A Space for Genocide:  
Local Authorities, Local Population and Local Histories in Gishamvu and Kibayi (Rwanda)  

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I, Charles Kabwete Mulinda, declare that “A Space for Genocide: Local Authorities, Local Population and Local Histories in Gishamvu and Kibayi (Rwanda)” is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Charles Kabwete Mulinda
17 September 2010
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ABBREVIATIONS

APROSOMA: Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse
AREDETWA: Association pour le Relèvement Démocratique des Batwa
ARSOM: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer
BBTG: The Broadened Base Transitional Government
CDR: Coalition pour la Défense de la République
CERAI: Centre d’Enseignement Rural et Artisanal Intégré
CFCCA: Centre de Formation des Cadres Pour les Coopératives Agricoles
CIC: Comité Interministériel de Coordination (Interministries Coordination Committee)
CNS: Commission Nationale de Synthèse (Synthesis National Commission)
CODESRIA: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
COFOGI: Coopérative des Forgerons de Gishamvu
COPADAGI: Gishamvu Cooperative of Agriculture Production and Development
CPM: Contribution Personnelle Minimum
CRISP: Centre de Recherche et d’Information Socio-Politiques
Dir.: Sous la direction de
Ed.: Edition or Editor
Eds.: Editors
ESM: Ecole Supérieure Militaire (Military Academy)
F. : Female
FIDH: Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme
FRODEBU: Front de Démocratie du Burundi
ICA: Institut Catéchétique Africain
ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ID: Identity Document (s)
IG: Interim Government
IPEP: International Panel of Eminent Personalities
IPJ: Inspecteur de Police Judiciaire
KOKIKI: Cooperative of the granary of Kirarambogo
KOKINYA: Cooperative of the granary of Nyabisagara.
M.: Male
MDR: Mouvement Démocratique Républicain
MINALOC: Ministère de l’Administration Locale et du Développement Communautaire
MINETAIN: Mines d’Etain du Ruanda-Urundi
MININTER: Ministère de l’Intérieur
MRND: Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement
MRNDD: Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement et la Démocratie
MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières
N°: Numéro.
NGO (s): nongovernmental organization(s)
No.: Number
OAU: Organization of African Unity
ONAPO: Office National de la Population
ORINFOR: Office Rwandais d’Information
p.: page
PARMEHUTU: Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation des Hutu
PDC: Parti Démocrate Chrétien
PL: Parti Libéral
pp.: pages
PSD: Parti Social Démocrate
RABRU: Rapport sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi
RADER: Rassemblement Démocratique Ruandais
Ref.: Reference
Réf.: Référence
RGF: Rwandan Government Forces
RPA: Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTLM: Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
SAP: Structural Adjustment Programme
SRP: Service de Renseignement Préfectoral
STIR: Société des Transports Internationaux du Rwanda
UN: United Nations
UNAMIR: United Nations Mission Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAR: Union Nationale Ruandaise
UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNR: Université Nationale du Rwanda
Vol.: Volume
Soon after the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, in 1994, research around this horrific event flourished. Although a variety of authors of different expertise (journalists, human rights activists, witnesses, academics, both Rwandans and foreigners) produced a great deal of literature, it is mostly scholars who had conducted research in Rwanda prior to 1994 who after 1994 took the lead in the endeavour to write about this genocide. Certain of these scholars produced serious work that has advanced our knowledge about it. These include anthropologists, political scientists, historians, sociologists and economists. As their prior research had brought them close to Rwanda, they felt the need and the moral obligation to contribute to the understanding of this genocide.

This serious literature has increased our understanding with regard to a number of problems. It has for instance challenged the view that the genocide was the result of popular anger following the death of President Habyarimana in the plane crash of April 6th, 1994. It has rejected the western journalistic view of the war and genocide in Rwanda as a result of innate and secular “tribal” conflict and confrontation between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Most importantly, it has advanced knowledge about the causes, the making of the genocide at the national level, and at some local levels. In this respect, it has to

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some extent analysed the contexts of the genocide from the political, economic, social and cultural perspectives. In establishing the context of the genocide, many authors have turned to the whole history of Rwanda in order to understand the genocide.

But there is something this literature has not yet managed to accomplish. There is still no detailed research on genocide for all the regions where the Tutsi genocide occurred. Furthermore, as far as deeper understandings of process are concerned, there are temporal gaps in terms of the periods before, during and after the event of genocide. In other words, all the dynamics at play in order to understand the genocide in a comprehensive way are not yet completely explored. This suggests that there is still much room for further research around the genocide in Rwanda. One area which has been strongly recommended is the study of the genocide at the local levels. This provides the opportunity to test the existing theories in areas not yet explored. This is where my research is situated. It seeks to understand the conditions that made possible the Tutsi genocide in Gishamvu and Kibayi Communes of the Butare Prefecture.

That genocide was planned at the national level is in no doubt today. What is not yet

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9 A number of these works combine the political and the socioeconomic perspectives, whereas some take those domains separately.


11 See for that matter Melvern, Conspiracy to murder; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story; Human Rights Watch, “The Rwandan Genocide : How It Was Prepared”, A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper,
fully known however is how all local regions responded to the national call for genocide. Yet such knowledge should help understand why the implementation of the extermination of Tutsi differed from region to region whereas the master plan was the same; how manipulation from above was received, reshaped and implemented at the local level and for what motives (same or different motives as government). It is worth noting that these local differences are due in part to the varying histories of those regions prior to genocide:

The local level is both the most fertile field for finding data on the genocide and the area of greatest need for research. Despite its small size, Rwanda contains considerable diversity [in the precolonial and colonial] […] The various prefectures and communes set up by the postindependence government had diverse relationships with the central state, depending in large part on their patronage ties to the regime [in different times]. The genocide, because of its decentralized nature, reflected the country’s regional diversity. Differences in the ethnic distribution, political party affiliations, presence of refugees, and time of RPF occupation, among other factors, affected how the genocide was carried out in various localities.12

This suggests that the local contexts varied, among other reasons because of the relationship between the central power with the local area. Therefore a journey in search of the republic’s nature and character in rural areas is of paramount importance.

The choice of two communes is made for the sake of comparing them. Gishamvu and Kibayi have some similarities and differences. They are located in the Butare Prefecture which lost nearly 75% of its Tutsi population during the genocide.13 However, the two communes had a different demographic distribution as far as Tutsi and Hutu population is concerned. The census of 1988 indicated that in Gishamvu the Tutsi population was 27.03%, whereas it was only 6.38 % in Kibayi. It is also interesting to look at their context since colonial times and to compare the impact of the genocide on each commune.


12 See Longman, “Placing genocide in context”, p. 39. On the decentralized nature of the genocide, see also Melvern, Conspiracy to murder, pp. 31, 195, and 212.
13 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 15-16.
Furthermore, my research aims at reconstructing a history of the genocide. It looks at the periods before and during the genocide. Historical research of those two communes since colonial times until 1994 here attempts to understand something of the longue durée\textsuperscript{14} of the political and socioeconomic life. Those political and socioeconomic factors are to be studied in their interrelation.\textsuperscript{15} In other words, my research looks at “the space for genocide”, that is, political and socioeconomic conditions that made possible the genocide in those two communes. The concept “a space for genocide” is borrowed from Pradeep Jeganathan’s concept of “A space for violence”, which means “…the conditions of possibility of violence”.\textsuperscript{16} As David Newbury has explained, “[w]hile we may never understand the depths of intensity of the killings, we can still understand the contextual situation that individuals acted in at the time…”\textsuperscript{17} While we condemn the violence or madness of the genocide, we need to understand the “real or alleged” conditions that made it possible, that is, its rationalities.\textsuperscript{18} This dissertation argues that those conditions were structural and conjunctural. It contends that the genocide cannot be understood unless one looks at the structure of power and society that produced it, as well as its time of occurrence.

As far as agency is concerned, I chose to focus on local authorities and local population, that is, the rulers and the ruled, in their multiple identities and statuses, actions and perceptions. Indeed, the decentralised nature of the genocide obliges us to study the role of the local authorities and local population while studying genocide in a local setting. In


\textsuperscript{15} This interrelationship approach has been advocated and used by Catharine and David Newbury, (1995, 2000, 1998), Verwimp (2000, November 2003, 2003), Yanagizawa (2006). Their attempt is to link the rural and the urban, the political and the socioeconomic in order to draw a fuller picture of the genocide.


\textsuperscript{17} Newbury, “Understanding genocide”, p. 88.

Butare, the local administration helped to hinder and then facilitate the genocide. On the other hand, a big part of the organisation of killings, such as the use of roadblocks, was shaped by national authorities and was transferred to the local authorities. Furthermore, while the genocide propaganda was organized at the national level and used the media, it is local authorities who mobilized local population at the grassroots level. As a result, a great number of local peasants got involved in killings: “…while state actions in Rwanda in 1994 may have speeded the process of genocide, people themselves, thinking and acting in mobs, assumed a degree of initiative in the violence, and killed with methods that far exceeded state mandates.” But most importantly, all along the postindependence period, the commune was the local administrative unit par excellence for implementing the governmental policy. Local authorities at the commune level were the bridge between the government and local population. They gave to power its social and diffuse connotations.

This dissertation is about “local histories” of those agents. It does not claim to be the totalizing history or the grand narrative. In fact, I am producing not a single history of these two communes but plural histories of the locals who happened to be plural in their agencies, experiences and representations. I am not proposing a conventional history (with a capital H), but complex pieces of histories which appear to be sometimes

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20 Melvern, Conspiracy to murder, p. 195.
21 See for example Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story; African Rights, Rwanda. Death, despair and defiance.
coherent and sometimes scattered. My dissertation includes as much continuities as it does discontinuities, and makes use of narratives, descriptions and explanations.

I use the notion of the local for Gishamvu and Kibayi experiences in the geographical sense and not as an epistemological boundary, to use Mamdani’s term. As far as policy and theory are concerned, my study refers extensively to the national and the supranational. In fact, it is aberrant to talk about genocide in the strictly local sense, since the concept itself goes beyond national boundaries, not to mention genocide experiences which sadly have become global. Gishamvu and Kibayi are just geographical targets and not isolated from the rest of Rwanda and the world. As mentioned above, Gishamvu and Kibayi Communes were until 1994 located in the Former Butare Prefecture, located itself in the South of Rwanda.

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24 On history in plural, see Michel Foucault, “Politics and the study of discourse”, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, with two lectures by and interview with Michel Foucault, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 53-72, pp. 53-55. I am indebted to Premesh Lalu who attracted my attention in this direction.


27 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, pp. XII-XIII.

Map 1: Rwanda Administrative Map
Map 2: Butare Prefecture Administrative Map

BUTARE Prefecture Map

Legend
- Prefecture boundary
- Commune boundary
- Highlighted commune
Map 3: Gishamvu and Kibayi Administrative Map
This dissertation follows on from previous works on the Tutsi genocide. A careful analysis suggests that those works intended to reach several objectives that include the reconstruction of events, the keeping of memory and the search for materials that would be used for judicial matters. From the published works, as far as the historical perspective is concerned, it is possible to identify three sets of literature: one that uses history in understanding the genocide, the other that focuses on local research in providing complementary knowledge on the genocide, and lastly one that attempts to uncover the factors and the causes of the genocide.

Indeed, rich historical research that is available today on the Tutsi genocide provides a valuable basis and opportunity for the undertaking of new research. To begin with, I agree with Timothy Longman that so far, “[t]he best analysis of the genocide is found in Des Forges (1999) […] Des Forges provides extensive evidence of the organized nature of the genocide, and she carefully explains the ideology behind the killing, the administration of the killing, and the quiescence of the international community.”

Most importantly, Des Forges extends the national situation to study the local administration of genocide in certain areas that include the Butare Prefecture for some communes. Her work is a good example for those seeking to understand genocide in a local setting in relation to the national area, since the planning was national but the execution was both national and local. It gives a detailed historical overview of the genocide. Another work that attempts to examine in a comprehensive way the Tutsi genocide is African Rights 1995. Though that research was conducted in a short time after the genocide, the extensive number of interviews and the attempt to explain wholly the “policy of massacres” makes it a valuable source. These two works look at the whole history of


30 Longman, “Placing genocide in context”, p. 34.
Rwanda in order to understand the genocide and not the other way around. My work intends to follow these sound methodological approaches.

The work of Mamdani does much the same, but by focusing on political history. Drawing from the history of Rwanda since the end of the 19th century, Mamdani explores the role played by colonial powers in redefining, reshaping, and rigidifying the Hutu and Tutsi political identities which became racialized by colonial policies and interests. It shows how this ethnic colonial legacy is perpetuated in the First Republic (1962-1973), and in the Second Republic (1973-1994). In addition, it looks at the regional backgrounds in order understand the context and the consequences of the civil war and the genocide. Most importantly, the strength of his work lies in the conceptual framework around power and identity. But, as his title suggests, he failed to reconstruct “how victims become killers”, that is, the process whereby certain local Rwandans embarked on the killing of their fellow Tutsi. A rather different emphasis on economic history comes out in the work of Uvin. Looking at the international development agencies and their role in Rwanda especially during the Habyarimana regime (1973-1994), the book shows how donors’ financial aid was used not for developing rural areas, but for strengthening the authoritarian regime, preparing and spreading the implementation of the genocide. It shows that the lack of a political definition of aid by the international community accounted for its mistake in helping an extremist government towards its extremist policy. Though Prunier also looks at the history of Rwanda since the end of 19th century, he emphasizes the role of ethnic ideology in explaining how many ordinary Rwandans became involved in killings. One area of debate is his statement that Rwandans were obedient towards power and that this eased the participation in the state

31 Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*.
project of genocide. In this dissertation, I test several statements on obedience and disobedience. I test also political and economic statements at the local level.

Linda Melvern’s book is a masterpiece concerning the planning of the genocide at the top. Using the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) testimonies of the top planners of genocide, including Prime Minister Jean Kambanda who pleaded guilty and told the story of the genocide to ICTR in exchange for the protection of his family, the book gives more insight than anything published before the testimony of Prime Minister Kambanda. Among other bits of precious information, it explains how the civil defence plan was conceived from the top military and governmental office and how it planned to involve the civil population in the military activities. This document was called “Organization of civil-defence.” In its effort to explain how the planning and execution of the genocide were made, Human Rights Watch in turn comes back to the civil defence force highlighted clearly in the testimony of Kambanda.

Pottier shows how Rwandan history and national identity have been subjected to multiple interpretations in time by various political and intellectual actors. Methodologically, his contribution is very important, since it underscores how careful any researcher on Rwandan history must be and especially with regard to the Tutsi genocide. One of his main arguments in the 2002 book, which is about the representations of the past or the uses of history in post-1994 Rwanda, is however not referred to directly in this dissertation for the simple reason that it only deals with events up to 1994. In the same vein of interpretive complexity, Nkusi, Uvin, Hintjens and Mamdani remind us of certain points in the history of Rwanda that have remained of

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35 Melvern, Conspiracy to murder.
great controversy. These include the Hutu “revolution” of 1959, Hutu and Tutsi identities, and the role of colonialism. Hence, there is a need to keep these ongoing debates in mind while dealing with those issues.

The second body of literature looks at the local cases. Indeed, since many works have been published concerning the Tutsi genocide at the national level, new research should look at specific issues of the genocide and specific localities in order to add something to the existing knowledge: “The research mostly needed now is not overly ambitious comprehensive analyses of the genocide that rehash the same secondary sources but sectoral, thematic, and local level research that tests theories of genocide and adds new data, creating building blocks upon which a more complex and complete understanding of Rwanda’s terrible tragedy can be constructed.”39 Scott Straus, in his research of 2006, which included both the national and local, also advocated more local research: “The new consensus has made considerable advances on the tribalism model, but our understanding of the genocide is still at a largely macro and sometimes superficial level. What is needed now is a more micro-level, social scientific investigation, one that identifies and evaluates the mechanisms and dynamics driving the genocide.”40 The few works so far produced in this direction have proved to be of valuable importance.

For example, the work of Danielle de Lame41 has pioneered the model of studying a local setting. Though conducted in the 1980s, the research of de Lame proved to be very useful in understanding the genocide at the local level. Studying the hill of Munzanga and linking it to the national context, the work of de Lame offers a picture of rural life during the time of the crises of the 1980s. It shows the strengths and weaknesses of the state at the local level, the social relations between rural peasants and elites, how the peasants

1, 2001, pp. 25-54.
were not equal in their poverty, how the peasantry was not a congregate group, and therefore how their behaviour during the genocide differed. It shows the importance of studying social relations between different groups at the local level and their material lives in order to understand their behaviour by the time of genocide. Longman’s article on Kibuye\textsuperscript{42} does this also. It shows how the relation between the local elite and local peasants has determined the way peasants embarked on killings or not. Where the population was against local power-holders, the latter had to hire killers from elsewhere to come to kill people in those places. This suggests that the populations were not just obedient, that they were also rational calculators. My research will follow this path by looking at the role of local authorities in their different backgrounds and interests, and local population in their varied social statuses, aspirations, and their unfolding behaviour in 1994 in two different communes.

Following de Lame and Longman, and looking at two communes, one in Butare and one in Kibuye, Kimonyo\textsuperscript{43} found that even though the state engineered the genocide project, it only partly executed it, since other sectors of society also became involved in killings: civil society, political parties, local population, military, etc. Political mobilization, argues Kimonyo, was not the monopoly of the state. Opposition parties, especially the MDR (Republican Democratic Movement), were instrumental in this process. Guichaoua’s work also contributes greatly in documenting the genocide in the Butare Prefecture, but it does not fully explain the interconnection between the planning of genocide by political leaders and its implementation at the local level.\textsuperscript{44} The focus is on political leaders of Rwanda and specifically of Butare. Moreover, Guichaoua’s main focus is on the urban commune of Butare, not the whole Prefecture of Butare. The work of Lee Ann Fujii also looks at genocide at local level, focusing this time at sector level, examining one sector in the central part of Rwanda and another in the North. Her comparison of the two areas, her careful analysis of agency, identity politics, and behaviour before and during the genocide, are a great contribution to the understanding of what happened at local level. Most importantly, she deconstructed the concepts of

\textsuperscript{42} Longman, “Genocide and socio-political change”.
\textsuperscript{43} Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire.
\textsuperscript{44} Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994.
ethnicity and regionalism in relation to identity, violence and conflict in a way very few authors have previously attempted. Finally, her remarkable effort to theorize violence in general and genocide in particular is highly commendable.\textsuperscript{45} Timothy Longman deepened the analysis begun in his 1995 article in a more recent book, where he takes the two cases of Kibuye from a longue durée perspective and this time studies the role of the Christian Churches in Rwanda in political developments since colonial times up to 1994 and (and during the genocide.) He argues that the Churches were not mere passive agents vis-à-vis state policies, that they were active agents in the shaping and implementation of what he called ethnic politics, in their close cooperation with the state, all the way up to the genocide. Moreover, the Churches taught to their followers to obey the state authorities.\textsuperscript{46}

The merit of all these local researches is that they show to what extent all local actors (elites, peasants) were rational calculators in their varied behaviours and to different degrees. I test all these local findings on Gishamvu and Kibayi. I also resort to some of the methodological approaches of this locally-based research and use it for my research about an area that has not yet been studied thoroughly regarding genocide.

Lastly, a number of works have insisted that obedience was among the causes that could explain how genocide was implemented in Rwanda. Criticizing Prunier for his theory of obedience to explain why many Rwandan peasants embarked in killings, Claudine Vidal remarked that if obedience was observed among some peasants, such an assertion could not be generalized to the whole country and to all peasants.\textsuperscript{47} Such a critique is vitally important because it suggests that it is difficult to generalize when it comes to causes of popular participation in genocide. I argue that there have been several contexts and not a single context. Space is important; as important as local agency. Possibly one would investigate every local setting and understand the causes of participation in that area, in order to make valid conclusions. One reason for this careful local study is that the


Rwandan peasantry was never a homogenous group. As Vidal highlights, the historical contexts of the relations between ethnic groups, in rural areas, were not uniform, in the north, south, east or west. But she pursues this by explaining that the differences were not just regional. They were also characterized by an internal social stratification. As Danielle de Lame has explained, all peasants in the villages she studied were not equally poor, there were differing socio-economic levels among them.

Jean Bigagaza et al. offer a detailed analysis of land in the conflict of Rwanda from the 1980s onwards. They conclude that it played a crucial role in the genocide as one of causal factors. “To the poor rural Hutu, inheritance of additional land and property was a big incentive to participate in the genocide.” And again: “The role of land is crucial in understanding the civil war and genocide in Rwanda.” Pottier also analyses the land issue and shows to what extent it was a source of conflict. If anything, the literature on land in Rwanda reveals that there was land shortage, and inefficient exploitation for those who had it. This seems to have been an incentive to kill by landless or more ambitious people.

Paul J. Magnarella, David Newbury, Catharine Newbury, Peter Uvin, Andy Storey and Helen Hintjens offer detailed analyses of factors relevant to explain the

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48 Vidal, “Questions sur le rôle des paysans”, p. 336; Newbury, “Understanding genocide”.
51 Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda.
53 “…the interests for members of both these groups to participate in the genocide is to be found in their respective relation to the land and labour markets. The landlords or employers had “something to defend”, meaning their job, their land, their farm or farm output and their overall privileged position in Rwandan society. The poor, […] could expect to gain from participation: it has been widely documented that a large number of participants, mainly the rank and file among the perpetrators were very interested in the property of the murdered Tutsi. Among the property, land was a much desired asset.” (Verwimp, “The political economy of coffee”, p. 29.)
55 Newbury, “Understanding genocide”.
Rwandan genocide: ecological, economic, cultural and political factors. They stress the following: the civil war of 1990, Hutu power ideology against Tutsi, economic exploitation of the masses by the Hutu upper elite, the failure of the government to solve the ecological and economic crisis of the 1980s-1990s by addressing sustainable solutions, and the choice to eliminate a portion of a population as a solution for that ecological question (disequilibrium between land and demography), economic decisions of international monetary institutions on Rwanda at the beginning of the 1990s, ethnicity that can be traced back to the late precolonial and the colonial periods, but also regional factors, such as the influence of Burundi massacres on ethnic politics in Rwanda, and gender issues. The key point that can be drawn from these works is that though all those factors may have contributed to the spread of killings, political manipulation seems to have been the main cause of the genocide. In answer to the question of why people killed, Uvin argued that ordinary people killed for the following motives that varied in degree between Rwanda and Burundi: fear, prejudice, a desire for revenge, impunity, opportunism and obedience. In an earlier article, he has emphasized the role of prejudice in the Rwandan crisis since colonial times. He indicates that after independence, prejudice was used to distinguish the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa groups and discriminate against some of them. Finally, Verwimp tried to link the politics and the economics in order to understand the Habyarimana regime’s context and policy. Newbury and Newbury advocated a link between the political and the rural in the understanding of Rwandan history. Studies by Little and Horowitz, and the responses

56 Newbury, “Background to Genocide”.
57 Uvin, Aiding Violence.
60 On this see also African Rights, Rwanda. Death, despair and defiance, p. 14; Yanagizawa, “Malthus in Rwanda?”.
63 Verwimp, “Development ideology”; and “The political economy of coffee”.
of Robins and Ndoreraho, show the need to link politics and economics, the rural and the politics, as far as agriculture for instance is concerned. Little and Horowitz argued that in 1987 there was a tension between the government and the rural smallholders over what crops to grow, the former privileging the export crops such as coffee, tea and pyrethrum, the latter preferring subsistence crops which were by far more profitable for their local consumption and local market and enjoying better prices. The response of Robins and Ndoreraho refuted the idea of conflict of interest between the state and rural smallholders, emphasizing that the state policy and discourse was in favour of subsistence crops. The reply of Little and Horowitz disagreed again with Robins and Ndoreraho for their adherence to the state rhetoric, and gave more evidence for the divergence between the state’s interests and rural smallholders’ interests regarding the choice of crops to promote.

Following this literature, my research examines political and socio-economic factors in their interrelationship. In addition, it looks at the role of state elites, local elites and local population in order to grasp the contours of conflicting interests, redefinition of conflicts, the changing patterns between the making and remaking of choices of actors (proponents and opponents) in different times and spaces, in order to understand the occurrence and the development of genocide in the two targeted communes.

Thus, this research attempts to answer the following questions: How and why genocide became possible in Gishamvu and Kibayi? In other words, what was the nature of power at different epochs and how was it exercised? How did forms of political competition evolve? In relation to these forms of competition, what forms of violence occurred across history and how did they manifest themselves at local level up to 1994? And what was the place of identity politics? Then, what were economic and social conditions since colonial times up to 1994 and how were these conditions instrumentalized in the

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construction of the ideology of genocide? Finally, how did the Tutsi genocide unfold in Gishamvu and Kibayi?

In order to answer these questions, I use historical and comparative methods. These go hand in hand with the techniques of the collection, analysis and interpretation of both written materials and interviews. Written documentation refers to both archives and published works. Archives include colonial reports and correspondence, postindependence reports, minutes and correspondence at national, prefecture and commune levels. The bulk of prefecture and commune archives are in Kinyarwanda language. Oral materials include in-depth and open ended interviews of 106 informants from Gishamvu and Kibayi who include 43 survivors, 16 perpetrators, 43 bystanders, and 4 who were not in Rwanda during the genocide. Altogether, my approach in these methods and techniques is qualitative. With regard to written and oral materials, I use triangulation in three ways. First, I confront written archives and interviews. Secondly, as far as interviews are concerned, I use the views of victims, bystanders and perpetrators. Thirdly, I use the standpoints of leaders and constituents which are found in both written materials and interviews. Here triangulation means the cross-reference of three different groups of informants in different sources, against and alongside each other.

Concerning oral sources, I consider eyewitness accounts as extremely valuable, but subject them to a critical examination. On this, I follow the advice of Totten and Parsons:

> Although eyewitness accounts are a valuable means of documenting historical events, their validity as a primary source is as good as the procedures by which they are collected as well as the accuracy of the witnesses whose accounts are documented. The same research standards used to develop historical works need to be applied to gathering, recording, authenticating, and interpreting eyewitness

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68 Archives that are in Kinyarwanda language are presented in English both in the footnotes and in the bibliography. Moreover, all translations of quotations from French and Kinyarwanda into English are by myself. This means that I used sources and works which are in three languages: Kinyarwanda, French and English. The bulk of publications were in French and English. All archives were in French and Kinyarwanda, while interviews were in Kinyarwanda.

accounts. In this respect, I check the validity of the interview data through cross-reference against other sources, i.e., when information of one person is supported or substantiated by others. Secondly I put that information in its context of production, that is, I examine the motives that drove those informants or authors to make such allegations and the context under which they operated. The information gathered from the oral and even the written sources, official and private, becomes ‘evidence’ only when its modes of production have been interrogated.

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The first chapter examines colonial legacies and agencies. It argues that the nature of colonial power perpetuated domination, oppression, and discrimination, that the economic sphere was exploitative and that the social policies were repressive and divisive. Since colonial experiences are by now fairly well-documented, this chapter focuses on local memories and experiences of colonization, by emphasizing the performance and the evaluation of local authorities, the hardships of economic exploitation and social repression in everyday life in Gishamvu and Kibayi. The chapter ends with a section on the late colonial reforms, and argues that these reforms, although they were productive of new political dynamics, were not sufficient enough to improve lives of people.

The second chapter is concerned with the decolonization process. It shows how the period between 1957 and 1962 was intense in terms of political activity, and how Rwandan intellectuals formulated their strategies in order to gain power. It also explores the agency of both Belgian colonial masters and the Roman Catholic Church leaders in those political developments. It describes as much as possible the violence of 1959-1962

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that came to be called “revolution” and the shift of power from Belgian administration and Tutsi auxiliaries to Hutu intellectuals through appointment by the Belgian authority, through elections or through violence. It ends with the consequences of that violence in society, such as the exile of Tutsi and other monarchists, the issue of property and representations around that event called “revolution”. From all these political, social and economic developments, one learns how complex are agency, status, identity, interests, social relations, and conflicts.

The third chapter studies the First and Second Republics in Gishamvu and Kibayi. It shows how political leaders managed society as well as the economy, and how local authorities and local population responded to the state policies. In this regard, it analyses the agency of postindependence leaders in dealing with issues left by the colonial rule and by the decolonization struggles and which continued to pose problems after independence, such as land, refugees and violence. It examines the policy of structural violence at local level and argues that this policy went beyond the issues of ethnicity and regionalism which have received most attention in the literature to date. The remainder of the chapter deals with everyday life in the economic sphere, in the political sphere and in social relations. It is there that it documents the relations between local leaders and constituents, the perception of constituents about their leaders concerning their economic and power performance, how they obeyed and/or disobeyed them, and relations between locals as far as their ethnic identities were concerned. This chapter shows that the everyday and the notion of the big ‘event’ were not always separated.\footnote{On the everyday as being also eventful, see Veena Das, \textit{Life and Words, Life and the Descent into the Ordinary}, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2007, p. 8.}

The fourth chapter revisits the economic crises of 1985 onwards and checks their implications in Gishamvu and Kibayi. It then explores the local experiences around the Rwandan Patriotic Front war, how the regime in place represented it and instrumentalized it in order to repress the Tutsi community and political opponents. It thereafter describes the criminal and social violence at local level, arguing that this violence resulted from both the economic crises and the war. The chapter dwells then on intense political
activities of political parties since the inception of the multiparty system in 1991 and argues that even in rural areas these parties were very active. This intense activity is seen both in the organisation of campaign meetings and in the competition among parties, using all means including political violence. This chapter ends with a section on disobedience during the multiparty system. If one links this culture of violence to the one of the early 1960s, one notices to what extent a space for violence and then for genocide was being prepared.

The fifth chapter examines the ideology that led to the Tutsi genocide. It argues that the arguments of this ideology drew as much on past histories and experiences, and on political and economic crises of the early 1990s. It starts with a theory on conditions of possibility of genocide, then it goes on to examine how the ideology of genocide was constructed in Rwanda. It argues that this ideology used four core tools: the dehumanization, the manipulation of history and ethnicity, the depiction of the Tutsi community as a threat, and massacres of Tutsi between 1990 and 1993. The last part of the chapter deals with the Tutsi genocide at national level.

The sixth and the seventh chapters reconstruct the unfolding of the genocide in Gishamvu and Kibayi Communes. As far as the commencement of physical violence against the Tutsi is concerned, these chapters link the national context with local developments, showing to what extent this point of origin differed in both communes. Then the local genocide is described by sectors as much as possible, stressing the perpetrators, the victims, the rescuers and the varied pattern of the massacres and of the scattered killings of individuals, either by sector or by commune. These chapters also stress the different periods or phases of the genocide. They also look at the intra-Hutu violence stemming from various motives, such as disputes around expropriated property or Tutsi wives. The main source used for reconstructing the unfolding of the Tutsi genocide in these two communes is the interviews I conducted, since archival documents and secondary materials remain scarce.
This dissertation concludes by emphasizing the importance of the linkages between longer-term processes and more immediate conjunctures, and between politics, economics and social dynamics, in order to understand the preconditions and the conditions that made possible the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda more broadly and in Gishamvu and Kibayi specifically. The conclusion also assesses how the key questions concerning the genocide have been addressed throughout the chapters of this dissertation, and identifies the strengths and the limits of such questions in the case of the local communes under examination.

This dissertation starts with an analysis of precolonial and colonial experiences, in line with its efforts to understand the Rwandan context using a longue durée perspective. It is to this early period that we must now turn in Chapter 1.
CHAPTER ONE

COLONIAL LEGACIES AND AGENCIES

INTRODUCTION

In studying the Tutsi genocide, an understanding of colonial experiences becomes important. First, it helps understand among other reasons where the authoritarian power that perpetrated genocide and the crisis that led to it come from. Moreover, that authoritarian power, the context in which it operated, and the means it used are analyzed by considering the colonial legacy. This helps understand what David Scott called “the political rationalities of colonial power.”1 Secondly, the colonial becomes crucial because even genocide think-tanks used languages and ideological references drawn from colonial historiography. The Hamitic hypothesis stating that the Tutsi were aliens, and the reinterpretation of certain Rwandan precolonial myths to prove that certain Rwandans were allochtonous and others autochtonous are precise cases in point. The version of Rwandan history as a history of a successive arrival of ethnic groups, Twa first, and then Hutu and lastly the Tutsi, all coming from different places, had been engineered by colonial scholars and taught to Rwandan students for decades. Those who did not study it had to get it through radio and extremist press propaganda, first in 1959 and again in 1990 and 1994.

Furthermore, my elderly informants included their colonial experiences in their explanation about the genocide in their rural area communes. One reason for this may be that in the local perception, history (amateka in Kinyarwanda) still means to some extent political history or past deeds of leaders, and particularly memories of or about the monarchy. The further one can go into the past, the more he or she is considered as an

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expert of “history”. The more one can recite names of chiefs and places the more one is seen or sees him/herself as a keeper of authoritative historical knowledge. Since my informants who were sixty and over at the time of the interview were born or lived during the colonial period, history for them meant a period from colonialism onward. The ease with which they still remembered colonialism, especially through its colonial agents, the Belgians, the Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs, suggests that it is important to include even the colonial local past experiences and representations in a study that focuses on genocide in local areas.

In addition to power considerations, this chapter looks as well at economic and social experiences and finally deals with the colonial reforms that started to soften the oppressive and repressive measures. But the colonial suggests that we also look at the precolonial as well. In this chapter, I refer to the precolonial slightly, because I did not find many recollections about it in Gishamvu and Kibayi, and because at national level, some other authors have already done this.

1.1. SOME NOTES ON THE PRECOLONIAL STRUCTURES IN RWANDA

In Rwandan historiography, the precolonial period is a much more complex time span to consider. On the one hand, so much literature has been produced about it. Although this literature contains some few insights into social and cultural traits, it remains largely a political history. Moreover, most authors who wrote about it during the colonial period tended to focus more on the central part of the country than other regions. After independence, a move has been made in the direction of producing monographs on peripheral parts of what became Rwanda. This has been done both by Rwandan and foreign students and scholars. On the other hand, after 1994, some works slightly mentioned the precolonial in order to clarify some issues of the past of Rwanda that can help explain the historical context of the genocide. They focused mostly on the occupation of territory, control of power, and ethnic identity – Hutu-Tutsi relations in social and political institutions – to mention a few. In my attempt to revisit the precolonial setting, I identify major trends and debates but leave them open.
Archaeological and linguistic evidences indicate that the territory that later became central Rwanda was already populated by the first millennium BC. The earliest social organisation that seems to have prevailed in that territory was based on lineage and clan structures. It is worth noting that these lineages and clans were not static. The state in the sense of monarchy or “sacred royalty” came later. But once the monarchies developed, kinship structures (lineage, clan and others) continued to operate in social, economic and political matters. The territory of Rwanda was occupied by many such monarchies or kingships, some of which came to be progressively conquered by the Nyiginya kingdom. This becomes clear at least from the mid-15th century onward. The name Rwanda came from the Nyiginya kingdom, but the culture that was found within that entity went beyond the Nyiginya influence.

The territory of the Nyiginya kingdom grew slowly from the centre (Gasabo) to include other parts of the territory progressively until the advent of colonial rule. Some few regions located in the north-west and the south-west were not yet subjugated by the Nyiginya kingdom when the Germans came. However, all these political entities shared a Rwandan identity in the sense of a similar core culture and language.

Since at least two thousand years, the population seems to have been stable within Rwandan territory. Its main economic activities revolved around agriculture, animal husbandry, craft production, hunting, gathering, and the exchange of goods and services.

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This society seems to have been more egalitarian in earlier times, when the demography was still low in comparison with the size of territory. In this regard, there seems to have been fewer conflicts between agricultural and animal economies. Those who needed land and pastures were moving freely to new lands in order to acquire the needed resources. But as the population grew over centuries, new resources were needed. The progressive clearing of forests by individuals and families, and conquest of territories by armies in order to acquire the control over land, cattle and subjects, can be read as an attempt to resolve this issue of economic welfare and expansion.

Some time before the 17th century, a relation between poor people needing cattle and cattle-owners was created. It was called Ubuhake. That relation existed in neighbouring kingdoms of Rwanda but bore different names. Concerning Ubuhake, some poor who sought the ownership of cattle had to go to submit themselves to people who were rich in cattle. The owners of cattle who in turn needed subjects accepted the terms of entering that relation or contract. Then Ubuhake became a sort of clientship based on exchange of the usufruct of a cow between a person called patron (shebuja) and the other called client (umugaragu). Before receiving the cow, the client had to perform a number of duties that included manual labour, allegiance and support in various social circumstances of everyday life. The transfer of the usufruct of the cow was the conclusion of that relationship or contract. In addition to the transfer of the cow, the patron also had other duties such as the protection of his client (s) in justice matters. The more cattle became scarce as a result of population growth or of cattle diseases, the more it was considered as precious and therefore the more it led to the increase of Ubuhake relationships. The existing literature suggests that this institution started in the central part of the country and arrived or developed in peripheral parts only later around the eighteenth century.6

Clientship was also recorded for land exchange or use. The history of traditional institutions around land such as Ubukonde in the north-western part of the country and the Igikingi in the nineteenth century also shows a pattern evolving in relation to time and space. Whenever the demography was small, conditions of clients vis-à-vis their patrons

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6 On the evolution of Ubuhake, see Kabwete Mulinda, The Dynamic Aspect, pp. 46-73.
tended to be generous. They became exploitative as the population size was increasing and resources were becoming scarce. *Ubukonde* was a much more ancient institution. Oral traditions mention it already by the 15th century. It meant the right of lineages called *abakonde*, that is, those who have cleared the forest in order to acquire a portion of land to exploit it in various economic activities: in agriculture (*ubukonde bw’isuka*) (the *ubukonde* of hoe); in hunting (*ubukonde bw’inzogera*) (the *ubukonde* of bell) and in cattle rearing (*ubukonde bw’inka*) (the *ubukonde* of cow). The lineages or individuals who could not have enough labour to clear land sought land clientship from the *abakonde* lineages and in the process became their subjects (*abagererwa*). However, *ubukonde* rights or identities were not static. Some experiences of the northwestern part of the country suggest that some *abagererwa* families, through their military power, gained the status of *abakonde*. This kind of *ubukonde* was called *ubukonde bw’umuheto* (*ubukonde* of bow).7

As for the *Igikingi* institution, it was created around 1840 in order to solve the problem of demographic increase and multiplication of cattle. These two factors put pressure on land. This pressure had started to be perceived as early as the 17th and 18th centuries when massive clearings of forest were registered. People from saturated places rushed into areas occupied by forests and started to clear them in order to gain some land. Those internal immigrations pursuing empty lands occurred both in the northwest, in the south and in the southwest.8 *Igikingi* was a reserved portion of land for herding given by the king or other top authorities to other leaders or owners of cattle. It reduced the public land that every owner of cattle used before without condition. It started to be implemented in the centre of the country and reached peripheral regions much later during the reign of Rwabugiri (1860-1895). There are even areas which did not witness it at all, such as those regions that had a low density of population where every owner of cattle had enough land for grazing. As a result, where the *Igikingi* system reached, it was necessary to own an exclusive pastoral domain.9 Since some of those in need of land for grazing had to seek clientship from owners of *ibikingi* (plural of *igikingi*), a new

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7 On a summary about *Ubukonde*, see Kabwete Mulinda, *The Dynamic Aspect*, pp. 75-80.
8 Kabwete Mulinda, *The Dynamic Aspect*, pp. 81-82.
clientship for land was born. In addition to *ubuhake* clientship seeking cattle, clients who owned cattle but not land for grazing, had to negotiate a land clientship. As a result, as explains Nkurikiyimfura, *Ubuhake* in this mid-19th century became not only a “pastoral clientship” but came to be perceived as the “pastoral and land clientship”.

Concerning the evolution of political power, the centralization of power and therefore the control of resources and labour was one of the most important concerns of kings for a long time. In order to gain more labour power and additional cattle, conquests of neighbouring kingdoms were organised by the Nyiginya kingdom. Alexis Kagame places the first clear attempt of the Nyiginya king to centralize power around the 15th century during the reign of Kigeri I Mukobanya.10 Indeed, the history of the Rwandan army is a record of successive conquests and annexations of territories, of looting the cattle from subjugated kingdoms and of capturing the defeated soldiers. Starting from the 17th century during the reign of Ruganzu Ndori, the kings co-opted great chiefs by concluding with them an *Ubuhake* relationship. During the next century, that relationship got extended from chiefs to owners of cattle and to agriculturalists. When spoliation of cattle became a major problem facing cattle owners, especially during the 18th and 19th centuries, people entered the *Ubuhake* clientship not just to acquire cattle, but also to protect those that they had.11

Moreover, few years after the creation of the *Igikingi* institution, the king Yuhi Gahindiro initiated another major administrative reform. That was around 1840. He created the posts of chief of land and chief of grass or pastures. The first acted as the administrator of land for agriculture or territory, while the second managed the cattle. These two were added to the third chief, i.e., army chief.12 Nkurikiyimfura thinks that this administrative reform was an attempt by the royal court to control the local chiefs who could easily become rich thanks to the distribution of *Ibikingi* lands to clients and by gaining many

Ubuhake clients. However, it is worth stressing that the reform of igikungi and of the three chiefs was implemented very slowly, for they became widespread only during the reign of Kigeri Rwabugiri (1860-1895).

Again, the royal court achieved the centralization of the kingdom by controlling as much as possible the power of great families that ruled the country. Although kings tried as much to crush factions among these great families that ruled the country in a hereditary manner from the 18th century onwards, it is Rwabugiri who relatively succeeded to annihilate those families, although they did not fail entirely. Rwabugiri waged several wars of extending the territory, appointed individuals from modest families to posts of army command and administration of territory, and seriously threatened the hereditary rights of great families. But after his death, it was clear that the influence of great families in the power structure was still important.

Then what was the nature of identity politics during this time in relation to the management of economic assets and control of power? It is worth noting that ethnic identity has remained one of the most controversial and complex issues to deal with in Rwandan historiography. However, knowledge about Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities and relations over time and space has advanced although gaps still remain. For example, on the issue of great migrations (so emphasized in the colonial and later on post-independence historiography) which assigned to each group a certain time of arrival in the territory that became Rwanda and place of origin, it has been made clear that those assertions could not be supported. As Vansina wrote, referring to archaeological and linguistic findings, “[t]here has never been successive immigrations of Twa hunters-gatherers, of Hutu agriculturalists and of Tutsi pastoralists, because those social categories were elaborated in place in order to classify people already established there.” In the same vein, Takeuchi stated:

16 Vansina, *Le Rwanda ancien*, p. 249, see also pp. 32-33.
It is appropriate to understand the emergence of Bantu speakers in the Great Lakes region, not as the migration of a single ethnic group, but the gradual appearance of several such groups having similar languages and cultures. Therefore, neither Tutsi nor Hutu should be regarded as a single separate group from the dawn of history. Statements such as ‘the Tutsi arrived in Rwanda before the fourteenth century’ or ‘[the Hutu] arrived in Rwanda during the first millennium’ are entirely inappropriate.\textsuperscript{17}

The second issue of great controversy was on the assertion that the Tutsi were pastoralists and the Hutu agriculturalists. Mamdani viewed this issue as follows:

Many Hutu had cattle, and many Tutsi farmed the land. […] The division of labor observed between the two at the onset of the colonial period is better thought of as a division enforced through the medium of political power rather than as a timeless preoccupation of the two separate groups. The economic community was less a natural than a historical artifact, less a biological predisposition than a political creation.\textsuperscript{18}

The third issue is on the debate whether Tutsi and Hutu are political or social identities. According to Vansina, Tutsi referred to a certain political elite or a social class among the pastoralists.\textsuperscript{19} However, towards the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Tutsi came to include not just the political elite, but all the pastoralists.\textsuperscript{20} Mamdani preferred to consider them as political identities which changed across time and space and whose change was influenced by the evolution of the Rwandan state itself.\textsuperscript{21} Takeuchi, who also reflected upon precolonial developments, emphasized the role of state formation in the Hutu-Tutsi relations. In the process, he formulated the following hypothesis:

\begin{quote}
It is likely that the notion ‘Tutsi’ was developed at the court and carried with it the idea of ‘ruling class’, as opposed to the rest of the population consisting not only of Hutu and Twa but also of Tutsi. […] On the other hand, the notion ‘Hutu’ might be understood as originally referring to ‘the rest of the Tutsi’. We may say
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{17} Shinichi Takeuchi, “Hutu and Tutsi: A Note on Group Formation in Pre-colonial Rwanda”, in Didier Goyvaerts (ed.), \textit{Conflict and Ethnicity in Central Africa}, Tokyo, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2000, pp. 177-208, p. 186.
\textsuperscript{18} Mamdani, \textit{When Victims Become Killers}, p. 51. Emphasis in original.
\textsuperscript{19} Vansina, \textit{Le Rwanda ancien}, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{20} , Vansina, \textit{Le Rwanda ancien}, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{21} Mamdani, \textit{When Victims Become Killers}, pp. 56 and 73.
that all the people who were alienated from power (i.e. the court) were collectively called ‘the Hutu’, simply because they did not belong to ‘the Tutsi’.\footnote{Takeuchi, “Hutu and Tutsi”, pp. 200-201.}

Finally, David Newbury warned against the danger to think that the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities have always been salient or powerful. He reminds that two centuries ago, people identified themselves in terms of region or neighbourhood and kin group. He pursues this argument: “With the expansion of the power of the monarchy, these categories of Tutsi and Hutu gradually came to over-ride in importance the local identities and to encompass virtually the entire population, in a process which was only completed under colonial rule.”\footnote{David Newbury, “Understanding genocide”, \textit{African Studies Review}, Vol. 41, No. 1, April 1998, pp. 73-97, p. 83.} He sees these identities as progressively but firmly constructed ethnic identities, which bear complexities within themselves and vis-à-vis each other: “Even within one ethnic category the patterns of change that occurred in one region differed from those in other regions; in other words, there is not a single coherent ‘Tutsi history’ or ‘Tutsi culture,’ just as there is no single ‘Hutu history’ or ‘Hutu culture.’”\footnote{Newbury, “Understanding genocide”, p. 83. See also pp. 84-87.}

The last context that reinforced the Hutu and Tutsi distinction was the creation of institutions that provoked or increased the likelihood of economic and social conflict. For example, the \textit{Igikingi} institution is described as having increased the means of control of ruled people by the leaders. Also in order to obtain land through \textit{Igikingi}, the recipient had first to be “tutsified” if he was not Tutsi in the first place. This is believed to have enhanced the ‘ethnic’ consciousness.\footnote{Jean-Népomucène Nkurikiyimfura, \textit{Le gros bétail et la société rwandaise : Evolution historique des XII-XIV siècles à 1958}, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1994, pp. 96-97.} The \textit{Uburetwa} institution created around 1870 and that requested the prestation of services from Hutu and rarely from Tutsi of two days out of the four or five that made up the Rwandan week also reinforced the Hutu-Tutsi distinction.\footnote{Vansina, \textit{Le Rwanda ancien}, p. 172.} This despite the fact that “the Hutu/Tutsi distinction could not be considered a socioeconomic distinction, one between exploiters and exploited or rich and poor.”\footnote{Mamdani, \textit{When Victims Become Killers}, p. 74.} Indeed, the poor Tutsi who were the majority among the Tutsi shared the same

\footnote{22 Takeuchi, “Hutu and Tutsi”, pp. 200-201.}
\footnote{23 David Newbury, “Understanding genocide”, \textit{African Studies Review}, Vol. 41, No. 1, April 1998, pp. 73-97, p. 83.}
\footnote{24 Newbury, “Understanding genocide”, p. 83. See also pp. 84-87.}
\footnote{26 Vansina, \textit{Le Rwanda ancien}, p. 172.}
\footnote{27 Mamdani, \textit{When Victims Become Killers}, p. 74.
economic condition with the Hutu. Moreover, Vansina thinks that the administrative reform that created the chief of grass and chief of land made a distinction between Tutsi pastoralists and Hutu agriculturalists as they were assigned a separate local leadership. But since these three institutions spread slowly from the centre to the peripheral regions, one needs to relativise their impact nationwide. The inequality that they created varied across regions.

Finally, these institutions that developed conflict of interests between the Hutu and the Tutsi evolved hand in hand and coexisted with other social institutions that tended to soften conflict in the sense that they strengthened reciprocity, exchange and mutual help between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Those institutions are the Ubuse that developed clan solidarity, the Kubandwa traditional cult that linked the Tutsi and Hutu members in the same religious beliefs and rituals, and the ideology of the monarchy that tended to go beyond Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities by emphasizing the Rwandan identity. Although the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities existed towards the end of precolonial times, they remained socio-political identities. They were seen as racial identities by the colonial rule that applied racial theories to describe them. After this quick overview of the precolonial structures, let us now turn to colonial experiences both at national and local levels.

1.2. POLITICAL COLONIAL DOMINATION

1.2.1. The Terms of Colonial Power and Domination

Rwanda has been colonized by two European powers, Germany from 1897 until 1916, and Belgium from 1916 until 1962. Both colonial powers have relied on the existing Rwandan monarchical administrative apparatus to enforce their rule. Except for the interference of Germans in Rwandan politics and the easing of the settlement of first Christian Missions in many provinces of Rwanda, the German presence did not change much in the existing political landscape. Germans came at a critical moment when the monarchy was coming from a destructive war of succession known as the Rucunshu war (1896-1897). The King Musinga faction had just won over the Rutuindwa faction, though some elements of the latter faction continued to rebel against the new king. Musinga, who was just enthroned by his uncles and mother in 1897, was helped by the Germans to counter and defeat those rebellions.

Belgians occupied Ruanda-Urundi territory since 1916 after defeating the Germans during the First World War. That military occupation continued until 1924 when the League of Nations decided to grant to Belgium the command of Ruanda-Urundi, as a Mandated Territory. Belgium administered these two tiny kingdoms as a province of the Congo Colony. When in 1945 the League of Nations became the United Nations, the Mandate system also changed into Trusteeship, and Belgium was granted the Tutelage power over Ruanda-Urundi. The text of the Tutelage Accord was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 December 1946 and was accepted by Belgium on 25 April 1949. Hence, the Belgian colonial rule over Rwanda has had three separate “legal” systems: Military occupation, Mandate and Trusteeship. It is worth noting that the concept “colony” has never been used in the Rwanda case, though it applied in real Belgian power management.

32 The territory called “Rwanda” can be easily geographically delimited with the advent of colonisation which stabilized the borders. However, before, it is hard, since borders changed regularly. (See Alberto Basomingera, “La participation de la population à l’administration et à l’exécution des missions de développement des collectivités locales au Rwanda”, Revue Juridique du Rwanda, Vol. VI, n° 3-4, juillet-octobre 1982, pp. 231-264, p. 234.)

There has been no doubt about the indirect character of the German colonial rule in Ruanda-Urundi, for, German administrators being very few in the territory, could not operate alone effectively. Yet, “indirect rule” as system was not yet conceptualised that way. This concept was developed by Sir Frederick Lugard some time later, i.e., in 1922, after German colonial rule in Ruanda-Urundi. On the other hand, the indirect character of Belgian rule has been debated. The Belgian colonial rule used the Congolese Force Publique (Military organ) until 13 June 1960 for a direct control of security. Rwandans could only be policemen, not soldiers. Since 1925, the administrative structure was organised as follows: Rwanda was under the supervision of the Resident who reported to the Vice-General Governor of Ruanda-Urundi who was based to Bujumbura in Burundi. The latter reported to the General Governor of Congo and Ruanda-Urundi who was in Léopoldville (Kinshasa) in Congo. The Resident had Territory Administrators placed at the level of the provinces. The Resident supervised the King of Rwanda, while the Territory Administrators controlled the Chiefs and Subchiefs at the local levels.

The Belgian colonial administration was characterized by regular reforms. But two among them seem to have borne significant effects. The first one occurred between 1926 and 1931. The second took place in the 1950s. The administrative reform of Rwanda and Burundi between 1926 and 1931 changed the boundaries of provinces, regrouped hills, which were the smallest significant administrative settings, and reduced the number of Rwandan leaders. It abolished the previous structure of three chiefs (army chief, land

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35 It is only at this date that Rwandans and Burundians entered the army, known as la Garde Territoriale du Ruanda-Urundi. (Guy Logiest, *Mission au Rwanda. Un blanc dans la bagarre Tutsi-Hutu*, Bruxelles, Didier Hatier, 1988, p. 159.)
37 In the 1955 administrative reform, this post became General Resident of Ruanda-Urundi.
38 It is only at the end of 1959 that the subordination of the administration of Ruanda-Urundi to the one of Congo was being discussed and reviewed. Indeed, when Congo was about to gain independence, the Vice-Governor of Ruanda-Urundi became General Resident of Ruanda-Urundi and ceased to report to the Congo colonial structure. See “La déclaration gouvernementale belge du 10 novembre 1959”, in *Chronique de Politique Étrangère, Décolonisation et Indépendance du Rwanda et du Burundi*, volume XVI, numéros 4-6, Juillet-Décembre 1963, pp. 445-446.
39 For the 1950s reforms, see below.
chief and grass chief) and set up a single chief’s structure. This restructuring of power along a single person, be he a king or chief, was then a widespread practice in various colonial systems.\textsuperscript{40} It is through this new structure that the Belgians attempted to control more directly the everyday exercise of power. The reform of 1926-31 indeed strengthened the repressive features of power while rejecting the conciliatory ones.\textsuperscript{41} “[T]he indigenous rulers were endowed by the colonial states with a set of powers quite different from those they had had before.”\textsuperscript{42} It is worth noting that the so called “customary law” had not much to do with the “precolonial” legal instruments.\textsuperscript{43} It was a completely new instrument. Furthermore, the colonial rule generalized the control of the Rwandan kingdom to the whole territory of Rwanda, a situation that had not yet been reached until the early 1920s.

This reform gave to the Belgian administration the opportunity to dispose of chiefs and subchiefs who were not submissive and attempted to remain ‘independent’, and to replace them by young ones (their sons) who had already studied at the primary school of Nyanza.\textsuperscript{44} It demoted a number of individuals deemed not appropriate to rule due to their group identity (Hutu, foreigners) or individuals supposedly of inferior status or activity (female servants).\textsuperscript{45} In fact, legitimacy, according the colonial rule, depended first of all on royal descent. In this regard, sons of Tutsi chiefs from the Nyiginya and Bega royal


\textsuperscript{43} Mamdani, \textit{Citizen and Subject}, pp. 39 and 122.

\textsuperscript{44} This school was a secular school created in 1900 ending. It was managed by the White Fathers and taught lessons of writing, reading and Swahili language. (Gamaliel Mbonimana et Emmanuel Ntezimana in Gurdun Honke et al., \textit{Au plus profond de l’Afrique. Le Rwanda et la colonisation allemande 1885-1919}, Bonn, Peter Hammer Verlag, 1990, p. 134.)

clans were considered as more legitimate. Education was a second condition. In this process, the Hutu and Twa found themselves progressively excluded from the positions of colonial auxiliaries.

The Belgians believed that the new candidates, both young and educated by them, would be more docile and able to follow their policy. In this respect, the Nyanza School was considered as a “breeding-ground” of future chiefs having a “civilised mentality” and who would become “precious auxiliaries” of the colonial administration.

By 1930, the Belgian colonial administration was satisfied about the work of the young chiefs and subchiefs who had replaced their fathers during the reform. However, this administration was not satisfied by the performance of King Musinga, who was depicted by both the European rulers and the Roman Catholic Missionaries as resistant. In order to complete the replacement of old by young rulers even at the top of the kingdom, among other reasons, King Musinga was deposed and relegated to Kamembe in south-west of Rwanda in 1931. Rudahigwa replaced his father at the age of 20. He was born in 1911.

Though the Germans left Rwanda with an administration very close to the precolonial one, it is the Belgians who attempted to operate a dramatic change of the power structure. However, they followed the principles that the Germans had initiated. This new structure bore the character of domination. Indeed, domination was seen in the fusion of political, legislative, executive, administrative and judicial powers in the hands of European holders of power and of Tutsi administrative officers from top down. The legislative power belonged to the Belgian Parliament, the King of Belgium and the General Governor of Belgian Congo, while the executive power belonged to the King of

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47 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 7 (53), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1926.
48 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 6 (54), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1930.
Belgium who delegated it to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi. As for the judicial apparatus, it progressively became a perfect instrument of colonial domination. At the national level, that is, from the Resident of Rwanda to the Territorial Administrators of Territories and to key technical positions, only Europeans occupied major positions, while the Tutsi auxiliaries held minor posts. Despite this, the colonial administration kept the name “indirect administration”, which means that “the Native customary authorities administer the country under the supervision and direction of the European administrative authorities.”

Tutsi leaders from the King to the Subchief were appointed and deposed by Belgian authorities. In the nomination of chiefs and subchiefs, the King of Rwanda had a say, but the last decision belonged to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi and the Resident of Rwanda. In the occupation of positions and in the everyday exercise of administrative and “developmental” work, the Chiefs and the Subchiefs were closely briefed and monitored by the Territorial Administrators. This monitoring was done through a number of repressive power instruments such as whipping, fines or destitution.

After enumerating several duties of chiefs, Lemarchand shows that the latter were more instruments of colonial power than service deliverers for their constituencies:

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52 Loi de 1925 and Territoire du Ruanda-Urundi, Service des A.I.M.O., Décret du 14 juillet 1952 sur l’organisation politique indigène suivi des mesures d’exécution et mis à jour au 31 août 1957, Archives Nationales, Doc. n° 1682. Note that the literature and the legal documents of the Belgian rule called the Burundi and Rwanda kings in the local language name of Mwami, used even in French texts. This may have been an attempt to stress the difference between the King of Belgium and the Kings of those colonized countries.

In short, the whole system of sanctions and rewards devised by the administration was overwhelmingly weighted in favour of bureaucratic standards, so that whatever obligations of a traditional nature the chiefs owed to their people tended to be superseded by their obligations toward the administration. [...] Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more rigorous and harassing surveillance than the one exercised by the Belgian authorities over the chiefs and the subchiefs. To ‘meet the needs of the system’, the chiefs were led to ask considerably more of their subjects than had been the case at any time before the advent of colonial rule.54

The critical position of chiefs and subchiefs made them more and more execrable, as colonial duties towards the Rwandan population were growing during the period of Mandate and of Tutelage. They are the ones who supervised activities such as the tax payment, the execution of compulsory works in agriculture and agricultural infrastructure, in road building and maintenance, in the building of churches, schools, health facilities, administrative building, and other infrastructures. They had the mandate to execute these activities. As a result, they used the instruments such as the beating (Ikiboko), the detention, and the fine in order to have any resistance suppressed. Just as they became with time docile to the Belgian authorities, they were asked to put the population under entire submission. Which to a certain degree they succeeded, for, resistance was attempted more in religious domains than in power and economic performance.55

In the colonial task, the Subchief and the Umumotsi appeared in the local landscape more than the Chief. The Belgian Territorial Administrator was even more absent, avoiding giving unpopular orders. He also faced a linguistic gap, as most Belgian authorities at the time did not know the local languages.56 Umumotsi was in charge of calling for summons, calling for “meetings”57, collecting prestations (food or other objects) that the Subchief was charging from the population, calling the “Hommes Adultes et Valides”

57 Meetings of the population with colonial leaders were called “ipera” in kinyarwanda language, which is a deformation of “appel” in French. It was considered by the population to be a kind of summon, because it was compulsory to attend it.
(able-bodied men\textsuperscript{58}) to go to perform compulsory works, collecting tax, etc. The official name of Umumotsi was Ikirongozi (from Swahili: leader, supervisor). Umumotsi was a nickname given to them by the population; it comes from the verb “\textit{kumoka}” (to bark). It was a way of describing allegorically the way those ibirongozi used their voices while transmitting orders coming from above. In short, they were messengers of the chief and subchief. \textsuperscript{59} The Umumotsi was not paid, which means that he lived at the expense of the population. However, he and his nuclear family members were discharged from doing compulsory works and from paying prestations.\textsuperscript{60} Generally, it appears that the more a colonial employee was close to the population the more detested he was.

However, even if the Territorial Administrator was not seen in permanent contact with the colonized subjects with the same frequency as the subchief and the chief, he was the main leader who controlled the execution of colonial programmes on a regular basis and who reported to the Resident of Rwanda. He often visited the chiefdoms and subchiefdoms where he settled in temporary shelters for few days, and examined the political, economic and social situation that prevailed there. He was the agent through which the indirect feature of Belgian administration was transformed into a direct executive power.\textsuperscript{61}

\subsection*{1.2.2. Colonial auxiliaries}

After circumscribing colonial power, its holders at different levels, and the debate as to whether this was a direct or indirect mode of rule, it is now necessary to turn to the instruments of that power. To begin with, the Chiefs, the Subchiefs and the Abamotsi seem to have been one of the channels on which colonial power relied at local level, and the King at national level.


\textsuperscript{59} Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 5 (53), Résidence du Ruanda, \textit{Rapport annuel 1924}.

\textsuperscript{60} See Wélars Kagambirwa, \textit{Les autorités rwandaises face aux pouvoirs européens à Nyanza (1900-1946)}, Mémoire de licence en Histoire, UNR-Butare, Juin 1979, pp. 109-110.

\textsuperscript{61} Office de l’Information et des relations publiques pour le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi (éditeur), \textit{Le Ruanda-Urundi, rapport}, Bruxelles, 1959, p. 95 ; Rumiya, \textit{Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat}, p. 227.
Concerning the docility of “customary authorities”, the United Nations Visit Mission of 1948 wrote the following:

…Belgium has utilized the Native authorities of Ruanda-Urundi, who are generally docile, because “she could not think of changing or abolishing a political organization which the masses had accepted and recognized. She has certainly succeeded in turning them into valuable and efficient agents, for according to the report:
At the end of 1947 Ruanda had only 31 [European] members in the territorial service, and Urundi 33. The reason why so small a number of officials have been able to administer a Territory of about four million inhabitants is the responsibility laid on the customary authorities and the way they have shouldered it.62

This “docility”, though undisputed, is however relativised by a number of minor episodes regarding the behaviour of local leaders. For example, in 1940, the Administrator of the Nyanza Territory, also a royal capital, was complaining that “loyal collaboration” of notables had not yet been attained, and that they were not working with a spirit of emulation among them, that “everyone does the least possible” and that “their submission is just superficial”.63 We are in 1940, about twenty years after the start of the Belgian rule, and yet, doubt about total submission is still there. On the other hand, Astrida Territorial administrators complained several times about several chiefs and subchiefs not having a spirit of public commitment, and caring mostly about their personal interests in their everyday duties. Indeed, it is hard to believe how otherwise it could be, while working for an administration of a colonial occupation. Furthermore, before 1940, it is three or four Chiefs out of nine Chiefs of the Astrida Territory who were appreciated as performing well. It is only after 1940, when the Astrida Groupe Scolaire started to release Chief candidates who had completed a Secondary Degree education, that these were evaluated as more competent. Concerning the Subchiefs, up until the end of Belgian

63 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 1(93), Résidence du Rwanda, Territoire de Nyanza, Rapport politique 1940.
colonial rule, those who got “very good” in their annual evaluation never exceeded the half for the whole Territory. This less bright evaluation of auxiliaries can be interpreted in many ways, either incompetence or lack of will in work, but it is possible to see in it an act of passive resistance, at least for some of them.

It is worth noting that by 1940, most Tutsi authorities who had shown resistance either to the Belgian administration or to the Roman Catholic Church had been dismissed. Chiefs and Subchiefs understood then that in order to keep their positions, they owed allegiance to Belgian authorities and to the White Fathers. One of them, Chief Mutembe, who ruled Nyakare from 1934 to 1946, is said to have been a model Christian. One annual report described his “Christian faith and practices” in laudatory terms:

Mutembe, chief of province [is] very well appreciated by the Administration and [is a] great friend of the king. Every year at the beginning of November he orders thirty masses for the deceased... He gives 50 francs for the propagation of faith, two big baskets of food for indigenous labour, 500 francs for the annual funds for the parish. He has a chapel at his home where, in reward for the beautiful road that he made for the mission, he asks for a priest to come and celebrate a mass in which he summons all his subchiefs, about 20, and the whole population of his hill. Since many years, he feeds and gives clothes to four young people who aspire to go to the seminary or to the postulate of Brothers. He is always at the Chiefs’ Inama (meeting) and does not allow any of his subchiefs to be absent from this meeting without reason.

Secondly, the position of chief and subchief became well paying. Before 1944 the subchiefs and chiefs had no salary, but since then they had a good salary and several bonuses. So it was hard for them to resist and miss financial and material advantages. For that reason, they chose to obey unconditionally, which led their constituents to nickname them: “Ndiyo Bwana” (yes, Sir, in swahili) to colonial injunctions.

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the position of Tutsi colonial authorities, wrote: “The Hutu cries bitterly his disadvantageous condition. The favoured Tutsi enjoys his absolutely favourable condition. He says that ‘Uhawe ararya – Si jye ni umuzungu...’ [The one who is given food, he eats - It’s not my fault, it’s the white’s…]”67 In other words, it is the one who gives food who is accountable, not the one who receives it. Or else, the one who eats is less accountable than the one who distributes food. In both cases, the ones who “did not eat”, that is, the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa who are not in power, are forgotten. The chiefs and subchiefs were so afraid of losing these positions, for, as Newbury and Rumiya observe, they provided wealth and respect. 68

These two reasons, colonial compulsion and material gain, made the local leaders choose to keep their positions and obey colonial orders rather than resist and lose them. Thus, the degree of agency of these colonial auxiliaries needs to be put into this colonial power context. They did not choose to be docile, they were left with that option, and it is clear that their position was by far better than the ones of the colonized “subjects”; for, they were at least “citizens”69. This was, one may argue, the trap of indirect rule. It was a trap because, during the decolonization process, it is these colonial auxiliaries who unfairly paid the price of colonial exactions.

1.2.3. ‘Customary’ Authorities in the studied region

The Gishamvu Commune was created in 1963 from a combination of former Shori and Kibingo Communes and Rwimbogo hill that were instituted in 1960 before the commune elections of that year.70 These two were located in Bashumba-Nyarare chiefdom and a


69 It is an agency they got within a system that they did not initiate. In this regard, one can say that they were not “making their own history.” (Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, p. 10.) It is worth noting that the chiefs and subchiefs who were citizens were the ones who had had access to colonial education.

small subchiefdom made by Nyakibanda, Muboni, Kibu and Gikunzi hills was located in Nyaruguru chiefdom. The Kibayi Commune which was also created in 1963 was a combination of two distinct communes that existed since the commune elections of June-September 1960, that is, Linda and Saga.71 Linda and Saga were two distinct regions located in different chiefdoms during the colonial period. Linda was made by former subchiefdoms which were located in Mvejuru chiefdom, whereas Saga was a combination of former Runyinya, Saga, Kirarambogo subchiefdoms or hills located in Ndara and later in Buhanga-Ndara chiefdom. This means that Gishamvu and Kibayi were located more or less in four colonial chiefdoms which are Bashumba-Nyakare, Nyaruguru, Buhanga-Ndara and Mvejurru. These chiefdoms were situated in the Territory of Astrida that coincided approximately with the precolonial province of Bwanamukari, located in the extreme south of the Rwandan kingdom.

A History of Bwanamukari region is recorded since the mid-18th century during the reign of Cyirima II Rujugira. Until the advent of colonial rule, the major source of this history is undoubtedly oral traditions. It is in this region that the Rwandan King chose to establish permanent military camps. The Nyakare, Nyaruguru, Ndara and Mvejurru, among others, were names of militias that were placed at the border with the then Burundi kingdom. They later gave their names to the regions they occupied.72

Court leaders who were sent to these regions came with their families and multiple clients. This suggests that this occupation came along with a new migration towards these regions. The father of Marie Thérèse Nyirabega is among these immigrants. She narrates that her father, Semugwegwe, son of Macumu, was from Gisaka. He was Tutsi, but when he arrived in Ndara, he took the ethnic identity of people he found there, that is Hutu. He was a client of chief Rwasamanzi son of Ntizimira. Later on he administered a hill and became judge until in 1947.73

71 Annexe II, les limites des communes, p. 193.
73 Interview with Marie Thérèse Nyirabega, Kibayi, 9 May 2007.
The region of Ndara got also a wave of immigrants coming from other parts of the country fleeing famines. Because the Buhanga-Ndara region was very fertile and was the food reserve for the southern part of the country, famines seem to have been easily controlled. So people flocked to this region during Kiramwaramwara famine (1907-1908), Rumanurimbaba famine (1917-1918) during the First World War, and Ruzagayura famine (1943-1945) during the Second World War. According to Nyirandugu and Nyirabega, hungry people were always fleeing to their home (Ndara), and no Ndara individual had to flee because of hunger. They also give credit to Subchief Kagabo for having been able to fight against Ruzagayura famine. This famine was caused by the irregularity of rain for about two years. This positive description of Ndara region as being wealthy is supported by several other sources.

This region has been in contact and close relation with Burundi. Many exchanges of goods and services occurred between the people of the two kingdoms, including social relations. During the colonial period, people from Rwanda living near Akanyaru River (Buhanga-Ndara, Mvejuru) went to Burundi to sell their coffee and Burundians came in this region with the same motive. According to several colonial reports, Burundians used to come to cultivate in Rwanda, while both Burundians and Rwandans used to have matrimonial relations.

**How colonial rulers and the colonised population evaluated Tutsi auxiliaries**

As stated above, in the view of colonial rule, a good colonial administrative auxiliary was the one who followed scrupulously the rules of the Belgian colonial authority and of the Roman Catholic Church’s White Fathers. Essentially he was evaluated by these two powers. While the Belgian authority held the secular state power, the Church retained both the secular and spiritual powers, the latter also giving rise to the power of influencing and even changing religious features of Rwandan “culture”. Wellars

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75 Interview with Suzanne Nyirandugu and Marie Thérèse Nyirabega Kibayi, 9 May 2007.
Kambanda enumerates a number of behavioural features that were needed for a Tutsi administrator to be judged as a good collaborator of Europeans: “…to be polite towards the whites, especially in public; to follow their injunctions in agricultural [and other economic] activities; to behave as a role model; to engage in conversation with whites in a pleasant and timid manner; to build a ‘European’ house and live in it à l’européenne, etc…” It is worth examining how certain Chiefs and Subchiefs in Bashumba-Nyakare, Nyaruguru, Buhanga-Ndara and Mvejuru were evaluated. Indeed, this evaluation appears significantly in the colonial archives and in local narratives about colonialism either individually or collectively.

I° In Bashumba-Nyakare

Chief Mutembe Ildéphonse

By the time Mutembe was appointed as chief, in 1934, he was only 24. Yet, he had started to help his father in the administration of Nyakare chiefdom before his formal appointment. The earlier reports about his beginning of activity describe him as having less authority than his father, but that he was promising as he had a good will. From then onward, his evaluations oscillated around “good” and “medium”. He even got a “Mediocre” once. But he kept office for he was described as having good intentions towards the European Administration and the Church, although his performance was not enough as compared to what was expected from him.

On the other hand, the interviewed people who said something about Mutembe are the ones who lived around Liba and Kibingo, where he resided. Their interventions are a mixture of a little appreciation and more frequently complaints about hard work.

76 Kambanda, Evolution politique, p. 65.
77 Appendix one offers a detailed list of chiefs and subchiefs from the 1920s up to the early 1960s and the time when they kept office.
78 See for example Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 5 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1932.
79 For example Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapports annuels 1935 et 1937.
80 Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapports annuels 1938-1943.
performed during the building of roads, during agricultural activities, the constraints about tax payment, and work at the chief’s house.81

Chief Elie Gitambaro: from 1946 to 1956

Chief Gitambaro seems to have not been appreciated by the colonial administrators. His evaluation was “good” in 1947,82 it became “fairly good” in 1952.83 In that year, this is what the Territorial Administrator had to report about him:

[Chief Gitambaro] lacks absolutely energy, he does not answer to questions that are formulated and reminded to him several times. The whole work is done directly by the subchiefs, the chief being of complete nullity. At the end of the year, the Mwami [king] has made an investigation concerning this case and expressed his vivid unhappiness about him.84

Since 1946, when he was appointed as chief, Gitambaro’s personality was judged as less imposing, but he was retained to his position because he was still young and “very loyal” and “conscious” about his work.85 So the administration hoped that he would improve. But until the end of his office, he had not gained the confidence of the colonial administration. The people interviewed did not say much about him, except mentioning that he was chief. The evaluation of Bashumba-Nyakare subchiefs were in average “fairly good” and “good.” One of them is Namahungu.

Subchief Namahungu: 1936-1959

From 1937 to 1957, Namahungu’s evaluations have ranged between “good,” “fairly good,” “medium,” and “mediocre.” That means that he never impressed colonial administrators. But he did not lose his office, because that evaluation was the average of almost all subchiefs in the country. Although the population considered that the subchiefs

81 Interview with Claude Ngirabega, Théodomir Munyarugamba, Evariste Kabano, Cassien Rwanyange, and Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba.
83 Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1952, p. 31-31 bis.
harassed them too much, the Belgian administrators still considered their work to be less than their expectations, given especially their low education and the numerous duties that they were called upon to execute. Reports from the 1930s until late 1950s point to the inferiority of quality of subchiefs as compared to chiefs.

As for the accounts of the population about Namahungu, these are balanced. A number of them suggest that Namahungu who administered Bitare, Mukuge, Gishamvu and Cyamutumba hills was very appreciated by the population. His son Anonymous 6 starts by narrating the career of his father, in relation to other leaders:

I know and remember the history since 1960 and before. I was grown up and witnessed it, furthermore my father was a leader at the time. He was a subchief. His name was Namahungu. In the subchiedad of Bitare. Now it has become a cell. The chiefdom was Bashumba Nyakare. I even know all the people who have ruled there. […] My father started first as a commis [administrative employee or clerk] in 1932, 1933 he was umukarani, kind of secretary of the whites. They were the ones who have completed the school of Bwanakweri at Nyanza. Seemingly the king Rudahigwa and others have studied there also. It was the first school. They knew Swahili since it is that language that the whites used, the Belgians. Until 1934, but then he was an umukarani. He was nominated subchief in 1936. I used to see it even in books. He replaced a certain Nyanjwenge, when he came to administer Bitare.86

According to Batura Christophe, people liked Namahungu:

The subchief was Namahungu, […] my father, Eulade Nzibaranga, was his ikirongozi. He was his boss. My father was administering Gashiru under Namahungu. […] Namahungu had studied, he was a good leader. But Namahungu had some opposition from some fellow Tutsi, such as Nyanjwenge from the Abaha lineage who wanted to replace him. The King Rudahigwa came to settle that case in Bitare. […] The population liked Namahungu.87

Indeed, Some Tutsi of Gashiru hill had accused subchief Namahungu that he had stolen a certain quantity of lime and had used it to whitewash his house. The king Rudahigwa

86 Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
87 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
came to the home of subchief to settle that case; he realised that his house did not have lime. So he ruled in favour of him.\textsuperscript{88}

Many interviewees of Gishamvu assert that Namahungu was a good leader. Others link him with colonial injustices, such as the confiscation of cattle and other properties.\textsuperscript{89} However, during the “revolution” of 1959, when most Tutsi leaders were ousted and attacked, he did not flee outside the country. He fled a little bit inside the province, and after the violence, he was allowed by the new Hutu leaders to come back home and recuperate his property. The case of Namahungu is an exception, for, most Tutsi leaders fled, a number of them were killed, but he managed to keep a good relationship.\textsuperscript{90} The case of Namahungu shows a person who kept the middle ground both on the side of the colonial administration and his constituents. It is hard to qualify him either as popular or unpopular.

2\textsuperscript{o} In Nyaruguru

Subchief Gashagaza

Gashagaza, who administered the hills of Nyakibanda, Muboni, Munanira and Gikunzi, is another subchief whose evaluations were below the average. He got most of the time “Medium” and “Bad.” Until 1952, he rarely reached the evaluations “good,” and “fairly good,” although towards the beginning of his office he was described as “a serious young man” or “who works with satisfaction.”\textsuperscript{91}

But the accounts from the population are balanced. A negative depiction is found in the account of Joseph Rwandanga:

\textsuperscript{88} Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
\textsuperscript{89} For example interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
\textsuperscript{90} But as we shall see in chapter three, the relationship was not always smooth.
\textsuperscript{91} Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 5 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1932.
Concerning the life of Gishamvu here, what I remember is about the mode of rule of that time [colonial time]. There were the ones we call the Tutsi. They are the ones who could rule. We were administered by the subchief Gashagaza son of Rugemampunzi. He lived here at Muboni. His chief was Kayihura. He ruled Nyaruguru. But my family lived at the border between Nyakare and Nyaruguru. [...] Truly speaking Gashagaza ruled with a kind of despotism. In order to affirm himself as a leader.92

According to Hakizamungu, however, subchief Gashagaza was on good terms with his subjects:

He interacted with the population very well, because people did not use to run away from his ruling area and go elsewhere. Never. When a subchief was bad, people were fleeing him and go to seek allegiance to another subchief. Why? Because of Ibiboko, the colonial beating. Eight lashes everyday.93

These statements do not allow us to say whether Gashagaza was popular or not, though the expectation is that he would be popular since the colonial masters did not appreciate his performance.

3° In Buhanga-Ndara

Wilfred Bucyanayandi (or Bucyana)

As mentioned above, Bucyanayandi was chief of Ndara from 1934 to 1941. He was the nephew of Rwasamanzi and cousin of King Rudahigwa. He had studied at the School of Nyanza. He was judged as intelligent and enterprising by Belgian reports, and was appreciated for having had a brick house before 1934 in Liba, Nyakare, when he was subchief there, and later on in Ndara when he became chief. He is allegedly the first to have brought a car in Ndara, and to have had a wife called “Madame,” who was wearing skirts like “white” ladies, and to have reared ducks, things that presented him as an “umusirimu” (“modernised” person).94

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92 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
93 Interview with Hakizamungu François-Xavier, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
94 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 6 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport politique 1933; Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 8 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida,
Bucyanayandi is among the few chiefs appreciated by the Astrida Territory Administrator from 1935 until the end of his office in 1941. He is described as an “active auxiliary of the territorial administration,” as a chief who enjoys “a great authority” towards his constituents. His evaluations were almost always “Very Good.” The report of 1938 applauds his efficiency in agricultural activities: “Buchyanayande [sic] has been able to produce a certain expansion to this region [Ndara] that is hard to govern given the presence of a considerable size of Burundian population. We record several progresses, notably in the domain of agriculture and tree planting.”

The population that mostly talked about Bucyanayandi are the ones who live in Runyinya, which was also the capital area of the Ndara chiefdom and the place that the chief administered directly (i.e., inyarulembo). They are therefore the ones who witnessed on a regular basis his mode of rule. The “great authority” that the colonial reports mentioned is described in the mouth of colonized population as “harshness,” “violence,” “injustice.”

He is said to have been very harsh towards the population when it came to enforcing colonial activities and punishing the ones who resisted, in such a way that he caused many people of Ndara to emigrate to Uganda. Here is what my informant Marie Thérèse Nyirabega said about him:

(Gashugi) had replaced Bucyanayandi son of Rwidegembya, when we were still young. Girls sang a song to insult him: ‘It is high time to hate Bucyana, for even the King hates him.’ Rudahigwa removed him and sent him to Gishari. [...] He was replaced by...who found that Bucyana had destroyed the country: when people cultivate sweet potatoes, he gives them to his pigs.

95 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 4 (57), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1937.
97 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 11 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1938.
98 Kambanda, Evolution politique, pp. 64-66.
A more elaborate account depicting Bucyanayandi and his misunderstandings with the population of Ndara and with the king Rudahigwa comes from Gratien Rwigimba:

Bucyana had been a bad administrator. He was taking over amasambu [individual agricultural tenures] of people. See, he confiscated the isambu [singular of amasambu] of the father of this person [Vénuste Sindabizera, my other informant], his name is Ruvuma. Then after some time, people turned behind his back and went to accuse him to the king; people are complex. Especially the Tutsi extended family called Abadahumbya. They went to tell the king: ‘Bucyana has confiscated all our cattle, yet he was brought here by Rwasamanzi his paternal uncle, although we did not like him.’ […] The king said: ‘I remember myself having sent Bucyana to do something for me and he disrespected me. Bucyana told me that the day I am enthroned as king, he will prefer to go out of the country. Now he is mistreating my people?’ Then he came. The king came. He had a car. He came secretly, but this news had spread [that he will come]. Bucyana had told us that our king will come to visit us. We put on our clothes and went to welcome him, but what clothes did we have then? It was impuzu [clothes made from umuvumu tree skins] and impu [clothes made from animal skins]. Modern clothes had come but they were not widespread all over the country. […] Then the king came, people danced for him, then he made a speech in French and told his interpreter Sendanyoye to translate in kinyarwanda, I know him very well… the king spoke French the way he speaks Kinyarwanda [i.e., fluently]…Then that interpreter told us ‘the king said this and this.’ The king said: ‘I thank you my people, I visited you, but I will come back’. He went and then came back. […] Then people accused Bucyana about the faults he commits [like not paying them after they worked at the road construction], […] and beating women and men after asking them to remove lower clothes; they accused him about all that. […] People told us that the king called Bucyana and told his interpreter to beat him two slaps. People told us that he was beaten at Kabogobogo place.100

The following account comes from Suzanne Nyirandugu:

The only one who worked very badly is Bucyana. We were cultivating sweet potatoes, cassava, beans but were not harvesting them. They were given to the Twa who were dancing for Bucyana. You get charged a basket of sorghum, you grind it, they get flour for pap, your goat or young bull gets taken, the Twa eat them with the pap. […] But those Twa are no longer around. We do not know where they disappeared, maybe they went with Bucyana, we never saw even their children. […] In fact, the bad person is Bucyana… He was meeting a woman with flour, then he puts his feet in it.101

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100 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007.
These accounts enumerate the true or false or exaggerated reasons why the population disliked chief Bucyana, the conflict between him and the King, and the way that chiefs were also beaten. In the following part of his account, Rwigimba says that the king spoke in French because he was with the white Territorial Administrator called Corbusier and that he wanted him to understand the message. “Then the day of removing Bucyana from office, the population and the leaders were gathering, the ladies sang the following song: ‘We have a better king than the strangers. Our king has a very beautiful hair style called amasunzu. Rudahigwa was still having amasunzu.’”\textsuperscript{102} This song seems to have been a way of challenging the Territorial Administrator who was the only stranger there. It seems, together with the previous one “It is high time to hate Bucyana for even the king hates him,” also to have been the product of a campaign strategically orchestrated by the colonial administration and by the king in order to restore the authority of the latter. This is likely because one letter of the Resident of Ruanda suggested to the king Rudahigwa to spend some time in Astrida improving his authority towards the population and the Tutsi local auxiliaries to avoid it becoming tarnished by the behaviour of Bucyanayandi.\textsuperscript{103}

The conflict between chief Bucyanayandi and the king Rudahigwa has been narrated in various versions. According to one version, “Bucyanayandi behaved as a small king of Ndara; he kept for himself the king’s allowances. Worse, he has been so insolent that he had given to his dogs the same names of the king and queen-mother, namely Rudahigwa and Kankazi.”\textsuperscript{104} Another version, close to the previous, comes from Mr. Dessaint, the Belgian Delegate to the king Rudahigwa in Nyanza. It shows that Bucyanayandi had chosen to obey the Belgians, that is, the most powerful rulers, and to forget about the king:

The investigation that I have undertaken brought me to the following conviction: This chief is very intelligent, hard worker, obtains remarkable results, but at the same time, he is civilized, very arrogant and he does not bear the authority of the

\textsuperscript{102} Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{103} J. Paradis, Résident du Ruanda, Lettre confidentielle à Monsieur le Délégué près le Mwami, à Nyanza, Objet: Chef de Province BUCYANAYANDI, Réf. N° 1719/P.I., Kigali, le 26 septembre 1941.
\textsuperscript{104} Kambanda, Évolution politique, p. 67, note (1).
king. He ridicules the Mwami [king], his mother, and all the old traditions concerning the ibgami [royal court or monarchy]. This is inadmissible on the side of a chief, even of Europeans who work in the Territory. […] Bucyanayandi has tried to convince some other chiefs of the Territory to follow his example, that is, to execute scrupulously the orders of the Europeans, but to disregard the king.105

In his conclusion, this delegate suggested that Bucyanayandi be removed from office. Bucyanayandi, having sensed that his chances of winning the case against the King were little, he decided to resign in October 1941 and suggested to the Belgian authorities to send him to Burundi as a chief there. The Belgian administration refused that idea, since it could still jeopardize the relationship with the King of Ruanda and the Belgians. Yet that relation had taken about ten years to strengthen. Indeed, until 1941, the King Rudahigwa was well evaluated. Then Bucyanayandi asked to go in exile in Gishari, Congo. As the report of the Residency of Ruanda notes, “the rebel [Bucyanayandi], having fallen in his own trap, asked and obtained the permission to go in exile with his cattle in the lands of Gishari [in Congo].”106 As for three Subchiefs who were related to Bucyanayandi and who asked to go with him, that is, Rwasamanzi, Nkorota and Gakuba, the Belgian administration judged as prudent to refuse their resignation, and keep them in office and in Rwanda, since it could look like sedition.107

The Belgian authorities were so supportive of Bucyana that after his departure to Gishari, one year later, that is in 1942, they appointed him as chief of Rwandese immigrants to Gishari, Congo, in replacement of chief Bideri who was there before. The Gishari province accommodated Rwandans who were moved there in order to be used in agricultural plantations for European settlers’ benefit.108 The population of Ndara interpreted this transfer as a punishment.

106 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 5 (58), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1941.
The episode of Bucyanayandi (called also Bucyana) confirms the assertion that when a chief was on good terms with the colonisers, he had by the same token to be unpopular to his constituents. It also shows how the colonial power used to settle misunderstandings between local leaders, this time between the King and a chief. Most of the time, the lower leader had to be sacrificed in favour of the higher. For example, when subchief Kagabo of Runyinya was in conflict with chief Gashugi who replaced Bucyanayandi, it is Kagabo who was transferred in Gisanze, Mvejuru. In most other cases, subchiefs were just dismissed in case of such conflicts with their superiors.

**Chief Justin Gashugi of Buhanga-Ndara (1941-1959)**

Justin Gashugi, son of Muyogoro, from a Nyiginya-Bashambo clan, made history in Buhanga-Ndara for having lasted a long time in this chiefdom. He was born in 1906 (or 1910). After completing his primary education at the Save Missionary School, he was appointed as administrative clerk from 1924 to 1928. From 1928 to 1938 he was subchief in Rwamiko in Nyaruguru chiefdom, and in Mugombwa of Mvejuru chiefdom. Then in 1938, he was appointed as chief of Buhanga until 1941 when he was again appointed to a higher position of chief of the two chiefdoms combined of Buhanga and Ndara.  

This successful professional trajectory shows that he was ‘a man of whites,’ as they were then called. The Report of Astrida Territory in 1947 depicts his psychological behaviour in following terms:

The chief Gashugi, calm, energetic, and full of bounce, is the chief who is convenient to the chiefdom of Buhanga-Ndara, country of savannah, of cattle, of immense size, and of a sedentary population. He knows very well the country, its morals and customs, and has a strong grip to make himself obeyed. With the disappearance of Kagabo, transferred to Mvejuru...one can hope that a good understanding will be realized between him and his subordinates.

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Gashugi enjoyed higher evaluations in his office. For example, from 1950 to 1954, his average evaluation was about 80%. In several years, his evaluations were “very good”. In 1944 and 1945, he was considered as “the best element of the political cadre of Astrida.” for having among other reasons been able to fight against the Ruzagayura famine that had killed around 300,000 people in the whole country. Moreover, unlike Bucyanayandi, Gashugi maintained a good relationship with the king Rudahigwa. People say that he was a close friend of the king. As a result of this double support, he gained the prestigious position of President of the Territorial Tribunal.

Even the population of Buhanga-Ndara seems to have appreciated his mode of rule. He is said to have been a good leader who has forbidden beating, who has encouraged the reform of abolition of Ubuhake clientship (clientship based on cattle), and who had taught the population how to fight laziness. My interviewees who were contemporary to him did not say much about him, except mentioning him in passing. See for example this passage: “Gashugi received reports from subchiefs, that is he was chief. The ones who executed for him were Kagabo son of Rubibi here (Runyinya), and him was answerable to the whites, to the commissary, commissary is Mburamatari…” The population tended to dwell on a chief or subchief who was either very unpopular or very well admired. The others were considered as routine leaders, hence they did not insist on them too much in their narratives.

The case of Gashugi shows that it was possible to be well evaluated by the colonial administration and to keep a neutral image from below. But he owes this image to the colonial reforms of the 1950s, namely the abolition of Ubuhake clientship, of the whipping, etc. Leaders who were in office during this time of reform or who were

111 Kambanda, Evolution politique, p. 96.
113 Kambanda, Evolution politique, pp. 96-97.
appointed at that time seem to have been less unpopular, as the harshness of colonial rule was progressively receding.  

**Subchief Médard Kagabo**

Subchief Médard Kagabo is among the few Subchiefs who enjoyed a higher evaluation by the Belgian colonial rule. He had for several years “good” and “very good.” He had worked in Bashumba before coming to Runyinya of Buhanga-Ndara. Here is one description of him in a colonial report by the time he was subchief of Muhambara hill in Bashumba in 1932: “Médard Kagabo, […] former pupil of Nyanza [school] […]. He is very active and very authoritarian.”

Subchief Kagabo is reported to have been both harsh and competent. His harshness towards the population is not depicted as despotism, but as an effort to reach efficiency. According to Hakizimana, “… the population was afraid of Kagabo. When the Abamotsi were accusing someone to him, he was not doing an investigation at first, people say that instead he was putting someone down and beat him.”

The account of the old man Rwigimba is more detailed:

Kagabo also beat people, especially those who refused to cultivate. But he is the one who fought against Ruzagayura [famine, from 1943 to 1945]. […] He fought against that famine, in such as way that no one was able to attack us and take over our food stocks. […] Kagabo fought against the famine, but he was beating us. Especially he was against the Tutsi who settled in a small area of Kibayi. He mistreated them […] because they were refusing to work. […] Kagabo, was a Tutsi but from a Hutu mother.

The old lady Nyirabega becomes more explicit on this:

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116 Interviews with former subchiefs Sehene Froduald, Sayinzoga Etienne and Mugengana Joseph, in 2000. On these reforms of the 1950s, see below.

117 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 5 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, *Rapport annuel 1932*.

118 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.

The name reflects the person’s behaviour. Kagabo was a man. [...] He went to seek a poison to kill wild animals, wild pigs which were destroying food from fields of people from that area of Mvejuru and Ndara. He went to Astrida, collected the poison from the Administrator, brought it to Kibayi and called his subordinates and population to participate in the hunting. Few days later, no pig came back to destroy food in the fields. The population was very happy about that. When they called the population with the sound of the horn, they thought they were going to be beaten, so they slept with fear. But it was just for trapping the pigs. Then Kagabo laughed, and the population laughed when they saw that all the wild animals were dead. [...] The other thing Kagabo did, he sensitized the population to cultivate a lot, in such a way that they did not suffer the severity of the Ruzagayura famine. He brought new seeds of cassava, of beans, of sweet potatoes, which grew fast and gave a good harvest. As a result, people became rich.120

The use of poison to destroy wild animals in that Kanyaru forest that surrounded Ndara and a part of Mvejuru is confirmed by Wellars Kambanda. The population were using several methods of hunting to reduce these animals, but it is the poison given to the population by the colonial administration that proved effective in destroying those animals.121 But the interviews on subsequent decades indicate that the population continued to hunt animals in that area, which means that the animals were not by then exterminated.

The case of Kagabo is very interesting in that it shows that when a leader administered a rich and fertile area, he could be less unpopular, for people were not hungry. But it also unveils a powerful mention of colonial punishment, which surprisingly does not lead to the unpopularity of the one executing it. However, it is more accurate to say that this is an analysis made by informants in the present time, while thinking about the colonial time. For, most people of this region say that during the colonial time, life was good, because land, food and climate were more available and better than in the present time due to current demographic increase, progressive reduction of fertility and size of land and climate change.

Subchief Kibwana

120 Interview with Marie Thérèse Nyirabega, Kibayi, 9 May 2007.
121 Kambanda, *Evolution politique*, pp. 84-86.
Kibwana was subchief in Nyakare, and then in 1941 he was transferred to Mvejuru chiefdom. He came to administer Runyinya to replace Kagabo who was not on good terms with the Chief of Buhanga-Ndara, Gashugi. Like Namahungu from Bashumba-Nyakare, Kibwana is another subchief who did not flee in 1959. He ruled Runyinya in Ndara from 1947 until 1959. His colonial evaluations are not very impressive, because they oscillated around “good.” The fact that he held office for a long time suggests that the Belgian administration’s interests were at least not threatened by his performance.

On the other hand, all the very old interviewees of Runyinya said good things about him. Rwigimba had this to say: “Then Kibwana came and became Kibyeyi. We called him Kibyeyi, because he spoiled us, we lived very well with him. Kibyeyi means to be in good terms with everyone. He ruled us very well.”

The case of Kibwana is complex, for, he is said to have satisfied both his masters and constituents. It is however hard to understand how he achieved this complicated outcome.

Subchief Urayaha

Subchief Urayaha was illiterate but started his career in 1932 in helping his father, Rusengamihigo, who was very old, on the position of subchief of Runyinya. From 1937 to 1948 when he ceased to work as subchief, his evaluation include “very good” “good” and “fairly good.”

Urayaha was subchief of Saga, Muganza and Kirarambogo hills since 1942. He was subchief elsewhere since 1934. Here is what Wellars Kambanda wrote about him:

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122 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. Normally, Kibwana means a baby dog, whereas Kibyeyi comes from umubyeyi which means a parent, mostly a father, a mother. So, from an injurious name (“their dog”), they gave him a dignified name (“their father”).

123 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 5 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1932.
Of all the subchiefs only one retains our attention. It is the subchief Urayaha. Though illiterate, Urayaha was able to keep his office from 1934 to 1948. He was appreciated by his superior employers and by his subjects. The testimony of … is eloquent: ‘Our subchief Urayaha was wise; he brutalized no one, but he wanted that every healthy person works. He was himself a hard worker; he preached by the example, for, sometimes he also took a hoe and showed us how we should cultivate. Everyone loved him and respected him. When the White arrived, he removed his hat and greeted him with respect as we were clapping hands for the White. Urayaha was the best friend of chief Gashugi who congratulated him and encouraged him in our presence.’  

Hakizimana Raymond, who was the first Hutu subchief of Magi, in Mvejuru following the “revolution” of November 1959, also corroborated this version: “Urayaha [administered] in Saga. Urayaha is said to have been a very good leader who was in good terms with the population. People were cultivating for each other, and shared together.”

This case, together with the one of Kibwana, show us that certain Tutsi auxiliaries were less oppressive. In fact, as Lemarchand put it, the Belgian colonial system was in general tyrannical, but this does not mean that all chiefs were “tyrants.” However, given the nature and character of colonial rule in general, at the national level, those who were not tyrants were the exception.

4° In Mvejuru

Chief François Rusagara (1946-1959)

Chief François Rusagara was also very appreciated by the colonial masters. He had completed his studies at the Astrida high school that produced chief and subchief candidates among other colonial auxiliaries. One report of Astrida Territory presented Rusagara as the best chief of the territory: “Rusagara collaborates with devotion to the
building of indigene houses, to the creation of local roads, sport fields in order to surround the urban city with rural cities that are to be used to settle indigene workers of European economy. His tribunal is one of the best in the territory.\textsuperscript{127} In 1952, his evaluation was “very good.”\textsuperscript{128} In 1956, he became Vice-President of the Territory Council, a prestigious post that shows the trust he had from the Territorial Administrator and the respectable position he enjoyed vis-à-vis other chiefs.\textsuperscript{129} In 1957, he got the top evaluation of “elite.”\textsuperscript{130}

One report of the Territory of Astrida also dwelled on his psychology:

The chief François Rusagara is doubtless the best element of the Territory of Astrida. Very balanced, enthusiastic of character, at the same time cheerful and thoughtful, Rusagara has been able to impose clearly his authority to all the notables of his chiefdom. With calm, punctuality, and firmness, he gives instructions, monitors the execution of his orders, and displays an intense activity on his hills, sacrificing himself, and moving without hesitation according to the needs to all directions of his province.\textsuperscript{131}

Not much is said about him by my informants about how he related to his constituents, neither about his predecessors, probably because he lived far from areas where the interviews were conducted (Magi and Linda).

As we have seen, these narratives on customary authorities highlighted the fact that chiefs and subchiefs in their multiple and varied personalities and performances, behaved differently vis-à-vis the subjects. They range from the harsher to the less harsh. But, a careful reading of the statements made on each authority mentioned above suggests that they above all describe them as enforcers of colonial compulsions. This is the picture that colonial rule left to them. This is how they are still remembered in local recollections.

\textsuperscript{127} Ntezihigo, \textit{Impact socio-politique}, pp. 43-44.
\textsuperscript{129} Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, \textit{Rapport annuel 1952}, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{130} Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, \textit{Rapport annuel 1957}, p. 9 bis.
1.3. ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION

During the colonial period, Rwanda has been exploited in several ways. The colonial power controlled the country’s resources, the population’s labour and assets. In this section, I mention only labour and things that Rwandans produced in favour of the colonial enterprise. These are the ones often mentioned in local narratives in Gishamvu and Kibayi.

1.3.1. Labour

Rwandans were required to produce cheap or free labour for the benefit of the colonizers, of the European settlers and of the colonial auxiliaries. Rwandans were also required to pay tax, and other contributions, in money or in kind.

a) Work for the colonial programmes

The arrival and installation of the Germans and first missionaries, towards the 1890s until the 1940s implied the extraction of labour such as the carrying of men, of luggage, and of construction materials (wood, bricks and stones) for the construction of the first colonial and church buildings. The porterage continued until when towards the 1940s lorries started to be widespread in the country. Other works included the making of bricks and the construction of those buildings. The *abatware* (chiefs) were required to provide the manpower for this labour.132

The advent of Belgian colonial rule brought about another set of works. First, since 1925, the Belgian administration enforced compulsory cultivation of cassava and sweet

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potatoes in order to fight against famines which had become endemic. Every peasant was required to cultivate 10 acres of cassava or potatoes depending on the suitability of regions. These 10 acres were to be added to his other fields. Other crops included groundnuts, and cash crops such as coffee, tea and pyrethrum. In order to fight against erosion, a programme of reforestation was initiated and carried out along with compulsory crops. Those crops came to bear the name amashiku, (literally from gushikuza, i.e., to harvest in a hurry; it was a way of describing how this work was enforced arbitrarily) whereas the whole set of colonial compulsory works were called “Akazi” (i.e., work, from Swahili).

There was also engineering work, the draining of marshes and the cultivation of marsh land. In Mvejuru, that work had started in July 1947 and 60 ha were cultivated in that year.

Concerning the building of roads, this started in the 1920s, but it was in 1929 that Belgians put a substantial budget towards this activity. It benefited also from the abundant manpower of Rwanda in this regard. The road construction involved a number of people such as white engineers, chiefs for provision of manpower and supervisors. Their presence in the area of construction required the building of their accommodation and the provision of their subsistence food. All that came from the population living in the vicinity of the site of road construction. By 1934, Buhanga-Ndara was linked to Mvejuru by roads that had been built using local manpower. A number of people living near the road from Astrida to Kanyaru towards Burundi interviewed have also worked on that national road. For example, Chief Sezikeye of Nyakare is remembered in colonial reports as the one who had helped a lot the Belgian administrator in providing

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137 For example Munyantore worked on this road.
the manpower for the construction of this road. After the completion of the roads, people who lived at less than 5 km from the road were obliged to maintain these roads by removing grasses and cleaning them. This work was performed for free until 1949, when teams of regular workers were put in place and were paid.138

Astrida benefited also from the building of a number of schools, a scientific centre and an aerodrome during the Second World War. The informant Segatashya recalls having worked both at the construction of the aerodrome and of the Institute Saint Jean, in which children of Belgians were studying during the Second World War, and which became the National University of Rwanda in 1963. They were working for two weeks per month and then replaced, and after a break of two weeks they went back to do *akazi* again.139

While the economic importance of crops and infrastructure was undisputed, it was the form of execution of these works that was resented by the population. First, their normal hours of work underwent a dramatic change. Having been used to work without stress as Rumiya puts it, they were required to fulfil a number of hours that exceeded their ordinary daily workload. Secondly, the colonial system was not explaining to them before enforcing those works, so as to stimulate participation. Furthermore, a number of peasants were required to cultivate far from their homes, which made this activity unpractical.140 Again, it was a compulsory work, so sick people were not spared; there was no way of discussing with abamotsi and subchiefs about one’s availability. The white agronomist who seems to have been very unpopular and who remained in the memory of peasants in Astrida is Languy, nicknamed Kurimpuzu or Kurimpuzu Rusharaza.141 For

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139 Paternostre de la Mairieu, *Le Rwanda, son effort de développement*, p. 127 and 172; Interview with Segatashya Gérard.
140 Kagame, *Un abrégé de l’histoire*, p. 204.
the roads, the complaints of the population were about not being paid, when a certain payment was promised.\textsuperscript{142}

It is all able-bodied men who were required to perform Akazi. People who refused to execute this work were severely punished. The chiefs and the subchiefs had the duty of monitoring the execution of all those public works. Sometimes, the Territory Administrator also checked those who did not work and instructed the chiefs to punish them. For instance, on 30 January 1947, Reisdorff, the then Territory Administrator of Astrida, wrote letters to two chiefs Gitambaro of Bashumba-Nyakare and Rusagara of Mvejuru, sending them a list of people who escaped from doing akazi and telling them to punish those people: “Below are the names of akazi workers who escaped doing akazi. Here are the instructions that I give you: […] Punish them because they disrespected, they refused to work…”\textsuperscript{143}

However, there existed some exemptions. European settlers and Christian churches had applied for a special exemption from akazi of Rwandan people who worked for them. For example, between 1937 and 1943, Bishop Classe negotiated for his followers and workers [catechists, students, bakuru b’ina (heads of local church councils)] in order not to perform Akazi and Uburetwa (work for Tutsi authorities).\textsuperscript{144} My informant from Liba, Gishamvu, Gaston Nzabamwita says that his father Casimir Butare did not do Akazi, because he had been a client of priests, he had worked as messenger of priests at Kansi Mission at the time of Father Classe. The brother of Nzabamwita, Grégoire Kamugisha, became a priest. He was a Seminary student during the Akazi time. So his father got a note allowing him not to do Akazi. Claude Ngirabega, my other informant, worked at the Seminary as well. As a result, he did not have to do Akazi. In March 1947, the Territory Administrator of Astrida wrote a letter to all chiefs informing them about

\textsuperscript{142} Rumiya ("La révolution socio-politique", p. 146) indicates that in 1939 that payment was 0,50 franc per day, while the poll tax was 36,75 francs per annum.


