State–Society relations in the ‘South African Developmental State’:
Integrated Development Planning and public participation at the local level

Dissertation submitted to the School of Government, Faculty of Economics and Management Sciences at the University of the Western Cape in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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December 2013

Promoter: Professor Christopher Tapscott
DECLARATION

I, Sharon Patricia Penderis, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation entitled *State–Society relations in the ‘South African Developmental State’: Integrated Development Planning and public participation at the local level* is my own work and that I have not previously submitted it, in part or in its entirety, at any university for a degree or examination. All sources have been indicated and acknowledged by means of references.

Signature: ______________________________      Date: 18 December 2013
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

While I take full responsibility for the content of this investigation, I am mindful that a number of people have played an important role in enabling me to complete this research. I hereby gratefully acknowledge the institutional assistance from the Deputy Vice Rector, Professor Ramesh Bharuthram, and the contribution of the African Centre for Citizenship and Democracy (ACCEDE), in terms of coordinating the preparation of the survey instrument, training the fieldworkers and funding the survey in Delft.

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ABSTRACT

In various formulations, the idea of a developmental state has appeared in official discourse in South Africa since the advent of democratic government in 1994, albeit that its adoption as state policy has been slow, uneven and inconsistent with the original East Asian model. What has been a feature of developmental state thinking in South Africa is the fact that the concept has been so poorly articulated in policy that it has come to mean different things to different state actors and to the public. This has been aggravated by the fact that the idea of a strongly interventionist developmental state has run counter to the idea of a diminished state enunciated in various neo-liberal policies. Moreover, unlike the authoritarian and top-down East Asian model, the government envisages a South African developmental state which is infused with democratic content where citizens assist in the formulation of policy from below. In its emphasis on a bottom-up approach to policy formulation the South African model differs markedly from the conventional idea of a developmental state which is heavily reliant on a strong central bureaucracy to drive economic growth. In the South African model local government has been assigned a pivotal role in addressing persistent economic exclusion and uneven development. A central tenet of this approach is the need for local authorities to institutionalise participatory processes at grassroots level and devise effective structures and processes to facilitate citizen participation in local affairs.

In the light of the above, this thesis sets out to examine the manner in which a system of developmental local government is being implemented in the City of Cape Town. Taking as a case study the township of Delft, the study looks at the systems and processes (and particularly the process of integrated development planning) set in place to advance citizen participation. It examines the extent to which the model is perceived to be achieving its goals from the perspective of political office bearers, officials from different spheres of government and residents. The research found that notwithstanding an enabling legislative and policy framework, there is little comprehension of, or interest, in the idea of developmental local government and municipal officials largely pay lip service to participatory processes which are carried out in a top-down fashion and which neither empower local residents nor enhance their welfare. It also concluded that developmental government, in its present form, is contributing little to the establishment of a national developmental state.
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# Glossary of Terms

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCEDE</td>
<td>African Centre for Citizenship and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASGISA</td>
<td>Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COGTA</td>
<td>Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Centre for Public Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMP</td>
<td>Disaster Management Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSTV</td>
<td>Digital Satellite Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDS</td>
<td>Economic Development Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDA</td>
<td>Housing Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP&amp;OPM</td>
<td>Integrated Development Planning and Organisational Performance Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP:</td>
<td>Integrated Development Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITP</td>
<td>Integrated Transport Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIPSA</td>
<td>Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGTA</td>
<td>Local Government Transition Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Municipal Demarcation Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td>Minerals-Energy Complex</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFMA</td>
<td>Municipal Finance Management Act</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NGP</td>
<td>New Growth Path</td>
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<td>NICs</td>
<td>Newly Industrialised Countries</td>
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<td>NNP</td>
<td>New National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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OECD  Organisation for Economic Trade and Development
PMS   Performance Management System
RDP   Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACP  South African Communist Party
SANCO South African National Civic Association
SANGOCO South African National NGO Coalition
SDBIP Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan
SDP   Social Development Plan
SFA   Strategic Focus Areas
TAS   Turnaround Strategy
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
WTO   World Trade Organisation
The economic achievements of the newly industrialised countries of East Asia in the latter half of the 20th century sparked considerable theoretical debate on the role of the state and the appropriate trajectories of development policy for emerging economies (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Beeson, 2009). In this context, the term ‘developmental state’ was used to describe the state-led model of economic growth adopted in the 1970s and 1980s by such countries as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Vietnam amongst others (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Woo-Cummings, 1999). Although the idea of ‘developmentalism’ lost some of its lustre following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which prompted debate over the merits of state-led growth versus neo-liberal notions of a minimalist state (Burkett & Martin Hart-Landsberg, 2002; Onis, 1991), belief in the model has spread and it continues to hold appeal in many parts of the developing world and no less in post-Apartheid South Africa.

In various formulations, the idea of a developmental state has appeared in official discourse in South Africa since the advent of democratic government in 1994 albeit that its adoption as state policy has been slow, uneven and inconsistent with the original East Asian model (ANC, 2007b, Manuel, 2013; Evans, 2010, Fine, 2008). However, following the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, which highlighted the weaknesses of laissez faire capitalism and emphasised the need for state regulation of the economy, there has been renewed interest in the idea of an interventionist developmental state and a growing conviction in many quarters (amongst academics, the media, policy formulators, social commentators and others) that it is the model most likely to succeed in overcoming South Africa’s multiple developmental challenges (Edigheji, 2010). However, what has been a feature of developmental state thinking in South Africa is that the concept has been so poorly articulated in policy that it has come to mean different things to different state actors and to the public. This has been aggravated by the fact that the idea of a strongly interventionist developmental state has run counter to the idea of a diminished state enunciated in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic framework which was launched in 1996 (Department of Finance, 1996) and the adoption of the principles of New Public Management which envisaged a public sector run on
more business-oriented principles (Cameron, 2009). This implicit contradiction aside, the conceptualisation of the developmental state in South Africa (to the extent that there is agreement on its core tenets) differs from that of the East Asian model, as shall be discussed, in a number of significant ways.

1.1 Contextualization

Chalmers Johnson (1982) is accredited with having coined the term ‘developmental state’ in the course of an investigation into Japan’s phenomenal post-war industrial expansion. Following Japan’s success, Beeson (2009:6) maintains, the developmental state model which ‘was emulated with varying degrees of faithfulness and efficacy elsewhere in the region, became synonymous with East Asia’s rapid economic expansion and emblematic of the region’s distinctive approach to economic management’. Developmental states in this context are typically characterised by a strong centralised administrative authority which plays a central role in determining macro-economic policy and planning and which has no hesitation in intervening in the market in order to guide the path of economic development (Evans, 1995; Bagchi, 2000). This interventionist state role is frequently contrasted in the literature with the neo-liberal ‘free market’ approach which envisages an arms-length approach by the state and reliance on market forces to determine economic outcomes (Chang, 1999).

While there continues to be debate on the essence of developmental states in the 21st century (Routley, 2012), there is broad consensus on the core features of the East Asian developmental model which the World Bank (1993) has referred to as the ‘Asian Miracle’. These features include a committed and determined political elite focused on achieving economic growth, a powerful, capable and insulated professional bureaucracy, successful policy interventions that promote growth, a strong symbiotic relationship between the state and private sector, relative autonomy of the bureaucracy and a weak and subordinated civil society (Meyns & Musamba, 2010; Evans, 1995; Wade, 1990; Johnson, 1982; Edigheji, 2010; Routley, 2012).

Notwithstanding the well-documented economic success of the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’, a number of authors have questioned the transferability of the East Asian developmental model
asserting that many of the preconditions for its success were historically and geo-politically contextual (Onis, 1991), emerging as it did in the aftermath of the devastating destruction of the Second World War and the threat of communist expansion in the region during the Cold War era (Mathews, 2006; Pempel, 1999). Others have pointed to the significance of cultural norms and political culture (Compton, 2000; Pye, 1985; Kuotsai, 2002; Kihl, 2004), in shaping the broad national consensus necessary to sustain a state-determined economic development path over a period of time (Gemandze, 2006). However, the approach has also not been without its critics who have pointed to the fact that East Asian development states were highly authoritarian in nature, that they permitted little dissent, imposed restrictive labour legislation and, in their early years at least, generally thought little of exploiting the working class who received low wages and often laboured under very poor conditions (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg, 2003).

This has prompted some authors to assert that, while some elements of the Asian developmental state remain relevant for emerging economies elsewhere in the world, it is not possible, nor indeed desirable, to replicate the model as a whole. In a context where economic development is increasingly linked with notions of basic rights and entitlements, there has also been an increasing emphasis on the need for developmental states to embrace democratic principles and practices (Leftwich, 2002; White, 2006), which include the promotion of citizen participation (Welch & Nuru; 2006) as well as notions of good governance (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007).

1.2 Towards a Developmental State in South Africa

An interest in the establishment of a developmental state was evident in the policy thinking of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) both in the lead-up to the first democratic elections in 1994 and on its assumption of office thereafter. Thus, the 1994 White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, which was based on the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) (ANC, 1994), although not explicitly referring to a developmental state, nevertheless asserted the need for an interventionist state which would play a leading role in steering the economy and in reconstructing South African society:
Reconstruction and development will be achieved through the leading and enabling role of the State, a thriving private sector and active involvement by all sectors of civil society. The role of the Government and the public sector within the broader economy has to be redefined so that reconstruction and development are facilitated. In a wide range of areas the GNU will take the lead in reforming and addressing structural conditions. In doing so its guidelines will remain the basic people-driven principles of the RDP (RSA, 1994, Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3).

While interest in advancing a strongly interventionist developmental state waned, as intimated, following the adoption of a neo-liberal macro-economic framework, the idea never entirely lost currency and in the course of the past decade it has resurfaced both in ANC policy documents (ANC, 2005, 2007b) as well in official discourse (PSC, 2008; The Presidency, 2009, 2010; Poon, 2009). In that respect, the concept received new impetus following the global financial meltdown in 2008 and as it became increasingly apparent that GEAR had failed to deliver the economic growth it had promised. For the ruling ANC government a developmental state is now portrayed as the most viable vehicle to overcome the legacy of apartheid, to address poverty, social inequality and unemployment, to improve service delivery and to promote people-centred development (Manuel, 2009; ANC, 2009; Edigheji, 2010). Significantly, official South African understanding of a developmental state (in as much as it has been formally articulated) is one that is both developmental and democratic (Olayode, 2005; Van Dijk & Croucamp, 2007). In that regard, the ANC’s 2007 ‘Draft Strategy and Tactics Document’ stresses that a South African developmental state should, besides the advancement of sustainable economic development, ‘mobilise the people as a whole, especially the poor, to act as their own liberators through participatory and representative democracy’ (ANC, 2007b: paragraph 59). Unlike the authoritarian and top-down East Asian model, government leaders envisage a South African developmental state to be infused with democratic content, where state/society synergies are created by a mobilised civil society working side by side with a committed and development-oriented government, in order to inform policy from below. In its emphasis on the need for a bottom-up approach to policy formulation the South African government model differs markedly from the conventional idea of a developmental state, and yet the first, and hitherto only, official policy document which proposes a developmental approach was the White Paper on
Developmental Local Government launched by the Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development in 1998 (RSA, 1998b). According to the White Paper, the four characteristics of developmental local government are:

(E)xercising municipal powers and functions in a manner which maximises their impact on social development and economic growth; playing an integrating and coordinating role to ensure alignment between public (including all spheres of government) and private investment within the municipal area; democratising development; and building social capital through providing community leadership and vision, and seeking to empower marginalised and excluded groups within the community (RSA, 1998b:8).

The initial focus on establishing a system of developmental local government was based on a conventional belief that municipalities, as the sphere of government closest to the people, are best positioned to be the key drivers in addressing persistent economic exclusion and uneven development (Pieterse, 2007). A central tenet of this bottom-up approach was the need for local authorities to institutionalise participatory processes at grassroots level and devise effective structures and processes to facilitate citizen participation in local affairs. In support of this objective, a comprehensive legislative framework was set in place directing municipalities to implement systems of participatory governance (Moodley, 2006). This includes the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) and the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) which stipulate the participatory processes that municipalities must follow in their engagement with local communities.

Amongst a number of measures introduced to promote citizen participation at the local level (including ward committees and sub-council structures) the most important mechanism for the advancement of developmental local government is the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) process (Achmat, 2002). In terms of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000, an IDP must be drawn up following municipal elections and the assumption of office of a new local government council (RSA, 2000). In that regard it is intended as a tool through which all development initiatives will...

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1 The ‘National Development Plan 2030’ (National Planning Commission, 2011), launched in 2012, speaks of the need for a ‘capable and developmental state’ but it is notably short of detail on the constituent elements of a developmental state.
be planned at local level and the means through which the views of ordinary citizens can be heard and their needs prioritised (Harrison, 2002, 2006). The Act further obliges municipalities to establish appropriate structures to ensure that effective citizen participation takes place (FCR, 2002; Goldman, 2005). As part of this process, the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 (RSA, 1998a) makes provision for a ward committee system which is intended to serve as the interface between citizens and local authorities on a day-to-day basis (Smith, 2008).

From the above it is evident that, formally at least, there is in place both a legislative and policy framework necessary to support the establishment of development local government and that this could form part of a broader programme to establish a developmental state in South Africa. However, aside from the somewhat anomalous approach to establishing a developmental state from the bottom up, there is mounting evidence that the notion of developmental local government is failing both in its attempts to improve the welfare of the poor and in its efforts to promote effective citizen participation. A review of the literature reveals that local authorities are unable to actualise their developmental mandate and that a substantial proportion of South Africans are forced to live in poorly resourced settlements with limited opportunities for meaningful participation in development initiatives and with equally limited prospects of economic advancement (Chagunda, 2007; Fakir, 2007; Van Dijk & Croucamp, 2007; Tapscott, 2008; Thompson, Nleya & Africa, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Van Donk, 2012; Andani & Naidu, 2012). To that extent, mounting service delivery protests across the country are reflective of citizen frustration and anger both at unfilled expectations and the failure of formal participatory structures (Atkinson, 2007; Kimemia, 2011, Cape Times, 2013, Plessing, 2011; Sowetan, 2012). These protests can be viewed as the final resort of citizens attempting to make their voices heard through non-institutionalised popular means. Piper and Nadvi (2010:212) refer to this dynamic as a ‘disengaged–enraged’ dichotomy brought about by ‘the failure of the formal invited spaces for public participation in local governance’.

In the light of the above, this thesis sets out to examine the manner in which a system of developmental local government is being implemented in the City of Cape Town. Taking as a case study the township of Delft, the study looks at the systems and processes in place to advance citizen participation (and particularly the process of Integrated Development Planning)
and examines the extent to which it is perceived to be achieving its goals from the perspective of political office bearers, officials from different spheres of government and residents.

1.3 Statement of the problem

The problem that this thesis seeks to investigate is the general inability of municipalities to give effect to the idea of a developmental local state and, in particular, their incapacity to bring about socio-economic transformation and the deepening of democracy. The establishment of a system of developmental local government is seen to form part of a broader programme to build a democratic developmental state. However, both government and independent commentators are in agreement that the creation of a developmental state in South Africa remains in its infancy, if it can be said to exist at all (Fine, 2008; Netshitenzhe, 2011; Kenny, 2010; Maphunye, 2009; Mokaba, 2001; Van Dijk & Croucamp, 2007; Chagunda, 2007), and there is also little evidence that developmental local government is contributing to this broader national project (Putu, 2006; Nzwei & Kuye, 2007; Frodin, 2009; Gumede, 2010). There is, nevertheless, substantial evidence to suggest that local governments are failing to fulfil their mandate with respect to the promotion of citizen engagement and that public participation is frequently reduced to administrative manipulation, coercion and top-down decision making (Williams, 2007a, 2007b; Piper, 2008; Andani, 2013). In this context it is evident that there is a variety of factors, including those relating to the systems, processes and practices of citizen participation, to the availability of human and financial resources, and to the relationships between political office bearers, administrators and ordinary people which individually and collectively inhibit the establishment of effective developmental government in South Africa and that their differential impact is not well understood.

1.4 Significance of the research

In recent years a significant body of literature has reflected on South Africa’s attempts to create a developmental state and has highlighted the lack of conceptual clarity and common understanding of the essential features of such a state (Putu, 2006; Nzwei & Kuye, 2007; Frodin, 2009; Gumede, 2010). Other research has discussed the notion of developmental local
government but this has largely been descriptive in nature, focusing on the need for municipalities to promote service delivery, local economic development and citizen participation (Koma, 2012; De Visser, 2006; Powell, 2012). These contributions also fail to make any linkage between the idea of developmental local government and that of a developmental state. It is nevertheless certain that the idea of developmental local government is seen to be integral to the idea of establishing a democratic developmental state. Thus, amongst the eight areas identified by the National Development Plan (NPC, 2011:410) as being crucial to the building of a capable and developmental state is the need to strengthen local government.

This research, as a consequence, is of significance in the extent to which it examines the role of developmental local government in building a democratic developmental state at national level. It is of further significance in the extent to which it aims to provide an empirical examination of the extent to which municipalities are able to give effect to one of the core elements of developmental local government prescribed in both policy and legislation, namely the establishment of mechanisms for effective citizen participation. Hitherto, research of this nature has tended to focus on the shortcomings of participatory processes from the perspective of citizens (Williams, 2007a; Thompson, Nleya & Africa, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c), while considerably less attention has been paid to the views of local state officials and political office bearers on the reasons why systems might be failing. Through the case study of Delft, this investigation aims to develop a more holistic view of the factors which are constraining participatory development at the local level.

1.4.1 Aims of the study

Against this background, the broad research aims of this investigation will be as follows:

- To review international discourse on the developmental state and, within that framework, to critically analyse the South African government’s attempts to construct a democratic and participatory developmental state;

- To investigate the theory and praxis of public participation and its contribution to participatory democracy and to review current participatory systems and practices in South Africa;
• To examine the legislative and policy frameworks in place to support developmental local government in South Africa and to assess the extent to which the Integrated Development Planning process is succeeding in advancing a developmental mandate at the local level;
• To evaluate the implementation of the Integrated Development Planning process in a selected case study area in Cape Town;
• To assess the extent to which participatory mechanisms enable citizen agency and influence development activities at the local level; and
• To consider the degree to which developmental local government is contributing to the broader objective of establishing a developmental state in South Africa.

1.4.2 Research propositions

This research is premised on three key propositions. The first is that South Africa’s seeming inability to construct a democratic developmental state is a direct consequence of the fact that the concept has been poorly defined and has yet to be fully articulated in policy or legislation. As a corollary of this, there is an inherent contradiction between the neo-liberal model of the state currently in operation and ambitions to create a strong interventionist developmental state. The second proposition is that the notion of developmental local government suggests a bottom-up approach to the construction of a developmental state which, once again, appears to limit prospects for the emergence of a central state with a strongly interventionist agenda. The third, and final, proposition is that developmental local government is intended to entail a strong commitment to citizen engagement, and yet, in practice, the Integrated Development Planning process (a key instrument for participation), is carried out in a top-down, pre-determined fashion which inhibits effective community participation.

1.5 Delineation of case study area

The City of Cape Town is the oldest urban area in South Africa and is currently one of the most rapidly growing metropolitan complexes in the country. The City comprises 24 sub-council areas
each of which is further divided into wards which, as indicated, were established to foster participatory governance and deepen democracy (City of Cape Town, 2010; Naidu, 2011). The selected case study area of Delft is located on the Cape Flats, which is an elongated corridor of land extending in a south-easterly direction from the City centre. The Cape Flats has been described as the ‘dumping ground of apartheid’ as its growth is attributed to the infamous Group Areas Act and Bantustan policy of the Apartheid government. As a result of this discriminatory legislation and policy, African, Indian and Coloured people from diverse backgrounds and traditions were uprooted and forcibly resettled in segregated racially based residential areas on the Cape Flats\(^2\) in a process which radically altered the social and physical fabric of Cape Town (Cook, 1991; Western, 1981).

While the Cape Flats accommodates the majority of the metropolitan population, economic and employment opportunities are predominantly located in the City’s central business district and in a few other industrial and commercial nodes. The majority of these employment centres are located some distance away from poor residential areas and people from the Cape Flats incur high transport costs in reaching them. Previous research reveals that low levels of physical and social well-being characterise most communities on the Cape Flats and residents face widespread poverty, unemployment, lack of education opportunities, health problems, high infant mortality, poor nutrition, drug addiction, crime, limited facilities and limited service provision (Penderis, 2003).

Many of these socio-economic conditions prevail in Delft which is located approximately 25km from the centre of Cape Town. The township was established in 1989 as what was termed an Integrated Service Land project, earmarked for the coloured population, but today comprises a mix of coloured and African people (Cook, 1991; Millstein, 2010). The rationale for the selection of Delft as a case study area for this research was twofold: in the first instance, empirical research conducted in 2009 by the African Centre for Citizenship and Democracy (ACCEDE) at the University of the Western Cape, and to which the researcher had access,

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\(^2\) Although it continues to be a contentious issue, the racial categories African, coloured, Indian/Asian and white are still deployed in post-apartheid South Africa for such official government purposes as affirmative action and historical redress. This categorisation will be used throughout this thesis when required for purposes of clarification and comparison.
revealed that, contrary to official claims on the inclusiveness of the process, the residents of Delft believe that they have limited opportunity to participate meaningfully in the formulation of IDPs or to influence decisions which might affect their welfare. Furthermore, protests surrounding poor service delivery are common in the area and are indicative of popular frustration at the lack of development and transformation taking place. In this context, the ability to access quantitative data and to conduct corroborating qualitative research with officials and residents in Delft presented an opportunity to examine, first hand, the manner in which participatory development processes are being implemented and the extent to which the idea of developmental local government is being given effect in the City of Cape Town, albeit in one locality.

In the second instance, the area was selected due to its geographical location on the Cape Flats and close proximity to the University of the Western Cape where the researcher is employed at the Institute for Social Development. This permitted relative ease of access to the case study area but it also enabled the researcher to build on the experience gained through research conducted in the surrounding region during 2003; this related in particular to an understanding of the socio-economic conditions, community dynamics and survival strategies of the residents of the Cape Flats.

1.6 Research design and methodology

The epistemological position undergirding this investigation includes elements of the positivist and interpretivist paradigms as both perspectives are deemed relevant in answering the research question. Furthermore, a mixed method approach, using a blend of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, was used in order to broaden the data base and enhance the depth of the investigation. While qualitative methodologies were used to access more in-depth information and gain a more holistic understanding of the experiences and attitudes of respondents with respect to the dynamics of participatory decision-making processes, the generation of quantitative data enabled broader targeting and hence more representative findings on the perspectives of respondents in the area.
While an extensive literature review assisted in developing a conceptual framework for the study, this was augmented by a range of secondary material. The secondary information analysed included state policy documents, legislation, research reports, draft discussion papers and internal departmental memos, communiqués and technical reports. In that regard, particular attention was paid to an examination of the City of Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan and public participation policy. Additional information was derived from minutes of sub-council, ward committee and sector meetings and chairperson reports.

A case study approach was deemed an appropriate method of empirical inquiry for research of this nature in that it facilitated the exclusive focus on a selected phenomenon (citizen participation in development process) in a specific locality (Delft) using multiple sources of evidence and methods to gather data (Yin, 2009). These methods will be discussed in greater detail below. While it is not possible to directly infer the extent to which the experiences of the residents of Delft are typical of other poor areas of Cape Town, the results of the Accede survey in Langa and Khayelitsha suggest that they are far from atypical and disapproval of participatory structures is widespread in both these localities. Furthermore, it is evident that the same model of citizen participation is implemented throughout the metropolitan area, suggesting that its shortcomings are likely to be replicated elsewhere in the City. Finally, the City of Cape Town is acknowledged to be one of the best run municipalities in the country and it may be inferred that if it is struggling to give effect to the idea of developmental local government then progress in most other local authorities is likely to be similar or worse.

1.6.1 The research procedure

Data gathering commenced in January 2011 and extended until October 2013. The collection of information initially focused on procuring background information and data relating to the case

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study area and this included the analysis of a range of documents, census data and research reports. Qualitative fieldwork took place between April 2011 and October 2013, whereas the quantitative survey was conducted over a three-week period during June 2011.

1.6.2 Quantitative methods

Formally defined, quantitative research involves the use of numerical measurement tools to gather information in order to uncover laws of relationships or causality (Mouton, 1996; Howell, 2004). The quantitative method employed in this research was based on a structured questionnaire which used both closed and open-ended questions. The data used in this investigation, as indicated, was derived from a larger study conducted by the African Centre for Citizenship and Democracy (ACCEDE) in three localities in the Cape Flats, namely Khayelitsha, Langa and Delft. A group of researchers (including the author of this study) with differing research interests in the case study areas, provided input to the design of the questionnaire. The design of the questionnaire took place during a number of workshop sessions attended by all contributors (see Annexure 1). Following the finalisation of the questionnaire design, fieldworkers were recruited and training sessions were held at the University of the Western Cape’s School of Government. The training sessions focused on the sampling strategy and sample universe, and on ensuring that fieldworkers fully understood the meaning and intention of each question in the questionnaire. Considerable emphasis was also placed on the need to observe protocols of ethical conduct including the need to ensure the confidentiality of responses given and the fact that respondents were under no obligation to participate in the survey and did so entirely of their own volition.

In all, 470 households in Delft were interviewed using a stratified random sampling method to select respondents. Fieldwork was conducted between 7 June and 29 June 2011 and each individual interview took about two hours to complete. Gender equality was ensured by using a gender split for individual interviews while individual households were stratified to include different housing types. The questionnaire focused first on gathering background demographic information about the respondents. Thereafter, questions focused on respondents’ perceptions of the performance of the City of Cape Town with respect to service delivery, the IDP process and
1.6.3 Qualitative methods

The use of qualitative research methods was particularly pertinent to a study of this nature as it enabled the researcher to gain ‘an insider perspective on social action’ and, at the same time, to gather information of a more sensitive nature (Babbie & Mouton, 2004:270). This methodology is concerned with understanding rather than measuring social phenomena, where people are conceived as self-directing, thinking beings that are continually constructing and changing their interpretations of the world (Mouton, 1996; Marshall & Rossman, 1989). The different methods were selected in terms of their relevance in answering the research question. Qualitative information was gathered using the following tools:

- Immersion in the study area enabled the researcher to spend time with councillors and community members and gain first-hand knowledge and insight into the lifestyles of residents and the conditions that they confront on a day-to-day basis. Such immersion also enabled the researcher to observe and reflect on the dynamics of social interaction between officials, councillors and residents. This method formed an important part of the fieldwork strategy and enabled the researcher to view community dynamics in a real-life context and from the viewpoint of the different groups of people.

- Observation has been referred to as the ‘fundamental base of all research methods in the social sciences’ (Adler & Adler, 1994:389). As a methodological tool, observation is extremely useful in terms of enabling the researcher to describe events, behaviours and day to day activities within a selected social setting (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). As such, and for the purpose of this research, observation within the case study area was an extremely valuable source of data collection and took the form of attendance at a number of meetings in the broader sub-council area. This included attendance at sub-council meetings on a monthly basis over a period of more than twelve months, as well as attendance at sub-council activity days, public meetings and ward committee meetings in
order to assess the socio-political dynamics of the participation process. Attendance at such meetings enabled the gathering of information on the form and effectiveness of the public participation process together with an assessment of the extent, level and nature of input from community members in the process. This proved to be an indispensable method of inquiry as it revealed important information relevant to the research such as human behaviour and relationship dynamics between officials and councillors on the one hand and between councillors and ward committee members on the other. One of the advantages of attending meetings as an observer was that it enabled the researcher to gain ‘insider’ knowledge of the functioning of sub-councils and ward committees and provided the opportunity to observe interactions between members which was essential to the focus of the research. Attendance at sub-council meetings further enabled the researcher to access meeting agendas and minutes, chairperson’s reports, line department progress reports and other official documentation relating to development and service delivery in the sub-council.

- Semi-structured interviewing, as a qualitative method of inquiry, is a particularly useful tool in terms of gathering information through direct personal contact with selected respondents according to pre-determined themes relating to the research question (Bless, Higson-Smith & Kagee, 2006). The use of semi-structured interviews and an open-ended questioning format in this research enabled respondents to elaborate on certain themes, highlight new issues impacting on selected topics and relate personal experiences, attitudes and opinions. Semi-structured interviews were used to gather information from three groups of office bearers, namely officials from the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Provincial Government, councillors from Sub-council 5 and ward committee members who represent sector organisations and the community in Delft. Interviews were conducted with local government officials to ascertain their perceptions of the responsibilities which they have with respect to service delivery and the implementation of the developmental local state. Officials from the Integrated Development Planning Unit and Public Participation Office were interviewed to gather information on the implementation of the integrated planning process and the participatory mechanisms which were used to gather public input. Officials from the
Departments of Social and Early Childhood Development, Health, Parks, Safety and Security and Sport and Recreation were further interviewed in order to shed light on service delivery matters and challenges that impinged on development efforts in the wider urban area. At provincial level, interviews were conducted with officials from the Department of Social Development, while telephonic interviews were conducted with officials from the Provincial Department of Human Settlements and a representative from the Housing Development Agency. At sub-council level, a number of interviews were conducted with sub-council chairpersons and managers, councillors, ward committee members and community representatives. These interviews focused on issues relating to the conceptualization of the IDP process, its implementation procedures, the nature and extent of stakeholder participation and matters relating to administrative and institutional capacity. Questions further concentrated on eliciting responses relating to problems and challenges faced by councillors and ward committee members in the performance of their duties within the sub-council area.

The sub-council chairperson and sub-council manager were essential sources of information throughout the empirical research. They provided a sound background to the dynamics that operate within the sub-council and invaluable insight into the issues that impact on the delivery of development in the different wards. These insights are explored and elaborated on in Chapters 7 and 8. It became apparent during both interview sessions and during observation at sub-council and ward committee meetings that the sub-council chairperson and manager have extensive experience in their respective roles and play a critical role in ensuring that Sub-council 5 functions according to the mandate set out by the City.

The procedure followed during the qualitative interview sessions was firstly to meet with the subcouncil leadership to gain a broad understanding of the functioning and roles of subcouncils and ward committees as mechanisms established by local government to foster participation within the metropolitan area. Thereafter, interviews with government officials were set up in order to gather deeper insight into the responsibilities and activities of different officials and government departments. Whilst some officials were
forthcoming in providing information, others were hesitant and meetings frequently had to be rescheduled. Some officials refused to meet with the researcher and on two occasions an official failed to attend a scheduled meeting. On these occasions, meetings were set up with alternate departmental officials. On the other hand, councillors were very informative during interviews and the workshop session and provided a range of insight into their role as councillor in the wards and the problems which they faced in liaising with officials from line departments, ward committee members and community residents. Information from ward committee members were gathered during a focus group discussion, ward committee meetings and during individual interviews. Ward committee members were eager to provide insight into the functioning of the ward committees and the problems that they experienced in performing their role in accordance with their mandate.

- A focus group discussion was conducted with five representatives from the different wards in the sub-council area in October 2012. The function of focus groups, as a method of inquiry, ‘involves collective engagement designed to promote dialogue and to achieve higher levels of understanding of issues critical to the development of a group’s interests and/or the transformation of conditions of its existence’ (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2011:546). There is an abundance of literature that highlights the potential of focus groups to focus specifically on a predetermined set of research issues that relate particularly to a selected research question, the provision of an unthreatening environment to participants which enables them to respond spontaneously to issues and the fostering of open-ended group interaction which can lead to the generation of new ideas and which enables participants to express common or diverse experiences, thoughts, perceptions and opinions about certain topics (Krueger & Casey, 2000; Babbie & Mouton, 2004). In setting up the focus group discussion, the sub-council chairperson and manager assisted the researcher in selecting members serving on the ward committees within the sub-council area and in inviting the participants. They further assisted in providing the venue at The Hague community centre in Delft.
The question schedule was formulated with the intent of gathering information required to answer the research questions of the broader investigation (see Annexure 2) and to collaborate findings gleaned from the questionnaire survey. Questions were formulated around their understanding of public participation and their opinions on the effectiveness of such mechanisms as the sub-councils, ward committees and the system of sector representation in fostering inclusivity and in promoting participatory decision-making. Other questions focused on assessing the extent of community input into the IDP process, the levels of participation, the obstacles to public participation and recommendations for improvement of the system of citizen engagement.

The focus group discussion took just over an hour to complete and was conducted in an informal atmosphere in order to enable participants to feel comfortable in expressing their views on the often contentious issues under discussion. The ward committee members participated actively and spontaneously in discussing the themes raised and provided important insights into the functioning of the institutionalised participatory mechanisms in the sub-council area as well the dynamics of citizen participation in the different wards. Furthermore, the nature of the method of inquiry stimulated different participants to elaborate on the comments of others and this in turn led to the generation of more in-depth information and insight on the problems faced by community members in attempting to influence policy decisions.

- A workshop was conducted with the sub-council chairperson, sub-council manager and eight councillors in order to explain the focus and objective of the research as well as to gain an understanding of their views of different aspects of the topic under review. Discussions thus related to their understanding of the concept of a developmental state, of inter-governmental coordination and of the implementation of the IDP as the mechanism for delivering development at the local level. Attention also focused on the role of councillors in the development process and the obligation imposed upon them to foster participatory governance and community participation throughout the sub-council, ward committee and sector representation systems; it also focused on their role in building a developmental state by way of developmental local government.
1.6.4 Processing, analysis and presentation of data

Untabulated quantitative data generated by Accede was edited and numerically coded for analysis using the SPSS Statistical Package. This enabled the presentation of information using statistical tables and graphs. The processing of qualitative data involved the organisation and categorisation of field notes taken during the observation phase of the research. This included the classification of information recorded at sub-council and ward committee meetings into themes and sub-themes and the identification of patterns and relationships in the data. Information gathered during the focus group discussion with ward committee members and the workshop with councillors was organised accordingly to the schedule themes and points of discussion. Analysis of the data required reflection on the responses of residents and this frequently led to a new set of questions being posed as a result of new understandings of the context. Interviews conducted with office bearers were similarly transcribed and ordered into themes and categories. In many instances the qualitative research findings confirmed the quantitative data and vice versa. Qualitative data is presented in succeeding chapters using diagrams, verbal descriptions and quotations.

1.7 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 has provided a theoretical overview of the concept of a developmental state and the context in which it has risen to prominence in South Africa. It has also set out the research problematic, the key research propositions and the methodology adopted in carrying out the research.

Chapter 2 discusses understandings of the origins and characteristics of developmental states in the literature and provides an interpretive and theoretical framework for the study as a whole.

Chapter 3 examines the emergence of developmental state discourse in South Africa and identifies what its advocates believe to be the defining features necessary to establish a
democratic developmental state, including the focus on a participatory and citizen-centred approach.

Chapter 4 provides a critical theoretical overview of the concept of participatory development and, inter alia, discusses the challenges which confront attempts to effectively engage ordinary citizens in officially created participatory spaces.

Chapter 5 investigates the idea of Developmental Local Government in South Africa and the role assigned to Integrated Development Planning as a key instrument in the rollout of a developmental state at the local level.

Chapter 6 provides an overview of the history, demography and settlement dynamics of the City of Cape Town and the township of Delft, together with a discussion of the extant system of municipal governance.

Chapter 7 focuses on the political perspectives of Delft residents and their perceptions of the effectiveness of the Integrated Development Planning process and participatory mechanisms set up by local government to foster inclusive governance and give meaning to the notion of a developmental state.

Chapter 8 presents the views and perceptions of officials, councillors and ward committee members with regard to the delivery of the developmental state mandate and the effectiveness of Integrated Development Planning and public participation processes in the case study area.

Chapter 9 summarises the general findings of the research and discusses the extent to which developmental local government in South Africa is fulfilling its brief to enhance citizen participation and promote socio-economic development, as well as the extent to which it is facilitating the building of a developmental state at national level.

The chapter which follows discusses the origins of the concept of a developmental state and the theoretical debates on its constituent elements. It also examines the extent to which the East
Asian model of a developmental state might be replicable elsewhere in the world. It further considers contemporary theorising on the essence of what has come to be called the democratic developmental state and its appeal to policy makers in South Africa.
CHAPTER TWO
DEVELOPMENTAL STATES – A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

The unprecedented economic successes of the East Asian developmental states, as intimated, have encouraged many other nations to consider adopting a state-led model of economic development. This applies no less to South Africa where the government has repeatedly asserted its commitment to constructing a developmental state which will pursue economic growth and yet which is people-centred, participatory and democratic. As a background to an analysis of the way in which the government has set about this task and with what effect, this chapter will examine the origins and characteristics of what are now understood to be the classical East Asian developmental states, as well as the way in which they have been framed in theory. It will also consider the ways in which theorists have distinguished the East Asian model from the democratic developmental state model which is being pursued elsewhere in the world, since it is believed this hybrid model will be of particular relevance to the South African case.

2.1 East Asian Developmental States

Despite the more recent labelling of countries such as Brazil, India, Botswana and Mauritius as developmental, the conventional definition of a developmental state refers to the high-performing economies of Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore which emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s and which owed their success to interventionist policies driven by the central state. As a consequence of the success of this model, Eastern Asia has been referred to as ‘the world’s most dynamic region of economic growth and social transformation’ (Zhang, 2003:1) and the economic achievements of these developmental states have been heralded by the World Bank (1993) as the ‘Asian Miracle’. While China only joined this celebrated group of first generation developmental states more recently, its rapid economic growth since the turn of the century is attributed to the lifting of 170 million people out of absolute poverty (Nee, Opper & Wong 2007).

Although all states intervene in their economies to some extent, Johnson (1982) emphasises
that it is the degree of state intervention that is determinant of their success. For Bagchi (2000:398), a developmental state is ‘a state that puts economic development as the top priority of government policy, and (it) is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal. The instruments should include the forging of new formal institutions, the weaving of formal and informal networks of collaboration amongst citizens and officials and the utilization of new opportunities for trade and profitable production’ (Bagchi, 2000:398). The state-led macro-economic model adopted by the so-called Asian Tigers, unlike the neo-liberal model which relies on the fluctuation of market forces, the depoliticisation of the economy and the contraction of the state, purposefully guides and structures the market in order to control and influence the pace and direction of development (Chang, 1999).

The term ‘developmental state’ was coined by Chalmers Johnson who analysed the economic successes of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) in East Asia and reached the conclusion that their successes were attributable to the pursuit of a different capitalist development trajectory to that of developed core economies in the West (Johnson, 1982). This trajectory was based on a different institutional ideology and management style (Bae & Sellers, 2007). Johnson stressed that, while the developmental state aimed to use market forces to grow the economy, economic policy was to be the key driver of development and a ‘strong state’ was critical in providing the means to accelerate growth including, where necessary, new capital, the approval of investment loans, the channeling of investment funding and the provision of tax breaks, amongst other measures (Evans, 1995).

Johnson, in his analysis of the industrial renaissance and phenomenal economic growth of Japan, provides an illustration of the economic initiatives embarked upon by the government following the recessions of 1954 and 1965 and the important inter-sectoral shift from primary activities to manufacturing to which they gave rise during this era. Such shifts, he emphasised, were not haphazard, but rather the result of the actions of a ‘plan rational’ state (Pempel, 1999) which focused on consciously intervening and shaping the development process, ‘rather than relying on the uncoordinated influence of market forces to allocate economic resources’ (Beeson, 2003:2). This ‘plan rational’ state referred to Japan’s deliberate reconstruction of its industrial capacity and adoption of interventionist policies which differed markedly from the market-rational regulatory states of Western countries, such as the United States, and the plan-ideological states of socialist countries, such as the then Soviet Union (Kim, 2007; Bello, 2009).
According to Bagchi, however, politics, not economics, was at the core of the ‘plan rational’ system of the development state, and government policy purposefully devised instruments to prioritise economic development as its primary objective (Bagchi, 2000). Leftwich (2008:154) concurs with this premise and attributes the successes of the Asian developmental states to ‘fundamentally political factors that have shaped the urgency, thrust and pace of their developmental strategies through the structure of the state’. The political motives behind the economic imperatives were concerns about power and control, and the desire to be treated as equals in the international arena (Johnson, 1999). The ‘plan rational’ developmental state was thus focused on national interests and the political power and astuteness of state bureaucrats were instrumental in achieving ‘national economic competitiveness’; in this context ‘political representatives, rather than individual, utility maximising consumers’, shaped the economic agenda (Pempel, 1999:140–145). In consonance with Weber’s normative bureaucratic state, the competent and coherent bureaucratic structures of the developmental state were indispensable in determining economic outcomes and industrial transformation (Evans, 1995).

2.2 Ideology and structure

A number of authors have pointed to the significance of what has been termed a ‘developmentalist ideology’ which has underpinned the operations of developmental states and distinguished them from ‘non-developmental states’ (Edigheji, 2007; Mkandawire, 2001; UNCTAD, 2007; Castells, 1992). Such a state, according to Mkandawire, is ‘one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development’ (Mkandawire, 2001:291). Elaborating on this view, Castells asserts that ‘a state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy, its ability to promote and sustain development; understood as the combination of steady and high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship with the international economy’ (Castells 1992:55). ‘Developmentalism’ in this context thus refers to the aggressive pursuit of clearly defined growth strategies and socio-economic development goals, aligned to attainable performance targets that enable it to meet its specified objectives (Gelb, 2006; UNCTAD, 2007).
The structural components of the developmental state, as described, refer to its institutional, technical, administrative and political capacity to devise and implement long-term economic policies. In order to do this it must be a ‘strong state’, willing to exert its political power and administrative capacity; but it must also be one which enjoys ‘relative autonomy’ from social forces ‘that might dissuade it from the use of its capacity to design and implement policies that are in its long-term interest’ (Mkandawire, 2001:2). However, there must also be a certain amount of ‘social anchoring that prevents it from using its autonomy in a predatory manner’ (Mkandawire, 2001:2). For Evans (1995:12) this autonomy does not entirely insulate such states in that they are embedded in a concrete set of social ties which binds them ‘to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies’ (Evans, 1995:12). Such embeddedness implies the immersion of the state ‘in a network of ties that bind it to groups or classes that can become allies in the pursuit of societal goals’ (UNCTAD, 2007:60). For Johnson (1999:33), the institutional characteristics of Japan and its ‘emulators elsewhere in East Asia’ differed from the capitalist economies of the United States and Britain in that they possessed the capacity to formulate and implement policies necessary to achieve their stated development goals, even at times ‘flagrantly flouting all received principles of capitalist rationality’.

2.3 Contextual determinants of the East Asian Developmental State

The East Asian developmental state was the product of a specific historical, societal and geopolitical context. Numerous developmental state theorists have studied the origins of the East Asian model and highlighted a number of factors which played a critical role in their development path and attainment of exceptional economic growth. These insights will be presented in the sections below.

2.3.1 Historical and geo-political factors

The historical setting and geo-political factors clearly played a critical role in the development path of East Asian countries and their attainment of high economic growth rates. Thus, for example, the foundations of the modern Japanese state may be traced to the reforms of the early 20th century. These emanated from the reforms of the Meiji Restoration and an emphasis on national autonomy, which implied both political and technological independence. Mass education and the adaptation (rather than adoption) of foreign
technology were the hallmarks of this era (Bagchi, 2000). Japan also made a concerted effort to adopt Western models and this quest for modernisation led to the establishment of a number of new institutions ‘including a British-style navy and postal system, a French-style police and judicial system, American-style banking and primary school systems, and a German-style army’ (McCargo, 2000:19).

The onset of the Cold War had a profound impact on the political development of the East Asian developmental states. Onis (1991) asserts that the fear of external threats and foreign control gave rise to a deeply ingrained nationalism and a single-minded quest for independence, long-term economic transformation and national prosperity. Amongst these states the ever-present communist threat boosted sentiments of patriotism and served as a strong motivation for economic growth and independence (ibid). Johnson (1999) notes further that military confrontation (in Korea and Vietnam) and concerns about communist expansion in Asia prompted intervention by the United States to protect its interests in the region. Japan, in particular, benefited from the Korean War and the support which it received from the United States is viewed as ‘the virtual equivalent of the Marshall Plan’ in the extent to which it created a platform for rapid economic growth (Johnson, 1999:55). Thus, the Cold War era and the communist threat not only fostered national cohesion around the goal of economic growth but financial aid received from the United States and its allies served to leverage this growth (Mathews, 2006; Pempel, 1999).

2.3.2 Cultural factors

A number of analysts have pointed to the significance of cultural norms and the political culture in which national leaders (both administrative and political) were socialised as decisive factors in the economic advancement of East Asian developmental states (Compton, 2000; Pye, 1985; Kuotsai, 2002; Kihl, 2004). According to Harrison and Huntington (2000), ‘culture matters’, and in support of this viewpoint Pye (1985:27) asserts that ‘Asian orientation to the group, rather than stressing the individual, affects not only basic political values but a wide range of ordinary political behaviour’. Cultural factors are also seen to have supported ideas about the importance of ‘indigenisation and isolation from external influence’ which, in turn, gave licence to the state to pursue a determined course of action that shielded it from ‘other cultural and political impulses on the processes of decision-making’ (Schmidt, 1998:9).
Culture in this context is seen to have played a significant role in setting the ‘paradigm under which political power could be exercised legitimately’ (Compton, 2000:2). Confucian doctrine, in particular, is regarded as having been central to the national cooperation of politicians, bureaucrats and workers and their commitment to the broader goals of economic advancement (Gereffi, 1989; Compton, 2000; Liou, 2002). Confucian beliefs such as those of industriousness, dedication, loyalty, harmony, respect for elders, conformity, punctuality and deference to all forms of authority are considered to have set the context for the national cooperation that led to the rapid economic growth of Japan and other East Asia states (Pempel, 1999; Gereffi, 1989; Leon, 1998).

Some writers, however, believe that the influence of culture has been overstated and that it was only important in the context of the ‘late development’ of these nations, more of which will be said below (Dore, 1990; Johnson, 1982). Furthermore, even some proponents of the cultural perspective have drawn attention to the variations in the economic structure and political-institutional forms which exist within Confucian Asia, and suggest that it would be misguided to present a universal cultural framework applicable to all (Kihl, 2004; Zhang, 2003). In similar vein, Leon (1998) notes that culture cannot be equated with religion and, moreover, Asia should not be viewed as a homogeneous cultural or religious region as it incorporates a diversity of religious and cultural collectives which, besides Confucianism, include Muslim, Shintoist, Buddhist, Taoist, Hindu and Christian followers. Notwithstanding these reservations and the specificities of individual East Asian countries, a combination of historical and socio-cultural factors do appear to have been influential in setting the context for a state-led approach to economic growth.

2.3.3 Socio-economic influences

Further factors which have been seen to contribute to the success of the Asian developmental state are low levels of conflict between capital and labour, ‘deferred gratification for consumers’ and ‘relatively flat pay scales’ (Crotty & Dymski, 1989:8–9). In that regard the literature reveals that economic growth was achieved despite the relatively equal spread of income amongst the countries of Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea (Onis, 1991; Gereffi, 1989). The devastation of the Second World War, in the case of Japan, and colonial land dispossession in Korea and Taiwan, had resulted in general poverty throughout
the population and an egalitarian distribution of income prior to the onset of industrialisation (Onis, 1991). According to Brohman (1996) this low socio-economic base enabled East Asian states to focus on labour-intensive export industries which provided them both a competitive and comparative advantage. This was also made possible through low wages and a relatively passive workforce held in check by restrictive labour laws.

### 2.3.4 Integration into the world economy

A further contributory factor relates to the manner in which developmental states had historically been integrated into the world economy. As Cumings (1999:92) points out, the experience of East Asian states in the early 20th century ‘had not been a realm of independence where autonomy and equality reigned, but wide enmeshment in another web: the hegemonic web’ of Western capitalism. While favourable international conditions in the post-second world war era undoubtedly played a significant role in the growth of the Asian economies, Japanese colonialism in Korea and Taiwan, during the early 20th century, was the machinery that set the stage for economic growth and industrial transformation in the wider region through foreign investment, technological support and agrarian reforms (Hart-Landsberg, Jeong & Westra, 2007). Hong Kong and Singapore had also benefited from British colonial rule in the form of modern state institutions, the provision of modern infrastructure and the creation of advanced industrial, financial, administrative and managerial structures which helped to attract investment capital (Brohman, 1996).

As previously indicated, the onset of the Cold War clearly served the interest of East Asian states, and Japan, Taiwan and South Korea as, frontline states, benefited in particular from aid supplied by the United States. The assistance these and other states received was in the form of development and military aid, access to foreign markets and direct foreign investment (Gereffi, 1989). In that respect, the role played by the United States (and to a lesser extent other Western powers) was of considerable importance in the extent to which it stimulated growth and provided an outlet for Asian merchandise in developed northern markets.
2.3.5 Geographical location and regionalism

The advantageous geographical location of the emerging developmental states and their position within the ‘new international division of labour’ has been seen as a further contributor to their success (Gereffi, 1989; Gereffi & Wyman, 1990; Zhang, 2003). Linked to this favourable location (at the cross-route between East and West), which afforded unique opportunities for intra-regional economic cooperation (Broham, 1996), scholars have ascribed the success of East Asian states to what has been described as the ‘flying geese’ pattern of development.

The ‘flying geese’ model of economic development was first advanced by Kaname Akamatsu in the 1930s as a means of analysing the process in which less-developed economies had been able to ‘catch up’ to those of the industrialised countries in the West (Kumagai, 2008; Zhang, 2003). The model described the regional transmission of manufactured goods, technology and foreign direct investment to less-developed countries and the sequential advancement of such countries as they benefitted from the transfers and began to ‘catch up’ (to be discussed further below) with the more advanced nations and progressively moved up the industrial ladder (Dowling & Cheang, 2000; Ozawa, 2008). Japan, favourably positioned as ‘lead goose’ and benefitting from its close relationship with the United States, initiated a rigorous ‘expansionist policy’ of regional integration in the 1950s and early 1960s and was followed by the newly industrialised economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore as ‘second tier geese’ (Furuoka, 2005). The third ranked tier comprised the main ASEAN countries of Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. China and Vietnam, as least developed countries during that period, comprised the fourth and final tier at the tail of the flying formation (Kasahara, 2004).

Although the flying geese metaphor was originally used to describe the trajectory of economic development in the Asian region, it later ‘acquired social and political dimensions’ due to what were believed to be the cultural similarities and shared values of the nations in the formation (Zhang, 2003:19). The ‘flying geese’ model was consequently accepted as a distinctively ‘Asian’ mode of development which other nations in the region were encouraged to emulate in their quest towards economic growth rather than conventional Western approaches.
2.3.6 The advantages of ‘late developers’ and ‘catch up’

A number of authors have attributed the rise of the East Asian developmental states to their status as ‘late developers’ and the fact that they were able to capitalise on technological, administrative and managerial advances elsewhere in the world (Onis, 1991; Woo-Cumings, 1999; Cumings, 1999; Mathews, 2006; Paul, 1987). In the immediate post-war period, East Asian states lagged far behind the advanced Western nations economically and there was a perceived need for these so-called ‘backward’ countries to ‘catch up’ and take advantage of the development trajectories of advanced economies. ‘Catch up’ theories of development were based on the work of Gershenkron (1962) and Abramovitz (1986, 1994), amongst others, and they differed from the relatively uniform linear stages-of-growth model advanced by W.W. Rostow. Rostow had proposed that for economic development to occur, traditional societies would need to follow the experiences of industrialised Western nations and pass through five stages of growth. If accompanied by substantial investment capital, he had maintained, development would occur and wealth would trickle down to all segments of society (Rostow, 1960).

Gershenkron (1962), in contrast, argued that evidence had shown that the catch-up process need not follow the same development paths as advanced economies and would, instead, be attendant on the ‘relative backwardness’ of different developing countries and the unique historical context of each. In that regard, ‘the more backward a country’s economy, the more likely was its industrialization to start discontinuously as a sudden great spurt proceeding at a relatively high rate of growth of manufacturing output’ (Gershenkron, 1962:353–4). An advantage for such countries was the opportunity to import existing technology from developed nations, while the instruments for ‘catching up’ were in the form of strong, growth-oriented state policies (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg, 2003).

In catching up, moreover, late developers tended to operate at greater speed than developed nations, mainly by tapping into existing foreign technologies, learning from advanced capitalist nations and thereby saving costs by replicating innovations (Bagchi, 2000; Burkett & Hart-Landsberg, 2003). The Gershenkronian ‘late-comer effect’ was thus deemed a deciding factor in the success of the East Asian developmental state and disproved the predominant Rostowian theory of the 1960s and other simplistic neoclassical economic models of the time (Mathews, 2006).
2.4 Defining features of the Developmental State

Over and above historical and contextual factors, there is a broad consensus in the literature on the essential criteria which contributed to the success of the classic developmental states of East Asia and a number of these are discussed in the section which follows.

2.4.1 The national structure of finance

One of the defining characteristics of the development state was its control of finance and ‘its centrality to the provision of new capital’ (Evans, 1995:48) which ‘binds the state to the industrialists’ (Woo-Cumings, 1999:10). In Japan this was achieved through interest rate controls, a rationalised currency system, enhancement of the quality of the financial sector, banking supervision for commercial and developmental banks, the creation of special credit institutions and the ability to provide loans through the banking sector and postal saving systems (Kohli, 1999). This scenario was also evident in South Korea where the leverage of finances enabled the state to ‘create or strengthen state organizations, to employ personnel, to co-opt political support, to subsidize economic enterprises, and to fund social programs’ (Skocpol, 1985:6).

2.4.2 Centrality of the role of the state

While all states (to a lesser or greater extent) play an enabling role in determining the course of national economic development, the Asian developmental state was focused on deliberately driving the development process by intervening in the economy rather than leaving it to the vagaries of the free market (Makgetla, 2007). One of the distinguishing attributes of the Asian developmental state has thus been the dominant role of the state in directing long-term development and in actively prioritising industrial policy as part of its ‘plan rational’ and intentional pursuit of developmental goals (UNCTAD, 2007).

According to Leftwich (1995:401), a state can only be termed developmental when ‘politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicitly developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions and direction of economic growth, or by organizing it directly,
or a varying combination of both.’ A strong state-led form of economic development was thus an essential component of the successes of the Asian developmental states (Chang, 2002). In that respect its programmes were focused, centering firstly on advancing the agricultural sector and thereafter on ‘rapid industrial growth; and (the) production of a disciplined, obedient, and educated workforce’ (Kohli, 1999:101).

2.4.3 Authoritarianism

A number of authors have identified authoritarianism as key a characteristic of the East Asian developmental state, whether this took the form of military dictatorship, authoritarian control, restrictive labour laws or working class exploitation, factors which are evident in the various histories of Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and China (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg, 2003). This authoritarianism was, to a significant extent, underwritten by the legitimacy which state officials had attained through their efficiency and effectiveness (Kim, 2010; Deen, 2011) and this, in turn, permitted them to be ‘more experimental and undoctinaire than in the typical authoritarian regime’ (Johnson, 1995:52). For some scholars, the state’s ‘soft authoritarianism,’ ‘repressive nature’ and autonomy not only enhanced its overall development performance but also enabled it ‘to consult, negotiate and elicit consensus and cooperation’ (Edigheji, 2005:12).

Although several studies have found that authoritarian regimes in developing countries are economically more successful than democratic states, other analysts point to the difficulty of establishing a causal relationship between authoritarianism and economic development (Leon, 1998). For some, authoritarianism can only ever be a temporary measure to mobilise the population towards sacrificing for the purpose of developmental growth and it is more the legitimacy of the leadership of such states rather than true authoritarian control that enables this sacrifice (Johnson, 1999). In the case of South Korea, List-Jensen (2008:21) maintains that it is difficult to assess the impact which authoritarianism has had on the country’s economic success as other ‘exogenous factors such as history, geopolitics, and culture’ played a significant role in shaping the developmental state. However, she concedes that an authoritarian regime is better positioned to ‘regiment a population’ to sacrifice for early industrialisation and its insulation from societal interests and policy consistency improves economic outcomes (ibid:5).
2.4.4 Structure of the bureaucracy

The influence of a professional, meritocratic bureaucracy, as previously intimated, has been seen as a key factor distinguishing East Asian development states from other types of state. Small, elite bureaucracies were chosen purely on merit and those recruited into their ranks were highly educated lawyers and economists ‘from the top ranks of the best law schools in the country … on the basis of legally binding national examinations’ (Woo-Cumings, 1995:14). The functions of these bureaucrats were to draft all legislation, manage the national budget and coordinate and supervise the path towards the achievement of economic development goals (Johnson, 1982). According to Maung Maung Than (2004:212) the expertise of highly educated lawyers and economists in the bureaucracy played a decisive role in the success of the developmental state. Emphasising the importance of expertise and capacity, he remarked that ‘(s)tate-led development is a non-starter if there is no competent and impartial economic bureaucracy or civil service to implement development policies. Successful developmental states possess capable economic bureaucracies that enjoy the confidence and trust of their political masters and are insulated from societal pressures’.

