



**UNDERSTANDING THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AFTER THE
'ARAB SPRING': THE CASE OF LIBYA**

Abdsalam Alahwal

Student Number: 3699520



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Institute for Social Development
Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences
University of the Western Cape

Supervisor: Professor Suren Pillay

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ABSTRACT

In this research study, the researcher explores the democratisation process in the Middle East and North African region (MENA), with Libya as the case study. The study is based on the views of students and lecturers from universities in the three major regions of post-revolution Libya – Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha – and examines how the relationship between democracy and revolution is perceived. The causes of the Arab Spring revolution, as well as its economic, social and political implications are presented in the study, based on reviewed literature, and the perspectives drawn from the study sample. Finally, the researcher presents the challenges and barriers to the process of democratisation after the Arab Spring.

In pursuit of these issues, the researcher explores the following main research questions:

- How do students and lecturers describe the relationship that exists between the Arab Spring revolution and democracy?
- What are the causes of the Arab Spring in Libya according to the opinions of students and lecturers?
- What are the implications of the Arab Spring in MENA and in Libya?

The study adopted a descriptive research approach, using quantitative and qualitative data. A major finding of the study revealed that there is a connection between the revolution and democracy, and that the barriers to the process of democratisation are inextricably linked to the political, economic and social implications of the Arab Spring, which has caused major security and stability repercussions in the country.

The researcher argues that, based on the opinions of the study sample, the Arab Spring revolution was necessary to initiate the process of democracy, and the barriers to the process of democracy are linked to the imbalance of the political and economic structures of the country, including the cultural-tribal base of the Libyan society. In order to address the barriers to the democratisation process, the researcher argues for the development of a hybrid democracy that takes into consideration the broader political, historical and cultural sensitivities of the Libyan people, and the MENA region.

KEY WORDS

Arab Spring

Democracy

Dictatorship

Libya

MENA

Revolution

Tribe



ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AQIM:	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASU:	Arab Socialist Union
BAM:	al-Bunyan al- Marsous
BPC:	Basic People's Committees
EU:	European Union
FACT:	<i>Front pour l'alternance et la concorde au Tchad</i>
FLN:	<i>Front de Libération Nationale</i>
GCC:	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP:	Gross domestic product
GNA:	Government of National Accord
GNC:	General National Congress
GPC:	General People's Congress
HOR:	House of Representatives
ICT:	Information, Communications and Technology (ICT)
ISIL:	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS:	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ITNC:	Interim Transitional National Council
IYSC:	The Islamic Youth Shura Council
JEM:	Justice and Equality Movement (Sudan)
LCG:	Libya Contact Group
LIFG:	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
LINC	Libyan Interim National Council
LNA:	Libyan National Army
LPA:	Libyan Political Agreement
MENA:	Middle East and North Africa
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NOC:	National Oil Controls
NSAGs:	Non-state armed groups
NSG:	National Salvation Government
NRA:	National Resistance Army
NTC:	National Transitional Council
POS:	Political Opportunity Structure

PC:	Presidential Council
PSLC:	Popular Social Leadership Council
RCC:	Revolutionary Command Council
SPSS:	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
UGTT:	Tunisian General Labour Union (French: <i>Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail</i>)



GLOSSARY OF ARABIC WORDS

<i>Bay'ah:</i>	electoral endorsement
<i>Buyut:</i>	sub-tribes called, into family groups called
<i>Caliph:</i>	Leader of Islamic state
<i>Ijma:</i>	consensus
<i>Ijtihad:</i>	independent reasoning
<i>Lahma:</i>	family groups
<i>Qabila:</i>	tribe
<i>Sheikh sharifs:</i>	holy tribes
<i>Shura:</i>	consultation
<i>Sunnah:</i>	prophetic model



DECLARATION

I declare that *Understanding the democratisation process in the Middle East and North Africa after the 'Arab Spring': The case of Libya* is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted, have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Name: Abdsalam Alahwal

Date: November 2019

Signature:.....



DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my loving mother and my wife.

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful (1) Praise be to Allah, the Cherisher and Sustainer of the worlds (2) Most Gracious, Most Merciful (3) Master of the Day of Judgment (4) Thee alone do we worship, and Thine aid alone we seek (5) Guide us to the straight path (6) The path of those on whom Thou hast bestowed Thy Grace, not of those who have earned your anger, nor those who have gone astray (7).”

“True are the words of God.”

Sûrat Al-Fâtihah (The Opening 1)



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Nameless in this document, due to concern for their confidentiality, I cannot express how open and honest all my research samples were, even while knowing that the information they provided could easily be misconstrued, or could get them into trouble. I hope I have lived up to their trust, while trying to explain a bit of the Libyan circumstances.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	I
KEY WORDS	II
ABBREVIATIONS.....	III
GLOSSARY OF ARABIC WORDS.....	V
DECLARATION.....	VI
DEDICATION.....	VII
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	VIII
APPENDICES.....	XVIII
LIST OF TABLES.....	XVIII
LIST OF FIGURES.....	XX
LIST OF MAPS.....	XX

1	CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1	INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.2	RATIONALE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY.....	2
1.3	RESEARCH QUESTIONS	4
1.3.1	MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION.....	4
1.3.2	SUB-QUESTIONS:	4
1.4	ARGUMENTS	4
1.5	AIMS OF THE STUDY.....	4
1.6	RESEARCH OBJECTIVES.....	5
1.7	PROBLEM STATEMENT	5
1.8	THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	6
1.9	DELINEATION OF THE CASE	6
1.10	RATIONALE FOR SAMPLE	6
1.10.1	LECTURERS AND STUDENTS	7
1.11	ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY	9
2	CHAPTER TWO: LIBYA IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT.....	10
2.1	INTRODUCTION	10
2.2	LIBYA: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW	10
2.2.1	GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND OF LIBYA	11
2.3	THE THREE MAJOR REGIONS IN LIBYA	13
2.3.1	TRIPOLI (TRIPOLITANIA) – THE WESTERN REGION.....	13
2.3.1.1	The University of Tripoli	15
2.3.2	BENHAZI (CYRENAICA) – THE EASTERN REGION	15
2.3.2.1	The University of Benghazi in Cyrenaica/Benghazi	17
2.3.3	SABHA (FEZZAN) – THE SOUTHERN REGION.....	17
2.3.3.1	University of Sabha/Fezzan	18
2.4	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LIBYA	19
2.4.1	ANCIENT ERA	19
2.4.1.1	Phoenician and Greek eras.....	19
2.4.1.2	Persian era.....	20
2.4.1.3	Roman era	20
2.4.2	COLONIAL ERA	21
2.4.2.1	Islamic era.....	21
2.4.2.2	Ottoman era.....	21
2.4.2.3	Italian colonial era.....	22
2.4.2.4	Sanūsī era	23
2.4.2.5	Modern colonial Libya	24

2.4.3	INDEPENDENCE.....	26
2.4.4	THE GADDAFI ERA.....	27
2.4.4.1	Muammar Gaddafi.....	27
2.4.4.2	Arrangement of Libyan society under Gaddafi	28
2.4.4.3	The Green Book.....	29
2.4.4.4	The General People's Congress (GPC) – 1977	31
2.4.4.5	Gaddafi and Arab nationalism	33
2.4.4.6	Beginnings of protests	35
2.4.5	THE POST-REVOLUTION ERA	37
2.4.5.1	The NTC – 2011 to 2012	37
2.4.5.2	General National Congress - 2012 to 2016.....	39
2.4.5.3	GNA 2016 - present.....	41
2.4.5.4	The role of NATO in the Libyan civil war	42
2.4.5.5	Libyan National Army (LNA)	44
2.4.5.6	The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), the Presidential Council (PC) and The Government of National Accord (GNA)	44
2.4.5.7	Government of Tobruk and Bayda	45
2.4.5.8	Prime Minister al-Sarraj, the GNA and Haftar	46
2.4.5.9	National Security Council - Abusahmain, Ghwell and the 'Tripoli government'	46
2.4.5.10	The power centres of Haftar, Aguila Saleh, and Tobruk	47
2.4.5.11	Tunisia-based interim government	47
2.4.5.12	Field Marshall Haftar	48
2.4.5.13	Haftar and the fight for Libya's oil	49
2.4.5.14	Haftar's allies	49
2.4.5.15	The New Parliamentary Council and Declaration of Principles	50
2.4.5.16	Libya's key armed groups and actors	50
2.5	INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS IN THE LIBYAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE	52
2.5.1	EGYPT AND PRESIDENT ABDEL FATTAH AL-SISI	52
2.5.2	THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT	52
2.5.3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	52
2.5.4	ALGERIA AND TUNISIA	53
2.5.5	THE ISLAMIC STATE (ISIS).....	53
2.5.6	THE FIGHT FOR SOUTHERN LIBYA – SABHA	53
3	CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE MENA REGION	56
3.1	Introduction.....	56
3.2	History of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.....	56
3.2.1	THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE MIDDLE EAST.....	56
3.2.2	WORLD WAR I, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE MIDDLE EAST	58
3.3	DICTATORSHIP IN THE MENA REGION	60
3.3.1	MECHANISMS OF TOTALITARIANISM.....	60
3.4	THE ARAB SPRING	62
3.4.1	BACKGROUND	62
3.4.2	CAUSES OF THE ARAB SPRING	65
3.4.2.1	Lack of effective governance.....	66
3.4.2.2	Dictatorships and political inadequacies.....	66
3.4.2.3	Restriction of freedom and violation of human rights	67
3.4.2.4	Social discontent	68
3.4.2.5	Security	68
3.4.2.6	Demographic trends and structural imbalances	69
3.4.2.7	Low economic growth	69

3.4.2.8 External causes of the Arab Spring.....	70
3.5 MENA STATES AND THE ARAB SPRING	70
3.5.1 THE TUNISIAN REVOLUTION	70
3.5.2 THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION	72
3.5.3 THE YEMENI REVOLUTION.....	74
3.5.4 THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION	75
3.5.5 THE BAHRAIN PROTESTS	76
3.6 OUTCOMES OF THE ARAB SPRING	77
3.6.1 CLASHES BETWEEN OPPOSITION FORCES	77
3.6.2 CULTURAL DIVIDES AND CONFLICTS	78
3.6.3 THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION.....	79
3.6.3.1 Democratisation in MENA	79
3.6.3.2 Regime legitimacy and the authoritarian rule in the MENA regions	81
3.6.3.3 The manipulation of political parties by the State	82
3.6.3.4 Coercive mechanism of the Arab states.....	82
3.6.3.5 Financial independence	82
3.6.3.6 Civil and international war.....	83
4 CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	84
4.1 Introduction.....	84
4.2 Essence of research methodology	84
4.3 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY	84
4.4 RESEARCH PARADIGMS	85
4.4.1 PRAGMATISM	85
4.4.2 INTERPRETIVISM.....	85
4.4.2.1 Advantages and disadvantages of interpretivism.....	85
4.4.3 POSITIVISM.....	86
4.4.3.1 Advantages and disadvantages of positivism	86
4.5 RESEARCH APPROACH.....	87
4.5.1 INDUCTIVE APPROACH AND REASONING	87
4.6 RESEARCH DESIGN	88
4.6.1 DESCRIPTIVE RESEARCH.....	88
4.6.1.1 Descriptive statistics	89
4.7 RESEARCH STRATEGY	89
4.8 RESEARCH SETTING	89
4.9 POPULATION.....	89
4.10 SAMPLING	91
4.10.1 JUDGMENTAL SAMPLING	91
4.10.2 UNIT OF ANALYSIS	91
4.10.3 UNIT OF OBSERVATION	91
4.11 DATA COLLECTION.....	92
4.11.1 QUESTIONNAIRE CONSTRUCT	92
4.12 DATA ANALYSIS	94
4.12.1 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS	95
4.12.2 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS.....	95
4.13 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE	96
4.13.1 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE FOR THE QUESTIONNAIRE.....	97
4.13.2 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE FOR THE INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW	97
4.13.3 ABSENCE OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE	97
4.14 TRANSLATION.....	98
4.15 RELIABILITY, VALIDITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS OF DATA	98

4.16	ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS	99
4.17	ETHICS STATEMENT.....	99
5	CHAPTER FIVE: INTERPRETING THE OPINIONS OF LECTURERS AND STUDENTS	102
5.1.	Introduction.....	102
5.2.	Data analysis arrangement	103
5.2.1	THE FRAMING PROCESSES THEORY	103
5.2.2	THE RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORY	104
5.2.3	THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE THEORY.....	105
5.2.4	THE RESOURCE MOBILISATION THEORY	105
5.3	DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF THE STUDENT STUDY SAMPLE	109
5.4	OBJECTIVE 1: TO DESCRIBE THE CAUSES/REASONS OF THE ARAB SPRING REVOLUTION IN MENA AND LIBYA	110
5.5	OBJECTIVE 2: TO DESCRIBE THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB SPRING ON THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS.....	113
5.6.	Objective 3: To describe the relationship that exists between the Arab Spring revolution and a need for democracy	125
5.7.	Objective 4: To describe the challenges to the process of democratisation after the Arab Spring.....	139
6.	CHAPTER SIX: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION.....	149
6.1.	Introduction.....	149
6.2.	Reflections on democracy.....	155
6.2.1	DEMOCRACY	155
6.2.2	ORIGINS OF DEMOCRACY.....	156
6.2.3	CATEGORIES OF DEMOCRACY	158
6.2.4	THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY	158
6.2.5	THE BIRTH OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY	159
6.2.6	THE ASSUMPTIONS OF A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY.....	164
6.2.7	ISLAM AND THE DEMOCRACY	165
6.2.8	THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY	166
6.2.9	THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA	168
6.2.10.	THE RISE OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA.....	169
6.2.11.	REASONS FOR THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY.....	170
6.2.12.	THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN AFRICA AND ITS CONNECTION TO THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION	171
6.2.13	MAJOR WAVES OF PROTEST IN AFRICA	172
6.2.14	FIRST WAVE OF PROTESTS.....	173
6.2.15	FOCUS OF PROTESTS IN AFRICA	173
6.2.16	URBAN AND RURAL DIVIDE.....	173
6.2.17.	The second wave of protest.....	174
6.3.	Tribal dynamics in Libya	178
7.	CHAPTER SEVEN: TOWARDS A LIBYAN DEMOCRACY	181
7.1	Introduction.....	181
7.2	African democracy and tribalism.....	182
7.3	ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY.....	186
7.3.1	EQUALITY.....	188
7.3.2	Freedom of expression.....	189
7.3.3	Consultation (Shura).....	189
7.3.4	Popular political participation.....	189

8	CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION	191
8.1	Recommendations for policy-makers	193
8.1.1	Recommendations for political reform	193
8.1.2	Recommendations for economic reform.....	196
8.1.3	Recommendations for social reform.....	198
	REFERENCES	201



LIST OF APPENDICES	225
Appendix A: Ethics Clearance letter from the Higher Degrees Committee (UWC).....	225
Appendix B: Acceptance letter from the Libyan Government (Arabic).....	226
Appendix C: Acceptance letter from the Libyan Government (English)	227
Appendix D: Certified Legal Translation of documents.....	228
Appendix E: Consent form (English)	229
Appendix F: Consent form (Arabic).....	230
Appendix G: Information sheet (English).....	231
Appendix H: Information sheet (Arabic).....	233
Appendix I: In-depth interview guide (English).....	235
Appendix J: In-depth interview guide (Arabic).....	237
Appendix K: Questionnaire (English)	239
Appendix L: Questionnaire (Arabic)	244
Appendix M: Editorial Certificate	248

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: List of Arab Spring states and related events	65
Table 2: Student sample demographic information	109
Table 3: Economic conditions before the revolution	114
Table 4: Economic conditions after the revolution.....	115
Table 5: The economic conditions of the country	116
Table 6: Escalation of unemployment since the Arab spring	116
Table 7: Living conditions before the revolution	118
Table 8: Social conditions after the revolution	119
Table 9: General improvement since the revolution.....	120
Table 10: Political conditions before the revolution.....	123
Table 11: Results for need of regime change.....	126
Table 12: The need for the Arab Spring in Libya.....	127
Table 13: Democracy is not achieved through revolution	131
Table 14: Protests and demonstrations are not necessary for democracy.....	132
Table 15: The revolution as integral to start the process of democracy	133
Table 16: The Arab Spring and democracy in Libya.....	133
Table 17: Consequences of the process of democracy	134
Table 18: The possibility of a democracy in Libya	135
Table 19: Democratic government is not the solution	135
Table 20: The negative impacts of the Arab Spring	136
Table 21: The Arab Spring has not brought about positive changes	137
Table 22: The government and the current challenges	144

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: King Sīdī Muḥammad Idrīs al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī (1951-1969)	26
Figure 2: Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi	28
Figure 3: Inductive Approach (Ormston et al., 2014).....	88
Figure 4: Schematic representation of Thematic Analysis	96

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1: Map of the three regions of Libya	12
Map 2: Map of Arab Spring states.....	64

1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Dictatorial regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have previously possessed the ability to monopolise power domestically, which, in turn, resulted in the erosion of the state's immunity against external penetration (Salih, 2013). Subsequently, sectarianism and ethnic enlistment, which, until recently, has been dormant under the ideological supremacy of Arab nationalism, has become apparent since the fall of Saddam Hussein, former Iraqi dictator, in 2003, and the ensuing uprisings of Syria in 2011 (Salih, 2013). The waves of uprisings have challenged the well-established supremacy of the governing regimes in the Arab states, and have paved the way for possible political transformation in the region (Salih, 2013).

For decades, the people of the MENA region were subjugated to years of tyranny, dictatorships, and survived the aftermath of deeply entrenched colonial legacies (Kayrouz & Atala, 2015). More recently, a need for democratic transformation developed in the MENA region, which eventually found its voice in the eruption of the Arab Spring revolution (Aras & Falk, 2015). Since then, the region has been beleaguered by waves of popular protests, demonstrations and civil wars, as well as the deposition of leaders, which have incurred major implications for the region and the respective countries. Further destabilisation of an already delicate socio-political atmosphere in the MENA states, in addition to imbalances in the economic infrastructures, only exacerbated the implications of a revolution, even further (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2013).

Although some of the economic, social and political implications may be traced to colonialist legacies in the region, many of the problems faced by the people of MENA are the results of post-colonial governments and failing leadership (Ennaji, 2014). Many explanations have been provided as the causes of the Arab Spring revolution. However, Aras and Falk (2015) argue that there is a strong case for linking the causes of the Arab Spring, to discontent towards the ruling regimes. In contrast, Weyland (2012) asserts that the fall of the Soviet Union, and the so-called 'third wave of democracy', created the occurrences in the Arab world, some twenty years later.

For many people in the MENA, widespread unemployment, lack of economic opportunities, extensive corruption, the absence of democracy and equality, as well as foreign agendas and domestic circumstances are motivating factors that triggered the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya in 2011 (Hussain & Howard, 2012). Barriers that previously prevented a demand for democracy, especially those supported by foreign agendas, were now sufficiently obviated by the reaction of the populace of these countries (Zajac, 2014).

The aftermath of the revolution has not only left Libya exposed to external infiltration, but internal instability, which has invariably affected its ability to institute political, economic and social reform, may pose barriers to the process of democratisation (Bogaert, 2013). Though the aim of the Arab Spring revolution in 2011 was a drive for social, political and economic change in the MENA region, the prospect of achieving a democracy still remains questionable, and people are losing faith (Malik & Awadallah, 2013).

1.2 Rationale and significance of the study

Though many researchers have provided arguments on the causes of the Arab Spring for the MENA region, the case of Libya has been under-studied (Bogaert, 2013). Unlike its other MENA counterparts, Libyans and others in the region, did not think that the Arab Spring would spill over into Libya, as the conditions in the country were at variance with those in the neighbouring ones (Hussain & Howard, 2012). Conditions, specific to Libya, were both internal and external to the state. Internally, the Gaddafi regime, in power for forty-two years, had solid control over the military and state, among others (Stepan & Linz, 2013). Further obstacles faced by the Libyan revolution, included the unchecked entry of non-politicised masses and arms into the country (Zajac, 2014). In addition, the Libyan revolution exposed the shortage of existing civil and military institutions within the Libyan society, as well as the failure of successive governments to achieve national reconciliation (Wilson, 2014).

According to the researcher, the Libyan people are still experiencing a much harder transition from the revolution, to the initial stages of the democratisation process, and are still living in the aftermath of a revolution. The country faces economic, political and social challenges that have not yet been addressed by the interim governments (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2013). These challenges and barriers cannot be addressed if they are not identified. Secondly, the challenges are linked to the political, economic, historical and cultural backgrounds of Libya. In order to

address these challenges, it is pertinent to examine the causes of the Arab Spring revolution in Libya, and the implications that occurred, as a result of it. Once these have been established, governments and policy-makers may use the information generated from this current study, to develop solutions relative to the challenges.

Additionally, this current study focuses on the concepts of democracy and revolution, in order to understand how these concepts are understood by the sample of people surveyed. Based on the opinions of the sample, the researcher argues that Libya may be in need of the development of an alternate democracy that considers the social, political, historical and cultural backgrounds of the Libyan people. The development of a new alternate form of democracy may prove to be useful for countries, in which a conventional liberal ‘western’ democracy may not be workable.

Though there have been many revolutions in the past, the motivating factors behind the Arab Spring revolution in Libya were to initiate economic and social reform, political reform, regime change and democracy. Therefore, a central argument presented in this current study is that whilst a relationship exists between a revolution and a democracy, and that the revolution/Arab Spring was necessary to bring about political change, it still requires important political reforms to accommodate local historical forms of political and cultural community. In terms of governments’ perceptions of protests, the interim government of Libya could learn from this current study that protesters are not necessarily against the political parties, but against the lack of socio-economic and political opportunities. Such a view might help mend the relationship between the state and its people, as well as pave the way for an easier transition to a democratic state. The researcher is of the opinion that the findings of this current study may lead to the government’s appreciation of the agency of communities. Additionally, the findings could assist the government to actively shape the state and society from the grassroots, based on the aspirations of the people it wishes to govern. The study may also provide valuable insight into the deep-seated tribal nature of the Libyan society, and that its cultural base may not necessarily have to be transformed to suit the state, instead a new form of democracy should be aligned to the tribal society.

1.3 Research questions

1.3.1 Main research question

- What are the social, political and economic challenges to democratisation after the revolution in Libya?

1.3.2 Sub-questions:

- What are the causes of the Arab Spring in Libya, according to the opinions of students and lecturers?
- How do students and academics envisage the Libyan government achieving democracy?

1.4 Arguments

The researcher argues:

- Argument 1: The revolution was necessary for political reform in Libya, in order to start the process of democratisation.
- Argument 2: Economic and social reform is a major motivation of revolution and the lack of opportunities was not a result of revolution only.
- Argument 3: 'Tribalism'¹ is not necessarily a barrier to the process of democratisation.
- Argument 4: Libya needs the development of an alternate form of democracy that considers the social, political, historical and cultural background of the Libyan people.

1.5 Aims of the study

- To understand the political, economic and social implications of the Arab revolution;
- To understand the relationship between the Arab Spring revolution and a need for democracy; and
- To explore the barriers and challenges to the process of democratisation after the Arab Spring.

¹ The terms 'tribe', 'tribal' and 'tribalism' are used in the context of the tribal system that refers to people who share a common culture and ancestry, and who live in a particular region.

1.6 Research objectives

- To analyse the relationship that exists between the Arab Spring revolution and the need for democracy in Libya; and
- To understand the challenges to the process of democratisation, after the Arab Spring in Libya.

1.7 Problem statement

Although the purposes and tasks of many theoretically oriented social sciences studies, in recent years, have been to critically explain the causes and events of the Arab Spring, additional research that examines the further implications of the Arab Spring, is still necessary, to determine whether it had indeed yielded some of its aims, in terms of political, economic and social reform, within the democratisation process (Hussain & Howard, 2012). The Arab Spring revolution imported global and historical significance, and is considered a process that was borne out of a need for economic, political and social reform in the MENA regions (Anderson, 2011). Academic researchers have often examined the causes and reasons for revolutions, but the case of Libya has been under-studied, and still appears to be limited, in comparison to other MENA states (Bogaert, 2013).

However, according to the researcher, Libya still lives in the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolution, and contentious politics have not addressed the very real issues faced by the Libyan people. In addition, the quest for ‘democracy’ has not even begun yet, and has been set off by basic democratic tools of elections and multi-partyism (Møller & Skaaning, 2013). Therefore, this current study aims to understand what ‘democracy’ means to the people of Libya, and their perception of how a revolution relates to it. Additionally, with its colonial legacy, dictatorial history of the Libyan society, as well as its deeply rooted tribal base, it is assumed that the idea of democracy may be almost alien to Libyan people, which may present another challenge to the process of democracy (Ahmida, 2013). Besides, pressing issues such as internal and external security, imbalances in the economic and political structures, the relationship between the revolution and a need for democracy, as well as how the people view that democracy, have not been dealt with, or identified (Jdey, 2012). The researcher is of the opinion that, in order for these challenges to be addressed, they should be identified and, subsequently, solutions should be developed.

1.8 Theoretical framework

This study draws its insights from four approaches within the Social Movement Theory, namely, relative deprivation, political opportunity structure, resource mobilisation, and framing processes. Relative deprivation explains the quest for social change that develops from communal feelings of relative deprivation, in relation to economic and socio-political problems, whereas the political opportunity theory focuses on the significance of political factors that either force, or expedite the rise and the advance of protests (Dalacoura, 2012a). The resource mobilisation approach emphasises the importance of protest organisation, via the establishment of links between sections of the population. Framing processes aid the political opportunity structure resource mobilisation, by providing an insider perspective, which entails explaining the reasons why social movements mobilise from the social movements themselves. The use of these inter-related approaches may assist in the comprehension of the socio-political impacts of the Arab Spring in Libya, and how the actors of the Arab Spring used these social movements to bring about political and social reform.

1.9 Delineation of the case

Libya is divided into three major regions, namely, Tripoli, Cyrenaica and Sabha. This study is limited to the students and lecturers of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at the three universities of Tripoli (Tripoli), Benghazi (Cyrenaica) and Sabha (Sabha). The researcher is of the opinion that it will be interesting to note the different perspectives on the revolution from these three sites, and how the respondents feel it has impacted on the democratisation process, owing to the fact that the three sites are polarised in different directions. The researcher anticipates that this will provide rich data and significantly contribute to future studies of Libya. This current study aims to describe the relationship that exists between the revolution and democracy, according to the perspectives of lecturers and students, as well as how they imagine the process of democratisation is unfolding in Libya. The data generated from this study is reflective of their opinions only, and is not representative of the entire Libyan society. The opinions expressed may not be an actual depiction of the current political state of Libya, and cannot be generalised to the entire MENA region.

1.10 Rationale for sample

The military was not selected, especially, as, in the past, they have been funded, primarily, by the Gaddafi regime. It was assumed that their opinions may be eschewed, in favour of the

previous regime. The current National Libyan Army (NLA) support Field Marshall Haftar, and, as such, their opinions may be inclined in his favour. Regarding local businessmen, it is assumed that, based on the literature provided, a large sector of the economy has been funded by the pro-Gaddafi regime, and that their perspectives would be in support of the pro-Gaddafi regime. In terms of local street vendors, the researcher assumed that they may not have a deeper understanding of the processes of democracy, and the stages of its development, due to a lack of knowledge on the subject. It is assumed that their opinions would be in support of whosoever they received support from, and as such, would not be a true reflection of the actual processes. Additionally, the questions in the instruments require the respondents to have some background knowledge of concepts such as democracy, revolution, challenges to democracy and dictatorship. Therefore, it is assumed by the researcher that ordinary traders may not have exposure to these concepts.

1.10.1 Lecturers and students

Although Libyan society comprises many groups, such as labourers, members of unions, the military, businessmen and traders, the researcher argues that, although the perspectives of these groups of people are valuable and useful, the opinions of students and lecturers, who already understand the concept of democracy, would be much more suitable to this current study. In as much as their opinions may not be completely bias-free, the researcher assumes that they would be able to provide some insights into how they think democracy is developing in the country. The researcher argues that students and lecturers would be the best group to represent the views on the democratisation process, as the selected sample would form part of an academic group, and would be less prone to over-exaggeration and biases in their opinions.

The researcher argues that the expertise and knowledge of lecturers, their exposure to the political atmosphere, as well as first-hand experience of demonstrations, would generate thicker and richer insights and information, regarding the impacts and implications of the Arab Spring on the process of democratisation. Lecturers with a background in political studies were able to provide additional insights into the current process, or conditions of democracy in the country. Additionally, both populations were easily accessible, and cooperated to participate in the study, ensuring a high rate of response.

Students have been selected as the second population, as they have historically played major roles in shaping the educational, political, and social landscapes of their countries. Besides, students with a better understanding of democracy, participate more in political activism. In the past, and more recently, students have played major roles in influencing political change through uprisings. Although most student activism is related to left-wing politics, there are those who have participated in right-wing movements (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). This was the case in South Africa, where students both supported and opposed the apartheid regime, and fought on both sides (Beresford, 2015). The researcher assumes that the opinions of students would be valuable in this regard. Countries which saw major changes along the lines of educational, social, and political reform include, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, China, Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet Union states, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, México, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Taiwan and the MENA countries, to mention but a few (Jarausch, 2014).

In Argentina, for example, during the *University Revolution*, student activism became a major force, where students fought towards democratisation (Rhoads, 2016). The student activism and resistance movements in Indonesia have, reportedly, enacted some of the biggest acts of student resistance in the history of the world (Rhoads, 2016). The university students were among the first to demand governmental changes, such as those student-led demonstrations of Jakarta, Medan and Yogyakarta, which spoke against the military government (Luescher-Mamashela, 2015). In Tunisia, for example, protesters were mostly young people, who also demanded economic and political reform (Anderson, 2011). In addition, most students have participated in demonstrations across Libya, and, therefore, will be able to provide first-hand raw information about the Arab Spring, as well as how they imagine it has impacted on Libya (Anderson, 2011).

The last reason for selecting academics was related to the current instability of the country and the tense political atmosphere (Aras & Falk, 2015). The researcher feared that, due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, there was a risk of being exposed to danger during the data collection process. However, if the data collection was conducted on the premises of the universities, the risk would be less, and hopefully, non-existent. For these reasons, the researcher decided on students and lecturers as the population for the study.

1.11 Organisation of the study

The study is divided into six chapters as outlined below:

Chapter One: The researcher introduces and contextualises the research topic and research problem. The research questions, problem statement, main arguments and objectives are also provided.

Chapter Two: This chapter provides an account of the state of Libya as the case study, as well as an overview of the history of Libya, including the ancient, colonial and post-colonial eras. The era of Gaddafi is also highlighted and, in conclusion, it provides an overview of post-Arab Spring Libya, leading up to current developments in the region.

Chapter Three: This chapter provides a contextual account of the MENA region and covers the causes, outcomes and goals of the Arab Spring.

Chapter Four: The research design and methodology used in this study is discussed in this chapter, together with the sample and sampling techniques employed for data collection, are discussed. The structure of questionnaires and interview schedules are described as the main research instruments in this study, followed by the ethics statement, in conclusion.

Chapter Five: A description and analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data, in relation to the research objectives, are presented here. The major findings are related to the theoretical framework, from which the study's theory derives. The researcher also provides a list of findings drawn from the data.

Chapter Six The researcher presents an in-depth discussion of the findings and how they relate to the main arguments of the study, with a special focus on democracy and protests in Africa.

Chapter Seven: This chapter presents towards a Libyan democracy, and the researcher, as well as principles for the development of a new alternate democracy, based on the findings of the surveys.

Chapter Eight: This chapter will provide suggests guidelines for recommendations for policy-makers, recommendations for economic reform and recommendations for social reform.

This chapter outlined the main arguments, research questions, problem statement, aims and objectives of the study. Finally, the rationale for the sample was provided, and the chapter concluded with the organisation of the study. The next two chapters provide a comprehensive historical, cultural, social, economic, political and geographical review, with a special focus on Libya, as the case study, within the broader MENA region.

2 CHAPTER TWO: LIBYA IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an historical overview of Libya, as the case study. The chapter commences with an overview of the ancient, colonial and post-colonial eras of Libya. The chapter then reviews Libya after the Arab Spring as well as events leading up to current developments in the region. This chapter concludes with a summary of the sectarian conflicts that arose after the Arab Spring in the region.

2.2 Libya: Historical overview

The history of Libya is an extraordinary story in the Middle East, ranging from an Ottoman backwater state, to an Italian colony, and recently, from a traditional monarchy, to a revolutionary state. Libya is a country riddled with history and influences of the great Greek, Roman, and Ottoman empires of the old world. Through the ages it has succumbed to Arab and Italian colonialism that left a country, rich in Arab culture, in its wake (Wright, 2012). Libya is still in the process of attaining statesmanship, and, for the most part of the twentieth century, had been subjected to some, or other, form of marginalisation (Hilsum, 2013). It finally gained its independence from Italian occupancy, and was united, with the incorporation of the three major regions, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, in 1951, presently known as Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha (Wright, 2012). These regions were side-lined, as a succession of local and foreign rulers shaped the social, political and economic landscapes of their country.

During the Italian occupation (1911-1942), Libya was excluded from political legitimacy and participation, followed by political marginalisation, during the Sanūsī monarchy, and subsequent exposure to a new mode of socialism, prior to the military *coup d'état* of Gaddafi in 1969 (Wright, 2012). More recently, with the dust of Libya's tumultuous political history not even settled as yet, it was refuelled with the revolutionary regime that sought complete political, social and economic reform (Capasso, 2013). Additionally, the degrees of separateness between the three regions were still tangible towards the end of the 1980s, and presented a significant hindrance for efforts to achieve a fully unified Libya (Hilsum, 2013). It is also clear that Libya's historical separateness has somewhat impacted, and generated further political complexities in the new post-Gaddafi era.

The study of these three regions is essential to this research, as the three major universities are based there. The data generated will provide insight into the reasons behind possible political conflicts in Libya, and separatist creativities after the revolution.

2.2.1 Geographical background of Libya

The name Libya was seldom used to reference what is presently known as modern Libya (Capasso, 2013). The inhabitants of the country were referred to as natives of the particular region they emanated from, and not as *Libyans* (Wright, 2012). Libya is the fourth largest country in Africa, and the fifteenth in the world, with an area of 1,760,000 square kilometres, and a Mediterranean coastline of nearly 1,800 kilometres (Wright, 2012). It has an abundance of natural resources, further intensified by the discovery of oil in the 1960s, bringing with it vast petroleum wealth (Capasso, 2013).


Pre-independent Libya suffered from scarce resources, and to the outside, represented a *poor desert state* whose only important physical asset appeared to be its strategic location at the mid-point of Africa's northern rim (Wright, 2012). It lies in a critical location, within easy reach of the major European nations, linking the northern Arab countries to those of the Middle East. Therefore, it was considered a bustling stopover and crossroad for travellers and merchants, and was exposed to external social and cultural influences (Wright, 2012). As a result, a large social divide emerged between the cities, with cosmopolitan cities, such as Tripoli, largely populated by foreigners, while desert localities were occupied and ruled by tribal chieftains, with minimal social change (Anderson, 2014).

The most prominent features of Libya are, its location on the Mediterranean coast, and the Sahara Desert (Hilsum, 2013). There are no true mountain ranges, except near the Chadian border in the South, which mostly has rising highlands (Hilsum, 2013). Its productive agricultural regions are located along a narrow coastal strip and highland steppes (Wright, 2012). Further south, pastoral grassland areas abound, leading to the Sahara Desert, a desolate desert of rocky plateaus and sand. With only a few speckled oases, it retains insignificant human habitation and agriculture (Wright, 2012).

Sirtica, is a region in north-central Libya and lies between Tripoli and Benghazi. The city of Sirte is located therein. It is famously known for its loyalism to Muammar Gaddafi and

was made the capital of Libya (as Tripoli's successor) for a brief period of 11 September 2011 to 20 October 2011 (Hilsum, 2012). To the east, lies the area, historically known as Cyrenaica, with deeply entrenched Arab identities, and, in the past, was especially recognised by Arab states in the Middle East. The shore of Tripolitania is extended for more than 300 kilometres, where coastal oases are alternated with lagoons and sandy spaces (Wright, 2012).

Cyrenaica has lesser coastal oases, for example, the Marj Plain, covering a small area, extending and rising to form Jabal al Akhdar (Green Mountain) in a limestone plateau (Wright, 2012). From Jabal al Akhdar, Cyrenaica spreads south until it reaches the Sahara Desert, eventually leading to the Chadian border, unlike Tripolitania which does not reach the desert. Sabha, historically known as Fezzan, in the south-western desert, was disjointedly administered from Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, during the Italian regime, and again during the federal period of the Libyan monarchy (Capasso, 2013).



Map 1: The three regions of Libya (<https://fanack.com/libya/geography/>)

In terms of borders, Tripolitania shares one with Tunisia, with countless legal and illegal crossings being reported, similar to the Cyrenaica province attached to Egypt, due to the

absence of naturally defined borders. However, the borders of Fezzan (Sabha) shared with Chad, Algeria and Niger, are rarely penetrated due to the region's barren desert countryside (Wright, 2012).

The three regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, as well as their political influences over the years, are of particular focus and interest in this current study. The three regions have their own unique identities, and were historically divided into smaller governorates and municipalities and maintained their specificity. In 1969, under the revolutionary government of Gaddafi, the provincial designation of Cyrenaica was officially amended to eastern Libya, Tripolitania to western Libya and Fezzan to southern Libya (Wright, 2012).

The largest of the three regions is Cyrenaica, which comprises fifty-one percent of Libya's area, followed by Fezzan at thirty-three percent and Tripolitania with sixteen percent (Chorin, 2012).

2.3 The three major regions in Libya

2.3.1 Tripoli (Tripolitania) – The western region

Tripoli is a historical region, located in the north-west of Libya, which was originally inhabited by the Berbers. The Berbers are believed to be the earliest inhabitants of Libya, and currently known as the Amazigh.

Tripoli, therefore, has had a long and tumultuous history and is considered the first republic to be established in the Arab world. In comparison with Sabha and Benghazi, Tripoli is the most populous region of Libya. In 1963, the declaration of Tripoli's independence marked the creation of a consultative assembly, and a republican assembly, as well as the election of the members of both (Vandewalle, 2012). The world powers were all informed of the independence of Tripoli; however, the election of a president was deferred, pending the stability of the region (Wright, 2012).

The military *coup d'état* of Gaddafi occurred in 1969 (Wright, 2012). Tripoli was the administrative capital of Libya, and the government of Tripoli comprised the Local People's Congress (LPC), wherein different issues and matters were discussed by the

population. There were twenty-nine Local People's Congresses; however, its liberty was limited by the former *revolutionary committees*, which by extension limited the democratic process, by submitting them to close supervision at all times (Ajami, 2012).

In 1977, *revolutionary committees* were organised and assigned the task of *absolute revolutionary supervision of people's power*; that is, they were to guide the people's committees, *raise the general level of political consciousness and devotion to revolutionary ideals*. In reality, the revolutionary committees were used to survey the population and repress any political opposition to Gaddafi's autocratic rule. In 1979 the revolutionary committees assumed control of the BPC elections. Although they were not official government organs, the revolutionary committees became another mainstay of the domestic political scene. As with the people's committees and other administrative innovations since the revolution, the revolutionary committees fit the pattern of imposing a new element on the existing sub-national system of government, instead of eliminating, or consolidating already existing structures. By the late 1970s, the result was an unnecessarily complex system of overlapping jurisdictions, in which cooperation and coordination among different elements were compromised by ill-defined authority and responsibility. The ambiguity may have helped to serve Gaddafi's aim to remain the prime mover behind Libyan governance, while minimising his visibility at a time when internal opposition to political repression was rising.

The RCC was formally dissolved and the government was again reorganised into people's committees. A new General People's Committee (cabinet) was selected, each of its *secretaries* becoming head of a specialised people's committee; the exceptions were the *secretariats* of petroleum, foreign affairs, and heavy industry, where there were no people's committees.

All legislative and executive authority was vested in the GPC. However, this body delegated most of its important authority to its general secretary and General Secretariat. Gaddafi, as general secretary of the GPC, remained the primary decision maker, just as he had been, when chairman of the RCC. All adults had the right and duty to participate in the deliberation of their local Basic People's Congress (BPC), whose decisions were passed up to the GPC for consideration and implementation as national policy. The BPCs were, in theory, the repository of ultimate political authority and decision making,

embodying what Gaddafi termed *direct people's power*. The 1977 declaration and its accompanying resolutions amounted to a fundamental revision of the 1969 constitutional proclamation, especially regarding the structure and organisation of the government, at both national and sub-national levels.

As the previous capital city, Tripoli was chosen as one of the research sites, owing to its rich historical background, as well as its role in the revolution. During *Arab Spring*, large scale protests were reported from Tripoli, which suffered the most significant losses, in terms of human life and infrastructure. Tripoli was viewed as the seat of power, and therefore, became the symbol of power for the pro-Gaddafi forces, as well as the anti-regime fighters (Wright, 2012). For these reasons, the researcher, specifically, chose the University of Tripoli, Department of Economics and Political Science, as a research site.

2.3.1.1 The University of Tripoli

The University of Tripoli is considered the largest university in Libya, and is situated in the Libyan capital, Tripoli. It was founded in 1957, as a branch of the University of Libya, before becoming autonomous in 1973, and known as the University of Tripoli, as it still does, currently (Wright, 2012). Certificates and academic degrees that the University of Tripoli confer include, diploma, bachelor, Bachelor of Arts (BA), as well as Master's and Doctoral degrees. The major colleges and faculties of the University of Tripoli include, the College of Engineering, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Faculty of Agriculture, Faculty of Education, Faculty of Information Technology, College of Science, School of Law, College of Physical Education, College of Human Medicine, College of Veterinary Medicine, Faculty of Medical Technology, Faculty of Pharmacy, College of Languages, Faculty of Dentistry, College of Literature, and Faculty of Arts & Media (Arjomand, 2015).

2.3.2 Benghazi (Cyrenaica) – the eastern region

The eastern province of Libya is known as Benghazi, originally Cyrenaica, named by the Greeks as such, in 630 B.C., after the city of Cyrene (Vanderwalle, 2012). Originally, it was known as Koranaiah, which became Kyrene, then Cyrene and, finally, Cyrenaica. The region is also known as *Burqa* in Arabic, which was taken from the ancient names, *Barcaia* or *Barcaei*. However, Cyrenaica has maintained its Greek name (Wright, 2012).

Cyrenaica was declared an Italian colony in 1919 (Vandewalle, 2012). In 1943, during World War II, Libya was occupied by the Allied Forces, and subsequently, both Cyrenaica and Tripolitania became British colonies (Wright, 2012). On 1 June 1949, the emirate of Cyrenaica declared its independence from the British United Kingdom. In 1951, the United Nations granted Libya its independence, and the three regions (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan) formed the United Kingdom of Libya, and was governed as a federal state, with Sheikh Idrīs, as the leader of the Senūsī order. During the federal system period (1951-1963), the rule of the state of Cyrenaica, in the Kingdom of Libya, was under the leadership of the following governors: Muhammad Sakizli (1951-1952); Hussein Maziq (1952-1961); Mahmoud Buhedmah (1961-1962) and Muhammad Sakizli (1962-1963). Subsequently, in 1963, the Libyan Kingdom was reorganised from a federal state, into ten governorates (Watanabe, 2016).

Benghazi is the second largest city in Libya, and the largest in Cyrenaica. Benghazi has shared-capital status with Tripoli (Wright, 2012). This is partly due to the fact that the King and the Sanūsī royal family were associated with Cyrenaica, rather than Tripoli (Clark, 2004). Benghazi has been the provisional capital of the National Transitional Council (NTC) since 21 February 2011, and has all the institutions and organisations of a national capital city (Anderson, 2014). The General National Congress (referred to under the section on Tripoli) took power from the National Transitional Council on 8 August 2012, and was the legislative authority of Libya for two years, following the end of the First Libyan Civil War. It was elected by popular vote on 7 July 2012 (Lieberman & Collins, 2012).

Benghazi has been the seat of Libya's parliament since 2011, which has led to a rivalry between the *cities* of Tripoli and Benghazi, and sensitivities for power and authority have been exacerbated (Anderson, 2014). Rivalry between the two regions can be traced back to ancient Greek and Roman times, but can also be traced back to the era of King Senūsī, who was not supported by Tripolitania/Tripoli, and was based in Cyrenaica/Benghazi (Wright, 2012). In addition, the King and the Senūsī royal family were associated with Cyrenaica/Benghazi, rather than Tripolitania/Tripoli (Clark, 2004). After the coup of Gaddafi, loyalists to the Gaddafi regime were concentrated in the city of Tripoli, and during his rule, Benghazi was marginalised. This rivalry extended to the *states* of Benghazi (Cyrenaica) and Tripoli (Tripolitania). Therefore, the first uprisings emanated

from Benghazi/Cyrenaica. Because of this, the rivalry and competition to rule has always existed, and still exists, between these two regions.

On 15 February 2011, popular insurgent movements erupted in the eastern part of Benghazi, with an uprising against the government of Gaddafi (Anderson, 2014). Benghazi, therefore, has been regarded as the capital of the revolution, where the initial protests started. In addition, it also has the largest university in the Cyrenaica/Benghazi region, which has been chosen as a research site.

2.3.2.1 *The University of Benghazi in Cyrenaica/Benghazi*

The University of Benghazi is regarded as the oldest and finest university in Libya. It was the first modernised university in the country, and covers an area of about 460 hectares in the suburb of Qaryounis (Clark, 2004), in the south of Benghazi. The University of Benghazi was founded on 15 January 1955, after the independence of Libya, and was directly associated with the Libyan university, and affiliated to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Clark, 2004). In addition, it was affiliated to the current National Transitional Council (NTC). Numerous subsidiary colleges are also affiliated to the University of Benghazi, in Qaryounis, namely: College of Arts and Sciences in Kufra, College of Arts and Science in Ajdabiya (a decision dependent of the University of Benghazi in 2004), Faculty of Literature and Science in Biar, College of Agriculture in Suluq, College of Arts and Sciences in the Marj (total dependency was relinquished to the University of Benghazi in 1995), College of Arts and Sciences in al-Wahat District (2003) and Teachers College in Qaminis (Clark, 2004).

2.3.3 Sabha (Fezzan) – the southern region

To the south-western part of Libya lies the historical region of Sabha, formerly known as Fezzan, which is considered the desert outback of Libya, abundant in mountains and valleys (Wright, 2012). Sabha also houses a significant portion of the country's oil reserves and was initially occupied by Italy in 1911. However, they were soon defeated by French troops in World War II (Hilsum, 2012). The main city of Murzuq remained under military French authority until 1951 (Hilsum, 2012). Fezzan (Sabha), like Cyrenaica (Benghazi), also became one of the three major regions, and agreed to be part of the United Kingdom of Libya, which was initially ruled as a federal state, and later divided into governorates (Wright, 2012). The rest of its history is similar to

Tripolitania/Tripoli and Cyrenaica/Benghazi. In early 1911, Fezzan/Sabha was occupied by Italy, however, absolute control over the area was not exercised until 1912, and stabilised when fascism surged to power in Italy (Wright, 2012). King Idrīs al-Sanūsī announced the United Kingdom of Libya on 24 December 1951. The district of Sabha, throughout the federal system period (1951-1963), during the era of the United Kingdom of Libya, witnessed several governors; Ahmed Saif Al-Nasr (1951-1954); Omar Saif al-Nasr (1954-1962) and Ghaith Abdul -Majid Saif al-Nasr (1962-1963) (Anderson, 2014)

Currently, Sabha is regarded as one of the most important regions in Libya. Sabha has been chosen as the third research site, as initially, the *coup d'état* of Gaddafi emanated from this region, and was, previously, the seat of the United Kingdom of Libya (Clark, 2004). Sabha represents the old Libya, before Gaddafi came into power, and is perceived as the foundation for Gaddafi loyalists (Benkato, 2012). It has been chosen due to its rich political history, and is considered the last standing stronghold of the Gaddafi regime (Mokhefi, 2011). Additionally, the University of Sabha is also the largest in the Sabha region.

