

**A CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION OF THE TEACHING AND  
ASSESSMENT OF VALUES WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN  
OUTCOMES-BASED CURRICULUM**

**INEZ DENISE SOLOMONS**



**A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor Philosophiae in the Faculty of Education, University of the  
Western Cape.**

**Supervisor: Professor L. Green**

**June 2009**

# **A CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION OF THE TEACHING AND ASSESSMENT OF VALUES WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN OUTCOMES-BASED CURRICULUM**

## **KEYWORDS**

Values

Values education

Values knowledge

Policies

Integration

Teaching

Outcomes based education

Competence

Assessment

Measurement



## **ABSTRACT**

### **A conceptual exploration of the teaching and assessment of values within the South African Outcomes-based Curriculum**

**Inez Denise Solomons**

**Faculty of Education, University of the Western Cape**

Both international and local authors argue strongly that state education systems have an important role to play in the development and nurturing of positive values and attitudes in learners. In some instances, as is the case in South Africa, the education system may even prescribe the values that ought to be taught in the institutions of learning. While I agree that education institutions have a responsibility to teach positive values to learners, it is my contention that it is unlikely that educators will be able to fulfil this role in any meaningful way, without an informed understanding of how to reconcile the tensions between personal and common values, the nature of values knowledge and the complexities and challenges that surround the teaching and assessment of values.

This study begins to explore some of these complexities by addressing the historical events, education initiatives and policy decisions that have informed and shaped values education policies in South Africa. I conclude that while the inclusion of values in the curriculum is a commendable education initiative to root democratic values in society, it must be acknowledged that values education inevitably, has a political role to fulfil.

The teaching of values knowledge cannot be limited to behaviourist approaches. Learners deserve an education that offers opportunities to them to develop into responsible, caring and morally just citizens. A central aim of values education should thus be to provide learners with opportunities and tools to construct meaning around moral concepts and positive values. I strongly believe that it is unlikely that this will occur if educators are not appropriately capacitated to provide such opportunities to their learners.

I explore the concepts of assessment and measurement based on the distinctions of Mouton (1996) and Kaplan (1964) and conclude that the assessment of values (the collecting of evidence of learning) needs to be distinguished from the notion of measurement or quantification. Based on Ryle's (1971) framework I argue that while particular conceptions of the assessment of values knowledge may be accommodated within the framework of Outcomes-based education, the notion of the measurement of values knowledge is extremely problematic and therefore it is not considered as a priority for education in other countries. My contention is that the epistemological and pedagogical implications and challenges embedded in values education, within the framework of Outcomes-based education, were perhaps not fully explored and considered during the curriculum development process and that values education is more complex than was initially thought.

**June 2009**



## DECLARATION

I declare that *A conceptual exploration of the teaching and assessment of values within the South African outcomes-based curriculum* is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Inez Denise Solomons

Signed: ..... June 2009



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All Glory and Honour belong to God.

I wish to thank the following persons:

Professor Lena Green, my supervisor, for her guidance, encouragement, compassion and expertise. I acknowledge that I have indeed been privileged to experience the excellence of her supervision.

Professor Aslam Fataar and Professor Sandy Lazarus for their valuable insights

Professor Juliana Smith for support when I needed it

My sons Heinrich and Herschel for believing in me

The NPDE educators for their much valued assistance in this study

Ms Rosalie Small for providing me with the opportunities to lecture on the assessment modules

My family for support and encouragement

Mr A. Fortuin for friendship, support and interest during difficult times

My colleagues Estelle, Nadeen, Eghsaan, Lucinda, Laura, Vanessa, Kim, Charlton and Peter for their support

My prayer partners Tiny and Christine for long periods of prayer and intercession.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Key words	i
Abstract	ii
Declaration	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Table of contents	v

### CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1	Introduction to the study	1
1.2	Motivation for the study	1
1.3	Research aim	6
1.4	The research question	7
1.5	Theoretical frameworks	8
1.6	Research methodology	8
1.7	Data verification	9
1.8	Significance of the study	10
1.9	Outline of the chapters in the study	10
1.10	Key terms	14



### CHAPTER TWO: THE CONTEXT OF VALUES EDUCATION POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA

2.1	Introduction	15
2.2	The socio-political and educational context pre-1994	15
2.3	The socio-political and educational context post-1994	18

2.4	The influence of the moral regeneration movement on values education	20
2.5.	Values education policy initiatives	24
2.6	South Africa's curriculum context	31
2.6.1	Historical process and curriculum aims	31
2.6.2	Teaching and learning principles	34
2.7	Assessment principles	36
2.8	An integrated approach to education and training	40
2.9	Conclusion	44

**CHAPTER THREE: VALUES EDUCATION UNPACKED: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE**

3.1	Introduction	47
3.2	Conceptual analysis	47
3.2.1	Values education terminology	48
3.2.2	Values and virtues	49
3.2.3	Values and moral education	54
3.2.4	Values and citizenship education	58
3.3	Expectations of values education	60
3.4	The nature of values knowledge	61
3.5	Value priorities in education	66
3.5.1	International debate on values priorities	66
3.5.2	The local debate on values education	74
3.6	Conclusion	75



## **CHAPTER FOUR: THE TEACHING OF VALUES**

4.1	Introduction	77
4.2	Approaches to the teaching of values	78
4.2.1	Behaviourist approaches	78
4.2.2	Kohlberg's stage theory	80
4.2.3	Insights drawn from Vygotsky's theory	84
4.2.4	Insights from authoritarian approaches	86
4.3	Strategies for teaching values	88
4.4	Research evidence	90
4.5	The curriculum and the teaching of values	92
4.5.1	Implications of curriculum principles	92
4.5.2	Specific curriculum guidelines	94
4.6	The professional judgement of educators in the teaching of values	98
4.7	Conclusion	100

## **CHAPTER FIVE: THE ASSESSMENT OF VALUES**

5.1	Introduction	103
5.2	The desirability of assessing of values	103
5.3	The assessment of values in schools	109
5.3.1	The concept of assessment	109
5.3.2	International practices regarding the teaching and assessment of values	112
5.4	The assessment of values in the curriculum	115
5.4.1	General assessment principles	115

5.4.2	Integration	115
5.4.3	Criterion referenced assessment	118
5.4.4	Demonstrable competence and its implications for the assessment of values	121
5.4.5	Evidence of competence	123
5.4.6	Assessment as a teaching tool	126
5.5	Curriculum guidelines for the assessment of values	128
5.6	Educator's professional judgement in the assessment of values	132
5.7	Conclusion	134

## **CHAPTER SIX: METHODOLOGY OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY**

6.1	Introduction	136
6.2	Research paradigm	137
6.3	Qualitative research	139
6.4	Case study research	144
6.5	Selection of participants	147
6.6	Data collection	147
6.6.1	Documents	147
6.6.2	Questionnaires	150
6.6.3	Interviews	151
6.6.4	Field notes	152
6.7	Data analysis	152
6.7.1	Overview of data analysis process	152
6.7.2	Analysis of documents	153
6.7.3	Analysis of questionnaire data	154



6.7.4	Analysis of interview data	155
6.7.5	Analysis of field notes	155
6.8	Data verification	155
6.9	Ethics	157

## **CHAPTER SEVEN: THE CASE STUDY**

7.1	Introduction	160
7.2	Setting the scene	160
7.3	The teaching of values	162
7.3.1	Learning area preferences	162
7.3.2	Outcomes, topics and learning tasks in LO lessons	164
7.3.3	Values education priorities	169
7.3.4	Values education practices	176
7.3.5	Recommended sources of support	179
7.4	Educators' concerns	185
7.5	The assessment of values	186
7.6	National codes and the assessment of values	194
7.7	Conclusion	199

## **CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

8.1	Introduction	202
8.2	How have policy decisions shaped the teaching and assessment of values in South Africa?	202

8.3	What conceptual understanding of values and values education can fruitfully guide policy in respect of the teaching and assessment of values?	205
8.4	What theories of learning can appropriately be applied to the teaching and assessment of values?	208
8.5	What can perspectives of local educators contribute to a conceptual analysis of the teaching and assessment of values?	213
8.6	Recommendations that might enhance the teaching and assessment of values in local schools	215
8.7	Reviewing the research process	216
8.7.1	Limitations of this study	216
8.8	Proposals for future research	217
8.9	Conclusion	218
<b>REFERENCES</b>		219
<b>APPENDICES</b>		
A	Questionnaire	251
B	Moral dilemma lesson	252
C	Interview questions	254



# **A CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION OF THE TEACHING AND ASSESSMENT OF VALUES WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN OUTCOMES-BASED CURRICULUM**

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY**

In this chapter I provide the motivation for the study and explain its aims. I outline its general and specific concerns about values education and explain the theoretical and empirical questions that I explore. This is followed by a brief outline of the theoretical frameworks and research approaches that I have drawn upon. I explain briefly the significance of this study, and finally, give an overview of what each chapter contains and provide interpretations of some key terms.

### **1.2 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY**

Morrow (1989: 174) in the late eighties identified a lack of moral discourse as one reason for the moral malaise that had become endemic to society in the past and maintained that:

... because of its use for betrayal moral discourse has become degenerate in our society. The legacy of a morally degenerate society is that moral discourse ceases to have credibility in public debate and it fails to gain a purchase on the decisions which people make.

Since then the political context and social landscape of South African society have changed in fundamental ways, but it appears that changes in the socio-political context have not provided the desired solutions to the moral challenges that society encountered in the past.

In the recent past increasing societal concern and outrage about the perceived moral degeneration of civil society generally and particularly in schools has revived the moral discourse among scholars in South Africa. Kallaway (Mail & Guardian, 18 November 2007: 8) for instance, under the heading “The profound crisis of teaching” remarks

The majority of public schools in our country can be regarded as sites of moral panic that highlight criminality, vandalism, bullying and violence, as well as “drop out” and academic failure.

He blames this state of affairs on the government’s unstructured and unplanned progressive education. Fataar (2002), Jansen and Christie (1999), and Jonathan (2001) have also offered explanations for the perceived moral decline in South African schools and society which generally include amongst others, the history of apartheid, the collapse of a culture of teaching and learning, the development of a culture of corruption and serious misconceptions about democracy and human rights. As a result South African society, not unlike many other societies in the world, presently, as it did in the past, continues to face complex moral challenges.

In South Africa values education policies have been included in the National Curriculum and it is anticipated that education will help “to heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights” (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996). This kind of healing refers to forgiveness, empathy, caring, respect, tolerance and compassion. In short, it refers to transforming the consciousness and mindsets of people. These were the expectations that values education were required to meet.

The media constantly reports on human rights abuses and actions informed by prejudice, disrespect and racial intolerance. This kind of news confirms that there is indeed a problem of decay in morals of society. Incidences of undisciplined behaviour, racial intolerance, crime, violence, gangsterism and

drug abuse, especially the notorious drug “TIK” on the Cape Flats, continue to plague schools and regularly make headlines in the media. This has resulted in a fast growing perception among civil society that education is not producing the expected results. In this article Kallaway claims that educators are expected to bear the brunt for the non-delivery of a quality mass education system that was promised to all.

It would of course be unrealistic to expect that education can on its own deliver the desired moral changes in society as values education is not only about what happens at schools. This responsibility is a shared family, educational, political, economic and social responsibility. Vygotsky (1978) explains that a child’s potential for any form of learning is revealed and often realized in interactions with more knowledgeable others; educators, peers, siblings, parents and other members of his society. Rorty (1990) and Peters (1966) as well as various other scholars, share the view that schools have some responsibility for the moral development of learners. Educators in South Africa accept this responsibility to teach values, but, unlike the situation in many other countries, the assessment of values is also prescribed by the Outcomes-based (OBE) curriculum of South Africa (A Teacher’s Guide for the Development of Learning Programmes Policy Guidelines Life Orientation DoE, 2003).

The Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (2001) was an initiative that paved the way for the explicit inclusion of common values in the national curriculum. But given the history of apartheid and the competing values philosophies of the Liberation Movements, several critics at the Saamtrek: Values, Education and Democracy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (2001) remained sceptical about the potential of values education to effect social transformation and so the inclusion of common social values in the curriculum did not receive overwhelming support. Discussions about the inclusion of values in the curriculum in South Africa have therefore been vigorous and highly contested (Jansen & Christie, 1999). The literature

indicates that this is also the situation internationally as not all countries are in favour of the teaching and assessment of values in schools. For, while the intentions of these policies are laudable, many critics believed that the prescription and inclusion of common values in the national curriculum of South Africa would present particular challenges to educators for a number of diverse reasons (Saamtrek: Values, Education and Democracy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, 2001). These reasons can be summarised as follows:

- Generally, the assumption that values can be taught and assessed is contentious and widely debated both internationally and locally.
- Because of its perceived history of betrayal and indoctrination in the past, values education is viewed with suspicion not only by some parents and educators generally, but particularly by previously marginalised sectors of civil society.
- In addition, values education is regarded by some critics as attempts at social engineering so there is uncertainty and scepticism among many educators about the potential of values education (given the internalization of the discriminatory values espoused by apartheid by large sections of society) to transform society.

A course on Assessment in Outcomes-Based Education (OBE) in 2002 that I presented to in-service educators, who had registered for a National Professional Diploma in Education, provided me with the opportunity to observe how educators conceptualised and engaged with the teaching and assessment of values within the Outcomes-based curriculum in their classrooms. On completion of the course, the message that the course evaluation forms conveyed was alarming as 73% of the educators indicated that they were still uncertain about the teaching and assessment of values. This result was not what I expected. It was disappointing and I naturally started thinking about what to do about this.

Subsequently, having listened to the complaints of many educators and student teachers, different perspectives on talk shows on the radio and points of view presented in debates and opinion polls in the media, about “the lack of values and discipline” in schools, I found myself constantly contemplating how South African policies on values education had come about; which events had influenced and shaped these policies, and what would be the best way to understand and engage with values education, values, values acquisition and the assessment of values within the Outcomes-based curriculum and the constraints of practice. It was in this context that this thesis was birthed.

Since its introduction in 1994, the OBE curriculum has been revised and renamed and a number of changes were recommended by The Review Committee of C2005 (DoE, 2000.) These included: the removal of technical jargon, the reduction of the design features from eight to three, the alignment of assessment with the curriculum as new insights and perspectives were developed by The Review Committee of C2005 (DoE, 2000). (I discuss these changes and their implications in subsequent chapters.) So it was assumed that the assessment practices of the curriculum generally had been streamlined, clarified and demystified. But the exclusion of design features, a simplified language, or aligning curriculum and assessment, did not fundamentally change the philosophy or the principles of OBE. For example, the fundamental assumption that values could be assessed and measured within the framework of the assessment model of the OBE curriculum had remained unchanged (The Review Committee of C2005 (DoE, 2000).

In 2004 I presented the module on Assessment in Outcomes-based Education for the second time to a group of educators who had registered for the National Professional Diploma in Education. I was hopeful that with the new recommendations of the curriculum an evaluation of the course would yield better results and that I would not have the same cause for alarm as before. The teaching facilities at the site were any lecturer’s dream; spacious lecture

rooms, ample space to do group work, a group of experienced educators (students) who were eager to share their years of experience and views, overhead projectors that actually worked and duplicating facilities for all. This really inspired me and I looked forward to an exciting and rewarding experience with this group. This was an opportunity to explore the practices on the ground perspective, which is one perspective of this study, on how educators currently conceptualised and addressed values education within OBE in their classrooms and it enabled me to add the perspective of a community of educators to the collection of perspectives I planned to explore.

### **1.3 RESEARCH AIM**

The overall aim of this study was to explore the teaching and assessment of values within the Outcomes Based curriculum of South Africa from different disciplinary and epistemological perspectives. My research was guided by two fundamental ideas from Mouton (1996), firstly, that the world of social science is only one of numerous worlds that we inhabit; secondly that scientific research in whatever paradigm it is presented, is a multi-dimensional activity that is driven by the ideal of the search for truth.

Howard (1991:188) notes that: “Scholars are encouraged to approach any problem of human understanding from a range of epistemological perspectives.” Following Howard, this study was conducted from a multi-disciplinary theoretical orientation, based on the awareness that education, like other disciplines, not only draws upon different disciplines to inform its practice and expand its knowledge base, but is shaped by many factors. Knowledge comes in different forms and formats and this study not only drew on different disciplinary perspectives, but also sought insights from the context of policy development and implementation in one particular setting. This study adopts a hermeneutic approach and is an attempt to explore and interpret the teaching, and assessment of values in South Africa’s OBE curriculum in terms of Gadamer’s (1977) notion of “the fusion of horizons.”

A horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point, (Mueller-Vollmer 1986). I believe that fusion of horizons offers the possibility of seeing the same phenomenon through different lenses. The benefits of this approach is firstly, that it extends the horizon and secondly that an extended horizon can have a fundamentally formative effect on situations, processes, systems or education models as it represents a drawing together of different ways of knowing. This study explores the topic from a different horizon in turn, philosophical, psychological, pedagogical, conceptual and empirical in order to ultimately draw together these different perspectives on the teaching and assessment of values within the South African Outcomes-based curriculum.

An important outcome of this study is to make it possible for readers to construct, shift or fuse their own horizons in the light of the different perspectives offered.

#### **1.4 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Approaching this topic from different perspectives indicates that there are different research questions, each drawing on different knowledge sources:

- How have education policy- decisions shaped the teaching and assessment of values in South African schools?
- What conceptual understanding of values and values education can best guide policy regarding the teaching and assessment of values?
- What theories of learning can appropriately be applied to the teaching and assessment of values?
- What can the perspectives of local educators contribute to a conceptual analysis of the teaching and assessment of values?

## **1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS**

This study engages with the discipline of philosophy of education regarding the nature of knowledge and different ways of knowing, based on the theoretical frameworks and analytical tools proposed by Ryle (1971), which was refined and extended by Mason (1997) and Barnette (1994). It draws on insights and theories from psychology regarding how learning occurs as advanced by the theories of Piaget (1965); Skinner (1971); Vygotsky (1978) and Kohlberg (1963, 1968, 1981) The study further draws on theories and concepts presented by Dewey (1964); Rorty (1990a) Peters (1966, 1973) and Bernstein (1971) whose views provide clarity on the teaching of values and the concept of curriculum. It draws on insights about compassionate citizenship presented by Waghid (2004) and the distinctions made by Mouton (1996) and Kaplan (1964) between the assessment and measurement of values. Finally it draws on insights for the teaching and assessment of values presented in official documents of the National Department of Education (DoE), the Northern Cape Education Department (NCED) and the Western Cape Education Department (WCED).

