Student Politics and the Funding of Higher Education in South Africa: The Case of the University of the Western Cape, 1995-2005

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Institute for Post-School Studies, Faculty of Education, University of the Western Cape

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KEYWORDS

Higher Education
Access
Cost-sharing
Student Funding
Financial Exclusions
Student Activism
Student Politics
Student Participation
Student Representative Council (SRC)
Inequalities
Higher Education Transformation
University and Society
Political behaviours of disadvantaged groups
ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines various ways in which the University of the Western Cape (UWC) in Cape Town, South Africa, confronted the paradoxical post-apartheid higher education policy of expansion of access to historically disadvantaged students and limited funds and how students addressed the resulting problem of ‘unmet financial need’. My case study is set within the broader context of the momentous political and social change in South Africa’s first decade of democracy and the transformation of higher education in that country between 1995 and 2005. I reconsider the general topics of student activism, student participation in university governance and student funding based on relevant and accessible scholarly literature. Eventually, Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam’s framework (1990) inspires a conceptual-analytical framework to be applied in the case study analysis, consisting of a typology of four ideal types of student action, namely, normative collective student action (Type 1), non-normative collective student action (Type 2), normative individual student action (Type 3) and non-normative individual student action (Type 4).

I adopt a qualitative case study approach and use a variety of data collection methods (such as interviews, official documentation and observation) to construct a case study database. Interviewees include members of the university management, university staff and students (both leaders and ordinary students). I interview diverse students in terms of their origin, race, gender, fields of study and levels of qualification, and political orientation. The interviewees include former student leaders in order to gain a historical perspective on the pre-1994 era. Staff interviews target mainly those members who were directly involved with student financial issues or who were responsible for making student funding decisions. I collected different types of documents, including Student Representative Council (SRC) annual reports, minutes, discussion documents, university annual reports, and university financial statements. I also have opportunity to observe various student activities on campus, including student meetings and workshops, where student funding concerns are discussed.
My study shows that UWC students combined collective normative and collective non-normative student actions in a complementary manner between 1995 and 2000. This becomes evident in the analysis of the UWC 1998 student activism, which sought to assist about 7 000 students facing financial exclusion. This landmark series of protests and negotiations occurred in an institutional environment characterised by antagonistic relations between students and the university management, on the one hand, and an institutional leadership crisis, on the other hand.

The absence of student activism is the most significant feature of UWC student politics between 2000 and 2005. The study shows that students solely relied on collective normative action, especially negotiations with the university authorities, to address their problem of unmet financial need. The SRC played a leading role in the negotiations, albeit without always receiving a mandate from the student body. This contributed to widening the social distance between the SRC and the student body and raised questions of legitimacy about SRC decisions, including those related to negotiations with the university management.

At an individual level, some students continued to consult and entrust the SRC to address their financial need, while others bypassed the SRC and negotiated directly with the university officials. Students conducted individual negotiations on their problem of unmet financial need with Student Credit Management (SCM) office established in the wake of the 1998 activism, and the University’s Financial Aid Office. As part of the study, students shared their experience of how delays in the finalisation of registration due to debts and an inability to pay upfront fees affected them academically as well as psychologically. Some students had to wait for almost two months before they knew whether they should go back home or could continue their studies. Others continued to attend their classes so that they would not miss a lot while at the same time seeking a solution to their problem of unmet financial need. In this respect, the study uncovers personal hardships in the
lived experience of disadvantaged students as a consequence of higher education policy.

Students also had to explore other alternatives. These included (a) establishing solidarity networks, which enabled them to share with other students who could afford study materials, laboratory coats, food and accommodation (whereby the latter would involve 'squatting' in hostel rooms); (b) drawing on student-family networks consisting of relatives, neighbourhood friends, and other community members; and (c) initiating support consisting of part-time jobs on and off campus, participating in the University’s work-study programmes, and in extracurricular activities. The study’s findings thus make an empirical contribution to knowledge. It has given voice to some of the 'unseen pains' of the transition and post-apartheid change in South African higher education.

The conceptual framework developed and applied in the study has the potential to be used in future research to conceptualise student actions as political behaviours of disadvantaged group members in terms of different ideal types characterised by interrelatedness and interdependency. As the study shows, the framework warrants further development and use.

The thesis ends with recommendations for future research, arguing for (a) the need to understand more closely the manner in which higher education institutions determine study costs, (b) the development of reliable means testing, which is one of the great dilemmas facing higher educational policy in South Africa and other developing countries - determining and verifying the amount that an extended family can reasonably be expected to contribute to the higher education of family members; (c) the need for more historical and sociological analysis of student organisations (including the SRC) and their role in shaping post-1994 South Africa; and finally (d) the need for more systematic investigations into the apparent dearth of student activism between 2000 and 2005 in South Africa, as against the history of high levels of student activism prior to that.
DECLARATION

I declare that Student Politics and the Funding of Higher Education in South Africa: The case of the University of the Western Cape, 1995-2005 is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination to any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Mlungisi B G Cele
November 2014
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I am grateful and indebted to my supervisor and co-supervisor, Associate Prof. Teresa Barnes and Dr Thierry Luescher-Mamashela, for their patience, intellectual guidance and support throughout my studies. Your penetrating and sometimes ‘hard and disturbing questions’ empowered and sharpened the way I approached and looked at issues. Your confidence and encouragement instilled in me a permanent sense of belief that the completion of this thesis was inevitable and just a matter of time.

I am also grateful to numerous students who volunteered their time to share and engage me on the issues facing them. I learned a lot. I am convinced that our beloved country will always have a bright future.

To Nangamso, my gorgeous wife and companion, this thesis belongs to you. I appreciate and thank you for your support, inspiration, encouragement, understanding and sacrifices that you made in order to allow for the production of this thesis. You were a pillar of strength that pushed me through the end. I love you. To all my beautiful kids, I thank you.

I shall never forget my parents who sacrificed everything to give me an education. They had a vision for me to do better than them through education. They did not want me to experience similar horrors of living under conditions of squalor, be poor, unskilled and always disadvantaged. Their vision will remain forever and I shall always share it with others.

I give thanks for the support of my colleagues. In particular, I thank you for the technical support that you provided.

I dedicate this thesis to my late father, Nongabaza, aunts (Nyasa and Nelile) and friend and colleague, Charlton, all of whom would have been very proud of my achievement.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAU</td>
<td>Association of African Universities</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFEC</td>
<td>Anti-Financial Exclusions Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGM</td>
<td>Annual General Meeting</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ANCYL</td>
<td>African National Congress Youth League</td>
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<td>ASAHDI</td>
<td>Association of Vice-Chancellors of Historically Disadvantaged Institutions</td>
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<td>ASB</td>
<td>Afrikaanse Studentebond</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>Afrikaanse Studentefront</td>
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<tr>
<td>AZAPO</td>
<td>Azania Peoples’ Organisation</td>
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<td>AZASCO</td>
<td>Azanian Student Congress</td>
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<td>AZASO</td>
<td>Azanian Student Organisation</td>
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<td>BEE</td>
<td>Black Economic Empowerment</td>
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<td>BTF</td>
<td>Broad Transformation Forum</td>
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<td>CEPD</td>
<td>Centre for Education Policy Development</td>
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<td>CHC</td>
<td>Central House Committee</td>
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<td>CHE</td>
<td>Council on Higher Education</td>
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<td>COSAS</td>
<td>Congress of South African Students</td>
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<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<td>CTP</td>
<td>Committee of Technikon Principals</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Director General</td>
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<td>DoE</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
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<td>DUT</td>
<td>Durban University of Technology</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GSC</td>
<td>General Student Council</td>
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<td>HBI</td>
<td>Historically Black Institution</td>
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<td>Historically Black Technikon</td>
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<td>HBU</td>
<td>Historically Black University</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
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<td>Higher Education Institution</td>
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<td>HESA</td>
<td>Higher Education of South Africa</td>
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<td>HSRC</td>
<td>Human Sciences Research Council</td>
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<td>Historically White Institution</td>
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<td>Historically White Technikon</td>
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<td>Historically White University</td>
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<td>IDT</td>
<td>Independent Development Trust</td>
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<td>IIES</td>
<td>Income and Expenditure Surveys</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>MDM</td>
<td>Mass Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>MSA</td>
<td>Muslim Student Association</td>
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<td>NCHE</td>
<td>National Commission on Higher Education</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Committee</td>
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<td>NECC</td>
<td>National Educational Co-ordinating Committee</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Economic Partnership for African Development</td>
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<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Industrialised Countries</td>
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<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Student Front (or Nasionale Studentefront)</td>
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<td>NSFAS</td>
<td>National Student Financial Aid Scheme</td>
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<td>NUSAS</td>
<td>National Union of South African Students</td>
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<td>NWG</td>
<td>National Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-African Congress</td>
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<td>PASAMA</td>
<td>Pan-African Student Movement</td>
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<td>PASO</td>
<td>Pan-Africanist Student Organisation</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>REAP</td>
<td>Rural Education Access Programme</td>
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<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<td>SANSCO</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>South African Post-Secondary Education</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>South African Student Congress</td>
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<td>South African Student Organisation</td>
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<td>South African Technikon Student Union</td>
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<td>SAU</td>
<td>South African Universities</td>
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<td>SAU-SRC</td>
<td>South African Universities – Students’ Representative Council</td>
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<td>SAUVCA</td>
<td>South African University Vice-Chancellors Association</td>
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<td>SCM</td>
<td>Student Credit Management</td>
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<td>SDO</td>
<td>Student Development Offices</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Student Representative Council</td>
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<td>SSRC</td>
<td>Social Science Research Council</td>
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<td>TBVC</td>
<td>Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei</td>
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<td>TEC</td>
<td>Translation Executive Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEFSA</td>
<td>Tertiary Education Fund of South Africa</td>
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<td>TUT</td>
<td>Tshwane University of Technology</td>
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<td>UB</td>
<td>University of Buea</td>
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<td>UCM</td>
<td>United Christian Movement</td>
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<td>UCT</td>
<td>University of Cape Town</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<td>University of Durban-Westville</td>
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<td>University of Johannesburg</td>
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<td>UKZN</td>
<td>University of KwaZulu-Natal</td>
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<td>UNIN</td>
<td>University of the North</td>
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<td>UP</td>
<td>University of Pretoria</td>
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<td>USF</td>
<td>United Student Front</td>
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<td>UWC</td>
<td>University of the Western Cape</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wits</td>
<td>University of the Witwatersrand</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>White Paper</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Introduction

This purpose of this chapter is to identify the research problem, provide the rationale and propose the purpose of the research and research question. It also describes the research methodology and outlines the structure of the thesis.

Statement of the problem

In 1994, the South African democratic government inherited a higher education system that was “characterised by a high degree of fragmentation and incoherence, high levels of institutional inequality, an inequitable financing system, inequalities of access and undemocratic systems of governance” (Wolpe, 1995a: 287). It was therefore believed that the transformation process should result in a higher education system that is “more socially equitable internally and promotes social equity more generally by providing opportunity for social advancement through equity of access and opportunity” (Badat, 2004: 3).

Not surprisingly, therefore, the issues of equity, access and redress continued to dominate the post-apartheid national higher education policy and student agenda (see Barnes, 2006: 153; Cloete et al., 2006). In particular, all higher education stakeholders generally supported the call for the expansion of access to higher education, targeting especially poor and black students. The White Paper on Higher Education (1997) formally adopted and committed government to "expanded access [with a focus on equity and redress] through the planned expansion of the system over the next decade” (Cloete, 2004; 52; Cloete, 2011: 2). This was perhaps not in the same way or form as the National Council on Higher Education (NCHE) had envisaged: a specific form of expansion of access known as massification. Definitionally, as Jansen argued, massification in South Africa "assumed an absolute growth in student enrolments as well as more egalitarian distribution of students in higher education, one that reflected the race and gender profile of the nation" (2003:292). Altbach refers to massification as tremendous expansion of enrolments that has taken place worldwide in the past 30 years.
The NCHE’s recommendation was informed in part by stark racial inequalities in the higher education participation rate: African students represented only one-sixth of the number of whites in 1992. Specifically, the participation rate of the age group of 18 to 21 year old Africans increased from 5% in 1986 to 11% in 1992, while the rate of coloureds increased from 9% to 12%, that of Indians increased from 32% to 37% and that of whites from 61% to 65% in the same period. In the age group of 20 to 24 year old South Africans, the respective increases during the period 1986 to 1992 were 4% to 9% for Africans, 7% to 10% for coloureds, 27% to 33% for Indians and 48% to 54% for whites (NCHE, 1996:33; see also Bunting, 1994).

There are many implications of expanding access, including its impact on the public budget. The South African government committed itself to changing the composition of the student body by ensuring that the “relative proportion of public funding used to support academically able but disadvantaged students must be increased” (White Paper on Higher Education, 1997: 22). However, government argued that “fee-free higher education for students is not an affordable or sustainable option for South Africa” (White Paper on Higher Education, 1997: 46). The reasons for this included: first, the knowledge and skills acquired in the course of achieving higher education qualifications generate significant lifetime private benefits for successful students, as well as long-range social benefits for the public at large. Second, although higher education institutions admit an increasingly large proportion of students from poor families, students from middle-class and wealthy families still tend to be disproportionately well-represented (White Paper on Higher Education, 1997:46). Based on these two reasons, government supported “an approach to higher education funding based on a sharing of costs between private beneficiaries (students) and the state, representing the public interest” (White Paper on Higher Education, 1997: 57; see also NCHE 1996 and Green Paper on Higher Education 1996). The sharing of the burden of the costs of study is known as cost-sharing (Johnstone, 2006: 16). Government further stated that it was aware of “severe limits to the capacity of many students and their families to pay, particularly first generation students from
poor families” (White Paper on Higher Education, 1997:57). Accordingly, government established the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) in 1999, which is an income-contingent loan scheme and typically part of a policy of cost-sharing (Johnstone 2003a: 8-9; see NSFAS 1999 Act).

The post-apartheid higher education policy needs to be understood as having evolved in the context of an unsupportive macro-economic policy, fiscal austerity and belt-tightening driven through the state’s overall economic plan, called the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), adopted in 1996. As some writers argued, the policy put “limits on public spending and imposed fiscal constraints on higher education institutions” (Gibbon and Kabaki, 2006: 128). For Badat this limited (or even inadequate) funding “hindered the government in its progressive commitments to increasing student enrolment, participation, access and equity” (2004: 46). With hindsight, the post-apartheid higher education policy thus represents a paradox of simultaneous pursuit of (1) massive expansion of higher education for black students (which in effect means creating opportunities of access to higher education for working class and poor students,) involving a policy of higher education massification in South Africa; and (2) a self-imposed commitment to fiscal 'austerity' reflected in the rejection of free higher education provision and provision of limited financial assistance and the adoption of cost-sharing, which requires that students, including the working class and poor, pay a significant share of the costs of study. It is an interesting puzzle to investigate in the context of a university committed to providing access to the poor; in terms of the political processes and student behaviours it gave rise to and students’ lived experience of the ‘unmet financial needs’ that this paradoxical policy gave effect to at the case of the University of the Western Cape (UWC), which is a historically black university (HBU) with a history of deep institutional commitment to opening access to black working-class and poor students.

The specific moment UWC found itself in during the immediate post-apartheid years was certainly complicated, if not worsened, by the effect of the democratic government’s paradoxical higher education policy of expansion of access and
limited funding (with cost-sharing promoted as policy solution). Historically, UWC experienced a high demand for the expansion of student access, particularly from historically disadvantaged and poor students. Student culture at that institution is historically characterised by high-level student activism to advance their demands and struggles for democratisation (Maseko, 1994). They linked their demands and struggles for access and equitable funding to the broader liberation struggle which they had participated in originally as a struggle against the illegitimate and repressive apartheid state and for equality, freedom and social justice prior to 1990, but which changed and came to be focused inwardly on their campus during the transition to and after the attainment of democracy.

In the 1980s, UWC acceded to student demands for the expansion of access and opened its ‘doors of learning’ in a political context that was “savagely opposed to it” (Muller, 2009: 4). While UWC won a “special place in the history of higher education in South Africa, and deserved reputation for its role in the creation of democratic order, it came at a cost” (UWC, 2002: 19-21). The ‘cost’ came from two fronts. First, the apartheid regime reduced its budget subsidy to UWC and other HBUs that had defied it. The apartheid regime revised its funding policy following the decision of UWC (and other HBUs) to open access to all students irrespective of colour, ethnicity or origin. The revised funding policy combined student enrolment growth (which was the most important factor in the old subsidy formula) with student success as two major factors for consideration in the allocation of resources to institutions. This disadvantaged institutions that were committed to the enrolment of poor students who were often academically underprepared; thus the institutions’ funding levels were reduced.

Second, given the fact most students who benefited from UWC’s democratisation of access were poor and unable to pay their fees, the university was “unable to collect from all its students their full contribution to their education, and a student debt developed over time” (UWC, 2002: 21). In consequence, UWC faced an increasing challenge of financial sustainability and student affordability. Given the persistent gross inequalities and imbalances in the higher education sector, the
'advent of democracy' in 1994 had "justifiably raised the hopes and expectations of many for fundamental and sweeping change" (Barnes, 2006:153). This was particularly true for students who, based on their historical role during the national liberation struggle and alignment with the liberation movement, could legitimately hope and expect that the post-apartheid government would be understanding and sympathetic to their concerns and thus develop higher education policies that would expand access, create more equal opportunities and provide equitable financial aid to historically disadvantaged black and poor students.

According to a UWC self-evaluation report, UWC accepted a call by the post-apartheid government to “allow indigent’ students to enrol without paying” (UWC, 2007: 6). This occurred against the background of rising student debt and thus placed the university in a precarious financial position (UWC, 2007: 6). Financially distressed, UWC continued to draw students from the “less wealthy sectors of society who have access to fewer resources and have had poorer schooling” (CHE, 2010: 8). In doing so, UWC had to continuously confront the challenge of ensuring both institutional sustainability and student affordability, which at times resulted in serious confrontations with students.

Research purpose and question
The way that UWC dealt with its own financial challenges simultaneously with the implementation of the post-apartheid higher education policy provides a point of interest into this study. Any decision or action that the university was going to take was bound to have an impact on students’ experiences and their ability to access and complete higher education. Given the historical role of student activism at UWC, I was specifically interested in understanding the type of behaviours that students would employ in order to address their funding problems.

The purpose of the study is therefore to understand what I call the paradoxical government policy of an expansion of student access to historically disadvantaged and poor students and in a context of commitments to limiting public funding of higher education (with cost-sharing being promoted as policy solution) in terms of
its effects on UWC and particularly student actions between 1995 and 2005. In the study, I am neither intending to offer a critique nor make policy recommendations. Rather, my study is about the 'human cost' or 'effects on the ground' of what amounts to a paradoxical government policy in the context of the case of UWC.

The key research questions driving the study are:

a) How did UWC confront the paradoxical post-apartheid higher education policy of expansion of access and limited funding?

b) How did students address the resulting problem of ‘unmet financial need’ at UWC?

According to Spencer, ‘unmet financial need’ “is a gap between total educational costs and available funding” (Spencer, 2002: 153). I argue that the problem of unmet financial need emerges at the individual level as historically disadvantaged, poor students are required to share the burden of the costs of study. The literature on the concept of cost-sharing provides an understanding of, and a rationale for, the notion of sharing the burden of the cost of the study. Since its emergence, cost-sharing has been promoted as policy solution to persistently escalating student demand for access and enrolment and inadequate public funding or financial austerity problems experienced by higher education institutions in both, developing and developed countries (Altbach, 2011: 308; see also Woodhall, 2002).

Cost-sharing is conceptualised as “the introduction of, or especially sharp increases in, tuition fees to cover part of the costs of instruction or of user charges to cover more of the costs of lodging, food, and other expenses of student living that may have hitherto been borne substantially by governments (taxpayers) or institutions” (Johnstone, 2006: 16). It has been suggested that students and their parents should increasingly shoulder “a greater share of higher education costs, usually through higher education tuition fees and paid for more often with loans and student jobs instead of grants” (Johnstone, 2006: 16; see also Merisotis and...
Wolanin, 2002; Van Harte, 2004; Vossensteyn, 2005). Potentially, students who can afford to pay their contribution would not have a problem in this regard. However, for poor students, the demand to pay their contribution to the costs of study becomes a problem, which may be conceptualised as an unmet financial need.

Rationale
There are academic, political and moral reasons for conducting this study. From an academic perspective, the survey of international literature shows that a lot has been done to understand the phenomenon of student activism, its role and impact (Luescher, 2005: 1; Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 262). However, some writers have raised concerns about the focus of the literature, which has “mainly been on industrialised nations and less on developing nations” (Byaruhanga, 2006: xviii; Munene, 2009: 117) and a lack of serious research on the role of students in democratic transitions (Zeilig and Dawson, 2008: 9). While the study of student activism in South Africa is relatively developed (e.g. Alence, 1999; Badat, 1999, 1997, 1995; Cele, 2009; Maseko, 1994; Murray, 1993, 1990; Naidoo, 2006; Pithouse, 2006; Odhav, 1997; Sikwebu, 2008), it generally focuses on national political issues and rarely links student activism with the issues of student funding.

Prior to 1994, student struggles typically revolved around racist political institutions, campaigns of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), political repression and similar issues (Badat, 1995: 145). However, the post-1994 era brought changes in the student struggles. Wolpe argues that the previous concentration on issues of political rights and state power gave way to "relatively un-coordinated and fragmented engagements around education, which have become virtually uncoupled from the struggle for political liberation and economic emancipation" (Wolpe, 1994: 7; see also Badat, 1995, Luescher-Mamashela and Mugume, 2014). Thus, this study seeks to contribute to understanding changes in student struggles and particularly changes in the form of
student action, which largely targeted educational concerns, especially the problem of unmet financial need.

Secondly, the literature provides some account of student activism in Africa against tuition fees, the abolishment of student allowances, poor living and accommodation conditions (whether as part of fighting against cost-sharing or structural adjustment programmes [SAPs] and their effects), which resulted in some instances in student arrests, killings, or expulsion from campuses (see Alidou, Caffentzis and Federici, 2008; Byaruhanga, 2006; Fukwang, 2009; Konings, 2009). References to student funding, however, appear largely coincidental at times. This is in part because the interest tends to be more in the role of students in dealing with larger social and political concerns (such as repressive regimes, SAPs) than in matters related to higher education policy.

Thirdly, the literature rarely provides accounts of individual student experiences or detailed accounts of the role of Student Representative Councils (SRCs), student guilds or student unions, in addressing the problem of sharing the burden of the cost of study. In fact, students in general are frequently treated at student body level, as if this was a homogenous body, thus putting individual student actions and intra-student dynamics such as the relationship between the student leadership and the rank and file beyond the scope of many studies.

My study seeks to address some of the above-mentioned gaps. It will seek to provide evidence emerging from the ‘ground’ on students’ lived experience of the post-1994 government policy implementation. This study is therefore partly about what Jansen referred to as “unseen pains of transitions” (2004: 118). Thus, it prominently includes interviewing and documenting student experiences across different races, ages, faculties and political orientations at UWC.

Moreover, the study seeks to contribute to the understanding of post-apartheid higher education transformation and student funding policy by providing the perspective of students shaped by their experiences, challenges and roles, as well
as changing political conditions. UWC is an important case where students frequently set the pace of transformation. The study provides an account of the shifts in student politics from a politics of resistance to one of co-operative governance, and the implications of this shift on how students addressed their problem of unmet financial need.

From the political and moral perspective, my study emanates from a deep concern for the high levels of inequality across all spheres of life in South Africa. As the son of a domestic worker and Transnet labourer, I personally experienced the brutality and loss of human dignity in not having enough money to access higher education, remain at university, and complete higher education studies.

Yet, as a student activist and leader, I realised that my situation was better than that of others that I served. I refused to be a victim. I saw other students who, like me, refused the status of victimhood. The power and collective struggles of students helped me to register for my second, third and final years without having to pay the full required registration fees. I therefore wanted to study the process and dynamics of inclusion and exclusion that enabled me to gain an education while it excluded so many others.

Methodology

I shall use a single case study method in conducting this study. A case study is a “process of inquiry about the case and the product of that inquiry” (Stake, 2005: 444). There are several reasons for choosing a qualitative single case study approach to conduct an investigation. First, a case study is a “common way to do qualitative inquiry” (Stake, 2005: 443). Second, UWC as a case offers an “opportunity to learn” (Stake, 2005: 451). Third, choosing a case study approach generally helps to “understand complex social phenomena” in their context (Yin, 1994: 3). The case study method allows for the investigation of specific issues in their real-life context where the issues to be investigated are integrally linked to the context. Thus, as Babbie and Mouton put it, “the interaction of the unit of analysis with its context is a significant part of investigation in case studies”
(2001: 283). I provide specific reasons for selecting UWC as my case study in Chapter Four. They include UWC’s principled but risky commitment to expand access to poor and African students in the 1980s, which was an antithesis to the apartheid agenda of white supremacy and racial bigotry.

Second, the post-apartheid era presented UWC with different challenges, including redefining its role and relationship with the state. In particular, I was interested in determining how UWC would respond to the paradoxical government higher education policy, given its historical commitment to expanding access to poor students.

Third, students were facing unfamiliar challenges as they defined themselves as allies of the African National Congress (ANC)-led MDM while the challenges they confronted mostly emerged when the ANC-led government policy and students’ ‘bread and butter’ issues did not complement each other. For me, the historic 1998 UWC conflict presents an interesting particular case within a much larger question which remains to be investigated.

Furthermore, I chose UWC because of its establishment of a Student Credit Management (SCM) office, which was a brainchild of students. SCM came to be responsible for debt management (including debt collection and payments) and financial risk management at the institution (including forecasting the implications of re-admitting debt-ridden students). SCM was also responsible for student billing and played a leading and central role in negotiations between the university management and students towards financial agreements.

Finally, I chose UWC for practical reasons, because I had ease of access and already an experiential ‘knowledge’ of the institution and its stakeholders. Blatter argues that having access is another important criterion for selecting cases (2008: 69). I was employed as a researcher at one of the university’s research institutes from 2000 to 2005. As a UWC employee, a researcher in student politics and an active participant in campus politics for five years, I was able to conduct research
as an ‘insider’ thus giving me the emic perspective sought in in-depth case study research.

As noted, the study uses multiple sources of data, including interviews, official documents and observation notes. Using multiple sources of data is “important in case studies of all kinds” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 282) and the main advantage of using multiple sources of data is the ability “to triangulate” (Yin, 2009: 261). Triangulation has generally involves “a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation” (Stake, 2005: 454). It is used to avoid the “common problems of bias, poor recall and poor or inaccurate articulation” (Yin, 1994: 85). Triangulation is also an important tool of ensuring the trustworthiness of the study’s findings and conclusions, which is a critical aspect of qualitative research study. I then highlight the limitations of my study.

The case study report is presented in Chapters Five and Six. They deal respectively with the nature of student demands (that is, demands for the establishment of a democratic and independent SRC; access and equitable student funding) and the related post-apartheid government policy response as well as an analysis of the various ways in which students address their problem of unmet financial need at UWC by applying the conceptual framework.

**Outline of chapters**

Chapter Two reviews the accessible scholarly literature that I consider relevant to the research problem and question. First, I review literature on international and national financing of higher education. The focus of the analysis is on cost-sharing and South African public financing of higher education policy. I shall show that cost-sharing is a highly contested concept and presented as a funding policy solution to a higher education funding crisis, which arises as a function of escalating student demand for access and enrolment on the one hand, and declining state subsidy and related pressure for diversification of funding sources on the other hand. In Africa, cost-sharing has frequently been ‘imposed’ as a
conditionality conjoined with SAPs in several countries; there are only few countries such as South Africa, which have a pre-1990s history of some form of cost-sharing and/or ‘voluntarily’ embraced cost-sharing. The introduction of cost-sharing has resulted in different kinds of student actions in countries that ‘voluntarily’ accepted it and those that somewhat ‘involuntarily’ accepted it.

Second, I review the literature on access to higher education. I argue that access and funding are closely intertwined. Funding can facilitate or inhibit the achievement of access in higher education. In particular, the problem of students' limited ability to pay for the cost of study, i.e. students’ unmet financial need, can inhibit access, which in turn may provoke various kinds of student action. I shall show that there are different types of access and I will review literature on different kinds of student actions, especially student activism as ‘informal governance’ (Luescher, 2005: 2) involving student participation in ‘extraordinary governance processes’ (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 262) and student representation in higher education governance as ‘formal governance’ (Luescher, 2005: 2) or participation in ‘ordinary governance processes’ (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 262). I then identify gaps and implications of the literature review in relation to my study.

Chapter Three uses the results of the literature review to develop a conceptual framework for the case study. This conceptual framework serves a heuristic function. It is a guide to data collection, analysis and interpretation. I am inspired by Wright et al.’s framework (1990) to conceptualise student actions as the possible behaviours of disadvantaged group members in terms of different ideal types. This enables me to construct a matrix of two continuums, i.e. a horizontal continuum ranging from collective to individual actions at the end of each extreme; and a vertical continuum consisting of normative and non-normative elements at the end of each extreme. The examination of the relationships between the continuums lead to an emergent typology of four different kinds of student actions, which I then categorise as collective normative and collective non-normative, and individual normative and individual non-normative types. In
addition, I clarify concepts such as student activism, student body, student organisations and student to clarify their use in this study.

Chapter Four provides the overall research design and methodology of the study. I provide reasons for selecting UWC as a case study and the use of the single case study methodology. I discuss the construction of the case study database in terms of data collection (interviews, observation and documentation) and data analysis, and matters related to the trustworthiness of the study’s findings. I also identify the methodological limitations of the study.

Chapter Five provides the broader ideological and policy context of post-apartheid South African higher education, which sets up the analysis of UWC student actions against the problem of unmet financial need in Chapter Six. Specifically, I examine historical student demands (that is, demands for the establishment of a democratic and independent SRC, demands for access, and for equitable student funding) and the related post-apartheid government’s policy response. I shall show in Chapter Five that (a) there was dissonance between student expectations and the post-apartheid higher education policy; that (b) there was a historical context to both student policy expectations and government’s policy responses; and (c) that the policy response regarding access and funding seen together amount to a problematic, indeed a paradoxical, combination of policies, which, as I shall show in Chapter Six, leads to unmet financial need and various and changing ways of students addressing the problem of unmet financial need.

Chapter Six thus describes and analyses the various actions that UWC students undertook both as a collective and as individuals to address the problem of unmet financial need. It finds that students used collective normative and collective non-normative actions in a complementary manner prior to 2000. The period between 2000 and 2005 in turn was characterised by an absence of collective non-normative action, especially student activism. Instead, students relied on collective normative action to address the problem of unmet financial need. In addition, I shall explore various individual student actions aimed at addressing the
student problem of ‘unmet financial need’. Chapter Six thus applies the framework developed in Chapter Three. The thesis concludes with Chapter Seven highlighting the main findings and conclusions and offering recommendations for future research.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
This study examines various ways in which UWC confronted the paradoxical post-apartheid higher education policy of expansion of access and limited funding and how UWC students addressed the resulting problem of unmet financial need between 1995 and 2005. The previous chapter provided a general introduction to the thesis, including a statement of the problem statement and identifying the research purpose and research questions. This chapter presents a literature review based on accessible scholarly literature. First, I review literature on international and national financing of higher education. The particular focus is on cost-sharing, which the literature finds to be a highly contested concept. Cost-sharing is considered a policy solution to a higher education funding crisis attributed to an escalating student demand for access and enrolment, declining state subsidy and related pressure for diversification of funding sources. The World Bank played an important role in conceptualising and promoting cost-sharing, especially in developing countries. In particular in Africa, cost-sharing was imposed and conjoined with SAPs in several countries, while other countries ‘voluntarily’ embraced cost-sharing. South Africa is among the few African countries which have a pre-liberation history of cost-sharing; given the first post-apartheid government’s commitment to the transformation of higher education (and, indeed, society), the cost-sharing and its continuation in South African policy warrants, however, a closer inspection. Moreover, as the literature shows, cost-sharing has resulted in various kinds of student actions in both, countries that ‘voluntarily’ accepted or ‘involuntarily’ accepted it.

Second, I review the literature on access to higher education, as access and funding are closely intertwined. Funding can facilitate or inhibit the achievement of access to higher education. In particular, the problem of unmet financial need can inhibit access, which is the reason for student actions. I shall show that there are different types of access. Thirdly, I review literature on various kinds of student political actions. The analysis of student actions in general and student
activism and student participation in higher education in particular is directly relevant to the research questions. I shall show in the discussion that students undertake different actions in addressing their funding problems. Student actions depend on context and prevailing conditions. Student actions affect the relationship between students and society. The role and meaning of the concept ‘students’ continuously change.

This chapter is structured according to three themes, namely public higher education financing and student funding; access and student actions (student activism and student participation in higher education governance). It concludes by identifying implications, relevance and gaps of the literature for the study.

**Public higher education financing and student funding**

*Cost-sharing and higher education*

Cost-sharing is a relatively new concept despite the fact that some of its associated elements (such as tuition fees) predate it. Cost-sharing has been conceptualised as “the introduction of, or especially sharp increases in, tuition fees to cover part of the costs of instruction or of user charges to cover more of the costs of lodging, food, and other expenses of student living that may have hitherto been borne substantially by governments (taxpayers) or institutions” (Johnstone, 2006: 16). The origin of cost-sharing can be traced back to World Bank studies and its associated experts (including Johnstone, 1991, 1993; Woodhall, 1992; World Bank, 1994; Ziderman & Albrecht, 1995; Johnstone, Arora & Experton, 1998) who recommended the supplementation of higher educational revenue by non-governmental sources - primarily students and family as an important policy solution to increasingly underfunded and overcrowded universities in the developing world (Johnstone and Shroff-Mehta, 2000: 8).

According to Mamdani, World Bank studies claimed to show that the rate of return on investment in higher education was much lower than that in secondary or primary education, and that the benefit was mainly private. The World Bank
drew two conclusions from this, namely that the “beneficiaries should share a significant part of the cost of higher education; and, two, that the state should reduce funding to higher education” (Mamdani, 2008: 8). Thus, the ideological basis of cost-sharing is such that higher education has both public and private benefits and that any funding policy must entail state subsidy and tuition fees that must be paid by students and their parents and "paid for more often with loans and student jobs instead of grants” (Johnstone, 2006: 16; see also Merisotis and Wolanin, 2002; Van Harte, 2004; Vossensteyn, 2005).

Since its emergence, cost-sharing has also been promoted as policy solution to the persisting escalating student demand for access and enrolment and inadequate funding or financial austerity problems experienced by higher education institutions in developing and developed countries (Altbach, 2011: 308).

The degree of acceptance of cost-sharing has varied from one form of cost-sharing to another and from one country to another. According to Johnstone (2004: 5), some forms of cost-sharing are “relatively acceptable”. These include small earmarked fees such as registration, examination, or caution fees - but not yet tuition (for example in Nigeria, Egypt and India); the ‘freezing’ of the value of student grants (in most African countries, the United States and Russia); the introduction of tuition fees only for students not admitted to ‘free’ slots, thus resulting in dual or parallel track student bodies (for example in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Russia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary); the encouragement of, and even provision of revenue support to, a tuition-dependent private sector (in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, the Philippines, Japan, Korea, Brazil, Russia); enhancing the recovery of student loans (e.g. in South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, and the United States); and the introduction of tuition fees in the form of deferred contributions (in Australia, New Zealand, Scotland).