Furthermore, capable economic bureaucrats possessed the competency to manage ‘local and foreign economic interests’ effectively (Leftwich 1995:405), and their accomplishments and the prestige which ensued from these achievements strengthened their insulation from political pressure (Wade, 1990).

2.4.5 National consensus and patriotism

A highly nationalistic public service and a single-minded determination to achieve economic goals are viewed as further important features of the developmental state (Gemandze, 2006). This took the form of public patriotism and commitment towards national goals and it was also evident in the high esteem in which the public service was held (Johnson, 1999). Thompson (2007:9) underscores the importance of a consensus and observes that ‘the creation of a genuine developmental consensus, where society backed the direction of development and the role of the state was not questioned’ enabled ‘long term thinking and, to some degree allowed the bureaucracy to experiment and learn from experience’.

The bureaucracy in this context was seen to be motivated by national rather than individual
interest and was believed to have the interests of the general public at heart (Bagchi, 2000). At the same time, although employee demands were strictly controlled, skilled workers and managers were ensured of life-time employment. Managers were further promoted on the basis of seniority and a profit-sharing system was introduced, linking workers and employers and instilling a sense of pride in their work in the latter (Bagchi, 2000; Kohli, 1999).

2.4.6 Coordination and co-operation between big business and the state

The symbiotic relationship between the state and big business in industrial transformation has been seen as a further defining characteristic of the developmental state (Weiss, 1988). The partnership between business and the state, which took the form of industrial financing, was mutually beneficial in achieving development goals and in ensuring enterprise viability (Cumings, 1999). Within this system, the state acted as a catalyst, partnering the private sector in industrial transformation and, through a range of incentives and disincentives, providing a platform for business to pursue profits and, thereby, national economic development (ibid).

2.5 Developmental States beyond East Asia

The defining characteristics of the East Asian developmental state which have been outlined in the discussion above point to the fact that the successes of the model were contextually specific and were shaped by a particular sequence of historical, geo-political, cultural and socio-economic factors (Mathews, 2006; Pempel, 1999; Woo-Cumings, 1999) and hence their exact replication elsewhere in the developing world is neither possible nor probably desirable. In that respect, a particular source of concern has been the hegemonic character of these states, manifest in their authoritarianism, managerialism and social exclusion which have been seen to conflict with contemporary concerns about democracy and citizen rights. Notwithstanding these concerns, a number of writers have argued that the sequence in which economic development occurs and democracy is introduced is critical to the success of both and a degree of authoritarianism is necessary to set things on the right track.
2.5.1 The relationship between democracy and development

The complex interrelationship between development and democracy was the subject of extensive theoretical debate from the 1960s onward and was characterised by two divergent positions, the first of which held that development is always a precursor to democracy, while the second asserted that democracy must precede or at least parallel development. In the first position it was argued that democracy could only be established in the context of economic growth, which would permit the development of the institutions necessary to support and sustain a system of democracy (Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1991). In East Asian developmental states, it was maintained, democratic ideals had been discouraged as it was believed that they could constrain the beginning stages of socio-economic development. Democracy, in this era, was viewed as ‘a luxury which poor countries can ill afford’ (White, 2006:61) and a slogan of the time was ‘development first democracy later’ (Kim, 2010:98).

Despite arguments that sustained economic growth is just about impossible in developing democracies, a second strand of scholarship supports the view that democracy should either precede or parallel development initiatives. Thus Przeworski and Limongi (1993) strongly dispute the idea that increased economic growth, in and of itself, leads to democracy, although they concede that it impacts positively on the survival and sustainability of democracy and that the nature of political regimes influences economic performance. Expanding on this theme, Robinson and White (2002:2) draw on lessons from Latin America (Brazil), Africa (Botswana and Mauritius) and Asia (Malaysia and India) to demonstrate that development and democracy are not only possible under certain political and institutional conditions, but they can be ‘mutually reinforcing’. Edigheji (2010:8) echoes these sentiments noting that ‘because development is multidimensional, political freedom – and hence democracy – is central to development’. He further refutes the supposed direct correlation between authoritarian regimes and development, arguing that ‘history is replete with examples of autocratic regimes characterised by development failures’ (ibid). Relatedly, after reviewing a substantial number of case studies on the interrelationship between democracy and economic growth, Przeworski and Limongi (1993), reached the conclusion that there was very little empirical evidence to support either argument due to the complex and multifaceted nature of the relationship.

White (2002:21–23) suggests that positions held by adherents of the different schools of
thought are as much a reflection of their ideological convictions as they are based on empirical evidence. In that respect he distinguishes between the optimistic view, which believes that liberal democracy is a strong stimulus to socio-economic development and calls for participation in the development process of a broad range of actors, and the pessimistic view, which considers democracy to be an impediment to development in that it leads to indiscipline, disorderly conduct, institutional uncertainty, rising demands and excessive expectations which will hamper economic growth.

Notwithstanding these theoretical debates on the relative merits of authoritarian or democratic models, changes in the global geo-political order played a major role in shifting the discourse towards a more inclusive and citizen-focused form of the developmental state. This was prompted, in the first instance, by what has been described as the ‘third wave’¹ (Huntington, 1991) of democratisation which began in the 1970s and was carried forward into the 1980s and beyond. This era witnessed the transition to democracy of a number of countries in Asia and Latin America and a discernible move away from autocratic rule. In this context, there was both domestic and international pressure on democratising states to embark on public sector reforms and to adopt a more inclusive system of government (Robinson & White, 2002; Randall, 2007). This process was given new impetus by the ending of the Cold War in the early 1990s and the fact that states in the Western bloc, and the United States in particular, which had hitherto been more tolerant of authoritarian regimes provided they were anti-communist, began to actively support democratisation processes and frequently set democratic reform as a pre-condition for continued aid.

Thus, while considerable interest remains in the manner in which Asian states were able to steer their economies towards sustainable growth, and hence to eliminate poverty, theorists and policy makers have broadened the scope of what might constitute a developmental state and this has taken into account more recent understandings of the meaning of development and democracy in a globalising world. It is, however, necessary to note a key distinction between theorising on the East Asian model and writings on developmental states elsewhere in the world. This relates to the fact that theory on the former is based on ex-post-facto

¹ Samuel P. Huntington used the term ‘third wave’ in his book titled The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, published in 1991, to refer the global wave of democratisation in countries throughout Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa since the 1970s.
analysis while the latter discuss what are believed to be the necessary preconditions for a democratic developmental state. It also evident that, where the East Asian developmental states were seen to embrace a relatively narrow range of measures to promote economic growth, those advocating for democratic developmental states envisage a much broader ambit of activities and approaches which, amongst others, will include notions of citizen participation, redistribution, capability enhancement, decentralisation and the essence of development, all of which are seen to be mutually reinforcing.

2.5.2 Conceptualising Democratic Developmental States

Edigheji (2005:22) defines a democratic developmental state as one which has the ‘institutional attributes of the classical developmental state, that is, being autonomous and coherent, but (which) also takes on board the attributes of procedural democracy. In addition, the democratic developmental state is one that forges broad-based alliances with society and ensures popular participation in the governance and transformation processes’. To that extent, there is some consensus in the literature that a democratic developmental state should have a transformative agenda which extends beyond economic growth to a focus on broader social and political goals (Maphunye, 2009; Gumede, 2009). In support of this perspective White (2006:60) asserts that ‘the process of development involves more than just economic growth but includes life-and-death issues such as poverty, personal security, distributive equity, social justice and environmental sustainability’. It must also embody the principles of democracy, which Leftwich (2002) refers to as a developmental orientation and democratic political system. To that extent Edigheji (2005) maintains that a key determinant of a democratic development state is its competence in promoting development and growth and, at the same time, its capacity to engender consensus and popular participation. The ability to provide mechanisms for effective citizen participation, in particular, has been seen as a key characteristic of the democratic developmental state. The extent to which citizens accept the legitimacy of the state, moreover, is believed to be contingent on the effectiveness of these participatory processes as well on the extent to which the gains of economic growth are redistributed (Leftwich; 2002; Welch & Nuru; 2006).

Unlike the East Asian model which required collective sacrifice in pursuit of long-range economic goals, redistributive capacity is seen to be one of the core features of the democratic developmental state as it builds public confidence in the system and confers
legitimacy on its political leaders. For Sindzingre (2004:14), redistributive capacity is essential ‘as it regulates inequalities and social conflict, and consolidates the middle class’, while weak redistributive capacity erodes credibility. Furthermore, in order to consolidate and deepen democracy, an effective democratic developmental state must promote social and physical investment and ensure the redistribution of the gains of economic growth to all sectors of society (White, 2006). In effect, Fritz and Rocha Menocal (2007) maintain that the legitimacy of a democratic developmental state is directly linked to good governance and its capacity to deliver public goods.

2.5.3 Decentralisation

A further component of a democratic developmental state is seen to be its capacity to decentralise administrative and political responsibilities to lower echelons of government. Although decentralisation had been ‘fashionable’ in development circles for some decades (Conyers, 1984), interest in the concept gained momentum in the 1980s and 1990s (Turner, 1999). Programmes aimed at devolving power away from central government have since been extensively supported by international donor organisations, by United Nations structures and international funding organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF (Blair, 1998). In that context, state reforms that focus on decentralised governance have been seen as not only desirable but, according to Blondel (1990), inescapable. This is because the process is associated with good governance, greater efficiency and the deepening of democratisation through participatory processes which give voice to the poor at the local level (Klugman, 1994). This element of the developmental state will be seen to be of importance in the analysis of the South African case to be discussed in subsequent chapters.

2.5.4 Conventional criteria needed to build a Democratic Development State

Over and above the emphasis placed by most advocates of the democratic developmental state on the need for citizen participation, good governance and legitimacy, a number of writers have reasserted the view that many of the characteristics of the East Asian model remain essential preconditions for any state hoping to assume a developmental label.

The need for economic growth: Contrary to the dominant citizen-centred view, Huff, Dewitt
and Oughton (2001:713) maintain that that economic growth alone will establish the reputation of a state as being developmental as this will confer credibility on its performance. They further maintain that only demonstrated economic achievements will convince the private sector of the genuineness of their intentions and will encourage the increased private sector investment necessary to stimulate still higher economic growth. They caution, however, that the private sector is an ‘always skeptical audience’ and to establish its reputation as democratic and developmental a state will need to convince society of its commitment and consistence (ibid).

*Building national institutions:* In rejecting the narrow economistic focus of the East Asian development states, a number of writers, adopting what has become known as the ‘institutional perspective’, have called for significant refurbishment of 21st century public institutions in order to address what are major shifts in the historic character of development (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001; Rodrik, 2002; Olate, 2003; Evans, 2010). The premise of the institutionalist perspective is that while the state must take centre stage it must focus particularly on effective, quality service delivery with the aim of increasing the well-being of the broader society through transformation and redistribution of the fruits of development. The institutional perspective which is supported by a number of development economists (Rodrik, 1999; Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2002), contest the view that development is primarily a process of capital accumulation. Instead, they view development as process of organisational change and stress the need to promote high-quality institutions that provide broad-based growth. For Evans (2010), the construction of such high-quality institutions can only take place if the foundation of a skilled and creative populace is set in place and a state invests in the development of human capabilities.

*Building a national consensus:* In similar fashion, a number of authors have pointed to the need for a common understanding of the strategies and policies which are adopted by a democratic developmental state. Just as the successes of the East Asian states have, in part, been attributed to a broad national consensus and a shared understanding of the objectives of the growth path which is being followed, so too have proponents of the democratic developmental states stressed the need for a collective vision. Thus Pant (2002:iii), writing in the context of India, asserts that ‘(e)very country needs a vision statement which stirs the imagination and motivates all segments of society to greater effort. It is an essential step in building a political consensus on a broad national development strategy, which encompasses
the roles and responsibilities of different agents of the economy.’ A similar view is advanced by Gupta (2004:1) who proclaims that a country’s vision must be comprehensive, harmonious and a synthesis of competing views and forces. It must be supported, he maintains, by objective and realistic appraisals of ‘emerging opportunities’ and ‘concealed potentials’ and must rise beyond past limitations and challenges. Such a vision, he declares, ‘should awaken in us an unswerving confidence in ourselves, a complete reliance on our own capacity as a nation and an unshakeable determination to realize our full potential.’

2.6 21st Century developmental thinking

The remarkable economic successes of the newly industrialising countries (NICs) of East Asia ignited considerable theoretical debate and a re-examination of the nature and character of development thinking and its status in the 21st century. The 1997 Asian crisis further revived these debates and post-crisis theorising has revolved around the merits of neoliberalism and development statism and controversy surrounding market-oriented and state-led development (Rapley, 2007; Radice, 2008; Pempel, 1999).

20th century development thinking, as indicated, was framed in terms of economic growth with development models focusing narrowly on economic expansion and industrial modernization (Kohli, 1999). Little emphasis was placed on issues such as participatory democracy, quality livelihoods, equity and redistribution (Edigheji, 2008, 2009). For Peter Evans (2010), however, developmental state thinking in the 21st century must shift its focus to the promotion of high-quality institutions and the expansion of human capacities as articulated in the ‘capability approach’ pioneered by Amartya Sen (1999). Others, such as Leftwich (2000) and Grindle (2007), underline the importance of sound governance and the preconditions necessary to bring about development and reduce poverty. As these three foci are interrelated and have significant relevance for research focusing on democratic developmental states in the 21st century, they will be discussed in more detail below.

2.6.1 Good governance
Since the 1990s, and the failure of the neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’ policy reforms\(^2\) to reduce poverty or stimulate growth, the concept of good governance has emerged as an alternate focus of development (Marangos, 2008). In this way, the original ‘Washington Consensus’ policy reforms were ‘augmented’ (Rodrik, 2002) to include ideas of good governance, social capital, civil society participation, capacity building, institutional reform, poverty-reduction strategies and the creation of safety nets (Beeson & Islam, 2005). Features of good governance include sound financial regulation, transparency and an active role of the state in fostering the expansion of human capital. Moreover, good governance is seen to incorporate such core factors as participation, consensus orientation, equity, efficiency and accountability (Stiglitz, 1998).

Grindle (2007:554), however, in questioning the term ‘good governance’ coined the concept of ‘good enough governance’. This implies that the development interventions of individual countries must be assessed in accordance with their particular historical contexts, sequencing and timing, and must be carefully selected in accordance with their ‘contributions to particular ends such as poverty reduction and democracy’. She used this concept to refer to the ‘minimal conditions of governance necessary to allow political and economic development to occur’ (ibid). Linking the notion of good governance to developmental states in the Third World, Leftwich (2000:126) preferred the term ‘democratic good governance’ where democracy would act as ‘the glue that holds good governance together’ and this would include such aspects as political legitimacy, adherence to the rules of the democratic process and the exercise of policy constraint in new democracies. Fritz and Rocha Menocal (2007), expanding on this line of thought, draw attention to the overlap of the developmental state and good governance agendas. These authors stress the need for such aspects as state capacity, accountability and respect for human rights, while supporting Grindle’s (2007) concept of ‘good enough governance’ as ‘less normative and more situational and pragmatic’ (Fritz & Rocha Menocal, 2007:538). Drawing on the work of Khan (2006), Fritz and Rocha Menocal (2007) further emphasise the key importance of political stability and state capacity in low-income countries, which they view as ‘key “growth-enhancing” components of governance’.

\(^2\) A term coined by John Hamilton in 1989. The Washington Consensus comprised a set of ten policy reforms including trade liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, fiscal policy discipline, tax reforms, redirection of public spending, competitive exchange rates, legal security for property rights and liberalisation of inward foreign direct investment (Williamson, 2004). These reforms were supported by the US leadership and Washington-based economic organisations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the US Treasury.
2.6.2 The Institutional Perspective

For many development theorists, unlike 20th century developmental states, the building of successful developmental states in the 21st century requires the establishment of participatory institutions that are democratic and capability enhancing. A significant body of literature (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001; Rodrik, 2002; Olate, 2003; Evans, 2010) proposes that 21st century institutions will require substantial refurbishing to address the shift in the historic character of development. For Evans (2010:37), ‘the idea of a developmental state puts robust, competent institutions at the centre of the development matrix’. However, he emphasises that, besides having to incorporate some of the institutional features of 20th century states, 21st century developmental states will need to strengthen state-society ties and engage with societal actors as access to ‘accurate information on collective priorities at the community level is a sine qua non for a successful 21st century developmental state’ (ibid:38). Moreover, Evans (2010) believes that the construction of high-quality institutions can only take place if the foundation of a skilled and creative population is set in place and a nation invests in enhancing human capabilities.

The premise of the institutionalist perspective is that the state must take centre stage and focus particularly on effective, quality service delivery with the aim of increasing the well-being of broader society through transformation and redistribution of the fruits of development. Building strong institutions is increasingly supported by a wide range of development economists who contest the view of development as primarily a process of capital accumulation (Rodrik, 1999; Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2002). Advocates of the institutional perspective view development as a process of organisational change and are increasingly focusing on promoting high-quality institutions that provide broad-based growth. In this regard, Rodrik (1999:19) proposes that participatory political institutions should be viewed ‘as meta-institutions that elicit and aggregate local knowledge and thereby help build better institutions. Improved performance of institutions depends on their own internal coherence credibility, their competence and their external accountability to civil society’.
2.6.3 Expanding capabilities

While the East Asian developmental states were seen to be synonymous with managerialism and authoritarianism (Fakir, 2007), democratic development states are seen as being more inclusive, focusing on effective state–society linkages, democracy-building (Randal, 2007; Edigheji, 2010) and the expansion of human capabilities (Ostrom, 1996). For Evans (2010:38) ‘a 21st century developmental state must be a “capability-enhancing state”’. Expanding capabilities, he asserts, ‘is not just a welfare goal. It is the inescapable foundation of sustained growth in overall GDP’. Evans provides a list of the provision of collective goods that will enable capability expansion, including health, education, infrastructure – particularly transportation that enables access to employment – and investment in the development of skills and capacity.

Capability expansion, which refers to a general enhancement of human capacity and well-being, has emerged as a new way of conceptualising development. The capability approach, pioneered by Amartya Sen (1981; 1995; 1999) and operationalised on a more practical level by authors such as Mahbub Ul Haqhas (1995) and Alkire (2002), has been advanced as an alternative to economic frameworks in addressing poverty, inequality and human development. In that regard, Sen’s (1999) notion of freedom seen to be a central feature of development in that it provides the poor with the autonomy and the means to become agents of change in exercising control over the course of their own lives. He sees instruments of freedom as including political freedom, economic facilities and social opportunities. Both Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2000) emphasise the importance of public discussion, political empowerment and democratic decision making as ethical processes for collective choice and social cooperation.

2.7 The prospects for Democratic Developmental States in Africa

While White (1988:44) acknowledges that the democratic developmental state is ‘a rare bird on the developmental scene’, experiences throughout the world reveal that it is clearly possible to construct such a state. Research commissioned by the World Bank in emerging economies in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia (Babajanian, 2005; Folscher, 2007a, 2007b; Goldfrank, 2007; Shall; 2007) revealed that participatory democracy and sound local government had been instrumental in building inclusive and accountable
systems of governance capable of supporting economic growth and redistribution. Further studies in countries which included Brazil, Mexico, India, Mauritius, Turkey and Armenia indicate that the adoption of a democratic developmental state model strengthens citizen–state engagement and enables the marginalised and disempowered to participate and influence decision making on issues which affect their welfare (Shah, 2007; Moynihan, 2007).

In the context of Africa, despite numerous references in the literature to the existence of developmental states on the continent (Mkandawire, 2001; Edigheji, 2005, 2006, 2009; Meyns & Musamba, 2010) or, alternatively, to their inevitability (Nzwei & Kuye, 2007:207), a number of scholars have questioned whether any African state can accurately be labelled as developmental or whether this is merely an aspirational goal (Fine, 2008; Southall, 2006; Turok, 2008). Referring to this ambivalence in the literature, Mkandawire (2001:289), observes that ‘one remarkable feature of the discourse on the state and development in Africa is the disjuncture between an analytical tradition that insists on the impossibility of developmental states in Africa and a prescriptive literature that presupposes their existence’. Referring to this ‘impossibility’ thesis, Mkandawire (2001:310) remarks that ‘Africa has had examples of countries whose ideological inclination was clearly “developmentalist” and that pursued policies that produced fairly high rates of growth and significant social gains and accumulation of human capital in the post-colonial era’.

Notwithstanding the scepticism, there is some agreement that Botswana and Mauritius exhibit many of the features of a democratic developmental state including rapid economic growth, state intervention in the economy, a determined commitment to pursue development, a competent bureaucracy and disciplined leadership (Leftwich, 2000; Mbabazi & Taylor, 2005; Gumede, 2009; Acemoglu et al. 2002; Mapunye, 2009; Taylor, 2003; Hwedi, 2001). Their status as democratic developmental states, moreover, stems from the fact that since independence both Botswana and Mauritius have supported a ‘political culture of pluralism and political tolerance anchored on a relatively stable multiparty political landscape, predicated upon liberal democracy’ (Matlosa, 2005:15).

In the case of Botswana, the country not only achieved the fastest economic growth rate in the world during the 1980s (Hwedi, 2001), but it also possesses a dedicated and efficient bureaucratic elite that enjoys legitimacy from its constituents (Taylor, 2003). Samatar (1999)
shares a similar view of the professionalism of Botswana’s bureaucracy and underscores the central role played by the state in acting as a facilitator or ‘entrepreneurial agent’. Relatedly, Acemoglu et al. (2002) ascribe the success of the country to the building of quality institutions by post-independence leaders, such as former presidents Khama and Masire, together with a disciplined public sector leadership.

The successes of Mauritius as a democratic developmental state are similarly attributed to far-sighted government policies, to state-led macro-economic planning, to the character and quality of its public service, to pro-poor interventionist policies and to a consistent track record of service delivery (Mapunye, 2009). The Overseas Development Institute lists the drivers of progress in Mauritius as being ‘smart leadership’ (introducing reforms, promoting national cohesion and facilitating local initiatives), ‘smart policies’ (promoting sound macro-economic management and meaningful citizen engagement), ‘smart institutions’ (advancing more responsive governance and offering a participatory role for citizens) and ‘smart friends’ (the nurturing of good relations with the international community and facilitating international donor support) (ODI, 2011:7). In economic terms Mauritius has managed to achieve significant growth and in 2011, after Botswana, it was the fifth best performing country in Africa in terms of GDP per capita (African Economic Outlook, 2012). In that respect, the state is seen to have played a central role in stimulating high growth rates and boosting trade (Gumede, 2009) but, equally important, since the 1980s this growth was successfully translated into improving human development and in substantially reducing poverty (Vandemoortele & Bird, 2010).

Notwithstanding the successes of Botswana and Mauritius and evidence that economic growth in Africa, in excess of five per cent, has been amongst the fastest in the world in the past decade (African Economic Outlook, 2012), a range of problems continues to inhibit the emergence of democratic developmental states (Edigheji, 2005; White, 1998). These relate, amongst others, to low savings, poor investment in technology and research, flawed industrial strategies, weak governance systems and corruption (UNECA, 2011). Furthermore, in analysing the achievements of Botswana and Mauritius, it must be borne in mind that both have small and relatively homogeneous populations which has made forging a national

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3 It must be noted that growth in the top three economies, those of Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles and Gabon was from a very low base (African Economic Outlook, 2012).
consensus necessary to pursue a democratic developmental agenda an easier proposition. The size of the population has also meant that it has been comparatively easier to redistribute some of the gains of economic growth. Forging a consensus in more socio-culturally diverse societies and alleviating wide-spread poverty is clearly a more challenging prospect in larger states.

Despite the aspirational nature of much of the writing on democratic developmental states in Africa and elsewhere, there is some agreement in the literature on what are, or should be, key components of the democratic model. Summarised, these include selected characteristics of the classical East Asian model such as the need for state-led intervention in macro-economic planning, the building of a competent bureaucracy and the establishment of some form of national consensus on the development path to be followed. There is also broad agreement that democratic developmental states should reject authoritarianism and, in addition to strengthening governance systems, should focus, inter alia, on promoting meaningful citizen participation, establishing a culture of human rights, decentralising administrative responsibility, adopting pro-poor policies and ensuring that the benefits of economic growth are redistributed across society.

It is nevertheless recognised that democratic developmental states may not necessarily manifest all of these features at one time. In addition, while many scholars are in agreement that developmental states, in general, share similar defining features, it is acknowledged that they are differentiated by a range of capacities, visions and ideologies (Evans, 2010; Fritz & Rochas Menocal, 2007) and emerge under very different circumstances and contexts (Pye, 1985; Compton, 2000; Hart-Landsberg, Jeong & Westra, 2007). It is therefore not possible to replicate developmental successes from elsewhere by merely superimposing a ‘ready to order’ template on another setting, and this would apply no less to democratic development states. Fritz and Menocal (2007:536) further caution that building a democratic developmental state is accompanied by certain challenges not faced by non-democratic regimes. Although democratic processes promote power sharing, decision-making processes are slowed down and the state also becomes ‘less autonomous and less insulated from societal demands’. If a democratic regime lacks the requisite skills to deliver development promises, this will result in increasing citizen dissatisfaction which could threaten the integrity of the state as a whole.
2.7 Concluding comments

This chapter has reviewed the factors (historical, geo-political, socio-cultural etc.) which gave rise to the East Asian developmental states and has examined what, in the literature, are seen to be their defining characteristics. Their successes were found to be attributable to a strong state capable of directly steering the economy towards clearly defined strategic goals over a sustained period of time. The East Asian developmental state was also found to be authoritarian and intolerant of democratic processes which might challenge or sway a government from its chosen path. It is evident that, while many developing nations have been prompted to emulate the East Asian model in their quest for accelerated economic growth, changing global attitudes towards state–civil society relations (a consequence of the ending of the Cold War and the onset of the Third Wave of democracy) have led to attempts to establish developmental states which are citizen focused and democratic in nature and which have a transformatory agenda. It is to this democratic developmental state model which the South African government appears currently to aspire. In the chapter which follows discussion will focus on understandings of developmentalism in South Africa and will examine the impact of seemingly contradictory policies on the attempts to construct a democratic developmental state in the country.
CHAPTER THREE
THE EMERGING SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

The preceding chapter discussed understandings in the literature of the factors which gave rise to the East Asian model of the developmental state as well as understandings of the components of a democratic developmental model which might be adopted elsewhere in the developing world as well as in South Africa. However, a challenge confronting the South Africa government in its quest to build a developmental state relates to the fact that the parameters of the model to be implemented have never been clearly articulated either in policy or legislation. Although there has been repeated mention of the need for a developmental approach in ANC policy documents, commencing with the 1992 ‘Waiting to Govern’ and followed by the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (ANC, 1994), this has always been at the level of broad generalisation and it has been left to independent commentators (academics, individual politicians, trade unionists and members of civil society amongst others) to advance what they believe to be the core elements of a developmental state. Much of this, as will be seen in the chapter which follows, is aspirational in nature and serves to highlight the challenges facing the construction of a developmental state rather than suggest a developmental path which might be followed. It also points to the fact that some of the key conditions necessary for the establishment of a developmental state in South Africa, including a consistent economic growth policy (strongly guided by the state) and a national consensus on the path to be followed, are simply not in place.

Over and above the multiple challenges faced by the incoming ANC in its attempts to overcome the legacies of apartheid, which included the establishment of an integrated non-racial state and the alleviation of wide-spread poverty, a number of additional factors have served to constrain attempts to forge an integrated and concerted development strategy and no less to reach a common understanding on the essence of a developmental state. The first of these relates to the fact that the transition to democracy in 1994 occurred far more quickly than most in the ANC had anticipated\(^1\) and in the process of conducting multi-party negotiations\(^2\), of forging new

\(^1\) It must be borne in mind that the ANC and other anti-Apartheid organisations were only unbanned in early 1990.
political alliances and, ultimately, of electioneering, the party had had insufficient time to develop a coherent development strategy to guide its policies once in office. As Jeremy Cronin, the Secretary General of the South African Communist Party (SACP) was to concede, ‘As a liberation movement, we were not well positioned, intellectually, theoretically in terms of policy formulation, in terms of socio-economic transformation. It was understandable. We had been very focused on the political tasks, democratisation, mobilisation, fighting a guerrilla struggle.’ (Cronin, quoted in Gumede; 2005:71).

This problem was aggravated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, until then a major source of support to the ANC and for some (in the South African Communist Party) a socialist model worth emulating. As Mac Maharaj, a former Minister of Transport in the Mandela cabinet, has stated, ‘there were no examples to learn from or use as a guide. We could not go it alone. Countries that did, such as Sweden, had the space to do so with the Cold War still raging and the world being bipolar. The ANC came to power at the end of the Cold War. We had no room to manoeuvre’ (Maharaj, quoted in Gumede; 2005:76). The process was further complicated by the diverse nature of the ruling tripartite alliance, which encompasses partners from organised labour and the Communist Party, as well as more conventional nationalists, seeking to advance the interests of hitherto disadvantaged black elites. The different ideological persuasions of these partners, as will be discussed below, meant that there was seldom a consensus on the development path to be followed, and policies formulated were in consequence, frequently inconsistent and sometimes contradictory. It is therefore not surprising that as recently as 2012 a draft Green Paper emanating from the Presidency should state, somewhat, disconcertedly:

*It is important to note that there seems to be no common understanding of the developmental state in the country as a key philosophy in driving economic growth and development. While there has been extensive deliberations on the subject, it would seem that the concept has not been adequately defined and communicated by government... It follows then that a common understanding of such an important tool*

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of government whose success is attributable to a vision commonly shared by all, should be fostered (The Presidency, 2013).

This lack of conceptual clarity, together with the lack of a broad political consensus, as shall be discussed below, has meant that the establishment of a democratic developmental state in South Africa has struggled to move beyond rhetoric. The project has also been hampered by the fact that many of the preconditions necessary to establish a developmental state, such as a strong bureaucracy and a skilled workforce, are not yet in place and headway in addressing these challenges is slow.

3.1 The rationale for a South African Developmental State

As previously indicated, the ANC, both as a government in waiting and on assumption of political office, had displayed an interest in the idea of a developmental state although it is evident that different ideological positions within the ruling alliance had different understandings of what this might mean. For those to the left, including the SACP, a strong state was necessary to drive through a process of social and economic transformation necessary to overcome the legacies of apartheid. Thus, according to Alec Erwin (2008:129), former Minister of Public Enterprises, ‘a developmental state comes into being when a political movement can translate its political power into a set of institutions that support developmental processes which can be sustained over decades’. This, he maintained, would require a ‘strong state’ where the ruling party has the political power, capacity and visionary leadership to bring about meaningful transformation that is sustainable (ibid). For others of a more nationalistic bent, a developmental state would be the vehicle for driving rapid economic growth, and this has subsequently been stated to have been the objective of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme to be discussed below. To that extent, at the outset the vagueness in the delineation of the parameters of a development state served different interests within the ruling party. With the passage of time, however, it has become increasingly apparent that the ANC’s partners, COSATU and the ANC, do not share the same ideological and conceptual understandings of a developmental state and this has given rise to tensions within the ruling alliance (Chagunda, 2007:2).
Although, as shall be discussed below, interest in the establishment of a development state in South Africa has waxed and waned since the advent of democracy in 1994, the idea has re-emerged as an important component of the ANC’s policy discourse, prompted both by the shortcomings of economic development policies in place and the lessons of the global financial crisis of 2008 (which demonstrated the dangers of unregulated capitalism). Reflective of this perspective, the National Planning Commission (2011) asserts that ‘(t)he call to build a developmental state resonates because the policies pursued since 1994 have not gone far enough in addressing the inequalities of the past and, as a result, the proceeds of growth have been unevenly shared.’ In this context, the construction of a developmental state is now viewed by the ruling party as the most viable option to address socio-economic inequalities and improve service delivery (ANC, 2007a; Levin, 2008). A commitment to the establishment of a development state was pledged in the ANC’s 2009 Election Manifesto which states that:

*The developmental state will play a central and strategic role in the economy. We will ensure a more effective government; improve the coordination and planning efforts of the developmental state by means of a planning entity to ensure faster change. A review of the structure of government will be undertaken, to ensure effective service delivery.*

In calling for a developmental state there is a recognition that it will need to follow a trajectory which differs from that of the East Asian model due to the contextual realities of South Africa (Thomas, 2008; Makgetla, 2008). Thus the National Planning Commission (2011:409) asserts that:

*Developmental states have been created in both authoritarian and democratic countries. In many cases, democracy has been crucial in ensuring the state has*

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3 A precursor to this line of thought is evident in the ANC Economic Transformation Policy Discussion Document 22 March 2007: ‘Our approach to economic transformation proceeds from the understanding that the changes we seek cannot emerge spontaneously from the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. The state must play a strategic role in shaping the contours of economic development.’ Accessed at http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=5246
sufficient legitimacy to bring about transformation. This is particularly important in South Africa where, as the plan identifies, one of the most critical roles of the state is to enable people to develop their capabilities. A robust democracy is therefore not just compatible with building a capable and developmental state, it is an essential prerequisite for the sort of developmental state needed to tackle poverty and inequality.

To that extent the ruling party has called for the construction of a state that is people-centred, participatory and democratic. This commitment has been repeated on various platforms including the ANC General National Council meeting in 2005 (ANC, 2005), the 52nd National Conference in Polokwane (ANC 2007b) and in its manifesto for the 2009 General Election (Poon, 2009). Further, the ANC’s 2007 Draft Strategy and Tactics Document (ANC, 2007b) states explicitly that a developmental state must mobilise society, and particularly the poor, to participate in their own development. However, as shall be discussed, despite these public declarations on the government’s commitment to building a developmental state, there are very few documents which provide any real detail on the constituent elements of such a state. Even the National Planning Commission (2011), which up to the present has advanced the most explicit explanation of the intended role of a democratic developmental state, provides a remarkably generalised description of what this would consist of or the policy directions it might follow:

Broadly defined, a developmental state brings about rapid and sustainable transformation in a country’s economic and/or social conditions through active, intensive and effective intervention in the structural causes of economic or social underdevelopment. This model has been applied to the success of East Asian countries from the 1960s in achieving rapid economic growth alongside improvements in human wellbeing; in the Indian state of Kerala to bring about improvements in human wellbeing (without comparable economic improvements); and in Scandinavia to realise full employment and establish welfare states. There is no prototype of a developmental state: each country has pursued a unique set of policies in response to its own set of challenges.
Beyond this generic definition, as will be discussed in greater detail below, there is little in policy or legislation which appears to distinguish the South African developmental state from states elsewhere in the developing world.

3.2 Defining features of a South African Developmental State

In as much as there is a coherent understanding of what might be the key features of a democratic developmental state in South Africa, there is agreement in the ruling alliance on the need for strong direction from the government (as the polity) and a strong central state.

3.2.1 The central role of a political centre and a strong state

Numerous sources point to the importance of developing a strategic political centre in South Africa, with effective central planning and the coordination of government activities to streamline its efforts. Jeremy Cronin, Deputy General-Secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and member of the ANC’s National Executive Party, questions how the state might become the strategic centre for transformation:

*How exactly do we understand this notion of a strategic political centre? Is it something we strive to build, a role that has to be earned daily in struggle through moral example, policy capacity, presence on the ground and an ability to provide inspiring strategic leadership to cadres in the ANC, in the state, to Alliance partners, to social movements and to grass-roots communities alike? (Cronin, 2008:237).*

Despite the desire for a strong political centre, it is evident that the diverse interests of the ruling alliance, together with the rent-seeking ambitions of political leaders seeking to use the state for personal accumulation, have presented serious difficulties to the establishment of a strong political centre. In that regard Kenny (2010:1–2) points to the infighting and ‘factional battles for position’ within the governing alliance and the purpose of certain elements intent ‘on state capture to serve their narrow political and economic interests which further negates the state's ability to deliver’. This reality prompted Erwin (2008) to call for a strengthening of the tripartite
alliance in order to dissuade attempts to ‘capture’ the leadership of the ANC’, either by unions or the idealistic views of individuals.

In addition to the need for a strong political centre is the need for a strong and unified state structure which is capable of implementing development programmes in a coherent way across, both within and between, the different strata of the governing hierarchy. Despite the fact that the Presidential Review Commission (1998) identified the need to strengthen the centre of government and improve intergovernmental relations more than 15 years ago, this still remains a key challenge. In that respect Mokaba (2001) contends that the coordination of planning and budgeting has remained an elusive reality in South Africa for a number of years. He firmly advocates the building of a strong coordinating centre, accompanied by competent bureaucrats and a capable administration that works jointly with non-state actors towards achieving common developmental goals. Such a centre must drive economic transformation, direct macro-economic policy towards developmental goals, synchronise economic reforms, monitor policy implementation and become more competitive by diversifying and identifying new niche areas. Both the Public Service Commission (PSC, 2013) and Kondlo and Maserumule (2010) draw attention to the importance of coordinating activities and integrating development programmes to prevent duplication of efforts, which have frequently plagued development activities in the past and led to the unnecessary squandering of scarce resources.

3.2.2 Intergovernmental relations

A key dimension in ensuring that a developmental state is capable of implementing its policies in a comprehensive fashion across all tiers of government is the extent to which it is able to establish effective intergovernmental relations. In the case of South Africa, the constitutionally determined notion of cooperative government has presented its own challenges to integrated development planning. Chapter 3 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996: Sections 40 and 41) describes the three tiers of government, national, provincial and local, as distinctive, interdependent and interrelated spheres which are obliged to cooperate with one another ‘in mutual trust and good faith’, to assist and support one another and to coordinate their actions and legislation. However, beyond presenting an enabling framework, the Constitution provides little detail on how this
A harmonious relationship might be built. This challenge is further compounded by the fact that constitutionally the public sector is not a unified entity and the legislation and administrative practices governing national and provincial government differ from those of local government (RSA 1996: Chapters 7 and 10). Furthermore, national government may only intervene to direct the affairs of provincial and local government under very specific conditions prescribed by the Constitution. Weaknesses in the coordination of government activities were identified by the Presidential Review Commission as far back as 1998 (PSC, 2008) and this continues to present challenges to the effective delivery of state programmes, prompting calls for the establishment of a common set of norms and standards for all spheres of government (Abrahams, Fitzgerald & Cameron, 2009). This, indeed is the intent of the 2013 Public Administration Management Bill which asserts that the challenge of redressing poverty, the marginalisation of people and communities and other legacies of apartheid and discrimination is ‘best addressed by providing for administrations in the three spheres of government to be organised and to function in ways that ensure efficient, quality, collaborative and accountable service delivery to alleviate poverty and promote social and economic development for the people of the Republic.’

The 2005 Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act was promulgated to facilitate cooperation between different spheres in order to enable each level to discharge its responsibilities effectively and efficiently (RSA, 2005b), but it has not managed to resolve many of the inherent problems still confronting intergovernmental relations in South Africa. It is thus unsurprising that the National Development Plan (National Planning Commission, 2011:409) should assert that:

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4 According to the 2013 Public Administration Management Bill, ‘public administration’ means the public service, municipalities and their employees; ‘public service’ means all - (a) national departments; (b) national government components listed in Part A of Schedule 3 to the Public Service Act; (c) provincial departments which means (i) the Office of a Premier listed in Schedule 1 to the Public Service Act; and (ii) provincial departments listed in Schedule 2 to the Public Service Act; and (d) provincial government components listed in Part B of Schedule 3 to the Public Service Act, and their employees.’ Republic of South Africa (2013), Public Administration Management Bill, (B55-2013). Accessed at http://www.dpsa.gov.za/dpsa2g/documents/acts&regulations/pam/Public%20Administration%20Management%20Bill,%202013%20as%20introduced%20in%20the%20National%20Council%20of%20Provinces.pdf.

5 Ibid. p. 2.
South Africa has struggled to achieve constructive relations between local, provincial and national government. A lack of clarity about the division of responsibilities together with a reluctance to manage the system has created tension and instability across the three spheres of government. There is no consensus on how this is going to be resolved and there is a lack of leadership in finding appropriate solutions.

The on-going challenges of intergovernmental coordination present constraints to the roll-out of most government programmes and they present a serious impediment to the establishment of a developmental state which, virtually by definition, calls for a coordinated and integrated plan of action. Reflecting this concern, in its 15-year review of intergovernmental relations in South Africa, the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG, 2008:16) asserted that ‘the underlying challenge for government currently is ensuring that IGR structures are able to bring certainty in how the three spheres transact on key developmental priorities of the country as a whole, and how to position government better for local and community focused development.’ It is thus not surprising that the National Development Plan (National Planning Commission, 2011:410) should set as one of the key priorities for a developmental state the need to improve interdepartmental coordination and to adopt ‘a less hierarchical approach to interdepartmental coordination so that most issues can be resolved between officials through routine day-to-day interactions.’

3.2.3 Institution building

The successes of the classic developmental states have been attributed to their coherent organisational structure, institutional arrangements that operated according to strict rules and norms and their institutional capacity to formulate and implement policies in order to achieve development goals (Johnson, 1999). For Edigheji (2010:4), ‘institutions matter’ and the quality and capacity of institutions in South Africa will determine its ability to bring about growth, transformation and developmental success. Evans (2010), together with analysts such as Butler (2010) and Kim (2010), draws attention to the critical importance of building strong, developmentally focused institutions, noting that effective developmental performance will only
emerge within a coherent institutional framework.

At a formalistic level, significant headway has been made since 1994 in establishing the institutions necessary to support a developmental state. These include the reconfiguration of the organisational structure of the state (both the integration of the former ethnic homelands and the re-delimitation of provincial and municipal boundaries), the establishment of representative structures at all three levels of government, the establishment of a coherent legislative framework and the creation of oversight and regulatory structures, amongst others. However, although the calibre of political institutions and their internal design plays a vital role in influencing policy outcomes and mediating between political and civil society, “good” institutions do not necessarily produce “good” developmental outcomes since this linkage depends on the quality of policies and other variables’ (White, 2002:36). Thus, despite the existence of a sound institutional structure, the South African state still manifests a number of the characteristics of what Myrdal (1970) has termed a ‘soft state’, with widespread disregard for regulations, a lack of accountability and corruption – more will be said of this below.

3.2.4 Building a strong state bureaucracy

The structure, power and caliber of the state bureaucracy were key factors in driving the successes of the East Asian developmental states and it is recognised that the establishment of a professionalised and dedicated public service will be of critical importance in building a democratic developmental state in South Africa. Thus Erwin (2008:139) stresses that the strengthening and transformation of the public sector will be one of the primary challenges faced in constructing a developmental state in South Africa and asserts that:

the state has to be composed of efficient and stable institutions that are capable of monitoring, evaluating and effectively implementing complex policy programmes and ensuring that they impact positively across the economy and society. This requires high levels of skill and organisational capacity to be located within the public sector.

Sangweni and Mxakato-Diseko (2008:37), respectively former chairperson and commissioner of
the Public Service Commission of South Africa, draw on experiences of developmental states in China, Japan, and India to highlight the vital importance of the organisational structure of institutions, strong leadership, the coherence of lead ministries and the need for ongoing training of public officials. In order for the South African public service to be ‘anywhere near a cutting-edge juggernaut for the developmental state’ (ibid:41), Sangweni and Mxakato-Diseko maintain, the public sector will need to ‘cohere into a high performance machinery, bound by a common developmental grammar and idiom, astuteness, capacity, agility and single-mindedness, and driven by strong nationalism to do its best for the country’ (ibid:47–48). A similar view is held by Marwala (2009:2) who contends that ‘in order to build a robust developmental state it is vital that we produce a cadre of highly educated people who are able to conduct advanced research and development’. This bureaucratic layer must comprise competent and numerate graduates, who possess well-developed visualisation skills, but will require ongoing technical education in order to increase developmental capacity and reduce poverty (ibid).

However, while the government recognises the need to develop a stronger skills base in order to establish a developmental state, its approach to the challenge is largely aspirational. Thus, as part of its 15-year review process the Presidency (2008:119) asserted that a developmental state:

(W)ould need organisational capacity, to ensure that its structures and systems effectively facilitate implementation of programmes decided upon, insisting on the highest possible standards of public service. This would mean continuing attention to issues of the macro-organisation of the state which have received profile in the findings of this review. It would include definition of roles and responsibilities across the three spheres, effective relations between the spheres and stability of the management system. This would include strengthening monitoring and evaluation capacity, including at points of delivery (such as schools, hospitals, clinics and so on). It should have the technical capacity to translate broad goals and objectives into practical programmes and projects and to see that they are implemented. This would require effective training, appropriate orientation and leadership of the Public Service, and recruitment and retention of skills. It would need to master long-term planning. This is a prerequisite not only of technical capacity but also of the state’s
ability to give leadership to the rest of society by making long-term commitments that other actors can rely on.

While it is acknowledged that the construction of a developmental state will require both a broadening and deepening of the national skills base, there is also general agreement, both within and outside the state, that the capacity of human resources in the public sector is inadequate for the task at hand. Thus, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (The Presidency, 2006:7) policy document notes that ‘for both the public infrastructure and the private investment programmes, the single great impediment is shortage of skills’. The document further highlights the different types of skills required which include ‘professional skills, such as engineers and scientists; managers, such as financial, personnel and project managers; and skilled technical employees, such as artisans and computer technicians.’ Significantly, the severe skills shortages are also seen to be a constraint to economic development. Thus, according to Breier (2009:1), ‘South Africa’s skills shortages are widely regarded as key factors preventing the achievement of the country’s targeted six per cent growth rate. These shortages of professionals and artisans in particular, need to be seen in relation to a number of issues that arise from the country’s apartheid history as well as post-apartheid attempts to rectify historical imbalances.’ Furthermore, while a shortage of key personnel is a challenge at national level, the problem is particularly acute at local government level (COGTA, 2009).

A further constraint to the effectiveness of the public sector has been the high level of corruption amongst civil servants (PSC, 2013). This has not only adversely affected the performance of the public sector but it has also led to considerable public distrust in state officials (Wielders, 2013). This, in turn, has made the task of forging some form of national consensus necessary for the construction of a developmental state an extremely difficult task.

3.2.5 Embeddedness and state–society synergies

As noted earlier, the political landscape of a nation plays a significant role in the construction of a developmental state. What distinguished East Asian developmental states from other states was their strength and autonomy in implementing long-term economic policies. Lessons from these
experiences inform us that a South African developmental state ought to be a ‘strong state’, willing to exert its political power and administrative capacity, while enjoying ‘relative autonomy’ from social forces ‘that might dissuade it from the use of its capacity to design and implement policies that are in its long-term interest’. It is state autonomy that prevents its capture from rent-seeking groups and particularist interests (UNCTAD, 2007:60). Only under conditions of such ‘embedded autonomy’ can states be termed developmental and provide the necessary structures for industrial transformation. It is the immersion of the state in a dense network of ties that binds all sectors to pursue common development goals and such alliances enable social actors to be the stimulus for socio-economic change (White, 2000).

Turok (2008:17) extends this discussion to include the importance of building democracy with social content to enable meaningful synergistic relations, noting that the South African developmental state ‘should mobilize the people as a whole, especially the poor, to act as their own liberators through participatory and representative democracy’. In that respect, Chang (2010:88) maintains that South Africa is in a particularly fortunate position in this respect, due to its ‘uniquely strong mass party base’ which it could use to its advantage and ‘implement its policy much more thoroughly than most other countries, if it has the political will’. However, Fine (2010:172) points out that what is of key importance in this context is ‘the precise nature of the connections between state and society, and what renders them functional – as opposed to dysfunctional’.

In South Africa the ruling party continues to enjoy significant popular support at the polls and this has been sustained through four successive elections. However, despite this support, as intimated above, numerous surveys (Afrobarometer, 2008) point to the exceedingly high levels of distrust which ordinary citizens have in all levels of government. In this context, the construction of a development state which is imbedded in civil society is likely to be a difficult undertaking.
3.3 Macro-economic policy and the Developmental State

South Africa’s limited success in growing the economy and redistributing its gains to the broader populace since its transition to democracy has been well documented in the literature (Tregenna, 2011; Bhorat & Van der Westhuizen, 2010; Misra-Dexter & February, 2010; Chagunda, 2006). While the pursuit of economic growth was a priority for Asian developmental states, there is widespread acceptance that a South African developmental state must, in addition, embrace a social development focus in order to address the inherited and deep-rooted poverty of the majority of its citizens and their unequal access to economic opportunities and services. For Heller (2001), developmental states must carefully balance the focus on economic growth with social development concerns.

Currently, as Turok (2010:498) points out, South Africa’s economy rests on a narrow economic base dominated by mining and financial services and is characterised by large income inequalities, concentrated patterns of ownership and limited economic growth in low-value consumer services. Despite numerous economic policy reforms since 1994, none have made significant inroads into addressing the increasing inequalities and poverty of the majority of South Africans. As a consequence, the government’s macro-economic policy has been subject to criticism from an increasing number of quarters. The neoliberal orientation of its policy is held accountable for the deepening of poverty and inequality and is cited as one of the primary reasons for the country’s inability to construct a transformative developmental state. This criticism stems from what is seen as the paradox between the ANC leadership’s developmental state policy discourse that purportedly favours state intervention in the market, on the one hand, and its neoliberal ‘non-interventionist’ macro-economic strategy that favours financialisation, trade liberalisation, free markets, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, the deregulation of markets and downsizing of the role of the state, on the other. Commenting on this Misra-Dexter and February (2010:xi) assert:

*It is ‘farcical’ for South Africa to preach the developmental state model when its macro-economic policies suggest the opposite. To move towards such a model, a radical departure from current macro-economic policy is required that would*
prioritise the welfare needs of the majority of South Africans over the interests of capital. Although Zuma’s government has alluded to the need for change, it has so far seemed to be paying lip-service to economic reform, making no substantive changes that would point to the creation of a developmental state.

Turok (2010:498), a senior ANC politician, likewise attributes the country’s inability to give substance to its idea of a developmental state to its neo-liberal policy stance. In Turok’s view this policy approach perpetuates social and spatial inequalities through its skewed economic structure, ‘concentrated pattern of ownership, its narrow base dominated by mining and financial services and the historic marginalisation of the black population from opportunities of all kinds’. While sluggish economic performance has been ‘skewed towards low-value consumer services’, worsening trade deficits and demand for basic commodities have resulted in job losses and the decline of industrial output (ibid).

What is clearly apparent from the above discussion is that, notwithstanding South Africa’s repeated commitment to construct a developmental state and follow a pro-poor development path, its continued support of neo-liberal policies is incompatible with its developmental focus and is, in many respects, responsible for frustrating attempts to bring about meaningful social and economic transformation. The economic focus on GDP growth, it is argued, continues to serve the interests of big capital and the elite minority, rather than a broader developmental focus intent on redistributing wealth and economic gains to the impoverished majority. This is perhaps nowhere more explicit than in its management of the industrial and mining sectors, which constitute the backbone of the South African economy.

3.3.2 The structure of South Africa’s economy

Although industrial policy represents only one aspect of economic policy, industrialisation is considered a ‘prime mover’ of sustainable economic development (McCarthy, 2011) and a ‘key determinant of any country’s overall economic growth’ (Kohli, 2004:2). The advantages to be derived from prioritising industrialisation include increased production, the emergence of markets, skills development, the creation of employment and political stability (ibid). Where
countries thus have the necessary resource endowments, it is seen to be essential that a nation’s macro-economic policy should promote industrial strategies which drive growth and support developmental goals (Wade, 2010).

Therefore, as part of the economic policy package, industrial policy in South Africa has a critically important role to play in fostering rapid economic development and in facilitating a more labour-absorbing and developmental growth path (Black, 2010). However, its success will require consistent long-term government intercession, rather than ‘once-off’ interventions, a focus on higher productivity areas (Laubscher, 2007) and gradual ‘cumulatively transformative change through identification of bottlenecks and self-correction’ (Hausmann, Rodrik & Sabel, 2008:17).

The complexities of South Africa’s industrial policy and problems stem from its heavy reliance on mining and mineral exports. In that respect, the country’s mineral riches have had a major impact on its current developmental path and system of capital accumulation. Prior to 1994, capital was shaped by its reliance on mining and was geared towards the production of consumer goods earmarked for high-income groups and the prioritisation of imports and capital equipment (COSATU, 2005). Post-apartheid industrial policy has not only continued but intensified this trajectory and the enduring dominance of mining is linked to the existing system of capital accumulation and the continuing influence of powerful corporate interests on state decisions and industrial policy resolutions (Fine, Ashman & Newman, 2010; Bezuidenhout, 2002).

The Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC), a concept first described by Fine and Rustomjee (1996:5), is used to explain the system of capital accumulation in South Africa. The MEC, which is recognised by many as the fulcrum around which South Africa’s industrial policy revolves (Terreblanche, 2011; Fine, 2008), comprises ‘a core set of industrial sectors’ which exhibit very strong linkages with each other and relatively weak linkages with other sectors (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996:91). South Africa’s continued direct and indirect dependence on the MEC has been seen as a retarding factor ‘not only by virtue of its weight in economic activity but also through its determining role in the rest of the economy’ and its contribution to the ‘poor performance of the manufacturing sector’ (ibid:5–6). In that respect Fine (2008:3) maintains that
the MEC effectively constrains ‘the space that can be occupied by other activities’.

Kaplan (2007:96) points out though that there are two systemic exogenous constraints that curb the impact of South Africa’s industrial policy. The first of these is the government’s macro-economic framework which has resulted in high interest rates and stifled investment as a result of the volatile exchange rates, while the second relates to the terms of trade set by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which effectively governs global trade and constrains the freedom of developing nations. Although the industrial sector unquestionably has an important role to play in generating higher levels of employment, it has been argued that this can only be achieved if existing economic activities become more labour intensive and the composition of output is shifted to sectors that are less capital intensive (Black, 2010). Other recommendations relate to fostering economic diversification in sectors that will create mass employment opportunities and a more robust role for government in terms of providing infrastructure, favouring local producers, using tax incentives and providing finance assistance through the Industrial Development Corporation – all of which might be expected of a developmental state (Bodibe, 2008).

Fine, Ashman and Newman (2010) argue that South Africa’s continued dependence on the MEC, together with post-apartheid macro-economic policy measures, are preventing the government from achieving its developmental state ideals. This dependence, they argue, rather than favouring a pro-poor development path, is supporting the interests of conglomerate capital, encouraging the flight of capital and preventing domestic investment. In a similar vein, a research report issued by the Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council (ECSECC) reveals that South Africa’s failure to diversify its industrial base and the continued dominance of the MEC is responsible for the poor performance of the economy (ECSECC, 2011). The ECSECC Report asserts that current debt-driven growth and investment in capital-intensive strategic industries counteracts developmental policy intentions, while the ‘lifting of barriers to financial outflows and the dominance of monetary policy, coupled with fiscal policies geared at reaching and maintaining a surplus, further attest to the non-developmental nature of government policies’ (ibid:23).
3.3.3 Redistributive capacity

A significant feature of a democratic developmental state identified in the literature is its capacity to redistribute welfare gains to society as a whole. This is necessary both to establish the legitimacy of the state and to build a national consensus. However, most theorists concur that for a developmental state to be able to redistribute welfare gains it must be able to grow the economy. In the case of South Africa, the state’s ability to achieve rapid growth has been constrained both by the structure of the national economy, as discussed, and by global economic trends. According to Pravin Gordhan, Minister of Finance, South Africa must aim to achieve an annual growth rate of 6.5% in order to have a significant impact on poverty and unemployment (City Press, 2010). However, the real gross domestic product (GDP) of South Africa fell by 1.8% in 2009, which amounted to the highest decline since 1992, when it contracted by 2.1% (South African Survey, 2010). In terms of GDP per capita, South Africa’s average annual growth between 1970 and 2008 amounted to only 0.6%, an insignificant rate when compared to Botswana’s growth of 5.9% and China’s growth of 7.9% (UNDP, 2010) over a similar period. Recent figures released by Statistics South Africa (2013a) reveal that GDP increased by 2.5 per cent in 2012. Between 2006 and 2008, the expenditure on Research and Development (R&D), imperative for building skills and capacity so sorely needed in South Africa, amounted to 1% of GDP, but was no more than 0.95% in 2006/2007 and fell to 0.93% of GDP in 2007/2008. This also impacts on South Africa’s goal to transform from a resource-based economy to a knowledge-based economy. In this regard, South Africa has fallen from 49th position in 1995 to 65th position on the knowledge-based economy index which is a reflection of its decreased funding for R&D and low university throughput. South Africa also fares very poorly in terms of pass rates in mathematics, science and engineering (Development Indicators, 2010).

