IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM FOR PUBLIC SECTOR
UNIONS IN ZAMBIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS AND
ALLIED WORKERS UNION OF ZAMBIA IN LUSAKA DISTRICT

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
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March 2016

Supervisor: Dr. Leon G. Pretorius
KEYWORDS

Public sector
Public Sector Reform
New Public Management
Post-New Public Management
Strategy
Collective bargaining
Trade union
Zambia
Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia
Lusaka
ABSTRACT

IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM FOR PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS IN ZAMBIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION OF ZAMBIA IN LUSAKA DISTRICT

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PhD Thesis, School of Government, University of the Western Cape

The thesis examines the implications of Public Sector Reform (PSR) for public sector unions in Zambia. Using the case study strategy, the research investigates the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) in Lusaka district under the rubric of PSR. The research is qualitative in nature. Two types of data were collected, namely, secondary and primary data. A sample of 25 key informants was engaged in the research. These informants include five managers of public institutions and 20 leaders of the CSAWUZ. The methods of multistage, purposive and snowball sampling were used to select the informants. Secondary data were collected by reading documents on PSR and trade unions while primary data were collected by conducting semi-structured interviews with the sampled informants. The data are analysed using the method of content analysis.

The findings reveal that Zambia is characterised by a young, unskilled and impoverished population. The government faces challenges to deliver services especially in rural areas and to the female population. There are three major categories of government institutions in Zambia. These are central government, local government and parastatals. There are also different types of trade unions organising employees in these institutions. They include sectoral unions, enterprise unions, occupational unions, industrial unions, and federations of trade unions. However, the operations of these unions have been challenged by the reform of the public sector. Two generations of PSR have been implemented in Zambia. These are New Public Management (NPM) and post-NPM reforms. On the one hand, NPM reforms emphasised the effectiveness of market forces and the
weakness of government regulation. On the other hand, post-NPM reforms emphasise the interconnectedness of stakeholders in the processes of policy formulation and implementation. These stakeholders include government, business, civil society organisations, employers and trade unions. The implementation of PSR is influenced by the interplay of a number of factors. These include the recognition of problems in the public sector, the emergence of a new ideology, and the presence of actors spearheading the reform of the public sector.

The findings show that PSR involves changing the role of the public sector in the process of providing goods and services. Instead of the public sector being the only provider, it is a partner. As a partner, its role is to create an environment that encourages the growth of the private sector. However, this kind of reform negatively affects trade unions in the public sector. The effects include reductions in union membership, income and power. Although public sector unions are negatively affected by PSR, they have agency and do not just wait to become victims of the reform process. They make strategies to adapt to the changing circumstances. These strategies include diversifying the membership, servicing the membership, decentralising the organisational structure of the union, coordinating union activities, and forming alliances with external organisations dealing with issues affecting workers. This implies that trade unions in the public sector have opportunities to deal with challenges facing them under the rubric of PSR.

March 2016
DECLARATION

I declare that *Implications of Public Sector Reform for Public Sector Unions in Zambia: A Case Study of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia in Lusaka District* is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Full name: Clever Madimutsa  Date: .................................

Signed............................................
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is a product of great support from many people and organisations that deserve my thanks. To start with, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Leon G. Pretorius, for his generous assistance and guidance throughout the process of preparing the thesis. I would also like to thank many members of staff and the entire School of Government at the University of the Western Cape that supported me and made the necessary facilities available.

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I would also like to appreciate all the informants (managers of public institutions and leaders of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia) who gave me the required information at the stage of data collection.

Finally, I wish to thank my family, especially my children, Anna and Evaristo, for understanding the situation and being able to endure my absence from home while pursuing these studies.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Annual Delegates Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGM</td>
<td>Annual General Meeting</td>
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<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>APAS</td>
<td>Annual Performance Appraisal System</td>
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<td>ART</td>
<td>Antiretroviral Therapy</td>
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<td>Branch Committee</td>
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<td>Branch Executive Committee</td>
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<td>BOO</td>
<td>Build Own and Operate</td>
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<td>CBoH</td>
<td>Central Board of Health</td>
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<td>CDE</td>
<td>Classified Daily Employee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Crude Death Rate</td>
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<td>CD-ROM</td>
<td>Compact Disc-Read Only Memory</td>
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<td>CHCH</td>
<td>Chainama Hills College Hospital</td>
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<td>CIDRZ</td>
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<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<td>CSAWUZ</td>
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<td>CSPR</td>
<td>Civil Society for Poverty Reduction</td>
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<td>Civil Servants Union of Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
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<td>DEG</td>
<td>Digital Era Governance</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>Extraordinary Delegates Conference</td>
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<td>E-government</td>
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<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung</td>
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<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Country</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection</td>
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<td>JUG</td>
<td>Joined-up Government</td>
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<td>K</td>
<td>Zambian Kwacha</td>
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<td>LBTC</td>
<td>Lusaka Business and Technical College</td>
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<td>MLSS</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Security</td>
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<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Disciplinary Committee</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Council</td>
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<td>New Public Management</td>
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<td>NPV</td>
<td>Net Present Value</td>
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<td>NUPSW</td>
<td>National Union of Public Service Workers</td>
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<td>NWS</td>
<td>Neo-Weberian State</td>
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<td>OS</td>
<td>Open Source</td>
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<td>OSU</td>
<td>Open-source Unionism</td>
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<td>PEC</td>
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<td>PMP</td>
<td>Performance Management Package</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>PSCAP</td>
<td>Public Service Capacity Building Programme</td>
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<td>PSR</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWE</td>
<td>Provincial Workers Educator</td>
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<td>R-SNDP</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>Sixth National Development Plan</td>
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<td>SOE</td>
<td>State-owned Enterprise</td>
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<td>School of Government</td>
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<td>SOT</td>
<td>Supply Operate and Transfer</td>
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<td>TCLC</td>
<td>Tripartite Consultative Labour Council</td>
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<td>TNDP</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>United National Independence Party</td>
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<td>United States dollar</td>
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<td>University of the Western Cape</td>
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<td>WOG</td>
<td>Whole-of-government</td>
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<td>Women’s Quadrennial Conference</td>
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<td>ZAWA</td>
<td>Zambia Wildlife Authority</td>
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<td>ZDA</td>
<td>Zambia Development Agency</td>
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<td>ZNUT</td>
<td>Zambia National Union of Teachers</td>
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<td>ZPA</td>
<td>Zambia Privatisation Agency</td>
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<td>ZRA</td>
<td>Zambia Revenue Authority</td>
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<td>ZULAWU</td>
<td>Zambia United Local Authority Workers Union</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The aim of the thesis is to examine the implications of Public Sector Reform (PSR) for trade unions in the public sector in Zambia. Zambia has been chosen because it is a developing country in sub-Saharan Africa affected by poverty. As much as 60.5 percent of Zambia’s population was living below the poverty line in 2010 (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). Public sector unions have been chosen because they play an important role in national development. They are involved not only in meeting the aspirations of their own members but also in enhancing government’s ability to provide public services. They do so by representing public servants who devote themselves to the processes of defining and implementing public policies (Sapru, 1994). However, the implementation of PSR presents challenges for public sector unions. This is because of the emphasis on market solutions such as outsourcing and privatisation (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007a). This emphasis increases competition among employers and employees from different institutions. They compete to get consultancies and jobs. This kind of competition divides public servants, fragments their unions and reduces their bargaining power.

Management of the public sector in advanced democracies was for a long period of time based on the traditional paradigm of public administration (Anderson, Griffin and Teicher, 2002; Pollitt, Van Thiel and Homburg, 2007). “In Europe, this paradigm was heavily influenced by Weberian ideas of bureaucracy and, in the United States, by Woodrow Wilson’s battle with late nineteenth-century American political patronage” (Pollitt et al., 2007: 1). This paradigm emphasised the separation of politics and administration, and the adoption of a bureaucratic style of administration (Pollitt et al., 2007). According to Weber (1978), bureaucratic organisation is characterised by rules and regulations, hierarchy of authority, written documents, specialisation, and devotion to duty. He further
argues that, in its perfect form, the bureaucratic style of administration is “capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency” (Weber, 1978: 223).

However, in the last two decades of the twentieth century, the traditional public administration paradigm was criticised for being too rigid and unresponsive in the delivery of public services (Anderson et al., 2002; Barzelay, 2001; Christensen and Lægreid, 2007a). By emphasising bureaucratic organisation, the public sector in both developed and developing countries kept on taking responsibilities and increasing its size to the extent that it became very large, highly centralised and too slow to respond to people’s needs. This criticism was followed by the desire to reform the public sector. The reform process involved a shift from traditional public administration to New Public Management (NPM) (Anderson et al., 2002; Pollitt et al., 2007). This shift marked the beginning of the first phase of PSR.

The NPM paradigm focused on the introduction of neo-liberal, market friendly and business-like policies to public administration. These policies included debureaucratisation, performance management and outsourcing (Dzimbiri, 2008). These policies were adopted because of the assumption that they were capable of promoting greater efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of services (Anderson et al., 2002; Lane, 2000). The major difference between traditional public administration and NPM is that while traditional public administration emphasised bureaucratisation (i.e. centralisation), NPM emphasised debureaucratisation (i.e. decentralisation and privatisation).

However, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the NPM paradigm was criticised for reducing access to information by the political leadership, lacking political accountability, promoting uneven service delivery (Zafra-Gómez, Bolívar and Muñoz, 2012), and worsening inequality (Edigheji, 2008; Manning, 2001). These problems emerged because of the emphasis on neo-liberal policies such as decentralisation and privatisation, which resulted in reduced coordination in service delivery. In addition, by introducing private sector methods, politicians had little control over policy-making and service delivery. This, in turn,
undermined the principles of democratic governance, which are vital in a modern society. This criticism led to another paradigm shift. The shift was from NPM to post-NPM (Zafra-Gómez et al., 2012). This shift marked the end of the first phase and beginning of the second phase of PSR.

As opposed to NPM which emphasised decentralisation and privatisation, the post-NPM paradigm “focuses more on central capacity and control, coordination within and between sectors, and value-based management” (Zafra-Gómez et al., 2012: 715). This means that under post-NPM, there is recentralisation of government and re-regulation of the market. This shows the appearance of what Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004; 2011) refer to as the Neo-Weberian State (NWS). In other words, post-NPM is a new form of the Weberian model of bureaucracy.

In line with the reform of the public sector, trade unions in the public sector have also been going through transformation. Traditionally, public sector unions have had large memberships and enjoyed the monopoly of organising public service workers. However, with the advent of PSR, public sector unions have been facing the challenge of declining membership (Koyi, 2010). By implementing PSR measures such as decentralisation and privatisation, employment opportunities in the public sector are reduced. This phenomenon has the potential of reducing the membership base and bargaining power of public sector unions. Nevertheless, the unions have tried to increase their membership and bargaining power by adopting the strategy of open and expansive unionism. One union that has adopted this strategy is the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ). Instead of being confined to the civil service, the CSAWUZ has extended its organisation to allied workers. This means that this union is now organising workers from the civil service and institutions delivering services that are connected with the civil service.

However, the strategy of open and expansive unionism complicates the process of collective bargaining. This is because of the need to diversify union policies to accommodate the interests of new members (Streeck and Visser, 1997;
Waddington, 2005). This strategy also presents challenges for union governance. This is because of the need to expand the governance structure so as to represent new members (Undy, 2008). In addition, the strategy of open and expansive unionism increases inter-union competition, “with all unions poised in principle to claim jurisdiction in any economic sector and to enter the territory, actual or potential, of any other union” (Streeck and Visser, 1997: 326).

The major contribution of the thesis is that it provides information about the implications of implementing PSR for public sector unions and their coping strategies. This information is important because, first, the success of these unions lies in their ability to effectively organise collective bargaining and meet the aspirations of their members. Second, these unions should be able to promote stability in the public sector and enhance government’s ability to provide efficient and effective public services. In turn, these successes promote the popularity and legitimacy of the government.

Zambia, which is the main focus of the thesis, is a landlocked country located in Southern Africa. It has eight neighbours. These are the Democratic Republic of Congo to the north, Tanzania to the north-east, Malawi to the east, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia to the south, and Angola to the west.

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the thesis. To achieve its purpose, the chapter is divided into the following sections: introduction, background/context, problem statement, purpose and objectives of the thesis, significance of the thesis, organisation of the thesis, and summary.

1.2 Background/context

As mentioned in the previous section, from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century, management of the public sector was governed by the traditional public administration paradigm which emphasised the separation of politics and administration, and bureaucratisation. However, this paradigm was
criticised for being inefficient. This criticism paved way for the reform of the public sector in a number of countries. The process of substantial reform of the public sector started in the United Kingdom (UK) in the 1980s under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007a; Harvey, 2005; Lane, 2000). From the UK, it moved to the United States (US), Australia and New Zealand. Later on, it moved to Scandinavia, Continental Europe and other countries across the world. The reform took the shape of NPM, whose main characteristic was to promote efficiency by increasing market orientation within the public sector (Lane, 2000).

At independence, in 1964, Zambia inherited a liberalised economy (Fagernäs and Roberts, 2004; Saasa, 1987). At that time, the private sector played a major role in the production and distribution of goods and services. The public sector was quite small. In 1965, the number of employees in the public service\(^1\) was 45,000 (Fagernäs and Roberts, 2004). However, in 1968, the government began nationalising enterprises in the non-mining sectors. These sectors included manufacturing, quarrying, brewing, transport, retail/wholesale, media, insurance, and banking. In 1969, the policy of nationalisation was extended to the mining sector (Saasa, 1987). The implementation of this policy resulted in the establishment of parastatal enterprises in various sectors of the economy. These enterprises operated in a protected environment. Economic activity was highly regulated (Fagernäs and Roberts, 2004).

As government responsibilities increased, its labour force also increased. Between 1965 and 1980, the number of public service employees increased from 45,000 to 110,000 (Fagernäs and Roberts, 2004). By 1993, the size of Zambia’s public service was “estimated at about 180,000, comprising about 75,000 Civil Servants, 26,000 Local Authority Employees, about 45,000 non-joint Council Employees and 34,000 Classified Daily Employees” (Republic of Zambia, 1993: 10). In the case of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), they had more than 100,000 employees.

\(^1\) Here the public service is defined in terms of central government, local council and specialised board employees, without the inclusion of parastatal employees (Republic of Zambia, 1993).
(Simutanyi, 2011). This means that the government, as a whole, had more than 280,000 employees.

Nonetheless, the expansion of the public sector presented problems to the public sector in particular and the economy in general. These problems included an oversized, too expensive to manage and unresponsive public service (Republic of Zambia, 1993). The other problems were inadequate supply of goods and services, high inflation (which was more than 100 percent by 1991), and inadequate financial resources (Krishna, 2006). The problems facing Zambia were worsened by the rise in oil prices in the 1970s and the reduction in the price of copper, which was the country’s major source of export earnings (Republic of Zambia, 1993). Due to lack of financial resources, the Government decided to borrow from international financial institutions, mainly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This resulted in a large debt accumulation. Between 1970 and 1990, Zambia’s external debt increased from US dollar ($) 627 million to US$7.2 billion (Rakner, 2003).

In order to address the above-mentioned problems, Zambia had to reform its public sector in particular and the economy in general. The reform process was introduced through the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1983 under the presidency of Kenneth Kaunda. Apart from addressing the economic and administrative problems facing the country, the adoption of SAP was also a condition to access financial support from international financial institutions, mainly the IMF and the World Bank (Simutanyi, 1996). The implementation of SAP involved deregulation including the removal of price controls, reduction in civil service employment and privatisation (Simutanyi, 1996).

Nevertheless, the major effect of implementing SAP was a decline in socio-economic development. Although the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate was below zero percent at the time of adopting SAP in 1983, the situation worsened during the SAP era. The worst GDP growth rate was -8.6
percent recorded in 1994 (Rakner, 2003). At the same time, there was an increase in the level of poverty. At national level, poverty increased from 69.7 percent in 1991 to 72.9 percent in 1998 (IMF and International Development Association [IDA], 2000). The declining socio-economic development led to protests through demonstrations and riots by members of the public and public announcements by trade unions opposing the reforms (Simutanyi, 1996). This negatively affected the ability of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) one-party government to implement SAP. However, when UNIP lost political power in 1991, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government decided to implement SAP under a multiparty political system (Chiluba, 1995; Rakner, 2003).

Although one segment of the labour movement opposed SAP, the other supported it. Other stakeholders who supported SAP included the business class. On the one hand, those who opposed SAP argued that it would negatively affect workers. On the other hand, those who supported it argued that SAP would enable the growth of profitable businesses, promote economic efficiency, minimise budget deficit, create jobs and increase wages (Simutanyi, 1996). This shows that there was no consensus on the implementation of SAP in Zambia. Even the labour movement was divided. This implies that the unions did not have collective strength in the process of bargaining for the terms and conditions of employment during the implementation of SAP. This, in turn, enabled the government, as an employer, to gain control over the employment relationship in the public sector during the era of SAP.

Despite the implementation of SAP, socio-economic problems in Zambia were not resolved. A majority of the population continued to be poor. In 1998, the level of poverty was 73 percent (Republic of Zambia, 2006a). In addition, although there was a slight reduction in external debt in the late 1990s (from US$7.2 billion in 1990 to US$6.5 billion in 1999), the debt was still very high compared to the country’s GDP (IMF and IDA, 2000; Rakner, 2003). According to IMF and IDA (2000), in Net Present Value (NPV) terms, Zambia’s external debt in 1999 was almost equal to 160 percent of the country’s GDP. As a result, it was categorised
as a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). This meant that the country was too poor to pay back its debt. As such, it needed debt relief. In 2000, the IMF and IDA decided to relieve Zambia of its debt under the enhanced HIPC Initiative. Under this initiative, Zambia was to receive a total relief of US$1,855 million relating to debt service payments over a period of 10 years (i.e. from 2001 to 2010) (IMF and IDA, 2000). However, there were conditions attached to this assistance. They included adopting and implementing a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), enhancing the fight against Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), enhancing the reform of the education and health sectors, and undertaking structural and institutional reforms (IMF and IDA, 2000).

The Zambian Government accepted the conditions for the HIPC Initiative and adopted the PRSP in 2002. In the same year, the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) was also introduced. The purpose of introducing the TNDP was to complement the PRSP. The implementation period for the PRSP was 2002-2004. As for the TNDP, its implementation period was 2002-2005. The “First PRSP Implementation Progress Report” indicates that:

The PRSP has the overriding objective of attaining sustained and high economic growth, improving access and quality in the provision of social and public services (especially education, health and water and sanitation), and mainstreaming the cross cutting issues of HIV/AIDS, gender and the environment (Republic of Zambia, 2004: 1).

In terms of real GDP growth, the aim of the PRSP was to reach an average of four percent by 2003. At the time of launching the PRSP in 2002, real GDP growth was slightly above three percent (Republic of Zambia, 2004).

The adoption and implementation of the PRSP based on the conditions for the HIPC Initiative shows that PSR undermines State sovereignty while increasing the influence of international financial institutions in public policy-making. This, in turn, destroys the basic principle of democratic governance. Instead of being
In addition, the adoption of the PRSP/TNDP in 2002 meant that Zambia had replaced SAP with policies that introduced a degree of re-regulation of the market. Furthermore, this meant that the emphasis of PSR in Zambia had shifted from NPM to post-NPM reforms. Essentially, this type of reform implied that the government could build its capacity so that re-regulation of the market is effective. Efforts to build the capacity of the Zambian Government were made through the implementation of the Public Service Capacity Building Programme (PSCAP). The objective of PSCAP was “to make public service delivery processes more effective and efficient in order to facilitate economic growth and reduce poverty” (World Bank, 2000: 3). The Key Performance Indicators of PSCAP included decentralisation, privatisation, establishment of executive agencies, client-responsiveness, result-oriented leadership, training and retraining of public servants, and transparent public procurement (World Bank, 2000).

The implementation of the PRSP/TNDP had some positive results. The economy grew at an average rate of around five percent per annum during the period 2002–2005 (Republic of Zambia, 2011a). This rate was higher than the targeted four percent (Republic of Zambia, 2004). The other area where positive results were recorded was poverty reduction. The level of poverty reduced from 73 percent in 1998 to 62.8 percent in 2006 (Central Statistical Office, 2012a; Republic of Zambia, 2006a). These results show that re-regulation of the market has the potential to yield economic and social benefits.

When the implementation period for the PRSP/TNDP came to an end, the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) was adopted. The FNDP was to be implemented during the period 2006-2010. The main goal of the FNDP was “to accelerate pro-poor growth, or to ensure that the growth process rapidly reduces poverty than what was achieved during the PRSP/TNDP period” (Republic of Zambia, 2006a: 26). In terms of economic growth, the target for the FNDP was an
average rate of seven percent per annum during the period 2006-2010 (Republic of Zambia, 2006a). These targets indicate that although both the PRSP/TNDP and the FNDP were dealing with the same economic and social problems, the FNDP had higher targets than the PRSP/TNDP.

Like the PRSP/TNDP, the implementation of the FNDP had some positive results. Despite failing to reach the set target, the economy grew at a higher rate than what was achieved under the PRSP/TNDP. During the period 2006-2009, the economy grew at an average rate of six percent per annum (Republic of Zambia, 2011a). The level of poverty also reduced, although slightly. Between 2006 and 2010, the level of poverty reduced from 62.8 percent to 60.5 percent (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). These gains were against a population growth rate of about three percent per annum (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). These results confirm the argument that re-regulation of the market has the potential to yield economic and social benefits.

However, despite the above-mentioned gains, a majority of the population in Zambia continued to be affected by poverty. Those affected included children and the rural population (Sitko et al., 2011) as well as public service workers who were getting wages lower than the basic needs basket (Koyi, 2010). This was in spite of the critical role played by public service workers in the formulation and implementation of public policies. This situation shows that public sector unions were weak. They could not bargain for a living wage for their members.

The citizens breathed a sigh of relief in September 2011 when Patriotic Front (PF) defeated the MMD and formed a government on the premise that the poor would benefit from economic growth. According to the Patriotic Front Manifesto 2011-2016, the PF Government was going to adopt policies, both domestic and foreign, based on the concept of social justice. The PF Government also committed itself to continue reforming the public sector and re-regulating the market. This was demonstrated by its decision to revise the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) prepared by the MMD Government. The SNDP was to be implemented
during the period 2011-2015. However, as a result of its revision, the Revised Sixth National Development Plan (R-SNDP) was adopted whose implementation period is 2013-2016. The overall focus of the R-SNDP is “to address the low levels of employment in the economy, invest in rural development and reduce widening inequalities in the economy” (Republic of Zambia, 2014: 7). In terms of economic growth, the objective of the R-SNDP is to “Achieve real GDP growth rates of above 7.0 percent per annum” (Republic of Zambia, 2014: 10).

To a large extent, the focus of the R-SNDP is similar to the FNDP. Both plans emphasise poverty reduction. However, the two plans differ in terms of their approach to poverty reduction. The FNDP emphasised private sector-driven growth while the R-SNDP emphasises a combination of public and private investments (Republic of Zambia, 2006a; Republic of Zambia, 2014). Figure 1.1 shows the paradigms of public administration in post-colonial Zambia.

**Figure 1.1: Paradigms of public administration in post-colonial Zambia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Policies/programmes/strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Public Administration</td>
<td>1964 – 1970s</td>
<td>Expansion of the public sector, nationalisation, establishment of parastatals, and regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Public Management</td>
<td>1980s – 1990s</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme, deregulation, reduction in civil service employment and privatisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own illustration
The fight against poverty is connected to the welfare of different categories of people in Zambia. These include children, the rural population and public sector workers who continue to be affected by poverty (Koyi, 2010; Sitko et al., 2011). For public sector workers, their situation is worsened by the failure of trade unions to bargain for wages that are equivalent to the basic needs basket (Koyi, 2010). This suggests the need for public sector unions to improve their bargaining strategies for the benefit of their members.

Trade unions have been in existence for a number of centuries, especially in developed countries. According to Webb and Webb (1920), formation of trade unions in Great Britain and Ireland started in the seventeenth century. Similarly, Commons, Phillips, Gilmore, Sumner and Andrews (1910: 20) assert that formation of trade unions in America started in 1827. This was done in Philadelphia through the formation of the Mechanics’ Union of Trade Associations. Salamon (2000: 95) argues that “The development of trade unionism in the UK, in common with other older industrialised countries, may be seen as a social response to the advent of industrialisation and capitalism.” According to Engels (1971), the major effect of the Industrial Revolution in England was the establishment of a clear distinction between the class of workers and the class of capitalists. In this society, “Craftsmanship was now replaced by factory production” (Engels, 1971: 24). This mode of production allowed the owners of the means of production to exploit the workers. This situation was characterised by low wages and poor living standards for the workers (Engels, 1971).

According to Engels (1971), several trade unions were formed in England when the workers were permitted to organise themselves, without restriction, in 1824. Their main objective was to protect workers against exploitation by the owners of the means of production. They pursued this objective by conducting negotiations with the capitalists (i.e. employers). The main focus of the negotiations was to adjust wages in line with the capitalists’ profits.
In Zambia, trade unionism started during the colonial period under the Northern Rhodesian Government, which was characterised by massive exploitation and discrimination against black people by whites. This made workers to organise themselves on racial lines (Chipungu, 1992). Formation of trade unions was started by European mineworkers who formed the Northern Rhodesia Mineworkers’ Union in 1936 to protect their own interests. African workers also organised themselves, beginning with the formation of the African Shop Assistants Trade Union in 1946. This was followed by the formation of other African unions in the Mines, roads, railways, teaching, general works and buildings trades (Chipungu, 1992; Mulenga, 2011; Roberts, 1976). The unions existed to bargain for better wages and improved working conditions. African unions also supported African political parties in the fight against colonial exploitation (Chipungu, 1992). Eventually, Northern Rhodesia became politically independent in 1964 and her name changed to Zambia.

In 1965, the UNIP government enacted the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance aimed at strengthening the labour movement and helping unions to conduct their affairs freely. The Ordinance also allowed the formation of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), a national federation of the unions. Thereafter, the 1965 Ordinance was replaced by the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which prohibited formation of more than one trade union in each industry. This resulted in the growth of industry-based unions (Mulenga, 2011).

In 1972, Zambia was declared a One-party State, and all organisations including trade unions were required to support government policies (Nyirenda and Shikwe, 2003). However, with the absence of opposition political parties, the labour movement became the actual opposition to the UNIP government (Simutanyi, 2007). This went on until the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1990 (Chiluba, 1995). The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 was also repealed and replaced with the Industrial Relations Act of 1990, which permitted liberal formation of trade unions (Mulenga, 2011).
The labour movement in Zambia rejected the idea of forming multiple unions in one industry following the enactment of the 1990 Act. As such, the union leadership asked the MMD government to revoke the new Act. The Government responded by replacing the 1990 Act with the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993 (Mulenga, 2011). The 1993 Act restricted formation of unions in industries that already had unions but allowed formation of unions that would represent professions that were not represented by existing unions. In essence, this introduced new forms of trade unionism in Zambia. As opposed to having a united labour movement, new unions started to be formed within and across industries. The 1993 Act was amended and replaced with the Industrial and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act of 1997, which created an environment for further division of the labour movement by permitting the formation of rival union federations (Republic of Zambia, 1997). This shows how neo-liberal policies attempted to weaken trade unions in the country.

Like other sectors such as mining, railways, building, timber and garment sectors, government workers in Zambia started forming trade unions during the exploitative colonial rule (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011). Formation of unions by public sector workers continued in the post-independence era. In 1976, the Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ), now Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ), was formed to represent personnel in the civil service. The National Union of Public Service Workers (NUPSW) was also formed to represent non-civil service employees including Classified Daily Employees (CDEs) (Subramaniam, 1990). These unions had large memberships and strong bargaining power (Simutanyi, 1996). However, since the introduction of the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) in 1993, public sector unions have been experiencing massive reductions in membership. Between 1995 and 2010, the membership of CSAWUZ declined from 65,000 to 17,000. During the same period, NUPSW declined from 34,000 to 13,000 members, and the Zambia United Local Authority Workers Union (ZULAWU) declined from 22,000 to 14,500 members (Koyi, 2010). This was in spite of efforts by the Government to
strengthen the unions through the amendment of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act and calls by the unions’ leadership to promote solidarity in the labour movement (Mulenga, 2011). This implies that public sector unions had been affected by the reform of the public sector.

As public sector unions are being fragmented, new forms of trade unions have emerged. They include splinter, open and expansive unions. Unions that have taken these forms do not confine their organisation to particular sectors, industries or occupations. Instead, they extend membership recruitment to several sectors, industries or occupations. The emergence of these forms of unionism in the context of PSR, therefore, shows that our current knowledge of the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector is inadequate. As such, it is important for this knowledge to be made available so as to enhance our understanding of trade union organisation in a reformed public sector.

1.3 Problem statement

The membership of public sector unions in Zambia has been reducing during the PSR era. As noted in the previous section, between 1995 and 2010, the membership of CSAWUZ declined from 65,000 to 17,000. During the same period, NUPSW declined from 34,000 to 13,000 members, and ZULAWU declined from 22,000 to 14,500 members (Koyi, 2010). The decline in membership is in spite of efforts by the Zambian Government and the unions’ leadership to strengthen the labour movement. The Government tried to restrict union formation in industries that already had unions through the enactment of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act (Republic of Zambia, 1997). The decline in membership is also in spite of attempts by public sector unions to change their structure so as to diversify the membership. The CSAWUZ tried to do so by incorporating allied workers in 2002 but the membership continued to decline. During the period 2003-2010, the membership of CSAWUZ reduced from 35,000 to 17,000 (Koyi, 2010: 22).
In addition, despite public sector unions in Zambia representing workers who play an important role in the implementation of public policies, they are unable to bargain for wages that are equal to the basic needs basket (Koyi, 2010). Furthermore, union governance and collective bargaining in the public sector have been challenged by union divisions and new forms of unionism. These forms include open and expansive unionism. The challenges include the need to adjust the governance structure and bargaining agenda to serve the diverse member interests. Open unions are also a source of inter-union conflict. This is because the unions compete for membership and recognition for the purposes of collective bargaining. As such, the unions are required to find ways of resolving their conflicts. This can be a challenging task for the unions.

While the membership of public sector unions such as CSAWUZ, NUPSW and ZULAWU has been declining, the Zambian Government has continued to employ public servants on a regular basis. These include teachers, nurses, doctors, police officers and military personnel. This shows that employment opportunities in the public sector have not helped public sector unions to increase their membership and bargaining power, hence the need for the unions to look for survival strategies.

The reform of the public sector does not only present challenges for trade unions but also for the Government. Considering the fact that the public sector gives the Government an opportunity to employ its supporters and to provide public services, the practice of PSR presents challenges for the stability, efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector and State legitimacy. This raises a question: What are the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector? This is the question that the thesis attempts to answer.
1.4 Purpose and objectives of the thesis

1.4.1 Main aim

The main aim of the thesis is to examine the implications of Public Sector Reform for public sector unions in Zambia.

1.4.2 Objectives

The objectives of the thesis are as follows:

i. To review literature and suggest a theoretical framework for analysing the implications of Public Sector Reform for trade unions in the public sector.

ii. To examine the dimensions of Public Sector Reform implemented in Zambia and their effects on the public sector workplace.

iii. To examine the effects of New Public Management and post-New Public Management reforms on collective bargaining in the public sector.

iv. To analyse the effects of New Public Management and post-New Public Management reforms on the long-term strategies of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia.

v. To identify the strategic responses by the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia to Public Sector Reform.

vi. To analyse the findings, draw conclusions and make recommendations.

1.5 Significance of the thesis

The significance of the thesis is that it provides information about the effects of NPM and post-NPM reforms on the public sector workplace in Zambia. The thesis also provides information about the effects of PSR on public sector unions and the unions’ coping strategies. This information is important because PSR advantages some groups and disadvantages others (Simutanyi, 1996). The organisation of public sector unions under PSR is worthy of academic investigation because these unions play a crucial role in national development.
Their functions include the protection of their own members and the welfare of society as a whole (Jackson, 1985). In other words, these unions not only represent public servants who play an important role in the implementation of public policies but also enhance government’s ability to provide public services.

In general terms, the information provided by the thesis is helpful to stakeholders such as public servants, members and leaders of public sector unions, policy-makers, policy analysts and researchers in the area of industrial relations. These stakeholders would be enlightened on how to strengthen public sector unions, enhance stability and efficiency in the public sector and reduce poverty among public service workers under the PSR paradigm.

In specific terms, the information can help the Zambian Government to understand PSR strategies that promote efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. The information is also beneficial to managers of public institutions in Lusaka district in particular. These managers would be able to understand how efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of goods and services in the district could be enhanced under the rubric of PSR. This is very important considering the fact that Lusaka is the most populous district in Zambia. It accounts for 13.3 percent of Zambia’s population (Central Statistical Office, 2012b). Due to its large population, Lusaka has the highest demand for public services in the country. Therefore, the delivery of these services requires the availability of policy-relevant information. This information has been provided by the thesis.

Furthermore, the information provided by the thesis is helpful to the CSAWUZ in particular. The thesis sheds light on how the union could increase its membership in the context of PSR. The thesis also provides information about the strategies that the CSAWUZ could adopt to improve its governance and collective bargaining structures for the benefit of the union in general and the membership in particular. The benefits for the union include increased bargaining power and influence in the policy-making processes. The benefits for the union membership include the ability to bargain for and receive a living wage.
1.6 Organisation of the thesis


Chapter 2 reviews literature on the concept of PSR and its implications for trade unions in the public sector. It explains the meaning and role of the public sector. It also presents the definition and overview of PSR. The chapter also explains the meaning, functions and objectives of trade unions. In addition, the chapter discusses the implications of NPM and post-NPM for trade unions in the public sector.

Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework guiding the analysis of the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector. It presents the main argument of the thesis. It also examines the approaches and theories of industrial relations. Furthermore, the chapter examines the perspectives on trade union structure, union governance, and collective bargaining structure. The chapter also presents the theoretical framework of the thesis.

Chapter 4 discusses the design and methodology of the research project used to analyse the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector in Zambia. The chapter explains the type of research conducted for the purposes of the thesis. It also presents the research strategy, and the scope and delimitation of the research area. In addition, it describes the sources of data, sample size, sampling methods, and methods of data collection. The chapter also explains the reliability and validity of the measurements. Furthermore, the chapter presents the method of data analysis, research ethics statement, and limitations of the research.

Chapter 5 examines the nature of the public sector in Zambia and the structure of its trade unions. It describes the nature of government and administration in
Zambia. It also presents the socio-economic profile of Zambia. In addition, the chapter describes the major categories of government institutions in Zambia. The chapter also examines the types of trade unions organising employees in the public sector in Zambia.

Chapter 6 examines NPM reforms implemented in Zambia and their implications for the CSAWUZ. The chapter explains NPM reform strategies implemented in Zambia. It also presents factors that influenced the implementation of NPM reforms in Zambia. Furthermore, it discusses the effects of NPM on the public sector workplace, collective bargaining, and the long-term strategies of the CSAWUZ. The chapter also discusses strategic responses by the CSAWUZ to NPM reforms.

Chapter 7 focuses on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) implemented in Zambia and their implications for the CSAWUZ. It discusses the types of services delivered through PPPs in Lusaka district. It also examines factors influencing the implementation of PPPs in Zambia. Furthermore, the chapter shows how private sector partners are selected in Lusaka district. It also explains the types of PPPs implemented in Lusaka district. In addition, the chapter examines the effects of PPPs on industrial relations activity. It also presents the strategic responses by the CSAWUZ to PPPs.

Chapter 8 discusses partnerships in industrial relations implemented in Zambia and their implications for the CSAWUZ. It explains the types of industrial relations partnership implemented in Zambia. The chapter also discusses factors influencing the implementation of partnerships in industrial relations in Zambia. In addition, it presents issues considered by industrial relations partnership in Zambia. It also shows how the partnership strategy affects industrial relations activity. Furthermore, the chapter shows how the CSAWUZ has responded to industrial relations partnership.
Chapter 9 focuses on the conclusions and recommendations of the thesis. It restates the purpose and objectives of the thesis. It also explains the main findings of the research. In addition, the chapter presents the conclusions of the thesis. Furthermore, it shows how the thesis has contributed to the field of research. The chapter ends with the recommendations of the thesis.

1.7 Summary

This chapter has shown that the main aim of the thesis is to examine the implications of PSR for public sector unions in Zambia. The chapter has also indicated that Zambia, which is the main focus of the thesis, is a landlocked country located in Southern Africa.

Furthermore, the chapter has shown that from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century, management of the public sector was mainly based on the traditional public administration paradigm. This paradigm emphasised the separation of politics and administration, and the adoption of a bureaucratic style of administration. However, in the last two decades of the twentieth century, traditional public administration was criticised for being highly centralised and too slow to respond to people’s needs. This criticism was followed by the desire to reform the public sector. The first phase of PSR involved a paradigm shift from traditional public administration to NPM. The NPM paradigm focused on the introduction of neo-liberal, market friendly and business-like policies to public administration. These policies included de-bureaucratisation, performance management and outsourcing. The assumption was that these policies were capable of promoting greater efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of services.

The chapter has also indicated that NPM reforms were introduced in Zambia through the adoption of SAP in 1983. This was done to address economic and administrative problems facing the country and as a condition to access financial
support from international financial institutions, mainly the IMF and the World Bank.

However, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the NPM paradigm was criticised for reducing coordination in service delivery and undermining the principles of democratic governance. This criticism was followed by the desire to reform the public sector for the second time. The second phase of PSR involves a shift from NPM to post-NPM reforms. The post-NPM paradigm focuses on building the capacity of the central government and re-regulating the market. Post-NPM reforms were introduced in Zambia through the adoption of PSCAP and PRSP/TNDP in the early 2000s. Like SAP, this was done to address economic and administrative problems facing the country and as a condition to receive assistance from international financial institutions.

In addition, the chapter has shown that trade unions in the public sector have been facing challenges in the context of PSR. The challenges include declining membership, reduced bargaining power and complications in the governance process. Public sector unions have also witnessed the emergence of new forms of unionism such as open and expansive unionism. Trade unions in the public sector have also been affected by the emergence of splinter unions.

The chapter also indicates that the significance of the thesis is that it provides information about NPM and post-NPM reforms in Zambia, their effects on the public sector workplace, their effects on public sector unions and the unions’ coping strategies. Furthermore, the chapter has indicated that the thesis is organised into nine chapters. The next chapter reviews literature on the concept of PSR and its implications for trade unions in the public sector.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter introduced the thesis and revealed that during the Public Sector Reform (PSR) era, public sector unions in Zambia had experienced a massive decline in membership and challenges associated with governance and collective bargaining. A question was then raised: What are the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector? This chapter, therefore, attempts to answer this question by reviewing the literature on the concept of PSR and its implications for trade unions in the public sector. To perform this task, the chapter has been divided into eight sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section is an explanation of the meaning and role of the public sector. The third section presents the definition of PSR. The fourth section presents an overview of PSR. The fifth section is an explanation of the meaning, functions and objectives of trade unions. The sixth section is a discussion of the implications of New Public Management (NPM) for trade unions in the public sector. The seventh section is a discussion of the implications of post-NPM for trade unions in the public sector. The final section is a summary.

2.2 Meaning and role of the public sector

The economy of a country is generally divided between the public and private sectors. The concept of public sector is defined differently by different scholars. Hicks (1958: 2) states that “Workers in the public sector are indeed also largely engaged in satisfying consumers’ wants in some way, but less those wants which are revealed by their own preferences on the market than those which the government chooses for them.” The definition by Hicks (1958) reveals that the public sector involves meeting the needs of customers based on government policies rather than relying on market forces. This definition is important because it highlights the political belief of the public sector. However, it does not explain the nature of institutions that constitute the public sector.
According to Mhone (2003: 12), the public sector refers to:

The key apparatus for the execution of the functions of the state or government. It is represented by the executive and its bureaucracy at the national, federal, provincial and local levels together with the various statutory and parastatal bodies that perform in a number of regulatory, monitoring, production and service delivery functions.

The definition by Mhone (2003) equates the public sector to the executive wing of government. Although this definition tries to show the composition of the public sector, it is not comprehensive. It leaves out other branches of government which are essential in the definition of the public sector. These include the legislature and the judiciary.

For Ayee (2008: 9), the public sector “represents a group of institutions, which have in common some reliance on the power of the state, from which they can justify their activities; and a political belief which accords greater merit to collective over individual action.” This definition indicates that the public sector does not only represent institutions of the State but also a political ideology that emphasises the achievement of a common objective rather than the preferences of individuals. To a large extent, this definition is more comprehensive. It highlights the nature of institutions that constitute the public sector and their political belief.

Although the concept of public sector may be defined differently by different scholars, its key feature is that component of the economy which is engaged in meeting the needs of customers based on government choices rather than relying on market forces (Hicks, 1958; Hughes, 2003). The term government refers to “the formal institutions through which a land and its people are ruled” (Lowi and Ginsberg, 1994: 4). The institutions of government include the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. These institutions may be located at various levels of the government system such as the central government, regional governments, local governments and semi-autonomous government institutions. These institutions have different levels of authority given to them by the state (Ayee, 2008). While government choices are associated with the public sector, the
involvement of market forces is associated with the private sector (whose survival depends on meeting customers’ own choices) (Hicks, 1958).

What, then, is the role of the public sector? The role of the public sector is to serve the public interest. The concept of public interest is defined as “the best possible allocation of scarce resources for individual and collective goods and services in society” (Den Hertog, 2010: 5). This implies that the public sector is supposed to ensure equitable delivery of goods and services in society. Although the private sector is involved in the delivery of goods and services, government intervention is supported because of the assumption that markets, especially in developing countries, can fail (Carson, 2010).

However, government intervention in the economy has been criticised by scholars such as Smith (2007) and Friedman and Friedman (1980). Smith (2007) argues that regulation of economic activity is aimed at promoting the interest of the regulator rather than the public interest. He asserts that this is because economic agents are driven by an “invisible hand” to achieve unintended goals (Smith, 2007: 349). For him, the public interest is effectively promoted by promoting the interest of individuals rather than regulation. This view is also held by Friedman and Friedman (1980) who argue that regulation of the market may not achieve the desired objectives due to the tendency of empowering some groups while weakening others. In their view, market competition protects the participants better than government intervention. They argue that, under free competition, the consumer is protected from exploitation by a given supplier by the existence of alternative sources of supply; a worker is protected from exploitation by his/her employer by the existence of other sources of employment; and an employer is protected from exploitation by his/her workers by the existence of alternative sources of labour (Friedman and Friedman, 1980). However, as noted by Carson (2010), markets may also fail in various ways.

Although government regulation may fail, the public sector has a moral obligation to promote the public interest especially in developing countries where poverty
levels are high. Therefore, government intervention to mitigate the effects of market failure in one way or another is justifiable. Nevertheless, a question can be asked: How, then, is the public sector managed so as to enable it promote the public interest? This question can be answered by examining the concept of Public Sector Reform (PSR).

2.3 Definition of Public Sector Reform

The concept of PSR has different definitions. Omoyefa (2008: 17) defines PSR as “the total overhauling of government administrative machinery with the aim of injecting real effectiveness, efficiency, hard-core competence and financial prudence into the running of the public sector.” This definition is significant because it shows that PSR involves rebuilding the whole executive wing of government so that it becomes effective and efficient in its operations. Nevertheless, Omoyefa (2008) can be criticised for confining the definition of PSR to the reform of the executive wing of government. This kind of definition excludes the reform of other wings of government such as the legislature and the judiciary. As noted in the previous section, the public sector is made up of various branches of government, of which the executive is one of them.

Ayee (2008: 16) views PSR in terms of administrative reform, whose elements include: “deliberate plans to change public bureaucracies.” Ayee (2008: 16) further equates administrative reform to innovation, whose elements are:

The injection of new ideas and new people in a new combination of tasks and relationships into the policy and administrative process; improvement in public service effectiveness and efficiency; and coping with uncertainties and rapid changes taking place in the organisational environment.

