TECHNO-BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN A NEO-PATRIMONIAL SOCIETY: ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN NIGERIA (1999-2014)

By:

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DECEMBER, 2015
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis entitled *Techno-Bureaucratic Governance in a Neo-Patrimonial Society: One-Party Dominance and the Developmental State in Nigeria (1999-2014)*, which I completed in December, 2015 is my original research work. Materials from published and unpublished authors, which are quoted in this thesis are duly referenced and credited to the authors.
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ABSTRACT

Most African states today are facing the serious challenge of socio-economic development. This is a problem not generated by the paucity of material and natural resources, but rather by challenges arising from mismanagement of these resources. Nigeria is in fact, a good example of a country in Africa facing socio-economic development challenges not as a result of lack of resources, but rather the mismanagement of abundant resources at its disposal. This mismanagement is associated with the culture of prebendal, clientelist and neo-patrimonial politics which have made it extremely difficult for technocrats and bureaucrats to contribute adequately to the development of the country.

In fact, as will be demonstrated in this thesis, technocrats in Nigeria are not allowed to occupy sensitive economic development positions for a sustained period of time and are never the driving forces in the formulation of socio-economic development policies and initiatives. In this country bureaucrats and technocrats have not been a stable force for development- given the constant changes of these groups by the political leadership and the splitting of sensitive ministerial portfolios for political reasons. Instead, political offices are captured and used for the benefits of office holders and those of their associated factions, class and ethnic groups. This negatively affects the insulation of appointed technocrats and bureaucrats from vested political interests. Therefore, instead of appointing or employing technocrats and seasoned bureaucrats to occupy relevant positions, appointments and employments are done in order for people to share from what is commonly referred to as ‘national cake’ in the parlance of Nigerian politics.
Central to the argument of this thesis is that one-party dominance and authoritarianism does not necessarily undermines techno-bureaucratic governance, as the cases of countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore in Asia as well as Botswana and South Africa in Africa suggest, but when such system is associated with politics of prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism techno-bureaucratic governance becomes difficult and the achievement of state’s led development becomes more daunting. This work therefore investigates why attempts at promoting prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism under Nigeria’s one-party dominant system undermines techno-bureaucratic governance. It also unravels how these have impacted negatively on socio-economic development of the country from 1999 to 2014. This study will contribute to the understanding of how the insulation of technocrats and bureaucrats from vested political interests can contribute to the development of the underdeveloped countries, using the developmental state argument as a basis of analysis.

**Keywords:** One-Party Dominance, Technocracy, Bureaucracy, Developmental State, Embeddedness, Autonomy, Insulation and Institutions
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<tr>
<td>ACN</td>
<td>Action Congress of Nigeria</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ANPP</td>
<td>All Nigeria Peoples’ Party</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>African Petroleum</td>
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<td>APGA</td>
<td>All Progressives Grand Alliance</td>
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<td>BPE</td>
<td>Bureau for Public Enterprises</td>
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<td>CBN</td>
<td>Central Bank of Nigeria</td>
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<td>CEA</td>
<td>Council of Economic Advisers</td>
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<td>CEPD</td>
<td>Council for Economic Planning and Development</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>DACs</td>
<td>Departmental Advisory Committees</td>
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<td>DDS</td>
<td>Democratic Developmental State</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>EDB</td>
<td>Economic Development Board</td>
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<td>EFW</td>
<td>Economic Freedom in the World</td>
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<td>EPB</td>
<td>Economic Planning Board</td>
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<td>FCTA</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory Administration</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
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<td>IDB</td>
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<td>LP</td>
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<td>MDAs</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFDP</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Development Planning</td>
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<td>MITI</td>
<td>Ministry of International Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>NEEDS</td>
<td>National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy</td>
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<td>NIIA</td>
<td>Nigerian Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>Northern Peoples’ Congress</td>
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<td>NPN</td>
<td>National Party of Nigeria</td>
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<td>PDP</td>
<td>Peoples’ Democratic Party</td>
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<td>QDA</td>
<td>Qualitative Data Analysis</td>
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<td>UWC</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

1.1. Introduction and Background to the Study

Most continents of the world are currently confronted with the twin challenges of democratization and socio-economic development; and Africa is no exception. However, Africa’s current developmental situation is paradoxical; because Africa is one of the richest continents in the world in terms of natural resources. There is therefore a dialectical relationship between natural resources abundance in Africa and socio-economic development. Nigeria is a good example of one of the resource-rich but poor countries in Africa. It is instructive to point out the fact that Nigeria’s case is alarming because the country which was at par in socio-economic development with Malaysia and Indonesia in 1960 was one of the world’s fifteen poorest countries in 1995 (Osaghae, 1998, quoting World Bank Statistics).

At present, Nigeria has a GDP per capita of $826, while a country like Botswana, one of the poorest countries in Africa at its independence has a GDP per capita of $7,203. In fact Nigeria has only experienced nominal socio-economic development plans and visions which have never engendered needed socio-economic development. For instance, apart from the low GDP per capita stated above, the 2010 democracy index for Nigeria was 3.47, out of the possible 10.0. More so, in the area of functional government Nigeria scored 3.21 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006-2010). Thus, despite the possession of enormous potential for development the country has been unable to achieve political, social and economic development and has not shown signs of achieving these in the nearest feature.
Associated with the challenges of development in Nigeria is the manner in which one-party dominates the countries multi-party political system. With the restoration of electoral democracy in Nigeria in 1999 the country initially has about 63 political parties, but the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has dominated both the executive and legislative arms of government at both the federal and state levels, from 1999 to 2014. For more than a decade, the PDP has controlled more than two-third of the national assembly, produced more than two thirds of state governors and has produced the President of the country after four consecutive elections.

Interestingly, the PDP is an off-shoot of the conservative Northern People’s Congress (NPC) that ruled Nigeria during the country’s First Republic (1960-1966) and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) that dominated the country’s Second Republic (1979-1983). Opposition parties in the country are fragmented and therefore make little political impact. Opposition parties such as the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) and the Labour Party (LP), were only able to win few National Assembly seats and few numbers of Governorship positions in past elections in the country.

Thus, in Nigeria opposition parties exist, run campaign, field candidates, but they do not win elections at the centre to take-over from the ruling party. This is what scholars like Sartori (1976), Pempel (1990), Bogaards (2004) and de Jager (2013) have termed one-party hegemony or a dominant party system. In such systems opposition parties participate in successive elections, but have little or no chance of winning (Leftwich, 1993).
It is important to point out that, according to institutional theory, this one-party dominance has some reasonable level of negative influence on the emergence and autonomy of technocracy and bureaucracy which in turn affect the socio-economic development of Nigeria. According to the ‘institutional’ development theory, development in the Third World should be understood as a process in which states have to play a strategic role in planning and sustaining economic development. This can be achieved by the developmental state with a powerful, efficient and embedded autonomous technocracy and bureaucracy, which are sufficiently insulated from vested political interests (Leftwich, 1994).

These efficient and autonomous technocrats and bureaucrats formulate policies that enhance development without unnecessary influence from vested political and economic interests. However in Nigeria, as preliminary evidences suggest, attempt at promoting development similar to the experience of the Asian Tigers, has not been enhanced by semi-authoritarian one-party dominant rule. Instead, this semi-authoritarian one-party dominance has unnecessarily promoted the politics of clientelism, prebendalism and neo-patrimonialism which has impacted on techno-bureaucratic governance in the country.

**1.2 Statement of the Problem**

In the literature, a developmental state is the state in which development is associated with state intervention in the process of development to a significant degree. One of the unique features of such a state is the existence of pilot agency or developmental oriented ministries that serve as the driving force for socio-economic development. Thus, in a developmental
state, developmental policies are formulated by a small group of qualified elites in the pilot agency or ministries that are devoted to the task of development planning. For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan serves as an institution supervising the enforcement of industrial rationalization and industrial structure policy. With such a strong power as Chalmers Johnson underscores, the MITI was “the greatest concentration of brainpower in Japan” (1982:28).

More so, as argued by Wade (1990) Taiwanese institutions like the Council on Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) and the Industrial Development Bureau (IDB), acted like Japan’s MITI, in which technocrats, planners, engineers and technicians from top universities in Taiwan serve in these institutions and are the driving force in the process of the formulation and implementation of developmental policies. Similarly, Korea’s Economic Planning Board (EPB) which is mostly dominated by technocrats controls most of the country’s financial assets. (Minns, 2001). In Singapore the Economic Development Board coordinates foreign capital for the country’s economic growth. The Board is made up of experts from different disciplines (Taylor, 2009).

In China the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was a powerful “pilot agency” that propelled China’s economic development. Botswana, Africa’s most celebrated developmental state has the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) as its brain trust for socio-economic development. This MFDP which is the driving force behind Botswana’s development is most often than not headed and dominated by seasoned
technocrats and bureaucrats who occupied that position for considerable number of years (Taylor, 2003; 2009).

In the Nigerian situation as preliminary investigation suggests, there is no entrenched pilot agency that serves as the driving force for the formulation and implementation of developmental policies. More so, few technocrats who are appointed to sensitive ministries that are relevant for development are not adequately allowed to occupy such positions for a sustained period of time and are never the driving forces in the formulation of socio-economic development policies and initiatives. Thus, in this country technocrats have not been a stable force in the process of development given the constant changes of these groups by the political leadership and the splitting of sensitive ministerial portfolios for political reasons. Let me illustrate this with examples.

Dr Okonjo-Iweala, an economist, who was one of the Managing Directors of the World Bank for several years and who was appointed the Finance Minister by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo was unceremoniously removed from the ministry while away in London negotiating the final phase of debt cancellation for Nigeria (Akinyoade, 2009). It is instructive to note that Dr Okonjo-Iweala played a significant role as Finance Minister in the $18 billion debt relief Nigeria got from the Paris Club of Public Creditors in October 2005 (Haruna, 2011). Dr Shamsudeen Usman a seasoned economist who happens to be the longest serving minister and who was responsible for the development of Nigeria’s long-term development strategy (Nigeria Vision 2020) and the first Nigerian Minister to publicly declare his assets before assuming office as a public officer, an act considered a sign of accountability and transparency in a country noted for its high levels of corruption, was
removed as the Minister of National Planning because he was not relating well with his then state Governor, Rabiu Kwankwaso (Newsdiaryonline, September 12, 2013).

Furthermore, the Ministry of Education which is critical for producing the country’s future leaders also faces similar Ministers’ turnover. Before the restoration of electoral democracy in the country in 1999 Ministers of Education have spent four years and above in the history of the country. For example, Aja Nwachukwu spent eight years in the Ministry (1958 to 1965) He was followed by Chief A.Y Eke (1970 to 1975) (5 years) and Prof Jubril Aminu, four years (1988 to 1992) (Jason, 2011). Interestingly, these longest serving ministers in the ministry served under authoritarian military regimes. Ironically, from 1999 to 2014 no Minister in the Ministry spent up to four years. Mrs Obiageli Ezekwesili spent just nine months as a Minister in the Ministry (Jason, 2011).

It is important to note that none of the Ministers that started with President Obasanjo survived his two terms of eight years in office, while the President himself doubled as the Petroleum Minister for seven years. In fact, no technocrat appointed by Obasanjo served consistently for a period of four years. The same thing was obtainable under the former President of the country, Goodluck Jonathan. Appointment of most Ministers in the country during this period was suggestive of the fact that such appointments were done to compensate politicians who had worked for the ruling party’s political success and for clientelist purpose.

This has at least two critical implications. One is the near absence of institutional memory and policy reversal and uncertainty of implementation. This is premised on the fact that new Ministers who are appointed into various Ministries may either start all over with new
“policies” or “blueprints”, or they may reduce existing programmes in their Ministry to their standard or understanding, install new contractors and cronies of their own and in some cases abandon existing programmes completely (Jason, 2012).

Two, critical to every developmental state is an autonomous and efficient bureaucracy. A bureaucracy that prioritizes meritocratic recruitment, provides promotion incentives, shows rationality and guarantees high levels of prestige and legitimacy to bureaucratic officials (Johnson 1982: 20; 1995; Evans 1997; Evans/Rauch 1999). Moreover, such bureaucracy in developmental states exhibits uncommon levels of autonomy by being effectively insulated from vested political interests of the ruling class (Pempel 1999). However, unlike other developmental states where bureaucracy remains autonomous and becomes the driving force for development; in Nigeria bureaucrats have not developed any consistently clear set of ideas that are dominant or have endured for any considerable period (Bangura, 1994).

In fact, in Nigeria it has become a common practice for friends, family members and political associates to be compensated with civil service appointment (Eme & Ugwu, 2011). For instance in Ebonyi State, South-East Nigeria in 2008, there were recruitment and selection exercise in the state where over eight hundred (800) people were recruited to the civil service. The slots for the recruitment into these positions were allotted to Commissioners, highly placed administrators and other influential politicians who sent in the lists of their preferred candidates (Onwe et al, 2015).

In the literature, the East Asian tigers and Botswana the celebrated developmental state in Africa have experienced socio-economic development under authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. In these countries development-orientated political leadership bound
together by a powerful economic and political ideology focused on development (Amsden 1989; Beeson 2003; Woo-Cummings 1999; Wade 1990). These authoritarian regimes with this type of political leaders has given the bureaucracy sufficient scope to take initiatives and act authoritatively in pursuit of the desired development goals (Weiss 2003: 24; Wade 1990). During the period of this study, Nigerian experiences similar regime type, with the domination of its political system by a single political party.

In Nigeria for some sixteen years (1999-2015), the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) successfully entrenched a semi-authoritarian rule, by winning four consecutive general elections without any reasonable challenge by opposition political parties. However, for those sixteen years unlike the East-Asian countries which experienced development under authoritarian regime; Nigeria had to face challenges of development. As preliminary investigations suggest, Nigeria under its one-party dominant regime was devoid of political leadership bound together with an ideological commitment to the provision of common good. Various lines of arguments have been advanced for the existence of such political elite’s structure in the country, but prominent among the debate is the enduring legacy of colonialism (Ekeh, 1976; Joseph, 1987, Osaghae, 2003; Adebanwi & Obadare, 2013). To what extent could this line of argument be justified?

Therefore, from the foregoing analysis, the substantive research question which this study attempts to answer is: to what extent has the lack of techno-bureaucratic governance contributed to Nigeria’s socio-economic development challenges under a one-party dominant system, from 1999 to 2014? Answers to this question shall assist other African states facing similar challenges of socio-economic development. The related sub-research questions are:
• To what extent are technocrats and higher bureaucrat parts of policy making in Nigeria?
• Why is the sustenance of techno-bureaucratic governance difficult in Nigeria’s one-party dominant system?
• To what extent has the lack of techno-bureaucratic governance contributed to the challenges of socio-economic development of Nigeria?
• What are the prospects for the future emergence of techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria?
• What are the key lessons that other countries in the global south can learn from the challenges of techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria?

Answers to the above questions may constitute a basis to generalize on how one-party dominant system or authoritarian rule can undermine the emergence and sustenance of techno-bureaucratic governance for economic development in Africa.

1.3 Purpose and Objectives

The major objective of the study is to demonstrate how the absence of techno-bureaucratic governance caused by the prevalence of neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism affects socio-economic development in Nigeria, from 1999 to 2014. Apart from this main objective, there are subsidiary issues and questions that are of interest to this study:

➢ The nature of technocratic-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria.
➢ The level of insulation of technocrats and bureaucrats from political elites’ interests in Nigeria.
➢ The level of autonomy of technocracy and bureaucracy in Nigeria.
The lessons to be learnt by other Third World countries from Nigeria’s socio-economic development problems occasioned by its brand of one-party dominant system.

1.4 Research Questions

The central hypothesis of the study is that the absence of techno-bureaucratic governance hinders Nigeria’s socio-economic development. Subsidiary hypotheses that will be tested and which constitute the building blocks of the study are:

1) The lack of a broad-based and stable political coalition/alliance affects the emergence and sustenance of techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria.
2) Techno-bureaucratic governance is impossible in Nigeria because of the presence of politics of prebendalism and clientelism.
3) The level of insulation of technocrats and bureaucrats from business and political interests determines development outcomes.
4) One-party dominance or authoritarian rule enhances socio-economic growth when technocrats enjoy sustained tenure as political appointees.
5) One-party dominance facilitates socio-economic development when the bureaucracy is autonomous.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The motivation for this study was the desire to urgently address the development challenges of Sub-Sahara African countries, especially under the emerging one-party dominant systems.
This is important because some African countries at the moment are gravitating towards one-party dominance without any meaningful development. Nigeria is of interest to the researcher because it attained independence as a relatively rich country, but now witnesses a painful continuous socio-economic decline within the context of low involvement of technocrats and bureaucrats in governance.

Fundamentally while some one-party dominant states could be regarded as operating a ‘democratic one-party dominant system’, with emphasis on technocratic governance, Nigeria is a classic example of ‘authoritarian one-party dominant’ state, where prebendal and clientelist politics flourishes (Joseph, 1987; Ogundiya, 2009; Omobowale, 2011; Bariledum, 2013; Suberu 2013; Ayobolu, 2014) and where techno-bureaucratic governance becomes more difficult to practice (Okotoni, 2001; Idakwoji, 2011; Thovoethin, 2014, Ibitan, 2015). The thesis intends to contribute to the study on how the failure of techno-bureaucratic governance caused by lack of insulation from political and business interests, especially under a one-party dominant system, can undermine socio-economic development, especially under a one-party dominant system. To achieve this, the thesis investigates an African resource rich but poor country under one party dominant rule.

Nigeria is a clear representation of other African one-party dominant states, facing challenges of techno-bureaucratic governance as a result of prebendalism and clientelism (Azeez, 2009; Kura, 2009; Oseni, 2012; Nwanegbo, 2014; Adeoye, 2015). The study will serve as reference point for other one-party dominant states in Africa from the socio-economic development crisis of Nigeria, especially as it relates to the non-insulation of technocrats and bureaucrats in the economic process. The study seeks to contribute to the promotion of economic
development under Africa’s party systems. The issues which the study addresses are useful for other developing countries. This position is premised on the fact that most developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, are faced with challenges of development, under the type of systems of government that they operate (Brooks, 2004; Chege, 2007; Salih & Nordlund 2007; Udugu, 2010; Riedl, 2014). More so, studies on one-party dominant system have often focused on industrialized countries in the world without giving adequate attention to the one-party systems in developing countries like those of Africa.

This study is also important because it is the first major study of the political economy of one-party dominance in West African Countries. Past studies on political economy of one-party dominant systems have focused on industrialized countries as well as on Southern African countries. The few studies on one-party dominant systems in Africa have limited their focus on Southern African countries without much attention given to the emergence of the system in West Africa. The study also pioneers a focus on the economic effects of one-party dominance on African countries, taking a look at a resource rich but poor country like Nigeria. The study answers the question of why or how the absence of technocratic governance can undermine socio-economic development in Africa. These underline the importance of the study.

1.6 Research Methods

This study investigates the relationship between one-party dominance, techno-bureaucratic governance and socio-economic development of Nigeria, within the context of prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism. It tries to investigate how neo-patrimonialism under
Nigeria’s one-party dominant system hinders techno-bureaucratic governance and negates socio-economic development. In order to achieve this objective and other subsidiary objectives, two research methods were utilised to collect, interpret and analyse data. The study relies on the use of secondary printed materials, primary sources in terms of non-participant observation as well as written and oral interviews.

The work intends to use the qualitative research method because the problem under investigation is primarily exploratory in nature. According to Jorgensen (1989) qualitative research is a breaking up, separating, or disassembling of research materials into pieces, parts, elements, or units. With facts broken down into manageable pieces, the researcher sorts and shifts them, searching for types, classes, sequences, processes, patterns or wholes. Therefore the research is an in-depth study of some selected groups of people upon which generalisation were made. Thus, the result of this research as obtainable in other qualitative research is largely descriptive rather than predictive. Therefore, the sample size is small, and respondents were selected to fulfil a given quota.

More so, secondary materials were used to check and crosscheck information acquired through the primary source. The most obvious procedure for the assessment of information is the classical one of the study of documents in addition to interviewing of stakeholders in Nigeria. Stakeholders that were interviewed in Nigeria include technocrats who served past military regimes, technocrats and bureaucrats who served under the Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration and those who served under the Goodluck Jonathan’s administration, members of the national assembly, government officials, leaders of political parties and civil servants.
In addition members of the civil society and media practitioners were also interviewed. These enabled the researcher to get a more objective opinion on the role of technocrats and bureaucrats, as well as lack of their insulation on the socio-economic development of Nigeria. Attention was paid to getting data through the primary source in Nigeria due to the fact that one-party Dominant system is relatively young in the country. That is, through the uses of oral and written interviews and personal observation carried out by the researcher.

Since the major objective of the study is to investigate how the absence of technocratic-bureaucratic governance has affected socio-economic development in Nigeria, from 1999 to 2014, it leads to the question: how can socio-economic development be measured? In order to measure economic growth, the study uses average annual GDP per capita income of Nigeria in order to reduce the risk of getting results that are driven by idiosyncratic figures. Data from the World Bank’s Development Indicators were used to determine economic development of the country. Human Development Index of the World Bank was also used to determine the socio-economic development of the country.

The research question relating to relationship between broad-based political coalition and the emergence of technocratic-bureaucratic governance was tested with an analysis of the mode of appointment and promotion in the bureaucracy as well as mode of appointment of technocrats into sensitive ministries in Nigeria during the period of the study. The research question relating to the effect of prebendalism and clientelism on the emergence and sustenance of techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria was tested with critical analysis of variables such as ethnicity and class on political appointments.
Investigating the research question on the relationship between sustained technocratic governance and development was done through analysis of the Economic Freedom in the World (EFW) ratings of government enterprises and investments, SOEs as percentage of GDP of Nigeria for ten years and models with government investment in fixed capital formations in the country. These secondary materials for investigating the research questions were complemented with structured and semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders and groups in Nigeria. Basically, all the research questions formulated in the study were assessed with the combination of secondary materials and primary sources in the form of interviews.

Overall the study was accomplished mainly through a qualitative, critical analysis rather than quantitative analysis. A qualitative study is an ‘inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem based on building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, and conducted in a natural setting’ (Cresswell, 1994). As pointed out earlier, the work used several data collection types for qualitative research, such as observations, interviews, and audio-visual materials. Thus, the thesis adopts a multi-method strategy. According to Denzin (1978), a multi-method strategy helps comparison of data sourced from different sources which strengthens the validity of research findings.

Moreover, I am interested in using the qualitative analysis due to the nature of the research problem. Therefore, it involves basically macro-political analysis. It employs macro-political analysis because it is an institution centred study. That is, political system, technocracy, bureaucracy and policies choices. It is however important to point out that some degree of
micro-economic analysis, especially as it relates to per capita income, are applied in certain aspects of the work.

1.7 Research Ethics

This study adheres strictly to ethical conducts in social science research in the conduct of interviews and administration of questionnaires. Before proceeding on the research participants were informed of the aims of the research and the voluntary nature of the process. Thus, participants were informed that they can voluntarily withdraw from the interview process if they so desire. More so, the researcher protected the anonymity and confidentiality of the participants and no name was used either for the interviews or on questionnaires. The address of interviews or respondents was not disclosed as means of reference by the researcher. Should there be a compelling need to utilise the name and or address of the interviewee or respondent the researcher would do so with the permission of the participant(s) concerned. All information gathered from the course of the field work was kept confidentiality as required. Participants were informed of the recording of interview through audio recording and were informed when notes were taken.

In some instances the interviewee(s) were given the option of choosing their preferred method of recording information provided by them. All research participants were informed of their right to consult the findings that have been gathered by the researcher once the final product is ready for submission. All persons who have contributed to the research were acknowledged. All participants completed and signed informed consent forms that were made available by the researcher (see attached appendix II for the informed consent form). Lastly,
copies of this thesis after approval were submitted to Political Studies Department and made available at University of the Western (UWC) library.

1.8 Structure of the Thesis

Below is an outline of proposed chapters of the thesis.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

This chapter focuses on the review of relevant literature on the conceptualisation of one-party-domiance, prebendalism, clientelism and socio-economic and political development. The chapter also reviews literature on; one-party dominance and socio-economic development, democracy and development, and one-party dominance and development in Nigeria.

Chapter Three: Theoretical Framing

This chapter explores the relevance of the institutional framework with reference to the developmental state model and explains the roles of technocrats and bureaucrats in a developmental state. The institutional framework is used under the chapter to explain the role of technocrats and bureaucrats in the socio-economic development of Nigeria, with a focus on how prebendalism and clientelism undermine socio-economic development.

Chapter Four: Research Methods

This chapter is a critical aspect of the research. It begins with the identification of the principal methods of data collection for the research. The rationale for the research methodology is also provided. While providing the rationale for the methodology chosen, the
study tries to examine the limitations of these techniques. It lays bare the mode and level of analysis to be employed for the work.

Chapter Five: Techno-bureaucratic Governance and Developmental State: The Case of Nigeria (1999-2014)

This chapter assesses the nature and character of techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria in order to establish whether technocracy and bureaucracy in this country represent structures that can enhance development. Thereafter, the chapter takes a look at the level at which the nature and character of techno-bureaucratic governance have contributed to the underdevelopment of the country during the course of this study.


The chapter examines how the nature and character of one-party dominance has affected the level of techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria and how this has impacted on the socio-economic development of the country. It analyses the effects of the fifteen years of uninterrupted rule by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) on the level of insulation of technocrats and bureaucrats from political and business interests and how this has affected the socio-economic development of the country. Thus the chapter examines the linkage among one-party dominance, techno-bureaucratic governance and socio-economic development in Nigeria. While relying on secondary sources of information, analysis in this chapter is also based on the researcher’s fieldwork.
Chapter Seven: Summary and Implications

This chapter provides a summary of our findings and concluding evaluation, assessing how the dissertation has contributed to the understanding of the effects of one-party dominance on techno-bureaucratic governance and socio-economic development of Nigeria. While looking at the implications emanating from the study for socio-economic development in Africa, the chapter concludes with an agenda for further research.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall attempt a review of extant literature on one-party dominance conceptualization, the effects of prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism on socio-political and economic development, as well as a review on the contestation among scholar on the causal linkages between democracy and economic development. The review of literature on the conceptualization of one-party dominance centres on the views of scholars ranging from electoral success and government formation, to the ideological and social context of one-party dominance.

As we shall see in this chapter the criteria used by scholars in explaining one-party dominance include: electoral success and formation of government; nature of opposition against such party; the geographical setting of the dominance; and the time-span over which the dominant party acquires a certain majority of votes or seats at a geographical setting. It is in the direction of explaining one-party dominance using these characteristics that pushes the analysis to the dichotomization between one-party dominance and one-party dominant system. This distinction between one-party dominance and one-party dominance system extends the debate to a consideration of one-party dominance to include the social and ideological requirements of the concept.

The review of literature under the effects of prebendalism, clientelism, and neo-patrimonialism on socio-political and economic development suggests that there are elements of these three variables in every political system, but there nature and form determine their effects on socio-political and economic development. On the review of literature on the
relationship between democracy and development, the dominant body of literature suggests that there is no linear relationship between democracy and development. To answer the question about whether it is democracy or authoritarianism that generates development, the dominant narrative suggests that structural and institutional factors are more important in the process of development than regime types. Thus, in the African context though democracy is desirable it is not the total solution to the socio-economic challenges on the continent. Development in Africa therefore requires democracy which accommodates Africa’s structural and institutional peculiarities. A turn to the review of literature under each subsection of this chapter gives us a clear understanding of these various arguments.

2.2 One-Party Dominance

One-party dominance has attracted the attention of scholars for more than half a century, and yet, as typical of most social concepts there has never been a consensus of opinion on the meaning of the concept. In their attempts at conceptualising and defining one-party dominance these scholars have taken into account different criteria to achieve this: electoral success and government formation; ideology of the dominant party; and the social or economic level of dominance. Under this section, I shall critically examine the position of different scholars as they present their understanding of the term one-party dominance situating their argument under some of the above mentioned criteria. In doing this, we would as well establish a clear dichotomy between one-party dominance and a one-party dominant system.

Furthermore, it is instructive to state that over the years scholars who have attempted conceptualizing and defining one-party dominance using electoral success and government
formation have used four different characteristics to explain the electoral success of a single political party. These four distinguishing characteristics include: the number of votes or seats won by the dominant party; the nature of opposition against such party; the geographical setting of the dominance; and the time-span over which the dominant party acquires a certain majority of votes or seats at a geographical setting. By suggesting the number of votes as a criterion for one-party dominance under a two-party system, Maurice Pinard (1971), recommends that a dominant party must have attracted 75% to 80% of votes at a particular election, while the main opposition may not attract an average more than 33%.

While Pinard suggests these percentages, Sartori’s (1976) in his predominance thesis argues that the predominant party should be able to secure 50-percent mark/votes under the assumption that constitutional government generally operates on the basis of the absolute majority principle. For Donald Smiley (1958), a dominant political party needs overwhelming strength. Smiley, however, fails to suggest the percentage of votes or seats a party needs to secure before being regarded as having an overwhelming strength. Duverger simply suggests that it is a party that is larger than the other (Duverger, 1964:308). Pempel (1990) in a similar direction like Donald Smiley and Duverger recommends that one-party dominancy is determined when one party wins a larger number of seats over those of its opponents.

In fact, Kenneth Greene argues against specifying percentage number of votes or seats to determine a party dominancy by positing that “rather than adopt a cut off associated with a particular percentage of seats or votes that inevitably causes difficulties” (Greene, 2009:809-810), dominance should be viewed by the ability of a particular party to determine social choice through policy and legislation. Thus:
In presidentialist systems, this means that the incumbent controls the executive, the absolute majority of legislative seats and in federal systems, the majority of state houses. In parliamentary and mixed systems, it means holding the premiership, at least a plurality of legislative seats, and it must be impossible to form a government without the putative dominant party (Greene, 2009:810).

In using the nature of opposition against a dominant party as one of the defining characteristic of an electoral dominancy Maurice Pinard asserts that under such system “the party in power cannot be seriously challenged by the opposition party and the latter is too weak to replace the former” (Pinard, 1971:22). Sartori also subscribes to the electoral and formal governance argument within the context of the nature of opposition against the dominant party by suggesting that “whenever we find, in a polity, a party that outdistances all others, this party is dominant in that it is significantly stronger than the others” (Sartori, 1976:193). Within this context he distinguishes between two types of dominant party system: the “pre-dominant party system” and the “hegemonic party system”.

For him “predominance”- which is less strong semantically, than “domination”- is the most fitting term for explaining one-party dominance. Thus, a predominant party system is that in which there is more than one political party in which rotation does not occur. It simply happens that the same party manages to win over time an absolute majority of seats (not necessarily of votes) in parliament.

This nature of opposition to the ruling party is what Alan Arian succinctly points to when he asserts that “opposition parties are reduced to a role of carping and sniping, rather than, that of developing immediate alternatives” (Arian and Barnes, 1974:599). On the time-span over
which a party acquire a certain majority of votes or seats to be labelled an electoral dominant party, Donald Smiley opines that such “party retains such overwhelming strength over a period of at least a decade that the major political issues of the community are fought out and the major conflicts of interests resolved within the party” (Smiley, 1958:320). For the duration of a single party’s predominance Sartori (1976) suggests four consecutive legislatures at least. In Graham White’s (1973) opinion the time span of the domination should be between 10 years to 25 years. For Bogaards (2004), a dominant party (system) occurs when one-party has won a parliamentary majority plus the presidential elections, where present, in three consecutive multi-party elections (1974:175).

While Smiley, Sartori, White and Bogaards suggest the number of years that a single party should win a certain percentage number of seats or votes to be regarded as a dominant party within the electoral dominance argument, other scholars within the same electoral dominance school fail to be categorical about the number of years the dominance should last. Such scholars include Heywood (1997) who argues that a dominant party system is the one in which a number of parties compete for power in regular and popular elections, but that these elections are dominated by a single major party that consequently enjoys prolonged periods of power. Heywood however does not suggest the number of years that the prolonged period of power should be. He only cited the examples of Liberal Democratic Party, of Japan which ruled for 38 years and the Congress Party in India which enjoyed unbroken spell of 30 years in power to buttress his position.

Shalev shares the views of Heywood by not being specific about the number of years that the electoral dominance should last, by asserting that “simplistically defined, dominant parties are those that head governments over a long periods (on the scale of the number of decades
rather than of cabinets) continuously or with only ephemeral interruptions” (Shalev, 1990:83). Gary Cox in his work Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral System”, also attempts defining one-party dominance without indicating how long a single party should retain overwhelming majority of votes or seats, when he points out that “dominant parties are those that are interruptedly in government, either alone or as the senior partners of a coalition, for a long period of time” (Cox, 1997:238).

Thus just like Heywood and Shalev, Cox fails to tell us the number of years that a political party must be electorally dominant to be regarded as a dominant party. Therefore, their assertion that a dominant party must be electorally dominant for a long period of time remains vague and at the same time makes the categorization of African political system into a dominant state difficult if not impossible. Going by their long years of dominance argument it is only Botswana that can fit-in into their assumption in Africa. Thus, going by this position it would be impossible to talk of one-party dominance in Africa in view of the fact that electoral democracy surfaced in most countries in the continent within the last 20 years.

An interesting aspect of the attempt at conceptualising one-party dominance within the electoral victory context is the underlining of the importance of the geographical setting of the domination into the analysis by few scholars. One of such scholars is Maurice Pinard (1971) who in his further clarification on one-party dominance argues that the fact that one-party dominance is an attribute of both the entire political system and its constituent parts— that is, we may speak of one-party dominance in province or a nation and also one-party dominance in a riding or group of ridings within the nation or province. More so, one-party dominance is clearly a variable— that is, we can talk of a party in one province as being more
dominant than another party in a second province; similarly ridings within each province may
be ordered according to the degree to which they are one-party dominant.

Graham White (1973) also suggests geographical setting to one-party dominance by asserting
that particular constituencies or regions may, for one reason or another, be more dominated
by a party than in the system as a whole. Pinard and White’s explanation of the fact that a
certain political party might dominate the political system at the central level of governance
while another political party dominates at the regional or other unit of government, remains a
logical argument. This account shows that while talking about dominant party it should not
be limited to an analysis of politics at the central level, especially under a presidential system
of government. For example in Nigeria the party dominating governance at the central level
is different from the political party which has consistently dominated governance at the
South-Western zone of the country.

Moving beyond the usage of electoral victory formal governance account of one-party
dominance system is the addition of ideological and social or economic criteria for the
explanation of one-party dominance system by some scholars. Duverger joins the early
debate on the meaning of one-party dominance by putting forward the view that one-party
dominance occurs when a party is larger than the others and outdistances its rivals over a
certain period of time. This party must consistently win a majority of votes in an epoch. In his
words:

(a dominant party is) first of all a party larger than any other, which heads the list
and clearly outdistances its rivals over a certain period of time ... (In a two party
system), a party is dominant when it holds the majority over a long period of
political development ... every party that is larger than all others over a certain period of is not necessarily dominant in character: sociological factors are at work as well as the material factor. A party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrines, ideas, methods, its style, so to speak, coincide with those of the epoch... Domination is a question of influence rather than of strength: it is also linked with belief. A dominant party is that which public opinion believes to be dominant ... Even the enemies of the dominant party, even citizens which to give it their vote, acknowledges its superior status and its influence; they deplore it but admit it (Duverger, 1959:308-309).