Johnstone has also identified some forms of cost-sharing that could be described as “unpopular and unacceptable”. For instance, the payment of ‘upfront tuition fees’ in public institutions remains ‘unpopular’ in South Africa and Mozambique
as well as in Britain, the Netherlands, Austria, China, Mongolia and Vietnam (2004: 5). The cutting or elimination of some student support grants is another form of cost-sharing that is ‘unpopular’ in most African countries as well as the United Kingdom (UK).

Moreover, the literature differentiates between contributions (or shares) of parents and students. Johnstone argues that a parent’s contribution is based on the principle that parents are obliged to pay for the educational costs of their “financially dependent” children “at least to the limit of their financial ability” (2006: 26-28). Beyond the dependency principle, Merisotis and Wolanin argue that parents should pay for the education of their children “not only because of the personal benefits the parents can expect to enjoy but also because it is their responsibility and their obligation as parents” (2002: 1). While this can be described as a “common cultural value”, it is not universal as cultures “clearly vary considerably in the degree to which parents are expected to pay for the education of their children, particularly education beyond secondary school” (Merisotis and Wolanin, 2002: 1).

On the student side, Johnstone argues that the theory behind the suitability of a student contribution is based “almost entirely on the assumption of substantial personal and private benefits from the higher education” (2006: 29). These presumed benefits may be manifested in having higher incomes, pleasant jobs, higher social status, improved living conditions and having a secured economic future for their children compared to those without higher education (Merisotis & Wolanin, 2002: 1).

Financial assistance plays an important role in relation to student contributions. As Woodhall argues, financial assistance enables students to pay direct and indirect costs of higher education (tuition fees, books and living expenses) and the fact that it ensures “equality of opportunity, equity, and social justice is rarely questioned” (Woodhall, 2004: 38). However, the form that such financial assistance should take (in particular, whether it should be in the form of universal
or means-tested grants or bursaries, competitive scholarships, sponsorships, sponsorship by employers, subsidised job opportunities, or student loans) remains “a matter of fierce dispute” (Woodhall, 2004: 38).

The issue of financial assistance has been a critical part of student demands or a focus of student struggles on various campuses, including UWC during the apartheid era and beyond. In the next section, I am going to explore student loans as a form of financial assistance. This is in part because the NSFAS became the primary means of post-apartheid higher education student loan funding in South Africa.

**Student loans – an important aspect of cost-sharing**

Johnstone argues that student loans, or any other sort of what are sometimes called deferred payment plans (including all forms of income-contingent and so-called graduate tax schemes, as well as more conventional, or mortgage type, forms of lending) “are integral to any policy that features as a share of higher educational costs to be borne by students” (2003a: 8).

Johnstone argues that student loans purport to achieve two distinct aims. Firstly, such schemes “are usually part of a policy of cost sharing” (2003a: 8-9). Secondly, loan schemes are ways to enhance student participation or accessibility to higher education (Johnstone, 2003a: 8-9). Consequently, equity would be achieved in “either (or both) by increasing the total revenue stream and thus expanding higher education’s capacity (and thus its accessibility), and also by making it possible for would-be students without parental or other sources of support nonetheless to invest in their own higher education” (Johnstone, 2003: 8-9).

The literature has identified problems associated with the implementation of student loans in developing countries. According to Woodhall there has not been an agreement on the feasibility or whether student loan schemes “can ever work successfully, particularly in developing countries - and if so, how best to design
and manage student loan programmes effectively” (2004: 38). Repayment of student loans has been identified as another problem being experienced more acutely in developing countries than in developed countries. This is in part because developed countries have “extensive reporting and monitoring of virtually all income and with a culture of voluntary income tax compliance may be able to overcome these problems, as Sweden and Australia seem to have done” (Johnstone and Marcucci, 2009: 19). In contrast, in developing countries, sources of income are “frequently multiple, highly variable, and often unreported, the problem of establishing the repayment obligation may be enormous and virtually invites misrepresentation of income and almost certain repayment shortfalls” (Johnstone and Marcucci, 2009: 19). It has been noted that “most loan programmes in Africa (as much as in Latin America and elsewhere in the developing world) simply do not recover payments” (Johnstone, 2006: 24; see also Johnstone, 2000; Ziderman, 2002; Ziderman & Albrecht, 1995).

Students’ aversion to debt and willingness to borrow has been identified as one of the problems related to student loans (Vossensteyn, 2005: 22). Students from lower-social economic status groups were “more likely to be deterred by higher education costs and the prospects of debt” (Vossensteyn, 2005: 42). As a result, some prospective students “who are not certain about going to higher education are strongly attracted to the financial independence of getting a job instead of studying” (Vossensteyn, 2005: 42-43).

Others who are uncertain but eventually end up going to higher education institutions are “more likely to reduce their study costs and debt by enrolling in shorter, lower level, less advanced and more vocational courses” (Vossensteyn, 2005: 42-43). Students seem to “believe that debt deters entry into higher education, and often regard it as one of the drawbacks of student life” (Vossensteyn, 2005: 43). The research results of Leslie and Brinkman (1988); Heller (1997) and Dynarski (2003) all found that grants increased the likelihood of enrolment of students and had stronger effects on students from low-income families than on students from middle- and high-income families (Vossensteyn,
In the Netherlands, one of the reasons for the decline in willingness to borrow was “the 1992 introduction of interest on student loans during college time” (Vossensteyn, 2005: 45).

Some of the challenges of student loans were confirmed by delegates attending a student loan workshop that took place in Tanzania in 2008. Delegates identified two challenging realities confronting cost-sharing in developing countries. The first reality was the ‘political opposition’ to cost-sharing. The delegates argued that political parties tended to use their opposition to cost-sharing as “focal point to galvanise support and foment campus unrest” (ICHEFAP, 2008: 3). The second reality related to the fact that any meaningful contribution to the costs of their higher education (including both tuition fees and the cost of student living) would require students to ‘defer’ in one way or the other study costs “until after completion of higher education and entry into the adult workforce - presumably at a salary that reflects the expected greater productivity of college or university graduates: in other words, a student loan scheme” (ICHEFAP, 2008: 3).

**Cost-sharing in Africa - from imposition to resistance**

As noted above, the policy of cost-sharing in Africa is both voluntary and involuntary. Cost-sharing was imposed in most African countries as part of World Bank higher education sector or structural adjustment credit in the 1990s, which was an aspect of SAPs (Wangenge-Ouma, 2008: 219, see also Fokwang, 2009 [Cameroon]; Kiamba, 2003, Ouma, 2007). In this sense cost-sharing can be seen as involuntary.

South Africa is one of the few countries that voluntarily accepted and embraced cost-sharing as a critical component of post-funding policy. In the case of South Africa, there are two possible reasons for the voluntary acceptance of cost-sharing. South Africa has a long history of tuition fees, upfront payments and fee increases, which predate the advent or emergence of cost-sharing both as concept and preferred funding policy solution internationally. Secondly, cost-sharing
seems to resonate with post-apartheid macro-economic policy. I shall examine cost-sharing in South Africa and student responses separately.

There has been resistance to various forms of cost-sharing in different countries and campuses. Student resistance took different forms. In Cameroon, during the 1994/95 academic year of the University of Buea (UB), the university administration tried to co-opt parents through the establishment of a Parent Faculty Association in a bid to stave off its financial crisis. The idea was to “create awareness of the need to diversify the university’s sources of income instead of depending exclusively on the government” (Fukwang, 2009: 15).

Students interpreted this action as the administration’s strategy to increase fees (Fukwang, 2009: 15; see also Konings, 2009). Student leadership mobilised the “student population against the idea, again pitting students against the administration in defiance of the ban on student strikes” (Fukwang, 2009: 15). The ‘ban on student strikes’ had been introduced following the initial student strike in 1993, when students “vehemently opposed some of the 1993 university reform measures, in particular the abolition of scholarships and the introduction of tuition fees” (Konings, 2009: 217). Perhaps feeling aggrieved and undermined, Dr Njeuma, the head of the university, ordered students and parents to “sign an undertaking never to indulge in strike actions” (Konings, 2009: 217). Nonetheless, students managed to achieve their objectives in 1994/95 despite the fact that some of them were “suspended indefinitely for inciting students to strike” (Fukwang, 2009: 15; see also Konings, 2009).

In Kenya, in 1989, political opposition and student unrest successfully resisted the government’s efforts to implement tuition fees in universities. The resistance occurred despite “the fact that expansion of student numbers from 8, 000 in 1984 to 40, 000 in 1990 imposed an unsustainable financial burden on government funds” (Woodhall, 2003: 47). At Kenyatta University and Egerton University students rioted in the mid-1990s over mismanaged loan payments and the exorbitant cost of university room and board. The police arrived at the scene and
crushed the student uprising. At the University of Nairobi, students demonstrated too and then rioted in 1997 over increases in tuition and government efforts to collect student loans. Armed riot police arrived on the campus and attacked the students with clubs, whips and guns, while the protesters fought back with stones. The police rampage left several students dead (Boren, 2001: 242).

In the late 1990s, the dual track tuition policy was introduced in Kenya and resulted in two types of students: government-funded students who are admitted for ‘free or nearly free’ and self-funded students who are admitted and expected to pay in order to supplement revenue (Marcucci, Johnstone & Ngolovoi, 2008: 3). In 1998, the University of Nairobi introduced the dual-track tuition policy called Model II or Parallel Programmes in the Faculties of Commerce, Law, Education, Medicine, Pharmacy, Dental Sciences and Engineering, as well as the Institute of Computer Science. The dual-track tuition policy served to supplement government revenue.

Johnstone (2006: 22) argues that dual-track tuition policies have been successful with respect to wages, faculty retention, infrastructure and technology. However, dual-track tuition policies or programmes also had several negative consequences. Zeleza argues that as fees rise or become more differentiated across programmes, learning increasingly becomes a “market transaction and consumer mentality takes hold among the high fee paying students, thereby weakening their collective capacity to protect their rights and the quality of their education” (2003: 165).

The Makerere University Council and administration imposed cost-sharing in 1990/91 (Mamdani, 2007: 15). Mamdani argued that the Makerere University faced “the drying up of financial resources as if it were a natural fact, something beyond its control” (2007: 9). The government was “in a position to set priorities, but within constraints of diminishing resources and with the full knowledge that it would have to shoulder responsibility for policy outcomes” (Mamdani, 2007: 9). Conversely, the World Bank was a “powerful creditor that was in the enviable
Mamdani then argued that “not surprisingly, the Makerere University Council’s first option was to look for ways to cut cost rather than to change policy priorities” (Mamdani, 2007: 9). The Makerere University Council made its decision “long before government commissions raised the issue; Makerere University Council began to explore cost-sharing as an option” (Mamdani, 2007: 9-10) in a “context … increasingly being defined by the World Bank” (Mamdani, 2007: 10; see also Wangenge-Ouma, 2008). So the cost-sharing was a “top-down strategy pushed by the Makerere University Council and the administration and opposed by staff and students” (Mamdani, 2007: 17; see also Byaruhanga, 2006).

Students led strong resistance and opposition to reforms at Makerere University between 1989 and 1994. The resistance took various forms. Firstly, student leadership engaged the student body partly to receive a mandate on the appropriate direction and actions to be taken. On Saturday 01 December 1990, the student guild leadership “convened a general assembly to solicit students’ response to a letter from the permanent secretary, Ministry of Education Fr. Pius Tibanyendera, restating the government’s decision to abolish student allowances (book, transport allowances and pocket money ['boom'])” (Byaruhanga, 2006: 97). The contents of the letter “enraged the students, who quickly decided to call a Student Emergency General Assembly on 1 December 1990. The second student action involved negotiations with the university management. Students invited the Vice-chancellor to attend the assembly and listen to students’ concerns, but “he declined the invitation, charging that he had not been informed ahead of time” (Byaruhanga, 2006: 97). Students then passed a vote of no confidence in the Vice-chancellor, “accusing him of dereliction of duty by prevaricating on student matters” (Byaruhanga, 2006: 97). Students also accused the Vice-chancellor of previously having served on the Visitation Committee (appointed by President Yoweri Museveni) in 1987 and as chairman of the Education Policy Review
Commission, which proposed the introduction of cost-sharing in education (Mamdani, 2007: 17).

Thirdly, student actions involved defiance, class boycotts and peaceful demonstrations against the government decision to eliminate student allowances (2006: 99). Despite a stern warning letter from the vice-chancellor against the planned boycott, students “staged a peaceful demonstration on Wednesday December 5, during which a group of about 3000 students marched around campus sounding their displeasure toward the vice-chancellor, while renewing their demands for allowances” (Byaruhanga, 2006: 99).

Again, on Monday morning, 10 December 1990, students began to “converge at the main building for the planned assembly, but suddenly the situation turned sour. Before the guild president arrived, police, who were earlier deployed to intercept the assemblage began to open fire, killing two students” (Byaruhanga, 2006: 99). Government “ordered closure of the university on 10 December 1990, sending all students home” (Mamdani, 2007: 17). Government continued “with a coercive and administrative response, compelling students individually to sign statements that combined a total renunciation of the strike with a blanket acceptance of all future decisions of the authorities” (Mamdani, 2007: 17). Part of the statement required that the student “sign a statement of abject surrender in schoolboy fashion” (Mamdani: 2007: 18). The last student action against cost-sharing was “the march to Parliament on 10 May 1994, and the agitation at Freedom Square the day after” (Mamdani, 2007: 18-19).

Thereafter Makerere University students embarked on a series of so-called ‘needy students demonstrations’, which demanded that government should find an alternative solution to the abolishment of allowances. Government conceded, and the 1992 White Paper on Education was promulgated and sanctioned the “creation of the ‘Needy Students’ Work Scheme” (Byaruhanga, 2006: 105). The university was encouraged to “provide work opportunities to the needy students in such janitorial areas as cleaning after meals and the like” (Byaruhanga, 2006: 106).
This section of the literature review has provided insights into the concept and policy of cost-sharing, which is a cornerstone of the problem of unmet financial need. The policy of cost-sharing requires that students share the burden of the costs of study irrespective of whether they can afford it or whether they have funding sources from which their contributions will come. Potentially, students who can afford the fees would have no problem to pay their contribution. However, for poor students who cannot afford to pay their contribution, the gap between educational costs and available funding can create a problem of unmet financial need. Therefore the issue of financial assistance could become critical.

The literature review showed that the issue of financial assistance has been accepted as a necessity but the form it should take, whether it should be in the form of subsidised job opportunities or student loans, remains in dispute. Student loans have been promoted as a form of financial assistance as part of the policy of cost-sharing. However, the implementation of student loans experienced challenges, especially in developing countries. Debt aversion and the unwillingness of poor students to borrow and repay student loans were some of the student challenges identified.

Other forms of cost-sharing have also experienced implementation and acceptability challenges in developing countries. Students embarked on different actions to resist or challenge the implementation of cost-sharing, which was imposed as part of SAPs in some African countries or World Bank-driven higher education reforms. Specifically, the analysis of Cameroon, Uganda and Kenya has shown that students’ actions against cost-sharing included defiance, student mobilisation, protests, peaceful demonstrations and marches, as well as class boycotts. These forms of student actions perhaps highlight a gap in the literature that I reviewed, namely that there was no focus on formal student participation in higher education governance, especially negotiations between students and university management. Potentially, the case study of UWC can contribute to closing this gap.
The literature review also indicated that some African countries, including South Africa, voluntarily embraced and implemented cost-sharing as part of student funding policy. In the next section, I shall examine cost-sharing in South Africa and student responses.

Cost-sharing in South Africa: historical context, implementation and student resistance

As indicated above, South Africa has a long history of some forms of cost-sharing (such as tuition fees). Therefore it is important to go beyond cost-sharing as it now appears in a post-apartheid public higher education funding policy. In the analysis, I am going to examine both the apartheid public higher education funding policy and the post-apartheid public higher education funding policy and their impact on students and resultant student responses.

Apartheid higher education funding system - for white and black

Higher education funding policies during the apartheid period (1948-1994) mirrored the apartheid regime’s divisions and the different governance models that it imposed on the higher education system (Bunting, 2006: 73). Funding and governance policies were integrally linked. Funding policy was designed in such a manner that it reflected perpetuated and maintained racial bigotry. The apartheid higher education funding policy was differentiated according to the old Republic of South Africa (RSA) and the former Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) states. It was also differentiated along the racial divide, that is, HBUs and historically white universities (HWUs). The HWUs were funded through the South African Post-Secondary Education (SAPSE) funding formula (Bunting, 2006: 73). The SAPSE framework “explicitly rejected the principles of equity and redress, holding that it was not the business of the higher education system to deal with social inequalities which affected either individuals or institutions” (Bunting, 2006: 84). The HBUs and technikons were funded through the so-called ‘negotiated budgets’ system.
The highly differential apartheid funding policy accorded institutions different powers. HWUs had considerable administrative and financial powers relative to HBUs, which had limited or no institutional autonomy. HBUs could not determine tuition fees, employ new staff or buy equipment and building material without the approval of the ‘controlling government department’ (Bunting, 2006: 74).

HBUs aspired to have a similar level of autonomy as HWUs during the 1980s. They envisaged that the achievement of autonomy would happen through the “adoption by their departments of the funding framework of the historically white universities. By 1988, the 18 HBUs (including UWC) had achieved their ambition to be placed on the same funding basis as the historically white universities” (Bunting, 2006: 74).

The SAPSE formula was applied to the six HBUs’ state allocations by the end of the 1980s. These institutions also accepted the assumptions and principles that underpinned SAPSE on the basis that they would gain more administrative and financial powers, as well as financial benefits to be accrued as a result of growth in student enrolments (Bunting, 2006: 76).

The government was of the view that its apartheid ideological basis remained intact; “all universities and technikons should be given high levels of administrative and financial autonomy” (Bunting, 2006: 76-77). It was also of the view that the so-called ‘higher education market’ should determine the size and shape of the higher education system in line with its apartheid agenda (Bunting, 2006: 77). Notwithstanding achieving some relative autonomy, between 1986 and 1994 HBUs experienced “severe financial strains” (Bunting, 2006: 81).

According to Bunting (2006: 81), three aspects of its financial performance in the years between 1986 and 1994 had generated severe financial strains on the RSA’s historically black university sector. First, because government appropriation totals in real terms remained flat over this period, even though student enrolments had
grown rapidly, the real government income per student at the HBUs had fallen sharply by 1994 compared with 1988. This happened because of the rapid student growth between 1986 and 1994.

Second, the RSA’s HBUs had been forced to rely to an increasing extent on student tuition fee collections to build up their required income. This had placed a heavy burden on students who came from economically disadvantaged sectors of South African society and were unable to meet large increases in their tuition fees and cost of living expenses. In consequence the HBUs were forced to “project their expenditure budgets on the assumption that they would be able to collect 100% of their student fee billings, even when there was evidence that they knew that at least 33% of all fees charged would remain uncollected” (Bunting, 2006: 81).

Third, the problems that this funding framework generated for historically black institutions emerged even more clearly when the universities and technikons of the TBVC countries were incorporated into the South African higher education system after the 1994 elections. These seven universities and technikons had not been placed on the SAPSE formula in 1988.

After the 1994 elections, all higher education institutions fell under the control of a new national Department of Education. Subsequently, the differential funding policy was abolished and instead all institutions (including those in the former TBVC states) received their allocations through the same funding formula. Government gave TBVC institutions about five years to ‘adapt’ to lower levels of government funding because they had received generous funding through the TBVC regimes in comparison with that of black as well as white institutions in the old RSA (Bunting, 2006: 81).

These developments had several implications for students. For instance, the fact that the apartheid regime had different funding formulae for HWUs and HBUs meant that the HBUs had to rely on student tuition fee collections to build up their
required income. The effect of this was a heavy burden on poor students who could not manage to deal with increases in their tuition fees and the cost of living expenses. This led to increasing student debt. In the next section, I examine issues of state subsidy and tuition increases.

Declining state subsidy and tuition fee increase

The state subsidy to South African higher education declined while tuition-fee income increased from 1986 to 2003. Steyn and de Villiers pointed out that the tuition fees as a percentage of total income for the HWUs increased from 13% in 1986 to 23% in 2003. The state appropriations as a percentage of the total income of HWUs declined from 51% in 1986 to 40% in 2003 (2006: 92).

Steyn and De Villiers found that tuition fees as a percentage of total income increased for HBUs from 11% in 1986 to 25% in 2003 (2006: 92; see also Pillay, 2003). The state appropriation as a percentage of the total income of the group was 66% in 1986 and decreased to 51% in 2003 (Steyn and De Villiers, 2006: 93). The Department of Education noted that student fees constituted 29% of the income of all public higher education institutions in 2005 from 24% in 2000 (HESA report, 2008: 10; see also Wangenge-Ouma and Cloete, 2008).

Steyn and De Villiers (2006: 94) indicated that the tuition fees as a percentage of total income increased for HWUs from 15% in 1986 to 31% in 2003. The contribution of the state’s appropriation for this group was initially high at 60%, but since 1990 it has been lower and relatively constant around 50%.

The post-apartheid ANC-led government was confronted with the challenge of having two broad sets of higher education institutions. The first set, the HWUs, had “enjoyed a period of relative institutional stability during 1983-1993 and were poised to engage in a greater level of entrepreneurial activity to increase their sources of own income” (Stumpf, 2001a: 2-3).
The second set was the HBUs, institutions that had “experienced a decade (1983-1993) of great institutional instability and seemed to place an inordinate amount of trust and hope in government to secure their financial futures through redress measures including student financial aid and the undoing of past injustices” (Stumpf, 2001a: 2-3). UWC was in this cohort.

**Student responses to cost-sharing in South Africa**

Student activism has been a common student response in dealing with multiple effects and implications of cost-sharing for higher education access. According to Wangenge-Ouma, tuition fees per full-time equivalent enrolled student in nominal rands rose at an average annual rate of 12.2% between 2000 and 2004, and in real terms at an annual average rate of 4.8% (2012: 5). In essence, the students’ view has been that tuition fee increases “make higher education unaffordable for poor students” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 5). According to Koen, Cele and Libhaber (2006: 408), about 51 incidents of student activism against cost-sharing (financial aid, financial exclusions and fee increases) took place in South African higher education institutions between 2002 and 2004. Student activism became “violent at times” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 5; see also Pithouse 2006: xxiv). The most notable incidents occurred at the UWC in October 1998; at the University of Witwatersrand (Wits) early in 2001 and again in 2004; at the former University of the North in early 2004; and at the former University of Durban-Westville (UDW) in 1998 and again in 2000 (Pithouse 2006: xxiv).

Koen et al. (2006: 407) found that all 51 recorded incidents of student activism were focused on institutions instead of the state. Koen et al. (2006) argue that the absence of state-focused student activism suggests that the post-apartheid state “has reasonably successfully resolved the key student-linked higher education challenges that it faced” (407-408). For example, state intervention in 2000 at the former UDW “contributed significantly to the appointment of a commission to investigate student and management actions and the appointment of a mediator to moderate engagement between students and management using a style appropriate to trade union negotiations” (Koen et al., 2006: 408).
Similar state intervention took place in 2004 at Wits following a deadlock and week-long student activism against cost-sharing. About 3 000 Wits students received letters informing them that their financial aid would be cut by up to 50%. The financial aid problems emanated from a R33 million cut in Wits’s aid budget in 2004. The cut was supposed to enable Wits to balance its books after it overspent by about R30 million on financial aid during the 2003 academic year (Edusource Data News no 46, 24 December 2004). From the perspective of students, the action taken by the Wits management was nothing but part of a continuous trend by certain administrators of higher education to commodify education rather than treating it as a basic need of the South African people (IOL, 08 October 2007). Wits senior staff and students slammed management’s apparent inability to foresee that increasing numbers of disadvantaged students would apply for financial aid and that its budget would not be able to meet the increased need (Mail & Guardian, 30 April 2004).

Students called for state intervention, which resulted in several meetings between senior officials of the former national Department of Education, university management and students. Consequently students suspended their collective action. A compromise was reached between university management and the SRC at the end of April. They agreed that the university would not exclude students who could not afford to continue their studies on the reduced aid, and the SRC and university management would raise funds to meet the estimated R40 million shortfall (Edusource Data News no 46, 24 December 2004). Another contested issue related to 12 students who were arrested and charged with public violence and participating in an illegal gathering during student activism. Students threatened to resume activism if the university did not drop the charges or refrained from charging interest on the accounts of students on financial aid (Edusource Data News no 46, 24 December 2004).

The Wits case highlights important issues related to understanding student actions in response to cost-sharing. The role of the state is an ambiguous one. As a
custodian of cost-sharing policy, it does not become an object of student anger, frustration and student activism. Instead, higher education institutions become the object of student activism. However, the same institutions would call for state ‘coercive and administrative’ intervention, which tends to come in the form of police, thus resulting in ‘campus invasions’. The police presence on campuses tends to exacerbate student anger and confrontation, which leads to arrests and imprisonment. Nevertheless, the state intervenes as ‘mediator’ between students and management. The literature suggests that the locus of struggle against cost-sharing seems to have shifted to higher education institutions; the university management and students thus have to face each other. Moreover, as demonstrated by the Wits case, student activism has remained a dominant student collective response. However, students also use negotiations and state intervention and forge alliances with staff in a complementary manner.

The literature review has shown that students embarked on various collective actions to address their funding problems, in relation to, for example, tuition fee increases, financial exclusions and financial aid. Various campuses have experienced different kinds of student actions, with student activism and negotiations dominating. Students have tended to use a combination of actions in order to address their problems. The literature also highlighted the ambivalent role of the state as enforcer of ‘stability’ by deploying the police and acting as mediator when there is a deadlock between students and the university management. Students directed their anger and frustrations at their institutions rather than the state as the source of their funding problems.

Provided that student struggles concerning funding concerns were primarily about ensuring students’ access to higher education, especially for those coming from a historically disadvantaged background and the poor, I shall therefore examine the issue of access more closely in the next section.
Access

Access to university education is an “important means to individual and collective social mobility” (Sichone, 2006: 35). The issue of access has been and remains a critical part of the national higher education policy and top of the student agenda. In his seminal writing, Morrow distinguishes between two types of access, that is, formal and epistemological access. Formal access is achieved once a student becomes “legally registered at the university” (Morrow, 1993: 3). Epistemological access is achieved when a student is able to access an ‘essential good’ or knowledge that is distributed by a university (Morrow, 1993: 3).

Reflecting on the pre-1994 era, Morrow argues that as part of its project of democratising access to knowledge, UWC developed an admissions policy that enabled many students who would not otherwise have had this opportunity to gain formal access to university education. There was a mismatch between the increased number of admitted students and available teaching staff. In consequence, Morrow argues, the university could not “in real terms provide adequate access to university education”, which is sometimes expressed as an issue of “quality or standards” (1993: 3). Morrow further argues that “unless there is a corresponding increase in teaching staff more formal access leads to less epistemological access” (1993: 3). It is therefore important to recognise access as a “complex domain and its expansion transcends enrolment management and admissions practices” (Subotzky, Koen and Howell, 2004: 1). Put differently, “opening doors of higher education is only a small part of [the] process” (Bird, 1996: 9). Emphasis must be put on both access and success in order to achieve equity.

People hold different views on access. Drawing on the American experience of racial segregation, Bird argues that “whereas white people emphasise issues of access, black people are far more concerned with what happens when black students enter higher education” (Bird, 1996: 10). Bird argues further that the experience of black students in higher education was not characterised by “quality treatment or by quality of treatment” (Bird, 1996: 10).
The achievement of greater and more equitable access would have been viewed as a crucial step in transforming higher education inequalities in order to create conditions and make “opportunities available to [historically disadvantaged] students who qualify to pursue different academic programmes” (Ngome, 2006: 845).

Access is relevant to the research question. Funding can facilitate or inhibit students’ formal access to higher education. In particular the problem of unmet financial need is a hindrance to formal access. Addressing the problem of unmet financial need is a means to the end of formal access. Students embark on any action to address the problem of unmet financial need primarily in order to access higher education (whether that means entering for the first time or resisting financial exclusion from higher education). My argument is that students act against the problem of unmet financial need not for its own sake but for the purpose of accessing higher education. In the next section, I examine literature on student action, especially student activism and formal student participation in higher education governance, as student actions are at the core of the research question.

**Student actions**

**Student activism**
In the preceding discussion of existing literature I have shown that students have tended to embark on student activism as part of their resistance to cost-sharing in various countries. Therefore I would like to explore student activism further as a concept, a form of student action and in terms of its impact on society. The survey of international literature on student activism shows that a lot has been done to understand the phenomenon, its role and impact (Luescher, 2005: 1; Pabian and Minksové, 2011: 262). However, some writers have raised concerns about the focus of the literature, which has “mainly been on industrialised nations and less on developing nations” (Byaruhanga, 2006: xviii; Munene, 2009: 117), with a

Student activism can influence and can be influenced by different social and political conditions (Badat, 1999: 21; see also Altbach, 1997). Student activism played a catalytic role in the national liberation struggles against colonialism, imperialism and apartheid, in Africa and continues to do so even in the post-independence era SAPs in African economies (see Altbach, 2004; Badat, 1999; Burawoy, 1976; Chikwanha 2009; Diouf, 1996, 2003; Munene, 2003 and Wolpe, 1994). It is through student activism that student latent and yet potent power is unleashed and students regain self-belief and courage to take on authority and power without fear.

Some writers have argued that student activism has had a greater impact in Africa than in the economically developed nations (Munene, 2009: 118, see also Altbach, 1997: 211). Some of the notable impacts of student activism include creating ‘government instability’, ‘power political shifts’ and overthrowing governments in some African states (Altbach, 2004: 47, see also Munene, 2003: 117). Some of the oppressive regimes that were overthrown with the element of student militancy and activism include the Bokassa regime of the Central African Republic in 1979 (Byaruhanga, 2006: xvii) and the Banda regime in Malawi in 1994 (Zeilig and Dawson, 2008: 22). In South Africa, students were “major catalysts of popular struggles against apartheid and often characterised as the shock-troops of the South African revolution” (Wolpe, 1994: 7).

The ‘nationalist project’ pursued by post-independence African nation states sought to “maintain the frontier between elders and juniors that characterised traditional African values, and to put young people at the centre of plans for economic development and national liberation” (Diouf, 2003: 3-4). At the same
time, students and youth were “conceived not only as the hope of African nations under construction, the chief actor in African societies’ struggle against underdevelopment, poverty, misery, and illiteracy but also as the hope of the world” (Diouf, 2003: 4, see also Burawoy, 1976). These various constructions of students implicitly suggest that students should see themselves as part of and responsible for the reconstruction and development process rather than take a distant, disinterested and critical stance against power. I may be giving a simplistic interpretation to a very complicated problem of redefining the relationship between democratic and developmental states and liberation movements and erstwhile allies such as students on the one hand, and liberation movements and social movements, including student organisations, on the other. While this problem remains unresolved in some countries, it is a well-known fact that student activism has not stopped. Its frequency, scale and degree of impact may change, but as a phenomenon student activism continues.

Chikwanha argues that after independence Zimbabwean students functioned as “an episodic oppositional force and periodically demonstrated against the government’s policies, which they view as violating their freedom and dignity” (2009: 80). For Diouf the failures of nationalist economic, cultural, and political models across the African continent had “particularly dreadful effects on young people. As national models of economic development proved to be inadequate or irrelevant, so did customary rites of socialisation through work or education” (2003: 4). Young people thus became the “first group in society to have manifested, in practical and often violent ways, hostility toward the reconstituted nationalist movement” (Diouf, 1996: 42). They also began to identify “authoritarian drift of postcolonial powers whose neo-colonial economic and political orientations they denounce” (Diouf, 1996: 42-43). This awareness seems to have been the “basis for youth’s resistance to the repression, *encadrement*, and co-optation through which the state handles social movements” (Diouf, 1996: 42-43). In confronting the effects of the collapsing nationalist project, youth "moved into the cracks opened up by the crisis of the state and society. African youth has provoked an unprecedented moral and civic panic” (Diouf, 2003: 9). This was
accompanied by violent activities, which as Diouf argues reflected the "enterprise of the postcolonial legitimacies" (2003: 7). Both the challenge to postcolonial powers (especially in Africa) and the violent nature of student activism have resulted in students being “seen and constructed as menace” (Diouf, 2003: 9). At the same time, the notion of youth as the "hope of the world’ has been replaced by representations of youth as dangerous, criminal, decadent, and given to a sexuality that is unrestrained and threatening for the whole society” (Diouf, 2003: 4). It seems students do not only serve, as Altbach puts it, as "spokespersons for [the] broader population" (1998: 162) and the "conscience of their societies" (1998: 162-163).

Some writers have tried to provide reasons for student violence. Konings suggests two reasons for student violent actions after observing the 2005 and 2006 UB student strikes that were marked by a high degree of violence. The first relates to the “regular failure of university and government officials to take students seriously and create effective channels of communication and negotiation” (2009: 214). Students use violence to give voice to their grievances mainly because of the intransigence of university officials who tend to be “suspicious of student unions and are hesitant about allowing students to unionise” (Konings, 2009: 214). The second reason is that university and government officials are “more inclined to solve student problems through repression than dialogue and peaceful negotiation” (Konings, 2009: 214). Conversely, for authorities, violence serves as a “deterrent to the students from engaging in any ‘irresponsible’ behaviour, but the provocative and brutal actions of the security forces have also tended to fuel student violence” (Konings, 2009: 214). I think it is fair to assume that universities and governments differ from one country or continent to another and therefore accept that some will resort to repression out of choice while others may detest violence but resort to repression because of their failure to find an alternative response. It cannot be assumed that all universities and governments are inherently repressive and that their relationship with students is necessarily and permanently antagonistic. There are many examples of students and universities standing side by side against autocratic regimes. My view is that the
reasons for students using violence are very complicated and can actually form part of a future research agenda on student activism - not from psychological but from sociological and political or even historical perspectives.

There is a considerable body of literature focusing on student activism against SAPs in African economies. I indicated earlier that cost-sharing was imposed in some African countries as part of SAPs. SAPs were essential elements of the neoliberal globalisation phenomenon underlined by the Washington Consensus, which refers to the 1980s-1990s ideology of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), US Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board and assorted Washington think tanks funded by large corporations and banks, as well as institutions outside Washington, such as the World Trade Organisation (Bond, 2000: 156). The universities were at the centre of this process and the resistance to it, both because of the “heated debates and anti-IMF mobilisations these policies generated within them, and because, from the start, they were one of the main targets of the cuts in public funds introduced in the name of paying the debt” (Alidou et al., 2008: 62).

Towards the end of the 1980s, prescriptions of SAPs had “begun to affect the education sector and suspicions of the government’s intentions towards the student body began to surface” (Chikwanha, 2009: 77; see also Zeilig and Dawson, 2008: 22). The universities were forced to cut budgets and rationalise resources as part of implementation of SAPs (Teferra and Altbach, 2004: 46).

