Progress and Challenges of Implementing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in Uganda

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Plagiarism declaration

I declare that **PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA** is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

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Map showing LRA conflict areas

Source: Conciliation Sources
Key Words

Challenges

Complementarity

Implementation

International core crimes

International Criminal Court

International Criminal Court Act

Prosecution

Rome Statute

State party

Uganda
Dedication

For you mummy and daddy

For you my dear sisters and brothers

For my dearest son Christopher Austin
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Above all, I say thank you to my family for being there and to God for his love.
### Abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APIC</td>
<td>Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (Uganda)</td>
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<td>DPP</td>
<td>Director/directorate of Public Prosecutions</td>
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<td>GCA</td>
<td>Geneva Conventions Act</td>
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<td>Government</td>
<td>Government of Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC Act</td>
<td>International Criminal Court Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court (Rome Statute)</td>
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<td>ICD</td>
<td>International Crimes Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULRC</td>
<td>Uganda Law Reform Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction to the study

“As a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of the national institutions, would be a major success”

Luis Moreno Ocampo

The coming into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereafter “Rome Statute”) in July 2002 was a thriving success for the international community insofar as that it contributed greatly to international criminal law jurisprudence. The Rome Statute establishes the International Criminal Court (hereafter “ICC”) and confers upon the ICC jurisdiction over the international crimes namely: the crime of Genocide; Crimes against Humanity; War Crimes and the Crime of Aggression. However, the execution of the Courts mandate is rather based two core principles that the Court operates on: the Principle of Complementarity, and the Principle of Cooperation. The principle of complementarity is to the effect that the jurisdiction of the ICC to prosecute those most responsible for committing international core crimes is subsidiary to that of national jurisdictions. States are therefore expected to undertake the primary responsibility to

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1 Chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (2003) Statement made at the ceremony for the solemn undertaking of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.
2 See Rome Statute Treaty.
3 Schabas (2010: 22-3).
4 Rome Statute, Art. 1.
5 Rome Statute, Art. 5.
6 Rome Statute, Preamble, para 10, Art 1 and 17.
7 Rome Statute, Chapter 9.
8 Werle (2009: 81 marginal n 222). The author states that, to the ICC, indirect enforcement of international criminal law through national prosecution will continue to be of pre-eminent importance.
prosecute and punish perpetrators of these crimes. Conversely, the principle of cooperation between the ICC and States Parties will arise after the Court has determined that it has jurisdiction over a case. States Parties shall in accordance to the provisions of the Statute cooperate fully with the ICC in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore, a State that ratifies the Rome Statute accepts to fulfil these requirements created by the Rome Statute. It is not an excuse for a State to plead the national legislation as a defence not to perform according to the provisions of the Rome Statute. Uganda a State Party to the ICC is among states that opted to domesticate a Rome Statute implementing legislation. It is on this stand point that the study seeks to examine the progress and challenges of implementing the Rome Statute in Uganda with focus on compliance with the principle of complementarity.

1.2 Background to the topic of this study

Uganda was one of the ratifying States that brought the Statute into force in July, 2002. Ratification was an indication of Uganda’s commitment to the journey to end impunity.

The genesis of Uganda’s commitment to the ICC process could be trailed from the civil strife, which plagued the country since obtaining independence in 1962. From the very outset, independence was marked by unstable government. Since independence, Uganda has undergone frequent regime change, mainly through Coup d'etats, which was characterised by gross human rights violations. Besides the erratic form of governance since 1986, a long-standing war had

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9 Rome Statute, Preamble, Para 4 and 6. Also see Werle (2009: 82-83) on complementarity model of the ICC.
10 Rome Statute, Art. 86.
13 Rome Statute, Preamble para. 5.
been raging in Greater Northern Uganda\textsuperscript{15} between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), rebel group led by Joseph Kony. This conflict lasted longer than others. The conflict with the LRA has been particularly brutal, with countless incidents of gross human rights violations, which constitute international crimes\textsuperscript{16}.

Efforts to bring the conflict to an end were in vain. The Uganda’s people’s Defence Forces (UPDF) tried to annihilate the LRA, but failed.\textsuperscript{17} The Government then offered the rebels a blanket amnesty,\textsuperscript{18} an offer which Kony and his cohorts have rejected.\textsuperscript{19}

All the above efforts having failed, Uganda, a States Party to the Rome Statute, invoked article 13(a) of the Rome Statute to refer its Situation to the ICC in December 2003, through a letter by the Head of State, President Museveni, inviting the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo to investigate the situation in Greater Northern Uganda and parts of Western Uganda as of 1 July, 2002.\textsuperscript{20} In May 2004, the government submitted a letter of ceding jurisdiction, expressing its inability, \textit{inter alia}, to conduct proceedings in relation to the persons of the LRA allegedly most responsible for the perpetration of the international crimes.\textsuperscript{21}

On 14 October, 2005, the Prosecutor of the ICC concluded that there was reasonable evidence to establish that war crimes and crimes against humanity as prescribed by article 5 of

\textsuperscript{15} Greater Northern Uganda encompasses the geographical areas of Acholi-Sub-region, Lango sub-Region, Teso Sub-region and parts of the West Nile.

\textsuperscript{16} Mbazira (2011: 201-203). See arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court for Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Dominic Ongwen, Okot Odhiambo and Raska Lukwiya ICC-02/04-01/05.

\textsuperscript{17} Mbazira (2011: 202).

\textsuperscript{18} Uganda’s Amnesty Act, Cap 294 Laws of Uganda (2000).

\textsuperscript{19} See the case of \textit{Uganda v Thomas Kwoyelo} Constitutional Petition (reference) No. 36/2011(Unreported), affidavit by the respondent in support of the reference Paragraphs 17-21; also see The Republic of Uganda: Amnesty Commission-Report: Rebel Group Percentages August (2011), indicates that number of reporters granted amnesty from the Lord’s Resistance Army are 12,906.


\textsuperscript{21} Schabas (2010: 179).
the Rome Statute had been committed in Greater Northern Uganda. On application to the Pre-Trial Chamber II for warrants of arrest, the Chamber subsequently issued unsealed warrants for five senior leaders of the LRA on 13 October, 2005. They are currently still at large.

Against this background, the implementation of the Rome Statute in Uganda becomes, inter alia, vital because, first, Uganda has a general obligation to ensure effective prosecution and punishment of international crimes. Secondly, Uganda’s situation before the ICC creates an even greater responsibility on Uganda to co-operate with the ICC to bring the case pending before the ICC to a final conclusion. Thirdly, despite the presence of charges before the ICC for Joseph Kony and his cohorts, Uganda is expected to proceed with national prosecutions of other low level perpetrators for the atrocities of international concern committed during the conflict. This is derived from the precept of complementarity. This is therefore, possible only if Uganda’s legal system can allow for the effective and efficient prosecution and punishment of international core crimes.

1.3 Justification and objective of the study

Two core reasons justify this study. First, Uganda as a State Party to the Rome Statute has obligations. Secondly, despite the fact that Uganda was the first situation before the ICC, prospects for trial for the indicted LRA remain in limbo because the perpetrators remain at large. Uganda is nevertheless expected to meet her obligations under the Rome Statute to allow for punishment of other perpetrators of the LRA conflict. Subsequent to the above events, Uganda has since experienced developments in the field of international criminal justice. Uganda has

22 The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and Raska Lukwiya (the latter has since been declared by the ICC to be deceased) ICC-02/04-01/05.
23 The prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al ICC-02/04-01/05.
24 See discussion in Sec 1.1 above on complementarity.
instituted both legislative and institutional framework to facilitate punishment of international core crimes. In 2008 a special division of the High Court, the International Crimes Division ICD was established, whose mandate is to try international crimes among others, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Further, in 2010, Uganda domesticated the International Criminal Court Act, 2010, whose future application with regards to prosecution of international crimes will be subject to the International Crimes Division.

Therefore, the study objective has been to examine the progress and challenges of implementing the Rome Statute in Uganda. The study examines what extent the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute are implemented by the International Criminal Court Act. What are the challenges affecting implementation?

1.4 Literature survey

There is available literature on the concept of implementation of the Rome Statute. The literature is widely presented in light of the core principles of the Rome Statute; the principle of complementarity and co-operation. Bellelli, in discussing the duty to implement states that the comprehensive legal system established by the Rome Statute on both the substantive criminal law and co-operation provisions is unavoidable. He therefore states that the absence in domestic criminal law systems under the statute would raise the issue of admissibility under Article 17 of

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25 High Court (International Crimes Division) Practice Directions Legal notices supplement 5-Legal Notice No. 10 of 2011; The Uganda Gazette No. 38 Volume CIV dated 31st May, 2011. Its expeditious establishment in 2008 was a way of fulfilling the Government of Uganda’s commitment to the actualisation of Juba Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation of 2007 and its annexure-Agenda Item No. 3. Both documents in their lamentation provisions recall the complementarity principle of the Rome Statute and make mention of the need to set up formal institutions to ensure justice and reconciliation.

26 Sec. 6.

the Rome Statute and thereby the ICC invoking complementarity jurisdiction. Werle,\textsuperscript{28} highlights the options for implementation of substantive criminal law by states, available to states. States may choose to incorporate or not incorporate provisions of the Rome Statute and use ordinary law. However, for the latter, Schabas\textsuperscript{29} establishes that a state must implement the crimes as they are spelled out in the Rome Statute. That it is not enough for states to prosecute the underlying ordinary crime.

Other works on implementation establish a standard checklist for determining measures for effective implementation of the Rome Statute. Amnesty International’s\textsuperscript{30} comprehensive checklist points to indicators to be considered for implementation of both complementarity and co-operation by states. That for complementarity, states should look at defining crimes, principles of criminal responsibility, defences, elimination of bars to prosecution and ensuring fair trials without the death penalty.

Further literature lies in the different analyses on implementation of the Rome Statute with regards to the domestic legal framework. This has been carried for both states that have on one hand, made changes to their domestic legal system to accommodate the Rome Statute\textsuperscript{31} and those that have not.\textsuperscript{32}

All this literature has been vital in guiding the approach to study. This paper therefore embraces the concepts in order to come up with the findings. The paper to a great extent hinges on the ICC Act, supported by other Ugandan domestic laws so as to achieve the objective of the study.

\textsuperscript{28} Werle (2009: 119-122).
\textsuperscript{29} Schabas (2010: 181-182).
\textsuperscript{31} See Werle and Jessberger (2002).
\textsuperscript{32} See Nkhata M (2010: 2770-302) and Marco Roscini (2007).
1.5 Research methodology and scope

The study has applied both primary and secondary sources of literature obtained through the use of: desk review, library based research and a phone interview. The primary sources relied on include international treaties, agreements, cases, hansard and reports. Secondary sources have been obtained from, *inter alia* books, thesis, journals and working papers.

However, this methodology applied had its limitations, for example, the nature of information retrieved from the internet, for instance, cases from Uganda could not allow for proficient citation of lines, paragraphs or pages of a particular extract in a decision.

The study applied a unilateral approach. Therefore the study confined the analysis and findings to Uganda.

