

**Assessing the role played by informal traders within the
snoek value chain in selected townships in Cape Town,
South Africa**

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the Master of Philosophy in Land and Agrarian Studies**

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Cape Town, Snoek, Value chain, Informal traders, Fishers, Small scale fisheries, Multiple livelihoods, Informal economy, Interactive governance, Gender



ABSTRACT

In the Western Cape, snoek (*Thyrsites atun*) is a target for small scale fisheries. This fishery is comprised of recreational, subsistence and traditional line fisheries in the province. Snoek contributes 40% to 50% of the line fish which is landed. This thesis sought to identify the roles which are performed by informal snoek traders in certain Cape Town coloured¹ townships in the snoek value chain.

There are various aspects of this fish which heightens its importance in the Western Cape. Snoek is significant in the provision of food security for many poor and working class individuals and households within the coloured townships of Cape Town. Snoek is an omega 3-rich fish and is one of the Cape's most well-known gastronomic traditions. It provides affordable and easily absorbable proteins, vitamins and minerals for township people. Poor people mostly rely on starches and fail to afford the most expensive protein sources like red meat. The snoek trade also helps in the creation of jobs and enables people to earn cash income.

The study revealed that there is specialisation and division of labour between snoek traders and fishers. Snoek is sold via the auction system at the various landing zones scattered all over the Western Cape. It was observed that the snoek value chain is dominated by men and there are few women in the value chain who sell or clean snoek. Informal snoek traders ply their business next to shops or on the sides of busy roads using 'bakkies'² from where the fish is flayed and sold to the waiting customer to emphasise its freshness. Snoek traders create convenience by bringing fresh fish to customers in the townships. They also assume risks which come with venturing in business. Some snoek traders engage in multiple livelihood strategies by diversifying income generating activities rather than relying on one income source. Among the several challenges which snoek traders confront, one pressing challenge they need to address is their lack of organisation which prohibits them from speaking with one voice. The snoek value chain should be more efficient so that it keeps supplying the much needed nutrients in the townships. Both primary and secondary data collection techniques were used. Snoek traders face a myriad of

¹ The term "coloured" in South Africa refers to the population of historically "mixed-race" largely Afrikaans-speaking inhabitants of large parts of the Western Cape Province (Norton: 2013).

² An Afrikaans word meaning a small vehicle with an open part at the back in which goods can be transported.

challenges which require the authorities to address. They have no access to infrastructure with sanitary facilities. The other problem they face is that they are disorganised amongst themselves which weaken their cause. Traders and fishers would like to see the real transformation taking place within this snoek fishery. Traders are convinced that there is corruption within the fisheries department and many have lost faith in the system.



DECLARATION

I declare that, *Assessing the role of informal snoek traders within the snoek value chain in selected townships in Cape Town, South Africa* is my own work that has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.


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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACRN	Anti-Corruption Research Network
BNP	Big Numbers Project
CBD	Central Business District
CPUE	Catch per unit of effort
DAFF	Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGP	Gross Geographic Product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
QLFS	Quarterly Labour Force Survey
SASP	South African Sea Products
Stats SA	Statistics South Africa (SSA)
SESE	Survey of Employers and the Self-employed
SSFs	Small-scale fisheries
TAC	Total Allowable Catch
TAE	Total Allowable Effort
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature
WWF SASSI	Worldwide Fund for Nature Southern African Sustainability Seafood Initiative

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


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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) predicts that global fishery production from wild capture fisheries and aquaculture is projected to set a new record in 2013 at 160 million tonnes, up from 157 million tonnes the previous year, while exports will reach \$136 billion (FAO, 2014). Fish is therefore the most valuable agricultural commodity traded internationally and increasing each year (FAO 2007, Nieland 2006, HLPE 2014). The fish trade contributes to a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), creates livelihoods and provides food security (FAO, 2014). For the developing countries net fish exports have grown from US\$ 27.7 billion in 2010 to US\$ 35.1 billion in 2012 (HLPE 2014). This sector therefore contributes significantly to the livelihoods and socio economic well-being of fisherfolk the world over (Johnson 2006, Tall 2001). The FAO (2010) estimates that about 45 million people are employed in both capture and aquaculture fisheries. Indications are that fish production and employment within the sector is expanding (HLPE 2014, Weeratunge and Snyder 2009).

The benefits from the fish trade do not stop with the fisher or trader (Johnson 2013). Fishing activities reverberate within the economy causing a host of positive changes both upstream and downstream for the community through the multiplier effect. The multiplier effect will result in other jobs being created as a result of fishers and traders' activities (Johnson 2013). Globally, downstream industries employ a further 135 million people within post harvest and manufacturing of fish and fish products because of the multiplier effect FAO (2012). With the income earned from selling fish, traders buy various goods and services to meet their family needs. The demand by traders known as "derived demand" for such commodities helps create jobs in those sectors. Studies tend to point to the fact that local agricultural employment and income multipliers accrue within the localities which are trading in agricultural produce (Allison 2011, Gordon et al. 2011). Multipliers become strong if traders spend most of the income locally. A study by the Sustainable Livelihoods Fisheries Project in Ghana found that one fishing job created seven additional livelihoods while the FAO suggests that for every person employed

directly in fishing, there may be an additional 4 associated downstream jobs (Gordon et al, 2011: 16).

Small-scale fisheries have been seen to be very important in livelihoods and food security in coastal communities (Gallardo 2008). Small-scale fisheries (SSFs) account for more than half of the total fish production in the world (Diei-Ouadi and Mgawe 2011). They employ 95% of men and women engaged in this sector and more than 90% of those operate in developing countries (FAO 2007). Within the West African community for example, the artisanal sector is an important source of employment and foreign exchange and consistently provides about 40% of animal protein to the region's growing population (Tall 2001).

1.2. Fish and food security

Fish provides affordable and easily absorbable and highly digestible proteins, vitamins and minerals for many poor rural people (Olufayo 2012). Fish provides high quality animal protein which is essential for the development and functioning of healthy nervous systems. Fish contains all essential amino acids, especially those such as lysine that are low in other protein sources; lipids, especially the omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids required for brain development and function and energy- and vitamin-rich oils; and micronutrients (vitamins and minerals; especially calcium, iodine, iron, phosphorus, zinc, and Vitamins A, B1, B2 and D) (Pullin 2013). This is particularly true for the poor who mostly rely on starches and cannot afford to buy the more expensive protein sources (Cheke 2012, Allison 2011). In most cases in developing countries, fish caught from small scale fisheries is more affordable than beef, mutton and pork. Small scale fisheries make a contribution to the economic development of a country (FAO 2012).

1.3. Fisheries and the Western Cape

Employment is the crucial livelihood strategy in the Western Cape, particularly in the fishing sector (catching and processing), farming, manufacturing and retail industries, port and tourism related service industries (Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen 1998: 9). In the Western Cape the fishing industry is estimated to contribute 0.2% to the gross geographic product (GGP) for the province (WWF 2011). The economic value of the recreational and commercial fishery was

estimated from expenditures on fishing trips and income earned by commercial operators and crew. When multiplier effects are taken into account, fisheries are estimated to contribute 1.3% of the gross geographic product (GGP) of the coastal provinces, and generate employment for 131 500 people (McGrath et al. 1997). Shore-angling was found to be most significant, contributing 76% of the GGP attributable to the fishery (McGrath et al. 1997). Fisheries are central in the social economy of the Western Cape where entire coastal communities depend directly or indirectly on fishing for their livelihood (Sumaila et al. 2002). According to Global Insight (2013), fishing and the operation of fish farms contribute 0.41% (approximately R605 million) to Cape Town's GDP and 0.3% (or R2, 916m) of Cape Town's formally employed total (Court 2013 per comm.). These figures, however, only capture the total value of the primary sector operations of this industry, namely the fishing and farming, and fail to take into account the broader value chain. This value chain includes the processing and salting of fish, packaging and retailing. These figures also do not take into account informal fishing activity (like the snoek trade) as this is not factored into the GDP. As such, the figures probably substantially underrate the industry in terms of its absolute value. The industry share of GDP though does provide some degree of insight. For instance, the fishing industry has a larger (0.41%) GDP share than agriculture (0.37%) within Cape Town (Court 2013 pers comm).

1.4. Snoek

Snoek or Cape Snoek (*Thyrsites atun*) is a predatory fish which thrives within the Benguela ecosystem (Griffiths 2002), which stretches from Angola to South Africa. Snoek is mostly sold by 'langanas'³ by the quay or road side (Hara 2014). For those langanas who ply their trade in bakkies (of which they are the majority) they park their cars by the roadside or near busy shopping centres waiting for customers. Most of their selling spots are known by their customers.

These traders assume risk by buying snoek to sell as they invest resources into the business. They are the intermediaries between the fisher and the consumer. They buy fresh fish from the fishers and convey it to the township residents and in the process address the nutritional needs of

³ 'Langana' is a traditional and historical Afrikaans name for township snoek sellers, which has been used by Cape slaves in the 1700s (Isaacs 2013, Hara: 2014).

the working class and poor residents within the south eastern suburbs of Cape Town. Traders therefore help with food security to the target market. Snoek traders are an important step towards poverty alleviation in the sense that their activities create employment, amongst other benefits. The trade in snoek also has positive impacts for both upstream and downstream activities within the value chain. This is the concept of the multiplier effect where activities pursued by snoek traders will have positive impacts on other value chain players like fishers, skippers, their families as well as others players who rely on snoek traders as their customers.

1.4.1. Why is snoek important to us?

Snoek traders and fishers earn a living from their activities and are able to fend for their families. Informal snoek traders earn income from their activities and are able to enjoy higher living standards for themselves and their families. The activities of fishers and traders also provide food security within the low income areas in which they operate. Snoek is a source of protein for the poor and working class people in Cape Town. Snoek is an omega 3-rich fish and is one of the Cape's most well-known culinary traditions (Isaacs 2013). In many African countries fish consumption is an important source of protein, contributing 22% of overall protein intake (DFID 2006). Snoek roe (eggs) is also a popular delicacy within the communities of the south eastern suburbs in Cape Town. Snoek is eaten mostly by the coloured people of the Western Cape. Many South Africans, especially those from Cape Town, refer to snoek as the classic Cape 'braai'⁴ favourite, as a fish that must be tried when one visits the city (Norton 2013).

Traders deliver fresh fish for the convenience of their customers, from distant landing sites to the coloured townships. Snoek is a target for artisanal and small scale fishers (although a significant amount is caught as by catch by demersal trawlers. Snoek fisheries are a low earning sector but a labour intensive type of fishing which means that most of the fishers can be classified as poor (Mann et al. 2000, McGrath et al. 1997). The line fishery sector employs 27% of all fishers but has the lowest average employment income of all South African fisheries (Branch and Clark

⁴ 'Braai' is an Afrikaans word for barbecue.

2006). On the other hand, the trawling sector (consisting of trawling companies like Irvin & Johnson, Viking, Foodcorp, Pioneer, Sea Harvest to name just but a few) pays salaries that are substantially better than most other fishing activities, with a mode of R35 000 per annum compared to about R12 000 per annum per person for traditional line fisheries (Branch and Clark 2006).

1.4.2. Snoek consumption

Snoek is eaten mostly by the low income members within the coloured community within the south eastern townships of Cape Town. The reason for this trend can be traced back to the days of the occupation of the Cape Colony in the 1600s and the 1800s (Isaacs 2013, Salo 2007). Snoek became a delicacy for slaves from West Africa and Muslim political prisoners who were taken from Indonesia and the Philippines and it was also an important food source for many poor families within the Cape Colony (Isaacs 2013). Salo (2007) documents that snoek was turned into a commodity for export to Mauritius as a reliable and cheap food for slaves working in the sugar plantations which had been seized from French colonists. Ironically, the cultural stigma of snoek as slave food has helped it survive as a contemporary staple for dispossessed agricultural and industrial workers living around metropolitan Cape Town (Salo 2007). Another reason why snoek is looked down upon by some sections of society is the claim that it has large densely packed bones which make it very difficult to eat (Norton 2013). And yet another claim is that snoek is full of globules of fat and parasitic worms which scares off the supposedly health conscious consumer (New Zealand Herald 2012). In Cape Town, big retailers like Woolworths, Shoprite, Pick 'n Pay and Snoekies in Lansdowne Road in Philippi do not stock locally caught snoek species because it is argued that the fish is not available in huge and reliable quantities. As a result, a substantial amount of snoek which is stocked in several retail chains is imported from New Zealand and Australia (Isaacs 2013).

1.5. Rationale and significance of the research

The snoek trade creates employment opportunities, lessens poverty and supplies food to the impoverished communities of Cape Town. In terms of poverty alleviation, this assumes at least two dimensions, namely poverty reduction and poverty prevention. Poverty reduction includes

earning income at household level, contributing to the country's GDP and contributing to taxes. The concept of poverty prevention looks at how people stay out of or not fall further into poverty by providing a minimum standard of living and a safety net function (BNP 2008). Snoek is a well known fish in Cape Town and provides food security to working class people and the poor coloured communities to the south east of the city. Fish provides food security at all levels of society (HLPE 2014, Pullin 2013). In the Western Cape, snoek is the mainstay of line fishery and yet there has been little research focusing solely on snoek traders and fishers in this part of the world.

The 1996 World Food Summit defined food security as a situation when all people, at all times, have access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences to lead an active and healthy life (Allison 2011, BNP 2008, FAO 2005). It was therefore felt that an investigation into the social and economic players within the snoek value chain needed to be done to get insights into the way snoek traders run their business operations. Studying the operations of snoek traders was also expected to identify constraints and opportunities inherent within the snoek value chain in an attempt to make the value chain reduce bottlenecks and make it more efficient. This study draws from theoretical underpinnings of the interactive governance framework, value chains, the informal sector, multiple livelihood strategies and gender studies. For instance, how does the interactive governance framework apply to players within the snoek value chain? The interactive governance framework places importance on solving societal problems and creating opportunities by generating interaction between civil, public and private persons and organizations (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). The Western Cape Provincial Government acknowledges that there is little doubt that informal traders in the right governance, institutional and macro-economic climate context can generate rent and contribute to local economic growth (de Soysa and Jütting 2006). Issues of governance and institutions play a pivotal role in improving the living standards and contributions of informal fish traders and fishers to the gross geographic product (GGP) of the Western Cape Province. Appropriate governance and proper institutional arrangements in a country like Norway appear to have made their fisheries sector contribute meaningfully to the country's economy (Béné et al. 2010a).


In most fishing communities, apart from dealing with fish, the fishing communities embark on multiple livelihood activities as coping mechanisms against unfavourable conditions. Studies done elsewhere show that fishing communities pursue multiple livelihood strategies (Chiwaula et al. 2012, Mmopelwa and Ngwenya 2008, Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011, Udong 2011). This aspect helps us identify coping measures which are adopted by traders against stresses and shocks within the fisheries value chains, the economic system and the environment. An understanding of the fishery sector and the characteristics of the households and communities is essential for sound policies and interventions to improve the sector and to strengthen the role fisheries can play in enhancing food security and alleviating poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (Béné et al. 2010b).

The informal economy and value chains were also considered to be important aspects of this study deserving special mention. Concepts on the informal economy and value chains would provide us with the background required to appreciate the operations of the snoek traders. Analysing value chains helps us identify the various players, their functions and existing linkages; determine value increasing opportunities; assess the input-output structure and we are also able to analyse the limitations and opportunities intrinsic in the value chain (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001). Value chain analysis also allows for an understanding of the snoek value chain and would be very important because this can contribute to the development of livelihood interventions since it exposes the constraints and opportunities (Campbell 2012, Gordon et al 2011, Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, Timmers 2012). It is widely believed that improved value chain governance will contribute to the more efficient transfer of fish to the market providing higher margins for fishers and traders as well as improved leverage for steering the industry towards sustainable production (Loc et al. 2010). Furthermore, improvements of fish value chains will improve the resilience of fishing households not only by enhancing the value but also by reducing the variation in income between good years and bad years due to unstable ecosystems (Chiwaula et al. 2012). From the statistics available, line fisheries in South Africa are valued at R2.2 billion annually of which snoek is the most important of the species caught comprising about 40% of line fish which is landed (DAFF 2012a, Griffiths 2002). Thousands of

people are employed within the snoek value chain - ranging from skippers to fishers and traders. Other players benefiting indirectly include bait dealers, gas stations and fishing gear manufactures. The full extent of the economic contribution created within the snoek value chain is potentially a subject of another research.

Undertaking this study required the scrutiny of the operations of langanas starting with the source of fish, transportation to the market, processing (if it was done) and selling the fish.

This research was also viewed as having the potential to contribute to the design of appropriate intervention policies and procedures which could result in empowering informal snoek traders and fishers as well as establishing a framework of sustainable livelihoods and livelihood security for the traders and their households as we move along the snoek value chain. The interactive governance framework contends that the state, community and NGOs should come together and equally decide on the rules of the game in a given situation to motivate fishers and make them abide by the rules since they will also own the programme (Hauck 2008, Jentoft 2013). It is argued that if such arrangements are put in place, poaching and deviancy are likely to be minimised.



1.6. Research Objectives

The objective of this study is to identify the roles which are played by informal traders within the snoek value chain in Cape Town. Informal snoek traders are part of the SSF community in the Western Cape since they form the link between fishers and consumers by distributing fish coming from small scale traditional line fisheries to the market. Informal traders in the snoek value chain operate within governance structures which are intricately linked to issues like gender, multiple livelihoods and power relations. As a result, these concepts are examined in order to get a deeper understanding of how they apply to the snoek trade. The analysis of value chains allowed the identification of opportunities and constraints which may be inherent in the snoek value chain.

The research problem can be summarised thus:

To investigate the roles played by snoek traders in terms of livelihoods, gender dimensions, governance frameworks and the informal trading sector in Cape Town's south eastern townships and to establish the nature of their relationship with snoek fishers within the snoek value chain.

It is from this research problem that research questions were generated.

1.6.1 Research questions

This research attempted to answer the following research questions:

- i. What is the current role of informal snoek traders in food security, employment creation and other aspects and how can that role be enhanced within the snoek value chain?
- ii. What governance framework is in place within the traditional line fishery sector?
- iii. How do gender dynamics, power relations and multiple livelihoods apply in the snoek trade?

Informal snoek traders' activities are crucial in the townships where they operate. Virtually every Cape Town inhabitant knows about snoek and langanas. The fish has strong traditions in the Western Cape. This study therefore focused on the informal snoek traders plying their trade in the south eastern townships of Cape Town, South Africa. Its aim was to acquire information on various roles which are played by snoek traders who work within the dominion of small scale fishers. This chapter looks at the way information on snoek traders was collected in an attempt to answer the research questions which are indicated earlier in this thesis.

