The Influence of Institutional Arrangements on Intra-party Democracy in Malawi

Samson Brown Lembani

Thesis submitted to the Institute for Development, Faculty of Arts, University of the Western Cape, in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the MA Degree in Development Studies.

Supervisor: Prof. Christo De Coning
Co-supervisor: Jacqueline Jansen

Date: June 2006
Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that this mini-thesis is my own work and that I have not previously submitted it at any university for a degree. All sources that I have quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of reference.

Signed: _________________________    Date: _________________________
Table of Contents

Declaration .................................................................................................................. II
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................... III
List of Figures .............................................................................................................. VII
List of Tables ............................................................................................................... VII
Acknowledgement ..................................................................................................... VIII
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................. X

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1

1.1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ......................................................... 1

1.2. GEO-POLITICAL CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND TO MALAWI POLITICS ........ 1

1.2.1. Geographical and Socio-economic Context ................................................. 2

1.2.2. Historical Development of Political Parties .................................................. 3

1.2.2.1. Pre - and Post - Independence Political Parties: Dr. Banda’s Era ............... 3

1.2.2.2. Political Parties formed in the 1990s .......................................................... 6

1.2.2.3. Splinter Parties and Parties Formed by Professional Groups ................... 7

1.3. POLITICAL PARTY MANIFESTOS AND IDEOLOGICAL DEFICITS ............. 8

1.4. MALAWI’S POLITICAL HERITAGE .............................................................. 10

1.5. STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM .................................................. 12

1.6. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND AIMS ....................................................... 15

1.7. MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY ................................................................. 16

1.8. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND QUESTION ............................................... 17

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............... 19

2.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 19

2.2. CONCEPTUALISATION OF TERMS .............................................................. 19

2.2.1. Political Parties ......................................................................................... 19
2.2.2. Democracy ................................................................. 20
2.2.3. Rational Choice Model of Democracy .......................... 21
2.2.4. Institutions .................................................................. 23
2.2.5. Theories of Institutions .............................................. 25
   2.2.5.1. Rational Choice Theory ............................................ 25
   2.2.5.2. Historical Institutionalism Theory ............................. 26
2.2.6. Formal Institutions ...................................................... 27
2.2.7. Informal Institutions ................................................... 29
2.2.8. Intra-party Democracy .............................................. 29
2.2.9. Deliberative Model of Intra-party democracy ................ 31
2.2.10. Elements of Intra-party democracy ............................ 33
   2.2.10.1. Candidate selection regulations ............................. 34
   2.2.10.2. Coalition formation procedures ............................ 36
   2.2.10.3. Conflict management guidelines ........................... 37
   2.2.10.4. Party convention rules ....................................... 38
   2.2.10.5. Party funding regulations .................................... 39

2.3. CONCLUSION ................................................................. 41

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN .................. 42

3.1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 42
3.2. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION .................................. 42
   3.2.1. Primary data sources .............................................. 43
   3.2.2. Secondary data sources ......................................... 46
3.3. RESEARCH CHALLENGES .............................................. 47
3.4. CONCLUSION ................................................................. 48
3.5. HYPOTHESIS OPERATIONALISATION AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL .. 49
   3.5.1. Introduction .......................................................... 49
   3.5.2. Hypothesis Operationalisation .................................. 49
   3.5.3. Conclusion .......................................................... 50
CHAPTER 4: STATUS OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY – EMPIRICAL FINDINGS .......................51
4.1.2. Definition of Intra-party democracy ..........................................................51
4.1.3. Existence and influence of institutional arrangements in political parties ..........................................................................................................................56
4.1.4. Intra-party democracy in candidate selection processes ..............................................62
4.1.5. Intra-party democracy in coalition formation procedures .............................................66
4.1.6. Intra-party democracy in conflict management .............................................................71
4.1.7. Intra-party democracy in party conventions ...............................................................75
4.1.8. Intra-party democracy in party funding .................................................................79
4.1.9. Intermediate Results .........................................................................................85
4.2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ..................................................................................88
4.2.1. Introduction .........................................................................................................88
4.2.2. Theoretical framework under review ........................................................................89
4.2.3. Existence and influence of institutional arrangements on intra-party democracy ..........................................................90
4.2.4. Perception of democratic practice in parties ..........................................................91
4.2.5. Participation in candidate selection process .............................................................92
4.2.6. Participation in coalition decisions ...........................................................................92
4.2.7. Participation in conflict management processes .....................................................94
4.2.8. Consistency and constitutionality of party conventions ..........................................94
4.2.9. Participation in party funding ..................................................................................95
4.3. BRIEF CONCLUSION .........................................................................................96

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS..........................97
5.1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................97
5.2. FINAL CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................97
5.3. Policy Recommendations .......................................................................................101
5.4. Recommendations for future research .................................................................102
6. REFERENCES ........................................................................................................104

Annexure 1: Map of Malawi ..................................................................................111
Annexure 2: List of Registered Political Parties in Malawi by August 2005 ..........112
Annexure 3: Political Parties Represented in Parliament in 2004..............................113
Annexure 4: List of Interviewees ..........................................................................114
Annexure 5: Research Questionnaire for Politicians ............................................116
Annexure 6: Research Questionnaire for Experts ..................................................121
List of Figures

Figure 1: Conceptual model of formal institutions........................................50
Figure 2: Responses to the Question ‘How do you define Intra-party democracy’? (in percentage)..........................................................................................52
Figure 3: The Importance of external institutions and intra-party operations (in percentage).............................................................................................................61
Figure 4: Degree of involvement in coalition decisions (in percentage)........68
Figure 5: Consistency of party conventions (in percentage)............................77

List of Tables

Table 1: Summary of Interviews by party and administrative hierarchy........44
Table 2: Perception of Intra-party democracy across parties (in percentage).....54
Table 3: Prevalence and Types of Intra-party Institutions.................................57
Table 4: Degree of membership involvement in coalition decisions per party (in percentage)........................................................................................................68
Table 5: Degree of membership involvement by party portfolio (in percentage).69
Table 6: Responses to the question ‘In whose interest are final decisions taken’?70
Table 7: Degree of compliance of conflict resolution processes to constitutional procedures (in percentage).................................................................72
Table 8: Degree of compliance of conflict resolution processes to constitutional procedures across parties (in percentage).................................73
Table 9: Major sources of party funding (in percentage)..................................73
Table 10: Who ultimately controls the allocation of party resources? (in percentage)..................................................................................................................80
Table 11: How transparent is the disclosure of sources and allocation of funding? (in percentage).........................................................................................81
Table 12: Correlation between control of party agenda and source of funding (in percentage)..................................................................................................84
Acknowledgement

Above all, I thank the Lord for His sufficient Grace which brought this work to completion. In addition, this study has been made possible through the effort, encouragement, support and enduring patience of many people. A few of them receive special tribute. First, I am indebted to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF) for providing the Scholarship, funding the research and the expressed intent to publish this research paper. Colleagues at KAF South Africa Country Office deserve special appreciation for facilitating and hosting my study internship.

Second, I am equally indebted to KAF Malawi Staff: Bhatupe Mhango, Chakupa Milanzi, Philemon Chawinga, and Ian Maliseni, for their selfless logistical help provided during my field research in Malawi. In addition, the district interviews would not have been possible if it was not for the voluntary support of former KAF graduates of the Training of the Young Politicians (TYP) programme, who kindly arranged all district interviews, and for some of them, being resourceful informants. I also thank the representatives of political parties, civil society, parliament and the High Court, academic researchers, and other experts for the wealth of information and knowledge shared during the interviews.

Third, special gratitude goes to Bob and Mphatso Hanjahanja and Betty and Enoch Chinyamunyamu and their families for hosting me and my family during the entire research period. You are more than family friends, and may the Lord overwhelm you with his favour. In the same vein, am indebted to the spirit of my former Lecturer of Economics, Dr. Flora Nankhuni, who with my wife assisted in conducting the district interviews in Salima on a Saturday. You are women of eminent virtue, I appreciate you.

The acknowledgement will be incomplete if I do not recognise the staff at the School of Government- Institute for Social Development, for this Masters Degree programme, the relevance of the course content and its multifaceted applicability to development and the commitment to the supervision of this thesis. On the
latter, I specifically appreciate my Supervisor- Professor Christo de Coning for his fervent mentoring and intellectual guidance. Lastly but not least important, my heartfelt gratitude to my wife Martina and our two daughters: Tamandani and Triumph-Ayanda, for being reassuring, supportive and overbearing. I owe you more that I can ever give back. While am fully responsible for the residual shortcomings in this thesis, the people mentioned did everything to assist me otherwise.
List of Abbreviations

AFORD  Alliance for Democracy
CEC    Central Executive Council
DPP    Democratic Progressive Party
EISA   Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
FPTP   First Past The Post
IDEA   International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
KAF    Konrad Adenauer Foundation
MCP    Malawi Congress Party
MEC    Malawi Electoral Commission
MPRSP  Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
NEC    National Executive Committee
NGO    Non Governmental Organisation
NIMD   Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
PAC    Public Affairs Committee
PPEA   Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Act
PPM    Peoples Progressive Movement
RP     Republican Party
SPSS   Statistical Package for Social Science
TYP    Training of Young Politicians
UDF    United Democratic Front
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction and Background

This research study seeks to investigate how institutional arrangements impact on intra-party democracy in Malawi. Intra-party democracy is essential as it promotes party unity through reduced fragmentation and factionalism, encourages a culture of democratic debate and deliberation of critical issues within the party and therefore collective ownership of decisions. Further, it creates legitimate internal conflict management systems and finally, reduces opportunistic and arbitrary use of delegated authority. These are fundamental tenets of any functioning democratic entity. These elements of intra-party democracy are attainable if they are formerly stipulated and governed by the party’s constitutional rules. Where such rules either do not exist or are not effectively enforced, major operational problems arise. These may include: non-inclusive candidate selection procedures, centralised coalition negotiation processes, un-procedural conflict management mechanisms and unconstitutional or illegitimate party conventions. Consequently, the resulting outcomes include party instability and factionalism stimulated by resignations and expulsions, declining electoral support and weak coalitions. These factors undermine the party’s contribution to democracy. The next section gives the context and historical evolution of parties in Malawi.

1.2. Geo-Political Context and Background to Malawi Politics

This section provides the framework within which intra-party dynamics are contextualised. These are limited to the geo-political and socio-economic environment, historical development of political parties, Malawi’s political heritage and political party manifestos.
1.2.1. Geographical and Socio-economic Context

Malawi, which was called Nyasaland prior to independence, is located at the South end of the Great Rift Valley, running from North to South through Africa. It is approximately 1,373 km long and varies in width from 130 km to 260 km. It has a surface area of 118,484 km², of which about 20% is occupied by water.¹ Malawi is a landlocked country, bordered by Tanzania in the North and North East, Mozambique in the South, South East and West, and Zambia in the West and North West,² (see Map of Malawi in Annex 1).

The country is divided into three regions: the North—hosting about 12% of the population; the Centre—home to 41%; and the South—being the most populous, with about 47% of the total population.³ The regions are further divided into 27 districts—six in the North, nine in the Centre and twelve districts in the South. Malawi’s population is estimated at 10.9 million inhabitants.

From independence in 1964 to 1979, Malawi recorded high economic growth rates of over 6% due to uncritical western donor support, favourable climatic conditions, expanding large-scale estate agriculture and steadily rising domestic investments.⁴ From the late 1970’s, this trend reversed owing to the oil crisis, prolonged drought, rigid macroeconomic policies and declining terms of trade.⁵ According to the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP), 65.3% of the population is poor.⁶

This poverty is caused by myriad factors including constrained economic productivity of land, technology, education, poor health, restricted non-farming

---

² Malawi Government, URL: http://malawi.gov.mw/
³ Kanyongolo, Fidelis, 2003: 224
⁴ Chisinga, Blessings, 2002: 29
⁵ Ibid
⁶ Malawi Government, MPRSP, 2002: 5
employment and limited access to credit services.\textsuperscript{7} Life expectancy at birth dropped from 43 years in 1996 to 39 years in 2000, literacy rate is at 58 \%, while subsistence agriculture is the main source of income for the rural poor who constitute over 85 \% of the national population and account for 63.7 \% of income.\textsuperscript{8} The next section focuses on historical evolution and context of political parties.

\textbf{1.2.2. Historical Development of Political Parties}

From 1891 to 1964, Malawi was a British Protectorate. Malawi gained its independence from colonial rule in 1964 and was declared a Republic in 1966. In this paper, the evolution of political parties in Malawi is classified into three categories: first, those formed prior to and soon after 1964 Independence, followed by parties registered before and after the 1994 multi-party general elections, and finally, those which for various reasons, were formed either as breakaway factions or by professional groups after the 1999 elections. Detailed discussion follows in this logical order below.

\textbf{1.2.2.1. Pre- and Post- Independence Political Parties: Dr. Banda’s Era}

The Malawi Congress Party (MCP) is the oldest party in this category, formed in 1944 as Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) - a national liberation mass movement to fight for independence from the colonial rule.\textsuperscript{9} Apart from the MCP, which was officially registered in 1960, other parties were established in the 1950’s and 1960’s.\textsuperscript{10} By 1966 and except for the MCP, all the other parties had virtually vanished since Malawi had become a de-facto one party state until 1993.

---

\textsuperscript{7} Malawi Government, MPRSP, 2002: 6
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid: 8
\textsuperscript{9} Kanyongolo, Fidelis, 2003: 232
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid: 232. These included the United Federal Party (UFP), the Christian Democratic Party (CDP), and the Congress Liberation Party (CLP).
when two thirds of Malawians voted for the return of multiparty politics in a national referendum.\textsuperscript{11}

Malawi had assumed a short-lived parliamentary system of government - a replica of the British Westminster, albeit due to the MCP dominance, the multiparty system was substantially undermined. Consequently, the MCP led by Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, did win all the parliamentary seats (except the few reserved for the white minority) in the 1961 multiparty elections.\textsuperscript{12} Dr. Banda was a medical practitioner-cum-historian, trained in the United States of America and Great Britain. He spent about four decades in training and private medical practice outside Malawi before he was called by his natives to lead in the anti-colonialism movement in 1958.\textsuperscript{13}

Soon after Independence in 1964, Dr. Banda established an autocratic regime, where dissent, freedom of expression and rule of law were forfeited in the best interest of national unity, social stability and economic development. In Dr. Banda’s Malawi, the MCP’s paramilitary brigade: the \textit{Malawi Young Pioneer}, and the party’s Youth League had the notorious task of safeguarding discipline and coercive obedience, relentlessly resorting to physical violence whenever dissidence was speculated.\textsuperscript{14} Hitherto, the MCP was organised in such a way that by its structure, leadership, procedures and forced membership cards, it sought to maximise its control over government and the people. Section 2 of the 1966 Republican Constitution provided that the Nation and Government of Malawi would henceforth, be established upon the four cornerstones namely: “Unity, Loyalty, Obedience, and Discipline.”\textsuperscript{15}

Through the patronage system enforced by the four corner stones, the MCP and its government created an intelligence system where overt dissent of opinion in the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Kanyongolo, Fidelis, 2003: 232
\item \textsuperscript{12} Khembo, Nixon, 2004: 88; Meinhardt, Heiko; Patel, Nandini, 2003: 3
\item \textsuperscript{13} Meinhardt, Heiko; Patel, Nandini, 2003: 3
\item \textsuperscript{14} Englund, Harri, 2002: 13
\item \textsuperscript{15} Kanyongolo, Fidelis, 2003: 243
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
party and government was institutionally and practically non-existent and concealed. The crushing force of the centralised and non-democratic MCP constitution and the 1966 Republican Constitution, did vest in Dr Banda absolute power over all institutions to decide who could occupy political office and who could be elected for a given Parliamentary constituency.\(^{16}\) All disciplinary authority over the MCP, including the power to make “disciplinary rules and regulations,” and the “interpretation of the party’s constitutions,” rested in Dr. Banda.\(^{17}\)

Those who radically challenged decisions and policies of Dr. Banda risked treasonous consequences including raucous dismissal, prison incarceration without trial or fleeing into exile as dissidents. On his defence, Dr. Banda is claimed not to have been told the \textit{truth} but \textit{lies}, by his advisors including cabinet ministers, presumably out of fear of the ‘\textit{Ngwazi}’ or ‘\textit{Lion}’ as he was candidly referred to. Kainja confirms this by noting that Dr. Banda promptly banned the selling of party cards the same day that Kainja told him the truth about the coercive and inhumane manner in which the party membership cards were being sold.\(^{18}\)

Nevertheless, the progressive trend and totality of the regime’s tyranny and mutual distrust was made evident from the 1964 cabinet crisis. In this year, prominent ministers fled the country after unsuccessfully challenging Dr. Banda’s autocratic leadership style and foreign policies.\(^{19}\) Upon becoming a Republic in 1966, Malawi adopted a new Constitution in which the most notable autocratic elements were the introduction of executive presidential system replacing the parliamentary system, and the simultaneous abolition of multiparty politics.\(^{20}\)

\(^{16}\) Kanyongolo, Fidelis, 2003: 243
\(^{17}\) Ibid: 241
\(^{18}\) Kainja, Kate, 2003: 242
\(^{19}\) Meinhardt, Heiko; Patel, Nandini, 2003: 5
\(^{20}\) Ibid: 3
The climax of this institutionalised autocracy was reached when Dr. Banda “reluctantly” accepted a resolution of the MCP Convention in August 1970 to become Life President of the MCP and the State in 1971.\(^\text{21}\) He held this position until the 1994 electoral loss, coupled by idiosyncratic factors including ill health, age and senility, which compelled him to resign from active politics.\(^\text{22}\) As a consequence of the inevitable transfer of undemocratic values into the present dispensation, political parties formed hereafter have inherited much from the MCP dictatorship era as will be noted below.

### 1.2.2.2. Political Parties formed in the 1990s

This second category comprises parties that evolved from pro-democracy pressure groups formed prior to and after the 1993 National Referendum. Until 1993, Malawi was uncritically rewarded western donor support for its austere anti-communist policy. However, the collapse of the cold war in tandem with the shifting geo-political movement in favour of democratisation in the early 1990s, compelled the MCP government to succumb to pressure for political pluralism. The UDF and other parties registered in the early 1990’s were initially formed as pressure groups to challenge the MCP dictatorship. By 1994, there were over 16 registered political parties\(^\text{23}\) while more than 20 political parties were registered in time for the 1999 general elections.\(^\text{24}\)

\[^{21}\text{Meinhardt, Heiko; Patel, Nandini, 2003: 6}\]
\[^{22}\text{Ibid: 11}\]
\[^{23}\text{These included, inter alia: AFORD, UDF, Congress for the Second Republic (CSR), Malawi Democratic Party (MDP), Malawi National Democratic Party (MNDP), and the United Front for Multiparty Democracy (UFMD)}\]
\[^{24}\text{Kanyongolo, Fidelis, 2003: 233; Phiri, Kings, 2000: 67. The newly registered parties included: Christian Democratic Party (CDP), National Patriotic Front (NPF), National Unity Party (NUP), Malawi Freedom Party (MFP), People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the Labour Party (LP), United Party (UP), Sapiwa National Democratic Party (SNDP), the Forum Party (FP), and Mass Movement for Young Generation (MMYG)}\]
1.2.2.3. Splinter Parties and Parties Formed by Professional Groups

Except for three parties formed by professional groups, this third category comprises four break away parties that were formed as a result of intra-party disputes and factionalism in all the three erstwhile major parties: AFORD, MCP and UDF since 2001. These were: Republican Party (RP) and New Congress for Democracy (NCD) from MCP; Movement for Genuine Democracy (MGODE) from AFORD; and National Democratic Alliance (NDA) from UDF. By the May 2004 general elections, there were over 30 registered political parties in Malawi.

In summary, it is imperative to mention that the emergence of political parties in Malawi has historically been characterised by three factors: (a) transient and election-oriented, (b) absence of clear ideologies, and (c) rudimentary structures for membership identification and mobilisation strategies. Due to their decimal electoral performance and failure to get parliamentary seats, most political parties are disillusioned and disappear into political oblivion, only to resurface for the next election. It is evident from the most cursory analysis that the majority of the break away parties were formed as a result of limited intra-party democracy and not due to ideological differences.

These factors include unfair candidates selection processes, arbitrary expulsions of critical members and the failed presidential third term bid by the UDF administration. The unprecedented 39 Independent MPs elected in 2004 bear testimony to democratic deficits particularly in the UDF and AFORD. These MPs were elected to parliament despite being sidelined by their parties for opting to

---

25 These were: Malawi Forum for National Development (MAFUNDE), Peoples Transformation Party (PETRA), and Peoples Progressive Movement (PPM). These parties were only registered in 2002, the same time as the factional parties but they were not directly linked to MCP, AFORD and UDF
26 EISA, 2004:15
28 Meinhardt, Heiko; Patel, Nandini, 2003: 63
contest as Independent Candidates, following allegations of fraudulent intra-party primary elections.\textsuperscript{29}

Due to the centralisation and manipulation of primary election for parliamentary candidates, the UDF produced more independent candidates and more independent MPs in its stronghold Southern Region than any other party in 2004.\textsuperscript{30} Given that neither the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) nor the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Act (PPEA), provide guidelines for intra-party primary election, this gives autonomy to parties to establish their own operational procedures and regulations.\textsuperscript{31} Where these regulations were established and were not followed, the primary elections were characterised by division, intimidation and last minute shifts of venues and aimed at confusing party delegates or non-preferred candidates.\textsuperscript{32} The next section links the present political dynamics and culture to the heritage of the one party era.