1.6 Preliminary Chapter overview

The research paper is laid out in five chapters. Chapter one states the introduction and background to the topic of study. Chapter two examines the legal concept of implementation of international criminal law in municipal law by establishing conceptual course for implementation from the theories of monism, dualism and co-ordination to options for incorporation to be considered by a State. Chapter three basically looks the relationship between international law and Uganda’s legal framework and how the former integrates into Uganda’s legal framework. Chapter four is the main subject of the paper and makes a feasibility study on the progress and challenges of implementing the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC in light if the International Criminal Court Act. Chapter five bears the conclusion to the study and offers possible recommendations for the challenges to implementation realised in the study.
CHAPTER TWO

THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF IMPLEMENTATION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW

1.2 Introductory remarks

Legal theory suggests that each state is sovereign and equal.\(^{33}\) International law is therefore founded on the consent of states, illustrated by legally binding rules: custom and treaty.\(^{34}\) These binding rules to be given force of law, States tend to make legal and regulatory changes to allow the State to act in accordance with international obligations.\(^{35}\) However, implementation of these binding rules varies among states, depending on the domestic legal system and treaty.

This chapter, therefore, examines the concept of implementation by defining implementation, addressing the monist and dualist concept of implementation of international law into domestic law, implementation in international criminal law and features of implementation in the domestic sphere.

2.2 Implementation defined

Implementation comes from the verb “to implement”, which means to ensure that what has been planned is done.\(^{36}\) Implementation has been defined as the process of bringing any piece of legislation into force.\(^{37}\) Shihata,\(^{38}\) in stretching the definition from the immediate, states that a wider scope of implementation of an international agreement is therefore meant to encompass all

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\(^{34}\) Shaw (2008:131).

\(^{35}\) International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (2008: 12).


actions required to carry out commitment resulting from agreements. This would suggest implementation not only by enactment of legislation, but also implementation/enforcement of the provisions of the implemented legislation. However, Humphrey,\textsuperscript{39} in defining implementation, distinguishes between implementation and enforcement. He states that the latter is peremptory. Shihata\textsuperscript{40} states that enforcement is a more restrictive notion. It normally refers to measures jointly or unilaterally adopted by a competent authority to ensure respect for such commitments if they are not honoured voluntarily in practice.

In essence, the term implementation is basically a broader term, which not only means incorporating the provisions of an international instruments into domestic law, but, implementation would also literally mean the act of actually give effect to the enacted law. The paper however, focuses on the former with regard to the Rome Statute of the ICC implementing legislation in Uganda.

### 2.3 Monist and dualist dichotomy: Implementing international law in municipal law

Traditionally, domestication of international agreements is based on the relationship between international law and municipal law elucidated by the dualist and monist theories.\textsuperscript{41} The relationship between international law and municipal law is based upon the supremacy of the state, and the existence of wide differences between the two functioning orders of monism and dualism dichotomy.\textsuperscript{42} Monism and dualism posit that there is a common field in which the

\textsuperscript{39}Humphrey (1978-1979: 34).
\textsuperscript{40}Shihata (1996-1997: 37).
\textsuperscript{41}Generally Cassese (2005: 213-216); Shaw (2008: 131-132); Brownlie (2008:31-33).
\textsuperscript{42}Shaw (2008: 131).
international and municipal legal orders can operate simultaneously in regard to the same subject matter.\footnote{Brownlie (2008: 31).}

The monist school posits that international and municipal law should be viewed as manifestations of a single conception of law;\footnote{Gevers (2011: 22). See Cassese (2005: 213). The author states that the monist approach recognizes the supremacy of the municipal law, which is in contrast with another monist view that recognizes the primacy of international law.} that international law is automatically incorporated into municipal law without any need for act of adoption by courts or transformation by the legislature.\footnote{Dugard (2005: 47).} The monist position is therefore referred to as lending support for the doctrine of incorporation,\footnote{Dugard (2005: 47).} which holds that international law becomes part of municipal law automatically without the need for the interposition of a constitutional ratification procedure.\footnote{See Shaw (2008: 140 \textit{et seq}).}

Conversely, the dualist approach stresses that the rules of the systems of international law and municipal law apply separately and cannot purport to have an effect on, or overrule, the other.\footnote{Shaw (2008:131).} This means that the two systems are quite distinct systems of law\footnote{Shaw (2008:139).} and regulate a different subject matter.\footnote{Brownlie (2008: 31).} Shaw,\footnote{Shaw (2008: 139).} further states that one expression of the positivist-dualist position is the doctrine of transformation, which is based on the precept that, a principle rule of international law can only have effect within the domestic jurisdiction when expressly and specifically transformed into municipal law by appropriate use of constitutional machinery, such as an Act of Parliament. Therefore, international law can then be applied by domestic courts only if adopted by such courts or transformed into national law by legislation.\footnote{Dugard (2005: 47). Also see Chapter 3, on the procedure of how Uganda a dualist State, implements international law instruments.}
A departure from monist and dualist theory is the attempt by jurists to embrace the theory of co-ordination.\textsuperscript{53} This theory is to the effect that international law and municipal law have a common field of operation and that the two systems do not come into conflict since they work in different spheres and each is supreme in its own field.\textsuperscript{54} According to Rousseau who asserts the primacy of international law, characterises international law is as a law of co-ordination, which does not provide for abrogation of internal rules when in conflict with obligations on the international plane.\textsuperscript{55} Instead, a state is required to assume its responsibility on the international plane.\textsuperscript{56} According to Shaw, this theory is to some extent a modification of the dualist position.\textsuperscript{57}

In conclusion, how a state opts to implement international law will depend on how its legal system embraces international law. However, for implementation in the context of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, it has been argued that the theories of monism and dualism have proven to be less useful because of among others, the distinct nature of the treaty, with its extremely detailed co-operation provisions and a distinctive complementarity structure.\textsuperscript{58} In my opinion, such an argument is left to be mooted because there is evidence of States Parties to the Rome Statute that have embraced either one of the theories in implementing the provisions of the Rome Statute.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{53} Brownlie (2008: 33).
\textsuperscript{55} Brownlie (2008: 33).
\textsuperscript{56} Brownlie (2008: 33).
\textsuperscript{57} Shaw (2008: 132).
\textsuperscript{58} See the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice (2008: 13).
\textsuperscript{59} See Chapter 2, Sec. 2.4.2 for dualist countries Uganda and South Africa incorporation of the Rome Statute. Also See Advocates Sans Frontiers (2009: 10-14 et seq)on how Democratic Republic of Congo, a monist State implements the Rome statute.
2.4 Implementation of international criminal law

International criminal law is a branch of international law, and is the criminal law of the international community.\textsuperscript{60} International criminal law embodies a new quality of international law, which is no longer limited to the rules of true interstate matters, but reaches deep into the state’s domestic sphere.\textsuperscript{61} Since international law makes it the primary responsibility of states to punish for international crimes,\textsuperscript{62} the practicability then lies with states making international criminal law part of their domestic legal order, which comes through implementation of substantive international criminal law that is established in international agreements.

2.4.1 An insight to implementation under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

The post Nuremberg trials era, witnessed adoption of international criminal law treaties. Most of these treaties contain express provisions that require a that a member state enact legislation to give effect to the substantive criminal law provision of the treaty\textsuperscript{63} Conversely, for the Rome Statute, the approach to implementation of provisions of the Statute differs. Although, the Rome Statute looks at direct enforcement of prosecuting international crimes as an exception rather than a rule,\textsuperscript{64} where, amidst the commission of international crimes, states have the primary duty to prosecute,\textsuperscript{65} neither the Rome Statute nor the principle of complementarity require that a State

\textsuperscript{60} Zahar (2008: vii).
\textsuperscript{61} Werle (2009: 40 Marginal n 111).
\textsuperscript{64} Werle (2009: 80-81). The author distinguishes between direct and indirect enforcement; the latter being enforced by national courts and the former by international tribunals. In the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, direct enforcement is primary.
\textsuperscript{65} Bellelli (2010: 212).
Party domesticate the substantive provisions of the Statute by altering their national legislation.\textsuperscript{66} The Rome Statute posits that implementation of the Statute can be achieved using already existing national legislation as long as it can effectively be compliant with the Statute provisions. However, Billeli\textsuperscript{67} states that the Statute establishes a comprehensive legal system, such that a full implementation through domestic enactment of obligations introduced by the Rome Statute regarding substantive criminal law and co-operation is unavoidable. In other words a state must implement the crimes as they are spelled out in the Rome Statute.\textsuperscript{68} Werle and Jessberger have attributed the wording of the ICC that states should be “willing and able,”\textsuperscript{69} to regard to the quality of domestic legislation insofar as prosecuting the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. This read with the preamble to the Rome Statute, paragraph four, which affirms that states must take measures at national level to ensure effective prosecution of crimes of international concern, would by implication require that: States Parties to the Rome Statute examine their legal framework, adapt in their national laws or enact laws to bring national criminal law in line with the Rome Statute.

\textbf{2.4.2 Options for implementation of international criminal law}

Whichever the theory of international law, whether monism or dualism that a State embraces, a State that chooses to make international criminal law part of its domestic legal order has broad options in deciding how to adopt substantive international criminal law.\textsuperscript{70} Werle\textsuperscript{71} identifies the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} See Werle and Jessberger (2002: 194); Werle (2009:118 Marginal n 312); Roscini (2007) on the non self executing nature of the Rome Statute. Conversely, see the Rome Statute: Art. 70 on the requirement that states criminalise offences against the administration of justice, and Part 9, that states must ensure that there are national procedures for state co-operation in place.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Bellelli (2010: 212).
\item \textsuperscript{68} Schaba (2010L: 181-182).
\item \textsuperscript{69} Cf. Rome Statute, Art. 17.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Werle(2009: 119 marginal n 314).
\end{itemize}
options for implementation to include: complete incorporation, non incorporation by applying ordinary criminal law, modified incorporation and combinations. Developments in Uganda indicate that in a decision to implement the substantive international criminal law, Uganda opts for complete incorporation by copying the substantive criminal law provisions as provided for in the respective international criminal law agreements. This has been so for, incorporation of the grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions under the Geneva Conventions Act and incorporation of the Rome Statute crimes under the International Criminal Court Act, 2010. Werle, further establishes two forms of legislative incorporation of international criminal law. They are either amendment to already existing legislation or codification of a separate law. The trend in Uganda shows that Uganda tends to codify specific legislation to implement respective international criminal agreements. States such as South Africa, Kenya.

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71 See Werle (2009: 116-121) for further elaboration on each of the options.
72 See Werle (2009: 119 et seq, marginal n 315-318), for various options for incorporation. They include: direct application of customary international law; reference to the ICC Statute; and by copying the provisions of the ICC Statute verbatim.
74 Werle (2009: 121, marginal n 322).
75 Werle (2009: 121, marginal n 323).
76 Werle (2009: 1201, marginal n 322). The author states that complete incorporation can occur by adopting the offences verbatim into the domestic law.
77 Geneva Conventions Act 1964, Cap. 363, Laws of Uganda (2000), Sec. 2. Also See Chapter 4, Secs. 4.4.1.3.
78 See Secs 7, 8 and 9. Also See Chapter 4, Secs. 4.4.1.1-4.4.1.3.
80 See the Geneva Conventions Act and the International Criminal Court Act.
2.5 Conclusion

The chapter has addressed the concept of implementation insofar as giving effect to international treaties by states is concerned. That implementation involves how a state makes international law part of the domestic law. In narrowing the concept of implementation to the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute, the chapter points out the options of incorporation available to states. In a nutshell, whichever option is taken, such act can be by the state either amending legislation or codifying legislation. This chapter therefore feeds the subsequent chapters on implementation of international criminal law in Uganda and the assessment of implementing the Rome Statute of the ICC in Uganda.
CHAPTER THREE

IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN UGANDA

3.1 Introductory remarks

It is now a settled trend in international criminal law that States have the primary duty to prosecute and punish perpetrators of international crimes. The duty to prosecute creates a need for states to make checks and consider accommodating international criminal law in the domestic legal system. Uganda is and has been party to a number of international treaties relating to the prosecution of international crimes. Therefore, since Uganda has a duty to prosecute international crimes on its territory, the legal basis of international criminal law and its application in the domestic legal system must be established.

