STATE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: AN EXPLORATION OF THE SCHOLARSHIP OF PROFESSOR (ARCHIE) MONWABISI MAFEJE

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By

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Abstract

The departing point of the thesis is that the neglect of African’s intellectual heritage within the South African Universities and in public discourse undermines the ability of the post-apartheid government to set its developmental agenda and maximize its democratic potential. The thesis highlights the neglect of Professor Mafeje’s scholarly contribution as an example of this neglect and argues that an engagement with his scholarly output might have differently shaped the debate on the thematic issues that are covered in this study. Against this backdrop, this study explores Mafeje’s scholarly works in the areas of state, development and democracy, specifically focusing on the insight that we can garner from his scholarly works that will allow us to re-examine the challenges of development. In this context Mafeje’s work is examined and situated within the social history of his milieus.

The study employs social constructionism to explore the scholarship of Professor Mafeje. An important aspect of this theoretical framework is social embeddedness. Brunner (1990:30) has argued that it is culture, not biology that shapes human life and mind. The important aspect of this approach is that it acknowledges that the way we commonly understand the world, the categories and concepts we use, are historically and cultural specific. Mafeje’s ideas make sense when located within complex social contexts in which they were produced. Because he was not producing knowledge in a vacuum, an understanding and appreciation of his ideas must be located within the social history that produced them.
DECLARATION

I declare that Development, Democracy and the State: An exploration of the scholarship of Professor Monwabisi Archie Mafeje is my own work, that it has never been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university and that all the sources I quoted have been acknowledge by a complete reference.

Full Name: LuthandoSinethembaFunani.

Date: .................................

Signature: ....................................
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my late Mother Ms. ThonekaFunani and her Sister Ms. BonelwaFunani. I am grateful to you both for parting ways with your hard earned money to keep me in school and most importantly, for instilling in me the value and significance of higher education. LalaniNgoxoloziNkenki.

To my political home, the African National Congress for being the leading force in the fight against apartheid, which among other achievements, led to the opening of higher education for all in South Africa.
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Professor Jimi.OAdesina, the leader of the Intellectual Heritage Project, I am grateful for your support, guidance and your belief in me. You introduced me to the writings of Professor Mafeje, in doing so, you liberated my mind from apartheid and colonial scholarship. Enkosikakhlu, ndibambangazo zozibini, wenzenjalonakwabalandelayo.

To my girlfriend, Amanda Sigaqa, you have been the source of my inspiration. I know without your companionship, smile and love, it would have been impossible for me to master the tenacity and creativity needed to take this project to its finality, for that nana wamEnkosi.

Nande and Simakhe may you accomplish greater things.

I offer my sincerest gratitude to my Family, you have been with me throughout, to my sister, Vovo, I love you! To my comrades and colleagues: XolaniPapu, MatshawandileTukulula, Thabo Mayi, BonganiNyoka, ZamuxoloMatiwana, SiphuxoloTshokwe, SamoraMzalazala, Sithule Xanga, LassyMathebula, ElitshaFunani, LefentseMatlhaga, SiphoNdhambi, Malibongwe Philip, SifisoMangali and many more, thanks for your support.

Any shortcoming(s) in this work are squarely my own!
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Chapter One
Introduction

1.1 General Introduction to the Study

Academic dependency has long been the subject of research for scholars globally, specifically for the scholars in the South. Syed Hussein Alatas has researched and published on the topic. The rationale for focusing on this topic has to do with the fact that scholarship in the South has long suffered from the consequences of academic dependency, such as misrepresentation of the South, and the imitative mind. The phenomenon of academic dependency is closely associated with concepts such as the captive mind, unequal (power) relations between North and South, and generally refers to the unequal structure of academic production and the dependency of one social science community on the other in knowledge production. These unequal power relations can be expressed in economic, political, social, military and cultural. The centre and periphery relationship in scholarship is a product of a wider political sphere. Thus, it should be stated from the onset that it is imperialism that gives rise to academic dependency; it provides the necessary political condition for the imperialist states to dominate in the sphere of social science. Through this ‘domination’ especially in the sphere of social science, Northern scholars have misrepresented non-western societies. For example, in his 1994 book, *Culture and Imperialism*, Edward Said demonstrated how, in their writings, Western scholars used culture for imperialist ends. It is for this reason that, Alatas (1977), asserted that academic dependency is analogous to political and economic imperialism. Like political imperialism, academic dependency refers to the domination of one society/people by another in the world of thinking.

In post independence Africa the form of academic dependency changed from direct to a more indirect form of academic dependency. Today, intellectual imperialism has a lot to do with the “control and influence the West exerts over the flow of social-scientific knowledge rather than its ownership and control of academic institutions” (Alatas, 2013: 284). With the change of Africa’s political situation and specifically the relationship with the West, the West also changed the manner in which it sought to dominate the continent. The new form of academic hegemony was/is no longer imposed by the west through direct control and power
but it is “accepted willingly with confident enthusiasm by scholars and planners of the former colonial territories and even in the few countries that remained independent during that period” (Alatas Syed Hussein, 1977:7-8). Therefore, “academic dependency is defined as a condition in which the knowledge production of certain social-science communities is conditioned by the development and growth of knowledge of other scholarly communities to which the former is subjected” (Alatas, 2013:285). It is for this reason that intellectual imperialism is understood as the bases for academic dependency. The inter-dependence between scientific communities has often resulted in one scientific community being able to expand according to certain criteria of development and progress (Alatas, 2013), while the development of scientific communities, mostly in developing countries, is conditioned by the development and expansion of the foreign scientific community. This is similar to economic dependency, which was defined by Dos Santos (1970), as the condition that one economy is conditioned by the development and expansion of the foreign economy. The growth of the dependant country depends on the development of the country which the former is dependent on. Thus, if the centre does not grow, the periphery will also not grow.

In social science, western have arrogated on them the right to develop theories that purport to explain developments non-western world. This process has often led to the neglect of academic research and theories developed by scholars from the South.

Against this backdrop, this study attempts to address problem of ‘neglect’ of African scholarship in South Africa by exploring the works and scholarship of Professor Archibald (Archie) Monwabisi Mafeje (1937-2007). We argue that this ‘neglect’ in South Africa of one of the foremost African scholars is a consequence academic dependency in the South, the history of colonialism in Africa, and the apartheid legacy in South Africa. An example of Mafeje’s neglect or the silence around his works relates to the “Two Economies” debate and more recently on the debate about the ‘developmental state’ where there was not a single reference to Professor Mafeje’s seminal papers published in 1971 and 1974 on the issue and his seminal 1978 work on development, Science, Ideology and Development: Three essays on Development Theory. Instead the debate mainly featured references of western scholars, and analogies from the western world. Such debates were by all accounts led by South African ‘public intellectuals’ with limited reference to African scholarship and heavy reliance on western scholarship. Coupled with this is the academic dependency on Northern theories in Southern scholarship broadly (Alatas, 2003) and African scholarship specifically
(Hountondji, 1995). As AISA (2006) notes, this neglect of African intellectual heritage undermines the continent’s ability to set its own developmental agenda and maximise its democratic potentials (African Institute of South Africa, 2006:1). As we explore the works of Professor Mafeje, the departure point of this thesis is to demonstrate that his work is relevant in explaining contemporary challenges in South Africa.

The aspiration for African scholarship should concern how knowledge as developed and “appreciated by Africans on the basis of their historical experiences can be valorised for empowering the state (and society) in pursuit of democracy” (Arowosegbe, 2008:24) and national development agenda. This does not suggest total neglect of academic output that may have been produced outside the boundaries of the African continent. Rather, it requires that African scholarship should be prioritised when trying to understand the African conditions because they are more part of the African continent than any ‘outsider’.

1.2 Research objectives

The objective of this research is to address the problem of academic dependency and how it relates to academic neglect of African scholars in the South. This is done through an exploration of the scholarship of Professor Monwabisi Mafeje by examining his works on state, development and democracy.

Largely exploratory in focus and intention, the study will seek to:

- Collate and explore Mafeje’s scholarly outputs on state, development and democracy.
- Highlight key aspects of his writings on the theme of the state, development and democracy in the context of the contemporary debates in South Africa, and
- Explore the relevance of his scholarly outputs on state, development and democracy in meeting the challenges of democracy in South Africa.

1.3. The structure of the thesis

The following is the breakdown of this thesis, aimed at introducing the thematic issues that are covered in this study.
Chapter 1 sets the context of the research and provides the general introduction.

Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of the literature that has been used in this study. Academic dependency serves as a framework on which this research is based. We argue that academic dependency and the legacy of apartheid in South Africa led to the general neglect of Africa’s intellectual heritage. Although not unique to Mafeje, the point of departure in this chapter is that many African scholars did not simply complain about the problem of academic dependency but used African data as a source for theory building and the antithesis to western epistemology of alterity.

Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology that has been employed in this study. This is through a detailed explanation of the research techniques used and how they enhance the study.

Chapter 4 outlines Mafeje’s afro-centric approach to the study of African social science. The departure point is that Mafeje’s commitment to Afro-centric scholarship is the antithesis of, among others, anthropology’s epistemology of alterity, and the general dominance of western scholarship in social science.

Chapter 5 explores the concept of dual economy and argues that the discussion on dual economy would not even arise if those who were its advocates had engaged Mafeje’s seminal work on the topic. We argue that Mafeje sufficiently dispelled the supposition that there are dual economies in Africa and invoking the concepts can demonstrate uncritical reliance on ready made western doctrines.

Chapter 6 is an exploration of Mafeje’s contribution to the discussions about the nature of the state in Africa. This chapter presents Mafeje’s narrative on the nature of the post-colonial state. Largerly, Mafeje argued that the post-colonial state strove to retain domestic income, break out of the technological rot and made efforts to change the economy. We also argue that the changing ‘conditions’ of the African state has implications for scholarship. Anthropology as a social science discipline is used to demonstrate this point. Argument is advanced that anthropology was used for colonial and imperialist ends and that the deconstruction process (in which Mafeje was among the main contributors) of anthropology was an inevitable reality at post-independence Africa. The changing nature of the state, from
colonial of post colonial had impact on scholarship. Indeed, Mafeje’s deconstructinist discourse of anthropology and its epistemology of alterity is reflective of the intensification of anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist struggle at post-independence Africa.

Chapter 7 discusses the tenets of liberal democracy and civil society in South Africa and what could be garnered from Mafeje’s work on these topics.

Chapter 8 discusses South Africa’s vision of a democratic developmental state, and how that can benefit from Mafeje’s conceptualisation of the term development. Our departure point is that as South Africa is developing, there is a need for awareness of a point that Mafeje made that there is no connection between western culture and development, as dependencia Latin American scholars proved, all societies could follow their own path to development. South Africa policy makers have to be aware of this fact and avoid using borrowed economic models.

Chapter 9 provides recommendation and general conclusion of the thesis.

1.4 Conclusion: This chapter has laid out the main thematic issues that are discussed in this study and the break down of chapters. Importantly, as it has been stated in the introduction, this thesis is aimed at discussing Professor Mafeje’s academic output and what can be gained from it.

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This however, does not mean that during colonial period the academic space was not a contested terrain rather that independence provided a unabling environment for scholars in the continent to forcefully drive the deconstruction cuase. Anthropology is a discipline that Mafeje spend his effort providing a case for deconstruction.
Chapter Two: Literature Review

Academic Dependency and Challenges for Scholarship in the South

2.1 Introduction

At the core of the independence movement that swept the African continent in the 1950’s and 60’s was the fight for freedom. A basic dictionary definition of freedom declares that it is a state of being free, independent and without restrictions. Within the independence movement in Africa, freedom was understood as meaning cutting the umbilical cord that tied(s) the African continent with its former colonisers in the sphere of economics, politics and in the world of thinking. This was the idea that the state and individuals within the state, would be able to take decisions and act independently from the influence of their former colonisers. This meant political freedom, social, economic and intellectual freedom. With political freedom attained, it was assumed that intellectual freedom was a given. Alas, it was not to be, as it would be demonstrated in this chapter that some of the scholars in the South and in Africa in particular continued to be dependent on their former colonisers in the sphere of social science, a phenomenon that Alatas (1997) referred to as the ‘captive mind’. By and large, Mafeje concurs with Alatas and many other scholars from the South who attributed some of the challenges of the Southern scholarship to academic dependency. However, Mafeje takes it further than just protest scholarship and demonstrates the importance of being rooted in one’s realities for scholarly output. Mafeje (1978:4) avows “revolution implies an intensified attack on bad manifestations i.e. exploitation and repression in our time. It then transpires that polemics are an integral part of critique. It is not a matter of style, as is often supposed, but a matter of theory trying to overthrow theory”. This is not uniquely Mafeje’s attribute; there are many other Southern scholars who have done the same. For example, the works of Ifi Amadiume and Oyeronke Oyewumi represent distinct epistemic raptures. Examples are Amadiume’s Male Daughters, FemaleHusbands (1987) Oyewumi’s The Invention of Women (1997).

2.2 Academic dependency: Conceptual clarity

Political imperialism is a good starting point in understanding academic dependency. It is political imperialism that gives rise to academic dependency, in that it provides the necessary condition for the imperialist states to dominate in the sphere of social science. As
Alatas (1977), asserted academic dependency is analogous to political and economic imperialism. Like political imperialism, academic dependency refers to the domination of one society/people by another in the world of thinking. This, however, does not mean that people in the ‘dominated’ societies have no ability to think. Rather the structural relationship between them and their former colonisers renders them ‘junior thinkers’ and the purveyors of knowledge by their foreign counterparts. Most importantly they are conditioned to depend on the dominating power in the world of thinking.

Colonialism provided conditions for direct form of intellectual imperialism in that the centre (the colonizing power) was often in direct control of the administration of the periphery (the colonized country). It was the colonizing power that would set the social, political and economic agenda of the colonized country, and this followed the pattern of economic power between the colonized and the coloniser. The economic and political power is the main determiner of which society becomes academically dependant on the other. For example, Garreau and Chekki (1988) believe that it is not a coincidence that ‘great economic powers are ‘great social science powers’

Any kind of dependency deals with these keywords: unequal (power) relations, domination and dependency, and this finds expression in economic, political, social, military and culture relations. Thus, academic dependency simply refers to the unequal structure that undergirds the production and circulation of knowledge within the global system. Therefore, the ‘big powers’ in economic and social terms are also ‘big powers’ in the social sciences (Ake, 1979). This explains why social sciences have been dominated by the western scholars (Gareau, 1988), as the ‘center-periphery continuum’ in the social science corresponds to the North-South divide in terms of unequal power relations. Adesina (2006) cited Paulin Hountondji who drew a parallel between the extroversion of the economies—export cocoa or gold; import chocolate or jewellery—and knowledge production process, where data is exported and theory imported.

This meant that directly or indirectly, the colonial powers could determine the quality of education in colonized territories. This was done either directly through sending ‘down’ experts to teach in universities (and provide ‘expert’ analysis to governments) within the colonial territories or through being involved in setting the syllabi within the occupied territories. Consequently, the manner in which the colonized ‘other’ viewed themselves was

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2China and Japan are the most notable exception to the rule. Although these two countries are regarded as economic powers, they are not social science powers.
often overlooked in favor of how their life experiences were constructed by the colonisers. The political situation provided the coloniser with an enabling environment to dominate in almost all spheres. There is a direct relationship between political dominance and intellectual dominance. This intellectual dominance was propelled through direct control of universities and publishing houses by the western scholars, who often determined what could and could not be taught in those universities and what they deemed acceptable/suitable for ‘their publishing houses’.

In post independence Africa, the form of academic dependency changed from direct to a more indirect form. Today intellectual imperialism has a lot to do with the “control and influence the West exerts over the flow of social-scientific knowledge rather than its ownership and control of academic institutions” (Alatas, 2013: 284). With the change of Africa’s political situation and the relationship with the West, especially that of being a politically and economically dominated territory. The West also changed the manner in which it sought to dominate the continent. The West had less direct control over the affairs of the African continent. The new form of academic hegemony was/is no longer imposed by the West through direct control and power but it is “accepted willingly with confident enthusiasm by scholars and planners of the former colonial territories and even in the few countries that remained independent during that period” (Alatas Syed Hussein: 1977, 7-8). Therefore, “Academic dependency is defined as a condition in which knowledge production of certain social-science communities is conditioned by the development and growth of knowledge of other scholarly communities to which the former is subjected” (Alatas: 2012:36). It is for this reason that intellectual imperialism is understood as the bases for academic dependency. The inter-dependency between scientific communities has often resulted in one scientific community being able to expand according to certain criteria of development and progress (Alatas, 2013). Development of scientific communities, in developing countries, is conditioned by the development and expansion of the foreign scientific community. This is similar to economic dependency, which was defined by Dos Santos (1970), as the condition that one economy is conditioned by the development and expansion of the foreign economy. The growth of the dependant country depends on the development of the country which the former is dependent on for its growth. Thus, if the centre does not grow, it is likely that the periphery will stagnate.
In his (1977) book *The captive mind and creative development*, Syed Hussein Alatas attempted to analyze the psychological effects of academic dependency. He conceptualized the phenomenon of academic dependency as captive mind. He suggested that dependent scholars become passive receivers of “research agenda, theories and methods from the knowledge powers”. (Syed Hussein Alatas, 1977:46). The former colonisers are understood by those who are dependent on them as knowledge powers. They are the main drivers of knowledge production. The captive mind depends on these knowledge powers for research agendas and theories. They suspend their thinking and are willing to accept knowledge from others, who are systematically portrayed as superior thinkers. As such, these scholars become purveyors of knowledge rather than being knowledge producers. They do not set the research agenda or the methods that would be followed in resolving the research question. As such, they could not be understood as original knowledge producers. They are merely promoting the ideas of others. In academia as in politics or in economics, the dominant global powers (mainly the western countries i.e. France, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom) are the social science powers. Knowledge produced in social science powers is widely disseminated and is the most read in the historically dominated countries of the South. Hence, some of the scholars of the South could be said to have a captive mind because they have spent most of their time and efforts disseminating scholarly output of their western counterparts.

### 2.3 Academic Dependency and Euro-centrism

Alatas (2013) argues that academic dependency is the expression of Orientalism. Hence he uses orientalism as the starting point to understanding academic dependency. He holds a view that the “structural context of orientalism in the social sciences today is academic dependency” (2013:273). He further argues that academic dependency is the problem that exists and finds expression at two levels. At the “structural level it is characterized by a certain division of labour in global social science which is maintained by policies and regulations enforced by bureaucrats and administrators This has much to do with administrative control and political domination of one geographic part of the world over the other geographic area(s). At the intellectual level, this finds expression at the realm of ideas” (Alatas, 2013:373). These two aspects of dependency are inter-related. The political domination of Europe over other continents created social dependency of those continents on Europe, and that gave conditions for academic dependency on Europe. Underpinning this
idea of academic dependency is cultural imperialism: the tendency to privilege one’s culture over others based on the perception of one’s own superiority and that ‘others’ are inferior (Nathan and Okpanachi, 2012: 85).

Cultural imperialism is maintained by the manipulation of history in order to locate the academic history in Western societies. In his 2006, inaugural lecture at Rhodes University, Professor Adesina referred to this manipulation of history as extroversion, erasure of memory and closure of history. For example, the “average sociology textbook, like Giddens, will date the emergence of the field to August Comte, the nineteenth century French philosopher, and identify the ‘founding fathers’ [as] Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim” (2006:135). To prove his point Adesina (2006), mentioned that Ibn Khaldum “completed his three volume magnus opus, Kitab Al ‘Ibar, in AD 1378, this was 452 years before the first volume of Auguste Comte’s six volume, The course of positive philosophy, was published. Similarly, Mamdani 2001 stated that “it is well known that there existed centers of learning in different parts of Africa –such as Al-Azhar in Egypt, Al-Zaytuna in Morocco, and Sankore in Mali prior to western domination of the continent. And yet, this historical fact is of marginal significance for contemporary African higher education” (Mamdani, 2001:2).

Orientalism is the exaggeration of differences between the Arab and the European culture(s) and often viewing the Arab culture as backward when compared to the European culture. Edward Said (1977) eloquently defined this as the acceptancy in the West “of the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, mind, destiny and so on” (Said,1977: 31). The period of ‘enlightenment’ and colonisation gave the rationale in the West, that the West is superior to the rest of the world and that the world needed the West to ‘civilise’ them. This process resulted in the development of concepts such as barbaric, backward, and so on to define the non-western world. This is the expression of cultural imperialism. Nathan and Okpanachi (2012:85) defined “cultural imperialism as the experience of groups who have their means of expression curtailed” often for a plethora of reasons. Hence, this trend has been the bedrock of the inability of many African countries and scholars in Africa to write and speak about their own situations. Through binary opposites, African and Western are defined along the lines of being ‘indigenous’ or ‘traditional’ while the West is deemed ‘modern’, ‘universal’ and ‘scientific’ thus bearing the qualities of what constitutes ‘good scholarship’. Adesina (2006) emphasises
an important point that in the quest to demonstrate the importance of indigenous knowledge, this is “not to substitute erasure for uncritical adulation” (Adesina: 2006: 137). Rather “the important point is to highlight the immanently ethnocentric (and largely racist) tendencies to create binary opposites: between knowledge and ignorance; science and dubious magic’.

Ignorance and dubious magic as signifiers of the non-Western other” (Adesina: 2006: 137).

Other terms worth defining at this juncture are ‘Euro- or western-centrism’ and ‘western scholarship’. Euro-centrism (or western-centrism), implies the neglect of geographical diversity and the imposition of one’s ethnic group (in this case Anglo-American) and its standards over others with underlying superiority or narcissism (Bernstein, 1971).

Western scholarship, on the other hand, has nothing to do with geography per se, it is rather a ‘world of thinking’ or mindset. Euro-centrism implies promotion of the Western culture and the neglect of everything non-western. These were the fundamentals of ‘enlightenment ‘and ‘modernization’. The basic tenet of these concepts is that non-western countries were/are behind and backwards in development and therefore need to be enlightened and modernized by the West. This resulted in westerners imposing their culture on the non-westerners. The “notions of ‘development’ are imposed on other societies without considering” their particular material condition (Nathan and Okpanachi 2012: 89). This is the consequence of the ideological bias and the neoliberal ‘common-sense’ (Soederberg, 2004) as well as the continuation of the status quo, thereby silencing ‘other’ forms of knowledge. In sum, academic dependency “recognizes an imbalance in the production of social sciences across societies and the resultant division of labour between the producers and consumers of such knowledge” (Alatas 2000: 84). The imbalance reveals the vertical and unidirectional flow of knowledge and information from the core to the periphery and the absence of communication among social scientists that belong to the former (Alatas, 2000: 84).

The early forms of orientalism find expression in depictions of the Arab world as “exotic and mysterious” (Said, 1977). These depictions and development of knowledge of ‘others’ and therefore developing the means to understand them was/is not only limited to the Arab world. The transportation of Saartjie Baartman in the 19th century from South Africa to Europe forms part of these depictions. She was paraded and her pictures circulated in order to provide evidence of how ‘strange’ African women bodies are. She was used in order to reinforce the Orientalist imaginary in Europe and as an object, while her physical
characteristics were used to reinforce the pre-conceived idea that she belonged to a backward culture. The discussion of Orientalism, as Alatas (2013) suggested has been focused on “traits or characteristics, usually understood in terms of a number of dichotomies such as “civilized-barbaric,” “enlightened-backward,” “rational-irrational” and truth-falsehood” (Alats, 2013: 274). He went on to assert that, if it is understood this way, orientalism can be regarded as the problem of the past, of the 19th and 20th century (Alatas, 2013), and as such not viewed as a problem that is currently impacting on society in general and social science in particular. As it will be demonstrated in this thesis, the problem of orientalism does still find expression in some parts of the continent. It is this scholarly arrogance and the captive mind that African scholars must confront and not merely protest against. If orientalism is treated as a thing of the past, Africans will not be able to take on the current challenges that demonstrate the persistence of orientalism. In South Africa, where African intellectual heritage has been neglected, public discourse will continue to be shaped by Western scholarship. Reviewing the Sally Moore’s book: Africa and Anthropology, Mudimbe (1994) said the following “it is not too difficult to suppose that the ‘new Africa’ Sally Moore talks about is the old exotic Africa of the Greeks, Romans, and early Europeans writers: a hot piece of land on which pathetic beings live on roots, herbs, and camel’s milk, a refused continent which produces and sustains so many venomous beasts which do not live in Europe, and above all a place where madness and melancholia reign supreme” (Mudimbe, 1994:8-9). In his review titled: Who are the makers and objects of history? A critical comment on Sally Falk Moore’s Anthropology and Africa, among other things, Mafeje (1995) exposes this orientalism in Moore’s writings, moreover he adds “the classical texts have one advantage, namely that their authors had no inhibition about expressing their prejudices concerning Africa. It was simply a continent of savages (red ‘tribes’) and venomous beasts” (Mafeje, 1995:10).

2.4 Building alternative discourse in the South

Although many scholars in the South are aware of academic dependency and Eurocentric biases, little effort has been made to develop alternative theoretical traditions. Some scholars in the South, especially in South Africa have not gone beyond what Adesina (2006) termed protest scholarship. Alatas (2013) believes that the dependence on theories and concepts generated in the Europe and North American still continues. There critique of academic

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3An indepth discussion on Mafeje’s review of Moore’s book is undertaken in chapter four.
4As it will be demonstrated in the following chapters, a lot of insight can be gained from Mafeje’s honest and robust deconstruction of Western suppositions about Africa and that a lot can be gained from such scholarship.
dependency and Euro-centrism in social science should directly lead to the establishment of an alternative discourse. Alatas (2013) defines alternative discourse as “those that are informed by local/regional historical experiences and cultural practices in the same way that the Western social sciences are. Being alternative means a turn to philosophies, epistemologies, histories, and the arts, other than those of the Western tradition.

Some scholars in the North are critical of the alternative discourse(s). Those who are critical of alternative discourse and new theories in social science in the South have often argued that these attempts are destructive to the broader study of social science. For example Northern scholars such as Sztompka (2011)⁵, believes that “science, including social science, does not know borders. It develops as a common pool of knowledge to which all national, continental, regional or even local sociologies are more than welcome to contribute” (Sztompka, 2011:11). He concludes by writing that, there is nothing alternative or indigenous there, but simply good sociology. However, he seems to omit an important aspect of ‘good sociology’, mainly that it requires attention to concept formation and theory building (Alatas, 2013). It is therefore deducible from the above that Sztompka calls upon the non-western world to celebrate and accept ‘universal knowledge’ as human knowledge. However, Mafeje (2000) rejected the phenomenon of universal knowledge and proclaimed that universal knowledge “can only exist in contradiction”. Concept formation and theory building are both determined by material condition and the cultural context from which each scholar is writing. This is in line with the long held belief that knowledge is not produced in a vacuum, rather it is a product of human interaction as well as present and historical experiences. The failure of some social scientist from the South to understand this has resulted to what Alatas (2013) termed the continuation of ‘Orientalist orientation’ and the general marginalization of knowledge that was produced from non-western world. This marginalization of non-western ideas becomes the basis for the neglect of intellectual heritage of the South and the general neglect of sources of theory from non-western societies. The continuing marginalization of non-western ideas and sources of theory many years after political independence is the direct result of the domination and teaching of the western scholars in the syllabi in many countries of the South.

