economic operators. It is best realized through ideological production that defines a new moral constitutionalism as the basis of economic and political integration”(2003:37). The central postulation of neo-liberalism that the free-market is the basis for a genuinely liberal democracy has been strongly contested by various scholars such as Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997), Zeleza (1997), Eyoh (1998), Mkandawire (1999), Mamdani (2000), etc. They see current operations of the free-market system as reproducing massive unevenness of power and resources, which in turn undermine the political ideals of liberal democracy. The market, they argue, cannot solely resolve the fundamental problems of resource generation and allocation. Neo-liberalism also tends to regard all questions concerning “redistribution of resources as illegal or against the rule of law” (Held, 1987:247). In
addition, liberal democracy glosses over the genesis of the economic and political malaise that continues to pervade African polities.

Rousseau’s notion of the general-will has largely inspired the Marxist conception of democracy, which in turn influenced participatory democratic theory. According to Cunningham (2002), Rousseau disputed the liberal notion that personal liberty was the prime motivator for submission into a sovereign authority and questioned the premise that liberty and submission could be reconciled. He maintained, “If the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his self-preservation how can he pledge them without harming his own interests” (cited in Cunningham, 2002:124). Rousseau therefore viewed the pursuit of common good as a principal virtue of democracy.

Influenced by Rousseau, participatory democrats reject the neo-liberal notion that individuals are free and equal, arguing that it is an imagined condition. Pateman (1985), for example, questioned the liberal theory’s assertions about individual rights, given the existing relationship among social classes, gender and race groups. He asked, “how does liberalism allow formally recognised rights to be actually realized”. According to Pateman, class, sex, and race inequalities significantly deter the extent to which it can be legitimately claimed that individuals are free and equal. While participatory democrats acknowledge the significance of the existence of formal rights, they maintain that these rights are of no value if all members of the society cannot genuinely enjoy them. They argue that liberalism as a paradigm contained inherent contradictions. The state under liberalism is locked into the reproduction of the inequalities and under such arrangement the individuals could not be free and equal, as per liberal postulations.

The immediate question then becomes, what form of democratic control or regulation of the state should there be? For participatory democrats, the state and civil society is one thing, as “there is no line dividing a state that rules and citizens in civil society who are ruled” (Cunningham, 2002:127). Notwithstanding this unity, Poulantzas (1980) argued for the necessity of general elections, unrestricted freedom of press and assembly and free struggle of opinion as vital elements of democratic control if we are
to avert death in every public institution. Criticising what he called the ‘adulation’ of social engineering, especially in Eastern Europe, both Poulantzas and Pateman called for the democratisation of the state by making parliament, state bureaucrats and political parties more open and accountable.

Likewise, Macpherson (1977) noted that liberty and individual development could only be completely attained with the direct and continuous involvement of citizens in the regulation of society and the state. In other words democracy has to be promoted outside the formal institutions of governance to all spheres of civil society. Participatory democrats agree with neo-liberalism about the significance of general elections. However, they argue that as long as rights to self-determination only applies to the sphere of government; the meaning of democracy will be limited to the periodic voting. It will count little in the determination of the quality of people’s lives. To achieve self-determination, democratic rights needs to be extended from the state to the economic enterprise and other central institutions of society. Participatory democratic theory has been criticised for hastily attempting to resolve the complex question of individual liberty, distributional matters and democratic processes, by stressing the superiority of collective decision-making. Held furthermore contends that they ignore important questions like: should the nature and scope of individual liberty and minorities be left to a democratic decision? Or should there be laws that allow and limit democratic processes?

2.2. The African Debate on Democratisation.

The contested issues between liberal and participatory models of democracy have featured strongly in and characterised, the democratisation debate in Africa. The debate revolves around those that stress the universal principles of democracy, especially the need for multi-partyism, versus those that emphasise the limitations of this approach and the need for more substantive reform. Authors such as Anyang’ Nyog’o (1992), Bratton and Rothchild (1992), Hyden (1992; 1999) and Bayart (1999) have called for thorough political liberalisation (read multi-party competition) that goes beyond economic privatisation. Rejecting the universalist perspective, African scholars such Mamdani (1989; 1996), Zeleza (1997; 2003), Mkandawire (1999), Ake
(2000), Aseka (2003) and others, argue that liberal democracy with its universalising proclivity will never engender and will continue to thwart democratic aspirations of the African people.

In the 1980s the African state was being portrayed as a “Leviathan” and there was a concomitant call for political liberalisation. A host of writers such as Bratton and Rothchild (1992), Battes (1994), Morgan (1997), Bratton and Posner (1999), Van de walle (1999) and Thomson (2000), all subscribed to what Eyoh referred to as ‘Universalist’ perspective (liberal democracy). Similarly to modernisation theory they saw the internal dynamics of the state as the cause for the state decay and argued for institutionalisation and political organisation. Huntington way back in the sixties described African polities as corrupt societies “…a society which lacks law, authority, cohesion, discipline and consensus, where private interests dominate public ones, where there is an absence of civic obligation and civic duty. Where, in short, political institutions are weak and social forces strong”(1968:416). This was the dominant portrayal of these societies in the 1980s and 1990s.

The universalist, in accordance with classical liberal tradition, stressed representation and accountability. Multi-partysim and individualism are considered as universal sacred virtues and central pillars of democracy. Normatively and forcefully propagating liberal democracy, Stephanie Lawson (1993), argued that democracy cannot be just anything. For her it described a particular type of a regime that meets certain minimal conditions. Lawson mentions Asia and Africa as specific cases where there is no “democracy because of the absence of equality, liberty, justice, representative institutions, and electoral system, plurality of political parties, and constitutionalism, and free opposition”. In Asia and Africa, she argued, elections are used to ensure the party’s continuance in office, not as a mechanism to transfer power (Lawson, 1993:186).

Epitomising the ascendancy of the universalist paradigm, Eyoh charged, “the development discourse has been preoccupied with nation-building and state-building projects, which the post-war development paradigms posited as symbols of political modernity” (1996:43). The indigenous African ruling elites were taken as the driving
agents behind these projects. As a result, the concerns of the post-war paradigms have since been with explaining how the operation of these projects is determined by the political practices of the ruling elites. Both Eyoh and Mamdani however assert that these paradigms are not able to explain the complexities in the structures and dynamics of these diverse societies. Few of these societies have successfully transformed into capitalist states, many becoming “failed states”. This indicates the limitations of the “universalist pretensions of the current Western orthodoxy on development” (Mamdani, 1989; Eyoh, 1996:43-44; 1998:284).