2.3.3.1 University of Sabha/Fezzan

The University of Sabha was founded in 1976, was established as an independent university in 1983, and is affiliated to General People's Board for Higher Education. The College comprises fifteen faculties that serve more than 9,500 students, including foreigners (Clark, 2004). These faculties include, Faculty of Human Medicine, Dentistry, Science, Agriculture, Arts, Engineering and Technical sciences, Economics and Accounting, Arts and Sciences and Teaching.

Essentially, Cyrenaica/Benghazi has a longer history as an Arab region because it became *arabised* at a much earlier date, as opposed to Tripolitania/Tripoli (Vanderwalle, 2012). Cyrenaica/Benghazi was ruled by Arabs, whereas Tripolitania/Tripoli still has some form of residual strains of the indigenous Berber people. In the South, Sabha has remained a desert outback, with its numerous oases, and has become mostly occupied by minority ethnic groups, such as the Tuareg and Toubou (St. John, 2014).

2.4 Historical Background of Libya

2.4.1 Ancient era

The earliest recorded inhabitants of Libya were the Afro-Asiatic ancestors, of which the earliest can be traced to the Garamantes tribe (Reitano & Shaw, 2018). They were originally Berbers of Saharan origin, and were predominantly based in what is referred to as present day Sabha, by about 1000 BC. They were considered a local power in the Sahara between 500 BCE and 500 CE. When the Phoenicians arrived in Libya, the Berbers had already been adequately established (Hilsum, 2012).

2.4.1.1 *Phoenician and Greek eras*

On the arrival of the Phoenicians in Libya, they established trading posts, due to the strategic trade route of Libya, subsequent to the development of commercial relations with the Berber tribes (Wright, 2012). During the fifth century BCE, the Phoenician Carthage colony had established its sovereignty across large areas of North Africa, bringing into existence the Punic civilisation (Anderson, 2014). The Punic civilisation settled along the Libyan coast, and occupied Oea, known as present day Tripoli, Libdah (present day Leptis Magna) and Sabratha (Anderson, 2014). These three cities were together labelled as Tripoli, literally meaning ‘three cities’, from which the name of Tripoli originated (Wright, 2012).

During the sixth century BCE, eastern Libya was colonised by the ancient Greeks, who established Cyrene (Wright, 2012). Subsequent to the development of Cyrene, the Greeks established four other major cities, which collectively constituted the Cyrenaica region. These cities included Euhesperides (present-day Benghazi); Barce (present day Marj); Taucheira (present day Taucheria); Balagrae (present-day Bayda); and Apollonia (present day Susa) (Wright, 2012). The cities collectively were known as the Pentapolis meaning the ‘five cities’ (Wright, 2012).

Owing to its great Greek origins, Cyrene developed into a profound Greek centre for intellectual and artistic activities, and made considerable contributions to the architectural and academic developments in the Greek world (Anderson, 2014). The Greeks of Pentapolis were subjected to attacks from the east by the Egyptians and from the west by the Carthaginians, but were eventually overrun by the Persian army of Cambyses II (Wright, 2012).

2.4.1.2 Persian era

For the next two centuries, Cyrenaica was under the rule of Persia or Egypt. Alexander was greeted by the Greeks, when he entered Cyrenaica in 331 BCE. Cyrenaica again fell under the rule of the Greeks, and formed part of the Ptolemaic Kingdom (John, 2008).

2.4.1.3 Roman era

After the fall of Carthage, the Romans did not immediately occupy Tripolitania. Cyrenaica was eventually bequeathed to Rome, making it a part of the Roman province (John, 2008). This was followed by a succession of civil wars, until the Romans established conquest of the region, and occupied northern Sabha, which after Tripolitania, became a prosperous city (John, 2008).

For over four centuries, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were part of a cosmopolitan state, in which its citizens shared a common language, legal system, and a Roman identity (John, 2008). This is evident in the ruins of Leptis Magna and Sabaratha. However, the distinct identities of the two regions still remained separate, a Punic Tripolitania and a Greek Cyrenaica (Hilsum, 2012).

The decline of the Roman Empire, in the fifth century, witnessed the emergence of decadent classical cities, which were further accelerated by the destructive conquests of the Vandals (John, 2008). Vandal domination contributed to the disruption of the old Roman political and social order. The Justinian's re-conquests of the sixth century planned to consolidate the old cities, but attempts were futile, as the cities had fallen to disuse, including Cyrenaica, which later was transformed into an armed camp. Byzantine rule also prevented the ascendancy of the Amazigh nomads in the coastal region, for one and a half centuries, but eventually weakened and dissipated towards the beginning of the seventh century (Hilsum, 2012). Unpopular Byzantine rule was met with numerous Amazigh rebellions, which presented an opportunity for Arab invasion (Wright, 2012).

It is clear, therefore, that the regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica have been influenced, significantly, by numerous cultures, such as the Phoenicians, Greeks, Roman, Egyptian and Arabs, and to a lesser degree the Persians, Jewish, Vandals

and Byzantine cultures. However, Sabha was primarily influenced by the Islamic Arab culture and sustained a powerful Garamantes kingdom (Varvelli, 2013).

2.4.2 Colonial era

2.4.2.1 Islamic era

In the seventh century, Arab conquerors entered the Pentapolis, and were met with little resistance (Varvelli, 2013). Subsequently, Cyrenaica was conquered and renamed Burqa by the Arabs. This was soon followed by Tripolitania and eventually, Fezzan (Varvelli, 2013). Thereafter, Libya was ruled for centuries by a series of Islamic autonomic dynasties, ranging from the Ummayyad and Abbasid dynasties, to the Fatimid caliphates of the time (John, 2008). Arab rule was imposed, effortlessly, on the locals, which led to the development and prosperity of many towns, while Arab patronage provided locals with security of person and land, and therefore, was not overtly challenged (Wright, 2012). This resulted in the conversion on many Berbers to the religion of Islam, even though they resisted Arab political rule (John, 2008).

2.4.2.2 Ottoman era

Tripoli was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in 1551, which was extended to Sabha in 1580; however, Cyrenaica did not fall under Ottoman authority (Wright, 2012). This period was characterised by frequent mutinies and coups, and eventually, Cyrenaica succumbed to Ottoman rule (Wright, 2012). After years of mutinies and constant exchange of leaders, Tripolitania eventually came under the leadership of Ahmed, and acted as an independent kingdom, surviving several dynastic crises, without invasion. During the Libyan civil war (1791-1795), which resulted in the deposition of Hamet Karamanli by the Turkish officer, Ali Benghazi, Tripolitania was restored to Ottoman rule (Gazzini, 2009). It was only during the rule of Yusuf (1795-1832), that the independence of Tripolitania was regained and re-established (John, 2008).

During the early 1800s, a war erupted between the United States and Tripolitania, resulting in a series of battles, which was later named the First and Second Barbary Wars (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). By 1819 the economy of Tripolitania dissipated, owing to treaties of the Napoleonic Wars that enforced the desistance of piracy in the region (John, 2008). The throne of Yusuf was abdicated to his son, Ali II, in

1832, resulting in a civil war. Consequently, Ali II was deposed by Ottoman, Sultan Mahmud II, marking the abrupt conclusion of the Karamanli dynasty, and the dawn of an independent Tripolitania era. However, the order did not last, and was easily disrupted by the Libyan revolt, led by Abd-El-Gelil and Gûma ben Khalifa, whose rule lasted until 1858 (Wright, 2012).

A period of direct Ottoman rule followed that instated administrative changes, and realised a somewhat greater sense of order in the governance of the three regions. Subsequently, European colonial interests were directed to the marginal Turkish provinces of Libya (Gazzini, 2009). The Italo-Turkish War (1911–1912) brought about some form of reunification.

2.4.2.3 Italian colonial era

Italian occupation started from 1911, when the three regions were reorganised into colonies (Gazzini, 2009). Libya was seized by the Italians, following a brief war in 1912. This was met with Libyan resistance, after which fighting erupted. The British brokered a truce, subsequent to Italy joining the Allies in World War I, in 1915 (John, 2008). This was followed by more fighting after the war, resulting in an extended colonial war (Gazzini, 2009). Italy was determined to colonise Libya, with grand ideas of re-establishing the Roman Empire in the region, by Mussolini.

In the hope of realising this dream, Mussolini declared a merciless campaign, to arrest Libyan resistance to Italian rule (Wright, 2012). The coastal cities were the first to be sieged by Italian rule, but the interior posed some difficulties for them. The regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were unified under colonial rule in 1929.

During the mid-nineteenth century, Italy was unable to participate in the *scramble for Africa* campaign, because it was not a unified state, until after 1860 (Gazzini, 2009). This campaign sought, essentially, to partition Africa, to be claimed by overseas European countries. However, the eyes of Europe were not set on the insignificant poor colonies in East Africa, but on Tunisia, due to its proximity to Sicily. However, it was seized by the French (Wright, 2012).

As a fall back, and bereft of Tunisia, the Italians focused on Libya, which was still notionally under Ottoman Turkish rule, and, at the time, exerted very little control over the area (Gazzini, 2009). Libya presented itself as an ideal colony, and Italy started with the development of economic interests in the area. A diplomatic campaign was initiated by the Italians, in the hope of gaining Great Power recognition that Libya was within the Italian sphere of influence. Thereafter, Italy crafted a crisis, claiming that the Turks armed the local Arabs, and demanded the right to occupy Libya (Wright, 2012). This was in reference to the then Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, in order to preserve Italian interests (Wright, 2012). On refusal by the Ottomans to reply, Italy decided to declare war, which was known as the Italian-Turkish War [1911-1912] (Gazzini, 2009).

War was declared on the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman army was significantly weakened, as the Italian navy barraged the main ports (Sawani, 2012). On 3 October 1911, Tripoli was seized and met with minimal resistance. This was followed by the occupancy of Tobruk, Al Khums, Darnah and Benghazi (Sawani, 2012). The small Ottoman forces of 5,000 troops were no match for the Italian expeditionary force of about 35,000 men (Wright, 2012). By arming the Arab tribes, Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), resisted the Italians (Wright, 2012). However, due to a more pressing war in the Balkans, the Ottomans yielded Libya to the Italians (Gazzini, 2009), and independence was awarded, by the Ottoman Empire, to the regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, in adherence to the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, in October 1912 (Gazzini, 2009).

2.4.2.4 *Sanūsī era*

The Sanūsī's, therefore, were forced to resist Italian violations, without Ottoman intervention, leading to the immediate annexation of both the provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the Italian colony (John, 2008). Under the Treaty of Lausanne, the Sultan was allowed religious jurisdiction, owing to his position of *caliph* (leader of Islam). The Italians allowed this privilege, fully aware that Islamic courts exercised religious authority, which also extended to civil matters. As a result, Ottoman influence was perpetuated in Libya (Wright, 2012).

During World War I, Libyan nationalists were torn between the pro-British and the pro-Ottoman, and eventually directed their allegiance towards the Ottomans, their former colonial masters (John, 2008). As a result, the First Italo-Sanūsī War was initiated, and in November 1915, an uprising against the Italians was staged by Sanūsī tribesmen (Wright, 2012). The uprising was a relatively limited action; however, it did cause the deployment of a substantial Allied force, with 110,000 British, French and Italian troops, which resulted in truce terms by April 1917 (John, 2008).

Italy was unable to extend its authority well beyond the coastal cities, due to the Muslim Bedouin tribesmen, who were against Italian rule (John, 2008). Even though Arab nationalism was a poignant movement, at the time, the nationalistic divisions between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were still significant. In addition, major splits occurred in the two regions, more so in Tripolitania. Consequently, units under the Sanūsī leadership of Ahmad ash-Sharif, efficiently repelled the Italians in Cyrenaica, Sabha, and southern Tripolitania (Wright, 2012). Because of the absence of Sanūsī influence in northern Tripolitania, the Italians were more effective in establishing their authority there (Anderson, 2014). In addition, tribal rivalries made effective resistance to the Italians impossible, who later became entangled in World War I (Wright, 2012). The Sanūsī resistance erupted, and became known as the First Italo-Sanūsī War (1914-17).

After successful defeat of Ahmad by the British, military and political leadership was granted to Idrīs Sanūsī, who recognised Britain as an ally, and was determined to resist the Italians (Benkato, 2012). Negotiations with the Allies, on behalf of Cyrenaica, began in 1917, resulting in a truce, as neither side compromised their claims (Wright, 2012). Eventually, Idrīs was officially recognised by the Italians and British as the emir of interior Cyrenaica. The future status of Cyrenaica was held in abeyance, until the conclusion of World War I.

2.4.2.5 Modern colonial Libya

In 1934, Italo Balbo, who was appointed as the governor of Libya, by Mussolini, divided the area into four official provinces, namely, Tripoli, Misratah, Benghazi and Darnah (Wright, 2012). Sabha was renamed South Tripolitania and remained

a military territory. All government positions were occupied by Italians and Italy invested heavily in the transportation and economic infrastructure of Libya, leading to the development of two economic sectors (John, 2008). The one was the traditional village Arab agricultural economy, and the other, a dominating modern Italian sector (Vanderwalle 2012).

At that time, the alleviation of over-population and unemployment in Italy was the major goals of the Italian colonialists (Wright, 2012). Therefore, Mussolini's design was to turn Libya into a politically and ethnically transformed colony. In an attempt to realise this goal, thousands of settlers were imported and given the lands of the local Bedouins (Vanderwalle 2012). The Italian authorities brought modern medical care and sanitation to Libya, and invested heavily in the country, in order to extract Libya's natural resources, much to the disadvantage of local Arab Libyans (Gazzini, 2009). Therefore, even though schools were erected, they were destined for Italian settlers, and not Libyans, leading to a gross level of underdevelopment among the Arabs, who did not receive modern education.

During the period from 1943 to 1951, Libya was subjected to Allied occupation. The Italian provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were under British administration, and Sabha under the French (Vanderwalle, 2012). King Idrīs Sunūssī returned from exile in Cairo, but refused to take up residence in Cyrenaica, until certain aspects of foreign intervention and control were disbarred. Subject to the terms of this treaty, Italy along with the Allied forces relinquished all power and claims to Libya (Wright, 2012). At the onset of World War II, approximately 150,000 Italian settlers formed about one-fifth of the country's total population. The North Africa campaigns (1941-1943) caused the destruction of Italian economic development in the area (John, 2008).

Tripolitania, by contrast, showed considerable economic and administrative development and growth, but stagnated and decayed towards the mid-forties (Wright, 2012). During that time, Libya was not only divided into three major regions, but was also under-populated and impoverished. The three regions each had their distinct political, economic and religious characteristics (John, 2008).

2.4.3 Independence

In 1942, the British foreign minister assured the Sanūsīs that Libya would no longer be subjected to Italian rule (John, 2008). This was followed by discussions lasting almost four years, resulting in the UN General Assembly voting that the unison and independence of Libya be achieved no later than 1952 (Wright, 2012). As a result, a federal state, with a constitution, delegating a separate parliament for each region, was drafted.



Figure 1: King Sidi Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi (1951-1969)
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idris_of_Libya)

Sidi Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, was elected king by a national assembly in 1950. This was followed by a declaration of independence by King Idris I on 24 December 1951. The country was a sovereign state with powers vested in the king, and the formation of political parties was disallowed (Wright, 2012). Even though the Tripolitarians did not, historically, support the Sanusi, they, however, acknowledged the monarchy, in part, to enjoy the advantages promised to them by the British (Wright, 2012). Cyrenaica was selected as the marked preference of the king, where he erected his new capital, on the site of the Sanusi Zawiya at al-Bayda (John, 2008).

With the discovery of considerable oil reserves towards the end of the fifties, and the resultant income from petroleum sales, Libya had become transformed from one of the

poorer nations, to an almost immediately wealthy one (Wright, 2012). However, the wealth of the country was concentrated in the hands of King Idrīs, and, as a result, fuelled discontent among the people, causing the development of resentful factions. In 1963, King Idrīs changed the federal system of Libya to a unitary state (Wright, 2012).

He showed considerable affinity to the western powers and permitted the erection of British and American military bases in the country, in exchange for economic aid (Anderson, 2014). After the discovery of oil in Libya, King Idrīs administered the flourishing oil industry, which resulted in rapid economic development. However, his regime began to crumble at the emergence of Arab nationalist and socialist sentiments, in addition to popular discontent and frustration concerning the corruption in the government, and its affinity to western nations (Wright, 2012). In 1969, King Idrīs was deposed by *coup d'état* under the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi. At the time, he was receiving medical treatment in Turkey.

2.4.4 The Gaddafi era

2.4.4.1 Muammar Gaddafi

On 1 September 1969, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi lead a group of rebel military officers, in a *coup d'état* against King Idrīs (John, 2008). At the time, Gaddafi was only twenty-seven years old, and later the coup became known as the Al-Fateh Revolution (Wright, 2012). He was referred to as the *brother leader and guide of the revolution* in government statements and the official Libyan press (Wright, 2012). Subsequent to the coup, for the first seven years, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was formed by Colonel Gaddafi and twelve of his fellow army officers (Mokhefi, 2011). The aim of the RCC was to initiate a complete economic, political and social transformation of the country.



Figure 2: Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi

(<https://qz.com/africa/1009354/u>)

2.4.4.2 *Arrangement of Libyan society under Gaddafi*

Gaddafi had grand plans to institute a new programme, in order to rearrange Libyan Society, and created a new political party, called the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). This party was modelled after the Egyptian one, created by President Nasser, at the time, which was no surprise, as Gaddafi idolised Nasser (Capasso, 2013). Gaddafi also invested heavily in the military and army, and as is the trend with dictators, depended heavily on military support (John, 2008). He was more concerned with the creation of a formidable army, than actually running the country, and menial and technical duties of government administration were vested with Major Abdel Salaam Jallud, who became Prime Minister in 1972 (Capasso, 2013).

Gaddafi focused on international and ideological issues, and in 1973, attempted to instate a cultural revolution moulded on Chinese revolutionary ideas (Wright, 2012). This approach to governance advocated that the people may remove administrative incompetence through a direct challenge of the ruling government. In order to achieve this, Gaddafi advised the formation of People's Committees, heading various spheres of society, such as universities, businesses, media organisations, and more importantly, bureaucracies (Anderson, 2014). The duties of the People's Committees would include the performance of administrative tasks, as well as dispatching their official representatives to represent them at higher

levels of government, such as the National People's Congresses, and finally the General People's Congress (GPC), which would gradually replace the RCC (Capasso, 2013).

It was Gaddafi's plan to have this gradual integration of Peoples Committees into the GPC, in an attempt to realise direct democracy. The theory for such political constructions was set out in 1975, in Gaddafi's Green Book (Hilsum, 2012). The Green Book was authored by him, and, apparently, based on Mao's sayings in China (Sawani, 2012).

2.4.4.3 The Green Book

Gaddafi's rule ushered in a new era of rule for the Libyan people and was characterised by the use of co-option and coercion, as well as the manipulation of tribal alliances and informal power networks, in order to maintain power for decades (Wright, 2011). Although Gaddafi proposed a direct democracy to his people, enshrined in his Green Book, his legacy was a state characterised by a gross lack of political institutions and parties, civil society and a complete deficit of the pillars for a democratic system (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh & Zahar, 2012).

The system of Libya's governance was primarily based on the Green Book, in which Gaddafi outlined his theories (Hilsum, 2012). The system of rule, known as the *Jamahiriya system*, was underpinned by 2,000 local Peoples Committees. These committees were granted the ability to raise political issues at ground level, and thereafter, raise them with the central general committee, who had elected representatives (Wright, 2012). The representatives, in turn, would raise issues at the GPC level, and influence the outcomes of national decisions. By March 1977, Gaddafi declared that Libya was the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Capasso, 2013).

The GPC acted as the general secretariat, comprising members of the RCC, mostly, with Gaddafi as the general secretary (Chorin, 2012). This was further restructured by the creation of 187 Basic People's Committees (BPCs), delegated by Gaddafi, in order to further consolidate the transfiguration of Libya's political structure. Libyans, therefore, had the duty to participate in the operation of their local BPC

(Pargeter, 2012). In addition, matters were complicated by the creation of the Revolutionary Committees (RC), which were accountable for the supervision of the BPCs, as well as the monitoring of any form of internal opposition and dissent, within the BPCs. In 1979, Gaddafi resigned his position as General Secretary of the GPC, but still maintained his position as commander of the armed forces of Libya (Sawani, 2012). He set about compiling the second edition of the Green Book, in which he outlined, in detail, that rental housing, retail trade and wage payments were all forms of exploitation. In an attempt to encourage state owned enterprises, employees were authorised to take control of their businesses (Capasso, 2013). Six years after Gaddafi's ascension to the position of power, he took it upon himself to author and publish his Green Book, entitled, *The Solution of the Problem of Democracy* (Ronen, 2008). The aims of this book were to enlighten the rest of the world, and rescue the, from the dismal failure, of communism and the western notion of democracy (Kawczynski, 2011). Gaddafi proclaimed that the masses would be enabled to rule themselves, in a more participatory government, practicing a direct democracy, and viewed it as a guide, based on the new Third Universal Theory (Sawani, 2012).

Gaddafi spoke against democratic tools, such as elections, the formation of political parties and popular representation and stated, "...the most tyrannical dictatorships the world has known have existed under the shadow of parliaments" (Anderson, 2011: p. 4). Additionally, the Book also dictates that votes are regarded a fraud against democracy (Kawczynski, 2011). For Gaddafi, true democracy could only be achieved through the formation of people's committees, popular assemblies and professional associations (Wright, 2012). Based on this interpretation, he viewed that the "the problem of democracy in the world is completely solved." (Al-Gaddafi, 2016: p. 19). In the second volume, Gaddafi outlines his solution to the economic problems of the world (Wright, 2012).

The second volume is characterised by a set of capitalist ideas and quasi-socialist ideals (Anderson, 2011). In some parts, he encourages the socialist ideal that there are only partners and no wage-workers in the socialist society (Wright, 2012). Other parts expound on the ownership of property, wherein he states that, "there is no

freedom for a man who lives in another's house, whether he pays rent or not," and "your vehicle should not be owned by others" (Anderson, 2011: p. 231).

According to the researcher, the ramblings of the Green Book was Gaddafi's attempt to demonstrate his self-proclaimed identity as a statesman-philosopher, but it remained just that, incoherent ramblings. Orthodox Islamic leaders disagreed with some of Gaddafi's writings in his Green Book (Ayub, Ahmad, Da Wan, Ismail & Lai, 2016). Gaddafi responded to this criticism by nationalising the property of religious orders, and exhorted the people to take control of mosques (Ayub *et al.*, 2016). For decades, Gaddafi tried to portray himself as a statesman-philosopher, which culminated in a three-part meditation on politics, economics, and everything, from the evils of mechanised poultry farming, to the importance of owning one's car (Anderson, 2011). In Libya, the text is everywhere, and has been studied by many, even though it stated the obvious, such as "woman is a female and man is a male" (Anderson, 2014: p. 235). However, the Green Book does have its own unusual logic. It is a concoction of idealistic socialism, Arab nationalism and the third world revolutionary philosophies, with a hint of Bedouin supremacy (Kawczynski, 2011).

2.4.4.4 The General People's Congress (GPC) – 1977

In 1977, the General People's Congress (GPC) was proclaimed by Gaddafi (Wright, 2012). Therein, Gaddafi claimed to establish the *people's power*, and amended the name of the country to the *Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya* (Hilsum, 2012). As a result, power and authority was vested in the GPC, notionally. Gaddafi continued to act as the actual chief of state and secretary general of the GPC, until he relinquished his position in 1980 (Wright, 2012). However, he still controlled all areas of the Libyan government, employing devices, such as directly addressing the masses, establishing tight security mechanisms, and very authoritative revolutionary committees, to maintain his position of power (Capasso, 2013).

Although he outwardly refused to be addressed as the head of state, Gaddafi exercised absolute authoritarian power. He was a dictator by all standards, and only trusted a handful of very close advisers. His allegiance was tribal, and most of his

trusted advisers originated from his hometown in the Sirte region, ironically situated between the historically contending provinces of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania (Kawczynski, 2011).

On 2 March 1977, Libya officially became the *Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, which, according to Gaddafi, would practice direct democracy (Hilsum, 2012). During this time, Gaddafi *officially* relinquished his authoritative powers to the GPCs, after which he merely considered himself a symbolic figurehead. In October 1975, a *coup d'état* was attempted by military officers from Misrata, but it was unsuccessful (Hilsum, 2012). As a result, the perpetrators were arrested and executed. The period after this coup was characterised by contention and tension that grew between the Libyan government, the revolutionary committees, and the military hierarchies (Kawczynski, 2011).

In May 1984, another coup to oust Gaddafi was attempted, but it was unsuccessful (Hilsum, 2012). This was followed by a radical shift in his rule, where in a state of paranoia, Gaddafi ordered the imprisonment and interrogation of thousands of people, accused of making threats (Hilsum, 2012). Countless executions were carried out, in an attempt to flush out internal threats to his regime, and instead of securing his regime, he merely fed the already deepened tensions between the Libyan government and its people (Hilsum, 2012).

In 1986, Gaddafi announced that the word *Great* be annexed to the name of Libya, officially being renamed as, *Al Jamahiriya al-Arabiya al-Libiyah ash-Shabiyah al-Ishtirakiyah al Uzma*” or *The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya* (Hilsum, 2012). The word *Jamahiriya* is, in fact, a word invented by Gaddafi, and is translated as the “people’s republic”. This name was selected, perhaps, in his attempt to convince his people that the government was, in fact, a participatory one (Wright, 2012). However, Libya, under the rule of Gaddafi, had always been ruled under a dictatorial autocratic system, and any allusion to democracy, was just that, an allusion (Kawczynski, 2011).

Libya did not flourish as Gaddafi intended it to, and in 1988, mass dissatisfaction concerning the dire shortages of consumer goods, in addition to the war with Chad,

forced him to establish some form of social and economic reform (Hilsum 2012). In light of this, Gaddafi devised strategies such as, the release of political prisoners, and the lifting of restrictions banning Libyans from travelling abroad (Hilsum, 2012). Additionally, to quell the growing discontent, concerning the lack of economic growth and opportunities, Gaddafi allowed private businesses to operate once again (Wright, 2012).

In terms of religious reform, Gaddafi adopted an anti-fundamentalist Islamic policy (Wright, 2012). He viewed that such radical approaches to religion may cause dissent and disunity among the people, and ultimately generate opposing factions to his regime (Mcdermott, 1973). Therefore, any threats to his position of power, or his regime, were constantly checked by devices such as, random house arrests, or the reshuffling of ministerial members (Ronen, 2008). Gaddafi was determined to diffuse any form of threat to his rule, which proved to be insufficient, as internal turmoil brewed among the people, and within the government (Wright, 2012).

A coup under the leadership of the Warfalla tribe was also prematurely suppressed by Gaddafi officials, and led to campaigns of widespread arrests, government reshufflings, followed by allegations of torture and executions (Ronen, 2008).

Despite being a stronghold of support for Gaddafi, the military had become a threat to his regime (Ronen, 2008). This culminated in another attempted coup, in 1993, this time designed by senior military officers, causing Gaddafi to employ sporadic and periodic elimination of potential military opponents, replacing them with loyal supporters (Ronen, 2008).

2.4.4.5 *Gaddafi and Arab nationalism*

In an attempt to revive Arab Unity, Gaddafi attempted to initiate a series of efforts with Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia (Ronen, 2008). However, all efforts failed, due to the differences between the governments concerned. In addition, Gaddafi's Libya was essentially a pro-Palestinian one, and had made numerous interventions to support the Palestinian cause. He also funded various guerrilla and revolutionary organisations in Africa and the Middle East, causing western countries to become alienated from Libya (Chorin, 2012).

In 1977, conflicts arose between Libya and Egypt, which led to the eviction of many Egyptians working in Libya (Chorin, 2012). Despite Gaddafi's efforts to revive Arab unity, Libya's relations with other Arab states rapidly disintegrated and deteriorated, as demonstrated by a treaty of union, signed between Gaddafi and King Hassan II of Morocco in 1984, which was abrogated, two years later (Ronen, 2008).

During the 1980s, with a drop in the demand for, and price of oil, Gaddafi attempted to make changes in the Libyan economy, but his efforts were fruitless (Hilsum, 2012). As a result, economic and social development stagnated, which caused social dissatisfaction and discontent. Consequently, various Libyan opposition movements developed and launched intermittent attacks against Gaddafi and his military supporters (Hilsum, 2012). However, they were unable to remove this indomitable ruler, and were met with arrest and execution.

Because of Libya's support of the Palestinian cause, it was further alienated from the US government, an important trading partner. As a result, the US government led a series of retaliatory trade restrictions and military conflicts (Zoubir, 2009). This was crowned by a US bombing raid of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986, during which the adopted daughter of Gaddafi was killed. The US government accused Libya of producing chemical warfare materials, which further exacerbated the already tense relationship between the two countries (Hilsum, 2012).

Up until the Libyan civil war, General Abdul Fatah Younis was second-in-command to Gaddafi in the government hierarchy, as well as interior minister (Hilsum, 2012). He resigned on 22 February 2011. On 1 March 2011, Gaddafi sacked his right-hand man, information Chief Abdullah Senussi, who was responsible for the brutality against the protestors. On 4 March 2011, Interpol issued a security alert concerning the "possible movement of dangerous individuals and assets", based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970. The warning listed Gaddafi and fifteen key members of his regime (Hilsum, 2012: p. 152).

2.4.4.6 *Beginnings of protests*

The Gaddafi revolution was centralised and focused on the Gaddafi family and its closest supporters, who were protected by its highly coercive and tight security mechanisms (Vanderwalle, 2012). For decades it had repressed any form of political and social change, which had festered to some extent, causing popular discontent among the people. Under the guise of the Jamahiriya system, it had successfully convinced the people, albeit temporarily, that Libya was, in fact, a direct participatory government, guided by the decisions of the numerous committees.

The Revolutionary Committees exercised strict control, monitoring any form of internal dissent, with dissidents often being executed and mutilated publicly, as dissent was illegal, according to Law 75 of 1973 in the Green Book (Ashour, 2015). Numerous restrictions were imposed by the Gaddafi government on the mandate of the Revolutionary Committees, which consequently, led to the revival of Libya's state popularity in the 1990s. However, in 2004, Gaddafi still continued with his old tactics, posting a \$1 million bounty for journalist and governmental critic, Ashur Shamis, who was accused of close links to Al-Qaeda (Hilsum, 2012).

In 2009, Gaddafi reported the dawn of a new *political era* in Libya, followed by elections for ministerial positions, as well as national security measures to be initiated (Hilsum, 2012). These elections were devised to correlate with the standard intermittent elections for the Popular Committees, Basic People's Committees, Basic People's Congresses, and General People's Congresses, in 2010 (Anderson, 2011).

However, in January 2011, there was considerable upset, concerning the delays in the construction of homes, promised by Gaddafi (Prashad, 2012). To this end, a string of protesters in Bayda, Derma and Benghazi entered and occupied government-built housing (Hilsum, 2012). The demonstrations were initially peaceful, and later developed into confrontations, which were met with military force. This resulted in further clashes between the police and the protesters, who then attacked government offices. As a result, at the end of January 2011, the

government decided to invest an amount of €20 billion in housing and further developments (Hilsum, 2012).

This was followed by the call of Jamal al-Hajji, a political commentator, accountant and writer, who rallied the public to demonstrate for freedom within Libya. However, he was later arrested on 1 February 2011, and falsely accused of injuring a civilian with his vehicle (Hilsum, 2012). Immediately thereafter, in early February, Gaddafi held a meeting with media figures, as well as political activists, and warned of imminent responses against all who dared to disturb the current political state of Libya (Hilsum, 2012).

February 2011 witnessed more protests, confrontations and unrest against the local administration, with protestors gathering in the square of Zawiya, (Roumani, 2014). Soon after, race riots were initiated and silenced by Gaddafi supporters and the police (Roumani, 2014). On 15 February 2011, the Libyan protests were again ignited by the arrest of a human's right attorney, Fathi Terbil, by the Benghazi police headquarters (St. John, 2014). Fathi Terbil represented the families of the 1,000 prisoners, who, allegedly, had been massacred at the Abu Salem jail massacre in 1996, in Tripoli (Wright, 2012). The arrest was followed by the demonstration of 500 to 600 people, calling for the release of Terbil (Roumani, 2014). Confrontations ensued, and the crowds were doused with tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets, by the local police force (Roumani, 2014).

On the 17 February 2011, a "Day of Rage" was declared by the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition. Despite heavy worded warnings from government officials that Libyans should pursue the proper channels, if they wished to raise grievances, hundreds of protesters in the cities of Zawiya and Zintan called for the end to the Gaddafi government (Roumani, 2014).

Subsequently, television and public radio station personnel were sacked, while protesters set fire to security buildings, Revolutionary Committee offices, the interior ministry building, and the People's Hall (Howard & Hussain, 2013). Due to the overwhelming crowds of protesters, the security forces were forced to retreat from Benghazi, on the 18 February. The peaceful protests had developed into armed

ones, and spread to Derma, Bayda and Benghazi, where it was reported that some armed personnel had joined the protesting crowds. This led to the first aerial attack by Gaddafi, who ordered helicopters to fire at civilians, on the 19 February 2011 (Howard & Hussain, 2013).

2.4.5 The post-revolution era

2.4.5.1 *The NTC – 2011 to 2012*

The regime began a systematic onslaught in the area, with aerial attacks, which soon spread to the region of Tripolitania (Schaller, 2016). For this reason, the National Transitional Council (NTC) established its base in Benghazi (eastern Libya), the capital of the Cyrenaica region, on 27 of February 2011, but was not declared officially established, until 5 March 2011 (Schnelzer, 2016). The NTC, a self-appointed institution, whose aim was the removal of the Gaddafi despotic regime, independently, declared itself the true representative of the Libyan people, and was originally known as the Libyan Interim National Council (LINC) (White, 2014). Subsequently, it was changed to the Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC), and later to the National Transitional Council. The institution was almost immediately accepted by many Libyans, and naturally became the symbol of the fight against the regime, as well as for equality, justice and freedom. Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Gaddafi's Justice Minister, was elected as the Chief of the NTC, after he defected to Benghazi (Ashour, 2015).

The NTC was at once acknowledged by France, Great Britain, Qatar and the USA, in July 2011. Other members of the Libya Contact Group (LCG), comprised of individual countries, as well as international organisations, such as the Arab League, United Nations and a selection of European countries soon followed suit (Eriksson, 2015). Interestingly, since its inception, the NTC was almost, immediately accepted by the international community, while any criticism thereof was held in abeyance, despite it being a self-appointed and created institution, with somewhat divided support from the Libyan people. Various confrontations and fault lines started to emerge (Vilmer, 2016).

On 15 August 2011, rebels in the east, with the aid of NATO forces, penetrated Tripoli, and pierced the symbolic heart of the Gaddafi stronghold, known as Bab

al-Aziziyya (White, 2014). This provided just enough support and fervour to the NTC, who were determined to bring their plans to fruition. Subsequently, the battles of Bani Walid and Sirt followed, lasting, approximately, one month (White, 2014). On 20 October 2011, Sirte came under rebel control and Gaddafi was brutally killed (Vilmer, 2016).

It was reported in Libya that Abdul Jalil, and all Gaddafi's loyalists, should be held accountable for previous violations. Soon, thereafter, the NTC was recognised by the Arab and western allies. The NTC quickly developed strong ties with their western and Arab allies, and began securing the international support it required to legitimise the organisation, and build the momentum to protect the Libyan civilians, through all means necessary (Cherstich, 2014).

One of the major aims of the NTC was to head the revolts and uprisings for *New Libya*, also referred to as *Free Libya*, and to oversee the transitional period, initially, until the election of a legitimate government, that is, after Libya was liberated (Cherstich, 2014). The council largely comprised self-appointed defectors and returned exiles, the identities of whom were kept secret, due to security reasons (Ashour, 2015). Three days after the declaration, the NTC announced its plans to officially hold elections within eight months.

In 2012, clashes erupted between the rebel forces of Benghazi, due to some disagreement regarding the nature of changes that were instated by the NTC. As a result, the head of the NTC, Abdel Hafis Ghoga, resigned (Ashour, 2015). One month later, in March 2012, the officials of the NTC, based in Benghazi, introduced a campaign to reconstruct sovereignty in the Cyrenaica region, further increasing tension with the central NTC in Tripoli (Ashour, 2015). During this time, militia from Ghana, Mali, and many other surrounding states, flocked into Libya and *destabilised* the political transition further in the country, with disruptions of armed non-state groups (St. John, 2014). In addition, the inability of the interim leaders to reach a firm decision, concerning the infighting in Libya, complicated conditions.

2.4.5.2 General National Congress - 2012 to 2016

The election of the General National Congress (GNC) followed on 7 July 2012, in which, Ali Zaidan was elected as the first prime minister of Libya (Watanabe 2016). Numerous operations followed and militia groups in the area of Zintan were deemed uncontrollable by government. In August 2012, the GNC elected Mohammed Magarief of the Liberal National Front Party as its chairman, making him the interim head of State. Magarief was determined to eliminate and driving out militia groups, such as the Ansar al-Sharia, as well as other groups in the Derna area. In October 2012, Ali Zaidan, was elected as the prime minister, and Mr Juma'a Ahmed Ateega, as the first vice president of the GNC (Lefèvre, 2016). However, in the following year, May 2013, Muhammad al-Magarief declared his resignation, in accordance to the PIL that bans Gaddafi era officials from holding positions of public office (Ibrahim & Otto, 2017). This was followed by the election of Minister Nuri Abu Sahmein, in June 2013, as the new chairman of the GNC.

The Libyan Political Isolation Law (PIL), which attempted to prevent members of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi from holding public office during the country's transition, was passed by the GNC, after pressure was exerted on the National Congress by Dar al-Ifta, as well as the Justice and Building Bloc of the Muslim Brotherhood. Factions belonging to Islamic groups besieged the headquarters and governmental ministries, in an effort to expel supporters of the Gaddafi regime. The resolution was drafted by militias of the city of Misrata, who shelled the city of Ben Walid, on the grounds that there were members of the former regime residing in the city. As a result of the resolution, tribal wars emerged and escalated, such as those between the Zintan and Mashashiyya tribes (Schnelzer, 2016). However, wars were not limited to the tribes only, but extended to cities as well, such as those fought between the cities of Asabi'ah and Ghiryamn, Gemayel and Ritalin, as well as Tubo and Awlad Sulaiman in the south (Schnelzer, 2016).

In November 2013, Mr al-Awaji was elected as the second first vice-president of the GNC; however, the position remained vacant for a few months, after his resignation in July 2014 (Ibrahim & Otto, 2017). The GNC's refusal to disband after the expiry of its mandate led to the eruption of numerous popular protests in

February 2014. This was followed by the sacking of Minister Ali Zaidan by the GNC and was succession of Ahmed Maiteg (Ibrahim & Otto, 2017).

In the interim, the *Karama* operation, under the leadership of Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, was launched on 15 May 2014 (Schaller, 2016). At the time, terrorists from some state organisations, Al-Qaeda, as well as battalions that were supported by the Islamic blocs of the GNC in the western city of Misrata, were fighting in Benghazi.

At the end of the mandate of the GNC, the *Daesh* (Jihadist/terrorist) organisations emerged in Sirte, Derna, Sabrata and Benghazi (Schnelzer, 2016). The second set of elections was concluded on Wednesday 25 June 2014, and the new parliament was elected (Schaller, 2016). The Islamic bloc suffered a major loss, resulting in their refusal to relinquish power. As a result, an attack was launched on Tripoli International Airport, in addition to the *Dawn of Libya* operation, allegedly committed by disgruntled members of the political Islamic groups, who had lost the elections.

Subsequently, the United Nations in Geneva began to monitor the dialogue between the conflicting Libyan parties to power, namely, the parliament, the GNC and active parties on the ground (Eriksson, 2015). The relevant parties agreed to continue with talks, aimed at bringing an end to the Libyan conflict. In November 2014, Omar al-Hassi became head of the ministers of the government of Tripoli, illegitimately, and the new elected parliament was moved to the Eastern city of Tobruk (Schaller, 2016).

The GNC was a self-appointed institution like the TNC and was led by Minister Nouri Abu Sahmein with Omar al-Hassi and Khalifa al-Ghawi as prime ministers. It was in existence from 2012 to 2016, and elected the New Salvation Government (NSG) as an interim government (Mezran & Miller, 2017: p. 3). On 1 April 2016, media reports confirmed the resignation of the NSG, who had relinquished its authority once again to the GNC (Blanchard, 2016: p. 8). The situation was further confounded when the NSG, as well as the GNC, announced that power would be ceded to the Presidential Council (PC) in April 2016. The GNC, therefore, was

disbanded on the 5 April 2016, with its last elected chairman being Nouri Abu Sahmein (Ibrahim & Otto, 2017: p. 14).

In summary, the GNC, considered as one of the major opposing forces to the east, was primarily dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood's Libyan Party, known as the Justice and Construction Party and Loyalty to the Martyrs Bloc, and had the military backing of the *Libya Dawn Coalition*. Although, the GNC played a major role in the second Libyan civil war, it was uneasy era for Libya and was characterised by the frequent occurrence of contentious tribal feuds, specifically, as a result of Resolution No. 7 (Watanabe, 2016: p. 114; Mezran & Miller, 2017: p. 4).

2.4.5.3 GNA 2016 - present

In December 2015, the GNC and members of the House of Representatives (HOR) signed a United Nations agreement, in support of reaching some form of political agreement. The agreement proposed the formation of a nine-member Presidential Council (PC), as well as a ~~seventeen-member~~ interim Government of National Accord (GNA), and new elections were to be held in the following two years. The agreement did not abrogate the HOR, which still existed as the advisory and legislative body for the government (Blanchard, 2016: p. 8). However, it was renamed as the State Council, which still comprised members elected by the New GNC. Subsequently, talks and meetings continued for several months, resulting in an agreement, signed in the Moroccan city of Skhirat.

On 17 December 2015, Mr Fayez al-Sarraj was appointed as chairman of the Presidential Council and the Government of National Accord (GNA) was named (Eriksson, 2015: p. 22). Fayez al-Sarraj was the first Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord (GNA), and subsequent to his arrival in Tripoli, it was reported that the GNA had seized the prime ministerial offices (Blanchard, 2016: p. 9). The interim authorities, as yet, had been unable to establish a form a stable government and failed to address urgent security issues, restructure the finances of the country, and develop a practicable charter to achieve post-conflict justice and reconciliation (Varvelli, 2013). Elections for the assembly of constitutional drafting and legislative bodies were held and administered with some

degree of transparency (Deeks, 2017). However, these transparent efforts were blemished by the reported decreasing rates of participation, lack of political competition, as well as threats to candidates and voters (Deeks, 2017).

However, this agreement did not succeed in unifying the Libyans, nor did it suppress the probability of civil war (Schaller, 2016). Some parties belonging to the House of Representatives (HOR) raised concerns about items that should be amended, or abrogated (Eriksson, 2015). The Presidential Council (PC), therefore, was unable to win and obtain the confidence and support of the House of Representatives (Eriksson, 2015).

2.4.5.4 *The role of NATO in the Libyan civil war*

The United States was the first country to initiate a no-fly zone over Libya, due to the dire chaos of the Benghazi rebels. This was soon after the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (Schaller, 2015). However, this resolution presented some difficulties, as it also included the use of additional measures by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to ensure the safety of civilians, which instigated many possible interventions and interferences from NATO (Schaller, 2015). Despite this, leaders of the western world were inclined towards efforts that would bring about the complete removal of the Gaddafi regime. Therefore, the presence and intervention of NATO became absolutely necessary, for the rebels to maintain their positions. In addition, pro-Gaddafi loyalists required greater measures to be defeated, and as such, the mission of NATO was extended and expanded.

NATO, therefore, played a leading role in the sustaining the civil war in Libya (Schnelzer, 2016). After the intervention of the NATO campaign, diplomatic initiatives were adopted as a solution to the ever-intensifying military problems (Vilmer, 2016). To this end, UN-Special envoy, Abd Allah Khatib, was elected to find a diplomatic solution. A number of solutions were proposed, one of which was raised by the Libya Contact Group, based on ending the civil war and simultaneously replacing the regime (Al Nahed, 2015).

The first solution, or scenario, focused on supporting the rebel groups, enabling them to push westwards to the loyalist province of Tripolitania. However, as a long-standing rivalry existed between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, this scenario could have created more difficulties, than opportunities. Traditionally, Tripolitania had supported the Gaddafi regime, and had been previously governed by King Sanūsī, who was based in Cyrenaica. Resistance from Tripolitania was to be expected, as it would, once more, be subjected to the rule of Cyrenaica, enforced by foreign western powers (Deeks, 2017).

The second solution was to simply divide the country into two states, with Tripolitania ruling the West, and Cyrenaica in the East. However, this option did not seem feasible as international and local parties did not wish to see Libya further fragmented into smaller states (Deeks, 2017). This would have major repercussions for the country as a whole, and possibly extend the civil war.

The third solution proposed a *waiting out* of the regime (Deeks, 2017). This implied that the regime would self-implode, and slowly come to an end, as financial resources would eventually become depleted. Alternatively, this scenario proposed the impending occurrence of an *internal coup*, or, in the least, *internal rebellion* among the Gaddafi loyalists. However, it would be an arduous, time consuming scenario, and quite unlikely, since Gaddafi loyalists refused to relinquish power to the Eastern province, leading to the perpetuation of civil war (Beresford, 2015).

A fourth solution emerged in July 2011 (Beresford, 2015), which involved diplomatic discussions between the western and eastern provinces, and appeared to be a more practical approach, as both sides had already sustained severe losses. Rebels in the east were unable to secure a solid victory in the west and the loyalists were running out of options. This solution set out to minimise the in-fighting among the opposition groups and maintain, in the least, a unified state of Libya (Beresford, 2015).

One of the focal points of the solutions was the fate of the Muammar Gaddafi and his family (White, 2014). The removal of Gaddafi regime was central to their cause of the NTC in the East, and to the western loyalists this was an unacceptable term.

This was further exacerbated by the decision of the International Criminal Court to indict Gaddafi and his son, Saif al-Islam, for human rights violations (White, 2014). In August 2011, the new negotiated settlement seemed to have made traction, as the eastern rebels gained more support from a diplomatic and military perspective, whereas the resources of the pro-Gaddafi loyalists were running low. The country was still not unified, however, even after additional military and muscular support from NATO. Despite the firm conviction of the rebels that they would be victorious, greater defective lines were uncovered, and disagreements ensued. These defective lines were even more significant, after the killing of the rebel commander, Abdel Fatih Younes (Vilmer, 2016).

2.4.5.5 *Libyan National Army (LNA)*

In May 2014, General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, the elected leader of the Libyan National Army, launched a military assault against militant Islamist groups, who tried to seize the parliament buildings in Benghazi (Mezran & Miller, 2017). Subsequently, Prime Minister Maiteg was accused of being sympathetic towards Islamist groups. In June 2014, the Supreme Court passed a ruling that Maitag's appointment was illegal, and he was immediately dismissed from office. A new parliament was elected, but was blemished by a low voter turn-out, due to boycotts and security issues (Blanchard, 2016). Consequently, fights began to break out between the new parliament and the GNC.

The people and tribes became even more polarised, creating further divisions on a larger national context (Lacher, 2015). This resulted in tribes affiliating themselves, either to the *Libya Dawn Operation* in the west, or the *Operation Dignity* in the east. At that time, Libya is dominated by three centres of power, each believing it had more legitimacy than the other.

