US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA - 1975 TO 1990: THE CASE OF THE NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE

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2006/2007
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JULY 2007

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ABSTRACT:

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MA thesis, Political Studies Department of the University of the Western Cape.

In this thesis, I investigated, and offer a balanced overview of the US foreign policy at different levels of detail and sophistication. This is done against the backdrop of the emergence of a new culture of the political struggles for self-determination.

This study, in contrast to contemporary held views relating to the US policy premises, aims to look at the inherent disabilities and inconsistencies of the policies of successive Washington administrations. More so, it investigates the US interventionist strategies to perceived threats from communist regimes and their allies, especially in Southern Africa. To be able to embark on such an investigation, Namibia and the Soviet-Cuban involvement in Southern Africa were selected as a special focus of this study. This thesis submits that the US foreign policy tends to be more inward-looking during the 1970s and 1980s, in the face of the genuine aspirations for freedom, justice and equality. It is further submitted that this militated against the US human rights credibility.

In getting to interrogate such observations, this thesis analyzes the policy of benign neglect adopted by the Nixon-Carter administrations, which reached its climax during the Reagan era. This, however, it is submitted, changed as it was becoming evidently clear that the Soviets were involved in the sub-region. Prior to 1975, Southern Africa appeared to be of no significance to the US foreign policy architects. The Nixon administration found it convenient enough to believe that there was little or no Soviet involvement in the sub-region.
A paradigm shift, however, occurred which did not necessarily represent the US strategic and economic interest, but rather to counter what was then termed the “red danger” or the “roll-back Communism campaign”; thus the perceived Sovietization of the sub-region had to be stopped at all costs.

The author argues that the US policies towards this region were on numerous occasions redefined and operationalized on the basis of perceived communist threats that were regarded as harmful to its interest. Therefore, insurmountable pressure, were put on national liberation movements in the region, to sever their ties with the Soviet Union. This would then perfectly tie-in with the US anti-Sovietization policies.

This thesis in the subsequent sections, investigates in great detail the question as to why independence for Namibia was only acceded to in 1988, a decade after the initial agreement was concluded. This pertinent observation is covered under subheading resolution 435 of 1978 versus obstructionism. We found that South Africa was roped in, and played a significant role for the delay in the early implementation of the Namibian peace plan. Suggestions on how these political and ideological differences could have been resolved are made, rather than keeping the Namibian question hostage to the then Cold War rivalry. It highlights the misconception and complete misplacement of the US policy strategies with regard to African political and diplomatic strategies. It is submitted that the greatness of the power of the US certainly knew no boundaries, even to the extent where it could trample on the freedom aspirations of others.

This study suggests that the mere association of national liberation movements with the then Soviet Union did not result in transplanting and reconstituting communist models in Southern Africa. Suffice to say, the US itself did not transplant the autocratic monarchist systems of its French and Spanish Bourbon allies after its declaration of independence. Instead, it opted for a democratic federal republican system of governance. Southern Africa’s struggles and the nature of the political process geared toward the attainment of national independence and self-determination were genuine expressions and aspirations for freedom, justice and equality as opposed to colonialism and apartheid.
KEYWORDS:

1. United States (US)
2. Namibia
3. Angola
4. USSR
5. Cuba
6. Cold War
7. Foreign Policy
8. Apartheid
9. Independence Struggles
10. Identities
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In conclusion, I would like to declare, that this study in International Politics, to the best of my knowledge, was done and completed in its entirety by myself in fulfilment of the requirements of the Magister Artium (M.A), Political Studies degree programme of the University of the Western Cape.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS:

AG       Administrator-General
ANC      African National Congress
CA       Constituent Assembly
CAA      Cuban Adjustment Act
CCB      Civil Co-operation Bureau
CDA      Christian Democratic Action
CDR      Committee for the Defence of the Revolution
CIA      Central Intelligence Agency
CIS      Commonwealth of Independent States
COMESA   Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DC       Damara Council
DMZ      De-militarized Zone
EU       European Union
FAPLA    Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola
GATT     General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
ICJ      International Court of Justice
IG       Interim Government
JMC      Joint Monitoring Commission
MNC      Multi-national corporations
MPC      Multi-Party Conference
MPLA     Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAM      Non-Aligned Movement
NAFTA    North American Free Treaty Area
NATO     North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>NNF</td>
<td>Namibia National Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization for African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLAN</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army of Namibia</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People’s Organization</td>
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<td>SWAPOL</td>
<td>South West African Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWANU</td>
<td>South West African National Union</td>
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<td>SWANU-P</td>
<td>South West African National Union-Progressive</td>
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<td>SWATF</td>
<td>South West African Territorial Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRIMS</td>
<td>Trade Related Investment Measures</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNCN</td>
<td>United Nations Council for Namibia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Assistance Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSR</td>
<td>United Nations Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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PREFACE:

A relentless body of critical research and analysis concerning the evolving political processes in Southern Africa has arisen in the wake of the mid-1970s. This prompted me to undertake this study with my desire to expose those factors that impacted on the politics of this region, particularly when taking stock of the then existing world order and the subsequent collapse of the former Soviet Union.

This study calls into question, the fundamental power relations of the then bi-polar world that at the time succeeded in creating client states in this sub-region. These in turn would serve the economic, political and strategic interests of the most powerful nations, and their imperialist tendencies, thus taking complete advantage of the then East-West rivalry.

It hopes to do this without raising alarm for resignation and complete dependency, but to rather bring into common perspective the elements that conceived the reshaping of the geo-political equilibrium, which addressed the “North’s” needs “to protect our sources of energy and raw materials”.

Finally, it is a study intended to be a source of comment and analysis on topical issues for further scholarly undertakings aimed at understanding the politics of yesteryear. It is geared towards social transformation in the future, particularly the brave and relentless struggles for national liberation and independence, especially in Namibia.
1. Introduction

The winds of change for national liberation and independence definitely shifted towards the southern tip of Africa. This indeed was quite evident as the 1970s, drew to a close. In most Southern African countries, a great charade had developed, which saw the emergence of a new culture of the political struggles for self-determination. Whether this new trend would hold dear to the aspirations of the masses, which could be translated into genuine social transformation, meaningful and equitable economic co-operation and development, remained to be seen. Given these observations, I came to recognize that the then Cold War rhetoric and threats have since passed. It is known to every reader of contemporary politics that Africa’s and in particular Southern Africa’s malaise was substantially not of its own making. It was manufactured elsewhere – the West – and exported. In fact, it is the function of the world’s capitalist crisis in which the Third World were caught up. It in turn made way for coercion and the further marginalization of the African continent.

It should be noted that given these assumptions, and of course against the background of the then Cold War, the internal processes of development in most of Africa had grounded to a halt. This by implication short-circuited advances to democracy as promised at independence. Of particular importance in this respect is the manner in which the US foreign policy evolved. Added to this, is the manner in which it impacted on the nature of the politics of this region. This thesis aims to present diverse viewpoints, using a broad range of literature in the field of political studies, such as published data from research reports, dissertations, periodicals, text books,
including oral communications with experts in the field, which will then be compared to empirical findings based on observations and interpretations.

This research also attempt to shed light on the concept of power-sharing as advocated by consecutive US administrations. It must be said that these were indeed deliberate attempts aimed at reshaping the politics of the region in the US favour. It goes without saying that such manoeuvres militated against the concept of democracy, which in essence is about choices. The struggles in Africa were about land, which indeed was a long haul. Equally, the same logic applies to imperialism and neo-colonialism, which indeed took great advantage – and succeeded – of fragile and unstable regimes in their infancy at independence. It is a view held by most readers of politics that the granting of independence in part emanates from pressures of the US. The objective here; was to carve out its own spheres of influence. A political evolution that was both complex and pervasive; it permeated all aspects of society – economic, social, political and cultural.

The contention is that Africa’s movement to political freedom and social emancipation should encapsulate as its primary objective the liberation from ethnic and tribal hatred, as well. Besides, the factors underlying the continent’s never-ending political violence and civil conflagration are still prevalent: human rights, poverty and self-determination. Another factor worth mentioning here has been the almost total absence of mechanisms, or otherwise neglect by continental and regional institutions to anticipate and intervene in resolving emergent conflicts. The OAU whose mandate also permeated conflict resolution and prevention shirked this responsibility for much of the post-colonial period. As a result minor political disputes
escalated into full-blown civil conflagration until foreign powers intervene to impose a settlement. Unfortunately, foreign interventions never provided the desired results. Moreover, these interventions at best lacked an African input and were rather reactive than preventive.

The march to genuine independence is a tall order. Suffice to say, the attainment of a populist independence itself set in motion new processes. This is the emergence of a new class structure that simultaneously affected all other classes and the way society functioned. Developmental theorists are of the opinion that economic exploitation occurred in tandem with political, ideological, cultural and other forms of sub-ordination. These in turn reinforced dependency within the framework of Western imperialism. It is against this backdrop, that the ever-changing, but parallel objectives of successive US administrations’ foreign policies should be examined. There is stark evidence of the persisting features of imperialist presence across Africa. Western colonialism never really withdrew after conceding independence. (1)

A close bearing on such tendency was the interventionist posture of the US since 1945, which came to find prominence during the Reagan revolution in the late 1980s. The foreign policy pursued by President Reagan was congruent with its assumed role as an imperial state exercising global

hegemony in defence of capitalism. President Reagan interpreted all foreign policy in terms of global considerations of the US-Soviet rivalry. Conflicts in Southern Africa were understood, not in their own terms, but rather as extensions of superpower competition. This in turn led to the responses and policies that were formulated accordingly, especially during the Reagan era.

(2)

Western policies toward Africa began as a private affair directed by missionaries and traders. While individuals and private organizations saw a continent of great spiritual, material and cartographic importance, leaders from the West held the belief that politically, Africa was irrelevant. This however, changed during the 1870s and 1880s. Indifference gave way to a frenzied scramble for territorial influence, which is still prevalent today. As such, the 1884 Berlin Conference, which saw the compartmentalization of Africa ushered in a century during which the colonial powers used the continent as a field with which to play out their rivalries. This continued during the Cold War. Today, however, with the West disengaging the nineteenth-century model has returned, spearheaded by aid agencies, transnationals and multilateral lending institutions. Though this epochal shift has hardly been noticed in the US and Europe it is wreaking havoc in Africa, particularly Southern Africa, where most nations attained independence during the late 1980s and early 1990s. (3)


As per the foregoing conjecture, the last decade of the 20th century saw the attainment of independence in most Southern African nations. Namibia got its independence in March 1990, followed by the first democratic elections in September 1992, in Angola and South Africa in 1994.

1.1 Objectives of the research

It is this study’s objective to examine the fundamental characteristics of the US policy objectives in the region. The broad and specific objectives of the study is to examine and contrast the parallel foreign policy aims of successive US administrations under Nixon, Carter and Reagan; locate the study in its proper historical context; investigate the reasons why the question of granting independence to Namibia was delayed for more than a decade and to determine the roles of the Soviet-Cuban involvement in the region. The aims of the study are the reflection of the research-hypothesis including the statement of the problem being researched. Much so, they lend much focus to the research through the identification of measurable variables. In other words, the primary hypothesis in this study is to seek an understanding on the roles played by outside forces in shaping the political landscape in the sub-region, especially subsequent to the attainment of independence in Angola.
1.2 Background of the research

Gervasi observes that the then Cold War added a new dimension to every square inch of the universe’s surface. (4) Nyerere contends that the political direction embarked upon by nationalist movements in Southern Africa did not necessarily represent an outburst of oppositional frenzy in which alternatives came to mean reactionary. Instead, the struggles for national independence and self-determination were driven by the mere believe that colonialism and apartheid oppression in any form were unjust and in contradiction with the basic tenets and values of modern democracy. (5) As it appeared then, the US policy objectives were at times rudder-less, inept and at best misplaced. Power-sharing arrangements as advocated by the US were mostly aimed at the creation of an African bourgeoisie who were mainly interested in replacing the colonial masters within the state apparatus. Suffice to say, the principal objective of the Washington-Pretoria alliance was to reshape the politics in the region in their interests. On the contrary the workers’ interests were mainly embedded in genuine social transformation.

1.3 The research design

The research methodology of this study includes elements from perspectives of discourse analysis and ideology critique, which presupposes the use of primary and secondary data collection tools, to either disapprove or prove the assumptions underlying the research problem. In other words, a


5. Nyerere, JK 1986. America and South Africa. (Special Issue). Julius K. Nyerere was President of the United Republic of Tanzania and inspired and harboured most of the current post-Cold War leaders in many States in the sub-region. UWC e-Journals.

6
process that goes beyond diagnosis into prognosis, where problems are found and interpreted and alternatives suggested. In this connection it is suggested that US foreign policy toward Southern Africa had been very confusing and contradictory. Strategies formulated to deal with turbulence in the Third World have followed no fixed pattern. Trial and error have produced a wide array of inconsistent policies, revealing flawed strategies. Suffice to say, the US policies were predominantly shaped by an alarming perception of an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union. As the Cold War came to an end we became increasingly aware of the extent to which the lens of anti-Sovietism distorted the US post-war polices toward Southern Africa, especially when considering the delayed settlement of the Namibian question. Namibia, in the classical sense of the word was considered the last remaining colony on the continent. Because of its allegiance to the former Soviet Union the US used the settlement of the Namibian question as a political tool to checkmate Soviet expansionism. The methodological strategies employed in this study are of a qualitative nature, which includes literature review, secondary analysis and qualitative research as a means to facilitate the depth and width of the study and the database. Useful information was acquired from various textbooks, journals and existing literature on the subject matter under investigation as these filled the need for specific reference or citation.

1.4 Structure of the research
Structurally, the thesis is divided into five broad chapters. Chapter Two introduces the main policy tenets of successive US administrations under Nixon, Carter and Reagan. It also highlights the significant shifts and
responses of the Nixon administrations’ policy of “constructive co-operation” within the context of the then Cold War. It further deals with the Carter policies of “enticement” aimed at winning over friends in the sub-region to safeguard Western interests. It further analyses the Reagan revolution, which is a natural outflow of the policy tones set by the Nixon-Carter administrations aimed at containing Soviet expansionism. Chapter three is based on a case study of the process leading to the armed struggle and the subsequent negotiations leading to Namibia’s independence. It also highlights the numerous efforts made at delaying the implementation of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978. Chapter four is dedicated to the roles of the Soviet-Cuban involvement in the sub-region and examines and contrast Cuba’s pre- and post-1959 foreign policy. In this connection, further details are explored and answers sought in terms of the US responses subsequent to President Fidel Castro Ruz’s epoch-making speech in 1961. This is outlined against the background of Cuba’s alliances with nationalist movements in the sub-region. Substantial details are also covered regarding the political and military situation in Angola following the granting of independence to Namibia.

1.5 Significance of the research
The research is significant in that it seeks to test, affirm or disapprove particular distinct perceptions and policy responses of successive US administrations. It highlights the disabilities of such and at the same time suggests that bi-partisan policies could have achieved the very policy objectives of the US namely, freedom, equality and justice. In addition, the study draws on comparative historical evidence and analysis, thereby contrasting and contending that the US policy formulation and responses
were unfortunate, uninformed and at best contradictory to the very same ideals it sought to achieve. Lewis corroborates this assumption in observing that over the decades, strategies formulated to deal with turbulence in the Third World have followed no fixed pattern. Trial and error have produced a wide array of inconsistent policies, revealing flawed strategies, especially during the Nixon, Carter and Reagan presidencies. (6)

1.6 Limitations of the research
The author of this study is very much familiar with subject matter as he has done some work on this topic already. In addition, his current profession as a diplomat may add to suggestions of an approach with fixed perceptions. This may further arouse suspicions of perceived resistance against “western views”. Another limitation of the study is extent of its focus on the Africanist approach, because of the author’s believes that “outsiders” deliberately distorted Africa’s political history. The problem of thoroughness may reveal itself at several levels because of a lack of constant consultation and guidance. Oral information may also not be objective as this is suspected to be limited to fixed perceptions. Therefore, the contents of the research work and its conclusions should be seen in relation to the aforementioned limitations.

1.7 Conclusion

The struggles for national liberation and self-determination reached a climax as the 1970s drew to a close, especially after granting of independence by Portugal to all its former colonies in region. This momentous occurrence added more momentum which saw the emergence and development of a new culture of the political struggles in the sub-region with an important component to that, this being the taking up of arms.

These struggles must be viewed against the background of the then Cold War. Of particular importance is the manner in which the US foreign policy evolved and impacted on the region. The interventionist posture adopted by the US since 1945 which came to find prominence during the Reagan-Bush revolution were deliberate attempts aimed at reshaping the politics in the region in the US favour. The policy pursued by President Reagan was congruent with its assumed role as an imperial state exercising global hegemony. (7)

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2. THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA

2.1 Introduction

Most Southern African nations during the 1970’s and beyond, in one way or the other had been plagued by “imposed civil conflagration”. This is termed so, because the superpowers had a hand in it. The objective it is assumed was to establish spheres of influence, or to create reliable allies at the periphery with the US as the undisputed centre of the core states. (8) This chapter aims to sketch the flaws of the UN foreign policy in Southern Africa, with specific reference to Angola where the Cold War was plying itself out. It will compare the foreign policies of successive US administrations, indicating continuity and change between the Nixon and Carter Presidencies and the Reagan-Bush Presidencies. President Nixon adopted a moderate policy of broadening ties with both the region’s white- and black-ruled states, whereas Carter’s approach to the region and language in which he framed it, took a more confrontational turn. The Reagan-Bush era saw the development of a new constructive engagement approach which rested on three pillars, 1) Namibian independence, 2) prevent the growth and eliminate Soviet expansionism and 3) allow South Africa to become part of the global security network of Western nations as a legitimate ally (9)

2.2 The Nixon and Carter Presidencies

As pointed out in the introductory part of this chapter, the Nixon

administration found it convenient enough to believe that “there was little, or no Soviet involvement” in the sub-region.