Aside from the fact that it has been unable to achieve its economic growth targets, the government’s achievements in redistributing welfare gains to the poor and in reducing inequality have been a source of national concern. While progress has been made in the delivery of such basic services as housing, water and electricity, considerably less progress has been made in addressing poverty and social inequality. In 2010, the official unemployment rate was 25.2% and
35.9% according to a wider definition. When disaggregated by race these figures become starker with 29.7% of Africans and 21.8% of Coloureds unemployed according to the official definition, and 38.2% and 24.9% respectively unemployed according to the wide definition (Development Indicators, 2010). Between 2009 and 2010, of the 3.4 million unemployed, a total of 86% were African. Excluded from these statistics is a further 51.4% of discouraged jobseekers. The decrease in the labour participation rate, from 61% in 2001 to 55% in 2010, is a further matter of concern (South African Survey, 2010). New unemployment figures released by Statistics South Africa (2013b) reveal that unemployment rose slightly in the last two quarters of 2012, averaging at 25.4%.

The Institute for Future Research (Kane-Berman, 2010) provides comparative annual per capita income figures by race and in 2008 African personal disposable income amounted to R9 700 compared to a disposable income of R75 297 for the white population group. In terms of the proportion of people living in relative poverty (< R1 259 per month) in 2009, 49.5% of Africans and 29.4% of coloureds fell in this category, as opposed to only 0.9% of whites. With a Gini coefficient of 0.65 in 2009, South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world.

### 3.3.4 A consistent and focused economic growth path

A hallmark of developmental states, both the East Asian and democratic variants, has been their adherence to a consistent economic growth path pursued over a sustained period of time. In the case of South Africa, however, the course chartered for economic growth has been anything but consistent and, as will be discussed below, the policies implemented appear often to have been at cross purposes. On its assumption of power the ANC’s vision of transformation was guided by its 1955 Freedom Charter, which advocated equality, inclusivity and improving the lives of the poor. The new government thus committed itself to redirecting resources to the poor with the aim of creating a more just and equitable society (ANC, 1994). However, as will be seen, over the course of the past two decades it has pursued a succession of economic policies, commencing with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).

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6 The narrow (official) unemployment rate refers to the number of people actively searching and available for work. The broad unemployment rate refers to the number of people available for work (Development Indicators, 2010:21).
3.3.4.1 The Reconstruction and Development Programme

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) released in 1994 by the ANC and its alliance partners was the culmination of a long process of consultation with civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations and research organisations and the business sector (Terreblanche, 1999). The RDP represented the first socio-economic policy framework of the post-apartheid government and it aimed to restructure and boost the economy and address the impoverishment, inequality and rampant unemployment facing the majority of its citizens (ANC, 1994). The RDP was explicit in its intent to redress the imbalances of the past and to orient development strategy towards improving ‘the quality of life of all South Africans, and in particular the most poor and marginalised sections of our communities’ (ANC, 1994:15).

In its broad orientation the RDP could be seen to be supportive of the principles of a developmental state in the extent to which it appeared to be aligned with Keynesian principles that advocated a significant role for state in the economy. The RDP asserted that ‘reconstruction and development will be achieved through the leading and enabling role of the state, a thriving private sector, and active involvement by all sectors of civil society which in combination will lead to sustainable growth’ (ANC, 1994: Paragraph 4.2.1). Its main policy goal was to link growth, development, reconstruction, redistribution and reconciliation into what was referred to as a ‘unified programme’ supported by an expansive infrastructural programme (Bond, 2001; ANC, 1994). The RDP proposed an interventionist role for government, while its transformative focus was on social welfare and the redress of inequalities stemming from the previous regime (Visser, 2004).

Due to its reconstruction and transformation objectives, the RDP has been likened to the Marshall Plan (Naidoo, 2006). Its socio-economic transformative goals were to create productive employment opportunities at a living wage, alleviate poverty and inequality, meet basic needs and ensure a decent standard of living, democratise the economy, empower the historically oppressed and remove discrimination in the workplace (HDR, 2000:viii). To that extent the RDP was essentially a strategy for narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, with a strong
emphasis on extending access to basic services to all (Lundahl & Petersson, 2004).

However, the RDP was not without its critics. While some criticised the ‘extravagant promises’ of politicians, others noted that the programme never got off the ground due to a lack of capacity at the local level where most of the projects were to be implemented (COSATU 2005; Lundahl & Petersson, 2004). Although the RDP aimed to provide a coherent and integrated socio-economic framework, it failed to specify the policies and strategies that would enable government to achieve its stated goals (Fine, Ashman & Newman, 2010). Additional problems included lack of funding and commitment by the public and private sector and lack of government capacity and coordination to implement the RDP (Terreblanche, 1999), while the low level of economic growth, needed to fund the various social development initiatives, was seen to seriously hamper the implementation of government’s plans (Naidoo, 2006). Other criticisms included the ambiguous nature of the RDP base document, which was exacerbated when it was formalised in the RDP White Paper which was released towards the end of 1994 (HDR, 2000). At the time Adelzadeh and Padayachee (1994:25) concluded that the RDP White Paper was not only ‘incoherent and fragmented’ but that ‘the possibility of retrieving the earlier vision is eroded daily in the cut and thrust of ‘reconciliation’ and compromise-making politics within the GNU’.

3.3.4.2 Growth Employment and Redistribution Programme

Besides numerous domestic challenges, the new government struggled to position itself within a growing and unpredictable global economy. Moreover, the absence of sustained economic growth, increasingly high unemployment and instability of the rand resulted in the closure of the RDP office in March 1996 and the introduction of a new macro-economic policy framework in June 1996 (Visser, 2004). Despite having earlier criticised the ideas of the pro-market Washington Consensus (ANC, 1996), the ANC government adopted the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic policy in 1996, which epitomised the free market oriented neoliberal framework promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Tregenna (2011:627) characterises the GEAR as ‘broadly neo-liberal, including amongst its key tenets tight monetary and fiscal policies, elimination of exchange controls, labour market
flexibility and privatisation’. The core goal of GEAR was to attain macro-economic stability and stimulate investor confidence and this took precedence over the social welfare developmental focus of the RDP and its attempts to reduce poverty and inequality.

GEAR’s point of departure was that sustained growth would require ‘transformation towards a competitive outward-oriented economy’ and higher levels of growth would be achieved through core elements such as budget reform, fiscal deficit reduction, consistent monetary policy, relaxation of exchange controls, tax incentives, trade liberalisation and an expansionary infrastructure programme (Department of Finance, 1996:1–2). It was estimated that such structural adjustments would enable South Africa to grow its economy by six per cent and create 400 000 jobs per annum by 2000 which would enhance credibility and encourage investor confidence (ibid).

For many scholars, GEAR’s narrower focus on fiscal stability and withdrawal from intervention in the market was at the cost of broader developmental goals. There was a clear shift in emphasis from ‘growth through redistribution’ which had been the dictum of the RDP, to the GEAR strategy of ‘redistribution through growth’, where redistribution was a secondary outcome which would presumably be achieved through a ‘trickle-down’ effect (Visser, 2004:9). To that extent, GEAR’s focus on macro-economic stability over shadowed the transformative agenda envisaged for a developmental state. While Jahed and Brey (2011) highlight some of the successes of GEAR, namely the reduction of fiscal deficit and lowering of inflation, they also point to its poor performance in attracting foreign and local investment and low levels of GDP growth, both of which they deem to be responsible for the failure to create jobs.

### 3.3.4.3 The Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative

The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), an extension of GEAR, was launched in July 2005 in an attempt to further stimulate slow economic growth. ASGISA represented an economic development strategy that, once again, supported neoliberal economic orthodoxy and a free market system (Mabhula, 2013). Its main objective was to steadily increase economic performance and job-creating capacity and to halve unemployment
and poverty by 2014 (The Presidency, 2006). In order to do so, a number of strategic government interventions would be put in place in specific socio-economic areas to address what had been identified as six major constraints to economic growth (ibid). These constraints included currency volatility, the shortage of skilled labour, infrastructure backlogs, barriers to entry and limited opportunities for new business, burdens placed on small and medium businesses as a result of the regulatory environment and deficiencies in state organisation, capacity and leadership (Van der Walt, 2010; The Presidency, 2006). Government interventions which were seen to be necessary to counter these constraints were identified as being infrastructure investment, sector-specific investment strategies, skills and education development, the elimination of what was termed the second economy, improved macro-economic management and enhancement of the quality of governance (Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2006). The Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) was a sister programme, intended as a joint initiative between government, business, labour and educational research institutions with a focus on addressing the scarce skills shortage in the country (Lunsche, 2010, The Presidency, 2006). However, both policies have been criticised for failing to meet their targets, due in large part to poor state capacity and weak organisational leadership (Mabhula, 2012).

Criticisms of ASGISA have also been raised by the government’s own allies including, amongst others, the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Non-Governmental Coalition (SANGOCO). Thus, COSATU’s General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi, maintained that ASGISA would need fundamental restructuring to include a common commitment to shared ‘rather than inequitable’ growth throughout all its programmes. COSATU’s stance, he maintained, were that ‘elements of AsgiSA are inadequate to achieve the desired transformation of the economy’ and that proposals on sector and infrastructural growth should be redesigned around a coherent development vision (Louw, 2006). SANGOCO’s criticism related to the lack of consultation which preceded the preparation of the framework document and the fact that civil society had been excluded from the planning and design of ASGISA (Chagunda, 2006).
3.3.4.4 The New Growth Path

The New Growth Path (NGP) which was introduced in November 2010 has as its main policy objective the stimulation of economic growth as means to accelerate employment creation and create a more equal and inclusive society and, to that extent, it was intended as a mechanism to advance a developmental state mandate. The NGP framework stipulates that massive infrastructure investment in the areas of energy, transport, communication, water and housing will be key drivers in stimulating ‘decent’ employment. Its target is to create five million new jobs by 2020. The NGP document proposes ‘smarter coordination’ between the different government tiers and the forging of closer ties with business and labour (The Presidency, 2010).

The New Growth Path acknowledges as its core challenge the reality of mass joblessness, poverty and inequality and the need for a developmental state to leverage resources and align market outcomes to developmental needs (The Presidency, 2010). Key actions proposed by the NGP include the use of micro and macro policies to create a favourable environment and support labour-absorbing activities, the generation of consistent and focused state policies that facilitate dialogue with business, labour and civil society actors and the re-industrialisation and deepening of both domestic and regional markets for South African goods (ibid). However, in a study to investigate whether the NGP’s targets of increasing economic growth to between 6% and 7% per annum and reducing unemployment to 15% were feasible, Van Aardt, Ligthelm and Van Tonder (2011) found, firstly, that factors other than economic growth affected job creation in South Africa and secondly that higher economic growth would not automatically translate into higher job creation due to the current preference of capital over labour in production processes. These authors further questioned the focus of the NGP on specific sectors and pointed out that, since 2000, nine out of the ten economic selected sectors in their survey showed a preference for capital over labour (ibid). The NGP has also been heavily criticised by COSATU who questioned its merit as a ‘comprehensive and overarching development strategy’ and called for its revision in that, in its present form, it would not achieve its goals of addressing unemployment, poverty and inequality (Mail & Guardian, 2011; COSATU, 2011). Amongst the revisions suggested by COSATU were the need for a greater focus on public healthcare and education and a more serious focus on the expansion of training opportunities (ILO, 2011).
3.3.4.5 The National Development Plan

The National Development Plan, released in 2011 but officially launched in 2012, represents the government’s latest policy framework and is one of the few documents which has explicitly referred to the need to build a developmental state. Significantly, it also asserts the government’s commitment to establish a democratic developmental state:

The National Development Plan highlights the need for a developmental state that is capable of driving the country’s development. Building state capacity is the most important step to achieve a developmental state. However, the plan also recognises that not all capable states are developmental and so emphasises the importance of building a capable and developmental state within a vibrant democratic system (National Planning Commission, 2011:474).

However, notwithstanding its explicit intent to establish a democratic development state, the National Planning Commission (2011:474) is vague on the details of what might constitute such a state, other than that it will aim to rapidly transform the economy:

A developmental state brings about rapid and sustainable transformation in a country’s economic and/or social conditions through active, intensive and effective intervention in the structural causes of economic or social underdevelopment. Developmental states are active. They do not simply produce regulations and legislation. They constantly strive to improve the quality of what they do by building their own capacity and learning from experience. They also recognise the importance of building constructive relations with all sectors of society, while insulating themselves from capture by sectional interests.

It is noteworthy, furthermore, that the eight areas identified by the NDP (National Planning Commission, 2011:410) as being key to the establishment of a capable and developmental state are operational rather than strategic in their orientation. These are stated to be the need to
stabilise the political-administrative interface; to make the public service and local government administration careers of choice; to develop technical and specialist professional skills; to strengthen delegation, accountability and oversight; to improve interdepartmental coordination; to take a proactive approach to improving relations between national, provincial and local government; to strengthen local government; and to clarify the governance of SOEs (ibid).

The NDP has also not been without its critics who have attacked both its ideological orientation and its format. Thus COSATU complained that ‘On Macroeconomic policy, instead of proposing a radical shift, the Resolution proposes 3 cautious changes to policy, in deliberately ambiguous language which rather than decisively confronting the Treasury’s conservative stranglehold on macroeconomic policy, will perpetuate massive contestation over the interpretation of ANC policy.’ (COSATU 2013:9) It also criticised the plan for its excessive length (over 484 pages), the number of ‘inconsistencies and errors’ in regard to ‘incorrect interpretations’ of related literature and incorrect ‘projections of poverty and employment’ (COSATU, 2013:18). Other criticisms relate to its overly ambitious ‘objectives, aims and coverage’ and that in order to be successful a number of ‘capabilities’ would be required by key players in terms of implementing and monitoring the NDP (Zarendra, 2013). Further areas of concern relate to the sequencing and structuring of the wide number of development efforts required at different levels and the coordination with other national plans such the Medium Term Spatial Development Framework (The Presidency, 2009a) and provincial and local level plans.

State ideologues have attempted to portray the twists and turns in economic policy as being part of an evolutionary process. Thus, Trevor Manuel (Manuel, 2013b), the Minister in the Presidency responsible for the NDP, asserts that there has not been ‘a deviation from where we were headed but rather a refinement of the route’ and that ‘(v)eidy simply put, the legislative and policy frameworks that have been adopted since the first democratic elections in 1994 are more than adequate, but requires proper implementation to be effective.’ However, critics such as Fine (2007:1) maintain that the government’s renewed interest in the developmental state is ‘a reinvention of the past decade’s economic and social policy, a way of excusing the Gear policy while departing from it.’ To that extent it serves to rationalise the government’s volte-face in key policy areas.
The rise of the putative developmental state is a rhetorical shift in the government signalling its belief that a job has been half done and conditions are now favourable for more interventionist policies. Second, of course, the politics of the rise of the developmental state is a matter of appeasing critics of the government’s economic and social policies. In particular, there has been the failure to address high and worsening levels of unemployment and impoverishment while black economic empowerment has mainly flourished as a source of elite enrichment (ibid).

In a somewhat contradictory fashion, given his assertions on the general continuity of policy directions cited above, in a speech presented a week earlier Trevor Manuel was remarkably candid in his admission of the inconsistency of state economic policy and its short-term focus, asserting that:

*It is important that we appreciate that sustainable growth and development require policy stability. Changing policy too often has the effect of destabilising the bureaucracy and therefore not allowing policies to take effect and show results. Our performance as a country on this measure has been uneven, at best. It is worth pausing for reflection on why we faltered on something so self-evident. After 1994, it was apparent through our policies that the government was aware that our people had high expectations. However, the performance of the public service did not reflect the improvements necessary to meet our policy objectives. Many of the failures had their root causes in the capacity of the state machinery inherited from apartheid – the corruption, the absence of a culture of public service, poor skills, among others. Instead of analysing the root causes of the performance failures and embarking on the painstaking process of institution-building, we resorted to changing policy each time we were dissatisfied with the results we were seeing... Too often ... new policies are or were implemented in an unconsidered fashion, as new leaders seek to make their mark, or as a response to the latest international fad. Many of the problems with public sector performance have to do with deeply rooted systemic issues, and there is no ‘quick fix’ substitute for a long-term and strategic approach to enhancing institutional capacity.*
From the above, it is evident that the ruling ANC government has not succeeded in maintaining a consistent economic course since it assumed power nearly twenty years ago. This has meant that the policies in place and the consequent state intervention have succeeded neither in accelerating economic growth nor in alleviating poverty.

3.4 Building a people-centred state

A key feature of South Africa’s attempts to build a democratic developmental state has been its stated commitment to a people-centred approach (National Planning Commission, 2011) which will engage ordinary people in decision making that affects their daily lives. While this approach applies to all three spheres of government, it applies specifically to the local state which is the vehicle for the delivery of basic services. This implies that local government has been assigned a particular role in the construction of a developmental state which is uncharacteristic of developmental states elsewhere in the world. In that respect it is also of significance that the first, and to date the only formal policy oriented to the creation of a developmental state was the 1998 White Paper on Developmental Local Government. Although, as will be discussed in a subsequent chapter, the use of the term ‘developmental’ in this context was more descriptive than strategic, it is reflective of an approach which aims to build a developmental state both from the top down and the bottom up.

3.5 Building consensus and setting a national development agenda

The success of developmental states, whether authoritarian or democratic, has in part been attributed to their ability to forge some form of national consensus on the economic path to be followed. This, as indicated, is necessary both to ensure that economic policy is sustained over time and also to convince citizens that short-term sacrifices will yield longer term gains.

The importance of a collective developmental vision and mobilising the nation around a commonly agreed upon national development agenda is critical to building a successful developmental state. However, the creation of such a collective vision and development agenda
will require a mutual understanding of South Africa’s developmental requirements, which Johnson (1995) refers to as a ‘common developmental grammar and idiom’. In that respect Erwin (2008:138) asserts that South Africa’s principal developmental objective must be nationalistly orientated and persistently focused on developing the economy and its entire people. A national development agenda for South Africa, he maintains, must be the outcome of broad national consensus, reflecting the commitment and clear vision of key stakeholders and must be devised according to the expressed needs of the majority of the population. Turok (2010:500) supports the need for a collective effort to define ‘a common purpose and sense of direction’ from all actors and stakeholders, which, he stresses, must include collaboration between spheres and sectors of government and partnerships with business, labour and community organisations in order to build commitment and national support. For the ANC government the building of such a consensus was never going to be an easy task given the nation’s bitter history of racial separation and economic exploitation. However, given the fact that the ANC has attained nearly two thirds of the popular vote since the first election in 1994, it might have been expected to have made greater headway in this undertaking. Public distrust in state institutions and in the integrity of public officials has been alluded to above, but paradoxically, reflecting the different ideological persuasions within the ruling tripartite alliance, the strongest resistance to the ANC’s economic policies has come from with the ranks of its own allies, the trade union movement, predominantly represented by COSATU, and the South African Communist Party.

Following the jettisoning of the RDP, both COSATU and the SACP have repeatedly criticised the ANC’s macro-economic policy approach and called for a more redistributive development trajectory that addresses the need for housing, basic services, healthcare, land reform and broad-based employment (Pillay, 2008). COSATU, in particular, has repeatedly stressed the need for an interventionist role for the state as the vehicle of transformation in post-apartheid South Africa and dismissed the likelihood of a ‘trickle-down’ effect emanating from the ANC’s neoliberal policies. In a political discussion paper issued by its Central Executive Committee, COSATU stressed that ‘…the world hegemony of neo-liberalism in the last twenty years of the 20th Century did not derive from success in addressing developmental needs. Global economic growth is still low; employment is stagnant; standards of living are worsening; and inequality is
growing both within and between states’ (2001: Section 2.2). Despite progress in the political sphere in South Africa, they maintain, ‘deeply contradictory government policies’ are in effect worsening poverty due to serious unemployment and underemployment which is forcing people to ‘rely on survivalist activities to make ends meet’ (COSATU, 2001: Section 2.1). The South African Communist Party (SACP) has also distanced itself from a macro-economic policy which supports privatisation, believing that it privileges the minority and leads to the exploitation of the majority (SACP, 2005, SACP, 2006). In that respect, both COSATU and the SACP are concerned that the interest of capital is being prioritised over the interests of the majority of the country’s inhabitants (Matshiqi, 2009).

The National Development Plan (National Planning Commission, 2011:2) recognises the need for a national consensus and yet, in the face of severe criticism from the government’s own allies, there is a millennial ring to its call for national unity:

The national plan has to attack the blight of poverty and exclusion, and nurture economic growth at the same time; creating a virtuous circle of expanding opportunities, building capabilities, reducing poverty, involving communities in their own development, all leading to rising living standards. Such a virtuous circle requires agreement across society about the contribution and sacrifices of all sectors and interests. This will translate into greater confidence and a greater field of opportunities for individuals and the country. Growth and development, and reducing poverty and inequality, are the core elements of this virtuous cycle. Strong leadership throughout society, national consensus, social cohesion and a capable state are its key enablers.

From this it might be inferred that there is a tacit acknowledgment on the part of the government that while a national consensus is an important requirement for the construction of a developmental state, one has yet to be established in South Africa.
3.6 Developmental State challenges

In the context of the discussion above, there is mounting scepticism in the literature and in public discourse over South Africa’s ability to construct a developmental state. A number of scholars cite inefficiency and the lack of skills as one of the major stumbling blocks to achieving this vision (Fine, 2008; Butler, 2010). Gelb (2006) concurs, noting that South Africa cannot yet lay claim to being a developmental state as, despite improved state capacities since the democratic transition, this has not translated to economic growth and distribution. He emphasises that such states are ‘made’ not ‘born’ and they constitute a deliberative process, with the fruits thereof shared across society. Mantzaris and Ngcobo (2007) cite poor leadership and the lack of long-term vision, together with corruption in the public sector, as major impediments to the construction and delivery of a developmental state. Van Dijk and Croucamp (2007) and Chagunda (2007) allude to inefficient local government, poor service delivery and the resulting increasing public protest across the country as proof of the government’s inability to construct and deliver such a state.

In similar vein, both Maphunye (2009) and Mokaba (2001) point to poor governance, poor bureaucratic capacity, corrupt practices, inefficient local government, the disjuncture between policy and implementation and conceptual eclecticism with regard to the type of developmental state required in South Africa. Furthermore, according to Makgetla (2008), substantial dualism, formal sector marginalisation, rising unemployment, massive inequalities in ownership and low living standards are some of the challenges that a South African developmental state must address. In summarising the multiple challenges which the nation confronts in constructing a developmental state Kenny (2010:1) asserts that:

*South Africa faces serious challenges which continue to constrain its ability to deliver on the minimum targets it has set itself. The overall state capacity needed to define and realise a national agenda seems to be unattainable at present. The quality of leadership which is required to successfully drive the process forward is sorely lacking, evidenced by the myriad scandals around corruption, party factionalism and a breakdown in the ability of government to deliver ... Clearly, if issues of*
governance remain unresolved then the tools by which the Government would like to implement its developmental state remain severely blunted.

3.7 Concluding comments

This chapter has examined understandings of the developmental state in South African government discourse over the course of the past two decades. It has revealed that the concept of a developmental state has never been clearly articulated either in policy or legislation and that it continues to be used largely as a descriptive device to reflect the ways in which the government of the day might intervene to promote economic growth and enhance social welfare. The chapter also discussed the manner in which state policy has changed over time, veering from the more interventionist ambitions of the RDP, to the neoliberal free market nostrums of GEAR, and on to the attempts to synthesise these contending positions in the New Growth Path and National Development Plan. It further concluded that the pre-conditions for the establishment of a democratic developmental state in South Africa are not auspicious when measured against a number of the key determinants of developmental states elsewhere in the world. These include a well-defined economic development strategy pursued over a sustained period of time, the existence of a strong and independent bureaucracy and the forging of a national consensus on the path to be followed.

In the chapter which follows, discussion will focus on the attempts to build developmental local government in South Africa as part of the broader programme to construct a national developmental state. It considers both the role of local government in the post-apartheid state and the responsibilities assigned to municipalities by the Constitution. It further reflects on the obligations of the local state to enhance the welfare of the population to service delivery and to promote systems of participatory governance.
The preceding chapter made reference to the fact that local government has been assigned a prominent role in South Africa’s endeavour to construct a democratic developmental state. In order to proceed to the case of Delft, which examines the manner in which developmental local government is unfolding in one specific urban locality, the chapter which follows provides an overview of the mandate which has been assigned to municipalities by national legislation and policy. It is in terms of this formal mandate, moreover, that the performance of the democratic developmental state in Cape Town will be assessed.

From the outset, it is clear that the ANC government had always intended that local government should play a key role in the reconstruction of the post-apartheid state. Thus, the resolutions of the 49th ANC National Conference held in Bloemfontein in December 1994 asserted that local government was to be the ‘arms and legs’ of local socio-economic transformation (ANC, 1994). In this context the local sphere has been defined as ‘the anchor of our reconstructive fibre in our developmental state’ and ‘the sphere of government that can be characterised as the pulse of interaction between nation and state, through which service delivery processes take place’ (Mmoiemang, 2010:1). Broadly understood, the local state is considered to be ‘the frontline of development’ and the ‘interface between government and citizens’ (Buhlunlu & Atkinson 2007:27).

Since the advent of a democratic dispensation in 1994 local government in South Africa has undergone major transformation. Through this process an autocratic, racially discriminatory municipal system was reconstructed to promote democracy, participatory governance and accountability (Blair, 1998, 2000). This transformation, as indicated in a previous chapter, took place within the context of broader international debates on decentralisation, good governance and participatory democracy (McEwan, 2003), and has been described as ‘nothing short of remarkable’ (Atkinson, 2007:53). The formal system of participatory governance proposed has
also been referred to as ‘state of the art’ (Frodin, 2009:288). These plaudits aside, a growing number of authors concur that the system is not functioning as intended. As Friedman (2006) observes, although ‘the plethora of formal mechanisms which enable citizens to participate in government should make South Africa a model of participatory governance, in which citizens have ample opportunity to shape decisions which affect their lives’ this is not the case.

4.1 Developmental Local Government

Prior to the democratic transition in South Africa, local government had been configured along strict racially defined and segregated lines, privileging the White minority and resulting in a highly unequal society characterised by poverty and social dislocation for the majority. Local government’s status during the apartheid era was ‘subservient, racist and illegitimate’ and the establishment of separate local authorities, according to De Visser (2009:8), ‘provided a clever scheme of naked exploitation on the basis of race’. Furthermore, the race-based system of municipal authorities resulted in fragmentation, the duplication of functions and inefficiency (Nyalunga, 2006).

The end of apartheid rule in 1994 heralded a new era of government in South Africa which was intended to elevate the majority of citizens from passive recipients of government largesse to active partners in matters of governance. In this context, local government was assigned considerably greater powers than in the past with a set of constitutionally enshrined powers and functions (Fakir, 2007:4). These prescribed a considerably more prominent role for municipalities in the broader affairs of the state and, in particular as shall be discussed below, in the construction of a developmental state.

Chapter 10 of the Interim Constitution of 1993 of the Republic of South Africa sets out the guidelines for the establishment, status, powers and functions of the first non-racial system of local government in South Africa. Section 174 (3) of the Interim Constitution stipulated that ‘local government shall be autonomous and, within the limits prescribed by or under law, shall be entitled to regulate its affairs’ while Section 174 (4) determined that ‘Parliament or a provincial legislature shall not encroach on the powers, functions and structure of a local
government to such an extent as to compromise the fundamental status, purpose and character of local government’. These principles were carried forward into the final Constitution. Chapter 3 of the 1996 Constitution sets out the relationships between the three spheres of government, and the principles of co-operation that must be followed by the national, provincial and local government. Section 40 stipulates that ‘the three spheres of government are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated’. For Cameron (2001:102) the ‘distinctive’ component denotes the autonomy of the separate spheres, while the ‘interdependent’ and ‘interrelated’ components signify their international nature.

The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, as previously indicated (RSA, 2005b:2), provides a framework for the promotion and facilitation of intergovernmental relations, recognizing that ‘all spheres of government must provide effective, efficient, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic to secure the well-being of the people and the progressive realisation of their constitutional rights’. Policy and legislation requires the local government sphere ‘to perform specific government functions within a specifically demarcated area, in consultation with the local community and other stakeholders, such as local businesses and the relevant provincial government authorities’ (Davids, 2006:1).

The objectives of local government are set out in Section 152 of the Constitution which stipulates that, subject to their financial and administrative capacity, municipalities must provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; ensure the provision of services in a sustainable manner; promote social and economic development; promote a safe and healthy environment; and encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government.

Section 155 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996) makes provision for the following categories of municipalities: Category A municipalities which have exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in their area of jurisdiction; Category B municipalities which share municipal executive and legislative authority with a category C municipality which falls within their boundaries; and Category C municipalities which have municipal executive and legislative authority in an area that includes more than one municipality. The new configuration of the local
state thus comprises three categories of municipalities, namely metropolitan, local and district municipalities. In this configuration metropolitan municipalities exercise all local government powers and functions, whilst local and district municipalities share powers and functions.

The Constitution further stipulates that national legislation must not only establish the criteria for determining different categories of municipalities and make provision for the division of powers and functions between them, but it must also take into account the need to provide municipal services in an equitable and sustainable manner (RSA, 1996). It further specifies that provincial government must determine the types of municipalities within each province. Provincial governments are mandated to support and monitor local governments within their province and to assist municipalities to build the necessary capacity to perform their functions and manage their own affairs. The Constitution assigns national and provincial government the legislative and executive authority to oversee the effective performance of municipalities (ibid).

4.1.1 The developmental role of Local Government

The South African government’s developmental vision for local government was introduced in the 1998 White Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998b). The White Paper directs local government to play a development role and ‘work with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives’ and to place their focus particularly on the poor and marginalised or historically excluded groups (RSA, 1998b). According to Davids and Maphunye (2005:59) the developmental role of local government is intended to include the integration and co-coordination of activities with other spheres of government, democratizing development, empowering the poor and redistributing income and opportunities in favour of the economically excluded and marginalized. They further maintain that the overall focus of local government is supposed to be on such developmental outcomes as the provision of infrastructure and services, the creation of liveable, integrated human settlements and the promotion of local economic development (Ibid). However, Samson (2007:37) points out that ‘whilst development is clearly understood as including improvements in material conditions of the impoverished majority, it is also explicitly seen as encompassing participation in general and participatory democracy in
particular as developmental objectives in and of themselves’. Linked to this idea, Parnell and Pieterse (2008) highlight the importance of the redistributive role which developmental local government is expected to play in safeguarding the interests of the poor,

4.1.2 Legislative and policy framework for developmental local government

The local sphere of government in South Africa, as indicated, ‘receives its mandate, powers and functions directly from the Constitution’ (DPLG, 2004:20). Its relative autonomy is protected by Section 151 (3) (RSA, 1996) which states that ‘a municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the Constitution’. Section 151 (4) emphasizes that ‘the national or provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions’ (RSA, 1996). According to Frodin (2009:292) ‘the Constitution thus raises local government from a subordinate level to a significant sphere in its own right, with considerable autonomy and the responsibility to promote social and economic development’. Similarly, Nel and Binns (2003:169) emphasise local government’s increasing responsibility in addressing the ‘daunting range of socio-economic challenges’ as ‘key agents for transforming South Africa’s society and economy in the post-apartheid era’.


4.1.2.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa

Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1996) clearly defines the new transformative role and responsibilities of local government. In that respect, Section 152(1)
outlines local government’s developmental objectives as including the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner, the promotion of social and economic development, and the facilitation of community involvement in matters of local government. Section 153 further stipulates that a municipality must ‘structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community and to promote the social and economic development of the community’.

The developmental role outlined for municipalities in Sections 152(1) and 153 is aligned with Section 195 of the Constitution which states that public administration must be governed by the democratic values and ‘must be development-oriented’ (RSA, 1996). Section 23(1) indicates that a municipality ‘must undertake developmentally-orientated planning so as to ensure that it strives to achieve the objects of local government set out in Section 152 of the Constitution; gives effect to its developmental duties as required by Section 153 of the Constitution; and together with other organs of state contribute to the progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained in Sections 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the Constitution’.

Although it is questionable whether the use of the term ‘developmental’ in this context was understood in the same context as that of a developmental state, it is clear that it implied a more decisive role for municipalities in the delivery of services and in the promotion of local economic development than had been previously been the case. It is also evident that, over time, what had been a rather descriptive use of the term (that is one pertaining to the delivery of services and local job creation) has been extended in official discourse to encapsulate a broader understanding of a developmental state.

4.1.2.2 The Local Government Transition Act (Act 209 of 1993)

Prior to 1994, as intimated, local government comprised a racially discriminatory system which incorporated a wide array of unequally resourced race based municipal authorities with differing functions established to favour the white population group (Nyalunga, 2006). In 1993, a total of 1262 municipalities were compartmentalised into race-based white, coloured, Indian and black local authorities (DPLG, 2004; Steytler, 2005). In addition, in the ethnic homelands local
government was restricted to the urban centres whilst the rural areas fell under the control of traditional authorities which lacked a democratic base. The Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) of 1993 set out the legislative requirements for a transitional process which was specifically geared towards de-racialising and democratizing municipalities (De Visser, 2009) and the construction of a more inclusive and participatory system of local government (Millstein, 2010). The LGTA mapped out a three-phase transition process, namely the pre-interim phase (1994-95), the interim phase (1995-99) and the final phase (2000).

The first pre-interim phase (1994/95) commenced with the promulgation of the LGTA in February 1994 which took place prior to local government elections and was characterised by the replacement of race based local authorities with interim non-racial transitional local councils. The LGTA prescribed the establishment of a negotiating forum for each municipal area and negotiations were conducted between statutory and non-statutory bodies in order to create pre-interim councils which would be responsible for decision-making on issues of governance and service delivery (De Visser, 2005; DPLG, 2004). Transitional councils comprised appointed councillors drawn from both existing statutory authorities and non-statutory community organisations located in black township areas (Cameron, 2001; Steytler, 2005).

The second interim phase commenced with the first democratic local government elections that took place from November 1995 to early 1996. This phase was guided by the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1993) which provided local government with institutional recognition and legislative protection for its autonomy in prescribed areas of responsibility. In 1995, the country was demarcated into 843 municipal areas and elections were held for transitional metropolitan councils and transitional local municipalities (Steytler, 2005). The Interim Constitution of 1993 prescribed the establishment of a two-tiered system of Metropolitan Local Councils in metropolitan areas, the establishment of Transitional Local Councils to administer urban non metropolitan areas, with Transitional Rural Councils and Transitional Representative Councils governing the rural areas (Naude, 2001:1). Democratically elected District Councils with new powers and functions were established in non-metropolitan areas (DPLG, 2004). During the elections of 1995 and 1996, 40% of councillors were elected by proportional representation, whilst of the remaining 60%, half of the ward councillors
represented previously classified white, coloured and Indian areas and the other half represented traditional black communities. The 1996 Constitution institutionalised three categories of local authorities for the entire country, namely metropolitan, local and district municipalities, thereby establishing the so-called ‘wall-to-wall’ local government system (Steytler, 2005:187-188).

A number of policy documents guided the interim phase. The Municipal Demarcation Act (MDA) of 1998 provided the legislative framework for the demarcation of municipal boundaries. Chapter 1 of the MDA set out the requirements for the establishment of a Municipal Demarcation Board and its operating procedure, powers and duties. Chapter 2 of the Act set out the demarcation criteria and procedures for municipal boundaries and ward boundaries within each municipality (MDA, 1998). Prior to the local government elections in 2000, the MDA provided for the demarcation of new municipalities and reduced the number of local authorities from 843 to 284. This was rationalized as a means to enable more functional and viable jurisdictions and to assist municipalities to achieve their developmental mandate. The 284 municipalities comprised 6 Metropolitan Municipalities, 231 Local Municipalities and 46 District Municipalities (Monare, 2011). Considerations of economies of scale were the driving force behind this drastic reduction of municipal areas (Naude, 2001). Another important development during this interim phase was the finalisation of the 1998 White Paper on Local Government which represented the first national policy framework for local government (Department of Constitutional Development, 1998). For the first time in South African history, the White Paper set local government on a path away from ‘a non-developmental, subservient and illegitimate level of government to a developmental, autonomous and democratic sphere of government (De Visser, 2005:61).

The final transformational phase commenced with the first non-racial local government elections on 5 December, 2000. This ended the transitional phase and the commencement of a new democratic form of local government (Sutcliffe, 2002; Nel & Binns, 2003). During the final phase, local government elections took place in accordance with the requirement of the 1996 Constitution which provided a ‘new generation of municipalities’ with a ‘renewed’ mandate and enhanced status (De Visser, 2005:62).
4.1.2.3 The White Paper on Local Government

The 1998 White Paper on Local Government presented a new vision for governance at the local level. Its prescription that local government must play a ‘development role’ and work with communities includes the stipulation that it should especially target those members and groups within communities that are most often marginalised or excluded, such as women, disabled people and the very poor (RSA, 1998b). This stipulation is in compliance with the Constitutional prescript that government must take reasonable steps, within available resources, to ensure that all South Africans have access to adequate housing, health care, education, food, water and social security. Section B of the White Paper (RSA, 1998b) clearly encapsulates the developmental role of local government in the following four interrelated responsibilities:

- Firstly, its developmental role in *maximising social development and economic growth* includes impacting positively on the social development of an area in terms of delivering basic services that meet the needs of the poor in a cost-effective and affordable manner. Furthermore, in order to stimulate economic growth, municipalities must work in partnership with local business to improve job creation and investment and must provide the environment for the creation of employment opportunities. This role prescribes that municipalities must intensify efforts to promote local small businesses that will employ local people.

- A second developmental role assigned to local government is an *integrating and co-ordinating* function. Within this context, municipalities are expected to play a leading role bringing together the various national and provincial government departments, parastatals, trade unions, community groups and private sector organisations operating in their area of jurisdiction in the process of integrated development planning.

- The third function assigned by the White Paper is that of *democratising development, empowering and redistributing* which is central to the developmental mandate of local government. Within this role, Municipal Councils must not only represent local interests but must support local citizens and groups to participate meaningfully in municipal programmes through the mechanisms of ward committees and community consultation.
Finally, the fourth functions of *leading and learning* relates to local government finding innovative and sustainable methods of governing in order to promote development at the local level. This requires that the leadership of municipalities must keep abreast with change in order to achieve developmental goals in their area, and must actively empower marginalised community groups and encourage their participation, together with ward councillors, in building a shared vision at the local level.

Section B of the White Paper further requires local government to pursue such developmental outcomes as the provision of household infrastructure and services; the creation of liveable, integrated cities, towns and rural areas, and the promotion of local economic development with aim of redistribution (RSA, 1998b). In this regard, three different approaches for the realisation of these developmental outcomes are proposed. The first approach is integrated development planning and budgeting which will enable the prioritisation of development needs and integration of planning. The second approach includes the development of a performance management system which will improve the accountability of municipal officials. The third approach relates to the role of municipalities in engaging local citizens as partners in government affairs, as voters, consumers and end-users of municipal services (ibid).

### 4.1.2.4 The Municipal Structures Act

The Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) gives substance to the Constitution and White Paper on Local Government and sets out the structural foundation for developmental local government. The Municipal Structures Act provides for the establishment of municipalities and outlines the categories and types of municipalities as specified in the Constitution. It further defines the division of powers and functions between the different municipal categories, clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the municipal office-bearers and regulates the internal systems and structures of local government. Section 83(3) of the Act prescribes the developmental mandate of district municipalities in terms of their responsibility to ensure district-wide integrated development planning, the provision of district-wide bulk services, the building of local municipal capacity and promotion of the equitable distribution of resources between local
municipalities.

In terms of the Municipal Structures Act, several different governance systems may be established by municipalities. These include the Collective Executive System, which allows for the exercise of executive authority through an executive committee, a Mayoral Executive System which allows for the exercise of authority through an executive mayor (assisted by a mayoral committee) in whom the executive leadership of the municipality is vested, a Plenary Executive System which limits the exercise of executive authority to the municipal council itself, a Sub council Participatory System which allows for delegated powers to be exercised by sub-councils established for parts of the municipality, and a Ward Participatory System which allows for matters of local concern to wards to be dealt with by committees established for wards (RSA, 1998a). Commenting on the impact of certain of these systems on decision making and development, Smith (2007:12) argues that mayoral committees tend ‘to be overly centralised bases of power, non-transparent and unaccountable to the broader council, and the community as a whole’ in that they have the power to exclude opposition party members. Furthermore, the tendency of mayoral committees to convene behind closed doors excludes ‘non-executive councillors, the public, the media from overseeing discussions and decisions on key municipal functions’.

In order to enhance participatory democracy, Section 19(2) of the Municipal Structures Act provides guidelines for the annual review of the needs of communities; as well of municipal processes for involving their citizens, together with their organisational capacity to deliver required services. Section 19(3) compels municipal councils to develop mechanisms to consult the community and community organisations in performing its functions and exercising its powers. Furthermore, Section 44 obliges municipal executives to report annually on community involvement in the affairs of the municipality and ensure that due regard is given to the views of the public elicited through participatory processes.

Part 4 of the Municipal Structures Act outlines the requirements for the establishment of ward committees, as a mechanism for enhancing participatory democracy, and sets out their powers and functions. Section 73 the Act specifies that the councillor representing a ward must be the
designated chairperson of the committee which must comprise not more than ten other persons. It also stipulates that municipal council must regulate such matters as the procedures for electing ward committees, which must take into account the equitable representation of women, the diversity of interests in the ward and the frequency of meetings. Ward councillors represent voters in specific geographical areas as opposed to party representative councillors elected according to proportional representation lists (Friedman, 2006). The Structures Act further stipulates that it is the responsibility of a municipality to make administrative arrangements to enable ward committees to perform their functions and exercise their powers effectively. With regard to the powers and functions of ward committees, Section 74 of the Act states that ward committees may make recommendations to the ward councillor on any matter affecting the ward, and, through the ward councillor, to the council.

4.1.2.5 The Municipal Systems Act

The Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) provides the legislative framework within which developmental local government must operate and prescribes the rights and duties of municipalities in that regard. Chapter 4 of the Act provides clear guidelines to municipalities on their responsibilities in fostering a culture of participation and outlines the mechanisms, processes and procedures necessary to enable communities to participate in municipal decision making processes. Chapter 4 further outlines the obligations of municipalities in regard to the communication of information to local communities on the mechanism for participation which are available to them, and stipulates that language preferences and usage in different localities be taken into account when disseminating such information. However, it is the process of integrated development planning (outlined in Section 17 of the Act) that the need for citizen participation is made most explicit.

4.2 Integrated Development Planning

There is an extensive literature on the topic of integrated development planning which includes discussion on international planning discourse and its impact on South African planning theory and practice (Holland, 2006; Mabin, 2002; Harrison, 2006; Binns & Nel, 2002; Cameron, 2009).
Integrated planning has, for a number of decades, featured prominently in development discourse throughout the world (Maxwell & Conway, 2000) and it is conceived as a participatory planning process that addresses development problems by synthesising of sectorial strategies as a means to optimize the allocation of limited resources in a sustainable and effective manner (DEAT, 2002).

The emergence of integrated development planning in South Africa has been ascribed to the influence of international thinking in the 1990s which underscored the need to foster participation between government and beneficiary communities (Harrison, 2006; Theron, 2005). Pre-1994 planning had been detached from international developments in the field of public service reform, and had been narrowly focused on service delivery which was conducted in a top-down, paternalistic, non-democratic and non-consultative manner (Binn & Nel, 2002, Thornhill, 2008). In this context there was an urgent need for the incoming ANC government to transform the sectorally fragmented and racially segregated municipal planning of the apartheid system and introduce an integrated municipal planning approach that addressed the needs of all South Africans (Oranje et al, 2000).

International policy discourse on governance and development and its support by major multilateral bodies, such as the World Bank and United Nations, in tandem with powerful international development agencies, impacted significantly on South African planning dialogue during the period of transition to democracy in the early 1990s (Harrison, 2006). In that regard, scholars such as Mabin (2002) and Holland (2006) highlight the influence of the international shift in focus from planning as a spatial exercise, to planning as a form of urban management to improve the performance of local authorities which emanated from the United Nation’s Habitat Conference in Vancouver in 1976.

A further factor which played a central role in directing South African public policy direction and planning discourse in the immediate post-apartheid era was the impact of the New Public Management (NPM) reforms which had arisen in Western countries in the 1980s. The NPM reforms were driven by the quest for greater effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of public services in order to construct a ‘market-friendly, liberalized, lean, decentralized, customer-
oriented, managerial and democratic state’ (DMPD, 2003, vii). The new approach to public management, which derived much of its logic from public choice theory and new institutional economics, was results-oriented and relied on performance-related operating principles (Harrison, 2006). This shift in global thinking was particularly appealing to South African policy makers in their attempts to transform and democratize the post-apartheid state and reform the public sector (Chipkin & Lipietz, 2012). In that regard Harrison (2006) argues that a second wave of NPM reforms in the 1990s and the ‘Third Way’ governance approaches of that period significantly influenced the policy debates of the ANC leadership, which as indicated, was struggling, to define its policy direction. Third Way thinking was an eclectic approach, which supported neoliberal market policies on the one hand, but also emphasized progressive ideals such as the importance of community, commitment to equality of opportunity, public-private partnerships and investment in human development (Surender & Lewis, 2004). For Harrison (2006:189), the emphasis of Third Way thinking on integration, also referred to as ‘joined-up government’, shaped not only the international planning arena, but contributed significantly to the emergence of integrated development planning in South Africa from the mid- to late-1990s. Together with the enhanced status of local government and the decentralization of development functions and responsibilities (Cameron, 2009), integrated development planning was adopted as the ‘new planning paradigm’ which would undo the planning iniquities wrought by apartheid, and would, for the first time, include a social and economic planning focus and ‘the lexicon of participation and democracy’ (Holland, 2006:23).

Today, integrated development planning in South Africa can be considered an amalgam of international planning theory and praxis together with local inputs and influences. Harrison (2008:326), reflecting on the influence of Third Way Planning on South Africa’s IDP, makes the following statement:

> The attention given to participation, for example, has been counter-balanced by stronger systems of performance management, while the decentralist tendency of the Third Way has been implemented together with greater centralisation of policy making, financial control and monitoring. Also, despite its concern with community and participation there is a

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1 The ‘third way’ was a policy approach first advocated by the UK Labour government under Blair.
strong technocratic streak to Third Way governance, driven by a pragmatic focus on ‘getting things done’. All this is reflected in the IDP.

4.2.1 Defining Integrated Development Planning

A commonly cited definition of the process of integrated development planning is provided by the Intergovernmental Forum for Effective Planning and Development as:

*a participatory approach to integrate economic, sectoral, spatial, social, institutional, environmental and fiscal strategies in order to support the optimal allocation of scarce resources between sectors and geographical areas and across the population in a manner that provides sustainable growth, equity and the empowerment of the poor and the marginalised (DPLG, 2004:2).*

Such an integrated participatory approach acknowledges that development is a human process involving all sectors of a population. It emphasizes that people must be the ‘masters of their own destiny’ and as a development strategy discards the notion of planning ‘for’ the people, ‘but embraces the belief in development planning ‘with’ the people’. A participatory integrative planning model is a hybrid planning approach that advocates a fusion of both top-down and bottom up approaches and involves communities, government officials, the private sector, NGOs, CBOs and labour who participate in development initiatives as equal partners (Du Mhango, 1998:2).

Integrated development planning is thus intended as a holistic, multi-sectorial and multi-dimensional planning endeavour where different actors and stakeholders work cooperatively to prepare development strategies, for a particular locality, in a coordinated and cohesive manner (Foundation for Contemporary Research, 2006). Furthermore, integrated planning is meant to be a participatory and consultative process that draws together communities and other stakeholders such as business, labour, national and provincial government, parastatals and NGOs to decide on the future development of a specific municipality (Todes, Sithole & Williamson, 2007:5). National government has formulated a comprehensive legislative framework that informs the
preparation and implementation of Integrated Development Plans (IDP). In this process local government is legally compelled to consult and engage communities in a meaningful manner on the overall development of the municipal area (RSA, 2000).

Integrated development planning is thus the key instrument through which local government is intended to support the creation of a national developmental state. This integrated planning approach has not only been described as the ‘cornerstone of developmental government in South Africa’, but it is also viewed as the mechanism through which to align and co-ordinate sectorial plans, strategic priorities and budgets and resources (GGLN, 2008:53). It is a planning framework which must be followed by all municipalities in their preparation of their five year strategic plans (Achmat, 2002), and according to Harrison (2008:321) it provides a mechanism to ‘align budgeting and project implementation with strategic priorities, and to link across and coordinate the growing number of sectorial plans, programmes and projects that impact on the activities of municipal government’.

The IDP is supposed to set out the developmental vision of a municipality and, as a strategic document, it is supposed to delineate its goals and objectives. In that regard the Municipal Systems Act defines an IDP as ‘the principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all planning and development, and all decisions with regard to planning, management and development, in the municipality’ (RSA, 2000). As such, the IDP supersedes all other local council plans and is used to assist local councils to achieve their developmental mandate (Valeta & Walton, 2008). As it is prescribed in legislation that all stakeholders within a municipal area must be involved in the preparation of IDPs and in the prioritisation of development needs (RSA, 2000), integrated development planning must involve ‘the entire municipality and the citizens in that municipality to find the most effective solutions to achieve sustainable development’.

The lifespan of an IDP is linked to the five year term of office of local councillors. A new municipal council has the option of adopting the IDP of its predecessor, adopting the IDP of its predecessor with amendments or it may prepare a new plan (RSA, 2000). As indicated, municipalities are also obliged to review their IDPs on an annual basis and, in particular, to
ensure that they reflect the changes that have been introduced by new municipal councils (FCR, 2002).

Before commencing with preparations for an integrated development plan, municipalities are required to formulate a ‘process plan’ that provides guidelines on the management of the IDP process, including the method to be followed in planning, drafting, adopting and reviewing an IDP (De Visser, 2005). Other requirements of the IDP process plan is that the document must specify the structures that will manage the planning process, the mechanisms that will enable the public to participate in the IDP process, the time schedule for the planning process, the delegation of responsibilities and the methods that will be used to monitor the planning process (DPLG, 2001).

IDP methodology comprises five planning phases and an interactive and participatory process involving the involvement of all relevant stakeholders. The Department of Provincial and Local Government (now the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs) emphasizes that, in order to be meaningful, the process of preparing IDPs must be a consultative and strategic process, must comprise an integrated approach across conventional sectorial boundaries and must include an implementation-oriented planning methodology (DPLG, 2001:7). The overall process is set out as five sequential but discreet phases, each with its own specified outputs, as follows (DPLG, 2001; Achmat, 2002):

- **Phase 1 (Analysis):** This first phase provides an assessment of the existing level of development in a municipality through a consultative analysis of existing socio-economic conditions and trends in the locality. During this phase, problems and priority issues are identified.

- **Phase 2 (Strategies):** The vision for the municipality and objectives for each priority issue identified in Phase 1 are developed. Strategic options and the choice of strategy for each issue are then established and development projects are then identified.
Phase 3 (Projects): The prioritization of projects takes place together with the formation of project task teams. Indicators, project outputs and major activities are decided upon together with tentative costs and budget estimates.

Phase 4 (Integration): During this phase, the screening, adjusting and integrating of project proposals takes place and 5-year financial plans, capital investment programme and municipal action plans are prepared. Other requirements include the preparation of an integrated spatial development framework, LED programmes, a performance management system and a disaster management plan.

Phase 5 (Approval): During this stage the IDP is approved by the municipal council with the support of the municipal administration, municipal residents, the district council and other relevant role-players and stakeholders.

4.2.2 Integrated Development Planning and Intergovernmental Relations

Both the scholarly literature and policy documents emphasize that IDPs should be the product of South Africa’s intergovernmental planning system of co-operative governance. The process of integrated planning is therefore intended to include the coordinated action and involvement of the three spheres of government and the alignment and coordination of national, provincial and local government development programmes. The overall aim of such co-ordinated intergovernmental action is to ‘maximise development impact’ at municipal level (Gueli, Liebenberg & Van Huyssteen, 2007: 100). According to Patel and Powell (2008:352) the inclusion of IDPs in the intergovernmental planning system was intended ‘to ensure that national objectives are realised in municipalities’. However, despite this objective, they highlight the numerous challenges of intergovernmental planning in the IDP process and the lack of coordinated input from all three spheres.

The key findings of the IDP Hearings Report conducted in 2005 by the Western Cape Province’s Department of Local Government and Housing include the need to develop a shared paradigm for sustainable development and to improve intergovernmental investment in localities by
identifying the common targets and outcomes. Another recommendation that emanated from the IDP Hearings was the need to strengthen the strategic development role of provinces and to utilize their ability to align, monitor and support development actions. It was stated that development was hampered by the ‘absence of credible provincial development strategy to contextualize the national development agenda and provide a framework to municipalities’ (Department of Local Government and Housing, 2005:4). Other problems relating intergovernmental cooperation included tensions between community needs and the long term strategies of national government, poor resource alignment, the lack of powers and functions required by municipalities to deliver local services and their reliance on the cooperation and commitment of national and provincial government (Patel & Powel, 2008:352-353).

Commenting on the role of Provinces in developing IDPs, the Municipal Integrated Development Planning Manual (DPLG, Undated:11) states that:

*Provinces have a crucial role to play in ensuring that municipal IDPs contribute to the sustainable development of the province as a whole. In particular, the Premier's Office and the local government departments must support, guide and monitor the formulation and implementation of IDPs. They must facilitate the coordination and alignment of IDPs with the strategies and programmes of national and provincial organs of state.*

In defining the role of municipal planning within the system of co-operative government, Section 24(1-4) of the Municipal Systems Act states that:

- The planning undertaken by a municipality must be aligned with, and complement, the development plans and strategies of other affected municipalities and other organs of state so as to give effect to the principles of co-operative government contained in section 41 of the Constitution.
- Municipalities must participate in national and provincial development programmes as required in section 153(b) of the Constitution.
- If municipalities are required to comply with planning requirements in terms of national or provincial legislation, the responsible organs of state must align the implementation of
that legislation with the provisions of this Chapter; and in such implementation (i) consult with the affected municipality; and (ii) take reasonable steps to assist the municipality to meet the time limit mentioned in Section 25 and the other requirements of this Chapter applicable to its integrated development plan.

- An organ of state initiating national or provincial legislation requiring municipalities to comply with planning requirements, must consult with organised local government before the legislation is introduced in Parliament or a provincial legislature, or, in the case of subordinate legislation, before that legislation is enacted.

Whilst the IDP should inform the allocation of local resources by the provincial and national sector departments, the local sphere must also consider national and provincial programmes when developing local and policies and strategies (DPLG, 2001). This is intended to ensure the alignment of policies, programmes and strategies of the different spheres of government.

4.2.3 The purpose of Integrated Development Planning

Integrated development planning is intended as a micro-level development planning strategy to be used by local government to transform and democratize grassroots development and as a mechanism to promote participatory democracy through the involvement of a range of role players. By design the IDP is intended to enable local government to be developmental in its duties and to ensure that it makes optimal use of resources in its pursuit of sustainable socio-economic development, and the reduction of poverty and social inequality (DPLG, undated).

The IDP, is thus the focal point of South Africa’s developmental local government system and it is the mechanism that through which municipalities are supposed to address social transformation and to play a distinctive developmental role (Frodin, 2009). As such, the IDP is not only a legislative imperative for local government, but a ‘binding strategic planning instrument’ (Achmat, 2002:5). Its critical development role, moreover, is acknowledged by the UNDP (2002:1) as ‘the principal planning instrument that guides and informs all planning and decision-making in municipalities throughout the country. The IDP embraces many of the characteristics of Local Agenda 21 (LA21) in terms of its underlying philosophy, principles and
processes and consequently represents a key vehicle for local government to fulfil its developmental role’.

The Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG, undated: 9) provides a list of the intended benefits of integrated development planning to various stakeholders in the planning process. Some of these benefits are listed below:

- **Municipal Council**: Provides accountable leadership and development direction; enables cooperative relationships with stakeholders and communities; enables access to development resources and external support; allows for the monitoring of the performance of municipal officials.

- **Councillors**: Provides councillors with a mechanism for communicating with their constituencies; enables councillors to represent their constituencies effectively by making informed decisions; enables councillors to measure their own performance.

- **Municipal Officials**: Guides business unit planning within the municipal administration; provides municipal officials with a mechanism to communicate with councillors; enables officials to contribute to the municipality's vision; permits officials to be part of the decision making process.

- **Communities and other stakeholders**: Gives stakeholders an opportunity to inform the municipal council what their development needs are; gives them an opportunity to determine the municipality's development direction; provides a mechanism through which to communicate with their councillors and the governing body; provides a mechanism through which they can measure the performance of the councillors and the municipality as a whole.
4.2.5 Public participation in Integrated Development Planning

Numerous sources emphasize the importance of public participation in the IDP process. Cameron (2001:104) highlights the participatory imperative of IDPs and its specific intent namely to ‘assess community needs, prioritise such needs, develop integrated frameworks and goals to meet these needs, formulate strategies to achieve the goals and implement programmes and projects’. In that respect, Section 3.3 of the White Paper (RSA, 1998b) states that ‘one of the strengths of integrated development planning is that it recognises the linkages between development, delivery and democracy. Building local democracy is a central role of local government, and municipalities should develop strategies and mechanisms (including, but not limited to, participative planning) to continuously engage with citizens, business and community groups’. In order to meet this objective Mosana (2005) observes, ‘a municipality must develop a culture of municipal governance that compliments representative government with a system of participatory governance’. He further emphasizes that municipalities must not only provide an environment which fosters community participation, but which encourages and builds the capacity of councillors, community members and staff to enable meaningful participation through the allocation of the requisite resources.

In 2000, the Department of Provincial and Local Government proposed the formation of an IDP Representative Forum to encourage and facilitate stakeholder and community participation in all stages of the IDP process. It was proposed that such a forum would consist of members of the executive committee of the Municipal Council and councillors, including district councillors, traditional leaders, ward committee representatives, heads of departments and senior officials from municipal and government departments (Losch, 2006).

Ward committees and ward based planning are a critical element of the IDP process. This system is aligned to the national policy framework to ensure stakeholder mobilization and citizen participation in development initiatives. A ward committee is an area-based committee whose boundaries coincide with ward boundaries. The Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) makes provision for the establishment of ward committees as a vehicle for encouraging community participation in municipal matters. Chapter 2 (19) of the Act requires a municipality
to consult with communities in the performance of its functions and in exercising its powers and this consultative process is institutionalized in Chapter 4 (RSA, 1998a).

Ward committees are viewed as an essential component of good local governance. For the DPLG (2005b), ward committees represent the interface between local municipalities and communities. In a similar vein, Putu (2006:5) declares that ward committees ‘serve as a cord which articulates the new system of local government to the majority of the people, more especially to previously disadvantaged communities’. He outlines their role as actively participating in core municipal business such as integrated developmental planning, budgeting and the municipal performance management process. According to the National Policy Framework on Public Participation (RSA, 2005a), ward committees must be impartial, must act as independent advisory bodies and must function as forums for deliberative democracy.

Considerable concern has been expressed both in the literature and in official documents about the effectiveness of ward committees. This is evident in the Ward Committee Resource Book (2005:6) which outlines the challenges to the effectiveness of the ‘Ward Participatory System’. These relate mainly to inexperience in committee procedures and participation in committee meetings, insufficient knowledge of budgets and financial statements and their roles and responsibilities as ward members. Other problems that have been raised surrounding ward committee representatives refer to poor communication and feedback of information to their communities. Piper and Von Lieres (2008) cite poor implementation and functioning of the ward committee system, political power struggles, party and partisan conflict over the composition and operation of ward committees, party and partisan conflict over the establishment of ward committees and party conflict over the implementation of ward committee policy.

Several other measures have introduced the process of citizen participation including Community Based Planning (CBP) which is a participatory planning methodology used at ward level in order to enhance community engagement action and foster ownership of development initiatives. The CPB process aims to assist local government in responding to community needs, in improving the quality of plans and the quality of services delivered. It was envisaged that the CPB process would lead to improved agency plans, ward plans and IDPs (CBP Guide, 2005),
although there is little documented evidence to date to suggest that they had have strengthened participatory process in any significant way. The appointment of Community Development Workers (CDWs) in 2003 was a further initiative introduced to support ward committees in terms of IDPs, CBPs and ward plans. The function of CDWs includes providing information on government services and support structures, facilitating community based planning in local areas, facilitating implementation of community projects and providing technical support in the compilation of reports and the monitoring and evaluation of projects (DPLG, 2005b).

4.2.6 Integrated Development Planning and Performance Management Systems

The Performance Management System (PMS) is seen as the mechanism by which developmental local governments and stakeholders are able to measure progress towards specified goals and targets and to hold institutions and individuals accountable for their duties and use of resources (Davids, 2006). A comprehensive legislative and policy framework informs the system of performance measurement in South Africa, and this includes the Constitution, the Batho Pele White Paper (1998), the White Paper on Local Government (1998), the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998), the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), the Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations (No 796 of 2001) and the Local Government Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003). The Batho Pele White Paper (Department of Public Service and Administration, 1997), in particular, laid the foundation for the adoption of a performance management system in local government. In order to improve the quality of the Public Sector and to adhere to its mantra of ‘People First’, emphasis was placed on consultation with citizens, the setting of service standards, equal access to services, courtesy and consideration, provision of information, openness and transparency and redress and value for money (ibid). However, the two core policy documents are central to the institutionalization of performance management at the local level, namely the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) and the Municipal Planning and Performance Regulations (796 of 2001). The preamble of the Municipal Systems Act (2000) emphasises the important role of participation in performance management noting that communities have an integral role to play in the affairs of municipalities ‘and in particular in planning, service delivery and performance management’.
Chapter 6 of the Municipal Systems Act (2000) sets out the conditions for the establishment of a performance management system, including the criteria for target setting, monitoring and review. Section 38 of the Act requires each municipality to establish a PMS which is proportionate to its resources, circumstances and in line with the objectives, indicators and targets specified in its Integrated Development Plan. Section 41 further requires that a municipality set appropriate key performance indicators and measurable performance targets in order to be able to monitor and measure performance on an annual basis. At the same time Section 42 reiterates the importance of the active involvement of local communities, noting that ‘a municipality, through appropriate mechanisms, processes and procedures established in terms of Chapter 4, must involve the local community in the development, implementation and review of the municipality’s performance management system and, in particular, allow the community to participate in the setting of appropriate key performance indicators and performance targets in terms of integrated development planning for the municipality’. Taking into account administrative and financial capacity, Section 51 directs municipalities to facilitate a culture of public service and accountability amongst their staff and for them to be performance orientated and focussed on the developmental objects of local government.

Section 7 (1) of the Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations (2001) provides the following definition of a municipality’s Performance Management System:

\[
\text{a framework that describes and represents how the municipality’s cycle and processes of performance planning, monitoring, measurement, review, reporting and improvement will be conducted, organized and managed, including determining the roles of the different role players.}
\]

Section 7 (2) of the Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations (RSA, 2001) requires further that the PMS of a municipality must demonstrate how it is to operate and be managed from the planning stage up to the stages of performance review and reporting. It must also clarify the roles and responsibilities of each role-player, including the local community, in the functioning of the system. It must further clarify the processes of implementing the system within the framework of the integrated development planning process, must determine the
frequency of reporting and the lines of accountability for performance, and must provide for the procedure by which the system is linked to the municipality’s integrated development planning processes. In addition, Section 9 sets out the requirements of key performance measures which include input indicators, output indicators and outcome indicators in respect of each development priority and objective. It also stipulates that a municipality must insure that communities are involved in the process of setting key performance indicators (ibid).

The Local Government Municipal Finance Management Act, No. 56 of 2003 requires that a municipal council must prepare a service delivery and budget implementation plan (SDBIP) indicating service delivery targets and performance indicators for each quarter. Section 53 of the MFMA requires that annual performance agreements for the municipal manager and all senior managers, as specified in Section 57(1)(6) of the Municipal Systems Act, must promote sound financial management and must be linked to the measurable performance objectives approved with the budget and to the service delivery and budget implementation plan. Sections 68 and 69 of the Act set out the requirements in terms of budget preparation and implementation, whereas Sections 72 and 88 provide guidelines in terms of mid-year budget and performance assessment of service delivery.

For Kambuwa and Wallis (2002) the adoption of Performance Management Systems (PMS) was propelled by the democratic imperatives of the South African developmental state, the need to institutionalise state accountability processes and to increase the chances of the IDP processes in achieving the desired results. Furthermore, the introduction of performance management systems was intended to strengthen both individual and institutional performance in the public sector. The performance monitoring system was also introduced to strengthen community oversight and to allow them to monitor and evaluate the performance of political office bearers and officials in their municipalities. Kambuwa and Wallis (2002) elaborated as follows:

*An overriding expectation was that the new PMS would be a tool that would empower communities to determine their needs and assess the performance of their municipalities. It would give credence to the idea of a bottom up approach – an idea of long standing in*
community development ideology. If implemented, this would be a radical departure from previous policies and practice (Ibid:8).

4.3 Concluding comments

This chapter has looked at the role of local government in the broader project to establish a developmental state in South Africa. In what may be viewed as a top-down and bottom-up approach, the South African model of a democratic developmental state assigns considerable importance to a decentralised and people-centred form of government. Although, as was discussed, the idea of developmental local government first advanced in the 1998 White Paper on Developmental Local Government was largely descriptive, the concept has assumed a wider meaning and it is increasingly portrayed as a foundation stone of a national developmental state. This is because developmental local government is expected to be the frontline between the state and ordinary citizens and the vehicle for the delivery of basic services and the promotion of local economic development. In that respect, it was seen that a key instrument established to promote developmental local government is the process of integrated development planning. The IDP process is not only intended to ensure that planning at the level of the local state is integrated, both within a municipality as well with other spheres, but that it also embodies participatory principles and practices.

The chapter which follows examines theoretical understandings of participation in the literature and its practice in South Africa. It points to the fact that whilst participatory democracy is seen to be self-evidently good, the practice of participatory development is fraught with many challenges and it frequently fails those whom it is intended to assist the most, the poor and marginalised. This chapter is also intended to provide a background to the analysis of participatory practices in the case study area of Delft.
The preceding two chapters discussed understandings of both government officials and other political and social commentators of the essence of a democratic developmental state and its potential role in post-apartheid South Africa. This included a focus on the local state and what might constitute developmental local government. Here attention was focused on the need to advance citizen participation in decision making within the local state and on the use of integrated development planning as a means to that end. The chapter which follows provides an overview of theoretical debates on participation in the literature. It then proceeds to a discussion of the way in which participation is conceived in legislation and policy, as well as in practice, in South Africa today.

Throughout the world, participation has become a key concept in the contemporary development lexicon and it is frequently used synonymously, and with much optimism and fervour, with deliberative democracy, good governance and citizenship. The raison d’ etat for the practice of participation and public deliberation is seen to be its central role in legitimising government actions and strengthening political systems in developing countries. However, over the course of the past two decades, there has been mounting disillusionment with the nature and outcome of engagements between the local state and society. Some theorists are of the view that the very notion of participation is ambiguous, contested and value-laden, surrounded by much conceptual confusion and inadequate grounding in development theory (Mohan & Hickey, 2004). Both practitioners and theorists have highlighted its marginalising and divisive nature which is seen to be a consequence of its mechanistic use as a tool to validate pre-conceived policy initiatives via top-down procedures reminiscent of the developmental approaches of the 1960s. Despite this critique, however, the acceptance of public participation as a definitive solution to the challenges facing developing countries continues unabated.

Within the bounds of this framework, this chapter seeks firstly to conceptualise participation within the context of the evolution of people-centred development approaches. Attention will then turn to locating participation and its institutionalisation within a more radical and
politicised participatory discourse, followed by an articulation of the dialectical relationship between popular agency and social structures and the exercise of human agency within the confines and constraints imposed by structures of the state. Thereafter, the focus will shift to an analysis of participation as a spatial practice and an investigation into the configurations and dynamics of power relations which infuse spaces of public engagement. Within the context of the foregoing analyses, the final section will explore the different levels of participation as a way of understanding current institutionalised practices and power dynamics.

5.1 Evolution of people-centred development approaches and public participation

During the late 1960s, disillusionment with orthodox development theories and their failure to address poverty and bring about transformation in less developed nations led to a systematic search for alternative conceptual analyses and a shift in focus from economic growth to the social dimensions of development. Between the 1970s and 1980s, participatory approaches were considered the *sine qua non* of development practice and development efforts increasingly promoted ‘people-centred development’, ‘state–society synergies’, ‘participatory democracy’ ‘bottom-up planning’ and ‘grassroots development’ (Rahman, 1993; World Bank, 1996; Hemson, 2007; Jennings, 2007).

People-centred development discourse emphasised that people should be the architects of their own future (Burkey, 1993; Chambers, 1997), and focused on the role of social capital, capabilities, freedom and the ability of ordinary people to manage development themselves (Ul Haqhas, 1995; Sen, 1999, 2002; Nussbaum, 2000). Following this perspective, participatory development would enable the poor to influence, implement and control activities which are essential to their development through interaction with agencies, officials and technical consultants (Burkey (1993). A new participatory rhetoric based on ideas of self-reliance, capacity building, equality and empowerment gained rapid currency during these decades and was used to constantly reinforce beliefs of what were seen to be the key advantages of a participating public.

The rationale behind participatory approaches to development was that grassroots support provides valuable insight into local conditions, facilitates the implementation of the planning process and improves development outcomes (Gupta, Grandvoinnet & Romani, 2004). It was
seen to be associated with the actualising of human rights, the enabling of social justice and the building of social capital. Mainstream or ‘populist’ participatory approaches of the 1980s emphasised the value of tapping into local knowledge and enabling the beneficiaries of development interventions to participate in all stages of the process (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). During this decade it was generally believed that it was not possible to implement any meaningful type of development initiative without following participatory procedures. For many a participatory approach was viewed as the ‘magic bullet’ for addressing inequality and social change, leading Chambers (1977) to declare participation to be a ‘new paradigm’ of development.

However, revisionist thinking in the 1990s led a ‘critical backlash’ against mainstream participatory practices (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). What were seen as palliative participatory approaches and an ‘appropriation of participatory discourse’, particularly by organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, evinced strong criticism from a number of quarters (Cooke, 2004; Kesby, 2010). During this era, major international institutions were charged with depoliticising development, and by implication participation, through their narrow technicist focus on project effectiveness and cost reduction, which ignored such issues as structural inequality, asymmetrical power relations and social justice (Leal, 2010; Gaventa, 2006; Williams, 2004). Mohan and Hickey (2004:59) ascribe the depoliticising of participatory praxis to ‘an absence of a coherent theory of participation that seeks to explain and articulate the role of agency within development processes’ and the inability to ‘theorize the potential contribution of participation to a transformatory political process’. For these authors, participation needed to be aligned to the notion of citizenship, social justice and development as social change, rather than its use as a ‘technical fix’ for problems of poverty and inequality. Emerging participatory discourse during this period thus placed emphasis on what was considered the vital link between participation and transformation in existing economic, social and political structures and on the need for strategies that encompassed ‘organizational change’ (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001).

5.2 Understanding participation

A review of the literature from different perspectives reveals the multi-dimensional nature and complexity of the concept of participation and its shifting role and focus over time. Moreover, the varied contexts of participation and the differing ideological underpinnings of
its advocates further complicate an understanding of the concept. Drawing on the ideas of Burkey (1993) and Oakley (1991), Penderis (1996:127) distinguishes between participation as a means to achieve the objectives of development programmes, as opposed to participation as an end ‘which lays emphasis on participation as a process which awakens levels of consciousness, constitutes self-transformation and develops and strengthens the capacity of beneficiary groups in development initiatives’. Following Nelson and Wright (1995:1), these two perspectives imply very different state–society power relations, with the first, focusing on efficiency and improved project outcomes, seen to be less empowering to citizens. In support of this view, Rahnema (1992:117) points to the way in which participation is used by governments as a coercive tool to increase productivity and reduce costs. Although such practices ‘are commonly cloaked in the rhetoric of empowerment’, Cleaver (2001:27) maintains that in practice they provide limited opportunity for empowerment and transformation.

Participation, according to some writers, should ideally be a transformation process and a proactive ‘learning by doing’ exercise and people-centred approach to development (Nelson & Wright, 1995; Oakley, 1991; Burkey, 1993). It is also seen to be essential in a democratic and accountable society that enables the exercise of agency and citizenship (Ayiar, 2010). Participation moves beyond representative democracy and its ideology is ‘driven by a belief in the importance of entrusting citizens with the responsibility to shape their own future’ (Jennings, 2007:1). The view of participation as ‘popular agency’ recognises the ‘existing capacities of people as active claims-making agents’ (Hickey & Mohan, 2004:3) and citizens are acknowledged as able participants in the development process. Scholars such as Yadav (1980) and Padarath (2006) inform us that the only viable approach to successful participatory planning entails a meaningful decision-making partnership between decision makers, planners, researchers and the community. This notion of participation not only enhances development practice and improves service delivery at the local level (Buccus, Hemson, Hicks & Piper, 2007) but also contributes to deepening the democratic process.

At the simplest level, public participation refers to the engagement in the decision-making process that occurs between civil society stakeholders and various democratic structures and institutions of the state, particularly at the local level (Brodie, Cowling & Nissan, 2009). Similarly, for Rowe and Frewer (2004:512), public participation is viewed as ‘consulting and involving members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-making and policy-forming
activities of organisations or institutions responsible for policy development’. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that engaging, consulting and involving local people rarely results in the anticipated goals of empowerment and transformation of the status quo, unless there is popular agency and true representation of the most marginalised sectors of society and in the context where there is equal control over the participatory process. According to all accounts this is a rare occurrence in the development arena. Thus, a more in-depth investigation of the political nature of participatory relations and the role of power within formal institutionalised spaces provides an important framework for analysing state-society relations in the context of a democratic developmental state.

5.3 Politicising and institutionalising participation

The linking of citizen participation to the claiming of basic rights has led to the growing politicisation of the concept (where it had previously been viewed as a technocratic tool). The expansion of the participatory agenda from a fairly narrow focus on beneficiaries as subjects, to a broader view on democratic governance has, in particular, succeeded in politicising participation through the promotion of a radical and transformative understanding of citizenship. According to Gaventa (2002), the embedding of participation within human rights principles serves to elevate the status of participants from mere beneficiaries of projects to the ‘legitimate claimants’ of development initiatives (Gaventa, 2002). The politicisation of participation has also led to its association with the idea of good governance. Features of good governance, as mentioned, include sound financial regulation, institutional reform, transparency and the expansion of human capital (Marangos, 2008; Rodrik, 2002), which incorporate factors such as participation, consensus orientation, equity, efficiency and accountability (Stiglitz, 1998). The progressive incursion of rights-based public participation into the political arena has led to the institutionalisation of participatory systems and processes. It has also prompted a rethinking of the nature of state and civil society relations and has led to a call to refurbish participatory institutions. In that regard, Gaventa (2004a:25) asserts that a ‘key challenge for the 21st century is the construction of new relationships between ordinary people and the institutions – especially those of government – which affect their lives’. However, he stresses that it is the nature of these new institutional arrangements and the power relationships that emerge within and around these spaces that will determine the level of inclusiveness of participatory democracy. In similar fashion Williams (2004:100) maintains that the institutionalisation of participation could potentially develop ‘a new
political imagery’ of empowerment by reshaping current practices and by advancing new ways of interacting in development processes. Within this context, supportive state officials can potentially ‘open up spaces of empowerment’ at the local level, build the political capacities of citizens and provide opportunities for political learning. This, in turn, will enable citizens to demand accountability and responsiveness to their expressed claims and, in so doing, to influence key decisions and thereby repoliticise participation (ibid). Such repoliticised, inclusive participation at the local level will enable citizens, as agents, to claim their rightful place as ‘makers and shapers’ of development initiatives, rather than ‘users’, ‘choosers’ (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2000) and ‘passive consumers’ of predetermined interventions (Babu, 2010).

5.4 Broadening the participatory agenda: Agency and citizenship

A major limitation of participatory theory is the lack of consideration of the role and potential of agency (Mohan & Hickey, 2004) which is viewed as essential in order to move participation from a technical device, or ‘tyranny’, to participation as a vehicle of structural change and transformation (Cleaver, 2004). The work of theorists such as Bourdieu, Giddens and Archer add depth to an analysis of participation in terms of understanding the complex relationship between human agency and social structures.

Bourdieu’s (1972, 1979) examination of the dynamics of power relations, the influence of external structures on social action and the role of social capital in producing and reproducing inequality provides an interesting analytical lens through which to view and understand the complex dynamics of state–society relations. The construction of social reality by agents, he asserts, is determined by their perceived position in social space and this hierarchical position, or ‘habitus’, is in turn shaped by the economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital or assets that they possess and the multiplicity of interactions in their personal life (ibid, 1979). This hierarchical status, conferred on them by their perceived position, influences their ability to engage with authorities. Thus, the possession of different forms of capital determines the form of social reality that agents construct and it is this perceived form that enables the (re)production of durable forms of hegemonic relations (ibid, 1990).

In his theory of structuration, Giddens (1984:131) discusses the ‘duality of structure’ which implies a dialectical relationship between actors and structures rather than a deterministic one.
suggested by Marxist doctrine. This ‘duality’ refers to the repetition of social action which creates structures, while the structures enable interaction within the social system. He explains the ‘duality of structure’ as follows:

*Human social activities, like some self-reproducing items in nature, are recursive. That is to say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated by them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible (Giddens, 1984:2).*

Giddens’s (1984) notion of recursivity implies that structures both enable and constrain action which in turn produces and reproduces structures. Social reality is the result of ‘social practices ordered across space and time’ and social practices are continually repeated, or recursive, reproducing ‘the conditions that make these activities possible’ (1984:2). Within the recursive ordering of social practices, the knowledge of actors plays a decisive role. This knowledge enables reflexivity of social practices as agents continually reflect, rationalise and monitor social and physical aspects of the specific context in which they find themselves, which in turn impacts on their action. Thus, continual inputs of knowledge enable ‘reflexive ordering and reordering of social relations’ which in turn impacts on actions and behaviour of individuals and groups (Giddens, 1990:16).

However, the actions of agents imply that power as agency is a reflection of capability, not intentions and it is the exertion of power that creates an effect and impact (ibid, 1990). Thus for Giddens, knowledge, power and capability play a critical role in both the actions of agents and the structures that are created over space and time. While authoritative and allocative resources and sets of formulated rules are properties within such structures that enable actors to reproduce social systems, these properties also function as a mode of control (ibid, 1984). There is similarity in the work of Giddens and Bourdieu in terms of the understanding of the relations between structure and agency. Both theorists place an emphasis on the conscious intentions of social agents. Thus Bourdieu stresses the significance of the *habitus* of individual actors, which limits or enables interaction, while Giddens places emphasis on the reflexivity of actors which enables them to transform social reality through reflection and rationalisation.
Archer’s (1995) notion of analytical dualism draws on Giddens’s structuration theory and posits that, while structures and agency are interlinked and function interdependently, their initial form over time is constrained and recreated to produce new forms under changing cultural and historical conditions. This she refers to as morphogenetic sequencing, which enable’s one to analyse the internal micro-dynamics of structures of a particular period and investigate their inter-linkages over time. Her concept of central conflation views structure and agency as co-constitutive; structures are reproduced by the exercise of agency of actors, but their actions and choices are both constrained and enabled by existing structures.

In line with Giddens, Cerny (1990:4) maintains that neither the structure nor the agent ‘determines’ the other. While agreeing that they are ‘inextricably intertwined’ and choices and alternatives are constrained, he asserts that ‘the actual pattern of constraint (and opportunity), is itself in dynamic flux, filtering and transforming the choices and actions of agents in ways that can either reinforce or modify existing structures (or both at the same time) in complex ways’. Cerny draws attention to an additional dynamic, noting that actions are limited in such settings due to tension over accessing scarce resources, particular rules of the ‘game’ and uncertainties over the role of actors within the ‘games’ that are being played out. Even within wider structures, ‘clusters’ of games emerge and opposing groups, with different stakes in the ‘game’, compete against each other, which could result in ‘dynamic tension’ between groups (ibid:6). In order to claim ‘radical’ citizenship which is their constitutional right, actors must therefore function within the confines and constraints defined by the political structures of the state. While agents can reinforce, modify and institutionalise structures by their choices, opportunities for change and transformation are limited and dependent on the political will, commitment and responsiveneness of the state to transformation.

The actions and choices of citizens, furthermore, are shaped and influenced by broader transnational political structures and forces which not only constrain choice but reduce and limit the leverage and decision-making powers of civil society. As agency is embedded within participatory institutional structures (which, in turn, are sited within larger formations), decision making occurs within predetermined parameters which restrict and constrain options and preferences (Heller & Evans, 2010). Such constraints constitute control and domination and are a reflection of the different power hierarchies and the supremacy of the instituting agents over society. Gaventa (2006:25), building on the work of Lukes, also
reflects on the broader global dimension and the vertical shifting of powers that impact on local participatory practices. In so doing he devised a three-dimensional model, the ‘power cube’, to analyse the types of participatory spaces that are created, the interplay of different types of power within such spaces, and the relationship between both spaces and levels of power within the global, national and local sphere. Although separate, all three dimensions are interrelated, implying that a change in circumstances on one dimension will impact on the others. Gaventa uses this model to consider the transformative possibilities within different participatory spaces in terms of their different manifestations of power and as a means to analyse participatory dynamics and devise strategies to strengthen praxis (ibid).

5.5 Formulations of place and space

Drawing on the work of such authors as Walmsley (1988), Hart (1986) and Krupat (1985), Penderis (1996:4) depicts the concept of place as conjuring up notions of ‘belonging, shared values and common concerns … imbued with strikingly different meaning and significance’ which confers both an identity on its occupants and ‘implies an integration of nature and culture’. Closely linked and within place, space exists as a three-dimensional bounded territory where ‘the various spatial dimensions articulate with one another and over time exert a powerful influence on place’ (ibid:5).

Spaces are thus centres of meaning, expressions of intentions and aspirations constructed by human experience (Buttimer, 1979; Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1975), where groups and individuals interact either at the microspace personal level, mesospace neighbourhood level or macrospace city level (Penderis, 1996; Weightman, 1985). Conversely, exclusion from space alienates and undermines feelings of identity, belonging and self-worth, manifesting powerlessness, lack of control, vulnerability and emotional deprivation (Huttman, 1993; Knox, 1987; Ley, 1983; Marcussen, 1990).

While a sense of place relates to prevailing personal and social arrangements, a specific locality is influenced by the wider economic and political structures of the broader region. Places are also mediums for social interaction, and different localities provide the infrastructure for social relationships and the context for the integration of people into collective groups with shared cultures. As such, while social space is a medium for social interaction and individuals and groups make their own ‘histories’, the environment of the
local milieu may be both enabling and constraining and people’s responses will vary as they draw on knowledge and resources in attempts to transform their realities. Politically defined space, in particular, can enable or constrain according to the nature and form of governance of the political superstructure or state apparatus (Peet, 1993; Thrift, 1983).

The foregoing discussion sets the context for the following sections which will focus more specifically on the form, content and purpose of participatory spaces and the dynamics of power which imbue and surround such spaces.

5.5.1 Participatory spaces

Participation, as intimated above, takes place in a variety of spaces created for different reasons, by different stakeholder groups, with different terms of engagement and different sets of dynamics. While some institutional forms are transient events, others are more resilient and regularised. In the participatory political sphere, spaces are constructed by ‘enablers’ and inhabited by ‘engagers’, to borrow Escobar’s (2011) terms, where enablers delineate and define the spaces according to predetermined specific goals and either summon or invite engagers to participate in deliberations in order to fulfill the requirements of participatory democracy.

A profusion of literature on the construction of participatory spaces and a growing number of terms and catchphrases has been employed to describe these spaces, often reflecting the power struggles that frequently inhabit such spaces. Institutionalised spaces are depicted as ‘closed’, ‘well-behaved’, ‘patronising’, ‘summoned’, ‘invited’ and ‘provided’, in contrast to popular spaces which are portrayed as ‘contested’, ‘claimed’, ‘captured’, ‘invented’, ‘resisted’ and ‘conquered’ sites of interaction (see Aiyar, 2010; Miraftab, 2004; Escobar, 2011; Gaventa 2004b; Cornwall, 2002a, 2002b). In that respect, Gaventa (2004a:35) provides a continuum of different types of participatory spaces in terms of how they were created and in whose interests. He differentiates between three different types of spaces. Firstly, ‘closed’ spaces are the exclusive domain of a group of decision makers, operating ‘behind closed doors’, and entry into these spaces is denied to outsiders. Secondly, ‘invited’ spaces are those shaped by state authorities or organisations in order to create a forum for citizens who are then requested to participate in development initiatives. Third on the continuum are ‘claimed’ spaces formed by the less powerful public and individuals, either to
challenge the more dominant or to raise common concerns that are not being adequately addressed by authoritative figures. Each of these spaces, he maintains, interact dynamically with each other, ‘constantly opening and closing through struggles for legitimacy and resistance, co-optation and confrontation’ (ibid). They are thus never static or void of social relations.

Cornwall (2004b:76), in her discussion of participation as a spatial practice, highlights the situated, bounded nature of participatory spaces as potential permeable arenas for participatory opportunities. Such spaces, she asserts, could represent informal opportunities for local people to come together, or more complex multi-stakeholder gatherings comprising government, civil society, the private sector and donors, as follows:

A space can be emptied or filled, permeable or sealed; it can be an opening, an invitation to speak or act. Spaces can also be clamped shut, voided of meaning, or depopulated as people turn their attention elsewhere (2004a:1).

Examining participation as a spatial practice enables an analysis of power relations and the exercise of citizenship within arenas of public engagement (Cornwall, 2002a). Cornwall’s (2002c) categorisation of participatory spaces differentiates between institutional and non-institutional spaces. Government-established participatory arenas, or ‘invited spaces’, although offering potential for state/civil society collaboration and the exercise of citizen voice, are frequently reduced to hierarchical sites of inequitable relations, which reproduce dependency and undermine the potential for meaningful participation and deliberation. Such spaces often reflect particular contexts and ‘histories of governance’ and ‘cultures of politics’ which shape relations and rules of engagement and limit opportunities for the enactment of citizenship (Cornwall, 2004a:2). New institutional spaces thus often reflect previous social relations and the power dynamics of earlier times, and consequently ‘simply creating a new institution is not enough to purge it of older associations’ (Cornwall, 2002a:3). ‘Popular’ spaces, on the other hand, are spaces of ‘radical possibility, (and) of resistance’ (2002b:78) where people congregate voluntarily as ‘expressions of public dissent’ (2004a:2) or to secure rights which are denied to them. These are ‘organic’ public spaces created by ordinary ‘like-minded’ people who come together to influence decision making and policy ‘from below’, or to take an ‘oppositional stance’, expose corruption, air grievances and hold institutions accountable (2002a:25).
Both Lefebvre and Foucault offer insights to understanding the production of space and the interplay of social relations within it. For Lefebvre (1991:14), there are different modes of space and, besides physical space, mental space and social space ‘involves, underpins and presupposes the other’. Hence, past experiences and social relations leave their footprint on new spaces, and thus animate new social relations and practices. As social products, spaces are never vacant or neutral, but function as a medium of ongoing production of social relations fashioned and reshaped differently by different sectors of society. Similarly, Foucault (1967) describes the production of space, not as a ‘homogeneous and empty space’, but as a site of clusters of social relations. Like Lefebvre, he draws attention to the many types of spaces such as private space, public space, family space, social space and even useful space, which can be appropriated, delimited, formalised and contested. Foucault (1977) points out that some sites are inclusionary and penetrable, while others are exclusionary and entry is restricted through the ‘disciplining power’ of officials. Gaventa (2006), building on the theme of exclusionary spaces, notes that those who shape the spaces have power over the spaces, although this power shifts continuously and a powerful group in one space could have considerably less power in another space.

Other scholars comment on the political motivations behind the construction of contemporary ‘invited’ spaces. Many have evolved over time in tandem with government reforms and democratic decentralisation and have been created as a means to legitimise decision making, enhance efficiency and strengthen accountability by ‘inviting’ citizens to participate in government-induced deliberative processes (Ayiar, 2010). Although such sites have the potential to enhance state accountability, responsiveness and public scrutiny, and to improve the quality and intensity of state-society interactions, in reality these ‘invited’ structures as arenas for state and civil society interactions are frequently, following Gramsci (1971), places of hegemony and platforms for control and repression to preserve the status quo rather than an opportunity for citizenship and the exercise of agency.

5.5.2 Contested participation: Issues of power

Participatory ideology and its praxis was conceived as a radical mechanism for emancipation of the poor and marginalised and the transformation of underlying socio-political structures, practices and power relations that reproduce inequality, injustice and social exclusion. Such
ideology is embedded in Marxist political economy and Freirean philosophy, rationalised as the pursuit of social justice through radical transformation. During the 1960s and 1970s scholars such as Paulo Freire, Orlando Fals Borda and Mohammed Anisur Rahman advocated an emancipatory form of participation and the creation of a critical consciousness and fundamental change in power relationships. Such drastic, transformative participation would challenge oppressive structures that reproduced inequalities, marginalisation and ‘dehumanising’ circumstances, and would, instead, produce ‘self-conscious people’ (Rahman, 1993:13) who would be ‘beings for themselves’ in their ‘struggle to be more fully human’ (Freire, 1970:29). While such freedom would enable ordinary people to determine their own destinies through a process of conscientisation, transformation of the status quo would ‘require a radical critique and reorientation of social theory and practice’ (Fals Borda, 2001:27).

Since the 1990s, participatory discourse has increasingly focused on the complexities of the surrounding power relations occurring within institutional spaces designed to function as arenas of interaction between state and civil society to enable the exercise of citizenship and the fostering of social justice (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2007). Scholars such as Harbers (2007:43) challenge the ‘democratising potential’ of participation and current practice that provides evidence of ‘undemocratic elements of deliberation’, while others highlight the continued practice of using participation as an element of coercion and control (White, 1996). Cleaver (2004) draws attention to the predominant practical and technical development discourse, concerned with efficiency, cost efficiency and enhancing the visibility of collective actions, noting that it is ‘commonly cloaked in the rhetoric of empowerment’. She advocates a far deeper consideration of radical empowerment discourse that calls for a more drastic ‘transformation of structures of subordination’.

A number of writers have emphasised the importance of a more in-depth understanding of the unequal power relations and contestations that occur within institutionalised participatory structures. Conceiving participatory sites as centres of resistance and contestation enables one to explore ‘the micropolitics of encounters’ within such spaces (Cornwall & Coelho, 2007:11). In that regard, Hickey and Mohan (2004:238), attribute the failure to bring about transformation in these spaces to insufficient consideration of issues of power and politics and the need for ‘a conceptual relocation of participation within a radical politics of development … and radicalized understanding of citizenship’ as opposed to mainstream
participation which is largely voluntaristic in nature. Such an approach, however, would require ‘a more radical reconfiguration’ of state–society interactions and responsibilities (Cornwall, 2004a). Cleaver (2001:36) urges participation practitioners to question entrenched beliefs that participation is essentially ‘good’ and that its practice ensures success and issues of power and politics must be ‘avoided as divisive and obstructive’.

In their analysis of the dynamics of power relations, Nelson and Wright (1995:7–14) identify three models of power which can be used to investigate different aspects of participation and empowerment. Their first model, referred to as ‘power to’, relates to the growth of human power through the transformation of knowledge and through everyday encounters which stimulate confidence and capacity. The second model, referred to as ‘power over’, relates to the participation of state and civil society actors in political decision making and their influence over development decisions and control of resources. The third model, ‘decentred’ power, which – contrary to the ‘power over’ model – views power as subjectless, interacting invisibly within and between discourse, institutions, actors and flows of events within the ambit of the state.

Gaventa (2006:24), building on the analysis of Nelson and Wright (1995), adds two further dimensions of power. The first of these is power within, which he describes as the acquisition of self-confidence and awareness which enables agents to participate meaningfully. The second, power with, refers to the highest level of power which arises through collective action and as a consequence of the synergies created between participating bodies. Gaventa’s categorisation implies a progressive increase in power, from an initial stage of no power or control to a stage where citizens have equal power and control of decision making.

Further analysis of the dimensions of power is provided by authors such as Chambers (2005), who describes the hierarchical power relations between ‘uppers’ and ‘lowers’, using the North–South analogy, whereby powerful ‘uppers’ control and determine the activities of powerless ‘lowers’. This distinction has particular relevance for deepening our understanding of state–society interactions at the local level, where power is institutionally centred and frequently used by authorities as a coercive measure. In that connection, Cooke and Kothari (2001:8) speak of ‘participatory decisions that reinforce the interest of the already powerful’.

Notions of power in participatory discourse are frequently dichotomised into state–society
categorisations. In that regard, Lefebvre (1991) describes *l’espace étatique* as the space which is used by the state as a ‘political instrument’ or strategy of control:

> the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action ... in addition to being a means of production is a means of control, and hence of domination, of power. Forces act within space as a result of actions of the state and within spaces the violence of power is answered by the violence of subversion and these seething forces ... can never be totally quieted. Though defeated, they live on, and from time to time begin fighting ferociously to reassert themselves and transform themselves through struggle (Lefebvre, 1991:24).

Brenner and Elden (2009:358), drawing on the work of Lefebvre, link space with territory and highlight the critical role of the state in the transformation of existing inherited political economic landscapes into new spaces:

> As the product, the child, of a space, the so-called national territory, the State turns back toward its own historical conditions and antecedents, and transforms them. Subsequently, the State engenders social relations in space; it reaches still further as it unfurls; it produces a support, its own space, which is itself complex.

The resulting space for Lefebvre (1991) is ‘abstract space’, or homogeneous space, which he refers to as ‘politically instrumental’ space which is designed to be used as an instrument of repression for the purpose of sustaining the centralised power of the state.

Foucault’s (1984) theorisation of relational power and its inextricable link to knowledge sheds additional light on our understanding of power dynamics within participatory spaces. Foucault, contrary to Marxist dogma, is of the view that power is not concentrated in the hands of any one group, but exists in all social relations. He asserts that:

> power is relations; power is not a thing ... power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society (Foucault, 1984:93).
5.6 Levels of participation

Moving the practice of participation from a position of ‘tyranny’ to one of transformation and empowerment and a shift in focus from participation as a means, to participation as an end requires interrogation of the different levels of intensity and dimensions of participation. The work of scholars such as Arnstein (1969), Pretty (1995), White (1996) and the International Association for Public Participation (2007) have added to our understanding of the role of power and intensity levels of participation.

Arnstein (1969) developed a typology of eight levels of participation, based on the type of participation, the level of participation and the extent of citizen control and power that each level confers on citizens. These different levels represent as a ‘ladder of participation’, ranging from non-participation at the bottom, to tokenism, and ultimately to citizen power at the top. The bottom two rungs of the ladder, comprising manipulation and therapy respectively, constitute non-participation and are the weakest forms of citizen engagement. The third, fourth and fifth rungs, representing informing, consultation and placation, are categorised as tokenistic. For Hilyard (2001:59), this category reflects ‘top-down planning’ as the involvement of local people merely ‘lend(s) credibility to decisions that have already been made’. Only rungs six, seven and eight, which involve partnership, delegated power and control, represent true participation whereby citizens have the power to negotiate and participate fully in the decision-making process. Arnstein (1995) used this typology to analyse the role of power and powerlessness in participatory systems. This included what she termed ‘road blocks’ facing participatory practices. On the part of the ‘power holders’ the ‘road blocks’ include ‘racism, paternalism, and resistance to power redistribution’, while on the side of the powerless they include such inadequacies as a limited ‘socioeconomic infrastructure and knowledge-base, plus difficulties of organizing a representative and accountable citizens' group in the face of futility, alienation, and distrust’ (ibid:218).

Pretty’s (1995:1252) classification also includes different levels of intensity ranging from the lowest to the highest levels of participation. Aligning Pretty’s (1995) classification to Arnstein’s (1969) typology of participation reveals similar trends. The first two levels – manipulation and passive participation – represent non-participation and are merely used as ‘pretence’ as participants have no power over any decision making in any form. The third, fourth and fifth levels – consultation, participation for material benefits and functional
participation – fall into the category of tokenism as citizens are dependent on external initiators and participate to fulfill predetermined project objectives. Pretty’s (1995) final two levels – interactive participation and self-mobilisation – are the highest intensity levels of participation and represent citizen power where local people are involved in the joint analysis of problems, act independently to solve problems and take initiatives independently of outsiders.

White’s (1996), typology of different forms, functions and interests of participation is illustrated in Table 5.1. Column one depicts the forms of participation which are arranged hierarchically moving from nominal participation, which confers the least amount of power on participants, as power is centred in the hands of the instigatory agent, to the transformative level, which confers the highest intensity of power on beneficiaries. White further distinguishes between the objectives of the implementing agency and the impact on participant beneficiaries respectively in columns two and three (ibid).

Table 5.1: Form, function and interests in participation (Source: White, 1996:7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Top-Down</th>
<th>Bottom-Up</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Legitimisation</td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>Display</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>Means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Leverage</td>
<td>Voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformative</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>Means/End</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is an important distinction as it differentiates between the outcomes desired by the initiator of a particular project as the *product* on the one hand, and the outcomes conferred on the actors as a *process* of transformation and empowerment on the other. The fourth column sets out the function of participation. While the aims of nominal and instrumental participation are largely for display to legitimise actions and to achieve cost effectiveness of projects respectively, representative participation is far more meaningful in terms of enabling citizens with a ‘voice’ to influence their own development outcomes. The most sought after and highest level is transformative participation which occurs where citizens are equal partners in decision-making processes and are empowered through meaningful collaborative deliberations.
Finally, the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) (2007) devised a framework of increasing levels of intensity ranging from informing, consulting, involving and collaborating to empowering. Within this structure, informing, consulting and involving represent little more than a cosmetic facade of participatory development and the actors stand to gain very little in terms of claiming power to affect any decision making. Collaborating and empowering on the other hand, signifies a far more equal participatory partnership where agents have more control of the process and play a far more proactive role in setting priorities and influencing the decision-making process.

The above analysis of the different models of participation advanced by Arnstein (1969), Pretty (1995), White (19960 and IAP2 (2007) enables categorisation of the intensity levels of participation according to participation as a means and participation as an end. This categorisation is depicted in Table 5.2 below.

| Table 5.2: Levels of participation as a means or an end (Source: Author, 2011) |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Participation as a Means** | Manipulation | Manipulative participation | Nominal | Inform |
| | Therapy | Passive participation | Instrumental | Consult |
| | Informing | Participation by consultation | | |
| | Consultation | Participation for material incentives | | |
| | Placation | Functional participation | | |
| **Participation as an End** | Partnership | Interactive participation | Representative | Collaborate |
| | Delegated power | Self-mobilisation | Transformative | Empower |
| | Citizen control | | | |

For all typologies, the vast majority of intensity levels fall within the category of participation as a means, which infers that participation is used to involve local people in decision making for the purpose of credibility or as a palliative measure due to legislative requirements or to satisfy donors. A far smaller percentage of intensity levels falls in the category of participation as an end, which requires active participation, partnership, citizen control and empowerment and which results in transformation. This is in line with research findings which reveal that in the majority of cases participatory practices are used as technical
solutions, or for the purpose of legitimacy as a ‘pretence’ mechanism to comply with organisational requirements. The above framework may be used as an analytical device to reflect on the different mechanisms of participation in operation and to consider how they might be redesigned to enable transformation and empowerment.

5.7 From subject to citizen: An explanatory framework

In the light of the above, an explanatory framework has been devised that enables consideration of currently accepted methodologies and practices and an analysis of the intersection between forms of citizen engagement and contestations of power that pervade participatory spaces and restrict popular agency. In addition, it facilitates an analysis of how current institutionalised practices and participatory governance spaces need to be reshaped to enable empowered participation and synergistic state-society relations.

![Figure 5.1: From subject to citizen (Source: Author, 2011)](image)

Figure 5.1 portrays the different levels of participation on a continuum, moving from manipulation, as the least empowering participatory form of engagement to self-mobilisation and empowerment as the most sought after form of interaction. These levels can then be separated into sub-categories according to non-participation, tokenism and citizen power, using Arnstein’s (1969) classification system. Within each sub-category, the different types of spaces reflect how they are created and the opportunities that such space offers participants in terms of influencing decisions and controlling the development process. Closely linked to
the nature of these participatory spaces is the interplay of power dynamic within each space.

The first sub-category depicts non-participation which, due to the closed nature of the participatory space, reduces the actor to the position of ‘subject’ of participation. In this context, the mechanisms of manipulation, placation and the restriction of information exclude beneficiaries from participating in the process and deny them their rights as citizens. Power is in the hands of the powerful and is used to control, subvert and exclude the powerless from any form of participation or impact on the development process.

The second sub-category represents tokenism. The site of participation has evolved to one of ‘invited’ space where participatory mechanisms include consultation, involvement and information sharing as a top-down method to legitimate decisions. Such tokenism constitutes mere ‘window dressing’, co-option and ‘pretence’ of inclusion of the marginalised. Participation at this level represents ‘depoliticised’ development with no emphasis on fostering political learning, restructuring political networks or consideration of structural inequalities. Nominal power is transferred to local actors and limited opportunity is conferred on beneficiaries to exercise agency and influence the trajectory of the development process. While this is considered a higher level of intensity than non-participation, it amounts to little more than a cosmetic smokescreen to gain approval of pre-designed plans from passive beneficiaries, with the production of power remaining firmly in the hands of the implementing agency.

In the final stage, which comprises self-mobilisation, transformation and empowerment, power is transferred to participants and this enables them to participate meaningfully as equal partners and to influence decisions that will impact on policy. These have become ‘inclusive’ spaces where citizens have claimed their rightful place in the participatory process and have the power, political knowledge and capability to define their collective priorities and influence development choices. The beneficiary, as powerless and passive subject of development, has achieved the status of empowered citizen which opens up new possibilities for transformational change. Following the model, it is only at this level that participation can achieve its stated purpose of transformation and emancipation aspired to by scholars such as Freire (1970), Rahman (1993) and Fals Borda (2001) more than four decades ago.

For the purpose of this research and deriving insights from foregoing theoretical discussions,
it is accepted that participation ought to give substance to the ideal of participatory democracy. Such democracy is only achieved through collective engagement, meaningful deliberation and shared decision-making. Within this context, and informed by international experience, meaningful participation should therefore be situated within a radical understanding of development where participation is understood as an intensely dynamic political process comprising the exercise of power and control. In this understanding, participation should be a politically transformatory process as it is only through radical empowerment that the notion of citizenship is realised and structures of inequality and institutions of subordination can be challenged and transformed. Within such a framework participation is viewed as a democratic process, an instrument of socio-political change and a mechanism for attaining human rights and social justice.

5.8 Public participation in South Africa

The apartheid system of planning ‘for’ rather than ‘with’ the people and the location of decision-making in the hands of the white minority, completely excluded politically marginalised groups from any form of participatory decision-making. The authoritarian apartheid regime nurtured an elitist approach to development initiatives and decisions remained the exclusive domain of government officials and planning consultants (Penderis, 1996; Sowman, 1994). Communities, in this context, were reduced to submissive recipients of development programs, rather than active participants and initiators of projects (Mathekga & Buccus, 2007). Williams (2006:200) concurs with these observations, remarking that prior to the democratic transition, government in South Africa ‘was highly centralised, deeply authoritarian and secretive, which ensured that fundamental public services were not accessible to black people’. This lack of opportunity for the majority of South Africans to participate and contribute to decision-making and policy implementation continues to impact on development in South Africa today.

Despite South Africa’s democratic transition and a legal framework which has institutionalised participatory democracy, public involvement in development initiatives remains an objective largely unfulfilled. Certain scholars highlight the lack of connectivity and tensions between government’s commitment to public participation and its neoliberal capitalist growth agenda which thwarts transformation and bottom-up grassroots development (Biyela & Xaba, 2009; Binns & Nel, 2002). Others, such as Von Lieres
(2007:70), maintain that ‘formal electoral democracy means little in practice’ and most opportunities for participation are limited to elections. She highlights the failure of the state to ‘facilitate new institutional spaces for poor citizens’. Tapscott (2007:84) agrees with these interpretations, informing us that:


Despite the best intentions of legislators and policy makers ... it is evident that the majority of municipalities have thus far failed to give effect to the principles of Batho Pele and participatory democracy. Indeed public frustration with what is perceived to be meaningless exercises in participation through ward committees, public meetings ... and the like is steadily growing.

Williams (2006:197) in turn asserts that participation has been reduced to ‘spectator politics’ with communities merely rubber stamping pre-designed planning programmes. In such contexts, Sisk (2001) argues, citizens will withdraw from participatory processes when they perceive themselves to be the objects of administrative manipulation. He notes that:


Participatory approaches will founder if people believe that they are being used to legitimize decisions that have already been taken or that the results of their efforts will not matter in the long run. Citizens and civic groups will quickly recognize when a process is a mask for a top-down decision-implementation and when the views of participants are genuinely sought (2001:163).

It is against this backdrop that the theory and praxis of participatory governance in South Africa is examined in order to assess the reasons for the state’s inability to recognise community voice and democratise development. The ensuing discussions will provide a platform for empirical investigation.

5.8.1 Government’s commitment to public participation and participatory governance

Since the establishment of a democratic state in 1994, and as a consequence of the country’s extensive history of political oppression, it is unsurprising that the in-coming government should align itself to the notion of people-centred development. Citizen involvement in political processes is integral to this process and participation is seen to be synonymous with democratic practices, accountable governance and the actualising of human rights through
popular agency (PSC, 2008). This commitment to participatory democracy is not only enshrined in the South African Constitution but is also evident in a host of supporting legislation and policy documents.

An examination of official government statements reveals that there is an increasing awareness in post-apartheid government and policy circles that the active involvement of citizens is fundamental to achieving the nation’s developmental state vision (The Presidency, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; ANC, 2007b). It is broadly acknowledged that public participation not only ensures responsiveness and legitimacy of the state but is a mechanism to give effect to South Africa’s developmental state mandate at the local level to transform society and alleviate poverty through the initiation of socio-economic development projects and improved service delivery (Davids, 2005).

Numerous sources highlight the government’s recognition of the importance of public engagement in local governance in line with global and regional views on the value of participation. Stanley Sangweni, former Chairperson of the Public Service Commission (PSC, 2008), draws attention to government’s commitment to the ideal of public participation by acknowledging that ‘public participation plays a critical role in deepening democracy and promoting good governance’. He affirms further that the involvement of citizens in matters of governance ‘ensures that their experiential and grounded perspectives inform government on their needs and how these needs can best be addressed’ (ibid:ii). However, Mafumadi (DPLG, 2004) cautions that although societal participation in local governance matters has been legislated, the actualisation of development will only be determined through the creation of meaningful participatory structures.

The Draft National Policy for Public Participation (RSA, 2005a) outlines government's commitment to participation and sets out the basic assumptions underlying this concept in South Africa. The policy stipulates that participation must be ‘genuinely empowering’ and not reduced to tokenism and manipulation. Besides being a legislative requirement, the motivation underlying the fostering of public participation in South Africa includes the promotion of good governance and the recognition of the potential of participation to improve development outcomes and empower local people (Moodley, 2007). Public participation is thus seen as the conduit through which information about public needs is conveyed to policy makers at the local level, thereby promoting not only responsiveness and
accountability but also the facilitation of policy implementation and community empowerment (Masango, 2002).

5.8.2 Legislative and policy framework for public participation in Local Government

In order to promote democratic governance and equitable development, the post-1994 government introduced a range of participatory structures, mechanisms and legislative mandates at all government levels. The most significant legislation and policy documents include the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which embeds citizen participation in development planning and decision making as a fundamental human right, the White Paper on Local Government, the Municipal Structures Act and the Municipal Systems Act. While there is less reference to public participation at the national and provincial level, there are substantial legislative requirements at the local level to include citizens in decision-making processes.

The Bill of Rights, contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996), provides for a legislative framework imbedded within a culture of human rights which, besides political rights, includes socio-economic rights and requires the state to promote the exercise and realisation of such rights. In this regard, De Villiers (2001:36) notes that ‘any legislation aimed at advancing the rights of citizens contributes, directly or indirectly, to their empowerment as participating members of society … Thus, the promotion of public participation must be viewed within the much broader context of the transformation of the entire society’.

Chapter 5 of the Constitution sets out the legislative requirements for public participation and Section 152 (1e) obliges local government ‘to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government’. This provision requires local authorities to create opportunities for communities to participate in local governance decision making. Furthermore, Section 195 (1e) stipulates that ‘people’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy making’. At the provincial level, Section 118 (a) and (2) of the Constitution states that a provincial legislature must facilitate public involvement and that a provincial legislature may not exclude the public from a sitting of a committee unless it is justifiable to do so (RSA, 1996). Implied in these clauses is the fact that, beyond electoral participation, the right of citizens to participate in policy making
processes is constitutionally enshrined.

The 1998 White Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998b) outlines the pivotal role of municipalities in democratising society and fostering participation at the local level. Section 1.3 of the White Paper specifies that municipalities must ‘seek to promote the participation of marginalised and excluded groups in community processes’ and ‘must adopt inclusive approaches to fostering community participation, including strategies aimed at removing obstacles to, and actively encouraging, the participation of marginalised groups in the local community’. Section 3.3 further proposes that municipalities ‘should develop mechanisms to ensure citizen participation in policy initiation and formulation, and the monitoring and evaluation of decision-making and implementation’. The mechanisms referred to in Section 3.3 include the setting up of participatory platforms to enable stakeholder involvement in matters of local government.

The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 impose legal obligations on municipalities to institutionalise participatory governance at the local level. Thus, Chapter 4, Section 44 (g) of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act stipulates that municipalities must provide an annual account of the ‘involvement of community organisations in the affairs of the municipality’. Section 44 (h), in turn, requires local government to give ‘due regard to public views and report on the effect of consultation on the decisions of the council’ (RSA, 1998a). Part 4 of Chapter 4 of the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 outlines the requirements for the establishment of ward committees in Category A and Category B municipalities. The ward system committee is the vehicle used in metropolitan and local municipalities to involve community members in planning and decision making processes and thereby to entrench participatory democracy and to ensure accountable local government. The ward committee system will be discussed more fully in subsequent chapters.

Section 16 (1) of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 mandates a municipality to ‘develop a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory governance, and must for this purpose encourage, and create conditions for, the local community to participate in the affairs of the municipality’ (RSA, 2000). This directive refers to local government’s obligation to encourage community participation in such areas as performance management, budget preparation, strategic
decision making in the provision of municipal services and, particularly, in the preparation and implementation of Integrated Development Plans. Municipalities are further required to contribute to building the capacity of local communities to enable them to participate meaningfully in the affairs of the municipality. It also requires them to build the capacity of councillors and staff in order for them to be able to foster community participation.

However, despite a wide range of statutes institutionalising participation and seemingly good intentions of government, overwhelming evidence in the literature indicates that the participatory processes in South Africa in reality amounts to little more than a façade of co-optation and manipulation of people to obtain approval of pre-planned official decisions. These institutionalised ‘invited’ participatory spaces, created through government channels, offer inadequate opportunity for the exercise of agency from below and the inclusion of the voice of the majority of citizens (Sinwell, 2010; Williams, 2006, 2009; Tapscott, 2008). The mounting upsurge of protests throughout the country is an expression of the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of institutionalised participatory spaces and indicative of the lack of meaningful dialogue and participation of local people in government decision making (Coetzer & Terblanche, 2013).

5.8.3 The impact of economic liberalisation on participatory governance

While the ANC government has attempted to anchor its transition to democracy in participatory processes, a number of authors have questioned the compatibility of consultative participatory governance with the state’s commitment to orthodox economic liberalisation policy. Significantly, as far back as 2003, even the then president, Thabo Mbeki, acknowledged the inappropriateness of following a rigorous neoliberal strategy by stating that in order to transform the country and improve the quality of life of its citizens, South Africa could not allow itself to be held prisoner to ‘neo-liberal market ideology’ as this would ‘abandon the masses of our people to permanent poverty and underdevelopment’ (Bond, 2006:4).