Authors such as Anyang’ Nyong’o and Jibrin Ibrahim are identified by Eyoh (1998) as the main proponents of the universalist perspective within the African scholarly community. Universalists call for liberal democratic model, marked by regular elections, multypartism, individual rights, equality and protection of minorities. Anyang’ Nyong’o for example places the blame for the failure of African states on the lack of accountability. As a result, African states have lost the ability and capacity to embark on socio-economic programs of development. In contrast, he argues that social democracy in Europe was realised by forcing the bourgeoisies to concede to the social power of the popular classes. While in Third World, “there is an obsession with utopian and adventurous idea that the restructuring of the international economic system in favour of the wretched of the earth will bring about democracy” (Anyang’Nyong’o, 1988:19).

Similarly, authors such as Hyden (1992), Thomson (2000) and others noted that the centralisation of state power into the hands of the president, who may even be in office through sheer incumbency, not from any popular electoral mandate, has led to an excessive interventionist state in Africa. Although they acknowledged the context under which the interventionist African post-colonial state emerged, nevertheless, they chose to revert to epithets such as ‘predatory’. It is generally acknowledged that in the 1970s and 1980s, African states were engaged in a constant struggle to develop their polities, maintain territorial integrity, and manage and control political conflict (Mamdani, 1996). The “praetorian prism” espoused by the universalist perspective upon which to peer and analyse the African polities, has forced neo-liberal paradigm to conceive African polities as incapable of inducing transformation or change in
political authority. They assumed that the crisis of African societies could only be surpassed by employing foreign intervention

Bratton and Rothchild (1992) for example, believed that the power to determine the distribution of resources in African countries really rests with the major international financial institutions, which are able to dictate the terms of economic adjustment policies. The view is that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund structural adjustment policies are useful: in that states elites are constrained in making decisions. But international financial institutions processes need to be accompanied by institutionalized pluralism (multipartysim). The call was on foreign powers to add political conditionalities to the current economic conditionalities of structural adjustment programs, and implement these through sanctions if necessary. The conclusion is in reality “no less than a call for further foreign intervention to democratize political life on the continent” (Mamdani, 1989:20). The idea is that, given the evil nature of these post-colonial praetorian states and their resilience in the face of mounting internal pressure for change (democracy), “the donor-mandated economic policies, accompanied by political demands are a suitable agency for democratisation of African polities” (Van de Walle, 1999:483).

These anti-statist notions of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund were challenged. Berman, for example, argued that the “anti-statist policies are not likely to reproduce Western modernity, particularly industrial capitalism and liberal democratic nation-state” (Berman, 1998:306). Instead, Berman illustrated that ethnicity and patronage were being reproduced in these new societies. One of the major limitations of the universalist paradigm is that they only focus on internal factors to explain the African crisis. Writers such as Zeleza (1994, 1997, 2003), Nabuderi (2000) and Majefe (1985, 2001) all question the fixation with the state as the genesis of the African catastrophe. The view is that it tends to turn into a shopping list of recommendations and lacks a concrete understanding of the dynamics of African societies (Mamdani, 1989; Adejumobi, 1996; Zeleza, 1997).

In contrast to the universalists, there are those that place emphasis on the need for substantive redress of socio-economic conditions for democracy to take root. They
argue that we need to take account of both the internal and external factors in explaining the African condition. Authors like Basil Davidson highlight the imposition of European models of state formation as root causes of the African problems. Davidson wrote, “despair rots civil society, the state becomes an enemy, bandits flourish, meanwhile the developed world, the industrialized world has continued to take its cut out of Africa’s dwindling wealth” (1992:9). Although he acknowledged the destructive role played by the post-colonial ruling elites, he dismissed the derogatory epithets used to describe African leadership as tantamount to an effort to find an easy answer to a huge complex problem that pervades the African continent (Davidson, 1987; 1990). For him the quandary arose from the social, economic and political institutions within which de-colonised Africans have lived and tried to survive (institutional crisis). What was really transferred to the new nation-states was the structural and economic disorder, resulting in formerly prosperous societies to become less prosperous and rural impoverishment.

Laakso and Olukoshi (1996) also made the point that the processes of nation building were not linked to democratisation in much of post-independence Africa. There was absence of durable structures of democratic government and popular participation. They along with a host of other African scholars also blame Structural Adjustment Programs for the current state of African societies. Although they all argue for democratization, they do not see neo-liberal paradigm as creating truly democratic societies. They also question the compatibility of globalisation with political liberalization noting that it erodes sovereignty over national policy alternatives (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Mkandawire, for example, wrote, “the tragedy of Africa’s policy-making and policy implementation in the last several years is the complete surrender of national policies to the ever-changing ideas of international experts, hence, choiceless democracies or democracy with tears” (Mkandawire, 1999:126-128).

Ake (2000) argued that while the intrinsic worth of the individual is recognised globally, in Africa, in contrast with liberal theory, the individual is considered as fully only through his or her dialectical relationship to sociability or the ability to live in society. They dismissed liberal rights theory for statism, and argued that the rights
discourse that emerged out of nation-states in Europe is totally different to the structural formation of African polities. Mamdani (2000) maintained that such rights discourse did not work in Europe, for it has led to the proliferation of national minorities. These scholars emphasise the influence of the West in the conceptualisation of African nation-states, Africa’s marginalisation and the effects of structural adjustment as explanatory variables for the African crisis. Multi-partysim cannot by itself address these factors. What is needed then is structural redress. I concur with this conceptualisation and seek to illustrate its relevance through my examination of Zimbabwe.
CHAPTER THREE

3.1. Colonialism and Land Question in Zimbabwe.

The attainment of Independence, in 1980, heralded a new period for Zimbabwe. However, the colonial legacy continues to influence the country’s path to meaningful structural transformation. This is especially so in relation to the resource ownership structure (land). A central question in the current land crisis relates to that of sovereignty, that is, can a sovereign state impose land reform liability on another sovereign state? We can only understand why this question has become important by looking at the nature of the land problem and aid regime that has developed around it. To begin to do so we need to revisit the era of colonial rule in Zimbabwe: delineated by material rape, economic exploitation, political and cultural domination from 1890 to 1980.

Prior to the advent of settler-colonial capitalism, Zimbabwe experienced a far greater social stability underpinned by agricultural prosperity and the entrepreneurial creativity of the Shona and the Ndebele people. The generation of a surplus led to the development of local, regional and long distance trade, which, according to Palmer (1977:14), run from “Portuguese settlements to as far afield as Islamic societies and China”. Both ethnic groups were therefore involved in trade relations where cattle, goats, beads, grain and tobacco were exchanged, especially during periodic droughts. There was thus a distinctive petty commodity mode of production existent by 1890.