This perception, however, took the US policy architects by surprise as the 1980s drew closer. With the granting of independence by Portugal to its former colonies, particularly Angola, the US assumption that “there was little, or no Soviet involvement” in the region was taken aback. (10)

We find that as independence for Angola became an imminent factor, a tripartite war escalated into an unprecedented regional conflict. This conflict involved the US, Zaire and South Africa, supporting UNITA and the FNLA on the one side. The Soviet-Cuban alliance supported the MPLA on the other side. This conflict lasted for almost three decades, causing tremendous destruction of property and life, second only to the Rwanda genocide, modern history has ever witnessed in the sub-continent. (11) The US architects had to revisit the drawing boards to reassess their policy objectives and strategies (12)

As these developments took place, we came to witness the determined involvement of the US in the region. President Gerald Ford during 1975, extended “limited” covert support to Holden Alvaro Roberto’s FNLA. On The other hand, the Soviet-Cuban alliance did likewise by providing both covert and overt support to the MPLA. (13)

The US Department of State under Henry Kissinger by 17 November 1975, as a counter-measure availed US$ 30 million in cash and arms to UNITA and the FNLA. With the Portuguese ceding control of Luanda, Angola was left firmly in the control of the MPLA, which immediately sparked-off a bloody civil war. Now we came to witness the complete involvement of the superpowers in the region. Military and financial aid were complemented by the introduction of troops, first from the then Zaire and later from Cuba and South Africa. At this point in time, war appeared to be the desired option, aimed at breaking the low-intensive military deadlock. The US administration in a tactical foreign policy manoeuvre, by December 1975, through the enactment of the Clark Amendment Act temporarily suspended the CIA’s operations in Angola. This in turn, gave the MPLA government some breather space, which was further bolstered by the introduction of 36 000 Cuban troops. (14)

Apartheid South Africa, a strategic ally of Washington was left on its own with UNITA and the FNLA in conflict with each other. The South African regime, subsequent to a powerful strike by the combined FAPLA and Cuban forces, followed suit in the footsteps of the US. It temporarily withdrew its forces from Angolan territory. A war previously confined to northern and central Angola, now shifted to southern Angola and northern Namibia. Haunted by the idea of that happened in Angola could easily spill over into Namibia, South Africa escalated its militarization of northern Namibia.

The objective was to combat the activities of PLAN within Namibia. This is testimony of the immense size of the SADF, and the billions of rand pumped into its maintenance and development. Support for UNITA was considered strategically advantageous as it could also be used to contain Communist advances in the region. This at the same time led to greater co-operation and co-ordination of the military activities of UNITA and the SADF. The SADF now assumed the principal role of availing huge amounts of military and financial assistance to UNITA. (15)

With the Angolan administration firmly under the control of the MPLA and compounded by the manifestation of a considerable Soviet-Cuban involvement in the region, the US foreign policymakers, once again reassessed Washington’s policies. These newly overhauled policies became operative in the early periods of 1976. The Angola experience must have taught Washington some important lessons. The lessons learned appeared to be the development of a strategy aimed at winning broad-based support for its policies. As these security and foreign policy cracks became all the more apparent, pre-emptive diplomacy appeared to be the desired strategy option. It must be remembered that this strategy was enunciated against the background that Congress might shoot down any strategy that involved the US military. These new strategy objectives were formally tabled on 27 April 1976, in Lusaka, Zambia. (16)

Kissinger, at the Lusaka Conference, enunciated a set of policies aimed at achieving a settlement in the then Rhodesia. Lewis observed that the Rhodesia regime, of course was hard-pressed by the prowess of the Mugabe-Nkomo led liberation forces and therefore the urgency. (17) In addition, a formula for an internationally supervised and recognized transition to independence in Namibia was hammered out, including a peaceful end to apartheid in South Africa. These were tactical moves aimed at hastening and managing the political changes that were taking place in the sub-region. They were also aimed at ending violence, thereby reducing the appeal and influence of the radicals. Simultaneously, they also had the objective of scaling down any persistent Soviet-Cuban influence in the region. (18)

South Africa, a geo-strategic ally in containing Soviet advances in the region was prioritized rather than the then-Rhodesia to set the Lusaka Conference objectives in motion. These strategies it is argued were to work like a double-edged sword. First, the possibility of a quick settlement in the then-Rhodesia was evident, given the military pressures exerted by the Mugabe-Nkomo led liberation movements. Secondly, they could also be employed as an effective mechanism to keep in-check Soviet-Cuban interventions. Thus Washington and Pretoria strategise the concept of a joint action to get negotiations on track in the then-Rhodesia. A similar approach would then

be adopted in respect of Namibia and South Africa. (19)

By mid-1976, after concerted consultations with apartheid Pretoria, Britain, the Frontline States and the US, Kissinger, launched a new diplomatic initiative. This encapsulated efforts aimed at convincing Ian Smith to concede to majority rule at a Conference sponsored by the British in Geneva, which later led to the Lancaster House negotiations. (20) Lewis contends that Kissinger was determined that bold new initiatives were required to stem the tide of instability and what he perceived to be a mounting challenge to US influence in Southern Africa. Besides, Kissinger at this critical juncture was going through a balancing phase induced by the collapse of his détente strategy toward the Soviet Union; the spectre of Euro-communism in Spain, Portugal and Italy; and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. (21)

By 1977, with the Oval Office changing hands, a total foreign policy overhaul was undertaken. This marked the inception of the Carter administration, viewed as singular in terms of US relations with Africa. The Carter presidency heralded a political emphasis on human rights, with a preferred approach on emphasizing diplomacy to resolve disputes, as well as to accommodate US interests. (22) The Carter administration was bent on offsetting past negative impressions of US neglect, emphasizing a stronger

commitment to social justice and economic development, greater respect for African nationalism, support for legitimate African defence needs etcetera. This indeed, in the initial stages put the US on a direct collusion course with apartheid South Africa. During this period, issues pertaining to the UNSC declaration on the granting of independence to colonial peoples became more prominent. As such, the resolution of the Namibian question once more resurfaced. Geo-politics (for the time being) was pushed to the margins. This strategy, the argument is advanced was used to explain the US interests in the sub-region. It worked, but stalemated in the long run, particularly when considering the protracted process of granting independence to Zimbabwe and Namibia. (23)

With these policy shifts and changes, albeit parallel to customary imperialist US objectives, the argument is that a strategy to settle all pending conflicts in the region was the most desired objective. As a step aimed at achieving this goal, Vice-President Mondale met with Prime Minister B. J. Vorster, to inform him about Washington’s new approach in the region. During this encounter, the US Vice-President stated that:

“We see all three issues (Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia) as being of basic importance. We don’t think that progress on one issue excuses no progress on the other issue. But any progress of significance will be appreciated, will be valuable and will have to be recognized” (24)

It is this study’s submission that such high-sounding rhetoric had been the


hallmark of successive US administrations. These were used to callously manipulate, marginalize and undermine genuine African priorities. Nonetheless, such unprecedented policy changes caught apartheid South Africa off-guard. It must be remembered that this happened at a time when South Africa had been under tremendous internal and external pressures and criticism because of its invasion of Angola and the 1976 massacre of students in Soweto. (25) Estimates are that from March 1976, when South Africa withdrew its troops from Angola to June 1979, it conducted altogether 386 military operations against that country. It goes without saying that South Africa had no alternative, but to review its regional policies if it was to maintain any international credibility (26)

It also appeared that there were in fact determined efforts at work in as far as Washington was concerned to settle the raging conflicts in the region. However, diplomatic efforts aimed at pushing for negotiated settlements between the two strategic allies differed significantly. For instance, the then Rhodesia issue was handled by the State Department of Washington in close consultation with its British counterpart. Nonetheless, it was only after three years of protracted on-and-then-off talks that a settlement could be produced. It must be remembered that Washington was not directly involved in the final rounds of negotiating a settlement for the then-Rhodesia. In any event, the Carter administration should be credited for its diplomatic efforts and most importantly, its refusal to bow to pressures

Congress to lift sanctions, which would have otherwise reduced pressure on the Smith regime to concede to majority rule. (27)

As far as the Namibian question was concerned, we found that the US delegation to the UNSC, although half-heartedly, shaped the way to also have this matter resolved. As already pointed out in the foregoing section of this thesis, the Carter administration was determined at off-setting past impressions of US neglect as evidenced during the Nixon era. South Africa and Namibia became a litmus test for this administration. As such the Carter administration shifted towards a confrontationist posture with apartheid South Africa. (28) It took the lead in organizing the Western Five Contact Group. Comprising the US, Canada, France, Germany and the UK, the Group unveiled proposals for the settlement of the Namibian question namely, resolution 435 of 1978. Suffice to say, these countries were and remain the largest investors in the Namibian mining industry, so they hardly constituted an impartial broker. In other words, they acted as both a player and referee to ensure the best possible post-colonial settlement for big business. In this connection, South Africa having agreed to, and accepted this peace formula on the long run attempted to frustrate its implementation in many ways. It also emerged that the same peace plan was compromised as the Washington administrations changed hands, especially during the Reagan era. (29)

The study submits that the Carter administration in stark contrast to its predecessor, indeed succeeded in laying the foundation for further consultation on the matter. However, the process of concluding the same peace formula took a nose-dive with the assumption of power by President Ronald Reagan in 1981. This period also known as the start of the Reagan revolution saw a dramatic u-turn from US foreign policy that committed itself to social justice and economic development in Africa; to resolve African disputes peacefully; to show greater respect for African nationalism; support for legitimate African defence needs and to show greater respect for human rights, which strengthens the fabric of African nations as articulated by Cyrus Vance at the 58th Annual Meeting of the US Jaycees on 20 June 1978. (30)

2.3 The Reagan-Bush Revolution

With President Ronald Reagan at the helm of the Oval Office, we came to witness an abrupt, if not a complete reversal of his predecessor’s policies. President Reagan brought into his administration foreign policy officers that were totally hostile to the Carter administration’s policies. It goes without saying that President Reagan was not that knowledgeable in as far as foreign policy matters were concerned. Much policy decisions that emerged during the infant stages of his first term of office reflected the views of his chief scholarly policy advisers, who saw the world through magnifying lenses of geopolitical considerations (31)


In the Southern Africa region all those nations perceived to be Marxist adherents were now seen as threatening Western interests. President Reagan’s anti-Soviet rhetoric indeed reflected his innate desire to depart from containment and embark on a much sterner course in world politics. Underlying these policy strands, marked by its multi-faceted scope of intentions and shifts was the then East-West rivalry, which peaked at that point in time. The Reagan doctrine was premised on the assumption that direct military, political and economic pressure on perceived Communist governments, would strain the Soviet Union’s military and economic systems to a point where they could not compete. The objective was to checkmate Soviet expansionism. In the America’s, mindful of its support for nationalist movements in Africa and Central America, President Castro’s Cuba was identified as such. The strategy enacted was the further tightening of the economic embargo initially imposed during the Kennedy era. (32)

The reversal of Washington’s foreign policy towards the Third World, this study argues, strongly influenced its policy premises with regard to Southern Africa. Dr. Chester Crocker, the then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and a former professor at Georgetown University was enlisted to set these policy objectives in motion. Geopolitical considerations thus resurfaced over human rights and peaceful co-existence. These, including the introduction of corporate capital as a major element in the strategy of Western imperialism, could be held directly responsible for the delay in settling the Namibian question for more than

two decades. Corporate capital could easily get under the defences of admittedly weak and newly independent states. (33) According to Allen, since the late 1970s the US had secured its economic interests more through international financial institutions and international trade regimes, such as the WTO. (34)

As we came to witness these dramatic changes in Washington's foreign policy, so was the likelihood of a more accommodative approach toward apartheid South Africa. This in fact is testimony of a major televised interview in March 1981, in which President Ronald Reagan described the South African regime:

“As a friendly country, a country that strategically is essential to the free world in its production of minerals that we must all have” (35)

In this connection, it should be noted that the US economic interests in the sub-region were heavily concentrated. The US economic interest at that point in time totalled a massive US$ 6 billion. More so, this region contains immense deposits of strategic minerals that were of vital importance to the US industrial economy. The region furthermore has a major share of the world’s diamonds, uranium and gold output. In addition, the US had an important objective in protecting its strategic and military interests in the region. More important, the Cape sea route was of strategic importance as most of the crude oil destined for the West was shipped via this route. The most important aspect vis-à-vis the US foreign policy toward

the sub-region, were purely economic and strategic. These were the considerations that took prominence over the US human rights credentials. (36)

Important to note in relation to the above observation is Dr. Crocker’s Memorandum to the then Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, in May 1981, in which he stated that:

“the political relationship between the US and South Africa has now arrived at the crossroads of perhaps historical significance. After twenty years of generally US coolness towards South Africa and the concomitant intransigence, the possibility may exist for a more positive and reciprocal relationship between the two countries based on shared strategic concerns in Southern Africa, our recognition of P. W. Botha represents an unique opportunity for domestic change and the willingness of the Reagan administration to deal realistically with South Africa. The problem of Namibia, however, which complicates our relationship with our European allies and Black Africa, is a primary obstacle to the development of new relationships with South Africa. It also represents an opportunity to counter the Soviet threat in Africa. We thus need Pretoria’s co-operation in working towards an internationally acceptable solution to Namibia which would, however, safeguard the US and South Africa’s essential interests and concerns”. (37)

On the margins of this Memorandum, Bush cites the development of the global interstate system, initially conceived between 1945 and 1967. The US is placed at the centre as the undisputed advocate of that system, which led to the emergence of a number of states that took up intermediary positions between the core represented by the US and its European allies and the periphery represented by poorer nations in Africa and the Third World at

37. Ibid., 19
large. Bush further observed that these intermediate states possessed characteristics of the core states in terms of their relationship with the periphery, but at the same time also share characteristics of the periphery in terms of their relationship with the core. Therefore, the relationship that was coined by Crocker and existed between the US and South Africa must be seen in this context. Suffice to say, South Africa was not only a source of cheap and economically important minerals for the US industrial economy, but it also provided a means for corporate capital to use it as staging point for its penetration of the sub-region. (38)

This Memorandum, the study further wishes to submit, presents a dramatic shift in the policy objectives of this particular administration from that of its predecessors. It should be noted, that President Reagan, perhaps more than any other president of the US, harboured the thought, that his predecessors had been too idle in the battle against Soviet expansionism. Therefore, those ingrained policies of containment had to be superseded, and supplanted by a more decisive and aggressive approach. What was now at issue was the determined safeguarding of the US economic and security interests, especially in Angola and Namibia and, to a greater extent South Africa. This is a clear manifestation that the tremendous loss of life and destruction of property in these countries did little to appeal to the moral conscience of US policy makers. Even so, it did little to appeal for a quicker resolution of

the conflicts in the region. Nevertheless, the Reagan administration seemed determined to push forward diplomatic efforts, aimed at settling the Namibian question. But, we should not be oblivious of the fact that this did not come about without major compromises and concessions. (39)

Hence, this thesis’ submission again, that it was indeed Dr. Crocker’s diplomatic initiatives that heralded the urgency of a settlement of the Namibian issue. This had to be done, taking into account the US core concerns that the Sovietization of the Third World had to be reversed. It was precisely at this moment, that the Reagan administration conceived the policy of “constructive engagement”, linking independence in Namibia to the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. This policy of linkage, Dr. Crocker believed would entice apartheid South Africa to concede to the implementation of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978. Dr. Chester Crocker never believed that South Africa could be pressurized into an agreement solely on implementing the peace formula for Namibia. Moreover, he was convinced that it could be enticed on this issue, mindful of its own particular concerns, thus the linkage strategy could serve both these ends. (40)

On the contrary, according to O’Neil and Munslow the linkage policy indeed aided Pretoria with more time and space to step up its aggression against neighbouring states. This in turn resulted in South Africa curtailing


black political rights, thereby tightening the noose on indigenous populations by expanding its Bantustan policies.  

Azicri observes that instead of the linkage policy the US should have abandoned it in its entirety. It should rather have taken a firmer stand with South Africa, including the threat of withdrawing all military, political and economic assistance. Furthermore, the US could also have disengaged itself from bilateral ties with South Africa. Suffice to say, which could have culminated in the suspension of training its coast guards, as well as the suspension of its Honorary Consuls in New York and Washington. In addition, it could also have re-imposed export controls on items destined for apartheid South Africa’s military and police machinery.

For Washington, the linkage strategy indeed served its desired objectives, especially on the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. Moreover, it should be remembered that Cuba had always been at loggerheads with the US, because of its support for revolutionary movements in Central America and Southern Africa, especially the Great Lakes region. Thus the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angolan territory would translate in a reversal of Cuba’s political and diplomatic successes of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

O’Neil and Munslow, further observed that the policy of constructive engagement was particularly developed for Southern Africa with the objective to encourage managed change in South Africa through dialogue.

rather than economic pressure. It must be remembered that the US at this time in point was under tremendous pressure to impose comprehensive economic sanctions on South Africa. It however, constantly shielded South Africa from becoming the target of such sanctions and other punitive measures. The bottom-line however, of this policy of “constructive engagement” was to keep South Africa as a regional ally to combat Soviet and Cuban influence in the region. (44)

Soviet-Cuban involvement in Southern Africa became a major obstacle to the US foreign and security policy makers. The Soviet-Cuban intervention in the region blocked the execution of the US policy objectives, aimed at winning over those sympathetic to its interests. Once President Reagan assumed office, new strategies were adopted to solve conflicting interests by peaceful means, but not without strings appended thereto. This strategy is identified as the US low intensive conflict resolution strategy. The enunciation of such a strategy would then require the selling of the US economic power, as it became evidently clear that the war was too costly and damaging to its interests. (45)

This strategy was set rolling in early 1981 subsequent to an article that appeared in the US Foreign Policy magazine by the summer of 1979. In this magazine, it is stated that:

“the multinational corporations can be the secret weapons of Western countries in Africa”. (46)

45. Gonzalez, C 1987. La politica Norte-America para Africa meridional. La Habana: Ciencias Sociales. 46
46. Ibid., 46
Here the perspective is based on the assumption, that greater activity on the part of the US was needed that could fit into the concept of the then Cold War. US economic power could be used, not only to checkmate Communist expansionism, but also to sell the successes of capitalism. Thus, the reintroduction of corporate capitalism became a major element in the strategy of imperialism and neo-colonialism. Undeniably, this conservative strategy was operationalized knowing that there was no Soviet equivalent to match it. Soviet military aid could only be accompanied by small amounts of financial aid, which were loans rather than grants. It could not match with parastatal investments on the scale of Western MNCs. (47)

Turok argues that powerful multinationals by-passed governments. They virtually ignored the existence of political independence and continued to operate in the same fashion as during colonialism. They processed raw materials and semi-manufactured goods by means of a transfer-pricing system from one to another. In this manner, they exploited the different taxation systems, levels of wage labour and the different levels of production. In the final analysis, this mitigated against the interests and militated against the emergence of a coherent indigenously rooted and integrated economic development. This study wishes to submit that the US indeed attempted in turning the sub-region into a geo-strategic real estate. In any event it is corporate capital that shapes the strategic considerations of states. Value was now defined in terms of US access to cheap labour, raw

47. Gonzalez, C 1987. La politica Norte-America para Africa meridional. La Habana: Ciencias Sociales. 46
materials, military bases and the like. Trans-nationalization, or more precisely, globalization of the world economy became a major contemporary phenomenon. (48) Bush and Szeftel rightly agrees that this was hardly surprising, given the traditional Western preoccupation with ensuring its own access to and control over raw materials, particularly for the US as its dependence on imported minerals increased. (49)

Turok further contends that in as far as the US was concerned, the effective and successful execution of such a strategy should have as its principle:

- a criteria to grant assistance to African countries that should be based on past and present attitudes of any African government with regard to issues that directly concern the United States, particularly these governments’ position in respect of foreign investment and nationalization,
- the evaluation of these governments’ real and potential contributions towards regional and international peace and stability,
- the possibility of that government to be in power, taking into consideration the problems it has to face,
- the qualities of such a State, rather than government, particularly with regard to its size, resources and location in relation to important areas of conflict and transportation routes, and finally,
- multinationals when perceived as qualifying to be a powerful instrument of the United States’ interests in the sub-region, be backed together with its already established allies in Africa, and for that matter, if need be alone. (50)

According to some development theorists, these policy premises of the US, only sought to prevent the Cuban troops based in Angola from crossing the

Cunene and the Orange Rivers. It at the same time prevented the South African troops from remaining in the Zambezi and the Cunene areas. Thus, the active participation of trans-national corporations, backed by the highest levels of government was urgently needed. On the other hand, material resources needed to carry out these strategic objectives, would be obtained by strengthening US interests in the sub-region. If need be, assistance programs for development should be duplicated. It must be noted, that at that moment, the then-Rhodesia was about to become Zimbabwe, following the Lancaster House negotiations. The outcome of the Lancaster House talks, ironically, effectively blocked US initial policies, at least in so far as Zimbabwe was concerned. What remained then was the issue of Namibia, which indeed demanded an immediate solution to the region’s conflicts. (51)

There had been a longstanding common consensus between the US and Western Europe, to co-operate in defending their common interests in relation to perceived Communist threats. The tendency that prevailed then was to take drastic steps, if necessary, to curtail Communism. This once again, brought to surface the re-enunciation of the “constructive engagement” theory, as advocated by the Anglo-American alliance of the Reagan-Thatcher team. The “constructive engagement” doctrine had two primary objectives, as per the 1981 statement of Dr. Chester Crocker, then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, in which he remarked:

“we have lost an important influence over South Africa due to our lack of perception towards the dynamic changes in South Africa.