2.4.5.6 *The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), the Presidential Council (PC) and the And The Government of National Accord (GNA)*

The Presidential Council (PC) was formed, in accordance with the terms set out in the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), and was the second centre of power (Lacher, 2015). The PC represented a predominant Tripoli constituency, and came into existence, as a result of the LPA. The LPA was signed on 17 December 2015 in Morocco, was sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council, and

consequently, the Government of National Accord (GNA) was recognised as the legitimate and only government of Libya (Mezran & Miller, 2017).

The four main principles of the LPA were founded on: a) the assurance of democratic rights to all Libyans; b) the election of government elected by consensus and founded on the separation of powers; c) the supervision of all powers, and the establishment of state institutions, as well as necessary mechanisms, to address forthcoming challenges; and lastly, d) due recognition and respect for the Libyan judiciary and its independence from the State (Mezran & Miller, 2017). Therefore, the LPA focused on the separation of powers, and specified that the equitable and just performance of each power, was a necessary feature, in order to achieve political equilibrium in Libya. The GNA was granted executive authority, whereas the House of Representatives (HOR) was granted legislative authority (Blanchard, 2016). In addition, the LPA also instituted the High Council of State, which acted as a consultative organisation, separate from the GNA (Blanchard, 2016).

The PC operated as the head of the state of Libya, and was designed to exert control over the LNA. The PC presides over the GNA, and currently, is internationally recognised as the executive government of Libya. The PC is based in the Abu Sittah Naval Base, on the outskirts of Tripoli, and is under the leadership of Fayeaz al-Sarraj, who was formerly a member of the Tobruk Parliament (Lacher, 2015). The PC still supervises the GNA, and should be endorsed by the HOR, but its members have been unable to formally vote, as yet, due to constant threats from rival party members. However, their verbal and written support have been expressed.

The official opposition is the Government of National Salvation (GNS), under the leadership of Prime Minister Khalifa Ghwell (Lacher, 2015). The GNC was initially re-established in 2012, and although also based in Tripoli, has limited power, in terms of its reach and influence to institutions. Most of the members of the GNC, also known as the Tripoli Government, have shifted to the State Council.

2.4.5.7 Government of Tobruk and Bayda

The third centre of power was the ruling authorities based in Tobruk and Bayda, located in eastern Libya, which had also conceded power to the GNA (Engel, 2015).

The HOR was considered the legitimate legislative authority, under the rules set out in the LPA. The government of Abdullah al-Thinned was based in Bayda (Engel, 2015).

The HOR was supposed to concede power to the GNA, once it had been voted into office. At that time, the Tobruk and Bayda authorities were under the leadership of the anti-Islamist, General Khalifa Haftar, who had close alliances with the Egyptian authorities and was in control of the Libyan National Army (LNA) (Mezran & Miller, 2017).

2.4.5.8 Prime Minister al-Sarraj, the GNA and Haftar

Prime Minister al-Sarraj was not considered as strong a military figure as General Haftar, but members of the PC, allegedly, had close ties to influential stakeholders (Kekilli, 2017). Ahmed Maiteeq, who served as his deputy, was also removed from office, and was considered a powerful representative of the city-state of Misrata (Kekilli, 2017).

At that time, Misrata was a major supporter of the GNA, in terms of military and political backing. The militia of Misrata also fulfilled a crucial role in bringing down the Gaddafi regime, and were still considered an influential and significant military force in Libya. Ali Faraj al-Qatrani represented Haftar, who led the LNA. However, al-Qatrani was boycotting meetings with the PC, on the grounds that the PC lacked inclusivity and representation (Faleg, 2016). Al-Qatrani also shared close links with Omar Ahmed al-Aswad, who represented the city state of Zintan, a city in Western Libya. Zintan also fulfilled a significant role in bringing down the Gaddafi-controlled Tripoli in 2011 (Faleg, 2016). Besides, there was also Abdessalam Kajman, a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, who had some support in Southern Libya.

2.4.5.9 National Security Council - Abusahmain, Ghwell and the 'Tripoli government'

Nouri Abusahmain and the PM of the GNA, al-Ghwell, originated from the cities of Zuwara and Misrata, respectively, and enjoyed the military support of the Jabhat al-Sumud (Steadfastness Front), under the leadership of Salah Badi (Lacher, 2015). The movement was initially coalesced under the Libya Dawn Operation, and included Islamists, the city state of Misrata, as well as some Amazigh minorities in

the western cities (Lacher, 2015). Previously, al-Ghwell and Abusahmain had both been subjected to sanctions, imposed by the European Union (EU), as a result of their hostility to the GNA. Even though their support-base had somewhat deteriorated, they still had the capacity to bring about disruptions to al-Sarraj's campaigns. This would be the case, particularly, if the populace were to switch sides, or the militia, which was loyal to him, were offered a better deal.

2.4.5.10 *The power centres of Haftar, Aguila Saleh, and Tobruk*

There was a definite powerful and influential link between General Haftar and the prevailing speaker of the Tobruk Parliament, Aguila Saleh Issa. The headquarters of Haftar's eastern city of Marj displayed very strong military control over the Bayda government, and the HOR in Tobruk (Lacher, 2015). Haftar had strong and powerful support in the east, and was firmly focused on the HOR, whose decisions were subject to his approval. Haftar's forces had brought about considerable changes to the political and military state of the country, and had made significant advances against the Islamic State group (ISIS) in Benghazi and the Benghazi-based Revolutionary Shura Council.

In October 2014, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon visited Libya, in order to facilitate talks between the new parliament of Libya, the Tobruk-based governments in the East, and the Islamist Libya Dawn in Tripoli (Vilmer, 2016). In January of the following year, the Tripoli-based militia and the Libyan National Army announced a partial ceasefire, after UN talks in Geneva (Deeks, 2017).

2.4.5.11 *Tunisia-based interim government*

In January 2016, the UN announced a new Tunisia-based interim government (Deeks, 2017). However, this was not legitimately recognised by the Tripoli and Tobruk governments, or by the Tripoli parliaments. Later that year, the Islamic State attacked the Ras Lanuf oil terminal, and threatened to move to Tobruk and Brega (Deeks, 2017). The beginning of March 2016 marked the arrival of the new *unity government*, and signalled General Haftar's control of the key oil export terminals in the east (Engel, 2015). At the end of 2016, Islamic State militants were removed from the coastal town of Sirte, which at had been under their control for eighteen months.

2.4.5.12 Field Marshall Haftar

Haftar, who was promoted from General to Field Marshall, had, over the years, built a formidable military formation, the LNA, and cleared Benghazi almost completely of all militia and ISIS groups (Engel, 2015). He had gained the confidence and support of most Libyans, because he had re-gained control and victory over Libya's eastern oil ports (Engel, 2015). The Tobruk government was the official opposition of the GNA, and the Misrata-based militia was the second military opposition of the LNA. Support for Haftar had grown, and he had, on many occasions, sworn to liberate Tripoli from internal and external threats. Al-Sarraj, however, appeared to be the weaker rival, with his support ebbing. Even though the GNA was supported and recognised by the United Nations Security Council, as the legitimate parliament, support for al-Sarraj was abating. He had been accused of paying too much attention on gaining international support and recognition, instead of focusing on eliminating the constant threat of ISIS, as well as the proliferation of militias within the country (White, 2014). He had been unable to rid the west of the militia, and still remained at the mercy of Tripoli's most powerful militia. For the Libyan people, this was a sign of weakness, driving many al-Sarraj supporters over to Haftar's camp. The Libyan House of Representatives (HOR) was democratically elected in 2014, and was considered the internationally recognised government, which preceded the formation of the GNA (Vilmer, 2016). Haftar had been and was still gaining power in Libya, progressively, since the launch of his efficacious military campaign against the Islamist and ISIS groups. His successful appropriation of four vital oil export ports from the Petroleum Facilities Guard in Eastern Libya, had been instrumental in increasing the country's oil production, which had escalated and reached its highest level in years (Vilmer, 2016).

There appeared to be a drastic imbalance of power between the two figures. Haftar, Libya's most powerful man on the one side, and on the other, al-Sarraj, whose support was on the decline. Haftar had successfully disbanded most of the ISIS and militia groups in the east, and was gaining considerable support from the Libyan people, who, after seven years, were in desperate need of some form of peace and political stability. Haftar had, to an extent, gained the confidence of his people, and therefore, knew he was in a position of power. Talks between the two figures were scheduled for February 2017 in Egypt, which proved unsuccessful.

Despite efforts from President Abdul Fattah al-Sassy to convince Haftar to hold talks and reach some form of agreement with al-Sarraj, al-Sarraj still left Cairo empty-handed after Haftar's refusal to even meet with him (Krieg, 2017). This clearly indicated that Haftar was aware of his position of power, which was strengthened even more, when he attracted the backing of Russia.

2.4.5.13 Haftar and the fight for Libya's oil

At the start of 2017, cooperation between the two sides began to disintegrate completely and in a meeting in Cairo, Haftar and al-Sarraj were unable to reach some form of agreement, despite pressure from Russia and Egypt (Krieg, 2017). This disintegration raised a series of events. In March 2017, the Benghazi Defence Brigades were able to retain the ports for a while, until it was recaptured by Haftar's LNA (Krieg, 2017). Subsequently, fighting between the Haftar led LNA and armed groups in Benghazi escalated for control of the oil parts. Control of the oil ports was an integral feature for political negotiation and manipulation. The LNA had gained control over four ports on September 2016, and ended the blockade that was previously placed on them. Oil is a key asset in Libya, a country that is in dire need of revenue from the crude exports, in order to rebuild the economic infrastructure and restore economic stability. The country has two National Oil Controls (NOC): the eastern one, based in Benghazi, and the western one, in Tripoli. Both are self-created. Recently, the NOC in Benghazi had endeavoured to regulate control over oil processes, but had remained ineffective.

2.4.5.14 Haftar's allies

Haftar is a strong man, who has sought out regional and international allies, and had been seen with Russian officials, spurring speculation about the possibility of a Russian presence in Libya. In addition to Russia, other foreign sponsors included Egypt, UAE and France (Vilmer, 2016). This aided Haftar in the gradual erosion of his opposition, the GNA. In March 2017, the pro-GNA Benghazi Defence Brigades seized control of the oil facilities in the Gulf of Sidra region, from the eastern parliament's LNA (Sinclair, 2017). The LNA hurled a counter-offensive, and the Tobruk government commanded that the GNA condemn their acts. As a result, the Libyan HOR later withdrew its recognition of the GNA, and called for new elections to be held by early 2018. During early 2016, the GNA lacked popular

support, owing to its inability to gain control of Tripoli, and eradicate the powerful militia (Krieg, 2017).

During early 2017, the GNA still lacked popular support, due to its weak military force, and inability to control Tripoli. In April 2017, and early May, a meeting was held between Prime Minister al-Sarraj and, at that time, Field Marshal Haftar, in Abu Dhabi. The outcome of the meeting suggested that both sides agreed to the necessity of reaching some form of agreement, and a peaceful solution seemed most apt (Krieg, 2017).

2.4.5.15 The New Parliamentary Council and Declaration of Principles

The agreement entailed the formation of a new PC, which would be founded on a power-sharing agreement, with elections to be held in March 2018. In addition to the existent LPA, the Libyan HOR and GNC parties also signed a Declaration of Principles, which was aimed at the formation of a national unity government (Krieg, 2017). The new Declaration of Principles was separate to the LPA, despite having parallel objectives.

This new declaration outlined the establishment of a ten-person committee, five from each party, who would jointly elect an interim Prime Minister, and two deputies, in addition to full legislative elections, to transpire within the ensuing two years (Smith & Pack, 2017).

2.4.5.16 Libya's key armed groups and actors

There were many groups competing for the control of Libya. A brief overview of the key military groups in Libya follows in the following section.

- **The Libyan National Army (LNA)**

The Libyan National Army appeared to be the most powerful and was under the leadership of Haftar's armed forces. It was the official military backing of the elected House of Representatives (HOR) in Tobruk. The HOR in Tobruk provided Haftar's LNA with the legitimacy it required, as Libya did not have a functioning institutional army in the previous regime (Schaller, 2016).

- **The Benghazi Brigades**

The Benghazi Brigades opposed the LNA and were formed in 2016, comprising opposition fighters, exiled from Benghazi after Haftar's takeover in 2014 (Schnelzer, 2016). Their primary goal of the Benghazi Brigades was to return to Benghazi, and as such, they were constantly clashing with Haftar's forces. They succeeded in the capture of two oil ports on their way to Benghazi, a victory that was short lived, as they were soon recaptured by the LNA (Schnelzer, 2016).

- **The Libya Dawn Alliance**

The Libya Dawn Alliance also opposed Haftar's forces and the Zintan fighters during *Operation Dignity* in 2014, in the city of Tripoli (Schnelzer, 2016). The Libya Dawn Alliance comprised various fighters, including those from Misrata. However, fractions soon occurred within the group, which became fragmented as a result of the internal tensions.

- **The al-Bunyan al-Marsous (BAM)**

The al-Bunyan al-Marsous (BAM) comprised a mostly Misrata-based constituency, whose primary goal was to fight the Islamic State of Iraq, and the Levant (ISIL) (Watanabe, 2016). The group eventually declared victory when they captured Sirte in late 2016, at the cost of losing hundreds of lives.

The GNC was elected in 2012 as the proposed replacement of the National Transitional Council, and mostly comprised moderate officials. The only Islamist protagonists were President Nouri Abusahmain and a few other officials. However, the GNC later became fragmented and split from the Islamist groups, raising concerns that the group had gained the support of Islamist militias, who perpetrated many violent crimes. Currently, the GNC is supported by uncompromising Islamist groups and militias in Misrata and Tripoli, and have almost no foreign and international support.

2.5 International players in the Libyan political landscape

2.5.1 Egypt and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi

President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi had also played an influential role in Libya's political state. He had expressed concerns that a settlement between the GNA and the Libyan House of Representatives was a necessary feat, in order to end the civil war. In addition, he maintained that the continuance of the civil war would only serve to perpetuate the proliferation of Jihadist and Islamist movements in the country (Howard & Hussain, 2013). Egypt also maintained that groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, would use the lack of political stability in the country to gain greater influence (Sasnal, 2017). However, Haftar's repudiation to negotiate with GNA Prime Minister al-Sarraj in February 2017, frustrated the Egyptian president, despite supplying Tobruk's government with substantial arms deals, in the hope of maintaining a buffer zone with ISIS, and consequently, eliminating the possibility of any opposition to al-Sisi's government (Sasnal, 2017).

2.5.2 The Russian Government

The Russian Government confirmed its intention to play some part in the restoration of a robust regime in the country (Sasnal, 2017). Russia had met with al-Sarraj's rival factions, and the previous year, Haftar had paid a visit to Russia (Lefèvre, 2017). Days before al-Sarraj's visit to Russia, in March 2017, Putin's spokesman said, "Russia is interested in Libya finally becoming a working state after this barbaric intervention that was conducted from outside, that led to catastrophic consequences from the point of view of the Libyan state and the future of the Libyan people" (Lefèvre, 2017: p. 330). This is the reason for the interest in the swift development of a durable power in Libya that could initiate the process of restoring and recreating the state.

2.5.3 United States of America

Even though the United States of America and the European Union were eager to recognise the legitimacy of the GNA, as Libya's new unity government, they encouraged all Libyans to support the Libyan Political Agreement, in an effort to bring about peace, stability, and the substantive rule of law (Lefèvre, 2017). Since 2015, the USA has carried out three airstrikes in what it deemed an air campaign to aid anti-Islamist groups to drive out Islamist groups (Sasnal, 2017). The USA and France proposed despatching 6,000 troops, from various NATO countries, to help train local fighters in fighting IS-associated groups. However, the GNA was hesitant, and disallowed such a presence in Libya.

2.5.4 Algeria and Tunisia

Algeria and Tunisia have been avid supporters of reconciliation and finding political solutions to end the civil war in Libya, and have made concerted efforts to prevent a spill over of ISIS affiliated groups into their territories (Sasnal, 2017).

2.5.5 The Islamic State (ISIS)

The Islamic Youth Shura Council (IYSC) declared that Derna, a small town on the north eastern coast of Libya, had joined the global caliphate in 2014 (Schnelzer, 2016). Later that year, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi acknowledged an ISIS presence in Libya, followed by the declaration of three governorates, namely, Cyrenaica, with Derna as its base; Tripoli, with Sirte as its base; and Sabha, in the south (McGregor, 2016). However, the Islamic State was driven from its first headquarters in Derna in 2015 by anti-Haftar forces, and started to establish a new base in Sirte, which became the Islamic State's stronghold in Libya, until May 2016 (Barmin, 2017). However, al-Bunyan al-Marsous (BAM) forces declared war on the Islamic State there, and in April 2016, declared their loyalty to the GNA, in an attempt to legitimise them as an armed force fighting for the country's internationally-backed government (Barmin 2017). On 6 December 2016, the LNA united with the GNA, to re-capture Sirte, resulting a declaration of victory later that month. Despite losing Sirte, the Islamic State is dormant in Libya, and operates in sleeper cells across the country (Lefèvre, 2017).

2.5.6 The fight for Southern Libya – Sabha

The conflict in Libya continued and spread to the southern region of Sabha. In Sabha, the proliferation of armed forces and groups seemed to be advancing; therefore, the LNA embarked on an on-going offensive campaign to gain control of the area (Sasnal, 2017). Much attention was paid to the oil crescent region and the balance of power between the major armed groups, such as the militias and the LNA. However, very little was mentioned about the South, which appeared to be off the radar.

The situation in Sabha worsened, considering the major power outages that occurred in January of 2017. These disruptions were attributed to the armed groups of Zawiya, who, in an attempt to release militia men captured by their opposition group, the Warshefenaa, cut off gas supplies to the entire region (Sasnal, 2017). The situation merely confirmed the inability of the GNA to affirm its power in the region, and demonstrated the non-existence of functional rule of law in the country. Southern Libya had been grossly

neglected by the authorities, and was declared a disaster area by some mayors (Sasnal, 2017). Mayors in the area had reportedly expressed their dissatisfaction with their representatives in the Tobruk and Tripoli governments (Lefèvre, 2017). In addition, some called for protests against the disruptions that had occurred in the area, as well as the lack of interest and intervention from the higher authorities. Consequently, many members of the HOR and the Tobruk-based parliament were compelled to leave Tripoli, with a suspended membership (Lefèvre, 2017). This decision directly impacted on the activities of the HOR, as well as the reconciliation process, to such an extent that, towards the end of January 2017, the HOR was unable to assign members of its delegation to the Libyan Political Dialogue, due to the boycott by southern representatives (Lefèvre, 2017).

Sabha had also become a melting pot for various militia and armed groups. One such group was the Third Force, a Misrata-based militia, which had been based in Sabha since 2015 (Krieg, 2017). At that time, two air bases were under the control of the Third Force, namely the Jufra airbase, in central Libya, and Tamanhant, near Sabha. The Third Force were facing escalating pressure from the LNA, to reduce its presence in Fezzan (Krieg, 2017). In December 2016, the LNA launched an offensive against the Third Force fighters, with launched attacks on the Jufra and Tamanhant air bases (Sasnal, 2017).

The LNA eventually took control of the Brak al-Shati air base in Sabha and, by the end of March 2017, the Third Force was compelled to relinquish another major checkpoint near Tamanhant to the Sabha security department (Krieg, 2017). The control of Tamanhant had become unsustainable, and local tribal elders were mediating between warring factions, to facilitate a peaceful handover, and prevent further clashes (Lefèvre, 2017).

Haftar was determined to gain control of central and southern Libya, as it was considered a strategically positioned military stronghold. Control of the Jufra air base would allow Haftar to launch airstrikes across Libya, and as a result, presented a direct threat to the GNA, as well as the Misrata power brokers (Sasnal, 2017). A stalemate in the oil crescent region ensued, causing tensions and internal turmoil to fester in Sabha, as Haftar's interest grew in the area (Lefèvre, 2017). As a result, periodic clashes occur red close to the two air bases, further demonstrating the snowballing insecurity in the area. In addition, Sabha was exposed to a third factor of insecurity, as instability in the Sahel region, and the

southern border with Chad, Niger and Sudan was allowing various non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to penetrate into Fezzan (Mezran & Miller, 2017). These NSAGs had created multi-faceted systems of coalitions and oppositions in the area. In December 2016, *Front pour l'alternance et la concorde au Tchad* (FACT), a Chadian group, claimed that the LNA had attacked them. FACT was considered a close ally of the Misrata militias, despite its claims of neutrality in the Libyan conflict (Ibrahim & Otto, 2017). Haftar had also gained the support of the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The JEM was a Sudanese opposition group, previously assisted by the former Gaddafi regime in the LNA's offensive in southern Libya (Igwe, Abdullah, Kirmanj, Fage, & Bello, 2017). In November 2016, it was reported that the Qadhafa tribe was supported by JEM fighters, during clashes with the Awlad Suleiman tribes in Fezzan. It was also reported that Haftar forces were accompanied by JEM fighters throughout the latest clashes in the oil crescent region (Igwe *et al.*, 2017).

Southern Libya was riddled with political tensions and strategic challenges, considering the aggressive presence of the LNA in the area, and its objectives to expand towards the South, in addition to the proliferation of NSAGs along the southern border. In addition, ISIS fighters had been moving towards the South, after their defeat at Sirte. To exacerbate the situation even further, ISIS established the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), creating a probable location for a new phase of an imminent conflict (Igwe *et al.*, 2017).

In this chapter, the researcher provided a comprehensive historical, cultural and political background of Libya, and highlighted events that occurred after the Arab Spring, as well as the roles of various actors in the reshaping of the Libyan political landscape. The following chapter presents an historical overview of the MENA region.

3 CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE MENA REGION

3.1 Introduction

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries share similar political, economic and historical backgrounds. Understanding the Arab Spring and its impact on the democratisation process in Libya can only be fully understood after careful study of the MENA region as a whole. Therefore, this study seeks to study the MENA region holistically in order to provide deeper insights. The twenty-four MENA countries and territories share challenges and cultural ties, unique and different from neighbouring economies. The MENA region holds, approximately, three-quarters of the world's reserve of crude oil, of which thirteen are oil-exporting countries (Menaldo, 2012). These are Algeria, Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (Farhani & Ben Rejeb, 2012). The primary religion is Islam, although minority religious groups do exist in several countries. Arabic is the principal and official spoken language throughout the region, excluding Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Pakistan (Vatikiotis, 2016).

This chapter provides a broad historical overview the MENA region.

3.2 History of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region

The Middle East, or what is currently known as the Middle East, historically, has always been a melting pot of activity, as well as vulnerability, and considered an epitomic centre for world affairs. Its vast oil reserves and affinity to the three major religions of the world, has caused the Middle East to be a religiously, culturally, strategically, economically and politically delicate area (Brady, 2014). It lies at the juncture of Africa and Asia, between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, and is considered the birthplace, and spiritual centre of the major religions of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Yezidi, Mandeism, Zoroastrianism, Druze, Yarsan and Mithraism, which have all claimed the region as their religious and spiritual source (Havilland, Prins, McBride & Walrath, 2013).

3.2.1 The Ottoman Empire and the Middle East

The territories of the Ottoman Empire (1300-1922) were massive and extended to the Balkans, Anatolia, the central Middle East towards the borders of Iran, and some

countries in North Africa (Wright, 2012: p. 47). The Ottoman Empire was a multi-religious and multi-ethnic state, where Islamic law was administered, in addition to the dictates of the Sultan (Tiliouine & Meziane, 2017: p. 523). However, the power of the Ottoman Empire waned towards the end of the eighteenth century, and in 1774, the empire was forced to relinquish considerable Muslim territories to Russia (Tiliouine & Meziane, 2017: p. 524). Structural changes on an international level soon outweighed the decentralised system of the Ottomans, causing an increase of European influence over the region. Russia, Germany, Britain and France contested to gain control over the region's natural resources, vying for the political and economic influence of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, North Africa, and Iran, prior to World War I (Goodwin, 2011: p. 452). France occupied Algeria, and later Tunisia in 1881; followed by Britain who took control of Aden, as well as Egypt in 1882 (Vatikiotis, 2016: p. 9). Libya was occupied by Italy in 1911. Nationalism had been steadily growing among the individual states, and challenging the authority of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. Greece gained its independence in 1932, and was soon followed by other Balkan nations (Menaldo, 2012: p. 707).

The Modern Middle East began after World War I, when the Ottoman Empire, which was allied with the central powers, was defeated by the British Empire and its allies (Wright 2012: p 48). It was partitioned into a number of separate nations, which was initially under British and French mandates (Menaldo, 2012: p 708). Other defining events in this transformation included the establishment of Israel in 1948, and the eventual departure of European powers from the region, notably Britain and France, by the end of the 1960s (Vatikiotis, 2016: p. 10). They were supplanted, in some part, by the rising influence of the United States, from the 1970s onwards.

Subsequently, the Middle East became the centre of a socio-political struggle between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), backed by America, and the Soviet Union, backed by the Warsaw Pact and its allies (Vatikiotis, 2016: p. 10). Both powers contended to gain strategic control over the region, as it contained approximately two-thirds of the world's oil reserves (Vatikiotis, 2016: p. 11). It was this context and ambition that inspired the United States to dissuade the Arab world from Soviet influence. The region, over the last two centuries, had experienced both periods of relative peace and tolerance, as well as periods of conflict, particularly between Sunnis and Shiites

(Tiliouine & Meziane, 2017: p. 527). The map of the Middle East, as it is currently, was shaped by the events of World War I, but the region, previously, had been under the control of the Ottoman Empire (Tiliouine & Meziane, 2017: p. 530).

3.2.2 World War I, the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East

In 1920, the Ottoman Arab provinces were separated and distributed between France and Britain, in accordance to the precepts of Sykes-Picot Agreement (Menaldo, 2012). These borders were completely decided and drawn up by colonial powers. Dictates of the League of Nations awarded France control of Lebanon and Syria, while Britain's mandate was extended to Iraq, Palestine, and the newly formed, Transjordan (Tiliouine & Meziane, 2017). In an attempt to placate the Arabs, the sons of the *sharif* of Mecca were granted the rule of two states by Britain (Sykes, 2016). Faisal was made king of Iraq, and Abdullah was made king of Transjordan, known as modern day Jordan (Sykes, 2016). The Kurds were briefly assured of their own independent state by the Allies in 1920, but they were grossly marginalised and their territories were divided among Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran (Menaldo, 2012).

The MENA region expands over Europe, Iran, North Africa and the Arabian Gulf.

Turkey represented the head of the Ottoman Empire, from the sixteenth century onwards, and controlled parts of Europe, a part of North Africa, the entire Fertile Crescent, but none of the Gulf area (Menaldo, 2012). It had lost North African provinces and most of its territories by the end of the nineteenth century, but still remained an independent state, and was re-established under Ataturk in 1923 (Menaldo, 2012).

Iran was earlier known as the Persian Empire, and formed part of the Islamic Empire. Iran was a hotspot for sub-division, was subjected to Russian influence in the north, and British influence in the south, during the nineteenth century (Sykes, 2016). However, Iran remained superficially independent (Sykes, 2016).

Egypt was under British rule from 1882 and became a British protectorate in 1914 (Sykes, 2016). It became a constitutional monarchy, under British instruction, from 1922, and obtained more *autonomy* from 1936 onward (Sykes, 2016). In 1956, the last remaining British troops departed from Egypt (Vatikiotis, 2016).

Sudan was under British rule from 1899, and gained its independence after 1956 (Sykes, 2016).

Tunisia was a French colony from 1881 and gained its independence in 1956 (Sykes, 2016).

Algeria was conquered by the French in 1830 and gained its independence in 1963 (Vatikiotis, 2016).

Morocco was a French protectorate from 1912 and gained its independence in 1956 (Vatikiotis, 2016).

Libya was an Italian colony from 1911; however, it gained its independence in 1947, established a monarchy in 1951, which was subsequently overthrown in 1969 (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

These countries were formally under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, until World War I, but were later divided between Britain and France, in accordance to the Sykes-Picot Agreement (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

Syria became a French colony in 1918, and gained its independence in 1946 (Sykes, 2016).

Iraq was occupied by the British in World War I, and gained nominal independence after 1932. Prior to 1918, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon were all part of Greater Syria (Sykes, 2016).

Jordan was made a British Mandate territory after 1918, and gained its independence in 1946 (Menaldo, 2012).

Palestine also became a British Mandate territory after 1918, but lost to Israel from 1948 to 1967. Palestine still fights for its independence and freedom from the occupying Israeli forces (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

Lebanon was under French Mandate after 1918, and became decolonised in 1943 (Sykes, 2016).

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates are all considered new states, and only came into existence during the 1960s and 1970s. They were mapped out of the region that, formally, had been under naval and military protection of the British, since the 1830s (Vatikiotis, 2016). Present **Saudi Arabia** is still

a fairly new state, and dates back to the 1930s, whereas **Kuwait** only emerged in the 1950s, when it appeared under Iraqi-British tutelage. **Yemen** was historically delineated to North and South Yemen (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). South Yemen emerged because of the ex-British colony at Aden, as well as a Marxist-Leninist revolution. North Yemen emerged because of a 'loyalist' holdout, and is almost regarded as a minor region of Saudi Arabia. Northern and Southern Yemen combined in 1990; however, regional divisions still remain (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

3.3 Dictatorship in the MENA region

3.3.1 Mechanisms of totalitarianism

An authoritarian regime refers to a state governed by a solitary power holder (Jdey, 2012), which may be in the form of a dictator, a small group of political elitists, or a committee, who completely monopolise political authority and power (Gause III, 2011). The aim of the authoritarian state is to maintain uncontested political power, while granting its society a certain degree of freedom and liberty (Gause III, 2011). Such a state merely attempts to maintain this position, and not alter the world with its ideologies, or change human nature (Menaldo, 2012).

By contrast, a totalitarian regime seeks to exercise control and monitor, practically all aspects of citizens' social lives (Gause III, 2011). The proclaimed ideology is virtually imposed onto the deepest reaches of societal organisation, completely controlling the actions and very thoughts of its citizens, and mobilises the whole population, to achieve its goals (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

Totalitarianism is fuelled by the ambition of seeing its indoctrination coming to fruition, and being practiced by the masses it wishes to rule by employing ideological doctrines as tools to realise this end (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). Gaddafi also, sought to form allies with many African countries, especially South Africa, on numerous occasions. Even within Hitler's inner circle, he employed propaganda as a tool to retain their loyalty, as they were not reliably indoctrinated, and, as such, not fully dominated (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). A totalitarian regime is constantly aware that the threat of an internal rebellion, is always possible and real (Jdey, 2012). It should be noted that Gaddafi rotated his affections and affinities, on many occasions, not only to the local tribes, but also to

his very kin, namely his sons, in the hope of preventing an internal rebellion of some sorts (Pargeter, 2012).

Indoctrination and terror increase the strength of the totalitarian movement. To illustrate the Libyan case, Gaddafi systematically indoctrinated his people with the dictates of his Green Book, a way of life that he carved for his people, based on his system of Jamahiriyyah (Jdey, 2012). The Green Book outlined the social and economic lives of the Libyan people. Terror and fear were instilled in the Libyan people, if they did not adhere to its precedents. It formed part of Gaddafi's dictates, in which he sought to completely introduce a new era of socialism (Goodwin, 2011). He set out and developed a self-glorifying dictatorship that lasted for over forty years, and employed mechanisms of fear, to perpetuate his rule. His rule is marked as the longest in the MENA region, as well as in the world (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

In Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was no different, utilising whatever means possible and necessary to maintain his power, as was seen by the use of chemical weapons against the minority Kurdish people (Dodge, 2012a). In Tunisia and Yemen, people suffered under lengthy dictatorships, exploitation, corruption, violation of human rights and repression (Dodge, 2012a). Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria, inflicted intolerable suffering on his people, and still does not express any remorse for his atrocious violation of human rights (Jdey, 2012). The Gulf States, such as Bahrain and Oman, established hereditary fiefdoms, and have resorted to crushing any opposition with heavy machinery (Tiliouine & Meziane, 2017).

Rule in the MENA regions, therefore, has been characterised, primarily, by dictatorships and autocratic regimes, and the region has generally exhibited a poor record of upholding human rights (Pargeter, 2012). In addition, the acquisition of power by dictators was often illegitimate and illegal (Dodge, 2012a). Muammar Gaddafi, for example, seized power illegally through a military coup in 1969; however, he is considered to have had one of the longest lasting rules on earth, whereas Bashar Al-Assad succeeded to power, inherited from his father Hafith al-Assad (Menaldo, 2012). This transition of power witnessed the fastest amendment to the constitution, ever, in no more than fifteen minutes. In Egypt and Yemen, Hosni Mubarak and Ali Abdullah Saleh, both intended to pass rule to their sons, Gamal and Ahmad, respectively (Jdey, 2012). However, the Arab Spring did not allow

their plans to come to fruition. The royal regimes of Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Oman, were governed by absolute rule, which eventually led to the development of widespread demonstrations (Dodge, 2012a). These protests demanded a constitutive monarchy, as well as more liberties for its citizens.

The critics are divided in their perceptions about the role of the Western superpowers, notably the United States and the Soviet Union, in supporting the authoritarian regimes in the MENA region. Bellin (2004: p. 148) asserts that,

... authoritarian states in the Middle East and North Africa profited from the cold war, reaping patronage from eastern and western great powers (sometimes simultaneously) in return for the promise of reliable alliance in the fight for or against Communism. But in contrast to other regions the authoritarian states in the Middle East and North Africa did not see their sources of international patronage evaporate with the end of the cold war or with America's subsequent reanimation with democracy, because western interest in the region has been driven by multiple security concerns that survived the cold war.

Despite the belief of the critics who believed that the Arab Spring was a conspiracy designed by the United States, or Zionist mechanisms, to redesign the map of MENA, for the people of the region, who suffered under abject living conditions, it was in fact, a desperate call for help. This call of help was initiated by a single Tunisian young man, who did not know that through his act of self-immolation, he would change the course of Arab history, forever (Prashad, 2012).


3.4 The Arab Spring

3.4.1 Background

Towards the end of the year 2010, and the start 2011, the Arab world witnessed a string of interrelated protests and demonstrations, which have become known as the *Arab Spring* (Ashley, 2011). Groundbreaking surges of demonstrations, which included both violent and non-violent protests, uprisings and eventually, civil wars, rippled across the Arab world (Aarts, Dijke, Kolman, Statema & Dahhan, 2012). According to Dabashi (2012), the term *Arab Spring* was coined in reference to the Revolutions of 1848, and the

Prague Spring in 1968, which was also referred to as the *Springtime of Nations*. The term was also used in reference to the aftermath of the Iraq War, in anticipation of a possible democratisation movement in the Arab world (Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014). Massad was among the first to use the term, as an initial US strategy of directing the aims and goals of the movement towards a more westernised liberal interpretation of democracy (Anderson, 2011). The events that unfolded have also come to be known as the *Islamist Spring* or *Islamist Winter* (Anderson, 2011). The Arab Spring could be attributed to mounting political discontent of two rampant problems in the Arab region: a lack of freedom and extensive corruption. In the hope of removing these vices, the phrase, “the people want to bring down the regime”, became a prominent slogan among protestors and demonstrations in the Arab world (Abbott, Teti & Sapsford, 2017: p. 2).

The initial wave started in Tunisia on 18 December 2010, with the Tunisian revolution, and spread throughout the countries of the Arab League and its surroundings (Dabashi, 2012). Syria, Yemen and Libya were among the first states to witness major insurrections. In addition, Egypt and Bahrain saw civil uprisings, followed by huge street demonstrations in Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Algeria, Iraq and Oman (Eyadat & Schaefer, 2013). Even Saudi Arabia could not escape the wave, and witnessed protests on a minor scale. These demonstrations were often met with violent attempts and responses from authorities to suppress them (Lynch, 2011). Conflicts between pro-government militias and counter-demonstrators, resulted in the further fragmentation of an already disjointed society (Dalacoura, 2012a). Matthiesen (2013) argues that, despite the variant aims and objectives of the Arab Spring in the different states, they were primarily fuelled by a need for state, social and economic reformation. This is especially true, in respect of the uprisings in Tunisia. The ousting of the then President Ali followed, which might have proven to be fortuitous, as it resulted in a transition from the former autocratic system of governance, to a version of a constitutional democratic governance (Matthiesen, 2013).



Map 2: Arab Spring states (*File:BlankMap-World6.svg*)

Even though the initial surge of revolutions and demonstrations dulled towards the middle of 2012, the implications of the Arab Spring are far-reaching, and the continuance of large-scale discourse conflicts in the region, have proven to be challenging for the state reformation and the democratisation processes (Abbott, Teti & Sapsford, 2017). The most radical discourse from the Arab Spring is the current civil wars that occurred in Syria, as early as the second half of 2011.

The Arab Spring affected six of the twenty-two Arab League members, namely, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (Matthiesen, 2013; Brynen, Moore, Salloukh & Zahar, 2012). These states witnessed full-blown upheavals, with multiple implications, such as, a) the unseating of dictatorial leaders; b) severe internal fragmentation and struggle, and; c) state fragmentation (Brynen *et al.*, 2012).

The first six countries to be involved in uprisings may not have experienced a genuinely democratic political system, automatically (see Table 1). Regarding the ousting of leaders, the popular insurrections in Egypt and Tunisia were successful in the ousting of Hosni Mubarak and Zaine El Abidine Ben Ali, respectively (see Table 1).

Table 2: List of Arab Spring states and related events

Country	Events
Tunisia	President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was ousted and his government overthrown.
Egypt	President Hosni Mubarak was ousted and his government overthrown.
Libya	Leader Muammar Gaddafi was killed, following a civil war that saw foreign military intervention, and his government overthrown.
Yemen	President Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted and power handed over to a national unity government.
Syria	President Bashar al-Assad faces civil uprising against his rule that deteriorates into armed rebellion, and eventual full-scale civil war.
Bahrain	Civil uprising against the government crushed by authorities, and Saudi-led intervention.
Kuwait, Lebanon and Oman	Government changes implemented, in response to protests.
Morocco and Jordan	Constitutional reforms implemented, in response to protests.
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Mauritania	Protests

Scholars in various fields have tried to explain the causal factors of the Arab Spring, but the prominent reasons include, widespread corruption, economic stagnation and poor living conditions, along with repressive political conditions and security restrictions, as well as the lack of fair elections in most of the countries of the MENA region (Dodge, 2012a; Hussain & Howard, 2012; Ismael, Ismael & Perry, 2015; Lesch & Haas, 2016).

3.4.2 Causes of the Arab Spring

Many scholars have indicated that there are somewhat difficulties with providing a full explanation for the timing and immediate causes of the Arab Spring events (Anderson, 2014; Aras, & Falk, 2015; Jamoul, 2012; Maddy-Weitzman, 2015). According to the researcher, this is partially due to the still *unsettled dust* status quo of the MENA region. However, it is possible to explain the driving factors behind the protest movement, and why some uprisings succeeded in toppling regimes, and others did not.

Dictatorial regimes have not always been successful in the provision of a sustainable democracy for their people, and have often invested in state security, at the expense of human security (Gause III, 2011). The Arab Spring was motivated by a lack of effective democracy support (Moghadam, 2013). In addition, the impact of the downward spiral of international economics had considerable damaging effects on vulnerable groups in

society, as opposed to the ruling governments of these groups. It is precisely for this reason that Arab societies initiated political change (Aarts *et al.*, 2012).

3.4.2.1 *Lack of effective governance*

According to Jamoul (2012), the Arab Spring started with the Tunisian Revolution, spurred on by the self-immolation of Mohamad Bouazizi, on 18 December 2010, initially, in response to police corruption and ill treatment. Generally, most Arab citizens suffer under severe economic strife and impossible social conditions (Lynch, 2011).

Social issues such as widespread poverty, constant inflation, rising food prices, human rights violations and high unemployment rates, are some of the more pertinent challenges, faced by the Arab world, on a larger scale (Salih, 2013). In addition to the internal social challenges, the Arab world has been under scrutiny for its lack of state policy implementation, social freedom and its obvious display of corruption on all levels. This initial incident destabilised the foundations of Arab patriarchal regimes and leaders across the Arab states.

3.4.2.2 *Dictatorships and political inadequacies*

Political reasons that led to the Arab Spring may be considered the most pertinent and prominent of all. The dictatorial and autocratic system of governance, in most Arab states, was conducted in isolation, to the exclusion of the will of the masses, and could be considered the most obvious cause. A dictatorship is a “form of government where a country or a group of countries is ruled by one person or political entity, and exercised through various mechanisms to ensure that the entity's power remains strong” (Bellin, 2017).

In an autocratic government, the president is considered almighty, and his word is final (Goodwin, 2011). Therefore, the legislative, executive and judicial powers were not separated in most Arab states, including Libya, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. History has revealed that unlimited and unchecked power, in the hands of a single person or group, will ultimately result in the suppression of rights and powers of all others (Dodge, 2012b). Therefore, the separation of these powers is crucial, to prevent the abuse of power, to protect freedom for all, and is an essential element for successful, as well as efficient governance (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

However, as these three organs of state were not separated in most Arab countries, no checks were in place to ensure that they interacted with each other in an equitable and balanced fashion (Menaldo, 2012). In addition, laws prohibiting freedom of political expression, rigged elections, corruption, banned formation of trade unions and political parties were the order of the day. Basic human rights, including the right to vote freely and fairly, were disallowed in most Arab countries, often resulting in the persecution and eventual imprisonment of the perpetrators (Menaldo, 2012). Such policies developed dissatisfaction with the government among the masses, which resulted in the weakening of the internal social fabric, and eventually, the dissipation of national unity.

When people are under the rule of a dictator, the populace, generally, is unable to voice their feelings of dissatisfaction with the regime, for fear of attracting attention from the authorities (Dodge, 2012a). As a result, reporting any form of problem, such as crimes, or issues pertaining to social and health services are generally avoided. A dictatorship thrives on this sense of fear, and is one of the many tools used to retain the status quo. As a result, people suffer, and silently endure the shortages of life, under a hostile regime (Hamdy, 2012). In this manner, the population continue to live in a state of deprivation and misery, giving rise, eventually, to rebellion and war (Dodge, 2012a). This was one of the driving factors that prompted the demonstrations, leading up to the Arab Spring.

3.4.2.3 *Restriction of freedom and violation of human rights*

The assurance of human and political rights for all citizens, is one of the fundamentals on which any State and society is founded (Bellin, 2012). Arab states have grossly neglected their duty to provide their citizens with freedom of speech and free elections (Anderson, 2011). To this end, Hudson, Iskandar and Kirk (2016) view that the Arab region still suffers from bad political systems and a general deficit of free and fair electoral systems. Widespread corruption in government, corruption and state of emergency laws, coupled with restraints on freedom of speech, have to be addressed in order to prevent future uprisings in the region.

3.4.2.4 *Social discontent*

Despite having earned in excess of three trillion dollars from oil revenues, over the last thirty years, economic despair and social dissatisfaction remain widespread in the MENA region. The people in the MENA region have expressed their dissatisfaction and awareness of the poor state of their countries, in the light of existing models, which they wished their states to simulate (Dodge, 2012b). Non-participatory governments in the region have excluded public participation in the administrative system of their countries (Menaldo, 2012). The people, therefore, desired to regain their original role, which allowed for active participation in the management of their countries, including their countries' wealth (Hamdy, 2012).

This sense of dissatisfaction was fortified by a general sense of injustice, humiliation, marginalisation, and feelings of frustration towards the existing regimes, which fuelled the slogan, *the people want to overthrow the regime* (Menaldo, 2012). However, the Arab Spring was not exclusively powered by social dissatisfaction with the economic state, injustice, corruption and poor social conditions, which was not sufficient to initiate a revolution. Instead, it was accompanied by a general sense of injustice against the regime itself, because it is the sense that drives the people to change (Goodwin, 2011).

In Egypt and Tunisia, it was exactly that sense of injustice, which led to the ultimate deposition of their dictators; however, this was not the case in Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (Kuşcu, 2012).

3.4.2.5 *Security*

Security in the MENA region has always been extremely volatile, with multiple interlinking threats to the internal and external security, and is linked to economic and political legitimacy (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). Simultaneously, MENA states have conflated *regime security* with *national security*, where the ruling elite families have pursued dangerous survival strategies, to retain and maintain control over state formation processes in the last century (Hamdy, 2012). External security alliances met internal needs, by reinforcing the security of the regimes, which, to a large extent, was to the prejudice of their own societies, as it was against neighbouring states (Dodge, 2012).

3.4.2.6 Demographic trends and structural imbalances

In most MENA states, the current level of welfare expenditure and redistributive mechanisms are unsustainable in the long-term (Weyland, 2012). It will become necessary to reformulate the social contract, through the introduction of charges for services, such as water and electricity (Dodge, 2012). This is one of the factors that led to the Arab Spring, as well as social tensions (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012). In addition, the rapid population growth and the lack of employment opportunities for the youth have resulted in major threats to long-term stability and security in the MENA region, which has one of the fastest growing populations in the world.

During the pre-Arab Spring period, unemployment was a major long-term challenge faced by regimes, but grossly ignored and neglected by them. The MENA regimes failed to formulate operative strategies to address the structural foundation of the labour imbalance (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). Therefore, employment to citizens entering the job market was not guaranteed, and the crucial insufficiencies in the educational systems, produced graduates, who lacked the qualifications to enter the private sector.

3.4.2.7 Low economic growth

Complex economic, social and political changes and transition resulted in the MENA region, not only because of the political reasons of *the Arab Spring*, but also because of the economic reasons from the global economic crisis (Malik & Awadallah, 2013). It is vital for the MENA region to develop an economic structure, in order to increase workable developments of the welfare of its society (Dodge, 2012). Osai (2013) asserts that, in reference to the Egyptian revolution, Egypt had suffered a plausible income gap under the leadership of Mubarak, which, according to him, was one of the main causes of the initial uprising. Arab citizens across most states, including Libya, live on less than two dollars a day, despite the rich natural resources, wealth and oil reserves of the country (Weyland, 2012). The second major cause of the Arab Spring, or possible factor, is the state of rampant unemployment in the Arab region. A large percentage of Arab youth, in most Arab states, are unemployed, reaching the twenty-four percent mark (Maghrabi & Salam, 2013).

3.4.2.8 External causes of the Arab Spring

It should be noted that many events clearly impacted on their ability to implement democracy and exercise political freedom. The 9/11 attack in the USA, and its continual *war on terror* campaign, was employed by the western super powers, to increase the violation of human rights and facilitate the role of the military court (Anderson, 2012). The so-called *war on terror* played an even bigger role in the later *domino effect* of the Arab Spring. The failure of the USA in its campaign against terror, specifically the USA-led Iraq One, was a mere strategy of supposed imported democracy. In addition, the conflicting political status quo of the Palestinian-Israel conflict, and the failure of the USA to effectively bring about peace in that region, might have been a tenable factor in the initial causes of the revolution (Hudson *et al.*, 2016).

The examination of the geographic positions of many Arab states, allows for a deeper insight into the root international causes of the Arab Spring. Firstly, Egypt is the largest Arab state, and the first state to sign a peace accord with Israel (Dalacoura, 2012a). This might have influenced and fuelled the uprisings of discontented civilians. Simultaneously, Mubarak maintained a firm alliance with the USA. In summary, all of these factors appear to have played a considerable role in triggering, as well as contributing to the uprisings across the region, and, despite the common motivations beneath the surface of the events, their outcomes varied from country to country, depending on a combination of factors.

3.5 MENA states and the Arab Spring

3.5.1 The Tunisian revolution

Tunisia's revolution was also known as the "Jasmine Revolution" and the "Grass Alfa Revolution" (El-Khawas, 2012: p. 1). It was the first popular uprising to topple an established government in the MENA region, since the Iranian revolution of 1979, and unfolded in three phases (Goodwin, 2011). Firstly, the suicide of the young Tunisian street vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, when he set himself alight on the 17 December 2010, in the city of Sidi Bouzid, to protest his treatment at the hands of the authorities (Pomerance, 2016). His attempted suicide was his reaction to his cart being confiscated by the local police. He eventually succumbed to the trauma of severe burn wounds on

Wednesday, 4 January 2011. His action of defiance and dissatisfaction with the oppressive regime, echoed the feelings of thousands of Tunisians, who took to the streets on 18 December 2010, in support of his ideals, and protest against the current state of affairs in Tunisia. Demonstrations erupted in his rural hometown, trailed by similar protests in other regions of the country, resulting in a brutal security crackdown on protesters by the regime, news of which rapidly spread throughout the country, via social media platforms (Jdey, 2012).