Public investment in education was gutted, user fees were introduced, and programmes were restructured so as to boost a technocratic knowledge appropriate for the tasks of economic liberalisation. The whole project was promoted by the World Bank under what Alidou, Caffentzis and Federici called “the racist title of ‘Africa Capacity Building’” (Alidou et al., 2008: 63). The budget cuts became a hotbed for student anger and struggles against “deteriorating living and academic conditions, poor student services, delay of stipends, and/or removal of perquisites and benefits” (Teferra and Altbach, 2004: 46). There was
open confrontation between students and government and student activism was increasingly repressed by force (Alidou et al., 2008: 62). Demonstrations, strikes, blockades, confrontations with police and armed forces invading the campuses quickly became part of the campus experience in many African countries (Alidou et al., 2008: 63).

The recent changes in higher education (including managerialism) have had an impact on student activism. In a case study of the University of Cape Town, Luescher-Mamashela found that managerialism changed student governance into a collegial-managerial regime and was reflecting an “individualistic, consumerist discourse, which appears to challenge the classic, emancipatory type of student activism” (2010a: 279). He then characterised the emergent new form of student activism as “entrepreneurial student activism” (2010a: 279). Some of the features of ‘entrepreneurial student activism’ include that it is “consumerist, individualist, and actively seeking the inclusion of student leaders in established authority rather than being revolutionary” (Luescher-Mamashela, 2010a: 279). In a reconceptualised role of students as clients, student leaders “only retained a degree of formal involvement in institutional decision-making as much as this would lead to better information being available to decision-makers and improved organisational performance” (Luescher-Mamashela, 2010a: 280).

Student activism has contributed to university transformation in various countries, changes of which “include curricula reforms, structural changes that resulted in the inclusion of students in the echelons of university governance” (Byaruhanga, 2006: xvii, see also Altbach, 1998: 153). I explore the issue of student inclusion in the university governance in the next section. It is important to note that student activism had an impact on the decisions of higher education institutions to accept the need and importance of involving students in formal governance processes (Byaruhanga, 2006: xvii; see also Altbach, 1997, 2006; Pabian and Minksová, 2011). Accordingly research studies have been conducted and literature has emerged focusing on a range of aspects related to student participation in higher education governance.
Student participation in higher education governance

According to Minksová and Pabian, despite a considerable number of studies on student involvement in governance, “unfortunately this topic remains ‘under-researched’” (2011: 262; see also Luescher, 2005). Some recent South African academic writings on the subject include those of Johnson (2000), Luescher-Mamashela (2010a), Luescher (2009, 2008, 2005) and Koen et al. (2006). Historically, students’ demand for participation in South African higher education governance was linked to the broader call for the transformation of higher education and democratisation of the political and social system (Maseko, 1994). This demand was finally realised with the promulgation of the Higher Education Act 1997, which formally recognised students as one of the key stakeholders in higher education.

The South African experience followed an international trend where students demanded institutional reform, especially ‘university democratisation’. According to Luescher-Mamashela, university democratisation can be defined as a “reconstitution of internal decision-making in universities with reference to democratic principles, inter alia, by making decision-making processes in universities more representative of internal constituencies such as students” (2010a: 260).

Consequently, higher education stakeholders reached general consensus that students should participate in higher education governance largely owing to what Pabian and Minksová describe as the “universal acceptance of (at least some of) the principles of representative democracy in higher education” (2011: 271). What remains in dispute among stakeholders relates to how and to what extent students should participate (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 271). Partly, the stakeholder differences can be attributed to their different and “competing visions of higher education” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 271).
Luescher (2005: 7) states that the formal inclusion of students in African higher education governance has taken three principal forms, namely (a) establishment of student governments on university campuses, (b) representation of the institutional student body in certain structures of university governance, and (c) involvement of national (or institutional) student organisations in higher education policymaking. However, there is a “paucity of publications on student involvement in national higher education governance” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 263).

In the literature, it has been suggested that one way of understanding student participation is by situating it within different types of higher education governance. In particular, the literature has identified four ideal types of higher education governance, which, as Pabian and Minksová have cautioned, however, were “formulated without students in mind” (2011: 269). A first ideal-type higher education governance model is called the representative democracy. This model rejects the idea that a single actor, such as the state or the academic estate, can represent the ‘general will’, instead, it opens the gates to the principle that every interest group should be democratically represented in the governance process (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 270). Within the logic of a representative democracy model students are defined as “legitimate or even as principal stakeholders in higher education” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 270). Students thus have the “fundamental right to participate in higher education processes at all levels and in all areas of decision-making on equal terms with other academic citizens and external stakeholders” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 270). When the students’ position is defined in this way, they play the role of “collaborators in achieving goals negotiated with other actors represented in the governance processes” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 270).

In addition, students will have a “strong sense of ownership of the university and conceive of themselves as a distinct group within a university community that ought to be governed democratically” (Luescher-Mamashela, 2010a: 262). The representative democracy model seems to have inspired some of the governance
proposals for a post-apartheid higher education policy (e.g. the 1996 NCHE and 1997 White Paper on Higher Education).

Secondly, the model of the academic oligarchy conceptualises the university as a “meritocratic community of scholars” (Oslen, 2005: 8). Pabian and Minksová thus argue that an academic oligarchy model is based on the “meritocratic principle” (2011: 269) that the “only legitimate authority is based on neutral competence” (Oslen, 2005: 10). The university is a “collegial organisation, [of] or [with] elected leaders and disciplinary organization” (Oslen, 2005: 10). The model of academic oligarchy only bestows on the academics (by virtue of their teaching and research responsibilities) the right to “participate in the governance of higher education because nobody else is qualified to make decisions about these tasks” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 269). Inherently, within this logic of academic oligarchy, students are not expected to play any role in governance in part because they are “learners, they enjoy the freedom to learn (Lernfreiheit) but obviously lack the academic qualifications to participate in the decision-making process” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 269).

Thirdly, the state bureaucracy model is based on the logic that the “most important authority in higher education is that of the state” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 269). Essentially, in the state bureaucracy model the university is an “instrument for national political agendas” (Oslen, 2005: 10). Therefore, it is expected that university decisions should be geared towards meeting national agendas whether “they are nation building or economic development” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 269). Following this logic, students have “no say in the formulation of policy agendas and are hardly in a position to participate in their implementation” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 269).

Student exclusion would be justified on the basis that students are “immature and incapable and impartial (they will promote the particular corporate interests of the student body, in contrast to the state, which promotes general societal interests)” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 270).
Fourthly, there is the market enterprise model in which higher education institutions are given the responsibility of ensuring “student satisfaction, in particular with regard to the provision of education and support services, thus leading to the development of satisfaction feedback mechanisms as the primary venue of student involvement in the governance processes” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 270). The market enterprise model defines students as ‘consumers’ or ‘clients’ or ‘beneficiaries’, in keeping with the hallmark of the neoliberal thinking and related institutions such as the World Bank (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 270; see also Luescher-Mamashela, 2010a: 264; McCulloch, 2009: 171). McCulloch writes that in the model of ‘student as consumer’, the university acts as the “provider of products and services, in the form of programmes of study and support for the pursuit of those programmes, and the student acts as a consumer of those products and that support” (2009: 171). As identified by McCulloch, some of the criticism against the ‘student as consumer’ concept stems from the fact it (a) “inappropriately compartmentalises the educational experience as a product as opposed to a process” and (b) “does little to clarify or to harmonise organisational relationships” (2009: 173).

In the market enterprise model, the participation of students in university governance “may amount to little more than the representation of service-users on user committees” (Luescher-Mamashela, 2010a: 262). Thus, in that study, student leaders “only retained a degree [of] formal involvement in institutional decision-making in as much as this would lead to better information being available to decision-makers and improved organisational performance” (Luescher-Mamashela, 2010a: 280).

Student participation has been assessed in some countries, such as Italy, Norway and Portugal. According to Pabian and Minksová, while students were allowed to participate and were democratically represented in Italy’s higher education governance structures, they “occupied a minority position in all the elected bodies while the decisive majority remained in the hands of the academics” (2011: 266).
This is, in part, because academics “refuse to accept students as fully legitimate actors in higher education governance” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 269). Students have therefore tended to distance themselves from the ordinary governance processes; instead they engage more in extraordinary student activism (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 269). Furthermore, Pabian and Minksová argue that in Norway, the “role of representative bodies was weakened and the students’ position partly refined as customers whose satisfaction is very important but who perhaps lack expertise to participate in managerial decision-making” (2011: 266). Conversely, in the case of Portugal, students are seen as ‘members of the academic community’ and therefore treated as such in governance processes. Pabian and Minksová note several factors that served as constraints to student participation. For instance, student participation was affected by institutional culture, which “is dominated by the values of academics and academic managers, thus symbolically relegating students to secondary positions and perhaps even leading them to withdraw their commitment” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 267).

Luescher argues that formal student participation in university decision-making would provide, on the one hand, an alternative to tactics of coercion and disruption by students; on the other hand, it might also moderate the partisan views of other members of the university and thus create less adversarial relationships on campus (2008: 24). Co-optation of students onto university committees is therefore a double-edged sword with a moderating effect on student activists as well as on the other role-players in decision-making, with benefits to all involved (Luescher, 2008: 24). The impact or effect of student participation in higher education governance on student activists and other stakeholders still requires systematic analysis, especially since South African higher education institutions continue to experience student activism. It is therefore necessary to be a little cautious.

The literature review has identified various ways in which student participation occurs, depending on the nature or model of the university. It also indicated that the meaning and role of students are defined differently under the different
models. Therefore, it is possible to locate UWC within the different models and think of the type of role that students play as they participate in formal governance. At an organisational level, UWC governance may be described as a hybrid model involving elements of a representative democracy model and, as far as the senate is concerned, it may also reflect aspects of academic oligarchy model.

The case study of UWC will enhance our understanding of students’ role in formal higher education governance, including the role of negotiations between UWC students and the university management and designated officials concerning funding problems.

**Implications and relevance of the literature review**

The literature review has shed light on issues to consider when developing a conceptual framework as well as on the analysis and interpretation of data. However, affordability (by state and students) has been raised as a serious challenge and the “main militating factor against maintaining wide scale enrolments” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 5). In both developed and developing nations, financial austerity has been crippling higher education institutions, which are battling with pressures of expanding access and increasing costs (Altbach, 2011: 307).

Cost-sharing has been proposed, adopted and contested as a funding policy solution. Cost-sharing is predicated on the view that higher education has both private and public benefits and therefore suggests financing of higher education must consist of a state subsidy and tuition fees. At the heart of cost-sharing is the notion that parents, students and the state should share the burden of the costs of study. Cost-sharing takes different forms, such as tuition fee increment, upfront payments, rationalisation of budgets and abolition of student allowances, all of which affect access and have in the past “triggered student activism, which was at times violent” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 5).
A synthesis of the views of Morrow, Subotzky, Koen and Howell emphasises the importance of thinking about access in relation to success, the effect of which will be equity. However, little or nothing has been said in the existing literature about the role that funding can play as an enabler or inhibitor to access. Funding is therefore a key determinant of access to higher education in South Africa. The existing funding context (declining government funding, regular tuition fee increases and inadequate NSFAS funding) is one that is arguably “inimical to wider access and participation, and therefore, the achievement of equity of access in South Africa’s higher education” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 5). I therefore propose that financial access needs to be recognised as critical in providing financial means for equitable outcomes. It must be considered alongside with formal and epistemological access.

The literature has identified different actions that students take in order to address their problems. Drawing on Byaruhanga and Badat’s conceptualisation of student activism, there are numerous points that are relevant for the present study. These include the fact that student activism influences and is influenced by educational and political conditions. In an attempt to understand students’ strategies and activities, it is important to analyse both internal factors (such as student origin, organisation, and leadership) and external factors. Another issue that has to be taken into account is the relationship between students and the ruling party, e.g. the ANC in post-apartheid South Africa, which they helped to bring to power, and the relationship between students and government. Finally, the relationship between students and other stakeholders in the higher education sphere is vitally important.

The literature reviewed also showed the dynamic and changing meaning of ‘student’. This is evident in the writings of Diouf, Muhula, Burawoy and Altbach and Luescher-Mamashela. On the one hand, the changing meaning and construction of students reflect both the temporary and yet dynamic and fluid nature of the relationship between students and society in general, and with those in power. The meaning of students has been transformed from the ‘hope’ or
‘future’ of a nation to being a ‘menace’ to ‘consumers’ or ‘clients’. On the other hand, the changing meanings of students may imply that students are in a permanent state, searching for the ‘better and different’ in their social and political lives. Therefore it would not be surprising to find students at the forefront of struggles aimed at bringing about fundamental social and political change. Nevertheless, students also depend on forging alliances with other sectors of society in order to achieve their objectives.

The literature review has further shown the relationship between student participation in higher education governance and different visions and governance models as necessary to consider. The literature review has identified factors affecting the effectiveness of student participation in higher education governance. These include institutional culture, the nature of the institutional governance model, attitude of staff, especially academics, to students, the implication of the reconstruction of students as ‘customers’ owing to managerialism, and the size of student representation in governance structures.

The literature reviewed has further highlighted several issues that have guided the study. These include (a) the interaction between the larger social and political environment and higher education institutions (e.g., political dynamics, priorities and interference, expected role of higher education, governance [e.g., the power of higher education institutions versus government, appointments of vice-chancellors, and role of international bodies in determining national policy]); (b) the government educational policies and their impact on higher education institutions, student activism and participation in governance (especially regarding the financing of higher education, access, student funding-financial aid); (c) higher education transformation and role of students; and (d) dynamics between the student body and student leadership, student organisations, social composition and origin of students, and finally the relationship between student leadership and the political elite.
Gaps

I have identified several gaps in the above literature review. Firstly, the literature on student activism in Africa is very limited. It also tends to collapse student activism into youth activism. Inherently, there is nothing wrong with this, given the fact that students constitute a critical aspect of the youth and in some instances boundaries become blurred in the ‘actual course of struggle’, as happened during the national liberation struggle against apartheid. However, the weakness of this approach manifests itself in many ways. There is generally a lack of conceptual clarity on the notion of students. The role of students as an autonomous force is not considered critically. The relationships between students and other components of youth, students and their surrounding social and political environment and between students and higher education are inadequately explored. Students’ internal dynamics, especially the relationship between the student leadership and student body, tend to be left unexplored.

Secondly, the literature tends to use concepts of student activism, student strikes, student politics, student boycotts and student riots interchangeably and without sufficient definitions.

Thirdly, the literature does provide some account of student activism in Africa against tuition fees, abolition of student allowances, poor living and accommodation conditions (whether as part of fighting against cost-sharing or SAPs and their effects), which resulted in some instances in student arrests, killings and expulsions from campuses. However, sometimes a reference to student funding is coincidental, in part because the interest tends to concentrate more on the role of students in dealing with larger social and political concerns (such as repressive regimes, SAPs).

Finally, the existing literature rarely provides accounts of students’ individual experiences or detailed accounts of the role of the SRCs, student guilds or student unions, in addressing the problem of sharing the burden of the cost of study. In fact, students generally remain treated at student body level, thus limiting access
to intra-student dynamics such as the relationship between the leadership and the rank and file. This study will contribute to addressing some of these gaps. It provides evidence emerging from the ‘grounds’ on the post-1994 government policy implementation. It is, in some sense, about what Jansen referred to as “unseen pains of transitions” (2004: 118). Thus, I document the experiences of a selected number of UWC students across different races, ages, faculties and political orientations. However, I provide more detail on this in the research methodology chapter.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has reviewed wide-ranging literature on students and higher education. I reviewed the literature focusing on cost-sharing, student activism, student participation in higher education governance and access. The literature review of cost-sharing has provided the basis for understanding the issue of students’ sharing the burden of the costs of study and related types of financial assistance, such as loans. These are two components of the problem of unmet financial need.

The literature review highlighted that cost-sharing is premised on the notion that higher education has both public and private benefits, thus any public funding policy must entail both a state subsidy and tuition fees. Cost-sharing takes different forms whose acceptability varies from one country to another. Some African countries voluntarily accepted and promoted cost-sharing as a funding policy. In other African countries, cost-sharing was imposed as part of the SAPs, driven largely by the World Bank. South Africa is one of the few African countries with a long history of cost-sharing, which predates the advent of the concept itself.

Cost-sharing continues to experience implementation challenges, especially in developing countries. Some of these challenges relate to student loan schemes. Students undertook various collective actions against different forms of cost-
sharing. The dominant form of student action against cost-sharing has tended to be student activism in various African countries.

The literature review on student activism has noted differences in terms of the impact of student activism in developing countries compared to developed countries. It highlighted the catalytic role that student activism played in the social and political transformations of various countries, including the overthrow of the oppressive regimes and resistance to them before and after independence. In consequence the meaning of ‘students’ was transformed from the ‘hope’ or ‘future’ of a nation or ‘shock-troops of revolution’ to being a ‘menace’ to ‘consumers’ or ‘clients’. The literature also highlighted the impact of student activism in the higher education transformation, including the acceptance that students should participate in formal governance structures. The literature differentiated between four models of a university (representative democracy model, academic oligarchy model, state bureaucracy model, market enterprise model), which were conceived without ‘students in mind’. The nature of student participation and the role and meaning of students vary within these different university models.

I have also reviewed literature pertaining to access, which is interlinked with the problem of unmet financial need. The literature review identified different types of access, namely formal and epistemological, and emphasised the importance of linking access to success in order to achieve equity. Funding inhibits student access (formal) in higher education.

The next chapter will develop a conceptual framework that will illuminate the research question and will guide data collection and analysis. In particular, the conceptual framework will enable me to be “selective and have some way of deciding what data are pertinent and essential to one’s enquiry” (Badat, 1999:5). Specifically, I shall conceptualise student actions, including student activism and formal student participation in higher education governance, the notion of students and cost-sharing.
CHAPTER THREE: TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction
In the previous chapter I conducted a literature review whose results will now be used to develop a conceptual framework for the study. I depart from the premise that funding is probably the most important tool that “was utilised by the apartheid state, and is being utilised by the post-apartheid state, to achieve the desired access policy goals” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 2). Funding played and continues to play a central role in the processes of inclusion and exclusion in higher education during and after apartheid. In the previous chapter I indicated that apartheid public higher education funding was structured to mirror apartheid racial divisions and promoted inequalities. An apartheid public higher education funding policy deliberately excluded the principles of equity and redress.

The post-apartheid higher education policy embraces principles of equity and redress and seeks to ensure that the financial need is not “an insuperable barrier to access and success in higher education” (Department of Education, 1997: 40). It advocates that the financing of higher education “must increase equity in access and outcomes, improve quality and efficiency, and link higher education activities and national and regional development needs more purposefully” (Department of Education, 1997: 40). Cost-sharing is one of the key principles underlying the post-apartheid public higher education policy. Cost-sharing is predicated on the fact that higher education has both public and private benefits (Department of Higher Education and Training, 2013: 14). This thesis seeks to show that government’s policy commitment to the expansion of access and reduced funding (with cost-sharing advanced as solution) is paradoxical. This paradox is most severely experienced by poor students at historically disadvantaged institutions (such as UWC), whose constrained ability to pay a portion of their cost of study cannot be mitigated by institutional resources alone. Generally, in post-apartheid South Africa, affordability both for the state and individual students (and their families) has been the main militating factor against maintaining wide-scale enrolments (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 5).
Therefore the main purpose of this chapter is to develop a conceptual framework that can illuminate the research question. In conceptualising student actions, I am inspired by the Wright et al. framework (1990) for categorising the numerous possible behaviours exhibited by disadvantaged-group members. Relationships between various forms of student action are explored and mapped in terms of a conceptual framework that can be applied in the analysis of student actions to address their unmet financial need.

**Conceptualisation of student actions**

Given the main concern of my study, student actions provide a first point of clarification. In particular, my investigation focuses on the how as opposed to the why and when students choose a particular action/s to address their problem of unmet financial need. Wright et al. (1990: 995; see also van Stekelenburg, 2013) have proposed a framework for categorising the numerous possible behaviours exhibited by disadvantaged-group members based on three distinctions. First, a distinction is made between action and inaction. Second, a distinction is made between collective action and individual action. Collective action refers to action or behaviour that “is “directed at improving the condition of the entire group” (1990: 995; see also Stekelenburg, 2013). It comprises “any form of concerted group effort to achieve a shared goal” (Ratner, Meinzen-Dick, May and Haglund, 2013: 200-201).

Individual action, on the other hand, is “behaviour that is directed at improving one's personal condition” (Wright et al., 1990: 995; see also Stekelenburg, 2013). Therefore the intended outcome of the action (whether it benefits the collective or individual) is the main distinguishing criterion. I must add that the mere belief in the shared goal and acceptance of being part of and acting as part of the group would not necessarily bar an individual from taking action at individual level. The ‘possibility’ is always there. A third distinction is between actions that conform to the norms of the existing social system (normative) and those that contravene the
existing social rules and structure (non-normative) (Wright et al., 1990: 995; see also Stekelenburg, 2013).

From these three distinctions, Wright et al. (1990: 995) then propose five broad categories that can be used to describe various actions in response to a particular inequality: (a) apparent acceptance of one's disadvantaged position; (b) attempts at individual upward mobility through normative channels made available by the system; (c) individual action outside the norms of the system; (d) instigation of collective action within the prescribed norms of the existing system; and (e) instigation of collective action outside the norms of the system. Furthermore, Wright et al. argue that collective non-normative action “directly threatens the existing social order, whereas acceptance and individual normative actions serve to protect the status quo” (1990: 995). These categories will play an important role in the process of conceptualising and locating student actions in this study. In the following discussion, I shall focus on two forms of collective action: student activism and student participation in higher education governance.

Moreover, the conceptualisation of student action needs to include the clarification of concepts such as students, student body and student organisation, as well as certain relationships among them. To begin with, all higher education institutions have a student body, which may be defined as the “collective of individuals who are engaged in academic study and vocational education and training at a particular higher education institution” (Badat, 1999: 23; see also Luescher, 2005). A student body is made up of student organisations and is the "source of potential members, supporters and sympathisers as well as antagonists" (Badat, 1999: 24). The size and social composition of the student body has an impact on the character, role and actions of a student organisation (Badat, 1999: 24). Accordingly, a student organisation can be understood as a collective of students with different reasons (political, cultural, religious, academic and/or social) for affiliation (Badat, 1999: 21). A student organisation can take different forms (such as ‘council’, ‘club’, ‘society’, ‘association’, ‘union’ and even ‘organisation’ itself, which may be used to designate such a formation) (Badat,
Most student organisations are characterised by voluntary membership, although some student organisations, for example the SRCs at historically black higher education institutions, have automatically incorporated all registered students (Badat, 1999: 22). Student organisations have constitutions or base documents that outline governance arrangements and guiding principles, objectives and the vision and conduct of members, including dispute resolution measures.

Badat argues that the concerns of students and student organisations “may extend beyond the educational arena and social relations in education to social relations in the political sphere” (1999: 21). This implies that the “form and content of student struggles may be mediated not only by educational apparatuses but also by the apparatuses of the political sphere” (Badat, 1999: 21; see also Altbach, 1997).

Thus, in keeping with Badat (1999: 21), the form and content of student actions may vary. Inspired by Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam (1990), I propose that various kinds of student actions can be conceptualised along two continuums, as shown in Fig. 1.

![Figure 1 Matrix of student actions](image)

The horizontal continuum (in Fig. 1) relates to the range of forms that student actions take within higher education institutions. I describe the extremes of this
continuum as collective student action and individual student action, with the former depending on the cohesive power of the student body as an organised force, the relationship between the student body and the student leadership and common concerns or objectives, while the latter is about individual students pursuing their self-interest individually rather than collectively with other students.

The vertical continuum in Fig. 1 involves an interpretation of the content of student actions in terms of whether or not such actions follow the prescribed norms of the system. The extremes of this continuum are normative and non-normative student actions. Normative student actions occur within prescribed norms. Non-normative student actions occur outside the prescribed norms of the higher education system.

The relationships within and between the two continuums are complex and characterised by interrelatedness and interdependency, on the one hand, and diversity of purpose and outcomes, on the other hand. This, however, presents a possibility to construct four ideal types of student actions with both analytical and practical applicability to this study. These ideal types are (1) collective normative student action, (2) collective non-normative student action, (3) individual normative student action and (4) individual non-normative student action. By proposing these ideal types, I am not necessarily suggesting that this is how students act in reality. Rather it is an attempt to find a way of thinking about student actions both in abstract and concrete terms.

The proposed ideal types require further elaboration in order to establish some basic characteristics and possible analytical interests. The results of the literature provide the necessary basis for analysing collective student actions. In particular it has been shown that students tend to use student activism or ‘informal governance’ (Luescher, 1995: 2) or ‘extraordinary governance process’ (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 262) or student participation in higher education governance or ‘formal governance’ (Luescher, 1995: 2) or ‘ordinary governance process’
(Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 262) to address their problems, including funding. I therefore propose to analyse student activism and student participation in higher education governance as a way of seeking to elucidate basic characteristics and identify possible indicators of collective student action. For the purpose of this study, I consider various kinds of student activism as representing collective non-normative student action and formal student participation in higher education governance as representing instances of collective normative student action. These two are, of course, historically intimately related, because student participation in higher education governance is a consequence of student activism in higher education.

**Collective normative student action (Type 1)**

In the previous chapter I highlighted that formal student participation in higher education governance is receiving increasing attention in academic research and writing. The relationship between this form of collective student action and the conceptions of universities has been explored. Luescher (2008: 68) recommends that any empirical study of student governance could investigate the extent of student influence and oversight in university governance by considering the following indicators

1. Formal means by which students can participate in the political processes and thereby express their preference about higher education policy;
2. Formal methods by which students can hold university leadership accountable; and
3. The extent of political participation of the student body at large in matters of university governance (Luescher, 2008: 68).

These indicators can to some extent complement the ones proposed for various types of student activism. If one compares the first indicator with the ones that I propose for state-focused and institution-focused student action (see below), there
is a common objective of seeking to influence policy; the difference is the route to be used.

Formal student representation in higher education governance presumes the existence of a relationship between the student body (as the represented) and student leadership (as representatives), characterised by a degree of common and shared vision or interests and governed by an agreed set of rules, which may be codified formally, for example, in a SRC constitution. This compels the student leadership to operate on some kind of mandate, which may be sought or provided in different ways, depending on the nature of student governance in a particular institution. The mandate may be interpreted as providing a framework within which negotiations between the student leadership (on behalf of the student body) and university management may happen.

However, the approach to the mandate that student leaders may take will differ, depending on their interpretation and understanding of the issues proposed as part of the mandate. The attitude and approach of university management could play a huge role in influencing and shaping the approach of student leaders. For instance, if management is seen as ‘intransigent’, students are likely to take a hawkish approach, whereas if management is seen as ‘progressive’ and understanding, student leaders may take a more ‘measured’ or consensus-building approach. In the final analysis the relationship between student leaders and the student body is vitally important to formal student participation in higher education in the form of collective student action. Student alliances (strategic-based on principles or tactical-based on convenience) with other stakeholders (such as workers) can also play an important role in ensuring the effectiveness of formal student participation in higher education governance.

The aspect of formal student participation in higher education governance that is most relevant to this study is negotiations. This is a process in which students try to influence higher education institutional leaders to understand and address their
‘bread and butter’ problems (such as access, financial exclusions, financial aid) (Cele, 2008: 88).

Collective non-normative student action (Type 2)
There are several analytic interests in studying collective non-normative student action. In this regard, this study focuses on collective non-normative student action with the following analytic factors:

a) Monitor and describe incidents of collective non-normative student action aimed at addressing students’ problem of unmet financial need.

b) Determine student perceptions on the use and relevance of collective non-normative student action in addressing students’ problem of unmet financial need.

c) Determine the effectiveness and impact of collective non-normative student action on national and institutional funding policy development and change.

The second and third analytic interests are also relevant to an empirical study of collective normative student action.

Student activism
I previously indicated that students tend to use student activism as one of their favourite forms of collective non-normative action. Student activism has consistently been a “feature of student life in higher education institutions in both the developed and developing countries for decades” (Munene, 2003: 117). Student activism can be understood as the manifestation of student struggles “within a specific arena aimed at specific sets of relations” (Badat, 1999: 21; see also Byaruhanga, 2006). These struggles can range from “militant protest demonstrations to petitioning legislators, from paramilitary political action to educational efforts as well as student publications focusing on politics” (Altbach, 1997: 2-3). In the previous chapter, I discussed the catalytic role and impact of student activism in bringing about social change, political and higher education
transformation. Student activism is largely influenced by the context and conditions under which it happens. In this study I emphasise the importance of understanding context and conditions as both enablers and inhibitors to students’ advancement of their struggles, including those directed at funding problems.

I propose to expand the conceptualisation of student activism in order to enhance its relevance and utility in this study. I intend to use Koen et al.’s (2006) typology of student activism in higher education in a revised form. The typology has been constructed based on the focus of student activism. Three ideal sub-types of student activism have consequently been proposed: state-focused student activism, student leadership-focused student activism and institution-focused student activism. I propose a refined version of typology, as summarised in Table 1. I follow this up with a detailed discussion. The main idea is that empirical studies can be conducted based on one of more of the three ideal types.

Table 1: Typology of student activism aimed at funding policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State-focused</th>
<th>Student leadership-focused</th>
<th>Institution-focused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
<td>Small-large, nationally or provincially and institutionally coordinated</td>
<td>Combination of small and large</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature</strong></td>
<td>Planned, mass meetings, handing over memorandum, class boycott, marches, peaceful and violent placard demonstrations</td>
<td>Spontaneous and planned, mass meetings, handing over memorandum, marches, peaceful and violent demonstrations</td>
<td>Spontaneous and planned, mass meetings, handing over memorandum, class boycott, sit-ins, marches, peaceful and violent demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus</strong></td>
<td>National policy</td>
<td>Accountability and responsiveness</td>
<td>Institutional policy and change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recognition</strong></td>
<td>Official</td>
<td>Unofficial</td>
<td>Unofficial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
State-focused student activism

State-focused student activism tends to focus on national funding policy as its primary object. Here I think of policy in its broadest sense as contested terrain and site of struggle. State-focused student activism may be used as strategy to mobilise support in order to influence and shape the policy. State-focused student activism can be coordinated at various levels, that is, nationally, provincially or even institutionally. Permission is generally sought from the police beforehand. State-focused student activism can assume different forms. These include planned action, mass meetings, handing over of a memorandum, class boycotts, marches and peaceful and violent placard demonstrations. Parliament and the Ministries of Education and Finance tend to be targeted, given their different roles in the funding policy. The intended recipients of student demands are Ministers or Directors General of government departments or the Speaker of Parliament. The size of state-focused student activism can attract small to large numbers of students as participants.

State-focused student activism can be seen as a way in which students attempt to exert influence on national funding policy as the site of struggle and contested terrain. In consequence the role and influence of students on policy development and change can be considered an important dimension of state-focused student activism. I propose five indicators that can be considered as part of any investigation related to student influence on national funding policy. The proposed indicators are the following:

- The impact of social and political conditions on student activism;
- Mass-based action;
- Change-driven action;
- Political and ideological disposition; and
- Performance of catalytic function.
It is also possible to think of qualitative indicators related to, for instance, the ability of students to change the content of a policy from an ideological or political basis to underlying principles. Therefore different studies can be conducted using all or some of the proposed indicators.

**Institution-focused student activism**

Institution-focused student activism tends to be driven by students’ concerns related to a particular funding policy or management attitude to student funding concerns and demand for change. All these issues are interrelated. Funding plays an important part in the processes of inclusion and exclusion of students, hence it tends to be a key focus. Students generally do not seek permission from the university management to embark on student activism. Therefore, institution-focused student activism can be considered ‘unofficial’. Institution-focused student activism can be large or small, depending on the nature of the institution, scale of the problem and number of students affected. It takes different forms, including spontaneous and planned mass meetings, handing over of memoranda, class boycotts, sit-ins, marches, peaceful and violent demonstrations.

I propose student financial access and financial exclusion as the two dimensions of institution-focused student activism against funding policy. I also propose a set of indicators for each dimension, as captured in Table 2.

**Table 2: Institution-focused student activism aimed at funding policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial exclusion</td>
<td>Percentage fee increase per annum (the extent to which students can prevent or reduce fee increment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of financially excluded students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount of outstanding fees and upfront payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fees and upfront payment, minimum payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial access</td>
<td>Number of financial aid awards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount of allocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Values of scholarship, bursaries or loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total student enrolment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of poor students as proportion of total student enrolment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I also propose that qualitative indicators can be formulated concerning the impact of fee increases, inadequate financial aid, inability of students to pay the minimum or the entire required amount and related experiences of seeking alternative funding in order to make the required financial contribution. These indicators are appropriate for both qualitative and quantitative research studies.

**Student leadership-focused student activism**

Responsiveness and accountability tend to constitute the focus of student leadership-focused student activism. It can be spontaneous and planned. Student leadership-focused student activism assumes different forms, including mass meetings, the student general council, handing over of memoranda, marches, class boycotts, peaceful and violent protest demonstrations and barricading of gates. Depending on the institutional context and nature of concern, student-leadership-focused student activism can attract large or small numbers of students.

The oversight and active participation of the student body seems to be the main dimension of student-leadership-focused student activism. I propose the following indicators:

- Regular holding of student mass meetings;
- The implementation of the student body’s mandate;
- Frequent reporting;
- Effective management and efficient use of the student budget by the student leadership; and
- Attitudes to and perceptions of students of the role and contribution of student leadership and student organisations, such as the SRC.

These quantitative indicators can be complemented by qualitative indicators related to experiences and views of the student body about the role, effectiveness and efficiency of their student leadership and student organisation, involvement of the student body in student governance in general and student organisations’ activities in particular and finally views of the student body on the existence or
nonexistence of accountability measures. Empirical studies that combine both sets of indicators should therefore be encouraged.

Having discussed the different types of collective non-normative student activism or ‘informal student participation in higher education governance’, the next discussion will shift the focus to ‘formal student participation in higher education governance’. I have made a point before about the interconnectedness between student activism or informal student participation in higher education governance and formal student participation in higher education governance, notwithstanding possible differences that may exist between these two forms of collective student action. The differences may be about ideological and political preferences or linked to the historical effectiveness of the two forms. To an extent some of the differences may be described as irreconcilable. One may think of situations where decisions about using any of the collective student actions would have been made along rigid ideological and political lines.

As indicated earlier, students may choose individual actions to address their problem of unmet financial need. I shall focus on the individual actions in the next section, differentiating between individual normative actions and individual non-normative actions.

**Individual actions**

*Individual normative action (Type 3)*

Individual student actions constitute an important aspect of the proposed conceptual framework of this study. They can be divided into individual normative student actions and individual non-normative student actions. Individual normative student actions occur within existing channels or prescribed norms of a system. Individual normative student actions in relation to a student’s unmet financial needs can assume different forms, such as negotiations with university officials, job-seeking on and off campus, part-time or temporary jobs
and sharing study materials and food, writing a letter to a newspaper or other public or social media platform.