1.7. Methodology

Both primary and secondary methods of data collection were used in this study. Both methods harmonize each other if they are used circumspectly. A combination of qualitative and quantitative and primary and secondary research is known as triangulation or methodological pluralism (Holtzhausen 2001). Triangulation is defined as the mixing of data or methods so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints provide clarity on a given topic (Olsen 2004). This approach is

advantageous because it allows us to cross check our results. The main methods of data collection were participant observations, interviews and secondary source analysis. This study integrates information which was obtained from key informants, face to face interviews and observations which were made while snoek traders were serving customers (including cutting and packing the fish). The fieldwork was conducted by interviewing and observing both traders and fishers interacting at one landing site.

1.8. Primary data collection

Face to face interviews and observation were used to collect primary data from various role players who included fishers, traders and other informants, namely Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Irvin & Johnson personnel. Although the focus was on traders, it was relevant to interview fishers as well to get the whole picture on the nature of the relationship which exists between the two groups. This was done in order to get a deeper understanding of the relationship between snoek traders and fishers. This made it possible to gain insight into the power relations existing between the two groups. An interview guide was designed for traders, fishers and informants. The interview guide (semi-structured interviews) was able to get information on snoek harvest statistics, landing zones, background of traders, sources of snoek, how fish was procured and sold, governance and the whole process of running the snoek trading business. Interviews were carried out *in situ* at spots where traders sold fish. Interviews and observations were also done at St Helena Bay when snoek was auctioned in the West Coast. Interviews with officials from WWF, DAFF and Irvin & Johnson were conducted at their places of work. On average each interview lasted 30 to 45 minutes. While interviewing traders who work as a group on one bakkie, they all would take part in the discussion and would consult and complement each other to show the true state of affairs.

1.8.1. Key informants

Six organisations provided informants, namely the City of Cape Town, DAFF, WWF SASSI, Irvin & Johnson and Snoek Wholesalers at Lansdowne and Becker Roads, Philippi. The researcher visited the offices of the WWF and the DAFF to talk to selected personnel. Discussions were also conducted with two senior employees at the Irvin & Johnson head office in Woodstock, Cape Town. The Snoek Wholesalers branch manager in Lansdowne was

interviewed on the premises as well. Another two individuals were interviewed at the WWF SASSI offices in Newlands.

1.8.2. Interviews

Interviews with snoek traders were unscheduled owing to the nature of their *modus operandi* since they sell their merchandise from the back of bakkies and are highly mobile. Some usual selling points were seen to be abandoned mainly because of the unavailability of stock. The statistics relating to the numbers and background of interviewees are shown in Table 1 below. Traders were interviewed within the townships, from where they conducted business.

Table 1: Number of stakeholders interviewed

Organisation	Number interviewed
Department of Fisheries	3
Snoek Wholesalers, Lansdowne Street	1
Irvin & Johnson	2
Snoek Traders	20
Fishers	4
WWF SASSI	2
Total	32

1.8.3. Observations of snoek traders

According to Kawulich (2005), observation research provides researchers with ways to check for the non-verbal expression of feelings, and determine who interacts with whom, grasp how participants communicate with each other, and check for how much time is spent on various activities. Observations may help the researcher have a better understanding of the context and phenomenon under study. Observations were used so that concrete descriptions of how fish is flaked and sold could be obtained. In her study of Ibaka women fish traders in Nigeria, Udong (2011: 123), argues that observation as a research technique is used, "...to get a better grasp on processes of livelihood generation...the way the fish market works, both at the beach and the village market". Visits were conducted to the stalls and spots where snoek was sold. Traders

were observed whilst they went about their business. Typically a bakkie with snoek will have the fish stacked at the back with the door open. The open bakkie door is used as a platform on which to cut the fish. A small mat or cutting board will be placed on top of the open door to absorb shock against direct blows onto the metal door from the butcher's knife. The fish is cut across its length. Once cut, it is opened and its insides (roe and intestines) are removed. A butcher's knife is then used to chop the fish bones into small pieces (without dismembering the pieces which are left loosely hanging). This requires a certain level of exactitude which can only be accumulated with experience. Sometimes customers can request the roe and the heads from the fish that have been cut for them or they leave them altogether. Old newspapers are used as packaging material. The uncollected roe and heads are sold to other deserving not so well to do customers.

On some bakkies, there will be two or three different sized piles of fish where fish from each respective heap commands a different fish price, with the bigger fish costing more. Customers are given the privilege to select what they judge to be the biggest and the best amongst other fish. The practice is that the fish which has been chosen is cut while the customer would be waiting, to emphasise its freshness and to make the customer feel satisfied since fresh snoek is regarded highly in this part of the world.

Observation as a research method was also done at St Helena Bay when boats came from fishing with snoek. Snoek was sold using the auction system with the highest bidder getting the fish. On the day the observation of the auction was done, the minimum asking starting price for each fish was R23. Once a deal is struck, the buyer (or a group of buyers) is obliged to buy all the fish on the boat. Deals were struck at prices above R23 which averaged around R27 per fish. Traders quickly loaded the fish and drove off. Observation as a technique was used to obtain information on how fish is acquired at the beach, processed, and sold to the final consumers in the townships. As a result, insights were obtained on how the fish market works, both at the beach and the townships.

1.8.4. Case Studies

Case studies were used to obtain qualitative data on how fishers and traders interact in terms of their social and livelihood behaviours. Several case studies were consulted of articles written by

a wide array of authors. There are multiple definitions and understanding of what constitutes case studies (Benbasat et al. 1987, Yin 2014, Zucker 2009). George and Bennett (2004:5) argue that, “The case study approach is a detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.” Case studies are generally strong precisely where statistical methods and formal models are weak (George and Bennett 2004). A major feature of the case study methodology is that different methods are combined with the purpose of illuminating a case from different angles, to triangulate by combining methodologies (Johansson 2003). Case studies offer the advantage that one does not need to visit the area under study as data or information will be obtained by simply consulting secondary sources. Yin (2014, 1998) views a case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context. The case study approach is useful where contextual situations of the events being studied are very critical and where the researcher is unable to control the events as they take place (Yin 2014). It is against this background that the case study approach was used in this thesis, drawing on case studies that were conducted on fish traders and fishers in West Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, North Africa, the Pacific, Latin America and South East Asia.

1.8.5. Overview of the study areas

The Western Cape of South Africa is the province where most snoek is sold by informal traders. Most of such transactions are done from bakkies by the road sides. The trade takes place within the townships in an area broadly known as the Cape Flats⁵ to the south east of the city of Cape Town. Townships which were included in the study are Athlone, Delft, Eerste River, Mitchell’s Plain, Hanover Park, Strandfontein, and Manenberg. Hout Bay to the south west of Cape Town was also covered. See, Fig 1 for details.

⁵ The ‘Cape Flats’ is an expansive, low-lying, flat area situated to the southeast of the central business district of Cape Town.




Figure 1: The townships included in this study.
Source: J. Hall

Due to South Africa's history and the legacy of apartheid through the Group Areas Act (Mabin 1990) these townships have coloured people as the dominant population group. Trade in snoek is common in these areas such that this fish is viewed by many as a historical and cultural food exclusive to the local inhabitants. Unlike other fish species, snoek is the only fish which has a flourishing substantial informal market in Cape Town where it is mostly sold in coloured communities (Martin and Nielsen 1996).

1.8.6. Challenges met

Sometimes it was difficult to locate snoek traders at the usual market places especially those roving with bakkies. Some designated selling spots were abandoned due to fish unavailability. This required that the interviewer would have to return to the spots in subsequent days until there were traders to interface with. Other traders felt uncomfortable with the interviewer as they viewed him as wasting their time. Some traders mistrusted the interviewer. They tried to hide information on how much income they were realising per day and feared that the interviewer might have been a state agent collecting information for taxation purposes. But, on the whole traders cooperated fully with the research which was conducted. Some traders had expectations that they would get help in funding as a result of the research as they thought that the interviewer was a government employee. Nevertheless, it was made abundantly clear to them that this was purely an academic undertaking.

1.9. Secondary data collection

For the most part, secondary data collection entailed the scrutiny of relevant literature. Most of the literature review was based on literature assembled through internet searches. A considerable amount of literature came from the WorldFish Center, FAO, DAFF and CGIAR. The literature review was used to understand various theoretical concepts which were relevant to this study. Several concepts were examined to gain deeper understanding of the way langanas operate. Such notions included, but were not limited to: interactive governance framework, informal sector, gender dimensions in selling fish, multiple livelihood framework and value chains. Documents which were accessed include reports, books, articles and newspapers. Both published and unpublished articles were used. Some documents provided case studies which were used to obtain information on how other fish traders and fishers interact and function in their respective communities. A review of essays and articles was undertaken to compare and contrast the functions of snoek traders in the Western Cape to those of other fish traders in other parts of the world. Several Master's and PhD theses from other students were consulted. The author was at pains to use current literature to make the study up to date with recent developments.

1.10. Structure of the thesis

Chapter 1 gives the introduction, context and background to the problem area and its relevance to research. Chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework relied upon to come up with this study. Chapter 3 talks through the methodology which was used to collect data as well as the delimitation which was done. Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results that came out of this study. Chapter 5 provides conclusions and recommendations based on the results of this research.

1.11. Chapter Summary

This chapter shows that fisheries are crucial to the economy of the western especially if we take into account the broader economic ramifications. Thousands of people earn their living from activities within and related to the fisheries sector. The sector also generates income which is critical for the employees and their dependants. The snoek has been shown to comprising the biggest percentage of all the line fish which is caught in the traditional line sector. As a result the management and governance of this fish should be in such a way that it does not interfere negatively on the way snoek players derive from it. As has been highlighted fish contributes widely to the GDP of respective countries in terms of earning cash income, creating employment and establishment of food security. Looking at snoek it is noted that the fish is mainly consumed by poor and working class people in certain coloured townships. Snoek is part of the traditional line fishery. This fishery contributes more than R2, 2 billion to the national economy. By inference, snoek is estimated to contribute at least 40% of that revenue. The chapter also looked at the conceptual framework which is relevant to this study. The concepts are applied to the study contracting and comparing with other studies done on informal traders elsewhere.

The chapter also examined the research objectives and methodology which were used in this study. The study used triangulation as a research method combining both primary and secondary research methods. This is aimed at making up for the weaknesses of either of the methods. Primary methodology was used by used of interviews and observations while secondary methodology employed the used of published literature and case studies. The next chapter looks at snoek within the South African context.

CHAPTER 2: SNOEK IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN FISHERIES CONTEXT

2.1. Introduction

The coastline of South Africa is estimated to range from 2 500 to 3 000 kilometres long (Griffiths 2000, IAEA 2014) and is characterised by a wide variety of marine life. It is estimated that South Africa has around 147 fishing communities, 28 338 fisher households and about 29 233 people who are considered true subsistence fishers while 100 000 people are employed in fishery-related enterprises (DAFF 2010a). South Africa's formal commercial fishing industry employs approximately 43 458 people, including those employed seasonally and permanently (DAFF 2010a). About 90% of all South African fish landings are done on the Western Cape harbours (Martin and Nielsen 1996, DAFF 2010a). However this figure excludes those employed within the informal sector. Incidentally, most of the snoek traded falls within the ambit of the informal economy. Statistics which relate to informal snoek traders are difficult to get hold of and this presents a challenge for scientists seeking to have an insight into the extent and impact of the snoek trade. It is estimated that line fishery of which snoek is the mainstay, is worth about R 2.2 billion per year for the four South African coastal provinces of Northern Cape, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal (Hara 2014, Isaacs 2013, McGrath et al. 1997).

2.2. Small scale fisheries

The term Small Scale Fisheries (SSFs) is used widely in many circles. It may be problematic to get an acceptable definition of what constitutes SSFs (Andrew and Evans 2009). What may be considered as small-scale in one place can be seen as large scale in another country. The BNP (2008: 5) states that:

Still, there are some general attributes that relate to the broad definition of scale; large-scale – or industrial fisheries – are often associated with high capital costs and sophisticated technologies; small-scale fishing is perceived as using smaller craft, and more labour intensive and low-technology fishing methods.

Snoek fishers are viewed as small scale and artisanal since they use handlines when catching fish. Griffiths (2000) argues that line fishery boat sizes range from 5.5 to 15 m in length. In Mozambique, semi-industrial fishing uses vessels with intermediate lengths of between ten to twenty metres, driven by engine and may use ice on board for fish preservation and catch fish using methods like bottom trawl, pair trawling, gillnet dropline or handline (Momade 2005). Unless otherwise stated, in this thesis the terms ‘fisheries’ or ‘fishers’ are used to make implicit reference to artisanal fisheries and the small-scale operations and *modus operandi* of those relying on them (Brugère et al. 2008). However, the snoek fishers use fairly more sophisticated equipment as compared to other small scale fishing communities in Africa. In most parts of the world small scale fishers may not afford the acquisition of such equipment like powered boats since they make use of rudimentary methods and implements which include dugout canoes, spears and mosquito nets.

On a good fishing trip when snoek runs are intense, snoek fishers can land as much as 1500 to 2000 fish per day (Croome 2013 pers. comm.). Even though, this quantity can be seen as infinitesimal when compared to the tens of thousands of tonnes that are harvested by large trawl companies whose boats are equipped with refrigeration facilities and can stay at sea for several months on a typical fishing trip. Snoek fishers and informal traders therefore fall within the category of SSFs due to the scale of activity they conduct in their business.

2.3. Line fishery

Line fishing is defined as a fishing method whereby fish are harvested using a hook and line but excludes the use of set longlines (DAFF 2012a, Mann et al. 2000). Snoek is caught using handlines. Line fishing embraces subsistence, commercial and recreational line fishing, the latter often being referred to as angling (Mann et al. 2000, Statistics South Africa 2012). Subsistence line fishing generally consists of poor people living within walking distance of the resource, they fish from the shore using low technology gear and the fish caught are generally used for their own consumption, while a surplus may be sold locally. Commercial line fishing catches fish for sale while recreational fishing occurs when fishers go to fish for fun and as a past-time.

Recreational fishers may release their catch or they may take it home. Together, the three sectors of the line fishery (commercial, recreational and subsistence) target between 95 and 200 of South Africa's 2 200 marine fish species DAFF (2012a). Apart from snoek, line fishers also catch other fish species like Giant trevally (*Caranx ignobilis*), yellow tail (*Seriola lalandi*), red roman (*Chrysoblephus laticeps*), black marlin (*Makaira indica*), Dusky kob (*Argyrosomus japonicas*), 'haarder', commonly known as harder-southern mullet (*Liza richardsonii*), maarsbanker (*Trachurus delagoa*), Hottentot (*Pachymetopon blochii*) and panga (*Pterogymnus laniarius*) (West and Marsac 2013, Attwood and Bennett 1995). Line fishing takes place from Port Nolloth in the Northern Cape on the West Coast, to Richards Bay in KwaZulu-Natal on the South West (Croome 2013, DEAT 2005). This area is divided into three Zones namely A, B and C (DAFF 2010b). Snoek is caught within Zone A. The fishing method is exceptionally traditional in nature with fisher families having participated, in many instances, for generations and centuries and is characterised by insecure labour relations (DEAT 2005). When fishing for snoek, skippers employ fishers on an *ad hoc* basis. Snoek fishers do not have employment benefits like leave days and provident fund. The origins of such exploitation can be traced back to the 1940s when the South African Sea Products company became a fishing monopoly on the Hout Valley when workers were forced to work for one large fishing company and the dependency relationships between labour and capital were uniformly extended to the entire workforce in the valley (van Sittert 1985).

Commercial line fishing along the South African coastline comprises about 3 000 boats and provides a livelihood for an estimated 25 000 people spread along the entire South African coast (Mann et al. 2000). However, the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) states that in the late 1990s the total number of registered vessels was estimated to be at 700 of which 37% of all boats were operating in marine fisheries in South Africa. But as of 2012, 455 boats were in operation (DAFF 2012b). And yet still, Griffiths (2000) argues that the Cape commercial line fishery consists of about 2 500 vessels (which are 5.5-15 m long), which operate on the continental shelf (5 -130 m depth) between the Orange and Kei Rivers (coastline length of 2500 km) using handline or rod-and-reel (Griffiths 2000). Most line fish caught is not exclusively target of this fishery but form important components of the catch or by-catch of other

fisheries. This complicates the management of this resource. Commercial line fishery is considered to be a low earning but labour intensive industry which is important from a human livelihood point of view. The line fishery as a whole, excluding the estuarine sector, is estimated to provide employment for approximately 130 000 people, and to contribute about R 2.2 billion annually to the economies of the four coastal provinces - Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Cape and Western Cape (DAFF 2012b, McGrath et al. 1997).

2.4. Brief snoek biology

Snoek (*Thyrsites atun*) is a long, thin, commercial food fish belonging to the snake mackerel family (Norton 2013). It used to be known as the “zee snoek” by the Dutch settlers in the 1600s (Isaacs 2013, Nakamura and Parin 1993). It is also known as the Cape Snoek and thrives in the temperate waters of the Southern Hemisphere. In Southern Africa it occurs within the Benguela Ecosystem (Griffiths 2002). It is found near continental shelves or around islands and feeds on crustaceans, cephalopods and small fish like anchovy and pilchard. Snoek is found from the top water to the sea bed to depths of 550 metres and forms schools near the bottom of mid-water and prefers water temperatures of between 13 °C (55 °F) and 18 °C (64 °F) (Nakamura and Parin 1993). The Benguela Current Ecosystem as a system can be loosely considered as covering the continental shelf between the Angola-Benguela frontal zone in northern Namibia/Southern Angola and the Agulhas retroflection area (Hampton et al. 2003). The occurrence of snoek within this ecosystem stretches from southern Angola right through Namibia to Mossel Bay in South Africa (Hampton et al. 2003). However, some authors argue that the *Thyrsites atun* have been recorded from northern Angola to Algoa Bay on the South African east coast but are mostly found between the Cunene River and Cape Agulhas, i.e. in the Benguela ecosystem (Griffiths 2002, Mann et al. 2000). South African snoek fishers indicated that they fish snoek within the stretch from Lamberts Bay, about 280 kilometres to the north of Cape Town and Arniston Village which is some 190 kilometres to the south east of Cape Town. *Thyrsites atun* also flourishes in other continents. It is also found off Tristan da Cunha in the mid southern Atlantic, off Western Australia and New Zealand, where it is known as *barracouta* (which should not be confused with the game fish barracuda) and the east and west coasts of Southern America (Chile

and Argentina) where it is called the *sierra* and the islands of Amsterdam and St. Paul (Griffiths 2003). Fig 2 shows the distribution of snoek the world over.





Figure 2: The global range and proliferation of *Thyrsites atun* (shown in red)

Source: FAO Fact Sheet, 2014



The body of snoek is dark blue, slightly paler on the belly; the first dorsal fin membrane is black (Nakamura and Parin 1993).



Snoek displayed for sale along Robert Sobukwe Road, Bellville. Source: P Mubaiwa.