The chapter identifies the sources of criminal law in Uganda in attempt to identify the legal basis of international criminal law. The chapter also looks into ways of integrating international criminal law agreements into the domestic legal system. This informs the next chapter insofar as that it gives a picture of the developments in Uganda’s legal system. This will help to shed light on the arguments raised in the next chapter.

3.2 Sources of criminal law and procedure

The applied law in Uganda is derived from sources of written and unwritten law. These laws are applied in order of precedence. Written law includes: the Constitution, Principal Laws and Subsidiary Laws. Unwritten law includes: common law and doctrines of equity, and customs and practices.

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83 See Rome Statute, Preamble, para 4 and 6. Also see generally, Werle (2009: Part 1, Section E).
3.2.1 The Constitution

The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 (as amended) (hereinafter “Constitution”), is the supreme law of Uganda.\textsuperscript{85} Article 2(2) of the Constitution, further, provides that if any law or custom is inconsistent with the Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail and that other law or custom shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.\textsuperscript{86} In essence, all laws in Uganda derive their authority from the Constitution and must conform to the Constitution.\textsuperscript{87}

Notably, Chapter 4 of the Constitution contains principles that are to be applied in criminal law process. Pertinent is Article 28 on the right of a fair trial that sets out the principles of natural justice. This is important because the submission in the subsequent chapter will make reference to this provision.

3.2.2 Principle laws

Principle laws are enacted by Parliament. Parliament enacts these laws in response to implementing constitutional provisions for peace, order, development and good governance of the Country.\textsuperscript{88} Principal criminal laws, \textit{inter alia}, include: the Penal Code Act, Cap. 120; the Geneva Conventions Act, Cap. 363; and International Criminal Court Act No. 11/2010. The latter two are a product of international criminal law instruments that Uganda ratified and later enacted to allow Uganda comply with its respective obligations.

\textsuperscript{85} See Constitution, Art. 2 (1).
\textsuperscript{86} Cf. with judgments in Uganda Women Lawyers et al vs Attorney General Constitutional Petition No. 2/2003 (Unreported); Susan Kigula et al vs Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No. 3/06 (SC) (Unreported). In both cases, provisions within the principle laws: the Divorce Act Cap. 249 Laws of Uganda and Penal Code Act Cap 120 respectively, were challenged as infringing on constitutional guarantees. The Court found such provisions to be unconstitutional contrary to Article 2(2) of the Constitution.
\textsuperscript{87} See Handbook of Uganda Law Reform Commission (2010: 3) (hereinafter “ULRC handbook”).
\textsuperscript{88} Constitution, Art. 79 (1). Also see ULRC handbook (2010: 3).
3.2.3 Subsidiary laws

Subsidiary laws generally implement principal laws and deal with matters of detail and procedure. They are usually meant to implement principle laws. Article 79(2) of the Ugandan Constitution restricts the power to make provisions to have force of law in Uganda on certain persons. They are: (a) persons mentioned under the Constitution; (b) members of parliament; and (c) persons or bodies authorised by law. Subsidiary legislation includes: statutory instruments, ordinances, by-laws, regulations, rules, or orders.

3.2.4 Common law and principles of equity

Common law and principles of equity are considered next in hierarchy to written law. Common law refers to principles of the law of England developed over time through practice and court decisions. Uganda, a former British colony has adopted and applies these rules. Courts, in adjudicating cases, may invoke these principles. Common law is used in Uganda where the subject matter is not covered by statutory law, that is, law made by the law making bodies of Uganda.

The principles of equity refer to values that promote fairness, justice and reasonableness in social relations. Equity was developed to attend to inadequacies in the application of common law.

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89 See ULRC handbook (2010: 3).
90 See the Criminal Procedure Code Act, Trial on Indictment Act and Evidence Act, subsidiary legislation established by Parliament to be applied to guide the process of criminal prosecutions in Uganda. For prosecution of international crimes, confer with Para. 8 of the High Court (International Crimes Division) Practice Directions 2010, which stipulates that the International Crimes Division shall apply rules of procedure and evidence applicable to criminal trials in Uganda.
91 Sec. 14(2) (i), Judicature Act, Chapter 13, Laws of Uganda 2000.
93 Uganda obtained Independence from Great Britain on October 9, 1962.
94 Judicature Act, Sec.14(2) (ii) and (3).
95 ULRC handbook (2010: 3).
96 See ULRC handbook (2010: 7).
The Judicature Act provides for the concurrent applicability of common law and principles of equity. However, in case of conflict, the doctrines of equity shall prevail.\(^{97}\)

3.4.5 Custom or usage

Established custom or usage can be applied in the absence of written law.\(^{98}\) This is only to the extent that the existing custom is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience and not incompatible either directly or by necessary implication with any written law.\(^{99}\)

In as much as this is a recognised source of law, it is rare that it would be applied in criminal cases because Article 28(12) Constitution provides that one can only be charged for an offence if the crime and punishment are defined by law.\(^{100}\)

Noteworthy is that custom and usage in this provision do not extend to customary international law. The Ugandan Constitution is silent on the application of customary international law as a source of law.

3.4.6 Judicial decisions

Another important organ that makes laws is the judiciary. When a case is decided, it forms part of precedence. Courts in Uganda are divided into a two tier system: superior courts of record, and subordinate courts.\(^{101}\) Courts of record, also known as the courts of precedence include: the Supreme Court, which is the highest and final court of appeal; the Court of

\(^{97}\) Judicature Act, Sec. 14 (4).

\(^{98}\) Judicature Act, Sec. 14(2).

\(^{99}\) Constitution, Art. 2(2); Judicature Act, Sec. 15.

\(^{100}\) See sec. 2.3 on dualist approach on the relationship between international and municipal law.

\(^{101}\) See Constitution, Art. 129. Decisions of subordinate courts are not cited as precedent.
Appeal/Constitutional Court; and the High Court. The order of hierarchy dictates the precedence in citing the binding decisions. Section 14(2) of the Judicature Act, provides the law to be applied by courts in Uganda. This section lists the sources of law courts that are expected to apply in adjudicating matters, and how they are to be applied in order of precedence, as discussed in Section 3.2.1-3.4.5 above.

Decisions from other jurisdictions including international criminal tribunals, may be cited by counsel in presentation of a case, but the discretion is upon the Court to embrace the respective decisions. Normally, when faced with international law in their midst, the courts will prefer to engage domestic sources of law to conclude matters. The case of Thomas Kwoyelo is one in point. The accused had been charged inter alia, with grave breach of the Geneva Conventions under the Geneva Conventions Act. The case, being the first of its kind, before the courts with international criminal law dimension, would have probably been the first to establish precedent by Ugandan courts on prosecution of international crimes in Uganda had the trial not been stopped by the Constitutional Court in favour of granting of amnesty to the accused.

This case, in essence, reveals the reservations Ugandan courts have when the need to invoke international law arises. This was a decision made irrespective of the fact that Uganda had domesticated the Geneva Conventions. The courts also ignored the fact that the Juba Peace Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of Uganda and

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102 See Constitution, Chapter 8. Also see parts I, II, and III of Judicature Act. Note that the Court of Appeal can convene as a Constitutional Court to hear constitutional matters.
104 See Kabumba (2010: 87-89 et seq). Also see generally Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni, No. 36/11 for submissions by the Attorney General in favour of international criminal law against Uganda amnesty law, which the justices of the Constitutional Court did not adopt.
105 See Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni, No. 36/11.
106 See Geneva Conventions Act, Sec. 2 and Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni No.36/2011 HCT-100-ICD-case No. 02/10 (amended indictment).
LRA,\textsuperscript{107} recognises the complementarity principle under the Rome statute and therefore, \textit{inter alia}, indicates prosecutions a means through which accountability for the LRA conflict can be addressed.\textsuperscript{108}

3.4.7. Conclusion

One can conclusively state that although the Constitution makes mention of international law and treaty obligations in Uganda,\textsuperscript{109} it is silent on the position of international law as a source of law.\textsuperscript{110} From the discussion, however, international criminal law as a source of criminal law in Uganda seems to be found only in parliamentary enactments as stated in section 3.2.2 above. This means that international law does not apply automatically in Uganda’s legal system. It requires to be incorporated by a law of parliament.\textsuperscript{111}

3.5 Requirements for the implementation of international conventions and treaties in Uganda

3.5.1 Convention and treaty ratification process

For both monist and dualist states, implementation of international law provisions starts right from ratification or accession of a treaty. It is at this point that other domestic procedures can be considered to give effect the respective treaty. This is subject to the rights or obligations created under the treaty.\textsuperscript{112}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{107} Signed 29 June 2007. See preamble para. 3, and Sec. 2.
\textsuperscript{108} See preamble, para. 3, and Sec. 2.
\textsuperscript{109} See Constitution, National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy XXVIII (i)(b) states that the foreign policy of Uganda shall be based on, among other things, respect for international law and treaty obligations.
\textsuperscript{110} Judicature Act, Sec. 14 (2).
\textsuperscript{111} See Chapter 2 on the concept of implementation.
\textsuperscript{112} See, Art. 2(1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (hereafter Vienna Convention) refers to “ratification”, “acceptance”, “approval” and “accession” to mean in each case, the international act whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty. Cf. with Article 14 of the Vienna Convention.
\end{flushright}
The process of incorporation of an international legal instrument in Uganda begins with the procedure to be followed in the event of ratification of treaties as laid down in the Ratification of Treaties Act\textsuperscript{113} (“Act”), and Article 123(1) of the Ugandan Constitution. Under Article 123(1), the President or a person authorised by the President reserve the right to make treaties, conventions, agreements or other arrangements between Uganda and any other country or between Uganda and any international organisation or body, in respect of any matter. Article 123(2) therefore, tasks parliament to make laws to govern ratification of treaties, conventions, agreements or other arrangements made under clause (1) above.

Consequent to Article 123(1) and (2) of the Constitution, Section 2 of the Act provides for a two level process of ratification by Cabinet and by Parliament. Section 2(a) empowers Cabinet to ratify any treaty other than a treaty that shall be ratified by Parliament. Section 2(b) provides for treaties to be ratified by parliament by resolution. This is in the event that the treaty relates to armistice, neutrality or peace; or in the case of a treaty in respect of which the Attorney General has certified in writing that its implementation in Uganda would require an amendment of the Constitution. Irrespective of whether ratification is by Cabinet or Parliament, the instrument of ratification of treaty shall be signed, sealed and deposited by the Minister responsible for foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{113} Cap 204, Laws of Uganda (2000), The Act defines “treaty” to include a convention, agreement or other arrangement made under article 123(1) of the Constitution.