\textsuperscript{144} Ian Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs au Rwanda (1900-1990), Paris, Karthala, 1999, pp. 278-279.
measures to take in favour of people who worked for white settlers, Arabs\textsuperscript{145} and Indians: “I told you that the employees are not being absent, they are working in companies of Whites, Arabs and Indians for 20 days per month. They have been freed from agriculture works and from ubuletwa. Their wives also must not be required to perform any of these works, they must take care of their amasambu [fields].” \textsuperscript{146}

\textbf{b) Works performed in favour of white colons}

Thousands of Rwandans were recruited to go and work in settlers’ companies in Rwanda and Congo. By 1939, workers going to work in MINETAIN (\textit{Mines d’Etain du Ruanda-Urundi}) were signing a contract and were given a health certificate before starting to work. They were also given some equipment that included uniforms. Those uniforms included tee-shirts or pullovers; hence people going to work there were called \textit{abapira} (from \textit{imipira}: tee-shirts or pullovers). \textsuperscript{147} In this regard, the “\textit{accoutrement}” gave them an identity. \textsuperscript{148} Unlike for \textit{akazi}, people who worked for white settlers got paid:

When I grew up after having the intelligence age, people who were going, were not fleeing abroad, they were going to MINETAIN, to wear uniforms (\textit{imipira}) and to dig gold and tin mineral (\textit{cassitérite}). When they complete a two, three year contract, they come back and join their wives and children. […] They got paid by those whites who took them. […] I did not have the age of going there at MINETAIN. They were taking strong and adult people.\textsuperscript{149}

Workers started to be recruited and sent to Congo from 1925. They worked in agriculture and in mining companies. The transfer of those populations to Congo was not directed by

\textsuperscript{145} The identity “Arabs” included a diverse range of Arabic people who came from various regions that include Middle East, North Africa and East Africa.

\textsuperscript{146} I. Reisdorff, Administrateur Territorial, \textit{Lettre à tous les Chefs}, Astrida, le 4 mars 1947, en kinyarwanda, Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida.


\textsuperscript{149} Interview with Gaston Nzabamwita, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. See also interview with Hakizamungu who worked for a white person as carpenter, and Ntakaraba who worked for the Roman Catholic Church’s carpentry workshop.
the intention to solve the overpopulation of Rwanda. It was led by the need for manpower for the European settlers in Congo.150

When I asked a question about the work performed for European settlers, I got answers revolving around two words: *abapira* - the recruited people to mining companies, as mentioned above - and Lugaravu.

Lugaravu was a Belgian dealer who was in charge of delivering meat that was consumed in mining companies in Rwanda and Congo since the 1930s until 1948. His true name is de Borchgrave. According to Nkurikiyimfura who attempted to reconstruct the activity of cattle selling, de Borchgrave got the monopoly of delivering meat from the government administration and used it to extort cattle owners. He used subchiefs to get the cattle delivered to him by force. Nkurikiyimfura indicates that at first the price for a cow was 40,50 F and that it is de Borchgrave who had the right to fix the price. The cow purchased underwent branding on its ear in order to be recognized.151 According to Kagame and my informant Rwigimba, the peasants who delivered their cattle to the subchiefs received the ridiculous sum of 5 francs, which was, according to Rwigimba, not a price, but the value of the transport of that cow. The cow was then sold to the white companies' markets at a price reaching 5,000 francs.152 This matter was so resented that in 1948 one petitioner complained about it to the United Nations Visiting Mission:

*Extermination of the cattle of Ruanda by the Belgians:* The cow is in Ruanda what money is in Europe. It is the wealth of the Native of *Ruanda*. Thousands and thousands of cows were forcibly taken by M. De Bolgrave [*sic*] […], Count of Alténa, at a sum that could *not* even be called a price, which was only paid for the sake of appearances. How can a country be saved by abolishing its capital without replacing it by an equivalent?153

Cattle businessmen from Nyaruguru and Ndara chiefdoms were progressively discouraged from purchasing and selling around the border with Burundi as de Borchgrave was collecting by force all the cattle of Astrida, and the administration was collecting other cattle for *effort de guerre* during the Second World War. Indeed, during the Second World War, the Belgian administration obliged the subchiefs to bring more cattle for the war effort.\(^{154}\) As a result, the sacrifice of the Rwandans who owned cattle became severe: «The Tutsi had already suffered a great deal before the war because of repetitive requisitioning of their cattle in order to supply meat and milk. Realizing that their herds were being decimated by sickness, a number of them committed suicide. […] During the war, the requisitioning of cattle enriched the Belgian intermediaries and impoverished the owners of cattle."\(^{155}\)

To the question as to what else he recalls about the colonial period, Munyantore told me the experience of Lugaravu (de Borchgrave):

> There was a programme of burning cows on the cheek. It is whites who did that. Then every cow burned was sent to the white Lugaravu who lived at Muyogoro in Butare. Lugaravu took those cows and slaughtered them and sent meat at his home. Then some people in Congo sang a song saying that people should lament to Mutara the king that Lugaravu has finished the cattle, pretending to cure them from Malaria. Rudahigwa heard those lamentations and ruled that no other cow should go to be burnt.\(^{156}\)

Indeed, king Rudahigwa became so angry about the extortion of de Borchgrave that he beat him one day at the market of Nyanza according to Nkurikiyimfura and Kagambirwa, and at Muyogoro, Gihindamuyaga, according to my informant Rwigimba. My informant Nyirabitaweho says the king expelled de Borchgrave. On the other hand, Kagame indicates that two among those who were extorting cattle got jailed but he did not mention their names.\(^{157}\) This account leaves a number of questions. For example, how


\(^{155}\) Linden, *Christianisme et pouvoirs*, p. 277.

\(^{156}\) Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.

could the king be able to beat a white person given the power relations that prevailed during the colonial rule?

c) Work for Chiefs and Subchiefs

The work for the Tutsi auxiliaries was part of duties of the subjects towards their patrons in several clientship institutions that existed before, such as *Ubuhake* (*guhakwa kw’inka* and *guhakwa kw’ubutaka* and *guhakwa k’ubutegetsi*), *Uburetwa* and *Ibikingi*. But the colonial rule made *Ubuhake* and *Uburetwa* clientships more exploitative.

Rumiya explains that before 1944 chiefs and subchiefs did not have a formal salary. In order to get some income, the Belgian administration obliged every Hutu person to provide labour for a number of days in favour of the chief and the subchiefs in return for land acquisition. This implied that those people became land clients of the chiefs and subchiefs.158 My informants refer to this type of labour as *umubyizi w’ukwezi* (a day of labour per month) for the subchief and *umubyizi w’umwaka* (a day of labour per year) for the chief per adult man.159 This regulation increased the weight of the *Uburetwa* that existed since the 1880s; it obliged then only agricultural land clients’ lineages in the centre, south and eastern parts of the country to perform two days of labour per week for their patrons. During the Belgian period, this type of constraint was generalized for the whole territory of Rwanda and for single individuals.

In 1939 the *Uburetwa* works were converted into payment in cash, but until the 1950s some people were still working for the Tutsi auxiliaries. Though the conversion had progressively reduced the number of people performing labour at the subchief and the chief, it did not ease life for them, for, as explains Ian Linden, those freed from *Uburetwa* were recuperated to perform *Akazi* as they gained more free time.160

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159 Interview with Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007 and others.
160 Linden, *Christianisme et pouvoirs*, p. 245.
*Ubuhake* ties also became widespread as more people sought this type of clientship following the suppression of the army institution in the 1926-1931 reforms. In order to get protection against the new chiefs and subchiefs who had a fused executive and judiciary power, following the administrative colonial reform, people entered *Ubuhake* in greater numbers than before. They performed such works as to build the fences, to look after livestock, domestic work, etc. in return for a cow and especially for protection. They spent weeks, sometimes months at the *shebuja* (patron)’s home working. But, as some interviews suggest, some *ubuhake* clients to the chiefs and subchiefs obtained cows while others did not. In the contemporary language, *guhaka* – that is, to have someone as *ubuhake* client – became synonymous with to administer, to rule. This semantic shift was perhaps caused by the fact that almost all new chiefs and subchiefs following the administrative reform of 1926-1931 had *ubuhake* clients. For instance, a Tutsi leader who was popular was referred to as: “a kind *ubuhake* patron” (*ahaka neza*), and the contrary as “*ahaka nabi*” (he is a bad *ubuhake* patron) (bad leader).

Finally, Nkurikiyimfura contends that the more people became workers to white men (settlers, church clergy or administrators), the more they became freed from *ubuhake* ties. In the same vein, colonial reports of the Residency of Ruanda and of Astrida and Nyanza Territories that I consulted point out that the more Hutu and poor Tutsi people got money, the less they paid court to the high ranking Tutsi, that is, those who had power and wealth during the colonial period.

According to Rumiya, chiefs and subchiefs started to forbid their populations to move freely from area to area because they needed to extract labour from them for their own benefit and for *akazi*. But my interviews suggest that some exceptions existed. Indeed, a number of people used to flee the harshness of one subchief and go to another hill

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161 Kagame, *Un abrégé de l’histoire*.
163 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007 and others.
administered by another subchief, and then come back when that subchief was removed.\textsuperscript{165}

The colonial rule did not just extort labour, it also seized material things from colonized subjects.

1.3.2. Economic constraints

a) Colonial Taxes

The first thing the colonial rule collected from income’s people was tax. This was in multiple forms: poll tax, cattle tax and polygamy tax. During the 1920s, the amount of tax was very small, and increased significantly during and after the Second World War as Rwandans’ \textit{effort de guerre} contribution.\textsuperscript{166}

The year 1940 is very important because it coincides with the time of the Second World War. So the Belgian colonial administration was expected to deliver a great deal for its mother country. It is the time when the former King Musinga was totally removed from Rwanda, and taken to Moba, Congo, on 20 July.\textsuperscript{167} It is the time when the Belgian colonial administration also checked for loyalism or lack of loyalism once again. Loyalism was calculated by what the population said in rumours, how leaders behaved towards the Belgians and how the population paid the war effort. The \textit{effort de guerre} was estimated in cash to the amount of 65,000 francs paid by the population and the chiefs in Astrida in 1940; to 660,000 francs for the whole Rwanda in 1941, that is, 1.60 franc per person as the report calculates. According to the Belgian administrators, this amount was paid willingly because Rwandese were saying they are giving it to their

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[167] Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 3 (58), Résidence du Ruanda, \textit{Rapport annuel 1940}, p. 64.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
“parents.” In 1944, the Belgian administration was ready to recognize that the Tutsi and the Hutu populations were undergoing a general malaise about the suffering that the war effort has caused them materially and they started to complain openly about it. As Bézy wrote, the severity of Ruzagayura famine was located also in the context of the payments of the effort de guerre.

The colonial administration was so interested in tax collection that subchiefs and chiefs put those who did not pay it in detention. The account of Munyarugamba indicates that extreme measures were sometimes taken to have the tax paid: “There was a family member of mine from Ndorwa. [He was in prison for not having paid tax.] Then he died in the prison. It was during the time of Mutembe [chief] [i.e., before 1946]. [...] They asked my brothers to go and pay for him, otherwise they will beat the dead body. They put the dead body there. Then, my older brothers paid.” Also the evaluation of the performance of the Tutsi leaders and the proportion of their salary depended on their capacity to collect as much tax as the number of adult men who were in their area. One understands then to what extent much endeavour was put into this activity.

b) Things given to abamotsi, subchiefs, chiefs and Europeans

Things in kind were also collected from the population. The most notable are agricultural and livestock products to be consumed by the Europeans – administrators or technicians, by the Tutsi administrators or technicians, the abamotsi and the catechists. Europeans who came to visit chiefdoms had accommodation during their travel. Black technicians on the other hand did not have such passage accommodation; hence, whenever they arrived, the chief had to move one inhabitant who had a decent house and accommodate the visitor. During their stay, they required food (beef, goat, mutton, chicken meat, eggs,

168 Résidence du Ruanda, *Rapports annuels 1940-1941*.
171 Interview with François Munyangore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
172 Interview with Théodomir Munyarugamba, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007.
173 See Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, pp. 120-121.
beans, peas, sorghum, etc.) and drinks (alcohol and milk) which were provided by the subchiefs. But it is mostly the abamotsi who collected these from the population’s fields and livestock and brought them to the upper level leaders.\footnote{Kambanda, \textit{Evolution politique}, p. 89-90 ; Ntezimana, “Les réactions rwandaises”, pp. 77-78 ; Interview with Evariste Kabano, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.} Nkurikiyimfura stresses cases of abuse and exploitation by colonial masters about the collections of cows to be milked for them. These spent some weeks up to a month with the white administrator. The subchief was obliged to collect these cows from the population and deliver them to the Belgian administrators. He was punished in case he failed to get milking cows to deliver.\footnote{Nkurikiyimfura, \textit{Le gros bétail}, 1994, pp. 192-196.} The same is repeated by Ngirabega: “When a white comes at Liba where Mutembe [chief] was living, they ask you a cow for \textit{umugogoro}, that is, for providing milk. Your cow will spend there a month providing milk for the white, the chief or the subchief. […] You had to give a cow to the subchief so that you survive…”\footnote{Interview with Claude Ngirabega, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.}

The abamotsi, because they were not paid, paid themselves through food and drink collections from the population as well. People who wanted to enjoy some peace had to befriend the abamotsi - and the subchiefs, when possible. In that case, they could be spared from doing \textit{akazi}, \textit{uburetwa} or from providing these things.\footnote{Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.} These collections of things by and for abamotsi came to be considered as corruption. This “corruption” bore the names “\textit{bituga}, \textit{bitugukwaha}, and \textit{inyoroshyo}.”\footnote{Interviews with Munyantore, Hakizamungu, Rwandanga, Batura, Munyarugamba. See also Gaspard Cyimana, “Plaidoyer pour le menu peuple au Rwanda-Burundi, article du 15 mars 1959”, dans Fidèle, Nkundabagenzi (éd.), \textit{Rwanda politique, les dossiers du C.R.I.S.P.}, 1958-1960, Bruxelles, CRISP, 1961, pp. 55-68, p. 60.}

The account of Batura Christophe concerning the work of his father as ikirongozi (umumotsi) explains how umumotsi was paid:

My father, Eulade Nzibaranga, was an ikirongozi. The work of Ibirongozi was to check how the colonial work is being performed. Amashiku, forest planting, coffee planting. It was \textit{Akazi}. [compulsory work] […] Their salary was drinks, in fact they were taking corruption. They survived from offers. It is the population that paid them. Their other advantage was to be welcomed in the power structure,
to be known by the abajyanama [councillors]. Also them and their children were spared from doing akazi.\textsuperscript{179}

c) Land

Land is among the things that were contested during this time. First, the abolition of the Igikingi institution occurred during the time of the administrative reform of 1926-31. The Belgian administration ruled that ibikingi (grazing domains) be distributed by the subchiefs to the peasants as plots for agricultural purposes. While this redistribution weakened the owners of those ibikingi, it gave immense material powers to the new subchiefs following the administrative reform. For example, some individuals from the south who were in conflict with the subchief could flee to other hills or to Burundi. Their lands were to be redistributed to people who paid allegiance to the subchief. In other areas, the subchief granted himself the right to drive the detested individual out of his land.\textsuperscript{180} According to Paternostre, certain chiefs and subchiefs who resisted this reform were removed from office and replaced by new ones.\textsuperscript{181} According to Rumiya, the new redistribution also undermined the communal lands which were also redistributed for individual property, because, when an individual was chased away, his land was not given back to his lineage but was controlled by the subchief’s administration. This new policy destroyed the “traditional” land system. Moreover, the subchief and other wealthier Tutsi kept the right to grazing lands for their cattle.\textsuperscript{182}

Yet, in the 1930s, land was already becoming scarce because of the pressure of demographic growth. Ian Linden reports that some young Tutsi who had money attempted to buy land, but were forbidden, under the allegation that the land belonged to the king according to the customary law and that it could not be purchased. There was a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
\item Paternostre de la Mairie, \textit{Le Rwanda, son effort de développement}, p. 130.
\item Rumiya, \textit{Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat}, p. 225-226.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
belief that this could undermine the authority of the king, the chiefs and the subchiefs.\textsuperscript{183} The report of the Astrida Territory of 1947 comes back to the land scarcity issue:

One of the social problems that is being evident in Astrida Territory is the agrarian or land issue. Land for agriculture is lacking in this overpopulated country; the struggle to keep a plot of land has become fierce. The scarcity of available patches of land and the necessity of the young households to acquire a place to settle have opened the door to a great deal of speculations. The more clever people have realized the need to have more land, and despite the absence of individual land property in the old customary law, they get an argument to grant themselves the ownership of land that they cannot be able to occupy or exploit themselves but that they will rent with benefit to the ones who do not own land. […] Everywhere in hills surrounding Astrida in a large radius, one can find indeed people who do not have land but who are just renting. Others have become purely and simply agricultural workers. […] Sometimes one witnesses a genuine constitution of a new serfdom contract based not on cattle but on land. […] Are we going to allow this new form of serfdom to replace the previous one?\textsuperscript{184}

The colonial administration presents itself here as a helpless agent observing and being overwhelmed by a dramatic shift of which Rwandans are represented as the main and sole ‘active’ agents. Nowhere in this passage does it mention the colonial political economy and its role in this predicament.

Hence, in Gishamvu and Kibayi, a number of people went to seek \textit{Ubuhake} clientship to the subchiefs and the chiefs in order to receive land. This \textit{Ubuhake}, as I was told by my informants in Kibayi commune, was not concerned about working for the patron and receiving a cow at last. It was about the client giving a cow to the patron who happened to be a political leader or an umumotsi or a councillor, when the councillors were established, and then the latter provides an \textit{isambu} (individual agricultural tenure). But some new recipients of land were clients in the ordinary sense of \textit{Ubuhake}.

During the early 1950s, a number of people migrated to the hill of Shyombo in Kibayi to settle there. This hill was then a forest. Most of them acquired the permission to clear the

\textsuperscript{183} Linden, \textit{Christianisme et pouvoirs}, p. 246, see also explanation on note 18 of this page ; see also \textit{Notules sur le Ruanda-Urundi}, 1960, Archives Nationales, Doc. 8639, p. 10.

forest and get a portion of land from subchiefs. The most mentioned is Ruzindana. This became a new wave of immigrants coming to settle in this area, following other immigrants who arrived during previous famine times. It is worth mentioning some of the experiences of my informants’ families.

Ildéphonse Bisamaza was born in Baziro, Muganza in 1951, but his parents moved to Kibayi, Shyombo in 1953. His father went there to seek land, because his land in Muganza was small. Shyombo was then forest, as he explains; therefore, many people moved there around 1952-3, whereas Muganza was populated. “You had to do *ubuhake*, you apply for land, and then you clear the forest yourself. They had to do *ubuhake* to the *bajurunga*, those are *abamotsi* of that time, then these send them to the subchief. Then the latter tells the abamotsi to go to serve them.”185

As for the father of Vianney Uwimana, he was given land by subchief Ruzindana in 1952: “My family arrived in this area around 1952, it came from Nyaruhengeri. When they came they took over the remaining *amasambu* [individual agricultural tenures].”186 The following explanation of Uwimana corroborates the point made in the report of 1947 as quoted above:

People we found here did not know the importance of land. The original people here [Hutu and Tutsi] arrived here around 1920, 1930. If you analyze the situation, you realize that they are the ones who do not have land now, because of their ignorance. They refused to offer a cow to the leader so that they could get land. In fact, they thought the land will always be available. […] We, we knew the importance of land, because you see there [where they come from] it is town, people from there travelled, arrived at Cyarwa and witnessed the way the people are overpopulated, then they projected that that situation will occur elsewhere. When my family arrived here, there were wild pigs which were destroying the plants of people. They killed them, and then food started to be available.187

So, Uwimana describes his father as a clever man, for having anticipated that land will be scarce and for having accumulated it through allegiance to the subchief.

185 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
The grandfather of François Shirubute had been an *ubuhake* client of subchief Nyarwaya of Cyarwa (Mvejuru). “Papa got an *isambu* which was a forest; he did not go to apply for a land belonging to the Tutsi gone (in 1959). Because the one land he had was sufficient for him. He got it when Kibayi was still a forest. Many people who settle here are from Nyaruguru, Gikongoro, Gishamvu, Nyakare, who came here to take over forests. […] Even the grandfather I told you about got a forest to clear; he did not get an *isambu* of the Tutsi. Because during the time of the Bikoramucyi [leader], to get an *isambu* you had to struggle, to enter clientship relations in order to get it.”

The father of Christophe Nyandwi arrived in Nyakazana, Shyombo in 1954, and his mother and children joined the father around 1956. Nyandwi came while a child. They came from Gishamvu.

The family of Anonymous 17 arrived in Shyombo in 1950; it was originally from Kibirizi, where Anonymous 17 was born in 1948. “They came in 1950, they got an *isambu*, their home had been destroyed by the church, for, they were established where the Kibirizi church is located now.” According to this informant, Runyinya was occupied by the native people, Joma was half occupied before the 1950s, and Shyombo is occupied by new people.

Ladislas Nyirisenge moved from Gikongoro to Saga in 1952. He was working for Ntamanyoma Bonaventure who was Tutsi, and builder of houses of the white man Campion at Ibis hotel. Nyirisenge was his *umuhereza* (assistant) and domestic cook. They also came at Musha to build the medical dispensary which is at Gisagara. He was his *umugaragu* (*ubuhake* client) as he calls himself. He got two cows from his chief, one as dowry and one for his household. He also got land from him. According to Nyirisenge, Ntamanyoma was brother-in-law of chief Gashugi of Buhanga-Ndara.

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189 Interview with Christophe Nyandwi, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.  
190 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.  
191 Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.
Finally, the parents of Ignace Gatabazi went in Congo before 1949, for Gatabazi was born there in that year. They came back to Rwanda in 1950. In stead of going home at Kibirizi, where land was small, they chose to go to Rwamiko, Ndara where the shebuja (ubuhake patron) of his father called Rwasamanzi rwa Ntizimira, had been a leader. His father went to seek ubuhake to the new Rwasamanzi rwa Gatunzi who gave him a bigger land. His father had gone to Congo, Masisi, to work there for white settlers. He had married his mother there, who was from Bwishaza.192

1.4. SOCIAL REPRESSION

As we have mentioned above, the colonial rule chose to use the Tutsi as their auxiliaries. Since John Hanning Speke’s hamitic hypothesis, the Tutsi were presented as a special race, a conquering race, made of intelligent blacks, born to rule. The White Fathers relied on this assumption and chose to promote the Tutsi.193 They conceived and implemented a policy of ethnic differentiation through education. Since the first school of Nyanza, children of Tutsi aristocrats were to be privileged in terms of admission and quality of education. Wealthy Hutu who were able and willing to pay for school expenses for their children failed to get them admitted to this Nyanza School.194 According to Gamaliel Mbonimana, this Nyanza School did not have a discrimination policy during the time it started around 1902-1907 during the German rule, though the White Fathers wanted it to be a school of children of the chiefs who they thought were Tutsi. It is in 1919 that the Belgians opened in Nyanza a school that privileged the Tutsi children’s recruitment. This school operated until 1935.195 Other schools were opened progressively in other provinces.

192 Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. Later on, during the genocide, Gatabazi was considered as an outsider as well, because from Kibirizi, hence his ethnic identity was in doubt.
Education functioned as a tool of racial, ethnic and gender differentiation. Whites were more privileged. Children from mixed couples of white and black were treated in the same status as the legitimate children of Tutsi chiefs. Both enjoyed a status higher than the one of Hutu children. Their selection criteria were softer than the ones for the Hutu children. Even after completing their respective education, the Tutsi stood more chance to get employed than the Hutu. The latter could not compete for the same posts as the Tutsi. Women also had little chance to study. As Erny observes, the education of girls evolved very little. In fact, many parents did not understand the importance of educating their girls, since no leadership position could be provided to them after they complete their education. Hence, even when the authorities were sensitizing parents to send their daughters to school, few parents responded to this call. Many considered it a waste of time. When schools for girls and ladies were created, they taught skills for housewives of “évolués” (civilized) citizens, and women school teachers. Some few women benefited from this elementary education. As a result, men studied more than women, and children of Tutsi aristocrats studied more than the rest. However, this education discrimination was not practised in schools of Protestant Churches and in Roman Catholic Seminaries. It is in these schools that some few Hutu intellectuals studied.

The Belgian administration instrumentalised race and ethnicity in politics through the reform of 1926-31. As mentioned above, this reform excluded the Hutu and the Twa and kept Tutsi aristocrats in local leadership positions. Ethnicity was transferred to society as well. During the population census that occurred during the time of administrative reorganization in the early 1930s, the Adult Men got identity books that mentioned for

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the first time the identities of hutu, tutsi and twa. As Twagiramutara indicated, “[t]he feeling of ethnic belonging gradually eclipsed that of clanic identity as the main basis of reference in the identification of people.”

Colonization did not solely affect the status and identity of subjects. It also reshaped and even disturbed the everyday social life. Colonized people were humiliated by the beatings administered. The existing division of labour within the nuclear and extended family underwent a dramatic change. The movement of people migrating to neighbouring countries caused social destabilization and family disintegration.

The punishment of whipping (ikiboko) became an institution during the colonial period. The subchiefs and the abamotsi are the ones often cited as having implemented this corporal punishment. This is one of the reasons why they became so unpopular. Though their frequency of administering this punishment differed in time and according to the individual’s behaviour and acquaintance with the subjects, records show that until the early 1950s people were still beaten. A UN report of 1950 wrote: “…it may be deduced from the almost unanimous reaction of those questioned that whipping still survives and is commonly practised by chiefs and sub-chiefs, Native subordinates and even some European officials, especially in connection with agriculture and forced labour on roads.”

Just as adult men were the ones who paid tax, who performed akazi, they were the ones who were punished when their duties were not carried out. As Mbembe wrote, colonisation, through its decentralized structures, did something to the body of the colonized. Rodney and Mamdani symbolized it as ‘one armed bandit’ and ‘clenched
The people interviewed mentioned the atrocity of beating, while at the same time noting some nuances. For example, they said that women were not beaten. They also mention strategies used in order to escape this corporal punishment. These included running away to another hill administered by a different subchief, providing a gift to the umumotsi in order to befriend him, becoming a known client of the subchief and chief, etc. Those who could not afford these means had the option of resignation or exile to East Africa. The statistics indicate that most accepted the fate of resignation until when the beating was abolished. A number of old people interviewed who were born in the early 1930s, did not get beaten that much, but saw their parents beaten and going to Uganda into exile. But during the 1950s, the inhumane practices had softened; the beating was no longer practised by administrative leaders, it was transferred to tribunals. Some say it is the king Rudahigwa who abolished it, others that it is the Belgian administration.

Exile also disintegrated the social life. People emigrated temporarily or permanently for many reasons. These include going into exile to work in order to get the money for paying tax, to seek land there for landless people, to get money for marriage for young men, to escape the whipping, *akazi* and *uburetwa*, etc.

Rwandans and Burundians who had settled in Buganda were about 30,000 in 1931, 200,000 in 1948 and 500,000 (350,000 among these were Rwandans) in 1959. In 1959, around 35,000 Rwandans had settled in Tanganyika. These numbers included permanent and temporary migrations. Between 1935 and 1949, a total of 94,016 Rwandan

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208 See Leurquin, *Le niveau de vie*, p. 25.

workers went into exile in the Congo.\textsuperscript{210} This number reduced in the following years, for, about 54,896 went to Congo between 1949 and 1960.\textsuperscript{211}

According to Wellars Kambanda, a number of persons from Buhanga-Ndara were influenced by the Belgian administration to go to Gishari, Congo, where agriculturalists were mostly encouraged to go there in order to work in European settlers’ farms. But a number of them came back to Rwanda after spending some time in Congo.\textsuperscript{212} Sometimes, those migrations were done by force, when they were the result of the Belgian project. Moreover, the Belgian administration promised to Rwandans who were willing to go to Congo some land property there.\textsuperscript{213} In 1937 about 20,000 Rwandans were sent to Gishari. They got about 37,000 ha of fertile land for agriculture. Ten years later they had reached the number of 25,000.\textsuperscript{214}

But these voluntary as well as forced migrations did not significantly reduce the population size of Rwanda. The estimates of Guichaoua suggest that the density for Ruanda-Urundi was respectively 55 inhabitants per km\textsuperscript{2} in 1923 and 92 in 1960.\textsuperscript{215} In 1957, Astrida Territory had 446,190 Rwandans under customary law (subjects) and the population density was 158.67 hab/km\textsuperscript{2}. The density of the Rwandan population was then of 93.10 hab/km\textsuperscript{2}. The Mvejuru chiefdom already had the density of 300 inhabitants per km\textsuperscript{2} in 1954.\textsuperscript{216}

Colonialism was also an androcentric institution. It excluded women. Tax, compulsory work (akazi) and work for the “customary” authorities (uburetwa) were fulfilled by men. This situation is said to have changed the way the Rwandan household’s division of

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\textsuperscript{210} Ministère des Colonies, \textit{Plan Décennal pour le développement économique et social du Ruanda-Urundi}, Bruxelles, les Editions de Visscher, 1951, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{212} Kambanda, \textit{Evolution politique}, pp. 93, 107 et 108.
\textsuperscript{214} Paternostre de la Mairieu, \textit{Le Rwanda, son effort de développement}, p. 131 ; Linden, \textit{Christianisme et pouvoirs}, p. 276.
\textsuperscript{215} Guichaoua, \textit{Destins paysans}, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{216} Office de l’Information et des relations publiques pour le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi (éditeur), \textit{Le Ruanda-Urundi, rapport}, Bruxelles, 1959, p. 34 ; Leurquin, \textit{Le niveau de vie}, p. 170.
labour was shaped before. The increase of constraints (labour and things to provide) on men during the colonial period made women increasingly left alone in the provision of food and children’s education.¹¹⁷ When money was introduced into the colonial economy, it is again men who got in charge of it, since they are the ones who were cultivating cash crops, who were paying tax, who were receiving minor wages. Leurquin argues that it is at this crucial moment that men started to control the household’s budget as it was becoming increasingly dependent on cash, since new products – clothes, kitchen utensils, modern medicine, etc. – were being introduced in the market. ²¹⁸

Women in their “social differences” – race, class, ethnicity, marital status, having children or not, age, generation, etc. – worked, struggled for a space and played an active role in the colonial rural and urban economy.²¹⁹ But this marginalization of women made them one of the forgotten agents: “…both inside and beyond the ‘domestic sphere’ women’s actions carry political weight, they marshal considerable creative power. But ‘their’ history was missed as newly gendered divisions of labour grew up in the later colonial economies that excluded women from the powerful roles of trader, cash cropper, and wage earner.”²²⁰ For example, any discussion or plan about the development of women during the 1950s was about their social associations, art craft, their role as housewives, and not about their political voice.²²¹

But women were not the only forgotten ones, children’s role or suffering is also absent in the colonial history. Yet, sons used to help their fathers to perform colonial works and clientship labour.²²² My informant Rwandanga replaced his father at akazi works under the order of subchief Gashagaza. My other informant Cassien Rwanyange replaced his

²¹⁸ Leurquin, Le niveau de vie, pp. 251-252.
father at chief Mutembe’s home for *ubuhake* clientship labour. Both were not yet adult when they were doing these forms of work.

### 1.5. COLONIAL REFORMS OF THE 1950s

Although colonial rule was characterized by so many regular territorial reforms, changes and adaptations of the “legal” frameworks, it can be said that only two major reforms have been registered: the administrative reorganisation of 1926-1931 and the political reforms that occurred after the Second World War, especially since the early 1950s. These later reforms of the 1950s intended to soften the repressive features of colonial rule, and to provide the opening of political space, but they failed to address major issues that colonial rule had created or exacerbated. In the view of Shillington, the colonial policy remained exploitative:

> Colonial governments were generally too intent upon ordering and instructing rather than consulting and supporting local African initiatives. With an eye to European’s needs, colonial postwar economic initiatives were still mainly concerned with developing Africa as an exporter of raw materials and an importer of manufactured goods. There was certainly no intention in the 1940s of developing African self-reliance in preparation for economic and political independence from Europe.²²³

Colonial reforms did not come as a will of the colonial government. They were dictated by the context of the moment: the end of the Second World War, populations asking for more freedom. Then, the colonial government responded by reforming a number of its earlier key policies, especially the ones challenged. As early as 1944 and 1945, colonial reports already pointed out the spirit on the side of the population, whether Hutu or Tutsi, of reclaiming their dignity, their freedom, an evolution that is said to have disoriented at

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first the “customary” authorities, who took it as a challenge against the existing power. By 1948, that will was well formulated:

In the political arena, the Rwandese aspires to not be given orders, to not be punished, constrained. He wants to be the master [of himself] to organize his work and above all his leisure time. In a word, he wants to be free, free to go, free to stay, free to cultivate at will, free from the whipping, free from sanctions, free from corvées, free from the morning summon, etc.

The reforms of the 1950s were also the result of the new policy under which Rwanda was placed, namely the Tutelage system since 1946-1948. Belgium managed Rwanda and Burundi as Tutelage territories of the United Nations. The first UN visit mission asked the Belgian authority to open up the political space by allowing more and more Rwandans to take up positions of responsibility and to set up an administration based on councils rather than on individuals. Following this request, the decree of 14 July 1952 was instituted. It announced the creation of councils of subchiefdoms, chiefdoms, territories and the Superior Council of the Country. Members of these respective councils were to be elected. In accordance with this decree, two elections took place, in 1953 and in 1956. Both elections kept the Tutsi as majority leaders from subchiefdoms to the Superior Council of the Country. Moreover, these councils were consultative; they had no power of decision. They did not also change the administrative structure into a service delivery one for the population. This structure remained a powerful tool for serving Belgian rule and protecting Belgian interests. Although councillors of subchiefs were functioning following their election of 1953 and 1956, the personality of the subchief remained the determining factor. Indeed the report of the Belgian administration of Ruanda-Urundi of 1956 notes that in certain territories the councillors behaved like the assistants of the subchief rather than as the representatives of the people.

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Another fact that shows that the 1950s epoch was not yet smooth is the continuation of migrations. The first phase of emigrations to Kivu had taken place from 1937 to 1945. The second major phase was from 1949 to 1956. The departures to East Africa also continued. This movement was encouraged by many reasons that included the weight of the tax which had increased significantly.  

However, it can be said that the chiefs, subchiefs and abamotsi who administered after 1945 were less harsh than the ones who worked before the time of colonial reforms initiated during the Tutelage period following the Second World War. Things were still far from satisfactory, but had improved. For example, it is during this period that *ubuhake* clientship, *uburetwa* works, the corporal punishment and the abamotsi position were abolished.

As early as 1945, the king Rudahigwa and the Superior Council of the Country had proposed the abolition of *ubuhake* ties between the patrons (*shebuja*) and the clients (*abagaragu*). But the Belgians were reluctant to implement such a reform, fearing that it could lead to other implications. Following the request of king Rudahigwa, the abolition of *ubuhake* was finally implemented as part of the programmes undertaken in the Ten-year Plan of Socio-Economic Development (1951-1960) for Ruanda-Urundi.

The measure to stop *ubuhake* was published by the king in April 1954. It was followed by another measure in 1956. Article 3 of the 1954 measure stipulated that the *shebuja* (patron) was obliged to divide cows with the heirs of the deceased *mugaragu* (client) if the *umugaragu* happened to have been dead by the time of division of cows. Article 4 fixed the proportions to divide: the patron got 1/3 and the client 2/3. Until 1958 the

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230 Arrêté du Mwami du Ruanda n°1/54, 1 Avril 1954, suppression progressive de l’Ubuhake.
division of *ubuhake* cows between the *shebuja* and the *bagaragu* was still going on, for at that year, about 280,000 cows had been divided.  

Legally, the *Ubuhake* institution was definitively abolished on 21 May 1960.

Saucier who has done research in the south of Rwanda on the evolution of *ubuhake* reports that clients welcomed this move with a vivid joy: “The reform was acclaimed in certain circles as the realization of ‘the most outstanding social progress’ ever accomplished since the beginning of the white rule.” My research too confirmed this reaction. Here is one account:

For those who claim to have put away the colonial rule, it is Rudahigwa who has started that process. [...] He abolished *ubuhake*, where a person could spend 4 to 6 years before he gets a heifer. [...] Isn’t it the Tutsi who were ruling? They became unhappy. Can you be happy about someone removing milk from your mouth? They got angry. They started to say: ‘this time the king is no longer the king of the country, he has become the king of the Hutu.’ That’s where you get that proverb saying: ‘It is from the King’s decision that the Abatwa get promoted.’ ‘He becomes a king of the Hutu, he frees the *abagaragu* [clients] from us, how will I work for myself whereas I used to have someone to work for me?’ [...] On the other hand the lower classes like us who are helpless and survive from cultivating became happy, arguing that ‘there is no better King than this one.’

Another account comes from Ntakaraba:

In fact, among all those rulers, Rudahigwa is the one who did the good thing for us in Rwanda. [...] My parents were *abagaragu* at Mutembe’s house. We shared the cattle in the abolition of *ubuhake*. [...] We welcomed very well that reform. In fact, that was the beginning of democracy.

Many more pointed to this move as a positive reform for them. Anonymous 6 says that his father, subchief Namahungu, left all the cattle to the clients and did not take any share. Munyarugamba corroborates this behaviour also: “There were some who were kind enough and gave the whole number of cattle to their *bagaragu* without allocating

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233 Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
234 Interview with Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
any to themselves." One informant says that he got a cow from the patron of his father because his father had died by the time of the sharing of cattle.

But this romanticised view is not generalised. Some others point out that certain clients hid the true number of cattle so that they could divide a small number of cattle and keep the hidden one. For example, they reported the mature cows and hid calves that the patron did not know about before. Some people from Buhanga-Ndara had not reported the true number of their cattle; as a result, the census of cattle in Buhanga-Ndara for the year 1954 showed a smaller number of cattle than for 1953.

All my informants who spoke about the abolition of ubuhake gave credit to king Rudahigwa. They did not consider it to be part of the Belgian programme. They did not understand that without the approval of the colonial power, the king would not have been able to implement such a considerable reform regardless of his good intentions.

Concerning the abolition of Uburetwa, since 1939, the Belgian administration had replaced the work due to the chiefs and subchiefs by a formal cash payment by the subjects. This measure was applied in 1939 mainly to people who earned money then. These included administration employees, as well as contract workers, catechists, and herders who owned more than ten cattle. Then this measure was applied to all taxpayers since 1945 and became obligatory since 1949. In 1957, the amount of replacement of work for the king was 3 francs per tax payer, it was 91 for the chief and the subchief.

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236 Interview with Anonymous 9, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
But the available literature reports that people continued to work for the chiefs and subchiefs even after the measures to transform this work into cash payment had been published. This seems to have continued until the “revolution” of 1959. However, some of my informants point out that in the 1950s, the subchiefs and chiefs used to pay people who worked for them, suggesting that working for free was being progressively abolished.

Concerning the reform of corporal punishment, the measure to remove the right to punishment from the colonial administrators was taken since 1948, probably after the remarks of the first UN mission to Rwanda. In order to have the population work, those refusing were reported by administrative leaders to the justice system. As a matter of fact, about 5,137 sentences were pronounced in 1950 in matters regarding colonial economic and agricultural production in Astrida. This is a lot if one considers that the Able-bodied men in that Territory were by then 62,900. This means that many people had started to refuse to work, thinking that compulsory labour was already abolished. The whipping continued in the 1950s, but it was enforced in the tribunals, not by administrative employees. For example, one letter from Ruanda informed the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi about the number of beatings inflicted on prisoners in 1951.

According to a number of colonial reports in the 1950s, colonial auxiliaries did not adapt to these new reforms: The right to punish had been removed from them and transferred to local tribunals. As their authority and their evaluation depended on the use of that force in order to enforce the payment of tax, the agricultural corvées, most of them were unable to

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enforce these works through collaboration and persuasion. Chiefs and subchiefs were no longer evaluated by their use of force but on the basis of their capacity to work in groups, to work in subchief and chiefdom councils, and therefore on the basis of their capacity to compromise. This dramatic shift became hard especially for those auxiliaries who were in office since long time ago. This explains in part the reason why the councils failed to become “democratic” forums in most subchixedoms and chiefdoms.  

247 It can be said that the suppression of *ikiboko* eroded the authority of subchiefs because the latter was previously depending on violence. But this was not authority as colonial reports have it. It was fear of sanctions. Once that fear is gone, so is also respect to leaders. Hannah Arendt was right: violence can create power, but for power to be sustained in the form of authority, it must not resort to violence. Several of my informants give the credit for the reform of corporal punishment to king Rudahigwa. They also confirm that towards the 1950s local authorities were no longer beating their constituents.  

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Another reform concerned the abolition of abamotsi position that occurred following the proposal of the Superior Council of the Country, in October 1956.  

249 The position was then abolished by 1957.

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All these reforms notwithstanding, the land issue persisted. Once *Ubuhake* was abolished, clients who then owned cattle needed grazing land. Most of them had been using pasturages of their patrons. Now that the clientship relationship was ended, they needed full ownership of pasture land and not the continuation of land clientship. Some went as

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far as to propose that the land be divided in the same proportion as the *ubuhake* cattle, namely 2/3 for the client and 1/3 for the owner of the land.251

As a result, they started to reclaim land from colonial authorities. A number of Tutsi land owners, fearing that their pasture land (*ibikingi*) could be taken away when land was already scarce, wrote a letter to the Superior Council of the Country, suggesting the alternative of giving to landless people the unoccupied land available in the country. They warned that should such sharing happen, it could lead to uprisings that would cause the killing or the emigration of owners of land and landless alike.252 The King also had doubts about sharing land.253 Unfortunately, this debate quickly became ethnic and dualistic between the Hutu, the vast majority of whom did not own land, and the Tutsi, that included some owners of large portions of land. It became a powerful tool of the Hutu intellectuals in 1957 who wrote “the Bahutu Manifesto,” to reclaim the end of the inequalities created by the colonial rule.254 Since then Hutu intellectuals continued to emphasize the land issue in newspapers and other organs of expression.255

The land issue is believed to have been one of stimulants of the “revolution” of November 1959. Hutu leaders were able to rally the support of a big majority of Hutu peasants who impatiently aspired to land redistribution following cattle redistribution.256 As early as March 1959, the word “revolution” was already used by a Hutu intellectual.257 Hutu peasants became disappointed because of shortage of land for grazing. The few Hutu intellectuals on the other hand had been frustrated by the colonial

255 See for example Aloys Munyangau, “Aspects des problèmes importants au Rwanda-Burundi, le 30 janvier 1959”, dans Nkundabagenzi (éd.), *Rwanda politique*, pp. 51-54, pp. 52-53 ; See Kayibanda in *Kinyamateka* Church newspaper, etc.
257 Cyimana, dans Nkundabagenzi (éd.), *Rwanda politique*, p. 55, see also p. 67.
masters for not having acquired jobs equal to their education levels, jobs that were given to privileged Tutsi. It became a sort of solidarity created by the suffering.

During this debate, the Belgian authority on the other hand did not take a major decision. It had entered into complicity with the Hutu intellectuals and in conflict against Tutsi auxiliaries since 1957, as we shall see in the following chapter. It waited until after the unrest of 1959 to pass the decree of 2 May 1960 that suspended former Tutsi political authorities from having access to *ibikingi* (grazing land) and to fallow lands of agricultural holdings. The decree of 11 July 1960 on the other hand recognized individual ownership of land through both customary and written laws. Furthermore, the Edict of 28 January 1961 that came into effect on 26 May 1961 abolished *Ubukonde* clientship that prevailed in the North-western part of the country.\(^{258}\) All these decrees were taken in favour of farmers who were in the majority of clients before.\(^{259}\) Thus, the Belgians were able to put these land reform measures to the credit of Hutu “revolutionaries,” unlike the abolition of *Ubuhake* that had made the king Rudahigwa and some Tutsi chiefs famous.

**CONCLUSION**

From the point of view of the colonized, colonialism was what one can call a “bad policy”\(^{260}\). This policy was bad both at the top level of decision-making (high politics) and at the local level of experiencing it (deep politics).\(^{261}\) At the top level it was what Mamdani called “decentralized despotism,” that is, a kind of power where the colonial masters resorted to one segment of the colonized population in order to enforce their despotic rule. At local level, colonialism was also bad in that it created and perpetuated domination, exploitation and repression.

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\(^{258}\) André, “Rwandan Land”, p. 6; *Notules sur le Ruanda-Urundi*, 1960, Archives Nationales, Doc. 8639, p. 10.

\(^{259}\) André, “Rwandan Land”, p. 5.

\(^{260}\) I use this expression in referring to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s concept of “bad history” which is said to be “dangerous”. (Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe, Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 97.)

When the colonial reforms following the Second World War were addressed, and the
decolonization process started (as we shall see in the next chapter), this is partly why the
former colonial “customary” authorities immediately strove to get the power that the
colonizers had. That is, to cease to be ‘assistants.’ In reclaiming autonomy, and then
independence, it represented a classic example of the argument made by Frantz Fanon.262
On the other hand, the Hutu intellectuals, who had been excluded from power structures,
acquired a forum to complain about their fate and ultimately addressed their grievances,
using by way of argument, the inequalities that colonialism had created at all levels of
society, but in “racial” or “ethnic” terms. At local level, these grievances were understood
in terms of what had been lost or what was envied and what was therefore to recover, that
is, freedom, recovery of labour rights, and scarce economic resources.

262 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New York, Grove Press, 1968.
CHAPTER TWO

THE “REVOLUTION” OR THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS

More than any other development, the Rwandan genocide is testimony to both the poisoned colonial legacy and the nativist nationalist project that failed to transcend it.¹

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I uncover the process that led to independence. I do so by looking at political developments as well as social relations. I try to reconstruct events at the national and at the local level. I show political choices and actions of different actors, Belgians and Rwandans, which were formulated in the programmes of political parties that were created in 1959 and the context of those multiple choices. I also try to reconstruct, as a reminder, the unfolding of the episodes of violence of November 1959, 1960 and 1961 at the national as well as at the local levels, the election process, and the power shift from the Tutsi auxiliaries to the Hutu new leaders, a shift operated mainly by colonial rule. It is this process that has come to bear the name “revolution.”

In addition to the uncovering of events, I show multiple debates and fractures among actors, whether political figures or ordinary Rwandans, and strive go beyond the colonial explanation of these events in binary terms – Europeans versus Africans, Hutu versus Tutsi, intellectuals versus peasants, etc. In this regard, I dwell on heterogeneities and contradictions. These are found either in the choices and actions of actors before, during, and in the aftermath of the 1959-1961 phases of violence and power or asset competition. They are also found even in the management of the effects of the “revolution.” As we shall see, these debates happen to be both semantic and social.

2.1. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE 1959

Two opposite phenomena, one negative, the other positive, provided an intriguing background for the “revolution” of 1959: the colonial exactions and the small hope of positive change created by colonial reforms of the 1950s. The Belgian system of indirect rule and the reform of 1926-31 had fused the power of chiefs and subchief in the hands of a single person. This despotism favoured abuses of power. Colonial exploitation through the regular request of cheap or free labour, and the payment of prestations (in kind and in cash) by subjects were among things that the majority of Rwandans resented. From the mid-1950s onwards, it became easy for the Hutu intellectuals to rally the support of this majority of rural Rwandans against colonial power.

But why did this happen in the mid-1950s and not before or after? This period was crucial in that it coincided with the time when the “Hutu-Tutsi problem” started to be addressed openly in the debates held in the Superior Council of the Country (Conseil Supérieur du Pays) meetings and also in several written documents emanating from different actors. This council had started its work in February 1954 following the 1953 election of councils for the first time in the colonial period. The position of king Rudahigwa and of the majority of this Superior Council was that the “Hutu-Tutsi problem” was nonexistent and therefore irrelevant. In a meeting in June 1958 they negated the existence of this problem. However, the position of a number of Hutu intellectuals was that that problem was key to addressing the injustices that prevailed then. These two opposing views transpired in two official documents that were produced by each group in early 1957. The first, entitled “La mise au point” was written by the Superior Council of the Country and addressed to the Colonial Administration. It was submitted to the United Nations Visiting Mission on 22 February 1957. It reclaimed

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mainly the grant of more autonomy, the increase of more power to indigenous Rwandans and the reduction of power exercised by Belgian authorities. An extract reads as follows:

The implementation of indirect administration requires that two partners collaborate. [...] Collaboration can exist only if the autochthonous government is efficient, well constituted and holding real responsibilities. If one admits that the current elite is not yet able to lead itself politically, because of lack of sufficient administrative ability, one must admit that small children learn to walk by standing up on their own feet. It is time to train the elite about the management of their own duties...6

A month later, on 24 March 1957, nine Hutu intellectuals signed a document entitled: “Note sur l'aspect social du problème racial indigène au Ruanda” (Note on the social aspect of the racial indigenous problem in Ruanda) that came to be called “the Hutu Manifesto.” This document instead addressed the issue of inequality between the Tutsi, understood as leaders, and the masses, understood as the majority Hutu. It also made a slight mention about the poor Tutsi but hastened to underscore that these have also benefited from the colonial administration.

One other prominent document that addressed the issue of inequality in Hutu-Tutsi binary terms was “La lettre pastorale” of Bishop André Perraudin, who was appointed since 25 March 1956.7 This letter was released in April 1959 and its content was very close to the Hutu Manifesto. It grosso modo presented inequality in Rwanda as the one between the Hutu and the Tutsi seen as two different races. It remained silent on the role and position of Europeans, and policies that had accentuated this inequality.8 As Paul Rutayisire has argued, addressing the issue of inequality in a deeper way would mean calling into question holders of power and of colonial benefits who include the Belgian administrators and settlers, Church missionaries and Tutsi leaders from strong lineages.

So, in order to simplify this issue, they called it a binary ethnic or racial inequality. This binary categorisation also remained silent on the fate of the third ethnic group in Rwanda, that is, the Twa.

Indeed, the colonial administration effected a rupture by shifting from the choice of Tutsi auxiliaries to the one of Hutu counter-elite. This rupture came as a response to Tutsi authorities’ demands for more autonomy, demands that were addressed in the “Mise au point” document. The colonial administration responded to it by supporting the Hutu intellectuals and by defining the conflict as ethnic and not political or colonial. As Jean-Pierre Chrétien wrote, “…the fracture of society was chosen on a line proposed by the colonial regime, and that line was ‘race.’” From then on, the Hutu intellectuals had the Belgian administration as their ally and the Tutsi colonial auxiliaries chose the UN mission as the new force to resort to in their claims for autonomy and independence. But as the situation revealed later, political developments gave more chance to Hutu intellectuals than to Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs.

This period preceding the “revolution” was also a period during which certain significant reforms were occurring. Between 1954 and 1956 the decrees to abolish the Ubuhake clientship were passed, and until the end of the 1950s clients and patrons were still dividing the cattle. This was also the time when whipping was progressively abolished. However, following the sharing of Ubuhake cattle, land did not get shared as desired by clients who happened to be new owners of cattle but not of grazing land (Ibikingi). The latter remained under the ownership of former Ubuhake patrons. This lingering issue of land for grazing formed one of the core arguments in the claims of Hutu intellectuals and

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10 In earlier times, the colonial archives had pointed out the existence of class. This category stressed clearly that the categories Tutsi and Hutu were not congregate ones. In 1945 and 1946, for example, some colonial reports showed that among the Tutsi, there were for instance leaders, rich cattle owners, small cattle owners, and poor cultivators. (Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 2 (94), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire de Nyanza, Rapport annuel 1945, pp. 35-36 ; Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 2 (65), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1946, pp. 34-36/1.)


12 Those reforms are developed in chapter one.
intense debate in the political arena. Once again, just as colonial injustices strengthened the cause for change, the partial reform did this too. It ironically also became an ingredient for “revolution.”

It is also during this period that in addition to elections of 1953 and 1956, several organisations and associations started to emerge and a number of these were transformed into political parties when a law allowed their creation in September 1959. The elections and the authorisation of parties can be considered a major political reform following the request of the United Nations Visit of 1948 to increasingly open the political sphere by including Rwandans in public affairs. Three tendencies emerged from these associations. Some belonged to Tutsi customary authorities, some to Hutu intellectuals and some to moderates who included Hutu as well as Tutsi intellectuals who were either customary authorities or colonial state or Church clerks.

Jean-Paul Kimonyo has offered a seminal contribution by suggesting we go beyond the interpretation of the conflict as merely ethnic in binary terms. He noted various tendencies that divided the Tutsi leaders as far as these political developments were concerned: there were conservatives who were mostly old; progressive democrats who happened to be younger and close to the Belgian administration; and opportunists. He also showed to what extent by April 1959, King Rudahigwa started to initiate a strategy of approaching Hutu intellectuals in order to convince them to join his side. He was shifting from the earlier stand of considering them as merely subversive and divisive, and was apparently taking their claims seriously. He was attracting them in order to isolate more and more the Belgian administration. The analysis of society and political affiliations made by Vansina in the aftermath of the death of King Rudahigwa also pointed out regroupings found in Kimonyo’s analysis: an amorphous mass, a faction of hardcore conservative Tutsi who had been excluded by the colonial regime, and who had become poor in the process, the “évolués” (both Tutsi and Hutu) who were prone to a

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democratic regime, and who were moderate, and some Hutu organizations that were “anarchic.”

This complexity is also found in the position taken by Tutsi students who were studying at Lovanium University (Congo). They took a different standpoint from the Tutsi members of the Superior Council. They acknowledged that inequality existed, but as social and not racial:

We are the first to admit that there is a problem. A social problem indeed, but that is considered as racial by the [Belgian] Administration with some indigenous people. We say it is a social problem, because had it been racial, it would mean that all Hutu have been oppressed and all Tutsi have been their oppressors. Yet we realise that the great majority of Tutsi (99,9%) are part of the mass that do not enjoy any political, social, cultural… privileges, contrary to what some like to say.

As for the few privileged ones [Tutsi from powerful families], they could not be able to enjoy political, social and cultural monopoly without the connivance of the [Colonial] Administration.

As we shall see later at local level, those Tutsi colonial authorities who were not expelled following the violence of 1959 were the ones who either collaborated with new Hutu leaders or were not strong members of the monarchist party. This suggests that alliances between Rwandan elites transcended their ethnic identity.

Lemarchand also showed the complexity that lay in the group of Hutu intellectuals, for neither were they a conglomerate or united group. There was the upper group of Gitarama region top intellectuals, those who had completed their studies in the Roman Catholic Great Seminary. There were other Hutu intellectuals based in the northern part of the country who had aspirations and hopes different from the ones from the Centre.

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But there were also small elites based in rural areas comprising teachers, catechists, workers who earned a salary, etc.16

And at the wider level of society, Tutsi intellectuals who were not united in their tendencies, had also lived a different experience from Tutsi peasants who happened to be the majority. The same applies to Hutu intellectuals (in their differences) who had not experienced colonial exactions to the same degree as Hutu peasants. These intra-group differences as well as inter-group alliances became patent during the formation of political parties.

One major source of disagreement and heavy argument in intellectuals’ debates revolved around the privileges of some and a way for others to attain them. For example, after noting privileges of the Tutsi on power, based on their education and selection by the Belgian administration, Makuza suggested in May 1959 that the Hutu masses be urgently given education, as the only way to gain a wealthier position in society, and as a way to have their own elites in greater number in future.17 A year before, the ‘Comité de l’Etude de l’aspect social Muhutu-Mututsi’ had met several times to discuss the issue of inequality among the Hutu and the Tutsi. Hutu representatives claimed that the Hutu should be appointed at the levels of chiefs and subchiefs, and in judicial positions, because they were then very few in those positions. It was a discourse of demanding posts for intellectuals Hutu. Positions varied from extremists and moderate, both Hutu and Tutsi, but in general it was a matter of asking a share in the political arena.18

The law of 8 May 1959 authorised the creation of political parties; that ruling became effective on 15 June 1959. UNAR (Union Nationale Ruandaise) was the party to which King Kigeri V Ndahindurwa belonged. He had been enthroned following the ‘mysterious’19 death of King Mutara III Rudahigwa on 25 July 1959. Several members of

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16 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 102-103; 140-141.
19 Up until now the cause of death of King Rudahigwa has not yet been ascertained.
the Superior Council of the Country, Chiefs and Subchiefs were also members of UNAR. It was officially recognised on 3 September 1959. Its president was Hutu, his name was François Rukeba. UNAR’s political aim was the gaining of autonomy in 1960 and independence in 1962, with democracy and constitutional monarchy.\(^\text{20}\)

Another party was RADER (*Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais*). It included Tutsi and Hutu intellectuals, mostly clerks in the Belgian administration. These were opposed to UNAR. It was created on 14 September 1959. It declared its gratitude for the role of the colonial power and wished to get autonomy later in 1964 and independence only in 1968. Like UNAR, it supported a regime of constitutional monarchy. Like PARMEHUTU, it was in favour of private property of land.\(^\text{21}\)

PARMEHUTU (*Parti du Mouvement pour l’Émancipation des Bahutu*) regrouped Gitarama Hutu intellectuals who worked for the Roman Catholic Church and some for the Belgian Administration. It was created on 18 October 1959 but it was the continuation of the association “*Mouvement Social Muhutu*” that existed since 1957. PARMEHUTU claimed independence only after the “colonisation of blacks by blacks” would be abolished. Like UNAR, PARMEHUTU had its own formula of what it believed to be democracy. It rejected inequality in salary and chose private ownership of land.\(^\text{22}\)

APROSOMA (*Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse*) was a party from the south of the country. Initially, it defined itself as the party of the masses, but in 1960 it radicalised its discourse around the definition of that mass as the Hutus. APROSOMA had become a party from the association bearing the same name that existed since 1 November 1957. It was based at Save in Mvejuru chiefdom, which was also the home of its president, Joseph Habyarimana alias Gitera. It regrouped Hutu intellectuals from the


\(^{22}\) See “Manifestre-Programme du Parmehutu” in Nkundabagenzi (éd.), *Rwanda politique*, pp. 113-121.
south: Munyangaju, Nzeyimana, Gasingwa, etc. The party and its programme were unstable.23

All these parties were created between September and October 1959, with the exception of APROSOMA that was created slightly before. They all supported democracy but defined it differently. Immediately in September the party campaign meetings started. Violence during the early campaign arose between party members, and also conflict between UNAR leaders with the colonial administration. The Belgian administration refused to be called a “colonialist regime”24 and went into overt opposition against UNAR which presented itself as a nationalist party.

So the simplification around the binary divide of Hutu versus Tutsi was an intellectual product of the colonial archive. Here is where one realises that indirect rule was a trap. For the colonial regime came to be considered as the Tutsi regime. For example, Ian Linden writes that colonel Logiest, who was appointed as first Military Resident of Rwanda, during the violence of November 1959, and thereafter Special Civil Resident of Ruanda, “was convinced that the Tutsi regime was oppressive.”25 Guy Logiest in his memoir written in 1988 also talked about this period as the period of Tutsi rule: “The Tutsi, lords and masters of the country, could not tolerate any slight sign of resistance of the Hutu.”26 In other words, the monopoly of those handful of Tutsi in power came to be confused with all Tutsi, which was not the reality. This trap thus led to a generalisation which became indeed fatal for the Rwandan society as a whole. In this process, the Belgian administration was able to hide its leading role as the main agent.

23 See for example “Manifeste-Programme du parti Uhuru”, in Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, pp. 258-261.
2.2. THE “REVOLUTION”

The event or the process that came to bear the name “revolution” was in reality a series of *jacqueries* (i.e. uprisings provoking violence, peasant revolts), campaign meetings for parties, violence during those campaigns, killings, expulsions, burning of houses, looting of property, elections, and the establishment of a new political order.

The violence heralding the *jacquerie* emerged from the immediate context of confrontations between parties. On the 1 November 1959, a rumour spread that one Hutu subchief from Ndiza in the Central part of the country, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, had been killed by the youth of UNAR. In fact, he had been attacked by these youths. The following day, violence started there. On the 3rd of November, The chief of Ndiza, Haguma was attacked and his coffee and banana plants were partly destroyed. He fled. However, on the following day, one subchief in Marangara, Ruhinguka and his son, Mututsi, were killed. Another three former authorities, two subchiefs and one judge, were also murdered. Then violence spread: houses of the Tutsi were burnt in several parts of the country. According to Logiest, who became later the first Military Resident to Rwanda and then Civil Special Resident of Rwanda on 3 December 1959, wrote that the burning of Tutsi houses by Hutu fighters was a message of expulsion. On the 5th November, the Vice-Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, Jean-Paul Harroy, and the Resident of Ruanda, Preud’homme, met with the president of PARMEHUTU party, Grégoire Kayibanda in Gitarama, and thereafter went to Nyanza to meet the King Kigeri Rutarindwa with a delegation of the UNAR party. That meeting was not however productive, for the violence continued. On the evening of the 7th November, UNAR members started to defend themselves, in attacking APROSOMA fighters. The military intervention of the Belgian administration came only on 8 November. On that day, a mob in Bufundu identifying itself as monarchist fatally attacked a certain Polepole Mukwiye from APROSOMA party. The following day saw the spread of violence in Bufundu, Marangara and Kibuye regions where 50 APROSOMA members were killed and houses
burnt. On the 10\textsuperscript{th} November, violence occurred in Kisenyi in the North where the Territorial Administrator shot and wounded six people. In Musambira, more than 10 people were killed by the Gendarmerie. From the centre, violence had spread principally in the North. According to Hubert, a Belgian who had investigated these incidents, on the 4 and 5\textsuperscript{th} November violence was extended to the whole of Gitarama, reaching Ruhengeri and Kisenyi on the 6\textsuperscript{th} November, and Biumba and Kibuye on the 7\textsuperscript{th}. Finally, on 9 and 10 November the territories of Nyanza and Kigali were drawn in. But the incidences of setting fire by Hutu did not reach Astrida, Shangugu and Kibungu. This violence came to an end on 12 November 1959.\textsuperscript{27}

While it could be ascertained that this violence was characterised by the attack on monarchists, counter-attacks by the monarchists, the deaths and casualties resulting from these attacks, with the burning of mostly monarchists’ houses in order to expel them, it became hard to establish the numbers of deaths and casualties. While Belgian authorities pointed out that this “revolution” was not a bloody one, various authors rejected statistics given by the officials. The UN mission recorded more than 200 people killed.\textsuperscript{28}

But the agency in violence was also debated. According to a Belgian official, General Janssens, it was the Tutsi and the Twa who were main perpetrators, the Hutu being depicted as main victims. Alexis Kagame rejected this assertion and proved its impossibility, basing his evidence on the census numbers of those respective groups: the first groups being about 16\% and the latter the remaining 84\%.\textsuperscript{29} The same author concluded that this confrontation was at its initial phase more between political parties than ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{30} According to the Hutu leader Anastase Makuza, who based his argument on the “ethnic census” as well, had the Hutu had an order to kill the Tutsi, it would be easy to defeat them, since, according to him, Tutsi were only 14\% against 85\%.


\textsuperscript{28} Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p. 167.


\textsuperscript{30} Kagame, *Un abrégé de l’histoire*, p. 276.
of the Hutu mass. It is worth noting that the monarchists’ counter-attacks or self-defence actually started on 7 November, but was stopped by Belgian military intervention.

Socially speaking, the November uprising became indeed complex, in that it did not always respect the ethnic divide in a ‘primordial’ sense. The attack against the monarchist UNAR party saw Hutu, Tutsi and Twa monarchists attacked indiscriminately. Furthermore, some Tutsi went to fight on the side of PARMEHUTU members, just as some Hutu were fighting on the side of UNAR and RADER. Again, not all people got involved in the violence. And not all targeted group individuals got attacked. According to Claudine Vidal, it was mostly educated people who were more involved in the jacquerie than rural people. However, Antoine Mugesera contends that those who were active were mostly few in number.

Just after the jacquerie, Hutu parties realised that they had gained from the dispersal of prominent UNAR party members that included a number of Chiefs and Subchiefs. Then they progressively radicalised their discourse along the Hutu-Tutsi divide. For example, Kayibanda, the president of PARMEHUTU, asked for the UN to divide the Rwandan territory in two: a hutuland and a tutsiland. In a note written on 24 November 1959, the President of RADER, Prosper Bwanakweri, explained his disapproval of this suggestion, which he deemed “anti-democratic” and “racist.” However, the separation between those two parties occurred only in July 1960.

Following the jacquerie of November 1959 and the death, exile or jailing of some Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs, the Resident of Ruanda Logiest took the opportunity to replace a
number of Tutsi customary authorities with Hutu leaders. He asked the Territorial Administrators to do this.\textsuperscript{37} According to him, these replacements gave to the Hutu people the hope that change was occurring.\textsuperscript{38} The report of the Trusteeship Council of 1960 noted that on 1 November 1959, at the beginning of the \textit{jacquerie}, all chiefs in Rwanda were Tutsi but that on 1 March 1960 there were about 22 Hutu chiefs and 22 Tutsi chiefs. As for subchiefs, on 1 November 1959 there were 549 Tutsi subchiefs and only 10 Hutu subchiefs. On 1 March 1960, there were about 217 Tutsi subchiefs and 297 Hutu subchiefs, the majority of whom were newly appointed.\textsuperscript{39}

The colonial authorities also made some institutional changes. It abolished the Superior Council of the Country and replaced it with a new structure called Provisional Special Council which was created on 6 February 1960. This new Council was made of eight members who emanated from four major parties: PARMEHUTU, UNAR, APROSOMA, and RADER. Each party had two members.\textsuperscript{40}

On 10 November 1959, the Belgian administration issued “the Government Declaration” that articulated a new policy towards Ruanda-Urundi. In this respect, the colonial administration decided to organise Commune elections in Rwanda in June 1960. Debates about dates arose. But once the principle was agreed between the UN and Belgium, political parties started to do campaign meetings preparing for these elections.

It is mostly during the campaign for Commune elections, in mid-1960, that political discourse in ethnic terms spread in the public sphere. First, PARMEHUTU operated an ideological shift by declaring itself republican against monarchy. To emphasize that shift, it adopted the new name of MDR-PARMEHUTU on 8 May. By the same token it ceased to use the title of king, mwami, to address the King of Rwanda. It chose the term “sultan” to describe the king. It is also during that time that PARMEHUTU, acknowledging the

\textsuperscript{37} Logiest, \textit{Mission au Rwanda}, p. 59.
\textsuperscript{38} Logiest, \textit{Mission au Rwanda}, p. 107.
\textsuperscript{40} Paternostre de la Mairieu, \textit{Le Rwanda, son effort de développement}, p. 221, and Logiest, \textit{Mission au Rwanda}, p. 127.
support of the Belgian administration, equated the Tutsi with colonialists and argued that Tutsi colonialism was worse than Belgian colonialism, for, “it had lasted several centuries.” It even openly thanked the Belgian administration:

The second type of colonialism in Ruanda is the European tutelage. This has been judged by the people as surely more preferable than the feudal colonialism, absolutist, tyrannical, and sanguinary of the tutsi regime. As we interpret here our people, we want to render a solemn homage to Belgium and to her functionaries of the local administration for the services they have done to the populations of Ruanda-Urundi.  

One scholar who favoured this interpretation of Tutsi domination as having been harsher than the Belgian colonisation is J. J. Maquet. Interpreting the 1959 jacquerie, he wrote:

This clash between Hutu and Tutsi is prepared on the eve of year 1960, during which seventeen countries got their independence in Africa. It may seem strange to notice that the Rwandan opinion was not preoccupied about independence then. It was not indifferent to independence, but the end of about sixty years of European colonisation was less problematic than the questioning of an ancient domination.

In addition to the depiction of Tutsi as “ancient colonisers”, Hutu parties called them “‘colonialists from the Ethiopian race’ who were invited to return ‘to their forefathers in Abyssinia.’” A number of Hutu leaders who include Grégoire Kayibanda called Hutu people “Bantu” as a way of stressing their difference to the Tutsi defined as “Hamite invaders” and as foreign as European settlers. In order to attract the attention of rural people, the argument of PARMEHUTU in the campaign across the country also focused on the issue of land for grazing.

Violence occurred again during the campaign for Commune elections of 1960. It came from both sides. According to the Resident of Rwanda, it was Tutsi bands that provoked

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43 Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs, p. 357.
44 Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs, pp. 357-358 ; Chrétien, Le défi de l’ethnisme, p. 35.
it and then Hutu groups reacted. He says that this violence led to more deaths and casualties than those registered during the *jacquerie* of November 1959. The view of UNAR was contrary to that interpretation. However, UNAR, following the threat from the scale of that violence against their members, announced its withdrawal from Commune elections. This party had been geographically split into two groups, the one located outside the country due to the exile of its members since November 1959, and the ones who remained in the country. So the outside branch of UNAR declared that any member who did not conform to this withdrawal would be excluded from the party. That declaration was signed by Michel Rwagasana, who was a member of the *Comité Directeur*. The UNAR members who had remained in the country obeyed this order not to participate.


The results of the Commune elections became favourable for PARMEHUTU who enjoyed the full support of the Belgian administration. It won 70.4% of the overall 3,125 seats of Commune Councillors, who in turn elected Burgomasters, while APROSOMA got only 7.4%, RADER 6.6%, UNAR 1.7% though it had withdrawn from the election, and the remaining small parties got 7.9%. In Astrida, the turnout was 75%. There were 537 seats in contention. PARMEHUTU got 237 of them and APROSOMA got 223, RADER 28, UNAR 0 and other small parties 49. These results show that though PARMEHUTU was the most dominant party at national level, it had a strong opponent in Astrida, namely APROSOMA. Altogether, Hutu-aligned parties controlled 211 among the 229 communes.

Following communal elections, colonial Territory Administrators undertook programmes to train newly elected burgomasters. In Astrida, the then Territorial Administrator, A. Peeters, planned visits for Mvejuru chiefdom communes from 5 to 7 December 1960.

The agenda to develop included the following issues: new governmental institutions, peace-making, and the explanation of the Commune law.\textsuperscript{48} From 12 to 13 December 1960, he planned to visit communes located in Buhanga-Ndara chiefdom and to develop the above issues in addition to rights and duties of burgomasters and councillors, and upcoming legislative elections.\textsuperscript{49} So, this was an intense moment of stabilising newly-established Commune structures.

The law n° 222/275 instituted a Provisional Special Council and Provisional Government under the proportion of the results of those Commune elections. In the Council, instituted on 18 October 1960, PARMEHUTU obtained 31 seats, RADER 7, APROSOMA 6, and AREDETWA 1.\textsuperscript{50} And the Provisional Government was set up on 26 October 1960. It had 10 ministries under the leadership of Gregoire Kayibanda as Prime Minister. In this Government, ministers were Rwandans and the deputy ministers were Belgians.

Belgian authorities, just after the institutionalisation of the Provisional Special Council and the Provisional Government, hastened the preparations around the upcoming legislative elections. The Rwandan Interior Minister wanted the Communes to be ready with logistical preparations by 15 December 1960. So, the Assistant Belgian Territorial Administrator of Astrida instructed the Burgomasters in his Territory to start setting up the voting places.\textsuperscript{51} UNAR applied for the permission to organise a meeting on 15 January 1961, but the then Territorial Administrator refused to grant them that authorisation, alleging that the Resident of Rwanda would have to first set a date for the beginning of campaign meetings.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{50} Logiest, \textit{Mission au Rwanda}, p. 171.
As far as political developments are concerned, a colloquium was organised from 7 to 14 December 1960. It was attended by delegations from political parties and discussed among other issues the dates for the following legislative election. The initial date to which PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA subscribed was 15 January 1961. UNAR and RADER delegates nevertheless suggested the postponing of that date. As no compromise was reached, the UN Commission organised another conference at Ostende on 7-12 January 1961. The resolution 1579 (XV) of the UN General Assembly decided that the date of 15 January would be postponed for the legislative elections.53

As PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA were unhappy about the postponement of the date of legislative elections, they used their powers in the new institutions to organise a coup. The General Resident’s law of 25 January 1961 following the one of 15 January 1961 had granted powers of autonomy to Rwanda. During this coup, which occurred on 28 January 1961, the provisional government, together with other institutions including all Commune burgomasters, proclaimed the Republic, abolished the monarchy and elected the president, an Assembly, and the Prime Minister of that government was empowered to form a government. Even a Constitution was prepared. This event was known under the respective labels “The Gitarama coup,” and “the Proclamation of the Republic.” However, the UN Trusteeship Council rejected those institutions, a decision that discontented both the Hutu parties and the Belgian administration.54 In this respect, describing the political developments in Rwanda in year 1961 in his book, Jean-Paul Harroy, who was the then General Resident of Ruanda-Urundi, called the year 1961 “a year of democratisation thwarted by the UN.”55 Nevertheless, the General Resident in respecting the order of the UN, found himself obliged to suspend the government born

from the Gitarama coup. The powers of this government went back to the Belgian and UN authorities.56 Analysing the impact of this event, René Lemarchand wrote:

The coup was revolutionary in two senses: it destroyed the old monarchical regime and led to a de facto republican system of government, and it created the conditions for further accelerating the revolution ‘from below’. […] After the coup of Gitarama…, the Hutu elites were able to gain partial control over the levers of the administration. And now that they enjoyed virtually unlimited discretion to use violence as they pleased, they had relatively little difficulty in carrying the revolution to its ultimate stage, to the stage where the republic would receive official, de jure recognition from the United Nations.57

The period of campaign for legislative elections also saw a further escalation of violence. Hundreds of people died during this time and others were wounded. More houses were burnt and a new wave of refugees fled to parishes, and outside the country.58 A relative calm was restored towards mid-September 1961. This allowed for the organisation of legislative elections on 25 September 1961. 44 seats for the Legislative Assembly were to be competed for by the various parties. The results were as follows: PARMEHUTU gained 35 seats. UNAR which had participated in these elections (unlike the previous ones) gained 7 seats. As for APROSOMA, it had already started to divide itself into multiple parties and got only 2 seats. One of its allies, APROSOMA-RWANDA-UNION got, together with other 11 small remaining parties, only 1,7% of the results. The referendum about the fate of the monarchy was also organised the same day. 80% voted against it, and in favour of the Republican system.

In relation to both Commune elections of 1960 and legislative elections of 1961, a number of old people interviewed in Gishamvu and Kibayi remember multiparty experiences in hierarchical and chronological terms. In this southern region, they say that

56 “L’exécution de la résolution 1605 ; les élections législatives”, in *Chronique de Politique Etrangère, Décolonisation et Indépendance du Rwanda et du Burundi*, volume XVI, numéros 4-6, Juillet-Décembre 1963, pp. 464-467.
APROSOMA was the strongest party, then PARMEHUTU became strong only later.\textsuperscript{59} The results corroborate their analysis: The Commune elections of 1960 showed the strength of APROSOMA over PARMEHUTU in this region. However, the legislative elections of 1961 already revealed the rapid rise of PARMEHUTU even in the south.

On 26 October 1961, the elected Legislative Assembly voted Gregoire Kayibanda as President of the Republic to replace Dominique Mbonyumutwa who was president since the Gitarama coup. It is under these circumstances that Belgium granted independence to Rwanda on 1 July 1962 after Hutu rule was established. Unlike in Congo where independence was followed by violence against Belgians, in Rwanda, the formal transfer of power from the coloniser to the colonised went smoothly between the Belgians and the Hutu intellectuals. The Special Resident appreciated the fact that at the festivities of that day the army of the coloniser paraded together with Rwandans and was applauded by them.\textsuperscript{60}

2.3. THE UNFOLDING OF THE “REVOLUTION” IN GISHAMVU AND KIBAYI

2.3.1. Early violence

A few incidents of attacks and burning of houses by APROSOMA members, and retaliation by the UNAR monarchists, did happen from 7 November 1959 onwards. But severe confrontation occurred in 1960. A form of violence that could be linked with \textit{jacquerie} as described above was reinforced in my region of study only later in early 1960. Documented records as well as interviews confirm this.

A number of attacks occurred in November 1959. For example, in Nyaruguru but far from Gishamvu, the Abahebyi group fighters were said to have been sent by Chief Mbanda to kill Kanyaruka, the Secretary of APROSOMA and cousin of Gitera, president of that party. Kanyaruka had fled to Burundi to his brother Renzaho. The killers found

\textsuperscript{59} Interview with Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.

them in Burundi and killed both of them under the supposed order of Mbanda. These killings occurred on 10 November 1959. Chief Mbanda was accused of having organised that attack, for the meeting organising that killing is said to have taken place at his home. He was jailed for about twenty years.

In Buhanga-Ndara, chief Gashugi and his brother were also accused of having participated in the violence on 11 November 1959, by allegedly putting a tree on the road and attacking the Hutu of Ndara. But the ‘Conseil de guerre’ decided that Gashugi’s accusation was unfounded. Nonetheless, former chief Gashugi was summoned to appear in court on 23 December 1959 on the basis of murder charges. He was again on the list of arrested people on 19 November 1959. He was ultimately sentenced to eight years in prison and officially demoted on 17 October 1960. On 29 December 1960, Mbanda, Gashugi and Rusagara were among the chiefs who were officially demoted.

In Bashumba-Nyakare also a small confrontation occurred between the Hutu and the Tutsi. At Gashiru and Bitare hills the Tutsi, who happened to be a majority there, resisted attacks of APROSOMA members. As a result, very few Tutsi from that area fled. Describing one battle, Tharcisse Karengera from Sheke said that while people were fighting, the Belgian troops came to stop them: “The Tutsi were gathered at Sheke at a place called Makaba. After taking their weapons, the battle seemed to reach an end. In order to stop the battle, the whites (Belgian commando) came at Gashiru where those people were fighting, and told the Hutu fighters to withdraw and go. They did not understand that, so the whites shot around five Hutu persons because they refused to withdraw. The Tutsi on the other hand withdrew, and as a result no one was shot.”

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62 In Rudipresse, n° 148 du 19 décembre 1959, p. 2.
64 Guy Logiest, Colonel BEM, Résident Spécial du Ruanda, Décision du 19 octobre 1960 à l’encontre de Gashugi Justin.
66 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
shooting of Hutu fighters by Belgian troops is also confirmed by Munyantore who indicates three deaths.\(^{67}\) It is hard to know whether this fighting occurred in November 1959 or in 1960, because the informants did not remember dates with precision. According to them, violence occurred in this area later than elsewhere, especially in 1960.

Another person who was killed in early 1960 is Mutembe who had been Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare from 1934 to 1946. Accounts about his assassination are varied. According to one of them, it is Father Paul Klep who headed the Kansi Mission who beat him with an axe and then another person, Nyabyenda, finished him off:

> The first victim was chief Mutembe. Because his killing was planned by Father Klep, [...] he took some Abakuru b’Inama [Heads of Local Church Councils]. He brought them into the attack. When they arrived there, they found that it was their chief, they got afraid to kill him. Then he took an axe and beat him, he fell, [...] he did not finish him off, so he told a certain Nyabyenda to kill him, he did it. As you can understand, it is the priest who killed him, since he is the one who brought them.\(^{68}\)

Another version does not mention the priest; it highlights the role of Léopold Nyabyenda who was neighbour to Mutembe at Liba hill, for having killed Mutembe with that axe. They were allegedly having disputes over land.\(^{69}\) A number of others say that Father Klep was just supporting those who came to kill Mutembe.\(^{70}\) This explanation is also given by Ntezihigo who did research on the Kansi Mission. He says that almost all his informants assert that Father Klep was accomplice in the killing of Mutembe. He indicates that Mutembe sold some of his belongings in order to flee, then he gave a sum of 60,000 Francs to Father Klep to keep it for him, since he was his confidant. The people involved in that killing have depicted Father Klep as their leader, but Ntezihigo doubts

\(^{67}\) Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.

\(^{68}\) Interview with Vincent Kanamugire, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.

\(^{69}\) Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.

\(^{70}\) Interview with Anonymous 1, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Damien Rwarinda, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
this information. We also learn from Ntezihigo that this killing occurred in early 1960 during the campaign for Commune elections. Two other people got killed in Bashumba-Nyakare: Rutambika, who had been a leader, and Karibushi. These varied versions show to what extent it is hard to uncover violent events.

In Mvejuru, a few attacks occurred around 7 and 8 November 1959 against the Tutsi. The latter, together with their Hutu fellows defended themselves until 10 November. Chief Rusagara together with a number of his subchiefs fled, while others got imprisoned. The burning of houses resumed again in this area in June 1960. In Buhanga-Ndara, Chief Gashugi may have attempted to attack APROSOMA members on 11 November 1959. Gashugi was latter accused, but he fled to Burundi.

The defensive capacity of monarchists went on diminishing in 1960 as compared to 1959 because Tutsi leaders were progressively dismissed, jailed and exiled. A number of them had also been killed. Also political developments were reducing the number of people keen to fight on the side of the monarchists who were progressively losing their leadership capacities. According to Hakizimana, the burning was organised by APROSOMA, and later by PARMEHUTU. He also says that no person died in Mvejuru of Kibayi. But some people got injured as a result of shooting by the Belgian soldiers who were stopping fighters. Rape was also mentioned during this time, but only two female informants talked about it. Some Hutu fighters are said to have raped daughters of attacked people. But in addition girls feared Congolese troops who allegedly were also committing rape.

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72 Interview with Gérard Segataxha, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
75 Mugesera, *Imibereho*, p. 41.
76 Mugesera, *Imibereho*, pp. 41-42.
77 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
78 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
79 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
80 Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli.
2.3.2. Violence during the campaign for Commune elections

The period that is remembered to have been particularly violent, however, is the one that coincided with the campaign for Commune elections of June-July 1960. In April 1960, violence in Mvejuru and Buhanga-Ndara chiefdoms caused “the burning or destruction of several hundreds of huts belonging to the Tutsi.” That violence occurred all through that month.\(^81\) From June to September 1960, the whole Astrida was criss-crossed by violence.\(^82\) While in April only a few injuries were reported, the bulk of it concerning the burning of houses, the looting of property and the chasing of monarchists, on 22 June 200 Tutsi attacked military forces who retaliated by killing 22 among them and injuring 35.\(^83\)

In a moralising tone, the then Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare, Cajetan Bisumbukuboko, wrote several letters to the population of his chiefdom, instilling in them the importance of not attacking each other. At the same time, he told them that the Belgian state did not condone such violence, that they should not accept what politicians were telling them about using violence during the campaign.\(^84\) He insisted that people should not follow rumours from political party leaders who lie to them that it is him who sent them to attack people.\(^85\) In fact, in general, colonial leaders were afraid of what they called “rumours,” that is, any information coming from a third party that was not associated with them, or who was associated with them but spreading information they did not authorise.\(^86\)

\(^{81}\) Rapport sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1960, Bruxelles, 1961, p. 27 ; in Rudipresse, n° 165, du 16 avril 1960, p. 11 ; and in Rudipresse, n° 166, du 23 avril 1960, p. 9.

\(^{82}\) Hubert, La Toussaint rwandaise, p. 53.

\(^{83}\) Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement, p. 223.

\(^{84}\) C.M. Bisumbukuboko, Ad interim Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare Chiefdom, Letter to the population of Bashumba-Nyakare, N°81/60.CH.-, Maraba, 13 June 1960, National Archives, Correspondence, Territory of Astrida.

\(^{85}\) C.M. Bisumbukuboko, Ad interim Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare Chiefdom, Letter to the population of Bashumba-Nyakare, N°82/60.CH.-, Maraba, 15 June 1960, National Archives, Correspondence, Territory of Astrida.

\(^{86}\) On the problematization of rumour in history, see Luise White, Speaking with Vampires. Rumor and History in Colonial Africa, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000, pp. 56-86.
Bisumbukuboko had difficulty in instilling these pacific measures. Some Hutu constituents interpreted them as messages intending to stop the “revolutionary” process, because this chief was also a Tutsi. So they considered that he was protecting his fellow Tutsi. At one time, in order to be more convincing to the people who were keen to use violence, he advanced an argument which was more political and to some extent geographical about his chiefdom:

Remember that you are located at the border of Rwanda. If you destroy it, you will be doing wrong to your forefathers who sacrificed their blood so that the foreign countries do not occupy the country. These are the reasons that are not supporting an ethnic group but the Chiefdom, which I am protecting against cowardice and critics who will be recorded in history in future… this advice I am giving you, think about it and do as God would wish…

Indeed, in each letter, Bisumbukuboko emphasized the issues of God and religion, explaining that to kill, to injure people and to loot their property was a sin. Though he was Tutsi, he was retained by the Belgian administration during the time of replacing the Tutsi ‘customary’ authorities by Hutu ones. His discourse shows that he was on the side of the Moderate Tutsi, who were also still befriended by the Belgian administration. It is worth noting that he was also a prominent member of RADER, a party that the Belgian administration considered as moderate. In a letter he wrote a day before the unfolding of the Commune election in Astrida Territory, he again urged the population to avoid violence in party propaganda; he warned that any leader who continued to divide the constituents by spreading “rumours” against the Belgians was acting against the country and against the King:

There are people who are telling you distorted news about the Congo, attempting to rejoice about how whites are being refugees, claiming that this event may undermine the unfolding of the election, and precipitate the date of independence. Let me tell you the truth about the Congo developments: It is true that whites are fleeing from there as a result of their being expelled from Congo. This does not mean that they have been militarily defeated, they are just fulfilling their gentlemanly behaviour of avoiding fighting against a country that they just gave

87 C.M. Bisumbukuboko, *Ad interim* Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare Chiefdom, *Letter to the population of Bashumba-Nyakare*, without date, National Archives, Correspondence, Territory of Astrida.
independence to a few days ago. So they decided to keep peace despite the wrong
they are undergoing.  

Seemingly, the context of July 1960 in Congo was having some effects in Rwanda too. The above letter of Bisumbukuboko shows that the colonial administration was sensitizing the population so that they would not be anti-Belgian, as was becoming the case in neighbouring Congo. So, the success of the unfolding of Commune elections in Rwanda was meant to at least create a stable position for Belgium in Rwanda, which it lacked in neighbouring Congo, due to the conflict that arose there just a week after independence. Belgium was willing to transfer power to partners who would ensure them this peaceful transition. Later, when Hutu parties won the election, Logiest, the Special Resident of Ruanda, celebrated that success as an attenuation of the failure that Belgium underwent in Congo.  

As expected, the Commune elections took place from 17 July 1960 onwards in Astrida. Bashumba-Nyakare voted on 25 July. Five communes had been created in this chiefdom. The chief Bisumbukuboko congratulated the population of his chiefdom for having voted in calm and peace, and for having participated in substantial numbers. He celebrated the fact that him and the new Territorial Administrator, Lees, had crossed the whole territory of the chiefdom and did not find any violent act. APROSOMA won most of seats of burgomasters in the area studied. Joseph Karengera of Shori, Servilien Nzabakira of Kibingo were in APROSOMA; Raymond Hakizimana of Linda and André Hitimana of Saga were also in APROSOMA. But they shifted to PARMEHUTU as soon as this party strengthened and APROSOMA weakened.

However, after the Commune elections, violence escalated again in this region. For example, in September 1960, the new burgomaster of Kurukara in Bashumba-Nyakare

88 C.M. Bisumbukuboko, _Ad interim_ Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare Chiefdom, _Letter to the population of Bashumba-Nyakare_, N°135/60.CH.-, Maraba, 16 July 1960, National Archives, Correspondence, Territory of Astrida.
89 Logiest, _Mission au Rwanda_, p. 159.
90 C.M. Bisumbukuboko, _Ad interim_ Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare Chiefdom, _Letter to the population of Bashumba-Nyakare_, N°149/60 CH.-, Maraba, 26 July 1960, National Archives, Correspondence, Territory of Astrida.
reported to the Territorial Administrator, Lees, that a “war” was occurring in his commune at a place called Vumbi and Rwimbogo. In a letter, the Territorial Administrator was complaining about the non-intervention of the burgomaster to stop the fighting between people from Rwimbogo and those from Shori.\textsuperscript{91}

Violence continued in Shori commune in September, in such a way that the Chief wrote a long letter to the population of Shori sensitizing them not fight, not to use lethal weapons, and not to divide themselves ethnically. He warned those who were dividing the population and who were in both Tutsi and Hutu groups to stop doing that, otherwise he would take legal measures against them. He advocated to the burgomaster of Shori to use all means including the police, the councillors and the population to keep peace.\textsuperscript{92} This violent situation continued, in such a way that in October 1960, the whole Astrida Territory was under fire. In Bashumba-Nyakare particularly houses of Tutsi were burning.\textsuperscript{93} Rusanganwa recalls one Hutu person who was killed during this time:

No one died in our area except a protestant called Ntabashwa who taught at Mubumbano and who was shot because he was mistakenly confused with a Councillor called Fabian Sefigi. He was carrying books in his hands, so they thought it was Sefigi. A white policeman shot him at Sholi near a tree that exists till today. […] People from Mubumbano had killed a policeman called Mahema, so the white policeman decided that any ruler of Mubumbano caught will be also shot. […] Sefigi was a Hutu councillor.\textsuperscript{94}

In Kibingo, on 16 and 17 October, 1960, about 80 houses were burnt and there were three Tutsi and one Hutu deaths, with two other unidentified victims. From 18 to 24 of the same month, the burning of houses occurred and the Military killed one person.\textsuperscript{95} This information may well be describing the same situation as the preceding interview.

\textsuperscript{91} Ch. Lees, Administrateur de Territoire d’Astrida, \textit{Lettre à Monsieur Musirikare, Bourgmestre de Kurukara, chefferie de Bashumba-Nyakare}, Astrida, le 12 septembre 1960, Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida. Here “war”means some kind of open violence.\
\textsuperscript{92} C.M. Bisumbukuboko, \textit{Ad interim} Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare Chiefdom, \textit{Letter to the population of Sholi Commune}, Maraba, 14 September 1960, National Archives, Correspondence, Territory of Astrida.\
\textsuperscript{93} Mugesera, \textit{Imibereho}, p. 53.\
\textsuperscript{94} Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.\
\textsuperscript{95} Rapport sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1960, Bruxelles, 1961, p. 28.
Some other killings had occurred during this period, but it was hard to establish the dates. These include Rutambika who had been a subchief. He is said to have been shot by Belgian soldiers as he was fighting against them.\(^{96}\) The father of my informant Mukagitoli was also shot by Belgian soldiers, but some people also say that he was shot by a priest, Father Gatseri,\(^{97}\) an allegation she doubts.\(^{98}\) Another person who is said to have been killed by a priest (also Father Gatseri) is Ntambabazi.\(^{99}\) Other people were killed who include Rwigimba, Bwandagara, Mukama, Budengeri who were Tutsi and Semunanira who was Hutu. An informant indicates about the latter that “they killed him because he liked the Tutsi.”\(^{100}\)

Other people who were killed include a man Sebutuna of Gashiru who was killed at Mvejuru as he was fleeing, and they killed him at Rwanyanza. Also a young man Sematama of Mukuge died during that time.\(^{101}\) But these were not associated with colonial power. In November 1960, violence had stopped for a while.

As noted above, on 26 October 1960, new institutions following Commune elections were set up, in which a partial autonomy was granted to Rwanda. Since Chief Bisumbukuboko had performed well in favour of the Belgian authority, despite the fact that he was Tutsi, the colonial administration accepted and supported his candidature to be the autochthonous deputy Territorial Administrator.\(^{102}\) The case of Bisumbukuboko is revealing in that it breaks with the general trend whereby Tutsi leaders were being expelled during this very time of his enjoyment of support from the Belgian administration. But it is not surprising because he was a member of RADER party, hence considered as a moderate by the Belgian rule. One informant, who lived at the border of Bashumba-Nyakare and Nyaruguru, indicates that though Chief Bisumbukuboko

\(^{96}\) Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
\(^{97}\) I am not sure about the spelling of this name, I noted it in following the way it was pronounced in Kinyarwanda language.
\(^{98}\) Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, Gishamvu.
\(^{99}\) Interview with Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
\(^{100}\) Interview with Damien Rwarinda, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
\(^{101}\) Interview with Vincent Kanamugire, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
continued to sensitize the Hutu and the Tutsi to remain united and not to follow the national trend of turning against each other, this policy failed, because violence against the Tutsi continued. “Bisumbukoboko ultimately fled himself. […] thereafter a decision stated that all Tutsi were to be driven out of their houses.”

Violence resumed during the campaign for legislative elections. In August 1961, the burning of houses was recorded in Linda commune in August 1961, whereas on the 10 September 1960, at Nyakibanda hill, Sholi commune, in Bashumba-Nyare chefferie, a group of Hutu was said to have arrested a Tutsi and tortured him to death. In October 1961, just after the legislative elections of 25 September 1961, violence was seen again in Shori and Kibingo communes. It also seems that powerful Tutsi were targeted first, in such a way that their houses were burnt early in 1960. The poor Tutsi started to be attacked later, especially after the Commune elections, when PARMEHUTU had won and had started to crystallise its discourse around clear ethnic division. As one informant reconstructed this sequence of events around house burnings, “at first the burning targeted the powerful Tutsi, and at last the poor ones were also targeted.”

Concerning the burning, Gashiru is said to have experienced fewer attacks. Tharcisse Karengera, who fled to Burundi in 1961 and then came back in early 1962, says that not more than 20 houses had been burnt in Gashiru.

2.3.3. Party developments at local level

As was the case at national level, most of the conflict at local level was occurring within the framework of political party competition. This is confirmed by a number of informants. Those active in the burning of houses of Tutsi or monarchists were also the

103 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
105 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
106 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. Here is his account: “Then Schmitz (the Anglican Pastor who was helping fugitives) gave them a car to take them to Burundi. This car took me to Burundi also. When we arrived at Nyaruteja, some cultivators threw stones to our car. […] Then we fled, it was in 1961. But I did not last there, my father had stayed in Rwanda, so in 1962 I came back to Gashiru. My home did not be burnt, in such as way that at our hill they burnt no more than 20 houses.”
ones active in parties. Also those Tutsi who fought against people who were burning monarchists’ houses were active members of UNAR. The conflict became ethnic mostly in 1960 and especially after PARMEHUTU had won the Commune elections, that is, when it started to articulate its discourse along lines of ethnic division. It is worth noting that this area which I am studying was also the place of origin of a number of well-known Hutu leaders. For example, Isidore Nzeyimana was part of nine Hutu intellectuals who had signed the Hutu Manifesto in March 1957. He had studied at the Centre Universitaire de Kisantu (Congo) and had started to work as a clerk in 1955. He became a member of the Special Provisional Council that replaced the Superior Council of the Country and Secretary of State of Education in the National Government that was formed on 26 October 1960 following Commune elections. He was also the elder brother of Raymond Hakizimana who became burgomaster of Linda Commune from 1960 to 1963 and then burgomaster of Kibayi commune from 1963 to 1971. Their other brother, Théotime Simogomwa became burgomaster of Saga commune in 1962 to 1963. All of them were in APROSOMA and shifted to PARMEHUTU later, when APROSOMA started to become weaker already by 1961. Other southern Hutu leaders include François Sezirahiga, Augustin Ndayambaje and Amandin Rugira. They had contributed to the strengthening of APROSOMA in the south since its creation in 1957, and became renowned political figures after independence at national and regional levels. PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA appeared united during the 1959 ‘revolution’. But after the Commune elections, which saw a notable victory of PARMEHUTU and a small result for APROSOMA, the latter started to take a distance from the first. By January 1961 during the time of proclamation of the Republic, this division had become patent.

One letter showed that Raymond Hakizimana had shifted to PARMEHUTU in early 1961 and that the latter party was in open conflict with APROSOMA. Propaganda for

110 See Musangamfura, Le parti M.D.R. PARMEHUTU, pp. 168-175.
Legislative elections had started; so Hakizimana and a number of his councillors were in competition with APROSOMA people who were also doing propaganda meetings in his area. These leaders claim that APROSOMA party leaders wanted to kill them:

Nowadays, APROSOMA is working day and night, using all means, what it wants is this: it is to kill all those who are in PARMEHUTU in the Burwi area. Dear Minister, we always address this issue asking for rescue, but you seem to think that is just a joke, or else you think that it is just hatred that we have against our fellows... On 15 March 61 people from Save came at our place in Mugombwa to do propaganda, wanting to kill several of us, and to do harm to others, we urge you to intervene and rescue us quickly.¹¹¹

This shows that competition for power was also acute even among parties that shared ethnic identity. Furthermore, this competition was not just verbal or using ideas, it too bore a threat to kill, which reveals how tense the situation was.

The Church also got involved in these developments. It is worth noting that the local clergy behaved in the same way as the clergy at national level. The Roman Catholic Missionaries had chosen the side of the Hutu intellectuals by supporting PARMEHUTU. In Gishamvu, at the Nyumba Mission, Father Noti was among the missionaries who supported the Hutu side, that is, the ‘revolution.’ At the Kansi Mission, it is mostly Father Klep who worked actively in favour of Hutu parties and who was even cited as having become involved in violence.¹¹² But at the same time, the church intervened in favour of victims in giving them shelter during the time when they were internally displaced. Most attacked people fled to churches and missions such as Kansi, Nyumba, Nyakibanda and Mugombwa where they were protected.

As for the role of the local population, it appears to have been ambivalent. On the one hand the population from various parties tended to follow leaders’ injunctions or general trends. But on the other, they also acted according to the existing social ties that they had

¹¹¹ Raymond Hakizimana, Bourgmestre; Gaëtan Habimana, Conseiller; Téléphore Iraguha, Assistant Médical; Philippe Balihutu, Conseiller; Vénuste Gabukingwe, Conseiller; Lettre au Ministre de l’Intérieur, J.B. Rwasibo, Mugombwa, le 18/3/1961.
vis-à-vis each other, as far as party affiliations and ethnic identities are concerned. Some also acted in purely practical ways dictated by the new situation. Here are some cases. Amidst acts of burning, some Hutu people saved their fellow Tutsi, helped them while fleeing, brought food to them at places to which they fled. Hutu people who had been clients of Tutsis and who had been in good terms with them tended not to take part in the burning activity. Consequently, houses of some people who had given cows to their Hutu friends did not get burnt. Those Hutu protected them. Also houses of some Hutu people who were acquainted with Tutsis were also burnt. People who had intermarried with the Hutu did not take flight as frequently. This situation is said to have occurred at Busoro place in Gishamvu. Furthermore, collective accusations seem to have been avoided at some point: Tutsi people who were active in UNAR saw their houses burnt and themselves expelled. But their nuclear or extended family members could remain in Rwanda. For example, Rwarinda was warrior-like (umuvumbantambara) as he describes himself, so the APROSOMA members expelled him but his father remained in Rwanda. Munyarugamba also was active in UNAR propaganda, as a result, he was expelled, while a number of his other family members remained in Kibingo. The father of Bucyabutata had been an umumotsi, he was expelled, but his wife and children remained in Rwanda. Families disintegrated in the process, some going into exile and others remaining in the country. Concerning political rational choice, some Tutsi people who agreed to join APROSOMA were spared from the attacks. This does not mean however that all those who were attacked had refused to join APROSOMA.

113 Emérite Kubwimana and her husband brought food to a number of Tutsi families from their place who had fled at the Mission. Haruna Bizimana says also that Hutu people were giving sweet potatoes to refugees of Nyumba and Nyakibanda in Gishamvu, as they were not used to the food distributed by the Church. See also Mugesera, “Une approche”, pp. 158-159.
114 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, with Ladislas Nyirisenge, and Gaston Nzabamwita.
115 Interview with Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
117 Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007.
118 Interview with Damien Rwarinda, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
119 Interview with Théodomir Munyarugamba.
120 Interview with Bucyabutata.
121 Interview with Evariste Kabano, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
122 Cases of the father of Christophe Batura and the family of Godeberthe Mukagitoli ; Ntezihigo, Impact socio-politique, p. 137.
In addition to these social ties, cultural features of “conviviality” broke the rules of ethnic and political divide. The reason why violence against the Tutsi was not severe, explain a number of informants, is that the culture or practice of “igihango” was still practised. This practice comes among others from the Kubandwa ritual included in Ryangombe religious or belief practice. According to it, a Tutsi member had a Hutu as godfather in the Kubandwa membership and vice versa. Kubandwa is often compared to baptism is Christian religion. There was then a belief that a person who has shared igihango, that is, a kubandwa pact or alliance with you, you cannot harm or mislead him or her.124 During the colonial period, though the church was fighting against this practice, many people were still observing it. This practice continues up until today, though the numbers of those practising it go on decreasing. Also there is a tradition in favour of rescue that was still respected, which says that “when someone is pursuing an animal in the hunting process and that animal seeks refuge in your house, you do not sacrifice it to the hunter. You save it, since it has sought your safe place.” This implies that any person who was seeking refuge in a house of a person was to be granted this refuge and not to be sacrificed to the attackers.125 However, it is hard to know the degree of the observance of this convivial practice.

2.4. THE EFFECTS OF THE “REVOLUTION”

2.4.1. A New Political Order

This “revolution” brought about fundamental changes in the power structures. First, Hutu leaders gained power through a number of means: appointment by the colonial authority, elections, partial autonomy and independence. All these power allocations occurred during the time of colonial rule ending and in the context of decolonisation. They were the result of competitions and negotiations between several parties: Belgian authority, the

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125 Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007.
Tutsi auxiliaries, the Hutu intellectuals and the UN Trusteeship Council. As far as political bargainings are concerned, it was a period of party as well as individual positionings. The position of parties or individuals depended on their capacity to negotiate with powerful partners, who appear to have been the colonial administration and the Church.