However, despite this rhetorical rejection of economic liberalisation, South Africa has continued to strongly support neoliberal ideology, which Mohamed (2010:156) attributes to the government’s desire to ‘maintain good credit ratings and to attract foreign investment’. Heller’s (2001:34) view of South Africa’s neoliberal support has important implications for
its developmental and redistributive efforts and he links the state’s inability to bring about transformation directly to its submission ‘to a neoliberal strategy of economic development and its attendant managerial vision of local government’. Similarly, for Carmody (2002), the state’s neoliberal pursuit is incompatible with its promotion of social democracy and its developmental state strategy due to its dependence on international investors and global markets, as opposed to its national market and domestic social forces.

Expanding on this position, Edigheji provides an insightful discussion of the contradictory dynamics of the South African government’s commitment to participatory governance and its support of neoliberalism and New Public Management (NPM) reforms. Firstly, Edigheji (2004) argues that, while the rationale behind the promotion of participatory governance is to lessen social exclusion and income inequalities along racial lines, its economic liberalisation policy is reducing and minimalising the social welfare role of the state and it is becoming more attentive to meeting the exigencies of the private sector. The outcome of the implementation of a neoliberal economic policy is inequitable growth favouring the privileged elite, the entrenchment of marginalisation and the undermining of ‘the state's capacity to realize its developmental objectives’ (ibid:4). Edigheji’s (2004:13) second contention is that the adoption of New Public Management (NPM) reforms promoting managerial efficiency has minimalised the role of the state and has transformed citizens into ‘passive economic entities’ whose ability to pay determines their access to services, and this impacts adversely on government’s commitment to democratic governance and the building of a democratic developmental state (ibid).

Extending this line of thought, scholars such as Lemke (2001) caution that an embracement of neoliberal governmentality represents a withdrawal of the responsibility of the state and ‘a new way of articulating its power’. Lemke proposes that:

The neo-liberal forms of government feature not only direct intervention by means of empowered and specialized state apparatuses, but also characteristically develop indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals without at the same time being responsible for them. The strategy of rendering individual subjects ‘responsible’ ... entails shifting the responsibility for social risks such as illness, unemployment, poverty, etc. and for life in society into the domain for which the individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of ‘self-care’ (Lemke, 2001:201).
Similarly, Larner (2000) views neoliberalism as a policy framework and political agenda favouring the operation of markets, economic efficiency and international competitiveness and governing citizens ‘from a distance’ rather than formulating policies to ensure full employment and an inclusive social welfare system. As social and spatial polarisation is a serious consequence of neoliberal reform, Larner (2000) recommends a policy shift from a minimalist non-interventionist state and calls for ‘the reintroduction of forms of state control that will attenuate the power of the market and prioritise the re-establishment of national control’ and ‘a return to the more protectionist stance associated with Keynesian welfarism’ (ibid:8).

Khosa (2003:49), like Edigheji (2005), reflects on the government’s neoliberal economic policy and the accompanying adherence to NPM doctrine which is in conflict with South Africa’s developmental state objectives and impacts on society as follows:

*Government’s efforts have largely been devoted to streamlining management systems, cutting costs, and emphasizing administrative performance rather than mobilising participation, training ordinary citizens, and engaging in sustained consultative initiatives. Not only has the language of managerialism and cost-recovery displaced the language of participation and social justice; the ruling party is also arguably disengaged from vital organs of civil society. Second, due to its commitment to technocratic creep, the government has increasingly come to rely on private sector consultants. The ANC’s technocratic concern with getting institutions right has all but obviated efforts to build local democracy and mobilise participation.*

Lemke (2001), Larner (2000) and Khosa’s (2003) analyses enable one to understand more fully the repercussions of following a neoliberal policy agenda in South Africa and its adverse implications for the construction of a developmental state that is participatory and inclusive. For these authors, the overall outcome of economic liberalisation in South Africa and its support of NPM is a relegation of the role of citizens to ‘users’ of services and a shifting of responsibility of governance onto the general public, encouraging self-governance, rather than a more protectionist state-centred approach which focuses on diminishing social inequality and the economic redistribution of development.
5.8.4 Current public participation approaches

Since the inauguration of the new democratic government in 1994, the approach to public participation in South Africa has evolved from the delivery of projects to a passive citizenry during the apartheid era to a ‘new democratic order’ which acknowledges the right of citizens to participate in creating their own future though the exercise of popular agency and voice (PSC, 2008). While the range of legislative requirements leaves ‘little doubt that a strong commitment to participatory governance exists’ (Marais, Everatt & Dube, 2007:10), Davids (2005) emphasises that this changing context raises a number of important questions that beg investigation. Such questions include an understanding of who is participating, what is the purpose of this participation for the different role players, what is the nature and depth of participation of the different stakeholders and what are the different types of participatory spaces that enable participation? Other questions that emerge include what are the power dynamics that are taking place within institutionalised and legislated participatory spaces and why are spaces such as ward committees and integrated development planning currently deemed dysfunctional and inadequate in nurturing citizenship and what alternatives might be devised to improve local governance and enhance participatory democracy?

Heller (2001:138–139) stresses that in order to enable meaningful participation in South Africa, the preconditions for successful decentralisation of responsibilities to the local level must include a strong central state with the capacity to coordinate between the different levels of government. In order to ensure transparency, accountability and representivity, he advises ‘more, not less regulation’ is required in order to avoid Mamdani’s label of ‘decentralised despotism’ and in order to enable inclusive participatory spaces which will lead to democratic deepening. Heller (2001:140) further maintains that democratic deepening and redistribution of power will only occur if decentralisation results in broadening the depth of participation through the inclusion of previously disadvantaged communities and in expanding the scope of participation in terms of bringing a wider range of socio-economic issues into the public domain and redistributing decision-making power to ordinary citizens.

5.8.5 Spaces of participation

In giving effect to the ideal of participatory democracy, different forms of participatory space have emerged in South Africa since the new democratic dispensation. Besides
institutionalised public space set up to enable local governments to include the voice of the marginalised, informal spaces are increasingly opening up as expressions of dissatisfaction. These also serve to challenge the inefficiency of institutionalised participatory platforms and the failure of the local state to respond to the voice of communities and to fulfil pledges of transformation (Miraftab, 2004; De Visser, 2009; Atkinson 2007).

5.8.5.1 Institutionalised participatory spaces

Official formal spaces are instituted by the state to facilitate the participation of citizens in decision making processes and to enable their inputs to influence policy outcomes. However, the nature of such participation is, to a large extent, determined by the structure of these participatory spaces, the methods of engagement used by officials and their capacity to enable meaningful participation. In that respect, Thompson (2008:97) rejects the accepted view that formal spaces ‘are characterised by rationalist, deliberative processes’ that enable meaningful participation of marginalised communities, as the public participation process is dependent on the dynamics of engagement. Following Cornwall and Coelho (2006), Thompson (2008) explains that, within the South African context, such formally instituted government spaces can be transformed into ‘sites of challenge’ or ‘conquered spaces’ by excluded communities, which is a reflection of the political contestation that increasingly characterises engagement in these formalised spaces instituted by the state. Thompson (2008) raises important issues relating to the usefulness and legitimacy of ‘invited’ spaces and notes that the extent of participation in institutionalised spaces varies, depending on which groups participate, the nature of such participation and the reason behind their invitation to participate. Reflecting on research conducted in the Western Cape, she highlights the limited influence of disadvantaged communities on decision making, the use of participatory spaces as vehicles for legitimising actions of the state, the inability of officials to reach a compromise or provide alternative solutions and unequal representivity of invited interest groups (ibid).

Research and policy discussion forums conducted by the Centre for Public Participation (CPP) and their research partner, the South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), disclose that power relationships impact significantly on meaningful participation. Research conducted by Hicks (2006:3), for example, revealed that institutionalised participatory opportunities:
were typified by unequal power relationships between politicians and bureaucrats, government and civil society representatives, those with access to information and resources and those without, those belonging to organized structures and those not, those who are viewed as educated and those not, urban and rural residents, men and women, and people with different abilities ... these unequal power relationships play themselves out in the policy arena, resulting in some issues not making it onto the agenda, the exclusion of some stakeholders, the rendering invisible of others, and the exclusion of many from that critical juncture where decisions are made.

Hicks (ibid:3) further notes that despite enabling legislation and the setting up of institutionalised participatory mechanisms, these are failing to enable meaningful participation and research has demonstrated that participatory mechanisms are ‘inadequate, inaccessible and disempowering, and (that) new approaches to community participation in planning and policy-making are required’. Steyn (undated) confirms Hick’s sentiments and underlines that the mere act of institutionalising formal spaces for public participation will not automatically translate into meaningful participation that is inclusive and transformative as this will depend on how these spaces are created, who is invited to participate in them, the nature of that participation and the type of power relations that animate such spaces.

5.8.5.2 Popular invented participatory spaces

A wealth of scholarship provides insight into the problems relating to invited spaces and top-down methods used by municipal officials to facilitate dialogue and public input at the local level. According to Van Donk, dissatisfaction with the current ‘technicist and state-centric approaches to public participation’ and the simultaneous subversion of democratic participation has resulted in the emergence of alternative ‘invented’ arenas of participation as alternative avenues to express community voice (Van Donk, 2011:7).

The reasons for the recurrence of ‘invented’ spaces of protest are multilayered. Ramjee and Donk (2011) ascribe the escalation of popular spaces to the unresponsiveness of the state to address the needs of particularly the poor and marginalised and its failure to provide reasons for its inability to address such needs. They further maintain that current official structures are inadequate in terms of enabling the expression of dissent and merely function to maintain the existing status quo. In these circumstances, ‘inventing new spaces to express their
dissatisfaction may be the only effective recourse that communities have to capture the attention of government’ (ibid:14). Williams (2008:33) refers to such spaces as ‘counter spaces’ or participatory spaces of resistance, which are claimed, restructured and transformed by citizens as an institutional challenge to formally constituted spaces of engagement and as a modality to overcome exclusion from meaningful decision making. Narsiah (2011:92) accuses the state of being ‘patronising and paternalistic’ due to its increasingly technobureaucratic approach, noting that ‘what is patently clear is that democratic modes of accountability have quickly been subsumed by market governmentality’. He comments further that citizens are prevented from playing an active and empowered participatory role in governance and that the delivery of services is ‘controlled and managed by unelected, unresponsive and unaccountable bureaucrats, technocrats and administrators’ and that it is ‘hardly unsurprising therefore that service delivery is very much a moribund backwater in South Africa’ (ibid:93).

In terms of the interplay of power dynamics in participatory spaces, we are reminded by Cornwall (2002a) that invited spaces are never neutral and it is thus essential to ‘make sense of power relations that permeate and produce these and other spaces’ and to take into account that the boundaries between formalised and informal spaces fluctuate over time. Cornwall (2002a:20–21) clarifies further that the ‘boundaries between “invited” and “popular” spaces are mutable, rather than fixed; “popular spaces” can become institutionalised, with statutory backing, and “invited spaces” may become sites for the articulation of dissent, as well as for collaboration and compromise’. She highlights the potential for power struggles and marginalisation, which is particularly relevant to the South African context, as follows:

> Even though such spaces can provide the terrain at the margins from which marginalised people can organise ... they can also work to deepen the exclusion of minorities, by representing the voice of the majority or occupying space by asserting the right to speak about and for ‘the people’.

This situation is certainly prevalent in South Africa where local elites wrestle for power over popular participatory spaces and these power struggles are frequently politically motivated. In this regard, research conducted by Mathoho (2011:42) reveals that poor service delivery is clearly the main motivation of protestors and the thrust behind the emergence of ‘invented’ popular spaces, although he concedes that some protests are politically driven. Mathoho
(2011:42) also draws attention to another matter of concern, namely that many municipalities claim that certain service delivery functions are not the responsibility of the local sphere of government and that poor intergovernmental co-ordination between the different spheres of government can often be blamed for service delivery failures. However, he asserts that ‘communities waiting for service delivery do not care which sphere of government delivers what. All that they are concerned about is seeing services delivered effectively in their areas’ (ibid). In similar vein, Tapscott (2008:9) maintains that the intensification of popular protests since 2009 is an attempt by communities to gain the attention of authorities. These protests, he states, have focused increasing attention on the inadequacy of institutionalised formal spaces and reflect disillusionment with the poor performance of local government and the ‘rhetoric of participation and empowerment unaccompanied by any material gain’.

5.8.6 Current participatory realities

In terms of both legislation and policy all development interventions in South Africa are supported to entail some form of citizen participation. The notion of a participatory public has been advocated in government circles as a means to improve service delivery and to deepen democracy. However, a number of sources have noted that the operationalisation of public participation is fraught with difficulties (Robino, 2009; Noble, 2003; Moodley, 2006; Esau, 2007; Williams, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). Beyond those scholars who question the intrinsic value of participatory initiatives, there is a considerable empirically based literature on the problems which appear to hinder effective participation in planning initiatives.

The lack of meaningful participation in South Africa is increasingly ascribed to the political system of proportional representation, to unequal power relations and to control over the formal participatory spaces by bureaucratic elites. The system of proportional representation, rather than a constituency-based system, impacts on the representivity of citizens in South Africa. Buccus and Hicks (2009:156) report that the proportional representation system:

*undermines the notion of citizen representation, with representatives allocated to constituency areas, which they must then service. This system is not sufficient to ensure that citizens’ needs and interests are incorporated in policy-making, with many arguing that elected representatives owe greater allegiance to the political parties who include them in party lists than to the electorate, who can only vote for parties and not*
Likewise, for Williams (2006:98), the party-based system, rather than a constituency-based system, presents its own set of problems ‘as the consent for governance is not earned through rigorous policy debate of the merits and demerits of particular social programmes, but political acquiescence is manufactured through the skilful manipulation of think-tanks, self-styled experts, opinion polls and media pundits’. Williams emphasises that this ‘limited form of democracy gives rise to an administered society rather than a democratic society’ (ibid).

Other sources draw attention to the current use of ‘invited’ participatory spaces as political platforms from which to wield power and gain support for political party interests. A research report compiled by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA, 2009) to evaluate the state of local government attributes the lack of true participation at local government level to insufficient separation of powers between political parties and municipal councils, problems with the political administrative interface and interference by political parties. Similarly, Skenjana and Kimemia (2011:58) are of the view that political affiliation and the concomitant desires of political parties to assert their dominance thwart development efforts as ‘political affiliation and the desire to maintain control over ward committees take precedence over concerns of fair representation and the pursuit of the set developmental objectives’. They further maintain that party politics has resulted in excluding ‘sizable segments of the population from the invited spaces’ (ibid).

The inability of authorities to entrench meaningful participatory practices and deepen democracy has been highlighted by a number of writers. Mathekga and Buccus (2007) assert that the new local government institutions, created with genuine intentions to bring about democracy and improve service delivery, have not lived up to expectations. In a similar vein, Osmani (2008:1) states that ‘examples of genuinely effective participation by all the relevant stakeholders, especially by the marginalised … are still more of an exception than the rule’. For Friedman (2006), formal participatory mechanisms are not enhancing participatory governance nor enabling the poor to influence government decisions as they are biased towards groups that have the capacity to organise. Others, such as Narsiah (2011) and Fakir and Moloi (2011) emphasise the lack of leadership and political will of local officials and commitment to participatory governance as problematic areas that require attention, whereas scholars such as Hollands (2011) draw attention to the need to build the capacity of both local
government officials and community members to enable meaningful participation. While Cooke and Kothari (2001), in their discussion of the theory and practice of participation, even refer to participation as the ‘new tyranny’, others, such as Stiefel and Wolfe (1995), query the value of the participation slogan and ask whether its practice is ‘Utopia or necessity?’

Mantzaris and Ngcobo (2008:24–27) elaborate on the dangers of the participation process in South Africa. Together with scholars such as Williams (2006) and Friedman (2006), they warn of increasing ‘top-down’ approaches of municipalities and the use of communities as ‘rubber stamps’ for decisions ‘already made’. They assert further that ‘such a process will constitute a decisive closing-down of a democratic “space” that could lead to an erosion of deep civil engagement’. Their empirical research, conducted in a number of case study areas in the Umzinyathi Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal, revealed limits to participation and highlighted problems such as staff shortages, scarce financial resources, lack of communication channels, lack of capacity, limited training of officials and the lack of inter-departmental co-operation and synergy. Moodley (2006:4) lists other factors that militate against active participation such as numerous delays in the delivery of development projects, increased project costs and complex decisions relating to who should be involved given the complexities of local community dynamics.

5.9 Concluding comments

This chapter has examined the theoretical debates surrounding the notion of participatory development within the context of its applicability to democratic developmental state discourse. Attention then turned to an analysis of the discourse and current status of public participation in South Africa. It also examined the government’s stated commitment to creating a participatory governance system that is inclusive and democratic, outlined the dynamics of institutional and non-institutional spaces and highlighted current realities that are impacting on efforts to provide meaningful participatory opportunities for citizen engagement.
The chapter which follows provides a broad overview of the overarching system of municipal governance in the City of Cape Town as a precursor to succeeding discussion on the interaction between citizens and local government within the ambit of a democratic developmental state. It also provides a summary of the demographic characteristics and settlement dynamics of the population of Delft and their perceptions of the challenges which they confront and the quality of life which they experience living in the area. These findings will serve as a background to the case study on the practicalities of implementing developmental local government in South Africa.

6.1 Development Local Government in the City of Cape Town

Cape Town is the oldest and largest urban area in South Africa and it is currently one of the fastest growing metropolitan complexes in the country. It is the seat of national parliament and the legislative capital of South Africa. Cape Town, together with the larger Western Cape province, is markedly dissimilar from other South African cities, both politically and socially, and has been described as one of the most unequal and ‘divided’ areas in the country (Cooke, 1991; Pieterse, 2002). This is reflected in Cape Town’s residential settlement patterns, with low-density housing in well-resourced neighbourhoods predominately inhabited by whites, contrasted with high-density residential areas for blacks, coloureds and Asians in poorly resourced neighbourhoods and informal settlement areas.

The evolution and transformation of local government in Cape Town in the post-apartheid era has followed a similar trajectory to other municipalities in South Africa and comprised three transition phases. During the pre-interim phase (1994–1996), the City of Cape Town was governed by 40 appointed local councils, comprising 50% statutory and 50% non-statutory councillors. In the interim phase (1996–2000), metropolitan Cape Town comprised six autonomous local authority areas, namely Cape Town/Central, Tygerberg, South Peninsula, Blaauwberg, Oostenberg and Helderberg with an umbrella administration set in place to oversee the metropolitan area. The final phase began after government elections in 2000, when these six local government structures amalgamated to form the City of Cape Town’s
However, in terms of municipal elections, the City’s political landscape has been far more complex than in any other metropolitan area in South Africa. The 2000 elections were won by the Democratic Alliance (DA) comprising a coalition of the Democratic Party (DP) and the New National Party (NNP). Shortly thereafter in 2002, and as a result of floor-crossing legislation, which provided a limited window of time for politicians to change political parties without forfeiting their seats, the DA lost many of its councillors to the NNP and ANC. The ANC and the NNP then formed an alliance which enabled them to take control of the City of Cape Town from the DA (Isaac, 2008). In 2006, no party won an outright majority, with the DA gaining 41.9% of votes as the largest party, followed by the ANC with 37.9% of votes (Politics Web, 2011). Currently, the DA is the majority party having won 60.9% of the votes in the 2011 elections (Independent Electoral Commission, 2011a) making it the only metropolitan authority in the country which is not run by the ruling African National Congress (ANC).

The City of Cape Town has opted for a Mayoral Executive system which assigns executive authority to the Mayor (IDP, 2012). The City is governed by a city council which comprises 221 councillors and which is responsible for electing the Executive Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Speaker. The City Manager, appointed by City Council, is responsible for the administration of the City and the management of its 12 directorates (City of Cape Town, 2013).

For governance purposes, the city is divided into 111 electoral wards and one member of the council is elected from each ward. An additional 110 councillors are selected from proportional party lists, which together make up the total complement of 221 councillors (City of Cape Town, 2012c). The Office of the Speaker assumes overall responsibility for the administration of the sub-council and ward system and is accountable for managing all community development activities within the jurisdictional area of the council. The Executive Mayor is elected head of local government for a period of five years and in turn appoints an 11-member Mayoral Committee which functions as a local cabinet. Other duties of the City council include the formation of the 24 metropolitan sub-councils (City of Cape Town, 2012c).
Following the elections of 18 May 2011, the DA won 78 of the wards while the ANC won 33 (Independent Electoral Commission, 2011a). Of the 110 councillors elected through the proportional representation system, the DA was awarded 57 seats and the ANC 40 seats. The African Christian Democratic Party and the Congress of the People were awarded 3 seats each, while the Africa Muslim Party, Aljama-ah, Cape Muslim Congress, National Party, Pan Africanist Congress, United Democratic Movement and Freedom Front Plus were awarded one seat each (Independent Electoral Commission, 2011b). As discussed in the previous chapter, among its most important tasks, the city council is responsible for developing and implementing an IDP, the development of infrastructure, the provision of services, the setting of rates and tariffs, the determination of service level agreements and the preparation of budgets.

6.1.1 The Integrated Development Plan

One of the first tasks of the incoming City of Cape Town council following its victory in the 2011 municipal elections, thus, was to prepare an Integrated Development Plan setting out its developmental strategy for the period from 2012 to 2017. The implementation and monitoring of the IDP is the responsibility of the Integrated Development Planning and Organisational Performance Management (IDP&OPM) Department which falls under the auspices of the Compliance and Auxiliary Services Directorate. The IDP&OPM is also responsible for maintaining the municipality’s organisational performance management system (City of Cape Town, 2011). In accordance with the requirements of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act, the City’s IDP must reflect its ‘developmentally-oriented planning’ (RSA, 2000: Section 23) and must set out a strategic vision for its long-term development, paying particular attention to its most critical development and internal transformation needs (RSA, 2000: Section 26).

The IDP, as indicated, is the practical mechanism through which the City of Cape Town aims to deliver the developmental mandate conferred on it by national government. Accordingly, the City’s IDP is informed by, and articulates with, a number of national and provincial policies relating to spatial development, transport, housing, social development, economic growth and environmental advancement. The IDP, in turn, informs a number of municipal
strategies and plans such the Cape Town Spatial Development Framework – which guides the spatial development of the municipal area and guides investment in infrastructure and social facilities – the Disaster Management Plan (DMP), the Social Development Plan (SDP), the Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP), the City’s Turnaround Strategy (TAS), the Economic Development Strategy (EDS), and the Integrated Transport Plan (ITP) amongst others. One of the most critical components of the IDP process is the linking of planning to the municipal budget and the allocation of specific funds to identified development projects (City of Cape Town, 2011; IDP, 2012).

The preparation of the current IDP took nine months to complete and the final plan was approved by the council on 28 May 2012. The IDP is centred on five Strategic Focus Areas (SFA). These focus areas include a well-run city, a safe city, a caring city, an inclusive city and an opportunity city, all of which are intended to inform governance, plans and strategies within the metropolitan area for the designated five-year period. Furthermore, a number of objectives, deliverables and indicators are linked to each SFA and are assigned to relevant directorates within the city council. All current development programmes are located within the five strategic focus areas and a development matrix has been established to implement, monitor and evaluate the performance of a range of programmes in each focus area.

The selection of the five strategic focus areas was derived from a public needs analysis process which included gathering information from three sources. Firstly, during 2011 and 2012 the council used a Community Satisfaction Survey to target 3 000 respondents using stratified random sampling across the municipal area. Trained fieldworkers conducted face-to-face interviews with residents in order to identify areas of priority need (IDP, 2012). The second source of information was gathered using the C3 Notification System which is a mechanism used by the City to obtain citizen complaints about municipal services. Information is received and logged through telephone calls and electronic messaging (sms) delivered to a central call centre. Complaints are then forwarded by call centre staff to the relevant line department which assumes responsibility for responding to the matter. The C3 system is an on-going system of information gathering used by councillors, ward members and the general public to inform the City of service delivery problems (ibid).

The third method used to source information for the compilation of the SFAs took the form of
a public engagement process, which is prescribed by legislation as part of the process of IDP preparation. This public engagement process took place between August and November 2011 and included various strategies to target different neighbourhoods in the metropolitan area (IDP Review, 2013:31). It was reported that the participation process included nine mayoral meetings in selected neighbourhoods, six sub-council meetings, one meeting with the City’s strategic partners and a meeting with internal council staff. Although it was noted that the public was encouraged to attend sub-council meetings and engage in discussions relating to the IDP, public meetings only took place in six of the 24 sub-council areas. The City of Cape Town, nevertheless, has repeatedly claimed that its public participation process was very inclusive:

*The extensive public participation process, involving the use of information inserts in a range of media, including newspapers, and the innovative use of social media, meant that more than a million citizens were reached in the public engagement process leading up to the formulation of this IDP. A total of 2 780 members of the public attended the various public meetings, including the meeting with the City’s strategic partners. Altogether 6 500 “Have your say” forms were received as at the end of 2011 (IDP Review, 2013:33).*

It is the responsibility of the Public Participation Unit to develop and implement all public participation strategies for the City’s directorates and departments. The IDP public participation process is monitored by the Public Participation Working Committee which was established to play an oversight role and assess the extent to which the City’s public participation strategies comply with legislation. The unit also provides logistical support and training to stakeholders on methods to be used in engagement with the public (Viti, 14/05/2013).

### 6.1.2 The sub-council system

In order to give substance to the ethos of participatory democracy and the new developmental orientation of local government, legislation requires that the City must introduce a number of institutional reforms to enable citizen participation in local decision making, thereby enabling them to play a role in identifying and influencing development initiatives in line with
recognised local needs and priorities. Accordingly, following the 2006 elections, the City of Cape Town made provision for the establishment of participatory mechanisms at the sub-council and ward committee levels. These mechanisms represent the institutionalised ‘participatory spaces’ prescribed by policy to facilitate the engagement of community members and community-based organisations, in the formulation of the IDP and in other decision making processes.

In accordance with the requirements of the Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998a), the City has been demarcated into 24 wall-to-wall sub-councils comprising varying numbers of geographically clustered wards. These sub-councils are decentralised government structures which serve as the interface between the council, ward committees and civil society. Each sub-council comprises between ten and twelve councillors representing the wards within its jurisdiction, together with additional councillors appointed through the proportional representation system.

A municipal staff member is elected as sub-council manager for each of the 24 sub-councils, and is given responsibility for compiling the annual budget, coordinating operations and implementing projects within the sub-council’s area of jurisdiction. It is also the responsibility of the sub-council manager to arrange sub-council meetings, to act as the official liaison officer between the sub-council governance structure and the council and to work closely with ward councillors and ward committees located within its boundaries. The chairperson of the sub-council is elected by majority vote and is assigned responsibility for convening sub-council meetings which are held on a monthly basis.

Sub-councils are tasked with overseeing all development within their respective sub-council areas and with carrying out functions designated by the City Council. These include responsibility for monitoring service delivery, supervising the spending of ward allocations, encouraging residents to participate in decisions relating to the IDP and budget, and making recommendations to council with regard to the development needs and priorities of their areas (City of Cape Town, 2011). Sub-council meetings are open to the public and are advertised in the media as well as on the city council’s website, where the agenda and minutes of meetings can be downloaded.
6.1.3 The ward committee system

Ward committees are participatory platforms which serve as the mechanism for channelling information from the community to the city council either through ward councillors or sub-councils (Putu, 2006). In accordance with the requirements of Section 17 of the Municipal Systems Act and Section 72 of the Municipal Structures Act, the City was given the option of determining the type of ward committee system within its area of jurisdiction. These may consist of either sector-based or geographically based ward committees and the municipality opted for the former of these two systems (City of Cape Town, 2012c).

Each sub-council area comprises between three and six wards with committees of up to ten members drawn from different sectors representing registered organisations which are active within the ward (City of Cape Town, 2012c). The ten sectors include civic-based organisations, faith-based organisations, safety and security organisations, environmental groups, early education, youth organisations, arts and culture, sport, the business community and designated vulnerable groups such as the aged and disabled. As each of these ten sectors is typically made up of a number of organisations, one representative is elected to represent the sector on the ward committee. Legislation further requires that the composition of ward committees must be reflective of the different sectors that are active in each ward. The Office of the Speaker is charged with the responsibility for the overall oversight of ward committees.

A ward councillor, who is elected by voters in municipal elections, is the designated chairperson of the ward committee and receives support from the proportional representation (PR) councillor who is assigned to the ward. Wards form the interface between the sub-council and city council, on the one hand, and between community organisations and their members on the other hand. However, a ward committee has no designated power and can only function as an advisory body and a link between communities and the municipality.

In terms of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998a), the overall objective of the ward committee system ‘is to enhance participatory democracy in local government’. As such it is envisaged that ward committees should participate meaningfully in the IDP process and in other matters of governance within the City of Cape Town. The
configuration of local representative structures is depicted in Figure 6.1 below.

Figure 6.1 Ward committee reporting structure

In their role as sector representatives, ward committee members are obliged to liaise with the organisations in their sector on a regular basis. The ward committee members are further required to inform the ward councillor of the needs and priorities expressed by the sector organisations. In turn, the ward councillor must make recommendations to the sub-council, portfolio committees or relevant line departments at the City of Cape Town. Once the specific matter has been finalised and a decision has been relayed back to the ward committee by the ward councillor, ward committee members must inform their sector.\(^1\) Ward committee members receive a small allowance for the expenses incurred in carrying out their duties and this amounts, on average, to about R500 per month.

\(^{1}\) Information sourced from interviews with officials and councillors, through attendance at sub-council and ward meetings and from the City of Cape Town website at [www.capetown.gov.za/](http://www.capetown.gov.za/).
Despite the fact that the City has in place a number of mechanisms to promote citizen participation, fieldwork conducted in the course of this case study revealed that the ward committee system is the only formalised platform through which community members can voice their needs and concerns. It is, thus, the only institutional structure used by the City to enable public participation and to give meaning to the notion of a participatory democracy as envisioned in developmental state rhetoric. However, as shall be seen in chapters which follow, ward committees have generally failed to promote effective citizen participation and, still less, to improve public access to services.

6.2 Overview and contextualisation of Delft on the Cape Flats

The case study area of Delft is a high-density urban community located approximately 25 kilometres from Cape Town’s Central Business District (see Figure 6.2 below). It is bounded by the Cape Town International Airport to the west, the N2 National Road to the south, the R300 freeway and Blue Downs to the east and the Stellenbosch Arterial Road and Belhar to the north. Delft incorporates seven suburbs, namely Delft South, Voorbrug, Leiden, Eindhoven, Roosendal, The Hague and Symphony Way. Apart from some open spaces within the currently developed area, most of its future expansion can only occur along its western boundary.

Delft owes its origin to attempts by apartheid authorities to address the serious housing shortages facing communities living on the Cape Flats and to accommodate the rapid influx of people into the south-eastern corridor of Cape Town (Cook, 1991). The development of Delft, together with Blue Downs, was initiated in 1987 as a project of the then Coloured House of Representatives to provide housing for the coloured community who were residing in the wider region. Like many other communities on the Cape Flats, the township was established as a ‘model’ housing project as part of the apartheid regime’s system of separate development (Millstein, 2010; Oldfield, 2000, 2004). However, today there is a far greater integration of population groups within Delft as a result of the N2 Gateway Project, a joint initiative of national, provincial and local government, which commenced in 2005 in Langa, to replace informal dwellings with formal housing (Jordhus-Lier, 2011). Following this initiative, large numbers of households from Langa were forced to relocate to Delft and this has increased the number of African residents in the area. Their relocation severely damaged social networks and resulted in a loss of jobs and earnings due to the increased distance from
places of employment (Mnguni, 2011).

Figure 6.2 Location of Delft within the City of Cape Town

6.3 The physical and infrastructural environment

Delft’s contemporary urban form has evolved over time, reflecting the overlap of apartheid segregationist policies prior to 1994 and post-apartheid integrated planning philosophy under the country’s new democratic dispensation. While older sections in the northern residential area of Roosendal directly reflect apartheid planning architecture, newer sections in the south and western sectors are the result of post-apartheid urban development efforts. Paradoxically, it is the newer sections of Delft, established in the post-apartheid period, that represent the most deprived, disadvantaged and poorly resourced areas.

2 Retrieved from the City of Cape Town website at http://www.google.co.za
6.3.1 Housing characteristics

Poor-quality housing and bleak surrounding environments are among the most noticeable expressions of poverty and inequality on the Cape Flats. Although housing quality varies within Delft, many residents have no access to formal government-subsidised housing and are forced to live in informal structures, backyard shacks and temporary relocation areas. As is common elsewhere on the Cape Flats, poor housing quality is a feature of the area. Dwellings are often constructed on shallow foundations and, as a consequence of sandy soil, this leads to subsidence and cracks in foundations and walls (Penderis, 2003).

The residential neighbourhoods of Delft have developed over time and are reflective of the settlement philosophy of housing officials of different eras. There are currently four types of housing structure in the area and the first of these comprises solid brick structures ranging from around 30m² to 55m² in size. These include detached, semi-attached or row housing units which are government subsidised. To qualify for subsidised government housing, families must have a combined monthly income of less than R3 500 per month. The older parts of Delft, comprising the four neighbourhoods of Voorbrug, Roosendal, The Hague and Eindhoven, have the largest houses with between three and four rooms.

The second type of housing includes structures built in the three temporary relocation areas established as part of the N2 Gateway relocation programme. In these temporary settlement areas housing units have been laid out in close, barrack-like grid patterns to facilitate service delivery. Living conditions are sub-standard and some of the houses are as small as 18m² and yet accommodate up to eight family members. Discussions with the sub-council manager reveal that although these areas are designated ‘temporary’, there is little chance that households living in them will be provided with formal housing in the near future due to extent of the housing shortage in Delft and the long waiting lists.

The third form of housing includes backyard structures which are built within the grounds of formal houses. These structures are extremely common in Delft and are most prevalent in the older neighbourhoods. In many cases, unemployed home owners build backyard structures for themselves and then rent out their government subsidised homes to earn an income. The
fourth category of housing comprises informal structures which are found interspersed throughout the residential neighbourhoods of southern Delft. These informal structures are similar to others found elsewhere in South Africa and are typically built with corrugated iron sheets and low-grade wooden planks scavenged from demolition sites and garbage dumps. The interiors of these informal shelters are insulated with cardboard and paper.

Research conducted over time has revealed the centrality of housing to general well-being across cultures and social groups throughout the world (Boutros Ghali, 1993; Kothari, 2004; Gabriel, Mattey & Wascher, 2001) and demonstrates that there is a positive correlation between satisfaction with housing and quality of life (Lee & Park, 2010). Thus, in order to gain some insight into the perceived quality of life of residents in the case study area, respondents were asked to indicate their level of satisfaction with their housing conditions in Delft as illustrated in Figure 6.3 below.

![Housing satisfaction](image)

**Figure 6.3 Housing satisfaction**

Considering the number of respondents either renting accommodation or living in backyard structures and informal shacks, it is perhaps not surprising that 36% of respondents are either not very satisfied or very unsatisfied with their existing housing situations. Among the reasons why residents are dissatisfied with their housing conditions, the most commonly cited relate to the impermanent nature of the building materials used in temporary relocation areas, the small size of the government-subsidised structures and a lack of protection from the elements as a result of poor building materials. Some respondents drew attention to the temperature extremes that occurred within the structures as a result of poor insulation and complained that this frequently led to the increased incidence of illness, particularly among
infants and the elderly. Some respondents noted that their houses leaked during the winter months, while others complained that they lived in a shack and not a formal house.

Reflective of the different types of accommodation available in the area, the majority of survey respondents (65%) indicated they are either fairly satisfied or very satisfied with the conditions of their home. These findings are confirmed to a large extent by survey responses illustrated in Figure 6.4 below which signify that a large proportion of respondents (56%) would not consider moving away from Delft to a surrounding area on the Cape Flats. However, a significant number of respondents indicated that they would give the idea of moving some consideration (20%) with others indicating strong consideration (23%).

![Figure 6.4 Desire to move from Delft](chart.png)

### Figure 6.4 Desire to move from Delft

#### 6.3.2 Service provision and community facilities

The provision of basic services and facilities in disadvantaged neighbourhoods has the potential to considerably improve general living standards and the quality of life of poor communities. It is for this reason that the government has repeatedly stated its commitment to extending basic services to communities in order to address poverty and inequality (Presidency of South Africa, 2011, 2012, 2013). This commitment is further articulated as part of government’s intention to build a democratic and transformative developmental state (National Planning Commission, 2011). In pursuit of this national policy goal, numerous documents produced by the City of Cape Town refer to the council’s commitment to address inherited public service disparities and to extend the provision of basic amenities and facilities to historically disadvantaged areas (City of Cape Town, 2010, 2012c). It is in this
context that the residents of Delft were asked to comment on their level of satisfaction with the services provided by the City.

The survey results reveal that Delft residents are generally satisfied with the level of basic services in their neighbourhoods. The overwhelming majority (97.9%) have access to electricity in their homes and most households use a prepaid meter system using units purchased from a variety of outlets in the area. As the cost of electricity is high, many households also make use of paraffin and wood fires for cooking and paraffin and candles for lighting. A smaller, but still significant, proportion of respondents (74%) reported that they had a water point inside their yard, while 26% had access to a water point outside the yard. In temporary relocation areas and informal settlements, both standpipes and sanitation and ablution facilities are positioned in communal areas outside the yards and these are shared by a large number of households. Discussions with residents living in these areas indicate that this poses a range of problems as the ablution facilities are unhygienic, the toilets are often blocked, there is no privacy and during the winter months the communal areas are often flooded as a result of the high water table on the Cape Flats. For these residents, the poor quality of services has the potential to translate into serious health risks, particularly in winter as the seepage of sewage from blocked toilets flows into the groundwater system and collects in pools of water around their dwellings.

6.3.3 Local facilities and amenities

Delft is generally well supported with public facilities and, besides sixteen primary schools, five secondary schools and one technical high school, there are also a number of adult learning centres and crèches run by various organisations in the area. There are numerous sports complexes which provide rugby, soccer and netball fields, together with a public swimming pool. Other facilities include civic centres, public libraries and health centres. The Delft Community Health Centre is managed by the Provincial Health Department and the Delft South Clinic is administered by the City’s Department of Health. Quarterly Progress Reports (DOH, 2013) provided by City of Cape Town health officials indicate that tuberculosis is the most serious illness in the area and each year they treat around 1 500 patients. More than half of all multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis cases identified in the City of Cape Town occur in Delft.
The Hague Community Centre houses the sub-council offices and is also used for sub-council meetings, workshops and community meetings. There is also a range of sector organisations that are active in Delft and these will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. Community organisations include the Delft Development Forum, Delft Community Policing Forum and Delft Poverty Development Alleviation Forum amongst others.

6.4 The socio-cultural environment

According to the 2011 Census\(^3\), of the 74 340 people living in Delft, 51% were coloured and 46% were African, with the remainder made up of other racial groups and foreigners. The survey data provides information on the demography of Delft and reveals that there is virtual parity in the gender ratio with 51% of respondents being women and 49% men. The survey also revealed that Delft has a relatively youthful population (the average age of respondents was 28 years) and 73% of residents are younger than 40 years of age.

This age profile is reflective of the fact that many of the residents of Delft are young people who have settled in the area because they are not able to find accommodation elsewhere. This pattern is similar to trends elsewhere in the province (DOGIS, 2013) and further underlines the challenges faced in providing employment opportunities for this generation of urban dwellers. As a likely consequence of the youthful make-up of the population, the survey results reveal that more than a third of households have no dependents under the age of 18 years. However, almost half of the sample indicated that their households had one or two dependents and a further 14% indicated that they between three and six dependents living with them.

Data from the 2011 census revealed low levels of education for African and Coloured people living on the Cape Flats and these broad trends are mirrored in Delft where only 33% of residents had completed secondary schooling, 52.2% had had some secondary schooling and 9.2% indicated that they had only completed primary schooling. These results pose a

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\(^3\) The City of Cape Town’s Department of Geographical Information Systems has provided demographic profiles for all wards within the City of Cape Town using Census 2011 data. Demographic data is accessed from www.capetown.gov.za/en/stats/Pages/Census2011.aspx
challenge to economic advancement when it is borne in mind that a well-educated and skilled workforce was a major contributor to the success of the Asian developmental states (Abe, 2006; Woo-Cumings, 1999). This shortcoming has been recognised by a number of scholars and politicians who have highlighted the critical need to improve the quality of education, (referred to by Akogee, 2010, as a ‘dysfunctional system’), and to provide the training and the requisite skills required by a state which aspires to be developmental and transformative (Butler, 2010; Edigheji, 2010; Manuel, 2013).

6.5 The economic environment

The section which follows documents the socio-economic status of the population of Delft as reflected in the survey data.

6.5.1 Income structure

Analysis of the household income of Delft residents reveals that, as a consequence of unemployment or low earning power, the overwhelming majority of the population are poor. In that respect, 41% of all respondents reported that they received no income, while 85% of households who were receiving an income indicated that they earned less than R4 000 per month. Only 27.4% of respondents indicated that they were currently employed, 40.1% indicated that they were unemployed with a further 21.9% revealing that they had never had a job. Based on this data, 70% of the sampled population is unemployed. Furthermore, of the 27.4% of residents who currently have jobs, only 50.5% indicated that they are currently employed on a full-time basis. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps to be expected that the majority of the households depend on income derived from other means such as transfers from family members living elsewhere, child-care grants (17.6%), old-age pensions (4.2%) and disability grants (2.9%).

Discussions with residents revealed that poverty in Delft is multi-dimensional and includes income poverty, asset poverty and capability poverty; residents not only receive too low an income to pay for essential household expenditures but they have too few assets and capabilities to initiate some form of informal economic activity. The following statements by residents interviewed in this study are reflective of the all-embracing nature of poverty (once
referred to as a poverty trap) which can lead to disempowerment and despair:

*I cannot even afford to look for work – I do not have the money for the transport* (40-year-old African father of three).

*If I am lucky to get casual domestic work in Kuils River, they pay me R70. Transport costs R15 and I have to pay R20 for day care for my child. Then I only have R35 in my pocket* (35-year-old single mother).

While there are a variety of formal economic businesses in Delft such as supermarkets, retail stores, petrol stations and building supply outlets, the size of the informal sector is far larger than the formal sector. Informal activities are highly visible alongside the Main Road, which is a major through route that separates Delft into a western and eastern zone, and on street corners within the different residential neighbourhoods. The most prevalent informal activities include fruit and vegetable stalls, barbers, hairdressers, car parts stalls and clothing stalls. Other types of informal activity commonly found in the area are spaza shops, which are micro-enterprises that sell basic household necessities and groceries, as well as tuck shops which are home-based shops attached to the residence. A small range of basic foodstuffs such as cigarettes, bread, milk and tinned foods are sold from these enterprises. Some of the spaza shops sell alcohol illicitly and provide jukeboxes and arcade video games to attract customers. Many of the spaza and tuck shop owners use either casual labour from within the neighbourhood or family members to run the shops on a daily basis.

### 6.5.2 Household assets

In terms of household assets, the vast majority of respondents reported that they owned a radio (96.1%), a television (96.8%) and a mobile phone (94.8%). This is aligned to findings in other disadvantaged areas on the Cape Flats (Thompson, Nleya & Africa, 2011b, 2011c). Discussions with residents and observation during qualitative fieldwork in the survey area reveal that leisure activities tend to be home-centred and focus on listening to the radio, watching television and socialising with friends and family. While financial constraints limit the ability of households to own a wide range of assets, both the radio and television are viewed as almost essential possessions for purposes of leisure.
6.5.3 General living conditions and quality of life

Quality of life refers to the general well-being of individuals although it varies according to culture, values and belief systems. An assessment of the attributes of quality of life includes not just the physical aspects of an individual’s living conditions but also those of the broader surrounding neighbourhood environment. Scholars such as Evans, Kantrowitz and Heshelman (2002) and Samman (2007) maintain that aspects such as health, education, housing, employment and participation in decision making are key determinants of an individual’s perceptions of the quality of his or her life. Other factors which can be used to assess quality of life, and which contribute to both physical and psychological well-being, include feelings of safety and security, which if absent can produce high levels of anxiety and vulnerability amongst members of a community. High-density living and a lack of personal space are additional factors that can impact negatively on one’s feelings of well-being and quality of life.

Sterile public places and environmental degradation are common features of formal housing areas in Delft, while conditions in the informal and relocation areas are considerably worse. Many of the public places interspersed between housing developments are bleak and unappealing with sandy, barren surfaces. Open spaces surrounding houses are also frequently used as dumping grounds for household waste and other materials. In April 2003 a three-year-old girl died after playing with toxic waste that was dumped on the corner of Symphony Way and Silversands Road. It was reported in the Cape Argus (2013) that a total of fifteen children and three policemen, who responded to calls for assistance at the time, were also admitted to hospital after inhaling the fumes of the toxic chemicals which had been illegally dumped at the site. According to residents, when rubbish is dumped it poses an additional health hazard in that it attracts flies and rodents, and during the summer the smell of rotting household waste is almost unbearable.

An issue of major concern to the residents of Delft is the high incidence of crime and gang-related violence. The highly visible security gates attached to the front entrances of houses along most of the main transport routes throughout the area bear testimony to the fear of theft and of intruders in general. Data released by the Department of Community Safety (Western
Cape Government, 2012) reveals that Delft has the sixth highest incidence of murder in the Western Cape Province and, according to provincial police reports, gang-related violence in the area is the highest on the Cape Flats. The most serious crimes reported are assault with intent to do bodily harm, robbery, sexual offences, common assault and domestic violence. The most common injuries sustained by victims are those caused by gunshot wounds (26.2%), stabbings (49.0%), and trauma caused by blunt objects (17.2%).

Most of the respondents in the survey felt safe within their own homes, but were fearful about crime in their different neighbourhoods. A sizeable 40% of respondents indicated they always feared crime in their immediate neighbourhoods, while an additional 21% indicated they had been fearful of crime many times. Only 26% of the sample indicated that they had never feared crime in their area. It appears further that most of the respondents fear crime when travelling. Although the majority of respondents (83%) reported that they had not been a victim of crime within the preceding 12 months, it is significant that nearly one in five (17%) had suffered from some form of criminal activity during this period. Women, children and the elderly appear to be at particular risk and discussions with some female residents indicated that they rarely allowed their children to be out of doors after dusk, unless they were accompanied by an adult. Respondents were further asked to indicate how they were treated by the police when reporting crimes and 77.4% reported that they had not been treated fairly. Furthermore, even if their case had finally been served in court two thirds (65%) were not at all satisfied with the outcome.

The perceived increase in criminal activity is presented in Figure 6.5 below. Respondents were requested to respond to questions relating to whether they had perceived an increase in criminal activity in Delft in the last 12 months and 66% of the sample stated that they felt there was much more crime now than in the previous year, with a further 13% indicating there was more crime. Only 11% stated that crime levels were about the same and a mere 8% said there was less or much less. According to residents the most common social and criminal problems were, in order of severity, drugs and alcohol abuse, followed by robbery and house breaking and gang activities. The vast majority of respondents (66%) believed that both drug usage and gang activity had increased significantly in the preceding 12-month period. Respondents also reported that police action frequently led to violent conflicts. This view has been confirmed by media reports which suggest that the Delft police have on a number of
occasions used excessive force in their actions against residents, using rubber bullets to control conflict situations and enforcing illegal curfews on residents living in the Blikkiesdorp Temporary Relocation Area (Slamdien, 2011).

Figure 6.5 Increase in criminal activity

Respondents’ perceptions about the increase in criminal activity were confirmed in discussions with the local police force and community police forum members. The need for greater safety and security within Delft and the need to address criminal activity is such a prominent public concern that it has frequently appeared on the agendas of sub-council meetings and members of the local police force have been invited to present strategies on how the problem might be addressed.

Over and above their concerns about the high incidence of crime, respondents were asked to rate their views on the overall living conditions in Delft on a continuum from very bad to very good, as reflected in Figure 6.6 below.
While almost half the sample (48.1%) were indifferent, noting that conditions were neither good nor bad, 33.9% indicated that they were either bad or very bad. Only 17.8% of the sample reported that their living conditions were either good or very good. Interviews with some of the residents indicated that they attributed bad living conditions to the high incidence of drugs and gangs and the lack of employment opportunities, while for others having good friends and neighbours in the community contributed to their view of good or very good current living conditions.

6.6 Concluding comments

This chapter has looked at the system of local governance which prevails in the City of Cape Town and, in particular, at the structures which have been put in place to support public participation in decision-making processes which affect the welfare of poor communities. It found that, formally at least, there is a relatively comprehensive system in place to support citizen engagement in the local state, whether through the process of preparing an IDP or through the channels established at ward level. The efficacy of these channels will be examined in the chapters which follow.

The chapter has also provided a broad overview of the socio-economic characteristics of Delft which, in this investigation, serves as a case study for an examination of the
effectiveness of efforts to establish a developmental local government as part of the broader mission to construct a democratic development state. In this context, the picture of Delft which emerges is one of a dislocated and poor community living in a built environment which is far from optimal. Educational levels are low, poverty and unemployment are endemic, alcoholism and drug abuse are widespread and the area suffers from some of the highest levels of crime on the Cape Flats, an area which is itself renowned for gang activity and violence.

The chapter which follows will consider the manner in which the City of Cape Town has set about implementing the model of developmental local government. This will focus, in particular, on the mechanisms set in place to advance public participation and will investigate the extent to which they are perceived, by different stakeholders, to fulfil their intended objectives.
As discussed in a previous chapter, one of the key features of a democratic developmental state is the extent to which it is able to establish mechanisms which will support citizen participation in policy formulation and in decision making processes which directly impact on their welfare. In pursuit of this goal, South Africa’s democratic reform strategies have included the concept of developmental local government which is intended to drive a development agenda and to support the national government’s vision of a developmental state. The mechanisms used by local government to promote public participation and identify local development needs, as previously indicated, include the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and the institutionalised sub-council and ward participatory systems.

The analysis of the case study area of Delft, which follows in this chapter and the next, aims to assess the achievements of the City of Cape Town in implementing the model of developmental local government. The first part of the chapter focuses on the structure and functions of the sub-council and ward committee systems in Delft. Attention then shifts to an examination of the public perceptions of the effectiveness of the IDP and the participatory mechanisms that have been set up by the municipality to enable citizen participation in decision-making processes. The final section provides an account of the broader political perceptions of residents in the case study area.

7.1 The political environment and governance system

The Cape Town metropolitan government, as mentioned in the previous chapter, comprises 24 sub-councils, which are political subdivisions which function as local councils within their areas of jurisdiction. Delft falls within the bounds of Sub-council 5 and includes Ward 13, Ward 20 and Ward 106. A study of political party dynamics in Delft show that since 2006 there have been shifts of power within the sub-council between the ANC and DA. Ward 20

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1 Information relating to the sub-council and ward system operating in Delft is derived from the City of Cape Town website (www.capetown.gov.za).
and Ward 13 had been ANC strongholds in 2006, but during the 2011 municipal elections they suffered defeat to the DA in both wards. On the other hand, the ANC won the municipal elections in Ward 106 which was established as a new ward in 2011.

7.1.1 Sub-council 5

Sub-council 5 incorporates the suburbs of Delft, Bishop Lavis, Bontheuwel, Valhalla Park, Montana and Charlesville. Most of the residents within this sub-council typically live in government subsidised housing, have low incomes and live in in poorly resourced residential neighbourhoods (DOGIS, 2013). Sub-council 5 includes Wards 13, 20, 24, 31, 50, and 106 and is comprised of six ward councillors and five proportional representative councillors. Five ward councillors are members of the DA and one councillor is a member of the ANC, whilst four proportional representative councillors are members of the DA and one is a member of the ANC.

Of the six wards located within the boundaries of Sub-council 5, three are located entirely within Delft, while the other three are situated within the suburbs of Bontheuwel, Bishop Lavis, Valhalla Park, Montana and Charlesville, some distance away. Sub-council 5 has two offices, one in Bontheuwel and one in Delft and meetings are held alternatively at the different office complexes. Sub-council meetings are held in the third week of each month and members of the public and other stakeholders are invited to attend these meetings. The agenda and minutes of previous meetings are available on the sub-council’s website prior to the meeting. Provincial and local government officials, the representatives of community organisations and members of the public are invited to address the sub-council at its monthly meetings with the proviso that they announce their intention to do so 48 hours prior to the event. Although this system ostensibly affords citizens the opportunity to participate in the deliberations of the sub-council on a regular basis, the fact that every second meeting is held in Bontheuwel precludes this possibility as few if any of the residents of Delft could afford to travel there for that specific purpose.

Although service delivery and local economic development are portrayed as key responsibilities of a developmental local government, the actual amounts which are made available for dispersal at sub-council level are extremely limited and their potential to impact infrastructural and socio-economic development in an area is minimal. Thus, in the 2012/13
financial year Sub-council 5 was allocated R4.2 million by the City for ward projects to be initiated within the area. Of this amount, each of the six wards was allocated R700 000.00 for development projects (this will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter). Ward councillors are responsible for the monitoring of ward allocations and development initiatives to ensure that the budget is spent in accordance with the business plan that was submitted as a precondition for the receipt of funding. Additional funding of R1 million from the Mayor’s Redress Fund and R254 000 from the Bulk Fund from the Speaker’s Office was received for additional development initiatives (Rau, 17/04/2013). These additional funds are generally used to provide services to the poorer wards. Sub-council 5 thus received a total amount of around R5.5 million for the 2012/2013 financial year for the development of projects identified within its six wards.

7.1.2 The ward system

Delft’s ward boundaries are illustrated in Figure 7.1. Ward 13, in the north-eastern area of Delft, includes the neighbourhoods of Roosendal, parts of Leiden and The Hague.

![Figure 7.1 Delft ward boundaries](image)

The population of Ward 13 has increased by 155.5% since 2001 and housed a total
population of 45 755 residents in 2011, whereas the number of households at 10 520 has shown an increase of 179.6% since 2001. Within this ward, the coloured population group (72%) comprises the majority. A majority of households (60%) have a monthly income of R3 200 or less and 88% of households report living in formal dwellings. With regard to educational achievement, 24% of residents aged 20 and older have completed Grade 12 or higher.

Ward 20 is situated in the south-western sector and includes parts of Delft North, Delft South, Eindhoven and sections of Leiden and Voorbrug. The population of Ward 20 has increased by 52.7% since 2001 and in 2011 comprised 41 762 persons, whilst the number of households has increased by 71.9% since 2001. The coloured population comprises 58% of residents and Africans comprises 39%. A total of 66% of households have a monthly income of R3 200 or less and 88% of households live in formal dwellings. Only 26% of residents have achieved Grade 12 or higher qualifications.

Ward 106 is by far the poorest of all the wards and has the least facilities. It includes the Cape Town International Airport area on its western boundary, together with the western parts of Delft North, Delft South, Delft Leiden and The Hague. In 2011 it had a population 48 995 which represents an increase of 315% over the total in 2001. The number of households has likewise shown a dramatic increase of 388.7% rising from 3 796 in 2001 to 14 753 in 2011. The African population (65%) constitute the majority of ward residents. The majority of residents (76%) live in formal dwellings and 76% of households earn a monthly income of R3 200 or less. Only 29% of residents have achieved Grade 12 qualifications or higher. This is the ward most likely to expand in the future due to a large expanse of open land in its western half, adjacent to the Cape Town International Airport. Although census data reveals a high proportion of formal house ownership, the picture is distorted by the fact that three temporary relocation areas are located within this ward and are included in the census as formal dwellings, despite their informal nature (DOGIS, 2013).

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2 Demographic and socio-economic data for Ward 13, 20 and 106 is based on 2011 census data supplied by Statistics SA and reworked by the Strategic Development Information and GIS department of the City of Cape Town (DOGIS, 2013).
7.2 Integrated Development Planning

In the context of previous discussion, the Integrated Development Plan is the instrument intended to enable the City of Cape Town to fulfil its developmental mandate and to that extent it represents an over-arching development strategy for the metropolitan area. The City Manager, Achmat Ebrahim, explains that the IDP “represents an integrated approach to all the activities of local government in consultation with residents and stakeholders; its focus is on development in the broader sense (economy, infrastructure and people), and it is a structured plan that informs budget priorities, decision making and the allocation of resources” (IDP, 2012:7).