\textsuperscript{114} Sec. 3, Ratification of Treaties Act.
3.5.2 Domestic implementation of conventional or treaty law

Uganda, a common law State\textsuperscript{115}, maintains the dualist approach of incorporating international law.\textsuperscript{116} Therefore, valid ratification of conventions and treaties does not guarantee that the respective international instrument has automatic force of law in the domestic legal order.\textsuperscript{117} For the instrument to be considered to have force of law, it must be codified as part of Uganda’s written law. Domestic implementation of a treaty is the reserve of a law-making authority, which is Parliament. Parliament is the primary legislative arm of government vested with the power to make law in Uganda.\textsuperscript{118} Article 79 (2) of the Constitution strictly confers upon Parliament powers to make provisions having force of law in Uganda. An intended law is therefore introduced to Parliament in the form of a Bill, which will then go through the process of enactment of laws as prescribed under the Rules and Procedure of Parliament.\textsuperscript{119} After Parliament has passed a law, it remains dormant until it is assented to by the president and gazetted for it to have effect.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{115} Uganda gained independence from Great Britain on 9 October 1962. See Cassese (2005: 214) on Britain’s adoption of the dualist approach of international rules and treaties.

\textsuperscript{116} See Shelton (2011: 595).

\textsuperscript{117} See Chapter 2, Sec. 2.3 above.

\textsuperscript{118} See Art. 79 (1), Constitution provides that Parliament shall have the power to make laws on any matter for the peace, order, development and good governance of Uganda.


\textsuperscript{120} Decision of Mulenga in \textit{Attorney General vs Paul K. Ssemogerere and anor}, SC. Constitutional Appeal no. 3 of 2004. Para 9. Also see \textit{dictum} in \textit{Attorney General vs. Dr. James Rwanyarare and Other}, Constitutional Appeal No.2/03, where the court in tackling the provisions of section 14(1) and (2) of the Acts of Parliament Act, (Cap.2) concerning commencement of an Act of Parliament, concluded that “Clearly according to those provisions an Act of Parliament... becomes a law when it is assented to by the President. However, we understand subsection (2) to imply that a law remains dormant until the day upon which it becomes enforceable and that day is the date of commencement.”
3.6 Conclusion

This chapter establishes that Uganda, a state that has embraced the dualist approach, has legal processes through which international law becomes part of the domestic law. International treaties, like the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, went through the domestic legislative process to have the force of law.\(^\text{121}\) Therefore, international criminal law in Uganda is contained in the respective parliamentary enactments.

Also established is that, Uganda’s decision to implement international instruments happens only after ratification.\(^\text{122}\) However, it must be noted that the domestication of international criminal law into principal legislation does not necessarily mean that international law provision will reign supreme. The Constitution still remains a determining factor in the success of the application of rules of international law.

\(^{121}\) See Geneva Conventions Act, Cap. 36, and the International Criminal Court Act 200; Act 11/2010 respectively.  
\(^{122}\) See International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (Manual) (2008: 13), on the contrary practice of Australia a dualist State whose Constitutional requires that a comprehensive implementing legislation needs to first be prepared before an international treaty can be ratified or acceded to.
CHAPTER FOUR

PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATING OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC IN UGANDA

4.1 Introductory Remarks

The implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC by States Parties is the most vital step for combating impunity on a world-wide scale. Uganda, in bid to fulfil its obligations under the Rome Statute, has enacted the International Criminal Court Act, 2010 (hereafter “ICC Act”), which comprehensively addresses both the principles of complementarity and co-operation. However, this chapter limits the discussion to complementarity, namely implementation of the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute. The paper adopts this in the light of the enacted Uganda ICC Act by placing it as the main piece of legislation that gives effect to the Rome Statute. But one needs to take a critical look at what the challenges are that lie in the way to a successful implementation.

4.2 Embracing international criminal justice in Uganda- Enacting the International Criminal Court Act, 2010

The attempt to domesticate the ICC Act began in 2004. But the process was delayed because the draft Bills turned out to exhibit major inconsistencies when considered against the contents of existing domestic laws. Also there were ongoing peace negotiations between the Government of Uganda (hereafter “Government”) and the Lord’s Resistance Army as well as the then

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124 Parliament of Uganda- Hansard (Wednesday 10 March 2010) at p 6-7, observations made by the Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs on, inter alia, question of the death penalty and immunity.
existing amnesty law.\textsuperscript{126} These reasons were confirmed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Legal and Parliamentary affairs, Hon. Stephen Tashobya.\textsuperscript{127}

Between 2004 and 2010, two draft Bills were tabled before Parliament. The first Bill was the “International Criminal Court Bill”, 10/2004,\textsuperscript{128} tabled before Parliament for first reading on 24 June 2004. It lapsed with the seventh parliamentary period and was not passed.\textsuperscript{129} In December 2006, the government tabled a new draft Bill entitled “International Criminal Court Bill, 18/2006” (hereafter “ICC Bill”).\textsuperscript{130} Even then it took the Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (hereafter “the Committee”) three and a half years to come up with a draft report.\textsuperscript{131} The findings of the report on the ICC Bill were presented by the Committee on 10 March 2010.\textsuperscript{132} The Committee highlighted the legal issues within the Bill for consideration by Parliament.\textsuperscript{133} On 10 March 2010, the ICC Bill went through a momentous second and third reading, and the Parliament enacted the International Criminal Court Act.\textsuperscript{134} It was has been said that Uganda’s bid to host the Rome Statute of the ICC Review Conference is what re-ignited and fast-tracked the process of the enactment of the ICC Act.\textsuperscript{135} This is because the expeditious enactment of the ICC Act happened two months prior to Uganda’s hosting of the Review

\textsuperscript{126} Amnesty Act, Cap. 294.
\textsuperscript{127} Telephone interview which the author conducted with Hon. Stephan Tashobya, Hon. Member of Parliament-Uganda on Wednesday 24 October 2012 at 09:25am. Also refer to Rules and Procedure of Parliament of Uganda, June 2006, Rule 113 on the role of the Committee with regard to Bills.
\textsuperscript{128} Parliament of Uganda- Hansard (Thursday 24 June 2004) at p 3.
\textsuperscript{129} See comment of the Deputy Attorney General, Parliament of Uganda- Hansard (Wednesday 10 March 2010) at p 18. Also, Chairman of the Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Hon. Stephen Tashobya, stated that the 2004 ICC Bill was withdrawn by government because it contained fundermental defects (Refer to phone interview 24 October, 2012 at 9:25am in note 115 above).
\textsuperscript{130} Parliament of Uganda- Hansard (Tuesday, 05 December 2006) at p 3.
\textsuperscript{131} Parliament of Uganda- Hansard (Wednesday 10 March 2010), comment of the Deputy Attorney General at p17.
\textsuperscript{133} Parliament of Uganda-Hansard (Wednesday, 10 March 2010) at p 6-7.
\textsuperscript{134} Parliament of Uganda-Hansard (Wednesday, 10 March 2010) at p 55.
\textsuperscript{135} Otim and Wierda (2010: 4).
Conference. The ICC Act was then assented to by the President on 25 May 2010, five days before the Review Conference took place. The Act took effect on 25 June, 2010.

4.3 Introducing the International Criminal Court Act

The preamble to the Act provides that,

“An Act to give effect to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; to provide for offences under the laws of Uganda corresponding to offences within the jurisdiction of the court; and for connected matters.”

Section 2 highlights the purpose of the Act, which is, *inter alia*, to give the ICC Act force of law in Uganda and to implement obligations assumed by Uganda under the Rome Statute. In a nutshell, Section 2 provides for the purpose of the Act as being to facilitate the principles of complementarity and co-operation. Whereas the former concerns itself with making it possible for Ugandan courts to punish the international core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and the offences against the administration of justice, the latter concerns itself with different procedure with respect to different forms of cooperation between the ICC and Uganda.

Embedded schedules to the Act are the Rome Statute and the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the ICC (APIC). Cross references of the ICC Act with respective

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137 See ICC Act at p 6.
138 See ICC Act at p 6.
139 ICC Act, preamble.
140 ICC Act, Sec 2 (a) and (b).
141 ICC Act, Sec 2 (c) and (g).
142 ICC Act, Sec 2 (d-f) and (h-i).
143 See ICC Act (Part II–Secs 7-19).
144 See ICC Act, Requests for assistance (Part III–Secs 20-25); Arrest and surrender of persons to the ICC (Part IV–Secs 26-42); Domestic procedures for other types of co-operation (Part V–Secs 43-63); Enforcement of penalties (Part VI–Secs 64-80); Protection of national security/third party information (Part VII–Secs 81-89); Investigations or sittings of the ICC in Uganda (Part VIII–Secs 90-96); Requests for assistance (to the ICC) (Part IX–Secs 97-99); Miscellaneous (Part–Secs 100-102).
145 ICC Act, Schedule I.
domestic laws are provided for at the end of the sections to the Act. The effect is that, unless otherwise stipulated, the ICC Act is to be read in harmony with the referenced laws.

4.4 Defining and prosecuting international crimes in Uganda

The ICC regime came with a formal identification of international core crimes by the international community namely: genocide; war crimes; crimes against humanity; and aggression. Due to their universal nature, it follows that these crimes, when committed, affect the international community as a whole. States are therefore encouraged to attach primacy to the investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators of these crimes. In doing so, states must implement crimes as they are spelled out in the Rome Statute. Prosecuting underlying ordinary crimes is not enough.

4.4.1 International crimes defined

Section 2 (c) of the ICC Act, provides that the purpose of the Act is to make provision in Uganda’s law for punishment of the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These have been prescribed under sections 7, 8 and 9, respectively, of the Act. The Act does not give force to the crime of aggression.

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146 ICC Act, Schedule 2. There exists an Agreement on Privileges and Immunities (APIC) between the ICC and Uganda, signed on 7 April 2004 and ratified the agreement on 21 January, 2009. APIC Article 3 generally provides that ICC shall enjoy privileges and immunities within the territory of each State party to allow for the fulfillment of its purpose.

147 See Appendix, The ICC Act.

148 Rome Statute, Art. 5. Werle (2009: 29) defines an International Crime as a norm that is part of the body of international law that entails individual criminal responsibility and subject to punishment.

149 Rome Statute, preamble paras 4 and 9, Art 5(1). Tomuschat (2002: 332,333 and 340) notes that not all these crimes have attained the status of universal jurisdiction.

150 Rome Statute, Preamble, para. 10, Art. 1 and 17.


4.4.1.1 Genocide

The crime of genocide was for the first time formulated in 1948 under Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereafter “Genocide Convention”). The crime was subsequently reflected in Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal(s) for Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Art 4), Rwanda (ICTR) (Art 2) and the Rome Statute (Art 6). The crime has since gained the status of customary international law and *jus cogens*.

Article 5 of the Genocide Convention requires that States Parties to the Convention criminalise genocide. Uganda accessed the Genocide Convention on 14 November 1995. It was however, only after enactment of the ICC Act that the crime of genocide was included as part of Uganda’s domestic law.

Before enacting the ICC Act, the definition of genocide under the Rome Statute, would have been incapable of allowing for the punishment of Genocide. The rationale behind the crime of genocide is to protect specific groups and not an individual. Protection of national, ethnic, racial and religious groups forms part of the material element of the crime of genocide. The

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153 See the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg did not expressly define the crime of genocide. The nature of the crime was considered to have been consumed with in elements-extermination and persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds of crimes against humanity. See Werle (2009: 254-255).