Individual normative student actions can take place at different institutional levels between the student concerned and university representatives or designated officials. Potentially, the academic performance and socio-economic situation of students will become the main basis of negotiations. Ability and willingness of students to pay may be considered key dimensions of individual normative student action. Some of the indicators related to this type of student action include:

- The amount of individual student financial contribution;
- Finalisation of the registration process; and
- Reduction or cancellation of student debt.

**Individual non-normative student actions (Type 4)**

Individual non-normative student actions can be described as those actions that fall outside prescribed norms or existing channels. Such actions range from individual student protest, ‘squatting’ or 'illegal' sharing of a university residence room, submission of financial aid eligibility-related documents with incorrect information, hunger strikes, placard demonstrations, sit-ins and forming human chains.

The ability and willingness of students to protest may be considered key dimensions of individual non-normative student action. Some of the indicators related to this type of student action will include the following:

- Non-payment of fees;
- Amount of individual student financial contribution; and
- Finalisation of the registration process.
Non-action
I have so far discussed various types of actions that students may undertake to deal with their problem of unmet financial need. I earlier indicated that Wright et al. (1990) distinguished between action and non-action. They proposed five categories to explain behaviours that could be displayed by individuals as they confront their disadvantaged situation. I have already discussed and mapped four categories related to action as well as certain sub-categories. I now want to focus on the fifth one related to non-action which is beyond the typology involved in the above framework. In Wright et al.’s terms inaction involves “apparent acceptance of one’s disadvantaged position” (1990: 995).

With respect to my study, I propose that a student who quickly gives up hope and ‘voluntarily’ accepts exclusion may indeed be accepting his or her disadvantaged situation. Here I am specifically referring to a student whose only basis of exclusion is finance, not academic performance. I also qualify my statement by a careful use of ‘voluntarily’ to distinguish between someone who is informed of outstanding fees, realises that he or she cannot do anything about it and chooses not to return to campus, versus someone who acts, returns to campus, approaches the SRC, participates in collective action and even tries to negotiate with the university officials individually, but in the end is still excluded. Both these types of students are victims of the system, but the difference is that the one apparently more readily accepts her or his disadvantaged position, almost voluntarily so, while the other one refuses to do so and fights against the disadvantaged position, even if eventually he or she loses the battle.

Conclusion
This chapter set out to develop a conceptual framework to analyse and interpret data for the study. The framework was inspired by Wright et al.’s framework (1990) for categorising the numerous possible behaviours exhibited by disadvantaged-group members. These could be (a) apparent acceptance of one's disadvantaged position; (b) attempts to gain individual upward mobility through normative channels made available by the system; (c) individual action outside
the norms of the system; (d) instigation of collective action within the prescribed
norms of the existing system; and (e) instigation of collective action outside the
norms of the system. Therefore the framework sought to conceptualise student
action as the possible behaviour of disadvantaged-group members in terms of
different ideal types. On the basis of this, I developed a matrix consisting of
horizontal and vertical continuums. The horizontal continuum indicates collective
and individual elements at the end of each extreme. The vertical continuum
indicates normative and non-normative elements at the end of each extreme.

Furthermore, I magnified the typology by developing sub-types of student
activism, which represent collective non-normative student action. I refined Koen
et al.’s (2006) typology of student activism and constructed three ideal sub-types,
namely, (a) state-focused student activism; (b) institution-focused student
activism; and (c) student leadership-focused student activism.

In subsequent chapters, I shall show how the framework and related typology can
be applied to the UWC situation from 1995-2005.
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction
This chapter presents the research methodology framework for the study. I adopted a case study approach and used multiple sources of data collection, namely interviews, observation and documentation. This was important to ensure methodological triangulation. My previous research experience at UWC enabled me to access a variety of data. I established the necessary rapport with students and university management, which played an important role in dealing with issues of subjectivity.

This chapter consists of four sections. The first section provides the rationale for the selection of UWC as the case. The second section deals with data collection and data analysis. The third section deals with issues of validity and reliability. The fourth section identifies the limitations of the study.

Selection of the UWC as a case study
Stake argues that perhaps the “most unusual aspect of case study in the social sciences and human services is the selection of cases to study” (2005: 450). The cases are of prominent interest before formal study begins (Stake, 2005: 450). A case study is a “process of inquiry about the case and the product of that inquiry” (Stake, 2005: 444). I adopted a qualitative single case study approach for several reasons. First, a case study is a “common way to do qualitative inquiry” (Stake, 2005: 443). Second, I chose UWC because it offered an “opportunity to learn” (Stake, 2005: 451). Third, choosing a case study approach generally helps to “understand complex social phenomena” (Yin, 1994: 3). In this respect, the case study approach allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events such as individual life cycles, organisational and managerial processes and environmental change. The case study method allows for the investigation of specific issues in their real-life context where the issues to be investigated are integrally linked to the context. In other words, as Babbie and
Mouton put it, “the interaction of the unit of analysis with its context is a significant part of investigation in case studies” (2001: 283).

Other reasons also influenced my choice of UWC as a case study. I chose UWC because of its historical role in the national liberation struggle against the apartheid system and its commitment to bringing about thorough-going transformation.

UWC’s commitment to expanding access to students despite lack of adequate funding on the one hand, and the role of students in this situation offered interesting data to analyse. Given the fact that UWC had built a special relationship with the ANC alliance before 1994 and had been an academic home to the National Education Policy Initiative and a number of intellectuals associated with it, I was initially interested to understand how this relationship would affect the subsequent relationship between UWC and the post-1994 government. I was also interested in understanding the impact of the relationship on the resolution of the paradox of expansion of access and limited funding.

Furthermore, I chose UWC because of its unique SCM office, which was the brainchild of students and born out of the 1998 UWC non-normative student action. SCM was responsible for debt management (including debt collection and payments) and risk management (including forecasting possibilities and the implications of admitting debt-ridden students). SCM was also responsible for student billing and played a leading and central role in negotiations between the university and students about financial agreements.

Finally, I chose UWC for practical reasons, because I had accumulated experiential ‘knowledge’ of the institution and its stakeholders. Blatter argues that having access is an important criterion for selecting cases (2008: 69). I was employed as a researcher at one of the UWC research institutes from 2000 to 2005. As a UWC employee, a researcher in student politics and an active participant in campus politics for five years, I was able to conduct research as an
‘insider’. For this reason, I gained access and permission to do research without experiencing any problems. I had access to all campus stakeholders (senior management, academic and non-academic staff and students) and maintained good working relationships with them. Admittedly the mere fact that I was a researcher (a research instrument) could potentially raise concerns about subjectivity and objectivity. Partly, I managed to deal with this concern through the existing ‘trust’ that I shared with stakeholders. This trust contributed to the generous support that I received throughout the duration of my study.

Another crucial factor was that I managed to persuade especially students and management to ‘buy in’ and see the importance of conducting my investigation, which despite its primary academic interest, could provide some insights or lessons for higher education institutions and stakeholders. I would use my observation in writing up my study in a limited and measured way with a view to supplement limited or missing data, to add context or provide clarity. My observations have been referenced.

Data collection
The access I enjoyed to students and university management for this study gave me the opportunity to assemble a unique and diverse case study database. I used multiple sources of data, which is “important in case studies of all kinds” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 282). The goal of using different types of evidence is “to triangulate” (Yin, 2009: 261). Triangulation has been generally “considered a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation” (Stake, 2005: 454). It is used to avoid the “common problems of bias, poor recall and poor or inaccurate articulation” (Yin, 1994: 85). I collected data through interviews, participant observation and documentation. Each one of these three methods is discussed below.
Interviews

I conducted individual research interviews, which are commonly used in qualitative research. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001: 289), the individual research interview differs from most other types of interviews in that it is “an open interview which allows the object of study to speak for him/her/itself rather than to provide our respondent with a battery of our own predetermined hypothesis-based questions” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 289). Accordingly I did not have predetermined questions that had to be answered in any particular order. Rather I created an environment in which I had open-ended conversations with interviewees around a number of topics in relation to my research question. Correspondingly, Babbie and Mouton (2001: 289) argue that a qualitative interview is an “interaction between an interviewer and a respondent in which the interviewer has [a] general plan of inquiry but not a specific set of questions that must be asked in particular words and in a particular order” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 289). I discuss how I gained access, selected interviewees and conducted the interviewing process in the next sections.

Gaining access

By their very nature most case studies are "reported and interpreted through the eyes of specific interviewees" (Yin, 1994: 85). It is argued that well-informed respondents can provide useful information and easy access to the case and can help a researcher to "identify other relevant sources of evidence" (Yin, 1994: 85). In the case of this study, the criteria of choosing 'well-informed respondents' who could provide a different perspective on the same situation prompted me to choose students and staff of the university who were directly involved in the key concerns of the study as respondents in interviews.

Gaining access to do research with students and staff of the university was an important step that I had to undertake before the commencement of my study. Access can be defined as the “appropriate ethical and academic practices used to gain entry to a given community for the purposes of conducting formal research” (Jensen, 2008: 2).
Thus, I approached the Registrar, explained my research in detail and sought broad university permission to conduct the study. In turn, the university granted me its full permission, which allowed me to have unfettered access to UWC staff and students, as well as documentary records and archives.

**Selection criteria**

For the selection of students as interview respondents, I used mainly snowball sampling, a technique of non-probability, purposive sampling. Snowball sampling refers to “the process of accumulation as each located subject suggests other subjects” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 167). Given the difficulty of locating students with ‘unmet financial need’, I identified a few interviewees (especially ordinary students) initially. These interviewees then assisted me in identifying others facing similar problems. These interviewees became informants or ‘gatekeepers’, which is “another means of access in qualitative research” (Jensen, 2008: 2). Gatekeepers will have “inside information that can help the researcher in determining who the best participants to access in the community or organisation are” (Jensen, 2008: 2).

Based on my insights into the university as locally based researcher, I carefully identified senior managers and SRC members whom I was going to interview, based on the nature and role of their portfolios in relation to my study. I mentioned earlier that I chose UWC because it offered “an opportunity to learn” (Stake, 2005: 451). Stake argues that the “potential for learning is a different and sometimes superior criterion to representativeness” (Stake, 2005: 451). I then considered this criterion applicable in the selection of interview respondents who were easily accessible.

Once interviewees had been identified, I then explained the purpose of and details about my study and requested them to grant me their informed consent to participate in the study. Since I did not prepare a research information sheet, I indicated to the potential interviewees that I was interested in finding out how
students addressed their problem of unmet financial need at UWC between 1995 and 2005.

Generally, the university management officials and student leaders consented to the research verbally, while some of the interviewees (mainly ordinary students) consented in writing by signing my notebook. Having gained the informed consent of the subjects meant that my study was in line with a general research code of ethics, which insists that “subjects must agree voluntarily to participate without physical and psychological coercion and their agreement must be based on full and open information” (Christians, 2005: 144).

Altogether, I interviewed two government officials, 30 UWC students (student leaders and ordinary students), four UWC staff members (academic and non-academic) and six UWC management officials. Interviews dealt with a variety of issues: contextual issues related to the changing role of UWC in society and the university’s understanding, interpretation and response to evolving national higher education policies as they apply to the issues under investigation in this study.

From the collective student action perspective, I interviewed student leaders who were in the different SRCs from the late 1980s till 2005. This enabled me to understand student demands, challenges and decisions across different generations of student leadership and to use the historical insights to make sense of students’ decisions, particularly on access, financial agreements, student debts and payment.

The interviews with student leaders provided insights into the role of students in transforming UWC from its origins as an apartheid institution for the so-called ‘coloured’ population to an open and democratic institution for all students across the erstwhile racial divide. The insights also provided understanding of the role of students and UWC in the national liberation struggle against the apartheid regime. The interviews with student leaders further highlighted internal student cleavages, some of which were politically and ideologically based. These cleavages
manifested themselves in the manner in which students approached student funding problems, the relationship with government, university management and the role of the SRC.

I interviewed student leaders representing different political organisations, namely the South African Student Congress (SASCO), the Azanian Student Congress (AZASCO) and Pan-Africanist Movement (PASMA). Interviewing these student leaders was important, given the highly politicised nature of the SRC and the fact that their organisations had been present in UWC student politics and contested SRC elections for the entire duration of the case study period. While SASCO was the dominant student political organisation to win SRC elections between 1995 and 2005, an analysis of UWC student activism would be incomplete without including all three student political organisations, which reflected national political differences between the ANC, Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and Azanian Political Organisation (AZAPO).

From the individual (or atomised) student action perspective, I interviewed ‘ordinary’ students (i.e. individuals registered as university students and not involved in any institutional leadership) who came from historically disadvantaged backgrounds and who had experienced financial difficulties. Some of these students had received inadequate financial assistance, which made them vulnerable to exclusion or drop-out. Others did not have funds for the required upfront payment and/or registration fees.

Process of interviewing
I conducted face-face interviews using ad hoc open-ended questions, which were related to the purpose and research question of the study and prompted by the interview encounter. The questions (or topics) used to stimulate respondent narratives were related to broad themes: student access, student funding (especially tuition and accommodation fees, fee increases, financial exclusions, financial assistance, upfront payments and registration), university funding policy (e.g. drivers, approach, structures, challenges) and agency role of students in
addressing their ‘unmet financial need’. The interviewees and I were able to discuss issues in detail. In instances where the interviewees did not respond adequately or misunderstood my questions, I gave clarifications, posed follow-up questions and probed further. My experience coincides with the insight of Babbie and Mouton that probes are “more frequently required in eliciting responses to open-ended questions” (2001: 253).

I conducted most interviews in the offices of the interviewees, especially the offices of university management and officials, union members and SRC members. In the case of ordinary students, I conducted some interviews in my UWC office or in places where students felt comfortable. The duration of the interviews ranged from 30 minutes to three hours. I always asked students if they were comfortable with the recording of the interviews, which would only be used for the purpose of my study. All interviewees gave me permission to audio-record the interviews and none ever requested to withdraw or that some parts of the interview should be deleted.

The interviews were necessary to understand students’ reasons for individual action while the SRC continued to exist. The interviews provided insights into the impact that lack of adequate funding and inability to pay had on students, especially their academic performance.

Most importantly, the interviews provided insights into the nature of the process that students and their parents had to undergo in mobilising the required funding and the engagement of students with university funding structures, especially the SCM. The interviews were critical in uncovering the stories or “unseen pains of transition” (Jansen, 2004: 118) and ‘solidarity networks’ that students leveraged in order to address ‘unmet financial need’.

I interviewed undergraduate students from five different faculties (Law, Natural Sciences, Community and Health, Arts and Economics and Management), at different levels of study. There were students who were first-years but had been at
the institution for more than six months, second-year students and also final-year students who were doing either the third year of a three-year degree or fourth year of a four-year degree. The reason for interviewing the different students was to gain diverse and yet rich data on their experiences, challenges and expectations, which would presumably also be different. For instance, two students (with the same amount of available funds) who were doing Bachelor of Pharmacy and Bachelor of Arts degrees might deal with the financial requirements of their studies differently.

I interviewed African and coloured students at UWC, as shown in Table 3. At UWC at the time there were very few white and Indian students. About 80% of the interviews were with African students, and 57% of interviewees were female.

**Table 3: Number of students interviewed by race**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Number of students interviewed at UWC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The students I interviewed at UWC came from different geographical backgrounds (mainly Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Gauteng and Western Cape), as shown in Table 4. More than half (about 53%) came from the Eastern Cape.
Table 4: Percentage of interviewed students by province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical origin</th>
<th>Students interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To gain an institutional perspective from management and academics, I interviewed UWC senior management (including the Rector, Vice-Rectors, Registrar, Executive Director of Finance and Institutional Planner), a student development officer, union representatives, academic staff members, and the heads of SCM and the Financial Aid Office.

Data security: recording, transcription and storage:
Most of the interviews were recorded and transcribed. Yin argues that “tapes certainly provide a more accurate rendition of any interview than any other method” (1994: 86). I stored the tapes in a safety box at home. I did not write down the original names of interviewees to maintain confidentiality and shall negotiate with the university about what to do with the tapes once I have finished the study.

Over and above recordings, I listened attentively and took meticulous field notes, which were later analysed and in some instances followed up with the respective interviewees for further clarity. This was in line with what Bryman and Burgess suggest, namely that “the quality, or even adequacy of a research project is not only the result of the questions asked or concepts used, it is also the result of keeping rigorous field notes” (1994: 36).
Participant observation

Yin (1994: 87) emphasises the significance of observation as an important aspect of data collection. As a UWC employee, I was able to conduct both direct and participant observation. According to Stake, researchers involved in a qualitative case study spend “extended time on site, personally in contact with activities and operations of the case, reflecting and revising descriptions and meanings of what is going on” (2008: 450). I therefore attended the SRC public activities held on campus between 2000 and 2005. These activities ranged from SRC elections, annual general meetings (AGMs), transformation summits and strategic planning sessions, cultural and social events, to SRC members assisting students during registration. I took notes, collected pamphlets, discussion documents and reports and interacted with students.

I also participated in institutional structures (such as the Senate, Institutional Forum (IF) and Employment Equity Forum as the National Education Health and Allied Workers Union representative and consultant respectively), where students were represented and contributed to issues that concerned them. The interaction enhanced my relationship with the student leaders and improved their confidence and trust in me, which facilitated access to information.

In addition, the different student political parties discussed their perspectives and differences with me. At times, the focus of the discussions emanated from the specific issues that I raised. Each party would articulate its position and indicate where it differed from others. Some of the UWC leaders were also members of the national executive committees of various organisations or participated in both provincial and national executive meetings of their respective political organisations.

Other UWC leaders were members of the national SRC structures, such as former South African universities’ SRCs and the South African Technikons’ Student Union (SATSU). In these cases, students shared and exchanged with me information and documents that they had received at these meetings. Students
shared their national positions on various issues. I also learned a lot about what was happening on other campuses.

Students also invited me to make presentations to their workshops, strategic planning sessions and national forums. I made presentations at the Western Cape Provincial General Council of PASMA in 2003 at the former Cape Technikon, SATSU National Executive Committee Meeting in 2004 at the former Pentech and SASCO National General Council in 2004 at the former Vaal Technikon. These engagements were useful to me. I received feedback on the presentations. Students critically engaged me on the issues that were raised with respect to their accuracy, relevance and bias. At times, I had to sharpen and refine or fundamentally change my thinking. Students can be brutally frank and robust in their engagements when they are confident about their issues and stories.

Being involved in institutional structures allowed me access to the arguments advanced by other stakeholders, particularly the university management. I was able to access the documents and data, which might have been impossible without maintaining such good relationships. I always informed and assured the university management that I would use their data only for the purpose of the study and consult them if there was a possibility of the analysis and writing 'harming' the university. However, the idea was not for the university to change or influence my data but be satisfied that there were no deliberate misrepresentations or inaccurancies. In this respect, the relationship methodologically was akin to member-checks.

I had an ongoing positive relationship with various student leaders across the political spectrum based on mutual respect and trust and commitment to social justice. This relationship was a consequence of my research work, which dealt with issues that were relevant to students. In other words, student engagement with my research work played an important role in establishing my relationship with students. From this base other aspects of the relationship emerged, including
broad discussion related to the internal and external challenges they were facing, their struggles with management and ideological and political differences.

The relationship posed ethical challenges, which I managed as follows. Whenever I observed something of interest or was given a document that could be useful to my research at the meeting or workshop that I attended, though not in my capacity as doctoral researcher, my approach was to make the students aware of my interest and request permission to use such data for my research. I enjoyed a relationship of mutual trust and respect with students. Students and I discussed issues freely. Students shared their personal views, which at times differed from the ‘official’ views. They shared sensitive discussions that they had in their organisations, or things that they were planning to do. Students even shared with me papers and presentations that they were going to make on various issues. Sometimes student leaders asked me to comment on these papers. In all my interactions with students as ‘research subjects’ in my study, I was guided by the ethics of social research (e.g. Babbie et al, 2001).

Documentation
Official and unofficial documents constitute another important source of evidence. Yin argues that the importance of using documents is to “corroborate and augment evidence from other data sources” (Yin, 1994: 81). Specifically, documents are “helpful in verifying the correct spellings and titles or names of organisations that might have been mentioned in an interview” (Yin, 1994: 81). Documents can be used to "corroborate information from other sources and if the documentary evidence is contradictory rather than corroboratory" (Yin, 1994: 81). Inferences can be made from documents. However, these inferences should be “treated only as clues worthy of further investigation rather than as definitive findings, because the inferences could later turn out to be false leads” (Yin, 1994: 81).

As Yin further argues, the “usefulness of various documents must not be based on their necessary accuracy or lack of bias. In fact, documents should be carefully used and should not be accepted as literal recordings of events that have taken
Therefore in my analysis I was careful and conscious of the potential problem of over-reliance on documents. This was because, as Yin argues, the casual investigator may mistake certain kinds of documents, such as proposals for projects or programmes, "for those containing the unmitigated truth" (1994: 82). In fact, it is important in reviewing any document to understand that "it was written for some specific purpose and some specific audience other than those of the case study being done" (Yin, 1994: 82). A case study investigator is "a vicarious observer, and the documentary evidence reflects a communication among other parties attempting to achieve some other objectives" (Yin, 1994: 82).

I collected and examined several kinds of documents from UWC. From the student side, I collected AGM reports, financial agreements, organisational, political, and financial conference documents, resolutions, programmes of action, memoranda, communiques, pamphlets, correspondence, minutes of meetings, letters, submissions to government, conference papers, student submission papers, strategic plans, student leadership election results reports, court judgments, election manifestos, pamphlets and posters.

From the institutional side, I collected annual reports, financial statements, review reports, strategic documents, policies (strategic plans, three-year rolling plans, financial plans, institutional plans, residence information and information on financial aid, student affairs, scholarships and bursaries) and submissions, relevant academic and non-academic published and unpublished writings - including public debates, press reports, and institutional research reports.

**Data analysis**

Analysis of data can be "conducted based on raw data such as interviews transcripts, fieldnotes, archival materials, reports, newspaper articles, and art" (Benaquisto, 2008: 86). Conceptualisation and breaking down of data constitute “the first step in data analysis” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 63). This process is called open coding. During open coding the data are “taken apart an observation, a sentence, a paragraph [at the time], and giving each discreet incident, idea, or
event, a name [or code], something that stands for or represents a phenomenon” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 63). Data are also compared for “similarities and differences, and questions are asked about the phenomena as reflected in the data” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 62; see also Benaquisto 2008). It has been suggested that it is necessary to group concepts around particular phenomena that have been identified in the data. The process of “grouping concepts that seem to pertain to the same phenomenon is called ‘categorising’” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 65). Essentially, the concepts are grouped together under “a higher order, more abstract concept called a category” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 61). The development of categories can be done in terms of their “properties (attributes or characteristics pertaining to a category), which can be dimensionalised (a process of breaking a property down into its properties)” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 63).

Strauss and Corbin (1990: 72; see also van den Hooaard and van den Hooaard 2008) suggest several ways of approaching open coding, which I have used during data analysis. First, I analysed interview and observation data ‘line by line’, which at times involved a closer look ‘phrase by phrase’ or at ‘single words’. I used preliminary results (especially of earlier interviews and initial observations) to ask specific questions arising from my research question and conceptual framework and focus on certain behaviours during later interviews and observations.

Second, I sometimes analysed a ‘sentence or paragraph’ with a view to find out the key message or idea. Once I had identified the key idea, I then tried to give it a name and conducted detailed analysis to refine the concepts further. This entailed questioning assumptions and meanings (both ‘intended and assumed’) of what the interviewees were saying.

Finally, I continuously reflected on each and every interview that I conducted and asked if there was anything emerging that could be similar or different from the previous interviews. I did the same thing with documents (such as financial agreements, annual reports, discussion documents and so forth) that I collected. Throughout the analysis process I was reminded of what Strauss and Corbin said:
“never take anything for granted ... because the minute you do, you foreclose on many possibilities that may be the key to uncovering the answer to one of your research problems” (1999: 93).

One of key challenges that I had to deal with related to interpretation of data. According to Badat one approach to the task of interpretation could be to concede that knowledge about one’s research is “intrinsic to the actors themselves, and to accept the definitions and conceptions contained in their documents, reports and statements as well as speeches of the officials” (1999: 6). Consequently, the meanings and voices of participants “are not only unduly privileged but also treated as unproblematic. There is no critical interrogation of meanings and self-definitions or dialogue with other empirical evidence, which could, indeed, be deemed irrelevant” (Badat, 1999: 6). Such an approach is more accurately described as “‘propaganda’ and characteristic of the ‘official histories’ of some organisations, rather than serious scholarly work” (1999: 8). In order to avoid falling into error, I examined each and every piece of data (whether from interviews, documents and observation). In the case of interviews, I did ask interviewees for their views on certain issues or statements that might have been expressed by others. For instance, if a student leader had made a certain statement I could ask another one and in some instances, I would even go back to the same interviewee to clarify the matter further. Moreover, the adoption of a conceptual framework (as presented in Chapter Three) eventually provided a useful lense for re-categorising and interpreting the data and emerging findings from the first rounds of analysis. In this respect, the post-hoc ‘imposition’ of a conceptual framework - after having attempted a more ‘grounded approach’ to conceptualisation - represents a departure from Strauss and Corbin (1990) but furthered the purpose of the investigation towards answering the research question.

**Addressing issues of reliability and validity**

The issues of validity and reliability were important to deal with in the study. Simon argues that validity and reliability “must be addressed in all studies” (2011:...
1). This is important to ensure that there are accuracy, dependability and credibility of information. There are differences in the manner in which validity and reliability are considered in quantitative studies and qualitative studies.

In quantitative research, reliability refers to the “ability to replicate the results of a study” (Simon, 2011: 1). In qualitative research studies there “is no expectation of replication” (Simon, 2011: 1). Similarly, some qualitative researchers have argued that the term validity “is not applicable to qualitative research, but at the same time, they have realised the need for some kind of qualifying check or measure for their research” (Golafshani, 2003: 602).

Many researchers (such as Davies and Odd, 2002; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Mishler, 2000; Seale, 1999; Stenbacka, 2001) have “developed their own concepts of validity and have often generated or adopted what they consider to be more appropriate terms, such as, quality, rigor and trustworthiness” (Golafshani, 2003: 602, see also Simon, 2011). They have also adopted ‘dependability’ instead of reliability (Simon, 2011: 1). Dependability necessitates that "an enquiry must also provide its audience with evidence that if it were to be repeated with the same or similar respondents (subjects) in the same (or similar) context, its findings would be similar” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 278).

The concept of ‘trustworthiness’ as introduced in the influential work of Lincoln and Guba (1985) is the key criterion or principle of good qualitative research. As Babbie and Mouton argue, the basic issue of ‘trustworthiness’ is, “how can an inquirer persuade his or her audiences (including him or herself) that the findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention to or worth taking account of”? (2001: 276). The concept of ‘trustworthiness’ contains four aspects, namely credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Morse et al., 2002: 2).

Regarding credibility, Babbie and Mouton ask: “is there compatibility between the construed realities that exist in the minds of the respondents and those that are attributed to them?” (2001: 277). They then suggest that credibility can be
achieved “through prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation, referential adequacy, peer debriefing, and member checks” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 277).

Transferability refers to the “extent to which the findings can be applied in other contexts or with other respondents” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 277). In a qualitative study, a researcher is “not primarily interested in (statistical) generalisations. All observations are defined by the specific contexts in which they occur” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 277). Therefore, a researcher “does not maintain or claim that knowledge gained from one context will necessarily have relevance for other contexts or for the same context in another time frame” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 277). Within the quantitative tradition, it is “the obligation of the researcher to ensure that findings can be generalised from a sample to its target population; in a qualitative study the obligation for demonstrating transferability rests on those who wish to apply it to the receiving context (the reader of the study)” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 277).

Thick description and purposive sampling are the strategies for transferability. A thick description is “usually a lengthy description that captures the sense of actions as they occur. It places events in contexts that are understandable to the actors themselves” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 272).

Confirmability refers to “the degree to which the findings are the product of the focus of the inquiry and not of the biases of the researcher” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 278). It can be established through an audit trail involving the review of at least six classes of data. That is, the raw data (e.g. recorded videotapes, written field notes, documents, and survey results); the data reduction and analysis products (e.g. write-ups of field notes, summaries and condensed notes, theoretical notes such as working hypotheses, concepts and hunches); the data reconstruction and synthesis products; findings, conclusions and a final report; process notes (e.g. methodological notes, trustworthiness notes, and audit trail notes); material relating to intentions and dispositions (e.g. inquiry proposal,
Several methodological strategies for demonstrating ‘trustworthiness or ‘qualitative rigour’ have been developed. These include triangulation, writing extensive notes, audit trails, peer review or debriefing, member checks when coding, confirming results with participants, structural corroboration and referential material adequacy (Morse et al., 2002: 2; Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 275, Jensen, 2008: 10). Luescher-Mamashela argues that application of these methods can take place at “one or several stages during the research process” (2010b: 5). He argues that the methods for ensuring trustworthiness “cannot - and should not - be purposed primarily for verification” (2010b: 5). He suggests that some methods “more appropriately aim at the falsification of the research findings (such as member checks); while most other methods, including those of triangulation (whether theoretical or methodological), prolonged engagement, persistent observation, and so forth, are strategies aiming dynamically at both verification and falsification” (2010b: 5). Thus, Simon argues that ‘member checking’ allows the participant a chance to “correct errors of fact or errors of interpretation (2011: 1). ‘Member checking’ also “adds to the validity of the observer’s interpretation of qualitative observations” (Simon, 2011: 1).

Moreover, according to Bryman and Burgess, the process of note taking should be considered “not only as a means of data collection, but also as an important location for formal and informal analysis through commentary and coding” (1994: 11).

Ensuring trustworthiness of the study

Having briefly discussed different methods for ensuring trustworthiness above, I now want to focus on how I have dealt with the issue of trustworthiness during my investigation. First, as indicated earlier, I used methodological triangulation by combining interviews, participation observation and documentation. This also involved source triangulation. Second, I wrote ‘extensive notes’ during
observations and interviews. This required me to listen very attentively to the interviewees. Third, I had good rapport with students. I enjoyed a unique position with student leadership structures at UWC. I participated in workshops and summits where students deliberated on issues and strategies that they were going to use to address institutional issues, problems and challenges. I also participated in informal discussions with student leaders on issues affecting students and the transformation of the UWC. I asked questions related to some of the issues that emerged during these sessions during interviews with some students. I also read various documents to see if and how they dealt with similar issues.

Methodological limitations of the study

The principal methodological limitation related to the availability of historical data on student funding and governance issues. UWC lacks detailed and consistent data runs related to fee increases, student debt and financial exclusions prior to 2000. During interviews with UWC senior management, it was mentioned that records related to the student affairs portfolio (including interactions between the SRC and management, governance and, financial exclusions) were either missing or unavailable in archived records. I was told that the university had not yet developed a student financial management system that could capture data such as student exclusions.

Student organisations did not have a proper records management system either. I could consequently not find SRC AGM reports and minutes. It was difficult to fully comprehend some decisions that the SRC took on the problem of unmet financial need because of a dearth of historical records. I was informed during my research that student political organisations tended to use the SRC records as part of their broader student power struggles. Outgoing SRCs used to destroy all their reports, correspondence, financial statements and similar documents. The intention was to disadvantage the incoming SRCs, especially if they belonged to a different political group. On the one hand, this implied that there would be no ‘proper’ handover reports between the outgoing and incoming SRCs. On the other
hand, it implied that future generations of student leaders would not have access to historical documentation and insights.

In future, UWC should consider developing a comprehensive knowledge and records management system to build and keep institutional memory and support work of different stakeholders, including SRCs.

**Conclusion**

This chapter presents the methodological framework for the study. I adopted a qualitative case study approach and used a variety of data collection methods (such as interviews, documentation and observation). I had to choose 'well-informed respondents' to provide insights and shortcuts to the prior history of the situation, and to identify other relevant sources of evidence (Yin, 1994: 85). In my case the criteria of choosing 'well-informed respondents' who could provide a different perspective on the same situation prompted me to choose students and staff of the university who were directly involved in the key concerns of the study as respondents in interviews.

Observation and documentation also played an important role as sources of data collection. In the former case, I managed to observe various student activities on campus, including student meetings and workshops where they discussed student funding concerns. In the case of documentation, I collected different types of official documents, including SRC annual reports, minutes, discussion documents, the university annual reports, financial statements and so forth. Using multiple data collection methods enabled me to conduct methodological data source triangulation, an important element of ‘trustworthiness’ or ‘qualitative rigour’. I took extensive notes during observations and interviews as part of ensuring the trustworthiness of my study. I also had good rapport with students and university management, given my role as a researcher and an activist on campus during my tenure between 2000 and 2005. This rapport facilitated access to the variety of data that I needed.
CHAPTER FIVE: STUDENT ACCESS AND FUNDING DEMANDS

Introduction

In the previous chapters, it was mentioned that prior to 1990, South African students were “major catalysts of popular struggles against apartheid and often characterised as the shock-troops of the South African revolution” (Wolpe, 1994: 7). Students demanded transformation of the apartheid higher education system, especially its governance and funding policies, which mirrored apartheid’s divisions (Bunting, 2006: 73). However, student focus and priorities, especially in HBUs, changed following the unbanning of the liberation movement and release of political prisoners (including former President Nelson Mandela) in 1990 and the commencement of political negotiations. Students shifted "from protests against an illegitimate government to demands for unrestricted access to higher education, expanded financial aid to needy students, and relief from personal debt to the institutions" (Jansen, 2004: 303-304; see also Naidoo, 2006). This shift was confirmed by the former UWC SRC president, who indicated that access and financial issues became dominant concerns for UWC students from the late 1980s onwards (Interview with the UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).

The shift was related to broader social and political change, which happened after 1990. Wolpe argues that the “previous concentration on issues of political rights and state power has given way to relatively un-coordinated and fragmented engagements around education, which have become virtually uncoupled from the struggle for political liberation and economic emancipation” (1994: 7; see Badat, 1995; Luescher-Mamashela and Mugume, 2014). At the same time, students had become “even further marginalised” (Wolpe, 1994: 7, see also Badat, Barends and Wolpe, 1995; SASCO Political Report 1996) and actually rendered “spectators” (Wolpe, 1994: 7).

Conceivably, HBUs and students might legitimately have expected the ANC-led government and especially its post-apartheid higher education policy to respond favourably to their demands for expanding access and financial aid for African
and poor students. However, I shall show in this chapter that (a) there was a dissonance between student expectations and the post-apartheid higher education policy; (b) there is a historical context to both, student policy expectations and policy responses; and (c) the policy response regarding access and funding seen together amounts to a problematic, indeed a paradoxical combination of policies, which as I shall show in Chapter Six, led to unmet financial need and various and changing student actions.

This chapter consists of five sections. The first section situates the study within the broader political and higher education context. The second section provides a brief historical account of UWC in terms of its origin, role during the liberation struggle and post-apartheid era, as well as leadership challenges. The third section deals with the student demand for an independent and democratic SRC. I have included this demand because of the historical role that the UWC SRC has played in the collective student normative and non-normative actions aimed at opening access to higher education institutions and the provision of financial aid to poor and African students between 1995 and 2005. Therefore, tracing the genesis and conditions that shaped and influenced the SRC is necessary to enhance one's understanding of its role as a leader and institutional representative of students' collective concerns, including unmet financial need. The SRC is a contested terrain of struggle for student power and influence. It is an embodiment of the dominant student ideological and political view, which in turn shapes and influences the nature and form of collective student actions against the problem of unmet financial need. The fourth section deals with students’ demand for the expansion of access. The fifth section deals with students’ demand for expanded and equitable financial aid.