Sometimes, it was a mistake to believe that the watches of South Africa and the United States are synchronized at the same hour. It is evident that to stimulate South Africa to decide its own future would benefit the interests of the United States”. (52)

Dr. Crocker here referred to the reform programs of President P.W. Botha, which were aimed at co-opting the internal nationalist wings in South Africa. He failed to realize that US policies in the region and, in particular South Africa lacked the potential of influencing the pace of the desired political changes. As a matter of fact, the US had long been considered as being too sympathetic towards apartheid South Africa. (53)

Besides, the Botha administration suffered a number of set-backs, particularly the failure of both the “total strategy” and its successor; “winning hearts and minds” (WHAM). These approaches involved offering token gestures of appeasement at home, such as injecting money into “betterment” schemes in black townships, while simultaneously cracking down on internal opposition. These further included mounting aggression against neighbouring states with the objective of flushing out external opposition to apartheid. (54)

In the final analysis, the course of events in South Africa, were set to determine the basic principles of the US foreign policy determinations.

53. Ibid., 55
Important to note in relation to this observation, was that the conservatives in the US and South Africa appeared to have coincidentally agreed in their intensions. They intended to prevent vis-à-vis the South African reform process the creation of subjective conditions and the constellation of objective conditions that could lead to a revolutionary process. It was such a situation that would in effect end white domination and the subsequent withdrawal from the international capitalist system. The latter would subvert the processes underway in Mozambique and Angola. (55)

Dr. Crocker realizing the apparent rejection of Pretoria’s disingenuous manoeuvres, set himself the task to re-assess US policies. He aimed at pressurizing South Africa to accelerate the reform process. This would encapsulate not to only recognize the interests of the dominant groups in South Africa, but also not to harm them. White domination however, had to be preserved at all costs. The Namibia question would be dealt with in finding an arrangement that would at best exclude the possibility of a SWAPO administration in Windhoek. In this regard, the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978, therefore would only serve as a means leading to independence, and not as the basis for a full agreement. Angola then would be another factor – the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from that territory. In relation to this, it is this thesis’s submission that had the US at that moment succeeded in getting the Cubans out of Angola as a precondition, the prospects of independence for Namibia would in all likelihood have been more remote. (56)

Gonzalez argues that the issue of pre-conditioning Namibia’s independence to the Cuban troop withdrawal had been shameful. The linkage theory completely disregarded international law and the need for peace in Namibia. As a matter of fact, Angola was already a sovereign state. Suffice to say, the linkage doctrine was purely designed, and geared towards the reduction, if not the elimination of the Soviet-Cuban presence in Southern Africa, especially in Angola with its huge oil reserves. (57)

By late 1983, Alexander Haig, formulated a new political strategy, also known as the “Haig Doctrine” that would follow two paths and be complimentary at the same time; to establish a dialogue with regard to the Namibia issue and second, to also establish dialogue with Angola on the same issue for a concession on the Cuban troop withdrawal. The Angolans agreed to the proposals, but only after guarantees for independence in Namibia was secured. This, the argument is advanced, now shifted the emphasis from withdrawal, but to how it should be executed. This manoeuvre by Alexander Haig alerted the members of the Western Contact Group. The Western Contact Group, at that moment was convinced that the Angolans would not allow the Cuban troop withdrawal prior to Namibia’s independence. They were fearful that the US insistence on this issue would endanger the entire process towards finding peace in the region. Apart from this, there were also some suspicions and mistrust that the US was attempting to make inroads in the region, thereby portraying itself as the messiah of peace to the region. There was exceptional scepticism regarding

the US motives, which at the same time was aimed at entrenching its own imperialist interests and agendas.  (58)

Moreover, the US also came forward with a strategy that portrayed apartheid South Africa as part and parcel of the regional problem. It is argued that this was much more aimed at preventing neighbouring countries from breaking their economic dependence from South Africa. As apartheid strategists then had it, South Africa had to take the leading role in the regional institution; the Constellation of Southern African States (CSAS), conceived by the regime led by P. W. Botha and endorsed by the US. This was to be a development project aimed at further entrenching international capitalist interests. Now, had such a doctrine succeeded, it would in all likelihood have placed the Botha regime in such a strategic position, where it could compromise the states in the region at will. Pressure would then be brought to bear on these states to sever their ties with the Eastern bloc countries. This in turn would have signalled a decisive defeat to Communist influence and advances in this strategic part of the African continent. The Reagan era indeed appeared to have had a tremendous impact in dictating the course of political events in the world. This is so, especially when considering the emerging disintegration of the Eastern Bloc. This process was further propelled with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev as Prime Minister of the Soviet Union in 1985. But could this be equally said of the US domestic policies from which it derived its foreign and security policies? (59)

The US domestic economic crisis, which started long before President Ronald Reagan assumed office, was gaining momentum. It was further worsened, because of President Reagan’s declared policies of war on drugs and taxes for the rich, which resulted in massive tax breaks for the rich and wealthy. Moreover, the Reagan administration also initiated an enormous strategic military weapons programme, especially with a focus on Communist advances in Afghanistan. The same programme was also aimed at deterring Communist advances in Central America and the Caribbean, particularly Cuba, the strategic and ardent ally of the Soviet Union in that region. All these were to have a tremendous impact on the Federal government’s budget. The increased deficit gap, resultant of President Reagan’s unchecked spending, this thesis submits, cost President George H. Bush a second term bid. According to MacKay and Hill, the 1981-82 economic recession of the US, was the worse ever since the Great Depression of the 1930s, which put up to 10% of Americans out of jobs. Although this recession subsided towards the end of 1982, a clear message was signalled to President Reagan’s successor - conservative spending if that trend of recovery was to be kept intact. After all it is the electorate that decides a president’s future in the White House. (60)

The Reagan administration, convinced that the balance of military power had swung in favour of the Soviets, increased military spending, especially on nuclear arms projects. It was the period of the great arms race, which saw the launching of the US Star Wars project, costing its tax-payers billions of dollars over the next decade. President Reagan launched this project convinced that the Soviet military and political threats were becoming a reality. He further believed that it was neither plausible nor possible to linger on as the US security interests were at stake. President Reagan simultaneously expanded the US navy as a key to a resurgence of its power in the post-Vietnam era. (61)

As March 1985 was drawing closer, we came to witness the assumption of office by Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union. This unexpected advent of Gorbachev now became the global focus of the US foreign policy. Mikhail Gorbachev, described by an ex-Soviet foreign Minister as “a man with a nice smile, but who’s got iron teeth”, ironically was more concerned with the Soviet Union’s domestic state of affairs. Gorbachev’s first priority therefore, was the Soviet Union’s economic reconstruction. On the margins of this, it must be remembered, that Gorbachev had a good command of international affairs. With his new reform policies, focused on the reconstruction of the Soviet Union’s economy still in its infancy stages, Gorbachev, after only a few months in office launched a diplomatic protest against President Reagan’s intensions to build a massive space shield. Moreover, well-versed with the Euro-

American differences on defence matters, especially their inability to act as a unit to the conflicts in the Middle-East, Prime Minister Gorbachev set himself the task of exploiting those weaknesses. (62)

According to O’Neil and Munslow, Gorbachev’s ascendancy to power marked a notable retreat from confrontation between the East and the West, which the US was unable, or rather slow to grasp. Conflict between administration and Congress exemplifies the disarray of US policy towards Southern Africa. Gorbachev, as early as March 1986, indicated that the Soviet Union was trying to help find solutions to the conflict in Angola as part of a wider policy decision by the ruling Communist Party, to seek negotiated solutions to all regional conflicts. Yet the US was bent on reasserting its power on the global periphery, thereby increasing the cost of confrontation as noted in the foregoing paragraph. (63)

Meanwhile, as the problems at home surged ahead unabated, the Soviets came to find themselves in a rather difficult position in respect of international affairs. Thus an opening-up in the then Soviet Union became an imminent factor for the ruling elite. Gorbachev in shaky command of the then Soviet Union and the man to be reckoned with, especially in steering the direction of international politics provided the opportunity for the realization of this new political philosophy. Washington at that moment


did know what the next tactical move of the Soviets would be, rather chose to follow the course of events with keen interest. The identification of a presidential hopeful that could match the diplomatic skills of Gorbachev now became the most singular issue as President Reagan’s term of office was drawing to an end. Thus, foreign policy matters came to dominate the 1989 presidential campaign in the US. The US electorate, having witnessed the first cracks in the emerging disintegration of the then Soviet Union, rallied firmly behind the Republican nominated candidate for the presidency, George H. Bush. (64)

By 20 January 1989, George H. Bush, who also came to be known as “Mr. Read my Lips”, became the 41st President of the USA. According to Franklin, the Bush era was a mere continuation of the Reagan revolution, characterized by deficit spending and government lending. President Bush almost revived the 1981-82 recessions. As far as Africa was concerned, the Bush administration claimed to be championing the continent’s needs with its conservative agenda. Ironically, its foreign policy was mostly preoccupied with the Middle East and the war on terror. We also came to witness the introduction of a foreign policy doctrine formulated during the Reagan era – the “new world order”. (65)

According to Mokoena, like the Reagan administration, the Bush administration embraced “constructive engagement” as the core of US

65. Ibid., 55
foreign policy toward Southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular. Nevertheless, it also sought to avoid controversy that had been a trademark of the Reagan revolution, by trying to accommodate the region’s realities. Like Reagan, President Bush, while publicly expressing the US abhorrence of Pretoria’s apartheid policies, continuously shielded Pretoria, thereby giving it the benefit of the doubt. The administration generally showed no urgency in pushing Pretoria to embrace democracy, thus fuelling African suspicion regarding the US genuine purposes and objectives. This has been the marked failure of the Reagan doctrine of “constructive engagement”. As the Cold War recedes into history, the ways and extent to which the lens of anti-Sovietization distorted the US formulation of its post-war policies became increasing exposed. Rather than examining African affairs in terms of regional concerns with poverty, human rights and self-determination, the US frequently adopted a narrow ideological view of the issues at stake – anti-Communism. (66)

On the margins of this, the “new world order”, the argument is advanced, was particularly aimed at stalling the spread of Communism in Latin America and Africa. On the heels of this policy formulation, came the invasion of Panama on 20 December 1989. This was the biggest US military intervention then, since the disgraced Vietnam War, in which approximately 25 000 US service personnel lost their lives, or were either

General Noriega was captured towards the end of December 1989, and flown to the US, escorted by marines and officers of the DEA to stand trial on narcotics related-charges. At this point in time, it appeared that Washington had a well orchestrated agenda in dealing with closely perceived Communist threats. Thus, next on the Bush administration’s agenda, in respect of its anti-Sovietization policy objective was the ouster of the leftist Sandanista movement of General Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. (68)

As these military and political developments were taking place across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, we at the same time came to witness the final stages of Soviet disintegration. President Bush, subsequent to an aborted coup in the former Soviet Union, and the consequent resignation of Prime Minister Gorbachev, announced the fall of Communism. This, President Bush declared, “was the triumph of capitalism over Communism as an alternative”. To the contrary, it is the opinion of this thesis, that this indeed, was not the demise of Communism. It was rather a pragmatic move to realize and adapt to the new realities of the world as perceived through a

68. Ibid., 55-58
prism of specific conditions typical of all corners of the world. A further argument is that Gorbachev’s *perestroika* and *glasnost* and its impact indeed introduced a dramatic change in the situation. (69)

This hypothesis is corroborated by O’Neil and Munslow, who observed that form the late 1980s, there has been strong evidence that the new school of thought as conceived by Gorbachev, recognized the need for Third World countries to pass through a capitalist development phase before arriving at socialism. (70) Saul also appear to agree with such an assumption, referring to a pronouncement by the former Soviet deputy foreign minister, Anatoly Adamashin during the 1989 signing of the Angola peace accord. Adamashin remarked: “I personally don’t think that they are going to build socialism in this part of the world”. He further observed that the Soviets have never been entirely enthusiastic about socialist endeavours in Southern Africa, consigning them as being mere states of socialist orientation. (71)

Given these observations, the question is what was the essence of these conditional changes in relation to the new school of thinking? The discerning answer is, given the evolving relative strengths and inclinations of the world’s different systems it would be the triumph of liberalism and, not capitalism over communism, with the latter collapsing into three hypostases, these being: *an idea, a reality and a social movement*. Hence, the birth and the triumph of people-centred social democracies. (72)

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Strictly speaking, and given the above scenario, the argument is that it is important to understand as to what was happening at that moment, by viewing the political evolutions then in retrospect. A further argument is that renewal of the then-Soviet Union, given its past development strategies, signified the collapse of an authoritarian bureaucratic form of socialism. Therefore, State-imposed socialism matched against developments as exposed by Prime Minister Gorbachev’s *perestroika* and *glasnost*, was becoming something of the past. At first glance, it might look like the demise of socialism itself, but at close scrutiny, it was just the opposite. And this is evidenced in the resurgent socialist and social democratic governments the world over, including the EU, South Africa and Namibia. Thus, the conclusion, that socialism has just not yet run its course. It has just emerged from an early development stage, which in the end would enable us to judge its development potentialities as it reaches its stages of maturity. (73)

The most appropriate conclusion, in relation to the events that were unfolding then and, given the crisis of capitalism in the new millennium, would be a just assumption that a social movement has just emerged. It has just begun to assert itself in its up-to-date forms for viable development, continuity and social transformation. The ultimate objective of such a phenomenon would be the lessening of the development of dependency and further marginalization. In the final analysis, socialist values are in no way distinct from those of liberal systems. Besides, both systems are organically

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connected by the notion of men’s freedom inherited from the epoch of enlightenment, and early bourgeois revolutions. These common traits included in both systems, in fact makes reference to the degree to which mankind has subjected the forces of nature. It makes reference to mankind’s abilities to disclose society’s creative capabilities, social dynamism and individual democracy, measured in terms of scope and depth. It accentuates the involvement of society in the political process, instead of being swamped as mere objects and consumers, as is the case in profit-driven capitalist systems. (74)

As 1991 drew to a close, the administration of President George H. Bush came to find itself engulfed in a domestic economic crisis. This crisis in many ways was similar to that of the former Soviet Union when Prime Minister Gorbachev took office. The 1991-economic crisis in the US had a clear bearing on the increased rate of unemployment, the soaring value of the dollar against other major currencies, and an ever-widening trade deficit with Japan. In addition, the US budget deficit stood at an astronomical US$ 300 billion. (75)

Meanwhile, the 1992 presidential elections were just around the corner and as a matter of fact the focus of the US administration was now more on domestic policy. According to the Washington Bureau’s economic poll, most of the US citizenry, including the large trans-national corporations appeared to be ready for political sacrifices. This in essence meant that

75. International Herald Tribune 1992. 16 October: 1 and 3
issues pertaining to foreign and security policy were now temporarily pushed to the margins. It was only in Florida, Miami, traditionally a Republican stronghold amongst the Cuban-Americans that President Bush attempted to talk foreign policy. President Bush in a desperate move aimed at retaining the Cuban-American support in this State, thereby boosting his re-election bid, signed into law the Cuban Democracy Act. This Act, also dubbed the “Torricelli Bill”, further tightened the more than three decades old economic embargo against Cuba. Nevertheless, exactly the opposite seemed to have weighed more than mere ideological in fighting with the Island’s Marxist Communist government of President Fidel Castro Ruz. (76)

These sentiments were well reflected in opinion polls of most Cuban-Americans, who accused the Reagan-Bush administrations of empty promises and sheer demagoguery over Cuba. They cite real issues facing the US, such as the staggering unemployment figures. The US employment rate at that moment stood at 17 million. In addition, the economy was deteriorating at an unprecedented pace with the country’s national debt standing at approximately US$ 4 trillion. It is estimated that between 30-40 million Americans had no proper medical insurance, because of an abusive health-care system. It must be remembered, that President Bush initially did not favour the CDA of 1992, drafted by the Florida-based Democrat Senator. When signing the Bill into law, President Bush stated that this was “for freedom to rise in Cuba, Fidel Castro must fall”. On the margins of this,

76. *The Miami Herald* 1992, 10 October: 10
what was at issue were the politics of change. Presidential contender, William Bill Clinton, during the election campaign touched little, if any on foreign policy, as well. His only foreign policy statement was a short remark on the CDA, stating, “I believe in it, and I will enforce it”. After all, it was a Democrat sponsored and initiated bill. (77)

President Clinton, as is customary in the US, only started to speak foreign policy after the 1992 presidential elections, reassuring US allies of the continuity of its foreign policies. He at the same time, cautioned US adversaries, especially those in the Middle East. President-elect Clinton, in addition appealed for continued co-operation with the US, in respect of foreign policy matters, noting that, “although the leadership of the White House would change with his assumption of power, America’s fundamental interests have not changed”. (78)

Amid the Democrat’s election victory, which brought to an end twelve years of Republican rule, the future of the US foreign policy in relation to Third World countries largely depended on its domestic policy resolve. (79) As a matter of fact, President Clinton in his first foreign policy speech at Georgetown University endorsed George H. Bush’s stewardship of US interests abroad. In addition, he also commented the Bush administration’s decision to wage the Gulf War, including his belief that the US should remain engaged in the World. In the final analysis, the US security, strategic, and economic interests have to be safeguarded at all costs.