The definition by Ayee (2008) is vital because it indicates that PSR involves the transformation of the government system so that it becomes effective and efficient within the context of a changing environment. Although Ayee (2008) is vital, his view of PSR is narrow. By focusing on administrative reform, he ignores the
reform of institutions that formulate laws, and those that interpret and enforce the laws.

Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011: 2 [original emphasis]) equate PSR to public management reform, which they define as “Deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector organizations with the objective of getting them (in some sense) to run better.” This definition reveals that PSR focuses on planned reorganisation of public institutions with the aim of improving their operations.

Despite the different definitions, there are certain common elements of PSR. They include: planned reorganisation of public institutions with the aim of increasing effectiveness, efficiency, competence, financial prudence and responsiveness to the needs of citizens (Omoyefa, 2008; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). This reorganisation is done using strategies such as downsizing the public bureaucracy, restructuring, Human Resource Management (HRM), decentralisation, accountability, privatisation, outsourcing, commercialisation, capacity building, performance management, and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) (Ayee, 2008; Dzimbiri, 2008).

2.4 Overview of Public Sector Reform

The purpose of this section is to present an overview of the evolution of Public Sector Reform (PSR) and the various interpretations of the reform process. This is done to provide the foundation for a critical review of the literature on implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector in sections 2.6 and 2.7.

As noted in the previous chapter, from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century, management of the public sector in advanced democracies was mainly based on the traditional public administration paradigm (Anderson, Griffin and Teicher, 2002; Pollitt, Van Thiel and Homburg, 2007). This paradigm emphasised the separation of politics and administration, and the adoption of a bureaucratic style of administration (Pollitt et al., 2007). According to Weber
(1978), bureaucratic organisation is characterised by rules and regulations, hierarchy of authority, written documents, specialisation, and devotion to duty. He further argues that, in its perfect form, the bureaucratic style of administration is “capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency” (Weber, 1978: 223).

However, in the last two decades of the twentieth century, the traditional public administration paradigm was criticised for being too rigid and unresponsive in the delivery of public services (Anderson et al., 2002; Barzelay, 2001; Christensen and Lægreid, 2007a). By emphasising bureaucratic organisation, the public sector in both developed and developing countries kept on taking responsibilities and increasing its size to the extent that it became very large, highly centralised and too slow to respond to people’s needs. This criticism was followed by the desire to reform the public sector in a number of countries. This was done to achieve several objectives. These include enhancing efficiency, effectiveness and good governance. As noted by Omoyefa (2008), the aims of PSR include promotion of efficiency and effectiveness of public institutions in particular and the economy in general. Mhone (2003) reveals that the main aim of PSR is to create institutions that are capable of promoting good governance.

There have been two generations of PSR. These are New Public Management (NPM) and post-NPM reforms (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007a). These generations are discussed below.

2.4.1 New Public Management

The term NPM was coined by Hood (1991). Since then, the term has had a wide range of meanings. Hood (1991) defines NPM in terms of the following elements: having managers that are free to manage, goal setting, performance-based rewards, disintegrating the centralised bureaucracy into corporatised units, adopting term contracts and public tendering, decentralised budgeting, cost saving, flexible hiring and rewards, intensifying labour discipline and rejecting trade union demands. This definition indicates that NPM focuses on the adoption
of private sector principles such as flexibility, performance-based management, competitiveness, cost saving and anti-trade union practices. The other terms used to refer to NPM include: entrepreneurial government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), managerialism, neo-Taylorism (Pollitt, 1993), and public/private hybridisation (Kletz, Hénaut and Sardas, 2014). These terms emphasise the adoption of business strategies in the management of the public sector. They imply putting emphasis on cost saving, increased output and anti-trade union tendencies.

Although the term NPM has a wide range of meanings, its main feature is to reduce costs. In order to do this, a number of private sector strategies such as flexibility, internal controls and anti-trade union practices are adopted (Hood, 1991; Kletz et al., 2014). The adoption of these strategies is based on the argument that private sector mechanisms raise efficiency in the provision of goods and services (Lane, 2000). In this regard, efficiency is viewed in terms of increased output and reduced costs.

The implementation of NPM started in the United Kingdom (UK) in the 1980s under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007a; Harvey, 2005; Lane, 2000). It then moved to other countries across the world (Lane, 2000). Heeks (1998) recognises three connected roots of these reform measures. The first is awareness of obstacles in the public sector. These obstacles are seen in the areas of inputs (which include unmanageable high public expenditure), processes (which include unprofessional conduct in the management of the public sector), and outputs (these are characterised by inefficiency in the delivery of public services). The second root is the appearance of the ideology of neo-liberalism, which highlights the effectiveness of market forces and the weakness of government regulation. The third root is the political will to adopt reform measures. In this regard, Heeks (1998) recognises three major agents in the reform of the public sector in many countries. These are the general public, government officials (i.e. politicians and public servants), and capital (i.e. local and global capital). In a number of countries, especially developing countries,
Heeks (1998) recognises a fourth agent in PSR, namely, international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. He argues that donor agencies have occasionally played a major role in the implementation of reform measures. This has been done through the conditions attached to external means of financial aid. These include demands by international donors that the benefiting country should reform its economic and institutional structures so that financial support is given.

According to Anderson et al. (2002), economic theories such as public choice and agency theories provided the theoretical foundations of NPM. Public choice theory is derived from the works of scholars such as Niskanen (1971). According to Niskanen (1971: 37), “a bureaucrat will engage in purposive behavior” that has “some elements in his utility other than the general welfare and the interests of the state.” He argues that the personal interests of bureaucrats are exhibited by their desire to have larger budgets compared to what they would spend to achieve a particular level of output (Niskanen, 1971). This shows that public servants are driven by the desire to gain prestige associated with larger organisation and budget rather than efficiency.

In order to raise efficiency in the delivery of services, public choice theory dismisses the use of bureaucracy, and calls for different ways of decentralisation (Lane, 2000). The term decentralisation can be defined as “the transfer by law and other formal actions, of responsibility, resources, and accountability from central government to lower levels of government” (Kandondo and Muleya, 2013: 2). According to the National Decentralisation Policy of the Republic of Zambia, there are four forms of decentralisation. The first is deconcentration, which refers to:

the transfer of functions and resources to lower level units of the same administrative system while authority over decision-making and use of such resources remains with the centre (i.e. from the headquarters of an institution or administrative system to the lower levels) (Republic of Zambia, 2002: iii).
For instance, this form of decentralisation occurs when the central government transfers some of its functions from the headquarters of a ministry to provincial, district and/or sub-district offices while authority over the use of the resources remains with the headquarters. The second form is devolution, which refers to “the transfer of some powers and authority, functions and resources by legal and constitutional provisions to the lower levels” (Republic of Zambia, 2002: iii). For example, this occurs when the central government transfers some of its authority, resources and functions to regional or local governments that are accountable to local people through elected representatives. The third form is delegation, which refers to “the transfer of functions and resources to a subordinate authority with the capacity to act in the behalf of the superior authority without a formal transfer of authority in the same structure” (Republic of Zambia, 2002: iii-iv). An example of this form of decentralisation is when the central government establishes an agent to perform specified functions on its behalf. However, the agent is still accountable to the central government.

The fourth form of decentralisation is privatisation, which refers to “the divestiture of state interests in public enterprises and the subsequent sale of such to the private sector” (Republic of Zambia, 2002: iv). Privatisation can take various forms. They include denationalisation, depoliticising, withdrawal or suspension of public services, commercialisation, outsourcing, and deregulation (Gildenhuys and Knipe, 2010). Privatisation can also be complete or partial. Complete privatisation involves the private sector having complete ownership of property and the right to manage it, while partial privatisation involves having joint ventures between the public and private sectors (Hughes, 2003).

As indicated by Anderson et al. (2002), the other theory that influenced NPM is agency theory. The general theory of agency was originally proposed by the works of scholars such as Mitnick (1975). According to Mitnick (1975), complex societies function on the basis of relations between agents and principals. These relations involve an agent acting on behalf of a principal. He assumes that, in these relations, both the principal and agent are rational and driven by the desire
to maximise their self-interests. He also argues that the main problem in these relations is for the principal to make sure that the agent serves the interests of the principal. He also assumes that rational principals use incentives to control the actions of their agents. This implies that the performance of employees can be improved by adopting a performance-based reward system.

Barzelay (2001) applies the principal-agent relations to minister-public servant relations, and believes that ministers (as principals) are faced with an agency problem, which should be solved. On this basis, he argues that ministers (as principals) “should presumably solve their agency problem by rewarding the public service on the basis of outputs” (Barzelay, 2001: 116).

However, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the NPM paradigm was criticised for reducing access to information by the political leadership, lacking political accountability, promoting uneven service delivery (Zafra-Gómez, Bolívar and Muñoz, 2012), and worsening inequality (Edigheji, 2008; Manning, 2001). These problems emerged because of the emphasis on neo-liberal policies such as decentralisation and privatisation, which resulted in reduced coordination in service delivery. In addition, by introducing private sector methods, politicians had little control over policy-making and service delivery. This, in turn, undermined the principles of democratic governance, which are vital in a modern society. This criticism led to a shift from NPM to post-NPM reforms (Zafra-Gómez et al., 2012). This paradigm shift was done to achieve a number of objectives including adapting to the changing environment. According to Christensen and Lægreid (2007b), the purposes of implementing post-NPM reforms include responding to crises, pandemics, disasters and new security threats such as terrorism. The details of the concept of post-NPM are presented below.
2.4.2 Post-New Public Management

The term post-NPM means different things to different people. Christensen and Lægreid (2007a: 5) associate post-NPM reforms “with the ‘whole-of-government’ (WOG) or ‘joined-up government’ (JUG) initiatives.” This definition involves having an integrated system of government. According to Zafra-Gómez et al. (2012: 714), post-NPM is an approach that “emphasizes objectives shared across organizational boundaries, as opposed to working solely within an organization (NPM philosophy).” In this regard, post-NPM focuses on organisations that serve the same purpose. According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011: 8), post-NPM is the general term used by some commentators to refer to PSRs that have been undertaken since the late 1990s. They further indicate that the other terms used to refer to this generation of reforms include governance, networks, partnerships, transparency, participation, and globalisation. These terms, generally, emphasise a multi-stakeholder governance process.

Although the term post-NPM means different things to different people, its main feature is coordination and integration of organisational functions (Liff and Andersson, 2013). The major elements of this type of reforms include re-regulation of markets, coordination of government institutions, and building the capacity of the central government (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007a).

A number of models have been presented by different scholars to explain post-NPM reforms. They include Neo-Weberian State (NWS), Networks, Digital Era Governance (DEG), and New Public Governance (NPG). The NWS model was suggested by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004). According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: 100), the NWS model focuses on “a citizens’ state, with extensive participation facilitated by a modernized system of public law that would guarantee rights and duties.” Katsamunska (2012: 80) asserts that the NWS model implies “a modernization of the Weberian tradition, not its rejection in terms of the market model.” Essentially, it involves the transformation of the public sector with the aim of enhancing its efficiency and responsiveness to citizens.
The other model that attempts to explain post-NPM is the network model. There are a range of definitions of the concept of network. Castells (2000: 501) defines a network as “a set of interconnected nodes.” Lane (2000: 36) defines the policy network model as “explicitly taking into account the stakeholders surrounding policy in order to make them legitimate participants in the process of implementing policies.” Klijn (2008: 511) defines governance network as “public policy making and implementation through a web of relationships between government, business and civil society actors.” According to Klijn (2008: 511), governance networks can take the shapes of “public–private partnerships or interactive policy making.” Networks can also take the forms of alliances (Buhl Lungu, 2006; Plaut, 2010). Despite the different definitions, the concept of network emphasises the interconnectedness of stakeholders. It implies an attempt to serve the interest of the network participants.

The DEG is another model that tries to explain post-NPM reforms. The DEG model was developed by Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow and Tinkler (2005). This model emphasises the major role played by Information Technology (IT) and information system in promoting private sector principles in the delivery of public services to consumers. The DEG model is a version of electronic government (e-government). According to Homburg and Snellen (2007: 136), “In general and loosely stated, e-government concerns the use of ICTs in public administration.” These Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) include video conferencing, touch-tone data entry, Compact Disc-Read Only Memory (CD-ROM), internet, intranet, interactive television, mobile phone and personal digital assistants (Hughes, 2003). E-government establishes two major styles of interaction among stakeholders. The first involves interaction within the government (i.e. intra-governmental interaction) (Homburg and Snellen, 2007; Hughes, 2003). The second style involves interaction between the government and external stakeholders (i.e. inter-stakeholder interaction). This style can take three forms. These are interaction between the government and citizens (Homburg and Snellen, 2007; Hughes, 2003), interaction between the government and business.
entities (Hughes, 2003), and interaction between the government and voters including online voting or electronic voting (e-voting) (Homburg and Snellen, 2007). According to Dunleavy et al. (2005), the adoption of IT systems enables institutions to easily interact with their customers and for the government to adjust quickly when need arises.

The other model that tries to explain post-NPM reforms is NPG. The NPG model was offered by Osborne (2006). This model emphasises the involvement of several elements in policy formulation and implementation. The model identifies two types of “plurality”. These are “a plural state, where multiple inter-dependent actors contribute to the delivery of public services and a pluralist state, where multiple processes inform the policy making system” (Osborne, 2006: 384 [original emphasis]). Under this model, governance is taken as a collaborative activity. The collaboration takes place at two levels. The first level focuses on stakeholder collaboration in the delivery of public services. The second level involves taking into consideration the various processes of policy-making. The purpose of taking a collaborative approach to governance is to promote effectiveness in service delivery (Osborne, 2006).

### 2.5 Meaning, functions and objectives of trade unions

The concept of trade union means different things to different people. According to Farnham and Pimlott (1990: 106), a trade union refers to:

> any organization of employees which, first, has as one of its main objectives negotiating with employers in order to regulate the pay and conditions of its members and, second, is independent of the employers with which it negotiates or seeks to negotiate.

The definition by Farnham and Pimlott (1990) reveals that a trade union is an autonomous association of employees with the aim of controlling the terms and conditions of employment through negotiation with employers. Although this definition sheds light on the composition of a trade union, it does not adequately explain the extent to which a trade union is independent of employers. From the
unitary perspective, managers are allowed to use force in the process of managing employees (Fox, 1973, 1974). This means that trade unions are not always independent of employers.

Another definition of trade union is offered by Cole (2002). Cole (2002: 423) defines a trade union as “an organisation of employees which aims to protect and promote their interests in the workplace, mainly by means of collective bargaining and consultation with employers.” This definition equates a trade union to an institution established by employees, which uses the process of collective bargaining with employers to safeguard and advance the needs of employees within an industry. However, this definition can be criticised for ignoring the role of class struggle in the formation of trade unions. According to Marx (1976), the aim of trade unions is to challenge the power of capital, increase the value of labour-power and achieve an increase in real wages.

Despite the different definitions, there are certain common elements that constitute a trade union. They include an organisation of employees which aims to represent and promote the interests of its members by negotiating with or challenging the power of employers (Farnham and Pimlott, 1990; Marx, 1976; Republic of Zambia, 1997).

Although trade unions share the above-mentioned elements, they differ in certain aspects. The differences include the functions they perform and the objectives they attempt to achieve. Salamon (2000) identifies six components of trade union function. These are gaining power (through the collective strength of the membership), economic regulation, job regulation, promotion of social change, provision of various services to individual members, and provision of avenues for individual member’s self-fulfilment. According to Bendix (2010), the objectives of trade unions can be classified as follows: economic objectives (such as improved wages), job security, social welfare, job regulation, individual development, and sociopolitical aims. In addition, Bendix (2010) indicates that trade unions utilise various means to achieve their objectives. These include
collective bargaining with employers, collective action, representation at company level, affiliation with other bodies, collective bargaining with government, representation on local and national bodies, representations to government and employer organisations, political involvement, benefit funds, and education and social programmes.

Trade unions also differ in the kinds of unionism they practice. Bendix (2010) classifies union styles as follows: business unionism, community unionism, welfare unionism, economically responsible unionism, and political unionism. Salamon (2000) categorises trade unions in the following terms: expression of class-consciousness, social responsibility, business unionism, welfare unionism, and political unionism. Trade unions can also be engaged in social movement unionism (Nepgen, 2008; Von Holdt, 2002).

2.6 Implications of New Public Management for trade unions in the public sector

A great deal of literature shows that there are several implications of NPM for trade unions in the public sector. It is within this context that this section reviews literature which is relevant to the thesis so as to enhance the understanding of these implications. In doing so, the section reviews literature on both developed and developing countries. The section will begin by reviewing literature on developed countries and end with literature on developing countries.

2.6.1 Implications for developed countries

Some lessons on NPM and trade unions in the public sector can be drawn from literature on developed countries. A review of the literature on these countries is necessary because this is where the NPM paradigm originated. According to Lane (2000), NPM started in the UK. From the UK, it moved to the United States (US), Australia and New Zealand. Later on, it moved to Scandinavia and Continental Europe (Lane, 2000).
The book edited by Nolan (2001) provides a very good account of PSR in developed countries.² In the same book, Brewster, Dempsey and Hegewisch (2001) explain the impact of reform policies such as privatisation, restructuring and redundancies, decentralisation and devolution, and management prerogative. They indicate that the reform process had resulted in many European countries decentralising the structure of pay bargaining. Notable in this regard were shifts from national to sectoral level bargaining and from sectoral to organisation level bargaining. The authors further indicate that these reform measures had put public sector unions in a difficult situation, which included reduced membership and growing demands on their services. As such, the unions had to respond strategically. According to Brewster et al. (2001), the strategic responses included formation of mergers and alliances both in the public and private sectors. In addition, unions like UNISON tried to transform their structures by decentralising resource allocation. Through this process, union resources were transferred from the centre to local levels. This was done to enable the services to be nearer to the membership. These findings are significant because they show that NPM reforms not only transform the public sector but also present challenges for both the public sector and its trade unions. The challenges include the disintegration of both the public sector and union membership. The findings also show that although the unions struggle to adapt to the reforms, they are able to respond strategically. Nonetheless, the contributions in Nolan (2001) do not cover the experiences of developing countries.

Similarly, in their article titled “The Changing Roles of Public Sector Unionism,” Anderson, Griffin and Teicher (2002) outline the changes in the character of Australian federal public service unions within the context of NPM.³ They indicate that the reform of the Australian federal public service had followed private sector principles, which included devolution of decision-making to

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² Most of the contributions in the book dwell on NPM strategies used to reform the public sector in selected Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. They also provide an account of the impact of the reforms on the public sector in these countries. A few of the contributions in the book do however focus on the impact of the reforms on service delivery as well as trade unions’ response to change in the public sector.

³ The article drew on a range of publications and interviews with public sector union officials.
departmental levels and market-based principles of service delivery, which involved contracting-out or privatisation. They also indicate that these reform measures had created several difficulties for public sector unions. These included loss of jobs in the public sector, and reductions in union membership and income. They further indicate that in response to these challenges, the unions did not only embark on internal reorganisation but also embraced the organising model of unionism. This response saw public sector unions adopting strategies almost identical to those used by private sector unions to transform their organisational structures. These strategies included amalgamation, having separate systems of accountability between government institutions and other sectors, and organising members in the private sector. This revelation is significant for the thesis especially as it relates to the changes in the federal public service under the rubric of NPM reforms and their implications for federal government trade unions. The finding shows that NPM reforms reduce the size of the public sector through job losses. This, in turn, leads to reductions in union membership and income. However, Anderson et al. (2002) do not cover reform measures at the lower levels of government such as local government and semi-autonomous government institutions.

The paper authored by Waddington (2005) discusses the problem of trade union membership in Europe and union responses. According to Waddington (2005), trade union density in a number of European countries had been going down since 1980. He attributes the membership reduction to external factors and internal union deficiencies. The external factors include globalisation, international competition and deregulation. In this regard, he cites the major factors as being rising unemployment, changing composition of the labour force, and increased employers’ resistance of unionisation. In the case of internal union deficiencies, he presents the following as illustrations: highly formalised trade union operations, middle-aged men and manual workers being supreme in trade unionism, undemocratic styles of union governance, and limited information by trade union leaders about workplace operations.

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4 The paper is based on an analysis of secondary data.
Waddington (2005) indicates that trade unions in Europe had initiated various reforms to deal with the problem of membership decline. The main reform measures included formation of mergers; using electronic systems including the Internet to recruit members, deliver services, and enhance the level of communication between the members and the leadership; and adding a number of new items to the bargaining list so as to serve the interests of new members.

He also argues that the unions had embraced varieties of the servicing and organising approaches to recruitment. On the one hand, the servicing approach involved offering various types of services to members such as financial and non-financial services. On the other hand, the organising approach was adopted “to intensify links between members and union representatives, to encourage more members to become engaged in union activities (including recruitment), and to generate forms of self-help among unionists at the workplace” (Waddington, 2005: 4). These findings are important because they show how union membership is negatively affected by external threats (including neo-liberal policies) and internal union inadequacies. The findings also outline various reforms that can be adopted by trade unions to reverse membership decline such as servicing and organising the membership. Although these findings are important, the focus of Waddington (2005) is confined to NPM reform strategies. He does not discuss other strategies of PSR such as re-regulation and partnerships, and their effects on trade unions.

In his Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Conoley (2008) uses the case of local government reform in Victoria, Australia, to investigate public sector reform agendas (based on the propositions of public choice) and the outcomes for trade unions. Conoley (2008) makes two important conclusions. First, he indicates that local government trade unions were negatively affected by competition in the provision of local government goods and services. The negative effects were in

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5 He applied both the positivist and interpretive methodological approaches to his study. He used both primary and secondary data sources. Primary data were collected through interviews with key informants from three case study organisations, namely, one trade union and two local councils.
the areas of impacting on government policy, membership levels, bargaining outcomes, and relations within and between unions. Second, he indicates that the extent to which local government reform objectives were attained was somewhat affected by the responses of trade unions and the level of competition in service delivery that the local councils managed to promote. Trade unions’ responses included participating in the reform agenda, embarking on union reorganisation, restructuring bargaining agreements, making submissions to government inquiries, persuading the community, and conducting electoral campaigns. It is clear that Connoley (2008) provides important lessons about the problem being investigated by the thesis. This is especially the case on the finding relating to local government reform based on the principles of public choice (a theoretical underpinning of NPM) and its implications for local government trade unions. The finding shows that competition in the delivery of goods and services weakens the union membership and governance process. It also undermines the power of trade unions in the processes of collective bargaining and policy-making. However, Connoley (2008) does not cover reform measures at other levels of government such as the central government and semi-autonomous government institutions including parastatal bodies.

Doellgast (2008) conducted a study on “National Industrial Relations and Local Bargaining Power in the US and German Telecommunications Industries.” She concluded that decentralisation had forced the unions to think of new methods of utilising their resources. In addition, she indicates that the unions in the US and German telecommunications firms had enhanced their bargaining power over restructuring measures through the strategies of building internal relationships with various worker representatives like works councils as well as external alliances and organisation of the membership. This revelation is important because it shows how alliances and membership organisation can help trade unions to enhance their bargaining power over work restructuring especially in the

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6 The study used matched pair case studies of six telecommunications firms to compare union influence on the outsourcing of call centre work. The study relied on over 200 interviews with corporate and local managers, works councillors and union representatives, as well as on collective agreements and archival materials.
telecommunications industry. However, Doellgast (2008) does not discuss firms outside the telecommunications industry. She also does not cover firms outside the United States of America (USA) and Germany.

Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) book titled “Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis – New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State,” is worth noting. In this book, the authors argue that frequent downsizings demotivate and decrease the expertise of the public service in particular and the government in general. The authors also indicate that public service unions tend to oppose reform measures that try to decrease the workforce even if such measures might result in improved performance. This finding is important because it brings to light the fact that downsizing does not only result in an incompetent public sector but also leads to reductions in union membership. The finding also reveals the negative perception that trade unions have about reforms that result in reductions in their membership despite such reductions being beneficial to the employer. As argued by Turner (1962), some unions (those he refers to as open unions) depend on the increased membership for bargaining power. Nonetheless, despite Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) being significant, they do not cover reforms in relatively unstable and less prosperous democracies including those of Africa and South America.

2.6.2 Implications for developing countries

Lessons can also be drawn from literature on developing countries. This is because these countries have also been affected by the NPM paradigm. According to Lane (2000), every country in the world has been influenced by NPM in one way or another. The NPM reforms have also been driven by different factors in different countries and continents. Gould (2003) indicates that the reform of the state in Africa has been influenced by external actors. These include governments of developed countries and international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These actors have been

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7 The book looks at reforms in 12 relatively firm and successful democracies of Australasia, Europe, and North America, as well as the European Union Commission.
requesting governments to reform their institutions so that they could access external assistance. The demands include adoption of democratic principles of governance as well as decentralisation and poverty reduction. According to Gould (2003), donor-driven strategies of reforming the public sector undermine the ability of the central government to operate in rural areas. Furthermore, he argues that the strategy of decentralisation gives non-state actors an opportunity to participate in the delivery of public services at the local level. This finding is important because of the following reasons: first, it shows that donor-driven strategies of PSR reduce the influence of the state in the processes of policy formulation and implementation. Second, it shows that PSR transfers employment opportunities from the public to the private sector. Third, the reduction in employment opportunities in the public sector implies that the membership base for public sector unions has been weakened. However, Gould (2003) does not discuss the effects of PSR on trade unions in the public sector.

The other strategies of PSR in Africa are presented by McDonald and Pape (2002). According to McDonald and Pape (2002), the South African government had made an effort to reform its institutions using the principle of cost recovery. Through this principle, public institutions were required to collect user fees for services they delivered. However, this resulted in outsourcing of public services, job losses and unaffordable services, which became sources of conflict between service providers, on the one hand, and the labour movement and civil society organisations, on the other (McDonald and Pape, 2002). This finding is significant because it shows how private sector principles such as cost recovery promote poverty in society in general and the labour force in particular. This finding also shows how difficult it is for public sector unions to protect the interest of their members in the context of PSR. Although this finding is significant, it is confined to the experiences of South Africa. It does not include the experiences of other countries within and outside Africa.

towards parliamentary democracy. In the same book, Webster (2006) indicates that the liberalisation of the economy and the informalisation of work had negatively impacted employment and the labour movement in post-apartheid South Africa. He asserts that the restructuring process led to the elimination of formal sector employment and an increase of informal workers including street vendors and homeworkers. He also argues that the restructuring of the labour market presented a challenge for trade union representation. For instance, retrenchments led to the departure of many union leaders. In addition, instead of union leaders maintaining their direct connection with the general membership, they started to strengthen their connections with the recently established influential group in the emerging political and economic system. Furthermore, he reveals that the traditional methods of worker mobilisation were challenged when skilled workers joined the unions. In turn, this problem resulted in some workers being dissatisfied with the leadership and leaving to form rival unions.

According to Webster (2006), COSATU affiliates had responded to their predicament in various ways. They included efforts to control outsourcing, mobilising casual workers, and organising informal workers. In his conclusion, Webster (2006) argues that although mobilisation of informal sector workers is difficult, the welfare of workers can be effectively promoted by adopting modern forms of trade unionism including formation of new coalitions. This revelation is vital because it shows that restructuring of work leads to reductions in the labour force, which in turn, compromise union solidarity and leadership. Although this revelation is vital, it does not distinguish between the experiences of public and private sector unions. This limitation comes in because the study examined the experiences of COSATU affiliates in general terms. This approach, therefore, makes it difficult to specify the effects of workplace restructuring on trade unions in each sector of the economy. This problem could be addressed by separating the experiences of trade unions in one sector from another. For instance, a distinction

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8 The study adopted the survey method. A questionnaire was administered to a total sample of 655 workers belonging to COSATU. The workers comprised ordinary members and shop stewards. These were drawn from five sectors of the South African economy, namely, manufacturing, municipal and public sector, mining, transport, and other sectors. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with members of the unions and various other organisations.
can be made between the experiences of public sector unions and those of private sector unions. In addition, Webster (2006) does not explain the implications of coalitions for union governance and collective bargaining.

Pitcher’s (2007) article examines organised labour in Southern Africa. She concludes that trade unions had been undermined by “declining numbers of formal-sector jobs due to the growth of casual labor, informal work, and subcontracting, or plant closures and retrenchments” (Pitcher, 2007: 155). However, she also concludes that although the unions had faced a number of challenges, there were possibilities of addressing them. These included recruiting various categories of members, creating worker-owned enterprises, establishing other means of civic engagement, and dealing with new issues. This finding is very important because it shows that policy reforms present multiple challenges for trade unions. However, Pitcher (2007) can be criticised for examining policy reforms and trade unions in general terms. She does not distinguish between NPM and post-NPM reforms. Neither does she distinguish between the experiences of public and private sector unions. Furthermore, she does not examine the effects of membership diversification and the inclusion of new issues on union governance and collective bargaining.

Omoyefa’s (2008) article on Public Sector Reforms (PSRs) in Africa analyses the policies of privatisation and commercialisation of public enterprises, downsizing of the public service workforce and the fight against corruption. His conclusions are as follows: first, he asserts that downsizing made the public sector in Africa to be deprived of several skilled workers that had been retrenched so as to reduce government expenditure. Second, he argues that the privatisation of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the aviation, petroleum and telecommunication sectors in Africa had been characterised by corruption at the stages of setting the selling price for the enterprise, the conditions of privatisation and the bidding processes. The beneficiaries in this process were seen to be private individuals and

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9 The article is based on a study of Mozambique, Zambia, and South Africa. The study relied on secondary data sources.
10 His analysis is based on a philosophical approach and relies on secondary data sources.
companies, and officials who managed the agreements. Third, he indicates that corruption also took place through personnel that had been laid off then engaged by firms belonging to senior government officials. Fourth, he asserts that the current PSR would not yield positive results due to a number of factors. These are the role played by the Breton Woods institutions in shaping the economies and policies of African countries, SOEs being bought by multinational firms, skilled workers moving from Africa to Europe and America, and the practices of corruption and neo-colonialism. These revelations are significant especially as they relate to challenges of implementing PSR measures without taking into consideration conditions that are unique to each country or continent. The revelations are also important because they show how the strategies of privatisation and downsizing negatively affect the size and quality of the public sector from which public sector unions are supposed to draw their membership. In addition, the loss of skilled workers due to downsizing implies that public sector unions are not only deprived of membership but also skilled leadership. However, Omoyefa (2008) confines his analysis to NPM based reforms. He does not include post-NPM reforms.

In his book titled “Reforming the African Public Sector: Retrospect and Prospects,” Ayee (2008) discusses the phases of PSR in Africa including the issues involved and challenges faced.\footnote{His book adopted a structural/institutional approach, and relied on the available literature on African public sector reforms.} He also looks at reform strategies such as privatisation, commercialisation, corporate plans, performance contracts, PPPs, civil service reforms, decentralisation, agencification, anti-corruption, and e-government. In his analysis, Ayee (2008) reveals that the retrenchment programmes implemented in countries such as Uganda, Tanzania and Botswana had resulted, on the one hand, in minor reductions in staff numbers and, on the other hand, in an increase in the wage bill. This outcome was attributed to the practices of re-hiring and redeployment of personnel. In this regard, he argues that governments had tried to keep the numbers of their key staff while reducing the expenses associated with equipment, service delivery and development. The revelation by Ayee (2008) is important because it shows how the emphasis on
reducing government expenditure could be translated into cuts in capital expenditure rather than having a lean and cost-effective government. This outcome, therefore, implies that trade unions could still have the opportunity to organise the re-hired and redeployed staff. Nevertheless, Ayee (2008) does not specifically discuss the implications of these reform strategies for trade unions in the public sector.

The other literature worth noting is Andrae and Beckman’s (2011) article on “Trade Unions, Tailors, and Civil society.”12 The authors indicate that the shutdown of textile plants in Nigeria and Ghana due to a mixture of trade liberalisation and a dysfunctional energy industry led to reductions in union membership. They also reveal that trade unions in these two countries had tried to organise manufacturers in the informal sector so as to strengthen themselves and their membership. In their conclusion, Andrae and Beckman (2011) assert that the division between formal and informal sectors undermines the power of workers in both sectors. Therefore, they suggest that workers in the two sectors should work together so that they increase their collective strength. However, they also argue that this approach alone may not increase union membership unless the interests of existing members are promoted, “for instance, by fighting casualization and labour brokerage” (Andrae and Beckman, 2011: 39). This finding is vital because, first, it shows how neo-liberalism (an ideology influencing NPM) threatens the power of trade unions. Second, it shows how wider alliances, such as links with the informal economy, could enhance trade union membership and power. However, the coverage of Andrae and Beckman’s (2011) article is limited to trade unionism in the textile industry in two African countries. The other industries and countries are not covered. The article can also be criticised for not explaining the implications of wider alliances for the governance structure of unions and collective bargaining.

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12 The article relied on interviews with union office bearers in the textile industry in Nigeria and Ghana as well as on secondary data.
Larmer’s (2005) paper explores the reaction and resistance to neo-liberalism in Zambia. Larmer (2005) argues that the privatisation of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines was heavily influenced by the combined efforts of donors and multinational capital. He further indicates that the privatisation process had very bad social and economic effects. These included the closure of companies, retrenchment of workers and a noticeable decrease in the quality of life. In addition, he argues that a combination of privatisation and civil service reform led to a decrease in union membership. The labour movement was also divided in terms of how to handle the issue of privatisation. This resulted in four very important unions, among them, the Mineworkers Union of Zambia, and Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers leaving the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions in 1994. However, he asserts that reform strategies that were different from complete privatisation had become visible in Zambia. These included neo-nationalism and PPP. These findings are relevant because they demonstrate the negative consequences of privatisation and civil service reform in both economic and social terms. They also shed light on the alternatives to complete privatisation, which include neo-nationalism and PPP. However, Larmer (2005) does not explore the implications of neo-nationalism and/or PPP for trade unions.

Michelo (2007) asserts that Zambia had attempted to improve service delivery by implementing the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP). He shows that in spite of implementing this programme, the public service in Zambia is still inefficient and ineffective. The poor performance of the sector is attributed to administrative problems such as inadequate decentralisation and poor remuneration. This finding is significant because it shows that reform measures that do not pay enough attention to decentralisation and improved terms and conditions of employment tend to yield negative results. However, Michelo (2007) can be criticised for limiting his study to one ministry in one province. His study focused on the Ministry of Education in Lusaka province. This approach

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13 The paper is based on a study of the privatisation of the Zambia National Commercial Bank and the copper mining industry. The study relied on both interviews with present and former union officials, and secondary data sources.
leaves out the experiences of other ministries and government departments. It also leaves out the experiences of institutions and individuals outside Lusaka province. In addition, Michelo (2007) does not discuss the effects of PSRP on trade unions.

Relatedly, Mate (2006) indicates that despite the Zambian Government having adopted the Performance Management Package (PMP), it had difficulties implementing it. The major problem was lack of resources. This revelation is important because it shows that inadequate resource allocation negatively affects the reform of the public sector. Nonetheless, Mate (2006) does not explain why the government is unable to mobilise the necessary resources to support the implementation of PMP. Furthermore, he does not examine the effects of PMP on trade unions.

There are some contributions in the book edited by Momba and Kalabula (2006) that focus on issues of decentralisation and provision of public services in Zambia. Notable in this regard is the contribution by Lolojih (2006) who uses lessons from bilateral cooperation to discuss the prospects of enhancing local government. He argues that despite the local government system in Zambia having been reformed in the post-independence era, it did not have the capacity to provide services. He notes that the system had several limitations such as “the lack of financial resources and capital equipment, inadequate administrative facilities, poor working relations between councilors and administrative staff, and undemocratic attitudes towards work” (Lolojih, 2006: 36). However, he reveals that cooperating partners had tried to improve the situation by undertaking a number of activities. These included training of local stakeholders in the area of democracy, renovating buildings belonging to local councils, purchasing of bicycles for councillors, and establishment of local News Letters and sub-district organisations for community participation in development issues (Lolojih, 2006). This contribution reveals the significance of partnerships between lower level government institutions, on the one hand, and the community and cooperating partners on the other, in the provision of public services. Nevertheless, Lolojih

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14 His paper relies mainly on the results of the Cooperation for District Development project implemented in three districts, namely, Mbala, Luwingu and Kaputa.
(2006) does not cover implications of partnerships including bilateral cooperation for trade unions in the public sector.

In the same book, Subulwa (2006) analyses the impact of cost-sharing on the demand for basic education in Zambia.\textsuperscript{15} He indicates that the commencement of user-fees had destroyed the education system. This was seen in three areas. First, the demand for primary education in both urban and rural areas went down. This was due to the high cost of education. Second, there was poor service delivery in schools. Third, school infrastructure was in a state of disrepair. This contribution shows that despite user charges helping government institutions to recover costs, they prevent poor people from accessing basic services such as education. However, Subulwa (2006) does not explain how poor service delivery by public institutions affects the operations of trade unions.

In the same book, Momba (2006) discusses the challenges facing Health and Educational Boards.\textsuperscript{16} She asserts that the Ministries of Education and Health in Zambia had been decentralised through the transfer of some functions from the ministries headquarters to Education and Health Boards created at the lower levels. The boards were established at national, district, college, school and community levels. These lower level institutions were mandated to deliver goods and services to the people. According to Momba (2006), the creation of the boards had some positive results. They included the following: first, the levels of bureaucracy in the management of public institutions had been reduced. Second, government institutions had extra means of financing their operations such as the launch of user fees. Third, the availability of additional sources of funding enabled schools, colleges, clinics and hospitals to improve not only their infrastructure but also the delivery of services to consumers. Nonetheless, she indicates that this kind of decentralisation had some negative consequences. They included the following: first, the introduction of user fees had prevented poor people from accessing education and health services. Second, the reduced funding from the central government to the boards had resulted in necessary materials not

\textsuperscript{15} His paper relies on secondary data sources.
\textsuperscript{16} Her paper relies on secondary data sources.
being available for effective service delivery. Third, the existence of the boards had been opposed by the teachers’ and health workers’ unions for failing to meet workers’ interests due to central government withdrawal of funding. The unions had also argued that the establishment of the boards was one way through which the government was privatising schools and hospitals, and abandoning its role of providing vital public services. It is also reported that the boards were misusing the power granted to them. This is illustrated by their tendency to ask for several supplies from the community and mistreatment of employees (Momba, 2006). This contribution is important because it reveals the challenges presented by restructuring of the public sector such as the withdrawal of central government financial support to lower level institutions in the delivery of services. However, Momba (2006) does not examine the extent to which trade unions can succeed in opposing the reforms.

Mwambwa, Griffiths and Kahler (2010) present a briefing paper on Zambia’s mining tax regime. The authors indicate that privatisation of the mines in Zambia was associated with several problems. These included “casualization of the workforce, deepening pensioner poverty and a failure to protect the social infrastructure” (Mwambwa et al., 2010: 7). However, they also show that the post privatisation era had some benefits. These included additional government revenue through taxes such as individual workers’ Pay As You Earn, company tax, mineral royalties, windfall tax and export duty. The other benefits included availability of mining jobs, expanded technology, connections with other industries, and increased foreign exchange reserves. Nonetheless, they reveal that the Government had a challenge to maximise the benefits from the privatised mines. This is because of many compromises that had been made in the mining sector including tax incentives, which undermined the benefits. These findings are relevant because of the following: first, they show that privatisation can enable the government to generate revenue through a continuous stream of taxes based on private sector investment. Second, they show that privatised industries can be a source of employment. This implies that jobs created by privatised industries offer

17 The paper relies on a series of public discussion seminars, analytical desk research, consultations and peer review exercises with tax and mining industry experts.
trade unions an opportunity to extend their sections of membership recruitment. Although the findings by Mwambwa et al. (2010) give some insights into the results of privatisation of the mining industry, they do not discuss trade unionism in the post privatisation era.

The booklet published by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (2011) gives an overview of the labour movement in Zambia. Contributions in the booklet include a paper by Mulenga (2011) who analyses the crisis and successes of the labour movement. He reveals that the labour movement in Zambia had been incapacitated by the declining numbers of membership due to economic measures of wage freeze and labour redundancies, and the growth of splinter unions. This contribution is important because it shows how trade unions are weakened by reform measures that focus on low wages and job losses. Although this contribution is important, it can be criticised for discussing economic reforms and their effects in general terms. Mulenga (2011) does not make a distinction between NPM and post-NPM reforms.

In the same booklet, Simutanyi (2011) analyses “Political Challenges Facing the Zambian Labour Movement Ahead of the 2011 General Elections.” He notes that the breakdown of the huge SOEs, employing more than 100,000 employees in Zambia, led to several job losses and reductions in both union membership and income. He also argues that job insecurity had made trade unions to be less aggressive when taking industrial action. In addition, he reveals that the autonomy of trade unions had been affected by high levels of government intrusion into their internal affairs. This contribution reveals that economic reforms put trade unions in a situation where their operations become dependent on their relationship with the government. This implies that, one the one hand, if the relationship is good then union affairs would receive government support. On the other hand, if the relationship is bad then union activities would be opposed by the government. However, Simutanyi (2011) does not explain how the unions manage their relationship with the government so as to achieve their objectives.

18 The booklet is a collection of papers that analyse trade unions from a legal, economic, social and political point of view. The papers rely on secondary data sources.
In the same booklet, Koyi (2011) examines “Economic Challenges Facing the Labour Movement in a Liberal Environment in Zambia.” He reveals that the function of trade unions in Zambia had been challenged by liberalisation measures, which included job losses, high levels of unemployment, high taxes, deregulation of labour laws, informalisation of work, low wages, casualisation of work, job insecurity, and union break-ups. He further argues that the appearance of splinter unions in Zambia is due to a high degree of distrust within the labour movement. This finding is vital because it indicates how trade unions are weakened by the implementation of neo-liberal policies. Nonetheless, Koyi (2011) can be criticised for not explaining how the relationships among splinter unions are managed so as to achieve union objectives.

2.7 Implications of post-New Public Management for trade unions in the public sector

The literature shows that there is a shift from NPM to post-NPM in the process of addressing public sector problems. It is against this background that this section reviews the relevant literature so as to enhance the understanding of the implications of post-NPM for trade unions in the public sector. In doing so, the section begins with a review of literature on developed countries. This is followed by a review of literature on developing countries.

2.7.1 Implications for developed countries

Post-NPM reforms have been implemented in both developed and developing countries. What, then, are the implications of these reforms for trade unions in the public sector in these countries? To answer this question, this subsection reviews the relevant literature on developed countries. Holcombe’s (2012) article titled “Planning and the Invisible Hand: Allies or Adversaries?” examines land use planning. The author presents two similar assertions on the distinction between

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19 The article relies mainly on the experiences of US cities.
top-down (teleocratic) planning (i.e. emphasising centralised planning) and bottom-up (nomocratic) planning (i.e. emphasising the self-organisation of the market). First, he argues that the self-organisation of the market cannot easily be destroyed. Second, he argues that even if governments make plans, most of them promote the interests of market players rather than those of the government. This revelation is important because it shows that although economic activities in general and labour activities in particular might be regulated, the interests of market players (including trade unions) cannot easily be overturned. This implies that these players look for opportunities to influence government plans so that their own interests are promoted. Nonetheless, Holcombe (2012) does not specifically discuss the implications of planning for trade unions.

The issue of government failure is also presented by Cobin (2014) who asserts that in spite of increased safety regulation, building fires in Turin had expanded. He argues that government failure theories occasionally provide a better account for the strength of regulation and planning than the long-established models of market failure. For him, the function of regulation is to promote private interests as opposed to the public interest. In this regard, he views “private interests and firefighters, planners, regulators, vote seekers, code writers, insurers, and home builders” to be the beneficiaries of fire safety regulation rather than the general public (Cobin, 2014: 206). This finding is significant because it reveals how regulation serves special interests rather than the public interest. The implication of this finding is that interest groups (including trade unions) have an opportunity to strategise and influence government regulation in their favour. Although this finding is significant, Cobin (2014) does not specifically examine the effects of regulation on trade unions.