⁵It is however not suprising us, Scholars from the North are likely to support and through their discourses hope to sustain western soppositions on Africa and attempt to undermine any alternative presented by the South.
The starting point in providing alternative discourse to the Western scholarship is to critique and prove how sometimes irrelevant Western scholarship is to providing solutions to the prevailing conditions of the South. Alatas (2013) cites Rizal (1887) as among the first scholars in Southeast Asia to provide a critique of Eurocentrism and the first to “raise the problem of Western constructions of non-Western histories and societies” (Alatas, 2013:277). Drawing from Rizal’s (1887) novel, *Noli me tangere* (*Touch me not*) and his (1891) *El filibusterismo* (*The revolution*), Alatas reaches the following conclusions: If we were to construct a sociological theory from Rizal’s works, three broad aspects can be discerned in his writings. First, we have his theory of colonial society, a theory that explains the nature and conditions of colonial society. Second, there is Rizal’s critique of colonial knowledge of the Philippines. Finally, there is his discourse on the meaning of and requirements for emancipation (Alatas, 2013:278). The important aspect of Rizal’s work cited by Alatas (2013) is the fact that Spain, as the colonial power, created the knowledge of the Filipinos and thus undermined their history and culture. The culture and history that existed before the Filipinos came into contact with colonial power was erased through presenting it as backward and irrelevant to future social development. Alatas (2013) demonstrates that, unlike the belief by the Spanish colonisers that Filipinos were lazy and backward, they were “relatively advanced society in pre-colonial times and that their (perceived) backwardness was a product of colonialism” (2013:278). Through his work, Rizal went on to address the theme of ‘indolence’. This concept was important in colonial scholarship; it formed a vital part of the ideology of colonial capitalism” (Alatas, 2013:281). This was the portrayal of the Filipino society as backwards and that their backwardness was due to their laziness. Alatas (2013) citing the work of his father Alatas (1977) argued that like his predecessor Rizal. Alatas (1977) was critical of the colonial view of the Filipino society, especially the concept of indolence. In his 1977 book, *The myth of the lazy native* he argued that the perceived backwardness of the Filipinos had nothing to do with the Filipinos themselves, rather it was a condition caused by the colonial rule. The colonial power’s understanding of the Filipinos was that they had little love for work or lacked motivation to work. Rizal strongly dismissed this assertion. For him, “indolence was a result of the social and historical experience of the Filipinos under Spanish rule” (Alatas, 2013: 283). He argued that, what was expressed by Filipinos was not indolence rather it constituted reluctance to work under exploitative conditions. The significance of Rizal’s work in this regard is the ability to restore the dignity of the Filipinos and restore their history. When they (Filipinos) were presented as inherently lazy by their
colonisers, Rizal was able to articulate that they were merely rebelling against exploitative conditions of the western colonisers.

The writing of Rizal (1887) and Alatas (1977) are to be considered as potential sources of social-science theories and concepts, which would decrease academic dependence on the world social-science powers. Academic dependency continues because of the presence of captive mind, the uncritical and imitative mind dominated by an external source, whose thinking is deflected from an independent perspective (Alatas, 1977). This translates to imitation of the Western concepts, and this influences “all the constituents of scientific activity such as problem-selection, conceptualization, analysis, generalization, description, explanation and interpretation” (Alatas, 2013: 288). The captive mind is mainly characterized by the inability to raise new and original problems and analytical methods to solve new challenges. This is largely due to the fact that the captive mind often reads academic material from the West or is being taught by teachers from the West who has no theoretical understanding of the local conditions and thus no basis for theorizing about the local. It is important for the purposes of this chapter to explain (as it will be discussed later) that captive mind is not limited to academic output but is also reflected in policy decisions that are taken by those who are captured.

Alatas (2013) demonstrates the consequences of captive mind on policy choices and argues that policy decisions in some instances are reflective of the continuing persistence of euro-centrism in social science in the South. He uses the notion of Islamic economics to make his point. Arguing that the “the notion of Islamic economics did not arise from within the classical tradition in Islamic thoughts. In the classical Islamic tradition, there were discussions and works on economic institutions and practices in the Muslim world, but the notion of an Islamic science of economics and specifically Islamic economy did not exist” (Alatas, 2013:290). He argues that Islamic economics is a modern creation that arose because of the dissatisfaction with capitalist and socialist and that its not fundamentally different from western economics. He concludes that “Islamic economics” amounts to neo-classical economics dressed and made up in Islamic terminology” (Alatas, 2013: 294). Thus, what is believed to be Islamic economics is well entrenched in neo-classical economics in terms of its near-exclusive concern with technical factors such as growth, interest, tax, profits, and so on (Alatas, 2013). The major challenge with this imitation and the disguise of the neo-classical economics is that the same policy options (as proposed by western countries) are legitimized under the new concept ‘Islamic economics’. As such, the Islamic economics is unable
to resolve the same social challenges that exist within western societies, such as increasing gap between those who have and those who do not have.

This lack of alternative theories and the heavy reliance on the Western theories has meant that African countries have given their western counterparts the monopoly to define concepts. For example, a simple definition of concepts such as development, suggests that it is an act of progress. Consistent with this definition, it is only rationale to conclude that all human societies have always been involved in development, in that no human society in history has remained stagnant and therefore all human societies have always been developing. Nevertheless, Bernstein (1971) noted that development has been regarded by many as the post-World War II preoccupation, and as a process that was greatly influenced by the 1948 Marshall Plan and the 1949 Truman Declaration which further elucidates its Eurocentric underpinnings generally (Nathan and Okpanachi, 2012:86). In development theory it is assumed that the prevailing Euro-American economic model is universally valid (Mafeje 1998). These Eurocentric underpinnings of development made Africa a testing lab for development theories that were said to have worked or are working elsewhere in the world. From the modernization theory in the 1950’s (Nathan and Okpanachi, 2012:86), and more recently to the Washington Consensus and the Structural Adjustment Programme, all are western imposed plans on Africa. There is a consensus among social science scholars in Africa that all these policy prescripts and ideological orientations have not improved the development condition; infact, many think that Africa is worse off. All these developmental initiatives from outside the continent have failed because they lack grounding in local conditions. Once again this highlights the importance of having policies that are rooted in local conditions. However, when Africans attempt to develop programmes that are informed by African realities they find contestation from Western institutions. After twenty years of unselective borrowing, African countries came to recognise the folly of this practice and tried to remedy the situation by producing their blueprint, the Lagos Plan of Action, in 1980 (Mafeje: 1998: 126). It was a result of intensive exchange among African governments, scientist, and intellectuals. The emphasis was on home grown models and satisfaction of local needs, above all else. Unhappily, this promising initiative was literally vetoed by the World Bank by imposing its own preferred alternative called Accelerated Development in Sub-Sahars Africa: An Agenda for Action and released in 1981 (Mafeje: 1998: 126).
Even when scholars from the South do present alternative theories, the credibility of such theories is often questioned. The “voice of suspiciousness” (Nathan and Okpanachi, 2012:86) in which case almost everything one says is questioned and received with suspicion. This suspicion is normally raised by those who claim monopoly of knowing. Hence “the denial and distortion of recognition that takes place with epistemic injustice reinforces existing oppression and damages the status in society of the putative knower” (McConkey, 2004: 204). This then perpetuates the idea that one social science community is better than the other and has the monopoly of the ‘truth’; that they posses “epistemic authority” (Lewis, 2007) and they believe that no valid form of knowledge exists elsewhere. This closing of intellectual space is used to perpetuate academic dependency as scholars from the developing South are compelled to rely on the ‘established’ knowledge. This trend undermines the creative and innovative ability that is necessary to establishing alternative and viable social discourses in Africa.

2.5 Challenges to knowledge production in Africa

Knowledge is an important component of social and economic development. It has been acknowledged that knowledge is important in enabling the African continent to set its own developmental agenda. As such, knowledge has been treated as important to the human and social development of the continent and as a readily available asset. In “a simple economic model, knowledge has been treated as exogenous and readily available in shelves as a public good” (Mkandawire, 2011:14). The availability of knowledge in African societies has never been a problem. The challenge has been what kind of knowledge. Mkandawire (2011) remembers that in the post independence period universities become the most important institution in nation building in various African countries. These institutions were regarded as the basis for interaction between the governments and academics, and the end game was to construct national vision. Universities were viewed as among the major originators of knowledge and as among the main drivers of social discourse. Universities were viewed as important in defining and establishing the post independence developmental trajectory. Hence there was a “realization that knowledge is something that state should invest in” (Mkandawire, 2011: 6). Nations began taking practical steps in ensuring that they do become fertile ground for knowledge production. However, according to Mkandawire (2011) many
factors have militated against the translation of this acknowledgement of knowledge as a catalyst to socio-economic development and setting Africa’s development agenda.

Firstly, the neglect of Africa’s intellectual heritage in some parts of the continent contributes significantly to the lack of development. According to Alatas (2006) the lack of home-grown or indigenous theories, concepts and methods in the human sciences is true of the general condition of knowledge in the Third World. Although this is the condition of the South, Africa in particular has experienced the problem more than the other parts of the developing world. This is a sentiment shared by Zeleza (2002: 9), who argued that African social scientists have been caught in the bind of addressing African realities in borrowed languages and paradigms. The major cause of this reality is that scholarship in some parts of Africa that emerged within the context of colonialism was not designed to serve Africa but “Europe and European objectives (Moore-Sieray, 1996: 35). It is for this reason that African intellectuals must help to “restore the historical consciousness of the African people and the Promethean Consciousness” (WEB DuBois, 1994: 15).

Secondly, effort has been invested in reconstructing the history of the continent and decolonizing scholarship. Within the trajectory of post independence Africa, the task of the African scholars has to be focused on the reconstruction and telling of history. Hence there is still need for the decolonisation of African scholarship, because, the “the African academic enterprise has long suffered from a culture of imported scientific consumerism. This culture established during the colonial era spread after independence despite rhetorical protestations to the contrary and ritual obeisance to local cognitive needs” (Zeleza, 2002: 21). Olukoshi (2006) believes that decolonizing African education will mean African Studies will need to be better anchored locally in ways that are organic to the domestic priorities of African countries and not conform to foreign standards and also permit full engagement of endogenous knowledge systems. As opposed to the prevailing situation, in which African Studies is primarily geared towards serving extra-African needs, whether it is in terms of policy, the training of personnel, or the generation of knowledge for strategic decision making (Olukoshi, 2006:539).

To emphasis this point, Nathan and Okpanachi (2012) assert that course outlines in some African universities shows how the course instructors in these schools rely on Western theories, sometimes to even teach domestic politics. For instance, a “course in political/social theory will contain all the big names such as Plato, Aristotle, John Locke, J.J. Rousseau, Max
Weber, and Anthony Giddens without the mention of African theorists” (Nathan and Okpanachi, 2012:90). Even worse in some instances, these scholars are presented as infallible in their disciplines, as such students are expected to reproduce their theories without critique. In most cases even renowned African scholars such as Claude Ake, Archie Mafeje, Samir Amin, and Bernard Magubane are given minimum attention. Furthermore, Nathan and Okpanachi (2012) cited example of PhD students in African universities who, for lack of reading resources, have to take a year of course-work or directed reading in an American university. He observed that at the end result of this endeavor is often a mixture of good and bad. While having such mutual learning experiences is vital to one’s intellectual development, these students may go home and finish their PhDs only promoting Western theories they were exposed to in America (Nathan and Okpanachi, 2012: 12).

The perpetual continuation of dominant Western ideas in Africa is maintained by the continuing global economic imbalance that still favors the West. By and large, the West has facilities and financial resources that enable them to research and tell their stories. Epistemic oppression results from the epistemic injustice built into the global knowledge production project. An aspect of this injustice identified by Fricker (2007) is ‘hermeneutical injustice’, the situation where a significant aspect of an individual’s social experience is obscured due to “prejudicial flaws in shared resources for social interpretation” (Fricker, 2007: 17). The economic dominance of the West has led to the obscuring of the social and historic experiences of the ‘Other’. The lack of resources has resulted in few established publishing houses that are not controlled by the West. This provided challenges to Africans in terms of telling their stories, to a certain extent, leading to the continuation of dominant ideas and experiences. This lack of alternative discourse to challenge the western views has led to “uncritical receptivity to these dominating forms of knowledge which makes one vulnerable to the vice of gullibility” (Marshall, 2003:30).

The prevalence of dissemination and teaching of the western scholarship in the South generally and particularly in Africa might be the cause for the continuation of policy practice that are biased to the West and not favourable to the local conditions. Nathan and Okpanachi (2012) defined western scholarship as, the “scholarship that perpetuates Eurocentrism in the sense that it celebrates theories, methods and research practices popularized in a particular area of the world without due regard to the diversity of perspectives existing elsewhere” (Nathan and Okpanachi, 2012:87). Nabudere (1997) argued
that such practice does ignore the peculiarities of different countries and cultures. The results of ignoring particularities of different countries has been the adoption of policy practices that are foreign to local condition, because the very knowledge that produce those policy is foreign and as such unable to accommodate local culture and practice(s). The fact that political independence was divorced from academic ‘uhuru’ on the continent meant the continuation of academic dependency. This meant some of the academic output in the continent is not suitable and won’t allow the continent to set its own development agenda.

2.6 State and Knowledge Production in Africa

Mkandawire (2011) raises the challenge of reconciling one party state and academic freedom as the major source of conflict between governments and academics in Africa. He holds a view that in general, African governments have been hostile to the idea of academic freedom. This has manifested itself through lack of support for and “restrictions that have been imposed on the research communities in Africa both in terms of material infrastructure and academic freedom” (Mkandawire, 2011: 20). He further argues that “African scholarship has had to deal with the continent insistence on conformity and sycophancy by authoritarian rulers” (Mkandawire, 2011:20). This is a sentiment shared by Mothlanthe (2014) who stated that, the “post colonial setting has seen interminable struggle between the intellectual class and the political establishment” (Mothlanthe, 2013:13). Moreover, he stated “quite often the intelligentsia has also been on the receiving end of political suppression and harassment” (Mothlanthe, 2013). Especially those “who remained outside the state often become the first to bear the brunt of the deformities of post-colonial independence. Because of their interrogating nature and free political inquiry, intellectuals in post-independent Africa faced the prospect of political marginalization” (Mothlanthe, 2013:13).

According to Mkandawire (2011), the other source of discomfort between African leaders and intellectuals was to do with relevance of the research output of the universities. African governments tended to view “universities as intended for the production of ‘manpower’ necessary to indigenize the civil service” (Mkandawire, 2011: 19). He believes universities were not viewed as independent entities but were believed to be tools used by governments in order to produce knowledge that was necessary for the production of the ‘human capital’ needed to carry the mandate of the state. Universities are treated as a big

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6 It could be that Professor Mkandawire is using his personal experience of Malawi under Kamuzu Banda to generalise about the nature of the relationship between African scholars and Political leaders in post-independence Africa.
production laboratory for the state and not as independent entities that must produce knowledge as demanded and determined by individual scholars. As such, universities are not producing knowledge but individuals with technical know-how to respond to tactical challenges.

The external forces also played a significant role in denigrating higher education in Africa. In 1986, the World Bank announced that social returns for higher education were too low compared to those of primary education (Mkandawire, 2011:20). This was a good enough reason for some of the African countries to start dis-investing on higher education. There was initial resistance on the part of African governments but conditionalities associated with Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) made this resistance difficult. Through SAP programmes, Africans were advised that the African continent reduces state expenditure on higher education. The reason advanced for this was that higher education does not guarantee any benefits to the state. In line with this idea, “local government embraced it and close down the only institution of higher education the country had” (Mkandawire, 2011:20). It is logical to conclude that these efforts by the western countries might have led to cutbacks in receipt from the state.

As of 2002, Africa was one of the least educated continents in the world, with the ability to provide higher education to only 3.5 percent of its college-age population, compared with 60 percent in many Western countries (Nathan and Okpanachi, 2012: 89). There is a clear correlation between low levels of knowledge production in the African continent and the percentage of people who have access to higher education. If African governments are supportive of knowledge production in the continent then they should probably be showing more interest in investing in knowledge production and investing in higher education in particular. The consequence of this relatively low level of academic output (relative to Europe and North America) in Africa is reliance on foreign academic scholarly outlets to train future scholars. It is highly unlikely that scholars who were trained using Western academic

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9Although Mkandawire makes an important point, it should be noted that this might be overgeneralisation on his part, closure of universities might not been a reality across all 54 African States.
material will have appreciation for any alternatives. There is a need for education policy that is “able to reproduce the intelligentsia who are, in Gramscian sense, organic to the development coalition driving process and a ‘training regime’ to produce the required skills. This is consistent with the biblical injunction ‘know-thyself’. In this way, at the individual level, knowledge production is and should be treated as self discovery rather than as foreign imposition” (Mkandawire, 2011:23).

It was/is easy for most governmentson the continent to dictate to the Universities because most higher education institutions are public institutions that are funded and to a certain extent managed by the state. In worse situation some of the institutions have to rely on some form of foreign funding (Mkandawire, 2011). The donor system around the universities onthe continent is a serious concern and reproduces dependency. While it is clear that donor funding has been important in supporting knowledge production in Africa, in some instances, the “knowledge that emerges from this endeavor, is a continuation of an earlier colonial enterprise that either promotes “western paternalism” (Moore-Sierray, 1996: 13) or produces knowledge that undermines African knowledge systems and is “the fostering of imperialist interests in Africa” (Ake, 2000). Adding tothis is the fact that English remains the language that is closely associated with knowledge production, any other language is deemed unintelligible (Jaygbay, 1998). The first step in changing this on the continent will have to be consideration of African languages in scholarly communication. Currently there is no evidence that this is being done. To emphasis this point, although “Kiswahili is a widely spoken language in East, Central and some parts of southern Africa, few scholarly works are published in KiSwahili language” (Ondari-Okemwa, 2007: 5).

There are cases where one particular approach or theory is repeated in many of the journals, often with few changes to wording. And in “contrast, non-Western theories never get much fame and publicity because the means of marketing, managing and expanding on such thoughts lie in the hands of the Western academy” (Andreasen, 2005). The continuing political and economic domination of the West is but one of the challenges to the provision of alternative discourse in the South. The most ‘celebrated’ journals are controlled by the West through funding and other forms of control. Western scholars can act as gate keepers and provide or deny access as they see fit. At the academic level, it is much more difficult to be taken as legitimate when a scholar from the South is presenting a new idea. “A scholar (from

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10It must be noted that French, German, Arabic and Spanish are widely used as media of academic communication.
the South) is expected to do far more to show that the new idea they are espousing is really novel. For example, if an African scholar attempts to develop a theory of democracy, it is usually measured by the standards of Alexis de Tocqueville, Anthony Downs, or perhaps Robert Dahl, among others” (Nathan and Okpanachi, 2012:91).

Nathan and Okpanachi (2012) argued that, “the structural inequality that dependency theorists refer to has translated into epistemic inequality. A case where some ‘knower’s’ have more recognition and privileges than others, often racialised ‘others’.” (Nathan and Okpanachi, 2012: 89). The recognition and privilege of Western scholars cannot be divorced from their exposure to resources, especially publication houses that have access to global audience. Some African scholars are less known in Africa as compared to their Western counterparts. This is a condition that Nathan and Okpanachi (2012) defined as ‘nonentity’. It is a direct result of the presentation of the Western world as superior than the ‘other’ non western societies, a condition that was perpetuated by colonialism and political imperialism. According to Brohman (1995) in social science, this has been given traction by Eurocentrism and ideological bias that surround development discourse from modernization theory to neo-liberalism. This has resulted in the neglect of geographical diversity and the presentation of one’s culture (western) as superior and ‘others’ presented as backward.

As the process of political decolonization unfolded Africa continued to struggle to “decolonize the mind” and seek to seize back “their creative initiative in history through a real control of all the means of communal self definition in time and place” (Nicholas Greary, 2012), what Adesina (2006) referred to as recovery of the nerve. Africa has been classified as a place with no historical meaning, as exemplified by the works of Hume (1985) and Hegel (1892) that both portrayed the African continent as both backward and without any meaningful contribution to history. Knowledge production has to confront these historic inaccuracies in order to reconstruct history about the African continent. European intelligentsia “has continued to depict Africa’s history in ways that are of much interest to Europeans but are in consonant with history” (Motlanthe, 2012). Academic dependency has been the major cause of Africa’s inability to set its own development agenda.
2.7. Brief history of the apartheid education in South African

The history of unequal education system in South Africa is well documented. It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a detailed history of the unequal education system in South Africa. Rather this is drawn in order to be used as the backdrop to the debate on transforming education in the country. From the onset it is important to state that education in apartheid South Africa was deeply shaped by the planning and the need to reproduce the social order that was relevant for the functioning of the apartheid state. The differentiation between historically black schools from the white schools becomes the basis of educational inequalities. Education produced maintained and perpetuated social inequalities that became the major characteristic of apartheid South Africa. The Bantu education was the main tool used to provide blacks with poor education when compared to whites. Take for example, the statement made by the then Minister of Native Affairs, Hendrik Verwoerd, who summarized Bantu Education as follows: “There is no place for the Black person in the European community above the level of certain forms of labor… For this reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption into the European community… Until now he has been subject to a school system which drew him away from his own community and misled him, by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze... What is the use of teaching a Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it” (quoted in Mathonsi, 1988: 12). The exclusionary practices of the Bantu Education Act promoted an idea that sought to teach black children that equality with their white counterparts was not desirable, as they were perceived as inherently inferior to their white counterparts, while Whites were being taught that they were superior to Blacks.

2.8. Transforming higher education

The patterns of apartheid exclusionary policies in higher education mirrored those of the basic education. There were universities that were reserved for whites only and those designated for blacks. The 1959 Extension of University Education Act formalised this segregation by preventing historically white universities from admitting black students or hiring black academics. The law also established racially and ethnically segregated universities for the education of the ‘Bantu,’ Coloured, and Indian populations (Kamola, 2011:124). This provided conditions for the teaching that followed Western standards and practice(s). In the sense that education was not aligned to what was being taught in the
African continent, this was consistent with the apartheid state’s view of South Africa as a European state at the lower tip of Africa. Research and teaching were extensively shaped by the socio-economic and political priorities of the apartheid separate development programme (Badat, 2007: 7). The blueprint of advantage and disadvantage did not simply end in 1994. Most importantly the consequence of this practice was what Adesina (2006) referred to as the closure of the space for diverse ontological narratives and the insistence on Euro-ethnic mono-discourse. Under certain circumstances education does promote social change. Therefore, sociologically speaking, education, as part of the super structure cannot be treated as a politically neutral and ideologically free process (Phalane and Lebakeng, 2001: 3).

The government continues to condition the current capacities of institutions to pursue excellence, to provide high quality learning and research experiences and equity of opportunity, and to contribute to economic and social development (Badat, 2007: 7). The post 1994 dispensation had to respond to these historic inequalities and ensure that higher education in South Africa mirrored the democratic principles, especially equality and equity. In line with the need to transform education the Education White Paper 3 of 1997 calls on higher education to contribute to South Africa achieving ‘political democratisation, economic reconstruction and development, and redistributive social policies aimed at equity’. Hence transformation becomes the operative word of the post 1994 education discourse in South Africa. For example, the ANC’s first major policy statement on higher education, A Policy Framework for Education and Training (1995), clearly reflected the economic and political agenda embodied in the Freedom Charter. Beyond the structural reforms that are necessary in education in South Africa, there are deep rooted changes that ought to be made. These relate to the use of local ontological narratives as source codes for scholarship (Adesina, 2006:145). Mafeje’s insistence on methodological approaches that favour the use of local data become obviously important if we want to transform education to reflect our local realities.

2.9. Conclusion

This chapter discussed dependency and argued it has been among the major challenges facing scholarship in the South generally and in Africa in particular. The problem of academic dependency has long been diagnosed in the South but few dare practically take steps and make use of southern ontological narratives as source codes for scholarship. Mafeje is among
the few, in making use of local data as a source of theory building. Ifi Amadiume and Oyeronke Oyewumi and Jimi Adesina are also examples that come to mind.
Chapter 3

Research Methodology and Theoretical Framework

3.1. Introduction

This chapter delineates the method(s) that was used during this study. It discusses the method at length with the intent of demonstrating how and why the method is best suited for this study. The second part of this chapter focuses on the underpinning theoretical framework that informs the study. It is worth mentioning that this is different from the method and thus it serves a different purpose for the study. Social constructionism is the main research paradigm that is used, hence it is also discussed at length and how it differs from other research paradigms and evidence is provided on why it is better suited for this study. The discussion in this part of the study is focused on how social constructionism influences the route and methods of analysis. Part of this chapter is focused on the presentation of research goals, data collection techniques, data analysis, and the ethical issues that may arise during the study, and presents a clear plan on how these ethical issues will be avoided.

3.2 Goals of the Research

The preliminary research on Mafeje shows that there was/is limited focus on Mafeje as a scholar in South Africa; hence there was/is a gap that needed to be filled in the South African academic literature on Mafeje. There is limited focus on his theoretical orientation and the relevance of his work in understanding contemporary South African challenges. More than just that, the research was motivated by the glaring/obvious relevance of Mafeje’s scholarship in understanding contemporary South African political landscape. Mafeje’s scholarship is used as the entry point in a broader understanding of African scholarship. Having had a limited exposure to African scholarship during my undergraduate and post graduate studies, I took a politically conscious decision to know more about African scholarship. This research can be defined as exploratory research, as Yin (1999) described it. This research is aimed at gathering as much information as possible on specific problem. Thus, the objective of this research is to explore and discuss Professor Mafeje’s scholarship on state, development and democracy. It should be emphasized from the onset that it is not the objective of this study to generalize about Majefe’s academic output; asthis work focuses on a fraction of his academic output. Mafeje’s academic output is vast and cuts across different academic disciples and
spans five decades. This particular study is necessitated by the neglect of his scholarship in South African academia and in policy discourse generally. Yet much of Mafeje’s works (on the above mentioned aspects) is relevant to the contemporary debates facing democratic South Africa at the present juncture. We show that through invoking his scholarship that a lot can be gained both by South African academics and policy practitioners alike.

Largely exploratory, the aims of the study are as follows:

- Collate and critically engage with Mafeje’s scholarly outputs on state, development and democracy.
- Highlight the key aspects of his writings on the theme of the state, development and democracy in the context of the contemporary debates in South Africa, and
- Explore the relevance of his scholarly outputs on state, development and democracy in meeting the challenges of democracy in South Africa.

3.3 Theoretical Framework

Social constructionism framework will be used to explore the scholarship of Professor Mafeje. Social embeddedness is an imperative aspect of this theoretical framework and is instructive for the purposes of this study. Brunner (1990:30) has argued that it is culture, not biology that shapes human life and mind, thus academic interactions is important in shaping one’s understanding of world issues. This is consistent with the assertion that knowledge is not produced in a vacuum; rather it is a product of human interaction. On the other hand, Burr (1994:3) emphasized the historical and cultural specificity of knowledge production, the idea that knowledge evolves with different human epoch(s). A generation is likely to have different experiences from the other and therefore explain the social, economical and political phenomenon differently. This is consistent with the view that each social epoch must be given an opportunity to think differently and creatively about the challenges that it faces, rather than uncritically using the old doctrine and approaches to resolve contemporary challenges. Burr (1994) argued that the way we commonly understand the world, the categories and concepts we use, are historically and cultural specific. Along similar lines, Gergen (1985) a social constructionist, advanced the notion that knowledge and the process by which knowledge is created are historically and culturally situated, and hence may become
accepted versions of reality in a particular local context. It will be important to keep this in mind as we explore some of the aspects of Mafeje’s academic output. As a way of example, the socio-economic and political conditions may have changed ever since his 1971 seminal work on the on ‘The fallacy of dual economy’. However, the passing of time will not be used to cover any shortcoming that may be attributable to him.