78. International Herald Tribune 1992. 6 November: 1 and 4
79. International Herald Tribune 1992. 6 November: 1 and 4
Undoubtedly, the US foreign policy had always been marked by its multi-faceted scope of objectives, shifts and images throughout the last two centuries. The premise has always been the reversal of the balance of power, in favour of the US, to a point where the international community was no longer divided in two, albeit with different approaches. (80)

The problem however, was that successive US administrations’ foreign and security policy institutions were not that well structured. These inhibited the triggering down of command from top to bottom, thereby making intelligence sharing all the more cumbersome. (81)

What one can read in this is that successive US administrations, if not all, never considered that external stakeholders needed to buy-in their policies for a common development agenda. On face value it seems that there had been a conspicuous lack of draft guidelines and a lack of scenario setting. These could have assisted tremendously with the running of “what if” scenarios, to determine the scope of analysis for security and foreign policy reviews, for implementation. The US policies, on the contrary, for the last four decades, or so attracted more resistance rather than support. (82)

Mindful of the above, the discerning conclusion, is that the US policy towards Southern Africa had been shaped by an alarming perception of an

increasingly aggressive Soviet Union. Liberation movements in the region sought and received assistance from the Soviet Union in the absence of such support from the West. Hence, they came to be perceived as advancing Communist agendas. Historically, nationalist movements could not be particular about the means through which they carry on the struggle for liberation; they had to take advantage of any opportunity that presents itself. They had to accept assistance from wherever they can get it.

The mere association of nationalist movements with the East did not preclude transplanting Communist models of governance. France and the US were the main birthplaces of modern democracy nevertheless they followed different paths towards setting up democratic systems. As such the US over-zealous policies of countering the Sovietization of the sub-region, thereby holding hostage vast populations to its global hegemonic aspirations in the name of international capital and its scramble for resources, had been completely unjustified and indifferent to aspirations of freedom and justice.

Skinner consolidates this view by stating that over the last three decades, strategies formulated to deal with turbulence in the Third World have followed no fixed pattern. Trial and error have produced a wide array of inconsistent policies and errors, revealing flawed strategies. Therefore, the


conclusion that the US foreign policy toward Southern Africa had been very confusing and contradictory and, at worst controversial, bias and hostile in as far as it related to African interest and aspirations for freedom, equality, justice and self-determination. (86) If democracy, freedom and support for human rights are the main policy goals of the US, its unholy alliance and partnership with a pariah apartheid state becomes even more questionable. (87)

2.4 Conclusion
For decades, many groups had looked at Washington to play a meaningful role in pressuring Pretoria to change its ways. Ironically, successive US administrations failed to fulfil those expectations. (88) Strategies formulated to deal with turbulence in the Third World followed no fixed pattern. Successive US foreign policy architects rather than examining Africa’s affairs in terms of regional concerns, frequently adopted a narrow ideological view of the issues at stake. Urnov observes that whatever policy the West put forward for Southern Africa, the interest of Pretoria was given maximum consideration. Liberation movements in the region in their quest for national independence and self determination sought and receive assistance from the former Soviet Union in the absence of such support from the West. As such, they were perceived as advancing Communist agendas. (89)

87. The Namibian. 2006. 7 May: 7
In the final analyses, no amount of imperialist planning and intervention could stem the tide of the struggle for self-determination and national independence. (90)

3 THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION

3.1 Introduction

Namibia, formerly known as South West Africa was taken from Germany during World War I and was officially declared a mandate under the League of Nations. South Africa, after having been mandated to administer Namibia on behalf of the League of Nations virtually treated it as a fifth province by extending its own discriminatory legislation. By 1966 the UNGA, including the US voted in the affirmative to revoke South Africa’s mandate through resolution 2145 of 1966, on the grounds of maladministration.\(^{(90)}\) This decision was further reinforced by the ICJ, which on 21 June 1971, declared South Africa’s continued occupation of Namibia as illegal and ordered it to withdraw its administration immediately. South Africa however, refused to yield to the demands of the world body and the international community and, began a long range programme of obstructing the settlement of the Namibian question. This chapter will examine in detail 1) the struggle for independence in Namibia, 2) the adoption of UNSC resolution 435 of 1978 as a blueprint for the settlement of the Namibian question and 3) the obstructionist posture of the Washington-Pretoria alliance aimed at checkmating Soviet expansionism in the region, thereby holding the Namibian question hostage to the US-Soviet rivalry. Namibia attained independence on 21 March 1990, more than a decade since the initial agreement on its independence was reached.\(^{(91)}\)

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3.2 The struggle for independence in Namibia

Namibia’s struggle for national liberation and independence has been a long and protracted one. We came to witness that by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the struggle for national liberation and self-determination has changed both in character and scope. This was so because of the US intervention in the region. SWAPO, one of the major liberation movements, adopted a threefold strategy aimed at abolishing South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia. The first premise being the adoption of a strategy based on direct or indirect military confrontation, secondly mass internal mobilization and thirdly diplomatic contacts with the international community to steer and rekindle its cause. (92)

It is in fact important to note that SWAPO in its efforts to end Namibia’s illegal occupation lent much allegiance to the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc nations. It in turn received tremendous support from these nations and was labelled as Communist. Paradoxically, Nyerere observes that nationalist movements then could not be particular in accepting assistance from whatever corner for their cause; they had to take advantage of any opportunity that presented itself. (93) Mokoena consolidates this position by stating that liberation movements in the region, in their quest for national liberation, sought and received generous assistance form the Soviet Union in the absence of such support from the West. (94)

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As it turned out, this in the long run dearly cost nationalist movements in terms of diplomatic and political bargaining. It is submitted that given the US Cold War anti-Soviet policies, SWAPO’s particular association with the East further antagonized the US. This is recognized as one of the major factors responsible for the delay in the early implementation of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978. (95)

As already pointed out in the foregoing sections, Washington had never been in favour of a SWAPO-led administration once the question of Namibia was resolved. Thus, the US foreign policy objective in respect of Namibia was structured in such a way that could elicit an arrangement that would at best exclude all possibilities of a SWAPO administration in an independent Namibia. In the light of this, the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978, would only serve as an instrument leading to a transition for independence in Namibia, and not as a basis for a full agreement. (96)

As all avenues for a peaceful resolution of the Namibian question appeared to be remote, particularly in the light of the 1966 ruling of the ICJ, SWAPO on 18 July 1966 announced its intensions to take up arms for the liberation of Namibia. According to the then Secretary-General of SWAPO, Herman Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, “the ICJ ruling came as a bitter disappointment that left the leaders of SWAPO with a feeling of betrayal”. It was SWAPO’s consideration that apartheid South Africa, given its past record cannot be

trusted. In addition, SWAPO declared, “that the effect of the ICJ ruling was that it had relieved it from any illusion that it had about the UN”. SWAPO thus, had no other alternative, but to take up arms as a means of securing Namibia’s early independence. By August 26, 1966, the first military clash between PLAN, the military wing of SWAPO and the SADF took place at Ongulumbashe, a remote village in northwestern Namibia. (97)

On the margins of this, diplomatic efforts relating to the Namibian question were gaining momentum, which in the end resulted in the establishment of an ad-hoc committee of the UNSC. This ad-hoc committee was tasked with the responsibility of further exploring ways and means for the implementation of all UNSC resolutions. Because of this committee’s findings, the Namibian issue was referred back to the ICJ, whereby it was asked regarding the legal consequences of South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia. By June 1971, the ICJ ruled that apartheid South Africa’s continued occupation of Namibia, was illegal and contrary to the spirit and letter of international law. This indeed, signalled a major diplomatic victory for SWAPO. The ICJ further ruled that UN member states were under the obligation to recognize the illegality of the South Africa’s presence in Namibia. (98)

By September 1972, at a meeting of the UNSC, South Africa responded by rejecting the ICJ ruling, at which the then AG to Namibia, Van der Walt

remarked that, “we will continue to govern South West Africa as in the past”. As 1976 drew closer, further developments that appeared more favourable to SWAPO took place: the adoption of the UNSC resolution 385 of 1976, which unanimously condemned South Africa for:

- its continued illegal occupation of Namibia;
- its illegal and arbitrary application of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;
- its military build-up and utilization of the territory as a base for acts of destabilization against neighbouring states;
- its failure to comply with the UNSC resolution of 1974, and
- all its attempts to evade the clear mandate of the UN for the holding of free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the UN. (99)

It is in fact important to note that at this stage subsequent to the post-Vietnam era as well as, the Watergate scandal, the US involvement in the region had been scaled-down. At the same time, apartheid South Africa’s international standing had been severely damaged following its invasion of Angola and, in particular the 16 June 1976 ruthless suppression of the Soweto student protests. With a fair amount of political changes taking place internationally, the Namibia question remained a pariah of international dispute, insofar as South Africa’s illegal presence in that country was concerned. (100)

It was no coincidence that the NAM also joined the fray in supporting the cause of the Namibian people, given the then three camps of the Cold-War

100. Ibid., 16
era. SWAPO, at first holding observer status from 1973, became a full member of the NAM by 1978. The NAM had always been viewing the question of Namibia as a political one, and in particular an issue of decolonization and independence, a process that started back in the 1960s in Africa. It was indeed the political view of the NAM that Namibia’s independence and its right to self-determination itself was very critical to the maintenance of world peace, stability and security as spelt out in the UN charter. Therefore, Namibia represented a decades old issue of independence and sovereignty. In addition, it uncovered how trans-nationals benefited from South Africa’s continued illegal occupation of that country. It further uncovered how the governments of these conglomerates, in particular France, West-Germany and Canada attempted to delay the peaceful resolution of the Namibian question. These were deliberate delaying tactics aimed at further guaranteeing the continued exploitation of Namibia’s natural resources. (101)

In the light of this, numerous reasons were documented regarding the most pertinent factors that contributed to the delay in implementing the UN instruments for Namibia’s early independence. As pointed out above, the motives were purely economic and strategic. Geographic studies have proved that the Namibian territory contains vast and immense deposits of strategic minerals that were of vital importance to the US, in particular and other Western countries’ industrial economies, especially uranium.

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Therefore, markets for extraction and consumption needed to be accessible to US trade, and it indeed took an active role in opening up Asia and Africa. The US domestic prosperity is closely tied to foreign policy and this connection was neither lost on the voters nor on to those who hoped to win the support of the US voters. (102)

It should be remembered that, there indeed had been clear and serious conflict of interests amongst the Western powers, particularly amongst the “Western Contact Group”. This group, at the same time sought to negotiate Namibia’s independence with apartheid South Africa. Suffice to say, this cosy relations of negotiations in the end turned out to be a bilateral affair between the former and the latter. The results of such shameful dealings meant that the affected people were further pushed to margins and were only consulted when it was deemed necessary. These very countries at the same time participated in the control and exploitation of, and accumulation of profits from the illegal trade of Namibia’s uranium and many other mineral resources. (103)

This in fact was in clear violation of Decree No. 1 of 27 September 1974, as adopted by the UNCN established in 1967, following the UN’s resolution

103. Ibid., 5
2145 (XXI) of 1966, that revoked South Africa’s mandate over Namibia. This Decree inter alia stated that:

- no person or entity, whether a body corporate or unincorporated may search for, prospect for, explore for, take, extract, mine, process, refine, use, sell, export or distribute any natural resource, whether animal or mineral, situated, or found to be situated within the territorial limits of Namibia without the permission of the UNCN;

- any permission, concession or license granted by any person or entity, including anybody purporting to act under the authority of the government of South Africa or the administration of South West Africa or their predecessors is null and void and of no effect or force;

- no animal resource, mineral or other natural resources produced in or emanating from the territory of Namibia may be taken outside the territorial limits of Namibia without the consent or permission of the UNCN;

- any animal or mineral resource produced in or emanating from the territory of Namibia which shall be taken from the said territory without the consent or written authority of the UNCN may be seized and shall be forfeited to the benefit of the said Council and held in trust for the people of Namibia. (104)

The view this thesis wishes to submit, was that this Decree was unambiguous insofar as the exploitation of the natural resources of colonial nations were concerned. Yet, we found that most of these Western nations sustained and further buttressed such illegal activities in the face of even further stipulations that stated that, “any person or entity or corporation which contravenes the present decree in respect of Namibia, may be held

liable in damages by the future government of Namibia”. (105) More important and given the above observations, what mattered most at the time were the economic, political, and strategic interests of these countries in the region. Therefore, the management and further development of a strategy of underdevelopment as pointed out by Frank in most of his development of underdevelopment theories. In his analysis, Frank asserted that the present imperialist and capitalist intervention in the Third World, was a deliberate attempt to develop underdevelopment, in particular Namibia, to take a recent example. Therefore, the interpretation that “the expropriation of economic surpluses from these countries and their appropriation by imperialist powers, including the polarization of the capitalist system into a metropolitan centre of peripheral satellites. Additionally, this propelled the generation of underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites whose economic surpluses were expropriated while producing economic development in the metropolitan centres”. (106)

As South Africa and its imperialist allies in breach of the UNSC Decree No.1, continued to exploit Namibia’s natural resources, the UNSC instructed the office of the UN Commissioner for Namibia to investigate mechanisms for the enforcement of the Decree. This was to be done against the background of initiating necessary legal action. By 1976, the UNSC


reflected the concerns of the international community against South Africa’s persistent refusal to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the UNCN on Namibia. It pertinently elucidated the importance of the advisory opinion of the ICJ. Resolution 385 of 1976 was subsequently adopted, which unequivocally demanded South Africa’s withdrawal from Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia. It furthermore called for the holding of free and fair elections under the UN’s supervision and control for the whole of Namibia. By 1978, the governments of France, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the US and the UK, formulated a proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Namibian question. This proposal was accepted by both SWAPO and South Africa on 28 April and 12 July 1978, respectively. Based on a detailed survey conducted by the SG’s Special Representative while in Namibia, the UNSC approved the report in its resolution, which came to be known as the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978. This resolution inter alia, established an internationally recognized peace formula for Namibia’s transition to independence. However, as pointed out in the foregoing parts of this study, South Africa and its allies, particularly the US, were not really committed to the said peace plan. It was their view that this plan should only serve as a means to a transition, and not a full agreement. (107)

Having been declared illegal in Namibia by the ICJ in 1971 and the demand put forward for its complete withdrawal from that territory, South Africa and

Washington, continued with their delaying tactics. They came forward with issues and demands that were totally irrelevant and unrelated to the peace formula for a transition to independence in Namibia. Such was the demand on the UNSC’s ability to prove its impartiality on the matter before it. It goes without saying that both South African and the US were fearful that SWAPO would get an overwhelming majority if the peace plan was implemented as agreed upon then. Therefore, a strategy to buy more time was developed and adopted by the two allies. Furthermore, apartheid South Africa adopted a dual strategy aimed at obstructing, or even disrupting negotiations on the modalities for implementing the peace plan. It used the time thus gained to impose its own internal solutions in the form of an administration subservient and accountable only to it. (108)

As a result of these manoeuvres, we came to witness the formation of the Turnhalle Conference on 18 August 1976, comprising representatives of various ethnic entities. Subsequent to this Conference was the 4-8 December 1978 unilateral elections, which were held under the auspices of the South African government. (109) The DTA, an ethnically composed political alliance emerged as the overall winner of the elections. It should however, be noted that SWAPO did not partake in these elections, as it was contrary to the letter and spirit of the UNSC resolution 435 adopted on

29 September 1978. The UNSC upon learning about the unilateral elections held under the auspices of the South African government, declared the elections nil and void and of no force. (110)

South Africa, subsequent to the 4-8 December 1978 unilateral elections, which subsequently saw the coming into being of the IG, came under tremendous opposition both from within Namibia and the international community. Persistent calls for the imposition of mandatory sanctions and disinvestments were repeatedly shielded by South Africa’s main trading partners, the UK, US and France by using their veto rights in the UNSC. The US policy strategies in relation to apartheid Pretoria have always been shifting from moderate to conservative, the former entailing the broadening of ties with both the region’s white- and black-ruled states. These strategies also encapsulated the softening of political and economic pressures on white-ruled states based on the then held assumption that “the whites are here to stay and the only way constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communist”. (111)

On the military front, the brisk encounters that commenced on 26 August 1966, was intensifying, given Pretoria’s intransigence and total disregard of international opinion aimed at paving the way for the transfer of power in Namibia. In addition, the mid-1970s provided the US policy makers with alarming evidence of growing instability in the white controlled states of Southern Africa. Of particular concern was the introduction of Cuban troops and Soviet personnel in Angola. Similarly, the Mugabe-Nkoma inspired guerrilla onslaught on the Smith regime in the then Rhodesia was gaining momentum and growing in intensity. Moreover, the startling success of the Arab oil boycott raised overall concern in relation to the West’s continued access to the rich mineral resources of Southern Africa should such come under the control of unfriendly Soviet-oriented states. At this point in time, the issue of transition in Namibia moved to centre stage and was further reinvigorated by Zimbabwe’s independence in April 1980.

