IDEALISED LAND MARKETS AND REAL NEEDS: THE EXPERIENCE OF LANDLESS PEOPLE SEEKING LAND IN THE NORTHERN AND WESTERN CAPE THROUGH THE MARKET-BASED LAND REFORM PROGRAMME

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Magister Philosophiae, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, School of Government, University of the Western Cape

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Key words

Idealised markets
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South Africa
Abstract

Idealised land markets and real needs: the experience of landless people seeking land in the Northern and Western Cape through the market-based land reform programme

Magister Philosophiae Thesis, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape

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This thesis interrogates the claim that resource-poor, rural land seekers can acquire land through the land market which constitutes the central mechanism of land redistribution in South Africa’s market-based land reform programme. The study explores two key aspects in relation to this claim. Firstly, it provides a critique of the underlying assumptions prevalent in much of the current market-based land reform policy, as advocated by its national and international proponents, and the manner in which the market as a mechanism for land redistribution has been conceptualized and its outcomes envisaged. Secondly, it considers the extent to which this conceptualization - which it is argued, draws on idealized and abstracted notions of land market functioning - is realized and examines the extent to which the espoused outcomes of market-based land reform policy are aligned with or contradicted by the functioning of real markets and the experiences of resource-poor land seeking people in their attempts to engage in the land market with limited state support. The details of the market’s operation are analysed, with a distinction made between the operational practice of real markets – based on direct evidence-based observation –
and degrees of policy abstraction and theoretical assumptions regarding how markets should or might operate.

The study’s methodological framework draws on an agrarian political economy perspective, as used by theorists such as Akram-Lodhi (2007) and Courville (2005), amongst others. This perspective enables a consideration of the various contexts and socially embedded processes involved in land transactions and the extent to which these are shaped and framed by the politics of policy-making. In line with this perspective, the study focuses on the social relations brought to bear on the acquisition of land and the way in which land markets operate. It is suggested that land is not solely viewed as an economic commodity by land-seekers. Furthermore, it was found that markets cannot be understood as neutral institutions in which participants are equal players.

The key research questions considered in this study are the following:

- What are the operational dynamics of the land market?
- How do these dynamics enable or hinder the acquisition of land by prospective land reform beneficiaries?
- What has been the experience of those trying to acquire land through market-based land reform?

The study critiques the extent to which all the necessary components for enabling land market access and activity are present and considers the available scope for resource-poor rural land-seekers to engage in the land market with limited state support. The following synthesis of the key policy assumptions which underpin land
market transactions forms the basis of the critique, against which the findings regarding the operation of real land markets in the case study areas are matched:

- A product or commodity (land) is available and is accompanied by a requisite response and level of activity in the land market;
- Willing buyers and willing sellers exist and interactions and relationships of negotiation and exchange occur between these transactors;
- The market is accessible and information is available to all;
- Ready capital and financing is available for the purchase of land;
- A regulatory framework exists.

The findings provide an insight into the workings and efficacy of real land markets, based on an analysis of the title deeds for all agricultural land transactions over a five year period and within specified case study locations. These are compared with the espoused outcomes and principles underpinning market-based land policy, with its reliance on the land market as the primary mechanism for land redistribution.

This study found that in general terms South Africa has an active land market and the necessary infrastructure and regulatory framework to support it – such as a systematised deeds registry, financial services and systems, professional land surveyors and valuators, and associated information networks. However, while noting a degree of land acquisition within specific locales, the Department of Land Affairs’ land reform programme and its accompanying provision of grants to prospective land reform beneficiaries, was found to be an inadequate response to the historical disparities, social inequalities and the socially embedded character of markets and land transactions. Consequently, the majority of resource-poor and marginalised land-seekers are unable to access the land market and are therefore
unable to acquire land. For them, the notion of the land market and their ability to engage with it remains an abstraction, an unattainable ideal. Interaction with the land market thus remains the preserve of those who have access to resources, specific social networks, information and finance.

The findings of this study point to a glaring gap between the State’s espoused policy and real practice, between what the market (as characterised within a range of idealised and real configurations) is expected to deliver and the extent to which the actual level of land acquisition by resource-poor land seekers has been made possible by the State’s response to land need and the implementation of its policy. In essence, this gap reflects a lack of integration between the spheres of what Bernstein (1994:3) refers to as ‘market logic’ and ‘bureaucratic action’. A number of the causal factors for this have emerged as findings in this study and are linked to a set of core issues. These focus on the politics of the process surrounding the State’s adoption of market-based land reform in the early 1990s; the manner in which the land market has been characterised in South African land reform policy and the implications of this for policy formulation and implementation; and the nature and level of support provided to would-be beneficiaries by the state.

The fundamental conclusion of this study is that a land reform programme premised on the land market as the key determinant of land redistribution, accompanied by the provision of limited grants and services to enable land acquisition by the historically dispossessed and landless, offers negligible promise or benefit to the vast majority. It is argued that this failure of land reform should be recognised not so much as one of market-failure, but rather of policy failure in the first instance.

September 2008
Declaration

I declare that, “Idealised land markets and real needs: The experience of landless people seeking land in the Northern and Western Cape through the market-based land reform programme” is my own work, that it has not been submitted for the purpose of attaining any degree or for any examination at any other university, and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Susan Mary Tilley

Signed:

September 2008
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# Abbreviations and acronyms

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act 126</td>
<td>Provision of Land and Assistance Act 125 of 1991</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>CASP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>District Assessment Committee</td>
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<td>DACE</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DLA</td>
<td>Department of Land Affairs</td>
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<td>DME</td>
<td>Department of Minerals and Energy</td>
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<td>DoA</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>DWAF</td>
<td>Department of Water Affairs and Forestry</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESTA</td>
<td>Extension of Security of Tenure Act</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Plan</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>LRAD</td>
<td>Land Reform for Agricultural Development Programme</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>PFMA</td>
<td>Public Finance Management Act, 1999</td>
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<td>PRLO</td>
<td>Provincial Land Reform Office</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>SANParks</td>
<td>South African National Parks</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/LAG</td>
<td>Settlement /Land Acquisition Grant</td>
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<td>SPP</td>
<td>Surplus People Project</td>
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Idealised land markets and real needs: the experience of landless people seeking land in the Northern and Western Cape through the market-based land reform programme

Chapter One – Introduction

This chapter provides an historical overview of how South African land reform policy came to be informed by a market-based approach and includes a brief summary of the main features of the land reform programme. It also provides an overview of the key issues addressed in this study.

International developments during the 1980s and 1990s precipitated profound changes that informed the nature and focus of land reform around the world. The rise of economic globalisation during these decades resulted in the integration of the world economy more explicitly, and emphasised a reliance on market forces and the deregulation of trade and the economy (International Union of Food Workers, 2001). These significant changes were underscored by the belief that sustainable growth is achievable through increasing trade and investment and the role of the private sector, with a reduction in state intervention in the management of the economy and in the provision and expenditure on social services and development (Bernstein, 2002). Globalisation led to a shift in the world economy towards the ‘free-market’ and market forces came to be relied upon to shape and determine the path of the economy and the developmental needs of the population.

The catchwords of ‘the market’ or the ‘free market’ became central to the international development discourse of the 1980s and, according to White (1993:1),
“took on virtually magical qualities as a developmental panacea. In the world of ideas, it was an intellectual juggernaut given political force (and therefore intellectual credibility) not only by the dominance of neo-liberalism in the key metropolitan countries (notably ‘Reaganomics’ and ‘Thatcherism’), but also by the notion of ‘market socialism’ in the former (and, in the case of China, still) state socialist countries”.

This pro-market shift, largely driven by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, impacted on the global arena of agrarian and land reform and militated against the more redistributive and interventionist land reform policies that had been prevalent in many countries during the 1960s and 1970s (IUF, 2001; Ghimire, 2001; Lahiff et al 2007).

Based primarily on the findings of theorists such as Deininger and Binswanger (1999) regarding the efficacy of land reform programmes since the 1960s and their rejection of state-led and compulsory models of land reform programmes, the World Bank advocated a new model of agrarian reform, known variously as ‘negotiated’, ‘market-assisted’ or ‘market-based’ land reform, where the principle of the willing seller/willing buyer transaction governs the form, pace and scope of land reform, and where the market is the central mechanism for land redistribution (Aliber and Mokoena, 2002; Ghimire, 2001; Greenberg, 2003; Department of Land Affairs, 1997; World Bank, 2003). According to this model, land redistribution is to occur via privatised, decentralised land transactions between ‘willing sellers’ and ‘willing buyers’ (Deininger & H Binswanger, 1999; Borras, 2003). The World Bank advocates the land market as the most effective mechanism for providing the landless with land and for developing equity and efficiency (World Bank, 1993; 1997; 2003).
The World Bank has strongly advocated this approach in a number of countries – most notably, Brazil, the Philippines, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and South Africa - in a bid to align land reform policies with the economic policies favoured by the International Monetary Fund (El-Ghomeny, 2001:106; Ghimire, 2001:23) and in accordance with the principles underpinning what has become known as The Washington Consensus.¹

In South Africa, with the advent of liberalisation in the late 1980s, prior to the African National Congress (ANC) gaining power, the ground was laid for a more ‘free-market’ oriented and deregulated economy (Marais, 1998). The new government had a range of political, legal and administrative options for the design of a land reform programme at its disposal but these were tempered by the framework that was established during the negotiations of the early 1990s and by the international pressures brought to bear on the various negotiating partners (Walker, 2003).

The World Bank showed interest in shaping the character and scope of the land reform programme to be implemented in post-apartheid South Africa and came to play an instrumental role in setting the parameters for the development and formulation of South Africa’s land reform policy. In 1993, World Bank officials held discussions with key South African leaders regarding a ‘market-assisted’ approach to land reform (World Bank, 1993).

The interest shown by the ANC in the market-based model contradicted its earlier policy commitments such as those outlined in the Ready to Govern statement of 1992 which had advocated nationalisation and expropriation and other non-market
mechanisms for land redistribution, and the *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP) of 1994 which emphasised a central role for the state in the redistribution of land, and which had specifically noted that, “Only a tiny minority of black people can afford land on the free market” (1994:20).

In the period from 1994 to 1996 when White Papers on land and agricultural policy and their respective implementation frameworks were being developed, the post of the Minister without Portfolio - responsible for overseeing the RDP - was abolished. This was followed in March 1996 by the closure of the RDP office. According to Wildschut and Hulbert (1998:11), this was widely interpreted as “a retreat from a transformative agenda to a new emphasis on private sector, investment-driven strategies.”

In contrast to the ANC’s earlier policy statements and interest shown in other state-led redistributive programmes, and in accordance with its shift towards an increasing adherence to a neo-liberal orientation, thereby reducing the role of the state in the provision of social welfare and services, the ANC adopted a framework that placed emphasis on the land market as the mechanism through which land ownership would become aligned with the demographics of the country (Deininger & May, 2000; African National Congress, 1994; Williams, 1996). In the course of defining its role vis-a-vis the redistribution of land and adopting a market-based approach, the new government opted for elements of an indirect and decentralised approach, reminiscent of Adam Smith’s much vaunted ‘hidden hand’ as described in *The Wealth of Nations* of 1776.
However, given the highly unequal nature of South African society (May, 1998), the need to address and placate competing interests (Walker, 2001) and the fact that the negotiated settlement had left the bulk of the power and wealth of the white minority intact (Lahiff, 2007b; Williams, 1996:152), policy designers were compelled to acknowledge existing inequalities and the contested nature of the socio-political terrain and recognise that the market alone could not redress these. The South African land reform programme that resulted from the constitutional negotiations process was therefore required to creatively combine a commitment to the principle of social justice and the needs and expectations of the landless and dispossessed, within the parameters of market-based land reform and the protection of private property (Walker, 2001:4). Existing landowners were able to secure the inclusion of the protection of property rights within the Constitution, while the landless had their interests accommodated in the promise of a speedy redistribution of land, restitution and improvements in land tenure (Walker, 2001) accompanied by various support provisions.

The outcome of the land reform policy-making process was a hybrid of state- and market-based policy (de Bremond, in Lahiff et al, 2007) which does not rely solely on the market but incorporates a degree of state intervention in the form of a set of land reform programmes which include scope for a changeable suite of associated strategies and support facilities. The state has relied on redistribution modalities based on the operation of the existing land market accompanied by limited grants and support services to assist willing and prospective land reform buyers to engage in the land market (Lahiff, 2007b). In addition, other options such as expropriation are available to the state but have largely remaining untested. The state has
continued to play a role in establishing and maintaining the necessary infrastructure to support the land market - such as a systematised deeds registry, financial services and systems, professional land surveyors and valuers.

The Constitution’s mandate and the intention of the 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy was to address the dispossession of land through three broad categories of reform - land restitution, which provides relief for victims of forced removals; tenure reform, which is intended to secure and extend the tenure rights of those previously discriminated against; and land redistribution, which is a discretionary programme to redress the racial imbalance of landholding (Lahiff, 2007b). The formulation and implementation of each of these policy areas, however, increasingly came to reflect an adherence to the principles of South Africa's neo-liberal macro-economic policy - the Growth and Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) - and the adoption of a market-driven and investor-friendly approach (Greenberg, 2003).

Aligned to the macro-economic policy, a key piece of legislation governing the redistribution of land was introduced - the Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Act 126 of 1993, amended in 1998 and re-titled the Provision of Land and Assistance Act. This Act did not however provide programmatic detail about the nature and mechanisms to facilitate land redistribution but essentially served as an instrument to enable the Minister of Land Affairs to allocate financial assistance for the purchase of land, with the details of land redistribution being deferred and located in various policy documents such as the White Paper on South African Land Policy (Lahiff, 2007b).
This White Paper reflects the guiding principles for the State's intervention in the land market through the land redistribution programme:

“The purpose of the land redistribution programme is to provide the poor with access to land for residential and productive uses, in order to improve their income and quality of life. The programme aims to assist the poor, labour tenants, farm workers, women, as well as emergent farmers. Redistributive land reform will be largely based on willing-buyer willing-seller arrangements. Government will assist in the purchase of land but will in general not be the buyer or owner. Rather it will make land acquisition grants available and will support and finance the required planning process. In many cases, communities are expected to pool their resources to negotiate, buy and jointly hold land under a formal title deed. Opportunities are also offered for individuals to access the grant for land acquisition” (Department of Land Affairs, 1997b:38).

The White Paper (1997b: 38) then details the land redistribution strategy which outlines a programme for land acquisition, land transfer, assistance with basic needs provision and land development. The following tasks and commitments are outlined, all of which, if implemented, should theoretically result in increased levels of land acquisition by the poor and landless via the land market:

- removal of impediments to the efficient operation of the land market
- identification and allocation of state land for redistribution
- establish financial mechanisms to provide grants and loans for land acquisition and development
- provision of assistance to groups to establish legal entities to purchase and lease land
- provision of dispute resolution services to seek local solutions
- assistance to enable beneficiaries to meet basic needs and utilise land in a sustainable manner.

The State has addressed the above commitments to varying degrees by means of different redistribution initiatives, with an emphasis on the provision of grants and loans for land acquisition. The Department of Land Affairs (DLA) currently has two main mechanisms through which land redistribution takes place – the Land Redistribution and Agricultural Development (LRAD) Programme and the Municipal Commonage Programme. These two programmes entail the use of different mechanisms and procedures for resource-poor land seekers to acquire or lease land through the land market.

Until 2000, the redistribution programme provided the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) – an amount of R16 000 allocated to eligible households who had an income under R1 500 per month. In 2001, the SLAG grant was effectively superseded by the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme, which shifted the target from ‘the poorest of the poor’ to the pursuit of commercially-oriented agriculture (Hall et al, 2003). Unlike SLAG, the LRAD grants were paid to individuals and not per household and the amounts available to prospective beneficiaries were larger and based on a sliding scale, dependent on the individual’s own contribution in cash or kind, with the minimum contribution being R5 000 in order to obtain a R20 000 grant. The maximum grant available to an individual
is R100 000. Applications for additional loan financing through institutions such as the state-owned Land Bank was provided for. LRAD also removed the income ceiling, thereby enabling new black middle-class and private sector entrants into the land market through the land reform programme (Walker, 2003).

The National Policy Framework of the DLA as outlined in 2000 states that the LRAD programme is a beneficiary and demand-driven process. This approach places the responsibility for identifying available land and associated willing sellers with willing buyers, and in this instance, with resource-poor land-seekers.

As a result of the small size of the available grants relative to the size and cost of available land, coupled with a reticence amongst sellers and officials to consider sub-division, the majority of redistribution projects have involved groups of applicants pooling their grants to purchase land. In addition, groups of farm workers have used the grant to purchase shares in existing farming enterprises, especially in areas of high-value agricultural land such as the Western Cape (Lahiff, 2007b).

The Department of Land Affairs’ Local Government Commonage Programme is outlined in the White Paper on South African Land Policy: “In large parts of the country, in small rural towns and settlements, poor people need to gain access to grazing land and small arable/garden areas in order to supplement their income and to enhance household food security. The Department of Land Affairs will encourage local authorities to develop the conditions that will enable poor residents to access existing commonage, currently used for other purposes. Further, the Department will provide funds to enable resource-poor municipalities to acquire additional land for
this purpose” (Department of Land Affairs, White Paper on South African Land Policy, 1997b:50 – 51).

The Commonage programme allows the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs to grant an advance or subsidy - the *Grant for the Acquisition of Land for Municipal Commonage* - to Municipal Councils to acquire land through the land market for use as commonage and to be leased by landless people earning less than R1 500 per month. The current level of the grant for the acquisition of municipal commonage land is set at the value or selling price of the land in question, while the infrastructure development grant is set at a maximum of 25% of the value of the land (DLA, 1997a). No planning grant is provided, on the presumption that land-use planning at the municipal level is part of the local Integrated Development Planning process as stipulated in the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003).

Notwithstanding the existence of these land reform programmes and the State’s interventions in the land market and the provision of support grants and services, a number of non-governmental land sector agencies that assist resource-poor land-seekers to acquire land have persistently argued that insufficient land is available for land reform and that resource-poor rural land-seekers’ attempts to acquire land through the land market are frustrated (AFRA, 2006; CRLS, 2003; Mngxitama, 2006; SPP, 2003). This study was prompted by a request from the Surplus People Project (SPP) to explore this claim and to interrogate whether resource-poor, rural, land seekers are able to acquire land through the market-based land reform programme and in doing so, consider whether the land market is an appropriate mechanism for addressing redistribution and land need.
In order to ascertain whether there was any concrete evidence to substantiate these claims, appropriate research sites were identified. The Magisterial Districts of Namaqualand and Hantam in the District of Namaqualand in the Northern Cape Province, and the Magisterial Districts of Bergrivier, Cedarberg and Matzikama in the West Coast District of the Western Cape were selected (details of which are outlined in Chapter Three). These sites are included in the operational areas of the SPP and the organisation facilitated access to communities and land reform projects in these areas, thereby providing an entry point for the research.

These sites enabled the researcher to access data across two provinces and obtain potentially differing insights into the geographic and socio-political dynamics that may impact on the way in which local land markets function in different contexts. The experiences of rural people’s attempts to acquire land in the arid regions of Namaqualand and the Hantam and in the better-resourced West Coast of the Western Cape potentially provided the scope for a range of experiences in differing contexts.

In interrogating the claim made by NGOs as outlined above, the following key research questions were considered:

- What are the operational dynamics of the land market?
- How do these dynamics enable or hinder the acquisition of land by prospective land reform beneficiaries?
- What has been the experience of those trying to acquire land through market-based land reform?
In framing and addressing these questions, the study draws on an agrarian political economy perspective - as used by theorists such as Akram-Lodhi (2007) and Courville (2005), amongst others. This approach provides scope for a consideration of the various contexts and dynamics involved in land transactions and the extent to which these are determined by their socially embedded determinants and the politics of policy-making. In line with this perspective, the study focuses on the social determinants of landholding and of land markets and explores two key aspects in relation to the claims made by land sector agencies. Firstly, it provides a critique of the underlying assumptions prevalent in much of the current market-based land reform policy as advocated by its national and international proponents and the manner in which the market as a mechanism for land redistribution has been conceptualized and its outcomes envisaged. Secondly, it considers the extent to which this conceptualization - which it is argued, draws on idealized notions of land market functioning and efficacy - is realized and examines the extent to which the envisaged outcomes of market-based land reform are aligned with or contradicted by the functioning of real markets and the experiences of resource-poor land seeking people in their attempts to engage in the land market, with limited state support. The details of the market’s operation are analysed, with a distinction made between the operational practice of real markets – based on direct evidence-based observation – and degrees of policy abstraction and theoretical assumptions regarding how markets should or might operate.

The following chapter (below) provides a theoretical framework and overview of the international and local debates about land markets in both their idealised and real forms. Contributing to this theoretical framework is a synthesis of the key features
and policy assumptions regarding the functioning and characterisation of land markets in South Africa and the elements necessary for land market transactions. The chapter provides the analytical framework for the empirical aspect of the study. Findings arising from the case studies (detailed in chapters three and four) regarding the operation of real land markets are matched against this framework. The key elements of this synthesis include a focus on the following features and assumptions:

- A commodity – in this instance, land – must be available for transaction and must be taken up by an adequate response and level of activity.
- Interactions and relationships of negotiation and exchange exist within the sphere of the market. It is assumed by proponents of the land market that the buyers, sellers and their intermediaries who interact in the market do so as equal partners and are viewed as reliable and trustworthy. For them to engage as equal partners, it is assumed that the market is accessible and open to all who wish to engage in it and that all have equal access to information.
- Land market activity presupposes adequate levels of purchasing power and available capital. It is assumed that willing buyers have the necessary expertise and wherewithal to purchase land in the market and have access to the necessary personal finance and/or land reform grants.