Duverger uses examples of the French radicals, the Scandinavian Social Democratic Parties and the India Congress party to support his position. According to him these parties have dominated the politics of their countries for a generation. He further asserts that it may well be virtually necessary for a party to preside over the establishment of the polity in order for it to achieve the level of identification with the epoch enjoyed by these parties. Thus, many dominant parties, including but not limited to these two examples have been closely identified with the creation of the constitutional and political order that they came to dominate, and it is unlikely that this association has been due to chance. Butler shares Duverger’s opinion on one-party dominance in this respect when he underlines the fact that “a dominant party is identified with an epoch; its ideas dominating public debate and its dominant position acknowledged by citizens and elites alike” (Butler, 2009:159)

Pempel, who has written one of the contemporary classic on one-party dominance, suggests the combination of conditions in which a political party becomes dominant. He asserts that one-party dominance exists in a political system when; a party is electorally dominant, that is,
it must win a larger number of seats than its opponent; that party must enjoy a dominant bargaining position which enables it to bargain effectively with other smaller parties in the formation of government; more so, the party must also be dominant chronologically which will make it to be at the core of a nation’s government over a substantial period of time; and a dominant party must be dominant governmentally (Pempel, 1990). Anthony Butler takes a similar line of argument with Pempel by asserting that one-party dominance refers “to the protracted electoral and ideological dominance of a single party in a representative democracy.

Butler furthers his argument by positing that one-party dominance requires more than, a series of electoral success. According to him One-party dominance implies institutions that translate electoral success into political power; the capacity to attract support from substantial electorates over an extended period; the presence of a historical project; and the ability to dominate policy agenda of the country” (Butler, 2009:159). Giliomee and Simkins (1999) in their edited work “the Awkward Embrace: One Party Domination and Democracy” as well agree with Pempel and Butler on the notion of one-party dominance, but they however emphasize the importance of a dominant party success in formulating a successful historic project- “a series of interrelated and mutually supportive public policies that give particular shape to the national political agenda”. According to them under this condition, a “vicious cycle of dominance” (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999: XVI) develops.

Thus, in the view of Giliomee and Simkins a party’s political supremacy and its successful execution of the historic project generate even more dominance. Matlosa and Karume (2004) advance similar contextual explanation of one-party dominance system like Giliomee and Simkins by identifying key features of a one-party dominant system to include:
Continuous electoral victories of a dominant party over time by huge margins and, as such, reducing oppositional contest to second fiddle; political hegemony of the ruling party over state institutions including control of the largest share of the legislature and local government authorities; and sole determination and direction of development policy trajectories by the ruling party with little challenge or credible policy alternatives from opposition parties over time (Matlosa & Karume, 2004:10).

It is instructive to affirm that looking at one-party dominance in the literature a one-party dominant system is a party system in which one political party wins four consecutive national elections, is able to dominate policy making, and more than one party exists, but alternation in power is unlikely. In view of this position, the People’s Democratic Party from 1999 to 2014 represents a dominant party because it has won four consecutive elections and was able to dominate policy making under a multi-party system.

2.3 Neo-Patrimonialism, Prebendalism, Clientelism and Socio-political and Economic Development

The terms, neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism were prominently introduced into the discourse on politics in the early 1970s. However, later discussions on the concepts extend to the discussion of the effects of neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism on socio-economic development. Therefore, debate on these three concepts centres on a pathology, analogy, and cause effect for socio-political and economic development. In the body of literature on this debate on the relationship between prebendalism, clientelism as well as neo-patrimonialism and socio-political and economic development some scholars argue
that the variables either collectively or individually remain(s) antithetical to the latter. This school of thought contends that prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism breed corruption because public office are used for private benefits of state office holders as well as those of their class, factions, followers and ethnic groups.

According to them these distort democratic institutions and are central to the crisis of development in Africa. However, an emerging body of literature has questioned whether neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism are actually detrimental to socio-political and economic development as argued by other scholars (Clapham, 1985; Crook, 1989; Lewis, 1996; Pitcher et al, 2009; Oarhe, 2010). This latter school argues that significant elements of prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism survive and thrive today without decisively undermining democratic process or economic development. Using examples of some highly industrialized countries they come out with the fact that the existence of prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism are not necessarily antagonistic to socio-political and economic development.

Under this section, before venturing into the assessment of various arguments of scholars on the political economy effects of neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism I shall attempt clarifying these three concepts. Thus, the focus of this section is the assessment of the position of scholars on the causal relationship between these concepts and socio-political and economic development, as well as clarification of the three concepts. I shall now turn to the arguments of scholars on the meaning of the concepts, before attempting a detailed review of the effects of these variables on democracy and socio-economic development.
After the work of Max Weber (1968) on the concept of patrimonialism in which he tries to delineate traditional forms of political authority, domination and legitimacy from modern ones, literature on the actual meaning of the concept has remained divided. In fact, the introduction of neo-patrimonialism by Elsenstadt (1973) in distinguishing between patrimonialism in traditional and modern contexts makes the conceptualisation of patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism more problematic. As we shall see under this section attempts at distinguishing patrimonialism from neo-patrimonialism have caused more confusion to the real dichotomy of the two concepts.

Furthermore, with a view to accounting for the obvious lack of “modernisation” or “development” in sub-Saharan Africa, different notions of patrimonialism, patronage or prebendalism and clientelism which have been employed by scholars over the years have made the conceptual clarification of neo-patrimonialism a catch-all concept (Erdmann and Engel, 2006). More so, while prebendalism and clientelism are equated or incorporated into neo-patrimonialism by some scholars other scholars aver that prebendalism and clientelism are symptoms of the latter. By the same token scholarship in some instances equates neo-patrimonialism with particular regime types.

I will join the debate on the notion of neo-patrimonialism by positing that some scholars who attempt clarifying the concept have linked it to the notion of the privatization of public affairs by those in positions of authority. That is, a situation where there is no dichotomy between the public sphere and private interests in the process of governance. For instance Tim Kelsall (2011) in his work “Neo-patrimonialism and Public Sector Performance and Reform” sees neo-patrimonialism, as a system of personal rule held together by the distribution of economic rents to clients or cronies. According to him under this type of rule there is always
a weak or no separation of the public and private spheres: This results in the private appropriation of the public sphere and the use of public resources for political legitimation. For Medrad (1982) Sandbrook (1985) and as echoed by Kelsall (2011) this phenomenon could be referred to as the ‘big’ or ‘strong’ man syndrome. For Farzana Nawaz (2008) refers to neo-patrimonialism as a system of governance where the formal rational-legal state apparatus co-exists and is supplanted by an informal patrimonial system of governance. According to Clapham, neo-patrimonialism is;

...a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers, so far as they can, as a form not of public service but of private property. Relationships with other likewise fall into the patrimonial pattern of vassal and lord, rather than the rational-legal one of subordinate and superior, and behaviour is correspondingly devised to display a personal status, rather than to perform an official function (Clapham 1985: 48).

My problem with Clapham’s and those that have similar views like him on the conceptual clarification of neo-patrimonialism as established above is that their various explanations minimise the legal-rational bureaucratic aspect and push the concept too far towards patrimonialism. This, I argue, is mistaken. I therefore suggest that the conceptualisation of neo-patrimonialism must account for both types of domination. This is premised on the fact that not all political and administrative decisions are taken according to informal rules determined by private or personal interest under every regime.
Bratton and van de Walle (1997) in their seminal work “Democratic Experiments in Africa” try as much as possible in avoiding this pitfall. In their own view they attempt demarcating the two types of domination: “to characterise as neo-patrimonial those hybrid regimes in which the customs and patterns or patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions” (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 62). However, when Bratton & van de Walle turned to characterising or operationalising the concept by using the informal institution of presidentialism as the first variable, the concept becomes ambiguous. For them, presidentialism entrenches “one individual, who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision-making tasks” (ibid. 63). Apart from this problem of defining presidentialism their argument puts almost everything at the discretion of personal (or privatised) rule which is not circumscribed by any rules or law. I will argue that this almost push them into the mistake of the above scholars by coming close to turning “neo-patrimonialism” into “patrimonialism”.

There are some other scholars that view neo-patrimonial rule taking place within the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy or “modern” stateness. For instance Budd (2004) avers that “neo-patrimonialism is a mixture of two, partly interwoven, types of domination that co-exist: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Put simply, neo-patrimonialism is patrimonialism combined with a modern state bureaucracy (Budd 2004: 2). Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel (2006) in their work “Neo-patrimonialism Revisited-Beyond a Catch-All Concept” make more elaboration on the concept. In their account, under neo-patrimonialism:
...the distinction between the private and the public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction... Formal structures and rules do exist, although in practice, the separation of the private and public sphere is not always observed. Naturally these spheres are not isolated from each other; quite to the contrary, they permeate each other; or more precisely, the patrimonial penetrates the legal-rational system and twists its logic, functions, and effects (Erdman & Engel, 2006:18).

They assert further that the patrimonial system penetrates the legal-rational system and affects its logic and output, but does not take exclusive control over the legal-rational logic. I strongly agree with the position of Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel (2006) on neo-patrimonialism, especially on how they establish the fact that patrimonial and legal-rational system co-exist in most societies and on how they further link the concept to clientelism and politics of patronage.

For Erdmann and Engel (2006) clientelism evolves as extended and partly changing nets of political client-patron relationships. According to them, clientelism means the exchange or brokerage of specific services and resources for political support. It involves a relationship between unequals, in which the major benefits accrue to the patron. Another interesting aspect of their work is that they distinguish between clientelism and patronage, which Joseph Richard (1987) in his work “Democracy and prebendalism in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic” has earlier on referred to as prebendalism. For him patronage is the politically motivated distribution of “favours” not to individuals but essentially to groups, which in the African context will be mainly ethnic or sub-ethnic groups.
Interestingly too, for Erdmann and Engel (2006), while clientelism implies a mutual personal relationship between patron and client, patronage refers to the relationship between an individual and a bigger group. Therefore the difference between clientelism and patronage is essentially the distinction between “individual” and “collective goods” (2006:22). They aver further that the patronage mechanism is usually based on the perception that if one of our ethnic group is not involved those that are involved will not care for us, because they will care for their own kin. Other scholars also try to explain clientelism arising from neo-patrimonialism in the manner in which Erdmann did but with some limitations.

According to Farzana Nawaz (2008) neo-patrimonialism gives rise to a situation in which decisions about resources are made by powerful politicians and their cronies who are linked by informal, personal and clientelist networks that exist outside of the state structure. For him the distribution of resources or benefits might be primarily motivated by personal relationships or ethnic / tribal loyalties. In such cases distribution can take the form of personal favours such as, appointing relatives or people from the ruler’s ethnic / tribal group to important government posts.

My stake in Nawaz’s position is that he did not make a clear distinction between clientelism and patronage (prebendalism) in the manner at which Erdmann and Engel (2006) did. Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Chabla and Daloz (1999) and Diana Cammack, (2007) also argue that in states labelled neo-patrimonial real power and real decision-making lie outside formal institutions. Given this situation, decisions about resources are made by ‘big men’ and their cronies, who are linked by ‘informal’ (private and personal, patronage and clientelist)
networks that exist outside (before, beyond and despite) the state structure, and who follow a logic of personal and particular interest rather than collective good.

The arguments of Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Chabla and Daloz (1999) and Diana Cammack, (2007) as established above also fail to clearly explain the vital differences between clientelism and patronage. This shortcoming therefore puts Erdmann and Engel (2006) explanation of clientelism to mean a relationship between a client and patron for political and economic advantage and patronage as political and economic rewards by a person in government to his ethnic group/kin as a more analytical tool.

Another important area that requires attention in the literature on neo-patrimonialism which scholars also disagree on is the equation of the concept to particular regime types. For example as noted by Bratton and van de Walle (1997), neo-patrimonial states tend to be presidential. For them, personalism suffuses neo-patrimonial states and expresses itself both in the form of presidentialism. On this debate I will subscribe to the position of Roth (1968) as reinforced by Erdmann and Engel (2006) that “neo-patrimonialism” is a feature which can be found in any society. That is, neo-patrimonialism remains an element of any political system. The implication of this position is that neo-patrimonialism and its attendant clientelism and prebendalism are always part of all sorts of political regimes. It is the degree at which they exist in every regime and how they influence politics and the economy that is only debatable.

Therefore, having taken a look at the various positions of scholars on neo-patrimonialism, clientelism and prebendalism I will in turn take a look at the political and economic
implications of the three concepts. This would however be done mostly in reference to the African’s situation. This is important in order to establish whether neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism are essentially antithetical to political and economic development in the global south.

Writing on democracy in Japan, Scheiner (2006) attempts an explanation of how clientelism affects electoral competition and the consolidation of democracy. Under his argument he looks at clientelism as the exchange of benefits (by the government, parties, and/or politicians) for voter and organizational support. Furthermore, in his view, clientelist benefits are those awarded to people who support a specific party or candidate and withheld from those who do not. Accepting electoral competition as one of the criteria for the measurement of democracy he avers that the major reason for the failure of democracy in Japan is the issue of clientelism which is at the centre of opposition failure in the country. He argues succinctly that competition is critical to democracy. Fundamental to democracy is the principle that all rulers are ultimately accountable to the people. Within modern democracy, this process works through representatives who, themselves, are accountable to the people through regular elections.

To further advance this argument he notes the argument of Manin et al (1999) that parties “are accountable” if voters can discern whether governments are acting in their interests and sanction them appropriately, so that those incumbents who acts in the best interests of the citizens win re-election and those who do not, lose them. One would assume that incumbents who get re-elected are those deemed by voters to be working in their interests, but due to the politics of clientelism this is not always the case. Through the politics of clientelism
especially when there are enough financial resources at the disposal of an incumbent elections are won despite failure to pursue collective interests of the citizens.

Thus, the presence of a governing party that continues to get re-elected when it is unpopular indicates a failure of accountability and an absence of democracy. Nicolas van de Walle, who analyses the parties and party systems in sub-Saharan Africa, shares Scheiner pessimism of clientelism on democracy by arguing that the illiberal nature of most democracies in Africa, within the context of their characteristics centralization of power around the presidency structures the relationship between the state and the citizenry. In his view under the presidential system the control of both political and economic resources by a single individual (the president) gives incumbent political advantage during elections.

He argues that despite the fact that during the course of the 1990s regular multiparty elections have become the norm for the states in Sub-Saharan Africa, few of these countries can be considered to be even imperfect liberal democracies. He contends that with the exception of a small number of states, these systems can be characterized as semi-authoritarian regimes despite their regular multiparty elections. According to him;

....throughout the region, power is highly centralized around the president. He is literally above the law, controls in many cases a large proportion of state finance with little accountability, and delegates remarkably little of his authority on important matters. In most countries, the presidency emerges as the dominant arena for decision-making, to the point that regular ministerial structures are relegated to an executants' role (van de Walle, 2003:310)
On how pervasive clientelism affects democracy van de Walle makes an argument that “winning party tends to become dominant since individual politicians know that they are more likely to get access to state resources if they are in the president’s party” (2003:313). Another effect of clientelism on democracy is his claim that such politics constitutes primarily a mechanism for the accommodation and integration of fairly small political elite rather than a form of mass party patronage. Most of the materials gains are limited to these elites. The stronger link between political elites and the citizenry is through the less tangible bonds of ethnic identity. Even in the absence of tangible benefits, citizens will choose to vote for individuals of their own ethnic group, particularly in ethnically divided societies.

These views represent the position of Nicollas van de Walle on the effects of clientelism on party systems in the early years of democratization in Africa. My concern about the argument of van de Walle under this work is his strong argument that all African countries adopt presidentialism. To a very large extent this is misleading, because there are African countries which at the beginning of their democracy practice parliamentary systems, e.g. South Africa and Botswana. More so, his argument painting presidentialism as essentially antithetical to democracy is also problematic because we have seen countries with presidential system of government in which their democracy are consolidated while some countries practicing parliamentary system have had crisis of democratization. For instance the Senegalese and Ghanaian presidential systems are far better than some countries on the continent with parliamentary system.

Juan Linz (1985) has raised this line of argument when he posits that the consolidation of democracy is not dependent on the system of government or regime type. In his account the consolidation of democracy depends on particular institutional arrangements and on the
willingness of society and all major social forces and institutions to contribute to particular system stability. According to him, all regimes stability depends on “the capacity of political leaders to govern, to inspire trust, to have a sense of the limits of their power, and to achieve a minimum of consensus” (Linz 1985:18). More so, regimes stability could also be influenced by distinctive factors such as federalism, ethnic or cultural heterogeneity, etc. I strongly support this Linz’s line of argument that the consolidation of democracy is not dependent on regime types or systems of government but in evaluating the consolidation of democracy other institutional factors must be put into account.

In his analysis of Nigerian politics, Richard Joseph (1987) argues that the concept of prebendalism offers a useful way to analyse and understand the fundamental processes underlying Nigerian politics. By making reference to Max Weber he asserts that “prebend is a public office procured by an individual in return for loyal service to a lord and retained for his personal use and for benefitting his followers”. In Nigeria, he contends that prebendalism involves a pattern of political behaviour that rests on the justifying principle that (state) offices should be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of office-holders as well as of their reference or support group, and which relegates the official public purpose of those offices to a secondary concern (1987:8).

More so, in his analysis, he further argues that prebendalism in Nigeria is socially rooted in clientelism which links individual from similar as well as different factions, class and ethnic groups in hierarchical relations centred on the exchange of political support for material resources. He sums up his argument by positing that prebendalism and clientelism constitute the two fundamental and mutually reinforcing principles of political organization and
behaviour in Nigeria. Together they distort democratic institutions and procedures and render the survival of a viable democracy in Nigeria extremely difficult if not impossible.

While the above scholars argue that clientelism and prebendalism are detrimental to democracy others disagree with this stand. For instance Inge Amundsen (2001) in his essay “The Limits of Clientelism: Multiparty Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa”, raised a caveat on the way neo-patrimonialism is used to describe the precarious nature of politics and economic failure in Africa by Eurocentric scholars. He uses the analysis of democracy in Senegal to advance his claim. With the Senegalese example he observes that clientelism and democratic institutionalization are opposing logics in analytical terms, but in practical terms both clientelism and democracy could co-exist. In his view therefore the degree of neo-patrimonialism varies enormously within African countries. He suggests the need for a narrower and more precise delineation and evaluation of the core aspects of neo-patrimonialism. It is also important to delineate and describe what aspects are relevant in a given country at a given time. Thus, Amundsen agrees with the fact that neo-patrimonialism practices are still present and hampers the process of democratization to some extent, but one should not identify every obstacle to democratization to neo-patrimonialism.

Despite the claims of Nicolas van de Walle on the negative effects of clientelism on democracy which I have examined earlier, four years thereafter he attempts a modification to his former claims. Under his new argument he underlines the fact that clientelism is a ubiquitous feature of modern politics and is unlikely to disappear soon, it is only the nature of clientelism that varies according to the type of political regime. To advance his new position he identified three types of clientelism; tribute, elite clientelism and mass clientelism. According to him *tribute* constitutes the traditional practice of gift exchange in peasant
societies and traditional kingdoms in which patron and client are engaged in bonds of reciprocity and trust. **Elite clientelism** entails the strategic political allocation of public offices to key elites, granting personal access over state resources. **Mass clientelism** relies on the practice of using state resources to provide jobs and services for mass political clienteles, and usually involves party organizations and electoral politics (van de Walle, 2007).

On the discussion that follows van de Walle’s classification of clientelism, he focuses on the difference between mass and elite clientelism to explain the political systems that rely primarily on patronage from those that rely on prebendalism to explain how democracies can be consolidated and undermined. He distinguishes these two concepts by using these analogies; “hiring a member of one’s ethnic group to a senior position in the customs office is an example of patronage. Allowing the custom’s officer to use the position for personal enrichment by manipulating import and export taxes is an example of a prebend” (van de Walle, 2007:4). After establishing this distinction he explains the impact of clientelism on the state capacity. On this premise he advance that prebendal practices weaken the state or at least limit its capacity, patronage is quite compatible with an effective and responsive state apparatus. In his words;

*We know from a wide variety of regimes across time that patronage political machines can be responsive to citizen concerns and deliver services. Indeed the so-called “political machines” of urban American and European politics in the early twentieth century were electoral machines that received support because they addressed constituent concerns. On the other hand, the prebendalism of elite clientelism can be associated with regimes that seek to limit participation and are not responsive to their citizens. Even as a small political aristocracy benefits*
liberally from its link to the state apparatus, the average citizen does not receive adequate social services or benefit from an adequate public infrastructure (van de Walle, 2007:6).

What this Nicollas van de Walle’s new essay suggests is that clientelism is not necessarily anti-democracy but could even bring optimism to democratic practices. By injecting this optimism into African democratic practices, he concludes that; “vote buying, jobs for the boys, schools being built in key constituencies in the week before elections, party finance scandals, corruption scandals in the press, influence peddling in the legislature- all these things should not be celebrated, sure, but they do mean that Africa is becoming less nepatrimonial and more democratic” (van de Walle, 2007:13). The logic of this argument is that some degrees of clientelism could have positive impacts on democracies.

While proving that patrimonial authority is not necessarily incompatible with democracy, Anne Pitcher and her colleagues using the Botswana’s example, claim that, a succession of elites, deeply rooted in the traditional life of village and countryside, used personal power and a range of reciprocities to solidify their legitimacy as a governing class and in the process built bridges across tribal (morafe) divisions and solidified their own financial stakes in sound institutions. This has resulted in the sustenance of “open elite democracy” (Pitcher et al, 2009:145). Within this context they argue that Botswana’s elites have not abandoned patrimonialism or overcome it; rather, they have built a democratic state on a foundation of traditional and highly personalized reciprocities and loyalties.

The leadership has been sufficiently secure, politically and economically, to accommodate opposing parties and interests, as well as the rise of a civil society that also brings traditional
loyalties into the public arena. Its electoral politics, while not as yet producing a handover from the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) to any of its rivals, has seen lower-level victories by opposition parties; elections are widely regarded as fair and substantially free of fraud. Pitcher and her colleagues posit that numerous societies with patrimonial pasts have regimes that have turned out badly, in Botswana patrimonial practices and institutions provided a foundation via the kgotla and traditional patterns of leadership, accountability, and exchange on which more recent generations have built Africa’s most solid democratic regime.

They therefore contend that the consolidation of democracy in Botswana shows that there is nothing in patrimonialism that leads directly to any one regime type, and there is nothing inherent in patrimonialism to prevent the creation of a democracy by leaders determined to do so. In that sense, understanding the role of patrimonialism in the building of a durable democratic regime is a much more demanding analytical test than looking at the more numerous cases in which just a few, often sporadic, democratic attributes would have to be accounted for. Thus, “patrimonialism must be understood in context, evaluated for its positive as well as negative consequences, and not be used as a one-variable explanation for broad national outcomes” (Pitcher et al, 2009:146).

Beyond the understanding of the relationship between clientelism, prebendalism and neopatrimonialism on democracy is the intensity of discourses on how the three variables affect economic development. For instance, Omobowale and Olutayo (2010) examine the economic effect of clientelism and prebendalism using South-Western Nigeria as a case study. With this case study they emphasise the relevance of rural social and welfare associations to the clientelistic structure in Nigeria. They argue that the clientelistic structure is entirely exploitative and will not contribute to the improvement of the lives of the people. According
to them, findings show the debilitating reality of clientelism, within which the Nigerian grassroots survive.

Thus, the prevalence of clientelistic relations between the political class and the grassroots, and their untoward debilitating effect on rural development, cast a slur on Nigeria’s democratic and development efforts. Thus, rural areas in Nigeria remain underdeveloped despite the continual inflow of projects in exchange for loyalty. Often, such were not intended for developmental purpose but for the entrenchment of solid clientelist ties. In this respect, clientelist projects distributed to rural communities for political support by the government are substandard which do not develop the rural communities.

Looking at the effects of clientelism on economic development with the Nigerian example as Omobowale and Olutayo does, Osumah Oarhe (2010) uses “patron-client politics in Nigeria to explain the nature and character of the Nigerian state. With the Nigerian example he avers that political patron also takes another dimension. In Nigeria a patron could be a “mercantilist or mercenary politician” ready to offer sponsorship to office-seekers to the extent that the individual accepts to be manipulated for the consolidation of his power-base and sustenance of his political dominance of the affairs of the state.

He contends that the power of the patron does not merely lay in his sponsorship of political campaigns. Largely, the power and influence stem from his ability to deploy primitive tactics such as; political violence, silencing of political opponents, electoral fraud and manipulation of state machinery in favour of the client. In reciprocation, the patron determines how to run the government he helped enthroned by exerting pressure on the stooge which has been
assisted to win elections. In such a situation policies are made in favour of the patron for the extension and consolidation of his political influence and control (2010:43-44).

In Oarhe’s opinion patron-client politics is not antithetical to democracy in advanced democracy such as America where the political machines strengthen democratic culture. In these advanced democracy there are effective and well-structured institutions that help in ensuring that there is democratic consolidation. However in Nigeria and some other African states the patron-client politics result in brazen manipulation of state machinery in the process of political recruitment in favour of preferred candidates of the patron. Furthermore, this dysfunctional patron-client politics stifles electoral contests, as the patrons are willing to do anything to frustrate and neutralize opposition from securing seats in government in order to get maximum return for their investment (Oarhe, 2010:55).

Osumah Oarhe summarises the dysfunctional effects of patron-client politics by asserting that the pervading underdevelopment, collapse of infrastructure and service, socio-economic deprivation, anxiety and insecurity have been more acute in states where the patron-client politics became a major feature. This “patron-client politics”, especially in the Nigerian context, is the contemporary usage of the term as “godfatherism politics” in Nigeria, to describe the democratic and economic evils of the practice. For instance according to Olawale Albert Political godfathers consist of rich men whose contributions to campaign funds of some candidates have helped the latter to win elections (Albert, 2005:81).

Albert uses this term to explain the clientelist elements in the Nigerian politics and how this negatively affects development in Nigeria. In his strong view, in the Nigerian context “godfathers” are political investors who sponsor candidates to political offices such as the
presidency, state governors and local government chairmen, in return for the right to control major appointments, awards of contracts and some percentages of revenues allocated to those offices. In his account, instead of using state resources for the majority of the citizens, the resources are used by those that have been assisted into political offices for compensating their political “godfathers”.

In situation where the political client fails to do this the outcome is violence sponsored by the “godfather” against the client and against the state. This violence sponsored by the “godfather” grounds the running of government by the political client. This explains how clientelism and prebendalism have contributed to the challenges of socio-political and economic development in Nigerian. Olawale Albert (2005) noted that these effects are not Nigerian specific but rather they are found in most African countries emerging from authoritarian rules to democratic transition especially in those countries that one-party dominate.

It is imperative to note that while the scholars mentioned above have succinctly argue that neo-patrimonialism, clientelism and prebendalism are detrimental to socio-economic development, others remain uncomfortable with their arguments and on the contrary argue otherwise. For instance, using Cote d’Ivoire during its early independence years as an example, Richard Crook (1989) emphasises that the concepts as used predominantly in the literature to explain political decay, economic collapse and administrative grotesquery of African states should not be generalised. In his argument, while some bureaucracies remain inefficient under neo-patrimonialism, the Cote d’Ivoire case was different because its bureaucracy was efficient and level of its state capacity was very high.
In view of this he contends that historically it is perfectly possible for bureaucracy and neo-patrimonialism to coexist, but the question of which principles dominate and whether patrimonial loyalties can be put to bureaucratic use is a matter for empirical determination. In his Cote d’Ivoire example Richard Crook argues that the patronage system aided economic growth of the country, which has enabled actual or potential sources of opposition to be absorbed through the expansion of state financed job opportunities and the relative distribution of the gains of the economic growth among the important indigenous social and economic interests.

Apart from arguing for the positive democracy advantages of neo-patrimonialism by Anne Pitcher and her colleagues which I have discussed earlier, they also attempt a reconsideration of the positive effects of neo-patrimonialism on socio-economic development, using the same Botswana’s example. Pitcher et al (2009) argue that recent studies on (neo)patrimonialism as they apply to the countries in Africa the distinction between types of authority and types of regime is blurred, and what precisely neo-patrimonialism explains and how it does so are left unclear. With reference to the work of Englebert (2000) they aver that in Botswana, by contrast, traditional Tswana elites were able to “re-appropriate” the state from the departing British, and thus never lost their legitimate right to rule. Instead, the historical continuity of traditional patterns of loyalty and authority gave the independent Botswana state a high level of legitimacy.

Endowed with the “initial allegiance” of their subjects, Botswana’s leaders did not need to resort to neo-patrimonial strategies to consolidate power. As a result, they were able to pursue longer term developmental strategies: “The initial degree of state legitimacy at independence,” “is therefore a determinant of the pressing nature of leaders” quest for
increased power and the relative returns, in terms of power, of developmental versus neo-patrimonial strategies” (Pitcher et al, 2009:134). Pitcher et al highlight the case of Botswana and argue that neo-patrimonial authority is compatible both with high levels of legitimacy and with economic development. Botswana’s rise from abysmal poverty to middle-income status, its sustained multiparty politics, and its favourable scores on governance rankings make it a key case for analysts of African development.

While Richard Crook and Pitcher et al argue for the positive effects of neo-patrimonialism on economic development using an example of two African countries, Richard Doner and Ansil Ramsay (2000) by using Thailand, an Asian country tries to justify the positive linkage of neo-patrimonialism to economic development. They argue that Thailand experienced long years of economic growth despite the presence of extensive clientelism, corruption and rent-seeking. They aver that the formative stages of Thai economic development facilitated the entry of new firms and the creation of competitive market structure in a variety of economic sectors. The greater openness and competitiveness of the country’s politics since the mid-1970s furthered this process. It is in this respect that they suggest that many types of rents and rent-seeking played a key role in process of development and are likely to do so again in the future. They however raised a caveat that their position is not a blanket endorsement of clientelism as neither a source of economic growth nor a dismissal of the waste caused by rent-seeking.

Without making specific reference to a country as the above mentioned scholars did, Peter Lewis (1996) subscribes to the positive effects of clientelism rather by distinguishing between prebendalism and predatory rule to explain these advantages. In his analysis on
predation, he avers that the concept embodies a reconfiguration of neo-patrimonial rule, towards more despotic and rapacious control, while prebendal relations is a situation of a patron-client links which are more diffuse and individual authority comparatively limited. Linking his argument to those of Christopher Clapham (1985) and Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (1982), he underscores the fact that many developing countries continue to be characterized by the appearance of Weberian “legal rational” administration, but beneath the trapping of formal bureaucracy, procedural rules, and law, their regimes are based upon networks of personal loyalty and patron-client ties. Power is typically concentrated in a single ruler or a narrow oligarchy at the apex of clientelist pyramid.

For him, public and private resources are melded, as state assets come under the discretionary control of political elites, and public office serves as a conduit for private accumulation. The effects of this type of rule he suggests in reference to Richard Sandbrook (1985), Catherine Boone (1990) and Nicollas van de Walle (1994) is the rise of a distinctive pattern of economic management, including arbitrary change, deficit financing, capital flight, and the chronic, unrecorded leakage of funds. The premium on transitory rent-seeking in such economies reinforce an orientation towards political rather than market allocation.

Using Nigeria as an example of a country that has moved from prebendalism to predation he argues that the emergent predatory order has embodied three essential features: the concentration of personal power under coercive auspices; repression augmented by material inducement requiring close discretion over public resources as well as a ready pool of available funds; and the conscious erosion of central public institutions, and the corresponding hegemony of a close circle of ethnic and personal loyalists. Lewis distinction between predation and prebendalism shows that prebendalism is not antithetical to
development, but that predation do. Richard Crook and David Booth (2011) also suggest that neo-patrimonialism/clientelism can either be predatory or developmental.

From the literature review under this section it is important to underline the following fundamental positions: First is the fact that elements of neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism are present in almost all system of governments across the world but are different in the form and degree at which they affect socio-political and economic development; second is the position that the form that they take determines their effects on socio-political and economic development.

The form that they assume in a given political system determines if they would be anti-development, pro-development or in some instances would not necessarily have any effect on development; Eurocentric scholars assume the fact that almost all post-colonial African states are neo-patrimonial, clientelist and prebendal in nature. They explain African politics as essentially privatized or that the modus operandi as being essentially informal. It is however important to point out that in Africa not all political and administrative decisions are taken according to informal rules determined by personal or private will. Erdman and Engel (2006) support this line of argument when they argue that:

> If all or almost all decisions would be taken according to personal interest the consequence would be that (1) all official would be corrupt, (2) most jobs would go to unqualified people, (3) hardly anything would be left that could be labelled a legal-rational bureaucracy, but everything would be arbitrary, with the result that (4) after a couple years or decades hardly anything would be working in Africa

(Erdman & Engel, 2006:18)
At this point I emphasise that contrary to contemporary conceptions, Weber’s ‘patrimonialism’ was not posited as antithetical to the entrenchment of democracy and socio-economic development. Rather, according to Bach (2012), ‘patrimonialism’ sought to understand the cultural framing of beliefs about the operation of legitimate power and emphasised mutual responsibilities between rulers and their subjects. Weber’s ‘patrimonialism’ recognised that leaders could and should be held accountable and that they must abide by certain norms in order to sustain the willingness of their subjects to obey.

Despite its modern usage and with the application of the concept in modern discourse of the political economy of African states as essentially neo-patrimonial, I shall subscribe to Bach (2012) position that there can be regulated and unregulated neo-patrimonialism. Socio-economic development can occur under regulated neo-patrimonialism, while unregulated neo-patrimonialism, as the Nigerian’s case suggests is detrimental to socio-economic development.

I shall however underscore the fact that when Neo-patrimonialism leads to clientelist and prebendal in any political system democracy is under threat and socio-economic development becomes more challenging. In such society as Adebanwi and Obadare (2013) suggest political offices are contested for and then utilized for the benefit of office-holders as well as that of their reference or support group. Thus, the ‘state’ in such a context is perceived as a congeries of offices susceptible to individual as well as communal appropriation. Therefore the statutory purposes of such state become a matter of secondary concern, despite the fact that much of that purpose might have been codified in law or other regulations.

**2.4 Democracy and Development**
The debate on the correlation between democracy and development is an old one assuming two dimensions of argument. The first dimension of the argument is the debate on the causal relationship or process between the two concepts. That is, the debate on whether democracy has negative or positive effects on development. There are three different views on this. On one hand are those who argue that democracy promotes socio-economic development, some are supportive of the negative relationship between democracy and development, while others, using the word of Pranab Bardhan (1999:1) are “agnostic” (that is, they do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders development). The second dimension of the argument is what I term the democracy and development prerequisite argument. That is, whether it is democracy that promotes development or conversely whether it is socio-economic development that produces an environment that allows democracy to thrive and be sustained.

Looking at this debate from any of these two perspectives, scholars have attempted either using theoretical or deductive arguments, or case study/cross-country’s analysis to advance their positions. Attempts under this section is not to examine the conceptual arguments surrounding the concepts of democracy and development, except when such is necessary for explanatory purposes, but rather the assessment of the position of these schools of thought, from the perspectives in which they view the linkage and their mode of analysis, showing their weaknesses and strengths especially as they relate to the African context. In doing this, I shall draw out the weaknesses of their arguments, especially at it relates to the 21st century African developmental challenges.

Just like the Biblical Apostle Paul who was an ardent critic of Jesus Christ but who later on became an ardent follower of the doctrine of Christ, Jagdish Bhagwati (19992; 1995a; 1995b;
2002) did extensive works on the relationship between democracy and development by dissecting the hypothesis that democracy is inimical to economic development (for more than three decades before then he was one of the major proponents of the hypothesis that democracy handicaps development). Under his new thinking he asserts strongly that democracy does not handicap development and in the right circumstances can even promote it. According to him when compared to authoritarian regimes democracy is more likely to foster an environment that facilitates the innovative and entrepreneurial process so essential for sustained development. He puts up two strong arguments in favour of democracy as being conducive to development: democracy as an ideology and democracy as a structure.

His view on democracy as an ideology is a government by consent, while the system of practices and institutions through which this principle is realized constitutes the structure of democracy. He advances this position by postulating that democracy is being conducive to development by virtue of its ideological content on the premise that democracies rarely—maybe even never go to war against one another, and that, authoritative regimes “bottle up” problems while democracies curtail them. In his opinion democracies are more likely to both provide governance that is conducive to peace and hence prosperity and to spend less on fighting wars and preparing for them. He points further that the structure of democracy, with its institution of voting rights, a free press, and an independent judiciary capable of restraining legislative and executive power in the name of fundamental law, also sets it apart from authoritarian rule. Restraints on arbitrary power are vital if development is to be sustained, he argues.