As these events unfolded, it became clear to the US policy makers that the pace of turmoil in the region needed to be halted. First there was a clear manifestation that major changes had taken place, insofar as they relate to the political structure of the region and the pressure for continued change that carried the threat of massive violence. Secondly, the eventual outcome of this explosive situation would obviously have a pervasive impact not only

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regionally, but on the entire world community. In addition, the means by which change occurs may have a major impact on the future race relations in South Africa and the rest of the world. Therefore, the policy choices made by the US would be crucial not only to South Africa, but also to the international community in general and to the US role in the development of a secure and just system of global public order. Thus, the operationalization of a containment strategy, which was later consolidated into the “constructive engagement” approach with the ascent to the presidency of Ronald Reagan. (114)

When Reagan assumed office in 1981, a complete review of the US foreign policy toward Southern Africa was carried out. The Reagan administration was convinced that the Carter administration had been too soft on communists in the region and too harsh on the US traditional allies in South Africa. Dr. Crocker was assigned the task of coining the “constructive engagement” approach, which indeed proved to be a singular failure of the Reagan administration in its infancy stages. (115) Urnov concurs with this position by observing that the ineffectiveness of this approach led to a split amongst the US ruling class over ties with apartheid Pretoria. Urnov further gave as testimony the passage of a law by Congress in October 1986 which imposed a number of compulsory economic sanctions against Pretoria, amid desperate opposition from the administration. (116)

According to Mokoena, the “constructive engagement” strategy rested on four interrelated assumptions, as per the 1987 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on South Africa, namely that:

- South Africa’s overwhelming economic and military predominance in Southern Africa, and its powerful internal security apparatus, would at least in the short term enable Pretoria to manage external pressures for change;

- The Botha government would be induced to agree to an internationally acceptable settlement of the Namibia question if South African withdrawal from Namibia were linked to both a Cuban pull-out from Angola and to prospects for an improvement in US-South Africa relations;

- An early Namibia settlement would set in motion a self-reinforcing spiral of positive developments throughout Southern Africa, thus validating the constructive engagement approach; and

- Progress could be made more quickly on apartheid issues if the US government used official, rather than public channels for its criticism and pressures. (117)

As already pointed out in the foregoing sections, these assumptions were grossly misplaced, given Pretoria’s continued raids into Angola, which further ignited an escalation in violence. This subsequently resulted in the South African Air Force attacks on 17 March 1981, on a SWAPO base in Lubango, approximately two hundred kilometres north of the Namibian-Angola border. This was the deepest known attack in Angola by the South African Air Force, since the SADF’s 1975-1976 incursions. (118)

118. Ibid., 29
believed that its overwhelming military superiority in the region and its capability of bringing brute force to bear on neighbouring countries would solve the problems in Southern Africa. Similarly, Pretoria found common ground with the US over its behaviour. There was the believe that this direction of its foreign policy accorded fully with Washington’s approach of using force where necessary to bend other nations to its will. In other words, Pretoria’s main objective in broadening its scale of aggression and subversive activities was to convince states in the region that hostilities against it were futile and threatened their own existence. (119)

Meanwhile, PLAN, the military wing of SWAPO however, did not relent. Supported by the Cuban-FAPLA forces, it launched massive offensives against South African targets. President Reagan at this point in time, on 19 March 1981 requested Congress to repeal the 1976 Clark Amendment in order to remove an unnecessary restriction on his foreign policy authority. On 17 April 1981, Dr. Crocker visited Angola en route from South Africa and informed the Angolan government that progress on the Namibia question was related to the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. This was the first public statement by a senior US government official linking the two situations. (120)

A major military showdown began in August 1987, subsequent to sporadic

military encounters in the intervening period up to 1985. This all began when FAPLA embarked on an offensive against the town of Mavinga held by UNITA since 1981. Pretoria, the main backer of UNITA as a US proxy repelled this offensive, by intervening in a cross-border operation from Namibia with the strategic objective to capture the MPLA government stronghold of Cuito Cuanavale by March 1988. The bottom-line of this objective was to open up for UNITA to launch even deeper attacks into Angolan territory while being protected by the South African Air Force support, thereby creating a security zone in the centre-south of the country. This was to be followed by the installation of a provisional government at the UNITA headquarters in Jamba. (121)

By early 1988, prospects for peace followed by the implementation of the UN settlement plan for Namibia became more elusive. In response to South Africa’s incursions into Angola in late 1987, Cuban reinforcements arrived in the form of the 50th Division, headed by Gen. Ochoa Sanchez. Gen. Ochoa Sanchez was a personality with formidable military experience and indeed the architect of the victory against the SADF-US invasion of Angola in 1975 and 1976. (122) By May 1988, 11 000 Cuban-FAPLA troops, backed by several tactical PLAN units, established a 400 kilometre southern front, running parallel and at some points no further than 20 kilometres from the

122. Ibid., 2-3
Namibian northern border. The Cuban-FAPLA forces were protected by some advanced MIG 23s and helicopter gunship, plus 200 tanks, artillery, air defence radar and five air-to-surface missile systems. The SADF/SWATF military intelligence, having learned this had no options out, particularly when considering military and political implications that goes with it and went on the defensive, mining their existing lines and retreated into Namibia. The SADF/SWATF for the purpose of military tactics established bases in the proximity of Ponhofi Secondary School. (123) Following the ensuing skirmishes two students were killed in the process, which saw approximately 35 000 students throughout Namibia taking their protest to the streets. They demanded the immediate withdrawal of the SADF/SWATF forces from the proximity of schools. It was indeed very much apparent, given the protestations from civilians that both sides wanted to avoid confrontations at all cost. (124)

Reports of South African fatalities first began to filter trough in November 1988, when more than twenty deaths were announced by Pretoria, including its first public admission of its military interventions in Angola. Simultaneously, a call for a negotiated settlement to the regional conflict emerged when all parties concerned recognized that a purely military solution was no longer feasible. South Africa’s loss of vital air superiority, with a consequent increase in the domestic politically sensitive “white

body” count, prompted Pretoria to reassess its entire Angola/Namibia strategy. It goes without saying that the Cuito Cuanavale confrontations, which presented a massive challenge to Pretoria’s military superiority, signalled a shift in the balance of regional military power away from South Africa. Obviously, operating more than 300 kilometres from the Namibian border and over 400 kilometres away from their nearest main base, Grootfontein, the SADF had become logistically overextended. O’Neil and Munslow further consolidate this assumption by stating that because of the new tactical moves of the Cuban and FAPLA forces, an estimated 4000 SADF troops involved in the battle for Cuito Cuanavale, had risked becoming bogged down in the Angolan rainy season. This could have had disastrous consequences, having their route cut off back into northern Namibia. Hence, the announcement of a formal ceasefire on 8 August 1988.

(125)

As it transpired diplomacy now was more in demand than ever before to help secure peace and stability in the sub-region. As these confrontations came to a head and a military stalemate was reached, the only avenue open was to test diplomacy once again. Nevertheless, how does one define the fundamental factors of a diplomatic agenda aimed at achieving a political solution beneficial to two opposing sides? It is submitted that such an agenda would require the two parties to bring things to a head one way, or the other. Therefore, the emphasis should be on the role of seizing an

opportunity that presents itself when it exists. According to Dr. Crocker, the assertion is that “when the door is open even though you don’t know what lies behind that door, it would be a mistake not to explore it fully and see what it could lead to if you walk through that door”. It is therefore important to conceptualize realistic options, scenarios and strategies aimed at avoiding, or otherwise minimizing further conflict, he concluded (126).

With hindsight, because of mounting internal and external criticism and pressures, a South African delegation led by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, R. F. Botha, met with a US delegation led by Dr. Crocker in Geneva on 14 March 1988. This conference had the objective to further explore possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the Namibian question, subsequently dubbed the Geneva protocol. A similar delegation headed by Neil van Heerden, Pretoria’s then Director-General for Foreign Affairs, met in London with an Angolan-Cuban delegation from 2-4 May 1988. These meetings were followed by another meeting on 13 May 1988, in Brazzaville, Congo, which was indicative of the progress being made in resolving the Namibian issue once and for all. (127)

It should be remembered that although the 1988 talks and protocols were more intense and active than the then-on-and-then-off talks and negotiations, the Namibia peace formula however, was not about to sail through

126. The Weekend Argus 1988. 8 April: 13
easily. Although in hiatus, it was indeed evident that all the parties had a desire to at least bring things to a head, but not without major compromises and concessions. This, the argument is advanced was made possible by a combination of various aspects, in particular the war which had its risks and the economic burdens that goes with it, including the scheduled elections in the US. (128) By 20 July 1988, a further meeting took place at Governors Island, New York, culminating in the finalization of the New York principles, which heralded the first major political breakthrough. South Africa, Cuba and Angola agreed and accepted the New York principles for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question, which were important in two respects, namely:

- First the principle of linkage between the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and the implementation of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978, were clearly confirmed, and

- Secondly, a number of important principles regulating the future type of government in an independent Namibia were laid down. Prominent amongst these was the acceptance of the responsibility of states not to permit their respective territories to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against other states. (129)

In any event, the format and spirit paved by these often in hiatus talks finally leading to the implementation of the Namibian peace plan became more apparent as time passed on. For Dr. Chester Crocker, the most important aspect of the process was to get these negotiations focused on the end-game; to relate the cessation of hostilities to the building of peace.


129. The Weekend Argus 1988. 8 April: 13
Therefore, the focus was on the existing military situation and the apparent prospects for peace. It is argued that the most appropriate diplomatic strategy enunciated was the application of a single-document strategy, which contained a number of differences rather than agreements. This in turn made it incumbent on the negotiators to get rid of all the disagreements in order to have an agreed upon language to carry the process forward. This subsequently happened during the next round of talks held in Geneva from 2-5 August 1988 viewed as the final breakthrough on the road to lasting peace in Namibia. Concluding the talks with Dr. Crocker, the then Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Anatoly Adamashin, notes “a positive momentum” toward resolving the conflict and predicts a settlement in the “nearest future”. (130) The Geneva protocol was indeed very much rigorous, in that it set the target dates for the conclusion of the peace process and the disengagement of all opposing forces. (131)

By 22 December 1988, a tri-partite peace agreement was signed between Angola, South Africa and Cuba, setting 1 April 1989, as the target date for the implementation of the Namibian peace plan. Simultaneously, Angola and Cuba signed a bilateral accord, confirming the linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal to the transition to independence in Namibia. (132) Now, the question is what brought about the urgency for negotiations? Firstly, according to O’Neil and Munslow, since Gorbachev came to power in 1985,

131. Ibid., 7-10
there has been a marked shift from confrontation to co-operation. As early as March 1986, Gorbachev hinted at the Soviet Union’s objectives to seek political solutions to the Angolan conflict. Yet it was unwilling to move away from the Angolan conflict, as doing so would have severely damaged Soviet prestige. In addition, it would have eliminated the principal position affording the Soviet Union a role in the politics of Southern Africa. Hence Moscow’s insistence on the Angolans to accept the linkage between independence for Namibia and Cuban troop pull out. (133)

Secondly, the US, particularly after the ascent to the presidency by Reagan developed the “constructive engagement” approach, which it presumed would encourage change in South Africa through dialogue rather than economic pressure. The bottom-line of this approach however, also encapsulated a working relation with South Africa as a regional ally to combat Soviet and Cuban influence. In other words, a perfect recipe for Cold War confrontation by proxy given that there were direct clashes between the Cubans and South Africa. The US condoned South Africa to confront the Angolan government and the Soviet Union did not relent, it indeed indicated firmly that it did not intend deserting its allies. Consequently, this set the stage for an escalating confrontation in the 1980s which, as it transpired could not be conclusively resolved militarily. On top of that was the mounting material, financial and

political costs. (134)

Available statistics are indicative that between 1985 and 1986, the Soviet Union supplied an extra US$ 2 billion in military aid to the MPLA, including more MIG-23 fighter planes, which proved decisive in tipping scale during the battle of Cuito Cuanavale. Equally, South Africa during the same period faced a dramatic rise in military expenditure. Thus, the urgency with which the US pressed for a negotiated solution stemmed from both Cuito Cuanavale confrontations and its desire to have something to show for its eight-year policy of “constructive engagement”. (135)

3.3 Resolution 435 of 1978 versus obstructionism
As pointed out in the foregoing sections of this study the struggle for independence and self-determination in Namibia has been a long and protracted one. Equally, its historiography, according to Gottschalk has long been dominated by a genre which invents the past, controls the present and prevents the future, namely apartheid, colonialism and imperialism. (136)

Subsequent to a UNSC Meeting by 1976, it reflected on the concerns of the international community against South Africa’s persistent refusal to comply

135. Ibid., 6
with the resolutions and decisions of the UNCN. It further pertinently elucidated the importance of the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the transfer of power to the people of Namibia. By 1978, the governments of France, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the US and the UK, formulated a proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Namibian question. This proposal was accepted by both SWAPO and South Africa on 28 April and 12 July 1978, respectively. Based on a detailed survey conducted by the SG’s Special Representative while in Namibia, the UNSC approved the report in its resolution, which came to be known as the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978. This resolution inter alia, established an internationally recognized peace formula for Namibia’s transition to independence. However, as pointed out in the foregoing sections of this study, South Africa and its allies, particularly the US, were not really committed to the said peace plan. It was their view that this plan should only serve as a means to a transition, and not a full agreement. (137)

Having been declared illegal in Namibia by the ICJ in 1971, and the demand put forward for its complete withdrawal from that territory, South Africa and Washington joined hands to frustrate the fulfilment of the sacred trust of civilization. They came forward with issues and demands that were totally irrelevant and unrelated to the UNSC’s resolution 435 of 1978. Such was the demand on the UNSC’s ability to prove its impartiality on the matter before it. It goes without saying that both South African and the US were

fearful that SWAPO would get an overwhelming majority if the peace plan was implemented as agreed upon then. Therefore, a strategy to buy more time was developed and adopted by the two allies. Furthermore, apartheid South Africa adopted a dual strategy aimed at obstructing, or even disrupting negotiations on the modalities for implementing the peace plan. It used the time thus gained to impose its own internal solutions in the form of an administration subservient and accountable only to it. (138)

As a result of these manoeuvres, we came to witness the 4-8 December 1978 unilateral elections, which were held under the auspices of the South African government. The DTA, an ethnically comprised political alliance emerged as the overall winner of the elections. It should however, be noted that SWAPO did not partake in these elections, as it was contrary to the letter and spirit of the UNSC resolution 435 adopted in September 1978. The UNSC, upon learning about the unilateral elections held under the auspices of the South African government, declared the elections nil and void and of no force. (139)

South Africa subsequent to the 4-8 December 1978 unilateral elections, which subsequently saw the coming into being of the IG, came under tremendous opposition both from within Namibia and the international community. Persistent calls for the imposition of mandatory sanctions and
disinvestments were repeatedly shielded by South Africa’s main trading partners, the UK, US and France by using their veto rights in the UNSC. Nevertheless, by 1982, the UNSC drafted a supplementary document aimed at strengthening and refining resolution 435 of 1978. SWAPO immediately endorsed the document, which inter alia provided that certain Constitutional principles be written into the first independence Constitution. It further made a provision that in the Constituent Assembly a two-thirds majority be required for decisions on the details of the future Constitution. The said agreements on the Constitutional principles in turn provided for a declaration of Fundamental Human Rights Bill. This Bill in turn made provision for the protection against arbitrary deprivation of private property without just compensation. It furthermore instructs that the Namibian Supreme Court be the effective upper guardian of these rights and the Constitution in its entirety. The Bill also provided for periodic and genuine elections for the Legislative and Executive branches of government which should be by secret ballot and on the basis of universal suffrage. (140)

Apartheid South Africa in cohorts with Washington immediately after the 1982 Agreements, in a further attempt to frustrate and prolong the implementation of the UN’s instruments leading to Namibia’s independence, raised another set of preconditions. These preconditions included the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. It should be remembered that

these preconditions were developed and managed by Dr. Chester Crocker, the then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Dr. Crocker, despite a favourable global balance of power persisted, to view Africa as a continuation of the struggle for global hegemony between the West, led by the US, and the Communist World, led by USSR (141) These perceptions at best highlighted the structural impediments, or rather the US policy makers’ inability to connect the dots. These policies appeared to turn a blind-eye to the freedom deficit and human rights of the affected peoples, thereby stirring up discontent and hostility towards the US, as could be witnessed world-wide. As a matter of fact, this thesis submits that these preconditions were absurd and irrelevant and out of touch with the reality on the ground. Suffice to say, Angola at that point in time had already been a sovereign State that could not be drawn into issues that affects only Namibia. In the final analysis, these are indeed the historical characteristics of the US policies, blanketed by a net of alienation and isolation. (142)

The South African-appointed IG following the 4-8 December 1978 unilateral elections however, failed to make any impact whatsoever on the Namibian populace. South Africa by 1983, resumed direct control of the territory by appointing an AG and dissolving the National Assembly and the Council of Ministers. Realizing the bankruptcy of the old model geared toward

solving the Namibian question, Pretoria invented a new one. It decided that it was time to change the mask on the puppets. This was a deliberate attempt to make them look like a force, which was broader and more representative than the DTA, capable of distancing itself from South Africa and acting in the interests of a genuine national accord. (143) Subsequently, on 18 July 1983, apartheid South Africa issued a proclamation for the creation of a Multi-Party State Council. This Council was renamed the Multi-Party Conference that governed the territory under South Africa’s auspices. (144)

This thesis submits that apartheid South Africa had committed itself to have no further objections than those pertaining to the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola before a final agreement could be reached on the Namibian question. Within this context, the argument is therefore advanced that South Africa indeed had abandoned, at least publicly its objections to the UNO’s bias in favour of SWAPO. In addition, Washington through Dr. Crocker also gave the assurances that South Africa had accepted resolution 435 as the only viable peace formula. Thus, South Africa would proceed to implement the settlement plan provided that there was a commitment on the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. (145)

Notwithstanding all these assurances, South Africa towards the end of 1983, in yet another sinister move initiated a political coalition aimed at
developing a viable alternative to SWAPO in the form of the mentioned MPC. This coalition consisted of several internal political parties based on their ethnic and tribal allegiances. It was boycotted by the NNF and SWAPO as another ploy to install a puppet administration. As expected, some internal political leaders who had been suspicious of the move to appoint the MPC, such as chief Justus Garoëb of the DC, a few months later withdrew from the MPC. This heralded in a decisive blow to apartheid South Africa’s political manoeuvres and manipulations. A further blow came with the pullout of SWANU-P by September 1984 from the MPC. SWANU-P instead resolved to work in unison with SWAPO and at the same time declared its total support for the unconditional liberation of Namibia. (146)

As these political metamorphoses were taking shape within Namibia, we came to witness yet another unilateral installation of a second interim administration by Pretoria. The UNCN wasted no time in voicing its concern, condemning South Africa for its intransigence. Within this context, it called upon the members of the UNSC to resume their undivided responsibilities for the immediate and unconditional implementation of the mentioned peace plan in respect of Namibia. (147)

Ironically, and given South Africa’s assurances to the UNO by 1983 that the alleged prejudices in favour of SWAPO, were no longer an impediment