Chapter Three describes the research methodology, the selection of the research sites and case studies, and the data gathering process and analysis. Key features and trends in the land market are considered, based on data gathered from the Northern and Western Cape. An analysis of all the agricultural land transactions that
occurred during the five-year period from 1998 to 2002 across five registration divisions within the two districts of Namaqualand in the Northern Cape and the West Coast in the Western Cape was undertaken. To this end, copies of all the relevant title deeds were obtained from the Cape Town Deeds Office and relevant data was extracted and entered into a spreadsheet. The number and size of land reform transactions for the same five registration divisions were then identified as a data sub-set and compared with the number and land size of all the agricultural land transactions which took place in the period and geographic areas under review. The number of land reform transactions as a proportion of general land market activity is presented. In addition, three specific land-seeking communities across the five selected registration divisions were identified as case studies and their experiences of attempting to acquire land through the market-based programme were investigated and documented.

Chapter four provides an overview of the three community case studies and provides background information on their various locations and the attempts made to acquire land through the market-based land reform programme. The Brandvlei Emerging Farmers’ Association in the Calvinia registration division of the Hantam Karoo region in the Northern Cape consists of small-scale farmers from the Brandvlei community. This case highlights the challenges confronting small-scale farmers in their attempts to access commonage through the Municipal Commonage Programme. The study of the Hondeklipbaai community in the Namaqualand registration division of the Northern Cape illustrates the impact of land availability on the operations of the land market and those attempting to engage in it. The study of the Bergrivier Emerging Farmers’ Forum of Eendekuil, under the Piketberg registration division in the
Western Cape, illustrates the attempt of small-scale farmers to utilise LRAD grants and external financial assistance to acquire land for commercial agricultural activities.

Chapter five considers the findings of the study and highlights pertinent outcomes from the case studies and the analysis of the title deeds of all the agricultural land transactions under review. These transactions are analysed in relation to the extent of land reform acquisitions in the same geographic areas. The functioning and accessibility of local land markets are considered in relation to the policy assumptions regarding the key ingredients necessary for market transactions. The findings provide an insight into the workings and efficacy of real land markets within the case study locations and are compared with the espoused principles and outcomes envisaged by market-based land policy with its reliance on the land market as the primary mechanism for land redistribution.

Chapter six concludes with a commentary on the key findings of the study and the extent to which real land needs can be met through the South African version of market-based land reform, predicated on a set of policy assumptions about the role and efficacy of the land market. The findings of this study point to a glaring gap between the State’s espoused policy and actual practice, between what the market (as characterised within a range of idealised and real configurations) is expected to deliver and the extent to which land acquisition by resource-poor land seekers has been enabled by the State’s response and provision of support. In essence, this gap reflects a lack of integration between the spheres of what Bernstein (1994:3) refers to as ‘market logic’ and ‘bureaucratic action’. Many of the origins of this schism can
be traced to the politics of the process surrounding the State’s adoption of market-based land reform in the early 1990s; the manner in which the land market has been characterised in South African land reform policy and the implications of this for policy formulation and implementation; and the nature and level of support provided to land reform beneficiaries by the state.
Chapter Two – Theoretical framework and key policy assumptions

The land market can simplistically be described as an institution, arena or mechanism through which landowners sell to those with the means to buy. Wallace et al (2004:4) suggest that people usually assume that the land market is “the realm of human activity involved in buying, selling, leasing and securing land”. However, in order to better understand the workings of the land market and the extent of market activity and access, the key features and policy assumptions that constitute and hinder or enable land market activity must be deconstructed. This chapter provides a theoretical framework and overview of the international and local debates about land markets in their idealised and real forms and in doing so, deconstructs the key features and policy assumptions regarding the nature and functioning of land markets in the South African context. The resulting synthesis provides the analytical framework for the empirical aspect of this study.

White (1993:2) argues that an effort to ‘deconstruct’ the market is becoming more urgent in the current and changing global politico-economic context in which the old dichotomy between ‘centrally planned’ and ‘market economies’ has been replaced by a situation in which it is becoming increasingly clear that there is a wide variety of market economies. He suggests that the neo-classically derived paradigm of ‘the market’ has become inadequate for the purposes of elucidating the dynamics of real markets as the range of market diversity changes.

The deconstruction of specific national and local land markets in order to discern their theoretical and operating paradigm requires searching beyond that which is
documented and framed in policy documents. Following Wallace et al (2004:19), land markets generate their own myths and shared understandings and a search for a coherent policy characterization of land markets “will reveal high levels of unwritten consensus about markets, access to land and social equity”. They further suggest that although a country may have officially stated policies for dealing with land, policy is formed by an “amorphous process of socio-political construction of a set of shared values about the importance of ownership and accessibility” (2004:22). The absence of specificity in policy documents suggests that there is a set of axiomatic assumptions underpinning land redistribution policy and implies that the land market mechanism for redistributing land is viewed as self-evident and unproblematic.

White (1993:2) suggests that, “the abstract conception of the market deriving from neo-classical economics overrides variations in real markets which are very important for considering and tackling practical problems of development”. This is echoed by Mackintosh (1990) who suggests that the avoidance of characterisation and the tendency to not acknowledge the complexity of markets has resulted in negative consequences for both the beneficiaries and land reform implementers. Idealised and abstracted notions of the market have found little applicability or resonance with those attempting to engage with real markets and those trying to address land need.

The absence of any specific analysis or coherent characterisation of the land market in South African land reform policy documents or legal frameworks, has by default resulted in a range of ‘myths’, perceptions and assumptions on the part of land sector policy-makers, officials, implementers and beneficiaries – these range from
those which reflect the market in terms of abstracted and idealised neo-classical principles to those that are more aligned to the workings of real markets. Besides outlining the provision of support services and land reform grants and their use by land reform beneficiaries in order to acquire or access land through the market-based land reform programme (DLA, 1997a, 1997b, 1999), South African policy documents do not explicitly analyse how the land reform programme will interact with the land market or provide a detailed characterization of the nature and role of the market as understood in the context of South African land redistribution.

The lack of characterisation of the land market in the South African context has fostered an ‘unwritten consensus’ and has led in some instances to individual policy makers and implementers arbitrarily interpreting the nature and scope of the land market in accordance with their own world view. One of the outcomes of this lack of characterisation is a set of assumptions that draws on elements from the neo-classical school of economics which portrays markets as inert intermediaries between mutually benefitting transacting parties and as inherently accessible and benign (Cartwright and Qeqe, 2004). These policy assumptions imply a notion of an idealised market and one that is not impacted upon or shaped by contending interest groups but that simply exists \textit{a priori}.

Wallace et al (2004:7) suggest that each country develops its own patterns and activities associated with the development of its land market, but that as a result of globalisation, local systems begin to adopt generic and common features. The elements necessary for land market activity and the range of policy assumptions that
accompany them have evolved as the land market has emerged in various contexts – these are synthesised below.

**Land as a commodity available for transaction**

Wallace et al (2004) state that “the physical parcel of land as a unique commodity is the starting point” in understanding the land market. A key assumption underpinning the workings of the land market is the manner in which land itself is viewed – primarily as a commodity to be bought and sold.

The evolution of the land market under modern capitalism and the consequent speculative value placed on land has transformed it into a commodity. Gutto (1993) argues that within countries of Southern Africa, with Roman-Dutch legal systems mediated by English common law and elements of indigenous African legal traditions, it is customary to view land and land rights under the “law of things”. Following Marx (1986: 72) and Lukács (1923: 1), land became viewed as private property – as a 'thing' to be protected, bought and sold. As a result of land being reduced to a ‘thing’, the potential exists for land to be stripped of the multiple values it holds for different groups so that it comes to be regarded primarily in terms of its value in relation to the market. Viewing land as a commodity can potentially preclude recognition of the varied values and meanings that are ascribed to and associated with land, such as multiple livelihoods, a range of different land use patterns, socio-political memories, and an acknowledgement of the different kinds of relationships people have to each other and to the land in terms of history, identity, community, gender, age, and religious and cultural beliefs. Walker (2001: 9-10) suggests that,
‘For poor people, a secure place to live, carries enormous value in their daily struggle to cobble together a living from a variety of income sources which include, but go beyond, the material resources offered by the land itself. In addition, land carries with it a highly charged, historically indexed symbolic significance at the political level… Land reform is about returning that which was stolen, that which was used to dispossess, that which fuelled the struggle against apartheid by the black majority. At the individual and community level land is imbued with cultural and emotional meaning that is based on more than its purely utilitarian value. Land is still a potent factor in the social identity of many South Africans, especially but not exclusively in the rural areas. As a consequence, the popular debate on land reform policy continues to be infused with an emotional content that derives its power both from the brutal memory of land dispossession and from the shimmering promise of redress held out by liberation … land is imbued with cultural and emotional meaning that is based on more than its purely utilitarian value.’

Borrowing from Wallace et al (2004), while acknowledging that land is primarily defined as a physical commodity or ‘thing’ within the context of market economies, it is also concurrently understood as being imbued with a range of associated values and meanings. Furthermore, while the commodity of land is a concrete physical entity, the use, ownership and control of land and the social relations associated with it are essentially abstract concepts of rights and powers.

The commodity of land, albeit valued in a myriad of ways, is central to the functioning of the land market which is premised firstly, on the presence of the commodity of
land and secondly, on this commodity being made available for transaction. Where there is no available land for transaction, the market becomes static and in effect non-existent. An active land market where the supply of agricultural land is elastic is a necessary condition for market success and therefore for a successful market-assisted land reform programme to operate (World Bank, 2003). Gordillo and Boening (1999) caution that a market-based approach to land reform can only work effectively in regions where there is a sufficient or excess supply of land in order to avoid triggering an increase in land prices. Deininger (1999, 27(4):651 - 672) suggests that the ideal ratio of land supply to demand is 3:1.

**Interactions and relationships of negotiation and exchange**

For the commodity of land to be transacted on the market, transactors – and in the case of market-based land reform, ‘willing sellers’ and ‘willing buyers’ – are necessary. There are a number of assumptions regarding the nature of these interactions and relations of negotiation and exchange.

According to Marx (1986), with the advent of capitalist economies and the consequent treatment of land as a transactable commodity or thing, the social relations between classes of people also came to be treated as relations between things: “There is a definite social relation between men that assumes ... the fantastic form of a relation between things” (1986:72). This concept is further developed by Lukács (1923:1), “... a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity’, an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people.”
Neoclassical economics and those who subscribe to abstract and idealised theories of markets do not explicitly recognise the impact of social relations, class differences, or positions in society—such as the relations between landowners and the landless, men and women, rich and poor, young and old—on land market transactions. Abstract theories of markets posit that land is a neutral object, a thing, to be bought and sold and that these transactions take place between equal players—equal ‘things’—interacting in the market. According to Cartwright et al. (2004), the nature of the exchange is premised on a notion that the transactors are neutral intermediaries, that the exchange takes place between mutually benefiting transactors and that the market is accessible, with equal opportunities allocated to all groupings in society.

Bernstein et al. (1990: 4) suggest that the land market should not be conceptualised as the “manifestation of impersonal laws of demand and supply or of a ‘hidden hand’”, but that markets are “social institutions and processes that people enter from very different positions in structures of class, gender and power,” and these in turn affect the outcome of their endeavours. This is affirmed by El-Ghomeny (2001), who argues that the land market has specific socio-political features that require particular attention and a different mode of analysis, rather than simply being viewed as an isolated economic mechanism serving to equilibrate supply and demand. The land market cannot therefore be viewed as an abstraction or a neutral, apolitical mechanism for the transferring of land between sellers and buyers but is an inherently complex and dynamic site of struggle between unequal partners, and may serve particular vested interests while excluding those of others (Sen, 2001).
Akram-Lodhi (2007:1437) argues that market-based land reform “is premised on assumptions that fail to recognise the socially embedded character of land transfers”. He further suggests that “land is a cultural resource, being a principal way in which the social and cultural identities that shape power and powerlessness within the myriad diversity of rural societies are formed”.

The consideration of social power and powerlessness is also addressed by White (1993:2) who argues that the conventional economic analysis of markets downplays the role of power, which he views as a key element of real markets. He advocates that a political analysis of markets is needed in order to reflect the ways in which power and power relations influence the structure and operation of real markets. He differentiates between two fundamental views of power – a behavioural and a structural view. The first concentrates on power in terms of interactions between two agents – in this instance, the seller and buyer – and tends to ignore the basis and derivation of each agent’s “initial endowments of power resources” (1993:3) and how power is exercised. The behavioural view tends to perceive transactors in the market as equal players with equal access. Beyond this behavioural view of power, White proposes that, “each real market is a patterned set of social relations with its own specific constellation of power; if the power relation involved in a micro-level market exchange is to be understood it must be situated in the context of a structural analysis of this wider system. The power-patterning of markets affects an agent’s choice by determining the boundaries of available choices, influencing the operational calculus of the chooser and shaping the relative attractiveness of various choices. A combination of behavioural and structural analysis also allows us to
capture the dynamics of the operation of power within markets as a systemic process” (White, 1993:3).

White identifies four different types of power that are at play in the complex process of market politics and the interaction between transactors:

- the politics of state involvement involving *state power* - this includes the state’s role in the regulation and taxation of land, and participation in land markets and land reform;
- the politics of market organisation involving internal *associational power* where the systems of internal regulation are created by market participants;
- the politics of market structure involving *economic power*;
- the politics of social ‘embeddedness’ involving various forms of *social/cultural/ideological power*, where power is inherent in social and cultural institutions, ideologies, gender relations and value systems.

Each of these forms of power is never absent and is interwoven into the broader set of social relations that intersect to grant men and women a place within the structure and hierarchy of their society, and impacts on their ability to access or acquire land. The development of the land market and the way in which it functions is determined by these relationships of power and a struggle between the various forces that they represent – “the characteristic economic features of markets embody political processes of conflict and cooperation and political relations of domination and subordination” (White, 1993:3).
White (1993:2) states that an idealised notion of the market “abstracts from social, political and institutional aspects of real markets which cannot be dismissed as ‘exogenous’ factors but are inherent, and indeed may be essential, characteristics of the functioning of markets in the real world”.

According to White (1993:8), the land market can thus be understood in terms of “a structure of power relations between agents with differential control over market-relevant material and mental assets. At the micro level, participants come to specific markets with unequal endowments in terms of resources. At the macro level, this results in widely different market structures characterised by more or less equal or unequal power; each specific structure of power conditions the way markets operate at the macro-level, shapes the character of exchange relations between individual market participants and influences their relative returns from exchange”.

Bhaduri (1986: 267-72) develops this idea and refers to the ‘class efficiency’ of markets and views the market mechanism as an instrument to further exploit one class by another, rather than perceiving it as an efficient system through which to allocate and redistribute wealth and resources.

White contends that markets can be analysed as “political games in which outcomes are structured in terms of choices taken in the context of variable but structured asymmetries in the capacities of participants, which vary across specific markets and which may in certain contexts result in systematic exploitation through unequal exchange ...” (1993:8).
The World Bank and keen advocates of the market such as Binswanger and Deininger (1996: 70) acknowledge that it is necessary to consider the social context of land markets: “The land market cannot be expected to lead to an efficiency-enhancing redistribution of land because poor family farmers who do not have much equity cannot acquire land”. Deininger et al (1998:2) also state that, “It is well understood that this idealised process has rarely been followed in actual history” and that “… in a number of countries, a highly unequal land ownership distribution implies inefficient and inequitable resource use which the land sales or rental market are not able to smoothly transform into a more efficient and equitable allocation”. They further indicate that “unmitigated operation of land markets alone would not necessarily produce an optimal land allocation” and that “in situations characterised by pervasive inequality in the ownership distribution of land or assets more generally, government involvement in redistributive land reform, aiming to improve efficiency and equity and at the same time remove impediments to the functioning of factor markets, could be justified” (1998:31-32).

Bernstein (1994:1) describes the World Bank, and its policy prescription of market-based land reform, as aspiring to “wrap up the savage contradictions of South Africa in a policy package of ‘efficiency and equity’ … The market is likewise to be the basis for land reform through assisted purchase of land by carefully selected ‘beneficiaries’. This amounts to a policy of ‘betting on the strong’: such beneficiaries are most likely to be men already active in agricultural commodity production and/or with other assets and sources of capital. Their identification and selection, moreover, are held to require elaborate administrative procedures.” Bernstein (1994:3)
suggests that South African land reform policy is an attempt to address ‘market logic’ and its failings by means of ‘bureaucratic action’ in the form of ‘assisted purchase’.

In acknowledging that markets (in the neo-classical sense) do fail, Stiglitz (2002: 73-74) asserts that a degree of state intervention is therefore necessary to assist those with limited access: “… whenever information is imperfect and markets incomplete, which is to say always, and especially in developing countries, … there are desirable government interventions which, in principle, can improve upon the efficiency of the market … Many of the key activities of government can be understood as responses to the resulting market failure.”

In order to meet its Constitutional and policy obligations and in accordance with the acknowledged potential for market failure and the inability of the land market to result in equitable land redistribution, Cartwright and Qeqe (2004) argue that the South African state is compelled to intervene in the market, as rampant free-market activity will not, of its own accord, take cognisance of the needs of the poor and that “without interventions, the outcome of contested exchanges (in the market) perpetuates existing patterns of poverty and power” (Cartwright and Qeqe, 2004:8). The South African state therefore intervenes in the land market through its various market-based land reform programmes and provision of limited support services and land reform grants to beneficiaries of these programmes. It maintains that this support will act as a corrective and enable prospective beneficiaries to overcome obstacles in their attempts to interact with the market (DLA, 1997b). The inclusion of grant provision in the land reform ‘package’ can be viewed as an acknowledgement on the part of policy formulators that while in a strictly theoretical and idealised sense,
South Africa’s land market is accessible to all, the reality is that the “rules of the game” (North, 1989: 5) that govern the market – the social relations and networks, flows of information, skills levels, access to finance, power blocs – pose significant obstacles for entry by resource-poor land-seeking people.

Transactions based on reliability and trust

In commenting on the nature of relationships of exchange, Wallace et al (2004:22) propose that dependence on transaction reliability and being able to verify or vouch for the reliability of a prospective buyer, their membership of certain groups, and the minimisation of risk in incorporating outsiders into groups involved in transactions are regarded as a feature of certain land markets.

Ostrom (1992, 17(9):1320) suggests that the existence of a relationship of engagement and a level of ‘trust’ lubricates and facilitates land transactions between sellers and buyers: “… transactions are facilitated and made easier and more likely when some form of relationship exists between transacting parties. This relationship may constitute an acquaintance, a previous encounter, a cultural link or a political reference. Over time these relationships become embedded in the fabric of markets and serve the interests of market incumbents. Those not party to the network of relationships, or market culture, may struggle to access markets…” Class, race and gender constructs and the social relations embedded in rural areas which are frequently based on perceptions of what constitutes ‘reliability’ and ‘trustworthiness’ impact directly on land reform transactions and on the degree of access to land markets.
Given that resource-poor prospective new entrants to the land market are not generally connected into the broader rural social network of existing market participants, and therefore do not have the benefit of such a verification process to vouch for their reliability, they are confronted by the challenge of finding an entry point into the market.

**Access to information**

An additional and linked factor which militates against resource-poor prospective entrants gaining access to the land market is their limited access to information. A common policy assumption is that information regarding available land, land prices, and other factors about the land market are uniformly and equally at the disposal of all players who wish to engage in the land market. Reality reflects that the patterns of information dissemination and access are uneven and truncated and, according to Cartwright and Qeqe (2004:5), tends to reflect patterns of wealth, with poorer farmers finding themselves with less market information and at a disadvantage.

Stiglitz (1996:62) suggests that “information imperfection” is a major contributing factor in limiting the extent to which markets can be decentralised or made accessible. He adds that information asymmetry has particular implications for certain contexts – in countries or markets where class and gender ‘gaps’ are more pronounced, there is likely to be a heightened degree of information asymmetry and that this should be corrected or considered by the workings of the market or through intervention by the state or other institutions. This is reiterated by Deininger and Feder (1998: 10) who suggest that “facilitating transactions between individuals who
are not members of the same community ... generally involve larger problems of asymmetric information”.

**Adequate levels of purchasing power and available capital**

Internationally, there is a very limited number of land transactions involving small scale farmers. Where these do occur, they are invariably mediated by support from land reform programmes. Deininger and Feder (1998) propose that it is very difficult for small scale farmers or resource-poor land seekers to access markets for credit and insurance. This is compounded by the fact that it is “very difficult to acquire land in the sales market with the expectation of paying off the debt from agricultural profits alone without recourse to equity ... both limited availability of credit and high cost of borrowing would prevent those who do not have accumulated savings from acquiring land” (Deininger and Feder, 1998:18).

The barrier of access to formal credit or grants is a fundamental cause of the perpetuation of market segmentation and exclusion. Besides obvious class differences, El-Ghomeny (2001) points to some of the reasons for the unequal buying power of most rural workers who wish to acquire land and who are unable to access support via a land reform programme or other external support. He questions whether a wage-dependent landless worker can independently purchase land in his or her lifetime and asks how long a worker would need to save all or part of his or her daily wage (assuming that he/she is not unemployed) in order to purchase land in the open market. He points to empirical evidence which indicates that opportunities for rural workers to buy land through the market are virtually non-existent, owing to (a) the downward trend in cropland availability per working person.
in agriculture; (b) inflated land-sale prices combined with falling daily wages in real terms and increases in the cost of living; (c) the increasing demand for land – not only as a commodity but as a unique social asset; and (d) the impossibility of obtaining land mortgages and the high risk of lending capital to landless workers and asset-poor peasants. All these factors contribute to a very limited ability to acquire land and point to the imperative that the state intervene in the land market, through the introduction of land reform programmes and associated grants and loans, in a bid to ameliorate the level of exclusion of the resource-poor.