Snoek are a large predatory, pelagic schooling species whose movement is highly unpredictable depending on seasons (Hampton et al. 2003). The seasonal migrations of this fish are known as “snoek runs”. The snoek run is seen as “...a moment in which a communal spirit of place, in all its incarnations, is performed,” (Norton 2013, 4). Snoek are a resilient and fast-growing species with the South African snoek population attaining 50% sexual maturity at a fork length of ca.73.0 cm in 3 years (Griffiths et al. 2002, Mann 2000). The fish spawns off-shore in winter/spring (Griffiths 2002). The unpredictable movement of snoek makes them less vulnerable to overfishing. The DAFF uses various stock indicators including the catch per unit of effort (CPUE) to assess the status of line fish and snoek, which is said to be 40-50% optimally exploited (Hara 2014).

2.5. Snoek catches over the years

Snoek is a lively creature which is historically, culturally, economically, and ecologically active in the Western Cape (Isaacs 2013, Norton 2013). Snoek is a well-known species and is the mainstay of line fisheries in the Western Cape, comprising more than 40% of the line fish that is landed (DAFF 2012b, Isaacs 2013, Mann et al. 2000). However, Isaacs (2013) argues that line

fishery accounts for more than 50% of line fishery which is landed. *Thyrsites atun* has been a commercial species since the early 1800s mostly caught with hand lines although trawling has been used after 1960 with a total catch peaking to 81 000 metric tons in 1978 (Griffiths 2002). Annual catches for 1991-95 were between 14,437 tonnes and 22,920 tonnes, and 93% of it was in South African waters (Nakamura and Parin: 1993). *Thyrsites atun* is also targeted by recreational fishers whose statistics are difficult to get. While the Australian and New Zealand snoek stock has been studied extensively, the life history of the South African snoek has been difficult to obtain because of relatively few studies done on it despite its importance in socio-economic and ecological terms in the Western Cape (Griffiths 2002).

Snoek is also caught as by-catch in both the inshore and offshore demersal large scale ⁶trawl fisheries. By-catch refers to fish which is caught accidentally by trawling companies while targeting different fish species. Trawling vessels for example, occasionally catch snoek as by-catch when their target would be hake. The by-catch of the trawl fishery is approximately 10 000 metric tonnes landed per year (Mann et al. 2000). Looking at the statistics, the average catch per boat increased from 4,669 tonnes in the period 1897 – 1906, then to 5,999 tonnes for the period 1927 -1931 and declined to 3,454 tonnes in the years 1986 to 1998 per year. The snoek catch in 2000 was 74% of the period 1897 – 1906, and 56% of that of the period 1927 -1931. The fluctuations over the three periods indicate that snoek has not depleted (Mann et al. 2000).

Most of the snoek which is caught in South Africa's West Coast is transported to the Cape Town metropolitan and other peri-urban areas (Isaacs and Hara 2007) where it is sold fresh. In South Africa, snoek is mostly caught from a stretch running from Lamberts Bay to Arniston within the Western Cape coastal area (Croome pers. comm. 2013). However, it is mainly eaten by coloured people in the south eastern coastal parts of Cape Town (Isaacs 2013) commonly known as the Cape Flats.

⁶ This is also known as the hake sector and makes use of big boats which can stay at sea for weeks, freezing the catch at sea.

Despite its importance, a considerable amount of *barracouta* is imported into South Africa from New Zealand and sold in some supermarket chains as South African snoek. It is estimated that about 100 tonnes of frozen *barracouta* is from New Zealand per annum (Isaacs 2013) while another estimate puts the amounts of *barracouta* imports at 5 000 tonnes (Hara 2014). However, South Africa's snoek and New Zealand's *barracouta* are the same species. Referring to *barracouta* as “snoek” can erroneously be construed to mean that it was caught within South African waters. Being a “traditionally and culturally important” part of South Africa since the 1600s, “snoek” should be a local, trademarked product name that can only be used for fish caught in local waters, much the same as Champagne refers only to sparkling wine from the Champagne region in France (Isaacs 2013). When snoek fishers were interviewed on what they thought of the matter they also said that *barracouta* should be properly labelled and identified (Norton 2013).

These imports are viewed as impacting negatively on the locally caught snoek as well as on the livelihoods of the fisherfolk which depend on this fish (Isaacs 2013, Hara 2014). Pursuing that trajectory, it can also be inferred that in the absence of imports, incomes earned from the trade in locally harvested snoek in all probability, would be higher than what is the case at present as local consumers would only buy locally caught fish. In principle, this would transform to higher living standards for local fishers and traders. Little is known of snoek as a researched species (Griffiths 2003) since most surveys favour certain fish species for studies, in particular valuable commercial fish species. This has led to little understanding of fish of less commercial value. It is ideal that all fish species should be studied so that they can be managed and understood better in terms of conservation regardless of their commercial status (Nashima 2009).

2.6. Snoek catches and trends in South Africa

There are differing arguments on which sector lands more snoek, the line fishery or the trawling sector. From the statistics available, (see Fig 3 below), there seems to be a non-conclusive answer to this conjecture. For the period 2001 to 2007, the trawl sector landed more snoek than the traditional line fishery. However, this pattern tends to change as from 2008 to 2012, where according to the statistics, line fishers landed a higher percentage of snoek than the trawling

commercial sector. It is also unfortunate that the Fisheries Handbooks do not have snoek catch statistics for line fishery for the years 2008, 2010 and 2012. They also have omissions for mid-water trawl (which is part of the trawling sector statistics) catches for the period 2001 to 2009.

Tonnes




Figure 3: Snoek catches for the period 2001 to 2012 (in tonnes)

Source: Information obtained from Hara, 2014; and Fisheries Handbooks 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013.

Some authors however, argue that approximately 40% of the South African snoek catch for the period 1990 to 1996 was made by traditional hand line fishermen while trawlers accounted for 60% (Griffiths et al. 2002, Mann 2013). This may not be an accurate assessment as the commercial line-catch may be under-reported by as much as 75% (McGrath et al. 1997, Isaacs 2013). Information gathered indicates that it is not easy to quantify accurately the value of snoek which is landed and most line caught fish goes to informal traders including some of the trawlers when sold as fresh (Handley 2013, pers. comm.). Boat owners who employ line fishers use fishing permits on the basis of the total allowable effort (TAE) to catch snoek whilst trawling companies supposedly get snoek as by-catch. The law allows the trawling sector to land snoek as long as they do so within their quota allocations (Peeha, pers. comm. 2013). For some reason, snoek catches fluctuate from year to year. The variation is determined by factors such as water

conditions, the extent of snoek movement and the availability of nutrients within the Benguela ecosystem. For some unknown reasons, in many parts of the world, some fishing periods are simply better than others in terms of fish size and quantity (Handley 2013, pers. comm., NORAD FAO Project 2012, Udong et al. 2009).

2.7. Governance within the snoek value chain

Like in all other marine and coastal resources, governance within snoek fisheries is guided by the DAFF as it is the authority which issues fishing rights and permits to fishers. According to the DAFF, snoek fishery falls under traditional line fishery (DAFF 2010b). Under this, fishery permits are issued through the Director for Inshore Fisheries Management. Permits are issued subject to the provisions and regulations of various Acts of Parliament which include the Marine Living Resources Act (1998), the National Environment Management Act (1998), National Environment Management Biodiversity Act (2004) to name just a few (DAFF 2010b). The Director has powers to amend the permit conditions after consulting with permit holders and relevant recognised business bodies. For most part, permit conditions outline the responsibilities of holders like the disposal of waste at sea, the total allowable effort, which fish products to harvest and how permits can be transferred to other individuals. Traditional line fishery permit holders are required by law to submit catch statistics which are recorded in the 'blue book' (DAFF 2010b). Failure to adhere to the permit conditions may lead to legal proceedings being instituted against transgressors. The DAFF uses Regional Management Areas and has established zones where respective permits are required to operate within demarcated zones. The zones are identified as Zone A, which runs from Port Nolloth to Cape Infanta, Zone B Cape Infanta to Cape St John's and Zone C which is KwaZulu-Natal (DAFF 2010b). Each permit is valid in only one zone and does not overlap onto other zones. Apart from the above, permit holders are required to adhere to vessel specifications in terms of boat sizes which are in tandem with their permits. Permit holders are required to pay levies as determined by the DAFF.

The DAFF regulations also specify fish species which are prohibited from being caught. For those fish species that can be caught, regulations specify the fish size to be landed and the bag limit. For the Cape Snoek, the minimum size that is allowed to be landed is 60 centimetres which

is measured in a straight line from the tip of the snout to the extreme end of the tail (DAFF 2010b). Snoek does not have bag limits as it is regarded as being exploited optimally. Traditional line fishers have designated landing bays. They are prohibited from using any other landing zones apart from those indicated on their permit conditions.

The researcher believes that permit conditions should be administered cautiously. In coming up with such rules and regulations, it is in everyone's interest for government to involve the civic society organisations, private citizens and fishing communities in pursuance to the system of belief of the interactive governance framework. The emphasis is for transparency in the eyes of all stakeholders so that regulations are drawn up collectively for them to be morally binding for all. There was dissent in the Western Cape in January 2014 when the DAFF released the names of small scale fishers who had been allocated fishing rights for the traditional line fishery. Several seasoned fishers had been left off the list, to their disappointment. After traditional line fishing rights expired on New Year's Eve in 2013, fishermen were required by law to re-apply. When the allocation process was done, the South African Commercial Linefish Association (SACLA) cried foul and claimed that it was fraught with irregularities. According to the Association chairperson, Wally Croome, of the 303 of their members who re-applied, only 115 were successful. As a result, SACLA took government to court over what they perceived to be a process which was fraught with irregularities and with a gross lack of lucidity in the allocation of fishing rights. The court ruled in favour of the SACLA and the then Minister of the DAFF, Tina Joemat-Pettersson was forced to set aside the original allocations to pave the way for an independent audit. Those fishers who had lost their rights were given a reprieve by the court to keep on fishing until certain clarifications were to be made by the DAFF. Some other fishing associations were up in arms, claiming their livelihoods were also at risk (Eye Witness News 2014).

2.8. Chapter summary

This chapter shows that fisheries are crucial to the economy of the Western Cape, especially if we take into account the broader economic ramifications. Thousands of people earn their living from activities related to the fisheries sector. The sector also generates income which is critical for the employees and their dependants. Snoek has been shown to comprise the biggest

percentage of all the line fish which is caught in the traditional line fisheries sector. As a result, the management and governance of this fish should be in such a way that it does not interfere negatively on the way snoek players derive livelihoods from it. The next chapter will examine the literature review which was conducted to come up with a framework to analyse snoek traders' operations.



CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1. Introduction

This chapter looks at the conceptual framework which was relied on in order to identify the roles played by informal snoek traders in Cape Town. It is very important to understand the theoretical underpinnings that govern the activities of small scale fishers and informal fish trading in general. In this respect six theoretical frameworks were examined. The examination involved analysing the concepts interactive fisheries governance theory, the informal sector (informal economy), multiple livelihoods framework, gender relations, and power relations. This is represented in Fig 4.




Figure 4: The conceptual framework of this study.

Such a multi-faceted approach is of significance since it allows this study to be placed contextually against other studies done before it and in other parts of the world. This has several advantages. Firstly, such an approach makes it convenient to identify the dynamics, roles and

functions of fish traders. Secondly, it affords the opportunity for us to grasp the basics on how the informal sector operates as well as the main pillars of value chain analysis. Thirdly, it would be possible to make comparisons across the spectrum of informal fish traders from other parts of the world and then juxtapose findings to those of Cape Town snoek traders. The literature review makes it possible to unpack theoretical concepts crucial for this study. The fourth advantage is that such an approach allows us to understand operations of informal fish traders since we would have grasped the theoretical aspects of the informal economy.

3.2. Governance and fisheries

In its broadest sense, governance refers to how any organisation or country is run. Governance has undergone transformations since the public sector reforms (like the privatisation and commercialisation of state entities) in many developed countries. These reforms meant that some of the roles which were exclusively performed by the state had to be shifted to markets, quasi-markets and networks (Bevir 2009). So for most of the cases in the world today, the state relies on other players to secure its intentions and deliver its policies (Bevir 2009). The IMF views governance as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority necessary to manage a nation's affairs (IMF 2007). Governance has to do with how political actors affect formal and informal rules; how they live by and through rules but that such rules could be, but are not necessarily, of the network type (Kjær 2011). Governance can also be viewed as the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action (Stoker 1998). The argument is that entities depend on other actors to achieve their goals and each entity needs the other even though one entity may dominate the process of exchange. In a value chain, governance refers to the structure of relationships and coordination mechanisms that exist between economic agents in that value chain (Kjær 2011). As a result, it is argued that the old and traditional understanding of governance as referring to the state as the sole governor is no longer accurate in today's world. Governance is the whole spectrum of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities. It includes the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them (Kooiman et al. 2008). Small-scale fisheries are an institution in that their

term's usage has constituted a frame of reference for approaches to fisheries and fisheries governance. HLPE (2014: 73) argues that:

Governance could, in a simplified way, be summarized as being composed of three elements: the rules themselves (including formal and informal ones); the way/process by which they are established and who contributes to it; the way they are implemented (and monitored etc.) and who is involved.

Governance looks at issues on how people decide and which people decide on what needs to be done at different levels within given institutions. In fisheries this looks at the way the fishery resources are managed, organized and run. Within fisheries, governance seeks to identify governance challenges for fisheries and aquaculture to deliver on food security and nutritional goals (HLPE 2014, Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011).

From a policy point of view, the scrutiny of governance in value chains is very important in the sense that it allows the identification of institutional arrangements that are required to improve the capabilities and efficiency in the value chain, remedy distributional distortions and increase value added within the sector (Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011). It was noted that the issue of governance is critical in terms of how fisherfolk interact and conduct their business activities within the informal setting. It is important to note that definitions of governance may vary given that its key concepts are derived from innumerable disciplines like public administration, political science, economics, business and sociology (Bevir 2009, Stoker 1998).

3.2.1 Why do we need governance in fisheries?

Studying governance aids us to "...explore abstract analyses of the construction of social orders, social coordination, or social practices irrespective of their specific content" (Bevir, 2009: 3). Governance is particularly important because it determines who has access to fisheries resources and has bearing on the integrity of fisheries resources and the distribution of fish benefits (HLPE 2014). The HLPE (2014) argues that in most countries, little attention is given to the ways different individuals and groups (including poorer and marginalized people in the fisheries and aquaculture supply chains, but also poor consumers more generally) will gain, lose, or be excluded from access to fish resources and to fish as a food commodity.

3.2.2 Actors in governance

The interactive perspective on governance argues that society is made up of a number of governing actors, who are constrained or enabled by their surroundings (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). Actors are any social unit possessing agency or power of action which includes individuals, associations, firms, governmental agencies and international bodies. Actors in governance depend on the type of government in place and on whether the place is within a rural or urban setting. Within governance spheres various groups of actors seek to have their voices heard. Within a rural setting, actors would typically include traditional and religious leaders, powerful business people, farmers, school governing boards, NGOs and councillors. In urban areas actors can take the form of political parties, media lobbyists, NGOs, workers' organisations (for example the Confederation of South African Trade Unions and its affiliates), business organisations like the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Fig 5 identifies the main actors in an urban setting. All other actors apart from government are collectively known as "civil society." In some parts of the world, criminal syndicates (like the mafia) have become powerful actors such that they are able to lobby and influence the governance process. In some political spheres, powerful politically connected families may also influence governance through corruption. Governance has been identified to be any pattern of rule that arises either when the state is dependent upon others or when it plays little or no role (Bevir 2009). As a result there are types of governance which include global governance and corporate governance. Governance expresses a growing awareness of the ways in which forms of power and authority can secure order even in the absence of state activity (Bevir 2009). Within that line of reasoning we arrive at what is known as the interactive fisheries governance framework.

Kooiman and Bavinck (2013: 9) argue that, "Interactive governance is a theoretical perspective that emphasizes the governing roles of state, market and civil society." The two authors point out that governance theory comes in different versions and schools, all of which share the view that governance is beyond government. This state of affairs is caused by societal realities of diversity, dynamics and complexity, which rule out the state from being the only governor (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). In the view of the two authors, 'interactive governance', has to do with solving

societal problems and creating opportunities through interface between civil, public and private people and organizations (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013).

Repeated failure to acknowledge and examine the diversity, complexity, and dynamics of small-scale fisheries can aggravate problems for fisheries governance as policies designed on assumptions of homogeneity or on outdated conditions dither on the reality of complex, globalised, and changing fisheries (Johnson 2006). The fisheries and marine ecosystems face many challenges but their diversity, complexity, and dynamics make it impossible to prescribe a fixed set of interventions that will hold for all cases (Bavinck et al. 2005). Such a flexible process orientation is necessary to match the diversity and complexity of actors and problems within and among fisheries, and to respond to the transformations in their relationships and the conditions within which they are embedded. Such an approach has been adopted by the FishGovNet and highlights the importance of the institutions through which actors negotiate rules, sanctions, and incentives (Bavinck et al. 2005).

As has been mentioned above, traditional theories deal with governance issues related to actions by government. And yet it can be seen that these days governance is done in many organisations leading to corporate governance which essentially deals with the running of private companies and any such organisations. Private enterprises, civic organizations, communities, political parties, universities, the media, and the general public, among others, are all in one way or another involved in governance (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). Kooiman and Bavinck (2005: 17) thus define interactive governance as:

The whole of interactions taken to solve societal problems and to create societal opportunities, including the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them.

According to the two authors, interactive governance seeks to tackle problems in society and identify opportunities within a given situation.




Figure 5: Urban Actors

Source: UNESCAP, 2009.


3.2.3 Governance within South African fisheries

Governance in South African fisheries appears to adopt the top-down approach since the DAFF prescribes rules and regulations on fisheries management with little consultation with stakeholders. In this respect government plays its part by establishing rules within the fishing industries. These rules come in the form of regulations, by-laws and legislation. The South African government, through the Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) issues permits to different categories of fisheries according to the size and type of fish or

seafood. These permits are commonly referred to as permit conditions (DAFF 2010b). Governments use various policies and instruments to ensure that the levels of capture of fishery resources are adhered to (HLPE 2014). Some of the measures used have to do with the management of fishing capacities and fishing rights, including individually allocated annual quotas. An increasing number of countries use rules like annual catch quotas to manage marine and fresh water resources. Rules and regulations in fishing are made to achieve certain objectives like outlawing poaching (e.g. perlemoen poaching in Hangberg in Hout Bay), reducing overfishing or exploitation of fishery resources which are facing extinction.

3.2.4 Governability

Within the realms of interactive governance, governability is defined as “the overall capacity for governance of any societal entity or system” (Kooiman et al. 2008: 3), whereby a societal system is understood to consist of a combination of human and natural characteristics. The analysis of governance focuses on actors within the decision-making process. Players in the process are both formal and informal. The principle of interactive fisheries governance identifies three players within its governance framework. These are the state, markets and civil society (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013).







