PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT:
A CASE-STUDY OF THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN

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A mini-thesis submitted to the School of Government, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, University of the Western Cape,
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
Master’s in Public Administration

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DECLARATION

I, Mbulelo Buwa, hereby declare that this Mini-thesis, entitled “Public-Private Partnership in Disaster Management: A Case-study of the City of Cape Town” is my own original work and has not previously been submitted for any degree, in part or in its entirety, at any other university.

.................................................................

MBULELO BUWA

UNIVERSITY of the WESTERN CAPE
ABSTRACT

Greater capacity for cities to be disaster resilient is needed. Public-private partnership enhances municipal capacity. This study therefore, interrogates the relationship between the City of Cape Town and its disaster relief partners. It is mainly concerned with policy implementation, and as such, investigates disaster management policy implementation in relation to public-private partnerships.

The objectives of the study were to provide a conceptual framework that defines the terms eminent in the practice and study of disaster management, particularly those that characterize public-private partnerships in the City of Cape Town; to explore the legislative mandate that makes provisions for disaster management and the funding of public-private partnerships in municipalities; to document the current practice of public-private partnerships in the City of Cape Town; to highlight noted challenges in the partnership and where necessary, recommend alternative policy implementation options for enhanced partnership sustainable capacity for disaster relief.

The researcher deemed it expedient to utilize the qualitative method for the purposes of the adeptness it affords in expediting malleable, arduous investigation in engaging with the phenomena that “unfold[s] in real-world situations.”

As far as the findings of this study are concerned, the public-private partnership of the City of Cape Town with its disaster relief partners is a successful one. It is effective in bringing the much needed awareness and relief to devastated communities. There are four main challenges that impact on this disaster relief partnership have been realized by this study.
These namely are the delays in the reimbursement process, the constant change of
government personnel dealing with relief partners, absence of a disaster relief official on the
sites of distress and unsubsidized expenses incurred by the relief partners. Having realized
these challenges, the study makes policy implementation recommendations.
ABBREVIATIONS

IDP      Integrated Development Plan
NGO      Non-governmental Organization
CBO      Community Based Organization
CoCT     City of Cape Town
DRMC     Disaster Risk Management Centre
DRM      Disaster Risk Management
DRR      Disaster Risk Reduction
HFA      Hyogo Framework of Action
KPAs     Key Performance Areas
MDMAF    Municipal Disaster Management Advisory Forum
MDMF     Municipal Disaster Management Centre
MIDMC    Municipal Interdepartmental Disaster Management Committee
NDMF     National Disaster Management Framework
NPO      Non-Profit Organization
PPP      Public Private Partnership
UN       United Nations
USA      United States of America
UNDP     United Nations Development Programme
UNISDR   United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
MTEF     Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NPM      New Public Management
MDGs     Millennium Development Goals
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KEY WORDS

City of Cape Town
Disaster
Disaster risk management
Disaster risk reduction
Disaster Risk Management Centre
Vulnerability
Hazard
Public Private Partnership
Non-profit organizations
Relief
CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

It has been established that calamity is a “recurrent feature of human life” (Alexander, 2005:25). Daily, news reports are saturated by calamities and catastrophes that occur all over the world. In 2010 alone, 406 natural disasters and 234 technological disasters were reported worldwide, with natural disasters alone claiming 297,752 valuable lives, affecting 304 million people (IFRCRCS, 2011:200). Exorbitant amounts of money spent in restoring the damages suffered in these occurrences rob numerous disadvantaged individuals of the very basic necessities of life essential for survival. Excluding other necessities, such as proper shelter, sanitation, and clothing chronic hunger characterizes the lives of many. Statistics show that “today, nearly 1 billion or almost one in seven people worldwide” (IFRCRCS, 2011:8). Disasters therefore, being increasingly common, become “an extraordinarily revealing sort of affliction” (Alexander, 2005:25). Afflicted and in distress, many in their quest for survival have sought refuge in cities. Since capital cities are mostly characteristic of economic activities, they have become the destination of many (Bekker & Therborn, 2012).

Studies documented by (Bekker & Therborn, 2012:1) reveal that “[c]apital cities have always played a central role in nation building and state building. Cities, as Bekker and Therborn continue to note, have been visible “symbols of power” and statements of authority. Monuments have been erected in cities as a distinction of the powers vested in that particular era. They also serve as “barometer[s] of new ideological approaches” (Bekker & Therborn, 2012:1). The argument thus
advanced by Bekker and Therborn intimates that, one by observing or studying the architecture and planning of cities, could obtain an inkling towards fathoming its political and historical development. South Africa has three capital cities, namely Pretoria, Cape Town and Bloemfontein.

Of the three South African Capital Cities, only the City of Cape Town has been enlisted among the 17 cities in the world designated as “Role Model Cities” (UNISDR, 2011). Role model cities “are part of the World Disaster Reduction Campaign” for the years 2010-2011, a United Nations initiative focusing on “making cities resilient” against disasters (UNISDR, 2011). This initiative was a call for “all mayors and local governments” as well as “community groups, citizens, planners, academia and the private sector to make as many cities as possible as resilient as possible” (UNISDR, 2011). Globally, only seventeen (17) cities met the requirements of this initiative thus qualifying for the “Role Model Cities” title. Of these seventeen international cities, only two in Africa qualified for the said status, St. Louis in Senegal and Cape Town respectively. The attainment of this status is a testament to the dedication of the City of Cape Town in combatting the devastating effects of disasters.

In the year 2011, African leaders were gathered in Durban, South Africa for what seemed to be a call for Africans to unite against climate change. Of the guests gathered there was Governor Babantunde Fashola, of Nigeria. Acknowledging the universal effects of global warming and climate change, Governor Fosholalamented the loss of “thousands of human lives and billions of dollars”
suffered at through the effects of disasters, destroying property and “source[s] of sustenance” (UNISDR, 2011). More significant is what was reportedly said by Fosholasubsequently, “All of these have happened in peace time, without war. This is the reality that we face. An enemy whose army is not known. A force created by our own actions and inactions that is taking human lives almost at will through extreme weather conditions such as droughts, flood, severe winter, tsunamis, hurricanes and earthquakes and typhoons” (UNISDR, 2011). Disasters threaten and devastate years of heritage, memories and political symbols characterizing urban infrastructure. They threaten the sustenance of millions who inhabit those cities. The inhabitants of the cities, while they may to a large extent be responsible for the human induced disasters, they themselves are in peril as a result of their actions or inactions.

According to the World Bank (2007) it was established that the public sector and private sector ‘have a strong mutual interest to make communities and businesses disaster resilient.’ This mutual interest emanates from the government’s role of ensuring safety and surety of both people and property, while the private sector also needs a safe and secure society to thrive. Government and private sector therefore, share a common interest in the preservation of the environment upon which their subsistence is based. The aura and manifestation of disasters perturbs the very foundations of the subsistence of both.

While this involvement of multiple sectors, according to (Bovaird, 2004), is believed to ‘dilute political control’, interfere with decision making and
compromise accountability; it can still be harnessed with great success to prevent and alleviate the debilitating effects of disasters. The partnership of the City of Cape Town’s disaster management centre with multiple disaster relief partners and other private entities, is one in many examples that attest to the reality of numerous possibilities that, when attempted, could present a glimpse or an opportunity for success. This study concerns the application of policy and governance of public-private partnership arrangements in disaster management that currently exist in the City of Cape Town, with particular reference to the procedure of funding or reimbursement of the City’s disaster relief partners.

This study purposes to closely reconnoitre this effectual partnership between the City of Cape and its disaster relief partners. Effort has been taken to concentrate this chapter on the nature and scope of the study, the problem statement, objectives of the study, research rationale, research design and methodology.

1.1 THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This study interrogates the relationship between the City of Cape Town and its disaster relief partners. It is mainly concerned with policy implementation, and as such, investigates disaster management policy implementation in relation to public private partnerships. The Disaster Risk Management Centre in the City of Cape Town is a government entity. The disaster relief partners, on the other hand, are Community based (CBOs) organizations and Non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
The partnership presents a unique case that affords the researcher grounds for an in-depth exploration. Furthermore, the agreement of these separate entities towards disaster relief presents empirical merits for the study. The disaster risk management centre, being a government department, subscribes to multiple levels of hierarchies, and a significant number of policies that characterize and govern its operation. The CBOs and NGOs by virtue of being less complex than the government, have fewer of both the hierarchies and policies when compared to government. This is union of government and non-governmental organizations, given the disparities in command structures and composure, may present some challenges. These challenges and perhaps the benefits that are likely to characterize such a partnership are the focus of this study.

Though the partnership seems complicated, given the disparities in the makeup and mode of operation between the government and the disaster relief partners, there are some common ground that can be noted in the partnership. The disaster risk management centre and the disaster relief partners both seek to provide disaster relief. They both serve in the same jurisdiction. They are complementary to each other. They both seek to serve communities distressed by disasters. Where the disaster relief need expertise and equipment the disaster risk management centre provides. Where the disaster risk management centre needs additional resources, the partners supplement, thus capacity is enhanced. That they are all on same geographical area also benefits both parties. As far as mobility and access is concerned, they are in close geographical proximity of about 30 kilometer radius. This proximity benefits the researcher as well,
reducing the cost of commuting significantly while affording him access to the organizations under study.

### 1.2 THE PROBLEM STATEMENT

The City of Cape Town has a unique disaster relief partnership model that seems to optimize its capacity for better disaster preparedness, relief and recovery. The model, being unique to the City of Cape Town may serve a proverbial guinea pig for other municipalities. The efficiency and effectiveness provided by this model needs to be documented as well as the challenges that may handicap it.

Should this model remain unappreciated and the challenges thereof unnoted and ignored, its demise will be inevitable. This study seeks to explore this public-private partnership between the disaster risk management centre and its disaster relief partners, with the intention of highlighting challenges that may characterize the partnership to prevent a long chain of deleterious circumstances that eventually result in delivery failure if the challenges go unnoticed. When noted and effort is made for improvement, the City of Cape Town will be better capacitated, better prepared, effective and efficient in disaster relief.

### 1.3 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

In pursuing the overall aim of the study, the researcher investigates the public-private trajectory of the City of Cape Town and its disaster relief partners to establish the operational procedure and possible challenges that threaten the
partnership. For more clarity and enhancement of the study, the study is further broken down into five manageable objectives.

The first objective was for the researcher to provide a conceptual framework that defines the terms eminent in the practice and study of disaster management, particularly those that characterize public-private partnerships in the City of Cape Town. The second objective sought to explore the legislative mandate that makes provisions for disaster management and the funding of public-private partnerships in municipalities. The third objective of the study was to document the current practice of public-private partnerships in the City of Cape Town. Concurrent with the documentation of the current practice, this study sought to outline the relationship between the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre and its relief partners. The fourth objective of the study was to highlight noted challenges in the partnership and the funding procedure and then. Lastly, the study sought to, where necessary, make recommendations for an enhanced partnership and sustainable capacity for disaster relief.

1.4 THE RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY

The value of the study is anchored in its employment of the chosen “qualitative” method, whose “raw materials” are “generated in vivo, close to the point of origin” (Maanen, 1979). The researcher deemed it expedient to utilize this method for the purposes of the adeptness it affords in expediting malleable, arduous investigation in engaging with the phenomena that “unfold[s] in real-world situations” (Durrheim, 1999 :43). In essence, the qualitative method
capacitates the researcher to observe the phenomena under study in close proximity, viewing it from the vantage point of the practitioners. This is necessary because (Robson, 1993:28) indicates that exploratory studies are valuable means of “…finding out and seeking new insights, as well as assessing phenomena in a new light”. A cogent argument in explanation of the insight thus gained in the collection of data was made, valid conclusions are arrived at, which in turn, yielded relevant recommendations.