In order to function effectively as developmental local governments, all municipalities are mandated to address poverty and inequality within their area of jurisdiction through the process of integrated development planning. Accordingly, as previously noted, the City uses a three-pronged process to develop and monitor its IDP. Key to the success of this process is the extent to which citizens are engaged in the identification of their most pressing needs and the extent to which they are able to make meaningful input into the formulation of an IDP. In order to assess the extent to which they were engaged in the most recent integrated planning process, the residents of Delft were asked to comment on their knowledge of the IDP and the extent to which they had provided input into the formulation of the current plan. Their responses are recorded in Figure 7.2 below.

![Knowledge of Integrated Development Planning](image)

**Figure 7.2 Knowledge of and input into Integrated Development Planning**

Figure 7.2 reveals that the vast majority of Delft respondents (98.9%) indicated that they had
never heard of the City’s IDP whilst 99.5% reported that they had never been asked to give input to the preparation of an Integrated Development Plan. These figures not only correspond with patterns for the municipality as a whole\(^3\), but they reveal that despite a highly publicised public participation strategy, the overwhelming majority of residents of Delft, and other historically disadvantaged areas, are effectively excluded from a processes which is intended to be the centre piece of participatory local governance.

Discussions with a senior official\(^4\) from the IDP Unit of the City of Cape Town (Male Official, Cape Town: 22/05/2013) confirms that these trends are common around the country and that, on average, no more than 5% of the national population is aware of integrated developmental planning or the participatory process which is supposed to underpin it. This appears to defeat one of the key objectives of the IDP process, namely that it should be as inclusive as possible. Research conducted by Marais, Everatt and Dube (2007) in Gauteng revealed similar trends. Their investigation highlighted a number of reasons for the lack of knowledge of IDPs and low public input rates which included the poor publicising of meetings, cost and difficulty of travelling to meeting venues, language barriers, inconvenient meeting times and poorly facilitated meetings (ibid). These, as shall be seen, are problems common to Delft.

Interviews with City officials, sub-council chairpersons and sub-council managers within the metropolitan area revealed that although public participation in the design of the IDP is prescribed by statute, this is not the case in practice and in reality the process is very much a top-down exercise where ordinary citizens have very little input. The data recorded above suggest that, despite the City’s attempts to engage with the public in the drawing up of an IDP, the systems and practices adopted are ineffective and generally benefit only those who

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\(^3\) Of those interviewed in the City’s 2011 Customer Satisfaction Survey, across the municipality 91% had never heard of the IDP (City of Cape Town, (2011) Community Satisfaction Survey, Project Robben, TNS Research Services., p.57.

\(^4\) During interviews, respondents frequently requested that their anonymity be protected, either due to the sensitivity of the topic or due to their position being threatened if it was known that they had made a particular statement. Thus, in accordance with these requests, certain statements are recorded by only providing the gender, place and date of the interview and indicating whether the respondent is an official, councillor or ward committee member.
are relatively well educated and who can provide a motivated, well-structured development proposal for their particular ward. Thus, although integrated development planning was introduced in South Africa as a method of fostering public participation (Harrison, 2006; Theron, 2005) and as a means to address the needs of all South Africans (Oranje et al, 2000), in the context of Delft this objective is clearly not being achieved.

7.3 Institutionalised participatory spaces

In order to comply with legislative requirements and to give expression to the notion of developmental local government, the City of Cape Town has established several structures to promote citizen participation in local decision making. These mechanisms include the aforementioned sub-councils, ward committees and sector organisations. In the section which follows both the establishment and responsibilities of ward committees in the case study area will be discussed based on information provided by officials from the City of Cape Town and the sub-council chairperson of Sub-council 5. Thereafter, survey data will be presented on the perceptions held by Delft residents on the effectiveness of the participatory systems which have been set in place.

7.3.1 Ward councillors and ward committees

Ward committees, as indicated, serve as the frontline structure through which the City gives effect to the idea of participatory governance and fulfils its obligations in terms of the Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998b). As indicated, the City has elected to use a system of sector representative (to be discussed in more detail in Section 7.3.2. below), rather than a geographically based system of representation. Ward committees, as discussed, are chaired by ward councillors elected by the residents during local government elections. Once elected, ward councillors are mandated to represent their constituency at sub-council meetings. The city council further designates a proportional representative councillor to assist the ward councillor to carry out his or her duties.

Discussions with councillors and attendance at ward committee meetings in the case study area reveal the procedure of communicating the needs of residents to council. This process is depicted in Figure 7.3. At level one, the community voices their development priorities, concerns and needs to their sector organisation.
Figure 7.3 Participatory hierarchy

The chairpersons or representatives of the ten sector organisations (more will be said of these below) that are active in the ward are elected as members of the ward committee. At level two, members of the ward committee highlight the concerns and development priorities of their respective sectors at the ward committee meetings which are held every second month. The ward councillor, who is the ward committee chairperson, is then responsible for tabling these matters at the sub-council meeting at level three. Following a decision at sub-council, either the ward councillor or sub-council chairperson must forward the matter to council. Once a council decision has been made, the response is then relayed back to sub-council through the sub-council chairperson and is then communicated back to the ward committee through the ward councillor who serves on the sub-council. Ward committee members representing their sectors are informed of the decision at the ward meetings and then must relay decisions back to their organisations.

The functions and responsibilities of ward councillors and ward committee members are set out in the City of Cape Town’s website. Further information available to councillors is provided by the Department of Provincial and Local Government (Ward Committee Resource Book, 2005) which explains the philosophy behind the notion of participatory democracy and the role and function of ward committees. Furthermore, according to the chairperson of Sub-council 5, shortly after the 2011 election, all councillors in the City of Cape Town attended training and capacity building workshops to enable them to fulfil their roles as councillors effectively (Rau, 23/10/2012).

Interviews with the sub-council chairperson (Rau, 23/10/2012) and sub-council manager (Julies, 23/10/2013) revealed that they clearly understood the role of the sub-council and
ward system and that these structures had been established to encourage residents to become involved in decision making in the City and to participate in the preparation of IDPs and annual budgets. Interviews with councillors revealed that they also understood that that they had a further responsibility to monitor service delivery within their wards and to deal with service delivery requests, complaints and enquiries. Other duties which they identified were the need to make recommendations to the City council on development priorities and matters that impact negatively on their ward (Female Councillor, Delft: 16/04/2013; Male Councillor, Delft: 15/04/2013).

When asked to comment on their understanding of the role of ward councillors, residents stated that they believed a ward councillor should be transparent and accountable when carrying out his or her designated duties and should serve as the link between the community and the municipal council. The importance of this role is underscored by the fact that a significant majority (62%) of residents in the case study area were of the view that local government was responsible for solving most or all the problems within a sub-council area, while only a small minority stated that some functions were the domain of provincial and national government. This implies that whether or not a developmental local government has the resources and the capacity to provide necessary services and stimulate local economic development and job creation, local residents are likely to hold them accountable for these activities.

As a means to assess the confidence which the residents of Delft have in institutionalised participatory structures, respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in their sub-council and in ward committees. Their responses are illustrated in Figure 7.4 below and reveal that just over half (52%) of respondents interviewed stated that they had little or very little trust in the sub-council, compared to 44% who stated that they had some or a lot of trust. In the case of ward committees, trust levels were somewhat higher with 52% of respondents reporting that they trusted these structures somewhat or a lot whilst 39% stated that they trusted them a little or not all. A small percentage of respondents indicated that they did not have enough knowledge of their sub-council and ward committee to comment which, in itself, is indicative of the extent to which the objectives of these participatory structures have been communicated to the local population.
This overall lack of trust in formalised participatory spaces appears to affirm the views of Arnstein (1969) who drew attention to the ‘roadblocks’ that are faced by citizens in their attempts to participate in formal structures and their alienation from and distrust of the ‘powerholders’ as a result of their powerlessness. Similar views are presented by Huttman (1993) and Marcussen (1990) who assert that feelings of alienation and distrust result from exclusion from space and this is manifested as a lack of control and emotional deprivation.

Respondents were further requested to consider their levels of trust in other key institutions operating in the area (see Table 7.1) and their responses are of interest. The community policing forum was the most accepted of these with 50% of respondents recording that they trusted these structures somewhat or a lot. This can be ascribed to the visible presence of the community police forum in Delft and its response to problems raised by residents (such as the current concern with increased drug activity in the area). The local police service was the next most trusted institution with 47% of residents indicating they trusted the police somewhat or a lot. In contrast, 51% of respondents reported that they did not trust the mayor of Cape Town at all. This response could be attributed to the party political preferences of respondents (since 2006 all mayors have been members of the DA), but more likely (in that two of the three wards are DA controlled), it is reflective of the mayor’s perceived indifference to the needs of the poor in areas such as Delft.
Table 7.1  Trust in key institutions in governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>A little</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor of Cape Town</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Police</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing Forum</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were also asked their opinions (represented in Table 7.2 below) on the extent to which their ward councillors facilitate citizen participation in decision making processes in the wards which they represent. These related to the extent to which they allowed citizens to participate, the manner in which they announced council programmes, and the manner in which they managed citizens’ complaints.

Table 7.2  Perceptions of ward councillors in enabling participation, announcing council programmes and managing complaints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very badly</th>
<th>Fairly badly</th>
<th>Fairly well</th>
<th>Very well</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allowing citizens to participate</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Announcing council programmes</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing complaints</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 11% of respondents reported that their ward councillor was facilitating citizen participation very well, compared to 46% who stated that this responsibility was being carried out fairly badly or very badly. Identical responses were recorded in respect to the way in which councillors succeeded in announcing council programmes to their constituents, with 46% of respondents reporting that this function was performed fairly badly or badly. This latter finding is of significance in that it implies that ward councillors are failing in their duty to act as the channel of communication between residents and the sub-council and other municipal structures. It also raises questions about the accountability of ward councillors who frequently appear to be unreceptive to the interests of their constituents. This is evident in the survey results which reveal that 47% of those interviewed felt that ward councillors managed public complaints either fairly badly or very badly, in contrast to just 10% who felt they were performing this function very well. Overall, it is significant that no more than 38% of
respondents were fairly satisfied or well satisfied with the ward councillor’s performance in any of these three areas of citizen engagement.

In a context where it is understood that participation should form an integral part of the process of democratic transformation and citizen empowerment (Nelson & Wright, 1995; Buccus, Hemson, Hicks & Piper, 2007; Jennings, 2007; Harbers, 2007), the responses of residents suggest that councillors in the case study area are failing to fulfil their legislative mandate. It is also indicative of the fact that in failing to promote meaningful citizen participation, councillors are also failing to advance one of the core elements of developmental local government. Furthermore, by failing to communicate council programmes and to facilitate citizen participation, the councillors are effectively excluding residents and preventing them from exercising agency, which, Cleaver (2004) reminds us, is essential in moving participation from a position of ‘tyranny’ to one of transformation. As the exercise of agency is one of the key features of a democratic developmental state, according to authors such as Gumede (2009), White (2006) and Leftwich (2000), the failure to actively involve citizens as partners is tantamount to a rejection of the model of democratic local government (Evans, 2010; Edigheji, 2010; National Planning Commission, 2011, 2012).

Citizens’ perceptions of the level of commitment shown by their political representatives are also evident in the amount of time which they believe councillors spend in their wards. When asked to comment on how much time they believed the ward councillor spent in their ward or was visible to residents, 39% noted that he/she was never in the ward, and only 11.5% reported weekly attendance in the ward. Almost 21% of the respondents indicated they did not know. On the other hand, when asked how much time they felt a ward councillor should spend visiting the community, a significant 40% of respondents stated ‘all of the time’. A further 40% of respondents indicated that the councillor should visit the community at least weekly, with 13% noting that he/she should visit at least once a month. Considering that ward councillors receive a salary of around R34 000 per month and that they are appointed specifically to represent community interests at sub-council level, residents might justifiably expect that the majority of their time would be spent in their communities or in dealing with community matters. Whilst the exact proportion of time spent by councillors’ in their wards is unknown, their perceived absence appears to have done much to undermine popular trust in their role and in their ability to advance participatory processes. As other studies have found (Narsiah, 2011; Fakir & Moloi, 2011) this may be due to a lack of leadership, of political will
and of a serious commitment to participatory governance on the part of local office bearers. It might also be due to the competence levels of councillors which, as the survey results suggest, appear not to be of the required standard.

Table 7.3 presents the extent to which respondents believe the ward councillors have the competence to perform their basic tasks and the experience to manage public service programmes. The findings reveal that a very small percentage of respondents were of the opinion that their ward councillor was competent in either category (7% and 8% respectively). While just over a third of respondents (35%) perceived their ward councillor to have some competencies, only 7% felt that they were totally competent. In contrast, 46% believed ward councillors to be not very competent or not competent at all. Similar perceptions were recorded with respect to the councillors’ experience in managing public programmes with 47% stating that they were either not very competent or not at all competent. These findings are similar to those of surveys conducted in parts of Kwa-Zulu Natal by Mantzaris and Ngcobo (2008) which they attribute largely to the lack of capacity and training of political office bearers. Yusuf’s (2004) research on Buffalo City Municipality and Stellenbosch Municipality revealed a similar lack of capacity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all competent</th>
<th>Not very competent</th>
<th>Somewhat competent</th>
<th>Totally competent</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ability to perform tasks</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience in managing public programmes</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Citizen concerns about the competence of their ward councillors are aggravated by what they perceive to be the indifference of their political representatives and the fact that they do not appear to care much about the people they are supposed to serve. These perceptions are recorded in Table 7.4 below.
Table 7.4 Perceptions of ward councillors in terms of caring, honesty and fairness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Not at all caring</th>
<th>Not very caring</th>
<th>Somewhat caring</th>
<th>Totally caring</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent they care about the community</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty in handling public funds</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness in allocating services</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness in allocating employment opportunities</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey results reveal that 54% of respondents felt that ward councillors were either not very caring or cared nothing at all about the communities they were serving, with just 33% believing they were somewhat caring or totally caring. Linked to popular concerns about the disinterest of their local political representatives was a widespread conviction that they are also inherently dishonest. Thus, 54% of respondents stated that they believed ward councillors to be either not very honest or not all honest in handling public funds. In contrast, just 5% of those interviewed believed ward councillors to be totally honest. This distrust of the integrity of councillors was also revealed in the extent to which respondents believed they displayed fairness in the allocation of services. Here 50% of the sample believed that ward councillors were either not very fair or not fair at all in the way in which they allocated services in the community, whilst just 7% felt they were totally fair. Respondents also felt that councillors were unfair in the way in which they allocated the employment opportunities which they had at their disposal. Thus, 52% stated that they were either not very fair or not all fair, and just 6% believed that they totally fair.

Although these findings present a damning condemnation of ward councillors, it is important to note that they are based on perceptions which may or may not be based on fact. Thus, for example, in the case of employment allocation, interviews with the chairperson of the sub-council and the sub-council manager (Rau, 23/10/2012; Julies, 23/10/2012) revealed that although residents were of the view that ward councillors have responsibility for this activity, this was not always the case. Despite the fact that the employment of locals was frequently
raised as an issue in housing projects in the area, the chairperson and manager of the sub-
council noted that housing is largely a provincial government competence and provincial
officials determine the criteria for the allocation of jobs and these include the use of unskilled
local residents. The sub-council manager explained that in cases where the municipality is
responsible for housing developmental programmes, he is mandated to assist in the
identification and appointment of local unemployed labour. The ward councillor, he
maintains, is not involved in the appointment of unemployed workers, although many
residents believe this to be the case. Whether or not ward councillors are involved in the
unfair allocation of employment opportunities, residents’ perceptions reflect the fact that the
responsibilities of councillors have been poorly communicated to them. They are reflective of
the general distrust which they maintain towards what are intended to be key role players in
the building of a democratic developmental local government.

This distrust is further evident in the extent to which residents feel that key institutions in
Delft were biased in favour of one particular group. In general, the responses revealed fairly
similar patterns in the extent to which respondents felt that the police, the community police
forum, ward committees, street committees, SANCO and the sub-council favoured one group
in the dealings with the community. Table 7.4 below reveals that the majority of respondents
(ranging from 62% to 72%) were of the opinion that all of these institutions looked after the
interests of all residents. However, it is noteworthy that greatest number of respondents
(27%) felt that the sub-council office was biased towards one group, considerable less than
the 15% who felt that ward committees, street committees and SANCO looked after the
interests of one group only. Whilst the opinions of respondents may be unsubstantiated they
are, once again, indicative of the poor communication channels that exist between citizens
and participatory structures and the fact that some residents feel that they are being unfairly
treated.
Despite the negative perception of ward councillors held by residents, it is evident that their views do not affect their participation in public meetings to the same extent. Thus, Table 7.5 reveals that 52% of all respondents reported that they often attended a meeting organised by the ward committee (only marginally less than the 54% who stated that they often attended a street committee meeting). Significantly, only 20% stated that they had never attended a meeting organised by the ward committee (marginally less than the 21% who stated they had never attended a street committee meeting). Attendance at school governing body meetings was ranked the highest and attracted 62% of respondents who indicated attending such meetings often.

**Table 7.5 Attendance at meetings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attendance at meetings organised by</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Once or twice</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-council Office</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Police Forum</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward Committee</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Committee</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanco</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents who stated that they had never participated in meetings, put forward a number of reasons for their non-attendance (see Table 7.6 below). In that regard, the primary reason for non-attendance cited by respondents was the fact that they had no knowledge of these
meetings (responses ranged 34% to 42%). A smaller but still significant proportion of respondents stated that they lacked the time to attend meetings (responses ranged from 17% to 21%).

Table 7.6 Main reasons for non-attendance at meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Ward Committee</th>
<th>Street Committee</th>
<th>School Governing Body</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I do not have information about the meetings</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not have time to attend meetings</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will make no difference as nothing will change</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The perception of some respondents that their attendance would serve no purpose as ‘nothing would change’ (15% to 17% of those who attended no meetings) can, in part, be explained by the work of Bourdieu (1979, 1989) and Giddens (1984, 1990) with respect to the complex relationship between human agency and social structures and the micro-politics that impact on state–society relations. These theorists draw attention to such issues as the perceived hierarchical status of actors. For Bourdieu this is determined by their knowledge and capabilities, whilst for Giddens the ability to transform social reality is dependent on knowledge, reflection and rationalisation. For many residents in the case study area, the historical legacy of non-participation, overall low levels of education and limited knowledge of municipal processes such as the IDP, is likely to play a role in limiting their exercise of agency. Other factors limiting their engagement could include the controlling and exclusionary attitude of officials, which not only limits the ability of residents to participate but also shapes their opinions on whether participation is likely to yield any gains.

7.3.2 Sector organisations

As previously indicated, ward committees in Delft consist of the ward councillor and ten members selected from different organisations which are active within the ward and wider area. These organisations are further categorised into ten different sectors in accordance with the objectives of the organisation (see Table 7.7).
Table 7.7  Sector organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic-based Organisations</th>
<th>Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ratepayers Associations</td>
<td>• Constituted Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civic Organisations</td>
<td>• City-wide Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Street Committees</td>
<td>• National Organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faith-based Organisations</th>
<th>Arts and Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Churches/Mosques/Temple Organisations in area</td>
<td>• Fine, Performing and Visual Arts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety and Security Organisations</th>
<th>Sports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Neighbourhood Watches</td>
<td>• All registered sporting codes in area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Community Police Forums</td>
<td>• Excludes Provincial/National bodies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Designated Vulnerable Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Natural and Built Environment with a focus on a particular issue in area</td>
<td>• Community Initiatives addressing the vulnerable, aged, gender or disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Environmental Organisations with focus in area</td>
<td>• Organisations servicing the Health sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Early Childhood Development Centres</td>
<td>• Community-based Associations focussed on the formal and informal sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Excludes Secondary and High Schools which participate through the Junior City Council</td>
<td>• Market gardeners and small-scale agriculture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The composition of the ward committee must be reflective of all the sectors and organisations must be registered on the sub-council data base in order to qualify as a sector organisation. Although each sector generally comprises a variety of similar organisations within its cluster, only one representative is selected from each sector to serve as a ward committee member. The sector representative is responsible for liaising with all the organisations within the sector and for raising sector concerns and development needs at ward committee meetings.

Discussions with a senior official from the City of Cape Town (Male Official, Cape Town: 17/05/2013) and councillors (Male Councillor, Delft: 23/05/2013; Male Councillor, Delft: 20/06/2013; Female Councillor, Delft: 20/06/2013) from the case study area reveal that the system of sector representation is problematic. Firstly, many sector organisations draw their membership from different wards in the sub-council area and as a result the chairperson of a sector organisation may be a resident in a different ward from the one in which he or she is serving as a ward committee member. Problems arise when these ward committee members are required to communicate council or sub-council responses back to their members who may be residing in a different ward or who may be unable to attend certain meetings. This presents particular difficulties in sub-council areas comprised of five to six wards.
The three wards in Delft comprise a diverse cross-section of population groups with a range of socio-economic and demographic characteristics. In this context, some councillors contended that the effectiveness of the ward committee system depends, to a large degree, on the chairpersons or representatives of the sector organisation and their interest in engaging with their members and in encouraging residents to become involved in development initiatives in the area (Male Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 22/05/2013; Female Councillor, Delft 19/06/2013). Councillors were consequently of the general opinion that the election of ward committee members on a geographic basis would lead to a more effective system of engaging with ward residents. This, they maintain, is because members would be only be elected if they were known to the community, had already achieved a track record of service to the community, and had displayed initiative and enthusiasm in their dealings with people (Sub-council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 22/05/2013).

Besides the registered sector organisations, there are various other organisations or forums which Delft residents can join. However, despite the fact that a significant number of respondents reported having attended meetings on a fairly regular basis, when asked to indicate their involvement in organisations within the community, in terms either of participation as a member or of performing a leadership role in the organisation, 99% of respondents noted that they were not involved at all. Furthermore, only 1% indicated that they were members of a community policing forum, a street committee, a school governing body or another type of association or community group. A far larger percentage of respondents indicated belonging to a religious group, with 39% stating that they performed a leadership or official role in the organisation, and 19% indicated they were members. An additional 3% stated that although they were not members, they attended meetings or gatherings. The remaining 39% stated that they were not involved in religious organisations in any way.

As ward committees comprises representatives from sector organisations, it is only through membership of these organisations that ordinary citizens can become ward representatives. Furthermore, as the ward committee is the only formalised structure through which local residents can participate in and influence decision-making processes, the finding suggests that the development needs of most people are not being heard. The findings also suggest that the system of sector representation operating in the City of Cape Town (which differs from the
system of geographic representation in place in many other local government areas across the country), is responsible for excluding a large number of residents who are not members of community organisations. In that respect, following Gaventa’s (2004) continuum of the way in which participatory spaces are established and in whose interests, the formally invited participatory spaces in Delft may be considered effectively ‘closed’ to those residents who are not affiliated to an organisation, 

Exclusion from institutionalised spaces, as discussed above, has important ramifications for residents. As authors such as Walmsley (1988), Buttimer (1979), Tuan (1975) and Weightman (1985) have pointed out, space confers identity on its occupants and it serves a centre for the expression of aspirations, as a means for enabling the interaction of individuals and groups and the exercise of voice (Cornwall, 2002c). At the same time, theorists such as Ley (1983) and Knox (1987) assert that exclusion from such spaces leads to alienation and inflicts feelings of powerlessness, vulnerability and low self-worth. In such circumstances, according to Rahman (1993), there is a need for emancipatory forms of participation which can challenge the structures responsible for marginalising and ‘dehumanizing’ ordinary citizens.

7.4 Popular participatory spaces

Since 1994, many communities throughout South Africa have established representative residents’ organisations which are affiliated to the South African National Civic Association (SANCO). Previous research and interviews with SANCO members (Penderis, 1996, 2003) reveals that these civic structures are in essence grassroots organisations that focus particular attention on poor living conditions in disadvantaged areas, and negotiate on behalf of the community for better service delivery and other developmental needs. In terms of power hierarchy and the chain of command, street committees represent second-tier structures within SANCO which are established to assist in maintaining order and in addressing problems in the community.

Interviews with one of the ward councillors (Female Councillor, Delft: 22/06/2013) reveal that a fairly sophisticated street committee system has been established within the case study area and this augments the institutionalised ward committee system, and provides further ‘voice’ to residents. Although street committees are informal community structures, their
influence in townships across the Cape Flats is significant particularly with regard to the resolution of local disputes and the provision of social support.

Wards in Delft are divided into different street blocks which are represented by a street committee and residents residing within a particular block can bring matters of concern to these structures. The ward councillor maintained that she and other councillors organise regular meetings with street committee chairpersons to discuss problems in specific neighbourhoods in their respective wards. Street committee chairpersons can also forward matters of concern directly to sub-council meetings. The issues raised mostly relate to problems with services in the area, but more serious matters concerning housing, crime, vulnerability and so forth are also dealt with by street committees. Street committees are thus, in practical terms, the participatory structures closest to the people where matters of immediate concern can be raised. More serious problems are raised at ward meetings or during one-on-one meetings with the ward councillor whose responsibility it then is to table the problem at sub-council meetings.

Respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in street committees and in SANCO and their perceptions are reflected in Table 7.6 below. A total of 52% of respondents indicated that they trusted the street committee somewhat or a lot.

![Figure 7.6 Trust in Street Committees and SANCO](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Street Committee</th>
<th>SANCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7.6 Trust in Street Committees and SANCO**

A similar response was recorded with regard to SANCO with 50% stating that they trust the
organisation somewhat or a lot. Although these levels of trust are roughly the same as those for ward committees (52%) a distinction arises in the case of the sub-council which less people trust somewhat or a lot (44%) and the highest number trust not at all (33% compared to 21% and 22% for street committees and SANCO respectively). In the case of the sub-council, it is evident that the residents of Delft have more trust in non-institutionalised platforms than the formal structures established through legislation.

When asked whether they had ever taken part in protests, which Gaventa (2006a) and Cornwall (2002a, 2004b) describe as non-institutional participatory spaces or ‘invented spaces’, only 1% of respondents indicated that they had participated in such activities in the preceding twelve months. However, these responses do not appear to be an accurate reflection of reality in that protest action in Delft appears to be increasing both in number and in intensity, largely as a result of dissatisfaction with service delivery and the quality of housing. Although statistics on the number of protests that have taken place are not available, media reports⁵ and interviews with senior officials in Delft (Rau, 22/05/2013; Julies, 22/05/2013) appear to corroborate the view that protest action in the area is growing.

Scholars such as Aiyar (2010), Escobar (2011), Gaventa (2004a, 2004b) and Cornwall (2002a, 2002b), as indicated, maintain that protests typically take place as a consequence of the closed and/or patronised nature of institutionalised spaces and that they are frequently the only avenues open to residents to challenge oppression and coercion and to raise concerns ignored by authority figures. The escalating protests in Delft can be understood in this context and it can be argued that residents have had to resort to ‘claiming’ spaces of resistance in order to air their grievances and to have their voices heard.

### 7.5 Political opinions and perceptions

Whilst a lack knowledge of the workings of the structures established to promote citizen participation appears to have a been a limiting factor for citizen engagement in Delft, it is evident that the community is generally well informed about current affairs and about broader issues of governance. In response to the question of how often they had access to the news

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⁵ This is evident in such press articles as ‘Protesting Delft residents block road with tyres’ (The Sowetan, 2012), ‘Delft residents picket’ (The Voice of the Cape, 2012) and ‘City seeks interdicts against Delft leaders’ (Cape Times, 2013).
(Table 7.8 below), 68% of respondents reported listening to the news on the radio on a daily basis, while 74% stated that they listened to the news on television on a daily basis. Due to the associated cost, only 29% of respondents reported reading newspapers on a daily basis, whilst very few had access to news on the internet.

Table 7.8 Interest in current affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Less than once a month</th>
<th>A few times a month</th>
<th>A few times per week</th>
<th>Every day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of news from</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of news from</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of news from</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of news from</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the internet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In response to the question whether they should hold the political leadership to account, the overwhelming majority of respondents (98%) stated that they agreed or strongly agreed that citizens should be more active in questioning leaders. There was also a strong assertion (93% agreeing or strongly agreeing) on the right of opposition parties to examine and criticise government actions, and an equally strong conviction (96% agreeing or strongly agreeing) on the need for news media to investigate corruption in government.

Table 7.9 Matters of governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens should be more active in questioning leaders</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition parties should examine and criticise government actions</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The news media should investigate corruption in government</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is evident that citizens of Delft consider themselves to be free under the new democratic dispensation. As illustrated in Table 7.10, the overwhelming majority of those interviewed (94.9%) considered themselves completely free to vote for anyone of their choice, to join any
organisation of their choice (96%) and to say what they think (95.7%).

Table 7.10  Perception of freedoms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freedom to choose who to vote for</th>
<th>Not at all free</th>
<th>Not very free</th>
<th>Somewhat free</th>
<th>Completely free</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>94.9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom to join any organisation</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom to say what you think</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While these responses indicate that progress has been made in the country’s transition from a racial autocracy to democracy, it also evident that ordinary people expect considerably more from the democratic system than freedom of expression and political association. Thus, when asked whether they were satisfied with South Africa as a democracy, two thirds of respondents (66%) stated that they were either not very satisfied or not satisfied at all. Only 26% stated that they were fairly satisfied with the democracy and a very small minority (8%) asserted that they were very satisfied with the current dispensation.

Figure 7.11  Satisfaction with South Africa as a democracy

While there is often a tendency to presume that disadvantaged citizens are politically uninformed, the survey results discussed above indicate that the residents of Delft are both politically knowledgeable and aware of their rights as citizens, including their right to
participate in systems of local governance. From this it may be inferred that their criticism of local participatory structures and of the poor performance of ward councillors are well informed. The results also indicate that the low level of citizen participation in the preparation of IDPs is not due to local apathy but is due rather to poor communication by the City on the planning process and perfunctory attempts to consult local residents. It also points to an essentially top-down approach to planning which pays lip-service to community participation and is the antithesis of the developmental rhetoric so evident in government policy documents. It is evident that citizen participation is further hampered by the poor design of ward committees and the system of sector representation which effectively excludes those who are not involved with local organisations.

7.6 Concluding comments

This chapter has examined the formal structures which have been established to promote citizen participation in Delft. The findings of the research indicate that the ‘invited spaces’ for participation created by the municipality are failing to engage the community as intended and the population have turned to their own ‘created spaces’, in the form of street committees, to address their concerns. It is also evident that the shortcomings of the participatory system have fuelled distrust in both local institutions (sub-councils and ward committees) and local politicians. The survey data also suggests that, from the perspective of poor citizens, the City is failing in its attempts to establish a developmental local government. This relates to its ability to promote citizen participation, to provide services of an acceptable standard, and to build a more equitable society. In this context, frustrated citizens are increasingly turning to protest action as the most effective way in which to exercise voice and to attract the attention of the authority.

Where this chapter has focused on the perceptions of the residents of Delft, the chapter which follows will focus on the views of officials from the City of Cape Town, councillors and ward committee members in the case study area in order to gain an understanding of their perceptions of the meaning of developmental local government and the extent to which they believe the City is succeeding in fulfilling its developmental mandate.
The previous chapter looked at the structures and processes in place to promote participatory development in Delft. Based on survey data it analysed the perceptions which residents of the area hold on the effectiveness of the system of participatory governance and the extent to which they believed they were being given a meaningful say in local affairs which affect their welfare. This chapter looks at the challenges of establishing participatory systems from the perspective of local government administrators and political office bearers. In so doing, it focuses on the extent to which the process of integrated development planning, a cornerstone of developmental local government, is seen to advance participatory development and general improvement of the welfare of poor communities. It also critically examines the institutions established to give effect to ongoing citizen participation in the affairs of the local state, namely the sub-councils and ward committees.

The views and perceptions of a variety of municipal officials, ward councillors and ward committee members in the case study area were canvassed in an attempt to understand the process through which the City of Cape Town is attempting to advance the ideal of democratic developmental government. In order to give structure to the evidence generated through several different sources including interviews, focus group discussions and personal observation, information is categorised into three broad themes relating to intergovernmental relations and the integration of governance efforts, the integrated development planning process and the sub-council and the ward committee participatory system.

8.1 Intergovernmental relations and integration of governance efforts

Besides the importance of inter-governmental cooperation and a ‘seamless web of services that cuts across jurisdictional boundaries’ (Layman, 2003:24), one of the key requirements of building a democratic developmental state in South Africa, as discussed, is the need to coordinate and integrate the activities of the national, provincial and local spheres of government. This pre-condition applies no less to the establishment of developmental local government. In that respect, while cooperation refers to the clear division of powers and
responsible, the integration of development interventions denotes the alignment of policies, strategies and planning of the three different spheres in order to deliver the developmental vision of national government at the local level. In this context, continued engagement and consultation between the three spheres, the coordination of development programmes and the streamlining of efforts and resources is seen to be essential in building a state that is both developmental and transformative. This is acknowledged in the Preamble to the Intergovernmental Relations Framework (Act No. 13, 2005b:2) which states that:

... one of the most pervasive challenges facing our country as a developmental state is the need for government to redress poverty, underdevelopment, marginalisation of people and communities and other legacies of apartheid and discrimination ... this challenge is best addressed through a concerted effort by government in all spheres to work together and to integrate as far as possible their actions in the provision of services, the alleviation of poverty and the development of our people and our country.

The rationale behind the creation of a system of cooperative governance in South Africa is the notion of a ‘whole’ government which delivers resources and development to its citizens at the local level in a synchronised manner (RSA, 1998b). It is thus necessary for the activities of the three spheres to focus on the development of municipalities through combined and synergised plans and actions. This, however, is not an easy task taking into consideration the numerous structures operating within each sphere and the number of engagements that are required both within and between spheres. Pieterse (2007:13) outlines the challenges involved in aligning inter-sphere activity as follows:

The tendency ... to have IDPs reflect the entirety of government’s efforts in a particular municipal territory is in part driven by the policy imperative to see a tight alignment between the NSDP, Provincial Growth and Development Strategies (PGDS) and IDPs. However, this alignment is more difficult to realise in practice than commonly suggested in formal policy prescripts. The reality is that these three categories of policy are actually very different to one another.

Reuben Baaitjies, Director of Intergovernmental Relations at SALGA, agrees that cooperative governance is an extremely daunting task and states that ‘for too long, there has
been little or no development planning within the other spheres, which means that when local
government plans, there is no, or precious little, engagement by the other spheres to align
their programmes with the priorities identified at the local level’ (Baaitjies, 2009:12). This
perspective was confirmed during interviews with ward councillors and officials1 from line
departments at the City of Cape Town who maintained that one of the structural barriers
impacting on the delivery of a transformative developmental state is the overlapping of
functions of the different spheres and the lack of synergised planning with national and
provincial structures (Male Official, Cape Town: 13/06/2012; Ward Councillor, Delft:
06/09/2012; Male Official, Cape Town: 02/05/2013). According to Councillor Van Wyk,
from Sub-council 5, a lack of coordination between local government and the other two
spheres of government directly impacts on the needs of local communities:

In terms of the Development State vision, there is a disconnect between National,
Provincial and Local Government. They start with a blank canvas, but the disconnect is
between the needs of the people and higher body decisions. What the people’s real
needs are is not understood and the diversity in wards is not understood. Emotional
forces and the political landscape play a major role. If one goes into the community we
can see what the real needs of people are. We cannot predetermine this. We must really
listen to the people, not the other way around. We are not doing this at grassroots level.
If we do not deal with this, things will just get worse. We talk about freedom, but look
at our informal settlements – still the same people are living there (Van Wyk,
24/09/2013).

Other councillors presented a similar view of the delivery of a developmental state. A
proportional representative councillor claimed that ‘if we want to achieve national goals at
the local level and give substance to the idea of a developmental state, we need to combine
development plans and support each other. Not work in isolation at different levels which is
what often happens’ (Ntoko, 23/05/2013). Ward councillor Gympies agreed that the notion of
a development state was not based on current development needs and asserted that

1 During interviews, respondents frequently requested that their anonymity be protected, either due to the
sensitivity of the topic or due to their position being threatened if it was known that they had made a particular
statement. Thus, in accordance with these requests, certain statements are recorded by only providing the
gender, place and date of the interview and indicating whether the respondent is an official, councillor or ward
committee member.
government is out of touch with the reality of circumstances faced in communities. She commented that ‘there is definitely a disconnect in the thinking of the developmental state. There is lack of alignment somewhere between the greater needs of national government and the immediate needs of communities. Our people want satisfaction of their immediate needs, such as jobs, housing and safety which are serious problems in most communities’ (Gympies, 23/05/2013). During a focus group discussion, ward committee members were asked their views on whether the government is succeeding in its efforts to deliver the goals of a developmental state in the context of Delft. One ward committee member noted that ‘I do not want to lie. I do not know about the developmental state. But what I do know is that there is no development here on the ground. What the government says is contrary to what is the practicality’ (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 20/10/2012).

A lack of co-operation is evident in the interface between administrators from different echelons of government and between these officials and local politicians. Observation of sub-council meetings revealed latent tensions between municipal and provincial officials on the one hand and councillors on the other. Councillors blamed municipal and provincial officials for poorly coordinated planning and budgeting, failure to provide development plans to sub-council, failure to indicate the on-going status of ward projects and failure to timeously release the funding required to implement projects in the sub-council area. One ward councillor was of the view that the poor coordination of effort leads to ‘duplication and infective utilisation of scarce resources. We often work in silos which impacts on our ability to perform optimally. Our community people then lose trust in us and follow the route of “toi toing” (protesting) and destroying property’ (Male Councillor, Delft: 19/06/2013). Agreeing with this viewpoint, another councillor added that the lack of response from municipal officials when requested to provide information on development plans was very frustrating, as this impacted on attempts to monitor the provision of services in their ward (Male Councillor, Delft, 19/06/2013).

A lack of harmonisation between provincial and local government spheres in the planning and delivery of public housing was reported to be a major source of frustration of City officials and office bearers alike. The lack of a shared and coordinated vision and the duplication of efforts by local and provincial government that this leads to is described by Mr Martin Julies, the sub-council manager, as follows:
There is no single data base and no coordination of beneficiary lists. As Delft is such a fast growing area new people are creating their own leaders and own lists and pleading their more dire circumstances in order to be given priority. Some projects are City projects and others Provincial projects which results in a very complex and difficult situation (Julies, 23/10/2012).

His concerns were confirmed during a telephonic interview with a provincial housing official, who claimed no knowledge of municipal housing projects in Delft and suggested that the researcher forward all enquiries in this regard to the City of Cape Town’s Human Settlements Department (Female Official, Cape Town: 07/11/2012). However, an official from the national Housing Development Agency (HDA), the entity responsible for the acquisition of land and the project management of housing services, disagreed that there was duplication and lack of collaboration. The Housing Development Agency is established under the Housing Development Agency Act (No. 23 of 2008) and operates as a national public entity with its executive authority vested in the minister responsible for housing. One of its key responsibilities is to ensure that there is intergovernmental collaboration and alignment of housing development services (HDA, 2013). While requesting anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic, she commented as follows:

Housing is a very emotional issue and there are many problems surrounding it. We (the HDA) are a parastatal and play a facilitative role. There is only one housing list, as there is an allocation committee for housing and representatives from the National, Provincial and Local Government Human Settlement Departments are members of the same committee. The role of the housing allocation committee is to reach consensus on the allocation of housing and budgeting and the process is coordinated by this committee (Female Official, HAD, Cape Town: 16/07/2013).

Another serious concern raised by officials in Delft is the slow pace of delivery of housing and the confusion engendered in the community as to which sphere of government might be held responsible. The sub-council manager noted that ‘community members do often not understand the difference and vent their anger on their ward councillor and committee members when they presume the City is running the project when in fact it is a provincial project’ (Julies, 23/10/2012). He added that this was a particularly problematic issue in Ward 106, ‘which is a very poor ward in terms of facilities, and community residents continually take out their frustrations on the ward councillor, although this is a provincial responsibility’
The chairperson of a neighbouring sub-council agreed with this view stating that ‘I am quite strict about not taking responsibility if the problem is not a local government issue. I will assist and take it to the responsible Provincial Department to follow up, but I won’t deal with it’ (Male Sub-council Chairperson, Cape Town: 20/09/2013). In attempting to address this lack of understanding, in a number of sub-council meetings observed, the chairperson urged councillors to use ward committees and sector organisations as a channel of communication to explain the division of powers and respective functions and responsibilities of the different spheres to residents, (Rau, 22/05/2013, 19/06/2013; 23/08/2013).

Although the provision of housing is a designated responsibility of provincial government, the City of Cape Town has received housing accreditation from national government which enables it to play a more proactive role in the delivery of housing (Pollack, 2011). Dr Martin van der Merwe, the IDP Manager of the City of Cape Town, noted that ‘as an accredited housing authority, responsibilities of the provincial housing authority are devolved to the local level in order to facilitate more effective housing delivery’ (Van der Merwe, 02/05/2013).

Another example of the lack of inter-sphere coordination and the failure to align national, provincial and local government programmes is to be found in the delivery of local health services. According to councillors in the case study area, this lack of alignment has resulted in serious duplication of effort and the wastage of scarce resources. A specific example that was discussed at length during a sub-council meeting related to the implementation of a national health programme in Delft and the lack of communication and alignment with the programmes of the City’s Health Directorate (Sub-Council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013). At national level, the Department of Health launched a nation-wide polio and measles immunisation campaign in April and June 2013 which was to be rolled out through all public health facilities at the local level. According to staff from the City Health Directorate, the national health campaign was not properly aligned to local government health programmes and accordingly City health officials were unable to inform ward councillors in Delft timeously of the implementation of the campaign.Confirming the challenge which this posed a councillor stressed that the lack of communication and collaboration impacted on the ability of local officials to provide an integrated service delivery system and it also meant that ward
councillors were unable to inform their constituents as they themselves were not aware of the campaign (Male Councillor, Delft: 19/06/2013). A failure to coordinate inter-governmental activity, according to another councillor, angered residents who then turned on their own councillors. “(T)hese complaints” she commented, “are understandable as immunisation is an essential service that should be communicated to the public’ (Female Councillor, Delft: 19/06/2013).

A further concern raised by officials relates to weak intra-governmental coordination within the municipality itself with regard to the planning and implementation of projects. This concern further extended to the lack of coordination within departments and this was stated to be a factor which constrains officials in fulfilling their duties (Male Official, Cape Town: 16/08/2012). In some cases poor coordination is attributed to a lack of capacity on the part of municipal officials, whilst in others it is attributed to continually changing responsibilities assigned to line departments and the reallocation of duties, all of which impact on the delivery of development programmes (Sub-council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 20/02/2013; Sub-council Minutes, 22/05/2013; Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013).

At the intra-sphere level, the lack of communication between the City of Cape Town’s line departments and the sub-council regarding service provision became a standard issue on the monthly sub-council agenda. One example in this regard, and a matter repeatedly raised at sub-council meetings, was the upgrading and maintenance of parks in the sub-council area (Sub-council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 22/05/2013; Sub-council Minutes, Delft: 19/06/2013). A specific issue under discussion during one meeting was that the City Parks Department, which is responsible for the maintenance of the parks in the City of Cape Town, repeatedly failed to communicate progress and to provide documentation relating to its upgrade development plan to the sub-council (Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013). An additional problem highlighted at the meeting was the delay in implementing service delivery maintenance programmes in the sub-council area, despite budget approval. The issue related to the on-going debate between the Department of Roads and Storm Water and the City Parks Department as to which department is responsible for services such as the maintenance of sidewalks (Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013). Once again, councillors felt that the lack

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2 The City of Cape Town has undergone a series of organisational restructuring exercises in the past few years.
of alignment of duties impacted on their ability to perform their duties and they believed that this lead to justifiable dissatisfaction and complaints on the part of the residents in areas which were affected by the lack of maintenance.

Other problems cited during interviews and at sub-council meetings as impacting on development in the case study area included substandard service from some municipal officials and line departments, unspent funds and the lack of timeous provision of business plans and action programmes from the various line departments (Male Ward Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 20/05/2013; Sub-council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 23/08/2013; Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013). According to a proportional representation councillor, line departments were failing to forward IDP plans to the sub-council which was ‘thus kept in the dark’ on the extent to which they were meeting their objectives and set targets (Female Councillor, Delft: 17/04/2013). Another matter of concern which was raised at sub-council meetings, and which was confirmed in interviews with City officials, related to the realignment of directorates which involved the redirection of some of their functions to a different or new directorate. This resulted in staff changes with new officials taking over responsibility for projects in a particular directorate and with consequent delays or inaction (Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013; Sub-council Minutes, 23/08/2013). In this regard the realignment of the Department of Social Development and Early Childhood Development was stated to have impacted on the implementation of ward projects due to the repositioning of responsible line department staff and the appointment of a new project manager. Councillor Esau remarked that this impacted on the delivery of ward projects in the sub-council area and contributed to the under-spending of earmarked funding (Esau, 19/06/2013).

From the above it is evident that weak coordination of both intra- and inter-governmental activity together with poorly synchronised strategies is inhibiting the goals of developmental local government. Weak integration of effort across spheres of government is also aggravating resource scarcity at the local level.

8.2 Integrated Development Planning

A range of official documents and media reports assert that, in compliance with statutory requirements, there is a comprehensive system of public participation in place to support the formulation and implementation of the City’s IDP (City of Cape Town, 2012a, 2012b; IDP,
In the Mayor’s Foreword to the current IDP, Alderman Patricia de Lille pronounces that ‘we are proud that this IDP has reached over one million people in an extensive public participation process. This is proof that the IDP is a plan that belongs to all the people of Cape Town; a plan in which they all have a say’ (IDP, 2012:6). Despite these claims, empirical evidence (both qualitative and quantitative) indicates that in practice the municipality’s IDP process is, to a large degree, a top-down process designed at mayoral level and presented to stakeholders for rubberstamping and approval. In particular, it would appear as if the Mayor of Cape Town herself plays an important role in the design of the IDP as evident in the following statement from a senior City official:

*The IDP is the Mayor’s Plan and it is a very important process for her. The mayor is at the forefront of the drafting of the IDP document and the shaping of the plan. She goes to meetings and listens to people and respondents and their problems and concerns. She very much owns the plan which gives it credibility. She also pushes the organisation very hard to reach its goals (Male Official, Cape Town: 09/05/2013).*

Regarding participation of civil society in the preparation of the IDP, it was acknowledged by an IDP official that ‘we are not even close to achieving what the spirit of legislation requires. We have initiated a number of participatory activities, but we only manage to access a miniscule number of the population’ (Male Official, Cape Town: 02/05/2013). Supporting this view a councillor from Delft added that ‘the IDP in its present form is a flawed and defective process. If we want to give substance to the government’s vision of a developmental state in South Africa, we will have to seriously rethink our existing system of local government as the implementing arm of government’ (Male Councillor, Delft: 23/05/2013). In addition to these sentiments, interviews with a cross-section of officials, councillors and ward committee members highlighted a number of recurring themes relating to the IDP which they believe impact negatively on the ability of local government to deliver a democratic and developmental state. These themes are discussed in the section below.

8.2.1 The Integrated Development Planning process

A discussion with an official from the City of Cape Town’s Public Participation Unit revealed that there are both internal and external role-players who provide input into the
planning of the IDP. Internal role-players comprise entities within the City Council, namely members of the Mayoral Committee (MAYCO), Portfolio Committees, the Executive Management Team, the different Directorates and Departments, Sub-councils, Ward Committees and other municipal bodies. External role-players include community members, community-based organisations, non-governmental organisations, national and provincial government, neighbouring municipalities and higher learning institutions (Male Official, Cape Town: 16/5/2013).

The Director of the IDP Office, Dr Martin van der Merwe, explained that the IDP process takes place at three levels with varying degrees of input from the different stakeholders. He explained that the first planning level comprises the corporate planning level, which is the responsibility of the Executive Mayor who designs the overall IDP framework on the basis of input received from the public through various channels including meetings and surveys. The draft IDP is then submitted by the mayor to the IDP Unit, together with a political mandate and the parameters within which the IDP must be formulated. The second level comprises a technical legislative level which allows limited flexibility in terms of planning options due to stringent national legislative requirements and strict oversight with regard to the implementation of the IDP and the achievements of set targets. Minimal public input or political influence occurs at this level and, according to Van der Merwe, ‘legislation is very restrictive in terms of what we can or cannot do’. The third level takes place at community level through the sub-council and ward system. However, input at this level is once again very limited and is restricted to concerns such as the fencing of parks and the building of speed humps. The Director of the IDP Office further maintains that the primary concerns of communities revolve around the three issues of employment, safety and housing and ‘these can be raised through other channels such as mayoral imbizos, walkabouts and “have your say” campaigns’ (Van der Merwe, 02/5/2013). This would seem to imply that the IDP process itself is not intended to address the major concerns of local communities and focuses instead on relatively minor issues of service delivery such as the installation of speed bumps.

As noted in Chapter 6, the City of Cape Town’s IDP has been developed around five Strategic Focus Areas (SFA), namely the Opportunity City (SFA1), Safe City (SFA2), Caring City (SFA3), Inclusive City (SFA4) and the Well-Run City (SFA5) and aligned to the annual budget. A total of 24 corporate objectives are set for the SFAs and for each objective a
number of measurable and quantifiable key performance indicators and corporate targets are specified. Subsequently, each objective is further divided into a number of different programmes which consist of smaller projects to be initiated in different localities across the City of Cape Town’s metropolitan area. Lead directorates and line departments are then given responsibility for managing the different programmes and projects that fall within their area of specialisation.

Selected officials from various line departments, who are responsible for the implementation of the different IDP programmes within the sub-council area, are mandated to provide a detailed written report and verbal presentation to sub-council members on a quarterly basis. This has proved to be a very significant practice as in this way local government officials are held accountable for reaching set targets. Councillors are also given the opportunity to discuss the status of projects in their area with implementing officials from the different line departments. This system of reporting further provides councillors with additional information on such matters as the alignment of departmental strategies with those of their provincial and national development counterparts, and this allows them the opportunity to request reports from other spheres of government when programmes are not aligned. In this way, theoretically at least, councillors have an opportunity to exercise some oversight over the activities taking place in their wards. In that regard, it was evident that both the sub-council chairperson and sub-council manager availed themselves of the opportunity to follow up concerns raised at sub-council meetings with line departments, portfolio committees and Mayco when required to do so, even if the outcome of their intervention was minimal (Sub-council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 22/05/2013; Sub-council Activity Day, Bonteheuwel: 23/05/2013; Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013; Ward Committee Meeting, Delft: 17/07/2013).

8.2.2 Public participation in Integrated Development Planning

The Director of the IDP Office acknowledged that ‘although there is an honest and sincere desire to involve communities’ it is not so easy in practice ‘as the IDP process is extremely complex and requires input from a number of diverse quarters’ (Van der Merwe, 02/05/2013). One of the officials from the City of Cape Town’s Public Participation Unit elaborated on this, noting that one of the many challenges that officials in his unit face when
developing participatory mechanisms, is the diversity of communities in terms of language and literacy levels. In response to the question of how illiterate residents are included, he explained that the policy is to use media such as local radio stations to advertise initiatives that are undertaken in the area and to conduct one-on-one ‘door-to-door’ interviews in the language of the residents being canvassed. However, he conceded that this approach was not followed in the formulation of the IDP, but was used in other initiatives such as the naming of streets which could form part of ward allocation projects run by line-departments. He acknowledged that an important mechanism to enable participation at the grassroots level is the sub-council and ward committee system, although he believed that they are often not performing as intended in facilitating participation (Male Official, Cape Town: 16/05/2013).

Although a media statement released by the Executive Mayor of the City of Cape Town and advertised on the council website (De Lille, 2013) proclaims that IDP public engagement meetings were held in all 24 sub-council areas to gather the views of the public, interviews with the Mr Julies, the sub-council manager and Ms Rau, the sub-council chairperson, revealed that as many of the sub-councils cover extensive geographical areas, in practice, few ordinary residents are given the opportunity to participate in IDP deliberations (Rau, 23/10/2012; Julies, 23/10/2012). This was confirmed during a focus group discussion held with ward committee members and during discussions with ward councillors in Delft. One of the ward committee members confirmed that an IDP public meeting had ‘never been held in Delft since the local government elections in 2011’ and that the Delft community had not been invited to give input in any form into the City’s current IDP (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 23/10/2012). In that regard a ward councillor admitted that current local government structures do not facilitate a bottom-up community-driven process (Female Councillor, Delft: 22/05/2013), whilst a proportional representation councillor maintained that ‘public participation is a dream. It’s just not possible. Community people do not understand the IDP and in any case they are more concerned about getting jobs and putting food on the table’ (Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 17/04/2013). This conviction that poor citizens have no intrinsic interest in participatory processes is further evident in the following statement by an official in the IDP Office:

*For the majority, they are really worried about bread and butter issues and not the IDP. The lack of awareness of the IDP overall in the country is very worrying – current*
statistics indicate that only 5% of South Africans are aware of the IDP. We accept that the overall knowledge of the IDP within the City of Cape Town is very small. Although we want people to engage with plans of the city, for many they are just not interested – only when it comes to matters of service delivery which actually affects them. Even though we want people to engage with plans of the City, many do not engage as it does not concern them (Male Official, Cape Town: 09/05/2013).

A chairperson from an adjoining sub-council acknowledged that the participatory process throughout the City’s municipal area is defective as a result of it being ‘council driven, not community driven and not emanating from the wishes of the people on the ground as required by legislation’. He explained that ideally the process should start at grassroots at ward committee level and ‘input should be coming in from every area in terms of what the people want in their ward. You have got the building blocks in terms of the 111 wards that are giving input’, he maintained. ‘These inputs must then be put to the 24 sub-councils who look at it and give input from the sub-council point of view’ as some of the things in the IDP are not ward based, ‘they are bigger than ward based’. He noted that additional input such as that relating to infrastructural requirements (for example, the sewerage system maintenance) would need to be provided by the different line departments as this information would not be known to ward committees and councillors. He also indicated that political input would have to be given by Mayco members, although he conceded that:

This is what should be done, but it isn’t. I don’t disagree that this is not a participatory process - but no-one will do anything about it. You have actually got the line departments dictating in my opinion, because you get presented with a budget which the line departments draw up. And surely that must be in line with the IDP? (Male Subcouncil Chairperson, Cape Town: 18/07/2013).

One of the official reasons for the lack of public participation was stated to be the weakness of civil society and its failure to engage in participatory processes. According to a City of Cape Town official:

If you don’t have organised civil society, if they just have to tick the blocks, then they just tick the blocks. To me it’s much more beneficial that they (the public) just tick the
block. We are dealing with civil society. They are not readily available. Every year before the IDP meeting then they must just tick the block. What do they do for the rest of the year? The whole process is flawed (Female Official, Cape Town, 18/07/2013).

A similar observation was made by a ward councillor who was of the view that the lack of ‘voice’ in the process of participatory decision making in the IDP stems from the fact that ‘community people are not well organised’ and they need ‘to also start taking responsibility for their development needs’ (Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 23/05/2013).

Irrespective of the validity of these claims, and a tendency to blame the victims, the lack of meaningful participation in the IDP process was a recurring theme by officials, councillors, ward committee members and sector representatives. Furthermore the absence of effective institutionalised structures for participation is likely to be a contributing factor to the recurrent community protests that take place in Delft on a monthly and sometimes weekly basis highlighting the dissatisfaction of community residents with their living conditions and the use of protests as a last resort to have their voice heard and to exercise agency. These protests also suggest that the frustration displayed by communities is, in part, due to the fact that the promise (endlessly repeated in policy documents and by political leaders) that their expressed needs and opinions will be taken into consideration is seldom if ever fulfilled.

Using the insights provided by respondents in the foregoing section, it appears that the lack of participation can be attributed to three major flaws in the current IDP process. Firstly, the methods of gathering input from the public are only reaching a very small sector of the population and are thus failing to not identify the tangible development needs of disadvantaged communities. Secondly, and linked to the first constraint, the current use of public input appears to be based predominantly on the views of the more literate and advantaged sectors of the society and this serves to further exclude the poor and marginalised. Finally, the participatory mechanisms to elicit community input, namely subcouncils and ward committees, are inadequate structures for the promotion of citizen participation. It is thus unsurprising that the vision of a developmental state that is intended to deepen democracy and decrease inequality, poverty and unemployment is not being reflected in any significant way in the case study area.
8.2.3 Alignment of local, provincial and national development plans

While the overall vision of a developmental state in South Africa remains a strategic focus of national government, as expressed in the NDP, the actualisation of this vision, as indicated, is intended to commence at local government level through the mechanism of Integrated Development Planning. In this context it was deemed necessary to determine how the City aligns its IDP to the NDP in order to assess how national objectives of developmental local government, and ultimately the goals of a developmental state, are given effect at community level. It is evident that, formally at least, the IDP is supposed to be fully aligned with the NPD and other national and provincial planning strategies. As the Director of the IDP Office explains:

Many of the other policy documents flow from the IDP – and are included as annexures. Planning the IDP is a total iterative process and it is carefully aligned to the NDP. Although some documents take a longer term view, all development in a municipal area must be aligned. Sometimes the long view is different to problems that we face today. For example a ten year plan may focus on certain issues and problems, but we might find that in a particular area a problem such as safety and security becomes an issue. Then one will need to adapt to that, but unfortunately that adaption takes time. One can compare this adaption to trying to change the direction of an elephant charging at full speed - how does one do this – the answer is slowly (Van der Merwe, 02/05/2013).