**Political context**

Wolpe and Unterhalter argue that “education may be a necessary condition for certain social processes, but it is not a sufficient condition, and hence cannot be analysed as an autonomous social force” (1991: 3). I propose that post-apartheid higher education needs to be seen in the broader national socio-economic and
political context. In general, higher education has an important role to play in socio-economic development and the eradication of inequalities. However, it is not a ‘panacea’ to all social ills. The higher education policy tends to be modelled within the broader socioeconomic development policy. I have already established in Chapter Three, that student actions can influence and be influenced by socio-economic and political conditions. Therefore I feel it is important to conduct a brief analysis of the post-apartheid socio-economic and political policy trajectory, which has a bearing on the research question.

The post-apartheid democratic state was established through a negotiated settlement and involved significant compromises and trade-offs between the ANC-led liberation movement and the apartheid government. The negotiated settlement was the outcome of a stalemate - “a relatively static, unstable equilibrium of power in South Africa” (Wolpe, 1992: 15). This stalemate was characterised by the dominant social classes not being “powerful enough to reproduce the apartheid and capitalist social order without massive and endemic social conflict and international isolation, and the liberation forces being unable to achieve the revolutionary overthrow of the regime and the winning of state power” (Wolpe, 1992: 15).

The main outcome of the negotiated settlement was the attainment of democracy with political power, but without economic power. This created a number of opposing and contradictory dynamics within South African society. The post-1994 democratisation project has created a peaceful and stable political climate in which many significant freedoms are enjoyed. It marked a beginning and established a “necessary condition, but not the sufficient conditions, for the transition from the apartheid system to a new social order” (Wolpe, 1995a: 286).

The attainment of political power by the ANC and the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) has, beyond the arena of representative government, and despite some erosion, left more or less intact the mode of operation of much of the existing institutional order, that is, the inequalities
between institutions (e.g. HBUs and HWUs, universities and technikons, etc.) as well as the social structural conditions of the society (Wolpe, 1995a: 286).

The country has witnessed four successive elections being held and widely accepted by both local and international stakeholders. The democratic state’s social policy has resulted in the significant expansion of social grants, millions of low-cost houses and water, electricity and telephone connections, and similar services. However, many people have had their water supplies disconnected, according to national government surveys, and ten million were victims of electricity disconnections (see Bond, 2004; Desai and Pithouse, 2004 for details).

The macro-economic policy has hampered social progress in other ways, as social spending has increased but critical social needs remain unmet (see Terreblanche, 2005 for further details). South African macro-economic policy has kept inflation and public debt low despite harsh criticism from mainly the left and civil society formations. It also opened the South African market to “international trade and capital flows” (Rodrik, 2006: 1; see also Hirsh, 2005). The economic policy adopted in 1995, GEAR, promised to achieve 6% economic growth and the creation of 400 000 new jobs by 2000. It was expected that GEAR would contribute to a “booming South African economy operating at or near full employment. Unfortunately, it has not turned out that way” (Rodrik 2006: 2).

Prior to the global financial crisis in 2008, South African economic growth exceeded 3% per annum. However, this did not lead to the creation of new employment. Rodrik argued that the South African unemployment rate was one of the highest in the world and in fact it appeared to have increased rapidly since the democratic transition (from a “low of 13 percent in 1993”) (Rodrik, 2006: 2). Specifically, unemployment had risen substantially, from 17.6% in 1995 to a peak of 30.4% in 2002, although it seems to have stabilised around 27% since 2004 (Bhorat & Oosthuizen, 2007: 391).
The unskilled and black population constitutes the majority of the unemployed. According to Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2007: 393), in 2004 unemployment rates among Africans and women were above the 38.8% national mean, at 44.8% and 46.6% respectively. The situation for African women was severe, with 52.9% being unable to find employment. The situation of rural women was even more severe (Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 2007: 393). Unemployment rate among persons aged 15-24 years was substantially higher than those in the 25-34 year age group in 2005 (Statistics South Africa: 2005:xvi).

Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2007: 398) furthermore state that overall, 9.7% of individuals with tertiary qualifications were unemployed in 2005, according to the expanded definition. However, among those with diplomas and certificates, the unemployment rate was 13.2%, compared to a rate of 4.4% among those with degrees. Thus, individuals with degrees appeared to be able to find work more readily than those with diplomas and certificates, and much more readily than those without any higher qualification.

Some of the complementary economic policy interventions spearheaded by the private sector worsened the situation. One of the consequences of these interventions was the restructuring of the economy, which involved mass retrenchments in the labour market, casualisation, informalisation, privatisation and fragmentation of the public and private sector (see Cronin, 2004; Desai and Pithouse 2004; Nzimande, 2004).

The restructuring of state policy from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to GEAR in 1996 sought to reduce the role of the state in order to create favourable macro-economic conditions for investors (especially foreign direct investors) and capitalist-driven growth. South African women of colour bore the brunt of retrenchments and casualisation as direct victims and as the ones who normally had to face the reality of poverty in the household and deal with it (see Daniel and Habib, 2003; Desai, 2004; SACP, 2005; Terreblanche, 2004).
Following strong opposition, a massive anti-privatisation campaign, and a general strike led by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) around 2001, dominant policy in government began to shift towards much greater emphasis on building state capacity, and towards supporting the idea of a developmental state playing an active role in the economy, particularly in driving infrastructural development and an industrial policy. However, these shifts did not necessarily mark a decisive break with a paradigm that envisaged a dichotomy between capitalist-driven growth on the one hand, and a more or less separate and technocratic development programme, dependent on capitalist growth, on the other.

The macro-economic policy set “limits on public spending and imposed fiscal constraints on higher education institutions” (Gibbon and Kabaki, 2006: 128). Badat argues that this limited or inadequate funding hindered the government in its progressive commitments to increasing student enrolment, participation, access and equity (2004: 46).

The history and role of UWC before the 1994 democratic elections

The apartheid regime’s 1959 Extension of University Education Act formally segregated the provision of higher education in South Africa and gave birth to five racial and ethnic universities established in 1960 and 1961. These were UWC for coloured students, UDW for Indian students, the University of the North (UNIN) for Tsonga/Venda/Sotho-speaking students, the University of Zululand for Zulu/Swazi students and, as an ethnicisation of an existing university, the University of Fort Hare for Xhosa students. These institutions were called HBUs or, more derogatively, ‘bush colleges’.

Wolpe stressed that UWC, together with the UNIN, Zululand and UDW, “emerged under the historical conditions of suppression of black political opposition, the introduction of repressive measures, the establishment of elaborate structures of administrative control of blacks, the initiation of and development of the Bantustan policy and so forth, all of which narrowed the scope for legal
political opposition and were aimed at the entrenchment of the apartheid system” (1995a, 278). According to Wolpe and Sehoole, there were gross material and functional inequalities (in terms of financing, material resources, staffing, undergraduate teaching loads, quality of students and availability of courses) between HWUs and HBUs (1995: 3). They argued that this functional differentiation of HBUs and HWUs had its origins in the different conceptions of the roles of these institutions which aimed at serving the broader political objectives of an apartheid society (Wolpe and Sehoole, 1995: 3).

HWUs were conceived of as “providing the human resources and knowledge required by the advanced industrial, social and dominant political order enjoyed by the white South African population” (Wolpe and Sehoole, 1995: 3). By contrast, the HBUs were shaped to “provide the human resources deemed to be necessary for the occupations available in the urban areas to black people and to the ‘development’ of the Bantustans - this being unrelated to any broad conception of the knowledge and skills required for their ‘real’ economic and social development” (Wolpe and Sehoole, 1995: 3). In this instance, UWC was meant to serve the interests of the so-called ‘coloured community’ in keeping with the political aim to “reproduce the apartheid project” (CHE, 2010:126). However, UWC resisted the apartheid project with all its intentions.

Wolpe (1995a:286) identified four elements that characterised the resistance tradition of UWC prior to 1994. First, UWC rejected the racially based ideology of separate education for different ethnic/racial groups. Second, the university, struggling to transform itself, recognised the dual hint and Third World structure of South African society and the obligation of the university to serve this society - although this did not include a specification of functions in terms of science and technology versus human sciences, basic and applied research, undergraduate versus graduate teaching. Third, it became clear that the inadequate education of the mass of students placed a particular obligation on the university to redefine its identity and conceptions of its teaching role.
Finally, the university defined itself as the home of the intellectual left. This was partly intended, as Gerwel put it, to “create the possibilities of a “post-apartheid social space during the repressive apartheid times” (Gerwel, 2009:1). In consequence, UWC stakeholders were able to engage with one another and in particular, students and management (especially the Rector) frequently met through ‘weekly forums’. The emergent democratic environment was a clear antithesis to the apartheid project.

The transition to democracy (1990-1993) challenged UWC to “define its role in the light of its history” (Wolpe, 1995a:287). The debate on the establishment of the new School of Government (SOG) in 1993 reflected this challenge. The debate focused on different approaches needed for the SOG. Two arguments were presented and each had a different reading and interpretation of the new government’s all-important (but short-lived) RDP. The first argument proposed an approach based on the overriding objective, which was to “produce technically qualified personnel for public administration” (Wolpe, 1995a:287). This was in line with the RDP’s call for human resources needed for national and provincial governments.

The second argument advocated public administrators who “should be steeped not only in technical skills (although these are indispensable) but also in the values of democracy, the ethos of accountability and service, etc” (Wolpe, 1995a:287). This was based on the view that RDP went beyond simply seeking to bring economic growth and enhanced quality of life, but that “transforming social relations in the society (non-racist, non-sexist, democratic, transparency in administration etc.) implies a different conception of education and training” (Wolpe, 1995a:287).

According to Wolpe, the importance of technical excellence “cannot be sufficiently stressed. This is necessary if UWC's graduates are to compete in the labour market and offer high-level skills to the reconstruction process and do so in such a way as to contribute to social transformation” (Wolpe, 1995a:288). However, this placed major new demands on the university both to “develop new
strengths - that is both new disciplines and high levels of technical competence and, at the same time, to link this to social concerns” Wolpe, 1995a:288).

Wolpe characterised this institutional task as “obviously a difficult task full of tensions for both teaching and research, yet in the best traditions of the university - in particular, its commitment to being an intellectual home of the left - and deeply ingrained in the RDP (1995a:288). The SOG debate was about a “critical role for the university.” (Burawoy, 2004: 31). It also reflected UWC’s internal dynamics and “may present a mirror image of the society where it is located, in terms of the diversity of ideological influences and material interests” (Sall, Lebeau and Kassimir, 2003: 128).

Having briefly described the trajectory from its origin to 1994, in the next section, I shall examine how it sought to redefine its role in relation to the new state, and how it dealt with a range of challenges such as leadership, financial crisis and student access and debt.

The post-1994 UWC context: leadership, institutional and student financial situation

Professor Jakes Gerwel played an important role in steering the university’s transformation project until his appointment as the first Director General of President Mandela’s Presidency in 1994. He was succeeded by Prof. Cecil Abrahams, who served as rector until 2000. However, by mid-October 1998, Prof. Abrahams was the object of an “unprecedented vote of censure from the senate; faculty meetings passed motions of no confidence; academic and administrative staff associations demanded his resignation” (Helen Suzman Foundation, 1999: 1).

Prof. Abrahams infuriated students with his ‘firm’ resolve to deal with the university’s financial crisis. He demanded that students should settle or reduce their debts. Students were so incensed with Prof. Abrahams’s insistence that they
engaged in high levels of student activism, which I discuss in detail in the next section.

The university also imposed a “voluntary severance programme that reduced employee numbers by 456” (UWC, 2007: 6). This corporatist model or market-based solution privatised and outsourced non-core activities in both academic faculties and administrative departments (UWC, 1999: 3). In consequence, in eight months Prof. Abrahams had “managed to turn not just the students against him but the whole of the university community” (Helen Suzman Foundation, 1999: 1).

At the beginning of 1999, UWC was characterised by a high level of disillusion with Prof. Abrahams (Helen Suzman Foundation, 1999: 1). There were also fears that more staff layoffs (both academic and administrative) would follow the 1998 retrenchments. Academic staff members who were retrenched in late 1998 sued the university and a full and final settlement was reached in August 2000. The total liability was R4.8 million; R2.5 million was paid in 2000 and R2.3 million was paid in instalments from 2001-2004. The settlement costs, combined with the deficits in the pension and provident funds, led to UWC having “very significant financial commitments to meet in the early 2000s” (UWC, 2007: 6).

Given its historical role in the struggle against apartheid, UWC also “heeded the call from ANC government to allow indigent students to enrol without paying” (UWC, 2007: 6). This resulted in increased student debt. At the same time there was an all-time decline in student enrolment at HBUs nationally.

Individual academic successes and leadership efforts at planning were undermined by “general and sometimes public crises of confidence and morale” (UWC, 2007: 6). The university was unable to replace employees who had left. Because of all these factors, UWC conceded that it “had lost its way” (UWC, 2007: 6). The ‘loss of vision’ deprived UWC of an opportunity to further its transformation agenda and to define its identity in the context of democracy and social change. It also
made the university miss out in terms of consolidating its position in relation to other institutions nationally and internationally.

The ‘atmosphere of suspicion and distrust’ contributed to the antagonistic relationship between management and students that prevailed from 1994 to 2000, which resulted in high levels of non-normative action, especially student activism. For UWC the budgetary erosion of the late 1990s and early 2000s and the need to recover vision and make strategic choices to advance the institution’s goals and ambitions highlighted the need for new and “dynamic leadership” (UWC, 2007: 6). In 2001, Prof. Brian O’Connell succeeded Prof. Abrahams as rector and vice-chancellor.

In its 2007 self-evaluation report, UWC argues that Professor O’Connell constantly sought to focus “UWC’s distinctive mission and identity by emphasising the university’s comparative advantage and using several leverage points for strategic change”. It also argued that Prof. O’Connell led the university through “a period of consolidation, regaining internal trust and public confidence in UWC’s leadership direction” (UWC, 2007: 6). In his inaugural lecture, Prof. O’Connell introduced the notion of UWC as an “engaged university capable of maintaining the dynamic link between academic knowledge and the realisation of society’s hopes”. The UWC community was called to “create an engaging space and an opportunity on large scale for its members to grow in hope and knowledge, and to develop, in a non-instrumentalist way, a sense of their agency in relation to the needs of society” (UWC, 2007: 6).

Prof. O’Connell spearheaded the development of a five-year financial plan, which was approved by the university council in 2001. The five-year financial plan was intended to assist the university to recover from its financial crisis and to measure its financial performance going forward. According to the UWC annual report, the five-year financial plan served “a dual purpose as an update of current income and expenditure against budget, as well as a five-year financial plan forecast based on projected financial outcomes” (UWC, 2005: 27). The five-year financial plan was
“aligned with national benchmarks that take into account expected changes in general economic factors and institutional-specific factors” (UWC, 2005: 27).

The five-year financial plan defined and set the following key financial drivers and targets: (a) admissions should grow at sustainable rates; (b) students should pay their tuition and residence fees; (c) employment costs should not exceed 65% of total income; (d) operating costs should not exceed 30% of total income (UWC, 2002: 41).

The 2005 UWC annual report indicated that student enrolment was 14 590, of which “almost 11 000 received some form of financial assistance” (UWC 2005: 15-16). UWC's Financial Aid Office administered a total allocation of R88.2 million in bursaries, of which R40.7 million was an NSFAS allocation. Other contributions included R10 million from the UWC bursary fund and R3.28 million merit awards for top achiever first-time entrants and senior students (UWC, 2005: 15). Other forms of student financial assistance came from student assistant credits (R1.251 million), and Edu-loan (R913 000) in 2005. Notwithstanding this, some students still failed to meet all their financial needs. This contributed to the university's persistent problem of student debt consisting of both recoverable and irrecoverable portions. The latter ended up being written off. For instance, in 2005 the UWC gross student fee debt reached R132 million from the R77 million in 2001. The university considered some portion of the student debt as ‘impaired’, which is an amount that is “irrecoverable after taking into account collections subsequent to year end and historic patterns of collection by the university as well as by professional debt collectors” (UWC, 2005:49). The impairment took into account “the present value of future expected cash flows” (UWC, 2005:49). Of the 2005 total student debt figure of about R132 million the impairment was R100 410 595 million.

UWC’s recoverable student debt fluctuated between 1995 and 2005 (as illustrated in Figure 2). The highest recoverable student debt was about R35 million in 1997 and the lowest recoverable student debt was about R12 million in 2001.
The institution itself had other pressing concerns. Lacking an adequate endowment or reserve fund, it needed those same students to make upfront payments at the beginning of each academic year to keep afloat before the state subsidy arrived in April. Consequently, government had to provide a guarantee to help the institution access financial support, especially the overdraft, which increased from R4,442,547 million in 1995 to R131,622 thousand in 2005 (see Figure 3). The overdraft was intended to keep the university afloat while waiting for the payment of the state subsidy to come available in April, coinciding with the government financial cycle.
On the one hand, UWC committed itself to address the challenge of financial sustainability and accomplishing its mission of “actively pursuing equitable strategies for students” (UWC, 2003: 8) in the context of global financial austerity and national conservative macro-economic policy thinking. On the other hand, UWC was expected to implement the paradoxical policy of simultaneous pursuit of expansion of access and limited funding (with cost-sharing being advanced as policy solution).

The relevance of some aspects of the institutional context will become evident in the discussions on student demands for expansion of access and financial aid. I, for instance, refer to issues such the historical role played by the university in the liberation struggle, the nature of institutional leadership and the institutional approach to financial crises and similar concerns.

**Student demand for independent and democratic SRCs**

The term SRC is uniquely South African. Even though it can be described as a student government body, the SRC is different from ‘student union’, ‘student government’, ‘student congress’, ‘student guild’ or ‘general student association’ found on most campuses throughout the world (see Joseph, Chemnjor and Ngware, 2008: 197; Luescher, 2005: 5).

The concept ‘SRC’ has historical and political significance and meaning in South Africa. South African students established the first SRC in 1906 at the University of Cape Town (which was then known as the South African College) (UCT Monday Paper, 26 May 2008). This marked the slow genesis of a protracted national student struggle for liberation, freedom and social justice, and demand for recognition and involvement in national and institutional higher education policy and decision-making, which finally culminated in 1997 in the approval of the Higher Education White Paper, which formally recognised the role of students.
The content and form of the SRC changed at various points of South African history of student politics or activism; SRCs were largely shaped and influenced by the prevailing social and political conditions and higher education institutions. The period from 1960 to 1967 can be broadly described as a lull in South African oppositional politics. This was due to the imprisonment of political leaders and banning of liberation movements such as the ANC and PAC, which was accompanied by the intensification of internal repression. Any oppositional political activity therefore had to be conducted clandestinely in a climate of fear and repression. However, it is during this political lull that students (especially the oppressed) regrouped and disaffiliated from the established, predominantly white and liberal National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) to establish their own organisation, called the South African Student Organisation (SASO) in 1968.

SASO radicalised student struggles or student politics and spurred the emergence of an independent and critical black student voice, which rejected the apartheid regime, white political dominance and economic privilege and its corollary of black domination. Students also rejected the apartheid ideological-political basis of higher education institutions, especially historically black institutions (such as UWC) and the limited powers of the SRCs, which were seen as instruments of control and suppression by the apartheid regime and its predecessors. Part of the objective was to transform SRCs into weapons of student activism beyond simply representing students on academic and administrative concerns (see Maseko, 1994; Badat, 1999).

Until then the state-appointed university rectors appointed the SRCs. With the exception of the first recorded example of an official student protest at the UWC in 1963, which involved male students refusing to wear ties to a social function, the SRC activities were tightly controlled. The university councils (at two black universities) rejected the requests of the SRCs to become NUSAS affiliates (see Gwala, 1988).
To deal with the effects of suppression and control, students at some institutions (such as the University of Fort Hare in the 1960s) decided not to have SRCs because they were perceived to be ambassadors of institutions and apartheid government ‘stooges’ (see Bhana, 1977; Welsh and Savage, 1977). Another reason was the ‘constant victimisation’ of SRCs by apartheid agents (Mzamane, Maaba and Biko, 2006:108).

Student rejection of the apartheid regime, its apparatus and SRCs spread throughout the country as disturbances at the Universities of the North, Western Cape, Fort Hare and Durban Westville in the early 1970s were linked to calls for more representative governing structures, a greater role for black staff and academic freedom (see Bhana, 1977; Welsh and Savage, 1977).

Nationally, as Mamdani argues, the ‘decade of peace’ ended with the Durban strikes of 1973 and the Soweto uprising of 1976. For the next decade, South Africa was in the throes of a protracted and popular urban uprising. The paradigm of resistance shifted from “an exile-based armed struggle to an internal struggle” (Mamdani, 1996:30).

Students’ demand for autonomous and empowered SRCs was one of the key concerns of students in the 1980s (Maseko, 1993: 1; see also Mzamane et al., 2006). It was “linked explicitly to a demand for greater control over their education” (Molteno, 1987: 7), as well as to the demand for broader political reform and democratisation of the country on the one hand, and the transformation of higher education (especially its governance) on the other hand (Cele, 2008: 90-91; see also Gerwel, 2009; Gerwel, 1988; Wolpe, 1994).

In the apartheid era, in the pursuit to secure the acceptance of SRCs, students braved expulsion or suspension from educational institutions, and dared injury, detention, long prison sentences and even death. The “campaign for the recognition of SRCs became in itself an instrument of mobilisation in the struggle to end the poor quality of education for blacks, and ultimately to destroy the entire
structure of racial/ethnic and class domination” (Maseko, 1993: 1). Yet the outcome of the campaign was in various respects neither successful, nor produced the form of governance the students envisaged, namely that they should take part in the decision-making structures. At some tertiary institutions this campaign was relatively successful, although at other institutions, such as the Universities of Fort Hare, the North and Transkei, SRCs were short-lived owing to state repression and harassment in collaboration with the authorities of these universities. At UWC the SRC had a longer life span, but its existence scarcely led to the representation of students in the governing structures (Maseko, 1993: 1).

UWC students managed to establish an independent and democratic SRC in 1981. However, the first two years of the formation of the UWC SRC were marked by intense student debate on the role and importance of having an SRC on campus. As a result there was little political or any other activity on its part. There were two dominant and opposing student views on the role of the SRC. The first view came from those who adhered strongly to the ‘non-collaborationist’ principle, a hallmark of the New Unity Movement tradition (Maseko, 1993: 10). This tradition was pessimistic about the efficacy of the SRC at a campus whose administration they mistrusted and regarded as hostile, hence they argued that the SRC would merely be a “puppet of the administration” (Maseko, 1993: 10-11).

The other view argued that the recognition of the SRC provided space for students to conduct their activities in a ‘legal way’. As evidenced in many debates, these different views were never completely resolved (Maseko, 1993: 11). These student differences were partly ideological and political, resembling those existing between the ANC and AZAPO, Black Consciousness Movement and PAC (Interview with the UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).

Reflecting on this, a former UWC SRC president argued that the UWC SRC was therefore “ideologically very narrow because for a number of years it was dominated by an ANC-aligned student organisation. I think that had a major influence on how we dealt with students on the campus” (Interview with UWC
 SRC president, 26 October 2004). The former UWC SRC president nevertheless argued that they did not “deny other student political organisations access to students. As organisations, they were also not denied access to the UWC. But in a way, since they were in the minority, they had less influence on policy matters of the SRC at that time” (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).

Maseko argues that after its formation in 1981 the UWC SRC adopted a ‘confrontational approach’ to the university authorities. This approach was largely influenced by the conviction that the apartheid origins and interests served by the university placed the two parties on a collision course. Students argued that the functioning of the university could not just be reformed but had to be radically changed (Maseko, 1993: 7-8). This was motivated by a view of UWC as a “site of struggle against the apartheid state but also against the very nature of the university” (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004). The transformation of the apartheid state (including its ideological state apparatuses such as UWC) into a democratic state thus remained a “priority for students” (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).

At the same time, students needed to deal with their own challenges related to racial and ethnic divisions among the student body. This was despite the fact that the majority of students at UWC could be described as black. The liberation movement had defined black people as “those who are by law or tradition, politically, economically and socially discriminated against” (Badat, 1999: 377). In pursuit of white supremacy and the quest for ‘hegemony’, the apartheid regime used ethnicity as its political and ideological weapon (Sikwebu, 2008: 122). Thus, Maseko argues that towards the end of the 1980s, “coloured students were accused of dissension, while African students were depicted as the militant group on campus” (1993: 17). In consequence, the concept of ‘African leadership’ was justified, which led to the “withdrawal of many coloured students, including some who were notable activists because they considered their involvement in student politics was being trivialised” (Maseko, 1993: 17). The issue of racial and ethnic
division remained part of the narrative and a challenge facing the UWC during the period under review (1995-2005).

In summary, UWC students had a long history of struggle for an independent and democratic SRC. UWC students managed to establish their own SRC in 1981. The SRC, however, took long to become effective owing to inter-student groups' ideological and political differences on the role of the SRC in advancing student interests and transformation of the UWC. In consequence, a highly political and democratic SRC structure emerged and became a contested terrain of struggle for student power. All student organisations (including political and religious) sought better representation and control of student government. Individuals could also contest the SRC election as independent candidates. The SRC was at the apex of student governance and supposed to serve the interests of all students, irrespective of political, ideological or even racial and gender differences. The SRC was therefore a collective voice representing diverse student views and interests. In other words, once elected, the SRC members were supposed to put the interests of all students first and always seek to serve such interests above their narrow sectional interests, which included the political organisations from which they came. However, as this study shows, the UWC SRC did not always manage to establish a balance between the interests of all students versus individual or organisational interests. Understanding the origin, nature and role (or lack thereof) of the SRC is important in any analysis of student action against unmet financial need.

The post-apartheid higher education policy acknowledged that the democratic government inherited a higher education system characterised by “fragmentation, inefficiency and ineffectiveness, with too little co-ordination, few common goals and negligible systemic planning” (Department of Education, 1997: 8). Concomitantly, there were contestations around the democratic participation and the effective representation of staff and students in governance structures at an institutional level (Department of Education, 1997: 8). The post-apartheid higher
education policy response included the adoption of democratisation as one of its underlying principles.

At the heart of the principle of democratisation was the requirement that the governance system of higher education and of individual institutions should be “democratic, representative and participatory and characterised by mutual respect, tolerance and the maintenance of a well-ordered and peaceful community life” (Department of Education, 1997: 12). The policy therefore created an expectation and demand for institutional governance to “ensure that those affected by decisions have a say in making them, either directly or through elected representatives” (Department of Education, 1997: 12). There was strong emphasis on ensuring transparency and accountability in decision-making across all levels (systemic and institutional) (Department of Education, 1997: 12).

To capture and operationalise the vision of transformed higher education governance, the policy preferred the model of co-operative governance of higher education in South Africa based on the “principle of autonomous institutions working co-operatively with a proactive government and in a range of partnerships” (Department of Education, 1997: 36). This was in part because of the recognition of “the need to transcend the adversarial relations between state and civil society arising from the apartheid era” (Department of Education, 1997: 36).

Co-operative governance is best conceptualised as a “social contract between a wide range of stakeholders in the interests of national reconstruction and development” (Hall et al., 2002: 43). The post-apartheid higher education governance policy guarantees higher education institutions with “appropriate levels of autonomy and academic freedom” (Hall et al., 2002: 43). The post-apartheid higher education governance policy created a “bicameral system of responsibilities in which accountability for governance is shared between two primary parties – lay members of Council, acting as trustees in the public interest, and professional academics, taking responsibility for teaching, learning and
research through the Senate and Faculty Boards” (Hall et al., 2002: 43). In 1997 a third agency was added to this traditional model: the Institutional Forum (IF), a statutory advisory committee of Council (Hall et al., 2002: 43).

The co-operative governance framework necessitated the transformation of institutional governance structures such as council, senate and SRC into democratic bodies and the creation of an IF where none had been established previously. The new framework sought to formalise the role of students as participants rather than bystanders in the process of higher education change. This provided a platform for students to engage with the university management in establishing common frameworks to address student access, retention, exclusion and individual financial difficulties (Cele, 2009: 64). At the same time, new challenges for UWC students emerged, such as lack of knowledge or inadequate knowledge and understanding of post-1994 legislative frameworks and national policy processes and the lack of financial resources or an inadequate SRC budget to commission research or receive expert-type assistance when engaging in policy actions (Cele, 2009: 67).

As indicated earlier, since 1990, expansion of access and financial aid has been a major issue concerning UWC students and student organisations such as the SRC. I shall examine these two issues in the next two sections, starting with access and then financial aid.

**Student demand for expansion of access**

At UWC the demand for the expansion of access was an integral part of student struggles for the transformation of the institution in the 1980s. Students embarked on institution-focused student activism or collective non-normative action to demand expansion of access. According to Gerwel, student activism or collective non-normative student action provided "the necessary energy and the driving force" (1988: 3), which challenged the "dominant ethos and practices of the institution as it was originally conceived and operated, and created the counter
ethos and the space and will for other transformative efforts in the institution" (1988: 3).

Following the appointment of Prof. Gerwel as the UWC rector in the late 1980s, the SRC and rector used to meet,

“on a weekly basis (during weekly forums) and discuss a range of issues pertaining to student affairs. These meetings would sometime happen before the formal meetings between students and senior management. We informed the UWC rector of our mandated position from mass meetings or general council so that he could first see how he can handle the situation. [Students’ relationship with the rector was not] adversarial and hostile, we both realised that we could agree on certain issues. But we also made it very clear that at the end of the day we are there to represent students’ interests first” (Interview UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).

The lack of transformation or limited transformation affected the relationship between the UWC SRC and management in the late 1980s. According to the UWC SRC president, there were

“sharp differences which led to the stalemate because some members of the university management could either not understand or did not want to accommodate the students’ position. The situation was strange because we had a very progressive rector on the one hand and some members of his executive that were not very progressive, in fact conservative” (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).

Students found themselves in an invidious position, as the former SRC president mentioned: “we thought that we have to contest but also assist the university” (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004). The SRC had to fight for what was in the ‘best interest’ of students and sometimes took the struggle to the
university management, led by Prof. Gerwel, whom students saw as “a very progressive rector” (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).

The transformation process undertaken under the leadership of Prof. Gerwel facilitated the ability of staff to work together for change. This resulted in the university's decision and commitment to 'democratise access' in order to allow African students, which contributed to the growth in student enrolment and transformation of the social composition of the student body (Gerwel, 1988: 3). Thus, according to Cooper and Subotzky, UWC African and coloured headcounts comprised 13% and 82% of total enrolments in 1988. In 1993, these had changed to 38% and 55% and by 1998 the figures were 58% and 36%. In absolute number terms, African headcounts increased from 1 398 in 1988 to 4 761 in 1993, followed by a smaller increase to 6 267 in 1998, while coloured headcounts fell from 8 762 to 6 890 between 1988 and 1993 and then fell further to 3 851 by 1998 (2001: 49).

Student demand for the expansion of access to higher education was also a national issue. At national level, SASCO demanded “removal of the language and admission criteria barriers, relief overcrowding pressure from the historically black institutions (HBIs), enhancing articulation and mobility between and within tertiary institutions and facilitating the course of the life-long learning ideal” (1995: 8). It called for an “expansion and widening of access to higher education for the poor and the black majority” (South African Student Congress, 1995: 31). SASCO and other student political organisations led both state- and institution-focused student activism, including marches on Parliament and the former Department of Education, protests, placard demonstrations and class boycotts in demanding expansion of access.

The post-1994 government acknowledged that there was “an inequitable distribution of access and opportunity for students and staff along lines of race, gender, class and geography” (Department of Education, 1997: 8). Government then set out a vision of a transformed, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist
system of higher education that would advance “equity of access and fair chances of success to all who are seeking to realise their potential through higher education, while eradicating all forms of unfair discrimination and advancing redress for past inequalities” (Department of Education, 1997: 10).

Concomitantly, government committed itself to the ‘planned expansion of the system’, arguing that a major focus of any expansion and equity strategy “must be on increasing the participation and success rates of black students in general, and of African, coloured and women students in particular, especially in programmes and levels in which they are underrepresented” (Department of Education, 1997: 21). Nevertheless, government warned that increased access “must not lead to a ‘revolving door’ syndrome for students, with high failure and drop-out rates” (Department of Education, 1997: 22). Government then committed itself to ensure that public funds earmarked for achieving redress and equity were “linked to measurable progress toward improving quality and reducing the high drop-out and repetition rates” (Department of Education, 1997: 22). The following section deals further with the issue of student funding.

**Student demand for expanded financial aid at UWC**

The demand for expanded and equitable financial aid was at the forefront of UWC student action. I have mentioned that UWC students identified funding and access as two critical issues of concern, which they had tried to address since the late 1980s. According to the former SRC president, UWC “admitted large numbers of working class students who could not afford to pay tuition fees and residence fees. So UWC had to balance its political objectives with its academic objectives” (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004). This showed UWC’s commitment to social justice. UWC did not “seek only students who could pay their way or those with the highest proven record of academic success, but sought to provide an intellectual home for the oppressed, with particular attention to working class students who showed potential” (UWC, 2002: 19).
In consequence, although the UWC won a “special place in the history of higher education in South Africa, and deserved reputation for its role in the creation of democratic order, it came at a cost” (UWC, 2002: 19-21). The ‘cost’ came from two fronts. First, the apartheid regime reduced its budget subsidy to UWC and other HBUs that had defied it and adopted an open access policy. The regime revised its funding policy following the decision of UWC (and other HBUs) to open access to all students irrespective of colour, ethnicity and origin. However, the revised policy combined student enrolment growth (which was the most important factor in the old subsidy formula) and student success as two major factors for consideration in the allocation of resources to institutions. UWC rector Gerwel was candid and recognised the negative consequences that the apartheid policy was going to have on the “UWC philosophy of democratising access and its deliberate policy of growth” (Gerwel, 1988: 27).

Second, given the fact that most students who benefited from the UWC’s democratisation of access were poor and unable to pay, the university was “unable to collect from all its students their full contribution to their education, and a student debt developed over time” (UWC, 2002: 21). In consequence, UWC’s challenge of financial sustainability and student affordability started to deepen. In response to the university’s financial challenge, students “took a very responsible position because we felt that UWC is progressive higher education institution and we did not want to contribute to its downfall of UWC” (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).

Students attributed UWC resources problem to the apartheid regime.

...the lack of resources at UWC was orchestrated by the apartheid state in the 1980s. So, while UWC took a progressive stance, in resisting apartheid regime, students also had to resist the conditions created on UWC. For instance, many members of staff were still remnants of the old apartheid era. There was a lot of financial and academic exclusions on campus and
those were things that the SRC had to deal with" (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).

The former UWC SRC president argued, unsurprisingly, that the apartheid state

...did not make provision for students from working class background to attend at places like UWC. Notwithstanding, UWC should be 'credited' for accommodating students who could not afford tuition fees. So when I say that UWC became a site of struggle, it was a site of struggle against apartheid, against the state but also against the very nature of that university (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).