The qualitative method tilts the scales on its counterpart, the quantitative method when compared in view of the objectives of this study. Though the two are not mutually exclusive and can be employed simultaneously, Maanen (1979) when contrasting researchers utilizing the two methods observed that, a quantitative researcher needs to design a research instrument to be administered in a standardized manner according to predetermined procedures. Thus any phenomenon observed that falls outside the designated parameters of the predetermined procedures and standards, may not be captured and its relevance, that could have led to the piecing together of ameliorating solutions is lost.

The analysis of the complex nature of the phenomena which concerns this study necessitates a rather intimate investigation. Accurate capturing of the intricacies manifest in this unique study, and the detail thereof, can be best attained through the employment of the case study approach. This research, therefore, utilized a case study approach, with the intention to explore a relatively unfamiliar area, such that “new hypothesis” regarding the existing situation and “new insight into
the phenomenon” is gained (De Vos & Fouche, 2001:124). The case study approach is believed to enable the researcher to understand instead of being predictive of the phenomenon under study. It provides the researcher with the capacity, pretty much enabling the researcher, to “interpret rather than to manipulate phenomena under review” (Yin, 1981). The employment of a case study method produced the sought understanding of the phenomena as it unfolds without categorizing it into the researcher’s preconceived ideas or manipulating it as it were.

1.4.1 Research Design

The nature of this research and its intended outcome affords it to assume the phenomenological and ethnomethodological approaches. This is by virtue of the fact that, this study investigates social interactions and the manner in which adherence to existing social structures is maintained. Phenomenology and ethnomethodology are described by De Vos and Fouche (2001:80) as “research approaches aimed to understand and interpret the meaning that subjects give to their everyday lives”. Thus, “by analysing the conversations and interaction that the researchers have with subjects” De Vos and Fouche (2001:80) continue, “the researcher is able to enter into the subjects’ life world and place himself in the shoes of the subjects”. Placing oneself in the shoes of the subjects is precisely what the researcher intended to do and by extension, what the research necessitated.
1.4.2 Sampling method

The population of participants involved in public-private partnerships in disaster management in the City of Cape Town is relatively wide. Since the study seeks an in-depth understanding of the public-private partnerships in disaster management in the City of Cape Town, a purposive sampling method was employed. This sampling method was used in targeting the departmental heads or managers as “access points”. Access points are described as “settings where subjects could be more easily reached” (De Vos et al., 2001:253). Thus through departmental heads, access to the Department was made possible.

As the study unfolded, the researcher carried out a snowball or chain reference sampling, “the process of referral of one member to another” (De Vos et al., 2001:145). Theoretical sampling further assisted the researcher in making a decision whether or not the data collected is sufficient, generating theories from the pattern evident in the data while guiding the research process, reducing the tendency of the snowball figuratively rolling ad infinitum.

1.4.3 Data collection methods

1.4.3.1 Interviews with stakeholders

In-depth face to face and telephonic interviews with key stakeholders were undertaken. Interviews as research instruments, among the variety of others, are believed by researchers to be better suited for the qualitative research method (De Vos & Fouche, 2001; Yin, 2003). These research instruments are not only consistent with the objectives of this study, they are largely significant in the
facilitating an environment that encourages the interviewees to reflect on their experiences and circumstances.

In carrying out this study therefore, the researcher conducted interviews with the head of the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Management Centre to gain, among other things, insight into the operations of the centre and the management of disaster related partnerships. Heads of NGOs or persons responsible for disaster relief partnerships with the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre were interviewed to collect relevant data for the purposes of this study. Relevant Government officials that administer the funding process of the partnership were contacted for their input into the study as well.

1.4.3.2 Documentary analysis

Documentary analysis played an important role in the data collection process. Policy documents and other documents relevant to Disaster Risk management including those from external sources such as Statistics South Africa form part of the data collection process, supplementary to the interviews. Interview findings were documented and discussed.

1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

While there are five disaster relief partners to the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre, despite the researcher’s multiple attempts, only three availed themselves for the interviews. The other two NGOs had all the intentions to make time, while they made promises, they however, were just too busy to
actually honour the promises. A similar predicament was experienced in the researcher’s endeavours to secure an interview with the official responsible for the funding process in one of the government departments identified for this study.

1.6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of this study rests in its practical worth, while theoretical application is intended for concept clarification. Though intended to be an empirical study, the theoretical themes of this study make a contribution on the on-going academic discourse on disaster management, with specific reference to public-private partnerships and policy implementation. It sheds light, on the City of Cape Town’s unique approach to disaster relief, highlighting the multiple stakeholder policy dynamics involved in the process.

As touching the practical value, this study makes structural and policy recommendations that will enhance the manner in which the partnership is currently being implemented. This study, by examining the partnership between the disaster risk management centre and its disaster relief partners will serve as an eye-opener, assisting the City of Cape Town to enhance the partnership while help addressing possible challenges confronting CBOs and NGOs in disaster relief.

When taken note of, issues raised in this study may enable the City of Cape Town’s disaster risk management centre to gain a unique opportunity to enhance its capacity for disaster relief and preparedness, thus maintaining and improving on its role model city status. It is the hope of the researcher that, through this
study, the possible challenges confronting the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management and its disaster relief partners may be abated and that this research may bring a fresh appreciation of the unique partnership enjoyed by the City of Cape Town.

1.7 EXPOSITION OF CHAPTERS

The study consists of five chapters. Chapter one, introduces the study, the nature and scope of the study, state the research problem and the objectives as well as the significance and organization of the study.

Chapter two deliberates on the background and conceptual themes manifest in Public-private partnerships in disaster management. It covers disaster management and public-private partnership concepts. This chapter further touches on the compliance and hierarchical issues within government organizations.

Chapter three will reflect on the constitutional, legislative and policy framework that inform public-private partnerships in disaster management in the City of Cape Town.

Chapter four documents the current practice and status of the public-private partnership in disaster management in the City of Cape Town. A brief background on the City of Cape Town, the disaster relief partners to the City of Cape Town, as well the challenges threatening the partnership. Exploring the
views of the NGOs and those of the government entities involved in disaster relief in the City of Cape Town.

Chapter five draws conclusions and brings forth recommendations while proposing *terra incognita* or unexplored regions for future research.
CHAPTER TWO:
CONCEPTUALISING DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

A review of literature that advances or expounds on the concepts, content, and context of public-private partnerships in disaster risk management is presented in this chapter. The main focus of the chapter is intended to be on themes and debates deemed relevant in clarifying or enhancing the understanding of the subject matter. Disaster, disaster management, vulnerability, hazards and public-private partnerships are among the main themes that will be discussed, setting a foundation for the study.

2.1 DISASTER

Some scholars lament that providing a definition for a disaster is a daunting task. The challenge mainly, or a “problem” as it were, lies in the difficulty experienced in drawing “a clear line” between what should be deemed an accident and that which should be categorized as a disaster (Korver, 1986). Kover seems to be bothered by the establishment of clear lines or pointers that delineate where accidents end and where disasters begin. Alexander (2005:26), contends that a disaster is “a phenomenon so multi-faceted that a general theory of universal explanatory power is unlikely ever to be formulated”. The complexity in formulating a universal explanation of what a disaster is, as (Alexander, 2005:26) continues to note, is mainly the result of the continual “changes in society and economy” which incessantly alter the “tenets and controlling parameters of
disaster.” From the issues outlined by these authors, it appears that, either the question “what is a disaster?” or an attempt to provide an answer to that question is a task of no small magnitude.

Considering the varied definitions given by an assortment of authors (Fischer, 2003; Fritz, 1961; Gilbert, 1998; Quarantelli, 1998) whose themes include deeming, a disaster as being a “passage to a state of uncertainty,” a definition alluded to by (Botha et al., 2011:18) who also adjoin that a disaster is that unlikelihood or inability to ascertaining and describing (real or perceived) dangers. Other definitions deem a disaster as “an intuitively regarded notion”, a state in which the social fabric is disrupted and becomes dysfunctional to a greater or lesser extent” and a social (structure) change under specialized circumstances.”

Alexander (2005:27) having considered the definitions brought forth by these authors, and the argument thereof, concludes that these definitions are very tentative and mostly subscribe to a sociological perspective on disasters negating the scientific perspectives of other non-social disciplines such as engineering. This further affirms the complexity of formulating a universal definition of what a disaster is. For any functional definition of the term “disaster” to have validity, there is a need for that term to be tested against a range of environmental and socio-technical events. Figure 1 below, demonstrates the complexity of defining a disaster and the transversal factors with which it is characterised.

Figure 1: Towards a root definition of a Disaster
Adopted from (Perry & Quarantelli, 2005:223)

It is worth noting therefore that complexity may cannot, by any means be explained in a word or two. At the same time, noting that complexity can be summarised is also important. Having thus said, it becomes practical then to provide a substantial description of a disaster in rather comprehensive manner. Smith in (Perry & Quarantelli, 2005:234) defines a disaster as:

“multiphased, multi-level, complex and damaging systems-related events that unfold over time and space, through an emergent complex interaction of elements involving structures, connections and networks and which are shaped by ideological, economic and social factors to generate impacts on elements of society, represented within a particular “place”. These changes are brought about by the destructive, high-energy nature of the phenomenon in such a way that it changes the performance of the
“normal” order of that societal setting and the networks and associations that operate therein. The damage that occurs is shaped via processes of agency (and in some cases because of the actions of agents), the networks of inter-dependence that they expose or damage, and through the consequences that they generate for the psychosocial well being of actors (as victims of the physical processes of generating harm). These events create considerable problems associated with complexity, communication, stress and sense-making.”

Smith in (Perry & Quarantelli, 2005) here is making an attempt towards providing a comprehensive definition of a disaster. This definition, however, is not for the consumption of the public, as it may not be palatable due to nature of its complexity. It is nonetheless intended for researchers to utilise it as a framework that guides their perceptions of what disasters entail, such that when research is conducted, validity is tested against a range of socio-technical and environmental events in various timelines.

A palatable definition of a disaster provided by Smith in (Perry & Quarantelli, 2005:234) will be that of an “event with too much negative energy, in the wrong place, at the wrong time and which exceeds the host “society’s” abilities to cope.” Further simplified by (Wisner et al., 2004) disasters result from the interaction of vulnerability and hazards. These authors are certain that there cannot be a disaster even if there are hazards but no vulnerability. They also claim that the other scenario is true that there can be no disaster if a vulnerable population has no hazardous event. In essence, while a match box and a match stick may coexist, there can be no fire. It is only when a match stick strikes the designated area of the match box that fire can be ignited. Thus it becomes clear, as the pressure and release (PAR) model shall demonstrate, that the interaction of vulnerability and
hazards result in disaster. It is perhaps expedient to, at this point, discuss the concepts “vulnerability” and “hazards.”

The (UNDP/UNDRO, 1992), described disasters as severe disruptions of the community’s operation, resulting in extensive human, material or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community to deal with the phenomenon by means of its own resources.