Knowledge production takes place within the context of social interaction; as already noted above, knowledge is not produced in a vacuum. Littlejohn (1992) noted that “people communicate to interpret events and to share those with others. The meanings we give to things and events arise in the context of our interaction and communication with others” (Littlejohn, 1992:190-1). This is particularly important in understanding the contribution made by Mafeje to scholarship broadly and to African scholarship in particular, as he participated in a number of debates that had varying significance within the African scholarship. Relevant to this study is the 1989 Makerere discussion on issues that are related to democracy and development in the African continent, his critic of Sally Moore’s book, *Africa and Anthropology*, in his (1995) paper titled “Who are the makers and Objects of history? A critical comment on Sally Falk Moore’s Anthropology and Africa.” As we will argue, Africanity was Mafeje’s antithesis for alterity. It was through his critique of Moore that this case was made. The thesis will situate his contribution within the social and political context which he lived in, and inevitably shaped his ideas and argue that, although located within a certain historical epoch, his academic output remains relevant today. In this sense, scholarship is biographical, the people he met, the debates he was party too and the socio-economic and political conditions that existed in the continent shaped his academic output. Indeed, Mafeje (2000) echoed this sentiment, stating that nobody can think and act outside historically determined circumstances and still hope to be a social signifier of any kind.

[Secondly,] it is the historical juncture which defines us socially and intellectually (Mafeje, 2000:66). While, Shivji, (2003) had this to say about nationalism, he recalled that “the quintessence of nationalism was, and is, anti-imperialism. It was a demand and struggle against, rather than for, something. It was an expression of a struggle against denial of humanity, denial of respect and dignity, denial of the Africanness of the African. It was the struggle for the “re-Africanisation of minds” (Shivji, 2003:3). Thus, there were political conditions that gave raise to nationalism and Mafeje (1992) agrees: “It was the historical experience of racial humiliation, economic exploitation, political oppression, and cultural domination under European and American slavery, colonialism, and imperialism that gave
rise to theories of ‘African personality’ and ‘Negritude.’ At the centre of these theories was the question of the liberation of the Black man – his identity or the meaning of ‘being-Black-in-the-world.’ It was a philosophical or moral justification for action, for a rebellion which gave rise to African nationalism and to independence. The latter was the greatest political achievement by Africans. It was an unprecedented collective fulfilment’ (Mafeje, 1992a:11-12).

Arowosegbe (2008) believes that ideas make sense when located within complex social contexts in which they are produced. Thus, we locate Mafeje’s scholarly output within the particular historical contexts in which he lived and worked as an intellectual, and how these shaped his writings. There is contestation about the significance of some events in shaping any human intellectual orientation and Mafeje is not an exception in this regard. For example, according for Hendricks (2007) among the developments that shaped Mafeje’s life and scholarship, we can highlight his experience at the University of Cape Town (UCT) where he was denied a position of senior lecturer in Social Anthropology. Hendricks will have us believe that after that event, Mafeje became more African centered. However, this is not substantiated by any scholarly works that proves a paradigm shift on the part of Mafeje after the famous ‘1968 Mafeje affair’. Infact there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Mafeje had been focused on Africa-centered research way before the so-called 1968 affair. For example in 1963 Mafeje co-published with Monica Wilson Langa: A Study of Social Groups in an African Township, and in the same year, he published A Chief Visits Town. Both these publication disapproves Hendricks (2007) claims that Mafeje suddenly underwent a major paradigm shift because he was not appointed at UCT. This assertion is tantamount to accusing Mafeje of having been a sympathetiser of Euro-centric views prio the 1968 event. We are not entirely surprised by Hendricks (2007) focus on Mafeje’s experiences, over and above his ideas. To illustrate why this is not suprising, Gordon (2000) stated “the biographical is almost mandatory fare in the order of blackness. The implication –insidious, patronizing, and yet so familiar and presumed – has achieved the force of an axiom: white intellectuals provide theory, black intellectuals provide experience”… hence “more continues to be written about Fanon than his ideas” (Gordon, 2002:54). ‘Significant’ as those experiences might be but they are less important to us today than Mafeje’s wrtings. To drive this point home, Gordon (2002) draws differences between a Foucault (a white intellectual) and Fanon (a black intellectual). He stated that: “Foucault, who, similarly, raised questions of historical specificity and who drew upon the genealogical methodology of Friedrich Nietzsche
to articulate his brand of poststructural analysis of knowledge regimes. Foucault’s thought is studied in the 1990’s, although it was inspired by 1950’s through 1970’s, and Foucault was comfortable utilizing Nietzsche’s nineteenth-century ideas but not those of Karl Marx, whose work he dismissed in the Order of Things as hopelessly locked in its time. Moreover, how is it that Foucault could use and re-use Nietzsche without being Nietzschean and out of date, but Fanon, by contrast, is constantly subordinated or dismissed as hopelessly a product of 1950’s and influence in the 1960’s –as though either decade was not part of the twentieth century” (Gordon, 2002: 54). This is example of racism in scholarship and assumed white superiority. Gordon (2002) cited W.E.B Du Bois who proclaimed, “blacks are often studied as problems instead of people who face problems in their lives, ‘blackness’ often afforded theorists a problematized moment. That problematized moment focused on black people over and against what they live (Gordon, 2002:47).This kind of writing about black intellectuals has its foundations in colonialism and imperialism. Gordon (2002) echoed this sentiment, he recalled “Hegel’s introductory remarks in his Philosophy of History, that History took a path from Asia to Europe and made only a shuddering glance at the northeast tip of Africa where, to this day, supposedly Asiatic people constitute its only source of culture. Standing neither on the level of History nor on the dialectical level of a particular negation that moves History forward, the black is left as nonbeing, non-Other, nothing. A project emerged, then, of articulating at least a point of universal subjectivity from such an abyss” (Gordon, 2002:48).Deducing from Hegel’s questionable logic, Gordon (2002) goes on to say, “It is no wonder that the autobiographical medium has dominated black modes of written expression. The autobiographical moment afforded a contradiction in racist reason: how could the blacks, who by definition were without a point of view, produce a portrait of his or her point of view?” (Gordon, 2002: 48).

Banks(2010) pamphlet titled Archie Mafeje: The Life and Work of an African Anthropologist is driven by this view. Rather than focusing on Mafeje’s point of view, he focuses on his life experience and therefore, willingly avoids engaging his ideas. As we write this thesis we are aware of such racist tendencies in biography.

Inherent in the fact that knowledge production is a consequence of human interaction, through continued communication with ‘others’, humans may revise or change their views on continued interaction with others. Indeed, “our understanding of the world as well as the process of acquiring that understanding, is not fixed, nor are both rooted in absolute,
objectively verifiable truth” (Moradi and Yoder; 2001:201). This is because of the changing social conditions from one generation to the other. However, this does not imply that what was regarded as ‘true’ in 1990 may be ‘un-true’ in 2015. As noted by Gergen (1985) this does not imply relativism, but rather the rules of creating knowledge should be acknowledged as historically and culturally situated and therefore subject to change. Although most of Mafeje’s works are time tested, some of his contribution may need revision as socio-economic and political conditions that help produce them might have changed considerably. Similarly, Shotter (1993) alluded to the fact that meaning is unlikely to remain constant, as a consequence of our participation in different relationships, versions of reality are open to revision. This is must be true of Mafeje, who as a consequence of having travelled the world and participated in different debates for example democracy and development debates also refined his 1974 seminal paper on “Two Economies” a version of which was first published in 1971. Thus, through different engagement with ‘others’ Mafeje was able to revise and refine his works.

3.5. Preliminary Research.

The preliminary research stage of this thesis began with the random reading of some of the papers that Professor Mafeje had published. This was preceded by a discussion with my supervisor, Professor Jimi Adesina, about the importance of African scholarship in shaping Africa’s development agenda. That discussion then got centered on the scholarship of Professor Mafaje, as an example of an African scholar that challenged western narratives on Africa. It was for the first time that I heard about Mafeje or his academic output. I become interested in knowing more about his contribution to scholarship. After reading a few of his published works, I decided that it would be important for me to research more about his work and implications that his academic output has for South Africa’s current challenges. As much as this was an academic decision to study towards a master’s degree, it was also a political decision. I knew that I had little exposure to African scholarship in my undergraduate studies and post graduate studies and knew it was not a mere coincidence, but that was part of the legacy of apartheid to teach and reference European scholarship. In addition, I was aware of the universities’ racist tendencies expressed in social science curriculum which were by and large dominated by white scholars. Wittingly or unwittingly, that created an impression that blacks are not thinkers. Hence I took a conscious decision to know more about Mafeje, in a university that seemed less willing to introduce its students to African scholarship.
I had an interest in understanding democracy and the state and how these concepts impact on Africa’s ability to develop, I then began to shape a topic around these themes. This process was followed by finalizing the research topic and determined the sources that I deemed relevant for the study. Bell (1999) emphasized the importance of this process as serving as a connection between pre-writing and formulating the thesis. At the beginning of the research, the research topic was broad and unfocused. Partly through an interaction with my supervisor and selected reading of Mafeje’s work, the research topic became more focused on state, development and democracy and how Mafeje’s input on the discussion on these topics could enhance my understanding on some of the post-apartheid socio-economic challenges.

The researcher was determined about the importance of exploring African scholarship broadly and the importance of Mafeje’s scholarship. This was because I moved from the premise that Professor Mafeje was deliberately marginalized and more importantly his scholarly inputs require in-depth discussion. He wrote across different disciplines, anthropology, economics, sociology and his CV lists extensive journals articles, papers presented at conferences and books he edited, yet in my undergraduate studies there was never a mention of him. Clearly this was partly a consequence of academic dependency, and was politically motivated, given the fact that South Africa could not claim to have had many scholars of his standing.

I sought to use the thesis to demonstrate that African scholarship is relevant in responding to current challenges of democracy in South Africa. In 2011 I was introduced for the first time to the publications of Professor Mafeje. Professor Adesina shared with me Mafeje’s 1971 seminal essays on *The fallacy of dual economy*. After reading those two essays I became increasingly interested on the work of Mafeje. This interest led the researcher to doing a desk top research on the publications of Mafeje. Desktop research involves a process of gathering and analyzing information already in print, this information is usually available in journals, books, newspaper etc and can also be accessed on the internet.

The desktop research revealed that Mafeje had contributed immensely in different disciplines, from sociology, to economics and anthropology. By and large, he did this by editing books, publishing in journals and taking part in debates about different aspects of African scholarship. But the paper that attracted my attention was his 1999 paper on *Democracy, Civil Society and Governance* in Africa. In that paper, not only does he question the assumed
universal meaning of concepts such as democracy and civil society, he insists that Africans need to determine for themselves the meaning of these concepts. This further arose my interest on the meaning of democracy for countries of the ‘Third World’ and South Africa in particular.

The preliminary research also exposed me to the academic outputs that are written about Mafeje himself. The works that have been written about Mafeje, especially after his passing in 2007 can be categorized/divided into three. Firstly, there is a booklet that was published by CODESRIA; this is a compilation of tributes by those who knew him, worked with him, friends and family. For example these included people who could be labeled as fellow travelers of Professor Mafeje, such Kwesi Prah, Jimi Adesina, Mahmood Mamdani, and a tribute from his daughter. What binds all these tributes together was the fact that they were more than just ‘normal tributes’; these were calls for African scholars to commit themselves to African scholarship. For example, in his tribute, Professor Mamdani has called for the memorialisation of Mafeje by making his works more accessible, especially to younger scholars.

The second is what is loosely referred to in this thesis as enterprise scholarship written about Mafeje. This is mostly written by academics in South Africa, especially those who emphasized the importance of the 1968 Mafeje Affair. The most notable example is Professor Bank’s 2010 pamphlet titled Archie Mafeje: The Life and Work of an African Anthropologist. Adesina (2012), when delivering the annual Archie Mafeje memorial lecture, dealt in details with the weaknesses of Bank’s pamphlet.

The third is the work that seeks to dig deep into Mafeje’s scholarship. For example the 2011 book by Professor Dani Nabudere book titled Archie Mafeje: Scholar, Activist and Thinker, Jimi Adesina’s paper Archie Mafeje and the Pursuit of Endogeniety: Against Altered and Extraversion, a paper by Sharp (1998) Who Speaks for Whom? A Response to Archie Mafeje’s Anthropology and Independent Africans or End of an Era? Sharp (2008) Mafeje and Langa: The start of an intellectual’s journey. This also includes lectures that are presented in honour of Mafeje. All these deal in detail with the methodological and theoretical orientation of Mafeje’s work.
3.6. Focusing Analysis.

According to Powel and Rennes (2003), good research largely depends on the researchers understanding of the data. Thus if the researcher did not understand the data, he/she is likely to make un-informed conclusions. After having made notes from several of Mafeje’s publications, it was clear that not all the articles that were deemed relevant during the preliminary stage were necessarily relevant for the purpose of the study. In an attempt to make sense and understand, I had to re-read some of the articles a number of times. After completing this process, I then focused my analysis based on the research aims that were set out during the preliminary stage of the study.

3.7. Qualitative Research.

The study involves the use of qualitative research technique. The decision to apply this method was based on the understanding that it will provide a better understanding of social phenomenon (Flick, 1999), moreover, according Mason (2002) making use of this research method (qualitative) will allow the researcher to explore multiple array of dimensions of social world under investigation. Qualitative research has also allowed the researcher to be sensitive to the social context in which knowledge is produced, while on the other hand allows for the vast accumulation of data.

As I was gathering data about the research topic, I was progressively gaining more insight on the work of Prof Mafeje. This was made possible by the qualitative research method. This method follows a non-linear, cyclical research path (Neuman, 2003). Thus during the research process, I moved sideways and backwards before moving forward. However, it should be pointed out that this research method is not disorganized, rather it is best suited for pulling together divergent information (Neuman, 2003). The thematic issues that are covered in this paper are diverse.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, I was unable to gain access to any archival work of Prof Mafeje. This denied me access to work such as manuscripts, research notes which could have given me greater insight into Majefe’s work. However, I considered published works that I had access to sufficient for the conclusion of this study. My supervisor, who is intimately involved in attempts to collate Mafeje work, assisted me a lot by sharing with me some of Mafeje’s papers that I could not have gained access to without his assistance.
3.8 Data Analysis.

After collecting data that I deemed relevant for the study, I began a process of data analysis. This involved a process of analyzing textual material, mainly from journal articles. Content analysis refers to words, meanings, pictures, ideas, symbols or any message that is communicated (Neuaman: 310, 2003). This is mainly about studying the role of human communications, for example, this will include books, research papers, journal articles etc. The limitation that might be associated with this approach is that content that is being analysed might be analysed independently of other social articles that shaped its production.

Having pointed out weaknesses that are inherent in the data analysis, I still deemed the research method suitable for the research that was undertaken because it allows description as well as making inferences about the sender’s message (Franfort-Nachimas: 298, 2000). Data collection and data analysis were at times done simultaneously; as I was reading Mafeje’s journal papers I also began to write down my interpretation of his work.

With the understanding that knowledge is not produced in a vacuum, as well as the understanding that some of Mafeje’s publications were a response to other scholars, that compelled me to read the other scholars in an attempt to better understand Mafeje’s rebuttal of their arguments. For instance, it would have been misguided to have only read Mafeje’s response to Professor Ali Mazraui without having read the original formulation by Mazraui (1995) that sparked the debate on whether Africa needed re-colonisation. It would also be difficult to understand the significance Mafeje’s 1998 contribution to the debate on the relationship between development and democracy, without having read Nyong’o 1988 book *Popular Struggle for Democracy in Africa*, that initially spark the debate as well as Mkandawire 1989’s response to Nyong’o titled “Comments on Democracy and Political Instability.” Through this process, I was in a position to make informed inferences about Mafeje’s response.

The second phase of the study involved content analysis of the collected materials. In the main, these are documents such as published papers, journal articles etc. This process involved a systematic reading of the texts, (Klaus, 2004: 3), that allowed for objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content (Barelson, 1952:18), which has allowed the researcher to draw valid inferences from text to the context of their use (Klaus, 2004:3). This does not suggest selective referencing. Similarly, Weber (1990:9)
defined content analysis as a research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text; these inferences are about the sender(s) of the massage, the message itself, or the audience of the message. The rules of the inferential process vary with the theoretical and substantive interest of the investigator. This study uses qualitative data analysis, which has been defined by Mayring (2000:2) as an approach of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of text within their context of communication, following content analytic rules and step by step models without rushed quantification. While Patton (2002:453) defined it as any qualitative data reduction and sense making, effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings. This is significant because in reading Mafeje’s work on the thematic focus of this study and drawing inferences, the researcher has been guided by such consistencies in making valid inferences. It is important then to use qualitative content analysis, because it allows the researcher to understand social “reality in a subjective but scientific manner” (Zhang and Wildemuth, 1966:1).

Quantitative content analysis requires that the data is selected using random sampling. On the other hand qualitative content analysis usually consists of purposively selected text which can inform the research question being investigated (Zhang and Wildemuth, 1966:2). The study is specific, in the sense that it is interested in certain areas of Mafeje’s scholarship. It concerns itself with his scholarly output on issues of state, development and democracy. This will inform the selection of text for the purposes of textual analysis, thus the research will not generalize about Mafeje’s academic output, and rather the inferences made here will be out of purposefully selected text.

A discursive practice “enabled” the researcher to create a framework which transcends a dualist understanding of the relationship between the individual and social processes, to open up ways of understanding life histories as products (Rassool, 2004:12). I related these to debates in which Mafeje himself was responding, as well as contemporary debates in South Africa on the thematic focus of the study.

3.9. A need for the Study.

This study is motivated by the realities that within South African universities and in policy discourse in South Africa, African scholars are often neglected. Mafeje is part of this neglected wider African intellectual heritage in South Africa. Knowledge production has
been racialised, only white South Africans and their European counterparts are recognised as the legitimate producers of knowledge. This reality is reflected in universities curriculum. Hence this is as much an academic project as it is political. Within the South African context of racialised history that sought to depict black South Africans as nothing but second class citizens and non-producers of knowledge, it is important to engage Mafeje’s ideas and demonstrate the relevance of his work. It is hoped that such efforts will led to a broader engagement with African scholarship. This is motivated by need to transform the South African academic space, from Jan Smut’s belief that Africans should only be hewers of wood and carriers of water. Through an exploration of Mafeje’s works we attempt to demonstrate that Africans have always contributed to knowledge production and not merely purveyors on knowledge, but most importantly, we intend to demonstrate the continued relevance of Mafeje’s scholarship (this is within the narrow South African context). Within the context of having to tackle existing governance problems of governments in Africa and in South Africa in particular, it seeks to show that South African government should engage more with African scholars as their theoretical orientations provide opportunities for policy practices that are rooted within the African realities.

As Arowosegbe (2007) stated in his tribute to Mafeje, he contributed immensely to the African people’s search for self-understanding, self-determination and political emancipation as they struggle against alienation and misrepresentation. As Africa still battles misrepresentation, it is important to study the works of Mafeje who did not only confront western misrepresentation but also set in motion the agenda for self understanding among African people. This thesis hopes to contribute to what Adesina (2006) refers to as the recovery of the nerve. Mafeje, as Professor Mamdani (2007) puts it, did an excellent job and left a heritage which future young scholars and thinkers will have to complete. The first step in completing what Mafeje started begins with tracing of Mafeje’s ‘academic footsteps’. This thesis forms part of the wider process intellectual restoration which is led by Professor Adesina in South Africa. Indeed as a leading novelist, Chinua Achebe, wisely remarked, “Until the lions produce their own historians, the story of the hunt will glorify only the hunter”. The duty for African scholars today is to force their own narratives on the global agenda in order to confront western misrepresentation of Africa and tell their story.
3.10. Ethical issues.

There are important ethical issues involved in a study of this nature. A major one is the boundary between the private life of a scholar and his/her intellectual production. This is particularly so when we are dealing with a deceased person. As such, the study has not made any reference to Professor Mafeje’s private life. The focus has been purely been on his professional life as a scholar. Engaging with private life has been avoided because it distracts from the content analysis of scholarly output of any scholar and Mafeje is not an expectation in this regard. Banks (2010) pamphlet ended up being something of an academic gossip and caricature because of his attempt to venture into Mafeje’s private life. Venturing into private life was avoided because we wanted to ensure that we are not distracted from the thematic issues that are covered in this study. Again here, we are not not at all surprised by Banks (2010) on Mafeje’s private life rather than his ideas. Gordon (2002) informed us that “the black theorist’s ideas were often absent and, instead, his or her biography became text for political interpretation. The focus was on what Douglass, Anna Julia and Cooper, Du Bois, or Marcus Garvey did, not what they argued (Gordon, 2002: 52). Banks (2002) did the same when he chose to ignore a career that lasted more than five decades, and by so doing ignored Mafeje’s ideas that transcended different academic disciplines.

The fact that I could not gain access to ‘archival research’ covering Professor Mafeje’s unpublished paper, manuscripts, correspondence, lecture notes and personal papers could potentially have denied me access to important documents that could have enriched the thesis. We are aware that this lack of access to Mafeje’s archival work is reflective of Mafeje’s work. ‘Archival’ sources are more than simply a storage system for data or remembrances about hidden or undiscovered pasts. These texts are important for the meanings they contain, their relation with the world that produced them and the processes and relations that went into their production (Rassool, 2004:13). These archived documents date back in history, as far back as his collaboration with Monica Wilson in 1963 Langa: A study of Social Groups in an African Township. These could have shed light on Mafeje’s early development as a scholar. Having said that, I had access to the document that I deemed relevant for the completion of this study. My supervisor, Professor Adesina, shared with me some of Mafeje’s works which is not easily accessible in libraries. To a certain extent, my interaction with Professor Adesina mitigated some of the weaknesses that are inherent in my inability to
access archival works. It has to be said that at the time of writing this thesis there is no university in South Africa that has a comprehensive archive on Mafeje.

The fact that in completing the study no interviews were conducted could potentially have denied the researcher data that could have been useful in drawing inferences about Mafeje’s scholarship. With this said, content analysis of his published papers allowed for a vast accumulation of data. However, this could have been richer if it was supplemented by interviews.

3.11. Conclusion.

This chapter has presented the methodology that has been used in this study. It has demonstrated that the method is suitable for the study. Possible shortcomings of the method have been mentioned and how these have been addressed. Social constructionism has been discussed at length because it is the main theoretical framework that has been used to explore the scholarship of Professor Mafeje’s academic output. As it has been demonstrated in this study the methods, techniques and theoretical framework that have been employed in this study are mutually reinforcing. Mafeje’s academic scholarship has been explored because of his academic excellence in understanding the African intellectual heritage and through this process younger generation of African aspirant scholars can benefit from engaging with his works.
Chapter Four

Mafeje’s Afro-centric Approach to the Study of African Social Science.

4.1. Introduction.

The following section presents and explores Professor Mafeje’s theoretical framework. Although a demand to be rooted in one’s realities in scholarship in not uniquely Mafeje’s, this chapter argues that he was among the most important advocates of this approach in the South and specifically in Africa. The need to be rooted in local realities has been the common trend that binds Mafeje’s contribution, in almost all the academic disciplines to which he contributed.

In his 1995 paper, Who are the makers and Objects of history? A critical comment on Sally Falk Moore’s Anthropology and Africa, as the title suggests, Mafeje critiques Moore book, Anthropology and Africa that was published in 1994, and makes a case for the deconstruction of Anthropology’s epistemology of alterity in post-colonial Africa. In his 2001 paper titled Anthropology in Post-independence Africa: End of an Era and the Problem the problem of Self-definition. In this thesis, these are used to demonstrate Mafeje commitment to Africanity, and a case is made that he uses africanaity as an antithesis to epistemology of alterity.


It is important to do a biographical sketch of Professor Mafeje before exploring his contributions to scholarship. This is not the analysis of his lifestyle or psycho analyses of his personality, as some, such as Banks (2010) have attempted to do. Rather this is a ‘basic introduction’ that aims at tracing his academic journey. Archibald Monwabisi Mafeje was born on 30 March 1937 in Ngcobo in the Eastern Cape, South Africa. He began his schooling at a primary school in Peelton, near King Williamstown, “From primary school he proceeded to Healdtown, an old and renowned Methodist Boarding school, outside Fort Hare” (Jordan, 2007). He earned his matriculation certificate in 1955 and proceeded to Fort Hare University. His stay at Fort Hare University Collage was rather short, because, like many other students of the day, he fell foul of the university authorities for his political activism. Like many other students who were involved in political activities he had to leave the university. He eventually started a BSc degree in Biological Science at the University of Cape Town in
1957 (Jordan, 2007). He followed this with a BA degree in Anthropology, with majors in Social Anthropology and Psychology, after which he enrolled for a Honours degree in Anthropology, and went on to complete his Master’s degree.

He was forced by the apartheid regime to go into exile where he spent the better part of his life. He obtained a PhD in Anthropology and Rural Sociology from Cambridge University in 1966. In 1973, at the age of 36, he was appointed a professor of Anthropology and Sociology of Development at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague by act of Parliament. His scholarship was vast as his grasp on issues, almost all issues, was breathtaking. His discourses transcended disciplinary boundaries and was characterised by a spirit of combative engagement underpinned by theoretical rigor and a commitment to social transformation.

Before going to The Hague, he was a researcher and visiting lecturer at the Makerere Institute of Social Research (1966-67). He was Head of Department of Sociology at the Dar es Salaam University (1969-1971). He was at the ISS (in The Hague) intermittently from 1968-1969 and 1971-1976. Mafeje was a consultant to the FAO from 1976-1978 and 1987-1991. A Professor of Sociology at the American University, Cairo from 1978 to 1986, and 1994-1995. At SAPES, Harare in 1991, Visiting Fellow in African Studies Program at the Northwestern University in Evanston, USA in 1992. From 1993-1994 he was Director of the Multidisciplinary Research Centre at the University of Namibia. He moved back to South Africa in 2000 as an NRF Fellow based at UNISA. In 2005 he was appointed a CODESRIA Distinguished Fellow jointly with the Africa Institute of South Africa.

According to Olukoshi (2007), Mafeje stood against intellectual servitude, resisted all forms of foreign domination and was an uncompromising defender of African scholarship. Although he stood firmly opposed to apartheid South Africa, Professor Mafeje was a non partisan intellectual. Jordan (2008) recalls that “he withheld his support from all liberation movements in South Africa”. This is probably responsible for his intellectual independency.