The book edited by McLaughlin, Osborne and Ferlie (2002) evaluates the nature and impact of the NPM paradigm in both developed and developing countries.  

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20 Cobin (2014) uses the lessons on fire safety regulation from Turin, Italy, to review the general theory of regulation and 10 theories related to safety regulation. His study relied on archival data on fire and regulations, and talks with the practitioners.

21 The book uses six distinct approaches to examine NPM. These are: its context, action, international comparative context, research, evaluation, and future prospects. The book covers the
Although the contributions in the book dwell mainly on the NPM paradigm, they also provide insights into post-NPM reforms. Notable in this regard is the contribution by Osborne and McLaughlin (2002) who argue that the UK model of NPM emphasised both the marketisation of public services, and community governance (i.e. focusing on the plural state). Here:

The planning, management and provision of public services is seen as something to be negotiated between a number of actors, including government, the voluntary and community sectors and the private sector. In this model, the key task of government becomes the management of these complex networks of public service provision (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002: 10).

This revelation is important because of the following: first, it shows that governance networks reduce the power of government in the processes of planning and service delivery. Second, it shows that governance networks offer network participants an opportunity to secure concessions for themselves in the processes of planning and service delivery. Third, this revelation implies that network participants (including public sector unions) would be expected to become social partners in the provision of services. This, in turn, reduces the power of individual participants (including trade unions) to put their own needs above those of the other participants. However, despite the contributions in McLaughlin et al. (2002) revealing some elements of post-NPM in the debate about NPM reforms, they do not specifically discuss post-NPM and its implications for trade unions.

In her book titled “States and Markets”, Strange (1994) indicates that the process of production and supply of goods and services is controlled by the powerful agents of the political economy. In this regard, she identifies three sources of power, namely, force, wealth and ideas. She also identifies two categories of power in a political economy. These are “structural power and relational power” (Strange, 1994: 24). She views structural power as the ability to establish structures that should be utilised by other players in the international political experiences of countries in Europe, North America, Africa, East Asia, the developing world in general, and Australia.
economy while relational power involves the ability to change the behaviour of another player. Strange (1994) further argues that structural power is distributed among four connected structures. These are production, security, finance and knowledge structures. In this regard, she sees the state as a representative of the regulator/s of the production structure.

Furthermore, Strange (1994) equates governance to a network of participants who bargain with each other to achieve their goals. In this network, the state is viewed as a participant that makes agreements with other participants including employers and workers so as to preserve its power. This revelation is important because it explains the role of the government and other actors in a globalised world. In the case of the government, the revelation is that its role is to promote the interests of influential agents of the political economy. This implies that if actors in the governance network including trade unions are to achieve their objectives, they need to build their capacity to influence government policies. However, Strange (1994) does not specifically discuss PSR and its effects on trade unions.

The reliance on networks to deliver public services is also supported by Kitchen (2005) who examines the options of delivering municipal and local services. Kitchen (2005) identifies three major options of delivering municipal and local services. The first option is complete delivery by the public sector. Under this option, the delivery of services “ranges from responsibility resting with the local council or city hall to responsibility assigned to some kind of independent or quasi-independent special-purpose body or local government enterprise” (Kitchen, 2005: 117). The second option is complete delivery by the private sector. Under this option, the choices of service delivery consist of “contracting out, franchises, grants, vouchers, volunteers, self-help organizations, and nonprofit agencies” (Kitchen, 2005: 117). The third option is delivery by PPPs. Under this option, the

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22 Kitchen (2005) relies on secondary data and interviews with municipal officials. The data are based on the experiences of countries such as New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Colombia, and those in North America, and Europe.
delivery of services is done by a combination of public and private sector organisations.

In addition, Kitchen (2005) makes some conclusions about the benefits and challenges of delivering services through public and private sectors. On public sector delivery, he argues that assigning duties to the municipal council enhances the effectiveness and openness of the public sector at the local level. However, he also argues that the presence of autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions “creates or has the potential for creating decision-making problems and unnecessary costs both for local governments and for local residents” (Kitchen, 2005: 145). On private sector delivery, he asserts that it has the potential of yielding substantial cost savings. This is attributed to competition, which is characteristic of private sector operation as opposed to public sector operation. He also argues that private sector delivery is capable of reducing rigidity in personnel management, enhance performance, increase the engagement of professionals, and reduce the wage bill for the public sector. Nonetheless, he reports that private sector delivery has been opposed for making public sector unions “vulnerable because of possible job losses and reduced bargaining power” (Kitchen, 2005: 146).

The above-mentioned finding is significant because it explains the various ways of delivering municipal and local services as well as their advantages and disadvantages. The finding also shows that networking is not a solution to problems facing the public sector. In spite of networks, the public sector is still experiencing budget overruns and other problems associated with service delivery. However, Kitchen (2005) does not cover services that are delivered by the central government. Furthermore, he does not cover the experiences of African countries. He also does not explain the strategies of strengthening public sector unions in the midst of job losses and reduced bargaining power.

In his report titled “Why Public-Private Partnerships don’t work: The many advantages of the public alternative”, Hall (2015) argues that PPPs result in poor
public service delivery, environmental degradation and lower terms and conditions of employment. He associates these outcomes with the desire to reduce costs or increase profits in PPPs. He also argues that service delivery is more expensive under PPPs. This is because of costs associated with tendering and monitoring of such projects. According to Hall (2015), the public sector has the ability to finance the delivery of services. The sources of finance at its disposal include taxes, user charges, and loans. This implies that there is no need for the public sector to rely on costly PPPs to deliver services. Instead, it can deliver the services on its own. This entails creating more employment opportunities in the public sector. This, in turn, promotes the growth of public sector unions. Nevertheless, Hall (2015) does not explain how productivity can be increased in a bloated public sector.

Coats’ (2006) paper on “Reviving the Public: A New Governance and Management Model for Public Services” discusses the development of a new model of public service governance. According to Coats (2006), the concept of social partnership had become part of business processes in continental Europe. He further indicates that employer-union partnerships had also been initiated in Nordic countries and Ireland. His assertion is that partnerships enabled trade unions to build their capacity to effectively participate in the decision-making process as opposed to the traditional collective bargaining process (where negotiations are confined to terms and conditions of employment). Coats (2006) notes that employer-union partnerships were able to provide reciprocal benefits to employers, trade unions and the broader economy. The benefits included financial savings on the part of employers, protection of jobs and enhanced service delivery.

Although the partnership model is associated with the above-mentioned benefits, it also has the potential to co-opt union leaders. Coats (2006) indicates that to
some extent trade unions in the UK perceived the partnership model as a method used by employers to get unions to support restructuring measures. However, he argues that in order for trade unions to benefit from this model, they need to build their own capacity. This entails being able to gather relevant information, solve problems, utilise ICTs, and promote gender equality. This revelation is vital because it shows how trade unions can make use of partnerships to achieve their objectives. Nonetheless, Coats’ (2006) analysis does not cover the experiences of developing countries.

In his book titled “Public Management and Administration: An Introduction,” Hughes (2003) introduces and assesses the principles and theories underlying changes in the management of the public sector.\textsuperscript{24} Although most of the chapters in the book dwell on the paradigm shift from the traditional model of public administration (based on the theory of bureaucracy) to NPM, there is a chapter on e-government. Hughes (2003) indicates that e-government had been embraced in countries such as USA, UK, Portugal, the Netherlands, Australia, Singapore and Canada. He shows that the taking up of ICTs by government promoted efficiency in the provision of public services. He cites the events in Australia, and reveals that not only did electronic filing of income-tax forms minimise the time but also significantly reduced the labour force required to work on the forms including data entry. These findings are significant because, first, they show that the government can adopt various types of ICTs including Computer-aided Design and automated systems to enhance efficiency in service delivery. Second, they show that ICTs can also be used to gather data and enhance monitoring and evaluation of public policies. Third, the findings show that automation of government operations leads to reductions in staffing levels, which in turn, reduce the size of the public sector. This outcome, therefore, would negatively affect the levels of trade union membership. However, Hughes (2003) does not cover the effects of e-government on trade unions.

\textsuperscript{24} The book relies on events in both advanced and developing countries. In terms of approach, the book concentrates on the broad international developments rather than individual national case studies.
In a related manner, an article by Li and Feeney (2014) examines factors that explain the adoption of two types of e-government technologies, namely, electronic services (e-services) and communication technologies. On the one hand, Li and Feeney (2014) perceive e-services as being services that are provided using electronic means. These services include online job applications and online payments. On the other hand, they perceive communication technologies as being technologies which enable stakeholders to be involved in one- and two-way communication. These technologies include social networking tools. The authors also reveal that although the requests by citizens influence the use of both e-services and communication technologies, the effect of external factors distinguishes the use of these two types of e-government technologies. In addition to the requests by citizens, external factors influence the take up of communication technologies. These findings are significant because they show that electronic technologies provide opportunities for government institutions to enhance their interaction with other stakeholders and to be responsive to people’s needs. Opportunities are also provided to improve performance in the area of financial management including debt management and cost reduction. This is possible through the use of prepaid systems in the delivery of services such as electricity, water and telecommunication, among others. These findings also imply that the social networks created by communication technologies can be harnessed to enhance union organisation. However, Li and Feeney (2014) do not discuss the implications of electronic technologies for the organisation of trade unions. Examples include the effects of business processing and automated systems on jobs, union membership, governance process and collective bargaining.

In his paper titled “The Advent of Open Source Unionism?” Freeman (2005) uses the Open Source (OS) model to examine the use of the Internet by unions in the 2000s in the USA and UK. The OS model of unionism is characterised by a heavy reliance on the Internet to perform union functions. The Internet is utilised

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25 The article uses data from a national random survey of 902 government managers from 500 local governments in the USA.
26 The paper is based on a review of Internet-based innovations including union websites.
for purposes of communication, networking and delivery of services to members (Freeman, 2005). Freeman (2005) indicates that the 2000s saw unions in the USA and UK starting to utilise the Internet in their operations. In his conclusion, he argues that attempts by these unions to utilise the Internet to meet the needs of their members in particular and workers in general had signaled the birth of OS unionism.

In the same vein, the paper by Saundry, Stuart and Antcliff (2007) titled “Broadcasting Discontent – Freelancers, Trade Unions and the Internet” examines the role of web-based networks. Saundry et al. (2007: 179) indicate that:

Over the last 20 years, a combination of increased competition and government re-regulation has transformed the audio-visual labour market from one characterised by stable-regulated employment into one in which around half of the available labour pool is made up of freelance workers.

Saundry et al. (2007) indicate that although this transformation had severely restricted the operations of trade unions, web-based networks enabled them to expand their operations. However, they also reveal that technology-based networks lead to the destruction of traditional structures of organisation.

The revelations by Freeman (2005) and Saundry et al. (2007) are vital because they show the opportunities that ICTs offer trade unions. These include the ability to extend membership, improve service provision, enhance communication, improve coordination, build solidarity, educate and train members, raise awareness, and have control over membership data. The ICTs also provide an opportunity for trade unions to enhance data gathering on various issues that affect their members such as wages and inflation. The availability of this information, in turn, helps the unions to enhance their bargaining power. Although

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27 The research paper adopted an intensive qualitative methodology and a flexible and inductive design. A sample of 36 freelance workers (comprising both males and females) in the UK audio-visual industries was used. A number of key informants (comprising representatives of trade unions and freelance networks) were also engaged. The research relied on in-depth interviews and an email questionnaire. The interviews took the forms of face-to-face and telephone interviews. Data analysis was done using NVivo data analysis software.
these revelations are vital, Freeman (2005) and Saundry et al. (2007) do not explain the strategies for addressing governance challenges presented by electronic technologies. Furthermore, they do not cover the experiences of trade unions in developing countries.

2.7.2 Implications for developing countries

The literature shows that post-NPM reforms have been implemented in developing countries as well. How, then, have these reforms affected the public sector and trade unions in these countries? McDonald and Ruiters (2012) present three options of public service delivery which are different from privatisation. These are delivery by state-owned institutions that are non-profit-making, delivery by non-state institutions that are non-profit-making, and delivery through partnerships between state-owned and non-state institutions that are non-profit-making. This implies that any form of profit-making whether by a state-owned or non-state organisation is viewed as privatisation while any form of non-profit-making is viewed as a substitute for privatisation. McDonald and Ruiters (2012) indicate that efforts had been made to deliver public services on non-commercial basis in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Two major factors affecting the effectiveness of non-profit service delivery have been identified. These are the coverage of service delivery and type of technology involved. In terms of coverage, wide-reaching deliveries help to reduce costs and to regulate the quality of services. However, such deliveries undermine stakeholder participation. In terms of technology, on the one hand, expensive technology may not be effective in the delivery of non-profitable services. On the other hand, accessible technology is effective in the delivery of non-profitable services (McDonald and Ruiters, 2012). This finding is relevant because it presents the substitutes for NPM reforms. The finding also implies that post-NPM reforms present new challenges for public sector unions. These include the need to relate with both the government and Non-governmental Organisations in the process of regulating the terms and conditions of employment. Nonetheless, McDonald and Ruiters (2012) can be criticised for limiting their analysis to three sectors, namely, health care,
water/sanitation, and electricity. They do not include other sectors such as education, transport and communication, among others.

Cherry (2006) indicates that COSATU’s alliance with the African National Congress (ANC) government had enabled it to participate in policy-making processes for the benefit of its members. These processes include parliamentary debates, deliberations of the National Economic Development and Labour Council, and deliberations of the Tripartite Alliance. The Tripartite Alliance is made up of the ruling party, the ANC, COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP). In addition, Cherry (2006) reveals that the democratisation process in South Africa had resulted in the upgrade of services, which could be accessed by workers. These services included clean water, housing, electricity and telephones. However, she also reveals that the South African government could not deal with the serious challenges of unemployment and decreasing incomes. This finding is significant because, first, it shows that partnerships with policy-makers enable trade unions to participate in the policy-making processes for the benefit of their members. Second, the finding shows that despite trade unions partnering with policy-makers, it is difficult to deal with the challenges of unemployment and decreasing incomes. Nonetheless, Cherry (2006) does not explain why the problems of unemployment and decreasing incomes cannot easily be resolved.

Plaut (2010) presents an article titled “South Africa – The ANC’s Difficult Allies.” Contrary to Cherry’s (2006) assertion that alliances are beneficial to trade union members, Plaut (2010) argues that the alliance of the ANC with COSATU, SACP and the South African National Civic Organisation had been characterised by fighting for dominance among the alliance partners. According to Plaut (2010: 201), to a great extent the fighting was centred on “jobs for friends and family, lucrative contracts and access to government funding.” This finding is significant because it shows that alliances can lead to the establishment of social compacts. The finding also shows that alliances can be captured by privileged

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28 The article relies on an analysis of secondary data.
actors so as to serve their own preferences. This implies that governance networks can be destructive to underprivileged actors. In this regard, trade unions are faced with a challenge of managing network relationships in a manner that enables them to secure benefits for their members. Although Plaut (2010) is significant in understanding the effects of governance networks on participating members, his focus is on the challenges presented to political parties by alliances. He does not specifically deal with the implications of governance networks for trade unions in either the public or private sector.

The other study worth noting is “A Preliminary Examination of Public Private Partnerships in National Park Management in Zambia” conducted by Pope (2006). Pope (2006) reveals that 42 percent of the national parks and 70 percent of the entire national park area in Zambia was managed using the strategy of PPP. Through this strategy, the Zambia Wildlife Authority was able to shift some of its functions to private partners. The private partners included private companies and Non-governmental Organisations. The shifted functions included routine management of the national parks, funding and arrangement of supplies for the operations of the parks for a specified period of time. Pope (2006) also identifies a number of advantages and disadvantages of PPPs in national park management. The advantages include the following: first, PPPs are able to alleviate the government from the pressures associated with wildlife management, thereby enabling it to concentrate on the issue of regulation. Second, PPPs promote competition, which in turn, improves the quality of wildlife management. Third, PPPs increase the sources of funding for wildlife management. On the negative side, he argues that smaller national parks tend to be less marketable, thereby making it difficult for the government to attract appropriate partners. This revelation is vital as it demonstrates the role played by PPPs in wildlife management. This revelation also means that PPPs make public sector unions to be under the control of employers from both the public and private sectors. This can be a challenge to a trade union that is used to dealing with one type of employer. However, despite this revelation, Pope (2006) does not discuss the effects of PPPs on trade unions.
Sumaili (2011) discusses the “Legal framework for the operation of Trade Unions in Zambia.” He notes that there are several laws both at national and international levels that regulate the activities of trade unions in Zambia. However, he argues that the effectiveness of the unions is constrained by the main domestic legislation dealing with trade union activities, which is the Industrial and Labour Relations Act. He illustrates this constraint through the following: first, he asserts that the Act provides for a lengthy time frame (i.e. six months) to finish the process of registering a trade union. Second, he argues that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to five groups of workers in the country. These are: employees in the Zambia Defence Force; Zambia Police Service; Zambia Prison Service; Zambia Security Intelligence Service; and Judges, Registrars of the Court, Magistrates and Local Court Justices. Third, he indicates that the Act empowers the responsible Minister to include other groups on the list of exempted workers. This means that trade unions are not allowed to organise these categories of workers in the public sector. This implies that the legal framework affects the categories and levels of union membership. It also implies that the legal framework affects the governance process and collective bargaining power of public sector unions. However, Sumaili (2011) can be criticised for confining his analysis to the legal framework that regulates the organisation of trade unions in Zambia. He does not cover the strategies adopted by the unions to achieve their goals in spite of government regulation.

Similarly, Sumaili (2012) presents a paper focusing on “Labour Legislation and Trade Union Organisation in the Third Republic” of Zambia. Sumaili (2012) argues that the amendments to the laws governing the establishment and operations of trade unions in Zambia had the tendency of incapacitating the unions. For example, he asserts that the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1997 promoted the formation of splinter unions with a smaller number of

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29 The paper is based on a review of changes in laws relating to the formation and organisation of trade unions. The reviewed laws include the Industrial Relations Act of 1990, the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993, the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1997, and the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 2008.
members and “a weaker financial base for all trade unions” (Sumaili, 2012: 18). He also asserts that the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 2008 had empowered the Department of Labour and the Minister in charge to determine the operations of trade unions rather than allowing the membership to manage their own activities. This revelation is important because it shows how government control influences the formation, membership levels, governance and collective bargaining power of trade unions. However, like Sumaili (2011), Sumaili (2012) can be criticised for confining his analysis to the legal framework that regulates the organisation of trade unions in Zambia. He does not discuss the strategies adopted by the unions to achieve their objectives within the context of government regulation.

2.8 Summary

The reviewed literature shows that a number of governments in both developed and developing countries have been reforming their public sector since the 1980s so as to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the economy in general and the public sector in particular. The literature also shows that there have been two generations of PSR. These are NPM and post-NPM reforms. On the one hand, NPM emphasises reorganisation of the public sector using strategies such as decentralisation, privatisation, commercialisation, competition, flexibility and performance-based rewards. On the other hand, post-NPM emphasises reorganisation of the public sector using strategies such as centralisation, coordination, partnerships, governance networks and e-government.

In addition, the literature shows that the implementation of NPM resulted in a fragmented and incompetent public sector. This, in turn, led to the fragmentation of trade unions in the public sector. However, the literature shows that the unions attempted to strengthen themselves by diversifying the membership. This, in turn, presented challenges for union governance and collective bargaining. There was need to transform governance structures and collective bargaining strategies to meet the needs of a diverse membership.
The literature also indicates that in order to deal with the problems presented by NPM and to adapt to the changing environment, post-NPM reforms have been adopted. Under post-NPM, the emphasis is on stakeholder collaboration in the processes of policy formulation and implementation. Nevertheless, the implementation of post-NPM has led to the establishment of a public sector that serves the interests of privileged actors in the governance network. This presents challenges for trade unions in the public sector. The challenges include how to mobilise the membership, govern the union and conduct collective bargaining in a manner that enables the unions to achieve their objectives.

However, despite there being a great deal of literature on PSR and trade unions, the literature is not comprehensive. It does not specifically discuss the implications of post-NPM reforms for trade unions in the public sector. The thesis, therefore, attempts to fill this gap by examining the implications of PSR for the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia in Lusaka district. The theoretical framework guiding the analysis is presented in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter reviewed literature on the concept of Public Sector Reform (PSR) and its implications for trade unions in the public sector. The chapter revealed that despite there being a great deal of literature on PSR and trade unions, it is not comprehensive. The existing literature does not specifically discuss the implications of post-New Public Management (post-NPM) reforms for trade unions in the public sector. The chapter also indicated that the thesis attempts to fill this gap in literature by examining the implications of PSR for the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) in Lusaka district.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical framework guiding the analysis of the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector. To achieve its purpose, the chapter is divided into nine sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section is a presentation of the main argument of the thesis. The third section is an examination of the approaches to industrial relations. The fourth section is an examination of the theories of industrial relations. The fifth section is an examination of the perspectives on trade union structure. The sixth section is an analysis of the perspectives on union governance. The seventh section is an analysis of the perspectives on collective bargaining structure. The eighth section is a presentation of the theoretical framework of the thesis. The final section is a summary.

3.2 The main argument of the thesis

The main argument of the thesis is that the reorganisation of the public sector workplace, through the implementation of PSR strategies, impacts on the employment relationship, which in turn, negatively affects trade unions in the public sector. The affected areas include membership, governance process, and collective bargaining. This, in turn, forces the unions to make strategic decisions
so as to adapt to the changing circumstances. These decisions range from short to long-term decisions.

The understanding of the employment relationship in a reformed public sector can be greatly enhanced through the examination of the approaches and theories of industrial relations (i.e. employer-employee relations). In addition, it is important to examine the perspectives on trade union structure, union governance, and collective bargaining structure. These approaches, theories and perspectives are examined below.

3.3 Approaches to industrial relations

Before examining the approaches to industrial relations, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the concept of industrial relations. According to Deery and Plowman (1985: 3):

> in its broadest sense industrial relations is about the behaviour and interaction of people at work. It is concerned with how individuals, groups, organisations and institutions make decisions which shape the employment relationship between management and labour.

The parties involved in this process include “workers and their unions, employers and their associations and the institutions which are established to regulate the relations between the two parties” (Deery and Plowman, 1985: 3). The employment relationship is regulated by policies and rules that are made by the parties involved in industrial relations either jointly or individually. The “rules determine rates of pay, hours of work, job descriptions and many other aspects of employment” (Edwards, 1995: 5). The other terms that are sometimes used interchangeably with industrial relations are labour relations, employee relations, and employment relations.

There are three prominent approaches to the study of industrial relations. These are unitary, pluralist and radical approaches. This categorisation of industrial relations approaches was originally done by Fox (1974) through his concept of
“frames of reference” in industrial relations. According to Skolnik (1988: 87), “frames of reference are perspectives through which people perceive and define social and organizational realities, and these perceptions and definitions shape their behaviour.” The details of these approaches are presented below.

3.3.1 Unitary approach

The unitary approach views relations in society in general and industry in particular as being characterised by unity. The leading proponents of this view include Parsons (1964) and Drucker (1986). According to Parsons (1964), society is a system that consists of interrelated components working towards a common goal. He also argues that centralisation of power plays a vital role in maintaining social order. In the case of industrial relations, unitarism gives managers the power to regulate the relations. Drucker (1986) argues that the task of management is supposed to be performed by a single person. For Drucker (1986), a manager is not supposed to be engaged in constant consultations with other stakeholders. Instead, he/she must perform his/her task independently.

Unitarism also takes a paternalistic view on employee welfare. Because of its emphasis on unification, this approach does not recognise the existence of conflict between parties in the organisation. As such, trade unionism is viewed as unnecessary. This approach also justifies the use of force in the process of managing employees (Fox, 1973, 1974).

Nevertheless, unitarism has been criticised by pluralists such as Clegg (1975). According to Clegg (1975), society is not governed by the principle of centralisation of authority. For him, governance involves agreements made by different parties with competing interests and values. Another criticism is presented by Green (1991) who argues that unitarism holds an artificial view of industrial relations. According to Green (1991), organisations are characterised by conflict.
3.3.2 Pluralist approach

As opposed to unitarists, pluralists view relations in society in general and industry in particular as being characterised by conflicts of interest. Scholars holding this view include Commons (1924) and Clegg (1975). Commons (1924) asserts that society is made up of several parties that fight against each other so as to satisfy their own desires. He further argues that this kind of interaction is governed by agreed-upon rules. This means that the competing parties make concessions in the process of pursuing their goals. According to Fox (1974: 261), “management is seen as making its decisions within a set of constraints which include employees, consumers, suppliers, government, the law, the local community, and sources of finance.” In this process, managers are seen to be interested in the profitability of the organisation (Clegg, 1975).

Pluralism perceives trade unions as important players in the process of regulating relations in society in general and industry in particular. According to Clegg (1975: 311), “Trade unions operate as pressure groups both in politics and in industrial relations.” He argues that, in these relations, the interests of trade unions include improved wages and job security.

Pluralism also views collective bargaining as a vital component of industrial relations. Clegg (1975) indicates that competing parties settle their disputes through negotiations and agreements. In addition, he asserts that the parties that are engaged in collective bargaining have the responsibility of keeping their agreements. This process is seen as the basis of social cohesion in a plural society (Clegg, 1975).

However, the pluralist approach has been criticised by scholars such as Fox (1973), Blyton and Turnbull (1998) and Fenley (2009). Fox (1973: 206) argues that pluralism “obscures the domination of society by its ruling strata through institutions and assumptions which operate to exclude anything approaching a genuine power balance.” Blyton and Turnbull (1998) assert that although
pluralism acknowledges the existence of different interests and conflict in the workplace, it does not explain the cause of the conflict. Fenley (2009) argues that pluralism fails to adequately explain the issue of power and its purpose both within organisations and the whole society.

3.3.3 Radical approach

The radical approach is based mainly on the work of Karl Marx as regards the organisation of the workplace within capitalist societies (Abbott, 2006). To explain the employment relationship, Marxism begins with the assumption that the workplace in particular and the capitalist society in general are divided into two classes which constantly oppose each other. According to Marx and Engels (1986: 35), “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.” These struggles take place between the persecutor and the persecuted who continuously act against each other. They argue that in the present-day “bourgeois society”, class hostilities occur between two classes, namely, “Bourgeoisie” and “Proletariat.”

They also argue that the bourgeoisie has captured the State so as to serve its own interests. In addition, they view the modern industry as being characterised by exploitation of the worker by the capitalist employer. According to Marx (1976), capital exploits labour-power so as to produce surplus-value. Surplus-value is then transformed into more capital (i.e. capital accumulation), which in turn exploits more labour-power to produce more surplus-value. This is considered to be a continuous process. Marx sees this process as being the source of class struggle between capital and labour. He argues that, on the one hand, the class of capitalists fights to exploit labour. It does so by trying to extend the working day, and, when it is feasible, expand the workload without a corresponding rise in payments. On the other hand, the working class fights against capitalist exploitation. It does so by trying to shorten the working day and minimise the workload without lowering of payments.
According to Marx (1976), the formation of trade unions is inevitable in the class struggle between capital and labour. He argues that “the value of labour-power constitutes the conscious and explicit foundation of the trade unions” (Marx, 1976: 1069 [original emphasis]). He views the aim of trade unions as being to challenge the power of capital, increase the value of labour-power and achieve an increase in real wages. He further argues that the struggle against capitalist exploitation would then be transformed into a struggle to overthrow capitalism and the eventual establishment of a classless society.

Nonetheless, Marxism has not been without its critics. One criticism is from Farnham and Pimlott (1990) who consider Marxism to be an out-dated ideology. They argue that Marxist assumptions could probably interpret nineteenth century Victorian capitalism, not the complex political, economic and social conflicts that characterise contemporary society. In their view, contemporary society can be explained in terms of mixed economy, welfare state and political democracy as opposed to market capitalism. The other criticism is presented by Blyton and Turnbull (1998: 27) who argue that the Marxist view of capitalist societies as being divided into two major classes cannot easily explain “the growth of a substantial proportion of the labour force occupying ‘intermediate’ positions in the occupational structure – administrative, middle managerial and professional positions.”

3.4 Theories of industrial relations

There are a number of theories of industrial relations informed by the above-mentioned approaches. The main ones include Human Resource Management (HRM), systems, strategic choice and labour process theories. The details of these theories are examined below.
3.4.1 Human Resource Management theory

Human Resource Management (HRM) is one of the theories influenced by the unitary approach. The HRM is a new model of personnel management that emerged in the 1980s (Farnham and Pimlott, 1990). One of the leading scholars in this field is Michael Armstrong, who defines HRM as “a strategic, integrated and coherent approach to the employment, development and well-being of the people working in organizations” (Armstrong, 2009: 4). According to Armstrong (2009), this theory emphasises management-employee mutuality, commitment to the organisation, and making the best use of the available resources to achieve the goals of the organisation. This theory also emphasises human resources planning, monitoring, control, managing employees individually, and cooperative employee relations. It “seeks to get the right quantity of human resource skills within organizations, at the right price, without taking a patronizing interest in employees’ personal affairs” (Farnham and Pimlott, 1990: 70). According to Blyton and Turnbull (1998), HRM’s emphasis on the management of individuals and achievement of broader organisational goals marginalises the roles of trade unions and collective bargaining.

Nevertheless, HRM has been criticised by scholars such as Evans (1999) and Watson (2004). According to Evans (1999), HRM fails to deal with opposing forces that characterise the management of organisations. These include centralisation versus decentralisation, teamwork versus individual performance, change versus continuity, long-term versus short-term goals, and consultation versus managerial prerogative, among others. Watson (2004) criticises HRM for paying little attention to the political and economic contexts within which managers operate.

3.4.2 Systems theory

Systems theory draws on the assumptions of the pluralist approach. This theory was initiated by John T. Dunlop in 1958. It was later revised and further
developed by other scholars such as Wood, Wagner, Armstrong, Goodman and Davis (1975) and Salamon (2000). Systems theory focuses on how the elements of society interact to produce rules that govern industrial relations. Salamon (2000) presents a two-level system of industrial relations. The first level takes a narrow perspective of the industrial relations system. It focuses on the rule-making process. This level emphasises the existence of inputs (in form of conflict), internal rules, outputs (in form of substantive rules), and the productive system. The second level takes a wider perspective of the industrial relations system. It considers the contexts within which rules are made. This level emphasises the interactions among participants (including management, employees and unions as well as government and state agencies), and the interests, functions and decisions of these participants. It also emphasises the contextual influences on the decisions and actions of the participants. These include political, social, market, technological and economic influences. According to Blyton and Turnbull (1998: 21), this process results in rules that “can be made jointly (through collective bargaining or custom and practice) or unilaterally (through managerial prerogative, trade union regulation or statutory imposition).” The rules may cover pay and conditions of employment, disciplinary matters, working methods as well as rights and duties of employers and employees (Farnham and Pimlott, 1990).

However, there are criticisms levelled against systems theory. According to Hameed (1982), the actors in industrial relations do not always have a shared ideology, as assumed by the systems theory. For instance, the interests of workers in matters relating to income, power or industrial harmony would be different from those of management and government. In the same vein, Kochan, McKersie and Cappelli (1983) indicate that the actors may have a shared ideology at the level of collective bargaining but their decisions could be different at other levels of industrial relations activity. Hameed (1982) also argues that the systems theory does not explain the behaviour of actors in the industrial relations system. Furthermore, Hameed (1982) asserts that the systems theory cannot predict the transformation of industrial relations.
3.4.3 Strategic choice theory

Like systems theory, strategic choice theory draws on pluralist assumptions about the nature of industrial relations. Strategic choice theory was proposed by Kochan et al. (1983) based on the reorganisation of the United States (US) industrial relations system. This theory was later revised and further developed by Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1994). The reformed US industrial relations system was characterised by features such as compromises in the areas of rewards, work arrangements, and job security in considerable industries. The other reforms included managers’ resistance of trade unions, unionism being associated with industries, firms and plants that had been in existence for a longer period of time, growth of nonunionised workplaces, dwindling union memberships, appearance of new ways of employee participation, new ways of organising work, and the quality of terms and conditions of employment becoming poorer (Kochan et al., 1983; Kochan et al., 1994). Strategic choice theory tries to explain these changes by attaching the concept of strategy or strategic choice to the systems theory. The concept of strategy can be defined as “a set of decision making and behavioural processes within organizations directed at securing objectives” (Gahan, 1998: 7).

The major assumption of strategic choice theory is that “industrial relations processes and outcomes are determined by a continuously evolving interaction of environmental pressures and organizational responses” (Kochan et al., 1994: 13 [original emphasis]). This means that strategic decisions of the main actors in industrial relations are affected by adjustments in the external environment. These adjustments include changes in the labour markets (competitive or noncompetitive), product markets (competitive or noncompetitive), technology (i.e. launch of new technology), and public policies (emphasising protection or free market). The main actors in industrial relations are employers, trade unions and government. Strategic choice theory assumes that when these actors get affected by the reform of industrial relations, they make strategic choices to achieve their goals. These choices are made at three levels of industrial relations activity. These are:
Decisions that are made at the top level of industrial relations activity focus on long-term strategies and policies of the actors. The strategies of employers at this level include business, investment and human resource strategies such as adoption of new technology, insourcing, outsourcing, reinvestment, relocation, acceptance of unionism or prevention of unionism. For trade unions, their strategies at this level include political participation and union organisation strategies such as alliances with political parties and similar pressure groups or corporate campaigns. For government, its strategies at this level include economic and social policies such as protection or free market policies (Kochan et al., 1983; Kochan et al., 1994).

Decisions that are made at the middle level of industrial relations activity relate to medium-term strategies and policies of the actors. The strategies of employers at this level include personnel management and collective bargaining strategies such as centralising or decentralising the structure of collective bargaining. For trade unions, their strategies at this level include collective bargaining strategies such as centralising or decentralising the structure of collective bargaining. For government, its strategies at this level focus on labour laws such as income or dispute resolution policies (Kochan et al., 1983; Kochan et al., 1994).

Decisions that are made at the bottom level of industrial relations activity relate to short-term strategies and policies of the actors. At this level, employer strategies focus on the management style (emphasising a bureaucratic or decentralised style) and job design (emphasising individual or group work). In the case of trade unions, their strategies at this level focus on employee participation and job design policies. In the case of government, its strategies at this level relate to
employment standards and policies dealing with workers’ rights (Kochan et al., 1983; Kochan et al., 1994).

Strategic choice theory also considers employers to be the prime movers of the reform of industrial relations. The theory argues that employers are influenced by adjustments in the external environment to adjust their business strategies. The theory argues that in the process of making strategic choices, employers take into consideration the environmental forces, their own management principles, and their relationships with the other industrial relations actors. The relationships with the other actors are taken into consideration because of issues of common interest. For instance, all the three actors are concerned with the issue of employee participation. There are also issues that may affect two actors only. For example, employers and trade unions are concerned with issues of new technology, collective bargaining and job design. Employers and the government are concerned with issues relating to productivity. Trade unions and the government are interested in issues relating to incomes and workers’ rights. In this regard, employers take into consideration the strategic decisions of the other actors on these issues so that they can make their own strategies to achieve their objectives. The strategic decisions are made at any level of industrial relations activity, namely, top, middle or bottom level (Kochan et al., 1983; Kochan et al., 1994).

In addition, strategic choice theory argues that when trade unions and government get affected by employer strategies, they also make strategic choices to achieve their goals. The other assumption of this theory is that the effects of strategic decisions can be felt at any level of industrial relations activity. These effects include reorganisation of responsibilities and/or relationships among the players in the industrial relations system (Kochan et al., 1983; Kochan et al., 1994).

However, there are criticisms that have been levelled against strategic choice theory. Edwards (1995) presents the following as criticisms of strategic choice theory: first, he argues that strategic choice theory does not explain issues of conflict and dependence which bring together the parties to industrial relations.
Second, he argues that strategic choice theory does not adequately explain the role of the state in industrial relations. Third, he asserts that the structure of strategic choice does not indicate the nature of choices made by the actors. Sisson and Marginson (1995) have criticised strategic choice theory for assuming that the process of strategy formulation is easy. Their argument is that “strategy is a most problematic concept” (Sisson and Marginson, 1995: 93). They indicate that strategy formulation involves a number of issues that should be taken into consideration. These include decision-making at various levels in the organisation, and constant scrutiny and revision of stance. Sisson and Marginson (1995) further criticise strategic choice theory for assuming that managers, to some extent, have the ability to make choices. They oppose this assumption, and argue that choices are affected by structures within which they are utilised.

3.4.4 Labour process theory

Labour process theory was developed by Braverman (1974). This theory has been influenced by Marxist assumptions. Drawing on these assumptions, labour process theory presents an explanation of the development of production and labour processes in a capitalist society. It begins with the assumption that the labour process is dominated and shaped by the interest of capital expansion and profit creation. This process is seen to strive through management control over labour. In this process, the capitalist takes human labour as an essential resource for the purposes of expanding his capital. Labour is then purchased and managed in such a way that the capitalist is able to maximise the value of his capital. The theory argues that in order for labour to be exploited, the capitalist cheapens its power. To achieve this, the industry is organised using the principle of division of labour. Through this principle, labour is divided in a manner that desskills the worker and puts him/her under the capitalist’s own control. The theory also argues that the capitalist continues to manipulate the worker so that he/she adapts to the conditions of capitalism. This is done through economic forces, and employment and bargaining policies. The theory further argues that the increased use of
machines in the industry is aimed at making workers lose control over their own labour and to increase productivity (Braverman, 1974).

Nonetheless, labour process theory has not been without its critics. Attewell (1987) argues that Braverman was inaccurate to associate the current phase of capitalism with deskilling. According to Attewell (1987), the conditions under which managers operate make it difficult for them to deskill workers. In a similar manner, Adler (2007) asserts that, over a long period of time, capitalism leads to skill development.

3.5 Trade union structure

The term trade union structure may be defined as “those sections of the labour force which a given organization seeks to recruit” (McCarthy, 1985: 125). According to McCarthy (1985), trade unions use different patterns of membership recruitment. These include confining their recruitment to specific occupations, industries, sectors or organising over a very large area. Clegg (1976) presents a theory of the determinants of union structure, and reveals that union structure is not static. He argues that “trade union types are the products of technological change and the new forms of industrial organization which it brings” (Clegg, 1976: 127). Based on this theory, he contends that the industrial revolution led to the formation of craft and promotion unions; mass production led to the establishment of industrial and general unions; and large-scale organisations of the twentieth century led to the development of white-collar unions. He further asserts that whichever structure a union takes, its firmness depends on employers or the state recognising it in the process of collective bargaining.

However, the classification of trade unions based on the categories of occupational, industrial and general unions has been criticised for being inadequate to describe the different forms that trade unionism may take. According to Turner (1962), the categories of craft or occupational, industrial and general unions do not adequately explain the current form of trade unions. Instead,
they may occasionally portray the union’s initial structure or former organisational belief. In a similar vein, Hughes (1966) argues that the categories of general, craft, and industrial unionism are inadequate to explain the structure of several large unions. According to Salamon (2000: 158), the categorisation of craft, industrial and general unions was the ideological discourse “that characterised the development of trade unions during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”

The diverse forms that trade union structure may assume have been discussed by several scholars. Jeong and Aguilera (2008) argue that the Japanese union structure had been characterised by a transition from industrial, general, and craft unions to enterprise unions (i.e. limiting union membership to employees of an enterprise or company). According to Jeong and Aguilera (2008), enterprise unionism emerged because horizontal unionism (unionism beyond the enterprise) had been eliminated by the Japanese state. Hughes (1966: 90) identifies general-sectoral unions to refer to “unions that have been based on a particular sector historically, but may take a wide definition of what that sector is, and readily extend into ‘allied fields’.”

Turner (1962) suggests an easy categorisation of open and closed unions. The category of open unions, on the one hand, is applied to unions that “recruit all workers in those occupations whom the employers themselves engage” (Turner, 1962: 98). He views such unions as having an expansionist inclination and dependence on the increased membership for bargaining power. On the other hand, the category of closed unions is applied to unions that not only “control the supply of labour to particular occupations” but also restrict union membership (Turner, 1962: 99). Nonetheless, Hyman (1975) argues that the two opposing views of open and closed unions exist in thought and are rarely achieved in actual terms. According to Hyman (1975: 41), trade union structure is not fixed but that it is a process that involves efforts to strike a balance between two opposing forces: “on the one hand towards breadth, unity and solidarity; on the other towards parochialism, sectionalism and exclusiveness. The one tendency
encourages unionism which is open and expansive; the other, unionism which is closed and restrictive.” He adds that because of the struggle between unity and division, union structure is constantly changing.

Similarly, Salamon (2000: 163) argues that many trade unions can be understood using the concept of hybrid unions: “open in certain directions and closed in others.” Streeck and Visser (1997: 305) assert that trade unions in developed countries were “in a process of regrouping, through bargaining cartels, mergers and take-overs.” They further argue that this kind of union regrouping had resulted in the rise of conglomerate unions, whose membership cut across sectoral and occupational boundaries. Freeman and Rogers (2002) consider the restricted definition of membership to be hindering the expansion and power of trade unions in America. To address this problem, they have proposed Open-source Unionism (OSU). By OSU, they refer to a practice where a trade union recruits a variety of new members, and depends to a great degree on the Internet to communicate and deliver services to them.

The advantages and disadvantages of open and expansive unionism have been widely debated. The major advantage put forward for this type of unionism is that it increases the membership and bargaining power of the union (Freeman and Rogers, 2002; Undy, 2008).

On the other hand, the disadvantages of open and expansive unionism include the following: first, it complicates collective bargaining by requiring the diversification of policies to accommodate the needs of new union members (Streeck and Visser, 1997; Waddington, 2005). Second, it presents challenges for union governance. This is because of the need to include new layers to represent new members (Undy, 2008). Third, recruitment of new members puts pressure on union resources (Undy, 2008). Fourth, open and expansive unionism promotes inter-union competition, “with all unions poised in principle to claim jurisdiction in any economic sector and to enter the territory, actual or potential, of any other union” (Streeck and Visser, 1997: 326).
3.6 Union governance

The term union governance relates to the management of union activities and relationships. It includes the roles of the leadership and the membership in directing union activities, and the extent to which union policies and decisions reflect the interests of the membership (Salamon, 2000). There are a number of perspectives on union governance. According to Michels’ (1915) iron law of oligarchy, all voluntary democratic organisations (including trade unions) are characterised by an oligarchical structure where the leaders have almost unlimited power over the masses. The existence of this style of governance is attributed to the complicated tasks of administration that need to be performed by expert leadership. Michels (1915) further argues that by controlling the choices of the masses and giving authority to leaders, the oligarchical structure results in the elimination of the fundamental proposition of democracy.

However, Michels’ (1915) iron law of oligarchy has been criticised for failing to represent modern democratic organisations (Van de Vall, 1970). According to Van de Vall (1970), trade unions are polyarchic organisations that comprise powerful leaders, submissive members, and militant members. He further argues that “by their two-way communication within the organization (controlling from members to leaders and informing from leaders to members), they act as its democratic core” (Van de Vall, 1970: 153). This argument is supported by Hyman (1975: 73 [original emphasis]) who posits that trade unions “explicitly incorporate a two-way system of control.” He asserts that sometimes union officials are allowed to control the members while other times the members are allowed to control the officials.

Nonetheless, Levi, Olson, Agnone and Kelly (2009) have criticised the polyarchic organisation of trade unions for not being enough to prevent the development of oligarchy. This criticism is based on the argument that it is rare for trade union leaders to strike a balance between delivering results and being democratically responsive to their members (Levi et al., 2009). As such, Levi et al. (2009: 206)
suggest an alternative perspective, which not only requires procedural democracy (the existence of electoral institutions) but also insists on participatory democracy (“active membership that understands the procedures and can use them to their advantage”).