2.1.1 Vulnerability

Picking up from the thought introduced by (Wisner et al., 2004) emphasis is made by (Alexander, 2005:2) that “vulnerability is a greater determinant of disaster than hazards themselves.” The implication of this statement that Alexander makes is to the extent that, hazards may be in existence and yet remain harmless, as long as humans and or their infrastructure are not vulnerable. To illustrate this point, (McEntire, 2012) provides a scenario of an earthquake that occurs in an uninhabited area, far from civilisation, such that no human or property is harmed by its occurrence; he argues that no matter the magnitude of that earthquake it remains only a hazard. The Sherman landslide that occurred in in Alaska, as a result of 1964 earthquake, was characterised by a 29 million ton (29 million cubic meters) of rock that slid at 180 km/hour into an uninhabited valley. Apart from the destruction of local vegetation and wildlife, “the event was a mere geological
curiosity,” a mere hazard, as it were, “discovered by accident during a routine aerial photography over flight.” Contrasting this event with a similar Aberfan landslide of 1966 in South Wales which was reportedly “193 times smaller and moved 25-30 times more slowly”, and yet killed 144 people – with 116 of them being small children – the latter was a major disaster resulting in enormous hardships for the survivors (Perry & Quarantelli, 2005:27).

In the scenarios presented, though hazards remain the same, the distinguishing factor is vulnerability. Thus it can be concluded that a disaster becomes, or is deemed a disaster only when it affects human civilisation. (McEntire, 2012) makes a valid point when he argues that, though hazards may be present, in the absence of human vulnerability there can be no disaster. (Cutter, 1996:532) defines vulnerability as “the likelihood that an individual or group will be exposed to and adversely affected by a hazard.” This is also one of the definitions given by (McEntire, 2012) in the plethora of definitions he provides for vulnerability.

2.1.2 Hazard

In (Westgate, 2010:17) view, a hazard is “[a] dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruptions or environmental damage.” This definition of a hazard drawn by Westgate, depict the point illustrated earlier, that a hazards is potentially a disaster trigger only when it affects humanity or civilization on points of vulnerability. Accordingly, this definition is also consistent with the two ingredients provided
by (Wisner et al., 2004), hazards and vulnerability whose interaction results in disaster.

Correspondingly, (McEntire, 2012:206) notes that “hazards cannot be eliminated or always controlled.” Illustrating his point he insists that there is no way that tornadoes, volcanic eruptions and or other natural hazards can be prevented, he applies the same reasoning to anthropogenic hazards such as terrorism, oil spills and industrial explosions. Drawing from historical occurrences and policy making, (McEntire, 2012) concludes that when much emphasis is placed on hazards, there will be “dramatic” policy swings. The USA being a good example, where in the 1970s civil defence and technological hazards were the focal point. There was a shift in the 1990s to natural hazards. Currently, due to terrorism, the shift in disaster policy emphasises homeland security. Citing studies by Birkman, (McEntire, 2012)suggests disaster management should place more emphasis on vulnerability and not just hazards themselves. This is for the reason already stated that, hazards on their own are incapable of inducing disasters while vulnerability may only need a tiny hazard (such as a match stick flame) to be transformed into a disaster. Perhaps, for another reason as well, that vulnerability can be improved while there cannot be much done, if anything at all to hazards.

2.2 DISASTER MANAGEMENT

From the previous section it became evident that a disaster is a complex phenomenon, that, while it is possible to describe its effects, defining the thing itself is a daunting task. From this background, it then becomes relatively clear
that disaster management is not an easy task to perform either, when viewed in the light of the complexity of disasters. Guster et al. (2012) also observed that the main challenge in managing a disaster situation is that, it is often difficult to comprehend the devastation of an unknown future event that has the potential of wreaking havoc, let alone proactively create a comprehensive disaster recovery plan to meet or survive it.

Disaster management defined by Jeegle in (Van Niekerk, 2006:98) is that process which involves “plans structures and arrangements established to engage the normal endeavours of government, voluntary and private agencies in a comprehensive and coordinated way to respond to the whole spectrum of emergency needs.” Thus it can be deduced from this definition that disaster management entails the directing of the ordinary government and private sector endeavours towards reducing the probability of disasters. This entails shifting the normal perception of day-to-day activities towards seeing them as having potential to induce disasters. Viewing refuse removal, street cleaning, blocked drainage etc. as potential hazards, not only encourages efficiency but also promotes disaster awareness. Another definition of disaster management refers to a continuous, integrated, multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary risk reduction as well as post disaster reduction recovery aimed at preventing or reducing the risk of disasters; mitigating the severity or undesirable consequences of disaster; emergency preparedness; rapid and effective response to disasters; and post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation(UNDP/UNDRO, 1992).
Citing Coburn et al. (1991:67), who assert that disaster management includes “all aspects of planning for and responding to disasters, including both pre- and post-disaster activities. It refers to the management of both the risks and the consequences of disasters” (Van Niekerk, 2006) alluding to the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 – which defines disaster management as “a continuous and integrated multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary process of planning and implementation of measures aimed at preventing or reducing the risk of disasters, mitigating the severity or consequences of disasters, emergency preparedness, a rapid and effective response to disasters, post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation” (Republic of South-Africa, 2003) – seems to suggest that disaster management is a process that enables facilitation and coordination of government and private entities to effectively respond to disaster risks and consequences.

The implications of this definition were not acknowledged in South Africa until the “mid 1990s”. Severely flooded informal settlements in the Cape Flats area in Cape Town greatly influenced the formulation of disaster legislation in South Africa (Van Niekerk, 2006). Subsequently, several pieces of legislation were adopted by the South African government, prefacing the adoption the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002, signed by former President Thabo Mbeki to be effectively implemented as from “15 January 2003” (Van Niekerk, 2006:101). The tenets of the Disaster Management Act, deemed relevant for this study are elaborated on in the next chapter. Disaster management therefore, as defined in
this section, becomes the main responsibility of the Disaster Risk management centre, whose function will also be discussed in chapter three and four of this study.

2.3 DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

If weight was assigned to concepts, in the disaster management field, it is probable that disaster risk reduction would be enlisted among the heavy weights. Defined by (UNISDR, 2009:10; Westgate, 2010:1)“disaster risk reduction is the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events”. The essence of this definition, as provided by these authors is such that, disaster risk reduction is the “practice of reducing disaster risks”. This definition is insufficient, in fact, it does not qualify to be a definition due to its utilisation – as a definition – of the very concept it seeks to define. Thus the UNISDR and Westgate are merely rephrasing the concept as opposed to defining it.

Remarking about risk, (Westgate, 2010) notes that it is a phenomenon that presents itself constantly, resulting in disaster risk being the anticipation of risk. McEntire (2012:215) simplifies the disaster risk reduction concept by first asserting that risk is “commonly equated to or related with vulnerability,” alluding to a conclusion arrived at by most disaster management scholars, (McEntire, 2012) affirms risk to be the “probability of disasters.” Implying that, risk as a
concept, refers to the likelihood of a disaster, and by extension, disaster risk reduction will be the lessening of that likelihood. Ingleton cited by (Wisner et al., 2004:37) emphasizes that there are two prerequisites for risk reduction. The first is to clearly understand each society, its culture, behaviour, how that society is organised, most importantly, how each society behaves and “interacts with the physical and natural environment.” The second prerequisite and one that is most relevant to this study, “the mobilisation of non-governmental organizations and participation of local communities.” (Wisner et al., 2004) deem these prerequisites indispensable in diffusing a “top-down technocratic” approach to disasters. Thus the sum of the idea churned by these authors is such that effective disaster risk reduction is that which lessens the likelihood or probability to disaster by diffusing a top-down approach through societal understanding and mobilisation.

2.3.1 The Hyogo Framework of Action

Olowu (2010) is of the view that the integration of the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) is a *sine qua non*, an essential condition or a prerequisite for effective disaster management in Africa. In his critique of Vherchick’s book Wisner (2012:126) reports that the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA), “is the UN’s master plan for reducing disaster losses by 2015.” It is a ten year plan that was, after negotiations, signed by 168 countries in January 2005 (Olowu, 2010; Wisner, 2012). (Wisner, 2012:126) clarifies that the HFA’s five priority areas and the specific suggestions it provides are entirely voluntary, since the HFA not a legal framework. This was a deliberate choice made by the diplomats
who formulated the HFA, who were clear in their intentions of avoiding “anything legally binding.” In essence, as (Westgate, 2010) clarifies, though following the objectives of the HFA is a sensible thing for most countries to do, no country is under any legal obligation to do so. Nevertheless, with a great deal of universal endorsement besides the UN’s contribution as and support in the promotion of the HFA agenda, it only “makes good sense” for most countries to work towards achieving the aims of the HFA as this is beneficial in setting national agendas and promotes international interchange of good practice (ISDR, 2007).

The HFA advocates three strategic goals (1) The integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development policies and planning. (2) The development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities to build resilience to hazards. (3) The systematic incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the implementation of emergency preparedness, response and recovery programmes. It also has five priorities for action which include disaster risk reduction being a national and local priority, use of knowledge and innovation and strengthening disaster preparedness (Westgate, 2010:3).

The main focus of the HFA is to “galvanize international and natural efforts to reduce vulnerability to natural hazards.” In the HFA is demonstrated a global commitment for disaster risk reduction through the provisions of a framework that encourages multi – stakeholder engagements. The HFA provides a platform for collaborated efforts between the private sector – which is the main driver of economic growth, and the government, whose main responsibility among other
things is the safety of the people – in disaster risk reduction. Since the two institutions need each other for survival (i.e. a sound economy for better development and safety for both people and property for the thriving of business.) public-private partnerships are a reasonable solution that serves mutual interests in making both the communities and business to be disaster resilient. The HFA supports the importance of the PPP as one of the most effective strategies in the implementation of risk mitigation and the risk financing of high risk countries (ISDR, 2007). South Africa adopted the Disaster management Act in harmony with the vision demonstrated in the HFA. The Disaster Management Act in its provisions serves as a guide for all three spheres of government, thus themes on preparedness regarding perceived vulnerabilities receive prominence in the act and should by extension be reflected in the country as a whole (Olowu, 2010).

2.4 DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT

The UNISDR (2009:10) deems disaster risk management to be a “systematic process of using administrative directives, organisations, and operational skills to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster.” This definition is similar to that provided by Westgate (2010) only with slight variations. It implies that disaster risk management is a well organised methodological process carried out in a manner that provides guidance towards the reduction of the impacts or possibilities of disaster.

It has been realised that the South African definition of disaster management, is
consistent with the universal definition of disaster (risk) management. In other words, the South African definition of disaster management, as provided by the Disaster Management Act, is in actual fact the definition of disaster risk management (Van Niekerk, 2006). This is evident, as when considering the definition already cited in the disaster management section above. It is perhaps due to this understanding of disaster risk management that, in the South African context, where the Disaster management Act uses the term “Disaster Management” the term “Disaster risk Management” is employed in practice. To illustrate this point; the Disaster Management Act provides for the establishment of “disaster management centres” (Section 43 of the Disaster Management Act). In practice, taking the City of Cape Town as a case in point, the Centre is called the “Disaster Risk Management Centre.”

It is clear however that disaster management and disaster risk management are “not synonyms” (Van Niekerk, 2006). From Van Niekerk (2006) argument it is also clear that Disaster Risk Management is what the Disaster Management Act intends to define when it refers to Disaster Management. What remains unclear however, is the reason behind naming the Act and all its ‘disaster (risk) management’ provisions as ‘disaster management’. While contending the use of “disaster management” where “disaster risk management” is implied; as a law abiding citizen, in this study the researcher, will make use of the term “disaster management” solely for the purposes of consistency with the Disaster Management Act.
2.4.1 Pressure and Release Model

The disaster pressure-and-release (PAR) model departs from the premise of the risk-hazard framework, defining risk as the product of hazard and vulnerability. It then presents an explanatory model of vulnerability that involves global root causes, regional pressures, and local vulnerable conditions, without explicitly defining the term ‘vulnerability’ (Füssel, 2007). The Pressure and release model “Is a tool that allows a carefully crafted explanation of disasters at different levels. It is first used to show the pressure from both hazard and unsafe conditions that leads to disaster, and then how changes in vulnerability can release people from being at risk” (Wisner et al., 2004:41,45).