The central pillar of the pre-colonial prosperity was a traditional land tenure system, which “vested land rights in a corporate group which had overriding rights over those of the individual,” (Moyana, 1984:13). Land rights were considered inalienable and therefore no member of a group could sell or transfer land to an outsider. It was considered as a natural endowment with no exchange value. In contrast, the colonialist tradition valued individual freehold title. The African form of land tenure, through creating equitable access to land, provided a sense of security for inhabitants (Palmer, 1977; Riddell, 1978). Communal land tenure was disparaged by settlers as a primitive
form of economic and political organisation. This was a convenient pretext to realise their immediate objective of expropriating land. Moyana noted that the African land tenure left no scars and sores among the hearts of the people it served, “because it did not create classes of people who stood dialectically opposed to one another as the colonial capitalist formula did” (Moyana, 1984:13). Colonialism directly contributed to the African socio-economic decline and disrupted their political stability. The question of land ownership became one of the most contentious issues during the era of colonialism and continues to pervade the post-independence period.

The land problem can be traced back to the 1890s when European settlers, financed by Cecil Rhodes, moved north over the Limpopo into the land of the Shona and the Ndebele people. Initially, this movement was spurred by the rumours of mineral wealth on the same scale as the 1886 discoveries on the Rand. These mineral discoveries in the great main reef of the Witwatersrand transformed the history of South Africa, and “its repercussions profoundly affected central Africa, in particular the lands of the Ndebele and the Shona” (Gilbraith, 1974:48). Similarly, Lebert (2003) argued that the gold hanger in South Africa led the mining capital to explore for further rich gold fields. The discovery of the ancient diggings in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland were used as evidence that the gold must be there. Palmer and Birch (1992), noted that these ancient diggings led to the conviction that with modern techniques more wealth could be extracted from the region. The gold rush became the basis for the direct-armed invasion and later to the colonial occupation of the region.

The British South African Company (BSAC) was the private commercial company founded by Cecil Rhodes in 1889, explicitly for the mineral exploitation of the area. According to Bull (1967) and Lebert (2003), initially, the company’s interest was on the rapid discovery of mineral wealth and everything else was of secondary consideration. Rhodes, in cahoots with other imperialists, called for the British Empire’s presence in the region. The idea was to realise their commercial interests under the pretext of an empire. The empire’s response, according to Wilmer (1973) was tepid, thus, inciting a flurry of attacks by the imperialists. Rhodes, however, persisted arguing that continued British supremacy in South Africa could only be guaranteed by the discovery of a second Rand.
The rapidly changing political power dynamics in Southern Africa began to threaten the imperialists position, that is, Transvaal independence, South West Africa as a German protectorate and the Portuguese’s colonialism. According to Kapungu (1974), imperialists threatened that if Britain did not act soon others, such as Afrikaners and Portuguese certainly would threaten the British commercial interests in Southern Africa. The British government acquiesced to the imperialist. They however favoured “trade with informal control” when possible and “trade with rule” when necessary. Consequently, they wanted minimum state intervention and that the merchants pay their own expenses (Loney, 1975:25). Rhodes agreed and secured a charter that gave the BSAC a mandate to administer the region. By 1902 the company “succeeded in expropriating three-quarters of the land for the benefit of the new settlers who numbered approximately five per cent of the population” (De Villiers, 2003:5). In this process Africans were dispossessed of their land.

Article fourteen of the BSAC Charter prescribed that “careful regard shall always be had to the customs and laws of the class or tribe or nation to which the parties respectively belong, especially with respect to the holding, possession, transfer and disposition of lands and goods … and … other rights of property and personal rights …” (cited in Muzorori, 2000:34). Article thirty-five further noted that the British government would “nullify whatever the BSAC officials would have done, should they fail to adhere to each provision of the Royal Charter” (cited in Muzorori, 2000:34). The implication was that the British government had the final say over the way in which the company administered the territory.

3.2. Land dispossession

As previously indicated, Rhodes wanted African lands for mineral exploitation. He did so through consistent swindling of Africans as represented by his interaction with King Lobengula. Petrified by the European scramble for the region and also eager to enforce Ndebele sovereignty, Lobengula entered into an alliance with the Transvaal republic. Ranger (1970) and Samkange (1978) argued that Transvaal promised to assist him in a friendly Grobler treaty of 1887. But the treaty in effect made the
Kingdom a Transvaal dependent ally. The treaty was later used to claiming mining rights in the Matabeleland area. Although the British government recognized the nature of the treaty, they were anxious about the mining rights. Reverend John Moffat was sent to seek a new treaty that would ensure British influence in the region. He was mandated to promise security and assured Lobengula that the “British government has no wish either to obtain possession of his country or to interfere with his sovereign rights” (Odhiambo, 1973:15).

With such assurances, Moffat managed to secure a new treaty, which “committed the king to desist from entering in treaties with any foreign state or power, to sell, alienate or cede any part of his territory without British approval” (Odhiambo, 1973:15). In other words, Lobengula had ceded away his rights to conduct his own foreign policy. C.D. Rudd negotiated with Lobengula to grant the company exclusive mining concession for all metals and minerals situated in his kingdom. Rudd promised that the company would not “bring more than ten white men to work in the country and also would abide by the laws of his country, in fact be King’s people. In exchange, Lobengula was promised rifles, ammunition, armed steamboat and £100 a month”, but the promises were never honoured either by British government or BSAC (Samkange, 1978:33).

Since the concession granted the company only mineral rights, the company decided to invade Mashonaland. The absence of direct British involvement made it difficult for Lobengula to control the settlers, as a result, he gave land concessions to Eduardo Lippert, who without the king’s knowledge immediately sold it to Rhodes. The treaty provided for “the sole and exclusive right, power and privilege for the full term of 100 years to lay out, grant or lease farms, townships, building plots and grazing areas; to impose and levy rents, licences and taxes thereon and to get in, collect and receive the same for his own benefit; to give and grant certificates for the occupation of any farms, townships, building plots and grazing areas” (Palmer, 1977:27). The company now assumed the right to issue land titles to European settlers. These concessions sowed the seeds for future conflicts.
Neil (2003:693) noted that in spite of Lobengula’s protestation and repudiation of these concessions, her majesty’s government went ahead and chartered the company. Given the nature of the African traditional land tenure, it was clear that Lobengula had no right to make such grants. More mystifying is how the British government satisfied itself that Lobengula was the ruler of the whole region. No gold was however found in Mashonaland and the company turned to Matabeleland. Given the military prowess of the Matabele the issue, according to Palmer (1990), was how to gain access to the areas. A quarrel between Lobengula and a minor chief presented an opportunity to invade Matabeleland.