On the contrary, Undy, Ellis, McCarthy and Halmos (1981) have criticised the classification of union governance structures based on the degrees of democracy or oligarchy. First, they argue that this kind of classification does not help to understand the responsiveness of leaders to their members. Second, they argue that the emphasis on participatory democracy does not help to analyse how union governance structures change over time. Third, they argue that a union may have different decision-making systems at each level of the governance structure. Based on these arguments, Undy et al. (1981) advance the following typology: first, they make a division between centralised and decentralised union governance. By centralised union, they refer to a union that “retains a greater degree of national control over a larger number of issues than other unions with which it is compared” (Undy et al., 1981: 174). By decentralised union, on the other hand, they refer to a union that “devolves more issues than other unions down to its lowest level of decision-making” (Undy et al., 1981: 174). Second, they differentiate between diffused and concentrated decision-making at each level of union governance, which include national, regional, district and shop floor levels. Third, they make a division between procedures for decision-making that deal with collective bargaining and non-bargaining matters.

Nevertheless, Hyman (1994) argues that the operations of large national organisations are not just based on unplanned decentralisation but also on coordination and strategic planning. He further indicates that some European unions had been looking for other ways of organisation that would balance the needs of leadership and democracy. In this regard, there was:

Experimentation with networks, working groups or discussion circles . . . partly to meet the needs of more member-friendly organization, but also to rebuild a relationship between leaders,
activists and ordinary members in ways which make strategic initiative effective because democratically developed (Hyman, 1994: 124-125).

The advantages of union democracy have also been debated. Hyman (1994) presents the following as advantages of governing trade unions according to democratic principles: first, he argues that membership participation enables trade unions to represent the interests of their members. Second, he argues that active membership participation enhances the capacity to mobilise collective resources such as power in support of trade unions’ interests.

Nonetheless, some criticisms have been levelled against union democracy. They include the following: first, it is assumed that the masses tend to lack the appropriate skills to deal with multiple problems facing trade unions (Michels, 1915; Van de Vall, 1970). Second, it is assumed that union democracy is susceptible to uncontrollable commands from the general membership, which can lead to excessive stress on the leadership (Wood and Dibben, 2006).

3.7 Collective bargaining structure

The term collective bargaining structure can be defined as “the scope of the employees and employers covered or affected by the bargaining agreement” (Katz, Kochan and Colvin, 2008: 177). According to Bendix (2010), the elements of a bargaining structure include bargaining units and bargaining levels. By bargaining unit, she refers to “the employees who will be covered by an agreement” (Bendix, 2010: 265). She argues that following the establishment of the bargaining unit, bargaining levels are determined. Bargaining levels relate to “the decision as to whether bargaining will take place at a decentralised level or at a more centralised level or at different levels where different issues are concerned” (Bendix, 2010: 265).

Various types of bargaining structure have been presented by different scholars. Salamon (2000: 346) distinguishes between “national multi-employer bargaining”
and “single-employer enterprise or organisational-level bargaining.” By national multi-employer bargaining, he refers to “a form of external regulation of the individual organisation or enterprise” (Salamon, 2000: 346). By single-employer organisational-level bargaining, he refers to a structure whereby the bargaining process is controlled within an institution. Salamon (2000) further subdivides national multi-employer bargaining into economy-wide bargaining and industry-or sectoral-level bargaining. On the one hand, he applies economy-wide bargaining to negotiations that take place at national level involving many employers and covering various categories of employees in various industries or sectors of the economy. On the other hand, he applies industry- or sectoral-level bargaining to negotiations that take place at national level involving many employers but covering a specific category of employees in a particular industry or sector.

In addition, Salamon (2000) subdivides single-employer organisational-level bargaining into three levels. The first level is company-level bargaining. This level of bargaining involves one employer and covers employees within a company, enterprise or organisation. The second level is plant- or site-level bargaining. Bargaining at this level involves one employer and covers employees at a particular plant or site within an enterprise or organisation. The third level is department-level bargaining. This level of bargaining involves one employer and covers employees in a particular department within an enterprise or organisation.

For Katz et al. (2008), a bargaining structure has two key features. These are the representation of employees in the bargaining unit, and the representation of employers in the same bargaining unit. They argue that the representation of employees in the bargaining unit may take two forms. These are narrow and broad bargaining units. A narrow bargaining unit represents only a particular group of employees while a broad bargaining unit represents various groups of employees. In the case of the representation of employers in the bargaining unit, they argue that it may take three forms. These are multi-employer (centralised bargaining
Based on the above-mentioned features, Katz et al. (2008) identify six types of bargaining structure. The first is broad centralised bargaining: – this is established when a single collective bargaining agreement covers the interests of different groups of employees across the various plants of a number of employers. Second is narrow centralised bargaining: – in this instance, a single agreement covers a particular group of employees in a number of companies. Third is broad intermediate bargaining: – this is established when a single agreement covers multiple categories of employees across various work sites of one company. Fourth is narrow intermediate bargaining: – this structure is established when a single agreement covers employees with a particular skill across various work sites of one employer. Fifth is broad decentralised bargaining: – in this instance, a union negotiates a single contract to cover the interests of different groups of employees in one plant. Sixth is narrow decentralised bargaining: – this structure exists when a union negotiates a contract to cover employees with a particular skill in one plant.

There is also a great deal of literature on the advantages and disadvantages of centralised and decentralised bargaining structures. The following are the advantages of a centralised bargaining structure: first, industry-wide bargaining prevents wage-based competition between both employees and employers, which in turn, enables uniform standards of employment to be established across organisations (Bendix, 2010; Salamon, 2000). Second, centralised bargaining enables unions to increase their bargaining power (Schnabel, Zagelmeyer and Kohaut, 2006). Third, a centralised bargaining structure allows the bargaining parties to save on bargaining costs (Hendricks and Kahn, 1982).

On the other hand, the disadvantages of centralised bargaining include the following: first, the results of centralised bargaining may not be in line with the interests of employees of particular organisations (Schnabel et al., 2006). Second,
centralised bargaining undermines democratic governance in trade unions (Bendix, 2010; Zagelmeyer, 2007).

The following are the advantages of a decentralised bargaining structure: first, in the case of managers, it gives them power to regulate the employment relationship (Zagelmeyer, 2007). Second, decentralisation promotes democratic governance in trade unions (Bendix, 2010). Third, decentralised bargaining provides an opportunity for collective agreements that serve the interests of employees (Zagelmeyer, 2007).

On the other hand, the disadvantages of decentralised bargaining include the following: first, it allows the terms and conditions of employment to vary from one organisation to another (Schnabel et al., 2006). This, in turn, can lead to internal divisions in the unions. Second, while decentralised bargaining enables management to regulate the employment relationship, it weakens the union (Zagelmeyer, 2007). Third, it is not easy to coordinate various bargaining units which characterise decentralised bargaining (Salamon, 2000).

However, Gollbach and Schulten (2000) reveal that the arrival of international competition led to new macroeconomic conditions with notable effects on collective bargaining. These effects included reductions in wages and conditions of service. To overcome these effects, Gollbach and Schulten (2000) indicate that European trade unions had formed cross-border collective bargaining networks to coordinate collective bargaining within the European Monetary Union. The networks emphasised collaboration in the process of collective bargaining. Nonetheless, Gollbach and Schulten (2000) reveal that there are organisational challenges associated with cross-border collective bargaining networks. These include external participants not being knowledgeable of the local bargaining procedures, and employers not being supportive of inter-union collaboration.
3.8 Theoretical framework of the thesis

The thesis’ theoretical framework consists of three major variables. These are:

- **External environment:** - this is expressed in terms of labour markets, product markets, technology, and public policies that affect the employment relationship.

- **Key industrial relations actors’ interrelationships:** - these are expressed in terms of the links among the government, employers and trade unions in the process of pursuing their goals. These relationships may take two forms, namely, tripartite and bipartite relationships. Tripartite relationships involve all the three actors relating with each other at the same time while bipartite relationships involve the links between two actors only.

- **Actors’ strategic choices:** - these are expressed in terms of strategic decisions that are made by the government, employers and trade unions in the process of pursuing their goals. Government strategies include economic, social and labour policies. Employer strategies include business, investment, human resource, collective bargaining, management and job design strategies. Trade union strategies include membership recruitment, union structure, governance, collective bargaining and job design strategies.

The links among these variables are shown in Figure 3.1, which is a pictorial presentation of the thesis’ theoretical framework. The theoretical framework draws on the following: first, it draws on the assumptions of the pluralist approach to industrial relations, and not the unitary or radical approach. The pluralist approach has been adopted because it helps explain the recent evolution of industrial relations. In this regard, the theoretical framework relies largely on the assumptions of the strategic choice theory. The other theories have been left out because they are associated with conditions that are somewhat constant and cannot easily explain the evolution of industrial relations (Kochan et al., 1983).
Second, the theoretical framework draws on Hyman’s (1975) perspective on trade union structure. This perspective has been chosen because it shows that trade union structure is not fixed but that it is constantly changing. Third, the theoretical framework relies on the typology of union governance presented by Undy et al. (1981). This typology has been adopted because it reveals that a trade union may have different decision-making systems at each level of the governance structure. Fourth, the theoretical framework has chosen the classification of collective bargaining structures presented by Katz et al. (2008). This classification has been chosen because it is more comprehensive than what other scholars have presented.

**Figure 3.1: Thesis’ theoretical framework**

- **External environment** (i.e. labour markets, product markets, technology, and public policies)

  - **Government**
    - Actors’ strategic choices
      - **Government**: economic, social and labour policies
      - **Employers**: business, investment, human resource, collective bargaining, management and job design strategies
      - **Trade unions**: membership recruitment, union structure, governance, collective bargaining and job design strategies

Source: Author’s own illustration
The applicability of this theoretical framework to PSR and its implications for trade unions in the public sector is as follows: first, there are environmental forces that influence employers in the public sector to make strategic choices concerning the management of public institutions. These forces include changes in the labour markets (competitive or noncompetitive), product markets (competitive or noncompetitive), technology (i.e. launch of new technology), and public policies (emphasising protection or free market). In this regard, public sector employers are forced to make strategies to reform public institutions so that they adapt to the changing environment. The strategies are made at three levels of industrial relations activity. These are long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels. The long-term strategies of employers include business, investment and human resource strategies such as adoption of new technology, insourcing, outsourcing, reinvestment, relocation, acceptance of unionism or prevention of unionism. Their strategies at the level of collective bargaining include narrowing or broadening the bargaining unit, and centralising or decentralising the bargaining unit. Their strategies at the workplace level include adopting a bureaucratic or decentralised style of management, and emphasising individual or group work.

Second, in the process of making their strategies, public sector employers take into consideration not only the forces from the external environment but also their own management principles, and their interrelationships with the other key industrial relations actors, who include public sector unions and government agencies. The interrelationships among these actors may take two major forms, namely, tripartite and bipartite relationships. Tripartite relationships involve all the three actors relating with each other at the same time while bipartite relationships involve the links between two actors only. Bipartite relationships may take three forms. These are employer-union relationship, employer-government relationship, and union-government relationship. These relationships are taken into consideration when making strategies because of issues of common interest. For instance, all the three actors are concerned with the issue of employee
participation in decision-making processes. Employers and trade unions are concerned with issues of new technology, collective bargaining and job design. Employers and the government are concerned with issues relating to productivity. Trade unions and the government are interested in issues relating to incomes and workers’ rights. In this regard, employers take into consideration the strategies of the other actors on these issues so that they can make their own strategies to achieve their objectives.

Third, when public sector unions and government agencies get affected by employer strategies, they also make strategies to achieve their goals. Like employers, public sector unions and the government make strategies at three levels of industrial relations activity. The long-term strategies of public sector unions include membership recruitment strategies such as open and expansive unionism or closed and restrictive unionism, and governance strategies such as centralising union activities, decentralising union activities, diffusing decision-making, concentrating decision-making, aligning to political parties and similar pressure groups or corporate campaigning. The strategies of public sector unions at the level of collective bargaining include narrowing or broadening the bargaining unit, and centralising or decentralising the bargaining unit. At the workplace level, the strategies of public sector unions focus on employee participation and job design policies.

In the case of the government, its long-term strategies include economic and social policies such as protection or free market policies. At the level of collective bargaining, government strategies focus on labour laws such as income or dispute resolution policies. At the workplace level, government strategies relate to employment standards and policies dealing with workers’ rights.

Fourth, the effects of strategic decisions can be felt at any level of industrial relations activity. These effects include changes in the responsibilities and/or relationships among the actors. In turn, the affected actors respond by making new
strategies to adapt to the changing circumstances. This is what makes strategic
decision-making a continuous process.

The thesis, therefore, is guided by this theoretical framework to analyse PSR
strategies implemented in Zambia and environmental forces that influenced public
sector employers to adopt them. This theoretical framework also guides the
analysis of the effects of PSR strategies on the public sector workplace, collective
bargaining and the long-term strategies of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers
Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) in Lusaka district and how this union has responded
so as to adapt to the changing environment.

3.9 Summary

This chapter has presented the main argument of the thesis. The thesis’ main
argument is that the reorganisation of the public sector workplace, through the
implementation of PSR strategies, impacts on the employment relationship, which
in turn, negatively affects trade unions in the public sector. The affected areas
include membership, governance process, and collective bargaining. This, in turn,
forces the unions to make strategic decisions so as to adapt to the changing
circumstances.

The chapter has also shown that the understanding of the employment relationship
in a reformed public sector can be greatly enhanced through the examination of
the approaches and theories of industrial relations as well as the perspectives on
trade union structure, union governance, and collective bargaining structure. The
prominent approaches to industrial relations are unitarism, pluralism and
Marxism. The main assumption of unitarism is that the relations between
employers and employees are characterised by unity. However, the main
weakness of unitarism is that it fails to recognise the existence of different groups
with competing interests and values in an organisation. For pluralism, its main
assumption is that organisations consist of competing parties that rely on
negotiations and agreements to resolve their conflicts. However, the major
weakness of pluralism is that it does not explain how conflict is generated in the workplace. In the case of Marxism, its main assumption is that capitalist societies are divided into two fundamental classes, namely, the owners of the means of production and the working class. It views this class division as the source of conflict in the workplace in particular and society in general. Nonetheless, Marxism has been criticised for failing to properly explain the growth of middle managerial and professional positions occupied by the labour force.

In addition, the chapter has shown that there are a number of theories of industrial relations informed by the above-mentioned approaches. These include HRM, systems, strategic choice and labour process theories.

The chapter has also presented the theoretical framework guiding the analysis of the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector. The theoretical framework draws on the assumptions of the pluralist approach in general and the strategic choice theory in particular. It also draws on Hyman’s (1975) perspective on trade union structure, the typology of union governance presented by Undy et al. (1981), and the classification of collective bargaining structures presented by Katz et al. (2008). The theoretical framework consists of five assumptions. The first assumption is that there are environmental forces that influence employers in the public sector to make strategic choices concerning the management of public institutions. These forces include changes in the labour markets, product markets, technology, and public policies. The second assumption is that in the process of making their strategies, public sector employers take into consideration not only the forces from the external environment but also their own management principles, and their interrelationships with the other key industrial relations actors, who include public sector unions and government agencies. The third assumption is that when public sector unions and government agencies get affected by employer strategies, they also make strategies to achieve their goals. The fourth assumption is that strategic decisions are made at three levels of industrial relations activity. These are long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels. The fifth assumption is that the effects of strategic decisions
can be felt at any level of industrial relations activity. These effects include changes in the responsibilities and/or relationships among the key actors in industrial relations. The next chapter discusses the design and methodology of the research project.
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the theoretical framework guiding the analysis of the implications of Public Sector Reform (PSR) for trade unions in the public sector. In its presentation, the chapter indicated that the thesis’ theoretical framework draws on the assumptions of the pluralist approach in general and the strategic choice theory in particular. The theoretical framework also draws on Hyman’s (1975) perspective on trade union structure, the typology of union governance presented by Undy, Ellis, McCarthy and Halmos (1981), and the classification of collective bargaining structures presented by Katz, Kochan and Colvin (2008).

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the design and methodology of the research project used to analyse the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector in Zambia. In order to achieve its purpose, the chapter is divided into thirteen sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section explains the type of research conducted for the purposes of the thesis. The third section presents the research strategy. The fourth section discusses the scope and delimitation of the research area. The fifth section describes the sources of data. The sixth section presents the sample size and sampling methods. The seventh section presents the methods of data collection. The eighth section explains the reliability of the measurements. The ninth section explains the validity of the measurements. The tenth section presents the method of data analysis. The eleventh section presents the research ethics statement. The twelfth section describes the limitations of the research. The final section is a summary.

4.2 Type of Research

The research is qualitative in nature. Qualitative research focuses on the collection of in-depth information on the issue under investigation (Mwanje, 2001a; O’Sullivan, Rassel and Berner, 2003). The issue investigated by the research is
the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector in Zambia. Qualitative research is adopted because of the following reasons: first, “It enables researchers to gain insights into attitudes, beliefs, motives and behaviours of the target population, and gain an overall better understanding of the underlying processes” (Mwanje, 2001a: 17). Second, it allows the researcher to be flexible in the process of conducting the research (Berg and Latin, 2008). Third, it helps the researcher to gain insights into the feelings of the participants about the issue under investigation (Allan, 1991; Berg and Latin, 2008; Maxwell, 1996). Fourth, it enables the researcher to become knowledgeable of the context within which the participants operate and how this context affects their behaviour (Berg and Latin, 2008; Maxwell, 1996). In the case of this research, the researcher wants to gain insights into the dimensions of PSR implemented in Zambia, factors influencing the implementation of these reforms, their effects on industrial relations activity in the public sector, and the strategic responses by trade unions to the same reforms.

4.3 Research strategy

The research uses the case study strategy. A case study is a research strategy that involves a detailed investigation of a particular social unit. A social unit can be a person, an institution or a community. The case study strategy emphasises not only an in-depth analysis of the selected social unit but also understanding its history and the environment within which it operates (Kothari, 2004).

Using the case study strategy, the research investigates the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) in Lusaka district under the rubric of PSR. The aspects of the CSAWUZ covered by the research include union structure, membership, governance process, functions, objectives and collective bargaining strategies.

The case study strategy is used because of the following reasons: first, it allows the researcher to collect detailed information on the behaviour of the selected social unit. Second, it helps the researcher to understand the history of the social
unit and its interaction with the environment. Third, it enables the researcher to identify challenges faced by the social unit as it interacts with the environment. Fourth, it enables the researcher to make recommendations on how to deal with the challenges faced by the social unit (Kothari, 2004: 115-116). In the case of this research, the researcher is able to understand how the above-mentioned aspects of the CSAWUZ are affected by PSR and how this union has responded to the reform of the public sector. The researcher is also able to identify opportunities for the union to achieve its objectives in the context of PSR.

4.4 Scope and delimitation of the research area

The research is confined to the analysis of the implications of PSR for the CSAWUZ in Lusaka district during the period mid-1980s-2015. The subject of PSR has been chosen because, first, it has the potential to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector in particular and the economy in general (Omoypefa, 2008). Second, PSR strategies such as privatisation and retrenchment of workers undermine the capacity of the public sector to create jobs. This is an issue of concern especially in Zambia where the government has traditionally been the largest formal sector employer. According to Kalinda and Floro (1992: 4), “the public and parastatal sectors accounted for 75.3 percent of total formal sector employment, in 1980 with the rest being in the private sector.”

The period mid-1980s-2015 is chosen because it is the period during which the public sector in Zambia has been undergoing far-reaching and rapid reform. During this period, Zambia has implemented a number of reform policies, plans, programmes and projects. These include Structural Adjustment Programme, privatisation programme, Public Service Reform Programme, Public Service Capacity Building Project, Public Service Management programme, National Decentralisation Policy, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, National Development Plans, Public-Private Partnership policy, and National Information and Communication Technology policy.

Formal sector refers to a group of registered institutions that adhere to the laws governing their activities (Central Statistical Office, 2011).
The link between PSR and the behaviour of the CSAWUZ is chosen based on the assumptions of strategic choice theory, which is rooted in a pluralist approach to industrial relations. Strategic choice theory assumes that the key actors affected by the reform of industrial relations (i.e. employers, trade unions and government) make strategic choices to achieve their goals. The theory also assumes that strategic decisions are made at three levels of industrial relations activity. These are long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1994). Drawing on these assumptions, the thesis’ main argument is that the reorganisation of the public sector workplace, through the implementation of PSR strategies, impacts on the employment relationship, which in turn, negatively affects trade unions in the public sector. The affected areas include membership, governance process, and collective bargaining. This, in turn, forces the unions to make strategic decisions so as to adapt to the changing circumstances. These decisions range from short to long-term decisions.

The CSAWUZ has been chosen because it was the largest public sector union in the country at the time of adopting the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP), which emphasised New Public Management (NPM) reform strategies. In 1995, the membership of the Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ), now CSAWUZ, was 65,000. In the same year, the other public sector unions such as the National Union of Public Service Workers (NUPSW) had 34,000 members, and the Zambia United Local Authority Workers Union (ZULAWU) had 22,000 members (Koyi, 2010: 22). Therefore, the selection of the CSAWUZ enables the researcher to gain a better understanding of the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector in Zambia.

The research is conducted in Lusaka district because Lusaka is the most populous district in Zambia. As such, it has the highest demand for public services. In 2010, Lusaka district had a population of 1,747,152, with an annual growth rate of about five percent (Central Statistical Office, 2012b). This population was against the national population of 13,092,666 (Central Statistical Office, 2012b). This shows
that 13.3 percent of Zambia’s population resides in Lusaka district. There are more females than males residing in Lusaka district. The population of females is 886,728 (representing 50.8 percent of the district population) compared to 860,424 males (representing 49.2 percent of the district population) (Central Statistical Office, 2012b).

Lusaka is the capital city of Zambia. It is located in Lusaka province. Conducting the research in Lusaka (the most populous district in Zambia), therefore, enables the researcher to have a better understanding of the strategies and challenges of service delivery in Zambia in the context of PSR. It also enables the researcher to gain a better understanding of the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector in Zambia.

4.5 Sources of data

The research collected two types of data. These are secondary and primary data. Secondary data, on the one hand, consist of documented data in the areas of PSR and trade unions. The sources of these data are documents on PSR and trade unions. These documents include textbooks, journal articles, working papers, research reports, conference papers, workshop papers, seminar papers, dissertations and theses. These documents were obtained from individuals, libraries and the internet. Secondary data were gathered so as to provide insights into what is already known about the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector. These data also help with the historical background and to identify gaps in the existing literature.

Primary data, on the other hand, consist of undocumented data and original letters, resolutions and policies on PSR and trade unions. The sources of these data were managers of public institutions and union leaders in Lusaka district. Primary data were collected so as to gain a deeper understanding of the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector in Zambia. These data were collected between 16 January 2015 and 24 February 2015.
4.6 Sample size and sampling methods

Primary data were collected from a sample of 25 key informants. These informants comprise five managers of public institutions and 20 leaders of the CSAWUZ. Among the managers of public institutions, there are three males and two females. This shows that the sample of managers of public institutions has more males than females. Among the leaders of the CSAWUZ, there are 18 males and two females. This shows that like managers of public institutions, the sample of CSAWUZ leaders has more males than females. In addition, the sample of CSAWUZ leaders consists of four former and 16 current leaders. This indicates that there are more current than former leaders in the sample. These leaders are drawn from four levels of union organisation. These are national, regional/provincial, branch and workplace levels. The purpose of selecting leaders at these levels is to ensure that each level of union organisation is represented in the sample.

Furthermore, most of the selected union leaders are also serving as public sector workers. Two of the four former leaders are also former public sector workers while the other two are still working in the public sector. In the case of the 16 current leaders, 15 of them are also serving as public sector workers. Only one of the 16 current leaders is solely employed by the union. Union leaders who are also public sector workers have been selected so as to capture their views on the issue under investigation not only as leaders of the union but also as public sector workers.

On the one hand, a sample of five managers of public institutions was selected based on the assumption that it was an adequate sample to provide insights into the management of the public sector in the context of PSR. On the other hand, a sample of 20 leaders of the CSAWUZ was selected because it was the most suitable sample to select based on the challenges faced in the sampling process. The following were the challenges:
The CSAWUZ did not have representation in all public institutions in Lusaka district. The union only organised workers in government ministries, central government offices and departments, public hospitals and clinics, and a few semi-autonomous government institutions. This meant that sampling could only be done in a few institutions where the union had representation.

Some of the leaders refused to participate in the research claiming that they were busy with other activities. As a result, such leaders were not sampled.

Other leaders refused to participate in the research claiming that they were new in their leadership positions and that they were not familiar with the organisation of the union. Because of their refusal to participate, these leaders could not be included in the sample.

Other leaders were never found in their offices. This was due to reasons such as being on leave, attending to other activities outside the workplace, and the workplace being closed especially for learning institutions that were on recess. Therefore, such leaders could not be selected for the purposes of the research.

It was very difficult to locate former leaders. This is because most of them had retired and their whereabouts were unknown. Others had died. As a result, such leaders could not be sampled.

Some of the former leaders had joined other unions and refused to participate in the research arguing that they were not interested in talking about their former union. As such, these leaders were not selected for the purposes of the research.

Multistage sampling (also known as cluster sampling) is used to draw a sample of five managers of public institutions. Multistage sampling involves selecting the sample in stages (Bless and Achola, 1988). In this research, the sample of managers of public institutions is selected in two stages. The first stage involves selecting a sample of four institutions out of a population of 67 public institutions from which the CSAWUZ draws its membership in Lusaka district. The
institutions include 20 government ministries, nine central government offices and departments, 33 public hospitals and clinics, and five semi-autonomous government institutions. At this stage, the lottery method is used to draw a random sample of four institutions. The lottery method involves assigning a number or name to each unit in the population. The numbers or names of the units are then put in a container and mixed completely. Thereafter, the required sample of the units is drawn (O’Sullivan et al., 2003: 137). In this research, the names of the 67 public institutions from which the CSAWUZ drew its membership in Lusaka district were written on similar pieces of paper. The pieces of paper were then put in a container and mixed completely. Thereafter, four pieces of paper were drawn. These constituted the sample of public institutions. These institutions were Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Chainama Hills College Hospital, Chilenje Clinic, and Lusaka Business and Technical College. The lottery method was used to sample public institutions because it gave each institution an equal chance of being selected. This was important so as to reduce bias in sampling.

The second stage of sampling involves the selection of five managers from the four sampled public institutions. At this stage, purposive or judgemental sampling is used. Under purposive sampling, the researcher uses his/her judgement to draw the sample (Bless and Achola, 1988). In this research, the researcher used his judgement to select four managers considered to be more knowledgeable of the strategies of PSR implemented at the sampled institutions. One manager was chosen from each of the four sampled institutions. However, at one institution, two managers were selected. This is because the earlier selected manager could not provide all the required information. As such, the researcher was referred to another manager who was able to provide the missing information. This meant that the final sample of managers of public institutions was five instead of four as earlier planned. Purposive sampling is used to select managers of public institutions because not all managers are familiar with the strategies of PSR implemented at their institutions. As such, it is important for the researcher to use his judgement to identify managers that are familiar with the issue under investigation. In addition, the method of multistage sampling is used because a
complete list of managers of public institutions from which the CSAWUZ draws its membership in Lusaka district cannot be obtained.

Purposive sampling is also used to select the current leaders of CSAWUZ at national and provincial levels. Using his judgement, the researcher selected one leader considered knowledgeable of the organisation of the union at national level. The researcher also used his judgement to select one leader who was familiar with the organisation of the union in Lusaka province. Purposive sampling is adopted because some of the leaders are not familiar with the operations of the union at these levels. As such, it is necessary for the researcher to use his judgement to identify leaders that are familiar with the operations of the union at these levels.

Although there is a possibility of bias in purposive sampling, its use in this research does not affect the reliability and validity of the data. Efforts were made to ensure that the data are reliable and valid. The first effort focused on having two investigators involved in the process of data collection and comparing their findings so as to determine the level of consistency. The second effort focused on examining the coherence of the responses for each informant. The details about the reliability and validity of the data are presented in sections 4.8 and 4.9, respectively.

Snowball sampling, also known as referral sampling, is used to sample the current leaders of CSAWUZ at branch and workplace levels as well as former leaders. Snowball sampling is a method that begins by locating one member of a population and requesting him/her to give names and addresses of his/her colleagues. Every member who is located is presented with the same request. A sample is then drawn from the located members of the population (O’Sullivan et al., 2003: 149). In this research, each leader who was located was asked for names, workplace locations and/or mobile phone numbers of other leaders.

At the stage of drawing the sample of these leaders, one former leader was selected at national level. Another former leader was selected at regional level. At
branch and workplace levels, the workplace was used as the base for selecting the
leaders. This criterion was applied in the selection of both former and current
leaders at these two levels of union organisation. In this case, each public
institution is treated as a workplace. Using this criterion, one current leader was
selected based on his/her familiarity with the operations of the union at his/her
workplace. However, in some institutions, two current leaders were selected. This
was done in cases where leaders who had been serving since the 1990s were
identified. In such cases, the two sampled leaders included one who had been
serving since the 1990s and another one who had been serving during the period
2000-2015. On the one hand, the leaders who had been serving since the 1990s
were selected so that they provide information on the organisation of the union
before and after the implementation of the PSRP. The PSRP was launched in the
1990s, which was part of the NPM era. As noted in chapters 1 and 2, the NPM
was the predominant paradigm in the last two decades of the twentieth century.
Therefore, it is important to understand how the union was organised before the
reform of the public sector and its transformation in the NPM era. On the other
hand, the leaders who had been serving during the period 2000-2015 were
selected so that they provide information on the organisation of the union in the
post-NPM era.

Former union leaders at branch and workplace levels were also selected.
Although, these people are no longer holding positions in the union at these
levels, some of them are still in employment (as public servants) while others
have retired. Like current leaders, the selection of former union leaders at these
two levels was based on the workplace. This means that a former leader is
selected based on his/her workplace at the time he/she was a leader in the union.
These leaders were selected so that they provide information on the operations of
the union at the time of their leadership. In this regard, the focus was on union
organisation before and during the NPM era.

Snowball sampling is used to sample current leaders of the CSAWUZ at branch
and workplace levels as well as former leaders because these leaders are difficult
to locate. On the one hand, current leaders at these levels cannot be located easily because the CSAWUZ does not have leadership representation in some of the institutions where it draws membership. On the other hand, former leaders are difficult to locate because most of them have retired and their whereabouts are unknown. Others have died.

Like purposive sampling, snowball sampling has a possibility of bias. However, its use in this research does not affect the reliability and validity of the data. Efforts were made to collect reliable and valid data. The first effort focused on having two investigators involved in the process of data collection and comparing their findings so as to determine the level of consistency. The second effort focused on examining the coherence of the responses for each informant. The details about the reliability and validity of the data are presented in sections 4.8 and 4.9, respectively.

In addition, although a number of challenges were faced in selecting leaders of the CSAWUZ and the eventual use of snowball and purposive sampling, the data were not skewed. This is because the research managed to draw a sample representing the four key levels of the union’s organisational structure. These are national, regional/provincial, branch and workplace levels. This means that the data collected from leaders at one level of union organisation were supplemented by those from the other levels.

4.7 Methods of data collection

As mentioned earlier, the research collected two types of data. These are secondary and primary data. Secondary data, on the one hand, were collected by reading documents on PSR and trade unions, analysing their contents and writing down relevant information. This method was used so as to gain insights into what was already known about the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector. This method also helped with the historical background and to identify gaps in the existing literature.
Primary data, on the other hand, were collected by conducting “semi-directive interviews” (Mwanje, 2001b: 25), also known as semi-structured interviews, with the sampled managers of public institutions and leaders of the CSAWUZ. A semi-directive interview is a method that uses a flexible interview guide to collect information on a particular issue from an informant. The interview guide comprises a number of open-ended questions that should be answered by the informant. Although the informant is given the right to decide the way he/she answers the questions, the interviewer can ask for clarifications and has the responsibility of ensuring that the informant sticks to the subject of discussion (Mwanje, 2001b: 25-26).

In line with the principles of semi-directive interviews, the researcher and his assistant (Pius Chisanga) conducted one-on-one interviews with the informants. The interviews with former leaders of the CSAWUZ focused on the PSRP (which emphasised NPM reform strategies) and its effects on the terms and conditions of employment, collective bargaining, union membership and governance. Former leaders were also asked questions about the strategic responses by the union to the PSRP. The interviews with current leaders of the CSAWUZ focused on partnerships in policy formulation and implementation (emphasising post-NPM reforms) and their effects on the terms and conditions of employment, collective bargaining, union membership and governance. The current leaders were also asked questions about the strategic responses by the union to partnerships in policy formulation and implementation. The interviews with managers of public institutions focused on partnerships in policy formulation and implementation (emphasising post-NPM reforms) and their effects on the public sector workplace. There was an interview guide for each category of the informants (see Appendices I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII). In addition, all the interviews were recorded and later transcribed. This was done to ensure that whatever was mentioned during the interviews was captured. The duration of the interviews ranged from 14 to 70 minutes.
The method of semi-directive interviews was used so as to obtain in-depth explanations of the dimensions of PSR implemented in Zambia, factors influencing the implementation of these reforms, the effects of PSR on industrial relations activity, and the strategic responses by the CSAWUZ to the reform of the public sector.

4.8 Reliability of the measurements

The instruments used to collect the data were quite reliable. Reliability relates to “the degree to which a particular measuring procedure gives equivalent results over a number of repeated trials” (Bless and Achola, 1988: 101). This means that if a particular research instrument is used two or more times in the same setting, the results should be the same. In this research, the type of reliability being assessed is inter-rater reliability (also known as inter-observer reliability) (Mwanje, 2001b). According to Mwanje (2001b: 67), inter-rater (inter-observer) reliability is “Used to assess the degree to which different raters or observers give consistent estimates of the same phenomenon.” Based on this method, a measuring procedure is considered reliable if different raters use it to measure the same phenomenon and manage to obtain consistent results. The application of this method in this research was as follows: first, two investigators were involved in the process of data collection. These are the researcher and his assistant (Pius Chisanga). Second, there was an interview guide for each category of the informants (see Appendices I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII). This means that informants in each category were required to respond to the same items. Third, the responses obtained by the two investigators were compared. Responses that were consistent with each other were identified and taken as reliable data. This shows that the research instruments were reliable. The research uses the method of inter-rater to determine the reliability of the research instruments because it is the most convenient.
4.9 Validity of the measurements

The research managed to collect valid data. Validity refers to “the degree to which an empirical measure, or several measures, of a concept accurately represent that concept” (Bless and Achola, 1988: 107). In other words, data are considered valid if the research instrument contains items that correctly represent the issue under investigation. The type of validity assessed in this research is construct validity. According to Bless and Achola (1988: 109):

Construct validity is involved when the interest is to find out the extent to which a particular measure (variable, scale, test) is related to other variables with which it is expected to, on logical grounds. The concept whose validity we seek to determine must be shown to have a logical relationship with other concepts on the basis of some known theory.

In other words, construct validity measures the link between variables under investigation. In this research, a logical relationship between PSR and trade union strategy has been established. The establishment of this relationship is based on the assumptions of strategic choice theory, which is rooted in a pluralist approach to industrial relations. Strategic choice theory assumes that the key actors affected by the reform of industrial relations (i.e. employers, trade unions and government) make strategic choices to achieve their goals. The theory also assumes that strategic decisions are made at three levels of industrial relations activity. These are long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels (Kochan et al., 1994).

The process of establishing the relationship between PSR and trade union strategy was as follows: first, the concepts that relate to PSR were identified. These are restructuring of the public service, performance management, decentralisation, privatisation, commercialisation, partnerships in policy formulation and implementation, public service capacity building, recentralisation, and the adoption of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). Second, the concepts that relate to trade union strategy were identified. These are membership
recruitment, governance, collective bargaining, and terms and conditions of employment. Third, the informants were asked questions relating to the effects of PSR on trade union strategy (see Appendices I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII). Fourth, the informants were asked questions relating to the strategic responses by the CSAWUZ to the reform of the public sector (see Appendices I, II, III, IV, V and VI). Fifth, the responses by the informants were examined so as to determine their logical relationship. Through this process, responses that showed a logical relationship with each other were identified and taken as valid data. This shows that the research managed to collect valid data. The research focuses on construct validity because it is the most convenient.

At this stage, it is important to mention that if another theory drawing on the assumptions of a different approach such as unitary or radical approach was used to assess construct validity, it might have given rise to a different set of findings. In other words, valid data could also have been collected under a different set of constructs. Therefore, this presents an opportunity for future research that could assess the relationship between PSR and trade union strategy using the assumptions of unitary and radical approaches to industrial relations.

4.10 Method of data analysis

The data are analysed using the method of content analysis. In content analysis, “the researchers are preoccupied with searching for structures and patterns or regularities in the text, and systematically drawing informed inferences based on the available evidence” (Mwanje, 2001b: 45). In this research, the technique of grouping is used to understand the patterns in the data. Grouping is a technique that involves related elements being put in the same category (Mwanje, 2001b: 46). In this research, four groups of the data are created. The first group contains data focusing on PSR strategies implemented in Zambia. The second group consists of data relating to factors influencing the implementation of PSR. The third group contains data focusing on the effects of PSR on trade union strategy. The fourth group consists of data relating to the strategic responses by the
CSAWUZ to the reform of the public sector. Based on this analysis, conclusions about the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector are drawn. The research uses the method of content analysis to analyse the data because it is the most appropriate method considering that the data are in text form.

4.11 Research ethics statement

The research was conducted in accordance with the Research Ethics Policy of the University of the Western Cape (UWC) (2009). In this regard, the following ethical obligations were met:

- Before conducting the research, the project proposal and ethics statement were submitted to UWC Faculty Board Research and Ethics Committees, and the UWC Senate Research Committee for consideration. The research project was then registered and cleared of the ethics by these committees.
- Requests for permission to conduct the research at the sampled institutions were made in writing (see Appendices VIII and IX).
- All potential informants were told about the objectives of the research, sampling methods and data collection methods.
- All potential informants were allowed to ask any questions about the research.
- All the informants were asked, in writing, for their consent (see Appendix X).
- The informants were told that their participation in the research was voluntary.
- The informants were told that they had the right to withdraw their consent whenever they felt like doing so.
- The data collected during the research are kept confidential.
- The anonymity of all the participants in the research is maintained. In line with this obligation, job titles are used to identify the informants.
- Honesty and integrity have been maintained in the processes of data gathering, analysis and presentation.
4.12 Limitations of the research

The following are the limitations of the research: first, although the focus of the research is on the implications of PSR for trade unions in the public sector, it does not cover all the strategies of PSR implemented in Zambia. The strategies that are examined are restructuring of the public service, performance management, decentralisation, privatisation, commercialisation, and partnerships in policy formulation and implementation. As such, the conclusions of the thesis are confined to these reform strategies. Strategies of PSR that are outside the scope of the research include public service capacity building, recentralisation, and the adoption of ICTs. Second, although the research was conducted in Lusaka, it did not cover all the categories of public institutions in the district. The research was confined to institutions from which the CSAWUZ drew its membership. These include government ministries, central government offices and departments, public hospitals and clinics, and semi-autonomous government institutions. Therefore, the conclusions of the thesis are confined to trade unionism in these categories of public institutions. Institutions that are outside the scope of the research include primary and secondary schools, and local councils.

Third, the research did not use quantitative methods. As such, the significance of the relationship between variables was not tested. Fourth, since the research used nonprobability sampling methods, the informants were not given an equal chance of being sampled. As such, the representativeness of the sample could not be established, “mathematically” (O’Sullivan et al., 2003: 146).

4.13 Summary

This chapter has indicated that the research is qualitative in nature. In this process, the case study strategy is used. Using this strategy, the research investigates the CSAWUZ in Lusaka district under the rubric of PSR. The aspects of the CSAWUZ covered by the research include union structure, membership, governance process, functions, objectives and collective bargaining strategies.
The research is confined to the period mid-1980s-2015. The chapter has also indicated that the link between PSR and the behaviour of the CSAWUZ has been chosen based on the assumptions of strategic choice theory, which is rooted in the pluralist approach to industrial relations.

In addition, the chapter has shown that two types of data were collected. These are secondary and primary data. A sample of 25 key informants was engaged in the research. These informants include five managers of public institutions and 20 leaders of the CSAWUZ. The methods of multistage, purposive and snowball sampling were used to select the informants. Secondary data, on the one hand, were collected by reading documents on PSR and trade unions, analysing their contents and writing down relevant information. Primary data, on the other hand, were collected by conducting semi-structured interviews with the sampled informants. The chapter has also shown that the instruments used to collect the data were highly reliable. The type of reliability being assessed is inter-rater or inter-observer reliability. The collected data are also valid. The type of validity assessed in the research is construct validity. The data are analysed using the method of content analysis. Ethical obligations were also met in the process of conducting the research. These include ethical clearance, informed consent, voluntary participation, confidentiality, anonymity, honesty and integrity.

The chapter has also indicated the limitations of the research. The conclusions of the thesis are confined to the following strategies of PSR: restructuring of the public service, performance management, decentralisation, privatisation, commercialisation, and partnerships in policy formulation and implementation. Strategies of PSR that are outside the scope of the research include public service capacity building, recentralisation, and the adoption of ICTs. The conclusions of the thesis are also confined to trade unionism in selected categories of public institutions. These are government ministries, central government offices and departments, public hospitals and clinics, and semi-autonomous government institutions. Institutions that are outside the scope of the research include primary and secondary schools, and local councils. Furthermore, the significance of the
relationship between variables was not tested. The chapter has also indicated that the representativeness of the sample could not be established, mathematically. The next chapter examines the nature of the public sector in Zambia and the structure of its trade unions.
CHAPTER 5: THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN ZAMBIA AND ITS TRADE UNIONS

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the design and methodology of the research project. The chapter indicated that a case study of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) in Lusaka district is used to examine the implications of Public Sector Reform (PSR) for trade unions in the public sector in Zambia.

The task of this chapter is to examine the nature of the public sector in Zambia and the structure of its trade unions. In order to perform this task, the chapter is divided into six sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section describes the nature of government and administration in Zambia. The third section presents the socio-economic profile of Zambia. The fourth section describes the nature of the public sector in Zambia. The fifth section examines trade union structure in the public sector in Zambia. The final section is a summary.

5.2 Government and administration in Zambia

The purpose of this section is to describe the political context within which public sector unions in Zambia operate. To achieve this purpose, two major aspects of the political context will be considered. These are the government and administrative structures.

Zambia is a unitary state with a multiparty system of government. The current ruling party is the Patriotic Front (PF). The PF has been in power since 2011. The Head of State and Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force in Zambia is the President who is directly elected by universal adult suffrage. Legislative power in Zambia is vested in Parliament, which consists of the President and the National Assembly. Zambia also has a local government
system based on democratically elected councils. This implies that different parties are allowed to participate in the policy-making processes. This kind of environment, therefore, offers trade unions an opportunity to form alliances with political parties and influence public policies.

Administratively, the country is divided into 10 provinces. These are Lusaka, Central, Copperbelt, Luapula, Northern, Muchinga, Eastern, Southern, Western and North-Western provinces. These provinces are further subdivided into 103 districts (Zambia Weekly, 2013). The capital city of Zambia is Lusaka, which is located in Lusaka province. This means that Zambia has three levels of government and administration. These are central, provincial and district levels. This also means that trade unions have an opportunity to organise public servants at these levels.

5.3 Socio-economic profile of Zambia

The task of this section is to present the socio-economic context within which public sector unions in Zambia operate. To perform this task, the following aspects of the socio-economic context will be discussed: population size and composition, education characteristics, economic characteristics, health characteristics, and poverty levels. These aspects are discussed below.