Figure 6: Interactive governance perspective of a societal system

Source: Kooiman and Bavinck, 2013




The definition of governability is built on the notion that societies, or parts thereof termed societal systems, are made up of three related components: a system-to-be governed, a governing system, and governing interactions (See Fig. 6). Such an approach proposes that governability depends on the merits of the object of governance (the system- to-be-governed), its subject (the governing system) and the connection (governing interactions) between the two (Kooiman et al. 2008). Governors, the governed, and their relations all contribute to the available governability. Such a viewpoint has important consequences for an appraisal of governing capacities. Rather than attributing failure to a shortcoming of only the governing system, it urges for a holistic assessment of the situation at hand. Governability depends on the ability of a governing system to deliver on the challenges that the system-to-be-governed raises (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013).

3.2.5 Governance in fish chains

Fish chains move from the marine ecology, through harvesting, processing, marketing and distribution, to the end consumer and, in so doing, they seep into multiple scale levels. Kooiman and Bavinck (2013) argue that it follows that the shrimp extracted from a particular ecosystem in, for example, South India, proceeds, through transactions at local, national and international levels, to the consumers' plates in Europe, North America, or East Asia. And yet another species of little international demand, is destined more for the local market, and follows a different chain route with its own configuration of actors (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). In the Western Cape, South Africa, hake (*Merluccius capensis* and *Merluccius paradoxus*) is an example of the former while snoek is an example of the latter. Most snoek is consumed fresh locally within the metropolitan area of Cape Town. In addition, the two authors argue that governing interactions are mutually influencing relations between two or more actors or entities in a governance setting. The minimal condition for governance interactions is the willingness or ability of actors to participate within a system (Gordon et al. 2011, Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). As a result, the interactive governance theory suggests that the central features of the system-to-be governed and the governing system are normally reflected in governing interactions (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013, Stoker 1998). A well-organized and powerful societal sector will thus find these qualities represented in governing interactions (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013).

As a result, less complex fisheries chains thus require significantly different governing arrangements than do more complex chains. For example, a large commercial fishery that uses a few large vessels to exploit a few relatively stable resources with outputs that are processed and sold in supermarkets may be inherently more governable than a widely dispersed, small-scale fishery from which products are distributed freshly by a large number of middlemen with little organization of either fishers or distributors (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). It would appear that snoek falls within this category since the langanas have little organisation amongst themselves and are scattered all over the south eastern townships as they conduct their business at their exclusive designated spots.

There are different stakeholders within fisheries and for that reason they have competing and, more often than not, conflicting interests, values and worldviews. Thus, in practice it is close to impossible to get consensus about what the problems are and how to go about solving them. Even when they share similar interests, different stakeholders tend to state the problem in their own way. Homogeneity is very difficult to find across the board. This is also reflected in the concerns that each group would consider most important, thus differentiating what they want the governing system to concentrate on (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). The way small fishers are organized and are interacting with traders plays a crucial role in determining income, both in level and stability, and to provide viable livelihood activities (HLPE 2014). Governing interactions are mutually influencing relations between two or more actors or entities in a governance setting (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). Governance interactions require that there be a willingness and the ability of actors to participate. However it is difficult to ensure that all members of society take part in governance initiatives if one considers the levels of illiteracy and poverty which prevail in most fishing communities in developing countries. There is always a danger of elite seizure from the enlightened and powerful within such communities. In any case, the concept of democracy may be little understood in such societies.



3.2.6 What happens when a governance system fails?

Hauck (2008) argues that in South Africa the illegal harvesting of abalone and rock lobster continues because poachers see it as a way of getting justice. This is especially so as they feel that they were marginalised during apartheid and now they are being excluded from participating fully within the fisheries sector by the new policies being made by the democratic government. A more inclusive governance of voluntary sustainability standards would create partnerships and initiatives which work better for small fishers and operators, both by including food security and nutrition concerns in the standards and by devising procedures adapted to the needs and capacities of small actors (HLPE 2014). According to Hauck (2008), poachers view that implementation of top down policies worsens their plight since they prohibit them from accessing these valuable marine resources. If the law is seen by the poor to be consolidating some groups, compliance with the law is reduced. People then break rules since they feel that it

is their right and this is a form of social protest especially when fishers are unemployed and poor and they do not have any other sources of food or income from fishing (Hauck 2008). Johnson (2013) argues that a broader conception of fisheries governance may be in society's best interest especially in the developing countries since there are so many people who are involved within these fisheries and secondly because of the need to create sustainable fisheries which contribute economically and socially. It appears that the application of the interactive fisheries governance framework as espoused by Kooiman and Bavinck (2013) could be the solution to make rules and regulations morally binding on the part of all stakeholders especially fishing communities. Jentoft (2013) argues that interactive governance allows for stakeholders to reach some agreement on which priorities to pursue and how evaluations should be done. Jentoft (2013: 63) concludes by saying:

Regardless of power differentials, interactive governance theory advocates a participatory process characterized by transparency, accountability, cohesiveness and inclusiveness. These governance principles are also about social justice, i.e. the right to be recognized and to have a say in the decision-making on issues within which people have things at stake. Thus, for enhancing governability, procedural justice is as much about governability as it is about distributional justice, and procedural justice is as important as the institutional design of governance systems.

The crux of the matter on what entails interactive governance is that fisheries as resources must be managed democratically with all stakeholders taking part in the making of the most important decisions which have far reaching consequences for everyone concerned as well as the sustainability and health of the resource being exploited.

3.3 Power relations

In his critique of Michel Foucault's philosophical work, Bălan (2010) gives us an insight into what power entails. Power is understood to be the capacity of an agent to impose his or her will over the will of the powerless, or the ability to force them to do things they do not wish to do. In this sense, power is understood as possession, as something owned by those in power. People get power over others for various reasons (Bălan 2010). Moncrieffe (2004) argues that the more

common perception of power is that it is essentially negative: power compels people to do what they would not choose to do. Power distorts knowledge and truth, and relies on repression and violence. Power may have autocratic tendencies. Power describes the ability of persons or groups to get things done effectively, particularly when their goals are obstructed by some kind of human and institutional resistance or opposition (Moncrieffe 2004). The main poverty dimensions, the lack of income and assets, the lack of voice and power as well as vulnerability have more impact on the lives of informal economy actors than on the formal economy (Becker 2004). The privileged and economically powerful persons have the ability to make other people work for them. Influential leaders become centrally positioned both in the knowledge and gear-exchange networks, can play a particularly important role in community-level natural-resource governance in general, and in instigating communities to collectively transform the way they use their natural resources in particular (Crona and Bodin 2010). Power relationships occur where there is an unbalance of power between the people interacting within a system or an institution. Dumont (1996) argues that an individual, whether s/he wishes to or not, fits into some sort of a network of power relationships which is often very complex. This is true for everyone whether he or she holds a position of authority or is subjected to it, whether he has the means to impose his wish upon those who are dependent on him, or whether he is obliged to hedge between the different forces which try to impose themselves on him. Everyone is a victim of power relations networks Dumont (1996). If one is more powerful than the other, then such a person feels strong and in control of themselves and the situation. The lesser powered person possibly will feel abused and generally puts up with the controlling and manipulative ways of the person in higher power (Crona and Bodin 2010).

Value chains experience repetitive interactions with a certain organisation linked to this amongst the various actors in the specific value chain. This, according to Gordon et al. (2011) reflects on power relations or governance of the chain. The power that any actors may have in a chain is reflected by the degree of their ability to make other parties take particular actions or their ability to be deaf to the demands of others. Power relations as used in the value chain analysis to describe actors who not only determine their own actions but may powerfully influence the ability of others to act, setting parameters for others to conform (Gordon et al. 2011, Kooiman

and Bavinck 2013, Stoker 1998). Moncrieffe (2004) asserts that sometimes people may become poor because of the deliberate actions and inactions of others. The dominant and the powerful groups are able to influence resource allocation and exploitation by preventing or helping the poor to improve their 'capacity to make purposive choice'/exercise agency. As a result, poverty is likely to deepen when people are trapped in arrangements that limit their power, which the World Bank defines as their 'capacity to make choice effective' (Moncrieffe 2004). The dominant and powerful are always able to have their way in many instances.

3.3.1 Examples of power relations at play

Power relations have an effect on how natural resources are exploited and more so fisheries. In the cases of Ghana, Tarawa and Sao Tome and Principe, power is strongly concentrated in the hands of fish traders. Traders command more power as they would have pre-financed fishing trips. These traders have the exclusive rights to buy the fish from the same fishers whom they pre-financed at preferred prices (Tekanene 2004, IFAD 1999, Overa 1993, Walker 2002). However, power shifts because of some reasons. In studies conducted in Ghana's Western region, Sao Tome and Principe, Malawi and Bangladesh it was shown that power relations may shift depending on the season and the extent of fishing success (Chiwaula et al, 2012, IFAD 1999, Gordon et al. 2011:28, NORAD FAO Project 2012). Seasonality shifts the balance of power between fishers and traders. In the high season when fish catches are many, fish traders command more power in determining fish prices. Since fish is a perishable commodity, fishers have little choice but to sell them to the traders before they turn bad.

Another interesting case study is that of Sarawak which showed that during the high season, middlemen would ask for credit from fishers. Under the circumstances, the middlemen would not have enough cash to pay the fishermen right at the time of sale (Merlijn 1989: 692). Fishers give fish to middlemen on credit who will pay later after selling fish. During the low season fishers have more bargaining power because of fish scarcity. However, it will be noted that, there is a symbiotic relationship between the women and the fishers in the fishing industry. As Chiwaula et al (2012 12) remarked, "Neither could survive without the other" and that the relationship between fishers and middlemen is not one of exploitation but one of social agreement with mutual benefit. Fishers need an efficient marketing system for their fish since

fish is perishable. They also require loans and inputs without having to go through cumbersome procedures. Middlemen on the other hand require an uninterrupted supply of substantial fish. As a result middlemen are always prepared to address the needs of fishers to the best of their ability. And for this reason, many fishers have long-lasting relationships with specific middlemen (Merlijn 1989).

3.4 The informal economy

Snoek traders are part of the blossoming informal economy in South Africa. The term “informal economy” is more appropriate to use instead of “informal sector” because the former indicates that there is a continuum from the informal to the formal ends of the economy. Informal economy also includes enterprises as well as employment in developing, transition, and advanced industrialized economies. However, the two terms will be used interchangeably in this article. Informal and formal institutions coexist and they shape important development outcomes (de Soysa and Jütting 2006). The term “informal sector or economy” has assumed other names like the second economy, the black market, the unofficial economy, the parallel economy or the shadow economy (Davids 2011, Dijkstra 2006).

3.4.1 The informal economy: A historical perspective

As is widely known, the term “informal sector” has its roots in the work of Keith Hart, a British anthropologist who “discovered” the informal sector while working amongst low-income activities in Accra of unskilled migrants from Northern Ghana who could not find wage employment, in 1971 (Bangasser 2000, Gërkhani 2003, Losby et al. 2002). Davids (2011) argues that Hart thought that the informal sector in Ghana would disappear once Ghana developed towards industrialisation (Davids 2011). Hart’s argument was that as the economy developed through capitalism, it would have the ability to absorb the labour that was excess at the time. Decent jobs would be created as the industry developed. Labour within the informal economy would abandon its activities in pursuit for better paying activities within the formal industries. However more than 40 years later the informal economy still exists in Ghana and other developing countries and indications are that it continues to grow.

The term “informal sector” was then adopted and popularised by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1972 on its mission to Kenya (Arellano 1994). In its seminal article “Report on income and employment in Kenya” (1972) the ILO mission argued that the informal economy was mostly small-scale in nature and could not compare with large-scale and capital intensive production conducted by the corporate establishments. The assumption at the time was that the informal and formal economies had no links between each other. The dualists were in agreement with Hart that the informal economy was a temporary phenomenon and was going to disappear (Davids 2011, Wiego 2011).

3.4.2 The dualist model

The proponents of the dualist model argue that the informal and formal economies do not have links between them and are intrinsically different (Davids 2011). The model propounds that the two sectors operate autonomously from each other. The arguments are that the formal economy is difficult to establish especially in developing countries (as it requires huge capital outlay and depends on advanced technology), depends on external inputs and experiences economies of scale to survive. The formal economy is distinct from the informal economy in the sense that entry to engage in its activities is easy, and utilizes local indigenous resources and the businesses are characteristically small and run along family lines exploiting low levels of technology. Fig 7 is a diagrammatic depiction of the dualist economy.




Figure 7: The Dualist Model of economic activity

Source: Davids (2011: 9).

3.4.3 The underground model

Dualists categorised formal and informal economies and failed to account for legal products which are produced in criminal ways. The dualists' perspective has been criticised on the basis that this approach acknowledged the existence of the informal and formal economies and yet it ignored illegal activities (Davids 2011). Against the criticism of the dual economy model, it is therefore acknowledged that there are linkages between the formal and the informal economies (Du Toit and Neves 2007, Petersen 2011, Neves and du Toit 2012, Davids 2011). This is partly because some products are manufactured illegally and yet end up being sold to formal players who use them legally (Petersen 2011). Added to that, some people perform activities in self-employment initiatives and yet at the same time they combine them with regular wage or salary income (Losby et al. 2002). There are enterprising individuals who work and earn regular

salaries and yet they switch activities. They earn wages from the normal working hours and then engage in informal activities afterwards. The weaknesses of the dualist mode led Rakowski to develop the “underground model” (Davids 2011). As Davids (2011) argues, Rakowski’s model identifies products which are produced using illegal production processes and yet at the end the final product becomes a legal output sold in licenced outlets. The underground model argues that the informal economy occurred due to economic crises, restrictive labour laws and globalisation. Innovative business people sought ways of avoiding bureaucracy and taxation and started to manufacture products without the knowledge of the authorities. Once manufactured the products would be sold as legal goods. Petersen (2011) acknowledges this position by arguing that link between the formal and informal economy can be seen in this regard as individuals enter and exit the two economies. Sub-contracting between the two economies occurs. Another linkage between the two sectors is that people who are working within the informal sector earn income which they use to acquire goods and services which are supplied by the formal sector (Davids 2011). Income flows either way between the two economies. Informal enterprises are intertwined with formal sector cash inputs. (Davids 2011) goes on to argue that the linkages between the formal and informal sectors include not only the leveraging of resources derived from the formal sector into informal enterprises, but also an extensive interaction between formal and informal sector employment. The informal economy actors supply formal businesses with inputs, finished goods and services and *vice versa* (see Fig 8).




Figure 8: The Underground Model showing linkages between the formal and the informal sectors.

Source: Davids (2011: 9)

3.4.4 The informal sector defined: Reviewing existing literature

The informal economy is so diverse, that it is defined in many ways depending on the context, discipline and country concerned. The many definitions of the informal economy should not be an obstacle but a possibility to identify relevant entry points and to select target groups for various interventions (Becker 2004). As such there is no universally accepted definition of the informal economy because of its heterogeneity and diverse activities (Becker 2004, Losby et al. 2002, Yu 2010, Yu 2012). In developing countries the term informal economy is associated with unregistered and unregulated small-scale (and dirty) activities which generate employment and income for the urban (and even rural) poor. Referring to the 1972 ILO mission to Kenya, Becker (2004: 8) informs us that:

The mission observed that the informal sector described activities that are unrecognised, unrecorded, unprotected or unregulated by public authorities was not confined to marginal activities but also included profitable enterprises. Furthermore, the activities of the informal sector were mostly ignored, rarely supported and sometimes actively discouraged by policy makers and governments.

An accurate definition is difficult to get because the term has been used to describe such sundry activities as street vending, hawking, undeclared domestic work, barter, corruption, tax evasion, driving taxis, collecting recyclables, rickshaw pullers, barbers, bookkeeping, arts and crafts, pottery, bricklaying, beadwork, the Mafia, selling *umqomboti* (traditional African beer in *shebeens* – South African context), cool drinks and different types of meat on the streets (Bernabe 2002, Becker 2004, Blaauw 2005, du Toit and Neves 2007, Siqwana-Ndulo 2013).

Getting a universally accepted definition is further compounded as some countries include the agricultural sector when defining the informal economy while others do not. This complicates the task since it becomes difficult to make cross-country comparisons in terms of how much the informal economy contributes to each country's GDP. Failure to define and measure the informal sector in an appropriate manner, hampers the ability of policy makers to identify all the range of activities and address the concerns of the informal economy (Essop and Yu 2008a, Essop and Yu 2008b, Willemse 2011). In Africa, informal activities are undervalued in terms of the roles they play when we try to factor in their contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) because there are no statistics on them (Ubale 2013). Informal activities in many countries show that their operations are characterised by minimal adherence to safety, hygiene standards and the law. As a consequence of the failure to get a common definition of the informal economy, it was considered prudent to have a glance at what other authors have to say on this litigious expression.

3.4.5 Other definitions of the informal economy

This section looks at some of the definitions of the informal sector. Table 2 below summarises these findings.

Table 2: Some of the definitions of the informal economy from selected authors

Author	Definition
Statistics South Africa (SESE-SSA) 2014: 3	The informal sector is defined in terms of registration and the size of the business in terms of the number of employees. In line with the international guidelines, agriculture and private households are identified separately and not included in either the formal or informal sectors.
Becker (2004: 12)	The unregulated non-formal portion of the market economy that produces goods and services for sale or for other forms of remuneration and encompasses all activities by workers and economic units that are practically not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements.
Schneider (2006: 4)	All currently unregistered economic activities that contribute to the officially calculated (or observed) Gross National Product (GNP).
Hart (1973: 68)	The informal economy is generally a part of the overall economy that has low income opportunities, temporary employment, low productivity, constitutes mainly self-employed persons, small-scale enterprises using labour intensive activities in the primary, secondary, tertiary and service industry, whether legitimate or not.
Willemse (2011: 7)	Informal sector, informal economy, informal business and informal trader refer to people who conduct informal street trading on a small scale, mostly from street pavements, and who, as a group offer a large variety of products and basic services to prospective clients.
de Soysa and Jütting (2006: 3)	Informal institutions are: a behavioural regularity based on socially-shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially-sanctioned channels.

3.4.6 Why does the informal economy exist?

It is recognised in some sectors that formal institutions alone do not shape human behaviour, but that much of what goes on can be explained also by informal institutions that are grounded in and emanate from a society's culture (de Soysa and Jütting 2006). Informal structures and economies are therefore necessary in our lives. Bernabè (2002) argues that the informal economy is generated from bureaucracy and corruption. Illegal and criminal activities undermine the legal system and remove production from the official GDP statistics. This distorts cross-country comparisons of national income and GDP per capita Bernabè (2002). The informal economy appears to be growing and contributing significantly to the national incomes in both the developed and the developing world (Davids 2011). This is also the case in South Africa (SESE, Stats SA 2014). Studies done in Latin America showed that informal employment tended to rise during periods of instability and economic crisis (ILO 2002), Tokman 2007, Wiego 2011) and is a coping behaviour (Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay 2010). Research conducted on informal traders in Pretoria found that the majority of them had had formal jobs at one time in their lives. Retrenchments and scaling down of operations saw them unemployed (Blaauw 2005). This seems to support the argument that the informal economy tends to absorb people when formal employment opportunities are scarce (Davids 2011). It appears that as long as there are high rates of unemployment the informal economy is likely to continue to flourish.