It is for this reason, amongst others, that the South African state introduced land reform policy intended to enable land acquisition and access. The White Paper on South African Land Policy states that, “The reality is that the poor and the landless are not in a position to acquire land at market prices without assistance from the state. This is because the market price of land usually includes a premium, over and above the capitalised value of agricultural profits. Poor farmers will therefore not be able to repay loans out of farm profits and will need financial assistance from the state in addition to, or instead of, credit” (DLA, 1997b:17).

The South African state therefore introduced land reform programmes such as the Land Reform for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme and Municipal Commonage Programme and their associated financial assistance packages in the form of LRAD grants (previously S/LAG) and grants to municipalities to acquire additional commonage.
A regulatory framework

While markets have become liberalised and deregulated spheres within the economy, they also embody a degree of regulation and established boundaries for them to function effectively and usually operate in accordance with a regulatory framework, a set of rules and conventions that structure the actions of market participants. These provide an established mechanism for enforcing property rights and defining the roles of relevant institutions, as well as mechanisms for determining and regulating the value and price of land. North’s schema of the “rules of the game” and the existence of “norms of behaviour to constrain parties in interaction” (1989:1319) can be understood as part of the regulatory framework which informs the functioning of markets. In part, the regulatory framework is established through the contending powers that intersect within the market, but in addition, a role is played by the state and its agencies, to create a regulated environment in which the market can operate.

The regulatory framework of the market is frequently discussed in terms of the state-market paradigm. White’s analysis (1993) however, differs from this approach. He suggests that the conventional state-market paradigm “predisposes us to think in dichotomous terms of two distinct spheres: on the one side, there is the realm of politics which has to do with the state and other institutions making up the system of formal public politics; on the other side, there is the realm of economics in which economic agents of diverse kinds produce, exchange and distribute through the modality of markets. In the real world, of course, the realms of state and market, public, political and economic systems, are densely and inextricably intertwined”
(White, 1993: 4). Mackintosh reiterates that, “All markets are structured by state action: the only variation is how the terms of their operation are set” (1990: 50).

There are a number of regulatory dimensions of the state’s involvement in the market. White (1993) suggests that at a superficial level, the state intervenes to facilitate market operations, correct market distortions, and achieve social or developmental goals – for example, the introduction and implementation of land reform programmes and associated financial assistance. However, “at a deeper level, the state’s involvement is pervasive; it is the source of a complex network of institutionalised arrangements which permeate markets and influence the way they operate: for example, the legal definition of property rights, licensing laws, standardisation of weights and measures, creation and validation of money and the regulation of contracts. At an even deeper level, state power saturates market exchange in invisible ways” (White, 1993:5), and can be described as an inherent quality redolent of Foucault’s “capillary” notion of power which acts to “permeate, characterise and constitute the social body” (Foucault, 1980:96).

Rosset et al (2006) highlight the impact of the reorganization of the State in accordance with neoliberal principles and argue that it “forces any current demand for agrarian reform firmly within the parameters of a depoliticized (market-oriented) project. In this way, an emphasis on land reform alone ... avoids addressing the other dimensions of power and historical inequity that in the current agenda have marginalized both the rural sector and the rural poor”. Furthermore, they suggest that, “Through a combination of decentralization and an increased privatization of public services, the state comes to function as an organizational tool for market
expansion, and less a vehicle for representative democracy or resource distribution” (Rosset et al, 2006).

Internationally, market-based land reform measures are showing an increasing tendency to rely more heavily on the state to play a central role in land acquisition and to intervene and regulate the market in a range of indirect ways. Besides the South African state’s intervention in and regulation of the land market in its protection of private property as enshrined in Section 25 of the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996), the White Paper on South African Land Policy states that, “The challenge is to find a way of redistributing land to the needy, and at the same time maintain public confidence in the land market” (DLA, 1997b:17). To the extent that there is an acknowledgement of market failure and the existence of historical inequalities and contestation, the post-1994 South African State was prompted to intervene in the land market via mechanisms such as the land reform programme and has provided corrective remedies in the form of land reform grants and limited support services to land reform beneficiaries – thus confirming that the land market on its own is not an effective redistribution mechanism. Its intervention is essentially focused on creating enabling mechanisms for certain categories of resource-poor land seekers to engage in the land market by providing and determining grant allocations, ensuring that the legal requirements are met, and directing buyers and sellers to sources of technical advice.

Besides the institutional interventions that regulate the market, a key element of the regulatory framework is the valuation of land and the guiding parameters for the pricing of land. Given the commodification of land and the view of land as a
speculative asset, the value of land is primarily understood by the market in terms of its price. The South African state has adopted an approach which places emphasis on the transaction of land based on negotiated prices. According to Sibanda, “In the South African experience, the State considers the negotiation of prices to be a cost-effective way of implementing the constitutionally mandated land reform programmes” (Sibanda, 2003:21). This being the case, land price in relation to the size and availability of grants is a major factor in determining whether land can be acquired by resource-poor land seekers through the land reform programme, and can potentially act as the primary brake on land acquisition.

In summary, the following features and their sets of associated assumptions regarding the characterisation and role of the land market underpin much of the current South African market-based land reform policy:

- Land is viewed as a commodity and must be available for transaction;
- Interactions and relationships of negotiation and exchange must exist;
- Adequate levels of purchasing power and available capital must be present;
- A regulatory framework that facilitates and oversees land market activity must operate.

The substance of the policy assumptions associated with these key features necessary for land market transaction are explored in the chapters which follow; with an emphasis on whether the South African state’s intervention in the land market through its various land reform programmes and associated support systems is able, in practice, to overcome the obstacles faced by resource-poor new entrants to the market.
Chapter Three - Methodology and key research questions

An exploration of the claim made by land sector agencies – and more particularly by the Surplus People Project (SPP) – that insufficient land is available for land reform and that resource-poor rural people’s attempts to acquire land through the land market are frustrated, required a critique of the nature and role of the land market and its performance within South Africa’s market-based land reform programme. In doing so, the overlap between the land market as conceptualised by land reform policy makers and real land markets as experienced by resource-poor land-seekers was probed and the following research questions defined:

- What are the operational dynamics of the land market?
- How do these dynamics enable or hinder the acquisition of land by prospective land reform beneficiaries?
- What has been the experience of those trying to acquire land through market-based land reform?

Methodological framework

A limited number of studies have been undertaken which explore the workings of the land market in South Africa. The work of Aliber and Mokoena (2000, 2002 & 2003) provides a profile of how the redistribution programme intersects with the rural land market in specific contexts and offers policy suggestions regarding how existing limitations can be remedied. Studies undertaken by Lyne and Darroch (2001), and Graham and Lyne (1999) focus on regional analyses of land redistribution via the
land market in the province of KwaZulu Natal and highlight the peculiarities of each region and the interaction of these on the local land market and vice versa.

In response to the claim made by land sector agencies as outlined above and their expressed need for a more comprehensive explanation for why resource-poor land-seekers find it difficult to acquire land, this study focuses on an examination of the socio-economic and political factors which militate against them – and provides a critique that draws on a political economy approach.

The study’s methodological framework draws on an agrarian political economy perspective, as used by theorists such as Akram-Lodhi (2007) and Courville (2005), amongst others. This approach provides scope to consider the various contexts and processes involved in land transactions and the extent to which these are determined by the socially embedded character of these transactions and framed by the politics of policy-making. It is argued that land cannot solely be viewed as an economic commodity and that markets are not neutral institutions in which participants are equal players.

Within this methodological framework, the data gathering technique used in this study draws on what Azfar (2002:6) refers to as “analytic narrative”. Azfar uses this term to denote a method that combines theoretical predictions (analytic) with anecdotal and historical description (narrative), based on document analysis, interviewing relevant actors and “seek(ing) to understand the actor’s preferences, their perceptions, their evaluation of alternatives, the information they possess, the
expectations they form, the strategies they adopt and the constraints that limit their action” (Azfar, 2002:6).

Azfar suggests that in-depth interviews are useful for identifying human motivations and that a combination of an analysis of quantitative data and in-depth interviews may provide the best empirical strategy, where the quantitative data provides some information of a more factual basis that can be used to substantiate the study’s findings, and in-depth interviews which are used to validate or qualify these, provide anecdotes and understand motivations. These two techniques, in conjunction with an analysis of broader secondary sources and documentary evidence, contribute to an “analytic narrative” which allows for the links between different levels of institutions and performance – in this instance the agents of market-based land reform policy and the workings of the real land market – to be explored. The motivation for adopting an “analytic narrative” was to facilitate the emergence of a detailed profile of the nature and dynamics of local land markets and the experiences of those attempting to engage in them. This method lends itself to enable the researcher to ascertain whether there is congruence between the more abstracted notion of the land market as reflected in much of the land reform policy, and the ‘behaviour’ of real markets and the experience of land-seekers in their attempts to acquire land.

**Method of data gathering**

Drawing on Azfar’s “analytic narrative”, a theoretical framework based on international and local debates as found in the literature on market-based land reform and an analysis of policy frameworks was developed (See Chapter 2). The
conceptualisation and assumptions made by proponents of the market-based approach and by South African policy makers regarding the nature and role of the land market as the central tenet of market-based land reform were explored. A synthesis of the key features of the land market and the policy assumptions which underpin market-based land reform was then developed. The elements of this synthesis were then matched against the documented experiences and needs of prospective land reform beneficiaries and the workings of real markets. In order to ascertain whether there was any correlation between the intended outcomes and assumptions of market-based policy and the experience of resource-poor land seekers in their attempts to engage in real markets it was necessary to obtain concrete evidence and to identify appropriate research sites.

The study’s research sites are located in the Districts of Namaqualand in the Northern Cape and the West Coast in the Western Cape. The Magisterial Districts of Kamiesberg and Hantam in the District of Namaqualand, and the Magisterial Districts of Bergrivier, Cedarberg and Matzikama in the West Coast District were selected. These form part of the operational areas of the SPP and the organisation enabled me to access communities and land reform projects in these areas, thereby providing an entry point for the research and data gathering. The selection of these districts also enabled access to data across two provinces and potentially provided differing insights into the geographic and socio-political dynamics that may impact on the way in which prospective land reform beneficiaries are able to access the land market and how local land markets might function in different contexts. The experiences of rural people’s attempts to acquire land in the arid regions of Namaqualand with its extensive grazing lands, and in the better-resourced West
Coast potentially provided the scope for a range of dynamics and experiences in differing contexts.

Three prospective land reform initiatives from across the research site were identified for in-depth investigation and constituted the case studies. They include the Brandvlei Emerging Farmers' Association, located in the town of Brandvlei under the Hantam Magisterial District of the Northern Cape; the Hondeklipbaai community under the Kamiesberg Magisterial District; and the Bergrivier Emerging Farmers' Forum in Eendekuil under the Bergrivier Magisterial District of the Western Cape.

The case study approach, which included in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, was used because it enabled the researcher to access sufficient detail regarding multiple factors impacting on those attempting to acquire land through the land market within specific localities and provided an opportunity for the key research questions to be probed within a 'real-life' situation. This approach enabled direct access to members of land reform initiatives and an insight into their experiences located within specific contexts. The findings from the case studies are more likely to approximate 'reality' than those that might be derived from constructing a series of concepts or solely through speculation (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:12) or from a disembodied generic study conducted at a provincial or national level.

Members of the prospective land reform initiatives were interviewed. The intention was not to obtain a representative sample of the views of all prospective land reform beneficiaries across the research sites but rather to focus on three specific and known examples of land need and to track the experiences of these three
communities or projects over the period of the research study in order to examine the kinds of issues that these examples manifested. It was not known at the outset of the study whether their attempts to acquire land would be successful or not. The tracking of their experiences would enable a better understanding of the challenges and obstacles faced by different groupings of land-seekers in their attempts to interact with the land market. In so doing, the evidence obtained would contribute towards an assessment of the claim made by land sector agencies, and the extent of overlap between the espoused outcomes of market-based land reform policy and concrete attempts to address real land need.

The case study approach offered a window into a unique set of circumstances within specific geographic and socio-economic locales which might or might not serve to confirm the broader findings of the study. The case study outcomes could potentially, though not necessarily, be indicative of trends found across the research sites. The intention was not to generalise from the case study evidence but rather to highlight the nature of the experiences of land seekers in these communities, to provide insights into the challenges they faced, to ascertain the level of support they received from service providers and the state, and potentially to indicate ways in which market-based land reform policy might be adapted.

Adding to the evidence obtained from the three case studies, all agricultural land transactions, excluding those zoned as rural town allotments, that took place within the five year period from 1998 to 2002 and across five selected registration divisions (administrative designations of land areas falling under a magisterial jurisdiction for the purpose of land identification and registration) from within the two selected
Districts were analysed. The five registration divisions of Piketberg, Clanwilliam and Vanrhynsdorp in the Western Cape and Calvinia and Namaqualand in the Northern Cape were selected because they incorporate the case studies and are large enough to provide sufficient data about the nature of market activity to allow for ‘saturation’ to occur (Neuman, 2000:418). Table 1 below provides an outline of the research sites and case studies under review.

Table 1: Research sites and case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT</th>
<th>REGISTRATION DIVISION</th>
<th>SELECTED CASE STUDIES OF LAND-SEEKING COMMUNITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>Namaqualand</td>
<td>Kamiesberg</td>
<td>Namaqualand</td>
<td>Hondeklipbaai community on the west coast of Namaqualand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hantam</td>
<td>Calvinia</td>
<td>Brandvlei Opkomende Boere Vereeniging (Emerging Farmers’ Association) in the rural town of Brandvlei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>West Coast</td>
<td>Bergrivier</td>
<td>Piketberg</td>
<td>Bergrivier Kleinboere Forum (Small Farmers’ Forum), in the rural town of Eendekuil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cedarberg</td>
<td>Clanwilliam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Matzikama</td>
<td>Vanrhynsdorp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The five year time frame was considered adequate in order to detect trends in the nature of land transactions; allow for fluctuations in the level of market activity; and include the uptake of the SLAG and LRAD redistribution programmes.

Document and data analysis

The literature review of the international and local debates about land markets in both their idealised and real forms contributed to the formulation of the study’s theoretical framework and situated the land market within the debate about market-based land reform in South Africa. In conjunction with the data analysis and case study interviews, the review of secondary sources and documentary evidence contributes to the “analytic narrative” and allows for links to be drawn between
market-based land reform policy and the workings of the real land market. Arising from the literature review, a synthesis was developed of the key features and policy assumptions regarding the functioning of land markets and the elements necessary for land market transactions. This synthesis provided the analytical framework for the empirical aspect of the study, and the findings arising from the case studies regarding the operation of real land markets are matched against it.

Details of all agricultural land transactions during the period under review across the five registration divisions included in the research site were found in the title deeds relevant to these transactions. Copies of all the relevant title deeds were obtained from the Cape Town Deeds Office.

Title deeds include the following information:

- Property information, such as province and diagram number, extent (hectares)
- Owners (whether there is more than one owner or if the property is held by a company, trust, etc.)
- Endorsements (details of any bonds / other endorsements)
- History (previous owners / title deeds)
- Detail of any contracts relating to the person
- Bonds (if any)
- Statutory information registered against the owner of a property, including farm number, portion number, date of purchase, price paid, bonds lodged and bond holder.

Relevant data was extracted and entered into a database spreadsheet and the data was analysed in terms of the following features, as per the five selected registration divisions and per year from 1998 to 2002 (inclusive):
The number of transactions;

The size of the land being transacted;

The extent to which land was purchased or transacted through mechanisms other than the market (e.g. inherited estates, donations);

The identity of the new owners;

The price of the transacted land.

The data was then qualitatively interpreted “for the purpose of discovering concepts and relationships in [the] raw data and then organizing these into a theoretical explanatory scheme” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:11). This included an analysis of the relationship between land size and the number of transactions that took place; the price of land that was transacted across the five registration divisions relative to the size of the land and the reported carrying capacity for the area; the number of land reform transactions relative to generalised market activity; the extent to which buyers already owned land, thereby indicating the level of land accumulation and concentration; the link between access to information and market access; and the impact of available finance on market access. The analysis also provided an indication of the nature and level of land market activity across the geographic locations and over time. The gathered data was treated both descriptively and analytically (Neuman, 2000:122) and is presented in the findings section outlined in Chapter Five of this study.

Data and information on all the registered land redistribution projects falling within the research sites was obtained from the relevant Provincial Land Reform Offices (PLRO) of the Department of Land Affairs. This data was matched against the data obtained from the analysis of registered title deeds to ascertain any overlap.
number of land reform transactions were then presented as a proportion of the total 
transactions via the land market and superimposed against the level of generalised 
market activity. This exercise provided an indication of the extent to which aspirant 
land reform beneficiaries were able to acquire land through the land market and their 
level of access to real land markets, relative to the general activity taking place in the 
land market.

Interviews

Interviews were undertaken with one hundred and seventy-three respondents from 
across the research sites, and included resource-poor land-seekers and members of 
land reform initiatives, staff of land sector agencies, academic researchers, 
representatives of organised agriculture, commercial farmers, representatives from 
local government structures, estate agents, representatives of the Land Bank and 
personnel in provincial and national offices of relevant government and private 
institutions, amongst others. The size of the respondent group allowed for sufficient 
data collection in order for “saturation” to occur (Morse, 1994:230, as cited in 
Neuman, 2000:418); to indicate trends across the research sites; and to provide a 
range of views from a variety of interest groups. Table 2 details the categories and 
number of respondents that the researcher interviewed, and indicates the level of 
representation according to the various interest groups.
The data that was sought focused on the experiences of land-seeking people in their attempts to engage in the land market and acquire land. The data gathering methods consisted of one-on-one interviews using an open-ended interviewing instrument, focus group discussions and workshop sessions. The interviewing instrument was adapted to each interviewing context, so as to remain appropriate and draw out as much relevant information as possible. The open-ended interviewing instrument was viewed as appropriate because the aim was to gather ‘an authentic understanding’ of the experiences of people and according to Silverman (1993:10), open-ended questions are the most effective route towards this end.

The data was analysed for patterns and relationships (Babbie et al, 2001) which included, for example, perceptions across the various respondent groups about whether land was being made available for land reform and possible reasons for this;

### Table 2: Categories and number of respondents interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of respondent</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hantam</td>
<td>NQl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community member who identified themselves as being landless; emerging farmer attempting to acquire land</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land sector NGO personnel and land sector researchers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of organised agriculture</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent commercial farmer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture official</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Land Affairs – national and provincial</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Public Works</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of municipality/local government structure</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of the Land Bank</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estate agent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining company/corporate institution/private sector</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of SanParks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS:</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
attitudes regarding racism; whether prospective beneficiaries felt that they were in a position to engage in land transactions; the role of the Department of Land Affairs and the impact of its policies and procedures on the scope and pace of land redistribution; the availability of grants and state support services; and perceptions of social inclusion or exclusion, amongst others. It was envisaged that the data would provide insights into people’s experiences and perceptions of the land market and the extent to which they felt it was accessible to them or effective as a mechanism for acquiring land.

It was intended that an amalgam of the findings arising from the analysis of the title deeds, the overview of the number of land reform transactions relative to the general level of market activity, and the documented experiences of people attempting to engage in the land market would serve to provide insights into the workings and efficacy of real, localised land markets and the extent to which they correspond to the intended outcomes as espoused by the proponents of the market-based approach to land reform.

**Limitations**

The process of gathering and systematising data across the two provinces of the Northern and Western Cape proved to be a challenge in terms of the integrity, consistency of format, and quality of information and data provided; and the differing approaches adopted for implementing, recording and sharing information regarding land reform initiatives by the different PLROs. Differences and inconsistencies were noted regarding the different approaches adopted by government departments in implementing land reform projects and programmes, the systems used for
monitoring and recording data, and in capturing information regarding the status and progress of land reform initiatives. These factors hindered the research process and may have introduced a degree of distortion that could not be avoided.
Chapter Four – Background to the case studies

This thesis examines three case studies of land reform initiatives located in Brandvlei, Hondeklipbaai and Eendekuil and which fall respectively within the registration divisions of Calvinia, Namaqualand and Piketberg (See map below).

Map showing location of case studies and research areas under review in the Northern and Western Cape
The case studies provide qualitative and substantive anecdotal information about the experiences of resource-poor land-seekers attempting to acquire or access land through the land market as the central mechanism of the land redistribution programme, and offer insights into perceptions of land availability and the way in which local land markets work. An overview of the case studies is provided here; the detailed findings and analysis are presented in Chapter five.

The first case study of the Brandvlei Emerging Farmers' Association is located in the Hantam Karoo region of the Northern Cape and falls within the Calvinia registration division. It highlights the challenges confronting small-scale farmers trying to access land through the Department of Land Affairs' Municipal Commonage Programme.

The second case study is that of the Hondeklipbaai community in the Namaqualand registration division and illustrates the lack of land available on the open market and the effect of this on a community that had previously been dispossessed of its land. The community attempted to acquire land utilising a range of land reform options – including both Restitution and Redistribution – none of which proved fruitful.

The third case study outlines the experience of the Bergrivier Emerging Farmers' Forum of Eendekuil, under the Piketberg registration division in the Western Cape, and illustrates the attempts of small-scale farmers to obtain support from the Land Bank and to access LRAD grants and external financial assistance in order to acquire land for their commercial agricultural activities.
CASE STUDY ONE – The Brandvlei Emerging Farmers' Association

“... Some people have no land and desperately need land, while other people have lots of land and don't always treat the land as if it is very precious to them. They just have it and it's there for them every day when they wake up. Sometimes people take their land for granted. This makes them to not understand how it is for people who do not have land and who keep looking and hoping.” – A small-scale farmer in the Hantam karoo.