5.3.1 Population size and composition

According to the 2010 Census of Population and Housing, the population of Zambia in 2010 was 13,092,666 with an average annual growth rate of 2.8 percent (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). In 2014, the population was estimated to be 15 million (Central Statistical Office, 2014a). This rate of population growth indicates the need for the government to increase the levels of service delivery so as to meet the demands of a growing population. This also implies increases in employment levels. Additional employees would be required to enhance service delivery.
In terms of the rural-urban divide, 60.5 percent of the total population resides in rural areas while 39.5 percent is in urban areas. This shows that a majority of the Zambian population lives in rural areas. This implies that rural areas are supposed to receive a larger share of goods and services than urban areas. In terms of distribution by sex, 49.3 percent are males while 50.7 percent are females. This shows that the population of females is slightly bigger than males. This implies that a slightly larger share of services should be directed at females than males. In terms of age, Zambia is characterised by a young population. Its median age is 16.9 years (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). This means that the workforce in Zambia is characterised by young workers. Therefore, if trade unions are to increase their membership, they need to organise this category of workers.

5.3.2 Education characteristics

In terms of literacy levels, most of the people in Zambia are able to read and write in one language or another. The national literacy rate for people aged five years and older is 70.2 percent. However, the literacy rates vary from one region to another as well as from one sex to another. The literacy rate is higher in urban areas (83.8 percent) than in rural areas (60.5 percent). The literacy rate is also higher among males (73.2 percent) than females (67.3 percent) (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). These rates correspond to the levels of accessibility of education services in the country. The national net school attendance rates are as follows: at primary school level (grades one to seven for the population aged 7-13 years) the rate is 71.6 percent while at secondary school level (grades 8 to 12 for the population aged 14-18 years) it is 45.5 percent (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). These data show that more than two thirds of the primary school-age population in Zambia have access to primary education. However, the country has a very low progression rate from primary to secondary school. From the data, it can be noted that a majority of the secondary school-age population cannot access secondary education. This implies that Zambia is characterised by a largely unskilled labour
force. This, in turn, presents challenges for productivity and the quality of union membership in the country.

In addition, the completion rates at various levels of education are low. The situation is worse as people move from lower to higher levels of education. The completion rates for the population aged 25 years and older are as follows: at primary school level the completion rate is 47.8 percent, at secondary school level it is 37.3 percent and at tertiary education level it is 14.5 percent (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). The school completion rates also vary between rural and urban areas. At primary school level, rural areas have a higher completion rate at 67.0 percent than urban areas at 28.2 percent (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). Nonetheless, the opposite is the case at secondary school and tertiary education levels. At these higher levels, the completion rates are higher in urban areas than in rural areas. At secondary school level, the completion rate in urban areas is 48.0 percent while in rural areas it is 26.8 percent. At tertiary education level, the completion rate in urban areas is 23.6 percent while in rural areas it is 5.7 percent (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). These data indicate that a few highly skilled workers are located in urban areas while most of the unskilled workers are in rural areas. This implies that the quality of union members is low especially in rural areas.

There are also gender inequalities in the school completion rates for the population aged 25 years and older. At primary school level, females have a higher completion rate at 56.9 percent than males at 39.7 percent (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). However, the opposite is the case at secondary school and tertiary education levels. At these higher levels, the completion rates are higher for males than females. At secondary school level, the completion rate for males is 42.6 percent while for females it is 31.4 percent. At tertiary education level, the completion rate for males is 17.5 percent while for females it is 11.3 percent (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). From these data, it can be noted that despite a majority of the people in the country being literate, their level of education is low. In this regard, females are more affected than males. This
implies that there is discrimination against females in the process of delivering higher education services in the country.

5.3.3 Economic characteristics

The total value of goods and services, i.e. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in Zambia in 2010 was estimated to be Zambian Kwacha (K) 97,215.9 million\(^{31}\) (Central Statistical Office, 2014b: 2). Zambia’s economy has been experiencing strong growth in recent years. The economy grew at an average rate of 4.8 percent per annum during the period 2002-2005. It then grew at an average rate of 6.1 percent per annum during the period 2006-2009 (Republic of Zambia, 2011a). By 2013, Zambia’s GDP growth was still above 6 percent (Chikwanda, 2013). This growth was higher than the regional and global economic growth rates. At that time, economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa was about five percent while for the global economy, it was about three percent (Chikwanda, 2013). This implies that Zambia has the capacity to improve wages in particular and to reduce poverty in general.

The structure of Zambia’s economy is dominated by the services sector\(^{32}\), which accounts for 56.5 percent of the country’s GDP. This is followed by the industrial sector\(^{33}\) at 33.9 percent. The agricultural sector accounts for the smallest share of GDP at 9.6 percent (Hartzenberg and Kalenga, 2015: 13). This shows that Zambia’s economy relies heavily on the services sector. This also means that institutions in the services sector including public administration play a very important role in sustaining the economy of the country.

However, the structure of the economy of Zambia differs from other Southern African Development Community countries. The country where the services

\(^{31}\) The exchange rate on 31 December 2010 was K4,800 = United States dollar (US$) 1 (Bank of Zambia, 2014).

\(^{32}\) Services sector includes services like wholesale and retail trade, transport, and public administration (Central Statistical Office, 2014b: 3).

\(^{33}\) Industrial sector includes manufacturing, mining, construction, electricity, water, and gas (Hartzenberg and Kalenga, 2015: 13).
sector contributes the largest share of GDP is Seychelles at 86.3 percent while Angola has the smallest share of this sector at 32.1 percent. In terms of industrialisation, the most industrialised country in the region is Angola where the industrial sector accounts for 57.8 percent of GDP while the least industrialised is Seychelles at 11.3 percent. In terms of agriculture, the country with the largest share of agricultural contribution is Mozambique where the sector accounts for 29 percent of GDP while the ones with the smallest share of this sector are Seychelles and South Africa at 2.4 percent respectively (Hartzenberg and Kalenga, 2015: 13).

According to the 2010 Census of Population and Housing, the working-age population (i.e. people aged 12 years and older) in Zambia was 7,715,022 in 2010. Of this population, 4,259,170 are economically active (constituting the labour force). This translates to a national labour force participation rate of 55.2 percent. The economically inactive population accounts for 44.8 percent of the working-age population. The economically inactive population cannot look for employment because of a number of reasons. These include full-time students, full-time homemakers, full-time housewives, beggars, patients and elderly people, among others (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). This means that there are many dependants in the country. According to Central Statistical Office (2012a), an average household has five people. This implies that the government has the responsibility of providing social security to vulnerable groups including workers that are unable to meet their basic needs.

A majority of the labour force is in rural areas, accounting for 62.1 percent. Urban areas account for only 37.9 percent of the labour force. The labour force participation rate is also higher in rural areas (60.3 percent) than in urban areas (48.5 percent). In terms of gender dimensions, there is a higher participation rate in the male population (65.0 percent) than in the female population (46.0 percent) (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). This means that there are more males available for employment than females in Zambia. This also implies that females are not empowered to actively participate in economic activities.
Most of the employment is in agriculture, accounting for 62.8 percent of the working population (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). This implies that most of the unskilled workers are engaged in agricultural activities in rural areas which account for a very small share of Zambia’s GDP. As noted by Hartzenberg and Kalenga (2015: 13), the agricultural sector accounts for 9.6 percent of Zambia’s GDP. This means that trade unions have difficulties bargaining for improved terms and conditions of employment especially in the agricultural sector.

The overall unemployment rate in Zambia is 13.0 percent of the total labour force. The unemployment rate is higher in urban areas (22.1 percent) than in rural areas (7.5 percent) (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). This shows that it is easier for people to find work in rural areas than in urban areas. However, rural employment is not lucrative. It is just for survival purposes.

In terms of the distribution between the formal and informal sectors, most of the people in Zambia are employed in the informal sector. According to Republic of Zambia (2011a), the proportion of formal sector employment is 10 percent of the total employment in the country. This means that the informal sector accounts for 90 percent of the total employment. This also means that the agricultural sector (which employs a majority of the labour force) comprises mainly informal enterprises. In addition, although the informal sector employs a majority of the labour force in Zambia, its contribution to GDP is lower than the formal sector. Central Statistical Office (2014b) indicates that the value of the formal sector is 66.4 percent of the total GDP while the value of the informal sector is 33.6 percent of the total GDP. This implies that employment in the informal sector is “survivalist” in nature. The other implication is that since they are not registered, employers and employees in the informal sector are difficult to organise.

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34 On the one hand, formal sector refers to a group of registered institutions that adhere to the laws governing their activities (Central Statistical Office, 2011). On the other hand, informal sector refers to economic activities performed by unregistered organisations (Central Statistical Office, 2014b).
5.3.4 Health characteristics

Zambia is among countries with the lowest life expectancy in the world. The life expectancy at birth in Zambia is 51.2 years. In terms of rural-urban residence, people residing in rural areas are expected to live longer than their urban counterparts. Life expectancy at birth in rural Zambia is 51.7 years while in urban areas it is 50.8 years. In terms of sex disparity, females are expected to live longer than males. Life expectancy at birth for females is 53.4 years while for males it is 49.2 years (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). This implies that Zambia is faced with the problem of labour turnover due to sickness and death. The 2010 Census of Population and Housing shows that Zambia’s Crude Death Rate (CDR) is 13.1 deaths per 1,000 population. The CDR is higher in the male population at 14.3 deaths per 1,000 males than the female population at 12.0 deaths per 1,000 females. The CDR is also higher in rural areas at 13.6 deaths per 1,000 population than in urban areas at 12.5 deaths per 1,000 population. Most of the deaths are due to illness/disease, which accounts for 75.7 percent of all the reported causes of death in the country (Central Statistical Office, 2012a). The main illness in Zambia is fever/malaria, accounting for 47.9 percent of all the reported illnesses/injuries. This is followed by cough/cold/chest infection at 17.9 percent, headache at 6.6 percent, diarrhoea without blood at 3.6 percent and abdominal pains at 3.4 percent. The other types of illness, each account for less than three percent of the reported cases (Central Statistical Office, 2012c).

The Zambian Government and its cooperating partners had committed themselves to start reducing the cases of major diseases including malaria by 2015. This commitment was part of the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2013). However, the cases of malaria (the main illness in Zambia) have continued to increase. According to UNDP (2013: 40), “New cases [of malaria] increased from 255 per 1,000 population in 1990 to 330 in 2010. Similarly, the fatality rate increased from 11 per 1,000 population in 1990 to 34 in 2010.” This represents 29.4 percent increase in the infection rate of malaria and 209.1 percent increase in the death rate due to the same disease. This
implies that productivity of the country is affected by the illness and death of workers. The other implication is that the government is facing a challenge to deliver health services.

5.3.5 Poverty levels

The other challenge facing Zambia is poverty. Central Statistical Office (2012c: 175) defines the poor as “those members of society who are unable to afford minimum basic human needs, comprising food and non-food items, given all their total income.” Despite the strong GDP growth (above six percent) experienced in recent years (Chikwanda, 2013; Republic of Zambia, 2011a), a majority of Zambia’s population continues to live in poverty. According to Central Statistical Office (2012c), the proportion of the population falling below the poverty line was 60.5 percent in 2010. In terms of the distribution between rural and urban areas, poverty is more prevalent in rural areas than in urban areas. The level of poverty in rural areas is 77.9 percent compared to 27.5 percent in urban areas. In terms of the distribution between sexes, poverty levels are higher among female headed households than those headed by males. In 2010, the level of poverty among female headed households was 62.4 percent compared to 60.1 percent among male headed households (Central Statistical Office, 2012c). This means that the government has a burden to provide services especially in rural areas and to the female population. This also means that the public sector is inefficient and ineffective, hence the need to reform it.

5.4 The public sector in Zambia

The public sector in Zambia comprises three major categories of government institutions. These are central government, local government and parastatals. The central government consists of all government ministries, Cabinet Office, all provincial administrations, and all statutory bodies such as the Human Rights Commission, Electoral Commission of Zambia, and Anti-Corruption Commission, among others (Central Statistical Office, 2011). The reform of the
public sector in Zambia has resulted in an increase in the number of central government institutions. Between 1972 and 2015, the number of government ministries increased from 15 to 20 (Mafuleka, 2005; Zambian Eye, 2015). During the period 1972-2013, the number of provincial administrations increased from eight to 10 (Mafuleka, 2005; Zambia Weekly, 2013). Furthermore, despite New Public Management (NPM) reforms having reduced the central government workforce, post-NPM reforms have been increasing it. Between March 1997 and June 1998, the number of central government workers reduced from 126,688 to 117,210 (Kingombe, 2004). However, between 1998 and 2011, the workforce in this sector increased from 117,210 to 152,666 (Central Statistical Office, 2011; Kingombe, 2004). This represents an overall workforce increase of 20.5 percent during the period 1997-2011. This increase is mainly due to the recruitment of teachers (Republic of Zambia, 2005: 9-10). This means that trade unions that organise in the central government such as CSAWUZ (which is the focus of the thesis) have an opportunity to increase their membership under post-NPM reforms.

The local government in Zambia consists of all the local councils. The councils are in three categories. These are city, municipal and district councils. Like central government institutions, the number of local councils has been increasing during the PSR era. Between 1965 and 2013, the number of local councils increased from 67 to 103 (Chikulo, 2009; Zambia Weekly, 2013). Like the central government, the local government workforce was reduced under NPM reforms and increased under post-NPM reforms. The number of local government workers reduced from 14,624 in March 1997 to 12,979 in June 1998 (Kingombe, 2004). Nonetheless, this workforce increased from 12,979 in 1998 to 33,024 in 2011 (Central Statistical Office, 2011; Kingombe, 2004). This represents an overall workforce increase of 125.8 percent during the period 1997-2011. This means that the workforce in the local government sector has increased at a higher rate than the central government. This implies that post-NPM reforms emphasise decentralisation and the growth of the local government sector. This also means
that trade unions that organise in this sector are in a better position to increase their membership under post-NPM reforms than those in the central government.

In the case of parastatals, “These are state-owned institutions whose part of the business portfolios is held by the private shareholders” (Central Statistical Office, 2011: [no page numbers]). These institutions include Zambia State Insurance Corporation, Zambia National Commercial Bank, Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation, Zambia Daily Mail, and Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation, among others (Central Statistical Office, 2011). Parastatals are found in a number of industries in Zambia. These include energy, communications, transport, media, finance, mining, water and sanitation (Balbuena, 2014). Unlike the central and local governments, parastatals have experienced massive reductions during the PSR era. Before implementation of the privatisation programme, which started in 1992, there were more than 280 State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Zambia (Krishna, 2006). Nevertheless, following the implementation of the privatisation programme, the number of SOEs has reduced to 41 (Balbuena, 2014). In addition, the number of workers in the parastatal sector reduced from 76,144 in 1997 to 62,636 in 2011 (Central Statistical Office, 2011; Kingombe, 2004). This represents a workforce decline of 17.7 percent. This implies that both NPM and post-NPM reforms emphasise privatisation. This also means that unlike the central and local governments, trade unions that organise in parastatals are operating in a declining sector. As such, it is very difficult for them to increase their membership in the context of PSR.

The distribution of employment among various categories of government institutions in Zambia is as follows: a majority of public sector employment is in the central government. The central government accounts for 61.5 percent of the total 248,326 employees in the public sector. This is followed by 25.2 percent in parastatals. The smallest proportion of public sector employment is in local government, accounting for 13.3 percent (Central Statistical Office, 2011). This means that, within the public sector, trade unions that organise in the central government such as CSAWUZ (which is the focus of the thesis) have the largest
membership base, followed by the parastatal sector, and the least is the local government.

Despite the increase in the labour force in some public institutions in recent years, the ultimate result of reforming the public sector in Zambia has been the transfer of employment opportunities from the public to the private sector. This transformation has resulted in the private sector being the largest formal sector employer. By the second quarter of 2011, 61.7 percent of the 635,550 formal sector employees were in the private sector while 38.4 percent were in the public sector (Central Statistical Office, 2011). This implies that the private sector offers the largest membership base of trade unions in the country.

The approach to economic development in Zambia has also changed. There is more emphasis on marketisation than command and control. For instance, the main aim of the Zambia Development Agency Act is to create an environment that encourages private sector investment. A number of measures have been put in place to achieve this aim. They include protecting investors’ property against compulsory acquisition, allowing foreign investors to externalise their profits, and giving incentives to investors. The incentives include relief from customs duties on equipment in selected industries such as rural entrepreneurship (Republic of Zambia, 2006b).

The pattern of government expenditure has also changed. More financial resources are being spent on economic activities than social services. On the one hand, the allocation for economic affairs increased from 18 percent of the total budget in 2006 to 28 percent in 2014 (Chikwanda, 2013; Magande, 2007). Sectors that benefited from this increment include agriculture, energy, transport, commerce, mining, communication, and tourism. On the other hand, the allocation for housing and community amenities reduced from 6.5 percent of the total budget in 2007 to 1.5 percent in 2014 (Chikwanda, 2013; Magande, 2007). Similarly, the allocation for the health sector reduced from 11.9 percent of the
Efforts have also been made to enhance competition and fair trade in Zambia. They include punishing individuals and firms that engage in anti-competitive activities. Activities in this category include price fixing, market division, bid rigging, fixing production quotas, and collective boycotts. The punishment for individuals engaging in such activities includes a fine and/or imprisonment. In the case of firms, their punishment is a fine (Republic of Zambia, 2010). To some extent, these efforts have enabled market forces to drive Zambia’s economy. According to Schwab (2015), the overall Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) score for Zambia increased from 3.8 during the period 2012-2013 to 3.9 during the period 2015-2016. The country has also improved its overall GCI ranking from 102 (out of 144) during the period 2012-2013 to 96 (out of 140) during the period 2015-2016 (Schwab, 2015). This implies that the reform of the public sector is more business friendly.

5.5 Trade union structure in the public sector in Zambia

There are different types of trade unions that organise employees in the public sector in Zambia. They include sectoral unions, enterprise unions, occupational unions, industrial unions, and federations of trade unions. The details of these types of trade unions are presented below.

5.5.1 Sectoral unions

Sectoral unions refer to those unions that organise in a particular sector of the economy. Examples of sectoral unions that organise in the public sector in Zambia include National Union of Public Service Workers; Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union; Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia; Judicial and Allied Workers Union of Zambia; and Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers. Nonetheless, some sectoral unions may take the
structure of general-sectoral unions. General-sectoral unions refer to those unions that “have been based on a particular sector historically, but may take a wide definition of what that sector is, and readily extend into ‘allied fields’” (Hughes, 1966: 90). Examples of such unions in the public sector in Zambia include Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia; Judicial and Allied Workers Union of Zambia; and Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers. At this point, it can be noted that the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ), which is the focus of the thesis, is an example of general-sectoral unions (a subcategory of sectoral unions).

5.5.2 Enterprise unions

Enterprise unions draw their membership from employees of a single organisation. However, some enterprise unions may also extend their recruitment to employees of other related organisations. Examples of such unions in Zambia’s public sector include University of Zambia Lecturers’ and Researchers’ Union; University of Zambia and Allied Workers Union; Copperbelt University Academics Workers Union; Copperbelt University and Allied Workers Union; Copperbelt University Senior Administrative, Professional and Technical Staff Union; Workers Union of Tazara; and Zambia Revenue Authority Workers Union.

5.5.3 Occupational unions

Occupational unions confine their recruitment to employees from one occupation. However, some occupational unions may also extend their recruitment to employees from other related occupations. Examples of occupational unions that organise in the public sector in Zambia include Zambia National Union of Teachers; Secondary Education School Teachers Union of Zambia; Basic Education Teachers Union of Zambia; Professional Teachers Union of Zambia; National Union of Technical Lecturers and Allied Workers; and Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation.
5.5.4 Industrial unions

Industrial unions refer to those unions that organise all employees in a particular industry regardless of their occupation. Examples of industrial unions that organise in the public sector in Zambia include Health Workers Union of Zambia; and Agricultural, Technical and Professional Staff Union of Zambia.

5.5.5 Federations of trade unions

Trade unions that organise workers in the public sector in Zambia are also affiliated to federations of trade unions. There are two federations of trade unions in Zambia. These are Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia (FFTUZ). The ZCTU is a larger federation than FFTUZ. The *LO-Norway / ZCTU Cooperation Agreement 2010 – 2014: Baseline Study Report* indicates that there are 33 trade unions affiliated to ZCTU with a membership base of 251,606. As for the FFTUZ, it represents 12 affiliated unions with a membership base of about 50,000. This means that 73.3 percent of the 45 affiliated unions in the country are represented by ZCTU while 26.7 percent are represented by FFTUZ. In addition, the membership base of ZCTU accounts for 83.4 percent of the estimated 301,606 union members affiliated to federations in the country while FFTUZ accounts for only 16.6 percent. At this stage, it is important to mention that the CSAWUZ (the focus of the thesis) is affiliated to the larger federation of trade unions in the country, the ZCTU.

It is also important to mention that some workers in Zambia do not belong to trade unions. The rate of unionisation (union density) in the formal sector in Zambia is around 72 percent (*LO-Norway / ZCTU Cooperation Agreement 2010 – 2014: Baseline Study Report*). This implies that about 28 percent of the workers in the formal sector in Zambia are nonunionised. Although the level of unionisation is high, the labour movement in Zambia is fragmented. It is characterised by small and weak splinter unions (Sumaili, 2012).
5.6 Summary

This chapter has indicated that Zambia is a unitary state with a multiparty system of government. Administratively, Zambia is divided into 10 provinces. Lusaka is the capital city, which is located in Lusaka province. The population of Zambia is estimated to be 15 million, with most of the people residing in rural areas. Zambia is also characterised by a young, unskilled and impoverished population. Most of the workers are engaged in agricultural activities, which are informally organised (i.e. unregistered and “survivalist” in nature). Since these workers are not registered, they are difficult to organise.

The chapter has also revealed that the government faces challenges to deliver services especially in rural areas and to the female population. In addition, despite being reformed, the public sector continues to be inefficient and ineffective. The chapter has indicated that the reform of the public sector in Zambia is more business friendly. Consequently, the private sector has become the largest formal sector employer and the largest source of trade union membership in the country.

Furthermore, the chapter has revealed that the public sector in Zambia comprises three major categories of government institutions. These are central government, local government and parastatals. There are different types of trade unions that organise employees in the public sector in Zambia. They include sectoral unions, enterprise unions, occupational unions, industrial unions, and federations of trade unions. The next chapter examines NPM reforms implemented in Zambia and their implications for the CSAWUZ.
CHAPTER 6: NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CIVIL SERVANTS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION OF ZAMBIA

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided an overview of the nature of the public sector in Zambia and the structure of its trade unions. The chapter showed that the public sector in Zambia comprises three major categories of government institutions. These are central government, local government, and parastatals. The chapter also showed that there are various types of trade unions organising employees in the public sector in Zambia. They include sectoral unions, enterprise unions, occupational unions, industrial unions, and federations of trade unions. The chapter identified the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) as one of the general-sectoral unions (a subcategory of sectoral unions) that organise employees in the public sector in Zambia.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine New Public Management (NPM) reforms implemented in Zambia and their implications for the CSAWUZ. In order to achieve its purpose, the chapter has been divided into six major sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section explains NPM reform strategies implemented in Zambia. The third section is a presentation of factors that influenced the implementation of NPM reforms in Zambia. The fourth section discusses the effects of NPM on the public sector workplace, collective bargaining, and the long-term strategies of the CSAWUZ. The fifth section discusses strategic responses by the CSAWUZ to NPM reforms. The sixth section is a summary.

6.2 New Public Management reform strategies implemented in Zambia

Like many other countries in the world, Zambia has experienced two generations of Public Sector Reform (PSR). These are NPM and post-NPM reforms. Under NPM reforms (from the 1980s to the 1990s), the following strategies were
implemented: restructuring of the public service, performance management, decentralisation, privatisation and commercialisation of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Republic of Zambia, 1993; Republic of Zambia, 2006b). Under post-NPM reforms (from the 2000s to date), the following strategies have been implemented: partnerships in policy formulation and implementation, public service capacity building, recentralisation, and the adoption of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). In order to achieve its purpose, this chapter will examine NPM reform strategies implemented in Zambia. Post-NPM reforms will be dealt with in the subsequent chapters.

6.2.1 Restructuring of the public service

This section will explain NPM reform strategies implemented in Zambia. The effects of these strategies on industrial relations activity will be discussed in section 6.4. As mentioned above, restructuring of the public service is one of the strategies of NPM reforms. Implementation of this reform strategy in Zambia started in the mid-1980s. This was done through a number of Government announcements. According to Republic of Zambia (1993: G4), in 1986, the following announcements were made by Cabinet Office: there were no new positions to be created in the service, there were no new promotions to be made, all unfilled positions for non-professional and non-technical workers were to remain vacant, and there was need for official permission to be given by Cabinet Office to fill any professional or technical position. These measures focused on workforce reduction and cost cutting.

The other reform measure was the reduction of the retirement age for civil servants. Men were to retire at the age of 55 instead of 60 years. For women, their retirement age was reduced from 55 to 50 years. This measure meant that all those above the new retirement age had to be retired. Civil Service pension benefits and gratuities were also increased so that public servants could be persuaded to retire early (Republic of Zambia, 1993: G4-G5). In this regard, early retirement was adopted as a cost cutting exercise. The idea was to reduce the wage bill through
workforce reduction. In the same vein, permanent secretaries were empowered to declare workers redundant and recommend them for retirement. In addition, permanent secretaries were empowered to recommend workers to be retired on disciplinary grounds (Republic of Zambia, 1993: G5). At this stage, it can be noted that restructuring focused on developing a leaner and less costly public service. However, through this strategy, the public service lost its expertise. For instance, the exercise of early retirement meant that experienced workers had to be separated from the service. This finding corroborates Omoyefa’s (2008) conclusion that downsizing made the public sector in Africa to be deprived of skilled workers.

Furthermore, the late 1980s saw additional measures being undertaken to promote productivity in the public service. These included training of senior public servants in the area of management, and improvement of remuneration packages (Republic of Zambia, 1993: G5-G7). This finding indicates that restructuring did not only focus on reducing the size of the public sector but also enhancing productivity and efficiency. This was done by building the capacity of public managers and improving wages.

Additional measures to restructure Zambia’s public service were contained in the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) adopted in 1993. The PSRP had three components. These are restructuring of the public service, management and human resources performance improvement, and decentralisation and strengthening of local government. Under the component of restructuring the public service, the PSRP aimed to achieve “a less costly, but more efficient Public Service,” empower retrenched workers, and improve “planning and budgeting in the Public Service” (Republic of Zambia, 1993: 6). A number of strategies were implemented to achieve these objectives. The main strategy was to reduce the workforce. Under this strategy, the following measures were implemented: the first was retrenchment of workers that were categorised as Classified Daily Employees (CDEs), otherwise known as general workers. The workers in this category included drivers, cleaners, office orderlies, and cordon guards (Former
The implementation of this measure meant that the capacity of the government to deliver services had been reduced. It also meant that the retained workers had to multi-task to ensure continuity of service delivery.

The second measure for workforce reduction focused on voluntary separation of civil servants. Under this measure, any civil servant who was willing to leave the service, on voluntary basis, was allowed to do so and promised to be paid their benefits without delay (Former President, CSAWUZ, interview, 29 January 2015). This finding implies that both professional and non-professional workers were persuaded to leave the public sector. This, in turn, reduced the expertise of the public sector (see Omoyefa, 2008).

The third measure for workforce reduction was to freeze unfilled posts. Under this measure, posts that became vacant due to death, resignation or any other reason were not filled (Former President, CSAWUZ, interview, 29 January 2015). This finding reveals that apart from retrenchment, the labour force can also be reduced by relying on natural attrition.

The Zambian Government adopted the strategy of workforce reduction so as to cut costs. Former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015) stated that:

So this was one way [of] trying to reduce the numbers and also to try and answer to the cries of the civil servants because they were saying they were poorly paid. Government was saying because of these high numbers, we can’t pay you well . . . So this was another motivation on the part of government to reduce the workforce so that the few who remain can get better paid.

The implication of workforce reduction is that those who remained in employment had to multi-task, work harder and be more productive. In other words, the workers were overworked.
The other strategy used to restructure the public service in Zambia was the professionalisation of the service. Under this strategy, employment was based on qualifications. According to former CSAWUZ Lusaka Province Regional Secretary (interview, 27 January 2015), the Government wanted civil service posts to be filled by personnel that had appropriate levels of education. In line with this requirement, all civil servants had to reapply for jobs they were holding and sit for interviews. Successful applicants were retained while unsuccessful ones were laid-off. The CSAWUZ Church Road Branch Trustee (interview, 30 January, 2015) indicated that during this process, those who did not have the qualifications for jobs they had applied for were either laid-off or redeployed to positions that suited their qualifications including demotions. These findings reveal that the Government used both voluntary and involuntary strategies to reduce the workforce and save costs. Workers who did not leave the service voluntarily ended up being demoted or laid-off in the name of not having appropriate qualifications. This implies that the public service remained with a smaller but overworked labour force. It also implies that the labour force experienced difficulties such as stress, pressure and exhaustion, among others.

In addition, the strategy of changing job titles and demanding for higher levels of education to fill the new positions was adopted. According to former CSAWUZ Long Acres Branch Chairperson (interview, 24 February 2015), the title of Clerical Officer in the Judiciary was phased out and replaced with Registry Clerk which required a higher qualification than Junior Secondary School Certificate. This requirement meant that workers who had Junior Secondary School Certificate and held the position of Clerical Officer did not qualify for the new position of Registry Clerk. As a result, they were relegated to the category of CDEs. As noted earlier, by virtue of being CDEs, such workers were earmarked for retrenchment. The implication of this finding is that workers become marginalised when their skills are devalued, thereby making it easier for them to be retrenched.
The strategy of merging units within public institutions was also implemented so as to restructure the workplace. The CSAWUZ Church Road Branch Trustee (interview, 30 January 2015) stated that the Letter Press and Lithographic Sections at Government Printers were merged so that they could operate effectively. This resulted in the merged sections requiring a smaller number of workers and the subsequent laying-off or redeployment of excess staff.

Another strategy of restructuring the public service in Zambia focused on the removal of “ghost workers” from the payroll. The CSAWUZ Church Road Branch Trustee (interview, 30 January 2015) mentioned that:

> These [ghost workers] are workers who maybe would appear on the payroll but probably they retired a long time ago or they died a long time ago. And some maybe they are on suspension for a long period of time, probably five years but they are still on payroll. Those were cleaned out.

The above-mentioned findings reveal that on the one hand, restructuring gave the public sector an opportunity to downsize and reduce wage-related costs. On the other hand, restructuring reduced the capacity of the public sector. This, in turn, forced the public sector to subcontract the private sector to deliver services.

6.2.2 Performance management

Performance management was the second component of the PSRP. The objectives of this component were to establish accountability and performance management systems, to develop skills of senior civil servants in the area of management, and to establish an open system of managing human resources in the public service (Republic of Zambia, 1993: 8). The main strategy adopted to achieve these objectives was to shift from a secretive system of performance appraisal, which depended on the Annual Confidential Report, to an open one.

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35 Ghost workers refer to workers who appear on the payroll of an organisation yet they do not actually work for it.
The informants indicated that under the Annual Confidential Report system, there was an appraisal form to be filled in every year. The process started with the worker indicating his/her qualification, position in the institution, and the number of years served in the institution. The worker was also required to indicate what he/she needed to improve his/her performance. Thereafter, the worker had to present the form to his/her supervisor who would fill in his/her part indicating what he/she considered to be the performance of the worker for the year under review. At this stage, the worker had no access to the supervisor’s remarks. This is the stage that characterised the confidentiality of this appraisal system. Former CSAWUZ Long Acres Branch Chairperson (interview, 24 February 2015) stated that:

The supervisor will get the form after you have submitted. They will also put their assessment of a particular employee. They will put their comments which was not privy to see because it was the confidential thing. After you have done your part, it becomes confidential because it’s now the employer who will do the comments of what you have said and make recommendations.

Because of the emphasis on confidentiality, this system promoted subjectivity in the appraisal process. Former CSAWUZ University Teaching Hospital (UTH) Branch Women’s Committee Chairperson (interview, 23 February 2015) mentioned that:

The immediate supervisor signs the Annual Confidential Report according to how he or she is looking at that person’s performance. But again it wasn’t good if someone has a grudge with the subordinate . . . the appraisee was the first one to fill in and then after that, the immediate supervisor signs whatever the supervisor thought about that appraisee.

The above-mentioned findings show that the confidential approach to performance appraisal made the system prone to abuse. The system was open to patronage, favouritism and victimisation based on arbitrary grounds. Under such a system, rewards or punishment would be given to wrong workers. This causes a lot of stress and dissatisfaction at the workplace.
The Annual Confidential Report system had provisions for rewards to be given to good performers and punishment to be meted out to poor performers. The rewards included promotion and being praised (Former Long Acres Branch Chairperson, CSAWUZ, interview, 24 February 2015). The other rewards included Labour Day Awards, loans, and being selected to attend workshops (Former UTH Branch Women’s Committee Chairperson, CSAWUZ, interview, 23 February 2015). The informants indicated that, in the case of poor performance, the actions that were taken included transfer from one section to another within the institution or from one ministry to another, counselling and encouragement to perform better.

The PSRP introduced a more transparent and objective system of performance appraisal called Annual Performance Appraisal System (APAS). Like the Annual Confidential Report system, APAS has an appraisal form which is supposed to be filled in every year. Despite both systems beginning with the employee to fill in the form, APAS provides for the employee to set his/her performance targets for the year under consideration. The informants indicated that the performance targets are set in such a way that each activity is given a time-frame. This is done at the beginning of the calendar year. The system also gives the appraised an opportunity to participate in the process of assessing his/her performance. Former CSAWUZ UTH Branch Women’s Committee Chairperson (interview, 23 February 2015) stated that:

If there are any constraints, the appraisee will be able to say, me, I’m not performing well because we are lacking in this or that . . . Then you [the supervisor] would agree with the appraisee to say here you didn’t perform well because we didn’t have these things. But when we have them, those things in place, then someone has no excuse . . . And then we would assess and then give the marks according to the agreement. Because now you have to agree with your appraisee. You can’t just write alone.

These findings show that APAS takes a participatory approach to performance appraisal. It gives workers an opportunity to protect themselves against unfair evaluations. In the case of poor performance, the appraised is able to indicate
whether their poor performance is due to the institution’s failure to provide the necessary resources or it is due to their own incompetence as individuals. As a result, this kind of approach protects the appraisal system against abuse and ensures that the rewards or punishment are given to deserving workers.

Like the Annual Confidential Report system, APAS has provisions for rewards to be given to good performers and punishment to be meted out to poor performers. The informants revealed that the rewards include letter of commendation, promotion, and salary increase. The actions taken for poor performance include training, demotion, transfer, warning letter, and retirement. These data show that performance appraisal is conducted to identify training needs, motivate workers and enhance productivity.

6.2.3 Decentralisation

Decentralisation was the third component of the PSRP. The objective of this component was “to provide direction and carry out implementation of the decentralisation of appropriate Government functions and operations from central government to the provinces and districts in a more efficient and effective manner” (Republic of Zambia, 1993: 9). The main strategy adopted to achieve this objective was the creation of new institutions by means of deconcentration and devolution of authority and responsibilities. Through this process, some departments and functions of the central government were hived off into new institutions and structures. According to former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015), the Customs and Excise department under the Ministry of Finance was hived off to form the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) and “most of the workers who were in this department were transferred to ZRA. Those who did not fit into the new structure were retired in national interest.” Similarly, the Wildlife department under the Ministry of Tourism was hived off to form the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA).
Decentralisation also took place in the Ministries of Health and Education. In these ministries, autonomous institutions called boards were established. Health boards were established at national, district, and hospital levels. Similarly, education boards were established at district, college, and school levels (Momba, 2006). The boards were empowered to design their own structures of operation, recruit their own staff and determine their own conditions of service. The process of empowering lower level institutions was also extended to local authorities. Each local council had its own management, which was “supposed to operate almost autonomously” (Former President, CSAWUZ, interview, 29 January 2015). These findings show that the purpose of decentralisation was to promote popular participation in policy-making and solicit compliance with government policies.

6.2.4 Privatisation and commercialisation of State-owned Enterprises

The procedures for privatisation and commercialisation of SOEs in Zambia were initially guided by the Privatisation Act of 1992 and its subsequent amendments (Republic of Zambia, 1996). Nonetheless, since 2006 these procedures have been guided by the Zambia Development Agency Act of 2006. This shift was due to the repeal of the Privatisation Act. Under the Privatisation Act, the function of privatisation of SOEs was performed by the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) (Republic of Zambia, 1996). However, in 2006, ZPA was merged with four other institutions, namely, Zambia Investment Centre, Export Board of Zambia, Small Enterprise Development Board, and Zambia Export Processing Zones Authority, to form a new institution called Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) (ZDA, 2015). Since then, the function of privatisation has been performed by the Board of ZDA (Republic of Zambia, 2006b). This Board is empowered to utilise various modes of privatisation, which include the following:

(a) public offering of shares;
(b) private sale of shares through negotiated or competitive bids or by private treaty;
(c) offer of additional shares in a State owned enterprise to reduce Government shareholding;
(d) sale of the assets and business of the State owned enterprise;
(e) reorganisation of the State owned enterprise before the sale of the whole or any part of the State owned enterprise;
(f) management or employee buyouts by management or employees in that State owned enterprise;
(g) lease and management contracts; or
(h) any other method the Board may consider appropriate (Republic of Zambia, 2006b: Section 31).

The above-mentioned modes of privatisation show that the Zambian Government had adopted two major forms of privatisation. These are complete and partial privatisation. Under complete privatisation, the private sector is given all the rights of ownership and management of property. In the case of partial privatisation, joint ventures between the public and private sectors are established (Hughes, 2003). Privatisation had implications for both the government and trade unions in Zambia. First and foremost, it changed the role of the government in the process of providing goods and services. Instead of the government being the only provider, it created an environment within which private firms could operate. This promoted a degree of competition in the delivery of goods and services. This kind of reform focused on developing what the World Bank (1997) defines as an “effective state.”

The sale of assets also offered government an opportunity to raise financial resources for its operations. In addition, the strategies of lease and management contracts enabled the government to rely on private sector finance and expertise to deliver public goods and services. However, privatisation undermined accountability in public service delivery (see Hildyard and Wilks, 1998). Furthermore, privatisation entailed the transfer of employment opportunities from the public to the private sector, thereby reducing the membership base for public sector unions.
6.3 Factors that influenced the implementation of New Public Management reforms in Zambia

The assumption of strategic choice theory is that employers are influenced by environmental forces to adjust their business strategies (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1994). This assumption is applicable to the implementation of NPM reform strategies in Zambia. In line with this assumption, the Zambian Government, being the main employer in the public sector, was influenced by the interplay of three factors to adopt NPM reform strategies. The first factor was the recognition of problems in the public sector. These problems included an oversized, too expensive to manage and unresponsive public sector (Republic of Zambia, 1993). When the Government decided to adopt the PSRP in 1993, the size of Zambia’s public service was estimated at about 180,000, comprising about 75,000 Civil Servants, 26,000 Local Authority Employees, about 45,000 non-joint Council Employees and 34,000 Classified Daily Employees” (Republic of Zambia, 1993: 10). As for SOEs, they had more than 100,000 employees (Simutanyi, 2011). This means that the government, as a whole, had more than 280,000 employees before the implementation of far-reaching and rapid reforms of the public sector in particular and the economy in general. There were also several public complaints about the performance of the public sector. These included failure to deliver basic services such as health, education, transport, and infrastructure to the people (Republic of Zambia, 1993). These findings show that the initial condition for the government to adopt reform measures is the presence of problems in the public sector (see Heeks, 1998).

The second factor that influenced the implementation of NPM reforms in Zambia was the emergence of a new ideology in the name of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism highlights the effectiveness of market forces and the weakness of government regulation. This ideology emphasises implementation of measures such as deregulation and privatisation. The ideology of neo-liberalism is a new form of liberalism. The ideas of liberalism were conceived in the seventeenth and

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36 Here the public service means employees of the central government, local councils and specialised boards, excluding parastatal employees (Republic of Zambia, 1993).
eighteenth centuries by thinkers such as John Locke and Adam Smith, respectively. Although the new form (neo-liberalism) appeared in the post-Second World War period, it started being influential in the world in the 1970s (Heeks, 1998). In Zambia, this ideology was embraced in the 1980s. This was demonstrated by various stakeholders demanding the adoption and implementation of neo-liberal policies. These stakeholders included the business class and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Simutanyi, 1996). This finding reveals that the recognition of problems in the public sector is not enough to influence the implementation of reforms. A new ideology is also required to influence the reform of the public sector (see Heeks, 1998).

The third factor was complicity of state actors and agents in the adoption of NPM reforms. In this regard, international financial institutions, especially the World Bank and the IMF presented to Zambia the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) aimed at addressing problems facing the public sector. To achieve this, the World Bank suggested implementation of a number of measures, which included reduction of the workforce, streamlining of posts, reforming of reward systems, and establishment of appropriate control systems in the public service (Republic of Zambia, 1993). International financial institutions managed to influence the Zambian Government to adopt their suggestions. This was demonstrated by the adoption of the PSRP, which contained reform measures suggested by the World Bank (Republic of Zambia, 1993). This finding shows that in addition to problems in the public sector and a new ideology, reforming the public sector requires the presence of actors that can influence the government to adopt the reforms (see Heeks, 1998).

6.4 The effects of New Public Management on the public sector workplace, collective bargaining, and the long-term strategies of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia

Section 6.2 explained NPM reform strategies implemented in Zambia. This section will discuss the effects of these reform strategies on industrial relations
activity. The discussion is guided by strategic choice theory, which assumes that the effects of strategic decisions can be felt at any level of industrial relations activity (Kochan et al., 1994). In line with this assumption, the effects of NPM strategies were felt at all the three levels of industrial relations activity in Zambia. These are long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels. These effects are discussed below.

6.4.1 Effects of New Public Management on the public sector workplace

Implementation of NPM reforms affected the public sector workplace in Zambia in many ways. They included the following: first, the measures of privatisation and employee separation resulted in the reduction of the size of the public sector. According to Krishna (2006: 64), there was “almost complete privatisation of 261 state-owned enterprises out of 284 enterprises earmarked for privatisation at end of 2004.” In addition, the number of employees in the public service reduced from 180,000 in 1993 to 139,000 in 1997 and 104,000 in 2000 (Republic of Zambia, 2005). This represents 42.2 percent workforce reduction during the period 1993-2000. Second, the reduction in the workforce led to increased workload for workers that were retained. The CSAWUZ UTH Branch Secretary (interview, 13 February 2015) indicated that at a hospital like UTH, shift work that used to be performed by nine people had to be performed by seven, thereby creating a shortage of two workers. He also indicated that instead of the wards being manned by four nurses, they only had two. This meant that the workload of the remaining workers had to increase. Consequently, the performance of the overloaded workers became poor. Former CSAWUZ UTH Branch Women’s Committee Chairperson (interview, 23 February 2015) stated that “there was a lot of work. Even the performance now reduced because the few nurses couldn’t manage the workload they had.”

In order to reduce the workload of the retained staff and improve their performance, casualisation of labour was introduced in the public sector. For

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37 Here the public service is defined in terms of central government, local council and specialised board employees, without the inclusion of parastatal employees (Republic of Zambia, 1993).
instance, UTH started to employ nurses and horticulture workers on part-time basis (UTH Branch Secretary, CSAWUZ, interview, 13 February 2015). This finding shows that the implementation of NPM reforms resulted in a lowering of the terms and conditions of employment in the public sector.

Third, the emphasis on employment based on qualifications resulted in public service positions being occupied by staff with appropriate qualifications, and workers being remunerated according to their skills. That is to say, those with higher qualifications started to receive better rewards than the less qualified. According to CSAWUZ Church Road Branch Trustee (interview, 30 January 2015), workers at Government Printers who had higher levels of education but occupying junior positions were promoted while those with lower levels of education but occupying senior positions were either demoted or retired. This finding reveals that professionalisation of the public sector ensures equity in the processes of recruitment, placement and rewards.