1.3. Political Party Manifestos and Ideological Deficits

This section briefly provides an overview on the political ideologies and manifests of the five parties under review: AFORD, MCP, PPM, RP and UDF. As observed above, there are no distinct ideological and programme inclinations between and among political parties in Malawi.\textsuperscript{33} Since political parties cannot defend their existence based on firm political ideologies and policies, their election campaign manifestos become fuzzy, redundant and opaque.\textsuperscript{34} This also explains the ease with which inter-party defections and coalitions occur since there are no ideological shifts or compromises to be considered. At critical occasions and during elections, all parties articulate generic and a narrow range of issues and promises including: transparent and accountable public governance,

\textsuperscript{29} Dulani, Boniface, 2004: 21
\textsuperscript{30} Khembo, Nixon, 2004:111
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid
\textsuperscript{33} Meinhardt, Heiko; Patel, Nandini, 2003: 29; Phiri, Kings, 2000: 68
\textsuperscript{34} Phiri, Kings, 2000: 68
separation of powers, media independence, poverty reduction and social-economic development, protection of civil, political and religious rights and freedoms, and private sector development.\textsuperscript{35} This makes it even more difficult for parties to propagate their corporate vision for Malawi. Consequently, the parties concerned are not intrigued by short and long-term goals for national development.\textsuperscript{36}

While clues to a party’s ideology can be found in its links to international networks, none of the Malawian parties is an official member of any of the global political associations.\textsuperscript{37} Since 1994, the UDF has held an observer status in Liberal International -the worldwide umbrella body of liberal parties. Similarly, AFORD does not have any active link to the Socialist International. Despite symbolic proximity to Christian Democratic International and its ally International Democratic Union, the MCP does not subscribe to any of these networks in any form.

In its profile, the PPM states that it espouses social democratic values premised on social market economy, social security, solidarity and partnership.\textsuperscript{38} However, its 2004 campaign manifesto which formed part of a grand opposition Mgwirizano Coalition was similar to those of other parties discussed above. The party has no active links to any international network. Finally, the RP which is an MCP breakaway, is equally not identified with any network and as a member of the Mgwirizano Coalition, its campaign manifesto offered no alternative to those of AFORD, MCP and UDF.

It can be concluded that political parties in Malawi are not identified by their programmes or ideologies. To the contrary, they are distinguished by their

\textsuperscript{35} Khembo, Nixon, 2004: 104; Phiri, Kings, 2000: 74; Konrad Adenauer Foundation,1998: 21
\textsuperscript{36} Phiri, Kings, 2000: 74
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid: 75
\textsuperscript{38} PPM profile, 2003: 3
founding personalities, geographic regional base\textsuperscript{39} and party colours. It is nevertheless, convenient in this study to ideologically classify AFORD and PPM as pro-Socialists, UDF as pro-Liberalists while MCP and RP as pro-Christian Conservatives.

1.4. Malawi’s Political Heritage

Malawi has a Presidential democratic system of government established and guaranteed by the country’s 1994 Constitution and the Political Parties (Registration and Regulation) Act of 1993.\textsuperscript{40} While the former provided for people’s political and civil rights, the latter created the “institutional framework” regulating the registration of parties and their activities.\textsuperscript{41} Although Malawians are generally excited about the introduction of multi-party democracy, legacies reminiscent of the previous regime including “a culture of secrecy and silence” still linger on.\textsuperscript{42} Meinhardt and Patel further observe that there is no acceptance of dissenting views within parties while incumbent party presidents exhibit patrimonial behaviour and begrudge any change in the party hierarchy.\textsuperscript{43} This aspect is also confirmed by empirical findings of this study. The multiplicity of political parties in Malawi has not had a corresponding increase in the people’s real alternative political choices. In short, much remains unchanged. The democratic deficits in intra-party operations can partly be traced back to their historical roots in the thirty years of autocratic rule led by Dr. Banda.

The hard-wearing continuities of the unpleasant past manifest themselves in the present in different shades, shapes and sizes. A few are exemplified. Quoting the \textit{Daily Times}, for example, Englund observes that after some Malawian Muslims

\textsuperscript{39} While the MCP President hails from the centre, the party is widely viewed to have its stronghold in the central region. The RP and UDF whose leaders come from the South command most of their membership from the most populous Southern Region. AFORD and PPM, whose presidents come from the sparsely populated North, are considered parties of the Northern Region.

\textsuperscript{40} Kanyongolo, Fidelis, 2003: 247

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid

\textsuperscript{42} Meinhardt, Heiko; Patel, Nandini, 2003: 50

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid: 51
openly criticised the former President Dr. Bakili Muluzi in 2001, people in Islamic attire became victims of violent attacks by alleged UDF’s “Young Democrats.” The Young Democrats are the party’s ‘militant’ youth wing, known for unleashing terror to any one critical of the President or the Party. They operated as a replica of Dr. Banda’s MYP and Youth League. In addition, the centralised power in the elite has served to nurture clientalism, consolidate patronage and personality cult, which in turn perpetuates mutual distrust and conflicts within parties and undermines popular participation.

Given the critical poverty levels, the state is the chief source of accessing wealth, power, prestige and affluence, which provides the incentives and high propensity for the making, breaking and remaking of parties, coalitions and mergers. There is high flexibility among otherwise political rivals to occasionally unite and form ‘improbable alliances’ as long as a new common enemy emerges who threatens to block personal expediencies and access to state resources and privileges. This is usually done with diminutive consultation with party members.

The near-obsession with personal political survival and convenience transforms genuine democratic participation to manipulation. Englund calls it a culture of ‘Chameleon Politics’, where those in power are evermore tactful with new ways to allure others into pacts and acquiescence.

Another dimension of cultural heritage that has irreducibly survived Malawi’s political transition is the culture of envy and jealousy. Mkandawire recounts that it is perhaps not surprising that Malawi is the only nation that explicitly entreats the good Lord in the national anthem to put down each and every enemy, “hunger,

---

44 Englund, Harri, 2002: 13
45 Khembo, Nixon, 2004: 134
46 Ibid; Meinhardt, Heiko; Patel, Nandini, 2003: 64
47 Englund, Harri, 2002: 12 and 14; Meinhardt, Heiko; Patel, Nandini, 2003: 64
48 Englund, Harri, 2002: 13
49 Ibid: 18
disease, envy."\(^{50}\) This is consistent with the rational choice model of individual behaviour discussed later.

Finally, while a lot of political parties have emerged over the years, it is discernible that those that have persevered have survived under the same old leadership, which boasts its experience from the dictatorship era, and therefore, traditionally non-democrats.\(^ {51}\) The “default mode” of political responses by politicians who learnt at the feet of Dr. Banda is reflexively undemocratic.\(^ {52}\) As will be seen from the next section, there is no ideological or programme distinction by which these political parties are distinguished, even those under this study. Likewise, party members are identified by attending political rallies and wearing party colours. The next section provides the research problem, theoretical and literature review to the study of intra-party democracy and institutions.

1.5. Statement of Research Problem

There exists general agreement among sceptics and advocates of democracy that political parties provide a critical link between their membership and elected representatives. In addition, it is beyond controversy that no contemporary democracy has excelled without political parties.\(^ {53}\) Incidentally, political parties across the globe have been wrecked by structural and functional challenges, which threaten their survival and effective functioning. These include shifting preference of people towards interest groups away from political parties, high profile scandals, inferior electoral performance, and weak internal organisation.\(^ {54}\)

As a consequence, the popularity of political parties has seen its down side as witnessed by inexorable disaffection towards partisan identification among

\(^{50}\) Mkandawire, Thandika, 2003:21  
\(^{51}\) Ibid: 67  
\(^{52}\) Englund, Harri, 2002: 18; Mkandawire, Thandika, 2003:21  
\(^{53}\) Teorell, Jan, 1999: 363  
\(^{54}\) NIMD, 2004: 8; Löfgren, Karl, 2003: 2; Rahat, Gedeon; Hazan, Reuven, 2003: 1
Western Europe mass parties as well as in Africa.\textsuperscript{55} Such developments have justified a rationale towards reforms to avert stagnation, regain legitimacy, improve the internal functioning of political parties, and enhance their survival both in government and opposition.

Political parties have critical functions in a democracy. At least in theory, political parties augment citizen participation in the course of political processes, widen aggregation of diverse political opinions in public life, facilitate orderly and democratic transfer of political power at all levels of society, promote government accountability, and impart legitimacy to the political system.\textsuperscript{56} To execute these functions, the reform agenda of political parties includes aspects related to the internal organisation of parties including: organisational strength, political identity, internal unity, and intra-party democracy.\textsuperscript{57}

In the case of Malawi as elsewhere in the region, there is a discrepancy between the democratic formality of political parties and their practice. There exists a contradiction between the values and spirit of statutory documents of political parties and the reality in the functioning of the political organisations. Notwithstanding the potential of other factors beyond this assessment, which may have influenced these outcomes, political parties have suffered from internal discord and disintegration, diminishing popularity and electoral losses due to the absence of regular communication, debate and dialogue in parties.\textsuperscript{58} The resultant outcomes include perceptions of personalised party ownership and heroic tendencies, which are partly explained by the manipulation of the rules to suit certain ulterior agendas.\textsuperscript{59}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55} Hopkin, Jonathan, 2004: 344, 351; Matlosa, Khabele, 2005: 5
\item \textsuperscript{56} Matlosa, Khabele, 2005: 3
\item \textsuperscript{57} NIMD, 2004: 11
\item \textsuperscript{58} Meinhardt, Heiko; Patel, Nandini, 2003: 33
\item \textsuperscript{59} Matlosa, Khabele, 2005: 5
\end{itemize}
The political landscape is also characterised by the damaging effects of the organisational design of parties and the top-down political behaviour as inherited from the colonial legacy.\textsuperscript{60} Within parties, conformity is enforced through silent, overt and illegal informal sanctions including ostracism, and hostile remarks. This has entrenched the culture of silence and secrecy. Consequences have included limited transparency and inclusiveness, high patrimonialism and other critical deficits of intra-party democracy in all parties.

The link between intra-party democracy and institutions is inherent in the principle-agent model of the public choice theory.\textsuperscript{61} Institutions promote mutual accountability between the principal (electorate/party members) and the agent (party representatives/leaders). Ideally, institutions oblige leaders to seek the consent of party members, hence reduce wide latitude of discretionary authority of political leaders.\textsuperscript{62} Macintyre states that ‘discretion is the enemy of optimality, commitment its ally.’\textsuperscript{63}

In terms of intra-party democracy and from the principal-agent model, this mitigates against the difficulty of observing the behaviour of elected representatives,\textsuperscript{64} in representative democracies of all types and flavours. Further, the absence of institutions threatens party stability and cohesion, while encouraging shirking and rent-seeking behaviour of agents. The research examines if political parties practically fulfil institutional obligations on specific aspects of intra-party democracy in Malawi. The next section provides the research hypotheses and aims.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{60} Kanyongolo, Fidelis, 2003: 273
\textsuperscript{61} Seyd, Ben, 2003: 2. This model asks how, when power is delegated from citizens to their representatives, we can be sure that the agents will act in the collective interest, rather than seeking to pursue their own goals. The key concern of the principal-agent model is the compliance problem inherent in representative democracy
\textsuperscript{62} Macintyre, Andrew, 2003: 21
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid: 2003: 20
\textsuperscript{64} Bickers, Kenneth; Williams, John, 2001: 49
\end{flushright}
1.6. Research hypothesis and aims

Drawing from the preceding theoretical discussion, the broad research hypothesis is that formal institutional arrangements enhance intra-party democracy. The unit of analysis are the five political parties, specifically focusing on the party constitutional provisions and the party laws and relating them to the five indicators of intra-party democracy. Specific aims of the study are:

1. To provide theoretical context and background to the study of intra-party democracy
2. To provide an overview on the status of intra-party democracy in Malawi
3. To assess the impact of formal institutional arrangements on intra-party democracy
4. To present research findings on the impact of institutional arrangements on intra-party democracy
5. To identify major factors limiting intra-party democracy and consequences on the party organisation, and suggest recommendations for reform.

These aims are premised on three major assumptions. First, that institutional arrangements or rules do exist both within and outside political parties, which influence how parties function and operate in Malawi. Second, that these rules are accessible and known by party members, and finally, that they are effectively enforced both internally and externally in order to enhance intra-party democracy.

The broad hypothesis has been split into five sub-hypotheses as follows:

**H1:** The more participatory the candidate selection process is, the higher the intra-party democracy

**H2:** The more participatory the consultations are in coalition formation, the higher the intra-party democracy

**H3:** The more participatory the formulation of party’s conflict management regulations, the higher the intra-party democracy
**H4:** The more participatory the party conventions are, the higher the intra-party democracy

**H5:** The more participatory the party funding and allocation of resources, the higher the intra-party democracy.

The five sub-hypotheses are the conceptual elements of intra-party democracy which the study aims to assess. The underlying argument is that an improvement in the performance of these five elements translates into enhanced intra-party democracy. By establishing (a) if there are existing internal and external institutional arrangements to regulate the functioning of the five elements, and (b) how in practice, the presence or absence of such institutional arrangements influence how intra-party democracy is enhanced or undermined in the five aspects, it will be concluded whether indeed institutional arrangements enhance intra-party democracy. This can be elaborated at two levels as follows: (a) the more participatory the five aspects are within the parties, the better the chance exists that a higher level of intra-party democratic practice will prevail, and (b) the more such participation is secured by and attributed to the influence of existing institutional arrangements, the more institutional arrangements enhance intra-party democracy. The next section focuses on the justification for the study.

### 1.7. Motivation for the study

This research is justified by three major reasons. First, major pioneering studies on intra-party democracy have focussed on relatively mature democracies of Western Europe (for example, Germany and Sweden) and the United States of America. Not much attention has been given to Africa’s transition democracies. While these research findings may hold true for the Western political parties, similar studies may empirically give different results if applied to the African, and specifically, the Malawian context. Hence, this study aims at complementing previous studies by analysing intra-party democracy under different geo-political and time contexts.
In addition, the only and recently published studies on intra-party democracy in Africa have been at sub-regional, and not country specific level. An example is the path breaking study conducted by Khabele Matlosa. While providing aggregated common and contrasting trends at regional level, such a study deprives the analyst of country-specific details and influencing factors such as national and party constitutions and party law, among others. This research seeks to provide such contextual and exclusive detail.

Second, the choice of elements for assessing intra-party democracy may have been inspired by unique assumptions and prevailing temporal and contextual challenges to intra-party democracy. This study examines other indicators that are uniquely critical to Malawi’s intra-party politics. This makes the study relevant and topical to the intra-party democratic development in Malawi. Third, earlier studies have only made cursory reference to the link between intra-party democracy and institutional arrangements, unless otherwise not yet published. By assessing the impact of formal institutional arrangements on intra-party democracy, this study intends to bridge this gap. The research question and objective are presented in the next section

1.8. Research Objective and Question

The research objective is to establish the relationship between institutional arrangements (constitutional rules, and procedures) and intra-party democracy. This research seeks to answer the question whether institutional arrangements affect intra-party democracy. Therefore, the research investigates the extent to which political behaviour is influenced by institutions, and how this affects intra-party democracy. Study findings will partly assist in understanding and interpreting political behaviour in terms of institutions, and its impact on intra-party democracy in Malawi.
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents literature review and conceptualisation of key terms, followed by Chapter 3 which focuses on research methodology and research challenges. This is followed by a section on hypothesis operationalisation and conceptual model.

Empirical results on the status of formal institutional arrangements and the Conclusion are presented in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 proposes recommendations.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

This section provides conceptual definitions of key terms, theoretical models and contributions made on fundamental aspects of the study. These include; political parties, democracy, intra-party democracy, elements of intra-party democracy and institutions.

2.2. Conceptualisation of Terms

2.2.1. Political Parties

While the expression ‘political party’ has been defined by different scholars and practitioners inconsistently, the common thread runs along the rationale for which political parties are formed. Maliyamkono and Kanyongolo assert that a political party refers an organised group of people working together and competing for political office to realise commonly agreed policies. In this thesis, I adopt the definition provided by Hess. Cited in Matlosa, Hess defines political parties as a collection of people united by a common quest to achieving their political and social aspirations. Formed in all societies and states to facilitate for the participation of the eligible population in the political process, political parties allow people to voice and realise their collective aspirations and objectives through organised and strategic approaches.

To this end, critical functions of political parties include; assembling electoral support for candidates for public office, aggregation of preferences to offer clearer alternative policies and choices to voters, and transferring of democratic political and cultural values across generations. Political parties also serve as instruments

---

65 Kanyongolo, Fidelis; Maliyamkono, TL, 2003: 41 (Maliyamkono’s first name is not disclosed by source)
66 Matlosa, Khabele, 2005: 3
67 NIMD, 2004: 9
that control governments or the masses through harmonised collective human action, a medium of leadership recruitment for political office and in fragmented societies, cater for the synchronisation of diverse political interests into compromises of political coalitions.\textsuperscript{68} Finally, Morelli and Teorell add that the primary role of political parties is that they mobilise voters in elections,\textsuperscript{69} and construct the public opinion agenda.\textsuperscript{70}

The above functions distinguish political parties from any other social organisation. Doorenspleet posits that a democratic regime is characterised by the existence of several competitive political parties.\textsuperscript{71} This implies that there is no democracy without many freely competing political parties. While political parties are critical assets to the attainment of a vibrant democracy through enhanced citizen participation, they become democratic liabilities when they overtly succeed at doing the opposite, in constraining the free expression of political choices of its citizens.\textsuperscript{72} The next section discusses democracy and its link to political parties.

\textbf{2.2.2. Democracy}

The meaning of the word “democracy” itself has sparked fierce political controversies and ideological debate. This is because “authoritarian leaders, dictators, totalitarian parties, libertarians, anarchists and fascists” have referred to their regimes as democratic.\textsuperscript{73} Dulani asserts that democracy is perhaps the most promiscuously used term in contemporary politics.\textsuperscript{74} The definition of democracy is also dependent on the underlying model of democracy. What is generally accepted is the origin of the word democracy linking government to the people as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{68} Salih, Mohamed, 2003: 3, 4
\item \textsuperscript{69} Morelli, Massimo, 2004: 830
\item \textsuperscript{70} Teorell, Jan, 1999: 374
\item \textsuperscript{71} Doorenspleet, Renske, 2003: 185
\item \textsuperscript{72} Matlosa, Khabele, 2005: 22
\item \textsuperscript{73} Dulani, Boniface, 2003: 1
\item \textsuperscript{74} Ibid: 2
\end{itemize}
the government ‘of’, ‘by’ and ‘for’ the people. This view is shared by International IDEA, who typifies a democratic political system as transparent, responsive, participatory and representatively inclusive in meeting citizen expectations. Connecting a political party to democracy and the catalytic importance of ‘the people’ in both definitions provides the context for understanding intra-party democracy. The existence of many competing parties is generally accepted, as a critical indicator of a democratic regime.

Thus, political parties are linked democracy by way of their critical functions, particularly through the aggregation and articulation of voter preferences and interests into alternative policies, which create a platform where the demos are able to participate in and contribute to public life. Without political pluralism or where parties are extremely constrained, the political game is reduced to mere ‘opportunism’ and overt self-serving interests of political actors and has the potential of reversing gains of the democratic development process. The above definitions of democracy are based on various theoretical models that explain key elements of democracy. Of relevance to this thesis, the Rational Choice Model is selected and discussed in the next section.

2.2.3. Rational Choice Model of Democracy

Rational choice theory, which originates from classical microeconomics, has received significant acclaim for contributing to political theory, its generic and broad applicability, illustrative power and influence on public policy. In its applicability to democratic theory, the model is premised on ‘methodological individualism’ and the ‘rationality’ concept. Mark Petracca observes that methodological individualism reduces society and social interaction to

---

75 Heywood, Andrew, 1997: 66
76 International IDEA, 2005: URL: www.idea.int
77 Doorenspleet, Renske, 2003: 169
78 Matlosa, Khabele, 2005: 3
79 Petracca, Mark, 1991: 291
individuals,\textsuperscript{80} whose behaviour is not conditioned by institutions and social structures, but by self-seeking interests. This narrow view is used to interpret the behaviour of politicians as exclusively power-oriented and monetary-driven, regardless of existing institutional limits and incentives.

In reality, this perspective is lacking in two ways. First, it assumes perfect information of political actors, yet social, political as well as economic systems are characterised by information asymmetries. Second and related to the first one, while individual and collective actions may be influenced by egoistic preferences over common good, they are equally governed by varied forms of formal and informal instruments, ethics and normative values. Petracca notes that similar to all other socio-political phenomena, rationality is socially constructed and constituted.\textsuperscript{81} This model explains essential elements behind political behaviour. In relation to this thesis, this aspect is critical as it underlines how the individual will act under different institutional parameters, and how this will eventually impact on intra-party democracy.

In conclusion, the polity comprising self-centred individuals transverses the dictates of representative democracy, hence renders the rational choice model useful for this research only in its modified form. Since individuals are indeed partly driven by egoistic interests on one hand, and within the permissible limits of rules and socially acceptable norms, on the other, this thesis applies the rational choice model in tandem with the deliberative model of intra-party democracy discussed in the next section.