Secondly, this period was difficult to manage. Newly appointed leaders fought together as well as against each other either to strengthen the party or personal gain. At local level, several trends appear. With the exception of two leaders, the rest did not survive the competition, for, by 1963, most lost office. In what came to be Gishamvu, that is the communes Shori and Kibingo, two leaders were elected during the commune elections of July 1960: Joseph Karengera for Shori and Servilien Nzabakira for Kibingo. The first kept office only until 1962 and was then removed for a number of reasons. These include the fact that he married a Tutsi lady, behaviour that is said to have shocked a number of his councillors. Yet the latter are the ones who were electing the burgomaster. Other informants talk about the conflict Joseph Karengera had with one councillor. So they removed him from office and appointed another councillor called Elias Karengera who was not as educated as Joseph Karengera.126 This one had been a teacher, had had some secondary education, whereas Elias Karengera had just primary education.127 Nzabakira Servilien kept office until 1963, which implies that he lasted longer.

Another who enjoyed more stability is Raymond Hakizimana, who kept office until 1971, a situation that arose from many factors. First, he was able to keep the confidence of councillors. Secondly, he was brother to Isidore Nzeyimana who was a national political figure. It is only after Nzeyimana was disavowed in PARMEHUTU by 1968 that Hakizimana also started to be discredited at local level.128 On Saga commune, from 1960 to 1963, two people succeeded each other: Théotime Simugomwa and André Gatanazi.

126 Interview with Anonymous 2, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Célestin Bangambiki, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. Bangambiki was Secretary and family member of Joseph Karengera. He latter became himself a councillor for a long time.
127 Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
128 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
Both had been councillors before, as one letter states.129 In 1963, Saga and Linda communes became combined to create a single commune of Kibayi, that was led then by Hakizimana. In Gishamvu, neither Elias Karengera of Shori nor Servilien Nzabakira of Kibingo obtained that position. It is Emmanuel Munyarugano who was elected in 1963. Elias Karengera complained about his removal from the list of election, alleging that police violence was used to make him stay away from candidates.

2.4.2. Some Lingering Effects

A number of developments changed almost forever the social landscape in Rwanda following the “revolution.” Indeed, this was the first time that an open conflict in the form of a “war” between the Hutu and the Tutsi occurred in the history of Rwanda. That itself is a fundamental fact. Then there was the exile of a big number of the Tutsi and other monarchists. This was followed by a policy of expropriation. All these developments had a lingering effect, for most of them were perpetuated in Rwandan politics until 1994.

a) The Exile

A number of scholars have already attracted our attention to the refugee issue.130 It is when analysing this issue at local level that one sees its acuteness, longevity and everydayness. Since at least 1960, the burgomasters and their constituents were dealing with it on an everyday basis.

It is however difficult to reconstruct the unfolding of exile either at the national level or at my local level, for a number of reasons. First, there were several places to which people fled: public and private. Among the public, there were churches and administrative areas, inside and outside the country. Second, there were different times of flight: those who

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129 André Hitimana, Burgomaster of Saga Commune, Buhanga-Ndara Chiefdom, Letter to the Territory Administrator of Astrida, Re: Councilors who have other positions, Ref. No. 69/60. TP, Saga, 4 October 1960.
fled in 1959 and then came back home; those who fled in the 1960-1961 election campaign violence; those who fled in 1962 following independence and subsequently. Third, there were also several frequencies or sequences of flight: being expelled and coming back; being expelled forever outside the country; fleeing outside the country and being called back to the country. Fourth, there were also the consideration of status and agency: those who are chosen to come back home from sites of internal displacement and those who are expelled from those places in reference to their colonial statuses, agencies or personal negotiations; those who were not expelled but fled and never came back; those who were never allowed to come back but who returned illegally, etc. Therefore, any attempt at recounting this episode is only a tentative one; it will definitely not do justice to local narratives which were very detailed on this issue.

1° The places of temporary refuge, permanent refuge and external asylum

The choice of the place where to flee depended on several factors. For example, the intensity of the attack undergone obliged the people who were fleeing to choose a place relatively close by. On the other hand, the imitation factor obliged a number of other people in flight to go where others were going. This increased the likelihood of a large number of people going to public places such as administrative offices, church or school sites. Also some others chose to go to those places because they had had information that a certain humanitarian service had been organised to cater for them. A few Tutsi also went to hide in the houses of Hutu family members or friends or former clients. Some of these went thereafter to seek refuge in public areas in order to benefit from some humanitarian intervention.

In Gishamvu, public places where the monarchists obtained refuge include the Nyumba mission and the Nyakibanda Great Seminary. Some few people from Gishamvu also fled to the Kansi mission, which is close to some areas of Gishamvu such as Liba, Kibingo, and Buvumu. Flight to church mission stations was motivated by a number of factors. Since churches were believed to be sacred places, there was hope of not being attacked

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131 Interview with Damien Rwarinda and with Gaston Nzabamwita.
there. Furthermore, the clergy used to provide some humanitarian help. So many people aimed for safety and survival there. However, some Hutu people continued to help their displaced fellows by bringing them food at the missions. Here is one account:

The war reached here (Gishamvu) in 1960. Some people fled, others stayed in their homes. Some went to Nyumba, I saw it. That is when I gave birth to my first born. I used to come here to Nyumba in the first mass, carrying sweet potatoes in a basket, and sorghum flower, bringing it to old people from Nyanza in Kibingo, my place of birth. Then people became angry of it; my husband advised me to tell the displaced people to come and collect the food themselves at my place.132

According to two accounts, the food distributed to the displaced people was different from the one they used to consume in their households. So an exchange occurred: “Those who fled [to Nyumba and Seminary] were receiving food from the Red Cross, such as rice, but were not having sweet potatoes, whereas they were used to these. They used to give us rice, and we give them sweet potatoes.”133

In Kibayi, public places of accommodating refugees include the Commune office and the Mugombwa Mission. Some people from Saga arrived in Mugombwa by their own means and once there, they had to get food from their home provisions kept by their Hutu friends and relatives.134 Some benefited from colonial state transport means to arrive at the Mugombwa Mission. These include Tutsis who lived in Shyombo, which is a bit far from Mugombwa as compared to Saga. They first arrived at the Commune office and got transportation from there. “As you hear now that people died in the parishes and in the commune offices, it was because of previous events.”135 Indeed, most of the places to which people fled in the 1994 genocide were also places where the Tutsi and other monarchists had fled in 1959 and afterwards. As they escaped attacks during those moments, the memory about those sites being safe places was kept alive. In 1994, the same scenario was repeated again, and people under attack thought that they could

133 Interview with Haruna Bizimana, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. See also interview with Emérite Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
134 Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.
survive by fleeing to those places. But unfortunately, as we shall see further, they did not survive. They were attacked and the bulk of them were murdered.

The Anglican Church Mission in Astrida also became a shelter for many people in flight coming from various corners of the Territory. A number of people from Gishamvu and Kibayi narrate how a pastor called Schmidt provided them with shelter in Butare and from there he gave them transport to flee outside the country, mainly to Burundi.  

The catering and humanitarian services were done by many agents. The colonial administration was a key agent among them. Indeed, as Astrida witnessed violence since early 1960, the budget of the Territory proved insufficient. In early 1961, the Accountant of the Astrida Territory wrote a letter to the Minister of Refugees based in Kigali asking for supplementary credit of 385,000 francs in order to balance the year 1960’s expenses. Those expenses came from reclamations from various missions and Territorial services which were intervening in favour of refugees’ provisions. The United Nations, the Red Cross, the Caritas Catholica, the Oxford Committee and others helped the displaced people as well.

As displaced people spent several weeks in those assembled areas, the Belgian authorities undertook a programme of moving them back to their communities or outside the country. It progressively started to close those places. It did so even when the displaced people did not yet feel safe to go back home. This was led by financial motives. It wanted also to vacate those buildings so that business could continue as usual. This happened in 1959, 1960 but also in 1961. In this respect, in November 1960, a leader of UNAR, Gisimba, asked to the Territorial Administrator a favour for the victims in order to spend more time in places of refuge in Ngoma, Astrida, because at their places security was not

136 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera; Interview with Anonymous 1; Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge.
137 See for example Hubert, La Toussaint rwandaise, p. 56.
139 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères du Rwanda, Toute la vérité, p. 9.
140 See Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 76-78 and interviews.
yet established. The Administrator refused to let the refugees remain in Ngoma settlement, alleging that land, housing and work were not available for them in Ngoma. So he required that all refugees who were not expelled by commune authorities return to their homes. 141

A number of people who were expelled from their homes had been sent to Nyamata in the centre-southern part of Rwanda by late November 1959, just after the very first jacquerie and in later waves of violence and flight. The first refugees to be sent to Nyamata were mainly from the north. This region had been very active in the November 1959 jacquerie against the Tutsi. For example, between 24 November 1959 and 29 April 1960, there were more than 5,000 refugees from Ruhengeri and more than 700 refugees from Byumba. On the other hand, the refugees from Astrida were slightly more than 800 in May 1960.142

Exceptionally, some people did not flee at all to public places. Some hid at Hutu fellows’ homes, others remained in their homes and were not attacked, because they had some Hutu people to protect them. These cases were found both in Gishamvu and Kibayi.143 Others assembled at Bitare hill and Bisi mountain in Gishamvu in 1960. The Bitare group defended themselves against the “revolution” fighters and a large number of them did not flee. The ones from Bisi were sent to Nyumba and Nyakibanda missions thereafter.144

Bitare and Bisi also became refuges in 1994. Almost all these places that provided shelter for victimised people in 1959-62, also became places to which the Tutsi fled in 1994.

144 Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007.
They had become “lieux de mémoire”\textsuperscript{145} of survival for more than 30 years, but in 1994 they became “places of annihilation.”\textsuperscript{146}

\textbf{2° The times of exile}

The timing of flight was conditioned by the violent events. Each wave of a major attack against the Tutsi and monarchists – 1959, early 1960, all along 1960, and during the propaganda campaign of 1961, even on the eve of independence in 1962 (see section on violence) - was followed by a wave of flight, both inside and outside the country. Secondly, at the church missions and at administrative places where temporary shelters were located, the victims would spend several weeks there. One informant recalled the time spent at Nyumba mission as “not less than three months.”\textsuperscript{147}

\textbf{3° The complex movements of exile: places of refuge inside the country and several different external countries of exile}

As far as individual and family experiences are concerned, it is hard to date flight experiences since they varied greatly. It was a back and forth experience, since for most waves of flight to public places, there were also processes of selecting the ones to come back home and the ones to be expelled. Furthermore, a number of people fled to Burundi in 1960 and 1961, and then came back in late 1961 and 1962.\textsuperscript{148} There is even one who went to Uganda in 1961 and then came back in 1962.\textsuperscript{149} A number of those returnees

\textsuperscript{146} This point is developed in chapters six and seven.
\textsuperscript{147} Interview with Callixte Kanyamugenga, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
\textsuperscript{148} Following informants went to Burundi and then came back to Gishamvu and Kibayi: Tharcisse Karengera, the father of Augustin Nemeye, the family of Ildéphonse Bisamaza, the family of Domitille Niyonsaba, Innocent Nahayo, family of Théodosie Kanyanja.
\textsuperscript{149} It is the informant Anonymous 4. Here is his narration of his experience as a refugee: “I was a student at Byimana when imvururu (upheavals) started. Then we heard that it started at Byimana. […] Imvururu continued in 1960. During that time I had left Byimana and went to Save. APROSOMA was strong there because Gitera, the president of that party, was from there. Then we saw houses burning there, then we went back home during vacations. We narrated to our parents what we saw, but they knew it also since they had heard news. Here at Sheke and Bitare, the revolt arrived in 1960. […] Then I stopped studying. During that time, any person who had studied some few years could get a job in the administration,[…] But me I did not get a job, because discrimination (against Tutsi) had started. Then in 1961, From Sheke I went in
from outside were suspected of being accomplices of the Inyenzi (refugee fighters) group, formed in exile; as a result, they were jailed and then released. But some others did not face any judicial procedure. These returnees from outside had come back as a result of a state communiqué that encouraged them to return by a certain date. Those who felt brave enough to come back or who were too young to suspect any subsequent intimidation came back. The burgomasters also sent messages to exiled people who were in Burundi to come back. However, it seems that only those who were friends of the new Hutu leaders came back. In Kibayi these include former subchiefs Urayaha and Kibwana. In this process, families disintegrated, since some members fled, and others stayed in the country. Some had fled together but a number of them came back while others decided to remain abroad. It was an imbroglio.

4° Identity, status and agency in exile

After the November 1959 jacquerie and in 1960 and 1961, the colonial state organised a programme of bringing back the people who had fled to missions and administrative places. That programme was made possible thanks to the colonial order to the new authorities to sensitize their constituents about peaceful welcoming of the Tutsi who had fled. The majority of poorer Tutsi, that is, those who were peasants and who had suffered the same fate as the Hutu and Twa during the colonial period, were welcomed back to their homes. By the same token, the colonial state decided to expel individuals who were deemed unwanted by the new PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA power and by the local population. These include any Tutsi, powerful or not, who had been a UNAR active exile abroad in Uganda. I became a refugee. But I did not last there. […] I went to a region called Toro near Lac Albert. I worked there, and then they gave me a leave of two months. I came back to Rwanda in February 1962, I encountered many problems on my way back, (being arrested, uncomfortable transportation until Sheke, suspicion). […] Luckily enough I found my parents alive, but I was in touch with them while abroad through correspondence. I found that many people had lost their houses because of fire. […] It became impossible for me to go back to Uganda, then I remained in Rwanda that way. […] I found a new Burgomaster, Joseph Karengera who had studied at Byimana as well some years ahead of me.”

151 Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, p. 125.
member, who had fought on the side of UNAR during the violence or who was deemed socially undesirable by certain Hutu parties.

The implementation of this selection programme was done through what was called the “revolutionary tribunal.”¹⁵² This included the authorities as well as the local population. Antoine Mugesera, who has been a witness of these events and who has written a book about them, says that two levels of meetings were organised in order to decide on who to allow to come back and who to expel from the country. The first meeting was between the Territorial Administrator and the Burgomasters and then the second was between the Burgomasters, their Commune Councillors and their constituents.¹⁵³

My research confirms this information and shows complex trends during this process of choosing (gutoranya) the “good” and the “bad” ones, as they were called by the informants; the good ones being allowed to come back to their homes, and the others being expelled outside the country (bagacibwa), that is, they get expelled. A combination of status, identity, interpersonal negotiations or mediations and conjunctural behaviours seem to have accounted for the Tutsi being allowed to stay in Rwanda or being expelled. Furthermore, these same patterns accounted also for the Tutsi accepting or refusing to come back after being given permission.

Identity counted to some extent in the criteria of those who could come back or not. For example, the Tutsi who were from a mixed family stood more chance of being chosen than the ones who were not. The Hutu who were among those making the selection tended to negotiate the reintegration of their Tutsi relatives.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, a Hutu who was acquainted with the Tutsi could be confused with them, even undergo their fate, but also be tolerated. Such is the case of my informant Nyirisenge. He was not Tutsi, was not

¹⁵² See the account of lieutenant-colonel Bruneau in Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, p. 145.
¹⁵³ Mugesera, Imibereho, pp. 80-81.
¹⁵⁴ See for example the family of my informant Théodosie Kanyanja, interviewed in Kibayi, 11 May 2007. See also Interview with Gaston Nzabamwita, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. According to Nzabamwita, “they (the Tutsi) went to Kansi mission, then the new burgomasters and the party members went to choose them. They used to tell some one ‘you you will go back home’, caused by the fact that some of them had intermarried with those Batutsi. Then they rebuild their destroyed houses.”
in UNAR, but saw his house burnt, just because he was acquainted with the Tutsi Ntamanyoma who was expelled. He also fled to Mugombwa Mission. He says that the Hutu confused him with Tutsi people. As a result, he sought refuge in Mugombwa at the mission. But he was selected among those who could come back, for being Hutu, as he says.\footnote{155 Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.}

Status was also important. As Raymond Hakizimana, who was burgomaster during that time, observes, Tutsi former leaders were targeted to be driven out. Some had gone long before the selection process, but the remaining ones got expelled. Kabisa, Kanamugire, Ruzindana and Ruvebana were former subchiefs. They had gone to exile. Only Kibwana and Urayaha were allowed to remain in the country and were reintegrated.\footnote{156 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.} In Gishamvu, also most authorities were expelled. The one who remained at home was Namahungu. Other Tutsi who were wealthy got driven out as well. It is only the poor Tutsi who were allowed to remain home.\footnote{157 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.} As one other informant described them, “those are people who have suffered like us.”\footnote{158 Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.} Another one went far as to say that since they have suffered, they were not Tutsi: “they [the authorities] said the one who was beaten and who did Akazi during the colonial period, who was beaten, who has cultivated amashiku, that one is not a Tutsi, therefore he was not to be expelled.”\footnote{159 Interview with Anonymous 11, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.} Here one notices that status\footnote{160 The analytical category class seems close to what I am calling here status.} could interfere with or reject identity.

But agency, that is interpersonal relations, negotiations and mediations in the past and present, could surpass identity and status, though the latter looked more durable and grounded. Tutsi people who had been friends with Hutu stood more chance of remaining at home: “They did not expel us, because my father, Léonidas Rushingabigwi, had done nice things to the Hutu. So they liked him very much, others regretted having burnt our house, they said it was a mistake, they would have not done that.”\footnote{161 Interview with Callixte Kanyamugenga, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.} Some who had even
gone into exile outside the country used to come back, as they had some Hutu friends among the new authorities to protect them. They had become like ‘clients’ of those Hutu.\textsuperscript{162} Another informant narrates: “I remember that my dad had a Hutu Godfather whose name was Kadogi. Then we fled here at Nyakibanda Seminary. We lived there. Then they decided that we should come back home. Then we went back home and lived with the Hutu very well, then we ate, we became wealthy, the bad time came again in 1994.”\textsuperscript{163} The same is confirmed by the informants who were on the side of the “choosers”. Here is one account:

\begin{quote}
I was a neighbour to the one who was called \textit{imfura} (noble, nice person). Then I consider the fact that we lived and socialised together, he gave me milk, cow, he gave a living to my wife and children, he must come back, then I go to collect him, to choose him. For example, there was an old lady who lived near to our home, her name was Mukamusana. She left her belongings when she fled. She left even her cows at my father’s house. We were neighbours. Then when the time to go and choose them arrived, it is my father who went to give her a hand; he removed her from the group of refugees in the Seminary, and brought her back at home. He gave her back the barrel of beans and other stuff that she had left at our home. They lived together again. The others who did not have folks to go and choose them to come back continued their way to exile. That is the history of that time.\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

The case of Justin Munyankindi’s family shows that status could be overcome by agency:

\begin{quote}
After choosing the ones who will be expelled abroad from Nyumba, they returned the others to their homes, the ones whose houses were burnt people helped them to repair their houses, the ones whose houses were intact they reintegrated them. […] As for us our house was not burnt, because there were two men that our family had given cows. They are the ones who protected our house, except my elder brother whose house was burnt. Because he was a teacher, they had in fact expelled him but the burgomaster Karengera intervened in his favour because they had studied together. That is why he did not flee. He only died in the 1994 genocide.\textsuperscript{165}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{162} Interview with Anonymous 2, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. The bulk of those who came back were from Burundi, because this region is close to the border with Burundi. Very few are said to have come back from Uganda or Congo.

\textsuperscript{163} Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.

\textsuperscript{164} Interview with Anonymous 3, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.

\textsuperscript{165} Interview with Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
The former subchief Namahungu also managed to remain home because among other reasons he had given cows to some Hutu who were in the new power structure. Those intervened in favour of him in ‘choosing meetings.’ As a result, he did not have his house burnt and was not expelled outside the country. In the same vein, Urayaha, former subchief of Saga, is said to have given a calf to André Hitimana (alias Kiramoto), the new burgomaster of Saga, when he returned from exile. In return, he gave him back the land of his extended family which was located at Kirembwa. Urayaha ultimately became a “friend” of Hitimana André.

From all these accounts, it appears that the gift of a cow was a significant way to cement interpersonal relations. Indeed, in the Rwandan “culture,” it signified and still signifies the most outstanding gesture of friendship between two individuals and families. Besides giving cows, social utility was also important. Families of old women who have the skills to deliver babies (midwives) were protected during violence and were reintegrated home. Apart from interpersonal relations, political collaboration also gave the Tutsi more chance of being chosen. The father of Godeberthe Mukagitoli had joined APROSOMA; as a result, his family got reintegrated home.

We already saw how the Tutsi who had been active in party politics and in fighting had been targeted during the time of burning houses. During the time of choosing, they were also targeted to be expelled. That was the time when the Hutu leaders found the occasion to retaliate against them: Munyarugamba who had been an active member of UNAR got expelled:

They came and burnt houses, we fled, we came here at Nyumba in the mission, others went to the seminary, others in Kansi. Then they came to expel. Some were expelled, others chosen to go back home. They said ‘the expelled ones are the violent ones’ then they sent us in exile. [They expelled me] because allegedly I

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166 Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
Some informants said also that people considered as witches, regardless of their identity and status, were expelled during this time. It was an occasion to settle previous misunderstandings.\textsuperscript{171}

As the selection process was decentralised thought the “revolution” tribunals, the Hutu population at local level felt empowered because they could decide on the fate of their Tutsi neighbours.\textsuperscript{172} As it appeared later, the ones chosen became friends or clients or protégés of the ordinary or powerful Hutu and had to keep their relations with Hutu in a good direction so as to live in relative peace.\textsuperscript{173}

The case of abamotsi is particularly revealing. The ones who were Tutsi tended to be expelled.\textsuperscript{174} But the ones who were Hutu were forgiven for their identity. Here identity surpassed their colonial role status:

\begin{quote}
\textit{The leaders say: ‘You so and so come here to choose; what do you say about so and so?’ We answer: ‘Pu, pu, pu, that one was umumotsi, he ruled badly, we don’t like him. […] The abamotsi were both Tutsi and Hutu. But you understand, the Hutu did not flee, it was only the Tutsi. […] The Hutu used to beat him saying that he misbehaved, but because he was our fellow Hutu, they said: ‘Stay here with us there is no problem.’ Yes, but there are also many Hutu who fled together with the Tutsi.\textsuperscript{175}}
\end{quote}

The last sentence of the above informant shows how complex was identity in this exile matter.\textsuperscript{176} The example given by Godeberthe Mukagitoli confirms this above explanation too: “There was one umumotsi called Bamanza, he was a Hutu. But because he was very

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{170} Interview with Théodomir Munyarugamba, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007.
\footnote{171} Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007; Interview with Esther Kanyambo, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007.
\footnote{172} Interview with Gérard Segatashya, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
\footnote{173} Interview with Anonymous 16, Kibayi.
\footnote{174} For example the father of my informant Augustin Bucyabutata.
\footnote{175} Interview with Gérard Segatashya, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
\footnote{176} In the following part of his account, Segatashya says that the Tutsi who lived at Busoro, his area, did not get attacked during this time, did not flee: “They were killed only in 1994.”
\end{footnotes}
arrogant, they beat him too much. He used to say: ‘I am not a Hutu, I am a Tutsi.’ They beat him during 1960. They had burnt his house and they cut his banana trees. But they did not expel him, they forgave him.”

The ones who were allowed to go back to their homes were helped by the Hutu population to rebuild their houses. Most of those who had kept their belongings returned them, and life continued again: “What shows that the Hutu and the Tutsi were still having good relationship is that the Hutu helped them to rebuild their houses, helped them to cultivate and to recover economically slowly and slowly.”

Finally, concerning the numbers of refugees who were allowed to come back home and those who were expelled, there is a disagreement. Colonial officials say that the majority were allowed to come back to their communities. In Burundi itself, by July 1962, the government of Burundi was counting about 40,000 Rwandan refugees and was urging the UNHCR to help them. Lemarchand also disagrees with the colonial estimate, pointing out that only few were welcomed back. But it is from 1963 onwards that the number of refugees grew significantly:

From about 7,000 at the end of November 1959, the total number of refugees rose to 22,000 by April 1960. Of these, about 7,000 were installed at the Nyamata camp of refugees, in the Bugesera, while the remaining 15,000, distributed through the territories of Biumba, Gisenyi and Astrida, found temporary asylum in mission stations and government buildings or wandered over the countryside in a vain quest for food, shelter and security. Only a small percentage of the total refugee population was allowed to return to their homelands after the events of November 1959, and many of those who did lived to regret it. Most of them eventually chose to resettle in neighbouring countries – Burundi, the Congo, Uganda and Tanzania. From a mere trickle, the number of refugees who sought asylum abroad grew rapidly after 1960: from approximately 1,500 in late 1960, approximately 130,000 Tutsi had left the country by the end of 1963.

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177 Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007.
178 Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. See also Interview with Marguerite Nyirabititiaweho, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
179 Logiest, Mission au Rwanda; see also the accounts of burgomasters during this time: Elias Karengera and Raymond Hakizimana.
181 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 172.
Until the late 1960s, the Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries had reached a number of about 300,000. They became “the most ancient refugees in black Africa.”

\[b) \ Property\]

The people who were expelled had left some of their movable assets, and the whole of their non-movable property, that included houses and land. Those who fled without leaving their livestock and food stocks with people to take care of for them, simply lost their property. It is mainly the attackers who looted them. Most of those who fled after leaving their belongings to some of their Hutu friends and neighbours to keep and protect them got their things back when they were allowed to return to their homes. Most informants who were among the victims assert today that at that time, there still prevailed a ‘good culture’ of helping those in danger. They even mention names of Hutu people who kept their or others’ belongings and once back gave them back those things. However, some movable property had been also destroyed inside houses while the latter got burnt.

As for the unmovable property, most houses had been burnt. Redistribution concerned mostly land. In 1960-61, the government of Rwanda issued a communiqué calling the people who had fled out of the country and who were not undesirable to come back. The existing power ruled that “anyone who will not come back by a certain date, his isambu will be redistributed to others. Then people waited for them to come back, they did not come back. Then the Minister of Agriculture and Breeding ruled that anyone who fled, his isambu must be given to others. […] Then the burgomasters followed that rule and redistributed the land. […] I also did that job of redistributing.”

184 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. The names of Hutu people who helped the Tutsi in that way include the following: Rwangabo, Kanani and John Nyambwana who was a teacher.
185 Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
who was also burgomaster at that time confirms the explanation of former burgomaster Elias Karengera. The redistribution did not happen immediately. At first, the government identified those lands that had been vacated, set people to look after them until the time of redistribution. Those people in charge happened to be mostly newly elected commune councillors following the Commune elections of 1960. According to the official version, this measure was taken, so that “the population could not fight over that land.” Those people in charge had usufruct rights over the monitored land, or could lease it in the meantime.

The first redistribution programme occurred later around 1960-61. It was the Commune Council made of the burgomasters and the councillors that was in charge of redistributing land of those who were expelled or who fled and never came back. “Every councillor was establishing the list of those applying for land. Then the commune committee meet and select those who will receive land. […] There was even a written statement given to the new beneficiaries of amasambu, and this was recorded in the commune register, so that anyone coming could check the accountability of this activity. […] That is how it happened at that time.”

The Minister of Local Government ordered that even coffee plants “abandoned can be redistributed after a certain time (two to three years) to the inhabitants of [the] commune. However, that redistribution must be written in a special register.”

Concerning those who were entitled to receive that land, the official version stated that poor people, that is, the landless, were the priority. According to former burgomaster Hakizimana, the Commune authorities who had many children also got additional land, it is in that regard that the Commune council gave to Hakizimana also land, but later on. For ordinary people, there was at first an investigation to check if they were in need. It

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186 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
188 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
189 J.B. Habyarimana, Préfet d’Astrida, Lettre à tous les Bourgmestres, objet : Entretien des cultures diverses, N° 475/Agri.9.01, Astrida, le 10 février 1961.
190 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
is mostly Hutu people who stood more chance of receiving this land, since they are the ones who are believed to have won the ‘revolution’. However, certain Tutsi individuals who were courageous enough to approach the new authorities also received a share of land. They received mostly a part of land that formerly belonged to their family members gone into exile: “Concerning the Tutsi, when I went to give the land of their parents, I made sure that I gave them a field at first.”192

The people interviewed who were among the peasants give some nuance to this ‘official’ description of events. They say that it is mostly rich Hutu people who got land, and that only a few Hutu poor people benefited from this redistribution.193 Others say that both the poor and the non-poor received some land during the redistribution. Some Hutu who were former clients of Tutsi subchiefs and who had received land did not have a chance to get land,194 while others still managed to negotiate a new friendship with the new authorities and get additional land.195

If the land to be redistributed happened to be large, it was divided among two or more new recipients.196 This suggests that the number of new land owners increased. One example of a piece of land divided among many people is the isambu that belonged to former subchief Gashagaza who lived at Muboni. His isambu was taken over and then redistributed by the commune council that met on 7 December 1962. This council gave that land to four people: Nkundabagenzi, Matabaro, Misigaro and Nzabonaliba. It also redistributed the land of other four refugees of Muboni to nine people.197

Most Tutsi informants confirmed that during this first redistribution certain Tutsi had received a portion of land belonging to their family members who had fled outside the

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194 See for example informant Gaston Nzabamwita, see also the father of informant Joseph Baritunga, and the father of François Shirubute.
195 See for example the informant Gratien Rwigumba who got isambu from burgomaster André Hitimana, alias Kiramoto.
196 Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
197 Elie Karengera, Burgomaster of Sholi Commune, Minutes of the meeting of the Commune Council that took place on 7 December 1962, Copy, Sheke, 9 February 1963.
country. Those are the few who could have enough courage to face the new authorities and apply for land. The Tutsi who had been displaced to Nyamata and elsewhere inside the country, though they were not refugees, lost their property rights over land left where they were previously established.

Some informants criticized the way the selection was done: The redistribution was as follows: “The councillors started to give themselves the land, then saw others they like, they give them. If they do not like you they could not give you.” Friends or clients of the new burgomasters stood more chance to get served in the first place. Politically, the redistribution programme became an occasion to reward those who had been strongly active in the ‘revolution’ either by fighting, burning houses or by doing propaganda for the Hutu parties: “Land was given to those who allegedly had worked very well. It became like ingororano (a reward).” “It is the abarwanashyaka [propagandists] who got land.” Some even considered this activity as a self-serving one in favour of authorities. Only one person described this activity in laudatory terms: “the poor also received land in the redistribution. […] It was Nzabakira who started the redistribution. He was nicknamed Inyagira, that is rain [i.e., the rain does not discriminate people it falls on, meaning a kind, fair person].”

Indeed, to be poor was a necessary but not sufficient condition in order to be entitled to land redistribution. One had first to approach leaders and apply for land. In practice, a person in need of land had first to identify in his vicinity a piece of land that was available, that had once belonged to those who had fled. Then he could approach his close councillor or go immediately to the burgomaster to submit his application. According to former burgomaster Elias Karengera, only those who came to apply had

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198 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza; with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, and Vincent Kanamugire.
199 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
200 Mugesera, Imibereho, pp. 87-88.
201 Interview with Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
204 Interview with Anonymous 9, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. See also interview with Augustin Gakuru.
206 Interview with Cassien Rwanyange, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
their case examined.\textsuperscript{207} One had to “consult”\textsuperscript{208} the authority. What was the meaning of this ‘consultation’ or, to put it differently, what were the requirements in this process of ‘consultation’? Several informants said that one had to bring something to the councillor or the burgomaster while introducing one’s demand. This kind of bribe was in the form of drink, or sometimes a different gift, and more rarely a cow. The names for this bribe were \textit{inyoroshyo, igiturire, and bitugukwaha}.\textsuperscript{209}

This condition for application was so important that some poor people, who did not have anything to offer, did not try their chances and go to apply.\textsuperscript{210} Furthermore, the type or quality of land to receive depended on one’s status and one’s level of negotiation with the local authorities. The poor, who did not have anything to offer or who offered little, also received little, that is, unfertile land,\textsuperscript{211} land located on top of mountains and that was previously used for grazing (\textit{umukene}).\textsuperscript{212} Whereas most of the wealthy ones or the ones who had managed to be close to new leaders received fertile land, including land that once belonged to former Tutsi colonial authorities.

The gifts received led some burgomasters to direct intimidation against some Tutsi constituents who were not their friends. The motivation was that once they flee, the burgomaster would have more land to redistribute, hence more redistributive power and more gifts and patronage.\textsuperscript{213} Therefore, those who had fertile and substantial land were likely to face the danger of being expelled: “When independence came, people slandered me saying: ‘This old Twa is a sorcerer!’ I was beaten twice. It was a way of obliging me

\begin{footnotes}
\item[207] See also Interview with Innocent Nahayo, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
\item[208] Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
\item[209] Interviews with Anonymous 2, Anonymous 5, Anonymous 17, Athanase Kumuyange, François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Thérèse Mukangwije, Tharcisse Karengera. See also Lemarchand, \textit{Rwanda and Burundi}, pp. 186-188, 274; Mugesera, \textit{Imibereho, p. 106.}
\item[210] Such is the case of the father of informant Vénuste Sindabizera, who “did not have the social status necessary to approach leaders.” As the informant Tharcisse Karengera observed, “in Kinyarwanda language, there is a proverb that says: “An empty mouth kills its owner.”
\item[211] Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
\item[212] Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
\end{footnotes}
to leave my lands. […] I had a big land, that is why I was mistreated.”214 In the same
vein, this early redistribution, since it happened when the Tutsi and other monarchists
were still fleeing violence, may have reduced the number of poor Hutu peasants helping
the Tutsi. “They understood very well that assisting the Tutsi in any manner was a way of
giving up to their land.”215 So, land involved very high stakes not just after the conflict,
but even during its unfolding. As Hubert writes again, “…the revolution has given
cultivating fields to the people…”216

Some cases of intimidation were registered in my area of study. A number of people saw
their property confiscated and redistributed whereas they had not yet gone abroad. Some
of these often made claims towards the Territorial Administration. These claims occurred
mostly from May 1960 onwards, which means during the campaign for the Commune
election around June-July 1960. As we saw above, this time was also characterised by
widespread violence. For example, the following people were also stripped of their
property and wrote a collective letter to the Territorial Administration, asking for justice:
Nkundabagenzi, Rekeraho, Nyagasega, Nzigiye…Rwabigwi, Rukerakurora, Matabaro,
Kwitegetse, and Gashagaza.217 A lady called Nyirambibi also wrote a letter to the
Territorial Administration claiming the isambu of his father-in-law who went abroad,
arguing that she needed that land in order to raise her children who were orphans.218

A few days later, another person claimed his land that was confiscated, whereas he had not
gone into exile: “I accuse Mr. Nzabakira [Burgomaster of Kibingo] of having stripped me
of my property on 21 July 1960. When I went to claim it […] his policemen came to my
house at night, beat me and brought me to prison, I spent a night there and on the
following day as there was no reason to imprison me, you have released me. I beg you,
Mr. Territorial Administrator to rescue me and inform me about what I can do in such a

214 José Kagabo et Vincent Mudandagizi, “Complainte des gens de l’argile. Les Twa du Rwanda”, Cahiers
der Études Africaines, XIV, 53, 1974, pp. 75-87, p. 87. Marie Thérèse Nyirabega says that her family
brothers fled, and those who remained in the country were called tutsi and threatened in order to leave their
property. But ultimately, they were not expelled.
215 Hubert, La Toussaint rwandaise, p. 58.
216 Hubert, La Toussaint rwandaise, p. 61.
217 Nkundabagenzi, Rekeraho, Nyagasega, Nzigiye…Rwabigwi, Rukerakurora, Matabaro, Kwitegetse et
218 Euphrasia N Mbibi, habitant de Bashumba-Nyakare, Lettre à l’Administrateur de Territoire d’Astrida,
Mubumbano, le 4/7/1960, Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida.
Almost the same situation happened to Claver Mugenzi. Another person wrote to the Territorial Administrator explaining that he had been expelled from Mvejuru where he lived, then he fled to Shori commune where he got also driven out. So he was asking for a permission to get settled in Astrida town located also in Mvejuru chiefdom. In November 1960, the Tribunal of Astrida confirmed in writing that two people, Semutwa and Mukamusoni were insolvent because they had lost their houses and property. In the following month, the Territorial Administrator asked the Burgomaster of Kibingo Commune, Nzabakira, to take into consideration the case of a lady called Nyiravara who was claiming the property of her father. While most of the above people were writing to the Territorial Administrator hoping to get their case examined in the Kibingo Commune, maybe because they believed the Belgian Territory Administrator to be fairer or more neutral, there is one case of a person who wrote to the burgomaster: “You know very well that I am in prison, I would like you to inform me if it is you who has redistributed my property.”

These claims continued even in the following cases of redistribution. Munyarugano, who was burgomaster of Gishamvu from 1963 to 1969 is said to have redistributed most of the land that had remained unredistributed, since he is the one who lasted in power unlike the previous burgomasters. He is also remembered to have confiscated land of Tutsi who had kept the land of their family members, he left them a small portion. Anonymous 5 is more explicit:

For example a Tutsi person could hide the property of his parent or sibling. Then during the rule of Munyarugano, he discovered that his predecessors did not

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225 Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
redistribute all the Tutsi’s land properties. Then he resumed the redistribution. They restarted the process by taking over that land and redistributing it. That is when some became unhappy about that taking over of land and decided to go into exile again. Some went again to Burundi, others to Tanzania by 1967-1968.

But according to Anonymous 5, they were few. No one expelled them, they decided to go because their land was reduced.226 Indeed, after the first redistribution, the local authorities continued to check land ownerships and redistribute. This process continued until Kambanda who ruled from 1970 to 1994.227 Land redistribution and claims became, as we shall see in following chapters, part of the everyday life both for local leaders and constituents.

2.5. WAYS OF NAMING THE “REVOLUTION”

In the account and interpretation of the event that came to bear the name “revolution” of 1959, two levels of debates arose in Rwandan historiography. At the first level, there was a discussion about whether this event was a revolution in the true sense as compared to other revolutions recorded across history, or not. At the second level, even those who contended that it was a ‘revolution’ suggested different qualifiers for it: ethnic, social, antiracial, peasant, etc.

Reyntjens called it a jacquerie, so did Lemarchand. But the latter explained that though it was the Belgians who called it a revolution, who made the Hutu intellectuals believe that their contestations were revolutionary and who logistically helped make it possible to oust the Tutsi former ‘customary’ authorities, it later became what he termed “la revolution téléguidée.”228

Mugesera called it Muyaga in referring to how Rwandans called it during that time. In my area of study, some used the word “revolution,” others “imyivumbagatanyo” (which suggests upheavals).

226 Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
227 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
Those who argued that it was a revolution fall into two groups. The first is constituted by the Hutu intellectuals themselves. These use words such as the social revolution, the Rwandese revolution, the anti-racial revolution, peasant revolution, ethnic revolution, etc. The second group includes scholars who revisited the history of this period: Catharine Newbury, Helen Codere, Peter Gravel, etc. One notices that they do not doubt this was a revolution.

Emmanuel Ntezimana has demonstrated that the borrowing of concepts from the French Revolution by a number of Rwandan intellectuals ("évolués") had originated from the colonial education programme. Moreover, Mugesera argued that Kayibanda failed to address the masses’ issues as he focused only on the Hutu masses and ignored others. Therefore, concludes Mugesera, Kayibanda did not do social class analysis of the Rwandan society, a critique that can be used with regard to the concept “social revolution”. As for the concept “ethnic revolution,” Newbury found it only partly accurate, but insufficient to fully account for what happened in Rwanda in 1959-1962.

But whatever it was called, it is important insofar as it led to several changes that brought about ruptures in the ways in which the Rwandan society viewed itself, and in the ways in which the power structure was going to be organised after independence. It was, in the Derridian sense, a major event. Indeed, never in the past did an open conflict occur between a group called Tutsi against another called Hutu, as became the case in 1959. And after that, the crisis continued under the structural violence and ultimately escalated into genocide. Therefore, though I keep using the term revolution in brackets in the

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234 Mugesera, “Une approche”, p. 151.
Rwandan case to show that there is still a debate concerning it, I agree with Mamdani that this event needs to be taken seriously.236

But Mamdani’s concepts in his analysis of the “revolution” in Rwanda must be viewed with caution. Two renowned authors on African History, Mamadou Diouf and René Lemarchand, have criticised the uses of “native” and “settler” terms to mean respectively the Hutu and the Tutsi. The first observed that “…in qualifying the Revolution of 1959 a revolution of the ‘autochthonous’ Hutu against the ‘allochthonous’ Tutsi, Mamdani has ignored the role of Belgian administrators and of the Catholic Church…”237

Lemarchand has his own critique of the use of terms such as ‘native’ and ‘settler’ in the Rwandan case:

It is easy to see why the author, a Ugandan citizen of Asian origin, should be sensitive to the plight of settler minorities confronted with ‘native’ majorities […] About the racialization of Tutsi and Hutu identities by the European colonizer there can be no doubt. Here Mamdani is on firm, if well-trodden, ground. But whether the settler metaphor applies to the case at hand, either as a conceptual derivative of the Hamitic myth, or as an overarching explanatory frame to account for the killings of Tutsi, is where questions are likely to arise. One would be hard put to detect in the discourse of Hutu revolutionaries in the late fifties references to Tutsi as settlers (as distinct from ‘feudalists’ or ‘monarchists’ or ‘feudomonarchists’). The ‘great nativist revolution’ of 1959 is indeed better described as a revolution téléguidée, which owed a great deal more to the tutelle authorities than to Hutu ‘nativism’. That it occurred when the Belgians were still in charge of the Trusteeship suggests as much. It was largely inspired, engineered and assisted by Belgian administrators, in Brussels and Kigali, acting in close collaboration with the Catholic Church. It came about hard on the heels of a Hutu jacquerie directed not against the monarchy, much less against the Tutsi as a group, but against the chiefs and subchiefs, who were seen by the Hutu masses as the principal source of their misery. To speak of ‘nativism’ in this context is singularly inappropriate.238

236 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers.
238 Lemarchand, “Review Article”, p. 308.
But a careful reading of the Mamdani’s work suggests that his uses of ‘native’ and ‘alien’ on the Rwandan context are not literal. This means that the critique of Lemarchand on this ground must be taken with some moderation.

Some 35 years before the above review, Lemarchand had shown to what extent the use of the term revolution in African countries, then emerging as independent nations, was strategic in the sense of propaganda, though in certain cases that include Rwanda, it was to be taken seriously. 239

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter stressed the violent and conflictual convulsions Rwanda went through during the decolonization process. While this process led to the redefinition of the political arena, it also caused social disintegration. Indeed, violence produced murders, and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans (mostly Tutsi) who became refugees. The political discourse used during this time influenced to some degree the ways in which Rwandans viewed themselves in terms of identity, and how they related to each other in the ensuing period.

Belgium finally granted independence to Rwanda in 1962, the same year UNAR was asking for independence in its 1959 party programme. But Belgium gave this independence to the partners it wanted: particular Hutu leaders. This was the beginning of the postindependence period, a complex and challenging period as we shall see in the next chapters.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE POSTINDEPENDENCE REPUBLIC IN RURAL AREAS:
BETWEEN Legacy AND AGENCY IN THE EVERYDAY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter studies the First and Second Republics in Gishamvu and Kibayi. It examines how political leaders ruled society as well as the economy, and how local authorities and local population interacted in their responses to the state policies. The three first sections of the chapter show the combination of colonial legacies and postindependence agencies. I show this combination in the authoritarian type of government, in the lingering issues of the decolonization process in the postcolony, and in the establishment of structural violence. The three last sections are about power performance and representation in the everyday life at local levels. In the whole chapter, I give enough space to primary sources (archives and interviews) that show the multiple but unequal agencies at local level. I do so, because these sources are absent in the existing literature on Gishamvu and Kibayi.

3.1. AUTHORITARIANISM: BETWEEN COLONIAL LEGACY AND CONTEMPORARY AGENCY

Since independence, a number of African countries gradually embraced authoritarian types of government. Both in principle and in practice, leaders tended to concentrate major powers in the hands of a few, mostly in the executive organ, and often in the hands of heads of states. That was in part a legacy of colonialism, where certain forms of despotic power emerged.1 And, as has been seen, most postindependence African

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regimes borrowed administrative features of colonialism. Power was more and more centralized and decision-making was a top-down process. The late colonial attempts to establish liberal democratic constitutional regimes failed, and the state appeared more and more as a property of the dominant class and stood in opposition against society.² Concerning the relationship between state and society, a number of postindependence states were considered as “soft”, for, though they had been able to control opposition, they failed to capture society as a whole. As a result, they relied on, or rather chose to favour, certain groups of citizens (ethnic, regional, or religious), who happened to be clients of rulers, at the expense of others. This behaviour was called at first patrimonialism or factionalism³, and later neo-patrimonialism.⁴ Patrimonialism or neo-patrimonialism or personal rule are terms used to describe the kind of rule that targets personal interest in a public state system.⁵ In its mode of functioning, personal rule in Africa manifested itself in a relation of clientelism and patronage between state holders and co-opted members of society. Heads of state chose their clients which they gave power. In turn, these chose lower clients and the process continued down to the bottom of society. Those clients at different levels enjoyed the benefits of public good, called patronage, and in exchange supported the existing regime.⁶ In most cases, clients were chosen from ethnic groups or regions of the heads of the state.⁷

⁷ Gordon and Gordon (eds.), Understanding Contemporary Africa, pp. 69 and 74.
In Rwanda, during the First Republic (1962-1973), authoritarianism and patrimonialism came to be strongly established. Although after independence Rwanda enjoyed a multiparty system, the PARMEHUTU party that was leading the country attempted to annihilate all other parties, and had significant success. It did so by co-opting top members of other parties. It destroyed the APROSOMA party by convincing the burgomasters of that party, who were mainly established in Butare, to cancel their membership from APROSOMA and enrol in PARMEHUTU. The main agents of this operation were the Prefects and the propagandists.\(^8\) One political figure of Butare who also was very active in convincing the APROSOMA Burgomasters to move to PARMEHUTU is Amandin Rugira, who was Secretary of PARMEHUTU in Butare. The shift of the Burgomasters to PARMEHUTU was to be followed by the move of the population making the same choice.\(^9\) As for UNAR and RADER leaders, a number of them were killed following the December 1963 attack of Inyenzi.\(^10\) Afterwards, these parties failed to sustain themselves both in the political arena and in the election of 1965. By 1965, PARMEHUTU was the sole party that won all positions in the legislature and the presidency. It became a de facto single party.

The same explanation given by colonial powers to justify their autocratic system, i.e., the pursuit of development,\(^11\) was also given by the Kayibanda regime: the country being poor, efforts ought to be united rather than divided among opposition parties. Therefore, it ruled, no opposition was to exist. One contemporary author even wrote that it was a luxury for a poor country like Rwanda to have multiple political views.\(^12\) In fact, proponents of Kayibanda considered his move as a pragmatic one.\(^13\)

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\(^10\) On the Inyenzi invasion, see infra.


Concerning patrimonialism, the First Republic maintained the policy of ethnicity. It justified this move as a way of correcting the errors of the past, where the Tutsi were said to have enjoyed more education and more job opportunities. It promised to promote the Hutu in spheres of education, labour and power. But, from 1963 to 1968, the regime attempted another exclusion, that of key Hutu leaders from Butare (South) and from the north. As a result, power remained concentrated among Gitarama politicians. That means that besides ethnicity regionalism was also instrumentalized. In the view of Reyntjens, the colonial regime and the First Republic were both regimes of authoritarianism, since they empowered a few at the expense of the majority. At one time it was few Tutsi leaders, at another it was few Hutu leaders.

On top of that, president Kayibanda attempted to personify his power. Since 1961, a systematic campaign of singing praise to his persona was set up and that he enjoyed several symbolic qualifications such as “Republican Mwami”, “Father of Democracy”, etc. The personality cult of African heads of states was then a widespread practice. In order to reach this campaign, the party used the propagandists who worked from top to down. These are said to have been ambivalently effective, both in mounting the monopolization of power of PARMEHUTU, in demonizing those who were targeted for exclusion at certain times, but also in creating a widespread resentment of the population against the party, because of their abuse of power and their terrorisation of the population. They even created regular tensions with the Burgomasters at local level.

By 1969, the political arena was so divided that the Gitarama dominating branch failed to strengthen the party that was weakened by ethnic, regional and interpersonal divisions. In early 1973, Kayibanda attempted to reunite the Hutus by redefining the prevailing

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leadership crisis as merely ethnic. In this regard, a systematic campaign against Tutsi students and employees was launched and resulted in ousting them from schools and jobs. This escalated in the violence of February- March 1973, and ultimately in the coup d’état against Kayibanda in July 1973.

The military officers who took over power, under the command of Major-General Habyarimana, justified their act as one of “rescue”, because they allegedly acted in order to stop the PARMEHUTU propagandists’ violence. Habyarimana’s initial discourse was one of appeasement. It proclaimed unity and peace for all Rwandans and this effectively reassured all previously threatened persons who believed that a new era had come. But soon after, the regime instituted a single party system, by creating the MRND (National Revolutionary Movement for Development) in 1975. This was claimed not to be a party, but a Movement, that is, “a Movement open for all, that strives to introduce a political and social renewal [and of which] every Rwandan is de jure a member…”

Power decisions were more and more concentrated in the hands of party leaders and mostly in the Head of State’s office. The Assembly that existed since 1978 was an instance of deliberation rather than of major decision-making. In the same vein as Kayibanda, as early as 1977, Habyarimana also instituted a personality cult, under the disguise of live cultural performances programmes called in French “Animation” that organised weekly sessions of singing and praising party programmes and the head of the state.

The Habyarimana regime also pursued a practice of clientelism, by concentrating power in the hands of politicians located in the North of the country around the presidential

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20 Republic of Rwanda, Butere Prefecture, Minutes of a meeting that was held in the Butere Prefecture, led by the His Excellency Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, President of the Republic and President of the Comity in charge of Peace and Unity, on 13 May 1975, p. 9.
family.\textsuperscript{24} It reinstalled the ethnic quota policy that claimed to allocate admissions at school and at work of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa individuals allegedly in the proportions of their demographic size at national level.\textsuperscript{25}

In 1990, when major political changes were occurring, and when the political arena was being challenged to open up more political space, the MRND structure made its auto-critique by suggesting the correction of a number of authoritarian policies within the party. It proposed the suppression of the live performances for the party, and the separation of power between the party and the existing administrative structure, since the party organs were fused with state organs. It proclaimed openly that corruption had been widespread in the administrative arena and that it should be corrected.\textsuperscript{26}

Leadership at local level was the reflection of the one at national level. During the First and the Second Republic, the Prefect of Prefecture appeared to be the representative of central power at local level. The Prefect was appointed by the President and only accountable to the Central administration. The Burgomasters of Communes reported to the Prefect who in turn reported to the Minister of Local Government.\textsuperscript{27} From 1960 to 1971, burgomasters were elected, with different electoral systems,\textsuperscript{28} but from 1973 until the end of the Second Republic, they were appointed by the head of state.

By law, the Burgomaster was the paramount authority of the commune, assisted by the Commune Council. The latter was made of elected Councillors who administered between 500 to 1,000 voters since 1963, or a territorial subdivision of the Commune called Sector, created since 1974. The Burgomaster was in charge of managing the

\textsuperscript{25} This point is developed infra in the section on structural violence.
Commune property and income and of development activities. He was in charge of tax and levies collection and was allowed to punish with coercive detention anyone who failed to pay his annual levies within 15 days. He held police powers which permitted him to control security in the Commune and jail unlawful people within seven days or fining them. The Burgomaster together with the Prefect held power on the engagement and resignation of Commune office personnel. The law of 1974 instituted two Commissions that worked hand in hand with the Burgomaster and the Commune Council: the Technical Commission and Development Council. During the Second Republic, although the Burgomaster worked in close collaboration with the Commune Council, the latter was accountable to him, who appeared to be the only one responsible for the commune territory. In this respect, the Minister of Local Government issued an instruction that read as follows:

I remind you that the burgomaster is accountable for every thing that occurs in the commune of which he is in charge. Those who say that the Sector has got a Councillor for it, so there is no need to go to the Commune are mistaken. In the Sector, the Councillor is a representative of the Burgomaster, he does not replace him there.

In principle at least, the Burgomaster appeared to be the main leader at local level. He is not answerable to the population, but to the central power that put him in office. So are other employees of the Commune: “There is no room at all for independent behaviour by commune personnel, and even less by the population. Commune personnel are not even remotely accountable to the population but solely to a vertical structure from which they receive detailed marching orders.”

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Lemarchand has compared prefects, burgomasters and propagandists of the First Republic to the former colonial Chiefs, Subchiefs and Ibirongozi, because of the way they behaved in relation to their constituents.\textsuperscript{32} Reyntjens also observed that the reason why the PARMEHUTU party leaders excluded more and more people is because profitable positions were scarce.\textsuperscript{33} This is in line with Bayart’s point that in Africa politics is more about wealth than about power.\textsuperscript{34}

3.2. THE LINGERING ISSUES OF DECOLONIZATION: LAND, REFUGEES AND VIOLENCE

Many scholars of Rwanda have identified the refugee issue as well as violence as lingering factors that perpetuated tension until the 1994 genocide.\textsuperscript{35} On this list, it is possible to add the land problem as an unresolved issue too.\textsuperscript{36} And, as we shall realize, these three issues are interrelated.

3.2.1. Land

The land issue became an everyday predicament for both leaders and constituents due to both political decisions that were taken on land redistribution and structural conditions. In the previous chapter, I mentioned land redistribution following the departure into exile or the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans. Some refugees were coming back and reclaiming their belongings. Also, some of the family members of those who went into exile used to reclaim the land of their siblings and parents. This continued during the 1960s and the 1970s. Furthermore, during this time, commune leaders continued to identify some lands held by certain Tutsi peasants but that were said to have previously...
belonged to their family members who were in exile. Those lands were subjected to redistribution again, and to reclamations via tribunal as well.

In 1966, a Presidential Decree stated that “[t]he refugee who returns has no right whatsoever of reclaiming land that he or she occupied before, if this land has been occupied by someone else or had been taken over by the public power.”37 But this decree did not stop reclamations, for those who reclaimed were proving that they had never been “refugees,” which implied that their land would not be targeted for redistribution. Sometimes the Commune office won cases and sometimes it lost. In 1968, for example, the Prefect of Butare Prefecture was complaining that cases lost by the Communes had become numerous.38 In the same vein, during the mandate of Burgomaster Athanase Mujyambere, I collected 13 letters of constituents who reclaimed their land which had already been redistributed to other people. They were trying to prove that they were not refugees so that the decree of 1966 would not apply to them, but the commune council proved that they were refugees. The content of some other reclamation letters is worth mentioning here:

- Namahungu, former subchief, reclaimed a land covered by trees as his private property. The Gishamvu Commune on the other hand proved to the court that that land and those trees located at a place called Rwamunyoha had been just administered by this former subchief, and that they were not his private property, since the trees had been planted using corvées.39 The same applies to Sekiromba, former ikirongozi, who claimed that a portion of land in one valley belonged to him. He was answered that no private property existed in the valley. After losing

In this case, Sekiromba was however allowed to keep some land for grazing that was on top of a hill.\textsuperscript{40}

- In 1971, the Gishamvu Commune had taken over the land of Sebarenzi and Rugumiliza located at Buvumu and gave it to Claver Ngabo and Etienne Mbonyumuvunyi. The commune office justified this decision by the Presidential decree (law) No. 25/01 of 26 February 1966 concerning the property of refugees.\textsuperscript{41}

- The following year, a lady called Nyirandinkabandi reclaimed the land of her husband, Ndereye, who was considered as refugee, a claim that made his land eligible for redistribution to other people.\textsuperscript{42} In the same year again, Mr. Kabututra reclaimed an \textit{isambu} that belonged to his relative Nyirakaticwa and that the Commune Council had given to Etienne Mbonyumuvunyi from Buvumu Sector.\textsuperscript{43}

- One person whose land reclamation lawsuit lasted for a long time is Cassien Nyakayiro who sued the Gishamvu Commune for having confiscated his \textit{isambu} located at the Busoro area. In order to justify the confiscation of his land, the Commune Council alleged that Nyakayiro became a refugee. It confiscated his land in 1969, and the Prefect of Butare Prefecture gave his consent to that confiscation. However, Nyakayiro, in his letter to the Prefect in 1969, had not stressed that he ever fled, which makes the application of the Decree of 1966 to his case a complex one. Instead he notes that in 1966 the Gishamvu Commune confiscated his \textit{isambu} that he had acquired in 1956.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{40} Athanase Mujyambere, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, \textit{Circular Letter to Mr. Minister of Local Government and Minister of Justice, Re: lawsuits of the Commune with the Constituents}, Ref.: No. 116/C.G./70/, Gishamvu, 30 June 1970.


\textsuperscript{42} By 1971, Claver Ngabo had become Councillor under Kambanda. (See for example Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, \textit{Minutes concerning the burning of bulletins of the election organized on 18 July 1971}, Ref.: No. 253/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 4 November 1971.)


During the Second Republic, new instructions over the land matter were issued by the Minister of Local Government to all Prefects. The redistributive power of the Burgomaster over land became again enforced:

Nevertheless, the Commune has the power to give a vacant property to one or several persons who are in need. It is the Commune that will determine the opportunity.

I would wish that by next July every abandoned property had had a destination and that a detailed report be communicated to me as soon as the end of that month.45

These new instructions still did not stop reclamations.

- In February 1975, the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune sent a list of properties left by the Tutsi who went into exile. He explains that the reason why those properties were not yet redistributed is that the parents of the fled people had hidden them so they could not be identified. The list includes the name of the person who left that land and the person who held it in 1975. In Gikunzi Sector, there were 12 land properties, Liba Sector had 12 also, Sholi Sector had 7, none for Mubumbano Sector, Mukuge Sector had 14; Kibingo Sector had 19; Nyakibanda Sector had 7; Sheke Sector 65. These happen to be a lot because Sheke was populated by a big number of Tutsi population. Gishamvu Sector had 11, Buvumu Sector had 28. This created a conflict between parents of those Tutsi (or Hutu or Twa) who fled against the local authorities who wanted to confiscate them and give them to new Hutu peasants.46

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- In August 1975, the Burgomaster of Gishamvu proceeded with the redistribution of 15 more properties that had been newly identified as belonging to those who had gone to exile.47

- In October 1975, the Subprefect allowed the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune to redistribute the land of two persons, Tete and Kanyangira: “Tete and Kanyangira have fled, so it is understandable that the inheritances [land] of those who have fled must be redistributed as the law stipulates…”48

- The citizen Edouard Munana had several lands (amasambu): one located at Kigote in Sholi and another located at Cyamutumba and another located at Mubumbano. Then the Burgomaster obliged him to choose one among those. The authorities chose for him the Cyamutumba one, and others got redistributed to other people. But Munana went to work in Butare town as a teacher in the Ngoma commune, so he did not occupy even the land given to him. Subsequently, when he wanted to obtain some of his lands, he went to the tribunal and the Acting Judge asked clarification to Burgomaster Munyarugano in 1965.49 In 1975 Munana reclaimed again his land and got a negative response from the Burgomaster Kambanda.50

- Sebasoni son of Sezikeye and Nyirahorana went to the Prefecture office to accuse the Burgomaster to having confiscated his father’s land whereas he did not flee, that is, did not become a “refugee”. The Subprefect requested the Burgomaster to investigate this case and send to the Prefecture office a written report of this investigation.51

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47 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Report concerning the redistribution of land properties left by the refugees, Ref. No. 369/04.09.01/14, Gishamvu, 22 August 1975.

48 N. Mujyakera, Subprefect of the Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Re: Concerning the case of Tete and Kanyangira, Ref.: No. 1350/03.05/3, 3 October 1975.

49 Emile Mpambara, Acting Judge and Auditor of Requests, Tribunal of First Instance of Butare Prefecture, Letter to Mr. Munyarugano Emmanuel, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Re: The problem of Mr. Munana, Ref.: No. 843/D.04/Req., Copy, Butare, 31 July 1965.

50 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to Mr. Munana Edouard, Teacher in Butare, Ngoma Commune, Re : Reply to the Munana Edouard’s letter dated 12 September 1975, Ref. No. 430/03.05/3, Gishamvu, 10 October 1975; Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune Gishamvu, A Monsieur le Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, Objet: Réponse de la lettre n° 1310/03.05/3 du 23 sept. 1975, n° 431/03.05/3, Gishamvu, le 10 Octobre 1975.

51 N. Mujyakera, Subprefect of the Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Re: Concerning the case of Sebasoni, Ref.: No. 1429/03.05/3, 18 October 1975.
The majority of these cases are for Gishamvu commune, but it is likely that even in Kibayi Commune they occurred. These cases show us that the land redistribution and reclamations continued even after 1966 and that the 1966 Decree did not stop reclamations. They show that confiscation by an authoritarian regime did not stop populations from attempting to reclaim what they thought to be their property right.

Moreover, as the population size continued to increase, land became more and more scarce. As a result, new lists of people consulting the Commune Councils for land allocation became numerous. In Commune meetings of the Commune Council, of the Development Council and of Technical Commissions, cases of application for land from individuals continued to be debated. Depending on the availability or planned use of communal land, decisions were taken either in favour or against applicants. Applicants were from various strata of the population: peasants and non peasants, youth needing land for founding a family, or just old people, poor and wealthy, etc. To a number of people, the existing administration gave the option of moving to villages, organized in order to create a demographic decongestion of overpopulated communes towards less populated ones, during the 1960s and 70s.

For example, in Kibayi in 1968, a number of people applied for land, for wood, for pieces of land in the forest and some of them received a positive reply, while others were refused. In Gishamvu Commune in 1975, a number of people asked for land. One of them is Jean Baptiste Kabiligi. Here is a portion of the content of his application letter: “I have the honour to apply for a land that is located in the Gishamvu commune precisely at the Rwimbogo hill. This property once belonged to one brother of Kamanzi, but the latter is a refugee since the events.”

52 Raymond Hakizimana, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune and Ruhigira, Mathieu (Secretary), Minutes of the Commune Council Meeting held on 31 March 1969.
even if it can be a small piece of land. [...] In case you receive this letter, please give the answer to my father Emmanuel Munyarugano who will inform me about it.”

Another letter is from a soldier asking for an isambu: “I write to you and the Commune council, in order to apply for an isambu among those amasambu that you are currently redistributing. [...] I inform you that at Ndanga’s place there are three amasambu: his, and the ones of Karama and Kabishinga, who are his sons. All these have fled, or else you can give me the one located elsewhere.”

Besides the allocation of land in the commune where applicants lived, the Rwandan government also planned for land allocation in villages (paysannats). Certain people were settled in these places during the 1970s. For example, in 1970, the Gishamvu Commune made a list of 97 men, probably heads of families or singles, wishing to go to Kibungo (East of the country) in order to settle there. Thereafter, the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune made a list of 61 people, men and women, who by February 1971 had effectively gone to live in the village of Rusumo. But the policy of village settlement existed before 1970. For example, Joseph Karengera, who was the first Burgomaster of Sholi Commune that was part of Gishamvu from September 1960 to January 1963, applied for a piece of land within the existing forest in Gishamvu. He was given the following answer: “Concerning your letter dated 12 August 1964, I inform you that the Commune Council does not have the power to destroy the forest so that it can settle people there. You can apply for an isambu located in the paysannat (village).”

The average size of land used for agriculture was about 1.21 ha per household at national level since 1987, which suggests that compared to the availability of land, demographic

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54 Vénant Ndemeye, Caporal, Rwandan Army, P.O. Box 42 Kibungo, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, written on 6 September 1975 and received on 16 September 1975.
56 Athanase Muyambere, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, (Signed by the Secretary Oscar Nkundizera), Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: the list of those wanting to go in the village (paysannat) of Rusumo in Kibungo Prefecture, Ref.: No. 133/C./G./70/, Gishamvu, 24 July 1970.
58 P.D. Nkezabera, Minister of Agriculture and Breeding, Letter to Mr. Joseph Karengera, Commune Gishamvu, Butare, Ref.: No. 11/860/AGRI., Kigali, 4 September 1964.
size had increased by far, and that the peasants were struggling to meet just subsistence needs. However, that average size hid considerable inequalities: according to one estimate of early 1990s, 43% of poor farmers occupied 15% of arable land, while 16% of the richest families held 43% of arable land. Indeed, those who had cash to purchase land, i.e., government officials or businessmen, had bigger portions of land, while poor peasants were left with insignificant portions. As a result, around the half of peasants across the country were obliged to lease land in order to meet food production needs, which means that life in rural areas had become precarious.

By 1991, there was no reserve of arable land, which means that new redistributions were quasi impossible. Farmers would access land by inheritance from the family land, by purchase or by leasing. The research of Pottier carried out in Butare shows that by 1986, there was “no more arable land to be distributed” and that there was “only one way forward: agricultural intensification.” But, despite this, some people continued to apply for land donations even in 1991. One of them, not even a poor person, was Dr. Bruno Ngorabatware, working at the University Hospital of Butare. The Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune answered him that there was no land available to give him and that the Commune Council could not even give him a portion of the forest located at Mubumbano Sector.

3.2.2. Refugees

Some attempts to resolve the refugee issue, though given less attention by the national media during the 1970s and the 1980s, had occurred both at the state and individual levels. At state level, negotiations did not attract much attention because on the one hand they were done kind of secretly, and on the other hand they did not bear positive results. On the side of Rwanda and Uganda, as early as 1974, the Habyarimana regime had just launched talks with their Ugandan counterparts. On the side of Burundi, as early as 1967, François Rukeba, who had been a renowned leader of the UNAR party in exile, got in contact with the Rwandan Minister of Defence. He also contacted the UN in 1970. However, these talks became futile because the Habyarimana regime lacked the political will to solve the refugee issue in a sustainable way. It posed more constraints, imposed more conditions on the refugees and promised less rights to them. It failed to take into consideration the requirements of the refugees. The refugees were required to behave politically in a manner that would not disturb the political line of Rwanda; they were asked not to reclaim their goods left while they fled and to be economically useful to the country; and they were asked not to engage in social conflict at local level. The regime often repeated the famous explanation that the country was too overpopulated to find a free space for all the refugees who were outside the country.64

At individual level, many refugees continued to cross the border and come to visit their relatives in Rwanda. In the process, some of them went back to their asylum countries, some remained in Rwanda, and some were caught by the local administration which either allowed them to settle or deported them back to their country of asylum.65 Though the number of these refugees is not statistically significant, it is important qualitatively, because it teaches us that certain individuals did not passively accept the government line. In other words, individual agency becomes important as a field of investigation in the consideration of the refugee issue. The few cases that I came across in my research area include people who came to visit their relatives and went back to their asylum

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countries; people who came and thereafter were reported to the local administration that sent them to the office of the Prefecture of Butare for further investigation; and cases of people who were effectively driven out of the country again.

Around 1978, my informant Théodomir Munyarugamba crossed the border from Congo (then Zaire) and came to visit his family members who had remained in Rwanda when he went in exile in 1961 or 1962. He arrived at the Commune Office, chatted with the Burgomaster Kambanda and was allowed to visit his siblings. He ultimately went back to Congo after his visit.

A number of other people came to settle in Rwanda. Some were authorized to return, others were refused. For example, in January 1969, one young man whose name is not mentioned in the letter was authorized to enter and live with his parents. For the following case, the decision was still pending, but the attitude of the Butare Prefect seemed in the direction of giving more decision room to the Burgomaster: “I am asking you if the refugee Joseph Ruganintwali, son of Sebizeze (sic?) and Gashikazi from Bitare Cell can have access to his land and settle in it in Bitare, and that if by settling in Bitare this cannot disturb the security and peace of the population.” Here is another case where the decision of authorities was not yet taken: “Referring to your letter [...] informing me about the return of Joseph Kayuku, I ask you to send me this person together with all papers that he brought from Tanzania, with your interrogation with him when he arrived in the country.”

In July 1969, the Butare Prefect issued a letter to all Burgomasters in which he ordered them to be more vigilant towards refugees who crossed the border with the intention to return to Rwanda. The attitude in this letter seems to be one of suspicion against those refugees:

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Nowadays, several refugees are coming back in our Prefecture without respecting the Presidential Decree No.25/01 of 26 February 1966. Those refugees are returning clandestinely crossing on paths that are illegal and cross the border [Akanyaru river] at night. That proves that they come back with the attitude and ideology that they had while fleeing. No one can tolerate this return which does not respect the authorities of the country. That is why I remind you to close the customs and put there security surveillants who will forbid those entering in the country without immigration and emigration papers. […] You must remind the populations especially those who live near the borders, to forbid those crossing the Akanyaru river and to inform the authorities about anyone crossing. Anyone who will be caught helping refugees to cross in an unlawful manner (due to bribes or friendship), catch him or her, bring them to me, they will be severely punished.⁶⁹

In January 1971, one lady, Vestine Kamanzi, returned to Gishamvu. Here is the interrogation text of her case:

Q: Who advised you to come back to Rwanda?
A: No one, it was because my husband had already died, and that there was no one else that we knew there, then we advised ourselves [her and her three children] to come back to Rwanda.
Q: Indeed, when they [the authorities] told you to come back to the country, why didn’t you come back?
A: We did not come back to Rwanda because we were with my husband, who was not willing to come back, then when he died, as we realised that we could do nothing, we decided to return.
Q: Can’t you go back to where you were, ask papers allowing you to come to Rwanda, then you come back and settle?
A: Official documents are given to men who pay levies, they cannot give them to us. Moreover, we cannot come from a grave and return into it again, we cannot go back there again.⁷⁰

Another case is about two individuals who returned to Rwanda in October 1971 and thereafter were expelled back to Burundi. The first is Mrs. Nyiramuramuko Emma-Marie. The Burgomaster interrogated her and wrote to the Prefect the following interrogation report:

⁶⁹ Tharcisse Karuta, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Confidential, Circular letter to all Burgomasters, Ref.: No. 1437/B.6./, Butare, 26 July 1969.
⁷⁰ Oscar Nkundizera, Secretary of Gishamvu Commune, Interrogation made by the Gishamvu Commune official to Mrs. Vestine Kamanzi, daughter of Nyagahakwa and Nyiraburere who were living in Mubumbano (before fleeing), Ref.: No. 23/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 25 January 1971.
We send you this lady called Nyiramuramuko Emma-Marie daughter of Ndakorerwa and Nyirabakata who came from Burundi on Saturday, 9 October 1971, now she is in Kibingo in Gishamvu commune, this lady went to Burundi as a refugee, now we send her to you so that you can examine her case: these are some of the words I asked her:

Q: When did you go to Burundi?
A: I went with others as we were fleeing.
Q: In what year did you go?
A: I do not know the year.
Q: With who did you go?
A: I went with my husband, then we separated and I spent six years in that separation.
Q: Now where does your husband live?
A: I do not know his whereabouts.
Q: With who did you come from Burundi? What was your way of crossing?
A: With no one, I crossed at the Kanyaru bridge.
Q: You crossed it at what date?
A: I crossed there on Saturday and I arrived at my home the same day.
Q: How?
A: I passed there by foot on a market day of Nyanza of Nyaruteja at the lower bridge [Kanyaru bas].

The second is Mr. Augustin Kanamugire who also crossed the border of Burundi and came back to Gishamvu and joined his family members. After the investigation of the two cases, the Prefect decided to expel both Nyiramuramuko and Kanamugire. The Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune executed that decision to expel them on 19 October 1971. Here is what he wrote to the Customs Officer: “I ask you to verify for me these two refugees Kanamugire and Nyiramuramuko, that I give to the policemen to send them back to Burundi, if really they made them cross the border so that they can return to where they came from.” But, few weeks after, the Burgomaster noticed that Kanamugire had again “illegally” come back to Gishamvu. So, he informed again the Prefect about this:

I inform you that I did a serious investigation in his neighbours and found out that he fled in 1962, he allegedly went following his elder brother called Twabagira who went as a refugee. Since that time of 1962, he did not come back.

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71 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, (the date and the reference number are not clear).
72 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Chief of Customs office, Gishamvu, 19 October 1971.
to Rwanda, the last time he returned was in October 1971, when he came with his sister Mukankundiye Immaculée, who also went there without emigration papers. Mr. Prefect, as you had requested us in your letter […] that we must expel him and he must go back to where he was, we expelled him, and accompanied him until the customs office, but after some time we saw him coming back again. I would like to hear from you what we must now do, concerning Kanamugire who is now at his father’s house, and her sister who went to collect him without having official papers to travel outside the country; she is lying saying that her brother is not a refugee.73

Another person who is mentioned by one informant as having been expelled from Gishamvu is the wife of Nkeramihigo, but the date is not ascertained: “There is a man who had fled in 1960. […] His wife was from Nyakibanda. Then she wanted to reclaim her isambu [land] from Nyakibanda. Munyarugano analysed the case, and told the policemen to go and deport the lady to Burundi, so that she could join her husband, and not come back here.”74 However, this lady, as she is said to have had some influential people as friends of her husband, did not cross the border. She came back by force and contacted those friends from Kigali who negotiated her return. Thereafter, this wife of Nkeramihigo was sent back to Mubumbano and Burgomaster Munyarugano lost the case.75

In 1975, the Burgomaster Kambanda sent an old lady Mukankundiye to the Prefect of Butare in order to decide whether the lady can be allowed to come back in Gishamvu or re-expelled. He sent her along with an interrogation report. The lady said that she went to Tanzania in 1961 with her husband, that she came back to Gishamvu on 5 February 1975, that they were staying in Mubumbano before fleeing to Tanzania, that she intends to stay at Sholi with the Munyezamu family, Munyezamu is her son-in-law. “Will you pursue in justice the belongings you left while fleeing with your husband?” asked the Burgomaster. “I will not waste my time and energy doing that, because I came here in order to be and

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73 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The issue of Augustin Kanamugire who came from Burundi, Ref.: 259/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 8 November 1971.
74 Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
75 Interview with Anonymous 4, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
die in Rwanda, she replied.” This gave her more chance to be accepted since she guaranteed not to sue the Commune about her land.76

On 5 January 1988 the officer Responsible for Intelligence Service in Butare Prefecture visited the Gishamvu Commune in order to investigate the case of two refugees, namely Jérôme Burabyo from Nyakibanda and Mathilde Uwihoreye from Muboni. Those refugees wished to be reintegrated in Gishamvu, so the Intelligence service wanted to take an ad hoc decision.77

This shows that until late 1980s, some refugees were still striving to come back to Rwanda. Rwanda represented for them the ideal home, both materially and symbolically. Asylum countries were symbolised as worst places, graves to use the term of one above refugee. And the ancestors’ land was the best place to rest on, as the old lady Mukandutiye stressed in her interrogation answers. It is interesting to see how both men and women were outstanding agents in this effort to come back to Rwanda by means not authorized by the state.

3.2.3. Violence

It is ironic that each postindependence regime in Rwanda, whether the First Republic or the Second, started in the wake of mass violence. The First Republic came after independence struggles which included violence. The second followed violence against the educated Tutsi.

A number of refugees formed a rebel group called Inyenzi (cockroaches).78 That group is said to have started attacking Rwanda in 1961.79 The Inyenzi made small but

76 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Interrogation report of Mukankundiye daughter of Gatoyi and Nyirabugasu who came from Tanzania after having gone as a refugee, Ref.: No. 89/04.09.01/14, Gishamvu, 11 May 1975.
77 Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Gishamvu, A Monsieur le Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, Rapport administratif 1\er trimestre 1988, N° 429/04.17.01, Gishamvu, le 13/05/1988, p. 3.
78 It is not well established whether this name was nicknamed to them as in insult, or if they gave themselves that name. According to Mubashankwaya, it was a nickname given to them because of their clandestinity and night surprise attacks. (Mubashankwaya, Le Rwanda depuis 1959, p. 77.) According to Shyirambere, they called themselves that way, in order to prove their force. (Shyirambere J. Barahinyura,
geographically scattered attacks that seriously disturbed the colonial state and then the postindependence state. If the numbers of their victims were not very considerable, the psychological effect that their attacks created was very significant. It is in December 1963 that they launched a major offensive at Bugesera on the border of Rwanda with Burundi. The Inyenzi were able to control the Gako military base for few days, after which the *Garde Nationale*, as the New Rwandan Army was called, together with Belgian troops were able to defeat them. Immediately after the defeat of the Inyenzi, the military engaged in retaliatory acts against the Tutsi population across the country. The President ordered Prefects all over the country to take whatever measures they deemed appropriate in order to counter the Inyenzi operations. Extreme violence started on 23 December 1963, a week after the Inyenzi invasion, and went on until January 1964. In Gikongoro itself, between 2,000 and 10,000 Tutsis were massacred, and that corpses were seen flowing in the Akanyaru river and were seen on the side of Burundi, which led to international media coverage. Violence in Gikongoro occurred from 24 to 27 December 1963, under the leadership of the Prefect André Nkeramugaba, who according to Reyntjens benefited from the Tutsi elimination by capturing land that belonged to thousands of them, and that that act did not jeopardize his political career. Numbers of the overall estimate of victims during this violence for the whole country are disputed. Reyntjens and Lemarchand suggest an estimate of between 10,000 to 14,000 Tutsi killed, while Antoire Mugesera calculates between 25,000 and 35,000 Tutsi killed. Following the December 1963 Inyenzi attack, 15 Tutsi political figures from UNAR and RADER were assassinated. Whether they shared the same political ideology with the Inyenzi or not, they were accused of being accomplices of this rebel group.

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*Rwanda. Trente deux ans après la révolution sociale de 1959*, Frankfurt Am Main, Editions Izuba, 1992, p. 38.) But Antoine Mugesera who has done an extensive research on the Inyenzi attacks, contends that it is not possible to know whether that group called itself Inyenzi or whether the name was given to them by their opponents. (Mugesera, *Imibereho*, p. 133.)

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After this attack of December 1963, the Inyenzi rebels launched other small attacks in 1964 at Bugarama in the South-Western part of the country, and in July 1966 at Kibungo (East), Ngenda in 1966 ending, Bweyeye and Nshili in November 1966.82

One feature of this mass violence is that the Rwandan government used not just the regular security apparatuses, which are said to have been few, about 1,200 soldiers for the whole country, but also the civil population: “…after the terrorist incursions triggered by at the end of December 1963, the government resorted to “hill self-defence” whereby all able-bodied men are always equipped with their spears and bows, either in their homes and at workplace, they do the guard, inform about any suspect movement and are ready to directly intervene.” 83 As this document continues, “[t]his emergency measure created a real danger concerning the legality of methods used for the securing order and rendered hard its control by public powers.”84

The Inyenzi group stopped its attacks in late 1966, but the reasons are not clearly known. It is either because the Inyenzi were “weary of seeing Tutsis slaughtered every time they attacked,”85 or because they came to be “aware that it is impossible to regain power militarily.”86 Another version points out that in 1966-1967, the government of Rwanda was in contact with the government of Burundi and that both reached an agreement of neutralizing armed groups of Rwandan refugees.87 The end of rebel attacks was celebrated in the 1966 Butare Prefecture report as having brought back peace and tranquillity.88

82 Mugesera, Imibereho, pp. 183-184.
83 Chronique de Politique Étrangère, Décolonisation et Indépendance du Rwanda et du Burundi, volume XVI, numéros 4-6, Juillet-Décembre 1963, p. 531.
84 Chronique de Politique Étrangère, Décolonisation, p. 532.
85 Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families. Stories from Rwanda, New York, Farrar Strauss and Giroux, 1998, p. 66.
Another feature of this violence is that it created suspicion against all the Tutsi population living in the country in general, and the ones established in communes located near the borders in particular. This suspicion went on for a long time, although from 1967 until 1990 no more attacks were launched against Rwanda. In my area of study, I came across testimonies of harassment and even imprisonment of some Tutsi people, following the Inyenzi attack of Nshili (Gikongoro) that occurred in November 1966. Informants enumerate the names of following people as having been put in prison: François Munyantore, Denis Senyange, Laurent Minani, Vincent Musoni, Joseph Muragwashaka, Laurent Ruhinguka, Sabizeze and university students who included Alexis Rwamwaga. The majority of them were teachers, hence considered as wealthy. According to Munyantore who is my informant and who is one of those who were jailed, they were imprisoned in Butare town. Concerning time spent in jail, it appears that they spent some months there, as one archival document on Denis Senyange establishes. They were ultimately released with no proof of connection with the Inyenzi.

In addition to arrests, suspicion was directed mostly against Tutsi people who used to travel: “… they chose us, and we came to live with them, but without much peace, because whenever the Inyenzi invade the country, we were to answer for those actions, we underwent verbal irony. […] If you travel somewhere where they do not know, they assume that you were among the Inyenzi, they book you to jail.” This is confirmed by Innocent Nahayo as well:

…the existing power used to suspect the ethnic group of Tutsi, alleging that it is the Tutsi who send logistical support to their fellows, they are the ones who help them. Munyarugano disliked anyone going to Burundi, even if it is a Hutu,

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90 “I have received your attestation of good behavior of 2 June concerning Mr. Senyange Denis, candidate at the Training of CFCCA (Centre de Formation des Cadres Pour les Coopératives Agricoles). This attestation mentions that the concerned person has been released from prison in 1967. Can you please inform me the reasons why he was in jail?” (C. Sanz, Responsable du Centre de Formation des Cadres Pour les Coopératives Agricoles (CFCCA), Lettre à Monsieur le Bourgmestre de la Commune Gishamvu, Préfecture de Butare, Ref. : 509, Kavumu, 15 July 1969.)
91 Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
especially when he knows that the latter cooperates with the Tutsi. Any person who put his feet in Burundi, Munyarugano [Burgomaster] was jailing him. 92

This informant gives an example of a Hutu man from Kayongwe area called Kayongoka Harerimana who had kept two cows of a refugee called Munyengango. The cows became three. Then he went to Burundi to give them back to Munyengango who rewarded him by giving him one of those cows. This informant contends that there were many Hutu who had kept some cows of the Tutsi who had fled to Burundi. Some of them used to take back those cows to the owners. They became suspicious as well, as they were in good relationship with people considered as enemies of the country.

Written documents about this suspicion are also available. I was able to find a few, which are worthy of note here.

This young man Léonidas Karekezi who was living in Buvumo [sic, Buvumu] in Gishamvu Commune was caught at the Kanyaru [river, also frontier with Burundi], now a policeman brought him here at the Office of the Prefecture, so I send him to you after allowing him stay in the Commune at his alleged place of Buvumo, but you are requested to closely check his behaviour in the commune, his conversations with other constituents, and he must remain within the Sector boundaries, he must not go anywhere else. 93

Suspicion was not directed towards men only. Even women were closely monitored, especially if they happened to travel.

Referring to your letter (…) informing me about the lady Teresa Mukangwije who comes from Burundi, I inform you that if you know very well that she went there but she was not a refugee, and that her parents did not flee and behave well in the Commune, and are patriotic, you can give her relevant papers, so that we can also issue her the passport. 94

This is one of my informants. She was easily permitted to travel because her parents did not flee, so she was not suspected of collaborating with Inyenzi in Burundi.

92 Interview with Innocent Nahayo, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
The Prefect of Butare suspected another three ladies and sent the following message to all Burgomasters of the Butare Prefecture:

After receiving this letter of mine, I ask you to check in your commune the following people living there: Sinandugu Mukarwego, Elisabeth Nyirasakwekwe and Cécile Nyiraminani. These people regularly go to Burundi. Search everywhere in your commune, and if you find them, please send them to the Office of the Prefecture.95

The Subprefect also inquired about one lady from Sheke Sector, in Gishamvu: “…I request you to inform me about the behaviour of Mukagashugi who recently came from Bujumbura (Burundi), now she is in Sheke in Gishamvu Commune. That is, [her behaviour] since she arrived in the Commune you administer.”96 The same applied to Marthe Mukamugema who is said to have travelled to Burundi as well and then came back.97

Finally, in February 1973, another major bout of violence occurred. The Kayibanda regime targeted mainly the Tutsi who either studied in secondary and tertiary schools, or who were employed. Lists of those to sack were made in advance and sent to heads of schools and employers.98 It was a way of recreating the ambiance of 1959-1962 where the attack against Tutsi seemed to unite the Hutu. In that particular moment of extreme division within the PARMEHUTU party, Kayibanda hoped to regain his previous popularity by instrumentalizing ethnicity again. As the situation turned out, however, this violence led also to the overthrow of Kayibanda.

The Second Republic was also responsible for political violence against former leaders. President Kayibanda with a number of his ministers were imprisoned. Some of them got

assassinated. From 1974 to 1976, President Kayibanda was sequestered at his home of Kavumu in Gitarama, where he lived in extreme poverty and ultimately died of sickness on 15 December 1976. The death of Kayibanda in very bad conditions together with a number of his former government members was reminiscent of the fall of African leaders since the beginning of the 1960s, where assassination and use of political violence has tended to predominate as a way of power changing hands, rather than by way of election. This was the result of their authoritarian nature and character. As Ali Mazrui rightly notes, “[w]here authority is too personified, challenge to authority also tends to take the form of personal violence. The possibilities of assassination are maximized.”

3.3. STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

In addition to what has been said above about the First and Second Republics, it is worth noting that they became regimes of multiple exclusions. The most documented are ethnicity and regionalism, but there are many others. These can be considered as part of what is called structural violence, that is, a violence “built into the structure of a society” and that manifests itself in the forms of “unequal life chances” caused by “great inequality, injustice, discrimination, and exclusion […] needlessly limiting people’s physical, social, and psychological well-being.”

3.3.1. Ethnic and Regional discriminations

The First Republic considered that promoting the Hutu and discriminating the Tutsi was a way of doing social justice, since the Tutsi were considered as having been favoured during the colonial period. Schooling was one priority, but the target was that once the Hutu increased their numbers of educated people, they would take over the control of the

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administration and other economic activities. President Kayibanda considered that education should be “democratic”, that is, it should have the Hutu as the majority beneficiaries at all levels: “Schools must be democratic, inevitably. What does that mean? - Children of the People might attend both elementary and tertiary education. - Instruction must be truly democratic. - In Schools, the Hutu, the Twa and the Tutsi must be represented proportionally with their percentage in the population, that means, 86% of the Hutu, 14% of the Tutsi and 1% of the Twa.”\(^{102}\) In order to control the education sector, President Kayibanda had nationalized schools in 1966, so that church control over education would decrease.\(^{103}\)

When in 1973 the Kayibanda government decided to wage war against the educated Tutsi, it accused them of occupying 50% of secondary education or more.\(^{104}\) However, available statistics had pointed out a smaller percentage: According to Mugesera, the statistics of Tutsi in Secondary school had gone down from 36.0% in 1962-1963 at independence to 11% in 1972-1973 when the Kayibanda regime was attacking the Tutsi.\(^{105}\) According to him again, the Tutsi were 8.5% in the Butare University, which means that, if these figures are reliable, they were under-represented according to their demography.\(^{106}\) These figures are fairly close to what is suggested in Hanf’s book: in 1971-1972, Tutsi were 19.7% in secondary school, Hutu were 79.8% and Twa were 0.03%.\(^{107}\) The statistics of the Education Ministry say that the Tutsi occupied 15.8% of places in secondary schools, whereas they were 11.4% in the population.\(^{108}\)


\(^{105}\) Mugesera, Imibereho, pp. 266-267.

\(^{106}\) Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 272.

\(^{107}\) Hanf et al., Education et développement, p. 140.

Two authors contend that Kayibanda was more discriminatory than Habyarimana when it came to Tutsi exclusion. However, a close examination suggests that though started by Kayibanda, this policy of ethnic and regional quota was systematized by Habyarimana who gradually excluded the Tutsi and the Twa in the public sector in areas of education and work. This policy put forward “hereditary statuses,” that is ethnic or regional belonging, rather than “individual merit.”

During the First Republic, the central region was favoured as it was the place of origin of President Kayibanda and most of the PARMEHUTU politicians who had survived the divisions of that party. The Second Republic favoured the Northern regions of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri over the rest of the country. This entails that Tutsi and Hutu of regions other than the ones of ruling elites, during both regimes, were like second-class citizens, to use Pandey’s term.

Though the Habyarimana regime started with a discourse of reconciliation, it kept up the ethnic politics. In this regard, ID books and official documents continued to bear ethnic identities. Furthermore, during the Major National Census of 1978, instructions to collect ethnic identities were given. According to these instructions, children bore the ethnic identity of their parents. In case the parents had different ethnic identities, the child could bear the identity of his or her father. In case the latter was not known, the child could bear the ethnic identity of her mother. Kimonyo argues that a number of Tutsi became afraid to report their ethnic identification, because they thought it could again be used against them.

I came across this phenomenon as well. The preparation of the census of 1978 happened to be problematic in communes located at the border with Burundi. In

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Kibayi, it was noticed that many people were Burundians who had arrived in that area long time ago, even before independence. Some of them even had Rwandan IDs. Even the Burgomaster Nyamigango was said to be a Burundian. Yet he was the one to handle this issue. So, those suspected to be Burundians were afraid of being expelled. The Tutsi also became afraid, because before the launching of this census, there were rumours that said that this census intended to identify some people to send to Tanzania into exile. The authorities dismissed such rumours, but this dismissal did not calm down those who were afraid. Some Tutsi of Saga are said to have been afraid to be identified as such, and curious about the reasons behind this identification, but the authorities calmed them down, explaining that there was no danger of being identified ethnically during the census. After all, this census came just five years after the expulsion of Tutsi in 1973, which means that those who remained in the country were still remembering the violent effects of ethnicity. This control through checking IDs and through organizing the census – and as seen above through checking their whereabouts – is reminiscent of Foucault’s analysis of the techniques of surveillance over certain members of society: registering them, locating them, and observing or visualizing them.

At local level, this ethnic and regional policy created not just a social malaise but also psychological suffering. Life histories of Tutsi and a number of Hutu informants are full of episodes of discrimination in areas of education and employment. Education seems to have attracted the attention of more informants than employment. Informants remember themselves or some or their family members having been refused access to first year secondary school after their state exam of 6th primary school year. Some of them say that they succeeded, attained higher marks but were surprised to notice that some of their

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117 Epaphrodite Nyamigango, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, *Minutes of General population meeting held on 2 June 1978*, Ref.: No. 86/03.04/1, Kibayi, 6 June 1978.  
120 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 143.  
colleagues who received lower marks were admitted while they were excluded. One record that I found in the Gishamvu archives for 1975 shows that of 88 students of the secondary school from Gishamvu, 17 were Tutsi and there were no Twa. This shows that the Tutsi were 19.3%, whereas the Tutsi population was 27.98% of the total population in that year. This is an imbalance if one considers the percentage of the Tutsi and the Twa in Gishamvu. According to one informant, certain Tutsi pupils, once excluded from the list of admission to secondary school, chose to go to Burundi to study in a refugee High School located there. This means that exclusion in education also created exile.

In education, discrimination was at the level of admission as shown above, but also at the level of treatment. Those who had been students recall having been asked by some of their teachers to identify themselves ethnically. This identification was recorded at school because it was resorted to in order to determine admission in secondary school later. However, it is not clear why the teachers had to ask children their ethnic identity, whereas it was easy to get it through the ID books of their parents. Certain narratives reveal that it was a way of bringing that awareness among pupils themselves. This identification is said to have made pupils uncomfortable, because either they did not know what to answer, since some of them did not know their ethnic identity, or else because they found out that they were different from the ones with whom they thought they were the same. Also, some of those who were fewer, that is, the Tutsi and the Twa, say that they felt more insecure.

Concerning employment, all interviewed people take the example of employment at the level of the commune administration and point out that almost all Councillors were Hutu and that it was only at the level of the cell that the Tutsi were included albeit to a minor

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122 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Anonymous 4, Anonymous 1, Thérèse Mukangwije, Eugénie Nikuze, Théodosie Kanyanja, Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Fortunée Mujawamariya, François Ntukabumwe, and Drocèle Uwimana.
123 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune (Signed by Councillor Joseph Rwandanga who replaces the Burgomaster), Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, List of Students enrolled in Secondary Education who are from Gishamvu Commune, Ref., No. 374/04.09.01/9, Gishamvu, 26 August 1975.
125 Interviews with Anonymous 12, Ladislas Harerimana, and Jean Marie Vianney Hategekimana.
extent. They narrate how the majority of Tutsi who had completed their secondary education were admitted only in the teaching profession and that in administrative positions at the Commune office they were allowed to be only employees in charge of youth organisation\textsuperscript{126}, a post that employed only one person per commune. For example, in 1976, among the personnel of the Gishamvu Commune, there was only 1 Tutsi, the agriculture supervisor (\textit{Moniteur Agricole}), a very small position out of 29 employees, and there were no Twa.\textsuperscript{127} The Tutsi in particular stood less chance of being in the military or in the police.\textsuperscript{128} However, in both Gishamvu and Kibayi Communes, Tutsi were numerous in teaching positions at primary education.

The strategies of survival in this form of exclusion included changing the ethnic identity. The research of Antoine Mugesera shows that this trend was a national one.\textsuperscript{129} Furthermore, the Tutsi created amicable ties as well as matrimonial ties with the Hutu, especially the ones who were powerful, and who allowed them access to education or jobs.\textsuperscript{130}

\textbf{3.3.2. Rural Exclusion}

During the Kayibanda and the Habyarimana regimes, officials always claimed to be promoting the masses and especially the rural people. However, the First Republic failed to articulate a policy of economic recovery that could reach the rural areas.\textsuperscript{131} The Second Republic made development its main policy, but because of authoritarianism in control of

\textsuperscript{126} Interview with Théodosie Kanyanja and Anonymous 12.
\textsuperscript{127} Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune Gishamvu, \textit{A Monsieur le Préfet de Préfecture de Butare, Objet : Réponse de la lettre n° 1062/03.01.02 “Personnel Communnal Commune Gishamvu”, N° 416/03.01.02, Gishamvu, le 6 Octobre 1976.}
\textsuperscript{128} Interview with Christophe Nyandwi, Drocèle Uwimana, and Anonymous 17.
\textsuperscript{129} Mugesera, \textit{Imibereho}, pp. 283-289.
\textsuperscript{130} This is the case of my informant Domitilla Nsabimana from Kibayi who studied thanks to the help of her relative Bishop in Butare, and got a job as teacher at Primary School in Kibayi after marrying a Hutu man, my other informant, Christophe Nyandwi, who was then the Inspector of Schools in Kibayi and Muganza Areas. Other interviewed people who lived or witnessed similar experiences include Césarie Uwambajimana and Anonymous 16.
cooperatives and economic projects, these gave more benefit to state employees of projects than to the local population for whom they intended to work.\textsuperscript{132}

The urban areas benefited from more investments to the detriment of rural areas. As a result, the gap between the rural and the urban, the peasants and the money-makers - leaders, state employees and businessmen – went on widening in favour of the latter.\textsuperscript{133}

This gap became a serious indicator of inequality. Furthermore, political decisions and projects in agriculture and livestock production failed to take into account the views of peasants, and were sometimes against their interests, and even worse, did not consider peasants as partners.\textsuperscript{134} As Jean-Pierre Godding put it eloquently, these projects ‘target things, ‘agricultural production’, and forget human beings, that is, ‘the producers’ as these are not quantified [in project drafts]. – They target the objectives to reach though they do not know clearly what to do. As a result, there is no particular interest to express the needs of the peasants (who are supposed to have been studied in the first place) […] Therefore, it is not a ‘thought with’ but ‘a power above’, and therefore a scorn of the peasant who is considered as an object, but not a subject of his or her development.’\textsuperscript{135}

Yet in the rhetoric, peasants are described as the ultimate beneficiaries of projects:

Internally, the Rwandan government has frequently reaffirmed its interest in promoting rural development to ameliorate rural living conditions. […] Although the commitment to rural areas is still embedded in political rhetoric, it sometimes appears more rhetorical than real. This tendency has increased as contradictions have appeared between the government’s announced commitment to improving the lives of peasant producers and the economic ideology of “planned liberalism” officially adopted in 1980.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{132} Uvin, Aiding Violence, pp. 176-178.
\textsuperscript{134} Reyntjens, L’Afrique des grands lacs, p. 224.
\textsuperscript{136} Newbury, “Rwanda: Recent Debates”, pp. 201-202.
In reality, those who benefited from projects were the financial organizations, the foreign experts and national employees of those projects. In the view of Bézy, “the rural areas produce and the town consumes…”

Concerning infrastructure construction, one government report noted that buildings were concentrated mainly in the Kigali city from 1979 to 1988, and that in 1988, 73% of construction authorizations were in Kigali, whereas Gisenyi had 11%, Ruhengeri 7% and Butare 4%.

Verwimp has showed the relationship between political loyalty and economy, through the monitoring of coffee production and revenue. From this, one understands how the existing Habyarimana power valued the peasants at national level, i.e., what they represented to his regime. It follows that they were nothing but producers and givers of loyalty to the leader. They seemed to have no other value.

Finally, the state strove to stop the rural exodus to towns. It used all police and administrative forces to restrict the rural populations to their territory, a measure that was not always beneficial to them: “…this anti-urban policy benefited people already living in the cities, the so-called ‘elite’.” Indeed, in order to move from one commune to another, a citizen had to apply for a letter of permission to move. And in order to permanently change their address, such as for people who migrated or who got married in a different place, this change of whereabouts was closely documented for both the commune of origin and the commune of destination. As a result, major cities of Rwanda and headquarters of Prefectures never grew to become big cities. As Verwimp observes, in 1973, 95% of the population lived in the rural areas, while twenty years later it was still the same percentage. However, it would be an exaggeration to assert that no

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138 Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989, p. 44.
140 Verwimp, “Development ideology”.
movement to town occurred. As we shall see later, a number of people attempted to move to town. It is more accurate to say that the movement was minor.

3.3.3. Gender Inequality

In addition to ethnic, regional and rural-urban disparities, there was also gender inequality. Women had been much less represented in decision-making apparatuses, though they were demographically around half of the population. They were among the main producers in agricultural and household activities.\(^{142}\) Towards the 1980s, an effort had been undertaken by women’s organisations to promote the rights of women, but in practice they remained less represented.\(^{143}\) The research of Danielle de Lame and Villia Jefremovas show that women did struggle to get some economic progress, and that indeed they made some headway. But, in general, they did not reach the so desired equality with men.\(^{144}\)

3.3.4. Structural Violence against Youth

In 1987, 65% of the Rwandan population were below 25. Yet development projects did not consult this population, and the majority of them were not land owners. So, this group was among the forgotten ones.\(^{145}\) The education sector during the Second Republic remained elitist: it was admitting around 10% of primary school pupils in secondary school, and less than 1% in Tertiary education, which means that the rest were left uneducated. Nothing captures this impasse more than my interview with Karengera Elias, former Burgomaster in the early 1960s about the despair of Sholi youths not attending school, including his own children.\(^{146}\) As a result, most of the unadmitted youths had to

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\(^{146}\) As we shall see in following chapters, this insufficient literacy has been a tool in political manipulation, since the youth were used in militia parties, party violence and later in genocide.
return to the rural homestead and work in agriculture. They had to struggle to get an infrastructure that would allow them to get married, such as land and a house. Yet, if it was still possible to redistribute land to the youth of marriageable age during the 1960s and 1970s, this process became increasingly difficult from the 1980s onwards.\footnote{147}

Indeed, the youth were helped as a group, socially and economically, but were not given a political voice as agents. They were given collective land or natural resources such as clay for bricks, marshland for agriculture, but only as cooperatives or associations.\footnote{148} At the Commune level, there was a service in charge of organizing the youth in associations, but this service suffered from the lack of sufficient human resources in quantity and quality. One employee was not sufficient for more than 50% of the population of the Commune. Communes wished to get at least one employee in charge of youth organization per Sector.\footnote{149}

Few attempted to go to town illegally, that is, without the consent of the existing national policy,\footnote{150} but only a tiny number of them were able to improve their lives that way.\footnote{151} A number of the rest became associated with crime, violence and prostitution in town and rural areas.\footnote{152} The movement from town to rural and vice versa, from home to outside, or to prison, is close to “geographies of delinquency” or “geographies of resistance” as analysed by Mamadou Diouf. In this regard, the youth’s disobedience, banditry, crisis are

\footnote{148 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Council held on 9 May 1984, Ref.: 152/04.04/2, Kibayi, 23 May 1984.}
\footnote{149 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune Gishamvu, Année 1989, Gishamvu, 1990, p. 16.}
\footnote{150 See République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune Gishamvu, Année 1986, Gishamvu, février 1987, p. 28.}
\footnote{151 Jef Maton, Développement économique et social au Rwanda entre 1980 et 1993. Le dixième décile en face de l’Apocalypse, Gent, Oktober – November 1994, p. 22.}
\footnote{152 On the girls and ladies going to town from rural areas and becoming prostitutes, as early as the 70s, see Marijke Vandersypen, “Femmes libres de Kigali”, Cahiers d’études africaines, Année 1977, Vol. 17, No. 65, pp. 95 – 120.}
to be put in a wider structural context of the failure of the state to secure hopes it once gave through the nationalist discourse.\textsuperscript{153}

Thus, several Prefecture and commune reports indicate how the youth of Gishamvu and Kibayi were constantly brought back to their commune after committing some crime in Butare or Kigali towns; were forbidden to play \textit{urusimbi} (sort of illegal lotto or gambling), to consume drugs, but the structural reasons why this youth felt despair and engaged in these activities were not deeply tackled.\textsuperscript{154}

These categories – ethnicity and regionalism, rural-urban disparities, gender inequality and youth exclusion – may not be the sole underpinnings for structural violence, but they appear to be among the most significant.

After looking at the nature and character of postindependence power, its unresolved issues and structural violence, and their connections to the colonial legacy, it is now necessary to turn to what local leaders achieved economically and how their constituents represented them in their everyday relations. This, I believe, is important in order to understand the interrelation between leaders and constituents during the postindependence period and later on during the political crises leading to genocide.