The general conclusion running through all his work on democracy and development is that there is no necessary trade-off between democracy and development. When compared to
authoritarian regimes, democracy is more likely to foster an environment with fewer restrictions on learning, travel, work and communication in all fields. This facilitates the innovative and entrepreneurial process so essential for sustained development. And when democracy is accompanied by presence of competitive markets democracy will be able to deliver significant development. Thus, democracy and markets are twin pillars on which lasting development can thrive, he concludes under these works. A look at his arguments in this work reveals that democracy can achieve the goal of development not only as an ideology but when accompanied with necessary structures and institutions.

Supporting the positive relationship between democracy and development is Vivek Dehejia (2007) who tries as much as possible to reconsider the long-held view that democracy is a hindrance to economic development. He counters this view by arguing to the contrary that democracy will, in the medium to longer run, promote, rather, than retard, economic development, and predict that the future experiences of India and China may bear this out. He supports this prediction with the argument that China’s pursuit of free market without a free society, sets up contradictory forces that will eventually lead, either to slow and painful democratization, or, more likely, a sudden political explosion, which will obviously, set back economic development. In the India’s case, democracy serves as a safety valve, through which putative losers of reform can make their voice heard. He moves on with this argument that the defeat of the BJP- led NDA government and the electoral success of the Congress-led UPA in the 2004 general elections rested on former’s triumphant “India Shining” campaign and the latter’s appeal to the common man.

Zack Williams (2001) under his work “No Democracy, No Development: Reflections on Democracy and Development in Africa”, takes more assertive position on the positive
relationship between democracy and development. He argues that democracy, defined as the ability of a people to control decision-making, is a sine qua non for development. Under this work he craves for the centrality of the state in the developmental process, especially in Africa. That, instead of rolling back the state, state capacity should be strengthened and this would have to be at the expense of the proliferation of unaccountable non-governmental organizations.

According to him, one early attempt at explicating corruption in Africa is the argument that corruption is an attempt on the part of the governing class to suture the divide between the ruling class (controllers of the major means of production) and the governing class, who are in formal control of the state apparatus. He continues his argument by making reference to the work of Szeftel (2000) that:

> Unfortunately, the state was not equipped to bear this burden. Underdevelopment and dependence on primary exports gave it an uncertain revenue base which constantly undermined development strategies. More importantly, the colonial institutions inherited by the independent state were inappropriate for the project of social renewal (Zack-Williams, 2001:219, quoting Szeftel).

In view of the above, it was the various agencies of the civil society who tamed the omnipresent state in Africa and which aided development in some countries on the continent. Therefore, the decade of the 1990s which ushered in democracy on the continent and the strengthening of the civil society organizations end the era of kleptocratic autonomy, as the ruling elites now face vibrant civil society. Thus, this allows the state to play its pivotal role in the process of development. He concludes that there could be the development of home
market when there is democratization with the strengthening of the state capacity in the emerging non-kleptocratic states in Africa.

I agree with the need for the existence of a strong state for the achievement of development on the continent of Africa. However, his argument on how a strong state could emerge in Africa is problematic. More so, I agree with Williams on his argument that institutions like the Civil Society Organisations remain necessary check against the use of the state for personal benefits of the political elites, but disagree with his assumption that these organisations have been playing this role on the continent of Africa. This disagreement is premised on the fact that CSOs in Africa are still weak and remain highly ineffective. Therefore, the weakness of the CSOs can be advance as one of the reasons for the crisis of development in Africa.

Claude Ake (1991; 1993) supports the positive linkage between democracy and development by taking a historical and deductive analysis of the linkage in the African context. He observes that the demand for democracy in Africa draws much of its impetus from the prevailing economic conditions within. Thus, in Africa, national conferences were held, or strongly demanded at times when the economy had virtually collapsed or when economic austerity was exceptionally harsh. It is in this view that he points out that the emerging political theory of the democracy movement in Africa sees the economic regression of the continent as the other side of political regression. It recognizes that the cause of development is better served by a democratic approach that engages the energy and commitment of the people who alone can make development possible and sustainable.
Under this argument Ake makes reference to the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, which argued that the absence of democracy is a major cause of chronic underdevelopment in Africa, and “The Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World”, adopted by the Organization of African Unity in 1990, which acknowledges that political environment guaranteeing human rights and the rule of law would be more conducive to government accountability and probity and that popular based political processes would ensure the involvement of all in development efforts” (Ake, 1993:242), to buttress his point.

He however argues further that, for democracy to achieve development, the state must be strong with immense penetrative capacity. He made reference to Western countries like the United States, where the state is very strong and penetrates far more deeply into the lives of its citizens. In these countries, power are used according to law and more importantly, by virtual automation of conformity and control. Ake’s position captures the reality of the positive linkage between democracy and development, but he fails to suggest how a strong state could emerge in Africa.

In support of the importance of democracy for development, John Gerring et al (2012) take their position by testing two hypotheses: that a country’s level of democracy in a given year affects its level of human development and that its stock of democracy over the past century affects its level of human development. By using infant mortality rate as a core measure of human development, they conduct series of time-series and cross-national tests of these two hypotheses and argue that the best way to think about the relationship between democracy and development is a time-dependent, historical phenomenon. They drive home this position by arguing that new democracies and old democracies are not the same. While new
democracies are prone to a host of problems associated with regime transition, older, more institutionalized democracies generally enjoy higher-quality governance. Thus if a democratic government is maintained over a longer period of time the net effect of that regime type will be positive for the welfare of its citizens, they assert.

John Gerring and his colleagues move on with this argument by looking at the numerous possible causal pathways linking democracy and human development taking into account the possible time-dependent nature of this relationship with the following propositions: First, competition among elites for voters’ favour should produce a situation in which elites are accountable to the citizenry—or at the very least, to a plurality of the voting electorate. Since widespread human misery is unpopular, democratically elected leaders are more likely to concern themselves with issues of human development than leaders who maintain their positions through other means; second, the institutions of democracy tend to foster a well-developed civil society. This is because political rights and civil rights are highly correlated, and the existence of civil rights usually leads over time, to a dense network of voluntary associations, which may be religious or secular, national or international, issue specific or broadly pitched. In turn, these voluntary associations are often instrumental in providing services for the poor, in conjunction with state officials and or international actors and demanding that the state and other actors do their jobs.

Yi Feng (2003) also finds that democracy has a positive impact on economic and social development, though mostly through indirect channels. These channels according to him include policy certainty, political stability, the establishment and enforcement of rules that protect property rights, the promotion of education, the ability to promote private capital, and the reduction of inequality. In his view, democratic regime is seen as vital in bringing about
these indirect benefits because it is a system that provides for regular government change while inhibiting irregular/erratic/unconstitutional change. Yi Feng’s argument has limits in its explanatory imports in the sense that the indirect benefits which he mentioned are not the exclusive domain of democracies: (some) authoritarian regimes also seem quite capable of providing stability, the rule of law, the protection of property rights, and basic social services.

Arguments emerging from the above review on the relationship between democracy and development suggest a positive relationship, but apparently these scholars agree with structural and institutional prerequisite for the achievement of development through democracy. Some of these structure and institutions include: voting rights, free press, independent judiciary (Bhagwati, 1992; 1995a; 1995b; 2002); free society (Dehija, 2007); stronger state (Ake, 1991; 1993; Williams, 2001); strong civil society organizations (Williams, 2001; Gerring et al, 2012); policy certainty and property rights (Feng, 2003).

It is these structures and institutions that these different scholars advance at their various mode of analysis to establish the linkage between democracy and development. More so, their arguments suggest a linear linkage between democracy and development. That is, democracy first and then development follows. While scholars above argue for the positive relationship between democracy and development and a linear linkage, some other scholars disagree with these, by arguing for negative effects of democracy on development, or by asserting that it is economic development that fosters democracy, and some others remain agnostic on the relationship.

Adrian Leftwich belongs to this second school of thought. Leftwich (2002) posits that democracies, especially in its Western liberal form, have great difficulty in taking rapid and
far reaching steps to reduce structural inequalities in wealth which new democratic
governments may have inherited. Under this argument he talks about the kind of political
system that may be required to sustain a developmental state. According to him, when and if
developmental states are democratic, they can be thought of as “authoritarian democracies”
(like Botswana), where basic characteristics of a democracy exist, such as free and fair
elections, but where human rights are less of a priority and some stability is brought about by
one party rule and strong control exerted by bureaucracies.

Leftwich buttresses his position by stating further that it is unrealistic to assume that political
and economic development goals (alongside equity, stability and national autonomy) can be
achieved simultaneously, at least from past historical experience. In his view, dominant-party
democratic developmental states have some potential of achieving some levels of growth that
could benefit the majority under democratic conditions. He argues his position further by
suggesting that the structural contradiction between the conservative requirements of stable
democratic survival and the urgent transformative imperatives of late development makes the
combination of democracy and development so difficult, and makes the establishment and
continuity of democratic developmental states so rare. According to him, it is in this context
that there would be serious challenges of development for the third world countries which
were pushed to democratization as a condition for growth. This is due to the fact that
effective development will not depend on regime type, but on the character of the state,
whether democratic or not.

Fareed Zakaria (2003) supports Leftwich’s position by suggesting that authoritarian regimes
seem to have a superior developmental record and that democracies seem to become stable
once they manage to surpass a certain level of economic development. The position of
Leftwich that developmental states cannot be democratic states, which is also supported by Zakaria, puts logic on its head because of the fact that most Western countries under liberal democracies are prosperous countries even more than most of their counterparts that are undemocratic.

His reference to Botswana as an “authoritarian democracy” is also misleading in the sense that the Country’s democracy is one of the shining examples of democracy on the continent. Thus, to conclude that Botswana’s democracy is an “authoritarian democracy” is to conclude the fact that the best form of democracy that countries in Africa can attain is at best “authoritarian democracies”. His argument further goes to show that other countries like Mauritius, South Africa, Ghana, etc. which are making considerable socio-economic development progress are at best “authoritarian democracies”. His argument therefore is more theoretical with little empirical evidences to support his position.

Sharing similar opinion with Adrian Leftwich and Fareed Zakaria on the democracy and development debate is Evelyne Huber et al (1993), who wrote on “the Impact of Economic Development on Democracy”. To advance their position, they assess democratic transition and breakdown in Europe and South America. Under this assessment they argue that the period of transition to democracy in Europe was also marked by the arrival of the organized working class. This organized working class was the most consistently pro-democratic force in the period they considered. This working class which formed an alliance with the urban middle class and the independent small farming population assisted democratic growth in Europe. Thus, according to them these categories of the labour which emerged as a result of economic growth in Europe and South America were instrumental to the emergence and consolidation of democracy in these two continents.
In their work “Development and Democracy”, Bueno de Mesuita and George Downs (2005), argue in similar dimension with Huber and her colleagues by suggesting that that “in long term economic growth can threaten the political survival of repressive governments by raising the likelihood that effective political competitors will emerge” (2005:3). This according to them happens for two reasons:

*Economic growth raises the stakes of the political game by increasing the spoils available to the winner, and it leads to an increase in the number of individuals with sufficient time, education and money to get involved in politics. Both these changes can set in a motion a process of democratization that can slowly gather momentum, eventually overwhelming an autocratic status quo and creating a competitive liberal democracy in its place* (de Mesquita & Downs, 2005:3).

Huber et al however advance their own argument by explaining the implications of their analysis for the future of democracy in contemporary third world. According to them there is less optimism about the chances of democracy in the third world, because of current economic problems in the third world, economic stagnation and the crushing debt. Within this context they argue that there is the expectation that some countries within the third world would have better prospects for democratization than others. Most obviously, the prospects are brighter for those countries with higher levels of economic development. They however made it clear that it is not the mere rise in per capita income that is of greater importance, but rather the changes in the class and social structure caused by industrialization and urbanization which are most consequential for democracy.
In as much that their arguments could be useful for the explanation of the development of democracy in their chosen case studies, especially with their agreement that structural factors like changes in the class and social structure that assisted the process, but their generalisation that it is the emergence of the middle class leads to democratisation remains weak, because we have seen countries with substantial middle class and which remain autocratic regimes. Examples of such countries include the Asian tigers of a generation ago- Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand.

I shall now turn to the agnostic scholars on the democracy and development debate. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi (1993) in looking at the debate on whether political regimes foster or hinder economic growth opine that political institution matters for growth, but thinking in terms of regimes type does not capture the relevant differences.

These authors make a serious critique of existing narratives on the debate on whether political regimes foster or hinder economic growth by positing that neither argument is convincing enough because it is difficult to know whether democracy fosters or hinders economic growth. What they could offer on the debate is what they refer to as “some educated guesses” (1993:64). Some of their guesses include: there is little knowledge about determinants of growth in general. According to them, the standard neoclassical theory of growth was intuitively unpersuasive and it implied that levels of development should converge: a prediction not born by the facts. Without a good economic model of growth, it is not surprising that the partial effect of politics is difficult to assess.

Second, according to Przeworski and Limongi politics does matter, but "regimes" do not capture the relevant differences to growth (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993:52). Post war
economic miracles include countries that had parliaments, parties, unions, and competitive elections, as well as countries ran by military dictatorships. In turn, while Latin American democracies suffered economic disasters during the 1980s, the world is replete with authoritarian regimes that are dismal failures from the economic point of view” (Przeworski & Limongi, 1993:65). Critically they established in their argument that state autonomy determines development rather than regime types.

Adam Przeworski (2003) furthers this position by confirming that Institutions and development are mutually endogenous and the most we can hope for is to identify their reciprocal impacts. The logic in Przeworski and Limongi is that it is neither democracy nor authoritarian rule that accounts for development, but that stable and effective institutions do. Thus, a country under democracy without necessary institutions cannot achieve development and a country under authoritarian rule with the right institutions will achieve development. However, Przeworski did not tell us what he meant by institution.

Ibrahim Shihata (1999) in his work “Democracy and Development” also takes an agnostic stand on the democracy and development debate. For him, in order to determine whether a linkage exists between the two concepts, the distinction between economic growth in the strict sense and development in the broader sense should be kept in mind. In this regard he posits that there seems to be no empirical evidence to suggest that democracy is a necessary precondition for economic growth. According to him country cases show a mixed record. He moves to claim that there is evidence, at least in the short term, that some countries have achieved high growth rates under regimes which were not democratic. Conversely, improvement in the standard of living, in particular increases in the middle-class share of
income and education have been found in a large number of countries to have positive impact on the rise of democracy, as measured by a subjective indicator of political freedom.

In his work he takes a middle position in the debate on the link between democracy and development by pointing to the fact that in different periods of time rapid economic growth has taken place within a variety of political systems and with quite different ranges of public policy. Thus, quite often but not always more democratic countries are also more developed and more developed countries are also more democratic. It is in this context that he argues that it is difficult to conclude that either process necessarily precedes the other. Shihata’s (1999) argument on the need for the emergence of the middle class, education and good policies as variables for development regardless of the regimes type remain relevant in the discourse on development, he however fails to give empirical examples to support the different directions of his argument, but rather based most of his arguments on assumptions.

Glaeser Edward et al (2004) join the debate from a more institutional analysis. From their arguments they suggest that human capital is a more basic source of growth than are institutions, poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and subsequently improve their political institution. In their opinion, the objective measure of institutions, those that actually describe the constitutional rules that limit the power of the sovereign, have no predictive power for the growth of per capita income. In contrast, the political variables that are correlated with development are themselves by construction a product of development. Glaeser and his colleagues further this position by arguing that the mere fact that although nearly all poor countries in the 1960s were dictatorships, some of them have managed to get out of poverty, while others stayed is
suggestive of the fact that the choices made by dictators, rather than the constraints on them, have allowed some poor countries to emerge from poverty.

However, in concluding their institution and growth thesis, Glaeser and his colleagues caution that the merits of democracy and the constraints on government as essential human values in their own right should not be denied. But their study tries to suggest some scepticism about the viability of democracy in countries with low level of human capita. This according to them is because there have been few examples of such democracies in the world. This is supportive of the fact that countries that emerge from poverty accumulate human and physical capital under dictatorships, and then, once they have becomes richer, are increasingly likely to improve their institutions.

While I agree with Glaeser and his colleagues (2004) argument that human capital and good policies and not necessarily regime types that enhance growth, I argue that they have little understanding of contemporary usage of institutions. The contemporary meaning of institution includes a special type of social structure that involves potentially codifiable and normative rules of interpretation and behaviour, as well as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions (Searle, 1995, 2005; Hodgson, 2006). Invariably therefore, policies choices are parts of informal institutions, and if we agree with the above conceptualisation of institution then there is the need for an understanding of what institutions generate development and those that hinders development when discussing developmental processes.

From the review of literature on the relationship between democracy and development which I have attempted so far, there is a consensus of opinion among scholars that structures and
Institutions matter for democracy and development, but the area of disagreement is whether it is democracy that facilitates the emergence of structures and institutions that aids economic development or it is authoritarian regimes that facilitate the emergence of structures and institutions that enhance the emergence of democracy. From the positions of these two schools one will rightly accept Jahdish Bhagwati quote of Joan Robinson’s observation that “in economics, everything and its opposite are true (for you can almost always find evidence, from some place or historical period, to support almost everything)” (Bhagwati, 1995:50).

Nevertheless, it is pertinent to point out that going by a critical assessment of the positions of the two schools within the context of deductive analysis and cross-country studies there is no linear relationship between democracy and development. More so, I shall advance another line of argument emanating from the body of literature that in Africa, democracy should not only be seen as an end in itself, but also as means to an end. In this context I will point to the logic that structural and institutional factors may distort or obscure the relationship between democracy and development. Thus, even if democracy is inherently capable of generating more and better development, as seen in the body of literature, a country with an authoritarian rule may enjoy initial structural and institutional conditions which are greatly hospitable to economic growth that it outperforms a democratic regime. Bhagwati (1995) attests to this when he suggests that this may have been the case with the super-performing Far Eastern economies which, in addition to authoritarianism, inherited both egalitarian land reforms and high literacy rates: two factors that are widely considered to stimulate development.

Therefore, for democracy to achieve development it must be accompanied with favourable endogenous and exogenous structural and institutional factors. It is the context of the structural and institutional prerequisites for development in the literature that I underline the
position that democracy and development in Africa must be pursued from an Afro-centric perspective. Claude Ake subscribes to this argument when he asserts that “in order for African democracy to be relevant and sustainable it will have to be radically different from liberal democracy. For one thing, it will have to de-emphasize abstract political rights and stress concrete economic rights, because the demand for democracy in Africa draws much of its impetus from the prevailing economic conditions within it” (Ake, 1993:241). Domesticating democracy in Africa within the context of the continent’s structural and institutional realities does not in any way affects the goal of development since the fact has been established in the literature that it is not regimes type that determines development, but structures and institutions does.

2.5 Conclusion

From the literature review under this chapter, I have established the fact that one-party dominance and its attendant neo-patrimonial, clientelist and prebendal politics could only be detrimental to socio-economic development, in accordance with the existing social and political class structure of the concerned country. This is because elements of neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism are present in almost all system of governments across the world but are different in the form and degree at which they affect socio-political and economic development. Moreover, the form that one-party dominance, neo-patrimonialism, clientelism and prebendalism take determines their effects on socio-political and economic development. The form that they assume in a given political system determines if they would be anti-development or pro-development.

The case of Botswana, which happens to be a good example of an African developmental state as I have earlier argued has proved that there is nothing in one-party dominance and
neo-patrimonialism that leads directly to any developmental outcome especially when political leaders are committed to the provision of the common good of all citizens. Thus, the effect of one-party dominance, neo-patrimonialism clientelism and prebendalism on socio-economic development must be understood in context, evaluated for its positive as well as negative consequences, and not be used as a one-variable explanation for development outcomes.
THEORETICAL FRAMING

3.1 Introduction

This chapter by using the developmental state’s model attempts establishing how formal institutions like the state, state structures and policies emanating from these formal structures enhance development. In order to achieve this, further attempt is made to unravel how technocracy and bureaucracy impact on the level of development. Moreover, by making reference to the East-Asia Tigers the work explore how institutions become relevant for development.

3.2 Theorising the Role of the State in Development

Development theory and policy debates over the years have remained divided between the neoclassical paradigm and the “institutional” development theorists. Though, the Institutional development theory was the dominant orthodoxy during the 1950s and early 1960s, the neoclassical paradigm and the neoliberal economic measures associated with it, dominates development theory and policy more recently, especially after the emergence of a unipolar world. This latter development paradigm views state involvement in the economy as negative and therefore advocates reducing its involvement, quite against the belief of the “institutionalists” who contend that market failure is responsible for underdevelopment, and hence the state should play important roles in development.

Four different factors were responsible for the dominance of the neoclassical orthodoxy over the Institutional theory or developmental state theorists, at least from the beginning of the 1970s up to the turn of the 21st century. First, was the collapse of many centrally planned
economies in the socialist states. Second, was the failure of extensive state intervention in promoting import-substituting industrialization that had instead generated inefficient industries that were bailed out by the state. Third, was the rise in “rent seeking” and corruption associated with state involvement in economic development. Fourth, empirical evidence from the most successful countries to emerge from the Third World (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) seemed to affirm economic development through outward-oriented measures driven by the state (Haggard, 2013).

However, in recent times the neo-liberal model of development has been significantly criticized. Key here is the failure of the neoliberal economic measures to rejuvenate the economies of most of the Third World countries. Further, the dominant of development in East Asian’s countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore and thereafter Malaysia has identified a central role played by the state in conjunction with capital and the re-emergence of a critique of the neoclassical paradigm has also seen the re-emergence of the relevance of the ‘institutional’ developmental state thesis. Core theoretical insight into the developmental state model according to Haggard (2013:10) ‘is that the process of economic development is characterised by a myriad of market failures that can only be solved through government intervention, coordination and institutions’. Thus, central to the developmental state thesis is that development, especially in the global South should be viewed as a chain in which states need to play strategic roles in planning and sustaining economic development. This state according to Adrian Leftwich (1994:381) must have;

sufficient power, probity, autonomy and competence at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit and nationally-determined development objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions of economic
growth, by organizing it directly, or by a varying combination of both (Leftwich, 1994:381).

This state is what De Onis (1999) refers to as a state where government is adequately involved in macro and micro economic planning for economic growth. Chalmers Johnson distinguishes the “developmental orientation” of such a state from the socialist type command economy state, on the one hand, and the capitalist regulatory orientation on the other hand’ (Johnson, 1982: 19). This type of state is the type that ‘can create and regulate the economic and political relationships that can support sustained industrialisation or in short, a developmental state’ (Chang 1999: 183). One important element of such state is the cooperation between private business and government or, in other words, the private sector and the public sector in the process of generating policy that aids development (Johnson, 1999).

It is however important to point out that in order to safeguard the state from being captured by private interests in the process of state activism in development there is the relevant roles of a powerful, efficient and autonomous bureaucracy recruited from the best talents available in a state. Furthermore, aside this effective and autonomous bureaucracy in the state led developmental process is the pivotal role of pilot agencies such as Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Economic Planning Board (EPB), Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), displayed by East Asian developmental models (Evans, 1989, 1995, 2009; Thompson, 1996; Johnson, 1999 Evans & Raunch, 1999; Minns, 2001; Sindzingre, 2004).
In the East Asian’s model the networking between the state and the private sector is carried out by either the bureaucrats or technocrats in these pilot agencies which emerge to negotiate and renegotiate developmental policies with the business sector. The ‘pilot agency decides which industries ought to exist and which industries are no longer needed in order to promote the industrial structure which enhances the nation’s international competitiveness” (Powell, 2004:3).

Thus, for a state to be developmental it must have techno-bureaucratic governance that is corporately cohesive and the insulation of the bureaucracy from special interests, the concentration of expertise in the bureaucracy through meritocratic recruitment, and the provision of long-term career rewards as well as a distinctive and rewarding status to officials (Evans, 1989, 1995, 2003, 2009; Onis, 1991; Kim, 1993; Kohl, 1994; Thompson, 1996; Evans & Raunch, 1999; Minns, 2001; Sindzingre, 2004, Wong, 2004; Jayasuriya, 2006; Radice, 2008).

Wade (1990) pointedly says that the effectiveness of the bureaucracy is vital for a developmental state as it allows bureaucrats to manage the economy, through the careful selection of key industrial sectors to support and the use of policy instruments to achieve this (Wade, 1990). According to Evans, it is not sufficient for a bureaucracy to be only autonomous but that such autonomy should be an ‘embedded autonomy’ for it to achieve developmental goals. For Johnson (1987) and as underline by Evans (1995 & 1998), this “embedded autonomy” requires the connection of the bureaucracy to their societies and particularly their business communities in order to formulate and implement developmental goals, with adequate insulation from public and private interests, in the cause of this
autonomy. Adopting a neo-Weberian typology in arguing for the necessary insulation of the bureaucracy, Evans argues that:

...the successful DS needed to be both close to, and distant from, the business class it sort to influence and nurture. In other words, the state had to be sufficiently embedded in society so that it was capable of implementing its goals by acting through social infrastructure, but not so close to business that it risked ‘capture’ by particular interests and was thus incapable of acting in the wider ‘national interest’. Ideally, the effective DS should be ‘embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of policies (Beeson, 2004:43)

While the features of the developmental state are numerous, the notion of embedded autonomy and the need for insulating the bureaucrats and technocrats from public and political influence in the process of formulating and implementing developmental policies as suggested by Evans and his colleagues make it compelling to introduce state’s commitment and capacity in the development state’s matrix. Ideological commitment is the ability of the state to rapidly accumulate capital and maximizes such for economic growth and sustained development that will impact positively on the citizens.

This commitment involves the state having national goals and the desire to formulate and implement policies to achieve these collective goals. State capacity on the other hand, involves the adequate possession of institutional, technical, administrative and political prerequisites to put into effect the developmental agenda in a developmental state (Mkandawire, 2001; Nyaluke & Seiful, 2003). This state capacity is what Beeson (2004: 22) refers to at a pragmatic level, the idea to conceive and implement policy by the state and at a
conceptual level, the attention of the state toward the precise circumstances, tools, strategies and relationships that distinguish and effectively constitute different national approaches to successful economic development.

State commitment and capacity remain relevant because the embedded autonomy and techno-bureaucratic insulation will only be possible when these two concepts/features are present in a state. This is to suggest that we can have state ideological commitment without state capacity for development, but state capacity becomes affected by state ideological commitment to development. It is upon this backdrop that I make a case for the prominence of ideological commitment and state capacity for every developmental state. Thus, for a state to achieve development through the state led developmental approach it must have both developmental commitment as well as the capacity to achieve such development. What this depicts is that there is the relevance of institutions as well as political variables in the process of state led development.

3.3 Developmental State and East Asian Development

The failure of the neoliberal economic measures to rejuvenate the economies of most of the Third World countries and the spectacular socio-economic development in the East Asian late industrialisers-Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore renewed scholars’ interests in considering the relevance of state’s intervention in the process of economic development. Thus, in explaining the unprecedented development in these East Asian countries and developmental failure in other third world countries political economy scholars come up with the developmental state thesis.
However, the literature on the developmental state remains diverse. Some developmental state scholars focus on the state's characteristics and its different forms, while others examine factors that contributed to its emergence or origin, and latter scholars concentrate on how the state, especially the East Asian states actually implemented their development policy objectives. I shall join the debate on this developmental state thesis, with reference to the East Asian countries, by taking a look at the position of different scholars about the developmental state and make a critique of existing literature.

In looking at the characteristics and forms of developmental state scholars attempt explaining the features of this type of state, the regime types conducive for its existence and the possible transfer or replicability of the East Asian state forms to other third world countries. According to Karl von Holdt (2010) the developmental state has wide range of state and governmental forms and contrasting models of development. Despite these variations, Karl von Holdt and some other scholars agree that there are shared features of developmental states. Some of these features include an ideological commitment to “development; such a state is an active or interventionist one; it must also have the capability or capacity to set appropriate developmental goals; develop the policies that have the greatest likelihood of achieving those goals, and then implement them effectively” (Karl von Holdt, 2010:12).

Under this category of developmental state scholarship state capability is crucial for the successful developmental state, with the idea that such a state requires an efficient and effective bureaucracy with a high degree of autonomy. Scholars who emphasise features of
developmental state have some consensus of opinion as well as disagreements on the characteristics and forms of such state. I shall take a review of developmental state’s scholarship with the intention of establishing shared features and areas of disagreement among these statists.

Central to the argument in the developmental state thesis is that such state needs an effective and efficient bureaucracy. According to Doner Richard and his colleagues in their classic work “Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: North-East and South-East Asia in Comparative Perspective” (Doner, R. et al, 2005), a developmental state is the state in which experts and bureaucrats collaborate for economic development. It is this effective and efficient bureaucracy that propels the state development through the formulation and implementation of developmental goals and policies.

Peter Evans goes further to explain the characteristics of such bureaucracy. In his view a developmental state bureaucracy must have corporate cohesion and insulated from special interests, the concentration of expertise in its folds through meritocratic recruitment, and the provision of long-term career rewards as well as a distinctive and rewarding status to officials (Evans 1989, 1995; Evans & Rauch 1999). He furthers his argument and which other developmental state’s theorists subscribe to that the autonomy of such bureaucracy must be an embedded one. That is, there must be institutionalized public-private cooperation or collaboration in the process of developmental policies formulation and implementation in such a way that the technocrats and bureaucrats are not affected by vested private and

In their opinion the interaction between the state and the society in the process of formulation and implementation should be done in a way that policy makers would not be influenced by political, economic and social interests. Evans (1989 & 1995) emphasises this point when he opines that the “term embedded autonomy describes this double move of the bureaucracy not being adversely influenced by interest groups but remaining connected enough to society in order to act to ensure growth and (to an extent) redistribution” (Evans 1995:221). According to Wonik Kim (2009), “this embeddedness helps the state to adopt optimal industrial policies that maximise industrial interests and, as a positive externality, social interests in the form of a high level of economic development” (2009: 384). In the argument of these developmental state scholars efficient bureaucracy and its embeddedness are the necessary elements that produced the economic miracles of the East-Asian countries.

A huge literature on the developmental state accepts the inevitable roles of an efficient and effective bureaucracy with some degree of its embeddedness in the process of policy formulation as I have variously examined above. There is however a lacuna created by developmental state scholars on the nature of embeddedness. There is no theoretical argument from these scholars pointing to the fact that connection between economic bureaucrats and business sectors will entail optimal policies. In fact, there are occasions where the consequence of the public-private interaction in the formulation and
implementation of policies have resulted in collusion or monopoly, which in turn creates moral problems for industrialists and investors and in turn becomes anti-development.

A series of corruption scandals in Japan and South Korea during the 1990s and after the Asian financial crisis erupted in 1997 are examples of the negative impacts of embeddedness which statists fail to consider in their analysis. Therefore the failure of the developmental state theorists in examining the negative externalities of embeddedness to the overall economy, and the fact that they do not specify the condition under which this close linkage necessarily leads to economic development show the shortcoming in their position.

While there is a consensus of opinion on the importance of bureaucratic embedded autonomy in the developmental state literature, it is further advanced among state activism theorists that the organisational structure of developmental state also includes the existence of pilot agents or economic general staff. Such pilot agents include Japan’s celebrated Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Korea’s the Economic Planning Board (EPB), Botswana’s Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), etc. (Wade, 1990; Ziya, 1991; Powell, 2004; Kim, 2009).

For instance while attesting to the importance of pilot agents in development planning Wade holds that “the pilot agency decides which industries ought to exist and which industries are no longer needed in order to promote the industrial structure which enhances the nation’s
international competitiveness” (1990:195). He buttress his position with the fact that one of the features of Taiwan developmental state is the existence of a pilot agency referred to as the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) which does the nuts and bolts of developmental planning and implementation. There is also Industrial Development Bureau located within the Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs which is responsible for championing and coordinating the interaction between the government and private sector (Wade, 1990).

Similarly Onis Ziya making reference to Chalmers Johnson supports the importance of pilot agents in developmental planning and implementation when he underlines the fact that the East Asian Tigers development was guided with policies formulated by pilot agents within the bureaucracy (1991:178). For Wonik Kim (2009) in order for a state to have a strong capacity to implement and sustain “big push” (2009: 386) policies there is the need for a bureaucratic agency that can coordinate industrial policies, like Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and Korea’s Economic Planning Board. This argument on the importance of pilot agents dominated by different experts in the process of development reinforces the relevance of technocrats in developmental planning and implementation. Thus, the emphasis on the pivotal roles of autonomous bureaucracy with pilot agents in the formulation and implementation of developmental policies is suggestive of the fact that techno-bureaucratic governance is relevant for every developmental state.

While there is a consensus of opinion on the relevance of techno-bureaucratic governance in the developmental state literature, there is a divided position on the form or type of such state
in existence. For instance, Maphunye Kealeboga (2009) in his view while explaining the prospects of developmental state in Africa argues that every developmental state aside having quality techno-bureaucratic governance must be democratic. With this argument he subscribes to the notion of Democratic Developmental State (DDS). According to him a developmental public service is seen as the best option available to support Africa’s quest for a developmental state, which itself will have to be democratic and egalitarian.

For him, to avoid the pitfalls of the East Asian developmental states, developmental states in Africa must be democratic. Quoting Sachikonye (1995) he asserts that democratic at least in the minimal understanding of the concept; “multi-partyism, periodic elections, [and] governmental succession by constitutional electoral procedures [that are] guaranteed under the rule of law” (1995: iii). So, while still making reference to Sachikoye, he argues further that for a developmental state’s model to succeed in Africa it has to adopt the participatory model of democracy, i.e. the “expansive and more substantive definition” which is characterised by “redistributive socio-economic reforms, broad popular participation and human rights” (ibid) including other values that will enable such countries to develop into DDSs. Other scholars also emphasise that developmental state needs to be democratic state (Edigheji, 2005; Pillay 2007; Sandbrook et al, 2007).

In the opinion of Kealeboga there are various reasons why democratic developmental states are important in Africa. In reference to Kwon (2005), he asserts that the East Asian’s model of developmental state is unsuitable for Africa because they were authoritarian and did not allow adequate public or civil society participation. More so, the Asian’s model of
developmental state did not address the problems of human rights protection and inequality among their citizens. In his opinion therefore, an authoritarian developmental state’s model is not appropriate for Africa, but rather a Democratic Developmental State (DDS).

I agree with Kealeboga’s position that democracy is desirable for developmental state, but however argue that democracy remains just means to an end and not an end itself. A good analysis of the East Asian developmental states suggests the presence of striking differences in the political regimes among the individual variants of these countries. For example the Japanese developmental state in the post-war period differed from its Korean and Taiwanese counterparts in that it has been able to coexist with democratic political institutions. One clear indication that democracy is not “one size fits all” condition for developmental state is the experience of the economic challenges South Korea faced when it moved from authoritarian regime to democracy.

Thus, empirical evidence is suggestive of the fact that regime types have little deterministic impact on development as Japan achieved economic development under democratic rule while other East Asian countries achieved development under authoritarian regimes. The key factor enhancing development is the quality of techno-bureaucratic governance, which remains the product of political elite structure and not regime type. Sung (2004) in examining the relationship between democracy and corruption in various cross-sections of countries underscores this line of argument when he posits that there is no significant relationship between democracy and corruption or development. In his view “it is the initial conditions and the final achievements of each society, rather than the democratization process itself that determine the shape and magnitude of the impact of democratic reforms on political institutions” (Sung, 2004:181).
In describing another typology of developmental state Peter Evans (1989) tries to differentiate between “legitimate developmental state” and the “intermediate developmental state” while attempting explaining the “predatory states” in Africa. According to him, the legitimate developmental states are characterised by embedded autonomy which joins well developed bureaucracy with the public-private ties in promoting economic transformation. East Asian countries of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore are his examples of legitimate developmental state. Intermediate states on the other hand occasionally approximate embedded autonomy, but not sufficiently to give them the transformative capacity of developmental states. He cites Brazil as classical example of such state.