This approach is evident in an internal departmental spread sheet which sets out how NDP objectives are aligned with those in the City’s IDP. For the purpose of this research only a selection of objectives, actions and deliverables have been extracted from this document and these are illustrated in Table 10.1 below. Each of the three NDP objectives listed in the table are drawn from Chapter 13 of the NDP which aims to create ‘a state that is capable of playing a developmental and transformative role’.
Table 8.1 Alignment of the National Development Plan and Integrated Development Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NDP Objective</th>
<th>NDP Action</th>
<th>IDP Objective</th>
<th>IDP deliverable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A state that is capable of playing a developmental and transformative role</td>
<td>No action directly impacting on local government found in the IDP</td>
<td>Objective 3.1 Providing access to social service for those who need it</td>
<td>Programme 3.1 (a) Number of targeted and development programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A state that is capable of playing a developmental and transformative role</td>
<td>No action directly impacting on local government found in the IDP</td>
<td>Objective 3.2 Ensure increased access to innovative human settlements for those who need it</td>
<td>Programme 3.2 (a) Use property and land to leverage social issues Provide beneficiaries with secure freehold title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations between national, provincial and local government are improved through a more proactive approach to managing the intergovernmental system</td>
<td>Use differentiation to ensure a better fit between the capacity and responsibilities of provinces and municipalities. Take a proactive approach to resolving coordination problems and a more long-term approach to building capacity</td>
<td>Objective 3.2 Ensure increased access to innovative human settlements for those who need it</td>
<td>Programme 3.2(c) Partner with Province in education and school sites through a review process which has been initiated between the City and the Provincial Department of Education in which all vacant educational assets are being assessed in terms of whether they should be released to other forms of development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each NDP objective an accompanying action has been listed and this is aligned to an IDP objective with specified targets. Since interpretation of the objectives and targets needed to support the NPP is at the sole discretion of the City (in other words, they are not agreed to in consultation with provincial and national government) it cannot be said that the process of planning is an integrated one. The City, in practice, determines which aspects of the NDP it wishes to pursue in its IDP and in which way.

The NDP objective of creating a state that is capable of playing a developmental and transformative role, is aligned to IDP Objective 3.1 entitled providing access to social services for those who need it, together with IDP Objective 3.2 entitled to ensure increased access to innovative human settlements for those who need it. The deliverable in both cases finds expression in the Strategic Focus Area 3 of the IDP (one of the five SFAs of the City’s IDP), namely a Caring City. As the exact number and nature of IDP deliverables is not provided in the spread sheet, an analysis was conducted of the City’s 2012/2013 Five Year Corporate Scorecard as this sets out the specific targets of each IDP deliverable as reflected in the Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP, 2013). For IDP Objective
3.1, the Corporate Scorecard lists the implementation of seven social development programmes and 25 recreation hubs as targets. Bearing in mind that there are 111 wards in 24 sub-council areas, and 14 sub-councils are either situated completely within the Cape Flats or include townships on the Cape Flats (City of Cape Town Sub-council Map, 2013), these targets appear to be decidedly inadequate in terms of addressing the needs of poor and disadvantaged.

With respect to IDP Objective 3.2, which specifies the number of public housing units to be delivered annually, the Corporate Scorecard sets a target of providing only 12,281 units for the entire metropolitan area. Given the vast number of informal settlements, backyard shelters and temporary relocation areas currently within the City’s boundaries and the dire need for housing, repeatedly expressed by City officials and councillors in Delft and elsewhere, it is evident the delivery of such a limited number of housing units will have very little impact in providing accommodation for marginalised households and in improving their quality of life. To place this in perspective, besides a vast number of backyard shacks, there are currently 377 informal settlements within the boundaries of the city (Van der Merwe, 02/05/2013) and an estimated housing backlog of 350,000 units (City of Cape Town, 2013). Considering the fact that only 3,802 subsidised housing units and 60 rental units were provided for poor families during the 2011/2012 financial year (City of Cape Town, 2012c) and considering the continuous in-migration into the City, the slow delivery rate does not bode well for the elimination of housing shortages in the municipality in the foreseeable future.

In that regard, according to officials, councillors and ward committee members interviewed, conditions in Delft appear to be deteriorating with respect to the provision of formal accommodation and other services as migrants continue to stream into the area. This is borne out, as indicated, by the growing number of housing protests in the locality. Illustrative of the scale of the problem, during a ward committee meeting attended by the researcher a resident asked when her family would be given a house as they had been on the waiting list for ten years. The sub-council manager informed her that she would still have to wait a very long time as those currently being assigned housing were residents who had been on the waiting list for 25 years (Julies, 17/07/2013). Amongst those in most dire need of formal housing are the residents of the Blikkiesdorp temporary relocation area which was considered by a ward
committee member as to be no better than a slum. He described the conditions in the area as follows:

_This is worse than during apartheid. These people live in these one-room tin sheds like cattle. They are treated like prisoners by the police. It’s an insult to one’s dignity. Don’t talk about democracy – where’s the democracy here? You tell me_ (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 19/06/2013).

The NDP objective of improving of intergovernmental relations is presented as corresponding well with Objective 3.2 of the IDP, which refers to the need to increase access to human settlements. Somewhat incongruously, the IDP deliverable in this instance is stated as the need to liaise with the Provincial Education Department to review educational and school sites that could be used for other forms of development. Although this deliverable could potentially increase access to human settlement opportunities, there is no guarantee that it would increase the housing stock per se and increase access to accommodation by the poor. Although housing has been identified, by officials, councillors and residents alike, as one of the most critical issues facing the municipality, the growing backlog in housing provision suggests that relatively little headway is being made in addressing the problem. However, despite the fact that the delivery of housing is a concurrent responsibility of all three spheres of government there is little in the City’s IDP of how inter-governmental coordination might be improved and better alignment of policy and planning objectives achieved. In that respect, the planning alignment which is evident in the IDP appears to be little more than an exercise in legislative compliance with little consideration given to the dynamics of how this might come about in practice.

One of the major constraints to more effective intergovernmental co-operation and the alignment and delivery of national objectives appears to be fact that provincial and local government officials in the Western Cape, for the most part, demonstrate a very limited understanding of the concept of a developmental state. It follows that if a basic understanding of national government’s vision of a developmental state is either lacking or limited at provincial and local government level, the strategies to implement such visions will accordingly be inadequate due to divergent views and the absence of a common purpose. The lack of a ‘common developmental grammar’, which according to Johnson (1995) is a
prerequisite of a successful developmental state, will undoubtedly detract from efforts to implement such a state at the local level. In that respect, not only is the term ‘developmental state’ not included in the City of Cape Town’s IDP, but the majority of officials interviewed have either ‘not heard of the term’ or stated that it is not used in their departments or in official documentation. This was reflected by the comments of a senior official who stated rather self-consciously that ‘I must be honest, but I have not heard of a developmental state in the work I do in this department or at any meetings with other departments. Even when I attend mayoral meetings this term is not used’ (Male Official, Cape Town: 20/05/2013). Likewise, in the Provincial IDP Assessment Annual Report of 2012/2013, prepared by the Western Cape Government’s Department of Local Government (WCGDLG, 2013), no mention is made of a developmental state. On the other hand, as has been seen, at national level the term is used far more frequently and can be discerned in a range of documents and most notably in the recently launched National Development Plan.

8.2.4 Challenges

There are a number of challenges that appear to impact on the ability of the City of Cape Town to develop and implement an IDP that reflects local needs and improves the quality of life of disadvantaged communities in particular. The most pressing challenges relate to the complexity of the IDP process, its scheduling after local government elections and the size of wards and methods of gathering input from residents; each of these is discussed below.

8.2.4.1 The complexity of the Integrated Development Planning process

Notwithstanding a media statement published on the City of Cape Town’s website referring to the City’s IDP as ‘a clear, concise and reader-friendly’ document, in reality the technical language is seen as a problem in a number of quarters. Ms Rose Rau, Sub-council 5 Chairperson, points out that the technical language used in the IDP is beyond the understanding of the majority of residents throughout the City of Cape Town (Rau, 17/04/2013). Dr Martin van der Merwe, IDP Manager, agrees, noting that ‘although the IDP is the primary strategy of council in terms of the development needs of the City, for most community people the notion of an IDP is a mystical concept’ (Van der Merwe, 02/05/2013). At sub-council level, many councillors report that the highly technical format of the IDP and
use of difficult concepts and terminology is not only confusing but also intimidating. This complaint is understandable as many councillors have limited technical expertise. One councillor stated that even IDP report-back meetings were difficult to understand due to their technical nature, and she recommended that ‘the IDP shouldn’t be such a highfalutin’ thing’ (Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 23/09/2012). In a context where officials and local political office bearers struggle to comprehend the technical content of the IDP, it stands to reason that the ordinary people will experience even more difficulties and will thus not be in a position to make any positive contribution even if presented with the opportunity to do so.

The lack of understanding of terms and concepts used in the IDP and its implementation process was further emphasised during a sub-council meeting and subsequent interviews with councillors. At the meetings an exchange took place between an IDP official and a ward councillor who requested information from the official on the way in which ward projects were aligned to the IDP. The reaction from the official was that she would forward the IDP to sub-council so that councillors could ‘see how the objectives of the IDP are reached’. In reality, ward projects are not linked to the IDP as they are projects that are identified in specific wards after the IDP has been finalised and specific funds for this purpose are channelled from council to wards through sub-council. Both the request for information and the response suggest that neither the IDP representative official nor ward councillor fully understood the concept or the functioning of the IDP. This lack of knowledge was further demonstrated when a number of councillors requested training sessions on the IDP in order to better equip themselves to give meaningful input when requested to do so. These findings provide further insight as to the reasons why community members fail to participate in IDP discussions. In a context where the councillors have a limited understanding of the process it is unlikely that meaningful IDP discussions will take place at ward committee level, let alone at sector level, which is the only level where grassroots participation can take place and development needs can be expressed.

8.2.4.2 The scheduling of the Integrated Development Plan

Another recurring challenge highlighted by respondents relates to the timing of the IDP after the municipal elections and the urgency with which a municipality has to compile the final plan. The Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs stipulates that local
governments must prepare their IDP within a time frame of nine months. The manager of Sub-council 5 explained the challenges in this regard as follows:

*The problem with the IDP is the need to decide quickly on its content and there is not enough time given to the process after elections. This is why only sub-councils give inputs, not wards as it takes time to establish both sub-councils and wards after elections. Sub-councils must be established first and only then wards. These are the structural problems that we face in terms of involving community residents (Julies, 20/09/2012).*

He conceded that although it is desirable for both councillors and ward committee members to provide input into the IDP as a means both to identify local needs and to comply with legislative requirements, in practice this is not possible due to a number of constraints. One such constraint is the lengthy process of establishing ward committees (as vehicle for public participation) after the elections. Thereafter ward committee members have to arrange public meetings with their sectors which, in large geographical areas such as Delft, are difficult to set up and attendance is often poor. Mr Julies further emphasised the need for ward committee members to receive training as ‘they are the extra hands and feet of local government and need to feel competent in what they do as they have an important role to play’ (Julies, 20/09/2012. This need was confirmed by one of the committee members at a ward meeting when he requested that more training be given to committee members ‘to enable them to play their role more effectively’ (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 17/07/2013).

An additional problem relating to the timing of the IDP is the requirement of preparing an IDP which is linked to the five-year term of office of councillors (DPLG, 2004). After government elections, as indicated, each local authority has just nine months in which to develop their IDP and this, according to an official from the IDP Office, is a ‘massively complex and demanding task’ which requires input from so many levels and is ‘an enormous responsibility’ in terms of planning for development in an area (Van der Merwe, 02/05/2013). This is a recurring challenge as at the end of every five-year cycle, new government elections result in the selection of new councillors and officials and the need arises once again to provide training and to formulate a new IDP.
Another challenge relates to the large size and diversity of many wards and the methods used to gather information within them. In that regard, the Director of the IDP Office maintains that ‘the mere size of the city and some of the wards present an enormous number of very complex challenges’ (Van der Merwe, 02/05/2013). In similar vein, a councillor observed that the demarcation of boundaries of sub-councils and wards ‘often makes things very difficult as these divisions result in different impacts’ (Male Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 23/05/2012). For another councillor, some of the wards are so large and accommodate such a diversity of neighbourhoods that it is almost impossible to attend to the development needs of the different groups, ‘let alone feed these needs into the IDP’ (Male Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 23/05/2012).

Besides the size of wards, the way in which information is required to feed into the IDP presents its own set of difficulties. Commenting on this, a neighbouring sub-council chairperson asserted that:

As we have such diverse communities, there is no one size that fits all. On the one hand you are going to insult the rocket scientist, but on the other hand if you are requesting information from someone who has never been asked for input in the past and you give it in a way that is indecipherable you are not going to get a response. The biggest problem with the IDP is that the way they are requesting information is inadequate – if you look at the IDP inputs for example, people are saying for instance that they don’t have enough street lights – what do you do with that information – you cannot do anything unless you phone the person and ask them where are the street lights inadequate. We don’t have the capacity to do that (Sub-council Chairperson, Cape Town: 22/09/2012).

He explained that besides the need for careful formulation of questions used to collect input, there was an urgent need to provide feedback to residents:

8.2.4.3 The size and diversity of wards
Another problem with the current IDP process and gathering input is there is no feedback. The person says I would like this for example. The next year the same thing happens. That person never gets feedback. I understand the logistics that you cannot go back and give feedback to 4 000 people. But you know what – if you can’t afford the service then don’t start the service (Sub-council Chairperson, Cape Town: 22/09/2012).

The shortcomings outlined above point to the complexity of eliciting information on the needs and aspirations of very diverse segments of the population of Cape Town. However, it does also point to the inadequacy of the participatory systems which have been established and the fact that many of the practices introduced by the City to encourage citizen input are carried out in a very perfunctory manner.

8.3 The sub-council and ward committee system

The sub-council and ward committee system in the City of Cape Town, as discussed, has been established in order to give expression to the notion of developmental local government. As noted in preceding chapters, sub-councils are responsible for a range of service delivery functions and tasks and they are held responsible for addressing development challenges at the local level. The ward committee system is designed to provide citizens the opportunity to guide decision making and to influence policy through their representative organisations.

8.3.1 The sub-council system

In an interview the chairperson of Sub-council 5 was asked to provide her views on the structure and functioning of the sub-council and its role in delivering ‘developmental local government’ to communities. She explained that ‘the sub-council chairperson and sub-council manager are the face of the sub-council’ and, together with wards, ‘sub-councils are tools that bring local government closer to the people and encourage participation’. However, she emphasised that this is by no means an easy task and the facilitation of public participation ‘is very challenging and a huge amount of energy is necessary to make it happen’ (Rau, 20/10/2012).
It is of interest to note that in the context of Delft party politics was not seen as a constraint to the effective functioning of the sub-council. The majority of councillors interviewed felt that party affiliations were not a problem and that there is a ‘good relationship between the different political parties’ in the sub-council and that they worked well together ‘on the whole’ (Male Councillor, Delft: 20/02/2013; Female Councillor Delft: 24/02/2013). This was confirmed through observation of sub-council meetings and activity days (Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 17/04/2013; Sub-council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 22/05/2013, Sub-council Activity Day, Bonteheuwel: 23/05/2013).

Nevertheless, local politics do inevitably have an influence on local affairs. In that respect there appears to be an inherent tension in the roles assigned to ward councillors and councillors appointed on a proportional basis. In that connection one councillor noted though that ‘there is not always a good match when appointing proportional representative councillors as they are sometimes from opposing political parties and this can create many problems in a ward’. In response to the question of whether party politics play a role in the sub-council area, the response was ‘yes there is sometimes abuse as councillors can use their political influence to appoint ward committee members and are then in a position of power to persuade them to support [their] recommendations, but this is not always the case’ (Female Councillor, Delft: 27/09/2012). This viewpoint was confirmed by other councillors who indicated that party politics was a discernible dynamic within Delft and played a role in determining the structure of ward committees. This impacted on the functioning of the ward committee as members would then make development decisions that were politically motivated and not necessarily in the interest of the broad majority (Sub-council Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 23/05/2013).

The terms of reference of sub-councils, set out in the City of Cape Town’s Council Overview, asserts their duties as being ‘to make recommendations to Council on any matter affecting its area of jurisdiction; to exercise any power, duty or function delegated to it by Council in respect of its area of responsibility; and to exercise any power, duty or function conferred upon it in terms of the Sub-council Bylaw’ (City of Cape Town, 2012c:12). However, the administration and management of such a large and diverse sub-council is by all accounts ‘a massively daunting responsibility’, to use the phrase of a senior municipal official. Challenges include the wide range of stakeholders from different line departments.
who are required by to provide input into the delivery of services and development initiatives and the low socio-economic status of its residents and their lack of basic needs. The sub-council chairperson, Ms Rau, commented that ‘if you think of the physical size of the sub-council, it will often appear as if we as councillors are not doing our work. But you must keep in mind that besides our other duties we are controlling 96 ward projects and these are often delayed due to the line departments not doing their work’ (Rau, 17/07/2013).

It is evident that the work of the sub-council is further hampered by the manner in which wards have been demarcated. In this delimitation the sub-council has been divided in two by a large tract of land which accommodates the Cape Town International Airport and adjacent industrial sites. This section of land divides the sub-council into two halves and physically separates two sets of three wards. As a consequence, one of the sub-council’s three wards is situated mainly in Bonteheuwel, on one side of the airport, while the others are in Delft. The division, not unexpectedly, impacts on the administration of the sub-council and results in the duplication of certain functions.

A further demarcation challenge relates to the establishment of a new ward in Delft following the 2013 elections. Prior to these elections Delft had comprised two wards, namely Delft North and Delft South. After the elections Ward 106 was included extending along the entire western boundary of Delft North and Delft South. While the new ward was established to accommodate the rapidly growing population of Delft (Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 22/05/2013), there have been complaints that the new political structure lacks basic facilities and services. According to a councillor ‘the redrawing of ward boundaries has given some wards hardly any infrastructure. When wards are drawn they only see voting numbers but not facilities’ (Male Councillor, Delft: 19/06/2013). This is evident in Ward 106 which has few facilities, poor services and substandard residential structures which are mainly situated in temporary relocation sites. A further problem highlighted by municipal officials and councillors (Male Official, Cape Town: 02/05/2013; Male Councillor, Delft: 20/06/2013; Female Councillor, Delft: 20/06/2013), is the fact that Ward 106 has become the location of choice for migrants moving into the metropolitan area and it is the second-fastest growing ward in the City of Cape Town with an in-migration rate of 315% per annum. In the context

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3 This data is based on 2011 figures supplied by Statistics SA and reworked by the Department of Geographical Information Systems at the City of Cape Town (DOGIS, 2013).
of an existing housing shortage, this rapid growth has become a major concern for both officials and councillors alike.

As previously indicated, sub-council offices are located in both Bonteheuwel and Delft and meetings are held alternatively at the two sites to enable councillors and the public equal access. Meetings are held monthly and are advertised on the sub-council website and the forthcoming agenda and minutes can be viewed and downloaded by the public and other interested parties prior to meetings. The sub-council manager and administrative personnel are responsible for convening the meeting and attendance is compulsory for all councillors and representatives of the City of Cape Town line departments such as the Departments of Sport and Recreation, Health, Traffic Services, Solid Waste, City Parks, Law Enforcement, Spatial Planning and Urban Design, Human Settlements and Finance.

Sub-council meetings are well structured and the chairperson adheres strictly to recognised meeting procedures. At the commencement of meetings members are presented with detailed documentation including the minutes of previous meetings and line department reports. On a quarterly basis, line department representatives present their departmental activity reports which provide information on the current status of development projects in the sub-council. Matters typically addressed relate to applications for land use departures, law enforcement problems, service delivery and maintenance issues, traffic services and the C3 notification system. While the public is invited to sub-council meetings, they are not permitted to participate in deliberations. If residents wish to bring a particular matter to the attention of sub-council, they first need to inform their sector organisation by forwarding a written statement explaining the problem. This is then tabled at the sector meeting and conveyed to the ward committee through the sector representative in his or her role as ward committee member. The ward councillor then decides how to proceed with the matter either by raising it at sub-council or attending to it through consultation with one of the relevant city council departments.

The functioning and effectiveness of the ward committee system was not only a recurring theme amongst councillors and officials but it was also a topic that triggered some emotional responses from councillors. The diverse range of concerns raised about the ward committee system related to flawed selection procedures, the poor representation of groups, the limited
power of ward committees to influence decision making, and the lack of capacity of committee members to serve as the interface between sub-council and the community. Problems associated with the use of sector organisations as vehicles for community representation were referred to in the previous chapter, and it is evident that this system leads to the capture of participatory processes by a small local elite. Thus, according to one councillor:

*In my ward, all the same people are members of the different sector organisations. All they do is change their names around and then they serve together on the ward committee. I have been working in this ward for 40 years – I know these people and we must take them to task. They are also the ones who are always protesting in the ward* (Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 19/06/2013).

A further limitation of the system of sector representation raised by the sub-council chairperson relates to the administrative burden of continually ensuring that sector organisations are registered and listed on the City of Cape Town’s database. For members to be eligible to serve on ward committees their organisations need to be officially registered. She noted that recent communication between the sub-council and council revealed that of the 400 organisations currently operating in Delft only 190 were compliant with regard to registration on the council’s database. Thus, of the 44 ward committee members currently active in the sub-council, only 22 members satisfied the required legislative criteria (Rau, 19/06/2013).

A further concern raised by officials and councillors is the youthfulness of some ward committee members and their ability and commitment to perform fulfil their obligations. Commenting on this the sub-council manager maintained that ‘he could be a very young person of 20 and subsequently his organisation decides to replace him for example. Also he must be a responsible person as he has to communicate problems of his organisation to the ward committee and once it has been forwarded through the system and decisions are made, he must then feed decisions back to his sector’ (Julies, 19/06/2013). Some members, he asserted, failed to fulfil these responsibilities.
In the context of these concerns, some councillors viewed the ward committee system to be as a superfluous and ineffective structure as evident in the following comments:

*It is my belief that there is not really a role for the ward committee. I know as ward councillor what the problems are in the ward. Perhaps when there is a diverse ward, then there is a role for a ward committee but, where you have a single community there is not really a role for a ward committee if the ward councillor is doing a proper job* (Female Councillor, Delft: 20/09/2012).

*First of all you'll find that the ward committee members are not participating effectively. According to me, the system is not working. There is a need to monitor what they do so that they start working to serve the people. They only participate when they come to get their salary* (Male Councillor, Delft: 23/05/2013).

*The ward committee is a waste of time and money. If you have a good ward councillor why do you need a ward committee? We know our area and know what the problems are, so why would we need a committee to tell us this?* (Female Councillor, Delft: 28/09/2012).

However, other councillors challenged these sentiments, commenting that ‘we must remember that ward committee members are not councillors and are not supposed to do the job of councillors. It is our responsibility to work closely with them and to guide them in their work’ (Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 19/06/2013). Another respondent agreed that some ward committees were working well together, but conceded that there is a need to focus on those wards where the committee system was not functioning (Male Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 21/06/2013). One repeated problem raised related to the failure of ward committee members to attend meetings and/or their failure to send letters of apology prior to meetings. This resulted in their ultimate replacement and a lengthy process of new elections to fill the vacancies in that they had ‘failed to take their Code of Conduct seriously enough’ (Sub-council Chairperson’s Report, 20/04/2013).

Although the need to encourage participation and to enable local citizens to participate in decision making was frequently stressed by the more experienced councillors, many do not
appear to understand the true meaning of the concept and fail to accord it the necessary seriousness.

For the most part, councillors appear to view the C3 system as the most appropriate vehicle for citizen participation as it permits them to report service delivery problems to a focal point in the City’s administration. This perception is based on comments made by councillors and ward chairpersons to the effect that the C3 system ‘is the mechanism that allows people to participate’ (Sub-council Minutes, 22/05/2013). In reality, this system only enables a reactive response to an identified municipal service fault and it does not represent a democratic process that facilitates the engagement of citizens in decision making based on identified needs and priorities.

Generally speaking, the evidence generated suggests that the current participatory approach used by most councillors in the case study area neither encourages participatory governance, nor is it representative of what Cornwall (2002b; 2004a) refers to as an ‘invited’ space for corroborative decision making between the state and civil society. This is partly attributed to a lack of understanding of the concept of participation, but it can also be ascribed to the inability and/or lack of capacity to use participatory methods to engage and deliberate with the community. This aspect will be discussed further in the following section.

8.3.2 The ward committee system

The ward committee system, as indicated, is intended to serve as a conduit for communication between the local authority and society and to that extent it has an important role to play in building a developmental local government which works with ‘citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives’ (RSA, 1998b: Section B (1)).

The ward committee system operates in terms of the municipality’s Rules for the Establishment and Election of Ward Committees (City of Cape Town, 2011b). In terms of these rules, once a ward councillor has determined the composition of the ward committee and the sub-council has endorsed his or her proposal, the recommendation is forwarded to the council for final approval. Sub-council minutes indicate that the scheduling of ward meetings
is determined by sub-council (Sub-council Minutes, 23/08/2013). However, the majority of ward committees in the case study area do not have a full complement of members, implying that there are sectors in the community (and by implication individuals) which remain unrepresented (Ward Committee Meeting Minutes, Delft: 10/04/2013; Ward Committee Meeting Minutes, 18/04/2013; Ward Committee Meeting Minutes, Bonteheuwel: 15/04/2013; Ward Committee Meeting, Bonteheuwel: 10/04/2013). Further difficulties relate to poor attendance and the fact meetings are often inquorate. In such cases ward meetings are postponed and rescheduled. Observation of ward committee meetings and an examination of the minutes of meeting reveal that absenteeism is a recurring problem, not only on the part of ward committee members but also on the part of ward chairpersons and proportional representative councillors. Under such circumstances, ward committee members have been requested to chair meetings (Ward Committee Meeting Minutes, 18/04/2013). Considering that ward meetings only take place once every two months, repeated absenteeism impacts on the optimal functioning of the committee.

The sub-council chairperson observed that ‘a healthy ward committee is a reflection of a good councillor’. However, she noted that one of the major constraints to effective ward committees is the fact that members are not appointed on a full-time basis as theirs is ‘an impossible job to do part time as Delft is such an overcrowded area with so many problems’. A further challenge is the need to provide training and capacity building for both ward chairpersons and ward committee members:

*Building capacity is essential. This has been a huge shortcoming, but the City identified this need and sorted out training. When ward committees are inaugurated they have to get training – this is a process that all wards have to go through throughout South Africa so that all ward members are on the same page and understand what their role is. This is the same for all officials and councillors at national and provincial level (Rau, 17/07/2013).*

The first training and capacity-building opportunities presented to current Delft ward committee members took place in March 2013. The aim of the training was to provide members with an understanding of their responsibilities as ward representatives, of the protocols which they need to follow, and of the need to encourage participation by their
fellow residents. The training is reported to have been a success and the sub-council chairperson claimed that ‘I can now confidently say that ward committee members have a good grasp of their roles and responsibilities and are passionate about making a contribution in their wards’ (Rau, 17/04/2013). This view was affirmed by a ward committee member who stated that ‘the training was really good – it took the form of different role-playing activities and made us understand our duties as ward committee members much better’ (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 18/04/2013). However, this was the only capacity building offered to ward committee members and it was stated that there was a need for further training.

Ward committee members also expressed the need for a much closer working relationship with their ward councillors. Calling for more frequent engagement with councillors than the bi-monthly ward committee meeting, one member stated:

*I am finding my role as ward committee member quite challenging. I respect my councillor but I need more interaction with her – not only once every two months at the ward committee meeting. This is not just for myself, but for all our ward committee members. The morale is down because there is no interaction and we want to be more involved. It is important for us to work with the ward councillor and that she can reflect on our views and see that we want to work* (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 17/07/2013).

Supporting this view, another member stated that ‘we are new to this so we need to interact more and meet on our own with our ward councillor before the ward committee meeting so that we can discuss issues that we want to raise’ (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 17/07/2013). In this instance, the ward committee chairperson agreed with the proposal and resolved that she meet with the committee informally in each alternate month (Female Councillor, Delft: 17/07/2013).

A dynamic that was clearly evident during ward meetings and interviews with both councillors and committee members is the unequal power relations that exist between the sub-council and ward committees. As one councillor’s conceded:
The ward committee does not have much power – and its impact is very dependent on the ward councillor who might not represent all in the ward. Although there are some ward councillors who work very hard and really try to make a difference, others do just the absolute minimum (Female Councillor, Bonteheuwel: 20/09/2012).

This statement aside, on many occasions it was observed that some councillors exhibited a rather domineering attitude towards ward committee members. This was evident in the manner in which they assumed a dominant role in the selection of development initiatives and in general decision making in their wards. Some councillors would, in an authoritarian manner, frequently overrule suggestions made by committee members. This is reflective of the limited confidence which some councillors hold in the ability of ward committee members to play a meaningful role. This was evident in the disparaging remarks made about ward committee members at some sub-council meetings and the paternalistic manner in which they were sometimes addressed by councillors.

A lack of meaningful engagement with formal council structures was raised on a number of occasions by ward committee members, particularly with reference to the process of ward project allocations (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 23/09/2012; Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 18/04/2013; Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 19/06/2013). The allocation of ward projects is a system which enables communities to identify and prioritise development needs through their sector and ward committees. As the majority of people are excluded from formal IDP processes, for the reasons previously mentioned, the ward allocation process one of the few meaningful opportunities for residents to influence development decisions. The process of identifying projects was described by a councillor as follows: ‘Wards must submit a ward plan. A ward plan is like a wish list of the different items that are needed within a ward’. It was important, she maintained, for ward committee members to prioritise their development requests, although she conceded that ‘it is often very difficult to know where to start as there is such a need, but ward committees must prioritise and decide how to use their allocation on development priorities’ (Female Councillor, Delft: 21/09/2012).

4 Apart from development projects identified in the City of Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan, the City provides each of the 24 subcouncils a specific additional allocation for the purpose of enabling ward committees to identify development projects according to the needs expressed in the wards.
When this viewpoint was presented to ward committee members during a focus group discussion, they strongly disagreed, maintaining that public participation practices in Delft were virtually non-existent and decision making was decidedly top-down. In most cases, it was stated, decisions were predetermined by the councillor. According to one ward committee member ‘ward councillors have all the power and they decide what development is needed here – it is not a democratic process at all and very frustrating’ (Female Ward Committee Member, Delft: 14/06/2013). Another ward member confirmed this opinion as well as the lack of opportunities for participation in the identification and allocation of ward projects:

*The ward councillor does not allow us to make decisions on how to spend ward allocations. Of the R700 000 allocated to our ward, we (the ward committee) were only given an amount of R20 000 and were told to come up with a project. It’s the same for all the ward councillors – they make the decisions and then come and tell us what to do* (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 14/06/2013).

The top-down nature of deliberations described by respondents above and the limited opportunity which exists to engage in and direct decision making was further confirmed during a discussion with a councillor. In response to the question on how ward committees identify and prioritise development projects in their wards, he stated that:

*We get all the ward committee members together in one room. Each ward committee member must then write on a piece of paper what their requests are for their ward projects. Then we (sub-council) type out all the requests. If the request is not part of local government’s mandate, we delete the request. We then take the requests to council or to the respective line departments for approval. Sometimes the line departments are not interested and the request is struck off the list. We need to keep record of this though, so that we can take this decision back to the ward committee who can inform the sectors. The City of Cape Town officials actually decide and it is up to the line department at the end of the day to decide. But then the request has to fall within the R700 000 that is allocated to each ward for their projects* (Male Councillor, Delft: 17/07/2013).
The gatekeeping role performed by various municipal line departments surfaced as a further dynamic of power relations in the case study area. It was reported that in order to have ward projects approved, councillors would sometimes have to resort to ‘lobbying’ officials for the approval of projects. This issue also emerged during discussions with senior City of Cape Town officials where it became evident that line departments play a very significant role in determining the selection of development initiatives (Male Official, Cape Town: 20/09/2013). The power struggles that ensue not only detract from the effective and democratic functioning of the ward committee system but they also impact on the ability of sub-councils to initiate development projects in their area of jurisdiction. These findings support Gaventa’s (2004b:157) contention that those who shape the spaces have power over the spaces of participation.

However, a number of councillors felt that the ward committee system had an important role to play and they emphasised the need to nurture and support ward members to enable them to fulfil their mandate. As a long-serving member of the sub-council remarked:

As our main focus as ward councillors is to promote grassroots democracy we must pay full attention to public participation. There is often lack of communication from our side to the community and we must communicate our role. The only way I can get results is through public participation and reaching the people. But they must also take responsibility, mobilise and initiate projects which is what I encourage them to do (Abrahams, 22/05/2013).

Ward committee members were asked to explain how wards function in Delft and to indicate their roles and responsibilities as members of the ward committee. They responded that their role was to advise the councillor on matters in the ward, to assist in monitoring service delivery, particularly the C3 notification system, and to assist in understanding and identifying the needs of the community. They stated that their role was only advisory and they had no formal powers and that ‘all decisions are made at council and sub-council meetings and are implemented here’ and that sub-council decisions ‘are told to us at ward meetings’ (Focus Group Discussion, Delft: 23/10/2012). When asked to evaluate how
effective councillors were in fulfilling their mandates, a ward committee member provided the following insight:

*One of the councillors, he did nothing. But if you are not doing the good thing you will not last. We had a very bad one who did nothing for the people, but this one was always protected by the officials even if he did nothing. It is different now. Now there is a new councillor who is doing the right thing* (Male Ward Committee Member, Delft: 17/05/2013).

The responsibilities of ward committee members were further communicated to them by the ward chairperson at ward committee meetings. They were advised to assist ward councillors in identifying problems such as drain blockages, unpaved sidewalks, broken street lighting and so forth and were encouraged to either forward the location of the problem to the sub-council or submit it to the ward councillor who would then send in a combined report to the relevant line department (Focus Group Discussion, Delft: 23/10/2012).

Besides the shortcomings of the system of sector representation already discussed, the procedure of relaying information to community members under the pretext of ‘participation’ would appear to be structurally flawed in that ordinary citizens are given very limited opportunity to participate in community matters in terms in an on-going basis. According to both councillors and ward committee members, the current participatory process starts at community level when residents identify needs through their sector organisations. Thereafter, the sector representative (who frequently represents more than one organisation in his or her sector), is supposed to relay the information to the ward committee during one of the six ward meetings that are held each year (Rau, 17/07/2013; Ward Committee Meeting, Delft: 17/07/2013; Focus Group Discussion, Delft: 23/10/2012). In reality, as discussed above, ward committees meet less frequently. It is subsequently the responsibility of the ward councillor to take the matter further, either by tabling it on the agenda of a sub-council meeting or by relaying the request to one of the City’s line departments. This represents the institutionalised mechanism that has been established to ensure that communities are consulted.

According to the sub-council chairperson, the Council Speaker plays an important role in ensuring that the required reporting protocols are adhered to, and that, following ward
meetings, ward committee members have to meet with their sectors and provide the Speaker’s Office with the agenda of the meeting, the minutes of the meeting and the attendance register (Sub-council Meeting, Delft: 19/06/2013; Ward Committee Meeting, Delft 17/07/2013). The sub-council assists with the organisation of sector meetings by advertising their time and by providing the venue. Sub-councils must additionally submit quarterly reports to the Office of the Speaker on the activities of wards and sectors (Sub-council Chairperson’s Report, 19/06/013). In this way the Office of the Speaker is able to ensure that sub-councils, ward committees and sectors follow the prescribed procedures as stipulated by legislation. However, the formalistic dimensions of this process aside, it does not, for the reasons discussed, ensure meaningful citizen engagement and nor does it represent a shift in power relations as they exercise little influence over decision making in their neighbourhoods. Furthermore, when it is taken into consideration how few of the residents of Delft are represented by a sector organisation it becomes clear that the prospects for participating in issues which affect the daily lives of ordinary citizens are limited and, for most, non-existent.

In addition to the legislated sub-council and ward committee and sector feedback meetings, other mechanisms used to encourage public participation in council matters include general public meetings, ward councillors’ quarterly feedback meetings and housing steering committee meetings. The dates of these meetings are advertised on the sub-council website. The chairperson of the sub-council noted that the ward councillors’ meeting is a new addition and is used to communicate progress on development projects to community members. These meetings are held in each of the wards in the sub-council area in order to ‘give the community the opportunity to hear from their ward councillor about the progress that has been made on the ward business plan and serves as a forum for residents to engage with the ward councillor on community affairs’ (Rau, 22/05/2013). However, these additional participatory opportunities offer limited platforms for engagement and are for the most part focused on information feedback sessions by councillors who represent the dominant voices in the community.

8.4 Concluding comments
Drawing on the collective evidence presented above, it can be inferred that the lack of development in the case study area can be attributed to a variety of different factors, one of which includes the failure to advance an effective system of participatory governance. However, it is also certain that a range of other factors such as a lack of funding for development initiatives and poor intra- and inter-governmental coordination in the integrated planning process combined with a rapid growth in the population have all served to hamper development intervention. Although a lack of funding (and particular funding to house the influx of new residents) is not an issue easily resolved at local government level, where revenue-generating opportunities are restricted by legislation, a failure to promote an effective system of citizen participation is less explicable.

This chapter has shown that, despite the existence of the necessary legislative framework to promote inter-governmental coordination, the integration of planning processes between the three spheres of government is weak. This manifests itself in poor communication between national and provincial and local government in the implementation of national policies but is also evident in the limited alignment of planning processes. In what should be a central characteristic of a development state, the chapter has revealed that the formulation of an IDP in the City of Cape Town is only loosely based on the National Development Plan and that it is left to the municipality itself to decide on which aspects of the NDP it should focus. While official discourse has suggested that the South African developmental state will be constructed in a top-down and bottom-up fashion, it is evident that the two processes remain largely distinct and far from integrated.

The IDP process, as indicated, is intended to be the key instrument through which municipalities engage with their citizens in the formulation of strategic plans for each council’s five-year term of office. However, evidence from the City of Cape Town’s own reports, which together will empirical evidence generated in Delft, suggests that, in what is supposed to be an inclusive process, the overwhelming majority of its citizens are excluded from participating in the formulation of the IDP. While this might be attributed, in part, to the complexity of involving a highly diverse citizenry, it is also evident from the case study of Delft that participatory processes are implemented in a top-down and perfunctory manner.
This is never more apparent in the system of sub-councils and ward committees which are intended to be the frontline interface between citizens and the local state. The evidence from Delft suggests that the design of the ward committee system, based as it is on sector representation, serves to effectively exclude the majority of residents. Furthermore, the discretionary powers and resources available to sub-councils are so limited that any decisions which they can make are unlikely to improve conditions for residents in any substantive way. In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that many local councillors have little interest in participatory processes and merely go through the motions of consulting their constituents. Thus, while legislative compliance is ensured, there is little serious attempt to elicit the views of ordinary people and to incorporate them into policy. To that extent the participatory practices documented in the case study area are reminiscent of the technicist approach adopted in the 1980s by major funding institutions such as the World Bank, which focused on project effectiveness and the reduction of project costs (Cooke, 2004; Mohan & Hickey, 2004). This is a far cry from the transformative goals spelt out in so many national policy documents which stress that citizen participation will lead to the empowerment and upliftment of the poor and to the deepening of democracy. It is also provides little evidence that progress is being made in the establishment of developmental local government.

The concluding chapter which follows will revisit the research propositions advanced in the opening chapter and will reflect on the extent to which the South African government is succeeding in its quest to build a system of developmental local government in the country. In particular it will examine the defining characteristics of developmental government outlined in policy and legislation and, in particular its emphasis on citizen participation, and will discuss the degree to which it has achieved its objectives. Finally, it will also reflect on the extent to which developmental government, such as it is, is contributing to the building of a national developmental state.
CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis set out to critically examine the South African government’s attempts to construct a developmental state and, as part of this process, to establish a system of developmental local government. In this it drew inspiration from the achievements of East Asian developmental states and their policy of state-led macroeconomic planning. However, despite the demonstrated economic success of these countries it is evident that the East Asian model of a developmental state was, in many respects, sui generis in that it came about in a particular historical, geo-political and socio-cultural context that may not easily be replicable elsewhere in the world. It is also apparent that the methods adopted by these states were often authoritarian and they operated counter to the accepted norms of modern democracies. This realisation prompted debate on whether a democratically oriented model of a developmental state is possible and, if so, what its determining features might be (Heller, 1999; White, 1988; Rodrik, 2004; Leftwich, 1995; Mkandawire, 2001). Further discussion revolved around the question of whether it was possible to build developmental states in Africa, given the extensive political, economic and administrative challenges faced on the continent. The experiences of Botswana and Mauritius, however, suggest that it is indeed possible provided national policies are advanced in a consistent and concerted way over a sustained period.

For much of the past two decades the ruling party and government in South Africa have stated their intention to establish a developmental state in an array of official statements and policy documents (Presidency of South Africa, 2009, 2010; ANC, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). The approach to this project, as discussed, has been inconsistent although it has gained momentum and the idea of a developmental state now forms part of the way in which the state portrays itself. Nevertheless, since it first entered official discourse the concept has never been clearly articulated in policy or in legislation and it is consequently understood in different ways in the public domain. Furthermore, in portraying itself as a developmental state South Africa differs from other states which have assumed this mantle only after they achieved a significant degree of economic success. In that respect a number of scholars have pointed out that the litmus test for a state aspiring to be known for its developmental attributes is not the intensity of its rhetoric, but rather its visible development outcomes. It
was against this criterion that the South African developmental state was assessed in this investigation.

9.1 **Focus of the research**

In the context of successful developmental state experiences elsewhere, the core thrust of this thesis has been to investigate the extent to which the South Africa government is accomplishing its vision of implementing a developmental state at the local level through the vehicle of integrated development planning. The research, as stated in chapter one, was premised on three key propositions, the first of which was that South Africa is struggling to construct a democratic developmental state due to the fact that concept has been poorly defined and articulated in policy and legislation. Linked to this was the premise that there is an inherent contradiction between the neo-liberal model of the state currently in operation and ambitions to create a strong interventionist developmental state. The second proposition was that the bottom-up notion of developmental local government is limiting prospects for the growth of a strong national developmental state. The third proposition was that despite the fact that developmental local government is intended to entail a strong component of citizen participation, in practice the integrated development planning process (which is key to the participatory process), is carried out in a top-down, pre-determined fashion which inhibits effective community participation.

Due to its proximity to the population, local government has been portrayed, in both policy and legislation, as the foundation of a democratic developmental state in South Africa and the space where development outcomes are to be realised. In this context, a key dimension of a democratic developmental state is the need, prescribed in legislation, to engage citizens in governance processes and to promote a form of co-determination in policy formulation and planning. At the local level the process of integrated development planning is seen to be the key vehicle through which participatory democracy, and by implication participatory development, will be advanced. The system of participatory development is further supported through the mechanism of sub-councils and ward committees which are intended to serve as the interface between citizens and the local state. These participatory structures were examined in some depth in the township of Delft in order to assess the extent to which they supported the participation of residents and led to improvement in their livelihoods.
9.2 Theoretical reflections

In order to frame the analysis of South Africa’s attempts to construct a developmental state through the vehicle of developmental local government this research began with a review of theoretical understandings of the factors which gave rise to the East Asian developmental states in what here is described as the 20th century developmental model. Thereafter discussion focused on what has now loosely been described as the 21st century model of the developmental state which has been extensively influenced by the wave of democratisation which swept much of the developing world in the latter decades of the twentieth century. These two models, in different ways, have informed thinking about the establishment of a developmental state in South Africa.

For this purpose of this discussion, the analytical framework illustrated in Figure 9.1 has been designed to enable reflection on developmental state theory and to review major scholarly contributions on the topic.

![Figure 9.1 Theoretical and analytical framework of Developmental States](image-url)
9.2.1 20th Century Developmental States

Theoretical analysis of the 20th Century development states, and the successes of the macro-economic planning systems adopted by South East Asian nations, was used as a starting point to inform this research. In that regard, a number of scholars highlight the importance of the policy measures designed by capable political elites and the significance of rational and deliberate planning (Johnson, 1999; Pempel, 1999; Beeson, 2003; Evans, 1995). The discourse of political-economists positioned the developmental state on a spectrum somewhere between a free-market capitalist system and a centrally planned socialist system (Woo-Cumings, 1991), whilst other theorists stressed their interventionist nature in directing economic development towards specific socio-economic goals (Johnson, 1982; Robinson & White, 1998). Despite contestation in the literature on the distinguishing features of East Asian developmental states, there is some consensus on three broad thematic influences, namely those relating to the ideology of developmental states, the context in which they were established, and their structural characteristics.

Whilst a large volume of literature describes the ideology/structure nexus of developmental states, few examine its ideological content in any great depth. Before the turn of the 20th century, the developmentalist ideology underpinning the Asian developmental state focused almost exclusively on economic growth (Murakami, 1992; Castells, 1992; Edighei, 2007) and scant attention was paid to social development goals and the enhancement of citizen welfare. This was clearly a secondary concern for Asian states at the time. The primary task of such states, in the words of Johnson (1982:306) was to ‘be a developmental state - and only then a regulatory state, a welfare state, an equality state, or whatever other kind of functional state a society may wish to adopt’. However, both Mkandawire (2001) and Taylor (2001) point out that Asian developmental states were not without ideological foundations and nationalism was to play an important role in encouraging the population to sacrifice for the ‘greater good’. What is presumed, but not articulated to any great extent in the Asian developmental state literature, is that the net result of its economic growth and industrial expansion would be a general increase in living standards, which, in turn, would provide political legitimacy, promote the growth of national cohesion, national autonomy and liberation from outside controls. In other words, the national consensus necessary to drive the development process was contingent on demonstrated improvement in the livelihoods of the population and this
gained momentum as the benefits of economic growth began to spread to all sectors of society.

Many scholars, as indicated, emphasise the critical role that contextual factors played in economic successes of East Asian developmental states and stress that attempts to replicate the model will not easily be achieved (Johnson, 1999; Schaller, 1997; Mathews, 2006; Pempel, 1999). This is because a series of geo-political factors, contingent on the Cold War, led to the provision of considerable amounts of aid to those East Asian states which were perceived to be the frontline in the struggle against communist expansion. Conditions within these states were also instrumental in determining the economic course which was followed. Thus, a limited resource base led to an emphasis on trade, whilst low opportunity costs, labour intensive activities, a passive workforce and low wages were further key factors which facilitated the expansion of the economy (Bagchi, 2000; Onis, 1991; Broham, 1996). Whilst some authors believe culture and the Confucian doctrine were important contributors to the success of East Asian developmental states, others contest the extent of their influence. What is not in dispute, however, is that East Asia’s integration into the global economy, as a result of assistance from the United States, provided access to foreign markets and direct foreign investment which accelerated economic growth. It is also evident that the geographical location and strategic positioning of East Asian nations opened up opportunities for intra-regional economic cooperation which was mutually beneficial to these states (Woo-Cummings, 1999).

From a structural perspective it is clear that these states shared a number of common characteristics which enabled them to sustain rapid economic growth and bring about social transformation (Mkandawire, 2001; UNCTAD, 2007; Evans, 1995). These included strong state-led planning, the existence of a powerful and insulated meritocratic bureaucracy and a competent civil service, state administrative capacity and strategic leadership. Other features included relative autonomy from social forces, a strong state business alliance, authoritarianism and a weak and subordinated civil society (Leftwich, 2002; Edigheij, 2005). Export oriented economic policies, investment in research and development, technological transfers and the protection of infant industries were further contributing factors to the economic successes of these states and their performance legitimised state efforts and approaches (Johnson, 1982).
21st Century development thinking influenced understanding of the functioning of democratic developmental states and their role in bringing about socio-economic transformation. Whilst earlier explanations of development fixed on the notion of capital accumulation and the supposed ‘trickle down’ effect, new thinking suggest that to be relevant, developmental states should focus on organisational change (Hoff and Stiglitz 2001:389) which is characterised by participatory people-driven transformation and strong state/society ties (Leftwich, 2000; Edigheji, 2010; Fritz & Rochas Menocal, 2007). These shifts in development thinking were prompted by the seeming unsustainability of 20th century developmental states and they emphasised the critical importance of good governance, relevant institutions and the building and expansion of capacities (Rodrik 1999, Evans, 2010; Alkire, 2002). Thus, a number of writers stressed that attempts to produce a successful 21st century developmental state would require a strong capable state with a common developmental vision, a high calibre bureaucracy, a growth oriented leadership, democratic enabling institutions and a skilled staff (Meyns & Musamba, 2010; Sangweni, & Mxakata-Diseko, 2008). The new thinking required a shift of mindset from a narrow focus on the need for synergies between the state and capitalist elites and the insulation of the state from public pressures groups, to a more inclusive ‘bottom up’ set of ties with civil society (Edigheji, 2010; Evans, 2010).

It is far easier to discern the ideological underpinnings of 21st century democratic developmental states, and they are thus of great use in evaluating South Africa’s attempt to build a state that is developmental in orientation. Here, the literature is far more expansive on the developmental intentions of these states which typically include social welfare, transformation, equality, freedom and expansion of opportunity. Key debates draw attention to the democratic nature of new developmental states, the types of institutions that must be built to deliver developmental outcomes with an explicit focus on addressing poverty and the redistribution of the fruits of development (Routley, 2012; Leftwich 2008; Musamba & Heyns, 2010). The importance of public deliberation, the fostering of equitable, inclusive development and an insistence on social justice are new themes which have emerged in 21st century developmental state literature (Gumede, 2009; Deen, 2011). For such states developmental outcomes will include a reduction of poverty and inequality, an increase in employment, wider access to essential services, improvements in general living conditions and quality of life, and broader social inclusion (Fritz & Menocal, 2007; Edighejii, 2010).
9.2.3 Developmental states and participatory theory

A key component of a democratic developmental state is the participation of civil society in decision-making processes. This feature distinguishes it from the authoritarian states of South East Asia. One of the key themes in democratic developmental state discourse and people-centred development is the role of agency in decision-making processes. This has been underlined by scholars such as Mohan and Hickey (2004), Cleaver (2004), Jennings (2007) and Padarath (2006) who emphasized the value of active citizenship in terms of empowering a nation and transforming society. However, despite the South African government’s repeated commitment to a participatory and inclusive developmental state in South Africa, as argued by Marais et al (2007) and evident in policy documents, research findings in the case study area reveals a top-down state-society relationship where the state apparatus, following Gramsci (2003), is coercive, rather than enabling and empowering in its engagement with community representatives and residents.

The insights of Bourdieu (1979) relating to how agents construct social reality in accordance with their perceived hierarchical position or ‘habitus’ (which is linked to the assets they possess), assisted in enabling a more in-depth understanding of the survey responses in the case study area of Delft and the implications of these findings. Bourdieu (1979) holds the view that the lower socio-economic status of certain groups impacts negatively on their relationship with authority figures due to feelings of inferiority and intimidation. Similarly, survey responses revealed that a large number of residents in the case study area are of the opinion that going to meetings set up by local authorities to discuss development issues would be a waste of time. They stated that past experience has proven that their opinions would not be deemed important by the authorities and that councillors would not be interested in their point of view even if they attended meetings. The vast majority of residents living in the case study area are low income earners with poor educational qualifications and are, in certain cases, intimidated by councillors and the technical language used by officials.

These survey findings also bring to mind certain aspects of Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration which draws attention to the complex dialectical relationship between official structures and popular agency and the danger of continually reproducing existing structures through the actions of agents. Like Lefebvre (1991), who maintains that knowledge serves power, Giddens (1984) supports Bourdieu’s contention that the knowledge and capabilities of
the different actors play a significant role in the recreation of social practices and reproduction of structures as they reflect and rationalise their particular context. This insight can also be applied to the South African context. Despite intentions to create meaningful participatory systems in South Africa and to enable grassroots residents to exercise popular agency and to participate in development decisions through Integrated Development Planning and institutionalised participatory structures such as the ward committee system, research findings highlight the reproduction of patronising practices of the past and the persistence of manipulative social practices that require community input as a formality to legitimise state decisions. These findings further support conclusions drawn by authors such as Hicks (2006), Skenjana and Kimemia (2022), Mantzaris and Ngcobo (2008) and Friedman (2006) who in research elsewhere in South Africa found unequal power relations at the local level, unresponsive bureaucrats and the exclusion of community members from formal participatory mechanisms.

Giddens’s (1984) contention that the transformation of society requires reflexivity, which in turn is determined by insight and knowledge, highlights the need for both training and capacity building of all actors in the participatory process, including officials councillors, community representatives and grassroots residents. Both councillors and ward committee members in Delft indicated a need and desire for capacity building (during interviews and at sub-council and ward committee meetings) as this would enable them to play a more meaningful role in fulfilling their respective mandates. This lack of capacity is not only a problem within the case study area, but it is also, according to Hollands (2011) and Sangweni and Mxakata-Diseko (2008), sorely lacking in other areas and within different levels of government in South Africa.

Both personal observation, attendance at meetings and discussions with officials, councillors and ward representatives revealed the existence of different layers of power dynamics within the political structures. Local government officials clearly held the most power in terms of decision-making and in many respects took on a gatekeeping role with regard to enabling development interventions in Delft. Whilst councillors were dependent on the decision-making powers of the local authority and support for their requests, they in turn controlled development decisions and inputs from ward committee members, who were representing the broader community. Such power imbalances are clearly impacting on the establishment of a transformative developmental local state as the needs and priorities of local residents are
clearly not being incorporated in decision-making. These findings are in line with the work of Foucault (1967; 1977) who elaborates on the different types of spaces of social interaction and the operation of power within such spaces, which can be both exclusionary and ‘disciplining’ in the hands of authorities. Likewise, Escobar (2011) and Gaventa (2006) assert that those who shape the spaces, which in the case study area is the responsibility of local government, have the power over it and typically fashion it according to their own predetermined objectives. The findings of this research support the assertions of these authors and although such institutionalised participatory platforms have the potential to promote more meaningful state-society relations and to enable the exercise of agency, officials and councillors use these sites as platforms to enforce pre-determined development plans and to gain the passive acquiescence of community representatives.

It is further important to heed the work of scholars such as Freire (1972), Fals Borda (2001), Cleaver (2001), Hickey and Mohan (2004) and Cornwall and Coelho (2007) who elaborate on the implications of oppressive participatory structures and their impact on development intentions. Rather than enabling the creation of a critical consciousness, empowerment and the attainment of social justice, the ultimate aims of public participation, the top down practices of developmental local government within the case study area is marginalising and disempowering residents and reproducing the inequalities which have characterised South African society for many generations. Whilst Lefebvre (1991:51) reminds us that space is not a void but is a ‘politically instrumental’ tool used ‘by all kinds of authorities’ as a means of control and domination, Cooke and Kothari (2001) are of the view that the increasing number of manipulative forms of participation merely serves to reproduce decisions of the ‘already powerful’. Despite a repeated commitment to participatory discourse in official policy statements (Presidency of South Africa, 2009, 2010, 2011) and its framing in legislation such as the Local Government White Paper (RSA, 1998b), Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 2000) and Draft National Framework for Public Participation (RSA, 2005a), the overall findings of this research show little evidence of meaningful participation.

In general terms, current participatory practices in the case study area can be defined as local authority officials paying lip service to the notion of participation and using institutionalised participatory mechanisms as a smokescreen to satisfy the need for compliance with legislative requirements. It is evident that this practice is also prevalent in other communities throughout South Africa according to authors such as Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper
that Delft residents, due to their dissatisfaction with the official ‘invited’ spaces of
participation established by government, have resorted to ‘inventing’ their own spaces of
participation which take the form of protests. Williams (2008:3) refers to these platforms as
spaces of resistance or ‘counter spaces’, while for Ramjee and Van Donk (2011) and
Mathoho (2011) protests represent the only vehicle that grassroots residents have to express
their dissent if the formal spaces are not enabling meaningful engagement. These protests are
escalating in the case study area and can be interpreted as a reflection of the frustrations of
residents living in temporary and makeshift structures with poor access to basic services and
lacking decent quality of housing.