3.4. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Since colonial times, the evaluation of economic growth was always a major concern for leaders in Rwanda. The link between economic production and demographic growth appeared to be a very important indicator of that economic growth. In this respect,


Censuses were organised at all times and revealed an always growing population size. From 2,000,000 inhabitants in 1913, the population became close to 3,000,000 in 1964, close to 5,000,000 in 1978 and more than 7.5 million inhabitants at the end of 1991. As for Butare Prefecture, it had more than 300,000 inhabitants in 1964. That number reached approximately double in 1978 census, and nearly triple, that is, 908,273 inhabitants in 1991.\textsuperscript{155} In 1934, the rate of demographic growth was 2.25 percent per annum; it increased up to 3.99 percent in 1989.\textsuperscript{156} The reasons seem to be the continuous decrease of the mortality rate\textsuperscript{157} and of course the stabilisation of the birth rate.

The Butare Prefecture was among the three most densely populated Prefectures of Rwanda in 1991, together with Ruhengeri and Gisenyi. As compared to other communes of the Butare Prefecture, Gishamvu and Kibayi were in 1986 of medium population size, because Kibayi was 11\textsuperscript{th} out of 20 communes, while Gishamvu was 12\textsuperscript{th}. The majority of this commune population was young, surpassing half the total number. Indeed, in Kibayi, the population of age between 1 and 25 was 51.6% while it was 55% in Gishamvu, for the year 1989.\textsuperscript{158} Tables 1 and 2 provide the evolution of the population in Kibayi and Gishamvu from 1968 to 1991 for Kibayi and from 1968 to early 1994 for Gishamvu. In these tables, it already appears that the census categorises the population according to ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{159}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{157} République Rwandaise, Office National de la Population (ONAPO), \textit{Le problème démographique}, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{159} These estimates must be considered as approximate, and not absolutely accurate. Indeed, they contain relative errors, because among other reasons not all births, deaths and population movements were reported to the census office at the commune level.
\end{footnotesize}
Table 1: Population of Kibayi Commune

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Surface</th>
<th>Hutu population</th>
<th>Tutsi population</th>
<th>Twa population</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Density</th>
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<td>118</td>
<td>50 945</td>
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Sources: Butare Prefecture and Kibayi Commune reports, monographs and censuses, from 1968 to 1991.
Table 2: Population of Gishamvu Commune

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Surface</th>
<th>Hutu population</th>
<th>Tutsi population</th>
<th>Twa population</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Density</th>
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<td>199</td>
<td>41 921</td>
<td>428</td>
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Sources: Butare Prefecture and Gishamvu Commune reports, monographs and censuses from 1968 to 1994.

The predicament for leaders at different epochs was to balance this growing population with the economic growth. More than 90% of the Rwandan population lived from agriculture, which means that they badly depended on arable land.\textsuperscript{160} As a result, the

\textsuperscript{160} See République Rwandaise, \textit{Enquête démographique et de Santé} 1992, Office National de la Population, Kigali, Rwanda ; Macro International Inc., Calverton, Maryland, USA, Février 1994, p. 3.
constant growth of the population size impacted on the availability of arable land resources. As mentioned earlier, by 1991 no arable land was left unexploited, and the majority of those who had land had a small size, not to mention inequality within land ownership.

Furthermore, soil erosion was still attacking a certain percentage of that arable land. As Rwanda is overwhelmingly a mountainous country, soil protection was and is paramount. Yet, according to Bézy, in 1990, 63% of land was unprotected. But that situation had exceptions: for example, in Gishamvu, on 8,200 ha that needed anti-erosion protection, 94.7% of it had been protected. Furthermore, fertilizers remained scarce: by 1981, Rwanda was cited as the country using the least fertilizer in the world.

As a result, it was frequently hard to cover food needs. For example, towards the end of the 1970s, the density of population in Butare was above 300 inhabitants per km²; as a result, almost everyone was obliged to resort to the market in order to cover food needs, which means that what households produced was no longer enough for food self-sufficiency. In this food insufficiency, there was also a considerable inequality, an inequality that went on growing until 1994, when, as Maton has demonstrated, the situation had become unbearable.

In order to solve the issue of imbalance between population growth and availability of resources, a number of strategies were initiated. They concerned both birth-rate control and increased economic production. The institution in charge of the population growth campaign (ONAPO) was created in 1981. It focused its attention on educating the population about birth control. Indeed, in 1983, Rwanda was top in the world in terms of the number of live births per woman: 8.6 on average. Furthermore, this average varied

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164 Guichaoua, Destins paysans, p. 66.
165 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport annuel 1979, p. 194.
from town to rural areas, the latter having more live births. But until 1990, sensitization towards family planning in order to reduce the number of births per family had not yet borne significant results. By 1988, only 3 to 4% of women at risk used modern contraceptive methods. As a result, the percentage of births per family remained high.

Faced with the issue of land scarcity, many Rwandans resorted to internal migration since as early as the 1960s by joining the villages (paysannats). By the late 1970s, unoccupied lands were already full, though the spontaneous movement of populations in need of land continued through to 1980 towards Kibungo. In Kibayi, the population migrated temporarily to Mayaga and Bugesera resettlements in order to seek agricultural jobs during coffee harvest, and that some even went to Tanzania. But this temporary internal migration also occurred elsewhere. According to one study, internal migrations in rural agricultural regions were widespread between 1960 and 1971, then from 1972 to 1976, the movement towards town was initiated; it intensified in the following period of 1977 until 1980. Rural migrants targeted mostly but not solely land, while urban migrants were the ones who had acquired some education, so they targeted mostly monied jobs.

As resources remained scarce and the population high, the bulk of experts in agriculture in Rwanda towards the 1980s came to the conclusion that diversifying economic production in Rwanda was a priority, since not every peasant could live anymore on

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farming. In order to survive in rural areas, a considerable number of peasants started to engage in non-agricultural production, especially in craft industry and in commerce. In order to regulate the commerce at local level, the state officials reduced the number of markets and set up schedules of those markets, most of which were not permanent. These markets were places established by the existing authorities where buyers and sellers met at certain days of the week to exchange goods and cash. The reasons behind the reduction of the number of markets included the following: some markets had few products, others attracted only women and children, others were accused of hiding a disguised unemployment. In 1976, officially recognized markets numbered two in Kibayi and Gishamvu: Mugombwa market for Kibayi, opening two days per week: Wednesday and Saturday, and Busoro market for Gishamvu, opening on Wednesdays and Sundays. Towards the mid-1980s, the number of these markets was doubled. Gishamvu had two markets: Busoro opening on Wednesday and Sunday, and Kibingo market opening on Friday, while Kibayi had the Kibayi Market for Wednesdays and Saturdays, and Gatunda market, on Sundays.

In the 1980s, both Busoro in Gishamvu and Kibayi centre in Kibayi had become small business centres. In particular, the Kibayi centre had been developed, having a bigger number of buildings and businessmen as compared to Gishamvu. In 1980, one set of business meeting minutes enumerated a list of 14 businessmen in Kibayi, but interviews revealed a much bigger number of them, while for Gishamvu, the only one

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175 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport trimestriel d’activités, du 1er Juillet au 30 Septembre 1975, p. 44.
180 Epaphrodite Nyamigango, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Minutes of the Meeting of Businessmen of the Business Center of Kibayi held on 1 June 1980, Ref.: No. 86/03.09.01/6, Kibayi, 13 June 1980.
renowned businessman seems to have been a certain François Mukimbiri. But at the Prefecture level, commerce was developed only around the 1980s. As late as 1979, there was no wholesale importer in Butare Prefecture.\footnote{République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, \textit{Rapport annuel 1979}, p. 195.}

In this economic uncertainty, Communes, as they enjoyed the status of financial autonomy, had to struggle in order to balance their functioning budget and to get funding for their development projects. The commune finance income came from various sources, internal and external. Internal ones included tax and levies, various dues from population, commune property exploitation, tourism income, and \textit{Umuganda} contributions. During the 1960s, the levies were collected on the adult population [Minimum Personal Levy (CPM)], on cattle and on women from polygamy relations.\footnote{See for example République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, \textit{Rapport annuel 1964}, p. A.P.-3 (1) ; République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, \textit{Rapport annuel 1966}, p. A.P.-3 (1).} Since 1965, the central government left a certain percentage of those levies to the commune administration. They became entirely given to the commune administration from 1976 onwards.\footnote{Alberto Basomingera et al., \textit{Etude sur les potentialités de développement des communes du Rwanda. Cas des communes de la Préfecture de Butare}, Rapport, UNR, Août 1987, p. 14.}

During the 1970s and 1980s, the extent of collection of taxes and levies depended on the charisma and coercion capacity of the leaders in general, and in particular of the Burgomasters, and on the economic situation prevailing at that moment. In Kibayi, before Nyamigango was in office, there were allegedly many adult people who escaped paying tax. When he came into office, in 1973, he focused on the use of police and force, and was able to make people pay tax. The same situation is reported for the advent of Kambanda into office since 1971 in Gishamvu.\footnote{See below.} In general, communes were able to balance their expenses as compared to their income. But towards the mid-1980s, when the whole country started to experience economic crisis due to the decrease of coffee and mineral prices, at the commune level, the financial crisis was witnessed as well. For example, in 1985, the Kibayi commune council was in a financial uncertainty, in such a way that after calculating its expenses in relation to its income, it decided every time to
increase its income by raising more levies and taxes. Commune employees had a delay of salary payment of about five months in May 1985. Strategies taken in order to solve this imbalance included the increase of endeavour in the collection of commune income, the reviewing of expenses, and the reduction of some employees. In 1986 again, the financial situation was not good. As a result, the commune council decided among other strategies to reduce the number of administrative and police personnel. For example in the first quarter of 1990, Kibayi commune had only 7 policemen, whereas it used to have 12 in 1981. The Gishamvu commune officials reported to have registered a financial loss in 1985 as well, and were unable to pay all the salaries. In 1987 it also reduced the number of its personnel. Concerning police in Gishamvu, in 1974, this commune had 14 policemen, this shows that economic conjuncture was good at that time. The number went on decreasing as the economic crisis was becoming severe as in the 1990s. In 1988 for example, the commune Gishamvu had only 5 policemen.

In 1989, as a major famine occurred in Butare, Kibuye and Gikongoro prefectures, people in Gishamvu and Kibayi resisted paying tax, the leaders also softened but did not stop their constraints on them. As a result, the financial situation of those communes was not good. For example, in order to get the local Cell committee members to collect a greater

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percentage of the party dues, the Burgomaster told them that those who reached 95% of collections would be rewarded with a bicycle.\textsuperscript{192}

Gishamvu and Kibayi communes also targeted income from the tourism industry. However, among the two, it is only Kibayi that was able to attract such incomes. Part of this is due to the outstanding effort of Burgomaster Nyamigango who is said to have been very active towards developing the commune in general and tourism in particular. In Kibayi, it is the mountain called \textit{Makwaza mountain} that was made a tourist site. It is near the Akanyaru river, and allows one to have a clear view of both Rwandan and Burundian sides including a beautiful peak. Nyamigango started this project in 1974 by building huts on top of that hill and displaying samples of ethnographic and art collections in one of those huts. The following Burgomaster, Kajyambere, pursued this project, and as a result, it proved successful. For example, from 1976 to 1986, close to 4,000 tourists had visited this site.\textsuperscript{193} In Gishamvu, prospective sites were two: one mountain, \textit{Ibisi}, and a historical site called \textit{ikibuye cya Shali}. But these two sites did not attract as much tourist attention as Kibayi.\textsuperscript{194}

Furthermore, \textit{Umuganda} communal labour was very precious in contributing to the implementation of development projects such as the building of infrastructure and major agricultural projects, such as the planting of trees, the fight against erosion and hygiene. \textit{Umuganda} was an unpaid communal labour provided by the constituents once per week in rural areas. It was instituted in 1974. Though it was not enforced by law, \textit{Umuganda} appeared as a formal contribution, because local authorities were able to punish those who refused to participate in it.\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Umuganda} was closely monitored from the ministry of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{193} Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Kibayi, \textit{A Monsieur le Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare}, Ref. : N° 349/03.09.01/15, Kibayi, le 19/11/1981.
\end{itemize}
local government to the prefect down to the commune.\textsuperscript{196} At local level, it is Development Councils that were in charge of planning for *Umuganda* activities.\textsuperscript{197}

*Umuganda* was about to be formalized by the issuing of an *ad hoc* card when the multiparty system came and weakened this communal work. It was planned by the Minister of Local affairs that from 1 January 1990 onwards, a card showing *Umuganda* participation would be issued and would be given to every member having the age and conditions required, so that this member could show it to whom it may concern to prove that he or she really participated in communal works “geared towards the development of his country.”\textsuperscript{198}

*Umuganda* is said to have contributed to the building of considerable social and administrative infrastructure: local roads and paths, schools, medical centres, administrative buildings, planting of trees in order to fight against erosion, etc.\textsuperscript{199} One official report evaluated the *Umuganda* labour at about 1 billion Rwandan francs each year.\textsuperscript{200} Each commune also quantified the extent of *Umuganda* works in its budget. For example, Gishamvu Commune evaluated at about 1,243,528 francs as the contribution of *Umuganda* labour in the first quarter of 1988.\textsuperscript{201} Across the country, *Umuganda* contribution is said to have reached 25\% of certain development projects.\textsuperscript{202}

Foreign aid was also very important in this move. According to one author, Rwanda was a country of a thousand NGOs. That was in part true if one considers the number of

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\textsuperscript{196} Frédéric Karangwa, Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, *A Monsieur le Responsable du MRND en Commune, tous, Objet : Carte de participation à l’Umuganda*, N° 2348/04.09.02/4, Butare, le 24/10/1989.


\textsuperscript{199} See several Butare Prefecture reports.


\textsuperscript{201} Commune de Gishamvu, *Volume des réalisations de l’Umuganda, 1er Trimestre 1988*.

\end{flushleft}
projects that operated around the country under the intervention of international aid. In the estimation of Peter Uvin, “[i]n total, there were approximately 200 donors in the country: about 20 bilateral ones, 30 multilateral ones, and 150 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Together, they managed more than 500 projects in 1986, ranging from the very small to the very large. The aid system was omnipresent in Rwanda both physically and geographically. [...] This development aid supplied the fuel on which the machinery of the state ran.”

The little economic growth witnessed towards the 1970s and 1980s is said to have benefited from this international aid and cooperation, but this growth was still far from development, because inequalities persisted.

In Gishamvu Commune, for example, from 1980 to 1987, the Commune Council financed its development projects in the proportion of 10%, while the state supported 44%, and the twinning cooperation, i.e. bilateral cooperation between provinces or district of two distinct countries, helped with 6% and the remaining 39% were supported by NGOs. As for Kibayi, for the same period, the commune financed 0%, the state supported 18%, international cooperation paid 21%, there was no twinning, then the remaining 61% came from NGOs. This means that dependence from the state financial intervention was borne by Gishamvu more than Kibayi, while dependence from international aid was borne by Kibayi more than Gishamvu.

Since 1986, Gishamvu Commune had twinning cooperation with the Municipality of Daun of Rhenanie-Palatinat. Among other projects, this cooperation had helped build the Nutritional Centre of Gishamvu and the Mubumbano primary school.

Another economic strategy that seems to have been widespread in Rwanda is the grouping of the active population in cooperatives. For example, Gishamvu and Kibayi had each two big cooperatives that enjoyed juridical personality. In Gishamvu there were COFOGI for Gishamvu smiths and COPADAGI that specialized in storage, catering and

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205 Basomingera et al., *Etude sur les potentialités*, p. 45.
selling of food products. COFOGI produced metal tools used in farming and in household everyday activity. COPADAGI had more than 2,500 members in 1986, which was a great number. COPADAGI was legally recognized since 1983. In 1986, Gishamvu had other 29 small cooperatives that were not yet legally recognised. In 1989, there were two big cooperatives in Kibayi, KOKIKI (1,401 members) created since 1982 and located in Kirarambogo, Rwamiko, and KOKINYA (1,325 members) located in Nyabisagara, Mukindo, created in 1985. They were both silo-cooperatives, that is, they bought, stocked and sold food from and to peasants. Another big one was the Migina People’s Bank that specialised in loan and savings with 1,760 members. There were other 33 cooperatives and precooperatives disseminated in the sectors of the commune created between 1973 and 1988. About 5,712 people were members of those cooperatives and precooperatives, which suggests that the bulk of active population had enthusiastically embraced associations.

Rice cultivation in particular was an activity that flourished significantly in Kibayi. It is Burgomaster Nyamigango who is remembered for having brought it to Kibayi in 1976 and planted it in the Akanyaru marshland. This crop helped the peasants of Kibayi get cash income in addition to coffee. The preparation of the Akanyaru marshland had started since the colonial period, it was underway around 1942, and major works were done after the Second World War. Father Claude Simard was among the main development partners who helped Kibayi in the rice projects, in the COKIKI cooperative and in many other infrastructure projects. After initiating rice agriculture in

208 Basomingera et al., Etude sur les potentialités, pp. 42-43.
212 J. Languy, Agronome d’Astrida, Note au sujet de la mise en valeur de la région de l’Akanyaru, 1946, Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida.
Kirarambogo, Rwamiko, Kibayi, this project was integrated in the national management in 1981. But certain management problems arose. Peasant associations started to be poorly paid for their labour.\textsuperscript{214}

From 9 ha used for rice in 1977, Kibayi rice exploitations reached 50.44 ha in 1981. One notices that Nyamigango, who died in 1980, had done a great job in this respect.\textsuperscript{215} From 1977 to 1983 the quantity of production of rice rose sharply, then reduced in 1984 and 1985.\textsuperscript{216} Burgomaster Kajyambere pursued this rice project as well. It is worth noting that though Gishamvu Commune had also five marshlands, it did not however develop rice, nor did it efficiently exploit that land for more beneficial economic activity, as was the case in Kibayi.\textsuperscript{217}

Finally, an effort was put into the building of social and administrative infrastructure. Perhaps it is necessary to show how this infrastructure evolved in the two communes, because this helps us to understand in the next section how the constituents evaluated the power performance of their local leaders on the basis of what they have achieved materially for them. Although infrastructure in rural areas was still insufficient, and the capital city benefited from more investment, certain improvements had taken place. For example, roads had been developed; new schools had been added to the ones that existed during colonial period; administrative buildings had been built and medical facilities had multiplied.

However, certain obstacles remained key to understanding the backwardness of infrastructure at the level of rural areas. For example, electricity was still rare. Gishamvu had a connection that provided electricity to the Nyakibanda Great Seminary, the Nyumba parish houses, the administrative office of Gishamvu commune and to a few

\textsuperscript{214} Père Claude Simard, Mission de Kirarambogo, Commune Kibayi, \textit{Lettre à Monsieur le Prévôt de Butare, Kirarambogo, le 13 octobre 1983.}
\textsuperscript{215} République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Kibayi, \textit{Monographie de la Commune Kibayi, Année 1981, p. 16.}
\textsuperscript{216} République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Commune de Kibayi, \textit{Monographie de la Commune de Kibayi 1985, Juin 1986, p. 15.}
\textsuperscript{217} République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, \textit{Monographie de la Commune Gishamvu, Année 1988, Gishamvu, février 1989, p. 9.}
business houses located in the Busoro centre. However, Kibayi did not have electricity. In 1982, the burgomaster of Kibayi was informed that there was a project to bring electricity from Save to Mugombwa (in the third Five Year Plan), so he wrote a motivation letter to the Minister of Planning, explaining why the project could be beneficial if it included the Kibayi administrative and medical centre. But this project did not succeed, for, until 1994, electricity was not yet available in Kibayi. Some medical centres had solar energy only.

Local roads were made but not paved. In Gishamvu, the acknowledgement of road construction is mostly given to Burgomaster Munyarugano, but also to Kambanda, while in Kibayi, it is given both to Hakizimana, Nyamigango and Kajyambere, that is, burgomasters who lasted in office. By 1988, all sectors and most cells in Gishamvu were linked by small unpaved but regularly maintained roads. Concerning accessibility, Gishamvu was said to be more accessible to Butare town than Kibayi, for, it was linked to the national road of Butare-Akanyaru border to Burundi, a paved road in good condition. From Butare to the administrative office there is only 17km, while, from Butare to Kibayi commune office, there is 35 Km, that is, double the distance.

Housing has also benefited from some attention. A systematic campaign existed already during the 1960s to get rid of straw thatching and replace them with roofing of tiles and corrugated iron. That campaign bore fruits, for by the 1980s, more than half the houses of peasants were covered by these durable materials. For example, in 1985, Kibayi commune had 6,196 houses covered with tiled roofs, 86 covered with corrugated iron, and 3,185 with straw, which suggests that straw roof houses were fewer than hard roof houses, while in Gishamvu there were only 1,666 houses covered with straw against 6,659 covered with both tiles and corrugated iron.

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218 Pierre Canisius Kajyambere, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Kibayi, Lettre à Monsieur le Ministre du Plan, Kigali, Ref. : N° 348/03.09.02/4, Kibayi, le 12/10/1982.
Concerning schools, in 1985, Kibayi commune had eight primary schools and two post-primary vocational training schools (CERAI). By 1991, Gishamvu Commune had six primary schools: four had been achieved just after the second world war, by the time the colonial administration was focusing on infrastructure development: Nyumba A school created in 1945, Nyumba B school created also in 1945, Mukuge school created in 1946, Mubumbano school created in 1947. Two more schools were added during the Habyarimana regime: Liba school in 1976, Nyanza school in 1987. As post-primary education of CERAI for vocational training, there was a CERAI at Nyumba that started in 1987. In 1993, the Gishamvu Commune was able to get its first secondary school: the Groupe Scolaire de Nyumba.

Concerning health infrastructure, this remained minimal until 1994. In Gishamvu, there were two medical facilities: the Sheke dispensary that started during the office of Munyarugano in 1966 and the Nyumba Nutritional Centre opened during the office of Kambanda in 1975. Kibayi had more medical facilities than Gishamvu: it had two better equipped medical centres with hospitalization facilities, the Kirarambogo medical centre created since 1971 and the Kibayi Medical centre that started in 1979 during the office of Nyamigango.

In addition to the above social infrastructures, the bulk of construction at commune level focused on administrative building, i.e., offices of burgomasters, tribunals and offices of sectors. The new office of Gishamvu Commune had been inaugurated in 1980, while the one of Kibayi was inaugurated in 1986.

3.5. PERCEPTIONS ABOUT LOCAL POWER: RELATIONS BETWEEN LEADERS AND CONSTITUENTS

In this section, I look at how the nature and character of power in Gishamvu and Kibayi are viewed. I notice that constituents talk about power in individual terms. The individual mentioned is often the burgomaster, but sometimes also the councillor. This is in part
because power was also too personalised. Secondly, this evaluation depends on who the constituent is, Hutu, Tutsi or leader or peasant, and the relation he or she had with that particular leader. This means that this evaluation is highly subjective, but remains significant to help us understand how power was perceived at local level. Thirdly, this evaluation takes into account the behaviour and performance of the leader in relation to events and phenomena or elements developed above: authoritarianism, unresolved issues, structural violence and economic performance. How a particular leader reflected on those issues at particular times determines how he was viewed.

3.5.1. Two key burgomasters during the First Republic: Munyarugano in Gishamvu and Hakizimana in Kibayi

Munyarugano from Gishamvu and Hakizimana from Kibayi can be put together for a number of reasons. Both ruled during the Kayibanda regime, with the difference that Munyarugano entered power only in 1963, while Hakizimana had started as ad interim subchief from 1959. Hakizimana, after 1971 when he lost support from above and therefore was rejected at local level, disappeared from the political landscape and went to work as civil servant in Kigali, Nyanza and Butare towns. He only came back to politics during the multiparty system of 1991-1994, when he became president of MRND party in Kibayi. As for Munyarugano, he had a bright political career as burgomaster from 1963 and as parliamentarian from 1968. When he retired, he became respectively local judge in Gishamvu and member in Technical Commission during the Habyarimana regime. Because of his close relation with the new burgomaster Kambanda, he continued to influence local politics until the late 1980s. Like Hakizimana, Munyarugano competed for the post of president of MRND party in Gishamvu, in 1991, but unlike Hakizimana, he failed.

It can be said that the postindependence state of Rwanda was a developmental one, at least in its overt ideology. In this regard, the ruler was evaluated in terms of what he had

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done concerning the improvement of social and economic infrastructure. Munyarugano is said to have brought more development activities and infrastructure to Gishamvu than any other burgomaster. He advocated that people use clay available in the valleys to make tiles and bricks and build houses covered by tiles instead of straw. This was done through a major campaign to eradicate Nyakatsi, that is, houses thatched with straw. In that housing development scheme, he targeted the youth. He made it a rule that no young man would any longer marry in a straw-thatched house. Once the production of tiles became prosperous, Munyarugano is said to have ordered the payment of taxes from tile revenues, which means that he made it a double gain.

In this process, Munyarugano is said to have striven to build some gender balance. Consider for instance what this old lady Emerite Kubwimana narrated:

Munyarugano advised people good things for development. He said that if a man comes to a local authority meeting, he must come with his wife. That if the man with his wife work together, they make adobe bricks, and tiles and build their houses, they can develop their household. [...] Men and their wives worked with endeavour. The man reduced his alcohol consumption, and the woman managed very well her harvest and reduced the spending in the clothes, so that they could make savings in order to build houses.

The fight against alcohol is stressed by another lady: “He forbid Hutu and Tutsi, young and others from spending in the bars. That is what I remember about him.” He also taught people to make associations. He is said to have founded the markets.

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222 Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 1, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 2.
223 Interview with Anonymous 8, Gishamvu, 24 and 26 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
224 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
225 Interview with Emérite Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. But this gender effort is not seen in the number of administrative employees that he had in the Commune office. They remained overwhelmingly men.
226 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
227 Interview with Emérite Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
Munyarugano is reported to have made the new roads inside Gishamvu. Munyarugano also converted the former accommodation of colonial Europeans located at Sheke into a medical dispensary.

In personal behaviour, he is said to have been a hard worker, a busy person: “…it is worth acknowledging that Munyarugano was a hard worker. He liked to cultivate. He could not make a conversation like the one we have made, no. Moreover, he was not following gossips. He investigated for himself. Munyarugano was a man, he was good leader.” Munyarugano is said to have been very charismatic, because he was considered as an “intellectual”: he had been a nurse since late colonial period. Certain constituents shared the myth of people who had studied. They appeared more legitimate than the ones who had less education. This is what Claudine Vidal has called the cultural capital of the fourth ethnic group, that is, the ‘intellectuals’. This positive evaluation of Munyarugano is shared by the upper leaders. In 1966, for example, he was the sole Burgomaster to have got the evaluation “Elite” in the whole Butare Prefecture.

On the other hand, as far as politics is concerned, the above positive description is highly relative. For example, Munyarugano is said to have been authoritarian. Furthermore, as he was contemporary to the time of Inyenzi attacks, he is said to have been very harsh to anyone he suspected of going to Burundi. This was a national policy as some recognize, so, some argue, it cannot be put down to him. But, others say that in this process, he took advantage of expelling any Tutsi who was not on good terms with him, and they conclude that that was his fault.

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229 Interview with Anonymous 1, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Célestin Bangambiki, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007.
231 Interview with Innocent Nahayo, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
was discriminatory towards the Tutsi. But other informants explain that this ethnic discrimination policy was a national one, so it cannot be put on him as Burgomaster. Most importantly, others separate his behaviours in different epochs: they say that when he was Burgomaster he was good; he just focused on development without excluding anyone. But when he became parliamentarian, that is when he shifted and became discriminatory. As one of the informants stresses, this is also the time when Munyarugano had become very rich, so he started to be more arrogant and authoritarian.

As for Burgomaster Hakizimana from Kibayi who was a contemporary of Munyarugano, the majority of informants report that he had been a good leader. They do not stress too much development activities such as for Munyarugano in Gishamvu, but they say that he had no ethnic discrimination. He also enjoyed considerable respect because he was considered as an intellectual too; he had been a teacher before entering politics. Development activities undertaken and realized are mentioned by himself. He talks about road design and construction, about coffee planting, tax collection, water taps and other minor activities.

Unlike Munyarugano who continued to enjoy outstanding respect and influence during the Habyarimana regime, Hakizimana was among Butare politicians who were rejected by PARMEHUTU during the divisions of that party in 1968, him with his elder brother Isidore Nzeyimana. He kept office until the 1971 elections when he failed to get re-elected, since he had lost support from above and the confidence of other councillors from below. In 1971, the Butare Prefecture described his removal from office in the following terms: “Burgomaster Hakizimana Raymond, a very active element, with integrity and impartiality, but he was not re-elected because most of his fellows did not

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236 See for example, interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
like him due to political antecedents…”239 Another report from national intelligence observed: “The Burgomaster does not have any notorious influence in his commune. He has lost popularity during his collaboration in the political struggle of his elder brother Nzeyimana Isidore […] by the time the latter was deposed.” 240

3.5.2. Nyamigango in Kibayi during the first years of the Second Republic

Local populations depict Epaphrodite Nyamigango in very controversial terms. On the one hand, almost all tangible development achievements are put down to his efforts. However, he is said to have been very authoritarian as well. Nyamigango had completed only one year of secondary education, but this limited education level seems to have had little impact on his performance. He started to work as a secretary at the Butare prefecture and was much appreciated there.241 Then in 1973, when the regime changed, the Burgomaster of Kibayi, André Sebarera, who had replaced Raymond Hakizimana in 1971, was deposed. Nyamigango was appointed as new Burgomaster of Kibayi from December 1973.242

Concerning commune administration, before Nyamigango, many adult people were still escaping paying annual levy and taxes. When he came into office, he focused on making people pay tax. He used the councillors and cell committee members to sensitize the population in this line. He also used the police and even got himself involved in everyday control and pursuit of those who were not paying.

Two major works of infrastructure are accredited to him: the Kibayi Medical centre and the Makwaza tourist attraction. However, even projects such as the building of the administrative office of the Kibayi commune that was completed after his death, is

242 Many informants said that Nyamigango was a Burundian. See for example this elaborate explanation of Bisamaza: “Nyamigango was also a Burundian, except that he studied and was raised in Rwanda at his brother-in-law called Sebitenga who was staying at Murama of Mukomacara. That is where he was raised, but he is originally from Burundi. His family resides at a place called ku Cyamaguru in Mwumba Commune, here in Burundi, in Gatsinda Zone.”
ascribed to him, because he is said to have initiated it. The rice agriculture is maybe the most important achievement for which the population gives Nyamigango credit. It made the Kibayi people have two cash crops: rice and coffee, not to mention banana.

Nyamigango realized all these infrastructure initiatives and projects, thanks to his capacity to negotiate with higher leadership and with foreign donors. There prevails a belief that Nyamigango never feared the upper echelons of power.\textsuperscript{243} He was for instance the first one to have brought to Kibayi the President of the Republic in 1979, when he came to inaugurate the Kibayi Medical Centre. For all the above achievements, many constituents appreciated him.

Senior leaders appreciated his performance as well.\textsuperscript{244} He was very active in the MRND single party. As a matter of fact, in 1976, he got elected among twelve members who were in the Prefecture Committee of MRND.\textsuperscript{245} This is maybe one of the factors that brought him into contact with senior leadership so he felt at ease contacting them in order to get many projects initiated in his commune.

Then concerning his mode of rule, he is said to have been very authoritarian in that he used force too much. He beat people.\textsuperscript{246} Secondly, he disturbed people even in the night, by coming after tax evaders and smugglers. The behaviour of Nyamigango in attempting to control the lives of people including at night became so embedded in memory that an artist invented the following saying or formula: “Nyamutwara ijoro kw’ijanja, bwacya akaritwaza umurindi”, meaning that he worked day and night in his administration.\textsuperscript{247} Another informant had this to say about enforcement of tax collection:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{243} Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. See also Interview with Raymond Hakizimana and André Uzaramba.
  \item \textsuperscript{244} République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, \textit{Rapport annuel 1974}, p. 23.
  \item \textsuperscript{245} République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, \textit{Rapport trimestriel d’activités, du 1er Janvier au 30 Mars 1976}, p. 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{247} Interview with Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
\end{itemize}
No one hid from him, he could discover you even in the bush. He charges you a fine, and goes after you have paid it to him. Or else he detains you. [...] We were *impiringi*, that is, we were not paying tax. When he realizes that such a hill does not pay tax, he goes there for a week, he comes back after receiving the whole payment of those taxes… 248

Another leadership flaw ascribed to him is that he used to intervene without making any investigation. If someone accused another person to him, he punished him immediately. A number of informants said that he listened to gossip. 249

Nyamigango is said to have fought against smuggling until it was significantly reduced. All previous burgomasters had failed to halt this activity. According to one informant, many smugglers shifted to new businesses. 250 Another informant who had been himself a smuggler, presented the Nyamigango campaign against smugglers as corruption, because things confiscated went into the pockets of leaders not into the state coffers. 251 Certain people interpreted the fight against smuggling as authoritarianism, because for them, the leaders were stopping the constituents from empowering themselves. Through this debate, one sees the contradiction between the formal and the informal economies:

In fact, you could see that there was no development. Because they were undermining the one who is empowering himself. I saw this from people who wanted to do low value trade, then you realize that he was charging them fines, and stopping their right to operate. [...] For example, I will refer to the area where I was living. There was a man Birasa Gerald, he was helping his neighbours, by resorting to smuggling. He goes to Burundi and brings cheap food such as beans, sorghum, oil, then he was always mistreating him, charging him money. Then you realize that those that he was helping to survive by selling to them, no longer get something from him because of the fine. There are many other examples. 252

Nyamigango ultimately died in June 1980 of an incurable wound on his leg. But there are numerous interpretations about his death. Some say that it was by bewitchment that he got that wound. Yet those who say so narrate various versions about how he was...

250 Interview with Jean Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.
251 Interview with Vianney Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. But on Nyamigango, this has to be relativised, because he died poor.
252 Interview with Ladislas Hererimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
bewitched. In these versions, one says that the bewitching took place at Mugombwa place, others say that it was at Saga place. Some say it is a lady who bewitched him after the Burgomaster threw away her traditional beer, for she did not pay tax. Others say it was a Burundian smuggler. The fact that these stories of bewitchment abounded reveals to what extent the strength of bewitchment in the local belief was great. It would be worthwhile to analyse more deeply these stories of bewitchment, and what they revel about people’s feelings and their subjectivities in the face of survival and local power. Several Gishamvu people said that he died poor. He did not accumulate wealth like most other leaders. At his funeral, the Prefect of Butare Prefecture said that Nyamigango loved his commune more than himself. But in the final years of his rule, one former councillor said that Nyamigango had changed, that he had become softer.

3.5.3. Kambanda in Gishamvu and Kajyambere in Kibayi during the Second Republic: Genocide burgomasters

These two burgomasters share certain features: they were incumbents when the country entered into a busier political time following multiparty politics and during the genocide. Both are the ones who lasted more years in power and probably who did a great deal in terms of infrastructure building. But all their credit for this has been given to their predecessors, because of their role in the genocide. Kambanda was in office from 1971 to 1994, while Kajyambere ruled from 1981 to 1994.

Kambanda tried his chances as a candidate in the parliamentary elections of 1981, and received good enough results to become a replacement parliamentarian. But he never

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254 Interview with André Uzaramba and Joseph Baritunga.
256 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Ref. : No. 210/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 6 September 1971; Emmanuel Ruzindana, Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, Confidentiel, Lettre à Monsieur Kajyambere Canisius, Projet GBK Butare, Réf. : N° 585/03.01.01, Butare, le 29 mai 1981.
became a parliamentarian. Kajyambere seems not to have evolved beyond the commune level, though he tried by all means to co-opt high profile national leaders who were originally from Kibayi by incorporating them in the Technical Commission of the Commune.

Socially and politically speaking, they were different. Kambanda, having come from a catechist background, behaved, according to certain informants, like a priest. Kajyambere on the other hand was presented as adulterous, in that he abused his position to get sexual favours from women. He was caught several times sleeping or attempting to commit adultery with wives of his employees and simple peasants.

Politically, Kambanda is presented as a moderate Hutu during all the years he lasted in power, even during the times of multiparty politics. In this respect, ethnic discrimination witnessed in the commune is put down to politics at a higher level. For example, Rwandanga who was a councillor, is among those who say that Kambanda interacted with the Tutsi socially: “In the mode of rule, Kambanda was on good terms mostly with the Tutsi. I don’t know how this changed later. You used to find him mingling together with the Tutsi, talking, sharing drinks.” This is confirmed by Anonymous 4 who was and still is a teacher, and Kumuyange who worked for several years at Nyakibanda Grand Seminary as a typist. Kambanda is accused of being extremist only during the genocide. Indeed, some people did not understand how he just betrayed the Tutsi at the last minute.


258 He was a teacher at Nyumba Primary school from 1963 to 1966. Then he went to study at the School of Catechists in Butare town for one year. When he came back, he taught catechism at the Nyumba School of Catechists until 1971. (Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, *Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture*, Ref. : No. 210/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 6 September 1971.)


261 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007.
lorry of rice is André Kameya, who was also in the Technical Commission. However, Kajyambere is said to have had close relations with the Tutsi who were wealthy, especially the businessmen of Kibayi commercial centre.262 This shows to what extent the relation between the leaders and the Tutsi population was often inauspicious, but also complex in the sense that injustices bore exceptions.

Concerning authoritarianism, both burgomasters are depicted as authoritarian figures but who behaved differently. Kambanda is said to have been very hypocritical: he was not punishing people openly, he made signs to the policemen to do that.263 While Kajyambere lacked that tact.264 Kambanda is said to have ruled in a soft way, that is, he was not taking decisions himself, he had within the Commune council and administration a faction that often influenced him. People who are enumerated in this faction include the driver Gatabazi, the Councillor Cyuma of Gishamvu Sector who was related to him as an in-law, his wife also is said to have influenced him in decisions pertaining to commune administration, and Sebujangwe, the brother of his wife. But the person most cited as having influenced Kambanda’s policies is the former Burgomaster, Munyarugano, who also became a parliamentarian. Also one priest is cited, Father Londen, for having been close to him.265 Kajyambere is described as very authoritarian, with a strong personality, who was not approached by lay people, let alone his family members. Furthermore, some say that Kajyambere did not like to consult the population that much.266 According to one former Councillor, Kajyambere did not like to mingle with minor local affairs, he delegated them to lower administrative levels, such as the sector and the cell. This


263 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.


according to him, was a “modern way of rule”, modern in the sense of taking some distance from interpersonal acquaintance and acting in a more abstract and indirect way.\textsuperscript{267}

Concerning economic activities, as early as 1974, Kambanda was among the Burgomasters most praised at the level of prefecture for his good performance, because he was striving to promote projects that improved infrastructure. That is the time when he was launching major projects for building health and education facilities and organizing cooperatives for adults and youth.\textsuperscript{268} He is the one who initiated the building of the Gishamvu commune office located at Nyumba, and many more projects, but the credit went to Munyarugano who is believed to have brought ideas for that.\textsuperscript{269} All that Kajyambere achieved is also accredited to Nyamigango. Kajyambere is presented as someone who had managed business as usual, who pursued policies initiated by Nyamigango, either in the building of social infrastructure or in the tourism project. They are right in part, but the improvement of those activities lie in the long-term work of Kajyambere.

Finally, both Kambanda and Kajyambere are held responsible for the genocide in their communes. Kambanda is presented as having been moderate during multiparty politics and extremist during the genocide. As for Kajyambere, he is said to have been worse both during the time of multiparty system and during the genocide.

3.5.4. Relations of obedience and disobedience

After this description of perceptions of constituents about their commune leaders, it is important to look at how they related to them. In general, the local population obeyed their leaders. This is what Prunier calls the culture of obedience and De Lame

\textsuperscript{267} Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{268} République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport annuel 1974, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{269} Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Athanase Kumuyange, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 3, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
conformism or conformity. In my case studies, obedience towards authorities and orders is also the general rule. It is the normal accepted political behaviour. However, the existence of so many complaints by leaders about cases of disobedience or constituents escaping governmental requirements, the strategies of leaders in order to bring back constituents to “order”, or the narratives of constituents about cases of disobedience against the authorities and their strategies to do this, suggest that disobedience against existing power structures needs to be taken seriously.

In general, Gishamvu and Kibayi informants assert that the population obeyed the orders of the state and responded to multiple demands of the government. But a closer examination suggests that this overall obedience was the result of multiple efforts and strategies of state agents, rather than of spontaneous or unconditional willingness of the population. Nothing captures this conditional obedience than the description given by my informant Hakizamungu:

Normally the population obey the rules of the authorities. Kambanda said to plant coffee. We did it. […] I told you that every time the lay people fear punishment: prison, detention, beating. This makes them obey the rules of authorities so that they can remain in peace. Even if they disagree with those measures.

Question: how was the burgomaster considered?
Answer: Consider how the head of the family is respected. When he arrives at home, you know how his wife and children welcome him. That’s the illustration I give you as to how the burgomaster was considered in his commune.

Other informants point out that obedience in Umuganda communal works, in tax payment, in anti-erosion works, in entering cooperatives, in road maintenance, in hygiene works, etc. resulted in the fear of fines and corporal punishment or detention. The

commune pick-ups that were sometimes used to collect people to be detained came to bear the nickname “Ruhumbangegera” (collector of vagabonds, rogues), meaning that anyone who did not pay tax or fulfil commune duties was considered an irresponsible citizen. Another pejorative qualification for such people is “impiringi” often used in commune reports as a description of people who disobeyed rules. Guichaoua also notes that people who did not participate in Umuganda were considered as “bad” citizens.

Leaders also assert that the population obeyed them in general, although they also reveal the everyday struggles to convince a number of constituents to fulfil state duties and the everyday fight against the disobedience of certain individuals. In this respect, depending on who the leaders were or what they did, namely their ontology and action or agency, it is possible to identify those who enjoyed more obedience than others. In Gishamvu, Munyarugano is believed to have been more obeyed than Kambanda, due to their personalities and actions. In Kibayi, Nyamigango is said to have been obeyed due to his actions and not to his personality, because certain informants present him as a person who was not having the image of a leader, due to his attire and ways of talking. Whereas Kajyambere is said to have borne a leadership image, though some informants present him as having enjoyed more obedience because he came into office after the population had been put to order by previous burgomasters. For example, the campaign of Nyamigango towards tax paying and his continuous fight against smuggling brought order to Kibayi in such a way that the rule of Kajyambere is depicted as having been easier: he found that people had started to comply with tax paying, Umuganda participation and other state dues. Postindependence leaders lacked the use of corporal


273 Interview with Anonymous 14, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
274 See for example Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Ntahobavukira, Joseph, Secretary, Minutes of the Commune Council meeting held on 28 April 1976 and interview with Fortunée Mujawamariya.
277 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
punishment, but certain burgomasters attempted to use it again, regardless of its very sharp unpopularity. Such is the case of Burgomaster Nyamigango who used beating anyway.

However, this obedience of constituents did not come from nowhere. It was notably the result of continuous efforts of the state. For example, concerning the control of everyday movement of population, whenever an individual would move from one commune to another for work or migration or marriage or other reasons, a document was filled out for him or her to carry to the commune authorities where he/she was moving and a copy of that document remained at the commune of origin. So every commune had a file about people who entered their communes or went away to other communes. This movement was notably regulated by the law concerning the census of the population, their identity documents and their migration, of 19 February 1964. It helped to monitor internal and external migrations, but also individual movements so as not to escape commune duties.

Furthermore, the local leaders strove to identify tricks of the constituents to escape commune duties. For example, during the office of Munyarugano in Gishamvu, the commune authorities were able to discover that certain individuals used to pay tax for one goat, and after getting the proof of payment of that tax, they used it for all the goats they had. So Munyarugano concluded that, since no one pays tax with joy, excessive control and regular punishment have to be used. During the office of Kambanda, in order to escape doing Umuganda, some constituents were misleading the councillors that they have a sick person to take to the hospital by foot carrying him or her. As they gave the same explanation every time, the councillors discovered that those were tricks. As a strategy, the burgomaster asked the councillors to make a list of all those who escaped doing Umuganda so that he can plan the place where they will work the next time and

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279 See for example the letter of Médard Muligande, Burgomaster of Ngenda Commune to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, *Concerning the authorization of Nzabonimana and his wife Mukandutiyi to settle in Ngenda Commune*, Ref.: No. 592/04.04/1, Ngenda, 29 October 1974.
280 Emmanuel Munyarugano, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Oscar Nkundizera, Secretary, *Minutes of the Commune Council meeting held on 5 July 1968*. 
how to control them. Moreover, some people were hiding their pigs in bushes located near the market of Busoro in order to escape paying taxes. Kambanda decided to clear that bush in order to avoid financial loss.

In addition to these strategies to overcome tricks of peasants, local leaders also set up special services or commissions for almost all duties - tax, Umuganda, party dues, health inspection, etc. – in order to monitor constituents’ participation. Yet, despite these local state efforts, the acts of avoidance and dissimulation continued. Some individuals always found ways of escaping the compliance with state rules. The more control was strengthened, the more the strategies and tactics of certain constituents also sharpened.

To begin with, in the local political culture, there were certain stereotypes about the population of Butare. One Prefect of Butare Prefecture once noted in a report: “If the people of Butare like to put themselves in all situations without caring about laws and rules, it is worth saying that this population likes and adores tribunals.” Moreover, some areas of Gishamvu and Kibayi were believed to be hard to rule. Such places include Sholi Sector in Gishamvu and Saga Sector in Kibayi. In Gishamvu, the Burgomaster once confessed that it was hard for him to monitor Gishamvu people because they were very

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281 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Joseph Ntahobavukira, Secrétaire, Minutes of the Commune Council meeting held on 8 February 1978.
violent and robbers. There was yet a stereotype that became like a saying that said: “Ab’i sholi twumva nabi.” (Sholi people, we do not listen, i.e., obey.)

In Saga there was also something that looks like a saying. It goes: “I Saga si agahato” (You cannot compel Saga people.) However, for Saga sector in Kibayi Commune, the description of people there went beyond stereotypes. It included some tangible examples of insubordination. Already since the 1960s, the former burgomaster Hakizimana confessed to have had a hard time ruling Saga as compared to other areas of his commune:

At that time things were fine. We were on sufficiently good terms with constituents. When you invited the population, they came, you share ideas, you give them advice, you show them instructions, they go back home knowing those instructions, that is, the works they will do, then the councillors made a follow up of those instructions. [...] It is Saga that made me suffer. Because they had an unusual way of understanding things. There were some violent people there, people who even killed others. That place made me suffer for two years. After that time, things went in order. [...] Some said it was witches, some other people were fighting over minor or ordinary issues, then you hear that someone has been killed.

Another young man narrated this about Saga as being hard to rule:

I remember when I was getting to an intelligent age, there is a place now called Buhiza cell, they called it “Kuri douane” [At the customs]. There has never been a customs office there, in general. But, there were some youth, including some men who lived there, there was also someone called Kagaragara, the other is Rutanga rwa Minani, but this is a nickname, there was also a Tutsi man who died called Rindiro. They were very violent people. In such a way that whenever they did not like people to pass there, no one could cross that area. That is why people called that place, kuri douane. It is at the road coming from Saga and going up to Rwamiko. People passed there with fear. People were talking about this when I grew up, and my mother is born from that cell, near that douane. [...] There were also those who were disrespecting the administration openly. That came from the youth, who had become kagarara [rebellious]. They were not doing Umuganda, that is why people were saying that Saga is hard to rule.

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286 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune and Joseph Ntahobavukira, Secretary, Minutes of Commune Council meeting of 22 December 1971.
289 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
Another informant points out that the much-feared Burgomaster Nyamigango had been severely beaten in Saga: “Nyamigango, as a result of harassing people, going to check in people’s house for the hygienic situation, he was strongly beaten by sons of Kiramoto at Saga.”  

This beating is confirmed also by Kimonyo who puts it in the context of political competition. According to him, it occurred in July 1976. Indeed, Kiramoto was a nickname for former Burgomaster André Hitimana who ruled Saga from 1960 to 1961. Maybe André Hitimana was among Nyamigango’s rivals. The death of Nyamigango through bewitchment by Saga people can be put under the rubric of disobedience too.

Secondly, certain practices of disobedience continued to prevail, regardless of means devoted by the commune officials to halt them. For example, in order to escape doing Umuganda, certain peasants likened it to colonial labour constraints, and the state spent a great deal of time, energy and means to refute such comparisons. As a result, although the majority of constituents performed duties of Umuganda work, there were always some individuals who managed to escape doing that work for several days. In the same vein, in order to escape paying annual personal levy, certain youths reaching the age of taking ID books, that is, 18, refused to report to the commune office and apply for those ID books, because that would mean starting to pay levies asked of adults.

One area where disobedience prevailed regardless of the extent of control used is smuggling. This situation is asserted for both the whole Butare Prefecture border areas and Kibayi Commune. The authorities even organised at different times joint meetings with fellow Burundi authorities in order to halt smuggling, but it did not stop. For

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293 See for example Republic of Rwanda, Butare Prefecture, Minutes of a meeting that was held in the Butare Prefecture, led by the His Excellency Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, President of the Republic and President of the Comity in charge of Peace and Unity, on 13 May 1975, p. 8; République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Intérieur et du Développement Communal, Bilan des 25 ans d’indépendance du Rwanda: 1962-1987, Kigali, Juillet 1987, pp. 188-190.
294 Epaphrodite Nyamigango, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Council held on 7 November 1978, Ref.: No. 206/03.04:2, Kibayi, 10 November 1978.
example, in 1973, the bulk of border communes were considered as smuggling zones: “Nearly all businessmen in Butare Prefecture survive by smuggling. The biggest centre for specialists of smuggling is located at Nyanza of Nyabisindu Commune. […] Similar cases are also found in Nyakizu, Kigembe, Kibayi, Muganza, Muyaga and Muyira Communes.” The Burgmaster Nyamigango had talks with the administrators of Mwumba, Marangara and Gashikanwa Communes of Ngozi Province of Burundi. Some of them were newly appointed following the taking over of power of President Bagaza in Burundi in 1977. So he went there to initiate relations with them. They discussed joint issues such as how to fight against smuggling on the two sides of the border, how to control the movement of Burundians entering into Rwanda illegally, that is, without passing through customs, and Rwandans who went to Burundi in the same way. They discussed also smugglers who sold bicycles stolen on the other side of the border and brought them into another country. They agreed to be vigilant against nightly smugglers. They discussed also about the activity and behaviour of conductors of boats who operated on the Akanyaru river. Similar talks also took place in 1984 between authorities of Butare Prefecture and the ones of Kayanza Province in Burundi. But, despite all those measures, smuggling continued.

3.6. SOCIAL RELATIONS

In my area of study, social relations are depicted in general as having been harmonious among the Hutu and the Tutsi. The Butare area is actually one of the Rwandan regions that had registered a long history of interaction of these two groups. In this regard, the Hutu and the Tutsi of Gishamvu and Kibayi are said to have interacted very well. This is seen in a big number of intermarriages and mutual help in everyday life. However,
ethnic intermarriage did not mean that ethnicity disappeared. Some few quotes show this pattern:

The population was living on good terms, but it was clear that ethnic groups existed. [...] there was sometimes suspicion saying that one is Tutsi, if you see him or her, if you were talking, you change the topic.  

…we ate together but it was not very warm, however, it was also not bad.  

People interacted very well. We lived together, no one knew that things could change this way. [We] were intermarrying. It is now that we witnessed division. We were sharing food. [...] But we knew our ethnic group, you knew that you are a Hutu, he knew that he is a Tutsi. But you live together. Even myself I once proposed a Tutsi young lady of the Tutsi Sembayi. I got her, but we thereafter separated.  

On the other hand, intermarriage appeared, among other reasons, as a way of securing trust or protection on the side of the Tutsi. For example, one of my informants says that whenever a Tutsi was marrying his daughters to other Tutsi, a number of Tutsi people were warning him that he is discriminating, that he should also have Hutus as in-laws in order to be fully integrated in the local area.  

As for mutual help, it concerned mostly exchange of goods or services. Those who had milk exchanged it with those who had grass for cattle. They cultivated for each other. They carried each other’s sick persons to hospital. They invited each other to celebrations and attended each others’ funerals. They shared food and drinks. Indeed, to live together on good terms was not just a moral obligation. It was also dictated by economic life in rural areas. In a place where public transportation is rare, where there is no fire-fighter organisation, where the ambulances are scarce, the neighbour is a great deal, if not everything.  

On the other hand, some Tutsi individuals stress their subordinate status after independence due to political exclusion and suspicion at each time of crisis. This

300 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.  
301 Interview with Béatrice Yambabariye, Kibayi, 9 May 2007.  
303 Interview with Anonymous 17.
suspicion seems to have reached also the everyday relations of the Hutu and the Tutsi at local level, where Tutsi had to be cautious about their everyday acts, by avoiding any conflict with their fellow Hutu neighbours. This was especially so in times of political crisis:

Between the population there were problems. But they were not sharp that much. They became sharp since 1990, when people heard that the Inkotanyi (Rwandan Patriotic Front rebels) had attacked.304

Since the war started, bad things came in, you saw that people were still not understanding each other. You find that the Tutsi keeps prudent. If you have an argument with someone, he speaks with irony on you, telling you that ‘akanyu ntigahera’ [you are still the same, you don’t change]. If a child of Tutsi and a child of Hutu fight, […] you find that things become hard. The Tutsi had to remain prudent, to avoid arguments and conflicts.305

During this time, the ethnic discrimination was not clear, but between the population you saw that there was something of not trusting each other that much. For example, in the cabaret, you could see people making many small groups or gatherings. […] But they were not showing it that much. […] But those things [ethnic division] increased as we were approaching things of politics [political crises] when people were listening to many radios, and many newspapers were writing, then it was clear that there is a small problem between ethnic groups. People were no longer sharing, but it was not yet severe.306

This relativises the above idyllic depiction of mutual understanding. As for the Twa group, both Hutu and Tutsi informants assert that interaction with the Twa never went beyond exchange of goods. The Twa were literally put aside. For instance, they were not allowed to share food and drinks with the rest of Rwandans.307

CONCLUSION

305 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
306 Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
This chapter focused on structural elements and examined them both chronologically and analytically. It first looked at authoritarianism and party politics. In this respect, I explained how power operated both at the national and local levels, and briefly reconstructed the process that led to the shift from multiparty politics to single party politics during the First Republic, and the continuation of the single party system in the Second Republic. I argued that the political line adopted during this time was as much the result of colonial legacy and postindependence actors’ choices and actions.

Furthermore, I highlighted the long standing character of land, refugee and violence issues. In Chapters One and Two we saw that they were the result of previous decisions and structural developments. In this chapter, I showed how they continued to survive in the everyday life during the postindependence period.

It is in structural violence that I placed ethnicity and regionalism as policies of exclusion, a feature that characterized both the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes. But I also showed that those were not the only ones, that it was possible to identify other forms of exclusion and inequalities.

It was not sufficient to describe the nature and performance of power from the standpoint of legal, official and scholarly reports and references. So, I resorted also to the views of constituents. This worked very well. Indeed, these two sources helped me uncover the economic performance, the perceptions about leaders, and about their relations with their constituents, but also social relations. In the next chapter, I look at the conjuncture of genocide and show the relevancy of all the above structural elements.
CHAPTER FOUR

ON THE EVE OF THE GENOCIDE: MULTIPLE CRISES from 1985 to 1993

INTRODUCTION

The period preceding the genocide was so fast, that is, a time when multiple events and processes were speeding up, converging and diverging. In a short time, the Rwandan economy found itself shrinking due to international and national developments; the country descended into civil war; the political system underwent dramatic changes; a strong famine occurred in three prefectures including Butare; and around 300,000 Burundi refugees fled and were settled in Butare, half of whom were in Kibayi. This chapter revisits these events, that is, it documents, reconstructs and problematizes these experiences and their multiple agents, linking the national to the local.

In this respect, it examines to what extent economic crises and the war paved the way for the increase of social and criminal violence, and to what degree political competition between political parties produced political violence. Since these two forms of violence are documented sufficiently in urban areas, this chapter highlights them in Gishamvu and Kibayi, arguing that even in rural areas violence was becoming acute.

Part of the argument is that these crises cannot be understood by referring only to the time in which they occurred. A number of them have a long genealogy since at least colonial times. In other words, they found their conditions of possibility and emergence long ago. Achille Mbembe has already argued to what extent the postcolony is not separated from the colony, although they are not the same.1 In this regard, these crises appear to bear both structural and conjunctural conditions. However, as we shall see,

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every time the leaders and other stakeholders tried to deal with those crises, they
proposed solutions that targeted more conjuncture and less structure. Does this stem from
the fact that they had limited means to address structure or that in facing emergency,
structure was sacrificed to be dealt with in future? All in all, it appears that deep solutions
were not priorities for political actors at this time. They were mostly concerned about
gaining power first rather than attempting to solve crises, a factor that, as we shall see,
deepened problems.

4.1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRISSES FROM 1985 ONWARDS

Economic data for Rwanda reveals that the period between 1970 and early 1985 was the
most prosperous one. This was the period characterized mostly by the advent of
Habyarimana into power and his continuous and successful attraction of foreign
investment and aid. Thanks to this foreign aid and to strategic economic policies, a
number of viable infrastructures arose and food self-sufficiency was guaranteed for most
Rwandese. This is the time when Rwanda was among the success stories of Africa.
However, a number of authors insisted that this economic move was different from
“development”, since it evolved hand in hand with social and economic inequalities,
inequalities that I put under the label of structural violence in the previous chapter.2

However, Rwanda started its economic decline in 1985 with the fall of major export
products’ prices such as coffee, tea and minerals.3 Under this disequilibrium, the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund imposed a Structural Adjustment Programme

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2 Johan Pottier, “Taking Stock: Food Marketing Reform in Rwanda, 1982-89”, African Affairs, Vol. 92,
No. 366, January 1993, pp. 5-30, pp. 5 and 11; Fernand Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989 : Bilan socio-
économique d'un régime, Louvain-la-Neuve, Institut d'Etudes du Développement, Janvier 1990, p. 11 ;
Danielle de Lame, “Changing Rwandan Vision of Women and Land, in the Heart of the House, at the
Outskirts of the World”, Africa Focus, Vol. 15, No. 1-2, 1999, pp. 3-12, p. 4; David Waller, Rwanda:
Which Way Now?, Oxford (UK), Oxfam Country Profile, 1993, p. 9; Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed:

3 Stefaan Marysse, et al., Rwanda. Appauvrissement et ajustement structurel, Bruxelles, Institut Africain
27-28, 30; Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989, pp. 15, 20 et 24 ; République Rwandaise, Ministère de l'Agriculture
de l'Elevage, Division des Statistiques Agricoles, Aperçu sur la politique caféicole au Rwanda, par David
Tardif-Douglin, Jean-Léonard Ngirumwami, Jim Shaffer, Anastase Murekezi et Théobald Kampayana,
Décembre 1993, p. 0.
(SAP) as a way of bringing back financial equilibrium. They allocated funds to Rwanda and at the same time imposed a number of financial and economic reforms that aimed to gradually solve this economic crisis. In this respect, the Rwandan currency was devalued twice, first in November 1990 by 40% and then in June 1992 by a further 15%. Other measures concerned the reduction of state expenses in areas of salaries and jobs in the public sector, and the decrease of coffee subsidies to peasant farmers, in addition to policies aimed at increasing state income through the raising of taxes and increase of user fees for health, education and other services. The SAP also asked the Rwandan government to implement more liberal policies in trade such as the lowering of protectionism and the privatization of some state enterprises.4

While this Programme is said to have increased state financial means through allocation of funds, the devaluation policy and the increase of fees for access to social facilities are criticized for having significantly reduced the purchasing power of the poor who were already affected by the lowering of prices for coffee and tea.5

During this crisis time, three prefectures located in the south and west, Butare, Gikongoro and Kibuye, underwent a severe famine starting from 1988 and continuing until early 1990. This famine was caused by the lack of sufficient rain during several agricultural seasons, culminating in the decrease of food production. Gishamvu and Kibayi experienced this famine mostly in 1989 when their harvest was reduced significantly, but it continued. In 1991 some aid from the World Food Programme arrived in Butare and was distributed to households in need. In order to survive this famine, a number of peasants resorted to emigration and moved towards Mayaga region that had some food reserves. Others went to Burundi and as far as Tanzania, where they hoped to get help from their relatives who were there as refugees. Some peasants from Kibayi survived by

exchanging their beer bananas with yam produced in Burundi. However, a number of those refugees, including some who went to Burundi and Tanzania a bit earlier, were evicted in 1991 and 1992. They were accused of either settling in those countries illegally or of participating in criminal activities. Once evicted, they were welcomed back to Rwanda and to their respective communes.

In Butare Prefecture, famine continued until the end of 1993. In Gishamvu alone, half of the population, about 20,905 were considered as vulnerable and in need of food aid. The reasons for this famine were a continuous lack of rain as a conjunctural cause, but also structural causes such as the small size of land holdings that were also not fertile, lack of fertilizers, lack of medicine, lack of seed due to poverty, and the problem of refugees welcomed back in certain communes. The solutions foreseen were: to seek aid from humanitarian agencies for emergency aid, and to exploit marshlands. These solutions were necessary but not sufficient in order to alleviate that famine, for, they focused more

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7 Pascal Kambanda, Bourgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, List of Rwandans expelled from Tanzania who are from Gishamvu Commune, Ref. : 570/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, le 16 July 1991; Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Gishamvu, Synthèse des données sur les victimes de la famine et les refoulés de Tanzanie, Réf.: N° 712/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, le 6/9/1991 ; Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Bourgmaster of Butare Prefecture (All), Re: Report concerning Rwandans who have been expelled from Burundi, Ref.: No. 2088/04.09.01/14, Butare, 10 December 1991; Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, (P.O. Subprefect of Préfecture), Letter to All the Bourgmasters of Butare Communes, Re: To collect the aid destined to the Rwandans who have been expelled from Tanzania, Ref.: No. 1787/04.09.01/4, Butare, 23 October 1991; Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Urgent, Circular letter to the Bourgmasters of Gishamvu-Kigembe-Nyakizu Communes, Re: Welcoming of Rwandans who have been expelled by Burundi, Ref. No. 73/04.09.01/14, Busoro, 24 January 1992; Straton Semanyenzi, Bourgommier de Kigembe Commune, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Rwandese young people expelled from Burundi, No. 029/04.09.01/14, Kigembe, 13 January 1992; Justin Temahagali, Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, (P.O. S/Préfét Bicamumpaka Evariste), A Monsieur le Bourgmestre de la Commune Ndora, Kigembe, Gishamvu, Nyaruhengeri, Nyakizu, Runyinya, Ngoma, Kibayi, Shyanda, Rapatriés du Rwanda refoulés du Burundi le 25/01/1992, Gishamvu, N° 157/04.09.01/14, Butare, le 5/02/1992.

8 Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Gishamvu, Lettre à Monsieur le Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, Objet : Situation alimentaire dans notre Commune, N° 439/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, le 17/12/1993.

on conjuncture than on remote or structural factors that were equally fragile at this time. As a result, up until the beginning of the genocide in the first semester of 1994, this famine prevailed in some households of Butare. Indeed, we learn from Patricia Hayes that famine is a complex process that involves at the same time structure, conjuncture and multiple agencies.\textsuperscript{10}

As a result of economic crisis in the whole country in addition to famine at local level, Butare Prefecture communes experienced a major financial crisis. Commune employees received their salaries with delays of several months and accumulated several months of unpaid overdue salaries. Furthermore, tax income also decreased as a result of war, as markets were not operating properly. In 1990, for example, only seven out of 20 communes were able to recover 80\% of expected tax revenue. Prefecture and commune leaders continued to put much endeavour towards tax collection, but they had little success since the tax payers’ economy was not doing well, and the political context was not favourable to the use of force in this regard, as the multiparty system had considerably reduced the population’s fear respecting the leadership.\textsuperscript{11}

Disasters continued in Butare Prefecture. The advent of violence in Burundi following the assassination of President Ndadaye on 21 October 1993 brought around 300,000 Burundian refugees who were settled in Butare Prefecture. Among these, more than 140,000 were settled in Kibayi Commune alone. As a result of this human concentration and lack of sufficient hygiene, in December 1993, a dysentery epidemic spread across a number of communes in Butare, including Gishamvu and Kibayi. In January 1994, there were about 140 patients affected by this disease in Gishamvu. In February 1994 the

\begin{footnote}{11 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, \textit{Rapport annuel 1990}, p. 19; Justin Temahagali, Prefect of the Butare Prefecture, \textit{To the Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, Kigali, Minutes of Meeting of Burgomasters held on 15 February 1991}, Ref.: No. 723/04.09.01/16, Butare, 17 April 1991; Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, \textit{Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Minutes of Commune Council meeting held on 13 September 1993}, Ref.: No. 354/04.04/2, Gishamvu, 16 September 1993; Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Rugemintwaza, Secretary, \textit{Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Minutes of a meeting held on 21 October 1993}, Ref.: No. 386/04.09.01/7, Gishamvu, 8 November 1993.}

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number surpassed 300 patients. Dysentery attacked the Kibayi Commune severely. About five sectors had from around 40 to around 60 deaths whereas the other five sectors had from around 10 to 20 deaths from 1 November to 28 December 1993. About 323 people died in total in Kibayi during that period. It became an emergency health situation.\textsuperscript{12}

In relation to the political crisis that occurred during this same time when the SAP was implemented, starting with the RPF war and then by multiparty politics and violence, the impact of SAP was interpreted in various ways. On the one hand it allegedly brought some kind of legitimacy to the Habyarimana regime as the allocation of funds looked like a support.\textsuperscript{13} On the other hand, the imposition of SAP together with multipartyism led to a weakening of the authoritarian regime that ultimately felt so threatened that it chose to resort to extreme violence in order to remain in power.\textsuperscript{14}

Finally, the economy suffered from the effects of the 1990-1994 war. An estimated 40\% of the Rwandan budget was used for military purposes, which suggests that other economic activities were less financed.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, the military expanded from 5,000 units in 1990 to about 30,000-40,000 units in 1992, and the Rwandan government was spending about US$ 100 million per year. In the view of Pierre Galand, the Rwandan economy became a war economy that benefited those who were involved in the purchasing of weapons and military logistics, while impoverishing more and more of the population.\textsuperscript{16} In addition to the erosion of the economy, the war also disturbed regions


\textsuperscript{13} Storey, “Structural Adjustment”, pp. 372, 376.


\textsuperscript{15} Andersen, “How Multilateral Development”, p. 447.

where it was operating, in the north and western parts of the country. By 1993, war
displaced more than 10% of populations and created a humanitarian disaster for a number
of years, and undermined transport movements and agricultural production in those
regions and had an indirect effect on other parts of the country.

4.2. WAR AND ITS INSTRUMENTALISATION

1990-1994 was also a period when Rwanda underwent a military invasion by Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA) rebels, a military branch of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
The RPF existence and struggle stem from the unresolved refugee issue from the 1960s
onwards. However, the time of the first invasion towards the end of 1990 needs to be put
in the wider context of the end of the Cold War, a moment when most authoritarian
regimes in Africa were required to open up their political space. At this moment, Rwanda
was no exception. Power was still the monopoly of a single party, and alternative political
views were not authorized. This time also needs to be put in its regional context, with
regard to the political organisation of Rwandan refugees from 1982 onwards, the time
when most of them were in a fragile state in asylum countries.17

Before the formation of RPF in December 1987, Rwandan refugees had organised
themselves into a wide range of associations from the mid-1970s onwards. Discussions
that occurred in 1988 between Rwanda and Uganda, which would provide for a peaceful
resolution of the refugee issue, became unproductive; hence, Rwandan refugees took the
military option. When the RPF attacked, Presidents Museveni and Habyarimana were
both in New York, attending a World Summit on children. The initial attack of 1 October
1990 of the RPA rebels estimated at about 2,500 was defeated by the Rwandan army
backed by ex-Zaire, French and Belgian soldiers. General Fred Rwigyema, the
Commander of RPA was killed on 2 October 1990 and the whole rebellion became
scattered, losing a big number of its fighters in the process. At the end of October 1990,

17 For the experience of Rwandan refugees in Uganda, See Mahmood Mamdani, “The political diaspora in
Uganda and background to the RPF invasion”, in Didier Goyvaerts (ed.), Conflict and Ethnicity in Central
Africa, Tokyo, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of
the Rwandan government declared triumph over the rebels. However, starting from the beginning of November 1990, Major Paul Kagame, who had gone to the USA for military training, rushed back to take over control of the rebellion. He reorganised the movement from the remaining rebels who had fled back to Uganda or who had hidden in the Akagera National Park, recruited more fighters and started a new phase of the war, based on guerrilla warfare tactics. He chose the Virunga Volcanoes as a new site and organised his rebellion from there. From January 1991 to July 1992, RPA rebels organised a more patient guerrilla warfare, thanks to a few territories that they occupied in Mutara, Byumba and Ruhengeri. At the beginning of 1991, the number of rebels had reached about 5,000 men. That number kept on increasing throughout 1992 and 1993. On January 22 or 23, 1991, the RPF Inkotanyi attacked the prison of Ruhengeri, freed prisoners and looted some food stuffs and cattle. They further attacked Gatuna located at the border with Uganda and closed the road from that country to Rwanda. From July 1992 onwards, a cease-fire was agreed upon following the Arusha negotiations that evolved from that time until 4 August 1993. This ceasefire was violated on 8 February 1993 by the rebels who nearly reached the capital Kigali and stopped a few kilometres away. By the time of the RPF attack on 8 February 1993, RPF had become strong enough thanks to recruitment from neighbouring countries such as Burundi, Zaire, Rwanda and other parts of the world, and due to more financial contributions from Rwandan refugees across the world. As the number of recruits was increasing the ranks of the RPF, the same applied to the Rwandan army which grew from its initial 5,000 to around 40,000 some time before the genocide.18

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Politically, the war offered to the Habyarimana regime an occasion to redefine a common enemy in ethnic terms. The enemy was presented as Tutsi, borrowing from the fact that the RPF rebels were made up of a majority of Tutsi. This label automatically victimized the Tutsi who lived inside Rwanda.\footnote{Filip Reyntjens, \textit{L'Afrique des grands lacs en crise. Rwanda, Burundi: 1988-1994}, Paris, Karthala, 1994, pp. 93-94; Kinzer, \textit{A Thousand Hills}, p. 152.} Secondly, the official discourse and propaganda likened the RPF rebels (Inkotanyi) to the Inyenzi of the 1960s, and the RPF party to the UNAR of the 1959. In this process, the rebels were presented as pro-monarchists, as the opponents of the 1959 Hutu “revolution”, and the 1973 “moral revolution”, and as people who were coming to establish Tutsi rule over the Hutu. Propagandists of the regime reminded the Tutsi that they were a minority and that they ought to accept themselves as such and not try to change their ethnic identity. The qualification of Hamite as Tutsi and Bantu as Hutu was brought once again to the fore. The colonial anthropological stereotypes of Tutsi as “cleverer” and “liars” were brought back to life. In short, the regime initiated an ideological war against the RPF couched in ethnic terms and based on the political rhetoric and discourse used during the 1959 “revolution”.\footnote{This propaganda is contained mainly in three books that were produced just at the beginning of the war by a number of Rwandan intellectuals and in a number of extremist ethnic media: Mathieu Ngirira, et Jean Bosco Nzitabakuze, \textit{Le Rwanda à la croisée des chemins}, Butare, 1991; François-Xavier Bangamwabo et Emmanuel Rukiramakuba, “Le vocabulaire et le discours des Inkotanyi et leurs allies”, in François-Xavier Bangamwabo et al., \textit{Les relations interethniques au Rwanda à la lumière de l’agression d’octobre 1990. Genèse, soussassements et perspectives}, Ruhengeri, Editions Universitaires du Rwanda, 1991, pp. 223-268 ; and Shyirambere J. Barahinyura, \textit{Rwanda. Trente deux ans après la révolution sociale de 1959}, Frankfurt Am Main, Editions Izuba, 1992.}

In one demonstration march against the RPF war in Butare Prefecture on 3 November 1990, this rhetoric was already formulated:

Message 3: The Inkotanyi… will have to accept our revolution, that represents a Rwanda in harmony.
Message 5: Inyenzi have been dispersed.
Message 15: Since God is on our side, who will be against us?
Message 29: Long life to Habyarimana. What is Rwigema? Rwigema is an Inyenzi. What does this enemy of Rwanda want? He wants to bring back Ubuhake clientship in Rwanda.
Message 32: We know from what servitude the Revolution of 1959 has freed us, no one will bring us there again.
Message 36: We have defeated the monarchy and colonial rule.
Message 47: We reject feudalism –long life to Habyarimana – Long life to Democracy.
Message 51: Who wants monarchy?? No one!!

In fact, before being used by intellectual propagandists, this rhetoric had been used by political leaders in official correspondence. Take for example the following circular letter produced in early November 1990: “…the only goal [of the enemy] is to grab from us the goodness of our Social Revolution of 1959 and our Moral Revolution of 1973.”

Concrete manifestations of the war were witnessed in the whole country albeit on an uneven basis. Areas where the military confrontations occurred suffered more severe effects of the war such as deaths of civilians, the destruction of infrastructure, the displacement of the bulk of populations and a significant decrease of agricultural production, resulting in famine and dependence on humanitarian aid.

In other parts of the country, workers and peasants contributed differently to the effort de guerre in kind through food contribution or in cash through payment of a portion of their salary. Additional recruitment for military service in the army and gendarmerie also reached almost all communes of the country.

Furthermore, the war became a justification for human rights violations against people the government did not like. Indeed, following the RPF attack of 1 October 1990, the Rwandan army fomented a fake attack of Kigali capital on 4th October, 1990. This was followed by mass detention of so-called accomplices. And the arrests were made throughout the whole country. By 19 October 1990, around 30,814 case files of people

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21 Butare Prefecture Archives, Some of the messages written on placards that militants were carrying in a march of support of the Rwandan army and its Supreme Commander in Butare on 3 November 1990.
23 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, pp. 203-204.
who included Tutsi and a number of Hutu considered as non-allies of the regime were collected by the Prosecuting authorities throughout the country. Following this, around 15,000 people were arrested after being accused of being accomplices of the RPF. Prunier thinks that this fake attack was made so as to attract France’s military support in favour of the Rwandan army, which effectively came in, while Braeckman indicates that it is from Mobutu, President of ex-Zaire, that President Habyarimana was advised to foment this fake attack.

In Butare Prefecture, the Tutsi who were arrested as accomplices of the RPF (Ibyitso) were predominantly the wealthier ones: businessmen, priests, university lecturers and employees, teachers in rural areas, but also some peasants. Cases for Butare town include Abbé Modeste Mungwarareba, Dr. Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana, Isidore Barahira, Vincent Munyeshuli, Abel Dushimimana, Gaëtan Niyonzeyu, Godefroid Ruzindana, Samuel Gasana, Alphonse Rutsindura, Augustin Nduwanji; many businessmen, who include Jean Baptiste Sebukangaga, Martin Uwariraye, Vincent Semuhungu, Jérôme Ngarambe, Clément Mudaheranwa, Jean Claude Kalisa, and Pierre Nsonera. Most of them were released in February-March 1991 after suffering severely in prison.

In Kibayi, a number of businessmen also were arrested. These include Ignace Mbuguje, Claver Nyirindekwe, Léonidas Nkundabagenzi, Vianney Gakuba, Segica, Gasekurume
and Nyirimpunga. Teachers include Gasasira. Peasants include Marara, Burasa, Sylvestre Rutagengwa, Mperkeje and Maniraho.\textsuperscript{29} The case of the businessman Nyirimpunga is interesting. He was under so much suspicion of collaborating with the RPF that when his two sons died, after burying them, the Burgomaster obliged him to open their graves and remove the corpses so that they could check whether he had hidden guns inside the coffins.\textsuperscript{30} The cases of Maniraho and his father Mperkeje are also worthy of note. On 13 October 1990, a peasant Innocent Mperkeje, born in 1929, in Linda, Kibayi, a Tutsi but living in Runyinya Sector, was interrogated by the Judiciary Police Inspector (IPJ) François Nsengiyumva. Mperkeje said that he was arrested because when the authorities came to search his house, they found a letter that he received from his son who resided in Tanzania. This son had celebrated his marriage in Tanzania, so one of his wife’s family members came back to Rwanda. In the process, he gave her a letter to give to his father, asking that his father should pay a cow (\textit{indongoranyo}) to the in-laws. He added the following: “People accused me of hosting some unknown people and that I have a gun, but authorities searched for these things but did not find them.”\textsuperscript{31} The son of Mperkeje, Faustin Maniraho, was also interrogated the same day of 13 October 1990. In addition to asking him questions about his younger brother who had written a letter to his father about his marriage cow, they asked him this: “Question: Are you denying that you said that if the Tutsi win, where will the Hutu go? Answer: They are lying against me, really, I never said those things.”\textsuperscript{32} Maniraho is husband to my informant Béatrice Yambabariye. She narrates how both her husband and her father-in-law were suspected of holding guns, then their houses were searched, but no guns were found. However, both were jailed among the accomplices.

In Gishamvu, a number of people were also arrested as accomplices. But informants did not mention names. The only person mentioned is Paul Gakuba from Kibingo Sector,

\textsuperscript{29} Interviews with Paul Twahirwa, Epaphrodite Ndidaze, Cesaria Uwambajimana, Julienne Uwiringiyimana, Anonymous 17, Ildéphonse Habimana, Béatrice Yambabariye, and Anselme Rutabingwa.
\textsuperscript{30} Interview with Drocelle Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{31} République Rwandaise, Parquet de la République, \textit{Butare, Interrogatoire de Mperkeje Innocent, par l’IPJ Nsengiyumva François}, Butare, le 13 octobre 1990.
\textsuperscript{32} République Rwandaise, Parquet de la République, \textit{Butare, Interrogatoire de Maniraho Faustin, par l’IPJ Nsengiyumva François}, Butare, le 13 octobre 1990.
who is said to have died in the prison. 33 As we shall see in the next chapter, RPF attacks in 1990, 1991 and 1993 were also used as excuses to commit massacres against Tutsi populations in certain areas of the country.

4.3. INSECURITY IN RURAL AREAS

Criminal and social violence became widespread during the 1990-1994 time. Ironically, this is also the time when the whole territorial administration was transformed into a security machine. But how this machine failed to halt insecurity at local level is a complex question. A number of authors have documented this violence at local level. Kimonyo called it social violence, but it is possible to find some criminal features in it, especially due to the fact that the bulk of motives behind it lay in the pursuit of material goods, so scarce in this time of severe famine and economic poverty. I found a number of cases in Gishamvu and Kibayi. Given that the existing literature focused mostly on urban criminal violence during this period, cases of insecurity in Gishamvu and Kibayi are worthy of note. While considering their authors, victims and modes of operation, one notices that they reveal varied patterns. In relying on commune reports, I first enumerate cases of criminal and social violence, and thereafter I discuss their major patterns.

4.3.1. In Gishamvu

On October 17th, 1990, the home of Nkeramihigo located in Bitare, Sheke Sector, was attacked by robbers and three persons were injured: Mr. Nkeramihigo himself, his wife and one of their children. The following day, the Subprefect of Busoro and the Burgomaster of Gishamvu met with the population of Sheke to calm them down and sensitize them about national cohesion. The casualties were transported to the Sheke dispensary for medical treatment. 34

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33 Interview with Anonymous 4 and Anonymous 5 and André, Guichaoua (dir.), Les crises politiques, p. 51.
34 Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Two Telegrams to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Security, Text No. 631/04.09.01 and 633/04.09.01, without date.
The Security Report of the Gishamvu police indicated that for the month of July 1991, nine people brought cases against 11 others who wronged them. Accusations were about six cases of assault and battery, two robberies and one murder.35

In the night of 17 August 1991, a mob of robbers attacked at Kibu in Gikunzi Sector at a place called Fauboug, but the population came and caught a certain Havugiyaremye who was from Mubumbano. The police transferred him to the prosecuting authority of Butare.36

In a Security Council meeting of the Butare Prefecture held on August 5th, 1992, the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune gave the state of security in Gishamvu. He noted that the “virus” of urusimbi (gambling) had spread in all sectors of the commune, that there had been a meeting of all party leaders but that they failed to solve that problem. He also mentioned a case of released prisoners from Liba and Mubumbano who were causing insecurity. He also said that on 26 July 1992 violence was about to happen, because some robbers from Nyakizu were caught in Kigembe near Gishamvu and were brought to the detention place of Gishamvu commune. Then people from Nyakizu came to reclaim them in order to jail them at Nyakizu instead, but it seems in reality they wanted to kill them. Because they refused to cooperate and were very angry, the Gishamvu commune authorities called in the gendarmerie who calmed down the situation.37 On 24 July 1992, a lady called Nyiramanywa from Kibingo Sector was killed by her step-son in connivance and her brother-in-law.38

In one security meeting, the Butare Prefecture leaders complained about the behaviour of the population in taking justice into their own hands and killing robbers. The prosecutor alleged that Commune authorities brought robbers without file cases, and Commune

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36 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Councillors of Gishamvu, Sholi and Nyakibanda Sectors, Ref.: No. 713/04.09.01/1, Gishamvu, 6 September 1991.
leaders retaliated with the charge that the prosecutor released those brought before him. For example, 15 robbers were killed in no more than a week: 11 in Nyaruhengeri on one time; 2 killed in Gishamvu and 2 others in Muganza. These killings of robbers occurred on the night of 6-7 August 1992.  

In another meeting at the Butare Prefecture in September 1992, the Minister of Justice lamented the fact that the population in Nyaruhengeri, Gishamvu and Runyinya was punishing the robbers themselves, and other people at fault, without transferring them to the justice system.

In a letter dated 23 September 1992, the Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture asked the Burgomaster of Gishamvu to investigate the case of a certain Georges, son of Saveri Nkwaya from Liba Sector, Kinteko Cell, who allegedly was a bandit and hid a mob of other bandits at his home, aiming at robbing and killing people in Gishamvu. Also he asked the burgomaster to investigate the case of the death of Melani Nzajyibwami from Liba who was killed in the night of 10-11 September 1992, and his wife who was severely injured and who ultimately died on 22 September 1992. The following people were suspected at having taken part in that killing: Sibomana son of Ntuyahaga; Sehorana son of Karimumbari; Ntezimana son of Habumugisha; Nkurunziza son of Felesita.

On 26 November 1992, the home of Pucie Nyirabalinda in Liba Sector was attacked by robbers who robbed and did violence. This robbery and violence led to the subsequent killing of Bazubwabo.

On the night of 5 January 1993, six robbers using arms such as grenades and machetes and wearing military uniforms attacked and robbed money and goods at the bar of J.

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42 S/Préfet Busoro, Télégramme officiel au MININTER Kigali, 10II20B, N° de l’exp : 92/087, s.d.
Baptiste Nyabyenda of Kansi Sector in Nyaruhengeri Commune. Eight people got injured in that attack. Two people were suspected: Regis from Liba Sector, Mububa Cell of Gishamvu, and Nzeyimana son of Prosper from Kinteko, Liba Sector, also of Gishamvu.43

On February 8th, 1993, an unidentified person attacked the driver of Gishamvu Commune and injured him with a machete. Furthermore, on the evening of 18 February 1993, other unidentified persons attacked a man called John Kubwimana from Kibingo Sector and cut him with a machete and destroyed his car. As the population came to intervene, the perpetrators launched a grenade. On the 21st of the same month again, a lady called Nibarere from Buvumu Sector was killed. This killing is said to have been caused by an argument between gamblers in the game called kazungu. In Sheke Sector also, an old lady was slashed with a machete following a deep conflict between her and the perpetrators.44

Since insecurity increased, one citizen called Antoine Rwangombwa from Kansi Sector, Nyaruhengeri Commune, took the liberty of writing a letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, on July 28th, 1993, asking for protection. He informed the Prefect about a problem of insecurity created by unidentified persons who attacked pedestrians and robbed their stuff, beat them and also stripped women. That violence was said to be located in Nyaruhengeri, Kigembe, Gishamvu and Ngoma communes.45

On 17 September 1993, at Gikunzi Sector in Gishamvu, three people were severely beaten until they died: Ntirumaririmana, Nyabyenda and Mukasoni. They were accused of witchcraft. They were beaten by a crowd of people in Gikunzi Sector. The population

44 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Eliphaz Liberakurora, Rapporteur, Minutes of Security Council meeting held on 4 March 1993.
wished that those responsible for their death be punished once identified. As it was argued, some used the witchcraft allegation in order to attack their previous enemies.46

A person called Callixte Karekezi from Gashiru, Sheke Sector, was attacked on 17 October 1993 at night by robbers. They robbed and seriously injured him and his wife. They robbed money, radio systems and kitchen utensils. A person called Nzaramba was suspected of having participated in that robbery.47 On the 31st of the same month, some unidentified people attacked the home of Alexis Rutaburingoga, a businessman at Busoro centre. When he and his wife arrived at their home around 8:00 pm, the robbers threw a grenade at the house and fled. That grenade killed Théogène Bulindwi, a worker of Rutaburinagoga and injured a person called Damascène. The windows were seriously damaged. The population came to their rescue and made a lot of noise but they failed to identify those responsible for the violence. The enquiry simply remained open.48

In a security council meeting held at Gishamvu Commune in mid-December 1993 a number of criminal and social violence cases were reported per Sector: (1) In the valley of Migina located between Gishamvu and Nyaruhengeri Communes, robbers organized in mobs were stopping people and confiscating their belongings during the day. (2) Some people from Gishamvu Sector were killed after being accused of witchcraft. Those who killed them were pursued and caught. (3) Some people including Gabriel Murara from Sholi, Jean Kubwimana from Kibingo, Callixte Karekezi from Sheke and Alexis Rutaburingoga from Mubumbano mentioned that they were attacked by grenades, but the perpetrators could not be identified, except Nzaramba who allegedly attacked Karekezi on 18 October 1993. (4) In Mubumbano Sector, two grenades were found. Robbery in Mubumbano is said to have increased the degree of famine during that time. (5) In Gishamvu Sector, security was threatened at the Busoro centre because of many bars in

which many people allegedly spread ethnic hatred and then resorted to violence. (6) In Nyakibanda and Gikunzi, security was threatened by the robbery of livestock and food in the fields. (7) Liba and Kibingo Sectors were said to witness robbery of food in the fields.\(^49\)

The late Rumashana’s family was attacked in mid-December 1993 and two children, Kalimanzira and Uwambaje, were killed by a grenade. The population accused two people of that killing: Thadeo Ngiruwigize and his son Charles Turame. Ngiruwigize was also son of Rumashana. This was a family plot killing. At the same time, robbers targeted Kalimunda’s house in Buvumu and robbed a radio system, clothes and a machete.\(^50\)

On 2 February 1994, Gabriel Hingabugabo from Kibingo was killed while attempting to rob the home of J. Damascène Twagirumukiza. Also on 6 February 1994, the shop of Gloriose Kanyumba was attacked by grenade; the robbers continued to the shop of Jean Kubwimana and robbed two boxes of beer.\(^51\)

\[4.3.2. \text{In Kibayi}\]

Two cases of murder were reported in the third quarter of 1990.\(^52\)

In early 1991, the Councillor of Shyombo, André Uzaramba, was accused of mistreating a number of his constituents. In this regard, Nzaramyimana, a peasant from Shyombo, wrote a letter to the Prefect, alleging that this Councillor was attacking him because he did not elect him (in the councillors’ election of January 1990), that he had extorted 9,500 francs from him, and had beaten him severely in such a way that he alleged he spent


\(^{50}\) Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, \textit{Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The death of Kalimanzira and Uwambaje from Gishamvu. Three grenades have been found in Buvumu Sector-Gishamvu}, No. 440/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 17 December 1993.


about two months in bed not working.\textsuperscript{53} The same applies to the inhabitant Vitaliani Nduwumwami who alleged that he was severely beaten by the Councillor Uzaramba: “I am being wronged in the Shyombo Sector because I did not vote for the Councillor, he attacked and beat me at my home more than the way people used to be beaten during the colonial period. I have been unable to work, he says that I refused to become his client, as if I do not know where beer is sold [i.e., so that I can buy for him]. Dear Prefect, we are about to die of hunger in our homes, will we get things to eat and to give him?”\textsuperscript{54}

The Security report of Kibayi, for August 1991 mentioned 13 charges: One charge for public insults, five charges for assault and light battery, two certified robberies, one charge for assaults having caused death, one charge for inflicting physical pain, one charge for marijuana smoking and one charge for destruction of houses.\textsuperscript{55} On 10 October 1991, another eight charges were registered. They included one murder, one rape case and one certified robbery.\textsuperscript{56}

In April 1992, the security report mentioned three cases of violence: In Joma Sector, a teacher called J. Pierre Rutazikwa was beaten with a bottle over his head and was injured. He was sent to hospital. It was on 18 April 1992. In Mukindo Sector, a woman called Tharcilla Nyirandutiye was stabbed in the head on 19 April 1992. In Shyombo, a man called Bosco Ntirushwamaboko was beaten and injured on 18 April 1992.\textsuperscript{57}


1992, security in the Kibayi Commune and at the border with Burundi was reported as fine. However, the robbery of bicycles was registered.\textsuperscript{58}

Security is described as bad towards the end of July 1992 in Kibayi: (1) In the night of 24 July 1992 in Runyinya Sector, Agasharu Cell, a young man called Samuel Musabyeyezu was killed by Mugarura in tandem with Clément Bikorabagabo and Vuganeza. Though the cause is not mentioned in the report, it looks like social violence. Mugarura who had killed Musabyeyezu on 24 July 1992 was caught four days later. (2) On 24 July 1992 in Shyombo Sector, a cow and a goat belonging respectively to Baligira and Christophe Nyandwi were robbed. (3) In Nyagahuru Sector, Kibu Cell, on 25 July 1992, the population took over land belonging to the commune where cattle stayed after drinking water, and cultivated it. The commune Burgomaster said in the meeting that he was planning to go to remove them from that state land.\textsuperscript{59}

August 1992: Around 100 people organized themselves and attacked cooperatives in Kibayi. The purpose of that attack is not mentioned. (2) On 4 August 1992 a young man was killed by his family member as he opened the door for him when he was asking for shelter. He was seeking to kill his paternal uncle because of conflicts they had regarding inheritance. (3) There was also an issue of robbing cattle that were taken to Burundi, provided that they were sold there at a higher price. (4) In Kibayi there were also the issues of youth playing the \textit{urusimbi} game, the consumption of marijuana, and people who escaped prison who had come to take revenge.\textsuperscript{60} On the night of 3 August 1992 in Mukindo Sector, a Yamaha 100 motorbike belonging to Vincent Urayaha was stolen. (2) In Rwamiko Sector, a house belonging to a certain woman had been burnt by her enemies.

\textsuperscript{60} J. Baptiste Hakizamungu, Subprefect of Prefecture, Fabien Uwimana, Rapporteur of the meeting, \textit{Letter to the Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, Kigali, Re: Minutes of the Security Council of Butare Prefecture, held on 5 August 1992}, Ref.: No. 191/04.09.01, Butare, 17 August 1992, p. 4.
who were not identified. In August 1992 again: The robbery of cows was exacerbated especially in Mukomacara, Shyombo, Joma and Mukindo Sectors, because these sectors had crossing bridges or paths (ibyambu) leading to Burundi where the stolen cows were sold. Rwandese robbed them and Burundians in connivance bought them. (2) In Shyombo, Nyakazana Cell, the population killed four bandits who had robbed the house of Balthazar Nzaramba.

In September 1992, a number of forests and hills were burnt: these included the forest of Straton Nsabumukunzi located in Kibayi Sector, Rwahambi Cell, burnt on 24 September 1992; 6 ha of a hill located in Nyagahuru, Mushongi Cell, burnt on 21 September, and in Joma Sector where seven people lost their forests. At the end of September and beginning of October 1992, hills and houses kept on being burnt in Joma, Nyagahuru, and Shyombo. On 19 October 1992, a man Joseph Kalinda from Runyinya Sector, Munyegera Cell was beaten and latter killed for having stolen a pot belonging to those who beat and killed him.

On 4 December 1992, three people - the teacher Jean Pierre Rutazikwa, Nzabambarirwa and Sindikubwabo - were accused of robbing bananas in Joma Sector, Rebero Cell. A group of people went to attack the teacher Rutazikwa at the Magi primary school where he worked, they were carrying machetes and clubs and were saying that they were going to kill him. The Burgomaster and policemen intervened in order to stop that violence. The group asked for 50,000 Rwandan Francs as a deposit in order not to kill him. The Commune authorities paid it. Then they released him but after beating him.

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thereafter taken to hospital. (2) On 6 December in Mukindo Sector, Nyabisagara Cell, a man called Habimana raped Alphonsine Nyiraminani who lived in Mуганза commune.66

The Councillor Theodore Bikorabagabo of Saga Sector was dismissed in March 1993 because he robbed tiles from the sector’s office roof, a chair and some money.67 On 1 May 1993, one of Cell Committee members in Rebero Cell, Joma Sector, called Alfred Ntibiruke, alias Mwami, died. An unidentified person had injured him a month previously with a stone.68 The Security Council meeting of 17 May 1993 in Kibayi calculated that in almost all 9 sectors of the commune the following crimes were found, however to an unequal degree: physical violence, robbery, gambling (*urusimbi* and *akazungu*), informal liquor *Kanyanga*, marijuana, and Burundians who brought food into markets through smuggling.69 On 27 May 1993, Faustin Kabera from Nyakazana Cell, Shyombo Sector was killed by Callixte Rutayisire and Murekezi for motives of revenge, because they were accusing the mother of Kabera to have poisoned the official wife of Rutayisire who later died. (2) A grenade TNT was found on 30 May 1993 in Joma Sector, Rebero Cell in the house of Viateur Nzasabimfura.70

In Joma Sector, Gitega cell on 11 June 1993, a man called Nahimana had beaten his wife Espérance Nyirarukundo with an axe until she died. The lady was carrying a baby of three months who also got injured in the process and died at the hospital of Butare town. The man also attempted to commit suicide by throwing himself from the top of a tree down into the stones. He was severely injured and was taken to hospital. He allegedly

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67 Jean Baptiste Habyalimana, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, *Letter to the Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Re: The issue of Mr. Bikorabagabo Théodore, Councillor of Saga Sector*, Ref.: No. 431/04.07, without date.
69 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, *Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Minutes of Security Council meeting held on 17 May 1993*, Ref.: No. 179/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 9 June 1993. In this meeting of 17 May 1993, one of my informants, Joseph Balitunga, was also accused of selling the liquor Kanyanga. The council decided that Balitunga’s house should be checked, in such a way that he be punished if found guilty.
had some mental sickness. In the last week of July 1993, three people were killed and two houses were destroyed. (2) On 5 July 1993 a certain Nsabineza from Mukindo Sector was injured by a stone to the leg, thrown at him by Bizumuremyi. He was taken to hospital, but died on 26 July 1993.

Certain news spread in Kibayi saying that some Saga people were going to attack Kibayi Sector. Kibayi Sector inhabitants became afraid in the process. But authorities said that this news was just rumours. (2) On 10 December 1993, a Burundian refugee called Frédéric Ntahondi residing near to Kanage was found with a submachine gun with 32 bullets. He said that he bought it from two Burundians who had fled with it. He did not resist showing it. That case was submitted to the Prosecuting authority.

An R4 rifle and bullets were also discovered in Rwamiko Sector. (2) On 27 February 1994, a man Nkurabanga attacked and injured a number of his family members cutting the arm of one, the leg of another, and the arm and two fingers of the third. (3) In Mukindo Sector, on 24 February 1994, a Burundian person died in the Kanage refugee camp. He was killed by other Burundians who suspected him of being a wizard. (4) In Runyinya Sector, on 27 February 1994 Straton Butoyi used a small hoe to hit Hategekimana in the head. Both were reported to have been drunk.

4.3.3. Patterns, Motives and Measures

In all these cases of Gishamvu and Kibayi, it is possible to find some key motives that drove the criminals. First it is material gain. Although robbery was always there before this crisis, a new feature is that it becomes more regular and more intense. The second feature of it is that it involves the easy killing of victims before or after robbing them. It

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involves also the killing of robbers by the population. The proliferation of arms must be one explanation, this is also related to the fact that some soldiers used to escape the battlefield and desert with guns and grenades and use them in criminal activities or sell them. The growing impunity during this time must also be a cause. Rampant corruption of justice employees and prisons may also be a cause of this, as well as the big number of prisoners who succeeded in escaping prisons. The consumption of marijuana and the increase of gambling suggest the exaggeration of desperation and criminality, while the accusation of witchcraft against targeted people suggests the use of “customs” for self-justifying purposes.

Yet, security measures had been tightened during this crisis time. For example, a day after the launch of the first attack of the RPF rebellion, a state of emergency and a curfew were proclaimed. They reduced the freedom of movement and regulated the hours for the opening and closing of certain public places such as markets, business places and bars. Those measures were applied more leniently at areas far from the battlefield towards May 1992.

Secondly, the state during this time became a defensive and police state. The authority of the Prefect at the level of the Prefecture was further reinforced. On security matters, the Prefect worked in tandem with the Prefecture Security Committee, which was supposed to work as a “crisis committee”.

At the level of the Commune, the Burgomasters were asked to report everyday on the security situation at the Subprefecture, the Subprefecture had to make a summary and send the message to the Prefecture, and then the Prefecture

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to the Ministry of Local Government and Commune Development. In this process, the
Burgomasters were helped by their Commune Security Councils.\textsuperscript{77}

For communes located at the border with neighbouring countries, security measures
became even more strengthened. For example, Butare Burgomasters were constantly
reminded to guard the border and other sensitive and strategic infrastructures located in
their communes such as public buildings, bridges, factories, telephone antennas, etc.,
using both the police and the civilian population in what was called civil self-defence
units. These units operated through the organisation of daily and nightly patrols and the
placing of roadblocks and control of identity of all those passing at those roadblocks. The
Prefect ruled that all the canoes that operate in the Akanyaru river between Rwanda and
Burundi be stopped from operating, and that the Butare population ceases to go to
Burundi. Burgomasters having sectors that touched on the frontier with Burundi were
asked to set up an intelligence committee made by Rwandans and possibly Burundians in
order to get information about an eventual attack of rebels from Burundi.\textsuperscript{78}

A special emphasis was put on the control of the youth who went to Burundi allegedly in
order to join the RPF rebel camp. The Prefects asked the Burgomasters to tighten the
control of their territory and catch anyone suspected of joining the Inkotanyi.\textsuperscript{79} In Kibayi

\textsuperscript{77} Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, \textit{Letter to Burgomasters of Gishamvu, Kigembe,
Nyakizu and Runyinya Communes, Re: Information to send everyday on Security in the Commune}, Ref. : No. 778/04.09.01, Busoro, 20 December 1990; Dominique Ntawukuriyayo, Sous-Préfet de la Sous-


\textsuperscript{79} Jean Baptiste Habyalimana, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, \textit{Letter to all Burgomasters of Communes located in Butare, Re: The issue of young men who join the Inkotanyi (RPF)}, Ref. : No. 229/04.09.01, Butare, 21 September 1992.
for example, nine young people were caught trying to cross the border on an unofficial bridge on the Akanyaru river at Joma Sector. They were from Muganza and Ndora Communes. They explained that they were going to Burundi to visit their relatives. But the population that caught them suspected that they were joining Inkotanyi. They brought seven of them to the commune authorities who reported to the Prefect about the incident.80

However, both in Gishamvu and Kibayi, movement of the population to Burundi seems to have continued regardless of these war regulations. Concerning Gishamvu, the Subprefect wrote the following to the Burgomaster: “There is news informing me about the movement of people back and forth of Mukuge Sector going to Burundi, especially the youth. It is possible that even other people from other sectors do this also. I urge you to verify if such information is sustained…”81 As for Kibayi, some Burundi peasants were crossing the border and entering Rwanda without crossing the official border since it was closed. Those Burundians were bringing food to the market. Those who were crossing from Kanage path were also bringing goods through smuggling.82

The security means were also supplied. For example, in November 1991, new guns were distributed to commune police in the proportion of two machine guns per commune added to what they had before, plus seven more guns for communes sharing borders with a foreign country.83 Communes were regularly asked to apply for an increase of police forces within their jurisdiction, with an emphasis on more police forces for communes located at frontiers.84 If this scheme was to be respected, Gishamvu should have 16

80 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Nine Young men arrested while going to Burundi, Ref.: No. 409/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 23 November 1992.
82 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Minutes of Security Council meeting held on 17 May 1993, Ref.: No. 179/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 9 June 1993.
83 Justin Temahagali, Prefect of the Butare Prefecture, To the Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, Kigali, Minutes of Meeting of Burgomasters held on 15 February 1991, Ref.: No. 723/04.09.01/16, Butare, 17 April 1991.
84 Justin Temahagali, Prefect of the Butare Prefecture, To the Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, Kigali, Numbers of Commune Police on 31 December 1990, Ref.: No. 225/04.01.02, Butare,
policemen instead of five, and Kibayi 44 policemen instead of six. However, the number of policemen on the eve of genocide suggests that this number never got increased in the desired proportions. Both communes remained with less than ten policemen per commune.

Major holders of power at local level, including heads of political parties, heads of schools, businessmen, and other employers were associated with the security issue and some of them were represented either in Prefecture Security Committees or in Commune Security councils.\(^{85}\)

Last but not least, the able-bodied civilian population were required to protect their local neighbourhoods by patrolling them day and night. Those who were not fit enough to do this job or who did not have time to do it, had to contribute financially by providing money to buy torches, and batteries for torches. At the beginning, all ethnic groups participated in these patrols. But towards 1993, when hatred against the Tutsi had increased as a result of hatred propaganda in the media, the Tutsi were excluded or excluded themselves from Hutu patrol groups. According to official instructions, people who guarded the roadblocks had to arrest any person not known in the vicinity and bring him or her to the nearby authorities for further investigation.\(^{86}\) The civilians’ patrols were

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1 February 1991; Jean Baptiste Hakizamungu, Subprefect of Butare Prefecture, and Onesphore Muvunandinda, Rapporteur, Confidential, Minutes of the Meeting of Police Brigadiers of Communes, held on 7 October 1991, Ref.: No. 1755/04.09.01/16, Butare, 17 October 1991; Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Confidential, Minutes of the meeting with Burgomasters held on 19 September 1991, Ref.: No. 747/04.09.01/16, Busoro, 5 October 1991.