4.3. Mafeje’s Afro-centric approach to the study of African social science.

In order to set a new programme of action that will redeem the African scholarship and redeem the dignity of African people, Africans have to firstly acknowledge the damage done by western forms of domination in the continent. This is affirmed by Mafeje (1998b); he stated that we need to acknowledge the damage caused by colonialism before we can

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11He was a member of the Unity Movement.
transcend it. Colonialism sought to destroy Africa’s indigenous mode of thought and practices. Through the process of “enlightment” indigenous African practices were often referred to as backwards, and not keeping up with the imperatives of modernization. As such, Africa needed to be ‘enlightened’ in order to keep up with the rest of the ‘progressive’ world. The starting point of ‘enlightenment’ was to obliterate all indigenous knowledge. This meant that African political leaders and intellectuals received theories from outside the continent. In order to understand their various predicaments and to establish a development agenda, they had to rely on those theories. These theoretical orientations sought to explain to Africans challenges that they were/are faced with and how they should overcome such challenges. These were theoretical frameworks that were at odds with local condition in the continent. Consequently, (Mafeje, 1988) proclaims that Africa is/was the worst victim of intellectual and cultural imperialism and is in the grips of the worst development crisis ever.

Post independence pioneered the intensification of academic output that challenged colonial narrative on Africa. Research output qualitatively changed from that which was produced under the stewardship of colonialism. Africans were increasingly interested in research that was rooted in their own realities. Much of the debate around decolonising knowledge, endogeneity, indigenous knowledge systems, all reflect the changing framework of knowledge production and academic output. Even during colonialism, contestation of the knowledge was a constant process. Notwithstanding all the above mentioned efforts at decolonising scholarship in the African continent, to a certain extent, the problems that were encountered during the colonial period did persist. The problems of foreign ‘experts’ also does not help the African scholars in finding their own feet and providing solutions to Africa’s challenges. The reason is “that the latter suffer from illusions of grandeur. They imagine that they could reach the summit, without having established a solid foundation” (Mafeje, 2000: 68). There have been few attempts at restoring indigenous knowledge that was degraded by colonialism. At all times, when solutions are being sought to African problems foreign ‘experts’ take the centre stage than affected Africans. As such, policy positions that are a product of this practice are unable to be the basis for finding solutions to long standing challenges because they are detached from the African condition. This leads to persistence of challenges, especially in development. The lack of progress in areas of economic and social development is a direct consequence of using received theories in an attempt to understand our political and social conditions. Africans should be the leaders in
creating knowledge about their own condition, in this way they will be in a position to be in charge of their own destiny. This would require that Africans stop being junior partners to their European counterparts.

The reception, by Africans, of western theoretical frameworks meant that Africa lost its authentic voice in the global affairs, as more often Africa was seen through the lenses of foreigners. The significance of authentic African voices will not only serve the purpose of communicating the message(s) of the African people, but will make the world understand the African conditions from Africans themselves and therefore get an authentic African perspective. As Mafeje (1989) once affirmed, that as long as Africans are seen to want to assimilate into the European modes of thought, not only will Africa not be able to set its own development agenda, but Africa’s authentic voice will be nonexistent in global political environment.

There is no way in which modern Africans can re-live their pre-colonial past and do things differently but there is enabling political environment to challenge the well entrenched western theoretical orientations in Africa. Africans should embark on a quest for authenticity. Indeed, there have been calls from Third World intellectuals for the indigenization of the social sciences. This presupposes a rejection of received theory and an awareness of knowledge of indigenous modes of thought and doing (Mafeje, 1989). The starting point in the journey to authentic African voice is to reject all forms of domination, and past misrepresentations, what Adesina (2006) referred to as the recovery of the intellectual and political nerve. For Mafeje (2000: 69) this “must entail a rebellion, a conscious rejection of past transgressions, and a determined negation of negations.”

Without rejection of Western domination, Africans cannot hope to set in motion an authentic agenda for development, which has Africa at its centre. In this regard it will be important for Africans to take note of how this has been achieved in other parts of the world. Latin-American scholarship is often cited as a good example, particularly Latin-American scholars of the 1970’s. They are widely credited with proving the fallibility of Northern conventional wisdom. Africans must use this as an example to demonstrate the ability to set their own paradigms. The Dependencia paradigm “through systematic analysis and methodological rigour demonstrated that there could be an alternative, if the various omissions of existing theories were taken into account” (Mafeje, 1989). In order to establish new theories, African researchers have to be rooted on local conditions. African researchers in particular should not
impose their pre-conceived ideas on data, but data should be used for its primary purpose, to
give new insight; the idea that a researcher should be guided by local ethnographies.Mafeje
(1989) agreed that if data contradicts established doctrines, then we experience
epitomological rapture and therefore new theories are established. Through this process
Mafeje was able to go beyond protest scholarship as demonstrated in his paper “The Ideology
and Tribalism” and his critique of Wolpe use of articulation of modes of production in
explaining African land teneture system among other things. On both occasion, because of
his reliance on local ethnographies as the basis for knowledge formulation, Mafeje was not
only able to protest against Wolpe usage of articulation of modes of production, relying on
African ethnographies, he was also able to prove the fallacy of Wolpe’s assertion.

It is only logical to suppose that “when Africans speak for themselves, the world will hear the
authentic voice, and will be forced to come to terms with it in the long-run” (Mafeje, 2000a),
an assertion that is anchored by Prah (1997).Mafeje argued that if we are adequately
afrocentric the international implications will not be lost on the others.Mafeje (2000) had
suggested self reliance in thought and in practice as the best possible way of overcoming
imperialism. Africa must rely more on its indigenous knowledge. This means Africans must
refer back and restore some of their traditional modes of thought. The calls for African
renaissance are an example of the attempt to revert back to African indigenous thought and
be rooted in our local conditions.Afro-centric, as suggested by Mafeje, is the means through
which Africans can regain their voice and be able to set their own development agenda. Afro-
centric can be “regarded as methodological requirement for decolonizing knowledge in
Africa or as an antidote to Euro-centrism through which all knowledge about Africa has been
filtered” (Mafeje, 2000). It is not a programme set to prejudice Western scholars, as it has
often been interpreted by some of the Western sympathisers; rather it is nothing “more than a
legitimate demand that African scholars study their society from inside and cease to be
purveyors of alienated intellectual discourse” (Mafeje, 2000). Molefi Kete Asante made an
important distinction between “afrocentricity” and “afrocentrism.” He defined afrocentricity
as “a consciousness, quality of thought, mode of analysis, and an actionable perspective
where Africans seek, from agency, to assert subject place within the context of African
observation:in comparative terms it is remarkable that when Chinese study Chinese culture
and society in their own terms and for their own purposes, western scholarship does not
protest. This is because the sovereignty of Chinese scholarship on China is accepted. India
and the Arab world have almost reached that point. Russians do not look west for understanding their society… Neither do the Japanese.

The major difference that Mafeje drew between afrocentricm and africanity is that the latter “has emotive force. Its connotations are ontological and, therefore, exclusivist. This is to be expected because its ontology is determined by prior existing exclusivist ontologies such as white racist categorisations and supremacist European self-identities in particular. These insinuated that blacks were inherently inferior. Hence, the blacks in the New World, especially, felt the need to prove themselves and thus produced what Martin and West call the ‘vindicationist’ intellectual tradition” (Mafeje, 2000: 107). It would seem that this is not a mere reference to race but a rejection of colonial stereotypes that were in the main driven by white settlers. But as Mafeje (2000) noted Africanity has acquired racial overtones precisely because it is a counter to white racism and domination.

Afro-centric is not an opportunistic call by African scholars; it is necessitated by both the historic conditions that have existed in the continent and the desired future by Africans, especially African intellectuals. It is worth quoting Mafeje (2000) at length in this regard. He declared that,

“Firstly, nobody can think and act outside historically determined circumstances and still hope to be a social signifier of any kind. In other words, while we are free to choose, the role in which we cast ourselves as active agents of history, we do not put on the agenda the social issues to which we respond. These are imposed on us by history. For example, we would not talk of freedom, if there was no prior condition in which this was denied; we would not be anti-racism if we had not been its victims; we would not proclaim Africanity, if it had not been denied or degraded; and we would not insist on Afro-centrism, if it had not been for Eurocentric negations” (Mafeje, 2000: 108).

Thus, the challenge of Africa-centred approach is imposed on Africans by history. Africans need to rise to these challenges in order to be able to set its developmental agenda. Afro-centric stance must simply be understood as a confrontation with imperial and colonial history in the continent. Both imperialism and colonialism sought to depict Africans as semi-human, and ‘white settlers’ as the superior human species. Mafeje (2000) captures this fairly well; he stated that “Africanity has an emotive force. Its connotations are ontological and,
therefore, exclusivist. This is to be expected because its ontology is determined by prior existing exclusivist ontologies such as white racist categorisations and supremacist European self-identities in particular” (Mafeje: 2000:68).

African scholarship is important in transcending past injustices and in affirming Afro-centric thoughts. To do this successfully Africans scholars should be rooted on local realities. An important question that Mafeje (1997: 16) asked in relation is whether the “local can be derived from the universal or can the local in its own right reflect the universal”. This formulation challenges Parsons’ (1951) notion that proclaimed that particularism will be replaced by universalism, which all human societies will develop in the same manner. This is the basis of the much celebrated globalisation in the west, the belief that there are global values. Something that has led to Western countries homogenising all human values. But all these have been challenged in non-western societies. At the heart of these challenges is the belief that at the value level there can be no universalism; all human societies have their value systems. This has been demonstrated by the clashes that have in some instances led to political confrontations between western societies and non-western societies.

In August 1994, Mazrui published an article titled “Decaying parts of Africa need begin colonization.” The article was premised on the idea that strong African states, with the United Nations and sympathetic Asian countries can undertake to ‘re-colonize’ their weaker or less stable countries in Africa. To be consistent with Mazrui’s suppositions, it is worth quoting him at length, he stated:

“Much of contemporary Africa is in the throes of decay and decomposition. Even the degree of dependent modernization achieved under colonial rule is being reversed. The successive collapse of the state in one African country after another during the 1990s suggest a once unthinkable solution: recolonisation

Recolonisation under the banner of humanitarianism is entirely conceivable. Countries like Somalia or Liberia, where central control has entirely disintegrated, invite inevitable intervention to stem the spreading cancer of chaos …the colonization impulse that is resurfacing, however, is likely to look different this

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12We are aware that unsanctioned murder is an example that cuts across human societies. However the point that we are making is that historically the west has arrogated on itself the right to determine and protect human rights or values.
time around. A trusteeship system...could be established that is more genuinely international and less Western than under old guise. Administration powers for trusteeship territories could from Africa, Asia, as well as the rest of the United Nations membership. The white man’s burden would in a sense become humanity’s shared burden” (Mazrui, 2005: 346)

Mafeje responded to Mazrui’s suggestion regarding recolonisation, with an article titled “Benign Re-colonisation and Malignant Minds in the Service of Imperialism.” Mafeje charged that

“The proposition that Africa be recolonised is not only preposterous but is also mischievous in that it is not meant for African consumption. It is again Ali Mazrui playing up to his Western gallery. He is acutely aware of the racist and imperialist connotation of the term and for this reason he tries to dispense with the ‘whiteman’s burden’ (a crude clichéd). He does this by inviting Asians and Africans to be custodians of the envisaged ‘benign colonisation’ – a contradiction in terms, as ‘colonisation’ implies political imposition by whosoever does it. In trying to deal with this hare-brained scheme Ali Mazrui makes suggestions which verge on lunacy. For instance, he proposes a ‘Trusteeship’ system – like that of the United Nations over the Congo in 1960’. He seems to be oblivious of the fact that it was under the same imperialist trusteeship that Patrice Lumumba was eliminated. Likewise, as an East African, he should have known that the relationship between Asians and Africans still suffers from an unresolved imperialist legacy” (Mafeje, 1995:19).

In a rejoinder, titled Self-Colonization and the Search for Pax African: A Rejoinder, Marui (1995) tried to clarify his suggestion of recolonisation, he stated that, “I am advocating self-colonization by Africa. I am against the return of European colonialism and the equivalent of Pax Britannica” (Mazrui, 1995). In what seems like a retreat from his original formulation, Mazrui stated, “it is true that while in the 1990s I sometimes use the vocabulary of Africa’s ‘selfcolonisation’, in the 1960s I had used the vocabulary of Africa’s ‘self-pacification’ (Mazrui, 1995). It will seem that his major concern was Africa’s ability to take center stage in resolving the challenges that are faced by the continent. He clearly stated that “I reserve the term ‘self-colonization’ for inter-African colonization only especially when its purposes are substantially benevolent. In such a
context inter-African colonization could become part of Pax-Africana”. The importance of this debate is that firstly, it signified Mafeje constant desire to reject domination of one people by the other. Secondly, because of his Afro-centric approach to social science he was always willing to reject a concept such as recolonialsation, in whatever sense that concept is used.

The importance of Mafeje’s paper’s (1971) on The Ideology of Tribalism is primarily a rebellion against misrepresentation and demonstrates the importance of being rooted on local data. Without using local data in formulating knowledge, Mafeje would not have been in a position to dismiss the ideology of tribalism with the same precision and conviction he did. This emphasises the importance of being rooted in local data, is clearly demonstrated by his assertion that there is no equivalent word for tribe in African languages, rather the word is invoke when English is used. As Mafeje (2003) once warned social analogies are misleading when drawn across continents. In his 1981 paper on the articulation of modes of production, Mafeje demonstrated this point by taking on Harold Wolpe, who Mafeje accused of imposing Marxist school of thought on local conditions, without taking into consideration local conditions. This was in connection with Wolpe application of class struggle, which led him to conclude that African land tenure system is communally owned. Wolpe’s shortcoming was trying to explain the agrarian question in Africa by imposing social analogies from other societies without due regard for local conditions. When he delivered the 2nd annual Mafeje memorial lecture in 2011, Professor Adesina cited Mafeje as having argued: “for a very long time agrarian studies in sub-Sahara Africa had been subjected to prejudices derived from experiences of other continents, namely Europe, Latin America and Asia”. This borrowing obscures us from understanding Africa’s unique land tenure system. A closer analysis of Africa’s land tenure system exposes facts that are opposed to Euro-centric views, importantly among other things is the fact that African land tenure system is not communal, rather there is a distinction between ownership and use rights (Adesina, 2011:6). Once again Mafeje meticulousness in dismissing Wolpe’s doctrine on land tenure systems is advantaged by his willingness to be rooted in African local social conditions. He showed that Wolpe’s use of Etienne Balibar’s idea of articulation of modes of production was inconsistent with Africa social realities, especially as far as this relates to the land question. Mafeje went on to state that the “persistent confusion led to the ignorance of the significant notion of lineage mode of production” (1981: 128). The significance of understanding the ‘lineage mode of production’ would be the appreciation “that in the reserves land is worked by ‘social units based on
kinship’ and that ‘the product is distributed in accordance with certain rules’ (Wolpe, 1980:215).

As it has already been demonstrated in the above mentioned discussion dependency robbed the dependant country/society of the opportunity to use local conditions as sources of knowledge. An important ‘trade mark’ of Mafeje scholarship\(^\text{13}\), is his insistence that knowledge is foremost local before it be said to be ‘universal.’ This finds clear expression in his (2000) Africanity: A Combative Ontology, in which he cited Mao Zedong phrase ‘if what we say and do has relevance for our humanity, its international relevance in guaranteed.’ Through focusing on local data, rather than on what is universally acknowledged as true, this process normally leads to the establishment of new theory. It is Mafeje’s view that, if local information/data from which the researcher generates knowledge contrasts with established views, then the outcome is epistemological rupture, an establishment of a new theory, a matter of theory trying to overcome theory (Mafeje, 1978:4). Adesina (2006) pointed out that the call to be rooted in African realities does not suggest that we substitute one erasure for another. Weber will be no less relevant to our Sociology, nor will Hegel for Philosophy, but there is a world out there that is much more than these (Adesina, 2006:146). This once again demonstrates that a call to be rooted on African realities does not necessarily mean a blind rejection of all ‘western knowledge’. As Mafeje (1978) declared, on the positive side, it would be difficult to discuss the emergence of such leaders as Nkrumah, Modibo Keita, Sekou Toure and others, without reference to Pan-Africanist ideas in London or Marxist ideas in Paris. Of course, over time ideas get assimilated into local thought systems and acquire a special flavour such as did Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism and Madibo Keita’s or Sekou Toure’s "African socialism" (Mafeje, 1978: 28). Although Mafeje stood opposed to universalism in scholarship, he was willing to accept that in some instances ‘universal knowledge’ can be given local flavour and applied to local conditions.

Nabudere (2011) stated “what can be observed is that despite Mafeje’s struggle against alterity and his demand for endogeneity and Africanity he increasingly found himself inarticulate with regard to how we can get there.” Mafeje might not have prescribed a best model endogeneity; the examples such as his article on “The ideology of tribalism” demonstrate how he practically took on the task of being rooted on African realities. As it will be demonstrated in the following pages (55-60), Mafeje’s commitment to the

\(^{13}\text{This thesis makes no claim that this is only unique to Mafeje.}\)
deconstruction of Anthropology is testimony to his ‘practical fight’ against alterity. This is completely against Nabudure’s supposition that Mafeje never practically demonstrated how antithesis to alterity could be achieved.

Against Nabudure’s (2011) supposition, Mafeje was an important voice in the critique of modes of production. It is important to note from the onset that Mafeje’s (1981) paper titled “On the Articulation of Modes of Production: Review Article” was intended to be a review of the essays “which have a bearing on African anthropology and history, and on the theorization of development in Third World countries in general” (Mafeje, 1981: 124). This as he said, arose out of the “Manchester conference on anthropology and history in Southern Africa in September” (1981:124). Mafeje (1981) listed the following as the issues that made the review of the theories of the articulation of modes of production so pertinent:

i. Whether idiographic enquiry yields deeper insights into societal processes than nomothetic enquiry. Traditionally, history and anthropology are idiographic disciplines unlike Marxism which, conventionally, is associated with nomothetic statements e.g. the theory of modes of production.

ii. Whether 'mode of production', as a unit of analysis, is a suitable substitute for 'tribe' or 'nation' as used by both anthropologists and historians.

iii. The relationship between cultural relativity and meta-theory, as exemplified by Marxism which treats culture as a purely super-structural phenomenon.

iv. If a Euro-centric view of history is unacceptable, then what would be the determinations of a counter-theory from, say, the Third World?

v. In an imperialist-dominated world what is the responsibility of the social scientist? (Mafeje, 1981: 123-124)

Due to the need to be focused in his critique, Mafeje chose to focus on Wolpe’s (1972) essay Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid’ which first appeared in 1972 in Economy and Society 1(4): 425-456.’ MorrisThe development of capitalism in South African agriculture: class struggle in the countryside.’ It first appeared in 1976 in Economy and Society 5(3): 292-343. The selection of these authors was influenced by the fact that “both authors are concerned to comprehend the development of capitalist relations and the specific mechanisms of labour-reproduction in 20th century South Africa” (Mafeje, 1981: 124). Moreover, Mafeje noted that the “the two writers are bound by a common epistemology (Marxism) and more or less the same conceptual armoury - 'mode of

Mafeje identified the following as the contentious issues on both Wolpe and Morris

“Wolpe's thesis is that:

i. In South Africa, the development of capitalism has been bound up with… the deterioration of the productive capacity and then... the destruction of the pre-capitalist societies. In the earlier period of capitalism...... the rate of surplus value and hence the rate of capital accumulation depended . . . upon the maintenance of the pre-capitalist relations of production in the Reserve economy which provided a portion of the means of reproduction of the migrant labour force.

ii. ...Apartheid, including separate development, can best be understood as the mechanism specific to South Africa in the period of secondary industrialisation, of maintaining a high rate of capitalist exploitation through a system which guarantees a cheap and controlled labour-force, under circumstances in which the conditions of reproduction ....of that labour-force is rapidly disintegrating (p. 296). This posed, for capital the problem of preventing a fall in the level of profit (p. 308).

iii. This relationship between the modes of production is. . . .contradictory and increasingly produces the conditions which make impossible the continuation of the pre-capitalist relations of production in the Reserves. The consequenceis the accelerating dissolution of these relations and the development. Towards a single, capitalist, mode of production in which more and more of the African wage-labour force..... is freed from productive resources in the Reserves. This.......transfers the major contradiction from the relationship between different modes of production to the relations of production within capitalism (p. 296).

Morris' thesis, on the other hand, is that:

i. There can no longer be any doubt about the capitalist nature of 'commercial agriculture' in South Africa by at least the second decade of the 20th
century. Labour tenancy... was neither a pre-capitalist form of appropriating surplus nor a pre-capitalist form of the productive forces

ii. A mode of production cannot affect its reproduction/transformation in and of itself. This can only be ensured as the outcome of specific class struggles conducted within those very conditions. The class struggle in social formations is the only cite in which the existence/reproduction of a mode of production can take place. (Mafeje 1981: 124-125)

Wolpe (1980) is convinced about his thesis of maximisation of surplus-value through the transfer of the cost of labour reproduction to the 'Reserve economy'. Mafeje (1981) challenged Wolpe supposition on the basis of what he termed the “problem of archaic and relative surplus value” (1981:126). Accordingly, as Mafeje maintained, “that apartheid constitutes an onslaught against the black working class precisely because of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall in those sectors of the economy which are capable of generating relative surplus-value (1981:126). According to the Marxist doctrine, as Wolpe (1980) stated that is the feature of the capitalist economies. In this regard, Mafeje noted with regard to South Africa, that “it fails to explain why in South Africa this tendency has manifested itself in the form of Apartheid” (1981:126), and added that there is no “evidence that the rate of profit in the central industries in South Africa is lower than that of the border industries where labour is cheaper” (1981:126). Morris stated, “There is evidence which confirms that [the ‘labour tenant’] was unable to provide for his own and family subsistence on the basis of the land granted to him by the farmer..... Therefore the existence of a separate patch of land allocated to the labour tenant did not serve to separate in time and space the necessary labour from the surplus labour as under the FMP. The labour tenant in our case is sufficiently separated from the means of reproduction to render him crucially dependent upon the sale of his labour power for his reproduction” (Morris, 1976:215-16).In response to this Mafeje stated that Morris “oversimplifies the social relations on the white farms in South Africa” (1981:127). Particularly, Mafeje took issue with the fact that Morris’ dividing line between feudalist and capitalist relations of production is land-rent and wage labour (1981:127). According to Mafeje, even though Africans were not owning land in ‘white farms’ they were still doing more than one thing (1981:127). This flies against Morris’ supposition that Africans in white owned farms were mainly concerned with selling labour power. In an attempt to remedy Morris’ shortcomings, Wolpe (1980) saw in South Africa the development
of a dominant capitalist mode of production, the African redistributive economies and the system of labour-tenancy and crop-sharing on white farm (1981: 127).

In rejecting Wolpe thesis, Mafeje rehashed an earlier argument by Morris that labour tenancy and crop sharing do not connote one and the same thing (1981:128). While agreeing with Morris on the difference between labour tenancy and crop sharing, he stated that “relations therein [are not] readily divisible into ‘feudalist’ and ‘capitalist’, as Morris supposed”(1981:128). The use of extended families by Africans to accumulate capital was mentioned by Mafeje as important economic activity that dispels both Morris and Wople supposition that Africans in ‘white farms’ are solely depended on wages. Africans in the farms, in collaboration with extended families in the ‘reserves’ used livestock to subsidise wages. This brought to the fore the debate on whether cattle(s) would be defined as property in the sense of production or simply instruments of production (1981: 128). Consistent with Marxist doctrine, for “both Morris and Wople, the term ‘property’ or means of production refer exclusively to land in the agricultural economy” (Mafeje, 1981: 128). Mafeje pointed out that “cattle among South African peasants are a prestige good par excellence and play a critical role in lineage reproduction under the system of lobola’ (1981: 129). Moreover, according to Mafeje (1981:129) this explains why when Africans in white farms are given a choice to invest between land and cattle, they chose to invest in cattles because they are the “means of lineage reproduction” (Mafeje, 1981: 129). In this regard, Mafeje’s critique of Wolpe and Morris has implication for understanding agrarian question in contemporary South Africa.

We now turn our attention to the salient points of the debate between Achille Mbembe and Mafeje on modes of self-writing. At the core of Mbembe’s 2000 paper titled African Modes of Self-Writing is the assertion that Africa’s subjective narrative has to change from ‘victimhood’ and polemic relationship with the world, to the one that is willing to embrace world views. For Mbembe, the starting point of Africa’s challenges has to do with the subjective narrative that is exclusionary of other narrative. He stated that “the emphasis on establishing an African interpretation of things, on creating one’s own schemas of self-mastery, of understanding onself and the universes, of producing endogenous knowledge all led to demands for an African science, an African democracy, an African language, and endogenous technologies. The need to make Africa unique is presented as a moral and political problem, the reconquest of the power to define one’s own identity seeming to be
constitutive of any subjectivity” (Mbembe, 2000: 25-26). Mbembe expressed his surprise about the fact that this assertive attitude of sovereignty is accompanied by what he referred to as ‘victimhood’. He stated that “what appears as the apotheosis of voluntarism is paradoxically accompanied by the cult victimization. The quest for sovereignty and the desire for autonomy are almost never accompanied by self-criticism (Mbembe, 2002: 5). As Mbembe stated, this ‘victimhood’ finds expression in persistent reference to “imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, dependency and more recently globalization”. (2000: 5). For Mbembe this is a feature of African discourse in general and it leads to a polemic relationship between Africa and the world, and ultimately to the feeling of self alienation among Africans.

At the core of Mbembe’s thesis, it would seem is the claim that it is Africanity that produces these discourses of victimhood, self alienation. It seems that Mbembe presents Enlightenment as antithetical to Africanity, which he believes is exclusionary. He stated that in Enlightenment discourse, “humanity is defined by its possession of a generic identity that is universal in essence and from which derives rights and values that can be shared by all. A common nature unites all human beings. It is identical in each of them, because reason is at its center” (2000:6).

Mafeje’s critique of Mbembe’s thesis starts with declaration that that “it is not apparent how phenomena such as "imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, dependency, and more recently, globalisation" can be lumped together and put on a one-dimensional scale and their persistence be attributed to a mental sclerosis that is peculiar to African scholars. Has not most of these been a preoccupation of the left universally since the middle of the 19th century? Only a poor philosopher or historian would not be cognisant of such a well-established fact. Therefore, Mbembe's supposition that these have come to constitute "African discourse in general" is born of philosophical and historical ignorance (Mafeje, 2000b: 1). Regarding the supposed self-alienation of Africans, Mafeje pointed out that the “idea of Africans being alienated from themselves is sociologically and anthropologically unfounded. In my thirty-six years in exile I have had the opportunity to mingle with a whole range of Africans and I have always been impressed by the extent to which they are not alienated from themselves, despite colonial imposition.(Mafeje, 2000:1). Rather Mafeje warned us that the supposed alienation of Africans from themselves is a ploy to make Africans less confident about themselves.
As we noted, Mbembe (2000) went to great length in accusing Africans of playing victims, he stated that Marxist and nationalist streams of thought are permeated by the tension between voluntarism and victimization. On this point, Mafeje stated, “Marxism believes in neither voluntarism nor victimization. According to dialectical materialism, far from being victimisation, class struggle is the motive force behind all known history and sets the parameters within which individuals as subjects of history collectively realise themselves. Secondly, Marxism is not "instrumentalist" because it conceives of material forces as social forces which are not blind but full of consciousness, whether true or false” (2000:2).