The rise in the political power of the settlers in Rhodesia was evident even prior to the actual occupation of the Matabeleland. They refused to fight for BSAC until given the promised concessions. This resulted in the Victoria agreement that promised everyone taking up arms would be entitled to “a free farm of 3,000 morgen anywhere in Matabeleland, with no obligation to occupy the land. Each man was also granted 15 reef and 5 alluvial gold claims, while the loot (the Ndebele cattle) was to be shared, half going directly to the company and the remaining half divided equally among the officers and men” (Palmer, 1977:29). This was in contravention of the provisions of the Royal charter; that Africans should live free from settler interference.

3.3. Colonial victory and its Political consequences

A large number of settlers descended on Zimbabwe and it was primarily them who carried out the company’s responsibilities (see Lebert, 2003). This according to Loney, created a situation, “where white conflicts with African population were not so much controlled as resolved in favour of the whites, who became plaintiff, police and judge in their constant efforts to make money out of Mashonaland” (Loney, 1975:38). The manner of invasion and occupation of the region had a psychological impact on the settlers. They believed that they had a right to occupation for they won via military defeat. Ranger noted that they were “not eager to listen to advice from London” (Ranger, 1979:464). The British did virtually nothing to stop the settlers from acquiring land and asserting political domination over the Africans.
The Matabeleland Order in Council of 1894 was introduced and this gave the British control over the land. It also led to the creation of early the Native Reserves. The order in essence created a racial solution to the land problem. This became a dominant feature of both the Rhodesian state and the post-colonial state. These Native reserves were created in marginal low yielding areas. They were justified on the basis of preserving indigenous culture. In reality they served as a resourcive of cheap African labour to meet the needs of the growing European mining and farming industries (Williams, 1983; Ranger, 1979). The settlers however frequently contravened the Matabeleland order without any reprimands from Britain. The indigenous people did not meekly accept their fate. They resisted in the 1893 and 1897. However, the ability of the settlers to crush these uprisings deepened their perceptions of racial superiority and entrench their political and economic position.

The lack of discovery of gold shifted the economic focus from mining to agriculture. But according to Riddell (1980), by 1899 settlers had alienated 15,8 million acres of the best lands, yet only a quarter of European farms were operational during this period. “The bulk of settler food requirements were produced by the African peasantry” (Arrighi, 1970:201), but control over the land asserted the settlers into positions of political and economic power. One of the major requirements of both mining and agricultural industries was labour, which Africans were reluctant to provide (Arrighi, 1970; Phimister, 1974). To overcome the labour shortage problem, settlers used forced labour and the hut tax. When these did not work, they often resorted to other methods such as the raiding of kraals. The brutality of this form of colonial rule produced the conflictual race relations, which became the hallmark of the Rhodesian society.

Traditional African socio-economic systems were under threat by the changes taking place. Their was much social discontent during this time for the reordering of the socio-economic system coincided with “natural calamities of 1894, 1895 and 1896, such as drought, locusts and rinderpest, which almost wiped out many of the Shona and the Ndebele cattle” (Beach, 1979:402). This led to the first chimurenga. Ranger (1967) and Chitiyo (2000) maintained that the 1893-1897 uprising (first chimurenga)
was primarily a response against land alienation, social brutalisation and dislocation. The uprising was violent and sustained and represented an attempt by Africans to regain their land and drive the settlers out of the region. But, it was ruthlessly suppressed by the British.

After the war, the British government issued an Order in Council of 1898, instructing the company to set aside more Native reserves. This further institutionalised racialised patterns of land ownership. In essence, the policy of Native reserves implied that Africans had lost control over much of their land. They were then to be settled on the land left over and/or not needed by the settlers. Such was the inequality that by 1920, “96 settlers occupied 54.8 million acres of land” (Palmer, 1977:59). The Native reserve policy led to the creation of two nations within a single country, one black and the other white. Williams (1983) noted that the commonality between the two nations was that the boundaries were normally only crossed by those who come serve the other nation, either as labourers or as traders. Confined to labour reserves, which were far away from the economic infrastructure and the main markets, inhibiting competition, the African peasantry increasingly became proletarianised.

3.4. Settler political power and self-governance.

By the mid 1920s, white agriculture occupied a very vital position in the Rhodesian economy. This was augmented by the acquisition of the political power. According to Loney (1975), the settlers sought to lessen the company’s control over their property and therefore staged a protest against company’s authority. The Privy Council ended the dispute by proclaiming the British government as the legal owner of the land (Africa Report, 2004). Settlers, however, wanted self-governance. This was realised in 1923 when, in a referendum the settlers rejected a proposal for union with South Africa in favour of responsible government (Bull, 1967; Chambati, 1973). The divergencies between international capitalism and local settlerification were beginning to set in. Settlers were no longer interested in merely being a mouthpiece for international capital, but were staking their own interests, using racial supremacy as their buttressing paradigm. The new constitution that was drawn up excluded Africans in the running of the internal affairs of the country. Palmer noted “effective political
power had passed into the hands of the white settlers, for Rhodesian Civil Service and armed forces were responsible to Salisbury and not, as in other colonies, to Britain” (Palmer, 1977:132).

A litany of discriminatory and oppressive laws soon followed suit, for example, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, Natural Resources Act of 1942, Native Land Husbandry Act of 1952, Land Tenure Act of 1969 and others. Racial segregation became the key pillar of all subsequent policies. The Morris Carter Commission Report of 1925, stated that “however desirable it may be that members of the two races should live together side by side with equal rights as regards the holding of land, we are convinced that in practice, probably for generations to come, such a policy is not practicable nor in the best interests of the two races, and that until the native has advanced much further on the paths of civilization, it is better that points of contact between the two races should be reduced” (cited in Bull, 1967:27).