86 Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Re: Main points developed in the meeting of the Prefect with Burgomasters held on 9 November 1991 in Butare, Ref.: No. 848/04.09.01/16, Busoro, 14 November 1991; Dominique Ntawukuririyayo, Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture, Confidential, Letter to all Burgomasters of the Gisagara Subprefecture, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 013/04.09.01/4, Gisagara, 22 April 1992; Interview with François Manirabona, Kibayi, 11 May 2007; Interview with Aloys Mutambirwa, Kibayi, 17 May 2007; Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007; Interview with Anonymous 8, Gishamvu, 24 and 26 April 2007; Interviews with Anonymous 1, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Célestin Karemera,
so important that in every meeting where the issue of robbery was reported, the leaders recommended that the patrols be strengthened more and more. In this respect, leaders appeared to rely on the population as a means of fighting against criminality.

But state measures to prevent rebels’ infiltration and to stop civil disorder did not halt criminal violence. As one can conclude, security measures were necessary but not sufficient, since structural and conjunctural situations could not be solved by security measures alone. First, land had been scarce and become less and less productive. In this respect, incidents of social violence among family members and the taking over of state property were related mostly but not solely to land. Secondly, banditry grew hand in hand with the large number of youth lacking jobs and land for agriculture, with famine that led to the theft of foodstuffs in the fields or in homes and with the proliferation of weapons due to the present war. Thirdly, the justice apparatus failed to punish those implicated in crimes; as a result the populations took justice into their own hands, and thus aggravated the situation.87

In the following section, we shall see that politicians in their quest for power also manipulated these fragile situations and in the process produced another form of violence that can be labelled political violence, since it opposed political actors or operated within the political arena.

4.4. PARTY POLITICS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

It can be argued that the advent of multiparty politics in Rwanda from 1991 to 1994 was a positive move in the sense that it brought political plurality and an opening of the political space. But given the result that this multiparty system produced, it can also be argued that it brought more chaos than democracy. But multiparty politics in Rwanda is

87 On this last point see Longman, Christianity, pp. 166-167.
interesting in that it helps us understand to what extent politicians of all sides were prone to use all means including crude violence in order to reach power. The degree of resorting to violence depended more on what means of violence a party or politician had at his disposal and less on the political programme of that party.

4.4.1. The Evolution of Multiparty Politics

a) The launch of the multiparty system

The advent of multipartyism in Rwanda was the result of international changes following the end of cold war and of internal demands. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the *la Baule* Conference in June 1990 brought about requirements for authoritarian states around the African continent to democratize their regimes. France, USA and the institutions of Bretton Woods imposed conditions on African countries that were not ruled democratically to democratize their regimes as a condition in order to continue to receive aid and loans.

Internally, it is also in Mid-May 1990 that the debate on how to open up the political space for multiple voices started, first inside the ruling party MRND through the CIC (Interministries Coordination Committee) and thereafter through the CNS (National Synthesis Commission). In May 1990, the CIC had criticized the confusion of power between the MRND power and the executive government, the presentation of a single candidate to the post of president of the republic, the unlimited eligibility of the President of the Republic, the lesser flexibility in the choosing of candidates in parliament and the way Burgomasters had a big influence in the election of candidates to the position of Councillor. 88 That was followed by the decision of the President of the Republic to form a commission that would study how to install multipartyism in Rwanda. That commission came to bear the name National Synthesis Commission. It started its gatherings on 24 September 1990 and presented its report in January 1991. However, before the CNS

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commission, a letter signed by 33 intellectuals reclaiming the opening of political space had been issued in August 1990.89

It is the new Constitution of 10 June 1991 that legally recognized many parties. From 1 July 1991 to 18 July 1993, 17 parties were created or legalized, but five seem to have been the most important: the former MRND single party transformed into MRNDD (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement et la Démocratie), MDR (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain), PSD (Parti Social Démocrate), PL (Parti Libéral) and PDC (Parti Démocrate Chrétien). 1991-1994 proved to be the time of intense political activity in Rwanda in general, including in Gishamvu and Kibayi which were among rural area communes. It is worth noting that at the beginning of July 1991, party activities already started in Gishamvu and Kibayi.

In August 1991 leaders of parties in Gishamvu were as follows: Augustin Kabiligi, director of CERAI Liba living in Mubumbano, for MRNDD; Augustin Sezibera who lived in Sholi and a teacher at the primary school of Mubumbano was head of MDR; PSD was said to be present but his leader was not yet known. It was advertised by Thadeo Kanyemera living at Muboni in Gishamvu Sector and teaching at Mubumbano primary school. It was also advertised by Aloys Sibomana, who was the agronomist of Gishamvu Commune.90

Deputé Amandin Rugira, one of the Executive members of MRND and the coordinator of MRNDD in Butare Prefecture came to launch the beginning of that party in Gishamvu. He is one of the senior Butare politicians since the 1960s and became an experienced politician during the Second Republic. He is from Kigembe, close to Gishamvu and Kibayi. He selected and invited 61 influential people in the commune and organized an election among them. For the presidency of MRNDD in Gishamvu, Augustin Kabiligi, a Hutu, head of CERAI-Liba and living in Mubumbano Sector, won over Jean

Niyizurugero, the Inspector of schools in Gishamvu, and Emmanuel Munyarugano, former burgomaster and parliamentarian. The coordinators of MRNDD at the level of sectors were also elected. 91 Three days before the meeting of 7 July 1991, a list of provisional leaders of MRNDD had been made by the Burgomaster Pascal Kambanda, in the proportion of six persons per sector. The Burgomaster was also a member of MRND in 1991. Two groups seem to have entered MRNDD earlier: those who held government jobs such as teachers, medical employees, agronomists, administrative leaders, and then businessmen, both Hutu and Tutsi. 92 Two months later, the MRNDD President in Gishamvu, Augustin Kabiligi, held a meeting with coordinators of MRNDD in sectors. Those coordinators voted in their office-bearers: vice president: Mathias Twagirayezu, Secretary: Laurent Minani, Treasurer: Innocent Murengerantwali. In this meeting, they also calculated the members of their party and they showed the number of 4,674 which is very big. If this holds true, that means at the beginning of the multiparty system, three months later, many people were still in the former single party and had not yet decided to join other parties. 93 According to MRNDD records, on 30 September 1991, this party had 5,884 members out of 15,073 people who were able to vote in the Gishamvu commune. Sheke Sector had 68.1% of its adult people in MRNDD and was the most affiliated to MRNDD with Mubumbano and Mukuge. It is worth noting that Sheke was the most populated by Tutsi people. That is why maybe Laurent Minani, a primary school teacher and Tutsi from Sheke, was elected into office. 94

7 July 1991 was extremely early if one considers that the new MRNDD party following multipartyism was only formally created on 5 July 1991. That means that in Butare Prefecture, MRNDD attempted to penetrate rural area communes simultaneously with the

91 Amandin Rugira, leader of the meeting and Jean Marie Vianney Muramutsa, Secretary, Minutes of the meeting of key leaders of MRND held on 7 July 1991 in Gishamvu, Ref.: No. 545/04.12, Gishamvu, 8 July 1991.
92 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, List of Provisional leaders of MRND in Gishamvu Commune, Ref.: No. 537/04.12, Gishamvu, 4 July 1991.
93 Augustin Kabiligi, Coordinator of MRND in Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Coordinator of MRND in Butare Prefecture: Re: Minutes of the meeting of coordinators of MRND in Gishamvu, Gishamvu, 19 September 1991.
94 Augustin Kabiligi, Coordinator of MRND in Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Re: The number of people who have already joined MRND party in Gishamvu, Gishamvu, 10 October 1991.
capital city from which the launching of the party occurred. The same applies to other significant parties such as MDR, PSD and PL. These were launched almost at the same time with MRNDD, respectively on 1 July, 1 July and 14 July. At the end of August, all of them were present in Gishamvu and Kibayi albeit at an unequal strength.

Other parties had also started their activities by designating party leaders. MDR’s President was Augustin Sezibera, Hutu, born in 1940 and living in Sholi Sector. He was a teacher at Mubumbano primary school. The representative of PSD was Aloys Sibomana, Hutu, born in 1959 and living in Gishamvu Sector. He was Executive Secretary of PSD in Gishamvu. He worked as chief agronomist of Gishamvu. He was helped by two assistants, one Tutsi named Thadée Kanyemera, a teacher at Mubumbano primary school, and a Hutu from Sheke called Athanase Habinshuti who had been dismissed from ESM (Military Academy).\(^95\) PSD also had the support of the renowned businessman in Gishamvu called François Mukimbiri, a wealthier Tutsi and head of the Gishamvu chamber of commerce. He gave one of his houses to PSD to become an office of that party in Gishamvu. This house was located at the Bosoro centre.\(^96\) The leaders of PL were not yet known by September 1991, but the party was already operating. It is later on that Justin Senyange represented it in Gishamvu. He was also a teacher, and Tutsi.\(^97\)

In Kibayi, commune leaders, such as the burgomaster, the majority of councillors and cell committee members, were also from MRNDD party at the beginning of multiparty system. The President of MRNDD was Raymond Hakizimana, former Burgomaster and brother of Isodore Nzeyimana, renowned politician of the 1960s during and after the “revolution”. Seemingly, the MRNDD strategy in the Butare Prefecture level was to capture leaders of the 1960s and bring them to the fore again in order to win the multiparty system. It had done that in Gishamvu by designating Emmanuel Munyarugano

\(^{95}\) Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, to Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: CV of heads of parties in Gishamvu, Ref.: 720/04.09.01, Gishamvu, 9 September 1991.
\(^{96}\) Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Minutes of the Campaign meeting of PSD held at the Office of Gishamvu Commune on 31 August 1991, Ref.: No.706/04.09.01, Gishamvu, 2 September 1991.
\(^{97}\) Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Minutes of the Councillors’ meeting held on 4 September 1991, Ref.: No.709/04.09.01/16, Gishamvu, 6 September 1991; Interview with Evariste Murindwa, Gishamvu, 24 March 2006.
among the list of candidate presidents, but he had not been elected there, probably due to his old age: he was 71 by then. Amandin Rugira, head of the party in Butare prefecture was close to both as they worked together in the 1960s, and Rugira was brother-in-law of Hakizimana. The president of MDR was Christophe Nyandwi who had been Inspector of schools in Kibayi and Muganza areas. He lived in Shyombo Sector. The president of PSD was Alphonse Vunabandi, a young person who lived in Saga Sector and who worked at the Commune office as Assistant to the Burgomaster in charge of economic and technical affairs. Salvator Ndahiro was the head of PL. He was replaced later by Jean Bosco Butera.98

At an earlier stage, MRNDD benefited a lot from its controlling of administrative power at the prefecture, subprefecture and commune levels. The Prefect, the Subprefect of Busoro and Gisagara subprefectures, the Gishamvu and Kibayi burgomasters and the majority of councillors were all from MRNDD.99

b) Rational choice theory in party adhesion

As a first proposition, most rural intellectuals and peasants who had had some misunderstanding or conflict in the past with established administrative leaders such as the burgomaster, commune employees and councillors tended to become the very first members of opposition parties, that is, MDR, PSD and PL. This element transpires clearly in the interviews of both rural intellectuals and ordinary peasants. It was a way of settling some unfinished conflicts.

In Gishamvu for example, Callixte Kanyamugenga, a Tutsi peasant from Mukuge Sector, was in MRNDD, then Gabriel Murara, Medical assistant, ‘recruited’ him in MDR by confiscating his MRNDD card and giving him the MDR one. Kanyamugenga asserts that he accepted to enter MDR because of his need for health treatment that he benefited from Murara.\footnote{Interview with Callixte Kanyamugenga, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.} In the same vein, Vincent Kanamugire, a Tutsi peasant from Mukuge as well joined MDR because as he narrates, he was an opponent of Burgomaster Kambanda for having refused him permission to buy land in Busoro centre. And later on when he bought a house there, the Burgomaster forbade him to finish the construction of it. Until the time of the interview, the case was still in court. So he claims to have joined MDR in order to counter Kambanda’s politics.

It is in Kibayi that I found many cases. Aloys Mutarambirwa lived in Saga Sector in the same neighbourhood with Alphonse Vunabandi, the assistant of the burgomaster and president of PSD in Kibayi. They knew each other very well. But he did not join the PSD, although he ought to enter there, since the youth, according to this informant, were attracted mostly to PSD because of more powerful propaganda and entertaining songs. He said he did not enter PSD because Vunabandi refused to lend him 400 Rwandan francs to pay for his tax in order to apply for his ID book.\footnote{Interview with Aloys Mutarambirwa, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.}

Another conflict saw Christophe Nyandwi, who was Inspector of schools, opposed to Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster. According to Nyandwi and his wife Domitilla Niyonsaba, the burgomaster was jealous of their household because they were as rich as - if not richer than – him, although he was the paramount leader of the commune. Concerning professional matters, Kajyambere is said to have been afraid that Nyandwi would one day replace him in the post of burgomaster, since Nyandwi was able to attract more aid from international NGOs in favour of education. As a result, an open conflict arose between the two, the burgomaster refusing to work with Nyandwi. A Ministerial commission even came to settle the case in Kibayi. It concluded that ‘two heads cannot be cooked in the same pot’, which meant that Nyandwi should be removed from the post.
of Inspector. In 1992, Nyandwi had become an ordinary teacher and had been replaced by Vincent Mukuralinda who was then Inspector for Kibayi schools.\textsuperscript{102} When the multiparty system came, Nyandwi found in it an occasion to oppose the burgomaster. He entered in MDR and became the president of that party in Kibayi. Later, the fight between MRNDD and MDR became an incarnation of the battle between these two individuals.

Another rivalry was between Joseph Baritunga and the Burgomaster Kajyambere. Baritunga was president of COKINYA cooperative since 1987. This cooperative had more than 1,000 members and had some influence even in Butare and Kigali cooperative associations. Baritunga was almost as a civil society opponent to the commune leaders. According to him, the conflict arose because whenever he went to Kigali to attend meetings, he used to report about what was not going well in the commune, a behaviour that the burgomaster did not withstand. When the multiparty system arrived, national and Butare MDR leaders noticed him as a person of influence in the commune and appointed him as head of MDR in Mukindo Sector and in charge of recruiting members for the party. He was soon among the most important figures who turned MDR into one of the most powerful parties in Kibayi.\textsuperscript{103}

Rwabigwi joined PSD not because it was strong, as he explains, but because it gave him more freedom of action than MDR for example. He says he only attended one campaign meeting of PSD party, yet they did not punish him. He needed his time, because he had a shop to take care of, cultivation tasks, and he also helped his parents. But in MDR, if you were absent you would get punished.\textsuperscript{104}

Ignace Gatabazi refused to join parties because he was unhappy about the existing leaders, Christophe Ndagijimana, the Councillor of Rwamiko Sector in particular,

\textsuperscript{103} Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{104} Interview with Laurent Rwabigwi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
because he did not help him solve an issue he had about isambu (land). Then he refused to enter MRNDD. Also he hesitated about entering MDR.\textsuperscript{105}

Secondly, some individuals, in single or in groups, made strategic choices based on their previous experiences with the multiparty system in the 1960s or else based on party propaganda machines. Some old people who had been in APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU joined MDR which claimed the PARMEHUTU legacy. They also sensitized their sons to enter MDR. But, according to Mutarambirwa, it is only sons who “listen to their fathers” who accepted this, since most young men liked to enter PSD because of its entertaining and propaganda songs which are said to have been very attractive, both in terms of rhythm and adaptability to youths’ taste at that moment. Guichaoua also confirms that the PSD was able to attract more young people including new elites than any other party in Butare Prefecture.\textsuperscript{106}

In the same vein, many Tutsi both in Gishamvu and Kibayi chose strategically to remain in MRNDD since the beginning, because it was showing some strength. They believed that the incumbent party is always the safest one. They were uncertain about the new change.\textsuperscript{107} But the subsequent weakness of MRNDD in both communes in 1992 and 1993 suggests that some Tutsi also ultimately got away from it to join opposition parties.

A number of peasants also claim that they did not have any party conviction. But strategically, they adhered to one or more parties so as to survive during the multiparty times. A number of them held two or more party cards so that wherever they went, if asked, they could produce the card of the prevailing party in that place. This strategy was important especially in 1992 when political violence among parties escalated.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{105} Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Aloys Mutarambirwa, Kibayi, 17 May 2007; André, Guichaoua, \textit{Rwanda 1994}, pp. 96-97 et 100.
\textsuperscript{107} Interview with Cesaria Uwambajimana, Kibayi, 21 May 2007; Interview with Tharcisse Karengera; Interview with Christophe Batura.
\textsuperscript{108} Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije and François Munyantore.
Others, especially leaders and intellectuals, moved from party to party due to the evolution of strength of those parties. By doing so, they hoped to gain some positions in the power sharing to come. This behaviour seems to have been more frequent among rural intellectuals. For example, the Burgomaster Kambanda who until mid-1992 was in MRNDD\textsuperscript{109} joined PSD probably in early 1993.

Third, others made a sociological choice. A number of Hutu individuals entered MDR because they believed MDR to be the “party of Hutu”.\textsuperscript{110} A number of Tutsi individuals were also in PL, since that party was also considered as “the party of Tutsi.”\textsuperscript{111} As for MRNDD, it was considered as a mixed party as far as ethnicity is concerned. This was different from other regions of the country where MRNDD and MDR were both considered as “parties of Hutu”. PSD was also considered as the party of Hutu and Tutsi, and so it was. Indeed, the Tutsi in Gishamvu adhered mostly to MRNDD and PSD, as one female informant Mukangwije narrates.\textsuperscript{112}

It seems that very few followed parties for their ideological programmes since the differentiating line was not always clear. MRNDD, MDR and PSD, to name the few among the parties, were rivalling to get the “revolution” of 1959 as their keystone ideology. They were not very different. They all emphasized republican, developmental and democratic principles. Party pageantry during campaign meetings and propaganda also borrowed a lot from former MRND single party propaganda programmes that aimed at building the personality cult of the president. Opposition parties had learnt from the MRND party how to use cultural performance or entertainment to attract masses. They were adding a cultural dimension to politics. Gishamvu and Kibayi were among Butare

\textsuperscript{109} For example, charles Kabeza the Burgomaster of Nyaruhengeri commune, neighbour to Gishamvu, asked Burgomaster Kambanda to come to help him in campaigning for MRND in Nyaruhengeri. (Charles Kabeza, Burgomaster of Nyaruhengeri Commune, \textit{Confidential, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune}, Ref.: 295/04.09.01, Nyaruhengeri, 18 May 1992.)

\textsuperscript{110} Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. But this informant says that though Hutu, he was not in MDR.


\textsuperscript{112} Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
communes that had trained some of the best artists in party live performance (animation in French). For example, Gishamvu ballet won the third place in the prefecture for live performance competition in 1986, and Kibayi became top in the Prefecture in 1989.\(^{113}\) However, among parties in Gishamvu and Kibayi, it seems that PSD made a good use of party live performances so as to attract the youth.

c) Multiparty system, power sharing and power bargains in 1992-1993

Before the advent of multipartyism, there was a government made of MRND party ministers that was formed on 9 July 1990 and a parliament elected since 1988. Another cabinet was formed on 4 February 1991. It is only on 31 December 1991 that the first multiparty government was formed. Besides MRNDD, it included only the PDC party. That was two months after the Prime Minister of this government was appointed in the name of Sylvestre Nsanzimana, and asked to form this government. As he failed to include other major parties, these started a series of hardcore street demonstrations from January to February 1992 in Kigali city and in Gitarama and Butare Prefectures. MDR proved to be strong in these manifestations, for, it was able to mobilise nearly a hundred thousand people in the streets against the Habyarimana and Nsanzimana government. In March the Nsanzimana government accepted to negotiate with MDR, PSD, PL and PDC parties about the terms of power sharing. That process resulted in the formation of a new government on 16 April 1992, led by Dismas Nsengiyaremye from the MDR party. Cabinet portfolios were shared in the following proportion: 9 posts for MRNDD, 4 posts for MDR, 3 for PSD, 3 for PL and one for PDC.

This government gave to itself the agenda of restoring peace and security, that is, to solve the war issue through peace negotiation, to organise the administrative service, to stabilise the economy that was in crisis, to organise the national political debate, to solve

the refugee crisis, and to respect the constitution. Just upon entering office in April 1992, the Minister of Education, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, together with this government made some significant moves in the education sector, for she was able to put an end to the policy of ethnic and regional quotas in education, and decided that only individual merit would determine admission in education. A number of powerful MRNDD supporters intimidated her, she even underwent a physical attack at her home from ‘unknown people’, but all failed to make her change her decision. Another thing that this government achieved was the peace process between the government, the opposition parties and the RPF, from June 1992 onwards. It was able to obtain a cease-fire from both the Rwandan army and the RPF on 12 July 1992, which lasted many months.

At the national and local level, the year 1992 is very significant in that it is during this time that political parties were busy organizing political campaigns to make their parties known, to recruit new members into their parties and to bargain for political posts at central level. They were also negotiating peace with the RPF first in Nsélé in 1991 and in Arusha all through 1992 until 1993. As we shall see in the next section on political violence, these parties used all means to make themselves more powerful, including violence and force.

Concerning party campaigns, I was able to gather party public activities for Gishamvu but very few for Kibayi. They are located in Appendix 2. But the reading of the schedule for campaign meetings for Gishamvu shows that political activity at rural area level was also intense, and that it was not confined to cities only.

These party campaign meeting schedules are not comprehensive, therefore they cannot allow me make some valid conclusions. However, they make it clear to what extent party public demonstrations were in Gishamvu on a regular basis. Interviews in Kibayi also

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suggest that these party campaigns were very regular and that political life was busy at this time.

One element that transpires from the political rhetoric of parties in 1992 as said before is that PSD, MDR and even CDR created on 16 March 1992 reclaimed ownership of the social “revolution” of 1959. In one campaign meeting in Gishamvu on 31 August 1992, Félicien Gatabazi, national leader of PSD and Minister in the Transitional Government, said that ideologically his party had a relationship with former APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU parties that organised the 1959 “revolution”. The MDR charter also proclaimed its relation with former MDR-PARMEHUTU ideals, although it proclaimed itself as a “renovated” MDR.

In a television public broadcast, in a video dated 2 November 1992, CDR and MDR party leaders were disputing the ownership of the 1959 “revolution”; they were fighting for the right to own the legacy of PARMEHUTU. In this tape, Barayagwiza of CDR said that Twagiramungu of MDR must not be the owner of PARMEHUTU legacy just because he is merely the son-in-law of former President Kayibanda. Barayagwiza said: “That legacy is for all the Hutu. If you are Hutu, it is yours, it is mine too.” Instead, Twagiramungu contradicted the CDR on its insistence on the Hutu privileges and advantages and said that the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa all were entitled to citizenship rights. He accused the CDR of dividing the Rwandan population. For Twagiramungu, the 1959 “revolution” is for all Rwandans, no one must claim the ownership of it. This was a debate between Hutu and Hutu, yet they contradicted each other politically. Twagiramungu said: “The Transitional government has rejected the quota policy in education and starts to speak about merit.” Stanislas Simbizi of CDR replied that the quota of MDR education ministry was still valid for regions. Barayagwiza argued that the Hutu are majority, therefore they

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116 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Minutes of the Campaign meeting of PSD held at the Office of Gishamvu Commune on 31 August 1991, Ref.: No.706/04.09.01, Gishamvu, 2 September 1991.
must rule, and then they protect the minorities. Simbizi from CDR insisted that PARMEHUTU is for CDR not for “renovated” MDR.  

Another element is the replacement at Butare Prefecture level of the Prefect. Justin Temahagali came in Butare just after the attack of RPF in 1990 and administered this prefecture from 4 October 1990 until June 1992. He was from MRNDD. He attempted to use all means to make MRNDD a strong party in Butare. He had partly succeeded in 1991, but the political developments of 1992 that empowered opposition parties made Butare the stronghold of PSD and MDR oppositions. When on 4 July 1992 the new prefect came, MRNDD ceased to have a significant position in Butare. He was from the PL opposition party, his name was Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana, a Tutsi, Professor at the National University of Rwanda. According to Guichaoua, Prefect Habyalimana acquainted himself easily with both Hutu and Tutsi from all regions and was able to rule this fairly moderate Prefecture efficiently.

The gradual weakening of MRNDD in Butare Prefecture had been seen all through 1992. During this time, a number of Butare people had slowly left MRNDD and adhered to opposition parties. One of these is Jean-Gualbert Rumiya, a Historian and Professor at the National University of Rwanda. He was among the top leaders of this party in Butare. He decided to go away from MRNDD when that party participated in the creation of CDR party and worked with other smaller parties such as PADER, PARERWA and PECO that proved to be very extremist against the Tutsi. In his resignation letter, he wrote:

As a Historian, working on the recent history of Rwanda, I believe that I know the circumstances and reasons that have led to […] the politicization of the ethnic phenomenon for the government of this country. I know that there was a way to
found the society on other bases. [...] As a citizen, I would like to remind you that I am the son of a Hutu mother and a Tutsi father. My family is linked to Hutu and Tutsi since many generations. It is by way of natural fidelity towards these links that I cannot support a political association where one of the members is categorically opposed to the Hutu-Tutsi unity that I believe to be the essential component of the Rwandan Nation.121

By 1993, MRNDD remained only with the control of seven out of 20 communes in Butare. The rest were under the leadership of MDR, PSD and PL.122

The year 1993 became also determinant for the development of inter-party politics. First, the mandate of the Nsengiyaremye government had expired in April 1993. Its mandate got prolonged until July 1993 in order to allow the formation of a new government, a process that brought back bargaining and competition among politicians. The parties kept the same share of number of ministries as in the April 1992 government, but the debate arose in the MDR party that held the position of the Prime Minister. While the MRNDD party wished to reconsider the candidature of Nsengiyaremye, the government refused that choice. In this development, Faustin Twagiramungu, the President of MDR, took the liberty to appoint Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was Minister of Education in the 1992 government, as the candidate for Prime Minister. She was accepted and nominated to that position on 17 July 1993, but the majority of Political Bureau of MDR voted against that choice, alleging that the President of the party did not consult this bureau on that choice.

This decision inaugurated a tense conflict within the leadership of MDR from this time until 1994, both at the national and Butare levels. At national level, MDR leadership met on 23 July 1993 and suspended Twagiramungu and Agathe Uwilingiyimana and announced that anyone accepting to enter that 1993 government would also be suspended. According to Reyntjens, the party got divided into three factions and not two

as the above suspension suggested. Of 42 people making the Bureau Politique of MDR, those who signed in favour of punishing Twagiramungu were 34, a telling sign that the Twagiramungu group had become a minority within MDR.

At the level of Butare Prefecture, the MDR party committee in Butare met on 7 August 1993 and demoted Agathe Uwilingiyimana from the position of President of MDR in Butare and proposed Jean Kambanda for that position. Agathe Uwilingiyimana rejected her suspension, as a result, both factions continued to function in anarchy for some time in Butare, each faction rejecting the other. That continued until when the Prefecture administrative authorities decided that no campaign meetings of MDR would take place until the MDR agreed which faction was to be considered as the legitimate one.

The government, the opposition parties and the RPF finally signed the Arusha peace accords on 4 August 1993, during the time when MDR was experiencing these divisions. Following those accords, a Broadened Base Transitional Government (BBTG) was supposed to be formed 37 days after the signature of the Arusha peace accord. As a result, before the July 1993 government could operate, party leaders had to bargain anew for power sharing in the BBTG government to come. Within the MDR, the Nsengiyaremye-Murego-Kambanda faction proposed Jean Kambanda to the post of Prime Minister for BBTG while the faction Twagiramungu-Agathe Uwilingiyimana proposed Twagiramungu to that post. The rival faction to Twagiramungu wrote a letter to the President of the Republic explaining reasons why Twagiramungu was not a suitable candidate for the BBTG Prime Minister’s post. These reasons range from economic to ethical: they enumerate court cases against him by the STIR Company in which he worked previously, monies that he robbed, debts that he refused to pay. Regardless of

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that, the President of the Republic opted for the choice of Twagiramungu. This choice initiated a new battle between both factions of MDR. The Broadened Base Transitional Government (BBTG) power-sharing scheme was signed on 9 January 1993 in Arusha. It planned the sharing of power as follows: MRNDD: 5 cabinet posts, RPF 5, MDR 4, PSD 3, PL 3 and PDC 1.

After this MDR division, the extremist faction represented by Kambanda, Murego, Karamira and others won over the one of Twagiramungu considered as moderate. In Butare also Jean Kambanda got bigger support than Agathe Uwilingiyimana. In a meeting that he held in Gishamvu on 26 September 1993, the Gishamvu representative of MDR made it clear that in Gishamvu, it is the Kambanda faction that was supported. Indeed, Jean Kambanda was a native of Gishamvu, from Mubumbano Sector. In his intervention at this meeting, his outright opposition against Twagiramungu and Agathe Uwilingiyimana transpired clearly. Here is a speech that refers to this indirectly:

Mr Kambanda Jean also spoke, saying that MDR originates from MDR-Parmehutu… He also told those present that their party was betrayed by Faustin Twagiramungu and Mme Uwilingiyimana Agathe. Because of that, Twagiramungu, Agathe and other three ministers have been dismissed from the party. He said that on Monday 27 September 1993 himself Kambanda Jean will go to accuse Mme Uwilingiyimana Agathe in the Tribunal of First Instance of Butare because she kept the tools and materials of the party whereas she has been dismissed and refused to go away from the party. He promised the members that he is the one who will be Prime Minister in few days, and that he prepares himself to establish the Government. He informed the members that the MDR party will in few days create a radio of its own and asked them to keep away from the bad belly and respect the existing power.

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128 Bertrand, Rwanda. Le piège de l’histoire, p. 249.

129 “Bad belly” (inda mbi in Kinyarwanda) is a metaphor to mean greed.

Following bargains within parties’ leaderships for ministerial positions in the BBTG, divisions among parties reached PL, PSD and PDC as well.\(^{131}\)

Finally, concerning the strength of parties, it is worth noting that their influence was unequal both at national and local levels. MRNDD seems to have enjoyed more support in the north where its leaders come from, that is, in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Byumba Prefectures. Other strongholds of this party include Rural Kigali, Kibungo and Cyangugu. MDR had also support in many prefectures, first the ones located in the centre where former MDR-PARMEHUTU was more popular, that is, in Gitarama and Kibuye, but also in Cyangugu from where Twagiramungu the President of the party came from, and again in Kigali town, Gikongoro and Kibuye. It was also present in Butare and some other prefectures. As for PSD, it was mainly influential in Butare and Gikongoro Prefectures, an area where APROSOMA formerly was strongly established. PL had a very limited support, and it is hard to say which Prefecture it controlled, although it was present all over the country.\(^{132}\)

At commune level, it becomes difficult to say which single party was strong between July 1991 when parties started to operate until April 1994 when the genocide started. Interviews show categorically this complexity. Informants are divided among those who assert that MRNDD was the strongest party in Gishamvu\(^{133}\) and in Kibayi;\(^{134}\) those who say that it is MDR which was strong;\(^{135}\) or those who say that is PSD. There is a number


\(^{133}\) Anonymous 13.


of others who argue that no party was stronger than the other especially among the three most prominent ones: MRNDD, MDR and PSD. Others mention MRNDD and MDR as the stronger ones.

Those who say it is MRNDD that was the strongest point out reasons such as the continuous holding of administrative positions. A number of those who consider MDR say that this party had so many youths who were hooligans who threatened the local population; that violent feature appears as a strength. Those who mention PSD also say that this party had enjoyed the adhesion of the youth, which was a prominent group demographically speaking, though weak in term of organisation as we saw in chapter three.

The reconstruction of Kimonyo suggests that in Gishamvu MDR was the dominant party and that in Kibayi it was PSD. In my view, one meaningful reconstruction of the strength of parties would be across time. Definitely no party got or kept its influences at all times from 1991 to 1994. In Gishamvu, MRNDD remained the strongest in 1991 if we are to believe estimates of burgomasters and prefects in their correspondence and minutes as seen above. Furthermore, the majority of the Tutsi remained in MRNDD as a survival strategy. By 1992, MDR became strong as a result of the intensification of campaign meetings, of demonstrations of end of 1991 and early 1992 for posts in the Nsengiyaremye government of April 1992. Also most bandits were said to be members of MDR, a thing that made many people join MDR in order to avoid violence against them. Thereafter, PSD became the strongest in 1993 thanks to meeting campaigns, party live performances and propaganda of national leaders such as Félicien Gatabazi, and commune party leaders such as Aloys Sibomana and others. This is the time when Burgomaster Pascal Kambanda decided to resign from MRNDD and join PSD. It is worth noting some of his Tutsi friends such as the businessman Mukimbiri and the

137 Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, pp. 216 et 226.
138 Guichaoua argues that Burgomaster Kambanda, though he went to PSD, he may have also remained somehow in MRNDD. (Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994, p. 236.) A number of informants contend that Kambanda Pascal did not decide to enter PSD, but that it is PSD that recruited him by force (kumubohoza).
employee Kumuyange, were also PSD members. The entering of Pascal Kambanda in PSD is said to have also attracted many Gishamvu people in PSD. But by late 1993 when Jean Kambanda became President of MDR in Butare, as he was very popular in Gishamvu, MDR seems to have become the strongest from that time until the time of the genocide.

As for Kibayi commune, it appears as well that in 1991, MRNDD was still the strongest party. In 1992 and 1993, MDR became strongest. This transpires in the power that MDR party leaders had at commune level. These became so popular that the majority of the population believed that they were the ones who would lead the commune after the elections. Christophe Nyandwi, Joseph Baritunga and Jean-Baptiste Mukuralinda (alias Masima) to mention a few started to prepare themselves to become commune leaders. Nyandwi allegedly started to wear suits and ties every day in order to have the look of a burgomaster. This strength came from campaign meetings where national and Butare leaders such as Agathe Uwilingiyimana were frequently visiting this commune, and from the use of force in recruitment. When MDR got divided in July 1993, the new team of MDR Butare led by Jean Kambanda did not have much influence in Kibayi, the way it had it in Gishamvu. Instead, Straton Nsabumukunzi of PSD Butare and originally from Kibayi became very influential in Kibayi. As a result, PSD became the strongest in Kibayi after July 1993, and possibly until when the genocide started. Thus, the point of Kimonyo about the strength of parties in Gishamvu and Kibayi holds only towards the second half of 1993 until when the genocide started.

**d) Party campaigns and social divisions**

Although the transitional government put an end to the ethnic and regional quota policy, ethnicity did not stop. Instead, it went in the political discourse of certain parties that saw in it a convenient strategy to win their audiences. In this regard, parties that gradually proclaimed themselves as Hutu parties, that is, in favour of the promotion of the Hutu, such as MRNDD, CDR and later on the extremist faction within MDR and PSD and PL, called *PAWA* faction, chose to radicalise their positions around ethnic discrimination
against the Tutsi. This discrimination came slowly and piecemeal. In December 1990, the extremist newspaper published The Ten Commandments of the Hutu and appealed to the Hutu not to mingle with the Tutsi both socially and economically. The year 1991 and 1992 saw a number of newspapers also adopting this tone. In October 1992, Léon Mugesera pronounced a speech in which he showed that the Tutsi are the candidates for death. When in 1993 politicians fought over positions within the July transitional government and the promised BBTG but that did not occur, and when the “Pawa” alliance between MRND and extremist factions within opposition parties was created following factionalisation of opposition parties, the criteria for power sharing and party alliances became ethnic, as Jordane Bertrand noted. 139 Byabarumwanzi, who observed this dramatic development in its contemporaneity, lamented the severity of this ethnic shift: “When we examine the actions produced and the discourses used so far by political parties, we realise that they did all that they could in order to undermine the unity and reconciliation between Rwandans. Their role in the national reconciliation has hence been negative.” 140

Apart from the role of political parties in undermining ethnic relations, certain informants point out that even within families and friends’ relations, there occurred some trust crisis. Though parents (husband and wife) and children (brothers or sisters) could be in different parties, in general the wife adhered to the party of her husband. This is the case of the ladies Uwambajimana and Uwilingiyimana who were in the same party as their husbands. 141 But it was also possible to find a family in which the husband and the wife adhered to different parties.

When some family members did not share party affiliations, by the same token they started being on bad terms at best and enemies at worst. Such is the case between

139 Bertrand, Rwanda. Le piège de l’histoire, p. 252.
Anonymous 17 and her brother who was in MRNDD and who looked at her as “an adversary”:

I went in a meeting of MRND there at Makwaza. The meeting was held by Raymond. Raymond said: ‘People who are not with us, are wasting our time, so they can go out. He told those from other parties to go. Then you stand up and go. […] Then my brother is the one who was about to put me away from the meeting, telling me that I am not in MRND. We are born together, then I winked him, the eye was still in good shape¹⁴², telling him ‘why are you doing this? Can’t you let me listen?’ […] I was not afraid of my brother.¹⁴³

Such is also the case with Anonymous 6 with his siblings, as he narrates. The experience of Twahirwa’s family shows that different memberships for the same family members does not always lead to conflict. He says that him with his father were in MRNDD, while his mother and sisters were in PL.¹⁴⁴

Among friends, if it happened that they did not share party affiliation, they could by the same token also not share drinks in a bar, because people started to sit in the bars according to their party affiliation, as Nyirakanani and Ntukabumwe explain.¹⁴⁵ In this respect, Munyantore says that he resolved to be a member of two parties, MDR of his friend, and PL for him. His friend gave him a cap of MDR so that they could be able to sit together in a bar and share a drink. “When I go to drink alcohol in the Gatobwe bar, I go as MDR pawa. When I climb the hill back, in order to mislead other people, I carry another cap of another party. I put PL on the head. It was a way of seeking the way [creating a crossing space and safety].”¹⁴⁶ This case shows some efforts of individual agency trying to overcome social division created by political parties.

Some boys are said to have started to disrespect parents:

¹⁴² Now one of her eyes is broken.
¹⁴³ Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
¹⁴⁵ Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with François Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
¹⁴⁶ Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
They [the youths] used to follow party activities […] until Gisagara to campaign meetings, others at Mugombwa. […] The youth spent their time dancing behind parties. […] No young man was respecting and following advices of the father and mother anymore. When you talk to him, he says ‘I am free’. The party made many people hot, a son tells you that he will slap you. Then the parent keeps quiet. […] The son goes to dance for parties, and comes back only at night, after you have locked the door.147

The experience of Rwabigwi is a case of disagreement between brothers. His brother was in MRNDD and he was in PSD. So his brother convinced him to join MRNDD so that he could not fear to disclose secrets of MRNDD to him.148

4.4.2. Political Violence

Political competition both at the national and local level went hand in hand with political violence. In fact, it should be said that the latter was a means used in the former. This section deals with a form of violence that appeared to be the result of conflict or physical clash between party leaders and administrative leaders and vice versa, between party members of one party against party members of another, or between administrative leaders against party members of a certain party and vice versa.

One motive behind these acts of violence between parties was to recruit as many members as possible, starting from the most influential ones, even the ones already in rival parties. That led to serious conflict between parties. It produced a phenomenon of political behaviour or political culture called “kubohoza”, which means literally “to liberate someone”, that is, to recruit him or her by force. Several interview accounts suggest that it is mostly leaders, rich people such as businessmen, intellectuals such as teachers and administrative employees, etc. who were targeted in the kubohoza. Then how it was done included such varied acts as to bring a mob at the house of a person, they sang and danced for or about him, they sensitized him, they put caps or scarves (i.e., symbols) of their party on the person, or else they used violence such as to destroy his house or property if the person is stubborn. Sometimes, the motive was not to recruit

147 Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
individuals in parties, but simply to loot public or private property such as land, forest wood and other things. In this regard, the looting was not the means for recruiting a person; it became an end in itself.

In the explanation of one informant in Kibayi, *kubohoza* was like a version of war by - and among - political parties.\(^{149}\) That means that as the government or to be precise the Habyarimana clique was waging a war against the RPF on the battlefield, the opposition parties were also waging a war among themselves and against MRNDD.

This phenomenon occurred in the whole country, but a careful examination of it at local level reveals to what extent it produced a state of uncertainty and instability. Strong words used in campaign meetings by parties against others, the carrying of weapons in campaign meetings despite the law against it, and the behaviour of *kubohoza* showed to what extent the culture of tolerance and democracy was very far to be reached.\(^{150}\) That experience was close to what one report called a state of anarchy.\(^{151}\) The remainder of this section enumerates certain cases of political violence in Gishamvu and Kibayi as recorded in archives and narrated by some of my informants.

a) In Gishamvu

On 25 September 1991, the President of MDR in Gishamvu accused the Cell Committees members of Liba and Buvumu Sectors and Mr. Gashugi from Gikunzi to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune for having beaten members of his party.\(^{152}\)

On 14 December 1991, the Executive Secretary of PSD in Gishamvu, Aloys Sibomana, wrote a letter to Joseph Bacinoni, Councillor of Sheke Sector, telling him to stop mistreating the members of PSD in his sector. He forbade him to insult his members,

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\(^{149}\) Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.

\(^{150}\) Byabarumwanzi, “Le rôle des partis politiques”, p. 50.


saying that they are the ones who urge people not to pay levies and government contributions.\textsuperscript{153}

In one of his speeches, one leader of MRNDD in Butare, Amandin Rugira, was accused of having said something that aimed at dividing the Hutu and the Tutsi. He criticized the coalition between MDR and PL arguing that the genetic mixture of these two parties considered respectively as Hutu and Tutsi parties will give birth to \textit{“ibirambu”}.\textsuperscript{154} In the process, he pronounced a proverb saying that: \textit{“Ujya gukuraho imbagara, arazegeranya”}\textsuperscript{155} or \textit{“Ujya gutwika imbagara arazirundanya”},\textsuperscript{156} meaning that that union will be nothing but unproductive.

On 12 June 1992, the citizen Célestin Bangambiki who had been Councillor of Gikunzi Sector in Gishamvu was being recruited by force to enter MDR and leave MRNDD. The MDR members were putting the hat of MDR on his head and were giving him the MDR party card. As the Subprefect of Busoro subprefecture witnessed that action, he intervened, explaining to MDR members that what they were doing was unlawful.\textsuperscript{157} It is worth noting that it is mostly influential people who were recruited by force this way (\textit{kubohozwa}).

On 18 August 1992, the Councillor of Buvumu Sector, John Hakizimana, wrote a letter to four people from PSD from Buvumu telling them that he heard that they were planning to kill him. He explained to them that if he dies, he will be avenged a hundred times: “what I see is that I may die as one person, but a hundred will die as a consequence of my death.”\textsuperscript{158} In response to that letter, the head of PSD in Gishamvu, Aloys Sibomana,

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item Aloys Sibomana, Executive Secretary of PSD party in Gishamvu Commune, \textit{Letter to Mr. Bacinoni Joseph, Councillor of Sheke Sector, Re: To give a warning to Bacinoni, Councillor of Sheke Sector, Gishamvu}, Gishamvu, 14 December 1991.
  \item \textit{Ibirambu} means babies of animals born before the complete time for birth, i.e., abnormal babies.
  \item Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007.
  \item MDR Butare-Ville, \textit{Announcement No. 1, Avoid Division}, Butare, 10 March 1992.
\end{itemize}
wrote five days later a letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune regretting this behaviour of the Councillor Hakizimana of threatening the four youths.\textsuperscript{159}

On 29 August 1992, Mr. Gabriel Murara, President of MDR in Gishamvu asked the Judiciary Police Inspector (IPJ) to launch an investigation into the case of a lady called Aniziya Mukaremera who allegedly had a problem with MDR party members and specifically with the youth of MDR, namely JDR of the Commune.\textsuperscript{160}

As MDR had too many bandits in Gishamvu as members, the members of other parties were afraid of this party. Even leaders seem to have feared this party. One example of this behaviour of fear is that in Sheke, some MDR members destroyed roofs of houses of those that they wanted to recruit by force in their party. Those wronged went to report the case to the Burgomaster and the Subprefect. These two leaders visited the Sheke Sector, saw the destroyed houses, but did not act against the perpetrators. The population got confused: they thought that either the leaders were complicit, or were helpless.\textsuperscript{161}

Some time in 1993, some people from Nyakizu commune, neighbouring to Gishamvu, used to come and attack the home of Burgomaster Kambanda. They danced, sang “…what’s wrong with Kambanda? Is he sick or what?”\textsuperscript{162} They wanted to put him in MDR probably, since it is MDR that was strong in Nyakizu. This is what Karengera narrates: “[Kambanda] was in MRND, then the MDR from Nyakizu attacked him and wanted to bohóza him, they even tried to remove him from office. In order to rescue his office, he joined PSD, but they were not happy with that. They went at his home a number of times. He posted a policeman at his home. But they were not even afraid of bullets. The policeman was not shooting, he was only threatening them.”\textsuperscript{163} Then PSD

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{159} Aloys Sibomana, Executive Secretary of PSD in Gishamvu Commune (P.O. Acting Executive Secretary Onesphore Muvunandinda), \textit{Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Re: Security in Buvumu}, Gishamvu, 18 August 1992.
  \item \textsuperscript{160} Gabriel Murara, President of MDR in Gishamvu, \textit{Letter to the Inspector of Judicial Police, Re: Asking for an investigation}, Ref.: 776/04.04.01, Gishamvu, 29 August 1992.
  \item \textsuperscript{161} Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
  \item \textsuperscript{162} Interview with Athanase Kumuyange, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 1, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
  \item \textsuperscript{163} Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
\end{itemize}
national and local leaders came to recruit him by force, they are the ones who succeeded to put him in their party. According to the female informant Nyirakanani, they sang for him the following song: “‘Why are you trembling with fear? ... I am trembling because I am afraid of Rukokoma.’ Then they put him in the middle of the crowd and told him many things, that was when he shifted and entered in their party of PSD. When the war [of 1994] happened, he was already a PSD member.”

b) In Kibayi

In Mid-January 1992 a clash between MDR and MRNDD members had occurred in Kibayi. This report does not give more details about actions and effects that characterized this clash.

The regional secretary of PSD in Butare complained about several attacks of authorities against his party. He writes that on 11 February 1992, the flag of PSD was burnt at Muzenga in Gisagara. Moreover, the Subprefect of Gisagara in which Kibayi is located made an indictment against Charles Murindahabi, the Executive Secretary of PSD in Butare. Again, in Ndora commune the citizen Emmanuel Bangumuvunyi of PSD was beaten by an Interahamwe of MRND and went into a coma.

At the beginning of March 1992, some members of MDR rebelled against one cell leader called Emmanuel Nyilinkindi in Joma Sector, accusing him of being extremist against the Hutu, as he was Tutsi. But the Burgomaster Kajyambere, who was Hutu, intervened in favour of Nyilinkindi since they shared both administrative duties and party membership. Those who were against Nyilinkindi calmed down only after a meeting.

164 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
166 Faustin Rutayisire, Secrétaire Régional du PSD à Butare, Lettre à Monsieur le Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, Objet: Indignations sur certaines situations dans Butare, Réf.: N° 196/04.09.01, Gishamvu, le 12 mars 1992.
that the Subprefect of Gisagara and the commune authorities held with the population of Joma Sector on 12 March 1992.\textsuperscript{168}

A member of MRND called Alexis Uwihoreye in Saga Sector stabbed a member of MDR called Kubwayo. That happened on 4 April 1992. The injured person was sent to hospital.\textsuperscript{169}

On 28 May 1992, opposition party members from MDR, PSD and PL marched in support of the new coalition government established in April 1992. When they finished that march, on their way back home, some of them attacked the house of the Councillor of Nyagahuru Sector, Didace Nkundiye, and destroyed the windows and the roof of his house. No one got injured, since the Councillor of Kibayi Sector and the head of police intervened to stop that violence. Others who also came from that march and who were going back home at Rwamiko Sector provoked more violence. When they arrived at a place called mu Buseruka, they met with some MRNDD members, reportedly provoked them and this caused a fight. As the Councillor of Rwamiko Sector, Christophe Ndagijimana, was present, he managed to stop that fight. However, this group organised itself against the Councillor and went to the Burgomaster to reclaim his resignation. The Burgomaster came the following day to settle that case in Rwamiko and found that those people were very angry. They accused the councillor of having beaten some of them at night. As a result, they reclaimed his resignation. When the Burgomaster told them to calm down, they refused. He went to the Prefecture office to ask for intervention and came back with a written message of the Prefect, read it, but the population said that they were not satisfied with that answer. They insisted that the Councillor be removed from office. As it was evening of that second day, they showed more anger. The Burgomaster narrates his experience:


I told the councillor to go back home, I wanted to carry him in the car, but the population refused to go away from the road. Then the councillor went to his home by foot accompanied by some of those who were not against him. Afterwards, I wanted me too to go back home, so that we could settle this matter the following day, that faction stopped me from going, saying that the car will sleep there, that if I want I can go by foot. I continued to beg them but to no avail. Because it was late (around 19 hours), it was hard to continue arguing, also I decided not to use force because that could cause the destruction of the car and the injury of people. By then the interahamwe [MRNDD youth and militia] had availed themselves to protect us, but I realised that nothing could be done, since it was night. I was with two policemen, I asked them to remain in the car, me I went to the Health Centre at Monique Vernandell [Kirarambogo]’s house, I remained there waiting for the population to calm down so that I could go back home. But the situation remained radical. That is when I wrote to the subprefect of Gisagara asking him to intervene in order to rescue me. When he got the message he promised to intervene. But that faction remained on the car doing party live performance, beating drums until morning. The next day in the morning I went to see them, I found that they were still insisting on the removal of the Councillor. But they were not still having violent mood (amahane), they accepted that I take the car. Then I went immediately to the Commune office, after 2km I found that the interahamwe have also set a barrage [roadblock] saying that they wanted to go to drive away that faction located in Buseruka in Rwamiko. I calmed them down. I continued until mu Kibangu where I found an attack mob [igitero] led by Vunabandi Alphonse, Assistant Burgomaster and the representative of PSD in the commune. That mob was made of PSD, MDR and PL members from Saga Sector. I asked them not to continue that march, because above all they did not have a permission to do it, they refused and continued to do it. When I arrived at the commune office, I met with the gendarmes who were already there, then we went back to Rwamiko. We found that the subprefect of Gisagara had arrived there, and had started to talk with them, advising them. Then that faction of Buseruka, the interahamwe and the igitero of Vunabandi, fortunately reached an agreement and went back to their homes. On that day moreover, in order to keep security, night patrol hours were set at 19 hours. No one was allowed to walk at that time. We installed two policemen there to remain in Buseruka day and night. Except two people who got injured there and a house of a citizen that had tiles destroyed, no other destruction occurred.

Besides verbal and property violence, this detailed report reveals to what extent commune leaders had lost authority and could be easily contradicted by their constituents who did not share party membership with them. On 6 June 1992, the Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture in which Kibayi is located, wrote the following to all Burgomasters of his jurisdiction. “I inform you that members of parties other than

MRND with their leaders have spent some days doing acts of terrorism in sectors and cells, attacking people who do not share party membership with them, spending their days insulting them, beating drums, doing live dance performances in homes, now they have started to even attack leaders of sectors and even communes.” He told the burgomasters to stop that live dance performance in houses and in the sector, and to strengthen security and consult with leaders of parties in order to solve those problems.171 This content, though proving the taking of side in favour of MRND by the Subprefect, also shows to what extent local leaders were disrespected as a result of party competition. In the next sections, I insist on emphasizing these acts of disobedience. Other versions of this clash reveal the taking of side in favour of MRND by local leaders but also the weak position of the latter.172

The helpless behaviour of local leaders in the face of party violence seen in Gishamvu was also evident in Kibayi. Here is one account:

MDR was the strongest party at our place. If a member of MDR does violence to you, if you go to accuse him, it becomes useless. […] Because the Burgomaster had no authority over the then MDR leaders. Even at the local level, you could bring a case at our Councillor, for example a wrong thing that a MDR member has done to you, our Councillor Ndagijimana could not attempt to punish him. He says: ‘how can I dare punish that one? You saw some time ago how they came to demolish my house saying that they are bohoza [liberating] me. How will I try to punish him? This time they can come back and kill me.’173

The other reason why Rwabigwi says MDR was the strongest party is because when it decided to have a campaign meeting on a date, that day the market could not open, every public gathering might be cancelled to allow many people to be available. Anyone who dared to open his shop or bar could see his assets taken over after the campaign meeting. But for other parties, the market still continued as usual.174

As compared to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu, the Burgomaster of Kibayi, Kajyambere, also faced the recruitment by force (*kubohoza*) from MDR top and local leaders. According to the informant Domitilla Niyonsaba, who is the wife of Christophe Nyandwi, President of MDR in Kibayi, top MDR leaders such as Agathe Uwilingiyimana came to her home to discuss about how to recruit by force the Burgomaster who was in MRNDD. But Kajyambere refused to enter MDR. When MDR became strong in Kibayi in 1992 and 1993, Kajyambere is said to have been afraid of Nyandwi, thinking that he could take over the leadership of the commune. But Kajyambere was not in Rwanda since 1994. He was said to be in exile in Tanzania or elsewhere, so it is hard to verify these allegations. But another informant, Ildéphonse Habimana who was a policeman during this time of multipartyism narrates how Nyandwi started to prepare himself to be burgomaster and that that behaviour created a serious misunderstanding between him and the incumbent burgomaster. Another thing which is sure is that Kajyambere remained in MRNDD until when the genocide started.

Some time in 1992, another form of party violence from PSD members occurred. After their campaign meeting, the members went to loot food and drinks in restaurants and bars, they consumed without paying. But the leaders of PSD, who included Dr. Straton Nsabumukunzi, president of PSD in Butare Prefecture and originally from Kibayi, agreed to pay all the expenses.

Habimana, who is a key informant in these matters since he often intervened in order to stop violence during this time, narrates another episode of violence produced against one MDR leader in Mukindo Sector, called Joseph Baritunga. He indicated that after one meeting of MRNDD in Gisagara, the propaganda group of MRNDD came back to Kibayi and on their way they found Joseph Baritunga at a place called mu Kabuga ka Nyabisagara where he stayed. This man stopped those MRNDD members, called his own MDR members and both started fighting. Baritunga got injured in the process, he was wounded in the head and the police organised some people who took him to the medical

175 Interview with Domitilla Niyonsaba, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
centre. In his own account, Joseph Baritunga presents himself as a victim, he hides his agency in that violence, especially his provocative role as Habimana stressed.\footnote{Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007; Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.}

Violence continued in Rwamiko. For example, the Burgomaster reported in August 1992 that some people from Kibangu, Rwamiko, such as Nseyimana and Saveri, and Niyongana from Buseruka, were still beating others claiming to “liberate” them, that is, to forcibly recruit them into their parties.\footnote{Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, \textit{To the Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture, Re: Security}, Ref.: No. 297/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 10 August 1992.}

Burgomaster Kajyambere had gone into open conflict with his Assistant Burgomaster Alphonse Vunabandi, who was one of his prospective rivals, since he was President of PSD in Kibayi. All were waiting for elections to come in order to compete for that post of burgomaster or other posts at higher level. As a result of this party competition, anyone who could find a small mistake from another did his best to exploit it. One example is when the Burgomaster found that at a certain afternoon of 1 June 1993, the Assistant Burgomaster Vunabandi was not in office and did not take part in a committee in charge of collecting taxes. The Burgomaster immediately wrote to him a punishment letter called in French “demande d’explication”.\footnote{Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Kibayi, \textit{Lettre à Monsieur Vunabandi Alphonse, FAB Chargé des Affaires Economiques et Techniques, Commune Kibayi, Objet: Demande d’Explication}, Réf.: N° 173/04.01.02, Kibayi, le 4 juin 1993.} The Burgomaster even plotted against Vunabandi by organizing eight people to accuse him of corruption in the fight against the smuggling of coffee to Burundi and about physical violence against them.\footnote{Obedi Gahamanyi et al., \textit{Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: To publicize the badness of Vunabandi Alphonse against the population}, Saga, 3 June 1993.}

c) Precautions Taken

All these acts of violence occurred despite measures, strategies and precautions by the national, Prefecture and Commune leadership in close collaboration with party leadership and civil society such as churches, businessmen and others. From October 1990 when the
RPF attacked the country to 1991-1994 multiparty experiences of violence, Security Council meetings at all levels were organised. They examined the situations, identified causes of those acts of violence, and set up strategies to stop them. We have already seen some of these measures in the above section on insecurity.

In relation to these, the Minister of Local Government wrote several times instructions about how Burgomasters must behave during the multiparty system and urged the party leaders and administrative leaders to respect the law on parties. Those instructions were repeated by Prefects in numerous meetings. Basically, Burgomasters were asked to be impartial in party campaign meetings, that is, to avoid speaking in favour or against such or such party, to stop wearing symbols of any party, to guarantee security for all parties.\(^{181}\) When it became clear that parties were not respecting these instructions, the Prefect decided that “any party that has insulted others or has instilled kubohoza violence should be refused the authorization of holding other campaign meetings where it has behaved like that.”\(^{182}\) In order to stop disorder in the putting up and respecting of flags of parties, the Prefect of Butare Prefecture instructed leaders of parties to put only one flag for each party per Sector, Commune and Prefecture.\(^{183}\)

In May 1992, the Minister of Local Government issued an instruction to all Prefects and Burgomasters stating that the place of campaign meeting at Commune and Sector level must not be close to residential areas and bars and market (if it is a day of market), and that the Burgomasters and Councillors must attend those gatherings in order to monitor


\(^{182}\) Jean Baptiste Habyalimana, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Circular letter to all Burgomasters, Re: Fighting against the behaviour of Kubohoza, Ref.: No. 1067/04.09.01, Butare, 14 August 1992.

\(^{183}\) Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Communes of Butare, Re: The issue of parties’ flags, Ref.: No. 318/04.09.01, Butare, 17 March 1992; Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, Kigali, Minutes of the meeting of Burgomasters and Leaders of political parties in Butare Prefecture, held on 7 April 1992, Ref.: No. 685/04.09.01/16, Butare, 27 May 1992, p. 3.
any disorder. The Cabinet Meeting urged leaders not to use discourses or words that are provocative and inspire hatred. But leaders kept using hate language. It asked the Prefects to control parties that have militias and that undergo military training, such as MRND and CDR. As the violence continued, the Minister issued a number of other instructions reviewing some of previous measures. For example, the Prefects and Burgomasters were forbidden to take part in party campaign meetings during labour hours, and that any Commune employee found in the act of recruiting members for parties by force would be relieved of his or her duties. At some point, even the populations were forbidden to wear party symbols while going to campaign meetings.

Administrative and party leaders at all levels also strove to identify causes and reasons for the continuation of political violence. They pointed out the war that the country was undergoing at that time, and a number of soldiers who had become undisciplined and who were engaging in acts of looting, with total impunity. The justice system also had failed to punish all criminals and authors of political violence, after releasing prisoners even bandits. Furthermore, some administrative leaders considered the kubohoza action, the insulting of leaders and subsequent political violence as a clear programme by opposition parties to weaken the existing power holders, while opposition parties considered the insulting of their other rival parties as a positive strategy.
Indeed, the same administrative leaders who took these measures together with party leaders are the same who broke them. Apparently, each party was ready to do anything in order to conquer more influence, in order to bargain for more power in political developments to come. Those who could, used ethnicity as a prospective strategy to win the support of the Hutu group, which was a majority. Once one had the support of this group, one could hope to win elections. Others who could, used violence. This professing of one thing in the meetings and doing quite the opposite in the field resembled the mixture of law and disorder as formulated by the Comaroffs. These authors have stressed the way the democratization process in Africa in the early 1990s was followed immediately by “a sharp rise in crime and violence”. They also highlighted the complex combination of both criminal violence and a “simulacra” of social order or stability. Law resembled the agreement between parties, and disorder was close to their actual behaviour. Thus, by 1993, the multiparty experiences created not hope for positive change, but “frustration, disappointment and fear” on the part of the population.

4.5. DISOBEDIENCE AND FAILURE OF THE STATE TO CAPTURE SOCIETY

The state trained the population in the use of the means of violence, and in return some elements of the society used the same violence against state wishes for their own benefits through both political and criminal violence. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that it is multipartyism and opposition discourse of parties that led the populations to disobey certain state rules, especially those that symbolised the authoritarian feature of Habyarimana power around coffee, tax, party dues and Umuganda. The ease with which this refusal was reached suggests that the populations were just waiting for an occasion allowing them to do so. Party discourse hence became an ingredient for this disobedience, but, as we saw in the previous chapter, some few people were already escaping fulfilling them. What happened in 1991-94 was the result of economic crisis first and then some degree of political freedom; these two made it possible for peasants to achieve their dream of freeing themselves from those constraints.

Disobedient practices seem to have been twofold: disobedience against leaders and disobedience against their programmes. According to the form of disobedience, it seems to have transpired in language and in action. As far as language of disrespecting administrative leaders is concerned, MDR seems to have made a record in its campaign meetings. From the end of 1991 onwards, at several demonstrations and in campaign meetings, this party launched slogans insulting the President of the Republic, calling him names such as “Gisunzu”, to refer to his hair fashion, or insulting the MRNDD party, in the formula such as “Zinga akarago” (go away). But MDR was not the only one in this insulting behaviour. Other parties also did that.

At local level, we saw previously how Kambanda was mocked as a person who is afraid. As for Kajyambere of Kibayi, he was nicknamed “Karyambeba” (a person who eats rats), as opposed to his true name, Kajyambere (a person who evolves, progresses). At this time Burgomasters were no longer respected as before. The only constituents who respected them were the ones who shared party membership with them, which means that authority was shifting from administration to party structures. In one meeting in Butare Prefecture, the Prefect observed that in some communes, administrative leaders had become like jokes, while certain party leaders were respected as genuine leaders.

In another meeting, as early as December 1991, that is, only five months after the advent of multipartyism, the Prefect complained that local leaders were being likened to colonial leaders in order to undermine their authority: “In the campaign meeting they [the opposition party leaders] say that the Prefect is comparable to the chief [colonial chief], the Burgomaster is the Subchief, the Councillor is the Kirongozi! They are destroying the existing administrative structure, therefore if they win what power regime will they put in

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193 Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, and Thérèse Kabega, Rapporteur, Minutes of the Meeting of Subprefects, Burgomasters, and Leaders of the Prosecuting Authority, and Commune Prosecuting employees, held on 26 November 1991, Ref.: N° 246/04.09.01/16, Butare, 25 February 1992, p. 3.
This allegation shows that the parties were trying to recreate the ambiance of 1959 of calling their fellows colonial employees so as to demonize them. This critique was a political strategy in itself.

However, the most considerable act of disobedience was directed against previous programmes that were considered as geared towards “development”. They are the programmes that founded the very essence and legitimizing ideology of the Habyarimana regime. These are Umuganda communal work, MRND party dues, ONAPO contraceptive campaigns, coffee production, and party live performances. The first thing opposition parties did was to sensitize their members to stop fulfilling these duties, as a proof of “liberation”. That occurred in the whole country.195

In Butare, it did not take too much time to start witnessing disobedience against state programmes. In September 1991 already, the Prefect was accusing MDR party of strongly attacking MRND, of criticizing all activities that have been done, of instilling the people to disobey the power and not accept it, not listen to it, to refuse to pay tax and levies of the commune.196

As early as August 1991, just a month after the beginning of multipartyism, constituents in Gishamvu were celebrating that the parties have “liberated” them from levies and taxes.197 In September 1991, the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune explained in a meeting that people were no longer paying taxes and do Umuganda because of party

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197 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, to the Subprefect of Busoro, Re: Minutes of the Meeting with the population on 6 August 1991, Ref.: 678/04.09.01/16, Gishamvu, 23 August 1991.
sensitization. Furthermore, the *impiringi*, i.e. people who escaped paying taxes since long ago, had become the main opposition party recruiters.198

One former Councillor in Kibayi had this to say: “It is during the multiparty system that the population started to disobey the leaders. When you tell them something, no reaction. They spend their time singing sarcastic songs against us, insulting us, but we accept that. The parties leaders said: ‘those who worked for MRND must not look down upon you.’ Then we got discouraged, when you talk to a person, he or she refuses to hear you.”199

Cases of disobedience were registered even in security patrols. For example, in early 1992, by the time crime was rising and war was unfolding in the northern part of the country, leaders in the south focused on night and daily patrols of the able-bodied men as a means for security protection. In Butare, some people living near the border such as in Gishamvu, feared the attack coming from Burundi more than the war in Mutara (north). Others from Kibayi are said to have been reluctant to do patrols (*amarondo*) because they considered the war to be far from them. This entails that even in the patrols, obedience was not entirely there.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter showed to what extent the economic crisis and war increased not only poverty but also the level of crime. Crime became so prevalent and trivialised that leaders failed to halt it, despite all means and measures planned. The point was not to have just measures, but to have ones that were appropriate. The war between RPF and the national army did not occur in Gishamvu and Kibayi physically, but the effects of it were felt there on an everyday basis, socially and psychologically, due to the propaganda that

199 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
followed it, and to security measures that were taken and that affected economic and social life, to mention just the few.

The democratization process in Rwanda led to – or coincided with – the spread of crime and political violence. Although this has happened in other parts of Africa, in Rwanda it seems to have reached the apex, as it was coupled with economic crises and political hardlining never witnessed before. Violence became the language and the means not only of the state as experienced in the war of the state army against the RPF rebels, but also the language and the means of political parties and even of individuals. Everyone who had the capacity to resort to violence in order to attain some economic or power interest seems to have used it.

Leaders complained about the population not obeying them, while the population felt deceived about the helpless or passive behaviour of leaders in the face of crime and political violence or their role in producing all those forms of violence. How disobedience turned into obedience at the time of genocide is an intriguing question. It needs to be addressed deeply. In the next chapter, I look at the way all these crises were used in the production and dissemination of genocide ideology. It is there that I come back again to the behaviour around obedience and disobedience.

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CHAPTER FIVE

FROM POLITICAL MOBILIZATION TO GENOCIDE

Knowledge about ideology is knowledge about ‘the conditions of its necessity’.¹

INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century has been a century full of great technological discoveries, but also full of pessimism, part of the reason being that it registered a list of the most murderous world wars and genocides.² Rwanda is a case in point, where in 1994, the state murdered more than 800,000 Tutsi and between 30,000 and 50,000 Hutu moderate in just a hundred days.

This chapter analyses the ideology of genocide, that is, the ideas, the mobilizing techniques and the human, material and intellectual means used by the Habyarimana regime in order to make genocide an acceptable and feasible project. It examines the contemporary conditions under which this regime operated but also how it reinterpreted the remote conditions – as examined from the beginning of this thesis onwards – in its ideological constructions.

In order to understand the conditions that led to the genocide in Rwanda, we need not just ask why (the causes of genocide), but also ask who (agency or agencies), what (actions, manifestations, practices or beliefs), how and when (processes, contexts, conditions) genocide became possible. To try to address these questions, I first explore key theoretical dimensions around genocide, then I examine the genocide ideology as it built up in Rwanda, from 1990 until 1994. In this respect, I look at dehumanisation, the instrumentalisation of history and the 1959 “Hutu revolution”, the depiction of Tutsi as a

¹ Althusser in Andrew Vincent, Theories of the State, Oxford (UK) and Cambridge USA), Blackwell, 1994, p. 172.
threat and the carrying out of the 1990-1993 massacres as both the result of ideology against the Tutsi and as ideological technique for genocide. I end this chapter with a brief reconstruction of the unfolding, the actors, the economics, the geography and the timing of genocide at national level.

5.1. A TWO-FOLD LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

The existing theories of genocide can be summed up in a two-fold analysis, the first focusing on the actors who engineered the genocide, and the second on the processes and contexts that made the planning and the execution possible. While the first element tends to be in the contemporary time of genocide, the second has its roots located far back in the past and is only instrumentalised at the moment when actors decide to use it in the project of annihilating a certain group of population. Authors who privileged the analysis of genocide from the standpoint of actors came to be called intentionalists, that is, those who analyse the intentions of the organisers and perpetrators. Those who analysed it by looking at contexts and processes were called functionalists. But a number of others came to realise that neither of those approaches was sufficient in itself, so they chose to combine both in order to fully make sense of genocide production, as far as that task is possible.3 I place myself among the latter, considering the fact that both approaches are complementary. As Edward Said wrote, ideas, cultures and histories are better understood only when linked to power configurations that produced them.4 And to understand power configurations, one needs definitely to consider power holders. In this regard, it appears that the linking of processes to actors is unavoidable if not compulsory.

As far as twentieth century genocides are concerned, the actors of genocide have been relatively easily identified, while the remote contexts and the immediate developments in which they operated seemed to be very complex to understand and uncover, so much so

that even for early genocides (such as those of Herero, Armenians, and the Holocaust), and of course the recent ones (the Cambodia genocide, Yugoslavia genocide and the Tutsi genocide), debates and new interpretations are being produced incessantly. This suggests that theorizing about genocide is not an easy task. It appears that any effort to understand contexts and processes can provide only interpretation, never a total explanation.\(^5\)

Drawing from nine cases of twentieth century crimes against humanity (Armenia (1915-1916), Eastern Ukraine (1932-1933), Nazi Holocaust, Cambodia (1975-1979), Chile (1973-1988), Argentina (1976-1983), Burundi (1972 and other dates), Rwanda (1994) and former Yugoslavia, (Bosnia 1992-1995)], Marchak constructed a theory of preconditions and processes that led to crimes against humanity. Such preconditions are:

- Economic and social crises that affect existing social and economic positions of citizens in their different hierarchies. These crises are caused by such different elements as war, environmental change, exhaustion of resources, economic changes in market, and dislocation of territorial parts of the country;
- A strong military, militia or revolutionary opposition force;
- Weak civil opposition institutions (political parties, universities, unions, mass media, and voluntary associations) that become unable to challenge a government that chooses the option of genocide against one part of its population;
- The existence of a wide inequality between the powerful and powerless, the rich and the poor, rural and urban populations, between ethnic and/or religious groups;
- The material interests that leaders have vis-à-vis their potential victims such as territory and property.

The processes are:

- A political crisis expressed in the form of a paralysis of governance, or a breakdown of the state;

\(^5\) This applies also to most contemporary historical accounts.
- The development of exclusionist ideology or ideologies around techniques of blame, dehumanization, negation of the right of life, etc.
- A clear articulated intention to exterminate the potential victims.
- And an open conflict.\(^6\)

Another theorization about the conditions of the possibility of genocide is given by Howard Adelman. Borrowing from Waller, he formulates four categories or dimensions that contain each three variables:

- Predispositions: 1. Ethnocentrism; 2. Xenophobia
  3. Desire for dominance
- Cultural forces: 1. Authority system; 2. Moral disengagement;
  3. Rational self-interest
- Cultural reinforcers: 1. Professional Socialization; 2. Group conformity;
  3. Merger of person and role
- Institutions of identity alterations: 1. Othering; 2. Dehumanizing
  3. Blaming the other.\(^7\)

Though not expressed in the form of an enumeration, other authors have provided explanations about prior conditions necessary for genocide. Staub summed up a number of the above preconditions and predispositions in what he called “difficult life conditions” and “group persistent conflict”. Difficult life conditions refer to “economic problems, political disorganization and upheaval, or very great social/cultural changes”, while group conflict may take the form of war between perpetrators and victims or not.\(^8\)

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Related to open conflict is war. A number of authors identify the occurrence of war as a factor that, for the organisers of a genocide, becomes a favourable context in which to operate. Analysing the holocaust, Bergen wrote:

War provided a cover for mass murder [...] War also made possible the training of large numbers of experienced killers, beginning in Poland in 1939. [...] War enabled Nazi propagandists to present attacks on innocent civilians of all ages as if they were defensive measures necessary to protect the German nation from its foes. For all these reasons, war was a necessary ingredient in what would develop into genocide…

These patterns also were developed in the Rwandan case. It is during the war between the RPF and Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) that extremist parties created militias that became instrumental in the genocide. It is also in the context of war that the RGF defined the enemy as Tutsi. When genocide killings began in April 1994 following the crash of President Habyarimana’s plane, the language used in the ideology of extermination of the Tutsi was a war language: the Interim Government appealed to the population to wage war against the Tutsi “invaders”.

Referring to the Armenian and the Tutsi genocide, Gibson identified three conditions for genocide possibility: the existence of a pluralized society, the advent of a period of political, economic and social crises, and the existence of governing formal and informal institutions that are weakened by those crises. Though his analysis lacks a longue durée perspective, his insistence on the formal and informal features of institutions is very important. In relation to social and economic crises, considering the Armenian and Rwandan case, Staub concedes that genocide comes after a series of smaller scale massacres. In this regard, genocide appears as the culmination of a mass killing process.

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The above preconditions, predispositions, contexts and processes exist in several societies, but they have led to genocide in some specific cases only. That suggests that there is need to understand the step that is taken in order to go to a choice of shaping or reinterpretting them into a genocidal project. In other words, we need to understand the intention of genocide. On the one hand, genocide organisers consider genocide as a tactic towards reaching certain state objectives that may include power consolidation, social purity, material gains and more. On the other hand, though the past and the present context of the moment may be favourable for genocide implementation, perpetrators need to sensitize the whole social fabric about that “abominable” project, so that they can come to see it as a “normal” one:

… the way to cruelty has to be prepared before it opens. Soldiers have to be systematically desensitized before they can kill; victims have to be dehumanized before they can be killed (or else killed from so great a distance that their humanity need not be confronted); great cruelties have to be approached, step by step, by a series of smaller ones, as though a natural resistance has to be overcome.

Social psychological approaches extend the dehumanization process of victims to many other subcategories: “delegitimizing” victims, so that they enjoy no protection; “infrahumanizing” them, so that they become less than human or more bestial, morally excluding them, so that they are disqualified from fairness, justice and moral consideration.

In addition to soldiers, that is, the institution formally in charge of force, and victims, that is, the ones against whom force has to be used, the whole society needs mobilisation before genocide can be an acceptable option: “… a substantial part of the population had to be ready to consider it desirable, acceptable, or at least unavoidable, that certain other

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people would be isolated, persecuted, and killed.”¹¹⁵ That is where mobilisation becomes necessary.

5.2. IDEOLOGY OF GENOCIDE

Any attempt to understand the ideology of genocide must include at least two things. The first must revolve around the conception of the genocide project. The second is the spread of that project to the whole country’s institutions and members of society. In a genocide such as the one that occurred in Rwanda which involved a mass participation, the analysis must include the techniques that were used in order to have ordinary citizens participate.

Glickman has defined ideology in a way that stresses its origin, which is mostly the ruling group and its destination, which is the ruled. It also encompasses features that show the objectives to be reached which revolve around interests of the ruling elite.¹⁶ The Hutu extremist propaganda that operated from 1990 onwards following the RPF attack of 1 October 1990 used a number of well-known techniques of mobilisation for genocide.

5.2.1. Dehumanisation

The extremist press and the extremist discourse of extremist political parties included dehumanizing language and depictions. These included the stereotypes about identity and behaviour. Concerning the first, Tutsi were called “bad weeds”, “snakes”, “dogs”, “hyenas” and identified with “misfortune”.¹⁷ According to the second, the Tutsi were considered as liars, always calculating in every matrimonial relation, unfaithful, dangerous, and always acting in complicity with group interests and not as single

individuals, to name a few. Primo Levi had contended that to be human, one needed not just to eat and breathe, but to have also “an identity, relationships with others, ties to a past and a future, and a sense of decency and dignity.” As we shall see, the Hutu Ten commandments, the Kangura newspaper and RTLM radio propaganda negated all those fundamental attributes or rights of the Tutsi.

The Tutsi were considered as “the other” vis-à-vis the Hutu. But it would be an overstatement to say that the Hutu were “the same”, as the extremist propaganda had it or wanted it to be. Regional, class as well as political divisions proliferated among them, as we saw in chapters three and four. In this respect, it is more productive to argue that the Tutsi were more “other” than the “Other”, the latter being the Hutu, or maybe the Hutu and the Twa, although the extremist interpretation seemed to forget the Twa in their rhetoric. In this process of “othering” the Tutsi, the propaganda negated or fought against all means of collaboration between the Tutsi and the Hutu, and urged the Hutu to take a distance from the Tutsi who were described as “evil”.

Secondly, the state had produced a “culture of impunity” since the 1960s until 1993, whereby each time a rebel group related to Tutsi refugees would attack, systematic revenge murders were committed against the civilian Tutsi, and all those who participated in that violence against the Tutsi went unpunished. This behaviour produced an impression that the Tutsi were not humans like others.

5.2.2. On History And Ethnicity

Perhaps the most important core mobilization message came from the representation of the past in the present relating to ethnic identity. This representation was not produced in

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18 These elements are more developed in the sections below.
19 In Bergen, War & Genocide, p. 174.
1990; it came all the way from the rhetoric of 1959. If one can assert that politics was partly decolonized at the time of independence, historiography remained in colonial terms. For example, the colonial ethnic descriptions ascribed to Hutu, Tutsi and Twa bore stereotypes about their physical features, behaviour and culture. The History that was taught to schools after independence was a history of successive arrival of ethnic groups on the territory, of “domination of Tutsi against the Hutu” as produced in the colonial historiography and the changes brought by the “Hutu revolution” against that domination. It was mostly political history, but included some few elements of social and economic history.\(^{23}\) It was as much a Marxist approach of history formulated in ethnic terms. Material culture, a long process of cohabitation and relation of people to environments, multiple regional and social identities that characterized the people who lived in the area that came to be called Rwanda, relations of conviviality and inequalities that existed between them and that transpired in a number of institutions, family oral histories expressing these multiple connections as well as contradictions, were not given an equal space in the curriculum. As Gasanabo concluded in his thesis, “Rwandans […] have a long history, a common language and culture. That there may be differences among them is undeniable; but to conceive these differences in racial or ethnic terms stems either from the ignorance of local realities, or from the deliberate choice to divide and oppose them.”\(^{24}\)

The Hamitic and Bantu myths produced and diffused during the colonial period and captured during the “revolution” of 1959, became again a key reference of extremist leaders in 1990.\(^{25}\) The Hamitic Hypothesis had been rejected by international scholars in the 1960s,\(^{26}\) but it survived in Rwandan historiography and political rhetoric.\(^{27}\) Part of the reason for this is that it offered an opportunity to put blame on the Tutsi through their description as affiliated to some other foreign people, and it emphasized their differences


\(^{27}\) Chrétien (dir.), *Rwanda : Les médias du génocide*, pp. 87-88.
with the so-called Bantu people. “Hutu extremists propagated a revisionist history of relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi that were not based on cohabitation and exchange, but rather on segregation and violence.”

Those depicted as Hamites, that is, the Tutsi, were deemed “superior”, because their origin was traced from elsewhere and close to the Caucasian race. Indeed, colonial historiography from Pagès to De Lacger to Alexis Kagame and others depict the Hutu and the Tutsi as having come from elsewhere, but with time, a new perception of Hutu as indigenous and Tutsi as alien came to be implanted. Though the claims to more autochthony of some groups than others is widespread in Africa, it is in Rwanda that it had extremely devastating consequences which led to genocide, because it was instrumentalized for that purpose: “In order to exterminate an ‘other,’ that other must first be placed outside, geographically, but also politically, socially, and symbolically.”

René Lemarchand has analysed both the 1959 period and the 1994 genocide. Regarding the Hamitic Hypothesis as instrumentalised in the 1990s, he states: “Initially fashioned by colonial historiography, the Hamitic Hypothesis provided a simple model for understanding perceived distinctions between lower and higher orders of humanity. Recast in the form of an ideological weapon to discredit allegations of Tutsi supremacy, it reemerged with extraordinary virulence during the 1994 genocide.” He writes further: “As an ideological construction designed to justify the annihilation of the Tutsi minority, the Hamitic myth must be seen as the central element behind the 1994 genocide.”

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29 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 80.
33 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, p. 57.
34 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, p. 63.
A number of authors show to what extent Rwanda was a bipolarized society, where you find two dominant ethnic groups. In this situation, the manipulation of one ethnic group against the other, mostly smaller, suffers no opposition from third party ethnic groups because they are simply absent. Ethnic politics in this regard become dangerous. But the existence of bipolar ethnic groups is not sufficient. It is the hateful manipulation of them that can create violence.\(^{35}\)

Although historiography continued to spread ethnicity, and the “values” of the “social revolution”, Jefremovas argues that during her fieldwork in Rwanda in the 1980s, she did not find the “ethnic rhetoric” deeply implanted in the peasants’ social relations and beliefs: “When asked about ethnicity they typically replied, ‘What difference does it make to me? I don’t get anything out of it. I was born a peasant, I’ll live a peasant and I’ll die a peasant.’ They clearly saw that ethnicity conditioned the capacity of elites to gain access to power and privilege but had little meaning for the common Rwandan.” Then she goes on to explain that “[t]he massive propaganda of 1990-94 was necessary because the simplistic ethnic visions of the extremists did not match the experience of everyday people.”\(^{36}\) Danielle de Lame, too, in her fieldwork in 1988, reports finding little focus on ethnic conflict among peasants, rather the case she registered was complex, in that it opposed two rural intellectuals of the supposed same ethnic identity but who were supported by people of different ethnic groups. But this does not mean that ethnic cleavages had gone away.\(^{37}\) In chapter three and four, I also showed that ethnic conflict only became sharp in times of political upheaval, suggesting that it had to be manipulated by political leaders first in order to escalate. But I also showed that in the everyday coexistence not everything was rosy, although people of different ethnic identity were


\(^{37}\) Danielle de Lame, *Une colline entre mille ou le calme avant la tempête. Transformations et blocages du Rwanda rural*, Tervuren (Belgium), MRAC, 1996, pp. 73-75.
interacting harmoniously. According to Gasanabo and Des Forges, that distorted history came to be accepted by intellectuals and entered the popular language of even those who did not study.\(^{38}\)

Extremist propaganda also focused on Hamites and Bantu as minority and majority populations respectively. Part of the argument was that a majority group cannot accept to be ruled by a minority one, therefore any power that the latter are attempting to bring to Rwanda would be oppressive and must therefore be resisted. This ‘majority’ argument pervades the extremist newspapers and radio messages. It also transpires in the literature produced by Hutu intellectuals in the aftermath of RPF attacks from 1990 onwards.\(^{39}\)

During the genocide, the propaganda repeated that what was happening was a replay or a new experience of the 1959 “revolution”. That strategy was intended to create a “good consciousness” among the actors.\(^{40}\) In this respect, in order to resurrect the whole 1959 theatre, the RPF was likened to *Inyenzi* of the 1960s. The 1990 war was defined as the prolonging of the 1959 war “of the Tutsi against the Hutu”.\(^{41}\)

The Hamitic and Bantu myths were used in explanations of political, social and economic experiences of both the Tutsi and Hutu.\(^{42}\) Ethnic identity was presented as natural, hence free from any debate and doubt.\(^{43}\) Yet a number of more critical authors have cast doubt on such allegations. For example, Emmanuel Ntezimana asked a fundamental question: How can we know who among the Hutu, the Tutsi and Twa was the owner of such and such material culture of ancient heritage, be it “cows,” “drums,” “iron,” “fire,” yet these

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\(^{40}\) Chrétien (dir.), *Rwanda : Les médias du génocide*, p. 119.


people have cohabited for centuries? In the same vein as Ntezimana, Chrétien destabilized the notion of Hamite and Bantu. For instance, he wondered to what extent Rwandans and Burundians can call themselves Bantu - which they would do legitimately, given that the Kinyarwanda and Kirundi languages are part of the Bantu idioms – whereas this concept was coined only in mid-19th century by the German Wilhelm Bleek? Now the question becomes: who were they before that time, since we know that they existed?

Perhaps the most helpful discovery of scholars concerning ethnic groups in Rwanda is that they were among the most debatable and controversial topics throughout Rwandan history. This is true even today. But as one can understand, this does not take us far towards an explanation. If they came from elsewhere and to different places, as the colonial and republican historiographies would have it, then why did the Rwandan language and culture remain the same for centuries? Is it valid to persist in calling them ethnic groups, when they share these cultural traits? Drawing on Mamdani, Helen Hintjens argued that the best answer for us regarding the origin of ethnic groups in Rwanda is “I do not know.”

We do not know for sure what are the origins of Tutsi, Hutu or Twa. We do know that since independence, and during colonial rule, identity politics in Rwanda involved little or no element of choice of ethnic groupings; instead identity has been a knife in the hands of power-holders. Identities can be manipulated to sever social connections and forms of solidarity, whether within families and neighbourhoods or within institutions such as schools, hospitals, churches and

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work places. Cutting the complex social and family ties between Hutu and Tutsi was seen as a necessary prelude to genocide.47

Prunier is right to say that it is a fallacy to talk about hegemony of a certain ethnic group over other ethnic groups across history. In fact, to assert the opposite would be to ignore complexities about colonial injustices during the colonial period and structural violence during the postindependence period, as I indicated. During different epochs it was a few Tutsi and then a few Hutu who dominated the rest.48 Therefore, This essentialized description of the Hutu and the Tutsi created a certain consciousness, but one that can be considered as a “false consciousness”.49 According to Prunier, “ideas can kill” 50, and according to Ignatieff, “it is not how the past dictates to the present, but how the present manipulates the past that is decisive.”51

Concerning ideology around ethnic relations, the very first text that was published in the media was the “Hutu Ten Commandments.” It was issued in Kangura, an extremist media as far as ethnicity is concerned. This piece, that a number of authors have likened to the “Protocol of the Learned Elders of Zion” describing the Jews as dangerous, was formulated in the imperative form close to the Ten Commandments contained in the Christian Bible. Keeping in mind that more than 80% of the Rwandan population was Christian, one understands the symbolic target of those who conceived it. Its content, which is worthy of note, runs as follows:

1. Every Muhutu should know that a Mututsi woman, wherever she is, works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Muhutu who:
   • marries a Tutsi woman,
   • befriends a Tutsi woman,

50 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 40.
• employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or a concubine.

2. Every Muhutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as woman, wife and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest?

3. Bahutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.

4. Every Muhutu should know that every Mututsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, any Muhutu who does the following is a traitor:
   • makes a partnership with Batutsi in business;
   • invests his money or the government’s money in a Tutsi enterprise;
   • lends or borrows money from a Mutusi;
   • gives favours to Batutsi in business (obtaining import licences, bank loans, construction sites, public markets…).

5. All strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, military and security should be entrusted to Bahutu.

6. The education sector (school pupils, students, teachers) must be majority Hutu.

7. The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October [1990] war has taught us a lesson. No member of the military shall marry a Tutsi.

8. The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi.

9. The Bahutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity, and be concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers.
   • The Bahutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Bantu brothers;
   • They must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda;
   • The Bahutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy.

10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the Hutu ideology, must be taught to every Muhutu at every level. Every Hutu must spread this ideology widely. Any Muhutu who persecutes his brother Muhutu for having read, spread and taught this ideology, is a traitor.52

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Commenting on this text, Jean-Pierre Chrétien insisted on the way their authors showed utmost disrespect of the Tutsi as well as depicted Tutsi women as “prostitutes-spies”.\(^{53}\) There is little doubt that this kind of description in stereotypical terms contributed to making the targeted group vulnerable, and a scapegoat.\(^{54}\) A careful reading of these “commandments” reveals that they targeted political, social, economic and even moral arenas of life. While the first is against intermarriage between the Tutsi and the Hutu, the second and third insist on purity of ontology and ethnic identity, and preservation. The statements resemble the Aryan racial preservation policy of Hitler. The fourth commandment includes behaviour, agency, and reputation, and advocates non-collaboration between the two groups. The Fifth, the sixth and the seventh plead for power and higher status in favour of the Hutu. The eighth dwells on the moral part, by suggesting that mercy is negative. The ninth goes beyond Rwanda to include the central and eastern parts of Africa, where it calls for the unity of the Bantu people against a common enemy. The tenth calls for recollection, preservation and diffusion of the 1959 “revolution” memory, which is close to the manipulation and instrumentalisation of history as we saw above.

These themes were repeated over and over since 1990 in the *Kangura* newspaper and later in Radio Rwanda and RTLM extremist radio, in the speeches of CDR and MRND in 1992 and 1993 and in the “Power” factions of MDR, PL and PSD parties. What makes the Hutu Ten Commandments interesting is the context in which they were produced. At this time (December 1990), RPF rebels had been attacking the country since October, but were defeated. The multiparty system was not yet set up, but laws for the multiparty system were underway through discussions of the National Commission of Synthesis. So, this means that on the one hand, it is not the Tutsi threat or the opposition threat that pushed the Habyarimana clique of *Akazu* to choose this extremist option. On the other hand, one may put forward a hypothesis that there was a strategy of grabbing the ethnic mobilisation discourse and the legacy of the 1959 “revolution” before any other party did.

To evaluate the strength of this ideological text, I refer to Edward Said’s notions of strategic location, the author’s position with regard to his or her text and the social world he or she is describing, and strategic formation, that is, the way that text gets referenced by other texts and in the process all these texts influence society.\textsuperscript{55} I also refer to Foucault’s analysis by considering this discourse not only as a memory, as an utterance, but also as a memory bearing a social impact:

I do not question discourses about their silently intended meanings, but about the fact and the conditions of their manifest appearance; not about the contents which they may conceal, but about the transformations which they have effected; not about the sense preserved within them like a perpetual origin, but about the field where they coexist, reside and disappear. It is a question of analysis of the discourses in the dimension of their exteriority. [...] To relate the discourse not to a thought, mind or subject which engendered it, but to the practical field in which it is deployed.\textsuperscript{56}

To begin with, I posit that this text is not a point of departure. Its content shows clearly its borrowing from the ethnic consciousness built in the struggles of 1959 onwards. This position makes it a text in continuity, not a rupture or a new discovery. Therefore, we can say that the authors of that document wanted to reconquer the ideological power of the 1959s in the new multiparty system that was to come in 1991. This means that they were targeting the future power, by using the past ideological canon. However, that text would not be powerful in itself if its content was not shared by other political actors (strategic location) and if it did not enter other texts and mediums (strategic formation).

Now, it is worth showing how in subsequent years the message of the Hutu Ten Commandments became repeated and re-emphasized, how it was sustained by various other political leaders when the multiparty system came into effect. In March 1991, as a number of intellectuals were warming up by making contacts in order to create political parties, the *Kangura* newspaper warned the Hutu that it was not efficient to divide

\textsuperscript{55} Said, *Orientalism*, p. 20.
themselves into several parties. It also challenged the Tutsi for not accepting their ethnic identity:

Tutsi who read Kangura, listen to me very well. I do not hate the Tutsi, I detest their refusal to call themselves Tutsi. I dislike their vice of dividing the Bahutu and of scorning them. You Hutu, I have so many things to reproach to you. It is surprising to see that you are creating division among yourself whereas you are attacked.\(^{57}\)

It is worth recalling that the most influential opposition parties were created by people from the regions that were disadvantaged during the Habyarimana regime. Those who believed they had been wronged by structural violence were now trying their chances through the multiparty system. These parties include the MDR which had its leaders mostly from Gitarama and Cyangugu, the PSD which had its leaders mostly from Butare Prefecture, and the PL which had a number of Tutsi as leaders, but also businessmen. These leaders were mainly Hutu, that is why perhaps Kangura was accusing them of sustaining a division among the Hutu at the time when a war was occurring in the country. In this respect, the Murwanashyaka newspaper of MRND made it clear in April 1991 that nothing other than ethnic identity can unite members of a party\(^{58}\), which means that parties of Hutu and Tutsi, perhaps also Twa\(^{59}\), are the ones that are wanted. Part of this obsession for ethnic party membership derives from the fact that the Hutu were in the majority, so they could simply win prospective elections on these grounds. But we know that ethnic identity does not always coincide with political affiliations.

In May 1991, the Kangura newspaper made another reference to ethnicity, but also to colonial suffering and to the threat that the Tutsi, qualified as foreigners and feudalists, represented at the time:

The Tutsi have found us in Rwanda, they have oppressed us and we endured it. But now that we have freed ourselves from serfdom and that they want to

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reestablish the morning whipping [colonial ikiboko], I think that no Hutu will condone this. The war that Gahutu is waging is just, it is a struggle for the republic. All Hutu should know this, when the feudalists will arrive in Rwanda, they will not distinguish between the Hutu from the North and the ones from the South, they should know that that will be the end for all of them.60

The importance of referring to the past by extremist propaganda is underscored by Marcel Kabanda:

Reference to the anger of parents is meant to inspire that of their children. […] Why did Kangura need to refer to the speeches made in 1964 by Kayibanda and Makuza, or by Joseph Gitera in 1976? In a society where age and experience bestow authority, the voices of elders constitute an excellent argument. The past provided evidence that violence against the Tutsi was normal and legitimate. However, it is clear that those historical references favoured a particular trend, that of the Parmehutu.61

In the same vein, one leader from the Ministry of Local Government stated in a meeting in Butare in early November 1990, that the military enemy (RPF)’s intention was to grab from them “the goodness of our Social Revolution of 59 and our Moral Revolution of 1973.”62

In 1992, at the time when political parties were busy campaigning and recruiting, and the peace process between the government, the RPF and opposition parties was underway, the extremist media continued to spread its hate message against the Tutsi and Hutu opposition party members. For example, in February 1992, Jean Barahinyura Shyirambere, who became later one of the founders of CDR extremist party, wrote the following: “I do not understand how MDR…can associate itself with PL knowing that the latter does not admit the Revolution of 1959 and what comes out of it.”63 In his book, also published in 1992, he conceded that Tutsi women were nothing but political strategists for their ethnic group: “The second point of the political strategy of the tutsi is

classical, because it had been used since long ago even in the interior of Rwanda: their daughters. [...] most of the Rwandan women married abroad and most particularly in Europe, being from the Tutsi ethnic group, they have become pillars used in the obscure aims of the Inyenzi.64

The past memory was again instrumentalized in the President of the Republic’s speech on 25 September 1992, at the commemoration of the anniversary of the “revolution” of 1959, most precisely of the referendum against monarchy of 25 September 1961:

I wish you a nice day of Kamarampaka. Referendum-Kamarampaka that we celebrate in these hard times in our Rwanda, you notice that it nearly resembles with what preceded Kamarampaka in 1961. The anniversary that we are celebrating today of Kamarampaka coincides with the time when Rwanda is in war again, a war waged by those who are thirsty for reaching power without resorting to election... these are those who thrive to strangle the democracy that we got from that Referendum-Kamarampaka.65

However, 1993 was the most difficult year in terms of Rwandan political developments during this multiparty experience. It is the time when the Arusha accords were signed, which gave the RPF a substantial position in civil politics and the army. This made the Tutsi become a target of the extremist media that showed its utmost resistance to the outcome of this peace negotiation. The CDR party had refused to sign the accord and therefore had been excluded from the power sharing of the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) that was to be formed following those negotiations. This was the time for it to present the Tutsi as a real threat. It is also the time when the Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye was killed and extreme violence escalated in Burundi, bringing hundreds of thousands of refugees to Rwandan territory. This event was used by Hutu extremists in Rwanda who argued strongly that it demonstrated the Tutsi could not share power with the Hutu in peace. This is also the time when the extremist radio RTLM was created to back up extremist print media. This was the radio station that broadcast appeals

65 Faustin Munyazesa, Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, To All Prefects of Prefectures and All Burgomasters of Communes, The Speech of His Excellency the President of the Republic on 25 September 1992, Ref.: No. 2696/04.09.01, Kigali, 22 October 1992.
for genocide participation from April to July 1994.\textsuperscript{66} When this radio started to air on 8 July 1993, \textit{Kangura} newspaper celebrated the event as a prospective victory for the Hutu: “Union is force. The Hutu have just achieved their strongest wish. […] This is the radio and the television that will help Kangura to finalise the objectives of the Hutu.”\textsuperscript{67} Here we find Said’s ‘strategic location’, that is, the institutional relation between \textit{Kangura} newspaper that published the “Hutu Ten Commandments” and RTLM, the radio that aired it in 1993-1994.

In December 1993, \textit{Kangura} newspaper published a picture of former President Kayibanda together with an illustration of a machete. Below those two images, the following question was written: “What tools will we use to defeat the Inyenzi once and for all?”\textsuperscript{68} The Kayibanda image can be interpreted as the ideological tool, that is, the Hutu “revolution” ideology, whereas the machete can be interpreted as the physical tool, one that was used also in 1959 and subsequently. However, one question remains: If the \textit{Inyenzi} were the RPF, how could machete be used against modern military weapons? Then it becomes clear that the \textit{Inyenzi} are mostly or exclusively Tutsi civilians. In fact, the RTLM rhetoric equated Tutsi to the \textit{inyenzi} in its broadcasts.

In the previous chapter we saw that power bargains in order to enter the July 1993 government and the BBTG resulted in the split of opposition parties and in the creation of a “PAWA” or “Power” faction within MDR, PL and PSD parties. Hutu politicians forming this faction joined the president’s cartel (MRND, CDR and other small parties) and started to use their newspapers for extremist causes as well.

In a communiqué issued by the PAWA faction of MDR, this extremist ethnic rhetoric and the reference to violence in Burundi become clear:

\begin{quote}
We are preparing manifestations that we will make on 5 November 1993 that aim at four things: (a) WE WANT UNITY OF THE HUTU: It is not understandable
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
the way a Hutu person member of MDR can every time be in conflict with the one in MRND or CDR, fighting, killing each other, thereafter leaders and politicians spend their time sensitizing us to the need to reconcile with the Inkotanyi who are Tutsi. If the Hutu of all parties become able to get enlightened, they can see that this war that has destroyed Rwanda is all about the Tutsi who want power. The apex that occurred in Burundi can serve as a lesson to us... 69

In October 1993, the same message transpired in another extremist newspaper and drew from the Burundi context: “The Hutu of Rwanda should know that it is time to unite and envisage a long term [future], to collaborate instead of destroying themselves under the pretext of multipartyism.” 70

The argument of Hutu as majority, and the Tutsi as a threat to a power coming from the 1959 “revolution” continued in 1994 during the genocide. In order to give to the 1994 killings the image of the “1959 revolution”, the propagandists continued to compare them with what happened in 1959. The Tutsi were called UNAR because they were born supposedly of UNAR parents. In this regard, identity and party ideology became the same; essentialism was pushed to political affiliation. 71

Genocide was thus not the result of hatred between the Tutsi and the Hutu, but a result of a long standing racial ideology that created and entertained hatred against the Tutsi on each occasion that political leaders chose to massacre a certain number of the Tutsi. 72

Indeed, as a strategy, Habyarimana had chosen to sacrifice the Tutsi in order to have the support of all the Hutu. 73 He had chosen to sacrifice the Rwandan nation in favour of the

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69 MDR, Kigali-Ville, Announcement No. 62, The unity of the Hutu is not to kill the Tutsi, it intends to put an end to this war, Kigali, date not clear on document. Capital letters in original.


“Hutu nation”. This culminated in the Tutsi genocide. A careful linking of the above extremist messages with the Hutu Ten Commandments shows that this document is an important one: it had summed up the core points that were to be developed slowly and steadily until the 1994 genocide.

**5.2.3. Tutsi Depicted as a Threat**

Vernon and Esses argue that the reasons for a state to exclude certain people include the following: the perception that they are different, not human or that they pose a threat. All these are found in the ideology of genocide in Rwanda. The Tutsi in general and the RPF in particular were presented in the extremist media as a threat to the Hutu. This became one of the strongest incentives in order to mobilize as much of the population as possible in genocide participation. The extremist propaganda presented the Tutsi as a threat on three grounds: the military, the economic and the political.

Firstly, war became the first pretext to cast the Tutsi as a threat. In this respect, the extremist propaganda spread the news that the enemy is not only the RPF, believed to be made up of Tutsi from outside, but that even the Tutsi from within were part of the enemy, because they were related to them. For that reason, the latter were meant to collaborate with the former by all means. Two documents were produced and diffused.

The first document was produced in September 1992 by a Commission of High Command Officers that met in early December 1991. That document defined the “main” enemy as the Tutsi within and without Rwanda, and the supporters of the enemy as Hutu opponents to the Habyarimana regime, and foreigners who either are related to Tutsi through marriage or who are from the “Nilo-Hamite” group that the extremists linked to

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74 Benedict Anderson, in a public lecture in Cape Town at the Centre for the Book on 19 September 2006, after problematizing the notion of nation, argued that (1) the end of nation is genocide and (2) that nation is a place of hope. Anderson is right if we take Rwanda as the nation to be.

the Tutsi. Another document, entitled “the organization of civil self-defence” produced in early 1994 planned the use of popular resistance and traditional weapons against the “enemy”.

The so-called threat of the Tutsi was not confined to the Rwandan territory. The propaganda stressed clearly and repetitively that all the populations located in the Great Lakes regions related to the Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi were also a threat of the Bantu people living in this region.

That the RPF was a threat to the Habyarimana regime was not so much in question because both were fighting. But to include all the Tutsi population as a threat was wrong, it was simply a strategy to ethnicise the conflict. As Alison Des Forges wrote:

…the RPF had recruited a small number of supporters, Hutu and Tutsi, within Rwanda, but most Tutsi had no link to the guerrilla movement and some actively opposed the invasion, remembering the killings of Tutsi civilians that had followed the incursions of the 1960s. Habyarimana and his supporters could have chosen to mount an appeal based on nationalism against the RPF, but decided instead to cast the war as a threat in ethnic terms. They may have believed it would be easier to rally all Hutu once again behind Habyarimana’s leadership if the threat were clearly identified as Tutsi.