The Brandvlei Opkomende Boere Vereniging (Emerging Farmers’ Association) consists of a group of 26 farmers from the small town of Brandvlei, located 120 km north-east of the town of Calvinia in the Hantam Karoo region of the Northern Cape. The Hantam Karoo lies to the east of the town of Vanrhynsdorp and the Vanrhyn's Pass over the Kamiesberg Mountains. The region includes the towns of Calvinia, Niewoudtville, Brandvlei, Loeriesfontein, Williston, Fraserberg, Middelpos and Sutherland.

The area is sparsely populated with vast areas of white-owned farmland and game parks stretching between the towns. The land is relatively dry, receiving approximately 50 to 200mm of rain annually. The chief agricultural activity in the area is sheep farming. In general, the carrying capacity of the land allows for one ewe per 12 hectare, thus necessitating a relatively large farming area, preferably with both summer and winter grazing.

Individual members of the Brandvlei Emerging farmer's Association (EFA) had for a number of years attempted to farm livestock on various small parcels of land that they had access to, including land on farms where they worked as farm workers and
were reliant on the goodwill of the landholders for the continuation of this arrangement. Between them, the members of the EFA owned a total of 411 sheep and 246 lambs and were unable to increase their stock numbers due to a lack of available grazing land at their disposal. They therefore decided in 1998 to approach the Hantam Municipality and request access to the town’s existing commonage for grazing purposes. They obtained permission to utilise 5,710 hectare of the town’s existing commonage, based on a lease contract with the Municipality. However, the Department of Agriculture intervened and indicated that almost half of this land had been over-used by the previous commercial lessee, and the Department required that this land lie fallow for two years in order to regenerate. This meant that the small-scale farmers had to be accommodated on just 3,365 hectares, where only 338 ewes could be managed. It was therefore critical that additional commonage was acquired in order to accommodate the farming needs of the existing EFA members as well as the growing number of people within the community who were showing interest in farming (Interview with EFA, August 2003).

In 2002, the EFA identified a farm for sale that suited their needs – a farm of 5,438 hectare called *Remhoogte*, adjoining the existing municipal commonage on the outskirts of the town of Brandvlei. The owner indicated that he was willing to sell for land reform purposes. Members of the Brandvlei EFA suggested that his reason for selling was linked to the location of the land: “He (landowner) keeps offering the farm to the EFA because it is surrounded by commonage land. This commonage is being used by other commercial farmers but their lease expires at the end of October and he is afraid that this land will be leased to emerging farmers and that he will be
surrounded by them – he’s worried about stock theft and dogs. Also, he hasn’t got offers from anyone else” (Interview with chairperson, Brandvlei EFA, October 2003).

The EFA consulted the Municipality and requested that it submit an application to the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) to purchase Remhoogte as additional municipal commonage, using the Grant for the Acquisition of Land for Municipal Commonage. In accordance with the terms of such an arrangement, the title deed would be held by the Municipality and the land utilised by the EFA based on the terms contained in a lease agreement. The Municipality agreed with the EFA’s motivation and approached the DLA regarding the purchase.

The landowner agreed to hold open a four-month option to the DLA and Municipality to buy the land at the price of R150 per hectare. This four month time-frame had, however, elapsed before the DLA approached the owner to engage in negotiations, by which time the asking price had increased to R160 per hectare. According to the landowner, this increase was unavoidable due to loss of production experienced by the owner while waiting for confirmation of the sale and a general increase in land prices in the area. However, the DLA indicated to the landowner and Municipality that it was only prepared to pay R155 per hectare (Interview with Chair of EFA, October 2003; Interview with DLA official responsible for negotiations, August 2003). The DLA was urged by the Municipality and the EFA to reconsider and appeals were made to its office in Kimberley, but the DLA insisted that the asking price was too high by R5 per hectare and it therefore terminated negotiations and the deal fell through (Interview, Councillor of Brandvlei Municipality, August 2003). The additional cost of R5 per hectare would have amounted to an additional R27,190 on the total
purchase price. According to a Municipal Councillor, “The Municipality offered to pay the R5 per hectare difference in the price but he (the DLA official) said that the DLA could not agree to this. The Municipality would have been able to pay this difference from the income from *meent* (commonage) leases – we could have paid it off in a year or so” (Personal interview, August 2003).

A Northern Cape PLRO official based in the Kimberley office confirmed that the Department believed the price to be too high and the official dealing with the *Remhoogte* negotiation at the time commented: “*Remhoogte* was ideally situated but the key problem was the price. We could not go above the market indicated price. The DLA does not want to be blamed for increasing land prices and one therefore has to stick to the limits. I agree that there was not a big difference in the price and what DLA could afford to pay but we needed to make the point that we are only prepared to buy land at an appropriate price... Unfortunately, the need for land by the emerging farmers in that area still exists” (Personal interview, DLA official responsible for negotiating the purchase of *Remhoogte*, August 2003).

An official of the Northern Cape PLRO commented: “Given the high selling price asked by the landowner of *Remhoogte*, this transaction was cancelled. Acquisition of this land would have meant that Land Affairs, especially the Northern Cape PLRO, was deliberately frustrating the land market. Had the PLRO continued with this transaction it would have been regarded as fruitless expenditure in terms of the PFMA (Public Finance Management Act, 1999)” (Personal interview, PLRO Official, Northern Cape, August 2003).
The EFA felt that given that available land was so scarce, the DLA should have pushed harder to acquire Remhoogte. Comments made by a small-scale farmer highlight the difficulty of finding available land:

“It is very seldom that a farm comes onto the market that is adequate for our needs and that is within the average price range in the area. It’s not as though we can pick and choose. When an option like this comes onto the market it is a gift on our doorstep, a miracle and yet this miracle has been lost to us because of DLA’s approach to land reform. I don’t think that DLA really understands the land crisis. There simply is no land available, certainly not at an affordable price. We can’t understand the logic of DLA” (Interview with EFA member, August 2003).

There was also a concern on the part of the EFA that the valuation of the farm that had been commissioned by DLA was inadequate and it was alleged that no proper attempt had been made to inspect the entire property and its infrastructure – according to comments from small-scale farmers in the area, the valuation was cursory and the valuation reports were not made available to the EFA or the Municipality. The DLA did not engage with the Municipality during the course of the negotiations with the landowner and the Municipality was simply presented with a final decision (Interview with EFA members, August 2003).

After the failure of the EFA’s attempts to have Remhoogte purchased as additional commonage, the EFA set up a sub-committee that was tasked with looking for other available land. This Committee has since indicated that they have not been able to find any land. They showed interest in a more remote farm that came onto the
market but according to the EFA, when they approached the landowner it was taken off the market. They believed that the landholder’s response was based on prejudice and a lack of preparedness to sell for the purpose of land reform. They suggested that the manner in which the DLA had dealt with the Remhoogte negotiations may have caused the landholder to feel disinclined to engage in a land reform initiative (Interview with EFA members, October 2003).

CASE STUDY TWO – Hondeklipbaai Community

“In the old days we were living and farming and fishing here. Then from the 1960s the mines came and the gates were shut – we were enclosed. We lost our land, we had to get rid of our livestock and we were forced to pay taxes. To this day, we still have no land” - A leader of the Hondeklipbaai community, August 2003.

The village of Hondeklipbaai is situated on the West Coast of Namaqualand, 80 kilometres west of the town of Garies in the Northern Cape. The region is semi-arid and large tracts of land are needed for extensive livestock and grain farming. The climatic conditions are harsh, with very little rainfall, a scarcity of drinking water, little vegetation for grazing animals and the constant threat of drought, overgrazing and soil degradation. The landscape has been further degraded by mining activity, with very little rehabilitation of the soil and vegetation being evident.

The key landowners in the area are the mining companies of de Beers, AlexCor, Okiep Copper Company (OCC), Black Mountain (Anglo American), and Blesberg, a private mine. In addition, the State owns large tracts of land which is leased to the TransHex Mining Company. The community is hemmed in by properties owned by
mining and fishing companies, the State, game parks and private commercial farmers (Interview, official of the Department of Agriculture, August 2003).

The village of Hondeklipbaai is located within the boundaries of the “Farm Hondeklip Bay”, also known as the Hondeklip Reserve, an area of approximately 2,162 hectares in extent. In terms of the Certificate of Registered Crown Title 292/1954, the Farm Hondeklip Bay is state-owned land. On 1st January 1954, the area was proclaimed the “Local Area of Hondeklip Bay”. In 1980, the Divisional Council of Namaqualand was granted jurisdiction over the state-owned portion of Hondeklip Bay. This responsibility was then passed to the Namaqualand Regional Services Council in 1990 and then to the Kamiesberg Municipality in the mid-1990s as a result of the new municipal demarcations (Govender, 1997).

The Hondeklipbaai community has a history of occupation of the Hondeklip Bay Reserve which goes back to the nineteenth century. Senior residents in the village make the following claim:

“Die gebied was plat en uitgestrek met geen beperking op weivelde. Geen grensdrade of bakens wat gedien het as grense tussen Hondeklipbaai en Kommagas. Veeboere het seisoenaal rondgetrek met hul vee en matjieshuise. Daar is dus bewyse van ou veeposte en oorblyfsels van okkupasie. [The area was flat and stretched out with no limits on grazing. There were no boundary fences or beacons which indicated boundaries between Hondeklipbaai and Kommagas. Livestock farmers migrated according to the seasons with their livestock and thatched dwellings. Today you can still find traces of old animal posts and signs of occupation]” (Govender, 1997).
As a result of the forced removals under Apartheid and the protection of diamond mining interests in the area, the community living in Hondeklipbaai was dispossessed of its land in the 1960s. Today, there are approximately 600 people living in the Hondeklipbaai township village. Of these, at least 40 indicated a strong desire for land in order to farm or pursue other marine and mining-based enterprises (Community focus group discussion, August 2003). People continue to struggle to find available land to carry out their multiple livelihood strategies. According to residents:

“There are economic opportunities such as perlemoen and oysters but we can’t expand and do the work because we do not have the land to run the operation from. A group of women want to start an oyster project but they have no land. As soon as you start to just use the land that is sitting there then suddenly the owners or whoever start complaining and tell us we can’t be there and chase us away. Just to get land or rights to use the land or to fish, you have to have a lot of money. People don’t have money and so they just stay away from engaging in these issues. They just stay on the side and then they can’t develop” (Interview with residents, August 2003).

Arising from a series of workshops conducted in the community, an analysis of the residents’ current livelihood activities was undertaken. It reflects that many residents are living below the poverty datum line and are struggling to support themselves and their families. Most are reliant on State social grants and pensions. All those interviewed indicated a desire to improve their standard of living and to explore other livelihood strategies and options – the acquisition of land was viewed as critical and central to realising this and reflected the multiple values and meanings community
members placed on the land (Findings of community workshop, Hondeklipbaai, August 2003).

Residents indicated that:

“There are no more jobs in the mining industry in this area – mines have been overworked and most are rationalising and down-scaling – and so farming is the only option available to us as a source of income and livelihood. We need land in order to farm” (Interview, August 2003).

Members of the Hondeklipbaai community indicated that they had received very little support in their attempts to acquire land and commented on the DLA and Department of Agriculture’s approach to land reform implementation work, suggesting that the government was not proactive:

“DLA and the Department of Agriculture do not help us find land. The community has to look for land and once we’ve identified it we have to approach the DLA or Agriculture. It seems that there is a conservative approach from Agriculture – if there’s no willing seller then that’s just too bad” (Interview, August 2003).

The community had attempted to acquire land through both the Restitution and the Redistribution programmes of land reform. The first claim for the restitution of their land rights submitted on behalf of the residents was lodged by the Hondeklipbaai Development Forum in 1994. However, the Regional Land Claims Commission was of the opinion that Restitution was not the appropriate mechanism to be utilised in
this instance and the land claim was rejected. This resulted in a claimant community in Hondeklipbaai that:

“... feels deeply aggrieved and lives with a sense of its rights having been eroded. The oral testimony of its members, especially its senior members is a tale of woe, of poverty and no promise of relief. Their accounts of what happened hold on doggedly to their conviction of loss of rights to the land” (Govender, 1997:21).

After the failure of their attempt to acquire land through the Restitution Programme, the Hondeklipbaai community continued to attempt to find land in the hope of acquiring it through the LRAD programme. However, they have had no success in finding available land and are of the opinion that there is no land currently available for purchase in the area. The residents view the land market as static and as essentially being an internal market in the event that land does become available for transaction. They indicated frustration about the LRAD process saying that they are responsible for finding land and that they can only approach the DLA for assistance or a grant once they have a degree of certainty about the owner’s preparedness to sell for land reform purposes. They indicated that it is virtually impossible for an owner to have faith in the negotiating process and to commit to engage in a land reform negotiation if the buyers themselves have no certainty about whether their grant application will be approved or how much money they will be granted (Interview with Hondeklipbaai residents, August 2003).

According to members of the community, they suspect possible collusion amongst private landowners in a bid to keep them out. They have the sense that land for sale
is not publicly advertised and that landowners only inform their neighbours and relatives. The community views this as a 'closed circuit' which excludes them (Interview with Hondeklipbaai residents, August 2003).

Land that could potentially become available is state-owned and is leased by the TransHex mining company. The Company indicated that it was rehabilitating mining areas and was due to hand land back to the state within two years (Interview, TransHex management, September 2003). Out of desperation, a number of the Hondeklipbaai residents are hoping to acquire this land, but while it is well-situated it may be unsuitable as it has become too degraded and will require an extensive period of re-vegetation and rehabilitation prior to being viable for agricultural purposes (Interview, Department of Agriculture, September 2003).

During 2003 and following a series of community meetings, the residents of Hondeklipbaai organised themselves into a *Grondsoek Kommittee* (Land-seeking Committee) in order to streamline and co-ordinate their attempts to access land and to network and engage with existing forums that may assist them with accessing land.

The community was concerned that even though they had raised their land needs with the Department of Land Affairs and with the mining companies in the area, the de Beers Mining Company was in the process of selling off land to the Namaqualand Parks Board and the State was not providing adequate assistance to support residents in their attempts to acquire land (Community workshop, Hondeklipbaai, August 2003).
The generalised level of despair expressed by residents of the Hondeklipbaai community is captured in the words of a land seeker and aspirant farmer:

“The land is dry, the grants are dry, and our pockets are dry” (Interview, August 2003).

CASE STUDY 3 – Bergrivier Small-scale Farmers Association

“It was dark for us, but it was light for them” – Comment made by a small-scale farmer from Eendekuil, regarding his Association’s experience of interacting with the Land Bank and a consortium of commercial farmers, August 2003.

Eendekuil is a village settlement that is located approximately 30 kilometres north of the town of Piketberg in the Piketberg registration division. It falls under the jurisdiction of the Bergrivier Municipal District of the Western Cape.

Private landowners and commercial farmers own approximately 90% of the agricultural land in this region. The land is used for commercial agriculture and increasingly for private game farms and wild life reserves. The remaining land is owned by private companies engaged in cement and sand mining and processing, with mining and industrial sites at Saldanha Bay; the Municipalities of Saldanha, Matzikama, Bergrivier, Swartland and Cedarberg each own commonage land; and Christian orders own extensive tracts of land at mission stations at Abbotsdale, Wittewater, Genadendal, Wuppertal, Genadenberg and Moravia.

There were initially two groups of small-scale farmers in the Eendekuil area – the Sandveld Farmer’s Association and the Eendekuil Small-scale Farmers’ Association.
Both groups had been interested in acquiring the farm Goergap at the time that the former owner of the farm had become insolvent and the farm was sequestrated and placed under the administration of the Land Bank. The farm has a land area of 3,000 hectares and is located in the Eendekuil area of the Bergrivier Magisterial District in the Piketberg registration division.

During the course of discussing how they might apply for redistribution grants from the DLA through the West Coast District Assessment Committee (DAC) in order to purchase Goergap, the two associations agreed to merge and make a single application to the DAC. They formed the Bergrivier Emerging Farmers’ Association, with a combined membership of 260 emerging farmers.

Due to the introduction of a moratorium on all redistribution grant allocations in 2000, the EFA was unable to access any land reform grants. They therefore approached the Land Bank in two capacities – both as the administrator (and therefore the seller of the land) and as a potential lender of finance – in order to purchase Goergap from the Bank. They requested assistance from the Bergrivier Municipality in the form of providing support and motivating for their intended land reform initiative (Interview, Bergrivier EFA, September 2003).

According to the EFA, at the time that they made their initial application to the Land Bank there were no commercial farmers showing interest in Goergap. During the course of their contact with the Bank, however, they came to believe that the Bank was “not interested in our application. We felt ignored and the Land Bank treated us as if we did not know about farming and about how to work the land” (Interview with
EFA members, September 2003). They approached the Land Bank on numerous occasions and provided a motivation as to why their application for a loan to purchase Goergap should be considered favourably. In addition, the EFA met with the DLA regarding the status of their application for a grant in light of the moratorium on all new grant applications and the implications of this on the registration of their intended project at Goergap (Interview with EFA members, September 2003).

During the course of lodging their application and feeling that they were not making adequate progress, the EFA was approached by a business consultant who became interested in purchasing Goergap. The consultant proposed that the EFA join him in establishing a joint venture in the form of a Trust, with the EFA having a 51% share and the consultant having a 49% share. He had indicated that on the basis of funds from the offices of the Departments of Agriculture, Social Services and Economic Development and Tourism he could secure funding from Holland and that the farm's produce (export quality onions) would be exported to Holland. He acquired planning funds from the Department of Agriculture in order to develop a business and land management plan (Personal interview with business consultant, November 2003).

The EFA then agreed to engage with the consultant to purchase the land and to embark on a joint venture. In March 2003 they jointly made an offer of R1 000 per hectare to the Land Bank as the administrator of Goergap. This amounted to a total offer of R2,9 million. When submitting their offer, they indicated in writing that they would be prepared to negotiate and to increase their offer if necessary, depending on the progress of the negotiations. However, according to the EFA, the Land Bank did not respond to their offer or to their various correspondence and instead offered
the property to a consortium of existing commercial farmers and landowners in the area, for R10 000 more than the EFA’s initial offer (Interview with EFA, September 2003). The EFA and consultant indicated that they would have been in a position to raise this additional sum had they been given to opportunity to do so (Personal interviews, September 2003).

The chairperson of the EFA indicated that after receiving no acknowledgement or outcome from the Land Bank, he had contacted the relevant official at the Bank and requested reasons as to why they had not been granted the farm and/or why they had not been invited to increase their offer in order to match that of the competing consortium. Various explanations were given to the EFA, none of which they found to be satisfactory (Interview, EFA Chairperson, September 2003).

The EFA viewed the Land Bank’s management of the situation as “unfair and unprocedural” (Interview, September 2003). They believed that the Land Bank had acted in a discriminatory manner towards them, after having initially raised their expectations. The EFA was of the opinion that the state, through the DLA and the DAC, had not played its expected role of encouraging land reform and supporting small-scale farmers in their endeavours (Interview, September 2003). When contacted by the researcher, the Land Bank indicated that, “The outcome had been determined by market forces” and that it was not in a position to consider “uncompetitive bids” (Personal interview, Land Bank official, September 2003).

The above case study sketches provide the background and the evidence base for the detailed analysis of the land market as presented in the next chapter.
Chapter Five – Findings of the study

This chapter presents the study's findings, including narrative and anecdotal detail from the case study interviews and a quantitative analysis of the title deeds of all agricultural land transactions within the five year period under review. The presentation of these findings is structured according to features that are necessary for land market transactions to take place and the policy assumptions associated with these, as outlined in Chapter two.

Land as a commodity available for transaction

This section focuses on land as a commodity, its availability for transaction on the land market, the extent of land market activity across the five registration divisions and case study areas, and the fundamental impact of the lack of land on the market and the potential for land seekers to acquire land.

Land as a commodity

In each case study, the respondents did not view land simply as a commodity but highlighted the multiple values they placed on land and the significant effect that having access to land might have on their livelihoods, health and well-being. The multiple uses and livelihoods derived from land are highlighted by the Hondeklipbaai case study. Significantly, all respondents viewed access to land as an indicator of the realisation of social justice and a restoration of their rights (Interviews, community members, 2003).
The focus on a land parcel primarily as a commodity, without due consideration for the other values and uses associated with acquiring that particular land as well as the State’s focus on market value as the primary determinant of the value of land is starkly illustrated by the Brandvlei emerging farmers’ experience of attempting to acquire the farm *Remhoogte* as additional commonage. The value of the farm was viewed by the DLA solely in terms of its market value and in terms of its price as a commodity rather than the socio-economic and political impact which the acquisition might have had on those involved. The Department refused to purchase the land because the price was viewed as being above the scope of what constituted the market value by R5 per hectare. In the process, other values of significance to the willing buyers were lost sight of – its location and proximity to town, the lack of any other available land in the area, the use value, the potential to improve the livelihoods of the farmers and their families, the multiplier effect on the local economy, the impact of improved nutrition for the affected families, and the element of social justice and symbolic restoration of land to otherwise landless people in the area.

*The availability of land in the case study locales*

A fundamental ingredient for both the functioning of the land market and for implementing market-based land reform is an adequate level of activity in the market. In contrast to the need for an ‘elastic’ supply of agricultural land in order for there to be a vibrant land market (World Bank, 2003) and Gordillo and Boening’s (1999) warning regarding the need for a sufficient supply of land if market-based land reform is to be possible and affordable (as detailed in Chapter Two), the experience of land-seekers in the three case study areas suggest that the lack of
available land for sale has resulted in an essentially static market within their locales and therefore in a stalling of land reform (Interviews with community members, August 2003; Department of Agriculture officials, October, 2003). In the Hondeklipbaai region of the Northern Cape, land-seekers indicated that there are at least 40 individuals seeking land at any one time, either as a group or as individuals, but that there is a zero supply of land available for transaction – thus indicating that there is effectively no land market in the area.