The policy of land segregation was institutionalised via the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which set aside 30% of land as “Tribal Trust Land”. Central to the act was the systematic removal of Africans from high rainfall, fertile and prime farming lands for their reoccupation by white farmers. Settlers, through the limited provision of “native purchase areas”, sought to create a small African bourgeoisie. This project failed because these Africans were offered minimal opportunities and, as Shutt (2000:67) contends, “the purchase areas were maintained as enclaves of modern, civilized farming”. By 1931 the land distribution under the Land Apportionment Act was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Land Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Areas</td>
<td>19,179,174</td>
<td>50,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Reserves</td>
<td>12,600,000</td>
<td>22,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Purchase Areas</td>
<td>7,646,566</td>
<td>7,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Area</td>
<td>590,506</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unassigned Area</td>
<td>17,793,300</td>
<td>18,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined Area</td>
<td>88,540</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>98,686,080</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Palmer, 1977:160-161)
From the above we can clearly see the unequal distribution of land, which enabled the entrenchment of European economic and political dominance, and gave a sense of reality to their belief of racial superiority. Palmer argued, “for the whites in Rhodesia the act has become something of a magna Carta, guaranteeing the preservation of their way of life against encroachment from the black hordes” (Palmer, 1977:178). There was no attempt to use national demographics as a fact in the distribution allocations as there were 1.1 million Africans compared to 50,000 whites. Neither was the quality of soil a factor. This land structure was carried through into the post-independence period (Moyo, 2000). Moyo also noted that of the thirty percent of the arable land held by the Europeans, only three to four percent was utilized. In addition as pressure on land in the reserves increased, the marketable surplus from African agriculture decreased. There was thus an inbuilt ceiling for the potential of African agriculture (Moyo, 1986:169-170).

The Land Apportionment Act was one of the first major discriminatory policy changes by the white settler government. These changes were followed by the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969 (Wilmer, 1973; Elich, 2002). The effects of the skewed land distribution patterns that these acts created and consolidated are still felt decades after decolonisation of the country. It was these forms of inequalities that sparked a national resistance movement commonly referred to as the -second chimurenga.

3.5. African Nationalism and Resistance

Beginning with 1893 Matabele war, African opposition to colonial rule continued to develop and became dominant in the 1950s. The social discontent over the worsening conditions in both urban and rural areas provided the impetus for the emerging African nationalist movement. In the rural areas conservation measures imposed on African areas in the 1950s brought the African peasantry into the fold of the nationalist movements. Arrighi (1970) noted that in the urban areas, industrial development during the war and post-war period was accompanied by a sharp decline in African living standards and these led to political protests. By the 1970s, the second
chimurenga (war of liberation) was in full swing (Loney, 1975). The settler government responded by outlawing the nationalist movements. They turned to Britain for assistance but little was forthcoming. In an attempt to thwart the decolonisation process that was sweeping over Africa, the Rhodesian government declared Unilateral Independence (UDI) in 1965. During the UDI period the nationalist movements began to differ internally on the best strategy to dislodge the white regime from power. This resulted in a split in the National Democratic Party NDP) that was formed in exile during the 1960s. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African Union (ZANU) emerged and conducted an armed struggle. However, it was only in the 1970s that their military presence was felt in Rhodesia.

The role of Britain in Rhodesia is an interesting one for it differed to its conventional approach to decolonisation. In Rhodesia, Britain had to confront a politically and economically dominant significant settler minority who were prepared to fight the decolonisation process. It was this phenomenon, according to Horowitz that led to Rhodesian exceptionalism: Rhodesia became the only colony where the two main themes of the British policy of de-colonisation (disengagement without complications and coming to terms African nationalism) conflicted with one another (Horowitz, 1970:9). The Ian Smith regime had cut ties with Britain and in turn imposed international sanctions. The international sanctions and war of liberation forced the settler government to the Lancaster negotiation table. In 1980, Zimbabweans gained their independence. It was an independence long fought for, and in which land redistribution was a key factor for the mobilisation of the population. At independence about “5000 large- scale commercial farms came to occupied 15.5 million ha out of 33.2 million ha (45 percent) of the entire farm land”(Potts and Mutambirwa, 1997: 557; Kinsey, 2000). Remarkable about the extent of inequality was that the average farm size in the large-scale commercial farm areas was about 3000 ha, while that of communal areas was about 20 ha (Moyo, 1986; Stoneman, 2000; Chaminuka, 2001).

It is also imperative to note that the land was divided into five regions, based on agro-ecological factors, such as rainfall and soil type. Region one, two and three were cropping and livestock production zones. Region four and five were only suitable for livestock farming. In view of this land classification, communal areas were mostly
located in regions four and five. These areas were marked by poor rainfall and high population density. Contrastingly, the LSCF areas were in regions one and two (Weiner, 1988; Moyo, 1995). This skewed pattern of land distribution persisted up until 2001. It is against this historical background that we should understand the context and the genesis of the land problem in Zimbabwe. It is a problem that the post-colonial government has consistently grappled with and failed to resolve.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.1. Transforming Zimbabwe

4.2. Sub-Saharan Africa and development aid

This chapter begins with a synopsis of the socio-economic situation in sub-Saharan Africa, highlighting the role played by the international financial institutions before turning to the specific case of Zimbabwe. It contends that the international financial institutions, through structural adjustment policies, not only underdeveloped sub-Saharan countries, but also stifled their meaningful structural transformation.

As earlier indicated, the African state failure theory perpetuated a view of Africa as a continent that not only required external advice and assistance but also needed to be given direction for its own development. The underlying premise, as noted in Thisday (10 June. 2004), is that “Africans lack capacity to save themselves and must rely upon the kindness of strangers”. Such assumptions continue to pervade the African discourse, for example, they are evident in the ‘State in Africa: the politics of the belly’ by Bayart (1993) and the ‘Criminalization of the state in Africa’ also by Bayart (1999).

Central to Bayart’s thesis is the projection of an archaic African state, marked by progressive processes of social, economic and political disintegration. African politics is projected as an individualised process, an occupation reserved only for predatory ruling elites (read crooks and kleptocrats). Thus, the people are seen as passive victims of elite rule. The African state failure paradigm is ethnocentric and “perpetuates the notion of Africa as a theater of the absurd” (Mustapha, 2002:3). Although this theorisation is interesting, it is unconvincing as the whole African political life has been ignored and summed up into two concepts; rents and predation. Mustapha contends that Bayart et al leave us with a depressing impression that Africa must fulfill its historical trajectory, that is, “it must move inexorably toward embracing the spirit of criminality. The implication and the notion perpetuated by these authors is that politics is the preserve of bandits in Africa” (2002:3).
The foregoing discussion exposes the insidious resilience of colonial structures and thought that continues to hinder the transformation of African polities. The source of this African retrogression is said to be the lack of political legitimacy and good governance in the post-independence period. The state came to be identified by the absence of freedom ethos that the anti-colonial struggle espoused. Instead, the post-colonial state began to resemble colonial rule, that is, it was merely a change in guard (Serequeberhan, 1994). The consequence of remaining within the European colonial model has been the absence of real independence and meaningful structural change within the African polities. Reflecting on the nature of African independence, Fanon (1963) and Cabral (1972) noted that in some countries they only replaced a white man with a black man, but for the people it was the same. Fanon (1963) berated the ruling elite (comprador bourgeoisie) calling it a poor imitation of the metropolitan one. He argued that “for them nationalism quite simply means the transfer into native hands of those unfair advantages which are the legacy of the colonial period” (Fanon, 1963:152).