## **1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

A concept is a particular type of word that plays a key role in formal processes of knowledge acquisition, formation and transfer and may be broadly contrasted with everyday or ordinary language use (Du Toit cited in de Vos, Strydom, Fouche & Delpont 2005:424).

In all instances of research, certain concepts are embedded in and constitute the field of research. My background is in philosophy and I have used conceptual analysis as a research tool to explore the meaning of concepts such as values, values education, assessment and measurement of values.

Part of the research takes the form of a case study which enabled me to move “inside classrooms.” Silverman (1997:1) points out that in qualitative

research there is a “commitment to a dialogue between social science and the community based on recognition of their different starting points.” The case study captures this dialogue and presents the starting points, voices, opinions and practices of a particular group of educators in a specific context and does not claim to be representative of or generalisable to other settings. It provides their practices on the ground perspective on the issues and challenges related to values education. Furthermore it highlights and illuminates unexamined aspects of the teaching and assessment of values in an OBE curriculum that might have been overlooked.

The study incorporates a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies as this seemed to be the sensible approach for an interdisciplinary exploration of the topic and the kinds of data that different perspectives and epistemologies could generate. Yin (1994) and Stake (1994, 1995), hold that these methodologies can be judiciously used in conjunction with each other, as they can complement each other. While most of the data were collected through qualitative research methodologies such as personal interviews and group discussions, questionnaires and rating scales were used to obtain numerical data. The case study data are interpreted and presented to provide one of many possible descriptive portraits of how educators presently address the teaching and assessment of values in their classrooms.

## **1.7 DATA VERIFICATION**

Babbie (2001) describes triangulation in qualitative research as the convergence of multiple perspectives that can provide greater confidence that what is being targeted is accurately captured. In this way the reliability and validity of research findings can be ensured. In this study a number of data sources have been used (interviews, documents, observation, field notes, questionnaires, and educator tasks) to ensure the capturing of valid and reliable data. While these different sources of data do triangulate in some respects, it also highlights points of divergence.

## **1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

- It explores an important concern in contemporary education debates, both internationally as well as locally, that has not been satisfactorily resolved and remains contested.
- The topic of this research is believed to be of important educational and social value at this time in South Africa, when answers are being sought on how to restore positive discipline in schools and to improve and restore the morality of society in general.
- It is of practical significance as it draws together insights from different perspectives and sources of data which policy makers and curriculum designers need to consider.
- It opens up the possibility for further debate between academics, curriculum theorists, educators and the general public.

## **1.9 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS IN THE STUDY**

### **CHAPTER ONE**

#### **INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY**

This is an introductory chapter that describes the motivation for the study, provides the aims of the study and outlines the methodology and research frameworks that will guide it. In addition it gives an overview of the structure of the text and lists the meanings of key terms used in this study.


## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **THE CONTEXT OF VALUES EDUCATION POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA**

In Chapter Two I present a historical narrative of the broad socio-historical context of values education policy and education initiatives that have influenced and shaped values education policy in South Africa. I provide an account of South Africa's curriculum context to orientate readers who may not be familiar with the historical processes and the debates surrounding the introduction of Outcomes-based education in South Africa.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **VALUES EDUCATION UNPACKED: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE**



In Chapter Three I explore the concepts “values education” and “values” as these appear in the literature from a philosophical perspective. I unpack the international and local debates about the meaning of values education, the distinction between values and virtues, the relationship between values and moral education and then turn to an exploration of the relationship between values and citizenship education and the values that should be prioritised in education.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **THE TEACHING OF VALUES**

In Chapter Four I review theories on learning and moral learning to explore the insights and guidelines to be drawn from these that could inform the teaching of values both internationally and locally. I focus on the teaching of

values generally but in particular on the Foundation Phase as an illustrative example. My rationale for this focus is that the literature indicates that it is during this Foundation Phase, that the foundations of values education ought to be laid as it is during this phase that learners tend to be most receptive to influences of values.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **THE ASSESSMENT OF VALUES**

The central aim of Chapter Five is to present different perspectives on the assessment of values. I explore different perspectives on the assessment of values internationally and then contrast these with the perspectives on assessment put forward in the curriculum and the implications of this for the assessment of values education in South Africa.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **METHODOLOGY OF THE EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY**

In Chapter Six I provide the research methodology of the empirical study. The research takes the form of a case study which incorporates a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies as this seemed to be the sensible approach for an inter-disciplinary exploration of the topic and the different kinds of data that it could generate. While most of the data were collected through qualitative research methodologies such as personal interviews and group discussions, questionnaires were used to obtain numerical data.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **THE CASE STUDY**

In Chapter Seven I present the findings of a case study of a group of educators that are presently engaging with the curriculum in terms of values education. The findings present one of many possible portraits of how educators currently address the teaching and assessment of values in their classrooms. The case study perspective complements and illuminates the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the study.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Finally in Chapter Eight, I provide insights that have emerged in response to the research questions that framed this study. These insights are integrated with the case study data and different perspectives on the teaching and assessment of values are drawn together. I offer some recommendations that might enhance the teaching and assessment of values in local schools.

## 1.10 KEY TERMS

Outcomes-based education

- Education policies and curriculum based on outcomes.

Curriculum 2005;

- The curriculum that was developed within the framework of outcomes-based education

The Revised Curriculum Statement;

- The revision of Curriculum 2005

The National Curriculum Statement;

- The curriculum that emerged from the review of Curriculum 2005

The curriculum;

- In this study the curriculum refers to the National Curriculum Statement which is the formal curriculum that currently operates in South African schools.

Assessment;

- The collection of information as evidence of learning in schools

Measurement;

- The quantification of evidence of learning in schools

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THE CONTEXT OF VALUES EDUCATION POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA**

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter I present a historical account of the broad socio-historical contexts and initiatives that have informed and shaped values education policy in South Africa. I believe this to be important as it explains the rationale for the inclusion of values education and the assumptions and expectations about the teaching, assessment and measurement of values that are embedded in the curriculum of South Africa.

#### **2.2 THE SOCIO-POLITICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT PRE-1994**

Perceptions and meanings of values in societies have evolved and been refined throughout history. This tendency is reflected by changing policies on values education. For example Veugelers (2003) holds that during the sixties the main emphasis of values in the educational system in the Netherlands was conformity and adaptation to society. Wringe (1998) suggests that in the 1970s values education was legitimized in terms of hierarchical power, tradition and religious belief. Ryan (1989) concurs with this view and suggests that values education in America, during this period was characterised by authoritarianism.

Similarly in South Africa perceptions about values have also been influenced by events of history. It is not my intention to provide a detailed account of all events, but merely to provide a brief sketch of some events that are generally considered to have been instrumental in shaping perceptions for the inclusion

of values education in the curriculum. Kallaway (1990) has pointed out that the issue of education under apartheid has provided one of the most fascinating anomalies in modern education history. For those schooled under apartheid, who were educators in state schools, who marched and supported the struggle for liberation from the seemingly endless cycle of resistance, it was often difficult to imagine a world without injustices and the restrictions that apartheid education wrought.

The ideological underpinning of the system of Apartheid was the notion of separate development of races (Christie, 1986). Consequently, not all state schools followed a common national curriculum. Nineteen different educational departments were established for different races in the 1960s and 70s. Racial stereotyping was promoted both explicitly through the formal curriculum and implicitly through what is referred to as the “hidden” curriculum by Christie (1986) and others. These mechanisms in line with the separatist ideologies of the time reinforced perceptions about differences: the inferiority and superiority of races and sexes.

Buckland (1982) and Christie (1986) maintain that an understanding of the hidden curriculum is crucial for an understanding of how specific values were implicitly transferred through education in pre-transition South Africa. Buckland claims that to ignore the hidden curriculum, is to ignore important features of the socialization of children under apartheid, as it was through this mechanism that schooling implicitly indoctrinated and prepared children with values for life under apartheid. Socialization occurred through the influence of particular value systems and practices in schools and society which were communicated implicitly or explicitly in schools (Christie 1986) through legislation, which resulted in intended or unintended consequences such as the Soweto uprising of students of 1976. Furthermore, the division of races emphasised differences between people which resulted in divisions of class, gender, religion and mother tongue (Christie 1986).

In this way through the hidden curriculum and in many other ways, apartheid had entrenched racism and separatism in all aspects of societal life; it affected and shaped identities of people from the cradle to the grave. With regard to education for example, Christian Nationalism, the ideology of the National Party took its direction from the notorious Christian National Act (39 of 1967) which reflected the perspective of Afrikaner Nationalism and propagated notions of separate identities and the superiority of whites within a framework of traditional Christianity (Kallaway 1990). Christian National Education and the Fundamental Pedagogics policies which it promoted were part of the suppressive state apparatus that became instrumental in facilitating the reproduction of the dominant ideology of apartheid through education (Enslin, 1984).

On the other hand, People's Education which emerged from the liberation movements propagated the values of a non-racist, non-sexist, democratic society (Kraak, 1998). It is not surprising that the terminology, values and discourses of transformation embedded in People's Education exerted strong influence on the educational discourses after 1994. Cross (1992) and Hyslop (1990) point out that the philosophy of black consciousness that emerged in the late sixties which similarly emphasised the need for liberation and unity, played a powerful role in the political conscientization and mobilisation of the youth of South Africa.

Cross and Chisholm (1990:58) have identified the black consciousness movement as a formative element of the struggle for liberation and democracy in South Africa:

The black consciousness movement was rooted in the increasing alienation of black youth from the prevailing political, economic and social structure and the attempts to inculcate conformist modes of behaviour, passivity, psychological and racial inferiority through various agencies of social control, particularly education.

These views and comments demonstrate the convergence between political objectives and the values promoted through education that dominated the pre-1994 period. So, this contestation of values between inter-dependent parties of radically different value orientations provided the platform for fundamental political and educational transformation in South Africa. Morrow (2001) explains that the project of transforming an education system is one of changing the vast web of practices that constitute it. This was the enormity of the task that awaited the post-apartheid government.

### **2.3 THE SOCIO- POLITICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT POST-1994**

As demonstrated above there was a convergence between political objectives of the state and the values, albeit implicitly, promoted through education. Curriculum theorists generally agree that there is often an implicit alignment between the ideals of states and their curriculum specifications (Bernstein, 1971; Malcolm, 1999). An exploration of policies relating to education in post-apartheid South Africa indicates a similar convergence between political objectives and values enshrined in the Constitution of South Africa. Harley and Wedekind cited in Chisholm (2004:198) concur with this view but claim that: “what makes C2005 distinctive in aligning itself to political values is the explicit way in which it does this.” Such claims provide the foundation for commonly held perceptions among critics such as Jansen (1999) and Harley & Wedekind (2004) that the curriculum of South Africa has an explicit political agenda. In its Preamble the Constitution speaks directly to the issue of social and moral renewal:

We therefore... adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996).

Given the socio-political objectives of the new government it is therefore not surprising that the discourse on values in education in South Africa is firmly grounded within the founding documents of society; the Constitution of South Africa and the Bill of Rights. These documents articulate the ideological ethical and moral standards of how people ought to interact with each other as citizens in a democratic society. As a result of this political grounding the inclusion of values in the curriculum has been criticized by Jansen (1999) as an exercise to enforce the political agenda of the state.


The introduction of a Bill of Rights (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996) provides members of society with freedom of choice in terms of their value orientations and religious convictions. Forster (2001) has pointed out a paradox that liberal democracies inevitably face when confronted with questions of values. It is generally believed that it is appropriate within a liberal democratic society that individuals have the right to commit themselves to particular value systems. But liberal democratic societies simultaneously depend on adherence to common democratic values for their continued existence. Waghid (2004) agrees with Forster and points out that, for democracies to function effectively, the quality and attitude of their citizens to participate in the political process to promote the public good is crucial. Kymlicka (2002:285) lends support to Waghid's view and maintains that "without citizens who possess these qualities, democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable." So there appears to be agreement that while individuals in democracies are entitled to personal choices in respect of their value systems, they also have a responsibility to commit themselves to a common value system for the good of society.

It seems that the tension between personal and common values raises broader philosophical questions about the assumptions and expectations that people have about citizens in democracies. For example, the perceived expectations of the justice institutions of South Africa; the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, that people will embrace democratic values because they are citizens

of a democratic society, seems idealistic and unrealistic as it ignores the tension, social and moral complexities that exist between choices of personal and common values. My observation is that the pre-conceived assumptions and expectations about how citizens in democracies ought to conduct themselves, and the tension between personal and common values, is perhaps largely responsible for a growing perception that social morality in South Africa is not developing in the way that many people hoped it would when the country became a democracy.

In the following sections I trace the social, political and educational initiatives that in South Africa have been instrumental in the inclusion of positive democratic values in the curriculum. My objective is to establish in what ways these initiatives have influenced the inclusion of values education in the curriculum.

#### **2.4 THE INFLUENCE OF THE MORAL REGENERATION MOVEMENT ON VALUES EDUCATION**



The foundation of the Moral Regeneration Movement (MRM) can be traced back to a meeting between ex-President Nelson Mandela and key religious leaders in June 1997 (Rauch, 2005). This meeting was initiated, organised and supported by various African National Congress (ANC) officials and was arranged by the ANC's Commission on Religious Affairs, a party structure that was formed in exile and which is still operational today. Toko Xasa Eastern Cape MEC of Social Development in a speech delivered to stakeholders on 11 May, 2006, explained the purpose of the MRM as follows: "...it is aimed at the regeneration and restoration of the moral fibre of society ...governed by acceptable human values and moral standards." It was anticipated that this quest for moral rejuvenation would provide a solid foundation for all citizens to become morally and socially responsible citizens.

According to Rauch the two main aspects that informed this structure's conceptual understanding of the concept of moral regeneration were religion and politics. Both religious and political attitudes in South Africa were being reassessed in ways which promised a critical and constructive relationship for the nation. This understanding is based on the premise that traditional religions and cultural beliefs both uncover the essence of humanness. The key concern of this meeting was twofold; to muster support from all religious communities for the MRM and to clarify and articulate the role of religion in social transformation, given the fact "that religion and religious education have for many years been regarded as a major vehicle for moral education" (Priestley, 1987: 107).

At this meeting Mandela highlighted the spiritual malaise underpinning the escalation of criminal activity that had become endemic in South African society and called on religious leaders to become active participants in a campaign that was subsequently known as the Moral Regeneration Initiative (MRI) (Rauch, 2005). A consequence of this meeting was the establishment of a permanent body for interaction between religious leaders and government; the National Religious Leaders Forum (NRLF). The initiative taken by this forum to engage and promote the re-examination of spirituality and morality as part of social transformation is significant, as it provided the platform for moral discourse and subsequent initiatives on moral regeneration.

Ex- President Mandela began using the phrase "moral regeneration" in early 1998. He argued that people must be ready to give back to society part of what they gain from it. This is perhaps one of the earliest indications of the revival of moral discourse in South African society. At this initial stage the meaning of the concept moral was not clarified and it was used fairly loosely, but generally understood to be linked to notions of patriotism and citizenship. Mandela's call to religious leaders according to Rauch, culminated in a moral summit that was held in Johannesburg in 1998. At this meeting moral

behaviour was perceived quite narrowly as constituting the avoidance of crime, violence and corruption.

President Nelson Mandela again referred to the moral degeneration of society in his farewell speech before Parliament in 1999. He identified and acknowledged the tension between personal and social values by again referring to the increasing levels of corruption in society and recommended that our nation needs as a matter of urgency, a reconstruction and development plan of the soul. The significance of this speech is that it signalled a shift from the earlier emphasis on criminal activities that had been the recurring theme of the moral regeneration movement. During this speech ex- President Mandela referred more broadly to civic values and duties such as good citizenship, and respect for the rule of law as examples of morally regenerative activities. According to Rauch (2005) the emphasis on responsible citizenship was motivated by the new government's need to transform the negative perceptions of its electorate about its relationship with the state. And so the new post-1994 government declared its commitment to key values of human dignity, non-racialism, non-sexism and democracy (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996).

The development of social policy within a framework of human rights had evidently failed to produce the desired effects as the intended implementation of policy and the actual implementation of policy proved to be two entirely different processes. Bush and West-Burnham (1994:12) refer to this phenomenon as the implementation gap while Mahomed, quoted in Jansen and Christie (1999:168) refers to this seeming inability of policies to connect with the reality of practice as "the reality principle." Another ANC contribution to the early conceptual underpinnings of the moral regeneration initiative is the notion of an African Renaissance. This concept marries pride in being an African and a new morality that would be facilitated through moral regeneration. It appears that the most important expectation underpinning the notion of the African Renaissance is that it will enable the

birth of a morally regenerative society; one which will be thoroughly moral and spiritual.

In his opening address at a moral summit in April 2002, the then Deputy President Zuma, projected a more inclusive view and deeper understanding of morality when he acknowledged that morality issues go beyond religion and crime. This was an indication that earlier ANC notions that religion and exhortations to avoid crime could play a definitive role in stemming the moral degeneration of society had not produced the desired results. It was at this juncture that the notion of common moral values was introduced into the moral regeneration discourse.

At the Fourth Annual Mandela Lecture held in 2006, the then President Mbeki reiterated some of the earlier assumptions and acknowledged that the causes of moral degeneracy are historical. This signalled that earlier ANC perceptions about the nature of morality had undergone decisive change and that the prevention of criminal activity alone did not constitute what moral degeneration is about. He identified the deconstruction of common and personal values as the root causes of a degenerate society.

In his view materialism had replaced the democratic principles of the liberation struggle: social cohesion, human solidarity and reconciliation, in short, he claimed that society had lost its anchor. This reference to an anti-social human order captures the perception of a culture of entitlement, personal enrichment and corruption that had seemingly become endemic at all levels of society.

The reference to a culture of entitlement is a theme that had gained prominence in the discourse of the ANC-led tripartite alliance. Its significance lies in the fact that it demonstrated a changed perception about the origins of the moral malaise; from one that was purely historical, looking

at pre-transition South African history for its causes, to a more contemporary and contextualised analysis of it.