146. NPP Information Pamphlet 1 1989. Why can’t we look forward to resolution 435. Windhoek: 1
to free and fair elections in terms of resolution 435 of 1978 it nevertheless continued unabated to encourage the IG and the leading army generals of the combined SADF/SWATF, to continue their propaganda of the alleged UN biases. This presented another obstacle to the implementation of the peace instruments that would lead to a transition to independence in Namibia. Arguments that surfaced alluded to the fact that the settlement plan was not a creation of the UNO, but rather a formula of the “Western Contact Group”, which was endorsed by the UNSC and accepted by SWAPO, South Africa and Frontline States. Therefore, Namibians elected as stipulated in the said resolution would be solely responsible for the drafting of the Constitution, and no one else. Moreover, the principles of such a Constitution had already been agreed upon. Thus, South Africa’s continued obstructionist stance on the implementation of the peace formula only raised questions on its credibility as a trustworthy party that could live-up to mutually agreed accords and decisions. (148)

In any event, whatever criticism one could level against the attitude of the UNGA towards SWAPO, the UNGA was in no position whatsoever, to influence the outcome of any elections held in that territory. Therefore, such a deposition this thesis submits dismisses apartheid South Africa’s claim of alleged UNO bias with regard to the issue of Namibia. The simple aspect is that the question of Namibia was an issue of decolonization that should have been resolved as such. (149)

149. Ibid., 28-29
According to Gottschalk, Namibia constituted a test case of the efficacy of the League of Nations’ Mandate system in providing legal checks and balances defending the rights and interest of an indigenous people against a colonizing power and its settlers. Historically, apartheid Pretoria regarded Namibia as belonging to South Africa by right of conquest; it was part of the Afrikaner’s heritage. In effect, South Africa ruled Namibia through a system of classical colonialism and was bent on continuing to do so within the context of the East-West rivalry. It took advantage of the US posture against Soviet expansionism in the region. (150)

Notwithstanding the UNSC’s selfless efforts to get resolution 435 of 1978 implemented as agreed to by all parties concerned, South Africa once again attempted to frustrate the completion of the process. This time around it levelled accusations against SWAPO of not being willing and committed to partake in a democratic process. To the contrary, it was in fact SWAPO that consistently endorsed its commitments to the 1982-Agreements on the process to an elected CA, the Constitutional principles, a Human Rights Bill, and a host of agreements and decisions since 1978. Undoubtedly, considering the above-mentioned factors, SWAPO had indeed shown its good faith while the IG backed by South Africa had either pretended that such agreements did not exist, or were blatantly undermining them. Moreover, the IG equally failed to clarify as to what it wanted to further negotiate and what it meant by “democratic process”, long after the passage of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978. (151)

Certainly, what the IG wished to further negotiate this thesis submits was the capitulation of SWAPO, recognition of the IG itself, a re-negotiation, or scrapping of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978, and the participation of SWAPO in the spoils of a government without any legitimacy. It would have amounted to compromising the genuinely held aspirations to freedom and self-determination of the Namibia populace. These sinister manoeuvres as it turned out for reasons obvious to everyone were rejected by SWAPO. SWAPO, by this move demonstrated its firm commitment to the internationally recognized peace formula and democracy as envisaged in the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978. It was also a show of firm commitment to the agreements and decisions concluded thereafter. (152)

As all these attempts by apartheid South Africa and its allies in Namibia, in cohorts with the Reagan administration, appeared to have no impact in winning the minds and hearts of the Namibian populace, another set of preconditions for the implementation of the said peace plan surfaced. The demand that reconciliation be achieved first, followed by the implementation of resolution 435 of 1978 was now put forward. How this would be achieved was not spelt out in clear terms and in addition, it would have gone against the wishes and aspirations of the Namibia people who associated successive Pretoria administrations with repression. (153)

It is in fact evident from the 1984-Cape Verde talks that South Africa did


not wish to implement the UN peace formula for Namibia. South Africa instead, requested SWAPO during those talks to lay down arms and participate in the existing constitutional arrangements under its auspices. As already pointed out above Pretoria came forward with the condition that a Constitution be drafted first followed by the implementation of the peace plan for Namibia and subsequent elections. This, Pretoria maintained would not as much be a re-negotiation of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978. It would only serve as a means aimed getting the priorities straight. Pretoria further argued that such an arrangement would also lay the foundations for further initiatives and actions, which indeed as expected were rejected by SWAPO, who on several occasions stood firm to its commitment to the UNSC peace formula for Namibia.  

In a letter dated 3 March 1986, Pretoria having realized that all its attempts aimed at derailing the UNSC peace plan for Namibia had failed complained to the UNSC. It cited the continued presence of the Cuban troops in Angola as the last remaining obstacle towards the implementation of the said plan. Thus, a U-turn to the linkage doctrine officially masterminded by the then US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Chester Crocker. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola in response, in a letter dated 13 March 1986 to the UNSC rejected the linkage of Namibia’s independence to the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. He at the same time

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154. Uulenga, B February 1989. Namibia solidarity week rally. Public address (delivered) at the Namibia Solidarity Week Rally, Bellville, University of the Western Cape.
expressed his willingness to offer his co-operation in the negotiations that would ensure Namibia’s early independence, thereby creating opportunities for lasting peace in the sub-region. President Dos Santos also indicated that within the context of Washington’s active military and financial support to Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi’s UNITA, the UNSG should take the future responsibility to resolve this standoff. By 15 March 1986, the UNSG indicated his readiness to begin with the implementation of the Namibian peace plan on 1 August 1986. (155)

In the light of the above-mentioned elements and given the US sponsored linkage doctrine, one finds it absurd and erroneous. This is so when considering the fact that the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978 was accepted by Pretoria then. In addition, the Cuban troops had been in Angola since 1976. Now the question is; why is this issue being raised as a precondition only in 1982? Moreover, the Cuban troop presence in Angola preceded the said resolution and a host of agreements and decisions reached thereafter. (156)

Meanwhile, South Africa tried its level best to bulldoze, lure and flatter the internal opposition into the IG. This was evident of the Pretoria appointed AG, Adv. Louis Pienaar’s actions by March 1987. Adv. Pienaar, with the blessing of State President P. W. Botha, launched a new initiative to broaden the base of the IG. He authorized the holding of ethnic elections that would

155. Uulenga, B February 1989. Namibia solidarity week rally. Public address (delivered) at the Namibia Solidarity Week Rally, Bellville, University of the Western Cape.
facilitate participation in the IG of ethnic leaders elected in such elections. It is this thesis’ submission that this strategy was particularly aimed at the co-option of the DC and the CDA of Chief Justus Garoëb and Peter Kalangula, respectively. These two ethnic leaders were perceived as having the majority ethnic following within Namibia. Thus, a clear manifestation of Pretoria’s belief and rightly so, that the IG in its composition then stood no chance of obtaining the needed credibility nationally and internationally as long as the DC and the CDA remained outside the IG. (157)

By early 1988, prospects of peace followed by the implementation of the UNSC peace plan for Namibia became all the more elusive. It became clear that the US sponsored linkage doctrine as a precondition was not the only obstacle for the implementation of the said process. Apart from this linkage policy the IG raised another set of obstacles of its own, referring to the mentioned UNSC peace plan as defunct and outdated. Ironically these were the very same politicians who shortly afterwards claimed to be the guardians of resolution 435 of 1978, portraying SWAPO as a communist dictatorship that had lost touch with Namibian realities. Further allegations were levelled that SWAPO was only interested in seizing power by force as it was afraid to contest free and fair elections. On the margins of these political infights, sporadic military encounters occurred between the Cuban-FAPLA forces supported by the PLAN fighters and the SADF/SWATF and UNITA

forces. By May 1988, 11 000 Cuban-FAPLA troops, backed by several tactical PLAN units, established a 400 kilometre southern front, running parallel and at some points no further than 20 kilometres from the Namibian northern border. These clashes culminated in the battle of Cuito Cuanavale. According to O’Neil and Munslow, the final showdown began in August 1987 with South African fatalities filtering through in November. (158) As these confrontations came to a head and a military stalemate was reached, the only avenue open was to test diplomacy once again. It should be noted that it was indeed a time in which diplomacy was more in demand than ever before, to help secure peace and stability in the sub-region. In other words, the definition of the fundamental factors of a diplomatic agenda aimed at achieving a political solution beneficial to two opposing sides. Such an agenda in turn required the two parties to bring things to a head one way or the other. Therefore, the emphasis was put on the role of seizing an opportunity that presents itself when it exists. According to Dr. Chester Crocker, the assertion is that when the door is open, even though you don’t know what lay behind that door it would be a mistake not to explore it fully, and see what it could lead to if you walk through that door. It is therefore important to conceptualize realistic options, scenarios and strategies aimed at avoiding, or otherwise minimizing further conflict. (159)

Resultant of the mounting criticism and pressures, a South African delegation led by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, R.F. Botha, met with

158. O’Neil, K & Munslow, B 1990. Ending the cold war in Southern Africa. (Special Issue) Review of Africa Political Economy. 2.3
a US delegation led by Dr. Chester Crocker in Geneva on 14 March 1988. This conference had the objective to further explore possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the Namibian question, subsequently dubbed the Geneva protocol. A similar delegation headed by Neil van Heerden, Pretoria’s then Director-General for Foreign Affairs, met in London with an Angolan-Cuban delegation from 2-4 May 1988. These meetings, was followed by another meeting on 13 May 1988 in Brazzaville, Congo, which was indicative of the progress being made in resolving the Namibian issue once and for all. (160)

This was made possible by a combination of various elements, in particular the war which had its risks and the economic burdens that goes with it, including the scheduled elections in the US. (161) By 20 July 1988, a further meeting took place at Governors Island, New York, culminating in the finalization of the New York principles, which heralded the first major political breakthrough. South Africa, Cuba and Angola agreed and accepted the New York principles for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question, which according to political analysts were important in two respects, namely:

- First the principle of linkage between the Cuban troop withdrawal form Angola and the implementation of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978, was clearly confirmed, and
- Secondly, a number of important principles regulating the future type of government in an independent Namibia were laid down. Prominent amongst these was the acceptance of the responsibility

of war, aggression or violence against other states. (162)

In any event, the format and spirit paved by these talks, finally leading to the implementation of the Namibian peace plan became more apparent as time passed on. For Dr. Chester Crocker, the most important aspect of the process was to get these negotiations focused on the end-game; to relate the cessation of hostilities to the building of peace. Therefore, the focus was on the existing military situation and the apparent prospects for peace. It is argued that the most appropriate diplomatic strategy enunciated, was the application of a single-document strategy, which contained a number of differences rather than agreements. This in turn made it incumbent on the negotiators to get rid of all the disagreements in order to have an agreed upon language to carry the process forward. (163)

This subsequently happened during the next round of talks, held in Geneva from 2-5 August 1988, also dubbed as the final breakthrough on the road to lasting peace in Namibia. The Geneva protocol was indeed very much rigorous in that it set the target dates for a conclusion of the peace process and the disengagement of all opposing forces. (164) By 22 December 1988, a tri-partite peace agreement was signed between Angola, South Africa and Cuba, setting 1 April 1989, as the target date for the implementation of the Namibian peace plan. (165)

162. The Weekend Argus 1988. 8 April : 13
163. The Weekend Argus 1988. 8 April : 13
165. The Weekend Argus 1988. 8 April : 13-14
Given Pretoria’s past record of unilaterally brushing aside agreed upon decisions and resolutions, a climate of scepticism however, remained. As 1 April 1989 was drawing closer the obvious scepticism of the Namibian populace and the International Community was confirmed. A battle broke out between the PLAN Combatants and SADF/Koevoet forces in the north at Endola, approximately 25 kilometres south of the Angolan border. The situation deteriorated to such an extent that the peace process appeared to be in the balance. Pretoria accused SWAPO of infiltrating into Namibia in violation of the established stipulations of the peace plan, aimed at taking power by force. According to Theo-Ben Gurirab, the then SWAPO Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the PLAN combatants were in Namibia from where they had been fighting the war for the past twenty two years. He further maintained that in accordance with the letter and spirit of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978 the PLAN combatants inside Namibia were in fact entitled to be confined to base by UNTAG. Furthermore, taking into account the Geneva Protocol signed on 5 August 1988, no reference is made about the PLAN combatants in Namibia at the time of the cease-fire. The protocol only made reference to those forces that would be north of the Namibian border. Unfortunately, UNTAG was not yet deployed by 1 April 1989. It did not have any structures in place in the north of Namibia. This was the last major ditch attempt by apartheid Pretoria to derail the whole peace process in Namibia. (166)

In conclusion, this study submits that the SADF/SWATF military intelligence had advance knowledge of the presence of the PLAN

combatants inside Namibia and took advantage of the situation to create a crisis aimed at wrecking the whole process. According to ballistic expert evidence, the PLAN combatants were rounded up by the SADF/Koevoet forces and cold-bloodily shot at point blank range from the back. “They were executed from the back”, stated one of the international ballistic experts who conducted a post-mortem analysis. (167)

A further complication and indeed a deliberate machination was that the UN had only a 783-member peacekeeping force, comprising military and civilian personnel in Namibia at that time in point, instead of the 4 650 authorized forces. Talking with the benefit of hindsight, in terms of the proposals made regarding the DMZ agreed to by SWAPO, Angola, South Africa and Zambia by 1980 it was found once again that these agreements and accords made no reference whatsoever, to the PLAN fighters inside Namibia. As a matter of fact, it is not clear what the sentence, “SWAPO would be excluded from the selected locations” implied? For example the temporary exempted sites within the 50 kilometre wide DMZ on either sides of the border. In any event, the DMZ however, was expected to become effective within fourteen days after the formal cease-fire. Moreover, it should be remembered that SWAPO had in fact declared a unilateral cease-fire nine days after the signature of the Geneva protocol. Based on the arguments advanced above, it appeared that Pretoria’s repeated claims that SWAPO had violated the agreement, which became effective at 04h00 on

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1 April 1989 had been baseless and another sinister attempt to derail whole implementation process. (168)

In addition, no documentary evidence was presented by Pretoria to substantiate its claims of violations. There was also no evidence presented that the PLAN combatants were not entitled to reassemble at bases inside Namibia and that these forces should have been redeployed north of the 16th parallel at the time of cease-fire. As a matter of fact most of the evidence found at the scene of fighting, as well as eyewitness accounts suggested that it was indeed the SADF/Koevoet forces that provoked the fighting. (169)

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the fighting attempts to get this crucial exercise back on track had been more vigorous. It surpassed mere political psychology for military gains aimed at securing an honourable exit from Namibia. By 8 April 1989, a high-level delegation from the five nations of the JMC, comprising the Angolan delegation led by Lt.-Gen. Antonio dos Santos Franco, Deputy Minister of Defence, the Cuban delegation led by Carlos Aldana, the South African delegation led by R. F. Botha, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, the US delegation led by Dr. Chester Crocker, Assistant Security of State for African Affairs, and the Soviet delegation led by Anatoly Adamashin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, met at Mount Etjo in Namibia. This meeting had the sole objective of revitalizing the peace exercise as Namibia teetered on the brink of an all-out war. Pretoria

still holding on to its claims of SWAPO violations of the peace process threatened a \textit{de facto} suspension of the implementation process, thereby asserting onto itself the right of ordering the UN out of Namibia. This however, did not come as a surprise considering Pretoria’s half-heartedness at implementing the UN’s peace plan for Namibia. Furthermore, it was inconceivable on what legal grounds a regime that was on numerous occasions declared illegal in Namibia could assert onto itself the right to expel the UNO out of Namibia. \textsuperscript{(170)}

As the Mount Etjo talks commenced, Pretoria pressed ahead with a new set of claims and allegations. It alleged that there were as many as 1 800 PLAN fighters inside Namibia involved in heavy fighting. In addition, it claimed that there was a further 1 300 “insurgents” just north of the border preparing to infiltrate. These unsubstantiated claims and accusations however, did not surprise anybody, given Pretoria’s obstructionist posture vis-à-vis the peace plan. Moreover, South Africa even after the final agreements were reached at the Mount Etjo talks attempted to take control of the exercise by announcing that the assembly points inside Namibia would be jointly manned by the SADF/SWATF forces and UNTAG. By 11 April 1989, Pretoria issued a statement, announcing that the UN had agreed to the interrogation of the PLAN combatants, as a means to determine the number of those wounded as well as, to ascertain their whereabouts and to identify positions of weapons caches. \textsuperscript{(171)}

\textsuperscript{170.} Namungongo, S (Producer) 1989. \textit{Born of the ballot box}. Windhoek: New Dawn Videos. (Video)

\textsuperscript{171.} Namibia Communications Centre 1989. London: 11-13
South Africa, further stepped-up its attempts aimed at either derailing, or otherwise bringing the whole exercise to a halt. Prominent amongst these were its refusal to release political prisoners who should have had been set free by 1 April 1989. In this respect, Pretoria indicated that as far as it was concerned there were no political prisoners held by it, but criminals instead. The AG further maintained that, those awaiting trial would not be released, and that prosecutions would continue as normal during the implementation period. (172) In the final analysis, Washington, worried about its ally’s intransigence intervened aggressively to keep the process on pace. According to O’Neil and Munslow, global developments towards ending the Cold War were a precursor for setting the agenda and urgency for resolving regional conflicts. In other words, whilst Pretoria’s policy of regional destabilisation carried out under its rubric of the “total strategy” provided a convenient ally to overall US policy of checkmating Soviet expansionism; it could not be allowed to challenge US hegemony in the region. (173) Thus, reasserting US hegemony required curbing the influence of the military within Pretoria’s decision-making process and wrestling key elements of its regional policy, namely UNITA and Renamo away from Pretoria’s control. Anxious to score a success within its policy of “constructive engagement” the US did little, if any, to prevent Pretoria from being defeated at Cuito

Cuanavale, the final battle which paved the way for Namibia’s independence on 21 March 1990. To summarize, a belated embracement of conventional diplomacy, which finally answers the question why independence for Namibia was agreed to a decade later? (174)

3.4 Conclusion
The struggle for independence and self-determination for Namibia has a long and protracted one. After South Africa with the backing of the US backtracked on several opinions of the UN regarding its illegal occupation of Namibia, SWAPO decided to wage an armed struggle for the early independence of Namibia. This decision was reinforced by the 1966 ruling of the ICJ. Subsequent to the adoption of the UN resolution 435 of 1978, South Africa in tandem with Washington adopted an obstructionist posture by trumping-up issues that were irrelevant and unrelated to the settlement of the Namibian question. The objective of the Washington-Pretoria alliance was to solve the Namibian question in their interests. As soon as Reagan became president, the US position over Namibia became pro-South African. (175)

President Reagan interpreted all foreign policy matters in terms of global considerations of the US-Soviet rivalry. The Reagan era reinforced support for South Africa, hostility toward African demands for self-determination

175. Urnov, A South Africa against Africa. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 284
and obstructing the process for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question. (176) The US obstructionist and interventionist policies only waned with the signing of the historic Geneva peace accord, subsequent to stalemates in several war efforts, which had their own risks and economic costs, particularly the battle of Cuito Cuanavalle. (177)


177. The Weekend Argus 1989. 8 April
4 THE SOVIET-CUBAN FACTOR

4.1 Introduction

The Soviet-Cuban intervention in southern Africa to assist liberation movements can be explained in different contexts, particularly when considering Cuba’s pre- and post-1959 foreign policy. Cuba’s pre-1959 foreign policy was carried out by a corrupt and firmly implanted group of politicians backed and encouraged by the US. To the contrary, Cuba’s post-1959 foreign policy changed dramatically both in shape and character with two important interconnected ideological components of national defense and internationalism. According to Hernandez, the US policy toward Cuba has greatly contributed to the identification of these two ideological components. Since 1959 these have come to symbolize the revolutionary cause itself; the idea to do combat in another country for a just cause, especially against foreign aggression.