The statement below illustrates this point:

...UWC cannot afford to go bankrupt - and in order for it to stay viable, students have to make a contribution towards their debt. As the SRC, we said to students. “Look, you have to pay. You can’t study for free.” And I think that was also a position where we differed with our own opposition” (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).

The demand for expanded and equitable financial aid was national, not just a UWC concern. At the 1994 launching conference of the South African Universities - Students’ Representative Council (SAU-SRC) student leaders from across the country characterised the student funding crisis as the “manifestation of the apartheid colonial education system intensified by an inability to develop a nationally co-ordinated, coherent policy and approach to university funding and student financial aid” (SAU-SRC, 1994: 2). Students noted that the funding crisis “affects disadvantaged students more acutely and jeopardises a programme to widen access to universities and ensure redress” (SAU-SRC, 1994: 2).

SASCO had been demanding free higher education since the early 1990s (UWC SRC, 2000: 15; see also Wangenge-Ouma, 2011; SASCO, 2010). In 1995,
SASCO identified and included funding as one of the key component of its national programme of action. It demanded a moratorium on financial exclusion, a moratorium on unilateral fee increments, immediate establishment of a national bursary and loan scheme, a HBIs-biased emergency relief and subsidy formula, financial accountability and transparency on the part of tertiary education institutions and re-allocation of departmental budgets to education, especially military budgets (1995: 8).

In implementing its programme of action, SASCO embarked upon collective non-normative action, especially state-focused and institution-focused student activism against financial exclusions, which were viewed as an “attack on collective access to higher education” (2006: 59). SASCO also engaged in collective normative action, especially “a process of negotiations at a national level with the aim of securing a national student bursary fund” (Naidoo, 2006: 59; see also UWC SRC, 2000).

The combination of collective non-normative student action and collective normative student action represented SASCO’s principle approach to the post-apartheid government (including the GNU), which it characterised as “both confrontation and cooperation” (SASCO, 1994: 1). In other words, SASCO confronted or even contradicted government when they differed, but complimented it when they agreed. The UWC SASCO branch dominated the UWC SRC between 1995 and 2005.

Given its role and contribution to the liberation struggle and persistent financial challenge of institutional sustainability and student affordability, it is possible that UWC students had legitimate expectations for some relief from the post-apartheid higher education policy. In the next section, the nature of the post-apartheid higher education policy in relation to student demand for expanded and equitable financial aid is examined.
The post-apartheid higher education policy: rejection of fee-free higher education and implementation of cost-sharing and NSFAS

As indicated in Chapters One and Two, government argued that fee-free higher education for students would not be “an affordable or sustainable option for South Africa” (Department of Education, 1997: 46) and thus embraced cost-sharing as a policy solution, whereby students and their parents were expected to contribute to study costs. Both the 1996 NCHE Report and 1997 Higher Education White Paper are explicit about their support for cost-sharing. In particular, the NCHE accepted the argument in the literature on the economics of education that “higher education generates significant benefits for the student concerned as well as for the public at large - the private/public benefits position ... and believes that the cost of higher education should be shared by the student and by the public (government)” (Department of Education, 1996: 220; see also Department of Education, 1997, 4.39).

Notwithstanding its acceptance of cost-sharing, government recognised the existing severe limits to the capacity of many students and their families to pay, particularly first-generation students from poor families. Government then recommended that capable students should not be “excluded from access to higher education because of poverty, it is essential to have in place a well-functioning, comprehensive student financial aid scheme” (Department of Education, 1997: 6.39). In consequence, government established the NSFAS in 1999, which was an income-contingent loan scheme and part of a policy of cost sharing (Johnstone, 2003: 8-9). Government transformed the then Tertiary Education Fund of South Africa (TEFSA) into NSFAS.

TEFSA, initiated in 1991 was not a true national financial aid scheme because of its limited reach (see SAU-SRC, 1994; SASCO, 1995). Higher education institutions had been raising their own funds through local and international donors. Some of these funds were allocated to financial aid. The Independent Development Trust provided R50 million for student financial aid granted in the form of loans to needy students from historically disadvantaged backgrounds.
during the 1991 and 1992 academic years. TEFSA had legislative power to offer loans and recover debts (see NSFAS, 2009).

In 1999, the National Student Financial Aid Scheme Act (No. 56 of 1999) was passed. This Act established the NSFAS, incorporating TEFSA. The change formally occurred in August 2000 with the appointment of the first board of NSFAS (see NSFAS, 2010 for more details).

An important aspect of NSFAS is that up to 40% of each award to a student is converted into a bursary, which does not have to be repaid to the scheme, unlike loans. The extent of this conversion is dependent upon academic results. In theory, NSFAS may appear to level the playing field by enabling poor students to gain access to grants and loans that would cover their tuition. To some extent, NSFAS mitigated the cost-sharing pressures. However, several concerns were raised and in fact students had regularly been involved in collective non-normative student actions because of NSFAS.

The financial exclusion of many poor black students from university education after 1994 has been attributed to inadequate NSFAS funding. According to Bunting, the majority of students affected by financial exclusions were “black students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds” (2002: 166). Although the purpose of the NFSAS was to “help these poor students register at and remain registered at higher education institutions, the exclusion of many from university or technikon studies was a clear signal that the national financial aid scheme was being funded at inadequate levels” (Bunting, 2002: 166).

Breier wrote that despite NSFAS having a means test to establish whether a student qualified for funding, there was “no test to determine whether a student had the means to pay upfront amounts” (2007: 9). Breier further argued that some students “genuinely did not have money to pay” (Breier, 2007: 9).
Students also complained about the interest charged on NSFAS loans. For instance, a third-year UWC B Com student interviewed for the study wondered if NSFAS interest,

...could be cut out or else if they cannot cut it out if they just wait until you have a job and then that interest kicks in. Because to me it creates a very worrying situation every time that I apply because I know that they are giving me a R15 000 now they are going to give me R40 000 as a bursary but the other R6 000 by the time I get a job will already have accumulated towards R50 000 as the years go (Interview with third-year UWC B Com student, 28 August 2006).

Another student who was interviewed suggested that changes to NSFAS should be considered:

...I think the government should let students not to pay back NSFAS if they pass. But, if the student failed, by then, the student must pay because the financial assistance didn’t assist. So, I think also if students continuously passed NSFAS must just cancel their debts, but if the students fail they must let the student pay back the student debt (Interview with second-year B Admin student, 29 August 2006).

**Conclusion**

This chapter set out to analyse student demands for independent and democratic SRC, expansion of access and financial aid at UWC. I situated this analysis within the broader political and institutional university context. Students demanded the establishment of independent and democratic SRCs, access and financial aid. Students campaigned for the establishment of independent and democratic SRCs for decades and this call was linked to the national struggle for democratisation of the state and transformation of higher education governance. At UWC, students managed to achieve their objective by establishing an independent and democratic
SRC in 1981. The UWC SRC continued to exist as a highly political and contested terrain of student control and influence.

During Gerwel's era, the relationship between the UWC rector and the SRC was crucial to the university's challenge of simultaneously ensuring both institutional financial sustainability and student affordability. Students and the university gained from this relationship in different ways. The relationship facilitated collaborative normative student action whereby students regularly met with the rector in order to persuade him and his executive to agree to certain student-related decisions. At the same time, the relationship facilitated students’ understanding of the university’ financial crisis and need for students to ‘save’ the institution by paying.

I also showed that student demand for expanded financial aid was a national issue that was taken up by national student organisations such as SASCO and SAU-SRC. The post-apartheid higher education policy acknowledged and recognised the need to (a) expand access and (b) address student funding problems through establishing a comprehensive and sustainable financial aid scheme (NSFAS).

However, the post-apartheid higher education policy did not accept that students should study for free, nor agreed to provide redress funding to HBUs such as UWC. Instead, it embraced and promoted cost-sharing, thus requiring parents and students to share the burden of study costs. In an effort to mitigate the negative effects of study costs, especially for poor students, the post-apartheid higher education policy recommended the establishment of NSFAS, which subsequently happened in 1999. NSFAS has been helpful and supported number of historically disadvantaged students (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 832).

Conversely, various studies have found NSFAS to be inadequate and identified it as a source of various incidents of campus student unrest. UWC and other higher education institutions increased fees in order to deal with a declining state subsidy and student debt. Wangenge-Ouma argues that the existing funding context
(declining government funding, regular tuition fee increases and inadequate NSFAS funding) is “one that is arguably inimical to wider access and participation, and therefore, the achievement of equity of access in South Africa’s higher education” (2011: 5).

Overall, I have demonstrated that the policy response regarding access and funding seen together amounts to a problematic, indeed a paradoxical combination of policies, which, as I will show in the following chapter, produced the problem of acute unmet financial need for many students and consequently various and changing student actions in response.
CHAPTER SIX: STUDENT ACTION TO ADDRESS ‘UNMET FINANCIAL NEED’

Introduction
In keeping with the conceptual framework established in Chapter Three, I shall show in this chapter that UWC students under the leadership of the SRC used collective non-normative student action, institution-focused student activism and collective normative student action in a complementary manner to address their problem of unmet financial need. This will be illustrated through the analysis of the 1998 UWC conflict triggered by the impending financial exclusion of 7000 students. I shall also show that UWC students embarked on various individual normative student actions and individual non-normative student actions in order to address their problem of unmet financial need. Individual student stories will shed some light on the “social origins of students or the solidarity networks they mobilise to gain access to higher education which have often been ignored or assumed to be largely elite-based without empirical evidence to support these beliefs” (Sall, Lebeau and Kassimir, 2003: 138). As I said in Chapter Two, the individual student stories represent in many respects what Jansen called “unseen pains of transition” (2004: 118).

The chapter consists of four sections. The first section examines collective student action between 1995 and 2000, and the second section looks at students’ use of collective student action between 2000 and 2005. In the third section, the analysis focuses on individual actions – both normative and non-normative in nature. Finally, the fourth section provides a brief interpretative reflection on the results.

Student use of collective student action between 1995 and 2000
The conceptual framework developed in Chapter Three provides for different types of student action, that is, collective and individual. Collective student action can be divided into normative and non-normative forms. I indicated that student activism can be considered as collective non-normative student action and formal student participation in higher education governance as collective normative
student action. UWC students tended to use student activism and formal student participation in higher education in a complementary manner to address their problem of unmet financial needs. In the next section, I am going to examine the 1998 UWC student activism, which was the most important instance of student activism in the 1995-2005 period. I consider different aspects of the event, starting with providing a context for understanding the 1998 UWC conflict. Second, I explore student action of lobbying used to garner support from external stakeholders. Third, I focus on the actual events of institution-focused student activism, which issues finally in an analysis of the resolution to the conflict.

The case of the 1998 UWC conflict

Origin of the dispute and the use of Type 1: collective normative student action
As a matter of course, the UWC management and SRC held fee negotiations annually in the 1990s. These negotiations tended to commence immediately after the election of a new SRC, which used to be held between September and October each year. I consider these negotiations as a particular form of the kind of formal student participation in university decision-making operative at the time; it can thus be understood as a normative kind of collective student action in the context of this institution. The intended outcome of the negotiations was a financial agreement for the coming academic year. The negotiations between the UWC management and SRC did not always lead directly to the intended outcome. This was the case in 1998.

The 1998 UWC conflict arose after protracted negotiations between student leadership and university management collapsed, as they could not reconcile their differences about the issue of students with outstanding fees and debts. UWC had indicated that it was “owed some US$10 million (R50 million at the time) by 7000 students too poor to pay” (Green Left, 1998:1). The UWC SRC was made up of SASCO members and negotiated primarily on behalf of these 7000 poor students. Therefore, the manner in which this matter was going to be crafted in the
financial agreement was clearly going to pose a challenge or become highly contested.

The main contested points of negotiation between the UWC SRC and management related to certain provisions in the draft 1997/98 financial agreement. The UWC SRC argued that the bone of contention in the draft 1997/98 financial agreement related to what they described as “Clause 4 or safety valve” (UWC, 1998: 11). In the past the clause used to read

... in the event students experiencing difficulty in meeting the required minimum contribution towards their outstanding fees their cases will be assessed individually to determine how further assistance can be extended (UWC, 1998: 11).

However, in the draft 1997/98 financial agreement, the clause read, “in the event students experiencing difficulty in meeting their outstanding fees their cases will be assessed individually to determine affordability” (UWC, 1998: 11). According to the 1998 SRC,

...an impression was created that affordability meant how much students can afford only to learn later that affordability meant whether or not the university could manage to register students without the stipulated amounts. Clearly, this was a recipe for exclusion and we consequently declared a dispute and that agreement was subsequently nullified (UWC, 1998: 11).

The source of the dispute between the UWC SRC and management thus centred on how they understood and used the notion of ‘affordability’. The UWC SRC approached ‘affordability’ from students’ financial standpoint, arguing whether or not students (possibly ‘all those affected’) could ‘afford’ to pay and if so, how much they could ‘afford’. The UWC management approached ‘affordability’ from the institutional financial standpoint by asking whether the university could
‘afford’ to admit students who could not pay. UWC student leaders would possibly be pushing for more students to be admitted without regard to that definition of ‘affordability’. The UWC management, on the other hand, was more concerned with ensuring overall financial sustainability, given the vast amount of student debt (R50 million). Therefore I may say that the dispute was a manifestation of the difficult reality of managing the paradox of expanding access and limited funding; it demonstrated the tension between affordability (for students) and financial sustainability (of the institution).

A frosty relationship between UWC students and university management, especially with the rector, Prof. Abrahams, exacerbated the situation. Students argued that they met with an administration that was “resolute on excluding students on financial grounds based on students not having met their financial obligations towards the institution” (UWC, 1998: 11). They acknowledged that UWC management had ‘a point’ from the legal perspective. However, students’ contestation was premised on the view that the ...

... escalation of the student debt was a direct consequence of management’s mismanagement of the university in general and the financial quagmire it was embroiled in, as it never put any systems in place of ensuring that students meet their financial obligations (UWC, 1998: 11).

UWC SRC further argued that university management was unable to come up with new ideas and solutions to the ongoing institutional financial crisis. It was left to the UWC SRC to come up with proposals, including 'parental involvement' and establishment of SCM (UWC, 1998: 11).

**Lobbying for external student support**

UWC SRC and management fell into a deadlock. UWC students then tried to explore other options in a bid to find solutions. They went outside the university, where they engaged and lobbied the Chancellor, Archbishop Desmond Tutu,
officials of the Department of Education and the ANC headquarters, all MDM organisations (SACP, SANCO, COSATU and ANCYL) and other civil society bodies such as churches and the Red Cross (UWC, 1998: 3).

These efforts, however, were in vain. They were told that they had “no justifiable cause” (UWC, 1998: 3). Students received “only one response: you have to pay. We were called names, a bunch of fee dodgers, irrational students who want free education, cell phone-toting youth who belabour their poverty in order to lead a posh lifestyle on campuses” (UWC, 1998: 3). This characterisation of students was an opposite to the pre-1994 characterisation of students as “shock troops of the revolution” (Wolpe, 1994: 7) and “energy driving force” (Gerwel, 1988: 3) for transformation of UWC.

According to the SRC, students were

literally left on our own. The crucial challenge of the time was to be united. An honest re-examination of our positions and their attendant tactics was needed. This is the challenge that some did not comprehend (UWC, 1998: 3).

In Chapter Three, I argued that different types of student actions are interrelated and can be used in a complementary manner. In 1998 UWC students began taking Type 1 collective normative student action, especially using negotiations and lobbying in order to address their problem of unmet financial need. Eventually, students decided to shift from Type 1 to Type 2, which is collective non-normative student action, or in this case, student activism. As I shall show, the shift did not imply complete abandonment of Type 1. Rather it was a tactical shift whereby students used Type 2 to put more pressure on the university to accede to their demands. UWC students combined Type 1 and Type 2 as they sought to resolve the impasse. In the next section I shall analyse student activism as it happened and its resolution.
The use of collective non-normative student action

Having failed to find sympathy and support or external intervention to unlock the impasse after four months of negotiations, the UWC SRC convened a general council in which all student organisations were requested to make proposals on how to resolve the impasse (UWC, 1998: 3). By January, it was “clear that a different approach was required to make a breakthrough” (UWC, 1998: 4). Students opted for collective non-normative action, especially student activism; hence I call it institution-focused student activism. According to the UWC SRC annual report, the student actions sought to protect about 7 000 students (out of a total student population of about 12 000) who were facing financial exclusion. In anticipation of student unrest, the UWC management suspended all academic activities and ordered students to vacate the campus premises on 30 January 1998 (UWC, 1998: 4).

However, the following day, on 31 January 1998, the UWC SRC convened a general mass meeting at which students resolved to defy the university management. On 1 February 1998, students staged a five-hour sit-in at the university (Green Left Weekly, 1998: 1; see UWC, 1998). They refused to vacate their residences when ordered to do so by the university administration. After students ignored the final notice to leave the campus, the university management called in the police. Heavily armed police came and “bundled students into armoured cars and police vans” (Green Left Weekly, 1998: 1). More than 300 students were arrested (Green Left Weekly, 1998: 1; see also SAPA, 1998). The remaining students marched to the UWC front gates, where a vigil of several hundred students and staff continued (Green Left Weekly, 1998: 1).

Hundreds of students marched to the Bellville magistrate’s court when those arrested were due to appear on Tuesday, 03 February. SAPA reported that students toyi-toyied and sang freedom songs outside the court and held aloft banners proclaiming: “We are not criminals”, and “We do not have the money, please help” (1998 February 03). The arrested students were released on bail (Green Left Weekly, 1998: 1).
According to the UWC SRC annual report, first-year students who were still to register volunteered themselves to the police for arrest. Other students “encamped on the campus boundary and slept outside the main university gates on Modderdam Road” (UWC, 1998: 4). Students showed solidarity and were prepared to do anything to support one another, especially those who could not pay. Solidarity and willingness to sacrifice were thus critical dimensions of the 1998 UWC conflict.

The police and their dogs guarded the university premises against the students sleeping at the entrance gates. This followed a meeting in which the “Minister of Education assured Vice-Chancellors that in case of an emergency, police will be supplied, and indeed, they were supplied” (UWC, 1998: 3).

Students did not wash for two days while sleeping outside and depended on the SRC to “buy food from the nearby fisheries” (Interview with former UWC student leader, 30 August 2006). Sympathetic faculty and staff also assisted some of the stranded students (Interview with former UWC student leader, 30 August 2006).

Students blockaded vehicles from entering the university. The situation was a “nightmare to the first-year students who were coming from as far as the Eastern Cape in buses because they also had to disembark at the gates” (Interview with former UWC student leader, 30 August 2006).

Some parents eventually fetched their children, especially the first-years. These parents arrived from various parts of the country. Some students ended up going to relatives in nearby townships. Others made their way back forcefully to sleep in the residences.

While institution-focused student activism was continuing, the UWC SRC and the university management re-opened and continued negotiations in a bid to reach consensus and agreement. The fact that students were embarking on both forms of
collective action further highlights their complementarity dimension. As student activism was continuing, the student leadership realised that their struggle was “losing its moral high ground” (UWC, 1998: 3). The UWC SRC acknowledged that the continuation of activism had a negative impact on public support. This was evident: “if you read papers extensively, you would have realised that our cause was slowly running out of sympathisers” (UWC, 1998: 3). Then South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki went out to “say that African students are not as poor as they portray, so they must just pay” (UWC, 1998: 3).

It would seem students could only rely on themselves to ‘win’ and had to defy the ANC government and especially their ‘comrades’ or ‘leadership’. They had lost political support as key sectors of society and government converged on the view that students should pay. The fact that civil society and the liberation movement disagreed with the students’ view in itself lent credence to the strong and harsh words used by the Deputy President in dismissing the students’ notion of being ‘poor’ and insisting that they should pay.

The attitude, language and tone used in the above extract were unexpected and harsh for a democratic government, which had just been elected into office. Again, similar trends could be observed on the rest of the African continent, where student activism not only threatened those in power, but those involved were severely punished. Clearly student activism had what Altbach called a “surprising impact on the authorities” (Altbach, 1998: 162).

According to Jansen, government had taken a ‘strong interventionist stance’ against those institutions it considered “completely ungovernable and found its very authority, if not legitimacy, threatened by an unstable, volatile higher education sector” (2004: 304). The message of the government to students and managements of higher education institutions was clear. Students were expected to pay their fees. Higher education institutional managers were expected to collect such fees. Only “academically-deserving students from poor backgrounds would receive funding; disruption would not be tolerated” (Jansen, 2004: 305).
Government further absolved itself from responsibility over student debts. It shifted such responsibility to higher education institutions. This approach can be characterised as 'neo-liberal' in keeping with the GEAR macro-economic policy framework, in that it was no different from the notion that government only creates conditions and markets will grow the economy and bring development to the people. Thus, the 1997 White Paper on Higher Education argued that the Ministry of Education “bears no liability for debts contracted between students and their institutions or funding agencies, but accepts that a study of the scope and dynamic of student debt in relation to institutional debt and liquidity has become necessary” (Department of Education: 1997: 4.46). This government stance needs to be understood in relation to the discussion on the NSFAS and without any doubt had a significant impact on the UWC’s paradox of pursuing expansion of access despite limited funding (with cost-sharing being advanced as solution).

The relationship between the UWC SRC and student body was critical in support of the 1998 Type 2 action, institution-focused student activism. At the end of January, all students were informed of the decision. Students then participated in singing and ‘toy-toying’ and carried placards around campus, including residences. Students appeared to be determined to achieve their objective through peaceful protest. As indicated in Chapter Three, by its very nature institution-focused student activism is ‘illegal’. UWC students did not seek permission to protest and were not operating within ‘rules’ and directives of the university management, which had demanded that they should vacate the campus. Student actions included defiance, sit-ins, protests, marches and placards.

Resolution of campus conflict and reaching of a financial agreement
After two weeks of simultaneous institution-focused student activism and negotiations, the UWC SRC and university management reached a consensus that resulted in the resumption of classes on 23 February 1998. The UWC management “regretted measures that had to be taken through the long negotiation period but was confident that efforts to attain the new comprehensive agreements
would ensure financial sustainability and a quality academic programme for the university” (SAPA, 11 February 1998).

For its part, the UWC SRC felt that the executive did “not act in goodwill over the past two weeks, however they were willing to go forward to ensure that the student body was made fully aware of the financial implications of non-payments of 1998 fees and debt” (SAPA, 11 February 1998).

The UWC SRC signed two agreements with management on 3 December 1997 and 10 February 1998. They required all returning students with outstanding debt to pay a registration deposit of R2 500 for resident students and R 2 000 for non-resident students, as well as an additional minimum contribution towards unpaid fees (UWC, 1998:31; SAPA news, 11 February 1998). The UWC SRC insisted that while the February agreement was “not the best ever to be signed, we, however, believe that it was the best that could be arrived at in the context of 1998” (UWC, 1998: 12). This position was accepted at a student mass meeting held on 10 February 1998. UWC students then mandated their SRC to sign the agreement (UWC, 1998: 12).

I need to emphasise the significance of the UWC SRC taking the proposed settlement to a mass meeting for the student body to deliberate and decide if such a settlement should be approved. It is also significant that the UWC student body 'mandated' its SRC to sign the agreement. This was evidence of student democracy and accountability of the leadership. Students who were to be affected were involved in decision-making and approved the type of settlement they were faced with, which the SRC had to carry through to its logical conclusion. As I shall show later, this relationship between the student body and the SRC changed after 2000.

At the end of the conflict the SRC thanked the student body for having been
behind us when we vowed to remain in Cecil Esau and Cassinga residences when the university gave us an ultimatum to leave. You have been with us when we appeared on national television, led into the yellow gumba-gumbas reminiscent of the bad old days of apartheid (UWC, 1998: 2).

UWC SRC also stated that the student body

...backed us when we defiantly marched from Bellville police station unbroken and more determined than ever. You slept with this very SRC in the main gate, guarded by drunk and dangerous police officers, with dogs as big as calves, using the yellow speed humps as pillows. You peacefully moved from student centre to Mitchell’s Plain Residence, back to the gate, again to Mitchell’s Plain, to Pentech like wolves (UWC, 1998: 2).

Further, the UWC SRC thanked “the courageous students who after all the sacrifices voted in the student centre that this SRC should sign the February 10 agreement and it did” (UWC, 1998: 2). The SRC reported that it had assisted 4 000 out of 7 000 students who were facing financial exclusion. It argued that the assisted students were the only ones on its list of needy students, and claimed ignorance of the 3 000 students who were probably excluded. For this, the UWC SRC blamed its opposition, the Anti-Financial Exclusions Committee (constituted mainly by those who opposed the UWC SRC) "for misleading some students by putting their names on a separate assistance list, which was different from its own list" (UWC, 1998: 12). As I indicated in Chapter Five, since its inception, the UWC SRC always had those who opposed it on political and ideological grounds. The differences would manifest themselves more especially when the student body had to decide on an approach to resolving financial disputes with the UWC management. The SRC was after all a highly contested terrain for different student political organisations vying for SRC elected seats. It is a typical feature of student politics across different campuses in South Africa. However, this behaviour becomes destructive when it weakens or hampers students’ collective
ability to address funding problems or where sectional or narrow self-interest subverts collective interest.

Lessons from the 1998 UWC conflict

The 1998 UWC institution-focused student activism was critical in several ways. First, it was meant to ensure that the university did not financially exclude students. Students initially embarked on collective normative student action, in particular negotiations with the university management. The UWC SRC had hoped that it would reach an agreement with management on the issue of ‘affordability’ of poor students with outstanding fees. However, when no agreement was reached, the way was paved for collective non-normative student action. Eventually about 4 000 out of 7 000 students with outstanding fees were re-registered after the student activism. UWC students used both collective normative and non-normative student action in a complementary manner to achieve this goal. Both forms of action sometimes occurred simultaneously.

Second, it highlighted the importance of the relationship between student leaders and the student body. The UWC SRC had to rely on the student body for support, energy and direction throughout the student activism and negotiations with the university management. The student body supported the UWC SRC even when the police invaded the campus and arrested hundreds of students. The student body was the only source of support to the UWC SRC after almost all stakeholders disapproved of the student action.

Third, the 1998 conflict exposed the paradoxes of the post-1994 democracy in general and the higher education policy in particular. Both the national government and UWC supported the expansion of access, especially to poor students, but they did not match their support with adequate financial assistance. Rather, poor students were still expected to make substantial contributions to the costs of their study. In consequence, some students had to be re-registered after embarking on student activism and thus missing quality time for learning. Other students did not return to campus, probably because of their inability to settle outstanding fees.
Fourth, the student activism was as much about whether students would ‘toe the line’ of the national political leadership (in the form of government) and in the process abjectly surrender, or fight against injustice caused by financial exclusions. Students chose to fight, defied the authorities and embarked on mass activism. Not even the police invasion of campus and subsequent arrests could deter them.

Fifth, the student activism highlighted difficulties that students experienced when trying to find support from their former allies in civil society, churches and liberation movements. Students had to stand on their own and fight.

**Students’ use of collective student action between 2000 and 2005**

In the previous section, I showed how UWC students combined student activism and formal student participation in higher education governance to resolve students’ financial problems in 1998. However, non-normative student collective action did not recur between 1999 and 2005. I characterise this as a “period of retreat” (Boudon, 1979: 669). Instead, students primarily relied on formal student participation in higher education governance – within the emerging framework of ‘co-operative governance’ in higher education (Hall et al., 2002) - to address their financial problems. UWC student leaders (SRC) were partly responsible for this.

During the 1999/2000 period the UWC SRC argued that they had to ensure that students “did not embark on ‘toyi-toyi’” [student activism] before reaching an agreement with the university management. The purpose of the agreement was to ensure that students would be registered (UWC, 1999/2000: 6). One year after the 1998 institution-focused student activism, the UWC SRC declared that “we are proud to announce that students have registered without any physical struggles (toyi-toyi)” (UWC, 1999/2000: 6).

The UWC SRC’s position was bound to be challenged by the student opposition groups consisting of the Pan Student Movement of Azania (PAZMA), linked to
the PAC, AZASCO, linked to AZAPO, and some splinter groups such as the Student League (linked to socialist international groups) and United Student Front (USF), which was made up all organisations opposed to SASCO, including some religious organisations. Between 1995 and 2005, SASCO only lost SRC elections once to the USF in 2003. According to a former UWC SRC president,

...whenever students faced problems, the opposition would say let us boycott. We would oppose it, because we were convinced that boycott was not the only option, and secondly boycott is not a principle. Boycott is a tactic, so it means that it is not compulsory for you to go to boycott (Interview with former UWC SRC president, 02 March 2002).

It was further argued that “if there is still a room or willingness on the side of the management to engage on issues, then there is no need to boycott” (Interview with former UWC SRC president, 02 March 2002). Timing was important in determining if student activism should be used or not. Willingness of the UWC management was not the sole determinant factor. The UWC management could be willing to engage without changing their original position. It would seem from anecdotal evidence that the UWC student leaders might have been bowing to outside pressure from the ruling party to create stability in higher education institutions by accepting a neoliberal view of the national economy. The UWC SRC acknowledged that that SASCO had been demanding free higher education for many years, but it “will not be blindly pursued in the name of advancing the socialist cause” (UWC, 2000: 16). The UWC SRC further argued that “slogans aside and let’s face it the South African economy as it is today cannot afford the provision of free education however socially desirable it is to do that” (UWC, 2000: 16).

Changes in the nature of student leadership might have been a contributory factor as well. The UWC SRC itself seemed to have suggested this point by arguing that they should not be compared with their predecessors because they were in “an era of policy formulation and engagement and no amount of blind militancy will take
us anywhere”. The UWC SRC characterised the era in which it found itself as a “battle of ideas which requires a dedicated cadreship and not merely a bunch of populists who find solace in the chanting of slogans and pious declarations about free education” (UWC, 2000: 20).

It seems that the 1999/2000 UWC SRC had sought to define itself differently from its predecessors by focusing mainly on the ‘battle of ideas’ and ‘engagement’ or preferring collective normative action instead of collective non-normative action, student activism, or what it called ‘blind militancy’. The UWC 1999/2000 SRC demonstrated lack of appreciation and support for the demand and campaign for free higher education, which it described as the ‘chanting of slogans and pious declarations’. Given the fact that I did not systematically focus on this issue, the extent to which this view of the UWC SRC represented the majority of the student body or even the political organisations remains unclear. Its pervasiveness and influence on UWC student politics and governance during the period between 2000 and 2005 remain unclear.

The increasing size and values of NSFAS loans could also be a factor. NSFAS funding grant parameters ranged between R13 300 (minimum of R1 100) in 1999 and R30 000 (minimum of R2 000) per student in 2005, as shown in Table 5.

### Table 5. Funding grants parameters between 1999 and 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Interest Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>R13 300</td>
<td>R1 100</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>R14 600</td>
<td>R1,200</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>R16 000</td>
<td>R1,300</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>R17 600</td>
<td>R1 400</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>R20 000</td>
<td>R1 500</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>R25 000</td>
<td>R2 000</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>R30 000</td>
<td>R2 000</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.nsfas.org.za accessed on 02 May 2010
As indicated in the previous chapter, the ‘seed’ had been planted in the late 1980s for students to understand the university’s financial situation and accept responsibility for paying fees or making financial contributions. After 1994, the UWC SRC continued to encourage students to pay for the costs of their studies if they could afford it, given that higher education was not free. At the same time, the UWC SRC insisted that those who could not afford to pay should be assisted.

There are students who cannot pay, and students who can pay but they don’t want to pay. So those who can pay but they don’t want to should pay. Those who cannot pay because they can’t, they should be assisted one way or other until we get free education (Interview with former UWC SRC president, 19 September 2007).

An analysis of various financial agreements between the UWC management and SRC showed that the underlying principles of the financial agreements between 1995 and 2006 remained consistent. The financial agreements reflected consistent acceptance and understanding of the need for both students and management to find solutions to the institutional financial crisis. The expectation that students should make minimum payments was also reflected in the financial agreements between the UWC management and the SRC.

...to ensure financial sustainability of the university ... we therefore commit ourselves to ‘encourage’ students owing to make their contribution to alleviate our desperate financial situation. Students who were unable to settle their accounts are expected to make minimum contribution. The minimum contribution depended on the total amount owed, for instance, a student with debt under R1 000 was expected to settle in full, while a student with debt between R10 001 and R15 000 was expected to pay R 3 500 (UWC, 1996: 2).

The financial agreements also stipulated that all students should make upfront payment at registration each year, in order to ensure that the university has
adequate operating funds for the first three months of the year before it receives its first subsidy payment. The agreement further jointly committed the UWC management and the SRC to approach the government for decisive intervention in the resolution of the financial crisis (UWC, 1996: 3).

According to the financial agreement between the UWC management and the SRC, by 2005 there were three different payment regimes for students (UWC, 2005a: 2). First, all new and returning students who were not being accommodated in residences in 2005 had to make an upfront payment of R2 600, except where such students were full cost bursary holders. However, full cost bursary holders would still be required to pay a cash registration amount of R500 at registration. Second, all students who were granted accommodation in the residences in 2005 for the first time, or after a break, had to make an upfront payment of R3100, as well as a refundable fee of R550 (R3650 in total), except where such students were full cost bursary holders.

Third, returning students who were in residences in 2004 and were granted accommodation by the university in the residences for 2005 had to make a minimum upfront payment of R3100, except where such students were full cost bursary holders (UWC, 2005a: 2).

Students with high levels of debt were expected to make payments over and above the required minimum upfront payments. These payments had to be made during the month-long registration period at the beginning of the term. The schedule indicated in Table 4 was developed for 2005 debt payment.
Table 4: Minimum payment that students were expected to make towards their outstanding debt, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outstanding debt</th>
<th>Minimum percentage to be paid</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1 500 or less</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1 501 - R 3 000</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3 001 - R8 000</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R8 001 - R12 000</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R12 001 – above</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2005 UWC and SRC financial agreement

The 2004/05 UWC SRC started fee negotiations with management immediately after its election in 2004. The UWC SRC argued that the process was not “an easy one given the deep financial crisis that the institution was faced with and our negotiations were based on what was objectively necessary for the students and the institution” (UWC, 2005a: 5-6).

At the end of the negotiations, the UWC SRC claimed victory on two issues. Firstly, the university would increase fees by 8.5% instead of 9% as it originally proposed. Secondly, the upfront payments would remain the same as those of 2004. In the latter case, UWC SRC argued that it based its analysis on the understanding that upfront payments were the cause of most student financial exclusions (UWC, 2005a: 6).

Another important change that occurred after about 2000 was a breakdown in the unity of most UWC students and the SRC. The UWC SRC constitution prescribed different political accountability mechanisms such as an AGM and mass meetings. The AGM was the highest student decision-making body of the UWC SRC, its affiliates and sub-structures. Between AGMs, UWC SRC was constitutionally required to call mass meetings at least once per quarter “to report to students and receive mandates from them” (UWC, 2002: 27).