\textsuperscript{80}\textsuperscript{80} Petracca, Mark, 1991: 291
\textsuperscript{81}\textsuperscript{81} Ibid: 301
2.2.4. Institutions

Ostrom defines institutions as ‘rules’ about behaviour, especially about making decisions, regulating individual conduct, information transmission as well decision choices.\(^{82}\) North observes that both formal and informal institutional frameworks constrain certain human behaviour and, where necessary, create conditions for permissible activities.\(^{83}\) However, in a democracy, institutions regulate political decisions and structure outcomes and institutions may be in the form of constitutions, statutes and judicial rules of action.\(^{84}\) Constitutions are regulatory frameworks that establish the legitimate basis for democratic decision rules, penalties and incentives for the formation of governments and its tenure and jurisdiction to rule, and democratic procedures for the termination of regimes.\(^{85}\)

The supremacy of constitutions is characterised by two key elements: (a) they take precedence in case of conflict with ordinary legislation, and (b) they are adopted as a whole rather than piecemeal.\(^{86}\) While conceding that other types of institutions (electoral, administrative, legislative, executive, judicial and statutory) are organs of, and defined by the constitution, Bickers and Williams observe that this non ‘exhaustive’ and ‘overlapping’ typology of institutions define procedures for elections, including eligibility for legislative candidacy, limits for exercising delegated authority and influence individual actions in favour of the collective good.\(^{87}\) The manner in which particular institutions are designed, adopted and enforced determines the political cognition and performance by endorsing one form while restricting another.\(^{88}\)

\(^{82}\) Ostrom, Elnor, 1996: 2
\(^{83}\) North, Douglass, 2004: 4
\(^{84}\) Bickers, Kenneth; Williams, John, 2001: 41
\(^{85}\) Skach, Cindy, 1993: 258
\(^{86}\) Elster, Jon, 1998: 97
\(^{87}\) Bickers, Kenneth; Williams, John, 2001: 42
\(^{88}\) Petracca, Mark, 1991: 302
Institutions are generally held to encourage socially optimal outcomes in two ways, via ‘ex-ante’ and ‘ex-post’ controls. Ex-ante controls guarantee comparability by providing a platform at which electoral competitors find incentives for the common good. They designate discretionary authority to parties and individuals, while correspondingly ensuring that elected officials remain sensitive to citizen preferences. Ex-post controls are designed to restrict the agents’ (elected representatives) discretionary power, such that accountability and checks and balances are maintained through regular elections in which voters make retrospective judgments about the agents’ activities. This entails a variation in the manner in which institutions are enforced. If party leaders violate their party constitution, they are internally sanctioned through the disciplinary measures and penalties contained by the same party constitution, since the party constitution is not independent from the party itself. On the other hand, if they violate the national constitution, then the offence becomes a judicial matter whose verdict is premised on penalties prescribed externally by the national laws or penal code. Hence, the judgement against violating the national constitution may also negatively affect the leader’s political career prospects within the party and at national level including disqualification from parliament. Although the party constitution is part of the party, it is treated as an independent variable because as an institution, the constitution enshrines the institutional requirement for practical fulfilment within the party.

Institutions or rules contain the risks of arbitrary political behaviour and actions, which reduce prospects of discretionary reversals. Macintyre succinctly posits that party leaders can seldom renege on campaign promises if they are obliged by rules to obtain the consent of other political actors. Macro-level examples of formal institutional foundations include electoral systems and constitutional

---

89 Seyd, Ben, 2003: 2
90 Ibid
91 Ibid
92 Macintyre, Andrew, 2003: 21
separation of powers.\textsuperscript{93} This assertion dovetails with the principal-agent model, which recommends for appropriately designed institutions to enforce contractual obligations between contracting parties. To this end Bickers and Williams propose that while political institutions should be relatively stable to instil public trust and prevent high propensity to manipulation for narrowly conceived personal ends, they should strike a balance between the extremes of authoritarian regimes and excessive controls of direct democracy.\textsuperscript{94}

2.2.5. Theories of Institutions

Most institutionalism theories have been derived and adapted from political science and economics to explain institutions as synonymous to organisations, on one hand, and as behavioural rules for social interaction, on the other. As this thesis takes the latter view of institutions, the next section discusses two institutionalism theories- Rational Choice Theory, and Historical Institutionalism Theory.

2.2.5.1. Rational Choice Theory

Rational Choice Theory of Institutionalism is informed by rational choice theory already discussed under the models of democracy. The theory assumes that in the political and economic interaction process, personal interests are the motivation of individual actions.\textsuperscript{95} The relevance of this theory to democracy lies in that it partly assists in understanding the motivational factors of political behaviour, which shape preference of political decision choices of one type over others. This is critical considering the heterogeneity and complexity of individual preferences and interests, which political parties attempt to aggregate. Therefore, institutions emerge and survive, because they fulfil important functions for the individual actors affected by these institutions.\textsuperscript{96} At the core of this new institutional

\begin{itemize*}
\item \textsuperscript{93} Macintyre, Andrew, 2003: 25
\item \textsuperscript{94} Bickers, Kenneth; Williams, John, 2001: 43
\item \textsuperscript{95} Jönsson, Christer; Tallberg, Jonas, 2004: 4
\item \textsuperscript{96} Ibid
\end{itemize*}
economics approach are imported theories of ‘transaction costs’ and ‘principal-agency’.

The idea is that in addition to production costs, additional costs are also incurred related to arranging (drafting, planning and negotiating) and enforcing a contract. This process is as costly as is the process of solving contractual disputes hence institutions serve to reduce transaction costs.  

This view applies to political theory of institutions at local, national and international level, since the individual is the unit of analysis. As discussed under deliberative democracy, the concept of transaction cost applies when considering why some political leaders are averse to deliberative, participatory and collective decision making because of its attendant costs. The link is further drawn to the principal-agency theory in order to establish monitoring and incentive mechanisms that can mitigate problems of shirking and reneging by the agent in their pursuit of personal interests, due to information asymmetry and conflicting interests.

2.2.5.2. Historical Institutionalism Theory

Historical institutionalism on the other hand, represents a ‘cultural approach.’ Jönsson and Tallberg note that individual behaviour is not based on completely strategic calculations, but restricted by their normative perceptions. Instead of being purely driven by selfish interests, individual actions are regulated by how they are morally interpreted. Peculiar to historical institutionalism, is the stress on historical contingencies and durability of institutions. This view accentuates that once an institutional framework is established, it tends to endure because change is costly and uncertain, thereby inducing adaptive behaviour especially in political parties. Thelen notes that institutions are enduring legacies of political struggles and actors adapt to prevailing institutions by investing in them in ways

97 Jönsson, Christer; Tallberg, Jonas, 2004: 4
98 Ibid
99 Ibid: 5
100 Ibid
that reinforce the institutions.\textsuperscript{101} She pointedly argues that institutions replicate and enlarge particular patterns of power relations and consequently, facilitate the empowerment of certain individuals or groups, while disorientating and obstructing others in terms of political organisation.\textsuperscript{102}

Theoretically, this paper blends the principal-agent view of the rational choice theory and the path-dependency aspect of the historical institutionalism. This approach strikes a balance between pure economic view of the rational choice model, (weakened by its extreme and narrow interpretation of social behaviour), and the historical model, which explains institutional configurations in terms of critical junctures and development pathways.\textsuperscript{103}

2.2.6. Formal Institutions

Hence, institutions are mainly considered from the formal perspective. The formal subset constitutes institutions that are internal and external to the political party. The endogenous formal aspects are internal to the party organisation as enshrined within, and therefore form an integral part of its constitution as presented in Figure 1. By contrast, among the rules external to the political party is the national constitution and the party law. National constitutions set the incentive system and organisations, within which democratic institutions operate.\textsuperscript{104} The national constitution provides a yardstick against which decisions and actions of party leaders are measured, especially in eventualities where deprived party members contest such actions and decisions in court.

In a democratic polity, the party law fixes preconditions for the registration of political parties. Further, it dictates the basic democratic instruments and standards that must be met by each party, including a democratic party’s

\textsuperscript{101} Thelen, Kathleen, 1999: 385
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid: 394
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid: 387
\textsuperscript{104} Skach, Cindy, 1993: 259
constitution. Ideally, the party law is descriptive of whether a regime is
democratic or otherwise. By examining the party law relative to the national
constitution and the party constitution, one can establish harmony and discord
between legal democratic requirements, on one hand, and actual practice, on the
other, with regard to intra-party democracy. Internal and external institutions
mutually assist in analysing the differences between theory and practice.

Both internal and external institutions constitute formal arrangements in that they
are usually available as written and formally adopted documents. In the words of
Lane, and applying the principal-agent model, Ben Seyd asserts that both national
and party constitutions are broad and long-term contractual obligations between
the rulers (agents) and the ruled (principals) under which the former may exercise
delegated power in the best interest of the latter.105 In addition, a democratic
party’s constitution lays out procedures for decision-making, and establishes other
internal organs including dispute management mechanisms.

Finally, a democratic party’s constitution is also expected to stipulate procedures
and rules governing the nomination of parliamentary and presidential candidates.
The organisational design, on the other hand, links levels of coordination and
mutual control between elected officials and its members. Where decisions of
those in senior party positions cannot be transparently scrutinised by its members
or a party convention, then the party’s internal democracy is undermined.

In summary, institutions fulfil the function of regulating both the vertical
obligations of ensuring consistency between superior institutions (i.e. national
constitution), and horizontal obligations of making human behaviour compliant to
rules, standard procedures and expectations of party members and electorate.

105 Seyd, Ben, 2003: 2
2.2.7. **Informal Institutions**

Informal institutions refer to socially shared rules created and enforced outside the formally/officially sanctioned sphere and can not be referenced to as they are routinely applied, followed and often exist in unwritten form.\(^{106}\) The rationale is that political actors are not exclusively influenced by formal rules but also and simultaneously, by dynamics arising from informal institutions, and sometimes to the detriment of formal rules.\(^{107}\) However, as informal institutional arrangements are not the main focus of this thesis, the analysis is on formal institutional arrangements.

2.2.8. **Intra-party Democracy**

Intra-party democracy broadly refers to the party organisation whose functioning is regulated by prescribed rules of procedure that restrain arbitrary control of ‘internal elections’ and other party issues by powerful elites.\(^{108}\) This implies that it is hypocritical for a political party to campaign for and defend democratic values and not practice democracy within its system. The relevance of democracy within parties has been defended by a number of authors as essential for the realisation of a number of political outcomes. Löfgren argues that democracy in the party organisation cultivates a civic culture of democratic education among the citizens, caters for popular participation, collective ownership, legitimacy and responsibility over party decisions.\(^{109}\) These components are critical for the ‘big democracy’ to work according to democratic norms.

It is further argued that intra-party democracy entails that all activities and systems within the party are guided by internal rules and procedures consistent with the expectations of the party members and the legally established statutory

---

106 Helmke, Gretchen; Steven, Levitsky, 2004: 727
107 Ibid: 726
108 NIMD, 2004: 11
109 Löfgren, Karl, 2003:7
This implies moderate empowerment for the members and the bottom-up decision-making. This assertion denotes a direct link between intra-party democracy and institutions whereby accountability processes are created and enforced by statutory devices.

While other commentators like Duverger have contended against intra-party democracy by arguing that it reduces prospects for coalition negotiations and promotes fragmentation, there is also substantial evidence that transferring power downward through intra-party democracy does not automatically undermine the importance of parties neither their internal cohesion. Scarrow states that “parties often retain control over the instruments of direct democracy, and deliberately use them to strengthen partisan positions and commitments.” She contends that in many countries and regions, party leaders have either “allowed” or “introduced” devices that extend citizens’ direct control over party and public decisions. This support for intra-party democracy, implicitly affirms the premise that intra-party democracy also enhances party solidarity and executive control over party affairs.

As will be elaborated under the section on institutions, the above tenets of intra-party democracy are attainable within a framework, which has the compelling, constraining and sanctioning rules and incentives, otherwise called institutions. Osabu-Kle states the need for a comparative operationalisation of components for democracy and dictatorship in political parties for measurement reasons. At party level, dictatorship comprises the level of political power centralisation, the ability of the political executive to act without consultation, and level of political violence. Conversely, the level of democracy, is identified by inter alia, degree of opportunity for individual participation, level of tolerance of political opinion,
degree of consensual decision making, and degree of decentralisation of political power. This entails that democratic practice consists of an inverse relationship with dictatorship. Various theoretical models have informed the description of intra-party democracy. However, among all others, the Deliberative Model discussed below, has argued an adequate defence for intra-party democracy.

2.2.9. Deliberative Model of Intra-party democracy

This model is a recent theoretical authority proposed by Jan Teorell and other deliberative Democrats in defence for intra-party democracy. The deliberative model argues that intra-party democracy is enriched by the decision making process if preceded and informed by open debate and exchange of arguments among equal, free and rational agents. In this model, opinions are not pre-given but are formed through deliberation- a free, participatory debate and exchange of arguments in parties. The merit of deliberation is that intra-party democracy supplements general elections in ensuring that legislators are constantly amenable to public opinion.

In Teorell’s view, parties can form a linkage between civil society and the political sphere if they use modes of deliberation. Citing Habermas and others, Teorell contends that public opinions should be made through free debate aimed at reaching consensus over a problem at hand, by the merits of a superior line of reasoning. He insists that democracy should be characterised by the endogenous determination of preferences that are judiciously formed through open and public debate within the political process.

Jon Ester, a deliberative democracy theorist, provides a complementary catalogue of virtues for deliberative democracy. He first defines deliberative democracy as a

115 Osabu-Kle, Daniel: 3, URL: www.carleton.ca/panafrica/journal/jpw/democra2.pdf
116 Teorell, Jan, 1999: 373
117 Ibid: 371
118 Ibid: 367
process of decision making with the participation of all who will be affected by the decision or their representatives, by means of sequential arguments and debates offered by, and to, participants committed to the values of rationality and impartiality.\textsuperscript{119} He defends deliberative democracy on account of five inherent virtues namely that: (a) it reveals privately held information about individual preferences over the outcome of a particular decision, (b) it lessens or overcomes the impact of bounded rationality, (c) it legitimises the ultimate choice as being for the common good while optimising prospects for compliance among those bound by decision, (d) it makes for Pareto-superior decisions “by fostering better solutions,” and (e) it facilitates compromises and larger consensus, thereby enhancing social solidarity.\textsuperscript{120}

Hitherto, opponents to intra-party democracy argue that broad-based participation of party members in the party organisational decisions is dysfunctional and inept. They argue that it diminishes operational efficiency, uses up scarce resources while also restricting the party leadership’s scope and flexibility of strategic interests in competing for voters and post-election coalition bargaining.\textsuperscript{121} However, as Thesing puts it, parties risk facing declining membership when they constrain intra-party democracy.\textsuperscript{122}

Along the Deliberative model of intra-party democracy, this thesis argues that intra-party democracy is sustained by the degree of participatory representation of views, not necessarily individuals, in the internal decision-making processes through which credible decisions derive their legitimacy. The question of process ‘efficiency’ of the deliberative democracy is a rational cost in order to retain the intrinsic-worth of deliberative democracy as argued above. Dahl corroborates the representative participation of the demos by endorsing that throughout the course of making collective and binding decisions, adequate and equal opportunity needs

\textsuperscript{119} Elster, Jon, 1998: 8
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid: 11
\textsuperscript{121} Niedermayer, Oskar, 1995: 128
\textsuperscript{122} Thesing, Josef, 1995: 15
to be availed to the citizens for expressing their preferences in determining the agenda and defend one set of outcomes over the other.\textsuperscript{123} Through free deliberations, people learn of new alternatives and insights to overcome their prejudices in confronting collective problems. Ideally, these instruments are variedly institutionalised in the party constitution as well as in the national constitution and are discussed in the next section.

\textbf{2.2.10. Elements of Intra-party democracy}

The debate is not conclusive on concrete determinants of intra-party democratic development. In a summary of her PhD research findings on coalition formation in the Swedish Local Government,\textsuperscript{124} Hanna Bäck observes that operationalising intra-party democracy is intricate.\textsuperscript{125} She then develops indicators, which are used to measure intra party democracy by asking interviewees on the extent to which they agreed with five statements concerning their party.\textsuperscript{126}

In his 1998 study, Teorell on the other hand, intensively measured the level of intra-party democracy in two Swedish parties, by assessing “the influence of party members, its opportunity to influence, and its possibility to hold the decision-makers accountable during two decision-making processes.”\textsuperscript{127} However, conducting such an in depth analysis of intra-party democracy requires more time and financial resources and is beyond the means of this research. Lastly, while

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} Dahl, Robert, 1989: 109
\item \textsuperscript{124} Given that Local Government springs from decentralised power of national government and political organisations within it, Hanna Bäck’s Local Government analysis and findings of intra-party democracy can be modified for theoretical application of analysing intra-party democracy at national level since the unit of analysis in both cases is the same, a political party.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Bäck, Hanna, 2004: 11
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid: 9. Her precise questions were: ‘(1) the local party organisation has a significant capacity to influence the decisions that are made in the party’s parliamentary group; (2) the leadership of the party group always informs and seeks the support of the party group when important decisions are made; (3) a very small group in the party negotiate when we are to enter a coalition; (4) decisions about cooperating with other parties in a coalition always have to be supported by the party group, (5) ‘it is very easy for the local party organization to dismiss a group leader if it so wishes.’ Level of Intra-party democracy is measured by the value the additive index.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Bäck, Hanna, 2004: 9
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
analysing challenges facing political parties in enhancing intra-party democracy in the Southern African, Matlosa isolates five major aspects: intra-party organisation, leadership, primary elections, party funding and gender equity.  

Related to the above dimensions of intra-party democracy, but framed differently to suit the objective of this research, five elements have been chosen and adapted for the analysis of intra-party democracy in Malawi.

The common attribute between elements used by the researchers cited above and those chosen for this research is the assessment of intra-party democracy in terms of level of participation in decision-making processes. However, unique to the present study is the institutional context within which these elements are assessed. These are; candidate selection processes, coalition formation approaches, internal conflict management mechanisms, party funding practices, and party convention processes. These are discussed in the next section.

2.2.10.1. Candidate selection regulations

In all electoral systems, candidate selection is one of the first things that political parties do before an election.  

Demand for the democratisation of the candidate selection process has been aimed at mitigating dropping membership rates, declining financial sources, increasing floating voters, and the increasing electoral volatility attributed to heavy fluctuation in the voter share of parties.  

Tangential to the rational-choice literature, candidate selection constitutes an integral business of political parties with major implications on party unity, representation, democratic stability and parliamentary conduct.  

Hazan lays a clear distinction between candidate selection and legislative recruitment by stating that the latter involves aspects of national legal and electoral system, while the former is an

---

128 Matlosa, Khabele, 2005: 3. However, Matlosa does not state how these indicators can be measured.
129 Hazan, Reuven, 2002: 108
130 Pennings, Paul; Hazan, Reuven, 2001: 268
131 Hazan, Reuven, 2002: 108
undertaking exclusive to the individual political parties. He defines candidate selection as essentially an extralegal procedure through which a political party determines from potential nominees, its recommended individuals or list of candidates lawfully eligible to represent the party in an election as its bonafide candidate(s).

Democratising the candidate selection process has two key merits. First, by allowing for unrestricted participation of members and voters to vote in closed and open primary election, parties act as intermediaries in the selection of representatives, and monitor who is selected. Second, the approach ensures that the controlling role of an exclusive selectorate diminishes in favour of a more inclusive process of determining representatives. Empirical evidence suggests that contrary to the assertion that this process weakens the power of party elites, democratising the candidate selection process may actually reinforce the grip of party elites in the selection of candidates, albeit to variedly and subject to diverse contextual factors, including the nature of political competition.

Finally, in order to observe the distribution of power within the party, candidate selection becomes the focal point at which the party’s democratic virtues are exhibited or compromised. Failure to balance interests of the party and those of its members results in the collapse of party cohesion. The hypothesis here is that the more participatory the candidate selection process, the higher the intra-party democracy.

---

132 Hazan, Reuven, 2002: 109
133 Ibid
134 Pennings, Paul; Hazan, Reuven, 2001: 268
135 Ibid
136 Ibid
2.2.10.2. Coalition formation procedures

Given that opposition parties especially in Africa tend to be weak and highly fragmented, they have not posed a great electoral challenge to many ruling parties and have suffered successive electoral defeats. In the process of reviewing their electoral strategies and modus operandi, coalitions have been considered among the most popular survival options. Equally, contemporary parliamentary democracies are notable for none-legislative majoritarian single parties, thereby prompting coalition governments.\textsuperscript{137} Formal political coalitions have been deemed favourable to create consensus and democratic stability, particularly in countries that are multicultural and multi-ethnic regardless of whether under proportional representation, as in most Western Europe, or presidential, as in most African countries’ electoral systems. Citing Gregory Luebbert, Bäck asserts that where party leaders are driven by personal ambition for power, they tend to suppress dissent within the party because leadership positions are at stake.

Empirical evidence concedes that a high level of intra-party democracy affects a party’s bargaining efficiency, as leaders have to spend a fairly significant amount of time and effort during bargaining, seeking their members’ support before making important decisions about coalition partners and bargaining deals. Thus, intra-party democracy negatively affects outside perception of an internally democratic party since ‘risk-averse’ potential coalition partners avoid cooperating with it.\textsuperscript{138} However, considering that lack of intra-party democracy is a recipe for factionalism, which is itself a deterrent to coalition prospects, as is the case of radical intra-party democracy, the empirical findings of Bäck lack the qualification of optimal level of intra-party democracy, which creates broad-based consensus for coalition formation. Hence, \textit{the more participatory the consultations are in coalition formation, the higher the intra-party democracy.}

\textsuperscript{137} Bäck, Hanna, 2004: 2
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid: 14
2.2.10.3. Conflict management guidelines

In addition to laying procedural rules governing candidate selection and coalition formation processes, the party constitution also provides (ideally) for conflict resolution mechanisms to address inevitable internal tensions and disputes. Often, disciplinary committees are established or ad hoc tribunals are constituted to hear disputes and pass impartial judgment. Intra-party democracy demands full compliance of dispute resolution processes to the statutes and procedures laid out in the party constitution,\textsuperscript{139} to avert unintended detrimental effects of conflict.

Dissent is an inherent component of intra-party democracy and a potential seed of destructive factionalism over intra-party issues. It follows that where there is less debate and forced conformity to the status quo, the less is the freedom of expression and opinion within the party, thereby limiting intra-party democracy. Intra-party democracy is signified by the extent to which a party abides by established procedural rules in disciplining its members, especially legislative candidates and those in government.\textsuperscript{140}

The research answers the procedural question on the extent to which political parties follow the due process of the national and party constitutions in resolving internal conflicts. This assumes that internal rules and mechanism for the conflict resolution do exist, and these statutes and by-laws were democratically formulated and collectively adopted.\textsuperscript{141} In cases where intra-party democracy is compromised, non-democratic measures include publicly embarrassing those considered rebels, non-conformists or dissidents. Democratically acceptable disciplinary processes include fair hearing, definite suspension, removal from party office, and in extreme cases, expulsion. The hypothesis is that \textit{the more participatory the formulation of party conflict management mechanisms, the higher the intra-party democracy.}

\textsuperscript{139} NIMD, 2004: 11
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid: 12
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid
2.2.10.4. Party convention rules

A party convention or assembly is an organ of the party constitution created to provide a forum for periodic and regular meetings held annually or after every three years to review overtime successes and challenges of the party. This is a deliberate initiative that affords the entire party membership (as principals) to receive, scrutinise and debate reports made by those in elected position (as agents). The process enhances participation, transparency and accountability, which are fundamental indicators of democratic values. Party conventions are also vital because that is where the mandate of elected leadership positions is secured, renewed and democratically terminated.