Far from being a phenomenon endemic in the developing world, informality can be found in developed nations. Examples given are within the regions of Sicily in Italy and in some streets of New York (Arellano 1994). Sicily is well known as a launch pad for Mafia-related activities whose influences have been felt even beyond the borders of Italy since the 1800s. Informal garment workers thrive in Toronto, as do shoemakers in Madrid, and electronic parts assemblers in Leeds (ILO 2002). Within the European Union it is estimated that the informal sector jobs account for 30% of total employment (ILO 2002). The United States is estimated to have 25% of its workforce within the informal economy (ILO 2002). However, compared to developed countries the informal economy in developing countries exists for different reasons (Davids 2011). Davids argues that in developed countries the informal economy exists because of a "...negative perception of government and because of the burden various taxes imposed"

(Davids 2011: 1). In such a set-up it would pay more to work within the informal sector as such activities are not subject to taxation and stringent government regulations.

In the developing world employment in the informal economy is survivalist in nature since engaging in informal activities enables participants to earn income for that fraction of the populace without jobs. For most part the unemployed have low levels of skills and fail to find other jobs (Davids 2011). This is why they end up turning to the informal economy for sanctuary. Studies conducted by the ILO on India, Mexico and South Africa show that the informal economy was a major component of total employment ranging from about 35% of total employment in South Africa to more than 60% in Mexico and more than 90% in India (ILO 2002). In all three countries women were dominant players representing 30 to 90% of street vendors. The Survey of Employers and the Self-employed (SESE) conducted by Statistics SA established that informal businesses are predominantly run by black Africans, persons aged 35–44 years, and those with the lowest levels of education (SESE, Stats SA 2014). An important role of informal trading is its ability to absorb unemployed people, young and old (SESE, Stats SA 2014, Siqwana-Ndulo 2013). In all developing countries self-employment comprises a greater share of employment representing 70% of informal employment in Sub-Saharan Africa (81% if South Africa is excluded), 62 % in North Africa, 60% in Latin America and 59% in Asia (Becker 2004).

3.4.7 The case for immigrants

Sometimes the status of immigrants getting into a country just forces them to go into informal trading (Losby et al 2002). Immigrants reproduce the informal activities they have been doing in their countries of origin especially if they are moving from less developed countries to more developed countries. Immigrants usually get inferior work and command a heavy presence in sectors like restaurants, barber shops and they also guard cars. They are subject to exploitation and are often threatened by being reported to authorities if they do not comply (Losby et al 2002).

3.4.8 South Africa and the informal economy

Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) indicates that the informal sector in South Africa contributed 5% to GDP (SESE, Stats SA 2014) and the sector continues to grow. In 2014, 15 million people are employed with 1, 5 million people working in the informal sector making 10% of the total employment (SESE, Stats SA 2014). There has been debate on which sex dominates within the informal sector. The latest statistics show that whereas the sector had previously been dominated by women, the tables have turned with more men than women in this sector at 55%. Siqwana-Ndulo (2013) argues that in the past, more women were employed in the informal economy than men estimating that there are 2.4 million women in comparison to 1.6 million men and the majority of the traders are black women. A reconsideration of this claim clarifies that less than 40% of the total increase in employment of 2.2 million was in wage employment in the formal sector (Casale et al. 2004, 10). Be that as it may, Petersen (2011) quotes Saunders (2005:130) as showing that there is a slightly larger share of male workers (averaging more than 55%) in the informal economy compared to their female counterparts. Male informal workers also constituted a slightly higher proportion than female workers in 2011 (Petersen 2011: 7). In the period under review the main activity within the informal sector activity had been trading, but now it has diversified into construction, manufacturing and to some extent finance.

Informal employment is also important in non-urban areas (ILO 2002). There are significant differences in employment across provinces reflecting *inter alia*, the legacy of apartheid. In Limpopo and the Eastern Cape, formal employment is less than half of total employment. However, in the Western Cape and Gauteng provinces more than three quarters of people are employed in the formal economy (QLFS 2012). Limpopo has the highest informal businesses at 6.3%, Mpumalanga at 6.1%, Gauteng at 5% and KwaZulu-Natal at 4.7%.

By its very nature, informal economic activity goes unrecorded and is therefore difficult to measure, but some estimates value the informal economy at around 28% of South Africa's GDP (QLFS 2012). South Africa's GDP is estimated to be R2, 4 trillion. Hence the value of the informal sector becomes R120 billion. Most small informal businesses are run by black African men and those who have little education.

3.4.9 What is the significance of the informal sector?

Most authors regard the sector in a positive way arguing that it is a source of livelihood for the poor (Becker 2004, Blaauw 2005, du Toit and Neves 2007, Nieland 2006, Willemse 2011). Becker (2004) contends that the informal economy may include restricted illegal and restricted legal operations but not criminal operators and that the informal economy is distinct from the criminal economy. The criminal economy deals with crime, illegal goods and services while the informal economy produces and distributes legal goods and services. Tokman (2007 4) estimates that, “out of every 100 new jobs created since 1980, around 60 have been informal”. This sector provides about half of total urban employment (Tokman 2007). The informal economy is large and its share in the labour market continues to grow steadily (Dijkstra 2006). The informal economy promotes survivalist strategies and reduces poverty among impoverished rural and urban communities by creating employment and savings opportunities and enhancing community development through improved entrepreneurial skills (Willemse 2011). The informal economy generates jobs and income and contributes to food supply. Informal players earn income and provide goods and services to their customers. It is argued that without the informal economy, the unemployment rate in South Africa would rise from 25% then to around 47.5% (QLFS 2012). The informal sector contributes significantly to the South African economy since it is estimated that approximately 2.2 million people were employed in the informal sector in 2010 (Casale et al. 2004, Quantec Research 2011). The latest figures from Statistics SA indicate that in the second quarter of 2014, estimates put the figure of those employed within the informal sector at 1, 5 million people (QLFS 2014, Quarter 2). The fact that the informal sector creates jobs is true in many cases. For example, studies which were done on informal fish traders within the Lake Chad Basin, i.e. Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Niger and Nigeria found that the informal sector created jobs and income (Nieland 2006). The sector also helps in small-scale distribution in both rural and urban economies. Becker (2004) argues that in all developing countries, self-employment comprises a greater share of informal employment than wage employment and represents 70% of informal employment in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The informal economy caters for the needs of poor consumers by providing accessible and low-priced goods and services (Becker 2004). Even some well to do members of society occasionally

acquire goods and services from informal traders at flea markets and road traffic intersections. Informal traders conduct their business within the cities and they serve a niche market and offer competitive prices.

Informal traders seem to have a unique edge over formal establishments. Some of them do not pay rent for the places where they conduct their business from. From a marketing point of view, the most fundamental aspect of informality is to know the wishes and the needs of their customers. This allows the informal players to choose the most appropriate techniques for choosing their products and attracting the interest of customers and negotiating with them before clinching a deal (Arellano 1994). Some informal sector operations like *shebeens*, barber shops, and *spaza* shops open late at night and public holidays when the formal sector activity has since closed its doors. This is particularly a case in point on many *shebeens* in South African townships which open late during the week and even on Sundays when licenced dealers may be required to close shop by law. Informal sneek traders operate within the residential areas where their customers live and so create a convenience for them.

In South Africa, prior to 1994, most informal economic activities were classified as illegal. With the dawn of democracy in South Africa and realizing the positive contribution of the sector, the major metropolitan areas of Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Tshwane have made tremendous strides to incorporate informal traders in their strategic planning. They have drafted by-laws which seek to regulate and accommodate informal economic activities within their municipal areas. The failure by governments in developing countries in regard to supporting the informal sector is unfortunate given that the majority of populations, particularly the poorest, are supporting themselves from these activities (Becker 2004). Some organisations sympathise with informal traders. With the help of sympathetic NGOs, informal traders within the Johannesburg CBD were able to successfully challenge the local authority in courts in 2013 to allow informal traders to conduct their work when the city was banning them. Informal traders have been given a respite by the courts and continue to flourish in Johannesburg's areas within the precinct of Park Station, Hillbrow and the central business district.

3.4.10 The bad side of informal economic activities

Some authors, while acknowledging the positive contributions from the informal economic activities, are of the view that the informal economy provides a fertile podium for underground illegal activities because people use it to dodge paying taxes, steal state property, bribe and engage in decadent and illicit activities like drug trafficking (Bernabè 2002, Dijkstra 2006). Some view the informal sector as a symptom of developmental backwardness. It is a problem that needs to be resolved, while others regard it as a positive dynamic which enables large numbers of people to gain a foothold in the urban economy (Willemse 2011). A big informal sector is likely to lead to reduced tax collections and funding of public goods (Frey and Schneider 2000). Despite the advantages, the “inability of the informal sector to comply with certain aspects of labour legislation is a reflection of the unsatisfactory conditions in which the informal sector operates” (Hansenne, 1991: 38-39). The street traders are generally poor, unskilled people at the lower end of the socio-economic ladder. Sometimes the traders selling wares in the streets are sub-contracted by some powerful individuals. They are agents who have been sub-contracted to sell and are paid commission by the owners. Most workers within the informal economy share one thing in common: the lack of formal labour and social protection (ILO 2002). A number of workers in South Africa working for formal economy enterprises face informal working conditions which include the lack of written contracts, labour brokerage, temporary or casual terms of employment and are not entitled to paid leave (Western Cape Government 2007). The main poverty dimensions, lack of income and assets, lack of voice and power as well as vulnerability have more impact on the lives of informal economy actors than on the formal economy entrepreneurs and workers (Becker 2004). In addition to that, informal actors have strained relationships amongst themselves. Associations which purport to represent informal actors are occasionally involved in conflicts. For example, in some cases intense violence arises within the taxi industry as rival taxi associations brawl for routes for their members (du Toit and Neves 2012). Du Toit and Neves quote a report on an official government inquiry into the taxi industry in the Western Cape which found that the taxi associations operate “...like a modern day mafia with the power to extort monies from operators, the ability to kill people who disagree with them and threaten their interests” (du Toit and Neves 2012: 13). The taxi associations use hired hit men to kill since they command the resources to do so.

According to Hansenne (1991: 6), informal traders operate on the fringes of the law. They are often associated with criminal activities and are consequently subjected to harassment. Informal traders face major difficulties such as fear of violence, crime, stock theft and foreign informal actors have the added fear of xenophobic attacks (Willemse 2011). In most municipalities in South Africa, relationships with police are always strained, especially when law enforcement agents are viewed as antagonistic to informal traders' activities. Sometimes the police are accused of confiscating goods belonging to informal traders that they will be selling. It is against such a background that informal sector players need to be organised amongst themselves so that they have a voice and be heard (Becker 2004, Subasinghe et al. 2012; Chiwaula et al. 2012, Willemse 2011).

3.5 Gender dimensions in selling fish

Gender is an integral and inseparable part of livelihoods in fisheries. The purpose of putting a gender lens on value chain analysis is to understand why men and women fulfil certain roles at every level in the chain, which roles provide the most benefits, and who has the access to and control over resources to participate fully in the chain, and thereby to find entry points for improvement (Kruijssen et al 2013). Gender is viewed as the psychological, social and cultural differences between males and females which is socially constructed and dynamic (Ellis 2000, Giddens 1993, Kantor 2013, Udong 2011). Kantor (2013: 4) argues that:

This means gender (and other intersecting forms of social difference such as ethnicity and class) affects: how women and men conceive of themselves and their capabilities; how women and men interact within the framework of social expectations; and how opportunities are structured and resources distributed within institutions like the market and the state.

Gender is fundamentally about power, subordination and inequality and it is also about changing these to secure greater equality in all its manifestations for women (Ellis 2000). There is widespread recognition of the importance of gender in development (Weeratunge et al. 2012). Within the fisheries sector, both women and men are involved in the trade of fish across the world. It is important to recognise that women's activities in the management of natural resources as well as the economic opportunities open to them are in most cases constrained.

Women make up half the workforce in capture fisheries value chains and a large share in aquaculture chains but their contributions are under recognized, under enumerated and more often informal (HLPE 2014, Yahaya 1998). Their lack of control over decisions concerning the use of key resources, and their insecure rights over land, trees, and products can limit women's incentives to invest in "sound" environmental management (Yahaya 1998, Leach 1992). Men and women should be given equal opportunities so that they can realise their fullest potential. This will open up new avenues and boost agricultural and fisheries productivity within the small scale sector. However, there is a major knowledge gap in fisheries in terms of gender and therefore cannot progress on gender-equitable and well-targeted approaches to sector development, particularly with regard to food security and nutrition (Chiwaula et al. 2012, HLPE 2014, Timmers 2012). The work of participants in fish value chains is highly gendered and fraught with inequalities, creating food security and nutrition challenges (HLPE 2014). For most of the time gender roles in fisheries portray men as fishers who go on boats to fish and women as fish sellers who conduct their operations on land (BNP 2008, HLPE 2014). Johnson (2013) argues that the "onshore-at sea division" shows the gendered character of employment within fisheries. Men and women's employment is of a different nature and is remunerated differently. However, such a gendered character of employment shows us that employment activity within the fisheries sector is linked since women and men need each other within their activities. However, while such an overview on the professional roles of men and women is largely correct, a closer look at gender in fisheries reveals a more complex situation according to countries and cultural contexts.

Information on data on fisheries employment in Europe shows that, also as in developed countries, very few women work on board vessels. And yet, they represent a third of the total sector workforce of some 400 000 people and they are mostly employed in the fish processing industry (BNP 2008). Women work in fish production and value chains but they are hardly visible and yet they perform activities like gleaning, diving, post-harvest processing and vending, which are underestimated (HLPE 2014).

There are few exceptions to the rule nevertheless. For example, in some countries, like Benin, Cambodia, Congo, Mali, and Thailand, women fish or collect fish on the lake in their own boats (BNP 2008). In some developing countries, men traders are actively involved in value chains for fish of high commercial value (Chiwaula et al. 2012). In Kenya men dominate the trading and processing of the Nile perch which is export oriented and of high value (Abila 2003). Under such circumstances men occupy all activities along the entire value chain from fishing right to trading and processing of fish. Abila (2003) corroborates this version by arguing that male actors in Kenya, Lake Victoria dominate the scene as they play roles that women used to play in the past. Another strand of the argument is that in Southern Africa specifically Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, certain parts of Malawi and Mozambique for example small scale fish trade is predominantly done by men (Chiwaula et al. 2012, Mmopelwa and Ngwenya 2008, Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen 1998). And yet for most of West Africa – most parts of Central Ghana and Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad – (Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen 1998, Nieland; 2006, Udong et al. 2010, Udong 2011) trading is a woman's job. As such field work results on the snoek value chain prove that South Africa, being part of Southern Africa fits into the scenario that men instead of women dominate in selling snoek. The scenario where traders are men who sell fish, the traders rarely form part of the fishing communities. They travel from afar to buy fish from the fishers.

3.5.1 Selected case studies of women pre-eminence within fisheries

It is estimated that 82 million people are employed in postharvest activities in fisheries (processing, distribution and marketing) and that almost half (47%) of them are women (Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011, Mills et al. 2011). Writing about fisheries in Ghana, Overa argues that in addition to employment for a large number of men and women, the expansion in fisheries has led to wealth accumulation in the hands of canoe owners and wholesalers (Overa 1993). The resulting social stratification took place along gender lines within the dual-sex hierarchies. Through their intermediary roles in the market system, combined with their roles as wives, mothers and daughters, entrepreneurial women in the fisheries in many cases outclassed men, as when they were able to combine the positions of standing women and canoe owners (Overa 1993).

Even though traditionally women are viewed as being the weaker of the two genders, there are some regions where the reverse may be true. In the fishing community of the Fanti people in Ghana, women have become powerful to the extent that they command vast amounts of resources in such a way that they are able to manoeuvre fishers who are predominantly men (Walker 2002). Instead of serving primarily as labourers and reproducers, women in both the colonial Gold Coast and independent Ghana have served as capitalists, entrepreneurs, and innovators throughout the establishment and development of the marine fishing sector (Overa 1993, Walker 2002). Walker argues that 25% of canoe owners within the Fanti are women. Even if women were culturally prohibited from performing fishing duties there is nothing stopping them from owning and inheriting canoes. Owning canoes is seen as logically related to the fish trade business and it ensures a reliable supply of fish for the owner⁷. In yet another example of women's power, Weeratunge and Snyder (2009) argue that there appears to be changing roles of women fish traders in Kerala in India where women were divesting from craft technology and investing into modern boats and moving from income earning activities to playing supportive roles in financial management and processing of fish. Despite such changing roles however, women in poor rural areas are still below their male counterparts in terms of social standing (Yahaya 1998). In a study of 15 selected Asian countries, it was found that women participate in almost all activities in the fisheries sector including the construction of fishing gears, fish sorting, fish handling, and fish processing with some women participating directly in fishing activities with their family members in lakes, rivers and streams (Siason et al. 2002).

As within most fishing communities, women are dominant in fish trading and processing in Ghana, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe and Uganda (Antunes 1998, Gordon et al. 2011, IFAD 1999, Timmers 2012, Udong 2011). Women fish traders in Ghana have formed associations which allow them to speak with one voice. At landing sites in Ghana for example the "konkohene" or the Queen Mother sets or influences prices at which all fish is sold from the boats on a given day. The "konkohene" is the leader of the women who are in the fish selling business. There could not have been a more apt description of the powers of the fish mothers in the Western Region of Ghana as done by Gordon et al, (2011: 22) thus:

⁷This is known as backward integration in business economics.

The fish mothers essentially act as a monopsonistic (one buyer) cartel: they control access to supply through pre-financing and (since relatively few people have the resources to offer such credit) they limit membership of the group by the same mechanism.

Closing the input gap between women and men would lead to an increase in agricultural output in certain developing countries (FAO 2010, Yahaya 1998, Weeratunge et al. 2012). And even if from the face of it women bear the brunt of gender inequities, these costs of lost agricultural production are distributed widely and are a cause of persistent poverty for all members of the society (Weeratunge and Snyder 2009). Therefore it is in the interest of all parties to promote greater equality in the fish sector, improve knowledge and to better inform policy and action to achieve food security and nutrition and gender equity (HLPE 2014).

3.5.2 Women's power as facilitators within small scale fisheries

Women's contribution and potential are underestimated. Fisheries in some developing countries may be dominated by women as opposed to the general view that it is a male domain (Weeratunge and Snyder 2009). Such women may come from the same household – they could be fishers' wives or daughters (Udong et al. 2009).