Figure 2: Pressure and Release Model

Adopted from (Wisner et al., 2004)
Vulnerability, as far as the pressure and release model is concerned, emanates from what (Wisner et al., 2004) term as root causes. “Root causes” is a conclusive term coined to sum up what Van Reit 2008 refers to as “structural elements” in society which, according to (Wisner et al., 2004) are inclusive of limited access to power, structures and resources, as well as variance in ideologies (political and economic systems). Dynamic pressures, characterized by lack of skills, local markets, rapid population change, rapid urbanization and environmental degradation, as (Wisner et al., 2004) model demonstrates, aggravates the pressure.

These and other factors further build the pressure up, subjecting communities to the third phase in (Wisner et al., 2004) model the “unsafe conditions.” Due to dynamic pressures, many communities, especially the poor, find their lives characterized by unsafe conditions. They dwell in dangerous locations or areas not fit for human habitation, with low income levels and other factors that render them unprepared for disasters. When all these vulnerabilities interact with hazards, such as floods, earth quakes, fires, etc. disasters are the result. As noted earlier, the mobilization of non-governmental organizations and the participation of local communities, noted earlier by (Wisner et al., 2004) together with government will play a major role in the release of pressure.

2.5 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP)

The definition of public-private partnerships (PPPs) provided by (Bovaird, 2004) indicates that they are functional “arrangements based on a mutual commitment
(over and above that implied in any contract) between a public sector organization with any organisation outside of the public sector.” (Bovaird, 2004) notes that public-private partnerships as a concept has a broad scope of application that encompasses business and civil society organisations such as community based organisation (CBOs), voluntary organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The concept further includes other collaborative partnerships and alliances that are in most cases without any legal “underpinnings,” and those partnerships that, although they are based on contracts, demonstrate commitment that goes beyond the contractual agreements.

2.5.1 Non-profit Organizations (NPOs)

Some scholars have noted the increase of the relevance of non-profit organisations (NPOs) in domestic and international policy implementation (Lane & Wallis, 2009). Citing studies done by Pressman, Wildavsky and Sabatier, (Lane & Wallis, 2009) argue that non-profit organisations would be ideal candidates for service delivery public contracts due to their capability of reinforcing the bottom-up approach of policy implementation – appoint also noted by (Wisner et al., 2004) – that fosters learning, adaptation, innovation and motivation as opposed to the top-down approach. These authors refer non-profit organisations as “third sector organisations,” highlighting that the major challenge with non-profit organisations is remuneration for their support and effort. Stakeholders in non-profit organisations constantly confront problems in securing donors, volunteer commitment, resources, time and effort for the running of operations. The main problem or challenge confronting non-profit organisations is finding or securing
funds and effort from volunteers.

The argument brought forth by (Lane & Wallis, 2009) is that non-profit organizations’ success is largely dependent on the leadership that directs them. Leadership that is of an inspirational style “is crucial for handling the needs for constant commitments to the Non-profit Organization.” Thus in their argument, (Lane & Wallis, 2009) conclude that commitments in non-profit organizations have an emotional basis. This implies that to a large extent, the hopes on which commitments in non-profit organisations are based “can be subject to erosion through the accumulation of disappointment.”

It is therefore critical that there be a “sufficient alignment of the beliefs and values” between the NPO and its stakeholders. Where this alignment is established, the interactions between the NPO and its stakeholders will surpass starting point of ‘boundedness’ so that a mutual focus and ‘emotional mood’ can be freely recognized, and a short cycle of increased mutual stimulation experienced satisfaction is reached. Referring to the work done by Collins (1993), (Lane & Wallis, 2009) affirm that such the interactions between the non-profit organisation and its stakeholders during the satisfactory stages will yield an “‘energetic afterglow’ that ‘gradually decreases over time’ so that individuals have an incentive to reinvest their emotional energy in subsequent interactions”. This implies that the partnerships that involve NPOs are in constant need of nurturing. Since the establishment of non-profit organisations is not driven by acquiring financial gains, there is a clear need for stakeholders to invest not only financially
but in a manner that indicates alignment of stakeholders with the values espoused by the NPO.
CHAPTER THREE:

LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

This chapter presents a survey of the legislative framework that underpins the practice of disaster management, the provisions for public-private partnerships and funding within the broader municipal context. It commences with the supreme law of the Republic, the Constitution. Subsequently, the Disaster management Act is discussed, the Municipal Finance Management Act, as well as the Municipal Systems Act.

3.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION

Citing the country’s 1993 transitional Constitution preamble (Goldstone, 1997), referred to South Africa’s past as that of “a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice”. The current preamble, though not explicit in describing the current state of affairs in South Africa, acknowledges the injustices of the past with a vista of “improv[ing] the quality of life of all citizens” (Republic of South-Africa, 1996).

In the words of Judge Learned Hand, echoed by (Goldstone, 1997), it is noted that;

“Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.”

In pursuit of the liberty here mentioned, the Bill of rights, “a cornerstone of democracy” Section 7(1) was adopted in the South African Constitution to redress
the ills of the past. A brief mention of this South African history is relevant and worthy of mention in disaster management, as it outlines a strong relationship between poverty and vulnerability to hazards, an apartheid relic.

Though disasters threaten both the rich and the poor, Botha et al. (2011) citing VanNiekerk, Reid & Mokonyama, (2002:63-64) maintain that the impact of poverty is a critical factor in the advancement of vulnerability to hazards. Emphasizing this point these authors argue that the correlation between poverty and the progression of vulnerability to hazards is extremely relevant in the South African context, given “the huge legacy left by the apartheid government of desperately impoverished and disadvantaged communities who are, as a result extremely vulnerable to disasters.”

The provisions of the Bill of rights, therefore, are of substantial significance as they are not “merely a negative enforcement mechanism shielding subjects against the abuse of government power, but that it also imposes a positive duty on the state to protect, promote and fulfill the entrenched rights” Du Plessis and Gouws, 1996 cited in (Devenish, 1999:9). The Bill of Rights presented upon the South African a colossal responsibility that rested upon This envisioned celestial bliss, at times seems to be “a pie in the sky”, given the harsh reality that even for almost two decades since the inception of democracy and national liberation, astonishing inequalities draped with racial undertones are still evident (Ruiters, 2007). This briefly depicted scenario renders the government fully occupied as it were. Yet, beyond the injustices and previous social ills that yielded devastating
inequalities putting government on its paces, lurking disasters are as unrelenting tyrants, devastating phenomena that respects no man. The constitution stipulates, in Section 41 that the role of all government spheres is to preserve peace, unity and to secure the well-being of South African citizens. Thus the threat posed by disasters to the well-being of South African citizens falls within the ambit of the provisions of this section, mandating the respective spheres of government to respond accordingly.

The most prominent feature of the South African constitution as adopted in 1996 was the autonomy of government. As such a deliberate shift form the centralised approach of the previous dispensation was evident. The emphasis on the separation of powers and the employment of the word “sphere(s)” to indicate the distinctiveness, interdependency at the same time, the interrelatedness of the three government levels. The Constitution is commonly understood to refer to “spheres” of government rather than “tiers” of government. Some scholars insist that there is in indeed, a difference between the “tiers” or “level” of government and “spheres” of government (Meyer, 1998). “The South African Constitution refers to ‘sphere’ instead of ‘level’, probably to emphasise the new relationship of cooperation among the levels of government. This does not alter the meaning of ‘government level’ because even the term ‘level’ does not necessarily refer to a hierarchical relationship” Rautenbach and Malherbe cited in (Meyer, 1998). That the “government level” does refer to a hierarchical relationship is endorsed by experience of the former dispensation, its systems of control and intergovernmental relationships. Instead of merely emphasising the “new
relationship of cooperation”, the word “sphere” introduces a new constitutional era of intergovernmental relationships and systems of control based not only on cooperative government between the spheres of government, but also on its constitutional status as government in the governmental team of the state: national provincial and local (Meyer, 1998). This autonomous and cooperative relationship among the spheres, is a theme that echoes through all the corridors of government and is embraced in disaster management as well.

Chapter three of the Constitution having distinguished the spheres of government, consigns the same with an awesome responsibility; the custody of all South African citizens. Within the broad parameters of this responsibility, the government of the Republic through the utilisation of its entrusted resources, is to ensure the well-being of all the citizens (Republic of South-Africa, 1996) Section 41(1)(b). This by implication, entails the “personal and environmental” health and safety of citizens (Tempelhoff et al., 2009). Natural resources that sustain life and promote healthy living such as water supply, sanitation, air pollution and a whole lot of others are to be preserved, maintained and in a sustainable manner, rendered accessible to the people of the Republic under the auspices of Local government as per provision of Schedule 4 part B and Section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution. Given that water and numerous other natural resources, and required facilities that minister to natural and basic needs of humanity are entrusted to local authorities, these then not only become primary functions of local authorities, but Government responsibility for effective disaster
management in South Africa as well (Tempelhoff et al., 2009; Van Niekerk, 2005).

Though a major catastrophic event that can potentially devastate the entire nation, the words “disaster management” do not appear anywhere, but once in Part A, Schedule 4 of the South African Constitution. Part A Schedule 4 enlists disaster management among the “functional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence”. This (Steytler, 2005) believes invokes one of the constitutional tenets regarding cooperative government which maintains that all three spheres of government should work hand in hand, in mutual trust and good faith by harmonizing their actions, “and legislation” with one another Section 41(1)(h)(iv). In essence, success in the functions listed in, Part A Schedule 4 of the constitution, among which is disaster management, will be attained through cooperation between the National and Provincial spheres and the harmonizing of legislation between both spheres. In affirmation, (Van Niekerk, 2005) highlights that the Part A Schedule 4 of the Constitution endows a legal imperative on both spheres of government to guarantee compliance with the Constitution and the Disaster Management Act in disaster management implementation.

Though all three spheres are to contribute in disaster management, it is argued that it is the local government that plays a predominant role (UNISDR, 2003:188-195) (Tempelhoff et al., 2009). This is consistent with the operational proximity of the local government to the communities, as opposed to other spheres of government. It then follows that when a matter would be most effectively
administered locally; and the municipality has the capacity to administer it, the national and provincial government must assign, by agreement and subject to conditions agreed upon, to that municipality any of the matters “listed in schedule 4 part A” which may necessarily relate to local government S156(4) (Meyer, 1998).

Meyer (1998) notices that Section 156(1)(b) of the Constitution also stipulates that municipalities have executive authority and the right to administer any matter assigned to them by national or provincial legislation as well as matters listed in schedules 4B and 5B.

While public-private partnerships in disaster management are not spelt out or clearly discernible in the Constitution, they are neither negated nor censured by the provisions of the sections here discussed. Implicit connotation for their involvement is however suggested, given the provisions for municipal capacity. Dedicated to the operational detail relevant to disaster management is the Disaster Management Act.