Here, it is argued that intra-party democracy is undermined when party conventions are held irregularly, too close to elections, and manipulated by the top leadership. If political leaders remain in positions beyond their constitutional tenure of office without renewed mandate, then incentives for non-compliance to the constitution are high. IDEA observes that parties can also decline if they devote their resources and strategies towards the re-election of established leaders. Moreover, the sequencing and timing of the convention is of paramount consequences to intra-party democracy. Conventions that are held in between elections are less riddled by election-oriented political manipulation.

The accessibility to, and the degree of free participation in the convention’s decision-making process, without undue influence of the elite, demonstrates greater intra-party democracy. Conversely, if elected representatives can easily renege on implementing resolutions of the convention without risking their positions, the weaker is the enforcement mechanisms of the social contract. This assumes that conventions are held not too close to elections, and that they are neither manipulated nor unrepresentative. As such, the hypothesis here is that the

142 International IDEA, 2003: 3
more participatory the party conventions are, the higher the intra-party democracy.

2.2.10.5. Party funding regulations

Political parties, like any other organisation, need to raise money to finance their normal operational costs in between elections, as well as campaign activities. These activities include financing for human and organisational resources, meetings- including party conventions, training of candidates and televised or billboards’ campaigns, among other activities.\(^\text{143}\) In Southern Africa, political parties cannot solely depend on public subventions which are only accessible to parties with legislative representation, except for Lesotho, where a modest amount is given to all parties contesting in elections.\(^\text{144}\)

Political parties need complimentary sources of funding including membership, voluntary and private contributions for their sustainable contribution to democracy. This money flows both legally or illegally into the party system and politicians.\(^\text{145}\) Where public funding is extremely limited, the party is inevitably subjected to financing by a single or a few rich elites. In emerging democracies like Malawi, most party members are too impoverished to contribute towards annual membership subscriptions. These elites in turn, exert excessive control over the party and wield immunity to the control by party members and operational rules. The narrower the resources base of party funding the higher is the potential for limited intra-party democracy, since those that privately finance the party tend to influence the party agenda. This is conducive to patron-client politics, which is inimical to intra-party democracy.

\(^\text{143}\) International IDEA, 2003: 4
\(^\text{144}\) Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2004: 5
\(^\text{145}\) International IDEA, 2003: 4
The legendary works of Robert Dahl provide a concise theoretical dose within which to operationalise the notion ‘control of party agenda’, as a critical component in a democratic auditing process. He asserts that the process of making binding collective decisions includes two analytically distinct junctures: setting the agenda and deciding the outcomes. Setting the agenda is the juncture at which ‘matters are selected on which decisions are to be made (including the decision not to decide on the matter).’ Deciding on outcomes refers to the point at which the process culminates in end results, signifying either definite adoption or rejection of a particular decision. Where one is “the first and the second is the last say, (then), the people must retain and exercise the sovereignty over first and last say.” Thus, the demos must resolve what must be discussed or not discussed (setting the agenda) and move on to determining the outcomes- deliberate and make or reject a particular decision.

Financial contributions are a form of political participation, hence an integral part of intra-party democracy. The persons that control the allocation of funds are in a powerful position to set party priorities. It follows that intra-party democratisation of political power is achieved if the national party organs and individuals from all regions assume greater institutional role and participation in the allocation of funds. The two aspects of party funding: acquisition and allocation of the resources are subject to political influences of various actors and this borders on intra-party democracy significantly. Hence, the hypothesis is that the more participatory the party funding and allocation of resources, the higher the intra-party democracy. As the above elements are constitutionally established by rules governing the operations of political parties, the next section links these elements to their institutional framework.

146 Dahl, Robert, 1989: 107
147 International IDEA, 2003: 4
2.3. Conclusion

This thesis uses the Rational Choice Model of democracy and the Deliberative Model of Intra-party democracy. Regarding theories of institutions, the thesis uses the Rational Choice and Historical Institutionalism theories. The foregoing section on literature review and theoretical framework is summarised as follows. First, political parties provide a critical link between the demos on one hand, and their collective participation through a democratic process, on the other. As such, there is no real democracy where competitive political parties are not allowed or where the parties fall short of fulfilling this role. Second, while the rational choice theory validates the self-interested individual behaviour, it is flawed in assuming symmetric information of political actors and that institutions have no force to regulate individual behaviour otherwise. This weakness is challenged by historical institutionalism.

Third, intra-party democracy argued by the deliberative model provides intrinsic merits which justify that collective decisions and choices should be preceded and informed by an open debate and exchange of arguments among equals. This legitimises the ultimate choice, optimises compliance, and facilitates democratic compromises and consensus. Fourth, politicians ideally institutionalise the five elements of intra-party democracy in party constitutions to limit rent-seeking propensity and reneging on political decisions. Fifth, and lastly, formal (external and internal) institutional arrangements ensure the compliance and harmony among institutions themselves and the enforcement of principal-agent contract through incentives and sanctions thereby promoting intra-party democracy.

The next chapter focuses on research design methodological aspects including data collection tools, and techniques, research target group, data processing and research challenges.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

3.1. Introduction

This section provides methods, tools and sources of research data collection, targeted groups and organisations where data was collected. It further discusses how the data were processed and tools used in the analysis. The section concludes by highlighting key challenges in the research and how these were circumvented.

3.2. Methods of data collection

The research uses both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. The two methods vary in three specific aspects. First, in quantitative research, variables are pre-determined and ‘converted into specific action during a planning stage’ before and separate from data collection and analysis, while measurement for qualitative research is done during data collection process. 148 Second, quantitative research develops data collection techniques which can produce quantitative numerical data to empirically represent abstract ideas, whereas qualitative data is sometimes in the form of spoken words, i.e. expressed opinions which cannot all be converted into a single median like numbers. Alternatively, data is presented using flexible expressions and forms.149 The difference lies in how the two methods link empirical data to concepts. In quantitative research, all concepts are thoroughly developed and considered before the actual research. Conversely, while qualitative research also makes preliminary reflection on the concepts beforehand, most of them are developed during data collection.150

Owing to the defining characteristics of qualitative and quantitative research methods given above, this research utilises both techniques.

148 Neuman, Lawrence, 2003: 171
149 Ibid
150 Ibid
Most of the data is quantitative in the sense that the variables and concepts were predetermined and developed at the design stage prior to data collection. This is illustrated by the pre-coded and close-ended questions where interviews were expected to provide specific responses as can be noted from the Research Questionnaires in Annexes 4 and 5. To some degree, the research also uses qualitative techniques to collect empirical data where the responses could not be fully predicted and were post-coded through content analysis technique. These are presented as open-ended questions including those classified as ‘Other’.

3.2.1. Primary data sources

Primary data was collected from two groups of informants: politicians and experts, using two respective sets of structured questionnaires. The questionnaire for politicians was aimed at getting inside information from respondents on their opinions, experiences and views regarding institutions and intra-party democracy. On the other hand, the non-politician experts were interviewed using an adapted questionnaire in order to get alternative perspectives and gain insights from convergences and divergences of responses given by the two groups.

Specifically, the study targeted five of the nine political parties represented in parliament namely: AFORD, MCP, UDF, PPM, and RP in ten districts from all the three Regions of Malawi. These are: Rumphi, Mzuzu and Nkhata Bay in the North; Dedza, Lilongwe, Mchinji and Salima in the Centre; and Blantyre, Mangochi and Zomba in the South (see annex 3).

---

151 See Annex 3 for the full list of interviewees
152 See Annexes 4 and 5 for the research questionnaires
153 See Annex 2. PPM and RP were only registered in preparation for the 2004 general elections. The NDA was not assessed as it was dissolved soon after the 2004 elections following its merger with the UDF. Independent MPS were also left out since they do not subscribe to any party officially.
The criteria for selecting these parties were based on three reasons. First, AFORD, MCP and UDF have participated in all general elections since 1994 and were until 2004, the only parties with parliamentary representation. On the other hand, PPM and RP are the biggest among the relatively new comers represented in parliament. Second, all the five parties got more than five seats in the Malawi’s 193-member parliament in 2004 general elections. Third and finally, all these parties, albeit to varied degrees, have experienced challenges related to intra-party democracy and institutional arrangements, which are the focus of this study.

The choice of the districts was strategically influenced by the potential to have all the five parties represented in the districts, the anticipated availability of interviewees and the rational utilisation of the available resources and time. Using stratified random sampling method, an average of ten interviews were conducted with each of the five parties at national, regional and district levels countrywide. As seen from table 1 below, from the 53 interviews conducted with political party representatives, 17 % were from AFORD, 26.4 % from MCP, 11.3 % from PPM, 13.2 % from RP and 32 % from UDF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is notable from Table 1 above that the aggregate representation at national, regional and district levels, translates to 9 (17 %), 11 (20.8 %) and 33 (62.3 %) for all parties respectively. It must be mentioned that the uneven distribution of party representatives across hierarchical levels were not by design. They are partly explained below in the research challenges particularly with regard to availability and willingness to grant such a politically sensitive interview by regional and national executive committee members across all parties.
However, it is comforting to note that district committee chairpersons in MCP, RP and UDF are also members of their respective Regional Committees. Likewise, regional committee chairpersons are either ex-officio or full members of their respective National Executive Committees. As such, the interview held with the UDF Regional Governor for the North, for example, was representative of both the regional and national executive membership. The same holds true for MCP and RP. The cases of PPM and AFORD cannot be ascertained in the absence of party constitutions.

The regional random sampling was aimed at ensuring balanced representation of political opinions, convictions and experiences in a country characterised by regional division along political preferences and orientations, traditional cultures, and different socio-economic factors. Actual identification of interviewees at district and regional levels were done by former graduates of the TYP programme at each district guided by the criteria set by the researcher. Thus, the researcher’s personal experience with Malawi’s politics and the direct contacts and access to politicians at district and regional level by the former TYP graduates, influenced the choice of interviewees. At national level, the researcher alone determined whom to interview. The KAF Malawi Office provided overall logistical coordination. Notwithstanding the varied levels of knowledge of interviewees about institutions and other intra-party issues, each interview lasted 45 minutes on average.

In addition, expert opinion was sought from academic researchers, officials from parliament secretariat officials, NGO representatives, the Malawi High Court, Malawi Law Society and the Malawi Electoral Commission. A total of 12

---

154 The MCP Constitution, 2003: 12, 15; The RP Constitution, 2004: 12, 13, 16; The UDF Constitution, 2003: 18, 45

155 The Training of Young Politicians (TYP) is an annual inter-party political education training programme for politically active youth aged between 18 and 35 from parties represented in parliament. The programme is sponsored by KAF in Malawi since 2001 and is aimed at promoting inter and intra-party democracy, peaceful political co-existence and capacity building for political parties. By 2004, about 232 graduates from all the 29 districts were trained and are actively involved in inter-party political activities at national and district and local levels.
interviews were conducted with these experts. The non-partisan informants were interviewed to get alternative views, which would also assist in triangulating findings from party members.

On the whole, a total of 65 interviews were conducted, of which 12.3% were female respondents while the rest were male. The full list of interviewees is presented in annex 3. As indicated above, primary data was collected through the use of two structured interview questionnaires, focusing on institutional arrangements and the practical fulfilment of these institutions in the targeted political parties. In the analysis and where applicable, responses from the politicians are compared with those from the experts.

3.2.2. Secondary data sources

Secondary data was collected from relevant publications, reports, acts of parliament, the National Constitution, political party constitutions, party profiles and newspapers. The information collected provides insights into the relationship between institutions and intra-party democracy and supplement empirical results from primary data. For example, where a political respondent did not know any formal institutions within her/his party, the researcher consulted either the party constitution or profile. All open-ended responses to the questions were post-coded after being regrouped into similar categories for content analysis. The content analysis methodology is used to process information, which is providing people’s opinions and judgment.

The research utilises statistical packages - SPSS and Excel - to correlate the relationship between institutional arrangements (as independent variables) and intra-party democracy (as dependent variables) to determine the pattern and frequencies of responses and produce graphs. The frequency distribution of responses has been used to show the degree to which institutions are translated into practice in the parties relative to intra-party democracy.
3.3. Research Challenges

Major research challenges were five fold. First, some politician interviewees (especially at regional and national levels) were non-cooperative due to suspicion with research objectives and fear of unknown. This resulted in fewer interviews held with regional and national committee representatives, relative to those conducted with members of district committees across all parties.

A second challenge was timing of the research and other unprecedented events. Coincidentally, the budget session of parliament was in session during the entire research period. While this was hoped to ease access to most politicians (especially those holding regional and national portfolios), it made most of them so busy that they were only available at odd times, either before or after parliamentary sessions. In addition, this often collided with party caucuses and other portfolio committee meetings, which inevitably rendered interview appointments of last priority.

Third, incidental to all this was the unprecedented death of the former Speaker of Parliament, Late Hon. Rodwell Munyenyembe in the first week of the research, which occasioned suspension of parliamentary business for about two weeks. All planned appointments for this period had to be rescheduled or foregone.

Fourth was lack of information on existing intra-party institutions among some respondents. This was more evident across all parties mainly at district level. This is due to the informal culture of secrecy and monopoly over party documents/constitutions by those in national executive positions. This resulted in some missing values. In the extreme cases of AFORD and PPM, their party constitutions could not be retrieved by the researcher against repeated efforts from multiple sources to do so. Finally, some parties particularly PPM, AFORD and RP have no traceable representation in most districts other than the major cities. This is partly because PPM and RP have not fully established their structures at local level owing to their short history and capacity challenges.
AFORD has remained a northern regional party for more than ten years of its existence. The party’s popularity has further plummeted as seen from the 2004 parliamentary election results. This resulted in fewer interviews held with these parties compared to MCP and UDF. This poses a challenge in terms of comparative analysis of empirical findings across parties as some of the percentages may appear big while representing fewer respondents, compared to others that may be smaller yet representing more respondents. Hence, cross party comparisons are used in limited cases.

To surmount some of these challenges, the researcher pre-tested the questionnaires and revised them in order to ensure undisputable clarity of its objectives and cut down on time per interview. Likewise, most of the interviews were conducted outside working hours and in odd places while every means was tried to secure party constitutions. Lastly, the research programme was extended by one week and some interviews were held at weekends to make up for the lost two weeks.

3.4. Conclusion

Despite the above stated and inevitable challenges faced during the data collection exercise, the research success is attributed to the cooperation of political parties and the experts, support provided by friends, former Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF) trainees in the districts, and the local experience and personal links of the researcher. Above all, the logistical support from KAF, including a vehicle through out the period made things possible. Accordingly, due acknowledgement is made in the appropriate section. The next section provides the operationalisation of the research hypotheses and the causal relationship of the variables in a conceptual model.
3.5. Hypothesis operationalisation and conceptual model

3.5.1. Introduction

This section outlines how the influence of formal and informal institutions is conceptualised from the theoretical and literature review discussed above. Importantly, the section presents a hypothetical illustration of the relationship between the institutional indicators of intra-party democracy- as independent variables, and intra-party democracy- as the dependent variable.

3.5.2. Hypothesis Operationalisation

The research hypothesis derived from the forgoing theoretical discussion is that formal institutional arrangements enhance intra-party democracy. This hypothesis seeks to establish the nature of relationship by which in practice, formal institutional arrangements influence intra-party democracy. Specifically, the thesis analyses whether indeed participatory formal and participatory institutional arrangements enhance intra-party democracy. Specific investigations focus on the five political parties’ constitutions, the national constitution and the party law as formal institutions.

The sub-hypotheses are individually and collectively a necessary, but insufficient condition(s) for assessing intra-party democracy in the five political parties. As such, they contribute by an equal weight to the degree by which institutions practically impact on intra-party democracy. More specifically, where most or all of the propositions are empirically satisfied, it will be upheld that institutional arrangements enhance intra-party democracy by some qualified level. Likewise, where empirical findings suggest that formal institutional arrangements do not substantially enhance intra-party democracy, then the broad hypothesis will to the same extent be partly accepted or falsified. Figure 1 below presents the conceptual model of the relationship between institutional arrangements and intra-party democracy.
3.5.3. Conclusion

The above model illustrates that internal and external formal institutions enhance intra-party democracy. Using empirical data, this thesis aims at analysing how in practice formal institutional arrangements influence intra-party democracy. The next chapter presents empirical findings on the influence of formal institutional arrangements on intra-party democracy in Malawi.
CHAPTER 4: STATUS OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY–EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

4.1. Introduction

Given that this research seeks to examine the influence of formal operational and administrative procedures and regulations in the democratic functioning of political parties, the assessment used both quantitative and qualitative techniques as discussed above. The next section presents empirical findings on each of the five elements of formal institutions. Interim observations and conclusions are made regarding how empirical findings support the first research hypothesis. An analysis of informal institutional arrangements is made in a separate section.

However, despite methodological and design weaknesses inherent in this study, the findings present a substantial reflection on the status of intra-party democracy relative to institutions since the political parties interviewed constitute those with a legislative mandate and from all the three regions of Malawi. Thus, the study gives a fair impression regarding the influence of formal and informal institutional arrangements on intra-party democracy in Malawi.

4.1.2. Definition of Intra-party democracy

This component was aimed at assessing three aspects: (a) establish the local definition of intra party democracy (this part had multiple responses), (b) compare such a definition with the one provided in the literature review, and (c) determine how, in practice, political party operations are evaluated against the given definition of the concept. The findings related to the first aspect are presented in Figure 2.

From Figure 2, 56.6 % of the respondents gave equal weight to the two critical elements of intra-party democracy- popular participation and consultation at all
levels and matters, and freedom of expression to criticise without fear of reprisals. The second most important aspect is adherence to the party constitution. Thirdly, respondents felt that a party is internally democratic if its members are able to influence vital party decisions. Further, 13.4% of the respondents equally weighted two characteristics of intra-party democracy at fourth position comprising: transparency and accountability and regular free and fair elections. These indicators give a basis for assessing a party’s intra-party democracy.

**Figure 2: Responses to the Question ‘How do you define Intra-party democracy’? (in percentage)**

Source: Author’s empirical findings

The findings reveal that the two most important elements of intra-party democracy according to the five parties interviewed are popular participation and consultation at all party levels and on all matters, and freedom of expression to criticise without undue reprisal. In relation to the second aim, these results are in
congruence with the theoretical definition, particularly the deliberative model of intra-party democracy discussed earlier. The model stresses that collective political choices and decisions should be informed by a deliberative and participatory process among party members as equals, within the framework of constitutional procedures and regulations. Inherent in the ‘free debate’ is the freedom to express constructive criticism without risking reprisals.

The second important element- adherence to the party constitution, is also in harmony with the theoretical definition with its emphasis on impersonal rules and procedures, which must promote democratic norms and practices to avoid arbitrary control of internal processes by powerful individuals. Although these aspects are given varied weights in terms of their order of importance, they must be viewed as mutually interdependent and not any one is inferior to the others, including those cited by fewer cases. The aspects mentioned by the respondents are all important in this research since they form a major part of the definition: free participation in collective decisions.

With regard to the third aim and linked to the above defining characteristics, the practical assessment of intra-party democracy in the five political parties reveals an interesting pattern. On aggregate, 32.3 % of the respondents gave a yes indication that political parties are internally democratic, while 32.3 % and 35.5 % rated the parties as not democratic and partly democratic respectively. It should be clear that the respondents are specifically referring to democracy within their own party and not all parties in general.

However, when these findings are disaggregated at party level, they show some differentiation as seen in Table 2 below. For example, in PPM only 16% of the respondents said the party is not internally democratic, while 33.3 % felt that the party is partly democratic and 50 % considered the party to be democratic. Some of reasons given as to why the party is not democratic include ‘vote-buying’ through ‘handouts’ by influential politicians at the 2004 party convention in
Most of those who felt the party is democratic cited such reasons as freedom to criticise their leaders on certain issues and that important decisions in the party are transparently taken with the consensual input of members, thereby securing collective authorship.¹⁵⁷

Table 2: Perception of Intra-party democracy across parties (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPERTS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s empirical findings

On the other hand, RP respondents broke even at 50% for Yes and No responses. Those who said the party is democratic mostly cited a situation when party members prevented the former party president, Mr. Gwanda Chakuamba, from unilaterally and unconstitutionally dissolving the RP to join another party in government.¹⁵⁸ Mr. Chakuamba was later expelled from the party. Among the reasons why the party is rated to be undemocratic is the non-consultative manner in which its former president coerced party members into and out of an electoral alliance with other opposition parties: Mgwirizano Coalition.¹⁵⁹

In the MCP, 46.2% said the party is democratic because it holds free primary elections and does not impose leadership candidates, holds regular conventions on a regional venue rotational basis, members are consulted regularly on important decisions including on coalitions, and there is rule of law in intra-party dispute resolution mechanism.¹⁶⁰ The 30.8% who said the party is not democratic noted

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Sheik M. Kazembe
¹⁵⁷ Interviews with Mr. B. Mbangali and Mr. F. Danger
¹⁵⁸ Interviews with Mr. K. Nyirenda and Mr. S. Masauli
¹⁵⁹ Interviews with Mr. I. Nankhuni, Mr. K. Kumwenda and Hon. C. Luya
¹⁶⁰ Interviews with Mr. B. Mtambalika Mr. N. Dausi and Hon. B. Kutsaira
that the party has a culture of secrecy and silence from the one party era, top leadership has dictatorship tendencies, limited renewal of leadership and limited transparency over party finances.