156 Rome Statute, Art. 6. Genocide is defined as, any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.


Penal Code Act definition of the offences of murder and assaults cannot be said have meaning within provisions of Article 6 (a) and (b): to “kill members of a group” or “cause serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” respectively. This is insofar as the special intent to kill a group in whole or in part is concerned. Murder is defined to mean, “…any person who causes the death of another person…”\textsuperscript{159} The definition does not include a special group. Part XXIII of the Penal Code Act lists different kinds of assaults. Section 236 on assault causing actual bodily harm is what could be close to the definition of Article 6(b). The discussion as to whether “causing actual bodily harm” includes serious bodily and mental harm is an aspect to be left for further analysis. However, the definitions of these offences fall short of including groups, a material element in the definition of genocide. Also to note is that acts prescribed in parts c-d of Article 6 can hardly be ascertained under any criminal law provisions.

The prosecution for the crime of genocide is now possible under Section 7 of the ICC Act, which copies the Rome Statute provision on Genocide.

The ICC Act in defining the scope of the criminal acts of genocide, extends it to include the crime of conspiracy\textsuperscript{160}. Section 7(2) establishes individual criminal responsibility for those who conspire or agree to commit genocide in Uganda or elsewhere. It is worth noting that t crime of conspiracy is not new; it one of the inchoate offences punishable under chapter XLI of the Penal Code Act. The Penal Code Act criminalises conspiracy to commit a felony or misdemeanour and other forms of conspiracy\textsuperscript{161}. The penalty of conspiracy to commit a felony for which genocide would fall is punishable by imprisonment for seven years. But the provision

\textsuperscript{159} Penal Code Act, Sec. 188.
\textsuperscript{160} ICC Act, Sec. 7 (1) (a) and Sec. 7(2).
\textsuperscript{161} Secs. 390, 391 and 392.
allows for other punishment to be applied if provided for. In this case, Section 7(3) of the ICC Act provides for a punishment of life imprisonment or a lesser term.

4.4.1.2. Crimes against humanity

Crimes against humanity were first devised in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The crimes continued to appear in other international agreements though with modification and departure from original format of Nuremberg. Unlike the crime of genocide and war crimes, crimes against humanity had not been defined in any treaty prior to their inclusion in Rome Statute. Nevertheless they have gained customary international law status.

Like the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity were not part of the Ugandan criminal law till the domestication of the ICC Act. The question whether the law as it was before the enactment of the ICC Act, would allow for prosecution of crimes against humanity is answered in the negative. The strict definition of crimes against humanity, “…any of the acts committed as part of a wide spread and systematic attack against a civilian population with knowledge of the attack”, would not furnish the prosecution under such a context. This is irrespective of the fact that some of the predicate offences of the crimes against humanity are

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162 Sec. 390.
163 ICTY, Art. 6; ICTR, Art. 5; Rome Statute, Art. 7.
164 Dugard (2005: 160) quoted from Bassiouni M.C. (1999) “Crimes against humanity in international law” in McComack and Simpson G. J (eds) The law of war crimes. Also see the Statutes of the ICTY, Art. 6; ICTR, Art. 5; ICC, Art. 7 that reaffirm the customary law status of crimes against humanity.
165 Rome Statute, Art. 7(1). Also see Rome Statute Art 30 for mental element, “intent and knowledge.”
crimes under the domestic law, while some others have been recognized as guaranteed human rights under the Constitution.

Section 8(2) of the ICC Act, therefore, introduces crimes against humanity as a novel crime in Uganda’s domestic system. The section incorporates completely the definition of crimes against humanity as stipulated under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. However, the new offences and terms, *inter alia*, include: Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender; extermination; deportation or forcible transfer of population; apartheid, and some of the sexual crimes like enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, have not been visible in Uganda’s criminal law.

**4.4.1.3 War crimes**

The term war crime is used to describe crimes committed under international law in connection with an armed conflict, even if the individual case involves crimes against humanity or genocide. A war crime is a violation of a rule of international humanitarian law that creates criminal responsibility under international law. Following their codification in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, they were later included in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Prior to the enactment of the ICC Act, war crimes were punishable under the Ugandan criminal law. Uganda had in 1964 passed the Geneva Conventions Act (hereafter “GCA”).

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166 Penal Code Act, murder (Section 188 and 189) and Rape (123 and 124).
167 Constitution, Art. 23 on protection of personal liberty, Art 24 on prohibition form any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” and Art 25 on protection from slavery, servitude and forced labour. Also see Art. 44 that provides that Art. 24 and 25 are absolute rights.
168 See Rome Statute Art. 7 (1) (a)-(k).
170 Werle (2009:346 Marginal n 929 *et seq*).
171 Art 6(b).
Section 2 of the GCA criminalises the grave breaches articles of the four Geneva Conventions.\textsuperscript{172} However, Section 9 of the ICC Act also criminalises war crimes by incorporating totally Article 8 of the Rome Statute, which, \textit{inter alia}, contains provisions on grave breaches as stipulated under Section 2 of the GCA.\textsuperscript{173} Therefore, it can be stated that the war crimes provision under the ICC Act, broadens the criminal jurisdiction of war crimes to include: an improved list on grave breaches;\textsuperscript{174} serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions;\textsuperscript{175} serious violation of laws and customs applicable in both international armed conflict and armed conflict not of an international character.\textsuperscript{176} The ICC Act actually expresses this by the proviso that its provision on war crimes does not affect or limit the operation of Section 2 of the GCA as discussed above. This means that the two laws are to be applied in tandem.

\textbf{4.4.1.4 Conclusion}

In conclusion, in giving force to crimes under the Rome Statute, Uganda has adopted the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes by completely copying the provision of the Rome Statute. Therefore, one can state that Uganda has made a great stride in implementing the Rome Statute in as far as that it is possible to punish international core crimes in Uganda as

\textsuperscript{172} See Arts 50, 51, 130, 147 of Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and IV respectively (Grave breaches involves the following acts if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly). Note that In light of the complementarity regime, the GCA was for the first time invoked in 2010, in an attempt to prosecute one Thomas Kwoyelo, a former low level commander in the Lord’s Resistance Army. The non-retroactivity principle prevented invoking the provisions of the ICC Act. Cf. \textit{Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni} No. 02/10 (amended indictment).

\textsuperscript{173} See Rome Statute, Art. 8 (i)-(iv).

\textsuperscript{174} Rome Statute, Art 8 (2) (v)-(vii).

\textsuperscript{175} Rome Statute, Art 8 (2) (c). Article 3, Common to the Geneva Conventions is specifically in respect to conflict not of an international character. Cf. Geneva Conventions 1949.

\textsuperscript{176} Rome Statute, Art 8(2) (a) and (e).
4.4.2 Principles of jurisdiction

The exercise of legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction is an important part of state sovereignty. The ICC therefore, provides for a mechanism where states are actually encouraged to use their sovereignty. The Rome Statute reaffirms the international criminal law principle that it is the duty of States to exercise criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes. Failure by States to do so warrants the ICC to invoke the complementarity principle in the context of admissibility.

Jurisdiction by Ugandan courts to punish international core crimes was only provided for under the Geneva Conventions Act, which provides for universal jurisdiction over commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Section 2(g) of the ICC Act states that the purpose of the Act is to give Ugandan courts jurisdiction over persons who commit crimes under the ICC Act. Section 18 of the ICC Act grants extra territorial jurisdiction to courts over the offences listed under sections 7-16 of the Act.

Distinct from the Geneva Conventions Act that grants universal jurisdiction, the ICC Act provision on jurisdiction highlights circumstances under which Ugandan courts may exercise jurisdiction with regards to the punishment of the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The section stipulates that, if an act has been committed outside Uganda, Ugandan courts shall have jurisdiction not only on the basis of active and passive nationality jurisdiction, but also, if a person is employed by Uganda in a civilian or military capacity, and

179 Preamble, Para 6.
180 Preamble, Para 10, Art 1 and Art 17. Also see Schabas (2010: 171-193).
181 Geneva Convention Act, Sec 2.
182 International crimes (Secs. 7, 8 and 9), and offences against the administration of justice (Sec 10-16).
183 See generally Shaw (2011) Chapter 12 on Criminal Jurisdiction.
if the person after the commission of the offence is present in Uganda. This means that the perpetrator does not have to be a Ugandan, what matters is that he/she is found within the confines of Uganda. In essence, in view of the LRA war, the ICC Act would allow for Uganda to initiate proceedings against LRA rebels for committing atrocities not only in Uganda, but, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Southern Sudan by virtue of the fact that the LRA are citizens of Uganda.

4.4.3 Procedure for domestic prosecution

Commencement of criminal proceedings in Uganda is generally the reserve of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The ICC Act under Section 17 confers to the Constitutional provision and specifically directs that proceedings for international crimes be initiated with the consent of the DPP. Currently, within the DPP is a special unit that has been set up to specifically deal with international crimes.

4.5 General principles of criminal responsibility

In Uganda, the general principles of criminal responsibility are not harmonised in one law as laid down in the Rome Statute. The Ugandan ICC Act under Section 19 makes the first attempt to harmonise the general principles of Ugandan criminal law. However, Section 19 does not replica Part III of the Rome Statute. It incorporates some of the principles to be applied with modification. However, note that these principles as stipulated under the ICC Act have a limited application to the crime of genocide; crimes against humanity; and war crimes.

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184 Constitution, Art. 120(3) (c). However, also see Art. 120 (3) (b)(C) which by inference also allows for individuals or any other authority to institute criminal proceeding. Cf. Magistrates Court Act Cap 16 Laws of Uganda 2000, Part V on “institution of criminal proceedings”, by persons other than the DPP.

185 ICC Act, Secs. 7-16. Note that the draft ICC Bill, 2006 had given the mandate to the Attorney General, which was reconsidered by parliament to confer with Art. 120 of the Constitution that gives the mandate to the DPP; at Parliament of Uganda– Hansard (Wednesday, 10 March 2010: 3.02).
4.5.1 Principle of legality

The idea that criminal law should deal fairly and justly with the individual is expressed in the principle of legality as stated in a number of maxims namely: *nullum crimen sine lege; nulla poena sine lege; nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali.*\(^{186}\) Generally, the maxims express that for one’s conduct to be punished, both the conduct and the punishment must be prescribed by law. Further, that such prescribed offence or punishment should not be retrospectively enacted. These maxims have constitutionally been part of Uganda’s legal system.\(^ {187}\) This leaves one to assume that this is reason why the ICC Act in tackling the principle of legality only highlights two clauses within the provisions from the Rome Statute.\(^ {188}\) Article 22(2), which relates to principles of interpretation applied to definition of crimes, to be in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted and convicted, and Article 24(2) which stipulates that in case of change of law before judgment, favourable law shall be to a person being investigated, prosecuted and convicted.

However, the provision on non-retroactivity of the law has poses a challenge and disappointment to victims and pro international criminal justice advocates who had hope that the ICC Act would allow for the prosecution of perpetrators of the LRA conflict from 1986 to date.\(^ {189}\) However, Namuwese in her thesis argues that non-retroactivity principle for the case of Uganda cannot be pleaded with respect to international crimes,\(^ {190}\) a matter to be addressed in the next chapter.

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\(^{186}\) Burchell (1970; 53).

\(^{187}\) See Art 28(7) and (12).

\(^{188}\) Sec. 19 (1) (a) (ii) and (iii).

\(^{189}\) See Chapter 1, Sec.1.1.

\(^{190}\) See Namuwase (2011: 33).
Therefore, one can literally state that complementarity in practice for the LRA conflict within and out of Uganda for the post ICC era, period between 1st July 2002 and 2010, when the Act was enacted is not to be possible. The Act is therefore only suitable for future application.