Secondly, on reaching the capital, Tunis, the regime responded to protests with more brutality, leading to the arrest of many demonstrators, activists, and a complete shutdown of the internet (Pomerance, 2016). The Tunisian revolution was also rightfully entitled, the “Revolution for dignity”, a call to regain the human dignity of the Tunisian people, in the face of abject destitution, under the rule of its dictator, Zaine El Abidine (Goodwin, 2011). Thousands of protestors expressed their dissatisfaction with the current conditions in the country, the absence of social justice, widespread corruption, and the lack of social justice in the ruling regime. Demonstrations rippled through the country, including several cities in Tunisia, causing injuries to numerous demonstrators, and leading to the death of many (Dodge, 2012).

Although the protests that erupted in Sidi Bouzid were spontaneous, they were characterised by a level of organisation and sophistication. The Sidi Bouzid branch of the Tunisian General Labour Union (French: *Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail*, UGTT) was engaged in the uprising from day one, and is considered a stronghold, as well as a major driving force behind the initial protests (Kuşcu, 2012). It was sparked by incidents in nearby towns of Menzel Bouziane and Regueb, when police killed protestors, causing regional protests to become a nationwide uprising (Pomerance, 2016). These protests led to the third stage of the revolution, forcing President Ben Ali to dismiss a number of ministers, including the Minister of Internal Affairs (Pomerance, 2016). He assumed that reshuffling his cabinet, and promising to create 300,000 jobs would pacify the masses, but it was too late, as protestors called for regime change and his removal from power. After addressing the nation, in an attempt to retain power, Ben Ali re-opened the blocked social media platforms, such as YouTube, after five years of blocking, and slightly reduced some food prices, but the revolution only intensified, until it reached the capital (Dodge, 2012b).

On 14 January 2011, Ben Ali and his family fled the country, taking refuge in Saudi Arabia, bringing an end to one of the Arab world's most repressive regimes (Pomerance, 2016). On the same day, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi announced his temporary assumption of the presidency of the Republic, due to the deficiency of the President to perform his duties. A state of emergency and a curfew was declared, in accordance to Article 56 of the Constitution (Pomerance, 2016). However, on 15 December 2011, the Constitutional Council decided to resort to Article 57 of the Constitution, and declared the vacancy of the presidential post. Subsequently, on 16 January 2011, the Constitutional Council declared the temporary assumption of the Presidency by Fuad Al-Mubazah, pending the presidential elections (Goodwin, 2011). The Tunisian revolution is considered a victory for people power, and marks the first time that an Arab dictator was successfully removed by a revolution, rather than a *coup d'état*.

3.5.2 The Egyptian revolution

The Egyptian revolution was also known as the 'January 25th Revolution', a date determined by various youth groups to correspond with the annual Egyptian 'police day', in protest against the increasing police brutality, witnessed in the last years of Mubarak's presidency (Dodge, 2012a: p. 6). Throughout Egypt, the protests against police brutality, the state-of-emergency laws, fraudulent elections, corruption, political suppression, and rampant unemployment, escalating food prices, low-income rates, abject living conditions, and inadequate demographic structural factors, were reported (Pomerance, 2016). The protests of 6 April 2011, particularly, were in response to the police brutality, as well as human rights violations by police officers, which were captured on several video recordings (Pomerance, 2016).

Initially, the police force and central security violently reacted to the protesters, by using of live ammunition in the province of Suez. In these clashes, more than twenty young men were killed, causing the people of Suez to emerge in droves, in mass protests and demonstrations (Anderson, 2014). This was subsequently trailed by similar protests, which took on a transformative quality. Mass protests were no longer against police brutality, strictly, but against the dire living conditions, political repression, social inequity, and a corrupt regime under the presidency of Mubarak (Dodge, 2012a).

According to Abaza (2014), the Egyptian Revolution was considered a headless one that developed spontaneously and sporadically, perceived by some, as a domino effect of the Tunisian Revolution. Late in the afternoon, on 28 January 2011, armed forces appeared in the Square of Cairo, and by five-thirty, declared a curfew in the cities of Cairo, Alexandria and Suez (Abaza, 2014). In spite of this declaration, droves of protestors took to the streets in defiance, and were met by Mubarak's army and security forces. The police forces became disjointed in front of the masses that stormed the prisons (Abaza, 2014). The police forces refrained from targeting the protestors, who continued in Tahrir Square (Pomerance, 2016). The status quo continued, until the announcement of the President Mubarak's resignation, on 11 February 2011. His resignation was followed with a brief statement by Vice-President Omar Suleiman, announcing that the post will be assigned to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, to manage the affairs of the country.

The Supreme Council assumed the administrative responsibilities of Egypt for a period of eighteen months, witnessing demonstrations and strikes during its occupancy, until the election Muḥammad Muḥammad Mursī 'Īsā al-'Ayyāt, as the new president (Abaza, 2014). The election of President Mursi was historic, as he was considered the first democratically elected head of state in the 5000 years of Egyptian history. The rule of President Mursi lasted for one year (June 2012 to July 2013), also witnessing a number of demonstrations, strikes and roadblocks. President Mursi delivered a temporary constitutional declaration in 2012 that effectively granted him unrestricted powers, including the power to legislate, free from judicial checks, or reviews of his acts (Pomerance, 2016). This developed into the hasty drafting of a new constitution by the Islamist-dominated constitutional assembly. It was presented to the president, scheduled for a referendum, before the Supreme Constitutional Court could rule on the constitutionality of the assembly, and was described by independent press agencies, as an "Islamist coup", not aligned with the regime (Abaza, 2014: p. 168). These issues, in addition to the grievances highlighting the prosecutions of journalists, and attacks on non-violent demonstrators, fuelled the 2012 Egyptian protests. To address these issues, Mursi withdrew the decrees, and amended the constitution, which was approved by approximately two thirds of the voters (Dodge, 2012b).

On 30 June 2013, demonstrations against President Mursi were met by those in support of him, and on 3 July 2013, a General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi unseated President Mursi from office by *coup d'état*, after the June 2013 Egyptian protests (Anderson, 2014). The event caused major divisions, internally in the country, and externally, in terms of international relations, and led to major protests and battles between the army and the Muslim Brotherhood as well as their supporters (Abaza, 2014).

3.5.3 The Yemeni revolution

Yemen suffers severe economic under-development, has a shifting political landscape, and a tribal society. Yemeni society is currently still very fragmented and under-developed (Cole & McQuinn, 2015). The Yemeni revolutions were fuelled by the dissatisfaction of the Libyan youth, with their dire social conditions and poor living conditions to which they were subjected (Jdey, 2012). The protests were initially peaceful, and were influenced by the wave of demonstrations in the MENA region of 2011. The revolution erupted on Friday, 11 February 2011, which later became known as the 'Friday of Anger', in reference to the fall of the Mubarak regime (Jdey, 2012: p. 70).

The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions particularly influenced this revolution, after the deposition of Presidents Bin Ali and Mubarak, respectively. The revolution was headed by Yemeni youth, in addition to opposition parties, who demanded regime change, and the deposition of the President Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose despotic rule lasted for thirty-three years (Krieg, 2017). They also demanded political, economic and social reform. The factors that influenced the organisation of demonstrations, as well as informing the masses, were the use of online social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter (Anderson, 2011).

The March demonstrations are of particular significance to the Yemeni revolution, as they signalled the decision of many Islamic clergies, social personalities and tribal chiefs to join the cause of the revolution (Jdey, 2012). This was prompted by General Ali Muhsen al-Ahmar, who witnessed the martyrdom of fifty-two young peaceful protesters, on 21 March 2011, known as the massacre of Jumuah al-Karama in the square of Sana (Arjomand, 2015). In addition, seven hundred protesters were wounded by sniper fire, which was later alleged to have been under the command of the Republican Guard, and

the ruling party's clique (Arjomand, 2015). The president denied this allegation, and claimed that the snipers were from the adjacent provinces.

Despite the significant number of resignations of ministers that occurred subsequent to Ali Muhsen's joining of the revolution, a slow siege of the republic palace by the youth, bought President Saleh enough time to re-arrange his documents (Cole & McQuinn, 2015). In an attempt to address the situation, President Saleh hastily tried to set out a resolution for the government, by assigning more tasks to it, as he feared more resignations of his ministers. Proceedings continued between the opposition, who wanted change, and Saleh, eventually leading to armed clashes between regime loyalists and tribal militants (Arjomand, 2015).

President Ali Abdullah Saleh left Yemen on 4 June 2011, and headed to Saudi Arabia for treatment, after the presidential palace was hit by a shell on 3 June 2011 (Arjomand, 2015). President Saleh returned to Yemen in September 2011, and in November, later that year, signed the Gulf Initiative, wherein he delegated his powers to the deputy, Abderrabh Mansour Hadi, a former armed forces field-marshal. Subsequently, in January 2012, he left Yemen, and headed to the United States for treatment (Cole & McQuinn, 2015).

Constitutional powers were assigned to Deputy Abderrabh Mansour Hadi until the election of a new president (Cole & McQuinn, 2015). The nomination of Abderrabh Mansour Hadi, as a compromise candidate, was announced for the presidential elections in Yemen. Hadi generally enjoyed the broader support of the Yemeni people before the elections, and was supported by other parties, tribesmen, religious scholars and youth of the Yemeni peaceful revolution (Arjomand, 2015).

3.5.4 The Syrian revolution

The Syrian revolution was also known as 'the free Syrian revolution', and was considered a national revolt against the corruption and the repression of human rights, as well as freedom of the Syrian people (Khan, 2014: p. 3). A range of demonstrations and protests challenged the authority of President Bashar Al Assad, in an unprecedented manner for the Syrians (Khan, 2014). Syria was also affected by the wave of massive and widespread

demonstrations that had erupted throughout the Arab peninsula in 2011, and particularly so, by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions (Arjomand, 2015).

These demonstrations were sparked when children from one of the Daraa districts, wrote slogans on the walls of schools, invoking political reform and freedom (Jdey, 2012). Their actions were met by Syrian security forces, who arrested and subjected them to torture. The parents of the arrested children demanded their release from the authorities; however, Brigadier Atef Nagib responded to the families' pleas by dispatching troops to storm the Omariy Mosque, with helicopters and special-forces (Arjomand, 2015). The families were mercilessly massacred.

This event marked the onset of the Syrian Revolution, and was mainly led by young Syrians, who called for political, economic and social reform and raised the slogan, *freedom, freedom* (Arjomand, 2015). Initially it was fuelled by a call for freedom, but transformed into a call to remove President Bashar al Assad from his position of authority (Arjomand, 2015).

Demonstrations spread for the first time in dozens of Syrian cities, during March 2011, and included Damascus, Homs, Hama, Lattakia, Daraa, Baniyas, Qamishli and several other areas, under the slogan "topple the regime" (Anderson, 2014: p. 300). As a result, Syrian security forces and intelligence, faced demonstrators with live bullets, leaving behind many casualties and wounded civilians. The movement continually expanded in numbers, and after the violent suppression of the revolution by the forces, the Free Syrian Army was formed (Fawcett, 2016).

3.5.5 The Bahrain protests

The Bahrain protests have also been referred to as the 'Pearl' and 'Rose' revolutions, inspired by youth, who wanted to adopt a peaceful approach to the protests (Ashour, 2015: p. 5). Bahrain is an absolute monarchy, ruled by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, since 1999 (Matthiesen, 2013). In February and March of 2011, Bahrain experienced peaceful popular protests, followed by brutal government repression, which left over thirty demonstrators and innocent bystanders deceased (Jdey, 2012). The protests were again led by independent youth, alongside other opposition groups, including the liberal,

national and bathite groups, who all demanded freedom and democracy as a right granted by state and religion (Fawcett, 2016).

In addition, the revolution demanded political reform, and was not led by a particular party, personality or entity, but by the people (Khan, 2014). Prominent opposition leaders were sentenced to lengthy jail terms, and over forty Shiite mosques, as well as other religious structures were demolished (Fawcett, 2016). The protesters called for political reform and equality for the majority Shia population of Bahrain, with many demanding the downfall of the ruling family. The revolution was characterised by many criticisms and doubts, but the international community stood by the political and government reform (Fawcett, 2016).

The Bahraini government has since, tightened its grip on Bahrain, by deploying the island's shield troops that were supposed to be reserved to resolve international disputes, and foreign attacks on one of the GCC countries. This has resulted in widespread, and bitter criticism of the Bahraini government (Cheibub *et al.*, 2010).

3.6 Outcomes of the Arab Spring

3.6.1 Clashes between opposition forces

Disagreements have been observed among various forces, who previously, had been united under the common goal of opposing the existing repressive regimes, but are now disunited about the intended direction for the future of the country, or state (Khan, 2014). In addition, the principles and philosophies to be adopted, to reinforce the new institutions and practices, as well as who should yield power to whom, and the mechanisms involved in doing so, are issues that still remain highly contentious (Khan, 2014). These disputes are not limited to dialogue only, but sadly, have deteriorated into violent clashes among opposing forces (Menaldo, 2012). Additionally, one of the most formidable challenges faced by the proponents of participatory and non-corrupt governments in the Arab World, are the numerous serious economic problems faced by the region, as a whole (Matthiesen, 2013).

However, the outcome of the Arab Spring is not astonishing. The Arab World, as the rest of the world, cannot be transformed completely in a matter of a years, let

alone months. For the last five decades, the MENA region has been riddled with societal fractures and fault lines along economic, cultural, regional and ideological boundaries. Boundaries, division and sectarianism are deeply entrenched in Arab society, further exacerbated by ethnic, regional and sectarian divisions. These divisions may have been pre- or post- Arab Spring and range from regional, secular, sectarian to cultural (Matthiesen, 2013).

In the next sections, the conflicts that arose, subsequent to the Arab Spring, are discussed.

3.6.2 Cultural divides and conflicts

The cultural divide, found in the Arab world, is largely attributed to its stark economic divisions. In the Arab world, more religiously, or Islamically inclined citizens, generally, belong to an economically less-advantaged class, while the secularists enjoy economic and educational privileges. The cultural and class fault line in the Arab states is further demonstrated in the urban-rural divide, where the secular ideology is largely followed by the urban population (Khan, 2014).

The cultural, political, and economic divides in the Arab world, in turn, reflect the experience of its people, with the notion of modernity, and the unfinished transitional form of state and government, alongside the consequences of these divides (Al Nahed, 2015). Therefore, the responses of the Arab World to the consequences of the Arab Spring, have also varied (Esposito, Sonn & Voll, 2015). It could also be argued that the current rise of Islamism post-Arab Spring, may well be reactionary, in part, to the effects of modernisation with its outcomes, as well as the effects of the Arab Spring, and may be simply another evolutionary step in the Arab world's integration into modernisation (Bellin, 2012).

These reactions may also be demonstrated in the rise of a new political Islam. The rise of political Islam post-Arab Spring was largely a consequence of the traditional and religious sectors of Arab society, who felt marginalised and inadequately compensated by the previous despotic regimes (Esposito *et al.*, 2015). The merge of an Islamist intellectual and political activists approach, as well as the reaction to

the Arab Spring, is well demonstrated by the founder of Tunisia's al-Nahda party, Rashid Ghannushi (Ayeb, 2011).

Islamist forces in the MENA region are well restricted, with the exception of Iran, a non-Arab country that witnessed the success of the revolution, ultimately leading to the establishment of an Islamic government (Esposito *et al.*, 2015). However, in most Arab countries, the Islamists represented the primary opposition to the existing regimes. Another form of division among various groups in the Arab world, since the Arab Spring, focuses on the actual and real primary ideational motivation of the Arab Spring. Various groups argue that the uprisings may not have been inspired by Islam, necessarily, but rather by the ideals of a western interpretation of democracy (Esposito *et al.*, 2015).

Currently, seven years after the eruption of the Arab Spring in the MENA region, as well as the fall of old regimes, these very forces that fought the regimes, are competing with secular opponents for the control of power to determine the future of their societies (Ajami, 2012). Despite the various divisions and disputes among these groups and forces, the demands and desires of all, remain fundamentally similar, namely, the achievement of fair political representation, the provision and protection of basic human rights, the preservation of human dignity and the development of an equitable socioeconomic structure (Ajami, 2012). Section A provided the historical background of the MENA region, as well as the characteristics that are unique and peculiar to these Arab states. It also included a summary of the causes, consequences and outcomes of the Arab Spring for the MENA region. The next chapter provides an overview of Libya, commencing with the historical, cultural, geographical, political and economic background.

3.6.3 The process of democratisation

3.6.3.1 Democratisation in MENA

The process of democratisation in the MENA regions have been widely studied in literature, and more specifically, the factors that have impeded it, or contributed to the resilience of its authoritarian states (Beresford, 2015). The Arab uprisings of 2010 and 2011 have punctured the strength of the authoritarian regimes, witnessing the re-autocratisation of Egypt, complete regime collapse in Libya, Yemen and

Syria, and the flexibility of monarchical dictatorial governments of Jordan, Morocco, and the Gulf (El-Khawas, 2012). This brings to light the prospect for democratisation in the MENA regions, and if, in fact, the long-lived authoritarianism might be coming to an end (El-Khawas, 2012).

The initial stages in the process of democratisation are generated by a need of the masses to be empowered with social and political freedom. In addition, people demand, and require, and will eventually acquire basic human rights, as well as civic freedoms that were absent in the previous regime (El-Khawas, 2012). Freedom of access to varying bases of information flourishes, and the formation of political parties are allowed for equal political competition, where later elections are held, and continue to be held, regularly and freely (Joab-Peterside *et al.*, 2012). Winners are openly declared, and subsequently take up seats in parliament, or positions of executive office. This is followed by the drafting and revision of constitutions. If the process is successful, then the transformation of the regime results in its acquisition of a new status, by being admitted to the international club of *real existing democracies* (REDs) (El-Khawas, 2012).

However, the abovementioned factors, especially parliamentary elections and political liberalisations, have ensured authoritarian stability in some countries, especially in the MENA region (El-Khawas, 2012). In the MENA regions, an authoritarian collapse was initiated in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, in the immediate reverberation of the Arab uprisings of 2011. Egypt and Tunisia, therefore, have appeared to be feasible for democratic transition, whereas while Libya, Yemen and Syria are riddled with civil war and political unrest (Dabashi, 2012).

The literature on politics in the Arab world has persistently emphasised the resilience of authoritarianism on various grounds. A number of factors have been considered responsible for the lack of democracy in the MENA region, as well as those impeding serious attempts at democratisation, or even abortive ones at liberalisation. They are presented in the following sections, under institutional, political, economic and geo-strategic perspectives (Dabashi, 2012).

3.6.3.2 *Regime legitimacy and the authoritarian rule in the MENA regions*

The issue of regime legitimacy is a very sensitive one, especially in Middle Eastern societies, where rulers are not elected, based on competitive elections (Lynch, 2011, p: 47). However, the Maghreb states, afterwards, possessed a good deal of legitimacy, in terms of freedom from colonial rule (Duignan & Gann, 2013).

In Algeria, for example, the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) made their successful revolutionary struggle central to their governing philosophy, but lost legitimacy at the end of the 1980s (Joab-Peterside *et al.*, 2012). The regime, however, did survive the resultant civil discord, and as result, did not regain any real institutional legitimacy. The Ben Ali regime in Tunisia came to power in November 1987, and was essentially based on a palace coup (Duignan & Gann, 2013). The regime, however, wasted its legitimacy by privatising the state for the benefit of close affiliated families and allies (Joab-Peterside *et al.*, 2012). Subsequent to the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia has commenced with the long and difficult process of institutionalising a new, more genuinely legitimate government (El-Khawas, 2012). Morocco, as a monarchy, possesses a special measure of legitimacy, and the late King Hasan II sought to reinvent himself into a more benevolent ruler, and promoted political change, which included the involvement of traditionally opposition parties (El-Khawas, 2012). His son, Muhammad VI, tried to hasten the pace of reform, but the primary socio-economic problems still remain severe.

In Libya, Gaddafi initially possessed revolutionary legitimacy, after having overthrown the Idrīs's monarchy in 1969, in a military coup (Lynch, 2011.p: 46). However, he lost his legitimacy with the institution of brutal repression of his people (El-Khawas, 2012). The new Libyan order is evidently uncertain, where the interim government, known as the National Transitional Council, currently owns temporary legitimacy, due to its removal of the Gaddafi regime (Duignan & Gann, 2013). In terms of realising real regime legitimacy, Libya has to build institutions that will address, contain, and integrate the various demands of different members of society.

Tribal identities remain very much central to Libyan life, and establishing a working system, regarded as legitimate by the majority of the society, and would require a form of power and wealth-sharing among the tribes. However, Libya is flooded with weapons, and control, over use of force, will be the most daunting task of the new authorities (El-Khawas, 2012).

The MENA region countries are in different stages of the democratisation process, but there is no promise that this will result in a true democracy. In terms of the process, Tunisia is much more developed in opening the institutional fundamentals of democracy, whereas Libya is only in the initial stages (Duignan & Gann, 2013).

Morocco, for example, has established political pluralism and supposed constitutional reform, even though the monarchy sustains pre-eminent power, ruling, as well as reigning (Joab-Peterside *et al.*, 2012). Algeria also owns a degree of democratic reform, in the form of political parties and free press, but the liberalisation of political life has remained purely theoretical up to this point.

3.6.3.3 *The manipulation of political parties by the State*

In Arab states, the rule is authoritarian, implying that civil society and opposition political parties have been weakened, as a result of being subjected to state manipulation (Diamond, 2010). Manipulation was imposed on the electoral processes, through the construction of effective patron client relationships. In addition, the autocratic rule was liberalised, to include and co-opt opposition (Joab-Peterside *et al.*, 2012).

3.6.3.4 *Coercive mechanism of the Arab states*

The Arab world is known to employ coercive mechanisms and institutions, and have the capacity, as well as the will to repress democratic initiatives, originating from society (El-Khawas, 2012). Their military and security expenditures, when compared to similar sized states, is significantly higher. This implies that the military is afforded excessive indulgences, in order to maintain the status quo of the ruling party (Hamzawy & Ottaway, 2009).

3.6.3.5 *Financial independence*

The existence of rentier and semi-rentier states in the MENA region led to the financial independence of many Arab regimes, especially the Gulf States, from

societal pressures to conform to Western democracy (Hamzawy & Ottaway, 2009). Therefore, this financial independence allowed Arab states to cultivate and implement their own policies, free from public, or international opinion and interference. The rentier state system implies that rulers have no need to seek legitimacy for their policies through competitive political processes (Joab-Peterside *et al.*, 2012).

3.6.3.6 Civil and international war

Most states in the MENA region have witnessed civil and external international wars, leading to a dependence on their respective militaries. This reliance on military, to enforce adherence, resulted in the systemic inclusion of the military wing into the internal politics, and the domestic economy. Elbadawi, Makdisi and Milante (2011) argue that the Arab world is different, with regard to the impact of conflicts on democracy; while conflicts have led, for whatever reasons, to a subsequent democratisation process in other regions, in the Arab world they have not (Elbadawi *et al.*, 2011, p. 2).

Chapter three provided a historical overview and background of the MENA region. The chapter also highlights the major causes of the Arab Spring in the MENA, commencing with the Tunisian revolution and concluding with all ensuing protests in neighbouring Arab states. A discussion of the major outcomes of the Arab Spring is also provided, highlighting resultant cultural divides and conflicts. Lastly, the researcher discussed the process of democratisation in the MENA, and factors preventing its development in the region.

4 CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a discussion on the research methodology in relation to the methods used for the collection and interpretation of the empirical survey material. The researcher provides a rationale for the use of both a qualitative and quantitative methodological approach in this current study. The research setting, the study design, the rationale for the study, as well as the sampling techniques used to recruit the respondents/participants, are presented. The methods of data collection and data analysis are explained, and the ethical considerations, applied in this study, are detailed.

4.2 Essence of research methodology

The selected specific philosophy for any research is linked to the practical implications of the study (Glatthorn & Joyner, 2005). Quantitative studies have philosophical differences with qualitative studies. The former focuses on facts and numbers relationships, whereas the qualitative studies explore in-depth subjective analysis (Panneerselvam, 2014). In this current study, the positivist and interpretivist research philosophies were employed, using qualitative and quantitative methods and measures (Tuohy, Cooney, Dowling, Murphy, & Sixsmith, 2013). Recently, the combination of both by many researchers, has resulted in the practice and popularity of the pragmatism philosophy. Pragmatism employs mixed and multiple data collection methods, thereby incorporating both the qualitative and quantitative methods (Panneerselvam, 2014). Positivism focuses on highly structured large samples, primarily using quantitative methods, but may also include qualitative ones. Interpretivism relies on smaller samples as data collection methods, with in-depth qualitative investigations (Tuohy *et al.*, 2013).

4.3 Research philosophy

This study has employed the subjectivist ontology, which infers that meaning is gained through understanding, based on social and experiential levels, and is illustrated in the agreement of different minds and consciences, on a particular set of meanings (Saunders *et al.*, 2015). Subjectivist epistemology appreciates that people and the knowledge they carry are inseparable, and advocates the human connection of the researcher to the subject of research (Saunders *et al.*, 2015). Therefore, the human element cannot be removed from the research process (Chan, Fung & Chien, 2013). In this current research study, the subjectivist view was adopted.

4.4 Research paradigms

Research paradigms deal with the source, nature and development of knowledge, and can be categorised into pragmatism, positivism, realism and interpretivism paradigms (Mollick, 2014).

4.4.1 Pragmatism

The pragmatic research paradigm accepts concepts to be relevant only if they support action (Rorty, 2013). Pragmatics “recognise that there are many different ways of interpreting the world and undertaking research and that no single point of view can present the entire picture in a world of multiple realities” (Collis & Hussey, 2014: p. 54). Pragmatism focuses exclusively on answering the research question, which is considered the most significant factor of this current research. The pragmatic research paradigm integrates more than one research approach and research strategy. Therefore, pragmatism uses a combination of methods necessary to address and answer the research question/s, and advances knowledge in a specific area of study in the best possible manner (Walliman, 2015).

4.4.2 Interpretivism

The interpretivist approach is broadly based on a relativist ontology and subjectivist epistemology (Ormston, Spencer, Barnard & Snape, 2014). Positivism and interpretivism are two mutually exclusive paradigms, about the nature and sources of knowledge (Walliman, 2015). Interpretivism is also known as the interpretive philosophy, and includes elements of interpretation by the researcher (Aliyu, Bello, Kasim & Martin, 2014). Interpretive research is based on the assumption that reality may be accessed through social constructs such as “language, consciousness, shared meanings and instruments” (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2013: p. 43). Interpretivism is critically juxtaposed to positivism in social sciences, and draws its bases from the philosophical position of idealism that seeks to collect diverse approaches, such as phenomenology, social constructivism and hermeneutics (Moon & Blackman, 2014). Therefore, interpretivism incorporates human interest and conscious element into the study (Schwartz-Shea *et al.*, 2013).

4.4.2.1 Advantages and disadvantages of interpretivism

In the interpretive approach, the researcher appreciates variant perspectives from different people, while meaning is derived and extracted, dependent on human

consciousness (Moon & Blackman, 2014). Therefore, this current study follows an interpretivist approach, focused on the extraction of meaning from the population sample that reflects different aspects of the subject matter. This current research follows a naturalistic approach of data collection, where the development of meanings occur towards the end of the research process (Ormston *et al.*, 2014). This study adopts the interpretivist paradigm, which relies on data collection methods, such as small samples, in depth investigations, and qualitative data (Schwartz-Shea *et al.*, 2013).

4.4.3 Positivism

Positivism is a philosophy that is “in accordance with the empiricist view that knowledge stems from human experience. It has an atomistic, ontological view of the world as comprising discrete, observable elements and events that interact in an observable, determined and regular manner” (Collins, 2010: p. 38). The Positivism philosophy is founded on the idea that science and numbers are the only way to arrive at the truth (Ormston *et al.*, 2014). Therefore, it advocates that factual and valid knowledge is obtained through measurement and observation (Robson & McCartan, 2016).

The role of the researcher is limited and confined to an objective interpretation of the research findings, as well as data collection, only because findings are normally quantifiable and observable. Therefore, the quantifiable observations would result in statistical analysis (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015). The researcher, therefore, is separate and independent from the study, with a specific emphasis on the lack of human influence, and human interest within the study. Generally, positivist studies adopt a deductive approach, as opposed to the inductive approach of the interpretivist philosophy (Robson *et al.*, 2016). Inductive reasoning should be used to develop statements (hypotheses), to be tested during the research process, where the observer remains independent. The positivist approach relies on explanations that should show causality between variables (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015). Human interests should be irrelevant, and generalisations are developed through statistical probability (Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls & Ormston, 2013).

4.4.3.1 Advantages and disadvantages of positivism

Because positivism has a highly structured research design that enforces pre-set boundaries and limits to the research, it is not very useful when attempting to explain the *why* behind a particular phenomenon (Eriksson *et al.*, 2015). The second

disadvantage of positivism is that it assumes the objectivity of the researcher. However, a positivist-based study cannot assume to be totally objective, as the values and interests of the researcher will ultimately impact the approach to the study, such as the choice of questions (Robson *et al.*, 2016). Thirdly, it is challenging to present the multifaceted relationships between phenomena within a single measure, and a large sample would be necessary in order to make generalisations from generated findings (Ritchie *et al.*, 2013). Lastly, positivism also heavily relies on the fact that experience is a valid source of knowledge and does not take into consideration additional influential components, such as time, cause and space (Ritchie *et al.*, 2013).

These components are not intrinsically part of experience, but externally impact the processes considerably (Eriksson *et al.*, 2015). In addition, positivism accepts that any process can be professed as a definite discrepancy of actions of relationships, or individuals, or between individuals. Therefore, research findings in positivism studies are only descriptive, and cannot provide deeper insights to in-depth issues (Ritchie *et al.*, 2013). In this current study, the researcher used the interpretivism approach for the individual interviews and the positivism approach for the questionnaires.



4.5 Research approach

4.5.1 Inductive approach and reasoning

According to Grant and Quiggin (2013), the inductive approach draws its insights from observations, and only proposes theories towards the end of the research process. Inductive research “involves the search for pattern from observation and the development of explanations for those patterns through series of hypotheses.” (Grant & Quiggin, 2013: p. 718). Hypotheses and theories are not applied at the onset of inductive studies, allowing the researcher freedom, in terms of developing or altering the direction of the study (Bryman, 2015). However, inductive research is not void of theories when formulating its objectives and research questions (Bryman, 2015).

The inductive approach is founded on the development and generation of meanings from the collected data, in order to identify patterns and relationships for the construction of

either a new theory, or an already existing one (Mollick, 2014). The emergent theory can be used to address the research question, identify emerging patterns, resemblances and regularities in the data, in order to reach a conclusion (Bryman, 2015).

This current study adopts the inductive approach to gain deeper insights into the causes of the Arab Spring in Libya, the impact of the Arab Spring on the democratisation process in Libya, according to the opinions of students and academics (lecturers), as well as how the Libyan government was able to achieve democracy. As illustrated in the Figure 10, the study utilises the *bottom up* approach, where theory is developed at the end (Ormston *et al.*, 2014).



Figure 3: Inductive Approach (Ormston *et al.*, 2014)

4.6 Research Design

4.6.1 Descriptive research

Descriptive research is not strictly qualified as either quantitative or qualitative research methodologies, but instead it employs elements of both, and often within the same study (Pickard, 2013). The term descriptive research refers to the type of research question, design, and data analysis that will be applied to a given topic, and may be either quantitative or qualitative, or both. This current study adopts the descriptive research approach, which involves gathering data that describe events, and, subsequently, organises, tabulates, depicts, and describes the data collection (Pickard, 2013). Survey research is commonly included in this type of measurement, but often goes beyond the descriptive statistics, in order to draw inferences. The researcher aims to determine, describe, or identify what is, while the analytical research attempts to establish why it is

that way or how it came to be. Descriptive research is aimed at casting light on current issues or problems, through a process of data collection that enables them to describe the situation more completely (Denscombe, 2014), in this case the democratisation of Libya after the Arab Spring.

4.6.1.1 Descriptive statistics

Descriptive statistics is used to describe the basic features of the data in a study (Meeker & Escobar, 2014). They provide simple summaries about the sample and the measures. Descriptive statistics form the basis of virtually every quantitative analysis of data, and varies from inferential statistics.

4.7 Research Strategy

A research strategy refers to the method that guides the researcher to investigate the research issue, a general design that aids the researcher to address and answer the research questions in a methodical way. It stipulates why a certain research strategy has been selected (Denscombe, 2014). The research strategy guides the study, in terms of collecting relevant background information, and using appropriate data analysis techniques, in order to arrive at a conclusion. Research strategies include, literature review analysis, interviews, case study analysis, experiments and surveys (Denscombe, 2014).

In this current study, two research strategies are followed, namely: a) a qualitative survey, the interviews and questionnaires, as the primary strategies and; b) a literature review as a secondary one. A qualitative survey strategy using interviews was used for the collection of qualitative data and information, whereas the questionnaire was used for the collection of statistical information. The interviews and questionnaires simultaneously enable the collection of reliable and valid data, required to achieve the objectives and aims of this current study.

4.8 Research setting

Data was collected on the premises of the universities of Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha, from the beginning of April 2017 until mid-June 2017, from one hundred and fifty students, registered at the Department of Economics and Political Science, as well as forty-five lecturers.

4.9 Population

A population is a set of entities, in which all the measurements of interest to the practitioner or researcher are presented (Denscombe, 2014). A sample is defined “as a subset of the

population” and must be representative of the population being studied, in terms of size and bias (Aminullah, Apriliawati & Arifin, 2015: p. 5). In this current study, the researcher declared fifteen staff members (lecturers) of the Department of Economics and Political Science, at each of the three universities, as the first population for the study in the face-to-face interviews. The population for the questionnaire was limited to one hundred and fifty students registered at the Department of Economics and Political Science at the three universities. The researcher argues that students and lecturers would be the best group to represent the understanding of how the democratisation process is developing in Libya. Although Libyan society comprises many groups, such as labourers, members of unions, the military, businessmen and traders, the researcher argues that although the perspectives of these groups of people are valuable and useful, the opinions of those who already have an understanding of the concept of democracy, would be much more suitable to this current study. In as much as their opinions may not be completely bias-free, they would be able to provide some insight into the development of democracy in the country. The selected sample would form part of an academic group, which, the researcher argues/assumes, would be less prone to over-exaggeration and biases in their opinions.

For these reasons, the researcher selected students and lecturers as the population for the study. The researcher argues that the expertise and knowledge of lecturers, their exposure to the political atmosphere, and first-hand experience of demonstrations, would generate thicker and richer insights and information, regarding the impacts and implications of the Arab Spring on the process of democratisation. Lecturers with a background in political studies would be able to provide additional insights into the current process, or conditions of democracy in the country. In addition, both populations were easily accessible and co-operated to participate in the study, ensuring a high rate of response.

These reasons motivated the selection of students as the second population, which was guided by the fact they would provide deeper insights into the current political state of the country, based on their understanding of political studies. The last reason for selecting academics was related to the current instability of the country, and the tense political atmosphere. Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, the researcher presumed to be exposed to danger during data the collection procedures; therefore, the data collection was conducted on the premises of the universities.

4.10 Sampling

Sampling refers to the process of selecting a representation of a population, from which to collect data (Levy & Lemeshow, 2013). There are two types of sampling methods; probability sampling and non-probability sampling (Fraley & Hudson, 2014). Probability sampling refers to the selection of a list, containing the names of everyone in the population that the researcher is interested in (Lowry, 2014). Non-probability sampling is used mainly for large scale social surveys, due to the lack of probability sample lists (Levy & Lemeshow, 2013). Non-Probability sampling was employed by the researcher in this current study.

4.10.1 Judgmental sampling

Judgmental sampling is a non-probability sampling technique, also referred to as purposive and authoritative sampling (Fellows & Liu, 2015). The advantage of purposive sampling is that a more representative sample can be selected to elicit more accurate results, than any other probability sampling technique (Palinkas, Horwitz, Green, Wisdom, Duan & Hoagwood, 2015). The implication of using a non-probability sampling is in the limitation of the generalisability of the study (Palinkas *et al.*, 2015). However non-probability sampling allows the researcher to target people with the required information, as well as collect relevant data. The process involves the selection of specific individuals from the population based on their knowledge and judgment of the subject matter (Allison, O'Sullivan, Hilton, Owen & Rothwell, 2016).

4.10.2 Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis was the opinions and perspectives of the lecturers and students, in the Department of Economics and Political Science at the three aforementioned universities, about the democracy and the relationship between the Arab Spring revolution and the democracy, as well as their views on the causes of the Arab Spring in Libya, and how it influenced the process of democratisation.

4.10.3 Unit of observation

Unit of observation were forty-five (45) lecturers and one hundred and fifty (150) students registered at the Department of Economics and Political Science at the three universities under scrutiny.

4.11 Data collection

The data collection instruments consisted of a questionnaire and in-depth interviews. The questionnaire was selected as the primary data collection instrument, and the interview as the secondary one.

4.11.1 Questionnaire construct

Questionnaires are a type of self-report method of data collection, which consists of a set of questions, usually in a highly structured written form, and may contain both open-ended questions and close-ended questions, to which participants record their own answers (Moser & Kalton, 2017). The questionnaire developed for this current study was identified as both quantitative and qualitative, as it contained closed-ended questions with multiple choice options, in addition to open-ended ones and matched the research objectives. These questions were analysed, using quantitative methods involving pie-charts, bar-charts and percentages, whereas the open-ended questions were analysed using qualitative methods, involving discussions and critical analyses.

The questionnaires were manually distributed by the researcher to the 150 students on the premises of the three universities of Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha. The objectives of the study were explained to all respondents, before distributing the questionnaires, which were completed in the presence of the researcher, who personally collected the completed questionnaires. Data were collected from the beginning of April 2017 to mid-June 2017 in Libya.

The researcher did not encounter any difficulties in the data collection process and the respondents willingly completed the questionnaires. The atmosphere around the campus was relatively secure and safe; therefore, the students did not feel threatened to respond in a particular manner. The response rate was one hundred percent (Appendix K and Appendix L).

In this current study, the questionnaire represented the primary data collection instrument and comprised three sections. The first section established the demographical information of students. The second section consisted of questions focused on the following themes;

- a) The economic, social and political conditions before the revolution;
- b) Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the previous regime;

- c) Thoughts about the necessity of regime change and the Arab Spring,
- d) The connection between democracy and revolution, between democracy and protests and the feasibility of achieving democracy and sustaining it;
- e) The impact of foreign intervention on Libya's current status and;
- f) The impact of the Arab Spring on the economic conditions, socioeconomic and political conditions of the country.

The third section comprised open-ended questions and highlighted the following themes:

- a) The impact of foreign intervention on Libya's democratisation process;
- b) Opinions concerning the nature of the previous government,
- c) Challenges of the democratisation process; and
- d) Challenges faced by the people after the revolution.

4.11.2. Individual interview construct

One of the most common methods of data collection in the qualitative method is the face-to-face individual interview (Richards, 2014). This type of interview allows the participant to speak freely, without the pre-allocation of responses by the researcher. This method of data collection is flexible and interactive rather than rigid, and involves a repetitive process of gathering information, analysis and testing (Robson & MacCartan, 2016).

The interview for this current study was based on a semi-structured style, and followed specific questions that were designed for this research. A semi-structured interview were favoured over a structured interview, which allowed the researcher to request and extract more information from the participants (Richards, 2014). The interviews were conducted in Arabic, and were recorded by Smartphone, and, subsequently, transcribed in Arabic. The Arabic interviews were then translated from Arabic to English by reliable translators. A thematic analysis was applied to the interviews, which is discussed under data analysis.

The interview was based on twenty-five open-ended questions and the length of each interview did not exceed twenty minutes. All interviews were audio recorded by Smart cell phone, and transcribed by linguists. The interviews outlined the following themes:

- a) Popular participation in the revolution and reasons underlying that participation;
- b) Social, political and economic conditions prior to the Arab Spring;
- c) Reasons for the Arab Spring;
- d) Satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the previous regime;
- e) Outcomes and impacts and challenges of the Arab Spring and the revolution for Libya;
- f) The feasibility and sustainability of democracy in Libya;
- g) The relationship between democracy, social satisfaction and revolution;
- h) Impact of the Arab Spring on the economic and political state of Libya and;
- i) Impact of the Arab Spring on the process of democratisation in Libya (Appendix I and Appendix J).

All interviews were conducted by the researcher on the premises at the three respective universities under scrutiny. The researcher did not experience any difficulties during the data collection process.

4.12 Data analysis

The purpose of data analysis is to derive meaning from the data, which is achieved by coding, summarising and using appropriate data analysis tools (Creswell, 2009). It involves the conversion of collected data into a form that is useful for the deriving of meaningful results, including conclusions, tables and graphs. A mixed methodology was selected for this current study, as the combination of both methods would produce richer data. By using a combination of methods, at various points in the research process, the researcher could build on the strength of each, and minimise the weaknesses of a single method approach (Creswell, 2009). Therefore, the mixed method approach increases both the validity and the reliability of the data (Creswell, 2009).

The aim of qualitative research is to investigate and analyse specific problems, by describing scenes, gathering data through interviews, or analysing the meaning of documents (Creswell, 2009). Therefore, the emphasis is placed on words and not quantification, in the collection and analysis of data (Myers, 2013).

4.12.1 Quantitative data analysis

Quantitative data analysis is presented in numeric form and allows researchers to apply statistical tests to formulate statements about the data. Descriptive statistics, such as the mean, median, and standard deviation, as well as inferential statistics and multiple regression correlations (MRC) are also included. The derivation of significant facts about the research data is made possible through statistical analysis.

The greatest advantage of quantitative data is the provision of descriptive information, which assists researchers to uncover the real facts of the subject (Moon & Blackman, 2014). However, this method is not able to answer the *why* of a subject. In quantitative data analysis, raw numbers are converted into meaningful data through the application of rational and critical thinking. It is of utmost importance to apply fair and careful judgment, as data sets are open to different interpretations. Therefore, data findings should be critically analysed, and objectively interpreted, via literature review findings conducted at the earlier stages of the research process, in order to reflect the viewpoints of other authors in similar researches. The findings from this research are referred to the literature review, using the critical and rational reasoning skills of the researcher. There are a few analytical software sets that could be used for the analysis of quantitative data (Grant & Quiggin, 2013). The three most popular quantitative data analysis software packages include, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Access, and Statistical Program for Social Science (SPSS). Quantitative data in this current study was analysed by means of descriptive and inferential statistical tests, using the SPSS system.

Descriptive statistics were used to present the results. In order to determine the relationships and predictions, the researcher adopted inferential statistics, such as correlations and regression analyses. The researcher organised data, generated categories, themes and patterns, tested emergent hypotheses against the data, and searched for an alternative explanation of the data and write a report (Grant & Quiggin, 2013). The data are presented in quotations, texts, tables, pie charts and histograms.

4.12.2 Qualitative data analysis

Qualitative data analysis (Thematic analysis) was employed in this current study using three stages (Robson & McCartan, 2016). The first stage comprises the development and application of codes. Coding is defined as the organisation of data, where a code refers to a short phrase, or word that represents a particular idea, or theme, after which

meaningful titles are ascribed to each code (Richards, 2014). The second stage explores the identification of themes, patterns and relationships (Richards, 2014). Qualitative data analysis relies on the analytical and critical thinking skills of the researcher; therefore, the generated results of a qualitative study cannot be repeated to produce the same results (Robson & McCartan, 2016). Effective methods of qualitative data interpretation, include analysis of word and phrase repetitions. Primary and secondary data comparisons may also be conducted, by comparing the findings of the interviews against the literature review, and finding similarities and dissimilarities (Richards, 2014). The last stage deals with searching for missing information, and examining issues not addressed in the findings. Subsequently, the summarisation of the data follows, where the researcher endeavours to link the findings to the aims and objectives of the research (Smith, 2015). Quotations from the transcript will be used to highlight major themes that emerged in the findings, as well as contradictions and similarities with other similar studies (Figure 11).




Figure 4: Schematic representation of Thematic Analysis

4.13 Data collection procedure

The researcher accessed the students via the administrative office of the three universities under scrutiny and met with the Heads of Departments before the commencing the data collection process. Only final year students were selected, because of their background knowledge. Appointments were scheduled telephonically and via email with the lecturers, in order to establish a suitable time and date for data collection. Before commencing the data collection process, the respondents and interviewees were provided with a brief introduction and basic overview of the research (Appendix G and Appendix H).

Apart from the written consent of each respondent to participate in the study, the researcher obtained the verbal consent from the respondents, prior to data collection. All the respondents were also informed that participation in this current study was voluntary. In addition, they were assured of anonymity and confidentiality, and informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time. The researcher distributed consent letters to respondents, seeking their permission to participate in the research (Appendix E and Appendix F). All instructions and questions were clarified in the questionnaire (Appendix K and Appendix L), in order to avoid confusion. The data collection period lasted from April 2017 to mid-June 2017.

4.13.1 Data collection procedure for the questionnaire

Questionnaires were manually administered to the respondents on the university premises, on different days. Before commencement of the data collection, the researcher directly informed all respondents about the aims of the study, in order to promote a fairly good understanding of the study, in general, as well as the aims of the study. On completion, all questionnaires were personally collected by the researcher. The original copies of the questionnaires were stored by the researcher in a file, accessible only to the researcher.

4.13.2 Data collection procedure for the individual interview

Before the commencement of the interviews, the participants were asked to sign a confidentiality document regarding their participation, in order to assure the above-mentioned principles. The interview sessions were concluded when the questions were completed. The responses were recorded by Smartphone and then transcribed in Arabic. Thereafter, the transcripts were translated from Arabic to English by reliable translators and stored in a Microsoft document.

4.13.3 Absence of external assistance

The researcher did not use the services of any assistants, to gain the confidence of the respondents. The subject of the study, and some of the questions involved, required sensitive answers that could possibly expose, or implicate the respondents. Libya is still a very unsettled country and suspicions are rife among its people. The researcher was of the opinion that, due to the political instability in the country, the respondents would feel safer in the presence of the official researcher only. In this manner, the researcher ensured that the responses were completed in a safe and non-threatening environment.

4.14 Translation

The questionnaires and interviews were originally developed in English, and subsequently translated into Arabic, as Arabic is the national language of the Libyan people. To ensure the validity of the data collection instruments, two linguistic professionals translated both the instruments from English to Arabic, and, on completion of data collection, again from Arabic to English. Transcripts were re-checked by a legal translator, in order to ensure that the data were true and correctly translated (See Appendix D).

4.15 Reliability, validity and trustworthiness of data

Validity and reliability are two of the most important criteria by which the adequacy of quantitative instruments is evaluated (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014). Validity refers to the extent to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014). The questionnaire is a self-administered tool; therefore, the researcher relied on the respondents to complete it to the best of their ability and with honesty. Credibility was assured by allowing all the respondents to answer questions freely. The respondents were not influenced in any way, regarding their responses, were informed that there was no right or wrong answer. Through the questionnaire, numerical data were collected, and was considered objective and reliable, because it was properly structured, efficiently administered and validated. The findings were reliable because the selection criteria for the respondents, as well as the analysis process adhered to statistical principles. In addition, the questionnaire was intentionally designed, according to theoretical knowledge, and the research questions, specific to this current research, and therefore, only collected pertinent and relevant information.

The aim of trustworthiness in a qualitative inquiry is to support the argument of the inquiry's findings (Leung, 2015). Reliability is referred to as the ability of the instrument to produce consistent results, when the measurement is repeated on more than one occasion (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014).