In 2004 the UWC SRC annual report (UWC, 2004: 9) highlighted lack of attendance as a key reason for the failure of mass meetings. During the 2003/04
term of office, the UWC SRC only organised one meeting, which was poorly attended. Nevertheless, a progress report on the registration process was given to the students who attended. The UWC SRC tried to organise a second mass meeting but failed dismally, as students did not attend the meeting (UWC, 2004: 9).

The post-2000 UWC SRC called student mass meetings not to receive a mandate but to inform and receive support from the student body for what the SRC was doing to address student financial and registration problems. This is captured in the following interview excerpt:

… well the post 2000 UWC SRCs have real never consulted its constituency, student body with regard to getting a mandate. They always consulted their constituency with regard to how registration was going. This was necessarily acute problem to announce that we have this problem. It was therefore not necessary for the SRC to call students at one place to tell them we have this problem and ask how we are moving on. Rather the SRC has always said, we have this problem and this how we deal with it. Let agree to this (Interview with former UWC SRC president, 19 September 2007).

I wish to highlight a few issues in respect of the statements of the UWC SRC annual report and interview with the former UWC SRC president. I established in Chapter Three that formal student participation in higher education governance presumes the existence of a relationship between the UWC SRC and the student body. The UWC SRC should operate on the basis of a mandate from the student body, which would guide its negotiations with the university management.

It is evident from the 2004 UWC SRC report that the SRC did not have a good relationship with the student body and therefore negotiated with the university management without a mandate. In fact, as the former SRC president stated, the SRC did not need a mandate from the student body but instead viewed
consultation as platform that the SRC used to inform students about its decisions and direction; it was therefore seeking endorsement. Put crudely, the UWC SRC expected the student body to rubber-stamp its decisions. This raised the question of legitimacy at two levels, that is, at the level of the UWC SRC as ‘legitimate student voice’ and at the level of decisions that were accepted. The attitude of indifference on the part of the student body was not helpful either. It could not prevent the UWC SRC from committing students to certain agreements with the university management without a mandate. Moreover, it could not prevent the university management from implementing such decisions.

In the next section I examine student negotiations and experiences with SCM, a critical division of the university funding regime. SCM is vitally important to the understanding of the UWC funding policy. It is an important instrument that UWC used to deal with the challenge of financial sustainability and student affordability. It was implicated in the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, given its responsibility to determine financial eligibility of students to access and continued study. SCM was also central to the negotiations and implementation of financial agreements between the UWC management and the SRC.

*Student negotiations with Student Credit Management*

The UWC management-student financial agreement reached on 10 February 1998 led to the establishment of the SCM office, which was unique to UWC at the time. Students had initially conceptualised SCM. According to the UWC SRC annual report, the students conceptualised SCM as “a concrete means test mechanism in our bid to verify the financial credentials of the student body” (UWC, 1998: 13).

Students thought SCM would do three things. First, students viewed SCM as an instrument to determine the eligibility of students, especially those considered ‘poor’. Second, students viewed SCM as an instrument that would “bring to an abrupt end the fee-dodging and show the seriousness of students to reduce debt” (UWC, 1998: 13). Students expected SCM to “devise strategies of how to retrieve fees owed by ex-UWC students other than credit listing” (UWC, 1998: 13). It is
important to highlight two aspects of the students’ intervention (through SCM). On the one hand, student leaders were responding to two student concerns, namely 'black-listing' of students (by TEFSA initially and NSFAS later) or the submission of names of students considered to be defaulters to national credit bureaus, which would make such information available to any creditor, and lack of an institutional eligibility mechanism to assist poor students. Student leaders were acting in the interest of and as defenders of students. They were also trying to show their commitment to saving the university from bankruptcy by seeking to contribute to debt reduction involving students who were still studying and those who had completed their studies. Again, this position was consistent with previous positions that student leaders had taken since late 1980s.

Having proposed the establishment of SCM, students sought to influence the decision-making of SCM in relation to student registration, financial exclusions and similar issues. In particular, the UWC SRC insisted on being consulted on ‘extreme cases’ where students faced a real possibility of being financial excluded because of poor academic performance or high debts. This was not uncomplicated. According to a former UWC SRC official,

...some of the affected students “do not come to UWC SRC, they go to SCM, and they were told that they could not negotiate and then give up and just go home and they do not come to UWC SRC” (Interview with former UWC SRC president, 19 September 2007).

In an interview conducted for this study, the Head of SCM argued that “if the student does not pass he/she cannot be assisted financially by the institution and the reality is that if for any other reason if that student finishes the studies, that student still won’t be in a position to be assisted because the student is carrying the debt of the previous academic years” (Interview with Head of SCM, 30 September 2007). According to this argument a student would not be financially assisted as long as he or she owed money to the university. It would seem
academic performance was not considered the key criterion for financial assistance.

However, it must be pointed out that this view was contradicted by the Vice-Chancellor. In an interview, the university Vice-Chancellor discussed some of the challenges that he usually confronted when considering the lists of students to be cleared for registration, which should also satisfy audit requirements. He followed a case-by-case approach, preferring to “start with students who had passed [their courses] but did not have money. That one goes quickly and I agree to let them register” (Interview with UWC Rector, 16 November 2004).

The Vice-Chancellor indicated that the second list would consist of first-year students who would “have just arrived and life is so hard. For those I look at what have they passed and then decide as long as I can have reasons to explain to the auditors” (Interview with UWC Rector, 16 November 2004). The primary focus of the Vice-Chancellor was to register students without risking negative audit findings. Presumably the Vice-Chancellor sought to avoid anything that could affect financial sustainability and to ensure that any readmission should be justifiable in audit terms.

Finally, the Vice-Chancellor indicated that the third list would generally consist of “senior students who have been here for about ten years who are carrying first-year courses but do not have money. They have built up a huge debt because residence is expensive, before you know it, they will be owing the university about R80 000” (Interview with UWC Rector, 16 November 2004).

The UWC SRC had identified several factors as basis for the university to consider individual cases of students with unmet financial needs. These included,

Some students applied late for financial assistance applications because they owed the university and others struggled to find people who could sign in place of parents who had passed away. Others have problems with
their parents, and their parents were divorcing, in such cases, nobody will encourage and help affected students to solve their problems. Some students have good academic records and just don't have money and as such the university can’t ignore them. The last one was people who were doing final years had academic record (Interview with UWC SRC president, 19 September 2007).

The UWC SRC also dealt with students with a dual challenge of academic and financial ability.

...The last people we had to deal with were those who are questionable academically. These are students who are failing. In such cases, we say to management, if a student is doing your final year but struggling to complete a module, such a student should be tolerated and allowed to register and if necessary extra support should be provided. The university does not look problem of academic failure at the beginning of the year, but it starts paying attention to them at the end of the year because they have to deal with the exclusion (Interview with UWC SRC president, 19 September 2007).

UWC further argued that there was a link between problems related to students’ academic performance and their financial situation.

... it was difficult to me to divorce the issue of academic performance to finances, because when students don’t pass they are going to accumulate debts that they will not pay for, and as result, when they are to be re-admitted, they have to go and negotiate for funds (Interview with UWC SRC president, 19 September 2007).

The UWC SRC and SCM relationship was characterised by disagreements, conflicts and challenges. This was largely because the UWC SRC and SCM had different objectives and mandates. According to the head of SCM,
...as much as it is necessary we register as many students but the reality is that we cannot register all students that wish to be registered. Then UWC SRC will come with their own mandate and they will also want to pull in students for the sake of just pulling in students. That situation will increase our debt (Interview with Head of SCM, 30 September 2007).

The management of these differences would pose serious challenges to both the SCM and UWC SRC. In particular, the two parties were expected to negotiate about students who needed to be ‘cleared’ before they could be registered. Whether the UWC SRC and SCM agreed or disagreed, they were expected to approach the Deputy Vice-Chancellor for Student Support and Development to endorse their recommendations before these could be submitted to the Vice-Chancellor for approval. It did not matter whether students had performed well academically or not, the UWC SRC still needed to negotiate with the university on their behalf. Students with high academic performance stood a better chance of being financially cleared to register.

In some cases the UWC SRC’s efforts earned grudging respect from management. The UWC Deputy Vice-Chancellor Student Support and Development indicated that in 2004, when she was meeting with two UWC SRC members and SCM officials about fees and considering different cases,

I’ve never seen two student representatives who advocated for students as much as those two did. They would not take no for an answer. You will not believe it, maybe the list had about 94 people; they left out about five and were able to justify each case. They came with real live situations. (Interview with UWC Deputy Vice-Chancellor Student Support and Development, 20 September 2007).

Although the UWC SRC was assigned the responsibility to negotiate with the SCM on behalf of students, the reality was that students still had to be assessed
and cleared individually by the SCM. I argue that this clearance process deliberately or unwittingly contributed to the demobilisation of students as a collective force and facilitated ‘atomisation’ of students. In consequence the SCM process contributed to the shift from Type 1 and Type 2 collective student action to Type 3 and Type 4 individual student action.

The weaknesses of SCM
Some students managed to identify and exploit weaknesses in the process. SCM lacked appropriate systems to centralise a student database, verify information and facilitate fee collection. From an official standpoint, students were “smart to outmanoeuvre both UWC SRC and SCM repeatedly, because we do not have proper systems, students lie. Students come and rock in the offices and pretend that they do not have required documents” (Interview with Head of SCM, 30 September 2007). In taking this attitude, SCM was trying to shift the blame to students instead of taking full responsibility for failing to satisfy the original purpose for which it was established. This raised questions about the efficacy and relevance of SCM, given the period of its existence.

After 2000, the UWC SRC had expanded its role in a process of trying to help students with their problem of unmet financial need. This expanded role included the UWC SRC members calling parents and students’ relatives to verify information provided by the students concerned. The question remained open whether or not the UWC SRC should have assumed and performed this expanded role. During the interview, the former UWC SRC president tried to clarify the role of the UWC SRC by stating that,

...we are not there to determine either a person got money or not. We are there to help cases of individuals. Should a student come to UWC SRC and say I do not have money, one of the things that we do would be able to call his or her family to verify just how much the family can afford to pay (Interview with UWC SRC president, 19 September 2007).
The UWC SRC seemed to have overstepped its boundaries by assuming the university's responsibility to ensure that students provided accurate, relevant and complete information. Understandably, the UWC SRC could be doing this out of goodwill to serve the student body. However, in my view, SCM was supposed to have robust and effective verification mechanisms. This could have addressed some of the UWC SRC’s concerns, including,

...that some students did not tell the truth about their financial status, and there are quite few people that we found who claimed they did not have money, but actually did. As a result, this compromised those students who really do not have money to pay their fees (Interview with former UWC SRC president, 19 September 2007).

The UWC SRC was also concerned that 'false information' would “compromise the financial state of the university” (UWC, 2005a: 10). Again, this is an indication that the UWC SRC viewed its role as ensuring accessibility and affordability of higher education for students, while at the same time ensuring the university's financial sustainability.

According to the Head of SCM, UWC management could not run the institution on its own and therefore saw a need to involve the UWC SRC in the registration process. The purpose was to ensure students “end up not having any other offices to go to lie, and say things that are not happening” (Interview with Head of SCM, 30 September 2007). However, the Executive Director Finance also indicated in an interview that in “all forums wherein UWC SRC participates, it commits itself to support the university’s efforts to collect debt, but they accommodate and advise junior students how to manoeuvre the system around” (Interview with Executive Director of Finance and Services, 25 February 2005). I suppose the UWC SRC found itself in a difficult situation in which it had to perform its historical role as the collective voice and champion of student interests on the one hand, as well as the newly assumed function as an ‘appendage’ or extension of the university’s administrative services on the other.
There was inherent tension between these two roles, which had emerged largely owing to the co-operative governance framework. Successive UWC SRCs were confronted with the challenge of managing the tension while dealing with student funding problems. This challenge can partly be attributed to some students seeking alternative strategies to address their unmet financial need without UWC SRC assistance. In the next section, I examine the different individual actions that students used to address their problem of unmet financial need after 2000.

**Individual student actions**

*Individual normative student actions (Type 3)*

Focus on the university registration process

Students negotiated with different key university student funding structures (i.e. SCM, the bursary office and the student enrolment office) to address their funding concerns. It was through student funding structures that the university exercised and implemented its student funding policy. However, these structures lacked co-ordination, strategic alignment and a shared approach in dealing with students in financial difficulties. The 2004 UWC SRC noted:

> We experienced problems during registration. We had seen lack of cooperation and co-ordination between the financial aid office and student credit management. This relates to the exorbitant amounts being needed by SCM regardless of amounts (NSFAS) confirmed by the financial aid office (UWC, 2004: 10).

The 2005 UWC SRC noted that the SCM demanded that students pay more money despite the NSFAS policy that students who held loans from it could register without making upfront payment. In Chapter Five, I indicated that in 2005, 11 000 UWC students (out of a total of 14 590) received some form of financial assistance to the amount of R88,2 million, of which R40,7 million was
allocated by NSFAS. The SCM’s argument was that the money came from the state, and as such, it was not a parental contribution. It is therefore evident that most UWC students had NSFAS loans, and thus found themselves caught between two contradictory policies (NSFAS and SCM) in respect of the required upfront payments. Nationally, it seemed as if institutions did not know whether they could allow NSFAS students to register without paying registration fees.

The UWC SRC (2005: 10) indicated that clarity should be sought from management with respect to power relations between the SCM and residence administration. It stated that some students were cleared for registration by the SCM and the SRC, but still encountered accommodation problems, as the residence administration demanded additional money.

Similarly, a former UWC SRC president argued that the student administration unit “should be able to find [those] who can afford and who cannot afford to pay, given that they have a student database. In that case, every year they will be able to ask students if their situation has changed. If the situation has not changed, they give such student NSFAS”. To the extent that there was “no student administrative relationship between the administrations and the financial aid, which is quite key, the financial aid office does not use the student database housed in the administration. The system is not the most efficient” (Interview with former UWC SRC president, 20 September 2007).

The former UWC SRC president made an important point about the need for the university structures to harmonise and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of their systems and processes for the benefit of students. He was also correct to insist or demand that student administration should have been able to determine who was poor or not. However, as indicated above, this was one of the original responsibilities assigned to SCM. The SRC should have demanded more accountability and ensured that SCM did not abdicate its responsibility.
Individual students had many concerns about the way the university managed the payment of fees. They indicated that it would seem to them that the university structures (especially the SCM) applied different eligibility criteria to different students when considering their cases. Some students had outstanding balances and could not pay full registration fees, but they were allowed to register, while others who owed less money were denied the opportunity. This is illustrated in the following interview.

I was refused to register with R1000 but other people came with R500 and they still have balances from the previous year and they still are registered (Interview with third-year UWC B Com student, 28 August 2006).

Despite its weaknesses, SCM should not have allowed such a practice to develop from the beginning because it was unfair to students and undermined the purpose of SCM. In this case it could not be described as students ‘exploiting’ the system, but as an ineffectual system.

Students raised concerns about the nature of the registration and clearing process and the attitude of some university officials working in student funding structures. A UWC BA third-year student could not hide her disappointment and frustration with the manner in which she was treated, as “if you do not exist, as if you are not even there. You know it is so inhumane.” She felt that SCM was her last hope and she asked if “they cannot help you in the SCM, where else do you go? If they say, they cannot help you what do you do?” Her main anxiety was facing the prospect of having to go home or “to call home and what do you say?” (Interview with third-year UWC BA student, 29 August 2006). Perhaps the student was more concerned about the negative impact that such a call would have on her parents, given the fact that she was doing her final year and could be able to take care of them as well as her siblings, or worse, that society might mock the family for having wasted money.
A second-year UWC B Admin student struggled to determine whether it was the SCM office or its management who “failed to listen to my situation. I outrightly failed” (Interview with second-year UWC B Admin student, 29 August 2006). He was simply told that he did not meet certain criteria and therefore “you are out”. This seemed to have confused him, because he had assumed the role of SCM to be “to look into students’ problems because we all have individual problems, sympathise with students and then play a sort of mediatory role between the students and the management” (Interview with third-year UWC BA student, 29 August 2006).

A third-year UWC BSc student said that she arrived back from holidays before the university opened in mid-January. She was aware of her outstanding fees from the previous year and decided to go and seek assistance from SCM. When she presented her request, staff members said, “we cannot help you. There is nothing we can do for you. You just had to pay the balance and I am like, my mother only has this much”. She tried the SRC and failed. She then decided to return to SCM, hoping that things might be different. She “kept on going to SCM for the whole month without any luck” (Interview with third-year UWC BSc student, 19 September 2007).

A third-year UWC B Pharm student stated that the registration process took long and was “emotionally bad but I managed to perform well”. He continued to attend classes while waiting for his registration to be finalised. However, there were problems. He said, “I remember at one time in one of my classes, there were certain practicals that we had to do in the hospital, lecturers said those who had not registered they cannot go to the hospital.” This was going to have a huge impact on the student, as he explained that “everything we do as final-year students is hospital-based and they have to group us.” Lecturers told us, "if you have not registered, they are not going to put you in anything. Imagine, now my whole life has to come to a halt because I have not registered." The student said he waited for about two months, the whole of February and March, before he could be registered during the last week of March. He had returned to campus on 15
January, and had been battling since then (Interview with third-year B Pharm student, 29 August 2006).

While waiting for his registration to be finalised, he also ran out of money and food and this affected him. He wanted to “study but something would tell me that I am hungry and I need to eat. I knew what I needed to do, but my mind was not really on what I should be doing it was concentrating on my other unsolved problems.” He felt that if the registration process did not drag on for so long he would be “free”. However, his anguish continued while university officials kept on asking for the registration fees when his situation had not changed, and he “told them whatever cent they want to squeeze out of me or out of my mother, I just do not have it” (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 August 2006).

The university and poor students thus both found themselves in a difficult situation. On the one hand, the university remained committed to expanding access to the poor, but to survive it required money, which it hoped somehow these poor students would be able to raise. On the other hand, students had been admitted and their expectations of escaping poverty and underdevelopment had been raised; they rested all their hopes on the financially strapped university to take care of their study costs. In between there were university officials who seemed less interested in the historical and socio-economic deprivation of students and were bent on meeting the ‘set targets’ of fee collections.

The head of the SCM accepted that the registration and clearance process was tedious, and that the behaviour of his staff members was painful at times. However, he argued that students should “realise … that we do have the mandate, which is to ensure that all students pay as part of their contribution in order for the university to survive before the state subsidy comes in. Yes, people might see us as being harsh but the reality is that students have been told many times about the portion of their contribution for registration (Interview with Head of Student Credit Management, 30 September 2007). This highlights the difficulties that
UWC encountered in implementing the paradoxical government policy of expansion of access and limited financial assistance, with cost-sharing being advanced as funding policy solution. It is evident from the statement of the Head of SCM, that the paradox created or deepened the existing challenge of financial sustainability and student affordability. In trying to deal with this challenge, it would seem the university was hoping that the cost-sharing approach would help. The university tried to get poor students to make their contribution towards the costs of their study. It did so well aware that the majority of its students were poor and could not afford to pay. The university was driven by the single motive of ‘organisational survival’ and SCM became a critical instrument. It can be argued that the university too, willingly or unwillingly, not only became the ‘victim’ but also played an active role in the furtherance of the paradox through the functioning of the SCM.

Some students felt that the university merit awards did not help them either. According to a second-year UWC BSc student, the merit awards or bursaries were “only for the top achievers which leaves out those who get the [marks of] Cs and the Bs, and for us who are B and C students, then there is no help, therefore the merit awards are not enough.” This student argued that the Financial Aid Office should be “realistic because they cannot expect someone who is unable to buy myself a book to suddenly become an A grade student.” His reason for this was that “half the time there are projects that you must do and you need to go and research in certain books and at times you go into the library, there are only five of those books and when they are booked out there is nothing you can do.” Students without sufficient and necessary study materials would therefore be placed at a “disadvantage when compared to the top achievers who tend to have all the required materials” (Interview with second-year UWC BSc student, 30 August 2006).

Students highlighted negative implications deriving from the registration process. According to the UWC SRC annual report, the fact that students registered late had a negative impact on their academic progress. Teaching would have
 commenced by the time students who registered late joined classes. The UWC SRC dealt with the problem of lecturers and tutors refusing admission to students who were still solving their registration problems. The UWC SRC found that it was difficult to de-link academic exclusions from financial exclusions because students spent time in long queues, missed classes and lost valuable time (UWC, 2004: 11).

The above discussion highlights a number of actions that students took to solve their unmet financial need individually. These include individual students negotiating with university officials representing SCM in an effort to be registered. Some of these students also consulted the SRC for help. Students attended classes while they were still trying to register. They did not want to be left behind. In other words, students were trying to ensure that they had both formal access and epistemological access. As the SRC report states, students possibly wanted to reduce the number of financial exclusions based on poor academic performance, hence they did not want to miss classes.

Students had to be ‘cleared’ by SCM, including those who had external bursaries and NSFAS beneficiaries. The NSFAS beneficiaries were supposed to pay registration fees or upfront payment because NSFAS did not cover it prior to 2003. Without making upfront payment, NSFAS beneficiaries would not be allowed to register or to be ‘cleared’ by SCM. Students applied for NSFAS through the Financial Aid Office, which kept all records and made decisions on loan allocations. In the next section, I examine student action in respect of the Financial Aid Office.

**Student negotiations with the UWC Financial Aid Office**

The Financial Aid Office was responsible for administering student bursaries and NSFAS. Therefore it had a huge responsibility and was a critical part of the UWC funding regime. Some students’ experiences with the office were not as pleasant as they should have been. For example, a third-year UWC B Pharm student indicated that when he was doing his second year, he had posted home the
NSFAS application form. His parents received it, but they could not find it when they were supposed to complete and return it to UWC. His parents eventually managed to find it and sent it late. It then transpired that his father had “signed on the wrong place and those people at financial aid office just did not want to take it.” As a result, the student was “stressed about where to find money to pay for this semester as well as next year. I have not really been talking about it even to my friends. My academic work really suffered. It has been hectic because now my only worry is getting a job” (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 August 2006).

Students also complained that the Financial Aid Office did not help them to understand the NSFAS loan agreement details. A fourth-year UWC B Pharm student mentioned that when he submitted the NSFAS loan agreement form “nobody told me or explained the terms and conditions of NSFAS bursary so I could understand. Somebody must say this will happen when you start working, this is how you are going to pay and this is the amount we are going to deduct from your pay. We know we are going to pay when we work but not what are the rates.” A student would have appreciated more information to be prepared. “I do not want a situation when I get out of here I have huge debt that I do not understand” (Interview with fourth-year UWC B Pharm student, 30 August 2006).

Some of the stories of students highlight frustrations and anguish that they were going through as they were engaging SCM and the Financial Aid Office. In an effort to improve their chances of registration and survival on campus, students had to use and rely on their solidarity networks and explore other strategies (such as mutual student support and family support), which I explore in the next section.

**Self-initiated support**

During interviews students informed me of how the problem of ‘unmet financial need’ was affecting them and the actions that they undertook to deal with it. Students said that they constantly worried about where to find money to settle debts or pay the next instalment of their fees and that this affected their academic
performance negatively. Some ended up participating in extra-curricular activities, which had become their ‘only choice’. A second-year UWC LLB student indicated that in 2005, she "owed R3000 or something so I couldn’t pay up because I didn’t have the money." The student had been part of the HIV/AIDS group that went to a camp where they met a businessman who was sponsoring students who were involved in extracurricular activities with R5000. So "I got that R5000 and paid for whatever I was still owing" (Interview with second-year UWC LLB student, 29 August 2006).

Other students indicated that they would do anything, including working in dining halls, as long as they could earn something, including food. For instance, a second-year UWC B Admin student indicated that he was “very shy to ask for money from home because I understood the situation. I used to eat with my roommate but I found I’m becoming too much of his burden and more particular he is younger than me.” The student then decided that he could no longer be a burden and wanted to free himself, so he “went to see the Residence Director and I pleaded my poverty”. The Residence Director understood and gave a letter to the student granting him permission to “eat once a day up to certain period at Mthonjeni residence dining hall” (Interview with second-year B Admin student, 30 August 2006).

Unfortunately, when the agreement lapsed, the student did not know what to do and went back to the Residence Director who said, “we would not give you another letter but now you needed to work. Then it is when I got the letter and I worked but it was not so much.” The student was working at the residence canteen but the owners did not want him to do much, which could affect “my academic progress. So I normally used to go when they were about just finished then I just clean up the floors” (Interview with second-year B Admin student, 30 August 2006).

While doing menial jobs, the student was approached by visiting doctors who asked him a few questions. They discovered that they all came from Mpumalanga.
One day, the doctors called and told the student that they would “pay my meal fees until I finish and they said that I must concentrate on my studies rather than working for food”. The doctors promised to support the student with everything (including books) that he needed at the university. However, the student had to “sign a contract with them which was not about repayment but indicating that should I fail my studies, they will stop paying. Therefore, I must not blame them as if they deserted me” (Interview with second-year B Admin student, 30 August 2006). The message was loud and clear that the student should focus on his studies. A similar message had earlier been communicated when he was working at the residence, even though it was rather subtle.

Some students sought university part-time jobs, most of which came through the university’s work-study programme. Students worked up to 20 hours per week as tutors, drivers, library assistants, administrative assistants etc. A second-year UWC B Com student received NSFAS but...

...it did not cover everything. So I have been struggling since my first year. However, to make up for difference, I applied and was employed as tutor for first-year physics students. At the same time, the SRC appointed me as one of the drivers (Interview with second year UWC B Com student, 28 August 2006).

The university deducted 60% from the work-study stipends and paid these funds into student accounts. For instance, a third-year UWC Library and Information Science student indicated that she was on the university work-study programme, which was “not enough. The policy is that 60% of what you receive is deducted and paid into your account and so I do not even get to work enough hours of what is required” (Interview with third-year UWC Library and Information Science student, 03 September 2004).

Many students viewed part-time jobs as more than providing financial assistance. The part-time jobs helped students in settling debts, developing some sense of
independence and gaining work experience. A third-year UWC Library and Information Science student received NSFAS, which was inadequate and hence she needed to find additional funding. She spoke about how her father “saved money to pay for my studies while he was working” (Interview with third-year UWC Library and Information Science student, 03 September 2004).

Having her father’s savings did not deter her from searching for a temporary job so that she could pay for her studies. She worked at Paarl Library on weekends. She worked as student assistant at the UWC campus and as a casual worker between October and January.

I used my money to pay for my tuition and transport fees. This made feel independent and I am also gaining experience which will help me after I have completed my studies (Interview with third-year UWC Library and Information Science student, 03 September 2004).

This is an interesting story of a student who had a vision and ambition that transcended her immediate concerns to study (which can be so consuming) but which in her case included completing her studies and finding a job thereafter and most importantly, becoming an ‘independent person’.

It would seem to me that almost all cases discussed above show the type of students who knew what they wanted, who were brave, who had a passion for education and their future, and who rejected victimhood and developed a deep sense of hope and optimism. In other words, these students refused fall into what Mamdani called “abject surrender” (2007: 18) and possessed a liberating spirit. In terms of my conceptual framework, they refused to accept their disadvantaged status and to fall into inaction and exclusion.

I have identified self-initiated support as one of the forms of individual normative action that students undertook to address their problem of unmet financial need. The individual stories of students describe various forms of self-initiated support.
They include participation in extra-curricular activities, being prepared to help clean residence kitchens and doing various other kinds of part-time jobs on and off campus. What seems to be an underlying and commonly shared characteristic is their rejection of the victimhood mentality and willingness to do ‘something’, ‘anything’, as long as they would find the money to contribute to the costs of their study. This is despite possible ‘dehumanisation’ experiences they might encounter in the process of seeking financial assistance, some of which have been related from the students’ point of view above.

Student-family networks

At the heart of cost-sharing is the requirement that parents should share the burden of study costs. I indicated in Chapter Two that some writers argue that parents should pay for the education of their children “not only because of the personal benefits the parents can expect to enjoy but also because it is their responsibility and their obligation as parents” (Merisotis and Wolanin, 2002: 1).

Interviews with students showed that their parents ‘understood’ the need to contribute and tried everything possible to pay for the education of their children however trying their own circumstances. Some managed to find the required funding, but others struggled to make financial contributions towards the education of their children at UWC owing to their poor socio-economic situation. I indicated earlier that UWC was an institution that admitted predominantly black and poor students. As a legacy of apartheid, black South Africans still suffer the socio-economic inequality deliberately created by the system. Therefore education can be seen as part of a solution to address socio-economic inequalities. Some of these parents were single parents looking after more than one child. For instance, a third-year UWC B Pharm student said that for two years “my mother had paid for me and then there was one year when she just could not because she was also paying for my other siblings” (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 August 2006).
A fourth-year UWC B Pharm student spoke highly of his father’s support to his studies. This is despite the fact that his father had last worked when the student was doing Standard 2 (i.e. primary school). However, his father had “connections and somehow always managed to find money. My father is my Superman. I always say there are some people that are in worse positions than I am. Complaining really will not help you” (Interview with fourth-year UWC B Pharm student, 30 August 2006). Given that searching for funding can be emotionally draining, the student said that his mother provided emotional and moral support and she “will say, you will be fine and all of that” (Interview with fourth-year UWC B Pharm student, 30 August 2006).

A second-year B Admin student indicated that her father “is not working anymore and he borrowed money from my cousin. I will have to pay it back once I have finished my studies” (Interview with second-year B Admin student, 29 August 2006).

While it is important not to generalise uncritically from these observations, one should not miss the determination in the manner in which parents sought assistance for their children. It might seem obvious that parents should support their children, but it is not necessarily possible in poor communities, where parents lack the means of survival and have to support several children. It requires someone to have character and a positive attitude.

One can see from the above cases that parents used different means of securing financial contributions for their children’s education. Parents used their savings, relied on old established networks for assistance and even borrowed from relatives and friends to make financial contributions for their children. Moreover, parents placed their hopes firmly on the shoulders of their children when they made financial contributions. Once the children would have completed their studies, parents expected them to support their siblings. In other words, the failure or success of some students could close or open doors of higher learning for their siblings. In this respect students reported in interviews:
I am always told that I have to finish school. I have to take care of my other sibling. Nothing much you know (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 30 August 2006).

I already have two people that I would have to fund their studies and look after them when I am done (Interview with third-year EMS student, 28 August 2006).

Some students who were interviewed indicated that their parents had high expectations and insisted that they should complete their studies on time.

My parents are expecting a lot. Every year, they expect that I should have progressed to the next level and that I should finish in record time. So with all of those expectations I have learnt to make them outweigh all my worries of having a better life here on campus so it is something that has just kept me going (Interview with second-year UWC LLB student, 29 August 2006).

My parents do not really say much. Sometimes I get a call in the middle of the night and my grandmother telling me, ‘I’m still praying. But I hang in there till you finish, you know’ (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 August 2006).

I can broadly categorise the student-family networks students described as falling into the normative dimension. Some parents had to borrow money from relatives and friends. In some instances parents were expecting their children to repay the borrowed money once they had completed their studies. In other instances parents had to find ways of repaying the money. Student stories related to family support have exposed the harsh realities of poor families whose effect was being felt by students and their parents as they sought financial assistance. In the main, the stories show parents’ commitment and willingness to do whatever possible for the
education and future of their children. Notwithstanding the financial difficulties, parents had ‘high’ hopes and expectations and motivated their children to soldier on and understand that they would have to take care of their siblings.

*Individual student actions (Type 4)*

**Student solidarity**

Needy students also found support from their fellow students. This support took various forms, including the sharing of residence rooms (which is a practice known as squatting), sharing books, study materials and laboratory equipment. For instance, a third-year UWC B Pharm student indicated he “sacrificed a lot” (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 August 2006). He could not buy the laboratory coat and “often used my cousin’s lab coat who is also studying here” (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 August 2006). The third-year UWC B Pharm student had to use “the little money that I receive from home to buy study notes every week. While it’s special the money that parents give you, it’s like you don’t have money for everything” (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 August 2006). He said, “I don’t complain like other people when they don’t have money to go buy clothes. I just spend R150 on buying basic food and other essentials that I know that even if I don’t have money, I could still eat and go to class. Nobody would know that I am eating such basic food or something” (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 August 2006). It would seem the primary focus of this student was to learn while ensuring that he survived hardship. He also had a sense of prioritising and separating his ‘needs’ from ‘wants’. Most importantly, the student understood his family background and did not allow peer pressure to affect him.

Another student had a mother who had worked as a domestic worker for 12 to 13 years. The mother used “her wages to pay for some of my studies. However, that is not enough” (Interview with first-year UWC B Admin student, 29 August 2006). The mother could only afford to pay for tuition fees. As a result the student could “not stay in the residence. I am squatting with a friend at Cape University of
Technology [former Peninsula Technikon]” (Interview with first-year UWC B Admin student, 29 August 2006). The Cape Peninsula University of Technology friend thus risked his or her future by allowing someone to squat who was not even studying at the same university. To me, this indicates a deep sense of solidarity among students. Students had to choose between achieving education and conforming to the rules of the university, and they chose education.

In line with the conceptual framework for this study, I describe student solidarity as both individual normative and non-normative student action. In some instances students are willing and prepared to risk their studies (by implication their future) to help those in need. Actions that fall under the normative dimension include the sharing of resources such as text books, laboratory coats, study guides and food. Actions that fall under the non-normative dimension include sharing of accommodation or ‘squatting’. Students also struggled through great hardship on their own, rationing food and living on the barest necessities. Indirectly students were rebelling against established university rules and exposing the inadequacies of university student funding aid.

**Interpretative reflection on the results**

*Collective student actions before 2000*

In relation to the purpose of this chapter, which examines student actions aimed at addressing the student problem of ‘unmet financial need’ at UWC, I found that students combined both, collective normative student action (Type 1) as formal participation in higher education governance, and collective non-normative student action (Type 2), that is various types of student activism, in order to address their problem of unmet financial need prior to 2000. The 1998 student activism provides the model case of the manner in which students transited from one type to another.

Students began with Type 1, where they negotiated with the university management in a bid to reach financial agreement, which among others was supposed to help students with debts and outline payment options. When the
negotiations failed, students lobbied their former liberation allies, including political organisations, civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations, without any success. Moreover, there was a distinctive change in the conception of students as political actors. Students were no longer seen as ‘catalysts’, ‘shock-troops of the South African revolution’, ‘energy driver of change at UWC’ but as a ‘bunch of fee dodgers’, ‘irrational students who want free education’, ‘cell phone-toting youth who belabour their poverty in order to lead a porch lifestyle on campuses’. The response that students received was that they should pay their fees. Having exhausted all possible Type 1 options, students opted for Type 2 collective non-normative student action, the 1998 student activism. The intention was to put more pressure on the university management in the hope that it would budge from its original position. Eventually the university management and the SRC reopened negotiations while student activism continued. This resulted in a compromise and financial agreement.

Conceptually, the analysis of the 1998 UWC student activism has highlighted a few points. First, it has enhanced our understanding of the relationship between Type 1 student action and Type 2 student action, in particular the fact that students combine and use these actions in a complementary manner. Another important dimension is that Type 1 and Type 2 action were used in parallel or sequentially. They were not mutually exclusive.