3.2 THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT (NO. 57 OF 2002)

The Disaster Management Act (DMA) is the supreme guide and policy in disaster management, all other disaster management policies cluster around it. It then follows that Section 3 of the Act provides that “[w]here provincial legislation regulating disaster management in a province is inconsistent” with the Disaster Management Act, the Disaster Management Act “prevails over the provincial legislation subject to Section 146 of the Constitution” (Republic of South-Africa, 2003). Chapter 3 of the Disaster Management Act Sections 29 and 43 provide for
the establishment of disaster management as a function of each sphere of government, consistent with the autonomy of government espoused by the Constitution, through the establishment of disaster management structures across the spheres. In the meanwhile, Section 7(2)(d) emphasises co-operative governance, entrusting the National government the responsibility of making certain that co-operation among the spheres is maintained. The national and provincial government operational structures and roles in disaster management are outlined in chapters three and four of the Disaster Management Act. For both the National and Provincial government respectively, the stipulations of the Act necessitate that, among other responsibilities, a Disaster Risk Management Policy Framework, a Disaster Risk Management Centre, as well as an Advisory Forum, be established and implemented.

The Act renders it imperative, Van Niekerk and Visser (2010) also confirm that, similar structures as those of the National and Provincial governments, should also be applicable to each district and metropolitan municipality, so that in each, a “Municipal Disaster Risk Management Policy Framework, a Municipal Disaster Risk Management Advisory Forum, a Municipal Interdepartmental Disaster Risk Management Committee, and also a Municipal Disaster Risk Management Centre” are established. Though these municipal structures may support municipal autonomy in disaster management, the Disaster Management Act remains the primary policy (Section 3), requiring cooperative governance among the spheres (in Sections 4(3)(a), 7(d), 7(l), 26(3) and 39(3)). The Act, through the adoption and implementation of a municipal disaster management framework envisages “an
integrated and uniform approach” among all municipal entities, the private sector and non-governmental organisations (Republic of South-Africa, 2003). The establishment and implementation of the municipal disaster management framework is “prescribed” as it were, by the Act. This is evident in the use of the word “must” in Section 42(1), (Van Niekerk, 2005:145) also notes this detail.

3.2.1 The Municipal Disaster Management Framework (MDMF)

The Disaster Management Act specifies in Section 42 that municipalities must both “establish and implement” a Municipal Disaster Management Framework (MDMF). The purpose for the establishment of the MDMF is to ensure that municipalities have a consistent and integrated approach to disaster management. Uniformity in the chosen approach is also among the motivating reasons that support the establishment of the MDMF.

According to the claims made by Van Niekerk (2005), the MDMF is not only a legislative responsibility, it is also designed to be for operational purposes while it “remains a strategic policy document.” It is Van Niekerk’s view that the overall purpose of the MDMF includes identifying clear objectives and providing incentive towards the development of specific plans that are tailor made for addressing municipal challenges. The uniformity envisaged by Section 42 of the DMA is directed towards the state intervention at municipal level with various role players that include the municipality and statutory functionaries of the municipality; all municipal entities operating in its area; all NGO’s institutions
involved in DRM in its area and the private sector. Thus the Act makes provisions for and recognizes public-private partnerships in disaster management.

Consistent with the constitutional provisions of cooperative governance, it is imperative that a MDMF be in harmony with requirements of the DMA, the NDMF as well as the PDMF. The MDMF and all other disaster management activities must be coordinated from the Municipal disaster Management Centre.

3.2.2 The Municipal Disaster Management Centre (MDMC)

The Municipal Disaster Management Centre is expected or rather compelled (in Section 44) to specialise in disaster related and disaster management issues. As a repository of specialty in disaster management, it is therefore sensible that each municipality should be equally equipped. It follows then that Section 43 of the Act specifies that “each metropolitan and each district municipality the establishment of a municipal disaster management centre (MDMC), whose head, according to Section 45(1) of the Act, is appointed by the municipal council. Chief among the purposes for the establishment of a municipal disaster management centre is to make certain that the focus in planning and application of disaster risk management is on risk and vulnerability reduction in communities most at risk. Municipal disaster risk management centres are responsible for the compiling of disaster risk management plans. These plans must be integrated into the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) of each municipality.
The IDP of any municipality is the most important governing document (Van Niekerk & Visser, 2010). All planning and budgeting for development and service delivery must be contained in the IDPs. The inclusion of the disaster risk management plan into the IDP follows the rationale that development interventions remain the best disaster risk reduction measure available to any developing state. Thus an integration of the disaster risk profile of a municipality on one side, with its medium- to long-term development objectives, on the other, would yield positive results.

Some of the roles assigned to the MDMC include ensuring that, within the municipality there are established procedures that entrance the capacity for the management of disasters. These disaster management procedures or institutional arrangements should be consistent with those of the provincial and national centres (Republic of South Africa, 2003). It is essential in Van Niekerk and Visser (2010) that a risk profile which will be integrated into the IDP and the municipal disaster risk management plan be developed by each municipality consistent with Section 44 of the DMA. Importance of awareness creation by MDMC and the fostering of a culture of risk avoidance. This means, training, education, capacity building and research should enjoy priority.

3.2.3 The Disaster Management Advisory Forum (DMAF)

Across the three spheres of government, a disaster management forum should be established (Republic of South Africa, 2003). A disaster management forum is a key institutional requirement that enhances strategy (Roberts, 2010). Van Niekerk
and Visser (2010) assert that an advisory forum is a consultative medium comprised of various internal and external role-players, in the sphere of government in question, whose task is to opine in disaster related issues in the respective spheres of government.

Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act permits each municipality to establish its own municipal disaster management advisory forum (MDMAF) for a similar purpose with that of the other spheres. A MDMAF also embodies the principles of cooperative governance to which the Constitution and the Disaster Management Act refer. The municipal and provincial government (section 51 and 37), according to the DMA, “may” establish advisory forums while the national govern “must” (section 5). The act through the employment of the word “may” seems to imply that the establishment of the MDMAF is optional for the provincial and municipal governments.

Concurring with this observation, Van Niekerk and Visser (2010) note also took note of that there no “legal obligation” placed by the DMA on local government for the establishment of advisory forums. Yet while the negative impacts of the absence of the advisory forums are unimaginable these authors (Van Niekerk & Visser, 2010) reckon that the MDMAF is strongly suggested in disaster management legislation. They also add that in South Africa, the MDMAF is supplemented by established municipal interdepartmental committee on disaster risk management (MIDMC) whose purpose is to afford a forum for technocrats to
deliberate and provide resolution disaster challenges. The MIDMC is mainly comprised of senior individuals from all municipal departments.

3.3 THE MUNICIPAL FINANCE MANAGEMENT ACT NO 56 OF 2003.

The MFMA is a piece of legislation that is relevant to all municipalities and municipal entities in laying out guidelines for the management of municipal finances (Treasury, 2009). Though not specifically designed to address the national and provincial governments’ finances, it is nonetheless relevant to national and provincial departments as well as other public bodies in such cases as they should deal with municipal financial matters.

While it is argued that the MFA plays a contributory role in the development of a democratic accountable and developmental local government (Davids, 2009), Fourie and Opperman (2007) maintain that it specifically focuses on the municipal annual budget and its Integrated Development Plan (IDP) in the context of the municipal annual budget. Section 21 makes key provisions for the municipal budget preparation process. The mayor as the municipal head is necessitated by the act to coordinate the processes of the annual budget preparation and the reviewing of the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and other policies associated with the municipal budget. Subsequently the mayor, having gone through the process of developing and implementing the budgetary process, with the aid of the accounting officer (Section 68), is to provide internal and
external consultation (Pillay, 2004). This internal and external consultation provides a grand opportunity for community members to be informed of the plans, processes, appositeness and viability of the intended plans. Thus a better platform is presented for municipalities to prioritize disaster management, while receiving feedback, to demonstrate to the communities the necessity and importance of preparedness.

The MFA introduces fundamental financial and fiscal reforms at local government level. These include establishment of audit committees, new budget standards and formats, improvement to supply chain management, establishment of municipal entities and other financial measures. It assigns definite roles and responsibilities to the role players involved in the management of the municipal finance (Davids, 2009; Pillay, 2004). The MFMA encourages transparency, good governance and financial sustainability. It is based on the principles of promoting sound financial governance by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of council and officials; ensuring a strategic approach to budgeting; modernising financial management; promoting sustainable local government. The MFMA provides clear guidelines on how to link the IDP and the budgets that give effect to the development plans. It encourages the participation of the communities in various aspects of financial management such as supply-chain management. Section 117 of the MFMA addresses this concern and prohibits any political influence in the supply-chain management process.
Section 120 of the MFMA allows municipalities to form public-private partnerships, albeit certain conditions are stipulated. Among the conditions of partnership listed in Section 120, it is noted that the public-private partnership must “provide value for money to the municipality” and should “be affordable for the municipality”. Prior to the sealing of a public-private partnership agreement, the municipality considering such a partnership ought to conduct a “feasibility study.” This feasibility study serves to elucidate on the tactical and functional benefits of the envisaged public-private partnership to establish its objectives, providing detail of the nature of the “private party’s role in the public-private partnership; the extent to which this role, both legally and by nature, can be performed by a private party” (Republic of South-Africa, 2003). Through this feasibility study, as Section 120 prescribes, the municipality’s capacity to “effectively monitor, manage and enforce the agreements” is measured.

When a public-private partnership agreement is in place, the MFMA expects from that partnership compliance with all existing regulations that govern public-private partnerships. In the case of public-private partnership that necessitates “provision of a municipal service”, compliance with the Municipal Systems Act must be ensured. The Municipal Systems Act also prescribes the sequence for the decision making, adoption of the findings of the feasibility study, the distribution of the plan for public comment as well all the adoption of the plan.
3.4 THE MUNICIPAL SYSTEMS ACT

Van Niekerk and Visser (2010) argue that, while schedule 4 of the South African Constitution refers to disaster risk management as a contemporaneous national and provincial competence, the Disaster Management Act in (section 23 subsection 7) noticeably endows certain disaster risk management activities upon local government as its responsibility “until a disaster is classified as either a national or a provincial disaster, it must be regarded as a local disaster”. This therefore implies the tremendous responsibility placed upon local municipalities and the crucial need to cater and always be prepared for disasters.

The Municipal Systems Act (MSA) was set out to be a law that regulates and ensures the integrated development planning within municipalities (Fourie & Opperman, 2007). The Act, as stipulated in Section 23 of the MSA, was directed towards being instrumental in shaping the advancing realisation of the various basic rights within municipalities, in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution for cooperative governance. To ensure the alignment of local plans with national requirements, the MSA stipulates that municipal development planning should be channelled through the provisions of the Development Facilitation Act of 1995. Therefore, complementing other municipalities and organs of state through development planning and strategies as well as participation in national and provincial programmes directed towards the same, is the emphasis of Section 24 and that of Chapter 5 of the MSA in its entirety.
The adoption of a municipal IDP that is attuned to the provincial and the national plans, and the adjustment of resources and capacity to accomplish the intentions of the plan is the focus of Section 25. It also becomes evident that capacity and resources to be utilized by the municipality in implementing its IDP ought to sufficient to cater for the necessities of disaster management. This is for a simple reason that, Section 26 of the MSA identifies the core components of the IDP. Disaster management, though not a prominent feature, is among the components of the IDP enlisted in Section 26. Provision is also made in this section for a three year financial plan, consistent with the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and key performance indicators which, in the case of disaster management, may be those outlined in the Disaster management Act. In essence, the MSA provides for the inclusion of the Disaster Management KPAs as part of the IDP implementation.

Van Niekerk and Visser (2010) are of the idea that, this provision made in Section 26 of the MSA is supported by section 10A of the Municipal Systems Amendment Act 44 of 2003 which imposes new constitutional obligations on local government. In terms of this provision the Cabinet member, MEC or other organ of the state initiating an assignment of a function or power to a municipality in terms of section 9 and 10, must take appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient funding is available and capacity building initiatives are undertaken as may be needed for the performance of the assigned function. Transformation in municipalities can only take place when funding is made available to finance the proposed plans. Fourie and Opperman (2007:77) view transformation not as that which relates to
“employment equity strategies,” but transformation in their view, is that which relates “more pertinently to the administrative structuring or restructuring of the municipality in order to ensure more effective service delivery.”