The problem of the nature of the state created after independence is the crux of the failure of African independence. To the ruling elite, anti-colonialism did not mean opposition to the ideals and principles of Western institutions; on the contrary, it was underpinned by the manifest acceptance of these ideals and principles. The assumption was that “conformity with these ideals indicated a level of achievement that ought to earn the new educated Africans the right to the leadership of their country. As a result, the source of legitimacy for the new African leadership has become alien, because anti-colonialism was against alien colonial personnel, but pro foreign ideals and principles” (Ekeh, 1975:100).

As a result of excessive dependence on the Western ideals and principles, pursued under the auspices of the major Western industrialised countries (read IMF and World Bank), sub-Saharan Africa is now paying a price for having listened to too many ideas. What is clear is that despite the internal dynamics pushing for change and transformation from the current socio-economic and political malaise, there seems to be no positive outcome. This is directly related to the current external structural
relations with the world capitalist system, which has not changed significantly since independence. Mkandawire (1995) conclude that international structural relations with the domestic economy has led to the disappearance of democratic politics and the emergence of authoritarianism due to use of political power for capital accumulation.

The general African development conundrum can be traced directly back to the Third World’s weak economic position in the international system, as evidenced by the oil shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s. African countries economies remain undiversified and therefore strongly reliant on only a few primary commodities for their export earnings (Amin, 1972). Colonial economies were extroverted and their structure still persists; infrastructure was built with the aim of facilitating the export economy not to integrate the internal markets (Amin, 1976). This over-dependency on the international markets, marked by negative terms of trade, accelerated Africa’s socio-economic and political crisis. Despite the external cause of the African development crisis, the provision of aid has been seen as the most appropriate corrective measure by the Western governments. Most of the sub-Saharan countries have been singled out as the most deserving of aid (Spero, 1985; 1990). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have become the major conduits for distribution of development aid from the major industrialized Western countries.

Matlosa (2000) acknowledged foreign aid as one of the critical flows of economic development in the developing countries. With the involvement of IMF and World Bank in the adjustment of African economies, aid has been largely multilateral. This means that the IMF and World Bank pool funds from major industrialized Western countries for distribution to developing countries. Initially, both the IMF and World Bank, including individual donor countries, demanded economic reforms, which entailed changes in the macro-economic frameworks of the recipient countries. But with the end of the cold war good governance, democracy and human rights are also demanded. Olsen (1998) labeled this as the second generation of aid conditionalities or political conditionalities. The structural adjustment programs (SAPs) became the pre-condition for aid. On the political front, SAPs demanded the implementation of Western liberal democracy, underscored by multiparty elections, while on the economic front, it called for the establishment of a free-market system. The economic
The economic recession after the oil crisis of the 1970s severely impacted on African states. They experienced declining net capital flows and went into arrears on their debt service payments. Odhiambo states that this led to the “twin aspects of indebtedness, that is, foreign borrowing and balance of payment deficits” (Odhiambo and Anyang Nyong’o, 1988:27). Oil price increases led to large amounts of foreign earnings being spent on purchasing oil and its related products, thus, creating the balance of payment crisis for the non-oil producing countries (Carvounis, 1986). As a result, developing countries adopted anti-inflationary policies, which caused an unsympathetic shift in the developing country’s terms of trade. According to Ross (1994), unemployment and social welfare concerns in the developed countries provoked domestic opposition to foreign aid expenditure, thus exacerbating the African debt crisis. Exploiting this opposition, the newly elected conservative governments, both in the United States and Britain, maintained that foreign aid had only a limited role to play in the development of Third World countries. This was based on the assumption that economic recovery and development had to be based on the free-market principles and foreign aid would not compete with private efforts.

Accelerating the workings of free-market principles, major Western industrialised countries reduced the amount of aid and also used SAPs as conditions for aid in order to promote private enterprise and investment capital. Since the 1980s, SAPs has been central in the development process of African polities and at the behest of IMF and World Bank, virtually all-African countries have embraced these adjustment programs (Mkandawire and Olukoshi, 1995). The IMF and World Bank were of the view that SAPs would strengthen the country’s capacity to overcome the economic crisis and resume growth and development. On the contrary, both institutions have been infamous for collectively imposing their policies uniformly and regardless of the particular and peculiar circumstances of individual countries. Critics have also pointed to a number of flaws in SAP such as accountability, too much reliance on market and price mechanisms, political costs of adjustment and neglect of the social factors.
(Beckman, 1992; Onimode, 1996). The African experiences tells us that liberalisation measures tend to overlook the fact that market imperfections need to be corrected by state intervention.

4.3. Development aid in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe was also not immune to the debt crisis that unfolded in the post-independence era. The country encountered economic problems from 1980 onwards and Mandaza (1986) maintained that since then, “the international finance capital has been the major factor in the internal and external policies of the state in Zimbabwe” (Mandaza, 1986:53). Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980 via the mediation of Britain and United States (U.S.). From the beginning Zimbabwe’s political and economic landscape was molded by the British and U.S. geopolitical strategists and cemented by the Lancaster House agreement of 1979 (Cobbing, 1989; Bond, 1999). The agreement had three objectives; to control the socialist inclinations of the Zimbabwe African National Union’s (ZANU); to prevent white flight and “to ensure the continued integration of Zimbabwe into the international capitalist system” (Bond, 2003:2). As a result, the Lancaster House agreement entrenched and ensured the perpetuation of colonial racial inequality, especially in terms of resource ownership.

Similarly, Mandaza (1986) noted that the West did not want a major upheaval in the context of Southern Africa. Zimbabwe, with its intent to socialise land and develop anti-Western international political allegiances posed a possible threat. The Lancaster House agreement then became the instrument for muting the ZANU-PF’s agenda. Mamdani (2000) noted that the Lancaster agreement was a political settlement that did not uproot the entire system of exploitation and domination. There would thus be no sweeping nationalisation of the economy and, through the reconciliation policy, a multi-racial and multi-ethnic state was forged.