The Soviet-Cuban interventionist missions in aid of liberation movements in Angola, Ethiopia and Congo triggered the US intervention in Southern Africa, the objective being to counter Soviet expansionism. This stemmed from the political and ideological differences between the US and Cuba since the triumph of the latter’s revolution in 1959. This chapter aims to 1) sketch impact on the region of the post-1959 Cuban policies versus US foreign polices, 2) the significance of the Soviet Cuban intervention in

Southern Africa and 3) the situation in Angola subsequent to the Cuban troop withdrawal.

4.2 The Cuban Revolution versus the US foreign policies

As already pointed out in the foregoing sections of this study exactly what the then Washington administration hoped not to happen took place right under its nose - the triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959 led by President Fidel Castro Ruz. This in fact signaled the end of an initial episode of collegial rule. By 1960, four major watershed political changes took place on this Caribbean island. These changes further helped to define and consolidate Cuba’s future political dispensation, which included amongst others:

- the nationalization of US businesses and industries;
- the conclusion of a major trade agreement with the Soviets;
- the introduction of a military government backed by the militia and the CDR, and finally
- the seizure of total control of the press and almost all types of organizations in existence then. (181)

As expected these measures antagonized Washington that in turn responded by imposing an economic, social and political blockade of Cuba. Subsequent to the introduction of an egalitarian economic and social policy and, the freezing of prices and similar moves by President Fidel Castro Ruz, the US once again responded with yet tougher measures – the severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba. It also by proxy of the CIA supported an

aborted attempt to overthrow President Castro Ruz’s newly installed revolutionary government. As all these political developments were taking place Cuba appeared to have no alternative, but to switch its allegiance to the then Soviet Union. This thesis submits that these were measures taken to counter the US sinister maneuvers as well as, to maintain its independence, given the height of the then Cold War. (182)

By December 1961, President Castro Ruz made an epoch-making speech announcing publicly that he was a Marxist-Leninist. This fact shaped the character and scope of present-day Cuba. It also at the same time signaled a dramatic shift in Cuba’s dependence from the US to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, a new ally was conceived and especially so for the Third World countries, particularly Southern Africa. (183)

By 1962, a major event took place that put the world on a threshold of an all-out nuclear war – the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The CIA after having studied photographs taken by two US U-2 spy aircraft informed the then National Security adviser, George Bundy that the Soviets were constructing in Cuba sites for intermediate range missiles. On 22 October 1962, at about 19h00, President Kennedy went on national television announcing that there were nuclear sites in Cuba. President Kennedy at the same time ordered a

183. Ibid., 368
naval blockade of Cuba to prevent the further delivery of nuclear warhead components and simultaneously demanded the dismantling of the missile sites and, the withdrawal of any and all missiles. (184)

On 25 October 1962, while the military leaders of the US had a high-level meeting discussing air assaults aimed at destroying the Cuban Air force and missile sites, President Kennedy received a rambling emotional letter from the then Soviet Union leader, Nikita Khrushchev. President Khrushchev’s letter informed that, if the US promised not to invade Cuba, “this would change everything…” The Kennedy administration believing that this was another stalling tactic by the Soviets aimed at buying time until all the missiles destined for Cuba were operational decided to apply more pressure. This led to an increase in the number of low-level reconnaissance flights over Cuba. (185)

It should be noted that President Castro Ruz was not directly involved in the diplomatic maneuvers between the US and the then Soviet Union. Consequently, he viewed the increased low-level flights over Cuban national territory as a prelude to a US attack and ordered Cuban anti-aircraft batteries to open fire on any US aircraft over-flying Cuba. President Castro Ruz simultaneously sent an astonishing bellicose message to President

185. Ibid., 368
Krushchev in which he estimated that the US was planning to invade Cuba “within three days”. “You can be rest assured that we will firmly and resolutely resist attack”, President Castro Ruz concluded in his letter. President Castro Ruz further suggested that if the US invaded Cuba the Soviets should try and pre-empt its aircraft by unleashing a nuclear attack on US targets. The Soviet Union, President Castro Ruz further wrote, “must never allow the circumstances in which the imperialist could launch the first nuclear strike against it”. In the final analysis the probable nuclear confrontation, which gripped the entire globe for approximately a month was averted diplomatically. How did this happen? (186)

According to Robert McNamara, the then Secretary of Defence, each nation’s decisions immediately before and during the crisis had been distorted by misinformation, miscalculation and misjudgment. As such, was the belief of the former Soviet Union and Cuba of the US intention to invade Cuba and overthrow President Castro Ruz and remove his government. Secondly, the US believed that at that point in time the Soviets would not move nuclear warheads outside Russia, which it in fact did. Thirdly, the then Soviet Russian leaders believed that nuclear missiles could be secretly introduced and when their presence were disclosed the US would not respond, which indeed was a misjudgment. Finally, the Washington security advisers who urged President Kennedy to strike first by an air attack were

almost certainly mistaken in their belief that the Soviets would not respond militarily elsewhere, thereby triggering a Third World War. In this connection, what then was the purpose of introducing nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba? According to Andrey Gromyko, the former Soviet Foreign Minister, “it was a tactical strategy…their action was to strengthen the defense stability of Cuba… to avert threats against it”. In other words, the defense of a strategic ally in the Western hemisphere given the then East-West rivalry. (187)

It is indeed against this backdrop that this study undertakes to analyze the circumstances under which Cuba became actively involved in the liberation politics of most other Third World nations, particularly Southern Africa. This is outlined in detail in the following section of this study. Suffice to say, the consolidation of the Cuban revolution in the face of imperialist pressures obviously required promoting it elsewhere. Besides, by the early 1970s a dramatic shift in Cuba’s foreign policy affected its international relations as most Latin America Nations resumed diplomatic ties with Cuba. (188)

It should be noted that Cuba’s post-1970 political program, as guided by its internationalist foreign policy brand linking historical developments to the on-going national and international social class struggles impacted tremendously upon Africa. This was even so in Southern Africa. This thesis submits that this would not have been possible without the socialist

solidarity from the then Soviet Union and other socialist countries that helped to defend Cuba militarily and sustained it economically. Moreover, Cuba’s changing strategies then reflected a change in its own political and socio-economic realities that were almost comparable to whatever Third World nation in the face of capitalist-imperialist onslaught. Therefore, the world’s changing realities, this study further submits provided a catalyst for Cuba’s international political and military strategies. In addition, Cuba’s foreign policy strategies as complimented by an improving economic situation during the 1970s were based on a newly created global outlook rather than mere ideology per se. It would therefore be wrong to assert that Cuba’s African policy was based on an opportunistic change of scenery as most scholars of political studies from the right would want to argue. (189) During the 45th anniversary of Labor Day, President Castro Ruz consolidated this assumption when he hailed Cuba’s revolutionary diplomacy at unnerving the West’s hypocrisy and cynicism used to preserve a rotten system of global political and economic domination. (190)

As a matter of fact, Cuba had been heavily involved in Africa during most of the 1970s. Needless to say, during the 1960s President Castro Ruz sent his trusted lieutenant, Ernesto Che Guevara to eastern Congo to assist Laurent Kabila and the Lumumbist rebels in their war efforts against the Belgian colonialist. This subsequently burst into a revolutionary wave, which

simultaneously provoked the then Washington administration’s harsh responses, heralding a new interventionist era under President Ronald Reagan. Against this backdrop, it should be remembered that it was Cuba’s post-1959 foreign policy objectives that bottle-necked its bilateral relations with the US. Another strain for example, was Cuba’s globalist objectives, which per se are expressions of its own world vision emanating from its own peculiar internal social order, which is then projected on an international scale. Under the Reagan administration, the earlier days of Western politicking returned with a vengeance. Moreover, the US-Cuba negotiating positions at that point in time had changed over the years, while the source remained constant. For Cuba, the most central issue in its relations with the US before any meaningful negotiations could take place was, and is:

- the lifting of the economic, social and political embargo, and all other forms of commercial pressure;
- the cessation of all forms of subversive acts;
- the cessation of pirate attacks from the US bases and elsewhere;
- the cessation of violating Cuba’s air and naval space as well as, the return of the Guantanamo naval base to Cuba. (191)

For the Federal Government of the US the most critical issues include amongst others:

- financial compensation for nationalized US property;
- the issue of human rights;
- cessation in participating in any kind of violence in the Western hemisphere;

- the removal of all troops from Angola, and the
- termination of Cuba’s close association with the then Soviet Union. (192)

Given the demands and conditionalities of the US, particularly in respect of the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola it became pertinent that it was Cuba’s policy objectives, to be engaged internationally in order to offset US enmity. Cuba in fact, achieved this objective with sterling results thereby neutralizing some negative aspects of the US anti-Cuban policies. Furthermore, Cuba at the same time succeeded in avoiding being isolated from the international political playground. Cuba’s motivation to lend more allegiance to the former Soviet Union could also be explained in part on Washington’s policies since the triumph of the Cuban revolution. (193)

In any event, it was Cuba’s desired objective to export its revolution, thereby simultaneously challenging the US military and political influence the world over. The US response in return was to contain Cuba as was evidenced during the Angolan conflict where we came to find the linkage of Namibia’s independence to Cuban troop withdrawal from that territory. For Washington, if Cuba could be immobilized in international affairs, its socialist government could become more palatable to the extent that the US could live with it. This was a similar policy approach adopted in respect of

apartheid South Africa. Although critical of South Africa’s apartheid policies the US in collusion with Britain continued to shield the then white minority regime in the UNSC using their controversial veto rights. Therefore, the major obstacle in the US-Cuba relations within the context of Southern Africa was Cuba’s support for national liberation movements in the region. Cuba supported the MPLA, SWAPO and the ANC, amongst others. (194)

As pointed out in the foregoing sections of this study the then Washington administrations did not have clear strategy directions on Southern Africa. This study submits that this was so, given their preconceived assumptions that the region’s white redoubts, comprising Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, the then Rhodesia and South Africa were secured. Thus, they entertained the idea that there was little or no significant Soviet involvement in the region that were likely to threaten the US relatively insignificant interests by then. Nonetheless, these assumptions just proved the contrary following the granting of independence by Portugal to its former colonies, commencing in 1975. This chain of events heavily impacted on the US policies for this region thereby forcing its policy architects to revisit, reassess and redefine America’s significant interests in the Southern African region as they were falling by the way-side. At this point in time, few of the US policy makers expected that the conflict in this region could escalate into a major international crisis. (195)

195. Ibid., 206-208
The US government following the Vietnam disaster only came to realize that the political playing field in the sub-region had been leveled in favor of the then Soviet-Cuban alliance. This encouraged its policy architects to take a hard look at the unfolding political landscape in Southern Africa, which heralded a major redefinition of the region’s significance. In the wake of its political and to some extent military set-backs in south-east Asia, the US government decided to capitalize on the situation in Angola. It did this to demonstrate that it still had the resolve to act as a superpower. It must be added that the US security and foreign policy approaches had been very much self-centered, thereby viewing most parts of the Third World, particularly Southern Africa with its rich strategic mineral resources for the West’s industries, as mere markets and targets. (196)

4.3 Significance of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Southern Africa

Soviet-Cuban intervention in Africa, particularly Southern Africa dates back to the early 1960s. For example, after independence from Belgium in 1960, the then Zaire became the Cold War battleground fought over by rebels and mercenaries, CIA agents and the Cuban troops. It is submitted that US, driven primarily by security concerns often oscillated between on the one hand, intervention to prevent a rival from gaining a foothold and on the other neglect when the threat passed. The US Southern African interventionist posture however, was never to be. (197)

196. The Namibian 2006. 1August: 7

By 1965, the legendary Ernesto Che Guevara slipped into the then Zaire with a group of black Cuban fighters to join the pro-Soviet rebels led by Desiree Laurant Kabila and the Lubumbumists. A CIA agent in Kishahsha warned of an imminent Communist take-over with far-reaching consequences. With the Portuguese colonial administration ceding control to nationalist movements in all territories under its control the US responded by availing assistance to rivals of these movements to counter Soviet expansionism (198).

Cuba resolved to send troops to Angola on the request of Dr. Antonio Agostinho Neto. Cuba’s earlier military involvement in Angola however, had been limited to advisers and training personnel. It is therefore, only on the desperate request of the then Angolan leader following intelligence reports that the US was aiding Holden Alvaro Roberto’s FNLA financially, and militarily with the assistance of the CIA that Cuba started its introduction and deployment of troops in Angola. This was indeed incremental and at the same time followed a fast pace. From initially 82 officers the number had already reached 4 000 by 7 November 1975. For Cuba, given its post-1959 policy differences with the US, Angola represented a major victory for its African policies. This principled and tactical move further enhanced its Third World leadership objectives and

liberation status that were indeed very much significant. The reversal of this triumph as was evidenced in the foregoing sections of this study became a major US policy objective. Suffice to say, the successes of which was indeed achieved with the linkage of Namibia’s independence to Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. What then were Cuba’s major victories and setbacks, following its involvement in Africa, especially Southern Africa? (199)

With its involvement in the Southern African region, Cuba highlighted its long held campaign – calling for a new world order based on mutual understanding and equality. Cuba indeed succeeded in fostering a natural bond of alliances with other Third World nations. This was especially so with those developing nations facing economic and political confrontation with the market economy nations. This objective in particular, although there appeared to have been some differences of opinion however, insignificant, amongst the Third World countries, gained tremendous momentum and credibility. Cuba also prompted some Third World nations following the Reagan administration’s interventionist policies in Africa to re-examine their relationships with it. This in fact was and is evident from the tremendous support Cuba obtained from these countries on resolutions manufactured against it in the UNGA, pertaining to the US decades old economic, social and political embargo. Cuba, at the same time managed to

shift international focus from East-West rivalry to that of the powerful *north* and hungry *south* issues. (200)

Following its activities in Angola in concert with its major ally, the then Soviet Union, Cuba also helped to put the question of Namibia’s independence high on the agenda of the UNSC. It became not just an issue of independence, but instead an issue of decolonization in accordance with the Convention of Nations. (201)

### 4.4 Angola after the Cuban troop withdrawal

Although the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola was completed by 1991, twenty-four months after the implementation of the UNSC resolution 435 of 1978, peace in Angola then was still remote. This came as a major setback for Cuba, particularly when considering the military situation in Angola then. Obviously, it was a policy objective that was not brought to its logical conclusion. Following the cease-fire accord signed by the US, Portugal and the then Soviet Union by May 1991, at Estoril paving the way for peace in Angola, and the subsequent presidential and legislative elections defeat of UNITA during the 29-30 September 1992, heavy fighting erupted that almost paralysed the entire country. Dr. Jonas Malhero Savimbi, the since late leader of UNITA cried foul, claiming that the elections were rigged in favour of the incumbent President of Angola, Jose Eduardo dos Santos and

201. Ibid., 210
and took to the bush to restart an all-out civil war. According to the UNSR in Angola, Dr. Alioune Blondin Beye, the since late Malian diplomat, the elections contrary to Dr. Savimbi’s alleged claims of rigging had been generally “free and fair”. Such were the opinions of other international observers. In its resolution 864 of September 1993, the UN responded to the late Dr. Savimbi’s intransigence by imposing an arms and fuel embargo. (202)

It is in fact worth noting that the US at this point maintained a low profile against its former war client. Having been UNITA’s military and financial mainstay alongside apartheid South African and the Zairian regimes, this study submits that the US could have used its influence of persuasion over UNITA and brought Dr. Savimbi to terms with the demands and norms of democracy. Yet, the US failed to do so in spite of the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and property as a result of the conflict. In addition, apartheid South Africa attempting to take advantage of the void left by the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola under the pretext of mediating in the Angolan conflict, aided UNITA. Consequently, the Angola authorities declared the then Foreign Minister of South Africa, R. F. Botha, a persona non grata. This represented a major diplomatic blow to the government of President F. W. de Klerk. This study further submits that President De Klerk sought to use mediation in the Angolan conflict as a diplomatic instrument to advance his efforts aimed at bolstering South Africa’s tarnished image, both at home and abroad. (203)

203. Ibid., 17
In yet another calculated move aimed at gaining political mileage thereby bolstering Pretoria’s standing, President De Klerk’s regime proposed to host and chair future talks between the warring parties of Angola. Ironically, this campaign came at a time when Angola had not only declared the regime’s Foreign Minister an unwanted person in its territory, but also making it public that the regime was sending plane-loads of weaponry and other logistical materials to UNITA. Thus, the then apartheid regime’s mission was clear, this thesis wishes to submit, to win for UNITA what it had failed to win in the presidential and legislative elections. (204)

Pretoria, under the prodding of the US still in a diplomatic shuttle in the Angolan jigsaw, again proposed a so-called African solution, which came to mean a power-sharing arrangement with UNITA. South Africa had by then drafted a document which suggested that for every MPLA Minister, there should be a UNITA Deputy Minister, and vice versa. In its essence this had been the approach of successive South African administrations to the concept of power-sharing and perhaps the main reason for the impasse in its internal politics. In the final analysis, such an arrangement would defeat the essence of democracy by all its definitions as democracy is about choices and not imposed political arrangements. Besides, the Angolan nation made their choices during the 29-30 September 1992 presidential and legislative

elections. What in fact aroused scepticism was that the US administration, the main protagonist of democracy appeared to have taken serious pains at pointing a finger against the aggressor. Unfortunately so, the UN also seemed to have echoed the same sentiments. This study submits that the US should have abandoned its quiet diplomacy strategy and publicly condemned UNITA. (205)