The lack of available land in this region was confirmed by commercial farmers who had themselves been forced to purchase land far away from their existing farm/s in order to acquire additional grazing. In the words of a commercial farmer in the Hondeklipbaai area, “Land is scarce here. I ended up buying a farm 200km away because there were no farms in this area that were for sale” (Interview commercial farmer, Hondeklipbaai, November 2003). The fact that a successful commercial farmer who had available capital resources and was well-connected in the local farming community had found it so difficult to find land, suggests that it would be all but impossible for local resource-poor community members to find available land in the area.

Similarly, the case studies of the Brandvlei Emerging Farmers Association and the Bergrivier Small-scale Farmers Association also point to a land supply-demand ratio that does not respond to land need in the area. The latter group stated that there was a scarcity of affordable and appropriate land type and size available on the market (Interview, Bergrivier EFA, September 2003). In the words of an emerging farmer from Bergrivier: “It is very difficult for us to understand and believe it when we
are told that land reform is working and that the willing seller/buyer is the best route to go. There simply is no land available to us, even if we could afford to buy it. Part of the problem is that certain farmers have up to seven farms each ... we cannot get our foot in the door. There’s a monopoly on land ownership here” (Interview, August 2003).

The DLA Northern Cape Provincial Office indicated, “There is a scarcity of land for purchase in the Hantam area. It is our experience that even private purchases are not regular and this naturally contributes to relatively high land prices” (Interview, November 2003). However, in the absence of available land on the market, no alternative channels were sought by the DLA to acquire land for prospective land reform beneficiaries through alternative mechanisms such as expropriation, the purchase of a large tract of land with the potential for sub-division, or other forms of intervention. The market can therefore be said to be the determining factor in the progress and pace of land reform, with little or no alternative intervention made by the state over and above making grants available to aspirant beneficiaries.

A factor that appeared to have impacted on land availability in the Namaqualand and Hantam Karoo region is the preparedness of the South African National Parks (SANParks) to pay relatively high prices for land. A number of commentators indicated that as a well-resourced buyer with an ambitious expansion plan, SANParks pushes up land prices and absorbs all available land in the area. An estate agent in Namaqualand indicated that, “It is not uncommon for SANPARKS to pay 50% above the normal market value to get land in order to establish new game parks or extend existing ones. An example is that of the SANPark’s purchase of land
in the Garies area in order to extend the Namaqualand National Park. The nature of this kind of land transaction accompanied by a preparedness on the part of the buyer to purchase land at any cost, serves to destabilise the land market and impacts on those who wish to buy land but who cannot compete with the offers made by the Park” (Interview, October, 2003).

The study found that the lack of available land in the three case study locales, more especially for the purposes of land reform, meant that there were extremely limited or non-existent local land markets in these areas and the local land markets were unable to meet the needs of resource-poor land seekers. This situation as found in the three case study locales points to policy failure in that the adoption of market-based land reform and its reliance on the market is predicated on land being available and yet a number of the local land markets where the case studies are located were found to be very thin or static.

Land market activity

At a broader level, across all the five registration divisions under review – Piketberg, Clanwilliam and Vanrhynsdorp in the West Coast region, and Calvinia and Namaqualand in the Northern Cape – the analysis of data based on the registered title deeds for all transactions of agricultural land from 1998 to 2002 indicated generalised activity across these local land markets, albeit with some registration divisions indicating higher average levels of activity than others. However, it is necessary to qualify the number of transactions by the amount (hectares) of land transacted and to consider the nature of the transactions which took place, including the identity of the new owners and the extent of land reform transactions. The
various elements that constituted the level of land market activity were analysed and are presented below.

- **Number of transactions and land area**

A total of 1,841 portions of agricultural land were transacted across all registration divisions during the five-year period under review, as detailed in Table 3 below.

*Table 3: Number, total area and size of agricultural land transactions in 5 registration divisions: 1998-2002*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registration Division</th>
<th>Piketberg</th>
<th>Clanwilliam</th>
<th>Vanrhynsdorp</th>
<th>Calvinia</th>
<th>Namaqualand</th>
<th>Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># existent agricultural properties registered in each reg. division</td>
<td>2,204</td>
<td>2,491</td>
<td>3,041</td>
<td>3,149</td>
<td>2,173</td>
<td>13,058 existent agricultural properties registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># transactions (purchased &amp; non-purchased portions)</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>1,841 transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># farms involved in transactions</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>832 farms involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># hectares transacted (ha)</td>
<td>108,691</td>
<td>306,110</td>
<td>250,757</td>
<td>631,810</td>
<td>730,482</td>
<td>2,027,846 ha transacted (including non-purchased land)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average size of land transacted (ha)</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td>1,101 ha = av. size per transaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage transactions of registered properties</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14% of total 13,058 registered agric land parcels were transacted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The number of agricultural properties is based on the number of portions of land, not the total number of title deeds registered for the area. This allows one to analyse the number of separate properties which could be transacted on the land market. A number of portions/properties typically make up a single farm. The number of farms indicates the number of agricultural properties registered under one farm number with the same title deed number for which at least one portion was transacted.

The total of 1,841 parcels of transacted land constitutes 14% of the total 13,058 registered agricultural land parcels in the five registration divisions under review.

There was not a great deal of variation across the registration divisions and a breakdown per registration division revealed that 16% of all registered properties in the Piketberg and Namaqualand registration divisions were transacted, 14% in Clanwilliam and 13% in Vanrhynsdorp and in Calvinia, thus suggesting that levels of activity (at least in relation to the total number of parcels) was relatively even across the five divisions.
As indicated in the table above, a total of 2,027,848 hectares of land was transacted across the five registration divisions with Namaqualand (730,482 ha) and Calvinia (631,810 ha) having the highest amount of land transacted followed by Clanwilliam (306,110 ha) and Vanrhynsdorp (250,757 ha), with Piketberg (108,691 ha) accounting for the least amount.

The average size of transacted land was 1,544ha in Calvinia and 2,040ha in Namaqualand, with an average of 618 hectares across the three West Coast registration divisions.

• **Transactions of non-purchased and purchased land**

Land market activity cannot be understood simply as a total of the number of land transactions that were registered with the Deeds Office. Based only on the number of registered transactions, the market may appear to be making more land available on the open market than is in fact the case. This study found that there were a sizable number of registered transactions that did not take place on the open market. A detailed analysis of the nature of these transactions and the extent to which the land involved was available to the open market was undertaken. For the purposes of this study, land transactions were analysed in terms of the following two categories:

- “Non-purchase transactions” – those land transactions where no purchase price was paid, as in the case of inherited estates, donations, consolidations of properties, transfer of properties from the national state to provinces and from one municipality to another.
- “Purchase transactions” - those land transactions for which a purchase price was paid.
The bulk of land that was transacted during the period under review was purchased and amounted to 1,575,077 ha of the total of 2,027,848 ha, or 78% of the total transacted land. However, there was a significant amount of land (452,802 ha or 22% of the total land transacted) that constituted registered transactions for which no purchase price was paid (See Table 4 below).

Non-purchase transactions

The non-purchase transactions effectively occurred outside the land market. While contributing to the apparent level of land market activity in terms of the number of registered transactions, the non-purchase land that was transacted might mislead one to believe that more land was available on the land market than was in fact the case.

Table 4 (below) indicates the various categories of non-purchase transactions as identified on the title deeds included in the research study data, and details the number and amount of non-purchased land transacted within each category according to the registration division in which they were located. Entries on the deeds registry include information such as certificates of consolidated and registered titles; transactions denoted by “Nil” where no purchase price was paid because there was a private agreement between parties; donations; inherited estates; partitions in the case of land being sub-divided and a new portion being granted its own certificate; rectification in the event of a deed being lodged incorrectly; expropriation; and various forms of transfer from national to provincial or municipal jurisdictions.
• **The transaction of estates**

The transaction of estates alone amounted to 291,564 hectares, or 14% of the total land area transacted and involved 225 transactions, which constituted 12% of the total number of land transactions that took place during the period under review. By implication, 12% of all registered transactions were already outside the realm of the market and therefore not available for purchase for the purposes of land reform.

Given that estates are usually passed down to family members or relatives, and that white people predominate in terms of existent land ownership, it can be assumed that this 12% of all transactions perpetuated the same white land ownership profile, and effectively excluded new entrants or potential land reform beneficiaries.

• **Donations**

The study established that a total of 11 donations were made, amounting to a total of 20,610 ha. Of these, there were seven totalling 20,518 ha (1% of the total land area transacted) made to the South African National Parks in the Namaqualand registration division; two in the Piketberg division – one of 5 ha to a Workers’ Trust and the other (86 ha), to a company; and two in the Vanrhynsdorp division where both were portions (0.3ha and 0.15 ha) of the same farm were donated to a trust.

As in the case of inherited estates, the land involved in these donations was not available for transaction on the open market, thereby further decreasing the amount of land ostensibly available to resource-poor land seekers.

• **Expropriations**

Expropriation in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 for public purposes other than land reform is not uncommon in South Africa. Much of the land that has been
expropriated has been for the purposes of public utilities and service routes such as roads and railways. This was confirmed by this study which found that a total of 21 expropriations totalling 308 ha took place in the period under review, all of which were undertaken to provide land required by the para-statal, Transnet. There were no recorded expropriations for the purposes of land reform.

Overall, this study found that approximately 23% of the total registered transactions for the period under review were for non-purchased land in the form of inherited estates, donations, expropriations and other transactions that were not accessible on the open market.

Table 4: Agricultural land transactions involving non-purchased land: 1998-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of non-purchased land:</th>
<th>Piketberg</th>
<th>Clanwilliam</th>
<th>Vanrhynsdorp</th>
<th>Calvinia</th>
<th>Namaqualand</th>
<th>Total # non-purchase trans'ns</th>
<th>Total ha non-purchase trans'ns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCT *</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32,977</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRT *</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7,430</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20,518</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited estates</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>62,239</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil *</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partition *</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8,124</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rectification *</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 239-200/93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expropriation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>67 (of 347)</td>
<td>48 (of 346)</td>
<td>72 (of 381)</td>
<td>128 (of 409)</td>
<td>205,785 (of 356)</td>
<td>115 (of 358)</td>
<td>430 (of 1,841 = 23%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The different types of coded non-purchased transactions are defined as follows:

  CCT = Certificate of Consolidated Title: A group of properties are amalgamated into one title deed as one property.

  CRT = Certificate of Registered Title: This is in order to separate a particular piece of property from a single title deed, including separating it from other properties. There is no change in ownership as a result of the transaction.

  “Nil” is indicated in instances where there is no purchase price in the deed because there is an agreement between the parties.

  Partition: One piece of land is sub-divided and the new portion is granted its own certificate in terms of S.43 of the Deeds Registration Act.

  Rectification: In cases where a deed is lodged incorrectly and the entry is corrected by the Deeds Office.
Transactions of purchased land

This section deals with land transactions where a purchase price was paid. Table 5 below indicates the amount of land and number of transactions involving purchased land per annum for each registration division for the period under review.

Table 5: Number of transactions and amount of land (ha) purchased per annum per registration division: 1998-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of purchase date:</th>
<th>Piketberg</th>
<th>Clanwilliam</th>
<th>Vanrhynsdorp</th>
<th>Calvinia</th>
<th>Namaqualand</th>
<th>Total # per yr per reg div</th>
<th>Total ha per annum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No: N</td>
<td>No: ha</td>
<td>No: N</td>
<td>No: ha</td>
<td>No: N</td>
<td>No: N</td>
<td>No: N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7,478</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10,865</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>39,250</td>
<td>37,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14,922</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>16,519</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51,577</td>
<td>121,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>18,868</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>211,612</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50,463</td>
<td>113,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>32,850</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>32,356</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>47,264</td>
<td>95,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10,830</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14,180</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15,970</td>
<td>57,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>84,948</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>285,531</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>204,524</td>
<td>574,049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of transactions that involved purchased land during the period under review was 1,411 with the Vanrhynsdorp area indicating the highest number of purchased transactions at 309, followed by Clanwilliam (298), Calvinia (281), Piketberg (280) and Namaqualand (243).

The graph in Figure 1 below provides details of the number of purchased transactions per annum for each of the five registration divisions under review.
The trend across all registration divisions from 1998 to 2001 (inclusive) demonstrated an increase in the number of land transactions over time. The decrease reflected for 2002 could be explained by the fact that not all land transactions for that year had yet been registered with the deeds office. In addition, an official from the Deeds Office suggested that the decrease in the number for 2002 could be accounted for by the very high interest rates experienced during that year and the consequent impact on people's ability to buy and sell (Personal interview, November 2003). The constant increase in the number of transactions year on year demonstrated that the land market was not static and that there were growing levels of activity.

The total amount of purchased land involved 1,575,077 hectares across the five registration divisions in the five-year period. The most land was purchased in Namaqualand (574,049 ha), followed by Calvinia (426,025 ha), Clanwilliam (285,531 ha), Vanrhynsdorp (204,524 ha) and Piketberg (84,948 ha).
Of the total amount of land registered as agricultural/rural land (excluding rural town allotments) in each registration division, Clanwilliam’s agricultural purchased land transactions amounted to 39% of the total agricultural land in this registration division, while Piketberg amounted to 19%, Vanrhynsdorp to 16%, Namaqualand to 11%, and Calvinia to 5%. These percentages reflect fairly high levels of land market activity.

In general, the study found that the trend over time reflecting the amount (area) of land purchased in each area is the reverse of the trend regarding the number of transactions in each area - the areas that witnessed higher numbers of transactions were found to involve smaller land areas, while those which had lower numbers of transactions involved larger areas of land. While Namaqualand reflected the lowest number of purchased land transactions (243 out of the total of 1,411 or 17%) of the total number of purchased transactions, it indicated the highest amount of land being purchased, at 574,049 ha, or 36% of the total land purchased across the research sites during the period under review. On the other hand, Vanrhynsdorp had the highest number of transactions (309) but had the second lowest amount of land purchased (204,523 ha) thus indicating that these transactions involved smaller tracts of land than those purchased in an area such as Namaqualand. This data suggests that there was not a direct correlation between a high level of market activity (in the form of the number of transactions) and the amount of land that was transacted.
Figure 2 below shows that across the five-year period under review there was a generalised downward trend in the average sizes of property transacted for all registration divisions.

![Average size of purchased land (ha)](image)

*Figure 2: Average size (ha) of purchased land per annum for each registration division: 1998-2002*

This profile suggests that owners were retaining the larger areas of land and shedding smaller available areas of land that they no longer required for productive use or could no longer afford to retain. It was evident that Namaqualand and Calvinia were consistently the regions where the highest average land area had been purchased, with average land sizes purchased in Namaqualand ranging from just under 4,000 hectares to just under 2,000 hectares over the five-year period, and revealing a gradual decrease in the average size of land transacted over the years. The average land areas purchased in the West Coast divisions of Piketberg, Clanwilliam and Vanrhynsdorp reflect a gradual downward trend within a range of less than 1000 hectares over the five-year period under review.
• **Land reform transactions relative to general land market activity**

As indicated above, the average level of activity on the land market was found to be considerable. Having noted this level of activity, the study examined the extent to which land reform transactions constituted part of this activity.

Table 6 below details the amount of land transacted for land reform purposes as a percentage of the total amount of registered land transactions from 1998 to 2002 across the five registration divisions under review. Over the five year period, a total of 35 land reform projects were approved by the DLA, amounting to a land area of 274,110 ha and constituting 13.5% of the total 2,027,848 ha transacted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period: 1998 to 2002</th>
<th>Namaqualand Registration Division</th>
<th>Calvinia Registration Division</th>
<th>West Coast of Western Cape (Piketberg, Vanrhynsdorp and Clanwilliam registration divisions)</th>
<th>Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land transacted for land reform (ha)</td>
<td>259,053</td>
<td>2,044</td>
<td>13,013</td>
<td>274,110 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of land reform projects approved</td>
<td>13 (2 x LRAD 11 x Commonage)</td>
<td>3 (3x LRAD)</td>
<td>18 (8 x LRAD 10 x FWES 1 x Commonage)</td>
<td>35 (13 x LRAD 10 x FWES 12 x commonage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ha transacted (purchased and non-purchased land)</td>
<td>730,482</td>
<td>631,810</td>
<td>665,557</td>
<td>2,027,848 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land reform acquisitions as % of total amount of transacted land in reg divisions</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1.95%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Across all the registration divisions under review, there were 13 approved LRAD projects, 12 Commonage and 10 Farm Worker Equity Share projects (FWES). The majority of commonage projects (11) were located in Namaqualand and the highest number of LRAD (8) and FWES (10) were located in the West Coast region.
Of the 887 transactions that occurred across the three registration divisions of Piketberg, Clanwilliam and Vanrhynsdorp in the West Coast District there were 18 land reform projects amounting to a land area of 13,013ha and constituting 1.95% of the total 665,557 ha transacted in these three registration divisions. It must be noted that not all the land reform transactions in the West Coast District were direct land transfers to independent land reform beneficiaries because many of the transactions were for the purposes of establishing Worker Equity Share schemes, where beneficiaries might participate in or obtain shares in the business operation of a project but not necessarily become joint owners of the land itself (Fast, 1999; Tilley, 2003). This result may therefore not accurately reflect the actual amount of land acquired by land reform beneficiaries themselves.

Of the 243 transactions in the Namaqualand registration division, there were 13 land reform projects, of which 11 were Commonage and 2 were LRAD projects – these combined projects amounted to 259,053 ha and constituted 35% of the total 730,482 ha transacted in this registration division.

Of the 281 transactions in the Calvinia registration division, there were 3 land reform projects, all of which were LRAD initiatives. These amounted to 2,044ha or 0.3% of the total 631,810 ha transacted in this registration division. This registration division reflects the lowest amount of land transacted for land reform purposes and suggests very limited access by land reform beneficiaries in this area. This outcome accords with the case study finding of the Brandvlei Emerging Farmers’ Association and its attempt to acquire commonage.
While the total percentage of 13.5% attributed to land reform across the five registration divisions far exceeds the national percentage for the amount of land transferred through land reform (4% of all agricultural land transferred to date - IRIN, 2007), it is necessary to analyse this data in more detail. The data for land reform acquisitions indicates that the amount of land transacted for land reform purposes was uneven across and within the registration divisions, with Namaqualand showing the largest amount of land being transacted for land reform purposes while a community within this same registration division remained unable to access any land due to lack of available land on the market in that specific locale. The amount of land transacted for land reform purposes in Namaqualand was followed by the amount transacted in the West Coast and Calvinia, respectively. It must be noted that the relatively high Namaqualand figure and the peculiarities of this region’s land quality and price may have had a strong influence on the total average land area transacted for land reform when calculated across the five registration divisions.

The data for Namaqualand is consistent with the profile across the entire Northern Cape where municipal commonage land transfers constituted 67% of all land redistributed, noting that commonage land is transferred to municipalities for use by small-scale farmers and not to individual beneficiaries as freehold title (Hall et al, 2003). In addition, relative to other regions, land in the Northern Cape is cheaper due to the low carrying capacity of the land. This cheaper land price, combined with the need for large tracts of land due to the poor quality of the land, contributed to a large amount of land purchased in this area, relative to other areas of the country. It suggests that land redistribution is working under certain conditions, namely where cheaper land is available. While the figures for Namaqualand indicate increased
access to land by resource-poor land seekers in the form of municipal commonage, it does not indicate an increase in land acquisitions by them or a shift in the prevailing profile of land ownership, or an altering of the configuration of social relations in the rural areas under review.

In summary, the analysis of all land transactions during the review period in the specified registration divisions on average revealed a relatively high level of activity – 1,841 transactions amounting to 2,027,848 hectares, of which 35 were for the purposes of land reform and amounted to 274,110 ha.

The study found that while a great deal of land market activity was evident, the land availability and level of activity was not even across all registration divisions or within a single registration division, as evidenced by the 3 case studies where land availability and market activity was very limited and in some instances static. While the lack of land availability indicated in the three case studies was not found to be generalised across all registration divisions, which were generally found to have considerable market activity, this uneven distribution of land availability remains a policy challenge to market-based land reform.

Furthermore, given that 23% of the total transactions for this period were for non-purchased land (for example, inherited estates), only 77% of all transactions can be viewed as involving land that was potentially available on the open market for acquisition by new entrants or other buyers.
The study found that while there was considerable land market activity, this in itself did not provide sufficient opportunities for land reform beneficiaries or resource-poor land-seekers to engage in the land market. This finding therefore suggests that there were other obstacles which prevented prospective beneficiaries from accessing the market in order to acquire land – these are addressed below.

**Interactions and relationships of negotiation and exchange**

The land market and the willing seller/buyer construct of market-based land reform are predicated on the presence of relationships of negotiation and exchange within the sphere of the market. This study provides an insight into the nature of the interactions between willing sellers and buyers and the impact of social relations on market access, with an emphasis on the socially embedded nature of land ownership and transactions (Akram-Lodhi, 2007), as outlined in Chapters One and Two.

**Profile of landownership**

In order to better understand the nature of the interactions and relationships of negotiation and exchange in the research sites, a profile of existing landownership was developed. This provided insights into whether land concentration and accumulation might impact on the amount of land that was potentially available for land reform transactions in the market.