The competing needs for financial means is not a strange phenomenon to individuals, households and organisations, so in government. The need for a budget formulation speaks to the prioritisation of the competing needs, a process that can be challenging at times. Accordingly, it is noted that sometimes lamentations in municipalities are heard regarding the strain associated with adapting the IDP with the municipality’s annual budget (Fourie & Opperman, 2007). The MSA provides a remedy in the Section 26(h), stipulating that a financial plan be prepared according to which annual budgets will be adapted. When put together in view of the realities that likely to confront the municipalities, particularly the likelihood of disasters that are conceivable, a realistic financial plan envisaged by the MSA can render an IDP an effective tool in disaster management.

As touching public-private partnerships, the MSA in Section 76(b) provides for the procurement of services through an external service provider. Continuing on the procedure of the procurement of services through a service provider, Section 81(1) insists that a service delivery agreement must be provided when municipal services are rendered through the employment of an external service provider. The act places the responsibility of service regulations and performance monitoring upon the municipality. Consistent with these provisions, the disaster
management centre procures disaster relief services from external service providers and thus enters into partnership with these providers in service delivery and complies with the oversight provisions of this act as it shall be demonstrated in the next chapter.

3.5 THE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE ACT (NO 13 OF 2004)

The Social Assistance Act (SAA) is aimed towards providing “for the rendering of social assistance to persons” as well as “to provide for the mechanism for the rendering of such assistance” (Republic of South-Africa, 2004). Though this act is not specifically intended for public-private partnerships or disaster management, it nonetheless addresses social needs that are pertinent to the promotion of a better standard of living. In unison with the right to social security sought and provided for by the Constitution of the Republic, the Social Assistance Act of 2004 “obliges the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources” to achieve the rights outlined in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights (Republic of South-Africa, 2004).

The SAA is intended to assist the government in carrying out its responsibility of administering relief. Section 13 of the SAA states that “the Minister may provide social relief of distress to a person who qualifies for such relief as may be prescribed.” Distress describes a situation or a condition that most or all disaster victims experience after a disaster incidence. Due to distress caused by disasters, especially to poor societies, the relief rendered by the NGOs working together with the disaster management centre qualifies to be categorised under the social relief
sought by Section 13 of this Act. On the other hand, the Disaster Management Act (Section 56) states that “the Minister may in the national disaster management framework prescribe a percentage of the budget, or any aspect of a budget of a provincial organ of state or a municipal organ of state, as the case may be, as a threshold for accessing additional funding from the national government for response efforts.” (Konings, 2012:15) is of a view that, it is this amount designated as a threshold that “should be spent on disaster response and relief…” It follows then that, while there is no legislation in South Africa at the moment that specifically provides for the funding of public-private partnerships in disaster management for social relief, Section 13 and other relief clauses in the SAA coupled with the provisions Section 56 of the Disaster Management Act provide a temporal leeway for the funding of public-private partnerships in disaster management.
CHAPTER FOUR:

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN AND IT’S DISASTER RELIEF PARTNERS

This chapter seeks to describe the challenges confronting the public-private partnerships in disaster management within the City of Cape Town. It starts by providing a brief background of the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre and that of the disaster relief partners. It then proceeds to outline the operational procedure and summary of the partnership arrangement between the disaster risk management centre and its disaster relief partners.

4.1 THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN

The City of Cape Town, situated at the tip of Africa in the Western Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa, is spread over an area that covers 2,445 square kilometers. The city is home to a population in excess of three million (3,740,026) people to be precise, and 1,068,573 households (Statistics South Africa, 2011). The City spawns 78% of the Western Cape Province’s GDP, contributing 11% to the total South African economy (City of Cape Town, 2009). The City of Cape Town “is prosperous by African standards (with a gross geographic product of approximately R94 billion in 2001), endowed with quality infrastructures, but with very young institutions” (Jaglin, 2004).

Notwithstanding its prosperity, the City of Cape Town is confronted with various developmental challenges that include increase in poverty, housing backlogs, and unemployment (City of Cape Town, 2009). It is also characterized by significant inequalities, with a Gini coefficient of 0.67 (UN-HABITAT, 2010:28). In the
midst of the economic and social imbalances, prosperity and challenges the City of Cape Town makes huge strides towards disaster preparedness, relief and recovery through its Disaster Risk Management Centre (DRMC).

4.2 DISASTERS AFFECTING THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN (CoCT)

The City of Cape Town “comprises 300 km of coastline” (City of Cape Town, 2009). Disaster experts note that “coastal areas are likely to experience storm surges, sea-level rises, increased flooding and (semi-) permanent inundation of low-lying areas” (UN-HABITAT, 2010:23). This implies that valuable economic assets such as ports, railway and road infrastructure, industrial zones, recreation zones including residential areas, are under threat from the hazards mentioned earlier. To add on the structural damage that can be sustained by the infrastructure, “coastal aquifers - on which these urban areas often depend for significant proportions of their fresh water supplies - stand to suffer as a result of saltwater intrusion through flooding or inundation” (UN-HABITAT, 2010:23).

There are other threats to which the city is vulnerable which include wild fires, structural fires, “especially in high density informal settlements” - which also tends to be vulnerable to flooding as well (City of Cape Town, 2012). During the period between May and November 2008 alone the was “intense pressure for disaster risk management services in the Western Cape” (Holloway et al., 2010) reports. Widespread xenophobic violence and displacement of “foreign nationals across the province was experienced in May, followed by cut-off low impacts in July, at the end of August, a severe storm, “in November a powerful cut-off low
and related flooding resulted in costly damage in the Winelands and Overberg” (Holloway et al., 2010:64).

4.3 THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN’S DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT CENTRE

Based in Goodwood, the headquarters of the City of Cape Town’s DRMC boast a modern day infrastructure. Within the centre is an established “disaster coordinating team, chaired by the head of disaster risk management, responsible for taking public protective action in the case of all emergencies, major incidents and disasters” (City of Cape Town, 2012). A team of trained disaster specialists, also led by the head of Disaster Risk Management, works around the clock ensuring the safety of the three million inhabitants of the city. Situated in DRMChub is a strategy room, a suitable venue for logistical meetings usually held by heads of departments and city executives in view of impending disasters.

A disaster communication hub, enables the relaying of commands by these executives to their personnel. Through the live link of CCTV cameras, disaster management staff is kept up to date of the unfolding events in real time. There also dedicated media briefing site enabling city spoke people to release vital news when and if required, warnings to the citizens of the City of Cape Town (City of Cape Town, 2012).

To mitigate the disasters listed above and numerous other disasters that time and space do not permit to be documented, the City of Cape Town has relied on the
assistance of a wide variety of early warning systems which include the services of the South African Weather Services, as well as their flood guidance system (City of Cape Town, 2012). Assessment studies that provide scientific and detailed information regarding hazards was also conducted by Eurecon (Interviews with Mr. G. Pillay, August, 2012). Several organizations have partnered with the City of Cape Town’s DRMC which include Rescue services, Metropolitan Police, Civil Aviation Authority and NGOs among others.

4.3 THE DISASTER RELIEF PARTNERS

The City has listed five NGO or NPOs as relief partners, namely the SA Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the HDI Support, Mustadafin Foundation and ZANZAF. Of these five, only three will be discussed due to their availability for this study.

4.3.1 The Salvation Army

The Salvation Army was established in England during the middle of the 19th century, in the 1892 was the year in which the Salvation Army successfully defended its financial practices in an inquiry that was held into its “Darkest England” scheme (Irvine, 2002). It was founded by the then Reverend William Booth, a Methodist Minister. Troubled by the plight of the poor in the East end of London, he realised a calling to minister to these people. The Church did not Agree with this, and as a result he (Booth) left the Church and joined up with a local Mission, which eventually became The Salvation Army.
Since then, to date, the Salvation Army is very much dependent on the public donations for funds. It is in essence a Christian organization, and is part of the universal Christian Church. Its ministers are in fulltime ministry, and are referred to as “officers”, in conjunction with the Salvation Army’s military structure. In the Western Cape the Salvation Army has a fulltime emergency and disaster relief coordinator. Additional support staff is drawn from its fulltime officers and employees, and or local Salvationists, known as “Soldiers”.

The Salvation currently has a lack of capacity. It cannot provide cooked meals. Though it is not mandatory that all these relief partners should have cooking facilities, the Salvation Army is of the idea that it will be better capacitated and more effective if it were to add the cooking element to its disaster relief strategy. Sharing his sentiments about this issue, “I dare say that should there be any major disaster, earth quakes and major stuff happening, then we would [be able to] put together emergency facilities… to set up a kitchen and cook for the people for one day or two days” (Interview with Mr Hitchkock, August 2012).

4.3.2 The Mustadafin Foundation

The Mustadafin foundation is a community organization. The word Mustadafin means or stands for “the destitute, deprived and oppressed” (Ghairunisa Johnstone, Personal communication 22 August 2012). The organization was formed in 1986 in response to the Cross Roads violence. Mustafin focused on assisting women and children with services like trauma counseling, as they were mostly affected by
the events that unfolded at the time. The victims of that crisis were accommodated across mosques, churches and halls around the Western Cape.

The services of the organization then expanded from that point on, to include the entire families, though the main focus was still on empowering women through education. From 1986 till 1992, determined to create self-sufficiency among women Mustadafin carried out health care, trauma counseling, and skills development training programs to develop women. For the sake of the destitute children, Mustadafin established a daycare centre. The day care or after care programme flourished such that to date there are about 21 centres run by the organisation

4.3.3 The Historically Disadvantaged Individual (HDI) Support

The HDI Support is a Non-Governmental Organization established in 2003 (Interview with Mr. Stephan Schreuder, August 2012). “The disaster risk management centre was at its infancy at the time, still operating from the Civic Centre offices, with only a handful of individuals that made up its personnel” Mr. Schreuder fondly recalled. The organization broke away from the Salvation Army under the leadership of Mr Andre Olivier. While the team that later became the nucleus of the HDI Support was still serving within the Salvation Army, they would be contacted in to render relief aid in disastrous situations. Incidences such as fires in the Langatownship, brought consciousness as if it were an epiphany of what would then become a dependable and established disaster relief initiative.
When contacted, still serving under the Salvation Army at the time, they started cooking for disaster victims.

Leaving the Salvation Army, this team which later became the HDI Support, worked with a company that existed at the time called Natware (which at the time of the interview, had recently closed down). In fact, when the team of individuals, which later became the HDI Support left the Salvation Army, they were approached by Natware to form an NGO for the purpose of food distribution and disaster relief. Natware’s function at the time, was to stock and prepare food parcels. Natware was a subsidiary of a “a leading South African supplier of duty-free/duty-paid marine fuels and marine lubricant and chandelling requirements” (Africa in Action, 2012). “Prompted by a desire to be involved in the progress of their country” (Africa in Action, 2012), World Marine and Offshore Supply eventually, took over, rather establishing the HDI Support in fulfillment of a social responsibility.

With the funds received from this World Marine and Offshore Supply company, the HDI Support stocks supplies in bulk, 5000 blankets for instance, baby packs and various other relief necessities. As a precaution, these supplies are stored for disaster emergencies. Since no one can predict when the next disaster will strike, and the magnitude unknown, the NGOs are confronted with some challenges in stocking for emergencies. Sometimes bulks of supplies are stored, and for a period of approximately six months, only few supplies will be required for the relief leaving the rest untouched. At other times, the stored bulks are just
insufficient to cover the magnitude of the disaster. It is then incumbent upon the
NGO to source for the difference, and then wait for the reimbursement to
replenish the supplies and at times, settle the outstanding arrangements for the
extra supplies.