At local level, the ideology saying that the Tutsi is the enemy seems to have been believed. Each time young Tutsi men went outside Rwanda, their absence cast suspicion on the rest of their family members who remained in Rwanda. Whether they had gone to look for educational opportunities or work or whether they had joined the RPF as it was claimed, all the same, the assumption was that they had joined the RPF. One informant in Kibayi (Paul Twahirwa) pointed out that the burgomaster used to tell the peasants that their Tutsi neighbours were sending their children to the Inkotanyi rebels to come to kill

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78 See Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda: Les médias du génocide, p. 163.
them. He usually enumerated a list of families whose sons were absent. Some Hutu peasants believed it, others doubted it. But when after the genocide, some of the sons who were absent came back as RPF soldiers, this informant believed that what the burgomaster was saying was true. In fact, some of the young men had actually joined the rebellion. But these are a handful as compared to the others who were just absent from home. Two of my other informants (Drocelle Uwimana and Théodosie Kanyanja) told me that their brothers had actually joined the RPF rebellion. In this respect, propaganda was about generalizing, so as to demonize every Tutsi.

Secondly, economic factors used in the propaganda positioned the Tutsi as a threat. To begin with, the Tutsi were depicted as the cause of past and prevailing economic crises. One version had it that the Tutsi were the more educated and wealthy, that they were the majority in Kigali city, that they monopolised national education and commerce, that Tutsi women occupied all jobs, that they controlled even the state. Like Jews who were portrayed as wealthier in the post-First World War Germany, the Tutsi became the exception in the general economic suffering of the remaining Rwandans. Therefore, to be deemed well-off at the time when the majority of the population were in extreme poverty became a threat. The Tutsi were thus presented as authors of the suffering of the Hutu who were portrayed as the victims, who should defend themselves. Just at the beginning of the publication of the Kangura newspaper, it reported that “70% of the rich people in Rwanda were Tutsi.” However, these descriptions were fallacies, stemming from false ideas; the few Tutsi who did better in business were known by everybody, and as Andy Storey explains, the rest were peasants and as poor as the other Rwandans.

Another economic explanation was that the manipulation of the local population to participate in the killing of Tutsi was facilitated by material desire. Things such as land,

80 Interview with Paul Twahirwa, Drocelle Uwimana, Théodosie Kanyanja and Anonymous 5.
82 Chrétien, (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 92.
cattle, and other assets were targeted by those who took part. However, more than the material to aim at, the propaganda also instilled fear in the understanding of the population. It stated that the rebels were coming to take over their land, and that they had to fight for it. In this regard, some of those who took part in the killings may have done so believing that they were protecting their property. One Hutu perpetrator narrated this: “I did not believe The Tutsi were coming to kill us… but when the government radio continued to broadcast that they were coming to take our land, were coming to kill the Hutu – when this was repeated over and over – I began to feel some kind of fear.” In relation to genocide, Rose’s research reveals that “…some Hutus participated in the genocide in order to prevent a loss of their land to the invading RPF,” and that “some Hutus participated in the genocide in order to gain land as a Reward”, but that land continued to be an object of competition and conflict even after the genocide.

But most authors argue convincingly that it is not the lack of arable land nor the difficult life conditions in general that caused the civil war and ultimately the genocide. These were the product of political developments. The economic was just an ingredient or an easy context for political mobilization: “The extreme violence of 1994 appears as the outcome of political manipulations at an economic dead end.”

The third threat that the Tutsi were said to represent was around the conquest and ownership of power. This mostly occurred in 1993 when the Arusha accords were proving to be conclusive. The more Arusha negotiations reached the signature of a

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protocol on power sharing, the more the extremist parties pronounced hateful speeches. The first move had occurred in November 1992 when MRND and CDR showed their resistance towards the negotiations and as a result, the President and after him Léon Mugesera made public declarations that showed their rejection of those negotiations and hence of power sharing with the RPF. It is following the Protocol with respect to human rights of 18 August 1992 and the Protocol on Power Sharing of 30 October 1992 that agreed to grant the RPF five ministries, including the Ministry of Local Government in the future BBGT, that the President said in one campaign meeting in Ruhengeri on 15 November 1992 that the Arusha accords were no more than a mere piece of paper and that his supporters should not bother about the prospective power sharing with the RPF. He even promised to organize a parade of his Interahamwe militia to show the MRND force, behaviour that opposition parties condemned in a number of their announcements.89 On 22 November 1992, Léon Mugesera, an intellectual in the President’s party, made a speech in which he openly called for Hutu violence against the Tutsi. Furthermore, shortly before the accords on power sharing were signed on 9 January 1993, Colonel Bagosora, one of MRND members, left and promised that he was going to Rwanda to prepare for an apocalypse, a declaration that all remaining parties condemned as extremist.90 Once the other protocol on the army integration of both the government forces and RPF forces was drafted, then the extremist discourse became even harsher against the Tutsi at large. The CDR party had rejected those accords, hence was not included in power sharing. The first priority of the MRND and CDR then became reclaiming one ministry for the CDR. The opposition parties together with the RPF rejected that idea. This new misunderstanding between the MRND, CDR and other smaller parties and opposition parties plus the RPF became a new motive for the endless postponement of the establishment of the BBGT from January 1994 onwards. In addition to this, the Arusha peace process foresaw the change of all the local authorities, from the

90 MDR, Kigali-Ville, Announcement No. 34, “Has Colonel Bagosora started to prepare his project of transforming Rwanda into a bloodshed (Umuyonga)?”, Kigali, 15 January 1993.
Prefecture to the Commune, which means that Prefects, Subprefects and Burgomasters who were incumbents by then felt that their position had become fragile.91

Following the signature of Arusha Peace Accord on 4 August 1993, Kangura magazine stressed that the only rescue for the Hutu was the CDR party, because the Tutsi had conquered power that the Hutu had had since 1959, that they came to grab all the material benefits that their 1959 “revolution” had given them and that the Tutsi were coming to subjugate them in slavery, corporal punishment, tax compulsion and economic exploitation again.92

Following the massacre of 300 people in the north-western part of the country in late January 1993, the RPF launched a major offensive towards Kigali on 8 February 1993 and stopped some few kilometres before the city. By early March 1993 the number of displaced people reached 860,000, that is, more than 10% of the population at that time.93

This attack is said to have convinced even moderate Hutu politicians that the balance of force was big for military protagonists and small for political ones, and that the RPF was not to be trusted. This in a way worked in favour of extremists whose point that the RPF was a Tutsi conqueror group was now proved: “On one side, even the most resolute and honest opponents of the regime began to fear that they had been naive and that, through their actions, they were running the risk of exchanging a Hutu military dictatorship for a Tutsi one.”94 Oppositions parties’ messages following that offensive made it clear that they feared and condemned both extremist parties and the RPF.95 The MDR showed that it was against the RPF when the latter demanded that the French troops leave the country as one of the preconditions for the continuation of negotiations. MDR decided on 1

91 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 196.
93 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 173-175.
March 1993 that the demand of the RPF should be rejected. This showed both the lack of trust towards RPF and the incertitude about the security of the country.\(^96\)

However, the most significant factor that promoted the perception of the Tutsi as a threat to the Hutu is how the extremist media portrayed the killing of the Burundian president, Melchior Ndadaye, on 21 October 1993 by a faction of Tutsi officers, and the violence that followed in that country that caused the death of between 50,000 and 100,000 people, both Hutu and Tutsi.\(^97\) The extremist media took this violent event as a proof that no Tutsi was ready for sharing power with the Hutu even in Rwanda, where the Arusha peace process had been signed two months before. In December 1993, *Kangura* wrote: “If Ndadaye was not assassinated, the Tutsi could continue to hide their strategy until the end of the world. Tutsi will pay until the end of the world the price for the death of Ndadaye, whether they like it or not!”\(^98\) According to Shingiro Mbonyumutwa, the killing of Ndadaye showed to clever Rwandans that the Tutsi cannot coexist with the Hutu in peace and share power peacefully.\(^99\) It became an occasion to reject the outcome of the Arusha peace accords. As Prunier wrote, the killing of President Ndadaye in Burundi became “a godsend for the ‘Power’ fractions of the ‘opposition’ parties which could both pretend to have been ‘moderates’ hitherto and to have turned to ‘rightful extremism’ only as a response to an intolerable threat.”\(^100\)

The death of President Ndadaye and the escalation of violence in Burundi, coupled with the flight of many Burundians to Rwanda, contributed to the polarization of politics in Rwanda. Opposition parties had been divided among themselves following the formation of the transitional cabinet of July 1993 as we saw in the previous chapter. All those politicians who were unhappy about the share of cabinet portfolios were approached by the Habyarimana clique and formed what was called the “Hutu Power” faction of the

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\(^97\) Chrétien (dir.), *Rwanda : Les médias du génocide*, pp. 69-70, 198.


\(^100\) Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 200.
MDR and PL and later on of the PSD. Moderate members of these opposition parties became more and more fragile because of that division of their parties. This occurred at the moment when the extremist discourse was becoming more and more radicalized against the Tutsi. Although ethnic identities were polarized\(^{101}\) and were presented that way in the extremist propaganda, the latter had failed to convince many Hutu to see politics along ethnic lines only. After October 1993 however, they were increasingly successful in doing that, as the Tutsi were depicted more and more as a political threat.

Finally, the arrival of Hutu Burundian refugees in Rwanda led to the banality of violence against the Tutsi as one of my informants narrated.

You could see that the population began to have oppositions among themselves. That continued until 1993. Especially after the Burundians removed fear from them. A war had occurred in Burundi, then the Burundians began to cross the border, you saw that they came after having killed people easily. As they entered in the country, they had machetes that killed people. Then the population became also eager, saying, if this programme can come here, we can also kill them. […] you saw that their fear [the perpetrators’] was removed by the Burundians.\(^{102}\)

Lastly, the Tutsi were accused of having killed the Rwandan President. This became an ultimate justification for exterminating them. The Tutsi were presented as evil in the extremist media: “These pitiful, pitiful Tutsi, in killing the President what did they reproach to him really? […] He had done a lot for them, but these people are insatiable.”\(^{103}\) In December 1993, the Kangura newspaper had even made a prophecy about the killing of President Habyarimana: “President Habyarimana could die before the month of March 1994. […] Last month we got irrefutable evidences that showed us that Habyarimana is going to be killed. Moreover, he will not be killed by a Tutsi but by a Hutu working for the Tutsi… We have carefully examined that…”\(^{104}\)

\(^{101}\) Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 23.
\(^{102}\) Interview with Drocelle Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007.
\(^{104}\) Ngeze Hassan in Kangura, n° 53, décembre 1993, in Chrétien (dir.), *Rwanda : Les médias du génocide*, p. 188.
During the genocide, just a week after the death of President Habyarimana following the shooting down of his plane, RTLM radio broadcast the following message: “The Tutsi who are a minority in Bujumbura wanted to take over power and this caused the extermination of several Tutsi in the countryside. This is exactly what the group of inkotanyi has done against the Tutsi living inside the country. We haven’t stopped saying two things that can lead definitely Rwandans in the fighting: to kill the President of the Republic and to restart the battle.” In this regard, the genocide in Rwanda looked like an imitation what had just occurred in Burundi a few months earlier.

The result of this sophisticated propaganda machine was the production of a number of patterns of behaviour and emotional outcomes both on the side of the perpetrators and of the victims-to-be. On the side of perpetrators-to-be, it led to hatred, scapegoating, blame and fear of the Tutsi and obedience to genocide organisers, whereas on the side of victims-to-be, it led to fear and despair.

It is worth noting that genocide propagandists were highly skilled. The analysis of Jean-Pierre Chrétien suggests that they learned how to instil obedience, using both scholarship and previous Nazi techniques. And obtaining obedience was a very important factor in order to have killing orders carried out:

Killing is very discouraging if you must decide to do so yourself ... but if you are obeying orders from the authorities, if you are adequately conditioned, if you feel pushed and pulled, if you see that the carnage will have absolutely no adverse effects in future, you feel comforted and revitalized. You do it without shame ... We envisaged this relief with no reluctance whatsoever ... we were efficiently conditioned by radio broadcasts and advice we heard.

But the extremists were also helped by the existing structural and conjunctural social and economic conditions. Adult rural peasants who headed households were for the great majority illiterate. A study conducted in 1984 suggests that about 59.8 percent of heads of
families in rural areas had no education, whereas the other more than 35 percent had only
primary education.\textsuperscript{107} The level of poverty had increased significantly since 1985 and life
conditions were becoming unbearable. Uvin argued that when people are put under these
difficult conditions, they are prone to easy manipulation. As Ervin Staub contended,
“[o]ne frequent, destructive response to difficult life conditions is scapegoating, blaming
some group for the life problems, or conflict, or past violence, even if the violence has
been mutual. Another frequent response is increased \textit{devaluation} of another group.”\textsuperscript{108}

But to what degree can the manipulated population be considered as passive in this
process? To what degree the above media propaganda reached the audience, and to what
extent did the latter react to it? While there is no doubt about the role that the radio
played in the genocide, the direct causal link between radio and killing has been debated
by a number of authors. Mironko argued that radio messages were not the main source
for the peasants perpetrators that he interviewed; instead, the main influence for
advocating genocide participation came from soldiers and leaders: “…soldiers brought it
[the killing] and then RTLM reported it. For example, I had a small radio. The radio used
to broadcast it. You found out that what it broadcast was what the soldiers were doing.
So, it was necessary that we do it too. Because the leadership supported it, we accepted
it.”\textsuperscript{109} The research of Scott Straus which includes both national and local cases, points
out that face-to-face mobilization was more significant than radio messages in inciting
genocide participation.\textsuperscript{110} My interviews also point to the efficacy of human contact
between local leaders and constituents in the instilling of extremist propaganda messages
before the genocide and in the dissemination of killing orders during the genocide. These
messages were conveyed by local authorities in their numerous meetings with the
population. It is also sure that these authorities read the printed media in addition to what
they heard through the radio and the instructions coming from above. As Higiro has

\textsuperscript{107} République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et des Forêts, \textit{Résultats de l’Enquête
Nationale Agricole 1984}, Kigali, Printer Set, s.d., p. 31.
\textsuperscript{108} Staub, “Genocide in Rwanda”, p. 249.
\textsuperscript{109} Charles Mironko, “The Effect of RTLM’s Rhetoric of Ethnic Hatred in Rural Rwanda”, in Allan
\textsuperscript{110} Scott Straus, \textit{The Order of Genocide. Race, Power and War in Rwanda}, Ithaca and London, Cornell
noted, print media reached a very limited audience that was predominantly made of intellectuals and rarely the lay people. ¹¹¹ But the informants also point out that the radio did have some influence. Consider for example this answer: “[By the time of parties], I was a man who understands politics. I also had a radio. In fact, radio is a school of people who did not go to school.”¹¹²

While the extremist ideology focused on the blaming of Tutsi and the unifying of the Hutu against the Tutsi before the genocide, it shifted to accusations against the Tutsi for having killed the President and to the incitement to kill them during the genocide. However, it is worth noting that hatred and obedience were not obtained by verbal propaganda only. Even the list of massacres that the extremists conducted from 1990 to 1993 seem to have acted as a propaganda in itself. Killing the Tutsi entered once again political culture and became a banal activity. I develop this point in the next section.

5.3. MASSACRES AS MOBILISATION

Doris Bergen who studied the history of the Holocaust asserted that “[v]iolence itself served the Nazi regime as a form of propaganda.”¹¹³ This seems to have occurred in the Rwandan case as well. The first instrumentalization of violence in the propaganda was through war representation as we saw above. The second was that most massacres that occurred between 1990 and 1993 were presented as a response either to actual or fake RPF attacks. In this regard, they appeared as revenge killings or preventive killings. In both cases they produced the effect of banalization of extreme violence. The reading of Hannah Arendt (Einchmann in Jerusalem) suggests that banalizing violence is an ideology in itself.

¹¹² Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. In fact, Frank Chalk has indicated that radio ownership in Rwanda was about 25 radios for one hundred persons in 1992, which was above the percentage in Subsaharan Africa. In early 1990, there were about 1,685 radios in the Kibayi commune. (Chalk, “Hate Radio in Rwanda”, p. 97; République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Commune de Kibayi, Monographie de la Commune de Kibayi 1989, Mars 1990, p. 65.)
¹¹³ Bergen, War & Genocide, p. 66.
But perhaps the most striking fact is that almost all the signs, practices and actors identified during the genocide - the language, the tools and the weapons, the actors ranging from the organisers to the executors, and the victims - had already appeared in these massacres. This is what makes them also a mobilising factor. They became a mobilising factor in that they showed that it is possible to massacre some Tutsi and not be seriously punished.

5.3.1. Kibilira

The first massacre occurred in Kibilira Commune, in the North-western part of the country, only ten days after the start of the RPF war, between 11 and 13 October 1990. The Kibilira massacre took 348 lives and more than 550 houses got burnt, with the participation of local authorities who used the population to commit those atrocities. Following that massacre the Burgomaster and the Subprefect who initiated that massacre were only sacked. In this massacre, the killing was described as “working”. The techniques of instilling popular participation included rumours about the murder of an important national leader known locally, and the display of two corpses of people supposedly killed by the Tutsi. Yet, it is stressed that no Tutsi among the victims had any link whatsoever with the RPF. Those who were accused of taking part in that massacre were jailed only for a month and thereafter got released.114

The second attack against the Tutsi of Kibilira occurred again following the massacre of Bugesera that occurred in early March 1992. But because the authorities did not condone them and actually strived to stop them, only five people were killed and a few others were injured. More than 1,000 others fled to a nearby church seeking safety. Another attack on the same place occurred in late December 1992, an attack that targeted not just the Tutsi, but also the Hutu from the opposition parties. It followed the speech of Léon Mugesera of 22 November, made at Kabaya in Gaseke Commune, neighbouring Kibilira.

That speech led to the attack of Tutsi living in Kibilira, Kayove and Mutura Communes. It is in this late massacre that the MRND militia, the Interahamwe took part. They had existed since early 1992. They were progressively used in massacres across the country. Following the Kibilira massacre, other attacks on Tutsi and Hutu opponents occurred in Murambi, Kibuye, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi.

The Mugesera speech has been analysed in various ways. My reading suggests that the first point that can be found in it is about party competition expressed in violent terms. The author of this speech is a party leader. He is talking to party members, haranguing them to fight against members of the MDR, the PL and other opposition parties:

… I tell you that the Gospel has already changed in our movement. If someone slaps you once, you must doubly retaliate, possibly give two mortal slaps. Please understand very well: we do not want in our territory a member of MDR and others, they must not be heard here [Kabaya] and in the whole Gisenyi. Their small flags must not be put here. Our fief must not be infiltrated: it is forbidden.

Moreover, the key word that keeps on coming back in his speech was “vigilance”, a word found also in the Hutu Ten Commandments (article 9). Then the killing, and not the chasing of the Tutsi as it happened in 1959, is perceived as a weapon to win political control. The speech of Léon Mugesera is also to be put in the context of the Hamitic theory, especially with its mention of the Nyabarongo river leading to Ethiopia:

Recently, I told to a so-called member of PL that the mistake we made in 1959, as I was a child, was that we let them go out [of the country] peacefully… “I inform you that your country is Ethiopia, and we are going to send you there via Nyabarongo in an express trip.” Yes, I repeat to you that we must start working. […] At last, I remind you the main points of what I just said: be vigilant in the first place.

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118 Guichaoua (dir.), *Les crises politiques*, p. 621.
Violence that occurred in Kibilira and Mutura in December 1992 is believed to have been caused by this speech. The Justice Minister asked that Mugesera be prosecuted, but the Habyarimana regime protected him and ultimately facilitated his flight to Canada.

5.3.2. Massacre of Bagogwe

The massacre of Bagogwe, a group of Tutsi who lived near the volcanoes and the Virunga Park, occurred in January 1991 following the RPF attack of the Ruhengeri prison. The FIDH human rights organisation pointed out the role of top country leaders in organizing this massacre including the President of the Republic. This massacre took around 300 to 1,000 lives of Bagogwe.

5.3.3. Massacres in Bugesera

The massacres of Tutsi in Bugesera occurred in March 1992. But since October 1991, the Burgomaster of Kanzenze located in the Bugesera region had harassed a number of young Tutsi men accusing them of joining the RPF. He had also gone into open conflict with the head of the PL opposition party in his commune, accusing him of being an accomplice of the RPF. From then on, extremist propaganda had been spread asking the population to be “alert”, and to make sure that the Tutsi did not escape. Part of this campaign was done by the official radio, Radio Rwanda, and with its leader, Professor Ferdinand Nahimana, who became one of the ideologists of genocide. Another development in these massacres is that the Interahamwe militia operated for the first time in this Bugesera massacre. It had just been founded shortly at that time. This massacre was made possible after an active participation of local leaders, Radio Rwanda, Interahamwe, Kangura, Military and others.

The FIDH (*Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme*) report concluded that the killings had reached 2000 between 1990 and January 1993, targeting Tutsi but also a number of Hutu opponents; that leaders had planned those mass killings in advance; that they had involved the outstanding participation of local leaders but also of local populations, but that the perpetrators had not been punished in proportion to their crimes.123

It is worth noting that it is in the regions that constituted strongholds of the MRND and CDR that these massacres occurred. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, party leaders had chosen violence against rival party members as a political strategy. The degree of manufactured violence depended on the control over the means of inflicting violence that a particular party might have. The MRND and CDR were privileged in this area, since their militia were becoming more militarily trained than the youth wings of other parties, and had the support of the military, the gendarmerie and the police more than any other party.

5.4. GENOCIDE AT NATIONAL LEVEL

5.4.1. The Unfolding

At the beginning of 1994 almost all conditions were met in order to have a serious political crisis. The Habyarimana regime was postponing the establishment of the Broad Based Transition Government (BBTG). The economic situation had not been improved by the Structural Adjustment Programme policies. War between the Rwanda Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and political violence between extremist and moderate political parties, had produced both criminal violence and political violence. The extremist parties had gone so far as to organise and implement the first massacres of Tutsi and assassinations of Hutu opponents since 1990. The Hutu

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extremist media were predicting the worst against the Tutsi in general and the RPF in particular. In other words, the political and social climate was extremely tense at this time.

However, it is the assassination of Habyarimana that gave the Hutu extremists the ultimate opportunity to implement genocide against the Tutsi and assassinate moderate Hutu politicians. That this genocide was planned and prepared some years before has been ascertained by the existing literature on genocide today and has cast very few doubts, given the efficiency with which the organisers and later on the perpetrators acted. However, when this planning started has not yet been precisely ascertained. Prunier situates the planning time to the end of 1992.124 According to Verwimp, that date is to be estimated between November 1991 and August 1992.125

The announcement of the extermination of the Tutsi following the death of President Habyarimana achieved two things as far as the ideology of hatred is concerned. It increased fear and blame. It also polarized behaviour. One had to participate in the genocide, or be considered as accomplice of the enemy. That is at least in theory.

Furthermore, opposition parties’ leaders had been seriously weakened by their internal divisions. So the extremist faction became strengthened by the coalition with the “Hutu power” leaders. Therefore, those who had caused disobedience during the multiparty system had been weakened, and those who wanted to lead the whole country in wholesale massacre gained more and more voice. As a result, the number of those Hutu individuals who had always been moderate started to decrease as a number of them were joining the killings. This is what Fletcher has called “to turn interahamwe”. The State message during the time of genocide was about turning more “bystanders” into “perpetrators”. However, the experience was that not every Hutu joined the side of the perpetrators, which suggests Staub was correct when he argues that no matter what the genocide experience, people still keep a certain portion of choice.

A number of Hutu extremists, in a move to clear their image after the genocide, have given more importance to the period between 1990 and 1994; in this regard they have argued that without the civil war caused by the RPF there would have been no genocide.\(^{126}\) Scott Straus has contended that the more the RPF attacks threatened the Hutu hardliners’ power, the more these turned to an extremist choice against the Tutsi, and ultimately to genocide.\(^{127}\) But a careful analysis of the content of the ideology of Tutsi genocide as developed above reveals clearly that the choice to victimize all the Tutsi as political strategy to counter the RPF advances was made as soon as the war erupted in October 1990, and that this ideology built its core arguments from the political situation since 1959. Alison Des Forges has argued that between the many choices that the Habyarimana regime had to fight the war, both militarily and politically, it chose the ethnic one. Maybe this temptation stemmed from the supposed efficacy of ethnic manipulation during the 1960s and the continuation of a racist policy during the First and Second Republics. The instilling of fear had become a permanent strategy to have massacres implemented, or to plan for future massacres.\(^{128}\)

The presidential plane was shot down on 6 April 1994 shortly after 8:00 pm. Immediately, roadblocks and patrols of Presidential Guards and other forces started. A number of Hutu moderate political leaders, who included the Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, were assassinated within a few hours. Retired Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, one of the Akazu members, took charge of the political control of the country for several hours and set up structures that could lead the country in this crisis. He is presented as the one who set up the Interim Government (IG) that implemented the genocide.\(^{129}\) This government was set up on 8 April 1994. It was led by Théodore Sindikubwabo as President and Jean Kambanda as Prime Minister. It contained MRND,

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\(^{126}\) See in Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence*, p. 73.


CDR members but also “Hutu Power” factions members of MDR, PSD, PL and PDC parties. No Tutsi was a member of this government for obvious reasons.130 Both Sindikubwabo and Kambanda were from Butare Prefecture. The first was elderly, and had been a renowned political figure since the 1960s. He was among the symbolic Hutu leaders during the “revolution”. He even became a Minister in the government of Rwanda on 1 July 1962. He is among the few politicians who served both the First and the Second Republic regimes. In 1994 he was a MRND member. As for Jean Kambanda, he was born in 1956, was in his late thirties by the time of genocide. He was commercial engineer and member of MDR “Power”. He had been a rival of Agathe Uwilingiyimana during the multiparty system and was angered by the fact that he had been excluded from the BBTG list of Ministers. Entering the IG became, as Guichaoua argued, an occasion for revenge against his long-time adversary, Agathe Uwilingiyimana.131 But the calculation by the Hutu extremists here was that including Butare politicians at the helm of this genocide government would homogenize the genocide project for the whole territory of the country, as they were already very sure of its implementation in regions of MRND and CDR control. Some other names of Ministers from Butare were Straton Nsabumukunzi, Callixte Kalimanzira and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko.132

The first thing the IG together with the security structures including the army, the Presidential Guard, the gendarmerie, and the police did was to set up roadblocks and monitor the daily and nightly patrols using the local population. The latter was organized into “security committees” which included also local leaders such as cell committee members, and sector committee members. These committees depended on the allegiance of commune, sector and cell local leaders. They seem to have operated efficiently as far as the experience of the genocide tells us. Indeed, if anything, the administration remained efficient during the genocide, a coherence it did not have during the time of multiparty system in the whole country, when, as we saw in the previous chapter, the local leaders were not being obeyed by their constituents in Butare, because this area was

130 Reyntjens, Rwanda: trois jours, p. 88.
a stronghold of opposition parties. It is worth noting that with the exception of one commune, Giti, located in the centre-eastern part of the country, all other 144 communes obeyed the call of genocide. Since the beginning of the genocide, the success of the execution of the extermination of the Tutsi population in an area depended in most cases firstly on the dedication of local leaders, but also of self-defence civil committees which worked in tandem with local leaders. Soldiers and policemen intervened in areas where the Tutsi had assembled en masse to use firearms, but the “finishing” of the “job” was done by the local population that had become “Interahamwe” that is, killers. The local leaders coordinated massacres, that is, mobilised as much of the population to enter the killing mobs (*Ibitero*); planned the areas where they would go to operate; moved the Tutsi population to assembly areas; and brought the killing mobs to murder them. Sometimes, the victims themselves fled to places which they thought to be safe, such as churches and administrative offices of the communes, but these areas turned out to be places of massacre. When the Tutsi were able to put up some resistance against their Hutu attackers, it was the local leaders who were in charge of calling for backup from the military, the gendarmerie or the neighbouring commune local populations.

The role of the local leaders can be discerned by the fact that where these showed some reluctance to participate in genocide, its implementation was delayed. Such is the case of Butare Prefecture where the Prefect, Jean Baptiste Habyarimana, the only Tutsi prefect at the time, resisted the genocide implementation in Butare. As a result, with the exception of one commune, Nyakizu, he was able to delay the genocidal killings in that prefecture for about 10 days, that is, until 18 April 1994. He was ultimately deposed on 19 April by President Sindikubwabo and Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, and later killed. The appointment of Sylvain Nsabimana as new Prefect and Colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo as the Head of the Civil self-defense unit in Butare, now made the genocide in Butare possible.

The IG then chose the strategy of sending its Ministers to their region of origin, to instill popular participation in the killings and to monitor how that “work” was being done. It is

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in that regard that Sindikubwabo and Kambanda came to Butare. In the episode of 19 April 1994 during which the Butare Prefect was deposed, the speech of the President was about raising awareness among the Butare people that they should cease behaving as neutral or passive (*Ba Ntibindeba*) and to choose to be active, that is, to accept that they should “work”, which meant at the time of the genocide to kill the Tutsi. He even threatened to deal with those who would remain neutral. But his language was coded, though it was clear enough, given the circumstances of the moment:

The people of Butare, … are known for their behaviour of indifference vis-à-vis what is happening elsewhere, as if it is not their business (*ntibindeba*). Today, the situation is different, you are wrong to think this way…. This is the only way of stopping the RPF attack, of defeating the inyenzi-inkotanyi once and for all, and to never hear about them anymore. Work as others. Those who do not want to work should not embarrass others. They must also be cleaned out of the way, so that they let others work.\(^{134}\)

This speech was aired on Radio Rwanda. It may have convinced more Rwandans who were not willing to take part in the killings to do so, since it looked as if that was the only option left for them.

The obedience of local leaders to orders coming from the national government stems first from the very political culture in which most burgomasters had evolved. As we saw in Chapter three, the commune leaders represented national leaders at local level; they had been appointed by the President of the Republic, were monitored by Prefects, who also were appointed by the President of the Republic, and as many authors argued, they seemed to represent the interests of the government more than those of their constituents. The genocide experience shows that the multiparty system time (1991-1994) did not change this culture that much. But it also shows that the propaganda entertained during this moment was strong enough to convince the majority of local leaders to join in the genocidal project. But more importantly, the killing of the President and the war situation following that killing and the starting of the genocide were encouraging a large number

\(^{134}\) See the French version of this speech which was pronounced originally in Kinyarwanda, in Ntaribi Kamanzi, *Rwanda. Du génocide à la défaite*, Kigali, Editions REBERO, 1997, p. 130.
of leaders but also the population to join in. As Fletcher argued, the start of the killing of Tutsi showed those who were not participating that they had to join.135

The efficiency with which the IG acted depended both on last minute strategies and past structural organisation. Indeed, the government moved from Kigali to Gitarama on 12 April 1994 as the RPF had arrived in the capital a day before and war was starting in the capital. The government worked in Gitarama until 28 May 1994, when it was obliged again to move to Gisenyi, as Gitarama was being invaded by the RPF.136 However, despite the geographical instability of this government, Tutsi massacres kept on continuing, which suggests that those in charge at local level had taken their task seriously. This outstanding submission was the result of the 1994 situation or pressure but also of the way burgomasters had always carried their duties, as we saw in chapter three. Therefore, those who argue that the Rwandan state was strong at the time of the genocide have a point if we consider these two elements: predominantly obedient relations already existing between upper leaders and lower leaders, and the 1994 context.137

One illustration that corroborates this two-fold analysis is the way genocide was conceptualised and symbolised in relation to Umuganda communal labour as far as longue durée is concerned.138 The Killing of the Tutsi was Umuganda “work”; those who enforced the 1994 killing were the same who had enforced Umuganda until 1990; that is the Burgomaster, the Councillor and the Cell committee members, also the Umuganda committees; the outcome that was always promised, that is, social welfare, was the same that was promised after the extermination of the Tutsi.

The conjuncture, that is, the period during the genocide, was also used. In the Hutu “Power” media propaganda and in the instructions of the upper echelons, genocide was a war. The Tutsi were the “enemy”. A big number of the local population of able-bodied men were organised into civil self-defence forces. Every adult Rwandan was asked to be “vigilant” towards the enemy; in practice this meant mounting roadblocks and doing night and day patrols for men, and to inform on hiding places of the Tutsi for women. The participation of soldiers, Presidential Guards, Gendarmerie and Police in the killing activity corroborated this war situation. The population was asked to collaborate with the military in the operations. Where the RGF and RPF forces had had confrontations, this was a proof that the “war” was a reality. But the whole country knew it, because it was reported on radios.\(^{139}\) War became a reality as the RPF advanced and victories were increasing. On 22-23 May 1994, the RPF captured both the Kanombe Airport and the Kanombe Military Camp. They attacked Kabgayi on 2 June 1994, occupied Gitarama Prefecture on 13 June 1994, and on 4 July both Kigali and Butare were captured.

Roméo Dallaire, the Commander-in-Chief of United Nations Mission Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), attempted to obtain a cease-fire between the RGF and the RPF, but both parties failed to reach any agreement, their actions, objectives and means during the genocide being diametrically opposed:

For the RGF (Rwandan Government Forces), the cease-fire was a prerequisite to stop the massacres; for the RPF, the cessation of the massacres was a prerequisite to the signing of any cease-fire agreement. […] The Government forces wanted the cease-fire because they did not seem to be holding very well. They were weak militarily. The RPF did not want it because they were under the impression that a cease-fire would be a significant limiting factor in their endeavor to stop the massacre.\(^{140}\)

The RGF were waging the war against RPF forces, but were also coordinating and participating in the massacres of Tutsi, especially in sites where the Tutsi were assembled


in big numbers, while the RPF was advancing to gain territory but also was rescuing the Tutsi population where it could find them alive. The objective of the RGF was to win the war against the RPF and to exterminate the Tutsi population, while RPF aimed at defeating the RGF, stopping the Tutsi genocide and bringing back peace. The means of the RGF included the military, the gendarmerie, the *Interahamwe* militia but also the civil self-defence units, while the RPF relied on its military forces that increased significantly during this time.

The war argument became strong as it convinced the population that their participation in the genocide was a “self-defence” effort. The war propaganda argument reduced the degree of guilt that perpetrators would normally have under ordinary situations. As Hannah Arendt stressed, “No one questions the use of violence in self-defence, because the danger is not only clear but also present, and the end justifying the means is immediate.”\(^{141}\) That the “Tutsi enemy” was a fake one seems to have mattered less, as the danger pressure was being brilliantly orchestrated by the organisers of the genocide. For example, in areas where resistance to participation was foreseen, leaders implemented such techniques as to bring corpses supposedly of Hutu people killed and displayed them as a way of mobilising the indifferent Hutu individuals for participation.

It is worth noting that war has become a classical context for extremist governments to implement genocides. Presenting defenceless citizens as the enemy in times of war has become an ordinary technique for governments to eliminate their unwanted innocent citizens.\(^{142}\) The war argument in the extremist media seemed to benefit from the coincidence of the same analysis of the situation by a number of international media and international organisations. According to a number of international media agencies, what was happening in Rwanda was a war between the Hutu and the Tutsi, it was an interethnic cleansing, which means that both ethnic group members were perpetrators and victims. Several international media agencies did not want to understand the multiple

\(^{142}\) For the Holocaust, see the quotation of Bergen above.
causes of the genocide and did not sufficiently report the extreme violence occurring.  
This interpretation of events went at least until late June 1994 when the UN report of René Degni-Ségui demonstrated unequivocally that it was a genocide against the Tutsi and that the Hutu who were killed at this time, were victims of either war between RGF and RPF or were moderate Hutu as far as political affiliations were concerned. Initially, international media delayed to investigate the events in Rwanda from April 1994 onwards, and when they did so, they were not efficient enough to attract the attention of the world and bring about preventive measures. The UN and OAU also cannot claim to have not known what was happening in Rwanda. Roméo Dallaire had issued early warnings about arms caches, intensive training of civilian militia for an imminent resumption of violence on the side of the Habyarimana regime, since January 1994, but the UN Head Quarters did not intervene to halt these actions. Instead, during the genocide, the UN decided to downsize its troops in Rwanda and to reduce the mandate of those remaining on duty. On the side of the OAU, war seems to have been the description of the crisis that was occurring in Rwanda at this time. It did not put significant pressure on the RGF, nor did it avail troops to stop the killing of the Tutsi population. Instead, it allowed the Rwandan government delegation to take part in one meeting of OAU in Tunis on 13 June 1994, a gesture that looked like a recognition of the “genocide government.”

5.4.2. Agency, Non-agency and Victimhood

The perpetrators of the Tutsi genocide were numerous and appeared in different categories as far as the degree of agency and hence responsibility is concerned. At the first level were organisers. The first cited by many authors are those who controlled the

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Alison Des Forges, “Call to Genocide”, pp. 52-53.
146 Kamanzi, Rwanda. Du génocide à la défaite, p. 169.
state during the Habyarimana regime, i.e., the Akazu members. Second come those who entered the Interim Government on 8 April 1994 who include Akazu members but also Hutu “Power” party members and other members from MRND and CDR. Then follows top military officials who got involved in the genocidal plan since its inception, Heads of Self-Defence Units in all prefectures, Heads of Interahamwe militia. Prefects, Subprefects, Burgomasters, communal police and local civil self-defence units seem to have received orders to execute the genocide in their jurisdictions, though it is possible that few of them were part of the planning clique. The last but possibly most complex group of perpetrators concerns the local ordinary citizens. These include as much the urban and the rural, the intellectuals and the illiterate, the latter being the great majority, the young and the old, men and to a small degree women. They include even foreigners such as Burundi Hutu refugees and others. 147

The Christian Churches in Rwanda have been considered as complicit in the genocide for their lack of preventive action or their ambivalent behaviour, given the prominent position they occupied in society and given the expectations that the victims put in them. The Roman Catholic Church in particular has always been close to state ideologies as they were changing from the colonial period until 1994. Sociologically speaking, churches were a good sample of the Rwandan society: they contained all the ethnic groups, all the economic classes, all the political tendencies, both in the clergy and in the membership. Ethnic divisions that were witnessed in society were also in the church. During the genocide, the church also had perpetrators, bystanders, victims and rescuers. Despite its political stand in favour of the “Hutu revolution”, and its divisions in 1959-1962, the Church had been able to save lives of the Tutsi and monarchists who fled to parishes and Christian schools. It had at least kept its moral power, as a sacred place and institution. In 1994 however, it failed to save most victims who sought refuge in its

premises. The MINALOC census calculated that 11.6% of genocide victims perished in churches.  

Given the mass participation in the genocide in Rwanda, which makes it the most peculiar genocide in history for having mobilised the biggest number of ordinary citizens, the Tutsi genocide has been called a “popular genocide,” a “rural genocide,” etc. However, such a terminology fails to capture the essence of each genocide so far witnessed in history: that genocide is always a state policy and project. I suggest that it be called “a popularized genocide” in order to stress the process of becoming popular, that is, both the role of the state in the ordering, and of the process of ordinary populations coming to join in the execution of genocide. As we have seen all along this chapter, mobilization or manipulation comes in between the state and society.

At an international level, the role of countries such as France in supporting the Hutu extremist government has been proven. France’s military trained the RGF as well as the Interahamwe militia in Rwanda before the genocide. They backed the RGF in the first RPF attack of 1990. The French military left Rwanda in December 1993, but delivered weapons for the RGF during the genocide, and continued to support the IG government in exile following the victory of the RPF. Politically, France supported the idea of “double genocide” in order to reject the recognition of the Tutsi genocide. From June 1994, through “Opération Turquoise,” France had been able to save some few lives of

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149 See the provocative book titles of Scott Straus (The Order of genocide) and of Jean-Paul Kimonyo (Un génocide populaire), despite the fact that both authors have included national and local case studies, as well as state and citizens’ participation.

victims, but also to provide the genocidaires (killers) with a safe haven and a way to escape prosecution. Finally, France gave asylum to some of the top genocide leaders.\(^{151}\)

The passivity of other powerful countries, and of the UN and OAU who decided to keep silent concerning what was happening in Rwanda at the time of genocide, gave the Rwandan government the opportunity to continue its genocidal project undisturbed.\(^{152}\) One author has suggested that this kind of passive behaviour, characteristic of all bystanders, can be considered as an act of perpetration itself, since it gives to actual perpetrators the impression of being silently and remotely supported: “Perpetrators see passivity as acceptance or even approval of their actions.”\(^{153}\) Others have gone so far in their problematization of the position of bystander as to bring together the bystander with the perpetrator.\(^{154}\) But bystanders were also among the ordinary citizens who either succeeded in not participating in the killings of their Tutsi neighbours or failed to rescue them.

As for Genocide victims, they include those who died and those who survived. The existing literature usually stresses the estimate of 800,000 Tutsi killed, and some tens of thousands of Hutu moderate who were killed (between 30,000 and 50,000). However, the Rwandan Local Government Ministry’s census of 2000, revised in 2004, has calculated about 934,218 people who lost their lives in the genocide. These include the Tutsi, those who died for being mistaken as Tutsi, those who died for being related to the Tutsi as a result of matrimonial relations or political affiliations, or those who were opposed to the Hutu extremist government. The Tutsi alone were about 93.67% of the overall number of victims, which is 875,082. This estimate is also calculated differently as compared to the

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one in the existing literature in that it includes the victims from 1 October 1990 until 31 December 1994.\textsuperscript{155}

Butare Prefecture was the top in having lost more lives during the genocide, followed by Rural Kigali, Gitarama, Kigali capital, and Gikongoro. The victims were of all ages, but those from 0 to 24 were more numerous than the ones from 25 to 64 and 65 and above. Tutsi genocide also included more male victims than women (56.4\% versus 43.3\%). It victimized more peasant-farmers than any other professional category, which corroborates the assertion that it was a rural genocide from the perspective of both perpetrator and victim.\textsuperscript{156}

Dan Stone argues that the tools of killing were bullets rather than machetes: “In fact, most of the murdered were slain by being shot, machetes being used to ‘finish off’ already dying victims, or toward the end of the genocide, when the numbers to be killed were smaller.”\textsuperscript{157} He says this with good intentions of warning those who study the Tutsi genocide, not to confuse it with “savage natives” busy “bestially murdering one another” with machetes. But the Ministry of Local Government’s Study corroborates the predominance of the machete as the main tool used in the Tutsi genocide. According to this study, 37.88\% of victims were slain by machetes, while those killed by guns were 14.8\%, a number that is even smaller to those who were killed by clubs (16.78\%).\textsuperscript{158}

The current Government of Rwanda has also conducted a census of the survivors of genocide. It calculated about 367,362 survivors of different categories that include 102,743 men, 150,170 women, 74,642 orphans, 27,733 widows and 12,074 disabled from genocide violence.\textsuperscript{159} This number however does not take into consideration women who died after 31 December 1994 as a result of rape and AIDS contamination during the

\textsuperscript{155}MINALOC, \textit{Dénombrement}, pp. 17, 21 et 35.
\textsuperscript{158}MINALOC, \textit{Dénombrement}, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{159}Number of survivors of genocide, \url{http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/abarokotse%20english.pdf}, consulted on 6 October 2007.
genocide. Between 200,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the genocide. Some of them were infected with HIV-AIDS.\textsuperscript{160}

The agents in the rescue of victims include certain Hutu who hid them, the RPF rebels who arrived in their area before they were killed and saved them, or the fact that the victims were able to cross the border of Rwanda and fled to neighbouring countries. But it is worth noting that the first agent of the rescue is the victim him/herself: he or she is the one who chooses to survive, who negotiates survival, who begs for it, who runs and then gets rescued. The second is the rescuer, but he or she comes after the survivor’s effort to survive. Of course, there is also fate or fortune. Indeed, most narratives of survivors of the Tutsi genocide stress their utmost conviction that it is God who saved them.\textsuperscript{161}

\textbf{5.4.3. The Economics of Genocide}

A glimpse at the profile of perpetrators in the Rwandan government census of Tutsi genocide perpetrators, as produced by the Gacaca courts, suggests that property was a very important incentive in genocide participation. Out of 808,564 alleged perpetrators, those charged for robbery or destruction of property reach 308,738 persons, about 38%.\textsuperscript{162} It is also likely that some of the remaining perpetrators who are in the categories of killers had also charges in relation to property. I have stressed above the importance of land in the argument about mobilisation. The prospective loss of land produced a


psychological effect of uncertainty about the future, while the present was itself precarious. On the other hand, killing Tutsi neighbours could become an opportunity to seize their land. For these two reasons, scholars have considered land to be a significant incentive. In addition to land, there was also livestock, furniture and movable assets. These material things functioned both as an incentive to participate in the killing and as booty once the killing had ended. Given the levels of poverty at the time of the genocide, it was not hard to recruit people after promising them better living condition afterwards.163

5.4.4. The Geography of Genocide

Geography mattered both at the macro and micro level. The victims who lived near borders used them to escape, but the perpetrators used them also to catch those who were trying to cross.164 Rwanda had very few forests and uninhabited places where people could hide easily. In this respect, it was hard to hide.165 The mountainous topography of Rwanda and the way the Tutsi and Hutu lived together in most areas of the country made it difficult to lie about ethnic identity or to hide in the landscape. But in places where Tutsi lived as one majority group and close together, they attempted to resist killings, such as in Bisesero in Kibuye or Bitare in Gishamvu. Major roads and small paths were monitored by roadblocks. Rivers became sites of genocide, as they were used to throw in the victims.

Even the killing places revealed the significance of space. Narratives about the genocide across the country stress how certain people were assembled in places such as administrative offices, churches, and improvised hill places in order to be killed en masse, or how they brought themselves there believing they had more chance as a group to resist or be rescued. Others were killed in scattered places near or far from their homes. In this regard, the sites of rescue often became the sites of genocide. Perpetrator

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163 This does not mean however that poverty always leads to mass violence. It is well known that across the world many other people are poor but do not engage in genocide. Other conditions have to be present.
behaviour also followed geography: certain people found it easy to kill in neighbouring communes where they were unknown. Certain people went very far distances to loot. But others killed both at their places and elsewhere.\footnote{166}

5.4.5. The Timing of Genocide

Timing during the genocide is also important. At certain places, genocide started as soon as the presidential plane was shot down, and it reached other places later. When genocide was underway, it had phases. There were April killings after which in certain areas, leaders thought that all the Tutsi were exterminated or others had fled outside the country. Then came other phases in May or June at different dates, after leaders had noticed that some perpetrators had spared some victims, mostly women and children. They ordered them to be killed as well. But fearing the attention of the international community at this time, the killings had to be done in secret as compared to the April ones which were in open places.\footnote{167} The last phase of killings seems to have been when the Hutu extremists were now fleeing following the progress of the military victories of the RPF. Before fleeing, they killed the very last Tutsi they found or knew so that they could later escape accusation. That phase can be dated between July and December 1994, although even during the RPF rule following the genocide, some few survivors continued to be killed. In some areas, the killing was selective at first, then it became systematic or total in the process. Finally, as in many other genocides, the official end of genocide did not mean the end of the threat for those victims who survived, or the end of their suffering.\footnote{168}

CONCLUSION

\footnote{166 For details about killing centers and different perpetrator-victim behaviours in relation to geography, see the rich accounts gathered in African Rights, August 1995.}
\footnote{168 On the Holocaust, see Bergen, War & Genocide, p. 222. On dates of onset of genocide in all Communes and Prefectures, see Straus, The Order of Genocide, pp. 249-256.}
This chapter has revisited the ideological process that led to genocide through the instilling of obedience. It looked at the intentions and roles of actors and processes, both remote and recent, that is, intentionalism and functionalism. It considered both the structural and the conjunctural conditions that the Hutu ideologues have used in their genocide propaganda.

Although by early 1994 all conditions - political, economic and social - were showing a serious crisis, it is the political choice of extremist leaders that instrumentalised the hard socio-economic living conditions so that they could blame one of the Rwandan ethnic groups, the Tutsi, and ultimately effect its victimization. This chapter has shown to what extent this instrumentalisation was done in the Hutu “power” propaganda using varied means, such as the written or oral media, massacres and power instructions; using past and present to prove how “threatening” the Tutsi were; and how it mobilised as much of the Hutu population as possible in the genocidal project.

But the actors did not involve only perpetrators and victims, as the extremist propaganda probably wanted; there were also bystanders inside the country. The Tutsi genocide is considered as a “popularised genocide” for having mobilised more local populations, more neighbours to kill other neighbours, than any other genocide. But, the presence of bystanders shows that not every Hutu Rwandan able-bodied person participated. This corroborates Staub’s point that despite the degree of mobilisation for genocide, actors still keep a certain margin of choice.

In the next chapter, I trace the process that led to the implementation of genocide in Gishamvu and Kibayi. In this regard, I try to understand how the national genocidal project became internalised by local agents; how local conditions were at work in relation to national ones; how the actors, the geography, the timing and the means used played a role in these local contexts, and ultimately what effects the genocide produced locally.
CHAPTER SIX

THE GENOCIDE IN GISHAMVU

The perpetrator tries not only to kill, but to erase the memory of the killing, that is, to do, to act in such a way that no archive is left.¹

INTRODUCTION

This chapter reconstructs the Tutsi genocide in Gishamvu Commune. It does so by using witnesses’ own reconstructions. Indeed, when one analyses the content of interviews, especially on the section regarding the genocide, one notices that this content is already a reconstruction which contains both experiences of the informant but also experiences of other people in his or her area; experiences which occurred when he/she was present in time and space, or sometimes which occurred in his/her absence both in time and space. It could not be otherwise, after sixteen years. Rwandans who witnessed the genocide spent these years trying to understand and put together as much as they could in terms of insights about what happened. So they supplemented their own recollections by what they heard elsewhere. The result becomes their recollections of today. Concerning my informants, the extent of their testimony before me depended on the value that they gave to my research and hence on what they decided to tell me. It depended also, I assume, on the context during which the interview took place.

Indeed, I started to collect interviews in April 2007. This coincided with the time during which the Gacaca tribunals trials were taking place in the whole country, for they had started in July 2006, after the phase of collection of information on acts of genocide since January 2005.² This contemporaneity may have impacted on the content of my research,

especially with regard to the perpetrators who may have thought that I was part of the
government and that they had to tell me almost the same version they told to the *Gacaca*
courts. This, I assume again, may have created a certain bias in my accounts, a bias which
may be assessed after a certain distance in time.

So far, the information collected about genocide can at best be considered as the product
of negotiation between state, civil society (especially Churches and Human Rights
organisations) and individuals. It is a negotiated or mediated truth; it is in this regard the
product of truth regimes.\(^3\) It is also a truth closely related to confession at least from the
perspective of perpetrators\(^4\), or related to memory recovery or justice reparation for the
survivors. However, this truth is of value, and must not be dismissed, given that it is one
sort of truth, and, above all, because it is the product of these complex relations and
interests.

This chapter is shaped along seven key sections: the action that triggered the beginning of
mass killings of Tutsi, how the genocide unfolded in the bulk of sectors of Gishamvu, the
second phase of killings that occurred in May and June 1994, the Hutu-Hutu violence
following the Tutsi genocide, the rescue practices, the victims and the perpetrators.

**6.1. HOW GENOCIDE STARTED IN GISIVAMVU**

The shooting of the Presidential plane on the night of 6 April 1994 that heralded the
genocide against the Tutsi in several parts of the country did not produce the same effect
in Gishamvu immediately. That news was heard in Gishamvu via radio. It produced at
first insecurity and uncertainty in Gishamvu as elsewhere, but it was a combination of
political decisions and actions, both nationally and locally, that brought the genocide into
Gishamvu some two weeks later.

\(^3\) Premesh Lalu, *The Deaths of Hintsa. Postapartheid South Africa and the shape of recurring pasts*, Cape
Town, Human Sciences Research Council, 2009, pp. 5, 7 and 9; Mamadou Diouf, “Des Historiens et des
histoires, pour quoi faire? L'Histoire africaine entre l'Etat et les communautés”, *Revue Canadienne des

For instance, in the minutes of the Security Council of the Gishamvu Commune of 11 April 1994, the Burgomaster and the Security Council of the commune decided to follow recommendations from the central government heard on the national radio and in Prefecture security meetings: these were the ban on gatherings of people, and the closing of cabarets and markets from 7 April. In addition, the Burgomaster urged the Councillors to be close to the population during those difficult times and urged them to fight rumours. In particular, he asked them to organise meetings with their populations, because in those days the Councillors were organizing meetings, but their constituents allegedly were not attending them. Gabriel Murara, head of MDR party, said: “I realize that the way some people welcomed and interpreted the death of the President of the country can cause insecurity. Some showed happiness, while others were saddened by this event. That caused a bad climate in the population.” The Councillor of Gishamvu Sector, Célestin Kubwimana, alias Cyuma, agreed with him and mentioned the fact that the populations were divided. He illustrated that misunderstanding by the fact that some persons such as François Nkurunziza (Inspector of Judiciary Police), Athanase Kumuyange, Silas Murekezi and Kinyata moved from their homes and went to seek protection at the home of a businessman called François Mukimbiri. Cyuma said that that movement caused insecurity because those people created factions. But Mukimbiri denied that those people were sleeping at his home. Another person, Sebujangwe, argued that in Gishamvu there were factions of Hutu and Tutsi, but that those factions were not always geared towards bad purposes. The Subprefect and the Burgomaster asked people not to divide themselves ethnically. This shows that until 11 April, the Burgomaster and the Subprefect were moderate in that they followed the line of the Butare Prefect, Jean Baptiste Habyarimana. They also decided not to close bars during the day since it was not creating insecurity. They also decided to continue to have Wednesday and Sunday markets in Busoro so that people could have a place to buy and sell goods. Because some people had started to look after themselves by organising night patrols, the Security Council found that that was not bad, but decided that the patrols should not be made of people of one ethnic group, they had to be mixed, in order not to become a “bad” group. Those involved in the patrols also had to inform the Councillor, who would in turn report to the Commune office about their
patrol activities. This shows that to start with, the patrols were an initiative of the population itself and did not arise from an order coming from above. But it was closely monitored by local leaders. It definitely became a state obligation from 19 April onward.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, genocide in the Butare Prefecture came later. It followed the dismissal of the Butare Prefect, Jean Baptiste Habyarimana, on 19 April 1994. This Prefect had been able to prevent the escalation of Tutsi massacres in his prefecture thanks to his charisma and to his close collaboration with the majority of Burgomasters and with military and police officers. With the exception of Runyinya and Nyakizu Communes where Burgomasters disobeyed his orders and initiated large scale Tutsi massacres before the 19th of April, all other parts of the Butare Prefecture remained relatively peaceful.

As for the action that triggered the genocide in Gishamvu, informants from Gishamvu understand or reconstruct the beginning of genocide in two ways. First, there is a view that it came from above, from the agents of central power: that President Sindikubwabo came to initiate the killings in their commune. Second, there is a view that it came from below or through the agency of the population: how the arrival of displaced people from Gikongoro Prefecture, Runyinya Commune and Nyakizu Commune informed the Gishamvu people that elsewhere the Tutsi genocide had started, a situation which also triggered the start of genocide in Gishamvu. But these two versions are not conflicting, they are complementary, since both occurred.

Concerning the view that it came from above, genocide was initiated by the arrival of President Sindikubwabo in Gishamvu. He came there on Thursday, 21 April 1994, afternoon, and met with local authorities (the Subprefect Assiel Simbarikure, the Burgomaster Pascal Kambanda and Councillors) at the office of the Subprefecture in Busoro, in Gishamvu. He was coming from Ndora Commune. A policeman from

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Gishamvu pointed out that it was from that meeting that the order to kill the Tutsi came. In another afternoon, the Subprefect and the Burgomaster spread the message of killing the Tutsi in the whole commune territory, one leader circulating at one side of the commune with a megaphone, another at another side, also with a megaphone. Two days before, the President Sindikubwabo had said that the Tutsi who had fled to Nyumba parish were “heavily armed,” a statement that presented them as a threat.

Some Gishamvu people, especially those who lived near the Commune office, either saw the Presidential cars passing by, or heard immediately about that visit. But no ordinary people attended that meeting. What told the population that that meeting was incendiary is that it was followed by the schedule of tracking down the Tutsi, of assembling them and of killing them. As André Guichaoua wrote, Gishamvu became one of the communes in which the order to start the Tutsi genocide was immediately implemented, given that the Prime Minister of the genocide government, Jean Kambanda, was from Gishamvu.

Three other informants note a tactic that provoked the genocide in Gishamvu. They say that certain local leaders brought a number of corpses allegedly of Hutu persons and explained that they had been killed by the Tutsi. One informant said that those dead persons were from the Butare University, another that they were from the north of the country. These corpses were put on the tar road that passes through Gishamvu and goes to Burundi, precisely near the Ikibuye cya Shali. This tactic presented the Tutsi as the potential killers of the Hutu and advocated that the Hutu defend themselves by killing the

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9 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
10 Interview with Gérard Segatashya, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
11 André Guichaoua, *Rwanda 1994*, p. 260. Jean Kambanda was born on 19 October 1955 (or 1956) in Gishamvu commune, Mubumbano Sector. He had been Commercial Engineer of Popular Banks of Rwanda in Kigali and Head of MDR party in Butare Prefecture in 1993. He became Prime Minister of the Interim Government that implemented the Tutsi genocide.
Tutsi. In addition to these corpses and to the explanations \textit{ad hoc}, there was a rumour saying that every rich Tutsi person had a grenade.\textsuperscript{12}

Another explanation concerning how genocide started in Gishamvu is given by Joseph Kubwimana, who accuses Laurent Kubwimana, who was Subprefect in Butare Prefecture but lived in Gishamvu, of giving 6,000 Rwandan Francs to two people in order to kill a Tutsi peasant that he had brought to them. This informant says that this was the act that heralded other killings in Gishamvu. He also adds that this act happened in Mukuge Sector and that he heard about it in the \textit{Gacaca} jurisdictions trials.\textsuperscript{13}

Concerning the view that it started from below, informants understand the beginning of genocide from the sequence of events. First, there were Tutsi displaced people who came from areas where the genocide had started just after the shooting of the President Habyarimana’s plane. They came from Gikongoro Prefecture, from Runyinya Commune of Butare and from Nyakizu Commune of Butare as well. As they arrived, they sought refuge in the Nyumba parish and at the Nyakibanda Great Seminary. As they were passing along the roads of sectors of Gishamvu Commune, some people started to loot the property and livestock which they had brought with them.\textsuperscript{14} In the security meeting of 11 April 1994 noted above, we do not hear anything about the displaced people from Nyaruguru at that date. That means that they came later, maybe towards or after the 15 April. As Alison Des Forges suggests, large-scale killings began in Cyahinda (Nyakizu) on 15 April 1994.\textsuperscript{15} But the report of African Rights maintains that already by 10 April, certain displaced people coming from Gikongoro had arrived in Gishamvu.\textsuperscript{16}

Some Gishamvu people were asking them why they were fleeing; they answered that they were fleeing people who were wearing plastic bags on their heads and who were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007; Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007 and Interview with Léopold Hategekimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 13, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. See also African Rights, \textit{The History of the genocide}, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{16} African Rights, \textit{The History of the genocide}, p. 7.
\end{itemize}
burning houses. Indeed, the smoke from the burned houses from the Nyaruguru area (Nyakizu, Runyinya and some parts of Gikongoro) were seen in the sky from Gishamvu hills.

Dative Kandanga, my informant, who was from Gikongoro, tries to explain the meaning of the plastic bags. In her view, plastic bags were like an imitation of guns or explosives: “It is the ordinary citizens who became Interahamwe. There were a number of young men who had been trained to use guns. Others had closed plastic bags that frighten, they put air in them, they go on top of a big hill, and they burst them. Then those [Tutsi] who fight back get afraid saying ‘guns are coming.’ Then some flee.” This mention of plastic bags is widespread in accounts of both informants of Gishamvu and Kibayi.

6.2. GENOCIDE IN SECTORS OF GISHAMVU COMMUNE

6.2.1. Genocide in Gishamvu and Nyakibanda Sectors

Perhaps the main sectors to have witnessed extreme mass murder on their territories more than other sectors of Gishamvu are the Gishamvu and Nyakibanda Sectors, because not only Tutsi inhabitants from there died there, but even other Tutsi from other sectors and communes died there too. The way genocide started in Gishamvu Sector shows that though mobilisation for hatred against the Tutsi had been carried out some time before (see chapter five), the overt order to kill the Tutsi came slowly and gradually as the genocide was starting in the whole commune, i.e., after 20 or 21 April 1994.

The Tutsi from Gikongoro, Runyinya and Nyakizu were the first to gather at public places such as Nyakibanda, Nyumba, Ibisí mountain and Bitare hill. Célestin Karemera thinks that the Tutsi from Gikongoro chose to come to Gishamvu because they expected help or protection from a Roman Catholic priest who was working there and who originated from their place:

18 Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
19 Interview with Dative Kandanga, Butare, 09 September 2005.
At first, the Tutsi in flight started to hide here at Nyumba. They chose here because they were coming to look for a priest called Gakwandi who originated from Kibeho [Gikongoro]. When they came, as they were thousands, he could not have the means of settling them. They came and spent here a week, then things became also bad here. Then the people from here also fled and went there. As for me, as I worked for those priests [at the Nyumba parish], I tried to help many people by bringing them water. When water was destroyed, I went to search for water far, and hid the jerrycan in grass because it was not allowed to help the Tutsi.20

Marie Ntawuyirushintege also points out that she went to Nyakibanda to give food to Tutsi that she knew, and stopped doing so when the leaders forbade the Hutu people to help the Tutsi.

Laurentine Nyirakanani, from Muboni Cell of Gishamvu Sector, narrates how the genocide started in her area. She mentions a number of attacks of unequal strength:

People wearing plastic bags threw stones at us, so the Hutu and the Tutsi came along to defend themselves from those stones. They then identified three persons among those who were attacking them, and caught them. Those three persons were from Gikunzi. They took them to the Commune office, they submitted them to the Police. Then, the Commune employees on duty told them to go back home and promised to punish the three people. Those populations went back home. The following day, another attack was made on the Muboni people. This attack was much stronger. Again the Hutu and the Tutsi went to stop that attack. Then they fought, the cell authorities went to tell the Commune authorities how they were attacked once more. What made them deceived is the fact that the then Burgomaster, Kambanda, told them to go back and defend themselves and if they were unable, it was their business. They went back home. Among those cell authorities, there were some Tutsi.21

A day after this second attack, the Muboni people underwent a much stronger attack, as Laurentine Nyirakanani pursues the story. They went back again to the Commune office to report the attack, but found the driver of the Burgomaster, called Evarite Gatabazi. This one “told them to go back home, saying that those people [the attacked ones] had killed Habyarimana [President]”. That is when Hutu and the Tutsi people of Muboni decided to pack things and go to the Nyumba parish to seek refuge. Some remained in the

20 Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007.
21 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
roads, others went up to the hill Ibisyi bya Nyakibanda. At first the Tutsi and the Hutu fled together. Then Councillor of Gishamvu Sector, Cyuma, asked the Hutu to go back home and explained to them that they were not targeted. But some few Hutu refused to separate from the Tutsi.22

The way the Tutsi people from Gishamvu and Nyakibanda Sectors fled to public places (Nyumba and Nyakibanda) is diverse. Some went there from their own initiative after they saw that the Tutsi from other communes such as Nyakizu, Runyinya and Gikongoro had fled to those places. Some others were chased from their houses by certain Hutu assailants and were obliged to join their fellow Tutsi at public assembly places. Some went to Nyumba and Nyakibanda, but some others climbed on top of the Ibisyi Mountain. According to Nyirakanani, a soldier went to shoot them on the Ibisyi mountain, but he was immobilised and disarmed by Tutsi and killed afterwards. “After killing him, other people phoned to Butare to call many soldiers saying that the Tutsi have started to kill Hutus. That is when the Tutsi got afraid and all ran to the Seminary”23 and probably to Nyumba. According to Rusanganwa, the soldier shot the group of Tutsi who were on top of the Ibisyi Mountain because they refused to descend from the hill with their cattle and join the other displaced people.24

The account of Munyankindi, who was among the displaced people at Ibisyi Mountain corroborates the statements of Nyirakanani and Rusanganwa:

There were the military, there were policemen, then they came at our place, it is the military from Butare who came up there to our place in the Ibisyi mountain to make us descend. There is one military that we killed, that is the reason why they came to make us come down. We had fought first. We were using stones. Then they defeated us, they made us descend, that is how we came here in the Seminary. The ones who brought themselves here were actually being killed even on their way, but us we came here [Nyakibanda Seminary and Nyumba] by force.25

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22 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007 ; Interview with Anonymous 14, Gishamvu, 30 April, 2007
23 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
24 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
The killing of a soldier and the moving of the Tutsi to public gathering places is also narrated by Anonymous 13:

All the Tutsi of Janja [Nyahibanda Sector] on 17 April took the decision to flee. They went to the Ibis mountain. On the 19th, a problem occurred from the soldiers who were stationed at Kadahokwa. The soldiers went up to shoot at them. But, as I heard this story, it seems that there was a soldier who was from Kigali, and who came with his wife who is from Vumbi [near Gishamvu]. Then the Hutu from Vumbi lied to that soldier ‘that the enemy is up there at the Ibis hill, we see that he is more powerful than us, he will come to attack us.’ They lied to him, then he went there, when he arrived there he shot, fired, then the gun got broken. The Tutsi young men ran after him, caught him and killed him. After killing him, the Hutu of Vumbi went to seek reinforcement from the soldiers from Kadahokwa. There was their detachment there. That is when they went to the Ibis mountain, scattered the Tutsi, they fired on them, the ones who survived then came to the Seminary, all of them.26

Another informant from Nyakibanda Sector gives an additional version of the same action of going to Nyakibanda Seminary:

A day after the death of Habyarimana, people from Nyakibanda, from Gikongoro, fled to Ibis. Others were in the Seminary. At 15:00 [on a certain day], two young men, Raphael Habanabashaka and Pascal Mutangana, came to tell the military who were working at the Electrogaz station of Kadahokwa that ‘the people from Ibis will descend on us and kill us.’ […] Pascal was a reservist soldier, he had a gun that the commune had given him. He took it and together with the military, they climbed the Ibis. Then they went there and started to shoot. As we were at home, we saw people from Ibis descending and going to the Seminary. On their way, the population who had witnessed it started to loot their belongings. By fleeing in the Seminary, they thought the situation will be like before [in 1960]. They thought they will come back home, just like others went back home. That is why they fled towards the Seminary.27

Another technique of instilling the Tutsi to leave their homes was to burn their houses so that they could have no other option than to join other Tutsi at mass gathering places.28

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26 Interview with Anonymous 13, Gishamvu, 30 April, 2007.
27 Interview with Augustin Gakuru, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
28 Interview with Marie Ntawuyirusintege, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
As for the mass killings that occurred at Nyumba and Nyakibanda, it can be summed up in the following activities or steps: the gathering of Tutsi at one place; the first attack made by other populations against the Tutsi, which became a failure; the closing of water supply and stopping food sold or given to Tutsi; the calling of reinforcements from other communes by the Subprefect and the Burgomaster; the second attack which became a success (from the perpetrators’ perspective); the massacre; a few escape at night or after days of being among the corpses; then a day of burying corpses using a caterpillar and other means.

As seen above, after the meeting of 11 April, roadblocks and daily and nightly patrols were mounted by the population. The report of African Rights on Tutsi genocide in Gishamvu Sector informs us that the Tutsi from elsewhere were moving freely in the Gishamvu territory since they arrived (either after the 10th or 15th of April), seeking food or drinks. But after the visit of President Sindikubwabo, the Councillor Cyuma forbade them to move anymore. They had to stay in the premises of the Nyumba parish or the Nyakibanda seminary. Cyuma forbade those who were selling food to refugees to continue selling them “in order to starve them so that they wouldn’t be able to put up any kind of resistance”.29

Thereafter, the Councillor spread the message of killing the Tutsi, first to the Cell Committee members of his sector, then to the population. In one meeting with the population, the Councillor gave the order to burn first the houses of the Tutsi so that they could flee to public gathering places. The Agronomist Aloys Sibomana, who was Executive Secretary of PSD party, was also together with Cyuma, a sign that he had joined the “Power or pawa”, i.e., extremist faction. Then the action of burning followed. Here is how it was made:

The work started at 6:30 a.m. [of Friday, 22 April 1994]. There was a massive response to this invitation from the young, strong people as well as the residents from the three cellules of Gishamvu sector. Young people from Gikunzi sector, Kibo [sic: Kibu] cellule, were also present at the meeting. Before burning the houses we had to check inside to see if there was anything that

had been abandoned there by the owner. Tables, chairs and household utensils were carried off by people. They set fire to the whole of the Gashyankingi [sic: Gasyankingi] hill; at least 50 houses were burnt. Afterwards, in order to soothe our tiredness, we held a handicapped man François Mukimbiri, to ransom for the sum of 10,000 francs. He was a Tutsi from Gishamvu cellule who was rich and had a lot of money. Damascène Ruzibiza collected the money; we quenched our thirst. Ruzibiza is currently held in Gishamvu commune detention centre. Once that entertainment was over, the councillor thanked us for the task we’d accomplished and told us that we still had the job of clearing the Tutsi refugees out of the seminary and Nyumba parish. Instructions were given and another meeting was fixed for the next day.  

That next day was Saturday, 23 April. On the morning of that day, the population gathered near the Nyumba primary school. The policemen who had guns shot and killed a few people. Then the population threw stones at Tutsi who were there, but the resistance of the latter made the attackers withdraw. Sunday became the day of gathering reinforcements from the population, police and leaders from the whole Gishamvu Commune, from neighbouring communes such as Runyinya, Nyakizu and Kigembe and of ammunition coming from Butare Prefecture. Then Monday 25 April became the day of a large scale massacre.

The meeting of the population led by the Councillor Cyuma occurred on Sunday, 24 April. It is confirmed by my informant Nyirakanani who says that her husband attended it. She adds that the agenda was top secret, but that this meeting was followed by the attack against Nyumba and Nyakibanda Tutsi.

Monday, 25 April 1994 was indeed a fatal or decisive day. In the morning of that day, answering the call of local leaders, the inhabitants coming from all corners of the commune territory arrived at the Commune office located at Nyumba. Afterwards, cars

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33 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
34 Nevertheless, the Tutsi genocide is commemorated in Gishamvu on the 20 April, according to a conversation I had with the now Executive Secretary of Gishamvu Sector, Joseph Kagabo, on 19 April 2007.
bringing policemen and people from the neighbouring Kigembe commune also arrived there.

The courtyard of Gishamvu commune was filled with a vast crowd ready to launch the assault. The bourgmestre and the councilor told us: “The job now is to kill all the Tutsi refugees at Nyumba parish and at Nyakibanda seminary.” The crowd clapped, and we set off as fast as we could, shouting and singing. Once we got near the primary school we divided ourselves into two groups. The first group stayed by the primary school and Nyumba parish, while the second headed towards the seminary. Frightened by the shouting and the commotion, some refugees had crammed into the classrooms and locked the doors. Those who were in the courtyard were the first to be lynched. In order to be able to execute the people in the classrooms we had quite a difficult task because we had to go and get pickaxes to break the doors down. This was done both at Nyumba parish and at the seminary. The soldiers and policemen used their guns, while the others who had knives were on the lookout for people trying to escape. The massacre started at 9:00 a.m. and was finished by about 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. After this slaughter, the strong returned with their spoils: cows, goats, doors, windows and other things of value. The people of Kigembe went back to their houses drunk with joy at having carried off so many things. The corpses were scattered all over. The sites of the massacres were real bloodbaths. On the Tuesday morning, the people from Kigembe came back to put the finishing touches to their gruesome plan. No gunshots were heard that day as their objective was to finish off the people who were still alive in the midst of all the corpses, and to loot property again like they had the previous day. The Tutsis who were struggling under all the human remains were automatically killed with knives.35

Anonymous 14 also talks about the first and second days of attack, maybe the Saturday 23 April and Monday 25 April:

…the population went and started to throw stones to the displaced who were at Nyumba. The latter also resisted. They threw stones at them, then they took the same stones and threw them back at the attackers. The attackers let them, returned home. In the next day morning, they came back again. When they came back they were not alone, people from Nyakizu came, Kigembe came, and elsewhere, they came sitting in cars, wearing hats, carrying weapons. They came, threw stones here [Nyumba], they killed them […] They massacred them until they finished them.36

The above account of African Rights makes it clear that the massacre continued again on Tuesday, 26 April. One of my informants from Nyakibanda Sector makes a

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36 Interview with Anonymous 14, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
reconstruction of what happened in Nyakibanda. He mentions two days of attacks, the second being more fatal, just as the account of African Rights and Anonymous 14 suggested. But his dates are different from the ones of African Rights’ report, a sign that it is hard to identify precise dates in oral narratives, even for a period that is not very ancient:

Many Tutsi arrived at Nyakibanda, even the ones who were hiding at my home told me that they were going to Nyakibanda. Because allegedly in 1959, people fled there and survived in the church. I told them ‘please let me seek for you a way of going to Burundi via Nyaruhengeri, because I had an uncle who had been a leader there, I hoped that he could help us find the path to Burundi.’ They fled to Nyakibanda. The Hutu followed them there. The Hutu became weak, they realised that their strength was not enough to attack them. Then, the existing power structure, that is when I can blame Kambanda [Burgomaster], the existing rulers who had done a good thing before of availing a policeman to guard those displaced, went to seek support from the policemen from Kigembe. They came with grenades, guns… They are the ones who started to shoot the displaced. They shot the whole day of 21 April until evening. At midnight a child from the people who had hidden at my home and who decided to go to Nyakibanda, together with other four persons came back at my home and told me that the rest of their family members were exterminated. On the 22, the police of Kigembe and Gishamvu together, resumed again the firing. That is where I condemn Kambanda, because if he wanted, he could advise those displaced to flee just like the ones of Sheke had gone to Burundi earlier. Here it was near the border. If you did that small gesture in secret, no central rulers could know about it. […] In Nyakibanda Sector, the majority were Hutu. But in particular the cell of Nyakibanda had a small quarter having around 50 Tutsi families. They were only Tutsi, no one else lived with them. […] Many people died there. […] It makes me sad when I pass there. Unfortunately, it is there that people accuse me of having killed people.37

Murindwa was among the Tutsi victims of Nyumba. He fled five days after the 24 April massacre. He camouflaged himself among the corpses and was able to flee only on 29 April: “There were many displaced people there at Nyumba parish. They were finished towards the 24th April. I was in the church. Me I left that place on the 29 April. I crossed

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37 Interview with Anonymous 13, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. Concerning the role of this informant in the genocide, he says that he looted “only” a motorbike, a cow, a sofa in Musange, and 100 tiles from a Tutsi family’s house, and because people died where he looted at Musange, although he did not kill there, as he says, he pleads guilty for not having rescued them there. But he rejects the killing crime, though he is accused to have participated in the killing of Tutsi in Janja. He was in prison at the time of the interview.
dead bodies, I bathed the blood of the dead, then on the 29th I left. For God’s help I fled and reached Burundi. [...] The Tutsi people of Gishamvu were a lot.”

Godeberthe Mukagitoli who was from Muboni cell of Gishamvu says that her family, that is, her mother, brothers and sisters, were killed at Nyumba parish. Justin Munyankindi lost his wife and children at the Nyakibanda Seminary. His only son who survived is the one who was in Kigali during the genocide.

Joseph Rwandanga who took part in the killings at Nyumba narrates:

The displaced people were here in Nyumba Parish, in classrooms, in the church, in the celebration area. There were the policemen. The councillors and the cell responsibles called the ibyitso [accomplices] to come and participate in the killings. I understood that I was among those called. I took my arc and bows and went to shoot at the church.

The use of “traditional” weapons such as bows, arrows and spears was widespread during the genocide. It was mostly used by older people who had once learned how to use them.

The African Rights report calculates that Tutsi victims were more than 3,000 in those major sites: Nyakibanda Seminary, Nyumba Parish and Nyumba primary school. As corpses were scattered everywhere between Nyakibanda and Nyumba and rain was falling heavily, corpses started to decompose. Commune officials ordered to cell leaders to order the population to bury the dead, but the population refused since it was hard. The Councillor, the Burgomaster, some businessmen and a priest from Nyakibanda, Thaddée Rusingizandekwe, paid people to remove corpses from Nyumba and Nyakibanda. The Red Cross was called in, worked but also failed to finish the cleaning. The Subprefect Simbarikure and the Burgomaster Kambanda went to Karubanda prison in Butare to seek the help from prisoners to come do that job, but these also failed to finish it. Finally, a

38 Interview with Evariste Murindwa, Gishamvu, 24 March 2006.
40 Interview with Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
41 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April, 2007.
“Caterpillar” bulldozer came from Butare to do the cleaning. It allegedly did that job for three days.43

In addition to Nyumba and Nyakibanda, the Gasyankingi hill located in the Gishamvu Sector and Mirambi are said to have registered also large-scale massacres but to an unequal degree:

There in our Gishamvu Sector, there is one part in which genocide became harsh. It is the part of the hill where the smiths are located. That place is called mu Kabuga, close to the house of Mukimbiri, at the workshop of the smiths, that is where the killings were harsh. Many people died there. In another part of the hill, called mu Mirambi, there were less killings. The ones who died there, at the top of the hill are the ones who were fleeing there and who came from Nyumba and Nyakibanda and who were attempting to flee and go to Burundi. Then when they arrived at Mirambi, people stopped them and told them to remain there. They remained there. Towards the end of the night at the eve, policemen came, they are the ones who exterminated them using guns. […] It is the police who killed them, it is not the population.44

According to African Rights, at the place called mu Birambi of Gishamvu cell, which probably is the Mirambi mentioned above, an estimated 200 to 300 people lost their lives as they were fleeing from the bigger sites of Nyakibanda and Nyumba. Unlike what is said by the above informant, they are said to have been killed by both the policemen and the population, and then buried in latrines and mass graves.45

After the Nyumba massacre, some few Tutsi had gone to hide in nearby sorghum fields. According to Vincent Nsengimana, those caught there were taken out, killed and then thrown in the toilet pit that once belonged to the Tutsi businessman François Mukimbiri.46 For example, Kamuyumbo lost a lot of his children and family members at

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44 Interview with Léopold Muremangando, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
46 Interview with Vincent Nsengimana, Gishamvu, 24 March 2006.
the hill of Gasyankingi who were thrown in the toilet pit of François Mukimbiri’s house as well.47

My informant Vuguziga also lost her husband and son at the hill of Gasyankingi. They were killed in an igitero (killing mob attack), but she mentions three names of perpetrators: Ntacyonayigize, Gafaranga, and Mugarura. She also mentions other names already contained in the African Rights report.48

6.2.2. Genocide in Sholi Sector

The Gishamvu Sector seems to have welcomed or undergone the violence order a bit earlier than the Sholi Sector. According to the informant Elias Karengera, it is after the inhabitants of Sholi saw some houses from Muboni Cell of Gishamvu Sector burning, that the Councillor of Sholi, John Ushizimpumu, told his constituents to go to mount a patrol at the Sholi hill: “We stood there all the ethnic groups […] Then he ordered old people to go back home. We went back home.”49

But when the order to kill the Tutsi reached the Sholi Sector, the Councillor Ushizimpumu seems to have joined the killing machine with enthusiasm. As one survivor explains, Ushizimpumu chose to move the Tutsi of his sector to Nyakibanda Seminary:

Then the Councillor Ushizimpumu John of Sholi told some policemen who were former military to chase out the people and to direct them toward Nyakibanda, saying that they cannot shoot at people one by one, saying that the one who refuses to go is the one you will shoot there. Then they collected us and brought us to Nyakibanda. Those who were killed on the way were few. When we arrived at Nyakibanda, people were already a lot.50

Among high profile organisers of killings against Tutsi from Sholi, Augustin Sezibera is mentioned. His role seems to have been the going to Butare town to bring weapons such

47 Interview with Consesa Kamuyumbo, Gishamvu, 24 March 2006.
48 Interview with Christine Vuguziga, Gishamvu, 24 March 2006.
49 Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 30 April, 2007.
50 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
as machetes. He was from Sholi Sector, but he taught at the Primary school of Mubumbano Sector of Gishamvu. During multiparty system, he was the head of MDR in Gishamvu in 1991. That means that he had joined the “Power” faction at the time of genocide.

According to Marc Rusanganwa, many Tutsi of Sholi were killed at Nyakibanda seminary. He is among those who sought refuge at Nyakibanda Seminary. Him and his nephew called Butoya left Nyakibanda amid the shootings by killers. They had spent only two days there, the day during which they arrived there and the other during which they left. They crossed Busoro and were attacked by Busoro people but they did not know them since they did not live at that area. Then they continued until Burundi.

But the accounts of Emerite Kubwimana, bystander, and Augustin Bucyabutata, survivor, stress that a number of killings of Tutsi occurred on the territory of Sholi Sector as well. They talk about the people from Cyambwe going to kill Tutsi people living on Sholi hill and the ones from Sholi going to kill Tutsi of Cyambwe.

6.2.3. Genocide in Kibingo and Liba Sectors

The Burgomaster Kambanda is said to have at first stopped violence from entering his commune via the Kibingo border with Kigembe Commune:

Kambanda heard that people from other communes were about to come in his commune to kill people. Then, he organised people to go at Kibingo border with Kigembe to forbid people from entering his area. But afterwards, he changed and compelled people to kill.

It is possible that the time when he compelled the Hutu to kill the Tutsi is after the 19 April 1994 when the genocide policy had been welcomed in the Butare Prefecture, while

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51 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.  
52 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.  
53 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.  
55 Interview with Augustin Gakuru, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
the time when he prevented attacks against the Tutsi can be the time when the Prefect Jean Baptiste Habyarimana was still in charge, i.e., from 6 to 19 April.

A number of Tutsi from Kibingo fled to Nyumba, few of whom escaped and more of whom were killed. Geographically speaking, the Tutsi from Kibingo could have fled as well at Kansi parish located in Nyaruhengeri Commune. This parish was closer than the one of Nyumba. But Léopold Hategekimana explains that the Tutsi of Kibingo were not killed at Kansi parish. They came to Nyumba, because the Burundian refugees who were settling at Rusagara in Nyaruhengeri towards the direction of the Kansi parish did not allow them to cross the way to Kansi parish.56 The account of Ntakaraba stresses that those Tutsi who did not flee to gathering places or to Burundi were killed at the hill, that is, at or near their homes.57 A number of those Burundian refugees are said to have participated as well in the killings of Tutsi in Kibingo.58

Among the hardcore killers in Kibingo, Ntakaraba mentions the sons of Léopold Nyabyenda, the well known person who was very active in the violence against the Tutsi in 1959-1962 but who lived in Liba Sector.59 Hategekimana also mentions that certain killers from Kibingo went to seek reinforcement from neighbouring Liba Sector killers’ mobs.60

Unlike Kibingo Sector, several informants from Liba Sector assert that the Tutsi fled to many places and ultimately the bulk of them got killed. The first informant mentions Kansi Parish as well as paths crossed as places of death:

Many people died after they had fled to Kansi. Liba is near Kansi parish. Others attempted to flee to Burundi, but we cannot know where they died. […] [The ones who were killed at their homes] are few. They died at Kansi and in roads and paths as they were fleeing. They were killing one by one as they saw them on the way fleeing, there were not group or mob attacks, people who died there were not

56 Interview with Léopold Hategekimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
57 Interview with Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
58 Interview with Léopold Hategekimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
59 Interview with Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
60 Interview with Léopold Hategekimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
a lot. [...] Tutsi were killed but also some Hutu who had a nose looking like the one of a Tutsi were also killed.61

The second informant also mentions Kansi Parish but adds that the Tutsi of Liba did not die at Liba: “[The Hutu] were accompanying them until Kansi parish. Most of them died at Kansi. In fact, all of them… but concerning genocide in Liba, the Tutsi of that place did not die at Liba”62 But the third informant asserts clearly that many Tutsi died on Liba territory: “In Liba, the Tutsi fled, the one God rescued survived, others got killed. [A big number of Liba Tutsi] were killed at their hill, a big number. It is the Hutu from parties [who killed them].”63

But in addition to Kansi Parish located in Nyaruhengeri Commune as a gathering place, one other informant says that some Tutsi from Liba fled to other gathering places such Nyumba and Nyakibanda mentioned above: “The Tutsi of Liba died few at Kansi… but most others came to Nyumba and Nyakibanda, where most died.”64

The main supervisor of killings at Liba often mentioned is Tharcisse Gashagaza, who was Director of Nyumba School Centre and prominent MDR member during multiparty system:

At our hill there was a very nasty man called Gashagaza, he was patrolling with his mob, he was a teacher with some high education. […] He was a director at Nyumba. […] He had a section of the people with whom he worked during genocide, that group had many of his family members. […] He is the one who decided who should be killed. […] Another one with less education is John son of Rwatangabo, he worked with Gashagaza. Gashagaza was their chief. […] They had followers because of the money they were giving them, and the drinks, […] they also promised them the *amasambu* [land] of the Tutsi once they are all dead.65

The second account insists on the charismatic power that Gashagaza had gained during these hard times:

61 Interview with Cassien Rwanyange, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
63 Interview with Anonymous 11, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
64 Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
It is the Director of schools at Nyumba called Gashagaza who brought and supervised killings there at Liba. […] At his home there was much livestock. […] People were making fire at his home, they eat and drink. Because Gashagaza was a very bad person, he ironically told some injured people to sit and eat meat before dying. They tortured them. Then the whole Liba people became dirty. They started to chop with machetes and kill that way. Because at their place the Tutsi were not a lot, they attacked other sectors as well and killed. They also looted livestock, money, everything. […] Gashagaza had become like the new leader of the Liba Sector. Because they [the constituents] were no longer obeying the official Liba Councillor. They were obeying that one [Gashagaza].

But another informant includes the Councillor of Liba among the hardcore killers at Liba. He calls him Juliani Maganabiri, but his true name is Julien Munyakayanza. Maybe Maganabiri [literally “two hundred”] is a nickname. According to informant Rwanyange, these hardcore killers had become even more charismatic than parents with their sons.

Another person included on the list of hardcore killers at Liba is a handicapped man, who was a son of Léopold Nyabyenda, the one who had killed the chief Mutembe in 1960 (see chapter two): “Among the leaders of killings in Liba, there is a handicapped man, who also arrived here in Gishamvu to kill, I do not remember his name, but I remember the name of his father, it is Nyabyenda. […] The one who killed Mutembe. You know, there is a hereditary factor in the act of killing: he behaved like his father.” The killers from Liba were considered so ‘courageous’ that they were called to execute killings even elsewhere:

Concerning killers, Kambanda [Burgomaster] was calling the Liba people to come and kill elsewhere because he believed they were very strong… because other people believed they are the ones who are good at doing ‘the job’ […] Didn’t I tell you that they are the ones who killed Mutembe? The Liba people? You understand that they started to be nasty since long time ago.

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66 Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. This pattern of hardcore killers being considered as “leaders” is also found in Kibayi. See following chapter.
68 Interview with Cassien Rwanyange, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
69 Interview with Anonymous 11, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
70 Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. See also Interview with Gaston Nzabamwita, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
This handicapped man is also mentioned in the Kibingo killings of Tutsi as seen above.

6.2.4. Genocide in Gikunzi, Mukuge and Sheke Sectors

a) Genocide in Gikunzi

The reconstruction of Kumuyange, from Gikunzi, informs us that the bulk of the Tutsi living in Gikunzi decided to join those who were in the Gashiru and Bitare hills of Sheke Sector, and that in the process, all decided to go to Burundi. They succeeded in crossing the border peacefully, thanks to favourable circumstances on their way, as Kumuyange explains. As a result, the victims were few:

Until on the 20th when we fled, some local population had not known what was happening. Here the events started on the 20-21st. [...] In Gikunzi, at our hill of Kibu and Munanira that is where the Tutsi were numerous. But the rest of Gikunzi, no Tutsi was there ‘since the beginning of the earth’ as the people used to say. [...] No Tutsi was living in the remaining Gikunzi. We were few [two hills only.] Many Tutsi were in Sheke and Bitare. [...] The majority survived the genocide at our place. If you analyse, at Munanira and Kibu where I live, few people died, such as some elderly who could not flee. [...] We, we fled. [...] We, we made a meeting and advised ourselves to join the Tutsi from Gashiru and Bitare, and then go to Burundi. [...] Fortunately we went and found that the military at the border had left, on the 20th April when we left, we went in peace really. We all went with our cows, even myself I went with my cows until Burundi. [...] Mubumbano, Gishamvu, Liba, etc. were exterminated. [...] We, we fled because we decided not to go to the parishes, because we had been informed that at Cyahinda [Nyakizu Commune] and at Kibeho [Gikongoro Prefecture] massacres had occurred. They killed them even inside churches. That is when we advised ourselves to go to Burundi. The luck we had is that, the ones who fled on the 19th had been shot by the Habyarimana soldiers, then the soldiers from Burundi shot with machine gun to them in Rwanda and then they left. The latter fled and went. Then a news spread saying that the Barundi are about to attack Rwanda in order to save the Tutsi. That is why we crossed peacefully. [...] We left here at 10:00 on the 20th April and arrived in Burundi at 17:00. We went all along the border, we did not pass in bushes.71

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71 Interview with Athanase Kumuyange, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
However, the statistics available suggest that in Gikunzi, victims were slightly more than the half the Tutsi population of that sector. Kumuyange was among those who crossed the border the first day, that is, Wednesday, 20 April 1994. As we shall see for other survivors, there is another group of those who crossed on April, the 21 April 1994. The 20th and the 21st April seem most reliable dates for those two departures. See for example the following account of Christophe Batura, who also survived from Gikunzi by joining the Sheke group:

We departed on the 19th [...] Wednesday, at 9:00 and arrived in Burundi at 17:00. [...] We were very exhausted; we found a tree which served as a roadblock at the border. A small girl said: ‘This tree is not a person”, and went to remove it and threw it in the Kanyaru river, and we crossed. Children are heroes, God speaks through them. That girl is my daughter; her name is Rose. [...] We crossed, and the Burundi people welcomed us very well.

This informant also corroborates the explanation of Athanase Kumuyange about the Tutsi from Gikunzi Sector who joined those from Sheke in order to cross together, but he adds that some other Tutsi from Mukuge Sector and even Nyakizu and Runyinya Communes were part of this group. There were also the Tutsi from Gikongoro who had fled to Gishamvu and who had stopped at Bitare and Gashiru hills.

According to Christophe Batura, there are around a hundred victims who died in Gikunzi at a place called Gisenyi. It is those that the killers met there before they could flee. In Kirwa, where he lived, he says the victims numbered fifteen. Ananias Kabandana and Kanamugire are mentioned as hardcore killers in Gishamvu. Justin Nsengimana and Ndutiye are considered as those who instilled the Hutu to participate in the genocide against the Tutsi. Perhaps it is indispensable to remind ourselves who Dr. Justin Nsengimana was, since some archival documents mention him. Dr. Justin Nsengimana had been very influential in Gishamvu politics. He was a medical doctor, working at the

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72 See infra.
73 According to the Calendar of April 1994, Wednesday was 20 April.
74 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
75 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
76 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
77 Interview with Célestin Bangambiki, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007.
78 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
University Hospital of Butare. He had also been President of the Technical Commission of the Gishamvu Commune. In 1975, he was on the list of Gishamvu inhabitants who were studying at university level in Germany. He was the son of Jean Nyambwana, who had been a teacher and member of the Commune Committee in 1975.

b) Genocide in Mukuge

In order to understand what happened in Mukuge Sector, I talked to three informants. To begin with, Anonymous 5 is among the Tutsi from Mukuge who survived by joining the Gashiru group. He is among those who crossed on Thursday, 21 April 1994. Here is how he narrates their exodus and trajectory as well as the fate of those who did not go:

… the cell members are the ones who ordered the Tutsi to go and join others. [Some went to the church and the seminary,] others went to Bitare and Gashiru. They spent there about two weeks. They met with the others who came from Nyaruguru. Then one day they took the decision to flee in group. They were a huge group. They passed at Kigembe, Murama, Ngera, Ngoma and Kayonza, [Kigembe commune] they continued the whole tar road, then crossed the border and went to Burundi. They went in three sets. They were so numerous. The people in the road were unable to do anything bad to them, since they were a lot. That is how it happened. […] Me I was in the second set, no the third. Because they fled on Wednesday, the date was 20 April 1994, me I went on the 21 April. They were afraid of them because they had also weapons such as bows, spears, they said: ‘Just go, just proceed, God has sacrificed you, wherever you go you will die.’ That is how it happened. […] The one who stayed alone such as the elderly, the sick, they were killed, no one arrived in Burundi.

On the other hand, the account of Kanamugire shows how the Tutsi organised themselves at Bitare and how they concluded they should go to Burundi. This reference shows that their choices were inspired by their experiences of the early 1960s:

80 Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Gishamvu, Lettre au Ministre de l’Education Nationale, Kigali, Objet: Liste des étudiants Rwandais, Réf. : n° 268/03.09.01/9, date not clear, letter answering the one of 19 May 1976.
81 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Report to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture concerning the election of Commune organs on 21 December 1975, Ref.: No. 538/03.09.01/7, Gishamvu, 29 December 1975.
82 Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
In 1960, we [some Tutsi from Mukuge] had fled to Bitare and Gashiru and resisted successfully. Then we imitated the 1960 scenario and went to Bitare again. Once at Bitare, we made a meeting, then we realised that this time we will be exterminated. Then we decided to go to Burundi. We took weapons, livestock, and other important stuff. Then we resisted against some who were on our way.83

He was among those who left on Wednesday. According to him, the second group went on Thursday. They gave some cows to people who wanted to attack them. They also showed grenades to the military that they met, so that they would not attack them. According to Kanamugire, there were some Tutsi youths from Nyaruguru with twelve guns and six grenades in the group. But he is the only one to provide this information. He says that it was a secret: those Tutsi young military did not want to tell everybody that they had guns, but they were protecting them. Just in case of a serious attack, they could intervene.84

The next informant, Kanyamugenga, starts his account with an explanation of the reason why the Tutsi decided to flee into parishes. Their choice is also inspired by the 1960s experiences just as the previous choice of going to Bitare as stressed above: “Long time ago people were fleeing to parishes and survived. No one died there. [...] As you understand, even now they said to themselves: ‘Let us flee to the parishes, no one was killed there, so even now we will not have any problem.”85

Then Kanyamugenga goes on narrating how he went to keep his belongings at the Nyakibanda Seminary where he worked before, then how he went home to collect his family and extended family which had gathered at his home because it is located near the road, then he brought them to Gashiru. Then he went back home and then went with his son to Busoro market to protect the wife of his son who was about to sell the sorghum beer before they fled. They protected that lady because the previous day the Hutu customers did drink the beer without paying. So the two men were there so that people could pay after drinking. Kanyamugenga says that he was fragile, because a certain

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83 Interview with Vincent Kanamugire, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
84 Interview with Vincent Kanamugire, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
85 Interview with Callixte Kanyamugenga, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
Niyizurugero who was the Inspector of Schools in Gishavu was looking for him in order to kill him, as he narrates. Then Niyizurugero sent five persons to cut him with machetes, on 18 April. From Busoro, he went by foot to Gashiru, crossing dangerous roadblocks, and luckily, he reached Gashiru. On Wednesday, 20 April 1994, people started to flee towards Burundi. The big group went on that date, as Kanyamugenga explains. But he postponed his crossing and did not go in that group because he says that he and his family waited as some food was being cooked for children, so they went in the second group that travelled on Thursday, 21st April. This experience shows to what extent certain people were caring not just about their lives during those hard times, but were also trying to flee with as much material assets as they could. The remainder of his account is about his experience during the crossing:

On Thursday 20th April [sic: 21st April], very early in the morning, we took safari [journey], we went with cows for those who had them, we proceeded with our spears and machetes, people seeing us. They were wearing *ibirere* [banana leaves], they could not do anything, because they were afraid, they saw that we had also weapons. They were only collecting some cow or sheep that was lost away and eating meat. Some however did throw stones at us, others were insulting us. We had departed at 5:00 am, when we arrived at Akanyaru river, we realised that corpses were floating on top of it. We found that the Burundi military have chased away the Rwanda military who were stopping people from crossing the border to flee. They had gone up the hill with their guns and uniforms, they were seeing us crossing. Then we went to Burundi.86

c) Genocide in Sheke

As mentioned above, the bulk of the Tutsi from Gikunzi and Mukuge Sectors survived as a result of joining those from Gashiru and Bitare of Sheke Sector and then all of them decided to go to Burundi before the massacre of Tutsi at Nyumba and Nyakibanda occurred. I have chosen the dates of Saturday 23 April and Monday 25 April for large scale massacres at Nyumba and Nyakibanda, as the report of African Rights (2003) noted. But this same report had also suggested different other dates, such as 20, 21 and 22 April for those same massacres.87 Nevertheless, because the informants from Gikunzi,
Mukuge and Sheke assert to have left on 20 and 21 April and that they left before the killings happened at Nyumba and Nyakibanda, it is more plausible to place those massacres on 23 April and afterwards. Consider for example the following explanation:

The role of Kambanda, at the day of our departure, we departed at around 5:00 am. At 9:00 he had arrived at our place to check where we had assembled, because he had been informed that we had left our houses and that we were together. When he arrived there and found that we had left, he and the soldiers he came with, they got angry. They said: ‘The ones of Nyumba and Nyakibanda should also escape us?’ He immediately left, that is how you hear that they exterminated the people of those places [Nyumba and Nyakibanda]. That is his role in the genocide.\(^88\)

According to my informant Augustin Rugengamanzi, they knew that the Tutsi had been massacred at Nyumba and Nyakibanda only after they had arrived in Burundi.\(^89\)

The decision to go to Burundi – taken by the Bitare and Gashiru Tutsi, together with the Tutsi who came from Gikunzi and Mukuge sectors, as well as from neighbouring communes such as Nyakizu and Runyinya, and even from Gikongoro Prefecture – can be considered as both strategy and luck. It was a strategy because it came from the inspiration of the 1960s’ experience when some Tutsi survived by gathering at the Bitare hill and by resisting their attackers. It was also a strategy, because the Tutsi at those hills of Gashiru and Bitare decided to flee to Burundi after hearing the experiences of Tutsi who had spent some days there and who were from Nyaruguru region (Nyakizu, Runyinya and Gikongoro):

Our decision about embarking [to Burundi] came from what we saw from Nyaruguru. The people from Nyaruguru fled in our direction. They said: ‘We, we fought at Kibeho [located in Gikongoro], at Cyahinda [located in Nyakizu], at Karama [located in Runyinya] [parishes], therefore, any parish you go in, you will be exterminated there. Do you carry a gun with you? Those small bows and arrows are useless. As for us, we are used to marching distances. We proceed our way.’ That is how we also we took the decision to go [to Burundi]. It is a decision we took in order to avoid being killed by those who know us. We preferred to be killed by unknown people.\(^90\)

\(^88\) Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
\(^89\) Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
\(^90\) Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
Alison Des Forges mentions that before the Tutsi gathering at Bitare left, they first underwent attacks from groups of assailants. When these noticed that the Tutsi were resisting successfully, they went to seek reinforcement from the military. This is when the Tutsi of Bitare decided to leave and to take the Burundi destination, as they noticed that it was no longer a simple war but “an extermination”. Des Forges also mentions the date of 20 April 1994 for the departure to Burundi. This explanation shows that the strategy to go to Burundi was guided, not just by past experiences, but also by the conjuncture of present events.

The following account insists more on the strategic agency of local Tutsi “intellectuals” to instil the Tutsi of Sheke to leave, than the inspiration of Tutsi from Nyaruguru region:

The refugees from Gikongoro came to our place earlier. When they go to drink Ikigage [sorghum beer], some people loot them. Then they come to our homes and ask us something to eat, we give them. It was even a bad conjuncture period (i.e., poverty time), but we gave them what we had. When we give them they go, and so on. Then a time arrived when people […] who include Minani [Laurent] […]. They came to advise us, because they used to interact with educated people of the commune, they explained to us how the war has started. And it is a war targeting one ethnic group. The ones coming from Nyaruguru were not narrating to us the situation, they were threatened, they used to come and go in forests and just wait. Then those men [the Minani] infiltrated and then came to inform us that the war is imminent and that we should take weapons and protect our homes. We did not know that we will flee. And then some local authorities who were the councillors came to tell us that there is peace. They came to our homes and convinced us not to flee outside our homes, that peace will prevail. They were coming from Kambanda [Burgomaster] and investigate the situation, after they had attended meetings, then they came to tell us that there was peace and that we should not flee and that we should not imitate the Nyaruguru displaced people. Yet they were planning how they will kill us. After some days, on 19 April 94 they told us that peace prevails, but those intellectuals of ours [the Tutsi] told us that there is no peace, then they advised us to come and flee. We collected some movable things, then we went to a place called Gashiru, we spent a night there. Until morning, nothing bad had happened, then we came back to our homes. In the evening, Minani who was our neighbour came and circulated at all our homes.

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91 Interviews in Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 496.
92 A number of Tutsi teachers in Gishamvu were members of MRND party. As a result, they used to interact with the Burgomaster and the Subprefect easily. In particular, Laurent Minani had been President of MRND party in Sheke Sector (see chapter four), a sector that had a great number of Tutsi population. Yet, MRND was considered as a pro-Hutu party.
and told us ‘anyone who sleeps here and who is not a disabled one, it is his business.’ Minani Laurent was a teacher, he told us to collect some few things and go. No Hutu person advised us to go. Except those who interacted with them. […] Then we packed, we went…

But fortune was also on the side of those victims. Consider for example the following account:

People who prepared themselves to attack Bitare and Gashiru spent their night at Kambanda’s house. Kambanda stopped them from attacking, saying that if they attack, the battle is going to be tough at night. Because they could be injured. ‘Stay here, you will attack tomorrow morning’, the Burgomaster said. That helped us to flee; it was luck from God. When they came in the morning, they found that we were long gone.