In the UDF, the respondents were even at 35.3% between those saying that the party is *democratic* and those indicating that the party is *partially* democratic, while 29.4% of the respondents indicated that the party is *not democratic*. Reasons for supporting that the party is democratic include freedom of membership to join or leave the party, and the holding of primary elections.\(^{161}\) Reasons for indicating that the party is not democratic include the imposition of presidential and parliamentary candidates on the electorate, non-holding of party conventions for over ten years, selective application of dispute procedures, lack of transparency over party finances and lack of consultation over coalition decisions.\(^{162}\)

In AFORD, over half of all respondents (55.6%) said the party is not democratic, giving such reasons as lack of tolerance at party conventions, limited transparency over financial matters, limited debate before joining coalitions, and members are not free to contest dictatorial decisions of the party president including on matters that deal with intra-party disputes.\(^{163}\) Those that said the party is democratic cited the party’s regular and constitutional conventions and freedom of expression and association. However, 90.9% of the experts indicated that the five parties are in general, *partly* democratic.

The dominant views of these experts are that while most of the parties hold conventions, rules of convention procedures are usually flouted, the conventions are irregular and held very close to elections. In addition, although almost all political parties hold some kind of primary elections, the democratic procedures and rules are not followed even where they exist. To the contrary, candidates are

\(^{161}\) Interviews with Mr. A. Naliwa, Mr. J.A. Gumbala and Mr. K. Gondwe

\(^{162}\) Interviews with Mr. M. Kuchingale, Ms. S. Chingomanje and Mr. W. Chinula

\(^{163}\) Interviews with Hon. Ms. L. Gondwe and Mr. W. Chiume
imposed on the electorate. Finally, where democratic constitutional principles and mechanism exist for intra-party conflict resolution, they are usually not followed.\textsuperscript{164} The 9.1\% who indicated that the said parties are not democratic cited none internal consultation and free participation on critical issues including coalitions and lack of transparency over financial matters.

In summary, the major reasons why political parties are considered \textit{democratic} include the possibility for members to influence important party decisions, holding of primary elections, regular party conventions, respect for rule of law in dispute resolutions, and membership freedom to join and leave the parties. By contrast, political parties are perceived as \textit{undemocratic} because of the imposition of candidates, leadership dictatorship on certain critical issues including decisions on coalitions and finances, and holding of unconstitutional conventions.

Finally, those that view parties as partly democratic noted that despite the existence of freedom of expression, members cannot freely criticise decisions of their leaders without risking unspecified reprisals. In addition, even where rules of procedure exist, they are not fully adhered to. While determining whether one party is more democratic than the other is beyond the objectives of this study, the results presented in Table 2 and the preceding discussions for such ratings, provide a satisfactory picture against which to assess various democratic deficits in each party. The next section links these findings to institutions.

\section*{4.1.3. Existence and influence of institutional arrangements in political parties}

To assess the types and influence of any existing institutional arrangements, respondents were asked to (a) give examples of any rules and regulations which variably regulate the functioning of their respective political parties and (b) to state how external institutions influence the internal functioning of political parties. Key responses to the first question included: party convention procedures,\textsuperscript{164} Interviews with Judge Dr. J. Ansah, Mr. R. Newa and Prof. W. Chirwa
dispute resolution regulations, candidate selection procedures, party funding and accounting regulations and party membership rules. The question had multiple responses and the results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Prevalence and Types of Intra-party Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Institutions</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party convention procedures</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute resolution regulations</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Selection procedures</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party funding &amp; accounting regulations</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party membership rules</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is remarkable to note that party convention rules are considered the most relevant institutional arrangements above all others. Although respondents were not asked why party convention procedures are important, it can be deduced from the fact that party congresses or conventions are associated with critical intra-party organisational and leadership decisions and dynamics as the supreme organ of every political party. These include elections into party national executive, review of party constitutions, election for presidential candidates and consideration of portfolio reports, among others. As such, party conventions represent a significant nationwide assembly of party delegates to review and make the party’s binding decisions.

On the other hand, an interesting discovery of the results is the importance given to party membership rules. However, a critical observation is essential that assists to explain undercurrent dynamics with regard to party membership rules to freely move in and out of political parties. While the freedom is itself a necessary democratic institution, when more people leave the party than those that join it, the net result is weakened popularity and support the party.

From the author’s experience with regard to the parties under review, the defection of members to other parties has been associated with two main factors: undemocratic tendencies of party leaders or cliques, and the personal quest for more power and material benefits on the part of those ‘migrating’ across parties.
Instead of addressing the institutional problems causing the defections, parties have boastfully said: ‘our doors are open for some to leave and others to join.’ On the other hand, the departing member is welcomed by the receiving party as a ‘hero.’ The result on parties is that they continue to be weak as long as institutional factors causing membership losses are not addressed because the departing member(s) immediately become(s) a cause of power mongering in the new party.

An example is Mr. Gwanda Chakuamba who resigned from the MCP in early 2004 to form the RP. After losing elections in 2004, he unilaterally sought to dissolve the party and coax all its members to join the newly formed Democratic Peoples Party (DPP), where he was elected Vice President. The party’s Central Executive Council declined to dissolve the party. Barely ten months after leaving the RP, had Mr. Chakuamba resigned from the DPP for not getting his personal financial gains. He re-joined the RP where he was also expelled allegedly for ‘divisive’ and ‘unconstitutional’ conduct.

Another interesting revelation is the absence of coalition formation procedures from the top five institutions indicated to be present in the parties under review. In fact, cross-checking the party constitutions, confirms that in the MCP, UDF and RP, there are no procedures on how the parties will make coalition decisions. While the status in AFORD could not be established, the PPM profile is also silent on coalitions. Similarly, neither the national constitution nor the PPEA recognises and stipulates procedures regulating party coalitions. Probably, this explains why leaders use discretion whether to consult their members or not and at what level, whenever they have to form or opt out of coalitions.

Further, the results also reveal an acute information deficit mainly among leaders at district level regarding constitutional rules. Hence, as much as 15.7 % of the

165 Ligomeka, Brian, 2005: 1
166 Banda, Mabvuto, 2005: 1
167 It is unlikely that AFORD has coalition procedures since none of its respondents indicated so
responses were missing values. Party slogans were in some instances mistaken for or perceived indistinguishably from rules. The degree of ignorance among party leaders is partly perpetrated by the culture of secrecy around, and monopoly for party information by the political elites.

An important interim conclusion is that the principal-agent relationship can not be secured in the absence of adequate knowledge of existing institutional arrangements and party documents among the principals (party members) including officials. On the contrary, institutions can secure such a relationship only on the assumption that party documents such as constitutions are readily accessible and that the agents fully acquaint themselves with these institutions. Further, five respondents mentioned those rules that reinforce top-down control of the members by the elite and the patron-client tradition.

A fitting example is what some MCP respondents gave as ‘the four corner stones: Unity, Loyalty, Obedience and Discipline.’ The four corner stones of the MCP single party era were held as sub-national statutes to suppress freedom of expression and induce unquestionable obedience and loyalty to the party and government in the interest of ‘national unity and development’. The perception typifies the earlier discourse on historical institutionalism, which stresses the path-dependent contingencies of history which persist and endure overtime once an institutional framework is established because change is costly and uncertain, thereby inducing adaptive behaviour especially in political parties.

Similarly, three respondents from the other parties at district level indicated ‘respect for the party leaders,’ as a very fundamental institution, yet in practice, such an informal institution is exploited to ensure uncritical acceptance of decisions of the elite. This translates into a scenario where informal institutions

168 Interviews with Mr. C. Mhone; Mr. V. Thundu and Mr. W. Wasi, Mr. B Mkweza and Mr. W Mwale
169 Jönsson, Christer; Tallberg, Jonas, 2004:5
170 Interviews with Mr. F. Danger, Mr. L Mnyanyi and Ms. Chabwera
(for example, traditional and moral values, and political culture) can dominantly
override the formal institutions to the extent of inhibiting the full realisation of
democratic values. As long as they work in favour of the patronage power
relations, there is a tendency not to resolve this confusion between formal and
informal institutions and human behaviour tends to adapt to status quo. One major
weakness of informal institutions is that they have no external enforceability. A
detailed discussion on informal institutions comes later in the chapter.

Regarding the impact of external institutions on internal functioning of political
parties, responses surrounded four institutions: national constitution, court
judgments and injunctions, Presidential and Parliamentary Elections (PPE) Act
and Parliamentary Standing Orders. Responding to the question how these
institutions affect intra-party democracy, both the politician and expert
respondents observed that the National Constitution forms the blueprint against
which party constitutions are mirrored. Courts decide on the democratic character
of party decisions and act by weighing the party constitution’s democratic merits
against democratic standards set in the national constitution. As such, they dictate
changes and reversals to intra-party decision.

For example, despite that the UDF constitution allowed the former State
President, Dr Bakili Muluzi to run for a third term of office, he was failed by the
national constitution’s limitation tenure of two-five-year consecutive terms. The
PPE and national constitution set the candidacy qualifications for both the
presidential and parliamentary election aspirants. This entails that even if a
candidate satisfies all intra-party requirements but falls short of those laid down
by the PPE, such a candidate cannot enter the contest.

Ancillary to this, eligibility criteria for public party funding is set in the national
constitution, thereby determining the scope of party operations and activities. A
similar effect on political parties is caused by Parliamentary Standing Orders,
which act as a ‘constitution’ of the National Assembly.\textsuperscript{171} External institutions are presented in Figure 3 below. The question had multiple responses.

The results in Figure 3 show that institutions impact on intra-party democracy. Particularly, external formal institutions have the controlling influence on the quality and legality of internal rules. Finally, responding to how institutions in general, impact on intra-party democracy, both politician and expert respondents noted that effective democratic rules and regulations both within and external to the party enhance internal democratic practice, while autocratic institutions reinforce authoritarianism.

\textbf{Figure 3: The Importance of external institutions and intra-party operations (in percentage)}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{171} Interviews with Hon. B. Kutsaira, Dr. A. Magolowondo, Ms. A. Nyirongo, Hon. S. Kaunda, and Mr. Chinula
As captured in the theoretical synthesis, institutions guard against discretionary and arbitrary exercise of delegated authority and therefore, safeguard the principal-agent relationship. Direct causal links between institutions and intra-party democracy are discussed in the next sections.

4.1.4. Intra-party democracy in candidate selection processes

This aspect sought to achieve two aims: (a) assess if there are any procedures regulating candidate selection, (b) ascertain how democratic and participatory is the nomination of parliamentary and presidential candidates, and (c) to assess the consequences of a centralised candidate selection process. The questions had single answers and not multiple responses. Regarding the first part, respondents from all parties indicated that presidential candidates are (constitutionally) elected at party conventions, while parliamentary candidates are nominated through intra-party primary elections. Respondents also considered free competition and non-imposition of candidates as prominent benchmarks for a democratic candidate selection process.

Although respondents indicated that they have candidate selection procedures in their party constitutions, they are both implicit and non-effective. For example, the RP Constitution states that the Strategy and Election Committee (SEC) ‘may organise Primary Party Elections’ to enable party members elect the party’s Parliamentary Candidates. The word ‘may’ does not make primary elections a compulsory, but an optional undertaking. Besides, the provision is too brief without stating consequences for non-compliance. The MCP Constitution has no cursory reference to whether and how the party will conduct primary elections. The party constitution is very silent. Section 40 of the UDF Constitution establishes a Parliamentary Elections Committee (PEC) and elaborately specifies

172 Article 9.3.2 of the RP Constitution, 2004: 23
who is eligible to participate as a voter and candidate in primary elections.\textsuperscript{173} PPM and AFORD constitutions were inaccessible.

The results raise questions regarding why the UDF had serious primary election irregularities despite the well articulated constitutional procedures, yet in the RP and MCP on the other hand, they had managed their candidate selection processes with limited altercations. This leads to two preliminary conclusions. First, the existence of elaborate rules of procedure does not in and of itself guarantee intra-party democracy \textit{per se}. There is need to assess other factors including informal institutions, which may undermine formal institutions. Second, the absence of written formal institutions does not imply absence of intra-party democracy. Some complementary informal institutions may apply effectively to enhance intra-party democracy. Informal institutions are examined in detail later.

Externally, the PPEA and the national constitution are equally silent on candidate selection procedures. This entails that formal institutions have no impact on enhancement of intra-party democracy with regard to candidate selection since they do not provide the incentives and sanctions for rewarding compliance and sanctioning non-compliance. Hence, party leaders opt to undermine their vague intra-party regulations without risking externally enforced penalties.

With regard to the second and third parts, institutions do not enhance intra-party democracy in practice, particularly in UDF and AFORD. By contrast, the MCP, PPM and RP appear to be guided by unwritten procedures which enhance intra-party democracy, although there are no rules governing candidate selection processes in the MCP, and insufficiently catered for in the RP constitutions, while the PPM profile is silent. However, secondary data offers more insights. For example, Khembo observes that the costs of limited intra-party democracy in candidate selection process were severe in AFORD and UDF. He notes that the 2004 UDF primary elections resulted in increased independent candidates and

\textsuperscript{173} Article 40 of the UDF Constitution, 2003: 72-75
more independent MPs in the Southern Region than any other party due to ‘lack of transparency and intra-party democracy.’\textsuperscript{174} He adds that almost all the 28 Independent Candidates who came from the Southern Region were in principle, former UDF members, and over 60% of these MPs reverted back to the UDF after being elected as Independents.\textsuperscript{175}

Prior to these developments, the party was characterised by instability, massive resignations and defections from the party by prominent members due to the manipulation of the party constitution and the imposition of both the presidential\textsuperscript{176} and parliamentary candidates. As a result, the UDF experienced substantial decline of electoral support manifested by the reduction in its parliamentary seats from 94 in 1999 to 49 in 2004.\textsuperscript{177} The former State President, Dr. Bakili Muluzi amended the party constitution in 2003 to create his new position as party Chairman. He then controversially hand-picked the party’s presidential candidate, Dr. Bingu Wa Mutharika, who had no executive influence in the party. After being elected State President, Dr Mutharika resigned from the UDF and formed his own party, the DPP. As more senior UDF officials defected to the DPP alleging dictatorial leadership (while also seeking state benefits of incumbency), the UDF was riddled with divisions, and reduced support.

Just like in the UDF, the effort to centralise primary elections in AFORD was aimed at ensuring the re-election of the party’s incumbent MPs. Existing internal procedures were seriously flouted resulting in confusion and division. Khembo cites the \textit{Nation Newspaper} asserting that in one constituency two candidates stood contesting on the same party ticket.\textsuperscript{178} Of course, there was an interplay of other factors within AFORD which militated against intra-party democracy that ultimately secured the party only 6 seats in 2004 - all in the North, down from 30

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{174} Khembo, Nixon, 2004:111
\bibitem{175} Ibid
\bibitem{176} Ibid
\bibitem{177} Ibid
\bibitem{178} For detailed election results, see Kadima D; Lembani, S, 2006: 13 (forthcoming)
\bibitem{179} Khembo, Nixon, 2004: 111
\end{thebibliography}
seats in 1999 general elections. Such factors may have included heightened internal strife for incumbency prospects between incumbent MPs and new aspiring candidates in both UDF and AFORD,\(^{179}\) and the splitting of votes between the official and independent candidates, thereby paving way for opposition party candidates.

In the MCP, PPM and RP where such incidences were unnoticed, the parties’ electoral performances were comparatively impressive and with limited controversies. Of course, it can not be generalised that candidate selection procedures solely contributed to the relatively successful electoral performance of the three parties given that electoral procedures in the three parties are either barely included or not there at all. It may be due to limited internal competition within these parties and that they may have strategically fielded candidates only in constituencies where they had undoubted prospects to win.

In general, the absence of a regulatory framework for primary elections provides recipe for manipulating the process without alternative recourse to legal remedy when free participation of the electorate is inhibited. All respondents noted that centralised candidate selection, limited participation and imposition of candidates have damaging costs to the party organisation, including factionalism, increased independent candidates, reduced party support and electoral losses.

On account of these findings, the broad hypothesis is not supported, because external rules do not exist. Where formal internal institutions exist like in the UDF, they are not enforced hence they do not enhance intra-party democracy. Conversely, where they do not exist as in the MCP, PPM and partly RP, there may be effective complementary informal institutions, which fill in the gaps of formal institutions. However, the sub-hypothesis is upheld by empirical results that the higher the level of participation in candidate selection, the higher the intra-party democracy. Appropriate and effectively enforced legislation at national and party

\(^{179}\) Note that the UDF and AFORD were in a government coalition between 2000 and 2004
level may guarantee free participation of members in determining their collective choice for a democratic representative.

4.1.5. Intra-party democracy in coalition formation procedures

This element had four aims: (a) to establish whether there are internal and/or external institutions that oblige party leaders to seek the approval of their members before entering into coalitions with other parties, (b) to gauge the degree of membership participation in coalition decisions, (c) to determine in whose interest are final coalition decisions taken and (d) to assess the consequences of centralised coalition formation processes.

In response to the first part, about 86% of all respondents indicated that their party constitutions either implicitly or explicitly oblige their party leaders to seek the consent of members before entering into a coalition. However, an examination of the party constitutions only of implied reference to coalitions, as shown in Section 16 of the Republican Party Constitution, and clear silence, as in the constitutions of the UDF and MCP.

This contradiction from research findings begs two constitutionalism questions which are beyond the scope of this research. First, how participatory is the process of formulating party constitutions, and how regularly are they reviewed in order to capture the changing political preferences of members. Second, how do parties ensure that their officials understand party constitutions? On the other hand, such optimistic responses as given above can only be interpreted on the assumption that democratic delegation of leadership authority does implicitly or explicitly oblige leaders to consult party members on all important issues.

180 Article 16.1.1 of the Constitution of the RP, 2004: 34. This provision states that ‘The party may by a resolution passed by the two-thirds majority of members at an emergency Convention called especially for the purpose of dissolution, amalgamation or merger resolve that it be dissolved, amalgamated or merged.’ Even in this statement, there is no explicit mention of Coalition or Alliance.
This must be done before, during and after taking coalition decisions. More reflection on this follows later in the section.

Figure 4, which had single responses, gives answers to the question on the degree of involvement of party members in coalition decisions. The figure shows a high percentage of slightly above 60% of respondents indicating that they are partially or never consulted by their leaders, while about 13% indicated that there is very high consultation. Comparing these responses across party portfolios does provide insightful differences, implying there are some biased responses linked to party positions.

However, it can be concluded that considering the complexity and privacy which surrounds coalition negotiations, it is evident that the level of participation of members is quite limited. Given that the electoral system in Malawi remains the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) and that in recent times, no single party secures an outright legislative majority the expediency for parties to form coalitions/alliances is inevitable.

The responses show more variations when (a) disaggregated per party and contrasted from experts’ responses and (b) if viewed by party portfolio, presented in tables 4 and 5 below. From table 4 which had single responses, it is clear that a sum total of 69% for MCP respondents felt they are somewhat consulted in coalition decisions to varied degrees. Another 31% of MCP respondents said that there is no consultation, while about 59% of UDF respondents and 67% of RP respondents said there is no consultation. Up to 44% of the experts said there is no consultation in all parties.
In AFORD a sum total of 77% said that there is some kind of varied consultation on coalition decisions. In all, it can be concluded that by looking at the mode rating, the least consulting parties are RP then UDF, while some moderate consultation is held in MCP. AFORD and PPM are moderately consulted.

Table 4: Degree of membership involvement in coalition decisions per party (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Very High</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Not at All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPERTS</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 5, which had single responses, the trend shows a more variegated pattern if further disaggregated by hierarchical portfolio of party respondents. Table 5 shows that national and regional level members feel somewhat consulted across all parties compared to their district level counterparts. From the views of district representatives, RP ranks least at getting district officials consulted in coalition
decisions, seconded by UDF, while MCP and AFORD indicated that they are fairly consulted. PPM respondents at all levels indicated that their party is highly consultative. But due to the proportion of UDF respondents compared to RP, UDF is the least followed by RP.

Table 5: Degree of membership involvement by party portfolio (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Portfolio</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Very High</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Not at All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEC Members</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Exec. Members</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Exec. Members</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results depicted in Figure 4, Tables 4 and 5 were verified when respondents were further asked to indicate ‘in whose interest are the coalition decisions made’? Most respondents mentioned the national executive, seconded by party presidents, while the least number felt that it is party members as shown in Table 6 below. These results are comparable to those in Figure 4 and Table 5 and confirm of a consistent pattern of limited consultation in RP and UDF albeit, with varied degrees. By contrast, consultations in MCP, AFORD and PPM are comparatively moderate and promote intra-party democracy.

However, considering the high patronage influence, it is probable that although members of the national executive in all parties responded positively about being consulted, further investigations on the quality of consultation would show less complimentary results. Considering that most regional executive committee
members also serve at national level, there are insignificant differences between the two. Table 6 had single responses.

Table 6: Responses to the question ‘In whose interest are final decisions taken’?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Party Members</th>
<th>National Exec. Members</th>
<th>Party President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPERT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, informants unanimously observed that centralised decision making in coalitions leads to reduced party unity and popularity, increased factionalism, fragmentation and independent candidates, and ultimately considerable electoral losses. Although these elements affect the parties with varied intensities, it is evident that none of these consequences is a lesser evil. In conclusion, the sub-hypothesis is sufficiently supported that the higher the participation in coalition decision processes, the higher the intra-party democracy. However, the broad hypothesis is not supported since there are no institutions for coalitions in Malawi thereby making legal enforceability problematic.

The results also confirm theoretical observations that coalitions between and among political parties are not legally regulated by the national constitution, the PPEA, the party law and at party level, by party constitutions. An exception is drawn to Section 80 (5) of the Malawi Constitution, which empowers the State President to appoint the Second –Vice President from a political party other than the President’s, if s/he deems it ‘desirable in the national interest.’ However, this provision only legally recognises the formation of coalitions but does not oblige the President in any way. To the contrary, it gives absolute prerogative to the State President to hire or fire his Second Vice President.

---

181 Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1999: 46-47
This subjects coalition negotiations, management and termination to the discretion of party elites in determining the degree and level of participation by members. To avert the cited setbacks and encourage adequate participation of party members, coalition laws need to be explicitly enacted in national and intra-party statutes to secure internal and external enforceability and enhance intra-party democracy.