To ensure that the captured qualitative data of the interviews were trustworthy, the recordings were transcribed verbatim in Arabic. The transcriptions were then translated by legal translators from Arabic to English. The translated transcripts were checked again by a legal translator, to ensure no errors were made in the transcription and translation processes. All data collected were only accessible to the researcher and stored safely on a Flash disk in a code-locked folder.

4.16 Ethical considerations

As recommended by Daymon and Holloway (2011), a high ethical standard must be ensured in a research project, and as such, ethical issues were considered in the data collection procedure of this study. Ethics considerations are achieved by following a number of ethical principles, some of which are integrity, professionalism, right and dignity of others, non-discrimination and the welfare of others (Daymon & Holloway, 2011). The consent and confidentiality of respondents/participants are important considerations in a research project. After the respondents/participants confirmed voluntary participation, they were invited to sign a consent letter (Appendices E and F) that was issued to them before the questionnaire (Appendices K and L) was administered and the interviews conducted. The respondents/participants, therefore, agreed to participate in this current study, without any form of coercion. In addition, the study obtained an acceptance letter from the Libyan government, granting permission for the research to be conducted (Appendices B and C).

The integrity of the research was preserved by ensuring that no explicit and implicit promises were made by the researcher to individuals, societies, funding bodies, or any other bodies, or any other actor in the study. The researcher did not disclose reports on the research to any interested parties, or allowed the review of the transcripts by other parties, thereby ensuring that the reported facts are correct, and the professional standard of the study was not compromised.

4.17 Ethics Statement

Researchers need to practice care that the rights of individuals and institutions are preserved when conducting research (Daymon & Holloway, 2011). For this current research study, the respondents/participants were recruited via the administrative offices of the three selected universities in the Libyan cities of Benghazi, Tripoli and Sabha. The aims and objectives of the study were explained in great detail to all the respondents/participants, who volunteered to participate in the study. They were also provided with the *Information Sheet* to ensure a full understanding of the purpose of the study, as well as voluntary participation (Appendices G and H). Participants were also asked to sign a *Consent Form*, when they agreed to participate in the study (Appendices E and F).

Anonymity was ensured as no names were indicated on the questionnaires, and only codes were used. Confidentiality was ensured, as respondents/participants were anonymous, prohibiting the researcher from relating certain answers to particular respondents/participants. Beneficence was ensured by informing the respondents/participants that they would not be harmed at any stage during the study. The respondents/participants were assured that they would be referred to a professional counsellor for assistance, should need such a service, due to involvement in the study. In addition, the respondents/participants were assured that all relevant research documents would be stored, carefully, for a period of five years, accessible to the researcher and supervisors only. The respondents/participants would also be given full access to the reported findings of the research, should they want to know the outcomes.

The research instruments, the questionnaire and in-depth interviews, used in this current research received approval from the ethics committee of the University of the Western Cape (UWC), Western Cape South Africa (Appendix A). The thesis was also submitted to a language editor (Appendix M).

In this chapter, the researcher provided a broad overview of the research methods adopted, and included the research philosophy, research approach, research strategy, data collection techniques and data analysis methods used in this current study. For this study, interpretivist, positivist and pragmatic philosophies were adopted, as there are multiple ways of exploring the phenomena under investigation. An inductive approach was adopted and a multiple-case study was used, based on judgmental sampling. A total of forty-five (45) staff members (lecturers) of the Department of Economics and Political Science at each of the three universities were declared as the first population for the study for the face-to-face interviews. The population for the questionnaire was limited to one hundred and fifty students registered at the Department of Economics and Political Science at the three universities.

Prior to the data collection process, permission was obtained from the administration offices of the three research sites (universities). The unit of analysis was opinions and perspectives of the lecturers and students at the Department of Economics and Political Science at the three aforementioned universities. A mixed methodology was selected as the combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods produce richer data. Descriptive statistics were used to present the results generated from the data, categorised into themes and patterns. Quantitative

data are presented in texts and tables in the next chapter. Qualitative data were subjected to thematic analysis, to extract meaning from the data.

The chapter was concluded with a discussion on ethics, considered from the beginning to the end of the research process. All participants were ensured of their anonymity, and that their responses were confidential. They were also assured of their right to withdraw from the study, at any point, without prejudice.

The following chapter comprises the results and analysis of the data gathered from the interviews conducted, as well as the questionnaires administered, during the research process, with the resultant findings and themes, based on the analysis of the data.



5 CHAPTER FIVE: INTERPRETING THE OPINIONS OF LECTURERS AND STUDENTS

5.1 Introduction

The researcher provided an overview of the diverse people and ethnic groups of MENA and Libya, as well as the causes of the Arab Spring, in the previous chapters. In Africa, more so than any other continent, native people were placed together in a single political economy by imperialistic European forces. This has undoubtedly brought about serious challenges to the political leadership, especially in the MENA region, which until today, suffers from an acute leadership deficit. Literature confirms that most of the MENA leaders are, and have been, driven by an excessive quest for power, and the *politics of exclusion* have remained prevalent in most parts of the MENA region, and in Africa as a whole (Wright, 2012). To remedy the situation, marginalised, dissatisfied masses and groups tried to remove hegemony through coup plots, as accomplished under the leadership of Gaddafi. However, they were not always successful in bringing about a true democratic system of rule and merely replaced one form of dictatorship with another one, under the guise of a democracy.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, one of the main aims of the study was to understand how the relationship between the revolution and democracy was perceived by the study sample. The data collection instruments were developed to match the aims and objectives of the study. For ease of reference the objectives are mentioned again below:

- To analyse the relationship that exists between the Arab Spring revolution and a need for democracy; and
- To understand the challenges to the process of democratisation in Libya after the Arab Spring.

Similarly, for ease of reference the main arguments that the study sought to advance are listed below. The findings are compared to the original arguments.

- Argument 1: The revolution was necessary for political reform in Libya and to start the process of democratisation;
- Argument 2: Economic and social reform is a major motivation of revolution; and
- Argument 3: Tribalism is not necessarily a barrier to the process of democratisation.

5.2 Data analysis arrangement

The quantitative and qualitative data were combined and categorised according to the objectives and arguments of the study. In terms of the underlying reasons for how and why revolutions erupted, theoretical frameworks are presented, from which the study draws its insights. The social movement theories that are aligned to explain the causes of the revolution include, the framing processes, relative deprivation, political opportunity structure (POS), and resource mobilisation theories

5.2.1 The Framing Processes Theory

The Framing Processes Theory is grounded on the requisite of consciousness transformation, and aims to transform grievances into protest and eventual claim-making (Borah, 2011). The Arab Spring was fuelled by a conscious need of the people of the MENA region to transform their poor living conditions through mass protests. Borah (2011) argues that framing processes aids both Political Opportunity Structure (POS) and Resource Mobilisation, by providing an insider perspective. This theory attempts to explain the reasons why social movements mobilise from the social movements themselves. While there is a danger that such construction and meaning-making by members of a social movement might be subjective, it is important to understand how a movement defines itself and understands its moral standings to a given problem (Lopes, 2014). This is especially important, because, apart from identifying, perceiving, labelling and locating phenomena that directly affect social actors, as well as those they are concerned about, they also make sense of such occurrences (Dickovick, 2012). One crucial aspect of framing in social movements and with protesters, is that it forges a collective identity, achieved through shared values, identity and status. This creates a sort of solidarity among members, which is an important factor in mobilising and sustaining social movements (Hoffman & Jamal, 2014).

Social movements' actions and their interpretive work are used tactfully. For one, social movement adherents assign and interpret phenomena in such a way, as to mobilise and garner support from prospective adherents, on the one hand, and to neutralise and demobilise antagonists on the other hand (Hoffman & Jamal, 2014). To this end, social movements, not only identify problems, but also identify who is to be blamed for the problem, and advance solutions that will help realise the desired change (Bellin, 2012).

In order to ensure the longevity of social movements, this tactful interpretive work is conducted continually. It is important to note that framing perspectives explain how social movement actors do the double work of producing and maintaining meaning to different groups, such as protagonists [those who are active supporters of a movement], bystanders [those who are not interested or who are neutral], and antagonists [those strongly opposed to views, values and arguments of a movement] (Dickovick, 2012). Clearly, once produced, meanings must be maintained and have to be continuously redefined, in order to include experiences and phenomena (Moaddel, 2012).

5.2.2 The Relative Deprivation Theory

Social satisfaction is a major reason for a revolution, and is the opposite of relative deprivation, which is regarded by many scholars as the core variable in the clarification of social movements; consequently, often the main motive behind protests and demonstrations (Borah, 2011). Relative Deprivation Theory refers to the notion that a population and society experience feelings of discontent and deprivation (Dickovick, 2012). This theory explains the quest for social change, which inspires social movements, as well as that they develop from communal feelings of relative deprivation in relation to economic and socio-political problems (Olson, 2014). Popular discontent develops and arises when the status of the entire group is compared to a referent group, who find themselves in a relatively better position (Borah, 2011). Relative deprivation may be sub-divided into fraternal deprivation, which may have impacted on the formation of a collective identity. In addition, Comunello and Anzera (2012) purport that relative deprivation theory is used to explain the root causes of social movements and revolutions. Therefore, a sense of deprivation, or inequality, compels masses into social movements, born out of feelings of deprivation, inequality and frustration. This is evident, particularly in relation to others, or with respect to their expectations.

As with many of the states in the MENA region, the Arab Spring was fuelled by undercurrent feelings of powerlessness, hopelessness, lack of economic resources, lack of freedom, inefficient state organs, and a general lack of basic human rights, such as freedom of speech and political expression. These factors created a desire within the masses to change the current state of affairs, and compelled participants to unite with those of similar sentiments, and voice their discontent to those in authority. Therefore,

the participants in the protests felt compelled to rebel, when a consistently improving situation, such as an improving economy, becomes stagnated and destabilised. As a result, people will join social movements because their expectations will have outgrown their actual material situation.

5.2.3 The Political Opportunity Structure Theory

According to social movement scholars, there are many primary theoretical avenues to be considered, in order to understand social movements, and more specifically, protests, as well as how and why they develop (Tarrow, 2011). The Political Opportunity Structure Theory focuses on the significance of political factors that, either force, or expedite, the rise and advance of protests, and concerns itself with the context, in which movements may, or may not emerge (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). Undoubtedly, social movements affect the course of history, yet it is worth noting that they do so within the circumstances they find themselves in, implying that they do not choose the contexts (Della Porta, 2013). This approach focuses on the political conditions that exist outside the social movement, as well as how it influences the movement's mobilisation, and is based on political mechanisms, such as constitutions, policies, institutions, and legislation, including historical opportunities at which coalitions are challenged (Tarrow, 2011). Therefore, POS are extensions that offer incentives for people to engage in collective action, by projected chances for either success or failure (Tarrow, 2011). Certain opportunities, such as regime change, and political, social and economic instability, may proffer avenues for the mobilisation of social movements. Therefore, it is important to note that the political dimensions in Libya, invariably, affect social expectations for failure or success.

5.2.4 The Resource Mobilisation Theory

The resource mobilisation approach emphasises the importance of protest organisation, via the establishment of networks (social and digital), as well as links between sections of the population (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). Resource mobilisation is a social movement theory that draws its basis from the ability of a movement's members to, firstly, acquire resources, and secondly, mobilise people towards accomplishing those goals set out by the social movement, through the use of those resources. The theory explains how social movements mobilise internal and external resources, in order to reach goals (Jenkins, 1983). Resource mobilisation theory is grounded on the idea that the success, or failure, of social movements is only realised through the effective and efficient mobilisation of resources, in addition to the development of political opportunities for members.

Resources include both the material and non-material. The former comprises resources such as, money, organisations, manpower, information and communication technology, and mass media. Non-material resources include intangible support, such as authority, loyalty, legitimacy, networks, social relationships and personal connections, moral commitment, public attention and solidarity (Vanhanen, 2006).

The use of social media as a resource in explaining social movements, as well as their impact on the Arab Spring, is of particular interest to this current study. It is argued that social media played a contributory, if not integral role in the successful co-ordination of the anti-regime demonstrations and protests. The effective use of this particular resource led to the mobilisation of masses, spread of information, transmission of events to the world as they occurred, and eventually, the resignation, ousting and assassination of presidents. The Arab Spring successfully incorporated social media platforms and digital technologies, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Whatsapp and YouTube, as important resources for collective action. Collective mass action in the Arab Spring included, organising action and implementing of social movements in the MENA regions (Vanhanen, 2006).

These theories, therefore, provide clarity as to why the Arab Spring erupted in the manner that it did, as well as why it transferred from one country to the next, in such a rapid manner. These approaches and theoretical avenues provide insights as to why the revolution was necessary. The political opportunity structure theory focused on political conditions existing outside social movements. The political conditions within Libya such as a dictatorship and tribal sensitivities were not receptive to the development of a democracy. Furthermore, the inherent Islamic and Arab identity of the Libyan people has to be considered as further social conditions. The interpretation of the collected data is directly linked to these political conditions, and guided the researcher to the conclusion that a hybrid democracy, which marries Islam and the unique tribal identity, is necessary and may be the solution to the current political state of Libya. A detailed discussion of this hybrid form of democracy is provided in the next chapter.

The results of the quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires included the demographic information of the student sample only. The quantitative data are presented in the form of tables, followed by a brief summary of the data. The qualitative data are presented in direct quotes from the sample, followed by a brief summary. Thematic analysis was employed for the development of themes in the qualitative data. The findings are presented, referencing the theoretical frameworks that the study draws on, and are organised according to the objectives and arguments of the research. The following is a list of findings from the integrated data analysis:

- Finding 1: There was no reason, it was not rationally motivated.
- Finding 2: Desire for change economic and social conditions.
- Finding 3: Mass media, as well as close proximity to Tunisia and Egypt was the cause of the Arab Spring.
- Finding 4: The economic conditions were good before the revolution.
- Finding 5: The economic conditions were bad after the revolution.
- Finding 6: The economic conditions did not improve after the Arab Spring.
- Finding 7: Unemployment rates have escalated since the Arab Spring.
- Finding 8: Economic instability was a consequence of the revolution.
- Finding 9: Living conditions were better prior to the revolution.
- Finding 10: Social conditions were bad after the revolution.
- Finding 11: Lack of improvement since revolution.
- Finding 12: The revolution caused social fragmentation.
- Finding 13: The revolution resulted in a lack of safety and security.
- Finding 14: General dissatisfaction with the political state before the revolution.
- Finding 15: The revolution caused political instability.
- Finding 16: Meanings of democracy.
- Finding 17: The Libyan revolution was not necessary.
- Finding 18: Revolution is violent and a democracy is peaceful.

- Finding 19: Revolution is not a condition for democracy.
- Finding 20: There is no specified relationship.
- Finding 21: Revolution has negative impacts on the process of democracy.
- Finding 22: Revolution is not necessary to achieve democracy.
- Finding 23: Democracy is not achieved through revolution.
- Finding 24: Protests are not needed to achieve democracy.
- Finding 25: The revolution was/was not necessary to start the process of democracy.
- Finding 26: The Arab Spring brought about democracy in Libya.
- Finding 27: The process of democracy causes problems.
- Finding 28: Democracy may/may not be possible in Libya.
- Finding 29: The democratic government is not the solution.
- Finding 30: The revolution has negative impacts.
- Finding 31: Democracy is not possible in Libya.
- Finding 32: General dissatisfaction and disappointment about the revolution.
- Finding 33: Safety and security.
- Finding 34: Lack of democratic culture.
- Finding 35: Tribal, political and military divisions.
- Finding 36: Poor infrastructure and health services.
- Finding 37: Inflation and lack of employment.
- Finding 38: The current government does not address the challenges.
- Finding 39: Social satisfaction achievable by addressing current political and economic challenges.
- Finding 40: Recommendations to achieve democracy.

5.3 Demographic information of the student study sample

Most students confirmed their participation in the demonstrations across Libya, and felt free and safe to complete the questionnaires. This current study focused on the three major regions, or provinces of Libya, namely, Tripoli, Cyrenaica and Sabha, and each province was equally represented in the questionnaire, as fifty students were selected from each research site for the questionnaire, as well as fifteen lecturers from each university for the interviews.

Table 2: Student sample demographic information

SUMMARY		N	PERCENT
City	Tripoli	50	33,3%
	Cyrenaica	50	33,3%
	Sabha	50	33,3%
Gender	Male	104	69,3%
	Female	46	30,7%
Age group	Group A - Under 20 years	8	5,3%
	Group B - 21-30 years	82	54,7%
	Group C - 31-40 years	60	40,0%
Language	Arabic	150	100,0%

Summary

The demographic information of the 150 respondents are displayed in Table 2, and their age groups are divided into three groups, namely, Groups A, students under the age of twenty years; Group B, students between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years, representing more than half (54.7%) of the sample; and Group C, the older respondents between the ages of thirty-one and forty years of age. The three regions are equally represented in the data, with fifty respondents recruited from each site. The majority of respondents were male (69.3%), and less than a third (30.3%) were female. This could be attributed to the fact that Libya is still a very conservative, Islamic country, and women might feel insecure about completing a questionnaire, or participating in a research study. Besides, the three universities generally enrolled more male than female students. More than half of respondents (54.7%) represented the (21-30 years) age group, whereas the slightly older population (31-40 years) were represented by forty per cent.

This population was selected, as many students and techno-savvy youth participated in the demonstrations during the Arab Spring. In addition, students enjoyed a larger degree of freedom of expression, as opposed to an older generation, who had been subjected to Gaddafi's regime for a longer period. The official language in Libya is Arabic, which is spoken by the majority; however, English is understood by many Libyans, as well. The respondents did not encounter any difficulties in completing the questionnaires, which were produced in Arabic. The remainder of the results focussed on the opinions, feelings and perceptions of students across the three regions. The tables were arranged according to the major headings that are linked to the main objectives and arguments of this current study.

5.4 Objective 1: To describe the causes/reasons of the Arab Spring revolution in MENA and Libya

This section comprises the views of the study sample about the reasons for the eruption of the Arab Spring. In this section, the *Political Opportunity Theory* provides useful insight as to why the Arab Spring erupted in the MENA region, and in Libya, specifically.

- Finding 1: There was no reason, it was not rationally motivated

Probing question: What are your reasons for supporting/not supporting the revolution?

"I didn't participate, because I am not convinced about what really happened..."

"... revolution was emotionally moved without rationality..."

"No I did not participate, because I am not convinced..."

"... non-support due to lack of appropriate conditions for a revolution... because it wasn't a revolution with its scientific meaning..."

"...reasons of non-support are that the required conditions of revolution were not available."

"I did not support, I am not convinced that it was necessary."

Summary: This question solicited two major responses, and most of the participants were unconvinced that the revolution was necessary in their country, as the conditions

for a revolution were not met. Some responses indicated that participation in the demonstrations was, in fact, against God's law, and the forced removal of leaders and governors was expressly prohibited in Islam.

- **Finding 2: Desire for change economic and social conditions**

History had witnessed countless examples of revolutions, namely, the Iranian revolution to the French revolution. People were simply frustrated with the *status quo* and felt compelled to air their frustrations in a more public and often violent manner (Olson, 2014). The second major reason that emerged from the findings was that people wanted change. This need for change was fuelled by feelings of deprivation. The *Relative Deprivation Theory* provides better insight as to how and why social movements erupt, and is followed by the findings of the qualitative data.

Probing question: What do you think is the main reason people participated in the revolution?

“Will to improve economic situation.... [T]hrough understanding citizens and real participation to improve society ...developing society in Libya.”

“The desire to want change for the better, for the development of the country ...”

“Desire to change for the better”

“ ... Participation of people was for desire of change and living better future.”

“Desire of change to the best.”

“The main reason of the revolution is the will of people in changing their lives to the better... “... and eliminating negativity in different administrations...”

“... many of them thought that change will be better...”

The main reason of the revolution is the will of change and improves economy ...”

“...to change economic and living conditions of the people...”

“...reasons include poor health services and infrastructure, despite Libya's massive economic potential, in addition to the mismanagement, administrative corruption, mediation and nepotism to be found in the Libyan health and education sector.”

Summary: Most responses confirmed that the major reason for participation in the revolution was the desire and need to change the poor economic and political conditions of Libya for the better. Some responses highlighted the brutal treatment of protesters at the hands of the previous regime. Other motivation factors for participation were the need for economic improvement, development in the country and political expression. Some responses highlighted the corruption at governmental and administrative levels, and that many people participated in the revolution in anticipation of removing these vices. Poor health systems and inadequate education were also highlighted as some of the reasons for the eruption of the revolution.

- **Finding 3: Mass media, as well as close proximity to Tunisia and Egypt was the cause of the Arab Spring**

The *Resource Mobilisation Theory* approach, with reference to the use of social media in the Arab Spring facilitated the discussion of related data.

Probing question: Why do you think the Arab Spring erupted in your country?

“...media is the main reason that led citizens to demonstrate...”

“The power of the conspiracy and its media tools and in the other side weakness of media management ...”

“Libya is between Tunisia and Egypt; the winds of changes are inevitable...”

“...considering the consequences of neighboring countries...”

“When the Tunisian revolution and its victory happened and the Egyptian revolution and the removal of Hosni Mubarak, the demands of the Libyans hit the roof and the Libyan youth demanded changes along the lines of the Tunisians and Egyptians.”

Summary: Mass media emerged as the prominent theme. Most responses indicate that mass media played a major role in the transferral of the Arab Spring to Libya,

followed by close proximity to Tunisia and Egypt. Libyans were of the opinion that the youth demanded “...*changes along the lines of the Tunisians and the Egyptians,*” as a result of being closely connected to, and affected by those countries. Many respondents also viewed that the eruption of the Arab Spring in Libya was largely influenced by social media, and the manner in which news about the Arab Spring was disseminated. Technologically-savvy youth, therefore, were inspired to participate, based on shared sentiments of deprivation and helplessness regarding their living conditions on social media platforms, such as Facebook, WhatsApp and YouTube. The close proximity of Libya to Egypt and Tunisia influenced the spread of the Libyan revolution.

Sub-theme: The revolution was opportunistic

The responses indicated that “...*Libyans were thus waiting for the opportunity to express their legitimate demands...*” (*Interview 8*). These responses could infer that the Libyan revolution may not have erupted independently, and was largely motivated by the consequences of Tunisia and Egypt. Consequently, it may be inferred that the Libyan revolution was largely reactionary, as confirmed by previous statements, and the revolution was not rationally motivated, because that many respondents still felt *unconvinced* about its necessity. The views of the participants reflected that a “*need for change*” during the Gaddafi era was a major motivation for participation in the revolution. The *poor socio-economic and political conditions of Libya* also surfaced as a reason for the eruption of the revolution, followed by a lack of political freedom, and corruption at governmental and administrative levels. In terms of seeking social reform, the participants expressed that poor health and education structures were also reasons for the eruption of the revolution. Many Libyans participated in the revolution in the hope of removing these vices.

5.5 Objective 2: To describe the political, economic, and social implications of the Arab Spring on the democratisation process

One of the aims of this current study was to gain an understanding of students’ perception of the Arab Spring in Libya, as well as how they considered that it influenced the political, social and economic conditions and the democratisation process in Libya. The following set of results

demonstrates the previous and current political and economic conditions of Libya, according to students' perceptions regarding the development of an effective democracy in Libya.

- **Finding 4: The economic conditions were good before the revolution**

Table 3: Economic conditions before the revolution

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
The economic conditions of your city before the revolution?	Good	Obs	27	9	42	78
		%	54,0%	18,0%	84,0%	52,0%
	Neutral	Obs	2	2	0	4
		%	4,0%	4,0%	0,0%	2,7%
	Poor	Obs	21	39	8	68
		%	42,0%	78,0%	16,0%	45,3%
Total		Obs	50	50	50	150
		%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: The results in Table 3 indicate the views of the respondents regarding the economic conditions of their respective cities after the revolution. The majority of respondents (84.0%) from Sabha acknowledged that the economic conditions were good prior to the revolution, whereas the majority of Cyrenaica (78.0%) indicated the opposite. Interestingly, Cyrenaica had always been historically and economically marginalised during the Gaddafi era, as opposed to Sabha that was considered Gaddafi's last-standing stronghold during the revolution. More than half (54.0%) of the respondents from Tripoli indicated good economic conditions prior to the revolution, which was a significantly higher percentage than Cyrenaica, where only (18.0%) indicated good conditions. Forty-two per cent of the Tripoli respondents indicated poor conditions, whereas a significant difference was noted between Sabha (16.0%) and Cyrenaica (78.0%). The results revealed that the most polarised and significant views were illustrated by Sabha and Cyrenaica, whereas Tripoli appeared to be straddling 'good' and 'poor' conditions. The overall results revealed that more than half (52.0%) of all the respondents agreed that the

conditions were good prior to the revolution, and less than half (45.3%) indicated ‘poor’. The results from Tripoli at (54.0%) and (42.0%) for poor conditions, indicated that Tripoli still had some loyal tendencies towards the Gaddafi regime, whereas the majority of Cyrenaica (78.0%), the birthplace of revolts against Gaddafi, indicated poor conditions.

- **Finding 5: The economic conditions were bad after the revolution**

Table 4: Economic conditions after the revolution

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
The economic conditions of your city after the revolution?	Good	Count	9	8	7	24
		% within City	18,0%	16,0%	14,0%	16,0%
	Neutral	Count	2	3	3	8
		% within City	4,0%	6,0%	6,0%	5,3%
	Bad	Count	39	39	40	118
		% within City	78,0%	78,0%	80,0%	78,7%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: The results of the respondents’ views about the economic conditions after the revolution are displayed in Table 4. The overall majority (78.7%) of the three sites agreed that the economic conditions of their respective cities were bad after the revolution, whereas sixteen per cent indicated otherwise. The results in Table 3 indicate that (52,0%) of all respondents agreed that the conditions were good prior to the revolution, which is significantly higher than results in Table 4, which reveals that only (16.0%) believed that the economic conditions were good after the revolution. This implies that the economic conditions of these cities deteriorated after the revolution, instead of improving, which was one of the many motives for the revolution: the improvement of economic conditions.

- **Finding 6: The economic conditions did not improve after the Arab Spring**

Table 5: The economic conditions of the country

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
I feel that economic conditions of Libya have improved since the Libyan Arab Spring	Agree	Count	2	1	1	4
		% within City	4,0%	2,0%	2,0%	2,7%
	Neutral	Count	5	5	5	15
		% within City	10,0%	10,0%	10,0%	10,0%
	Disagree	Count	43	44	44	131
		% within City	86,0%	88,0%	88,0%	87,3%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

The views of the respondents regarding the improvement of economic conditions since the Libyan Arab Spring, are indicated in Table 5, and reveals that the majority (87.3%) of the respondents were of the opinion that the economic conditions had not improved. In addition, the results revealed that the majority from all regions concurred; Cyrenaica (80.0%), Sabha (80.0%) and Tripoli (86.0%). The overall minority (2.7%) maintained that the economic conditions had improved after the Arab Spring. However, the results indicated that Libyans were adamant that the economic conditions had deteriorated.

- **Finding 7: Unemployment rates have escalated since the Arab Spring**

Table 6: Escalation of unemployment since the Arab spring

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
I do not feel that unemployment has escalated since the Libyan Arab spring	Agree	Count	11	14	15	40
		% within City	22,0%	28,0%	30,0%	26,7%
	Neutral	Count	15	12	12	39
		% within City	30,0%	24,0%	24,0%	26,0%
	Disagree	Count	24	24	23	71
		% within City	48,0%	48,0%	46,0%	47,3%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: In Table 6, the views of respondents regarding the escalation of unemployment after the Arab Spring are clearly presented. The majority of the respondents from Tripoli (48.0%), Cyrenaica (48.0%) and Sabha (46.0%) maintained that the unemployment rates had escalated since the Arab Spring. The overall results revealed that just less than half of all the respondents (47.3%) concurred, which outweighed the minority (26.7%), who viewed that unemployment rates had not escalated since the Arab Spring.

- **Finding 8: Economic instability was a consequence of the revolution**

Probing question: Describe the social and economic state of your city before and after the revolution?

“...The economic situation is very bad as the living conditions, in terms of the high living costs and inflation...[T]he Libyan currency has depreciated in value.”

“...lack of economic potentials and resources, deterioration of health situation, facilities, security and full fall down in all economic activities.”

“Scary economic situation...”

“Social and economic status after the revolution is worse than before...”

“Results of the revolution: transforming the country to a jungle, reaching bankruptcy and looting...and after it became fragile, unstable and overlapping.”

“... economic status after the revolution is worse than before.”

“...escape of capitalists and high prices...”

“... after the revolution it is very bad...”

“Increase of inflation, absence of capitalists, state role absence...”

“...Economic situation is worst after the war due to consequent wars in the city and spread of chaos and weapons...”

“...economic: total collapse of the sector, administrative: total collapse.”

“...economic pressure and high prices...”

Summary: A destabilised economy appeared to be a major theme, according to the respondents. Most of them confirmed that the economic condition of the country had worsened since the revolution, and cited the lack of employment opportunities, resources

and general infrastructure, as an economic consequence of the revolution. A secondary theme that emerged was that of financial bankruptcy and the inflation of prices. Generally, the results revealed that the overall economic state of Libya had not improved after the revolution, despite it being the major motive for participation in the demonstrations.

5.5.1 Social implications of the Arab Spring

The following set of data explores the social implications of the Arab Spring, such as living conditions, unemployment and overall improvements.

- *Finding 9: Living conditions were better prior to the revolution*

Table 7: Living conditions before the revolution

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
Living conditions before the revolution?	Good	Obs	35	25	37	97
		%	70,0%	50,0%	74,0%	64,7%
	Neutral	Obs	2	3	1	6
		%	4,0%	6,0%	2,0%	4,0%
	Bad	Obs	13	22	12	47
		%	26,0%	44,0%	24,0%	31,3%
Total		Obs	50	50	50	150
		%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: Table 7 contains the views of the respondents concerning their living conditions before the revolution and reveals that half of Cyrenaica (50.0%) considered their living conditions to be good before the revolution, as did seventy per cent of Tripoli and seventy-four per cent of Sabha. The overall majority (64.7%) of respondents concurred that living conditions were better prior to the revolution, while more than thirty-one per cent disagreed. This is a significant difference. The results revealed that only half of Cyrenaica viewed the conditions as good prior to the revolution, while forty-four per cent reported bad living conditions. The difference between the two percentages is only six per cent of respondents, who

selected the neutral option. The results also revealed that Cyrenaica appeared to be more disadvantaged before the revolution, than Tripoli and Sabha were.

- ***Finding 10: Social conditions were bad after the revolution***

Table 8: Social conditions after the revolution

The social conditions of your country after the revolution?			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
The social conditions of your country after the revolution?	Good	Count	12	23	9	44
		% within City	24,0%	46,0%	18,0%	29,3%
	Neutral	Count	3	2	1	6
		% within City	6,0%	4,0%	2,0%	4,0%
	Bad	Count	35	25	40	100
		% within City	70,0%	50,0%	80,0%	66,7%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: Table 8 contains the views of the respondents regarding the social conditions after the revolution. The majority (80,0%) of the respondents from Sabha indicated bad social conditions after the revolution, followed by Tripoli at seventy percent; however, only half of Cyrenaica indicated bad social conditions. The table shows that two-thirds (66,7%) of the overall respondents agreed that the social conditions were bad after to the revolution, while (29,3%) indicated that they were good. Table 7 indicates that the majority (64,7%) agreed that living conditions were good before the revolution; however, Table 8 indicates that the majority (66,7%) viewed their social conditions as worse, after the revolution.

- **Finding 11: Lack of improvement since revolution**

Table 9: General improvement since the revolution

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
I feel that the country has not improved since the revolution	Agree	Count	42	43	42	127
		% within City	84,0%	86,0%	84,0%	84,7%
	Neutral	Count	6	6	6	18
		% within City	12,0%	12,0%	12,0%	12,0%
	Disagree	Count	2	1	2	5
	v	% within City	4,0%	2,0%	4,0%	3,3%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: As viewed in Table 9, the overall majority (84.7%) of all three regions maintained that the country had not improved since the revolution, as opposed to the minority (3.3%), who believed that it did. The results from each region also revealed that the respondents were adamant that the country had not improved, with the Tripoli and Sabha percentages each at eighty-four per cent, respectively, and Cyrenaica with the highest percentage (86.0%).

- **Finding 12: The revolution caused social fragmentation**

Probing question: Describe the social and economic state of your city before and after the revolution?

“Social disintegration and tearing apart the social fabric...”

“...social division, chaos... tearing social fabric...”

“...weakness of social tissue.”

“Before revolution it was stable, conjoined and homogeneous...”

“Social and economic situation before revolution were good...”

“... tearing social fabric.”

“...before the revolution, the city was stable – socially...”

“Social ... status after the revolution is worse than before...”

“Social status before war was better.”

“Before revolution there was not a total satisfaction due to recession...”

“After war, catastrophic and pathetic situation, there is social rupture inside the family, dissociation of the one home, friends, neighbours ...”

“After the revolution: society is divided, lack of social connections and the rejection of revolution by people...”

“...[F]ragmentation...”

Summary: Most responses indicated that the social fabric of the Libyan people was *torn* and *fragmented* after the revolution, and that it was much more *homogenous* prior to it. Many participants were also of the opinion that the situation had worsened and that the social fragmentation had infiltrated familial and tribal bonds.

• **Finding 13: The revolution resulted in a lack of safety and security**

Probing question: Describe the social and economic state of your city before and after the revolution?

“...Lack of security is the most important challenges...”

“...lack of security...”

“Security disorder ... illegal immigration because it is a passage area...”

“Catastrophic in all levels: security: through lack of security...”

“...Before the revolution, the city was stable...economically and security...”

“After the revolution, different political views contributed to problems that further escalated into familial and tribal issues. These then developed into armed clashes between members within a city, between cities between tribes leading to a large rupture in the lining of the Libyan the social fabric...”

“...security collapse...”

“Destruction.”

“...conditions, insecurity, kidnapping for ransom, robbery under coercion, tension with neighbouring countries...”

“Safe and stable city...[b]ut after the war it is unsafe city controlled by dark militias...”

“Spread of camps controlled by outlaw militias...”

“...lack of security...”

“...Religious and extremist religious groups, proliferation of weapons, threat to local security poor economic...”

Summary: Most of the participants confirmed that a lack of security is a major consequence of the revolution and a source of major concern for them. This lack of security has been mainly attributed to the spread of various militia groups in Libya, in addition to the spread of weapons. Furthermore, some responses indicate that clashes have infiltrated familial and tribal levels, which have also developed into armed confrontations, thus creating an internal security threat. The source of an external security threat is mainly posed by the militia groups who according to the responses, resort to “kidnapping” for ransom. Secondary themes that have emerged from the data include the growing tension between neighbouring countries as a result of the internal security threat posed by extremist groups.

5.5.2 Political implications of the Arab Spring

The following set of data present the views of the study sample about the political implications of the Arab Spring.

- **Finding 14: General dissatisfaction with the political state before the revolution**

Table 10: Political conditions before the revolution

The political conditions of your country before the revolution			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
The political conditions of your country before the revolution	Good	Count	6	5	6	17
		% within City	12,0%	10,0%	12,0%	11,3%
	Neutral	Count	1	2	2	5
		% within City	2,0%	4,0%	4,0%	3,3%
	Bad	Count	43	43	42	128
		% within City	86,0%	86,0%	84,0%	85,3%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: The results of the respondents' views about the political conditions of the country before the revolution, are presented in Table 10. An overwhelming majority (85.3%) agreed that the political conditions of the country were bad before the revolution. This percentage is significantly higher than the overall minority (11.3%), who indicated the opposite. Interestingly, the majority of the three regions agreed that the political conditions were bad prior to the revolution. The results from Tripoli and Cyrenaica are similar at eighty-six per cent, followed closely by Sabha at eighty-four per cent. These results indicated the general dissatisfaction of the respondents with the political state of the country before the revolution.

- **Finding 15: The revolution caused political instability**

Probing question: Describe the political state of your city before and after the revolution?

“...before the revolution, it was stable and then became a jungle...”

“...after the revolution, the situation became chaotic as militias that espoused the Takfiri ideology spread to criminalise political action. “

...Assassinations were rife and civil acts seized for a short period of time.

“... the political status ... after the revolution it suffers division and chaos, and the lack of stability...”

“... after the revolution it is very bad...”

“...catastrophic, political conflicts, chaos...”

“...Spread of corruption and stealing public funds...”

“Political hysteria and who has weapons controls.”

“...militias, the proliferation of weapons and the weakness of the state apparatus...”

„...Political status ... [A]fter the revolution it suffers division and chaos, and the lack of stability...”

Summary: Major themes that emerged from the data indicated political instability and chaos after the revolution. Sub-themes that emerged from the data focussed on the proliferation of weapons, and the spread of various militia groups throughout the country, as well as the spread of corruption. The general theme seemed to indicate that the political state of the country deteriorated after the revolution. The sub-themes that emerged were, the lack of political freedom before and after the revolution, as per the following excerpt:

“The Libyan regime criminalised political parties but after the revolution it is very bad...but after the revolution, and it is divided without freedom of expression and opinion differentiation.”

5.6 Objective 3: To describe the relationship that exists between the Arab Spring revolution and a need for democracy

The following section highlights the opinions of the study sample about democracy. The questions were designed to explore their views on the following issues, relating to democracy:

1. What democracy means;
2. The necessity of the revolution for Libya;
3. The relationship that exists between the revolution and democracy;
4. The possibility of a democracy in Libya;
5. The positive and negative impacts of a revolution; and
6. The impact of the revolution on the process of democratisation.

Findings from the questions provided an insider perspective into how the study sample viewed democracy and its relationship with the revolution.

5.6.1 What democracy means

- ***Finding 16: Meanings of democracy***

Probing question: *What does democracy mean to you?*

“Democracy is transforming countries to refugees’ camps...”

“Democracy is appropriate lies that should be in the right place...”

“There is no clear meaning for democracy just as there is no real existence of it. It is merely a concept; a ‘named thing’. It is but chaos that came to the green and dry land, resulting in the loss of the unity, stability and freedom of the country.”

“Peaceful transfer of power by a mechanism and rules agreed by politicians and all society...”

“Democracy is developing human and granting him the freedom for progress, creation and innovation.”

“Democracy...is developing the country and the citizen in the road of progress, development and prosperity...”

“A true democracy (in our view) is one that does not conflict with or oppose Islam; one in which a human enjoys complete human and civil rights. This is what our government has failed to achieve.”

“The democracy is a goal not a tool.”

“Security and safety for a society as the Libyan society...”

Summary: Most respondents view that democracy is synonymous with ‘development’ and ‘progress’. Other major themes that have emerged is the idea that democracy is coined with the enjoyment of human and civil rights, freedom, social prosperity, progress, and safety and security for all and should be a peaceful process. Some responses indicate that the negative consequences of democracy and the process of achieving it far outweigh the positive results. Some responses indicate that the notion of democracy results in disunity and instability in the country.

5.6.2 The necessity of the revolution for Libya

- *Finding 17: The Libyan revolution was not necessary*

Table 11: Results for need of regime change

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
I do feel the need for regime change	Agree	Count	24	34	38	96
		% within City	48,0%	68,0%	76,0%	64,0%
	Neutral	Count	5	5	3	13
		% within City	10,0%	10,0%	6,0%	8,7%
	Disagree	Count	21	11	9	41
		% within City	42,0%	22,0%	18,0%	27,3%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: In Table 11, the majority of the respondents, who agreed with the need for regime change were from Sabha (76.0%), followed by Cyrenaica (68.0%), and forty-eight per cent from Tripoli agreed that regime change was necessary, while less than half (42.0%), disagreed. These percentages were very close, with Tripoli

straddling between the need for it or not. Only 18.0% of Sabha and 22.0% of Cyrenaica disagreed with the need for regime change. The overall results indicated that the majority (64.0%) agreed on the need for regime change.

Table 12: The need for the Arab Spring in Libya

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
I think that the Arab Spring was necessary in Libya	Agree	Count	10	13	11	34
		% within City	20,0%	26,0%	22,0%	22,7%
	Neutral	Count	8	7	7	22
		% within City	16,0%	14,0%	14,0%	14,7%
	Disagree	Count	32	30	32	94
		% within City	64,0%	60,0%	64,0%	62,7%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: In Table 12, most of the respondents from all the regions disagreed on the necessity of the Arab Spring in Libya. The majority of the respondents from Tripoli (64.0%) and Sabha (64.0%) disagreed, followed closely by Cyrenaica (60.0%). The cities appeared to concur that the Arab Spring was not necessary in Libya, with an overall percentage of 62.7%. Only 22.7% of the respondents agreed to the necessity of the Arab Spring.

5.6.3 The relationship that exists between the revolution and democracy

This section highlights what the study sample perceived as the relationship between the revolution and democracy.

- **Finding 18: Revolution is violent and a democracy is peaceful**

Probing question: What do you think is the relationship between the revolution and democracy?

“Relation between the revolution and democracy is the same relation between wolf and sheep...”

“... Revolution depends on violence, but democracy depends on peaceful accord.”

“Revolution and democracy... [t]he former... is an aggressive uprooting that cannot be achieved except by the ‘corpse’ of the former regime... revolution” adopts violence and the second adopts the language of peaceful understanding... the principle reason for any revolution is the pursuit of democracy...”

Summary: The above data indicate that a revolution is built on violence, while democracy is built on a language of peace.

- **Finding 19: Revolution is not a condition for democracy**

“The revolution is not a condition of the presence of democracy...”

“Democracy does not require a revolution sometimes...”

“Democracy is not in need of violence, but ostracises and condemns it whereas a revolution adopts and demands it...”

“A revolution may be the catalyst for the emergence of a democracy, but it not necessarily yields a true democracy.”

“...if there is revolution there will be no democracy”.

Summary: The achievement of a democracy is not reliant on the eruption of a revolution.

- **Finding 20: There is no specified relationship**

“There is no specified relation...”

“There is no relation.”

Summary: The responses indicated that the revolution was not necessary to achieve a democracy.

“...if there is revolution there will be no democracy”.

Some responses indicated that there is no relationship between democracy and revolution, and that they are mutually exclusive, and not dependent on one another. Some responses indicated that democracy is based on the language of “understanding” and “peace”, whereas revolution is characterised by “violence”, and that the two are completely separate entities. The main emerging theme was that democracy was not being achieved through revolution, and that, although a revolution might intend to bring about a democracy, a true democracy will not be achieved in this manner.

- ***Finding 21: Revolution has negative impacts on the process of democracy***

Probing question: *How do you think the revolution has impacted on the process of democratisation?*

“The revolution killed democracy clinically in my country...”

“In the beginning of 2012, there is a partial impact in the positive direction...”

“Negative impact...”

“Who is not with us, and then he is with terrorism...”

“Negative.”

“Negative.”



Summary: Most respondents indicated that the revolution had negatively impacted the process of democratisation, and that the prospects of a democracy were good at the beginning of the revolution.

- ***Finding 22: Revolution is not necessary to achieve democracy***

Probing question: *Is revolution necessary to achieve democracy?*

“Not necessary – without explanation.”

“Not necessary and the reason is that fast and surprising change results will be negative”.

“Not necessary – the shepherd protects the sheep from the wolf, but how come the wolf be the shepherd?”

“Arabic spring is not necessary as long as there is progressive reform from the top of the pyramid to the bottom...”

“After the bad situation that our country has reached, I think it was not necessary at all”.

“...not by a revolution in the Libya case, it should not be by using weapons...”

“Not necessary...”

“Not necessary...”

“No, sometimes results chaos as in Libya...”

“No, it is not necessary, because there are countries that have witnessed a peaceful transition of power, such as South Africa and other states...”

“No.”

Summary: Many respondents indicated that the revolution was not necessary, and have used the current state of affairs of the Libyan state, as proof for their responses. However, some responses indicated that the revolution was necessary and have cited many reasons, with the removal of the Gaddafi regime, as the most prominent. Some responses indicated that the change was necessary, although a peaceful process would have been better, *“...change is necessary, Better to change the situation peacefully through accepting all sides as the Tunisian case”*. Others noted the need for foreign intervention *“...open the gate for direct and indirect foreign intervention.”* However, the overall sentiment that emerged was that the Arab Spring was not necessary in Libya, despite the many maladies of the previous Gaddafi regime. According to the results, there appeared to be no connection between revolution and democracy, for the Libyan people at least. The majority indicated that the Arab Spring was not necessary to achieve democracy.

- **Finding 23: Democracy is not achieved through revolution**

Table 13: Democracy is not achieved through revolution

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
Democracy is achieved through revolution	Agree	Count	18	25	9	52
		% within City	36,0%	50,0%	18,0%	34,7%
	Neutral	Count	7	12	4	23
		% within City	14,0%	24,0%	8,0%	15,3%
	Disagree	Count	25	13	37	75
		% within City	50,0%	26,0%	74,0%	50,0%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: The overall results in Table 13 indicate that the majority of the regions disagreed that democracy was achieved through revolution, while over a third (34.7%) agreed that it was. More than fifteen per cent indicated the neutral option. Half of the respondents from Cyrenaica (50.0%) agreed that democracy is achieved through revolution, and represented the majority of the votes for Cyrenaica. Over a quarter of the respondents from Cyrenaica (26.0%) disagreed, while the majority of the respondents from Sabha (74.0%) shared the same view. The most significant difference was noted between Sabha (74.0%) and Cyrenaica (26.0%). Half of the respondents from Tripoli (50.0%) also disagreed that revolution is a means to achieve democracy, and only thirty-six per cent agreed.

- *Finding 24: Protests are not needed to achieve democracy*

Table 14: Protests and demonstrations are not necessary for democracy

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
Protests and demonstrations are not necessary for democracy	Agree	Count	28	16	43	87
		% within City	56,0%	32,0%	86,0%	58,0%
	Neutral	Count	8	11	4	23
		% within City	16,0%	22,0%	8,0%	15,3%
	Disagree	Count	14	23	3	40
		% within City	28,0%	46,0%	6,0%	26,7%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: The results displayed in Table 14 shows that the majority of the respondents from Sabha (86.0%) agreed that protests were not necessary to achieve democracy, while more than half of Tripoli (56.0%) shared this same sentiment. In addition, the results reveal that Cyrenaica represented the minority, in terms of agreement (32.0%), but represented the majority (46.0%), in terms of disagreement. The overall results indicate that over half of the respondents from all the regions (58.0%) agreed that protests were not necessary for a democracy, while only twenty-six per cent disagreed. Over fifteen per cent of the respondents remained neutral.

- **Finding 25: The revolution was/was not necessary to start the process of democracy**

Table 15: The revolution as integral to start the process of democracy

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
I feel that the revolution was necessary to start the process of democracy	Agree	Count	16	21	6	43
		% within City	32,0%	42,0%	12,0%	28,7%
	Neutral	Count	9	12	5	26
		% within City	18,0%	24,0%	10,0%	17,3%
	Disagree	Count	25	17	39	81
		% within City	50,0%	34,0%	78,0%	54,0%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: Table 15 displays that more than half (54.0%) of all the respondents from the different regions, believed that the revolution was not necessary to initiate the process of democracy, as opposed to less than a third (28.7%), who viewed the opposite. Cyrenaica (42.0%) represented the majority, who believe that the revolution was necessary to initiate this process, closely followed by Tripoli (32.0%). The majority of the respondents who disagreed were from Sabha (78.0%), followed by Tripoli (50.0%) and Cyrenaica (34.0%).

- **Finding 26: The Arab Spring brought about democracy in Libya**

Table 16: The Arab Spring and democracy in Libya

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
The Arab Spring has brought about democracy in Libya	Agree	Count	48	47	47	142
		% within City	96,0%	94,0%	94,0%	94,7%
	Disagree	Count	2	3	3	8
		% within City	4,0%	6,0%	6,0%	5,3%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: Table 16 shows that the overwhelming majority (94.7%) of respondents indicated that the Arab Spring brought about democracy in Libya. The results were consistent across all regions.