The immediate challenge faced by black South Africans after the fall of apartheid in 1994 was, among others, a need for black South Africans in particular to assert their being, their Africaness, which was denied through constitutional segregation. Apartheid defined black South Africans as second class citizens, sub-humans, and using different legislations (and other related mechanism) it sought to expunge black(s) identity, history and self confidence. Black South Africans were constitutionally prohibited from fully participating in social and economic activities, and in that process apartheid robbed black South Africans of the right to equal opportunity. Since the fall of apartheid there have been many attempts mainly by the government to restore the dignity and respect of black South Africans. Most notable of these are Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment. Both are aimed at redressing the injustices of the past. Alas, these noble attempts have faced mounting resistance and criticism mostly from white South Africans who ‘feel excluded’ from the new South Africa. Outside the sphere of government individuals and groups who have tried to assert their Africanity have also faced challenges from white formations who view blacks as advancing reverse racism. South African whites who for so long had treated the Africans as the ‘other’ now that the chickens have come to roost, they want the Africans to think of themselves as something other than what they think they are (Mafeje, 2000). They are depicting black South Africans as a group that wants to bring back apartheid. Forgetting that at “no stage did this imply a desire to oppress others: the underlying sentiment has always been self-liberation, at the present historical juncture, what has made Africanity appear otherwise is the political insecurity” of white settlers (Mafeje, 2000).

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14 See Pillay P (2013) To BEE or not to BEE? The DA’s dilemma, Mail and Guardian 11 Sep 2013. (Although it is not possible to make these issues of a generic White South Africans but as Pillay noted there is a race resistance to BEE.)
Not able to see that Africanity has nothing to do with skin colour but simply an assertion of African nationalism, some white South Africans have often accused blacks of being racist and by implication they have argued that Africanity is regressive. Mafeje (2000) pointed out that in Africa, only Southern African white settlers, who are the prime authors of racism, are preoccupied with colour and are unable to deal with their Africanity for they have persistently played ‘European’ to the extent that they unconsciously granted that they were aliens whereas blacks were ‘natives’. They have defined themselves as non African and therefore are unable to accept any project that wants to assert Africanity.

This proves that the denial of Africanity in South Africa continued way after the independence in most African countries. In the post apartheid era in South Africa white domination continued to be the major issue that remained opposed to Africanity in the African continent. However, post apartheid South Africa has produced many social contradictions. For example the idea of reconciliation is a contradiction in terms. How does one reconcile ‘things’ that were never one, moreover, the point about the problematic nature of reconciliation is that it places the burden of forgiveness on the victims (black South Africans) without a concommitant acknowledgement and reparation from white South Africa. This idea obscures social realities, mainly that political independence has not been complimented by economic uhu: many black South Africans are still economically excluded because of the history of apartheid. Thus solely focusing on political rights might create a clouded picture of post apartheid South Africa. This is “particularly true of those African academics that came from outside and had no first-hand experience of white-settler societies and mistook majority-rule for ‘independence’, as is known elsewhere in Africa (Mafeje, 2000). Although political power was transferred to the democratic government in 1994, economic power remained firmly in the hands of white South Africans. Even worse white South Africans continued to dominate in higher education institutions and ownership of media houses and use those platforms to portray themselves as victims of reverse apartheid. Government programmes such as BEE and Affirmative action, which sought to restore the dignity of Africans, are often referred to as racialist and exclusivist programmes that sought to undermine white South Africans. This is the case because; white South Africans refuse to understand that these programmes are merely a government attempt at asserting identity that

15Thus in South Africa universities, the debates about ‘alterity’ indigenous knowledge, endogeneity got delayed and not rooted as they may be in other parts parts of the African continent. In my undergraduate and post graduate studies at Rhodes University I have no reflection of curriculum that refered to these issses.
was denied, a restoration of the dignity of Africans. This is a project that rejects domination of any kind and therefore it is opposed to allowing others to dictate on Africans. However this should not be confused with Pan-Africanist project, which included blacks of African descent in the Diaspora (Mafeje, 2000).

As South Africa continues to struggle with its attempts at establishing common identity for all its citizens, under the ideal of *rainbow nation* there has to be an understanding that Africanity is pivotal in achieving that desired end goal. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that those African intellectuals who insist on Africanity do not think of it only as a necessary condition for resisting external domination but also as a necessary condition for instituting social democracy in Africa (Mafeje, 2000); the implications for post apartheid South Africa should be obvious. It is only when white South Africans stop perceiving themselves as Europeans who have settled in South Africa will they see the need accept as critical initiatives such as BEE in creating a common identity among South Africans.

White resistance to Africanity in South Africa has not been the only obstacle faced by those wanting to create a common identity for South Africans. Apartheid history remains a challenge. The education system under apartheid system dislocated South African academic curriculum from the rest of the continent. The most notable inclusion to the South African higher institutions curriculum is African studies. This is not found in most African Universities, it is an anomaly found in South African and some parts of Southern Africa where settlers settled in large numbers. Also, Africanity has to be about rejecting the idea of African studies, simply because of the understanding that to “study themselves, Africans do not need African Studies as a separate intellectual or political endeavour” (Mafeje, 2000: 109). This derives from the realisation that African studies are a product of Americans, “run by Americans for their purposes, good or bad”(Mafeje, 2000). As steps are taken to transform academic institutions in South Africa in order to reflect the realities of democratic society, the void that will be “created by the disappearance of African Studies ‘made in the USA’ will be filled by such African organizations as CODESRIA, OSSREA, AAPS, SAPES/SARPIS, CASAS, CAAS, (Mafeje, 2001). These are institutions that have for a long time been dedicated to cause of Africanity. South African scholars have to be in touch with the academic output of these institutions as they are attempting to Africanise their academic curriculum.
4.4. Mafeje’s critique of Anthropology and its ‘epistemology of alterity’.  

It was in the mid sixties, as Mafeje (2001) stated that he began to doubt the “validity of colonial anthropological categorization” (Mafeje, 2001: 28). It was during that time when he began to question the relevance of the usage of the word ‘tribe’ when reference is made to African ethnic and linguistic groups. He will go on to deconstruct the concept in his 1971 article The Ideology of Tribalism. However, Mafeje lays no claim to being the ‘father’ of deconstructionist; rather he locates its development to ‘North’ and mentions that the North “continues to predominate”. Mafeje (2001) ascribes to lack of foresight on the part of African anthropologists to the lack of ‘anticipatory deconstruction’ of colonial anthropology so as to guarantee a rebirth or transformation of anthropology” (2001: 30). This he says (2001: 30) “could be attributed to such factors as the intellectual hegemony of the North, the intellectual immaturity of African Anthropologists. Hence the “interrogation of northern perspectives on African Anthropology inevitably become part of the problematique. Socially and politically they are inescapable points of departure for any serious deconstructionist discourse from the South” (Mafeje, 1995c: 30). Thus at post independence, as his starting point to the deconstructionist agenda in anthropology, Mafeje (2001), thinks it is relevant to pose the following issues: “first is the self-identity and role of African anthropologist since independence. Second is the question of whether in the post-independence period there could be African Anthropology, without African Anthropologists. The third issue is whether or not any authentic representation by African Anthropologists would necessarily lead to the demise of Anthropology as is traditionally known” (Mafeje, 2001: 30).

Mafeje (2001) notes that in the North deconstructionist discourse in anthropology were led by British anthropologist and their American counterparts. In Britain, as noted by Mafeje, ‘eminent and leaders in the field’ took on the deconstructionist discourse and “in majority of cases the relationship between the supposed demise of anthropology and the end of colonialism was made explicit” (Mafeje, 2001: 31). The reason for this is that there was a thought that there is a relationship between colonialism and anthropology as an academic discipline. Indeed, as Maquet (1964), cited in Mafeje (2001), maintained the anthropologist was not only a member of the ruling white oligarch but also a representative of the European middle classes which were architects of colonialism. In addition, Levi-Strauss, cited by Mafeje as one of the adherence of colonial anthropology, “expressed appreciation for the growing hostility in developing countries towards anthropology, which he admitted has been
Mafeje (2001) observed that in America deconstructionist agenda was left to “younger generation of disaffected anthropologist” (2001:32), according to Mafeje, they were less “concerned about the survival of anthropology than its complicity in American imperialist domination and exploitation in the Third World” (2001:32). Their major concern was the association of anthropology and colonial demands. Gjessing (1968) cited by Mafeje, echoed Maquet (1964) and stated that anthropology had been serviceable to the dominant powers and that perspective was essentially that of the Western middle class. But it was Gough (1968) who declared that anthropology was the child of western imperialism. Echoing this sentiment, Mafeje (2001:37) stated that this (relationship between colonialism and anthropology) reached a climax during the Vietnamese War in which some of the anthropologist were involved as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents. Mafeje (2001) credits his article on Ideology and Tribalism (1970) and Magubane’s article (1971) A critical look at Indices Used in the Study of Social Change in Africa, as the example of African’s contribution to the early debates on the deconstruction of anthropology in Africa after independence. As Mafeje puts it, the political and ideological environment was hostile. They (colonial Anthropologist) were under pressure to account for themselves. They responded by being generally anti-colonial, writing anti-colonial Anthropology, and denounced structural-functionalism (1995:4). This trend marked the “decline of colonial anthropology in Africa” and the “ensuing atrophy of anthropology itself in Africa”. In Africa, Mafeje avowed, “Anthropology got identified with colonialism because of its object and epistemology of alterity. It was introduced by people whose professional interests were the same as those of the colonial administrators. The fact that the two shared the same structural position and often collaborated to perfect the desired system of political control made it impossible for Africans to distinguish between them, politically and ideologically (1995:4).

After independence, Mafeje proclaims “anthropology became the most controversial discipline in the social sciences” (Mafeje, 2001: 49). This dislike was not only confined to intellectuals, politicians also shared the same sentiment. Anthropology was perceived to be an instrument of colonialism and after the Second World War, “an imperialist tool” (Mafeje, 2001), to the point that “African government(s) put a permanent ban on it in favor of sociology and African Studies. In the new African universities anthropologist
got ostracized as unworthy relics from the past” (Mafeje, 2001: 49). Moreover, it was rejected from the view point of African nationalist “because anthropologist were (perceived to be) peddlers of tribalism, while for development theorist anthropology was not a modernizing science and, therefore a poor investment” (2001:49). This conditions forced African anthropologist to consider the feature of anthropology at post independence. In their attempt to resurrect anthropology, “far from making a rebirth of anthropology, they sounded like a post-mortem of anthropology as they use to know it before independence” (Mafeje, 2001: 54). Mafeje also found a problem with attempts to incorporate anthropology into “broader non-disciplinary social science organized around chosen themes” (2001:54), because he was convinced that “anthropology is the study of ethnography in a given cultural context… and African social scientist can make this essential dimension an integral part of his/her research (2001:54). Thus African anthropologists were called upon to jettison Anthropology entirely, “rather than anthropology” (2001:54). Mafeje believed that African scholars could indigenize social science and anthropology in particular because “ethnography is an end product of social texts authored by the people themselves. It is our duty to study and understand these in their true context. This implies intersubjective communication, which is not necessarily uncritical (Mafeje, 2001:63). This is different from the old Eurocentric view on ethnography, which maintained a high social esteem to the researcher and saw African communities as objects, and a fertile ground for research. To emphasis this difference Mafeje said the following:

“It should be clear that my concept of “ethnography” is radically different from that of the Northern theorists or conventional anthropologists. I do not write ethnography nor do I have any use for the term “ethnology”. “Ethnology” is a biological analogy dating back to the time of Westermarck whose main interest was to develop taxonomy of human societies according to their basic characteristics. This created a predisposition towards associating human types with particular ethnological types in the same way that in biology it is presumed that ontogeny breeds phylogeny. In the case of human societies not only does this implies fixed and closed systems but also has racist overtones. This is best exemplified by what happened in South Africa where Afrikaner ethnologists perfected a system of classification of African societies, which became a justification for the introduction of the notorious Bantustan system and the main
pillar of the racist Afrikaner volkekunde anthropology. This argument might appear not to apply to seemingly innocent systems of classification such as dividing African peoples into tribes or dividing African political systems into acephalous and centralized types. Once again, one of my readers found my adversity to taxonomic categories incomprehensible (Mafeje, 2001:63).

This conviction made Mafeje (2001) to acknowledge the subject studied not merely as objects in knowledge making but as knowledge makers in their own right. Thus anthropology is no longer a “study of primitive or culture, the emphasis is now on ‘ethnography’ between fieldworker and his/her informants so on to eschew the problem of ‘alterity’ which characterized colonial anthropology” (Mafeje, 1997: 6-7). Gordon stated, “whereas “scientific anthropology was the Western moment on distinguishing European man as man through study of the so-called lesser men, philosophical anthropology became the Africana moment if critically engaging the human being through so called lesser beings struggle for their humanity. Such a struggle took many forms, including engagements with ontological questions of ‘being’ – for example, essence, necessity, contingency, and possibility – and teleological questions of where humanity should be going -for example, liberation, humanization, revolution, freedom” (Gordon, 2002:52)

The basis of Mafeje’s critique of Moore’s book Africa and Anthropology (1994) are largely the same as his critique of anthropology broadly, mainly the epistemology of alterity in anthropology. The main supposition of Moore (1994) is that those who are dedicated to the deconstruction of anthropology and its epistemology of alterity at post-independence suffer from ‘colonial mentality while she claimed “these connections between anthropology and colonial enterprise become the subject of considerable invective in the 1960s and 1970s” (Cited from Mafeje, 1995). Mafeje (1995:10) stated that Moore pours scorn on Africans’ hostility to colonial anthropology and thinks that such feelings are irrelevant in post colonial era. This does not only demonstrate Moore’s colonial mentality, in terms of arrogating toherselfthe right to tell Africans what they should or should not be concerned about. Italso shows that at post-colonial Africa, the threat of colonial Anthropologist is omnipresent.

Mafeje charged that “Moore maintains the colonial epistemology of subjects and objects and sees Africa as a laboratory for testing theories, which could not be tested in the civilized
world. This is reminiscent of the 19th century evolutionist” (Mafeje, 2001:58). Mafeje (1995) stated that the relationship between colonial Anthropologist and African communities, which they were meant to study largely took the model of “superordination and subordination” thus everywhere they, the colonial anthropologists, were Nwana Mukubwa or Mama by virtue of their skin colour in a colonial setting. They commanded attention and services of natives at will’ (Mafeje, 1995:3). Those relations were used by colonial anthropologist to treat African communities in which they were gathering data as ‘others’ and objects. Among other things, it is this relationship that maintained the epistemology of alterity. In her book, as Mafeje noted Moore suffers from the same arrogance of treating Africans as objects of curiosity. In a “book that purports to be historical guide to anthropology one would have expected that even these bastard children of anthropology would be mentioned as authors in their own rights. But none of them features in the text…their omission is tendentious” (Mafeje, 1995: 5).

Concerning Moore’s attempt at writing about ‘African anthropology’. Mafeje pointed out the following (on both ‘African Studies’ and ‘African Anthropology’), “Euro-Americans can easily talk about and write about African Studies’ but not African Anthropology” (Mafeje, 1995: 1). This is the case because African studies in Africa are a creation of Western countries whereas the African Anthropology could among other things refer to a specific claim by Africans (1995:1).

4.5. Conclusion.

This chapter has engaged with Mafeje’s Afro-centric approach to the study of African science. It argues that although he is not alone in insisting on Afro-centric approach to social science, scholars such as Asante and Magubane, to mention just a few, have concerned themselves with Afro-centric scholarship, it seems that Mafeje made it his life mission. Moreover, the chapter has presented Mafeje’s deconstruction of anthropology and its epistemology of alterity in post-independence Africa, and we argued that is an antithesis to misrepresentation of Africa. A lot can be garnered from his theoretical rigour and the special gift of being able to transcend different academic disciplines. His many debates that have been presented in this chapter are testimony to his willingness to challenge western supposition on African society, even if such misrepresentations are presented by Africans.
Chapter Five

Mafeje’s critique of dual economy and its relevance today.

5.1. Introduction.

In the early 2000’s dual economy debate dominated the public discourse, the debate was initially introduced by the then South African president, Thabo Mbeki. As we will demonstrate in the pages that follow, like most ‘dualist’, Mbeki assumed disconnect between the two sectors of the economy, one ‘modern’, while the other is ‘traditional’. So important were the discussions on two economies that in 2007, Patrick Bond edited a journal, Special issue of the University of South Africa Development Studies Journal Africanus, titled *transcending two economies- renewed debates in South African political economy*. In this chapter we argue neither the original formulation of the argument by Mbeki or the critique as in the collection of essay by Bond did Mafeje’s original article or ideas on dual economy feature. That could only be a result of either ignorance about Mafeje's works in this area or deliberate erasure.

5.2. The history of dualism in Europe.

According to Cain (1976) the dual economy approach as a doctrine developed from social policy issues. The leading policy issue was the need to understand the persistence of poverty and social inequalities, the continuation of large racial and gender inequalities in western societies. Similarly, Silverman (1992) traces the development of dual economy doctrine to the French physiocrats. He proclaimed that the ‘physiocrats’ envisaged a system with two sectors, for example, a productive, agriculture sector, and a small non-agricultural sector, which provided services and artisanal goods to the ruling class. To make his point, Silverman (1992) noted that Richard (1815) and Marx (1857) suggested that the agricultural sector was static and ascribed the dynamic status to the small, but growing industrial sector (Silverman, 1992:2). Hence the definition of dual economy mirrors the ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ binary, with the urban area viewed as a centre, while the rural is perceived to be periphery. Using the centre-periphery analogy, Averitt (1968) defined dual economy as “the new economy, is composed of firms large in size and influence. Its organizations are corporate and bureaucracy, production process are vertically integrated through ownership.

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16As it will be mentioned in pages that follow, Mafeje locates the development of dual economic growth to western societies, mentions leading scholars such as: Arthur Lewis, John Fei and Gustavo Rains
and control of critical raw material, suppliers and product distributors, its activities are diversified into many industries, regions and nations….firms in the large economy serve national and international markets, using technologically progressive systems of production and distribution…..We shall call this network of firms the ‘centre’. The other economy is populated by relatively small firms, these enterprises are the ones usually dominated by a single individual or family. The firm’s sale realized in restricted markets… techniques of production and marketing are rarely as up to date as those in the centre… let us designate the firms in the small economy by the term ‘periphery’ (Averitt, 1968: 7).

Hodson and Kaufman (1982, 728) mentions that many different names have been used to define two sector economy (dual economy), for example, he mentions binary concepts such as ‘centre/periphery’, ‘core/ periphery’, monopoly/ competitive’ concentrated/unconcentrated. While there have been different concepts used to define dual economic model. Hodson and Kaufman (1982) avow that there are widely “agreed characteristics, such as, the core firms are monopolist, while periphery firms are competitive” (1982:728). He further notes that “an important aspect of the dual economy model is the specification of a dependency relationship between the two sectors. The theory assumes that, the rural economy is dependent on agriculture and technologically backwards, while urban sector is assumed to be industrial and technologically advanced. Thus, the core exploits periphery firms in a number of ways. Firms in the core extract monopoly profits from the periphery firms to which they sell, and they demand preferred customer rebates from their suppliers. Indeed, many periphery firms exist as satellites of the centre firms which are their only or main customers” (Hodson and Kaufman, 728-729:1982). This does not only assume those peripheries are small and support the firms at the core but also proclaims that the very survival of the periphery firms is dependant of core firms. Silverman (1992) points out that “in the beginning a majority of the total population works in the agricultural sector while the size of the industrial sector is relatively small. In the course of the successful development, the contributions of both sectors to output and employment are reversed” (Silverman, 1992: 2).

Hodson and Kaufman (1982) noted that, dualist theorist rely heavily on Marx’s conception of capitalist dynamic of concentration and centralization. According to this dynamic, Hadson andKaufman (1982) observed, capitalist are able to accumulate capital through the extraction of surplus value from labour and from competitions among themselves. Thus, overtime, capital becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of the capitalists. Also overtime, there
are periodic economic crises brought about by overproduction and under consumption of commodities. During these crises, many businesses fail and are bought out at the devalued rate by other other capitalists. This leads to the “concentration of capital in the hands of progressively fewer capitalists” (Hodson and Kaufman, 1982:729).

Hodson and Kaufman (1982) further argue that this dynamic led to the development of two distinct sectors. The “core sector arose from those firms in which the capital becomes increasingly concentrated and centralized while periphery sectors consists of the remaining small competitive firms. Core firms continue to grow not only by buying out businesses within their product line but also through horizontal and vertical integration” (Hodson and Kaufman, 1982: 729) While on the other hand Galbraith (1967) placed high premium on the utilization of technology and long term planning as the main distinguishing factor between the two sectors affect the ability of the firm to survive economic crises.

Hodson and Kaufman (1982) argue that there is a link between dual economy and dual labour markets. They substantiated this argument by stating that “corresponding to the core and periphery sectors respectively are two separate labour markets, a primary labour market and a secondary labour market” (Hodson and Kaufman, 1982: 729) and O’ Connor (1973) accentuated this point by pointing out that employment is stable in the core sector of the economy. While the same is not true for the periphery sector of the economy, which at times is characterized by casualisation. Bibb and Form (1977) raised the general condition of work as among the major distinguishing factors between the two sectors. They argued that jobs in the primary market are generally ‘good’jobs with high rewards and jobs in the secondary market are bad jobs with low rewards. Moreover, Hodson and Kaufman (1982) cited (Reich et al, 1973) as having argued that “there is a higher return for education in the core sector/primary market”. While Lewis (1954: 527) acknowledged that the major characteristics of the dual economy models is that the model proclaims that there are “two sectors, modern or capitalist and traditional or subsistence (1954; 527). He further claimed “although these sectors need not be identified exclusively with the urban-manufacturing industrial sector on the one hand and the rural agricultural sector on the other hand, most discussions on the dual economy do simplify the model in this way” (Lewis,1954: 527). Lewis further noted that capital and labour are common factors in both sectors; however he notes that land is a major factor in traditional sector.
The doctrine of dual economy has mostly been associated with developing countries. This view is shared by Itagaki (1968) who asserted that dual economy has been referred to in one sense or the other, in discussions on theories and political economic development of the underdeveloped or developing countries (Itagaki, 1982:143). This approach has been used to assess the challenges of development or lack thereof in developing countries. Itagaki (1982) further points that the problem of dual economy is mostly encountered in the formerly colonized countries, in the “countries underdeveloped due to colonialism” (Itagaki, 1982:144). Moreover, he pointed out that the problem of dualism also permeates in the field of politics, society, and culture (Itagaki, 1982:144). For Itagaki “the problem of dual economy is on one hand the problem of economic development of underdeveloped countries, while on the other, the implication is that this is the problem of modernization including economic development and as such is related to the problem of the development of society as a whole (Itagaki, 1982: 144).

According to Furnivall (1939) “there is a plural society, with different sectors of the community living side by side, but separately within the same political unit” (Furnivall, 1939:446). Again the emphasises here is on existence of different sectors side by side but are said to be disconnected from each other. For Furnivall (1939) racial segregation is the basis of what he refers to as plural society. In some instances this then becomes the basis of a dual economy. He believes that “racial segregation is meaningful because it becomes the basis of differentiation not only in terms of ethnicity, language, religion, morals and customs but also because each section of the community performs a different economic function along racial lines in economic fields as well (Furnivall, 1939:45). As such, Furnivall (1939: 306) argues that ‘plural society “lacks common social will.”’ In addition, Itagaki (1982) concluded that since there is no social need of a society as a whole, which is shared by all members and there is no national consensus, each section of society sticks to its own narrow point of view without trying to understand those of the others’ (Itagaki, 1982: 50). It is important to present Peter Ekeh’s thesis on ‘two publics’. In his 1975 paper titled Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A theoretical statement, Ekeh stated that unlike in the west, in Africa there are two publics instead of one. According to Ekeh (1975) the existence the two publics is the by-product of colonialism.

Ekeh (1975) characterized the two publics as follows:
The distinction between the public and private realms as used over the centuries has acquired a peculiar Western connotation, which may be identified as follows: the private realm and the public realm have a common moral foundation. Generalized morality in society informs both the private realm and the public realm. That is, what is considered morally wrong in the private realm is also considered morally wrong in the public realm. Similarly, what is considered morally right in the private realm is also considered morally right in the public realm. For centuries, generalized Christian beliefs have provided a common moral fountain for the private and the public realms in Western society. There are anomic exceptions, of course. For instance, the strong appeal of Banfield's *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* is that it provides a striking case of an exception in which the same morality does not govern the private and the public realms. But this is a case where the exception proves the rule. Banfield's (1958) observation of amoral politics in the southern Italian village has drawn so much attention precisely because it violates the Western norm of politics without reproach (Ekeh, 1975: 92).

He went on to argue that “there is a private realm in Africa. But this private realm is differentially associated with the public realm in terms of morality. In fact there are two public realms in postcolonial Africa, with different types of moral linkages to the private realm. At one level is the public realm in which primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments influence and determine the individual's public behavior. I shall call this the primordial public because it is closely identified with primordial groupings, sentiments, and activities, which nevertheless impinge on the public interest. The primordial public is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm. On the other hand, there is a public realm which is historically associated with the colonial administration and which has become identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa. It is based on civil structures: the military, the civil service, the police, etc. Its chief characteristic is that it has no moral linkages with the private realm. I shall call this the civic public. The civic public in Africa is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private realm and in the primordial public” (Ekeh, 1975: 92).

Ekeh says these two publics find expression through what he termed ‘cadre of colonial administration’ (Ekeh, 1975:93) mostly drawn from the bourgeoisie class in Europe and the African bourgeoisie class born out of colonial experience (Ekeh, 1975: 93). He believes that the emergence
of two publics in Africa is directly linked to this class. He adds that ‘ordinary African’ was the target of the intellectual workmanship of the group in its formation of ideologies (1975: 93). He defined bourgeoisie to mean “newness of a privileged class which may wield much power, but have little authority; which may have a lot of economic influence, but enjoy little political acceptance” (1975:93)

He stated that by “'ideologies' he refersto unconscious distortions or perversions of truth by intellectuals in advancing points of view that favor or benefit the interests of particular groups for which the intellectuals act as spokesmen (1975:94). He mentioned the following as part of theses ideologies through which western bourgeois used to dominate Africa i) Colonial Ideologies of Legitimation ii) The Administrative cost of colonialism to Europeans iii) The lack of contributions by Africans to the building of Africa, and iv) Inter-tribal feuds.