Fourth, the creation of semi-autonomous institutions (through decentralisation) resulted in improved conditions of service in certain sections of the public sector. According to former CSAWUZ UTH Branch Women’s Committee Chairperson (interview, 23 February 2015), health boards were paying higher salaries than the Ministry of Health. This led to workers under the Ministry of Health to receive a “top up” so as to equalise the salaries.

Fifth, the decentralisation process resulted in the creation of a disjointed public sector. This is illustrated by public institutions that started to operate independent of each other. For example, health boards, education boards, and local councils were empowered to design their own structures of operation, recruit their own staff and determine their own conditions of service (Former President, CSAWUZ, interview, 29 January 2015). This had a negative impact on the terms of employment. For instance, employees were made to lose the benefits associated with transfer from one public institution to another. According to former CSAWUZ UTH Branch Women’s Committee Chairperson (interview, 23
February 2015), employees under health boards could not be transferred from one hospital to another because each hospital was being run by its own board. So, if an employee wanted to move from one hospital to another, he/she had to resign then look for employment in the other institution.

Sixth, the implementation of strategies such as commercialisation, lease and management contracts in the public sector led to a degree of public/private hybridisation. This meant that public and private sector organisations could be managed using similar principles (Kletz, Hénaut and Sardas, 2014). By implication, NPM reforms blurred the distinction between public and private sectors.

6.4.2 Effects of New Public Management on collective bargaining

Under collective bargaining, the major effect of NPM reforms was to transform the bargaining structure from a centralised structure to a decentralised one. Former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015) indicated that, before the reforms, collective bargaining in the public sector in Zambia was highly centralised. Trade unions representing various categories of public sector workers used to come together and form a “joint bargaining unit” to negotiate with the Government. The unions included Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union (ZULAWU), Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT), Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ) [now Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ)], and National Union of Public Service Workers (NUPSW). These unions represented workers in the local councils, teachers, civil servants, and general workers, respectively. At this stage, collective bargaining took the structure of what Katz, Kochan and Colvin (2008) refer to as broad centralised bargaining (i.e. having a single collective bargaining agreement covering the interests of different groups of employees across various plants of a number of employers).
However, following the establishment of semi-autonomous institutions, collective bargaining was decentralised to the organisation level. This arrangement meant that trade unions had to negotiate with the management of individual public institutions as opposed to negotiating with the central government. For instance, hived off institutions, health boards, education boards and local authorities had to conduct their own negotiations as individual entities. Former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015) mentioned that “because local authorities had differing capacities and so each council was supposed to take into account their capacity to meet financial obligations. They were supposed to determine their own conditions.” At this stage, collective bargaining took the structure of what Salamon (2000) refers to as single-employer organisational-level bargaining (i.e. the bargaining process being controlled within an institution). This finding is similar to the report presented by Brewster, Dempsey and Hegewisch (2001) on the decentralisation of pay bargaining in many European countries following the implementation of NPM reforms. In addition, this finding corroborates Zagelmeyer's (2007) argument that decentralised bargaining enables management to regulate the employment relationship while reducing the power of trade unions to do the same.

The NPM reforms also affected issues that trade unions could present for collective bargaining. Before the reforms, trade unions were presenting several issues for collective bargaining relating to conditions of service. They included salaries, allowances and loans. Under allowances, there was uniform allowance for uniformed staff, overtime allowance, rural hardship allowance, and tool allowance for workers using personal tools to perform official duties. The loans included house, car, and household loans. However, following the implementation of the reforms, other items were added to the bargaining agenda. These were housing and transport allowances. Housing allowance became a bargaining issue because the government had sold its houses and stopped providing accommodation to workers. Therefore, there was need for housing allowance so that workers could secure their own accommodation. Similarly, transport allowance became a bargaining issue because the government had stopped
transporting workers to and from the workplace. As such, there was need for transport allowance so that workers could find their own means of moving to and from the workplace (Former President, CSAWUZ, interview, 29 January 2015). This finding shows that NPM reforms tended to alleviate the government from the pressures associated with employee welfare. The reforms also reduced employee benefits. This means that the government was able to reduce costs by lowering the conditions of employment.

Decentralisation of collective bargaining also affected the time and resources that the unions spent in the bargaining process. When collective bargaining was centralised, the time and resources spent in this process were less. This is because there was only one bargaining unit to attend to. Nevertheless, after decentralisation, the bargaining process became very expensive for the unions. This is because of several bargaining units that needed to be attended to. According to former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015), the hiving off of institutions:

Posed quite some strain on the part of the union because they had to spend more time now in conducting collective bargaining and it’s not an easy, cheap process. So you find you are wanted this side, and then this side also the negotiations have to be conducted. For instance, the Civil Servants Union [of Zambia] now, apart from attending to the central government, they had to attend to National Food and Nutrition Commission. Then you have to attend to ZAWA, you had to attend to Lusaka Business and Technical College. So this was the added burden that the Union had to bear now.

The above-mentioned finding supports Salamon (2000) who indicates that it is very hard for an institution to coordinate various bargaining units.

6.4.3 Effects of New Public Management on the long-term strategies of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia

The implementation of NPM reforms also affected the long-term strategies of the CSAWUZ. The effects were felt in a number of areas such as union structure and
governance. At the time of its formation, in 1976, the Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ) assumed the structure of what could be called a “specific-sectoral” union, which is a subcategory of sectoral unions. The term “specific-sectoral” union may refer to a union that organises in a particular sub-sector of the economy. In this regard, the CSUZ organised civil servants, who are a subcategory of workers in the public sector. Civil servants were defined in terms of central government employees that were engaged on permanent and pensionable terms of employment. The informants mentioned that the workers in this category included Administrative Officers, Print Assistants, Personnel Officers, Registry Clerks, Accountants, Accounts Assistants, Accounts Clerks, Nurses, Laboratory Technicians, and Laboratory Scientists, among others.

According to former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015), the CSUZ was formed because “there was no union to represent the civil servants.” This was in spite of other government workers such as teachers having a union to represent them, namely, the Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT). So, the civil servants “felt strongly that they also needed a union in order to advocate for improved conditions of service” (Former President, CSAWUZ, interview, 29 January 2015). This finding reveals that trade unions are formed to fight for better terms and conditions of employment (Bendix, 2010; Salamon, 2000).

However, the implementation of NPM reforms had a negative impact on the membership of CSUZ. The processes of retrenchment, voluntary separation, freezing of unfilled posts and hiving off of some departments led to a significant loss of union membership. Since the CSUZ had confined its recruitment to civil servants, it lost membership of employees that were separated from the civil service. Between 1995 and 2001, the membership of CSUZ reduced from 65,000 to 36,000 (Koyi, 2010: 22). This represented a membership decline of 44.6 percent. This finding shows that NPM reforms led to job losses in the public sector, which in turn, resulted in the reduction of union membership (Anderson, Griffin and Teicher, 2002; Larmer, 2005; Simutanyi, 2011). This finding also shows that confining union membership to a specific category of workers
weakens the union when such workers begin to lose employment due to restructuring measures.

The effects of NPM reforms were also felt in the governance process of CSUZ. Union governance was affected by reductions in membership and subscriptions. With few members paying subscriptions, the union had less money for its operations. Former CSAWUZ Lusaka Province Regional Secretary (interview, 27 January 2015) stated that:

So where like Ministry of Health, we used to collect a cheque of [Zambian Kwacha] 90,000 a month. But when these reforms came, as you are saying, it came drastically sometimes to [Zambian Kwacha] 30,000 . . . So that means it affected even our day by day administration. It was affected because our budget was brought down from what we anticipated.

The above-mentioned finding shows that NPM reforms resulted in not only job losses in the public sector and reduction in union membership but also reduced union income (Anderson et al., 2002; Simutanyi, 2011). The reduction in union income meant less meetings, less democratic decision-making and less services to members. Eventually, public sector unions became weak.

The inability of the unions to prevent job losses led the general membership to lose confidence in the union leadership in particular and union activities in general. According to CSAWUZ Church Road Branch Trustee (interview, 30 January 2015), at some point employees at Government Printers felt that they were better off without a union because their employer, the Government, was able to do whatever it wanted, whether the union was against it or not. Furthermore, due to job losses and increased workload for those who remained in employment, trade union leaders by virtue of them being workers were also overworked by their employers such that they were unable to effectively perform union functions. Former CSAWUZ UTH Branch Women’s Committee Chairperson (interview, 23 February 2015) indicated that:
The members had to work hard and because some of the union members were nurses just like myself, it was difficult to find time to do branch work and again come back and work in the ward because sometimes I would find myself alone on duty. So, it was difficult to run the affairs of the union because of the shortage.

From the finding above, it can be noted that restructuring of the public sector created problems for the union leadership. Because of the reduction in the workforce, workers were too exhausted to participate in trade union activities. This implies that restructuring enables public sector employers to exploit workers and prevent the growth of trade unions.

The reforms also affected the relationship between the labour movement and the government. Rather than maintaining a cordial relationship, conflicts of interest started to emerge between the two parties. First and foremost, the labour movement was against the manner in which the government was handling the issue of separating workers from central government employment. For instance, the government wanted to transfer all the health workers from the central government to the Central Board of Health (CBoH) (a newly established autonomous institution) without compensating them. Its argument was that the issue of compensation would also be transferred to CBoH. This approach was rejected by the CSUZ, which wanted the workers to be paid their dues before being transferred to the new employer. In spite of the objection by the union, government did not change its position. This forced the union to take legal action to protect workers’ interests. According to former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015), “around 1995 . . . the Civil Servants Union [of Zambia] decided to go to court to prevent government from transferring the health workers without paying them what they had accrued as benefits.” This finding indicates that the employment relationship is characterised by conflicts of interests (see Clegg, 1975; Engels, 1971; Fox, 1974; Green, 1991; Marx, 1976; Marx and Engels, 1986). In this regard, the employer is interested in cost reduction while the union is interested in employee rewards (see Clegg, 1975).
The other source of conflict was the use of threats by the government to separate workers from central government employment. Former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015) indicated that the union viewed the government as being untruthful in the reform process. He mentioned that:

Because they were saying if people migrated from central government to the Central Board of Health, their conditions of service will be better . . . But the way government was doing it was more like blackmail. Like those who remain with the government will have nowhere to work. Because they said if you don’t move to central board then where are you going to work because government will have no hospitals? (Former President, CSAWUZ, interview, 29 January 2015).

The above-mentioned finding shows that the Zambian Government believed in unitarism in the process of implementing NPM reforms. This approach justifies the use of force to deal with rebellious employees (Fox, 1973, 1974).

Another area of conflict was political interference in the operations of trade unions. This was illustrated by government efforts to weaken public sector unions by way of influencing the formation of splinter unions. According to former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015), the “architect” of the formation of the Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers was Mr. Michael Sata, then Minister of Health. He indicated that Mr. Sata “actually confessed that it was his idea that there should be a union just for health workers because they were a special group” (Former President, CSAWUZ, interview, 29 January 2015). This finding reveals that NPM reforms enabled management in particular and the government in general to undermine the power of trade unions in the process of managing workers in the public sector. This confirms Sumaili’s (2011) and Sumaili’s (2012) assertion that government control negatively affects the organisation of trade unions.

The NPM reforms implemented in Zambia also affected inter-union relations. This was through the establishment of semi-autonomous institutions, which facilitated the formation of new trade unions to represent workers in those
institutions. For instance, Zambia Revenue Authority Workers Union was formed to represent workers at ZRA. The Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers was also formed to represent workers in health boards. A new union was also formed to represent workers in Trades Training institutes and colleges. The formation of these (new) unions resulted in inter-union conflicts. The conflicts were due to the problem of poaching of members. Former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015) mentioned that:

So the Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers was formed. And that union, primarily, they were supposed to target workers employed by the boards. But they began straying and trying to recruit even those who were employed by the central government. So some hostilities started arising between the Civil Servants Union and the Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers.

From the finding above, it can be noted that open unionism increases conflict between trade unions. This finding supports Streeck and Visser (1997: 326) who indicate that open and expansive unionism increases inter-union competition, “with all unions poised in principle to claim jurisdiction in any economic sector and to enter the territory, actual or potential, of any other union.”

6.5 Strategic responses by the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia to New Public Management reforms

The assumption of strategic choice theory that the key actors affected by the reform of industrial relations (i.e. employers, trade unions and government) make strategic choices to achieve their goals (Kochan et al., 1994) is applicable to the responses by CSAWUZ to NPM reforms. In line with this assumption, the CSAWUZ made strategic decisions both before and after the implementation of the reforms. These strategies are examined below.
6.5.1 Strategic responses before the implementation of New Public Management reforms

The strategic decisions made by the CSAWUZ before the implementation of NPM included participating in the process of formulating the reform strategies. Union participation took the forms of challenging government proposals and presenting alternatives. This was done through meetings with the government. For example, instead of focusing on the reduction of the workforce, the labour movement was interested in identifying the most appropriate level of employment in the public sector and embarking on rightsizing as opposed to downsizing. Former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015) stated that:

So for us, we instead came with a counter proposal of rightsizing rather than downsizing because the government was emphasising on downsizing. As a union, our emphasis was on rightsizing where we felt that the numbers were insufficient, we should endeavour to increase the numbers. Where the numbers were more than the requirement to operate optimally, then we can reduce.

The other alternative presented by the union was on the package for those who decided to leave the public service on the basis of voluntary separation. The union opposed the package offered by the government because of the perception that it was very small. This was in spite of government assurance that it would pay the separation package immediately. Instead, the union “insisted that we go by what the Employment Act provided for. The severance package in accordance with the Employment Act” (Former President, CSAWUZ, interview, 29 January 2015). This finding shows that trade unions have the ability to hold government accountable and secure benefits for their members. The finding also shows that trade unions have agency and do not just wait to become victims of PSR. They make strategies to participate in the reform process for the benefit of their members (Connoley, 2008).
6.5.2 Strategic responses after the implementation of New Public Management reforms

After the implementation of NPM reforms, the CSAWUZ made strategic decisions in a number of areas. These were membership recruitment, union functions and objectives, collective bargaining and governance. Following the reduction in union membership due to downsizing of the public sector, the CSAWUZ made a number of strategies to increase its membership and power. The first strategy was to change its structure from a “specific-sectoral” union to a general-sectoral union. This meant that rather than being confined to a specific sector, it extended its recruitment to related fields (Hughes, 1966: 90). In this regard, instead of being limited to civil servants, the CSAWUZ extended its recruitment to allied workers. The allied workers included those “in the Zambian Public Service and grant aided institutions and employees of government departments turned [into] parastatal bodies and organizations, Boards, Authorities, Agencies and Non-governmental Organisations” (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 1). The second strategy was to change the name of the union from Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ) to Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ). This change was made in 2002 so that the name of the union could reflect the change in its structure. The new name showed that the union was not only organising civil servants but also allied workers. The third strategy was to enhance the organisation of new employees in the public sector. Former CSAWUZ Lusaka Province Regional Secretary (interview, 27 January 2015) stated that:

We instructed branches to keep an eye to new employees. Because every day, public service employs and sends these civil servants in various ministries . . . So those are new members who do not belong to any union. Then it is the work of the branch to recruit the new members then report to us as Regional Secretary.

The fourth strategy was to discourage workers from joining new unions on grounds that their ability to serve the interests of workers was unknown. At the same time, the workers were encouraged to join the CSAWUZ because it was the
oldest union in the civil service and had experience in dealing with issues affecting workers in the sector. The fifth strategy was to promise workers access to loans if they joined the union. The sixth strategy was to promise workers opportunities to attend training workshops if they joined the union (Former UTH Branch Women’s Committee Chairperson, CSAWUZ, interview, 23 February 2015). These findings show that there are several strategies of recruiting union members. They include various forms of servicing and organising the members (Waddington, 2005).

However, these strategies may not be effective if membership recruitment is confined to workers in a declining sector. This was the case with CSAWUZ, which concentrated on the organisation of administrative workers or office administrators whose sector was declining. For instance, despite the CSAWUZ adopting the above-mentioned strategies, its membership continued to decline. Between 2001 and 2010, its membership reduced from 36,000 to 17,000 (Koyi, 2010: 22). This represented a membership decline of 52.8 percent. This membership decline was in spite of an increase in employment in the public sector. The number of employees in the public service in Zambia increased from 104,000 in 2000 to 115,000 in 2004. This increase was mainly due to the recruitment of teachers (Republic of Zambia, 2005: 9-10). At the same time, unions that organised in the growing sectors such as teaching managed to increase their membership. For instance, the membership of Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) increased from 33,380 in 2002 to over 37,000 in 2007. This membership consisted of teachers and lecturers (Nyirenda and Shikwe, 2003; ZNUT, 2007). This finding confirms Freeman and Rogers’ (2002) argument that restricted definition of membership hinders the expansion and power of trade unions.

The other area where strategic decisions were made involved the functions and objectives of the union. Before the implementation of NPM reforms, the CSUZ set itself to achieve the following objectives:
(a) The organisation of Civil Servants employed by the Zambian Government in order to pursue and protect the general and individual interests of its members.

(b) To seek for and safeguard reasonable salaries and conditions of employment.

(c) The improvement of the standards and status of the Civil Service.

(d) The encouragement of sympathy and understanding between the Government and its servants.

(e) To mediate in dispute between Government and its employees, between one member and another and between members and other workers so as to secure an amicable settlement whenever possible.

(f) Co-operation with other trade unions.

(g) To provide members with financial assistance during prolonged and unpaid sick leave subject to the financial position of the Union permitting.

(h) To advance members’ education through workers’ education programmes.

(i) To encourage members’ participation in national development programmes.

(j) To do all such other lawful things as are related to or lead to the achievement of all the above objects or any one of them (CSUZ, 1985: 2-3).

The data presented above indicate that before the implementation of NPM reforms, the functions and objectives of the CSUZ included meeting collective and individual needs of its members as well as the needs of the nation as a whole. These needs include collective strength, individual growth, economic welfare, social welfare, industrial harmony, and national development. This finding is consistent with the literature on trade union functions and objectives (see Bendix, 2010; Salamon, 2000).

After the implementation of NPM reforms, the CSAWUZ made a strategic decision to adjust its objectives. The major adjustments were in two areas. The first focused on increasing the categories of members to protect. In this regard, the union started to organise both civil servants and allied workers. This strategy was important because it had the potential of attracting new members. The second adjustment focused on the enhancement of gender equality (CSAWUZ, [undated]: 1-2). This strategy was significant because it gave the union an
opportunity to attract female members. This finding reveals that trade unions in a reforming public sector have an opportunity to increase their membership and power through the organisation of workers in related fields and dealing with nontraditional matters such as gender equality. This revelation endorses the conclusion by Pitcher (2007) that although trade unions have faced a number of challenges, there are possibilities of addressing them. These include recruiting various categories of members, creating worker-owned enterprises, establishing other means of civic engagement, and dealing with new issues (Pitcher, 2007).

The CSAWUZ also made strategic decisions in the area of collective bargaining. The first strategy was to conduct research before presenting items for collective bargaining. This strategy required the engagement of experts in research methodology. As such, the union decided to recruit a degree holder especially in Economics to be in charge of its Directorate for Research. The research was to focus on gathering information on the performance of the global economy, performance of the national economy, the cost of living in the country, and comparison of pay structures of various institutions. Based on this information, the union would then come up with its items for collective bargaining (Former President, CSAWUZ, interview, 29 January 2015).

The second strategy was to increase the number of bargaining units. As opposed to having one bargaining unit covering the interests of all civil servants, the union decided to have two. One bargaining unit covered the interests of health workers only while the other was for the rest of the civil servants. According to former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015), this strategy was necessitated by government’s desire to improve the remuneration of health workers without doing the same to other categories of civil servants. He mentioned that:

So the idea was really to challenge government to say, look, if you really want the health workers to have a better pay than what they are getting now, you can still give them even when they are working under the central government (Former President, CSAWUZ, interview, 29 January 2015).
These strategies had both positive and negative consequences. By having two bargaining units, the CSAWUZ was able to secure gains for one category of its members while others lost out. According to former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015), in the year 2003, when this strategy was launched, “the government gave higher salary increments for the health workers.” This finding shows that the strategy of dividing the union membership into several bargaining units enables collective agreements that meet employees’ needs to be made (Zagelmeyer, 2007). For instance, this strategy enabled improved conditions of service to be secured for health workers in Zambia. However, this strategy has the weakness of promoting variations in the terms and conditions of employment among institutions (Schnabel, Zagelmeyer and Kohaut, 2006). As mentioned above, this strategy enabled health workers to have better conditions of service than the rest of the civil servants in the country.

The CSAWUZ also made strategic decisions concerning its governance process. Changes were made regarding the union’s organisational structure and strategies to influence policy-making. Before the implementation of NPM reforms, the CSUZ had a decentralised organisational structure. Under this structure, union powers and duties were distributed among various organs of the union. These included Quadrennial Conference (QC), Annual Delegates Conference (ADC), Extraordinary Delegates Conference (EDC), National Executive Council (NEC), Disciplinary Committee (DC), Branch Meeting, and Branch Committee (BC) (CSUZ, 1985). This structure is shown in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1 shows the organisational structure of the CSUZ in 1985. At that time, the QC was the highest ranked organ of the union. It was composed of NEC members, DC members, Provincial Workers Educators (PWEs) and two members of each BC. The QC was held after a period of four years. Its duties included policy-making, and election of NEC and DC members (CSUZ, 1985: 10-11).

The ADC was the next organ below the QC. Its composition was similar to the QC. The only difference between the two organs was that while the QC had two
members from each BC, the ADC had one member from each BC. The ADC was held once every year. Its duties included provision of appropriate guidance to the NEC for the purposes of governing the union in the period between the QCs (CSUZ, 1985: 11-12).

**Figure 6.1: Organisational structure of Civil Servants Union of Zambia before implementation of New Public Management reforms**

![Organisational structure diagram](image)

Source: Author’s own illustration

The EDC was the next organ below the ADC. Its duties were the same as the ADC. The EDC was held when members of the NEC or the Branches asked for it (CSUZ, 1985: 12-13).

The NEC was the next organ below the EDC. It was made up of nine members elected at the QC. The NEC was led by the National Chairman. The term of office
for members of the NEC was four years. The members could also be re-elected when their term came to an end. The NEC had the mandate to manage the affairs of the union in the period between ADCs (CSUZ, 1985: 13-16). The NEC also had the power to select union employees. These employees included the Workers’ Education Secretary (WES) and PWEs, among others. These employees were engaged on terms and conditions determined by NEC (CSUZ, 1985: 24).

The next organ in the organisational structure was the DC whose members were elected at the QC. This committee was mandated “to institute disciplinary action against any member in breach of the Constitution, rules or standing orders of the Union” (CSUZ, 1985: 16).

The next organ was the Branch Meeting. This kind of meeting was held at branch level. Branches of the union were formed at:

(i) every place where there are two hundred or more members; or
(ii) every district (CSUZ, 1985: 18).

There were two types of meetings that were held at branch level. The first type involved general meetings that were held “at least once every three months or more frequently should circumstances demand” (CSUZ, 1985: 31). The second type was the Annual General Meeting (AGM), which was held to, among others, elect the BC. A branch or its committee had the power to act in a manner aimed at promoting or protecting the interests of its members (CSUZ, 1985).

The lowest organ of union organisation was the BC. This committee was formed in each branch of the union. The committee consisted of seven members elected by branch members at the AGM. The BC was led by the Chairman. Members of the BC were to be in office for a period of four years. The functions of the BC included recruitment of members and dealing with issues affecting its members. The committee also had the power to establish an ad hoc DC to deal with disciplinary matters at branch level (CSUZ, 1985: 18).
These data indicate that, to some extent, the CSUZ was governed according to democratic principles. These include devolution of power and duties to different levels of the union’s organisational structure, membership participation in union matters including the election of leaders, and the existence of lines of accountability within the union. This finding supports Hyman (1975: 73 [original emphasis]) who posits that trade unions “explicitly incorporate a two-way system of control.” He asserts that sometimes union officials are allowed to control the members while other times the members are allowed to control the officials. However, this type of organisation was inadequate to deal with the challenges presented by NPM reforms such as massive job losses, and reductions in union membership, income and power.

After the implementation of NPM reforms, the CSAWUZ attempted to strengthen itself by reforming its organisational structure. The first reform measure was to reduce the number of conferences held in the period between the QCs. This was achieved by abolishing the ADC and replacing it with the Biennial Conference (CSAWUZ, [undated]a). The Biennial Conference was to be held after a period of two years. Its duties were similar to those of the abolished ADC (CSAWUZ, [undated]a). This reform measure was important because it helped the union to reduce operational costs. At that time, the union could not afford to hold several delegates conferences because its financial base had been eroded. As mentioned in section 6.4, the income of CSAWUZ was reduced due to the decline in membership.

The second reform measure involved some changes to the composition of the NEC. The changes included replacing the title of National Chairman with President, replacing the title of Vice-National Chairman with Deputy President, abolishing the positions of Assistant General Secretary (Administration) and Assistant General Secretary (Finance), and introducing the position of Deputy General Secretary (CSAWUZ, [undated]a). These changes reveal that the union attempted to mimic the structure of the government, which was headed by the President. The union also made efforts to downsize. Instead of having two
officials assisting the General Secretary (i.e. Assistant General Secretaries), there was one (i.e. Deputy General Secretary). This was significant as it meant that the union could reduce its wage bill.

The third reform measure was the establishment of new organs of the union. These included Women’s Committees (WCs) at national and branch levels, Women’s Quadrennial Conference (WQC), and positions of Regional Secretary and Shop Steward (CSAWUZ, [undated]a). The composition, power and functions of these organs were as follows: the WC at national level consisted of seven members led by the Chairperson. The members of this committee had a four year term of office. The functions of the WC at national level were as follows:

(i) To organize women’s affairs in all Branches;
(ii) To promote unity and understanding among female members of the Union;
(iii) To advise the National Executive Council on problems of working women and assist in the effective implementation of related recommendations and resolutions;
(iv) To co-operate with other women bodies in the Trade Union Movement and other specialized women organisations locally and internationally (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 10).

The function of the WC at branch level was to handle matters affecting women in line with the instructions given by the NEC and the WC at national level. As for the WQC, it was made up of members of the WCs at both national and branch levels (CSAWUZ, [undated]a). The establishment of organs to deal with women matters was significant for the union. These organs offered the union an opportunity to attract female members. This, in turn, had the potential to enhance the collective strength of the union. This finding shows that there are possibilities of addressing challenges facing trade unions. These include putting in place mechanisms to deal with modern issues (Pitcher, 2007).

The position of Regional Secretary was established at provincial level. This position was elective for a four year term of office. The Regional Secretary had the duty of coordinating the activities of the branches in his/her province.
This finding upholds Hyman’s (1994) argument that the operations of large national organisations are not just based on unplanned decentralisation but also on coordination and strategic planning.

The position of Shop Steward was established at Ministerial, Departmental or Section level. This position was elective for a four year term of office. The functions of the Shop Steward included membership recruitment and organisation, and attending to issues affecting members at that level (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 11). The creation of this position was significant because it brought union services closer to the membership. This implies that trade unions can be reformed by empowering lower level organs. This finding confirms the argument by Brewster et al. (2001) that the strategic responses of trade unions include attempts to transform their structures by decentralising resource allocation.

The fourth reform measure was the reduction in the number of members required to form a union branch in urban areas. As opposed to the traditional requirement of 200 or more members, places that had 100 or more members in Lusaka, Ndola and Kitwe urban districts were allowed to form union branches (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 11). This measure made it easier for branches to be formed. It also reduced the number of members to be served by each branch, thereby making union organs get closer to the membership. In addition, this measure reduced the workload for the leadership at branch level. However, the formation of new branches put pressure on union resources.

The locations of the new organs in the union’s organisational structure are shown in Figure 6.2. Figure 6.2 is a representation of the organisational structure of the CSAWUZ in the 2000s.
The other area where the CSAWUZ made strategic decisions following the negative effects of NPM reforms was its influence on policy-making. The union attempted to increase its influence by participating in the policy-making processes. At the level of public policy formulation, the CSAWUZ decided to
participate through its federation, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). In this regard, whenever ZCTU was invited to participate in the formulation of a public policy, it requested its affiliates (to which the CSAWUZ was a member) to make contributions. According to former CSAWUZ President (interview, 29 January 2015), ZCTU used this strategy to participate in the formulation of the National Development Plan. This finding reveals that networks can help trade unions to increase their influence on policy-making.

At institutional level, CSAWUZ requested management to allow its representatives to participate in the policy formulation process. This strategy enabled workers’ representatives to attend management meetings. However, the union faced challenges to participate in this process. First, union representatives were not allowed to attend all the management meetings. They attended some of them but prevented from others. According to former CSAWUZ Long Acres Branch Chairperson (interview, 24 February 2015), sometimes management at the Judiciary looked down on union leaders because they felt that union leaders were not part of management. As a result, the union had difficulties to get the opportunity to fully participate in policy-making. Second, when union representatives got the opportunity to attend management meetings, the environment was not conducive for them to participate effectively. Former CSAWUZ UTH Branch Women’s Committee Chairperson (interview, 23 February 2015) indicated that most of the time union leaders at UTH complained that they were intimidated by those holding high positions in the policy-making process. This finding verifies Connoley’s (2008) conclusion that PSRs guided by public choice theory negatively affect trade unions’ impact on government policy.

6.6 Summary

This chapter has shown that a number of NPM reform strategies had been implemented in Zambia. These include restructuring of the public service, performance management, decentralisation, privatisation and commercialisation of SOEs. The main aim of restructuring the public service was to achieve a less
costly but more efficient public service. As for performance management, its objectives were to establish accountability and performance management systems, to develop skills of senior civil servants in the area of management, and to establish an open system of managing human resources. Under decentralisation, the objective was to transfer some functions and operations from the central government to provinces and districts. Under privatisation and commercialisation of SOEs, the main aim was to reduce government shareholding in SOEs.

In addition, the chapter has indicated that implementation of NPM reforms in Zambia started in the mid-1980s under the influence of three connected factors. These are the recognition of problems in the public sector, emergence of a new ideology in the name of neo-liberalism, and complicity of state actors and agents in the adoption of NPM reforms.

This chapter has also shown that the effects of NPM reform strategies appeared at all the three levels of industrial relations activity, namely, long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels. The effects at the workplace level were a smaller but disjointed public sector, loss of benefits associated with transfer within the public sector, increased workload for retained workers, poor performance, casualisation of labour, employment of skilled personnel, equity in the processes of recruitment, placement and rewards, improved conditions of service in certain subsectors, and hybridisation of public and private sectors. At the level of collective bargaining, the effects were transformation of the bargaining structure from a centralised structure to a decentralised one, alleviation of the government from pressures associated with employee welfare, reduction in employee benefits and collective bargaining becoming more expensive and time consuming for trade unions. The effects on the long-term strategies of trade unions were felt in the areas of union membership and governance. In terms of membership, the CSAWUZ experienced a significant loss of membership. In terms of governance, the CSAWUZ became weak due to losses in membership and income, weak leadership and less participation in union activities. The
reforms also resulted in conflicts of interest within the labour movement and between the labour movement and the government.

Furthermore, the chapter has indicated that although trade unions in the public sector were negatively affected by NPM reforms, they were active agents in the reform process. The unions had opportunities to make strategic decisions to achieve their goals. The opportunities were available both before and after the implementation of the reforms. Strategic decisions of the unions before the implementation of NPM included participating in the process of formulating the reform strategies. The participation took the forms of challenging government proposals and presenting alternatives. After the implementation of NPM, strategic decisions of trade unions were in the areas of membership recruitment, union functions and objectives, collective bargaining and governance. In the area of membership recruitment, the first strategy was for public sector unions to change their structures from “specific-sectoral” unions to general-sectoral unions. This strategy enabled these unions to extend their recruitment to related fields rather than being confined to specific sectors. The second strategy was to enhance the organisation of new employees in the targeted sectors. The third strategy was to discourage the growth of new unions. The fourth strategy was to offer members various services such as loans and training opportunities. However, the effectiveness of these strategies depended on the union’s ability to extend its recruitment to growing sectors rather than being confined to declining ones.

In the area of union functions and objectives, the strategy was not only to organise workers in related fields but also to deal with nontraditional matters such as gender equality. In the area of collective bargaining, the first strategy was to conduct research before presenting items for collective bargaining. The second strategy was to divide the union membership into several bargaining units, each covering the interests of a particular category of workers. In the area of governance, the first strategy was to enhance decentralisation of the organisational structure, coordination of union activities and networking. The second strategy was to participate in the policy-making processes both at national (public policy)
and institutional levels. The next chapter focuses on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and their implications for the CSAWUZ.
CHAPTER 7: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CIVIL SERVANTS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION OF ZAMBIA

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined New Public Management (NPM) reforms implemented in Zambia and their implications for the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ). The chapter revealed that a number of NPM reform strategies had been implemented in Zambia. These include restructuring of the public service, performance management, decentralisation, privatisation and commercialisation of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). The chapter also showed that the effects of NPM reform strategies were felt at all the three levels of industrial relations activity, namely, long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels.

The task of this chapter is to discuss Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) implemented in Zambia and their implications for the CSAWUZ. To perform this task, the chapter is divided into eight sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section discusses the types of services delivered through PPPs in Lusaka district. The third section examines factors influencing the implementation of PPPs in Zambia. The fourth section discusses the process of selecting private sector partners in Lusaka district. The fifth section explains the types of PPPs implemented in Lusaka district. The sixth section examines the effects of PPPs on industrial relations activity. The seventh section presents the strategic responses by the CSAWUZ to PPPs. The eighth section presents the summary.

7.2 Types of services delivered through Public-Private Partnerships in Lusaka district

As indicated in the previous chapter, both NPM and post-NPM reforms have been implemented in Zambia. Since NPM reforms were covered in the previous chapter, this chapter and the next will discuss post-NPM reforms. Post-NPM
reform strategies that have been implemented in Zambia include partnerships in policy formulation and implementation, public service capacity building, recentralisation, and the adoption of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). Although there are several strategies of post-NPM reform, the thesis will only focus on partnerships in policy formulation and implementation. The areas of partnership to be covered are PPPs and partnerships in industrial relations. This chapter will discuss PPPs while the next chapter will discuss partnerships in industrial relations.

Implementation of PPPs in Zambia started in the 2000s (Zambia Development Agency [ZDA], 2014). Two major types of services have been delivered through the PPP strategy in Lusaka district. These are core and non-core services. The informants indicated that core services that have been delivered through PPPs include male circumcision, and environmental protection services. As for non-core services, the informants indicated that the following have been delivered through PPPs: cleaning, security, landscaping, accommodation, construction, rehabilitation/maintenance, ambulance, laboratory, X-ray, ultrasound, and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) support services. This finding shows that, to a large extent, PPPs are used to deliver non-core services.

7.3 Factors influencing the implementation of Public-Private Partnerships in Zambia

Strategic choice theory assumes that employers are influenced by environmental forces to adjust their business strategies (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1994). This assumption is also applicable to the implementation of PPPs in Zambia. In line with this assumption, employers in the public sector in Zambia have been influenced by three connected factors to adopt the PPP strategy. The first factor is the recognition of problems facing the public sector. These problems include lack

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38 Core services refer to services that are central to the operations of an institution. Non-core services refer to services that are not essential to the operations of an institution. The purpose of non-core services is to offer support to core services.
of financial resources, inadequate management skills, incomplete and poorly maintained public infrastructure, inefficiency in service delivery, and large domestic and international debts (Republic of Zambia, 2011b). In 1999, Zambia had an external debt of around United States dollar (US$) 6.5 billion (International Monetary Fund [IMF] and International Development Association [IDA], 2000). According to IMF and IDA (2000), in Net Present Value (NPV) terms, Zambia’s external debt in 1999 was almost equal to 160 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As a result, it was categorised as a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). This meant that the country was too poor to pay back its debt. As such, it needed debt relief.

The second factor is the nuanced shift within the ideology of neo-liberalism. Contrary to the thinking in the NPM era which opposed government intervention in the economy, post-NPM is characterised by an emphasis of the role played by networks. The concept of network emphasises the interconnectedness of stakeholders in the processes of policy formulation and implementation (Klijn, 2008; Lane, 2000). The stakeholders in these processes include government, business and civil society organisations (Klijn, 2008). According to Klijn (2008: 511), governance networks can take the shapes of “public–private partnerships or interactive policy making.” Under governance networks, there is a degree of government intervention in the economy. World Bank (1997: 1) argues that “the state is central to economic and social development, not as a direct provider of growth but as a partner, catalyst, and facilitator.”

The idea of social networks started as a metaphor especially in classical German sociology (Scott, 1988). However, in 1954, John Barnes introduced a shift from a “metaphoric network” to “modern network analysis” (Bögenhold, 2013: 303). Since then, a number of detailed analyses of social networks have been done. However, a great deal of literature on networks in public management and other fields began appearing in the early 1990s (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). In Zambia, the idea of networks in the management of the public sector became

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39 Metaphor refers to a word or phrase with a hidden meaning.
acceptable in the 2000s. At that time, the government started to rely on the private sector to finance, develop and manage public infrastructure (ZDA, 2014).

The third factor is the presence of actors spearheading the adoption and implementation of PPPs. According to ZDA (2014: 8), “PPP projects can only be implemented with a strong political will.” In this regard, the Zambian Government has expressed its desire by adopting the PPP policy and enacting the PPP Act. The PPP policy highlights the vision of the Government, the rationale of adopting PPPs, and the frameworks to administer, coordinate, monitor, regulate and evaluate the PPPs. In this case, the vision of the government is to promote national development. The rationale of adopting PPPs is to utilise private sector finance and expertise in the provision of public infrastructure and services (Republic of Zambia, 2011b).

### 7.4 Selection of private sector partners in Lusaka district

The studied institutions use the method of competitive tendering to select their private sector partners. The process starts with the public institution putting up an advertisement, which indicates the need for a partner to undertake a particular task and requesting different organisations to tender for the contract. There are two criteria used to select the most appropriate partner. The first criterion involves taking into consideration the bid price. Under this criterion, the lowest bidder is selected and offered the contract. Chilenje clinic Nurse-in-Charge (interview, 4 February 2015) stated that “depending on the cheapest, where you know our community what they can afford, they will get the cheapest.”

The second criterion involves taking into consideration the capacity of the bidder to perform the task. Under this criterion, the bidder with the most appropriate capacity to perform the required task is selected and offered the contract. The bidder’s capacity is determined by four factors. The first factor is having qualified personnel to undertake the task. The Principal Hospital Administrator, Chainama Hills College Hospital (CHCH) (interview, 13 February 2015) mentioned that
“when he [bidder] tenders, that document should show us that the people he has included there are well qualified to do the job.” The second factor is having work experience in the same field. The CHCH Principal Hospital Administrator (interview, 13 February 2015) indicated that “they [bidders] should even add photos, just to prove or as proof that they have done similar works in the . . . [past].” The third factor is that the potential partner organisation should be able to meet the legal requirements for its existence. These include being legally established and in good standing with various regulatory bodies. To this effect, bidders are required to provide the necessary documents to prove their compliance with regulations. The CHCH Principal Hospital Administrator (interview, 13 February 2015) mentioned that:

We are also very particular on documentation . . . Whether these companies are registered with the Tender Board and again whether they have . . . registered with ZRA [Zambia Revenue Authority] and . . . if it’s a contracting company, there is an association where they are supposed to be registered.

The fourth factor is that the bidder should have adequate financial resources to undertake the required task. The CHCH Principal Hospital Administrator (interview, 13 February 2015) stated that “also, we do look at their financial capacity. Meaning that do they have enough capital? Because there are certain works where we would want them maybe to use their own resources to get started before we pay them.”

The tendering process is managed by specialised units established within public institutions. These units are called by different names such as Purchasing and Supply Department, Tendering Committee, and Procurement Committee. This finding shows that the use of competitive tendering to select private sector partners is beneficial to public institutions. The benefits include the ability to select suitable partners and reduction in the cost of service delivery.
7.5 Types of Public-Private Partnerships implemented in Lusaka district

There are two types of PPPs implemented at the studied institutions. These are Build Own and Operate (BOO), and Supply Operate and Transfer (SOT) contracts. A BOO contract is “A contractual arrangement whereby a concessionaire is authorised to finance, construct, own, operate and maintain a project from which the concessionaire is allowed to recover this total investment by collecting user levies” (Republic of Zambia, 2011b: 55). Under this type of partnership, there is no provision for the project to be transferred to the public sector. Nonetheless, a public institution can cancel the contract after a particular period of time (Republic of Zambia, 2011b: 55). Services that have been delivered under this option include X-ray, ultrasound and male circumcision at Chilenje clinic. Chilenje clinic Nurse-in-Charge (interview, 4 February 2015) indicated that:

The time frame, like . . . for X-ray, there is just signing the Memorandum of Understanding. No time limit. [The] same applies to those doing ultrasound but they were told that immediately we install our own machinery, they would terminate their contract.

The other type of partnership, SOT contract, is “A contractual arrangement whereby a person undertakes to provide services to the Government or contracting authority for a period” (Republic of Zambia, 2011b: 56). Under this type of partnership, public institutions pay for the services in line with the terms of the contract (Republic of Zambia, 2011b: 56). Services that have been delivered under this option include cleaning and security services at Chainama Hills College Hospital (CHCH) and Lusaka Business and Technical College (LBTC). The other services are ambulance and landscaping services at CHCH. The duration of the contracts varies. For those covered by the research, the duration ranges from one month to two years. Thereafter, if the performance is satisfactory, the contract is renewed. The CHCH Principal Hospital Administrator (interview, 13 February 2015) indicated that “sometimes we will allow them [ambulance services] to ferry our patients the whole month, then they come and produce the bill after a month . . . so that we pay.” He also mentioned that, in the case of cleaning services, the
institution has a “one year contract and then subject to review, based on their performance” (Principal Hospital Administrator, CHCH, interview, 13 February 2015).

In a related manner, LBTC Deputy Director (interview, 5 February 2015) stated that “the cleaning services and the security services, the contracts are two years initially . . . subject to renewal.” These findings show that the PPP strategy emphasises partial privatisation, which is a strategy of NPM reforms. This means that there is a thin dividing line between NPM and post-NPM reforms. This confirms the argument by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011: 8) that “the detail of public sector reforms often turns out to be more like geological sedimentation, where new layers overlie but do not replace or completely wash away the previous layer.”

7.6 The effects of Public-Private Partnerships on industrial relations activity

The strategic choice theory’s assumption that the effects of strategic decisions can be felt at any level of industrial relations activity (Kochan et al., 1994) is also applicable to Zambia’s experience with the PPP strategy. The effects of this reform strategy have appeared at all three levels of industrial relations activity, namely, long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels. These effects are discussed below.

7.6.1 Effects of Public-Private Partnerships on the public sector workplace

The major effect of implementing PPPs in Zambia has been the intensification of the process of public/private hybridisation. As noted in the previous chapter, NPM reforms initiated this process by using similar principles to manage public and private sector organisations (Kletz, Hénaut and Sardas, 2014). The PPP strategy has reinforced this process in two ways. The first is by allowing private sector organisations to make investments at the public sector workplace. This is evidenced by the presence of privately owned and operated facilities in public
institutions. Examples of such facilities include X-ray, ultrasound and male circumcision facilities at Chilenje clinic (Nurse-in-Charge, Chilenje clinic, interview, 4 February 2015). The second way is the creation of dual chains of command at the public sector workplace. The first chain of command involves private sector employers supervising their own workers performing duties at the public sector workplace. The second chain of command involves public sector managers supervising private sector workers performing duties at the public sector workplace. According to Assistant Labour Commissioner-Industrial Relations (interview, 11 February 2015), in addition to workers recruited by the contractor, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS) assigns its own Project Manager to the PPP project to ensure that the contractor complies with the terms of the contract. Similarly, LBTC Deputy Director (interview, 5 February 2015) stated that:

They [private companies] have their own supervisors, but in order to ensure that they are actually abiding by our policy, the human resource department is also responsible and also other departments to ensure that they are working in confinement with our policies.