While the above developmental state’s literature I have examined so far takes into account the characteristics or types of developmental state, another body of literature contends that for a proper understanding of the concept there is the need to understand historical structural basis and factors that contributed to the emergence of state-led development in East Asia or what could be referred to as the origin of developmental state. For Onis Ziya (1991), two factors, both of which are the products of specific historical circumstances are relevant in explaining the emergence of developmental state in East Asia.

The first factor is the unusual degree of external threat confronted by the East Asian states in the post-war period. This extraordinary security threat faced by the East Asian states helped to bolster the nationalistic vision which existed in these states and the unique commitment to the long-term transformation of the economy. The second factor is the international context
within which East Asian growth materialized in the post-war period. According to Onis Ziya unlike the experience of many Third World states, Korea and Taiwan for example benefited from heavy interaction with the strongest and most dynamic countries within the cores, the United States and Japan. He however proposes further that it was not only the special nature of their interaction with the core which explains their superior success, but also the way that they have managed their interaction with the external environment with respect to both trade and capital inflows.

Another prominent argument in this category of causal factors of developmental state’s scholarship is the work of Kohli Atul (1994) “Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea’s Developmental State”. According to him Japanese colonial influence on Korea, in 1905-45, was important in shaping a political economy that later evolved into the high-growth Korean path to development. Japanese colonialism differed in important respects from the colonialism of European powers in the sense that they made extensive use of state power for their own economic development, and they used the same state power in transforming South Korea in a relatively short period. Atul sees the Japanese colonial state in Korea as a busy state, which while pursuing the imperial interests evolved a full policy agenda, including the goal of economic transformation of its colony.

He advances the logic that the broad strategy of transformation of South Korea by Japanese colonialism was two pronged: the state utilized its bureaucratic capacities to directly undertake quite a few economic tasks; and also involved propertied groups. Thus, of all the
colonisers Japan stands remains the only one with a successful record of deliberate, State led political and economic transformation of its colony. Kohli argues that Japanese colonialism created new "state structures" and "patterns of state-class relations" that helped postcolonial ruling elites build South Korea's high-growth economy. Therefore, there are historical continuities in the process of South Korea’s development, Kohli Atul argues.

My problem with Kohli Atul’s argument on the unique nature of Japanese colonialism and its impact on the development of Korea is that it cannot be used in a comparative analysis of Korea’s development and that of other East Asian countries like Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia. This is premised on the fact that if Korea faced a unique colonial experience that enhanced its development, then one can rightly argue that Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia also had unique colonial experience that propelled their own development. I hold strongly that colonial has little impact on the development of Korea because this line of argument is not substantial.

Wonik Kim also takes a look at the importance of colonialism in the emergence of developmental state in his work “Rethinking Colonialism and the Origins of Developmental State in East Asia”. According to Kim “the developmental state is not manna from heaven” (Kim, 2009:386). While citing Stephen Haggard (2004) he contends that the preoccupation with institutions and functionalism in the developmental state literature has concealed more fundamental political and social processes that are themselves determinants of institutional form and quality. According to him the socio-economic factor that gave rise to the developmental state, which led to economic growth must be taken into cognisance. He
substantiates his argument by positing that the foundational moments of colonialism greatly influenced the pattern of development in these North-East Asian countries.

He advances that colonial institutions played a crucial role in perpetuating income distribution in these countries; these initial institutions shaped the evolution of the conditions under which subsequent development would occur. Following the position of Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) Kim argues that countries that were wealthier in 1500 are the ones that are less developed now, suggesting that the crucial factor for growth in the long term is colonialism. In his view the economic successes in the North-East Asian developmental states were not because of the continuing influences from colonialism but because of the radical rupture from the colonial legacy, especially as it relates to successful bridge of societal inequality. For him the crucial historical phase was the moment of independence when East Asian countries had an opportunity to break away from the colonial legacy of income inequality. He holds that the ability to break from colonial legacy is dependent on the type of society and the political elite structure created by the nature and character of the colonial state in the first place. Thus, the type of society and elites structure Southeast Asian countries inherited affect their process of development.

The third category of developmental state scholarship is the one that emphasises how policies are made and implemented in the state. Onis Ziya (1991) contributes to this body of literature. Elaborating Amsden’s argument on how South Korea achieved economic development Ziya posits that market rationality was constrained by the priorities of industrialisation. In South Korea the government performed strategic role in taming domestic
and international forces and harnessed them to national economic growth. In his opinion on the South Korean case, the state subsidised and directed a selected group of industries and subsequently exposed them to international competition.

In Ziya’s argument he observes that the Korean’s government did not merely subsidised selected group of industries but the government also has specified stringent performance requirements in return for the subsidies it has provided in the first place. This discipline exercised over private firms enabled the government to reward firms that made positive use of the subsidies while penalising those that did not perform well. This discipline accounts for why subsidies fail to lead to a waste of resources as obtained in the case of other middle income countries. Thus, government dual policy of support and discipline constitute the core component of the Japanese, South Korea and other East Asian development “miracles” (Amsden, 1991; Ziya, 1991; Kim, 2009).

Mark Thompson (1996) also supports the subsidisation of industrialisation as the chief policy options that accounts for the rapid economic development of the East Asian countries. In Mark’s account, exporters and importers, savers and investors, domestic industrialists and foreign investors are all helped by these industrial subsidies. He subscribes to the fact that the efficient use of government subsidise immensely contributed to the economic development of the East Asian countries. Citing examples of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia he contends that when subsidy is not politicised it will automatically lead to greater productivity. Thus by supporting the position of Amsden (1991), Ziya (1991), Kim (2009) Thompson Mark underline the fact that the ability of these East Asian states to make
subsidies more dependent on performance criteria than developmental states elsewhere in the world contributed to their tremendous economic development.

Mark Beeson (2004) in his own account about how development was achieved through policy formulation and implementation in the East Asian countries has a different opinion form the subsidised industrialisation as argued by the above mentioned scholars. In his own version, he holds the view that much of East Asia was able to replicate the experience of the ‘developed’ world, facilitate industrial development through technological adaptation, and integrate national economies into the wider international system on favourable terms through a judicious use of trade and industry policies for the promotion of domestic business. This was achieved by recycling high level of domestic savings to targeted domestic industrial sectors and businesses. In these developmental states domestic businesses were given adequate access to capital through “artificially” low interest rates, which gave them a potentially important advantage over established rivals elsewhere. He gives the Japanese financial system insulation and autonomy until the 1970s in supporting his argument.

It is pertinent to establish at this juncture that the general narrative in the developmental state literature is that the Late Industrialised Countries (LICs) achieved development through state intervention in designing national developmental goals and the formulation and implementation of policies to achieve these goals.
Also central to this literature is that “autonomous embedded” bureaucracy and pilot agents dominated by various experts were invaluable in transforming these LCIs from the league of underdeveloped to developed countries. Opinions are however divided among scholars on the factors that contributed to the emergence of the East Asian developmental states, as well as socio-economic policies that made development to be realisable in these countries. Prominent among the factors that contributed to the emergence of the developmental state in the literature are the argument of; initial condition of these countries with colonialism as an explanatory tool for this, geographical location, external threats, co-operation with the Western World, etc.

I argue that a singular factor cannot be used to explain the emergence of developmental state, but holds that one factor that remains prominent and more relevant in the causal literature is the initial condition laid by colonial experience in these LICs. Colonialism in these countries established society and elite structure which later affected post-colonial state’s commitment to achieving developmental goals and also enhanced state’s capacity for development.

Scholarship on the policies that generated development in the developmental states is also diverse. However, general trend in the developmental state literature suggest that subsidised industrialisation occasioned by reward for performing sectors/industries and discipline for non-performing ones and state regulation of the financial sector, through the granting of low interest loans to selected domestic industries and businesses were major policies adopted by these developmental states. The regulation of the financial sector assisted the domestic industries by promoting import substitution that to a large extent aided economic growth and
development. Logically therefore, the developmental state’s literature establishes that the East Asian states achieved development through industrialisation midwifed by state’s intervention. Going further, the general logic in the developmental state’s literature is that development in the LICs was achieved through state’s commitment and capacity to generate national developmental goals and the formulation and implementation of policies to achieve national developmental objectives.

### 3.4 Technocracy, Bureaucracy and Economic Development

There is a growing debate on the role of technocrats and bureaucrats in the promotion or impediment of socio-economic development. More so, there is also the contention among scholars on the appropriate system of government or regime type that enhances techno-bureaucratic governance as well as development. While some scholars argue that regime types have impact on techno-bureaucratic governance and development some other scholars posit that regime types have no impact on techno-bureaucratic governance. I intend joining this debate with a review of different positions of scholars in these two groups, in order to establish the conditions under which certain types of political regime are likely to generate development through techno-bureaucratic governance.

By so doing I would be able to establish if there is relationship between types of regime and technocrats involvement in the process of development. Especially within the backdrop of the fact that Chalmers Johnson who coined the concept of developmental states, succinctly asserts that “it should not be forgotten than authoritarianism is the most common form of
Patricio Silva (1996) explored the role of technocrats in Chile and Mexico by making a lucid study of technocratic governance in Chile in comparison with what is obtainable in Mexico in order to explain the roles that technocrats play in the process of policies formulation and implementation. He also examines the extent at which political factors (such as the type of political regime, the political party system, and the relationship between intellectuals and the state) played a role in strengthening or hindering technocratization of politics in the two countries. Furthermore, he asserts that to a greater extent the type of regime (authoritarian or democratic) affects the size and importance of the state technocracy in a country.

To establish this linkage he makes a comparative study of authoritarian regime in Mexico and Chilean democratic regime for the period between 1935 and 1973. In this respect he underlines the fact that Mexican technocracy constitutes one of the most remarkable cases of techno-bureaucratic ascendance in Latin America as a result of the authoritarian nature of its political system, while during the same period in Chile, the increasing politicization and ideological polarization have affected the rise in technocrats involvement in policy making process.

In the Chilean example Patricio Silva points out that no political sector proved able to construct a political formula capable of keeping it in power for two consecutive presidential terms. This had a negative effect on the continuity of policies and particularly of state personnel. Thus, not only did the people in charge of ministries and state agencies change every six years, but often the entire political and economic orientation of the country also
change. Silva, also explains the differences between Mexico and Chile in relation to the level of technocratisation within the context of the differences in their political party’s system. By establishing these differences he underscores the fact that the effective deactivation and eradication of potential power contenders in the society eliminate one of the major barriers to the rise of technocracy. He sums his position by concluding that Mexico achieved by authoritarian means what Western industrial societies obtained by steady social and economic development: an increasing depolitisation of society in the face of the technocratisation of the decision-making process.

What Silva’s position suggests is that technocratic governance is important for socio-economic development, but such can be achieved more under an authoritarian regime as displayed by Mexico between 1935 and 1973. This position on the need for technocratic governance as a one of the necessary condition for development especially in developing countries is convincing, but the assertion that technocracy can achieve this feat mostly under authoritarian regimes is misleading. Taking a look at the level of technocratisation in decision making in most advanced democracies we would quite agree with the fact that while Silva’s position is logical for the explanation of development in countries transforming from authoritarian to democratic rule, however generalizing that authoritarian rule is a necessary condition for technocratic governance is controversial.

Similar to Patricio Silva arguments, Francis Owakah and Robert Aswani (2009) explain how technocracy can aid development, with emphasis on the roles of regime types in the process. However, while Silva emphasizes authoritarianism as suitable for technocracy which in turn generates development, Owakah and Aswani observe that, the future of development in Africa lies in the shift from democracy in the conventional sense to a value-driven
democracy, where the role of the expert is recognized and appreciated. An anticipatory technocracy “designed as a form of in-built problem-solving, in which action is based on psychological conditioning, rather than intrusive whims of personality” (Owakah and Aswani, 2009:89). In their view, most African countries still struggle with the tripartite problems of eradication of poverty, provision of adequate health care and universal provision of education.

They argue that these problems can be given a solution based perspective if and only they are well conceived in a technocratic model system embedded in a value-driven democracy. Out of this, a country can address ways and means of investing in roads, power, water, situation, health care and education by identifying the basic needs of the populace, computing the cost of meeting them and identifying ways of financing the relevant services. For Owakah and Aswani, the amount of public resources wasted in Africa points to the lack of expert management of public affairs. They therefore suggest that in order to chart a path of development in Africa technocrats should be given prominent roles. According to them this is necessary due to the fact that:

What technocracy aims for is not the assimilation of democratic institutions, but rather the total transformation of constitutionalism, entailing the introduction of knowledge based means of assessing the desired development needs, aligning them to available resources, and mainstreaming these in future value oriented thinking and policy decision making. The technocrat seeks to inform, assess and integrate the infrastructure in a merit-based management system (Owakah and Aswani, 2009:97)

The need for technocracy for development in African states cannot be overemphasised. Therefore, I agree with Owakah and Aswani’s position that if development must be achieved
on the continent technocratic governance remains an important element of the process. And if technocracy is to achieve development, it is not within the context of Western liberal democracy, but with a democracy that is participatory and competitive, while at the same time accommodating African peculiar realities.

In the manner in which Francis Owakah and Robert Aswani argue against the enhancement of development by technocrats under western liberal democracy, Miguel Centeno (1993) raises very pessimistic views about the roles of technocrats in policymaking under democratic regimes. He argues that technocratic policymaking focuses on instrumental action that is purposive and not conducive to debates regarding values or ends. This instrumental action appears to require authoritarian and bureaucratic frameworks and these, in the final instance, are not conducive to large-scale population. More so, a democratic technocracy cannot sustain prolonged crises of confidence in its abilities. This according to him is true of all political bodies, but it is particularly salient for technocracies. Precisely, because it legitimates itself as a meritocracy, a technocracy is also under much greater pressure than other regimes to perform efficiently on a consistent basis. In this respect, the challenges of creating a consensus, apportioning sacrifice, and sustaining confidence will strain the alliance technocrats may have established with popularly elected politicians.

In Centeno’s account, as the politicians face constituency demands that require the satisfaction of particular interests or the proposals of alternative policies, they find it increasingly difficult to both defend the technocratic policies and to retain their elected positions. Centeno concludes that under democracies involving technocratic governance “while advanced degrees may help our modern leviathans construct societies in which our lives will be longer and less nasty, there is no reason to suspect that such expertise will keep
them from making our existence even more brutish” (Centeno, 1993:330). While he argues for the negative consequences of technocratic governance under democracy, Centeno fails to suggest an alternative regime types through which policies that aid development can be made. For, if democracy is not good for technocracy, what is the alternative? Centeno did not in any way answer this question.

While Centeno did not suggest the type of regime under which technocracy can aid development, Mark Eric Williams (2002) suggests that the optimal model is democracy in which the executive gives strong support to technocracy but within an environment where the legislature is not assertive. By examining how market reforms, technocrats and institutional innovations facilitated reforms in Mexico and Argentina, Mark Eric Williams contends that executive leadership helps facilitate institutional change, but technocrat policy makers play more crucial roles.

According to him, “first wave” market reforms in developing countries yield two fairly consistent findings. First, to advance liberalization initiatives successfully requires significant revision of government agencies, institutional arrangements, and policy-making procedures, in part to provide reformers autonomy from countervailing pressures. Second, in this process presidents and technocrats play critical, but fundamentally distinct roles; in terms of effective institutional change, the fate of reform projects are seen to hinge on a president’s capacity to assemble a cohesive, technocratic “change team” insulate it from countervailing pressures, and delegate to its members the authority to craft sound policies and execute tough policy choices.
Williams however points to the fact that while technocrats achieve institutional innovation via strong executive support, the technocrats achieve more results in a political system where the legislature is less assertive. With his case study Mark Eric Williams suggests that in Mexico, congressional subservience to the executive gave the president’s technocrats an unusual degree of freedom. In Argentina, however, executive agents laboured under the constraints of a legislature that was far more assertive. Thus, in order to enhance development engineered by technocrats the support of the executive in collaboration with the legislature is important. Williams work confirms that institutional change can powerfully affect reform outcomes and that policy technocrats can play critical roles in bringing such changes about. Furthermore, this work highlights the critical roles that technocrats can play, both in identifying the institutional impediments to reform, and in formulating the innovation strategies that the president embraces. I am however not convinced with his argument that technocrats cannot engineer development under assertive legislature. Taking case studies of Botswana where technocrats have assisted the president in formulating development priorities despite the assertive nature of the country’s legislature shows that techno-bureaucratic governance is possible under assertive legislature. What are required for effective techno-bureaucratic governance especially in developing countries are an executive arm and a legislature that are both committed to development.

From the foregoing literature it is apparent that development results from policies that allow a state to play developmental roles in which technocracy constitutes an important element in the process. However, while the above mentioned scholars establish a very close linkage between; regime types, technocracy and socio-economic development a look at further
literature suggest empirical and cross-country evidences to show that regime types remain partial proximate causes of development, while there remain deeper links in the causal chain. Thus, for more than three decades ago R.S Milne (1982), while writing on “Technocrats and Politics in the ASEAN Countries” raises this important caveat that “from the experience of these countries, authoritarianism and the prevalence of ministerial technocrats do seem to be associated, but this generalization is in need of refinement” (Milne, (1982:428). He suggests that instead of assuming that it was authoritarianism that aided development in these countries we should look beyond that argument and link the development in the countries to the outlook and attitude of technocrats, and political competition which allows technocrats to have political skills and political power base.

Similarly, Tung Vu (2007) while writing on “State Formation and the Origins of Developmental States in South Korea and Indonesia” argues that state structure and the roles of leaders are very crucial in successful developmentalism than regime types. The state structure which aids development according to him include: a stable centralized government; a cohesive bureaucracy; and effective coercive institutions, which must rest socially on an alliance with producer classes. The roles of the leaders in the development process involve the commitment and technical capacity of state leadership to play developmental roles.

Riwanto Tirtosudarmo (2008) like Tung Vu supports the importance of these structural factors in the process of development, but while Tung Vu suggests the roles of leaders in the process, he adds institutional factors as another important element necessary for development. Riwanto Tirtosudarmo contends that “the interplay of major structural factors, exogenous or endogenously generated, becomes the development underpinnings in which
pro-poor policies and a poverty reduction strategy can be sustained over a relatively long period” (2008:1).

By using Nigeria as an example in his structural and institutional thesis, he asserts further that the “convolution of embedded structural factors, most particularly the divisive and conflicting character of the state and society, constitutes the weakness of political institutions that resulted in the lack of technocratic elite’s effectiveness to formulate and to implement economic development” (Tirtosudarmo, 2008:1). He builds this position on the argument of Peter Lewis (2007) who took an institutional perspective on the process of development in which he argues that it is the interplay of politics, institutional change and economic growth that produced the divergence in the economic development of Indonesia and Nigeria.

By dichotomizing between managerial technocrats and political technocrats with reference to the Fourteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Community Party (CPP) Xiaowei Zang (1993) explains the condition under which technocrats aid development and downplays the importance of regime types and emphasizes the unity between technocrats and bureaucrats. In his opinion the Fourteenth Central Committee of CCP shows the fact that for political and economic development an alliance between the bureaucrats and technocrats is pertinent. According to him, “the career bureaucrats need the technocrats for their advice and expertise, and thus need to share power with them and the technocrats need to cooperate with the career bureaucrats in order to climb up the political hierarchy that has been controlled by the latter” (Zang, 1993:801).

Sulfikar Amir (2008) also advances the need for the unity of the various elements within the technocratic elite for the enhancement of socio-economic development. However, unlike
Zang who examines the dichotomy between managerial technocrats and political technocrats in China, Sulfikar Amir observes the competition between two groups of technocrats (the engineers and the economists) in Indonesia during the New Order era. In his account the engineers advocate technological based development strategy, while the market-oriented economists promote a comparative advantage approach in development policies. This he terms “disunity of technocracy” (Amir, 2008:322).

According to Amir (2008), rivalry between these technocratic groups occurs in the arena of policymaking process and bureaucratic structure. Thus, the two groups brought in different views not merely on the issue of which economic sectors should be put on priority over others, but more principally, the way development ought to be pursue. The economists pursue market economy principles while emphasizing the role of the government to stimulate growth. The engineers who joined the Indonesian government during when the economy was booming, in contrast to the economist’s gradual development approach, offered a technology-based development strategy to accelerate the transformation of Indonesia from an agricultural-based society to an industrial based one.

During this bureaucratic and development agenda clash battle between the economists and the engineers, the latter has more political resource which enable them to outmanoeuvre the former. The price for such clash according to Amir is the creation of policy incoherency, which eventually afflicted Indonesia’s industrial competitiveness. Thus Xiaowei Zang and Sulfikar Amir underline the importance of unity of purpose for technocracy to achieve socio-economic development. Zang argues that each group of technocrats possesses distinctive resources necessary for development that the other group does not possess. Zang’s and
Amir’s arguments point to institutional expression of developmental approaches and not necessarily a product of regime types.

Furthermore, a look at scholars’ views on the roles of the bureaucracy in development point to the pivotal roles of techno-bureaucratic governance in the process of development, than how regime types facilitate the process. For instance Gillian Koh (1997) by assessing bureaucratic rationality in Singapore posits that Singapore movement’s toward developmental state is aided by the bureaucratic elites. These bureaucratic elites were engaged in a more proactive process of problem-definition, that is, of creating a vision of the future of Singapore and “building it”.

According to him, this is different from being a bureaucracy geared towards problem-solving, which is focused mainly on policy implementation and system maintenance. Thus, the basis of the successful Singapore developmental state was a simple mission-oriented bureaucracy that was organized like an efficient, machine bureaucracy. The top bureaucrats here were independent thinkers, but not as an autonomous group, rather by adopting the overarching meta-value as defined by the Singapore’s ruling party’s “development for survival”. Koh’s position shows that an effective bureaucracy in collaboration with the ruling party is the primary factor for Singapore’s development.

Evans (1998), examination of the institutional prerequisites of East Asian economic policies points to the position of Gillian Koh in similar context. According to him a highly capable, coherent economic bureaucracy, closely connected to, but still independent of, the business community, remains essential institutional prerequisites for successful policy formulation and implementation. He thus put forward his argument in this context by characterizing East
Asian economic policies into the “market friendly model”, the “industrial policy model” and the “profit-investment nexus model”.

According to him, despite the important differences between these three models, they share a robust core as far as institutional prerequisites are concerned. All the three models require relations between government and business that are close but preserve the government’s ability to act independently of business pressures. He sums his argument by suggesting that if there are transferable lessons to be gained from East Asia’s success, they must begin with the institutional combination he has suggested. Similarly, Goran Hyden et al (2003), in taking a survey of bureaucracy and governance in 16 countries argue that the period of rapid growth in East Asia supports the view that the bureaucracy was a key ingredient of the “miracle” and that the weakness of bureaucracy in Africa helps explain the poor development performance of many countries on the continent.

This review of literature shows that technocracy and effective bureaucracy are necessary for good policies that can generate development, but there are no enough deductive and empirical evidences suggesting that regime types play vital roles in the process. It is more convenient to settle for the fact that the alliance between technocrats and politicians (Centeno, 1993) and the unity of the various elements within the technocratic elites (Zang, 1993; Vu, 2007; Amir, 2008) remain structural conditions for development than a specific type of regime.

In fact if regime types play any significant role in the emergence of technocracy and development, it is expected that since both Botswana and Nigeria which are blessed with abundant natural resources and under the same one-party dominant system, should experience the same level of technocratic governance and hence the same level of development.
However, in the literature and as empirical evidences suggest, while Botswana with abundant
diamond deposit experiences development enhanced by technocratic governance, Nigeria
with abundant deposit of oil is facing challenges of development in the absence of adequate
technocratic governance. It is against the stark reality that regime types might not in any way
account for development that it becomes necessary to look at structural and institutional
factors involved in the process of shaping up economic development, especially with
emphasis on technocratic governance.

Thus while technocracy and bureaucracy are key in the process of development, the effects of
the character and forms of other variables such as, clientelism, prebendalism and neo-
patrimonialism, political and economic alliance as well as leadership roles on technocratic
governance and by extension development require in-depth research and analysis. This shall
be done with greater emphasis on the socio-political base for techno-bureaucratic governance
and state’s capacity for development.
CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH METHODS

4.1 Introduction
This study investigates the relationship between politics, techno-bureaucratic governance and socio-economic development of Nigeria. Thus, it assesses how neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism pose challenges to techno-bureaucratic governance as well as socio-economic development of the country from 1999 to 2014. Invariably, the research is anchored on the fact that the absence of techno-bureaucratic governance has impacted on the challenges of Nigeria, from 1999 to 2014. Furthermore, it attempts investigating the factors that are responsible for the challenges of techno-bureaucratic governance and development in Nigeria’s dominant party system. In order to understand why there is problem with techno-bureaucratic governance and development in Nigeria the study investigates how the nature and form of clientelism, prebendalism and neo-patrimonialism in this country can be used to explain these challenges.

This study will enable us see divergent formations of techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria, especially in reference to other developmental states, and answer the question about why Nigeria faces challenges of development despite experiencing similar entities (authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes). These types of study are what Tilly (1984) and Azarian (2011) refer to as variation finding comparisons, understood as studies that through comparing multiple forms of a single phenomenon seek to unearth systematic differences among instances and establish a principle of variation in the character or intensity of that phenomenon. Lijphart (1975) refers to this type of study as the study of instances of a
well-specified phenomenon that resemble each other in some respect but different in some others.

Therefore, the study is interested in demonstrating why Nigeria under semi-authoritarian system similar to the East Asian developmental states, has different level of techno-bureaucratic governance and development. Due to the fact that Nigeria’s one-party dominant system is relatively young attention shall be paid to sourcing data through the primary means. That is, through the uses of in-depth interviews, and personal observation carried out by the researcher. Thus, the study involves the usage of various tools, but basically qualitative in the country. These tools include in-depth (individual) interview (IDI) of respondents and observation by the researcher.

The IDIs were audiotape/handwritten (shorthand) and later transcribed. Thereafter, the data collected were analysed using the thematic content analysis. According to Hofstee (2006) content analysis involves coding and classifying data. It also involves categorising and indexing and with the aim of making sense of the data collected and to highlight the important messages, features or findings. Thus, under this study interviewee’s responses were grouped into categories in order to bring together the similar ideas, concepts, or themes that have been discovered. These are therefore reflected in the analysis under different chapters of the work.

4.2 Research Question and Unit of Analysis
Since the major objective of the study is to understand how the absence of techno-bureaucratic governance caused by the prevalence of neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism affects socio-economic development in Nigeria, it led to the first question: how can socio-economic development be measured? In order to measure economic growth, the study uses average annual GDP per capita of Nigeria in order to reduce the risk of getting results that are driven by idiosyncratic figures. Data from World Bank’s Development indicators were also used to determine economic development of the country. Human Development Index of the World Bank was further used to determine the socio-economic development of Nigeria. This is to guide against the misleading use of only Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to measure development.

The research question about the relationship between broad-based political coalition and the emergence of technocratic-bureaucratic governance was examined with an analysis of the nature and character of technocracy and bureaucracy in Nigeria, in order to establish their level of autonomy and insulation. Furthermore, I focus on that research question by analysing nature and form of techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria with reference to other developmental states. This enabled me to unravel critical factors responsible for the unique problems of techno-bureaucratic governance and development in Nigeria.

The research question relating to the effect of prebendalism and clientelism on the emergence and sustenance of techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria was analysed with critical assessment of the effects of variables such as ethnicity, business and political class on political appointments, as well recruitment and promotion in the civil service. This was
further examined with an analysis of the number of technocrats appointed to economic and development relevant portfolios, their identity and social class and the duration of such appointments in Nigeria for a given fifteen years’ period (1999 to 2014). This is necessary in order to establish how the appointment of technocrats affects policy stability and consistency.

I investigate the relationship between sustained technocratic governance and development through analysis of the Economic Freedom in the World (EFW) ratings of government enterprises and investments, SOEs as percentage of GDP for Nigeria for fifteen years and models with government investment in fixed capital formations in the country. Human Development Index and Gini coefficient of Nigeria in year’s preceding general elections were also used as basis of analysis. These HDI and Gini coefficient were used in order to determine if policies formulated during the years preceding a general election were formulated to serve incumbents political interest or for the economic interests of the entire citizens. This analysis was done to determine whether the desperation to enhance election outcome and consolidate dominancy affects the level of techno-bureaucratic governance and development.

This question on the relationship between technocratic governance and development was examined with the analysis of major economic policies initiated by technocrats in Nigeria during a particular period of economic development, as well as a period of economic decline, in order to locate the extent of clientelism and prebendalism in the policy options. This enabled me to answer the question of how clientelism and prebendalism affect policy options and to further establish if different forms of the variables can generate different development
outcomes. Major constitutional provisions and policies that have direct impacts on the autonomy of technocrats and bureaucrats in the process of policy formulation and implementation were selected.

On the relationship between an autonomous and efficient bureaucracy and development, I look at the mode of appointment and promotion in the civil service of Nigeria. Apart from this, the level of the involvement of bureaucrats in the implementation of policies in the case study was used as further mode of analysis. More so, the partnership between technocrats and bureaucrats in policies formulation and implementation was examined in order to adequately establish the relationship between autonomous and efficient bureaucracy and development.

I shall however point out that the “why” and the “how” aspects of the research questions were subjected to the in depth interview method. As Kehinde (2010) while quoting Yin (2003: 1) suggests, the “how” and “why” questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case studies… This is because such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time rather than mere frequencies” of occurrence, which is the strength of surveys. Therefore in order to get objective data the conduct of the field work was guided by a line of inquiries that was structured in a manner that was open-ended, friendly and non-threatening.

4.3 Primary Data

As I have stated under the introduction of this chapter, primary data constitute an important aspect of the study. Thus, primary data for the study were gathered through two extensive
field trips to Nigeria. During those field trips in-depth interviews were conducted and observation by the researcher was made. However, focus was on the use of semi-structured in-depth (individual) interviews (IDIs) of the major stakeholders in this country than other tools listed earlier.

According to Workbook E definition, an in-depth interview is an open-ended, discovery-oriented method to obtained detailed information about a topic from a stakeholder (Workbook E on Conducting In-Depth Interviews: 3). The goal of which is to explore in depth a respondent’s point of view, experience, feelings, and perspectives on the role of technocratic governance on socio-economic and political development under one-party dominant system. The use of semi-structured in-depth interview would assist in uncovering valuable insights and enable us to find out the real effect of techno-bureaucratic governance on development from the people in the known. It would also enable the researcher to probe further questions asked from the respondents for greater detail.

More so, the field study largely employed the in-depth individual interview as tool because the technique is one of the most important means of case study data collection (Kehinde, 2010). The choice of this strategy is the result of a careful consideration of the type of research questions posed, the extent of the researcher’s control over actual behaviour of respondents and the political/contemporaneous character of the data sought. Furthermore, interviews afford the opportunity of immediate response, the problems of low percentage returns of questionnaires did not arise, as well as the avoidance of improperly filled questionnaires if the researcher has opted for the questionnaire’s technique. The interview method afforded the researcher opportunity to ask follow up or probing questions for
questions which the respondents were unable to understand and for sensitive questions, which would not be possible with the questionnaire strategy.

For the in-depth interview in Nigeria, 20 stakeholders were interviewed. Those interviewed include: two technocrats who have served past military regimes; two technocrats who served under Obasanjo’s regime; three technocrats who served under the Goodluck Jonathan’s administration, two members of the National Assembly, in which one was a technocrat; two scholars who have written on prebendal politics in Nigeria; two leaders of political parties, one from the ruling party and the other from the opposition party and seven senior civil servants from the directorial and permanent secretary cadre. Interviewees in this country were drawn from Lagos, the country’s former capital and Abuja, the present capital. In situation where it became practically impossible for the researcher to have face-to-face contact with a very important stakeholder for interview, such interview was conducted through the telephone.

The bulk of the interviews with politicians, technocrats, bureaucrats, and scholars in Nigeria were conducted in English. The interviews were conducted in English because the language is the lingua franca of the country. More so, the respondents were not illiterates but educated people who understood and spoke the language. The interview technique adopted was a mix of case study strategies, both target and accidental respondents. The target respondents included bureaucrats, technocrats and scholars who were specifically sought out for because of their relevance to the research problem and their ability to give relevant information. The politicians who were interviewed were not so deliberately selected, but were interviewed on the basis of accessibility and availability due to the difficulty of getting them interviewed. At any rate based on the tendency that politicians could have party’s bias and therefore give
subjective responses, were selected for interview in order to corroborate or repudiate information gotten from the technocrats, bureaucrats and scholars.

Respondents for the in-depth interviews were selected using the non-probability sampling method. According to Emmanuel (2001) the non-probability sampling is a method in which all subjects in the sampling frame do not have an equal opportunity of being chosen as part of the sample. The study however focused on the usage of the purposive non-probability sampling method, because the field research was approached with specific plans in mind. What I mean by this purposive non-probability method is the selection of people who are likely to have relevant information on the research questions (Emmanuel, 2001:38).

It should be noted that the use of this non-probability method for the selection of my sample doesn’t mean that samples were not representative of the population. I adopt this method due to the nature of the research in which I am not necessarily interested in working out what proportion of population gives a particular response but rather in obtaining an idea of the range of responses on ideas that people have on my research questions. It is in view of this, that information was sourced from respondents with expert knowledge on my research questions due to their office and their experiences relating to the research questions.

4.4 Secondary Data

As stated earlier, apart from the primary sources of gathering data for this work, data were also gathered on my research questions from secondary sources too. Thus, data from
secondary sources like textbooks, journals, unpublished works, bulletins, government gazettes, magazines, periodicals and newspapers, form important source of information for this work. In this regard, the researcher spent some days at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, University of Lagos, Nigeria and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos. The data sourced here serve as additional materials to those gathered at the University of the Western Cape’s Library and from the Internet. This was important due to the fact that there were some secondary materials which could not be found in UWC library or online, but which were found in the Universities and research institutes in Nigeria. This is particularly important in the cases of magazines and newspapers which are domiciled in the country.

4.5 Research Field Work Approach

The researcher embarked on two field trips to Nigeria. The researcher embarked on the first field trip to Nigeria which lasted for six months. Three months were spent at Abuja for the conduct of in-depth interview and to make some personal observation by the researcher. The remaining three months were spent at Lagos for further conduct of in-depth interview and the gathering of secondary data. The conduct of in-depth interview covered the two trips to Nigeria due to the fact that some important interviewees were not available during the first trip, considering the calibre of people that were interviewed. More so, during the field trips, whenever the researcher is not on the field to collect primary data, some time was spent at the library of the Universities and research institute in Nigeria mentioned earlier for the collection of additional secondary data with also took some considerable time.
The second in-depth interviews were conducted for a period of two months. Four weeks were spent at Abuja, to conduct the in-depth interview for the chosen population of my study who were not available during the first field trip. The remaining four weeks were spent at Nigeria to continue the in-depth interview for the selected stakeholders who were based in Lagos. More so, whenever the researcher was not on the field for in-depth interview some time was spent at the libraries of University of Lagos, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs for gathering additional secondary materials. As stated earlier, the researcher was assisted on the field at Nigeria by a research assistant, who has the knowledge of the political economy of the country in which the field work is taking place, research experience and also versatile with geographical terrain of the location of the field study.