He defined the African Bourgeois Ideologies of Legitimation as follows:

The colonial ideologies have had a major impact on Africans. The absence of a strong traditional ethos, for instance in the form of a pan-African religion, made Africans easy targets of these ideologies. But there was considerable variation in the spread of their effects on Africans. The Western educated African was a greater victim of their intensity than the non-literate African. The purpose behind the colonial ideologies, wrought by colonial administrators and missionaries, was to legitimate an alien domination of Africans; African bourgeois ideologies were formed to achieve two interrelated goals. First, they were intended to serve as weapons to be used by the African bourgeois class for replacing the colonial rulers; second, they were intended to serve as mechanisms for legitimating their hold on their own people. Both types of ideologies were largely directed at the African masses. However, in terms of timing, the first set was used during colonialism and was an attack on alien rulers. I shall call these set anti-colonial ideologies. The second set of ideologies is more directly related to the issue of legitimation and is involved in post-colonial politics in Africa. Its appearance coincided with the departure of the alien colonial rulers. I shall call these post-colonial ideologies of legitimation. (1) Anti-colonial Ideologies. What I call anti-colonial ideologies here refer to the interest-begotten reasons and strategies of the Western educated African bourgeoisie
who sought to replace the colonial rulers. Anti-colonialism did not in fact mean opposition to the perceived ideals and principles of Western institutions. On the contrary, a great deal of anti-colonialism was predicated on the manifest acceptance of these ideals and principles, accompanied by the insistence that conformity with them indicated a level of achievement that ought to earn the new educated Africans the right to the leadership of their country. Ultimately, the source of legitimacy for the new African leadership has become alien. Anticolonialism was against alien colonial personnel but glaringly pro foreign ideals and principles. I shall now discuss some of the ideologies used to justify this form of anti-colonialism: African high standards. In every post-colonial African nation, Western educated Africans, that is the African bourgeoisie, have bent over backwards to show that their standards of education and administration areas good as those of their former colonisers. The point of reference in such demonstrations is to prove that they are the 'equals', but never the betters, of their former rulers. At least if they judge their standards of education and administration not to be as high as those prevailing in the capitals of the former colonizing nations, they rue the fact of their 'low' standards and make attempts to raise them. Nowhere does one come across the statement that the prevailing standards, say, in England are not high enough or too high for the problems in, say, Nigeria. These 'high' standards are invariably defined in terms of the prevailing, that is ordinary, standards in the former colonizing nations. This ideology of African high standards had its origin in the fight for independence. Most African leaders in the fight for independence boasted to their followers that they were as qualified as the English or the French colonisers; that their rule could be as 'democratic' as that in England or France; that Africans could attain as high a degree of efficiency in bureaucracy as that in Britain or France, etc. In his manner of speaking the English language and of pronouncing English words, the Nigerian 'been-to', for instance, wants to demonstrate to the common man that he is as good as an Englishman in the use of the English language. There is logic to these over-zealous attempts by the African bourgeoisie to prove the equal, but never the better, of the former colonisers. They are a message addressed to
the masses that educated Africans have attained the level of the colonisers and therefore can replace them permanently. It is not required to prove oneself the better of the former colonisers to do so, since their behaviors represented the very best in the view of Africans (Ekeh 1975: 100-1).

The dual economy model seems to assume a diminishing significance of the high levels of labour in rural agricultural sector, while the urban manufacturing sector is expected to grow increasingly with time. In order to make up with the shortages of the labour force, the agricultural sector will employ more technology to drive agricultural productivity. The linkage between the two sectors arises from the fact that according to dual economic model “successful development depends on industrialization and that, in turn, depends crucially on innovative role of the agricultural sector, for example, the entrepreneurial spirit of the rural landowners who must produce surpluses for manufacturing. Equally important for the successful growth of the economy is sufficient capital accumulation and/or innovation in the industrial sector to absorb unemployed (or underemployment) people from the agricultural sector” (Silverman, 1992: 3).

Silverman (1992: 4) listed the following as the major elements criticism of dual economy and it is important to list them

a) Dual economy models do not assume economic rationality with regard to agricultural employment levels but also do assume rationality of decision making with reference to agricultural landlords investing surplus in the industrial sector.

b) A two sector model is too limited for analyses of the many problems related to development such as modernization, growth and structural change.

c) The model presents the dualistic conditions of developing economies as static with reference to degrees of interdependence, factors of immobility, and asymmetry which are fixed at the time the model was designed and do not change in the course of development.

d) The model assumes that industrial as well as agricultural labour markets clear instantaneously and, therefore, all unemployment is voluntary.”
5.3. The rise of ‘first’ ‘second’ economy divide in South Africa.

An article titled “meeting the challenges of second economy” that appeared in August 2003, in the ANC’s magazine, ANC Today. Penned by the then president of the ANC and South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, the article inaugurated and brought to the fore the debate about the ‘second economy’ in South Africa. In order to do justice to Mbeki’s thesis, it is important to rehash it here in detail. Mbeki proclaimed that “our country is characterized by two parallel economies, the first and the second. The first is modern industrial, mining, agricultural, financial and services sector of the economy, that every day, becomes ever more integrated in the global economy...produces the bulk of our country’s wealth, and is integrated within the global economy...the second economy (or the marginalized economy) is characterized by underdevelopment, contributes little to Growth Domestic Product (GDP), contains a big percentage of our rural and urban poor, is structurally disconnected from both the first and global economy and is incapable of self generating growth and development” (Mbeki:2003).

It is important to briefly trace the economic policy context in which Mbeki developed the idea of a dual economy. Gelb (2006) believes that by 2003 it was evident that Growth, Employment, Redistribution (GEAR) policy, however successful it was in guiding fiscal policy, had failed as a job creation and redistribution strategy. The persistent poverty while the economy was growing becomes increasingly difficult to explain. Du Toit and Nerves,(2007:4) argued that this was the context in which Mbeki’s 2003 dual economy doctrine was advanced; it “played an important role in reframing the terms of official thinking about growth, poverty, race and national identity” (Du Toit and Nerves, 2007: 4). This is consistent with (Faull, 2005) who argued that Mbeki tended to portray socio-economic inequalities as inequalities between two nations. Mbeki’s argument, is similar to Sparks (2003) who avowed that South Africa suffers from double-decker economy, the idea that there are two economies existing side by side.

Mbeki, like most classic dualist, believed that there is a disconnect between the ‘first’ and the ‘second’ economy. He believed that the “development of the marginalized economy (second economy) requires infusion of capital and other resources by the democratic state to ensure the integration of this economy within the development sector” (Mbeki, 2003: 2). He goes on to point that, the disconnect between the first and second economy is (maintained) because the interventions we make with regard to the first economy are not necessarily relevant for the second economy (Mbeki, 2003). To make his point, Mbeki (2003) said it is sometimes
argued that higher economic growth rates, of 6 percent and above, would, on their own, lead to the reduction of the levels of unemployment in our country. This is the proposition about an automatic so-called trickledown effect that would allegedly impact on the third world economy as a result of a stronger first world economy. None of this is true (Mbeki, 2003: 2). However, in the same article Mbeki states that “our first world economy has greater capacity to produce the resources we need to make an impact on the third world economy” (Mbeki, 2003: 3).

Mbeki took it a step further, and stated, “the global economy is characterized by this (division) into two worlds, the first world and the third world, the North and the South, one rich and developed, and the other poor and underdeveloped. Our country contains this phenomenon within its boundaries, resulting in the coexistence of two nations side by side, one rich and developed, and the other poor and underdeveloped (Mbeki, 2003:3). However, unlike classic dualist, Mbeki does not make the urban-rural divide his departure point. For him, these two worlds do co-exist in the urban, as poor and rich. Mbeki’s analysis is supported by Aliber (2006) who argued, “three hundred years of colonialism, and fifty of internal colonialism had hard wired a duality into the system, whereby two domains co-existed, on the one hand, a globally integrated world of population, exchange and consumption and on the other, a constrained world of informality, poverty and marginalization. These two worlds may be conceptualized as the first and second economies” (Aliber, 2003: 3). Devey, Skinner and Valodia (2006: 2) pointed out that in some ways; the term seems to have a somewhat radicalized logic.

In emphasizing how the concept of dual economy dominated public policy discourse in South Africa in the early 2000’s, Faull (2005) mentioned that the concept has become stump material for politics, journalists, activist and academics alike and an integral component of contemporary political jargon. In 2007, Patrick Bond edited a special issue of the University of South Africa Development Studies journal, Africanus; it was titled Transcending two economies- renewed debates in South African political economy. As the title suggest, the journal was dedicated to interrogating two economies debate. Relevant to our current work is the contribution made to the journal by Du Toit and Nerves, In search of South Africa’s second economy. It is important to paraphrase their conclusion. They argued that, “since 2003, South African economic policy was about persistent of poverty, specifically “the notion that poor people stay poor because they are located in the second economy, that is
disconnected from the mainstream first world economy” (Du Tiot and Nerves, 2007: 2). Using research data collected in Eastern Cape Town, Mount Frere, and the urban township, Khayelitsha, Du toit and Nerves (2007) were convinced, that “rather than being structurally disconnected from the formal economy, formal and informal, mainstream and marginal activities are often thoroughly interdependent, supplementing or subsidizing one another in complex ways” (Du toit and Nerves, 2007: 2). This analysis denounced the fallacy of dual economy in South Africa. As it will be demonstrated in the following pages, Mafeje presented a much more theoretically grounded thesis against dual economy doctrin, but more importantly Mafeje’s work on the dual economy thesis (though on South Africa) did not feature in the debate.

5.4. Presenting Mafeje’s critique of dual economy.

The underlying reasons for Mafeje’s critique of dual economy are partly based on his critique for development theory broadly. He maintains in “development theory in Africa and elsewhere is definite liberal determinism whose peculiarity is not only to assume that underdeveloped countries will necessarily follow the capitalist route to development but also to treat western bourgeois societies as alpha and omega of development” (Mafeje, 1978: 47). Thus, western societies have arrogated to themselves the right to ‘guide others’ on how to develop. Throughout his work, Mafeje challenged this arrogance, believing that the material conditions and lived experience in the third world countries places them in a position to pave their own road to development and not be trapped in western doctrine of development. As such, as Mafeje proclaimed, “the underdeveloped countries are in a position to make a contribution by reflecting more closely on their own experience which is already raising some important question marks about the logic of history” (1978: 48). It is on these bases that dual economy doctrine did not escape Mafeje’s criticism. As previously noted, dualism in economic growth has been used a lot in an attempt to explain underdeveloped country’s challenges especially those that are related to the patterns of economic development.

Mafeje (1978) traces the origins of dual theories of development to the works of Arthur Lewis, John Fei and Gustavo Rains. It must be added that by and large these are scholars from the North, except for Lewis who is from the Caribbean. He went on to capture the fundamental basis of the dual economy as advanced by the above mentioned dual economy

17The reference to the geographic area where the classic dualist come from is not simply unwarranted difference between people but as it has been mentioned earlier in this thesis, Northern scholars, wittingly or un-consciously tend to generalize about their societal experience, and assume that such experience are universal.
pioneers. It is worth quoting Mafeje at length in this regard: “descriptively, they posit an existence of two sectors in underdeveloped countries which are governed by different economic laws. These are the so-called “traditional’/subsistence and ‘modern/capitalist’ sectors. The former is supposed to be characterized by surplus labour, unchanging production techniques and zero net savings. In contrast, efficient labour utilization and high savings rates are believed to be the diagnostic feature of the modern sector. Within this basic schema growth is construed as gradual shift from the ‘traditional/subsistence’ sector to ‘modern/capitalist’ sector. In the transitional period it is ascribed to the subsistence sector the role of labour supplier and to the ‘capitalist’ sector the role of the creator of employment opportunities through progressive capital investments, accumulation and introduction of advanced technologies” (Mafeje; 1978: 48-49). The above are not merely the supposition of the early dualist theorists but become the point of departure of most dual economic beliefs.

Having stated the above, it is important to quote in detail Mafeje’s questions relating to dualist supposition because they form the basis of his critique of dual economy model.“i) “What is the time sequence between industrial expansion and the drawing away of surplus labour from the ‘traditional’ sector ii) In land surplus economies such as the African ones what is to be understood by the term surplus labour? In distorted underdeveloped economies what constitutes ‘efficient’ utilization of labour? iii) What is the objective function of the hypothetical two sectors? For example, with restricted expansion of modern sector in underdeveloped countries in relation to labour supply, what are the processes of social reproduction of labour? iv) What is the relationship between technological growth and labour? vi) Finally, what is the function of unindustrialized economies in global system or, alternatively, what are the limits of the theory of comparative advantage? (Mafeje, 1978:48).

In rejecting the dual economy thesis, Mafeje (1978) used East, Central and Southern Africa as his field of reference. In the following pages we will present some of his arguments about the above mentioned geographic areas. In South Africa, Mafeje (1978) maintained that “economic integration is an accomplished fact, despite the Apartheid state artificially maintaining what are variously calls tribal homelands” (Mafeje, 1978: 49). To maintain the artificial disconnect between rural and urban, Africans were required to pay the so-called poll tax and hut tax. Between 1848 and 1936-7 through a series of acts they were deprived of control over 87 percent of the land In South Africa” (Mafeje, 1978:50).
This led to over population of the rural areas and subsequently that rural areas had deteriorated into slums (1978: 50). Nonetheless, “the black rural population earned more than two thirds of their income by migrating to the cities” (Mafeje, 1978: 50). Through a system of pass laws, they were allowed in the cities for work purposes and return to ‘reserves.’ According to Mafeje (1978) this process turned to “dormitory suburbs’, an industrial proletariat domiciled in the country side (1978:50). The implications, he believed, is that the “urban-industrial areas, far from supplementing rural incomes through remittances, are holding the rural areas to ransom” (Mafeje, 1978: 50-51). Thus, Mafeje concluded that in South Africa it is the countryside, through labour migration and measurable financial exploitations, which supports the cities and not the other way around” (1978: 50).

Regarding the then Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) and Zambia Mafeje (1978) made the following observations. From the onset, he stated that both Zimbabwe and Zambia had similar features to South Africa. For example, although there was never any wholesale dispossession of Africans in Zimbabwe, there was a demand for agricultural land by white farmers and the demand for labour by the British” (Mafeje, 1978: 52), which placed the rural communities in a similar situation as in South Africa. He argued that labour demand in the cities, had led to the gradual erosion of the traditional African economy in Rhodesia (Mafeje, 1978: 53). Further compounding the demand for labour in Rhodesia was the “flow of international capital into Rhodesia, the consequent expansion of industry, commerce as well as agriculture intensified the demand for African labour” (1978: 53).

The major difference between Zambia and its neighboring countries is the fact that “Zambia has never experienced any large-scale alienation of land to white settlers” (Mafeje, 1978: 53). Thus a combination of unproductive land and taxation almost made migration for wage labour inevitable. Hence Zambia was not an exception to the general phenomenon of migration. consequently, Zambia, “like in the settler territories further South, the development of the rural sector has long been subjected to the interests of foreign capital in towns and mines in particular” (Mafeje, 1978: 55), therefore, the urban sector developed at the expense of the rural sector. Mafeje (1978) explicitly concluded that in Zambia, the “exploitation of the countryside by the urban sector is implicit and overall exploitation of the local manpower and resources is the inevitable objective of international capital” (Mafeje,: 1978:57).

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Assessing East African countries, mainly Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, Mafeje made the following conclusion: unlike “Southern Africa, East Africa had no big mining industries and with the exception of Kenya, never had any serious white settler problem” (Mafeje, 1978: 57). Moreover, he observed that East Africa was more backward industrially than Southern Africa, “with the industrial sector contributing hardly 20 percent of the GDP in all the countries (1978, 57). While agriculture was serving foreign market through exports, as Mafeje (1978) pointed out “our submission here is that the East African economies have functioned, and have been made to function, like plantation economies. In them the whole process of agricultural production has been geared to cash-crop production for an external market (Mafeje, 1978:63), placing the east African countries in similar position as their southern neighbours.

Contrary to the supposed complete detachment and disconnect between rural and urban, as advanced by dualist, Mafeje (1978) was convinced that, the “village is visibly different and removed from the city or the plantation but its members are not. They are agents of the processes they neither willed nor have come to comprehend fully (Mafeje, 1978: 64). To emphasize this point, Mafeje cited Amin, who said the following:

“Under these circumstances, the traditional society was distorted to the point of being unrecognizable, it lost its autonomy, and its main function was to produce for the world market under conditions which, because they impoverished it, deprived the members of any prospects radical modernization. This traditional society was not, therefore, in transition to modernity, as a dependant society it was complete, peripheral, and hence at the dead end. It consequently retained certain ‘traditional’ appearances which constituted its only means of survival. The Africa of colonial trade economy includes all the subordinations/domination relationship between this pseudo-traditional society, integrated into the world system, and the central capitalist economy which shaped and dominated it” (Amin, 1972: 520-21).

Whereas on the other hand, the classical dualist, as quoted by Mafeje use the “concept ‘dualism’ to describe a society in which, owing to internally generated revolutionary changes, an antiquated mode of production and social organization was being superseded by a new and superior one” (Mafeje,1978: 64). Moreover, Mafeje (1978) further noted that “the classical economist were concerned to comprehend the origin and use of economic surplus to distinguish between productive and unproductive labour and to analyze relations
of social production (1978: 65). According to Mafeje (1978), to make their point, classic economist used the binary of ‘feudal society and emerging capitalism’, and they concluded on the expansion of capitalism at the expense of feudalism (Mafeje, 1978:66). Not only that, according to Mafeje, they ‘saw disappearance of feudalism as the natural outcome of the genesis of capitalism, which they believed was an objectively superior mode of production (Mafeje, 1978: 66). He goes on to note that the ‘laws’ of capitalism made for the destruction of the feudal society with all that went with it in the form of modes of production and social division of labour. Thus, classic economist did not view feudalism as the necessary transitional stage to capitalism, instead, Mafeje (1978) notes, that for them, capitalism was not contingent upon accommodative behavior on the part of feudalism. It is for this reason that Mafeje concluded that “classical theories are basically not transition theories but naturalistic and synchronic theories” (Mafeje, 1978:67).

Questioning the thesis of the classical dualist theorist, Mafeje posed the following questions:

a) Is the logic of internal capitalist transformation in Western Europe applicable to present day underdeveloped countries?

b) Is Adam Smith’s natural movement from feudalism to capitalism or Stuarrt Mill’s historic evolution’ repeatable in these countries?

c) Has the ‘absolute rationality’ of modern capitalism been demonstrated in the manner of the classical theories?

d) Can it still be suppose that development (‘progresses’) is transition to capitalism?

e) In modern times has capitalism, apart from being dominant, been exclusive in the classical sense?(Mafeje, 1978: 67).

Mafeje believes that these questions challenge the basic supposition of classical economist in so far as dual economy doctrine is applied in the developing world. The empirical evidence presented using Southern, Central and East African countries have demonstrated that “not only was the level of development of material forces at the time with Europe out of step with capitalist development, but also the historical sequence was reversed” (Mafeje, 1978: 67).

To drive his argument to its logical conclusion, Mafeje (1978) made the following conclusion about the supposed transient nature of dual economy:
Introduced capitalist production preceded the specific socio-economic formations with which it is now supposed to be in competition or conflict. It was a social emergence produced by external forces. Apart from economic imposition, the special requirements for control and regimentation of the indigenous population under colonialism gave rise to special social formations which are not attributable to tradition. South Africa might be an extreme living example but it is certainly not unique. Under the circumstance dual theories become a mere apology and not an explanation. In underdeveloped countries, the question of the exclusiveness of the capitalist mode of production over time is neither a foregone conclusion nor its blockage a problem of traditionalism. The fact that capitalism in its external expansion, unlike in its internal development, has not been able to sweep aside certain traditional institutions and modes of production points to a serious historical contradiction and not transient natural phenomenon (Mafeje, 1978:66)

Most importantly, Mafeje noted a fallacious position of ‘dual theorist’ as “seeing contradictions between moments of a colonial social formations as contradiction between two social systems, capitalism and traditionalism” (Mafeje, 1978:66). To express the said contradictions, concepts such as ‘traditional society’, ‘traditional sector’, ‘subsistence sector’ and ‘modern sector’ were developed. Interestingly, in binary view of development, development is presented as “gradual absorption of the traditional into modern sector” (Mafeje, 1978:66), also important to note is the fact that it is supposed that the modern is capitalist. Mafeje (1978) further notes that dualist theorist blame the failures of capitalism on traditional society, a surprising fact from theorist that purports transition.

For Mafeje, dualist theorist in underdeveloped countries have not been able to prove their basic supposition, mainly the, “applicability of the inner logic of capitalism in underdeveloped countries, its ‘absolute rationality’ or progressiveness in our time, nor the practical and theoretical validity of the supposition that development is transition to capitalism” (Mafeje, 1978: 67). A question that validates Mafeje’s point is why a domination of capitalist policies in developing countries has not had the desired results, development. Mafeje (1978) believes that in underdeveloped countries, “the primary contradiction is not between traditional society and sector and modern or capitalist sector
but between capitalism as a mode of production and its social formations in peripheral countries” (Mafeje, 1978: 68).

5.5. Mafeje on dual economy and lessons for South Africa.

We will briefly focus on the two main tenets of ‘dualism’, mainly that there are two sectors in a single economy that exist side by side but disconnected. Dualists term these sectors the periphery/traditional and core/industrial. As it has been mentioned before, dualist will have us believe that the traditional sector is backward and that the core is advanced. Firstly, Mafeje proved that contrary to the belief of detachment between the supposed two sectors, the rural dwellers are the agents and catalyst for the development that is pushing industrialization, and that the rural communities are not the burden to the ‘core’ economy as dualist will have us believe. Infact, Mafeje proclaimed urban industrial areas are holding rural areas to ransom, thus disapproving one of the major tenets of the dualist thesis that the ‘periphery’ is inferior to the core. The implications for this in South Africa is that the rural economy should not be perceived as burden to the core economy or needing infusion from the core for it to grow.

Unlike classic dualist, Mbeki’s thesis does not seem to use the urban/rural binary, rather the two economies are said to co-exist in the cities as they do in rural areas, furthermore, unlike classic dualist Mbeki does not see the ‘interventions’ in the core economy as necessarily helpful for the periphery. Thus Mbeki’s thesis is useful only as far as it emphasizes the growing gap between the rich-white and poor–black. It is not a useful theoretical framework that explains the challenges of development or lack thereof.

We can only accept it as a vague of reference used for convenience (Mafeje, 2001:61)

5.6. Conclusion.

The phrase, the poor remain poor because they are trapped in the ‘second economy’ was popular in South Africa in the early 2000’s. This was reflective of Mbeki’s thesis on dual economies. We have argued that such a discussion arose as a reflection of either ignorance of Mafeje’s work in this area or deliberate erasure. As early as 1971, in his seminal paper on the fallacy of dual economy, Mafeje dispelled the notion of dual economy. In neither Mbeki’s thesis nor the subsequent critique as in the collection of essays by Bond did Mafeje’s articles or ideas on dual economy feature. As we have demonstrated, Mafeje’s research and output on this issue covered most of Southern Africa. As such, his data and
subsequent analysis are hard to ignore for any scholar who purports that there is existence of dual economies in Southern Africa, and South Africa in particular.
Chapter Six
The State and Colonialism in Africa.

6.1. Introduction
The understanding of prevailing circumstances and the prospects for development on the African continent is largely dependent on the role the state has played and the responsibilities the state can still undertake. Hence the discussion of the nature of the state in Africa is significant. Firstly, some of the social challenges (i.e. poverty, social inequality, under-development, un-decolonised academic curriculum in some parts etc) facing the continent today is rooted in the state system. And thus such problems cannot be resolved without tracing the history of the state, establishing a proper understanding of the nature of the state, its functions in economic activity and development. This chapter, while not affirming any unique contribution that Mafeje made to the debates on the nature of the state in Africa, explores his contribution, nonetheless. Unlike the pessimistic narrative on the state in Africa that purports a crisis of post-colonial and economy as one of collusion and complacency on the part of the new African political elite that took over power after independence, Mafeje’s argument is that they (many of the political elite) strove to retain domestic income, break out of the technological rot, made efforts to change the economy, its human resource base, etc.

6.2. Defining the State.
Any meaningful discussion of the state has to commence with an understanding of what the state is. In the lexicon of political science there is no consensus on a definition of the state. In fact, over a hundred different meanings have been suggested (Keller, 1991). However, a definition of what constitutes a state remains important. Such conceptual clarification is important, not only to ascertain whether the writer understands the subject but also to provide an operative meaning of the concept. Overtime, there have been long and sustained discussions of what the state is and different definitions have been provided. According to Danziger (1998) the state is a territorially bound sovereign entity, with clearly identified borders. While he also emphasized the importance of sovereignty, Ranney (1987), stated that there are five key requirements for statehood: particular territory, a definite population, a government, formal independence or sovereignty, and a sense of national identity. On the other hand, Clapham’s (1996) approach to the definition of statehood is slightly different. He emphasizes the importance of sovereign territory and governmental legitimacy. His
understanding of ‘government legitimacy’ seems to be based on the Western tenants of
democratic liberalism, which proclaims that legitimacy of the government can only be gained
through the ballot box. Consistent with Clapham understands of legitimacy, un-elected office
bearers cannot be seen as having legitimacy to govern. Weber (1989) conceptualized and
defined the state as a human community that successfully claims for itself the monopoly of
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. The ability to make and
implement binding rules is paramount to the state, as often it becomes among the determining
factors on whether the state fails or succeeds. Important in this is the idea that the state has
the monopoly to the legitimate use of violence in order to enforce compliance. Thus the
state’s authority and control over a particular area gives it the legitimacy to be the ultimate
source of law within the boundaries it controls.

6.3. The Evolution of the Concept of the State in Western literature.
The concept of the state has been among the major points of discussion in the scholarship
broadly. This is especially true of the Western philosophers, who dedicated much of their
energy and time in defining and theorizing about the state. Olowu (1994) stated that the State
has been the preoccupation of the western philosophers for a long period. Starting with the
classical political scientist to the contemporary, all have given a special focus to the subject of
the State, from “Socrates to Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas to
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, to modern writers like J.S. Mill, Tocqueville and
Karl Marx” (Olowu, 1994: 2)18. The contribution of all these scholars about the State signals
the complexity of the State as the part of the human social organization. And hence there is a
widely shared sentiment that the state requires more attention than other social organisations
that preceded it, such as the family, the clan and the village (Olowu, 1994). The state is
inclusive of all the other social organisations that came before it, and represents the highest
expression of human sociability and inculcation of virtue, for example free speech (Olowu,
1994). In Marxist terms, the state is not viewed as simply neutral entity, which helps in
organizing human life without serving interest of a particular group. Marxist view the state as
a social construct that serves the interest of the dominant class in society.

18This thesis does not argue that it is only western scholars who have theorised about the State. Rather it argues
that their scholarship on the topic is probably the most publicised through the western monopoly in publishing
houses.
The major discussion about the state centres around the power(s) and the influence the state has in organizing human society. Historically the discussions centered on the limits of the state power. Should the state have absolute power, as suggested by Hobbes (1651) or should the power of the state be shared through a social contract, a sentiment shared by both both Locke (1690) and Rousseau (1753)? Although there are various discussions and differences regarding the powers of the state, there seemsto be a commonly shared view among the scholars that the state represents the centralisation of power to the state and away from the other social formations (i.e. family, clan, chieftaincy etc) that came before it. In most societies these institutions that historically yielded so much power had to surrender their powers to the state and are expected to abide by the laws that govern the functioning of the state.