Studies conducted in several developing countries point to the fact that fish traders support fishing activities by lending money to fishers. Women traders pre-finance fishing trips and the more prosperous ones in Ghana and Nigeria own boats and canoes (Udong 2011, Tetteh 2007, Cheke 2012, Gordon et al. 2011, Walker 2002). They also tend to exploit the system to their maximum benefit within the social structures in the community. Some fish traders were married to fishers and command positions within their informal associations or even getting influential positions within households so that they would be able to manipulate the fish trade (Overa 1993, Walker 2002). In Burkina Faso women within fishing communities take risks by investing money in alternative income generation activities in post-harvest activities. This also increases the bargaining power that women wield over fishers. In that respect, women can influence the management of the fishery (Brugère et al. 2008). Udong et al.(2009) argue that the division of

labour between men and women has ensured guaranteed incomes which have given women traders a source of livelihood, autonomy, agency and a measure of independence.

3.5.3 Customary prejudice against women in fish chains

It is rare for women to go out to sea fishing with men. This sea-land dichotomy can be related to the fact that going to sea is risky because of fatigue at night and the occasional bad weather (HLPE 2014). In such cases men go fishing while the buying and selling of fish is exclusively done by women. And yet women's work in handling and distribution of fish and fish products is critical to the food security in their communities (Loc et al. 2012, Gordon 2011, Antunes; 1998, Tekanene; 2004). Nevertheless, customary beliefs, norms and laws also discriminate against the full participation of women within the fisheries sector (FAO 2006, HLPE 2014, Siason et al. 2002). Women end up being confined to the lower ends of supply chains which are so-called 'informal' sector in many developing countries. There are institutional and cultural constraints faced by the women traders in the various spheres of life they work in. In Egyptian aquaculture a study showed that the fish farming of tilapia and catfish was entirely male. The traders and wholesalers were also almost exclusively male (Macfadyen et al. 2011). Women were only located on the lower echelons of the fish value chains and this can be linked to the conservative nature of the Egyptian society. It is also difficult for women to access credit and the subsequent capital (Chiwaula et al. 2012). Anthropological studies of fishing communities along the Kanyakumari coast of Southern India relate to how fishing communities have evolved systems of keeping women away from the primary occupation of fishing by various social conditioning systems (Siason et al. 2002). Admittedly, one is tempted to argue that studies on gender relations in the fisheries/aquaculture sector remain at a pioneering stage and would be open for further research in that regard (Weeratunge and Snyder 2009).

3.6 Multiple livelihood strategies

In its simplest form, a livelihood is seen as a way to earn living. However, livelihoods within rural populations are varied and go beyond just earning an income to make a living. Probably the most often quoted definition of livelihood comes from Chambers and Conway (1992) who define a livelihood as encompassing capabilities, assets (stores and claims and access) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood can also be seen as "comprising assets, the activities

and the access to these that together determine the living gained by the individual or household,” (Ellis, 2000 10). It is also possible for us to accept that access to material resources, labour and capital, in the pursuit of a livelihood is shaped by normative and cultural factors such as lifestyle and identities (Long 2000, Weeratunge and Snyder 2009). Livelihood approaches may be applied at multiple levels (Scoones 1999 as quoted by Johnson) although they are mostly applied at the household level (White and Ellison 2007, Johnson 2013). It may be argued that such an approach is plausible given that most people organise production, distribution and reproduction at the household level (Johnson 2006). In many fishing communities, people have established a social capital of kinship networks which allow them to access fishing knowledge, capital and resources which they personally may not possess, like boats or fishing gear. The livelihood approach has been a very valuable tool of understanding the way fish trading is gendered in many fishing communities and to various degrees, where for instance in some communities men act as fish traders whereas in other communities trading in fish is dominated by women. This approach is also useful in the sense that it facilitates our understanding of the various ways in which the people and households construct their livelihoods.

3.6.1 Livelihood diversity

Within fisheries, diversification is encouraged as a means for reducing dependence on fishing resource, making restrictive management easier and less controversial for those affected by such measures (Brugère et al. 2008, Carney 2002). Brugère et al. (2008) further assert that with the risks of overfishing, it is very important to examine diversification and its links to both poverty reduction and responsible fisheries. Fisherfolk⁸, just like their small-scale farmer counterparts, have been known the world over to adopt a wide range of livelihood strategies to buffer themselves against shocks and stresses. Even if there are few choices the fisherfolk try to engage in some form of an activity in order to get income (Castro, 2005). These are called multiple livelihoods. The hypothesis which seeks to explain this behaviour is known as the multiple livelihood approach. The principle of multiple livelihood approaches challenges the view that rural people depend solely on one activity like farming or fishing (Johnson 2013, Glavovic and

⁸ A term used to refer to members of the fishing community including traders and fishers.

Boonzaier 2007). The literature review points to the fact that in many fisheries, informal fish traders engage in other activities in addition to selling of fish (Chiwaula et al. 2012, Udong 2011, Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011, Weeratunge and Snyder 2009). As rational human beings, traders engage in activities to help supplement and maximise their income. Like many other small-scale farmers in rural areas in Africa, informal fish traders pursue a diverse livelihood portfolio (Scoones 1992, Chambers and Conway 1992). Small scale farmers do not rely on farming only as a way of living. They engage in some other activities. This is so because relying on one activity fails to provide them with all their needs. In any case, crop production in many rural areas is rain fed and can only be carried on in the rainy season.

3.6.2 Case studies of multiple livelihoods

In Zimbabwe, rural farmers do not rely on crop production alone as this is not enough. They have other sources of income, like remittances. Unreliable rainfall can wreak havoc to their crop outputs (Scoones 2014). The combinations that such farmers use are identified as the set of different possible livelihood strategies (Johnson 2006: 72). Historically, fishers and members of their households in parts of the world such as Atlantic Canada and presently in many parts of Africa and Asia, are also farmers, foresters, gatherers and workers in industrial or service sectors. Seasonal dependence on state transfer payments is also a standard element in Canadian fishers' livelihood strategies (Johnson 2006: 76). In most African countries the same traders are part-time fishers and farmers (Kambewa et al, 2009). A study on inland communities in Burkina Faso found that backward and forward linkages were occurring between fishing, rice and fish farming, trade and craft production, including agriculture, in a clearly defined manner. Income generated from fishing is transferred towards non-fishing activities as a means to ultimately protect income from fishing (Brugère et al. 2008). Women within fishing communities take risks by investing money in alternative income generation activities in post-harvest activities which also increases their bargaining power on fishers. This is a way of hedging against vulnerability given that the fishery sector may suffer from stresses and shocks like seasonal variations. As a result, women influence the management of the fishery (Brugère et al. 2008). In Sarawak, Malaysia, from January until March, the peak of the monsoon period, drift/gill net fishing almost ceases, and its

fishermen look for other sources of income such as agriculture, logging, manufacturing and boat construction (Merlijn 1989). In Botswana, rural people within the Okavango Delta work on their land during January and February and resort to fishing during March to December (Mmopelwa and Ngwenya 2008). Livelihood approaches have shown that adaptation to trends, shocks and associated uncertainty is an important feature of household livelihoods strategies in fisheries (Allison and Ellis 2000, Johnson 2013). Livelihood diversification is therefore a form of adapting to the uncertainty of seasonal variations and unexpected shocks (Johnson 2013). Timmers (2012) argues that Ugandan traders migrate if fish is scarce in the areas they will be fishing and they would supplement income with non-fish related activities although some will have to go without work as they are tied up to fishing. Farmers, fishers and fish traders are generally encouraged to engage in multiple livelihood activities (Welcomme et al. 2010). This can be understood from Ellis' assertion when the author argues that: "Engagement in a diverse portfolio of activities also means nurturing social networks of kin and community that enable such diversity to be secured and sustained" (Ellis, 2000: 3).

Writing about small scale fishers in Bangladesh, Payne (2000: 4) notes that:

On the floodplains of Bangladesh only 20–30% of the total catch is taken by full-time fishers. Part-timers have other occupations, often seasonal, but fisheries remain an essential component of their livelihoods. This is a reason to recognise the interdependence of fisheries with agriculture or petty trading and, therefore, the need for a well-integrated cross-sectoral development policy.

3.7 Value Chains

The value chain analysis seeks to identify the various actors, their functions and existing linkages; determine value increasing opportunities; assess the input-output structure and analyse the constraints and opportunities inherent in the value chain. A value chain describes the full range of value adding activities required to bring a product or service through the different phases of production; including procurement of raw materials, assembly, physical

transformation, and acquisition of services in response to the needs of consumers (Campbell, 2012, Chiwaula et al, 2012; Elloumi 2004, Hellin and Meijer 2006, Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, Timmers 2012). A value chain is therefore the full range of activities which are required to bring about the product or service. The activities start from the conception, through different phases of production, delivery to the final consumers and final disposal after use. At each stage that the product or service passes through, it gains value.

To apply this to the snoek informal traders specifically, we view their role as value adding within the chain of snoek as it moves from the fisherman to the final consumer. There are two routes by which snoek can reach the consumer. The first way is that it can go through a big dealer (intermediary) who buys snoek in bulk from fishers (producers) and then sells to smaller traders. Alternatively, the small traders can buy the fish themselves from the fisher. These two channels are depicted in Fig 9.




Figure 9: The snoek value chain showing two possible routes by which the fish reaches consumers.

Actors within the snoek value chain are skippers, fishers, traders, gear manufacturers, traders of fishing gear and equipment. While it is true that there is not value added to snoek *per se* (no processing is done), it will be argued here that the informal trader adds value by buying the fresh fish from skippers/fishers and delivering it to customers in the townships. The movement of fish as a commodity from one stage of the chain to another represents value addition (from the fisher

to the trader and then from the trader to the customer). Fresh snoek at sea has little value to a customer who is in the township of Delft, more than 150 km away and is unable to travel to St Helena Bay to get it. There is little value addition made to the fish after it has left the fisher except that the fish attains what is known as place utility (Chiwaula et al. 2012, Campbell 2012). Snoek gets value added to it when it is transported to the townships where it is sold from the back of bakkies or stalls and where it is conveniently accessible to the customers. The informal trader links the fisher to the consumer by acting as an intermediary. One of the interesting features of the informal snoek value chain is that there is a very short time from harvest to final consumption by the consumer due to the fresh sales nature of all sales. Fish is generally sold to the consumers on the same day it was harvested. In such instances, post-harvest losses are almost non-existent (Macfadyen et al. 2011). This is viewed as an efficient distribution system and production is located near major areas where the fish is sold.

In a study of women fish traders in Malaysia, Yahaya (1998: 100) argues that:

Women's activities are critical in creating form, place and time utilities which in turn will have a significant impact on total fisheries production and distribution. Post-fishing and distribution activities undertaken by the women have ensured the persistence of low-cost services and goods which are affordable by the local communities.

Value chains are usually characterised by repetitive interactions and a certain amount of "organisation" linked to this. This in turn reflects the power relations or governance of the chain. According to a study done by Loc et al, (2010) traders contribute the lowest net added value in the fish value chain (17, 5%) as opposed to producers and retailers/processors and yet they appear to earn higher margins compared to what fishers get. People at the marketing end of the supply chain tend to be better off and more sophisticated than the fishermen at the production end (Abraham 2007).

The application of a value chain analysis in fish value chains is very important because it will allow the stakeholders to understand the whole value delivery system and not only the portion of the value chain in which it participates and this will allow the stakeholders to gain an advantage

over competitors. An improved understanding of value chains can contribute to the development of pilot livelihood interventions because it permits constraints and opportunities to be identified and elucidates the governance of the marketing system (Andrew and Evans, 2009; Elloumi 2004, Gordon et al. 2011, Chiwaula et al. 2012, Kruijssen et al. 2013, Timmers, 2012). It is only after understanding the fishery value chain that we can be able to formulate policies to exploit the potential so as to drive down income poverty and sustain them along the chain if properly managed. In any case, aquatic resources play an important role in fighting poverty, food security and rural livelihoods (Hellin and Meijer 2006, Nyeko, 2004; Ratner et al; 2012).

3.8. Chapter summary

In this chapter the conceptual literature review was looked at in order to gain a perspective of where to place the snoek traders. This also allows for a comparison of the operations of snoek traders and other informal traders in the developing world. Some of the interesting observations is that multiple livelihood strategies are employed across many facets of rural and agricultural economies in the developing world as communities seek to diversify activities and mitigate against bad weather and stresses within the systems they find themselves in. The concept of the informal economy tells us that people engage in it as a coping mechanism as well because of the lack of employment within the formal sector. Interactive governance deals with consulting all stakeholders on the different resources, how and when they can be exploited. This has a bearing on the nature of power relations existing in any given value chain. Chapter 5 will look at the results of this study.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the main findings of the study. It will do so by linking the theoretical framework to the activities which were observed in the fieldwork. A number of issues came to light. The social life of a typical snoek trader is briefly examined. This includes issues relating to the procurement of snoek, how gender is represented, governance, the state of power relations and employment creation within the value chain. The various roles which traders play are also discussed. Their functions are fairly straight forward and are not as complicated as in other developing countries around the world. Their interaction with skippers for most of the time involves buying from the boats, transporting, cutting, cleaning and packing the fish for customers. They are not involved in the operations of fishers at all. Governance remains a bone of contention in the management of traditional line fishery.

4.2 Profiles of typical snoek traders

Selling snoek starts at around 12 noon and ends at around 5 o'clock in the evening. Snoek traders say that there are not many customers before and after those times. But typically they start work earlier because they need to fetch the fish and travel to the selling spots. The information gathered indicates that most traders have been selling snoek ranging from 7 years upwards. Some said they had been selling for more than 15 years. There are historical reasons why traders sell snoek, as it has been in the family for decades. The indication was that most traders sell fish because their families and social networks sell fish. Most traders did not reach Matric (Grade 12) as an educational qualification and selling snoek is a safety net for them. Traders earn a living from their activities and are able to fend for their families. Many traders said that they were selling fish because they wanted, "to put food on the table." They were bread winners in their homes and snoek trading is a viable employment option for many people. Snoek traders work in groups with each individual having a specific task to perform. They indicated that they were working as friends or relatives. Each person has a duty to perform. One person specialises in cutting the fish on the mat, placed on top of the open back of the bakkie door, while another

wraps the fish and another collects the money. The fourth person may be responsible for disposing the fish offal. However, there are cases where lone traders ply their trade. For the traders conducting their business by the roadside, owning a bakkie is a prerequisite. The bakkies used for selling fish belong to the bona fide fish owners.

Some fish traders have permits issued by the municipality to sell fish in specific zones while others were in the process of obtaining documentation. Municipalities recognise the informal snoek industry and allow langanas to conduct their business as long as they do not break laws and ensure that they maintain clean and healthy environments on their selling spots. Snoek has an appeal across a range of professional people who include the private sector, government and municipal employees. Snoek is mostly sold on a cash basis while on rare occasions customers can buy fish on credit and pay later. Snoek prices fluctuate depending on the season. This has implications for power relations in the sense that traders will have power during intense runs of snoek while fishers have relatively more power when snoek was scarce. Well-resourced dealers are able to sell fish throughout the year since they are able buy in bulk and preserve fish in cold rooms.

4.3 The auction system at landing zones

When boats sell snoek to traders they charge the same price per fish regardless of the fish size. However, when traders sell the fish in the townships, they grade them according to size, charging less for smaller fish and more for bigger ones. A langana can have three or four grades of fish at any one time. Depending on fish availability and size of traders, each trader would buy anything from 300 fish upwards per trip. Traders are not compelled to buy from any one skipper although some indicated that they had some form of relationship with skippers. A boat's entire catch of fish is usually sold to one buyer or group of traders. All crew members sell the entire catch at the same time and to the same buyers at the same prices as the auction would have established during the haggling and bargaining which is characteristic of snoek procurement by informal traders. After all the fish has been sold, the proceeds are shared on a *gazat system*⁹. Van Sittert (1985) argues that the share and auction systems in fisheries have origins in the 1940s. Each

⁹ Afrikaans word meaning a 50-50 split when the snoek catch is shared (Isaacs: 2013).

fisher surrenders half of his catch to the boat owner and keeps the other half. If the boat has a total crew of 8, the boat owner will get 8 halves from each fisher. He then adds all of his catch to his side. In practice however, all fish will be sold at the same time to one buyer and proceeds will be shared according to how many fish each one has landed. This has a similarity to the way the Fanti people of the Central Region of Ghana, conduct their business. It was found that after fishing has been concluded, the crew divides and shares the catch equally amongst all on board. An extra *birefi* (shares of fish) goes to the canoe, net, and motor owner (Walker 2002). This arrangement was different from the practices at St Helen Bay. The information gathered points to the fact that there are some coloured skippers, although they are few. By law and in terms of permit conditions, line fishers are required to land the snoek at designated bays which are equipped for that purpose. The landing areas roughly stretch from St Lamberts Bay to Arniston, a small town on the east coast. According to fishers and traders, some of the places where snoek is sold include Cape Point, Elands Bay, Hermanus, Hout Bay, Kalkbay, Lamberts Bay, Miller's Point, Malmesbury, St. Helena, Gordon's Bay, Stompneusbaai and Yzerfontein. There are several other landing sites where the fish can be landed. The choice of which landing area to buy snoek from depends on where the fish is running since it is highly peripatetic. Traders travel to any of these places to buy fish if it is available there. Landing sites always change depending on the time of year, weather conditions (like rain and strong wind) and fish behaviours (Croome 2013, pers. comm.). Bad weather in the form of heavy winds and rain prevent boats from going fishing as the seas would be rough and dangerous. When going to landing zones, traders receive information from fellow traders as to which areas snoek will be running at any given time. The traders travel and then assemble at the landing site in the afternoons when boats start streaming in. Traders are free to obtain snoek supplies from any skipper who has fish. They do not have any contractual obligations to buy fish from particular boats or fishing crews. Fig 10 shows the coastal area where snoek fishing and landing takes place, from Lamberts Bay on the west coast to somewhere near Arniston on the south coast.




Figure 10: Map of the Western Cape: The coastal area where most snoek is caught and landed

Source: Croome, 2013, Pers. Comm.

4.4 Sub-contracting in selling snoek

The field study revealed that most snoek sellers did not own the fish they were selling. They sell fish on behalf of principals who in turn paid them a commission. Most sellers worked in groups. Sub-contracting is rife in the trading of snoek. From the study done by van Sittert (1985) it can be seen that sub-contracting had its origins in the 1940s to 1950s when fishers were tied to

fishing companies. Fishing companies faced stiff competition for labour from other sectors. When it was dangerous to go to sea due to bad weather, fishing companies offered employees free accommodation and cash advances (van Sittert 1985). Such wage advances would be recovered when they eventually went fishing. Fishers would then be able to buy food for their families (*kosgeld*). Such arrangements ensured a constant and ready supply of labour to go to sea for the fishing capitalists (van Sittert 1985). Although that was to change, the foundation of sub-contracting and subjugation had been laid. During interviews the snoek sellers claimed that the business was their own. On further probing they inadvertently revealed that someone else gave them the fish to sell on their behalf and they did not know how much the fish had been bought for. Selling snoek also appeared to be a safety net for some traders who were undergoing rehabilitation after they had had a brush with the law and for others who may have been retrenched from formal employment. In as far as fishers are concerned, skippers wield a lot of power. Sub-contracting often involved a dual process: first between the skipper and the company and secondly between the skipper and individual crew members (van Sittert 1985).