The HDI Support with its resources has a capacity of feeding about 16 000
victims two meals a day. Providing for this number of people, however, does not
happen every day. The length of time for the provision of the relief also varies.
The Langa fire incident, as a case in point, necessitated the rendering of services
for a period of about 9 months. As the victims received assistance with housing,
the numbers dwindled and eventually the relief was attained. In the case of the
xenophobic attacks of foreign nationals, Mr Stephen recalls that the relief spanned
to about three months of serving food to various camps of about 7 000 victims,
every day of the week. In summer the first meal, is served mid-morning meal
referred to as a brunch, a combination of breakfast and lunch, consists of bread
fruit juices or sour milk. In winter, victims are usually served bread and hot soup.
Hot meals, usually are served to the disaster victims in the evenings come in a
variety of menus that include stews, vegetables and rice are. The Department of
Social development provided specifications for the meals to be given to disaster
victims. These specifications apply to relief partners that have the capacity for
mass feeding, mainly the HID Support and Mustadafin Foundation.

The HDI Support was formed solely for the purposes of disaster relief. It is not
every day that a crisis or a disaster occurs, though every can potentially be a day
of disaster. The HDI Support therefore, is constantly on stand-by with supplies such as food parcels, blankets etc. When a disaster alert is raised, a fax or an e-mail bearing an incident report form sent by the DRMC is received by the HDI Support. This incident report form serves as an order form, wherein the HDI Support is informed about the number of structures affected, the number of people affected and so on. The supplies are provided according to the specifications of the incident report. More of the operational procedure in disaster relief is discussed in the next sections.

4.4 PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS
The City of Cape Town in carrying out its disaster management mandate is guided, among other acts, by the provisions of the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 in conjunction with the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 previously discussed in chapter three. Because of the de-centralization of power and the autonomy exercised by the South African government, each metropolitan and district municipality is required to formulate and implement a disaster management policy to ensure an integrated and uniform approach to disaster management in its own jurisdictional area. This is to embrace the municipality and statutory functionaries these include; all municipal entities operating in its area, all the non-governmental institutions involved in disaster management, and the private sector. As illustrated in chapter three of this study, each district municipality is required by the Disaster Management Act, Section 42 to establish its disaster management framework after consultation with the local municipalities in its area. This framework should be consistent with those of the
national and provincial governments. Greg Pillay, (Personal communication, June 2, 2011) affirmed that, in compliance with the provisions of the Disaster Management Act, the City of Cape Town, not only established its own disaster management framework, but a Disaster Risk Management Centre as well.

The City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre partners with CBOs and NGOs in disaster relief and mitigation. This is, in actual fact, a “tripartite arrangement that involves the NGOs, the Provincial government and the Centre” (Greg Pillay, Personal communication, June 2, 2011). This disaster relief partnership model has been in place since 1999, with 2012 marking the 13th year of existence. It was initiated by the South African Red Cross, and later joined by the Salvation Army. The latter stood at an advantage as, at the time, it was already running a hostel, and on regular basis provided meals for the hostel residents. Subsequent to joining the disaster relief partnership, the Salvation Army availed its hostel facilities and other resources for use in disaster relief purposes, setting a trend for other partners to follow suit. Mustadafin foundation with its industrial kitchen picked up on the trend set by the Salvation Army and so did the HDI support group.

These disaster relief agencies partnered with the City of Cape Town are not in the partnership for profit purposes. Though they need income for sustainability, they render their services for humanitarian causes. This is an important public-private partnership arrangement and is advantageous in improving the City’s Disaster Risk management Centre’s capacity for apt response on emergency calls. The
arrangement necessitates that the reserves of these partners be fully replenished at all times. There is, in fact, a corporate agreement in place with five of the NGOs. These namely, are the Sanzaf, Mustadafin foundation, SA Red Cross, Salvation Army and the HDI Support group. Of the five NGOs, the HDI Support and Mustadafin foundation are the two most capacitated. They each are capable of catering for about 5000 to 6000 people. Though others are not as capacitated as these two are, the city makes strides in ensuring that all the disaster relief partners have a fair share in proportion to the resources each NGO commands.

The Disaster Management Centre engages with these partners to bring relief to various needs of disaster-stricken communities, such as providing blankets, meals, food parcels, baby packs, etc. Because the Disaster management centre is not capacitated with facilities to provide for these basic needs, it then outsources the task to capable agents while it manages and coordinates the process. Regular meetings with the partners are held, quarterly through the Municipal Disaster Management Advisory forum (as alluded to in chapter three) and when necessary, to establish the terms of engagement. A fair distribution of tasks is ensured, and monitored through a roster system. The selected provider of services, as per consented agreement, is bound by a signed cooperative agreement.

This arrangement between the Disaster Risk Management Centre and the disaster relief partners is a unique arrangement to South Africa, that exists only in Cape Town, thus rendering the City of Cape Town the only city that is capable to perform mass feeding of about 22 000 people in one evening (i.e. 22 000 meals
twice a day). The industrialized kitchens owned by some of these organizations play a significant role in the preparation of these meals. More frequent than not, mass cooking presents disadvantages, and at times compromises the quality of the food prepared. An example of this is an outcry experienced during the incidences of xenophobic attacks, which attested to the apparent lack of quality in the meals prepared; the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre tasked a team of inspectors for quality inspection to mitigate this effect (Pillay, 2011). This initiative ensured that relief in the form of nourishment attains to a quality standard.

4.5 THE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE

The disaster process is monitored in the Disaster Risk Management Centre control room. This control room operates 24 hours a day. About three officials are assigned per shift to monitor all calls etc. In case of an emergency call, the Disaster Management coordinator reaches out to the scene to perform a relief assessment. The coordinator then communicates his/her assessment via a two-way radio or cell-phone. The context of this communication frequently entails the number of people destitute and what their situation requires e.g. shelter, the number of blankets, number of meals, etc. This message is relayed back to the centre’s control room, where the decision is made with and regarding the relief partners, according to the roaster and the proximity of area affected, the suitable service provider is selected. The roster is then marked out and a record is made rendering the process official. Open communication in the establishment of service
agreements between the Centre and the organization designated as a service provider cannot be over emphasized.

The arrangement with these disaster relief partners was not a planned arrangement, but was circumstantial. At the initial stages of the involvement of these organizations, there was no funding in place for their reimbursement. They rendered their services utilizing their own funds. Officials in the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre then, upon cogitating about the situation reckoned that the arrangement necessitated a funding mechanism. Having engaged with the Department of Social Development, the officials stumbled upon a clause from the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 (referred to in chapter three) which made provision for social distress funding. The Provincial government approved the initiative and the Department of Social Development agreed to fund these organizations.

The funding comes from the provincial government, which (provincial government) in turn, sources its funding from the National Department of Social Development. In all disaster management meetings, Pillay (2011) noted, that there always is present, a provincial representative, a representative of the City of Cape Town and representatives of the NGOs. This partnership came out of necessity, as the City of Cape Town is confronted with the challenge of urbanization (Pillay, 2011).
Since a funding provision had been established with the Department of Social Development, based on the providence of the Social Assistance Act, the disaster relief partners now have funds allotted for services rendered. The process of accessing these funds requires that the organizations submit their claims specifying their costs per item. For example, for each meal supplied the current rate is about R4 to R6 per meal, between R30 and R45 per blanket. For consistency, the NGOs and the centre agreed on a standardized quality and size of blankets. These blankets need not be fancy, but adequate for the purpose for which they are intended. Some of the organizations stock clothes as well.

All transactions are kept track of in the control room, where the NGOs submit their claims. These claims, stating the date, place and services rendered by that particular organization, are submitted through the office of the Head of the Disaster Risk Management Centre administration. This office has 83 operational staff member. The Centre then captures all relevant particulars and provides a case number for transactions carried out, while copies of the same remain with affected organizations for verification purposes. Once the records and the invoices are verified, and are consistent with the claim, the claim is then submitted to the Province (Department of Social Development) for payment.

The Department of Social Development then assigns the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) to pay out the relevant NGOs or disaster relief partners. Sometimes, it happens that these NGOs are left with no choice but to wait a month or two for the Province or Department of Social development to release the funds.
In such times, the Disaster Management Centre officials deem it necessary to embark on an unpleasant task of applying pressure on the provincial government to payout the NGOs in order that they may replenish their stocks.

4.6 CHALLENGES

This section discusses the findings of the study. Though not all five disaster relief partners to the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre availed themselves for the interviews, common treads in challenges they confront deemed significant to this study will be picked and outlined concisely.

4.6.1 Delays in reimbursement

The City of Cape Town has, since 1999, partnered with community-based organisations CBOs and non-governmental organisations NGOs in disaster relief programmes. A corporate agreement that enables the channelling of funds for the replenishing of disaster relief resources has been corollary to this partnership. The availability of the aforementioned funding originated not with the inception of the partnership. It was a consequence of the City of Cape Town’s colloquy with the Provincial Government. Though the attainment of this funding arrangement is commendable, access to it by relevant organizations has been fraught with challenges. Habitual delays from the Provincial government often characterise the expected release of these disaster relief funds which in turn, adversely affects the operations of the CBOs and NGOs (Interviews with Mr. G. Pillay, 2011 and Mr Stephan Schreuder, 2012).
These delays in reimbursement have been attested to by all the interviewed participants of this study. The organizational relay (between the relief partners and the government departments) that characterizes the partnership was also confirmed in an interview with Mr. Duncan Thomas, an official for SASSA. As an illustration of these delays, in an interview with Mr. S. Schreuder (2012) it was realized that when an emergency call is received by HDI Support and the relief has been rendered, the HDI Support sends the claim to the DRMC. The DRMC sends it to the Department of Social Development. The Department of Social Development sends it to SASSA and SASSA reimburses the relief partner. Mr. Schreuder later affirmed that the problem is continuous, they (the HDI Support) are “still sitting with unpaid moneys.” The promised turnaround time in this arrangement had been 30 days. Mr. Schreuder believes that “it can happen in that 30 days if they want to”, but unfortunately, this is not the case. “The reimbursement for Services rendered is sometimes a lengthy process, and cause unnecessary delays” (Interview with Mr. N. Hitchcock, 2012). Other NGOs like the Salvation Army have not been reimbursed yet (at the time of the interview 22 August 2012) for relief services rendered last year (2011).

The delay in reimbursement of these relief partners poses a critical challenge to the partnership. It has a potential to sour the relationship between the relief partners and the disaster risk management centre. Since the relief partners should keep their reserves replenished at all times, continuing with uncertainty of payment hampers their operation. Interview with Ms. G. Johnstone (2012) revealed that these organizations more frequently than not, have to go beyond
spreading themselves thin, to find alternative financial sources to prepare themselves for disaster relief or to settle debts outstanding debts that result from the funding delays.

Looking at disaster funding from a holistic perspective or an elevated point of vantage, Mr. Pillay (2011) deems the funding of disaster relief a serious challenge due to absence of a contingency clause in the National Disaster Management Act, that ought to provide for funding. The result is the current arrangement, whereby funds are sourced from the Department of Social development. Illustrating his point, Mr. Pillay (2011) remarks, “if something happens in February, [they] have to wait until the second week in October (the appointed time in which the National Allocation Committee sits). Since the National Allocation committee sits only once a year, the relief to a disaster has to wait for almost a year just to find out if the funds are available.” This reflects an even greater challenge of which the delays in reimbursing the relief partner is just a symptom. Since the main focus of government is channelled towards development, Mr. Pillay notes that the major chunk of government spending is on infrastructure, thus, “there is no way” that disasters can be funded as they should.