Implementation of the PPP strategy is beneficial to the public sector. The benefits include the following: first, it alleviates public institutions from the pressures associated with service delivery. These include provision of resources such as qualified personnel, materials, equipment and financial resources. The Principal Hospital Administrator, CHCH (interview, 13 February 2015) stated that:

Because when you hire this cleaning company, you are assured that you have these people who are trained in the job of cleaning. A good number of these companies will bring quality products, cleaning materials. They have better equipment that the hospital doesn’t have. They are committed to their work more than our own people employed by government. You get what you call value for your money.

The above-mentioned finding supports Kitchen (2005) who argues that private sector delivery has the ability to enhance performance and increase the engagement of professionals. The finding also supports Pope’s (2006) argument
that PPPs promote competition, which in turn, improves the quality of service delivery.

In a similar manner, the PPP strategy enables the public sector to generate revenue from private sector investment. According to Chilenje clinic Nurse-in-Charge (interview, 4 February 2015), private sector partners at Chilenje clinic are required to pay the clinic 20 percent of their total collection. The payment schedules range from monthly to quarterly payment. This finding supports the revelation by Mwambwa, Griffiths and Kahler (2010) that privatisation enables the government to generate revenue through a continuous stream of taxes based on private sector investment. This also endorses the observation by Pope (2006) that PPPs increase the sources of funding for service delivery.

The second benefit is that outsourcing of non-core services enables public institutions to focus on their core functions. The LBTC Deputy Director (interview, 5 February 2015) mentioned that:

The other reason was that we also looked at our core business. Our core business is training. It has got nothing to do with security. Security and cleaning, those are just by the way. So we wanted to concentrate on our core business.

The core services that public institutions in Lusaka district have managed to deliver on their own (i.e. without any PPP arrangement) include training, consultancy, labour inspection, registration of trade unions, nursing, medical care, neonatal health care, and maternal health care (Various managers, public institutions, interviews, February 2015). This approach to PPPs has the potential to increase productivity (see Mohiuddin and Su, 2013).

The third benefit is that PPPs reduce the workload of public sector workers. According to National Food and Nutrition Commission Branch Vice Secretary, CSAWUZ, (interview, 19 February 2015), security duties at the commission have been divided between public and private sector workers. The division of labour is done in such a way that security guards employed by the commission work during
the day while those from the private sector work in the night. Relatedly, the duty
of cleaning at the University Teaching Hospital (UTH) has been divided between
workers in the two sectors. The CSAWUZ UTH Branch Trustee (interview, 12
February 2015) said that:

Here at UTH . . . private sectors they are offering like cleaning in
the wards. They are mostly the ones who are cleaning there. The
ones in the government they do them in the nights, because those
on private sector they don’t do the nights most of the time.

The fourth benefit is that the PPP strategy is capable of improving the
remuneration of public sector workers attached to PPP projects. The CSAWUZ
Lusaka Urban Clinics Branch Trustee (interview, 11 February 2015) indicated
that government workers at Makeni clinic had enjoyed part-time allowances for
about two years under the Antiretroviral Therapy (ART) programme introduced
by the Centre for Infectious Disease Research in Zambia (CIDRZ).

Although PPPs are associated with the above-mentioned benefits, they also
present challenges to public institutions. The major challenge is that a number
of private sector partners do not maintain the desired quality of service delivery. The
CHCH Principal Hospital Administrator (interview, 13 February 2015) mentioned
that:

These companies, when they come on the ground, some of them
start very well . . . But the longer they stay, they are seen to drop
consistency and terms of provision of services. They start dropping
the quality. We are speaking this because we have changed the
companies and seems to have been more of a trend. Now, we have
not kept quiet. We have time and time again reminded them.

The CHCH Principal Hospital Administrator (interview, 13 February 2015) also
mentioned that CHCH terminated its contract with a company engaged to perform
the task of landscaping at the hospital after six months because of unsatisfactory
performance. These findings show that private sector partners are interested in
getting the contract and capital accumulation rather than improving the quality of
service delivery. As such, public managers are forced to supervise their private
sector partners so that good performance is promoted. This explains the existence of dual chains of command in PPP projects.

Nonetheless, the use of dual chains of command in PPP projects creates role conflict at the public sector workplace. This is due to the tendency of issuing conflicting commands. This tendency is illustrated by the PPP project at Makeni clinic where conflict had emerged between government workers and members of CIDRZ in the process of managing the ART programme. The conflict was due to the existence of two lines of authority. One line was from the government structure while the other was from CIDRZ. The CSAWUZ Lusaka Urban Clinics Branch Trustee (interview, 11 February 2015) stated that:

So sometimes we have had a tug of war where a CIDRZ employee comes here, they think they are our bosses. They are not our bosses. That one we have told them, no, you just come and do your job, get your reports and go. But instructing to do this and this, it might not work.

The finding mentioned above reveals that the task of managing PPP projects is complicated. This is because partners tend to fight for the protection of their individual interests. This revelation confirms the argument that alliances can be captured by privileged actors so as to serve their own preferences (Plaut, 2010).

In addition, PPPs limit employment opportunities in public institutions. This is due to the presence of private companies that are contracted to deliver public services. The CSAWUZ Director-Research and Information (interview, 16 January 2015) stated that:

That [PPP strategy] is working against the union in the sense that those spaces or positions that were supposed to have been taken by the workers that were supposed to be also members of the union are the spaces that are being taken by the private institutions.
The above-mentioned finding shows that the PPP strategy reduces the scope of the public sector while promoting the growth of the private sector. This, in turn, constrains the development of public sector unions.

7.6.2 Effects of Public-Private Partnerships on collective bargaining

Under collective bargaining, the major effect of the PPP reform strategy has been to further decentralise the bargaining structure. As noted in the previous chapter, NPM reforms decentralised collective bargaining to the organisation level. Under organisation (company) level bargaining, the bargaining process covers employees within a company, enterprise or organisation (Salamon, 2000). However, following the implementation of the PPP reform strategy, several bargaining units have been established at the public sector workplace. These bargaining units are employer-based. This means that each employer negotiates with unions that organise his/her workers. This arrangement is in spite of the various employers operating at the same workplace. It is also in spite of the workers having similar interests. This is because they do the same work and operate at the same workplace. The CSAWUZ Director-Research and Information (interview, 16 January 2015) mentioned that “we will concentrate on looking at the workers that have been employed by central government. So these other workers also will be looked after by the employer and the union that may be operating in the private sector.” This finding reveals that the aim of PPPs is to promote private sector interests. This is done in two ways. First, private organisations and individuals are allowed to enter the public sector workplace and access public resources. Second, workers at the public sector workplace are divided and their collective strength weakened by the establishment of various bargaining units. This is done to promote the exploitation of workers by employers. This finding corroborates Zagelmeyer’s (2007) argument that decentralised bargaining enables management to increase its power in the process of regulating the employment relationship while reducing the power of trade unions.
The implementation of PPPs has also affected issues that trade unions present for collective bargaining. Before the adoption of the PPP strategy, trade unions were presenting various issues for collective bargaining relating to conditions of service. The informants indicated that the bargaining agenda included items such as salaries, allowances, work environment, work time, and leave days. The allowances included rural hardship, night duty, risk, subsistence, housing, and transport allowances. However, following the implementation of the PPP strategy, other items have been added to the bargaining agenda. The new items focus mainly on the welfare of workers. These include gender, HIV/AIDS, holiday, Occupational Health and Safety, medical insurance, and social security issues.

7.6.3 Effects of Public-Private Partnerships on the long-term strategies of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia

The implementation of PPPs has also affected the long-term strategies of the CSAWUZ. The effects have appeared in two major areas. These are union structure and governance. When PPPs emerged in the 2000s, the CSAWUZ had assumed the structure of a general-sectoral union. That is to say, rather than being confined to a specific sector, it extended its recruitment to related fields (Hughes, 1966: 90). In this regard, instead of being limited to civil servants, the CSAWUZ extended its recruitment to allied workers. The allied workers included those “in the Zambian Public Service and grant aided institutions and employees of government departments turned [into] parastatal bodies and organizations, Boards, Authorities, Agencies and Non-governmental Organisations” (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 1). The informants mentioned that under this structure, the categories of workers organised by CSAWUZ included forest officers, forest guards, clinical officers, nurses, laboratory technicians, pharmacists, radiographers, psychosocial counsellors, maids, lecturers, human resource officers, registry clerks, accountants, purchasing and supply officers, security guards, and receptionists, among others. This finding shows that under the structure of general-sectoral union, the CSAWUZ was able to organise diverse categories of workers in government and non-profit organisations. The membership also varied in terms of skill levels. They included skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers.
However, the implementation of PPPs has negatively affected the ability of CSAWUZ to increase its membership. This is because of limited employment opportunities in public institutions due to the presence of private companies that are contracted to deliver public services. The CSAWUZ Director-Research and Information (interview, 16 January 2015) indicated that “we are not able to organise because, I mean the recognition agreement that we have is a recognition agreement that is there for us to organise the workers in the public sector and not in the private sector.” The effects of this limitation are evidenced by the fact that like in the NPM era, the CSAWUZ continued to experience a decline in membership during the early years of PPP implementation. Between 2001 and 2010, its membership reduced from 36,000 to 17,000 (Koyi, 2010: 22). This represented a membership decline of 52.8 percent. This finding substantiates the perception that restricted definition of membership hinders the expansion and power of trade unions (Freeman and Rogers, 2002).

The effects of PPPs have also been felt in the governance process of CSAWUZ. The affected areas include relationships within the union, and between the union and managers of public institutions. These relationships have been affected because PPPs reduce the influence of trade unions on decision-making. The CSAWUZ Chainama Branch Chairperson (interview, 18 February 2015) stated that:

> When this company came, they first met management to discuss how they were going to do the collection of garbage and also the fees involved . . . So after they made that agreement without unions, then they called for another meeting where now union was involved . . . the union actually contributed to say, no, actually the fees that you have suggested are too high for our members. But it’s like management and that company, they were not very flexible . . . So in other words, they made the work of unions to be very hard . . . somehow, they are affecting our position in terms of decision making.

In addition, the CSAWUZ Chainama Branch Chairperson (interview, 18 February 2015) mentioned that “now, you know people are losing trust in the union . . .
They are saying no, our leaders are very weak. They cannot defend us and so on and so forth.” This finding reveals that PPPs promote power imbalance between trade unions and employers in the public sector. The imbalance is in favour of employers who are co-opted by the private sector to promote its interest. This, in turn, results in mistrust between the union leadership and the membership. In the long run, this kind of relationship leads to union fragmentation (Webster, 2006).

7.7 Strategic responses by the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia to Public-Private Partnerships

The assumption of strategic choice theory that the key actors affected by the reform of industrial relations (i.e. employers, trade unions and government) make strategic choices to achieve their goals (Kochan et al., 1994) is also applicable to the responses by CSAWUZ to PPPs. In line with this assumption, the CSAWUZ made strategic decisions both before and after the implementation of PPPs. These strategies are discussed below.

7.7.1 Strategic responses before the implementation of Public-Private Partnerships

The strategic decision made by the CSAWUZ before the implementation of PPPs was to participate in the process of formulating the reform strategies. At this stage, the aim of the union was to safeguard the interests of workers. These include job security and favourable rewards. When interviewed on 16 January 2015, Director-Research and Information, CSAWUZ, indicated:

So the concerns which we can talk about are the concerns to do with redundancies . . . to ensure that the package is first of all substantial and it is applied on time and if there are job losses, let these job losses be as minimal as possible. The other big concern is to ensure that workers . . . do not lose their jobs. What measures can we put in place to ensure that these are deployed to somewhere where they can be used?

The above-mentioned finding confirms the argument that trade unions do not just wait to become victims of Public Sector Reform (PSR) but that they make
strategies to participate in the process of formulating the reform plans for the benefit of their members (Connoley, 2008).

7.7.2 Strategic responses after the implementation of Public-Private Partnerships

After the implementation of PPPs, the CSAWUZ made strategic decisions in a number of areas. These are membership recruitment, union functions and objectives, collective bargaining and governance. The strategies that the union has made to increase its membership focus on two main areas. These are organising and servicing the membership. The main strategy of organising the membership involves the sensitisation of potential members on the benefits of belonging to the CSAWUZ. The potential members include members of rival unions and nonunionised employees. The CSAWUZ Lusaka Business and Technical College (LBTC) Branch Chairperson (interview, 4 February 2015) indicated that “whoever comes in we normally talk to them to say here there is a union and . . . the work of the union is to do this, in case you have a grievance they will stand in for you.”

The strategy of servicing the membership focuses on offering various services to members. The first service involves the supply of union branded clothes such as shirts and chitenges.\(^{40}\) The purpose of offering these clothes is to attract membership. When interviewed on 26 January 2015, Ministry of Education Branch Chairperson, CSAWUZ, stated that “we have done the distribution [of] our union regalia. We have T-shirts that are being given out and chitenge materials we give out to our members. And so these are helping in promoting the union in this branch.”

The second service involves giving financial rewards to union members that manage to recruit new members. Under this strategy, the larger the number of members that someone recruits, the higher the amount of money he/she receives as a reward. According to CSAWUZ Lusaka Province Senior Trustee (interview, \(^{40}\) A chitenge is an African garment usually worn by women. It is generally wrapped around the waist.)
13 February 2015), if someone recruits a member, he/she is given 25 percent of the new member’s initial subscription to the union. The remaining percentage of that subscription is shared as follows: 50 percent goes to the National Executive Council and 25 percent to the Provincial Executive Committee. This strategy has been adopted to encourage members to participate in the recruitment process and increase the union membership.

The CSAWUZ has “a subscription of 2% of a member’s monthly basic salary or such other sum as determined by a resolution of the Quadrennial Conference or Biennial Conference” (CSAWUZ, [undated]b: 3). There are three ways of paying the union subscription. These are:

(a) By stop order (deducted at source by the Ministry of Finance);
(b) By stop order (deducted at source by other Accounting Units);
or
(c) By the member to the Union (CSAWUZ, [undated]b: 3-4).

The third service that the CSAWUZ offers its members is the fight against casualisation of labour and asking workers who benefit from this fight to join the union as a sign of appreciation for the rendered service. The CSAWUZ LBTC Branch Chairperson stated that the union ensured that management complied with the provisions of the labour laws. He indicated:

According to . . . the labour laws, no one should be employed for more than six months on part-time . . . So, whoever works for maybe six months and we know it, we easily go to HR [Human Resource Department] . . . they easily even give that person a contract and those people immediately he’s given that contract, will tell him we are the ones who have made you be employed on this contract. So, please join us and they easily come (LBTC Branch Chairperson, CSAWUZ, interview, 4 February 2015).

The finding mentioned above shows that trade unions can respond to their predicament by forming coalitions with casual and informal workers (see Andrae and Beckman, 2011; Webster, 2006).
These strategies have helped the CSAWUZ to deal with the problem of membership decline. Between 2010 and 2014, its membership increased from 17,000 to 17,463 (Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union - Membership December 2014; Koyi, 2010). This represents a membership increase of about three percent. A larger proportion of CSAWUZ members are men. According to a report titled Women Membership Distribution in Unions 2013, the CSAWUZ had a women membership of 5,900 out of a total union membership of 12,700. This means that women accounted for 46.5 percent of the total union membership while men accounted for 53.5 percent. This finding upholds the observation by Waddington (2005) that trade unions can deal with the problem of membership decline by embracing varieties of the servicing and organising approaches to recruitment.

The other area where strategic decisions have been made involves the functions and objectives of the union. Before the implementation of PPPs, the CSAWUZ set itself to achieve the following objectives:

(a) The organization of civil servants and allied workers in the Zambian Public Service and grant aided institutions and employees of government departments turned parastatal bodies and organizations, Boards, Authorities, Agencies and Non-governmental Organisations in order to pursue and protect the general and individual interests of its members;
(b) To seek for and safeguard reasonable salaries and conditions of employment;
(c) To improve the standards and status of its members;
(d) To encourage sympathy and understanding between the employer and his employees;
(e) To mediate in disputes between the employer and his employees, between one member and another, and between members and other workers so as to secure an amicable settlement whenever possible;
(f) To co-operate with other Trade Unions;
(g) To provide members with financial assistance during prolonged and unpaid sick leave, subject to the financial position of the union permitting;
(h) To advance members’ education through workers’ education programmes;
(i) To encourage members’ participation in national development programmes;
(j) To do all such other lawful things as are related to or lead to the achievements of all the above subjects or any one of them; and
(k) To promote gender equality (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 1-2).

The findings mentioned above show that like the traditional public administration era, the functions and objectives of the CSAWUZ during the NPM era included meeting the collective and individual needs of its members as well as the needs of the nation as a whole. These needs include collective strength, individual growth, economic welfare, social welfare, industrial harmony, and national development (see Bendix, 2010; Salamon, 2000).

Following the implementation of PPPs, the CSAWUZ has made a strategic decision to add two new objectives to its list. The focus of the new objectives is to enhance the participation of women and young workers in decision-making processes (CSAWUZ, [undated]b: 2). This finding reveals that trade unions in a reforming public sector have an opportunity to increase their membership and power by promoting the participation of marginalised groups in decision-making processes. These groups include women and young workers. This revelation backs the argument by Coats (2006) that in order for trade unions to secure maximum benefits from the partnership model, they should build their own capacity. This entails, among others, enhancing equality in the performance of union activities.

The CSAWUZ has also made strategic decisions in the area of collective bargaining. The main strategy in this area involves conducting research before going for negotiations. The research focuses on gathering information about the revenue of individual public institutions and the government as a whole, and the cost of the food basket. This information then forms the basis for negotiations (Lusaka Province Senior Trustee, CSAWUZ, interview, 13 February 2015). Based on this information, the union sets the limits for its demands. The limits are set in such a way that they enable the workers to meet their basic needs. The CSAWUZ Ridgeway Branch Chairperson (interview, 22 January 2015) stated:

So, the methodology is that we have ceilings. If all goes to the worst, the government refused to pay this, our minimum should be
this. And usually our minimum shouldn’t be below the food basket. If it comes below the food basket, it means our workers cannot manage to have the minimum requirements they need to survive.

The above-mentioned findings show that trade unions can increase their collective bargaining power by gathering information on the prevailing economic conditions and negotiating for terms and conditions that enable workers to meet their basic needs.

The CSAWUZ has also made strategic decisions concerning its governance process. Changes have been made regarding the union’s organisational structure and its relations with external actors. Before the implementation of PPPs, the CSAWUZ had a network organisational structure. This structure emphasised decentralisation and coordination of union activities. Under this structure, union powers and duties were distributed among various organs of the union. These included Quadrennial Conference (QC), Biennial Conference, Extraordinary Delegates Conference (EDC), Women’s Quadrennial Conference (WQC), National Executive Council (NEC), National Disciplinary Committee (NDC), Women’s Committee (WC) at national level, Regional Secretary, Branch Meeting, Branch Executive Committee (BEC), WC at branch level, and Shop Steward (CSAWUZ, [undated]a). This structure is shown in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1 is a representation of the organisational structure of the CSAWUZ in the 2000s. From Figure 7.1, it can be noted that the QC was the highest ranked organ of the union. The members of this conference included NEC members, NDC members, members of the WC at national level, Regional Secretaries and two members of each Branch Committee. This conference took place after a period of four years. Its duties included policy-making and election of members of other organs such as NEC, NDC and Regional Secretaries (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 4).
The Biennial Conference was the next organ below the QC. The composition of the Biennial Conference was similar to the QC. The only difference between the two organs was the number of members drawn from the branch level. The QC had two members from each Branch Committee while the Biennial Conference had one member from each Branch Committee. The Biennial Conference took place
after a period of two years. Its duties included provision of appropriate guidance to the NEC for the purposes of governing the union in the period between the QCs (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 5).

The EDC was the next organ below the Biennial Conference. Its functions were the same as the Biennial Conference. The EDC was held when the NEC or branches called for it (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 5).

The WQC was the next organ in the organisational structure of the union. This conference was composed of members of the WC at both national and branch levels (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 10).

The next organ in the structure was the NEC. This council was made up of eight members elected at the QC. The NEC was headed by the President. Members of the NEC were to hold office for a period of four years and could be re-elected at the end of their term. The duties of this council included managing the affairs of the union in the period between Biennial Conferences (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 6). The NEC also had the power to choose union employees. Among these employees was the Director of Workers’ Education. These employees were to serve under terms and conditions determined by NEC (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 16).

The next organ in the structure was the NDC. Members of this committee were elected at the QC for a four year term of office. These members were also allowed to stand for re-election. This committee was mandated “to institute disciplinary action against any member or official up to the level of member of the National Disciplinary Committee in breach of the constitution or standing Orders of the Union” (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 8).

The WC at national level was the next organ in the union’s organisational structure. This committee consisted of seven members headed by the Chairperson. The term of office for members of this committee was four years. The functions of this committee were:
(i) To organize women’s affairs in all Branches;
(ii) To promote unity and understanding among female members of the Union;
(iii) To advise the National Executive Council on problems of working women and assist in the effective implementation of related recommendations and resolutions;
(iv) To co-operate with other women bodies in the Trade Union Movement and other specialized women organisations locally and internationally (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 10).

The next level in the union’s organisational structure was the position of Regional Secretary. This position was established at provincial level. It was an elective position for a four year term of office. The Regional Secretary had the duty of coordinating the activities of the branches in his/her province (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 11-12).

The next organ was the Branch Meeting. This kind of meeting was held at branch level. Union branches were formed at:

(a) Every place where there are one hundred or more members in the case of Lusaka, Ndola and Kitwe Urban Districts; or
(b) Every District (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 11).

There were two types of meetings held at branch level. The first type involved general meetings held “at least once every three months or more frequently should circumstances demand” (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 21). The second type was the Annual General Meeting (AGM), which was held to, among others, elect the BEC. Branches and their committees had the power to act in a manner aimed at advancing or defending the interests of their members (CSAWUZ, [undated]a).

The next organ was the BEC. This committee was formed in each branch of the union. Its members were elected by members in the branch at the AGM. The term of office for BEC members was four years. The functions of the BEC included organisation of members and dealing with issues affecting the members. The BEC
also had the power to “appoint a Branch Disciplinary Committee to handle disciplinary matters within the Branch” (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 10).

The next organ in the organisational structure was the WC at branch level. The function of this committee was to handle matters affecting women in line with the instructions given by the NEC and the WC at national level (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 11).

The position of Shop Steward was located at the lowest level of union organisation. This position was established at ministerial, departmental or section level. The Shop Steward was elected for a four year term of office. His/her functions included membership recruitment and organisation, and attending to issues affecting members at that level (CSAWUZ, [undated]a: 11).

These data show that the organisational structure of the CSAWUZ was characterised by an attempt to strike a balance between democratic governance and strategic management of the union. On the one hand, the aspect of democratic governance emphasised adherence to democratic principles such as devolution of power and duties to different levels of the union’s organisational structure, membership participation in union matters including the election of leaders, and the existence of lines of accountability within the union. On the other hand, the aspect of strategic management focused on capacity building through strategies such as reliance on advice from specialised organs of the union, coordination of union activities, cooperation with other unions, cooperation with other specialised organisations both locally and internationally, and planning future tasks. These findings support the argument by Hyman (1994) that the process of managing large national organisations is characterised by three elements, namely, decentralisation, coordination and strategic planning.

However, the level of networking that had been adopted by the CSAWUZ could not handle the challenges of PPPs. These include limitation of employment opportunities in public institutions, division of workers at the public sector
workplace into public and private sector workers, establishment of several bargaining units, trade unions being sidelined in the process of decision-making, and mistrust between the union leadership and the membership.

In order to deal with these challenges, the CSAWUZ has made a strategic decision to reform its organisational structure. The reform measures include abolishing the position of Regional Secretary. The other reform measure involves the establishment of new organs of the union. These include Disciplinary Tribunal, Provincial Conference, Provincial Executive Committee (PEC), Provincial Women’s Conference, Provincial Women’s Committee, and Workplace Committee (CSAWUZ, [undated]b). The composition, power and functions of these organs are as follows: Members of the Disciplinary Tribunal are drawn from the NDC as well as current and former members of the NEC. The functions and duties of this tribunal are:

i. to institute disciplinary action against any member of the National Executive Committee in breach of the constitution or Standing Orders of the Union.
ii. to receive and deal with disciplinary cases referred to it by the National Executive Committee (CSAWUZ, [undated]b: 13).

The establishment of the Disciplinary Tribunal is significant because it helps to maintain order in the union. It is important for union members and leaders to behave in a way that enhances the achievement of union objectives. As such, members and leaders who act against the interests of the union must be disciplined.

The union has also established a supreme organ at provincial level called Provincial Conference. This conference is composed of the following:

i. representation from the National Executive Council;
ii. all members of the Provincial Executive Committee; and
iii. four (4) members from the Branch leadership of which three shall be from the main branch committee and one from the women’s committee (CSAWUZ, [undated]b: 15).
The Provincial Conference is held after a period of four years. Its functions are:

- to receive reports from the Branches in the province, to review the past work of the Union branches in the province and to plan future tasks for the province, to review all appeal cases at the province and to elect members of the Provincial Executive Committee (CSAWUZ, [undated]b: 15).

The establishment of the Provincial Conference is important because it promotes union democracy. This style of governance enables the union to represent the interests of its members (Hyman, 1994).

Another organ that has been established at provincial level is the PEC. This committee is composed of five members elected at the Provincial Conference. The committee is led by the Provincial Chairperson. Members of this committee have a four year term of office. The PEC has the duty of coordinating the operations of branches in the province. The committee also has the power to handle disciplinary matters involving officials and members in the branches (CSAWUZ, [undated]b: 15-16). The formation of this committee is significant because it promotes order and strategic use of union resources.

The union has also put in place the Provincial Women’s Conference, which is held in each province. The composition of this conference includes members of the Provincial Women’s Committee and those from the Women’s Branch Committees. The functions of this conference include electing members of the Provincial Women’s Committee (CSAWUZ, [undated]b: 18-19). This conference is vital for the union. It does not only promote union democracy but also enables the union to meet the needs of female members.

In addition, the Provincial Women’s Committee has been formed in each province. This committee consists of five members elected at the Provincial Women’s Conference. The Provincial Women’s Committee is headed by the Chairperson. The term of office for members of this committee is four years. The functions and duties of this committee are:
i. To organize women’s affairs in all branches in the province;
ii. To promote unity and understanding among female members of the Union in the province;
iii. To bring to the National Women’s Committee policies on women to be worked on by the Union through the Chairperson and the Secretary;
iv. To advise the National Women’s Committee on problems of working women and assist in the effective implementation of related recommendations and resolutions;
v. To co-operate with other women bodies in the Trade Union Movement and other specialized women organizations locally (CSAWUZ, [undated]b: 19).

The formation of the Provincial Women’s Committee shows that the union is determined to promote gender equality in decision-making processes. This committee also helps the union to meet the needs of female members. Furthermore, this committee encourages the development of union networks and strategic leadership.

The Workplace Committee is now the lowest organ of union organisation. It is located at departmental or section level. Members of this committee are elected for a four year term of office. The functions of this committee are “recruitment, mobilization of members, maintenance of membership records and handling members’ grievances at such level” (CSAWUZ, [undated]b: 22). The creation of this committee shows that the union has attempted to decentralise its functions and enhance the participation of members in union activities. The reformed organisational structure is shown in Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.2 is a representation of the organisational structure of the CSAWUZ in 2014.
Figure 7.2: Organisational structure of Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia after implementation of Public-Private Partnerships

Source: Author’s own illustration
The establishment of union organs at the local level has been accompanied by the decentralisation of financial resources. According to CSAWUZ Lusaka Province Senior Trustee (interview, 13 February 2015), branches of the union are given quarterly grants to help them operate at the local level. This finding shows that the CSAWUZ has attempted to not only strengthen its local level structures but also to ensure that the services of the union are closer to the membership. This finding is similar to that reported by Brewster, Dempsey and Hegewisch (2001), who indicate that unions such as UNISON in the United Kingdom had responded to the reform of the public sector by transferring resources from the centre to local levels of the union.

Another reform measure implemented by CSAWUZ involves changing the strategies used to establish branches of the union. The CSAWUZ no longer uses its traditional strategies of forming branches based on a specified number of members in a particular urban area or having branches in each district in the country. Instead, there is a new strategy which empowers the NEC to liaise with the PEC to form and abolish branches of the union (CSAWUZ, [undated]b: 21). This reform measure reveals that strategic leadership is important in the union’s governance process especially when the industrial relations system is changing. Through this kind of leadership, the union is able to adjust its structures to suit the changing circumstances.

Although membership diversification increases the bargaining power of the union, it presents challenges to the leadership. This is because of the various expectations that need to be met. Lusaka Province Senior Trustee, CSAWUZ (interview, 13 February 2015) stated:

The challenge that comes in is, for instance, whenever you . . . call for a meeting, you notice to say that different groups will come with different issues that affect them. And then as the province, the challenge that we are faced with now is how do you operate or handle such challenges from an informed point of view? . . . you are now forced as a province to learn what really happens in these institutions.
Furthermore, Lusaka Province Senior Trustee, CSAWUZ (interview, 13 February 2015) indicated that different categories of government institutions have different conditions of service, which are negotiated differently. As a result, some union members have better conditions of service than others. He mentioned that “how do you harmonise the two? So, the challenge now is to help these others to agree or accept whatever has been put forth on the table” (Lusaka Province Senior Trustee, CSAWUZ, interview, 13 February 2015). This finding shows that it is difficult for union leaders to meet the needs of a diverse membership (see Undy, 2008; Wood and Dibben, 2006).

The other area where the CSAWUZ has made strategic decisions following the negative effects of PPPs is its relations with external actors. The union has attempted to enhance the ability to achieve its objectives by forming strategic alliances with external actors. These alliances involve working with organisations outside the workplace that deal with issues affecting workers. According to the Director-Research and Information, CSAWUZ (interview, 16 January 2015), the CSAWUZ is a member of the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) Steering Committee dealing with issues of labour. He also mentioned that the union participates in the process of computing food baskets under the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR). In addition, the union collaborates with international cooperating partners to address climate change (Director-Research and Information, CSAWUZ, interview, 16 January 2015).

In the same vein, Lusaka Province Senior Trustee, CSAWUZ (interview, 13 February 2015) indicated that women’s committees of the CSAWUZ liaise with Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) advocating for women’s rights. He also indicated that the union collaborates with the National AIDS Council to handle HIV/AIDS issues (Lusaka Province Senior Trustee, CSAWUZ, interview, 13 February 2015). These findings show that trade unions can build their capacity by forming alliances with external organisations that deal with issues affecting their members. These findings confirm the revelation by Doellgast (2008) that the power of trade unions to bargain over restructuring measures is enhanced by not
only organising the membership but also by building alliances both internally and externally.

7.8 Summary

This chapter has revealed that PPPs are part of post-NPM reform strategies. The chapter has also revealed that implementation of the PPP strategy in Zambia started in the 2000s. Two major types of services have been delivered through this strategy. These are core and non-core services. The chapter has also shown that the implementation of PPPs in Zambia has been influenced by three connected factors. These are the recognition of problems facing the public sector, the nuanced shift within the ideology of neo-liberalism, and the presence of actors spearheading the adoption and implementation of PPPs.

In addition, the chapter has shown that public institutions in Lusaka district use the method of competitive tendering to select their private sector partners. This process uses two criteria to select the most appropriate partner. These are the bid price, and the capacity of the bidder to perform the advertised task. The use of competitive tendering is beneficial to public institutions. The benefits include the ability to select suitable partners and reduction in the cost of service delivery.

The chapter has also indicated that there are many types of PPPs. They include BOO and SOT contracts. The chapter has also indicated that there is a thin dividing line between NPM and post-NPM reforms. This is because post-NPM reforms such as PPPs emphasise partial privatisation, which is a strategy of NPM reforms.

This chapter has also shown that the effects of PPPs appear at all the three levels of industrial relations activity, namely, long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels. The major effect at the workplace level is the intensification of the process of public/private hybridisation. This process is reinforced in two ways. The first is allowing private sector organisations to make investments at the
public sector workplace. The second is the creation of dual chains of command at the public sector workplace. The chapter shows that this process presents both benefits and challenges to the public sector workplace. The benefits include the following: first, it alleviates public institutions from the pressures associated with service delivery. These include provision of resources such as qualified personnel, materials, equipment and financial resources. Second, partnerships that focus on the delivery of non-core services enable public institutions to concentrate on their core business. Third, PPPs reduce the workload of public sector workers. Fourth, PPPs are capable of improving the remuneration of public sector workers attached to such projects.

The challenges presented by PPPs to public institutions include the following: first, a number of private sector partners do not maintain the desired quality of service delivery, thereby forcing public managers to supervise their private sector partners. Second, the use of dual chains of command in PPP projects creates role conflict at the public sector workplace. Third, PPPs limit employment opportunities in public institutions while promoting the growth of the private sector. This, in turn, constrains the development of public sector unions. Eventually, the private sector is able to accumulate capital by exploiting both the public sector and workers.

At the collective bargaining level, the effects of PPPs include further decentralisation of the bargaining structure, and reduction in trade union power. The effects on the long-term strategies of trade unions are felt in the areas of union membership and governance. In terms of membership, unions like CSAWUZ whose membership is restricted to public sector workers are unable to organise private sector workers operating at the public sector workplace. This, in turn, hinders their expansion and power. In terms of governance, PPPs give employers an opportunity to sideline trade unions in the process of decision-making. Consequently, mistrust between the union leadership and the membership emerges. This weakens the unions while empowering employers.
Although, trade unions in the public sector are negatively affected by PPPs, they have opportunities to make strategic decisions to achieve their objectives. These decisions are made both before and after the implementation of PPPs. The strategic decisions of the unions before PPPs are implemented include participating in the process of formulating the reform strategies. At this stage, the aim of trade unions is to safeguard the interests of workers. After implementation of PPPs, strategic decisions of trade unions are in the areas of membership recruitment, union functions and objectives, collective bargaining and governance. In the area of membership recruitment, the main strategies focus on organising and servicing the membership. In the area of union functions and objectives, the main strategy is to handle new issues such as promoting the participation of marginalised groups in decision-making processes. These groups include women and young workers. In the area of collective bargaining, the major strategy is to gather information on the prevailing economic conditions and negotiating for terms and conditions that enable workers to meet their basic needs. In the area of governance, the first strategy is to emphasise four elements of trade union organisation. These are democratisation, decentralisation, coordination and strategic leadership. The second strategy is to form alliances with external organisations that deal with issues affecting union members.

Furthermore, this chapter has shown that although a diversified membership increases the power of trade unions, it puts the union leadership under pressure to meet various expectations of the membership. The next chapter discusses partnerships in industrial relations and their implications for the CSAWUZ.
CHAPTER 8: PARTNERSHIPS IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CIVIL SERVANTS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION OF ZAMBIA

8.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) implemented in Zambia and their implications for the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ). The chapter indicated that promotion of partnerships in policy formulation and implementation is one of the post-New Public Management (post-NPM) reform strategies. In addition, the previous chapter indicated that the thesis would focus on two areas of partnership. These are PPPs and partnerships in industrial relations. Since PPPs were discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter will cover the other area of partnership.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss partnerships in industrial relations implemented in Zambia and their implications for the CSAWUZ. In order to achieve its purpose, the chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section is an explanation of the types of industrial relations partnership implemented in Zambia. The third section discusses factors influencing the implementation of partnerships in industrial relations in Zambia. The fourth section is a presentation of issues considered by industrial relations partnership in Zambia. The fifth section discusses the effects of the partnership strategy on industrial relations activity. The sixth section presents the strategic responses by the CSAWUZ to industrial relations partnership. The final section is a summary.

8.2 Types of industrial relations partnership implemented in Zambia

There are two major types of industrial relations partnership that have been implemented in Zambia. These are tripartite and bipartite alliances. The details of these alliances are discussed below.
8.2.1 Tripartite alliance in industrial relations

A tripartite alliance refers to a partnership that consists of all the three key actors in industrial relations. These are employers, trade unions and the government. Zambia has been implementing this type of partnership since the era of traditional public administration. According to Fashoyin (2002: 20), “tripartite consultation . . . started soon after independence when a Tripartite Labour Conference was held in Livingstone in 1966.” The results of this conference included the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971. In the early years, this type of partnership took the forms of ad hoc tripartite conferences and meetings that were held to deal with labour matters. This kind of consultation was institutionalised in 1993 through the establishment of the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council (TCLC). This institution was constituted at the national level by the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993 (Fashoyin, 2002: 20). This finding shows that the TCLC was established in the era of NPM.

The TCLC has continued to exist in the post-NPM era. This council consists of the Minister of Labour and an equal number of representatives of trade unions, employers and the Government. The exact number of members of this council is decided by the Minister of Labour but it is not less than 21. The members representing trade unions are chosen by trade unions registered under the Industrial and Labour Relations Act. Those representing employers are chosen by employers’ organisations registered under the same Act. Those representing the Government are appointed by the Minister of Labour (Republic of Zambia, 1997: Section 79). The function of the TCLC is “to advise the Government on all issues relating to labour matters, manpower development and utilisation and any other matter referred to the Council by the Government” (Republic of Zambia, 1997: Section 83). This finding shows that the partnership strategy enables alliance partners to consult each other so as to deal with issues affecting them. This finding is similar to that reported by Cherry (2006), who indicates that the

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41 Traditional public administration was the main paradigm from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century.
42 The NPM was the predominant paradigm in the last two decades of the twentieth century.
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)’s alliance with the African National Congress (ANC) government had enabled it to participate in policy-making processes for the benefit of its members.

8.2.2 Bipartite alliance in industrial relations

A bipartite alliance refers to a partnership that consists of any two of the key actors in industrial relations. This type of alliance may take three forms. These are employer-union partnership, employer-government partnership, and union-government partnership. Employer-union partnership is a form of partnership that involves an alliance between employers and trade unions. There are three options of implementing this form of partnership. These are:

- An alliance between one employer and one trade union.
- An alliance between one employer and a federation of trade unions.
- An alliance between an employers’ organisation and a federation of trade unions.

Under employer-government partnership, the alliance is between employers and the government. This form of partnership can be implemented in two ways. These are:

- An alliance between one employer and the government.
- An alliance between an employers’ organisation and the government.

In the case of union-government partnership, the alliance is between trade unions and the government. There are two choices of forming such an alliance. These are:

- An alliance between one trade union and the government.
An alliance between a federation of trade unions and the government.

The interaction between bipartite alliance partners in industrial relations in Zambia is mainly through consultative meetings that are held to deal with issues relating to employment relations. According to Assistant Labour Commissioner-Industrial Relations, Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS), (interview, 11 February 2015), employers in the public sector hold bipartite meetings with trade unions to handle labour matters. Relatedly, the Acting Senior Human Resource Management Officer, Chainama Hills College Hospital (CHCH), (interview, 12 February 2015) indicated that there are union-management meetings held at the hospital to discuss issues relating to conditions of service. The specific issues considered by these partnerships are discussed in section 8.4.

The above-mentioned findings reveal that all the three major phases in the evolution of public administration have been characterised by one form of partnership or another when dealing with issues relating to industrial relations. These phases are traditional public administration, NPM and post-NPM. This means that Public Sector Reform (PSR) does not completely replace the elements of traditional public administration but that it simply introduces incremental change to the administrative machinery of government (see Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).

8.3 Factors influencing the implementation of partnerships in industrial relations in Zambia

Strategic choice theory assumes that employers are influenced by environmental forces to adjust their business strategies (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1994). This assumption is also applicable to the implementation of partnerships in industrial relations in Zambia. In line with this assumption, employers in the public sector in particular and the government in general have been influenced by three interconnected factors to implement the partnership strategy in industrial relations. These factors are the recognition of problems at the workplace, the nuanced shift
within the ideology of neo-liberalism, and the desire of the major players to promote social dialogue and industrial harmony. These factors are discussed below.

8.3.1 Problems at the workplace

The first factor influencing the implementation of partnerships in industrial relations in Zambia is the recognition of problems at the workplace. These problems include industrial disputes such as disagreements between employers and trade unions over terms and conditions of employment. According to the Acting Senior Human Resource Management Officer, CHCH, (interview, 12 February 2015), when the Ministry of Health was restructured in 2008-2009 by way of abolishing Health Boards, conflict emerged between management and trade unions. The conflict was due to changes in the conditions of employment that were introduced by the reform process. The changes included transfer of workers from the abolished Health Boards (i.e. semi-autonomous institutions) to Ministry of Health (i.e. central government) where employment was based on qualifications. This type of reform resulted in workers occupying lower positions than they held under the boards. The Acting Senior Human Resource Management Officer, CHCH, (interview, 12 February 2015) stated that “you find out that maybe in the board this person was a Human Resource staff. When they come to the civil service, they are maybe a cook or a cleaner.”

In addition, the Acting Senior Human Resource Management Officer, CHCH, (interview, 12 February 2015) mentioned that “now with the restructured Ministry of Health, the unions and our staff saw management as more like an enemy in opposition.” These findings show that trade unions in the public sector tend to be antagonistic when dealing with reform measures aimed at lowering the terms and conditions of employment despite such measures being associated with efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of services (see Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). This implies that industrial disputes can be resolved by creating a good balance between efficiency and employee well-being.
8.3.2 Nuanced shift within the ideology of neo-liberalism

The second factor is the nuanced shift within the ideology of neo-liberalism. As noted in the previous chapter, post-NPM is characterised by an emphasis of the role played by networks. In broader terms, like other strategies of post-NPM, industrial relations partnership has been influenced by ideas associated with networks. However, in specific terms, partnerships in industrial relations have been influenced by the notion of social dialogue (which is a networking strategy). Social dialogue emphasises “all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of information between representatives of governments, employers and workers, on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy” (Lawrence and Ishikawa, 2005: 3). According to Kip (2011: 6):

The term ‘social dialogue’ was coined after the former European Commission President, Jacques Delors, who initiated a first meeting in Brussels in 1985 between ‘European social partners’ and representatives of the European Commission.

Since then, meetings among social partners have become essential elements of the industrial relations system around the world. Nevertheless, the idea of social dialogue emerged several decades before the term was coined. For instance, bipartite consultation in Zambia started in the colonial period. This kind of consultation was done through processes such as collective bargaining. In the case of tripartite relations, they were introduced immediately after independence. However, in the early years, this kind of industrial relations was practiced on an ad hoc basis. It was not until 1993 that tripartite consultation became institutionalised in Zambia. This was done through the establishment of the TCLC (Fashoyin, 2002).

8.3.3 Desire of the major players to promote social dialogue and industrial harmony

The third factor influencing the implementation of partnerships in industrial relations is the desire of the major players to promote social dialogue and
industrial harmony. This desire is illustrated by the ability to hold consultative meetings involving employers, trade unions and the government to handle labour matters. Examples of such meetings include those at CHCH. The Acting Senior Human Resource Management Officer, CHCH, (interview, 12 February 2015) indicated that in 2014 the hospital management and trade unions met five times to discuss issues relating to conditions of service. Furthermore, she stated that “actually what is remaining is to come up with dates for 2015” (Acting Senior Human Resource Management Officer, CHCH, interview, 12 February 2015). The central government (as the main employer in the public sector) and the trade unions also hold similar meetings. According to Assistant Labour Commissioner-Industrial Relations, MLSS, (interview, 11 February 2015), bipartite meetings had been held between the government and public sector unions. In these meetings, the government was represented by the Ministry of Finance, and the Public Service Management Division. Government has also expressed its desire by enacting the Industrial and Labour Relations Act, which provides for the establishment of the TCLC. The Act also requires employers and trade unions to “enter into collective bargaining for the purpose of concluding and signing a collective agreement” (Republic of Zambia, 1997: Section 66). These findings imply that the partnership strategy is used to prevent industrial action such as strikes. In turn, this creates an environment conducive for productivity. Subsequently, the interests of employers are promoted.