4.5.2 *Ne bis in idem* rule

The *Ne bis in idem* rule or principle against double jeopardy is based on the pleas of previous conviction *autrefois convict* and previous acquittal *autrefois acquit*. The ICC Act incorporates this principle among the provision on general principles of criminal law as opposed to its location under the Rome Statute.\(^{191}\) The principle of double jeopardy has been part of Uganda’s domestic legal provisions. Article 28(9) of the Ugandan Constitution prohibits the trial of an individual for the same offence more than once, whether acquitted or convicted or for any other criminal offence of which, he or she could have been convicted at the trial for that offence. The provision however, creates an exception to waiver of the defence in cases where a superior court in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the conviction or acquittal has ordered a trial. The question, therefore, is whether national courts in Uganda would apply this to international decisions considering that the courts have jurisdiction to try the ICC crimes.\(^{192}\)

Perhaps, in case such an issue arose, one may invoke the Rome Statute provision, which in essence attempts to be true to the complementarity principle in as far as the relationship between the ICC and national courts are concerned in prosecuting international crimes. In this provision, the principle of double jeopardy is to be invoked by the ICC in two instances: in cases where the ICC crimes have been prosecuted by another court; the reverse has been said to also be

\(^{191}\) ICC Act, art 20.  
\(^{192}\) ICC Act, Sec. 7, 8 and 9.
true for other courts in respect to the ICC decisions on the same. However, in as much as the ICC Act incorporates in totality the Rome Statute provision on double jeopardy, it is my view that this could raise a future constitutional challenge on the matter especially considering that international law decisions are rather persuasive and not binding on national courts as discussed in chapter two of this thesis. A further argument would be that the Rome Statute seems to set the ICC at the pick of the hierarchy of courts in Uganda when it gives exceptions, under which the ICC can waive the principle of double jeopardy following decisions made by other courts, which could include Uganda national courts. Article 20 (3) of the ICC Act allows for the ICC to review decisions in instances where trials were carried on in such a way that the person was being shielded from criminal responsibility and that the conduct of the trial was not compatible with international criminal law standards. Food for thought would then be whether this provision of the ICC Act is inconsistent with chapter thirteen of the Constitution in as far as the hierarchy of courts in Uganda and their roles are concerned vis-à-vis the ICC. This therefore calls for a further analytical research on the application of the double jeopardy in light of the evolution of international criminal tribunals particularly in the ICC complementarity regime.

\textsuperscript{193} Art. 20(2) and (3).
\textsuperscript{194} Art. 20(3).
4.5.3 Criminal responsibility

4.5.3.1 Individual criminal responsibility

Individual criminal responsibility refers to an individual being responsible for his/her unlawful actions. The principle of individual criminal responsibility under international law was first clarified at the Nuremberg trials of the German major war criminals. It was stated that “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can international law be enforced.” Article 25(1) of the Rome Statute, reaffirms the Nuremberg statement when it establishes individual responsibility for international core crimes. The article, under part (3) regulates the modalities of individual criminal responsibility and distinguishes several modes of criminal participation. The ICC Act, completely incorporates Article 25 of the Rome Statute, therefore, creating individual criminal responsibility for the international crimes incorporated under the Act. Notably, individual criminal responsibility had already been created for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions in Uganda as discussed in section 4.4.1.3 above. The modes of participation stipulated under the Geneva Conventions Act include: the act of commission, or aiding, abetting or procuring the commission of an offence by another person. Therefore, the incorporation of the modes of participation into the ICC Act from the Rome Statute expands the scope to embrace the entire body of international core crimes.

Further, Section 19(b) allows for the application of further principles under Ugandan criminal law. This means that individual criminal responsibility can be attributed to an individual

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195 Damgaard (2010: 12).
196 International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Goring et al Judgment of 1 October 1946.
198 Art 19(1) (a) (iv).
199 Geneva Conventions Act, Sec 2(1).
on grounds of conspiracy. This component is not included under the modes of participation under the Rome Statute, but, is among the inchoate offences under the Uganda Penal Code Act.

4.5.3.2 Exclusion of jurisdiction over persons under 18 years

The ICC Act, Section 19(1) (5), incorporates Article 26 Rome Statute that prevents the courts from having jurisdiction over a person who committed one of the international core crimes while he/she was under the age of 18 years. This is contrary to various domestic provisions on the criminal responsibility of children. Section 88 of the Children Act puts the minimum age of criminal responsibility at 12 years. Section 89, further, provides for the procedure for the arrest and charge of a child and states among others that no child shall be detained with an adult person. This corresponds with the Constitutional provision under Article 34(6). The Trial on Indictment Act provides for a special procedure to be taken in lieu of a sentence of death on person under 18 years. The unevenness in application of the law, created by the ICC Act is being challenged in the petition filed before the Constitutional Court in the case of Jowaad Kazaala vs the Attorney General. The petitioner alleges that the ICC Act provision is discriminatory. Though the matter is sub judice, it is my opinion that regard should be given to

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200 See discussion on Genocide, Sec 4.4.1.1 above.
201 See Sec.4.4.1.1 above.
202 During the debate of the ICC Bill, a concern was raised that this provision vis-à-vis Article 8 (2)(b) of the Rome Statute that makes it an offence for a person to enlist children under the age of 15 to take part in hostilities, creates an opportunity for children between 16 and 17 years to be enlisted to take part in hostilities without the enlistsers committing crimes and the children not being criminally responsible for their actions; See Parliament of Uganda-Hansad (10 March 2010: 6-7).
205 Quoted from, Mbazira (2010:218).
the nature in which children get involved in international crimes. The LRA conflict was of such nature in which children were abducted and forced to commit grave atrocities.

4.5.3.3 Responsibility of commanders and other superiors
Responsibility of commanders and other superiors under Article 28 of the Rome Statute is linked to the fact that the ICC only tries those who hold the greatest responsibility. For Uganda, the criminal responsibility attributed to commanders and superiors is under section 19(1) (a) (vi) of the ICC Act. Prior to the ICC Act, remedy for acts committed by commanders or superiors in the normal course of duty lay in civil law for damages against the Attorney General. This did not include acts by non-state actors.

This provision is, therefore, vital to attributing responsibility in the Greater Northern Uganda conflict. The Pre-Trial Chamber II in issuing an arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and his cohorts, cites the status of the relevant individuals as commanders with respect to participation in the conflict under Article 25 (3) (b) of the Rome Statute.

4.5.4 Dealing with bars to prosecution
On this subject, the findings are limited to three components that would prevent the prosecution of international core crimes. They include: immunity for officials, amnesty/pardon and statute of limitation.

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206 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I judgment of 14 March 2012, paras 607-618.
208 Cf. Rome Statute, Art. 25 on establishing individual criminal responsibility modes of participation.
209 Warrants of Arrest for Joseph Kony, Vicent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/05
4.5.4.1 Irrelevance of official capacity

Irrelevance of official capacity is under the Rome Statute is synonymous with the term immunity.\(^{210}\) Immunity has its ancient roots in international law.\(^{211}\) Developing from customary international law, into conventional and treaty international law,\(^{212}\) immunity allows for an accused to evade prosecution for criminal offences.\(^{213}\) The defence of immunity under international law is raised either on grounds of *ratione materie* or *ratione personae*.\(^{214}\) However, with the evolution of international criminal justice on the subject of disregard for immunity for international core crimes, jurisprudence by courts indicates that there remains discourse on this subject.\(^{215}\) The international community of states also remains divided on the question. This has been evident with the ICC warrants of arrest for seating Head of State of Sudan Omar Hassan Al Bashir continues to be a contentious one.\(^{216}\)

\(^{210}\) See Rome Statute, Art. 27.


\(^{212}\) Murungu (2010: 36).


\(^{214}\) Murungu (2010: 42).

\(^{215}\) In ex parte Pinochet, the House of Lords held in Appeal decision 3 that immunity for incumbent head of state is absolute. In the post-Pinochet case, the Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, the International Court of Justice held that Incumbent state officials are immune from criminal trials abroad regardless of the severity of the charges. However, in the joint separate opinions of Judge Rosalyn Higgins, Judge Koijmans and Buergenthal argued that though they agreed with the majority ruling, ‘[the growing international consensus on the need to punish crimes regarded as most heinous by the international community, indicate that the warrant for the arrest did not as such violate international law] available at <http://www.paclii.org/journals/fJSPL/vol07no1/4.shtml> (accessed 30 September 2012).

Conversely, the Special Court for Sierra Leone held in the case of Prosecutor v. Charles Gbhankay Taylor SCSL-2003-01-I, that the official position of the Applicant as an incumbent Head of State at the time when criminal proceedings were initiated against him was not a bar to his prosecution by the court. The Applicant was therefore subject to criminal proceedings before the Court. The applicant had been charged with committing crimes against humanity and war crimes.

In Uganda, the question of immunity is said to be one of the reasons that stalled the passing of the ICC Act;²¹⁷ the intricacies are discussed below.

Article 27 of the Rome Statute disregards immunity for prosecution of international crimes with emphasis on the irrelevance of official capacity of Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official. The article further states that immunity shall not be considered for the reduction of sentence.

The Uganda ICC Act is silent on this particular provision. One would then posit that since in defining the crimes, the ICC act refers to, “[a] person”, by implication, this would include all persons covered under Article 27 of the Rome Statute. However, such an argument would not hold for the Head of State, in light of Article 98(4) of the Uganda Constitution that exempts the Ugandan Head of State from liability in criminal proceedings in any court. The ICC Act in this context would be null and void according to Article 2(2) of the Constitution.²¹⁸ In the case of Prof. Gilbert Baliseka Bukeyna vs The Attorney General,²¹⁹ the Constitutional Court confirmed the Constitutional provision on immunity of the Head of State. The Court stated that that Article 98(4) is the exclusive preserve of the Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in- Chief of the People’s Defence Forces and Fountain of Honour.

However, the research reveals that it was not the intention of the Parliament to exclude the provision on irrelevance of official capacity from the ICC Act. The debate in Parliament reveals that parliament agreed to retain Clause 25 of the ICC Bill, which provided for irrelevance

²¹⁸ It states that any law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is null and void to the extent of its inconsistence.
²¹⁹ Constitutional Petition No. 30 of 2011.
of official capacity.\textsuperscript{220} This raises food for thought as to why the provision was excluded in the published ICC Act.