9.2.4 The South African Developmental State

There is a wide body of literature which discusses what might be the components of a
developmental state in South Africa (Van Dijk & Croucamp, 2007; Gelb, 2006; Fine, 2007,
2008; Randall, 2007; Poon, 2009; Thomas, 2008; Makgetla, 2008; Southhall, 2006; Nzwei &
Kuye, 2007; Levin, 2008). One such theme focussed on the need to incorporate such
democratic principles as citizen participation, social inclusion and state/society synergies into
a South African model of the developmental state (White, 2006, Edighei, 2010; Erwin, 2008),
Others underline the critical importance of economic growth as a necessary precondition for
funding developmental interventions and addressing poverty and inequality (Ashman, Fine &
Newman, 2010:26; Misra-Dexter & February, 2010; Bhorat & Van der Westhuizen, 2010).
Two opposing views have led to a robust debate. One, voiced mainly by government
officials, alludes to the ‘current existence’ of a South African developmental state (ANC,
2009; ANC, 2007b, The Presidency, 2009b), despite any supporting empirical evidence to
support this claim, whilst an opposing view advanced by academics and political
commentators refute the existence of a South African developmental state due to its inability
to produce developmental and transformative outcomes (White, 2006; Gelb, 2006; Weiss,
focuses on the need to include good governance, on the importance of building appropriate
institutions, and on the need to enhance capacity as a means to bring about developmental
outcomes (Mokaba, 2001; Evans, 2010; Gelb, 2010; Habisso, 2010).
From an ideological perspective, it is evident that the ANC-led government is cognisant of the importance of the need to foster a developmentalist approach which embraces participatory democracy, the transformation of society and a human oriented development agenda (Edighei, 2010; Gumede, 2011). However, unlike the context in which the East Asian developmental states achieved their growth (Bagchi, 2000; Leftwich, 2008; Woo-Cumings, 1999; Johnson, 1999), the South African context presents a very different challenge due to the historical legacy of discrimination, high poverty levels and inequality, low levels of literacy, comparatively weak regional integration and a culturally diverse and heterogeneous population. In that respect, writers such as Fakir (2007) are critical of the government’s failure to take into account these contextual factors and stress that its failure to do so undermines developmental efforts. With regard to the structural characteristics of the South African state, a number of writers have pointed to a weak bureaucracy, inefficiency and a lack of skills, weak alliances with the public sector, poor leadership, corruption and the government’s pursuit of neoliberal economic policy as detrimental to efforts to construct a state that is developmental, pro-poor and transformative (Fine, 2008; Butler, 2010; Maphunye, 2009; Mokaba, 2001; Mantzaris & Ngcobo, 2008). Furthermore, it is argued, despite the government’s developmental state discourse, political rhetoric has not been translated into any meaningful efforts to transform the structural features of the state such that it is able to deliver a developmental mandate.

9.3 Summary findings of the research

The foregoing review of the literature provided a theoretical framework with which to assess the manner in which the South African government has set about constructing a developmental state, and in particular the construction of a system of developmental local government, and with what effect. Discussion in the section which follows focuses on the findings from the case of Delft and it reflects on the manner in which a number of factors, cumulatively, are serving to constrain the establishment of developmental local government in Cape Town. These challenges, which operate at both the macro and micro levels, are summarised in Figure 2 and discussed in greater detail below. The summary findings of the research indicate that contrary to government claims that it is a developmental state, the data suggests that in its current form it is decidedly non-developmental. This is because measured against the objectives of transformation, redistribution and an expressed commitment to participatory democracy, very little progress has been made.
9.3.1 Macro-level influences

Both empirical findings in the case study and official documents point to a number of macro-level influences which are preventing transformation to a developmental state in South Africa. These include slow economic growth and diversification, a weak bureaucracy and civil service, and poor intergovernmental collaboration and coordination.

**Slow economic growth and diversification:** Although South Africa’s aspiration to emulate the Asian development model through strong state intervention would seem an appropriate strategy to grow the economy and widen inclusion, a paradox has been the government’s unrelenting pursuit of a neoliberal economic policy framework which has not brought about the desired level of growth. Despite its stated pro-poor orientation, the ANC government’s embrace of unfettered free market principles is in effect enriching a small elite, whilst the majority of citizens are becoming more impoverished. This is confirmed by current economic
data released by Statistics South Africa (2013a) which shows trends of sluggish economic growth and increasing unemployment, which does not bode well for efforts to decrease poverty and inequality. Low labour participation rates are attributed to the persistently low GDP growth rate of 3.2%, between 1993 and 2013, and this impacts predominantly on previously disadvantaged black and coloured population groups (Statistics South Africa, 2013b). Survey results in the case study area and in the wider Cape Town metropolitan area reflect these national trends with employment cited as the most critical need of residents. During a seminar session presented by Minister Trevor Manual on the National Development Plan and future prospects for South African, he emphasised that a growth rate of at least 5.7% would be required for sustainable development and the creation of decent employment in South Africa (Manuel, 27.08.2013).

**Weak state bureaucracy and public service sector:** Both the literature and case study findings reveal that the poor performance of the local state is due to indecisive leadership, the lack of strategic vision, a poorly trained bureaucracy, an unskilled public, and the lack of political will to bring about transformation. An uncoordinated and weak central government system, poor sequencing of interventions and non-aligned strategies and budgeting remain serious constraints which, as evident in this research, are factors acknowledged by senior government officials. Despite the government’s recognition of the need to restructure the economy and to deliver visible developmental outcomes, there appears to be little serious intent to devise policy instruments to support this process or to build the capacity necessary to bring about change in the institutional infrastructure.

The impact which the limited skills, capacity and commitment of local politicians and public officials has on the delivery of a development state in South Africa was a recurring theme which surfaced during interviews in the case study area. These skills relate to analytical abilities, visionary skills that enable long-term strategising, intellectual and technical skills required for appropriate policy formulation and organisational skills required to build an effective and efficient public sector. One of the problems relating to the delivery of national development plans identified by Minister Trevor Manuel was the capacity of local government officials to deliver at community level.

**Poor intergovernmental collaboration and co-ordination:** Observation at official local government meetings, information generated through interviews and analysis of such
government documents as media statements, internal memoranda and in-house documentation points to poor inter- and intra- governmental collaboration and co-ordination. Furthermore, within the case study area the lack of sound intergovernmental and intra-government relations, together with the ‘silo mentality’ of line departments in service delivery, is frustrating development interventions and resulting in the duplication of efforts, the wastage of scarce resources and a lack of accountability on the part of officials.

The lack of development in the case study area and broader region is attributed to the serious disconnect between national, provincial and local level planning. In this regard, the National Development Plan which sets out the long term developmental state vision for South Africa has not incorporated local level development priorities due to a failure to collaborate with the local sphere. Local level needs are thus not reflected in the National Development Plan of government. There is further minimal alignment between the developmental plans of the different spheres of government. Thus, whilst national government defines the long term development vision of South Africa, little account is taken of provincial and local planning which is where this vision must be translated into reality. Within the case study area, in-house documents of the City of Cape Town reveal that the municipality independently formulates its Integrated Development Plan and thereafter, as an exercise in compliance, attempts to superficially align certain interventions with objectives of the National Development Plan.

A further problem that was identified was that the developmental state model has never been enunciated clearly and means different things to different groups of people. Despite the fact that the notion of a South African developmental state is referred to in a succession of national policy documents such as the Medium Term Strategic Framework (The Presidency, 2009a), New Growth Path (The Presidency, 2010) and the National Development Plan (The Presidency, 2009b) amongst others, there is a clear lack of conceptual understanding of the underpinnings of such a state. Furthermore, besides the 1998 Local Government White Paper which delineates the ‘developmental’ role of the local state, the concept has never been officially defined in formal policy documents. Furthermore, empirical evidence reveals that while senior national government officials frequently allude to a South African developmental state in strategic policy documents, there is scant reference to the term at provincial level and no reference whatsoever in the City of Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan which is intended as the strategic instrument to deliver development outcomes. Moreover, officials from a variety of local government departments in the City of
Cape Town and councillors in the case study area concur that developmental state discourse does not form any part of local government deliberations. Unsurprisingly the majority of local government officials and councillors interviewed could not even define the term as it clearly did not form part of their day to day lexicon. This lack of a common understanding of the concept of a developmental state at different levels of the governing hierarchy represents a major impediment to the establishment of such a state in South Africa.

9.3.2 Micro-level influences

There are a number of micro-level challenges which emerged during empirical fieldwork in the case study area. These challenges can be broadly categorised according to three themes including ineffective participatory structures, the poor capacity of role-players, and top-down decision-making and restrictive legislation.

**Poor capacity of role-players:** Numerous interviews with office bearers, local officials and residents revealed a lack of capacity to be a source of concern in the case study area. This impacted on various levels of government. Despite the fact that more senior officials and councillors have the requisite skills and experience, many more recent appointments do not have the necessary education, skills and experience to meet the requirements of their positions and mandate. Together with certain line department officials, the majority of councillors do not understand the process and ethos underpinning Integrated Development Planning. As a consequence officials in the case study area do not follow the prescribed participatory processes in terms of the identifying the community’s most pressing development needs.

Both senior officials and councillors agreed that training and capacity building for councillors is essential in order to enable them to perform their duties. One such area is the training of ward councillors in terms of their responsibilities as ward chairpersons. Ward committee members also highlighted their lack of experience in their role as ward committee members reporting that training and capacity building is vital in enabling them to perform their responsibilities effectively. Since the local government elections in 2011, ward committee members in the case study area have only been give one capacity building exercise which took the form of role playing. Furthermore, councillors have limited understanding of the true meaning of participation and consequently its practice is largely reduced to levels
described by authors such as Arnstein (1969) and Pretty (1995) as tokenism, placation and manipulation. A limited number of councillors in the case study area have an in-depth understanding of the concept of participation and thus lack the capacity to facilitate meaningful participation within the institutionalised setting.

**Ineffective participatory structures:** Rather than ‘getting prices right’ which has been the mantra of the IMF, World Bank and the neoliberal economic policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, it is now widely believed that it is the strength of institutions and the nature of governance that shapes the development path of nations. Unfortunately, although the South African government has stated its commitment to building a state that is developmental, it has not made much headway in ensuring the effectiveness of its institutions at the local level in terms of enabling a participatory democracy and providing a meaningful platform for state/society interaction and collaboration.

Despite the formal establishment of local government participatory structures in compliance with legislative requirements, research findings point to their use by politicians and officials to present predetermined development plans. Attendance at meetings and interview data gathered from politicians, officials and community residents reveal that the mechanisms set up in the name of participatory democracy, are merely used as a platform to present the illusion of enabling consultation and meaningful engagement in accordance with required legislation. Moreover, despite claims that ward committee structures enable engagement of community representatives and the exercise of agency, the dynamics observed in the case study area are far more reminiscent of Cornwall (2002a, 2002c), Gaventa (2004) and Ayiar’s (2010) depiction of such ‘invited spaces’, where hierarchical power relations are controlled by those who shape the spaces. Current practices highlight illustrate how different levels of power are being exercised by different role players. At ward committee level, the ward councillor is in a position of control and determines the development needs of his/her respective ward. These development needs are subsequently tabled at sub-council, where it is decided whether development requests are taken to council for approval or rejected. At council level, officials from line departments have the power to approve or turn down requests and councillors have to lobby for support of development proposals.

As such, identified dynamics in Delft are far removed from those advocated by Marxist theorists, and supported by scholars such as Freire (1970) Fals Borda (2001) and Rahman
(1993), who envisaged in participation a process of emancipation, empowerment, conscientisation and the fostering of social justice. The nature of power relations within these participatory spaces and other levels of government not only impacts on the delivery of development to the case study area of Delft, but additionally impacts on the effective functioning of such spaces. This is in line with Gaventa’s (2004) discussion of levels of power and his assertion that those who create the spaces frequently have power over the spaces.

**Top-down decision-making:** In line with Cooke and Kothari’s (2001) observation of ‘participation as tyranny’, which describes the way in which authorities use the notion of participation as a technicist ploy to maintain the status quo or enforce the views of the implementing institution, most of the state/society interaction in the case study area is reduced to coercive measures and manipulative tactics frequently in the name of participation. The drafting of the City of Cape Town IDP is a case in point, despite legislative requirements that call for community participation and input. Current power is in the hands of the Mayoral Executive, concurring with Smith’s (2007:12) assertions that mayoral executive committees tend ‘to be overly centralised bases of power, non-transparent and unaccountable to the broader council, and the community as a whole’.

Officials, councillors and residents broadly agreed that the Integrated Development Plan was not based on democratic participation. Councillors, sector representative and community residents were not presented with any opportunity to provide input regarding specific community needs and the only public contribution was gathered from community satisfaction surveys targeting the more literate sectors of society. Other decision-making relating to the allocation of ward projects in the case study area was also top-down with sub-council members determining the overall development needs of the community.

Another broad summary finding of this research points to legislative restrictions which, contrary to their stated intention, are hampering efforts to implement a developmental state at the local level. This is particularly observable in terms of efforts to design and construct a representative Integrated Development Plan and to enable the process to be inclusive and participatory. Interviews with senior officials revealed that compliance with legislative requirements which prescribe that the IDP must be completed within nine months after local government elections is an extremely difficult task. This relates not only to the complex
nature of the plan, which involves identification of diverse development needs in the metropolitan area, but particularly to enabling meaningful input from the public.

Legislation surrounding the establishment of participatory mechanisms to enable inclusive governance and people-centred development is contradictory in respect to the role and responsibilities assigned to ward committees. On the one hand ward committees are intended to serve as the primary mechanism for community members to identify their collective development needs and to participate in the IDP and matters related to service delivery. On the other hand ward committees are only designated as ‘advisory’ bodies and are allocated no power whatsoever to influence final decision-making. This advisory role of ward committees enables some councillors in the case study area to dictate their own development preferences regardless of the input of ward committee members.

Whilst compliance with legislative deadlines not only excludes meaningful public participation in terms of providing input into the IDP, it further prevents ward committees from playing any role in IDP decision-making. The establishment of ward committees in the case study area is a lengthy process as it requires public meetings with different organisations and sectors in the case study area and the selection of sector representatives to serve on ward committees. The subsequent selection of ward committee members and the formation of ward committees is only finalised after the submission of the City of Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan to council. This precludes any attempt to participate in strategic decision-making regarding development priorities in the case study area.

9.4 Policy implications and recommendations

Clear designation of the specific roles and responsibilities of different spheres of government will be required in order to strengthen existing efforts to build a developmental state. Existing developmental state discourse and strategic plans focusing on the government’s intent to build an interventionist state that is capable of bringing about socio-economic transformation and of deepening democracy is focussed almost exclusively on the role and function of national government and says little or nothing about the roles of provincial and local government which represent the implementation arm of the state. Despite the fact that the Constitution assigns responsibility to the central government to support lower spheres of government, there needs to be far more clarity on the specific roles assigned to the provincial
and local spheres with regard to the manner in which the implementation of strategies, programmes and projects should be aligned to national developmental goals. This can be achieved through the setting of clear development indicators and the enunciation of measurable targets and outcomes in accordance with the allocated core functions of provincial and local government.

Enhancing capabilities and building capacity must be a key policy objective of government and a fundamental ingredient in efforts to construct and implement a developmental state. Capacity strengthening will be required at different government levels and across the spectrum of state role players and actors in the development process to equip state bureaucrats and civil servants to perform their required role in the development process. Focus should be placed on capacitating officials by enhancing the required technical, analytical, organisational, communication and administrative skills. The building of a knowledge economy, investing in mathematics and science training and enhancing the general level of education at all levels of society is a further pre-requisite for the establishment of a successful developmental state.

Intergovernmental relations and coordination of efforts both across and within spheres should be prioritised as a policy objective in order to address the current overlapping of roles and responsibilities which has resulted in duplication of effort. As the contribution of provincial and local government is critical in terms of implementation of government’s developmental state vision, efforts need to be synergised and coordinated to a far greater degree than at present. To that extent, the provincial government’s Development and Growth Strategic Plans and local government’s Integrated Development Plans must reflect national government’s developmental state vision and must be aligned accordingly. The responsibilities of different spheres and departments within spheres must be clearly specified, strategies clearly articulated and mechanisms must be put in place to monitor achievements and outcomes.

Although a number of policy documents such as the New Growth Path, National Development Plan, Industrial Policy Action Plan and Medium Term Strategic Framework (2009 – 2014) refer to the notion of a South African developmental state, the concept has never been formally defined and articulated in any policy document. Thus, if government is serious in its intent to construct a state that is developmental, it should firstly outline the
meaning of such a state within the South African context and provide clarity on its philosophical underpinnings. This will help to remove current confusion surrounding the term and furthermore will enable leadership and officials to build collective understanding and support a common vision.

As fiscal constraints impact on efforts to implement a state that is developmental, it is axiomatic that sustained economic growth is a fundamental requirement and will be necessary to fund socio-economic development and to increase employment. By all accounts, the current structure of the South African economy and its unrelenting focus on the Mineral Energy Complex is continuing to prevent broad and inclusive economic growth. It is thus recommended that the government focuses its attention on a pro-poor development path in a more strategic and concerted manner in order to address the serious challenges of unemployment and socio-economic inequality facing the country. Other policy choices that the political leadership must consider includes diversifying the industrial base and building the manufacturing sector, focussing on sectors that encourage more labour intensive activities, encouraging export led growth and building the necessary infrastructural environment that facilitates poverty alleviation and economic inclusion. Furthermore, in its efforts to build a developmental state the South African leadership must not only focus attention on building sound public private partnerships to assist in driving the development agenda forward, but must also forge strong partnerships with labour and civil society in order to identify national priorities and gain support for long term development goals that are in the interest of all sectors of society.

As the deepening of democracy is one of the stated goals of a South African developmental state, the building of functional participatory mechanisms at the local level is essential in enabling civil society to participate in decision-making and influence policy decisions from below. The current system of using ward committees through sector representation is failing to achieve broader goals of inclusive decision-making as the majority of residents do not belong to organisations and are thus falling through the net. A system of geographical representation with democratically appointed representatives will ensure that the process is more representative and inclusive.
9.5 Contribution and significance of the research

This research has made a number of contributions to knowledge in the field of developmental state theory and practice. Whilst the broader topic focused on the construction of developmental states which is well represented in the literature, there is a considerable dearth of research which focuses on the implementation of developmental states at the local level. Furthermore, notwithstanding the existence of a number of important scholarly contributions documenting South Africa’s efforts in constructing a state that is developmental and transformative at the macro-level, no such attempt has explored the micro-dynamics at play within communities or analysed their impacts on the delivery efforts of a metropolitan local government.

Furthermore, the investigation identified a noticeable gap in the research on developmental states in that the majority of contributions refer to centrally controlled states and research efforts have accordingly focussed on the national level. Very little research has focussed on sub-national and community level with regard to examining the institutional architecture and the different types of local level strategies that are used to deliver development outcomes.

An additional contribution of this research is that a number of matters of significance to the political leadership and policy makers have emerged from the analysis and can be used to inform government decision-making in a number of sectors. Whilst it must be acknowledged that the findings of this investigation make no claim to be representative of conditions in other regions in South Africa, there are certain broad trends that emerged that need to be considered by government in their efforts to construct a state that has the capacity to be transformative and to enable the democratic participation of its people.

9.6 Concluding comments

Whilst the South African political leadership has frequently claimed the title of a developmental state, their development performance has clearly not matched their development intentions. Pedestrian economic growth has prevented South African political leaders from making any meaningful inroads into addressing poverty, unemployment and inequality and the current participatory mechanisms put in place to enable an empowered
citizenry and deepen democracy have not achieved the desired outcomes. State capacity, a defining feature and essential ingredient of a successful developmental state, is sorely lacking both between and within the different spheres of government.

However, this should not detract from South Africa’s commitment to construct a developmental state and become more proactive and developmental in its orientation in terms of promoting sustained growth, deepening democracy and prioritising the development needs of its disadvantaged and marginalised citizens. Despite its many critics and an abundance of theorizing as to why South Africa cannot yet claim to be a developmental state, there is a wealth of scholarship which is of the opinion that the route of strong state intervention still remains the only path to follow. South Africa faces enormous challenges as a result of its historical legacy of discrimination and the perpetuation of its inherited patterns of inequality. In that context, considering the daunting challenges facing the country, it would not seem responsible for the leadership to expose the nation to the vagaries of the market when redress of past injustice remains a priority. As the state clearly plays a central role in determining the development success of a nation and in producing development outcomes relevant to its particular context, it is recommended that South Africa follow the route of an interventionist developmental state and purposively fashions policy to suit its unique development needs.
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Good day. My name is ____________. I am part of a team from The African Centre on Citizenship and Democracy (ACCEDE) which is part of the University of the Western Cape. We are doing a study of citizen participation and we would like to discuss these issues with a member of your household. We would like to choose an adult from your household. Would you help us pick one?

Every person in the area has an equal chance of being included in this study. All information will be kept confidential. Your household has been chosen by chance. Note: The person must give his or her informed consent by answering positively. If participation is refused, walk away from the household. Use the day code to substitute the household. If consent is secured, proceed as follows.

**Respondent Selection Procedure**

Interviewer: Within the household, it is your job is to select a random (this means any) individual. This individual becomes the interview respondent. In addition, you are responsible for alternating interviews between men and women. Circle the correct code number below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please tell me the names of all males/females who presently live in this household. I only want the names of males/females who are citizens of South Africa and who are 18 years and older.

If this interview must be with a female, list only women’s names. If this interview is with a male, list only men’s names. List all eligible household members of this gender who are 18 years or older, even those not presently at home but who will return to the house at any time that day. Include only citizens of South Africa.

**Women’s Names**

<p>| |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Men’s Names**

<p>| |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Take out your deck of numbered cards. Present them face-down so that the numbers cannot be seen. Ask the person who is selecting respondents to pick any card, by saying:

Please choose a card. The person who corresponds to the number chosen will be the person interviewed. [Interviewer: REMEMBER to circle the code number of the person selected on the table above]

The person I need to speak to is [insert name] ___________________________. Is this person presently at home?

If yes: May I please interview this person now?
If no: Will this person return here at any time today?
If no: Thank you very much. I will select another household. Substitute with the next household to the right and repeat the respondent selection procedure. (NOTE: YOU CAN ONLY SUBSTITUTE HOUSEHOLDS NOT INDIVIDUALS.)

If yes: Please tell this person that I will return for an interview at [insert convenient time]. If this respondent is not present when you call back, replace this household with the next household to the right.

If the selected respondent is not the same person that you first met, repeat Introduction:

Good day. My name is ____________. I am part of a team from The African Centre on Citizenship and Democracy (ACCEDE) which is part of the University of the Western Cape. We are doing a study citizen participation and we would like to discuss these issues with a member of you. Your answers will be confidential. They will be put together with 900 other people we are talking to, to get an overall picture. It will be impossible to pick you out from what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you think. This interview will take about 45 minutes. There is no penalty for refusing to participate. Do you wish to proceed? [Proceed with interview only if answer is positive].

NOTES ABOUT THE INTERVIEW:

[UNIVERSITY of the WESTERN CAPE]
BEGIN INTERVIEW

Let me start by asking you a few questions about your interest in political matters and your views on democracy.

1. How interested are you in public affairs? [Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: You know, in politics and government?] [Read out options.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very interested</th>
<th>Somewhat interested</th>
<th>Not very interested</th>
<th>Not at all interested</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. How often do you get news from: [Read out options] HAND RESPONDENT SHOW CARD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Every day</th>
<th>A few times a week</th>
<th>A few times a month</th>
<th>Less than once a month</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Internet</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters: [Read out options.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequently</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you agree or disagree. PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Citizens should be more active in questioning leaders</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Opposition parties should examine and criticize government policies and actions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The news media should investigate corruption in government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. It makes you proud to be a South African.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. The courts should have the right to make decisions that people always abide by</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Sometimes it might be better to ignore the law rather than wait for legal solutions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. People like me do not have any influence over what the government does</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Politicians do not care much about what people like me think</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in South Africa? Are you: [Read out options.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction Level</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
<th>Fairly satisfied</th>
<th>Not very satisfied</th>
<th>Not at all satisfied</th>
<th>South Africa is not a democracy [Do not read]</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Thinking about freedom in South Africa,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Not at all free</th>
<th>Not very free</th>
<th>Somewhat free</th>
<th>Completely free</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. How free are you to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. How free are you, to join an organisation you want?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. How free do you feel to say what you think?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let’s turn to economic and living conditions as well as your experience with crime.

7. How would you describe: [Read out response options]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Condition/Personal Condition</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Neither good nor bad</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Very Bad</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. The present economic condition of South Africa?</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Your own present living conditions?</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. How do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other South Africans?
   Much Worse | Worse | Same | Better | Much Better | Don't know [DNR]
   1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 99

B. Looking back, how do you rate your living conditions compared to twelve months ago?
   1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 99

C. Is your life today better, about the same or worse than it was under apartheid?
   1 2 3 4 5 99

D. Looking ahead, do you expect your living conditions in twelve months time to be better or worse?
   1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 99

9. Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without the following: [Read out options]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Just once or twice</th>
<th>Several times</th>
<th>Many times</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Don't know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
A. Enough food to eat?     | 5     | 4                  | 3             | 2          | 1      | 99               |
B. Enough clean water for home use? | 5     | 4                  | 3             | 2          | 1      | 99               |
C. Medicines or medical treatment? | 5     | 4                  | 3             | 2          | 1      | 99               |
D. Enough fuel to cook your food? | 5     | 4                  | 3             | 2          | 1      | 99               |

10. How much do you depend on: [Read out options]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at All</th>
<th>A Little</th>
<th>A Lot</th>
<th>Don't Know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
A. Earning a wage or a salary? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
B. Buying and selling goods as a trader? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
C. Doing work in return for food or shelter? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
D. Employing other people to work for you? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
E. Participating in a community savings group? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
F. Borrowing money from friends or family? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
G. Borrowing money from a bank? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
H. Receiving money from family members working elsewhere in the country? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
I. Receiving money from family members working in other countries? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |

11. How often do you? [Read out options]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Some of the time</th>
<th>Almost all the time</th>
<th>Don't know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
A. Borrow things from people living close to you | 1 | 2 | 4 | 99 |
B. Lend things to people living close to you | 1 | 2 | 4 | 99 |
C. Visit people living close to you | 1 | 2 | 4 | 99 |

12. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Don't know/Haven't heard enough [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
A. It is better to have low prices for basic goods even if it forces some local businesses to close. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 99 |
B. It is better to have low price goods sold in this area/neighbourhood, it doesn't matter who sells the goods. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 99 |

Now I am going to ask some questions about crime and safety in your community.

13. What, if anything, makes you feel unsafe in your area/neighbourhood?
   DO NOT PROMPT. RECORD ALL MENTIONED.

WRITE IN __________________________ (1st response)

WRITE IN __________________________ (2nd response)

WRITE IN __________________________ (3rd response)
The area is too dark at night and there are insufficient lights | 1 | 1 | 1
Theft from cars is common | 2 | 2 | 2
Rape takes place often | 3 | 3 | 3
Murder takes place often | 4 | 4 | 4
Hijackings occur often | 5 | 5 | 5
There are violent gangs in the area | 6 | 6 | 6
There are drug dealers in the area | 7 | 7 | 7
Cars are driven at high speed or carelessly in the area | 8 | 8 | 8
Alcohol and drug abuse are high | 9 | 9 | 9
I don't trust my neighbours and other people in my community | 10 | 10 | 10
There is not enough patrolling of the area by government or community police | 0

I feel safe in my area

No further reply

Don't know

| 999 |

14. **Mostly Positive** | **Mostly Negative** | **Don't know [DNR]**
A. In certain communities people have said that gangs make a positive contribution. If there are gangs in your area/neighbourhood, do you feel that they have a mostly positive or mostly negative effect in your area/neighbourhood? | 1 | 2 | 99
B. What about taxi drivers? Do you think taxi-drivers have a mostly positive or mostly negative effect in your area/neighbourhood? | 1 | 2 | 99

15. Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you: [Read out options]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Feared crime in your own home?</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Just once or twice</th>
<th>Several times</th>
<th>Many times</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Don't know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| B. Feared crime in your area/neighbourhood? | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |

| C. Feared crime while travelling? | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |

16. **Yes** | **No** | **Don't know [DNR]**
A. Have you or a member of your household been a victim of crime in the past 12 months? IF NO, MOVE TO Q18. | 1 | 2 | 99
B. Was there a charge laid with the police? | 1 | 2 | 97
C. [IF CHARGE LAID] Did the case go to court? | 1 | 2 | 97

17. **Not at All** | **A Little** | **Completely** | **NA** | **Don't Know [DNR]**
A. Overall, how fairly were you treated by the police? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 97 | 99
B. How satisfied were you with the overall result of the case? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 97 | 99
### 18.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Compared to 12 months ago, how much crime is there in your area/neighbourhood at the present time?</th>
<th>Much more</th>
<th>More</th>
<th>About the same</th>
<th>Less</th>
<th>Much Less</th>
<th>Don't know/Haven't heard [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Compared with 12 months ago, how much drug activity do you think there is in your area/neighbourhood these days?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. Compared with 12 months ago, how much gang activity do you think there is in your area/neighbourhood these days?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 19. Has there been violent conflict in this area/neighbourhood over the past 12 months? IF NO, MOVE TO Q 22.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 20. Over what sort of problems do violent conflicts arise in this community/neighbourhood? DO NOT PROMPT. RECORD VERBATIM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WRITE IN</th>
<th>(1st response)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WRITE IN</td>
<td>(2nd response)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRITE IN</td>
<td>(3rd response)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st response</th>
<th>2nd response</th>
<th>3rd response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gang-related</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug-related</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol-related</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi-related</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shebeen-related</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia-related</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening of spaza shops/other businesses</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When people in the area try to solve crimes or deal with criminals</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police corruption</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest-related</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No violent conflict</td>
<td>997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No further reply</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other (1st response), Specify

Post Code

Other (2nd response), Specify

Post Code

Other (3rd response), Specify

Post Code

### 21. To whom would you turn for help to resolve a violent conflict in this area/neighbourhood? DO NOT PROMPT. RECORD ALL MENTIONED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WRITE IN</th>
<th>(1st response)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WRITE IN</td>
<td>(2nd response)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRITE IN</td>
<td>(3rd response)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st answer</th>
<th>2nd answer</th>
<th>3rd answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No-one</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The people involved in the conflict</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Police</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family/friends/neighbors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional chiefs/elders/mediators</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
22. In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? [Do not read options. Code from responses. Accept up to three answers. If respondent offers more than three options, ask “Which three of these are the most important?” if respondent offers one or two answers, ask “Anything else?”]

DO NOT PROMPT. RECORD VERBATIM.

WRITE IN ___________________ (1st response)
WRITE IN ___________________ (2nd response)
WRITE IN ___________________ (3rd response)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1st response</th>
<th>2nd response</th>
<th>3rd response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of the economy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages, incomes and salaries</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty/destitution</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food / Agriculture</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food shortage</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Transport</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure / roads</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphans/street children/homeless children</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services (other)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sickness / Disease</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime and Security</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political violence</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination/ inequality</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender issues/women’s rights</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing/ no problems</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the last question you said that [READ IN MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM]________________is the most important problem facing South Africa. How well or badly would you say the ANC has handled that issue over the past year? [Probe for strength of opinion]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very badly</th>
<th>Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>Don't know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Could any other political party have done a better job than the government handling this issue?

| No | 1 |
| 2 |
| Don't know [Do not read] | 99 |

*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO OR DON'T KNOW, MOVE TO Q26

Which political party?

Democratic Alliance (DA) | 1
Congress of the People (COPE) | 2
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) | 3
United Democratic Movement (UDM) | 4
OTHER: Write Name: ____________________________________________
Not applicable | 97
Don't know [Do not read] | 99

How well or badly would you say the current NATIONAL government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say? [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creating jobs</th>
<th>Very Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>DK / Haven’t heard enough</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrowing gaps between rich and poor</th>
<th>Very Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>DK / Haven’t heard enough</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reducing crime</th>
<th>Very Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>DK / Haven’t heard enough</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improving basic health services</th>
<th>Very Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>DK / Haven’t heard enough</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Addressing educational needs</th>
<th>Very Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>DK / Haven’t heard enough</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivering household water</th>
<th>Very Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>DK / Haven’t heard enough</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fighting corruption in government</th>
<th>Very Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>DK / Haven’t heard enough</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combating HIV/AIDS</th>
<th>Very Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>DK / Haven’t heard enough</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What are the most important problems facing your area/neighbourhood at the present time? DO NOT PROMPT.

1st response

2nd response

3rd response
28. In the last question you indicated that [READ IN MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM] is the most important problem facing your area/neighbourhood. How well or badly would you say your municipality has handled that issue over the past year? [Probe for strength of opinion]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very badly</th>
<th>Badly</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29. How much of the problems in your area/neighbourhood do you think your municipality can solve? [Read out options]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All of them</th>
<th>Most of them</th>
<th>Some of them</th>
<th>Very few of them</th>
<th>None of them</th>
<th>Don’t know [Do not read]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30. When there are problems in how local government is run in your area/neighbourhood, how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation? [Read out options.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nothing</th>
<th>A small amount</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>A great deal</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31. Do you think that [READ IN] looks after the interests of all in your community or after the interests of one group only, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?

A. The ANC
   - All: 1
   - Only one group: 2
   - Not Applicable: 99
   - Do not know enough about them: 99

B. The DA
   - All: 1
   - Only one group: 2
   - Not Applicable: 99
   - Do not know enough about them: 99

C. The COPE
   - All: 1
   - Only one group: 2
   - Not Applicable: 99
   - Do not know enough about them: 99

D. Your municipal office
   - All: 1
   - Only one group: 2
   - Not Applicable: 99
   - Do not know enough about them: 99

E. The Police
   - All: 1
   - Only one group: 2
   - Not Applicable: 99
   - Do not know enough about them: 99

F. The Community Policing Forum in your community/neighbourhood.
   - All: 1
   - Only one group: 2
   - Not Applicable: 97
   - Do not know enough about them: 99

G. The Ward Committee in your community/neighbourhood.
   - All: 1
   - Only one group: 2
   - Not Applicable: 97
   - Do not know enough about them: 99

H. The Street Committee in your community/neighbourhood.
   - All: 1
   - Only one group: 2
   - Not Applicable: 97
   - Do not know enough about them: 99

I. The South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO)
   - All: 1
   - Only one group: 2
   - Not Applicable: 97
   - Do not know enough about them: 99

32. Do you know the name of:

A. Your Ward Councilor
   - Don’t Know: 99
   - Know But Can’t Remember: 1
   - Incorrect Guess: 2
   - Correct Name: 3

B. Your Member of Parliament
   - Don’t Know: 99
   - Know But Can’t Remember: 1
   - Incorrect Guess: 2
   - Correct Name: 3

33. How well or badly would you say your ward council or is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say? [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]

A. Allowing citizens like yourself to participate?
   - Very Badly: 1
   - Fairly Badly: 2
   - Fairly Well: 3
   - Very Well: 4
   - DK / Haven’t heard enough [DNR]: 99

B. Making council’s programmes known to ordinary people?
   - Very Badly: 1
   - Fairly Badly: 2
   - Fairly Well: 3
   - Very Well: 4
   - DK / Haven’t heard enough [DNR]: 99

C. Providing effective ways to handle complaints about councillors or officials?
   - Very Badly: 1
   - Fairly Badly: 2
   - Fairly Well: 3
   - Very Well: 4
   - DK / Haven’t heard enough [DNR]: 99

34. Please rate the group of councilors serving on your local government council according to the following:

A. Their ability to perform their tasks?
   - Not at all competent: 1
   - Not very competent: 2
   - Somewhat competent: 3
   - Totally competent: 4
   - Don’t know [DNR]: 99

B. Their experience in managing public service programmes?
   - Not at all caring: 1
   - Not very caring: 2
   - Somewhat caring: 3
   - Totally caring: 4
   - Don’t know [DNR]: 99

C. The extent they care about the community?
   - Not at all caring: 1
   - Not very caring: 2
   - Somewhat caring: 3
   - Totally caring: 4
   - Don’t know [DNR]: 99
30. Not at all honest  Not very honest  Somewhat honest  Totally honest  Don't know
D. Their honesty in handling public funds?
  1  2  3  4  99
E. Their fairness in allocating services?
  1  2  3  4  99
F. Their fairness in allocating employment opportunities?
  1  2  3  4  99

35. How much time should your local councilor spend in this area to visit the community and its citizens? [Read out options]
A. Almost all of the time  B. At least weekly  C. At least once a month  D. At least once a year  E. Never / It is not necessary  F. Don't know

B. How much time does your local councilor spend in this area?
  1  2  3  4  99

36. Have you ever get together with others and to make your ward councilor listen to your concerns about matters of importance to the community?
A. Have Never  B. Have done this once  C. Have done this a few times  D. Have done this often  E. Don't know

37. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? [Read out options]

38. Have you ever heard an Integrated Development Plan (IDP)? IF NO, MOVE TO Q41

39. Have you ever been asked to give input into the IDP for your area?

40. How much difference has the IDP made to the improvement of your area?
A. No Difference  B. Minor Difference  C. Major Difference  D. Don't know

41. Overall, how satisfied are you with the delivery of services in your area?
A. Very satisfied  B. Fairly satisfied  C. Not very satisfied  D. Not at all satisfied  E. Don't know

*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS VERY SATISFIED OR SATISFIED, MOVE TO Q43

42. IF DISSATISFIED: What makes you feel dissatisfied? DO NOT PROMPT.
1st response
2nd response
3rd response
43. What do you do when you need help with getting a service from government?

1st response

2nd response

3rd response

44. Have you encountered any of these problems with your local public schools during the past 12 months? [Read out options.] IF NO EXPERIENCE IN A, MOVE TO Q45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>No experience with public schools in past twelve months</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Lack of textbooks or other supplies</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Poor teaching</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Absent teachers</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Poor conditions of school</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO, MOVE TO Q46

45. Have any of your children left school before finishing grade 12 and if yes what did they do immediately after leaving? WRITE IN THE RESPONSE:

Not Applicable: Don't have children

Not Applicable: No child has left school early

Started working

Started their own business

Attended another school

Attended an educational institution

Nothing in particular (no further education or employment)

Other, please specify

Don't know

46. Have you encountered any of these problems with your local public clinic or hospital during the past 12 months? [Read out options.] IF NO EXPERIENCE IN A, MOVE TO Q47

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>No experience with clinics in past twelve months</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Once or Twice</th>
<th>A Few Times</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Don't know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Lack of medicines or other supplies</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Lack of attention or respect from staff</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Absent doctors</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Long waiting time</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Dirty facilities</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47. Do you think clinics and services in your area are:

Of lower quality than most other areas

Of the same quality as most other areas

Of higher quality than most other areas

Don't know [DNR]

A. Do you think clinics and services in your area are:

1

2

3

99

B. Do you think schools in your area are:

1

2

3

99

C. Do you think houses in your area are:

1

2

3

99

Now I would like to ask you some questions about some of the community organizations in your area.

48. Yes No

A Have you ever heard of the organisation called Violence Prevention Through Urban Upgrading (VPUU)?

1

2

B Have you ever heard of the Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF)?

1

2

*IMPORTANT NOTE: ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT HAS HEARD OF VPUU.

49. How effective do you think VPUU is in reducing violence in your area/neighborhood?

Very effective

Effective

Ineffective

Very ineffective

Don't know [DNR]
50. *IMPORTANT NOTE: ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT HAS HEARD OF KDF.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. How do you feel about the Khayelitsha Development Forum? Do you support this organization or have you not heard enough about them to say?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Think about the people who are important to you. Generally, do you think most of them would support or oppose KDF?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51. | A. How effective do you think KDF is in helping people to get services? PROBE THE EXTENT OF EFFECTIVENESS. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. How effective do you think KDF is in encouraging development in your area/neighbourhood?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. How effective do you think KDF is in promoting employment opportunities in your area/neighbourhood?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52. Do you think that the Khayelitsha Development Forum looks after the interests of all in your community or after the interests of one group only, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All</th>
<th>Only one group</th>
<th>Do not know enough about them</th>
<th>Had not heard of them</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53. Do you think KDF favours any particular political party?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO, MOVE TO Q55*

54. [IF Yes] Which political party?

- Democratic Alliance (DA)
- Congress of the People (COPE)
- Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
- United Democratic Movement (UDM)

Other:
- Write Name: _________________________________________
- Not applicable
- Don't know [Do not read]

Now I am going to ask you some questions about the activities you take part in, your contact with political leaders and your role in the community.

55. We find that some people are not able to vote or decide to not vote. How about you? How likely are you to vote in the 2011 local elections?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very certain to vote</th>
<th>Likely to vote</th>
<th>Likely not to vote</th>
<th>Very certain not to vote</th>
<th>Don't know [Do not read]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS VERY CERTAIN OR LIKELY TO VOTE, MOVE TO Q57.*

56. [If respondent answered that they will not vote, ask] Can you tell me why you will not vote? DO NOT PROMPT.

WRITE IN VERBATIM RESPONSE: ______________________________________________________

| I am not registered to vote | 1 | Political all make the same promises | 7 |
| I don't have time to vote | 2 | I am not interested in political matters | 8 |
| I am too ill to vote | 3 | Other reason | 9 |
| I don't know which party to vote for | 4 | Not applicable – will vote | 97 |
| It is not worthwhile to vote | 5 | Refused to say | 98 |
| Voting makes no difference | 6 | Don't Know [DNR] | 99 |
57. On a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being very difficult and 10 being very easy, how easy or difficult is it for an ordinary person to have their voice heard between elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very difficult</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>Very easy</th>
<th>Don't know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

58. Do you feel close to any particular political party?

- No (does NOT feel close to ANY party) 1
- Yes (feels close to a party) 2
- Refused to answer 98
- Does not know [Do not read] 99

*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO, REFUSES TO ANSWER OR DOES NOT KNOW, MOVE TO Q60.

59. [If Yes] Which party is that?

- African National Congress (ANC) 1
- Democratic Alliance (DA) 2
- Congress of the People (COPE) 3
- Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 4
- United Democratic Movement (UDM) 5

OTHER:
Write Name: _____________________________________________

POST CODE

60. I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are a leader/official, a member, attend meetings even though you are not a member or are not involved in the group at all?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A.</th>
<th>A religious group (e.g., church, mosque)</th>
<th>Leader or Official</th>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Not a Member, but attend meetings</th>
<th>Not involved at all</th>
<th>Don’t Know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>A Community Policing Forum</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>A Street Committee</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>A School Governing Body</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.</td>
<td>Some other association or community group</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.</td>
<td>Any other type of organization?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Write in: _____________________________</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61. If respondent belongs to more than one organization] Of the organizations to which you belong, which one is the most important to you and what is its name? Which is the next most important and what is its name? And which one is the next most important?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A.</th>
<th>[Write in Name of Group] 1st Most Important</th>
<th>[Write in Name of Group] 2nd Most Important</th>
<th>[Write in Name of Group] 3rd Most Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

62. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A.</th>
<th>Have ever attended a meeting organized by your Ward Committee?</th>
<th>No, never</th>
<th>Yes, Once or twice</th>
<th>Yes, often.</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Have ever attended a meeting organized by your Street Committee?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Have ever attended a meeting organized by your School Governing Body?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS YES, MOVE TO Q64
63. **IF NO, WHY HAVE YOU NOT ATTENDED? WRITE IN THE RESPONSE:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A Ward Committee</th>
<th>B Street Committee</th>
<th>C School Governing Body</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable: has attended a meeting</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't have transport</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't have any information about the meetings are held</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't have the time</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will make no difference, nothing will change</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They will not listen to my opinion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have not thought about it</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, please specify</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64. **Have you taken part in a protest or demonstration in the last twelve months?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO, MOVE TO Q70**

65. **VERBATIM RESPONSE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. What kind of protest was it? (march, rally, etc)</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>POST CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Who organized the protest?</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>POST CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. What was the main issue being protested against?</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>POST CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D. What was your main reason for taking part in it? (Did you support the cause or organization?)</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>POST CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66. **Were the goals of the protest achieved?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67. **Did the protest become violent?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68. **(IF YES) Do you feel it was necessary for the protest to become violent to achieve the goals of the protest?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69. **VERBATIM RESPONSE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. (IF YES) How did the protest become violent?</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>POST CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now I am going to ask you some questions about group relations in your area/neighbourhood.

70. **People have different group identities and South Africans describe themselves in different ways. Besides being South African, do you feel you belong to any other group?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO, MOVE TO Q75**

71. **If yes, which other group do you belong?**

72. **Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a South African and being a [R's GROUP]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to, or are they equally important?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South African</th>
<th>[R's Group]</th>
<th>Equally important</th>
<th>Not applicable/Does not feel close to any group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS SOUTH AFRICAN OR EQUALLY IMPORTANT, MOVE TO Q75**

### 73.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Does [READ IN R’s group] people have less, the same, or more influence in politics than other groups in this community?</th>
<th>Much less</th>
<th>Less</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>More</th>
<th>Much More</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Are [READ IN R’s group] people treated worse, the same as, or better by members of other groups?</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Much Better</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. Are [READ IN R’s group] economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this community?</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Much Better</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 74.

In general, do you feel that people in government are less interested, or more interested in what [READ IN R’s group] think compared to other groups, or is it about the same? PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Much less interested</th>
<th>Less interested</th>
<th>About the same</th>
<th>More interested</th>
<th>Much more interested</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 75.

Are there any groups living in this community who you think should not be living here?

| Yes | 1 |
| No | 2 |
| Don’t know [DO NOT READ] | 99 |

**IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS NO OR DON’T KNOW, MOVE TO Q77**

### 76.

IF YES: Which groups? MULTIPLE MENTIONS POSSIBLE. ACCEPT UP TO THREE RESPONSES.

1st response

2nd response

3rd response

### 77.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For how long have you lived in this area?</th>
<th>Less than a year</th>
<th>1-2 years</th>
<th>2-3 years</th>
<th>3-5 years</th>
<th>5-10 years</th>
<th>More than 10 years</th>
<th>Since birth</th>
<th>Don’t Know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For how long have your neighbours lived in this area?</th>
<th>Less than a year</th>
<th>1-2 years</th>
<th>2-3 years</th>
<th>3-5 years</th>
<th>5-10 years</th>
<th>More than 10 years</th>
<th>Since birth</th>
<th>Don’t Know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For how long have most other people lived in this area?</th>
<th>Less than a year</th>
<th>1-2 years</th>
<th>2-3 years</th>
<th>3-5 years</th>
<th>5-10 years</th>
<th>More than 10 years</th>
<th>Since birth</th>
<th>Don’t Know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 78.

Before coming to live here, where did you stay?

### 79.

Where were you born?

| Western Cape other | 1 |
| Gauteng | 2 |
| Eastern Cape | 3 |
| KwaZulu/Natal | 4 |
| Mpumalanga | 5 |
| North West Province | 6 |
| Northern Cape | 7 |
| Northern Province | 8 |
| Free State | 9 |
80. Would you consider leaving this community to go and live somewhere else in the future? Would you give it: **READ OUT - SINGLE MENTION.**

| Strong consideration | 1 |
| Some consideration   | 2 |
| Would not consider it | 3 |
| Don’t know [DO NOT READ] | 99 |

81. How much do you trust each of the following? **[Read out options]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People living close to you</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Just a little bit</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Your relatives</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Just a little bit</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Africans in general</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Just a little bit</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Don’t know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, let me record a few facts about yourself.

82. How old were you at your last birthday?

[Interviewer: Enter three digit number. Don’t Know = 999]

83. Are you the head of the household?

No | Yes | Don’t know
---|-----|-------------
0  | 1   | 99

84. In your household, how many children are there under the age of 18?

[Interviewer: Enter two digit number. Don’t Know = 99]

85. What is your home language?

| English | 1 |
| Afrikaans | 2 |
| Xhosa | 3 |

86. What is the highest level of education you have completed? **[Code from answer. Do not read options]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No formal schooling</th>
<th>Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling)</th>
<th>Some primary schooling</th>
<th>Primary school completed</th>
<th>Some secondary school / high school</th>
<th>Secondary school completed / high school</th>
<th>Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. diploma from technikon or college</th>
<th>University degree completed</th>
<th>Post-graduate</th>
<th>Don’t know [Do not read]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

87. What is your religion, if any?

| None | 0 |
| Islam | 1 |
| Catholic | 2 |
| Protestant (Mainstream) | 3 |
| Protestant (Evangelical/ Pentecostal) | 4 |
| African Independent Church | 5 |
| Zionist Christian Church | 6 |
| Traditional religion | 7 |
| Hindu | 8 |
| Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God) | 9 |
| Atheist (Do not believe in a God) | 10 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other [Specify]:</th>
<th>Post code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Don’t know | 999 |

314
### 88. Where is your main water source?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inside house</th>
<th>Inside yard</th>
<th>Outside yard</th>
<th>Don't Know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 89. Which of the following best describes the housing situation of this household?

- Own the House/flat 1
- Rent the house/flat 2
- Rent a dwelling in the backyard 3
- Informal dwelling in informal settlement 4
- Other [Specify]: ____________________________ 5

### 90. IF RESPONDENT IS THE OWNER, how did you obtain your house?

- Purchased it 1
- From the government but had to pay a subsidy 2
- From the government and was not required to pay a subsidy 3

### 91. Overall, how satisfied are you with your house?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Highly dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*IMPORTANT NOTE: IF RESPONDENT SAYS VERY SATISFIED OR SATISFIED MOVE TO Q106*

### 92. IF DISSATISFIED: What makes you feel dissatisfied?

DO NOT PROMPT. MULTIPLE MENTIONS POSSIBLE. ACCEPT UP TO THREE RESPONSES.

1st response

2nd response

3rd response

*IMPORTANT NOTE: ASK Q104 AND Q105 IF THE RESPONDENT IS NOT THE OWNER.*

### 93. IF THE RESPONDENT IS NOT THE OWNER, are you on a waiting list?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 94. (IF YES). How long have you been on the waiting list?

Don't Know [DNR]

### 95. Which of these things do you personally own?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No (Don't own)</th>
<th>Yes (Do Own)</th>
<th>Don't know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Radio</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Television</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Mobile Phone</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D A Computer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Bicycle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Motorcycle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Motor Vehicle / Car</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 96. How often do you travel 10km or more from where you live right now?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Less than once a month</th>
<th>A few times a month</th>
<th>A few times week</th>
<th>Everyday</th>
<th>Don't know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 97. What type of transport do you normally use?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Train</th>
<th>Bus</th>
<th>Taxi</th>
<th>Lift</th>
<th>Private transport</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 98. Do you have a job that pays cash income?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 99. (IF YES) Is it full time or part time?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Time</th>
<th>Part Time</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 100. Are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know (DNR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 101. What additional sources of income does your household have?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Income</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other household members also work</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old-age pension</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child care grant</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster care grant</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability grant</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borde &amp; lodging</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental income</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance from relatives not living in the house</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: Specify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 102. How much do spend on public transport per month?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Range</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know (DNR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do not use public transport</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than R50 per month</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R51-R100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R101-R200</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R201-R300</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R300-R699</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R700-R999</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1000-R1999</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2000 or more</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 103. What is your the total income? HAND RESPONDENT CARD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know (DNR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No regular income</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1-999</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1000-R1999</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2000-R3999</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4000-R5999</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R6000-R7999</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R8000-R9999</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R10 000-R19 999</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R20 000-R29 999</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R30 000 - R50 000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R50 000+</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know [DNR]</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 104. What is your present occupation or last occupation (if unemployed)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never had a job</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently unemployed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioner</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife/Works in the house</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NB REMEMBER TO COMPLETE NEXT SECTION!**

**ALL SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ANSWERED BY THE INTERVIEWER AFTER THE INTERVIEW IS CONCLUDED**

### 105. Respondent Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 106. Respondent’s race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know (DNR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could not tell</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 107. Does the respondent have electricity in the house?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know (DNR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
108. (IF YES). Is it through a meter or a wire?  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meter</th>
<th>Wire</th>
<th>Don't Know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

109. Do you think the respondent is well informed about politics?  
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Well informed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat informed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very informed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not informed at all</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know [Do not read]</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

110. Which of the following best describes the main dwelling unit that this household occupies?  
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House (brick structure)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat in block of flats</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House/flat back yard</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal dwelling in backyard</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal dwelling in informal settlement</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other [Specify]: _______________________</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

111. Was the roof made of: ONE CODE ONLY  
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metal, tin, zinc</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiles</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thatch</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic sheets</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple materials</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could not see / could not tell</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

112. Were there any other people immediately present who might be listening during the interview?  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No one</th>
<th>Spouse only</th>
<th>Children Only</th>
<th>A few others</th>
<th>Small crowd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>interview?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

113. What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering?  
<p>| | |</p>
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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

114. What was the respondent’s attitude toward you during the interview?  
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Was he or she</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Friendly</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 In between</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Hostile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Was he or she</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Interested</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 In between</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Bored</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Was he or she</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Cooperative</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 In between</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Uncooperative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Was he or she</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Patient</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 In between</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Impatient</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Was he or she</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 At ease</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 In between</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Suspicious</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>F. Was he or she</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Honest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 In between</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Misleading</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Did your presence in the area arouse interest from neighbors?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Did your presence in the area arouse suspicion from neighbors?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Did your presence in the area arouse fear from neighbors?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Were you approached by community and/or political party representatives?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Did you feel threatened during the interview?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Were you physically threatened during the interview?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SIGNATURE PAGE**

116. INTERVIEWER: Do you have any other comments on the interview? For example, did anything else significant happen during the interview?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes: [Explain]</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>

INTERVIEWER: I hereby certify that this interview was conducted in accordance with instructions received during training. All responses recorded here are those of the respondent who was chosen by the appropriate selection method.

INTERVIEWER SIGNATURE: __________________________________________
ANNEXURE 2
FOCUS GROUP SCHEDULE
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION HELD WITH WARD COMMITTEE MEMBERS ON
23/10/2012 IN DELFT

1) How was your ward committee constituted?

2) Do you understand the roles and responsibilities of a ward committee? Provide some examples of the tasks that you are expected to perform on a daily basis.

3) Have you received training in respect of how ward committees are supposed to function? Is this training adequate in terms of performing your role as ward committee member and the mandate you are given by sub-council?

4) Are you familiar with the City of Cape Town legislation regulating establishment of ward committees in respect of:
   • The code of conduct for members of ward committees approved by council: 28 September 2011 – C82/09/11.
   • Rules for the election and establishment of ward committees.
   • Rules for the operation of ward committees in the Metropolitan Area for the City of Cape Town.

5) Is the sub-council effective in terms of their mandated roles and responsibilities in the community?

6) Are ward committee members encouraged to attend sub-council meetings?

7) As ward chairperson does the ward council assist ward committee members in enabling the ward committee to function optimally? Please elaborate on your answer.

8) Would you consider the ward committee system as an effective mechanism in terms of representing the broader community and being able to influence decision-making?

9) Would you consider the system of sector organisations as an effective mechanism in terms of representing the broader community on the ward committee?

10) What is your understanding of the term participation? Are community members encouraged to participate in activities in the ward and sub-council? What is the nature of this participation?

11) What is your understanding of the IDP process?

12) Has your ward committee been invited to attend IDP meetings in the community? What is the nature of participation?
13) Is your ward committee enabled to make a meaningful input into the City’s IDP during meetings in terms of expressing the priority and needs raised by ward committee members?

14) Are inputs made by ward committee members in IDP consultation meetings reflected in the final IDP?

15) Is your ward committee enabled to provide a meaningful input in terms of identifying other development initiatives in the area?

16) Does your ward committee encourage community members to attend IDP and other meetings in the community and participate actively in deliberations? If yes, how do you encourage community members to attend and what is the nature/level of their participation? If not, what is the reason/obstacle preventing participation in community meetings?

17) Could you make some suggestions that would enable more active participation in the IDP and other activities in the community?

18) How do the sub-council and council respond to community service delivery needs as expressed by community members?

19) What are the daily problems that you confront when performing your responsibilities as ward committee member in the community?
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