According to Lehman (1995) and Stoneman (1993), at the time of independence Zimbabwe’s economic performance was more robust than that of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Real growth averaged at about four percent (4%) per annum. It was a relatively diversified and industrialised country. The economic growth and the
euphoria of political independence led to the restructuring of the economy along socialist lines. From the outset, the claims of socialist transformation project were problematic as the Lancaster agreement guaranteed and protected private property, whether in agriculture, commerce or industrial sector. This was despite a hard fought war of liberation, which in fact was all about land and its fair redistribution. Independence had created a dilemma: the need for equity in land ownership in favour of the national economy under the belief that the nationalisation of white farmland would paralyse the agricultural sector (Ross, 1994; Moyo, 1995).

In spite of an impressive economic growth of the early 1980s, Zimbabwe experienced key economic problems. There was a persistently “high budget as saving were directed to paying off government debt. Strict foreign exchange controls reduced private investment, which in turn slowed down the creation of new jobs. The world recession of 1982 and drought exacerbated these problems. External reserves dropped from US$ 13.5 million to US$ 8.6 million in 1982” (Skalnes, 1993:407-408). Government decided on major economic reform. They intended to attract aid in order to bridge the resource and trade gaps. The result was the introduction of IMF sponsored stabilisation program “in mid 1990 as a policy response to the economic crisis facing Zimbabwe in the 1980s” (Chakaodza and Vivekan, 1996:94). This marked Zimbabwe’s dependence on foreign aid.

According to Gibbon (1996:353), the IMF stabilisation program prescribed a “17 percent to 40 percent devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar; cut on government expenditure; removal of subsidies on staple food such as maize and a moratorium on the new recruitment of civil servant”. The government had to cut approximately US$ 200 million from its developmental plan. Satisfied with these conditions, the IMF announced a US$ 735 million loan and the World Bank a loan of US$ 76 million. This money was earmarked for the importation of raw materials for Zimbabwe’s export-manufacturing sector. Although typical of SAP requirements, these measures were not labeled as such. Typical of these financial arrangements, the country soon drowned in debt and became hostage to the international financial institutions. By the end of 1985, “Zimbabwe owed the World Bank US$ 494 million and by then had already spent 30
percent of its export earnings on debt servicing with IMF, World Bank and other financial institutions” (Sibanda, 1989:153).

Notwithstanding government’s concerted efforts in acquiring more loans from Western aid agencies, the economy was on a freefall due to the severe shortage of foreign exchange. To arrest the situation the government suspended profit and dividend remittances to foreign investors between March 1984 and early 1985. This did not sit well with foreign investors forcing the government to devise a strategy. Bond (2003) notes that the plan was devised with the assistance of IMF and World Bank. This did not remove the balance of payment constraints. However, as Sibanda (1989:156) shows, a relationship between the government of Zimbabwe and these institutions was being consolidated. Bernard Chidzero (Minister of finance) was appointed chairman of the IMF and World Bank development committee in April 1987. Steadily, the government moved towards an official SAP (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989). From as early as 1989, the government began relaxing price controls on maize and sugar. Herbst (1990) asserted that further measures to liberalise the economy met with opposition from industrialists that were scared of being pushed out of the market by imports. Trade unionists, too were upset as prices on basic commodities increased. The government nevertheless went ahead with its Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in February 1990.

By adopting a more liberal economic framework, the government of Zimbabwe was totally deviating from its socialist route. According to Gibbon (1992), in the beginning of ESAP, the government continued to play a significant role by trying to direct foreign investment towards development projects determined by itself. Initially, there was no accompanying agreement with the IMF and this can be seen in the differences of ESAP from other SAPs: a five year duration instead of the normal three year, limited reform of parastatal to semi-commercialisation rather than full privatization, as well as the inclusion of compensatory measures for vulnerable social groups (Gibbon, 1996:150). This relative autonomy of policy decision-making was short lived. Donor agencies forced compliance by refusing to release disbursements. Gibbon further notes that this was followed by the intensification of trade liberalisation, removal of subsidies, retrenchment of civil servants and devaluation of the currency. These

Given the above, the transformation project by the government could only but be limited in nature. Government was unable to break the colonially inherited patterns, especially in relation to agriculture. Moyo (1995:35) noted that after a decade of independence there were about “4,500 to 4,600 large-scale commercial farms (LSCFs), corporate and state owned estates averaging 2,400 hectares in size and occupied almost 30 percent of the total land area. The overwhelming majority of African agriculturalists farmed on about 800,000 semi or non-commercial plots in the communal areas, this amounting to 11 percent of the total land area”. The export sector therefore continued to be favoured and the non-exporting food sector neglected (Gibbon, 1995). ESAP guaranteed that the status quo in relation to land would prevail. Thus, in a country in which land redistribution was a key economic policy of the liberation movement, “42 percent of the country remained in the ownership of about 6,000 white commercial farmers” (Cusworth, 1992:89). Most of these farmers had “fought tooth and nail to prevent Rhodesia becoming Zimbabwe” (Palmer, 1990:16). More than four million Africans occupied another 42 percent and the remainder was allocated as game reserves and forest areas.

In 1989 Mugabe began to reiterate the need to correct the imbalances in land (Moyo, 1996). Just after independence, the government had created marketing depots and extension services for rural areas in a bid to enhance the marketing of the food production from the communal areas. As a result, according to Gibbon (1996), “between 1988 and 1990 peasant farmers in the communal areas were producing roughly half of Zimbabwe’s marketed maize, the majority of its marketed cotton and a vital share of certain other commercial crops” (Gibbon, 1996:365). Through these measures, communal farmers were able to fill the vacuum left by LSCFs, in favour of tobacco (which was grown almost exclusively by LSCF), horticulture and game farming. The IMF and World Bank were particularly concerned about the losses incurred by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). The World Bank argued that from
1986 to 1990, GMB accounted for Z$ 740 million of the total losses of Z$ 1836 million by the major public enterprises (cited in Gibbon, 1996). They therefore began to demand cuts in the delivery of service of the GMB. The World Bank thought it more prudent to concentrate on the LSCF sector than to rely on peasants for food security (Moyo, 2000). ESAP therefore perpetuated the dualistic development strategy and patterns of resource ownership.

**4.4. Attempts at land reform.**

The approach to land reform during the national liberation period was a revolutionary one. It encouraged illegal land occupation by peasants and promised no compensation to landowners in the belief that the land rightfully belonged to the indigenous. However, in post-colonial period, in conformity with the provisions of the Lancaster house agreement (the protection of private property in particular) the ruling party’s approach became more conservative. It began to pursue land resettlement based on the market approach, that is “willing-seller-willing-buyer principle” (Moyo, 1986; 1995; 20003). Little change resulted, leaving the agrarian power structures in tact.

The government, believing that the British would, as agreed upon at Lancaster, fund half the costs of the land resettlement programme implemented in four resettlement schemes (A, B, C, D).