5.6.4 The impacts of democracy

- *Finding 27: The process of democracy causes problems*

Table 17: Consequences of the process of democracy

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
The process of democracy has caused more problems or my country	Agree	Count	31	29	36	96
		% within City	62,0%	58,0%	72,0%	64,0%
	Neutral	Count	10	8	7	25
		% within City	20,0%	16,0%	14,0%	16,7%
	Disagree	Count	9	13	7	29
		% within City	18,0%	26,0%	14,0%	19,3%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: Table 17 comprises the views of the respondents regarding the process of democracy, and whether they perceived it to have negative consequences. The results reveal that the overall majority (64.0%) of the respondents believed that the process of democracy had caused more problems in Libya. The majority of the respondents from Sabha (72.0%) agreed that the democratic process had caused more problems in their city, and was closely followed by Tripoli (60.0%). More than half of the respondents from Cyrenaica agreed with this statement. Cyrenaica presented the majority (26.0%), in terms of disagreeing with the negative impacts of the Arab Spring on their city, and was followed closely by Tripoli (18.0%). The overall results indicated that the majority (64.0%) agreed that the Arab Spring had caused more problems in their respective regions.

5.6.5 The possibility of democracy in Libya

- *Finding 28: Democracy may/may not be possible in Libya*

Table 18: The possibility of a democracy in Libya

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
I do not think that a democracy is possible in Libya	Agree	Count	16	22	23	61
		% within City	32,0%	44,0%	46,0%	40,7%
	Neutral	Count	12	11	11	34
		% within City	24,0%	22,0%	22,0%	22,7%
	Disagree	Count	22	17	16	55
		% within City	44,0%	34,0%	32,0%	36,7%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: Table 18 represents the views of the respondents on the possibility of a democracy in Libya. The overall results indicate that less than half (40.7%) agreed that the prospect of democracy was not possible, closely followed by more than a third (36.7%) who agreed that it was. A further 22.7% of the responses were neutral. Tripoli represented the majority (44.0%), in terms of disagreeing that democracy was not possible, closely followed by Cyrenaica (34.0%).

- *Finding 29: The democratic government is not the solution*

Table 19: Democratic government is not the solution

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
I do not think that a democratic government is the solution to our problems	Agree	Count	45	44	43	132
		% within City	90,0%	88,0%	86,0%	88,0%
	Neutral	Count	5	5	5	15
		% within City	10,0%	10,0%	10,0%	10,0%
	Disagree	Count	0	1	2	3
		% within City	0,0%	2,0%	4,0%	2,0%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: Table 19 indicates the sentiments of the respondents about the idea of a democratic government, as a solution to their current problems. The overall results indicated that the majority (88.0%) were of the opinion that a democratic government was not the solution and far outweighs the minority (3.0%). The results were significantly different. In terms of the different regions, Tripoli (90.0%) represented the highest numbers of those who agree with the statement, followed by Cyrenaica (88.0%), and Sabha (86.4%).

5.6.6 The positive and negative impacts of a revolution

- *Finding 30: The revolution has negative impacts*

Table 20: The negative impacts of the Arab Spring

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
I think that the Arab spring affected my city negatively	Agree	Count	29	29	30	88
		% within City	58,0%	58,0%	60,0%	58,7%
	Neutral	Count	12	11	11	34
		% within City	24,0%	22,0%	22,0%	22,7%
	Disagree	Count	9	10	9	28
		% within City	18,0%	20,0%	18,0%	18,7%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: Table 20 presents the views of the respondents regarding the negative impacts of the Arab Spring. Both Tripoli (58.0%) and Cyrenaica (58.0%) agreed that the Arab Spring had negatively impacted their cities, while Sabha (60.0%) represented the majority in this regard. The overall results indicated that more than half of the respondents (58.7%) from all the regions indicated their agreement that the Arab Spring had negatively impacted their regions, while the overall minority disagreed (18.0%).

Table 21: The Arab Spring has not brought about positive changes

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
I feel that the Arab Spring brought about positive changes	Agree	Count	5	6	6	17
		% within City	10,0%	12,0%	12,0%	11,3%
	Neutral	Count	8	7	7	22
		% within City	16,0%	14,0%	14,0%	14,7%
	Disagree	Count	37	37	37	111
		% within City	74,0%	74,0%	74,0%	74,0%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: Table 21 comprises the views of the respondents regarding the impacts of the Arab Spring. The majority of all the regions (74.0%) concluded that the Arab Spring did not bring about positive changes, and the minority (11.3%) believed that it did. The results indicated that most of the respondents were of the opinion that the Arab Spring had not impacted their lives, positively.

5.6.7 The impact of the revolution on the process of democratisation

- **Finding 31: Democracy is not possible in Libya**

Probing question: Do you think the development of a democracy is possible in Libya?

“It is not possible, due to the lack of social awareness and Institutional construction.

“No, it is not possible with the presence of... culture...”

“Libyan society is not prepared to enter into the foreign democracy...”

“Refusal of (one) side to be controlled by the other side...”

“No - developing democracy requires a long time inside Libya due to the tribal nature of the Libyan society and the cultural heritage. And this requires a cultural revolution first”.

“No -- due to the social and political accumulations...”

“In the meantime, I think it is difficult due to the suffering of the country as a result of its nature as a tribal society, also cultural heritage that prevents its development, therefore it will take a long time.”

“Currently, no. Democracy requires security and economic stability, and a real understanding of the political process and the peaceful transfer of power. Libya currently exists in complete chaos -- from the proliferation of weapons, to insecurity and other problems.”

Summary: The overwhelming majority of the respondents perceived that democracy was not possible in Libya, and have cited many reasons for this fact. Some responses indicated that the social, cultural and tribal state of Libya was not predisposed to the idea of democracy, and that a “cultural revolution” was necessary, in order to achieve democracy. Others indicated that the lack of security, as well as economic instability were barriers to the process of democratisation, which was likely to extend over a long period.

• ***Finding 32: General dissatisfaction and disappointment about the revolution***

Probing question: *How do you think people feel about the revolution?*

“Dissatisfaction, dissatisfaction, dissatisfaction.”

“Big disappointment...”

“Negative.”

“Not satisfied because they were expecting better results.”

“Most people feel frustrated by the country's fragmentation...sorry and regretful for what has occurred...”

Summary: Most responses revealed overall dissatisfaction with the current conditions in the country. Some respondents refused to respond.

5.7 Objective 4: To describe the challenges to the process of democratisation after the Arab Spring.

The following section presents the views of the sample about the challenges faced, after the revolution, and the government's ability to address them. The section concludes with a set of recommendations by the sample for democratic transformation of Libya. The set of recommendations are listed in the List of Appendices (Appendix N). The major challenges that were highlighted by the sample were:

1. Safety and security
2. Lack of democratic culture
3. Tribal, political and military divisions
4. Poor infrastructure and health services
5. Inflation and lack of employment

- **Finding 33: Safety and security**

Probing question: *What are the challenges Libya will encounter in order to achieve democracy?*

"...other extremist terrorist groups emerged as a result of this division decreased the possibility of successful democratic transition..."

"...Many challenges, political, security..."

"...proliferation of arms and weapons has given another dimension to this phenomenon, as some of the differences between tribes have taken on a language of arms, posing a threat to public safety, security and social stability..."

"...presence and emergence of armed battalions who operate within the framework of religious-political ideology..."

"...The extremist groups, like the Daesh and Al-Qaeda, they are causing a lot of problems for us here..."

"Different organisations and groups are crossing the borders illegally like terrorist groups..."

"The militia groups enforce their power on the people"

“Benghazi has a lot of armed terrorist groups, like Al Qaeda and the Daesh, and even many more other groups. They have run a lot of operations and caused explosions, before the army could get hold of them...”

“...the militias and terrorist groups are coming from the South...”

“...Illegal immigration of people coming over the borders and human trafficking...”

“The biggest challenge for this is intervention, foreign and national intervention, and financing the different militia and terrorist groups with money and weapons...”

“...the lack of safety and security prevents us from starting the process...”

“The biggest challenge we have is kidnappings, no safety, theft...”

“...and we are constantly faced with kidnappings and theft...”

“...there is no safety, and they are kidnapping and stealing, because there are no job opportunities...”

Summary: The findings indicated that safety and security issues presented major challenges, specifically, the terrorist groups, militias and illegal immigration that poses a threat to that security. In addition, the respondents emphasised that kidnappings for ransom and theft are real security and safety concerns, while internal security threats hinder the initiation of the democratic process. Safety and security issues emerged as a major challenge for the Libyan government, especially the armed clashes between tribes and extremist groups. Some responses indicated that the extremist groups act as obstacles to the process of democratisation.

- **Finding 34: Lack of democratic culture**

“...Social awareness...”

“Social, economic and cultural challenges...”

“Many challenges, political, security, economic social and cultural challenges...”

“Most important challenges are decrease of democracy culture level, no democracy without democratic culture...”

“Lack of democratic culture...”

“Institutional building... national constitution...”

“Inappropriate persons in higher positions...”

Summary: The findings also indicated that the process of state building, as well as the development of a democratic culture, may pose significant challenges to the Libyan government. Additional challenges include social, political and economic challenges. This section presents the challenges that Libya is currently facing, in terms of the democratic process after the Arab Spring, according to the opinions of the students at the three universities.

- **Finding 35: Tribal, political and military divisions**

“...I think the tribe is a challenge, because loyalty to the tribe overtakes and is more powerful than loyalty to the state, because people have lost faith in the state, so there is division now...”

“The state does not have the ability to exercise its power and authority on its institutions because it is fragmented...”

“There is political and military division, this is all contributing to the current status and blocks the democratic process, preventing it from starting...”

“The country is split up, and there are a lot of divisions, like there are two parliaments, two central banks and two governments...”

“The tribal confrontations and the wars between cities, using weapons to overcome different militia groups, these all stand in the way of starting the democratic process. The country is divided...”

Summary: Most respondents felt that the country was divided and that tribal loyalties played a significant role in this phenomenon.

- **Finding 36: Poor infrastructure and health services**

“...the health sector was collapsing and most Libyans got their medical treatment in other countries...”

“We do not have basic necessities like electricity and health services...”

“...right now we need to work on the health sector, there is no medical for us,

“...There is no health system and safety and security...”

“...electricity is a major problem here...”

“The state is weak, the health sector is deteriorating, and inflation is getting higher and higher...”

“...health services are a big problem and the lack of power and electricity...”

“...we need better health services and safety, the militias are fighting with each other...”

“... No electricity and we don't have an income...”

Summary: Health services appear to be of major theme for the Libyan people, which is perceived as a major challenge to the current government, in addition to the poor infrastructure.

- **Finding 37: Inflation and lack of employment**

“We are paying too much money for our daily needs, everything has gone up and the prices are too high...”

“There is inflation of prices and the safety.”

“The prices are very high and the dinar has lost a lot of its value...”

“Lack of job opportunities is a big problem...”

“There are no jobs and no health services...”

Summary: Lack of employment opportunities, in conjunction with inflation, represent major problems to the Libyan government.

- **Finding 38: The current government does not address the challenges**

Probing question: *How has the current government addressed the challenges after the revolution?*

“... stealing public funds and fraud on people...”

“...the most important reason is that the power became in the hands of incapable persons...”

“... [c]urrent government is powerless...”

“...Denouncing, disapproval and censure.

“The government must impose state prestige and build its establishments...”

“The government is unable to do anything as it is subjected to the influence of militia groups in Libya. Neither the transitional government nor the succeeding government was able to address or remedy the problem of the fighting factions, which poses a considerable threat to stability and civil peace...”

“They (factions) possess heavy weapons comprising rockets that target governmental centres and embassies... so the Libyan government is not really capable of doing anything...”

Summary: One of the prominent themes that emerged from the data was that the government was powerless to provide safety and security to the population of the state. In addition, failure to deal with the in-fighting appeared to emerge. Some respondents expressed that the state needed to focus on building the state, as a major priority, to deal with the current challenges. Some responses from the sample referred to the government's lack of confidence to address challenges

Table 22: The government and the current challenges

			City			Total
			Tripoli	Cyrenaica	Sabha	
The current government is dealing with the challenges after the revolution	Agree	Count	15	21	21	57
		% within City	30,0%	42,0%	42,0%	38,0%
	Neutral	Count	14	9	8	31
		% within City	28,0%	18,0%	16,0%	20,7%
	Disagree	Count	21	20	21	62
		% within City	42,0%	40,0%	42,0%	41,3%
Total		Count	50	50	50	150
		% within City	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Summary: Table 22 indicates that the overall majority of the respondents (41.3%) disagree that the government is dealing with the current challenges, whereas more than a third (38.0%) agreed. The difference between those who agree and disagree, is not significant.

- **Potential recommendations to stimulate the process of democratic transformation**

The following findings explore avenues that would enable government to achieve social satisfaction, and offers recommendations to achieve democracy, based on the suggestions of the sample.

- ***Finding 39: Social satisfaction achievable by addressing current political and economic challenges***

Probing question: *How do you think the current government is able to achieve social satisfaction?*

“With a realistic look, achieving social satisfaction comes as a result of economic and financial situation improvement, also security improvement...”

“Social satisfaction is inflexible matter...”

“...Who is looser of something, and then he cannot give it...”

“The society does not accept the results of the revolution...”

“It cannot...”

“Incapable and has no power in the reality to achieve social satisfaction...”

“Through...national reconciliation between the tribes, supporters and opponents...”

“...redress the damage and return the displaced into their cities, and also activate the courts and enact transitional justice laws...”

Summary: According to the respondents, social satisfaction could be achieved by addressing the current economic and political challenges. In addition, the social fabric of Libya has to be repaired, and organs of the state have to be reinstated.

• ***Finding 40: Recommendations to achieve democracy***

Probing question: How do you think the Libyan government is able to achieve democracy?

“...Imposing prestige of the state first, and then building state establishments...”

“There was not a real government to improve deteriorated conditions, and face challenges through real strategy to settle all problems caused by popular demonstrations...”

“...the weapons must be removed from the militia groups and the security forces have to be strengthened and the militias should not be funded...”

“...that the wealth generated from the oil reserves, should be enough to oversee the country and should be distributed amongst the citizens, by looking at the geographical and tribal positions. The government should also use a large portion of the returns from the oil reserves and invest it in the education and health sectors, and we should try to get rid of the extremist culture...”

“We should look at national reconciliation between all the different groups in the country and the different factions, and we should make sure that each side is guaranteed safety. This is important for the peaceful transition in to the democratic process.”

“We have to get the judicial system going again, and we have to get rid of the idea of a politics of revenge and should resort to the law and use the law when there are confrontations...”

“.. There is in-fighting. The government must get rid of all the fighting....”

Summary: The above responses indicate a range of recommendations, according to the respondents. Issues covered include better state building, initiation of the judicial system, national reconciliation, and re-distribution of wealth, creation of job opportunities, removal of safety and security threats and development of infrastructure and the economy. The list of recommendations has been added to the list of Appendices (Appendix N).

In this chapter, the researcher highlighted the four social movement theories, as well as how they may have played a role in the Arab Spring revolution. The findings relating to the need for democracy revealed that the respondents regarded the revolution as unnecessary for the achievement of democracy. In addition, the findings reflected that the respondents shared a negative view of the revolution, and that conditions prior to it, were considered better. The data indicates that the views of democracy and how it will improve the country were popular before and during the revolution.

In addition, the need for change, the influence of social media, and the proximity to other Arab Spring countries, such as Tunisia and Egypt, were considered the primary reasons for the eruption of the Libyan revolution. The results also revealed a sense of dissatisfaction with the previous regime, as well as the current government/s, because of its inability to address the poor economic conditions in the country. Furthermore, the expectations and the aspirations of the people on the ground come up particularly among the youth and the revolutionary intelligentsia, who mobilised the masses on the basis of the ideas and desires for a better life

under a democratic dispensation. Much of this was highly populist in nature as it was driven by the anticipation of the demise of the dictatorship, without any concrete and material evidence of how these new conditions were to be attained, post-revolution. The revolutionary intelligentsia, with the support of the mass media, succeeded in maintaining the revolutionary fervour among the masses, driven by populist slogans and the reinforcement of the promise of the current dictatorship being replaced by a democratic dispensation. Despite the absence of coherent post-revolution structures and plans, the momentum of the populist upsurge among the Libyan masses, continued to fuel the desires, aspirations, hopes and expectations of the people for a better life. However, the negative impacts of the revolution such as the deterioration of social and economic conditions as well as political instability, have directly impacted on respondents' opinions of the revolution. Most respondents have expressed general disappointment and despondency about the revolution, because their social conditions have worsened during the post-revolution era. In addition, the pre-revolutionary expectations and hopes that were inspired by the populist ideals of a transformed and democratised Libya had amounted to despondency, despair and ultimate rejection of any further support and participation in any further post-revolutionary activities. Regarding their sentiments about the socio-economic consequences of the revolution, many respondents reported poor health services and fragile infrastructures that have left them in dire circumstances. Additionally, the presence of militia, as well as the illegal entry of masses into the country, posed threats to internal and external security, according to most respondents. The overall sentiments about the revolution, as well as the effects thereof, appear unenthusiastic, while the prospects and possibility of achieving a democracy in Libya, seem bleak. Regarding the major obstacles and challenges to the process of democratisation, finding 35 identified them as the lack of a democratic culture and tribal loyalties. Additionally, the major challenges for the government were the unchecked entry of militia groups, and the proliferation of arms into Libya. The following chapter will explore these findings in-depth, as well as how they are aligned, or misaligned, to the aims and main arguments of this current study.

The findings of this current study revealed that most respondents have very little faith in the current government, and do not necessarily believe that a democracy is the solution to the problems they face. The challenges of the government/s are inter-linked with the political, economic and social implications of the Arab Spring in Libya, which, according to the researcher are barriers to the process of democratisation. Although the interim government/s

have made attempts at political reform, through the establishment of multi-party elections, and free voting, the current economic challenges of Libyans, after the revolution, have been grossly neglected. These political and economic challenges present barriers to the democratisation process, and have to be remedied, if the Libyan government hopes to win the confidence of its people.



6 CHAPTER SIX: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the researcher discussed the results of the data analysis, in relation to the research objectives and main arguments, in light of four social movement theories. In this chapter, the researcher provides a discussion of the central question that emerges in the data, relating to the relationship between democracy and revolution.

Democracy and revolution are contrasted in history, and have been considered unrelated, and occasionally hostile practices (Axford, 2011). Although all revolutionary struggles may not claim democratic legitimacy, some revolutions are not underpinned by democratic ambitions, but are born out of a need for democracy, or at least, democratic processes. The “democratic revolutions”, as witnessed in the MENA region, did not resemble the traditional Arab *coup d'état*, which merely substituted one elite group, or leader/s, with another, but instead, aimed to achieve a more democratic form of government, and supported democratic principles, such as population participation, as well as freedom of expression. Understanding the relationship between democracy and revolution, and what it meant to the respondents, was one of the objectives of this current study.

The respondents reported that the revolution had many negative connotations, and that the two concepts were completely opposite, and pursued different outcomes. Besides, the political, economic and social implications, prompted many respondents to associate feelings of dissatisfaction and hopelessness, with the concept of democracy. Although some views associated democracy with *growth* and *development*, for many Libyans, democracy responsible for the current state of affairs in the country. Many definitions of democracy exist; however, some views assert that *elections* and *freedom of speech* are the major elements of a democratic system of government.

In terms of how democracy is perceived, as well as its relationship to the revolution and protests, one particular sentiment is clear, the revolution was not necessary for the achievement of democracy in Libya, and the prospect of achieving a democracy in Libya, is low (Findings 28-32). In addition, the findings concur with literature, indicating that

democratic systems of government have not necessarily, and reliably, emerged from revolutions, but have emerged, when ruling elites reached a compromise, based on democratic tones, founded on liberalising elements. In this regard, the MENA region, and Libya, more specifically, may have to prepare itself for a hybrid democracy, one that is compatible and recognisable to the west as a democracy, and simultaneously, merged with ideas of Islam, while maintaining its unique cultural Arab identity.

The major argument advanced in this current study was that the Arab Spring revolution was necessary to initiate the process of democracy, or change in Libya. This argument finds its basis in previous literature, confirming that many previous revolutions initiated new forms of government. Although the revolutions did not bring about a *true democracy* for the people, the system of governance was removed, at least, or changed. Libya's case is no different in this regard, and although the views of the respondents reflected that the revolution was not necessary to achieve democracy, the researcher is of the opinion that these sentiments could have been motivated by the current state of Libya. It is submitted further that the current state of Libya, even though in the aftermath of the revolution, cannot be exclusively attributed to the revolution, but is a product of years of underdevelopment, as well as the remnants of colonial legacies and previous regimes. Therefore, in this regard, the Arab Spring revolution merely uncovered the existing unbalances within the structures of Libya.

The findings 22 and 23 highlighted that the revolution was not necessary to achieve democracy. In addition, many respondents perceived no actual connection between the revolution and the achievement of democracy. For many, the two concepts were separate, with the former relying on acts of violence, and the latter founded on a language of peace and development. In addition, the sample asserted that the revolution had negatively impacted the political, economic and social state of the country, and many were nostalgic about a bygone era. On the other hand, some (Finding 26) implied that the Arab Spring brought democracy to Libya. These views, however, were those of the study sample only, and not a reflection of Libyan society, as a whole.

Therefore, it is submitted that the revolution might have been the catalyst for political, economic and social destabilisation in Libya; however, it was not the cause of it. It should be highlighted that the political state of Libya was already well on its way to destabilisation, during the Gaddafi era. This may be the reason that the views of the

respondents reflected a negative opinion of democracy, and why it may not be possible in Libya (Findings 27 - 31).

The researcher is of the opinion that the revolution could have been necessary to tip the scales in favour of initiating the democratisation process. To this end, most of the respondents agreed that, although the revolution did not bring about positive changes in their country, it was necessary for the initiation of the democratisation process, at least.

Although these were the views of the respondents, it appeared that the people of Libya did not understand the nature of revolutions, which could be costly and ugly, in the very least. Its consequences are sometimes catastrophic, and, as witnessed by history, often results in the complete destabilisation of the social, economic and political structures of the state. This form of destabilisation would invariably lead to political, economic and social challenges for the survivors of that revolution.

According to the respondents, one of the major motivations behind the revolution was the need for economic change, while the lack of job opportunities for the youth, motivated many young people to take to the streets. Firstly, many Libyans were not happy with the political *status quo* in the country and called for *regime change*. The findings indicated that the lack of economic opportunities for the people was the main reason for participation in the revolution. On closer inspection of the economic conditions in the country, prior to the revolution, it is *surprising* to note that the economic, political and social conditions were cited as *much better*, prior to the revolution, and that the overall conditions of the country worsened, after the revolution. Although the views of the sample also reflected that the economic conditions worsened after the revolution, the lack of job opportunities, and the escalation of unemployment, were cited as the major reasons for the revolution. Secondly, the mass media played a major role in encouraging the people of Libya to protest against the ruling regime; however, this was not the sole cause. Social media platforms, such as Facebook, YouTube and WhatsApp, allowed thousands of Libyan youth to share their stories and events with the rest of the world, as they unfolded. In addition, the youth gained support from protesters in Tunisia and Egypt, to overthrow their ruling regimes. In this manner, the mass media, as well as the close proximity to Tunisia and Egypt, played major roles during the Arab Spring in Libya.

It is submitted that, although poor economic conditions were cited as one of the impacts of the revolution, the Arab Spring revolution was not the cause of the economic instability that Libya is currently undergoing, but merely uncovered existing imbalances and weaknesses in the economic infrastructures of the country. To further support this view, it is submitted that unliberalised politics and economics of Libya, prior to the revolution, were the main reasons for the existing weaknesses in the economic system of Libya.

Politics in the MENA countries have always shaped its markets, and economic privileges were granted to loyalists of the countries' rulers and their regimes. As a result, those firms and tribes in Libya, who were favoured, were able to acquire virtual monopolies over entire liberalised economic sectors. However, this system yielded minimal growth and only proved that political loyalty did not translate into economic efficiency. In addition, the loyalists of the autocratic leaders, consistently failed to build competitive world-class corporations, which resulted in a lacuna of jobs in the economic sector (Robson, 2012). The few decent jobs were reserved for the loyalists to the regime, whereas the growing pool of educated young workers, faced lower-quality jobs in the informal sector.

Despite concerted efforts to promote state building, risks for private investors and low investment opportunities in the MENA states, still remained very high, after the Arab Spring revolution. Libya and some of the MENA states attempted to liberalise their economies, but failed to liberalise their politics, as was the case with Mubarak and Abidine in Egypt and Tunisia, respectively. These ruling regimes were supported by western powers, and on removal, caused the collapse of supporting structures in the country. This is one of the many factors that caused the current circumstances in Libya. The Gaddafi regime enforced a number of regulations that stunted the development and growth of the private sector, and favours were extended to tribes loyal to the regime, by uplifting their economic positions (Wright, 2012). The emergence of independent businesses and entrepreneurs was stunted, and opportunities for independent businesses to grow in the Libyan economy, were meagre. Similar to his Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts, Gaddafi feared that allowing the growth of small businesses would challenge his autocratic control and rule over the country.

In the aftermath of the revolution, Libya's economy suffers lethargic economic growth and overall economic contraction. The economy was subjected to a range of shifts in the

political landscape, such as, being governed by different parties and regions. Currently, Haftar (LNA) and al-Sarraj (GNA) are seated in the eastern and western provinces, respectively, causing further instability to an already divided country. Both these governments have failed to stabilise the country politically, economically and socially. Since the Arab Spring in Libya, as well as the MENA region, as a whole, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia have achieved somewhat reasonable levels of political stability. According to the International Monetary Fund, their economic growth and pace still remains sluggish, and is expected not to exceed 1.5% *per capita* this year. Therefore, in support of the view that the Arab Spring was not the cause of political and economic instability, the researcher argues that the current state of Libya is attributed to years of underdevelopment by previous regimes, and the failure, as well as inability of the of the current governments to recognise and address this, effectively.

Consequently, it is important to discuss the inefficient subsidy system instated by Gaddafi during his rule. Subsidies for health, education, and housing were provided to the Libyan people, but strict controls were also exercised over many basic food products and fuel (Robson, 2012). As a result, government expenditures were focused primarily on wages, as well as subsidies, and expenditures for development, therefore, received lower priority. When the revolution erupted in Libya, under these economic conditions, the country collapsed into an economic free-fall. The civil war that resulted, caused a severe cuts in oil production, in addition to the UN-sanctioned freezing of Libya's foreign assets. This oil production, the country's main product and source of revenue, led to a decline in the Nominal GDP of 2011, from \$75 billion in 2010 to \$35 billion, a disastrous collapse, by any standard.

Although Libya's performance was satisfactory, and on par with other oil-exporting countries, it had structural problems on the economic level, which spilled over into the new state of Libya. The governments of the day, could not begin to change the economy of the country, without first addressing these structural imbalances. It is crucial for Libyans to realise that the economic circumstances of Libya were deteriorating before the Arab Spring, and major economic reform would take many years to implement (Robson, 2012).

Additionally, in order to address the findings that reveal the escalation of unemployment rates, since the revolution, which was, and still is, a major concern to the current government, it is important to consider certain factors before the lack of employment opportunities in Libya could be attributed to the revolution only. Firstly, the official unemployment rate of Libya was 13.5 per cent, and youth unemployment was estimated at 25-30 per cent, prior to the revolution, which is attributed to the state-dominated economy (Khan & Milbert, 2012). Secondly, the public sector employed eighty-five percent of the labour force, a mismatch between the skills demanded by the private sector, and the skills of Libyan workers. In addition, high and low-skilled jobs were occupied by foreign nationals, leaving Libyans to work for the public sector (Khan & Milbert, 2012). However, after the eruption of the Arab Spring revolution in Libya, many foreign nationals fled, leaving in their wake, a lacuna of job opportunities, which could not be filled by under-skilled Libyans. These factors are submitted as reasons for the study sample's responses that the current rate of unemployment was higher after the revolution, as opposed to before it.

While this post-Arab-Spring-period has provided Libya with an opportunity to reconstruct a new unified state, Libya finds itself exposed to the threat of disintegration into national and regional division. The most crucial representation of this disunity has been the emergence of *two separate conflicting parliaments and governments*; Benghazi in the East, and Tripoli in the West. The disintegration of Libyan unity has been transferred to the security institutions and structures, resulting in two parallel police, army and security forces. Libyans fear the real possibility of a country split in two and have expressed a lack of real political change on the ground. Marginalisation of some groups and regions, in addition to a weak central authority, have driven many Libyans to demand for the return to a federal political system of government.

As Libya has always been divided along regional divisions, and finds itself polarised in different directions, it may be beneficial, in the interim, or at least until it reaches some form of political stability, to return to federalism. This is because the central government/s may not, as yet, carry enough power and authority to dominate the periphery, namely the three regions, and the periphery is not powerful enough to break away from the centre. In this regard, a federal system would be based on democratic principles, wherein power is shared between the regional and national provinces, or

states. The concept of democracy and how it is perceived by the people of Libya is a central to this study. Therefore, the following section provides a detailed discussion of democracy.

6.2 Reflections on democracy

The era of Gaddafi had subjected Libyans to economic and political slavery, and although the prospects of a democracy promised freedom from both, many Libyans still maintain that their conditions were *better* before, and had deteriorated after the revolution. In order to understand what democracy means to the people of Libya, the researcher provides a discussion on democracy, as well as the foundations of liberal democracy, with a special focus on the contrasting views of the scholars on liberal democracies. The researcher also highlights the development of liberal democracy in Africa and related issues. In addition, a discussion of the major waves of protest in Africa is also presented, followed by the process and approaches to democratisation in Africa. Thereafter, the process of democratisation in MENA is discussed, as well as the structural imbalances in the region.

6.2.1 Democracy

The definition of democracy is varied and has multiplicities, uniquely characterised in the fields of social, economic and political science. The term has been applied freely for decades, and has been considered as one of the great western legacies of the world, as well as the golden standard by which humans should be governed (Ake, 2000). In as much as democracy is an ideal system of governance, its origins are not completely rooted in a Eurocentric narrative. The origins and history of democracy, as an ancient practice that predates the Greeks, have not really been highlighted (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011). Therefore, it appears that the world has been indoctrinated with the Eurocentric interpretation of democracy.

According to Wolf (1947), democracy refers to a state of social organisation, in which the mass of the people possess the whole sovereignty, implying a society wherein every free person, without distinction of fortune or class, is entitled to an equal share in the entire life. It should not be argued, or assumed that democracies, as they are practiced currently in the modern world, are the only ones in the true democratic form, even though the republican representative form of the US government would like to believe so (Aras & Falk, 2015). Democracy has many variations, and in order to understand these

variations, as well as find its application in the present world, it is important to highlight its actual foundation. The definition and history of democracy has been influenced by a predominantly western interpretation and perspective. However, history shows that the ancient world, and more so, the great civilisations of the Middle East, were already practicing the principles of democracy (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011).

For many scholars, the term democracy refers to “government by the people in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system” (Olatunji, 2014: p. 19), and has been summed up by Abraham Lincoln as a “government of the people, by the people, and for the people” (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010, p. 69). Democracy, according to this definition, at least encompasses a set of principles and ideals about freedom, including practices and procedures developed throughout western political history (Moghadam, 2013). Bunte (2011) argues that democracy is the institutionalisation of freedom, and that the fundamentals of constitutional government, human rights, and equality before the law, has to be properly tested, before any society can be properly called democratic. In summary, the principles of democracy have been outlined as follows: sovereignty of the people; government based upon consent of the governed; majority rule; minority rights; guarantee of basic human rights; free and fair elections; equality before the law; due process of law; constitutional limits on government; social, economic, and political pluralism; and values of tolerance, pragmatism, cooperation, and compromise (Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014).

6.2.2 Origins of democracy

The Eurocentric narrative dictates that democracy is reported to have reached its peak in the Athenian times, which apparently “dissipated” with the fall of their empire, and was followed by the Christian Middle Ages that was based on a faith hierarchy (Keane, 2009). Europe was faced with the necessity of political order, which eventually led to the French revolution, heralding in the new age of modern politics, in a modern world (Keane, 2009). Scholars, who rely on the Eurocentric foundation of democracy, claim that the French revolution introduced ideologies such as universal citizenship, and human rights, in an attempt to revive the Athenian ideal of popular power (Fukuyama, 2011). However, the ideals of human rights and equality was not born, or revived by the west, and the assertion

that the classical Greeks were the sole democrats of the ancient world, in the researcher's view, is untrue.

In this regard, Isakhan and Stockwell (2011: p. 3) state that the surviving texts, dating to Athenian times, do not provide actual details of the procedures and principles of the so called "Athenian democracy" and that "most of them are decidedly anti-democratic". The proposed alternative models of governance found in such texts were merely just that – proposals by elite idealists. Isakhan and Stockwell (2011) also argue that, while the Athenian Revolution heralded in the age of democracy for the west, the east had its fair share of democratic systems and ideals, embedded in texts, such as the Epic of Gilgamesh, the Laws of Hammurabi, and the Declaration of Cyrus. According to the researcher, it is quite possible that the worldview of democracy and its origins have been based on a Eurocentric foundation for years, and the democratic systems in the east have remained hidden and undiscovered because of language or cultural barriers. Schemel (2000) asserts that there is evidence of assemblies being held in the great empires of the ancient Middle East, such as Ashur, the Assyrian capital. According to these texts, the assemblies were allowed to congregate, and were supported by the more senior, influential members of the community, once an agreement was reached. These assemblies were often called for, when a consensus could not be reached. Schemel (2000: p. 104) writes, "...historical documents describe assemblies of citizens deliberating for days...[where] majority votes were often sought and reached...[and] it was always possible that minority views would raise the problem again if its legal solution was a failure".

The great merchant families appear to have convened in a building, commonly known as the "city house", where they "made decisions on commercial policy, fixed the rates of export tax...acted as a diplomatic body...and controlled relations with Anatolian rulers on whose cooperation and protection the caravans and resident merchants relied" (Leick, 2009: p. 203). In Wolf's (1947: p. 98) *Traces of primitive democracy in ancient Israel*, similar assemblies are reported among the ancient Israelites, as follows, "In the Old Testament certain terms and relationships appear which suggest that democracy, in the broadest definition of the term...was prevalent in the earliest times and that vestiges of democratic procedures may be discerned in both political and religious concepts throughout the later periods of Israelite history". Therefore, the researcher is of the

opinion that, to believe that the West is the founder of democracy, is completely untrue, and merely serves to further the colonial project for the world. The researcher adds that, in light of this information, it may be argued that the Middle East may not be in need of a Western Democracy, but an Eastern one, embedded in their ancient history.

6.2.3 Categories of democracy

Democracies are categorised into direct and representative (Zajac, 2014). In a direct democracy, all citizens, excluding the intermediary of elected or appointed officials, are able to participate in public decision-making (Altman, 2013). However, the practicality of such a system is limited (almost impossible), and only effective within small numbers of people, such as a community organisation, or a tribal council. In such a setting, issues are discussed, and a decision is reached, based on the consensus, or a majority vote (Altman, 2013). Therefore, the key word “majority” would outweigh the minority.

It is reported that ancient Athens practiced some form of direct democracy, with an assembly reaching 5,000 to 6,000 members (Ober, 2009). However, modern society is not really suited to this kind of direct democracy, with its size and complexity. Therefore, the idea of a representative democracy was developed, in which citizens elected officials to make political decisions, frame laws and govern programmes for, what they considered to be, the good of the public (Alonso, Keane & Merkel, 2011). Such appointed officials are granted the power to deliberate on intricate public issues, in an attentive and systematic manner, which is often unfeasible for the majority of private citizens (Alonso *et al.*, 2011).

6.2.4 The foundations of democracy

Ake (2000), on the other side of the democracy spectrum, reduces the notion and ideal of democracy to a method that facilitates the peaceful co-existence of the world. Ake (2000: p. 7) writes, “Democracy has become a unifying discourse which is supposed to time national and international politics and to foster peaceful coexistence in a world”. This author maintains that the idea of democracy has been trivialised in the world, and has been developed to keep the masses at bay, by giving them a sense of fair representation. To this author, democracy is a tool of the elite, because it does not pose a threat to the political elite of the world (Ake, 2000). The ruling elite are able to enjoy the “democratic legitimacy” according to the rest of the world, without being subjected to the attached democratic practices (Altman, 2013: p. 742). However, the foundational principles of an

Islamic democracy although granting citizens a degree of freedom; all citizens are charged with social and personal responsibility and accountability. In the Islamic democratic system, the elite are not exempted from democratic practices.

Therefore, it is a theoretical interpretation of democracy that is presently practiced and not a practical one, in the true sense. Democracy in this day and age, is a far cry from that which was practiced by the ancient cultures of the Middle East, who instituted practical political arrangements. They made it very clear that the final decision belonged to the masses, and strictly applied the rule of equality in decision-making and before the law (Ober, 2009). The French revolution introduced new ideologies, such as universal citizenship and human rights, and essentially tried to revive the so called “Athenian ideal” of popular power (Fukuyama, 2011). However, the ideal of popular sovereignty, coupled with political participation, was not welcomed by the European bourgeoisie, who feared the implications of granting absolute power to the masses, which could pose a threat to their enjoyed privileges and property, as well as social and economic status (Maier, 2015).

6.2.5 The birth of liberal democracy

Liberal democracy, also known as western democracy, is founded on a liberal political ideology, and based on government, in which a representative democracy functions under the codes of classical liberalism (Bell, 2009). Classical liberalism may be best understood as a political ideology that advocates equality and liberty, supports civil rights, democracy, secularism, gender equality, internationalism and the freedoms of speech, the press, religion and markets (Fukuyama, 2012). A liberal democracy is typically characterised by the separation of powers into different branches of government, the rule of law, free and fair elections between several diverse political parties, political freedoms, and the preservation and protection of civil and human rights, as well as civil liberties for all people (Fukuyama, 2012). In practice, it draws its authority from a constitution that delineates the powers of government, in order to preserve the social contract. It has, over the last century, become the principal political system in the world. The rule of law, or what has been decided to be law, is one of the defining features of a liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 2012).

The evolution of democracy, since its ancient origins, has been well-documented, and its variants have occupied political philosophers, especially regarding its manifestations in

western societies (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011). This gave birth to the idea of a liberal democracy, which, although it appears closely affiliated to its ancestor, is founded on the notion of government by the consent of the governed, formal political equality, human rights (including the right of political participation), and accountability of power to the governed, as well as the rule of law (Ake, 2000). Therefore, liberal government replaces the ideal of government by the people, with “government by the consent of people” and emphasises the sovereignty of the law over the sovereignty of people (Fukuyama, 2012).

Although many have advocated that liberal democracy is the world’s number one preference, there are those who declare that liberal democracies are self-imploding and unsustainable (Fukuyama, 2012). Maier (2015) views that state nations have employed liberal democracy, produced failing institutions and maintains that people have generally lost hope in that system of democracy. Ake (2000) discusses how the western social sciences’ constant clarification of the meaning of democracy, has ended in redefining it to the detriment of its democratic values. Ake (2000) for example expands on the protective theory of democracy: the people are protected from the state, through a vibrant civil society and that political stability is dependent on people surrendering participation, and political apathy is interpreted as a sign of people being content with rulers.

By contrast, Fukuyama (2012: p. 60) argues that liberal democracy should be tied to a market economy, and that the collapse of the Soviet Empire marked the beginning of the “American-style liberal democracy”. This author’s argument is rooted in the idea that a new modern liberal democracy cannot be established, without the prior establishment of a well-armed and functional territorial state, with an independent judiciary, responsible for overseeing the rule of law, which a robust state power then makes possible. According to Fukuyama (2012), a liberal democracy, centred on free elections, remains the world’s political preference. Although Fukuyama (2012) admits that democracy has its share of problems, he believes that they are remediable (though he does not provide the solution), and that it is a much more sustainable way of government, owing to its long-term evolutionary characteristics. He also argues that the modern territorial state, such as America, is the epitome of political order, and that order will only be realised, if there is a rule of law. Therefore, if there is no rule of law, there will be no state, and no liberal democracy. The researcher is inclined to agree with Fukuyama (2012) in this respect, in terms of the necessity of a rule of law in order to establish a state and liberal democracy,

but disagrees as to whether America can be considered the ‘‘epitome of political order’’. Although it appears to be a sustainable form of governance, minority groups are still marginalised and cultural sensitivities are not always taken into consideration. America currently, or rather the current administration has grossly neglected basic rights of ethnic minority groups such as the Mexican immigrants.

However, according to Pieterse (1993), Fukuyama’s liberal democracy relates to three problem issues, with the main weakness of his argument being that liberal democracy is divorced from social actors, and is conceived in a nation-state framework. Pieterse (1993) highlights the three problem issues as: liberalism and its exclusions; liberalism and democracy; as well as liberalism and imperialism. Fukuyama (2012) argues that the rule of law outlines how the state is able to exercise power, and that democracy, as the tool of elections, allows the state to best represent the interest of as many people as possible, and not only that of the ruling elites. Although this is the basis of his argument for liberal democracy, Fukuyama (2012) does admit that it has its shortcomings, as he admits that globalisation did not benefit all people equally, and the notion of democracy has been taken for granted. This author argues that, though many nation states have endeavoured to become liberal democracies, people are still dissatisfied with how the state institutions are managed. Fukuyama (2012: p. 11) concludes of by stating, with reference to the sustainability of a liberal democracy, ‘‘...it’s going to be a test. I think we’re all in for an interesting test of the stability of our democratic institutions, how legitimate they are, whether they can actually self-correct’’.

In contrast to Fukuyama, Ake (2000) argues that a liberal democracy is not essentially democratic, as it only gives power to a few (the elite). Ultimately, it is not relevant, or sensitive to the socio-economic, cultural and historical legacies and circumstances, as well as the collective aspirations of the people, especially, the African people. Ake (2000: p. 75) states, ‘‘the feasibility of democracy in Africa will depend crucially on how it relates to the social experience of Africans and how far it serves their social needs’’. The researcher strongly supports the view of Ake in this regard, as the tribal, cultural and social sensitivities of the native people have to be considered in order to reach a true democracy. A further discussion of this is provided in the concluding chapter. Additionally, Ake (2000) is a proponent for social democracy, which is characterised by policies that focus on addressing social issues, such as inequality, oppression of

underprivileged groups and poverty. Besides, social democracy focuses on policies that support access to public services such as education, health care, child care, and care for the elderly and workers' compensation. According to Ake (2000), the inability of the African democracies to deal with such social issues, is one of the greatest challenges to the process of democratisation, as social development and political development are interlinked, and cannot be separated. In addition, he asserts that the solution to Africa's problems is not the Western based democracy, but a uniquely African grounded one, as "the absence of enabling conditions for democratic participation at the grassroots is the greatest obstacle to democracy in Africa, just as the transformation of society for the empowerment of ordinary people is the greatest challenge of democratisation" (Ake 1993: p. 11).

As previously mentioned, the researcher is also in agreement with Ake (1993) who argues against the copying of a Western liberal democracy, as a solution for the problems of Africa. A uniquely African democracy would be grounded in a process of remedying social issues, than just political ones. While Fukuyama (2012) proposes the neo-liberal democracy, as the way forward, and favours transformation from the top-down, Ake (1993) argues that transformation should start at grassroots, and supports the bottom-up approach. For Ake (2000), democracy should be launched from the social base of society, in order to ensure its longevity. Ake (2000) avers that, whereas a popular form of democracy would empower the people, a liberal democracy would disempower them. In his view, some of the qualities for a popular democracy would include its transformation, to ensure that everyone participates as part of an interconnected whole, to promote the common good (Ake, 2000: p. 184). His notion of participation does not rest on individuality, but on the "social nature of human beings" and "taking part in sharing the burdens and the rewards of community membership" From a practical perspective, he advocated that democracy had to be relevant to the African people, as well as developmental, alongside the democratisation of the state (Ake, 2000).

Ake (1993), in a radical manner, addresses the challenge of democratisation as the solution to Africa's crisis of underdevelopment, the violent nature of politics, and debilitating cycle of violent conflicts, such as communal conflicts, civil wars, and regional wars, which breed insecurity, and undermine progress on the continent. However, it is important to note, that ultimately, he considers democracy in Africa a

highly contested and complex terrain. His contribution was to re-connect democratisation with the historical struggles of Africans for power, freedom and development (Ake, 1993).

Many scholars have argued about democracies, as well as the types of democracies that will be feasible for different nations, whether it be state nations or tribal ones, as is the case of Africa (Ake, 1993; Zakaria, 1997; Willis, 2015). However, during the Cold War, the different variations of what was deemed a democracy, was brought to the fore, and though loosely used and defined, it is now evident that not all democracies are alike (Ake, 1993). Larry Diamond (1997) and Fareed Zakaria (1997) drew further distinctions between the Western liberal democracies and the limited ones that emerged from second and third world countries, such as Russia and Africa. Other democracies included popular and delegative democracies. It appears that democracy has become a term that is less easy to define, and cannot be confined to mere electoral procedures that have been sharply-defined as a process of democracy (Gause III, 2011). Though “free competition for a free vote” had always been the base of a direct democracy, it appears that mere elections are not enough to ensure fair representation, as power is still held in the hands of the few elite (Hashemi, 2009). In this regard, Fareed Zakaria (1997: p. 23) states, “elections are an important virtue of government, but they are not the only virtue.” Instead, many theorists have shifted from focusing on the centrality of the popular vote, in favour of more reasoned decision-making within institutional pluralism (Zakaria, 1997). The definitions of democracy, specifically liberal democracy, are not necessarily guarantors for legitimacy and efficacy (Hashemi, 2009). According to the researcher, the development of a new social democracy may be necessary, rooted in the social base of society, with structures and powers that allow for decisions to be made, independent of the people, but, for the protection of the people. Ake (2000: p. 130), who leans towards a social democracy, admits, “...even at its best, liberal democracy is inimical to the idea of the people having effective decision-making power. The essence of liberal democracy is precisely the abolition of popular power and the replacement of popular sovereignty with the rule of law.”

Gwatkin (1980) considers that some systems of governance have yielded some success, and created stability in African communities. This system is characterised by a sense of social cohesion that allows people to come together, in order to ensure the survival of

each member (Gwatkin, 1980), and is based on what is deemed *Ubuntu*, wherein the individual is intertwined with the collective.

6.2.6 The assumptions of a liberal democracy

It should be noted here that the ideal of liberal democracy was born out of a panicked need of the ruling elites to protect their individual property, against the will of the majority (Fukuyama, 2012). Currently, even the most advanced democratic governments, such as the United States of America, are reduced to multi-party electoral competition, and is merely an ideological representation of democracy. Democracies are supposed to be systems, in which citizens freely make political decisions by majority rule, and do so under the rule of the majority. However, these systems are not necessarily truly democratic (Fukuyama, 2012). A truly democratic society advocates that majority rule is only executed, when coupled with a guarantee of individual human rights, which include the ethnic, religious and political ones (Fukuyama, 2012). The rights of minorities are independent, and not eliminated by majority vote, because of the basic institutionalised rights of all humans (Lijphart, 2012).

Alonso *et al.* (2011) argue that a representative democracy operates in accordance with a constitution, which limits the powers of the government, and guarantees fundamental rights to all citizens. This form of government is a constitutional democracy (Alonso *et al.*, 2011). In such a society, the majority rules, and the rights of minorities are protected by law, and through the institutionalisation of law. These elements clearly define the fundamental elements of all modern democracies, irrespective of history, culture and economy (Alonso *et al.*, 2011). These essential elements of constitutional government, which is majority rule, coupled with individual and minority rights, with the rule of law, are applied in Canada to Costa Rica, France and Botswana, Japan and India (Alonso *et al.*, 2011). The question arises as to whether they are really sustainable in the long run.