4.1.6. Intra-party democracy in conflict management

This section had three aims: (a) to establish existing intra-party conflict management mechanisms and their constitutionality (b) to assess how in practice, parties comply with constitutional procedures, and (c) to identify consequences of limited intra-party democracy in conflict management.

Concerning existing conflict management mechanisms, over 90% of respondents stated that their parties have constitutionally established internal tribunals. The other 10% was uncertain if such mechanisms exist. An examination of the party constitutions indicates that in most of the parties, ad hoc committees are appointed by the National Executive Committee (NEC) to deal with disciplinary issues and their decisions are subject to the approval of the NEC.

Section 14 of the RP Constitution empowers its ‘Central Executive Council’ to constitute from among its numbers, an internal tribunal called Complaints and Disciplinary Committee to ‘deal with complaints from or against any member of the party.’\(^\text{182}\) Subject to the party Constitution and approval of the Convention, powers to enact disciplinary rules and regulations in the MCP are vested in the NEC by Articles 62 and 63 of the party Constitution.\(^\text{183}\) In UDF, the party Constitution mandates the NEC to appoint a Disciplinary Committee, to deal with disciplinary matters.\(^\text{184}\)

\(^{182}\) See Section 14.1 of the RP Constitution, 2004: 33
\(^{183}\) See Articles 62-63 of the MCP Constitution, 2003: 29
\(^{184}\) See a detailed account in Article 12 of the UDF Constitution, 2003: 22-26
AFORD and PPM respondents indicated that they have constitutionally established disciplinary committees, to resolve internal disputes but these were not verifiable. While it is commendable that there are constitutional provisions within the statutory frameworks of parties, the major challenge lies in the practical enforcement and compliance to these constitutional procedures.

As noted from Table 7 below which had single responses, about 34 % of the respondents indicated that in practice, the process of conflict management selectively complies with constitutional procedures while about 27 % percent felt that there is no compliance to the constitutional order. A reasonable 39 % of respondents felt that conflict management processes comply with constitutional procedures. These findings reveal the need for improvement in enforcing adherence to the constitutional procedures to enhance intra-party democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of compliance</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Compliant</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectively or Discretionary Compliant</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Compliant</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While high compliance to constitutional order (39.3 %) entails high intra-party democracy, this is undermined by equally high incidences of selective compliance (33.9 %). This means that institutions impact on intra-party democracy with strong limitations. When the results in Table 7 are disaggregated by party, they show a marked pattern of differentiation across parties as seen in Table 8, which had single responses.
Table 8: Degree of compliance of conflict resolution processes to constitutional procedures across parties (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Very Compliant</th>
<th>Selectively Compliant</th>
<th>Not Compliant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPERTS</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 8, three parties: PPM, MCP and RP have high compliance rates in descending order. For example, 67% of PPM respondents rate their party as very compliant to constitutional procedures in dispute resolution processes. In MCP, the party’s respondents rate the constitutionality of disciplinary decisions by 58%, while in RP half (50%) of the respondents feel that the party is compliant and as many others indicate the exact opposite - not compliant at all. These results show that internal institutions regulate the process and procedures, thereby promoting intra-party democracy.

By contrast, AFORD, UDF and expert respondents view conflict management processes as selectively compliant. For instance, 56% of AFORD respondents observed that their party is inconsistent in complying with constitutional procedures in conflict resolution. In UDF, 44% of its respondents felt the procedures are followed inconsistently, while another 38% indicated that procedures are not followed at all. Similarly, 43% of the expert respondents observed that parties comply with their constitutions selectively. This implies weak enforcement of intra-party conflict procedures, which undermines intra-party democracy.

The low ratings for UDF and AFORD may be attributed to the high influence of patronage and dictatorship especially while the two parties were in government. Leaders of the two parties used similar strategies in dealing with dissent and intra-party conflicts to portray false internal unity.
An austere combination of patronage, clientalism and dictatorship were dispensed to curb and conceal dissent, and instil loyalty of potentially disgruntled members. Until the failed bid for a presidential third term in 2002, the UDF had not manifested internal conflicts.\footnote{Kanyongolo, Fidelis, 2003: 283} By contrast, the MCP had lived with power mongering and leadership personality clashes often associated with elections.\footnote{Ibid}

Although the average rating for high compliance is relatively bigger than the one for selective compliance, the low trust in the intra-party dispute resolution mechanisms can be informed by the increasing recourse to litigations on intra-party disputes. This necessitates a cursory examination of the role of external institutions - the national constitution in promoting intra-party democracy. The Judiciary draws its mandate from Section 9 of the Malawi Constitution which empowers the Courts to \textit{independently} and \textit{impartially} ‘interpret, protect and enforce’ the Republican Constitution and all laws in accordance with the national Constitution.\footnote{Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1999: 12} Further, Section 10(1) states that the ‘supreme arbiter’ and ultimate authority in the resolution of political disputes is the Republican Constitution itself.\footnote{Ibid}

In terms of intra-party democracy, the Republican Constitution states that in interpreting the Constitution, the Judiciary must seek to promote ‘the values, which underline an open and democratic society.’\footnote{Section 11(2) (a), Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1999: 13} Kanyongolo observes that the political transition between 1994 and 2004 in Malawi was distinguished by enormous ‘weaknesses in the internal dispute resolution mechanisms within parties leading to failure to resolve intra-party disputes.’\footnote{Kanyongolo, Fidelis, 2004: 200} As such, Courts were involved in deciding on several disputes related to ‘party leadership, selection of parliamentary candidates and procedures of party conferences.’\footnote{Ibid}
Thus, the weaknesses in the intra-party dispute resolution mechanisms particularly in AFORD, MCP, UDF and RP are ascertained by the party members’ ‘invariable’ recourse to judicial intervention.\textsuperscript{192}

With regard to consequences of limited intra-party democracy in conflict management, all respondents indicated that it reduces party popularity and electoral support, undermines the moral authority of the party constitution and increases party instability and resignations. These are all confirmed my empirical results cited above. Hence, the hypothesis is partly supported by empirical findings because the weak dispute resolution mechanisms and selective compliance to the party constitutions undermined intra-party democracy.

This underscores the point that although dispute resolution mechanisms are present in almost all the parties, they are imprecise and weakly enforced. However, external institutions - the national constitution and court judgments have strongly safeguarded intra-party democracy as an arbiter in resolving intra-party disputes. To ensure strict adherence to the constitutional order, political parties must not only institutionalise conflict resolution mechanisms, but also collectively and transparently adopt the procedures, and consistently abide by them in resolving intra-party disputes.

\textit{4.1.7. Intra-party democracy in party conventions}

This element was assessing (a) the regularity of party conventions, (b) agenda of party conventions (c) mode of its proceedings and (d) factors that characterise limited democracy in party conventions. The assessment on the regularity of party conventions compares constitutional provisions and actual practice, in MCP, AFORD and UDF only, which were registered in 1993 just before the 1994 elections.

\textsuperscript{192} Kanyongolo, Fidelis, 2003: 252
The PPM and RP can only be assessed in terms of their constitutional provisions given that they were only registered in 2003 and 2004 respectively. However, the PPM and AFORD Constitutions were inaccessible.

In Figure 5 below which had single responses, no UDF respondent felt that the party holds consistent conventions, while 76.5% indicated that the party holds conventions only close to elections. This contrasts sharply with AFORD, whose 66.7% of its respondents observed that their party holds conventions consistently and constitutionally. In MCP, 38.5% of the respondents said that the party holds constitutional conventions consistently, while another 38.5% said that the party holds its conventions erratically.

In the case of UDF, Khembo confirms that the party ‘suspended’ its constitution by not holding conventions in ten years.193 AFORD is considered by members and outsiders as having held its conventions annually and consistently between 1994 and 2003, while in 2004 alone, the party held two conventions. The second convention was an order by the High Court after some top party members filed a lawsuit against the democratic deficits of the first convention. The second convention was prematurely called off due to physical clashes between two factions: one which supported the retention of Chihana as party president, and another which had hitherto forcibly suspended Chihana as party president. While the MCP regularly held its annual conventions until 2000, between 2001 and mid 2003, the party had its share of chaotic, factional and court-sanctioned conventions at the peak of the protracted wrangles between the party’s former President, Gwanda Chakuamba and his then Vice, John Tembo.

The results in Figure 5 show that party conventions are irregular and election oriented in the UDF, more regular and consistent in AFORD, and a combination of regular and erratic conventions in MCP. Except for the UDF, secondary data shows that party constitutions either make implicit provisions for conventions (as

193 Khembo, Nixon, 2004: 109
is the case of RP) or remain silent on party conventions - as is the case of MCP and the PPM Profile. For example the UDF provides that the party shall ‘hold at least one National Conference every six (6) years.’\textsuperscript{194} While the MCP states that NEC members shall be elected by the national convention every five years, the party constitution is silent on intervals of these party conventions.

\textbf{Figure 5: Consistency of party conventions (in percentage)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.png}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{194} Article 10, Section (h) of the UDF Constitution 2003: 13
The RP constitution implicitly provides that the party shall hold its conventions every three years, while the PPM profile is silent on conventions. Where conventions are held erratically or very close to elections, then party rules have little or no influence on the party obligations. This undermines intra-party democracy as members are denied the right to regularly review the performance of elected representatives, party statutes and other matters incidental to the principal agent relationship.

Regarding the mode of convention proceedings, all respondents considered high geographical and opinion representation and free participation as characteristic features of a highly democratic convention, as contrasted from intimidation and discriminatory attendance. Facilitating the free participation and representation of diverse opinions/interests constitute key functions of political parties. This is also at the core of the deliberative model of intra-party democracy. As such, it is critical that party conventions are characterised by free debate as an expression of intra-party democracy.

In response to what constitutes the convention agenda, all parties indicated that their conventions focus on four key areas: (a) election of national executive members, (b) adopting or rejecting party constitutions or amendments, (c) receiving and considering financial and activity reports and (d) in few cases, debating on coalition decisions. These aspects are at the core of intra-party democracy as argued in this thesis particularly pertaining to the participatory and collective decision-making processes among equals.

Regarding the participatory element, all respondent confirmed that intra-party democracy is enhanced by equitable representation and free debate in the convention proceedings. To the contrary, respondents observed that financial handouts, limited and conformist participation, holding of conventions close to

---

195 Section 10.1.2 of the RP Constitution, 2003:24
elections and physical/verbal harassment of other members inhibit intra-party democracy.

In the light of the above, the theoretical arguments are supported by empirical findings that where institutional arrangements or constitutions exist and are enforced, they enhance intra-party democracy by obliging responsible leaders to convene party conventions as stipulated by party constitutions. Where such provisions are fully known by party members, the principal-agent relationship of mutual accountability is attainable and therefore intra-party democracy is achieved. The broad hypothesis is only partly supported by the results since internal party regulations are weakly enforced. External institutional arrangements are strongly enforced because they are derived from the principles of the national constitution.

4.1.8. Intra-party democracy in party funding

Within the context of intra-party financial management, this component sought to establish (a) key sources of party funding (b) who controls the allocation of party resources in the party (c) the level of transparency about sources and allocation of party finances and (d) the correlation (if any) between the source of party funding and control of party agenda. In terms of sources of party funding, the question had multiple responses hence the results are higher than 100 percent.

Major sources of party funding are presented in Table 9 below. The results show that political parties get most of their funding from three major sources: private funding by their leaders, Parliament (in the cases of MCP and UDF since 2004) and foreign donations. In PPM and RP, another important source of funding is membership contributions. Fundraising activities and interest groups contributions are the least sources in all the parties.

196 Section 40 (2) of the Republic of Malawi states that ‘any political party which secures more than one-tenth of the national vote’ in parliamentary elections shall be eligible for public funding prorata
Table 9: Major sources of party funding (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Private/Party President</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Membership Subscription</th>
<th>Fund raising</th>
<th>Interest groups</th>
<th>F/Donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While all PPM respondents indicated that they get their finances from the party president and membership contributions, the only other party which utilises the two sources equally is the RP, indicated by 83% of party respondents for both sources. On the other hand, all UDF respondents and another 94% of the respondents said that the party gets its finances privately from the party leadership and publicly from parliament respectively. In MCP, 92% of the respondents said that they get the bulk of their party finances privately from the party leaders and from parliament. Foreign donation to the two parties was mentioned by 65% and 62% of their respondents respectively.

Membership contributions in the MCP do not exist since the banning of selling compulsory party membership cards in 1992. About 23% of MCP respondents also mentioned that the party raises some money from property rentals and other investments accumulated during the one party era. The extraordinary membership contributions in PPM may be attributed to the fact most of its founding members were middle class and successful private entrepreneurs, who from the outset, created and enforced a culture of membership contributions. This culture seems to persist.

In practice, all party constitutions contain clear procedures regarding financial management. The UDF Constitution elaborately sets out procedures for financial management and vests the custody of financial matters in the Treasurer General, who is also supposed to prepare and present audited annual financial reports to the

---

197 Interviews with Mr. N. Dausi and Hon. B. Kutsaira
NEC and the party convention. Similarly, the MCP Constitution details out how the party will get its funding and account for it. Financial management responsibilities are vested in the Treasurer General in collaboration with the NEC. The Constitution also requires that audited financial reports be presented at party conventions. Finally, the RP Constitution too clearly lays out sources of party funding, spending and accounting procedures, adding that the Treasurer General shall present audited reports at party conventions. AFORD and PPM Constitutions were not available.

It is evident that rules exist within party constitutions with clear obligations for the Treasurer General to ensure that reports of annual audited accounts are presented at the party convention. In practice, these rules are not enforced. Regarding who ultimately controls the allocation of party resources in practice, the results are comparable to the responses provided by the experts as presented in Table 10 below. Note that the question had single responses.

**Table 10: Who ultimately controls the allocation of party resources? (in percentage)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Party President</th>
<th>NEC Members</th>
<th>Party Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPERT</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s Empirical Findings*

In Table 10, it is evident that 91% of MCP respondents showed that the NEC controls the allocation of party resources, while 83% of RP respondents also felt that their NEC controls how party resources are allocated. Similarly, 63% of AFORD members indicated that the allocation of its resources is determined by

---

198 Articles 16, 41-43 of the UDF Constitution, 2003: 31-32, 75-78
199 Articles 47-58 of the MCP Constitution, 2003: 25-28
200 Article 13 of the RP Constitution, 2004: 29-31
the party’s NEC. In PPM, 60 % of the respondents also noted that the party’s resources are controlled by its NEC.

On the other hand, 76 % of UDF respondents said that the party’s National Chairman controls how the party’s resources are allocated, while 57 % of the experts also felt that the party presidents/chairpersons wield more control in determining the allocation of party resources. The extra-ordinary results of AFORD can be attributed to the fact from its inception; the party was largely dependent on foreign donations. As with all donor money, the party had developed transparent accounting systems over which the NEC exercised collective control and allowed for the scrutiny of its members. Besides, the trade union background of the party leader paved way for a culture of accepting transparent systems and separation of powers.

The results show that UDF respondents and the experts view the party presidents domineering in the control of party resource than the NECs. The other party respondents felt that their parties’ NECs are in control. However, the findings are indicative of limited intra-party democracy since party members have no control even through party convention reports. This dovetails with the results in Table 9, where it is shown that party members are not an important source of party funding, probably due to acute poverty levels in Malawi.

Nevertheless, the resources obtained from Parliament by parties such as MCP and the UDF are firstly, public resources - indirectly given by the people including non-party members (through taxes and otherwise), and therefore of collective public ownership. Moreover, the parties receive such public funding on behalf of their party members as delegated trustees of the members/electorate, hence the members’ inalienable right to control how these resources are used. This is at the centre of the principal-agent model of public choice in the exercise of delegated authority and its attendant mutual obligations. Institutions have no control over a process where party presidents wield absolute control of how party resources are
allocated. This undermines intra-party democracy due to the absence of transparency and accountability.

Further, aside from establishing who controls the allocation of party resources, an assessment was made to establish the degree of transparency in terms of disclosure and allocation of party resources across all parties. The results (which had single responses) are presented in Table 11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Very Transparent</th>
<th>Partly Transparent</th>
<th>Not Transparent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPERT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s Empirical findings*

In Table 11, responses reveal that except for the PPM and narrowly the MCP and RP, the other parties are not transparent at all. About 67% of PPM felt that their party is very transparent in disclosing how its resources are obtained and used. This is in harmony with the results in Table 9 in which all PPM respondents (100%) said that party members contribute financially and otherwise to the running of the party. The party leadership in this case feels more obliged to be more transparent to its funders - the members. The extreme case of UDF shows that 82% of party respondents indicated that there is no transparency in how party funds are sourced and allocated. Likewise, 80% of the experts held that there is no financial transparency virtually across all parties.

The secrecy surrounding sources and allocation of party resources also relates to the legality and motives of the undisclosed party funders. This requires further investigation on how the party responds to the vested interests/pressures by its
undisclosed private financers vis-à-vis the imperatives of intra-party democracy. Nevertheless, it follows that where there is no transparency, there is no accountability either and intra-party democracy is denied. Where the party president/chairperson is the key private funder to the party, the sense of obligation to be accountable and transparent declines conversely with the incentives for patronage. Table 12 which examines the correlation between control of party agenda and source of funding illustrates this. The results in Table 12 had single responses. The results show that 67 % of PPM respondents felt that there is no correlation between source of party funding and control of party agenda.

Table 12: Correlation between control of party agenda and source of funding (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No relationship</th>
<th>Weak relationship</th>
<th>Strong relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPERT</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This sharply contrasts with results obtained from UDF and AFORD where a strong relationship was registered by 71 % and 86 % of their parties’ respondent respectively. In RP 50 % of the respondents were of the view that there is strong relationship while as many as 78 % of the expert respondents also felt that the relationship is very strong. The MCP respondents alone indicated by 62 % that there is a weak relationship. However, indicating the weak relationship is no denial that the relationship exists.

From these results it can be concluded as follows. Except for the limited public funding to two parties - the MCP and UDF, private funding mainly by party presidents and a few elites is a major source of funding in all the parties under review. The results also show that foreign donations constitute a notable source of extra funding to these parties. Except in PPM, membership contributions in the
other parties is extremely limited. This limits membership control over the allocation of party finances. The absence of statutory regulations in the party law to ensure transparency makes accountability optional and not obligatory. This undermines intra-party democracy as there is no institution to guarantee enforcement.

Finally, the fact that party elites particularly presidents/chairpersons wield more control than the NEC and members in the allocation of party resources is in harmony with the findings of strong correlation between control of party agenda and source of funding as provided by all parties (except PPM) and the experts. This is because both the research findings and the personal experience of the author are that forceful elements of political culture, patrimonialism and social capital tend to suppress the independent judgment of NEC members from the influence of party presidents. Here party elites are treated as part of the NEC. Thus, pervasive patronage and clientalistic relationships and networks become coercive factors to conform to the positions of party presidents.

It can be concluded that the limited transparency and accountability on one hand, and strong control of party agenda by party presidents/elites disadvantages party members in the sense that it limits free participation and does not enforce the principal-agent relationship. Hence, institutional arrangements governing party funding and accountability have insignificant impact on elite behaviour to the detriment of intra-party democracy. The broad hypothesis is partly supported by empirical findings while the results also fully substantiate the theoretical arguments.

4.1.9. Intermediate Results

An interim summary of the empirical findings on the five elements of intra-party democracy presented above shows in theory that institutional arrangements are a pre-condition for the realisation of intra-party democracy. Applying the principal-agent model of public choice in analysing relations between the electorate/party members (as principals) and elected political representatives (as agents), it is
evident that institutions assist in enhancing mutual obligations inherent in this relationship. The results show that the five political parties are partly democratic and partly undemocratic.

This conclusion is informed by two critical preconditions that must be fulfilled for institutions to enhance intra-party democracy. First, institutions or rules of procedure must firstly, exist within the party’s governing instruments, most importantly, the party constitution. The constitution must stipulate in specific terms, all incentives and sanctions for individual conduct of all party members. Where the constitution is collectively adopted through a participatory and deliberative debate, it ensures collective authorship, consensus and high probability of compliance by those it is intended to serve. Second and last, the rules or party constitution must not only be in accessible form but be made available and understood particularly by the principals at all levels of the party. This removes incidences of acting in ignorance or being inactive by the principals due to asymmetric information.

According to responses from experts and party representatives from AFORD, MCP, PPM, RP and UDF, they define intra-party democracy by three major elements in order of importance: popular participation and consultation on all matters at all party levels, adherence to party constitution and freedom to criticise the leadership without fear of reprisals. This definition captures all the key elements of the deliberative model of intra-party democracy, which stresses free participation and debate among equals who will be affected by the collective choice of intra-party decision. It also augers with the theoretical definition of intra-party democracy with its emphasis the existence of impersonal rules that provide incentives and sanctions for political behaviour. The parties are considered to be partly democratic mainly because (a) party constitutions exist in all of them, (b) in some cases, candidate selection procedures are provided for and (c) primary elections are held.
In addition, party conventions are somewhat held just as disciplinary and financial management procedures are somewhat provided for in almost all party constitutions. However, they are considered as partly undemocratic because the procedures are vague imprecise and weakly enforced. Even in cases where the procedures are available, they are not followed. This may be because the formulation and adoption processes of these procedures within the parties fell short of being collectively transparent and participatory.

This scenario is compounded by the fact that most of the party members do not even know if such procedures exist. Candidates are often imposed on the electorate resulting in the increase of independent candidates and reduced votes for the party candidates. In terms of conflict resolution mechanisms, even where these constitutional mechanisms exist, they are inconsistently applied with a fair degree of discretion. This increases incidences of factionalism, resignations from the party membership and/or judicial litigations on matters that could otherwise be resolved within parties. Despite the existence of constitutional provisions for freedom of expression, members do not freely criticise their leaders without risking informal reprisals.

In terms of candidate selection procedures, there are no precise and effectively enforced regulations within parties to regulate candidate selection process. Within parties, less democratic alternative procedures are preferred which militate against intra-party democracy. The consequences include an increase in independent candidates, factions and a diminishing electoral support for parties.