## **2.5 VALUES EDUCATION POLICY INITIATIVES**

The literature on values in education in Western countries generally indicates that there is a strong belief that education can and should play a more active role in the development and nurturing of democratic values (Gutmann, 1987; 1995; Fine, 1995). According to Goodman (1998) in the United States, for example, with increasing urgency the public, press and President, enjoin schools to reverse the collapse of morality and to influence the character of children by teaching sound positive values. So it appears that across different continents educators, parents, political and religious leaders agree that values education can lead to social transformation and contribute to the moral regeneration of society.

At the establishment of South Africa's first democratic government in 1994 the then Minister of Education S. Bengu, had already announced that all forms of racial discrimination should be removed from educational institutions in line with the 1993 Interim Constitution. The South African Department of Education (DoE) launched the Tirisano (which means working together) Project in 1999. The goal of this project was to oversee the implementation of the new outcomes-based education system in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights of 1996. The discussions of this project paved the way for a "Values, Education and Democracy" initiative. This idea was not unique to South Africa, as a similar initiative had been undertaken in England according to Smith & Standish, (1997). They point out that a statement on shared values was produced in England by the National Forum on Values in Education and the Community in 1997. In his opening address of the Inaugural Meeting of the Consultative Forum on Racism in 1999, the then Minister of Education Kader Asmal, announced that

he would bring together a collective of academics, politicians, researchers and educators to deliberate about common values in society.

The values and attitudes of many South Africans were formed in a divided, separatist society and the aim of this ministerial initiative was twofold; firstly, to reflect on the quality of the national character to which people in a democratic South Africa ought to aspire and secondly, to consider the mechanisms by which education can best support the development of these values. Two initiatives of the DoE that influenced debates on values education were: The Report of the Working Group on Values in Education (DoE 2000) which constituted a first discussion of value issues, put forward for public debate and response. This working group proposed the promotion of six values: equity, tolerance, multi-lingualism, openness, accountability and social honour. This initiative was the starting point towards identifying the values that would ultimately be included in the education curriculum.

The Report of this Working Group culminated in the second initiative known as the Saamtrek Conference on Values, Education and Democracy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (DoE, 2001). The recommendations of this conference resulted in The Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (DoE, 2001).

In October 2002 several schools such as Vryburg and Bryanston High; Ben Viljoen School, Rydal Park and Balfour High were plagued by incidences of racial intolerance and incidences of violence which made headlines in the national media and created impressions and perceptions among civil society that the racial integration policies of the State for schools had failed dismally (Soudien & Sayed, 2004). Many other schools across the country reported no such incidences, but in some cases where such racism had occurred, it had been hidden from the lenses of the media.

Reports from the local media generally, seemed to suggest that the roots of these problems were to be found in the socio-political contexts in which

schools are situated. Township schools, according to the views expressed in the media in particular, seemed to be unaffected by racial incidences. The common reason given for this is that the racial demographics at these schools had largely remained unchanged. Very limited numbers of white learners had yet moved into township schools but conversely, significant numbers of learners from other race groups had moved into previously white suburbs and schools (Soudien & Sayed, 2004).

There is therefore a perception that the implementation of racial desegregation policies for schools had lacked coherence which hampered effective implementation (Soudien & Sayed, 2004). Given this perceived lack of attention to social integration and racial integration at schools, the introduction of values education has been seen by critics such as Jansen (1999) and Soudien and Sayed, (2004) as an intervention strategy to salvage some credibility for the disorganised process of racial integration at schools.

The Manifesto identified and prescribed ten values for inclusion in the National Curriculum; democracy, social justice and equity, equality, non-racism and non-sexism, “ubuntu” (human dignity), an open society, accountability, the rule of law, respect, and reconciliation. The key value is clearly the value of human dignity that is asserted in Sections 1 and 36 of the Constitution: human beings are worthy of respect. According to Asmal and James (2002) this principle provides the foundation for the rights entrenched in our Bill of Rights. These values have historically been embedded in webs of political, social and cultural assumptions that may have profound implications for personal and common values. Therefore a question that needs to be asked is; what are the underlying assumptions and expectations for values education embedded in the Manifesto?

Firstly, it appears that the Manifesto uncritically assumes that values is a transparent concept that can be un-problematically prescribed to a society in which there seems as yet, to be limited inter-subjective understanding of the

meaning and importance of democratic values and the reasons for taking them seriously. This approach of prescription according to Jansen and Christie (1999) has developed a conception of values education policies as policy by declaration. This is a process whereby certain expectations are attached to policies; for example it is expected that the prescription and inclusion of values in the curriculum will un-problematically transform schools previously seen as racist, into non-racial institutions in a rational, linear way.

Secondly, the Manifesto seems to ignore the important point of values as social constructs. It assumes that existing value-systems which are embedded in society can be extricated from the historical and socio-political contexts in which they have been formed and be replaced with new value-systems. Thirdly, the Manifesto seemingly ignores the tension that exists between personal and common values and the implications of this for a society that shares a history of differences rather than commonalities. Fourthly, the Manifesto un-problematically appears to assume that values can be taught and that teachers will have the pedagogical expertise, theoretical knowledge and conceptual understanding required to do this.

Fifthly, the Manifesto creates the impression that the school is the only setting in which values education is likely to occur and the differing roles of parents, religious communities and government as potential agents of moral education are not fully acknowledged or sufficiently specified. The inclusion and *assessment* of values in the school curriculum may have created the impression that the teaching of moral knowledge, over and above academic knowledge, is primarily the responsibility of educators. In this way the role of parents and others who ought to share the responsibility of inculcating and nurturing positive values may have been minimised or under played.

Perhaps the most fundamental criticism that has been levelled at the Manifesto is that it is trapped in behaviourist principles from which it will be difficult to extricate itself (Jansen 1999). Behavioural psychology assumes

unanimity of behaviour: by claiming that in the same environment and under the same circumstances all learners will behave in the same way according to prescribed outcomes (Watson 1913). It is impossible to miss the strong positivist notions (that it is possible to establish universal laws of human behaviour) that are embedded in these assumptions. Furthermore, the behaviourist approach to education has been critiqued as a form of moral indoctrination by many scholars (see Morrow & Beard, 1981; Jansen, 1999; and Parker & Harley, 2001). Kraak (1998) commenting on the powerful influence of behaviourism on the curriculum explains that behaviourism has led to a hybrid educational methodology, which politically has sought to go beyond the narrow confines of competency models by incorporating the progressive pedagogic principles of People's Education. He claims that this has created a learning methodology that is simultaneously radical in discourse yet behaviourist in its assessment technology.

The educational role of the Manifesto was to recommend common social values, which through education could foster social cohesion and support the transformation of society. Based on the recommendations of strategic initiatives of the DoE namely the Report of the Working Group on Values in Education (DoE, 2000), the Saamtrek Conference on Values, Education and Democracy (DoE, 2001) and the Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (DoE, 2001) the following values have been identified for inclusion in the curriculum: equity, tolerance, multilingualism, openness, accountability and social honour. The Manifesto (DoE, 2001: 9-10) notes the following about education and values:

Values and morality give meaning to our individual and social relationships. An education system does not exist simply to serve a market... Its primary purpose must be to enrich the individual, and by extension the broader society ...

After its inception the real role of the Manifesto and its relationship with values education has been questioned by various sources. Jansen (1999) for

example, points out that the Manifesto could be seen as an attempt to cover up the flaws of Outcomes based education and the failure of the government's racial integration policies that became apparent in schools in 2002 (see also Soudien & Sayed, 2004). Jansen sees the Manifesto as an uncritical emulation of international education policies (or elements of such policies) that lacks careful thought and consideration of the South African context. He and others believe that the Manifesto represented an attempt to emulate the values initiatives that were popular in other countries for example, in England at the time, as Smith and Standish, (1997) have pointed out.

The framework of the Manifesto assumes that educators have the expertise to navigate impartially between conflicting value-orientations that may co-exist in the same classroom. South African society is fraught with inequalities; issues of poverty, unemployment and inequalities between race and class and these structural constraints and social differences need to be acknowledged, considered and addressed in conjunction with policies for values education. It is assumed in the Manifesto that the teaching and acquisition of values in schools can be divorced from social contexts, competing sub-cultures and different value orientations that operate concurrently in a pluralistic society. The lack of attention to social context as is evident in the Manifesto, assumes that South Africa is an egalitarian society and does not recognise the differences between social conventions, social etiquette, traditions and social norms that exist concurrently in society

Apart from its internal challenges, South African society has in recent years also been exposed to globalization, new technology and greater mobility which have all impacted on the value orientations and belief systems of people as they are exposed to different value orientations and cultures both locally and internationally. It is therefore generally acknowledged that value formation for young people both locally and internationally, presently occurs within a global-social context that is constituted by the remnants and

fragments of a multiplicity of de-constructed value orientations, cultures, webs of belief systems, politics and traditions (MacIntyre, 1981).

Since the inception of South Africa's democratic Government in April 1994, education policies have been formulated within the framework of the democratic principles of the Constitution and Bill of Rights of 1996. A survey of literature on values in education in South African reveals that various authors have given attention to the dynamics of values in education in the transition period after 1994. For example Badat (1995); Collins and Gillespie (1993); Christie (1993); Soudien and Sayed (2004)) have researched the process of racial integration in South African schools and classrooms. Penny, Appel, Gultig, Harley, and Muir (1993) have researched the process of democracy and participation in schools, while Sayed and Carrim (1997) have explored school governance. Research has been also conducted on various aspects relating to values, virtues and morality locally.

Rhodes and Roux (2000) have identified values and beliefs in an outcomes based curriculum; Schoeman (2000) has researched teaching Citizenship Education within the Human and Social Sciences learning area and Green (2004a, 2004b) has investigated educators' perspectives and educators' practices in the nurturing of democratic values. Afrika, Absalom, Ackerman, Sijula and Green (2008) have recently researched various aspects relating to the nurturing of values in schools.

In looking at the relationship between values initiatives and the curriculum, different questions from those that have already been researched are introduced and addressed in various chapters in this study. For example what constitutes values education? Which values should be given priority and for what reasons? What do theories of learning suggest in respect of the teaching of values? What are the implications of the integration of education and training for values education? What are the practical consequences of the assumption that values can be assessed and measured?

## 2.6 SOUTH AFRICA'S CURRICULUM CONTEXT

### 2.6.1. HISTORICAL PROCESS AND CURRICULUM AIMS

The National Department of Education published its first official statement on Outcomes-Based Education (OBE) entitled Curriculum 2005: Lifelong learning for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century in March 1997 (DoE, 1997.) Jansen and Christie (1999: 9) maintain that:

There remains to this day confusion about what is meant by Curriculum 2005. For some people it meant a deadline; the year by which OBE would be introduced in grades 1-7, to some department officials C2005 and OBE meant the same thing; and to some academics C2005 is a model for teaching effectiveness.

The new curriculum's outcomes based design feature was so centrally positioned that outcomes-based education became synonymous with C2005. In the public domain outcomes-based education and C2005 are therefore still conflated and seen as interchangeable to the extent that there is rarely a debate on outcomes-based education without reference to C2005. An important difference between OBE and C2005 as I understand it is; OBE is an approach to education while C2005 is the curriculum that was developed within an outcomes-based framework. In the next section I provide a general overview of OBE. In chapter four I discuss its implications for the teaching of values and in chapter five its implications for the assessment of values.

The aim of C2005 is directed towards achieving a prosperous, truly united, democratic and internationally competitive country with literate, creative, and critical citizens leading productive, self-fulfilled lives in a country free of violence, discrimination and prejudice (Curriculum 2005: Lifelong Learning for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century DoE, 1997) and that all learners should reach their full potential and be prepared for meaningful participation in society as critical democratic citizens, who embrace the principle of lifelong learning (Report of the Review Committee on C2005, DoE, 2000). This approach is based on the

belief that all learners need to and can achieve their full potential, but that this may not happen in the same way or within the same period of time for all learners.

There have been several commentaries and criticisms of C2005 since its inception in 1997/8. Rasool (1999) and Jansen and Christie (1999) provide a summary of some of these criticisms and explain that, the language of OBE was too complex; that no relationship existed between curriculum change and economic growth, that OBE was based on flawed assumptions of what happens inside schools, and that its emphasis on procedural knowledge offered an instrumentalist view of knowledge. Furthermore, the fact that learners must discover knowledge for themselves involved limited teacher participation, but multiplied teachers' workloads, while it trivialised content. Rasool also brings to our attention that OBE lacked appropriate assessment systems and that it side-stepped the issue of values.

Following the problems educators experienced in understanding the technical terminology and implementation of a complex matrix of concepts such as range statements, performance indicators and assessment criteria as well as 66 specific outcomes for the nine years of the General Education Phase, (Gultig, Hoadley & Jansen, 2002) the Ministry of Education commissioned a review of C2005 in 2000. The structure and design of C2005, teacher orientation, training and development, learning support materials, provincial support to teachers in schools and implementation time-frames are some of the concerns that the Review Committee was required to address.

However as Harley and Wedekind quoted in Chisholm (2004:214) have pointed out: "The Review was constrained by its brief to review C2005 and not outcomes-based education" so the philosophy of OBE and its approach to education was retained in the Revised National Curriculum Statement (RNCS) currently referred to as the National Curriculum Statement (NCS).

***Henceforth reference to curriculum in this study is to be understood as reference to the official, national curriculum, known as the National Curriculum Statement, (NCS) and should be distinguished from C2005 and the RNCS.***

The Report of the Review Committee on C2005 (DoE 2000:38-48) pointed out that the problems experienced with C2005 were owing to:

- Incoherence, incompatibility, and flaws in the design of the curriculum structure; and
- Poor implementation, planning and execution and not as a result of OBE.

It is therefore not surprising that according to Report of the Review Committee on C2005, (DoE, 2000), the curriculum *streamlines* and *strengthens* C2005 and continues to be committed to OBE. Outcomes-based education is viewed as part of the process of transforming education and training to realise the aims of our democratic country and of the Constitution.

Numerous other critical inquiries which focus on different aspects of the curriculum have been undertaken. For research findings on the epistemological underpinnings of the curriculum, see Christie (1998) and Jansen (1999). For information on research of curriculum implementation see Taylor and Vinjevoldt, (1999) Harley and Wedekind, (2004). For findings on its operational features see Jansen & Christie, (1999) and Greenstein, (1997). These studies generally reflect deep scepticism about the curriculum as appropriate vehicle for educational development and transformation in South Africa.

## **2.6.2. TEACHING AND LEARNING PRINCIPLES**

### **TEACHING IS OUTCOMES BASED**

What does an outcomes-based education system mean? For Spady (1995) a major influence on curriculum thinking in South Africa since 1994, outcomes-based education means clearly focusing and organizing an educational system around learning outcomes. These specify what is essential for all students to be able to do successfully at the end of their learning experiences. Outcomes-based education starts by designing the outcomes to be achieved by the end of the learning process in all learning areas. The outcomes describe the knowledge, skills and values which learners should acquire and demonstrate on completion of the learning experience (Report of the Review Committee on C2005, DoE, 2000).

### **TEACHING IS LEARNER CENTRED**

OBE is described as a result-oriented, participatory, learner-centred, activity-based approach to the teaching and learning of knowledge, skills and values (Report of the Review Committee on C2005, DoE 2000). The outcomes encourage a learner centred and activity-based approach to teaching. Drawing clearly on constructivist principles learners are required to discover their own knowledge by making links between prior knowledge and new content and ideas. Teaching towards critical outcomes, developmental outcomes, learning area outcomes based on a constructivist approach to learning, limits or expands indefinitely the choices of educators to the extent that what falls in and outside of the educative process has become uncertain.

## TEACHING IS INTEGRATED

Integration refers to connecting or combining content, knowledge, skills and values across learning areas that have been separated, erasing boundaries that have been imposed, or collapsing the boundaries between disciplines, thus facilitating unrestricted penetration and exchange of ideas between different areas of learning. According to Kraak (1998: 21-58) the idea of “seamless learning” or integration is typical of Outcomes Based Education and Training (OBET), it is based on an assumption of the ease of the transfer of learning between different learning areas.

But policy also adopted a second application of the term integration so that two different meanings are borne by the concept integration in the discourses of education and training namely; certification and pedagogy. Firstly, as pointed out by Christie (1997) it refers to integration of certification, the bridging of different qualifications for academic education and manual training and secondly, it denotes integration of pedagogy and curricular content. Muller in Chisholm (2004: 227) explains that: “for the administrative progressives in the Department of Labour and the pedagogic progressives in the Department of Education integration meant quite different things.” Although there is some overlap in the education and training mandates so that at times these could intersect, there are very important differences in terms of conceptual understanding, vocabulary, categories of knowledge, pedagogy, knowledge acquisition, application of knowledge, assessment, assessment instruments and measurement of competences that are distinctive of education and training.

Following Bernstein (1986), integration refers to connecting or combining what has been separated, erasing boundaries that have been imposed, or collapsing the boundaries between disciplines, thus facilitating unrestricted penetration and exchange of ideas between different areas of learning. Such integration may be achieved through many processes for example; Carrim

and Keet (2005:101) have identified infusion as one of the mechanisms through which integration is facilitated;

Infusion then, refers to a technique of curriculum design that aims at integration. It is a way of designing curricula so that the different contents may be brought in relation to one another, disciplinary boundaries pierced or collapsed or subjects areas linked to one another.

Given this interpretation of integration as the integration of curricular content it is positive and desirable in some respects. The curriculum is appropriately designed to integrate content across learning areas so that learners may come to know and experience the world as a set of inter-connected knowledge systems. In this way vertical and horizontal knowledge is combined to facilitate knowledge construction and the application of knowledge which is beneficial to learners.

## **2.7. ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES**



### **ASSESSMENT IS OUTCOMES BASED** WESTERN CAPE

The curriculum is aligned with the assessment policy contained in the Assessment Policy (Government Gazette No 19640 of 1998). The Western Cape Education Department has also issued a policy document entitled Assessment Guidelines for the General Education and Training Band (gradesR-9) (WCED, 2003). The aim of this document is to provide assistance in developing and implementing an assessment programme for Grades R-9 in schools. Outcomes-based education and its assessment model introduced educators to a number of assessment terms for example; norm-referenced and criterion-referenced assessment, assessment standards, assessors, assessment instruments and different types of assessment. Jansen and Christie (1999) point out the fact that more than 100 new words were introduced onto the curriculum landscape by OBE.