In the absence of an available government land audit, the study developed a profile of those who acquired land during the period under review. The data for both purchased and non-purchased transactions across the research sites was grouped according to the different types of buyers – these included companies, private
landowners, trusts, game parks, municipalities, churches, communities and para-statals, amongst others. The land transactions are reflected in Table 7 below in terms of the number of buyers in each category for each registration division and the amount of land acquired by each category.
Table 7: Categories of buyers/new owners and amount of land acquired by them: 1998-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of new owners</th>
<th>Piketberg</th>
<th>Clanwilliam</th>
<th>Vanrhynsdorp</th>
<th>Calvinia</th>
<th>Namaqualand</th>
<th>Total # of transactions per category.</th>
<th>Total ha transacted in each category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>21,789</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>43,976</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>70,628</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Trust</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>25,921</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11,657</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37,844</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Parks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private owner</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>28,885</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>205,462</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>102,643</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusts:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of Private Trust, Company Trust &amp; Family Trust</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,136</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Council</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Trust</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private and Company</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,656</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province (Sect. 239-200/93)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parastatal (Transnet)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>108,695</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>306,110</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>250,757</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This data is further analysed in Figure three below, indicating the percentage share of each ownership type in relation to the total number of transactions.

![Pie chart showing categories of new owners as % of total number of transactions: Company 20%, Private owner 44%, Trusts (mixed) 23%, Community 0%, Parastatal 2%, Municipality 2%, Game Park 2%, Sect 239 1%, Transit council 2%, Church 0%]

**Figure 3: Categories of buyers/new owners as percentage share of total transactions: 1998-2002**

The data revealed that the majority of transactions involved private individual owners, and in this case, 806 transactions or 44% of the total number of transactions. This was followed by company owners at 363 transactions, or 20% of the total transactions. The data indicates a high level of land concentration in private and corporate hands.

A consideration of the buyer profile of company ownership across the five registration divisions revealed that the most purchases by companies were to be found in the divisions of Clanwilliam (31%), followed by Piketberg (25%), Vanrhynsdorp (24%), Namaqualand (11%) and Calvinia (9%), thereby suggesting a
lower prevalence of capital intensive farming and more family farms in the Namaqualand and Hantam Karoo areas.

Calvinia (31%) and Namaqualand (23%) showed the highest number of private buyers, with figures for Vanrhynsdorp indicating that 20% of all buyers were private individuals. Figures for the West Coast regions are markedly lower, with Clanwilliam reflecting 13% and 12% of buyers in Piketberg being private individuals.

Areas which involve more capital intensive agricultural production and agri-business, such as those in the West Coast areas, typically require substantial investment – this may explain the higher prevalence of company ownership in these areas. Another possible reason for the prevalence of company buyers is that as land becomes increasingly expensive and less affordable for individual private buyers, commercial farmers form consortiums and companies in order to buy land (Interview, Director, Farmer Settlement Unit, Western Cape Department of Agriculture. July 2003).

The accumulation and concentration of land

The information found on title deeds does reflect all the properties contemporaneously owned by a particular owner but does state whether owners own other parcels of land under the same title deed. (It was not within the scope of this study to undertake a comprehensive deed search of the entire deeds registry to ascertain the linkages between all properties owned by one owner.) Information regarding the ownership of property under the same title deed is indicated on the title deed under the heading: ‘Identity of new owners’ and is coded using the letters “O”, “A”, and “P”. The code “O” denotes the acquisition of a portion of land through
shared ownership of the property where each owner does not own other property under the same title-deed; “A” denotes the acquisition of a property by more than one owner each of whom has other property registered under the same title-deed; and “P” denotes the acquisition of a property owned by only one person who also owns other property under the same title-deed.

Based on information contained in the title deeds under review, the study established a profile of buyers who owned at least one other tradable portion of land, albeit under the same title deed - thus providing an indication of whether buyers/new owners were existing landholders or new entrants to the land market, and the extent of possible land concentration and accumulation. Table 8 below provides summary details of the identity of new owners of agricultural land in terms of the categories ‘O’, ‘A’ and ‘P’ as defined above.

Table 8: Identity of new owners of agricultural land: 1998-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity of new owner</th>
<th>Piketberg</th>
<th>Clanwilliam</th>
<th>Vanryhnsdorp</th>
<th>Calvinia</th>
<th>Namaqualand</th>
<th>TOTAL in each category:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O (no other property under same title deed)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (more than one owner, each with other property under same title deed)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P (only one new owner but with other property under same title deed)</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The combined categories of “A” and “P” show those properties whose owners (individually or jointly) own more than one portion of property under the same title deed. These combined categories constituted the majority of all the transactions within the scope of this study. The category “A” buyers (numbering 92) and the
category “P” buyers (975) constituted 1,067 buyers and accounted for 58% of the total 1,841 transactions that occurred in the period 1998 to 2002. This indicates that a minimum of 58% of all portions of land transacted in the period under review was acquired by owners who already owned at least one parcel of land, thereby indicating a relatively high concentration and accumulation of land in the hands of existing landholders. This profile implies that the potential opportunities for new entrants and non-landholders were reduced.

This profile of land accumulation and concentration is confirmed by information gathered from community respondents, a number of whom indicated that many commercial farmers have more than one farm – in the Hondeklipbaai area it was alleged that some landholders own as many as ten farms. They felt that in a country where there is such an unequal distribution of resources, this is neither fair nor equitable (Interviews, Hondeklipbaai community members, 2003). Commenting on the extent of land accumulation in the Hantam Karoo, an emerging farmer said, “This is how capitalism and the free market system work. Most commercial farmers have more than one farm – some have about ten. The free market allows them to accumulate so much land while others cannot access any... The longer the land market stays closed in the way that it is, and the less change in land ownership that takes place, the more we will lose out ...” (Interview, July, 2003).

Land accumulation was also commented on by a Municipal official, “There are also millionaires in Namaqualand who have thousands of hectares ... One particular farmer has more than 9 farms and he is always eager to buy up more farms as they are put up for sale. When local commercial farmers buy up all available land, usually
before the wider public even gets to hear about it, this leaves little chance for community people or emerging farmers to acquire this land, with or without the help of DLA and Agriculture (Personal interview with official of Kamieskroon Municipality. October 2003.)

**Implications of unequal social relations on the land market**

While acknowledging that there is a myriad of historical, behavioural and structural reasons for the unequal social relations in the South African countryside, the study attempted to analyse some of the *behavioural* ways, drawing on White’s analysis (1993:3), in which social relations were being maintained and the impact of this on land availability for land reform. A number of reasons for the very limited amount of land being made available for land reform were identified – these involved the interwoven issues of racism, power, class, notions of trust and reliability, the protection of the labour market, a perceived threat of competition, the notion that the land will not be well managed or maintained once transferred, and concerns about the land reform process and its administration.

**Racism, power and class**

According to Mbongwa et al (1996), the effects of Apartheid are still evident in the form of well-laid infrastructure networks and know-how built over many years with substantial state subsidisation. These social and economic networks persist, and have a significant impact on information sharing and market access and the nature of interactions which take place within the sphere of the market.
A number of community respondents highlighted their experience of racism during the course of their attempts to acquire land. In some instances, racism was described as taking an extreme form of prejudice, as reflected in a comment made by a commercial farmer to prospective land reform beneficiaries: “Not today, not tomorrow, never will I sell to non-Whites” (Interview, Community members, Brandvlei, 2001).

A group of emerging farmers indicated that, “Racism still operates as an underlying reason for why commercial farmers oppose the land reform process and for why they are not prepared to sell land to emerging farmers. Racism plays a role in whether land reform happens or not – many commercial farmers don’t want coloured neighbours and so they put the price up or they just won’t sell to us” (Interview, Namaqualand, 2003).

It was alleged by emerging farmers, and was reiterated by a DLA official and by NGO fieldworkers, that this scenario is frequently compounded by collusion and coercion from neighbouring commercial farmers who place pressure on sellers not to sell their farms for land reform purposes. This finding was confirmed by two officials in the Hantam Agricultural Union who said, “Some (commercial farmers) are positive while others are not. Some people will buy up a farm, even if they don’t really need it, just to keep Black people out. The old attitudes do still exist among some people” (Interview, office bearers of Hantam Landbou Unie, July 2003).

An official in the Department of Labour commented on his perception of land as a source and signifier of power and as a reason for why it will not be made available to
those who are perceived as eroding existing power blocs: “The fact is that land is a symbol of power. They (white commercial farmers) are holding onto their remaining power of land ownership. If sellers find that there are emerging farmers involved or that it is for land reform, the price either goes up or the land is taken off the market” (Interview, Department of Labour, Calvinia, July 2003). This situation was the direct experience of members of the Brandvlei EFA who, having lost the opportunity to acquire a particular farm, attempted to explore the possibility of acquiring another farm and found that overnight the property was taken off the market once they had shown interest (Interview, September 2003).

A number of commercial farmers explained their resistance to sell to land reform beneficiaries as a fear about a lack of maintenance of fences and the resultant destruction caused by wild predators and the theft of their own livestock. They indicated that they remained concerned about their neighbours having to contend with this problem once they had sold property to land reform beneficiaries. An official of the Department of Agriculture in Namaqualand suggested that, “Sometimes it gets translated as racism but I think the key issue is that of farm maintenance which causes tensions and objections – there is a serious problem with predatory animals such as jackals and rooikat in this area. If all the farmers do not maintain their fences, the livestock owned by neighbouring farmers’ can be attacked by wild animals. Emerging farmers do not always have money for maintenance and don’t always prioritise it; so it’s not so much a question of racism but rather concerns about maintenance” (Interview, August, 2003).
In some instances, potential sellers raised concerns about whether the land would be honoured as “a productive resource to provide food for the nation” (Interview, commercial farmer, Namaqualand, August 2003).

In certain agricultural production sectors, the threat of competition was another possible reason for resistance being shown by some commercial farmers to land reform. As indicated by a land reform participant, “Commercial farmers are resistant to black people getting land and farming – they are particularly opposed to us farming rooibos tea because we are competition to them in what is still a fairly limited niche market” (Interview, Calvinia, 2003).

Some respondents suggested that a ‘lubricant’ to enable interactions between willing sellers and prospective land reform beneficiaries is the perception of reliability and trustworthiness. Outcomes of the interviews indicate that where there is a relationship, a level of trust, an understanding or a shared commitment to farming and producing from the land, the potential for existing commercial landowners to consider selling their land to land reform beneficiaries or assisting land-seekers to access land or shares in a share equity scheme is increased. An official of the Land Bank in Calvinia suggested that attitudes are slowly changing and that there is a gradual shift towards a more positive attitude being developed in some quarters to include new entrants in the market: “Establishing a relationship between small-scale farmers and commercial farmers is central to developing understanding, trust and co-operation, and changes in this regard can be detected. Two years ago there would have been resistance to a neighbouring farm being bought for land reform, but
now there's a more positive attitude” (Interview, official of Land Bank, October 2003).

Perceptions about the DLA as a buyer and transacting partner were expressed by a number of respondents. The study encountered a widespread perception amongst landowners, including both those who were potential willing sellers and those who had already embarked on a land reform transaction, that the DLA is itself an unreliable buyer or transacting partner, largely as a result of its protracted procedures, negotiating style and rigid project cycle (Interviews, members of Namakwa Farmers’ Union, commercial farmers, estate agent, August 2003). As a result, land reform has become discredited, as owners prefer to transact with buyers who have ready capital and who do not require what are perceived by sellers as “bureaucratic and lengthy procedures” (Interview, commercial farmer, 2003).

The land reform process was said to be too sluggish in relation to the dynamics of the market - a local commercial farmer in the Hondeklipbaai area said, “You have to get your foot in the door quickly and early if you hear about farms on the market. DLA does not always act fast enough to get the land that is available ... the problem is that DLA doesn’t show interest or put in their offers quickly enough” (Interview, commercial farmer, Hondeklipbaai, November 2003).

An official of the Department of Labour suggested that, “You can buy a cheap farm through an auction but the problem is that the DLA does not have a pool of money available that allows them to attend auctions. This is a very easy way to buy reasonably priced land but you have to be ready and be able to move quickly – the
DLA’s project cycle is too long and too slow” (Interview, official of Department of Labour, Hantam Karoo. July 2003).

In the words of a Namaqualand estate agent, the lack of success in land reform can largely be attributed to the DLA’s systems and procedures:

“The DLA process is too slow. The Department does not seem able to keep up with the pace of land transactions and sellers get frustrated. Sellers have now reached the point where they prefer to avoid negotiating with the DLA or making their land available for land reform simply because of the bureaucratic process and the long waiting period in between each phase of the transaction” (Interview, estate agent, Loeriesfontein, October 2003).

The concerns raised about the unreliability of the DLA process and its lengthy timeframes had a direct impact on how prospective land reform beneficiaries were perceived and treated by prospective sellers. By association, the willing sellers’ perceptions of the lack of reliability on the part of the DLA were projected onto prospective land reform beneficiaries who were consequently viewed as ‘unreliable’. This perceived ‘unreliability’ became evident in instances where prospective land reform beneficiaries had managed to identify available land and engage in the initial negotiations with the seller (in accordance with the DLA’s policy procedures) but did not have the autonomy to engage substantively because they did not have any certainty about an available land reform grant allocation or the amount of such an allocation. Having established contact with willing sellers during the initial phase, based on inadequate information or commitment from the DLA, they then remained dependent on the outcomes of decisions within the DLA that were beyond their
control. They thus found themselves entering negotiations with willing sellers in the absence of having any clarity about their bargaining scope, and were consequently perceived as being “vague and unreliable” (Interview, commercial farmer, Namaqualand, 2003).

This situation served to undermine the confidence of prospective land reform beneficiaries. For willing sellers to overcome their perception of unreliability and engage with prospective beneficiaries, they would have to view the negotiation as a ‘transaction of a special type’ for which concessions would need to be made, delays accommodated and lengthy procedures or financing problems overlooked. This immediately casts land reform beneficiaries in a position where they would not be treated as equal players in the market and would be made to feel this during the negotiation process, thus perpetuating the existent unequal social relations. This sentiment is captured by a small-scale farmer from Namaqualand:

“Everywhere you go, you are a beginner - either in finding land on which to farm, entering the market, in terms of starting up on your own land, in terms of getting credit, in terms of being recognised and being included in the associations and groupings of farmers in the area. Somehow it feels like you will always be on the outside and not be viewed as a serious farmer in the area. Just one of the beginners, always ... and DLA doesn’t help us to get a foot up. People are now not so interested to sell to DLA, mainly because of all their delays and the problems they cause” (Interview, July 2003).

Besides the perception of the time-consuming and unreliable transaction procedures of the DLA, the State’s introduction of legislation pertaining to land and labour issues
was also raised as a factor that did not endear commercial farmers to land reform and possibly led to a lack of co-operation and trust in terms of making land available. Examples of laws and policies which appeared to result in resistance and political hostility included the introduction of a minimum wage for farm workers, changes in property taxation, and the introduction of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA). Anecdotal evidence suggested that land may be held back from land reform as a form of protest against these laws and policies and that the political hostility which this represented was projected onto aspirant land reform beneficiaries – many of whom are farm workers or occupiers under ESTA. A comment made by a commercial farmer in Namaqualand reflects this perception:

“There are still things that bother commercial farmers and these impact on their attitude to land reform – an example is ESTA. This makes a lot of farmers want to oppose anything about land reform. There might be farmers who would be willing to sell or be interested in engaging in joint ventures or contract farming type arrangements but ESTA creates problems for them and so they shy away from getting involved. They do not want to be stuck with people on their land that they cannot get rid of” (Interview, 2003).

A number of commercial farmers and representatives of organised agriculture indicated that they would feel more supportive of the land reform programme and of releasing land onto the market for this purpose if there was evidence of the necessary financial and resource support to beneficiaries, and the provision of post-settlement support by the DLA or Department of Agriculture. Some commercial farmers expressed concern that in the absence of a developmental approach with the associated support for the infrastructure, maintenance and operational costs of
farming, there was the danger that many land reform initiatives would not be viable and that this would lead to soil degradation, land becoming unproductive, a lack of maintenance of necessary infrastructure, and ultimately that beneficiaries would “be set up to fail” (Interview, Hantam Landbou Unie, July 2003). While the rationale underlying these concerns is unclear, they may reflect general concern about the future of the agricultural sector and a potential decline in the productive use of land, as well as dissatisfaction with the negligible post-transfer support made available by the DLA to land reform beneficiaries.

In summary, the study found that while there was a large pool of ‘willing buyers’ in the form of prospective land reform beneficiaries, the pool of ‘willing sellers’ who were prepared to sell land through the land market for land reform purposes was limited. The reasons for this are multiple but at base are due to the socially embedded nature of land transactions and the unequal social relations in the countryside which are perpetuated by a range of perceptions, many of which are based on prejudice. This situation is compounded by the apparent level of incompetence demonstrated by the DLA in maximising opportunities to acquire land as it becomes available on the market. Given the reality of these unequal social relations and the inability of relevant government institutions to play an actively supportive role, it was found that the land market (in itself a structural manifestation of the unequal social relations) cannot be expected to play an equalising role in providing adequate access to resource-poor land seekers; thereby pointing not so much to market failure but to a policy failure in the State’s adoption of the market as the central mechanism for land redistribution, albeit with accompanying ‘pro-poor’ elements. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the state’s policies were not
implemented consistently and in many instances, were not accompanied by adequate resource allocations or support measures as outlined in policy.

**Market accessibility and information access**

The extent to which the market is a closed or open one, and by implication potentially exclusive or inclusive, remains central to whether land acquisition by prospective land reform beneficiaries is enabled or hindered. Key to the accessibility of the land market is the extent of information access regarding available land for sale.

Interviews with a wide range of informants suggested that the procedures for land sales across the research sites varied considerably, ranging from relatively ‘open’ processes that may be accessed by a wide public to relatively ‘closed’ or private processes that are known only to a select few.

In many areas of the countryside there are few points of contact or exchange between white landowners and resource-poor land seekers, and there is a tendency for the latter to remain outside the information and social networks that exist amongst existing landowners, and to therefore have limited or no access to available information about land availability in the market.

The study found that the State does not play a role in maintaining a register of available land. According to a Department of Agriculture official, “Advertising is done
by word of mouth. There’s no database of farms or those that are up for sale” (Personal interview, official of the Department of Agriculture, July 2003).

While the study found that there are specific types of land transactions that by their nature are ‘closed’, or private, such as the transfer of inherited estates, the study examined the extent to which the ostensibly ‘open’ or public facet of the land market in fact operates in a transparent and accessible manner.

Interviews with estate agents in the study area revealed that they were aware of only a very limited number of transactions taking place on the open market that were publically advertised and could be accessed by members of the general public. In light of the level of activity reflected in the number of transfers registered with the Deeds Office, this perception of a limited number of advertised properties for sale indicates that the land market was essentially an internal or private one, with little information made available in the public domain and thereby, effectively excluding prospective land reform beneficiaries.

An estate agent working in the Hondeklipbaai area suggested that land was very rarely sold on the open market in the area to the west of Garies and toward the coast of Namaqualand, and that most land that is sold in this area is sold by private arrangement. He suggested that land in this area was owned by those with long term interests - such as the state, private sector and mining companies - and that “in the event of land becoming available, the word is put out amongst their network and it is snapped up by existing landowners ... the number of properties changing hands
is not large, and when sellers wish to sell, it is generally not made public” (Personal interview, estate agent, Loeriesfontein, November 2003).

A member of the Brandvlei Emerging Farmers’ Association was of the opinion that the sale of land in the Calvinina area is not usually an open and transparent process and says,

“People who are selling, first offer their land to their family members and then the information is secretly shared internally with their friends. The local commercial farmers usually know that a farm is for sale long before anyone else finds out or even before it is advertised. The commercial farmers tell their ‘connections’ and no one else really gets a chance before they are snapped up. We are on the outside of this network and so we don’t get to hear of land being available until it is already being bought by someone else, and usually someone who is part of the ‘special group of connections’. But in some cases outsiders (those viewed as ‘socially acceptable’ and ‘financially trustworthy’) who have put the word out that they are looking for a farm can get in on the act – especially if money is not a problem for them, they can sometimes get first option” (Personal interview, member of Brandvlei EFA, October 2003).

This sentiment was confirmed by a local government councillor in Piketberg who suggested that, “The land market in this area is essentially an internal market and available farms become known through word of mouth. It’s a case of ‘farms for friends’. When a brown person approaches a seller, the price goes up. There are some farmers who are well intentioned, but they are few” (Interview, local government councillor, Piketberg, 2003).
The lack of public information about available land was confirmed by an estate agent who suggested that if the market was more transparent and open, and if the advertising of available land were to be made more public, prospective land reform beneficiaries would be more able to access the limited land that does come onto the market (Personal interview, estate agent, Namaqualand, August 2003).

A number of routes for advertising available land were identified, some being more open and transparent than others. It was found that in general, the process by which agricultural land is advertised involves an informal procedure which has evolved amongst existing landowners. Landowners will firstly offer the land to family members or neighbours, if they are on good terms. If these people are not interested, the property is advertised at a range of gatherings including farmers’ co-operatives, agricultural unions and associations, or through social institutions such as the church. These advertisements may take the form of printed notices on bulletin boards, via the publications issued by these social institutions, or by word of mouth at meetings or informal discussions that take place in these formations. Only if the land is not sold through these networks are the services of estate agents sought. Estate agents then embark on a formal sales strategy that as a rule places emphasis on buyer identification prior to public advertising (Personal interview, estate agent, Namaqualand, August 2003). Given the social location of most estate agents, it might be assumed that they would be inclined to initially identify buyers and advertise available land amongst those in their social network. In the event that there is no positive response, the land might only then be publically advertised or information supplied to prospective beneficiaries. Given that the latter do not usually participate in the same range of social institutions and networks as estate agents.
and that these agents act as intermediaries and mediate the available information, this method of advertising can potentially exclude aspirant beneficiaries from accessing information about available land.