It worth noting that the absence of Article 27 in the ICC Act would only favour the Ugandan Head of State as explicitly provided by the Constitution, and not any other individuals.\textsuperscript{221} As to whether, foreign nationals can raise this defence while before Ugandan courts, is left to be addressed by the broad base of the immunity question under international law.\textsuperscript{222}

Further, to note is that, Section 25 of the ICC Act, rejects official capacity of a person as a bar to request for surrender or assistance made by the ICC.\textsuperscript{223} The interpretation with the prior submission would be that, the Ugandan Head of State cannot be tried before Ugandan Courts as stated in Article 98(4) of the Constitution, but, under this provision, he/she could be transferred to the ICC, which will be hardly practicable. However, on a positive note, pleading \textit{ratione personae} or \textit{ratione materie} will not suffice for other individuals including Heads of States from other jurisdictions. One could therefore state that the Ugandan law would allow for the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, against whom the ICC has issued warrants of arrest, if he was found present in Uganda.\textsuperscript{224}

\textsuperscript{221} See the case of\textit{ Uganda vs Akbar Hussein Godi}, Criminal case No. 124 of 2008 where a former Member of Parliament who while serving as a Member of Parliament, was charged with murder and sentenced to 25 years in prison. Also see the case of\textit{ Prof. Gilbert Baliseka Bukenya vs The Attorney General} No.30/11.
\textsuperscript{222} Refer to Sec. 4.4.2 of this chapter on jurisdiction.
\textsuperscript{223} (1) The existence of any immunity or special procedural rule attaching to the official capacity of any person is not a ground for-
(a) refusing or postponing the execution of a request for surrender or other assistance by the ICC;
(b) holding that a person is ineligible for arrest or surrender to the ICC under this Act; or
(c) holding that a person is not obliged to provide the assistance sought in request by the ICC.
\textsuperscript{224} See The Prosecutor v. Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, First arrest warrant issued 4 March 2009, and second arrest warrant issued 12 July 2010; available at \texttt{<http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205%20related%20cases/icc02050109/icc02050109>}
### 4.5.4.2 The question of pardon/amnesty

Article 29 (10) of the Uganda Constitution prohibits the trial for a criminal offence for which one has been pardoned. Therefore, grant of pardon exonerates one from prosecution and punishment in respect to the said offence for which one was pardoned. Pardon within the confines of the Ugandan law includes prerogative of mercy granted by the President under Article 121(4) (a) of the Constitution, and then the grant of amnesty. However, the subject for discussion will only delve into the question of amnesty as a bar to prosecution since prerogative of mercy is only available to one who has already been convicted.\(^{225}\)

Amnesty is considered a form of immunity because it bars any future prosecutions against the person for whom amnesty has been given.\(^{226}\) It is wider than pardon, which merely relieves the offender from punishment.\(^{227}\) The justices of the Constitutional Court in the case of *Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo*\(^ {228}\) concurred with the applicant’s argument that amnesty under the Amnesty Act was a form of pardon recognised by the Constitution. However, precedents from regional courts and criminal tribunals detach amnesties from international core crimes.\(^ {229}\)

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\(^{225}\) Cf. [http://oxforddictionaries.com](http://oxforddictionaries.com) (accessed 29 August 2012); prerogative of mercy refers to the right and power of a sovereign, state president, or other supreme authority to commute a death sentence, to change the mode of execution, or to pardon an offender thereby relieving the defendant of all the consequences of conviction. In *Kooky Sharma and Anor vs Uganda*, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No.44/2000. The appellant was convicted for murder and sentenced to death by the Supreme Court, however, in March 2012, he was granted presidential pardon available at [http://www.newvision.co.ug/article/fullstory.aspx?story_id=629895&catid=1&mid=53](http://www.newvision.co.ug/article/fullstory.aspx?story_id=629895&catid=1&mid=53) (accessed 29 August 2012).

\(^{226}\) Amnesty Act, Sec 1(a). defines amnesty to mean “a pardon, forgiveness, exemption or discharge from criminal prosecution or any other form of punishment by a State.


\(^{228}\) Constitutional Petition No. 36/2011 (Reference) (unreported) lines 480-495.

From the year 2000 to May 2012, the Amnesty Act made it possible for reporters who renounced rebel activity to be granted amnesty.\textsuperscript{230} Amnesty could be applied for at any stage,\textsuperscript{231} irrespective of the offence committed.\textsuperscript{232} Such a provision made it possible for other senior perpetrators of the LRA conflict to apply for and be granted amnesty,\textsuperscript{233} even after, it was established by the ICC that the crimes perpetrated during the LRA conflict consisted of the international core crimes of war crimes and crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{234} The amnesty law, therefore, was until May 2012, a challenge for possible prosecution of even the top LRA leadership wanted by the ICC. Although section 2A of the Act, allowed the Minister\textsuperscript{235} by Statutory instrument, with the approval of Parliament to declare persons not eligible for grant of amnesty, the Minister throughout the span of the Act, never made any such exemptions.\textsuperscript{236} This used to probe questions whether the top LRA commanders wanted by the ICC would have been granted amnesty had they applied.\textsuperscript{237} One can state that the decision would have been a rather contentious one subject to legal battles. It would be so, first, considering that the enactment of the amnesty law was a desperate move by the Government to end mainly the Greater Northern

\textsuperscript{230} Amnesty Act, Sec 2 and 3. Also see Sec. 1; “Reporter” is defined as any person seeking to be granted amnesty.

\textsuperscript{231} See Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo Alias Latoni No. 36/2011 where it was indicated that the accused applied for amnesty after being captured and while in custody awaiting trial.

\textsuperscript{232} Amnesty Act, Sec 2(2), prohibited prosecution and punishment upon any person to whom amnesty has been granted for participation in the war or rebellion or for any crime committed in the cause of the war or armed rebellion.

\textsuperscript{233} See Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo, No. 36/2011, affidavit in support of reference, para 6, 11 and 12 on Senior LRA commanders captured by the UPDF who were granted amnesty- Brig Kenneth Banya (2004) and Brig. Sam Kolo (2005).

\textsuperscript{234} Available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/situation%20index?lan=en-GB> (accessed 30 September 2012).

\textsuperscript{235} Amnesty Act, Sec 1, “Minister” means, Minister responsible for Internal Affairs.

\textsuperscript{236} The provision to allow the Minister to exempt from amnesty was included in the Amnesty Act by the Amnesty (Amendment) Act, 2006, an Act to amend the Amnesty Act, Cap 294. This was a move carefully and conveniently done subsequent to the unsealed arrest warrants for the top LRA commanders issued by the ICC in October 2005. Uganda was also at this time having peace talks with the LRA; the famous Juba Peace Agreements that collapsed in November 2008.

Ugandan war. The intention of the Amnesty Act was to discourage rebel activity, particularly those involved in the LRA war to freely surrender without fear of being prosecuted.\textsuperscript{238} Secondly, in light of the Amnesty Act, the rebels were free to apply for amnesty and be granted. Thirdly, the Constitutional Court ruling in the case of \emph{Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo alias latoni} provides the tip of the iceberg of how the courts would have approached the issue. The Justices of the Court, subject to the Amnesty Act and Constitution, ordered that the trial Court stop the trial of the applicant, who was charged with committing grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions Act and Penal Code Act offences. The Court further ordered that the Directorate of Public Prosecution and the Amnesty Commission grant the applicant amnesty. The Court disregarded any precedents presented by the respondent with respect to the international law position on amnesty for international core crimes.\textsuperscript{239} Perhaps this position will be settled by the Supreme Court in a pending appeal filed in the case of \emph{Uganda vs Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni} on the question of the Amnesty Act as it then was vis-à-vis the prosecution for international core crimes in Uganda.

Positive to note is that the Amnesty Act expired on 25 May 2012.\textsuperscript{240} Despite the discretion the Minister had to extend the Act, he extended the span of the Act to the exclusion of provisions of part II of the Amnesty Act, which refers to the application for and grant of Amnesty.\textsuperscript{241} This has been a milestone for advocates against amnesty and pro prosecution of ICC crimes. It means therefore that for now, there is clear path for prosecuting perpetrators of international crimes in particular the LRA.

\textsuperscript{238} Cf. Constitutional Petition No. 36/2011 lines 510-535.
\textsuperscript{239} See discussion in Chapter 3, Sec. 3.4.6 above.
\textsuperscript{240} See the Amnesty Act (Extension of Expiry Period) Instrument, No. 2010 that extended the span of the Amnesty Act for 24 months beginning 25\textsuperscript{th} May, 2010.
\textsuperscript{241} Available at \url{http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/631450-no-more-amnesty-r-ira-rebels-as-law-expires.html} (accessed 30 September 2012).
4.5.4.3 Statute of limitations

Article 19(1) (a) (vii) of the ICC Act, restates Article 29 of the Rome Statute on statute of limitations. It is to the effect that the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes shall not be subject to statute of limitations. This confers with Uganda’s penal laws, which as a general rule, do not allow for statute of limitations. Even then, offences that Section 28 of the Penal Code Act allows for the application of the statute of limitations period do not include offences within the scope of the crimes under the ICC Act.

4.5.4.4 Defences

Defences are used to denote all grounds for which, for one reason or another hinder the sanctioning of a criminal charge. The Rome Statute makes provision for procedural defences to be raised or considered by the Court to exempt one charged with crimes under the Rome Statute from criminal responsibility. Articles 31 “[g]rounds for excluding criminal responsibility” provides a list of grounds namely: insanity; involuntary intoxication; self defence or defence of others or, in case of war crimes, defence of property; duress and necessity. Other grounds are listed in the subsequent Articles. Articles 32 and 33 are in regard to mistake of fact and law, and superior orders and prescription of law respectively. Some these listed do not differ from the already existent list of general defences stipulated under the Uganda Penal Code Act: Mistake of fact (Section 9); Insanity (Section 11); Intoxication (Section 12); and the defence of person and property (Section 15). The ICC Act under Section 19(1) (a) (ix), (x) and (xi) nevertheless adopts the defences as provided for in Articles 31-33 of the Rome Statute, thereby including what the Penal Code does not provide for.

The defence of superior orders is not appreciated by courts in Uganda.\(^{243}\) Other defences under the ICC Statute contained in other provisions include: abandonment and prevention (Article 25 (3) (f)) and exclusion of jurisdiction of persons under 18 (Article 26). These have been incorporated under Section 19 (1) (iv) and (v) of the ICC Act.

However, the Rome Statute further permits for the Court to consider applying other defences that have not been codified by the Statute guided by the provisions of Article 21.\(^{244}\) Article 21 states that:

“[The Court shall apply:
(b)…where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;
(c)… general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.]”

With this provision, in particular Article part (c), other general principles excluding criminal responsibility stipulated by the Uganda Penal Code Act and those established by precedent could be considered by the court during proceedings.\(^{245}\) Section 19(1) (b) of the ICC Act, further, allows for a person when charged with genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, to rely on any justifiable excuse or defence available under the laws of Uganda or under international law.

However, Section 19(3) provides that, in case of a conflict between the Rome Statute defence provisions and those stipulated under section 19(b), the former shall prevail.

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\(^{244}\) Article 31(3).

\(^{245}\) Penal Code Act: Claim of right (Sec. 7); Intention and motive (Sec. 8); Compulsion (Sec. 14); Defence of rash, reckless and negligent acts (Sec.15); Use of force in effecting arrest (Sec. 16); Compulsion by husband (Sec. 17). For the defence of Alibi, the burden rests on the prosecution to disprove the defence put up by the accused as decide in Uganda vs George Kasya [1988-1990] HCB 48. Cf. Vincent Rwamwaro vs Uganda, High Court. Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 1988.
It can be stated that the provision on the accused’s right to raise a defence under Article 67(e) of the Rome Statute has greatly been complied with.

### 4.6 Penalty and sentencing

Defining punishment for a crime that has been established is a rule under the principle of legality maxim *nulla poena sine lege.* \(^{246}\) Both the Rome Statute and Ugandan Constitution confer to this principle.

Article 77 of the Rome Statute provides for the penalty of person found guilty of committing the international core crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. A person may receive a sentence of imprisonment for specified number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of 30 years [Article 77(1) (a)]; or imprisonment for life in exceptional circumstances [Article 77(2) (b)]. Other possible penalties are a fine, and forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from that crime [Article 77(2) (a) and (b)]. The ICC Act prescribes the penalty for the similar crimes as imprisonment for life or a lesser term. \(^{247}\) This provision of the ICC Act in stipulating lesser penalty for offences that would otherwise at the discretion of the Court, carry the death penalty under the Ugandan law becomes debatable. \(^{248}\)

The question would have been, whether Article 80 of the Rome Statute accommodates the national provision. This is because the article allows for states to impose penalties as prescribed by national laws even where the law of the State does not provide for penalties as prescribed by the Statute. At the drafting of the Statute, it was not the intention of the drafters to

\(^{246}\) Burchell (1983:53).