Assessment within the curriculum is based on the prescribed learning outcomes and assessment standards as indicated in the NCS. Assessment standards describe the level at which learners should demonstrate their achievement of the learning outcomes of the learning areas. Assessment Standards are now grade specific, showing what is expected of learners in each grade and how conceptual progression will occur in each learning area (Report of the Review Committee on C2005, DoE, 2000).

### **ASSESSMENT IS INTEGRATED**

Integrated assessment assesses competence across a number of outcomes in an integrated manner so it is not really a type of assessment, but rather a way of conducting assessment. Integrated assessments are deliberately structured to assess the ability of the learner to see the bigger picture that is, to integrate different learning outcomes in terms of knowledge, skills and values and to demonstrate understanding of the interrelationship of these across learning areas (Hager, Gonzi & Athanasou 1994). It provides the learner with an opportunity to demonstrate the ability to integrate knowledge, skills, theory and practice, in a way that reflects the appropriate combination of practical, foundational and reflexive competence. The task of the educator is to interpret the performance of learners and make a judgement about the learner's competence to integrate different outcomes in the light of the criteria. This indicates that integrated assessment is a lot more complex than sorting items where criteria are usually observable, and measurable.

### **ASSESSMENT TAKES VARIOUS FORMS**

Assessments are not only conducted by lecturers, educators, instructors or formally registered assessors and there are four main types of assessment for different purposes according to the (Report of the Review Committee on C2005, DoE, 2000).

**Baseline Assessment:** The purpose is to determine the level at which the learner is able to function (prior knowledge) in order to pitch the learning at the correct level for the learner. It assists in planning teaching and learning activities.

**Diagnostic Assessment:** The purpose is to determine the nature and causes of barriers to learning. Guidance, support and appropriate interventions follow such assessment.

**Formative Assessment:** The purpose is to determine the progress the learner has made towards the outcomes. Formative assessment takes place on a continuous basis throughout the teaching/learning process. It is developmental and is built into the learning activities so that it is not something that occurs as a separate part of the learning programme. Its main purpose is to determine the learner's progress towards achieving the specified outcomes so as to improve learning. Constructive feed forward is given.

**Summative assessment** is aimed at assessing whether a learner has successfully achieved the outcomes of a learning programme or not, in terms of being awarded a credit, qualification or certificate. Its purpose is to judge whether or not the learner has achieved the outcomes described for the module or programme. It is generally conducted at the end of a learning programme, at the end of a term, year, or on transfer to another school. The learner must be informed and must clearly understand when an assessment is summative. (Report of the Review Committee on C2005 (DoE, 2000))

### **ASSESSMENT IS BASED ON APPLIED COMPETENCE**

The importance of applied competence is also stressed by the curriculum which is described as follows: Applied competence is the ability to put the learning outcomes that have been developed through a learning programme into practice in the relevant context. Competent learners must be able to

understand what they have learnt and must also be able to do something useful with this knowledge in a real-world context. Integrated competence refers to the following competences:

- Practical competence: The demonstrated ability to perform a set of tasks – to do a particular thing, to consider a range of options/possibilities and make decisions about putting it into practice.
- Foundational competence: The demonstrated understanding of what learners are doing and why.
- Reflexive competence: The demonstrated ability to integrate or connect performances with understanding of those performances, so that learners learn from their actions, and are able to adapt to changes and unforeseen circumstances.

### **ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES SHOULD TEACH**

The assumption of the outcomes-based curriculum is that teaching, learning and assessment should be *linked*; assessment should inform teachers and others about the performance of learners towards the achievement of the learning outcomes and even more strongly that teaching, learning and assessment should be *inextricably* linked. Assessment has been furthermore been promoted as “*a critical element*” and an *integral* part of education

Furthermore, it is understood that assessment activities should *teach*; teaching, learning and assessment should be *interrelated* and that assessment is *essential* to outcomes-based education. Assessment policy documents in South Africa also indicate that appropriate assessment practices are considered to be essential for the successful implementation of an Outcomes-based curriculum (Western-Cape Education Department (WCED) Assessment Guidelines for the General Education and Training Band Grades R-9, 2003).

## 2.8. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Kraak (1998) noted the following influences on the decisions to adopt an outcomes-based model:

- The discourses of transformation and People's Education that emerged in the heat of the struggle for liberation.
- The ascendancy of competence-based modular education and training in industry after 1985
- The adoption of Australian and British outcomes models through the involvement of COSATU and the ANC

The integration of education and training is part of a vast number of policies adopted by the post-apartheid government to restructure and transform the legacy of apartheid education and training in South Africa. I do not recount in detail precisely how all of these policies and discourses of transformation came to be promoted and accepted, but only refer to those which had a direct bearing on values education.

According to Kraak (1998) People's Education as a phenomenon of the 1980's was primarily a political movement which viewed the school classroom as a central site of struggle and which came to represent a radical alternative to that of Apartheid education. Kraak holds that People's Education became an educational pedagogy encompassing the development of critical thinking, inter-disciplinary curriculum content, learner-centredness, participatory teaching methods, community involvement and a concern to link the focus of formal education with the world of work. Kraak points out that further development of these ideas did not take place with the dawn of the negotiations era but ironically, the radical language and populist appeal of People's Education has been resurrected to give legitimacy to what is essentially a conservative and technicist unit standards-based assessment technology-OBE (Kraak, 1998).

Proposals for restructuring first emerged during the period that led up to the 1994 elections. Following intense debate between the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), private sector groups and community groups, an education and training agenda was drawn up, borrowing from a range of international experience (see Jansen, 1997; Fataar, 2001; Jansen & Christie, 1999). An integrated approach to education and training attempts to marry two related but different worlds; the world of education and the world of industrial training that have widely been seen as separate from each other. An important aim of the policy reform in the post-apartheid era was to unite education and training into an integrated system.

The “integration agenda” as Christie (1997: 117) refers to it, aimed to integrate the separate qualification opportunities offered by formal and non-formal education that were widely seen as the cause of unequal opportunity in the workplace. The main objective of the integrated system was seen as an attempt to eliminate artificial divisions and blur the distinctions between mental and manual labour by means of a centralised qualifications grid: The National Qualifications Framework (NQF). This grid was premised on a single reductive “conceptual vocabulary for all modes of learning” as the Joint Departmental Consultation Document (DoE/ DoL 2003: 6-7) explains.

Fataar (2001) agrees that the integration of education and training became firmly embedded in curriculum discourse through the active lobbying of the trade union movement and as a result of a convergence of thinking by business, and the state in support of the integration of education and training.

The OBE discourse depended heavily on policy borrowing from different international contexts which is particularly apparent in the NQF’s approach to defining outcomes. Jansen and Christie (1999:9) note: “This shift in language (from competencies to outcomes) is a union-derived language for the workplace linked firmly to the NQF.” This view is supported by Fataar

(2001) who alerts us to the fact that the outcomes approach is an adaptation of a strong training discourse prevalent in Australia, which had considerable influence on the development of the integration of education and training debates and the development of OBE in South Africa. For example, the influence from Australia and New Zealand came via the active interaction between those countries' labour movements and COSATU (Christie 1997).

Objections to the integration of education and training came from various sources for example, as Taylor, (1985: 62-101) points out:

Administratively, (industrial) training has been linked with employment rather than education... fundamentally the separation reflects the way in which history, economic circumstances and social structures have given us a heritage of values, attitudes and assumptions that constitute education and training as two separate metaphors ...

Kraak, (1998: 21-58) in explaining the effects of integration of education and industrial training on knowledge holds:

... this formulation (integration) has the dramatic effect of collapsing ... all boundaries which historically have evolved around different forms of knowledge acquisition and knowledge organization, and which are intrinsically linked to specific institutional locales for example disciplinary knowledge in universities, institutionally-prescribed categories of knowledge as in the curriculum in schools and experiential knowledge in private enterprises.

The Committee of University Principals regarded the integration discourse as an attempt to stifle academic freedom by failing to:

... reconcile the differences between students with manual training, and those with formal academic training who are working towards the same qualification" (Greenstein, 1995: 8 quoted in Fataar 2001).

Harley and Wedekind cited in Chisholm (2004: 199) raises a different point of criticism and comment on educators' disengagement in the policy process of OBE and point out that:

The new curriculum did not emerge from debates within the educational sector about the most appropriate forms of pedagogy... or what was feasible in the profoundly diverse and unequal range of schools ... Teachers ... simply found themselves in a new curriculum world.

Despite various arguments against the integration of education and training and OBE notably by Taylor, Kraak, Jansen and Christie and Fataar, a policy of integration was adopted.

Kraak, (1998) and Lave and Wenger (1991) stress that generic competences are acquired in specific contexts; often referred to as communities of practice and as a consequence, are not always applicable in other knowledge or occupational contexts. They point out for example, that the critical thinking and problem solving skills that a brain surgeon and a mechanic acquire in their respective communities of practice, cannot easily be substituted one for the other or transferred to one another.

Jansen and Christie (1999) point out that there is a Tayloristic understanding in labour and industrial training where competence is understood as that worthy performance...for which someone is willing to pay. Other definitions of competence relate to “aspects of the job at which the person is competent” (Woodruffe, 1992:17). Jean-Francois Lyotard cited in Mason (1997:10) refers to competence in terms of “the performativity of knowledge.” This refers to demonstration of the use of knowledge which the curriculum seems to favour above the process of the acquisition of knowledge.

An analysis of the terminology employed in the curriculum demonstrates that concepts that have traditionally been associated with industrial training; such as observable behaviour, skills, outcomes, competence, performance indicators (although these have been removed from the curriculum) assessment- standards, measurement and checklists have been transferred from training to education. This implies that the process of integration had

been biased in favour of the industrial training and assessment model. In fact, Christie (1997) maintains that the concerns of training workers for occupational mobility trumped the pedagogical concerns of People's Education in the integration discourse. Jansen and Christie (1999:7) point out that "the sudden emergence of proposals (for OBE) brought ordinary teachers into contact with a curriculum discourse completely foreign to their understanding and practices."

As Degenhardt (1984: 232-252) in referring to the assessment of observable competences and measurement of moral concepts such as values explains;

Concern with observation, measurement and statistical method has been at the expense of reflection of *what* is being observed- on whether what is being so carefully measured *is* what it is *taken* to be...they blind themselves to the complex mixture of knowledge, feeling, judgement, habit and action that makes up moral life.

The danger of the integration of education and training and its "demonstrable competences" approach is that, what is distinctive and constitutive of education as a process which includes both the acquisition and application of diverse knowledges (cognitive and moral) may be underrated and marginalised.

## **2.9. CONCLUSION**

As was to be expected values education policy was influenced by a number of factors, one of which is political vision. Political vision has always influenced education in South Africa and in the past education became the conduit through which negative racist attitudes and undemocratic values were transferred to society through the hidden curriculum as Christie (1985) has explained. This led to the rejection of apartheid education as was evidenced by the Soweto uprisings of 1976 and resistance to apartheid education from various political organisations. Jansen (1995) holds that C2005 emerged as a political and not a pedagogical project and Harley and Wedekind cited in

Chisholm (2004:198) point out that “what makes C2005 distinctive in aligning itself to political values, is the explicit way in which it does this.” C2005 has also been described as a political strategy that is used to drive social transformation. This view is evident in a policy document Curriculum 2005 Lifelong Learning for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (DoE 1997) which states that (C2005) will also foster learning which encompasses a culture of human rights, multilingualism and multi-culturalism and sensitivity to the values of reconciliation and nation building.

So political agendas have in the past, and presently, whether implicitly or explicitly, played a key role in the values that are embedded in the curriculum. It is fairly obvious that there are high expectations attached to values education to contribute to the vision of a morally just, democratic society, but it must be recognised that values education cannot change society on its own particularly as the complexities of values education have not as yet been fully explored. Curriculum assumptions regarding the integration of education and training have pedagogical and practical implications and create challenges for the teaching and assessment of values which have not been fully considered, recognised and addressed.

The curriculum is now a public issue and the values that it promotes are made explicit which is a positive development. But openness is only one dimension of the curriculum, for without research of how the curriculum is conceptualised and addressed by educators in classrooms, it will not be possible to determine the extent to which it has accomplished the political transformation and educational vision it was intended to accomplish. It should also be acknowledged that another hidden curriculum continues to operate in society.


It is a curriculum that implicitly transmits different values to learners than those of the formal curriculum. Seemingly harmless activities such as “mix it” on cellular phones and unrestricted access to websites on the Internet exert

powerful influences on value formation of young people. Perhaps this is the new hidden curriculum that needs to be explored.

Gultig (2001:10) writes

... that if we are to intervene in the schooling process in order to foster moral learning and to improve its quality, to encourage its diversity, to expand and enrich its outcomes, to mediate and facilitate it, we need to develop our understanding of it.

Beck (1990: 143-150) in support of Gultig's view, agrees that there is a need to understand what values education entails, but also argues for a consideration of the importance of values education: "If we are to teach morality in schools we must not only understand what it is, but also be certain of its importance." Clearly there is a need for on-going conversations and the revisiting of policies for values education as it is apparent that there is a mismatch between curriculum assumptions and expectations, and the assumptions and expectations of education and training.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **VALUES EDUCATION UNPACKED: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE**

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

The central aim of this chapter is to explore how the concepts of values and values education can best be understood. Kohlberg (1963: 57-58) referring to the meaning of these concepts holds:

If I could not define virtue... then could I really offer advice as to the means by which virtue could be taught? Could it really be argued that the means for teaching obedience to authority are the same as the means for teaching freedom of moral opinion...? It appears, then, that either we must be totally silent about moral education or else speak to the nature of virtue.

I explore values education terminology and consider the relationship between values and virtues. Thereafter I unpack and discuss values priorities, the related meanings of values education, moral education and citizenship education. Finally I consider the nature of values knowledge as a means of gaining insight into the meaning of values education. I explore debates about values education internationally and locally to glean some understanding of the issues concerning values education that are raised in these debates.

#### **3.2 CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS**

Conceptual analysis is the research tool used by philosophers when clarification is sought for the meanings that might be ascribed to concepts. It is therefore one possible means of gaining insight into how concepts such as values and values education can best be understood. I use conceptual analysis as a tool to bring into view the meanings of often unexamined assumptions about “values education” and “values” as these appear in the curriculum. Du Toit in de Vos, Strydom, Fouche & Delpoort (2005:425) explains that:

... conceptual analysis is crucial for orientating oneself to one's chosen field of research... it is an attempt to become conversant with the basic tools of thinking and understanding: namely language, terms, ideas and concepts.

While conceptual analysis makes a valuable contribution to the interpretation of the meanings of concepts Flavell (1977: 1) points out that:

The really interesting concepts of this world have the nasty habit of avoiding our most determined attempts to pin them down ... Their meanings perversely remain multiple, ambiguous, imprecise and above all, unstable and open- open to argument and disagreement ...

### **3.2.1 VALUES EDUCATION TERMINOLOGY**

Conceptual analysis of the term values education reveals considerable differences of interpretation and understanding of what is subsumed under this term. But the umbrella term values education is commonly understood as having particular emphasis on civic and moral values (Halstead & Taylor, 1996). Values education is therefore very closely aligned to other terms being currently used in the literature including spiritual, moral, social and cultural education. Lickona (1991) and Halstead and Taylor (1996) refer to character education, education in virtues and the development of attitudes and personal qualities.

Veugelers (2000) points out that various terms are being used in the literature each with its own assumptions, epistemology and theoretical framework for values education. For instance, in the United Kingdom literature refers to: values education, character education, moral education, personal and social education, and citizenship education. In the debate about the task of the educational system in the United States there are many references to character education.

Research by Munn (1995) and Halstead and Taylor (1996) shows that scientific publications mostly refer to moral education but in the European

context the term civic education is commonly used in the literature. The South African Constitution (Act No 108 of 1996) refers to critical citizenship and democratic citizenship. Waghid (2004) has advocated the need for compassion and justice to inform citizenship education in South Africa. Waghid (2004: 44) believes that the notion of responsible citizenship needs to be extended and holds "... learners are educated to act responsibly...Yet this would not necessarily guarantee that learners would become morally just." The implication is that democratic citizenship entails more than just being responsible.

In this study the term values education is used to include and capture the following meanings subsumed under it: human rights education, citizenship education, moral education, values education which includes attitudes, dispositions and compassion, all of which have been identified in the moral education literature as candidates for values education efforts (See Ryan, 1989; Bennett, 1992; Kohlberg, 1971; and Nucci, 2001). Values education appropriately captures my understanding of values education as a collective, inclusive (both formal and informal) educative process.

### **3.2.2. VALUES AND VIRTUES**

The Collins English Dictionary (2004: 1795) defines values as "the moral principles or accepted standards of a person or group." Accepted standards may be good or bad, moral or immoral and this dictionary definition does not distinguish between these. So this definition seems inadequate as it fails to capture the true meaning of this concept. Values have also commonly been described as moral compasses by which to navigate the course of our daily interactions with members of society or as guides to action. Veugelers (2003: 379) explains that "values are judgements (decisions) based on a notion of what is good and bad; they refer to concepts of a "just life." Morrow (1989) suggests that instead of referring to values we could also refer to rules or

principles. This interpretation is favoured by Halstead and Taylor (1996:2) who hold that:

... values refer to the principles and fundamental convictions which act as general guides to behaviour, the standards by which particular actions are judged to be good or desirable.

Virtue is defined in the same dictionary as “any admirable quality or trait” (2004:1818). Needless to say people have different views on what constitutes admirable traits. In fact what some people consider to be admirable traits may not be moral at all. Such limited descriptions in my opinion, may be the result of looking for definitions of concepts instead of evaluating different interpretations of their meanings.

Green (2004a) in this regard has pointed out that the literature is vague in terms of an adequate description of the meaning of values as it does not provide a clear-cut and consistent distinction between values and virtues. This might imply that when people commonly use the term values they do not mean any values, but rather those values they consider to be important for democracy or becoming a good person. In other words they are inclined to mean positive or desirable values and this could refer to what is generally considered to be worth valuing. Values education therefore by implication, has a moral dimension. But the question that begs an answer is: are values and virtues the same?