The study found that owners and estate agents were more open about sharing information about available land if it was the type of land that was not highly sought after or was located in an area that was ‘undesirable’ for whatever reason. An estate agent in the Piketberg area suggested that given the lack of expansion in the potato sector and the fact that there was not a high level of demand for farmland conducive to growing that particular crop, landowners were increasingly advertising this land more publicly on the open market. However, in the grain or wine-growing areas where the demand for a specific type of land is more intense, the land market tended to be an internal one where neighbours and friends were informed by word of mouth (Personal interview, estate agent, Piketberg, November 2003). It may therefore be assumed that there are potential opportunities for resource-poor land seekers to acquire certain types of land that are used by farming sectors that are proving to be less successful or profitable, or land that is in a more remote area or, as in the case of the Remhoogte farm in Brandvlei, surrounded by commonage land.

While estate agents are occasionally sources of advertised land for sale, a number of estate agents said that the DLA tends to avoid utilising their services because of the commission to be paid on transactions. They suggested that this was unfortunate and that an agent may ultimately assist the DLA to purchase a farm for less, including the cost of the commission, because the agents have a working knowledge
of the property market, relative sales in the area, and are able to arrange valuations of properties.

It was found that in some instances information was selectively shared by sellers and that estate agents might be informed of available land while certain government departments were not: “It seems that the estate agents are sometimes told by commercial farmers about available land but the Department of Agriculture is not told because the commercial farmers don’t want to engage in land reform projects and transactions because it takes too long and they have to wait for their money and for the deal to be finalised” (Community member, Hondeklipbaai, August 2003).

However, there were indications that this modus operandi was showing signs of change - a Department of Agriculture respondent indicated that, “Estate agents are now starting to involve us. It is a relatively new thing and not to a very large extent yet. They are starting to approach the Department of Agriculture to tell them about available farms for sale” (Personal interview, official of the Department of Agriculture, July 2003). Small scale farmers cited cases in Klawer in the Matzikama District where estate agents assisted land reform groups and acted as intermediaries between the seller, the Land Bank and the buyers. In the Vredenberg area of the West Coast, land reform beneficiaries were apparently beginning to approach estate agents (Interview, small-scale farmer, Matzikama, 2003). According to an estate agent in the West Coast, “They have opted for this (the use of estate agents) because they say that this arrangement offers them a go-between who acts as a buffer between white sellers and themselves. There is, however, confusion amongst the parties as to who should be responsible for the payment of the agent’s
commission – the prospective land reform beneficiaries, the Land Bank, the Department of Agriculture or the DLA?" (Personal interview, estate agent, Piketberg, August 2003).

In summary, the activity in the local land markets under review essentially constituted a closed market and information about available land was typically known to only a select few who had the necessary finance and formed part of the social network. This situation is borne out by the apparent limited public knowledge about available land by land-seekers and estate agents relative to the number of registered transactions taking place. The study found that the asymmetrical and segmented nature of information dissemination and access resulted in resource-poor land seekers remaining on the periphery of the land market.

**The availability of capital and financing**

While acknowledging the multiple challenges arising from the socially embedded nature of land transactions as well as the lack of available land in some areas, both of which militate against aspirant beneficiaries acquiring land, the study found that resource-poor land seekers, as a category of willing buyers, are constrained in their ability to engage in the land market because of their lack of access to finance and the limited land grants available to them. In the absence of sufficient security for a loan or adequate ‘own contribution’ in the event of an LRAD grant allocation, many aspirant buyers are rendered powerless and find themselves effectively excluded from the market.
As indicated previously, even those at the top-end of the buying market were showing signs of being unable to acquire land independently and were therefore establishing consortia, trusts or companies in order to obtain capital for land acquisition and production activities (Interview, Director, Farmer Settlement Unit, Western Cape Department of Agriculture, July 2003, and as detailed in the findings above). It can be assumed that if better-resourced landowners or prospective buyers were finding it difficult to amass sufficient capital to acquire land independently, prospective land reform beneficiaries would be finding it all the more difficult and prohibitive, more so due to the application process and limited size of grants available from the DLA.

A number of respondents indicated that they were not viewed by banks as being credit-worthy in order to obtain either purchase or production loans because they had no collateral and the likelihood of them obtaining returns on their enterprises was limited, more especially during their initial phase of production. A Department of Agriculture extension officer said, “The Land Bank won’t always give loans to emerging farmers because they are not viewed as being credit-worthy. Very often, if they do get a loan, they have to repay the loan on a monthly basis as opposed to paying it off over a year. In the beginning or during lean months, when you do not have income from either wool or your harvest, then this is very difficult” (Personal interview, Department of Agriculture extension officer, Namaqualand, July 2003).

The chairperson of the Hantam Landbou Unie stated that one of the key obstacles to emerging farmers acquiring land is the lack of finance and the difficulties involved in obtaining loans. “The interest on loans is too high for emerging farmers. They cannot
pay 10% interest. If you can’t pay interest on your loan, it usually means that you
don’t in fact have enough money to farm and to keep going. What is the point in
South Africa of giving people a piece of land if they have no capital and no means to
work the land? You are just setting people up to get into more debt and to fail – in
the long run this is not fair either” (Interview, chairperson of Hantam Landbou Unie,
July 2003).

DLA budget constraints and the impact on beneficiaries

The allocation of state funds for the purposes of grants is fundamental to the
effective implementation and functioning of the market-based approach to land
reform. In spite of the policy intentions outlined in the White Paper on South African
Land Policy (1997) regarding the need for support to be offered to prospective land
reform beneficiaries to enable them to engage in the land market, the study found
that during the period under review, the annual budget allocations for land reform
were consistently less than 0.5% of the total national budget (Surplus People
Project, 2003). The lack of adequate budget allocations for land redistribution and its
associated grant systems was found to be hampering progress with land reform and
preventing the acquisition of land by land-seekers and emerging farmers. An official
of the Western Cape Provincial Department of Agriculture indicated that, “One of the
biggest problems has been the budget constraints of the DLA. This has affected
how much money is available for land reform grants and the size of grant that a
person can get. In my opinion, the LRAD grant is not enough to actually allow you to
start farming and the situation ends up being unsustainable” (Personal interview,
October 2003).
Due to the budget constraints experienced by the Western Cape Department of Land Affairs, progress with LRAD projects came to a virtual standstill due to the moratorium on all new applications for LRAD grants. (As a result of a shortage of funds, the Director of the Western Cape Provincial Land Reform Office issued a memorandum to the various District Assessment Committees on 4th March 2003 informing them that he was instituting a moratorium on the acceptance of new land reform projects. Prior to this, the Minster of Land Affairs had instituted a moratorium on new land reform projects from July 1999 to April 2000. Thus in the space of three years, landless communities in the Western Cape were instructed not to submit their requests and proposals for land reform projects.) This had a very direct bearing on the ability of landless and emerging farmers to acquire land.

When asked to comment on the moratorium on LRAD grants and the impact of this on the EFA’s ability to acquire land, a member of the Bergrivier EFA, said: “We are stopped in our tracks before we even start, and soon our footprints in the dust are blown away and we are left, forgotten” (Personal interview, emerging farmer, Eendekuil, July 2003). In light of the moratorium, the Bergrivier EFA, having already identified available land under the curatorship of the Land Bank, were forced to seek private sector financial support. However, in spite of having obtained this support, they were still unable to acquire the land they had identified and applied for.

It was suggested by a number of respondents that even those land-seekers who were eligible to obtain grants from the DLA, continued to face a range of challenges and in many instances were unable to acquire land. Their lack of access to credit or
grants and the inadequate national budget allocations for land reform have further complicated these challenges.

Having outlined the challenge of accessing finance or grants for land acquisition, this study examined the market value and pricing of agricultural land in the five registration divisions under review and in relation to the affordability of land by land reform beneficiaries.

A recurring, though sometimes contradictory, view expressed by a number of interviewees about the price of land was that land reform was causing prices to rise. Land reform was seen as leading to artificial pricing based on the belief that the state pays more for land than do the local commercial farmers. This claim is made, for example, in the government’s own review of the Redistribution Programme: “Marginal land is being bought at exorbitant prices, turning white landowners into instant millionaires” (DLA, 1999). While this may be true in a number of instances, it may also be the case that during the initial stages of the land reform programme, the DLA purchased land at higher prices than was necessary and may have led sellers to believe that they could sell at higher prices to the land reform programme. A representative of the Department of Agriculture in Namaqualand commented as follows: “It must be acknowledged that the first land reform process in this area went wrong because DLA paid high prices and so, from then on, the prices asked for land being offered to the DLA for land reform, have rocketed. Land prices are very high. Land reform has pushed prices sky high because DLA and the Parks Board initially paid the prices that were asked for – this was for grazing land – and so now people ask for high prices because they assume the government will pay. However, this is
no longer always the case” (Interview, official of the Department of Agriculture, Namaqualand. October 2003).

A local commercial farmer suggested that, “Land reform has not put land prices up but land reform is a new factor in the equation and the DLA is therefore a new buyer in the market – they are an additional buyer and one that has a very thick cheque book, a cheque book that is fatter than most other buyers in the market” (Interview, commercial farmer, Namaqualand, 2003).

Table 9 below details the price of all the transacted land per registration division and indicates an average price per hectare in each of the divisions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registration Division</th>
<th>Piketberg</th>
<th>Clanwilliam</th>
<th>Vanrhynsdorp</th>
<th>Calvinia</th>
<th>Namaqualand</th>
<th>Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Price of total transacted land</td>
<td>R 98,914,781</td>
<td>R 53,349,533</td>
<td>R 75,276,262</td>
<td>R 4,154,440</td>
<td>R 102,242,36</td>
<td>R793,919,252 = total price of transacted land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average price per transaction</td>
<td>R 710,409</td>
<td>R 514,595</td>
<td>R 890,861</td>
<td>R 228,307</td>
<td>R 285,542</td>
<td>R431,243 = average price per transaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average price per hectare</td>
<td>R 2,341</td>
<td>R 537</td>
<td>R 1,345</td>
<td>R 150</td>
<td>R 140</td>
<td>R391 per ha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An analysis of the price per hectare across the five registration divisions revealed that the average land price in the Piketberg area (R2,341 per ha) was more than in Vanrhynsdorp (R1,345 per ha), followed by Clanwilliam (R537 per ha), Calvinia (R150 per ha) and Namaqualand (R140 per ha). On average, the prices per property were found to be above the maximum LRAD grant that any individual land reform ‘willing buyer’ could obtain (R100,000), therefore implying that buyers would be forced to pool their grants. In Calvinia, which had the lowest average price per
transaction, this price was more than twice the maximum LRAD grant. In Vanrhynsdorp, the lowest average price per transaction was found to be almost nine times as much as the maximum grant, thus indicating that land acquisition by individuals or a small group would have been prohibitive.

A number of respondents indicated that in the event that land was available, it was “too expensive” for them to purchase. A number of interviewees raised the issue of the price of land in relation to the financial capacity of the various land acquisition options available to them. A recurrent refrain was that the available land reform grants and the budget allocations given to DLA did not match prevailing land prices. Emerging farmers from a range of different associations and initiatives confirmed the view of a Brandvlei emerging farmer: “LRAD doesn’t work because the basic R20,000 grant is not enough. We can’t afford to get grants bigger than R20,000 because we don’t have money or equipment and other things to put in as our own contribution. The market price for land in this area for a decent size farm is not covered by the LRAD grant and the Land Bank doesn’t give enough of a loan. The interest on Land Bank loans is too high and we have to tightly our belts in such a way that it just can’t really work for us. The interest squeezes us too hard. We then have to pay it back too soon and we end up living in debt for the rest of our lives. The poor just seem to get poorer, even if we use the options that are supposed to help us out of poverty” (Personal interview, emerging farmer, Brandvlei, October 2003).

In some instances, land was viewed as “too expensive” because prospective buyers felt that the asking price was inflated and based on an unreliable valuation. Aliber and Mokoena (2000) highlight the potential for valuations to be purposefully inflated as a result of collusion between the valuator and the seller. The potential for this to
occur was noted in the current study where it was found that in some instances, those conducting the valuations were members of the farming community who may have had vested interests in maintaining good relations with landowners in the community on whom they rely for the bulk of their business. Concerns were also raised by respondents regarding the manner in which the valuation of the farm Remhoogte in the Hantam Karoo had been conducted (Interview, Brandvlei EFA, August 2003).

A fundamental assumption about the functioning of the land market is that ready capital and finance will be available for purchasing land. However, the study found that access to credit and grants was very limited on the part of prospective beneficiaries, who in many instances were not viewed as being credit-worthy. The limited availability and size of the grants was also found to be inadequate in relation to land prices.

The existence of a regulatory framework

The South African state provides a framework to regulate the land market through the provision of a systematised deeds registry, financial services and systems, professional land surveyors and valuators, and legislation and policy.

Land valuation for the purposes of land reform is part of the market and the state’s machinery for regulating land transactions. The DLA bases its policies for land valuation on the principles outlined in the White Paper on South African Land Policy, the Constitution and various precedents and rulings of the Land Claims Court.
Prices paid for land bought for land reform by the DLA through its willing seller/buyer approach are based on the market value of the land. This principle is stipulated in the White Paper: “Where funds are used to subsidise the purchase of private land, the DLA and the Department of State Expenditure require that a fair price be paid. This will usually be ‘reasonable market value.’ This is defined as a price which is comparable with recent sales in the locality and one which is endorsed by an independent valuer and/or the Land and Agricultural Bank ... Government has a responsibility to ensure that state resources are used wisely and that prices negotiated are just and equitable” (DLA, 1997b:42).

Aspirant buyers interviewed in this study suggested that if they were able to buy land at productive value rather than market value and had access to ‘soft loans’ or subsidies, they would be in a better position to acquire land.

“The problem is that we have to buy at market prices and not productive prices ... DLA policy doesn’t accept this and nor do the farmers. We want an instrument that allows us to buy land at productive price with soft loans for a specific period of time. It seems unfair that for all these years whites have had land and farmed it, and did not pay cash for it and yet, we are forced to pay cash. We do not have the benefits of agricultural subsidies and support like all these farmers had in the past and yet, we are having to engage in farming at the same level with very little support” (Interview, emerging farmers, Namaqualand, 2003).
Introduction of legislation and taxation

In addition to providing a regulatory framework for the land market, the state is also able to influence the land market through introducing legislation or altering levels of property taxation.

At the time of writing, the government was debating the formulation of the Property Rates Bill of 2003. A number of respondents viewed this as potentially impacting on the amount of land that might be made available to the land market. A de Beers Mining Company representative indicated that, “We’ve realised that with the introduction of the Property Rates Bill it’s not going to be viable for us to keep ownership of a number of properties. This will prompt de Beers to sell off some of our property. The Agricultural Unions, Parks and small-scale farmers are interested in any of our available land and it is possible that some land will become available as a result of the introduction of increased taxes on our land” (Interview, de Beers Mine management, August 2003). The Kamiesberg Municipality echoed this sentiment: “The Bill will have a big impact because people won’t be able to afford to pay the tax and so will sell their properties” (Interview, September 2003).

Land reform as a form of State intervention in the land market

The land reform programme is one of the ways in which the State can influence the land market and act in the interests of those who are not automatically included in the sphere of the market.

This study encountered widespread dissatisfaction and concern, amongst both prospective land reform beneficiaries and willing sellers, regarding the manner in
which the State was intervening in the land market through its land reform programme. These have been detailed throughout the study and are amplified by this comment by an official of the Department of Labour in the Hantam Karoo regarding the LRAD programme, as an element of land reform:

“There needs to be a more aggressive drive to acquire land. All LRAD does is to give people hope but government needs to intervene and make it easier to get land. LRAD is not getting to the nuts and bolts – it just gives limited grants and provides limited access to a limited number of people with a limited number of livestock. Hope is important, but it’s not enough. The acquisition of land is very difficult for people and it can’t just be left to people to find and negotiate and sort out on their own – government must intervene more directly” (Interview, official of Department of Labour, Hantam Karoo, July 2003).

An official of the Farmer Settlement Unit in the Department of Agriculture in the Western Cape acknowledged that:

“Government processes are not streamlined in accordance with the needs of the client but in terms of the needs of government. Government cycles are out of synch with developments within LRAD. The government had not put personnel in place prior to LRAD being brought in. There is a need for a different kind of approach, a different kind of intervention and different staffing levels within the LRAD programme if we are going to meet the demands on land reform. To this end, more attention should be given to a more pro-active or supply-side orientation for land reform” (Interview, Director, Farmer Settlement Unit, Department of Agriculture, July 2003).
It was found that while the state had introduced land reform policy, insufficient attention was paid to advance the policy intentions and that there was a lack of a strategic plan for land reform on the part of most Municipalities, which are responsible for local development initiatives. The Acting Municipal Manager of the Hantam Municipality, which is responsible for the Brandvlei emerging farmers’ initiative, indicated that the Municipality's Integrated Development Plan (IDP) does not refer to land reform or to the acquisition of additional commonage. According to him the Municipality “has no specific strategy as such but land reform is always on our agenda. If land becomes available we will buy it, depending on DLA’s budget and capacity at the time” (Interview, Acting Municipal Manager, Hantam Municipality, October 2003). The case study of the Brandvlei Emerging Farmers’ attempt to acquire additional commonage points to the inadequacies in the State’s Municipal Commonage Programme and to the difficulties experienced by small-scale farmers and landless people in their attempts to acquire land through this programme via the land market.

The study found that the difficulties encountered by aspirant farmers seeking commonage land were exacerbated by the following:

- The Integrated Development Plans of municipalities generally did not include the acquisition of commonage, and municipalities lacked autonomy and financial bargaining power in relation to land reform;
- The DLA’s procedures made the acquisition of land through this programme very difficult and time-consuming;
• Reliance on the availability of land on the open market frequently led to stasis in the acquisition of land and the stalling of the Commonage Programme.

In summary, the study found that in the absence of further support and an overarching recognition of the deeply embedded social inequalities that exist, the land reform grants are very limited and insufficient to address land need and the profound socio-economic differences amongst sellers and buyers in the market.
Chapter Six – Conclusion

Despite South Africa’s transition to democracy and the constitutional commitment to a more equitable redistribution of land, this study found that market-based land reform policies implemented by the state since 1994 are not meeting the needs of many resource-poor land-seekers in the Northern and Western Cape. The evidence of this local study reflects the national picture of a generally slow pace of land redistribution – by the end of 2007, the South African government had redistributed 4 percent of white-owned commercial agricultural land, thus reaching the target of 30 percent redistribution by 2014 highly unlikely (IRIN, 2007). The Department of Land Affairs noted in its annual report for 2006-2007 that it faced “a serious challenge” in meeting its 2014 target (DLA, 2007). This serious challenge has been precipitated by a number of factors, of which the general reliance on the market and the particular manner in which the DLA has approached – and expects others to approach – the land market are amongst the most significant.

A number of the factors leading to this “serious challenge” and the lack of progress in meeting the target were found to have their roots in the politics of the State’s adoption of market-based land reform in the early 1990s; the absence of a clear characterisation of the land market in South African land reform policy and the implications of this for implementation; and the nature and level of support provided to prospective beneficiaries by the Departments of Land Affairs and Agriculture and associated agencies.

Having adopted market logic as the cornerstone of the land reform programme, while at the same time recognising that the land market on its own is an inadequate
mechanism for land redistribution in response to the Apartheid legacy of land dispossession, South African policy makers introduced a corrective in the form of ‘bureaucratic action’ (Bernstein, 1994:1) through the introduction of land grants and a limited suite of support arrangements. The outcome of the adoption of market-based land reform and its failure to address land need and reach the intended targets, would seem to contradict the policy intentions and assumptions about the reliability of the land market as the central mechanism for land redistribution and the efficacy of the state’s support initiatives in the form of land reform grants and technical assistance to resource-poor land seekers.

This study highlights a number of the contradictions and a mismatch between the claims made for the hybridised market-based land reform programme and the experience of resource-poor land-seeking people in the Western and Northern Cape. This mismatch essentially reflects a lack of integration of the assumptions held by policy makers regarding ‘market logic’ and their response to the inadequacies of this logic in the form of ‘bureaucratic action’; a lack of convergence of policy intentions underpinned by a set of assumptions about the role and capacity of the market (whether viewed in idealised or pragmatic terms) and the state’s ability and preparedness to provide and implement sufficient and appropriate assistance for the purchasing and redistribution of land.

These contradictions became evident through the analysis of the title-deed data of all agricultural land transactions across the research site during the period under review. The data revealed that while there was a considerable level of market activity, the Apartheid demographic profile of land ownership was not significantly
altered and land acquisition for the purposes of land reform was very limited. While land was not evenly available across or within all the research sites, opportunities for land acquisition remained the preserve of those who had the appropriate knowledge, access to networks and resources at their disposal, namely existing landowners and those who had the independent wherewithal to engage in the market. The three case studies attest to a lack of available land for land reform purposes in their respective localities and a lack of preparedness on the part of the Department of Land Affairs and the Land Bank to advance the interests of resource-poor land seekers and prospective beneficiaries.

While market failure, static markets, the range of reasons as to why ‘willing sellers’ might not be prepared to sell to prospective land reform beneficiaries, and limited budget resources, amongst others, have all served to retard land reform, the study found that the DLA had not made use of its policy options such as expropriation or sub-division in order to realise land redistribution and neither had it shown a commitment to advance the interests of prospective land reform beneficiaries by conducting its administrative procedures more efficiently and effectively.

In part, the financial capacity of the DLA to acquire land might be excused by the lack of financial resources and national budget allocations, which in turn is ultimately indicative of a lack of political will or prioritisation of land reform at the highest political and administrative level. Even so, the study found that where DLA funds were available, where the Land Bank was in a position to further the interests of land reform applicants, and where land was available on the market, these opportunities
were not actively pursued – as evidenced by the Brandvlei and Bergrivier case studies.