It is important to reiterate that data for the thesis were gotten from secondary sources which included textbooks, journals, internet source, periodicals, newspapers, unpublished works and primary source which includes two extensive field trips in which data were collected through in-depth interview and observation in order to increase the validity/reliability of the outcome of the research. These multiple methods or sources of data collection enabled the researcher to compare and synthesise data collected from the sources for corroboration and repudiation. The strength of applying different methods for the collection of data is anchor on the fact that the weaknesses of one method are usually the strength of another. In other words, the shortcomings of one method are overcome by another method, hence combining methods helps overcome unique deficiencies. Furthermore, as Kehinde (2010) while quoting Denzin (1978) avers a multi-method strategy helps comparison of data sourced from different sources which strengthens the validity of research findings.
4.6 Data Analysis

The study was accomplished mainly through a qualitative, critical analysis rather than quantitative analysis. A qualitative study is an ‘inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem based on building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, and conducted in a natural setting’ (Cresswell, 1994:2). As variously pointed out under this chapter the work uses two basic data collection types for qualitative research, such as observations and in-depth interviews. I am interested in using the qualitative data analysis due to the nature of the research problem. Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) according to Jorgensen (1989) “is a breaking up, separating, or disassembling of research materials into pieces, parts, elements, or units. With facts broken down into manageable pieces, the researcher sorts and shifts them, searching for types, classes, sequences, processes, patterns or wholes. The aim of this process is to assemble or reconstruct the data in a meaningful or comprehensive fashion (Jorgensen, 1989:107).

After the collection of data, data analysis followed the process suggested by Ellen Taylor-Powell and Marcus Renner (2003): understanding of the data through listening to the recorded tapes from the field work and reading of jotted notes; focusing the analysis by identifying and writing down key questions that the analysis need to answer, either through a focus by case or at the individual’s level; categorization of data either through identifying themes or through organization into coherent categories; identifying patterns and connections between categories, which shall be done through within category description, later categories, relative importance and relationships; interpretation using our themes and connections to
explain our findings. Basically therefore, data analysis under this study takes the form of a macro-political analysis. Consequently, no statistical approach commonly used in quantitative research was employed in the analysis of data under the work. It however employs macro-political analysis because it is an institution centred study.

4.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study is limited to the study of the link between politics and techno-bureaucratic governance and the effects of such link to development in Nigeria, from 1999 to 2014. References are made to good examples of developmental states only for explanatory purposes of the Nigerian’s case. Since the primary aim is to understand the place of politics and techno-bureaucratic governance on the socio-economic development in Nigeria, I employ variables like clientelism and prebendalism to explain how structural and institutional factors affect effective and autonomous techno-bureaucratic governance and developmental outcomes. This enabled me to establish the relevance of structures and institutions on development. The study is also be limited by time frames, studying Nigeria from 1999 to 2014 being the period in which electoral democracy was restored after protracted years of military rule and the period in which a semi-authoritarian (one-party dominance) rule becomes entrenched.

A research of this nature requires funding and time. Thus, this work to some extent was limited by funding and required time due to the time-bound nature of doctoral research.
Nevertheless, I make the outcome of the work valid and reliable within the context of available funds and time. Limitations associated with data collection were taken care of by the use of the combination of different sources of data collection. Another challenge that the researcher encountered under this study was the challenge of the availability of some key informants for in-depth interviews. Considering the fact that most of those interviewed were politicians, political appointees and top civil servants with busy schedule and with some stringent protocols for gaining access to them, the researcher find it difficult to get some of the relevant interviewees. However, I try as much as possible to conduct the in-depth interview for key informants relevant for the validity and reliability of this research. This accounts for why I embarked on two field trips to Nigeria for data collection.

4.8 Ethical Issues

This study adheres strictly to ethical conducts in social science research in the conduct of interviews and observations. Before proceeding on the research participants were informed of the aims of the research and the voluntary nature of the process. Thus, participants were informed that they can voluntarily withdraw from the interview process if they so desire. More so, the researcher tries to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of the interviewees, thus no name was used in the analysis and interpretation of interviews. The addresses of interviewees or respondents are not disclosed as means of reference by the researcher.

All information gathered from the course of the field work is held with much confidentiality that is required. Participants were informed if the recording of the interview is going to be done by taking note or through audio recording. In some instances the interviewee(s)
was/were given the option of choosing their preferred method of recording information gotten from them.

The researcher while on the field-trip to Nigeria engaged the services of a research assistant who also served as an interpreter on a particular occasion. All research participants were informed of their right to consult the findings that have been gathered by the researcher once the final product is ready for submission. All persons who have contributed to the research are acknowledge and their copyright. All participants were provided with informed consent forms which they completed and signed. Lastly copies of the thesis when approved by appropriate authorities will be available at Political Studies Department and at the UWC library.
CHAPTER FIVE

TECHNO-BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: THE CASE OF NIGERIA (1999-2014)

5.1 Introduction

What this chapter sets to achieve is the critical assessment of the nature and character of bureaucracy and technocracy in Nigeria from 1999 to 2014, in order to establish whether technocracy and bureaucracy in the country represent structures that can stimulate development. In order to achieve this goal the chapter takes a look at some of the empirical features of Nigeria’s technocracy and bureaucracy with references to techno-bureaucratic governance of the East Asian Tigers and similar cases in Africa and establish the link between effective and autonomous techno-bureaucratic governance and development outcomes. Since development is the end product of development policies an overview of the economic condition of Nigeria under the period of this study becomes invaluable in order to establish the critical roles of techno-bureaucratic governance in the country’s economic development process.

Furthermore, it takes a look at how the nature and character of techno-bureaucratic governance has impacted on the level of economic development of Nigeria from 1999 to 2014. In doing this I take a look at the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the Human Development Index of the country under the period of this study in order to establish how the nature and character of techno-bureaucratic governance has contributed to the provision of collective good of the people.
5.2 Nature and Character of the Nigerian Bureaucracy

As argued above state capacity is crucial for a successful developmental state, with a further argument that such capacity is determined by ‘embedded autonomy’ of the bureaucracy, for which Peter Evans has provided the most detailed prescription: corporate cohesion and the insulation of the bureaucracy from special interests, the concentration of expertise in the bureaucracy through meritocratic recruitment, and the provision of long-term career rewards as well as a distinctive and rewarding status to officials (Evans 1995, 2009; Evans & Rauch 1999). Given the primacy of these features of bureaucracy in the developmental state as displayed by the East Asian examples assessment of the Nigerian bureaucracy shall be in relation to these features.

To achieve this the section attempts answering the following pertinent questions: How are recruitments made in the Nigerian bureaucracy? Are recruitments and appointments based on relevant regulatory frameworks and based on transparent, accountable frameworks that justify such appointments? What are the structural factors that affect recruitment and promotion in the bureaucracy? Does Nigeria’s bureaucracy have relevant provisions for training career staff for capacity building? And to what extent has the implementation of relevant regulatory frameworks on appointment, promotion and training of bureaucrats affect bureaucratic efficiency and autonomy? Answers to these questions will reveal if the Nigerian bureaucracy has sufficient capacity that can engineer successful growth and development. In order to properly answer these questions I shall take analysis of recruitment, promotion and
training in the Nigerian bureaucracy in order to establish the level of efficiency and autonomy of public service in the country.

**Recruitment**

I will start my analysis by stating that an extremely meritocratic form of recruitment constitutes the starting point in understanding the nature and character of the bureaucracy in every political system. In reference to the popular computer software terminology of “Garbage-in-Garbage-out”, the efficiency of every bureaucracy is highly dependent on the quality of people that are recruited into its fold. The point being established here is that efficient bureaucracy among other things requires meritocratic recruitment. Meritocratic recruitment in this case is the recruitment done on the bases of abilities and talent and not on wealth, origin, family connection, class privilege or due to other key factors concerning social position or political power. Thus the foremost factor that shapes the nature and character of bureaucracy in every developmental state is the meritocratic recruitment of its personnel. As Charles Harvey and Stephen Lewis (1990:9) remark, in Botswana and other developmental states in East Asia, “considerable attention is paid, particularly within the civil service and the cabinet to putting able people into key positions and keeping them there for extended periods”.

It is in recognition of the importance of meritocratic recruitment for efficient bureaucracy that the public service codes and conditions of service in Nigeria stipulate a checklist of requirements for entry into the service (Eme & Ugwu, 2011). However, despite these public service codes and conditions of service, political, family, ethnic, religious and other primordial factors are mostly considered in recruiting personnel into the Nigerian public
service. Overwhelming empirical evidences point to the fact that recruitment into the Nigerian public service, especially those of junior staff on salary Grade Levels 01-06 delegated to ministers/extra-ministerial officers have mostly been done to serve the personal interest of the recruiting officer and for the reduction of rates of unemployment in the country. More so, in the country, most people who are recruited into the public service are those who couldn’t find a place in the private sector which is known for the recruitment of the best hands and have remuneration far above those paid to the public servants.

The abandonment of the guideline for recruitment into public service for clientelist and patrimonial considerations has negative effects on the Nigerian bureaucracy. The first of such is that the practice inadvertently gives opportunities for incompetent persons to enter the public service. Phillips (1991) subscribes to this position when he asserts that too little qualified personnel are hired in the Nigerian public service, especially at the top levels and too many support staff. This to a large extent affects the performance of the Nigerian bureaucracy in the area of policy articulation, implementation and evaluation (Adeyemo & Osunyikanmi, 2009). The subversion of merit in recruitment into public service positions in Nigeria also leads to the over-bloating of the civil service and the numbers of agencies and parastatals in the country.

Thus, in Nigeria it has become a common practice for friends, family members and political associates to be compensated with civil service appointment (Eme & Ugwu, 2011). For instance in Ebonyi state, South-East Nigeria in 2008 there was recruitment and selection exercise in the state where over eight hundred (800) staff were recruited to the civil service. The slots for the recruitment into these positions were allotted to commissioners, highly placed administrators and other influential politicians who sent in the lists of their preferred
candidates (Onwe et al., 2015). The resultant effect of this is that in the Country’s bureaucracy there are lots of people employed doing nothing and the existence of agencies without any political economy relevance.

Under a Harmonized Report of the 20 editions of a workshop attended by 1,902 Directorate Level officers in the Federal Civil Service, between 1999 and 2001 it was discovered among other things that there have been over-bloating of the public service which had risen 350% between 1960 and 1999 compared with a national population increase of 160% over the same period (Eme & Ugwu, 2011). Similarly, from 1999 to 2014 the total strength of the Nigerian civil service has increased tremendously with no actual data of the staff strength available anywhere. Empirical evidences like that listed in the preceding paragraph reveal that the over-bloating of the Nigerian bureaucracy is not on the basis of addressing the problem of understaffing but as a result of using the civil service as a means of reducing the level of unemployment and the need to compensate friends, family members and political party’s affiliates with employment.

Aside the fact that there is non-meritocratic recruitment in the process of recruitment in the Nigerian bureaucracy is the prevalence of non-existing people claimed to be recruited into the civil service. This is what is popularly referred to as ‘ghost workers’ in the parlance of Nigerian public service. ‘Ghost workers’ in the Nigerian public sector is used to refer to a situation in which deceased, retired, or non-existent people draw pay checks from the government’s payroll and thus increases the recurrent expenditure of the country. The ‘ghost workers’ phenomenon is clearly one of the oldest forms of fraud that has been witnessed in the Nigerian’s civil service and seems to have survived despite all efforts at addressing
it. Annually, millions of Naira is expended by the government on monthly salaries to fictitious pensioners, underage persons, dead civil servants and other ‘ghosts’ (Akpan, 2013).

In a statistics released by the country’s Federal Ministry of Finance detailing the scope of the problem of these inexistent workers who collect salaries on the payroll of key Federal Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), the Budget Office of the Federation tops the list of government agencies with “ghost workers”, with 77.33 percent of the total staff on its payroll non-existing people (they are ghost workers). The Budget Office is closely followed by the National Planning Commission, with 74.90 percent ‘ghost workers’, while the Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation has 74.68 percent ‘ghost workers’. Other ministries and agencies with a high percentage of ghost workers are Public Service Institute, 66.67 percent; Ministry of Niger Delta, 64.87; Federal Ministry of Information, 57.15 and Ministry of Works, 51.67. These figures reveal the fact that the number of genuine workers in each of this governmental organisation is lower than 50 percent of those on the payroll (The Sun Newspaper, March 10, 2014).

The economic implications of the above scenario is the astronomical increase in the pattern of recurrent expenditure over capital expenditure and negative budget indicator that does not stimulate Nigeria’s economic growth in recent years. This is due to the fact that a substantial part of the Country’s budget annually is used for the payment of salaries and other benefits of civil servants, majority of who are non-existing workers. For example, out of a budget outlay of N4.6 trillion for 2014, Recurrent Expenditure is allocated N3.5 trillion, representing 72 percent, while Capital Expenditure takes only N1.1 trillion, or 27 percent (The Punch
Newspaper, June 2, 2014). The larger implication of the above figures in respect of ‘ghost workers’ is its prevalence in key and sensitive government offices such as the Budget Office, the office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Public Service Institute, Ministry of Works, National Planning Commission and Ministry of Niger Delta which are crucial for policy formulation and implementation. Invariably with the majority of the workers in these ministries and agencies remaining non-existent, Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in Nigeria cannot in good judgment operate efficiently and effectively. This has profound implications for the country’s development efforts.

Therefore, from empirical evidences and with the examples given above it is not a misnomer to argue that the Nigerian bureaucracy in the first place is dominated by so many unmerited and unproductive civil servants and non-existing workers, such that 80% of the government budget is directed towards unproductive recurrent expenditure, while the remaining 20% is meant for capital expenditure. This type of situation in which recurrent expenditure grossly surpasses capital expenditure creates a situation whereby little resources are channelled towards developmental projects. This type of expenditure pattern to a very large extent is anti-development.

I will also like to raise the caveat that the numerical strength of a bureaucracy does not determine its level of efficiency and development orientation. As Goldsmith (2001) observes, a growing economy makes it possible to support a larger bureaucracy, and a larger bureaucracy may create conditions that support a growing economy, with the proviso that the bureaucracy be reasonably effective at delivering public services. He also moves further to make the claim that, a shrinking economy makes it difficult to maintain a stable level of public employment, leading to cutbacks in the bureaucracy and perhaps creating even more
unfavourable business conditions. (Goldsmith, 2001). In the Nigerian case as I have consistently argued, the large number of the country’s bureaucracy is only unhealthy for the development due to non-meritocratic process of recruitment which has had enormous effect on bureaucratic efficiency.

**Promotion**

Promotion in the Nigerian bureaucracy also follows similar pattern like that of recruitment in that promotion is not on the basis of competence, but rather on subjective considerations. Promotion in the Nigerian public service fails to differentiate between productive and non-productive workers. Promotion especially at the junior and middle carrier level are mostly done on the basis of years of experience and favouritism. Okafor (2005) puts this in a proper perspective when he holds that:

> ...Once ensconced in a bureaucratic position, officials are promoted primarily on the basis of seniority. Rules for promotion fail to differentiate between productive and non-productive workers (Okafor, 2005:67)

Promotion at the directorate level and above which are crucial for policy formulation and implementation is not done on the basis of competence but rather on the principle of federal character. The Federal Character Principle as entrenched in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: section 14 subsection (3) mandates that the different segment of the Nigerian population should be appointed in the public bureaucracy and in political positions. Empirical evidence from field research reveals that in order to adhere to this principle in some cases civil servants are promoted to the position of Permanent Secretaries above those
they met on the job and those that are more productive. Thus, the promotion based on number of years in the civil service and the principle of the federal character and not on the basis of employees’ performance and examination negates the principle of performance reward for further efficiency necessary for organization performance. In fact, empirical evidence in the Nigerian case shows that recent attempt of the government at enhancing meritocratic promotion on the basis of performance, written examination and oral interviews have not been strictly adhered to by most ministries and agencies of government.

Weber terms such non-meritocratic promotion as patrimonial, in which getting ahead becomes a matter of connections and political considerations more than performance (Goldsmith, 2001). The East Asian countries of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore as well as African countries of Botswana and Mauritius which remain classic examples of developmental states have bureaucracies with clear guidelines for promotions in the service which are mostly judiciously obeyed (Mkandawire, 2001), which is quite different from promotions based on patronage and/or ethnic considerations as displayed by the Nigerian bureaucracy. Promotion based on merit had to a very large extent increased the level of commitment of the bureaucrats in these East Asian and African countries and also ensures that competent people are promoted to relevant positions for better on-the-job performance which increases efficiency.

Training
Aside from the fact that personnel entering the Nigerian bureaucracy through the use of spoils system (non-meritocratic recruitment) lack the required skill for their positions, there is also the problem of weak and ineffective on-the-job training (Otono, 1992; Adebayo, 2001). From the field research conducted by me it was discovered that in the Nigerian bureaucracy there are career civil servants who have not undergone any intensive on-the-job training from the period of their recruitment, up to the period of their retirement. While some others who are sent for training courses by government fail to attend such training and instead keep money given to them for other uses.

Another pronounced negative feature of the Nigerian bureaucracy is the poor remuneration of bureaucrats in comparison with their counterparts in the private sector (Ejiofor, 1987; Fajonyomi, 1998; Okoh, 1998; Onyeoruru, 2005). In fact remuneration in the public service is too low to attract the best in the society. This allows the private sector, such as oil companies, financial institutions, telecommunication companies, construction companies, etc. to recruit the best. As Fajoyonmi (1998:64) posits:

> the disparity between the public and private wages is so wide that those who take up public service jobs do so for absence of something better...Consequently, the civil service lacks the high level competence required, not only to formulate development policies, but also to convince prospective investors on the actual state of the economy.

As this juncture, I will state that the nature and character of the Nigerian bureaucracy is aptly captured in the statement of a former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo that:
Over the years, the public services at federal and state levels lost the value on which they were established. Merit is sacrificed for expediency and opportunism. Retraining of hired staff hardly take place. It allows so-called ghost workers to infiltrate the service and ended up with a pay-roll that is totally at variance with output or productivity, parastatals are so mismanaged, looted, and badly ruined that they became an embarrassment to norms of efficiency, productivity, management and probity... Proliferation of parastatals as well as the creation of several agencies had resulted in unnecessary duplication of functions and in some cases, mandates... The management of these agencies appointed persons into the public service haphazardly with the result that most of them are now over-bloated and enormous resources are spent on their overheads (The Guardian Newspaper August 3, 2004; African News Service, August 23, 2004).

Therefore, if a high level of state capability is a defining feature of developmental states, and the kind of capability required is one that is able to take initiatives, to innovate or facilitate innovation, and to effectively implement its policies, as well as analytical, discretionary, and innovative capacity, and integrate these in appropriate ways (von Holdt, 2010), then, as this section demonstrates one can convincingly conclude that Nigeria does not have the capacity necessary for state led development due to the nature and character of its bureaucracy.

It is obvious from various analyses under this section that Nigeria lacks the kind of efficient and autonomous bureaucracy that propelled the East Asian Tigers and African countries like Botswana and Mauritius to development. Quite clearly no state with the type of bureaucracy that Nigeria has at the moment could meet the requirements for a developmental state. Karl
von Holt (2010) supports this claim when he asserts that bureaucracy is “one of the core institutions of Western modernity: it is what makes the modern state and the modern capitalist economy possible. It is also at the core of what a ‘developmental state’ is and what it can do”. (2010:5).

Invariably in order for the Nigeria to achieve development through state activism there is the need for the construction of a "real" bureaucratic apparatus (as opposed to a pseudo-bureaucratic patrimonial apparatus). To accomplish this task, there must be the institutionalisation of meritocratic recruitment patterns, predictable career paths must be accompanied by the provision of sufficient resources to make careers in the state competitive with careers in the private sector and there must be continuous on-the-job training for all categories of staff.

5.3 Nature and Character of Technocracy in Nigeria

In the literature, the state led developmental approach requires the need to draw up strategies for the achievement of national goals, and national developmental goals can be achieved through the formulation and implementation of appropriate policies, state developmental theorists suggest (Johnson, 1982; Minns, 2001; Beeson, 2005; Kashara, 2013). Central to the argument of the developmental theorists and, as the unprecedented development in East Asian countries exemplify, state activism in the process of development requires industrial policies which are products of state negotiation and renegotiation of policies options necessary for development with the private sector. This linkage between the state and private business for industrialization and development requires technical skills and adequate
insulation of technocrats for the formulation of appropriate policies that enhance development.

Therefore, in order to promote positive linkage between the state and private business and to enhance the insulation of technocrats from private interests in the process of development, East Asian developmental States and our African examples adopted one of the key elements of developmental state and an essential prerequisite for managing the development process by establishing “pilot agencies” that propelled their process of development. For instance Japan has the celebrated Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, Korea’s Economic Planning Board (EPB), Taiwan’s Industrial Development Bureau (IDB), Singapore’s Economic Development Board (EDB), China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and Botswana’s Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP). I shall briefly examine these ‘pilot agencies’ before proceeding to an elaborate examination of technocracy in Nigeria in order to address the question of compatibility of the nature and character of the country’s institutions to the model of developmental state.

In Japan, MITI staff by a small number the best available managerial talent in the country. This Japanese ‘pilot agency’ has a high level of autonomy and is capable of independently formulating and implementing its own goals. This pilot agency directs the course of development itself, and employs and devises a range of policy tools to ensure that indigenous business is both nurtured and managed in the overall ‘national interest’. Its relative autonomy enables it to negotiate and renegotiate policies with the private sector without been influenced by private interests either of those in political power or the economic elites (Beeson, 2005). The Japanese MITI and the Ministry of Finance were able to use their control of domestic savings to provide cheap credit for particular industries. In this way, Japanese planners were
able to guide a continuing process of initial industrialization and subsequent industrial upgrading as new, more valuable industries were encouraged and older ones like textiles were encouraged to be export oriented (Beeson, 2005).

Johnson (1982) explains that the industrial policy undertaken by the Japanese MITI and the Ministry of Finance were basically two; industrial rationalization policy and industrial structure policy. Industrial rationalization policy according to Johnson focuses on the micro aspect of the national economy, which includes detailed measures for the operation of specific industrial sectors or individual firms, with the intention to improve their operational efficiency. On the other hand, industrial structure policy (often known as selective or strategic industrial policy) involves the identification of the strategic sectors to be developed as well as the selection of the non-strategic sectors to be converted to other lines of work.

He further explains that ‘Japan’s industrial structure policy was based on such standards as income elasticity of demand, comparative costs of production, labour absorptive power, environmental concerns, investment effects on related sectors, and export prospects’ (Johnson, 1982: 27). In a more succinct way Kashara (2013) avers that the Japanese industrial structure policy concerns the proportion of agriculture, mining, and manufacturing services in the country’s total production; and within manufacturing it concerns the percentages of light and heavy as well as of labour-intensive and knowledge-intensive sectors.

Similarly, Korea’s Economic Planning Board (EPB) was given powers unprecedented in a system which still described itself as based on the free market. The head of the EPB is the Deputy Prime Minister who happens to be the second in the government hierarchy. The Board controls most of the country’s financial assets. This control allows EPB technocrats to
distribute resources to areas of industry deemed vital to industrial development (Minns, 2001). The Economic Planning Board (EPB) especially in the 1960s up to the 80s did not only oversaw development planning but also controlled the budget. The Country’s Ministry of Finance controlled the purse strings rather than planning and other ‘spending’ ministries, collected taxes but had no control over their use. The EPB coordinated the activities of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (in charge of detailed sectoral policies), the banks (which were all state-owned between 1961 and 1983 and fully controlled by the government until the early 1990s, even after some of them were partially privatized) (Beeson, 2005).

Taiwan’s Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) which comprises of engineers and allied professionals, and notable economists was responsible for development planning in the Country. Members of this bureau are expected to monitor industrial growth in various sectors of the economy. As part of their job they were required to spend several days a month, at least, visiting firms in their sector. The aim of their monitoring and visits was to find opportunities to nudge the process of import replacement and export promotion (Wade, 2004). In Singapore the Economic Development Board coordinates foreign capital for the country’s economic growth. The Board is made up of experts from different disciplines.

In China the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was a powerful “pilot agency” that propelled China’s economic development. NDRC is to China what MITI is to Japan. This policy commission comprising 28 functional departments was responsible for formulating and implementing national economic and social development strategies. It facilitated development in economy and society. That is, it monitored, predicted and guided macro economy providing information and warning. It was also responsible for the
formulation of fiscal policies, monetary and land policies and in fact promoted and guided China’s economic system restructuring (Feina, 2010).

Botswana, Africa’s most celebrated developmental state has the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) as its brain trust for socio-economic development. The MFDP has remained important in directing the process of development in Botswana (Raphaeli et al, 1984; Holm, 1988; Samatar, 1999; Taylor, 2002; 2003; 2005; 2012; Sebudubudu & Molutsi, 2009; Thovoethin, 2014).

The MFDP, just like the Korean EPB, is headed by the Vice-President. Botswana’s MFDP is responsible for planning, budgeting and coordinating all development activities. The ministry also carefully monitors the implementations of all development projects. The overall mandate of the Ministry is to coordinate national development planning, mobilise and prudently manage available financial and economic resources. Further to that, the Ministry is responsible for the formulation of economic and financial policies for sustainable economic development. To ensure that the MFDP’s remains effective in spearheading development agenda, there are planning units, staffed by professional planners responsible to the director of Economic Affairs of MFDP, in other ministries (Samatar, 1999).

This MFDP which is the driving force behind Botswana’s development is most often than not headed and dominated by seasoned technocrats and bureaucrats (Thovoethin, 2014). In fact with the exception of Ian Khama, the office of the Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning has been mostly reserved for seasoned bureaucrats and technocrats who occupied that position for considerable number of years (Taylor, 2003; 2009). Such technocrats include Quett Masire who was a founder and principal of Seepapitso
Secondary school, *African Echo* journalist and director, and editor of *Therisanyo* (Democratic Party Newspaper) (Answers.Com, 2013). Festus Mogae who was planning officer Ministry of Finance and Development planning (1970), secretary economic affairs MFDP (1972-74), Permanent Secretary MFDP (1975-76), Permanent Secretary MFDP (1989-98) (Answers.Com, 2013), before becoming the Vice-President and Minster of Finance for this same MFDP in which he has being a bureaucrat occupying different positions for several years. Peter Mmusi who resigned in 1993 was also the Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning.

In fact during the period when Ian Khama was the Vice-President, because he was not a technocrat, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning was separated from the Vice-President’s portfolio and a technocrat Baledzi Gaolathe was appointed as a substantive Minister of the MFDP. Gaolathe before becoming the Minister of Finance and Development Planning has served as the Governor of the Bank of Botswana (1997-1999) and a Member World Bank Board (1999). Similarly, Lt General Mompati Merafhe who was the Vice-President to Ian Khama but who was not also the Minister of Finance and Development Planning from 2008 to 2012 has to be replaced with a technocrat Kedikilwe Ponatshego in 2012 because among other things the former’s lack of bureaucratic and technocratic background to efficiently oversee the MFDP and eventually succeed Ian Khama as the President. Kedikiliwe has before becoming the Vice President and the Minister of Finance and Development was a career bureaucrat who has served as Assistant Principal, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (1970-73), Principal Officer MFDP (1973-75), Director of Financial Affairs MFDP (1976-77) and Permanent Secretary Ministry of Works and Communication (1977-78), etc (Brillonline, 2013).
From the above analysis it is evident that pilot agencies in these developmental states are responsible for directing the course of development of their respective countries, employs and devises a range of policy tools to ensure that indigenous business is both nurtured and managed in the overall ‘national interest’ (Beeson, 2005). As discussed earlier, many East Asian States and my African developmental state’s example engaged in selective industrial policy equivalent to what Johnson (1982) calls industrial structure policy toward their strategically targeted sectors. They also used their domestic financial sector (publicly controlled) for providing firms within these sectors with subsidies of different kinds, combined with various trade- and investment-related preferential treatments. Selective industry policy measures used in the East Asian developmental states were based on a broad industry targeting through administrative regulations and guidance for strategic/priority sectors and firms.

These measures were to restrict foreign competitors’ access to the domestic market in general or its specific sectors in particular (Kasahara, 2013). As noted earlier, the measures adopted for protecting and nurturing, the targeted sectors and firms included, among others, financial subsidies, credit subsidies, production subsidies, tax subsidies, export subsidies, and so forth – together with preferential market licensing, adjustment assistance and manpower training (UNCTAD, 2009). Thus, it remains logical to argue that the Asian developmental states and my African example heavily engaged pilot agents as the principal agents in the conflict-prone process of industrial development involving different social actors (Kasahara, 2013).

Another point that requires emphasis is that these countries that have had the greatest ‘state capacity’, or the ability to devise and implement various industry policies. Thus, the East Asian states and my African examples are known to have pilot agencies staffed by the
nation’s brightest and best personnel. As scholars of developmental states’ posit, at the centre of the successful developmental State of Japan as well as those in Taiwan Province of China (Wade, 1990), the Republic of Korea (Amsden, 1989) and Singapore (Huff, 1999), China (Feina, 2010) was a competent pilot agency combined with effective bureaucracy. I shall buttress this position with the China’s example of meritocratic selection into government. In China it is a tradition that working in government establishment has strong appeal to most people.

The annual National Civil Service Examination seeks to pick out the most excellent and suitable performers for public service positions, and therefore contest is keen. For instance, according to China Central Television (CCTV, 2009), about 1.35 million applicants (the highest in the Country’s history) attended the 2009 examination in which 150 thousand people were eventually selected. This means that only one out of ninety could make their dreams come true (Feina, 2010).

My argument so far is that the aforementioned economies have developed the greatest state capacity not only to formulate development policies but also to implement them effectively through ‘pilot agencies’ staffed with best available people. Wade reinforces the importance of an effective pilot agency in every developmental state when he suggests that ‘the main feature of development planning is: “A pilot agency or economic general staff as one of the core features” (Wade, 2004:13). The pilot agencies in these countries take decisions on industries that ought to exist and which industries are no longer needed in order to promote the industrial structure which enhances the nation’s international competitiveness” (Wade, 1990:195). I shall turn to the Nigerian case as regards the place of technocracy in the country’s developmental efforts.
Since the restoration of electoral democracy in Nigeria till the time of the administration led by President Goodluck Jonathan, it has become a common practice for each regime to constitute an economic team, especially at the beginning of their tenures, which to some extent, especially at the level of nomenclature, is similar to the pilot agencies in the developmental states mentioned above. Members of the various teams are expected to manage the economy in order to promote economic development of the country and engender an efficient, dynamic and self-reliant economy (Nigeria Intel, April 8, 2013). Though the Nigerian economic teams have been made up of some technocrats the majority of them are politicians, including those that have business interests in Nigeria, such as Aliko Dangote, Femi Otedola, Aig Imoukhuede, and those that have been recycled in government over the years. Thus, the decisions of this committee as we shall see in the next chapter of this thesis were swayed by the political bias and business interests of its members (Nairaland, November 21, 2011).

Apart from the economic team some of the ministers and other aides of the president are either technocrats or bureaucrats. For example, the Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration engaged the services of technocrats, though not in a particular pilot agency as obtainable in the East Asian and other developmental states. These technocrats appointed by Obasanjo were accomplished individuals in their respective areas. These include Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who was once a director at the World Bank and one of the Managing Directors of the bank between October 2007 and July 2011.
Okonjo-Iweala who has doctorate Degree in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in United States was also appointed minister of finance and the coordinating Minister of the Economy by the Goodluck Jonathan’s administration. With her position as the Coordinating Minister of the Economy she heads the economic management team-comprising selected governors, ministers, manufacturers and the Central Bank of Nigeria. In her capacity she oversees the economic policy thrust of the economy (Masterweb Reports, 2013). Other technocrats appointed by Obasanjo included Prof Chukwuma Soludo, Dr Oby Ezekwesili, Malam Nasir El Rufai, Prof Dora Akunyili (Vanguard, May 26, 2011).

Barth Nnaji, a Professor of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering at the University of Massachusetts Amherst has on different occasions been a Special Adviser to President Goodluck Jonathan on Power and energy and Chairman, of the Presidential taskforce on Power and energy. Another technocrat appointed by the President Goodluck Jonathan administration that readily attracts attention was Mallam Sanusi Lamido, Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (Vanguard Newspaper, 20 August, 2011). Dr Shamsudeen Usman a seasoned economist was also appointed as the Minister of National Planning by the Jonathan’s administration. Usman was responsible for the formulation of Nigeria's long-term development strategy, Nigeria Vision 2010, and the National Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan. He was also at a time the chairman of the Nigerian National Economic Management Team. He also represented Nigeria as a Governor on the Governing Boards of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Newsdiaryonline September 12, 2013).

It has therefore become the usual practice for different civilian governments in Nigeria to appoint some technocrats to embark on reforms in the financial sector, judicial sector, and
public sector, among others (Mustapha, 2006). It is however instructive to note that from 1999 to 2014 the various administrations have witnessed economic teams and cabinets rendered unstable by regular change of membership. A few examples are cited to buttress this position. At the end of the first year of the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, one-third of the 30 ministers who in most cases were technocrats were either rotated or replaced. By the third year, additional 12 ministers were replaced, and by the start of his second term of office in 2003, only four ministers from the first term survived their posts.

In fact, Dr Okonjo-Iweala, an economist, who happened to be head of the economic team during the first term administration of Obasanjo was removed as a result of her rising public profile and ‘demoted’ to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs while away in London negotiating the final phase of debt cancellation for Nigeria (Akinyoade, 2009). In fact Dr Shamsudeen Usman a seasoned economist who happens to be the longest serving minister and who was responsible for the development of Nigeria’s long-term development strategy (Nigeria Vision 2020) and the first Nigerian Minister to publicly declare his assets before assuming office as a public officer, an act considered as a sign of accountability and transparency in a country noted for its high levels of corruption, was removed as the Minister of National Planning because he was not relating well with his then state Governor, Rabiu Kwankwaso (Newsdiaryonline, September 12, 2013).

What the above also suggests is that the Ministry of National Planning, which is very important to development planning, was not also spared of the instability of office of appointed technocrats. The ministry has the mandate to determine policies relating to
National Development and overall management of the national economy. The ministry aims at efficient planning that guides the growth and development of Nigerian economy to be and among the leading economies in the world.

Furthermore, it determines and efficiently advises on matters relating to national development and overall management of the economy for positive growth; and to ensure that plans and policies are properly implemented by all relevant stakeholders (Whoiswho, 2013). Despite these important functions of the ministry and the need for long term planning no minister spent more than four years as a minister of National Planning. Usman remains the longest serving minister in the ministry who served for about four years in that position (before becoming the minister of National Planning he was the minister of Finance from 2007-2009).

It is a common knowledge that short term development plan takes a minimum of five years, while medium and long term plans take more years and in situation where ministers of National Planning fail to occupy their position for a period of four years this affects developmental plans formulation and implementation (Thovoethin, 2014). This argument is centred on the fact that since ministers in this sensitive economic development ministry do not enjoy secured tenure of office, it creates a situation whereby a minister will not involve in the formulation and implementation of a particular development plan.

What this scenario portends is that no technocrat appointed to development relevant and ministerial positions occupied such position for a period of four years. More so, only few
ministers and heads of agencies and parastatals occupy their positions on the basis of their expertise, knowledge and professional qualification. This has negative impact on development policy choice and outcome. Akinyoade attests to this when he points out that “respective ministers do not have enough time to digest their mandate and come up with plans that tie into the federal government strategic plans and business plans in a way that ensures effective achievement and monitoring of target goals” (2009:13).

Similarly, ministers who are normally selected by the president are not given adequate opportunity to have independent choice in the formulation and implementation of workable strategic plans. This is informed by the fact that they hardly concentrate on their duties before they are relieved of their position. Most often technocrats are sacked from their positions when general elections are approaching for the appointment of political loyalists that would help in securing victory in elections for the ruling party. I shall give some few examples to buttress this position. In 2014, a year preceding the Nigeria’s 2015 general elections President Goodluck Jonathan appointed twelve new ministers who were mostly politicians to replace those ministers that were sacked in 2013.

Among those appointed was Ambassador Aminu Wali, who is a respected politician from Kano State and who has shown considerable support for President Goodluck Jonathan. Even while serving as ambassador in China, he was one of the President’s point men who has kept the ruling PDP alive in Kano. He had a running battle with his state Governor Rabi’u Musa Kwankwaso over the control of the party structure before the governor eventually defected to the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC) (Thisday, 6th March, 2014). His nomination
was seen as a lifeline for the ruling party ahead of the 2015 election, especially at a period when the party has lost the control of the state to the opposition party with the defection of his state’s Governor to the opposition party.