Green (2004a) maintains that it seems reasonable to assume that when authors mention or identify democratic values, they are by implication also referring to associated virtues. I agree with Green’s view because, if tolerance and caring are considered desirable values, then it logically follows that non-violence and compassion would be some of the virtuous dispositions that a tolerant and compassionate person would value. It also follows that such a person will engage in acts of behaviour that mirror these values. This view is also held by Lipman (1996:1) who claims that: “...virtues are values, whether

they are matters of conviction, of disposition, or of action...” But not all writers agree that to associate values with virtues is rooted in a firm understanding of the distinction between their meanings.

Williams (1995) for example claims that there is a need to make a distinction between values and virtues. He points out that a common assumption may be that we simply have no need for “values” since the word is fully replaceable by less ambiguous and more forceful synonyms such as “virtues.” Williams argues that these words are not synonyms; for in his view, virtues refer to good habits, a disposition of the will towards goodness, while values refer to qualities of things or actions that make them desirable. Williams concedes that values and virtues often intersect, but claims that values cannot be reduced to virtues, as values extend beyond moral virtues and comprise all good for the person; biological, human, moral and spiritual. This view extends the meaning of the concept of values beyond dictionary definitions. Ryan and Bohlin (1989) draw attention to the fact that values can be good or bad and in view of this, values may therefore be, but are not necessarily, morally desirable. Therefore the meaning of values in this study refers to positive values and virtues which are morally desirable.

While there appears to be a lack of clarity regarding the distinction between values and virtues; and the relationship between values and virtues; it has become clear from the literature that there is some agreement on a relationship between values (virtues) and action or, as Williams (1995) has pointed out, between good habits and the values that make such habits probable. Oser (1996) holds that values are expressed through judgements (attitudes) and through forms of behaviour or action. Levy (1993:2) concurs with the view of Oser and understands values as: “preferences for a certain form of conduct” (But Veugelers and de Kat (1998: 379) challenge these views and draw our attention to the fact that knowing about values does not necessarily result in moral behaviour):

... research indicates that agreement about values at an abstract level between teachers often coincides with different interpretations at the level of the concrete actions of those teachers.

The implication is that understanding values is not the same as making judgements about values or acting in accordance with such decisions. While these explanations confirm a relationship between values and agency, it is not a causal relationship as understanding of values does not automatically cause moral action.

Values are sometimes regarded as, and confused with, social norms and traditions, but there is obviously a difference between these. Norms and traditions are social conventions that are based on values, but are strongly defined within a specific social or cultural context or in communities of practices. Some values, traditions, social norms and customs are clearly culture specific by definition and therefore may not necessarily be considered as moral by other cultures.

Berkowitz (1997) and Smith (1970) make a distinction between different types of values. Berkowitz claims that values such as honesty and obedience are regulative values, while justice and equity are social values, as their real meaning becomes evident in a social context. Kohlberg (1971) Ryan (1989) and Prencipe and Helwig (2002) point out that making a distinction between different types of values, is important in debates about values. They list the following categories; firstly, basic moral values or social values that reflect issues of justice and harm and have direct implications for the welfare of others; secondly, character values that are closely associated with individual character traits; thirdly, non-moral values that are sometimes identified as cultural values, for example industriousness; fourthly, politico-moral values that involve patriotism and citizenship and more abstract values such as democratic perspectives or beliefs; finally, religious values that pertain to particular belief systems.

A too narrow conception of values education may exclude other values that ought to form part of values education for example caring, compassion and justice as Waghid (2004) has suggested. The writers mentioned in the previous section all seem to agree that values may not be necessarily moral, but they are valued by individuals as strong preferences for certain qualities or dispositions, while virtues are generally considered to be moral; a disposition towards goodwill to others. So logically we should speak of virtues education, but we do not. Reference to different categories of values is useful as it serves to demonstrate the different dimensions of values, and this extends and enriches our understanding of the complex nature of values.

Veugelers (2003) for example identifies the following dimensions of values: person-oriented values; socially-oriented values; conformation or independence-oriented values; acceptance of values or critical reflection on values. Berkowitz (1996) refers to justice and human well-being as central values while Veugelers (2003) refers to these as moral values. In the Just Community Schools' approach, respect for others, care and social responsibility are regarded as central (common) values according to Power, Higgins and Kohlberg (1989) while Smith (1970) suggests that these are to be understood as basic values. Values relating to order and structure in work and behaviour, the development of self-discipline and autonomy, empathy and learning to deal with criticism are generally referred to as regulative values. Berkowitz (1997) refers to such values as meta-moral characteristics.

Power, Higgins and Kohlberg (1989) affirm that values such as care, trust, collective responsibility and participation are central (common) values. Personal values refer to positive values such as respect, honesty, cleanliness, obedience and diligence and are usually of an individualistic nature. I am aware of the fact that not all values can be seen to be morally good. I am also aware that different writers have identified different categories of values such as common, personal, individual, basic, central or social. A moral value, as I

understand it transcends the hierarchy of values as it is more than just a belief; it constitutes a worthiness of a norm or principle embedded in a person, a group or a belief system which provides positive structure and order to their social reality.

In this study I understand values in terms of Kohlberg's interpretation as "making decisions which are moral and acting in accordance with them" (Kohlberg 1964: 425). I will also refer to personal and common values. My use of the term personal values will refer to positive, desirable values and morals that individuals possess; while common values will be used in reference to positive democratic values related to the notion of the common good of a society.

### **3.2.3 VALUES AND MORAL EDUCATION**

Warnock (1967:75) makes a strong plea for investigation and clarification of the concept moral. She maintains, (and I strongly agree with her) "that if we do not understand the meaning of concepts, how do we know what the phenomena are which moral theory is to deal with?" Nucci (2004) supports the notion of clarifying morality, as she maintains that we cannot know about methods and means of teaching and learning in the absence of knowledge about the substance and essence of that which is taught and learned. Nucci argues that too often the stated aim of moral education is for children to be good with only vague conceptions and indications of what it means to be good.

Much effort has been spent on attempts to define morality in the form of a set of fundamental principles or definitions. Such attempts to give a firm foundation to what morality means have not successfully resolved the question, but they have given rise to a variety of accounts of morality which in some way or another, have informed our understanding of the nature of this concept. The meaning of the concept moral is as complex as the meaning

of values so it is neither self-evident nor transparent. Judging from the way this concept is used in the literature it seems that it could refer to a number of possibilities; actions, motives, dispositions, reasoning, or to the consequences of people's actions. Goodman (1998) agrees with this view and holds that the distinction between what falls in and out of the moral domain, what is moral and what is merely conventional, what is obligatory or just preferred, is unclear and often arbitrary.

It appears that our common use of the word moral does not clearly articulate its meaning, which indicates that different meanings may be borne by it. Haydon (1987) similarly recognises that it is difficult to define morality in the form of a fundamental principle or a set of principles, but asserts that one of the most important facts about morality is its concrete social reality. He explains that morality is embedded not just in the ideas and choices of individuals, but in the daily lives of people and in their social practices. He believes that without a certain moral background, or social tradition, there could be no such thing as the rational, autonomous moral agent. Haydon holds that the fact that some questions are considered to be moral questions for some individuals, but not for others, cannot be explained without reference to a moral tradition of thought and practice within which the individual had been socialised and learnt to think.

Birch and Rasmussen (1989) consulted the discipline of etymology to seek clarification of what the term moral means. Their research has traced the meaning of moral to the word ethics and has revealed that ethics has a Greek root, the noun form of which is *ēthōs*. *Eiōtha* is the Greek form of ethics which means "to be accustomed to." The Latin equivalent is *mōs* from which we have derived words such as moral, morality and morale. *To ethōs* originally referred to the shelter for animals like a stall which provided security, stability and sustenance. One of the oldest interpretations of morality from the Greek tradition is translated as behaviour according to custom. The rationale here was that customary behaviour (according to the

rules, norms, traditions and social conventions of society) is moral behaviour as it provides guidelines for the kind of behaviour that is sanctioned in a stable non-pluralistic society. So, originally it referred to a shared understanding of what was considered to be moral and what was socially agreed on.

Birch and Rasmussen (1989) provide us with some distinctions that are extremely illuminating in understanding terms which we commonly associate with morality. Firstly, that moral and non-moral distinguishes human from other life forms, for example plants and animals. Their reasoning is that morality is based on a consideration of what plants lack and humans possess: the awareness of a difference between “is” and “ought.” Plants can be seen as having a distinctive form of life, but they do not have the capacity of moral vision; and therefore cannot conceptualise or create a better world. Dolphins and elephants do exhibit love, nurturing and group loyalty, all of which in a sense are aspects of the moral life but they lack moral vision.

Furthermore the distinction between moral and non-moral also has to do with semantics: the fact that words which we often associate with moral matters can have non-moral meanings as well. Good and bad; right and wrong, are some of the terms that we usually associate with the evaluation of morality. In some ways moral terms are often disengaged from their contexts and confused with evaluation although the intention is not to evaluate morality. For example, if I evaluate a student’s essay and commended it as a good essay; good in this instance refers more to the academic capacities, literary abilities and the right technical execution of details such as sentence construction and referencing, than to the character of the student.

This is a crucial distinction that has particular significance for this study as it demonstrates that judgment of character is different, but can be confused with judgment of academic capacities, social skills or technical skills when evaluative terms such as good and bad are used as assessment criteria.

As Birch and Rasmussen (1989: 36) explain

Moral consciousness resides in the distinction of is from ought and that it has to do with the capacity of humans to discern and choose what is right over wrong, to seek a better world or envision a transformed society.


So while humans may have a social agreement of what morality is or ought to be, they have a choice in acting in accordance to what is moral. Seen from this perspective what is moral refers to understanding the difference between a present situation (what is) and a future one (what ought or could be) and involves choice. Sigelman and Shaffer (1995) concur with this idea and maintain that the term morality implies the ability to make a distinction between right and wrong, to act accordingly and to experience pride for the correct choices and shame for the wrong ones.

Another perspective of the meaning of moral is to distinguish between different ways of understanding practices in societies. Practices in societies can be described and defined from a variety of ways of understanding or perspectives; the social; legal; religious; economic, moral and political. But can one perspective be similar to another? Understanding abortion from a legal perspective is different from understanding it from a moral perspective; therefore legal and moral perspectives often do not converge. To describe society in terms of a concern and compassion for the welfare of human beings is not necessarily to describe it from the legal, political or economic perspective. It is to describe it from a perspective that is linked to a disposition of goodwill, caring, compassion and concern for the well-being of others, all of which are typically moral considerations. So the moral point of view establishes the reference point or boundaries for elements of the moral life as it provides the framework for what is to be included and excluded in a discussion of the moral life.

### 3.2.4. VALUES AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Kerr (1999) in referring to citizenship makes a distinction between three approaches to citizenship education: education about citizenship, citizenship through citizenship and education for citizenship. Kerr explains that:

- Education about citizenship involves and incorporates gaining understanding of national history and the governing structures and constitutional processes of civil society.
- Citizenship through education is a more inter-active “hands on” approach and includes participation and involvement in school and community life.
- Education for citizenship is inclusive of both approaches but also includes equipping learners with skills, attitudes and values to prepare them for active participation and responsible citizenship.



Gutmann and Thompson (1996) refer to active citizenship while Walters (1999) mention critical citizenship. Mitchell (2003) refers to reflexive and participative citizenship. Waghid (2004) points to different uses of the term citizenship that have become embedded in educational discourses through the introduction of concepts such as democratic citizenship. He maintains that South African educational discourse has tended to fuse many aspects of citizenship in its Values, Education and Democracy initiative. While the writer generally supports the idea of citizenship education, he argues that citizenship education in South Africa is guided by liberal and communitarian concepts of citizenship, and that this liberal-communitarian concept of citizenship is not sufficient on its own to bring about educational transformation in institutions. Referring to the question of values Waghid (2004: 535) holds that:

Whereas the South African programme...highlights the importance of teaching pupils to become democratic, *socially just* individuals...it does not mention the necessity for pupils to become trustworthy, generous and compassionate: *morally just* individuals.

Waghid points out that, citizenship education in South Africa also needs to promote a sense of compassion; motivating learners to take seriously the suffering of others, as the stability of modern democracies depends not only on the justice of their institutions, but also on the quality and attitude of their citizens. He therefore believes that the concept of compassionate citizenship ought to be included in our understanding of democratic citizenship. Veugelers (2003) has suggested that the notion of a just life should inform citizenship education

Racial barriers, national barriers and social barriers cause damage to all people. A society with caring and compassion as its central values is one that challenges and dismantles barriers that have historically been erected and tolerated. Current concerns such as the HIV and AIDS pandemic, poverty, crime, abortion, child prostitution, human trafficking, and road rage affect both the private and public lives of citizens. The recent incidences of Xenophobia brought Waghid's notion of compassionate citizenship into sharp focus.

What was at issue, in this case, was to make a decision between compassion for the unfortunate displaced victims, or indifference to their plight, in other words making morally just decisions. Judging from the views about these incidences expressed in the local media, it seems that for some reason, compassion is more readily extended to victims of natural disasters (floods, hurricanes, tsunamis and famine) than to victims of political disasters (wars, and displaced people).

Kymlicka (1999: 88) in support of Waghid (2004) is quoted as saying:

... citizenship education is not simply a matter of knowledge of political and constitutional institutions. It is also a matter of how we think about and behave towards others.”

Harley and Wedekind (2004:195) referring to the new curriculum maintain that, “its new mission would be that of uniting all citizens as equals in a democratic and prosperous South Africa.” What these views illustrate is that values such as compassion, caring, and the common good are essential for genuine educational transformation. This should alert us to the fact that there ought to be a moral dimension to citizenship education. Furthermore, these views signal that values education could not only potentially extend beyond citizenship education, as it is commonly understood, but that it ought to.

In conclusion, while I take on board and support the notion of compassionate citizenship as explained by the writers above, I want to sound a note of caution. The crisis relief centre of a local church provided shelter in the hall for 30 victims (that had been identified by its members) of the recent Xenophobic attacks. Within a day the numbers had grown beyond what the relief centre could accommodate as victims flocked to the hall demanding shelter. The point is that learners should be taught to value compassion for what it is: an act of goodwill which is extended by caring human beings to others in need and it should therefore not be tainted by notions of entitlement.

### **3.3 EXPECTATIONS OF VALUES EDUCATION**

According to Veugelers (2001) critical-democratic citizens are not mere participants, but they also take responsibility for the functioning of society. Judging from the aims of the Constitution of South Africa and the selection of personal and common values in the Manifesto, it is reasonable to deduce that there is an expectation that educational policies in South Africa will support the development of critical democratic citizens. The kind of learner that is envisaged is described in policy documents as one who is imbued with democratic values and acts in the interests of society, based on respect for

democracy, equality, human dignity, life and social justice. (Report of the Review Committee on C2005, DoE, 2000)

It is clear that it is expected that the inclusion of personal and common values in the curriculum will result in learners who are bearers of both rights and responsibilities. Veugelers (2001) contends that a multicultural society places specific demands on a critical-democratic citizenship. For, in terms of values education policies, young people are expected to develop their own identities and at the same time, they must be prepared to actively participate in societal life and respect differences in identities.

Gutmann's (1990: 2) observation that "these tensions between individual freedom and civic virtue pose a challenge for education in every pluralistic society" sums up the challenge facing values education in other countries and in South Africa.

### **3.4 THE NATURE OF VALUES KNOWLEDGE**

Assuming then that there is a role for schools, what philosophical understanding of knowledge, and particularly knowledge about values and morals can best guide the practice of values education? Ryle (1971) developed an epistemological framework for the classification of knowledge which has made an important contribution to general theories of learning and teaching. It provides an illuminating framework for answering the question of how to distinguish between different categories of knowledge. I prefer this framework for three reasons: firstly, it acknowledges that values constitute a different kind of knowledge from other categories of knowledge; secondly, it provides a helpful classification of knowledge; and thirdly it provides a practical way of relating to the categories of knowledge proposed in the curriculum. Ryle (1971) distinguishes between three kinds of knowledge: *knowing about* which is associated with factual or content knowledge; *knowing how to*, which refers to skills or operational knowledge, and

*knowing to be*, which refers to acting in accordance with positive values, dispositions and attitudes in short, acting morally. More recently Mason (1997) based on the framework provided by Ryle, makes a similar distinction between categories of knowledge, but refers to propositional, procedural and dispositional knowledge.

If this framework is applied to values education it could mean for example, knowing about values; such as social norms or conventions; knowing ways of behaviour and then having a disposition towards acting in accordance with accepted social and moral norms. Ryle claims that for the latter kind of knowing, one needs to know “how to go on in the same way” as a conscious act of will. According to Ryle this is learnt through example (modelling), training (discipline) and understanding (cognition). An important point that Ryle demonstrates is that while there are methods of teaching and learning “that” and “how to” we need a different approach for knowing how “to be.” What Ryle suggests is that moral learning is informed by both of these categories as well as the will to act accordingly, as each of these categories of knowledge is necessary for moral learning. For example in a lesson on natural resources in environmental education one could address:


- a) The state of water resources
- b) How to save water
- c) The will to act in accordance with (b)

If the same principle is applied to values education:

- a) Knowing what respect is
- b) Knowing how to behave with respect towards others
- c) Being respectful

There is a general assumption among many educators that outcomes based education prioritises procedural knowledge. The central argument appears to

be that one ideology, academic competence, is being replaced with another ideology, operational competence. Gultig (2002:115) supports this argument and explains: “This focus on demonstrated, visible performance has the effect of emphasizing procedural knowledge at the expense of propositional knowledge.” The assumptions and argument is based on the fact that learning outcomes should be stated in terms of outwardly observable performance. The notion that teaching should primarily be focussed on demonstrable competences that could be assessed against clearly-set criteria of performance, on the one hand signalled a welcome shift from the overemphasis on the transmission of facts and rote learning. But on the other hand, the emphasis on procedural knowledge has left many teachers confused and uncertain about the relevance of propositional knowledge to the extent that some teachers no longer believe propositional knowledge to be as important as procedural knowledge. I strongly agree with Gultig (2002) who maintains that we need to be cautious about disregarding content knowledge. Hemson (1996:192-194) in defence of content knowledge argues that:



... knowledge does not change in such a way as to make all previous knowledge irrelevant...What has changed with the rapid development of knowledge is a greater understanding that educators cannot achieve a command over such a wide range of content as in the past.