Moreover, party conventions are either held erratically or indefinitely postponed till close to elections, thereby limiting the possibility for members to regularly renew the mandate of their elected representatives and review/consider important decisions of collective effect. Similarly, almost all party constitutions do not at all provide procedures regulating inter-party coalition formation, management and dissolution, making them legally not enforceable internally and externally.
Finally, there are no clear rules governing how parties will secure and account for their financing. Even where procedures to account for public funding exist, no political party has been sanctioned for not reporting to parliament on how previous finances were utilised.

This situation is aggravated by the fact that some of these regulations (i.e. those governing primary elections, coalitions, party conventions and party funding) are not elaborated in the external institutions (i.e. national constitutions, the PPEA and other national statutes). Where they exist within parties, they are not enforced because there is no incentive for compliance and no sanctions for non-compliance. Thus, institutions only partially impact on intra-party democracy in Malawi. While the results confirm the theoretical framework, the broad hypothesis is partly adopted since formal institutions partly enhance intra-party democracy.

However, other studies have revealed that where state structures are weak and ‘formal rules are not routinely enforced,’ substitutive informal institutions can complement and achieve what was intended to be achieved by formal rules, thereby enhancing intra-party democracy. The next section summarises all findings on the impact of both formal institutional arrangements on intra-party democracy. Lastly, relevant conclusions are made in relation to whether the findings support the sub-hypotheses and the broad hypothesis. The final section proposes a few recommendations.

4.2. Summary of Findings

4.2.1. Introduction

This section provides an overall summary of empirical findings presented above. The first part reviews the critical aspects of the theoretical framework in order to argue on the relevance of the variables chosen. In the second section, findings on

---

201 Helmke, Gretchen; Levitsky, Steven, 2004: 729
each variable are summarised per party and linked up to show their mutual interconnectedness. The third part presents the link between formal and informal institutions as they variedly impact on intra-party democracy. In the conclusion, overall empirical findings are re-examined to see whether the results warrant that the hypothesis be adopted or rejected.

4.2.2. Theoretical framework under review

This thesis research was aimed at establishing whether institutional arrangements are important in promoting intra-party democracy. Both theory and empirical results reveal that intra-party democracy is vital for among others reasons, encouraging a culture of democratic debate within the party thereby giving the final decision the legitimacy of collective authorship. This is paramount for intra-party consensus, compliance and solidarity. The context of achieving such a participatory process must be defined by institutions or rules of procedure both internal to the party organisation and external to it.

Müller notes that rules affect parties in restricting their calculated options by effecting ‘the costs and benefits’ of alternative behaviours. The necessity of intra-party democracy as theoretically conceptualised is confirmed by the definition derived by the empirical findings of this research. The findings reveal the centrality of ‘popular participation’ and ‘consultation’ on all matters and at all levels, ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘respect of constitutional rules’ within the party.

These findings are in harmony with characteristic elements contained in the definition of both intra-party democracy and the deliberative model of intra-party democracy in this thesis. Essentially, collective political decisions within parties ought to be characterised by free debate and participation among party members as equals within the framework set by the party constitution.

202 Müller, Wofgang, 2002: 252
The rational choice model was ideally chosen to explain motivations behind individual interactions and behaviour conceived as exclusively power-oriented and utility maximisation regardless of existing institutions. Due to the model’s erroneous assumption of perfect information of political actors and total disregard for the force of institutions on individual actions, the historical institutionalism model brings in the balance between institutions and the self-interested individual.

In theory, formal institutional arrangements constitute an important catalyst in enforcing the principal-agent relationship provided by the public choice theory. This model assists in mitigating problems of shirking, reneging and mutual compliance to collectively agreed decisions between principals and agents. The broad hypothesis was that formal institutional arrangements enhance intra-party democracy. The hypothesis was subdivided into five segments arguing that the higher participation of party members in candidate selection, party coalitions, formulation of internal conflict resolution mechanism, party conventions and party funding, the higher the intra-party democracy.

It is worth noting that the conceptual model provided in Figure 1 does not include the component on the impact of informal institutional arrangements. This is because the analysis of informal institutions was instigated by the results of formal institutions, hence did not constitute an integral part of the study. The next section summarises empirical findings on the five sub-hypotheses in the five political parties under review.

4.2.3. Existence and influence of institutional arrangements on intra-party democracy

The empirical findings indicate that the five political parties: MCP, UDF, AFORD, PPM and RP are partly democratic and partly non-democratic. Among the parties themselves, others are more democratic in some aspects than others. The trend generally confirms that the five parties face varied challenges regarding institutional arrangements and how they impact on intra-party democracy in the five aspects analysed above. Weak and absent institutions and enforcement
limitations undermine full impact of formal institutional arrangements on intra-party democracy.

Regarding existence of internal institutional arrangements, almost all parties have constitutional rules in whatever limited form, regulating candidate selection, conflict management, party conventions, party funding and party membership. An examination of party constitutions for the MCP, RP UDF and the PPM profile, shows that these provisions are differentiated in detail and precision across the parties.

In addition, there are three major aspects in these provisions common to all the parties: they are vague and implicit, not readily accessible to members and irregularly applied. Another interesting result derived from both party constitutions and empirical responses is that there are no stipulated rules to regulate coalition formations and dissolutions. Similarly, external rules particularly, the party registration laws, the PPEA and the national Constitution do not have specific provisions to ensure adherence to intra-party democracy.

These factors invariably result in the selective compliance by the agents to the rules and high potential for flexibility, discretion and inconsistencies in compliance to the formal institutional arrangements. However, a review of each variable provides a clear status of the extent to which institutional arrangements impact on intra-party democracy in the five political parties, starting with their own assessment of intra-party democracy within their parties.

### 4.2.4. Perception of democratic practice in parties

Concerning the perception of democracy across parties, it is generally concluded that the five parties are partly democratic. This view is also shared by the experts. In ascending order of increasing intra-party democracy, AFORD and UDF are least, followed by RP, MCP and PPM. Parties are considered partly democratic because of imprecise and vague constitutional rules, discretionary compliance to
rules and/or overt manipulation of existing procedures to achieve self-driven and utility-maximising imperatives. This is compounded by similarly vague, deficient and weakly-enforced external institutions particularly the party law and the PPEA.

4.2.5. Participation in candidate selection process

Regarding intra-party democracy in candidate selection, the results show that the UDF ranks least, followed by AFORD, RP, MCP and PPM. The UDF absconded from all candidate selection procedures in nominating both the presidential and parliamentary candidates especially in the 2004 general elections. This was evident in the party’s manipulation of procedural rules and imposition of candidates. The results also show that AFORD suffered from centralised candidate selection and manipulation of procedural rules of internal candidate selection. The results show a sharp decline in electoral support and popularity for the two parties as seen from their 2004 electoral results. This trend compliments Richard Katz’s observation that other empirical researchers have established that the capacity of party elites to control candidate selection is ‘quite limited.’

In the MCP, RP and PPM where incidences of candidate imposition were very limited, the parties’ electoral results were evidently better than in UDF and AFORD. This is not withstanding the influence of other factors apart from the candidate selection processes. Further, MCP’s performance would probably have been even better if RP did not break from MCP in January 2004 and virtually used former MCP organisational structures and facilities in the Southern region during the entire campaign period leading to the May 2004 general elections.

4.2.6. Participation in coalition decisions

In terms of coalition procedures, there are no rules within and outside parties that regulate inter-party coalitions. As such, it is not possible to assess the practical

\[\text{Katz, Richard, 2002: 109}\]
effectiveness of non-existent institutional arrangements, save to say that this impairs intra-party democracy. Theoretically, the absence of formal rules governing coalitions entails a corresponding absence of formal incentives and sanctions to oblige the conduct of political actors in the making and unmaking of coalitions. Conversely, incentives are high for discretionally decision making against intra-party democracy. Thus, this variable can only be assessed in terms the nature of actual practice within parties.

Practically and in ascending ranking order, PPM and MCP leaders are more consultative- more democratic. The RP, AFORD and UDF, registered least consultative practices implying, that leaders in the three parties unilaterally decide how and when to form or terminate coalitions. The results also show that the final coalition decisions in RP and UDF are taken in the best interest of party presidents/chairperson, whereas in AFORD and MCP, they are in the best interest of NEC members. In PPM, the final decisions are made in the best interest of ordinary members. The experts stated that final decisions are taken in the interest of the majority of the NEC members. These results are presented in table 6. The scope of the study fell short of establishing why leaders still consult in the absence of compelling internal and external formal institutional arrangements.

However, due to patronage, it is misleading to assume that the NEC members do indeed freely and independently challenge the preferences of their party presidents/chairpersons. The researcher considers that party leaders have uncontested control over coalition decisions. However, they make superficial consultation to secure popular support not prior authority. More investigations on the quality of consultation may give concrete and more reliable results. It is discernible that despite the non-existence of formal institutional arrangements regarding coalitions, there is a pattern towards informal consultation especially in PPM, which promotes intra-party democracy. The presence of informal but complementary modes of consultation can create the foundation and basis for establishing a formal institutional framework with high-compliance potential. The hypothesis is nevertheless not supported.
4.2.7. Participation in conflict management processes

Some form of democratic rules of internal conflict management procedures exist in all the party constitutions. In addition, ad hoc and permanent tribunals are catered for within party constitutions. In practice, problems lie with the selective and non-compliance to the procedures laid in the party constitutions. Thus, institutional arrangements do not fully impact on intra-party democracy. Across the parties and in descending order, PPM, MCP and RP variedly show some compliance to constitutional procedures. On the contrary, rules of procedure are neither followed nor enforced in UDF and AFORD, thereby subjecting the process to prejudice and discretion. Most of the experts also observed that parties selectively comply with constitutional procedures in disciplinary matters.

To ensure strict adherence to the constitutions, political parties must not only institutionalise conflict resolution mechanisms, but also collectively adopt the procedures at party conventions and consistently abide by them. To the extent of such partial compliance to disciplinary procedures, the results partially support the hypothesis that institutional arrangements enhance intra-party democracy.

4.2.8. Consistency and constitutionality of party conventions

As provided in Figure 5, no single UDF respondent felt that the party holds its conventions consistently. Contrariwise, 76.5 % of the respondents indicated that their party holds conventions only very close to elections. This undermines intra-party democracy. In AFORD and MCP, the parties hold conventions regularly although some of them are unconstitutional. This denotes that the institutional arrangements are not effectively enforced. The high flexibility to waive party constitutions and hold conventions only very close to elections entails that institutional arrangements do not fully impact on intra-party democracy in these parties due to inherent structural weaknesses in the existing institutions. The absence of externally enforceable institutions in the party registration laws, further undermine prospects for intra-party democracy.
The research did not intend to establish whether the parties also rotate the venues for party conventions to facilitate ease of access to, sense of collective ownership and participation of the party members in the conventions from all the political regions. From the researchers own knowledge and experience, the UDF particularly holds its conventions in the South, while the MCP and AFORD have rotated venues for their conventions among the three regions. Two more aspects require further investigation: (a) the level of participation in determining the convention agenda and (b) the extent to which convention delegates freely debate over party issues.

Such findings can assist in establishing additional dimensions to the level of intra-party participation. Finally, external institutions can enforce intra-party democracy by making it obligatory for parties to hold conventions as regularly as stipulated by their constitutions. The above results lead to the conclusion that party convention rules only partly enhance intra-party democracy. Hence, the hypothesis is only partly supported.

4.2.9. Participation in party funding

The results show that political parties get most of their funding from three major sources: private funding from their leaders, parliament (in the cases of MCP and UDF since 2004) and foreign donations. There are no formal rules governing private funding of political parties in Malawi, nor regulating how parties that get public funding should account for the money received. The weak enforcement of rules governing public funding is a disincentive for state-sponsored parties to comply with accounting procedures hence the laxity. The absence of statutory regulations in the party law makes accountability optional and not obligatory in all parties. It follows that the weak enforcement of state rules to enhance accountability makes the institutional arrangements of no consequence, hence impact negatively on intra-party democracy.
However, Table 10 shows that in deciding the allocation of party funds, party presidents wield more power than the NEC and ordinary party members. Although the cross-party results show that the NEC controls the financial allocation in the majority of the parties, the experts also noted that party leaders usurp absolute control in determining the allocation of party resources. Despite the existence of constitutional provisions regarding party funds, these intra-party regulations have no practical effect on the actual management of funds within parties. There is no positive correlation between source of party funding and control of party agenda in PPM. MCP respondents indicated that there is a weak relationship. However, cross-party results of UDF, AFORD and RP show a strong positive correlation. This view was confirmed by most of the expert respondents.

Some UDF respondents exemplified the party chairperson’s influence on the party operations by his purchasing and distribution of over 200 brand new pick-up vehicles to party governors. As all these vehicles remain in Muluzi’s personal ownership, he is guaranteed that those who derive direct benefit from the utility of these vehicles will provide unquestionable loyalty and support for his decisions. This is a classic example of particularistic disbursement of favours to consolidate patronage, which undermines intra-party democracy. It is concluded that institutional arrangements do not impact on the allocation and transparency of party finances. The broad hypothesis is not supported.

4.3. Brief Conclusion

This study produced mixed results which warrant only for the partial adoption of the hypothesis. While confirming that formal institutions are partly important for intra-party democracy, there are many cases where rules are either not enforced or non-existent. Lack of precise and incisive internal and external formal rules governing party conventions, candidate selection, conflict resolution, party funding and party coalitions has led to discretionary exercise of authority by the elites, thereby by inhibiting intra-party democracy. The next chapter provides the overall conclusion on the findings and proposes recommendations for policy reform and future research.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Introduction

This section makes final conclusions on each of the secondary hypothesis and the main research hypothesis. These conclusions are inferred from the analysis of the empirical findings of the research. The section proposes recommendations for policy reform as well as for future research. The policy recommendations are derived from the empirical findings of this study while proposals for future studies are informed by both the results and limited scope of this study.

5.2. Final Conclusions

From the theoretical perspective, institutional arrangements are essential for the attainment of intra-party democracy. Although the status in the five political parties suggests that institutional arrangements do not satisfactorily influence intra-party democracy matter, the situation is as such because the institutional arrangements are either non-existent, or are weakly enforced. Institutions assist in securing and enforcing the principle-agent relationship between the electorate-party members and the elected-party representatives.

In defending intra-party democracy, the deliberative model of intra-party democracy advocates that intra-party operational procedures must be collectively and freely agreed upon among equals. This must be done through the endogenous determination of preferences within the party to ensure that politicians are amenable to, and driven by, public interest and not personal motives. The participation of all those who will be affected by the ultimate decision(s) must be guaranteed and systematically enforced by the institutional arrangements contained in such instruments as the party and national constitutions.

It is similarly essential to discern that intra-party democracy is also influenced by unwritten informal institutional arrangements, which are value driven. These values are internalised by individuals through the socialisation process and may
include political culture and political legacy (i.e. the culture of secrecy and silence as a sign of respect for elders), social capital, patrimony. Beyond the scope of this research, are also such informal institutional arrangements, which are complimentary, functional and a source of solving the principle-agent problems of social interaction that in turn promote the efficient performance of formal institutional arrangements.  

As such, it is imperative to be cautious of both the negative as well as positive implications that informal institutional arrangements may have on intra-party democracy.

Some informal institutional arrangements may enhance a culture of debate and consultations within the party thereby promoting intra-party democracy, while others have the tendency to impede intra-party democracy. It is therefore important to identify and encourage those informal, unwritten socio-cultural values, ideals and orientations that are decisive in, and critical to, the enhancement of intra-party democracy. Conversely, those informal institutional arrangements that inhibit intra-party democracy need to be guarded against as a deterrent to the promotion of intra-party democracy.

The key elements of the theoretical definition of intra-party democracy are supported by the empirical definition of intra-party democracy. These central elements are popular participation, and consultation on all matters in all levels of the party hierarchy, freedom of expression and debate and respect for constitutional procedures established in the party constitutions. In practice however, empirical findings show a varied pattern in the influence of institutional arrangements on, and status, of intra-party democracy in the five political parties. This pattern is concluded from each of these five hypotheses in relation to the main hypotheses, are made as follows.

First, regarding participation in candidate selection process, the main hypothesis is partly supported. This conclusion derives from the fact that although primary

---

204 Helmke, Gretchen and Steven, Levitsky, 2004:728
elections for the nomination of parliamentary candidates are held in almost all parties, there are critical deficits. These include strong tendencies towards centralised candidate selection, imposition of unpopular candidates and manipulate rules of procedure especially in UDF and AFORD. This scenario is compounded by the fact that there are no clear internal and external rules regulating the selection of party candidates in the party law, the national constitution, the PPEA and in most of the party constitutions. As such, while institutional arrangements theoretically enhance intra-party democracy, in practice, both the absence and, where they exist, weak internal and external enforcement of these institutional arrangements undermine free and popular participation in candidate selection processes. It is concluded that the sub-hypothesis is only partly supported.

Second, in relation to participation in conflict resolution processes, it is notable that some democratic procedures exist in all the party constitutions. Further, there are standing or ad hoc committees to deal with internal disputes. However, these committees do not consistently comply with the laid constitutional procedures and/or apply the rules selectively. Across the parties, the UDF and AFORD are extreme cases of the malpractice, while the PPM, MCP and RP variedly abide by set procedures. Therefore, both the main hypothesis and the sub-hypothesis are only partly supported owing to the selective and inconsistent compliance with the laid constitutional procedures. Hence, institutional arrangements on conflict management processes only partly enhance intra-party democracy.

Third, concerning participation in party conventions, institutional arrangements do not fully enhance intra-party democracy due to non-compliance to constitutional provisions. Party conventions are mostly held very close to general elections and contrary to the timeframes and procedures set in party constitutions. The findings show that the least of all the five parties is the UDF. Although the MCP and AFORD hold regular conventions, these conventions have often been legally contested in court for being un-procedural. Neither the national constitution nor
the party law, do define clear and enforceable procedures for conventions. Due to these limitations, both the main and sub hypotheses are only partially supported.

Fourth and on participation in the formation and dissolution of inter-party coalitions, the complete absence of institutional arrangements adversely undermines intra-party democracy. There are no regulatory provisions in any of the party constitutions, the national law, the PPEA and the party law. This absence of formal incentives and sanctions to oblige political behaviours subject coalition negotiations to limited consultations and a high propensity for discretionary decision on the party of a few top party officials. Across the parties and ascending order, PPM and MCP are more consultative, while RP, AFORD and UDF registered decimal consultative tendencies.

Although both the sub-hypothesis and main hypothesis are not supported by the research findings, it may be intriguing to explore the possible existence of informal institutional arrangements which influence other parties such as PPM, MCP to consult. It can be concluded that such informal institutional arrangements are complimentary to the role of the otherwise non-existent formal institutional arrangements, which promote intra-part democracy.

Fifth and lastly, the absence of procedures regulating party funding and ensure transparency seriously impedes participation and therefore intra-party democracy. The absence of clear and enforcement of accountability rules for parties that receive funding from parliament - currently the UDF and MCP only, contributes to the laxity of parties to be transparent. Most of the party funding and other resources are privately received from the party leader(s) and this gives them undue leverage in controlling the party agenda. Further, given the level of abject poverty among most party loyalists, the single-leader financing of parties perpetrates patronage, clientalism and cronyism.
Across the parties, respondents from the UDF showed that their party is most ravaged by this practice, hinting that the party chairperson who provides the bulk of the party funding ensures that outcomes of all internal processes are in his favour. AFORD and RP respondents followed after the UDF with decreasing levels of patronage respectively. Despite the elaborate party constitutional provisions regarding the management of party funds, there’s no notable effort to increase participation and therefore enhance intra-party democracy. An exception is made for PPM whose respondents said that they periodically contribute to the party hence there is no monopolistic control of party agenda by its leadership. Both the main hypothesis and the sub hypothesis are not supported.

The next section makes recommendations from the conclusions derived from the above analysis.

5.3. Policy Recommendations

The following broad recommendations are proposed for the purpose of ensuring effective implementation of internal and external institutions in order to enhance the influence of institutional arrangements on intra-party democracy in Malawi.

♦ The Political Parties Registration and Regulations Act (1993) and the national constitution need to be simultaneously reviewed to ensure that party constitutions have specific and democratic provisions for party conventions, candidate selection, coalitions formation, conflict management mechanisms and party funding. The new rules will ensure transparency within the party organisations and provide for internal and external enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance.

♦ The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Act (PPEA) should provided detailed procedures for compulsory primary elections for political parties, which must be monitored by local independent observers. This will ensure that parties elect their presidential and
parliamentary candidates transparently, and that legal redress for violation of such procedures is attainable. This will promote a democratic culture of legitimately attaining leadership and accepting defeat.

♦ Specific rules of procedure need to be introduced in the PPEA and set as a requirement for all party constitutions to regulate the formation and dissolution of inter-party coalitions and alliances. These procedures should instil a culture of consensual pre-coalition consultation among members of a political party. This will increase the legitimacy and collective ownership of coalition decisions and minimise incidences of arbitrary and unilateral decisions by party elites.

♦ The PPEA and the national constitution should make specific provisions to ensure transparency and accountability by political parties which are funded by parliament. The existing laws should be re-enforced to oblige parties to account for their previous funding before subsequent funding is made. Further, these accounts must be audited and regularly presented at party conventions to encourage transparency.

5.4. Recommendations for future research

In view of the limitations in the design and scope of this thesis research, future studies should be extended to the areas concerning both formal and informal institutional arrangements. In this regard, the following aspects stand out.

♦ On formal institutions in general, it may be important to explore how constitutional procedures within parties should be formulated, reviewed and adopted to ensure representation of views, participation, collective authorship and subsequent compliance of all bound by them. This investigation may include assessing how regularly are the five specific aspects of this study reviewed and adopted in political parties. In
addition, the study may also assess how to ensure that party documents are accessible to its officials at all levels.

♦ Further investigation is necessary to establish scenarios where and how formal and informal institutional arrangements compliment each other.