Amuno Wenike Danagogo who was appointed a Minister of Sport was a close friend of the Supervising Minister of Education, Nyesom Wike who happens to be a staunch supporter of the president and who remained the arrowhead of the ruling party in Rivers State that gave the President the highest number of votes during the 2011 Presidential election. Danagogo who served as a commissioner under the Rotimi Amaechi’s led government in Rivers State was at a stage deeply opposed to Amaechi opted out of Amaechi’s government in December 2013 when he declined to defect to the APC. His action was believed to have been engineered by Wike as a show of strength and relevance. His eventual appointment is considered as a compensation for his loyalty to the President by not decamping to the opposition party with his state Governor and the need of strengthening the ruling party in the state. Mrs Laurentia Laraba Mallam who was appointed Minister of Environment is a grassroots mobiliser of women, a reputation that has won her various roles in the political field during that period. She was the Women Leader, Obasanjo/Atiku Presidential Campaign for the North-west Zone Committee in 2003.

She was also the Women Leader, Yar’ Adua/Goodluck Presidential Campaign in the North-west Zone Committee in 2007 and she was also a member of the Goodluck/Sambo Presidential Campaign Committee in the North-West Nigeria between 2010 and 2011. Basically, she was appointed to use her strength as the coordinator of Catholic Women
Organisation (CWO), a Christian Non-Governmental Organisation known to be highly organized and with membership spread across the Nigeria. Alhaji Mohammed Wakil who was appointed Minister of State for Power is an astute politician. Before his appointment as a minister he was the North-East National Vice Chairman of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). More so Wakil, as at the time of his appointment was a strong supporter of President Goodluck Jonathan (Thisday, 6th March, 2014).

This electoral victory’s consideration also accounts for the catastrophic numbers of political appointees into various agencies, ministries and other governmental establishments. Schneider’s (1987a:5) analogy that ‘while Japanese prime ministers appoint only dozens of officials and U.S. presidents appoint hundreds, Brazilian presidents appoint thousands (15-100 thousand)’ succinctly explains the nature of technocracy in Nigeria. The Nigerian techno-bureaucratic governance is a replica of what Evans (1989) terms as ‘a massive cabide de emprego (source of jobs), populated on the basis of connection rather than competence and correspondingly inept in its developmental efforts’.

The common knowledge running through this section is that in Nigeria there is no ‘pilot agency’ staffed with the best and that enjoys the necessary autonomy -like those of the East Asian developmental states, and my African examples, that can partner with complementary ministries and the private sector in order to channel developmental policies. The economic development teams constituted by different administration in Nigeria, which to some extent could be said to have that semblance of ‘pilot agencies’ in developmental states, are mostly not sufficiently staffed with right technocrats that can formulate and implement a development agenda. More so, in a situation where technocrats are appointed into development agencies they are not guaranteed minimum security of tenure in office necessary
for short term developmental planning without mentioning medium and long term plans, despite the fact that the country operates one-party dominant system which could have guaranteed stability of office for technocrats.

The above situation becomes more challenging when combined with the fact that the bureaucracy which should serve as a gap for policy instability caused by the high turnover of technocrats is largely inefficient and non-autonomous. The end result of this is policy making process that is dominated by politicians with short-term goals of securing power, with a limited role for technocrats to drive long-term policy. Thus, in other developmental states where ‘politicians reign and technocrats rule’ in the Nigerian case politicians ‘reign and rule’ (apology to Chalmers Johnson, 1995). The next section of this chapter shall be devoted to the analysis of how the ineptitude of techno-bureaucratic governance has impacted on Nigeria’s level of socio-economic development.

5.4 Techno-Bureaucratic Governance and Challenges of Development in Nigeria

One important aspect of the developmental state concerns what I refer to as developmental outcomes. The expected end product of the combination of state commitment and capacity is an expected developmental outcome in the form of the rise of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and positive Human Development Index (HDI). That is, a developmental state must produce developmental outcomes (Fritz & Menocal, 2006; Leftwich, 2008). In view of this, developmental outcomes become very crucial while discussing state centric development. Interestingly, what counts as a developmental outcome is highly contestable. Most scholars
tend to mainly associate developmental state to a state with a growing economy (Mkandawire, 2001). I disagree with this measure of developmental state and rather agree with a broad understanding of developmental state as a state with a clear commitment to a national development agenda, that has solid capacity and reach, and that seeks to provide growth as well as poverty reduction and the provision of collective goods (Johnson, 1987; Fritz & Menocal, 2006; Leftwich, 2008).

I hold strongly that one of the basic goals for every developmental state is its focus to significantly increase the standard of living for a large number of its population. This position is in consonance with the works of Wade (1990), Fritz & Menocal (2007), and Monga (2011), who see the legitimacy of developmental states resting on significant improvements in standards of living for a broad cross section of society. In fact Pempel (1999) and Leftwich (2000; 2008) suggest that East Asian developmental states achieved positive social outcomes in terms of improved standards of living, health care and education, which led to the prominence of the concept. The central elements of the developmental outcomes therefore, are growth combined with widespread increases in the standard of living of greatest number of people in a developmental state. Thus, emphasis under this section shall be an assessment of how the form of techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria has impacted on economic growth and living standards of the Nigerian population.

I shall start an assessment of the Nigerian economy under the period of this work by pointing to the fact that exploration of oil and gas is the main stay of the Nigerian economy. In 2014 Nigeria’s real net oil export revenue was $77bn accounting for over 90 per cent of the country’s exports (The Punch, 2nd April, 2015) and about 80 percent of government revenues and 25 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (IMF 2014, available at
Thus, Nigeria’s economy is heavily dependent on the oil and gas sector.

The Nigerian government’s reliance on oil production for income generation clearly has serious implications for its economy. One of such effects is that the level of industrialisation is low outside of oil and gas. In fact the industrial sector contributes just 3.4% of total GDP and offers low employment opportunities. Lack of competitiveness in the industrial sector, particularly in the areas of product cost, packaging and product quality, has contributed to its underutilisation thereby preventing the country from climbing up the global value chain towards industrialisation. According to Barungi (2014) the average manufacturing-capacity utilisation declined to 55.8% in 2010 from 78.7% in 1977. In the 70s and even up to 80s, Nigeria’s economy moved very well in the direction of rapid industrialization. At that time, the country had assembling plants where vehicles, air-conditioners, refrigerators and other items were assembled. Unfortunately, Nigeria in the beginning of the twenty first century has witnessed a downward trend in the industrial sector (Vanguard Newspaper, May 31, 2015).

However, despite this low level of industrialisation, the countries rebased Gross Domestic Products (GDP) ranked Nigeria as the 26 largest economy in the world (Vanguard Newspaper, July 23, 2013) and the largest in Africa, with an estimated nominal GDP of USD 510 billion, surpassing South Africa’s USD 352 billion. More so, the country has maintained its impressive growth over the past decade with a record estimated 7.4% growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013, up from 6.5% in 2012. This growth rate is higher than the West African sub-regional level and far higher than the sub-Saharan Africa level. The table below indicates the country’s economic performance for four successive years;
Table: I

**Macroeconomic indicators**

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<th>2012</th>
<th>2013(e)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Real GDP growth</td>
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<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real GDP per capita growth</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI inflation</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget balance % GDP</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance % GDP</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Barungi (2014), estimates (e) and projections (p) based on authors' calculations.

It would be relevant to point out that despite a sustained GDP growth as indicated by the above table; the impact of such growth is not felt by the majority of Nigerian citizens. This suggests that the benefits of economic growth have not sufficiently trickled down to the masses. This is evident in the growing gaps between the rich and the poor, shrinking public service, inaccessibility to public goods, and high rate of unemployment. In fact in the World Bank assessment on the situation of poverty in the world as at 2014 Nigeria was ranked third among world’s ten countries with extreme poor citizens.
From the assessment, the World Bank established that Nigeria falls among countries with extreme poverty whose over 70% population live on $1.25 (N200) or even less per day. Specifically, the report revealed that 7% of the 1.2 billion people living below poverty line in the world are Nigerians (Daily Independent, May 2, 2014). More so, from the angle of per capita income, Nigeria ranks 160 out of 177. Life expectancy in Nigeria is put at an average of 46 years (Ibietan & Joshua, 2015). The Poverty level in Nigeria, in years preceding 2014 as indicated in the statistics released by the country’s National Bureau of Statistics which shows Nigeria’s population in poverty for seven different periods is also not in any way impressive. See the data below:
Table: II

RELATIVE POVERTY HEADCOUNT IN NIGERIA FROM 1980 TO 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poverty Incidence in (%)</th>
<th>Estimated Population (Million)</th>
<th>Population in Poverty (Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>102.3</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>126.3</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>112.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) HNLSS 2010

What the above data as released by NBS further confirm is that despite the fact that Nigerian economy is paradoxically growing, the proportion of Nigerians living in poverty is increasing...
almost every year. The proportion of the population living below the poverty line increased significantly from 1980 to 2004. I shall however drive this argument further by juxtaposing the above with the World Bank GDP data for some specific years as represented in the graph in order to establish in a detailed form the condition of the Nigerian economy and the linkage between state’s institutional capacity and socio-economic development.

Table II showing Nigeria’s poverty rate for the aforementioned periods and the graph showing Nigeria’s GDP above reveal two distinct fundamentals about the state of the Nigerian economy. The first is that prior to the restoration of electoral democracy in 1999 the rate of poverty was lower than when there was the restoration of electoral democracy. The increase in the number of people living in poverty from 27.2% in 1980 during the Nigeria’s Second Republic to 69.0% when one-party dominance is beginning to be consolidated supports this first argument. This effectively supports the claim that the increase in Nigeria’s
GDP during the period of Nigeria’s one-party dominance has not in any way has any meaningful impact on the Nigerian populace.

The analysis of the above table and graph clearly reveal that increases in GDP have benefited only few members of the population. Thus, the high rate of poverty in the Nigeria shows that enormous resources available in the country have not been channelled to benefit the majority. Invariably government economic policies have continued to serve the interests of the few.

It is therefore apparent that Nigeria from 1999 to 2014 faces challenge of making its recorded economic growth more inclusive. This is confirm by the fact the analysis above and which could be buttressed by the fact that 70 percent of its population are in abject poverty, over 15 million housing units deficit, massive unemployment which stood at 38% in 2013 (National Bureau of Statistics Report 2014), epileptic power sector in which total electricity supply as at 2014 is less than a mere 1,400 megawatts (MW) for a country of over 150 million people (Vanguard Newspaper, 26th May, 2015).

More so, there is the problem of depreciating local currency, which is at the exchange rate of over N200 to a Dollar, a real sector that is in comatose, environment of insecurity as displayed by the level of killings and other criminal incidences and inefficient transport system among other challenges (Vanguard Newspaper, 31st May, 2015. This shows that Nigeria extracts large amounts of otherwise investable surplus and provides so little in the way of "collective goods" for its citizens (Table II and above graph attest to this). I will quickly point out the fact that the Nigerian situation is not solely caused by lack of initiatives
as the direction of this work has consistently suggests. In fact, Nigeria has attempted economic reforms aim at economic development but perhaps with little or no success.

For instance, during 2003–2007 Nigeria attempted implementing an economic reform program called the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS). The purpose of NEEDS is to raise the country’s standard of living through a variety of reforms, including macroeconomic stability, deregulation, liberalization, privatization, transparency, and accountability. NEEDS addresses basic deficiencies, such as the lack of freshwater for household use and irrigation, unreliable power supplies, decaying infrastructure, impediments to private enterprise, and corruption. The government hope that NEEDS will create 7 million new jobs, diversify the economy, boost non-energy exports, increase industrial capacity utilization, and improve agricultural productivity (Odularu, 2007).

Furthermore, it was in an attempt to reverse the dismal performance of the economy that Vision 20:2020 blueprint was adopted in 2008 to fast track development. The blueprint seeks among other things to make Nigeria rank among the top 20 economies in the world by 2020. More so, there was also a long-term economic development program of the United Nations (UN) sponsored National Millennium Goals for Nigeria. Under the program, which covers the years from 2000 to 2015, Nigeria is committed to achieve a wide range of ambitious objectives involving poverty reduction, education, gender equality, health, the environment, and international development cooperation. (Odularu, 2007).

As stated above, these reforms or policies have failed to achieve desired developmental outcomes as indicated in the level of economic development of Nigeria. I see the failure of these reforms at enhancing inclusive socio-economic development in Nigeria more of an
institutional failure rather than policy failure. This argument is premised on the fact that the task of formulating and implementing developmental policies and agenda remain a function of bureaucrats and technocrats, but who have been subverted in the Nigerian case by politicians and their short-term power struggles. As Maphunye (2009) proposes, the key characteristics of a developmental public service and administration suitable for a developmental state are that such administration must be capable of successfully carrying out the mandate of a developmental state, i.e. to formulate and implement developmental policies that significantly reduce poverty and unemployment, as well as social inequalities. Such an administration is, among others, efficient, effective, and able to make critical input into the policy and decision-making processes.

Let me take for example, in South Korea when the government undertook land reforms in order to redistribute land so that agricultural sector could become a central pillar of national development (You, 2011) a development plan that served as the roadmap for the realisation of this goal was established. In order to implement the plan, various public institutions were established. These institutions were made efficient and effective through the recruitment of personnel based on merit as the pathway to mobilizing the requisite administrative, managerial and technical skills that were germane to the developmental process.

Also, public servants were given excellent compensation packages, secured tenure and autonomy in decision-making. The combination of all these factors within the South Korean public institutions made the realisation of the goals of land reforms possible (Bandung, 2015)). Similarly, as Fakir (2007) argues, the public service plays important roles in Botswana’s development process. According to him and as supported by Taylor (2002),
Maipose (2003), Bandung (2015) effective and efficient public institutions were designed by the Botswana’s government in order to achieve development goals.

These public institutions operated by professional bureaucrats are involved in development governance in which they were responsible for the formulation of the national development plan, the elaboration of the development ideology, the integration of development and financial planning, the management of natural resources, especially diamonds, and the delivery of public goods such as education (Taylor, 2002; Maipose, 2003; Bandung, 2015). Furthermore, Mauritius’ successes in formulating and implementing economic reforms was predicated on the critical role played by a committed and visionary leadership and the important role played by effective and efficient public institutions in providing the administrative, managerial and technical expertise that is indispensable to development (Maphunye, 2009; Bandung, 2015).

Therefore, it is not a misplaced argument to advance the position that the failure of various reforms at increasing the level of development in Nigeria is either a problem of poor policy formulation or implementation which could be linked to the lack of adequate capacity for techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria. Thus, the decline of Nigeria from the league of the richest countries in the world to its present state of one of the poorest countries can to a large extent be said to be the failure of techno-bureaucratic governance.

The Nigerian bureaucracy through its ineptitude could not ensure that public service delivery and policy implementation happen quickly and reach the intended beneficiaries. As Caiden (1971: 86) writes “the inefficiencies of the public bureaucracy could cost a country its independence, stability, progress, and well-being.” This Caiden’s position quite explains the
Nigerian situation. As I have argued severally and with consensus of opinion in the literature that the roles of a competent, meritocratic, well-structured and motivated bureaucracy and technocracy with an “embedded autonomy”, are important for a nation quest of achieving development. Aligning with this position underscores the fact that the present state of underdevelopment of Nigeria can therefore be linked to techno-bureaucratic governance lacking these fundamental characteristics.

5.5 Conclusion

As explained under this chapter, for a developmental state to achieve positive socio-economic developmental outcomes there is the need for an efficient and autonomous bureaucracy and technocracy, sufficiently insulated from public and private interests. Consequently commitment and capacity of the state to generate positive development outcomes is what accounts for the differences in the level of socio-economic development among states. As indicated under the chapter, a state possesses capacity for state led development when it combines meritocratic recruitment, promotion and training of its bureaucrats, with a powerful developmental pilot agencies populated by seasoned technocrats. This suggests that the ability of the state to lead development is dependent more on the capacity of its techno-bureaucratic governance. The capacity of techno-bureaucratic governance in the process of state led development is also however dependent on a country’s elite structure, as well as ideological commitment of the political leadership to enhance this capacity and achieve common good.
Peter Ekeh (1975), in his work “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement” has argued that Nigeria’s elite structure and the commitment of the ruling class to common good just like other African countries could be located as enduring legacies of colonialism. For him most educated Africans are citizens of two publics in the same society. On the one hand, they belong to a civic public from which they gain materially but to which they give only grudgingly. On the other hand they belong to a primordial public from which they derive little or no material benefits but to which they are expected to give generously and do give materially.

To make matters more complicated as Osaghae (2003) argues: The dynamics of African politics have been generated from the fact that individuals have fought to expand their, say, ethnic spheres of influence by controlling the state so as to be able to dominate the public realm and use its resources for the benefit of their own primordial public. Thus, according to Ekeh (1975) while many Africans ruling class try as much as possible to benefit and sustain their primordial publics, they seek to gain from the civic public. Moreover, while the individual political elite seek to gain from the civic public, there is no moral urge on him to give back to the civic public in return for his benefits. This in fact, explains the structure of the Nigerian political elites and their commitment to development.

Furthermore, techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria as this chapter argues still lacks the needed capacity that the developmental state’s ideal type requires. The country’s bureaucracy is characterized by non-meritocratic considerations in recruitment and promotion, lack of adequate staff training and general lack of motivation which are necessary for increased capacity of a state. Not only is the level of bureaucratic capacity lower in Nigeria, there is
also the problem of the lack of adequate inputs from technocrats in the developmental process of the country.

This latter problem is made worse by the fact that in Nigeria there is no any well-known ‘pilot agents’ staffed with best available hands in different fields with a career path that can serve as an engine room for socio-economic development similar to those in the developmental East Asian states. In a related manner the ‘embedded autonomy’ in which the state and the private sector interact in the process of development goals formulation and implementation is also not in existence. These various deficiencies of bureaucracy and technocracy in Nigeria have reflected on the level of development outcomes as seen in the last section of the chapter. Invariably, if an efficient, effective and autonomous bureaucracy and technocracy are necessary features of developmental state as displayed by the East Asian countries as well as Mauritius and Botswana in Africa, Nigeria at the moment do not qualify in any way as a developmental state.

This position pushes the argument that in order to achieve development and collective good in Nigeria through state led efforts there is the need to increase the level of efficiency, effectiveness and autonomy of the bureaucracy. This should also be combined with a clear mandate for certain ‘pilot agencies’ staff with committed team of technocrats determined to change the economic fortunes of Nigeria by positively formulating and implementing good economic policies and strategies that can aid the diversification of the economy through industrialisation. This move is however premised on the political commitment of the economic and political elites, as we shall see in the next chapter of the work. Thus, there is a causal linkage between state’s commitment and capacity and development in the sense that
ideological commitment to national development enhances capacity and institutional capacity to formulate and implement developmental policies stimulates socio-economic development.

CHAPTER SIX

POLITICS AND TECHNO-BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA (1999-2014)

6.1 Introduction

The current literature on developmental state and empirical evidences underscore the primacy of technocracy and an autonomous and efficient bureaucracy as prime institution for the achievement of state-led development. It is the bureaucrats and technocrats that formulate and implement policies that bring about development, within the larger policy framework informed by political judgement. Such policies might be industrial policies or market policies or a combination of both policies. However, it is imperative to observe that it would be grossly misleading and rather too simplistic to emphasise the abilities of technocrats and bureaucrats to formulate and implement these policies without a proper consideration of the political economy and other variables that enhance the capacity of technocrats and bureaucrats in the first place.

Therefore, in order to take a holistic understanding of the process of development through the developmental state paradigm, a focus on the political process of a society is very important (Kohli, 1994; Leftwich, 1994; Fritz & Menocal, 2006; Randall, 2007; Thovoethin, 2014). My
focus on the effects of politics on techno-bureaucratic governance is not an attempt to emphasis the link between regime type and development, as I have consistently argued and supported by empirical evidence and as the Nigerian case suggest, that regime type is not a determinant of development. Bringing in one-party to dominance is merely an investigation and explanation of why this semi-democracy has not brought about development in the manner some authoritarian regimes did in East Asia.

More so, the political processes under focus that are relevant and which are also to a large extent determinant of development are the nature of the elite class and the structure of the society. The nature of the elite class which is determined by the type of education they undergo and the socio-economic status and the structure of the society which is mostly determined by the process of its evolution, which according to Osaghae (2002) governs behaviour in public realm. Invariably, this chapter examines the position that the embedded autonomy of the bureaucrats in a developmental state as suggested by Peter Evans and other state-interventionist scholars is determined by political elites and the entire social structure. Stephan Haggard terms this “state-society relations” (2013:14).

In essence, in considering the political process of a developmental state emphasis should be placed on the nature of political elites which shapes policy making options and wider other social structures or state institutions (laws, rules, regulations, ethics, etc), which combination determines state’s capacity for development. Thus, for every developmental state one crucial component that should be clearly brought into focus is the political (which to some extent includes economic elements) and social elements which enable techno-bureaucratic governance operate sufficiently in order to take initiatives and operate effectively.
It is within the context of the importance of political process for state’s developmental capacity that this chapter attempts an analysis of how political interests of the Nigerian ruling class, economic class and other wider social structures determine the country’s capacity for development. By so doing it takes a critical analysis of the emergence and consolidation of the Nigerian political class and the implication of this to development, a review of enabling social structures and their implication for techno-bureaucratic governance as well as development in the country.

Such analysis would involve an understanding of how some provisions of the Nigerian constitution and other legal frameworks have contributed to the level of commitment of the Nigerian political class to the provision of public goods instead of private one. In the final analysis a clear examination of some few recent policies of the Nigerian government is taken into consideration in order to establish how political and economic interests of the ruling class have resulted in clientelism and extreme neo-patrimonialism which account for the type of policies formulated and implemented by few technocrats and bureaucrats.

The chapter is divided into five sections. It starts with the examination of the relevance of political commitment of the ruling class to building state’s capacity for development, an analysis of the level of commitment of the Nigerian political class to development. This is followed by an overview of some selected developmental policy options initiated and implemented from 1999-2014, in order to establish a linkage between political class interests and commitment to development. Thereafter, it takes an examination of how some constitutional provisions such as federal character principle and presidentialism have impacted on the Nigerian state’s capacity for development.
6.2 Exploring Political Process-State’s Developmental Capacity Link

The literature on the developmental state clearly establishes that state led development is achieved through good policies, formulated and implemented by effective and autonomous bureaucrats/technocrats. The question that should logically followed this assertion is that what are the underlying reasons for the success of state intervention through good policies in some cases and the failure in other states to generate and implement good developmental policies? Preliminary answers I offered under the introduction of this chapter and which several scholars (Evans, 1995; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Beeson, 2004; Kohli, 2004; Edigheji, 2005; Kim, 2009; Routley, 2012) have also suggested is that a combination of political and social factors are responsible for the ability of some countries to achieve development through good policies why others are not.

These political and social factors are determinant of state’s commitment and capacity for development. As a matter of emphasis, state capacity for development through technocratic governance is a product of political ideological commitment influenced by wider social structure. This section tries to explore the truth of this assertion by examining the nature and manner of ideological commitment in countries that have achieved development through state interventionism and those that are still facing the task of achieving development.
Central to such analysis is the advancement of the logic that ideological commitment to development is function of what Abdullah refers to as “public orientation” (2008:9). The type of public orientation in a state determines whether shared or collective interests of the citizens are pursued or whether the philosophy of the state is dominated by the pursuance of private and individual interests. This orientation is what Evans (1989) refers to as the motivational logic that constrains individual behaviour in the direction of consistency with collective goals. And it is in fact the existing orientation in a state that redefine individual (and I will add political leadership) goals in ways that motivate them to pursue corporate goals. Through this public orientation thesis I will argue that developmental success in East Asian and developmental failure in other third world countries has some link with “public orientation” which determines differences in the ideological commitment to collective goals in the former and latter. Thus, with country specific examples I shall attempt confirming the relationship between socio-political factors and state led developmental outcomes. These examples aim at establishing the relevance of political variables in the determination of developmental outcomes.

As Mark Beeson (2004) quoting Johnson (1999) contends, Japan’s quite remarkable and historically unprecedented development was a consequence of the efforts of a rationally planned state. This Japanese state took it upon itself the task of establishing ‘substantive social and economic goals’ with which to guide the processes of development and social mobilisation. According to Beeson the most important of these goals in Japan’s case was the reconstruction of its industrial capacity which was made possible by a widespread social consensus about the importance of economic development.
Therefore, at the centre of the Japanese significant development was a highly committed political leadership and competent bureaucracy dedicated to devising and implementing a planned process of economic development (Beeson, 2004). Similarly, the economic development set as an overarching goal of public policy in Korea and Taiwan was a result of the nationalist zeal of Park Chung-Hee in Korea and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. These two leaders laid the foundation for the economic development plans of their respective countries. These leaders, the bureaucrats and the public regarded economic development as an important goal in order to put their countries in the same pedestal with the Western countries (Kwon, 2007 quoting Haggard 1988).

Malaysia, as one of the Late Industrialised Countries (LICs) in Asia jumped from an agriculture intensive economy to an industrialized and knowledge-based economy by the 21st century due to the commitment of the country’s political leadership as well as the general public orientation of the need for shifting from an Agricultural to an industrialised economy. It should be noted that like most African states, in the 1960s and 70s Malaysia was heavily dependent on agriculture.

However, with the ideological commitment to development, Malaysia under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed (1981-2003) started looking at the developmental interventionist state as the means to industrialize the Malaysian state. That is, Malaysia under a determined Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed focused on the institutional and socio-political bases necessary for development. Thus, Malaysia pursued state-led development with the total commitment of its political leadership to meritocratic and autonomous bureaucracy as well as government elite’s insulation from the influence of the corporate or working class interests (Dest, 2012)
The commonly cited African’s developmental states, Botswana and Mauritius also exemplify the political-development path dependent logic. In these two countries the political leadership remained faithful to their initial vision about how to structure and run the civil services, making a sequence of prudent choices that reinforced themselves in a positive way (Goldsmith, 2001; Edigheji, 2005). Prebendalism and clientelism never got as far out of hand in these countries as in other African countries, because of the amount of relatively transparent and competitive political systems which existed in the two countries. The achievement of state led development in the two countries was made possible through the commitment of political elites to the formulation and implementation of developmental policies and the support and cooperation of the citizens (Goldsmith, 2001).

In other African countries the commitment to achieving development is quite different from what was obtained in Botswana and Mauritius. The behaviour of political leaders in most African states has remained that of self-serving than serving collective interests. As Fritz and Menocal (2006) opine, existing social structures and power relations which were inherited from colonialism and which did not face significant transformation account for the predatory instead of developmental instincts of African political elites. Thus, in most African countries the people have to rely on clientelist social structures in order to find an income and to ensure themselves against adverse events; in turn, these structures tend to reinforce poor leadership patterns and a state that is not sufficiently autonomous. Therefore, developments with regard to economically and politically powerful groups, and differences in the state apparatus which emerged as a consequence, appear to be key factors distinguishing most African countries from other countries that have achieved development through state intervention (Fritz and Menocal, 2006).
Running through my analysis under this section with cross countries’ examples is that the nature of political systems, based on the level and form of neo-patrimonialism and clientelism determine state capacity and developmental potential. Invariably it is correct to answer in the affirmative that there is a close relationship between political process and state’s capacity for development. Hellman et al (2000), Khan (2005) and Fritz & Menocal (2006) raise this type of argument when they suggest that the difference between successful and failed attempts at state led development should not be primarily linked to corruption, but rather to the problem of ‘state capture’ (Hellman et al., 2000; Khan, 2005).

State capture which implies that aside the fact that benefits from state interventionism are diverted into private pockets, the policies themselves are not driven by the need of yielding development, but rather are intended to yield benefits for limited groups. In other instances, the majority of the countries on the African continent lack committed and competent bureaucracy (Menocal, 2004). Having established this position what requires further examination is the understanding of the factors that enhances various level of ideological commitment to collective rather than private goals in economically successful and non-successful countries. This shall be examined using the Nigerian case study.

6.3 Socio-Political Structure and the Nigerian State

The analysis under this section is to examine the nature, character and evolution of the Nigerian socio-political system and how these affect the character of the Nigerian state and by extension its capacity for development. This analysis would enable us to understand why
the Nigerian state has remained ineffective in pursuing collective goals and also to ascertain the level at which Nigeria could be assumed to be a developmental or predatory state. The starting point of my analysis here is the understanding of the nature and character of the Nigerian political class. Post-independent Nigerian state is characterised by political elites that lack material and economic resource base and as a result using the words of Ezema and Ogujiuba (2012) exploit state power to compensate for the lack of these material and economic resources.

Akude (2007) strongly supports this claim by suggesting that the Nigerian political elites are not active in productive activities, lacks independent wealth base and therefore with political power in their hands, they proceeded to use same to compensate for their lack of a solid resource base. Given this situation the state becomes predatory and is regarded as a collection of individuals who are entirely concerned with extracting rents in the form of economic resources (Ake, 1996; Jomo, 1997; Omitola, 2005; Majekodunmi & Adejuwon, 2012). More so, as Akude (2007) holds pursuing economic development by the political elites could be detrimental to their interests as new classes might emerge and wrestle political power away from them and hence their failure to attempt pursuing developmental agenda.

Another type of explanation for the type of political elites that Nigeria has is the deeply instilled characteristics of Nigeria’s political economy. Here neo-patrimonial politics reflects a particular level of economic development. As I have consistently stated the acquisition of political office by the ruling class in Nigeria represents the best avenue for personal accumulation. Unlike in Botswana where the political elites were rural capitalists before their ascent to national public office (Pitcher, et al, 2009), most members of the Nigerian political class have no known capital base.
Therefore, as a result of the nature and character of the Nigerian political elite and the need to continuously protect both their political and economic interests there is no strong political will to pursue collective interests. That is, there is a clear absence of populist politics in Nigeria. This is underscored as noted earlier by elite complicity in resource mismanagement, political activities and governance underlined by plunder, combined with leading policy outcomes that are unfair and inequitable to the majority of the citizenry (Ibietan and Joshua, 2015).

Judging by this, strong political will as identified by Giovannetti et al (2011) as a requirement for the success of social policies is absent in the Nigerian case. In its stead as we shall see in the next section there is the existence of frequent policy changes and inconsistent implementation of developmental policies which impact on the country’s progress. Umukoro (2013) emphasises this when he holds that the lack of strong political will has created severe budgetary and governance problems in Nigeria, which in turn contributed to how programmes are formulated and implemented. The consequence of which is partial implementation or abandonment of developmental policies.

Another important area that requires critical examination is the need to understand how resources are competed for and appropriated by the Nigerian ruling class. In Nigeria there is an absence of nationhood or a strong national identity and as result access to state power is used for the benefits of the particular ethnic group in power in a prebendal way. Ekeh (1976) in his argument on how colonialism has resulted in the emergence of two publics in Nigeria and other African states has argued for how colonialism has laid the foundation for what
manifest in the type of post-colonial ruling class in Nigeria. According to him the civic public which was introduced at the advent of colonialism is essentially amoral.

Thus, resources are diverted from the ‘civic realm’ through criminal corruption to service the primordial public which is perfectly moral and which an individual see as public that one should not steal from. Invariably, in Nigeria political class sees access to state’s resource base as crucial and as such driven by ethnic ideologies (Ayatse & Iorhen, 2013). Therefore, the politics of allocation based on the politics of enrichment to the group(s) with the upper hand in the interplay of power politics account for why the capture of state power has remained fierce battle among political elites that represent the three dominant ethnic groups (Odeyemi, 2014).

This lack of national community, and the importance of various and rival national groups leads to a situation in which various ethnic groups compete to capture state power not for national but group’s interest. The consequences of this weak national identity in Nigeria have been disastrous for economic development of the country. One of such consequences is the lack of any prospect of evolving and carrying through a national project; including development. Where attempts are made to seek development, policies tend to be hampered by ethnic groups’ social and political interests’ protection. Furthermore the absence of strong national identity has great impact on the contest for state power. In Nigeria there is always the serious struggle for state power by different ethnic groups which mostly leads to endemic political instability detrimental to economic development (Ologbenla and Waziri, 2012, quoting Ake, 2000).

After establishing the nature and character of the Nigerian political class and the socio-political structure that emerged thereof I shall address the factors responsible for the
existence of these type of class and socio-political structure. Without overstating the effects of colonialism I will however strongly assert that a crucial element responsible for the Nigerian type of political class and socio-political structure is the colonial origin of the Nigerian state. As Osaghae (2002) argues the primary motive of the colonial state was to exploit the resources of the country and link it to the metropolitan Britain and other international capitalist centres as periphery. According to him the colonial state was an “extractionist state” (Osaghae, 2002:12), with the welfare functions of the state almost non-existent.

Ekeh (1976) in his own account on the effects of colonialism on Nigeria’s post-independence socio-political structure and political class argues that the structure remains enduring legacies of colonialism. For him, colonialism turned African society upside down and inside out, and marked a re-invention of social formations that have endured in various ways till this day. He furthers his argument that in Nigeria and other African countries there exist the primordial public which is “closely identified with primordial groupings, sentiments and activities which nevertheless impinge on public interest” to the extent the groupings, ties and sentiments influence and determine the individual’s public behaviour. Osaghae (1999) supports this Ekeh’s position by suggesting that the existence of the ‘us’ versus ‘they’ differentiation characterizes relations between the people and the civic public, where the ‘us’ is the primordial public whose ownership, autonomy and sustenance are jealously guarded.

More so, the civic public “is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private realm and in the primordial public”. Coupled with a feeling of non-ownership, this amorality is conducive to the opportunistic, lawless, prebendalist, corrupt and plundering tendencies that have come to characterize behaviour in the public sector in contemporary
Nigeria. Thus, the individual feels no moral urge to reciprocate the benefits he receives, and behaviour that would be regarded as morally reprehensible in the primordial public, such as embezzlement of public funds, is permissible to the extent that the larger group directly or indirectly benefits from the loot (1999).

Similarly, Osaghae (2002) while quoting Ekeh (1975), Dudley (1982) and Joseph (1987) further holds that the extractive nature of the colonial state prevails in post-colonial Nigeria’s and this gives rise to corruption, abuse and exploitation of public office to serve private ends. In his words “to facilitate its regulatory and extractive roles, the post-colonial state centralises the production and distribution of national resources, and in the context of state capitalism this encourages the perception of the state as an instrument of accumulation and the patron-client ties as the dominant mode of political relation”. This position is in line with Majekodunmi & Adejuwon (2012) citing Omitola (2005) argument that the extractive and exploitative nature of colonial rule did not stop after independence; rather it developed another character as the emerging ruling class at independence continued the same mode of capital accumulation.

I shall highlight some few effects of colonialism on the nature and character of the Nigerian political class and politics for a better understanding of my position. First, the foundation for the Nigerian post-colonial social-political structure was laid by the way the British colonial masters bifurcated the Nigerian colonial state created discords and division among the existing tribal and ethnic groups (Ologbenla and Waziri, 2012). As Osaghae (2002) argues the manner in which the Northern and Southern Nigeria were brought together has far-reaching implications for state and nation-building. In his account Northern and Southern Nigeria although amalgamated continued to develop along different lines. For instance, while
most parts of the North were shielded from western influences which gave advantage to the South in education and development which could be linked to the latter’s exposure to western influences.

This North-South separation also leads to the spirit of regionalism. Regionalism is defined as “a system in which citizens who are not originally from a region are discriminated against in, and excluded from, the provision and enjoyment of public goods” (Osaghae, 2002:7). Thus, Nigerian post-colonial politicians use this North-South dichotomy and its attendant regionalism for political advantage during the contest for state power and economic resources.

Another factor that influenced the nature and character of the Nigeria state and its political elites was the conservative nature of post-colonial political parties that inherited political power. It is a known fact that in the African context the party in control of government is always in control of the allocation of economic resources and social infrastructures and hence the development process. The political party that dominated the Nigerian politics from 1999 to 2014 the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), is made up of three groups of people which were either retired Army generals, past political appointees and others who benefited directly from the prolonged military rule in the country, especially between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s (Yagboyaju, 2012).