According to Max Weber (1999) the most important privilege of the state is sovereignty and political independence from other external political authorities. It is for this reason that the state should have the ability to protect its citizens against external aggressors. Thus, the actions of the state against external aggressors is taken as a natural reflex of the state in protection of the common good of the people and this justifies the centralization of military power within the state. Beyond just defending the citizens against foreign ‘forces’ and law making, there are other factors that determine the nature of the state. For example, whether it will be a negative state, responsible only for maintaining law and order, or a positive one, which removes those obstacles such as poverty, illiteracy and poor working conditions that stand in the way of the full (social and moral) development of the individual within the society, those functions determines the relationship that the state will have with the citizenry (Olowu, 1994). It is therefore agreed that the state has a domestic role in setting the standards that must be followed in human society. This is often done through establishing and compelling every member of the society to follow the established rules.

It is important to discuss the pre-colonial state, firstly, to demonstrate that the African continent had a history before colonialism. Much often, the narrative, (especially emanating from the western society) on the status of the state in the African continent is shaped in a manner that creates an impression that before the colonial state, life in the African continent was not organized; that Africa was a lawless jungle, without norms and values that organized
The concept of stateless society in pre-colonial times, which was deployed by Ayittey (1991), would seem to affirm the idea that in pre-colonial times Africa was not organised into a state system. Contrary to that view, this thesis holds a view that Africa had a history and the system of governance before the colonial times. Secondly, the pre-colonial state is discussed in order to juxtapose the current post-colonial state with the pre-colonial state. The colonial state in Africa is probably the most researched and thus most writings have focused on the colonial state, to the point that one can easily assume that there was no state in Africa before the colonial period. Furthermore, the history of the colonial state has been presented to the detriment of the pre-colonial state’s history. It seems that the official “policy (of the colonisers) is to suppress and supplant the pre-colonial state, even though the latter was much better integrated in terms of norms, texture and structure” (Olowu, 1994: 5). Notwithstanding efforts to suppress its history, the pre-colonial state formations incorporated within it elements that were designed to serve the interest of the majority of African people, that justifies a detailed discussion about the tenants of the pre-colonial state.

According to Ayittey (1991) there are two types of pre-colonial states. They are stateless society and states with centralized authority. Stateless societies included the Igbo of Nigeria, the Kung of Liberia, the Tallensi of Ghana, the Somalis, Jie of Uganda and Mbeere of Kenya (Ayittey, 1991: 34). Whereas, states with centralized authority are characterised by the personalised authority of the collective to the chief. Both these ‘types’ of pre-colonial states had a common denominator. First, “the state was concerned with the welfare of all its citizens. This has been labeled as communalism, but the central notion was that the welfare of every member, rather than just a few within the community, mattered (Olowu, 1994: 5). This had direct implications for economic activity. As the community focused on the welfare of every member, every member of the society was expected to focus and spend his or her energy on the ‘economic welfare’ of that particular community. For example, every household was expected to be represented by a family member during the planting of the lineage land.

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19 However, in this thesis we do not agree with the belief that since there were no border in pre-colonial Africa, that necessarily means there were no norms and values that governed social relations among people.

20 We note the contradiction in Ayittey Statement, mainly that there were two types of States in Africa in pre-colonial period and yet cites ‘Stateless society’ as part of the State.

21 We are aware that the idea of ‘lineage land’ is not common across the whole of Africa. But Mafeje (1981) drew a relation between lineage land and agrarian question in South Africa, what he termed lineage mode of production.
In pre-colonial Africa, the society was organized for political purposes on the basis of lineage, thus the lineage connected the family to the ‘state’ (Olowu, 1994: 5). This guaranteed the leaders of the society the utmost support and that their authority was accepted by the majority of the populace, hence there was greater internal cohesion within the society. On the other hand, pre-colonial states recognized their strength and weakness, they knew that centralized rule could be useful in defending their communities against aggression and usually joined together to ward off external attacks. (Olowu, 1994). There is also evidence of the fact that they tried to mitigate against the weaknesses of the centralized government, especially the possibility of the abuse of power. Even in the centralized kingdoms, checks and balances were instituted against tyranny (Olowu, 1994). Contrary to the general perception that chiefs had unlimited powers, there were checks and balances in place that ensured that traditional leaders remain accountable to the people. These included (i) the ideal notions of leadership woven into oral narratives was one that emphasized consensus leadership rather than one who imposed his opinions on others; (ii) imposition of religious or supernatural sanctions (including invocation of curses or advising the ruler to drink poison); (iii) institutionalized sanctions, including private and public admonitions (rebuke by the Queen mother, Council of Elders or threat of deposition) (Olowu, 1994:6). Hence consensus-building become a norm and an important aspect of leadership. This sentiment is shared by Ayittey (1991) arguing that, in indigenous African political system, consensus between leaders and those they lead was often sought after before important decisions were/could be taken. Mazrui (1986) agrees, citing Julius Nyere’s phrase that, the very origins of African democracy lay in ordinary discussion. The elders sat under a tree and rallied until they agreed. Hence imposing one man’s views is generally rejected by the African people.

The ability of the African society to hold their leaders to account was balanced by the willingness of the citizens to ‘play their part’ in building a community. There was/is importance attached to citizenship. For example, young men had to learn the art of war and are taught to be ready to lay down their lives for the commonwealth (Olowu, 1994:6). Contrary to the general view about African women, that proclaims that on the main African

22In this regard, it would seem that Olowu think(s) of Africa in singular. His observations might be true of some states but it does not account for State formations such as Mali.
women had to be in the kitchen, young women were taught more than just that; they were, like their male counterparts expected to be responsible members of the community (1994: 6). The societal organization of the pre-colonial state was based on the state’s ability to take care of the social welfare of its citizens, whereas on the other hand citizens were expected to partake in building and protecting their society.

6.6. The formation of the colonial state in Africa.

The significance of the state in Africa has been a focal point of contestation for sometime. Notwithstanding the fact that the state in Africa is regarded as a fairly new form of political organization as compared to the western societies, where the state as a political organization is much more entrenched, the discussions on the State in the African continent has been equally robust as everywhere in the world. Lonsdale (1981) noted that nowhere is the debate over the state and state-centered research more vigorous than among Africanists. According to Keller (1991) this is because the state has been acknowledged a key concept in understanding political dynamics and the current circumstances facing the continent in the twenty-first century.

The foreign character of the state in Africa has dominated much of the debate about the state. It is generally agreed that the ‘modern’ African state is a product of both imperialism and colonialism. Mafeje (2002) shares this view; he stated that all African countries were born in the context of imperialism or Western capitalism which emasculated indigenous social institutions and modes of organization for its own purpose (Mafeje, 2002:60). As such, it is viewed as a foreign imposition on the African continent. As Ake (2000) states that the problem with the African post-colonial state is that it remained as it was during the colonial era, except for a change in the composition of managers of the state, hence the rise of the popular movement of democracy in the 1990’s. The African state did not develop over a period of time. Rather the statehood in Africa was relatively rapid when compared to the Western evolution of statehood. Mathews and Solomon (2013) share similar sentiment and pointed out that colonialism resulted in the moulding of Africa into a hybrid state system which had gradually developed in Europe. Moreover, Cornwall (1999) observed that Africa

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23There is no single template across the whole of Africa for the nature and contents of the relations between men and women. Thus what is perceived as ‘responsible’ might vary from society to society.
was divided into a number of artificial states according to the preferences and whims of the colonialists, with little regard for the desires or needs of the inhabitants of Africa. Hence Kondlo and Ejiogu (2011) concluded that the African state emerged on the foundations of the colonial state rather than the indigenous pre-colonial state form, which was consonant with the authority patterns of the diverse African nationalities. While on the other hand, Van Creveld (1999: 126-128) notes that the Western system of government developed from being essentially personal to being a forerunner of the modern state over the years 1648 to 1789. According to Mathews and Solomon (2013) throughout this period, the definition of borders and the development of political theories to accompany and justify these changes occurred.

As noted above, the development of state in Africa did not follow the same pattern as state formation in the West. The African society did not have the same opportunity to define the institutions according to, and consistent with, their historical development. Rather, the state system was imposed with all that accompanied it without due regard to the peoples traditions, norms, values etc. Colonialism and imperialism did set “the boundaries of the state and provided it with state structure, the constitution, governance systems and bureaucracy” (Olowu, 1994: 4). This was done “primarily in the interest of the colonising states” (Akude, 2007:1), and not the interest of the peoples of Africa, hence in a number of instances there has been fragile loyalty to state institutions.

The artificially imposed boundaries on the African state by the colonial powers has received much attention from the scholars in the continent and often an impression is created that the major problem facing modern Africa is mainly caused by these boundaries. Although it should be acknowledge from the onset that the imposed boundaries in the continent resulted to some challenges, but more than just the boundaries. Cornwell (1999) believes that it is the nature of the state that post colonial Africa inherited from the colonial period that serves as the source of major challenges. In certain instances an assumption is made that the colonial state was a complete replica of the metropolitan power, however, Cornwell (1999), disagrees. He cites the omission of the doctrines of European theory dealing with the limitations of the power of the state. The importance of this doctrine is much telling when one considers the president for life phenomenon that characterized post-colonial Africa.
In colonial period, the colonised were subjects rather than citizens and the issue of separation of powers, as is known in post-colonial period, was not applicable. This resulted perceptions about the abuse of power. As this phenomenon continues, the citizens become increasingly alienated from the state and in fact view the state as the obstacle rather than an instrument that could assist them in improving their conditions. Hence in some societies within the African continent, citizens have opted to operate outside and independent of the state. This partly explains the state inability to collect taxes and the failure to get compliance to legislation that has been passed by the government (Hyden, 1980). In responding to lack of compliance, the colonial state sought to impose on people rather than seeking to build consensus on issues. Lack of consensus building regarding the norms that will govern society is a practice that is generally foreign to African society, which was historically exposed to leadership that was geared towards consensus-building rather than imposition.

As the name suggests, the ‘colonial state’ was established for a sole purpose: to colonise. The first step in achieving this was the attempt at bending the pre-colonial institutions to the will of the colonial state. The idea was to retain Chiefs and Chiefdoms but in service of the colonial state. Furthermore, there was a strong element of racism that accompanied the formation of the colonial state. According to Olowu (1994) nowhere is this superiority better expressed and articulated than in Lord Lugard's 'Dual Mandate'. Because the colonialist had an assumed sense of superiority, they thought that the colonialist institutions had to replace all the ‘inferior’ institutions it was confronted with. Hence the Western narrative on the post-colonial state in Africa is designed to make the reader conclude that what preceded the colonial state was not good for humanity; that the colonial state freed Africans from the tyranny of the chiefs. Indeed, Lugard (1965) stated that an indirect rule system was created with the aim of incorporating traditional authority into a colonial state. As Hyden (2008) reflected “this more pragmatic (Dual Mandate) approach allowed the incorporation of ‘native’ interests in a way that direct ruledid not do” (Hyden, 2008: 9), in stating that, Hyden

24Olowu’s reading of Lugard’s Dual Mandate is not entirely accurate, rather than ‘replace’ the pre-colonial institutions; the aim was to adapt them for colonial use.
confirmed that the essence of dual mandate was to adapt indigenous institutions to serve colonial ends\textsuperscript{25}.

The lack of personnel was the immediate challenge that faced colonialism in establishing colonial regimes in Africa. Having realized that they did not have enough personnel to control the administrative aspect of the colonial Africa, the colonial powers were forced to rely (partly) on domestic personnel to carry out their project. It adopted an 'indirect rule' system whereby local chiefs were transformed into local potentate with absolutist powers similar to those of the colonial governors (Olowu, 1994). The end result of this system was the rulers that were far removed from the citizens they were governing. Wunsch (1990) best captures this phenomenon; he concluded that the colonial state was elitist, centrist and absolutist. This meant the concentration of decision making powers in the metropolis, far removed from the people that had to live with the decisions made. As such there was a disconnection between the citizens and the holders of power. This resulted in questions about the legitimacy of the rulers and the rules they wanted to promote. By and large, those who held powers were not seen as legitimate by those they wanted to rule over\textsuperscript{26}. To make up for the lack of authority, brute force was often used to force compliance with the laws. The colonial state relied on the use of brute force to impose its will on the people who would otherwise reject the decisions of the colonial state. It is worth noting that the colonial administration maintained effective control over the whole state apparatus, the military, and the police (Cornwell, 1999: 64). With this power, colonial administrators thought there might not be a force strong enough to challenge it, but the successful anti-colonial movement and struggle attest to the will power of organized societies that overthrow colonialism and apartheid. Thus there was no chance for an alternative authority that could challenge the power of the state.

6.7. The post-colonial State.

\textsuperscript{25}In both his books \textit{Citizens and Subject} (1996), and \textit{Define and Rule: Natives as Political Identity} (2012) Mamdani addresses in detail how colonial State attempted to adapt pre-colonial institutions into colonial governance.

\textsuperscript{26}However this observation might not be accurate of all people under colonial rule and apartheid, for example, many lived much as many resisted the apartheid State, many more happily functioned under its ambit and served it—from your police officers to Bantustan leaders and functionaries.
To a large extent the post-colonial state was a continuation of the colonial state. The colonial state, as the term signifies, was a creation of the colonial powers for their purposes. As such, it exhibits specific characteristics that are not found in the metropolitan state. These are: (i) an imposition from outside, ready-made and extrinsic to the society in which it exists; (ii) a contrivance meant to administer not citizens but colonial peoples or natives i.e. to administer not subjects but objects; (iii) not accountable to those who are administered but to itself and ultimately to the metropolitan power; (iv) arbitrary use of power and lack of transparency; (v) and highly extractive, especially with regard to the peasants. Mafeje (2002: 6) and John Saul (1987, cited by Keller (1991)) suggested that there were three primary functions of the post-colonial state. First, the post-colonial African state was created by the metropolitan bourgeoisie because the class needed an administrative apparatus it could control while the local administrative state in turn controlled the indigenous population. Secondly, the post-colonial state has a special role in promoting and manipulating the indigenous economy. Third, in post colonial societies, capitalist hegemony must be maintained by the African state once it assumes political power. Saul (1987) and Mafeje (2002) correctly identified primary fuctions of the post-colonial state; however, both created an impression that all post-colonial states can be reduced to one type, subordinate, neo-colonial enterprises; undemocratic; and beholden to the metropolitan powers. A lot of this is true of many (if not most) African states at one time or the other, but it does not allow us to explain why many of such states have come under attacks from the metropolitan powers, or help to explain the degree of development outcomes achieved. The brush-stroke of ‘neo-colonial state’ won’t allow us to account for the policy spaces that were available and how some of them have used the space. Furthermore, it won’t allow us to account for the differences in social development performances and outcomes we witnessed on the continent. This results from over-generalizing about the continent.

After political independence from colonialism, there were no major changes in the boundaries of the state in Africa. The foundations upon which the colonial state was built remained intact. According to Zartman, (1995) it was during the period of colonial rule that

27With that being said, there were some major changes in the principles that governed African Sates. This is explains things like Frontlines States and the efforts towards the complete liberation of the continent if the functionaries of the states in Africa were no more than processed versions of the colonial projects.
modern Africa took on many of its most familiar characteristics. Much of the state practice(s), legislation, procedures and even routine of daily governance, despite the massive quantitative expansion, reflected the inheritance of their colonial state (Mehta, 2003:106). Cornwel(1999) shares the same sentiment, asserting that “eventual leaders of the successful revolt against colonial rule made no attempt to overturn this imposed system of states or dismantle the alien political framework in favour of a return to the more ‘natural’ shape of pre-colonial African society” (Cornwel, 1999: 62). According to Ake (2000) the opposite was done. He stated that the post-independence African leader “decided to inherit the colonial system, instead of transforming it in accordance with popular nationalist aspirations” and as a result, most African leaders found themselves on a collision course with their people (Ake, 2000:34).

Instead their actions (post independence leaders) sought to preserve the colonial political structure. Consequently, the continuation of the social disillusionment with the state continued. The consequence of not re-drawing the boundaries after independency resulted into post-colonial African states having borders that make no economic sense, and which result in several political and social problems (Thomson, 2000)\(^\text{28}\). As such, the states become a political impracticality. Although there was a general agreement that these states did not make sense, little or no effort has been placed on changing the state boundaries in post-colonial Africa. According to Ohaegbulam (1996) the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) legitimized the state system in post colonial Africa. He stated that the OAU decided in 1963 that the boundaries of the states in Africa should be left alone\(^\text{29}\). Clapham (1996) believes that the attitude of the post-colonial African leader played a pivotal role in maintaining the

\(^{28}\) Thompson is correct in pointing out the difficulties resulting from ‘artificial borders’. However, he does not seem to account for the fact that every border is a product of balance of power at the time they were established not something inherently natural. For example, the German-speaking people are split into three states in Europe. Switzerland transverses German-speaking, French-speaking and Italian-speaking people. In each case, there are German/French/Italian-speaking people across the borders. Over time, people of different cultural and linguistic groupings within a state territory develop greater sense of common history than their kinsfolk’s across the borders. Thus, common identity is not only a consequence of people of same linguistic living together, moreover, when people of different linguistics reside together does not necessarily mean conflict and tensions are automatically be the outcome, as Thomson will like to have us believe.

\(^{29}\) The alternative argument that Ohaegbulam 1996 is advancing presupposes that there were natural boundaries before colonialism. Yet there is no clear evidence of their existence, rather it seems that is assumed. Even for State formations like large kingdoms and empires (including Shaka’s) boundaries were not only not stable they transverse ethnic boundaries.
arbitrary boundaries. He maintains that they used the state system in order to maintain their own survival and prosperity. This went against the spirit of the struggle against colonialism. Anti-colonial nationalist struggles were essentially a bid for political power and liquidation of colonial domination. It was generally assumed that executive authority would terminate colonial exploitation, as is shown by the assumptions underlying the first development plans of most underdeveloped countries (Mafeje, 1978: 9).

The socio-economic environment in which the post-colonial state had to function differed tremendously from the socio-economic environment that the western countries at the same stage of development had to contend with. The “western democracies emerged into a world in which they initially had to contend with a fairly limited number of government functions, and the management of fairly simple economic and political systems in a relatively spacious global system in which their technological achievements tended to give them the advantage” (Cornwal, 1999: 65). The post-colonial state had to contend with superpower competition, had to fit in the already defined global order, with established rules governing international economic activities. Thus the state configuration in Africa had to be transformed in order to be aligned to the new realities. For example, the effort to align traditional lekgotla and the democratic system in Botswana is a post-colonial phenomenon. Tanzania’s reconfiguration and abolition of colonial chieftaincy system and the reconfiguration of the inherited regional system and modes of representation in the State of the diversity of its component parts is a post-colonial product in Nigeria. The Nhlapo commission in South Africa also spoke to the need to reconfigure the state in Africa, especially its relationship with apartheid installed Chieftaincies.

Furthermore, the post-colonial state also had a burden of expectation. These were expectations that were “nurtured during the fight against apartheid” (in South Africa and Namibia) (Cornwall, 1999: 65) proceeded by imperialism and colonialism in most African Countries. Thus there was an expectation that the leaders would live up to those expectations. As the post-colonial state wanted to modernize, much focus was given to the Western institutions at the expense of traditional institutions. Yet, “the local and traditional leaders who remained so significant to most Africans also represented an incipient threat to the would-be builders of the new nation and their tentative political legitimacy” (Cornwell, 1999:65). In some African states, such as South Africa, this led to tensions between the post-
Apartheid state and the traditional institutions\textsuperscript{30}. In some instances, the response to these tensions was either to incorporate the traditional institutions to the state, reduces their formal powers or summarily abolished them (Cornwell, 1999). The other way of dealing with them was to bastardise chiefs, kings and headmen as backwards and ethnically divisive and giving them all sorts of negative labels.

\section*{6.8. Disconnection from the Past.}

By and large, the post colonial African state was/is disconnected from the African past, largely because it was constructed principally on its colonial origins in terms of its philosophy, structure and organization (Olowu, 1994). Instead of doing away with the oppressive institutions and instruments of the colonial state and reverting back to the social fundamentals that constructed the pre-colonial state, some\textsuperscript{31} states in the post-independence Africa continued with the social structure of the colonial state. In more ways than one, the post colonial African state simply became the continuation of the colonial state. As a result, the post colonial state institutions and policy frameworks have curiously foreign character. The alien character of the post colonial African state is caused by the fact that state completely relied on western institutions of governance over and above the institutions that governed life before colonisation. Infact, the pre-colonial institutions such as chieftaincy were bastardised. This then further alienated the African leadership from the “past and the people” (Olowu, 1994; 8). The state continued to be alienated from the people, their history and the ways of doing. As Keller (1991) observed, the state in Africa is devoid of an indigenous ruling class, it is controlled and manipulated by the metropolitan bourgeoisie.

The kinship and ethnic allegiances that dominated and helped in shaping pre-colonial society were viewed as the backward by the authorities that governed the post colonial state. Even worse, ethnic identity was interpreted as inimical to the state building project (Cornwall, 1999). It seems that their mistake was to assume that ethnic identities were inherently in conflict with the national building exercise, rather than guarding against the politicization of

\textsuperscript{30}See the Nhlapo Commission Report released in 2010. Among other things the commission was set up for the determinations of the Status of the Paramount Chiefs.

\textsuperscript{31}Some’ is an operational word in this regard because not all African countries had the same experience at post independence, the experiences varied across African countries.
ethnic identities. Thus ethnic identities were viewed as a direct obstacle to national building. Yet at the national level there was hardly a common national culture which people identified with. Laakso and Olukoshi (1997) observed that without an economic and social push towards the kind of national ‘high culture’ experienced in Europe, the idea of national unity came, paradoxically, to be reduced to an almost perfect negation of a common culture. After realising that it was unable to create a national identity, the post-colonial Africa state sought to impose unity. Consequently this situation created tensions between the state and the society. These tensions further perpetuated the distance between the state and the people it was meant to serve. Without the state’s ability to create rather than impose national unity, people’s sense of belonging remained rooted in their communities as there was “no parallel community has been created at the national level” (Cornwall, 1999:67). Fragile loyalty to the state became the end results of this lack of national unity.

The political system of the post-colonial African state further entrenched the disconnect between the people and the state. The Weber’s systems that governed the state had their foundations within the western societies. For example, “formal aspects of electoral democracy (elections and constitutionalism) have been emphasized over meaningful participation by ordinary citizens in matters of governance. This alienation of the citizens from political participation also meant that the state was unable to ascertain the needs of the people. Hence there was a general disconnect between the services provided by the state and the needs of the people.

The appropriation of the post colonial state by some leaders further alienated the state from the masses, because the state was personalized; it struggled to reflect the needs of the majority of its members. The right to personalize the state by some African leaders come from the claim that “that they fought or led the struggle for independence” (Olowu, 1994: 8). This personalization of the post colonial African state resulted to a blurring of lines between what is public and what is private, exposing the African leadership at post independence, mainly that they were not abiding by the traditions separation of power, as it was a norm in some western countries that had the state well entrenched in their societies. The lack of differentiation between what is public and what is private created a culture of corruption. Mazrui (2006:4) best captures this phenomenon when he stated that colonialism introduced capitalist greed without capitalist discipline and helped to promote western consumption.
patterns without western productive techniques. By the time the colonial powers departed, to return to Europe, what had started as adequate African greed exploded into a frenzy of post-colonial acquisitiveness. Western taste had indeed taken root in Africa, but not western skills (Mazrui, 1993:3). Hence he states become an arena for competition. According to Jackson Rosberg and (1982:14) the political systems in African states become more like a game or a market than a planning organization. The state power or the access to the state resources was viewed as a position to benefit, an advantageous position to distribute patronage. Thus some people become involved in political activity with the sole purpose of securing capital.

It is for this reason that Ake (1989) concluded that, the African state (the post colonial state) is not a state of all, but the state of the few who are fortunate to be at the helm of affairs. This resulted in the president-for-life phenomenon, that encouraged an attitude of disempowering social institutions rather than accommodating them within the realms of governance. The disconnect between the leaders and the masses is further confirmed by the fact that most African countries still use foreign languages (i.e. English and French) as the medium of instruction, in so doing, alienating the rest of the population from taking part in decision making. This practice has obvious implications for decision making. Without taking part in societal decisions such as legislation formation and other policies that have a direct bearing on people’s lives the state becomes something foreign to the people and as such the loyalty of the people is often fragile. As such the accountability of the post colonial African state to its citizens is questionable.

The other major challenge of the post-colonial African state is the perceived immorality. According to Olowu (1994), this perception stems from the fact that the post-colonial state has two forms of morality that seem to contradict each other. On the one hand there are “traditional norms to which the majority of the society subscribes, which emphasizes primordial loyalties and particularistic qualities to the family, clan and village. On the other hand, there are also the modern norms associated with the larger state system and its institutions which emphasise universalism, objectivity and neutrality (Olowu, 1994: 9). This then led Ekeh (1992) to conclude that two types of publics exist in Africa. These are the civic public and the primordial public. The conflicting norms and values between the societal traditions and the western values that inform how government governs over them often leads to conflict.
6.9. The collapsed African state.

It is important to discuss, at length the perception that some African states have collapsed. The functionality of state in Africa is important for socio-economic development, thus if the state is perceived to have failed, the implication for socio-economic development should be obvious. The concept, collapsed state is often used interchangeably with concepts such as failed state, dysfunctional state, leading to confusion about the usage of these concepts. The African state has been given different labels. For example, Ayoade (1982) believes that some African states have so little vitality that they can best be described as “bedridden” “comatose” or “expired”. Ake (1989) takes it even further, by questioning the very existence of the state in Africa; he questions whether we can properly speak of the state in postcolonial Africa, since it possesses only limited autonomy or hegemony. What we have in Africa today, he suggests, are states in formation.

With all the above mentioned debates on the character of the African state that have an impact on what constitutes a collapsed state, it is imperative to mention that, a collapsed state can be simply be defined as “one that ceases to perform the functions commonly expected of a state” (Matthews and Solomon, 2013: 1). Saikal (2000) defined collapsed states as those that no longer perform the functions expected of a state. In a collapsed state, important aspect of what constitutes a state such as the legitimate use of violence and governmental legitimacy, properly defined boundaries, all ceases to exist. The disintegration of the structure, authority, law and order within the state characterizes state collapse (Cornwall, 1999). Security, law and order, provision of public services all become a thing of the past when the state has collapsed. According to Thomson (2000:189-199) the definition of state collapse should not only be limited to political instability and the violent takeover of power. Things such as the state inability to provide public services and general provision of security are symptomatic of state collapse.

The phenomenon of state collapse has been synonymous with Africa in the most recent history but as Mathews and Solomon (2013) observed, the problems (of state collapse) experienced by African states today are by no means foreign to history. Moreover, the phenomenon of state collapse is not unique to Africa. While the end of the cold war is widely viewed as the period that brought an end to the bipolar world, Cornwall (1999) views the period as the beginning of the collapse of individual states as we knew them before the cold
war. Zartman (1995: 1) pointed out the phenomenon of the collapsed state is not only limited to the overthrow of a regime, it also involves the disintegration of structure, legitimate authority, law and political order within the confines of the state. Thus a collapsed state cannot, by definition be able to provide public services or lead economic development through a national development plan. The suggestion that a number of states in Africa can be categorised as collapsed states has direct implications for the economic development.