Gultig regards content knowledge as being as important as procedural knowledge and while theorists like Ryle and Mason seem to emphasise procedural knowledge this does not imply that they regard content knowledge as unimportant. Mason (1997:10) explains the emphasis on procedural knowledge and reminds us that: “The intellectual currents of the day stress what Jean-Francois Lyotard, the French philosopher of post-modernism, called the performativity of knowledge in other words of what practical use is your knowledge, or what can it do?”

The question that now arises is not whether propositional or procedural knowledge should be prioritised, but whether these categories of knowledge

are in themselves sufficient to hold us accountable for how knowledge is used? Accountability for the use of knowledge points to a moral dimension; a category of knowledge that should not only terminate in the acquisition of knowledge, or consist of knowing how to execute procedures, but the application of knowledge which should facilitate the development of accountability and caring for the ends to which knowledge is used. This knowledge integrates thinking, doing and feeling. Mason (1997) refers to this category as dispositional knowledge. For example a learner may become a brilliant physicist, but this kind of knowledge does not have the capacity by itself to make her want to care that her knowledge is used in morally correct ways and not to manufacture bombs to inflict harm on humanity. Mason (1997) agrees with this and maintains that: “The learning of propositional and procedural knowledge without a firm grounding in a set of shared values (moral learning) creates unthinking technocrats.” Technocratic rationality or instrumental rationality limits itself to questions on how to do it rather than questioning why it should be done (Morrow 2001). Gibson (1986:1-19) has described technocratic rationality as “a kind of intellectual activity which actually results in the decline of reason itself and it therefore stultifies, distorts and limits individual and social growth.”

There is a common misconception that tends to equate knowing that or knowing how to with knowing to be. In values education the task of the teacher is not only to acquaint learners with bits of theory as Peters (1973) has argued, or content knowledge about the predominant values and morals of society and how to behave. It must extend beyond that and culminate in moral conduct (wanting to be) if it wants to qualify as values education. Following Ryle, values education is not just about simply helping children to know what is considered right and what to do. It is also encouraging them to want to act in accordance with what is right; which means providing them with opportunities and tools (skills) to practice making moral decisions and acting morally when confronted with a moral decision (Ryle, 1971). So, what Ryle seems to be suggesting, is that learners should also be taught how to live

values, as no amount of moralising on what to do will necessarily result in learners being moral. After all learners are not human doings but human beings.

It is evident that moral learning is a different kind of learning which requires much more than merely telling learners what to do or knowing what to do. It also includes the will to do. It is often mistakenly assumed that the intellect is educable, but that the will is not. But if our wills were not educable we would never want better food or better education or better communities. The theory that the human will is uneducable, flies in the face of the fact that people do have the will to desire more knowingly, intelligently and reasonably (Gibson, 1986). So if we accept that individuals have a free will when it comes to making value choices, one of the aims of values education as I see it, is to educate the will of learners to make good moral decisions and choices.

The frameworks provided by Ryle (1971) and Mason (1997) are by no means perfect as it is common knowledge that it is not always possible to make such neat, precise distinctions between different categories of knowledge particularly in respect of values as values are informed by all three categories. But these frameworks are illuminating as they make visible the taken-for-granted and seemingly unexamined view that is embedded in the curriculum that all categories of knowledge are the same.

Ryle's theory correctly suggests that the processes through which different kinds of knowing occur are far more complex than can be addressed by merely providing educators with a curriculum based on specific outcomes, assessment standards and assessment codes which uncritically assume that such requirements can be applicable to all forms of knowledge, teaching, learning and assessment.

### **3.5 VALUE PRIORITIES IN EDUCATION**

The most profound challenge that values education in democracies has to confront is how to reconcile freedom to choose personal values with commitment to common democratic values (Forster, 2001). For while members of a democratic society value their individual freedom of choice in respect of values and beliefs that they hold, they should also value a society where there is adherence to a common consensus of what constitutes the moral good. Waghid (2004:528) agrees with this view and maintains that “individuals cannot simply pursue their own self-interest without regard for the common good.” Certain values have been prioritised for inclusion in the curriculum, but there as yet seems to be no common agreement about which values should be given priority in schools and for what reasons. The Chair of the Curriculum 2005 Review Committee, Linda Chisholm, criticised C2005 for more or less the same reason: ... “It also does not provide a strong enough statement about which values the curriculum promotes and which it does not promote” (Gevisser & Morris, 2002: 197-219).

#### **3.5.1 INTERNATIONAL DEBATES ON VALUES PRIORITIES**

The question that begs an answer is should we prioritise personal values over common values? If so, which values and for what reasons? The literature indicates that some communitarian writers give priority to teaching what Njabula Ndebele at the Saamtrek Conference (2001) referred to as “the ties that bind”; those common values that provide social cohesion and unite citizens in their pursuit of a common good. But Gutmann (1990:3) challenges this communitarian view and maintains that “societies united by a common good have without exception been repressive and discriminatory.” She cites as an example that perceptions of the common good of the New England Puritans of seventeenth -century Salem, commanded them to hunt witches. Closer to home in South Africa, a perception of the common good of society

in terms of racial separation policies of the National Party (1948), led to the repressive social policy of Apartheid.

The literature indicates that writers generally maintain that education must remain neutral amongst different conceptions of the good life. Ackerman (1980:139) asserts a more individualistic conception of education and postulates that “a system of liberal education provides children with a sense of the very different lives that could be theirs.” Brighouse (1998) supports this view and reminds us that a key feature of public education in a liberal democratic society is that it does not impose or prescribe an exclusive conception of the good life on its future citizens, but that it rather equips them to define and shape the good life for themselves. Rorty (1990a) concurs with the views of Ackerman and Brighouse and asserts that the role of schools is to create literate citizens and independent thinkers who can distinguish right from wrong for themselves. Lipman (1961) supports this view and agrees that this is to be considered the most important mandate of schools.

It appears that we stand at an educational impasse. We must either teach learners personal autonomy, so that they are free to choose the good life among the widest range of options available for themselves, because freedom of choice is paramount. Alternatively, we should teach them to become good citizens because common civic values are the paramount good. The notion of personal autonomy provides the basis for freedom in democracies and it is generally agreed that all persons have the right to autonomy. Strike (1982) points out that autonomy is a complex term and that it fundamentally consists of three components. Firstly, psychological freedom; this is the capacity for independent choice. Secondly, the right to self-determination; this means the right to choose one’s own beliefs and lifestyle. Finally, persons have the right to participate in collective choices. Strike points out that these are pre-requisites for responsible choice and that a person who is not free in these ways cannot act or choose autonomously. But what does autonomy mean in respect of the rights of citizens in a democratic society? Fundamentally it

means that all people have a *prima facie* right to be self-governing, which indicates that the right to autonomy is rooted in the notion of agency.

Seen from Strike's perspective citizens must be capacitated to access (interpret, judge and apply) information and evidence in an intelligent way. This refers to the development of those cognitive abilities that enable the capacity for rational choice and decision-making. We cannot assume that sound moral judgement will develop without the cognitive skills and dispositions to be able to evaluate situations in an informed way, to choose options responsibly and then to act in accordance with those decisions. The objective of values education from this perspective should be to create opportunities for intelligent deliberation as Waghid (2004) refers to it, about moral issues and social problems in order to provide learners with relevant tools to exercise their right to autonomy intelligently and responsibly (Lipman, 1961). The implication is that morality is not only a matter of intelligent reasoning or thinking about moral issues. For if one only thinks about what ought to be done, but does not do it, there is a perfectly clear sense in which one has not solved the problem. It is the actual doing that solves the problem, not the answer you have in your head. This looks like one of the more promising roles for values education.

The question that remains unanswered is should schools prioritise personal or common values? It seems that the most common ethical stance adopted by educators in various countries especially those of democracies, was consensus pluralism. This position is justified on the premise that democracies provide freedom of choice to individuals. But the danger of this position is that, in the absence of a common moral compass a situation of moral relativism may arise.

The literature indicates a tendency to formulate objectives in education as dichotomies; in this case, personal or common values. Dewey (1964) strongly objects to this tendency and points out that it creates tension when

distinctions are made in terms of personal and common values, facts and values; freedom and discipline and freedom and truth. He cites the example of practices relating to freedom and discipline in schools and locates this debate within the larger debate of “child-centred” or “subject-centred” approaches to pedagogy. The problem is that these approaches are presented as being incompatible with each other, as if they cannot be held in tandem. Dewey (1964:255-259) resolves this tension by redefining and reconstructing the freedom- discipline debate: he links discipline to freedom in the following way:

The discipline that is identical with trained power is also identical with freedom. For freedom is power to act and to execute independent of external guidance. It signifies mastery ... emancipated from the leading strings of others ...

In this way both freedom and discipline become necessary, for a balanced approach to freedom. Gutmann (1990:5) also argues that this debate between personal and common values need not be constructed as a dichotomy and points out that the “the ideal of democratic education denies the validity of the dichotomy between individual and common values.” She argues in favour of schools promoting values and claims that we can make some progress towards relieving the tension between personal and common values if we develop a more democratic ideal for education.

Rorty (1990a: 44-47) points out that we should not ignore the fact that the word (values) education covers two entirely distinct, but equally necessary processes; socialization and individuation. The interesting question is: which values should be given priority during these processes? I think the answer lies in understanding the nature of these processes. The meaning of “socialization” according to the Collins English Dictionary (2004:1543) is “to prepare for life in society.” In some African societies this preparation is done through *esuthwini*; an initiation process which resembles the idea of an apprenticeship for young males. The aim of this apprenticeship is conscious

social reproduction, to induct the immature into the history, social constructs, norms, values, traditions and customs of their societies.

Dewey (1966) believes that socialisation is the shaping of an animal into a human being, followed (with luck) by the self-individuation and self-creation of that human being through his/her later revolt against that very process. So, for Dewey who had a significant influence on Rorty's ideas, primary education will always be in part, a process of socialising the young into the received ideas of the society. Dewey claims that;

Society exists through a process of transmission quite as much as biological life. This transmission occurs by means of communication of habits of doing, ways of thinking and feeling from the older to the younger. Without this communication of ideals, hopes, expectations and opinions from those members of society who are passing out of the group to those who are coming into it, social life could not survive (Dewey 1966: 3).


Dewey believes that higher education is a matter of inciting doubt and stimulating the imagination, thereby challenging and removing the barriers that socialization inevitably imposes.

So for Dewey (1966) and Rorty (1990) the teaching of common values should precede the teaching of personal values; meaning that socialization should come before individuation. Rorty (1990:45) explains: "education up to the age of 17 or 19 is mostly a matter of socialization; of getting students to take over the moral and political common sense of the society as it is ...." Dewey (1966) claims that it can never be the function of lower education to challenge prevalent ideas of what in a society is held to be true. Mitchley (1991:45) in agreement with Rorty and Dewey notes: "Children must take what society can give them and learn how it works before they can hope to change it."

Sartre's (1956) view of freedom seems to hinge on what is currently perceived to be a post-modernistic or moral relativistic view. On this view

values and moral standards are seen to be a matter of opinion for, according to this view, there is no absolute truth, meaning or certainty as to what values and moral standards ought to be. Sartre strangely believes in moral equality between a child and a grown adult and views them as moral equals. Based on this belief, he argues that both can define and choose the good life for themselves. His contention is that what all individuals have in common is that they have the freedom to choose; and choice is freedom and freedom choice. He is quoted as saying, “Man does not exist in order to be free, subsequently, there is no difference between the being of man and his being free” (Sartre, 1956: 25).

The difficulty as I see it is to explain how children with their initial limited understanding and lack of intelligent reasoning and discernment of the choices available to them, can make responsible choices. Surely choices based on impulse, feelings, ignorance and lack of certainty, cannot be regarded as responsible? Manser (1966:122) is equally unconvinced of Sartre’s position and points out that;



It would seem that little remains of the freedom that Sartre has emphasised... it is hard to see how an infant can be aware of what he is doing, and if not, then it is odd, even irresponsible, (my emphasis) to call him responsible.

Even the legal system acknowledges that youth cannot always be held responsible for the consequences of their actions and therefore age restrictions are imposed on obtaining a driver’s licence and what constitutes statutory rape.

The logical question then is: at what stage should learners be taught to be critical about the received ideas of society? According to Bak (2004:45) “critical discussion of the accepted rules, norms and values can begin at primary school level.” The primary aim of the process of socialization should be to provide novices with tools (concepts related to ways of knowing) that

will enable learners to identify the boundaries of the range of options that are available to them in order to make informed choices about what constitutes the moral life. In other words these tools should function to guide and deepen perceptions which will generate critical discussions about society in the individuation stage. Bak (2004: 44) posits that it is through communication of the things people hold in common that communal life is possible. In this way the processes of socialisation and individuation become linked. Those members of society whom Green (2001: 84) and other writers have referred to as “more knowledgeable others” all contribute in one way or another to extend this process of socialization until it culminates in individuation.

Seen from Rorty’s perspective, learners do not automatically have unlimited freedom of personal choice of values, but that their freedom necessarily ought to be constrained by their ability to make rational choices about values. Therefore Rorty maintains that “freedom cannot begin before some constraints have been imposed” (1990: 46). So Rorty and Dewey seem to hold views that accord with Piagetian thinking of stages of cognitive development while Bak and Lipman seem to think that we do not have to wait for adolescence if we make the input of values relevant.

Morrow (1989: 117) commenting on the socialization process points out that:

...immature human beings are dependent not only for their very survival, but also for their development into rational beings on the benevolent actions of the more mature beings amongst whom they live.

A crucial matter to note, here, is that immature beings cannot appreciate, at least not till after the event, the nature, and value of benevolent actions such as values education. As explained by Rorty and Dewey the process of socialisation needs the imposition of boundaries and this by implication means that socialisation is of necessity an undemocratic process.

Bak (2004: 45) agrees that the socialisation process is undemocratic and argues that it would be inappropriate to apply basic democratic principles such as equality and autonomy to the socialisation process of education. Following Harré (1999) Bak makes a distinction between “thin” and “thick” democracy and concludes that the socialisation process of education is necessarily characterised by “thin” democracy. Strike (1982) does not seem to support Bak’s view of thin democracy in the socialisation process only as he holds that democracy in educational affairs is governance by the incompetent. This seems to suggest that for Strike education in general should be undemocratic as he believes that learners are incompetent to be self governing when it comes to education. Seen from this perspective there is a need for education, in democracies, particularly in South Africa, to question whether the perceived strong focus on the democratic rights of learners is sacrificing morality for the sake of democracy.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the founding document for policies aimed at the introduction of values education in South African schools; the Manifesto on Values Education and Democracy (Department of Education, 2001) professes that there is “no intention to impose values.” This view reflects a limited understanding of what is constitutive of values acquisition in the different processes of education as explained by Rorty (1990); Dewey (1966); Strike (1982) and Bak (2004).

In summary, if Gutmann, Rorty, Dewey, Bak and other writers who support the view that socialisation should precede individuation are correct, then the pedagogical implications for schools in democracies are clear; to firstly cultivate common values and set boundaries to human rights through a process of socialisation, and then, through the process of individuation prepare learners for meaningful life as thinking democratic citizens. If we take on board the insights of these writers then South Africa’s moral and political commonsense in respect of the process of socialising the youth into a culture of human rights seems to need revision and re-thinking in many

ways. It appears that there may be some truth in the general perception among educators that the government places too much emphasis on the rights of learners and that there is a need to set boundaries to these. The challenge for values education in South Africa therefore is, firstly to socialise learners into the common values of a democratic society such as caring, compassion, respect and honesty and then during the individuation phase, to find a balance between personal and common values as both are necessary, for the development of thinking, democratic citizens.

### **3.5.2 THE LOCAL DEBATE ON VALUES EDUCATION**

Delegates at the Saamtrek Conference on Values, Education and Democracy held in South Africa in (DoE, 2001), did not reach consensus on the question of whether values can be taught. Morrow with regards to this maintained that "...values could not be taught in a classroom but emerge gradually if at all, out of community life..." (DoE, 2001:13). Some educators argue that schools cannot take on the responsibility of inculcating values in learners as this is considered to be the responsibility of parents. There are also those who believe that values education requires a collective effort from all members of society as values are socially constructed. Ex-President Mandela supported this view and maintained that "... one of the most powerful ways of children and young adults acquiring values is to see individuals they admire and respect exemplify those values in their own being and conduct (Values, Education and Democracy DoE, 2001:13). Justice O' Regan maintained that values cannot be asserted or taught in any direct fashion, but are assimilated and adopted and that the manner in which we teach probably does more to instil values than the subject matter that we teach.

Hindle at the same conference remained sceptical about the role of education in the teaching of values and maintained that the whole issue of character building is the responsibility of institutions in society; the home, the family, the church and schools. Nolan, responding to a question on the legislation of

values agreed that a government must make laws and impose them in order to protect society, but he argued that this is not how you educate people in the spontaneous adoption of moral values. He believed that the adoption of moral values requires a change of consciousness; something that education can do. Reardon (1995, 1997) in support of Nolan (1995; 1997) emphasised the need for values to centrally inform human rights education. Her thesis is that the moral dimensions of human rights are central to an appreciation of human rights, and that education in and of values is crucial for the preservation and development of human rights, including those in schools.

What these opposing views indicate is that the question of values education is complex and seems to entail more than policy by declaration or the setting up of a moral agenda for teachers to teach. Kallaway (2007) points out that policies which neglect teachers' insights are not going to work and external managerial solutions are deeply damaging to schools, teachers and students. This seems to be the approach that the Manifesto has favoured. Kohlberg (1971) criticized such approaches on the grounds that they project and endorse a "bag of virtues" approach to morality which in his view often does not accomplish much in changing the mindsets, decisions and actions of people.

### **3.6 CONCLUSION**

Much of the present complexity and uncertainty, in respect of values education, seems to stem from a flawed conceptual understanding of the nature of values knowledge. Therefore we might conclude that learners who have knowledge about values but no experience of making informed choices and lack personal capacity to reason about moral issues intelligently, are likely to act less morally if only just from ignorance or failure to consider different possibilities.