For approximately thirty-five months after the departure of the Cuban internationalist forces from Angolan territory, the UNSR had been arm-twisting negotiators from both sides in Lusaka, the capital of neighbouring Zambia. For eleven months, with fierce fighting raging in Angola, the only thing to come out of Lusaka had been acrimony and disappointment. By 17 October 1994, Dr. Blondin Beye, the UNSR in Angola announced that the belligerents had “agreed in principle” to a peace deal, namely the Lusaka Protocol. “Peace in Angola is within our reach”, Dr. Blondin Beye later declared. In any event, given the above-captured observations these should serve as lessons learned mindful of Angola’s recent political history that should be viewed as a model of how not to attempt to manage African politics. Both rivals had their Cold War patrons, these being the then Soviet-Cuban alliance, siding with MPLA and the US, South Africa and Zaire on the side of Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi’s UNITA and Holden Alvaro Roberto’s FNLA. (206)

206. Ibid., 16
As that war faded, a cease-fire was arranged and the subsequent elections meant to consolidate the prospect for lasting peace in Angola. However, this failed to hold because Dr. Savimbi lost the vote. It is in fact justified to conclude that if Dr. Savimbi as pointed out in the foregoing sections of this study could have been induced with the proper treatment he might in all likelihood have accepted defeat, almost quietly. Dr. Savimbi did not get that and took to the bush. Given this, it became almost certain that Dr. Savimbi’s intransigence was borne out of the West, in particular the USA’s unwillingness to flex its muscles in order to muzzle this wayward personality’s mischievous and dangerous ways. What then would be the prospects for lasting peace in Angola? (207)

Obviously negotiations and subsequent power-sharing based on proportional representation as per the Lusaka Protocol appeared to be the only way out in the interim. But once again, how does one determine the political will and mechanisms of such an arrangement? (208) According to Dr. Blodin Beye, the sides had agreed how to share-out power. Following these arrangements:

- UNITA will run four Ministries, including the country’s important Ministry of Geology and Mines and will have seven deputy ministerships, governorship of three provinces, several ambassadorships and control of the Cuando Cubango, Kwanza Norte and Uige provinces and some municipalities. The presidency would be subjected to a new vote. (209)

208. Ibid., 16
However, under the 1992 peace deal signed at Estoril in Portugal, President Dos Santos ought to have contested a second round after winning more votes than UNITA’s Dr. Savimbi. Nonetheless, the second round was abandoned after Dr. Savimbi cried foul and went to war. President Dos Santos despite this setback won recognition abroad, most notably from the US. The US at this point after a long period of silent diplomacy appeared to have had a change of heart and were willing to engage the path of creative and daring political solutions for the decades-old civil conflagration in this southern African nation. For Cuba, a staunch Cold-War ally this indeed signalled a major diplomatic and political victory. Moreover, the deal was less than what Dr. Savimbi hoped for. It should be remembered that UNITA had long demanded the governorship of the Huambo province, its military base and political heartland. UNITA however, had dropped that demand not out of goodwill, but rather because of the pressures the MPLA and South Africa exerted on it. (210)

As the world community was watching the new wave of the Angolan civil war escalating into unprecedented proportions, FAPLA, backed by aircraft turfed UNITA out of one town after another to such an extent that it was also in a position to launch attacks on Huambo itself. The MPLA government only relented from doing so mainly because of pressures from the US, Portugal and Russia, the principal observers of the peace process.

Aided by the political changes that were taking shape in the sub-region following the waning of the Cold War, obviously the warring parties had to put more reason at work. Thus, diplomacy and political tolerance had to be tested once again. Therefore, the unpalatable evils of racial, ethnic and ideological polarization and strife, economic backwardness, national disunity and disintegration, had to make way for more acceptable concepts. These were democracy and national reconciliation, which appeared to have been realized with the 4 April 2002- Luena Peace Accords as an addendum to the 1992 Lusaka Protocol, ushering in the watershed end of the almost three decades of civil conflagration in Angola. (211)

Meanwhile, Cuba followed the turn of events with keen interests following its withdrawal from that territory and at the same time witnessed the shifting of the balance of power in favour of its Cold War ally. Obviously, a new political strategy for them became imminent. Thus, a focus on the home front mindful of the collapse of the then Soviet Union. It is very important to note that Cuba’s domestic economic crisis could partly be blamed on the US more than three decades old economic, social and political embargo. As it stands, part of this crisis was home manufactured and only came to impact tremendously on Cuba’s domestic economy after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Internal factors such as mismanagement, corrupt government officials and a highly centralized and bloated bureaucracy compounded by the US economic blockade surfaced in the early 1990s. (212)

211. *The Namibian* 1993, 1 March: 7
212. Ibid., 7
Naturally, the US blockade of Cuba had been more than just economic as it also extended to the diplomatic, military and cultural spheres. For that reason, for more than three decades Cuba had been brutally denied the most basic principles of peaceful co-existence of human civilizations stemming from its orthodox Marxist-Leninist principles of governance. (213)

As a matter of fact, Cuba’s major post-1959 foreign policy problem in the Western hemisphere had been its bilateral ties with the US. Once the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola was completed one would have expected that Washington would soften its stance against this island nation of twelve million people. However, it was just the contrary. In any event, it is agreed that there would be a continuous disagreement with regard to the system of apartheid in the then South Africa and other regional issues, but this would be of relatively minor significance in terms of the US-Cuba bilateral relationship. Furthermore, considering the productive diplomatic relations that was put in place as evidenced in the negotiations that finally led to the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and the subsequent independence of Namibia, it could be concluded that the foundations were laid for a spill-over into other areas as well. (214)

Notwithstanding this, it was absolutely incumbent and dependent on the leaders of both the US and Cuba to realize that at least a settlement was reached in respect of the Angola-Namibian questions based on each side’s

214. Ibid. 118
common sense and willingness to abandon ideological posturing. Therefore, recognition of the legitimacy of each side’s interests and concerns would suffice. When asked about the dangers facing Cuba in a post-Cold War free world, President Castro Ruz stressed the US economic and diplomatic embargo. In other words, and given the demands for change in Cuba from eight consecutive Washington administrations before meaningful negotiations could take place, it appeared then and even now that President Castro Ruz was not about to help matters. For example, by announcing “free” elections in which he is certain to walk out victorious, given Cuba’s principled stance on independence and non-interference in its domestic policies. For the record, this is indeed evidenced from the statements made by the then youthful Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roberto Robaina Gonzalez at various UNGA meetings that Cuba would never negotiate its sovereignty and socialism. Besides, how does Washington intend pressurizing Cuba given the fact that the Cold War was long gone? Ironically, Washington eased and even lifted its embargo on a host of Cold War adversaries, including Vietnam. Needles to mention the US had no problem whatsoever with Portugal being a one-party fascist state until 1974, in NATO (215).

The Clinton administration it is noted was of opinion that trade and not confrontation was the policy towards China, another major bastion of communism despite reports of its alleged human rights abuses. At close

scrutiny, one finds that these were the same allegations levelled against Cuba. Now should the same logic not be applicable to that country as well? (216) Instead of easing the embargo of this island nation Washington’s response had been to tighten it. As a pointer to that effect Washington by December 1992, passed the CDA, which also came to be popularly known as the Torricelli Bill. The Act, was in every definition an up-to-date version of the decades old US blockade of Cuba. It in effect provided for an increase in communication, academic contacts and humanitarian aid. The main thrust however, had been to extend the embargo to US subsidiaries abroad. (217)

As it stands now, the uncompromising stance continues on both sides. Some US administration officials responsible for foreign policy strategies towards Cuba then argued that to ease up on Cuba would be tantamount to rewarding dictatorship. Further assertions were that unlike China and Vietnam there were no serious signals of reform in Cuba despite the changes in contemporary global politics. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration unlike its predecessors had not gone out of its way to antagonize Cuba given the enormous support for Cuba from Third World countries. On the other hand, it equally appeared that Washington was neither contemplating a change in its embargo policy, the most contending factor in its relationship with its immediate Caribbean neighbour. It was and is in fact evident that

216. The Economist 1994. 22 October: 45
217. Ibid., 45
this embargo policy was leading the US on a lone path insofar as Cuba was concerned on a multi-lateral level. The US embargo of Cuba had been overwhelmingly condemned in the UNGA in both 1992 and 1993, and continued to be condemned at every occasion possible. Given these observations, this thesis submits that the worst affront to the US foreign policy, was President Fidel Castro Ruz still holding on to absolute power for decades in the face of the collapse of the former Soviet Union. (218)

4.5 Conclusion

Soviet-Cuban intervention in aid of liberation movements impacted tremendously on the nature and scope of the political landscape in the region. Although positive in most respects there however, had also been negative ramifications stemming from the US policy machinations triggered by its over-zealous obsession of containing Soviet expansionism. (219)

The US policy impacts in Southern Africa relative to the Soviet-Cuban intervention became most emphasized during the 1970s. Suffice to say, Cuba’s post-1970 political program guided by its internationalist policy brand, linking historical developments to the on-going national and international class struggles impacted heavily on Africa. This became even more pronounced with the socialist solidarity from the then Soviet Union that helped to defend Cuba militarily and sustain it economically. Cuba’s

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post-1970 strategies reflected a change in its own political and socio-economic realities that were almost comparable to whatever Third World country in the face of capitalist-imperialist onslaught. (220)

As Portugal ceded control of Luanda to the MPLA in 1975 it immediately called for the complete decolonization of Africa. The MPLA further proclaimed its support for liberation movements in the sub-region and provided shelter and military assistance to SWAPO and the ANC. As a result of constant destabilizing acts carried out by Kinshasha, Pretoria and UNITA, the MPLA requested and received assistance from the Soviet-Cuban alliance, the latter introducing multiple numbers of troops into that country in a short period. This triggered the determined intervention of the US in the region driven by its Cold War psychosis. (221)

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5. Conclusion

There are various and distinct opinions on how the US foreign policy evolved towards most Third World nations, particularly Southern Africa. It is submitted and with explicit reference to the then conflicts in Angola, Namibia and South Africa, although different in character and scope, that the US foreign and security policy premises had been to manufacture these conflicts. With hindsight, the policy premises had always been a clear depiction of the overall collusion of colonial exploitation that founded economic systems that prospered in ways that eventually attracted untold millions of free immigrants from Europe. These conflicts sustained the West so that it could attain the living standards and supremacy it came to enjoy in the last two centuries. Therefore, the argument that these civil wars at times conveniently labelled by the Western media as black-on-black violence were imposed on these countries. At the height of the Cold War, Southern Africa became the epicentre of East-West rivalry. (222)

With the emergence of the so-called “new world order” and “constructive engagement” enunciated by President Ronald Reagan we came to witness the projection of an old American nostalgia – America First. It should be noted that this concept was embraced by a motley crew of Americans using it for vastly different ends. For example, it was used by an aviation pioneer,

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Charles Lindbergh, in a bid to keep the US out of World War II. At present it has come to mean the US national interests. (223) Rice corroborated this assumption when acknowledging that the US found it extremely difficult to define its national interests in the absence of Soviet power. The former Soviet Union was perceived as more than just a traditional global competitor; it strove to lead a universal socialist alternative to markets and democracy. The inference here is that the US national interest should take precedence over issues such as human rights, justice and equality, which indeed is in contradiction to the very same principles and values of a democratic system. (224)

These were the very same sentiments reflected in a major televised interview of President Ronald Reagan, by March 1981, in which he described apartheid South Africa, its major ally in fomenting conflicts in the sub-region, as a “friendly country that strategically is essential to the free world in its production of minerals that we must all have”. (225) Needless to say, in the conception of the US planners of the modern world after 1945, the Third World was to function as a source of raw materials and as a market. As a consequence the US used its unchallenged military muscle to strengthen its relative economic position. (226)

225. Ibid., 47
Conversely, the Reagan administration concentrated more on white opinion, when a strategy of black empowerment defined as dialogue with the black leadership would have been more encompassing. It did not have a coherent and sustainable policy towards Southern Africa. It did not have the ability to deal resolutely and effectively with apartheid Pretoria. Southern Africa has always been a difficult terrain for US policymakers. Urnov argues that whatever policy the West put forward for Southern Africa, the interests of Pretoria were given maximum consideration. (227) Over the last three decades, Republican and Democratic officials alike have repeatedly miscalculated the stability of white rule in Southern Africa and the strength of black resistance. In addition, they did so likewise in terms of the significance of Soviet-Cuban involvement in the region with equally damaging consequences. (228) Lewis corroborated this when observing that over the last three decades, strategies formulated to dealt with turbulence in the Third World have followed no fixed pattern. Trial and error have produced a wide array of inconsistent policies and errors, revealing flawed strategies during the Nixon, Carter and Reagan-Bush presidencies. (229)

In their efforts to promote political change in the region, consecutive US administrations tended to rely too much on quiet diplomacy and so-called positive measures. When these failed it switched to strategies that emphasized pressure and isolation. It is submitted that both approaches have

been tried several times and each time they have failed to produce tangible results. As one approach fell into disfavour the other was revived and the cycle started anew. As pointed out in the foregoing sections of this study, President Reagan’s remarks on South Africa have often exhibited a perception that his views differ from those of his advisers. This has been the case on a number of occasions on questions regarding the significance of the South African reform initiatives, the causes of black unrest and the right of the South African military to attack facilities in neighbouring states at will.

(230)

The America First concept as exemplified in a statement made by Patrick Buchanan, a 1994-Republican presidential candidate was a clear manifestation of the US view of geo-politics as opposed to human rights and peaceful co-existence. Besides, these were and are the views that constituted the bottom-line of the US foreign policy tradition. (231) According to Mead, a senior fellow in US Foreign Policy at the Council of Foreign Relations, it was no accident that the country’s early leaders devoted so much attention to foreign policy. The prosperity and happiness of the typical American family were closely tied to international affairs and the connection was lost neither on the voters, nor on those who hoped to win their support. Suffice to say, the US domestic policy resolve had been, and are, inextricably linked to its foreign and security policy objectives. (232)


232. Ibid., 163
This, the argument is advanced in fact is a policy tradition that reflected the US fear of a global equalitarian society, as reflected in Cuba’s post-1959 African policy, hence the diplomatic and political animosity with its Caribbean neighbour. This was further aggravated by the latter’s active involvement and alliances with Africa’s liberation movements. Further evidence towards this end can be traced in Dr. Chester Crocker’s Memorandum of 1981 in which he stated that:

the US has lost an important influence over South Africa due to our lack of perception towards the dynamic changes in South Africa. Sometimes it was a mistake, to believe that the watches of South Africa and the US were synchronized at the same time. It is evident that to stimulate South Africa to decide its own future would benefit the interest of the US. (233)

In the final analysis and based on these observations white supremacy driven by corporate America in collusion with apartheid South Africa and other white redoubts, had to be preserved at all costs. It was the perception that such a strategy at the same time would serve the US essential economic, political and strategic interests in the region. In this context, consecutive US governments therefore took an active role in opening up Africa and Asia to American trade. Reminiscent of the US traditional imperialist objectives as America spread out across the world in search for profits, diplomats followed suit to reinforce those objectives. What really was at issue here, one can conveniently conclude were national interests, but whose national

233. Newsweek 1993. 1 February: 14
interests? Obviously the interests of a selected elite as per the dictates of capitalist-imperialist motives spearheaded by corporate America that for decades had been the driving force of the US domestic, security and foreign policies. Unfortunately, given its global definition the concept national interests in the US took a beating. Ever since the 1960s, several US administrations invoke the concept national interests, when what really mattered were the political and economic interests of the administration of the day, for instance, President Reagan’s limitless obsession to checkmate Soviet expansionism in Southern Africa. (234) Urnov observes that the US support for colonial liberation movements had been subordinate to its opposition to the former Soviet Union during its “roll back Communism” campaign. Those on the wrong end suffered the consequences. The sharp edge of the Washington-Pretoria alliance directed primarily against Angola is a case in point. Too rarely has the concept national interests been used within its proper context - the interest of a global community. (235)

It must, however, be admitted that not only did the US prevail in the then Cold-War, but it also ensured the spread of its language, culture and products world-wide. The American currency became the international medium of finance; English became the lingua franca of global business; American culture and consumer goods dominated world media and markets, and as a result its claim to being the “sole superpower”. (236)

234. Newsweek 1993. 1 February: 14
What were the real economic, political and strategic interests of successive US administrations in Southern Africa? Was the removal of the MPLA government from power in Angola of sufficient national importance to merit the US almost direct interventions in the sub-region? Or was it of real US’ national interests to prevent the attainment of power by a SWAPO administration in an independent Namibia? Once again, the answers are obvious, and a resounding “yes” – to counter the Sovietization of the Southern African sub-continent, given its strategic location and vast strategic resources for the West’s industries, such as oil, diamonds and gold. Africa’s growing importance as a US energy supplier and its continued significance to the latter’s security of late became very much pronounced. These led to shifts in the US-African policies – anti-terrorism replaced anti-communism. American diplomatic thinking concluded that Washington must continue to view Africa as important, both for its resources and the necessity of maintaining stability there as a bulwark against global terrorism. (237)

Undoubtedly, the US foreign policy had been marked by its multi-faceted scopes of intentions, policy shifts and images throughout most of the last two centuries. It has been the major factor in weighing the balance of power in the world, during peacetime and in periods of war. President Ronald Reagan perhaps more than any other leader of the United States, shifted this balance of power to a point where the international community was no longer divided into competing ideological camps. (238)


Realizing that the Soviet Union’s political and military threat was becoming a reality and that the US security interests were at stake, it became crystal clear that it was neither plausible nor possible for the US to linger on. Therefore the reigning-in of the Soviet Union’s allies in Southern Africa and elsewhere. These objectives were set to avoid an Afghanistan scenario of the earlier decades. A policy of containment through economic aid and direct military involvement in countries perceived to be threatened by communist take-over was then enunciated. Liberation movements such as the MPLA, SWAPO and the ANC in the Southern African region were singled out for retribution, because of their close alliances with Cuba and the then Soviet Union. (239)

Most contemporary political analysts and scholars alike characterized US African policies as wrought with double standards and ascribed this to its inability to appreciate African political and diplomatic strategies. Now what do we read in such an analysis? Liberation leaders throughout the world had been very much circumspect about the US policies in Africa as these were perceived as the vehicle to transplant Western imperialism in the face of abject poverty on the African continent. Hence their alliances and allegiances to the East that sought to create a global equalitarian society. Liberation movements in their quest for national independence and self-determination sought and received assistance from the ten Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc counties in the absence of such support from the West.

It has always been Africa’s collective determination and aspiration to broaden its continental interests to include peace for all, security everywhere and prosperity for everyone in line with the United Nations Charter. After all, democracy is about choices and has its own traditions, values, moral systems and opinions. It differs from place to place, region to region and from continent to continent. This is exactly what was demonstrated in the sub-region, subsequent to the elections held by November 1989 in Namibia, September 1992 in Angola, and the first democratic election of 1994 in South Africa, which saw the coming to power of liberation movements, then regarded as the arch adversaries to the US-African policies. (240)

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