1. Scheme ‘A’: each family would receive five to six hectares of land, more for those in the drier regions. Government would provide infrastructural support and services to them. According to Potts and Mutambira (1997:551), “over 90 percent of those resettled during the first ten years of independence, belonged to model ‘A’ scheme”.

2. Scheme ‘B’: sought to establish commercial farms on a cooperative and mechanised, largely using the abandoned farms.

3. Scheme ‘C’: provided plots of about ten hectares to individuals. These largely, encircled a core estate owned by the state. According to Moyo (1995), only few of these were tried out.

4. Scheme ‘D’: intended to provide ranching for use by peasantry in communal areas. Palmer (1990) noted that the land allocations on model ‘D’ have been
very generous as they were modeled on commercial farms, limiting the number of people who could benefit from them.

Noticeable about the resettlement programme was the poor quality of land acquired for redistribution by the government, limited state support and slow pace of resettlement. This can partly be attributed to the Lancaster House agreement, for its provisions led to a speculative pricing of land, increasing costs of marginal lands for redistribution. Cliffe (1988) is of the view that the 1980 policy of reconciliation and the desire to prevent white flight seemed to have been important factors to the new government and hence the slow pace of land redistribution. Neil (2003:697) notes that the government had to revise its original intention of acquiring “8.3 million ha of land on which to resettle 162,000 families. By 1989 it acquired only 2.6 million ha and resettled 52,000 families”. Criticising the land reform project, the British government argued that the land reform figure was impracticable and unrealistic: it meant resettling 20 percent of all peasants in the nation (Neil, 2003). This may have been the case but given recent events, the need for land remains high in Zimbabwe.

4.5. The anomaly of land reform.

The Zimbabwean government certainly attempted to change the patterns of land ownership after independence. They were however severely curtailed in what they could do. White farmers held onto their prime fertile farmlands and were only prepared to sell the most marginal parts at exhorbitant costs. The Lancaster House Agreement tied government’s hands. Indicative of government frustrations, president Mugabe noted “we had wanted to resettle 162,000 families within three years. It just proved to be impossible, because it was beyond, completely beyond our management and our resources … and even if we had the resources, we just do not have the capacity to do it” (cited in De Villiers, 2003:12). The market oriented land acquisition therefore failed to deliver the required quantity and quality of land needed by the government.

Moreover, Britain began to refuse to adhere to the initial agreement of paying half the costs of the purchase of land. Palmer (1990) notes that the agreement came to nothing
as Britain accused the government of embezzling funds. Also, the international donors did not contribute to the actual purchase of land, only to the resettlement of people. According to Bratton (1990), this was in contrast to the Kenyan land reform process where more than 95 percent of the financing for the actual land acquisition came from foreign sources. Moyo (1986), discussing discourses of development noted that in the 80s, it became fashionable to talk about rural development and as a result, “technical questions of a multi-disciplinary, positivistic scientific nature, far removed from the initial political issues around the land question … have came to the fore” (Moyo, 1986:172). He argues that the main argument has been merely to integrate CAs into the mainstream agricultural sector without significant changes in structural power relations. This is usually justified by a “land use or efficiency argument, riddled with biasness towards the LSCF” (Moyo, 2000:79). Instead, Moyo showed how much of the land owned by the LSCF was not used and could therefore be transferred to the peasantry without affecting the overall aggregate production.

The Lancaster House agreement came to an end in 1990. Government now sought to remove restrictions on land acquisition and compensation within law (Moyo, 2000; Neil, 2003). It adopted the Land Acquisition Act in 1992. This act laid out the mechanisms for land acquisition and also empowered the government to repossess land. It gave the government “the right of first refusal on all land sales, [and] … allowed government to acquire derelict lands without compensation. The government was now only obliged to pay compensation in local currency and could compulsory acquire for public good, not only underutilized lands, but also used land” (Moyo, 1995:244-45). The act also allowed the government to determine a fixed amount of compensation of land acquisition and the “disputes over compensation could only be settled through appeals to an administrative court” (Palmer and Birch, 1992:25). However, the court could not rule against the government on grounds that compensation was unfair. Central to the act was the need to increase supervision and regulation of land use, reduction of foreign and absentee landownership and reduction of multiple farm ownerships.

It was also expected that the land act would increase black farmer’s access to prime farmlands. The act was clearly meant to resolve the land ownership imbalances once
and for all. The government set a target of five million hectares of land to be acquired for resettlement. Moyo (2003:66) argued that the government compulsory acquisitions were attempted on 130 farms, “with further 1 471 farms targeted by the end of 1997”. These measures spiraled Zimbabwe into the governance crisis it now faces. After 2000, the international community became pre-occupied with changing the regime in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has been subjected to a number of sanctions and negative publicity because it has chosen to exercise its sovereign right to enact a policy of land reform.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.1. Conclusion

All states have to practice good governance and democracy. This is not what is being questioned in the thesis. However, these concepts are open to multiple interpretations. What is good governance for one, is not necessary so for another. The form of good governance and democratisation, ties as it was to aid, this thesis argued, tended to limit transformation. Aid has given donor agencies the ability to influence key policies of recipient governments. In the process it has curtailed national independence in the policy decision-making process. It has especially eroded the state’s ability to introduce transformative national policies. The implementation of ESAP in 1991 reversed limited attempts made by ZANU-PF to transform Zimbabwe. This thesis has shown that the adoption of ESAP, under pressure from the IMF, World Bank and Western donors, was implemented in a society whose resource ownership structure was still frozen in a colonial period. The opportunities created by liberalisation of the economy merely served to perpetuate the racially skewed resource ownership structure in the country.

The current tensions that pervade the land question in Zimbabwe prove that aid dependency correlates with the degree of external influences on the domestic policy decision-making. The land issue in Zimbabwe illustrates who decides and defines what good governance and democracy is and who controls such processes. It also clearly demonstrates the impact of externally determined processes of social change. For example, when the government of Zimbabwe embarked on a policy of compulsory land acquisition in 1997 in order to effect land redistribution, this invited threats and sanctions by donor agencies and Western governments. Hence, the country has been portrayed as a nation descending into anarchy and chaos, with the land question being downplayed by the demands for good governance and democracy (Hendricks and Mandala, 2002). In spite of its dynamics, the case of Zimbabwe shows how policies pursued by donor agencies and major Western industrialised countries could limit socio-economic and political development of Third World societies. Echoing Adejumobi, this thesis has shown how SAPs can actually undermine good governance
and democracy: “SAP confounds the logic of good governance and democracy in Africa” (Adejumobi, 1996:37).
5.2. References


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