Foa and Mounk (2016) argue that the success and stability of liberal democracy, is premised on three assumptions about social life. First, the population shares a moderately similar worldview, influenced by mainstream media, such as broadcast news, newspapers, radio. As a result, a similar worldview is shared by diverse communities, as they are all part of the same conversation, and share the same *facts*. The second assumption is the broadly-shared economic growth and relative economic equality. For

most of the history of the world, there was basically no economic growth. The researcher is of the view that a liberal democracy according to Foa and Mounk (2016) cannot be sustained, as populations are diverse and thus have diverse worldviews, and secondly do not share relative economic equality.

Mounk (2014) argues that eras of stable liberal democracies around the world have largely been dependent on, and characterised by, fairly homogeneous populations. However, liberal democracy has come under severe stress, and is unravelling under the weight of these assumptions (Mounk, 2014). The impact of social media in the dissemination of information, facts and opinions, has exploded over the last decade. Any individual can now become a broadcaster, allowing for *free-er* expression of opinion, which has, in turn, fuelled the development of fringe ideas and conspiracy theories. In terms of economic growth, it has been relatively stagnant, and more people believe that their futures may not be financially secured (Axford, 2011).

Lastly, to address the assumption of a relatively homogenous population, in order to achieve a liberal democracy, successfully, it should be noted that the rate of immigration has increased rapidly since the mid-twentieth century, leading to a particular and rapid increase in diversity (Mounk, 2014). These assumptions -- on which a liberal democracy is premised -- have come under severe stress and further confirms that a new form of democracy or governance is desperately needed by the masses (Foa & Mounk, 2016). In an authoritarian society, virtually all such organisations would be controlled, licensed, watched, or otherwise accountable to the government (Maier, 2015). In a democracy, the powers of the government are, by law, clearly defined and sharply limited. As a result, private organisations are free of government control. Other groups, concerned with the arts, the practice of religious faith, scholarly research, or other interests, may choose to have little, or no contact with the government at all (Altman, 2013).

6.2.7 Islam and the democracy

Islam is a religion of peace that advocates equality of all humans, not only in the eyes of God, but before the state (Moghadam, 2013). However, there are groups with deviated extremist ideologies in Libya, and the Islamic world, who declare the idea of democracy as *un-Islamic* (Hassan, 2015). Most of the adherents of such ideologies resort to violence and terrorism as a means of imposing their discourse on others, for example, the rise of

ISIS in Libya (Hassan, 2015). Clearly, no contradiction exists between Islam and democracy, as evidenced by some of the largest Muslim countries in the world, namely, Indonesia and Malaysia (Elbadawi, Makdisi & Milante, 2011). These countries have flourished under democratic rule, and yielded higher levels of development and prosperity, while preserving and maintaining their Islamic identity, values and culture (Meijer, 2014). However, the majority of the MENA countries, Saudi Arabia especially, have grossly violated human rights such as freedom of speech and fair electoral systems. Although most Arab countries claim to follow Islamic Law, their interpretation and application of it is clearly neglected and are primarily identified as dictatorships rather than democracies.

6.2.8 Theoretical foundations of liberal democracy

The classical theory of liberal democracy was developed by social contract theorists, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke (Machpherson, 1962). Hobbes, who was disturbed by the fear of civil strife and political turmoil, developed the idea of liberal democracy, as a foundation for sound political order (Machpherson, 1962). He maintained that society, as well as human nature demand, and have to function within order. In addition, he asserted that any order is better than disorder. Human nature, according to Hobbes, in essence, seeks gratification, where humans are laws unto themselves (Maier, 2015). Therefore, the very nature of humans requires order, and in the absence of such order, certain chaos and lawlessness will prevail (Hashemi, 2009). This would be the alternative to political order making, and may only be avoided with the institution of order, to achieve harmonious interaction between humans (Tuck, 1990). This political order is founded on *the Leviathon*, or *the sovereign* (Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014).

The sovereign does not expect people to relinquish their human natures and natural rights, nor does it impose any obligation to those who have surrendered their right of nature to the governing body (Bell, 2009). Bell (2009) maintains that there is no limit on the obligation of the subject to *the sovereign*, and is dependent on the idea of self-preservation. When the ideal of self-preservation becomes threatened, the obligation of the subject to the sovereign will be removed (Bell, 2009). This theory of political order is based on the idea that the consent of the subject is given under chaotic and anarchic conditions, such as fear of imminent death (Ake, 2000). Evidently, the consent borders on compulsion, removing the notion of choice from the subject.

Hobbes theory has been relied upon as the theory of liberal democracy, due to the characteristic of limited government (Ake, 2000). Even though it has advocated political absolutism, which is based on absolute sovereignty and central authority, it is supported by the European bourgeoisie, who feared democracy and the democratic radicalism of the French Revolution (Macpherson, 2010). His theory maintains that the existence of governments is necessary for the preservation of human life, and for the prevention of complete annihilation, emphasising the idea of *laissez-faire*, where things are left to their own course. His doctrine is also founded on the following ideal; *the government that governs least, governs best* (Alonso et al., 2011).

According to Hashemi (2009), it is clear that the framework of a liberal democracy has little to do with democracy, as a whole. While the Athenian precepts of democracy advocated the governing of the people, by the people, Hobbes focused on the preservation of people from each other, due to their egotistical natures (Macpherson, 2010). Liberal democracy is a system of rule that offers the subject protection and preservation of life, as the central point, whereas democracy, in the Athenian sense, is the realisation and empowerment of human potentialities, through dynamic contribution in ruler-ship (Lijphart, 2012).

John Locke is definitively at variance with the theory of Hobbes. Instead of a state of war advocated by Hobbes, he maintains that life, as well as the state of nature, is in a state of peace, yet not without governance (Hashemi, 2009). He is of the view that nature, quintessentially, is ruled by God, which is to be understood by humans through the gift of reason (Tuck, 1990). The harmonious laws of nature allow for the preservation of human rights and life preservation. In addition, it enjoins obligations on its subjects, especially the obligation to enforce the laws of nature (Lijphart, 2012). Human beings are essentially governed by laws, and are bound to fulfil the obligations arising from these laws. Locke asserts, "...the state of nature is lawful and reasonably peaceful" (Tuck, 1990: p. 158).

Locke (2014) advocates that the law of nature will also pose definite problems, as everyone would be enforcing their own law, resulting in a loss of objectivity, ensuing conflicts and injustices. Therefore, the outcome is the same, and people would, therefore,

be required to leave this state of nature, to form a political society (Locke, 2014). Once this society is formed, they would contract to set up a government, relinquishing their right to enforce the law of nature, to the government.

According to Ake (2000), the theory of Locke posits some serious implications for the subjects, such as the nature of the consent, as well as how it is given or withheld in such a society. Locke (2014) presupposes that consent is limited to implicit consent, based on any attachment to government. Therefore, the use and enjoyment of any services, such as roads, or hospitals, provided by the government, is considered a form of implicit consent, according to Locke (2014). In this case, it is almost impossible to be completely alienated from any link to government, making the actuality of non-consent nearly impossible, and limited to acts of active revolt only.

These theories, although considered the founding stones of liberal democracy, replace the idea of *government by the people*, with that of *consent of the governed* (Alonso *et al.*, 2011). These authors do not elaborate on the Athenian concept of active political participation, but focus on the minimisation of inconveniences and conflicts, prevention of disorder and harm, without seeking to implement good. It is a theory based on the pervasive need to maintain social order, and protect humans from self-annihilation (Alonso *et al.*, 2011).

6.2.9 The development of liberal democracy in Africa

The pursuit of democracy in Africa by the Africans and external countries has not yielded any long-term success, and instead of promoting unification and harmony, it led to the generation of ethnic favouritism and divisions (Hilsum, 2012). Social equality is a noble goal of African states, but has been replaced with corruption and injustices, where economic development has been exchanged for material stagnation and economic decline (Hilsum, 2012). The so-called political orders of the colonialists, and the subsequent dictatorships that followed, inspired an array of military coups, civil wars and more recently, the Arab Spring in the MENA region (Anderson, 2011).

The absence of democracy in Africa is so perceptible that the accountability of African politics can no longer be defensible on moral grounds (Lijphart, 2012). Therefore, it could be argued that the initiation of democratic mechanisms, such as accountability of

government and representation, are essential to arrest Africa's descent into squalor. The current state of Africa is attributed to the emergence of modern authoritarianism, resulting from a contradictory colonial legacy, the Hobbesian process of class formation, and the severe economic and political crisis (Hashemi, 2009).

Even though most countries claim to be democratic, the question of democracy is still a crisis all over the world (Hoffman & Jamal, 2014). This is especially evident in Africa, where the prospects of successful democracy are still in question (Dodge, 2012a). The Middle East and North African regions have undergone considerable toil and suffering under colonialist powers, tribal rule and dictatorships, and are still in the developing stages of democracy and a democratisation process (Hoffman & Jamal, 2014). The following section provides a discussion on the characteristics of the current state of democracy, as well as the factors impacting on its implementation, in the MENA regions. In addition, the weight of tribalism, ethnicity, culture, history, the struggle for wealth and privilege, and the variations of poverty and insufficiency, led to the generation of dictatorial forms of rule (Hashemi, 2009). These autocratic forms of rule, as evidenced in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, are difficult to sustain, and will eventually lead to political vulnerability (Anderson, 2011). More accountable and representative methods of governance are required, and appear to be the first step in the process of democratisation (Bruns, Highfield & Burgess, 2013). Libya has witnessed this collapse of authoritarian power, leading to a *war of all, against all* battlefield, where every person seeks to secure his safety and property, leading to civil strife and confrontations (Vandewalle, 2012).

6.2.10 The rise of western democracy in Africa

The condition of the democracy in the MENA regions is traced back to the colonial era (Bruns, Highfield & Burgess, 2013). The researcher, therefore, provides a brief discussion of the state of Africa under colonial rule, and how it impacted on the development of new ruler-ship, and more specifically, dictatorship.

The colonial states of Africa were all imposing, and all powerful, where little consideration was given to transformation of domination and hegemony, to harmony and democratic representation of the people (Herbst, 2014). The colonial state was an arbitrary power, which could not engender legitimacy, and its subjects were not granted any fair chance of political competition. Instead, politics became a forceful battle for two

respective claims to ruler-ship (Herbst, 2014). When independence was granted, or taken by the African states, its character remained much as it was during the colonial era. Instead of replacing the old authoritarian mode of rule, such states, namely Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, continued to be totalitarian in nature, and often presented themselves to their subjects as mechanisms of violence, used to enforce order (Herbst, 2014). Compliance under coercion and fear was relied on, instead of willing adherence to legitimate authority (Duignan & Gann, 2013). The ruling elite, who came into power, violated and exploited the existing colonial system for their own material, political, economic and social gain, instead of endeavouring to implement democratic transformation in most African states (Alonso *et al.*, 2011). The use of force led to an increased gap between the elite and the subjects, intensifying further alienation from the ruling class (Alonso *et al.*, 2011). Popular discontent was silenced and constrained, while a sense of political unity was falsely created, in the midst of social pluralism (Duignan & Gann, 2013).

This is the main background to Africa's single party form of rule that relied heavily upon military rule to suppress mass political expression (Vandewalle, 2012). These countries were operated in a constant mode of siege, where political repression festered beneath the surface of social order (Arendt, 1973). It is not surprising that economic and social development in these countries was arrested, as a result of this mode of rule, and the only active development was, in fact, underdevelopment (Arendt, 1973). Therefore, Africa's civil wars and economic crises may all be attributed to its lack of political development and its stagnating political environment, giving way to a demand for democracy (Mamdani, 1996).

6.2.11 Reasons for the rise of democracy

These conditions of suppression, oppression and repression, as well as continual underdevelopment led to the surge of democracy in the African states (Mamdani, 1996). The post-colonial state was considered almighty, whose control was complete and absolute. It operated without constitutional checks and constraints, as well as public accountability, controlled by the elite and imposed on the masses (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). Force was the mechanism of choice, to maintain this system of rule by the elite (Lynch, 2011). The state was administered as a private institute, where the dictator shared power with collaborators of similar interests, usually of the same faith, ethnicity and

community (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). This was the case in Liberia, under Samuel Doe, Ethiopia, under Mengistu, and Rwanda, under General Habyarimana, to name but a few, as there are too many to mention (Ake, 2000).

Africa finds itself in a constant struggle between those who wish to stay in power by exclusion, and those who want to access power via incorporation. In order to maintain the status of exclusion of power, the ruling elite and the dictators use the military as a mechanism against the civilian population. This is achieved by granting the military exorbitant privileges, and depleting budgets to maintain this system (Lynch, 2011). In addition, the military is played up against civilians and granted lavish indulgences, securing its loyalty to the ruling party, and enforcing civilians to adhere to authority (Lijphart, 2012). Any opposition to the ruling party is silenced, and any affiliation to opposing parties is crushed by the military, as was witnessed in Niger (Lijphart, 2012).

6.2.12 The economic crisis in Africa and its connection to the process of democratisation

Alonso *et al.* (2011) argue that the development of a democracy movement in Africa is linked to the demand of the masses for economic incorporation, which is based on the ideal that the dignity and human rights of the colonised have to be preserved, and the provision of equal opportunity, as well as equal access to political expression and representation, is assured. These expectations mobilised masses to express their public discontent around the lack of these rights. However, in most cases, they were not realised, and new rulers merely continued with the already operational colonial era mode of despotic rule (Duignan & Gann, 2013).

After the first decade of independence, Africa's attempt at economic and political development still appeared frail, and only worsened two decades later. The state of Africa appeared to be worse off in the 1980s, when compared to that of the 1960s (Joab-Peterside, Porter & Watts, 2012). Collapsing infrastructures, coupled with escalating social conflicts and ethnic tensions, intensified poverty and malnutrition, and made the case of getting legitimate and proper leadership, a matter of survival for most Africans (Joab-Peterside *et al.*, 2012). The failure of rulers to ensure the rights of its subjects, caused masses to insist on economic incorporation, and subjects found themselves forced, out of necessity, to become self-reliant. This lack of confidence in the ruling party caused

masses to treat the ruling elite with hostility, leading to the formation of political parties (Bayat, 2017).

Pro-democracy groups started to take shape, which included farmers, who called for economic and political incorporation (Alonso *et al.*, 2011). In the past, political parties operated covertly underground, such as Laurent Gbagbo's Popular Ivorian Front (Joab-Peterside *et al.*, 2012). Therefore, it is evident that popular discontent contributed to the transition from a single party rule, and a multi-party rule system became inevitable. In countries, such as Togo, President Eyadema hoped to be spared of such democratic insurrections that started in Africa since 1979, and, in spite of popular discontent, he advocated that his subjects preferred one-party rule (Ake, 2000). However, the deepening recession in Togo, and the rest of the African states, led to the dire need of political reform for the people, and the initiation of a democracy movement (Lynch, 2011, p: 46).

6.2.13 Major waves of protest in Africa

The popular uprising of many countries in Africa, and more specifically, in the MENA, was short-lived, and have, to some extent, become stifled. More recent protests in Libya are of a different nature to the original ones, with a narrowed focus. Citizens have criticised both sides of the regime, al-Sarraj and Haftar, but lack popular mobilisation. Protest might still very much be alive in Libya, but on a quiet, reshaped and retooled stage (Blanchard, 2016).

Africa has witnessed countless demonstrations, challenging the status quo of the state, but it has only been fairly recently, that the mass political action of the East has made western headlines (Berti & Guzansky, 2015). Popular revolutions that ousted Tunisia's and Egypt's autocrats, the narrowed ones about Marikana in South Africa, the Red Wednesday protests in Benin in West Africa, and the anti-corruption demonstrations in Kenya in the east, all signal that Africans are taking to the streets to bring about change (Branch & Mampilly, 2015).

Branch and Mampilly (2015) seek to outline a uniquely African course of protests, highlighting the almost blind optimism of an Africa uprising, and its patriotic belief that it is, in fact, ready to take its own political reigns. A new political society, therefore, has emerged and comprises young people in the streets, an urban underclass, marked by its

“political identity as it is shaped by the form of state power to which it is subject.” (Branch & Mampilly, 2015: p. 15). History has revealed that popular protests under the organisation of students, organised labour, as well as the political elite, can claim a win. This was observed in Ghana, which dealt heavy-handedly with the very movements that disbanded and ousted the British powers. Political society and the masses, most defiantly have a voice, and it is a voice that is demanding change (Branch & Mampilly, 2015: p. 67).

6.2.14 First wave of protests

Branch and Mampilly (2015) outlines two major phases of political waves of protests in Africa. The first is set as the movements against colonisation, and towards a process of decolonisation. Two major approaches have been highlighted: a) non-violent and guided anti-colonial protests into a nationalist project, as was instructed by Ghanaian independence leader, Kwame Nkrumah; and b) the resistance *by any means necessary*, as was advocated by the revolutionary philosopher, Frantz Fanon, in Algeria (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). Besides protests against colonisation, Africa faces crucial obstacles to democratisation that have persisted over time. One of these challenges is the stark divide and contrast between the rural and urban populations (Branch & Mampilly, 2015).

6.2.15 Focus of protests in Africa

Political society is not a standardised society, and therefore, the structure, possibilities, as well as limitations, are differently structured in different countries. Africa has a particular quality to its protests, which occur within, and amid, the political divisions and exclusions of the *colonial and post-colonial powers*. This form of colonial power has permeated all aspects of the citizens' lives, more so in the urban citizens, which has been systematically entrenched in the economy, industry, and geography of the land, as well as the identity of its people (Branch & Mampilly, 2015).

6.2.16 Urban and rural divide

In Africa, the stark contrast of the urban-rural divide is painfully poignant. Protests in Africa need to consider this divide, and ensure that they are not merely perpetuating it, thereby generating similar political structures. This was the case of the protests in Latin America, which have instated developmental policies, much to the advantage of the urban populations, and often to the disadvantage and negligence of the marginalised rural populations, and indigenous peoples (Ober, 2009). Protests that focus on the class divide, or formal citizenship, may also disbar the manner in which power interacts with different

racess and ethnicities. In Brazil, for example, further questions were raised concerning the absence of the larger black populations, and their lack of participation in the protests, as well as how protests may, in fact, represent the inequality of race representation (Branch & Mampilly, 2015).

Africa's population has been largely divided into the urban and the rural, as a result of the historical colonial rule (Alonso *et al.*, 2011). In addition, regions and rural positions were further divided, based on ethnicity, and subjected to indirect rule. Therefore, urban populations settled into variant economic and social classes, due to marginalisation and patronage. This divide is what has faced many of the anti-colonial movements in the past, and were necessary, in order to overcome the colonial powers. However, the protests of modern Africa face a similar challenge, and are not always successful, due to an economic and social divide (Branch & Mampilly, 2015).

Politics in Africa has taken on numerous forms, and has been seen to be both violent and non-violent in nature. Frantz Fanon has articulated his logic, supporting violent uprisings, and by *all means necessary* kind of thinking (Bond, 2002). However, Africa, during the last few years, has witnessed far less violent protests. It has long been the stage of on-going civil wars, coups, and more recently, non-violent political mobilisation (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). More recently, and more so during the Arab Spring, political mobilisation was activated and proliferated without the use of arms, and the usual familiar guerrillas' armies. Instead, masses were mobilised with technology and social media, by techno savvy youth, centred completely on mass protest (Branch & Mampilly, 2015).

6.2.17 The second wave of protest

The second wave of protests emerged during the 1980s and 1990s, and was focused on challenging the new structural adjustment, and the single party rule (Bond, 2002). These mass protests were mostly non-violent, but faced an array of challenges. States that had emerged from independence, had eventually fallen prey to the same vices, which they sought freedom from, and were held hostage by corruption and neoliberalism (Bond, 2002). In this case, popular protests were an initiated political reaction against the ruling party, because of the violation of a theoretical pact that was concluded between them and the population. This phase of political protest was organised by students, organised labour, political elites, and NGOs, in order to gain access to state resources, by requesting

multi-party elections. However, they maintain that the promotion of multi-partyism only benefited those, who were resolutely established within civil society (Bond, 2002).

Even though these movements were based on ushering in a new era of change, they did exclude rural and political society, as was the case with the national conferences that swept francophone Africa. Multi-partyism, according to Branch and Mampilly (2015: p. 77), was “a way of disciplining long-standing demands for radical change from political society” and “the democratisation process also represented a tool for promoting urban interests at the expense of the rural, and urban elite interests at the expense of the poor.” These authors also maintain that the scope and aim of politics is extended well beyond mere elections and democracy, and that the process of democratisation obscured more than it illuminated. This implies that heads of states attempt and try to maintain their positions of power, through the development of new constitutions, and the suppression of protests, not so much to introduce democratic benefits to the people, but as a mechanism of political manoeuvring and manipulation (Bond, 2002).

Branch and Mampilly (2015) further elucidate that the rest of the world has, in fact, become disenchanted with the process of elections, but that political opposition are merely exciting moments, when a convergence of social, economic and political factors, spur masses of people to protest for various underlying reasons. In African politics especially, economic and political protest are underpinned by the same motives, and are the same. In countries such as Libya, the state has, in the past, employed aggressive and strict economic mechanisms, to keep the masses abated. This still appears to be the case, despite a move towards so called democratisation (Ober, 2009).

It appears that African masses are not so much protesting against the absence of multiparty elections, but rather against economic deprivation and violent state power. African protests might not necessarily be successful in the long run, but may prove that possibilities do exist, beyond the current status quo. In Uganda, all that remains of the popular protest is the closed off public square in Kampala (Ober, 2009). Currently, the Ugandan government stays in a state of counter-protest, whereas Ethiopia is still a counter-protest state.

The tribe in Libya is a formidable, yet silent, force that may significantly impact on the course of the current political state of the country (St. John, 2014). For this reason, tribal dynamics, and how they could impact the current civil war, is of particular interest to this current study. Tribes, in the Libyan context, may be defined as a social organisation, consisting of smaller branches, characterised by traditions of common descent, language, culture and ideology (St. John, 2014, p: 278). The actions, allegiances and ideologies of the tribes are always varying, often influenced and based on the changing landscape of the state and society (St. John, 2014. P: 280).

The structure of a tribe in the Arab world is relatively similar, and is constructed hierarchically (Wright, 2012). The original tribe is referred to as a *qabila* (tribe), and comprises sub-tribes, named *buyut*, which are further divided into family groups, termed *lahma* (Kymlicka & Pförtl, 2014). The structure is not exclusively systematic, and appears to be a general form of social organisation (Varvelli, 2013). The heads of the tribes are called *Sheikhs*, who wield powerful influence, by providing guidance (Roumani, 2014, p: 167). The opinion of the *Sheikh* is held in high regard, and has been used in the past, to influence state policies at various levels of government. This was evident, particularly, during the rule of King Idrīs (Varvelli, 2013).

Even though the entire tribe is socially constructed and affiliated to the main *qabila*, loyalty is affiliated to the *lahma* (Vandewalle, 2012). This means that loyalty is a bottom up approach. For some, the sense of tribalism is not only linked to bloodlines and social organisation, but is a means of identifying with a particular ideology. The tribe is, therefore, a form of social organisation that allows the grouping of nomadic peoples, scattered across the country's vast spaces, which was the foundation of social order, for the better part of Libya's history (Ashour, 2015).

Libya is "one of the most tribal nations in the Arab world" (Capasso, 2013, p. 120). Tribalism in Libya, as well as the current civil war, plays a powerful and dynamic role in shaping the political future of Libya. At present, there are one hundred and forty tribes in Libya, of which an estimated forty appear to carry significant political influence (Chorin, 2012). Even though tribes were traditionally and historically concentrated in certain areas, they still have a series of transnational networks extending well beyond visible boundaries (Chorin, 2012).

Consequently, the allegiance of tribes to a particular group may ultimately impact on the outcome of a war, if the influence was considerable. This is because tribal identity and the notion of affinity and favouritism is so deeply entrenched in Libyan society that it will have a profound impact on its political condition (Ashour, 201, p: 5). Because tribes are naturally branched off into smaller sub-tribes, the sense of allegiance and favouritism will prevail in situations that directly impact on the tribe (Anderson, 2014).

Colonisation has also impacted on the very fabric of the society and people it aimed to subjugate, and Libya was no different (Chorin, 2012). Numerous colonisation efforts by the Greeks, Romans, as well as the Italians and French, followed by the Sanūsī period, have all played their part in the composition and grievances of Libyan tribes. As far back as 1050, history has recorded the migration of the Hilalian Arab tribes to northern Africa, who either integrated into the native Amazigh tribes, or displaced them (Anderson, 2014, p: 4). The Amazigh are reported to have lived in the region since 1000 BCE (St. John, 2014). The Amazigh have been grossly marginalised and oppressed through the eras of colonisation, and especially during the rule of Gaddafi. In addition, Arabs settling in the region introduced the culture of nomadism, and more importantly the religion of Islam, as well as the Arabic language. Therefore, a cultural invasion was initiated, resulting in the *arabisation* of the Amazigh, who accepted the new religion, and adapted to the Arab culture (Anderson, 2014, p: 6).

Although many views reflected that there was a lack of democratic culture in Libyan society, it should be noted that tribal structures still carry considerable influence in the minds and politics of the Libyan people. The question that needs to be addressed is whether the tribal nature of Libyan society is able to enhance, or hinder the process of democracy, or whether the lack of democratic culture is not a result of its tribal nature, but attributed to Libya's colonial past.

Tribalism in Libya cannot be removed from the equation, and still infuses and pervades every part of Libyan society. It is regarded as an important factor in Libya's civil war, and will play a critical role, invariably, in shaping the political landscape of the country. As is reflected in the literature review, tribalism is well established in Libyan society, constituting over 140 different tribes where loyalties are often iron-clad. However, only

30-40 of these tribes carry significant influence. It should be noted that the notion of tribe in Libya is a broad form of social organisation, and should not be confused with an *ancient static social structure* (Varvelli, 2013). Tribal identities are linked, and share a strong sense of acting and thinking, comprising ethics, practices and norms, such as solidarity of kin, and practicing values, such as honour and shame. These are not merely measures of moral judgment, but form the moral basis for tribal institutions and procedures, which may be harnessed for the development of new form of democratic system. Therefore, it is submitted that, although Libya does suffer from a lack of democratic culture, its tribal identity cannot be held responsible for it.

Finding 34 indicates that Libya suffers from a lack of democratic culture, which may be attributed to a number of factors. In order to examine why this lack of democratic culture can be cited as an obstacle to achieve democracy, it is important to discuss the underlying reasons for this finding. Firstly, Libya has a tumultuous history, riddled with inadequacies of colonial and post-colonial legacies. These legacies, coupled with autocratic policies, defy democracy as a concept, and a form of governance. The remnants of these authoritarian legacies in Libyan society, and its operation within regional and political frameworks, have also greatly influenced Libyan political life. In addition, the people of Libya have been accustomed to a culture of violence, political exclusion, as well physical and intellectual oppression. Therefore, the use of violence had also become a means of resolving the differences and conflicts on the political landscape, which, consequently, led to further instability. Additionally, because Libyans were subjected to intellectual and cultural oppression by previous regimes, for decades, a culture of *surrender to the state or perish* had developed. Libya was subjected to regional and international isolation, as well, making the country economically weak, and culturally vulnerable to external forces, which systematically weakened the society. Based on the findings, it is submitted that these factors may have influenced the sample's view of democracy, in a negative light. As reflected in the findings, this was most probably the reason that the concept of democracy was coined with negativity for the people, as well as why the respondents regarded conditions in Libya as being better, prior to the revolution.

6.3 Tribal dynamics in Libya

Finding 35 indicates that the study sample viewed tribal allegiances as a barrier to the process of democracy, which might be attributed to a number of factors. The problem

that Libya faces is that tribal allegiances may act as both a cause of insecurity, as well as an element of peace for the country. To illustrate this point, the clashes between the southern tribes in Kufra and Sabha have resulted in the further breakdown of central authority, and a revival of a tribal political economy, to some degree (Abu Zayd, 2012). Additionally, tensions between the Berber and self-identified Arab tribes exacerbated efforts to centralise the administration and unify the country. The Berbers of Nafusa mountain tribes have historically been marginalised by the previous regimes, and have recently asserted their cultural rights, calling for a return to the federalisation of Libyan political system (Maddy-Weitzman, 2015). Obeidi and Obeidi (2013) concurs that tribal identification is a major structural instrument in Libyan society, and as a result, a key source of political and social and mobilisation. This may present itself as a real problem, and may be the reason that the study sample viewed tribalism as a major obstacle to the process of democratisation. As democratic mobilisation is founded on the idea of citizenship and a civil society, in light of ethnic tribalism, these mechanisms become seriously weakened due to tribal and regional allegiances.

Regionalism may also be considered another structural hurdle that hinders the process of democratisation. Representatives of different regions want to assert their own influence on the process of state-building. This was best illustrated during Libya's first elections, where the representatives of Cyrenaica demanded equal representation in the parliament, as the east. The distribution of 200 parliamentary seats have been allocated as 120 for the (south-) western provinces of Tripolitania and Fezzan, and 80 for Cyrenaica, which has been interpreted as a power grabbing policy by the political elites in the west (Kjaerum *et al.*, 2013, cited in Della Porta, Hidde Donker, Hall, Poljarevic & Ritter, 2018). Regional tensions further emerged with the construction of the majoritarian system of voting, after the first parliamentary elections. These debates between representatives from the regions of Tripolitania (with 67% of Libya's population), Fezzan (8%) and Cyrenaica (28%) resulted in a compromise. Besides the majoritarian distribution of parliamentary seats, an amendment to constitution was added, for a parallel system of proportional representation to be incorporated (Kjaerum *et al.*, 2013, cited in Della Porta, Hidde Donker, Hall, Poljarevic & Ritter, 2018).

The respondents' views reflected a lack of democratic culture in Libyan society, as well as tribal structures that still carry considerable influence in the minds and politics of the Libyan people. Many tribes expressed their dissatisfaction with the previous Gaddafi regime, as they felt marginalised, and denied their fair share of wealth and power (Sawani, 2012). These sentiments will have to be addressed by the current government/s, granting equal and fair opportunities to all Libyans, despite their tribal affiliations and loyalties.

Additionally, the marginalisation of some groups and regions, added to a weak central authority, prompted many Libyans to demand a return to a federal political system of government. A general lack of confidence in the current government to achieve democracy, was also expressed in the findings, with many Libyans presupposing that a democratic government was not the solution, because of the sluggish progression to demonstrate the benefits of an active democracy in Libya. Libya faces an array of challenges on an economic, political and social level, which may be traced to the previous regime, and consequently, the respondents had no confidence in the current leadership.

A lack of safety and security was a major consequence of the revolution, and a source of significant concern; therefore, a general lack of confidence in the government was evident, which may be attributed to its inability to deal with this threat, effectively. For this reason, many Libyans have taken up arms to defend themselves, and advised authorities to remove firearms and weapons from militia groups. Clashes have infiltrated familial and tribal levels, developing into armed confrontations; thereby, creating an internal security threat.

The challenges faced by the government/s are inter-linked with the political, economic and social implications of the Arab Spring in Libya, which the study sample consider barriers to the process of democratisation. Although the interim government/s have made attempts at political reform, through the establishment of multi-party elections, and free voting, they have neglected to meet the current economic challenges that Libyans were confronted with after the revolution. These political and economic challenges present barriers to the democratisation process, and have to be remedied, if the Libyan government/s hope/s to regain the confidence of its people.

7 CHAPTER SEVEN: TOWARDS A LIBYAN DEMOCRACY

7.1 Introduction

Every democratic transition has challenges and obstacles that should be overcome, to achieve its mission. Therefore, the parties that constitute the political landscape of Libyan politics have a daunting task ahead of them, in terms of easing the tensions of the political climate. Besides these indicators that hinder the process of democratisation in Libya, some necessary requirements are still lacking for a successful transition and transformation. After the revolutions of the Arab Spring, Libya was transformed from a one-party dictatorship to a multi-party system, from an enforced closure to an excessive opening, unchecked and unrestricted. The parties that came into power lacked vision, experience and maturity, in terms of the democratisation process, resulting in a country, steeped in chaos and political confusion. Based on the findings derived from this current study, it is submitted that the Arab Spring revolution was necessary to start the process of democracy in Libya. The barriers to the process of democracy are linked to the imbalance of the political and economic structures of the country, as well as the cultural-tribal base of the Libyan society.

In order to address these barriers, related to the cultural base of the Libyan society, the researcher argues in favour of the development of a hybrid democracy that takes into consideration the broader political, historical and cultural sensitivities of the Libyan people and the MENA region. The problem is that Libya may be in danger of falling into this very trap of merely replacing one dictator with another, and ambitions to achieve an electoral democracy may develop into an electoral authoritarianism. The Libyan government has a daunting task ahead, in terms of seeking an alternative, as well as unique model of democracy, in order to initiate a successful democratisation process. However, the concept of democracy has to be understood and accepted by a people, who wish to be ruled by a democratic system, or a system underpinned by democratic mechanisms. Democracy, in its true sense, is not limited to basic practices, such as, once-off free and fair elections, but is a complete system that ensures, and grants, rights to all human beings, and wherein all people, regardless of religion or ethnicity, are entitled to justice, fairness, equal opportunity and equality before the law.

Libya has real challenges, in terms of the tribal loyalties, which many have argued, act as barriers to the process of democracy. However, it is submitted, that the tribal nature of Libyan society cannot be removed, and should be incorporated into a new hybrid democracy. For many Libyans, loyalty belongs to the tribe foremost, and then to the state. In order to actively remedy the current democratic crisis of Libya, it may be necessary to, not only to explore how a democracy can be achieved through the use of democratic processes, but also how the rich tribal and religious bases of the Libyan society could be harnessed to achieve this aim. Therefore, the following questions should be considered by government/s and policy-makers to address current challenges.

- What kind of democracy does Libya need, if any?
- How will the new democracy consider the tribal base of the Libyan society?
- Will this new hybrid form of democracy be based on a majority rule, on minority rule, or on the proportional representation of different tribes?
- How will minorities, such as the Berbers, be incorporated into the political landscape, after years of oppression and marginalisation?
- Is the tribal nature of Libyan society the barring factor to the democratisation process?
- Should Libya and other MENA countries consider the development of a democratic-tribal state that is not predicated on the ideals of a democracy, but founded on the amalgamation of tribal concepts, and an Islamic interpretation of democracy?

The following discussion seeks to provide some guidelines to address these questions.

7.2 African democracy and tribalism

The ethos of the tribe is based on a sense of social equality and inclusion (Hermann & Seeberg, 2013). This implies that ties within a tribe, and the matriarchal bond that holds the members together, will not break in the face of oppression or marginalisation. Instead, it draws its strength from oppression and statelessness, and, as a result, becomes a unified force. This has been demonstrated in the era of colonisation, to the Idrīs era and finally the Gaddafi regime (Varvelli, 2013). Tribalism, therefore, is growing stronger in Libya, and more so, in the absence of a formal state, which has witnessed the emergence of old affiliations and allegiances (Wehrey, 2013). These may present problems, or solutions, in addition to the current political challenges, already being faced by Libya. Cherstich (2014: p 12) writes, “Libya, therefore, is

not failing to become a nation because of tribalism. Rather tribalism is growing stronger because in post-Gaddafi Libya, the state is traumatically absent”.

In order to address these challenges, it is important to note that the notion of democracy is well-known in Africa, and not the product of the western civilisation solely, as it is perceived to be. Perhaps, it is noteworthy to mention the views of scholars like Achebe, Chege and Ake, in support of the view that Libya is not in need of a western democracy, but a uniquely African one, which considers its tribal and religious base. In this regard, Achebe (1990: p. 4) asserts that the Africanism and tribalism of Africa has always been viewed by the world as being devoid of democratic practices, before exposure to the western world. This notion that Africa and its people were in need western political systems, claimed that “bad leadership and deep-seated ethnic rivalries and economic inequalities” were the challenges, to achieve a democracy (Chege, 1996: p. 350). Achebe highlights that, although the western well-wishers provided a range of solutions, regarding how Africans should govern their administrative systems, it is apparent that the advice rested on two misconceptions. The first is premised on the notion that Africans are not familiar with the concept of democracy, and secondly, democracy is a concept that can *be given* to those not familiar with it. However, for scholars like Ake (1996: p. 69), “democratisation is not something that one people does for another. People must do it for themselves or it does not happen”.

Therefore, democracy has to be *grown* in Africa, and in this current study, Libya. Isakhan and Stockwell (2011) provide some useful discourse, by noting that democratic practices were alive on the African continent, long before the arrival of Europeans. While it is true that Africa had its fair share of civil wars, as well as several ethnic groups that seemed lawless, these problems are, in no way, uniquely African, and a large number of African ethnic groups observed democratic practices that governed their daily lives, before the arrival of the colonialists. For example, Teffo (2012) states that, contrary to popular belief, Africans were not ruled against their will in the past, and followed traditional systems that ensured their people a voice and representation in their governance.

Therefore, Africa, and specifically Libya, is not in need of western democracy, but a uniquely Libyan one, that considers traditional principles and customary law (*Urf*), Islamic Law (*Shari'ah*), and wider principles of democracy, such as public participation, free and fair representation, as well as freedom of expression. The combination of these factors should be

considered in the development of a new hybrid form of democracy, and will depend on the degree of democratisation, the country can reach. This process will not only be limited to the implementation of typical democratic procedures, such as, competitive elections and separation of powers, but also inclusive of wider concepts, namely, principles that ensure the guarantee of civil liberties and shared values. In addition to these internal factors for the development of a democracy, the role of tribes and religion, as well as their effects on the relationship that exists between state and society, should be examined as part of the process.

According to Deng and Wu (2004: p. 40), “It is not be difficult for an unprejudiced mind to see signs of democracy in traditional African political life”. Similarly, Ake (1996) also supports the view that African democracies existed well before their European counterparts, and these democracies were established on democratic values. Even though these tribal societies were patrimonial, and their consciousness, communal, there was strong emphasis on participation and accountability, and much stricter standards than their western counterparts. Therefore, democratic principles are not foreign to the tribal societies of Africa.

In light of this view, examples of some decentralised and centralised entities in Africa could be scrutinised. Decentralised entities, such as the Chiga, Iteso, Karamojong and Basoga also have democratic practices, as do the hierarchically arranged, centralised entities, such as the Ankole, Batoro, Buganda and Banyoro people (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011). Even though they shared different administrative systems, a strong socio-political administrative feature prevailed, which enabled them to govern themselves democratically.

The notion of the ‘tribe’ is controversial across the African continent, both in its historical conceptualisation and its practice. Ntsebeza (2005) questions the relevance of ‘Tribal Authorities’ within a modern democratic state. His South African case study of the Xhalanga community’s vehement opposition to Tribal Authorities captures the sentiments regarding these colonial structures, where the primary role of the traditional authorities and headmen was the “policing (of) Africans in the rural areas of the Bantustans” (Ntsebeza, 2005, p.173). Although this case study focuses on one specific South African rural community’s “long history of rejection of chieftainship” (2005, p.173), Ntsebeza maintains that Tribal Authorities are an anachronism within modern-day democracies on the African continent.

Renowned African scholar and historian Mafeje (1971, p. 261) contemplates if ‘tribalism’ still mattered. In his critique of the ideology of tribalism, he asserts that, firstly, the ideology of tribalism “over-simplifies, mystifies and obscures the real nature of economic and power relations between Africans themselves and between Africa and the capitalist world”. Secondly, it draws suspect distinctions between the African continent and the rest of the world. Thirdly, it is out of place and in contradiction of the current times, which makes cross-cultural analysis nearly impossible. Mafeje therefore concludes that ‘tribalism’ does not have the same significance as other universal generalisable concepts with high explanatory power, which allows for social scientists to analyse human societies globally.

The question at this juncture is; how does this apply to Libya?

Although, the notion of the tribe is a controversial one, it should be noted that the Libyan tribal dynamics share similarities with their African counterparts such as the Buganda kingdom in Uganda. The tribal structures are similar, and more than often, tribal tendencies and loyalties of the native people were used by colonialist powers. These methods included direct and indirect rule, the latter referring to the system of integrating pre-established native elites into the colonial administration system according to Mamdani (1996). Whereas the former, direct rule, vested absolute authority with the colonial powers assigning menial tasks to local tribal chiefs. In the Libyan case, indirect rule was employed by the colonialists who utilised the tribal loyalties of the Libyan people to further their colonial plans.


Tribes are arranged hierarchically, and Libyan tribes are no different. This may be best demonstrated by observing the democratic practices, values and norms of the Buganda people’s clan. The Buganda people had judicial systems that enabled them to practice a form of democracy, based on consensual decision-making, and broad participation in governance at all levels, mostly through representation (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011). The Buganda clan system had intricate administrative organisations that were responsible for various activities, specifically aligned to protect the cultural values and traditions of the clan (Karlström, 1996). Overall, each member of the clan was treated as an equal entity, and had a voice in their governance. This is, perhaps, the most striking democratic principle practiced: that each member had an equal right to vote in their governance (Green, 2010).

It is submitted that Libyan tribes share similar traits with the Buganda clan, in that governance of the clan adopted the bottom-up approach. This implies that decisions were consensual, and

made at each level. In the Bunganda clan, if the individual felt dissatisfied with the decision, resolution or suggestion that was reached at a particular level, he was granted an equal and fair opportunity to take the case to the higher level. In this manner, the Buganda governed themselves democratically (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011) (Karlström, 1996).

However, tribalism is so deeply-seated in the minds of the Libyan people that it cannot, and (the researcher argues) should not be removed, as it forms the basis of their unique Arab identity. Instead of being viewed as a barrier to the process of achieving a democracy, it should be seen as a means to enhance it. The very nature of democracy advocates that people have a right to their identity. Besides, being a tribal society, Libyans identify with being adherents of the Islamic faith first; therefore, it is the researcher's view that both the natures of Islam and the tribal base of the Libyan society, should not be seen as barriers to the process of democracy necessarily, as they share underlying principles with democracy.

To further understand this, it is important to reflect on how democracy was perceived and defined, and how its Eurocentric basis has for decades been regarded as the only form of democracy. The principles of equality, public participation, protection of human rights and the freedom of expression are universal, and can be found in almost any society, as well as most religions. These ideals are not foreign to humanity and are found in Islam, as well as many cultures, such as African tribes.



Libyans have been subjugated by tyranny for so many years that the idea of a democracy seems strange and odd. At best, Libyans should be educated in a democratic culture, so that they will be able to receive democracy. Therefore, Libya has to be groomed for democracy, and Libyans should view themselves as citizens with "equal rights, enshrined in constitution and law that they should demand, attain and protect and not merely be clients of a patron authoritarian ruler." Under the totalitarian rule of Sanūsī and Gaddafi, Libyans had, and still have, no experience, or knowledge of the workings of a democracy. This is evident in the current deficit of democratic culture, which may be what impedes Libya from transitioning into a successful democratic state.

7.3 Islam and democracy

Islam provided the foundations for good governance and statesmanship over 1 400 years ago, and many ancient cultures, such as the Assyrians and the great empires of the Middle East and

India, in fact, had practiced forms of democracy and flourished, while Europe remained in the dark ages. Therefore, it is submitted that a new form of democracy, a hybrid form of democracy, may be the solution to Libya's current democratic crisis. Democracies, as are seen in the world presently, are not truly democratic, but are rather hybrid forms of democracy, which sometimes emerge as an electoral democracy, or an electoral authoritarianism. An electoral democracy and an electoral authoritarianism, although both are based on the principles of elections, tend to revolve, crucially, on the freedom, fairness, inclusiveness and meaningfulness of elections (Diamond, 1999). The degree of freedom, fairness, inclusiveness and meaningfulness of elections have to be closely monitored, if Libya is to transition, successfully, from an authoritarian state to a newly democratic one.

In the case of Libya, it is pertinent to address the issue of fair representation for all the different tribes of Libya, ensuring that minorities, such as the Berbers, are also fairly represented. Kymlicka (2007) argues that modern society is multicultural and that their unique rights and cultural sensitivities have to be considered in a truly inclusive democratic system. Although these rights conform to what is generally accepted as human rights, such as the right to freedom and social justice, the aspirations of such minorities remain unique. Similarly, Libya has some minority groups whose cultural aspirations have been muted by previous regimes, and have yet to be raised to interim governments and/or appropriate authorities. The researcher shares the sentiments of Kymlicka (2007) in this respect, and opines that these minority groups have been neglected in contemporary liberal theory. Furthermore, Tully (1995) questions whether a modern constitution can recognise and accommodate cultural diversity. He suggests that instead of arguing for or against cultural diversity, one should rather consider "the critical attitude or *spirit* in which justice can be rendered to the demands for cultural recognition" (Tully, 1995, p.1). This raises the question of whether Libya could learn from global best practices in how the various manifestations of the repression of group rights were handled. See more detailed global examples in 7.3.1 below.

Regarding elections, one of the founding principles of a democracy, are *free*, when the candidates and supporters of the political parties have a substantial degree of freedom to, firstly, campaign and, secondly, solicit votes (Diamond, 1999). Freedom, in this sense, entails considerable freedom of speech, assembly, movement and association in political life, as well as in civil society, as a whole (Diamond, 1999). However, when the basic standard of what constitutes a free and fair election cannot be met, an electoral authoritarianism ensues, and it is

argued that Libya may be at risk of falling into this type of regime. Electoral authoritarianism emerges when there is an “uneven playing field between the government and the opposition.” Though elaborate criteria have been developed for the assurance of free and fair elections, countries, such as Libya, should make use of neutral authorities to administer the elections. These authorities should be sufficiently competent to take precautions and measures against electoral fraud (Diamond & Plattner, 1996).

It is further submitted that a hybrid democracy would have to be developed, by using the already existing principles of Islam, as well as the tribal systems, already practiced by the Libyan people. In this regard, Islamic principles do not only provide guidelines for human conduct, but also assert social and political order, founded on social justice, equality and the rule of law, to name a few. These principles are founded and drawn from the text of the Holy Quran, as well as the prophetic model (*Sunnah*), and comprise consultation (*Shura*), consensus (*Ijma*), electoral endorsement (*Bay'ah*), and independent reasoning (*Ijtihad*) (Kamali, 2002). In addition, the social and political order, founded by Islam, includes underlying principles of democracy, such as equality, freedom of expression and political participation. All of these principles are highly compatible with the notions of democracy and tribalism. In the following sections, the main principles of democracy in Islam are discussed.

7.3.1 Equality

One of the fundamental principles of democracy, found in the Islamic doctrine, is that of equality. According to Kamali (2002) equality has historically manifested itself in four main dimensions. These are: (a) legal equality that grants all human beings basic rights and protections – the legislation against the women in Saudi Arabia who are legally prohibited from engaging in certain social and economic activities, serve to illustrate this point. (b) Judicial equality that grants all humans access to courts for fair hearings and treatment - the persecution of the Native American Indians over ancestral land conflicts is an example of this violation. (c) Equality, in terms of opportunity - the former racist oppression in South Africa during the apartheid period, as well as casteism in India illustrate the gross violations of the human rights to fairness and access to social, economic and political opportunities in these countries. (d) Equality, in terms of religious rights and obligations - the repression of the religious rights of the Rohingya in Myanmar and the Uighurs in China are prime examples of the human rights violations of these religious minority groups. These dimensions of equality are deeply ingrained

in Islamic practices, and do not consider class, race or gender (Kamali, 2002). Additionally, the Islamic constitution guarantees civil and religious rights to all people, including minority communities, as well as equal rights to freely participate in the daily affairs of the state. The first Islamic state of Medina provided the basis for an important historical precedent of two theoretical premises that have influenced contemporary political theory (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2012). These are the theories of a social contract, and a constitution. More importantly, the values of consent and cooperation for governance were established.

7.3.2 Freedom of expression

Freedom of expression is one of the underlying principles of a democracy, and one of the most basic rights afforded to human beings in Islam. Freedom of expression, according to Kamali (2002: p. 163), refers to the “the absence of restraints upon the ability of individuals or groups to communicate their ideas to others, subject to the understanding that they do not in turn coerce others into paying attention or that they do not invade other rights essential to the dignity of the individual”. In Islam, the rights of humans, such as right to life and property, as well as the preservation of human dignity, precede the state. This contrasts with the western context that witnesses an on-going struggle between the power of the state, and individual rights and liberties. However, the relationship between the state and individual rights is fundamentally different in Islam, as rights precede state formation.