4.6.2 The constant change of government personnel

The constant change of personnel that handled disaster claims in government offices that deal directly with the relief partners was highlighted among the challenges that confront the partnership. While the relief partners would be adjusting to dealing with one person for disaster relief claims, and the procedural preferences
of that particular person regarding relief claims, in a short space of time that person would no longer be there and someone else would be in their stead. Mr. Schreuder reckons that this change in personnel, is due to hiring arrangements; people hired on a one, two or three year contracts. When the contract lapses, and the person is gone. The replacement sometimes comes with a different approach, or may not be up to speed with the current operations. This becomes a setback, affecting the smooth operation of the partnership, possibly contributing to the delays noted above.

4.6.3 Absence of an appointed official on site

As one who has been involved in the disaster relief partnership for almost the entire duration of its existence, Mr. Schreuder recalled that, in the past the partnership used to work very well, not so at the present moment. In the past, upon occurrence of a disaster incident where assistance from the disaster relief partners was required, there was always an appointed representative from disaster management centre assigned a responsibility of among other things, assessing that affected area, who was to be always available on site. Though this representative would not be necessarily dealing with paper work, he would nonetheless, familiarize himself with both the situation and the area prior to the arrival of the relief partners assigned for that incident. The familiarity of this appointed official with the situation, the area and the distressed community, as Mr. Schreuder recalled, proved to be very helpful.
The challenge with the absence of this representative in the current dispensation implies that, when relief is needed, the relief partner(s) assigned to that particular incident would in most cases be unfamiliar with the situation, the area and the community. Whereas the relief partners relied on the assistance of this official in to effectively render relief, available to their disposal for the understanding of the situation, the area and the community is a contact person (i.e. a person they can contact who is not representing the disaster management centre, who at times has proven not be as effective as those deployed by the centre in the past). Tasks as simple as crowd control, that an official deployed by the disaster management centre could have handled with relative ease, now remain the responsibility of the relief partner(s) assigned to that disaster-stuck community. Such tasks become cumbersome and consume the relief partners’ valuable time that could have been utilised in the distribution of relief packs and services, as opposed to the controlling of the crowd.

Citing a recent incidence, MrSchreuder (2012) mentions that two communities in close proximity were affected by a disaster. The authorities consented on choosing a central point for food distribution, such that both camps are served from that central point. It happened that, members of one community decided to chase the other community away from the relief, claiming sole entitlement to the aid. Subsequent to that occurrence, the HDI Support had to prepare meals the following day for the unfortunate community that was chased away, a situation that could have been avoided, in MrSchreuder’s view had there been a disaster management representative present. The presence of this representative would
been effective in bringing about awareness to both camps of the arrangement that was to transpire, preventing the unfortunate predicament as well as ensuring cooperation and optimal use of resources.

4.6.4 Unsubsidized expenses

The interviews revealed that disaster relief partners incur costs (making phone calls etc.) in sourcing the relief items (such as food parcels, blankets, clothes, baby packs among other things) securing the relief items, storing facilities, packaging, delivering, and so on. One respondent remarked that “They do pay us for the blankets, they pay us for the parcels, they don’t pay for travelling, they don’t pay petrol, they don’t pay salaries…” thus, while the partners do all they can to aid in disaster relief, they are only compensated for the items they supply.

In most if not all instances, as all the interviewed participants acknowledged, they need to hire additional employees to assist in disaster relief, thus incurring more costs. Despite the costs incurred, these disaster relief partners carry out these tasks as part of their social responsibility and for the sake of the communities in distress. Some, (the Salvation Army the Mustadafin Foundation and ZANZAF for instance) provide disaster relief as part of their ministry and religious conviction.

Though according to the interview Mr Hitchcock (August, 2012), there was an established understanding that this issue of additional costs has been raised with the government departments involved on various instances. Yet all that can be
said about their response is that, “they are not interested.” Whether this is explicitly stated or implicit in the government officials’ behaviour, is not clear.

These additional expenses incurred by the relief partners place upon the partners and added strain that slows down the process, making it cumbersome to the relief partners. As with the challenge of the delays in reimbursement, these additional costs, placing a strain upon the relief partners, have a potential of damaging the partnership by virtue of inciting “donor fatigue” to the “go to” sources of the relief partners. Thus the relief partners may be placed in a position of being unable to provide the necessary relief, resulting in the reduction of the City of Cape Town’s capacity for disaster relief, rendering the city less disaster resilient.
CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter draws together the main findings of this study and relates them to the research problem and literature review. It also includes recommendations that are relevant to implications for policy and practice. These are practical recommendations which the researcher believes are attainable.

5.1 CONCLUSION

This study sought to investigate the partnership between the City of Cape Town and its disaster relief partners. This model has proven to be effective in optimizing the City of Cape Town’s capacity for better disaster preparedness, relief and recovery. Through the aid afforded by the relief partners through meals and supplies, the city is better positioned to cushion the effects of disasters. The efficiency and effectiveness of this model or the absence thereof has been documented as well as the challenges that may handicap it.

The four main challenges that impact on this disaster relief partnership have been realized by this study. The first being delays that are experienced by the disaster relief partners in the reimbursement of the relief they provide. These delays impact negatively on disaster preparedness since they render the relief partners unprepared for impending disasters, a compromise to the disaster relief capacity of both the relief partners and the Disaster Risk Management Centre. This for a simple reason that on its own, the Disaster Risk Management centre has no
capacity for mass feeding and two or more organization working together to solve a crisis are better than one.

The change in the personnel that deals with the relief partners has been identified as another challenge. This change tends to impact on the understanding of procedures and the establishment of rapport between the relief partners and the government. This slows down the processes and has a negative effect on the partnership.

The absence of an official appointed by the Disaster Risk Management Centre on the affected site of the incidence is another challenge that was identified. The absence of this designated official has negative effects on the smooth delivery of disaster relief. It consumes the disaster relief partners’ time by placing them in a tight position that forces them to do other time consuming errands that could have been better dealt with by this official, allowing the relief partners to proceed with their relief programme as soon as they arrive on the site of distress.

The unsubsidized expenses that the relief partners incur was the final challenge discussed in this study. Compensating the relief partners only for the goods they deliver places a tremendous burden on the relief partners. While they may obtain compensation for the goods delivered, the costs incurred through the preparation logistics reduces the relief compensation, leaving them less capacitated for the next incident. The absence of a contingency fund to cushion unforeseen
circumstances or excess demand during relief also adds to the challenge, forcing the relief partners to search for additional funds, and in most cases, incur debt.

This study has demonstrated the complexity of disasters and through the literature consulted attempted made attempts to provide a definition. The meaning of various terms such as disaster management, disaster risk management, disaster risk reduction and a few others, have been explored to clarify the context in which these terms are applicable. This study has demonstrated that there is substantial merit in the employment of the two prerequisites for disaster risk reduction advanced by (Wisner et al., 2004), that effective disaster risk reduction occurs effectively when the top-down technocratic approach to disaster management has been diffused. Understanding societies and their characteristics, as well as the manner in which they interact with the natural and physical environment will bring success. Through the partnership of the Disaster Risk Management Centre and its disaster relief partners, the study portrayed a working partnership model between government and the community, a model that can be emulated by any city where similar organisations exist.

Though the partnership model be between the City of Cape Town and its disaster relief partners seem to be working well. Much care and attention should be given to the concerns or challenges raised by these relief partners. As indicated in the works of (Lane & Wallis, 2009), NPOs are founded on more personal values as opposed to most organisations. All the relief partners to the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre operate in a manner consistent with that
described by (Lane & Wallis, 2009). This implies that, though these partners may find value in being of service to the DRMC, when and if, due to the challenges they confront in the rendering of their services, come to a realisation that the partnership is no longer reflecting the values that attracted them; they might retract or withdraw. This would cripple the capacity of the City of Cape Town.

Therefore, that they were willing to participate in disaster relief activities voluntarily does not suggest that their services should be taken for granted. On the contrary, the services of these relief partners should be encouraged by making their work a delight and smooth as is reasonably possible.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

In line with the findings highlighted above, the study proposes the following recommendations for consideration:

5.2.1 Delays in reimbursement

In unison, all relief partners acknowledged the delays to be due to the interdepartmental relay of the claim process. It is therefore recommended that:

- A public-private partnership policy be established that enables the relief partners to deal with one department to lessen the reimbursement delays.
- A public-private partnership specific policy that provides for the specific funding of disaster relief partners (as opposed to a clause in the SAA).
- A fund designated specifically for the funding of public-private partnerships in disaster management.
5.2.2 The constant change of government personnel

- A permanent position be afforded a an official who among other tasks, will liaise with the relief partners.

5.2.3 Absence of an appointed official on site

- An official be appointed to assess the sites of distress, liaising with both the DRMC and the relief partners of the necessary preparations, prior to the arrival of relief.

5.2.4 Unsubsidized expenses

- The additional costs incurred by the disaster relief partners should be taken into consideration when reimbursement is considered.
- The centre should have relief contingency funds to cushion additional relief costs that may be needed by the relief partners.

As far as the findings of this study are concerned, the public-private partnership of the City of Cape Town with its disaster relief partners is a successful one. It is effective in bringing the much needed awareness and relief to devastated communities. The lessons learnt therefore will prove useful in enhancing this partnership and will serve as a model for other communities in South Africa and abroad.
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ANNEXURE A

INTERVIEW QUESTION STRUCTURE FOR THE DISASTER RELIEF PARTNERS TO THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN’S DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT CENTER.

1. Organizational background
   Would you kindly provide the background of your organization, stating:
   a) How it was formed,
   b) When it was established, and
   c) By who?
   d) What was the purpose for its establishment? What is its mission? What is its vision?

2. Organizational operation
   a) On a day to day basis, how does your organization function? (i.e. what services does your organization render to the public on a daily basis,?)
   b) How is your organization funded?
   c) What is your organization’s capacity (i.e. how many people are employed therein? How many volunteers? etc.)
   d) How much of the staff (inclusive of volunteers) assists in disaster relief?
   e) What infrastructure is there and how much of the infrastructure is made available for disaster relief?
   f) In disaster relief, what is the maximum number of disaster victims your organization assist? In what means? For how long?

3. Relationship with Disaster Risk Management Center (DRMC)
   a) How and when was the relationship between your organization and the DRMC established?
   b) What were the terms of reference or agreement?
   c) In terms of your partnership, how does your organization relate with the DRMC on a relatively day-to-day basis? (i.e. is there an on-going collaboration?)
   d) In your view, is this a functional or satisfying relationship, one that enables the attainment of your organizational mission?
   e) Are there any benefits to your organization (in terms of capacity or otherwise) resulting from this partnership?
   f) Do you work with other government agencies, apart from the DRMC, in Cape Town?

4. Funding Arrangements between the DRMC and its partners
   a) What funding arrangements exist between your organization and the DRMC?
   b) How did it come about?
   c) When was it initiated?
   d) What processes does this arrangement follow?
   e) Are you aware of any legislation that warrants such an arrangement?
f) Do you feel that this funding is sufficient for all that your organization deems necessary for disaster relief?

g) Are there any noticeable flaws, discrepancies or unsatisfying occurrences experienced in the duration of this arrangement?

h) If any, what in your opinion could be the cause of these challenges or discrepancies?

i) What do you think could be a solution?

5. Possible improvements
   a) In what ways can this partnership be enhanced?