This chapter has revealed that values and values education is a distinctive category of knowledge. It is distinct from knowledge and skills, but is also inclusive of it. It appears that the complex nature of values knowledge is not always known, considered and acknowledged by curriculum designers. This chapter has revealed that there is a moral dimension to citizenship education and that unless the link between values, moral education and citizenship education is taken into account, impoverished versions of citizenship education will result.

An important conclusion drawn from this chapter is the need for further ongoing discussion and deliberation about values education. The need for a coherent policy for values education has often been expressed and the current policy has been identified as a concern. What has emerged from this chapter is that there are many aspects relating to values education that first need to be resolved. I believe that the resolution of these is a pre-condition for a coherent policy for values education.

In the following chapter I will explore the teaching of values showing that depending on how values knowledge is conceptualised, there are different possibilities in respect of content, process and assessment.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE TEACHING OF VALUES

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

Different kinds of knowledge exist in any society: lay knowledge, experiential knowledge, tacit knowledge and intuition all of which influence value preferences and values acquisition of individuals in one way or another through their everyday experiences. As a result of this, different perspectives about the acquisition of values abound in society, for instance, that values are ‘caught rather than taught.’ But it appears that understanding the need for racial and religious tolerance, the need to respect the suffering of the less fortunate, or the details of other peoples’ cultures and point of view, are types of knowledge that educators and especially learners do not ‘catch or pick up’ through everyday experiences (Beck, 1990).

In this chapter I explore the major theoretical approaches, as suggested in the literature, to the teaching of values. Thereafter, I refer briefly to the classroom strategies most frequently mentioned in the literature and then turn to research evidence regarding educators’ perceptions of their role in the teaching of values. I then explore the curriculum guidelines for the teaching of values both generally and in respect of Life Orientation. Finally given the strong emphasis on the professional judgement of educators in policy documents, I examine what the professional judgement of educators in respect of the teaching of values entails.

It is generally accepted that the responsibility to teach values does not only rest with schools. Civic institutions share the responsibility to teach positive values, but as Waghid (2004:44) points out, these institutions also have the potential of indoctrinating learners with negative attitudes of intolerance and racism. He therefore concludes: “that the virtues of responsible citizenship

can best be learned in schools.” Justice O’Regan speaking at Saamtrek: Values Education and Democracy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (2001) agreed that schools are probably in the best position to teach values but held that the manner in which we teach probably does more to instil values than the subject matter of what we teach. This view is endorsed by Waghid (2004: 44) who believes that:

... schools must educate learners how to engage in the kind of critical reasoning and moral perspectives that define public reasonableness and hence promoting these sorts of virtues is one of the fundamental justifications for (values) education.

Waghid (2004:532) alerts us to what is constitutive of moral judgement in democracies and suggests that “moral judgement pre-supposes an ability among citizens to appreciate not only the arguments of those who support their position, but also of those who oppose it; a competence in moral reasoning that is crucial for participating in a democratic society.” Enslin, (1984), commenting on the crucial pedagogical role of educators in democracies remarked that for democracies to thrive citizens have to be taught to be democrats.

If we accept that there is a crucial role for values education in schools, then it is important to explore different approaches to the teaching of values to identify their strengths and weaknesses so that schools and educators can be capacitated to deliver this mandate.

## **4.2 APPROACHES TO THE TEACHING OF VALUES**

### **4.2.1 BEHAVIOURIST APPROACHES**

Behaviourist theories assume that knowledge is acquired either through the strategic use of rewards Skinner (1971) or the observation of the behaviour of others and the rewards it elicits Bandura (1974). Skinner’s (1971) theory of

behaviourism has been and continues to be very influential in educational thinking. Important concepts that inform this theory are stimuli, response and rewards. The social learning approach as presented by Bandura (1974) is based on the premise that learning occurs through observational learning and imitation of the behaviour of role models. The behaviour of educators, parents, peers and members of society are modelled to learners, who in turn, may choose to imitate and reproduce such forms of behaviour through observational learning. Behaviourist learning theorists believe that moral behaviour is learnt in the same way that other forms of social behaviour are learnt: through reinforcement with rewards and punishment and by observational learning of others being rewarded. Behaviourist approaches claim only to be able to increase the likelihood of certain observable behaviours which, in terms of Ryle's framework, amounts to operational knowledge or knowledge of 'how to do' things.

Rewards may serve as temporary motivation and immediate gratification for learners to be good and this may result in a lack of real commitment to continue to do the right thing or 'to follow the rules.' In this case learners tend to exhibit good conduct simply as a means to an end and the inculcation and internalization of values loses importance. The result of this is that learners who are frequently rewarded, are likely to only behave pro-socially when they believe external pressures or rewards are present and not from any real desire to want to be good. The point is that the primary motive may be to gain rewards and as Lipman (1996) asserts: this approach helps learners to achieve outward commendation at the expense of inner conviction.

However it is important not to ignore the potential of social learning theory. If positive values are 'caught' it must be from some admired role model. Role models who express certain positive values and display satisfaction when these values are upheld and rewarded, have an important role to play in the value formation of their admirers. This suggests that identifying learners' role models may be instructive.

#### 4.2.2 KOHLBERG'S STAGE THEORY

Kohlberg cited in Nucci (2004) rejects the notion that values education could be comprised of a moral agenda that spells out lists of values to be learnt. Kohlberg's work (1963, 1981) has remained influential in research on moral development as he provides clarity on the perceived relationship between reasoning and morality. One of the real strengths of Kohlberg's approach to moral education in schools according to Nucci (2001:9) is that "it was grounded in research on moral development and associated philosophical analyses." Nucci regards this as a very important point about moral education for, as she sees it, it highlights a crucial shortcoming of most approaches to moral education; all too often psychology is expected to provide only methods for moral teaching without questioning or examining why. It is these insights that have motivated me to fuse philosophical and psychological frameworks in this study on the teaching and assessment of values.

Kohlberg's research is based on studies of the moral judgments that individuals make when confronted with a hypothetical moral dilemma, the most famous being the Heinz dilemma which poses the question of whether it could ever be morally right to steal in order to save a life. He developed a framework based on the findings of this research which proposes that "moral reasoning is related to the development of specific levels of cognition" (Papalia & Olds 1978:217). Kohlberg believes that the capacity to make moral judgements of right or wrong depends on the capacity to reason. He sees moral development as part of a natural maturation process that can be facilitated, but not unduly hastened.

Stages 1 and II in Kohlberg's scheme are referred to as the stage of Pre-conventional Morality. What is typical of this stage is unquestioning obedience based on the power of authority figures (usually parents or educators). During stage I rules are accepted without question by children and right and wrong are whatever is rewarded or punished. Moral judgements

are made on the basis of observable consequences, not the doer's intentions. A young child will therefore think that it is worse to make a big mess while helping someone, than to make a small mess while fooling around. In Stage II the child is still focused on his /her own needs, and right or wrong are seen as what satisfies those needs. Children generally behave well in order to get what they want or to avoid the unpleasantness of punishment.

Stages III and IV are known as the stage of Conventional Morality. At stage III the individual is able to consider the views of others as well as obedience to the rule of law. Right behaviour is what pleases other people. It is at this stage that children are able to learn pro-social behaviour and understand what is required to be a good citizen. The notion of what constitutes a "good" or "bad" child operates at this stage. The individual is now capable of judging actions and intentions. At Stage IV the child enters the law and order stage, in which right is seen as doing one's duty according to the norms and rules of society, such as showing respect for authority and rules are adhered to because a sense of conscience has developed.

Stages V and VI represent the stages of Post-conventional Morality. Individuals base moral decisions on principled reasoning: a sense of responsibility develops and actions, intentions and consequences for the self and others are considered. Right is seen not so much as a matter of social rules, but rather as a matter of personally held views. Laws are not seen as absolutes and may change. Stage V reasoning is based on making moral decisions that are established through mutual agreement such as majority rules and consensus. At stage VI according to Kohlberg, right conduct is determined by self-chosen moral principles and is based on respect for the dignity of human beings. Reasoning is based on the universal principles of justice and liberty, even if they conflict with social norms or oppose rules.

Kohlberg's account of how people develop through these stages is linked to Piaget's theory of cognitive development. Stages 5 and 6 are only considered

possible once individuals have reached the stage of formal operations which usually occurs during adolescence. Both Piaget and Kohlberg assume that development is an individual process dependent on the active involvement of the developing person and the provision of appropriate environmental stimuli.

Kohlberg suggests that adolescents should engage in the discussion of hypothetical moral dilemmas to promote moral reasoning and encourage movement towards the next stage. The aim of this approach is to strengthen children's reasoning and moral judgement through dialogue, discussion and deliberation so generally speaking it is a learner-centred approach, based on constructivist principles which let the learners take over their own learning. Any adult present facilitates discussion but does not prescribe values. This approach is supported by Blatt and Kohlberg (1975), Galbraith and Jones (1976), and Howard-Hamilton (1995). Discussion-based approaches such as debates, small group discussions, brain storming activities and speeches are widely used although Taylor (1994) points out that discussion may be viewed as having low status as a teaching method. It is commonly agreed that the success of any discussion-based activity is determined by the communication skills and attitudes of children. Moreover, discussion does not automatically lead to desirable social values. Cohen (quoted in Klein, 1993) found that children did not necessarily change their racist views when challenged to examine them in open discussion.

I do not agree with Cohen's view for, as Kohlberg's theory has shown, it depends on the stage of moral reasoning that learners and even adults have reached. While discussion of racism leaves a great deal to an individual's judgment and younger learners may not be able to discuss complex issues possibly because of a limited moral vocabulary, they can be inducted to discussions of moral challenges such as bullying or name calling as Kohlberg (1978) suggests. Moreover children are very often not even aware of racism they learn to be racist by imitating the behaviour of adults. Discussion does in

fact offer fruitful opportunities to discuss moral issues with younger learners to unlearn negative behavioural patterns, providing that such discussions relate to the experiences of learners. I believe that when learners and adults experience real freedom in a non-threatening, learning environment, they are more eager to communicate their points of view and learn from each other even about contentious issues such as culture, sexism and racism. In such learning environments new meanings can be constructed and points of view modified as new perspectives are developed.

Kohlberg's theory is also claimed by the values clarification approach to the teaching of values, which is strongly influenced by individualist Piagetian views and the assumption that reasoning individuals will choose desirable values. It maintains that moral education must promote freedom of choice of the individual; which seems to imply freedom from any form of influence, coercion or indoctrination. This approach is grounded in the assumption that values are a matter of personal choice, concern and reflection and therefore it rejects any attempts from religion, society, politics or tradition to impose values on the young.

It is asserted that the values clarification model rejects any notion of conformity to some external code or norms of behaviour, or the common good that is exclusively determined by a social institution. Milson and Mehlig, (2002) have condemned this approach where individuals have freedom of choice to the exclusion of concern for others as morally relativistic.

A limitation of moral relativism is that valuing the common good, cannot flourish without inter-subjective agreement among members of what constitutes the moral good. Morrow (1989:176) agrees and maintains that:

... shared goods are not merely the convergence of various interests, but articulation of principles which give unity and direction to the life of the community... their common

appreciation is constitutive of them...what binds a community together is shared goods.

As pointed out by Papalia and Olds (1978: 284) “Kohlberg’s theory describes moral judgements rather than moral action” and moral judgment as is commonly known, does not necessarily result in moral action as Kohlberg seems to assume. One can hardly solve a moral problem by merely uttering or forming a judgement. It is the actual doing that constitutes solving the problem not merely the judgement. So, Kohlberg is perhaps guilty of idealism as his theories tend to present a conceptual relationship between moral judgment and moral action, and he paints a much neater picture of uniform moral development in human beings than that which we experience in reality. Muuss (1988) draws our attention to the fact that Kohlberg questioned his own assumptions about moral reasoning in the sixth stage, citing the difficulty of finding people at such a high level of moral development. Naude (2008) has similarly pointed out that some people never develop to Kohlberg’s sixth stage of moral reasoning.

#### **4.2.3 INSIGHTS DRAWN FROM VYGOTSKY’S THEORY**

Kohlberg’s theory is based on Piaget’s individual constructivist understanding of cognitive development, which assumes that each person individually arrives at a higher level of development through his/her own efforts to make meaning from environmental stimuli. This would suggest that educators provide stimuli, but refrain from offering guidance. Vygotsky (1978) strongly opposes the individual constructivist understanding of human development proposed by Piaget and Kohlberg (the latter believes that children are “moral philosophers” who work out their moral systems by independent discovery) and believes that human beings are social by nature, and that human behaviour therefore is shaped by the social context in which it occurs.

Vygotsky believes that the process of learning needs social interaction with others during which the content of learning is negotiated and renegotiated. The knowledge that has already been constructed through inter-subjective agreement in social contexts by past generations is thus both perpetuated and reconstructed. This social constructivist view presents a challenge to the individual constructivist theories of Piaget and Kohlberg as it introduces and stresses the role that mediation plays in stimulating the development of intellectual capacities in children. Fisher (1998:61) is quoted as saying that: “Vygotsky reminds us that our intellectual range can be extended through the mediation of and interaction with others, by the social distribution of intelligence.” Vygotsky defines cognitive development from this perspective of mediation as consisting of coming to find and handle particular problems, building on the intellectual tools inherited from previous generations and the social resources provided by other people.

Piaget and Vygotsky share some important areas of agreement for example, in respect of the role of agency and activity as the foundation for the development of thinking and reasoning, but Vygotsky places far greater emphasis on the role of socialization through language, communication, social interaction, instruction and mediation from those whom Green (2001:84) refers to as “more knowledgeable others...” Morrow (1989:117) makes a similar point about the importance of mediation when he says:

Immature human beings are dependent not only for their survival, but also for development into rational beings on the benevolent actions of the more mature human beings amongst whom they live.

Vygotsky also rejects Piaget’s notion of fixed stages of development and argues that younger children are capable of reasoning about moral issues and values if equipped with the appropriate thinking skills and if the moral issue relates to their own social experiences. If Vygotsky is right about how

children develop as thinkers, it seems reasonable to assume, firstly, that younger children can also benefit from discussion of moral issues and, secondly, that moral development requires more mediation than Kohlberg would propose. Some critics Lickona (1991) suggest that Kohlberg did not give enough attention to the role of mediation in his presentation of theoretical moral dilemmas. If we consider Vygotsky's belief in the role of social mediation, then what Kohlberg, drawing on Piaget, says has to be re-examined.


Vygotsky's theory suggests that we have a collective social responsibility in mediating moral issues to children. This, by implication seems to suggest that more active mediators and strategies for mediation are needed to encourage the development of positive values and dispositions. Waghid (2004:44) concurs with this view and maintains "it seems clear that no single institution can be relied upon as the exclusive seedbed of civic virtue." Glendon, (1991: 109) in support of Waghid, points out, that, just as is the case with state institutions such as schools, institutions of civil society (churches, unions and forums of civil society) "equally have the potential to teach disobedience to authority and intolerance of other faiths and races. The point is that neither schools nor any other institution of society can guarantee civic virtue.

#### **4.2.4 INSIGHTS FROM AUTHORITARIAN APPROACHES**

According to Fisher (1998) authoritarian approaches assume that it is sufficient simply to tell children what they need to know and what they ought to do. This approach in terms of Ryle's framework translates into "knowing that." Such approaches are sometimes referred to as authority-based as they take it for granted that the religious, parental or other authority involved will be respected without question. They frequently rely on direct instruction and may make use of behaviourist strategies. Proponents of initiatives that actively reject the moral relativism implied by extreme Piagetian views, such

as Character Education Lickona (1991), Wynne and Ryan (1992), Molnar (1997) tend to favour direct instruction and behaviourist strategies.

Criticism levelled against authoritarian approaches of whatever persuasion is that they can be seen as a form of moral indoctrination and the danger is that children who are subjected to indoctrination may become vulnerable to other forms of abuse. According to Fisher (1998) indoctrination does provide the necessary social boundaries and conditions for education to take place, but it does not foster the desire in learners to develop their own set of personal values such as care, concern, or respect for others. Morrow (1989) makes a distinction between negative indoctrination in the sense as referred to by Fisher and benevolent indoctrination which he believes is at times unavoidable in the process of (values) education. As is commonly known, the value of what children may initially perceive to be negative indoctrination, (for instance insisting that they read certain books or attend church) may possibly be appreciated only later in their lives as forms of benevolent indoctrination.



The fact that children tend to interpret this approach as brain-washing, bribing, manipulation or indoctrination may render it ineffective on its own as a means of values education. I speculate that learners ignore moral education primarily because they are treated as spectators and believe that moral education 'is being done to them.' This model fails to actively engage learners (through teaching and discussion) and unless it involves them, they do not share the responsibility for their moral development. Authoritarian approaches (obedience to rules and regulations) to moral education could result in characters being constructed to gain the approval of parents and teachers, earn rewards, praise and privileges, without the development of individual identity. The challenge seems to be to find a balance between extreme forms of authority and no authority.


### 4.3 STRATEGIES FOR TEACHING VALUES

Despite different assumptions about how values are acquired several strategies are common to more than one approach. The most frequently mentioned strategies are the use of stories, the creation of extra-curricular opportunities to act compassionately, and engagement in various forms of discussion, with or without the active mediation of effective thinking skills and dispositions.

Stories are considered to play an important part in the moral development in children because they can expand and enhance the moral imagination and develop the emotional side of a child's character (Lickona, 1991). Kozulin (1991) points out that literature is considered an important psychological tool by Russian psychologists. Lipman (1961) maintains that stories provide an opportunity to articulate issues of concern to children and young people and to model ways of deliberating about them. They can also offer role models in terms of values. Clearly stories may be used in a variety of ways, to teach obedience, to inspire, to model, or to generate discussion.

There is considerable agreement about the value of discussion, whether it is conceptualized as circle time (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984) community of inquiry (Lipman, 1961) or deliberation (MacIntyre, 1999). The latter explains that deliberation occurs in situations (classrooms) when people (learners) care, respect and engage justly in discussion with each other, which resonates with a Vygotskian understanding of the role of mediation. This view conveys the idea of creating a democratic culture in classrooms which is in line with the expectations of the South African curriculum. Waghid supports MacIntyre's conception of deliberation and explains that deliberation is a form of intelligent action which encourages teachers and students to reflect upon problems, stimulates them to acquire new ways of solving problems, and engenders possibilities through which problems could be examined.