4.5 The snoek value chain

A value chain describes the full range of value adding activities required to bring a product or service through the different phases of production, including the procurement of raw materials, assembly, physical transformation, and acquisition of services in response to the needs of consumers (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001). Snoek traders however, do not add value to the fish *per se*. Their role is to add what is called 'place utility' to the fish; by transporting snoek from the landing bays to customers they are able to provide - their customers with access to the fish nearby. Consumers do not need to travel to the sea to buy fish for themselves. When they sell snoek, they cut and pack it for their customers, which is another aspect of value addition to the fish.

4.5.1 Selling snoek on credit

Most traders indicated that they have regular customers who buy snoek from them. Such customers may be given fish on credit because of a strong bond that developed over a period of time. This finding is underpinned by a case study done in Moree, Ghana, as observed by Overa (1993: 121), which is described below:

At the fish market in Kumasi, small scale traders sell fish to by-passers, but those with long experience and those who trade on a larger scale, have regular customers to whom they sell on credit, and thus long lasting trading relationships develop.

But for the most part, snoek traders pointed out that they rarely extend credit to customers. This point is in line with some findings of a study conducted on the south-eastern arm of Lake Malawi (Kambewa et al. 2009). For most of the time snoek is sold on a cash basis because the money should buy new fish stock for the next trading day. The reason could be that their principals (who sub-contract the actual snoek sellers) want the proceeds of the trade at the end of each business day.

4.5.2 Selling by the roadside

The main way of selling fish was by the roadside with fish stacked on the back of bakkies. Most of the bakkies are old cars which have outlived their usefulness. It is not surprising that their vehicles are in that state since snoek, being a marine product, causes metallic bodies to rust because of the oxidation caused by saline moisture dripping from the fish. There are no typical fish markets in South Africa as opposed to other countries like Nigeria, Cameroon, Tanzania, Uganda and Malawi (DFID 2006). Trading areas studied in South Africa lacked legislative control and basic trading amenities like a water supply and cold storage facilities (DFID 2006). This observation is contrary to the studies done in Kampala in Uganda, Lagos in Nigeria and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, where traders sell fish on fixed stalls and designated points or markets (Ogbe et al. 2009, Reynolds and Kirema-Mukasa 1991). Observations in South Africa were that only a handful of sites were officially designated to sell fish within the Cape Town metropolitan areas, namely Hout Bay, Grassy Park and Mitchell's Plain.

4.5.3 Snoek price variations

The peak time for snoek runs was identified as the period between May and July. Snoek is mainly a winter species, at its best during the months of May to August, although it is sold throughout the year (Isaacs 2013). Investigations revealed that during the snoek peak times,

prices tumble to as low as R5 per fish at the sea while traders would charge R15 when delivered to residential areas. That would happen for a few weeks before prices firmed. At the time of this study (October 2012), prices per snoek were ranging from R30 (for very small snoek) to R80 (for large snoek). It also depended on the places where the fish was being sold. Lone traders who sell at positions away from other snoek traders tended to charge higher prices than those within close proximity to each other. Snoek prices were lowest at Mitchell's Plain and Hout Bay. Incidentally, these two centres happen to have a high concentration of traders who are housed in stalls built for that purpose by the local authority.

4.6 The roles played by snoek traders

Snoek traders are important players within the snoek value chain. Amongst other functions, traders also clear fresh fish at the landing zones and help fishers to avoid the burden of seeking storage for the fish.

4.6.1 Buying snoek

Depending on where the snoek runs occur, langanas can purchase snoek a few kilometres from where they live or they have to travel tens of kilometres away from their residential areas to acquire fresh fish from boats. Traders buy freshly caught fish at the places of landing which are dotted all over the Western Cape coast.

4.6.2 Selling snoek

Traders bring the fish to the customers in township areas, where most of the fish is sold from the back of pick-up trucks. The core business is to buy and sell fresh snoek. However, in some cases snoek is sold dried, frozen and smoked, although most customers prefer it fresh. Mmopelwa and Ngwenya (2008) had the same finding from a study conducted within the Okavango Delta in Botswana where the citizens preferred to buy fresh rather than smoked or dried fish (Mmopelwa and Ngwenya 2008).



A trader cuts snoek for waiting customers at a Lentegur Mall stall in Mitchell's Plain. In the foreground, fish roe and cut heads can be seen. The orange bucket behind the seller is for fish waste disposal. This fish waste being sold for R50 each and weighed about 1,5kg.

Source: P. Mubaiwa




Father and son helping each other run the snoek selling business from the back of a bakkie by the roadside in Mitchell's Plain. A mat on which fish is cut can be seen to the left, with a butcher's knife on top.

Source: P. Mubaiwa



A trader cutting, cleaning and preparing fish at a roadside stall in Strandfontein. This trader was selling three species – snoek (*Thyrsites atun*), Hottentot (*Pachymetopon blochii*) and sardine (*Sardinops sagax*) on the same stall.

Source: P. Mubaiwa



4.7 Langanas and multiple livelihood strategies

It was observed that some snoek traders sell fruit from the same bakkies from which they sell fish. Such activities can be both *ex-ante* risk management measures (pro-active initiatives in advance) and those that are *ex-post* coping mechanisms that attempt to facilitate a move back out of poverty, which are reactive initiatives following some unforeseen shock to or crisis for the household strategy (FAO 2005). However, even though multiple livelihood strategies need to be encouraged, not all of them can be positive or cumulative. Several traders indicated that they would sell fruit and vegetables when snoek was off peak. One of the interviews was conducted on a vegetable stall in Delft where snoek was being distributed to various sellers who were sub-contracted by a wealthy langana woman. Each of the sellers was given a bakkie to use for the business. The woman counted the fish given to each trader. After the sellers had left the woman went back to concentrate on selling fruit which was abundantly on display at a shop. The facility was equipped with a cold room. Some traders indicated that they would sell fruit and vegetables

on the same sites where they sold fish. Yet others said that they would opt to stay at home if they did not have stock. Some langanas said that when there was less snoek on the market, they would go and buy fish from Snoek Wholesalers, Irvin & Johnson or Sea Harvest to re-sell at their usual spots. A marked difference between snoek traders and fish traders elsewhere was that the livelihood strategies employed by snoek traders in Cape Town were linked to diversity within the urban environments owing to the fact that they operated within urban areas. In most Sub-Saharan African countries, informal fish traders live in rural areas and also depend on crop farming (Béné et al. 2010b). Such traders turn to farming as the next best livelihood alternative, unlike in Cape Town which is the second largest urban metropolitan centre in South Africa. Snoek traders may lack the knowledge and drive to engage in farming activities. Even though there is a sizeable number of coloured farm workers in the Western Cape, most fish traders indicated that they had a strong family tradition in selling snoek and possessed little or no farming knowledge. Traders would not say whether or not they would embark on farming if snoek was not available. They may also lack the expertise to do other jobs apart from selling fish, since some families appeared to have specialised in selling fish. The availability of cultivable land could also be the limiting factor within such fishing communities (Béné et al. 2010b). Many of these informal traders are involved in other income-generating activities like driving taxis, selling fruit and vegetables, and running *shebeens* (outlets for selling alcohol, either legally or illegally), thus moving in and out of the fishery, depending on the fish supply and the time of year (Isaacs 2013). Traders also rely on state grants to boost their household incomes (DAFF 2012b).

4.8 Power relations within the snoek fishery

Studies done on small scale fishing communities in developing countries showed that women traders usually wield a lot of power over fishers. In the *suki* relationship in the Philippines for example, a trader provides the fisher with a guaranteed market for his fish and gives capital to the fisher. In return, the fisher will be expected to provide the trader with a steady supply of fish (Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011). In Ghana, fish traders known as “konkofo” also pre-finance fishing trips and then purchase fish from the fishers they financed. The “konkofo” may even supply fishers with fuel, gas, kerosene and food to secure the boat’s catch. One fish mother can support several fishers (Gordon et al. 2011). “It is this ability to command funds that gives fish mothers

unique access to fish catches and why they are able to collectively influence fish prices” (Gordon et al, 2011: 21). To the contrary, this study’s findings showed that snoek traders in the Western Cape are not necessarily more powerful than fishers. In the Western Cape snoek traders specialise in selling snoek and do not perform any other functions which are ancillary to the activities of fishers. Snoek traders are not generally involved in fishing activities. There is usually a clear distinction between a fisher and a trader. Their activities and occupations do not normally overlap into others’ domain. Most traders said that they would not want to be involved in fishing at all. They envisage their role as buying and selling of fish. They seem to apply the economic principle of specialisation and division of labour. A fisher’s job is to catch fish, and nothing else. Either one has to be a fisher or a trader, not both. Each party is not involved in another party’s business activities. In any case, fishers and traders are more or less strangers when it comes to the buying and selling of fish at the landing zones. Snoek fishers fund their business operations independently from traders.

It was observed that most boat owners are mostly white and are well resourced and command wealth whose genesis may be traced back to the apartheid era. Apartheid made it possible for the ownership of the means of production (boats) to be in the hands of the white man while the fishermen would be black or coloured (Martin and Nielsen 1996, Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen 1998). After docking at St Helena Bay, it was observed that boats were hauled out of the water and loaded onto trailers using 4X4 trucks which were driven by mostly white men. Almost 80% of skippers were white and 83% of them owned their own boats (McGrath et al. 1997).

They own the means of production (boats, accessories and bait) and earn higher incomes than their crew, whose earnings barely exceed the poverty datum line. As such, there is no leeway in which white skippers or boat owners can request pre-financing from langanas. Most langanas are historically disadvantaged individuals anyway. When a study was carried out in the village of Arniston (Western Cape) it was found that the situation is still characterized by a *de facto* segregation of white and coloured people living within the fishing community. Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen (1998: 8) observed that, “Whites mostly assume the role of boat owner/skipper whereas the Coloureds usually work as fishing crew.” The village of Arniston is a fishing

community in the Western Cape in the Southeast Cape with about 800 inhabitants (Martin and Nielsen 1996).

Snoek traders do not preside over fishers because the buying of fish at landing zones is through the auction system. The system is so transparent that virtually anyone who wants to buy fish can do so as long as the price being asked for is agreed upon. The highest bidder gets the catch. From the face of it, fishers and traders did not know each other. They were merely conducting a business transaction. In the snoek fishery the nature of transactions conducted points to a “zero sum game” for all players concerned. The picture is different if the findings from other places of the world are anything to go by. Informal traders in some parts of the world lack access to capital to fund their operations and get sponsored by traders. They are required to sell all the fish to the “financiers” who may dictate the price of the catch. Observations done at St Helena Bay showed boats coming in, with potential buyers waiting on the shoreline. Most boats were small and could accommodate six to ten fishers. The auction system which was used to sell fish was transparent and fair. An auction allows buyers and sellers to reach agreement on a price by bidding and the highest bidder takes the goods or service at stake.

4.9 Linkages between the informal snoek traders and the formal sector

The underground model acknowledges that the informal sector exists and has links with the formal sector. During the research it was revealed that some innovative informal traders possessing an aura of success, supply fish to formal establishments like fish and chips shops on a regular basis. In turn, after they have been paid, the snoek traders acquire products which have been produced by the formal economy. Such products include fuel, ice, and personal consumer products for themselves and their dependants. Some of their customers are also employed formally or work in formal public and private sectors despite serving hordes of unemployed customers or those who are working within the informal economy. Applying the concept of informal sector to small-scale fisheries in general (as a conceptual principle), it is argued that small scale fisheries employ 95% of the men and women engaged in the sector, and more than 90% of these operate in developing countries (FAO 2007). These small scale fisheries activities are carried out informally since there is widespread informality in their operations.


4.10 Gender dynamics within the snoek fishery

From the observations made and information gathered, female snoek fishers are virtually non-existent. Fishers interviewed indicated that female fishers are likely to fail to cope with the physical rigours of catching this fish species. After a fish has been hauled out of the water, the neck of the caught snoek must be broken before the hook can be safely removed. Failure to do that on time may allow the fish to deliver a blood-thinning toxin with its bite (Norton 2013). Fish is slippery and will wriggle, trying to free itself from capture. This requires skill and endurance to put it down. Taking too long trying to catch snoek will reduce the fish's quality into what is known as *pap* fish. *Pap* fish is as soft as *pap* or mealie-meal porridge. It derives its meaning from the tendency of snoek flesh to turn soft (Norton 2013). As soon as a snoek is dead, the fisher must work hard to prevent its flesh turning into an undesirable mush. *Pap* fish is difficult to sell since it is shunned by many. Most *pap* snoek is smoked. Some traders give *pap* fish away for free while others smoke or dry it.

While on fishing trips, fishers also have to relieve themselves in the open on the boat, insensible to their fellow fishermen's presence. While a study by the City of Cape Town showed that black South Africans and women are over-represented within this sector (Siqwana-Ndulo 2013, Skinner 2013, Chen 2001, SESE, Stats SA 2014), results within the snoek value chain point to a somewhat different picture. In the 1940s men were forced to provide labour to the South African Sea Products (SASP) while women were required to work in the factories for fish (van Sittert 1985). Women fisherfolk within the snoek value chain were lowly represented and a few were working as traders. However a significant number of women were playing an active role as traders at the Mitchell's Plain, Lentegeur Mall, and Hout Bay fish markets (fixed stalls provided by the municipality). There was one case where a crew of women sold along Robert Sobukwe Road in Bellville. They were equally nimble-fingered as they went about the slicing and cutting of fish. Added to that, it became clear in this thesis that the job of selling fish in most Southern African communities was predominantly a man's job (Chiwaula et al. 2012, Mmopelwa and Ngwenya 2008, Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen 1998) and yet women dominated the scene in West Africa (Overa 1993, Olufayo 2012, Udong 2011). In the words of an Eerste River trader, snoek trade is "a man thing," (Ulrich: 2012).

4.11 Contribution to food security

Snoek is a much needed source of protein in Cape Town. Low income and working class citizens are able to get valuable nutrients at affordable prices. Added to that, langanas also supply their immediate families with fish. To draw parallels with the Nigerian case study, it was noted that women fish traders in Nigeria contribute significantly to the nutritional needs of their families Olufayo (2012). Small-scale fisheries generally make broader direct and indirect contributions to food security as compared to larger-scale fisheries that make affordable fish available and accessible to poor populations and are a key means to sustain the livelihoods of marginalized and vulnerable populations in developing countries (HLPE 2014). Langanas sell snoek at prices which are about 40% lower than the prices that supermarkets charge (Isaacs 2013). Their prices are low because they buy directly from fishers and deliver to the markets and they do not have costs associated with refrigeration, processing and packaging. In that sense, langanas play an important role as they make the fish affordable for low income and working class township residents (Hara 2014). Snoek can be cooked in several ways, e.g. deep-fried, boiled, microwaved, grilled or baked (Isaacs 2013). Findings indicated that snoek is also eaten with fried potato chips.



It came to light that during Easter the selling of any type of fish and fish products will be brisk, particularly in township communities. This is linked to the fact that those people who are Christians eat fish as a religious sacrament which is linked to the biblical account of Jesus Christ's miracle of feeding a multitude of five thousand people with five loaves and two fish. Norton (2013) argues that fish is a traditional meal during Easter and this occasion is even bigger than Christmas for many communities, where fish, especially "kerrievis" or curried fish, is the main item on the menu. Snoek products range from fresh whole fish, to fish that has been gutted, filleted, or salted and smoked (Isaacs 2013); fish roe is also a popular delicacy.

4.12 Clearing the fish market

Some authors have concluded that the primary goal of informal fish traders is to meet the demand for fish (and hence provide food security) within their immediate communities since there are no post-harvest facilities and yet the fish will need to be disposed of quickly, owing to perishability (Abraham 2007, Diei–Ouari and Mgawe 2011, Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011). This may be viewed as a win-win situation as traders are able to minimise spoilage and customers have access to a fresh product with which to feed their families. Fishers will have their fish stock cleared and traders have fish to sell and earn margins. At the same time households will get food on their tables to feed families.

4.13 Snoek traders as entrepreneurs

A snoek trader possesses an entrepreneurial spirit since he or she assumes and absorbs the inherent risks that come with selling fish. Fishers are less exposed to market fluctuations because traders take more risks in transporting the fish to the markets (Loc et al. 2010). Fish traders offer a very important service to the fishers who cannot be fishers and traders at the same time (Basurto et al. 2012). When buying snoek, the traders travel to the landing areas where they buy fresh fish from the skippers. They are faced with the conundrum of the ever rising costs of fuel. A trader periodically bears higher risks than fishers themselves, i.e. risks associated with spoilage, low prices on the market, non-payment of debts and they have to mitigate against such adverse events (Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011). The fact that they bear higher risks than fishers probably explains why they get higher margins than fishers within the fish value chain (Chiwaula 2012). Langanas have to contend with competition amongst themselves and some unforeseen unpredicted incidents that may occur within the markets and wreck their business operations.

4.14 Employment generation

The activities which are pursued by langanas create jobs by hiring people who sell snoek as sub-contracted agents. This is a critical function, given the high levels of unemployment in South

Africa. Some of the contracted individuals fail to get alternative employment elsewhere and participating within the snoek value chain is the best activity they can do. A few sellers indicated that they had served time within the penal system. That means that it is not easy for them to get hired elsewhere as some employers require clean records for potential employees. The snoek trade becomes a safety net for them. Some snoek traders indicated that they have worked within the snoek selling business all their lives and had never done any other job. They learned the ropes since they were young until they became professional snoek sellers. This implies that the snoek value chain with the right governance is a stable, sustainable and reliable source of livelihood. It is clear that most traders are breadwinners in their families. Langanas as entrepreneurs are able to support themselves and look after their dependants. It might mean that such traders do not really lack alternative forms of employment if they have been selling snoek for more than 20 years as indicated by some. Some snoek traders work as families and employ and lure their kith and kin into this industry.

4.15 Consumer convenience

“...the real snoek hunters take to the streets” (Ken Liffiton as quoted by Norton, 2013 3). This quote may be interpreted to mean that serious snoek sellers need to conduct their business in the streets if they are to derive sustainable livelihoods in this industry. Snoek traders constitute the first stage within the snoek marketing chain since they are the people who buy fresh fish directly from line fishers and sell to the respective communities in the formerly exclusive coloured townships to the south east of the Cape Town Central Business District. It takes a lot of ingenuity to wake up early and drive from Delft to say, St Helena Bay, haggle for fish with fishers, pay for it and drive back and arrive with the fresh fish in time for cooking.

Langanas focus on the smaller market segments (niche marketing) for which their small businesses are best suited. In the same light snoek traders' existence is of significance as they serve a market composed of poor working class residents in the townships of the south eastern parts of Cape Town. Township dwellers, as citizens of this world have a right to food that provide nutrients which come from marine products like snoek. They provide a much needed

service of bringing fresh snoek to their customers, close to where they live. As the case with the sole trader economic theory, informal snoek traders are a convenient way of shopping for snoek since fresh fish is conveniently brought almost next to the consumer's door step. The customers are given the privilege of choosing what they want. The fish is cut to the customers' specifications while they are waiting. This is indeed an important role.