8.4 Issues considered by industrial relations partnership in Zambia

Industrial relations partnership in Zambia considers a number of issues relating to economic and social policies. At national level, the Assistant Labour Commissioner-Industrial Relations, MLSS, (interview, 11 February 2015) indicated that the TCLC had considered the following issues: sector-based minimum wages, labour law reform including redrafting of the Employment Act, conditions of service across the country, and reports from international labour conferences. In a related manner, Director-Research and Information, CSAWUZ, (interview, 16 January 2015) stated that the TCLC had considered issues of
pension reform, and ratification of international instruments such as Maternity Protection Convention (Number 183).

Similar issues are considered at the workplace level. Management and trade unions at various public institutions have been holding joint meetings to consider issues relating to organisational structure and terms and conditions of employment. The Acting Senior Human Resource Management Officer, CHCH, (interview, 12 February 2015) indicated that the hospital management and trade unions met on several occasions to discuss issues of outstanding bills, housing, night shift allowances, long service bonuses, leave, travels, settling-in allowances, and salary arrears. Similarly, management and trade unions at the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS) met to consider issues relating to the structure of the ministry and recruitment of more labour officers (Assistant Labour Commissioner-Industrial Relations, MLSS, interview, 11 February 2015). Relatedly, management and the union at Central Statistical Office worked together to formulate a Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) workplace policy (Ridgeway Branch Chairperson, CSAWUZ, interview, 22 January 2015). In the same vein, CSAWUZ Lusaka Urban Clinics Branch Trustee (interview, 11 February 2015) stated:

In fact like during Labour Day preparations, it’s the management plus the union leaders, we meet to say I think this year that member of staff . . . they have worked very well. So these I think they deserve to go and put on the suits. We do choose. It’s us to choose. So we always meet.

The above-mentioned findings show that industrial relations partnership considers various issues affecting social partners. These include economic and social issues (see Coats, 2006; Fashoyin, 2002; Lawrence and Ishikawa, 2005).

8.5 The effects of the partnership strategy on industrial relations activity

The assumption of strategic choice theory that the effects of strategic decisions can be felt at any level of industrial relations activity (Kochan et al., 1994) is also
applicable to Zambia’s experience with the partnership strategy in industrial relations. The effects of this reform strategy have appeared at all the three levels of industrial relations activity, namely, long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels. These effects are discussed below.

At the workplace level, the implementation of industrial relations partnership has promoted a degree of industrial harmony. This has been achieved by reducing the power of trade unions. When interviewed on 16 January 2015, Director-Research and Information, CSAWUZ, mentioned that:

It [Tripartite Consultative Labour Council] weakens the union in the sense that . . . the militancy is taken away because there’s just the issues of consensus and agreeing on issues. So, that element of militancy in the labour movement is somehow weakened. Because it’s about social dialogue and issues of appealing and understanding situations.

The findings mentioned above show that the notion of social dialogue is used to weaken the unions and enhance the power of employers. Under such conditions, it is easier for employers to exploit workers. These findings corroborate the argument advanced by Mandel (1991: 75) that employers “have a common interest in trying to prevent the rise of militant unionism.”

The partnership strategy also enables the government to amend labour laws with little or no trade unions’ resistance. The Director-Research and Information, CSAWUZ, (interview, 16 January 2015), indicated that while issues of pension reforms were under discussion, a Statutory Instrument relating to the same issues had already been signed. This finding shows that despite being social partners, trade unions were bypassed in the process of policy-making. This implies that government does not always negotiate in good faith. In this regard, the concept of social dialogue is used to manipulate the unions and ensure the enactment of laws that promote the interests of employers. These interests include reductions in employee rewards. This finding also shows that social partnerships can be captured by privileged actors so as to serve their own interests (see Plaut, 2010).
Ultimately, implementation of the strategy of industrial relations partnership lowers the terms and conditions of employment. When interviewed on 22 January 2015, Ridgeway Branch Chairperson, CSAWUZ, stated:

There are certain demands that we need as workers which become a cost to the management at institutional level . . . I will give for instance, every civil servant when you go out, you are supposed to be given subsistence allowance because you are sleeping out . . . So if you have to be paid subsistence allowance for instance, 500 [Zambian Kwacha] per day or per night, so if you have to be out, if you have a big group maybe about 400 people are out, it means the government will spend a lot of money to pay you . . . If my entitlement is 500 [Zambian Kwacha] per night, they will say we pay you half the rate. That half the rate is not part of my terms . . . the contract I have with the government is 500 [Zambian Kwacha] . . . They will tell you that we don’t have enough resources to pay you for this longer period . . . Even if you want to tell members to stop working . . . they say you are working against management.

Along the same line, University Teaching Hospital (UTH) Branch Trustee, CSAWUZ, (interview, 12 February 2015) indicated:

Now what has been done . . . is that management promise to give what belongs to people as incentives which has not taken place . . . management promised people . . . in October, come November you get what belongs to you, terminal benefits, like all those retirement package but things are not coming. Management there . . . they have become a failure and failed us as a union. So we are . . . already making appointments to . . . meet management with the three unions.

The above-mentioned findings reveal that industrial relations partnership enables employers to make promises they do not keep. The findings also reveal that this strategy enables employers to dictate the terms and conditions of employment. These findings support the conclusion by Zhukov (2011: 167) that:

Social dialogue has become a distorted form of labour relations and a disguise for a steady monopolization of the market by pro-oligarchic social partners’ organisations, to which process poorly
organized and unprotected employees have been merely a passive witness.

At the collective bargaining level, the partnership strategy helps employers to control collective disputes. According to the Assistant Labour Commissioner-Industrial Relations, MLSS, (interview, 11 February 2015), meetings between employers and trade unions enable the unions to have a clear understanding of the situation in the organisation so that when it comes to collective bargaining, there is no unnecessary conflict. This finding shows that the partnership strategy does not only pacify trade unions at the workplace level but also at the collective bargaining level. This, in turn, promotes the interest of employers at these levels of industrial relations activity. This finding also shows that the interest of employers is promoted through strategies that restrict the power of trade unions (see Mandel, 1991).

The effects of industrial relations partnership also appear at the long-term strategy making level of trade unions. At this level, employers are allowed to control the decision-making processes of trade unions. When interviewed on 12 February 2015, Acting Senior Human Resource Management Officer, CHCH, stated:

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Usually what we do, we would have a separate meeting [management and union meeting] before we meet the larger staff. Union and management [meet] so that we look at what issues can be handled. Okay, for instance, the other time we had a challenge with long service bonus. The unions at national level explained but our workers did not understand. We had a separate meeting with our local union, the branch, where we told them to say it’s up to you to explain to our staff. So once we go in the bigger meeting [involving management, union leaders and staff] . . . management will do its explanations and the unions will also have [to do their explanations].
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The above-mentioned findings indicate that the partnership strategy enables employers to limit the influence of trade unions at all the three levels of industrial relations activity, namely, long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels. Consequently, this serves the interest of employers. In this regard, employers are interested in having a submissive workforce. According to
the Deputy Director, Lusaka Business and Technical College (LBTC), (interview, 5 February 2015), “they [trade unions] need first to educate their members about industrial harmony, the issues of collective bargaining and the process of handling labour grievances.” Similarly, the Assistant Labour Commissioner-Industrial Relations, MLSS, (interview, 11 February 2015) indicated that the role of trade unions should include communicating with their members about government policies, laws and strategies. These findings show that industrial relations partnership is a strategy used by employers to control labour.

8.6 Strategic responses by the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia to industrial relations partnership

The assumption of strategic choice theory that the key actors affected by the reform of industrial relations make strategic choices to achieve their goals (Kochan et al., 1994) is also applicable to the responses by CSAWUZ to the partnership strategy. In line with this assumption, the CSAWUZ has made strategic decisions following the implementation of partnerships in industrial relations. These decisions are in the area of influence on policy-making. In this regard, CSAWUZ has decided to increase its influence by actively participating in the processes of policy-making. The union has adopted four strategies of participation. The first strategy involves the union being represented in committees established at national level to lead the processes of policy-making. According to the Director-Research and Information, CSAWUZ, (interview, 16 January 2015), the union has a representative in the pension reform committee. The union is also represented in the committee dealing with the creation of a Health Insurance Scheme. In addition, the Director-Research and Information, CSAWUZ, (interview, 16 January 2015) stated:

There are some processes that are looking at reforming the Ministry of Health in terms of looking at the structures and positions, and also the relationship of Ministry of Health and [Ministry of] Community Development, because they [Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child Health] are looking at issues of health. We have also union members who are in those committees. So at least they are able to ensure that the
concerns of the unions, the concerns of workers are taken on board. There are sub-committees or task forces that are looking at issues of rural and remote allowances or housing issues. So we also have members of the union that are in those committees.

The second strategy is negotiating for union representation in management meetings (i.e. at institutional level). The CSAWUZ Church Road Branch Chairperson (interview, 29 January 2015) said:

You know as a union we requested for management to be allowing at least one member from the union whenever they have policy decision making meetings so that even our input from the workers’ view is also taken on board.

The third strategy involves the union presenting alternative policies to management. The LBTC Branch Chairperson, CSAWUZ, (interview, 4 February 2015) indicated:

Sometimes, we are told no we can’t pay for your gratuity because . . . the institution has no money. So the union came up with something to support actually the policies in the strategic plan that . . . let’s actually start enrolling students in the middle of the year. We have another stream running from August somewhere September. We only had January intakes. So, that I think has . . . influenced a lot and that is working and we have seen a lot of people being paid off. Once they graduate, they are paid off.

The fourth strategy involves the union familiarising itself with the prescribed terms and conditions of employment and ensuring that management complies with them. The CSAWUZ Chainama Branch Chairperson (interview, 18 February 2015) stated:

Yes, what we have done is that, like I said, our book is the terms and conditions of service. So, whichever thing that the management is doing, if we see that it’s not in line with the terms and conditions, we will always speak out to say this is the way . . . I can give you a specific example . . . by government regulation, anyone staying in places like that one [convents or hostels] is not supposed to pay rent because that kind of accommodation is regarded to be a transitory accommodation. You are just there for some time then once proper
accommodation is found for you, you move out of that place. But after that audit was conducted, the management [at CHCH] decided that these people should start paying rent . . . And the union has strongly spoken against that decision to say no, you cannot go ahead and ask those people to pay rent because by law, they are not supposed to do that.

To some extent, the above-mentioned strategies have enabled the CSAWUZ to secure benefits for its members. These include improved terms and conditions of employment. The CSAWUZ Church Road Branch Chairperson (interview, 29 January 2015) indicated:

> When funding comes to this department [Government Printing Department], we have requested that a member of the union representative also be in that meeting, so much that the monies which are being disbursed also our members should benefit, and on that front I think, though we are facing difficulties here and there but it has helped.

The other benefit is that the strategy of active participation has enabled the union to challenge decisions that worsen the terms and conditions of employment. The CSAWUZ Ridgeway Branch Chairperson (interview, 22 January 2015) mentioned that:

> When a member, any member, starting from management up to the lowest man in the system has an issue, I will give an example of a funeral, you find if a junior officer loses a relative or a spouse . . . you would find the cheque will delay to be cut . . . But when somebody in management has a funeral, you find within hours, the cheque is cut for the entitlement of that officer. And with this, we sat and said, no. After that, now when something happens, it doesn’t matter whether it’s junior or senior [officer], the same things have to happen at the same time.

Relatedly, the National Food and Nutrition Commission Branch Vice Secretary, CSAWUZ, (interview, 19 February 2015) said:

> Yes, there was . . . rationalisation and harmonisation of salaries which the PF [Patriotic Front] government had put in place. Yes, we had to sit down, especially after discovering that the circular had
come . . . with specification and when we looked at the situation where there were some kind of deliberate delays or sometimes procrastination, yes, union had to be so proactive . . . by taking over the matter, presenting that matter first of all starting with management, and management could not respond appropriately and we had to target the chair who happens to be the Director. From there, issues were discussed . . . we could see things happening, yes, and that is how things were accelerated or were quickly done.

In addition, active participation in policy-making has allowed the union to protect the rights of workers. The CSAWUZ Lusaka Central Branch Chairperson (interview, 4 February 2015) mentioned that:

I think they [union strategies] have been very effective because for example if you talk of the workers’ rights, like the Labour Day participation, that one has been done very well at this office [Police and Prisons Commission] so to say.

The findings mentioned above show that trade unions can strengthen their position in industrial relations partnership by building their own capacity and actively participating in the processes of policy-making at both national and institutional levels. This entails having the ability to negotiate for representation in policy-making processes, gathering policy-relevant information, negotiating for improved terms and conditions of employment, challenging decisions that worsen the terms and conditions of employment, and presenting policy alternatives. These findings are in agreement with Coats (2006) who argues that in order for trade unions to benefit from the partnership model, they need to build their own capacity.

8.7 Summary

This chapter has shown that there are two major types of industrial relations partnership implemented in Zambia. These are tripartite and bipartite alliances. Tripartite alliances involve all the three key actors in industrial relations working together to deal with labour matters. These actors are employers, trade unions and the government. In the case of bipartite alliances, they involve any two of these
actors working together to deal with labour matters. The chapter has also revealed that all the three major phases in the evolution of public administration have been characterised by one form of partnership or another when dealing with issues relating to industrial relations. These phases are traditional public administration, NPM and post-NPM. In addition, the chapter has indicated that implementation of the partnership strategy in industrial relations in Zambia has been influenced by three interconnected factors. These are the recognition of problems at the workplace (which include industrial disputes), the nuanced shift within the ideology of neo-liberalism, and the desire of the major players to promote social dialogue and industrial harmony.

Furthermore, the chapter has indicated that industrial relations partnership considers issues relating to economic and social policies. In addition, the chapter has shown that the effects of the partnership strategy appear at all the three levels of industrial relations activity, namely, long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels. The major effect at these levels of industrial relations activity is that employers become more powerful than trade unions. This, in turn, enables employers to easily lower the terms and conditions of employment.

The chapter has also revealed that although trade unions are negatively affected by partnerships in industrial relations, they can make strategic decisions to achieve their objectives. These decisions are in the area of influence on policy-making. In this regard, the influence of trade unions can be enhanced by building their own capacity and actively participating in the processes of policy-making at both national and institutional levels. This entails having the ability to negotiate for representation in policy-making processes, gathering policy-relevant information, negotiating for improved terms and conditions of employment, challenging decisions that worsen the terms and conditions of employment, and presenting policy alternatives. The next chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations of the thesis.
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present the conclusions and recommendations of the thesis. In order to achieve its purpose, the chapter is divided into six sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section restates the purpose and objectives of the thesis. The third section explains the main findings of the research. The fourth section presents the conclusions of the thesis. The fifth section discusses the contribution of the thesis to the field of research. The final section presents the recommendations of the thesis.

9.2 Purpose and objectives of the thesis

The purpose and objectives of the thesis were presented in Chapter 1. These are restated below.

9.2.1 Main aim

The main aim of the thesis was to examine the implications of Public Sector Reform for public sector unions in Zambia.

9.2.2 Objectives

The objectives of the thesis were as follows:

i. To review literature and suggest a theoretical framework for analysing the implications of Public Sector Reform for trade unions in the public sector.

ii. To examine the dimensions of Public Sector Reform implemented in Zambia and their effects on the public sector workplace.

iii. To examine the effects of New Public Management and post-New Public Management reforms on collective bargaining in the public sector.
iv. To analyse the effects of New Public Management and post-New Public Management reforms on the long-term strategies of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia.

v. To identify the strategic responses by the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia to Public Sector Reform.

vi. To analyse the findings, draw conclusions and make recommendations.

The main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the thesis are presented below.

9.3 Main findings of the research

The main findings are presented in such a way that reference is made to the various chapters of the thesis. From these findings, conclusions are drawn in relation to the above-mentioned corresponding purpose and objectives of the thesis. Thereafter, recommendations are made. The main findings are explained below.

9.3.1 Dimensions of Public Sector Reform implemented in Zambia and their effects on the public sector workplace

This subsection explains the main findings corresponding to objective (ii). The dimensions of Public Sector Reform (PSR) implemented in Zambia and their effects on the public sector workplace were discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. The findings indicate that two generations of PSR have been implemented in Zambia. These are New Public Management (NPM) and post-NPM reforms. The reform strategies that have been implemented under NPM include restructuring of the public service, performance management, decentralisation, privatisation and commercialisation of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). As for post-NPM reform strategies, they include partnerships in policy formulation and implementation. On the one hand, NPM reforms emphasised the effectiveness of market forces and the weakness of government regulation. On the other hand, post-NPM reforms emphasise the interconnectedness of stakeholders in the processes of policy
formulation and implementation. The stakeholders in these processes include government, business, civil society organisations, employers and trade unions.

The effects of PSR in Zambia have been felt at all the three levels of industrial relations activity. These are long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels. The effects of NPM reforms at the workplace level included a smaller but disjointed public sector, loss of benefits associated with transfer within the public sector, increased workload for retained workers, poor performance, casualisation of labour, employment of skilled personnel, equity in the processes of recruitment, placement and rewards, and improved conditions of service in certain subsectors. The NPM reforms also initiated the process of hybridisation of public and private sectors. This was done through the introduction of private sector strategies in the management of the public sector. These strategies include commercialisation, lease and management contracts.

In the case of post-NPM reforms, their major effect at the workplace level is the intensification of the process of public/private hybridisation. This process is reinforced in two ways. The first is allowing private sector organisations to make investments at the public sector workplace. The second is the creation of dual chains of command at the public sector workplace. One chain of command is from the government structure while the other is from private sector partners. This process presents both benefits and challenges to the public sector workplace. The benefits include the following: first, it alleviates public institutions from the pressures associated with service delivery. These include provision of resources such as qualified personnel, materials, equipment and financial resources. Second, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) that focus on the delivery of non-core services enable public institutions to concentrate on their core business. Third, PPPs reduce the workload of public sector workers.

The challenges presented by partnerships to public institutions include the following: first, a number of private sector partners did not maintain the desired quality of service delivery, thereby forcing public managers to supervise them.
Second, the use of dual chains of command in PPP projects created role conflict at the public sector workplace. Third, PPPs were limiting employment opportunities in public institutions while promoting the growth of the private sector. This, in turn, constrained the development of public sector unions. In addition, the notion of social dialogue made it easier for the private sector to exploit both the public sector and workers. Under such conditions, the terms and conditions of employment are lowered.

9.3.2 Effects of New Public Management and post-New Public Management reforms on collective bargaining in the public sector

This subsection focuses on findings that address objective (iii). The effects of NPM on collective bargaining in the public sector were presented in Chapter 6. As for the effects of post-NPM, they were presented in Chapters 7 and 8. The findings reveal that both NPM and post-NPM reforms have transformed the bargaining structure from a centralised structure to a decentralised one. Through this transformation, workers are divided into several bargaining units and their bargaining power reduced. In addition, collective bargaining has become more expensive and time consuming for trade unions. This is because of several bargaining units that need to be attended to. This, in turn, has enabled employers to lower the terms and conditions of employment.

9.3.3 Effects of New Public Management and post-New Public Management reforms on the long-term strategies of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia

This subsection considers the findings that address objective (iv). The findings, as presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, show that the implementation of NPM and post-NPM reforms also affected the long-term strategies of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ). The effects of these reforms have been felt in the areas of union membership and governance. In terms of membership, the CSAWUZ has experienced a significant loss of membership due to job losses in the public sector. The union is also unable to organise private
sector workers operating at the public sector workplace. This is because its membership is confined to public sector workers. This implies that restricting membership recruitment to public sector workers hinders the expansion and power of public sector unions. In terms of governance, the CSAWUZ has become weaker due to losses in membership and income. The reforms have also resulted in conflicts of interest within the labour movement and between the labour movement and the government. This has further weakened the union while empowering employers. Under these conditions, employers are able to lower the terms and conditions of employment.

9.3.4 Strategic responses by the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia to Public Sector Reform

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 have also discussed the findings corresponding to objective (v). The findings show that although the CSAWUZ was negatively affected by the reform of the public sector, it was an active agent in the reform process. The union had opportunities to make strategic decisions to achieve its goals. The opportunities were available both before and after the implementation of the reforms. Strategic decisions of the union before implementation of the reforms included participating in the process of formulating the reform strategies. The participation took the forms of challenging government proposals and presenting alternatives.

After implementation of PSR, the CSAWUZ made strategic decisions to deal with the negative effects of the reforms. The strategic decisions were in the areas of membership recruitment, union functions and objectives, collective bargaining and governance. In the area of membership recruitment, the first strategy of the CSAWUZ was to change its structure from a “specific-sectoral” union to a general-sectoral union. This strategy enabled it to extend its recruitment to allied workers rather than being confined to civil servants. The second strategy was to enhance the organisation of new employees in the targeted sectors. The third strategy was to discourage the growth of new unions. The fourth strategy was to offer members various services such as loans and training opportunities.
In the area of union functions and objectives, the strategy of the CSAWUZ was not only to organise workers in related fields but also to handle new issues such as promoting the participation of marginalised groups in decision-making processes. These groups include women and young workers. In the area of collective bargaining, the main strategy was to conduct research before presenting items for collective bargaining. The research focused on gathering information on the prevailing economic conditions. Based on this information, the union would then negotiate for terms and conditions that enabled workers to meet their basic needs.

In the area of governance, the first strategy was to reform the organisational structure of the union. The reform process emphasised four elements of trade union organisation. These are democratisation, decentralisation, coordination and strategic leadership. The second strategy was to participate in policy-making processes both at national (public policy) and institutional levels. In order to strengthen its position in these processes, the CSAWUZ made efforts to gather policy-relevant information and present policy alternatives to government and employers. The third strategy was to form alliances with external organisations that deal with issues affecting union members.

Furthermore, the findings show that although a diversified membership increases the power of trade unions, it puts the union leadership under pressure to meet the diverse needs of the membership.

9.4 Conclusions

The thesis shows that PSR involves changing the role of the public sector in the process of providing goods and services. Instead of the public sector being the only provider, it is a partner. As a partner, its role is to create an environment that encourages the growth of the private sector. This environment is characterised by the following features: reduced employment opportunities in public institutions, weak trade unions, lower terms and conditions of employment, and transfer of resources from the public to the private sector. However, this mode of production
negatively affects trade unions in the public sector. The effects include reductions in union membership and income, less participation in union activities, increased intra- and inter-union conflict, and reduced union power.

The thesis also shows that although public sector unions are negatively affected by PSR, they have agency and do not just wait to become victims of the reform process. They make strategies so as to adapt to the changing circumstances. These strategies include diversifying the membership, enhancing membership recruitment, servicing the membership, discouraging the growth of new unions, dealing with nontraditional matters, and promoting the participation of marginalised groups in decision-making processes. The other strategies include decentralising the organisational structure of the union, coordinating union activities, gathering policy-relevant information, presenting policy alternatives to government and employers, negotiating for terms and conditions that enable workers to meet their basic needs, and forming alliances with external organisations dealing with issues affecting workers. This implies that trade unions in the public sector have opportunities to deal with challenges facing them under the rubric of PSR.

9.5 Contribution to the field of research

The thesis has made a number of contributions to research findings on Public Sector Reform (PSR) and trade unions in the public sector. First, the thesis has contributed information confirming the argument advanced by Christensen and Lægreid (2007a) that there are two generations of PSR. These are New Public Management (NPM) and post-NPM reforms.

Second, the research is the first of its kind from Zambia. There is no other research that has been conducted in Zambia focusing on NPM or post-NPM reforms and their implications for public sector unions.
Third, the thesis confirms other studies about public/private hybridisation. The findings show that PSR blurs the distinction between the public and private sectors. This is because of the use of similar principles to manage the two sectors (Kletz, Hénaut and Sardas, 2014).

Fourth, the thesis has contributed to the literature on industrial relations under the rubric of PSR. The findings show how public sector employers in particular and the government in general use reform measures to weaken trade unions (Anderson, Griffin and Teicher, 2002; Brewster, Dempsey and Hegewisch, 2001). The findings also show how trade unions respond to the reform of the public sector (Anderson et al., 2002; Brewster et al., 2001; Connoley, 2008).

Fifth, the findings confirm the assumptions of the thesis’ theoretical framework. These are:

(i) Public sector employers are influenced by environmental forces to make strategic choices concerning the management of public institutions.

(ii) In the process of making their strategies, public sector employers take into consideration not only the forces from the external environment but also their own management principles, and their interrelationships with the other key industrial relations actors.

(iii) When public sector unions and government agencies get affected by employer strategies, they also make strategies to achieve their goals.

(iv) Strategic decisions are made at three levels of industrial relations activity. These are long-term strategy, collective bargaining, and workplace levels.

(v) The effects of strategic decisions can be felt at any level of industrial relations activity.

From the above-mentioned findings and conclusions, it can be argued that to a large extent the purpose and objectives of the thesis have been achieved. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the thesis has exhausted all there is in the
understanding of PSR and its implications for trade unions in the public sector. There are still other areas for future research. These are presented in the next section.

9.6 Recommendations

The recommendations of the thesis are in two categories. These are implications for policy and areas for future research. The details of these recommendations are presented below.

9.6.1 Implications for policy

The thesis has revealed that PSR reduces the scope of the public sector while promoting the growth of the private sector. The thesis has also revealed that PSR reduces the bargaining power of workers by creating several bargaining units. These findings imply that public sector unions need to reform their policies so as to deal with the challenges facing them. In this regard, the following reform measures must be undertaken:

(i) Public sector unions must organise workers in the private sector so as to increase their membership and bargaining power.
(ii) There is need for trade unions to establish collective bargaining networks so as to increase their bargaining power and harmonise the terms and conditions of employment across the country. This will, in turn, prevent the transfer of employment opportunities and resources from the public to the private sector. Eventually, the interests of workers in both sectors will be promoted.

9.6.2 Areas for future research

The thesis has contributed to the literature on PSR and its implications for trade unions in the public sector. However, the research does not cover all the strategies
of PSR implemented in Zambia. The research is confined to the following strategies of PSR: restructuring of the public service, performance management, decentralisation, privatisation, commercialisation, and partnerships in policy formulation and implementation. Strategies of PSR that are outside the scope of the research include public service capacity building, recentralisation, and the adoption of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). Therefore, future research can focus on public service capacity building, recentralisation, and ICTs and their implications for trade unions in the public sector.

In addition, the research does not cover all the categories of public institutions in Lusaka district. The research is confined to institutions from which the CSAWUZ draws its membership. These include government ministries, central government offices and departments, public hospitals and clinics, and semi-autonomous government institutions. Institutions that are outside the scope of the research include primary and secondary schools, and local councils. Therefore, future research can focus on trade unionism in primary and secondary schools, and local councils. Future research can also be conducted on PSR and trade unionism outside Lusaka district. Furthermore, future research can focus on the integration of gender issues in trade union activities, and trade union engagement in policy processes.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR FORMER CSAWUZ NATIONAL LEADERS

Background

1. Date of interview: ______________________________________
2. Start time of interview: __________________________________
3. Position held in the union: _______________________________
4. Gender of interviewee: _________________________________

Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ) before implementation of Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP)

5. When was CSUZ formed?
6. Why was the union formed?
7. Ask for union constitution, policies and conference reports and resolutions so as to identify its objectives, activities and organisational structure before the days of PSRP.

Effects of PSRP

8. What structures did the government create when it decentralised some functions from central government to provinces and districts under the PSRP?
9. What functions were transferred to these structures?
10. How did implementation of PSRP affect the collective bargaining process for your union members? Explain the difference between the pre-PSRP and post-PSRP collective bargaining processes.
11. Did implementation of PSRP change issues that could be presented for collective bargaining? Describe issues that were presented for collective bargaining before the days of PSRP and those for the post-PSRP era.
12. How did the change in the collective bargaining process and/or bargaining issues affect your union’s bargaining power and strategy?
13. How did implementation of PSRP affect membership levels and the organisation of your union? Give examples.

14. How did implementation of PSRP affect the relationships between your union and the government, and other partners such as other unions, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), political parties and the like?

CSUZ strategic responses to the effects of PSRP

15. What was your union’s reaction to government efforts to implement the PSRP?

16. When was CSUZ renamed as Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ)?

17. Why was the union renamed?

18. Was the union constitution amended? Ask for the amended constitution.

19. What strategies did your union adopt to increase its power in collective bargaining and policy-making following the implementation of PSRP?

20. What do you think should be done to strengthen trade unions in the public service?

21. Finish time of interview: ____________________________

22. Duration of interview: ______________________________

End of Interview  Thank You
APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR FORMER CSAWUZ REGIONAL LEADERS

Background

1. Date of interview: ________________________________
2. Start time of interview: ___________________________
3. Position held in the union: _________________________
4. Gender of interviewee: ____________________________

Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ) before implementation of Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP)

5. What categories of institutions did CSUZ draw its membership from within Lusaka district?
6. What was the organisational structure of CSUZ in Lusaka province?

Effects of PSRP

7. What strategies did the government use to reduce the size of the public service in Lusaka district when it implemented the PSRP?
8. What structures/institutions did the government create in Lusaka district when it decentralised some functions from central government to provinces and districts?
9. What functions were transferred to these structures/institutions?
10. How did implementation of PSRP affect the collective bargaining process for CSUZ members in Lusaka district? Explain the difference between the pre-PSRP and post-PSRP collective bargaining processes.
11. Did implementation of PSRP change issues that could be presented for collective bargaining? Describe issues that were presented for collective bargaining before the days of PSRP and those for the post-PSRP era.
12. How did the change in the collective bargaining process and/or bargaining issues affect your union’s bargaining power and strategy in Lusaka district?
13. How did implementation of PSRP affect membership levels and the organisation of your union in Lusaka district? Give examples and statistics, if any.

14. How did implementation of PSRP affect the relationships between your union and the government, and other partners such as other unions, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), political parties and the like in Lusaka district?

**CSUZ strategic responses to the effects of PSRP**

15. What was your union’s reaction to government efforts to implement the PSRP in Lusaka district?

16. What strategies did the Regional Secretary adopt to increase union membership in Lusaka district following the implementation of PSRP?

17. Did membership diversification/the new recruitment strategies help your union to increase its membership in Lusaka district? Provide statistics, if any.

18. What changes, if any, were made to the union’s organisational structure in Lusaka district when CSUZ was renamed as Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ)?

19. What strategies did your union adopt to increase its power in collective bargaining and policy-making following the implementation of PSRP in Lusaka district?

20. What challenges did the Regional Secretary face governing a union that had diversified its membership?

21. What do you think should be done to strengthen public sector unions in Lusaka district?

22. Finish time of interview: ___________________________

23. Duration of interview: _____________________________

End of Interview          Thank You
APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR FORMER CSAWUZ BRANCH LEADERS AND SHOP STEWARDS

Background

1. Date of interview: ________________________________
2. Start time of interview: ________________________________
3. Category of public institution worked for:
   1. Government ministry office
   2. Public hospital/clinic
4. Name of public institution worked for: ____________________
5. Position held in the union: ______________________________
6. If branch official, specify the name of the branch: ___________
7. Gender of interviewee: _________________________________

Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ) before implementation of Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP)

8. Which categories of workers did CSUZ draw its membership from at the public institution you worked for (i.e. before the days of PSRP)?

Effects of PSRP

9. What kind of restructuring took place at the public institution you worked for during the implementation of the PSRP?
10. What system did management introduce to manage the performance of employees at that institution?
11. How did implementation of PSRP affect the terms and conditions of employment at that institution?
12. How did implementation of PSRP affect workers’ rights in general at that institution?
13. How did implementation of PSRP affect the collective bargaining process for CSUZ members at that institution? Explain the difference between the pre-PSRP and post-PSRP collective bargaining processes.
14. Did implementation of PSRP change issues that could be presented for collective bargaining? Describe issues that were presented for collective bargaining before the days of PSRP and those for the post-PSRP era.

15. How did implementation of PSRP affect membership levels and the organisation of your union at that institution? Give examples and statistics, if any.

16. How did implementation of PSRP affect the participation of members in union activities and decision-making processes at that institution?

17. How did implementation of PSRP affect the relationship between union leaders and members including the ability of the leaders to direct union activities at that institution?

18. How did implementation of PSRP affect the relationships between your union and management, and other unions at that institution?

CSUZ strategic responses to the effects of PSRP

19. What strategies did your union adopt to increase its membership at the public institution you worked for following the implementation of PSRP?

20. Did the new recruitment strategies help your union to increase its membership at that institution? Provide statistics, if any.

21. What changes, if any, were made to the union’s governance process at that institution when CSUZ was renamed as Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ)?

22. What strategies did your union adopt to increase its power in collective bargaining and policy-making following the implementation of PSRP at that institution?

23. What do you think should be done to strengthen trade unions in public institutions?

24. Finish time of interview: ___________________________

25. Duration of interview: ___________________________

End of Interview

Thank You
APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CURRENT CSAWUZ NATIONAL LEADERS

Background
1. Date of interview: ________________________________
2. Start time of interview: ______________________________
3. Position held in the union: ______________________________
4. Gender of interviewee: ______________________________

Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) before implementation of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) policy
5. Ask for union constitution, policies and conference reports and resolutions so as to identify its objectives, activities and organisational structure before the days of the PPP policy.

Effects of the PPP policy
6. Mention some of the services that have been delivered on the basis of PPPs or outsourcing in the public service.
7. How has implementation of PPPs or outsourcing affected the collective bargaining process for your union members? Explain the difference between the pre-PPP and the current collective bargaining processes.
8. Has implementation of PPPs changed issues that are presented for collective bargaining? Describe issues that were presented for collective bargaining before the days of the PPPs and those being presented now.
9. How has the change in the collective bargaining process and/or bargaining issues affected your union’s bargaining power and strategy?
10. How has the implementation of PPPs affected membership levels and the organisation of your union? Give examples.
11. What is the current membership of CSAWUZ?
12. What is the total number of workers in the public service?
13. Of the total number of workers in the public service, how many belong to trade unions?
14. How has the implementation of PPPs affected the relationships between your union and the government, and other partners such as other unions, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), political parties and the like?

CSAWUZ strategic responses to the effects of the PPP policy

15. What was your union’s reaction to government efforts to implement the PPP policy?
16. Has the union constitution been amended in response to the effects of PPPs or outsourcing? Ask for the amended constitution.
17. What strategy has your union adopted to increase its collective bargaining power following the implementation of PPPs or outsourcing?

Tripartite Consultative Labour Council

18. What factors influenced the establishment of the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council?
19. What issues are considered by this Council? Give examples.
20. How many times did the Council meet in 2014?
21. How has the establishment of this Council affected the power and strategies of your union? Give examples.

CSAWUZ strategies to increase its influence over government policies

22. Has your union adopted any strategies to increase its influence over government policies?
   1. Yes  
   2. No (skip to q 25)
23. If yes to q 22, what are these strategies?
24. How effective have these strategies been in increasing your union’s influence over government policies? Give examples.
25. What do you think should be done to strengthen trade unions in the public service?
26. Finish time of interview: ___________________________
27. Duration of interview: _____________________________

End of Interview  Thank You
APPENDIX V: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CURRENT CSAWUZ PROVINCIAL LEADERS

Background

1. Date of interview: ________________________________
2. Start time of interview: ________________________________
3. Position held in the union: ________________________________
4. Gender of interviewee: ________________________________

Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) before implementation of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) policy

5. What categories of institutions did CSAWUZ draw its membership from within Lusaka district before the days of PPPs or outsourcing?
6. What was the organisational structure of CSAWUZ in Lusaka province before implementation of the PPP policy?

Effects of the PPP policy

7. Mention some of the services that have been delivered on the basis of PPPs or outsourcing in Lusaka district?
8. How has implementation of PPPs or outsourcing affected the collective bargaining process for CSAWUZ members in Lusaka district? Explain the difference between the pre-PPP and the current collective bargaining processes.
9. Has implementation of PPPs changed issues that are presented for collective bargaining? Describe issues that were presented for collective bargaining before the days of PPPs and those being presented now.
10. How has the change in the collective bargaining process and/or bargaining issues affected your union’s bargaining power and strategy in Lusaka district?
11. How has the implementation of PPPs affected membership levels and the organisation of your union in Lusaka district? Give examples and statistics, if any.
12. How has implementation of PPPs affected the relationships between your union and the government, and other partners such as other unions, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), political parties and the like in Lusaka district?

CSAWUZ strategic responses to the effects of the PPP policy

13. What was your union’s reaction to government efforts to implement the PPP policy in Lusaka district?
14. What strategies has the provincial committee adopted to increase union membership in Lusaka district following the implementation of PPPs or outsourcing?
15. Have the new recruitment strategies helped your union to increase its membership in Lusaka district? Provide statistics, if any.
16. What changes, if any, have you made to the union’s organisational structure in Lusaka district as a response to the effects of PPPs or outsourcing?
17. What strategy has your union adopted to increase its collective bargaining power following the implementation of PPPs or outsourcing in Lusaka district?
18. What challenges does the provincial committee face governing a union with a diversified membership?

Tripartite Consultative Labour Council

19. How has the establishment of the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council affected the power and strategies of your union in Lusaka district? Give examples.

CSAWUZ strategies to increase its influence over government policies

20. Has the provincial committee adopted any strategies to increase its influence over government policies in Lusaka district?

1. Yes  2. No (skip to q 23)

21. If yes to q 20, what are these strategies?
22. How effective have these strategies been in increasing your union’s influence over government policies? Give examples.

23. What do you think should be done to strengthen public sector unions in Lusaka district?

24. Finish time of interview: __________________________

25. Duration of interview: ____________________________

End of Interview Thank You
APPENDIX VI: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CURRENT CSAWUZ BRANCH LEADERS AND SHOP STEWARDS

Background
1. Date of interview: ______________________________
2. Start time of interview: ___________________________
3. Category of public institution worked for:
   1. Government ministry office
   2. Public hospital/clinic
   3. Semi-autonomous government institution
4. Name of public institution worked for: _______________
5. Position held in the union: __________________________
6. If branch official, specify the name of the branch: ______
7. Gender of interviewee: _____________________________

Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) before implementation of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) policy
8. Which categories of workers did CSAWUZ draw its membership from at the public institution you work for before the days of PPPs or outsourcing?

Effects of the PPP policy
9. What services have been delivered on the basis of PPPs or outsourcing at the public institution you work for?
10. How has implementation of PPPs or outsourcing affected the terms and conditions of employment at this institution?
11. How has implementation of PPPs or outsourcing affected workers’ rights in general at this institution?
12. How has implementation of PPPs affected the collective bargaining process for CSAWUZ members at this institution? Explain the difference between the pre-PPP and the current collective bargaining processes.
13. Has implementation of PPPs changed issues that are presented for collective bargaining? Describe issues that were presented for collective bargaining before the days of PPPs and those being presented now.
14. How has the implementation of PPPs affected membership levels and the organisation of your union at this institution? Give examples and statistics, if any.

15. How has implementation of PPPs affected the participation of members in union activities and decision-making processes at this institution?

16. How has implementation of PPPs affected the relationship between union leaders and members including the ability of the leaders to direct union activities at this institution?

17. How has implementation of PPPs affected the relationships between your union and management, and other unions at this institution?

**CSAWUZ strategic responses to the effects of the PPP policy**

18. What strategies has your union adopted to increase its membership at the public institution you work for following the implementation of PPPs?

19. Have the new recruitment strategies helped your union to increase its membership at this institution? Provide statistics, if any.

20. What changes, if any, have you made to the union’s governance process at this institution as a response to the effects of PPPs?

21. What strategies has your union adopted to increase its collective bargaining power following the implementation of PPPs at this institution?

**Employer-union partnerships**

22. Is there a forum at your institution through which management and trade unions work in partnership to make policies or strategic plans?

   1. Yes  
   2. No (skip to q 25)

23. If yes to q 22, what is this forum?

24. How has the establishment of this partnership affected the power and strategies of your union at this institution? Give examples.

**CSAWUZ strategies to increase its influence over employers’ policies**

25. Has your union adopted any strategies to increase its influence over management policies or strategic plans at this institution?
1. Yes 2. No (skip to q 28)

26. If yes to q 25, what are these strategies?

27. How effective have these strategies been in increasing your union’s influence over management policies or strategic plans? Give examples.

28. What do you think should be done to strengthen trade unions in public institutions?

29. Finish time of interview: ___________________________

30. Duration of interview: ____________________________

End of Interview Thank You
APPENDIX VII: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MANAGERS OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

Background
1. Date of interview: _______________________________________
2. Start time of interview: ________________________________
3. Category of public institution
   1. Government ministry office
   2. Public hospital/clinic
   3. Semi-autonomous government institution
4. Name of public institution: ______________________________
5. Interviewee’s position in the institution: ___________________
6. Gender of interviewee: _________________________________

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)
7. What services have been delivered on the basis of PPPs or outsourcing at this institution?
8. When did PPPs or outsourcing of these services begin?
9. How does your institution select its private sector partners?
10. What are the terms of the concessions/contracts?
11. What factors influenced the adoption of PPPs at this institution?
12. What services does your institution deliver on its own (i.e. without using PPPs or outsourcing)?
13. Why are these services not outsourced?

Tripartite Consultative Labour Council
14. What factors influenced the establishment of the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council?
15. What issues are considered by this Council? Give examples.

Employer-union partnerships
16. Is there a forum at this institution through which management and trade unions work in partnership to make policies or strategic plans?
1. Yes  
2. No (skip to q 21)

17. If yes to q 16, what is this forum?

18. Give examples of policies or strategic plans that have been made through this forum/partnership.

19. What factors influenced the establishment of this partnership?

20. What challenges does management at this institution face partnering with trade unions in the process of policy-making or strategic planning?

21. What role do you think trade unions should play so as to promote effectiveness in the delivery of services at this institution?

22. Finish time of interview: ____________________________

23. Duration of interview: _____________________________

End of Interview  

Thank You

University of the Western Cape

March 2016
APPENDIX VIII: LETTER TO CSAWUZ GENERAL SECRETARY

The University of Zambia  
School of Humanities and Social Sciences  
Department of Political and Administrative Studies  
P. O. Box 32379  
Lusaka  

5th January, 2015

The General Secretary  
Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia  
P. O. Box 50160  
Lusaka

Dear Sir,

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO INTERVIEW LEADERS OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION OF ZAMBIA

I am hereby requesting for permission to interview leaders of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ). I am a Special Research Fellow in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zambia. The interviews are part of the data collection process for a study towards my PhD in Public Administration at the University of the Western Cape in South Africa.

The research title is: “Implications of Public Sector Reform for Public Sector Unions in Zambia: A Case Study of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia in Lusaka District.” The interviews will focus on how public institutions in Zambia have been reformed, the effects of the reforms on CSAWUZ, and the union’s coping strategies.
In this process, I promise to protect the confidentiality of all the participants and to use the collected information for academic purposes only.

I will be grateful for your favourable consideration of this request.

Yours faithfully,

Mr. Clever Madimutsa
To Whom It May Concern

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO INTERVIEW ONE MANAGEMENT OFFICIAL AT YOUR INSTITUTION

I am hereby requesting for permission to interview one management official at your institution. I am a Research Fellow in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zambia. The interview is part of the data collection process for a study towards my PhD in Public Administration at the University of the Western Cape in South Africa.

The research title is: “Implications of Public Sector Reform for Public Sector Unions in Zambia: A Case Study of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia in Lusaka District.” The interview will focus on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) adopted by your institution to deliver public services, employer-union partnerships, and the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council.

In this process, I promise to protect the confidentiality of all the participants and to use the collected information for academic purposes only.

I will be grateful for your favourable consideration of this request.
Yours faithfully,

Mr. Clever Madimutsa
APPENDIX X: CONSENT FORM

RESEARCH TITLE: IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM FOR PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS IN ZAMBIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION OF ZAMBIA IN LUSAKA DISTRICT

I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted by Clever Madimutsa towards the Doctoral Programme at the School of Government (SOG) at the University of the Western Cape.

This study has been described to me in a language that I understand and I freely and voluntarily agree to participate. My questions about the study have been answered.

I understand that my identity will not be disclosed and was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time by advising the student researcher.

With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree to participate in this study.

Participant Name : _______________________________
Participant ID Number : _______________________________
Participant Signature : _______________________________
Date : _______________________________
Place : _______________________________

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