For example, Solomon Lar the pioneer chairman of PDP was a Minister of Police Affairs under the military regime of late Sani Abacha (available at peoplesdemocraticparty.com.ng), Olusegun Obasanjo the President of Nigeria from 1999-2007 under the banner of PDP was a retired military Head of State who handed-over power to the conservative National Party of
Nigeria (NPN) in 1979, Chief Tony Anenih a retired police officer and Bendel state NPN state chairman served as the PDP board of trustees chairman for many years, Ahmadu Ali PDP’s national Chairman from 2004 to 2008 was also a retired military officer, Bamanga Tukur the National Chairman of the party from 2011 to 2014 was also the Governor of defunct Gongola State under the platform of NPN and the Minister of Industry under the Military Regime of Abacha (www.peoplesdemocraticparty.com.ng), etc. In fact encyclopaedia Britannica (undated) clearly asserts that the People’s Democratic Party proved especially popular with the army, as some 100 retired senior officers joined, including Olusegun Obasanjo a former military leader of Nigeria (1976–79). These categories of people are highly conservative and prefer maintaining already existing status quo under failed civilian government and military authoritarian rule.

For more than a decade after the restoration of electoral democracy in Nigeria in 1999, the PDP has controlled more than two-third of the national assembly, produced more than two thirds of state governors and has produced the President of the country over four consecutive elections. Interestingly, the PDP is an off-shoot of the conservative Northern People’s Congress (NPC) that ruled Nigeria during the country’s First Republic (1960-1966) and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) that dominated the country’s Second Republic (1979-1983) and some military apologists. The political elites in these post-independent political parties were unwilling to change prevailing socio-political structures which were also a dominant ideology of the PDP as displayed by the elements that dominated its membership, and according to Kim (2009) without the institutional change a new development path could not be realised.
Doner and his colleagues (2005) “systemic vulnerability” thesis can also be used in explaining why the Nigerian state has not experienced socio-political transformation that can enhance development. According to them political elites will only build institutions that enhance collective interests when simultaneously faced with three important conditions, especially under democracy: (1) the credible threat that any deterioration in the living standards of popular sectors could trigger unmanageable mass unrest; (2) the heightened need for foreign exchange and war materiel induced by national insecurity; and (3) the hard budget constraints imposed by a scarcity of easy revenue sources. This they call interactive condition "systemic vulnerability."

In their opinion, any subset of these constraints might make it somewhat more difficult for rulers to stay in power without improving institutional performance. Even mild constraints might inspire politicians to forego their individual interest in maximizing patronage resources, and press them to convert state institutions for collective benefits. They conclude under this thesis that unless political leaders are confronted by all three of these constraints at the same time they will find less challenging ways of staying in power (Doner et al, 2005). Empirical evidences point to the fact that the Nigerian political elites from independence to date have not been faced with these constraints and hence their failure to transform the country’s socio-political and economic structures (Doner et al, 2005). Nigeria since independence has only experienced popular revolt against military authoritarian rule without similar revolt against bad civil rule, has not been confronted by national insecurity that heightened for foreign exchange, there is the abundance of revenue resources through the oil and gas sector and hence the absence of the compelling need for socio-political and economic transformation by the those in political power.
My account under this section is that existing socio-political structure and power relations as they have evolved during colonial rule and consolidated by post-colonial elites determine the nature of post-colonial state. It is within this context that I argue that the nature of the Nigerian state as indicated under the analysis in this section is a state lacking basic developmental features. In effect the Nigerian state has been ineffective in fulfilling reasons for its existence. And as Fritz and Menocal (2006) hold ineffective states have to rely on clientelist and neo-patrimonial social structures in order to generate revenue and ensure themselves against adverse effects. In their opinion these structures tend to reinforce poor leadership patterns and a state that is not adequately autonomous. This is exactly what the Nigerian state depicts. I shall turn to an examination of three policies meant for development, which were implemented after the restoration of electoral democracy in Nigeria from 1999 to 2014, in order to support the claim that state’s existing socio-political structure accounts for the country’s inability to achieve development through state intervention.

6.4 Prebendalism, Clientelism and the Politics of Development in Nigeria

This section takes a look at some selected policies of the Nigerian government, with the aim of establishing how the nature and character of the country’s political elite affects the formulation and implementation of policies. By so doing I shall basically establish how technocrats and bureaucrats are influenced by various political and economic interests in the formulation and implementation of policies, which invariably account for the prebendalist and clientelist politics and associated underdevelopment in Nigeria.
As I have stated elsewhere, it is misleading to assume that Nigerian bureaucrats and technocrats do not formulate and implement developmental policies. In fact every successive Nigerian government has different developmental plans and agenda, but such plans and projects are made to serve the political class interests and those of their followers and using the words of Oshodi (2008) are only meant to mimic development. Therefore, under this type of situation, decision on the kind, content and direction of developmental policies are met for perpetuating interests of few members of the Nigerian political and economic class. Thus, the needs of the people hardly frame development policy, programmes and projects of the state under such circumstances (Oshodi, 2008)

Emphasising the above point, Oshodi (2008), holds that in Nigeria as well as some other African countries this situation is largely so, because tiny political elite within the state structure, who, in most cases dominates the entire political class and dictates the content and direction of politics and development has no known productive base. Supporting this Oshodi’s position, Maphunye (2009) using Nigeria as a case study argues that for many of the countries in Africa the acquisition of state power leads to opportunity for economic benefits. Jomo (1997) is more assertive in his view of the Nigerian elites and their impacts on policy formulation when he underscores the link between process of social development and the nature of the state in development. In his view under this situation the Nigerian state has become predatory and arena for the promotion of the interests of some few elite who extracts rents in the form of economic resources.

I shall turn to critical examination of three major policies that have been implemented by successive regimes during the Nigerian fourth republic in order to explain how policy making and implementation have become a tool for the promotion of the interests of politicians and
those of their followers. These policies include the privatisation policy, constituency allowance for legislators, and the oil pipelines protection contract’s award. Each of these policies shall be examine one after the other to serve as a reference points on how prebendalist and clientelistic politics accounts for how policies decisions are taken and implemented in Nigeria.

Shortly after his election in 1999, the then president, Olusegun Obasanjo announced a new privatisation policy for Nigeria. The implementation of this policy gathered more momentum thereafter. However, the implementation of the privatisation policy has been criticised basically on two different accounts and accounts which suggest that the policy is another elites’ initiatives to promote their political and economic interests. The first argument in this direction is that the privatisation policy has moved towards the allocation of privatised firms by the government to personal friends/network with whom they have interests, powerful few individuals, the political class and their followers who have enough resources to buy these firms (Anugwon, 2011).

I shall point out few examples to buttress this first argument. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo who started the privatisation policy sold African Petroleum (AP) to a close political and business associate Femi Otedola’s Zennon Oil. Mallam Nasir el-Rufai, former Minister in the presidency and chairman of the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) who in that capacity was in charge of the privatisation in the Federal Capital Territory bought a presidential guest house for himself. Dr Andy Uba a close associate of the president, Mrs Remi Oyo a special assistant to the president, Dr Mohammed Hassan Lawal a former Minister during the Obasanjo regime and Mr Akin Osuntokun a Honorary Political adviser to the former president and a host of other government appointees also bought choice
government properties during the first stage of the Nigerian privatisation exercise. The sales of these public assets to those in government and to people that are close to the corridor of power clearly confirm the fact that the privatisation policy was not in the first place mooted to serve public interests but another way of primitive capital accumulation by those in political power and their close allies.

The second argument is that some of these privatised firms and properties were sold to members of the ruling class and their cronies at prices lower than their actual values. I will point to few examples to support this position. The first example of such is the sale of the controversial 28.7% equity interest of the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in AP Plc. to Zenon Oil owned Femi Otedola, who happens to be former President Obasanjo’s business friend. When these shares were sold to him no advertisements were placed before the sales were effected and as it were, even the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) denied any knowledge of the transaction.

It is on record that Global Fleet Group initially paid the sum of N17.5 billion for these number of shares which sale was eventually cancelled and sold to Zenon Oil for the sum of N17 billion (Octnus.Net, 23rd August, 2007). Another interesting case is the sale of Daily Times of Nigeria which was sold by the BPE to Folio Communications at an undervalued price. The controversy surrounding the sale of this newspaper company was finally resolved by a Federal High Court of Nigeria ruling in January 2010 voiding the sale of 140 Million shares of Daily Times of Nigeria (DTN) to Folio Communications by the BPE. The core investor of DTN (Folio Communications) according to the court never paid a single kobo for Daily Times. Instead, it used the shares of Daily Times and its assets network to secure a loan of N750Million from Afribank (Daily Independent Newspaper, 23rd April, 2014).
The case of Ajaokuta Steel Rolling Mill is another shocking example. According to newspapers reports, this industrial complex built for over $1.5 Billion by the Federal Government of Nigeria, was sold to a purported Indian company for $30 Million. Delta Steel Company, Aladja was also sold for less than 20% of their actual market value. Oshogbo, Jos and Katsina steel rolling mills are not functional today after they were sold at scrape prices to organizations that do not have the capacity to manage and turn them around (Daily Independent Newspaper, April 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2014)

From every indication therefore, it is plausible to argue that the privatisation policy in Nigeria, which in the first place was embarked upon in order to make firms more efficient only involve the improper sale of government firms and other valuable properties to cronies, family members and associates of those in the corridors of power for peanuts, at the expense of the general public and in absolute disregard of due process. In fact the BPE public admitted in national newspapers that only 10% out of 400 privatized firms in Nigeria are properly functioning after they have been privatised (Daily Independent Newspaper, 23\textsuperscript{rd} April, 2014)

The constituency project system for federal legislators is another policy of the Nigerian government that has been used for the benefits of the political elites instead of serving the interests of the citizens. The system is one where funds are allocated in the nation’s budget to allow legislators to carry out developmental projects in their various constituencies. In 2013, Chairman Senate Committee on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Senator
Mohammed Ali Ndume declared that N900 billion has so far been appropriated for constituency projects for legislators from 2004 to 2013 (CISLAC, available at www.cislacnigeria.net). Nigeria operates a bicameral legislator with the Senate having 109 members while the House of Representatives has 360 members. The implication of this is that within this period N900 billion has benefitted less than 500 people out of over 150 million Nigerian population, because the appropriated money that ordinarily should enhance grassroots development for which the provision was made have not benefited in any way from the policy (See www.tribune.com.ng).

More so, projects generally involve a chain of complex processes, several professionals with varying expertise, and complex resources that must be managed effectively and efficiently in order to achieve maximum success. Most of the Nigerian legislators cannot lay claim to such capacity, therefore; constituency projects in the Nigerian context if they are embarked upon at all are poorly conceived, formulated and executed. Several of such constituency projects have therefore ended as failed projects such as uncompleted, mal-functioning and unsustainable projects (The Punch, 25th March, 2013). For instance, the Deputy Director (Programmes) in the Nigeria Ministry of Power, Mr Rasaki Alonge, disclosed that plethora of rural electrification projects under legislators’ constituency projects are pending across the country. According to him there are 1400 abandoned projects at the ministry and also 1600 rural electrification projects that has also been abandoned (ThisDay Newspaper 11th September, 2013).
In fact, in Lagos State, South-West Nigeria, which has a slightly higher rate of performance for constituency projects, many projects still remained abandoned especially in the health sector. In Ejigbo Local Council Development Area (LCDA) of the state three Public Health Centres contracts which had been paid for since 2010 were abandoned by contractors who got the contract. According to the chairman of the Local Government, the contractor handling the projects abandoned them without completion. The same scenario happened at another site at Ikosi, a town in Lagos State where a contractor constructed a Health Care Centre to lintel level and abandoned it and after the community members protested another contractor was brought in and he got it to some level and also abandoned this same project. Expenditure for these abandoned Health Care Centres was again put in the 2014 budget of the Country (The Nation Newspaper, 26th October, 2014).

It is necessary to observe that embarking on constituency project by the Nigerian legislators is an aberration. They do not have a basis in the Nigerian constitution and therefore they remain outside of the law. According to the Nigerian 1999 constitution, the National Assembly as the legislative branch of government is to make laws while the executive branch is to execute projects. At no time did the Constitution intend that legislators should embark on projects execution. The legislators only use the constituency project to box the Executive branch to a tight corner where during the annual budgetary process; every legislator is given the opportunity to implant into the document, some flimsy projects, with large budgetary outlays, ostensibly for his constituency (The Punch, 4th October, 2010). Putting it in a clearer perspective, constituency projects remain one of the ways through which the ruling class appropriate public funds for themselves, in the spirit of sustaining the presidential system.
Another area in which shall be subjected to critical analysis is the award of contracts worth N5.6 billion for the protection of pipelines to some private companies (NOGIntelligence, Issue 45, available at www.militarynews.us). The pipeline protection contracts were awarded to ex-Niger Delta militants, Mujahhid Dokubo-Asari, Ebikaowei “boy loaf”, Victor Ben, Ateke Tom and Government “Tompolo” Ekpumopolo (Ibid). Dokubo-Asari earns $9 million (N1.420 billion) annually guarding pipelines of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), while Tompolo was paid $22.9 million (N3.614 billion) for similar contract (Nairaland, 26th August, 2014 available at www.pregnancyweekguide.org). It should be noted that those that were awarded these contracts were from the same Bayelsa state and from the same Ijaw ethnic group with the President of the country when the contracts were awarded, Goodluck Jonathan. This suggests the prebendal and clientelist nature of the contract.

These contracts were awarded to these ex-militants to protect the nation’s water ways so that the theft of crude which was going on at the time would be curbed. The argument of the government was that since the ex-militants are from the creeks they know the nook and crannies of the creek, therefore, they are in a better position to provide security to the pipelines, repel pirates and oil thieves who usually sail into the Nigerian waters at night to steal oil (Nairaland, July 15, 2013 available at www.pregnancyweekguide.org). One of the reasons why this contract award is faulted is that the Nigerian government awarded the contracts to these individuals through the NNPC in spite of the fact that the responsibility of pipeline protection falls under the purview of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) (Nairaland, 26th August, 2014 available at pregnancyweekguide.org).
More so, the global practice is that the owner of the assets work out the safety and security needs assessment of the infrastructures using a consultant, and where need be, contract a “competent” third party to protect the assets if it becomes obvious that it cannot protect it (Olufamous.com, July 03, 2013). Therefore, the expectation is that firms within the oil industry are expected to protect oil installations. More interesting is the fact that despite contract awarded to these ex-militants no visible result could be seen. In fact, Nigeria’s oil was stolen more than ever before (NOGIntelligence Issue 45, Nairaland, July 15, 2013). What this suggests is that the contracts were awarded to the ex-militants for clientelist purpose than the need to protect the pipelines.

These ex-militants that incidentally are from the same Ijaw ethnic group like the country’s president were those that later vigorously campaigned for the second term ambition of the president. For instance these ex-militants under the auspices of the Niger Delta Leadership, Peace and Cultural Development Initiative vigorously campaigned for the re-election of President Goodluck Jonathan’s ambition. In fact the leader of the group Asari-Dokubo who incidentally was one of the major beneficiaries of the pipelines protection contract openly boasted in one of their campaigns in reference to the agitation of the return of the presidency to the northern part of the country that:

_They cannot fight an Ijaw man out of office. Let them continue to shoot and bomb but we will win them because Goodluck has performed better than any other President of this country. So, the 2015 Presidential election is a do-or-die affair_ (Daily Independent Newspaper, November 15, 2014).

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The analysis of these three policies of the Nigerian tries to uncover how governmental policies reflect the interests of few elite class and groups within the Nigerian state quite against the interest of the majority. This development shows that bureaucrats and technocrats are not insulated from vested political and class interests in the policy making and implementation process. This negates the tenets of state interventionism in the developmental process. The next sections of this chapter shall examine some constitutional and legal frameworks that have enhanced prebendal, clientelist and neo-patrimonial practices in Nigeria, which constituted a clog in the emergence of efficient and autonomous techno-bureaucratic governance, essential for state-led development.

6.5 Federal Character Principle, Quota System and Techno-Bureaucratic Governance in Nigeria

The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies (Section 14 (2) of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution).

Above quoted section of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution gives legal backing to the federal character principle aims at regulating appointments, promotions, security of tenure and severance in every government department. The framers of this constitution (Umukoro, 2014) include the Federal Character Principle in the constitution with the mind set of accommodating people from the different segments of the over 150 million Nigerian population in the public bureaucracy and in political appointments (Gbereghe, 2012;
Gberevbie & Ibietan, 2013). In order to ensure proper implementation (Umukoro, 2014) of the Principle the Federal Character Commission is mandated to work out formulae for sharing posts and services, compliance monitoring, enforcement of compliance (See www.crise.ox.ac.uk) through legal actions, demanding and reviewing data on staffing, and institutional investigations (Mustapha, 2007).

It is not out of place to posit that the Federal Character Principle is a good instrument in managing the diversities and divisive tendencies in a plural and sharply divided society like Nigeria. What however requires debate is the application of the Principle in order to establish its success or otherwise. Such analysis would enable us to establish how a framework like the Federal Character Principle has contributed to undermining technocracy and bureaucracy effectiveness and affected the country’s developmental efforts. Thus, this section of the work is solely designed for such analysis.

As stated earlier the Federal Character Principle and its provision of quota system for employment, appointment and promotion have been included in the Nigerian constitution in order to promote the principle of “equity” in a highly divided country like Nigeria. The principle of “equity” it is argued is to reflect the diversity of the multi-ethnic Nigerian state. While I have stated repeatedly that the Federal Character Principle remains laudable the operation of the principle has however been abused on the altar of political exigencies. In fact its most damaging application in recent years has been in the bureaucracy and public services. As noted by Ekeh when the principle was first introduced in the 1979 Nigerian constitution, “the application of the Federal Character Principle has invaded the integrity and standards of public bureaucracy and…other governmental bodies that normally require safeguards from the ravages of politics” (Ekeh, 1989:34, See also nigeriaworld.com). Thus,
the implementation of the principle since 1999 when it was firmly entrenched has not in any way changed from what it used to be when it was first introduced in 1979. A detailed x-ray of the implementation of the principle and its attendant political implication will clearly support this claim.

The implementation of the Federal Character principle shall be examined in respect of how it has affected appointment and promotion in the Nigerian Public Service, especially a consideration of how politics has impacted on its implementation. It should be noted that the Federal Character Principle is not used for appointment into junior level of the Nigerian civil service. The adherence to the principle is taken into consideration for appointment into senior civil service position and into various political offices in Nigeria. I shall focus on recruitment into grade level 07 and above, since authority for recruitment, appointment, promotion and discipline of staff on salary grade level 01 to 06 (See www.nou.edu.ng) was delegated by the civil service commissions to ministries and extra ministerial offices which performed such delegated functions through their departmental advisory committees or DACs as they were commonly known (Maidoki & Dahilda, 2013).

Grade level 01 to 06 is the grade of junior staff, while grade level 07 to 17 is the grade level for senior civil servants in Nigeria. In employing and promoting civil servants within the junior staff category the federal character principle is not taken into consideration. The principle is only applied in the appointment and promotion of staff within the senior staff category. Therefore, appointment and promotion of staff within the senior staff category for which the principle is applied shall form the basis of my analysis.
According to the principle in employing people into various civil service positions starting from level 8 and above various segments of the Nigerian state must be represented. As stated earlier, this is to enable the various segments of the society to be represented in the Public Service. As Erhagbe (2012) rightly observes the Principle has sometimes been ignored in the area of employment and in other cases when used it has been abused, in such a way to favour persons from the same ethnic group with those in government (See eujournal.org). For instance it is not a coincidence that the Minister of Finance and the coordinating Minister of Economy under President Goodluck Jonathan Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala who incidentally is from the Ibo ethnic group has appointment to parastatals and agencies under her ministry dominated by people from her ethnic group at the detriment of other zones in the Country. In a list marked “Strategic Public Sector Finance/Economy Leaders, March 2014” numbering 26 appointees, 16 heads of strategic agencies all hail from the Ibo-speaking (the ethnic group of the Minister), three from South-south, three from South-west (SW), three from North-central (NC), two from North-west (NW)and one from the North-east (NE) (Peoples’ Daily, March 22, 2014).

Besides Professor Nwanze Okidegbe, the chief economic adviser to the President, heads of the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority, Nigeria Stock Exchange, Securities and Exchange Commission, Assets Management Company of Nigeria, Investment and Securities Tribunal, National Pension Commission(PENCOM),Bureau of Public Procurement, Debt Management Office, Fiscal Responsibility Commission, Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission; National Salaries, Income and Wages Commission and Nigeria Export Processing Zones Authority were all from the Ibo ethnic group (the ethnic group of the Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister of the Economy) (Peoples’ Daily, March 22, 2014).
This biased appointment into the public service according to Gberevbie (2010) brings into the public service an incompetent workforce that lacks the ability to implement the policies of government for sustainable development.

The poor implementation of the principle is not only limited to employment in the Civil Service but also in the area of appointment into various political positions. In the spirit of adhering to the Principle it has been observed that membership of the ruling political party, the need to get political advantage from a particular ethnic group and compensation for party loyalty have remained major considerations in appointment into various political positions. I shall point a few examples to buttress this position. Stella Oduah who was an Aviation minister was very active in the 2011 political campaign of President Goodluck Jonathan, where she served as his campaign’s Director of Administration and Finance. She was a notable face during the Neighbour to Neighbour campaign organisation. Godsday Orubebe, a former minister of Niger Delta Affairs, like Oduah, also played a major role in Jonathan’s emergence as the President in 2011. He was the President’s stabilising agent in the tempestuous Niger Delta and was primarily deployed to assuage the militancy in the region (National Premium Newspaper, February 20, 2014).

Mohammed Wakil who was once a front-runner for the PDP national chairmanship position was nominated a minister to score major political point in Borno State. This is due to the fact that historically the ruling political parties at national level have always been playing second fiddle in Borno State. Throughout the first, second and this Republic, no party that controls the centre takes the centre stage in Borno State. Obviously, the aim of President Jonathan for
appointing Wakil, is to reverse the dwindling fortunes of the party in the state ahead of the 2015 general elections.

Mrs Laurentia Laraba Mallam who was Jonathan’s 2010/2011 campaigner was appointed a minister to play a big role in the 2015 presidential election. She is a female politician with experience in mobilizing people, especially youth and women to appreciate the intricacies of politics. Laraba Mallam, as a result of her involvement in the Catholic Women Organization (CWO) which is one of the most organized and widespread women organization in Nigeria, travelled to virtually all the States in Nigeria where she is alleged to have developed friendship which she used to assist her political party in numerous elections (Sunday Trust Newspaper, 02 February, 2014).

These few examples above show that appointment into public office in Nigeria is predicated on the contribution of the appointee to past electoral success of the ruling party and potential contribution to future political success of the party (the latter shall be further discussed under subsequent paragraphs of this section). As noted elsewhere under this thesis, this has resulted in putting square pegs in round holes. The resultant effect is that such appointees become grossly ineffective and this has seriously affected policies consistency and the march towards development in the country.

More so, the implementation of the Principle which requires that each of the thirty-six states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory (See www.refworld.org) should have a minister appointed from them also has serious economic implications for the country. Apart
from the states, each of the six geo-political zones (See www.achpr.org) that make up the country is expected to have a minister nominated from their zones. By implication the Nigerian Federal Executive Council at the moment has forty-three ministers. These Ministers too have different Special Assistants, Senior Special Assistants, various Special Advisers, Senior Special Advisers, Personal Assistants and other personal aides appointed by them. The implications of such numbers of Ministers and high number of aides appointed by the Ministers are not farfetched.

The first implication of this number of ministers and personal aides is that the recurrent expenditure is always on the high side having serious effect on the budgetary allocation for capital projects. In fact from 2011 to 2014 the recurrent expenditure profile in the Nigerian budget has always been above 70 percent (www.theguardianmobile.com). Similarly, there is always duplication of functions of some of these ministries. Thus the implementation of this aspect of the principle, allows the President compensate those that have contributed to his electoral victory all in the name of the implementation of the principle. Given that, the principle is not entrenched in the Nigerian constitution, the President could not have had any legal justification in appointing this number of ministers whose functions are significantly duplicated. For instance in Nigeria there is always the practice of appointing a Minister and Minister of State in each of the ministries. It is illogical to have a Minister and a Minister of State when there are permanent secretaries. This calls into question the relevance of the functions of Ministers of State in the various ministries.
The rentier economy nature of the country which gives political office holders unfettered benefit from the spoilt system also contributes to the use of the Federal Character Principle as a political advantage for the ruling party. The rentier nature of the country’s economy as a matter of emphasis allows each minister to involve in primitive accumulation in order to use money acquired from political office to fund party politics. I shall give two good examples of Nigerian ministers, Diezani Alison-Madueke and Stella Oduah, who were alleged to have involved in various financial recklessness without any punitive measures.

Diezani Alison-Madueke who is the Nigerian minister of petroleum has been accused of different financial recklessness. One example of these was the preliminary enquiry in the Nigerian House of Representatives where she was said to have spent €500,000 (N130 million) monthly or N3.21 billion in two years to maintain a Challenger business jet. Furthermore, Alison-Madueke’s tenure as Petroleum Minister, which started in 2011, has been scarred by pains, controversies, sickening graft at the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). One of such was the 2011 petrol subsidy scandal, in which the parliament approved only N245 billion for payments, but the government under the minister spent N2.5 trillion. More so, in February, 2013, the Senate uncovered how the corrupt oil corporation spent N700 million daily to subsidise kerosene without the product reaching consumers who pay as much as N150 per litre, instead of the NNPC’s N55 per litre (The Punch Newspaper April 1, 2014).

Ms Stella Oduah, who was a former Aviation Minister of the country, was also alleged to have bought through one of the agencies under her ministry, the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, N255m bulletproof cars (The Punch Newspaper, October 29, 2013). There were
numerous corrupt practices and primitive capital accumulation by some other ministers and aides, which are just too numerous to be mentioned. Some of them include 2.2 billion-US-dollar arms scandal, a 6.9 million US Dollar fraud by the Chief Security Officer (CSO) to former President Goodluck Jonathan, committed under the guise of buying three mobile stages for the President, a 2.5 billion-Naira scam involving the rent of house boats, etc (Nigerian Monitor, 30th August, 2015). I have given detailed analysis of these two examples under this section of the work in order to establish the fact that those that have future electoral values for the ruling party are put in ministries where they can easily loot funds without apprehension and in return expected to use such funds for the electoral advantage of the ruling party. In this respect neo-patrimonial culture dominates the existence of the Nigerian state.

Similarly, ministries that are viewed in the parlance of Nigerian politics to be “juicy” are given to those considered as more loyal party members, those close to the President and those believed to have more electoral values. Invariably, with the Nigerian political process highly monetised, the ruling party has the advantage of using the financial resources acquired from this high number of ministers and the “juicy” ministries to fund elections for the advantage of the ruling political party. Thus, since the idea is for political appointees represent their political party, state, tribe, religion, etc, the first advice the person gets from his constituency is a reminder to him that the last person in the office looted $1 billion and that he must top that. Under this situation poor performance is seen as acceptable so long as he represents his party and his section of the country, gives contract to those that recommend him and cites projects to benefit his people (Benjamin Obiajulu Aduba, 2011). This depicts the prevalence of prebendal mode of the Nigerian politics.
Another area that requires serious assessment of the Federal Character Principle is in the area of appointment of Permanent Secretaries (Bogaards, 2010) in the Nigerian civil service, which is subject to the provisions of the Principle. According to the principle every state of the federation must have at least one permanent secretary in the public service (Available at www.tribune.com.ng). The Nigerian constitution empowers the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation to screen and recommend to the President people that are to be appointed Permanent Secretaries. In recommending those that are to be appointed Permanent Secretaries the Federal Character Principle is applied in order to make sure that each of the thirty-six states of the federation has at least one representative. Thus, in some states there may be up to seven directors competing for one position so you now select one out of seven, while in some states, you have just one person competing for one position (Ibid) which automatically qualifies the person to be appointed a Permanent Secretary.

The first implication of the application of the federal character Principle in the appointment of Permanent Secretaries and Directors (Eghosa, 1996) is that the maturity requirement of three years’ experience on the post of a Director prescribed for eligibility for consideration for the post of Permanent Secretary and that of Deputy Director prescribed for consideration for the post of Director is not adhered to (NBF, September 7, 2009). For example in order to respect the Federal Character Principle the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation in March 2013 wrote the Presidency requesting a “waiver for the transfer of indigenes from disadvantaged states of Bayelsa, Ebonyi and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) to the mainstream federal civil service as directors (ThisDay Newspaper, 14th September, 2014).
This was sequel to an observed lack of directors on Salary Grade Level 17 from the two states and the FCT that were representing their states or zones. The President granted this waiver and fifteen Directors were appointed to represent these two States and the FCT. It is however important to point out that some of these appointed Directors were not appointed on the basis of merit but to satisfy the Federal Character Principle. This is supported by the claim that out of the 15 directors appointed; eight were believed not to have met the requisite requirements as provided by the Scheme of Service, Federal Civil Service Commission Guidelines on Appointment, Promotion and Discipline; Public Service Rules, and Establishment Circular (ThisDay Newspaper, 14th September, 2014). Considering the fact that the position of permanent Secretary and Directorial positions are very important policy formulation position empirical evidences as confirmed by the above example shows that there were instances where bureaucrats with little knowledge occupy this very important positions in the civil service. In this respect some of those appointed depend on their subordinates before they can perform effectively (Daily Independent Newspaper, July 23, 2014).

The second implication of applying the Principle in appointing Permanent Secretaries is that it promotes unhealthy rivalry between some directors and their Permanent Secretary. This is mostly the case in a situation whereby in order to ensure representation of each state some directors or Assistant Directors are appointed Permanent Secretaries above their superior officers which automatically results to ill-feelings in the service. In such situation some directors find it difficult cooperating with their Permanent Secretaries who were once their subordinates.
More so, there are some skilful bureaucrats who can never become a Permanent Secretary by virtue of the fact that there are several numbers of directors from their states who are also qualified to be appointed. This situation is even made worse because of the fact that the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation (See www.refworld.org) can only recommend those to be appointed Permanent Secretaries, with the President having the power to decide who would be appointed. In the exercise of this power political and ethnic considerations become more relevant. That is, the section of the state that those recommended come from, as well as the political advantage that the appointee brings to the appointee has for the ruling party become more relevant than the ability to perform.

I have argued unequivocally under this section that instead of solving the ethnic problems of the country, the Federal Character Principle has become more of a political advantage to the ruling party, especially in the appointment of ministers, head of government agencies and parastatals and Permanent Secretaries. Some provisions of the principle give room for the promotion of clientelist and prebendal considerations in appointments and promotions. Further, in some other instances some of the good areas of the principle have been manipulated by the ruling class for political and ethnic advantages. Therefore, my analysis so far goes in line with Ochonu’s assertion that:

...the Federal Character Principle is understood, in this new political atmosphere, as a mere conduit for elite patronage and for the circulation of public privileges. It bears little or no relevance to the needs of the suffering peoples of Nigeria.

(Ochonu, 2010:3)
6.6 Presidentialism and Techno-Bureaucratic Governance in Nigeria

The attempt under this section is not to assess why Nigeria adopts the Presidential system of government or an examination of the merits and demerits of the system, but rather to understand how the implementation of presidentialism has promoted the culture of neo-patrimonialism and prebendalism which have hindered effective and efficient techno-bureaucratic governance and the implications of this for the country’s development. Thus, I shall basically examine some features of the presidential system of government (See Africa News Service, September 13, 2010 Issue) that have resulted to prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism and which have direct effects on techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria.

It should be noted that Nigeria first adopted the presidential system from October 1979 to 1983. The framers of the country’s constitution considered that the dual executives is dangerous to national unity (See Africa News Service, September 13, 2010 Issue). This was because the system of the parliamentary system of government practised in Nigeria during its first republic produces two national leaders (Ibid), which are the Head of State and Head of Government, who were unable to work together for the progress of the country. They felt that clashes between the head of state and Head of Government (Power, 2012) during the first republic divided the country along tribal, ethnic and political lines and contributed to the collapsed of the republic. Thus, when Nigeria returned to electoral democracy in 1999 for these same reasons the country retained the presidential system of government (See www.nou.edu.ng). For the purpose of achieving the aim of this section a logical assessment of some features of the system that have promoted prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism, in subsequent paragraphs of the section shall be taken.
The first dominant feature of a presidential system of government (See Africa News Service, September 13, 2010) and which is also practised in Nigeria is that the president is directly elected by popular votes. This practice is directly an opposite of what is obtainable under some countries’ presidential system. Most notably the United States of America has an electoral college rather than direct popular elections (Mainwaring, 1990, See also Kellogg.nd.edu). In the United States, the President and Vice President are not elected directly by the voters as it is done in the Nigerian case, instead, they are elected by 538 "electors" who are chosen by popular vote on a state-by-state basis (Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/electoral_college_(united_states). Similarly, legislators are directly elected by the electorates. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart put this feature in a clearer perspective when they assert that ‘both powers are popularly elected, and the origin and survival of each is independent’ (Mainwaring and Šhugart, 1993:4).

Elsewhere, Mainwaring assessed the effects of the separate elections of the executive and legislature by putting it succinctly that, “executive-legislative conflict stems primarily from the separate election of the two branches of government and is exacerbated by the fixed term of office” (Mainwaring 1993:209, See also bibliotecadigital.fgv.br). This negative trend of presidentialism as argued by these two scholars and those that toe a similar line of argument shall be subjected to further explanation using the Nigerian example.

Section 133 (b) of the Nigerian 1999 constitution states that;
A candidate for an election to the office of President shall be deemed to have been duly elected to such office where, being the only candidates nominated for the election – he/she has not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the state in the federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (Nigerian 1999 constitution, See also directory-nigeria.org)

The above mentioned section of the Nigerian constitution especially as it relates to the presidential elections have some political economy implications especially on how it promotes the politics of prebendalism and clientelism, which to a very large extent affects techno-bureaucratic governance. A clear understanding of the section of the constitution suggests that for a person to be elected as a president apart from winning a simple majority votes (Ologbenla and Waziri, 2012) must also win at least one quarter of votes in twenty-five out of the thirty-six states of the federation. This provision is stipulated in the constitution to enable the president has (Africa News Service, August 7, 2002) a wide acceptability and good geographical spread.

As laudable as this provision of the constitution is, it is pertinent to point out that one of the far reaching implication of the implementation of this provision is that it makes presidential election in Nigeria to remain one of the most expensive in the world. Unlike the United States in which a Presidential candidate and his Vice are expected to be elected through an electoral college by 538 ‘electors’, the Nigerian President and his Vice are elected directly by popular votes of the people. Hence, since the president is expected to have political structures and followership in all the states of the federation the financial demands for winning elections in Nigeria is very high. The implication of this is that an incumbent president in order to meet up with the financial demands of election engages in primitive capital accumulation and also
encourages bizarre fund raising activities. For instance while seeking a second term in office, President Goodluck Jonathan amassed N21.27bn (£75.6m) in a single election’s fund raising event (Nigerianwatch, 21st December, 2015).

A breakdown of the amount shows that the chairman of the occasion, Mr Tunde Ayeni donated N2bn. The President’s friends in the Oil and Gas sector donated the sum of N5bn; those in Real Estate and Building donated N4bn; Transport and Aviation, N1bn; Food and Agriculture, N500m; Power, N500m; Construction, N310m; Road Construction, N250m; National Automative Association, N450m; and Shelter Development Limited, N250m. (The Punch, 21st December, 2014). It is instructive to observe that Chief Tayo Ayeni who bought the government owned telecommunication outfit, NITEL, was incidentally the Chairman at the event. It would therefore not be wrong to conclude that his donation at the event could be a payback to the government that sold the country’s commonwealth to him. His donation and that of others raises the question about the propriety of a sitting president receiving campaign donations from the people and organisations with which his government has businesses. It is ridiculous to observe that government agencies which failed in their responsibilities of rendering valuable services to the people also contributed to the fund. Such agencies include; the power, aviation and transport sectors, to name a few (The Sun Newspaper, 30th December, 2014).