Second, it reflects the importance of the relationship between the student body and student leadership in collective student action. The SRC sought a mandate from the student body from beginning to end. This included the decision to embark on protest and eventually a mandate to accept and sign the final agreement with the university management. The bulk of the student body supported the SRC, even when some students were arrested by the police for defying the university’s instruction to leave the campus.

The 1998 UWC conflict was also important in other ways. It was institution-focused student activism, i.e. a sub-type proposed in Chapter Three, aimed at
ensuring that the university did not exclude students financially. More than half of
the students (about 4 000 out of 7 000) facing exclusions were reportedly saved
from exclusion and could re-register. The remaining 3 000 students, however,
could not be accounted for, at least from the students’ perspective. Possible
explanations given of their whereabouts included that some of the affected
students could have given up and be sitting at home, thus accepting their
disadvantaged position, while others may have been ‘misled’, as the UWC SRC
claimed. Lack of institutional records makes it difficult to express an informed
view on the matter. Based on what the UWC SRC reported, I can conclude that
the 1998 UWC institution-focused student activism helped most, although not all,
students in addressing their problem of unmet financial need with respect to
gaining formal access to the institution.

The 1998 UWC conflict exposes the paradoxes of the post-1994 democracy in
general and higher education policy in particular. Both the national government
and UWC supported the expansion of access, especially to poor students, but they
did not match their support with adequate financial assistance. Rather, poor
students were expected to make a contribution to the costs of their study. In
consequence some students had to embark on student activism to be re-registered
and thus missed valuable time for learning. Other students did not even return to
campus, probably because of inability to settle outstanding fees. The action of
these students can be described as non-action in terms of my conceptual
framework.

A conclusion can be made based on this non-action of students. This is that the
dreams and aspirations of a black and poor child to access higher education may
be shattered before entering or after entering a higher education institution as long
as such a child is unable to contribute to the cost of his or her study. This is
notwithstanding collective student action, which may take place.

The 1998 UWC conflict challenged student leaders to choose whether to ‘toe the
line’ of the national political leadership (in the form of government) and in the
process risk ‘abjectly surrendering’ or to fight against potential injustice as a result of financial exclusion. Students chose to fight, defied authorities and embarked on student activism. Government took a very harsh stance towards student action. Among others, government issued a strong warning and brought the police to campus as part of crushing student activism. This type of government response was similar to what had been reported in most African states (Altbach, 2004, Alidou; Caffentzis and Federici, 2008; Byaruhanga, 2006). This point may highlight a limitation in the conceptual framework for this study in that it does not capture the transition from one type of student activism to another. For instance, while UWC students primarily targeted the university, the intervention of national government brought the state into campus, which then created a situation in which students fought against the police, but most importantly defied the national government order against embarking on student activism.

**Collective student action after 2000**

There are two distinctive features of UWC collective student actions between 2000 and 2005. First is the absence or non-use of student activism in addressing the problem of unmet financial need. Second, the relationship between the SRC and student body necessary for any collective student action was weak or non-existent. The SRC struggled to convene student mass meetings where they could have received a mandate to guide their negotiations with the university management. Consequently, the SRC defined its own terms and conditions of negotiations and subsequent settlement with the university management. The SRC tried as much as it could to ensure that poor students accessed the university; however, some students were excluded because of poor academic performance, while others allegedly did not return after their initial attempts to register failed. The SRC argued that these students would not have approached the SRC offices for assistance. Although I was unable to obtain the necessary documentation on financial exclusions from the SRC or university management to verify the SRC’s claims, it is possible that some of the affected students would still have been excluded, even if they had come to the SRC, for various unknown reasons including poor academic performance.
Individual student actions

A third prominent feature of the post-2000 period is the prevalence of both, normative and non-normative individual student actions in addressing their unmet financial needs. This is not to say that there were no individual student actions prior to that period; rather, it appears that in the combination of different types of student actions, individual student actions became a much more significant feature after the experience of 1998 and the establishment of NSFAS and SCM. To illustrate this point, I presented the stories of a number of individual students that I gathered during interviews. These individual student stories bring to light what Jansen described as “unseen pains of transition” (2004: 118). The stories reveal different kinds of normative action that students used as individuals to address their ‘unmet financial need’. First, it was individual negotiations with the university authorities. Some individual stories showed that students had to endure some harsh, painful and ‘almost dehumanising’ conditions. Some students had to wait for almost two months before they could be registered, while they went to class and then visited SCM to negotiate their situations after standing in endless queues. Potentially, this could have affected students psychologically and academically.

Second, there was self-initiated support. Students showed a great sense of commitment to their studies by seeking financial assistance from many different sources. Students sought part-time jobs both within and outside the university. Some of these part-time jobs came in the form of participating in the university’s work-study programme where a certain percentage (60%) of their stipends went into repaying student debts. Students tutored, worked in libraries, performed basic administrative functions in university offices, drove SRC cars, and so forth. Students also volunteered their services to community-oriented projects such as the Bra Wam Sis Wam and HIV/AIDS projects of the university. Other students related their experience of doing menial jobs such as cleaning the dining hall or washing dishes at the residence canteen. Again, whatever they earned contributed to settling debts.
Third, student-family networks consisting of the immediate family, family relatives, friends and neighbours were sought for assistance. Students approached their parents for help, which came in different forms. Some parents borrowed from immediate and even extended family members or ‘networks’ to support their children. Others tried to save from their meagre salaries. While these savings played an important role in supporting students, they were often inadequate; hence students applied for NSFAS assistance and sought part-time jobs.

Student solidarity played an important role as both normative and non-normative action. In some instances student solidarity constituted a form of non-normative action, which involved, for example, illegally sharing university accommodation, i.e. ‘squatting’. This could have resulted in the students being expelled from campus residences. Nevertheless these students went ahead and helped each another. Students shared their pain and suffering. In some instances student solidarity constituted a form of normative action, which involved students supporting one another through sharing study materials, clothes (such as laboratory coats) and food.

Student solidarity has highlighted a limitation in the conceptual framework for this study. In particular, the conceptual framework did not anticipate that one student action can assume both normative and non-normative forms: the question is: whose norms apply? This emphasises a need for a more careful conceptualisation of the framework in future studies, as well as flexibility and elasticity in characterising student action types, which may be represented through dotted rather than rigid connecting lines.

**Conclusion**

The main purpose of this chapter was to address the research question by investigating different actions that students took to address their problem of unmet financial need. I applied four ideal types of student action and subtypes of conceptual framework to analyse and interpret data. This has provided a way of
understanding some of the dynamics involved in the manner in which students addressed or sought to address their problem of financial need.

As indicated in Chapter Three, the relationships between four ideal types of student action (Type 1, Type 2, Type 3 and Type 4) should be understood as complex and characterised by interrelatedness and interdependency. The analysis of the 1998 UWC conflict revealed interrelatedness and interdependency of student actions. UWC students combined and used Type 1 and Type 2 to address their problem of unmet financial need in a complementary manner. Type 1 included negotiations with the university management. Type 2 included institution-focused student activism protest, defiance, sit-ins, marches, placard demonstrations and mass meetings. The elaboration of Type 2, especially student activism, into three sub-types (state-focused, institution-focused and student-focused) can be considered as another contribution of this study.

Type 3 and Type 4 were helpful in analysing and interpreting individual student stories related to how students sought to address their problem of unmet financial need. Some of the Type 3 student actions included negotiations with SCM and the financial aid office, solidarity networks involving sharing of study materials, laboratory coats and food, student family networks consisting of friends, relatives and community members and self-initiated support consisting of part-jobs on and off campus, work-study programmes, participation in extracurricular activities and similar activities. Type 4 student actions included solidarity networks, especially sharing of accommodation without official permission or ‘squatting’.

However, the conceptual framework showed a limitation related to its inability to accommodate student solidarity behaviour, which could be categorised as both normative and non-normative. In an attempt to address this weakness, I had to reconfigure and connect the different ideal types of the framework, using dotted lines instead of the original rigid connecting lines. This was done in order to ensure the flexibility and elasticity of the student action types.
Having analysed individual students, I have recognised the possibility of further elaborating Type 3 and Type 4 in terms of whether students were using internal (within a university) or external (outside the university) sources or means to address their unmet financial need. As such, four types of individual student actions were identified: Type 1 internal-directed individual normative student action; sub-type 2: external-directed individual normative student action; Type 3: internal-directed individual non-normative student action; and Type 4: external individual non-normative student action.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Introduction
This study has examined various ways in which UWC confronted the paradoxical post-apartheid higher education policy of expansion of access and limited funding and in which UWC students addressed the resulting problem of unmet financial need between 1995 and 2005. It was set within the broader context of political and social change and higher education transformation between 1995 and 2005. It has been argued that the pursuit of transformation in higher education led to a post-apartheid higher education policy that represented a paradoxical simultaneous pursuit of (1) a massive expansion of higher education for black students (which in effect meant creating opportunities of access to higher education for historically disadvantaged students who came mostly from working class and poor backgrounds), and (2) a self-imposed commitment to fiscal 'austerity' reflected in the rejection of free higher education provision and provision of limited financial assistance and the adoption of cost-sharing, which required that students, including the working class and poor, pay a significant share of the costs of study. The implementation of this paradoxical policy further deepened and compounded challenges that already persisted at UWC in the mid-1990s. The paradox was most severely experienced by poor students whose constrained ability to pay a portion of their cost of study could not be mitigated by institutional resources or funds from family and relatives.

By 1995, UWC had already a long-standing challenge of balancing financial sustainability and student affordability. This partly originated from the university’s historic decision to ‘democratise’ access to its educational programmes in order to increase the number of African students in the late 1980s. The opening of access to all racial groups by some higher education institutions such as UWC was an antithesis to the policy of academic segregation at the time. The apartheid regime responded to this development by introducing changes in the higher education funding formula, in particular the addition of a success
factor, the implication of which was that those institutions with a low pass rate would receive a reduced state subsidy. UWC was one of these institutions.

The key research questions of this study were:

a) How did UWC respond to the paradoxical post-apartheid higher education policy of expansion of access and limited funding?

b) How did UWC students address their problem of unmet financial need?

The study proceeded at different levels. I approached the research problem by developing a conceptual-analytical framework with four ideal types of student actions relevant to student funding problems. This was further enhanced by the conceptualisation of student activism in various sub-types, which represents one of the ideal types of student action. This framework was applied in an empirical case study exploring how students sought to address their problem of unmet financial need at UWC between 1995 and 2005. The case study has provided a rich tapestry of student responses – in the form of collective and individual actions embedded in their ‘lived experience’ of unmet financial need - to the dissonance between their demands and national and institutional policy responses. The empirical findings of this study presented in Chapters Five and Six constitute in my view the main contribution to knowledge of this thesis and thus advance this particular field of research.

This concluding chapter summarises the earlier chapters, reflects on the findings and recommends areas for further investigation.

**Summary of chapters**

Chapter One presented the general introduction and context of the case study. It identified the research problem, purpose and research question and provided the rationale and methodological framework for a case study. The chapter outlines were also presented.
Chapter Two presented a literature review focusing on cost-sharing, student activism, student participation in higher education governance and access. The literature review of cost-sharing clarified the notion that students (and parents) should share in the burden of the costs of study and outlined related policies of financial assistance, such as loans schemes. The literature review highlighted that cost-sharing is premised on the notion that higher education has both public and private benefits, thus suggesting that any public funding policy needs to entail both, a state subsidy as the public contribution and tuition fees as the private share of the burden of financing higher education. Cost-sharing takes different forms whose acceptability varies from one country to another.

The literature review showed that some African countries voluntarily accepted and promoted cost-sharing as a funding policy. In most African countries, however, cost-sharing was imposed as part of SAP conditionalities driven largely by the World Bank. South Africa is one of the few African countries with a long history of cost-sharing, which predates the advent of the concept itself, and which was (unexpectedly for some) continued in the post-apartheid era. The literature review further noted that cost-sharing continues to experience implementation challenges, especially in developing countries. As the literature shows, students in numerous African countries have undertaken various forms of collective action against different forms of cost-sharing. The dominant form of collective student action against cost-sharing has tended to be non-normative, especially forms of student activism.

The literature review on student activism noted differences in terms of the impact of student activism in developing countries compared to developed countries. It highlighted the catalytic role that student activism played in the social and political transformation of various countries, including the overthrow of oppressive regimes and resistance to them before and after independence. However, in the course of time, the meaning of 'student' was transformed from students as the ‘hope’ or ‘future’ of a nation or 'shock-troops of the revolution' to
being ‘menaces’ on the established body politic and eventually to become seen as mere ‘consumers’ or ‘clients’ of higher education.

Given the interface between access and the problem of unmet financial need, I reviewed selected literature on access. The main outcome was the identification of three dimensions of access, namely formal access, epistemological access, and the importance of linking access to success in order to achieve equity. Funding constraints inhibit student access in more than formal terms. As the case study eventually showed, funding issue delayed formal access, which exacerbated existing constraints to epistemological access, and would become in these and other respects a major factor for the success of disadvantaged students in higher education.

The literature review concluded with the identification of the gaps in the existing literature. These gaps included, firstly, that literature on student activism in Africa is limited. It tends to collapse student activism into youth activism. Inherently, there is nothing wrong with this given the fact that students constitute a critical segment of the youth and in some instances the boundaries become blurred in the ‘actual course of struggle’, as happened during the national liberation struggle against apartheid. However, the weakness of this approach manifests itself in many ways. There is generally a lack of conceptual clarity on the notion of students. The role of students as an autonomous force is not considered critically. And student involvement in national politics tends to be overemphasised while their contribution to higher education politics is frequently overlooked.

Secondly, the literature tends to use concepts of student activism, student strikes, student politics, student boycotts and student riots interchangeably and without sufficient clarification. This has been highlighted even though it was not the purpose of this study to address this weakness in the literature. Thirdly, although the literature does provide some account of student activism in Africa against tuition fees, abolishment of student allowances, poor living and accommodation conditions (whether as part of fighting against cost-sharing or SAPs and their
effects), which resulted in some instances in student arrests, killings and expulsions from campuses, references to student funding seem nevertheless mostly coincidental, partly because the interest tends to be more in the role of students in dealing with big social and political concerns (such as repressive regimes, SAPs) as mentioned above.

Finally, the literature rarely describes students’ individual experiences or gives detailed accounts of intra-student body politics, the roles of SRCs, student guilds or student unions, and their relation to the student body. This is even more so the case in relation to specific topics like how students – individually or collectively - address the problem of sharing the burden of study costs. Hence I noted that students generally remain treated at a student body level, thus limiting access to intra-student dynamics such as the relationship between the leadership and the rank and file.

Chapter Three developed a conceptual framework for the study to analyse and interpret data. The framework served as a guide to data collection, analysis and interpretation. It was inspired by Wright et al.’s framework (1990) and sought to conceptualise student actions as the possible behaviours of disadvantaged group members in terms of different ideal types. On the basis of this, I developed a matrix consisting of horizontal and vertical continuums. The horizontal continuum consists of collective and individual elements at the end of each extreme. The vertical continuum consists of normative and non-normative elements at the end of each extreme. I examined and found the relationship between the continuums to be complex and characterised by interrelatedness and interdependency. Theoretically, four ideal types of student actions emerged from the matrix, namely (1) collective normative student action; (2) collective non-normative student action; (3) individual normative student action; and (4) individual non-normative student action. Furthermore, I magnified the typology by developing sub-types of student activism, which provide a more detailed perspective on collective non-normative student action. For this purpose, I refined Koen et al.’s (2006) typology of student activism and constructed three ideal sub-types, namely, (a) state-
focused student activism; (b) institution-focused student activism; and (c) student-leadership-focused student activism. The framework was applied empirically in the case of UWC and the results were presented and discussed in Chapter Six.

Chapter Four presented the methodological framework for the study. I adopted a qualitative case study approach, selecting UWC as a case for various reasons. I described my use of a variety of data collection methods (such as interviews, documentation and observation) and rationale for this, and my choice of respondents at the university. Interviewees included persons who were directly involved in the key concerns of the study, in particular UWC management, staff and students (both leaders and ordinary students). I interviewed diverse students in terms of origin, race, gender and study fields and levels of qualification. The interviewees included former student leaders in order to ascertain the historical student perspective on the pre-1994 era. Staff interviews targeted mainly those members who were directly involved with student financial issues or who were responsible for making student funding decisions. I recorded and transcribed the interview material, and stored it in a safe place.

Observation and documentation played an important role as sources of data, both as sources of information in their own respects and for the purpose of triangulation. In the case of observation, having been a staff member at the institution, I managed to observe various student activities on campus, including student meetings and workshops where they discussed student funding concerns. In the case of existing documents, I collected different types of official documents, including UWC SRC annual reports, minutes, discussion documents, the university annual reports, financial statements and similar documents.

As mentioned, by using multiple data collection methods I was able to carry out methodological and source triangulation, which is an important way of ensuring the ‘trustworthiness’ of a case study report. In addition, I took extensive notes during observations and interviews as part of ensuring the trustworthiness of the study. I also had good rapport with students and university management, given my
role as researcher and activist on campus during my tenure between 2000 and 2005. This rapport facilitated access to all kinds of data that I needed.

The limitations in terms of data are, however, related to the availability of historical data on student funding and governance issues. UWC could not provide data related to fee increases, student debt and financial exclusions prior to 2000. I needed the data to quantify the extent of the problem of unmet financial need. Students did not have a proper records management system either. In consequence, I could not find UWC SRC AGM reports and minutes. Hence it was difficult to fully comprehend some decisions that the SRC took with regard to the problem of addressing unmet financial need.

Chapter Five delved into the first part of the case study by analysing the pre-1994 student demands and expectations for the establishment of independent and democratic SRCs, expansion of access, and equitable financial aid, along with a discussion of post-apartheid higher education policy responses. I provided a historical context to both student policy expectations and policy responses. I identified moments of dissonance between student policy expectations and post-apartheid higher education policy responses in all cases. Finally, I demonstrated that the policy response regarding access and funding, seen together, amount to a problematic, indeed a paradoxical combination of policies, which, as I show in Chapter Six, reproduced or even produced in some respects, a problem of unmet financial need and consequently various and changing student actions as ways in which students engaged with this problem.

Thus, Chapter Six investigated different actions that students took to address their problem of unmet financial need. I provided both the political and institutional context in which to locate and understand student action. The first of two main aspects of this chapter is the UWC 1998 student activism, spurred by a desire on the part of students to protect about 7 000 students with outstanding fees who were facing financial exclusion from the university. I examined collective student action and the dynamics concerning this. This included focusing on the role of the
UWC SRC and its relationship with the student body. I also examined collective normative student action, especially student negotiations with the university management and officials, the relationship between students and funding structures (such as the SCM and Financial Aid Office). Secondly, I presented and analysed interviews with individual students who shared their stories of how they sought to address their problem of unmet financial need. Some students negotiated directly with the university officials regarding their unmet financial need. The SCM and Financial Aid Office were the main offices with which students had to negotiate individually. Other students had to find ways other than engaging the university officials.

Summary of findings

Government’s paradoxical policy
The post-apartheid higher education policy evolved in the context of an unsupportive macro-economic policy, fiscal austerity and belt-tightening driven through GEAR, which “imposed fiscal constraints on higher education institutions” (Gibbon and Kabaki, 2006: 128). In consequence government’s progressive commitments to increasing student enrolment, participation, access and equity were hindered (Badat, 2004: 46). The post-apartheid government accepted and supported the idea of expanding access targeting historically disadvantaged, black and poor working class students as part of the broader transformation process to eradicate the historical and social inequalities in higher education. Conversely, government rejected the long-standing student call for free higher education. Instead, it accepted cost-sharing as one of the key principles of post-apartheid higher education policy, which further entrenched the already existing practice whereby students (and their parents) and the state share the burden of the costs of study. Government subsequently established NSFAS in an effort to assist academically deserving poor students financially to access higher education. I have argued that NSFAS should be considered and understood within the logic of cost-sharing policy. NSFAS managed to assist many students but remained inadequate to address all student financial needs (Breier, 2007; HESA,
2008; Wangenge-Ouma, 2012). Therefore, I have conceptualised as paradoxical the government’s simultaneous pursuit of the expansion of access to historically disadvantaged students and limited financial assistance (with cost-sharing being promoted as policy solution).

Cost-sharing

As shown in Chapters Five and Six, the notion of sharing the burden of the costs of study was the most contested aspect of the apartheid higher education policy and post-apartheid higher education policy and produced conflict and tensions between the university management and students at UWC. The university has always attracted mainly working class and poor students since its decision to ‘democratise access’ in the 1980s following high levels of student activism. Some of these poor students could not pay, thus increasing institutional student debts, a portion of which was declared ‘impaired’. Affordability then became a critical concern for students and the institution, although in the case of students affordability was conceptualised in terms of their ability to access higher education while from the institutional perspective, affordability referred to the institutions’ ability to grant access to students with limited capacity to pay and thus was a matter of financial sustainability for the institution. The apartheid regime had already reduced its state subsidy to institutions committed to granting access to disadvantaged students by including a success factor in its revised funding formula in addition to student enrolment. Institutions such as UWC, which admitted students who were not only poor but also academically underprepared, were the most severely affected by this policy, which posed a threat to the university’s financial sustainability. The paradoxical post-apartheid higher education policy did not resolve but perpetuated UWC’s financial challenge of ensuring both financial sustainability and student affordability. Because it was being implemented at institutional level, its negative effects were to some extent viewed as the reflection of poor institutional leadership or institutional failure to deal with the concerns of poor students. This was evident in the manner in which students responded to their unmet financial needs, such as during the 1998 conflict, which became what I have described as institution-
focused student activism according to the conceptual model presented in Chapter Three.

**Balancing financial sustainability and student affordability**

The analysis in Chapters Five and Six showed that both the university and students responded to the challenge of financial sustainability and student affordability in different ways. First, from the late 1980s to 1994 the relationship between UWC students (and in particular student leaders) and the Rector, Prof. Gerwel, was an amicable one, and a catalyst in managing the worst effects of the challenges facing the institution. The Rector and students shared similar political and ideological perspectives and belonged to the ANC-led liberation movement. The Rector’s vision of UWC as the ‘intellectual home of the left’ resonated with student leaders. Students viewed their plight as a consequence of apartheid, rather than blaming the university. The apartheid regime consequently became the object of students’ struggles, anger, frustrations and resentment. The mere fact that students identified the apartheid regime as the primary cause of their financial problems and the institutional financial crisis was important to the university management’s strategy. It provided a basis for compromises in respect of students understanding of the need to make minimum payments and this was codified in various financial agreements entered into by the UWC management and the SRC. Moreover, the university’s long-standing commitment to expand access to poor students played an important role in enabling the university management and students to reach agreements both before and after 1994.

Prof. Cecil Abrahams succeeded Prof. Gerwel as Rector. There was antagonistic relationship between management and students, which resulted in high levels of non-normative action, especially student activism. Affordability was a source of dispute between the UWC SRC and management. The UWC SRC approached ‘affordability’ from students’ financial standpoint, arguing whether or not students (possibly ‘all those affected’) could ‘afford’ to pay and if so, how much they could ‘afford’. The UWC management approached ‘affordability’ from the institutional financial standpoint by asking whether the university could ‘afford’
to admit students who could not pay. The UWC management was more concerned with ensuring institutional financial sustainability. The failure to reach consensus around affordability and resolve tension between affordability and institutional financial sustainability led to the 1998 conflict. At the heart of the conflict was students’ resolve to defend about 7 000 students who were facing financial exclusions. Eventually, 4000 students successfully managed to register again.

Notwithstanding the conflict, UWC continued to face the challenge of balancing student affordability and institutional financial sustainability. The 2001 university five-year financial plan also played a role. This plan was approved by the university council in 2001. The five-year financial plan defined and set the following key financial drivers and targets: (a) admissions should grow at sustainable rates; (b) students should pay their tuition and residence fees; (c) employment costs should not exceed 65% of total income; (d) operating costs should not exceed 30% of total income (UWC, 2002: 41). Cost-sharing was deeply ingrained in the financial plan, which implied that the challenge of student affordability would continue to confront students. Coincidentally, the implementation of the five-year financial plan happened at the same time that students decided against using student activism in conjunction with negotiations, a major difference from the pre-2000 era, especially the 1998 student activism, which was an institution-focused subtype.

Collective student actions
This study shows that students used and combined collective normative and collective non-normative student actions in a complementary manner between 1995 and 2000. In particular during the 1998 UWC conflict, students initiated Type 1 collective normative student action, especially using negotiations and lobbying in order to address their problem of ‘unmet financial needs’. Eventually, students decided to shift from Type 1 to Type 2, which is collective non-normative student action or student activism. The shift did not imply the complete abandonment of Type 1. Rather, it was a tactical shift in which students used Type
2 to put more pressure on the university to accede to their demands. Students therefore combined different types of collective action.

Between 2000 and 2005, UWC students predominantly used collective normative student actions. I established in Chapter Three that formal student participation in higher education governance presumes the existence of a good working relationship between the UWC SRC and student body. The UWC SRC should operate on the basis of a representative ‘mandate’ from the student body, which would guide its negotiations with the university management. The UWC SRC did not have a relationship with the student body of the kind that could give the it an explicit mandate in this respect, and therefore negotiated with the university management without such mandate. Potentially this could raise legitimacy questions at two levels, that is, at the level of the UWC SRC as ‘legitimate student voice’ (given the previously established norm of receiving mandates and accounting to mass meetings) and at the level of decisions that were taken in negotiations with management. The attitude of indifference (or apathy) on the part of the student body was not helpful either and may signal changes in the political culture of South African youth beyond the confines of this thesis. In any case, the new practice did not prevent the UWC SRC from committing students to certain agreements with the university management even if its ‘mandate’ only derived from having been elected into office. It would also not prevent the university management from implementing such decisions.

The 1998 UWC conflict
The 1998 UWC conflict played an important role in this study. In the main, it provided scope to analyse and understand the conditions and nature of students actions used to address student funding problems at a particular moment of the university’s history, which provides a turning point in student politics at UWC. The 1998 UWC conflict happened soon after the elaboration of the post-apartheid higher education policy framework, the adoption of the 1997 White Paper on Higher Education and the Higher Education Act of 1997. The latter granted students legal stakeholder status and a formal role in higher education governance
across all institutions. This newly assigned role and status of students as stakeholders should at least have resulted in better ‘formal communication lines and consultation’ between students and management, the effect of which would have been the prevention of the 1998 student activism as some writers seemed to suggest (Alence, 1999; Bergan, 2004, Boland, 2005; Luescher-Mamashela, 2011; Mathieu, 1996; Munene, 2003; Nkomo, 1984). This clearly did not happen.

The 1998 UWC institution-focused student activism highlighted a number of important points. First, students combined collective non-normative action and collective normative action in a complementary manner to resolve the problem that led to the 1998 institution-focused student activism. Students (led by the SRC) initially embarked on collective normative student action, in particular negotiations with the university management. The UWC SRC had hoped that it would reach an agreement with management on the issue of ‘affordability’ for poor students with outstanding fees. However, the negotiations collapsed before an agreement could be reached, thus paving the way for collective non-normative student action, institution-focused student activism.

Second, the relationship between the student leaders and the student body was important. The UWC SRC had to rely on the student body for support, energy and direction throughout the student activism and negotiations with the university management in the face of a wide-spread public rejection of students’ demands. The student body supported the UWC SRC even when the police invaded the campus and arrested hundreds of students. Even first-year students ‘volunteered’ to be arrested. The student body was the only source of support to the UWC SRC after almost all other stakeholders, including the government, publicly disapproved of the student action.

Third, and in direct response to the research question posed, the 1998 UWC conflict exposed the paradox of post-1994 higher education policy. Both the national government and UWC supported the opening of access, especially to poor and black students, but this commitment was not matched with adequate
financial assistance. Rather, poor students were expected to contribute to the costs of their study. Indeed, the pains of transition uncovered in this study bear witness to a sense of ‘abandonment’, reminiscent of Biko’s famed struggle slogan, “Black man, you are on your own”. While many students were able to re-register after embarking on student activism, they had missed quality time for learning; many other students never returned to campus.

Fourth, the role of students is critical in society in its emancipatory potential, be it under a repressive or democratic regime. The review of literature in Chapter Two has shown that students jealously guard and are often ready to defend democratic rights, spaces and principles, and often also a commitment to social justice. The 1998 UWC institution-focused student activism was about issues specific to students as much as it was about rolling back the post-apartheid government’s imposition of unpopular policies and rolling back of civil society participation in policy-making; with respect to student politics, the 1998 conflict defied government’s drive to clamp down on student activism across higher education institutions as ordered by the former President Mandela, Deputy President Mbeki, and Minister of Education Professor Bhengu. The 1998 student activism exposed the emerging post-apartheid government’s disposition towards student activism, which was characterised by intolerance. Government’s response could be seen as surprising given the euphoria of democracy, and perhaps people found it unthinkable that the ANC-led government could turn its back on poor students so soon after the 1994 elections. However, when viewed in the broader context, government’s response shared similarities with that in other post-colonial African countries, where coercive and control measures were introduced, coupled with the issuing of stern warnings and discrediting of student activism, together with name-calling of students labelling them a ‘menace’, ‘spolit’ with unrealistic demands and so forth. Like elsewhere, the police was readily brought to campuses to suppress students’ voicing their demands (see Alidou et al., 2008; Chikwanha, 2009; Diouf, 1996, 2003). UWC students were called ‘fee-dodgers’, a term in stark contrast to ‘energy drivers’ (Gerwel, 1988: 3) or ‘shock-troops’ of the revolution (Wolpe, 1994: 7).
Individual student actions

Once SCM had been established, the SRC had the responsibility to negotiate with SCM on behalf of students on student funding issues. However, SCM still had the power to assess and clear students individually. I argue that this clearance process inadvertently contributed to the demobilisation of students as a collective force and facilitated political ‘atomisation’ of students in relation to addressing their unmet financial needs. In consequence the SCM process may have played a role in the shift from Type 1 and Type 2 collective student actions to Type 3 and Type 4 individual student actions. I argue that UWC students came to use Type 3 individual normative student actions predominantly after 1998. The individual student efforts manifested themselves in a variety of ways, including students seeking part-time employment on and off campus, and showing solidarity with each other (sharing or lending books or study notes, squatting, sharing food and so forth). Students mobilised additional funding from family members, friends of parents and through direct engagement with the university’s newly established funding structures, such as SCM and the NSFAS Financial Aid Office, for possible bursaries, a relaxation of payment rules, or entering into arrangements for a payment plan.

In conclusion, while the findings of this study can be regarded as an 'empirical contribution' to knowledge, they clearly also provide much material for conceptual clarification and reflection. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that an important accomplishment of the study has been to give voice to some of the 'unseen pains' of the transition in post-apartheid South African higher education. Be it collective student actions or students’ individual actions such as negotiations with SCM and the Financial Aid Office in pursuit of addressing their unmet financial need, they were at best humbling experiences for a young person who seeks access to higher education towards a better life, at worst dehumanising ordeals. The study reports, for example, how students’ experience of delays in the finalisation of registration affected them academically as well as psychologically. Some students had to wait for almost two months before they knew if they should
go back home or continue their studies. Others continued to stand in the long queues in front of the offices, attend their classes so that they would not miss a lot, while continuing to hope for a solution to their problem of unmet financial need.

The findings of the study address research questions and thereby contribute towards improving understanding of various ways in which UWC confronted the paradoxical post-apartheid higher education policy of expansion of access and limited funding and in which UWC students addressed the resulting problem of unmet financial need between 1995 and 2005.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEWS

- UWC Executive Director of Finance and Services, 25 February 2009.
- Third-year BCom student, 28 August 2009.
- Former UWC SRC president, 19 September 2007.
- Head of Student Credit Management, 30 September 2007.
- Fourth-year B Pharm student, 30 August 2006.
- Third-year BA student, 29 August 2006.
- Fourth-year Library and Information Science student, 03 September 2004.
- Third-year Library Science student, 03 September 2004.
- Former UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004.
- Second-year BCom student, 28 August 2006.
- Second-year B Admin student, 29 August 2006.
- Second-year LLB student, 29 August 2006.
- Former UWC SRC president, 08 March 2002.
- Former Cape Technikon SRC president, 08 May 2002.
- Former Pentech deputy SRC president, 23 September 2002.
- Stellenbosch SRC members, 04 March 2002.
- UCT registrar, 26 February 2002
- Pentech deputy registrar, 10 May 2002
- Cape Technikon Deputy Vice-Chancellor Student Affairs, 16 April 2002.
- UWC Senate and Council senior member, 09 May 2002.
- National Department of Education official, 14 February 2002.
- Cape Technikon student development officer, 08 May 2002.
- UWC student development officer, 18 February 2002.
• UWC Vice-Rector Student Affairs, 12 December 2002.
• UDW academic member of Council, 24 June 2003.
• University of Fort Hare SRC president, 04 September 2003.
• Fort Hare student services officer, 04 September 2003.
• Fort Hare treasurer general, 04 September 2003.
• Fort Hare SASCO chairperson, 04 September 2003.
• University of Transkei SRC deputy finance secretary, 05 September 2003.
• University of Transkei deputy social welfare officer, 05 September 2003.
• University of Transkei sport and cultural officer, 05 September 2003.
• SRC chief electoral officer, 2003/4, 03 September 2003.
• Rhodes University (East London Campus) SRC secretary general, 02 September 2003.
• Border Technikon SRC education and transformation officer, 01 September 2003.
• UDW SRC president, 24-27 June 2003.
• UDW SRC vice-president, 24-27 June 2003.
• UDW SRC information and publicity officer, 24-27 June 2003.
• Tshwane University of Technology (former TNG campus) SRC deputy president, 29 March 2004.
• Tshwane University of Technology SRC gender project officer, 29 March 2004.
• Tshwane University of Technology (former Pretoria Tech) SRC secretary general, 30 March 2004.
• UNISA national deputy president AZASCO NSRC projects and finance officer, 30 March 2004.
• Wits SRC president, 31 March 2004.
• University of Pretoria SRC president, 01 April 2004.
• UNISA National SRC Secretary General, 01 April 2004.
• UCM National PRO and UNISA local SRC secretary and UCM NEC member - project officer, 01 April 2004.
• UniZulu SRC deputy president, 05 April 2004.
• Peninsula Technikon deputy SRC president and SATSU president, 07 July 2003.
• University of South Africa (Durban Campus) SRC member, 25 June 2003.
APPENDIX B: GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

- * Provision of Special Funds for Tertiary Education and Training Act, No. 121 of 1993.*
APPENDIX C: DAILY NEWSPAPERS AND WEBSITES

- Business day
- Cape Argus
- Cape Times
- Citizen
- City Press
- Financial Mail
- This Day
- Sowetan
- Star
- Sunday Independent
- Sunday Times
- Sunday World
- Isolezwe
- Ilanga
- Dispatch
- http://www.iol.co.za
- www.sapressgroup.co.za “Socio-Political Comment-Education-Tertiary”
- http://www.thestar.co.za
APPENDIX D: REPORTS AND MINUTES

Students

- UWC SRC Mid-term evaluation workshop. Report from academic officer.
- UWC SRC financial report (2001/02).
- UWC financial agreement in respect of the 1997 student debt.
- UWC SRC financial report (1994/5)

Institutional

- Draft UWC self-evaluation report.
• UWC annual report (2004).
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