\(^{247}\) Articles 7(3), 8(3) and 9(3).

\(^{248}\) Uganda’s penal law allows for punishment up to the death penalty for the offences of murder (Sec 188 and189, Penal code Act), rape (sec 124, Penal code Act). Also see the Magistrates Courts (Amendment), Act, 2007 for the death penalty for aggravated defilement. These offences are, *inter alia*, common to some of the predicate crimes contained within the Rome Statute. Cf. the Rome Statute, Article 6(a), Article 7(a) and (g), Article 8(2) (a)(i) and 2(c)(i).
include the death penalty since the death penalty violates the right to life and is a form of torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment therefore, going against the human rights standards upon which the Rome Statute was being founded.\textsuperscript{249} Similarly, parliament of Uganda was aware of the Constitutional provision on the death penalty,\textsuperscript{250} but, opted not to include it in the ICC Act because it was not in line with Art 77(1) (b) of the Rome Statute.\textsuperscript{251}

However, one must note that such variances in punishment for similar offences under the ICC Act vis-à-vis the other penal provisions on the same offences will definitely create discrepancy. The basis being that Article 21 of the Constitution calls of equality before and under the law. Further, Article 22 of the Constitution allows for one’s life to be taken away in execution of a sentence passed in a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of a criminal offence under the laws of Uganda and the conviction and sentence have been confirmed by the highest appellate court. In the case of \textit{Attorney General vs Susan Kigula and 417 others}\textsuperscript{252}, the Supreme Court confirmed that the death penalty is not unconstitutional, save for the fact that it is imposed at the Court’s discretion. Therefore, the fact that one is liable to suffer death under one law while under another to suffer life imprisonment or lesser term for similar offences creates a possible constitutional question.

\textsuperscript{249} Arts 3 and 6, UN General Assembly, \textit{Universal Declaration of Human Rights}, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III).
\textsuperscript{250} Constitution, Art 22(1).
\textsuperscript{251} See Parliament of Uganda-Hansad (Wednesday, 10 March 2010) at p. 23 and 24. Clause 8 sub-clause 3(a) on crimes against humanity and Clause 9 sub-clause 3(a) on war crimes of the ICC Bill contained provisions on the death penalty, which parliament agreed to amend to confer with Article 77(1)(b) of the Rome Statute.
\textsuperscript{252} Supreme Court-Constitutional Appeal No. 03 OF 2006 (Unreported).
4.7 Conclusion

The analysis of the chapter reveals that Uganda has to a great extent implemented the substantive provisions of Rome Statute to allow effective prosecution and punishment of the international core crimes. This is not only with regards to directly importing into ICC Act the crimes as they are stipulated in the Rome Statute, but also adopts other provisions of the Rome Statute to some extent in tandem with other domestic laws. This is to allow for the effective prosecution and punishment of the international core crimes in compliance with the Rome Statute. The Act contains special provisions on prosecution and exercise of jurisdiction for these crimes. The latter gives the national courts extensive jurisdiction over the international core crimes committed within and outside Uganda. However, the biggest setback in the ICC Act is the non inclusion of irrelevance of official capacity.
CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of research findings

Chapter one sets the pace by establishing the relationship between the ICC and Uganda. This is important because it justifies Uganda’s obligation to implement the Rome Statute provisions. For Uganda the most pressing being the need to enable accountability for the atrocities committed during the Greater Northern Ugandan Conflict both at the ICC and in Uganda.

Chapter two addresses the concept of implementation of international treaties. It is established that the nature of international criminal law, whether or not it subscribes to dualism or monism, a State in implementing the substantive provisions of international criminal law may opt either implement by incorporation or by non-incorporation and instead choose to apply ordinary criminal law.253 However, if a State chooses to implement by incorporation, then the State may choose to either amend the existing criminal legislation or enact a new law.

The chapter three reveals that international law becomes part of Ugandan law through enacting implementing legislation and by courts setting precedence. However, in light of the case of Thomas Kwoyelo, courts do not seem to appreciate the principles of international criminal law even when they are conflict with domestic law. Therefore, enactment remains somewhat the most available option of implementation of international law. However, whatever law that is enacted must not be inconsistent with the Ugandan Constitution, because that law will be considered null and void to the extent of its inconsistency.254

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253 See Chapter 2, Sec. 4.2.2 above.
254 See Chapter 3, Sec. 3.2.1 above.
Chapter four in examining the progress and challenges of implementing the Rome Statute in Uganda establishes that Uganda has made great progress domesticating a Rome Statute implementing legislation, the ICC Act. In mainly dealing with the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute, this paper, in this chapter, reveals that Uganda has comprehensively implemented the Rome Statute provisions to allow for effective prosecution and punishment of international core crimes. The Act completely incorporates the crimes by copying the provisions of the Rome Statute. The Act also incorporates to a great extent the general principles of criminal law under the Rome Statute with necessary modification. In a nutshell, the research analysis reveals that the existing domestic legal frameworks prior to the ICC Act would have hardly accommodated the effective performance of Uganda’s duty to prosecute and punish obligations under the Rome Statute. The analysis also reveals challenges that present. Lack of inclusion of a provision of irrelevance of official capacity\(^{255}\) is a weakness of the Act that presents for implementing the Rome Statute. Threats to the Act from prior established domestic laws are also pointed in the analysis. These will affect the possible implementation of the Act because variances in application of the law is created, which would possibly probe constitutional interpretation.

5.2 Concluding Remarks

It is evident that a State that ratifies an international agreement consents to be bound by obligations created by the treaty.\(^ {256}\) However, the evolution of international criminal law creates even a far greater obligation for States to oblige. This follows the internationally developed norm that States have the primary responsibility to prosecute international crimes.\(^ {257}\) The provisions on the principles of complementarity and co-operation under the Rome Statute hardly leave any

\(^{255}\) See Chapter 4, Sec. 3.5.5.1.
\(^{256}\) See Vienna Convention, Art. 2(1)(b) and Art. 14.
\(^{257}\) See Rome Statute, Preamble, Para 4 and 6.
option for a country like Uganda that has been engulfed in conflict characterised by the commission of international core crimes not to enact a statute implementing the Rome Statute. Basing on the study focus, one can state that Uganda in adhering to the complementarity principle has substantially complied with the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute, which will ensure adequate prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of international core crimes. What remains to be seen is the how courts will deal with the challenges discussed in the paper, when in their midst. It is hoped that the case of *Jowaad Kazaala vs Attorney General No. 24/2010* will set a landmark when decided upon by the Uganda Constitutional Court.

### 5.3 Observations and possible recommendations

#### 5.3.1 Absence of provision on irrelevance of official capacity

This sets a draw back to the purpose of not only the Act, but the foundations for criminal justice. Statistics from the situations before the ICC, involve indictments for Heads of States considered to bare the greatest responsibility for international core crimes committed.\(^{258}\) The war in Northern Uganda involved not only the LRA but also the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces, whom the communities in Uganda claim committed atrocities in Uganda.\(^{259}\) Subject to the principle of command responsibility under the Rome Statute,\(^{260}\) it would then be possible to attribute the atrocities committed to the commander in Chief of the Uganda armed forces who is the President.\(^{261}\) Therefore, not including the provision of official capacity can be perceived as applying the law selectively. Since the research established that Parliament enacted the ICC Act

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258 Indictment for Omar Hassan Al Bashir of Sudan, Laurant Gbagbo of Ivory Cost, Muammar Gadaffi of Libya (now deceased); available at<http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/> (accessed 23 October 2012).


260 See Rome Statute, Art. 28. Also see Chapter 4, Sec. 3.5.3.3.

261 See Chapter 4, Sec. 4.5.4.1.
with the provision on irrelevance of official capacity present, a move to amend the ICC Act can still be brought forth. Also, consideration to amend the Constitution should be thought to include this provision as an exception to Article 98(4). This should be done with the notion that leaders are not expected to get involved in such international core crimes and if they do, then they should be held accountable.

5.3.2 Possible constitutional challenges

The main threats to implementing the ICC Act are the variances established between the Act and other provisions in domestic legislation. First, are concerns raised about certain provisions of the ICC Act being inconsistent with domestic laws. Among these are: no death penalty for acts of murder under the ICC Act, which is otherwise stipulated under the Penal Code Act for the same offence; and no prosecution for acts committed while one is below the age of 18, yet other domestic laws indicate that criminal liability is possible for children under 18 years. Secondly, are provisions that are directly inconsistent with the Constitution, for instance the *ne bis in idem* rule which impliedly places the ICC as the highest Court, contrary to the Constitutional provision on hierarchy of courts in Uganda. To streamline the application of these provisions to avoid future technicalities, the constitutional challenges can be brought before the Uganda Constitutional Court to let the court rule on the issues.

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262 See petition by *Jowaad Kazaala vs the Attorney General* 24 of 2010, where the petitioner challenges a number of provisions of the ICC Act as being inconsistent with the Constitution.
5.3.3 Non-retrospective application of the ICC Act

The fact that the ICC Act is subject to the Uganda Constitution provision on non-retroactivity of the Law means that the ICC Act is reserved for a future rather than current application with respect to accountability of the LRA conflict. This therefore, defeats the whole underlying purpose for which those who lobbied for a Rome Statute implementing law had thought. The non-retroactivity of the law principle defeats the whole purpose of the Act in light of the LRA committed atrocities vis-à-vis the principle of complementarity. It can however, be argued that in as much as the principle is appreciated in law, it can be exempted in certain instances. The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which, although recognises the non-retroactive principle, also allows for retroactive prosecution and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations.\textsuperscript{263} Namuwase\textsuperscript{264} contends that wording of the Ugandan Constitution on the Principle of legality subscribes to the international version of the principle of legality that is affiliated to international crimes as opposed to the national version. The international version does not require that a written law be in place as opposed to the national version that requires a written law. This posits that since Uganda had ratified the Rome Statute and the ICCPR, the principles and crimes automatically fell within the jurisdiction of Ugandan Courts. Such an argument would therefore, suggest that the principle of non-retroactivity for the ICC Act can be waived. However, this reverts back to the realities established in Chapter 3 on the question of international law being part of the domestic legal order in Uganda and the attitude of judges who will need to be enlightened on this development.

\textsuperscript{263} ICCPR Art. 15.
\textsuperscript{264} See Namuwase generally (2011).
5.3.4 Engaging judges

Chapter three on sources of criminal law in Uganda points out the fact that precedents by the courts of record form part of sources of law. However, as revealed, the Courts in their first encounter with a case of international criminal nature,\textsuperscript{265} differed from the international criminal principles in favour of the domestic grant of amnesty.\textsuperscript{266} This was irrespective of the fact that the accused was facing charges of grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions Act.\textsuperscript{267} This can be attributed to the fact that the justices do not appreciate the foundations of international criminal law particularly international core crimes. It is important that trainings are held on a roll in basis for members of the entire judiciary and not limited to judges of the Special Division-The International Crimes Division, established to try international crimes. This should be considered, owing to the fact that first, judicial officers are often transferred, meaning it is possible to have a novel mind handling a case one finds. Secondly, is the possible that an appeal may lie from the International Crimes Division to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Thirdly, constitutional petitions on international crimes may be lodged and as such, the justices need to appreciate the principles of international criminal law.

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