4.16 Chapter Summary

The roles which are performed by informal snoek traders are there for all to see. Traders travel to the designated landing zones. They buy fresh fish and transport it to the townships. They cut and remove fish offal for the customers. Traders pack the fish for the waiting customer. They also deal with other fish species if snoek is scarce and also during certain occasions. While pursuing their business, traders sub-contract and create employment for other citizens. Snoek traders are important entrepreneurs as they generate employment and in most instances snoek sellers operate as teams of at least two individuals making it labour intensive. The availability of snoek helps in the provision of food security in the impoverished coloured communities, where it is eaten most. This study shows that governance is key in ensuring that the previously disadvantaged fishers and traders are able to access sea products in an equitable manner. The findings indicate that most traders are relatively illiterate and this may be the reason why they sell fish instead of working in other sectors of the economy. The auction system used is a very fair way of arriving at a price and avoids the exploitation of one group by another. There are linkages between informal traders and the formal sector in the sense that both sides can supply snoek to each other, depending on whether the fish is off-season or not. The gender composition in the informal snoek fishery shows that men dominate this particular value chain.

5 CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Features which threaten snoek traders' livelihoods

As actors within the informal economy, it would be unimaginable that snoek sellers are not without challenges. Isaacs (2006b) noted that small scale fishers and indeed snoek traders face several challenges in their operations. Removal of limitations to their operations would mean greater access to resources and hence higher performance, and more food and livelihood secure households (Udong et al. 2009). Some of the challenges they face are briefly discussed here.

5.2 Lack of transparent governance within traditional line fishery

New approaches to governance within fisheries call for imaginative interactions along the lines suggested by the interactive governance perspective as espoused by some authors (Jentoft 2013, Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). Jentoft (2013) points out that a system-to-be-governed that has inherent inequities and justice disparities among its components is likely to experience tensions and conflicts that can cause lack of cooperation and resistance to governing interventions. Such a system needs to be accountable and be able to acknowledge its failures and it must be prepared to address problems within its area of influence. Terminologies such as 'pro-poor', 'people centred' and 'responsive to the poor' only make sense if decisions are being made together with the poor (Onyango, 2011: 35). Hauck (2008) argues that governance in fisheries must also allow for redistributive justice and procedural justice. The latter type of justice is very important in fisheries because it gives legitimacy to the fisheries governance process. Legitimacy follows from the fact that if people are allowed to have their voice heard they will feel that they have been treated fairly and they get satisfied with decision makers (Jentoft 2013). As a result, lately there has been a shift in many countries towards co-governance and participatory approaches in natural resource management. As the HLPE (2014) acknowledges, there is a need for better, more inclusive governance so as to establish governance systems that are more aware of these various dimensions of the problem, allowing and empowering stakeholders to engage actively in decision-making processes, in appropriate management mechanisms and rights definitions,

towards making end-users become responsible stewards of the resources (HLPE 2014). The reasoning behind such an approach is that stakeholder participation is likely to improve compliance, which is an urgent problem in fisheries worldwide and a major reason why so many fish stocks are in peril. It is assumed that participation increases the legitimacy of governing systems and hence the willingness of stakeholders to follow the rules and accept outcomes (Jentoft 2013).

Governance frameworks within fisheries should be enhanced for the benefit of fisheries stakeholders. The difficulty that has been observed worldwide with the implementation of fisheries and aquaculture regulations suggests that effective governance is an on-going struggle that necessitates adaptation and improvement. Writing on the continued poaching of *perlemoen*, de Greef (2014) argues that many of the residents of Hangberg, a small fishing town in Hout Bay, outside Cape Town, have turned to poaching as an alternative, rejecting a formal system that continues to overlook their interests. De Greef describes *perlemoen* as a big kelp-grazing sea snail which is commonly known as abalone, which is considered to be a delicacy and a status symbol in Asia where its flesh can fetch thousands of dollars a kilogram (de Greef 2014). Despite years of it being officially banned within the area, the illegal harvesting of abalone continues. The poaching of abalone has created elites within the community who are driving fancy cars acquired from the proceeds of poaching activities of the endangered marine resource (de Greef 2014). It is argued that such South Africans feel betrayed by the democratic government on its failure to address the injustices of apartheid. This assertion seems to be generally true in South Africa in the minds of many previously disadvantaged individuals who have developed the spirit of entitlement. The endless violent service delivery protests are also testimony to this mistrust. Fishers and traders yearn to be heard by the authorities. One female fish trader at Hout Bay said that she did not bother to apply for fishing rights because she did not have any hope of getting any because of corruption. She said that she lost confidence in the way rights were allocated and said that only the politically connected got them. To confirm her fears, it was alleged that fishing rights allocations conducted by the DAFF for small scale fishers had not been done in a transparent way in January 2014. Coastal Links, an organisation which

represents fishermen in the West Coast town of Paternoster, said that its members have no faith in the current government (Eye Witness News 2014).

5.3 Lack of infrastructure

One challenge which was constantly highlighted by roadside snoek traders was the lack of a suitable infrastructure for them to conduct their business. They indicated that they required physical stalls with sources of clean water to make their job easier and to work in a hygienic manner.

5.4 High levels of illiteracy

In the majority of cases in African countries, high illiteracy levels pervade fishing communities (Chiwaula et al. 2012, Isaacs 2006b, Tekanene 2004, Weeratunge and Snyder 2009, Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011). Most Western Cape inhabitants to the south east of the Cape Town speak Afrikaans as their home language but they are able to communicate in English which is considered by many as their second language. During this research, snoek traders professed ignorance on the existence of a draft SSF policy which had been drafted by the DAFF and aimed at benefiting small players to enter the sector. It is however, difficult for illiterate people who are working within the informal economy to embark on further education when their existence is survivalist in outlook (Becker 2004).

5.5 Lack of access to credit

A Survey of Employers and the Self-employed (SESE) conducted by Statistics SA showed that many of those who operated informal businesses and did not use their own money to start their businesses, borrowed the money from friends and relatives (SESE, Stats SA 2014). The lack of access to credit for small scale fishers and traders restricts the maximum participation of fishing communities within the economies of their respective countries (Gordon et al. 2011, Isaacs 2006a, Kambewa et al. 2009, Kleih et al. 2006, Loc et al. 2010). In fishing communities it is difficult to access capital to start or expand businesses. Social networks could enable them to access resources for them to pursue livelihood activities (Weeratunge and Snyder 2009, Udong et al. 2009). Fishing communities do not possess assets which banks accept to be used as collateral.

The unavailability of formal credit to informal traders is further constrained by the fact that a savings culture rarely exists in fishing communities because of the perception that there is always fish to catch and also that options to save money through financial institutions may be limited (Chiwaula et al. 2012, Kleih et al. 2006). In any case, the income they make is small, such that it becomes difficult to save. Snoek traders are thus unable to participate fully within the lucrative trawling sector. It is insurmountable for small players like langanas to own multimillion dollar trawling vessels as the costs of acquiring such plants and equipment are prohibitive. A small number of large corporations have a virtual monopoly in this sector with Irvin & Johnson and Sea Harvest holding 75% of the quotas between them (Martin and Nielsen 1996). Added to that, the two companies are vertically integrated, meaning that they control the whole value chain, which include fishing gear manufacture, fish trawling, processing and sales (Heistein 2011). This leaves little scope for new small scale producers to penetrate such networks.

5.6 Lack of organisation

Sometimes small scale fishers and traders generally lack organisation amongst themselves. It would be to their advantage for informal traders and fishers to be organised so that they could form cooperatives or associations. At their best, cooperatives have the means to pool resources and establish their own marketing channels which promote their interests. The benefits of organisation have been shown in West Africa and South East Asia (Gordon 2011, IFAD 1999, NORAD FAO Project 2012, Walker 2002). As a result, they fail to lobby and advocate for their rights. While there are many organisations within the fishing industry in South Africa, there are few which are aimed at the poor fishers and their comrades - the snoek traders (Isaacs 2006a, 2013). In some parts of Nigeria and Ghana women fish traders are members of associations which seek to protect and advance their own interests. The poor usually suffer from a low level of socio-political organisation and their capacity to make their voices heard is as a consequence weak, resulting in exclusion from political and decision-making processes (Béné 2003). It is generally agreed in the literature that the establishment of associations and cooperatives among fishing communities would bring about benefits to all fisherfolk. Furthermore, the issue of fragmentation is crucial to addressing problems arising from the nature of fisheries as common pool resources. Property rights are not in place and rules which govern the sustainable use of

fishing grounds are non-existent or not enforced, leading to a situation known as an open-access situation, which is known as the “tragedy of the commons” (Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011, Hardin 1968). As Jacinto and Pomeroy (2011: 162) contend:

By organising into a cooperative, fishers are able to have greater control over their product, obtain a wide variety of services and have greater bargaining power than an individual fisher would have.

In the fishing industry in South Africa, the failure of the workforce to unionise then was a result of the fragmentation of the labour force in the 1940s (van Sittert 1985). Within the snoek fishing area, fishers had shown that they did not favour unionisation since the days of the SASP (van Sittert 1985).

The nature of employment revolves around the skipper who they try to please so that they could retain their jobs. Skippers are usually employed by companies owning the boats and exist as “labour aristocracy” and play a crucial role in the control of the work force. Capitalism, to some extent, operates by sub-contracting exploitation and management (van Sittert 1985). Payment to crew members depends on the amount of snoek harvested and this often causes intense competition between crew members. As a matter of fact, fishers compete against each other and cause suspicions amongst crewmen and the skipper and his crew (van Sittert 1985). Although sea products are enjoyed by the rich and poor alike, in the words of Sir Walter Scott, “It’s not fish ye re buying. It’s men’s lives” (van Sittert 1985). Traders, like the fishers, operate individually and are fragmented.

5.7 Sustainable management of fisheries

The management of fisheries should be prioritised in such a way that snoek actors are able to participate fully in the economic activities, particularly of the Western Cape and South Africa in general. Brugère et al. (2008) argue that fisheries management plans should also be broadly integrated into national development plans, associated in particular with credit, education and employment policies to ensure that the right balance between household diversification and resource conservation is reached.

5.8 Snoek trade and gender

This research indicates that there is minimal participation by women within the trading of snoek. Gender equality should be insisted upon to increase women's participation within the snoek value chain. Women must be empowered and capacitated so that they can play more active roles within the snoek value chain. This should be a priority as women can and are able to improve their living standards and those of their dependants. Increased women's participation in agriculture has been seen to increase productivity and food availability to their households. Some authors argue that women are less prone to corruption as compared to men (ACRN 2010, Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2014, Esarey and Chirillo 2013).

5.9 Transformation within the fisheries sector

It is the view of the researcher that that affirmative action and transformation within the fisheries sector in South Africa is required. Such changes should and must take place to improve the lives of the previously disadvantaged individuals, most of whom are inhabitants of the Cape Flats. Meaningful transformation should help the community to access fishery resources on an equal footing with the already established operators. This should help reduce poverty and make fish more accessible to those who require it most. Transformation helps to stem mistrust and uncertainty within the various racial groups in the Western Cape Province. South Africa has some of the world's widest gaps in terms of income and living conditions. These gaps require radical transformation to narrow it to acceptable limits. Fisheries management and planning theory recommends that transformation should be done in a way which takes care of shocks and stresses within the value chains. If done in a haphazard manner, transformation can result in unemployment and fish shortages and fish price increases which can harm the very people that it seeks to conciliate. Property rights and the rule of law should be embraced whenever transformative processes are taking shape. If real transformation fails to produce tangible benefits for the poor and working class populace, it is likely to increase mistrust between the rulers and the ruled.

After getting impatient with the newly elected democratic government, in 1996 Andy Johnston, a Cape Town activist led a group of protestors into the Parliament of South Africa. The group was

protesting against the persistence of apartheid rules for allocating, capturing and exporting fish and shellfish resources. Salo (2007: 2) quotes Johnston as having said,

"Informal fishers had become disenchanted with the ability of the ANC government to change the corrupt, inhuman and bureaucratic apartheid fisheries policies and our actions on that day were part of a renewed defiance campaign, the scorched-sea campaign, to protest the continuation of legal practices that transformed the high protein fish food our poor coastal communities rely upon, into paper. Green paper. With a dollar sign on it."

The researcher argues that authorities should be proactive and not be reactive when it comes to transformation issues.

5.10 Conclusion

It is clear from this study that informal snoek traders play important roles within the political and social economy of the Western Cape. Fishers' activities provide nutrition to many households and help fight hunger. Traders' activities also help create employment and mitigate against the high unemployment levels in South Africa. I argue that traders should be capacitated so that they are able to operate more efficiently in delivering their mandate and enable local communities to derive maximum benefit from the resource.

It is noted that informal traders have links with formal entities. This linkage should be strengthened so that at some stage the traders may formalise their operations so that they are able to participate fully within this fishery. It was revealed that for the most part, snoek traders have been in the business for a long time and their involvement may span several generations. The provision of support mechanisms and capacity building are needed since the snoek trade is a viable employment alternative which can create a host of multipliers in both down and upstream.

This study should be in a position of making us aware of several aspects embodying the snoek value chain. It gives insights into the gender dynamics within the value chain, as well as the need for a concerted effort to eliminate these glaring disparities, so that both men and women get an equal share of the cake.

Governance within the traditional line fishery in the Western Cape should be conducted in a transparent manner. Fishers and traders live from hand to mouth and are disillusioned by the fact

that white citizens dominate this space. While there is no need to grab fishing rights from white citizens, a balance needs to be struck so that all groups across the social spectrum benefit from the marine resources. Authorities should seek to balance the act by ensuring that real transformation takes place with the poverty stricken fishers and traders. Reforms must benefit all the intended groups. This requires a mechanism where the politically connected and elites do not hijack the programme. Without that, the communities will continue to feel that they are being segregated and will end up taking the law into their own hands to claim what they feel belongs to them. In conclusion, traders should organise themselves into associations. Instead of coming together, they are alienated and antagonistically compete against each other.



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Appendix A: Interview Guide

University of the Western Cape

Project Questionnaire on the role played by Snoek Traders in Cape Town


Name of Student: Pasipanodya Mubaiwa

Institute of Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS)

Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences

Section A: Respondent Demographics

Age		<input type="text"/>
Gender	Male <input type="checkbox"/>	Female <input type="checkbox"/>
Marital status	Married <input type="checkbox"/>	Single <input type="checkbox"/>
	Divorced <input type="checkbox"/>	Separated <input type="checkbox"/>
Number of children		<input type="text"/>
Other dependents (please specify)	_____	
Level of education	_____	



Section B: Themes

Historical Background:

1. When did you start selling fish?
2. How did you become a fish trader?

Fishing Activity:

3. Do you ever perform any of the following activities?
 - (a) Lending money to fishers
 - (b) Pre-financing fishing trips to fishers
 - (c) Funding fishers to buy fishing gear
 - (d) Hire out a boat and fishing gear to fishers
 - (e) Having automatic rights over the catch of fishers you lend money to?

Buying Fish:

4. Where do you buy fish?
5. How far do you travel?

6. What does it cost to get to the fish and back?
7. Explain the negotiation process?
8. Do you buy from the same fishers, boats?
9. Do you buy frozen snoek?
10. Do you buy snoek from the wholesalers Snoekies in Landsdowne Road?
11. Do you only sell snoek or other fish or other goods?
12. What are the other livelihood activities?
13. What other work do you do to supplement your income apart from selling fish?
14. Where did you get money as startup capital for selling of snoek?
15. What other fish species do you sell?
16. If selling snoek fails what would be the next best alternative occupation would you pursue and why?
17. Do you always use cash when buying fish from fishers?
18. How much do you buy fish from fishers?
19. How do you come to an acceptable price of fish with the fishers?
20. Who is more powerful in price determination a fisher or a trader?
21. When buying fish what unit of measurement do you use?
22. Do you always buy fish from the same fishers?
23. Do you have any relatives who are fishers and who you buy fish from?
24. Are you bothered at all with the competition that comes from big retailers and New Zealand? Do you buy snoek/barracouta caught off the coast of New Zealand?
Please explain.....
25. How many fish do you buy on average per day? And sell per day?
26. Do you own the transport that you use when buying and selling fish?
27. How much of the fish you sell is eaten to your house?
28. Do you think there is an opportunity cost in having fish being eaten at your house by your family?

Monitoring –Quality and Standards:

29. How do you keep your fish fresh?
30. Do you take ice with you?
31. What do you do with the fish at the end of the day?
32. Do you air dry fish, smoke?
33. Do you know how to preserve fish other than refrigeration?

Selling Fish:

34. Do you stand at the same place when you sell?
35. What if there is another bakkie selling snoek at the space you use?
36. Cash or credit and if on credit how do they repay you?
37. Is it your own business or do you work for someone?
38. What do you do when there is no snoek?
39. Does the city monitor your activities in terms of health and hygienic requirements/standards?

40. What challenges do you face in your day to day activities in the fish selling business?
41. Apart from selling fresh snoek, do you also sell smoked fish?
42. What happens to the fish which is left unsold at the end of the day?
43. What do you do with the fish that goes bad?

Governance:

44. Do you belong to any organization?
45. How do you get information about the snoek, landings
46. Do you know of the new small-scale fisheries policy?
47. What do you think the authorities should do to promote small scale fish traders like you?
48. Do you have a fishing right for snoek or does any of your family member have?
49. Do you know of what is a permit, quota, rights?
 - (a) Other (please specify)



Appendix B: List of Interviewees/Respondents

Snoek Traders

1. Irifaal Jacobs
2. Moegamat Shakies Daniels
3. Reagan van der Spuy
4. Johan Visagie
5. David Karstens
6. Zuhair Albertyn
7. Kurtlee Prins
8. Derrick Swanepoel
9. Piet Oosthuizen
10. Ulrich Esbach
11. Rushda Warner
12. Jacob Coetzee
13. Samuel Wulana
14. Chantel Roberts
15. Yvonne de Drieks
16. Umuziwendoda Ngutyana
17. Riaan Zuhair
18. David Stevens
19. Gert van Wyk
20. Christopher Hendricks



World Wide fund for Nature South Africa

1. Mkhululi Silandela Small Scale Fisheries Officer Market Transformation
2. Alice Johnson Programm Officer – Fisheries and Aquaculture

Fishers and skippers

1. Jody Malgus
2. Simon Erasmus
3. John Goosens
4. Colin Smith

Irvine & Johnson

1. Denis Handley
2. Anthony

DAFF

1. Christopher Gerald Wilke - Scientific Technician Control Grade B: Inshore Resources; Linefish Section, Fisheries Management; Chief Directorate: Research and Development: Directorate: Research.
2. Saasa Pheeha Director: Offshore and High Seas Fisheries Management at Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.
3. Cobus de Swardt Deputy Director: Business Economics Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries (DAFF) Branch: Fisheries Management

Line fish Association

1. Wally Croome - Chair of the SA Commercial Linefish Association