7.3.3 Consultation (Shura)

Shura is potentially a central democratic principle in Islam, and is generally found in most tribal societies. Consultation is the hallmark of good governance, as well as the hallmark in matters pertaining to all aspects of life: civil, military, religious and administrative.

7.3.4 Popular political participation

At the heart of elections, is the practical means for the people to assert their sovereignty; this does not fulfil the requirements of modern democracies. Elections must be free, fair, and sufficiently recurrent, if the people’s will is to be implemented and executed. Therefore, the central point is that the process of electing a leader, according to the Islamic perspective, relied upon the collective participation of the people, who were treated as equal citizens of the state. A system of electoral endorsement, known as *bay’ah*, ensured that members of the community were given the opportunity to convey their acceptance of a particular leader, through an oath of allegiance (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2012). This process assured that legitimacy was deliberated on a leader, and is completely in sync with popular sovereignty, which regards people as the ultimate authority, and the source of the authority of government -- a fundamental principle of

democracy. Therefore, consent of the governed will also be attained, and is, yet again, compatible with democracy, which maintains that the just powers of government are based upon the consent of the governed.

Sandel (1982) views that liberal society is governed by the principles of justice, in order to provide citizens with a degree of freedom to govern their lives as they please. However, Sandel (1982) asserts that the achievement of such liberal society is limited by the concept of liberalism, and a deeper understanding of community is necessary for its achievement. In line with Sandel's views, the Islamic system of rule is governed by a deep sense of individual as well as social accountability and responsibility. In Islam, freedom is granted to all individuals but is linked to social responsibility. In this manner, social justice and democracy is achieved.

The discussion above highlights that Islam has inherent foundational principles, compatible with *democracy*. However, in practice there are global examples illustrating the blatant and deliberate distortion, perversion and violation of these foundational principles of Islam. At the political level, Kuwait's support of the US-led invasion of Iraq, and the Saudi Arabian justification of the US war mongering against Iran illustrate the political opportunism that supersede the foundational principles of Islam. At the level of global terrorism, the violent and deadly practices of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS and Boko Haram demonstrate the vulgar and perverted interpretation of Islamic principles for devious and destructive motives (Mamdani, 2004).

Therefore, it could be argued that while Islam provides theories and principles consistent with democracy, the interpretation and potential distortion of these foundational principles resort with those who practice their chosen brand of Islam. This holds true for the situation in Libya, as well.

8 CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

It has been eight years since the revolts that led to the fall of Gaddafi's regime (2011) yet political instability is rapidly escalating in Libya. Despite international efforts to encourage a process of reconciliation among the warring groups, fragmentation on a national level in the country continues. The Libyan Political Agreement (also known as the *Skhirat agreement*, signed on 17 December 2015) and the establishment of the Government of National Accord (GNA) were regarded as positive advances in this critical phase of Libya's political atmosphere. Instead, they have lacked in easing the centrifugal pressures, and upturned the dynamic of the on-going conflict. This has been further exacerbated by rivalries between the various power centres in the country, from Haftar's LNA, to al-Sarraj's GNA, and the Misrata-based political brokers. The explosion of weapons in Libya and the diverse militias have, to some extent, refuted the presence of politically legitimate institutions that would be able to run the country efficiently. Libya is at risk of being overrun by groups, such as ISIS, if they remain disunited and fragmented, and is still in a very unstable transitional stage.

Tripolitania would have to be re-incorporated into the greater part of Libya, and a new political praxis for Libya would have to be formed. The development of equitable, legitimate and reformative institutions that would monitor the current production of weapons in the hands of civilian and militant hands, would have to be established. Additionally, supervisory mechanisms should be put in place, to prevent the government from falling prey to the same avarice mechanisms, employed by the previous regime, to maintain power, that is, the use of the oil revenues for political manipulation and convenience. These changes seem almost foreign in a country where political dialogue has been muted practically for decades.

Western powers have become increasingly concerned that, if infighting between the different political factions continue, and the GNA is not recognised soon by the GNC, further turmoil would evolve, allowing the Islamic State and other Islamist groups to gain additional territory in the country. The internationally backed Libyan Political Agreement has failed dismally to subdue the turbulence and turmoil in the region.

Libya is at risk of descending into a *free-fall*, if the peace process is not initiated and truly applied. The idea of a caretaker government that would accommodate two parliaments and their

allies, does not appear to be a plausible solution to the on-going crisis. Libya and Libyans are in desperate need of political order, and the reintegration of militias into the political arena cannot be implemented, without major international and international repercussions for the Libyan people.

Therefore, it appears that the MENA region might have to prepare itself for a new innovative democracy that, although it is compatible and recognisable to the west as a democracy, is simultaneously merged with ideas of Islam, while maintaining its unique cultural Arab and Islamic identity. The western interpretation of a democracy cannot be exclusively applied to Arab society that is not governed by the same rules and ideals. Similarly, contesting parties for the rule of countries such as Libya and Tunisia, should lend themselves to these liberalising tendencies, in order to bring about the process of democratisation.

However, in as much as these societies wish to achieve an *Islamicised* form of democracy, they still lack the institutional mechanisms to achieve these goals. Cultural and ideological differences present unnecessary difficulties in reaching agreement on goals, as well as the means of achieving them, placing further strain on an already delicate situation. Further ethnic and sectarian divisions complicate the development of democratisation processes, institutions and practices.

Presently, seven years after the eruption of the Arab Spring in the MENA region and the fall of old regimes, these very forces that fought the regimes are competing with secular opponents for the control of power, to determine the future of their society. Despite the various divisions and disputes among these groups and forces, the demands and desires of all remain, fundamentally, similar. These are, the achievement of fair political representation, the provision and protection of basic human rights, the preservation of human dignity, and the development of an equitable socio-economic structure.

Currently, the Libyan government is still strongly backed by tribal loyalties that wield influence in some regions, and many confrontations between opposing groups have been of a tribal nature. This sense of deep loyalty to the tribe, before anything else, makes democracy, or rather, a western democracy, an un-practicable solution for the formation of the democratic Libyan state. Libya may need a shift from a tribally-loyal culture, to a nationalistic culture, where

loyalty is to the state and its institutions, before the tribe. Libya needs to start laying the foundations and erecting the pillars for the structures of a state, recognise and remedy the impacts and remnants of its colonialist past, develop a democratic culture, and address the many challenges on the road to democratisation, in order to prevent a new era of tyranny and dictatorship. The inclusion of tribal figures is integral to social and political reform, which implies including tribal figures into the political landscape, who will work with the state, to establish the rule of law and institutions. In addition, Libya may need intellectuals, who are experts in the field of democratic transformation.

It appears highly unlikely that the Arab Spring would yield stable, fair, and democratic societies any time soon, and the possibility of a need for order by the masses, may lead to the arrival of innovative authoritarian systems of government, of either secular, or Islamist variety. This, invariably, would lead to a perpetual cycle of dictatorship, and consequently another rebellion in the Arab World.

8.1 Recommendations for policy-makers

The researcher presents these recommendations, drawn from the lessons learnt, during the study, as well as the literature reviewed, concerning the causes and implications of the Arab Spring, for consideration by policy-makers in the political, economic and social landscapes in Libya. The collapse of any authoritarian regime will often introduce insecure periods of civil violence, compromised security, and civil war, which could obstruct a relatively easy transition from a dictatorship to democracy. This was certainly evident in Libya, which seven years after the 17th February 2011 revolution, finds itself quite far from the initial stages of the democratisation process, and faces both short- and long-term challenges. Even though most of these challenges are shared by other states in the MENA region, there are specific factors exclusive to Libya, namely, the political, economic and social challenges that may also act as barriers to the democratisation process. Below are some recommendations and conclusions derived from this current study.

8.1.1 Recommendations for political reform

Presently, Libya is essentially a country deprived of state institutions, and riddled with civil war by opposing parties, fighting for power and wealth. Therefore, it is imperative for the policy-makers in Libya to address the challenges that currently hinder the

democratisation process. This would require a complete reform of the current political state of Libya. The following recommendations are offered:

- The government should establish genuine and operative democratic systems, and create more participatory and representative political systems, as well as independent judiciaries.
- Political parties in Libya must be given the necessary resources and time, to organise and develop political platforms, so that the Libyan public could become familiarised with the various issues affecting economic development, as well as the future security of the country.
- Elections should be halted until political platforms have been developed properly, in order to prevent isolated tribal factions, and Islamists, for example, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), from garnering loyalty in the undeveloped Libyan political landscape.
- The most pertinent and urgent priority is to stop the violence and stabilise the country. Establishing and maintaining stability is crucial for the initiation of the democratisation process, and should be addressed with clear strategic guidelines, for Libya to lay the foundations, and re-build the basic structures of a state.
- Democratic principles should be implemented within institutions.
- A constitution, founded on democratic principles that address the political, social, religious and cultural structure of Libyan society, should be drafted.
- The government should encourage and establish comprehensive reconciliation, as well as national reconciliation. This could be achieved through the political reconciliation of political parties, and the resolving of political crises between various political forces.
- The western state of Tripoli should merge with the eastern one in Benghazi. Therefore, it is incumbent that Haftar and al-Sarraj reach a compromise, in order to prevent national disunity.
- The rule of law should be established, and stricter regulatory mechanisms should be established, and enforced.

- Since Libya is a country in transition from dictatorship to democracy, and still facing challenges with enforcing the rule of law, it should improve its legal system, so that it could enforce the law, for example, the activation of the amnesty law for prisoners who have not committed crimes against the Libyan people.
- Political reform should be activated, and errors in the political process have to be acknowledged.
- Decentralisation should be considered as a method of advancing democracy and development from the bottom-up. This method allows for more participation, and transfers managerial authority, capacities, and skills to sub-national levels.
- Terrorism, violence and armed confrontations have to be eliminated. The government should urge militants to engage in political action, by offering legal and moral guarantees to those who exercise their political and intellectual right, away from the language of arms, or militia.
- Libya should adopt the liberalising tendencies of a democracy. The western interpretation of a democracy should not be exclusively applied to Arab society, because it is not governed by the same rules and ideals. A solution may lie in increasing the powers of parliament, and decreasing those of the ruling elites. Similarly, contesting parties in Libya, should adopt liberalising tendencies, to bring about the process of democratisation.
- The Government should practice accountability, transparency, good governance, and strong regulatory mechanisms.
- Libya suffers from a lack of formal institutions and political structures, where neither the power-holders, nor the decision-making processes are clearly defined, and accountability for their deeds enforced.
- Equality before law should be established and tribal domination in the monopoly of administrative and political decisions, should be removed, because the state is being administered through a combination of coercion, manipulation of informal power networks, and close tribal associations.
- Participatory principles in government should be adhered to in the allocation of resources since people should *have a say* in the running of their own affairs.

- Free and fair political participation in decision-making within a framework of democracy should be implemented. Government should promote more effective forms of participation, especially at the local level. Participation should serve to promote more genuine and effective forms of sustainable development.
- Administrative and financial corruption should be combated through the implementation of preventative measures, such as transparency and accountability. Government should take legal steps against those parties, allegedly committing acts of corruption, and restore, as well as protect the rights of persons who have suffered from acts of corruption.
- Nepotism and favouritism should be removed. The government should appoint officials on the basis of their expertise, knowledge, skills and experience, rather than tribal affiliations and political connections.
- The government should reduce the external interference of neighbouring countries through the impact on certain political components.
- In order to avoid and prevent further coups, it is imperative, therefore, for the African Union (AU) to disallow unconstitutional change of power, by encouraging a political atmosphere of inclusiveness among its members.
- Finally, formulae have to be devised that would allow for peaceful gun-free separation among opposition groups, as a solution to the escalating militia and rebel activities that have caused unprecedented human and material suffering and loss.

8.1.2 Recommendations for economic reform

Political and economic reforms are intertwined, and in an under-developed country, such as Libya, it is ever more so. In order for the democratisation process to succeed, it is essential to move forward, simultaneously, on both tracks. Political reforms in the MENA region are necessary, but comprehensive democratic reforms cannot be achieved without first prioritising economic development programmes. These are necessary to prevent the continued instability in Libya, which, potentially, could initiate the re-emergence of totalitarian regimes, under the guise of maintaining order and stability. The researcher offers the following recommendations to achieve economic reform:

- Current governments will have to take a closer look at economic inclusion, which, invariably, would require inclusive government arrangements, without threatening political leaders.
- The government's attention should be focused, equally, on the imbalances of Libya's economic structure, which is currently focused on security issues, in order to avoid yet another uprising of the Libyan people.
- Disparate interest groups and tribal powers should be united, in order to establish a cohesive government, and the drafting of a new constitution.
- Sustainable development should be adopted through democratic exchanges and consensus-building.
- The decentralised, or participatory method should be implemented in the development programmes. This organisational arrangement is a democratic approach, applied by local communities to assess their development challenges and opportunities. Subsequently, these communities could create and implement action plans that reflect their shared priorities, such as job creation, education, health, and the environment.
- A decentralised national system should be established. Local communities form part of the decentralised national system, whose leaders are elected, based on their ability to respond to the consensus decisions of their constituents. Libya urgently needs developmental projects, and should enrol the aid of NGOs that have better capabilities to enlist resources for developmental interventions.
- The Libyan economy should be expanded and steered away from absolute reliance on its limited natural resources. Subsequently, a diversified and expanded economy would harness effective institutional development, leading to the growth of the private sector. Consequently, this will give rise to the economic and political empowerment, necessary to insist on their right to freedom and democracy, which will enhance the success of democratisation.
- The government should facilitate wealth creation by the people from other productive and infinite sustainable sources.
- State patronage should be reduced, as it is overly-dependent on the primary source of people's income.

- MENA countries in the region should work to obtain higher rates of sustainable growth, and integrate more wholly into the global economy. This is a necessary obligation, in order to generate and sustain significant employment for a swiftly rising labour force, ultimately, reducing poverty and developing better living conditions for its people.
- New economic development programmes should be drafted that are founded on participatory planning approaches, in order to address the critical human needs in Libya.
- Economic benefits from privatisation should be equitably redistributed to meet social objectives, as well as ensure that basic services are improved for low income households.
- Decision-makers should focus on the upgrading of infrastructure and its maintenance, to ensure future production capacity, according to population growth.
- Good governance should be applied in all institutions, and spheres of government, in order to manage the country's economic resources effectively, to deliver services efficiently and equitably.
- In order to improve the quality of, and access to basic services, such as health care services, electricity and water, regional government should ensure high quality services, for taxpayers to receive value for their money.

8.1.3 Recommendations for social reform

One of the main impediments faced by Libya is the pervasive sense of tribalism, general lack of democratic culture shared by the local people and a weak civil society. Libya was under the rule of its tribes long before Europeans set foot on their lands. The complex tribal system in Libya is poignant, perhaps more so than in any other Arab state. Europeans came and divided Africa through the delineation of political borders, known today as the MENA region. As a result, borders and countries were made with little and no regard for the ethnic integrity of local tribes and their legitimacy to rule. Thereafter, the concept of an “Arab World” was introduced, branded by the installation of dictators, only to be removed at a later stage during the *Arab Spring*, and yet again in total disregard for the local and indigenous peoples.

Is the tribal nature of Libyan society the barring factor to the democratisation process? Or should Libya and other MENA countries consider the development of a democratic-tribal state that is not predicated upon the western ideals of a democracy but founded on the amalgamation of tribal concepts and an Islamic interpretation of democracy?

Libyans have been subjugated to tyranny for so many years that the idea of a democracy seems strange and odd. At best, Libyans should be educated in a democratic culture, so that they are able to receive democracy. Thus, Libya has to be groomed for democracy and Libyans should view them themselves as citizens with “equal rights, enshrined in constitution and law that they should demand, attain and protect and not merely be clients of a patron authoritarian ruler.” Under the totalitarian rule of Sanūsī and Gaddafi, Libyans had and still have no experience or knowledge of the workings of a democracy. This is evident in the current deficit of democratic culture, which may be what impedes Libya from transitioning into a successful democratic state.

Tribalism has a two-fold and juxtaposed effect on the process of democratisation. On the one hand, it may be harnessed to develop a new form of democracy and on the other hand, it might be one of the greatest obstacles faced by Libya in the process of democratisation. Tribalism and tribal loyalty is so deeply entrenched in Libyan society that it cannot be separated from its very foundation.

Today, the Libyan government is still strongly backed by tribal loyalties who wield influence in some regions, and many confrontations between opposing groups have been of a tribal nature. This sense of deep loyalty to the tribe before anything else makes democracy or at least a western democracy an un-practicable solution for the formation of the democratic Libyan state. The following recommendations are suggested to achieve social reform in Libya.

- Libya may be in need of a shift from a tribally-loyal culture to a nationalistic culture, where loyalty is to the state and its institutions, before the tribe. Libya needs to begin by laying the foundations and erecting the pillars for the structures of a state, recognise and remedy the impacts and remnants of its colonialist past, develop a democratic

culture and address the many challenges on the road to democratisation, in order to prevent a new era of tyranny and dictatorship.

- The inclusion of tribal figures is integral to social and political reform. These include the inclusion of tribal figures into the political landscape who will work with the state to establish the rule of law and institutions. In addition, Libya may be in need of intellectuals who are experts in the fields of democratic transformation.
- A complete social reform in Libya may be necessary which may comprise a re-education of democracy and what it entails.
- A complete shift in tribal loyalism will have to be instated and replaced with loyalty to the state and its institutions.
- Additional democratic principles such as equality of all citizens in the eyes of the law, independent of ethnic or tribal loyalties, is a necessary requisite for a successful transition to democracy.



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LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: (Ethics Clearance) Acceptance letter from the Higher Degrees Committee (UWC)



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR: RESEARCH
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION DIVISION

Private Bag X17, Bellville 7535
South Africa
T: +27 21 959 2988/2948
F: +27 21 959 3170
E: research-ethics@uwc.ac.za
www.uwc.ac.za

27 February 2017

Mr A Alahwal
Institute for Social Development
Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences

Ethics Reference Number: HS17/1/56

Project Title: Understanding the democratization process in the Middle East and North Africa after "Arab spring", the case of Libya

Approval Period: 21 February 2017 – 21 February 2018

I hereby certify that the Humanities and Social Science Research Ethics Committee of the University of the Western Cape approved the methodology and ethics of the above mentioned research project.

Any amendments, extension or other modifications to the protocol must be submitted to the Ethics Committee for approval. Please remember to submit a progress report in good time for annual renewal.

The Committee must be informed of any serious adverse event and/or termination of the study.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Josias".

*Ms Patricia Josias
Research Ethics Committee Officer
University of the Western Cape*

PROVISIONAL REC NUMBER - 130416-049

APPENDIX B: Acceptance letter from the Libyan Government (Arabic)

Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research		الحكومة الليبية المؤقتة وزارة التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي
تاريخ : 2017 / 02 / 16		الرقم الاشاري : .../831/2017ف...
السادة / جامعة ويسترن كيب الغربية بعد التحية ؛؛؛		
بالاشارة الي الطلب المقدم من السيد / عبدالسلام منصور المبروك الاحول جواز سفر رقم : H0J09L7H الطالب بكلية الاقتصاد والادارة بجامعة ويسترن كيب الغربية والذي يبدي فيه رغبته باجراء دراسة حقلية بخصوص : فهم التحول الديمقراطي في الشرق الاوسط وشمال افريقيا بعد الربيع العربي حالة ليبيا . عليه ، لا مانع لدينا من اجراء الدراسة وجمع البيانات من اعضاء هيئة التدريس والطلبة في الجامعات الاتية : 1 - جامعة طرابلس . 2 - جامعة بنغازي . 3 - جامعة سبها .		
تفضلوا بقبول فائق الاحترام والتقدير		
د.محمد شتيوي الصلابي مدير ادارة البعثات الدراسية		
		
Tripoli - Libya	www.mohe.gov.ly	طرابلس - ليبيا

APPENDIX C: Acceptance letter from the Libyan Government (English)

Maani
For Legal Translation



معاني
للترجمة القانونية

Translation from English 19/02/2017

Libyan Transitional Government
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research

Ref № 831/2017

Date: 16/02/2017

Messrs. University of the Western Cape

Dear Sirs, Madams,

Referring to the application submitted by Mr. ABDSALAM MANSOUR ALMABROOK ALAHWAL, holder of passport № H0J09L7H, Student at the Economic and Management Sciences at University of Western Cape, in which he showed his desire to carry out a field study on: Understanding the democratization process in the Middle East and North Africa after "Arab spring" the case of Libya.

Therefore, we inform you that we have no objection to conduct this study and collect the required data from lecturers and students at the following Universities:

1. Tripoli University
2. Benghazi University
3. Sebha University

Thanks with best Regards,

Signed and sealed by:

Dr. Mohamed Shtiwi El Solabi
Manager of Scholarships Administration
Tripoli - Libya



092 347 6201

092 347 6201

APPENDIX D: Certified Legal Translation of documents

WHAFIEKA MARTIN
SWORN TRANSLATOR OF THE HIGH COURT

E: wmartin.trans@gmail.com

C: +27 79 435 6781

Date: 10 November 2016

وفيقه مارتين
مترجمة محلفة قانونية

بريد الكتروني:

wmartin.trans@gmail.com

هاتف: +27 79 435 6781

To whom it may concern

The translated documents listed below are an accurate translation from the English language to the Arabic version listed below. All of these documents are attached hereto for review.

English Original Version	Arabic Translated Version	Date of Translation
1 Abdsalam English Consent Form	Abdsalam Arabic Consent Form	10/11/2016
2 Abdsalam English Questionnaire	Abdsalam Arabic Questionnaire	10/11/2016
3 Abdsalam English Interview	Abdsalam Arabic Interview	10/11/2016
4 Abdsalam English Information Sheet	Abdsalam Arabic Information Sheet	10/11/2016

I am a certified translator of the High Court of Cape town (Ref No: 13973/2015) proficient in both the Arabic and English languages. I hereby assure you that this translation is to the best of my knowledge, accurate and correct.

I also assure the reader that I am acting independently from any principal investigator and am not affiliated with any active study in any way, nor related to the applicant.

Should the reader have any queries please contact me using the information below

Sincerely,




Whafieka Martin

Sworn Translator of the High Court and EX OFFICIO

0794356781

email: wmartin.trans@gmail.com



RECEIVED

10 NOV 2016

APPENDIX E: Consent form (English)



**UNIVERSITY of the
WESTERN CAPE**

Private Bag X 17, Bellville 7535, South Africa
Tel: +27 21 959 3853, Fax: +27 21 959 3865
E-mail: akarriem@uwc.ac.za

CONSENT FORM

I....., have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, and received satisfactory answers to my questions.

I agree to take part in this research.

I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary. I have the right to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to explain myself.

I am aware that this interview might result in research which may be published, but my name may be/ not be used (circle appropriate).

I understand that if I don't want my name to be used that this will be ensured by the researcher.

I may also refuse to answer any questions that I don't want to answer.

Date:.....

Participant Name:.....

Participant Signature:.....

Interviewer name: Abdsalam Alahwal.....

Interviewer Signature:.....

If you have any questions concerning this research, feel free to call (Abdsalam Alahwal 3699520@myuwc.ac.za) or my supervisor, (Prof. Suren Pillay, Spillay@uwc.ac.za).

APPENDIX F: Consent form (Arabic)



UNIVERSITY of the
WESTERN CAPE

جامعة الويسترن كيب

صندوق بريد إكس 17- بيلفل 7535 - جنوب أفريقيا

هاتف : +27 21 959 3853 فاكس : +27 21 959 3865

البريد الإلكتروني : akarriem@uwc.ac.za

إستمارة موافقة

أنا.....، قد أتيت لي الفرصة لطرح أي أسئلة تتعلق بهذه

الدراسة، وحصلت على أجوبة شافية لأسئلتني.

أنا أوافق على المشاركة في هذا البحث.

وأنا أفهم أن مشاركتي في هذه الدراسة تطوعية. ولي الحق في الانسحاب من الدراسة في أي وقت، دون الحاجة إلى تبرير سبب الانسحاب.

وأنا أدرك أن هذه المقابلة قد تنشر في البحث.

وأنا أفهم أنه إذا كنت لا أريد استخدام اسمي فإن هذا سيتم ضماناً من قبل الباحث.

أنا قد أرفض أيضا الرد على أية أسئلة لا أريد أن الإجابة عليها.

UNIVERSITY of the
WESTERN CAPE

تاريخ:.....

اسم المشارك:.....

توقيع المشارك:.....

اسم الباحث: عبدالسلام الأحول

توقيع الباحث :

إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة حول هذا البحث، لا تتردد في الاتصال (عبدالسلام الأحول، 3699520@myuwc.ac.za) أو

مشرقي، (البروفيسور سورين بيلاي، Spillay@uwc.ac.za).

APPENDIX G: Information sheet (English)



**UNIVERSITY of the
WESTERN CAPE**

Private Bag X 17, Bellville 7535, South Africa
Tel: +27 21 959 3853, Fax: +27 21 959 3865
E-mail: akarriem@uwc.ac.za

INFORMATION SHEET

Project Title: Understanding the democratization processes in the Middle East and North Africa after “Arab spring” the case of Libya

What is this study about?

This is a research study being conducted by Abdsalam Alahwal a PhD student at the Institute of Social Development of the University of the Western Cape. I am conducting a research in which I kindly ask you to participate to understand the democratization process in the Middle East and North Africa after “Arab spring” with the case of Libya.

What will I be asked to do if I agree to participate?

If you agree to participate then you will be asked to contribute towards this research by answering some questions which will provide your opinions and information. The interview will be between you and me. Furthermore, the interviews will be held in the place of your choosing and they will be for less than an hour.

Would my participation in this study be kept confidential?

Your personal information will be kept confidential. To help protect your confidentiality, the information you provide will be totally private; no names will be used so there is no way that you can be identified as a participant in this study. In addition the information you provide will safely stored in my locked desk and will only be used for the purpose of this research. I will only interview you if you allow me to. For this reason, if you so choose to participate in this interview you and I will be required to sign a consent form that binds me to adhere to what we agree to, which include upholding your privacy and keeping your information and opinions anonymous.

What are the risks of this research?

Participating in this research does not pose any risk to you before and after the research. You will not be deceived in any way.

What are the benefits of this research?

While no direct personal benefit is anticipated, it is hoped that this research's findings will offer recommendations and solutions for the initiation of a democratization process, thereby understanding and stimulating the conditions for democratic reform. This research will offer valuable insight and build on the current literature and contribute to the development of knowledge peculiar to the topic.

Do I have to be in this research and may I stop participating at any time?

You do not have to be in this research. You are kindly asked to participate voluntarily. If you do choose to participate, you are to remember that you can stop at any time and you will not have to provide reasons for your decision.

Is any assistance available if I am negatively affected by participating in this study?

This study poses no danger to you.

What if I have questions?

If you have questions feel free to contact **Abdsalam Alahwal**, who is conducting the research. His email is 3699520@myuwc.ac.za

If you have any questions about the research study itself, please contact my supervisor Prof. Suren Pillay at the Center for Humanities Research, University of the Western Cape, email Spillay@uwc.ac.za

Should you have any questions regarding this study and your rights as a research participant or if you wish to report any problems you have experienced related to the study, please contact: Dr. Abdokarriem email akarriem@uwc.ac.za or +27219593865

Head of Department: Institute for Social Development

University of the Western Cape

Private Bag X17

Bellville 7535

APPENDIX H: Information sheet (Arabic)



UNIVERSITY of the
WESTERN CAPE

جامعة الويسترن كيب

صندوق بريد إكس 17- بيلفل 7535 - جنوب أفريقيا

هاتف : +27 21 959 3853 , فاكس : +27 21 959 3865

البريد الإلكتروني : akarriem@uwc.ac.za

ورقة المعلومات

عنوان البحث: فهم عملية التحول الديمقراطي في الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا بعد "الربيع العربي" حالة ليبيا.

حول ماذا هذه الدراسة؟

هذه الدراسة البحثية يجريها الطالب عبدالسلام الاحول، طالب دكتوراه في كلية الاقتصاد (التنمية الاجتماعية) في جامعة الكيب الغربية، حيث ندعوكم للمشاركة في بحث الدراسة لفهم عملية التحول الديمقراطي في الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا بعد "الربيع العربي" حالة ليبيا.

ما الذي يمكن أن يطلب مني للقيام به إذا وافقت على المشاركة؟

إذا كنت توافق على المشاركة سوف يطلب منك أن تساهم في هذه الدراسة من خلال الإجابة على بعض الأسئلة التي ستوفر الآراء والمعلومات الخاصة بك، و المقابلة سوف تكون بيني وبينك، وعلاوة على ذلك، سيتم عقد المقابلة في مكان من اختيارك، و ستكون حوالي ساعة.

هل ستبقي مشاركتي في الدراسة سرية؟

سيتم الاحتفاظ بالمعلومات الشخصية الخاصة بك بكل سرية وسيتم عدم استخدام أي أسماء حتى لا يكون هناك أي طريقة يمكن لها تعيين هوية أحد المشاركين في هذه الدراسة. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك سوف يتم تخزين المعلومات التي تقدمها بأمان في مكتب مقفل لي وسوف تستخدم فقط لأغراض هذا البحث. سيتم التعامل مع المعلومات بعدم الكشف عن الهوية وللسرية لن يظهر اسمك على الاستبيان و لن يتم مقارنة المعلومات التي تم الحصول عليها في الاستبيان الخاص بك مع المعلومات التي تم جمعها في الاستبيانات الأخرى وبالتالي لن يكون هناك أي وسيلة لربطكم في الاستبيان. وسوف تكون هناك حاجة للتوقيع على استمارة الموافقة التي تشمل دعم خصوصيتك وحفظ ارائك.

ما هي مخاطر هذا البحث؟

المشاركة في هذا البحث لا تشكل أي خطر لك قبل وبعد البحث.



UNIVERSITY of the
WESTERN CAPE

جامعة الويسترن كيب

صندوق بريد إكس 17- بيلفل 7535 - جنوب أفريقيا
هاتف : +27 21 959 3853 , فاكس : +27 21 959 3865
البريد الإلكتروني : akarriem@uwc.ac.za

ما هي فوائد هذا البحث؟

ليس هناك توقع لأي منفعة شخصية مباشرة، نأمل أن نتأخر هذا البحث سوف تقدم التوصيات والحلول لبدء عملية التحول الديمقراطي، وبالتالي فإن فهم وتحفيز الظروف تكون من أجل الإصلاح الديمقراطي. لذا هذا البحث سوف يقدم معلومات قيمة والتي سوف تساهم في تطوير المعرفة السياسية حول ليبيا.

هل يجب أن أكون في هذا البحث ويمكن أن أتوقف عن المشاركة في أي وقت؟

تعتبر مشاركتك في هذا البحث طوعي تماماً إذا قررت المشاركة وإذا قررت عدم المشاركة في هذه البحث بإمكانك وقف المشاركة في أي وقت.

هل هناك وجود مساعدة متوفرة إذا أنا تأخرت سلباً من خلال المشاركة في هذه الدراسة؟
هذه الدراسة لا تشكل أي خطر عليك.

ماذا لو كان لديك أسئلة؟

إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة حول بحث الدراسة يرجى الاتصال بي عبدالسلام الاحول الذي يجري هذا البحث. البريد الإلكتروني:

3699520@myuwc.ac.za

إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة حول الدراسة البحثية نفسها، يرجى الاتصال بمشرفي البروفيسور سورين بيلاي في مركز البحوث و العلوم الإنسانية، جامعة الكاب الغربية، البريد الإلكتروني Spillay@uwc.ac.za.

إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة بخصوص هذه الدراسة وحقوقك كمشارك في البحث أو إذا كنت ترغب في الإبلاغ عن أي مشاكل لديك عانيت منها خلال التجربة ذات الصلة لهذه الدراسة يرجى الاتصال ب :

الدكتور عبدالكريم عبدالرزاق- رئيس قسم التنمية الاجتماعية في كلية الاقتصاد

الهاتف: +27219593865

عنوان البريد الإلكتروني: akarriem@uwc.ac.za

وقد تم الموافقة على هذا البحث من قبل المجلس الأعلى للجنة ولجنة الأخلاق للبحوث في جامعة كيب الغربية.

APPENDIX I: In-depth interview guide (English)



UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE

Private Bag X 17, Bellville 7535, South Africa

Tel: +27 21 959 3853, Fax: +27 21 959 3865

E-mail: akarriem@uwc.ac.za

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE

Good day. My name is Abdsalam Alahwal and I am a Libyan national. I am PhD student at the University of the Western Cape, in Cape Town, South Africa. I do not represent the government or any political party. I am studying the views of lecturers at three universities in Libya concerning the impact of the Arab Spring and the processes of democratisation in Libya. The universities are; The University of Tripoli, The University of Sabha and The University of Benghazi.

Please be assured that your responses will remain confidential. The responses will be collected by the researcher in order to gain an overall perspective of the issue. I would also like to assure you that it will be virtually impossible to assign a particular answer to any particular respondent, so please feel free to share your thoughts with me. This interview will last approximately 60 minutes. Your participation is offered voluntarily and will be highly appreciated. If you do not wish to participate, please know that you are free to do so.

Do you wish to proceed?

1. What is your occupation?
2. Did you participate in the uprisings in your city: If [YES] Why? If [NO] [Why not]
3. What are your reasons for supporting/not supporting the revolution?
4. What do you think is the main reason people participated in the revolution for?
5. How do you feel about the removal of the old regime?
6. Describe the political state of your city before and after the revolution?
7. Describe the social and economic state of your city before and after the revolution?
8. Did you feel satisfied/dissatisfied with the country before and after the revolution?
9. Why do you think the Arab Spring erupted in your country?
10. Do you think the Arab Spring was necessary/unnecessary? Explain.

11. What were the outcomes of the revolution?
12. How has the current government addressed the challenges after the revolution?
13. What does democracy mean to you?
14. Do you think the development of a democracy is possible in Libya? If [YES] Why?
If [NO] [Why not]
15. What do you think is the relationship between the revolution and democracy?
16. Is revolution necessary to achieve democracy?
17. What are the challenges Libya will encounter in order to achieve democracy?
18. What are some of the difficulties your city is faced with after the revolution?
19. How has the revolution impacted on the economic state of your city?
20. How has the revolution impacted on the political state of your city?
21. How do you think the revolution has impacted on the process of democratisation?
22. How do you think people feel about the revolution?
23. What do you understand by social dissatisfaction?
24. How do you think the current government is able to achieve social satisfaction?
25. How do you feel about the use of media during the revolution?



APPENDIX J: In-depth interview guide (Arabic)



جامعة الويسترن كيب

صندوق بريد إكس 17- بيلفل 7535 - جنوب أفريقيا

هاتف : +27 21 959 3853 , فاكس : +27 21 959 3865

البريد الإلكتروني : akarriem@uwc.ac.za

مقابلة

طاب يومك. اسمي عبدالسلام الاحول ليبي الجنسية. وأنا طالب دكتوراة في جامعة الكيب الغربية، في كيب تاون، جنوب أفريقيا. أنا لا أمثل الحكومة أو أي حزب سياسي. أنا أدرس آراء أعضاء هيئة التدريس والطلاب في ثلاث جامعات ليبية بشأن تأثير الربيع العربي على عملية التحول الديمقراطي في ليبيا. الجامعات هي؛ جامعة طرابلس، جامعة سبها، وجامعة بنغازي.

يرجى التأكد من أن ردودكم ستبقى سرية. سيتم جمع أرائكم من قبل الباحث من أجل تكوين فكرة شاملة لهذه القضية. كما أود أن أؤكد لكم أنه سيكون عدم اجباركم علي تعيين إجابة معينة، لذلك لا تتردد في مشاركة أفكارك معي. وهذه المقابلة تدوم حوالي 60 دقيقة. يتم تقديم مشاركتكم طوعاً. إذا كنت لا ترغب في المشاركة فلك الحرية في ذلك.

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هل ترغب في المتابعة؟

1. ما هي وظيفتك؟

2. هل شاركت في الانتفاضات في مدينتك: إذا [نعم] لماذا؟ إذا [لا] [لماذا لا]

3. ما هي الأسباب التي دفعتك لدعم / عدم دعم الثورة؟

4. ما هو السبب الرئيسي لمشارك الناس في الثورة؟

5. كيف تشعر حيال إزالة النظام القديم؟

6. صف الحالة السياسية لمدينتك قبل وبعد الثورة؟

7. صف حالة الاجتماعية والاقتصادية للمدينة قبل وبعد الثورة؟

8. هل تشعر بالرضي أو عدم الرضي عن البلاد قبل وبعد الثورة؟

9. ما هي أسباب إنتقال الربيع العربي لبلدك؟

10. هل تعتقد أن الربيع العربي ضروري أو غير ضروري؟ مع الشرح.

11. ما هي نتائج الثورة؟

12. كيف تعالج الحكومة الحالية التحديات بعد الثورة؟

13. ماذا تعني الديمقراطية بالنسبة لك؟

14. هل تعتقد أن تطوير الديمقراطية ممكنة في ليبيا؟ إذا [نعم] لماذا؟ إذا لا، لماذا؟
15. ماهي العلاقة بين الثورة والديمقراطية؟
16. هل الثورة ضرورية لتحقيق الديمقراطية؟
17. ما هي التحديات التي تواجه ليبيا من أجل تحقيق الديمقراطية؟
18. ما هي الصعوبات التي واجهت مدينتك بعد الثورة؟
19. كيف أثرت الثورة على الحالة الاقتصادية لمدينتك؟
20. كيف أثرت الثورة على الحالة السياسية في مدينتك؟
21. كيف تعتقد أن الثورة أثرت على العملية الديمقراطية؟
22. كيف تعتقد أن الناس يشعرون حول الثورة؟
23. ماذا تفهم من عدم الرضا الاجتماعي؟
24. كيف تعتقد أن الحكومة الحالية قادرة على تحقيق الرضي الاجتماعي؟
25. ما هو شعورك حول استخدام وسائل الإعلام خلال الثورة؟



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APPENDIX K: Questionnaire (English)



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1.1

1.2 Private Bag X 17, Bellville 7535, South Africa

Tel: +27 21 959 3853, Fax: +27 21 959 3865

E-mail: akarriem@uwc.ac.za

QUESTIONNAIRE ON DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AFTER THE ARAB SPRING WITH THE CASE OF LIBYA

Respondent No.			
Data entry No.			

Site	
Tripoli	
Cyrenaica	
Sabha	



Tick in the appropriate age group.

1. Gender: Male Female

☐☐

2. How old are you?

Below 20 year

21-30 years

31-40

☐☐☐

Good day. My name is Abdsalam Alahwal and I am a Libyan national. I am PhD student at the University of the Western Cape, in Cape Town, South Africa. I do not represent the government or any political party. I am studying the views of students at three universities in Libya concerning the impact of the Arab Spring on the process of democratisation in Libya. The universities are; The University of Tripoli, The University of Sabha and The University of Benghazi.

Please be assured that your responses will remain confidential. The responses will be collected by the researcher in order to gain an overall perspective of the issue. I would also like to assure you that it will be virtually impossible to assign a particular answer to any particular respondent, so please feel free to share your thoughts with me. This interview will last approximately 15-30 minutes. Your participation is offered voluntarily and will be highly appreciated. If you do not wish to participate, please know that you are free to do so.

Do you wish to proceed?

3. Which language do you speak?

English

Arabic

Italian

Other (specify)

4. How would you describe:						
	Very good	Fairly good	Neutral	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know
The economic conditions of your city before the revolution?						
Your own living conditions before the revolution?						
The economic conditions of your city before the revolution?						
The social conditions of your country after the revolution?						
The political conditions of your country before the revolution						

5. How do you feel:						
	Agree	Strongly Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree
Satisfied with the previous Regime.						
It was necessary to participate in the demonstrations and the revolution.						
Many people were satisfied with the previous regime.						
Many people did not participate in the demonstrations						
The previous government provided us with safety and social security						
I do feel the need for regime change.						
I think that the Arab Spring was necessary in Libya						
Democracy is achieved through revolution						
Protests and demonstrations are not necessary for democracy.						
The process of democracy has caused more problems or my country.						
I do not think that a democracy is possible in Libya						
I think that foreign intervention in Libya had a negative/positive impact on Libya						
Foreign Intervention was not useful in Libya						
I think that the Arab spring affected my city negatively.						
I feel that economic conditions of Libya have improved since the Libyan Arab Spring						

I do not feel that unemployment has escalated since the Libyan Arab Spring.					
I do not feel that the country has improved since the revolution.					
I do not think that a democratic government is the solution to our problems.					
I feel that the revolution was necessary to start the process of democracy.					
I think that my living conditions have not improved since the revolution.					
I feel that the Arab Spring brought about positive changes					

6. How do you feel foreign intervention has impacted on the process of democracy in Libya?

7. Do you think the previous government was undemocratic?

[YES] ____ NO ____

8. What do you think was wrong with the previous government?

9. How do you think the Libyan government is able to achieve democracy?

10. And what for you would be signs that democracy is being achieved in Libya?

11. What do you think are the challenges to democratisation as seen by lecturers or students?

12. What do you consider to be the most important problems or challenges facing your city after the revolution?

13. What do you think are the challenges the current government is facing in developing a democracy?

	Very good	Fairly well	Fairly badly	Very badly	Do not know
14. How do you think the current government is dealing with the challenges after the revolution?					

	yes	No	I do not know
15. Do you think the Arab Spring has brought about democracy in Libya?			

END THANK YOU

APPENDIX L: Questionnaire (Arabic)



UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE

Private Bag X 17, Bellville 7535, South Africa

Tel: +27 21 959 3853, Fax: +27 21 959 3865

E-mail: akarriem@uwc.ac.za

إستبيان

عنوان البحث: فهم عملية التحول الديمقراطي في الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا بعد "الربيع العربي" حالة ليبيا.



رقم المشارك	
تاريخ المشاركة	

الموقع	
طرابلس	
بنغازي	
سبها	

طاب يومك. اسمي عبدالسلام الاحول ليبي الجنسية. وأنا طالب دكتوراة في جامعة الكيب الغربية، في كيب تاون، جنوب أفريقيا. أنا لا أمثل الحكومة أو أي حزب سياسي. أنا أدرس آراء أعضاء هيئة التدريس والطلاب في ثلاث جامعات في ليبيا بشأن تأثير الربيع العربي على عملية التحول الديمقراطي في ليبيا. الجامعات هي؛ جامعة طرابلس، جامعة سبها، وجامعة بنغازي.

يرجى التأكد من أن ردودكم ستبقى سرية. سيتم جمع أرائكم من قبل الباحث من أجل تكوين فكرة شاملة لهذه القضية. كما أود أن أؤكد لكم أنه سيكون لكم الحرية في إختيار إجاباتكم، لذلك لا تتردد في مشاركة أفكاركم معي. وهذه المقابلة تدوم من 15-30 دقيقة. يتم تقديم مشاركتك طوعا. إذا كنت لا ترغب في المشاركة فلك الحرية في ذلك.

هل ترغب في المتابعة؟

ضع علامة في الفئة العمرية المناسبة

أنثى

ذكر

1. الجنس:

☐
☐

2. كم عمرك؟

31 - 40 سنة

21-30 سنة

أقل من 20 سنة


☐
☐
☐

3. أي لغة تتكلم؟			
	العربية		الإنجليزية
	لغات أخرى		الإيطالية

4. كيف تصف الآتي :					
لا أعلم	سيئ جداً	سيئ إلى حد ما	محايد	مقبول	جيد جداً
					الأوضاع الاقتصادية لمدينتك قبل الثورة؟
					ظروف المعيشة الخاصة بك قبل الثورة؟
					الأوضاع الاقتصادية لمدينتك قبل الثورة؟
					الظروف الاجتماعية للبلد بعد الثورة؟
					الظروف السياسية للبلد قبل الثورة

5. ما هو شعورك:					
أعارض بشده	أعارض	محايد	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	
					راض عن النظام السابق
					من الضروري المشاركة في المظاهرات والثورة
					الكثير من الناس كانوا راضين عن النظام السابق
					كثير من الناس لم تشارك في المظاهرات
					الحكومة السابقة قدمت لنا السلامة والأمن الاجتماعي

					الحاجة لتغيير النظام
					الربيع العربي كان من الضروري في ليبيا
					تحقيق الديمقراطية من خلال الثورة
					الاحتجاجات والمظاهرات ليست ضرورية للديمقراطية
					عملية الديمقراطية تسببت في المزيد من المشاكل بالدولة
					لا أعتقد أن الديمقراطية ممكنة في ليبيا
					أعتقد أن التدخل الأجنبي في ليبيا كان له تأثير سلبي و إيجابي على ليبيا
					التدخل الأجنبي لم يكن مفيداً في ليبيا
					أعتقد أن الربيع العربي أثر سلباً و إيجاباً علي مدينتي
					الأوضاع الاقتصادية في ليبيا تحسنت منذ الربيع العربي الليبي
					البطالة لم تتصاعد منذ الربيع العربي الليبي
					هذا البلد لم يتحسن منذ الثورة
					لا أعتقد أن الحكومة الديمقراطية هي الحل لمشاكلنا
					الثورة كانت ضرورية لبدء عملية الديمقراطية
					أعتقد أن ظروف المعيشية لم تتحسن منذ الثورة
					أشعر أن الربيع العربي أحدثت تغييرات إيجابية



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6. ما هو شعورك حول التدخل الأجنبي في عملية الديمقراطية في ليبيا؟

7. هل تعتقد ان الحكومة السابقة غير ديمقراطية؟ نعم () لا ()

8. اين كان الخطاء في الحكومة السابقة؟

9. كيف تعتقد الحكومة الليبية قادرة على تحقيق الديمقراطية؟

10. ماهي الدلائل علي تحقق الديمقراطية؟

11. ما هي التحديات التي تواجه الديمقراطية كما يراها أعضاء هيئة التدريس والطلاب؟

12. ماهي التحديات او المشاكل التي تواجه مدينتك بعد الثورة؟

13. ما هي التحديات التي تواجه الحكومة الحالية في تطوير الديمقراطية؟



لا أعلم	سيئ جداً	سيئ إلى حد ما	جيد جداً	جيد إلى حد ما	14. كيف تعتقد ان الحكومة الحالية تتعامل مع التحديات بعد الثورة؟

لا أعلم	لا	نعم	15. هل تعتقد أن الربيع العربي قد أسفر عن الديمقراطية في ليبيا؟

شاكرين لكم حسن تعاونكم على المشاركة في هذه الدراسة

APPENDIX M: Editorial Certificate

26 November 2018

To whom it may concern

Dear Sir/Madam

RE: Editorial Certificate

This letter serves to prove that the thesis listed below was language edited for proper English, grammar, punctuation, spelling, as well as overall layout and style by myself, publisher/proprietor of Aquarian Publications, a native English speaking editor.

Thesis title

UNDERSTANDING THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AFTER
"ARAB SPRING": THE CASE OF LIBYA

Author

Abdsalam Alahwal

The research content, or the author's intentions, were not altered in any way during the editing process, and the author has the authority to accept or reject my suggestions and changes.

Should you have any questions or concerns about this edited document, I can be contacted at the listed telephone and fax numbers or e-mail addresses.

Yours truly



E H Londt
Publisher/Proprietor

Idea Corporation t/a



**AQUARIAN
PUBLICATIONS**

STREET ADDRESS

9 Dartmouth Road
Muizenberg 7945

POSTAL ADDRESS

P O Box 00000
Muizenberg 7946

TELEPHONE

021 788 1577

FAX

021 788 1577

MOBILE

076 152 3853

E-MAIL

eddi.aquarian@gmail.com
eddi.londt@gmail.com

WEBSITE

www.aquarianpublications.com

PUBLISHER/PROPRIETOR

E H Londt