Still, the following account, belonging to informant Innocent Nahayo, helps us see the combination of both strategy (or agency) and fortune:

The reason why they survived, they became a big number at Bitare. On the 20 April the authorities wanted to attack, then they changed their minds, it is the councillors who told us that news. They said that they need more help from other areas in order to attack us. Then on the 21 April we remained there, on the 19 April we started our way to Burundi. When we approached people on the way they ran saying those are the Bitare people. Bitare people fled with their cows, those who died were not a lot, few people died such as the ones who were tired of walking, such as the sick. They went and arrived in Burundi. I am one of those. In fact, we split ourselves into two groups because we were a lot. […] I went in the first group. The second came on Thursday. We, we went on Wednesday.

Finally, three informants were able to narrate in a more elaborate manner, how the travel to Burundi by foot went. The first reconstructed both the first day and the second day crossings and showed also the combination of both luck and strategy:

The Prefecture of Butare was ruled by Habyarimana Jean. People hoped that he cannot get involved in those killings. They hoped that as a Prefect he will also oblige the Burgomasters not to embark in killings. Also we hoped that the killings in Gikongoro will not reach Butare, the way even before in 1959, 1963, 1973

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93 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
94 Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
95 Interview with Innocent Nahayo, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
killings were always starting from Gikongoro. But after being informed about the death of Habyarimana Jean Baptiste, we understood that there was no escape. Then the refugees started to flee. We realised that the violence has reached us. The roadblocks were a lot, so it was difficult to cross them and flee. […] The first group of those fleeing fled on the 20 April 1994 in the morning. The perpetrators who wanted to kill them on the way, they threw them a young male cow or a goat. Then they followed that meat and left the people. People also had weapons such as sticks, machetes, so they could also fight. By chance, they did not meet military forces who could easily defeat them. Then they crossed Akanyaru [river]. The following day there was a big group which crossed again. They also were able to arrive in Burundi [21 April]. I was part of that second group which was saved by God and by being a big group.96

The second was a comprehensive account from an informant who was from Bitare, and who was part of those who crossed on the Wednesday 20 April group:

During that time, we were at home at Bitare. We were a strong hill inhabited by Tutsi only. We protected ourselves. No one came to infiltrate us. We had some other relatives coming from Gashiru. When we heard that things have become worse, that people started to die, and that some of our children studying in Kigali and elsewhere had joined us, we united and protected ourselves. No one infiltrated us until 20 April. Then things became worse, we decided to flee, to go. We went with our cows, goats, pigs, rabbits in baskets, we went very well in a queue. The date is 20 April 1994. […] We used 3 to 5 hours to arrive to Burundi. […] Then we went to the camp of Mureke, they helped as much as they could, as all refugees are treated. A big number of people died of macinya (dysentery), but the majority survived and came back to Rwanda.97

The last one was part of the ones who crossed the border on Thursday, 21 April 1994 and who was from Gashiru:

People from Cyahinda, Nyaruguru fled to Gashiru. Then the interahamwe after killing people near the Ibisi came to attack us. Then we decided to go out of our houses, we regrouped ourselves and spent the night together. We heard that people fleeing to Burundi are being killed by the FRODEBU... The first group departed on Wednesday. Then the killers went to look for reinforcement, saying that our people fled. Then we of the second group decided to depart the following day early morning and we departed. We were attacked at Ngera of Kigembe, but the people there decided to leave us the Bitare and Gashiru people in peace since they saw that we were ready to fight, we had our spears and bows. Only people

96 Interview with Anonymous 4, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
97 Interview with Anonymous 2, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
with guns could defeat us, they did not have a gun. We continued our route. At 13:00 we arrived at Kanyaru river. The Burundi people rejoiced, we had our cows, no one died in the crossing. We were more than 5,000 people. The people from here plus the ones from Kibeho, the whole Nyaruguru, Cyahinda had joined us. Even the Kigembe people joined us. […] We only suffered in the refugee camps and lost many people there because of macinya [dysentery] and hunger.98

As one can notice, the above accounts are about those who survived by crossing the border of Burundi. But in this group, some few people got injured or died on their way to Burundi.99

But some other Tutsi from Gishamvu died in Sheke Sector. They include the disabled, sick and the elderly who could not flee to Burundi by foot. They are fewer than the ones who survived as the interviews from Sheke informants suggest.100 Some other Tutsi people from Sheke had sought refuge at Nyumba. As a result, the bulk of those were killed.101 Also a number of the Tutsi from Sheke who were living in Kigali or Butare towns, or who were married elsewhere were killed as they were on their way back to Gishamvu.102

6.3. MAY-JUNE 1994: SECOND PHASE OF GENOCIDE

6.3.1. The Tracking down of remaining Tutsi victims and the civil self-defence policy

After the first wave of genocidal massacres that occurred in April 1994, and that eliminated the bulk of Tutsi victims, several orders came from above to ask local leaders to search carefully those who had survived the first massacre and kill them. These were either the ones who had been able to hide in nature, such as in forests or sorghum fields

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98 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
99 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
100 See for example Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007, and Anonymous 1, Gishamvu, 19 April, 2007.
101 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
102 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
or the ones who had been hidden in houses of Hutu inhabitants. These victims included mostly women and children.¹⁰³

One lady, who lived in Muboni Cell of Gishamvu Sector where Nyumba massacre had occurred as mentioned above, explained in detail how this second phase of killing occurred at her place. It looks pretty much like what was happening in many other parts of the commune.

Simbarikure [Subprefect], Kambanda [Burgomaster], Cyuma [Councillor] then said: ‘At this time, killing is finished.’ People did not know that it was a trick. They added: ‘Anyone who hid a Tutsi, be he/she a young lady, or a child, we are not targeting those. Those who hid them are not faulty, they are asked to bring them outside, they will not be harmed. The killing has been stopped, now we have cleaned ourselves, that’s it. Now they are not a threat, in fact a lady does not have an ethnic identity.’ At that time, those who were keeping them brought them to light. But after bringing them outside, they killed them. Q: When did that happen? A: In June [1994].¹⁰⁴

Laurentine Nyirakanani adds that certain old people refused to show the Tutsi persons that they were hiding, as a result those survived.

This “tracking down of the last Tutsi” was called “guhumbahumba”. It meant searching in every hiding place for the last Tutsi individuals who remained alive. This term was borrowed from agriculture where after harvesting beans, children are sent in the field to gather the remaining grains of beans. It was the result of too much sensitization and training done by local leaders to local populations in a programme that was called “civilian self-defence”. This programme focused mainly on the mounting and guarding of barriers or roadblocks, on the organisation of nightly patrols with the aim of discovering and catching “the enemy”. As one understands, bureaucratic organisation (i.e. civil self-defence policy) was combined with – or translated in - an everyday language

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
(guhumbahumba) in order to make it more efficient. Particular emphasis was put on communes located near the border with foreign countries.\textsuperscript{105}

One letter from the Gishamvu Burgomaster insisted both on roadblock mounting and organisation and on the tracking down of the “enemy”. It bore a war language:

Dear Councillors, I urge you to monitor closely how roadblocks are being protected. You must inform us wherever they are set. No place must have a roadblock that you did not inform us about. Work in tandem with your respective cell committees. In addition, there must be a person responsible, this one must put in place a team that will monitor the roadblock. So that you can prevent the robbery that is happening in some places. Those who are surveilling the roadblock must do it very carefully, so that the enemy cannot have a way of crossing.\textsuperscript{106}

We learn from this letter that the roadblocks were monitored and that they were not spontaneously made by local populations. Secondly, when the Tutsi happen to pass near the roadblock, they are called enemies, in the war logic. This discourse undoubtedly victimised them, as we saw in the previous chapter.

As André Guichaoua, who has also done research on the Tutsi genocide in Butare Prefecture, wrote, there were a series of administrative documents disseminated by leaders towards the end of May 1994 and that were concerned about the programme of “civilian self-defence”. One such document was published on 25 May and was written by the Interior Minister, Edouard Karemera, and was about “the implementation of orders of the Prime Minister on the auto-organisation of civilian defence”. According to Guichaoua, civil self-defence units were given immense powers vis-à-vis political parties, military hierarchy and local administration services.\textsuperscript{107}

At the level of the commune, the Burgomaster seems to have organised several meetings in his sectors in May 1994. For example, he planned to have a meeting with the Liba

\textsuperscript{105} See Des Forges, \textit{Leave None to Tell the Story}, pp. 545-546.
\textsuperscript{106} Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, \textit{Letter to All the Councillors}, Ref.: 108/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, le 19 May 1994.
residents on 26 May 1994 at 9:00 am, and this meeting took place.\textsuperscript{108} It is likely that he organised similar meetings in other sectors of the Gishamvu Commune.

On the 9\textsuperscript{th} of June 1994, the Burgomaster Kambanda held a meeting at the Sheke Sector. That meeting was attended by a large number of inhabitants from Sheke Cell, while those from Gashiru and Bitare cells were few. According to the minutes of this meeting, the Sheke Sector was underpopulated at that time. This is true, because it was half populated by the Tutsi population before the genocide. At this time of June 1994, the bulk of the Tutsi from this sector had fled to Burundi, and those who failed to cross had been exterminated. The main issue of that meeting was about solving the misunderstanding that prevailed between the Councillor, Mr. Joseph Bacinoni, and his constituents, who, according to him, were not answering his calls, were not attending his meetings. The Burgomaster started his speech with a word of thanks to the residents for having united in the “struggle against the enemy and against his accomplices who wanted to bring a rule of Ubuhake again”, i.e., the Tutsi, but hastened to add that the struggle was not yet ended.\textsuperscript{109}

Now concerning the civilian self-defence programme, on 1 June 1994, the Subprefect of Bosoro Prefecture, Assiel Simbalikure, issued a circular letter to Burgomasters of his territory that includes Gishamvu. Here is the main content of that letter:

\begin{verbatim}
Dear Burgomaster,
In order to stop the enemy who has attacked Rwanda, i.e. Inyenzi Inkotanyi, here are some of the instructions you must transmit to your constituents:
1. To cross all the sides of the whole commune in order to catch the enemy because he is very clever, he knows how to hide like a snake. This checking must be done by the population in all cells and the roadblocks must be well monitored;
2. To teach the population how to dig holes which they will use to hide when the enemy will attack;
\end{verbatim}


\textsuperscript{109} Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune and Rugemintwaza, Augustin, Secretary of the Gishamvu Commune, \textit{Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the meeting with the population of Sheke sector held on 9 June 1994}, Ref.: No. 131/04.09.01/16, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994.
3. To stop the enemy from capturing the commune. This means that if the enemy attacks, all the populations must stand up as one person, carry their traditional weapons, helped by the policemen of the commune and by that youth that was few days ago trained on how to protect the commune [civil self-defence units]. Those who live near the border must protect it very much…\(^{110}\)

The Burgomaster made sure to transmit this letter the same day to the Councillors of his commune in order to follow this instruction of the Subprefect.\(^{111}\)

Just two days after the Subprefect’s circular letter to Burgomasters to use civil self-defence, a security meeting was organised in the Gishamvu Commune. The Burgomaster decided that the displaced people from Mayaga and Bugesera must not scatter among the population of Gishamvu, that they must be settled together at a hill called Akagunda in the Mubumbano Sector so that they can be helped. At this date, the RPF had taken over Bugesera, that is why the population of this area fled to Butare communes including Gishamvu and Kibayi. The Subprefect asked those who attended the meeting to teach the population how to protect themselves using traditional weapons. He said that it is urgent to teach the youth which knows democracy, i.e. the Hutu, to use guns. “So the population must be calmed down and taught how to fight.” These were the instructions given by the Prime Minister, as the minutes stressed. In the recommendations of that meeting, one stressed that “the security committees at the level of sectors are the ones that will be in charge of determining who is the accomplice and who is not, they are not entitled to take the final decisions as they are just consultative. The suspected ones must be submitted to the administrative authority.”\(^{112}\) The way roadblocks were organised and the above final decision on determining the identity of the enemy show that orders at this time were highly centralised.


\(^{111}\) Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Councillor of Sector, All, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 119/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 1 June 1994.

\(^{112}\) Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Rugemintwaza, Secretary of the Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the Security meeting held on 3 June 1994, Ref.: No. 130/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994.
Indeed, towards the 15th of June, the eastern part of the country was controlled by the Rwandan Patriotic Front rebels, while the territory from Kigali to Butare was still controlled by the Rwandan Governmental Forces.\footnote{Paul, Quilès et al., \textit{Mission d'Information, France, Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise (1990-1994) T.I. Rapport}, Paris, 1998, pp. 300-301.} At this time, in Gishamvu, the focus was on the strengthening of civil self-defence units in the form of military training of those units. Surprisingly enough, a priest from Roman Catholic Church, Abbé Rusingizandekwe, was in charge of training during this genocide time:

Dear President,
You are asked to inform the constituents that have undergone the military training in your sector that they must quickly come to the Gishamvu Commune on Friday 17 June 1994 at 8:00 am so that they can undergo the second phase of military training that is given by Abbé Rusingizandekwe Thaddé from Nyakibanda. Please use also those who teach military training in your sectors and tell them to bring their learners.\footnote{Pascal Kambanda (P.O. Augustin Lyumugabe Assistant of the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune), \textit{Letter to the President of the Civil Self-defense Committee in the Sector, All}, Ref.: 134/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, le 15 June 1994.}

This second phase of genocide killing was very close to a “hunting exercise” as a number of researchers have observed. Having analysed the vocabulary that was used in the tracking down of the Tutsi in bushes and other hiding places, in the description of victims, of perpetrators and of the action of searching them, then killing them, they realized that this description was very close to the hunting of animals in forests. This is so in part because the victims had been animalized in the ideology demonizing them:

On the level of common discourse, then, those who participated in the killing of Tutsi were able to see their actions as good for the wider society, and sanctioned by the highest authorities in the land. Indeed, using words like \textit{kuvuza induru} (yell), \textit{kwihisha} (to hide), \textit{kuvumbura} (flush out of hiding), \textit{gushorera} (to herd), \textit{guhiga} (to hunt/chase), and \textit{kwichira ku gasi} (kill in full view) the \textit{avoues} I interviewed often seemed to be recounting hunting expeditions, rather than genocidal attacks. Psychologically, those people called to participate in the genocide transformed themselves into hunters in pursuit of dangerous animals. As for the victims (their prey), often they too felt dehumanized to the extent that it made sense on some level for them to be killed. Ironically, according to Rwandan tradition, it is a taboo to hand an animal that seeks refuge in someone’s compound
over to its pursuers. During the genocide, however, Tutsi were not able to benefit from this loophole.\textsuperscript{115}

The analysis of Tutsi genocide as a “hunting game” has also been made by Josias Semujanga. In addition to the enumeration of four steps of the ‘traditional’ hunting activity, - the departure to hunting, the arrival to the assembling place of hunters and the practice of rituals, the hunting, and the return after hunting – he stressed that several accounts of both survivors and perpetrators use words and representations of hunting activity.\textsuperscript{116}

The “hunting” that Mironko and Semujanga are talking about had become so common that a Priest who was based at the Nyakibanda Seminary, Abbé Rusingizandekwe, also reminded those at a security meeting he attended to search in the bushes in order to get the ‘enemy’ there.\textsuperscript{117}

### 6.3.2. The policy around possessions

While the Tutsi from Gikongoro, Nyakizu and Runyinya were fleeing to Gishamvu, they were looted on their way by certain young Hutu. Also during the massacres, the looting continued, this time involving property of the Tutsi from Gishamvu.

After that phase of large scale massacres and the flight of some Tutsi victims, the looting of their property continued. However, in early May 1994, the government regulated the fate of those properties, especially of land, livestock, and harvest in fields:

At its May 6 meeting, the prefectural security council decided to renew instructions on property from 1963-64, when most Tutsi land and belongings had been forcibly appropriated. [...] [T]he policy seems in practice to have been the same as that being implemented elsewhere in the country. Local authorities would appropriate the most valuable goods for eventual sale, but would concede other


\textsuperscript{117} Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Rugemintwaza, Secretary of the Gishamvu Commune, \textit{Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the Security meeting held on 3 June 1994}, Ref.: No. 130/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994.
goods to looters; they would redistribute land; and they would leave standing crops to the disposition of the people of the cell or sector.  

Among the looters, the ones who had participated in the genocide seem to have been given more priority: “As for the land, they sold fields, they sold sorghum. You pay 2,000 Francs, they give you a field. But at our place, they gave land to only those who have participated in the genocide. The one who did not ‘work’ did not get anything. I was promised to get sorghum, but I did not get any, they gave to those killers only…”

The cheaper price of land was itself an incentive for many people to rush after that deal, that is why, as the above quotation suggests, other criteria had to be considered. In Gishamvu Sector, the price of such goods went as low as 1,500 francs:

… with regard to the victims’ crops and land, the councillor sold them to people at a very low price. Some people got several hectares of banana plants or fields of colocase for very low prices—no more than 1,500 Rwandese francs. Knowing the value of this land before the genocide, such a price was as good as giving it away for free. Victims’ houses were also destroyed. The looters took everything of value that they could transport: tiles, metal sheeting, bricks, trees, doors, windows, etc.

Sometimes, the looters were going to occupy the land of the deceased despite the regulation about property: “Both in town and on the hills, some did not wait for the formalities but simply moved into empty homes and began cultivating fields that had belonged to Tutsi.”

At local lever, the Councillors seem to have been the main agents of selling and/or redistribution. A number of interviews confirm this statement. As this selling was occurring in May and June 1994, it coincided with the military advance of RPF rebels and defeat of government forces. As a result, certain Hutu citizens, when they noticed that they had bought fields of land only to flee some weeks later, concluded that the

118 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, p. 562.
119 Interview with Anonymous 13, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
122 Interview with Marie Ntawuyirushintege, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
Councillors had lied to them that it was a purchase, whereas it was a swindle or a crooked deal:

Things continued, they said that the guns of RPF are heard at Rwabuye. Then, Cyuma with other leaders lied to the population that they must go to collect the property of the Tutsi and promised to defeat the Tutsi. But they knew that RPF had defeated them. They lied to the people to give them money so that they can get the amasambu [land] of the Tutsi. Thereafter, they asked that money to people by force. […] They knew that they were lying to the people. Even a poor person was borrowing money in order to buy that land. Some sold their belongings in order to buy those Tutsi properties. Those leaders shared that money because it was a lot. For example, people said that Cyuma put the money he got in a bag and the bag became full. Then after two days, those leaders fled and the population remained in the confusion.123

6.4. THE “GUSUBIRANAMO” PHENOMENON

In May and June 1994, after the Tutsi had been removed from the landscape, either by genocide or by escape, it is understandable that the Hutu were the ones who remained in communes, with of course the Twa who were always very few.124 One may suspect that no conflict would prevail any more, since society became “sociologically” homogeneous. But this did not become the case. Instead, a new conflict arose. That conflict was articulated around the targeting of property. It also concerned the Tutsi wives of the Hutu men. The latter had protected them despite the official call for killing any Tutsi, including anyone who is related to the Hutu matrimonially. It is this phenomenon of Hutu fighting against other Hutu that came to be called “isubiranamo” (noun) or “gusubiranamo” (verb), which roughly means to be against one’s fellows, in violent terms.

6.4.1. Fighting over loot

123 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
124 See the demographic statistics of the Twa in chapter three.
The *gusubiranamo*, i.e., the fighting of Hutu against Hutu, was unequivocally about the material targets. See for example what this informant explained: “After exterminating them [the Tutsi], life continued, it was in April. […] Then people started to be divided. […] After the Hutu had done that killing, they started now the thing of attacking each other. They were fighting over the things looted.”

In one letter, the Burgomaster planned for a security meeting on 3 June 1994, alleging that insecurity was being widespread in the commune, due probably to *isubiranamo*, i.e. violence among the Hutu. Indeed, after the genocide, insecurity meant that *isubiranamo* phenomenon. One informant called it “the violence of the belly” in contrast with “the violence of identity” that concerned the genocide. The “violence of the belly” referred to Hutu-Hutu violence targeting the property, whereas the “violence of identity” concerned the Hutu violence against the Tutsi, targeted for who they were:

In the meantime, except the material things of the Tutsi that people had looted, they started now to attack the Hutu and confiscate their belongings. It is the youth mobs who did that. Even the uneducated population did it. […] They started to fight over the material things. I even assert that it was luck that the RPF took over the country. Because a second massacre, very harsh, of the belly was to start. I think very few people would survive. They saw a person who was rich, having many cattle, then they accuse him of being a Tutsi who had changed his identity and become Hutu in 1960, as a way of justifying his killing and/or looting. That crime had started, and was escalating.

More importantly, this quotation shows how the *isubiranamo* became a complex phenomenon. Though it was material based, the justification of the looting was based on the accusation of a Hutu owner being Tutsi so as to victimise him or her and then to loot him or her. Which means that identity was being used again as a weapon against even

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125 Interview with Anonymous 14, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
126 Pascal Kambanda, (P.O. Augustin Lyumugabe, Assistant of the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune), Letter to the Head of Security in Gishamvu Commune, to the Head of MDR, MRND, PSD parties in the Gishamvu Commune, Representative of Businessmen of Gishamvu, Re: An urgent security meeting planned on 3 June 1994, Ref.: No. 124/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 2 June 1994. This letter invited the members of the Security Council of the Commune, the heads of MDR, MRND and PSD parties in Gishamvu and the head of the Chamber of Commerce of Gishamvu. But it did not invite the representative of PL. It is likely that he had been killed in April. His name was Justin Senyange. Probably, this party was eliminated in Gishamvu, since it had members who were majority Tutsi.
127 Interview with Anonymous 13, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
their fellow Hutu. Agency also seems to have played a certain role. For example, those Hutu who were witches or considered so were also targeted.\textsuperscript{128}

My informant Nyirakanani mentions a case of a man who had looted many things including cows, rice sacks, and US dollars in the Nyakibanda seminary. His name is Karangwa. So, in order to confiscate some of that property, some other Hutu persons came and at first accused him of hiding Tutsi in his house. He denied that he had Tutsi hidden in his house. They took everything. They also collected those Tutsi that he was hiding.

Another accusation was party affiliation. Those who once belonged to moderate factions of parties started to be victimised by the extremist ones. Some Hutu moderates had been killed along with the Tutsi, as is known across the whole country. But those who were not killed and who remained in the country, faced this threat around material goods. The account of Marie Ntawuyirushintege explains both the issue of identity and party affiliation:

\begin{quote}
The leaders would start to kill those that did not go with them to kill. Even my husband was going to be killed. […] First, people living on the hill and not having a known genealogy [and hence a known ethnic identity] were to die. As early as possible. Secondly, others who were not sharing the same party affiliation with them [the killers] were to die. They [the Hutu] got divided towards the end of May.\textsuperscript{129}
\end{quote}

The handling of this violence was taken seriously by the national and local leaders. Instructions came from the Prime Minister advocating the Hutu not to do violence against each other especially during those times of “war”, as he explained. This call was repeated over and over by the Subprefect of Busoro and the Burgomaster of Gishamvu.\textsuperscript{130}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{128} Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, 27 April 2007
\textsuperscript{129} Interview with Marie Ntawuyirushintege, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
\textsuperscript{130} Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Rugemintwaza, Secretary of the Gishamvu Commune, \textit{Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the Security meeting held on 3 June 1994}, Ref.: No. 130/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994.
\end{flushright}
But that violence was not stopping. For example, my informant Joseph Kubwimana lost his four nephews as a result of this Hutu-Hutu division. Another example is about a series of attacks and attempts of attacks. Gabriel Murara, who was medical assistant, who was the Head of MDR in Gishamvu, and who has been an active organiser of genocide in Sholi Sector and even in the whole commune, alleged in one security meeting that he was about to be himself attacked. Cyuma, Councillor of Gishamvu Sector, confirmed that information and added that he is the one who helped him and saved his life in that isubiranamo (Hutu-Hutu division). In that meeting, other cases were also reported. It was said that the Liba, Buvumu and Kibingo Sectors had people who were attacking other sectors in order to loot, and they were organised by some elite from those sectors. The members of that meeting agreed also to urge their populations to have good behaviour so that the foreigners who visit Rwanda find them in a “good condition”.

Moreover, robbery was widespread during this time. For example, the Burgomaster sent Mr. Jean Paul Habinshuti from Gishamvu Sector to the Prosecutor. Habinshuti was a soldier in the army of Rwanda. He robbed a motorbike on 6 June 1994 at night with the complicity of a civilian, Grégoire Mwongereza.

The existing administration did not just issue verbal messages. It also took tangible measures, such as the modification of the administrative leadership of certain sectors, where this violence was being seen between the constituents and their local leaders. For example, in Liba Sector, the Councillor, Julien Munyakayanza, resigned from his position on 24 May 1994. The Burgomaster accepted his resignation on 27 May. He was

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131 Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007.
132 Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
133 African Rights, The History of the genocide, pp. 6, 12, 18 and 21.
134 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Rugemintwaza, Secretary of the Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the Security meeting held on 3 June 1994, Ref.: No. 130/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994.
replaced by Théodomir Misago. The Burgomaster informed the Prefect of Butare Prefecture about this replacement on 31 May 1994.

Again in Sheke Sector, the population went into open conflict against their Councillor, John Bacinoni. That conflict was apparently over material things. As a result, the population asked for the dismissal of the Councillor. The population called the Burgomaster for a meeting. That meeting was held on 9 June 1994, between the Burgomaster, the population of Sheke, and the Councillor. In that meeting, the Councillor was disavowed by his population. They accused him of taking for himself one sorghum field of the Tutsi, of having harvested that field alone, an act that provoked the looting of the remaining harvests that were still in the fields untouched. They also accused him of insulting them that they were crooks. The Burgomaster advised the population of Sheke not to instil division among themselves. The constituents made it clear that if Bacinoni did not resign, they would not work with him. As a result, the Councillor Bacinoni accepted to resign from his post. This report from Sheke shows that during these hard times, the population was an active agent, that it was not a mere tool of the Councillor or the Burgomaster. Bacinoni was replaced by Ezéchiel Sindambiwe after the latter being elected by the population on 14 June 1994.

The frenzy around land acquisition was so strong that when the bulk of Tutsi survivors came back in Rwanda in July or August 1994, they found that their area had been already owned by their neighbours or other Hutu: “We found our land already redistributed. In a month since April they had destroyed, cultivated everywhere: in the valleys, and even

138 Pascal Kambanda, Kambanda, Pascal, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune and Augustin Rugemintwaza, Secretary of the Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the meeting with the population of Sheke sector held on 9 June 1994, Ref.: No. 131/04.09.01/16, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994.
139 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Mr. Sindambiwe Ezéchiel has replaced Bacinoni Joseph to the position of Councillor of Sheke Sector, Ref.: No. 132/04.09.01, Gishamvu, 15 June 1994.
where it is not possible to cultivate. They had looted; nothing had remained on the hill."140

6.4.2. Fighting over Tutsi wives of Hutu men

Concerning the problem that was dividing Hutu men over the Tutsi wives of other Hutu, the Burgomaster of Gishamvu agreed with the other local leaders in one meeting to stop killing those Tutsi women and their children because “they are not the inkotanyi we are fighting against”, instead “that can make us dusubiranamo [divide ourselves] instead of helping each other to fight against the true enemy, i.e., the inyenzi-inkotanyi.” This was also an instruction of the Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda, of not dividing themselves so as not to weaken themselves.141

The research of the late Alison Des Forges also confirms this sparing of Tutsi women:

Authorities often discussed disputes over women at the same time as they considered problems of property. This was not just because issues of marriage and inheritance were often related, but also because men were thought to have an interest in their wives or female relatives comparable to their interest in property. Thus Hutu men were generally recognized to have a right to protect their wives, even if they were Tutsi. Hutu men also intervened to defend their sisters, even if they were married to Tutsi husbands.142

She goes on to explain that in certain areas of Butare Prefecture, some clashes occurred between the Hutu men who wanted to extend the genocide to Tutsi women and the husbands of those women.143 My informant Nyirakanani, who witnessed closely this phenomenon of attacking Tutsi wives of Hutu men, also corroborates the view of Des Forges:

I remember at that time, I had my brother-in-law who had a Tutsi wife. He came to tell his brother that ‘I have sharpened my machete’. I saw another one who had

140 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
141 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Rugemintwaza, Secretary of the Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the Security meeting held on 3 June 1994, Ref.: No. 130/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994.
142 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 564.
143 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 565.
Nyirakanani mentions two Tutsi wives of Hutu who got killed, because they were widows. The killers went to kill them, because they expected no resistance. Nyirakanani says that afterwards, the leader Cyuma called a meeting and said that ‘do not do those things, (killings of Tutsi women) stop them, they will lead us nowhere’. He said: ‘All we tell you is to protect yourselves from the enemy, and the enemy you know him.’ But she thinks that it was just a pretext, as he knew that all the Tutsi had been killed and that it was hard to kill the Tutsi wives who had Hutu husbands or older sons. Because naturally these would protect them. These Hutu husbands and sons would also argue that, after all, in the Rwandan kinship system, women do not have identity in the sense that their clan and ethnicity is not transferred to their children. But, as we know, Tutsi women were not spared in general, it is only some of these Tutsi wives of Hutu men who had that chance.

Finally, this Hutu-Hutu violence became so frightening to some Hutu, that some of them alleged that the taking over of power by the RPF was a rescue of not just the Tutsi – the majority of whom by the way had been massacred– but of the Hutu who were about to be killed. Anonymous 13 and Nyirakanani already mentioned this above. Consider also this analysis or prediction of Nzabamwita: “Gashagaza wrote to me saying that they should ask me the amount of my belongings. […] If the Kagame troops did not come we were to be killed also, the Hutu would vanish too. Because they would finish up the Tutsi and then they start to target the property of the Hutu, in fact this had already started.”  

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144 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, 27 April 2007.
145 Interview with Gaston Nzabamwita, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. See also Anonymous 13 and Laurentine Nyirakanani above.
who fled. This time, they would perhaps target the property of their fellows by taking advantage of being in a time of insecurity and chaos.

6.5. RESCUE PRACTICES

In general, the rescue of Tutsi by their Hutu neighbours was very limited but it occurred. One reason of this limited feature is that it was too risky to hide a person during that time. Indeed, local leaders had made it clear that to hide an enemy or an accomplice of the enemy was tantamount to treason and this was punishable by death. As a result, many Hutu tended to hide the Tutsi who shared kinship or matrimonial relations with them, very rarely their friends. It was even an exception for a Hutu to hide a Tutsi that he or she did not know, but a few cases existed. In the Gishamvu Commune cases, I found, among my informants, some who saved the Tutsi. Three were perpetrators, three others were bystanders, and some other cases include the accounts by survivors about cases of successful rescue and failed rescue.

Anonymous 13 claims to have saved a girl who was around 7 during the genocide. Her name is Mutuyimana, she was daughter of Leopold from Rusatira Commune. She was still alive at the time of the interview and was studying in secondary school, according to this informant.

Anonymous 14 also claims to have rescued a child called Josepha, daughter of Febronia. She kept her for three months during the genocide and returned her to her mother at the time when the Hutu were fleeing RPF soldiers, i.e., towards the end of June or beginning of July 1994.

The informant Joseph Rwandanga also explains how he saved two kids by getting involved in the genocide at the Nyumba: “I was doing shooting with arc and arrows at Nyumba in order to save two kids I hid. The parents of those children are Sebuturo and Mukamudenge. Those children are still alive. I was accused of shooting at the church, but
if I did not do that, those children would be killed.” He says that he got a paper from Burgomaster Kambanda proving that those children were his, but illegitimate children. This informant had been Councillor of Gishamvu Sector from 1975 until 1990, so he was a well known figure in local politics and acquainted with the Burgomaster. He was also one of the founders of the Smith Workshop of Gishamvu, a strong artisan craft association.

Hakizamungu was also a smith. He claims to have saved six children of a lady called Emerita from Gishamvu Sector but who got married in Sholi Sector. Her family is neighbour to Hakizamungu. He saved also the children of his daughter who had a Tutsi husband. He explains that he used his smith craft to threaten those who came to attack him in order to kill those children, namely Kagarara and Nteziryayo. He told them: “You say you come to kill snakes here, go to the bush where snakes live. They said that they see Fransisco [I] has changed, they got afraid and went. In fact, they knew I was a smith. Note that smiths know the secret of poisonous and sharp metal tools and weapons.”

Emerite Kubwimana says she saved some of her grandchildren, two who were alive at the time of the interview. She saved also a lady called Thérèse Mujawamariya, who was teaching in Mubumbano at the time of the interview.

Segatashya alleges that he hid a girl called Nyirasangwa, whose parents were killed in Nyakibanda. He also saved the son of the wife of his brother but who did not belong to this brother. After the wife was killed, Segatashya pleaded for the son to be spared. He lied that that son was Hutu in order to save him. As a result, he survived. He was in the military at the time of the interview, his name is Harerimana.

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146 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. The Gacaca justice system sentenced Rwandanga to 15 years, as he spent 10 years in prison, he is left with 5 years of Community Work.
147 These two names appear on the list of prominent hardcore killers in Gishamvu, as made by African Rights.
Since all the above informants talked about themselves and because I did not meet with those that they rescued in order to ascertain the validity of these declarations, it is more prudent to take these rescue cases as provisional. Normally, the rescue that is ascertained by the survivor is, at first glance, more reliable than the one mentioned by the “rescuer”, because currently in Rwanda there is much at stake if one is acknowledged as “rescuer”. These include judicial advantages if one is a perpetrator, or moral advantages in other cases.

There are also cases of rescue practices mentioned by victims or relatives of victims. Here is what my informant Rugengamanzi, who survived by crossing the border to Burundi narrated about the rescue of his younger brother in Kigali: “Me I had a brother who worked in Kigali for an agronomist. They were together for seven years. He hid him until the end of the war. If he killed other people, I do not know, but he rescued my younger brother.” But this informant did not remember the name of that agronomist.149

As for my informant Bucyabutata, from Sholi Sector, he, together with other two persons, was saved by his father-in-law who hid them and thereafter gave them a person to accompany them on the way to Burundi:

How it happened to me, the killing started on Tuesday, but my wife was a Hutu. I had a cow from her father, I was taking care of it. Her father came and told me to give him back his cow so that they could not think it is mine and take it. I gave it to him. Another Tutsi man who had married his daughter also returned him his cow. On Wednesday, people started to come check our whereabouts, me and that other Tutsi man. They did not do anything bad to us, even when they saw us. The following day on Thursday they came this time to kill us. Someone came to tell us that when the people of Cyambwe, Sholi, come they will kill us. Someone came to tell us that when the people of Cyambwe, Sholi, come they will kill us. That is when we went to hide in the ceiling of our father-in-law who was Hutu. He was a powerful man. There was another child with whom we were, then they came to check, they did not check carefully. My father-in-law who was also our neighbour forbid them. They went to seek us elsewhere. They did not see us. Then our father-in-law told us to flee to Burundi. ‘We hear that people are also being chopped there with machetes, but do not stay here, I do not want to see how they kill you in front of me’, he said. The Interahamwe [militia] continued to come and warn him that they will attack him. That Thursday around 7:00 pm we went to Burundi. The father-in-law gave a man to accompany us until at Kagera. We lived in the

149 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
bushes. We continued crossing that valley. We continued, there was a lot of rain water. The killers had wood with fire, and were eating meat and drinking and dancing. The war had just started. We were listening to them. We finally arrived in the Akanyaru. We crossed. When we arrived in Burundi, we met with the Tutsi of Gashiru and Sheke who had just arrived there.\(^{150}\)

But when he came back home from exile in July or August 1994, Bucyabutata found his wife alive since she was Hutu, but his son had been killed by the brother of his wife, called Nzabande. But his daughter survived. That other man who also shared the same father-in-law with Bucyabutata found his family alive. But Bucyabutata lost also the family members of his elder brother, as he narrates.\(^{151}\)

Though the above rescue experience stresses a case of a successful rescue, the following case, of François Mukimbiri, is one that illustrates a failed rescue action. As stated before, Mukimbiri was a well known businessman in Gishamvu. In fact, he was Chairperson of the Chamber of Commerce of Gishamvu.\(^{152}\) He had also been member of the Commune Committee in 1975.\(^{153}\) During the multiparty system, he was member of PSD party.

One version says that Mukimbiri went to hide at Kambanda’s house and the latter welcomed him and hid him because they were long time friends. The informant Kumuyange, who was acquainted to both Mukimbiri and Burgomaster Kambanda narrated this account:

When genocide started, we, we fled on the 20 April, the situation was not yet very harsh. […] At first, Kambanda was not a nasty person. He was not very involved in those killings. As we heard from other people after leaving, he was not very involved. But his wife was more virulent than her husband. […] There is a man called Mukimbiri François, he died at Burgomaster’s house. It is his wife who betrayed and sacrificed him and his son Lambert. Instead, Kambanda peed in his

\(^{150}\) Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
\(^{151}\) Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
\(^{152}\) See Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Mr. Mukimbiri François, Chairperson of the Chamber of Commerce of Gishamvu Commune, Re: Concerning a meeting of businessmen planned on 9 February 1994 at Butare, Ref.: No. 37/04.09.01/16, Gishamvu, 2 February 1994.
\(^{153}\) Kambanda Pascal, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Report to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture concerning the election of Commune organs on 21 December 1975, Ref.: No. 538/03.09.01/7, Gishamvu, 29 December 1975.
pants after hearing that Mukimbiri was dead. He allegedly trembled, and peed in his pants. You understand that he was not a bad person. This proves it.154

According to informant Anonymous 7, Mukimbiri and his son Lambert were sacrificed by the Burgomaster: “The other thing I heard about him [Burgomaster Kambanda], there is a man called Mukimbiri who was his friend, he fled to his place with his son. Then he [Kambanda] sacrificed them.”155

Another version says that Mukimbiri was being rescued by André Ndibwami. The latter was carrying him on a motorbike straight to his home to hide him. Thereafter, it rained. As a result, they found themselves in need of roof, so they went to Kambanda’s house to protect themselves from rain. It is worth noting that Ndibwami and Mukimbiri knew each other very well and were both close to the Burgomaster Kambanda. Indeed, Ndibwami André was a medical assistant. He had been influential in Gishamvu politics just as the businessman François Mukimbiri. Ndibwami had been member of the Technical Commission of Gishamvu Commune since 1975.156 Concerning the death of Mukimbiri, the informant Anonymous 12, who was one of Gacaca tribunals judge in Gishamvu, had this to explain:

I went there [to the trial of the wife of Kambanda], but I found that she had finished testifying. [During the genocide], there is a person who came and found me at my father-in-law and told me ‘[…] The one who was powerful, that is, Burgomaster Kambanda, it is as if we are ruling him now.’ He said: ‘Now we are doing whatever we want. My father-in-law asked him: ‘What are you doing really’. He answered: ‘Mukimbiri is now dead, he died as we removed him from the Kambanda’s house.’ The way they removed him there, if I refer to news from people of here [Gishamvu Sector, where the interview was taking place] who went there [Gikunzi sector, the home of Burgomaster Kambanda], they say that there is a man called Ndibwami André who was a medical assistant in Butare. It is said that Ndibwami came a certain morning with a motorbike to help Mukimbiri flee, then when they arrived at the way going to the Burgomaster’s house, it

154 Interview with Athanase Kumuyange, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
155 Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007.
156 Palatin Kabalisa, Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, Transmission des listes des Commissions Techniques, Réf. n° 1118/03.04/1, Butare le 21 août 1975. For his membership in 1989, see Justin Nsengimana, Président de la Commission Technique de Gishamvu, Compte rendu de la réunion de la Commission Technique tenue au Bureau Communal de Gishamvu en date du 10 juillet 1989.
rained. This man [Ndibwami] was living a bit far from Kambanda’s house. On the way to Kambanda’s house there was a high mountain on which there were a mob of people watching people who pass and attack them. That rain became heavier. Ndibwami could not continue his journey. Then he went with Mukimbiri at Kambanda’s home. Once there, that mob attack which was at the Ibisi mountain, came down and met with some people of here [Gishamvu Sector] and then they went in that house. […] The wife [of Kambanda] was there, with the brother of his husband, Ludovico Gatama. I heard that he is the one who said that Mukimbiri must go out. They exchanged bad words, then he entered and removed him from the house and sacrificed him to those mobs. They took him and pulled him down, then they went to kill him near a river at the border between Gishamvu Sector and Kibu [Gikunzi Sector]. They killed him there, and buried him. That is how we knew that information. Me I am an Inyangamugayo [a Gacaca judge, it means literally a person of integrity], I am telling you the truth, he did not last a long time at Kambanda’s house. After entering, that mob came to remove him. Ludovico, that extremist and nasty guy, entered there. The wife [of Kambanda] testifies that she is faulty because she was present at that moment of the sin, accepted that that person entered in her house, she also accuses herself for having failed to rescue him.

Yet another version, which is like a combination of the two previous ones, asserts that Ndibwami was only accompanying Mukimbiri to Kambanda’s house:

Mukimbiri went to hide at Kambanda’s house, he was accompanied by Ndibwami. He had given his money to Kambanda, Ndibwami and Nsengimana Justin so that they hide it for him. The wife of Kambanda, after reaching the money, she… If you analyse, you realise that she sacrificed him. […] It is the prisoners who conclude that the wife of Kambanda had sacrificed Mukimbiri. […] It is allegedly Mukimbiri who had helped Kambanda to take office, also who – with Abbé Niyibizi, Paul Gakuba, Masabo, and Kubwimana – had brought development here. In such a way that when Kambanda came and found that Mukimbiri has been killed, it is said that he trembled of fear and then peed in his shorts, I mean in his trousers.

It is the two informants Athanase Kumuyange and Christophe Batura who mention that the Burgomaster Kambanda peed in his pants as a reaction to the killing of his long time friend and collaborator. As one can speculate, Mukimbiri was Tutsi but the Burgomaster

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158 Interview with Anonymous 12, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
159 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
Kambanda had failed to see him as “the other” or as invisible: “The Other (autrui) is the sole being whose negation can only announce itself as total: a murder. The Other (autrui) is the sole being I can wish to kill. […] To be in relation with other (autrui) face to face is to be unable to kill.”¹⁶⁰ As far as the gender aspect is concerned, the reaction of Burgomaster Kambanda produced a controversial effect as compared to the one of his wife, if we are to believe the active role ascribed to her above. A man reacted like a child in the face of violence against a friend, whereas a woman behaved as a fully aware and responsible person. The woman was able to see the victim in an abstract or remote form, whereas the man could not, given their friendship. Masculinity, as we know it at least in stereotypical forms, was in crisis here.

The last case of rescue or survival concerns the crossing of the border to Burundi. As already mentioned above, the bulk of Tutsi who survived from the genocide, especially in Gikunzi, Mukuge and Sheke (Bitare and Gashiru), did so for having crossed the border of Burundi. But even a big number of survivors from other sectors of Gishamvu Commune and of other communes of Butare Prefecture survived because they had the idea and the possibility of taking the exit route to Burundi and of encountering fewer mortal obstacles on their way.¹⁶¹ Those who had crossed before the 20 April seem to have encountered Rwandan soldiers at the border of Rwanda and Burundi and to have been killed en masse. But those who crossed on 20 and 21 April, as stated before, found fewer obstacles and survived in big numbers. Those are the ones who constitute the most considerable population of survivors in Gishamvu Commune.

When they arrived in Burundi, those Tutsi from Gishamvu and from other communes of Butare were put in refugee camps such as Mureke and given humanitarian help. The main suffering endured there was the disease of dysentery that attacked them severely and several hundreds lost their lives there. One informant who survived there, and who fought against that disease, narrates this:

¹⁶¹ Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, p. 221 ; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 432-433.
We crossed, and the Burundi people welcomed us very well. [...] We spent there two months. *Macinya* (dysentery) killed us until we resorted to the traditional medicines. I worked there for free since they had nothing to pay me. I was sending them to go and look for herbs. [...] It is there that I learnt how to cure *macinya* [dysentery] and cholera. There is a physician who taught me how to mix herbs and acids. Now I cure also cholera. In exile people also learn.\textsuperscript{162}

At the national level, other rescuers include the RPF rebels who were fighting against the RGF and militias and at the same time were saving the Tutsi. Also the fact of having stopped the genocide is in itself an act of rescue, for, the lives of those who were hiding in Rwanda depended on it. To a lesser extent there is the UN force that saved some few thousands of Tutsi, but also the controversial *Opération Turquoise* did save some lives, though it was at the same time protecting the perpetrators of genocide.\textsuperscript{163}

6.6. THE APPROXIMATE NUMBERS OF VICTIMS

Certain state censuses and statistical research have made available some data on the number of victims and alleged perpetrators. These figures are very important because they help us have an approximate picture of the effects of genocide. This usefulness explains why I cannot ignore them in this study. However, they need to be problematized, that is, to be interpreted with scrutiny. Since they bear limits, they also need to be taken just as an approximate picture of what happened and where, on what scale, etc., not as absolute and precise reports of facts.

According to the census made by the Ministry of Local Government of Rwanda (MINALOC) in 2000, published in 2002 and revised in 2004, there were 14,499 declared victims of genocide in Gishamvu Commune.\textsuperscript{164} This number surely includes the Tutsi who came from other places, such as Gikongoro, Nyakizu, Runyinya and even Ngoma, and who fled to places of gathering in Gishamvu. The interviews even mention a number

\textsuperscript{162} Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
by far bigger than the one of the MINALOC. These other numbers are 40,000 victims\textsuperscript{165} and 37,000\textsuperscript{166}. Indeed, all these numbers are bigger than the overall number of Tutsi population of Gishamvu commune before the genocide. For example, in January 1994, the Tutsi population of Gishamvu was 11,108.\textsuperscript{167} If we add 1 per cent for the following three months in order to determine the Tutsi population in April-May 1994 at the time of genocide, since increase of the population in Rwanda was around three per cent per year, then in April ending and May beginning, the Tutsi population in Gishamvu Commune was around 11,219.

The other figures are about the number of survivors of genocide, as availed on the website of the National Service in charge of Gacaca jurisdictions. These figures establish that in Gishamvu survivors were 5,819. The details are shown in the below table.

\begin{table}
\end{table}

\footnotesize
\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{165} Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007.
\textsuperscript{166} Conversation with my research assistant Janvier Kayiranga in April 2007.
\textsuperscript{167} See table 2 in chapter two.
\end{flushleft}
Table 3: Number of survivors in Gishamvu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTORS</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>ORPHANS</th>
<th>WIDOWS/WIDOWERS</th>
<th>DISABLED BY GENOCIDE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bitare</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheke of Huye</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheke of Nyaruguru</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sheke =</strong></td>
<td><strong>692</strong></td>
<td><strong>799</strong></td>
<td><strong>591</strong></td>
<td><strong>69</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>2165</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buvumu</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gikunzi</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gishamvu</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibingo of Huye</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibingo of Nyaruguru</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kibingo =</strong></td>
<td><strong>282</strong></td>
<td><strong>335</strong></td>
<td><strong>257</strong></td>
<td><strong>75</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>988</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukuge</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyakibanda</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sholi</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mubumbano</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 821</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 304</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 199</strong></td>
<td><strong>358</strong></td>
<td><strong>137</strong></td>
<td><strong>5 819</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: No data for Liba Sector.


If we accept this figure for Gishamvu, and we also accept the above figure of the Tutsi population at the time of the genocide (11,219), then the victims were 11,219 - 5,819, that is, 5,400. That means that the victims reached around 48.1 percent of the Tutsi population of Gishamvu. This total number of victims of genocide does not include the persons who died after the genocide. For example, there are some women who had been contaminated with HIV/AIDS through rape and who died some years after 1994.168

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As for the victims of genocide in each sector of Gishamvu, it is hard to calculate them with absolute certainty. But an approximate view is possible, if we refer to available data stressing ethnic population per sector. Unfortunately, the only table that contains ethnic identity data for each sector which I could find in the archives was the one of 31 December 1992. It would be better to find at least the one of 31 December 1993 which was close to April 1994 at the time of the genocide in order to compare it with the table of survivors as this one is organised per sector. This way we could know how many victims were registered per sector. But because the total population of Tutsi in Gishamvu rose from 11,054 (31 December 1992) to 11,219 in May 1994 as we estimated, the difference (165) is not big enough to forbid us from comparing data from the two tables, keeping however in mind that these are just approximate figures.

Table 4: Population of Gishamvu Commune on 31 December 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative sector</th>
<th>Ethnic identity</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buvumu</td>
<td>4,368</td>
<td>1,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gikunzi</td>
<td>2,689</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gishamvu</td>
<td>2,834</td>
<td>1,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibingo</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>1,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liba</td>
<td>2,544</td>
<td>1,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mubumbano</td>
<td>4,426</td>
<td>1,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukuge</td>
<td>2,517</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyakibanda</td>
<td>2,204</td>
<td>1,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheke</td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>1,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sholi</td>
<td>3,026</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,636</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,054</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, the comparison of these two tables is difficult. Indeed, it is worth noting that the figures of Table 5 were reconstructed in line with the administrative reform of 2005, which means that the boundary of communes and sectors had changed. These changes had affected Sheke, Kibingo and Liba Sectors, but other sectors had remained slightly the same. If one combines the data for these two tables, one finds that the victims for each sector would be approximately the following:
Table 5: Approximate number of Tutsi victims of Gishamvu Commune per sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Number of Tutsi population on 31 December 1992</th>
<th>Number of Tutsi survivors</th>
<th>Approximate number of victims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buvumu</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gikunzi</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gishamvu</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibingo</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liba</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>No data provided</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mubumbano</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukuge</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyakibanda</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheke</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>2,165</td>
<td>Impossible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sholi</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As one can comment, it is sure that the approximate number of victims is slightly bigger than the number shown in this Table 7, because also the number of Tutsi population in April-May 1994 is bigger than the one presented above for 31 December 1992 (column two). As for Sheke, the data obtained are impossible to understand, since the number of survivors (2,165) is bigger than the one of Tutsi population at the time of genocide (a bit more than 1,460). This is not possible, because we know from interviews that some few people died in Sheke. So the number of survivors would logically be lower than the one of the Tutsi who lived in Sheke before the genocide.

But it is possible to make comments for the remaining sectors: Gikunzi, Gishamvu, Mukuge, Nyakibanda, Sholi, Buvumu and Kibingo. The first observation from Table 6, shows that the Tutsi lived in every sector, unlike the Twa. Again, the Tutsi were less numerous in Gikunzi, Mukuge and Sholi if one takes their proportion vis-à-vis the Hutu. Also, the proportion of Tutsi was bigger in Sheke more than elsewhere. Then for Table 7, Gishamvu and Nyakibanda seem to have registered the biggest number of victims. This is
corroborated also by the fact that the large-scale massacres occurred in those two places, namely Nyumba in Gishamvu Sector, and Great Seminary in Nyakibanda. This means that the bulk of the Tutsi from Gishamvu and Nyakibanda Sectors died at Nyumba and Nyakibanda. Then follows Buvumu for which almost two thirds of Tutsi who were living there were killed. Then follows Gikunzi which also registered a big number of victims, slightly more than the half of the Tutsi population indeed, although there are also some who survived by joining the Sheke Tutsi and by crossing the border to Burundi as mentioned above. This means that those victims may have been killed in their homes or on their hills or else at Nyumba and Nyakibanda where they may have fled. Sholi also registered victims who were above 50 percent. Only Kibingo and Mukuge had a number of victims which was below 50 percent. It is probably Sheke that registered the smallest number of victims, as the interviews made it clear.

6.7. PERPETRATORS AND ALLEGED PERPETRATORS

According to African Rights, the main architects of genocide in Gishamvu were: President Théodore Sindikubwabo, Assiel Simbarikure, Subprefect, Laurent Kubwimana, also Subprefect in Butare but lived in Gishamvu, Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu, Célestin Kubwimana alias “Cyuma”, Councillor of Gishamvu Sector, Gabriel Murara, medical assistant at Butare University Hospital, Jean Niyizurugero, school inspector in Gishamvu, and Eliphaz Liberakurora, Assistant Burgomaster and Alexis, alias “CDR”.169

There are other hardcore killers per sector. John Ushizimpumu is mentioned for Sholi Sector that he led since December 1974.170 Among other Councillors accused there is Julien Munyakayanza of Liba Sector. Gishamvu Commune policemen are accused almost in total. Joseph Nyamwasa, Benoît Karenzi and Emile Ntagugura were mentioned. Edouard Gasasira, who was an intellectual, is mentioned in killings that occurred in

Nyakibanda Sector. Evariste Gatabazi, driver of the Gishamvu Commune since 1983 and Mutangana are mentioned by Anonymous 9. Among the local intellectuals, there is Tharcisse Gashagaza from Liba as mentioned above. He had been secretary of MDR in Gishamvu in 1992.

At the national level, the number of alleged perpetrators as calculated by the Gacaca jurisdictions following the gathering of information of 2005 was 818,564. In category one, that is, the planners of genocide and the hardcore killers, there were 77,269 people accused. In category 2, that is other killers, there were 432,557 accused. And in the third category, that is, those who looted and/or destroyed property, there were 308,738 accused.

In Gishamvu, almost a thousand persons were accused of genocide participation and put in category one, while more than four thousand were put in category two. Which means that around five thousand were accused of murder charges. The details are given in the table below.

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171 Interview with Anonymous 13, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007.
173 See chapter four.
Table 6: Numbers of alleged Perpetrators of Gishamvu Commune (i.e., accused of genocide participation) following the Gacaca gathering of information of 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Category 1</th>
<th>Category 2</th>
<th>Category 3</th>
<th>Total per Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bitare</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheke from Huye district</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheke from Nyaruguru</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheke</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buvumu</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>1323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibingo from Huye district</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibingo from Nyaruguru district</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibingo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>1012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mubumbano</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>1339</td>
<td>1569</td>
<td>3196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyakibanda</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>1249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheke</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sholi</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gikunzi</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liba</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukuge</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL GISHAMVU COMMUNE</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>4182</td>
<td>4051</td>
<td>9187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown to what extent the Tutsi genocide had an unequal distribution over the commune’s territory, but that it occurred in every sector. Furthermore, the geographical situation of Gishamvu allowed a number of Tutsi victims to cross the border and survive that way.\(^{175}\) Concerning timing, the phases of massacres resemble the ones

that occurred in several other parts of the country. There was the first wave of massacres that occurred after 21 April 1994 and that took lives of the bulk of Tutsi victims. Those who died in the second wave of May and June 1994 were fewer. The killing in the first wave was done in the open air, while the second one was done in secret, as some few international observers and journalists were arriving in Rwanda. But Genocide in Butare Prefecture occurred some two weeks later than many other parts of the country.

Although the content of this chapter seems somewhat detailed, it also bears many gaps and this leaves many questions unanswered. For example, it is hard to know from local informants how the killings were prepared, step by step. The archives provide some few scarce documents on how meetings and orders on civil self-defence were organised, how the administration functioned, but there is no written indication of the April massacres’ preparation and supervision. This, despite the fact that during the genocide, the administration continued to function as if it was during normal days. Filip Reyntjens has written that it looked like “business as usual”\textsuperscript{176} For example, the Gishamvu Commune continued to deliver authorizations of entering the commune and moving to other communes, reports were being typed and sent to relevant upper and horizontal authorities, etc. But the gap of the local preparation of genocide remains. Secondly, for every sector of the commune, all the perpetrators are not known, although many have been accused. Also not all places where the killings occurred have been identified, although major sites for mass killings are known today. And many others. These gaps are recognised for the genocide in the whole country, they are not an isolated case of Gishamvu and Kibayi. The next and last chapter, which is on the genocide in Kibayi, tries to address the issues developed here and to include further specificities.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE GENOCIDE IN KIBAYI

INTRODUCTION

This chapter concerns the Tutsi genocide in Kibayi Commune. It relies mainly on interviews of perpetrators, bystanders and victims. The content is organised per sector, that is, according to a smaller subdivision of the Commune territory, whenever possible. This approach is followed because, in the reconstructions of the genocide witnesses, the majority of them talked about their individual experiences that occurred either at, or close to, their homes. This means that the reconstruction of the approximate picture of what occurred at the level of the Commune effectively became my task.

The focus of the content of this chapter is on the beginning, the unfolding and the ending of the genocidal violence. In the process, several other elements are mentioned. These include the outcome of the genocide, namely the killing of the Tutsi, as well as the unpredicted, that is, acts that arose without necessarily being intended by the perpetrators of genocide, such as the survival of certain victims, or the violence between people who were not among the targets or the perpetrators.

7.1. HOW GENOCIDE STARTED IN KIBAYI

The way that genocide started in the Kibayi Commune is narrated in various ways, depending on the place (cell or sector) where one was located. The dates seem different if one considers when violence started in each Sector of the Commune. This suggests that violence did not start in the Commune on the same day. It happened in a graduated way. Moreover, violence seems to have started in certain areas by the targeting of property first, and in other areas by targeting both the property and the Tutsi inhabitants.
To begin with, the Kibayi inhabitants learned about the shooting of the presidential plane in the news and in verbal exchanges, just as any other Rwandan learned. Although violence did not immediately reach Kibayi, some signs that violence had started elsewhere in the country were seen in Kibayi. For example, smoke of houses burning was seen in the sky from Nyakizu Commune. Also, some people from the Bugesera region (South-Centre), from Gikongoro and even from nearby Nyaruhengeri were passing in Kibayi as they were fleeing. Some from Kigembe even stayed at the Kibayi Commune office and sought refuge there together with other Tutsi of Kibayi.¹

Secondly, some Tutsi individuals heard rumours from their fellow Hutu residents about the imminent violence against Tutsi. But, given the context in which they were and the local interaction that existed between those Tutsi and the Hutu, the bulk of Tutsi seem to have not taken the news seriously. For example, Ntukabumwe was at the Kanyaru river when the violence against the Tutsi started, allegedly on Monday (18 April 1994), but he did not cross the river as he paddled canoes on the Kanyaru river. Instead, he went to see his friend the Hutu Councillor of Mukindo Sector, François Macumi, and asked him to protect his wife and children. Another informant from Saga Sector, François Mukezamfura, was told by two party leaders that violence was about to start but ignored that information, since he did not immediately take flight:

I went to the bar to drink with the Assistant Burgomaster Vunabandi. We were neighbours. We went to drink in the bar of Raymond. Masima [Jean Baptiste Mukuralinda] ordered a bottle of drink. […] He was head of MDR power [in Saga] […] He said: ‘Let them give you a bottle so that I give you farewell.’ I asked: ‘How can you tell me goodbye whereas I am not going on a trip?’ He answered: ‘Anyway you should know that your fate is going to be sealed very soon.’ So I said: ‘If it is a bottle you are offering me, let them give you a bottle to drink too.’ The assistant Vunabandi laughed and emphasized: ‘But you should start to tell people goodbye.’ That is when I heard [how things were going to be hard].²

² Interview with François Mukezamfura, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.
Before the genocide, some time in 1993 or 1994, Mukezamfura indicates that some Burundian friends told him that they heard from meetings of the Hutu that the Tutsi were going to be killed. But at that time, as he emphasizes, he could not know that this would happen.

Thirdly, between the 7 and 19 April 1994, some actual attacks against Tutsi and some looting of property occurred. But still several Tutsi did not read the signs of the times correctly. Some accounts narrate how incidents of early violence occurred in Joma Sector, then it reached Shyombo Sector, and then Mukindo Sector. Indeed, some children who were from Secondary School and who were returning home for vacation passed through Joma, and some of them were killed and others were injured. Then the Burgomaster came to collect those injured and took them allegedly to hospital, but this is not confirmed.³ In addition, the house of a certain Rutazigwa from Nyamabuye cell of Joma Sector was burned. The Burgomaster, together with the gendarmes, took those who had burned it to jail them. But in the process, he went to enquire in Butare how to halt these episodes of violence.⁴ In Shyombo, André Uzaramba, who was Councillor of Shyombo Sector at the time of the genocide and who was among my informants, narrated how three Tutsi boys ran towards him as they were being followed by men who wanted to assault them. When they saw him, they stopped their plan to attack those children. As a result, he took those children, calmed them down and brought them to their parents. Two belonged to Mr. Vénuste Boneza and one to Mr. Joseph Sikubwabo.⁵

Then concerning the looting in certain sectors, in Saga Sector some early looting occurred but was not seen as a sign of violence to come. Here is the account of Augustin Nemeye from Saga:

³ Interview with Domitilla Niyonsaba, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
⁵ Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
friends]. So they intervened in his favour, and his cows were recuperated. But this was to mislead him [things became harsh thereafter]. Then on Monday the first group started to flee, going to Burundi. But we, we felt that it was not necessary to flee. We thought that those attacking and advising us to flee just wanted to benefit by taking our belongings, but that no one could kill a person.6

This looting was also mentioned by people from Kanage of Mukindo Sector. According to the informant Ildéphonse Habimana, a businessman and wealthy cattle merchant from Kibirizi in Nyaruhengeri Commune named Sebasoni was fleeing to Burundi via the Kanage crossing bridge. As he was fleeing, he met with some Tutsi people from that area and informed them that violence had started where he came from. Some decided to join him and they fled to Burundi. Following this flight, the Burgomaster asked certain neighbours of Tutsi who had fled to take care of their property including some cows that were wandering around without any herders and destroying crops. The Burgomaster took some other property to the Commune office allegedly to look after it.7 One of these Tutsis from Kanage is Cyriaque who was an old man. Here is what my informant Anonymous 15 says about the targeting of the property of those who fled:

Cyriaque was an old Tutsi man from Mukindo. He fled to Burundi, and left his cattle. Then some men from Kanage came to tell Kajyambere [the Burgomaster] in the following morning that those people fled. Then Kajyambere went to collect those cattle and brought them to the Commune office. Then the population came to see him at the Commune office around these hours [around 13:00] and told him: ‘Give us those cattle, we want to eat them, especially if you fail to tell us the whereabouts of the owners of these cattle.’8

On Monday, 18 April 1994, the house of Gaca from Kanage was destroyed and looted by some people from Kanage, Mukindo.9 My informant from Mukindo, François Ntukabumwe, also indicated that his three houses located at the Kanage centre were destroyed, some of his cows were eaten and his wife and children fled but not to Burundi.10

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6 Interview with Augustin Nemeye, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
7 Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007.
10 Interview with François Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
In Joma Sector also, some accounts point to early looting and the intervention of the Burgomaster:

Some others from Joma started to slaughter livestock and to evict people. They were coming, they find you in your house, they take your livestock and slaughter it. When the Burgomaster knew about this, he went to collect the gendarmes. Here there was a small section of the gendarmerie that was staying at Makwaza mountain. He caught those people, and some of them were shot. […] It was after the death of Habyarimana, but the killing had not started. [6-19 April]. So he went to stop those things. I am telling you, some people were shot and injured. […] That was done by the gendarmerie. Things became hot. When the Burgomaster became overwhelmed, he allegedly went to Butare to report on that case at the Prefecture.11

The account of François Manirabona from Joma mentions the robbery of one goat of a Tutsi person by a group of Hutu persons who were from Joma and Shyombo and who were neighbours to that Tutsi person. He also mentions the burning of houses and the looting of property in several houses of Tutsi, the intervention of the gendarmerie to halt those acts of vandalism and the arrest of the perpetrators.12 Although this informant observes that the organisers of those actions were not known, it is possible that in Shyombo and Joma, the initiative to loot property seems to have come from the residents themselves, since the authorities came to stop it.

The fourth pattern identified in the narratives about how genocide started in Kibayi concerns the decisions and actions of the Burgomaster and the Commune Security apparatuses in reaction to early violence against the Tutsi and against their property. In reaction to the attack against the Tutsi, narratives say that the Burgomaster together with the gendarmes told the Tutsi who had gathered in their southern sectors such as Shombo, Joma and Mukindo to go to the Commune office in order to be protected there against the attacks of their neighbours. As Ildéphonse Habimana explained, the Tutsi who agreed to go to the Commune office gathering place were refering to the experience of 1959 where again the Tutsi had fled and remained safe. They thought that it could be the same

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again. According to Narcisse Nzaramyimana, the Tutsi spent around one week at the Commune office, between 15 and 22 April 1994, in his estimation. They had fled there with their livestock and with some other belongings, which probably helped them to survive. Also some Hutu relatives were visiting them, bringing them some few things needed for consumption. They were mixed with some few Hutu who felt insecure at their homes.

Finally, concerning the northern sectors, that is Runyinya, Kibayi, Saga and Rwamiko, the accounts stress that early violence was recorded in Kibayi and Runyinya before Saga, and Saga before Rwamiko.

In reaction to early violence and early looting, the Burgomaster went to the Prefecture office to enquire how to stop it. Then he allegedly came back with the genocide schedule. The informants stress that it is from Butare meetings that the Burgomaster received that order. Indeed, on 19 April 1994, a meeting held by the President Sindikubwao and the Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda in Butare Prefecture put in place the new Prefect, Sylvain Nsabimana and demoted Jean Baptiste Habyarimana. It is in this meeting that the President made a speech exhorting the Butare people to be active in the genocide. Then on 20 April, the new Prefect Sylvain Nsabimana held a security meeting in which they discussed ways of implementing the genocide order. Also, another meeting took place on 21 April 1994 in Ndora Commune at the Headquarters of the Gisagara Subprefecture. It was held by the President Sindikubwabo.

7.2. GENOCIDE IN SECTORS OF KIBAYI COMMUNE

7.2.1. Genocide in Shyombo, Joma and Mukindo Sectors

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14 Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
15 Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera; Anonymous 15; Epaphrodite Ndibaze and Laurent Rwabigwi.
Shyombo, Joma and Mukindo Sectors can be combined as far as genocidal massacres are concerned for a number of reasons. First, the bulk of the Tutsi population that lived in those three areas are said to have fled to the Commune office located in the Mukindo Sector. Secondly, those Tutsi who were killed at their homes are said to have been fewer than those who were massacred at the Commune office. Thirdly, the Tutsi who survived in those three sectors seem to have used almost the same means that include crossing the border to Burundi immediately, hiding in Hutu friends’ homes and then crossing the border to Burundi, as well as hiding in their Hutu fellows’ homes until the end of genocide.

a) How the Tutsi gathered and went to the Commune office

It can be said that the Tutsi of Shyombo Sector gathered on their own initiative, but went to the Commune office on the initiative of the Councillor. Indeed, the bulk of Tutsi inhabitants from Shyombo who did not flee to Burundi gathered together at one hill, close to a certain Mujyejye’s home 17 and were then asked to proceed to the Commune office where the authorities promised to protect them against the Hutu attackers. The gathering at that hill took place on Monday, 18 April, a suggestion that the threat against the Tutsi of this area occurred before the Butare Prefecture call to genocide (i.e., 19 April 1994). 18 This gathering of Tutsi was provoked by the attack and killing of some Tutsi people at the small centre in Kazenga. This attack also occurred on Monday, 18 April. 19

This gathering was also the result of Tutsi trying to protect themselves as they heard rumours coming from the neighbouring Joma Sector where a certain Evariste Rutazigwa was evicted. The killers’ mobs ran after him in order to catch and kill him, but he escaped by running away and crossing the Kanyaru river up to Burundi. This is what Bisamaza reconstructs:

17 Interview with André Uzaramba and Jean Bosco Nzeyimana.
18 Interview with Anonymous 17 and Ildéphonse Bisamaza.
19 Interview with André Uzaramba.
At our Sector, things started on Monday 18 April. I still remember it. We heard that things were bad in Gikongoro. Then the ones who live near Kanyaru river told us that they saw corpses floating in the river coming from Gikongoro. It is on Sunday 17th that we heard here that things were severe. They said that the war is about to occur. At first we underestimated this information [that is why many did not flee immediately.] We said: ‘From where will the war originate?’ On Monday 18th, we spent the day helpless and fearful, and our neighbours changed their mood and face. It looked as if they secretly knew about things. Some of them started to sharpen their machetes, day and evening. Then on Monday around 15 hours, we heard rumours from Nyamabuye cell. People were running after the man Evariste Rutazigwa, who was Tutsi from Nyamabuye. The war started in Nyamabuye. [...] That rumour was saying that the Tutsi have exterminated the Hutu.20

When the Tutsi who gathered at Mujyejye’s home saw the Councillor, André Uzaramba, they asked him to help them. According to this Councillor, they asked him to take them to the commune office. Then he accompanied them there, with some of their belongings. When he arrived in Kazenga, he found corpses of slain people really there. He says that near those bodies he found a certain François Bijiyibwami, who was seemingly in charge of that killing, and who was from MDR party. He also found Ananias Bavumiragiye and Emmanuel Nshimiyimana there. They were from Joma but ‘worked’ everywhere. Bijiyibwami was in prison in Butare at the time of the interview, while Bavumiragiye and Nshimiyimana had fled to Congo. Those are the ones who initiated the killing between Shyombo and Joma. Then concerning the Tutsi from Shyombo who fled to the Commune office, here is what this former Councillor said:

[Some of] those who fled to the commune office were living here in Shyombo, and it is me who escorted them, by way of helping them to flee. As the population had surrounded them, they told me: ‘Please Councillor, deliver us from these people and make us arrive at the administration office, you see these people want to kill us.’ [...] They spent two nights at the Commune office, then the massacre happened.21

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21 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
Anonymous 17, who is from Nyakazana Cell and who chose not to go to the Commune office and as a result survived, argues that Uzaramba took those Tutsi from Shyombo to the Commune office, knowing very well that it was a place of death rather than of rescue:

The Tutsi who were close there assembled together. Makanyaga [nickname of Councillor André Uzaramba] came and brought the military. He took them to the Commune office. He said that it was a way of seeking a refuge for them. You seek a refuge for them, whereas you take them to death? So he went on asking: ‘Is there anyone remaining here?’ […] The ones who wanted to cross the border, he forbade them to do so, this man [Makanyaga]. He took them back to the Commune office. All of them vanished.

Those Tutsi that Councillor Uzaramba accompanied were from Nyakazana and Nyabiryo cells of Shyombo Sector. In his estimation they were around thirty families.22 Ladislas Harerimana who was Hutu but had a Tutsi wife, calculates that around forty people from his wife’s family were taken from Shyombo to the Commune office and were all killed.23 Anonymous 17 from Nyakazana calculates that the victims who were from her extended family and who perished at the Commune office were around twenty five.24 According to Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, no Tutsi among those who were from Shyombo and who went to the Commune office survived.25

While there is consensus that those Tutsi who were taken to the Commune office were exterminated, the contradiction or the debate is over the intention of the local leader who took them there. Because the Councillor took the Tutsi to the Commune office before the genocide occurred, he may argue that he did not have the signal to commit genocide at that time, which means that he did not intend to sacrifice them. But if it happens that he knew that they were to be assembled in order to be killed, then he was fulfilling the genocidal project. The result shows they were not rescued. But before the killing, that is, at the time of taking them to the Commune office, it is hard to dispute his claim that he was rescuing them. That is what makes the case against this Councillor very complicated.

22 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
23 Interview with Ladislas Harerimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
25 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Kibayi, 12 mai 2007.
Concerning the *Gacaca* tribunal trial of this case, Councillor Uzaramba received a three year sentence, suggesting that he was not put in the category of those who planned or incited others to commit acts of genocide, which would have earned him a sentence of life imprisonment. As he had spent nine years in jail, he was a free man at the time of the interview.\(^{26}\)

The bulk of Tutsi of Joma and Mukindo were told by the Burgomaster or their Councillors to go to the Commune office.\(^ {27}\) But some other Tutsi took their own decision to go there, where they saw others gathering.

**b) Massacre at the Commune office**

Three informants from Mukindo claim to have been witnesses of the massacre at the Commune office of Kibayi located at Nyabisagara of Mukindo Sector. Two were bystanders and one was a victim. The first one, Narcisse Nzarmacyimana, narrates how the Tutsi gathered and how the decision to start the massacre was communicated:

> Then when people here got afraid, they sought how to flee, they fled here in this house in which we are sitting [former Commune office, where the interview was taking place], but they were outside this house in the courtyard. [...] I think the killing started on 22 April. I guess they had been here a week before. It may be between 15 and 22 April. They came from various sectors of the Commune. They lived here, but the mood was not fine. [...] It is the Tutsi who came here, or the others who had misunderstandings with the state, but the Tutsi were the majority. They fled here with their livestock, or with some other stuff. We were also visiting them, because there were some of our relatives among them. The existing authorities were giving them morale. The day the killing started, in the morning [of 22 April 1994], I remember that the leader of this Commune met with me as I was standing with other men who included Tutsi, then he talked to us. It was morning, then he went to Butare town. We heard that he went to the meeting of all leaders of the Communes of Butare. Before they left they had said how to protect the population who were here. But what came from the meeting of Butare, they are the ones who know it. But the outcome became about exterminating people. [...] When they came back around 15 hours, that is when he came, that day he had

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\(^{26}\) This contradiction between Uzaramba and Anonymous 17 was also present in the trial of Uzaramba, because Anonymous 17 was among his plaintiffs.

\(^{27}\) Interview with François Manirabona and François Ntukabumwe.
gone together with the soldiers, when they came back, they were meeting with the people who were badly waiting for news about what was happening. All the people were near the road. They told them: ‘You are stupid, what are you waiting for there?’ They gave them secret codes, they ordered them to kill.28

The following part of Nzaramyimana’s account is about how the massacre was done and the strategies to have more people participate:

Then immediately the killing started, some used whistles to call people telling them that the *Inkotanyi* (RPF rebels) have attacked the Commune office, so that they could convince them to join them, in reality they came to kill those who had fled here. […] Another thing that made the killing become severe here is that as people from here had refused at first to kill, they used the youth from the Burundian camp of Kanage who had fled war from their country and who were used to fighting. They used them in the killing of people who were here. The killing lasted two days.29

The account of the second witness adds something to the previous one:

So the people [the Tutsi] started to assemble, the Hutu gathered, came close to them, then the killing started. It is the guns that were used at first by the police at the Commune office. They were shooting, but not shooting at people. They had had a briefing on this, they told the killers who went to kill those others: ‘When you hear us shooting, the Tutsi will get fear and will scatter, so you, you will start to kill them.’ Therefore, they were shooting, they were in the yard of the Commune office. Me too, I remember, I was there too. I had gone there to visit some family members of mine who had fled there. When they shot, people jumped. Me too I jumped, and ran. So for others, the one who jumps, they cut him with a machete. The killing started that way. […] It was the Hutu cutting the Tutsi, it is the population from here. Among them there were Burundians who were staying in a camp at Kanage, who were working with the population here, of these two sectors [Joma and Mukindo]. They went to kill the Tutsi there, they chopped them. They killed them in two days at the Commune office. The first day, and the morning of the second day. They finished them at the evening [of the second day].30

According to both informants, the massacre lasted two days. The account of the third witness, who was also among the people who had fled at the Commune office and who miraculously survived there, gives dates which are different from the ones of

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28 Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
29 Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
Nzaramyimana, but confirms that the massacre lasted two days. The first part of his account is about how he ended up at the Commune office:

As I was at Kanyaru [river], I heard from my son Koku and my worker called Aphrodis that my three houses were destroyed at the Kanage centre, but refused to go to Burundi without my wife and children. The people ate my cattle, and my wife and children fled. I refused to cross, I went to see the Councillor Macumi. He told me that the fate of the Tutsi is sealed. I asked him to help me find my family members. He allowed me to sleep at his home and promised to help me. We had been friends. He took me to the Commune office the following morning. ‘Let me take you to the Commune office, he said, then I will search for your wife and children. Nothing bad will happen to you at the Commune office.’ Then he brought me here at the Commune office. But as we walked, we saw houses burning. When I arrived here, I found several Tutsi here. I found also my younger brother Evariste Nzunkize with my mother. They were living in Runyinya Sector. Then we realised that the mother had a problem. We told her to go back home to seek protection to her brothers, since they are Hutu, they have no problem. The mother went, so I remained with my brother. So we spent the whole day here [at the commune office where also the interview was taking place].

The following part of the interview is about the Burgomaster going to Butare to enquire about how to deal with the issue of security of the displaced Tutsi:

Then the Burgomaster told us: ‘Listen, don’t go away from here, stay here, you see the population has attacked you. You Claver [Assistant Burgomaster Claver Zirimwabagabo] look after these people, see these are the policemen, me I go to Butare.’ Then he took some soldiers, put them in the car and went. He went after telling us that. […] We were all here. Then after a short time, the Burgomaster came back, as he was from Butare. He arrived here at 14 hours. He parked his car there [in front of the Commune office], the soldiers came out of it, then he called Claver who was Assistant Burgomaster, he told him: ‘All these people who have fled here are accomplices of Inkotanyi. These are the ones who came to take over the country, in fact they came to take over the Commune office. These are the spies. Therefore, they must not flee, we must kill them, they have been sacrificed.’ […] This was Kajyambere Burgomaster telling this to Claver Zirimwabagabo who was Assistant Burgomaster. […] He was saying this here at the ground in front of the Commune office, at our presence. He had a megaphone with so many soldiers from there at Makwaza. The date was 18 April 1994, on Wednesday [sic, in reality, Wednesday was 20 April 1994]. ‘Yes, we must kill them.’ We did not know that these things had been planned well before.31

The last part of the account of Ntukabumwe is about how the massacre was done:

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31 Interview with François Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
Then we saw all the inhabitants coming with spears, the soldiers and the police surrounded the area, they started to shoot at us. The population collected stones, threw them on us, we also threw back the same stones at them. But because many people had fled here, approximately it can be 15,000. They were Tutsi from Kibayi. Some others had come from Butare [i.e., urban centre of Butare Prefecture]. [...] There were also some students who could not cross, and then they came to administrative areas to seek protection. Even some from Mugombwa were coming. [...] Others from Murama of Kigembe also came here seeking protection from the ruling power. [...] Then they started to shoot. The first to shoot was Charles from Nyagahuru who was a policeman. Another is Alexis, who used a gun with legs, he also shot here. Then the situation became severe, the population also threw stones at us. We threw back those stones. That allowed the women and the children to enter the house of the Commune office. We tried to flee, but we failed. We realised that the Commune office was surrounded, no one could pass. [...] It was the population of the Commune who surrounded it. They had spears, others bows, so we also entered the Commune house. There were also Burundians who were in the refugee camp who used grenades to bomb us. They even had home made grenades, made in bottles which exploded like grenades. We entered the office, they shot at us the whole night, it was also raining. They shot, they threw stones. This office was full of people, some we went in the ceiling. A person shot me an arrow on the leg. At the night Kajyambere [Burgomaster] put lights of his car on so that the killers could continue shooting. Those who were behind the Commune office fence which was destroyed then had also torches. Then they shot the whole night. In the morning, the people were finished. But me, I remained here alive, there were also four women alive in the morning of Thursday. With three women and me alive. I was just injured and painful, all of us were injured. They removed us from the ceiling. The Councillor Macumi said: ‘Come here.’ We came away, so the people there took the women to the medical centre. He said: ‘Take also this man.’ They refused, they said they must kill me. Macumi objected, alleging that since long ago I am a peaceful man, although I am Tutsi.

This informant Ntukabumwe was not killed. Nevertheless, he lost his brother in that massacre. But, as we shall see later, he was ordered to participate in the genocide in order to be spared, and he accepted. All these three informants point to the participation of policemen and local population in the massacre, but also the participation of Burundi

32 The policemen of Kibayi Commune were the following on 31 December 1993: Gilbert Diriye, Sylvestre Nzabamwita, Charles Matabaro, Claver Ndikunkiko and Alexandre Semashinge. (Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Kibayi, A Monsieur le Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, Objet : Liste du personnel communal de Kibayi au 31/12/1993, Réf. : N° 19/04.01.02, Kibayi, le 2/2/1994.)
33 Interview with François Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
refugees who settled at Kanage refugee settlement in Mukindo Sector, just near to the Commune office.

Four other people such as Shirubute, Niyonsaba, Nyirimana and Baritunga confirm the going of the Burgomaster to Butare and the coming back with the genocide project. The use of grenades is mentioned by Joseph Baritunga.34

Concerning the number of victims at the Commune office, I was informed by the administrative leader of Mukindo in June 2007 that the estimated number of victims who were killed at the Commune office is 1,700, almost all being Tutsi. This number was reached following the counting of bones of victims that were found later at the Commune office.35

  c) How certain Tutsi did not go to the Commune office but were killed

The killing of Tutsi in Shyombo, Joma and Mukindo did not occur only at the Commune office. A number of others were killed at or near their homes. Though it is difficult to determine their number from interviews, the informants estimate that those killed on hills were less numerous than the ones who were killed at the Commune office. An analysis of some specific cases mentioned by my informants reveals that the bulk of those Tutsi killed at the hills where they lived tended to be the ones who were either related to – or those who had built strong friendship ties with – the Hutu neighbours. As a result, they did not go to the Commune office with other Tutsi, or did not take the option of crossing the Kanyaru river in order to reach Burundi, as these hills of Mukindo, Joma and Shyombo have the Kanyaru river as their valleys, which means that a walk of about thirty minutes was sufficient to arrive on the other side of the Kanyaru, that is, in Burundi.

35 Telephonic conversation with David Nityamira Muhire, Executive Secretary of Mukindo Sector, on 1 June 2007. The Mukindo Sector since 2006 includes more than the half of the territory of former Kibayi Commune.
These include the father of my informant Bisamaza who was killed at his hill with two children from his second wife who was Hutu. As he had a Hutu wife, and because the Hutu were not targeted by genocide, he may have thought that he could be spared. But only that wife survived. This father of Bisamaza was attacked with a machete allegedly by a certain Harerimana, a Burundian bachelor. Bisamaza also lost his younger brother in the killings that happened on the hill, but he did not stress whether this brother was related to the Hutu or not. He was allegedly killed by two men, Joseph Semakuba and Paul Ndimurwango.36

Another case mentioned is that of the families of Augustin Mararo and his son Gérard Birasa. My informant Ladislas Harerimana was neighbour to Birasa and his father Mararo’s homes. These are the families which were targeted in the Cyimana cell of Shyombo Sector as they were the only Tutsi families in that cell. According to Harerimana, some neighbours protected these Tutsi families.

They said: ‘The ones who want to fight against these they will first fight against us.’ As the attacking mobs were few, they withdrew and went. They did not kill them at that day. They instead went to destroy houses. They destroyed, they looted. Afterwards, they came back more powerful and searched for them, discovered them and killed them.37

This informant says that the killers of Birasa include Vitaliani Nduwumwami, Shumbusha, Munyandekwe and many others such as Mirenzo. Some of these have died. Others, such as Munyandekwe, are jailed because of this. The ones who killed Mararo include Nyandwi Byankandondera, who is said by some to be a Burundian, while others say that he was a Rwandan who had just been living in Burundi.

Another informant, Alfred Ndahimana, also from Cyimana Cell, asserts that he was among the Hutu who were protecting Mararo, and that, as a result, he came under suspicion. He had to kill a person in order to redeem himself, as he narrates:

37 Interview with Ladislas Hererimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
My role [in genocide], I was able to kill a person, after being ordered to do so by those who led the killers’ mobs. They told me that if I don’t kill him, me too I will die. They ordered me to do this because of the Tutsi Augustin Mararo whom they wanted to kill, then I intervened in his favour. I even gave prices for him to get rescued. Then they turned against me, saying that I am part of the enemy, they said if I don’t kill a person, I will die with him. That is how I committed the sin.38

Indeed, he killed a person called Alexandre Ngarukiye. He claims to have not killed any other person. He thinks that he killed that person just at the beginning of the genocide. He was jailed in August 1996 and was released in May 2003, he is left with one year of community work. It is Vitaliani Nduwumwami who ordered him to kill Ngarukiye.39

Another element that stressed the long time interaction of Gérard Birasa with the Hutu is that after his death, his six children were hidden by the Hutu neighbours. They were killed in the second phase of genocide in May 1994 at the time of the hunting of Tutsi who were hidden by Hutu.40 As for the perpetrators in Shyombo, Vitaliani Nduwumwami and Shumbusha are said to have been leaders of mobs of killers. Others included Jean Bosco Nzeyimana and Vénuste Bizumuremyi.41

Some killings of Tutsi occurred also on Joma hill. Those that I came across in my interviews are also cases of Tutsi who expected a hiding place from their Hutu relatives. For example, my informant Théodosie Kanyanja was married in Joma but she was originally from Kibayi Sector. She was Tutsi but had a Hutu mother and a Hutu husband called Augustin Mutungirehe. A few days before the beginning of massacres in Kibayi Commune, she went with her husband to visit her family members at Kibayi Sector. When they arrived there, genocide started. As a result, she and her husband decided to return to Joma. In the process, she took with her two boys, one was her brother and the other was the son of her elder sister. When they arrived in Joma, she hid those two boys in the ceiling of their house. Her husband went to arrange a deal with another man to accompany those children to Burundi at night. It was Manariyo who agreed to drive the

38 Interview with Alfed Ndahimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
40 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Kibayi, 12 mai 2007.
41 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Kibayi, 12 mai 2007.
children in a small boat. He had accepted 5,000 Francs for that deal. Then before they went, it was in the morning at 8:30 am of a certain day, they heard a noise, some people emerged from a forest down from their house:

They came hunting, as people who hunt wild animals, that means the killing was starting. We were standing at Nyabikoni in Joma, they came until home. Those children were still in the house. I was also in the house. They surrounded the house and the sorghum field, it was April, the month of the starting of growing of sorghum. Those attackers include Xaveri Hatungimana, Nibivugire and Rutoni, they are from Nyamabuye, Joma. Those children, in fact they were almost grown up teenagers, went up in the roof. Then they said: ‘Hey, don’t destroy this house, let us come down to you.’ My husband ran as he heard that the children had said to come down. Nibivugire ran at him and shot him an arrow with a bow in the leg, he got mildly injured. When he arrived at his maternal aunt, as she was in the field in the valley, she covered him with grass. [...] Vianney Uwimana, who just talked to me in the interview, as he is also part of my informants was part of that attack from Nyamabuye. He is part of those who killed that teenager Vénuste Bizimana, son of my elder sister. He removed his clothes.

They killed those two children, then continued to search for this informant Kanyanja. In order to escape, she went to hide to Nzanywayimana’s house at Nyabikoni, Rebero cell, Joma Sector.

The man called Nsenga who was Professor at Save Secondary School [Vincent Nsengiyumva] was going all over with books explaining to people that he had studied that those actions are allowed: ‘Whatever I say, you must do it, as I am Professor.’ Then my mother-in-law asked him: ‘Do you have a book of law that says to kill people? This blood you are throwing you will pay the consequence of it.’ They took her with hands behind and threw her in a field. He is the one who attacked our home with a mob coming from Nyamabuye. [...] I hear that Nsenga is in Malawi, but I am not sure. He was born in Nyamabuye.

She got a person to accompany her to her mother-in-law and hid there. Her husband also came there so they saw each other. Then they heard a whistle calling people to go to rescue the Commune office with their weapons, saying that the Commune office has been attacked by the Tutsi. Which means that the killing in Joma started probably before the massacre at the Commune office. She says that they stayed in the house for three days, as the killing at the Commune office was happening.42

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The leadership of killings at Joma by Vincent Nsengimana, teacher in Secondary School, is confirmed by my informant Vianney Uwimana who was among those who killed the two boys in the home of Kanyanja and Mutungirehe:

The killing started here [Joma] on the 18 April. The ones who initiated it are two men: Vincent Nsengiyumva and Joseph Enquêteur. But Enquêteur is not a name, it is the job he did, he was Joseph from Gitarama. Those are the ones who took the lead in killing the Tutsi here in Joma, and in mobilising the population about the killing. Nsengiyumva was a teacher at Save. Enquêteur was investigator at the Commune office. When they started that [killing], they attacked the man Evariste Rutazigwa, the following day, they went to the man Mutungirehe, even myself I was with them at Mutungirehe’s house. Then we killed people there. Then they continued, them they continued. […] Rutazigwa did not die, he ran until he reached Burundi. His wife and children fled to the Commune office. […] Rutazigwa lives in Nyamabuye, we are neighbours. But Mutungirehe is Hutu. [They killed a child who had sought refuge at Mutungirehe’s home] […] I was only part of the mob that killed that child. […] He was killed by Ezéchiel Karikurubu, who is at Karubanda [prison]. […] I accused myself for my involvement in that killing.43

Another person mentioned as an inciter of killings is Pierre Kanimba.44 According to Vianney Uwimana, only a few people died at their homes. The majority went to public gathering places.45

In Mukindo Sector, some Tutsi were killed at their homes. But in the estimation of Baritunga, they were fewer than the ones who were killed at the Commune office. He counted fourteen people who were killed at Nyabisagara hill, which is part of Mukindo. 46 The well known businessman Nyirimungu who had a shop at the Kibayi Kabuga commercial centre is believed to have been killed in Mukindo Sector as well. The military gendarmes located at Makwaza promised to rescue him. As a result, they brought him and his family to Makwaza mountain. According to my informants, it was a trap in order to collect his money, his goods and his car. Once the money was finished, they

46 Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
killed him and his family members and went to throw their bodies near the water pools at a place called mu Kadahokwa located not far from the Commune office.47

7.2.2. Genocide in Kibayi Sector

Apart from the Commune office, another place where a mass killing of Tutsi occurred in the Kibayi Commune is the Kabuga commercial centre, located in Kibayi Sector. Kibayi Sector accommodated more Tutsi than any other sector of Kibayi and was close to Nyagahuru which also had a significant Tutsi population in the Commune after Kibayi, Rwamiko and Saga Sectors. Furthermore, the Kibayi commercial centre had shops which belonged to businessmen who were mainly Tutsi. When attacks against the Tutsi started, it is probably for these two reasons that the Tutsi of the Kibayi Sector and of Nyagahuru and of some other surrounding sectors felt secure to gather at the central ground of that business centre.

After the Tutsi had gathered at Kabuga centre, the leaders and the military went to mobilise the Hutu population of Kibayi Sector but also of Runyinya Sector. At first, they told them to come to rescue the Tutsi who were allegedly attacked. Thereafter, the message changed, they told them that the Tutsi were the enemy and that they had to go to loot the Kabuga shops.48 They emphasized that the Tutsi were killing the Hutu. As a result, some Hutu from surrounding areas flocked to Kabuga to respond to that call. They looted the shops, but the military were allegedly the ones who looted more things, as they were using cars in the transportation of looted goods.49

The message to kill the Tutsi only came later, if we refer to the account of one informant who was present at Kabuga during the massacre of Tutsi there. Her name is Drocelle Uwimana. She lived in Joma Sector where she was married since 1990, but her parents lived in Kibayi Sector. She was Tutsi but her husband was Hutu. In the first part of her

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account, she narrates how she arrived in Kibayi Sector at the beginning of the violence against the Tutsi:

My husband was not around, he had gone to Kigali to visit her sister, so he failed to make his way back home as there was no public transportation [after the 6 April 1994]. At Kibayi [Sector] there were many Tutsi at my home, so they hoped that no one could attack them. At home, they feared for me, since in Joma the Tutsi were few, it was like two families only. They sent my elder sister to come to fetch me. She came, we went together at my family home. On our way, we met with others fleeing to the Commune office. We hoped that no one could attack us since there were many young men. We arrived at home, I saw that there was no problem. I had a child. I gave him a bath, then we went in the house, we slept.

Towards the evening of the day when she arrived in Kibayi Sector, the attack against Tutsi occurred, the attackers being both the civilians and the military, as Uwimana picks up in her narrative:

In the evening, we heard around Saga an *igitero* (attack) coming from there at night. We went out of the house and into the valley. We came back in the morning and felt that there was no problem. Around 8:00 am, we saw another very big *igitero* [killers’ mob attack] that was threatening. This *igitero* was side by side with the Tutsi from Linda. All were rushing, but they were not killing them, they overtook them. Then we became a lot in Kabuga centre, just in the middle [of shops], that is where we were. Then the time arrived, we saw the military coming in their cars. We saw many Hutu coming, wearing banana branches. They came dancing, with bows on their chests. But I thought it was ordinary things, I hoped that they could not kill people. Then the military came, lied to the Tutsi, told them to assemble their weapons, and put them somewhere. I am jumping some parts of the account. They started to throw stones at each other. From Mugombwa and from the road up Kabuga there were many people coming from there flocking, it was many mobs on the attack. There were some women, and some young maids with baskets of stones. All their weapons were with them. Some came from Mugombwa, others from Saga, others from Kibayi. It was a mixture of populations. They came, the military shot into the air, those populations lay down. One soldier went to talk to those who were sleeping down, we saw that he was giving them a small briefing forbidding them to attack. Then when the time arrived, they [the military] came and told us: ‘These people had become hardliners, take all your weapons, keep them somewhere, and we, we will face those people.’ They went to ask them also for their weapons, they [the Hutu] also agreed to hand them over. But the military kept those weapons at a place known by them. For others [the Tutsi] they kept their weapons in an area they did not know. But some clever people kept their weapons with them. After keeping those weapons, it was like 16 hours. They had put women in one place, we were very numerous, an overwhelming number. All women of Linda, Kibayi and
Mugombwa had fled to Kabuga. So many, countless. Then God helped me, the child cried. So I went out of the group, it was a fat baby, so I said to myself, let me go to ask water, as I slept last night in grass, so that I can bathe it. I knew the Kabuga centre houses, because I was working there when I was still single, I was sewing clothes there. I planned that afterwards, when I come back, I will go with others at Mugombwa parish, because my mother had told me that if we are able to go to Mugombwa [parish] with others, we will be safe. I went with the baby, as I was bathing it, I saw that where I was sitting, all those mobs came with their weapons. We did not know where they got those weapons. Then they started to chop people with machetes, then people started to scatter. The men ran. They chopped the women who refused to leave the children. Those who knew they should run, ran, others ran after them. Others continued to chop them in Kabuga. They chopped from 16 hours to 19 hours. As they scattered, many of them fled to Mugombwa church, others to Kabuye.\textsuperscript{50}

Mugombwa Church located in nearby Muganza Commune, and Kabuye hill located in Ndora Commune, became two of the biggest sites of genocide where tens of thousands of Tutsi were massacred. Drocelle Uwimana went to hide with an old lady neighbour and then with the Councillor of Kibayi Sector, Jean Bosco Ndagijimana. Then she went back to Joma after some weeks, probably in early May 1994.

The Councillor told me: ‘I have kept you for a long time, now what can I do?’ As I felt I had no problem being killed, I followed a medical nurse called Josepha, I put the child on my back and went with her. We crossed the whole Kibayi. By the protection of God, no one stopped me on the way. I was covering my face with a dress. It was in May, I had spent a long time there [at Ndagijimana’s house]. Wherever we passed, they thought it was the Hutu passing by.

When she reached the Commune office, she met with Burundians who stopped her. Her clothes were broken as she says. She saw Kajyambere the Burgomaster ordering one of his workers to go and kill a Tutsi man who came out of his hiding place in the bush. He came there to seek help because he found his house destroyed. So Kajyambere ordered one of his men to take him somewhere, in fact they went to kill him and threw him in a hole. The Burundians on the other hand took Drocelle, counted her ribs to verify if she was Tutsi. They also checked her hands and fingers. They asserted that she was Tutsi. They took her. Then the Director of IGA [adult literacy learning programme], Ignace,

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with Drocelle Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007.
asked the Burundians to let her back, so that he can go to bring her husband to collect the children. 

He went with a bicycle, collected family members of my husband, no, he took instead people who were praying with us, since my husband’s family members did not support me. They were angry at their child marrying a Tutsi, but my husband had hidden that from me. Then those people came and we went together. Those we prayed with include Rukizangabo who prayed with my husband. We went home.

Until the end of the genocide in Joma, Drocelle was protected by her husband. Then when the RPF won the war and the Hutu fled, Drocelle fled with her husband to Burundi. They settled at a place called mu Cyahi in Burundi in a Pentecostal church. But then Drocelle was threatened to be killed by the Hutu who were there. She decided and convinced her husband to come back to Rwanda in September 1994. Most Hutu came back in 1996. Drocelle had two children, both survived. They had a third, then the husband died of sickness. She got remarried and had a fourth child at the time of the interview. In her family, people who survived were: one girl who just completed high school education and a soldier from the RPF rebellion. They are only three. His father died of sickness two days before the genocide started. Others were killed. All her brothers were killed. Even her mother who held a Hutu ID book was also killed: “My mother was Hutu, but in reality a Tutsi who had changed her ethnic identity. During the war [genocide], they killed her, because they discovered she was Tutsi.”

I was not able to find numbers of people who were killed at the Kabuga commercial centre of Kibayi Commune, but they must be several hundreds.

7.2.3. Genocide in Runyinya Sector

The accounts of survivors, bystanders and even perpetrators from Runyinya indicate that the Tutsi from Runyinya were killed either at the Commune office, or near their homes and that the bulk of them were killed by being thrown in the Kanyaru river.

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For example, the family members of Anselme Rutabingwa were killed at the Commune office.

Here genocide started later. We heard about it elsewhere. When it arrived here, I was among those who fled earlier. I went around 20 April 1994. […] There is a policeman who was a friend of our family. His name was Semashinge. He took my mother, my grandmother and my sisters to the Commune office [as a way of rescuing them]. They are among the people who got shot at the Commune office. I think no one escaped from the massacre at the Commune office. Because they put them in the room and threw grenades on them, and set them on fire.

He was the only one to survive in his family among those who were in Rwanda.52

My other informant, Augustin Nemeye, survived by crossing the border to Burundi. He indicates that his elder brother and the family of the latter were killed at the Commune office.

Several other Tutsi were killed by being thrown in the Kanyaru river. Here are some accounts.

Among the people with whom we lived [in Runyinya], some died, others survived, but the majority died. […] I also took part in the genocide. But I did not kill a person. I only accompanied mobs of killers. I was among them. For example, we took a lady with her two children and went to throw them in the Kanyaru river. There is another person. His brother-in-law came to call us and told us that he had hidden him, he asked us to come and collect him. So we collected him from his hiding place and brought him, then they killed him.53

A big number of family members of Béatrice Yambabariye were thrown in the Kanyaru river:

Kajyambere mobilised people to work. Then people endeavoured to work, they exterminated [the Tutsi]. I had seven children, they killed them, with their father as the 8th person, with my father-in-law, mother-in-law, with the wife of my brother-in-law, with my other brothers-in-law and their children. They finished them. […] Me I got saved by an old lady Nyirabayovu who was my aunt, she was married to a Hutu. But her husband had died before. […] My five children were thrown in the Kanyaru river, others fled with their father, I don’t know where they

52 Interview with Anselme Rutabingwa, Kibayi, 9 May 2007.
were killed. [...] Me I live near the Kanyaru river, down there in Runyinya Sector, Gitega Cell. I stayed there [at Nyirabayovu’s house] for three months until we fled.54

Fortunée Mujawamariya also explains that the Tutsi of Runyinya were taken to the Kanyaru river, drowned there, and that no one was killed on the Runyinya soil.55 But Nemeye stresses that he lost two children of his younger brothers, who were killed in Runyinya, at a place called Kw’Ishinga, which suggests that certain killings of Tutsi occurred in the territory of Runyinya Sector.

Finally, the account of Libérathe Nyiratabaro indicates that certain Tutsi from Runyinya were killed in remote places. For example, she lost certain members of her family at the Commune office. Others were killed on the hill of Runyinya. As for her and her sisters, they fled to Kabuye. She survived because she was hidden by her maternal uncle who was Hutu.

By the time killing started, some fled to Nyabisagara where the Commune office was located, others fled to Kabuye. I am among those who fled to Kabuye. [...] It is a hill which is not inhabited, just like this hill we are on. It is located in Gisagara. [...] My father and my two younger sisters and my step mother fled to the Commune office. Me at Kabuye I was with some of my young sisters. It was the fleeing in a scattered way. Then we went to Kabuye. Once we arrived there, they started to kill. They killed there so many people. [...] They killed and exterminated people. As for me, I was able to hide and go slowly. I came with my younger sisters, but they were killed here [Runyinya] in such a way that they removed them from soil few days ago during the burying process.56 [...] They were two.

Those who fled to the Commune office were killed, including the younger brother of her father. But her mother survived as she was Hutu. She died in July 2006.57

54 Interview with Béatrice Yambabariye, Kibayi, 9 May 2007.
56 In Rwanda after the 1994 Tutsi genocide, the state, and the survivors identified sites where the Tutsi had been killed and organised each year the their burial. It was, and still is, a way of restoring their dignity and keeping their memory.
57 Interview with Libérathe Nyiratabaro, Kibayi, 9 May 2007.
7.2.4. Genocide in Saga Sector

The Tutsi of Saga died in several places that include Saga territory, Kabuye hill, and Mugombwa church. According to Mukezamfura, Nyirisenge and Uwiringiyimana, a few died at Mugombwa Church and at Kabuye, while a lot were killed at or near their homes in Saga and thrown in the Kanyaru river and into toilet pits.\(^{58}\)

Genocide is said to have started in Mukindo before Saga.\(^{59}\) Just as it is the Burgomaster who initiated killings at the Commune office at Mukindo, Saga informants indicate that it is he who also came to mobilise the Saga Hutu to start killing the Tutsi: “At Saga, it is Kajyambere who came to make a meeting. He told people to kill the Tutsi. He said: ‘No one must remain alive, kill even the child.’ Then they started. They killed. In an extended way.”\(^{60}\)

Julienne Uwiringiyimana, a Hutu lady married to a Tutsi man, lost her husband and children as well as almost all family members of her in-laws, most of whom died at Saga. Here is her account:

[The Tutsi households at Saga were a lot] […] Some died at the parish of Mugombwa. Some were killed and put in toilet pits, some were killed at the hill outside, as they were seeking refuge, and failing to get secure paths. They died different deaths. Some were thrown in the Kanyaru river. For example, my husband, they chopped him [with machete] and then threw him in the Kanyaru. Our brothers-in-law fled to the Church [of Mugombwa], then the killers threw grenades inside, they got cut into pieces, were killed and exterminated. Their wives died together with their children, scattered place by place. Everyone had his or her own death.

She knows this from the fact that she was in Saga the whole time of the genocide, as she was hidden by a Hutu man Ladislas Ntirushwamaboko, who was the friend of the extended family of her in-laws: he was cultivating for them since he did not have a big piece of land, then they used to give him food as payment in kind. She also followed

\(^{58}\) Interview with François Mukezamfura, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.

\(^{59}\) Interview with François Mukezamfura, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.