♦ On coalitions, it may be vital to investigate the level and quality of consultation suitable to give the process its democratic legitimacy.

♦ Regarding party conventions, future studies should assess the level of participation in preparing the convention agenda to ensure that principals have the first and final say.

♦ On party funding, future investigations should examine the distinction (if observable) in the personal influence of the party president (as a member of the national executive) on the final decisions of the executive as a whole. Further, more research is needed to analyse the more complex interplay between formal and informal institutional arrangements and how they at times reinforce and substitute each other. This would establish conditions under which effective formal institutions are impacted by informal institutions and intra-party democracy. Lastly, such a study would explore informal institutions which positively impact on intra-party democracy in Malawi.
6. REFERENCES


Malawi. Christian Literature Association in Malawi, (CLAIM/MABUKU),
Malawi, pp.11-24.

(Eds.): Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and


Hopkin, J, (2001): Bringing the Members Back In? Democratizing Candidate

Kadima, D, and Lembani, S, (2006): Making, Unmaking and Remaking of
Political Party Coalitions in Malawi, EISA, Johannesburg (forthcoming).

Immink, B; Lembani, S; Ott, M and Peters-Berries, C. (Eds.): From Freedom to
Empowerment: Ten Years of Democratisation in Malawi. Montfort Media,

T.L, and Kanyongolo, F.E, (Eds.): When Political Parties Clash. TEMA

Kanyongolo, F.E, and Maliyamkono, TL, (2003): When Political Parties Clash,
TEMA Publishers Company, Tanzania.

Kanyongolo, FE, (2004): Courts Elections and Democracy: The Role of the
Judiciary. In: In: Ott, M; Immink, B; Mhango, B and Berries, C.P, (Eds): The


**Electronic Sources**


Annexure 1: Map of Malawi

Source: United Nations, 2004:
### Annexure 2: List of Registered Political Parties in Malawi by August 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Political Party</th>
<th>Date of Registration</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malawi Congress Party (MCP)</td>
<td>1960/19.08.93</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Democracy</td>
<td>21.07.93</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Front (UDF)</td>
<td>27.07.93</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Front for Multi-Party Democracy (UFMD)</td>
<td>27.07.93</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi Democratic Party (MDP)</td>
<td>05.08.93</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi National Democratic Party (MNDP)</td>
<td>11.08.93</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress for Second Republic (CSR)</td>
<td>18.02.94</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP) (formerly Christian Democratic Party)</td>
<td>15.02.95</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Patriotic Front (NPF)</td>
<td>24.05.95</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity Party (NUP)</td>
<td>31.07.95</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi Freedom Party (MFP)</td>
<td>26.01.96</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)</td>
<td>10.10.96</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>29.05.97</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Party (UP)</td>
<td>15.08.97</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapitwa National Democratic Party (SNPD)</td>
<td>24.10.97</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Movement for Young Generation (MMYG)</td>
<td>19.08.98</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Solidarity Party (NSP)</td>
<td>17.02.99</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress for National Unity (CONU)</td>
<td>17.03.99</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Progressive Movement (PPM)</td>
<td>20.03.02</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi Forum for Unity and Development (MAFUNDE)</td>
<td>13.06.02</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamodzi Freedom Party (PFP)</td>
<td>21.10.02</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples’ Freedom Party</td>
<td>21.10.02</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Transformation Party (PETRA)</td>
<td>16.12.02</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Alliance (NDA)</td>
<td>03.01.03</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Dawn of Africa (NDA)</td>
<td>03.01.03</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Genuine Democracy (MGODE)</td>
<td>06.10.03</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Popular Front</td>
<td>06.10.03</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtendere Ufulu Party</td>
<td>16.01.04</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Congress for Democracy (NCD)</td>
<td>19.01.04</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party (RP)</td>
<td>19.01.04</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Party (UDP)</td>
<td>28.02.05</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)</td>
<td>15.03.05</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Active, ** Dormant, *** Dissolved

**Source:** Registrar of Political Parties, Malawi, (2005), adapted by the author
### Annexure 3: Political Parties Represented in Parliament in 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Number of Parliamentary seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Democracy</td>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress for National Unity</td>
<td>CONU</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi Congress Party</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Genuine Democracy</td>
<td>MGODE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Transformation Party</td>
<td>PETRA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Progressive Movement</td>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent MPs</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Figures adapted from EISA Election Observer Mission Report No 15: *Malawi Parliamentary and Presidential Elections 20 May 2004*, pp.15
## Annexure 4: List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Interviewee</th>
<th>Party/Organisation</th>
<th>Position/Portfolio</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mr. Charles Nkozomba</td>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>NEC Member</td>
<td>05.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mr. Ian Nankhuni</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>NEC Member</td>
<td>06.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ms. Hope Maida</td>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>DEC (Dedza)</td>
<td>07.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mr. Maxwell Maundi</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>DEC (Dedza)</td>
<td>07.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mr. Barnet Mtambalika</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>DEC (Dedza)</td>
<td>07.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mr. Ajusu Lengi-Mnyanyi</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Dedza)</td>
<td>07.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Mr. Moses Kuchingale</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Mchinji)</td>
<td>08.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mr. S.A. Nkhata</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Mchinji)</td>
<td>08.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Mr. Gabriel Machado</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Political Analyst (Mchinji)</td>
<td>08.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Mr. John Chimanja</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>DEC Chairman (Mchinji)</td>
<td>08.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Mr. D.A.T Kalambo</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Political Analyst (Mchinji)</td>
<td>08.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Mr. Reuben Chimbalanga</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>DEC Chairman (Salima)</td>
<td>09.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Mr. W.K. Mwale</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>DEC (Salima)</td>
<td>09.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Mr. B.W.E. Mkwewza</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>REC (C. East) Chairperson</td>
<td>09.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Mr. L.B. Zambezi</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>DEC (Salima)</td>
<td>09.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Mr. Salimu J. Kadango</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>REC (Central)</td>
<td>09.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Mr. Fred S Gama</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Salima)</td>
<td>09.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Ms. Sakina S. Chingomanje</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Salima)</td>
<td>09.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Mr. R.E. Ibrahim</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Salima)</td>
<td>09.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Mr. Khumbo Kumwenda</td>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>DEC (Rumphi)</td>
<td>12.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Mr. GD Simbeye</td>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>DEC (Rumphi) Chairperson</td>
<td>12.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Mr. Moses Nyoni</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>DEC (Rumphi)</td>
<td>12.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Mr. G.L. Khosa</td>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>DEC Rumphi</td>
<td>12.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Mr. Kambotoli Nyirenda</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>DEC (Rumphi)</td>
<td>12.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Mr. Kajisu Gondwe</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>REC (North) Chairperson</td>
<td>12.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Mr. Chimwemwe Mhone</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>REC (North)</td>
<td>13.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Mr. Lameck Ndau</td>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>REC (North)</td>
<td>13.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Mr. Khumbo Mwaungulu</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>REC (North)</td>
<td>13.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Mr. William C. Chinula</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>REC (North)</td>
<td>13.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Ms. Loveness Gondwe (MP)</td>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>15.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Ms. Esther C. Mcheka (MP)</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>15.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Mr. Willy Kalonga</td>
<td>MEC (Expert)</td>
<td>Deputy Chief Elections Officer</td>
<td>17.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Mr. Nicholas Dausi</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>NEC Vice President</td>
<td>17.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Mr. Stanley Masauli</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>NEC (Acting President)</td>
<td>17.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Mr. Bernard Mbabangi</td>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>DEC Blantyre</td>
<td>18.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Mr. L.H. Kalua</td>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>REC (South)</td>
<td>18.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Mr. Eccram Basher Sherrif</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Blantyre)</td>
<td>18.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Mr. J.A. Gumbala</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Blantyre)</td>
<td>18.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Hon. Justice Dr. Jane Ansah</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Malawi High Court</td>
<td>18.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Mr. Don Nanthambwe</td>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>19.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Mr. Boniface Dulani</td>
<td>Expert Researcher</td>
<td>Head of Political Studies Department (Zomba)</td>
<td>19.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Interviewee</td>
<td>Party/Organisation</td>
<td>Position/Portfolio</td>
<td>Date of Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Aboo Naliwa</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Zomba)</td>
<td>19.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. William Wasi</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>DEC (Mangochi Chairperson)</td>
<td>20.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Frank Danger</td>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>DEC (Mangochi)</td>
<td>20.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Hillary John</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Mangochi)</td>
<td>20.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Alaja Amisi</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Mangochi)</td>
<td>20.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Wallace Chiume</td>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>NEC (Secretary General)</td>
<td>21.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Nancy Chabwera</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>DEC (Lilongwe)</td>
<td>21.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Charles Luya (MP)</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>REC (South)</td>
<td>21.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Rodgers Newa</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Chairperson –HRCC</td>
<td>22.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Robert Phiri</td>
<td>Expert –PAC</td>
<td>NGO Researcher</td>
<td>25.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Martha Lunje (MP)</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>REC (Centre)</td>
<td>26.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. S. Kaunda (MP)</td>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>DEC Nkhata Bay</td>
<td>26.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Vasco J Thundu</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>DEC Nkhata Bay</td>
<td>26.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Shenard Mazengera</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Legal Officer-NORAD</td>
<td>27.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. E.D. Mvundula</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>DEC (Dedza)</td>
<td>27.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. M. Kazembe</td>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>DEC (Dedza) Chairperson</td>
<td>27.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Gerald Kampanikiza</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Dedza)</td>
<td>27.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Raphael Mkutu</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>DEC (Dedza)</td>
<td>27.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Atuweni Nyirongo</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Malawi Law Society</td>
<td>28.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. L.L. Chitseko</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Deputy Clerk of Parliament</td>
<td>29.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Soo Phiri</td>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>REC (Centre)</td>
<td>29.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Wiseman Chirwa</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>University Lecturer (Zomba)</td>
<td>29.07.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Augustin Magolowondo</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Gtz Programme Officer</td>
<td>03.08.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Bintony Kutsaira</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>09.08.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annexure 5: Research Questionnaire for Politicians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>Interview Number [I Number]:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of Interviewer:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Interviewee:</td>
<td>Party Portfolio: (Tick where applicable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1] National Executive Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[2] Regional Executive Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[3] District Executive Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[4] Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Represented:</td>
<td>MCP [1], UDF [2], AFORD [3], PPM [4], RP [5], Experts [6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Interview:</td>
<td>Full Contact details:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Intra-party democracy
   1.1 In your view, how do you define the term intra-party democracy?
   ………………………………………………………………………………………

2. Indicators for Intra-party democracy
   2.1 In your opinion do you think your party is internally democratic? Yes☐, No☐, Partly☐
   2.2 Please give at least two reasons for your answer
   ………………………………………………………………………………………

3. Institutional Arrangements
   3.1 What rules are in place to regulate the functioning of your party? Please give three examples.
   ………………………………………………………………………………………

4. Intra-party democracy and institutional arrangements
   4.1 How do rules impact on intra-party democracy? Please give at least, two examples
   ………………………………………………………………………………………

5. Intra-party democracy and Candidate Selection process
5.1. In your party, how do you nominate presidential and parliamentary candidates?

5.2 In terms of presidential and parliamentary candidate selection procedures, what would you consider to be a democratic approach?

(a) candidates are nominated by the executive and only endorsed by the voters/members presidential: Yes □ No □ parliamentary: Yes □ No □

(b) voters/members directly nominate candidates who freely compete in primary elections presidential: Yes □ No □ parliamentary: Yes □ No □

5.3 What are possible consequences of a centralized candidate selection process with limited degree of intra-party democracy?

(a) Party stability and increased party support (Agree □ Disagree □)
(b) Factions and increased independent candidates (Agree □ Disagree □)
(c) substantial electoral losses (Agree □ Disagree □)
(d) stronger party coherence and unity (Agree □ Disagree □)

6. Intra-party democracy and Coalition Formation procedures

(a) Does your party constitution oblige party leaders to seek the approval of party members before entering into coalitions with other parties? Yes □ No □ (Ask for copy of the constitution)

(b) To what extent are the members involved in the coalition decisions in your party?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very high 1</th>
<th>High 2</th>
<th>Medium 3</th>
<th>Low 4</th>
<th>Not at all 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) In your opinion does the final decision respect the expressed opinion of

1. party members □
2. majority of national executive □
3. party president □
4. all of the above □

(d) From your experience, what are the consequences of centralized coalition decision-making?

1. party stability and increased party support (Agree □ Disagree □)
2. factions and increased independent candidates (Agree □ Disagree □)
3. substantial electoral losses (Agree □ Disagree □)
4. stronger party coherence and unity (Agree □ Disagree □)
7. Intra-party democracy and Conflict Management
(a) How does your party deal with internal disciplinary matters?

(b) To what extent are your party’s conflict resolution mechanisms in line with the party’s (possible) constitutional provisions?
1. very much compliant □
2. selectively or discretionary □
3. not compliant at all □

(c) In your opinion, what of the following aspects of intra-party conflict management undermine intra-party democracy
1. absence of constitutional provisions for conflict management □
2. illegitimate expulsions of members from the party □
3. unjust application of rules of natural justice (equal judgment for all people in similar disciplinary offences) □

(d) What are the consequences of limited intra-party democracy in conflict management?
1. reduced party popularity and electoral support (Agree □ Disagree □)
2. resignations of members from the party (Agree □ Disagree □)
3. reduced moral force of party constitution (Agree □ Disagree □)
4. stronger party coherence and unity (Agree □ Disagree □)

8. Intra-party democracy and party conventions
(a) In practice how often has your party held procedurally constitutional conventions since it was officially registered and launched?
1. consistently and in compliance to the constitution Yes □ No □
2. very erratically and on ad hoc basis Yes □ No □
3. only close to upcoming elections Yes □ No □
4. none at all Yes □ No □

(b) What important decisions are taken at your ordinary as well as extra ordinary party conventions?
1. adopt/reject party constitution or proposed amendments □
2. elect new national executive office bearers □
3. debate and consider coalition partnership proposals □
4. review previous years’ financial and activity reports □
5. Other………………………………………………………………………………

(c) Regarding process aspects of your conventions, how do you characterize the level of intra-party democracy in terms of?
1. inclusiveness in membership representation (High □ Low □)
2. quality of free debate, participation (High □ Low □)
3. level of intimidation (High □ Low □)

(d) In your opinion, how is intra-party democracy undermined in party conventions?

1. held irregularly contrary to the party constitution □
2. outcomes are predetermined by the executive awaiting for uncritical approval of members □
3. held only very close to elections □
4. characterized by limited debate and conformist participation □
5. marred by physical and verbal harassment of some members □
6. Other (Explain) .................................................................

(e) What are possible consequences of a centralized party conventions with limited degree of intra-party democracy?

1. party stability and increased party support (Agree □ Disagree □)
2. factions and increased independent candidates (Agree □ Disagree □)
3. substantial electoral losses (Agree □ Disagree □)
4. stronger party coherence and unity (Agree □ Disagree □)

9. Intra-party Democracy and Party Funding

(a) From the following sources, which one by estimate represents the three biggest source of your party funding?

1. private funding from party president/chairperson □
2. government subventions □
3. membership subscriptions/contributions □
4. party fundraising activities □
5. interest groups □
6. foreign donations □

(b) In your view, who has ultimate control in the allocation of your party resources?

1. party president/chairperson □
2. majority of party executive members □
3. party members through party convention □

(c) What is the relationship between the control of party agenda and source of funding?

1. no relationship □
2. very weak □
3. very strong □
(d) How transparent is the disclosure of sources and allocation of funding within your party?

1. very transparent □
2. partly transparent □
3. not transparent □

(e) What are possible consequences of centralised control of financial allocation with limited degree of intra-party democracy?

1. party stability and increased party support (Agree □ Disagree □)
2. factions and increased independent candidates (Agree □ Disagree □)
3. substantial electoral losses (Agree □ Disagree □)
4. stronger party coherence and unity (Agree □ Disagree □)

10. Informal institutional arrangements

In your opinion, how do the following informal aspects influence intra-party democracy (Please explain your responses)

1. political culture (*political history and past legacy*)
   ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

2. neo-patrimonialism (*the big man* syndrome)
   ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

3. social capital (*relations and social networks*)
   ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Thank you

**Source:** Author
1. **Intra-party democracy**

1.2 In your view, how do you define the term intra-party democracy?

……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………

2. **Indicators for Intra-party democracy**

2.1 In your, opinion do you think the five political parties under review are internally democratic? Yes☐, No☐ Partly☐

2.2 Please give at least two reasons for your answer

……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………

3. **Institutional Arrangements**

3.1 What influence do external regulations (for example: party law, and national constitution) have on democratic functioning of parties? Please state at least two implications.

……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………

4. **Intra-party democracy and institutional arrangements**

4.1 How do rules impact on intra-party democracy? Please give at least, two examples

……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………

5. **Intra-party democracy and Candidate Selection process**

5.1 In terms of presidential and parliamentary candidate selection procedures, what would you consider to be a democratic approach?
(a) candidates are nominated by the executive and only endorsed by the voters/members presidential: Yes □ No □; parliamentary: Yes □ No □

(b) voters/members directly nominate candidates who freely compete in primary elections presidential: Yes □ No □; parliamentary: Yes □ No □

5.2 What are possible consequences of a centralized candidate selection process with limited degree of intra-party democracy?

(a) Party stability and increased party support (Agree □ Disagree □)
(b) Factions and increased independent candidates (Agree □ Disagree □)
(c) substantial electoral losses (Agree □ Disagree □)
(d) stronger party coherence and unity (Agree □ Disagree □)

6. Intra-party democracy and Coalition Formation procedures

(a) Do party constitutions oblige party leaders to seek the approval of party members before entering into coalitions with other parties? Yes □ No □ (Illustrate with examples)

(b) To what extent are the members involved in the coalition decisions of their respective parties?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very high 1</th>
<th>High 2</th>
<th>Medium 3</th>
<th>Low 4</th>
<th>Not at all 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) In your opinion do final decisions respect the expressed opinion of

1. party members □
2. majority of national executive □
3. party president □
4. all of the above □

(d) From your experience, what are the consequences of centralized coalition decision-making?

1. party stability and increased party support (Agree □ Disagree □)
2. factions and increased independent candidates (Agree □ Disagree □)
3. substantial electoral losses (Agree □ Disagree □)
4. stronger party coherence and unity (Agree □ Disagree □)

7. Intra-party democracy and Conflict Management

(a) How do parties deal with internal disciplinary matters?

.................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................
(b) To what extent are intra-party conflict resolution mechanisms in line with the party’s (possible) constitutional provisions?
1. very much compliant ☐
2. selectively or discretionary ☐
3. not compliant at all ☐

(c) In your opinion, what of the following aspects of intra-party conflict management undermine intra-party democracy:
1. absence of constitutional provisions for conflict management ☐
2. illegitimate expulsions of members from the party ☐
3. unjust application of rules of natural justice (equal judgment for all people in similar disciplinary offences) ☐

(d) What are the consequences of limited intra-party democracy in conflict management?
1. reduced party popularity and electoral support  (Agree ☐ Disagree ☐)
2. resignations of members from the party  (Agree ☐ Disagree ☐)
3. reduced moral force of party constitution  (Agree ☐ Disagree ☐)
4. stronger party coherence and unity  (Agree ☐ Disagree ☐)

8. Intra-party democracy and party conventions

(a) In practice how regularly have political parties under review held procedurally constitutional conventions since over the last ten years?
1. consistently and in compliance to the constitution Yes ☐ No ☐
2. very erratically and on ad hoc basis Yes ☐ No ☐
3. only close to upcoming elections Yes ☐ No ☐
4. none at all Yes ☐ No ☐

(b) What important decisions are taken at ordinary as well as extra ordinary party conventions:
1. adopt/reject party constitution or proposed amendments ☐
2. elect new national executive office bearers ☐
3. debate and consider coalition partnership proposals ☐
4. review previous years’ financial and activity reports ☐
5. Other……………………………………………………………………

(c) Regarding process aspects of party conventions, how do you characterize the level of intra-party democracy in terms of?
1. inclusiveness in membership representation (High ☐ Low ☐)
2. quality of free debate, participation (High ☐ Low ☐)
3. level of intimidation (High ☐ Low ☐)
(d) In your opinion, how is intra-party democracy undermined in party conventions?

1. held irregularly contrary to the party constitution
2. outcomes are predetermined by the executive awaiting for uncritical approval of members
3. held only very close to elections
4. characterized by limited debate and conformist participation
5. marred by physical and verbal harassment of some members
6. Other: (Explain)…………………………………………………

(e) What are possible consequences of a centralized party conventions with limited degree of intra-party democracy?

1. party stability and increased party support (Agree □ Disagree □)
2. factions and increased independent candidates (Agree □ Disagree □)
3. substantial electoral losses (Agree □ Disagree □)
4. stronger party coherence and unity (Agree □ Disagree □)

9. Intra-party Democracy and Party Funding

(a) From the following sources, which one by estimate represents the three biggest source of party funding?

1. private funding from party president/chairperson
2. government subventions
3. membership subscriptions/contributions
4. party fundraising activities
5. interest groups
6. foreign donations

(b) In your view, who has ultimate control in the allocation of party resources?

1. party president/chairperson
2. majority of party executive members
3. party members through party convention

(c) What is the relationship between the control of party agenda and source of funding?

1. no relationship
2. very weak
3. very strong
(d) How transparent is the disclosure of sources and allocation of funding within political parties

1. very transparent □
2. partly transparent □
3. not transparent □

(e) What are possible consequences of centralised control of financial allocation with limited degree of intra-party democracy?

1. party stability and increased party support (Agree □ Disagree □)
2. factions and increased independent candidates (Agree □ Disagree □)
3. substantial electoral losses (Agree □ Disagree □)
4. stronger party coherence and unity (Agree □ Disagree □)

10. Informal institutional arrangements
In your opinion, how do the following informal aspects influence intra-party democracy (Please explain your responses)

1. political culture (*political history and past legacy*)

2. neo-patrimonialism (*‘the big man’ syndrome*)

3. social capital (*relations and social networks*)

Thank you

Source: Author