Both Piagetian and Vygotskian approaches to discussion open up the possibility for value choices, but the latter would emphasize the active role of the mediator in influencing (but not determining) both how to think and what to think. Discussion need not only be about hypothetical moral dilemmas. It may concern everyday decisions, or take the form of learner involvement in the classroom and school discipline procedures or community service. The objectives are to help them to understand the nature of rules; to understand the inter-relatedness of rights and responsibilities of citizenship; to become morally just and to act in the face of injustice and to care about the plight of others. It is assumed that learners will be more motivated to obey rules and act in accordance with a Code of Conduct that has been negotiated with them (Garner, 1992; Nobes, 1999). Obedience to rules is part of the process of socialisation and it is generally accepted that younger learners should be taught to obey basic social rules in the classroom, but that these rules should be explained to them. In this context, it can be seen as a process of gaining new understanding of social relationships under the supervision of more knowledgeable educators



The focus of such discussions could also include social issues for example the recent incidences of xenophobia in South Africa which learners may have witnessed; taxi violence and the need for deliberation and efforts to find peaceful solutions to these. Drug abuse especially the notorious TIK drug, alcoholism, the abuse of women and children, unemployment, HIV/AIDS, teenage pregnancies and school drop outs are social ills that most societies experience. For as Gyekye (1997: 74) has pointed out “...our moral sensitivities should extend to people beyond our communities.” Environmental concerns such as the fires that annually destroy valuable land and property in the Western Cape often as a result of the irresponsible behaviour of smokers and the reasons for saving water also provide topics for discussion. These are topics related to human rights and values and are in line with the aims of the Constitution and the curriculum.

Waghid (2004) points out that the Manifesto aims to cultivate in learners the capacity for respectful dialogue and deliberation. He believes however, that learners should also be taught through dialogue and deliberation to develop a sense of caring and compassion. Nussbaum (2001) believes that compassion extends or “pushes the boundaries of the self” outwards as it enables one to focus away from the self to the suffering and hardships of others. As explained by Nussbaum (2001: 3) “without emotional development, a part of our reasoning capacity as political and social creatures will be missing.” International literature seems to have taken on board this notion and recommends involving learners in community service in which they assist others, as an effective way of teaching learners to “live” values such as caring and compassion. In South Africa, the tendency seems to be to require evidence of community service when applications are made for certain types of employment, bursaries or admission to certain fields of study, but the notion of community service, for various reasons, has not yet been taken on board by many schools.

#### **4.4 RESEARCH EVIDENCE**

The literature that I referred to in the previous section offers explanations and suggestions related to the teaching of values. The question is what evidence is available about the effectiveness of various strategies and about the attitudes and practices of educators with regard to the teaching of values?

Very few, if any, educational challenges are straightforward enough to have simple answers or solutions and the teaching of values is no exception. I do not think that the most effective approach could be ‘assessed or measured’ but it is clear that some approaches may be better in some contexts and for some purposes than others. For example, if one compared behaviourist approaches with those that encourage discussion, it is obvious that a combination of these approaches would be more effective than any single one as these theories tend to draw strength from each other. So, it is difficult to

single out the most effective model for the teaching of values. While the literature does offer suggestions about possible strengths and weaknesses of approaches, I did not find any strong claims in the literature for the success of a specific approach. This is not surprising since, as I shall argue in the next chapter, the assessment of the most effective strategies for values education in any meaningful way is almost impossible.

However, there is some evidence available regarding educators' attitudes to the teaching of values. International research suggests that educators tend to accept that the school is a moral environment and that part of their role is to provide moral education (Henson, 2001; Maslovaty, 2000; Milson and Mehlig, 2002; Zuzovsky, Yakir and Gottlieb, 1995). Green (2004a) notes that, the literature indicates that educators internationally tend to support universal values such as human dignity, diversity and nationalist democratic values. The most frequent ethical stance adopted by educators in various countries, she adds, appears to be consensus pluralism, an acceptable position, but one that can lead to avoidance and confusion in schools, and, if extreme, can result in a moral vacuum as Veugelers (2000b) has pointed out. He maintains that it is not possible or desirable for schools to adopt a value-neutral position. A survey conducted by Stephenson, Ling, Burman and Cooper (1998) indicates that while most educators in the United Kingdom support the idea of values education as a means for raising standards of positive behaviour, they have difficulty in identifying suitable values and consider it impossible to teach values that they do not personally embrace.

Findings regarding educators in South Africa are more limited but Green (2004a) found that local educators acknowledged that their professional role included a moral dimension. According to Rhodes & Roux (2000) educators displayed uncertainty with the identification of values that are embedded in different learning areas, the philosophical and conceptual underpinnings of values and the methodologies required to teach values successfully. Green's (2004b) article refers to school-based research conducted for the Department

of Education in South Africa which indicates that educators believe that the government overemphasises human rights of learners.

Furthermore educators generally believe that training in moral education for educators is necessary. Therefore purposeful teacher-training and the provision and development of effective teaching strategies for values education must be prioritised (Jansen & Christie 1999). The view that educators need to be capacitated for the task of teaching values and that their legitimate perspectives and concerns should be accommodated for the successful transfer of values is confirmed by the research of Rhodes & Roux (2004) which indicates that because of these reasons and others, most educators have not played an active or successful role in teaching different values and belief systems in schools.

## **4.5 THE CURRICULUM AND THE TEACHING OF VALUES**

### **4.5.1 IMPLICATIONS OF CURRICULUM PRINCIPLES**

General guidelines that need to be considered for all Learning Areas are contained in The Teacher's Guide for the Development of Learning Programmes Policy Guidelines (DoE, 2003: 1-14). This document states that to achieve the aim of Learning Programmes, Work Schedules and Lesson Plans the following aspects have to be considered during planning:

Under Philosophy and Policy it is pointed out that the curriculum is an embodiment of the nation's social values and its expectations of roles, rights and responsibilities of the democratic citizen as expressed in the Constitution. Outcomes-based education philosophy and practice, based on the Critical and Developmental outcomes is the underlying educational philosophy. The critical and developmental outcomes are a list of outcomes that are derived from the Constitution and are contained in the South African Qualifications

Act (1995). They describe the kind of citizen that the education and training system should aim to create.

The Critical Outcomes are:

To be able to:

- Identify and solve problems and make decisions using critical and creative thinking
- Work effectively with others as members of a team, group or organisation and community
- Organise and manage themselves and their activities responsibly and effectively
- Collect, analyse, organise and critically evaluate information
- Communicate effectively using visual, symbolic and/or language skills in various modes
- Use Science and Technology effectively and critically showing responsibility towards the environment and the health of others
- Demonstrate an understanding as the world as a set of related systems.

The Developmental Outcomes envisage learners who are also able to:


- Reflect on and explore a variety of strategies to learn more effectively
- Participate as responsible citizens in the life of local, national and global communities
- Be culturally and aesthetically sensitive across a range of social contexts
- Explore education and career opportunities
- Develop entrepreneurial opportunities

Under Principles underpinning the curriculum it is noted that the curriculum builds on the vision and values on the Constitution and C2005 and that is based on the principles of social justice, a healthy environment, human rights and inclusivity. In particular, the curriculum attempts to be sensitive to issues of poverty, inequality, race, gender, age, disability and such challenges as HIV/AIDS (DoE 2000).

#### **4.5.2 SPECIFIC CURRICULUM GUIDELINES**

The Teacher's Guide explains that integrated learning is central to outcomes-based education. Educators need to have a clear understanding of the role of integration within their Learning Programmes.

Once educators have taken the philosophy, policy and other issues into account, the following steps are suggested:

- 
- Select the Learning Outcomes
  - Identify Assessment Standards
  - Determine the teaching, learning and assessment context and/or core knowledge and concepts

Two main contexts have been identified; firstly the broad consideration of the social, economic, cultural and environmental contexts of the learners and secondly, contexts unique to the Learning Area. Such contexts are to be reflected in the kinds of examples used, the types of projects given, the language used, the barriers to learning anticipated, and the teaching, learning and assessment activities. In those Learning Areas where contextual information that is unique to Learning Areas is not provided, educators need to determine their own (The Teacher's Guide for the Development of Learning Programmes Policy Guidelines, DoE 2003).

The Teacher's Guide continues that educators must decide how they will approach their teaching and what methods they will use bearing in mind that learners have different learning styles and that some activities are more likely to succeed than others. Barriers to learning, resources, prior learning and school policies need to be considered. Lesson plan development, as is pointed out, is not a linear process, but rather one of continual modification, reflection, revision and refinement.

The main thrust of the Learning Area named Life Orientation is to enhance *the self in society*. Instilling Human Rights and promoting environmental and social justice issues will therefore always form the core. In Life Orientation it is useful for the teacher to use experiential learning and teaching methods. Learning and teaching activities must focus on the acquisition of knowledge, skills and values relevant to functioning effectively in society. Lessons should be interactive and stimulate learner interest. It is important for the teacher to be flexible and to always take the needs and realities of learners into account as the learners' needs and experiences form the basis for learning and teaching. Teachers should encourage reflection and allow for the application of knowledge and skills learnt. Learners must be made aware of and be taught to respect cultural diversity (DoE 2003).

Rasool (1999) pointed out that OBE side-stepped the issue of values by not providing clear guidelines on how values should be taught and which values should be prioritised. The Chair of the Curriculum 2005 Review Committee, Linda Chisholm also criticised C2005 for its lack of clarity on values and pointed out that ... "It also does not provide a strong enough statement about which values the curriculum promotes and which it does not promote" (DoE 2000:197-219). It is obvious that curriculum principles are broad guidelines that lack specificity of what methodologies could be appropriate for the teaching of values and which approaches are better than others.

But the policy/practice debates on curriculum seem to focus primarily on the implementation of policies, but tend to leave the conceptualisation of curriculum as Carrim and Keet (2005) for example demonstrate, unexamined. I want to signal as an aside, that some of the most important sources of data are often impossible to trace and that some data are never published or made available for dissemination. Numerous attempts to secure information from others who had been involved in this working group proved to be futile. So availability of information in respect of the Report of the Human Rights Inclusivity Working Group which formed part of the Review Committee of C2005 on the infusion of values in the curriculum has been a challenge for this study.

While this could possibly be seen as a weakness, this study has nevertheless gained valuable insights (which were confirmed by other sources) from this article. Meyers & Rockwell (1984:23) commenting on the constraints that researchers like myself faced in obtaining data, offer the following advice: “Often, the researcher must accommodate his or her research ... to the constraints imposed by using data that someone else has collected for different purposes.”

According to Carrim & Keet (2005: 99) the brief of the Human Rights and Inclusivity Working Group (HRIWG) was “to infuse human rights in the RNCS.” What this brief meant, as I will demonstrate, is far from clear. According to Carrim & Keet attempts at infusing values in education elsewhere have generally tended to be of three primary sorts each of which has different implications for the teaching and assessment of values;

- To teach knowledge about human rights; their constitutional and legal definitions and provisions
- To focus on how to access such rights mainly as versions of “civic education”

- To focus on the valuing human rights - acting in accordance with these values

The knowledge systems provided by Ryle (1971) and Mason (1997) which if applied to values education, demonstrate that depending on how human rights is conceptualised, the infusion of human rights in the curriculum could mean three approaches:

- Firstly, learners should be taught knowledge about human rights in order to know about it
- Secondly, values should be promoted through understanding of how to access human rights; follow procedures and processes in making decisions about human rights
- Thirdly, learners should be taught to value human rights

The first approach: knowledge about values according to Carrim and Keet has been criticised by Osler and Starkey (1996) as being limited as the latter maintain that such an approach focus on understanding what values are but does not sufficiently recognise the “affective dimension” of values. Tibbuts (1995) has emphasised the second approach; the need not only to focus on human rights, but also on their accompanying skills and attitudes while Reardon, (1995, 1997) has stressed the need for values to centrally inform human rights. Reardon makes a distinction between human rights and values and believes that the moral aspects of rights are crucial to an appreciation and valuing of human rights, which is consistent with the third approach. Reardon explains that education in and of values, is crucial for the preservation and development of human rights including those in schools.

Carrim and Keet identified their conceptual understanding of human rights and values as problematic for infusion into a curriculum that is underpinned by a different conceptual understanding of human rights. Their argument is that only if the infusion of human rights is conceived of exclusively in terms

of propositional knowledge and access to it, it is possible to teach and assess human rights in terms of how they are conceptualised in the curriculum (Carrim & Keet, 2005:105).

#### **4.6 THE PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT OF EDUCATORS IN THE TEACHING OF VALUES**

The Collins English Dictionary (2004:1296) explains professional in the following way; “a person who engages in an activity with great competence.” Judgement (2004:856) is described as “the faculty of being able to make critical distinctions and achieve a balanced viewpoint.” In Vine’s (1940) expository dictionary of New Testament words, one of the Greek words translated as judgment is partially defined as a decision passed on the faults of others and is cross-referenced to the word condemnation. According to this same source, one of the Greek words translated as “judge” is partially defined as “to form an opinion” and is cross-referenced to the word “sentence.” Which of these interpretations of “professional judgement” best represents the view of professional judgement in the teaching and assessment of values as advocated by the curriculum? Is it fault- finding, condemnation or to pronounce a sentence or an evaluation of the values that learners ought to have acquired, particularly as it is not known on what evidence of moral learning professional judgement is based?


Shulman (1987) and Downie (1990) who argue in favour of a professional knowledge base in teaching, claim that the first requirement of a profession is its knowledge base, as this is what is distinctive about professions and what affords them integrity and social importance. Sockett (1987:12) has interestingly called for an “epistemology of the practice of teaching that could serve as reference points for professional judgement in situations of uncertainty” such as the teaching of values.

It is commonly known that the knowledge base of educators consists of different kinds of knowledges. Tacit knowledge is described by Linley and Joseph (2004) as a crucial component of wise decision making. It describes knowledge that is implicit, intuitive, acquired without instruction, and is procedural rather than propositional. Shulman (1987) in agreement with this view suggests that the knowledge base of teachers should not only consist of a balance between theory and practice, but should also be informed by the wisdom of practice which refers to the intuitive knowledge and experiential knowledge and insights that educators gain through experience in their practice.

The theories of learning of Piaget, Kohlberg and Vygotsky inform us on how knowledge is acquired. The acquisition of moral knowledge based on what these theories suggest, require educators to be knowledgeable about different stages of cognitive development, how moral learning occurs, different approaches to moral learning, which values to teach at what stage of moral development, as well as the crucial role of mediators for effective moral learning.. This view is supported by Fisher (1995) who holds that being knowledgeable as a moral educator implies being able to reason about moral concerns. What this indicates is that theoretical knowledge is equally necessary for the effective teaching of values. While tacit knowledge is an important component of professional judgement, it cannot be conceived of as a substitute for professional knowledge but should inform the professional knowledge base of educators. I conclude that the professional judgement of educators requires horizontal as well as vertical knowledge; theoretical knowledge from psychology and philosophy, tacit knowledge, experiential knowledge and the wisdom gained through practice.

Clearly the curriculum guidelines do not offer much help in terms of teaching strategies for values education and much is left to the conceptualisation and interpretation of methodologies based on the professional judgement of educators. While there is guidance on what content should be taught, and

references to experiential learning and interactive teaching or reflection in the guidelines, the application of these concepts in practice; the “how to do it” is lacking. For example, Resource Material for the Life Orientation Learning Area (Foundation Phase) WCED (2003: 4) in referring to lesson plans, states that “it should include the how.” Educators are required to provide an account of their teaching style, approach, methodology and assessment activities to be managed in the classroom but the guidelines do not provide any example of how this should be done. It needs to be taken into account that the explicit teaching of values did not form part of the pre-outcomes based curriculum and as Jansen & Christie (1999) have indicated, teachers had no involvement in the conceptualisation of OBE. Furthermore educators had received minimum formal preparation and training and the effectiveness of the Cascade Model of training has been questioned. Educators in South Africa have generally expressed a need for a coherent strategy for values education; the bringing together of a number of different teaching and learning approaches which could assist them to become more effective in their approaches to the teaching of values (Taylor & Vinjevoldt, 2001).



#### **4.7 CONCLUSION**

From the literature it is clear, that generally, all theories and approaches to the teaching of positive values, whatever their differences and limitations in other respects, suggest that values can be taught. Piaget, Kohlberg and Vygotsky point out the importance of moral reasoning and the need for learners to be actively involved in the valuing process. Vygotsky emphasises the importance of active mediation by more knowledgeable others in society, while behaviourist approaches demonstrate the power of rewards, punishment and modelling behaviour.

If we accept Vygotsky’s insights, we have to conclude that values knowledge cannot be limited to discussions of theoretical moral dilemmas as values education, it seems, needs to be informed not only by Kohlberg’s stage

theory of moral development, with its Piagetian implications in respect of cognitive development but also by active mediation. Kohlberg's belief that children are "moral philosophers" who work out their moral systems by independent discovery is questionable as studies show that moral judgements are strongly influenced by education Lickona (1973) which includes the teaching and mediation of values. These insights demonstrate that different approaches, whatever their weaknesses in one area, have strengths in other areas and that a combination of approaches may provide a more holistic approach to the teaching of values knowledge.

I therefore agree with Green (2004a), who concludes that no single approach to values education has all the answers and is known to guarantee success. Any approach that encourages learners to reason about values and engage in actions in accordance with positive values should thus be pursued. It appears that the most widely held view is that the teaching of values requires active involvement of learners, strong mediation that will facilitate moral reasoning, responsible, informed discussion and decision-making which will culminate in moral action.

A central aim of the teaching of (values) education should therefore be for educators to provide continual opportunities to equip learners with tools that will enable them to "live values" by acting in morally acceptable ways. The importance of using teaching methodologies that create an atmosphere in which learners are genuinely free, within a context of what Waghid refers to as 'respectful disagreement' to disagree, propose alternatives, and modify positions on issues relating to values cannot be over emphasised. Curriculum guidelines rely on the critical and developmental outcomes and significant importance is attached to the professional judgement of educators in the teaching of values. So it is important for educators to acquire a strong knowledge base that is informed by theoretical, tacit, intuition and the wisdom of practice knowledge. Waghid (2004:47) underscores the need for teacher training and holds: "My contention is that it will be difficult for

learners to learn about compassionate citizenship if their educators are not skilled appropriately.”

















































































































































































































































































