While the President got this huge amount through the organised fund raising strategy and engaged in primitive capital accumulation in order to finance the general election the opposition party’s Presidential candidate also got sponsorship from local and regional power brokers cum political entrepreneurs who finance campaigns for the presidency
This type of ‘sponsorship’ is effectively a business transaction in which the patron recovers the ‘investment’ in the form of public works and procurement contracts, prebendal appointments of cronies to public offices and other forms of prebendal activity by the president on assuming office (Obiorah, 2004, See also www.review.upeace.org).

Apart from the fact that the nature of electing the president leads to patrimonialism and prebendalism, another feature of presidential democracies (Kellogg.nd.edu) which provides that the president must be elected for a fixed time period also has its implications, especially in the Nigerian situation. Rose (1981) agrees with this position when she posits that in order to win subsequent elections most democratic presidents are constantly engaged in cultivating public support, hence have less actual time to oversee administrative activities than do prime ministers (Also available at www.nd.edu). In the Nigerian context incumbent presidents seeking second term cultivate this public support in various ways. The first of such methods is in the area of appointments. In the country the President has the power of appointment over the major functionaries of government, from the cabinet ministers, to the ambassadors, to the regional directors running government offices and to the directors of government-owned corporations (Obiorah, 2004).

The President also appoints all members of the judiciary, from the lowest trial court to the Supreme Court, which encourages politicization of the judiciary. This undermines the creation of professional institutions (See www.constitutionnet.org) like the bureaucracy and technocracy because in the constitution the legislature is entitled to check presidential appointments, but in reality it is too weak to have any genuine impact (Ellis and Samuel, 2010). Logically therefore, appointments under presidential system of government are usually
the president’s decision and are not brought about by party decisions (Mainwaring, 1993). It is in this respect that the president uses his enormous power of appointment for cultivating public support, especially when seeking a second term in office. It is in view of this that it is argued that in ten years of Nigeria’s democracy (Africa News Service, September 13 2010 Issue), the executive has set up more agencies and departments of government than in the country’s over 54 years of existence (www.thisdayonline.com).

The third distinguishing feature of the Presidential system which implementation has serious political economy effects in Nigeria is the doctrine of separation of power and functions among the three arms of government. Scott Mainwaring (1990) emphasises this feature by pointing out that under presidentialism the legislature is not only separated from the executive but is also supreme over the other branches of government. Thus, unlike the parliamentary system where members of the executive are also members of the legislature, members of the executive under the presidential system of government are not members of the legislature. Both arms of government are independent of each other and have distinct powers and functions. Each of the arms is also independent of the other.

The independence of each arm of government under this doctrine of separation of powers leads to the principle of checks and balances prevalent in the Presidential system. The check and balance makes the president to subject some of his policies to the approval of the legislature. In the process of the approval of the policies sent to it by the executive arm the legislature can stop some of the policies of the executive, especially when there is no cordial relationship between both arms of government. When the legislature exercises that power on a consistent basis, an impasse easily results (Mainwaring, 1990, Also available at
In the Nigerian case National budgets have over the years constituted a major source of friction between the executive and the legislative arms of government. Since May 29, 1999, elected Nigerian representatives at both levels of government have consistently squabbled over the passage of National budgets.

I will illustrate this with an example. After the National Assembly passed a N4.987 trillion budget for the 2013 fiscal year in record time, President Jonathan signed the document but returned same in the form of a supplementary appropriation bill. The President hinged his action on what he said was an error made by the National Assembly. While retaining the sum of N4.987trn passed by the National Assembly in December 2012, he proposed N2.4trn as recurrent expenditure which is at variance with the 2.3trn passed by the legislature. The president is also asked the National Assembly to revert to his earlier proposal of N1.588trn as capital expenditure as against the N1.6trn they passed into law. This request was not accepted by the legislators which caused delay in the budget approval and created implementation problems. The budget was eventually passed after the President reached some compromise with the legislators. It is important to state that such compromise include the lawmakers’ inclusion of N100bn for constituency projects. The fund meant for targeted federal intervention by the legislators in critical areas of need in all federal constituencies and Senatorial districts, has been a controversial item within the budget since the restoration of civil rule in 1999 (The Punch Newspaper, 20th June, 2013).

Thus, in order to avoid frictions with the legislature, successive Nigerian Presidents bargain extensively with the legislators to win support for their programmes (www.kellogg.nd.edu). Nigerian Presidents usually face this challenge because the ruling party has majority members of the legislature but very weak party discipline. In Nigeria, the ruling People’s
Democratic Party (PDP) (www.encyclopedia.com) has consistently dominated the legislative arm since 1999, but remains opposition to itself, especially when it comes to the support of legislators for programmes and bills emanating from the executive. Therefore in order to secure the support of the legislatures for its programmes and policies the President often resort to clientelism and politics of patronage. Mainwaring (1990) points to the negative impact of widespread use of clientelism and patronage to secure the support of individual legislators when he warns that such attempt largely encourages populism and clientelism as a way of coping with the difficulties created by the separation of powers (Mainwaring, 1990, See www.kellogg.nd.edu).

Peter Mba paints a picture of what contributes to the low level of party discipline among the ruling class and the effects of this emerging trend in Nigeria when he explains that in the country;

...the state becomes a means of production for those who have acquired it and have control over its resources. State power becomes parcelled out and personal interests become deflected as collective interest. This primacy of politics becomes even worse as economic resources reduce or become more concentrated in few hands... The state remains a state of private and sectional interests rather than a representative of the collective interests of the people. The state exists as prebends parcelled out to various private and sectional interests. Consequently, politics becomes fiercely prebendal as private and sectional interests engage themselves in fatal contest for increasing and defending their share of the powers of the state and the enormous economic advantages there from (2014:3, also available at www.placng.org)
From the foregoing it is obvious that party discipline is very low and prebendal politics become very high as a result of separation of power, which gives adequate opportunity for the realisation of the Nigerian political class passion for easy money or crave for filthy lucre derived from subverting either an economic, political or social system (Atim, 2012). This in fact can be deduced as the major reason why the cost of running Nigeria’s democracy and paying elected and public officers for managing the Nigerian state has been too expensive. I shall give some empirical evidences to further my assertion.

Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, a former Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria (www.elombah.com) claimed, that 25% of the nation’s budget is used to service the National Assembly expenditure (www.arabianjbmr.com), trimming down the amount available for the badly needed capital investments (Saturday Sun, 2010). Meanwhile, the cost of running the entire US congress, including salaries of senators and representatives, is put at 0.2 per cent of its federal spending (www.ttimesabuja.com). In Nigeria an average Senator receives an equivalent of $1.7 million total package in a year and the federal representative collects the equivalent of $1.45 million a year, the average US congressman, whether in the Senate or House of Representatives receives only about $174,000 (www.arabianjbmr.com).

In fact, as Mailafia (2010) observes, not only are Nigerian legislators at the federal level among the highest paid in the world, a typical Nigerian senator also earns more than the President of the United States of America. The states and federal assemblies have not been left out either from the utilization of the country’s resources. The amount expended annually to sustain members of the legislature in the states and National Assembly in Nigeria, is mind-boggling (Africa News Service, September 13 2010 Issue). It was revealed that the country
spends N27 billion per annum on the salaries and emoluments of 109 senators while 360 members of the House of Representatives gulp down N73 billion, bringing the total to N100 billion ($667 million) expended on just 469 elected public officials (Ibid). This high amount of the country’s budget spent on the legislature in Nigeria it is believed is to ensure a good working relationship between the executive and the legislature (www.dni.gov) at the detriment of the citizens. This quite displays the clientelist and the patronage politics that is used to secure the interests of the ruling class at the expense of development in the country.

What my account under this section suggests using the Nigerian case is that Presidential system in situations where the surrounding institutions are weak and political parties are not considered representative (See www.174.129.218.71) encourages clientelism and neo-patrimonialism. Under this type of situation techno-bureaucratic governance which could aid development becomes nearly impossible. Thus, the Nigerian situation clearly shows that where there is consistent conflict between the public and private interest of political office holders, political appointments and implementation of policies remain suspect.

6.7 Conclusion

In the literature on the developmental state as supported by empirical evidences in Nigeria, the effectiveness of techno-bureaucratic governance in achieving state led development is predicated on state’s existing socio-political structure. Such socio-political structure as identified in the Nigerian case include the elite structure, structure of the society itself and some constitutional and other legal frameworks that shape the entire political system. Under this chapter I have established that the Nigerian elite structure is populated with people that
are self-serving and hence strive to protect their interest instead of collective ones. In the process policies formulated and implemented by bureaucrats and technocrats are meant to protect the interest of the existing political and economic class. Examples of the privatisation policy, constituency projects and pipelines’ protection contracts in Nigeria have been examined to confirm this line of argument.

More so, the non-existence of a strong spirit of nationhood in Nigeria creates a situation whereby the political leadership and the citizenry see the need to formulate and implement policies to serve ethnic and group interests. Thus, successive policies of the government from 1999 to 2014 are also done in a way to protect either ethnic or group interests. Hence, the prevalence of clientelist, and neo-patrimonial nature of the Nigerian state can be linked to the lack of commitment to achieving collective goals by the ruling class and the absence of the spirit of nationhood among the citizens. Furthermore, there is also the erosion of the incentives to work for the common good by the Nigerian political class because state capture by this class is assumed to be major source of wealth for politicians and their followers. In Nigeria, there is a low level of industrialisation and hence the continuous believe by politicians in holding political power for economic gains rather than for the common good of the people.

Some constitutional and legal frameworks created by the political class itself to some large extent affect the ability of the bureaucrats and technocrats to formulate and implement quality policies that can aid development. Aside the weakness of some provisions in the Nigerian constitution and some legal frameworks as identified the chapter empirical evidences suggest that they are also implemented to promote the interests of the ruling class and their various support groups including the ethnic group they belong.
With the lack of the required embedded autonomy in Nigeria the expectation of generating development through techno-bureaucratic governance instrument is grossly impeded. It is therefore logical to conclude that the existing Nigeria’s socio-political structure which immensely promotes the culture of prebendal, clientelistic and neo-patrimonial is antithetical to state led development. Thus, to address the problem of state led development through techno-bureaucratic governance the existing socio-political structure must be restructured in a way that would enhance the insulation of bureaucrats and technocrats from vested societal interests.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the major findings of this study as well as to highlight its major contributions to the body of knowledge on the study of development in global south, especially that of Sub Sahara Africa. As I have showed variously under this work and as extant literature suggests, there is a continuous debate on the role that the state should play in the process of development. This study tries to join this debate by filling some gaps on how state intervention through techno-bureaucratic governance can contribute to development in the global south. Therefore, from empirical findings it tries to underscore the position that there is a link between effective techno-bureaucratic governance and developmental outcomes. The Chapter also tries to raise issues for further research, especially due to some limitations and challenges faced by the researcher. The Chapter after the introduction is divided is divided into two sections; Summary and the implications of my findings.

7.2 Summary

The major objective of the study is to understand how the absence of techno-bureaucratic governance caused by the prevalence of neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism affects socio-economic development in Nigeria. The major assumption is that state capacity which is a product of efficient and autonomous techno-bureaucratic governance enhances development. Thus, the lack of such state’s capacity has endangered development in Nigeria. As demonstrated in this thesis, state led development is a product of the state’s commitment
to development and capability of the bureaucracy as a primary force in the process. The capacity/autonomy of the bureaucracy is important for public-private collaboration without a capture of the former by the latter’s interest. This “embedded autonomy” enables the bureaucracy to relate with the private sector in order to enhance developmental oriented policies without being captured by them, and this is what makes for successful developmental efforts. Thus, state led development is a case of state commitment to development and institutions’ capacity to enhance the quest.

According to this study there are the two central features associated with the developmental state, namely, the unusual degrees of bureaucratic autonomy and public-private cooperation. This affirms Onis’ (1991) suggestion that the coexistence of these two conditions allows the state and the bureaucratic elites to develop independent national goals and to subsequently translate broad national goals into effective policy action. Therefore, this study holds that coexistence of these two conditions is critical. In fact, as variously stated in the study the absence of bureaucratic autonomy leads to a situation whereby public-private cooperation easily degenerates into situations in which state goals are directly reducible to private interests.

The Nigerian example has showed how "weak states" with a lack of autonomy from powerful groups in society can easily turn predatory. According to Zartman (1995) such weak state become weaker, softer, more divided and contested and generally unable to perform the functions of a normal state. As Osaghae (2003) suggests in such “weak state” formal rule are applied copiously and in a lax manner rather than vigorously and consistently. More so, private advantage can be gained and private bargains struck concerning the enforcement or
non-enforcement of the rules. Thus, Ekeh (1975) attributes the soft state and its associated problems, especially as the Nigerian case suggests, to the distorted social order and related pathological political, economic and social relations.

Therefore, the thesis investigates the capacity for state led development within the lens of efficient and autonomous techno-bureaucratic governance while also factoring the role of politics in the process, by taking the case study of Nigeria. Empirical findings confirm that development is dictated by the ability of the state to pursue collective goods instead of private ones. However, as displayed by the Nigerian case culture of neo-patrimonialism, prebendal, and clientelist politics undermine the ability of technocrats and bureaucrats in contributing to development and in essence the pursuit of collective goods. The implication of the foregoing analysis is that resource abundance may not lead to development when state policies effectively serve private interests rather than collective good. As demonstrated under this thesis developmental challenges could be majorly addressed through an efficient and autonomous bureaucracy reasonable insulated from private capture. If this position is true as confirmed by this study, the failure of development in Nigeria was a failure of techno-bureaucratic governance.

This failure of techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria is linked to the result of the attempt at entrenching one-party dominance which has led to the promotion of the culture of neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism. After the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) got political power in 1999, it tries to swiftly transform itself into a political party well equipped to win subsequent elections and consolidate its hold on power in the manner in which Tom Lodge (2014) argues that the African National Congress (ANC) ensconced in power after
winning the 1990 elections. According to Lodge, after the ANC won the 1990 elections, the first effort of the party was simply to expand its organized following across the entire country in order to consolidate its hold of political power.

For Lodge (2014), the quickest way to accomplish such expansion was through the politics of neo-patrimonialism, clientelism and prebendalism. The neo-patrimonialism politics in South Africa as Lodge suggests comes in the form of re-enacting the social relationships of clientelistic politics. The second way of entrenching one-party dominance in South Africa was its attempts at giving contracts to party faithful and the appointment of party supporters onto company boards and political office in order to generate resources for expected future political contests. As established under this thesis, the PDP also embarked on similar activities with the pipeline protection contract given to the supporters of President Goodluck Jonathan and his kinsmen. Political appointments were also given to PDP followers in order to increase patron-client’s relationship and to also increase the financial base of the political party.

In a related manner policies were formulated to favour the ruling political class and existing constitutional provisions were also implemented to favour the ruling class and its support group in order to enhance the hold on to power by the ruling party. The constituency projects for national assembly members, the privatisation policy are examples of such policies and the implementation of Federal Character Principle (FCP) is an example of a constitutional which is implemented in such a way to compensate party supporters in order to increase the strength of the ruling party undermine techno-bureaucratic governance and by implication development.
Therefore, this manner of consolidating one-party dominance which led to a negative cultures of neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism lead to situation in which recruitment and promotion are based on political patronage. In effect, the ability of technocrats and bureaucrats to formulate good policies and pursue national developmental goals are impended. More so, as seen under the study, when there is no autonomous bureaucracy policies are formulated and implemented to serve the preferences of the ruling class and their various support groups.

Furthermore, as the Nigerian case suggests, the state’s intervention in the process of development is also undermined by inadequate and ineffective involvement of technocrats in policy making process. In the developmental state literature and as different cross countries’ study suggest pilot agencies are relevant especially in state-public interaction in the process of formulation and implementation of developmental policy. This study however establishes that in Nigeria, aside from the non-existence of known pilot agencies dominated by technocrats that should be responsible for state-private partnership as seen in the East Asian case critical ministries relevant for economic development were headed by politicians instead of seasoned technocrats. Thus, limited numbers of these experts were involved in the process of development. This inadequate involvement of technocrats in the process of development in Nigeria makes the formulation and implementation of policies at the whims and caprices of the politicians. In sum “politicians reign and rule” for themselves. The end result of this is a negative developmental outcome.

The study holds further that the lack of effective techno-bureaucratic governance in Nigeria which has impacted negatively on state led development is predicated on the Nigerian state’s
existing socio-political structure, as well as its type of political class. Such socio-political structure as identified in the Nigerian case include the structure of the society itself and some constitutional and other legal frameworks that shape the entire political system. More importantly, the Nigerian political elite as this study suggests, is dominated by people who are self-serving and hence often strive to protect their interest instead of collective interests. In the process policies formulated and implemented by bureaucrats and technocrats are meant to protect the interest of the existing political and economic class. Examples of the privatisation policy, constituency projects and pipelines’ protection contracts in Nigeria have been examined to confirm this line of argument.

In addition, the non-existence of a strong spirit of nationhood in Nigeria, which makes people from different ethnic groups to have more attachment to their ethnic group than the country, has created a situation whereby the political leadership in some instances see policy formulation and implementation as opportunity to protect and promote sectional interests. Thus, successive policies of the government from 1999 to 2014 are mostly done in a way to protect either ethnic or political group’s interests. Hence, the prevalence of clientelist, and neo-patrimonial nature of the Nigerian state can be linked to the lack of commitment to achieving collective goals by the ruling class and the absence of the spirit of nationhood among the citizens.

Aside from the structural deficiencies of the Nigerian state identified above, the study has been able to establish that there are some constitutional and legal frameworks created by the political class itself which to some extent promote the culture of neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and clientelism and which account for the undermining of techno-bureaucratic governance and the ability of the bureaucrats and technocrats to formulate and implement
quality policies that can aid development. It is interesting to note that these constitutional provisions and legal frameworks were included in the country’s legal framework in the first place in order to promote the interests of the ruling class and their various support groups, including the ethnic group they belong. The logic thereof is that with the lack of the required embedded autonomy in Nigeria the expectation of generating development through techno-bureaucratic governance instrument was grossly impeded.

7.3 Implications
As discussed under this study a key ingredient in enhancing development is competent, meritocratic and ‘results-oriented’ techno-bureaucratic governance. Establishing such a system as seen in the Nigerian case is challenging. As Rocha Menocal (2004) posits in East Asia, competent bureaucracies did not develop automatically or overnight, but were rather the result of a prolonged struggle guided by strong political motivation to achieve national development. Thus, for effective techno-bureaucratic governance that would generate development commitment of state actors and capacity of the state itself are important (Kohli, 1994; Leftwich, 1994; Menocal, 2004; Fritz & Menocal, 2006; Randall, 2007; Thovoethin, 2014). However, in the Nigerian case as this study confirms Nigerian technocratic and bureaucratic structures and other benefits that could be generated by state-led development were frequently manipulated by the government apparatus and ruling elites as a source of patronage. The Nigerian state has been captured by narrow interests more concerned with building clientelistic networks than with pursuing collective interests that will generate socio-economic development.
Thus, in the case of Nigeria, the challenge of development has become more immense. The challenge concerns the fundamental transformation of existing social structures and power relations, as they have evolved during the colonial period and since. Ekeh (1975) in his book “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A theoretical Statement” clearly the existing social structures and power relations on enduring legacies of colonialism. For him, colonialism turned African society upside down and inside out, and marked a re-invention of social formations that have endured in various ways till this day. As Majekodunmi & Adejuwon (2012) citing Omitola (2005) hold the extractive and exploitative nature of colonial rule did not stop after independence; rather it developed another character as the emerging ruling class at independence continued the same mode of capital accumulation. According to Osaghae (2003) the transfer of such social structure and power relations to post-colonial Africa, (in which Nigeria is inclusive) was made easier by the fact that the African bourgeois class did not antagonize the precepts of the colonial state but only its alien personnel which it eventually replaced.

Therefore the transformation of existing social structure and power relations is very important in order to bring about commitment to development on the part of the political class as well as the Nigerian’s state capacity for a state-led development. The transformation in this direction becomes more compelling as I have stated in the above paragraph, because, colonialism in Nigeria like other former British colonies established a particularistic society and elite structure which later affected Nigeria post-colonial state’s commitment to achieving developmental goals and also undermines the state’s capacity for development.

Thus, the Nigerian state during the period covered under this study has remained inefficient and therefore requires transformation. Such transformation becomes necessary because as
suggested by Fritz and Menocal (2006) ineffective states mean that people have to rely on clientelist social structures in order to find an income and to ensure themselves against adverse events; in turn, these structures tend to reinforce poor leadership patterns and a bureaucracy/civil service that are not sufficiently autonomous. Doner and his colleagues (2005) has avers that the lack of post-independence “systemic vulnerability” in Nigeria has hindered the desire of the Nigerian elites to build institutions that enhance collective interests.

According to them political elites will only build institutions that enhance collective interests when simultaneously faced with three important conditions: (1) the credible threat that any deterioration in the living standards of popular sectors could trigger unmanageable mass unrest; (2) the heightened need for foreign exchange and war materiel induced by national insecurity; and (3) the hard budget constraints imposed by a scarcity of easy revenue sources. I hold that the Nigerian political leaders have not been confronted by all these three constraints at the same time hence their failure to pursue national developmental agenda. That is, empirical evidence points in the direction that the Nigerian political elites from independence to date have not been faced with these constraints and hence their failure to transform the country’s socio-political and economic structures. I do agree with Doner and his colleagues (2005) that given the three listed conditions there can be transformation of Nigeria’s socio-political structure which would invariably enhances the Nigeria’s development.

Similarly, Stephan Haggard (2004) argues that the transformation of colonially inherited social structure can occur through the efforts of nationalist movements. It is on record that in the Nigerian situation nationalist movements immensely contributed to ending colonial rule but failed to challenge and transform inherited colonial social structure which up till date
affects the socio-political structure of the country. In fact immediately after the Nigerian independence existing nationalist movements went into oblivion and the pursuit of sectional interests by various ethnic groups become the norm. This partly explains the lack of the spirit of nationhood and the attendant failure of the political class in pursuing national interests against personal or sectional interests.

All told, I hold on to the position that one of the important elements of the thesis is that developmental state is seen as a state which possesses developmental structures (state capacity) and uses these to perform developmental roles (commitment). It agrees with literature on developmental state which emphasise the relevance of capacity and leadership/vision in achieving development (Fritz and Menocal, 2007). Thus, for a developmental state to achieve success the combination of these elements is important. As Routley (2012) suggests, these two elements; structures and developmental commitment are required together. Empirical findings under this study confirm the position that Nigeria from 1999-2014 lacks the necessary structure in the form of efficient and autonomous techno-bureaucratic governance as well as the lack of commitment to development. The study unravel that the prevailing culture of prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism to a great level contributed to institutional deficiencies and the lack of commitment for development in Nigeria.

Furthermore, the study holds that the existing post-colonial socio-political structure and power relations as they have evolved during colonial rule and been consolidated by post-colonial elites determine the nature of post-colonial Nigerian state and governance. It is within this context that I argue that the nature of the Nigerian state as has been developed
under this is one lacking basic developmental features. In fact the Nigerian state has been ineffective in fulfilling the primary reasons for its existence. And as Fritz and Menocal (2006) hold ineffective states have to rely on clientelistic and neo-patrimonial social structures in order to generate revenue and ensure themselves against adverse effects. This is exactly what the Nigerian state depicts. Existing literature and empirical evidences as showed under this study confirm this claim.

Therefore, the emergence of a political class committed to development and an increased state capacity for development remain compelling. The starting point for enhancing state capacity for development is the need to increase the level of efficiency, effectiveness and autonomy of the bureaucracy. The efficiency of the bureaucracy can be enhanced when recruitment and promotion are based on merit rather than patronage. The developmental state literature quite pushes for an extremely meritocratic form of recruitment into bureaucracy as the starting point in understanding the extraordinary degree of bureaucratic autonomy associated with the developmental states (Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1989; Onis, 1991; Centeno, 1993; Goldsmith, 2001; Beeson, 2004; Fritz & Menocal, 2006; Kelsall, 2011). The bureaucracy should be a system where recruitment is designed in such a way as to attract the best managerial talent available to the ranks of the bureaucratic elite.

For instance, in South Korea, civil servants are employed through an open competitive entrance examination. The open competitive entrance examinations are classified into three types according to the employed grades: the Senior Civil Service Examination, the Open Competitive Entrance Examination for Grade 7, and the Open Competitive Entrance Examination for Grade 9. It is an important method for recruiting competent persons for middle management positions within executive agencies. This examination is divided into
three categories according to occupational groups, i.e. the administrative service, the Foreign Service, and the technological service category.

More so, promotion to a higher grade in the South Korea’s civil service is determined by the Promotion Review Committee by selecting candidates based on performance, skills, career history, specializations, ethic, and aptitude. In addition, civil servants who have contributed an exemplary service in terms of integrity, performance, and policy development are given preference during the promotion process (South Korea DPADM, 2007). Similarly, in India there is an entrance examination for the civil service, and bureaucrats are protected against politicians being able to dismiss them (Dasandi, 2014). In China there is the national civil service entrance examination for recruitment of senior civil servants (http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-publications/staff research).

This thesis has proved that there is the need to entrench rigorous standards of entry into senior grade levels in the Nigeria’s public service in order to ensure a high degree of bureaucratic capability and also to generate a sense of unity and common identity on the part of the bureaucratic elite as obtainable in developmental states. This would enable bureaucrats imbued a sense of mission and identified themselves with national goals. The work suggests that the Federal Character Principle (FCP) be made flexible in the recruitment of senior staff and appointment of Directors and Permanent Secretaries. Appointment into directorial cadre and permanent secretary positions are consider critical position relevant in the formulation and implementation of policies and as such merit should be considered in promotion at these levels. Merit in this sense is that rigorous entrance examination should be conducted for entry into the bureaucracy and promotion thereof should be based on examination.
More so, to increase bureaucratic efficiency consistent on the job training must be a regular exercise. Career civil servants are expected to undergo training at every grade level they occupy. This will adequately equip the bureaucrats in the performance of the new functions and roles that their new posts require. Salaries and remunerations in the public service should be made to commensurate with what is obtainable at the private sector, in order to serve as morale booster for career bureaucrats. Evans (1989) raises this position by contending that in order to enhance the capacity of bureaucracy the institutionalization of meritocratic recruitment patterns and predictable career paths must be accompanied by the provision of sufficient resources to make careers in the state competitive with careers in the private sector.

The study has identified three major tasks that the Nigeria State has to undertake and which have also be recommended by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) as a means of achieving economic transformation in Africa: the planning of the development process, the formulation of appropriate development policies, and the implementation of development plans and policies (ECA 2011). To achieve these therefore, I recommend that there should be the establishment of key planning institutions which should be given the power and autonomy to do their work effectively and efficiently. These planning institutions are expected to be in the form of developmental pilot agencies staffed with committed team of technocrats with a clear mandate to change the economic fortunes of the country.

These pilot agencies should be small but powerful like MITI or EPB and thus they would be expected to provide important strategic guidance in the selection of key industries to be encouraged and also in the provision of a stable and predictable environment for private investors to undertake long-term investment projects (Onis, 1991). These agencies are expected to be dominated by experts in relevant fields and are also expected to enjoy secured
tenure of office. The federal Character Principle should not in any way be used in the appointment of people into these agencies rather appointment should be basically merit based.

The study has made it clear that techno-bureaucratic governance can only achieve development through institutional autonomy. It is institutional autonomy that can ensure insulation of bureaucrats and technocrats from vested political and social interests. It is in the context of the challenges of institutionalising bureaucratic autonomy in most Third World Countries that the work suggests how this autonomy can emerge in Nigeria. I recommend that for bureaucracy and technocrats to toe developmental path in policies formulation and implementation there is the need for building a broad based coalition among the political class which is an impetus to ideological commitment to development. According to Doner et al (2005), Vu (2007), Poteete (2009) and Routley (2012), developmental states like Japan and Botswana acquired development through a broad based coalition among its political elites. In these developmental states the political elites are committed to the pursuit of collective good instead of private interests. This broader based coalition among the political class is needed for consensus on what developmental path should be taken and what policies should be formulated to achieve development.

One of the key ways to increase commitment to development is the role that civil society actors should play in the process. Historical analysis in Nigeria could be used to buttress this stand. Available historical facts show that nationalist movements fought for an end to colonialism, while civil society groups fought for an end to long years of military authoritarian rule which led to the emergence of electoral democracy in Nigeria. However, after the emergence of electoral democracy in Nigeria civil society groups remained passive
and there is therefore no check on the activities of the ruling class. Therefore in order to promote the provision of collective goods civil society organisations should engage the ruling class in the manner in which colonialism and military rule were confronted. It is also important to suggest that the international donors should also assist the civil society organisations to be more effective in carrying out the task of serving as a check on the activities of the ruling class.

This is quite against the experience of most developmental states where development was achieved through the existence of weak civil society organisations. If weak civil society organisations remain one of the factors that contributed to development in some developmental states it has failed to serve as a motivating tool for development in Nigeria. In similar manner the failure of the Nigerian’s authoritarian one-party dominant system to enhance development in the manner at which the East-Asian authoritarian regimes did point to the fact that regime type is not a key factor in development. In fact, in the Nigerian case attempts at entrenching one-party dominance system has contributed to the development challenges of the country. This further confirms that the level of autonomy of technocracy and bureaucracy are important to development than regime type.

Thus, the failure of a weak civil society and authoritarian one-party dominant system to enhance development in Nigeria confirms the assumption under some developmental state literature that features of developmental state as seen in the East Asian’s cases cannot be replicated elsewhere. The features of developmental state as seen in the examples of the East Asian’s Tigers can only be adopted albeit some modifications depending on states’ peculiarities. It is on this premise that this work holds as a central lesson that development in
Nigeria will be self-defeating in the absence of effective and autonomous techno-bureaucratic governance. The construction of effective and autonomous techno-bureaucratic governance (as opposed to a pseudo-bureaucratic patrimonial apparatus as presently seen in the Nigerian case) is a crucial challenging task. The study has suggested how the required autonomous techno-bureaucratic governance necessary for development can be constructed. In essence it suggests the conditions for the emergence of stronger institutions instead of stronger individuals that exist at the moment, for the achievement of meaningful development in Nigeria.

It is relevant to round off the thesis by underlining the fact that the unpredicted end of the political dominance of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) by the victory opposition All Progressive Congress (APC) during the 2015 presidential election, after the sixteen years of the dominance of the former do not point to an end of one-party dominance and challenges of development in Nigeria. With the existing Nigerian social structure and power relations in Nigeria, the All Progressive Congress may also end up imposing similar PDP one-party dominance and undermines techno-bureaucratic governance as well as socio-economic development for a number of years before it implodes like the PDP.

Therefore, the politics of how a broad based political coalition can emerge, which would alter existing social structure and power relations and how this can translate to effective techno-bureaucratic governance and development should be an important area of further research on the challenges of development in Nigeria. More so, the study did not in any way examine the type of industrial policies and sectors that should be the focus of developmental policies. In
view of this, investigations of the type of policies and sectors that can enhance the development of Nigeria are suggested for further research.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I:

Research Schedule (Work plan and time-frame)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2011-Sept2012</td>
<td>Preparation and submission of Research Proposal</td>
<td>Approval of the Research Proposal by the Academic Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September-November 2012</td>
<td>Review of Literature</td>
<td>Submission of Chapter Two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td>Pre-field trip preparation</td>
<td>Ready for the field trip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2013-July 2013</td>
<td>First Field Trip to Nigeria</td>
<td>Collection of primary data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2013-October 2013</td>
<td>Coding and Analysis of Data</td>
<td>Data presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2013</td>
<td>Preparation for the second field trip</td>
<td>Full preparation by the researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2013-January 2014</td>
<td>Second Field Trip to Nigeria</td>
<td>Collection of data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2914-April 2014</td>
<td>Coding and Analysis</td>
<td>Data Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-June 2014</td>
<td>Analysis of nature and Character of Techno-Bureaucratic Governance in Nigeria</td>
<td>Completion of Chapter Four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-August 2014</td>
<td>Analysis of Politics and Techno-bureaucratic Governance in Nigeria</td>
<td>Completion of Chapter Five</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September, 2014</td>
<td>Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations</td>
<td>Completion of Chapter Six</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-November 2014</td>
<td>Revision and Editing</td>
<td>Completion of Thesis’s First Draft</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2014-February 2015</td>
<td>Correction of Draft Dissertation</td>
<td>Supervisor’s Comments and Corrections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2015-August 2015</td>
<td>Supervisor’s Comments and Corrections of Second Draft of Thesis</td>
<td>Corrections and Comments on Second Draft Ready</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II:

Consent Form

University of the Western Cape,

________________________________________________________________________


Researcher: Paul-Sewa Thovoethin

Please initial box

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time
without giving any reason(s) and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.

3. I understand that my responses and personal data will be kept strictly confidential. I give permission for the researcher to have access to my responses with anonymity. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the reports or publications that result from the research.

4. I agree that the data collected from me can be used in future research.

5. I agree to take part in the above research project.

_________________________  _______________
Name of Participant   Date   Signature
(or legal representative)
Name of person taking consent  Date  Signature

(If different from the researcher)

Researcher  Date  Signature

(To be signed and dated in presence of the participant)

Copies: All participants will receive a copy of the signed and dated version of the consent form and information sheet for themselves.

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Interview Guide for Nigerian politicians - leaders (current and past key office holders); scholars (fields of development – economics – public administration -political science); civil servants; public affairs analysts; technocrats and bureaucrats

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Briefing:

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I am Paul-Sewa Thovoethin, a PhD student at the University of Western Cape, South Africa. I am carrying out a research study on the topic: *Techno-Bureaucratic Governance in a Neo-Patrimonial Society: One-Party Dominance and the Developmental State in Nigeria (1999-2014).* You are kindly requested to help in answering questions related to this research topic. The information provided will be treated in confidence and will only be used for this academic purpose.

**Questions:**

1) For the first time in the history of Nigeria’s democratic experience the country has witnessed uninterrupted civil rule. What impact has this feat played in the political and economic development of the country?

2) In what ways have the Nigerian political class been able to be a relevant force in the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria?

3) Given the continuous division among opposition political parties in Nigeria and the constant emergence of more smaller opposition political parties do you think that the country is moving towards an authoritarian one-party dominant system?

4) In the development process of the East-Asian tigers like Japan and South Korea technocrats and bureaucrats were reported to have played vital roles in the process. Do you think that technocrats and bureaucrats are playing similar roles in the Nigeria’s case?

5) Do prebendal politics and the culture of neo-patrimonialism have any impact on the effectiveness of technocrats and bureaucrats in the formulation and implementation of policies in Nigeria?

6) What other factors impact negatively on the performance of technocrats and bureaucrats in Nigeria?
7) How would you rate the performance of technocrats and bureaucrats under the present political dispensation?

8) To what extent can you support or disagree with the position that some of the policies formulated by bureaucrats and technocrats in Nigeria are reflection of vested private political and economic interests?

9) In your assessment what impacts do the level of insulation of technocrats and bureaucrats from vested private political and economic interests has on Nigeria’s level of economic development?

10) The East-Asian Tigers achieved development under authoritarian rule. Why has Nigeria failed to achieve the same level of development like the East-Asian tigers under a one-party dominant system?

11) In the East-Asian Tigers’ example technocrats are known to enjoy long and secured tenure of office in order to formulate and implement long term developmental policies. In your opinion what are the various factors responsible for the consistent removal of technocrats from their positions by different regimes to the extent that most appointed technocrats fail to spend up to at least four years in their positions?

12) How can the Nigerian civil service be made more efficient and autonomous?