This study cites instances of slippage between policy and its operationalisation and of potential land market transactions being frustrated due to, for example, racism and prejudice on the part of ‘willing sellers’ who refuse to sell for the purposes of land reform, as witnessed in a number of instances, more specifically that of the Brandvlei case study. The study highlights a lack of available land, as indicated in all three case studies and particularly that of Hondeklipbaai; an inadequate level of information about land sales; a lack of preparedness on the part of the DLA to actively engage and assert its bargaining power in the market; and lengthy delays in concluding land reform negotiations, amongst others. These difficulties have invariably been rationalised and variously explained by the DLA as ‘market failure’ or the intransigence of ‘willing sellers’ and their attempts to increase prices. Besides appearing to have not made the link between the dynamic of ‘market failure’ and the behaviour of ‘willing sellers’, the DLA has not adequately addressed these challenges or taken responsibility for the lack of progress with land redistribution – as further evidenced by its unwillingness to utilise the provisions of expropriation or sub-division. If the State had come to the conclusion that the slow pace of land reform was the result of ‘market failure’ – as indicated by Minister Thoko Didiza (2000) in her address to Parliament in February 2000 in which she outlined the key problems facing land reform and stated that market forces "as core redistributive factors have not produced the desired effects and impact", and in response to the outcomes of the Land Summit held in 2005 – a more appropriate approach would have been for the State to either abandon the market-based approach altogether or to develop
strategies that would overcome the range of obstacles faced by new entrants to the market. It appears to have chosen to do neither.

The findings of this study suggest that the gap between the promise of South Africa’s constitutionally-sanctioned land reform programme and the experience of prospective land reform beneficiaries represents not so much a problem of market failure but of policy failure. In adopting the market-based approach, the South African state can either be viewed as having been unaware of the realities of the land market and of the multiple forms of exclusion and disadvantage experienced by the rural poor and landless, or it can be viewed as having knowingly adopted a market-based approach to land reform (albeit presented in the trappings and framed in the rhetoric of a more comprehensive form of redistribution) as part of its neo-liberal agenda and in a bid to minimise the antagonism of the interests of big business and foreign investors, with the understanding that market-based land reform would not lead to a radical or comprehensive reorganisation of land ownership and control. However, it cannot be argued that the state was oblivious to the realities of the market or to the level of disadvantage of the rural poor, as attested to in a range of policy documents such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994) and the White Paper on Land Policy (1997b). One can therefore conclude that the latter scenario is more likely to be the case – the adoption of market-based land reform is aligned to the state’s neo-liberal agenda and is not intended to facilitate comprehensive land reform or address the land need of the resource-poor and dispossessed to a significant degree. It is therefore suggested that the policy choices on the part of the state have resulted in the slow pace of land redistribution and the associated difficulties encountered by resource-poor land seekers in their attempts to acquire
land. The failings of the South African land reform programme and the lack of land acquisition by the resource-poor should therefore not be explained as *market-failure*, albeit that the failings of the market do play a contributory role, but rather as the failure of political policy choices made during the 1990s and adhered to into the twenty-first century – the failure of land redistribution and the numerous obstacles faced by resource-poor land-seekers are a direct result of *policy failure* and the abdication of responsibility for land reform on the part of the State and its policy designers. It should be no surprise to policy-makers that markets, by their very nature, fail and that in doing so, it is the poor and marginalised who invariably become the casualties. The policy designers of South African market-based land reform, having wittingly adopted the market as the central mechanism for land redistribution, have come to rationalise the failure of their policy choices and practice by blaming the market.

Interestingly, in as early as 1994, Bernstein (1994) suggested that the World Bank (viewed by many as the bastion of conservative proponents of the market economy) had consistently advocated a more comprehensive land reform programme for South Africa than that adopted by the ANC and had called for an increased level of support to beneficiaries than that provided by the South African state (Van den Brink, 2002). It would seem that the post-Apartheid government made a policy decision not to accommodate the real needs of resource-poor land-seekers but rather to protect its neo-liberal interests and those of the existing landowning and agricultural sector, while at the same time presenting its land reform policy in the language of radical change.
This abdication and devolution of responsibility for land redistribution through the use of the land market mechanism has meant that the potential for confrontation between existing land owners and the resource-poor who are currently asserting their land need, has been deflected from a centre-stage national confrontation between the State and landowners to a decentralised, localised and less visible interaction between landowners and resource-poor individuals or groups, equipped only with the promise of a limited grant and a degree of technical support. The decentralisation of land redistribution has also placed additional burdens and responsibilities on aspirant individual and group beneficiaries, as they are required to identify available land and initiate negotiations in the absence of adequate expertise or support.

In formulating South Africa’s market-based land reform policy, very little characterisation of the land market or the ways in which the South African land market (or land markets more generally) operate in practice was articulated or documented in policy papers. As a result, no strategies have been developed for dealing with critical issues such as how to stimulate supply in conditions of extreme land scarcity, how to overcome information shortages among buyers, how to address racial and other biases among sellers, or how to deal with discrepancies between ‘market value’ and the prices actually demanded by landowners or the affordability of these by the rural poor. Rather, it appears that the nature and role of the land market was viewed by policy makers as axiomatic and unproblematic. As long as the historically disadvantaged were provided with funds – rationed through various bureaucratic and budgetary processes – they could be expected to avail themselves of opportunities provided by the market and thus meet their land needs. In effect, the
state framed land reform policy as essentially a financial and technical response to a deep-seated and complex political challenge that runs to the core of South Africa’s highly unequal and stratified society. Kariuki and Van der Walt (2000) suggest that by ignoring the potentially profound implications of power differentials in the market, the ANC government “dress(ed) up a process of actually buying back land, originally acquired in highly unjust circumstances, as a program of redistribution to the poor” and following Bernstein (1994), framed the political act of land redistribution in terms of a more neutralised “assisted purchase”.

In the absence of a clear characterisation of the land market, those responsible for implementing policy – such as local officials of the national Department of Land Affairs, the provincial Department of Agriculture, the Land Bank, local municipalities and prospective beneficiaries – have been left to interpret the nature of the land market, and their role in it, according to the prevailing orthodoxy in their locale at any given point in time. The study detected a range of myths, perceptions and assumptions on the part of land sector policy makers, officials and implementers which, in a number of instances, included viewing the market in accordance with abstracted and idealised neo-classical principles rather than those more realistically aligned to the workings of real markets. Partially arising from this lack of analytical attention to the character of the market, the study detected what can be described as a ‘reverential’ attitude to the market on the part of some state officials and support agents who ascribed it with an almost mystical quality. A prime example of this being the view expressed by an official of the Northern Cape PLRO who suggested that the acquisition of the farm Remhoogte at R5 per hectare more than the initial and
outdated asking price would have meant that the government was “deliberately frustrating the land market”. Another example was the perception of a local estate agent that SANParks was prepared to purchase land in the Garies region of Namaqualand at almost any cost and that this served to “destabilise” the market. This attitude suggests an assumption that the market is an idealised abstraction outside the realm of everyday interaction, rather than a site of struggle or a reflection of complex and historically determined social relations. In other words, the market is viewed as an idealised institution that has its own internal momentum and equilibrium that should not be impacted upon by real needs, vested interests or external factors of power, ownership or control. This notion of “destabilisation” and “distortion” generates the impression that any activity in the market that is not viewed as being in the interests of a particular grouping or dominant power bloc might be expediently represented as unsettling the market.

This reverential attitude, and the idealised notion of the market on which it rests, was found in this study to have been used by some officials to justify their reticence or refusal to actively intervene in the process of acquiring land for beneficiaries, in the belief that this would ‘destabilise’ or ‘distort’ the market – as evidenced by the Brandvlei and Hondeklipbaai case studies.

However, the study found that the lack of characterisation of the land market and the scope for interpreting the market according to individual preference or the prevailing orthodoxy of a particular DLA office or group of officials, did not result in this
reverential attitude being uniformly held; there were some government officials that were more assertive about the need to maximise the opportunities created by the market to acquire land for land reform purposes – witness the comments made by an official of the Department of Labour in the Hantam Karoo regarding the LRAD programme, as an element of land reform, “There needs to be a more aggressive drive to acquire land”. This was reiterated by an official in the Department of Agriculture in the Western Cape who acknowledged that:

“Government processes are not streamlined in accordance with the needs of the client but in terms of the needs of government ... There is a need for a different kind of approach, a different kind of intervention ... if we are going to meet the demands of land reform. To this end, more attention should be given to a more pro-active or supply-side orientation for land reform” (Interview, Director, Farmer Settlement Unit, Department of Agriculture, July 2003).

The lack of characterisation of the market in policy frameworks has served to generate confusion about the scope and purpose of the DLA’s procedures and support provisions, and has resulted in a range of inconsistently held interpretations about how the land market may or may not be used to advance the interests of aspirant beneficiaries.

While the principal difficulties confronting aspirant land reform beneficiaries in the study area were found to be the exclusionary – and at times non-existent – nature of the land market, a second set of problems became evident and is based on the
nature and timing of the support or intervention provided by the DLA, the Department of Agriculture, and the Land Bank. This set of problems includes, firstly, a failure on the part of the DLA to intervene in areas where a land need was expressed but where no land was available on the market. In the event of a static market or temporarily non-existent market, such as in Hondeklipbaai, the DLA did not intervene to correct this ‘market imperfection’ and the real land needs of the community remained neglected. In the words of a Hondeklipbaai resident, “DLA and the Department of Agriculture do not help us find land ... if there’s no willing seller then that’s just too bad” (Interview, August 2003).

Secondly, the limited size of the land reform grant relative to the price of land was repeatedly referred to by respondents of this study as undermining the possibility of aspirant beneficiaries engaging in the land market – as evidenced by community members in the Hantam Karoo and West Coast who variously confirmed the view of a Brandvlei emerging farmer that:

“LRAD doesn’t work because the basic R20,000 grant is not enough. We can’t afford to get grants bigger than R20,000 because we don’t have money or equipment and other things to put in as our own contribution. The market price for land in this area for a decent size farm is not covered by the LRAD grant and the Land Bank doesn’t give enough of a loan ... The poor just seem to get poorer, even if we use the options that are supposed to help us out of poverty” (Personal interview, emerging farmer, Brandvlei, October 2003).
In attempting to overcome the challenge of the small size of the grant, aspirant beneficiaries resorted to establishing groups in order to pool their grants. In the absence of being able to find affordable land as individuals, the Bergrivier group decided to join forces and pool their grants in order to make an offer to purchase the farm *Goergap*. They were, however, mindful of the potential problems that can emerge from such an arrangement, in particular, the danger that, once purchased, the productive capacity of the land would not necessarily provide sufficient income for the large group of beneficiaries. Other respondents, including those from Hondeklipbaai and Brandvlei, indicated that even if they were to pool their grants, the amount of the grant would still be insufficient to purchase the land that was available. This was cited by the small-scale farmers in Brandvlei as a key reason for opting for Commonage land through the Municipal Commonage programme.

Thirdly, the DLA’s limited budget and its reticence to accommodate a minimal increase in land price – partly due to its reverential attitude to the land market – as shown in the case of the Brandvlei application to purchase the farm *Remhoogte*, served to truncate any possibility of acquiring land by the aspirant beneficiaries.

Fourthly, and linked to the previous issue, the interruptions to the flow of funding, as in the case of the moratorium on all grant applications in the Western Cape, compounded by the apparently unsympathetic response on the part of the Land Bank, served to undermine the attempts of aspirant beneficiaries to acquire land – as in the case of the Bergrivier Emerging Farmers Association’s attempt to acquire the farm *Goergap*. 
Fifthly, the general administration within DLA and its apparently prolonged bureaucratic procedures served to frustrate both the willing sellers and aspirant beneficiaries, and frequently resulted in the DLA losing credibility on the part of those who had initially been willing to engage in land reform initiatives, as evidenced by comments from respondents such indicating that:

“The DLA process is too slow. The Department does not seem able to keep up with the pace of land transactions and sellers get frustrated. Sellers have now reached the point where they prefer to avoid negotiating with the DLA or making their land available for land reform simply because of the bureaucratic process and the long waiting period in between each phase of the transaction” (Interview, estate agent, Loeriesfontein, October 2003).

The documented case studies and experiences of resource-poor rural people’s attempts to engage in the land market to acquire land in the arid regions of Namaqualand and the Hantam Karoo in the Northern Cape, and in the better-resourced West Coast of the Western Cape, starkly expose the nature of the challenges faced by them and the failings of the state’s market-based policy to address their land need. Each of their stories tells a different tale but with a shared and constant refrain – distress about the manner in which land is valued as a commodity by the market; frustration and despair about the lack of available land; exclusion from the land market due to historical and socio-economic inequalities; non-existent or inadequate financial resources and insufficient support from the State.
In summary, the study found that the key elements necessary for the land market to function, as synthesised in this study, were in general absent, more specifically within the three case study locations, and that while numerous obstacles confronted historically disadvantaged people when trying to acquire land on the market, these were compounded by the implementation strategies and bureaucratic procedures and action of the DLA, the Land Bank and associated land reform structures. As evidenced by the three case studies, the availability of land for land reform purposes was extremely limited; the number of ‘willing sellers’ who were prepared to sell their land for the purposes of land reform were negligible; the potential for relationships of transaction to develop, more especially based on trust, was highly unlikely given the socially-embedded nature of race and class relations in most rural areas; the lack of information available to resource-poor land-seekers meant that even when land was available, it was difficult for them to find out about it; the limited grants, budget constraints and the moratorium on grant applications retarded the ability of aspirant beneficiaries to acquire land; and where opportunities did exist for the State to intervene in the market, in the event that land was for sale and willing sellers were prepared to sell for land reform purposes, the DLA failed to take advantage of these opportunities in the interests of aspirant beneficiaries. A dominant message emerging from the study is that of the inadequacy and inappropriate nature and level of support which the state provides to enable market access and land acquisition by resource-poor land seekers.

In essence, the level of support by means of limited financial allocations and technical assistance, as detailed above, suggests that policy designers and proponents of the land market were either incorrect in assuming that this limited
support provided by the State would have the capacity to remedy centuries of social inequality, or wittingly advocated such a policy approach in the knowledge that it would not advance the interests and needs of the majority of aspirant land reform beneficiaries, and thereby protect the interests of existing landowners, agri-business and foreign investors. Overcoming the realities of a socio-politically entrenched land market clearly demands more than the provision of grants or credit.

The study found that amongst the various ways in which the land market has been characterised and interpreted, the predominant and idealised notion of the land market as a neutral, fair and apolitical institution is not congruent with the reality of markets as experienced by under-resourced land-seekers. It was found that the policy choice of adopting the land market is itself flawed in that the market does not, and by its very nature cannot, respond to real need and that its *modus operandi* in effect serves to inhibit land redistribution and maintain the status quo of land ownership. The acquisition of land by resource-poor land seekers via the land market thus remains an illusory, elusive and frustrating abstraction.

The portrayal of the land market in land reform legislation and policy as a technical mechanism for the transaction of land, devoid of historical and political substance and divorced from the socio-economic dynamics of South African and global realities, is an idealised abstraction. This misrepresentation has served to bewilder and mislead many rural land-seekers who desperately strive to have their land and survival needs met but who remain frustrated in the face of little progress. Until such time that it is acknowledged that real markets are social amalgams interacting with and pervaded by the state and society at large, and are political entities permeated
by power relations of diverse kinds, following White’s characterisation (1993), and that the land market is essentially a site of struggle and contestation in the battle for land and power, resource-poor land seekers will continue to grasp at a mirage that remains out of their reach. Sadly, it may be the case that the elusive nature of land acquisition by resource-poor land-seekers through the market-based land reform programme is the underlying, though not articulated, intention of much of the South African state’s land reform policy agenda.
Endnotes

i. The Washington Consensus is a term, initially coined in 1989 by John Williamson, to describe a relatively specific set of ten economic policy prescriptions that he believed constituted a "standard" reform package to be promoted for developing countries by Washington-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United States of America's Treasury Department. The term has since been used to describe a range of principles and policies that are broadly associated with expanding the role of market forces and constraining the role of the state and allied to the principles of neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism.

ii. Prior to the constitutional negotiations, the bulk of all commercial agricultural land in South Africa was owned and controlled by the white minority and the economy was highly centralised and regulated, with commercial agriculture for decades having been bolstered by a suite of subsidies, loans, controls and protections (Williams, 1996:152).

iii. A registration division, formerly known as an Administrative Division, is a designated land area defined by squares of latitude and longitude and which falls under a specific magisterial district. It enables the identification and location of specific parcels of land as registered in the Deeds Office for that province or relevant jurisdiction.

iv. Neoclassical economic theory posits that markets are the best mechanisms for allocating resources and are most effective when left alone without government or corporate interference.

v. Each district municipality has a district level, District Assessment Committee (DAC) to assess proposed projects. LRAD applications are presented and discussed at DAC forums and recommendations made for the consideration of the DLA provincial grant approval committee.

vi. Given that no validated land audit is available, these figures are offered as a rough estimate of all agricultural/rural land in each registration division. The figures for the total amount of agricultural/rural land were arrived at by subtracting all town allotments from the total land area for each registration division, based on figures obtained from the Surveyor General's Office in Cape Town. The following total areas of agricultural/rural land were thus estimated for each registration division: Clanwilliam: 729,708 ha; Piketberg: 445,600 ha; vanRhynsdorp: 1,248,778 ha; Calvinia: 8,69 million ha; Namaqualand: 5,26 million ha.

vii. While it was not within the scope of this study and active verification was not sought, no anecdotal evidence was found of black South Africans acquiring land outside of the land reform programme.
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Primary Sources

Documents
Title deeds of all agricultural land transactions for the registration divisions of Piketberg, Clanwilliam and Vanrhynsdorp in the Western Cape; and Calvinia and Namaqualand in the Northern Cape as registered during 1998 – 2002 and located at the Deeds Office, Cape Town.

Respondents
Government departments
- Mr Christo Smit, Department of Agriculture, Springbok.
- Mr R.C. Ockers, Provincial Department of Agriculture, Elsenberg
- Ms Joyene Isaacs, Director: Farmer Settlement, Provincial Department of Agriculture
- Mr van Niekerk, State Property Holdings, Northern Cape Department of Public Works
- Mr Johnny Slingers, DLA planner for West Coast
- Ms Linsey Lotter, DLA planner for West Coast
- Mr Gerhard Jordaan, DLA Officer For Remhoogte, Springbok
- Mr Ralph van der Poll, extension officer from the Department of Agriculture, Hantam
- Mr Clive Africa, Department of Veterinary Services, Hantam Karoo
- Mr Leukes, Department of Labour, Calvinia

Local Government
- Mr Louis van Wyk, official of Kamiesberg Municipality, Garies
- Mr Willem Engelbrecht, Springbok Municipal Manager
- Representatives from the Steinkopf Transformation Committee and Council members
- Mr. Frik Sterkse, Municipal Councillor, Brandvlei
- Mr Deon Engelbrecht, Acting Municipal Manager, Calvinia
- Mr Willem Engelbrecht, Springbok municipal manager
- Mr Retief, official of the Hantam Municipality
- Mr Bredenhahn, Municipal Manager of the Bergrivier Municipality
- Mr Jacques Josias, ANC Councillor, Piketberg.
• Mr Renald van Rooyen, ANC Councillor, Piketberg.
• Mr Rabbets, Chairperson of the West Coast District Assessment Committee

Private landowners and agricultural union representatives
• Mr Hannes Britz, de Beers Mining Company
• Mr Altie Krige, TransHex Mining Company
• Dr Phillip Schreuder, TransHex Mining Company
• Mr Jeremy Cole (Oceana), Namaqua Fishing Company
• Mr Matthew Norveal, Namaqualand National Park
• Mr Robert Archer, Chair of Namakwa Boere Unie
• Mr Koos Mostert, Private landowner/farmer in Hondeklipbaai
• Mr N. Symington, representative of the Sutherland Commercial Farmer's group
• Mr Francois van Wyk, Hantam Landbou Unie
• Mr Hennie van Wyk, Hantam Landbou Unie
• Mr Kobus Kloppers, director of Prominent Holdings and business consultant
• Mr Niekie Mouton, commercial farmer

Researchers and NGO personnel
• Mr Anton Cartwright, research consultant, Cape Town
• Ms Ann Stagler, SPP
• Mr David Mayson, Research Programme Manager, SPP
• Mr Patrick Kulati, SPP
• Mr Ricado Jacobs - SPP
• Ms Elvene Oncke, Calvinia office, SPP
• Ms Margie Cloete, Springbok office, SPP
• Mr Charles Williams, Calvinia office, SPP
• Mr Ronnie Newman, Springbok office, SPP
Estate agents, lawyers and miscellaneous

- Mr. Alwyn Muller, lawyer and estate agent, Loeriesfontein
- Mr. Willem Van Wyk, Land Bank official, Calvinia
- Mr. Lampies Steenkamp, estate agent, Calvinia
- Mr. Danie Cillie, estate agent and business consultant, Piketberg
- Ms Veronica Luks, Acting Regional Manager of Southern Region, Land Bank

Community and Beneficiary respondents

- Ms Veronica Deurgaardt, secretary of Pella Boerevereniging and Transformation Committee
- Ms Sussana Cloete, small scale farmer in Pella and Treasurer of Transformation Committee
- Mr Petrus Jannetjes (“Oupa Jannetjes”), Emerging farmer and member of Meentkommittee, Pella
- Thirty participants present at the Pella Boeredag, Namaqualand
- Twenty members of the Hondeklipbaai community
- Fifteen emerging farmers and land-seekers in Steinkopf
- Representatives of Steinkopf farmers’ union and Meentkommittee
- Mr. John Markus, Chairperson of Brandvlei EFA
- Mr Thomas Arendse, Member of Brandvlei EFA
- Participants at general meeting of members of the Brandvlei EFA
- Mr Lionel Cloete, Niewoudtville LRAD project – Bitline cc.
- Executive Committee members of the Bergrivier Emerging Farmers’ Association