\(^{60}\) Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.
Gacaca tribunal testimonies in her area. She mentions some among the perpetrators who were responsible for the death of her relatives:

Among those who came to attack our extended family area, there is Kagaragara, Ntambara, Macumi, Matayo Cyiza, Batakanwa, Masima [nickname for Jean Baptiste Mukurarinda] also who went on organising them, leading them. He became famous, a star in genocide. With many other bad people. [...] These included Burundian refugees who were settling at Saga. They were students, other Burundians had gone back to their home [country]. Those students remained. They are the ones who organised the Rwandans, teaching them how to throw (burst) grenades. They said: ‘That’s not how you kill people, do it like this.’ They worked in conjunction with the Rwandans. But because I did not arrive at Mugombwa, I cannot know who was a Rwandan working with those Burundians. However, a lady came to be noticed among the killers, her nickname was Kibeberi, but now I hear that she passed away. People say that she collaborated with those who were throwing grenades. [...] [In that church] our two brothers-in-law, Emmanuel Niyibizi and Laurent Ubonabaseka, died there. Others died on the hills, others got thrown into toilet pits.

She complains that the neighbours who saw them killed kept quiet at the time of the Gacaca trials and do not want to tell her how the whole extended family died, who killed them, where are their bones, etc. But she expresses acknowledgement about the current prisoners who testify, plead guilty and tell how the Tutsi were killed. That is how she came to know the situation about some of her family members mentioned above.61

The role of Jean Baptiste Mukurarinda, alias Masima, is asserted in the whole Saga and even Rwamiko Sectors. According to Jean Sindayigaya, who lived just near the Kanyaru river at the place where people passed to cross the river to go to Burundi in Bucaya cell, Masima came to order the population there to stop those Tutsi who were crossing the river from that place. Vincent Kamanzi, the head of the Bucaya cell, disagreed with Masima and advocated that people should let those who were fleeing pass peacefully. “But the youth that was checking the paths used to loot the belongings of the fleeing Tutsi. Then Kamanzi with other Hutu people forbade those youth to loot them.” That was the first day when violence reached his place. No person was killed, according to Sindayigaya. Then the following day, information came saying that the Tutsi caught there must be killed.

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The one who meets with those groups of bad people gets killed. The killing started on the second day, at the first day it was the looting. [...] They kill him or her, and bring his or her corpse to the Kanyaru river. And so on. Thereafter, a law came which stated that no one will throw corpses again in the Kanyaru river, because that can pollute the water. [...] It was still in April 1994. People no longer threw people in the river. They killed them at the hill, in the fields, others in the holes, in the toilet pits, etc. [...] At that time, I remember, Kajyambere came in the Saga Sector, just around four days after the war [massacre]. [...] He asked: ‘Is there any Ibyitso [accomplices] among you?’ The people of Saga answered: ‘No Ibyitso are among us.’ He said: ‘[…] If they are among you, remove them from you.’ He proceeded and went. The killing continued.

Sindayigaya did not see Prefects coming to mobilise inhabitants about the killing. Instead, he saw soldiers with spears in the car, crossing Saga, showing people those spears. He says he did not know how the killing occurred at hills, because he was in the Bucaya Cell, located at the border. And also he lived with two Tutsi families, one in his cell of Saga, another family located in Runyinya Sector, but close to this home. The one from Runyinya, Sebagabo, was killed by Runyinya people. They killed him with two of his sons.

The way he [Sebagabo] was killed, they descended from their Sector [Runyinya], they came as a very big group, they were like a wedding. They came, they found him. The war was even over, after maybe five days [from the first massacre]. They found him cultivating. He had allegedly lied to them that he was Hutu. Then they did an investigation and found out that he was Tutsi. They then found him in the valley cultivating. They called him. He went up with his two sons with whom he was cultivating. Me too, I was cultivating this other side, I was covering cassava with soil. They called him, he went up, they took him to his house. I heard what they were asking him. They were asking him what evidence he had to prove that he was Hutu. They asked him: ‘You say you are Hutu, so why some of your children have fled?’ The one who had fled is the one who is our neighbour on the Saga side. Truly speaking the one who had fled to Burundi was his son, and had a wife with five children. Those escaped. They asked him: ‘Why did they flee, why did you remain?’ They did not tell him many things, they collected him immediately with those other male children, they went, they disappeared behind a hill, where I was no longer seeing them. So I did not follow his death. I only saw that they went beyond the hill where he lived, and took him to the Rubona hill. That is where they killed him. They killed him with those two sons of his.62

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The death of Sebagabo and his two sons shows how geography was conflicting with identity dynamics. Had Sebagabo wanted to flee, it could be easier for him, since he was cultivating just near the Kanyaru river, and Burundi was just some metres ahead. The proof is that his other son had easily fled. But because he relied on the Hutu identity that he had acquired through manipulating the system, he thought that he would not be targeted for genocide. As a result, he remained at home. But because during the genocide the checking of ethnic identity became sophisticated, they caught him and killed him. This case shows once again that those Tutsi who thought that they had been welcomed within the Hutu community through social interaction or changing of ethnic identity were the ones who tended not to flee, and as a result, the majority of them were killed. For these, the proximity with the border did not become a loophole.

Finally, Alison Des Forges mentioned a case of the killing of thirty to forty Tutsi staff from MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières) who were working in the Saga refugee camp for Burundians. The soldiers and militia ordered the Hutu staff of MSF to kill their Tutsi colleagues.63

7.2.5. Genocide in Rwamiko

The signal for violence is said to have arrived in Rwamiko from Saga and Kibayi Sectors. Some people from Saga came to loot selected houses in Rwamiko. As a result, the Rwamiko people went to protect themselves.64 According to another informant, on a certain Tuesday and Wednesday, violence was severe in Saga and Kibayi Sectors. A Tutsi man, Sabukeye, who was a tailor, went with his bicycle to the Kabuga centre where he worked. He found in Saga and Kibayi that houses were on fire, people were slaughtering and eating cattle and killing people. But in Rwamiko that was not yet reached. That man came back to Rwamiko and narrated what he saw in Saga and Kibayi to the Councillor of Rwamiko, Christophe Ndagijimana.

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63 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 503-504.
64 Interview with Viateur Twiringiyimana, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
After that man narrated that [which he saw], the Councillor [Christophe] Ndagijimana came to enquire how the situation was. I saw them at the hill where I live, the hill of Rwamabare, they were watching the situation of Saga and Kibayi. All of us Tutsi and Hutu were assembled there, no one thought he or she could kill another person at that time. It was Wednesday morning. […] The Councillor said: ‘Please do not dare to kill anyone; we, we must protect ourselves, so that no one dies in our area.’ That is how things began. The Councillor said: ‘Please calm down, we will protect ourselves, I will not sacrifice you. Also no one will come to kill someone from us if we remain united.’ We remained there, then when the evening came, people from Kibangu, with the Saga people, started to attack towards Rwamiko. They destroyed houses of our neighbours. Those houses were destroyed by people from the Mwaryi cell [Rwamiko], they also looted. The owners of those houses went to hide in the bushes. No one understood how that attack came, it surprised us. […] In the evening, they started to eat cows, after that the following morning of the next day they killed the man Kabalisa during the day. The whole Kibangu had descended, so they started to do catastrophic things. They became hot, after being influenced by the Saga people, and by the Burundian people who were in the Saga refugee camp. They instilled those things [the killing of Tutsi] in the youths who were active in party activities. Before that, we heard that the *Inkotanyi* are snakes, are cockroaches, so people understood that those *Inkotanyi* will be one day killed.65

Ndibaze continued her account by explaining that the population of Rwamiko was united, but that it got divided when the Burgomaster Kajyambere came to mobilise the population about killing the Tutsi, following the meeting of the President of the Republic, Théodore Sindikubwabo held in Gisagara Subprefecture. The Burgomaster is also allegedly the one who brought soldiers and Burundians to participate in the killing of Tutsi.66 Ignace Gatabazi corroborates the view that the violence started in Kabuga before Rwamiko and that the Councillor Christophe Ndagijimana stopped the first attack against the Tutsi in his sector, before being overwhelmed by other attacks and ultimately joining the killings.67

The account of Twahirwa somewhat resembles the ones of Ndibaze and Gatabazi as to how genocide started in Rwamiko following Mukindo and Kabuga and the initial role of the Councillor Christophe Ndagijimana. Twahirwa was in Saga when the genocide was about to start. He says that it was Tuesday evening. He went there to visit his mother-in-

law in Saga. Then an old man coming from Mukindo said that in Mukindo the burning of houses of Tutsi had started. Then he said: “What are you doing [as you don’t imitate them?]”. The next morning, Wednesday, Twahirwa went to Kabuga ka Migina centre. Then back at Rwamabare, Rwamiko, he found the Councillor with many people, they were observing how at Kibangu, houses of Tutsi were burning. He said: “No one must touch the houses of anyone before we understand why those things are being done.” Twahirwa continues his account by explaining how the killing occurred, and his role:

We were together, the Hutu and the Tutsi. Then at around 10:00 o’clock, the Councillor came to tell us to go back to our homes to collect arms in order to protect our cell. Machete, spear, bows were brought. We spent time there. When it was 15 hours, a big group of attackers (*igitero*) came from Kibangu and Saga, it came and scattered us and entered in that cell [of theirs]. They went until evening eating cows. They had started to burn houses by 17 hours. It was houses of the Tutsi. The people fled from houses, as they were being burnt. People started to be killed on Thursday. At the first house I was part of the attackers. The man Kabalisa was killed, with Leodomir, with two children of the latter. The teacher Gasasira died, his elder brother Antoine Kabera also died. My brother-in-law Callixte Kamanzi also died. Those are the ones who died at that Thursday. Those are the ones in whose killing I took part. The next day, some others died, I did not take part in their death. They were killed by others on Friday. Until Saturday the killing continued, and the people of our place had finished by Saturday, there was no one left among those to be killed.

Twahirwa also mentions some leaders of killings:

The first *igitero* [killers’ mob attack] came from Saga. In it there was the man Kamanzi, the man Sinamenye, and Bertin. Those are in general the ones who were leaders. In our place Rwamiko, the first attack was led by Shinani, with a teacher called Narcisse. This one worked in the *ibitero* of Nyabitare and Rwamiko, he was still a bachelor, he had gone to the military. It seems that he had the rank of Lieutenant when the *Inkotanyi* attacked in 1990. He was there in 1994. Those are the ones I could see who led those attacks. 68

In contrast with the above informants, the account of Laurent Rwabigwi suggests that the act that triggered the genocide in Rwamiko is the killing of the businessman Ignace Mbuguje, who had a big shop at the Kabuga commercial centre but who was living in Rwamiko. This businessman had built strong ties with Hutu people in his area. Many

were his friends and others his trusting customers. As a result, they promised to protect him, which they did. For several days, they pushed back the attacks against him. But ultimately, more powerful attacks from Saga and from Burundian fighters defeated those who were protecting him. He consequently got killed, an act which heralded killings of other remaining Tutsi:

Here at our home, if Burundians were not involved, no Tutsi could die here. Because we spent the whole week waiting, hesitating. The people of Saga came, burned, and ate cows. We kept some other cows. But when the Barundi came in, when they started by killing that man Ignace Mbuguje… He is the only one they killed, and said that: ‘We give you the example.’ […] They killed him a certain Friday, whereas the genocide had started on Tuesday. […] The Burundians were in conjunction with Masima. Masima used to walk with record books that contained lists of Tutsi of Kibayi. So, even the person we did not know was Tutsi, he discovers him and uses that book to trace his ancestry. Then he says ‘that one must die.’ After the Burundians killed, we entered also the killing. […] On the killing of Mbuguje, Masima gave the order only, then one Rwandan Nyamukwaya, and the Burundian Kavamahanga, with the man Ntihabose – others were spectators – it is Nyamukwaya and Kavamahanga who actively killed him. Kavamahanga cut him with the sword. Mbuguje was an old man, but still strong.69

According to this informant, the case of Mbuguje became the master choice to start the killing in Kibangu and in Rwamiko Sector. It had an impact, because of the respect he had. Then an order came asking to hunt his children such as Thomas who was also in Kabuga centre. Then Saga mobs came, collected cows, and killed. People from Kibangu cell allegedly realised that the Saga people were taking over the whole booty, so they decided to enter the killing in order to gain the remaining cows.70

In addition, by the time genocide started, the Councillor Ndagijimana went on mobilising the Tutsi to gather at the church of Kirarambogo, claiming that that is where he was going to provide for their security.71 Many Tutsi accepted that call and hid in the Kirarambogo church. But, According to Ndibaze, only one person was killed on those premises. A grenade was thrown in the church, the watchman opened the church and the

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69 Interview with Laurent Rwabigwi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
70 Interview with Laurent Rwabigwi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
Tutsi fled outside, only to be caught and taken to Kanyaru river where they were drowned.\textsuperscript{72}

The Kanyaru river seems to have been used excessively to kill the Tutsi. According to Gatabazi, few Tutsi people were killed on the hills of Rwamiko. The bulk of them were thrown in the Kanyaru river.\textsuperscript{73} However, after some days of throwing the Tutsi in the Kanyaru, the local authorities realised that the bodies were polluting the water of that same river. They forbade the killers to throw the Tutsi into the Kanyaru river anymore.\textsuperscript{74} Furthermore, to go to the Kanyaru river was time and energy consuming because of the distance. As a result, the killers decided to kill the Tutsi at their locations.\textsuperscript{75}

Apart from the Tutsi who had sought refuge at the Kirarambogo church and elsewhere, some others sought refuge to their close Hutu relatives’ and friends’ homes as in the case of Ignace Mbuguje. But the bulk of them were not lucky enough to survive. Ndibaze explains that the killers always went to search the Tutsi at the homes of the Hutu who were known to be related to them or to be their friends. As a result, so many Tutsi who fled to Hutu relatives or friends were discovered and killed.\textsuperscript{76} This situation reduced significantly the likelihood of being hidden until the end of the genocide.

One example of this pattern is narrated by the informant Cesaria Uwambajimana. Claude Twagirayezu and Nkundabagenzi were sons-in-law of the Hutu man Habiyamere. They went to hide at his home. But a killer called Serwenda who was very close to Habiyamere suspected that Claude and Nkundabagenzi went to hide there as he knew their matrimonial ties. He was right, they were there. Claude Twagirayezu was the husband of this informant. She narrates:

\begin{quote}
Serwenda went with spears, he went to check, pointing at pots, down the beds, my husband was underneath the bed. [...] Then my husband said: ‘Don’t injure me
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{72} Interview with Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{73} Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{74} Interview with Jean Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. See also above.
\textsuperscript{75} Interview with Cesaria Uwambajimana, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{76} Interview with Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
with the spear, I am here.’ He immediately came out of the hiding place. Then my father intervened saying: ‘Serwenda, my son, you know I had an Igihango [sort of strong friendship oath] with your father.’ He whispered in his ear saying: ‘Please forgive me, look, you are alone in this attack, please don’t make my daughter a widow.’ The man refused to hear that, we were standing there, saddened. He said: ‘Me, don’t bring me those Igihango rituals explanation, I came here as a pitiless person, I have seen him, this one is the enemy, I am collecting him.’ ‘You have lived together, as he was selling in business, now you realise that he is an enemy?’, my father said. The man immediately put his hand on the mouth and yelled strongly to call people from afar. The man Abdallah from Mwaryi came and helped him to put him [her husband] out. Then my husband removed the dress he was covering himself with underneeth the bed, threw it down and said: ‘Take this dress, maybe you will use it to put on the bed of the child, since you fled with nothing.’ Then they took the man behind the house as we were witnessing, they took him to Kanyaru river, but he did not go there alone, he was taken there with many other Tutsi who were taken from the family of the old man called Nkwaya, who also was attacked by the igitero (mob). […] They took my husband to the river on Friday, then on Saturday, that man [Serwenda] came back at my home. He said: ‘I come to see that son of Claude who remained. Even this foetus which the wife is pregnant of, we will remove it and kill it by all means.’ I became dead with fear, the stomach was sticking to the back. That man came around 13 hours with that killers’ mob.

Then that group killed his son. According to Cesaria, it was made of the following people: Serwenda, Bizumuremyi, Nitrenganya called Nyarubwana who was also a child; he is the one who killed her son. Others include Rubayiza, Ntegayino, and many others she could not recall. She says that all the above were jailed at the time of the interview. She also stresses that they beat her and “did bad things to her”, which means probably that they raped her, an act that made her abort after a week or two.77

Finally, according to Viateur Twiringiyimana, the Burundian refugees who are often accused of having taken part in the genocide side by side with Rwandans were not alone. There were also some Burundian citizens who were not refugees but who used to cross the border and come to kill the Tutsi and loot property. Those mentioned by this informant lived just at the hill next to Rwamiko.78

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77 Interview with Cesaria Uwambajimana, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
78 Interview with Viateur Twiringiyimana, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
7.3. SECOND PHASE KILLINGS

The large scale massacre at the public places became itself a mobilisation to kill the rest of the Tutsi who had remained in hiding. It had shown that the order of the day was the killing of the Tutsi, for, they were killed openly. As we know now, there was no genocide law published in the official gazette of laws (*Journal Officiel de la République Rwandaise*). But genocide had become a law in the factual sense, that is, it had been engineered by the state, had been ordered by it. As a result, the military and the civilian population took it as a law. In the foucauldian sense, the tactic or the practice had become a law in itself. 79

After the April killings, in several places, the bulk of killers believed that they had exterminated all the Tutsi inhabitants. But soon, in early May 1994, the authorities and the civil self-defence committees realised that a certain number of Tutsi were still hidden. As a result, they organised again a series of meetings to mobilise by word now. Otherwise, the first mobilisation was by action. Before the massacre, it is possible that the former mobilisation was about whispering to future perpetrators what to do, so that the victims would not know that there was a threat and flee to the border. As some survivors mentioned, there was too much secrecy and less information. This was a kind of tactic of effectiveness and surprise. Once the agenda of killing was no longer a secret, that is, after the first large scale massacre of April 1994, meetings about killing became normal and were held openly.

Those Tutsi who had escaped the first massacre were hunted from early May onwards. It was, as the narratives describe it, the “hunting time” as opposed to the first phase which was the “massacring time”. They were preceded by meetings of Prefecture leaders who often came to mobilise Commune leaders about the new tactic. This tactic was about “clearing the bushes” so that they could discover the “enemy” who were hiding there. It

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was also about ordering the Self-defence committees to search in houses of Hutu who were suspected of hiding certain Tutsi. It was also about ordering those Hutu who were hiding Tutsi to bring them to the fore and sacrifice them.

This was done through a very clever method. Indeed, when in May those second phase killings were occurring in homes, at roadblocks and in bushes or sorghum fields, the killers were noticing that their targets were not being met: certain individuals who were believed to be hiding were still missing. As a result, the local leaders informed the population that peace has been proclaimed, that anyone who was hiding the Tutsi could bring them outside. Some, as we saw in the previous chapter, were misled by this message and disclosed their Tutsi protected ones. Those got killed. Others, but few, continued to hide them. Those are the few cases of people who hid until the formal end of genocide and who survived. For example, in Runyinya Sector, one head of the cell called Juvenal held a meeting with his constituents and at first told them that it was a time of peace. After disclosing the Tutsi who were hiding, he came back with the message of extermination.80

The words that are reported to have been pronounced by those Prefecture leaders show the clear genocidal impulse. For example, after Lieutenant Colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo was appointed Prefect of Butare Prefecture, that is, after 17 June 1994, he arrived in Kibayi Commune and stressed that “no one [Tutsi] must remain alive.” 81

Prefecture leaders who came to mobilise the Kibayi people about the second phase of killing the Tutsi included administrative leaders such as the Prefect and Subprefects, the Army, Gendarmerie Leaders and Civil-self defence committees coordinators. The most often mentioned names are Colonel Tharcisse Muvunyi, Colonel Aloys Simba, Lieutenant Colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo and the Subprefect Dominique Ntawukuriryayo.82

80 Interview with Libérathe Nyiratabaro, Kibayi, 9 May 2007.
82 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 516-517; Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
For example, at a meeting that was held on 20 May 1994 by the Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture, Dominique Ntawukuriryayo, of which Kibayi Commune was part, warned the Gisagara constituents not to remain neutral, using the 19 April 1994 words of President Sindikubwabo. He insisted that everyone must denounce the enemy who was not just the RPF rebels, but any other Tutsi found in the surrounding area of his territory.83

In a meeting that was held at the Kibayi Commune office in June, the Prefect of Butare, Alphonse Nteziryayo said approximately this:

Why did you work partially? The result was not very good. You killed some, you kept others and you hid them. You will see the consequence of that. I order you, anyone who is keeping someone, must go and kill him or her or sacrifice him or her. Anyone who knows where there is any Tutsi, must go and kill him or her. [...] Anyone refusing to give the hidden person to you, he or she will also be killed.84

Some other words attributed to a head of cell in Runyinya Sector seem to be a repetition of the above:

Juvenal, Responsible of Runyinya Cell, said that if you eat a whole snake’s body, you cannot fail to finish the tail too. He said that they must collect those remaining few and exterminate them. He added: ‘There will be people who will come and see the empty landscapes and wonder who were living there. [...] They should answer them that they woke up in the morning, then found that those people went to Arusha in Tanzania.’ [...] That is when they started to kill anew.85

This was probably an ironic expression against the Arusha accords in which the RPF had received a substantial share of power as a promise, but which was not fulfilled. Some other words attributed to Colonel Tharcisse Muvunyi and which remained famous, go

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83 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, p. 547.
this way: “When a snake coils itself around a calabash [or a churn], there remains no other alternative but to smash the calabash.” 86

The remainder of this section is about particular cases of killings of Tutsi that occurred in May and June 1994. This killing took the lives of mostly children, 87 but also women. The bulk of men seem to have been killed in the first phase of massacres.

In Cyimana Cell of Shyombo Sector, six children of the Tutsi Gérard Birasa were killed in that second phase of killings. They had been hidden by Hutu neighbours. Six other children whose parents are not specified were killed together with Birasa’s children. Birasa had been killed in April 1994. They were killed near the Kanyaru river and their corpses were thrown in the river. 88

In Joma Sector, the cases often mentioned include the one concerning the children of Evariste Rutazigwa. They were hidden by Vianney Uwimana, my informant. He narrates how they got killed:

Rutazigwa was my friend. His children came to my house. I kept them. It was on 18 April. Towards 2 May, someone passed near my house and noticed their presence. Then he asked me why I am locking children inside the house. I told him that there is no other possibility, they are children of a neighbour. After one day, he brought people who were from the night patrol, they came and took those children. I also followed them to see where they were taking them. They killed them in my presence. I plead guilty for not having been able to rescue them, though I did not have the power to do that. 89

Those children of Rutazigwa were three according to the informant Shirubute. This informant pleaded guilty for his involvement in the killing of those three children. He narrates how he killed children at the roundabout of Nyamabuye Cell of Joma Sector. He says that it is a certain Pierre Kanimba who brought him into the killer mob. Kanimba

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87 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzyimana, Kibayi, 12 mai 2007.
88 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzyimana, Kibayi, 12 mai 2007.
brought three children of Rutazigwa who were hiding at Vianney Uwimana’s home. Kanimba ordered to his brother Haburuvugo to kill those three children. He gave him a club to do that, but the latter refused. So Kanimba gave the club to the informant Shirubute who killed them.\footnote{Interview with François Shirubute, Kibayi, 11 May 2007.}

Shirubute testifies to have killed another six children. Some were hidden at the old man Nturo’s home. They were his grandchildren from his daughter Cansilde Nyirandama who was living in Rususa Cell of Mukindo Sector down at Makwaza mountain. Nyirandama had fled with her children to Nyamabuye at her father’s house. Pierre Kanimba brought another two children belonging to Francine Iyakaremye, a Hutu lady with Tutsi kids and brought them to the roundabout where the informant was with other mob killers. The number of children brought to the roundabout became six. So Kanimba asked Shirubute to kill those children. He killed three with the club, when he was about to kill the fourth, the club went flying out of his hand. As it was a sloping area, he went to look for the weapon which had landed far away. When he came back, the other three children were dead, which means that it is Kanimba with another person, Cyubahiro, who killed them, according to Shirubute’s assumption. So the mob buried them, and went back home. Shirubute calculates that he killed six people but that he would have killed nine had the club not left his hand.\footnote{Interview with François Shirubute, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. Shirubute was tried by the Gacaca Court on 31 June 2006. He received a sentence of eleven years of prison. He had spent almost ten years in prison, so at the time of interview he remained with a one year punishment. He stresses that he agreed to testify about his role in the genocide because there was a Commission that was advocating prisoners to do that.}

In Mukindo Sector also, those Tutsi who were killed in May and June included those who were hidden in neighbours’ houses and especially children who were hidden by some family members who were Hutu. The perpetrators kept on hunting them, and killed them when caught.\footnote{Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007.} For example, at Mukindo, near the Makwaza mountain, my informant Raymond Hakizimana lost his grandchildren from his daughter. They were from Joma, they fled to Hakizimana’s home who was their grandfather, then they were killed there.
Although Raymond Hakizimana had been a strong party leader since 1991 as he was President of MRND in Kibayi, he failed to rescue them.  

In Runyinya Sector the second phase killing also occurred. Two cases of killings that I found include a man called Hategekimana, who was cousin of my informant Nyiratabaro. He was killed in May or June 1994. Another case is about the killing of a person called Ryamukuru from Linda. He came to seek refuge to the home of his father-in-law who was Hutu in Runyinya Sector. They hid him in a sorghum field. But afterwards, his brother-in-law and sisters in-law decided to sacrifice him, because a message came stating that if they caught someone hiding a Tutsi, they would either kill him or her, or charge him or her 20,000 francs, or his/her house would get destroyed. Only his father-in-law wanted to protect him at all costs. My informant Sindabizera alleges that he was forced by one of the in-laws of Ryamukuru called Nyabenda Nkundineza Kamatari to come and participate in that mob attacking Ryamukuru. He came and they went to ‘hunt’ him in the sorghum field. This informant surrendered to pressure and accompanied them. But by the time the killers went to murder Ryamukuru at night, this informant claims that he was back at his home since he did not have a wife to look after his house.

In Saga Sector, that second phase of killing also occurred. One informant who took part in the killing narrated one case: “In fact, the [April] killing did not last many days. People died in three days only. Some of them had hidden at some places. Children going to their grandparents. That is the trap I fell in.” Then Aloys Mutarambirwa recounts how, as he was going to a place where he had his land, he met with Aimable Uwimana who was with Kazihise (nicknamed Rutamu). He saw those men entering into the house of the old man called Minonko. He heard them ordering him to bring two kids he was hiding who were his grandsons from his daughter married to a Tutsi. Her husband was already killed. The children were a girl and a boy. In general, the killers were discovering the whereabouts of hiding places and going to collect the Tutsi and kill them. He is accused of having been

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93 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
95 Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. This is seemingly his alibi.
part of the mob that collected those children. According to him, this killing occurred in late April or early May 1994.

Even in Rwamiko Sector, some cases of this second round of killings were recorded. My informant Laurent Rwabigwi alleges that he became involved in the genocide during this time. He says that he entered the killing after all the Tutsi of Kibangu had been exterminated, i.e. during the first April massacre. These are the murders he testifies to having taken part in:

The igitero [mob] from Saga came once again, and said to me: ‘You, they told us that you spend your time selling only. Now come and join us. All the people we will catch, you will kill them.’ I endeavoured to join them. They got the first person, so they beat him with a club, and me I injured him with a spear. I know that person, I do not remember his name, but his mother-in-law is Agnes, and his father-in-law is Sendababonye. My elder brother beat his wife, the man Sinderibuye finished him. Their child also got killed, as they were four. They were not from Kibangu cell of Rwamiko Sector, they were from Mwaryi cell. They had come to Kibangu to hide. As you understand, there must have been someone who denounced them [to the killers].

Rwabigwi stresses that he also joined the attack against a man called Nkotanyi. The killers’ mob was led by Laurent Nzibavuga. Rwabigwi’s role was to enter the house and bring them outside their hiding place. They were six people. They freed one lady who was Tutsi but sterile, and told her that she can go back home, she is useless, they cannot kill her. They freed also one child and gave her back to her grandmother who was Hutu, so that this child could continue helping the Hutu old woman to fetch water. Then the remaining four people were taken by Nzibavuga and Ndiyonibyo down the road and then they killed them. After those people died, no one else died in their cell (Kibangu) or in Mwaryi cell, in Rwabigwi’s view. He explains that most people of their area were thrown in the Kanyaru river alive, at least according to his experience. He narrates how he took a man called Zachariah Banani to the Kanyaru river, who chose to die with his whole dignity: He put on his expensive suit. My informant Rwabigwi alleges that he did not beat him. He himself plunged into the Kanyaru river and died. This allegation is hard to ascertain, especially when one hears it from the perpetrator. In fact, it cannot be verified,
because the one who could tell us what actually happened, namely the victim Banani, is no longer alive.  

The above few cases show that almost in every Sector of Kibayi Commune this second phase of killings of Tutsi occurred. In addition to the killing of Tutsi, also their houses were targeted for destruction. Those houses which had been destroyed in part, following the looting of doors, windows, tiles, and the furniture inside the houses, got destroyed entirely. The decision to destroy them entirely came some time in May 1994 when national leaders started to fear the investigations of some international journalists and humanitarian agencies. As a result, the Subprefect of Gisagara and the Burgomaster of Kibayi gave the order to destroy houses “because those houses were accusing them”. The population was also ordered “to plant gourds” in those empty spaces, so that no one could know that any homestead ever existed there before.

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97 Interview with Laurent Rwabigwi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. As Derrida put it, killing the witness is destroying the archive. (Jacques, Derrida, “Archive Fever (A seminar by Jacques Derrida, University of the Witwatersrand, August 1998, transcribed by Verne Harris)”, in Carolyn, Hamilton et al. (eds), Refiguring the Archive, Cape Town, David Philip Publishers, 2002, pp. 38-80 (even pages), p. 50.) Although we need to problematize the archive (Premesh Lalu, “The Grammar of Domination and the Subjection of Agency: Colonial Texts and Modes of Evidence”, History and Theory, Vol. 39, No. 4, Theme Issue 39: “Not Telling”: Secrecy, Lies, and History, December 2000, pp. 45-68), that archive has to be available first. Thus, the availability of the archive is the first condition, its problematization comes next. Rwabigwi was jailed since 30 January 1996. He went to serve his jail term in Nyanza prison. Then in 1997, some Adventist Church pastors came to sensitize prisoners about the need to testify about their crimes. Where he was, he was always dreaming about the people of Kibangu he killed, he was traumatized, as he says. So he accepted to speak out, that way he recovered. He agreed to plead guilty in 1997. He continued to pray. He was brought to Karubanda prison in 2000 or 2001 with other people who pleaded guilty. He was given a task of advocating other prisoners to plead guilty or testify about their crimes in case they had any. They were given a room, which they called “Arusha” at Karubanda prison. When they arrived at Karubanda, there were 60 (who had pleaded guilty), but by the time he left prison the number had reached 1,800. That was according to him the result of their job. He was then released. He went to be judged by the Gacaca tribunal of his hill in February 2007, that sentenced him to ten years prison. As he had spent eleven in prison, he was freed. He has since then been appointed in the Gacaca structure of his cell as the Chairperson in charge of the activity of pleading guilty and testifying. So even outside the prison he was continuing his job of ‘sensitizing’. He was in charge of preparing the dossiers.

7.4. GUSUBIRANAMO

As we saw in the previous chapter on Gishamvu, the division between the Hutu in May and June 1994 following the first massacres of Tutsi which occurred in April 1994 escalated despite the efforts of national and local leaders to unite the Hutu. This phenomenon of Hutu-Hutu conflict also occurred in Kibayi. The Subprefect and the Burgomaster urged the Hutu constituents “not [to] attack their brothers”, but this call seems to have not been welcomed.

Some examples show this pattern. One informant explains how he was obliged to hide, this despite the fact that he was Hutu, and had an ID bearing the “Hutu” designation. There were doubts about him because he was not originally from Saga, also because he had interacted with Tutsi chiefs during the late colonial period, and possibly because he had a Tutsi wife. He had spent around forty years there, but they were still dubious about his ID. As a result, he lost some of his family members in the genocide.

Another person whose ethnic identity was a matter of doubt is the Councillor of Rwamiko, Christophe Ndagijimana. The members of MDR party allegedly attacked him several times because he was not originally from Rwamiko of Kibayi. He had lived there for more than twenty years, had been Councillor since the 1970s, but during the genocide, they had doubts about him. But as the informant Gatabazi explains, he was saved by his ID book that stressed that he was Hutu. The informant Ndibaze explains that the Councillor Christophe Ndagijimana was originally from Nyaruguru area, and that

99 Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, p. 523.
100 Nyirisenge lost some of his nephews: one among them died with his three children, he was thrown in the water of the Kanyaru river. Another one died with five children. They killed her with her husband. Nyirisenge also lost his daughter. She was killed along with her husband and one child. He lost only one child however, that daughter. Paradoxically, he has one son who took part in the genocide. He was in jail in Butare prison at Rwandex at the time of the interview. That son had pleaded guilty and was about to come to be tried in *Gacaca* tribunals. So, one complex question remains: Is this old man a bystander, or a victim, or both? (Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.)
he was very tall, a physical description often attributed to the Tutsi. That is why, she thinks, he was suspected of being Tutsi.103

My informant Ladislas Harerimana was legally Hutu, but he says that he was targeted, because he was suspected of having changed his ethnic identity from Tutsi to Hutu. They suspected that his grandfather was Tutsi since he came from elsewhere to settle in Shyombo. This was a strategy to loot his cows and other livestock, as he stresses, and they actually were looted.104 The cases of Nyirisenge, Ndagijimana, and even Harerimana show that geography and ethnic identity were instrumentalised during this time.

The last case however is about two political rivals in the Kibayi Commune, namely the Burgomaster Kajyambere and the former Inspector of schools, and head of MDR party in Kibayi, Christophe Nyandwi. It is about instrumentalisation of political rivalry during the genocide. It is a case of a Hutu-Hutu division but that occurred in April 1994, not in May as most other cases did.

Christophe Nyandwi, whom I was able to interview, together with his wife, narrated how he was attacked many times by people sent by the Burgomaster Kajyambere: He went to tell Kajyambere about some people who were killed at Kazenga, he also told him that he was threatened. Then Kajyambere asked him: “Don’t those people know that you are Hutu?” Nyandwi alleges that his home was attacked several times, until they used a grenade and guns in one final and harshest attack. Then he and his wife fled to Burundi. According to him it was PSD members who killed people in Kazenga. According to him again, PSD, MDR and MRND all became involved in the genocide. His informant who told him how people attacked his house, how Kajyambere ordered Joma youth to attack him and kill him because he was an accomplice of RPF, is an old man called Jeremy. But Jeremy is dead. So, the only informants who assert that Nyandwi was victimized are himself and his wife. Kajyambere is in exile, so it is hard to check the veracity of the Nyandwis’ claims of victimhood. But there are nevertheless some additional pieces of

104 Interview with Ladislas Hererimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
evidence: his Shyombo house got destroyed and looted, as his wife at the time to return home from exile chose to live in their Mukindo house which could be easily repaired. Another issue is that his car was looted, but whether it was by Kajyambere, as Nyandwi alleges, or not, is yet to be proved. Another issue is that Nyandwi, his wife and children fled at the end of April 1994. But Nyandwi came back to Rwanda in June 1994, which shows that he was not afraid, or he did not feel himself to be a victim at that time. He narrates himself how he came from Burundi to Rwanda on 25 June 1994, passed through Nyaruteja, went all the way to Butare town by foot to see the then Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Sylvain Nsabimana, who had been his colleague in High School, to ask him to examine his problem of being wronged by the Burgomaster Kajyambere. He found that Nsabimana had been removed from office and the new Prefect was Alphonse Nteziryayo who had been appointed on 17 June. Yet, the latter was also a friend to Burgomaster Kajyambere and originated from Kibayi, Runyinya Sector. Then Nyandwi told Prefect Nteziryayo how he had been robbed and attacked by Kajyambere, and how he needed help from him. While he was in Butare town, the town was attacked by RPF rebels, then he had to flee in the cars of the French Turquoise Operation to Kibeho, to Gikongoro Prefecture. It is around 1 July 1994 that they fled to Kibeho.

It is clear that property was very important, because Nyandwi took all this risk to come back to Rwanda, in order only to reclaim his house, his car, his cows and some other property. In fact, my other informant, Claver Ntirushawamaboko, explained that some

105 Nyandwi, the Burgomaster Kajyambere, and the Prefect Nteziryayo knew each other very well. They worked together in several Kibayi Commune commissions such as Umuganda Commission, Development Council, and the Technical Commission. (Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Umuganda Commission held on 3 October 1983, Ref.: 271/03.09.02/4, Kibayi, 10 October 1983; Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Bourgmestre de la Commune Kibayi, A Monsieur le Ministre de l’Intérieur à Kigali, Objet: Proposition de remaniement de la Commission Technique, Kibayi, Réf.: No 314/03.03.04./1, Kibayi, le 30 novembre 1983 ; Technical Commission of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Technical Commission held on 2 June 1984, Ref.: 266/04.04.1, Kibayi, 10 September 1984; Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Development Council held on 5 February 1986, Ref.: 63/04.04./1, Kibayi, 17 February 1986.)

106 Interview with Christophe Nyandwi, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. When Nyandwi came back to Kibayi in January 1995, he went to teach for three months, then on 11 April 1995, he was jailed. He was released in 2005, and judged by the Gacaca tribunal on 2 February 2007. He was accused of having participated in Augustin Mararo and Gérard Birasa families’ death. He was proclaimed innocent. So he was free at the time of the interview.
killings happened as a settling of scores over property ownership conflicts. If there were for instance land disputes between two persons, the time of genocide became a favourable moment for one person to eliminate the other, even if it was a Hutu against another Hutu.  

A second conflict that occurred between the Hutu in addition to the identity and material pretexts or claims, is the battle over Tutsi wives belonging to Hutu men. This conflict also occurred in Gishamvu as we saw in the previous chapter. It seems to have been a generalised pattern in the whole Butare Prefecture. But it is in this Kibayi Commune case that more explanation about leaders’ management of this issue is provided. Indeed, I was able to find Tutsi wives of those Hutu men to give me more explanation. I also talked to some Hutu men having Tutsi wives who survived. I also talked to perpetrators.

All of them asserted that these Tutsi women were spared if they had lived for a long time with their husbands. But if they had been “married” (i.e., taken by force) during the time of genocide, they were killed. Those who were spared, their remission came after a long debate and after some of them had been violated. Indeed, some Hutu men had been obliged to pay money to attackers in order to protect their wives. Others had fought.

Then in June, a meeting was held at the Kibayi Commune office and led by the Butare Prefecture authorities. It was the time when Lieutenant Colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo was Prefect, which means after 17 June 1994. At first, the authorities decided to kill everyone. Then some arguments arose, which obliged the leaders to review their decision. That is when they decided that those Tutsi women who were long-time wives of Hutu and had children with them were to be protected, for they were no longer Tutsi (ntabwo babandwa imandwa z’abatutsi), those have become like Hutu. But the then Prefect

108 Théodosie Kanyanja, Drocelle Uwimana and Fortunée Mujawamariya.
109 Ladislas Harerimana, Ladislas Nyirisenge, Ignace Gatabazi, and Raymond Hakizimana.
110 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Paul Twahirwa, and Vianney Uwimana.
111 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana and Fortunée Mujawamariya.
113 Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Vianney Uwimana and François Shirubute.
was accused of having ordered the killing of young women just “married” some days previously during the genocide.114

Finally, in May and June 1994 during the genocide, a new phenomenon or behaviour in the power structure appeared. Formal local leaders, i.e., the Burgomaster, the Councillors and the heads of cells, underwent the concurrence of informal leaders, that is, those who had become famous in the killings. These tended to hold a more charismatic power than the one of formal leaders, because they were in most cases heads of the Civil Self-Defense committees and it was the time of killings. As the agenda of killings was more prominent than any other agenda during this time, everyone feared these hardcore killers.

The explanation of one perpetrator in Kibayi is telling:

At that time, no one had a say, there was even no place to go to accuse them [those Hutu who attack other Hutu]. Q: What was the Burgomaster doing? A: He was not seen. At that time power was in the hands of the population, of the Committees’ members. These were the people who had become powerful because of getting involved in killings. […] For example, there was Nsengiyumva from Joma, if anything had to be done, they asked him. The Burgomaster was no longer appearing, he was not seen. When the Burgomaster meets this man Nsengiyumva, he greets him with respect: ‘Leader, have you arrived?’ Things had changed. Some people say that he was afraid of him. […] In Shyombo, a person who was powerful in that way, whom people considered as a Councillor is called Vitaliani Nduwumwami; whatever he said the population followed. They had trusted him. Q: Why was he powerful? He became powerful because he was from MDR, and MDR was powerful here, because they trusted this party to tell the truth. When meetings were organised, he liked to ask questions, so people thought he is strong, though he did not have formal education. He was a peasant like others. He did not

kill anyone, he was only leading people to kill, he was present in every igitero [attack] we went in.\textsuperscript{115}

In Saga Sector, a person who held such charismatic power although he was not a formal local leader is Jean Baptiste Mukurarinda, alias Masima. He was a primary school teacher, then he became a party leader in MDR during the Multiparty system. At the time of the genocide, he reinvented himself as a security committee leader, a position that made him the most feared person in Saga and Rwamiko Sectors. He is depicted as the most active perpetrator of genocide in both Saga where he lived and in Rwamiko. His role was mainly to lead killing mobs. Here is the description of Ladislas Nyirisenge: “There was a man called Masima, he is the one who had become the chief of Saga, who was ordering people to go to kill. He was ruling them, he was ruling ibitero [mobs of killers]. […] He was a teacher.”\textsuperscript{116} Another informant from Saga had this to say about Masima:

The head of that committee [in charge of redistributing property] was Mukurarinda Masima. He was also the leader of the killings, he is the one who gave orders for assembling ibitero [killers’ mobs], he was also the administrator of Saga. It was like the one who was Councillor [Bikorabagabo Théodore] had stepped down, because the population had to follow what Masima ordered them.\textsuperscript{117}

Another informant who survived the genocide also described Masima as the then “leader”: “Masima had the right to attack wherever he wanted, and did whatever he wanted to do. […] I heard about him even in Runyinya, he arrived everywhere. […] He is the one who led, in fact he was like the Burgomaster. […] Kajyambere [Burgomaster] no longer had a say, except that he had set the fire, i.e. he had begun the killings.”\textsuperscript{118}

7.5. POLICY AND PRACTICE AROUND PROPERTY

\textsuperscript{115} Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Kibayi, 12 mai 2007.
\textsuperscript{116} Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{117} Interview with Jean Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{118} Interview with Augustin Nemeye, Kibayi, 21 May 2007.
The narratives about the Tutsi genocide and about Hutu-Hutu violence also include the conflicts around the looting of material goods. The land of the Tutsi who had been killed was a matter of contention. Most of the livestock was being eaten during the genocide. But those who had looted cows were also envied by others. As a result, the conflicts around material goods arose mostly among the killers. In most cases, those who had participated in the killing of members of a household were also the looters of that household’s property.119

The existing administration resolved this conflict by setting up a Committee to administer the material goods looted from or left by the Tutsi. Those committees were put in place towards the end of May 1994 at Cell, Sector and Commune levels. It was the local leaders who designated the people to form those committees. In principle, each committee had about 10 to 15 people that included local leaders and ordinary citizens. But in practice, those members are the ones who had been more active in the genocide activity. Their role was to capture the land and fields of the Tutsi, that is, to take them over from those who had looted them, to redistribute the usufruct of those lands and fields to the citizens who had the money that was requested in order to apply for this usufruct and to give a receipt to the citizens who had received the usufruct. Then the Committee members had the right to pay themselves half of the income from that usufruct and then submit the other half to the Commune Property Committee at the Commune office.120

The price of a piece of land or a field containing crops to be harvested in future varied. It was around 5,000 Rwandan Francs for a big piece of land,121 5,000 RwF for a big field of crops,122 900 to 950 RwF for a small field located in the marshland123 and 3,000 RwF for

121 Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
a banana field. Some of the informants who give these prices have actually paid those amounts in order to get a piece of land or a field of crops. According to Jean Sindayigaya, not everyone could approach the Property Committee in order to get the usufruct of these properties. The most eligible were the hardcore killers. Then the other Hutu peasants had to approach those who could easily buy from the Committee and then get the right to apply for usufruct. For instance, Sindabizera was unhappy that rich people were still the ones who obtained the land and the cows of the Tutsi.

As land was very scarce and precious at this time, it constituted an incentive for participation in the genocide. Genocide participation entailed material reward, sometimes in the form of land allocation. At the same time, the refusal to participate entailed victimization, as some Hutu were looted for having been reluctant to participate in the killing of the Tutsi.

7.6. RESCUE PRACTICES AND SURVIVAL

In general, the victims who were killed at or near their homes were the ones who had expected to be given hiding places by the Hutu. The ones killed at the Commune office were the ones who expected protection from the local administration. Those who did not ask for help from the local Hutu and from leaders, crossed the border. As a result, the bulk of them survived. But specific cases of those who were hidden by those Hutu until the end of genocide do exist, just as at the Commune some few, probably less than ten, survived. While some hundreds of Tutsi died even in Burundi either on their way to, or in the refugee camps as a result of dysentery, it is worth noting that the majority of Tutsi survivors are the ones who crossed the border to Burundi.

Some Tutsi survived the genocide by crossing the border immediately. They avoided going to gathering places such as at Mujyejye’s house in Shyombo, at the Commune

125 Interview with Jean Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.
127 Interview with Claver Ntirushwamaboko, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.
office, in Kabuga commercial centre and elsewhere. Indeed, if one sees to what extent the Rwamiko, Saga, Runyinya, Mukindo, Joma and Shyombo Sectors share the border with Burundi and the way the commune and sector leaders convinced their Tutsi constituents to save them, one learns that the latter did not suspect that the existing power could kill them. If they had gone between 6 and 19 April 1994, they would not have been exterminated. Those who decided to cross immediately seem to have had more chance than those who decided to hide in Hutu fellows’ homes. As for those who went to public gathering places, they stood less chance of survival. For example the Tutsi who survived at the Commune office are less than ten, according to two of my informants.  

I was able to gather some cases of those who crossed the border immediately. For example, Evariste Rutazigwa from Joma survived by running away towards the Burundi border just at the beginning of the killings around 18 April 1994. The killers ran after him but he escaped them. He crossed at a place called Kigoyi. He allegedly swam across the Kanyaru river and reached Burundi that way.Anonymous 17 was part of those who refused to gather at the Shyombo hill near Mujyejye’s home. She chose to cross the border and survived. She went into the bush on 18th April, and she crossed the border only on 23 April. No one helped her to cross. She lost one daughter who died in Nyaruhengeri at her aunt’s place, i.e. the sister of the informant. She says it is God who helped her to cross because they kept on hunting her, but God hid her from their eyes. She fled at first to Gatsinda in Burundi, then went to Mureke camp. On her way back to Rwanda she passed through Bugesera.  

Ildéphonse Hitayezu survived by crossing the border earlier, before the killing started in Shyombo. He heard how genocide started in Kigali and elsewhere in the country from the radio, so he decided to go early. He crossed on 19 April. Unfortunately he survived alone: he says he witnessed how his home was destroyed, as he was standing on the Burundi

128 Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana and Domitilla Nsabimana.  
130 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
hill, as his home is near the Kanyaru river. He mentions names of people who destroyed their houses and who killed his mother. As for his three elder brothers, they were killed and thrown in the Kanyaru river, their wives and children were also killed. One sister of his was killed in the Kabuye massacre. Another one was killed in Joma.\textsuperscript{131}

The second case concerns those survivors who started by hiding and then later crossed the border to Burundi. For example, Anonymous 16, having parents of both ethnic groups, but being Tutsi from his father, having also a Hutu wife, survived because he did not go to the Commune office, as he explains. He also survived because he gave drinks, and some livestock to the Hutu neighbours so that they would not attack him during the first days of the genocide. Then he went to hide at Makwaza mountain until 28 April 1994 when he had the possibility to cross the border. As he explains, “my day was the night, because that is when I could move more safely.” He was helped by his mother-in-law to get some money while fleeing. It is also she who hid his children, his younger sisters and brothers. Her name is Xaverina Nyirandora. Anonymous 16 went to Burundi and reintegrated in the Mubuga camp. From Makwaza mountain to the Kanyaru river, it is a thirty minutes walk. He includes another rescuer, a certain Mpakanyi who was Hutu by having changed his ethnic identity, but who was Tutsi before, who advised him not to continue on his way to the Commune office.\textsuperscript{132}

The account of Ildéphonse Bisamaza shows that his family and himself survived by crossing the border, after however hiding provisionally with a Hutu friend and dispensing money. On Monday 18 April, a strong rain fell, as Bisamaza narrates, then the Kanyaru river became full and dangerous. The Bisamaza family did not sleep at night. On Tuesday, 19 April, he decided to flee to Burundi with his wife and five children. They behaved as if they were going to the Kanyaru marshland to cultivate sweet potatoes as a way of camouflaging their flight. When they arrived outside they saw local populations on the road waiting and watching them, so he strategised and went to the house of Narcisse Butare, a Hutu friend, who lived just near the Kanyaru river. They went to hide

\textsuperscript{131} Interview with Ildéphonse Hitayezu, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{132} Interview with Anonymous 16, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
there. He had seen that houses on Shyombo were already burning. That was before the
Commune office killing that occurred on Wednesday 20 April. As he explains, this was
the advantage of living near the border. They lived about 600 m from the Kanyaru river.
They heard a strong gunfire around 11 o’clock. Around 2 pm, Butare who had gone out
came back and told him that things were severe. He told him that he had heard that at
Nyamabuye they had already killed three people. Then he told a son of a neighbour called
Emmanuel Mbarushimana to accompany them and help them cross the Kanyaru river.
Mbarushimana asked for money, so they bargained and after some time he accepted the
only money they had, namely 200 francs that the son of Bisamaza had and 500 francs that
Bisamaza had. That was 700 francs in all. He once more refused that amount saying that
it was too little. Bisamaza added the hoes they had carried since leaving home in the
morning. Mbarushimana refused again. So Bisamaza told him: ‘The one who is gone is
gone. I don’t know what will happen afterwards, so I give you also my sweetpotatoes
field, take it.’ It is Butare with his son Birutukwinginga who helped Bisamaza convince
Mbarushimana to accept all those things. ‘That young man is called Mbarushimana, but
now he is in jail in the prison of Butare. He is accused of having participated in the
genocide, but he did all what was possible to rescue us.’ Indeed, he put one child after
another on his back and swam across. He helped Bisamaza cross last. Then he came back.
When they arrived in Burundi on that Tuesday, they found Burundians waiting to attack
them. But one Burundian came and threatened to denounce them to the commanding
officers. In the process another Burundian, Vénance Miburo, helped him with a mat for
children to sleep on during that night when they crossed the border. Then Bisamaza and
his family went to Nyamurenza, and then from there they went to Mureke seminary camp
in Ngozi using the car of the High Commission of Refugees (HCR) from 2 May 1994 and
stayed there until 3 August 1994.\textsuperscript{133}

The nuclear family of Jean Baptiste Nyirimana, that is, himself, his father, mother,
brothers and sisters, fled to his maternal uncles who were Hutu who hid them and
ultimately accompanied them to Burundi. But his other extended family members fled to
the Commune office and as a result got exterminated there:

\textsuperscript{133} Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007.
In my extended family, it is my father who remained in the rural dwellings, all others had gone to the Commune office. It was Wednesday, in the morning. They killed them towards 15 hours. [...] All were killed. It is my father who survived in the whole family. You see, we were going here and there hiding with my maternal uncles. By the time of going to Burundi, my mother had to pay money to people who helped us cross. When we crossed we were four. My father went first. You see, we were not all hiding at one place. We were scattered, because we did not like to go together. We assumed that if some die, some others will survive. [...] I do not remember when we crossed. We crossed four days after the massacre had occurred. It was Saturday or Sunday. [...] The people who accompanied us left us at the Kanyaru river. They were Hutu, friends of my family. They put a rope on two people, one Hutu stays on the Rwandan side, the other on the Burundian side, they throw two people in the water, and then the ones on the Burundi side pull us until we cross. They wished us a safe trip: ‘Whether you will die, or whether you will survive, we don’t know.’ Then by God’s will we survived. Among the people who accompanied us, there is my maternal uncle Vincent Gakwaya, he was Hutu. Others are Munyakayanza, and Kuyavuga.134

However, one other maternal uncle of Nyirimana, called Murindahabi, wanted to betray Nyirimana’s family, because, according to Nyirimana, they had previously had land conflicts. The other maternal uncles had to isolate and threaten him first in order to stop him from calling the killers’ mobs to kill the Nyirimana family. But Murindahabi was not satisfied. Ultimately, the mother of Nyirimana had to pay him in kind and in cash. She gave him the bank booklet in order for him to withdraw the money later, and gave him the bananas which were in the field. That is how Murindahabi stopped yelling for the killers’ mobs against the Nyirimana nuclear family. This account shows again to what extent the material goods were important elements in determining the fate of some Tutsi.

Another informant, François Mukezamfura, took his children and went to hide them with Vincent Kamanzi, who was the local leader. He went back to collect also his wife who was pregnant by several months. He heard people saying that no Tutsi must cross the border.

When I arrived at Kamanzi’s house, I found a document, a letter, coming from Theodore [Bikorabagabo], Councillor, stating that no Tutsi must cross the border. ‘Kill all of them.’ After reading that letter, I asked to Kamanzi: ‘Why didn’t you tell me this?’ He answered: ‘There was no other way.’

That is when he went back home to fetch his wife. Then he met with a killers’ mob that had come from killing a man called Mvugayabagabo. He went to fetch her from the home of Sematabarlo who had hidden her, and who advised him to take his wife, since they were checking for her. When he went back with the wife to see the children at Kamanzi’s house, he found that the wife of Kamanzi had driven them out. So he found them in the bushes, they were three girls. Then they made their way to the Kanyaru river, it was night. They arrived at Kanyaru, but did not find the boatmen. He also found one of his nephews at the Kanyaru river. He moved to another crossing bridge, and found boats available. He came back, fetched his family members. Then they fled to Mubuga in Ngozi in Burundi.135 The experience of the Mukezamfura family shows that some problems occurred at Hutu homes that had resolved to hide the Tutsi, that not all members of Hutu families agreed to help the Tutsi.

Finally, another informant, Domitilla Niyonsaba, hid with Hutu friends before crossing. She crossed the border on 28 April 1994. She was hidden by her godmother who was Hutu and helped by the children of this godmother to hide during the day and night in the coffee field and in the house. She was accompanied across the border on 28th April, but her mother was killed while attempting to cross. Her children survived. A certain Sasaba was accused of having killed her mother.136

The last case is about a number of survivors who survived by being hidden by the Hutu from April to early July 1994 during the whole time of the genocide. Their profile shows that they were mostly very close relatives of the Hutu, either by marriage or by having one of their parents a Hutu. The first informant, François Ntukabumwe, is a special case. This informant is Tutsi but had a Hutu mother. As mentioned above, he is among the very few who survived in the massacre at the Commune office building. After the first night of

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136 Interview with Domitilla Niyonsaba, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
shooting and macheting, in the morning of the second day of the massacre, Ntukabumwe found himself alive together with other two ladies amid more than a thousand corpses. Then the killers took the ladies who were alive to the hospital as they were injured, but resolved to kill Ntukabumwe. It is the Councillor of Mukindo Sector, François Macumi, who intervened in his favour. Then the killers decided to use him as killer in order to spare him, as he explains:

So they [the killers] said: ‘You Tutsi are clever, […] in order to help us you must join us in the struggle. If you refuse, then we will kill you.’ […] They gave me a machete, they brought one person, so they said: ‘In order for you to be part of our struggle, kill this person.’ I killed that person, I did not know his name, we had just fled together here [to the Commune office where the interview was taking place]. He is from Linda, I think. […] Then they used me. They made me sin, I accepted the sin I did, I even thereafter got imprisoned for that.

But another person wanted to kill Ntukabumwe. As a result, the Councillor took him to a person called Ndirazi to hide him. Afterwards, Ntukabumwe went to hide with his in-laws who were Hutu. At first he hid with his mother-in-law, then with his brother-in-law who stayed in Nyabiryo, called Nsabimana. This one was bringing him food in the bush amongst the pinhus trees where he was hiding. He met with his wife and children in June 1994. They were alive, except one girl who was killed. Others have survived. He narrates that he came out of hiding in the pinhus forest in early July 1994, and came to participate in a Security meeting held at the Commune office. The Burgomaster was telling the population that the *Inkotanyi* (RPF) rebels were approaching their area, he urged the civilian population to take weapons and go to Ntyazo to stop the advance of those rebels. Ntukabumwe adds that during that meeting, the Burgomaster said that no one should attack him. As a result, he became safe, he went back home, the neighbours helped him to build a grass house and his friend Ndirazi hosted him again for few days. Then the RPF rebels came and he fled with the Hutu to Burundi in early July 1994.

The informant Ntukabumwe indicates that once at Munzungu refugee camp in Burundi, people discriminated against him since he was Tutsi in a camp of Hutu. So he fled to the camp of Byerwa, also a camp of Hutu refugees. Again he experienced discrimination, so he decided to come back to Kibayi in October 1994. He was immediately jailed and was
released only in 2006. He says he is the one who told the authorities what he did, so they jailed him. The *Gacaca* tribunal sentenced him for seven years prison, but as he had been in jail for twelve years, they freed him entirely. At the time of the interview, he was a free man at home, but he was facing problems of social integration, as the Hutu were against him, because he accused them for the killings and the looting they did to his family. The Tutsi survivors were also against him because he had been involved in the killing. As he explains, when the national service in charge of registering and helping survivors came to register survivors, they refused to register him, because he had been in prison. So he asked at least that his wife and children be registered as survivors. The local authorities were still analysing the issue at the time of the interview.137

Another informant who had a Tutsi father and a Hutu mother is Jean Marie Vianney Hategekimana. He was a teenager at the time of the genocide. When the April 1994 violence started, he fled to the Commune office. Thereafter, he left there and joined his friend called Habimana who was Hutu and a cook at the military gendarmes camp located at Mukindo on the Makwaza mountain. This camp was in charge of protecting the refugee camp of Burundian refugees who were settling in Mukindo Sector. Hategekimana stayed in that military camp during the time of massacre at the Commune office. But, as he explains, as his mood changed during that time as he was thinking about the fate of his family members, the military noticed that he had a problem and suspected him of being Tutsi. But he negated having any problem. He ultimately became a cook too, and he was considered to be even better than his friend Habimana.

Then Hategekimana decided to go to neighbouring Kigembe Commune to his mother who is Hutu and some other family members from her mother’s side. His friend Habimana negotiated and got a document for him attesting that he is Hutu. So he made his way to Kigembe via Gikore Sector of Nyaruhengeri Commune. He crossed many roadblocks there, but after showing the document, they let him pass, because they did not doubt his ethnic identity. When he arrived at Kigembe, he went to live with his half-sister who was Hutu. But after some days, the brother-in-law of his sister came to attack him

137 Interview with François Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
alleging that he was Tutsi and that he fled to Kigembe. It was then in May 1994 during
the second phase of killings. He was saved by one of his cousins. This cousin had been a
hardcore killer, so everyone feared him. One of his uncles was among those who wanted
to kill him. Moreover, the killers’ mob charged money from his mother in order to spare
him. Hategekimana says that he learned about the issue of money during the Gacaca
hearings. Then in early July 1994, Hategekimana fled together with his mother, his sister
and other Hutu to Burundi’s refugee camps. Just as the previous informant, he was
discriminated against there. From an area called Mparamirundi, he went to Ruvumu camp
and then to Magara camp. He ultimately came back to Rwanda, and to Kibayi in
December 1994.138

Two other Tutsi women, my informants Théodosie Kanyanja and Drocelle Uwimana,
also remained hidden by their Hutu family in-laws in Joma until the end of the genocide
in early July and fled with their husbands to Burundi. Concerning the experience of
Kanyanja and her husband, they did not go to refugee camps in Burundi. One Burundian
friend of theirs hosted them from July to September 1994 as a gesture of gratitude to
them because they had also helped him and his children when they were also refugees in
Rwanda. He had also protected Kanyanja in Rwanda at the time of the genocide by
threatening the Rwandan killers.139 As for Drocelle Uwimana, she was in Kibayi Sector
at the time of the beginning of the genocide. From there to Joma where she was married,
she was helped by several people who hid her for a few days each. Those people included
an old lady called Nyiraminani, the Councillor of Kibayi Sector, Jean Bosco
Ndagijimana, and her husband.140

The last case is the one of a Tutsi lady who was saved by an old lady. This lady is my
informant Béatrice Yambabariye. She lost her husband and seven children, together with
the extended family of her husband. She was rescued by an old lady called Nyirabayou,
who was her aunt and who was married to a Hutu man. She stayed there for the whole

138 Interview with Jean Marie Vianney Hategekimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007.
three months of the genocide. She also fled to Burundi to the Hutu refugee camp of Murehe.\footnote{Interview with Béatrice Yambabariye, Kibayi, 9 May 2007.}

7.7. VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS

As seen above, the Tutsi of Kibayi Commune were massacred at several places that included public gathering places, smaller gathering places near their homes, at or near their homes and the Kanyaru river. But a large number of Tutsi were also killed in scattered places far from their homes as they were fleeing. The public gathering places included the Kibayi Commune office, the Kibayi commercial centre of Kabuga, but also two other gathering places located outside Kibayi Commune such as the Mugombwa parish church where around 26,000 Tutsi were killed, and the Kabuye hill massacre where between 40,000 and 50,000 Tutsi were massacred.\footnote{For the number of Tutsi victims at Mugombwa parish church see Joan, Kakwenzire, and Dixon, Kamukama, \textit{``The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990-1994''}, in Howard Adelman and Suhrke Astri (eds.), \textit{The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaïre, The path of a genocide}}, New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK), Transaction Publishers, 1999, pp. 61-91, pp. 81 and 86. For the number of victims at Kabuye hill, see ICTR/Butare Trial, \textit{``Nteziryayo and Kanyabashi allegedly Ordered Killing of Tutsis''}, NI/CE/FH(BT”0315e), Arusha, March 15th, 2004, \url{http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefdfd9edd48f5826c12564cf004f793d/bfb327260c1bed7ac1256721007e38377?OpenDocument}, accessed on 7 January 2008.\footnote{MINALOC, \textit{Dénombrement des victimes du génocide et des massacres, Rapport final, version révisée}}, Kigali, MINALOC, avril 2004, p. 47.

The number of genocide victims who were recorded for Kibayi Commune is 8,557.\footnote{MINALOC, \textit{Dénombrement des victimes du génocide et des massacres, Rapport final, version révisée}} This number surely includes the Tutsi of other communes who were killed in the Kibayi territory. In order to determine the number of the Tutsi from Kibayi who were killed during the genocide, we need to calculate the number of those Tutsi on the eve of the genocide and the number of survivors. The difference between these two will be the number of victims.

Concerning the number of the Tutsi in April 1994, the available data on the number of Tutsi in the Kibayi Commune per sector is that of 1989 which gives the estimate of 3,128 Tutsi.\footnote{See Table 1, chapter 3.} Considering that there was an annual increase of population of 3\% at national
level, if we apply it to Kibayi Tutsi population, that means that the Tutsi population of Kibayi was 3,222 in 1990; 3,319 in 1991; 3,419 in 1992; 3,522 in 1993. For April 1994, we can add 1 per cent increase to the 1993 estimate, since it is four months, i.e., a third of the year. That means that in April 1994 ending, the Tutsi population in Kibayi was approximately 3,557. The table below gives us the number of those who survived the genocide in Kibayi.

### Table 7: Number of survivors in Kibayi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTORS</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>ORPHANS</th>
<th>WIDOWS/WIDOWERS</th>
<th>DISABLED BY GENOCIDE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joma</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibayi</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukindo</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukomacara</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyagahuru I:</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runyinya</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwamiko</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saga</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shyombo</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>1709</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Using the above two estimates, we can calculate the number of victims of genocide in Kibayi as follows: 3,557 (approximate number of the Tutsi who lived in Kibayi in April 1994) minus 1,709 (number of survivors in Kibayi). The difference is 1,848. This is the probable number of victims of genocide in Kibayi. It is around 52% of the total Tutsi population of Kibayi Commune. That means that those who survived are around 48 per cent.

This survival was undoubtedly mostly the result of proximity with the border of Burundi. And this has been ascertained not just for Gishamvu and Kibayi, but also for a number of
other communes of Butare Prefecture. In fact, had several Tutsi who trusted their Hutu fellows as a way of survival chosen to go to Burundi, the number of survivors would have increased significantly. As we saw, several Tutsi who had Hutu connections (social capital) and had material wealth (economic capital) tended not to flee despite the closeness of the border. They believed that those social and economic assets would protect them, but that was to underestimate the danger of the then politics. In fact, the killers knew most of the Hutu connections that those Tutsi had. As a result, they easily determined where to find them. In this regard, politics surpassed the social and the economic. On the other hand, those Tutsi who took the road to the border earlier tend to be the ones of modest socio-economic situation, and of less closeness to the Hutu community. But this is not a general rule. It is a trend. As Bhavnani and Baker have shown, the trust of Hutu officials and choice of their hiding place increased the degree of risk and death of Tutsi victims rather than the other way around.

7.8. PERPETRATORS

The perpetrators of Tutsi genocide in Kibayi were both the leaders and the ordinary citizens. The leaders often mentioned by informants are mostly at prefecture level. From Butare, the two prefects during the genocide, i.e., Sylvain Nsabimana and Lieutenant colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo were mentioned as having played a mobilising role. Both are being tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Nteziryayo had been a prominent actor in Kibayi politics in the 1980s, was a brother-in-law of Isidore Nzeyimana who was a well-known politician in Rwanda and in Butare since the 1960s. The Subprefect of Gisagara, Dominique Ntawukuriyayo, was also mentioned. His name was number 70 on a list of perpetrators of genocide who are abroad. He was arrested in October 2007 in France, was transferred to Arusha, Tanzania in June 2008 and his trial started in May 2009. At the commune level, the role of the Burgomaster of Kibayi,

Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, in both the planning and execution of genocide is ascertained. At Kabuye massacre where a number of Tutsi from Kibayi perished, the role of the Burgomaster of Muganza Commune, Elie Ndayambaje is mentioned.\(^{148}\)

While the leaders were mainly in charge of planning and mobilising, the role of the local population was effectively the execution of the genocide. To elaborate, those who were accused of being among the killers by the Gacaca tribunals were around 2,500 (category 2 in the table below), while those who were accused of being part of the genocide think-tanks and hardcore killers were around 300 (category 1 in the table below). The remaining alleged perpetrators were accused of material destruction and/or looting (category 3 in the table below). The Table below shows the estimate of alleged perpetrators as gathered by the Gacaca tribunals. Apart from Rwandans, some Burundian refugees were mentioned as having participated in the killing of Tutsi, as we saw above.

Table 8: Statistics of alleged perpetrators (i.e., accused of genocide participation) in Kibayi Commune following the Gacaca gathering of information of 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Category 1</th>
<th>Category 2</th>
<th>Category 3</th>
<th>Total/Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joma</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibayi</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukindo</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukomacara</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyagahuru I</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runyinya</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwamiko</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saga</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shyombo</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>1,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL KIBAYI COMMUNE</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>2501</td>
<td>3096</td>
<td>5,931</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCLUSION

Genocide was done by both the leadership and the population. Although it started later than in several other parts of the country, it became harsh. Part of the reason was that it was well prepared. This preparation can be seen in the way the local leadership assured protection to the Tutsi population, assembled this population in public places and thereafter turned the protection place into a place of massacre, especially after defining the displaced Tutsi as the enemy. Between 6 and 19 April 1994, the Commune administrative leaders hesitated about whether to attack the Tutsi population or not. This is probably the result of the initiative taken by the Butare Prefect at that time of not getting involved in the genocide. Once he was removed from office and replaced, and once the issue of genocide was taken seriously by national leaders who came to hold meetings to win over local leaders in the Butare prefectures and in subprefectures, these local leaders of Kibayi also joined the genocide project.

The Tutsi who had gathered at public places were massacred. The bulk of those who had sought refuge among Hutu friends and relatives were also killed. However, the Tutsi individuals who distrusted the leadership at an earlier stage and who took the direction of Burundi survived in the majority. Others were helped by close Hutu friends or relatives and some of them survived, while the bulk of others were killed during the second phase of killings. The expectation that I had before doing this research was that in Kibayi the number of survivors would be much bigger than in Gishamvu because it was located just near the border with Burundi. But this was not the case, part of the reason being that the survivors did not flee in greater numbers at an early stage, as they did not predict what would happen after 19 April 1994.

As we saw, during the second phase of killings, some other aspects of violence appeared. These include violence among the Hutu over Tutsi wives of some of the Hutu men and
violence over material things. The Tutsi Genocide stopped in early July 1994 as a result of the military victory of the RPF rebels over the Rwandan army and the militias.
GENERAL CONCLUSION

The purpose of this dissertation was to understand the conditions that made possible the Tutsi genocide in Gishamvu and in Kibayi. It argued, like many previous works, that the state played a crucial role in the occurrence of this genocide. As we saw, on the one hand the state in Rwanda has always been the object of political competition. The control of the state was the means for claiming paramount political power. The state was also the terrain or the framework within which that competition operated. On the other hand, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was, like the other twentieth century genocides, engineered by the state. The aim of the Hutu extremists was to control the state and get the benefits thereof. They saw the Tutsi genocide as a means to this end. They succeeded in implementing the genocide but were defeated militarily, and as a result, they failed to reach their objective of definitively controlling the state.

Since colonial times, the state in Rwanda strove to control the central government (high politics), but also to reach the local level, that is, to control society (deep politics). And to a large degree, it succeeded in controlling society, despite some resistance to this trend as shown in chapters three and four. This success of the state agents was due in part to the geographical situation of Rwanda, a country with a small territory, hence manageable to administer. Moreover, the Rwandan society was to some extent a society with a culture of obedience to the existing authority, hence an opportunity to control it. In addition to this, civil society remained weak all through the twentieth century, a condition that the state agents exploited significantly.¹

As far as time is concerned, the Rwandan state was both colonial and postcolonial. We saw that the postindependence state inherited authoritarianism from the colonial state. But, given that the authoritarian type of regime under Kayibanda varied at least in degree vis-à-vis the Habyarimana regime, I stressed in chapter three that hand in hand with the

colonial legacy, postindependence agency was also important. Was the postindependence Rwandan state weak, a failed state or a gatekeeper, as Marennin, Herbst and Cooper have argued for African states? Though Rwanda shared several features with other African states, the state in Rwanda seems to have controlled society and resources a great deal. The state remained strong in several different phases.

Even in times of turmoil, the state conserved its monopoly of coercion. This monopoly was challenged only at the time of the multiparty system in areas controlled by the opposition parties, such as in Butare Prefecture as seen in chapter four. But even there, the challenge to state force remained limited and circumscribed in limited and scattered regions. But even during the time of the genocide, the state conserved its strength. One theory has linked the strength or the centralisation of the state with the likelihood of the occurrence of lethal violence. Although this cannot be verified in every case of centralized states across history and across the world, it has some merit as far as Rwanda is concerned. Lethal violence in Rwanda has always been the consequence of competition for the control of central power.

All through the postindependence period, the Rwandan central state strove, and often succeeded, in controlling local administration. It appointed local leaders at the level of the prefecture and the commune, and gave immense powers to prefects and burgomasters. These appeared more as representatives of the central state at local level than the representatives of the constituents. At the time of the genocide, they did not become an exception. They continued to implement the orders of the central government. Therefore, that the genocide bore the aspect of a “decentralised” genocide is not an accident. It was

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the result of a structural evolution of centralization since colonial times. Hence, 144 of 145 communes of Rwanda embarked on the genocide.6

Genocide was carried out by both the leadership and the population. Mamdani has argued that the genocide stemmed from planning and participation, and that any comprehensive account needs to consider both the state and the society in understanding why the government planning and call for genocide resonated with tremendous support at local level.7 This is what my dissertation has attempted to do. From chapter one up to chapter four, it traced political and socioeconomic developments that bore the features of conflict and violence both at the top and at local level and from colonial times up to the eve of the genocide. It showed in chapters five, six and seven how the ideology of genocide was engineered and then spread and how genocide came from the top down to the bottom. At the most local level, the Tutsi genocide was implemented mostly by groups of killers and rarely by individual killers.8

A number of tools have been used in these struggles for access to power and control. Violence was the means and sometimes the end of such struggles. We saw in chapter two the violence that occurred during the time of decolonization. We also saw the violence that occurred in the early 1990s at the time of extreme economic crisis and political crisis following the attack of the RPF. While criminal violence showed Gishamvu and Kibayi residents striving to have access to some of the material goods and property of their fellows or of the Commune, the violence among political party members was about increasing the influence of each party at the expense of the other. If we concede Foucault’s point that politics is war by other means, at the time of multiparty politics, politics was becoming just war, that is, war by means of war. And again, in Rwanda,

6 In 1991, there were 11 prefectures, 32 subprefectures, 145 communes and 1,490 sectors. (République Rwandaise, Service National de Recensement, Recensement général de la population et de l’habitat au 15 août 1991, Résultats provisoires, Kigali, Décembre 1991.) It is only the Giti Commune that did not take part in the Tutsi genocide.

7 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 7.

8 Fujii, Killing Neighbors, pp. 7 and 155-179.
politics has come to mean plots, conflict or upheavals. Times of politics (igihe cya za politike) meant “times of open violence”.

The manipulation of the discourse around identity was also used. As far as conditions of possibility of violence are concerned, we have learned a number of things all through this thesis. First, that ontology did not always determine – or coincide with – agency. People (rulers and ruled, perpetrators and victims and bystanders) from the same identity behaved differently vis-à-vis modes of rule, or the production or execution of violence. Certain people from the same identity group behaved differently, or else people from different identities acted in the same direction, because they shared interests in doing so. In this respect, David Newbury has warned against the view that Hutu and Tutsi were “absolute corporate groups”, and against the view that all Tutsi or all Hutu shared the same welfare or suffered the same fates in different periods, whether precolonial or postcolonial. As groups, they did not share the same positive or negative experiences in an absolute manner.9

Secondly, the extremist party leaders instrumentalized ethnicity in their competition for power. They racialized political discourse,10 they insisted on the equation of Hutu as majority and Tutsi as minority, Tutsi as a threat11 and Hutu as victims, etc. The point about Hutu and Tutsi identities as being political, in other words shaped by the evolution of the state in Rwanda, was still valid until 1994. Those identities took the shape that state holders wanted them to have. Lee Ann Fujii is right to say that “[t]he story of genocide was thus not one of ethnic conflict – old and new – but an even older tale of power and politics.”12

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12 Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*, p. 46, see also p. 121.
However, socially speaking, since precolonial times, there has been no recorded systematic violence between Hutu and Tutsi and no deep rooted hatred between them. Moreover, Hutu and Tutsi never constituted two separate communities. Serious social division among the Hutu and the Tutsi came all the way from the colonial policies and historiography. It was only in 1959 that violence among Hutu and Tutsi occurred, amidst political competition between parties in order to inherit the state following the end of colonial rule. Then it was perpetuated by postindependence regimes up to 1994. However, ethnic identity intervened in the genocide, because the Tutsi were killed for who they were and not for what they did.

It was not the RPF attack of 1990 nor the economic crises of 1985-1994 that led the Hutu perpetrators to kill the Tutsi. Nor was the death of President Habyarimana the cause of genocide. The preparation of the genocide was done long before 1994. Some authors have proposed dates for that preparation, between 1991 and 1994 (see chapter five) and a number of massacres against the Tutsi had been implemented in certain areas of the country between 1990 and 1993. They bore features that resembled the Tutsi genocide of April-July 1994 a great deal. Furthermore, as we saw for Butare Prefecture, Gishamvu and Kibayi Communes, the genocide started some twelve days after the shooting down of the presidential plane. This suggests that the death of the president was not sufficient to instil the determination to exterminate the Tutsi population within Rwanda. The killing of President Habyarimana was instrumentalized as a pretext to start exterminating the Tutsi.

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It was not the cause of the genocide. As we saw all along this thesis, the context of the genocide was there. That is what I called a space for genocide, in other words, the conditions that made possible the genocide. I have explored this dynamic throughout the entire dissertation. What the shooting down of the plane achieved was to provide the pretext for the implementation of what was long prepared and engineered. And for Butare, the national leadership needed even to demote and kill a reluctant Prefect in order to make the genocide a possibility.

In addition to violence and the instrumentalisation of ethnicity, material benefits were also powerful tools used during major episodes of violence. One of the material assets so dearly competed for was land. Since colonial times, land was defined as the state’s property. It was redistributed for usufruct by central and local state agents. The redistribution of land gave leaders immense influence in economic life. This influence grew as the population size kept on increasing up to 1994. During the violence of 1959-1966, land was the target of most attackers of those designated as Tutsi and monarchists. Land was ultimately redistributed to mostly those who had taken part in their expulsion. During the genocide, land was one of the main incentives for popular participation. It was promised to perpetrators, was targeted by perpetrators and thereafter was redistributed to them.

Structural violence that was recorded during the twentieth century in terms of inequalities and injustices, can also be applied to the types of struggles for control of power and appropriation of resources. In many African countries, holders of power tended to monopolize the public goods as well. Normally, genocides did not happen wherever structural violence was identified, but genocides against particular groups followed their

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exclusion or discrimination in everyday life. In chapter three, I developed cases of structural violence that occurred in the whole country and in Gishamvu and Kibayi in particular. Most complaints were about Tutsi from all over the country and Hutu from particular regions experiencing discrimination in the education and employment sectors. It is interesting to note that the answers of my informants from Gishamvu and Kibayi as to why genocide became possible in their communes revolved around power and material assets. Half of the informants who answered this question said that genocide stemmed from the fact that those who held power refused to share it; instead, they chose to exterminate the Tutsi community. As to those who responded to the call of participation in the genocidal project, the informants said that they targeted the wealth of the victims.

Let us just consider some few passages: “The crisis came from the fact that people wanted to eat alone, and leave others hungry.” Another informant added: “What caused the genocide is the big belly of people. […] It is the big belly of the ordinary Hutu who were excluding the Tutsi, and hunting them for their belongings, their cows, saying: ‘let’s kill him so that we can eat those cows.’” The big belly is a literal translation of “inda nini”. This kinyarwanda expression also means lust for material things. It is repeated by several informants. Another term close to that one is “bad belly” which is a metaphor to mean envy of others’ belongings. It was used by Célestin Karemera:

[The main cause of killings] is the bad leadership. If you analyse, the peasants did not have guns. I guess, if the government told the military to stand there, and shoot anyone who wants to kill the Tutsi, no one could dare approach there. The bad power sent them to kill, helped them to kill, and they killed. […] Some had started to receive the land of the ones they killed, and they had already taken the banana fields. Others had the cows taken from those killed. Don’t you see that killing was not useless? Those are the benefits they got. It is the bad belly. It is the bad belly that destroyed this country.

If the monopolizing of power by Hutu extremist parties seems the incentive for planning the genocide, the target of material things is suggested as the main incentive that brought

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23 Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007.
24 Interview with Gérard Segatashya, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007.
more participation from the side of the ordinary peasants in Gishamvu and Kibayi. As far as sensitization to genocide participation is concerned, the material discourse functioned at two levels. One level was the promise given to all untargeted people that once the Tutsi are exterminated all their belongings would be given to the perpetrators. For example, Anonymous 2 explains that the Hutu peasants were told that if the Tutsi are killed, all their belongings will be distributed to Hutu. The property that was promised included mostly land, but also household furniture, materials from destroyed houses, livestock and groceries. That promise fell on fertile ground for two reasons. First, because even in the 1960s, the redistribution of land of those who had fled had been accomplished and the active participants were visibly the most privileged beneficiaries. Secondly, even the conjuncture of 1994 was favourable to the spread of such hopes. As it was the time of famine, as stressed by a number of informants, several peasants found it an occasion to profit from some gains. But more importantly, as a big number of the youth were landless, the promise of access to land attracted a number of them.

There was also a certain level of expectation among certain Hutu inhabitants of Gishamvu and Kibayi. Some of those who had Tutsi neighbours were tempted by the latter’s land and considered themselves as potentially the first beneficiaries of the belongings of those Tutsi neighbours: “A person who had an isambu [land] near the one of a Tutsi, believed that if he is able to kill him, he can just move the imiyenzi [plant that serves as border of two land properties of different people], then his isambu gets extended.” Vénuste Sindabizera also mentioned this case: “Neighbours also enjoyed to take over the land of the Tutsi who were close to them. They are the ones who either killed them or fomented a plan to denounced them. In the Gacaca tribunal trials, we


always hear such cases of people who denounced their neighbours." Intellectuals expected even bigger gains. For example, some people alleged that the teacher Masima from Saga in Kibayi, as he was among the influential leaders of MDR party and a hardcore organiser of killings, he would later become burgomaster of Kibayi and then the burgomaster Kajyambere would be appointed to a higher position.

Some other informants sought explanations of why the genocide became possible in their area in terms of older colonial practices. They pointed out that the Tutsi genocide was caused by the ethnic policy engineered by the colonial rulers and by the later misrepresentation of Tutsi chiefs in school history books. This follows one of the main points of Mamdani: “The origin of the violence is connected to how Hutu and Tutsi were constructed as political identities by the colonial state, Hutu as indigenous and Tutsi as alien. The reason for continued violence between Hutu and Tutsi, I argue, is connected with the failure of Rwandan nationalism to transcend the colonial construction of Hutu and Tutsi as native and alien.”

Finally, the interviews point to the groups who were more active in the participation in the genocide. Some say the youth were more active. Others blame charismatic individuals and leaders, or the elderly. If one may arrange them by order of importance, they include:

1. the youth who mostly needed land in order to settle and get married,
2. old men who knew what the benefits were in getting involved in such killings and upheavals,
3. political party hooligans in order to loot minor movable property, cattle, etc. but without more ambition of getting very rich,
4. neighbours of the Tutsi who hoped to be the first beneficiaries of their land, as mentioned above,

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32 Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 34.
5. the rich people in order to protect their assets,
6. the rulers, military, police, administrative employees and teachers because of their employment in the civil service, and because of the expectations of being promoted.

Perhaps, the most important tool for making genocide a possibility was to instil more obedience in the state’s authority. As we saw in chapter five, although the multiparty system of 1991-1994 produced a serious challenge to the state, at the time of the genocide, opposition parties had been weakened, divided and scattered, and in the process the Hutu PAWA faction had been strengthened. When a decision came ordering to exterminate the Tutsi, sufficient coherent opposition did not exist to contradict this position.

Concerning the outcome of the genocide in Gishamvu and Kibayi, some few observations need to be stressed. First, as we saw in chapters six and seven, each sector underwent genocide, albeit to an unequal degree. In Gishamvu, the Nyakibanda and Gishamvu Sectors were the most victimised. In Kibayi, the major genocide sites of large-scale massacres included the Commune office located in Mukindo Sector, and the Kabuga commercial centre located in Kibayi Sector. Many Tutsi from Kibayi were also massacred at Mugombwa Church and Kabuye hill, both located outside Kibayi Commune. The Kanyaru river became also the space of killing by throwing the victims into the water, alive or dead.

Secondly, the proximity of Gishamvu and Kibayi with the border of Burundi did save the bulk of survivors from those communes, but, as we saw in chapters six and seven, had the Tutsi anticipated the occurrence of genocide, more survivors would be registered, given that these two communes were very close to Burundi and the genocide started later in those communes. Indeed, border dynamics were very crucial in this region. We saw that the proximity with Burundi has offered a number of occasions of interaction for the populations of Gishamvu and Kibayi, both at the time of tense political developments and in everyday life. The Burundi populations located near the border with Rwanda interacted
with Rwandans in business, in matrimonial relations, in friendship, and even during the
time of acute violence in both sides. Alternatively, even during the violence of 1994,
some Burundians took part in the killings and in the lootings in Kibayi just as some
Burundians saved lives of certain Rwandans. Burundi hosted Rwandan refugees from
1959 to 1966, in 1973 and in 1994. Rwanda also hosted Burundian refugees in 1972 and
in 1993. Sadly again, for both Rwanda and Burundi, violence recorded in one country’s
politics served as a powerful ingredient for violent political rhetoric or violence itself in
the other. Gishamvu and Kibayi seem to be among Rwandan communes that have
witnessed this Burundian influence on an acute basis. This explains why all through this
dissertation, accounts concerning border experiences abound.

Thirdly, as far as my estimates in chapter six and seven are concerned, that Gishamvu
registered less genocide victims than Kibayi is a complex issue. Normally, given the
geographical proximity of Kibayi with the border to Burundi, I was expecting that the
victims in Kibayi would be less than the ones in Gishamvu. But that was not the case.
Moreover, as we saw in the four earlier chapters, the inhabitants of Gishamvu and Kibayi
communes were used to crossing the border to Burundi either for commercial purposes,
or even social interactions, not to mention political ones, when they had to flee political
upheavals. Kibayi had an even bigger Burundian population than Gishamvu. But why the
Tutsi population did not use this opportunity to flee earlier is hard to understand.
Especially given that, as the genocide in the whole country lasted about ten days before
the majority of Butare territory was touched, it is possible to think that the Tutsi of
Gishamvu and Kibayi would have used those days to flee.

One possible explanation is that, as we saw in chapter six and seven again, even a few
weeks after the genocide began, Gishamvu and Kibayi people still did not believe it
would possibly reach their place. Most of them hoped that peace would hold, as the then
Prefect, Jean Baptiste Habyarimana, protected them during those first two weeks. As a
result, the delay in crossing the border did have an impact on the limited survival of the
Tutsi community, even in this area where it was only a short distance to reach Burundi.
Indeed, despite some years of spreading ethnic hatred messages in a high degree, several
Tutsi living in the country were not thinking that the genocide could be imagined. This is very well explained by Helen Hintjens:

Many Batutsi apparently failed to anticipate the genocide, in spite of mounting evidence that something was being planned, and in spite of periodic killings of unarmed Batutsi civilians. [...] Had they believed genocide possible, many more Batutsi would have fled the country before April 1994. It is important to explain how it was that the genocide remained an ‘open secret’ until the day it began.33

Had they anticipated the possibility of genocide, perhaps more survivors could be registered in Gishamvu and Kibayi, and maybe more in Kibayi than in Gishamvu. Sociologically, Gishamvu had the bigger percentage of Tutsi population than Kibayi. Did that element have an impact of explaining slightly higher Tutsi survival rates in Gishamvu than in Kibayi? Given especially that as we saw in chapter six, those who could, fled en masse. Did this help them not to be attacked on their way? One other sociological element made the Tutsi people of Kibayi become even more fragile. A great number of them had integrated themselves with the Hutu community through matrimonial ties. As a result, more Tutsi who had Hutu relatives went to seek refuge there. But the killer mobs knew about those ties. Hence, during the second phase of killings, they went in search of particular Tutsi individuals or families at the Hutu homes where they knew they would hide. That is how a big number of Tutsi died in Kibayi after refusing to flee to Burundi before and even during the genocide.

Finally, though I can say that I am lucky to have obtained interview responses from all sides of the population – perpetrators, victims and bystanders, and to have had access to a wide range of archival materials of different periods and agencies, I cannot claim to have found all the answers and to have covered everything. Some people told me a selected version after extracting what they did not want me to know, some exaggerated parts of the testimony that they wanted me to focus on, others kept quiet and said “I do not remember”.34 Some avoided remembering,35 some failed to put in words certain parts of

34 On the difficulty of collecting genocide experience views in the aftermath of the genocide, see Christine Stansell, “‘I Was Sick during the Genocide’. Remembering to Forget in Contemporary Rwanda”, Dissent, Spring 2007, pp. 11-19.
their recollections, some did not exteriorise their “inner language” as opposed to their “private language”, some failed to put in words what they have witnessed or undergone, some were afraid to do that for reasons known by themselves, some did not find in current language the vocabulary to describe what they witnessed, some stuck to my questions which did not attend to the totality of their experiences, etc.36

In addition to the above difficulties, in a study of genocide such as this one, many experiences remain unsaid. A person who was killed will definitely not tell his/her experience of the genocide. I will hear it from the survivor, the perpetrator or the bystander. These accounts will not be sufficient without that of the dead. The dead person is the “complete witness” who lived the genocide experience up to its completion, but who “could not bear witness” as argued by Giorgio Agamben.37 In this regard, any history of genocide remains a mutilated knowledge.38 This is not even to mention witnesses that I did not interview, simply because it is impossible to interview the whole population.

In the same vein, the fact that many survivors in their own narratives about their genocide experiences consider themselves as dead raises some questions. On the one hand, we consider them as alive as we see them before us and interact with them. But on the other hand, we hear them talk about themselves as dead among the dead during the genocide. Expressions such as “they killed us”, “they finished us”, “we were all exterminated” were fully articulated in their accounts. In fact, that means the killers wanted them killed, finished, exterminated. As Derrida said, if someone wants you dead, then he has killed you; you are dead even if still alive. That follows what Schreiber called the “dead-dead”, and the “alive-dead” among the Tutsi.39

36 On similar cases of memory fences about violence, see Das, *Life and Words*, p. 11.
As Staub and Diamond argued, there is a hope that understanding the conditions that made possible the genocide in Rwanda has the capacity to help prevent the same thing happening again in future, in the same country or elsewhere. In the time such as the one we are living in, we need to understand the making of extreme violence, and to promote more advocacy for human rights: “We must…more than ever stand on the side of human rights. We need ...human rights. We are in need of them and they are in need, for there is always a lack, a shortfall, a falling short, an insufficiency; human rights are never sufficient. Which alone suffices to remind us that they are not natural.” We need to acknowledge that the road to a world free of genocide is still far away. Indeed, it seems as if present states do not learn from past violence. Despite this obstacle, Totten advocates the increased efforts to prevent further genocides, since this is about the survival of humankind. But on an optimistic note, one seminal paper has made it clear that knowledge about the making of group-targeted violence can be used as expertise for halting future group-targeted violence before it occurs or even during its occurrence. If this hope stands, then my research has had also a useful purpose.

Given that there was enough early warning signs, some authors argued that the Tutsi genocide could easily have been prevented. Dallaire warned the UN Security Council

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before the genocide, and attracted the attention of the international media during the genocide in order to instil awareness and prevent extreme violence, but nothing was done by the UN or by western countries to stop the genocide.\textsuperscript{46} This raised the issue as to whether to consider the international community as a bystander or complicit in the Tutsi genocide.\textsuperscript{47}

This dissertation has argued that the state was strong even in rural areas, that the culture of violence since the decolonization time up to 1994 had reached even remote communes such as Kibayi and Gishamvu and that ethnic relations, even though they had their regional specificities, depended a great deal on the direction of state policies in matters relating to identity. It has also argued that rural areas were not spared from intense multiparty politics both in 1959-1965 and 1991-1994. Finally, material benefits were paramount in decisions of various people at different times, but the decision to embark on genocide stemmed from politics.

It is worth noting that the Tutsi genocide was not the sole case where the ordinary citizens were persuaded to exterminate innocent victims. In the holocaust this also occurred.\textsuperscript{48} In Serbia and Bosnia, it also occurred.\textsuperscript{49} But the peculiarity of the Rwandan case lies in the magnitude of that mass participation and the occurrence of it at nearly every corner of the country. This obliges us to pursue the investigation of the Tutsi genocide in several other communes of Rwanda. Such local studies can contribute to a


\textsuperscript{47} Fred Grünfeld, and Anke Huijboom, \textit{The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda: The role of Bystanders}, Leiden and Boston, Transnational Publishers, 2007, pp. 5-6.


\textsuperscript{49} Weitz, \textit{A Century of Genocide}, pp. 222-223.
deepening of the understanding of the nature and the management of power at local level, as well as social relations, material culture and local behaviours during the genocide.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: COLONIAL CHIEFS AND SUBCHIEFS IN THE TERRITORY THAT BECAME GISHAMVU AND KIBAYI

Bashumba Nyakare

In 1925, Kabera was chief of Bashumba and Sezikeye was chief of Nyakare. Kabera was replaced by his son, Rutamu around 1932, while Sezikeye was replaced in 1934 by his son Mutembe, born in 1910. Both Rutamu and Mutembe had studied at the Nyanza primary school and Rutamu had done an internship at the Territory as Indigene Secretary. In 1946, Bashumba and Nyakare were merged to form a new chiefdom of Bashumba-Nyakare. This new combined chiefdom was given to the new chief Elie Gitambaro, who by 1940 had completed his education at the Astrida Secondary School. He kept office until January 1956. He was then replaced by Eugene Muhikira who kept office until the 1959 “revolution”. Then Nyangezi Fiacre was appointed as Chief ad interim. He kept office until May 1960, then was replaced by Cajetan Bisumbukuboko. Bisumbukuboko was the last Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare. He was chief until February 1961 when Chiefdoms were officially cancelled and replaced by Prefectures.

In 1955, the following were subchiefs: Bucagu was ruling Shori; Namahungu was administering Bitare since 1936; for Buvumu it was Kanyarugero; for Mubumbano it was Gatege and for Kibingo it was Nzabamwita. In 1957 administrative reform, Shori is cancelled and annexed to Mubumbano. At the end of 1958, Mubumbano had still Gatege as subchief. The subchiefs were Kanyarugero or Sefigi, Hutu for Mubumbano; Bitare still had Namahungu and Kibingo still had Nzabamwita.

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Nyaruguru

Nyaruguru has had respectively Sendashonga, Michel Kayihura, Hormisdas Mbanda and Phocas Kabagema as chiefs.

By 1932, Gashagaza was already subchief of Nyakibanda. In 1957, Gashagaza was no longer in office; he was replaced by Gasamunyiga. At the end of 1959, Nyakibanda was led by Kabirigi.

Buhanga-Ndara

Senyamambara, from Nyiginya clan, was chief of Buhanga from 1928 to 1930 after completing his Nyanza School education. In 1933, Kayondo is chief of Buhanga, but makes himself represented in Buhanga by his son Kimonyo, while he rules elsewhere. Kimonyo is replaced by Justin Gashugi in 1939.

In Ndara, Rwasamanzi son of Ntizimira, was chief before the administrative reform. Then, in 1934, he asked for resignation and suggested his nephew Bucyanayandi, from Abega clan, to replace him. His choice was confirmed by the Belgian administration. The chief of Ndara was Bucyanayandi from 1934 until 1941. Then in 1941, the two chiefdoms were merged to form Buhanga-Ndara that was given to Justin Gashugi, from the Nyiginya clan, from 1941 to 1959. Following the violence of November 1959, Gashugi was demoted and replaced by Rucyahana, who was also Tutsi, as Chief ad interim.

Rusengamihigo was subchief of Runyinya in 1932. Then from 1934, it was directly administered by Chief Bucyanayandi (1934-1941). Then Kagabo, son of Rubibi, administered Runyinya from 1942 to 1947. From 1947, Kibwana was appointed to replace Kagabo in Runyinya. He held office until late 1959.
Saga, Muganza and Kirarambogo subchiefdoms were ruled by Urayaha son of Rusengamihigo in 1947. He had started in 1942 and ended his office in 1948. Then Rwasamanzi, son of Gatunzi, took over in 1949 and ruled until 1959. In 1952 Kirarambogo hill became a new subchiefdom led by Nyakarundi until 1957 when it was cancelled again. Rwasamanzi of Saga was replaced by André Hitimana (alias Kiramoto), Hutu, in Saga in 1959. In 1960, this area of Ndara became Saga Commune and was ruled by André Hitimana who was elected as first Burgomaster.

Mvejuru

In 1925, Cyitatire was chief of Bwanamukari (that became later Mvejuru). He was replaced by his son Semutwa, who kept office from 1927 to 1946. Then François Rusagara took over and kept office until 1959. On 31 December 1959, chief Rusagara had been replaced by Minani, a Hutu.

Before the administrative reform of 1930, Mukomacara subchiefdom was ruled by Kigoye; Joma subchiefdom by Fangari; and Magi by Rumashana. Then the administrative reform of 1926-1931 regrouped these three subchiefdoms. They were ruled by Ruzindana, son of Kayijuka, in 1939. In 1952, Ruzindana is the subchief of following hills: Magi, Mukomacara, Joma, Nyabisagara and Mukindo. In 1958, Ruvebana had replaced Ruzindana. In 1959, Magi had a new Hutu subchief by the name of Raymond Hakizimana.

Before the reform, Linda was ruled by Gatambira and Nyagahuru by Rutabana. After the reform in 1939, Linda, Nyagahuru and Kibu were given to Kanamugire, son of Musonera, as subchief. In 1958, Kanamugire had been replaced by Kabisa. The latter was dismissed in 1959 and replaced by Habimana, a Hutu ad interim Subchief.
APPENDIX 2: CAMPAIGN MEETINGS IN GISHAMVU AND KIBAYI from 1991 to 1993

Campaign meetings in Gishamvu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Whereabouts</th>
<th>Chairperson</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td>15 August 1991</td>
<td>Soccer field of Nyumba near the Commune office</td>
<td>Jean Kambanda, Head of the MDR committee in Butare Prefecture</td>
<td>Foreseen (means that the party has applied for the permission to hold a campaign meeting at that date, but that the local authorities haven’t answered yet.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>23 August 1992</td>
<td>Gikunzi Sector</td>
<td>Aloys Sibomana, Executive Secretary of PSD in Gishamvu</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>31 August 1991</td>
<td>Gishamvu Commune</td>
<td>Félicien Gatabazi, National Executive Secretary</td>
<td>Done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td>29 September 1991</td>
<td>Ikibuye cya Shali for Mubumbano, Buvumu, Liba and Kibingo members</td>
<td>Augustin Sezibera, President</td>
<td>Allowed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRND</td>
<td>26 October 1991</td>
<td>Commune Gishamvu office</td>
<td>Augustin Kabiligi, Coordinator of MRND in Gishamvu</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td>22 December 1991</td>
<td>Gishamvu Commune</td>
<td>Augustin Sezibera, President</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>10 November 1991</td>
<td>Gishamvu Sector</td>
<td>Aloys Sibomana, Executive Secretary</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>17 November 1991</td>
<td>Sheke Sector, place: Ku Nyundo</td>
<td>Aloys Sibomana</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>24 November 1991</td>
<td>Mubumbano, Buvumu, Liba and Kibingo Sectors, place: Ikibuye cya Shali</td>
<td>Aloys Sibomana</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>22 January 1992</td>
<td>Gishamvu Commune</td>
<td>Aloys Sibomana</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>25 January 1992</td>
<td>Busoro, Gishamvu</td>
<td>A. Rutsindura, Sr., Secretary of the regional committee of PL in Butare Prefecture</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Responsible of MDR in Butare Prefecture</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td>2 February 1992</td>
<td>Gishamvu Commune Office</td>
<td>Responsible of MDR in Butare Prefecture (no name)</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td>09 February 1992</td>
<td>Gishamvu, Kibayi Communes and in other three communes of Butare</td>
<td>Jean Kambanda, Responsible of MDR in Butare Prefecture</td>
<td>Allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRND</td>
<td>16 February 1992</td>
<td>Nyumba</td>
<td>Augustin Kabiligi, President of MRND in Gishamvu</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>1 March 1992</td>
<td>Muhumbando Sector office</td>
<td>Aloys Sibomana, Executive Secretary of PSD in Gishamvu</td>
<td>Allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>8 March 1992</td>
<td>Buvumu Sector</td>
<td>Aloys Sibomana, Executive Secretary of PSD in Gishamvu</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td>8 March 1992</td>
<td>Gikunzi Sector</td>
<td>Augustin Sezibera, President of MDR in Gishamvu</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td>14 March 1992</td>
<td>Buvumu Sector</td>
<td>Augustin Sezibera, President of MDR in Gishamvu</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>15 March 1992</td>
<td>Liba Sector</td>
<td>Aloys Sibomana, Executive Secretary of PSD in Gishamvu</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td>21 March 1992</td>
<td>Sholi Sector</td>
<td>Gabriel Murara, Acting representative of MDR in Gishamvu</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>22 March 1992</td>
<td>Kibingo Sector</td>
<td>Aloys Sibomana, Executive Secretary of PSD in Gishamvu</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td>22 March 1992</td>
<td>Liba Sector</td>
<td>Gabriel Murara, Acting representative of MDR in Gishamvu</td>
<td>Foreseen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td>28 March 1992</td>
<td>Kibingo Sector</td>
<td>Gabriel Murara, Acting representative of MDR in Gishamvu</td>
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<td>MRND</td>
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<td>MDR</td>
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<td>Ikibuye cya Shali for Mubumbano, Buvumu and Liba Sectors</td>
<td>Justin Senyange, President of PL in Gishamvu</td>
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<td>Busoro Subprefecture office</td>
<td>Charles Mulindahabi, Regional Executive</td>
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<td>Party</td>
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<td>MDR</td>
<td>26 September 1993</td>
<td>Gishamvu Commune, area: soccer field at Nyumba</td>
<td>Gabriel Murara, President of MDR in Gishamvu</td>
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<td>PSD</td>
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<td>Mubumbano Sector, area: Ikibuye cya Shari</td>
<td>Executive Secretary in Gishamvu</td>
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</table>

Sources: Letters of party representatives applying for authorization to hold campaign meetings, letters of administrative leaders authorizing the holding of campaign meetings of parties, and reports of party leaders and administrative leaders on parties’ activities.

Campaign meetings in Kibayi

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
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<th>Whereabouts</th>
<th>Chairperson</th>
<th>Observation</th>
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<td>MDR</td>
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<td>Kibayi Commune office</td>
<td>Responsible of MDR in Butare</td>
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<td>Commercial Centre of Kabuga, for Kibayi and Muganza Communes</td>
<td>President of MDR in Butare</td>
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</table>

Sources: Letters of party representatives applying for authorization to hold campaign meetings, letters of administrative leaders authorizing the holding of campaign meetings of parties, and reports of party leaders and administrative leaders on parties’ activities.