Zartman (1995), further notes that the collapse states does not necessary lead to political vacuum, rather the political space is occupied by other actors such as war lords, international organisations, etc. When other social actors take over, the state as a functioning order, is gone (Zartman, 1995). The inability of the state to occupy the centre stage, in relation to the provision of long term economic development and social planning leaves a space open to competition. In some countries on the continent void spaces have been occupied by Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) that are financed by the international donor agencies, and in worse situation these NGOs are a mere extension of their governments and are encouraged to do work overseas. In the ‘absency’ these NGOs become responsible for discharging some of the responsibilities of the state. This has to be separated from the idea of a portion of national budget that is donor-funded. For example, approximately 40% Malawi’s national budget is financed by donors. In such circumstances, they (NGOs) not the central government become the authority and they can set the social agenda. Although the phenomenon of the collapsed state is not limited to Africa, Cornwall (1999) states that it is mostly encountered in Africa. The inability of some of the African countries to exercise control in most of their territories has been taken as the key indicator of the collapsing state. For example Jackson and Rosberg (1982) observed that some African states exercise only tenuous control over the people, organizations and activities within their territorial jurisdiction. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) doubt whether African states can meet the empirical definition of the state based on its ability to exercise control over citizenry under its jurisdiction. The power of the state is often limited to the cities and particularly the capital, thus there are parts of the country where the national government has no control.

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32 See page 14, Icelandic International Development Agency (Malawi country strategy Paper 2012-2016)
Consequently, the state is not able to collect revenue (through tax) to fund its developmental initiatives. Hence the ability of the state to provide basic provision is compromised.


The twin challenges of economic weakness and the lack of sustained development in post-colonial African could be traced back from the colonial period. For example, from the colonial period, some African countries inherited an overdependence on a narrow range of primary commodities for export and foreign exchange earnings, which rendered them excessively vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices (Cornwall, 1999:68). After gaining independency little effort was placed on re-establishing new economic ties, instead the old economic framework that governed trade was allowed to continue unmanaged, hence the old vulnerabilities continue. The early post-colonial African state was an interventionist State. According to Cornwall (1999), this was also inherited from the colonial period. Since the 1970s there has been a continued preoccupation with the neo-colonial state in Africa and its negations among African scholars (Mafeje, 2002: 7). Cornwall noted that government administered prices, and regulated or intervened in labour, mining, agriculture, manufacturing and financial markets (Cornwall, 1999:69). Consequently the public sector grew as some public enterprises and institutions were brought under the control of the state. As Aaron (1996) puts it, export-import trade were centrally administered often in favor of the urban elite and the expense of the rural population. However, the down side to this government interventionism was the fact that the state reach throughout the economy eventually outran the state’s administrative capacity (Cornwall, 1999: 66). In turn, this led to a poor public service and subsequently led to poor economic performance. According to Aaron (1996) commodity price falls eroded the existing tax base, while heavy public investment in the boom years left governments with long term recurrent expenditure even after public spending was curtailed. Instead of allowing exchange rates to move in tune with the balance of payments crisis, most governments intervened even more strongly in currency markets, promoting the growth of parallel markets and economies, which further reduced the state’s access to revenue. The only reliable solution to increasing budget deficit was heavy reliance on expensive foreign loans. As the socio-economic challenges of the post-colonial African state increased, the state become further entrenched in indebtedness. The state was unable to attract private capital, “many African states found that their only recourse was to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank” (Cornwall, 1999: 68).
This situation usheredin a new period in the post independence Africa. Aaron (1996) sums up this period as ‘the less state the better’. The state intervention was seen as the cause for the underperforming economy, hence the understanding was that as one pushes the state back from economic activity, the status of the economy would improve. As the state increasingly become a night watchman, the IMF and the World Bank occupied the vacuum. Their first step was to impose austerity policies. Most governments that relied on these institutions had little choice but to implement the policies. This meant greater authoritarianism on the part of governments, further undermining the social contract upon which so much of the state’s declining legitimacy rested (Laakso & Olukoshi, 1997: 19). All this experience was to prove that it is a very short step from political independence to economic dependence. In the euphoria of independence leaders in underdeveloped countries had not studied carefully the mechanisms for accumulation in advanced capitalism and had underestimated the substantive power of monopoly capital (Mafeje, 1978).

To confront the omnipresent colonial influence in the economies of the African continent, African governments “gradually and pragmatically arrived at the idea of 'nationalisation' as a strategy for self-defence” (Mafeje, 1978:9). It is significant to quote Mafeje extensively in this regard, he stated that

First, underdeveloped countries, irrespective of ideological orientation, desire maximum retention of domestic incomes. Second, they wish to break out of the technological rut which is a consequence of their being, traditionally, suppliers of raw materials that rely for their production on low-level technology and largely unskilled labour. Third, as evidenced by their struggles for independence from the former colonial powers, they wish to be in full control of their national resources and life chances......all these aspirations, genuine as they are, are negated by the logic of external dependence for capital and technology and its attendant modes of accumulation. These contradictions have been experienced in actual practice and, as a result, every underdeveloped country has come to know that: (a) partial or complete nationalisation of the 'commanding heights' of the economy is a prerequisite for the protection of its flagging economy; (b) partial or complete control of trade by the government ensures less wanton use of scarce foreign reserves; and (c) land, which still accounts for the bulk of the national income in underdeveloped countries,
cannot be left entirely to the vagaries of individual owners and producers (Mafeje, 1978: 16).

6.11. Democratization in Africa and development framework.
The post cold war period ushered in a new phase in Africa’s political scene. As the two global powers stopped jostling for Africa’s support, the African states become more inwards looking. The discussions on Africa’s democratic outlook started in earnest. Without having to place focus on international arena, most African leaders had to confront the inherent weaknesses of their regimes and consider sharing power with others (Cornwall, 1999). Coupled with economically challenging times was the opening of the political space in Africa. The politically conscious and mainly urbanized people began to challenge the rulers in the continent and ask deep questions about the promises of independency. Especially given the fact that much of Africa had suffered a steady decline in living standards through the 1970s and 1980s (Cornwall, 1999). And the pressure from the donor agencies that started attaching conditionalities to aid, issues such as accountability and Africa’s human rights record was raised as requiring urgent attention.

Under the guise of helping Africa to overcome its economic difficulties, the structural adjustment programme was introduced. This involved a number of things, “the reduction of public expenditure, balanced budgets, economic liberalisation and currency devaluation” (Cornwall, 1999). The implementation of structural adjustment programmes led to the decline in standard of living and thus worsened the welfare problems. On the other hand the popular demand for democracy was built on the demand for improved standard of living. These contradicting imperatives between the demand for improving standards of living and the austerity policies that were advocated by the structural adjustment further undermined the post-colonial African state’s legitimacy.

Mafeje (1978) ascertains that the state in post-colonial societies is important because “it emerged to fill a political vacuum where all classes were still inchoate after the departure of the colonial powers” (1978: 13). Moreover, the state was the only viable force to undertake the enormous task of national and economic integration. This however does not deny the reality that the state in Africa is a colonial project but realises that the state become a reality
that was stark at post independence stage. Indeed for Mafeje, if political independence is insufficient, as we all agree, then we should not deny the given fact, the state, for we will miss out on a very important theoretical point, namely, the historical sequence which in this instance gave rise to priority of politics over economics (Mafeje, 1978). He further pointed out that this is a more positive way of understanding the state than depicting it purely as a colonial overgrowth. In its form the state in Africa is a negation of colonialism (Mafeje, 1978:13). This is sharply distinct from the traditional conception of the state in Africa as merely a colonial project that needed to be done away with by post colonial Africa.

The rhetoric that has been discussed at length in this chapter, as championed by the some African scholars—mainly the idea that the state was a liability in post-colonial Africa—misses one point; that there was no easily identifiable replacement of the state. Mafeje avows that the “local bourgeoisie was, initially, too weak to be entrusted with input provision on a large scale. Consequently, provision of capital, technology, infrastructure, training of labour and research, credit and social services became the responsibility of the state. Combined with nationalisation of any sort at all, this assured the dominance of the state and its agents, particularly the bureaucracy” (Mafeje, 1978: 12). Moreover, Mafeje (1978) avows that apart from political liberation, the struggle for independence also implies emancipation from economic exploitation and backwardness (Mafeje, 1978:14). With a weak local bourgeoisie which was not able to ensure economic emancipation, that task was left to the state as the driving force for economic change; the same state that had its origins within the colonial tradition. This is what has come to be recognised as a neo-colonialist strategy for development (1978:14). Mafeje acknowledges that African countries took mild protectionist measures. However, a neo-colonialist strategy won the day.

Neo-colonialist strategy usually means not only a willingness to cooperate with foreign monopolies but also heavy reliance on them for capital, credits, supplies and technology. In return they get opportunities for lucrative investments, managerial contracts and protected markets for their local products. This often produces measurable growth in the favoured sectors of the economy, allowing worthwhile appropriation by the indigenous elites and living wages for a tiny section of the local labour. In such cases, the state acts as a broker for foreign firms and the emerging national bourgeoisie. In the process a number of insoluble contradictions, both external and internal, are created (Mafeje, 1978:14).
Mafeje (1978) noted that this will lead to (i) increased domination of the economy by foreign monopolies and continued loss of domestic income (ii) increased discrepancy between resource use and domestic demand, as foreign capital concentrates on extractive industries which produce commodities that are not consumed locally, e.g. mining and export agriculture (iii) increased technological dependence on foreign suppliers and retardation of domestic capability (iv) monopolisation of the local market through import substitution industries and further losses of added value due to inducements offered in order to secure licences and capital; and (v) increased imbalances in incomes between those engaged in the modern sector usually capital intensive and those in the neglected sectors always technologically backward and inhabited by the great majority of the population.

This leads to the division among those who aspired to independent national economies and the local bourgeoisie who are benefitting from the neo-colonial strategy (Mafeje, 1978:16). Hence the original national movement sooner or later gets fragmented into those who are strongly allied with foreign interests (Mafeje, 1978:16) and the ‘revolutionaries’ who aspired to independent national economy. Consequently, “the state, which by reason of its birth under conditions where no particular class enjoyed universal hegemony within society, loses its original role as mediator between contending classes, or its temporary but historically determined partial autonomy” (Mafeje, 1978:17).


Africans rightfully cite colonialism when confronted with socio-economic conditions in their independent states. Such voices are often dismissed on the basis that colonialism has long been overthrown in the continent; hence Africans cannot be fixated with colonialism. They must confront these challenges without drawing on their past. However, Mafeje (2002) points out that it is extremely difficult to ignore the pervasive impact of European colonialism on Africa. Furthermore, he points out that colonialism was not replaced by uhuru; it was rather replaced by neo-colonialism, in which African leaders were junior partners. Testimony of neo-colonialism in the post-colonisation period is to be found in the fact that some African countries cannot cut the economic umbilical cord from the former colonisers, for example
they still trade more with their former colonisers. Mafeje (2002) proclaims that this signifies two things, namely, that African economies literally became appendages of European economies and, accordingly, lost their internal dynamics. For example, they got totally subordinated and could not reproduce themselves. This then suggest that the Western economic and political ways of doing in the African continent were not overthrown with the birth of independency. At independency, Mafeje (2002) argues, African leaders were left with two options, “the first and the only viable options is to commit themselves to a thoroughgoing process of decolonising their societies, starting with the state and economy. The two are closely linked. The second and the easiest option is to maintain the status quo and try to find opportunities for self-aggrandisement within it. Needless to say, this is the option African leaders have chosen over the last 30 years or so” (Mafeje, 2002: 5) It is perhaps worth noting that while the 1978 publication was more nuanced in differentiating between the different pathways explored by different African countries (Tanzania vis-à-vis Kenya; Algeria vis-à-vis Nigeria [Mafeje 1978: 20]), the 2002 paper had a more pessimistic tone and less differentiation of the diversity of the African experiences. These may be a reflection of the differences in the material conditions between the 1970s and the 2000s; the first being a period of experimentation and drive for transcending colonial political economy and the second one of African countries being subdued under the neoliberal regime. In this instance, Mafeje’s writings reflect the ebbs and changes in the material conditions of the African countries. African economies did not change significantly after independency, the patterns Western economy remained the same, with African leaders attempting their best to find means and ways to assert their authority within the existing structure of the economy.

This then led to the assertion by Majefe (2002) that the African state was in many ways a continuation of the colonial state and as such can “deliver neither political democracy nor social democracy” (Mafeje, 2002: 6). The colonial state was created by the colonisers in order to serve their economic and political interests, and not the economic interest of the colonial state. Hence the colonial State did not deliver political or economic freedom for the colonised in the African continent. To make things worse at post-independance the behaviour of some African leaders mirrored that of formers colonisers. According to Mafeje (2002), the new bureaucracy on the continent governed with the same arrogance as it was experienced during colonialism. Just like colonial masters who accounted to the metropolis, the African leaders were accountable to themselves, and not to the citizenry. The relationship between the state and citizens did not immediately change from that of a subject and objects, citizens remained
objects to be governed by the state; leaders viewed themselves as above individuals they were governing.

The character and nature of the colonial state was the subject of African intellectual efforts for a long time in the post-independency period. In the 1970s most African scholars were pre-occupied with character of the neo-colonial state, the protagonist rightfully denounced the neo-colonial state as unprogressive and therefore unable to deliver democracy in the continent (Mafeje, 2002:8). Thus alternatives to the neo-colonial state were sought after, as the opposition to neo-colonial state intensified; this gave an opportunity to increasing number of states that proclaimed themselves as socialist states. The supposed “African socialist states turned out to be as undemocratic and authoritarian as the rest” (Mafeje, 2002:8). Consequently they were denounced by the radical left, leaving almost no alternative from the neo-colonial state, hence the persistence of the neo-colonial state in Africa long after independence from colonial masters was proclaimed.


This Chapter affirmed no unique contribution that Mafeje’s made on the nature of the state in Africa, but pointed out that Mafeje did present a different narrative of the post colonial state, from the known usual narrative that presents post-colonial African state as weak and unable to bring any real economic changes. Mafeje’s analysis of colonialism in not only limited to political and socio-economic issues, as is usually the case, rather Mafeje went a step further, an analysed the relationship between anthropology and colonialism. He proved, through a sustained critique that it was a product of a colonial project, driven by the colonialist state. The departure point of this chapter has been to establish a relationship between the colonial state in Africa, and how it influenced social sciences, especially anthropology. Mafeje’s deconstructionist discourse is reflective of the intensification of anti imperialist struggle in post-independance African state and there is a lot ‘other’ social science disciplines can garner from Mafeje’s doconstructionist discourse.
Chapter Seven

Post Apartheid South Africa: Democracy and Civil Society.

7.1 Introduction.

The struggle for democracy in South Africa culminated in a democratic dispensation in 1994. The democratic government was faced with the immediate task of creating a conducive political environment for a pluralistic society. This was partly necessitated by the injustices of the past, and the government that was not tolerant to pluralistic political views. Further; the government had to ensure equal participation by all citizens in economic activity. Faced with all these challenges, it will seem that the system of governance and the constitutions were the direct outcomes of a protracted negotiation rather than something that the ANC ‘opted for, as it is often supposed. In this chapter we present tenets of liberal democracy as they find expression in South Africa. Through the work of Mafeje we provide a critique of liberal democracy. We agree with Mafeje that social democracy would be well suited political model in addressing challenges of democracy in South Africa. The second part of this chapter discusses civil society and how it functions within the liberal political framework and what can be gained from engaging Mafeje’s scholarship on civil society.

7.2. The Narrative of Democracy in South Africa.

The minimal definition of democracy suggests that a democratic regime has to have at least the following characteristics: universal adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source of information (Morlino, 2002: 5). Among those that meet these minimum criteria, further empirical analysis is still necessary to detect the degree to which they have achieved the two main objectives of an ideal democracy: freedom and equality (Morlino, 2002), meaning a hybrid regimes whose failure to insure a minimum level of civil rights keeps them below the minimum threshold requirements for classification as democratic.

More than ever before there is a widespread tendency to equate democracy with liberal capitalism in a way that reinforces the cultural imperialism to which the developing world has long been subjected. Individualism thus takes precedence over the more communal histories of African societies, with civil and political rights accorded priority over social, economic and cultural rights. Many in the West have tended to view recent changes in Africa as the
natural triumph of liberal democracies in the Cold War. Fukuyama (1992), for one, argued that we have come to the end of history because liberal capitalism is the only viable path remaining to the peoples of the world (Adelman, 1987: 5). South Africa’s democracy and its constitution have been hailed as a best model of a universally accepted democracy, and as an archetype for other states to model (Knowlton, 2009: 288). The ‘type’ of democracy in South Africa was also influenced by the plurality of the South African political landscape at the time of the negotiations.

According to White (1998), democratic citizenship is undermined if there is too great a gap between the egalitarian norms of democratic polity and the inequalities of individuals. That has been a problem of post democratic South Africa. In the main the social inequalities are a product of constitutionalised apartheid. The need to ensure that the injustices of apartheid will not be repeated might have compelled the post-1994 South African government to put more focus on political rights, the main feature of liberal democracy. To do away with political inequalities, although maybe insufficient, in South Africa, the efforts involved affirmative action, black economic empowerment, all aimed at uplifting the historically disadvantaged groups. It should be noted that the persistence of economic inequality does not suggest that the South African government has not attempted to redress past socio-economic injustices. In recent time, African scholars have been highly critical of liberal democracy and further arguing that democracy must not solely focus on political rights but it must deliver economic empowerment. This led Edigheji (2005) to conclude that if democracy cannot deliver on the basic needs of the people, it will be short lived.

The ANC had to deal with the burden of expectation from millions of enfranchised black majority; the party received a clear majority of votes (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997)\(^{33}\). This demonstrates the level of trust and confidence the voting population had in the ANC. The party had the responsibility to foster social and economic reform, as well as the responsibility to transform social institutions. However, the ANC in government was soon to realize that there were stumbling blocks that it needed to overcome, if it was to make any meaningful inroads to eroding the injustices of the past. The major obstacle was the fact that the ANC inherited a highly indebted state (Lyman, 2007). This was combined with social backlogs which were created by the Apartheid state, and made the task of social

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\(^{33}\) The following are the results the ANC garnered since the 1994 elections: 62.65% in 1994, 66.35% in 1999, 65.90% in 2009, and 62.15% in 2014. It was only in the 2004 elections that the ANC received more than 2/3 of the votes (69.69%).
transformation a difficult one. The situation was made worse by the fact that the white minority, under the auspices of the National Party, as it might have been expected, negotiated to safeguard their narrow political interests. Unsurprisingly they seem to have been concerned more about the defence of their privileges. (Knowlton, 2009: 295). While on the other hand the ANC needed to be careful and ensure that the party will not falter on the general expectations that were generated by the euphoria of the then possible democratic elections. However in many instances, the ANC and the National Party emerged as the two main political parties (Knowlton, 2009: 295)

With these conditions in existence, constitutional democracy based on liberal values was chosen because it was assumed that “not only would it enable all South Africans to have a stake in their system (in a normative sense), it would also allay fears of the ANC or the National Party from utilizing the state to either punish or oppress the other side” (Knowlton, 2009: 295). The starting point in “fostering equality was through a constitutional democracy. In other words, only true democracy can guarantee rights. This is why the ANC’s decision to take up arms to secure the rights of South Africa’s people will only be fulfilled in a government of the people, by the people, and for the people” (Mandela, 1993). Unifying South Africans was among the immediate responsibilities of the African National Congress. The country had for decades been characterized by racial violence and other social ills that perpetuated divisions along racial lines. South Africa under the apartheid regime was characterised by a legal system based on racial discrimination. The task of the democratic state was the need for a legal system based on non-discrimination and equality before the law. Thus the constitution was crafted with these realities in mind. The ANC faced two challenges; the first was the stabilization of the South African state. Secondly, the institutionalization of democracy. Both these seem to have been necessary in ensuring that South Africa does not revert to political instability.

The democratic state in South Africa is yet to be successful in addressing the challenges of racialised disparities; by and large white South Africans are still the main players in the economy. Constitutional democracy in South Africa has not been able to undo the historical legacy of economic ownership that was created by the apartheid government. Infact, some have argued that aspects of our constitution, such as the property clause, have entrenched and legitimized white minority gains, especially in highly contested terrain of land ownership in the country.
Liberal democracy, with its emphasis on legally defined equality, (such as equality before the law, and broader political rights that it offers) has proven to be unsuccessful in de-racialising socio-economic conditions of black South Africans. Liberal democracy in South Africa at least has not challenged the structural inequalities that were created by the apartheid state. In some instances, constitutional democracy in South Africa’s case has unintentionally re-enforced past inequalities. For example, the South African public discourse has been in the past dominated by discussions on how South Africa hopes to change the racially aligned land ownership while it has emphasised the importance of property clause. Consequently, after 18 years of democracy in South Africa, whites still own more than 80% of land (Mngxitama, 2014), while by and large, black South Africans, who constitute the majority of the population are still marginalized from ownership. Thus, race still determines one’s relationship to land. Ownership and labour dialectic is still defined along racial lines.

7.3. Government understands of democratic challenges in South Africa.

The National Planning Commission (NPC), which was set up by the government in order to develop a planning framework for the country, “drew attention to the fact that despite the achievements made during the first 16 years of democracy, the persistence of widespread poverty and extreme inequality in a middle-income country poses a major threat to social cohesion and nation building” (NPC, 2009). The conclusion of the NPC is that should these challenges persist, and the government continues with the programmes of the preceding 16 years without a radical shift, the government will fail to meet its objectives of reducing the levels of inequality, unemployment, and poverty eradication. The NPC (2009) propose that the vision of the country for the next 30 years should be focused and be rooted on social and economic transformation. There is widespread agreement that the first decade of the democratic dispensation was focused on democratization and notwithstanding the efforts of government in bridging inequality gap, the levels of inequality are high. At the 53rd National Conference, the ANC proclaimed that, “there is little contest that the main success of the first 15 years of the new South Africa was our peaceful and thoroughgoing political and democratic transformation. Although this took place in a global context of democratic transitions, there are elements of our transition that are specific (if not unique) to South Africa” (52nd National Conference). The particular challenges that are specific to South Africa
seem to relate to the history of injustice, which ensured that most black South Africans do not participate in economic activities of the country.

The 52nd National Conferences listed the following as the provisions of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, as well as, the guiding principles and parameters for the South Africa’s democratic polity. These included “regular elections in a multi-party democracy; protection against discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, religion, creed and sexual orientation; the commitment to gender equality; freedom of association, movement, speech and the media; protection of workers’ rights, and the rights of children and the elderly; and equality before the law” (52nd ANC National Conference, 2012). The document on the Second Transition further highlights that South Africa’s freedom was not solely about political rights but about the struggle that was inextricably bound to socio-economic emancipation. Before the 53rd National Conference, other ANC guiding documents had addressed the same issue: the ANC Constitutional Guidelines (1987), Ready to Govern (1992), and during the democratic dispensation the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP, 1994). All the documents detailed the need to transform the South African economy in order to reflect the countries demographics and deal with the injustices of the past.

Notwithstanding challenges relating to economic transformation, South Africa has made progress in providing basic amenities. As it has been acknowledged by the NPC (2010:6) in its Diagnostic Overview that, since 1994, significant progress has been made. Access to primary and secondary education has been expanded to include almost the entire age cohort. Ten million people have been accommodated in formal housing. Primary healthcare has been expanded. Access to electricity and water has been significantly expanded. Enrolment in higher education has almost doubled and, in terms of its race and gender demographics, is more representative of our nation. Although the ANC understands that progress has been made in the provision of basic services and in the macroeconomic stabilisation, however, the party often agrees that there is a long way to go, “particularly, in the transformation of the economy” (50th ANC National Conference).

These improvements in the provisions of basic services were applauded by the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), which noted that between 1996 and 2010 an average of 1 019 formal houses were built per day (mainly by government, but also by the private sector), compared with an average of 79 shacks per day during the same period, with similar
improvements in access to sanitation, water and electricity. All these point to the energy the governing party and the government has devoted to rolling back the social backlogs that were left by the apartheid state.

Despite all these positive strides, South African society is still divided by deeply rooted socio-economic inequalities, poverty and unemployment. All these challenges reflect the racial discrimination of the Apartheid state. By and large, the poor are black people and the rich are white South African citizens. Statistics South Africa reflected that in 1995 the median expenditure among Africans was R333 a month compared to whites at R3 443 a month. In 2008, median expenditure for Africans was R454 a month compared to whites at R5 668 a month assign of inequality. Towards a Ten Year Review produced in 2003, the government identified key fault lines that if left unattended will reverse the achievements made in the democratic dispensation. In 2010, the NPC’s Diagnostic Overview repeated the same thing; it stated that in spite of these successes, “our conclusion is that on a business-as-usual basis, we are likely to fall short in meeting our objectives of a prosperous, united, non-racial and democratic South Africa with opportunity for everyone, irrespective of race or gender” (NPC, 2009:7).

In the African continent the focus has been on the need to undo the legacy of colonialism. Understood this way, democracy will be viewed as mutually inclusive, with socio-economic gains for all members of the society. Doing away with all the social ills will enable citizens to participate fully in democratic processes. This is premised on the assumption that if bread and butter issues have been addressed, citizens might be able to participate fully in democratic processes and by so doing shape the outcome in decision making. Edigheji (2005) captures this well; he has asserted that when individuals have overcome socio-economic challenges, “they will be able to exercise real choice, that is after they have overcome poverty, squalor or ignorance as these constitute constrains on freedom and equality” (Edigheji, 2005: 8). This is intractably linked to the idea of developmental state, which does not only embody the principles of electoral democracy, but “also ensures citizens participation in development and governance processes” (Edigheji, 2005:13).

In its 2012 annual January 8th statement, the ANC reinforced the above sentiments, “the process of developing a sense of common nationhood or a common vision of the future, has
been slow. We continue to have different and differing perspectives on the processes unfolding in our country. Despite the progress we have made, there remain deep fault lines in our society that continue to undermine our vision of a united, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa” (2012 January 8th statement). The fault lines that are highlighted include deep racially based inequalities and unemployment, which are acknowledged as capable of reversing all the democratic gains that have been made since 1994. The 52nd ANC National Conference agreed that the growing need for reflection on our developmental trajectory is based on the acknowledgement of the far-reaching achievements of political liberation and democratisation, and concern about the lack of commensurate progress in liberation from socio-economic bondage.

The 2007 Strategy and Tactics document of the ANC echoed the above sentiment that the process of political transition is almost complete and therefore the next step for South Africa should be focused on consolidation and deepening of democracy. It further stipulates the need to build a common vision and acknowledges that this could not be done until the existing inequalities are addressed. According to the Strategy and Tactics (2007a) in order to build a consensus on the common vision, there is a need to resolve historic social injustice. The Strategy and Tactics (2007) document, therefore calls for ‘corrective measures’ beyond political rights, and a systematic programme of affirmative action aimed at those excluded on the basis of race, class and gender in the process eradicating apartheid’s legacy of racial discrimination. For example as the social inequalities diminish, the need for affirmative action might also diminish. However, at the current juncture these measures are needed in order to ‘level the playing field’ between black and white. To emphasise the need for economic transformation the ANC adopted its “second transition” document in Mangaung in December 2012. This seems to be based on the premise that the ‘first transition’ was focused on political rights, while the ‘second transition’ will need to focus more on addressing economic inequalities. The approaches used to attain the first transition have proven inadequate for social and economic transformation.

These historical realities did not stop the ANC from searching for new options, for example the National General Council (NGC) of the party that was held in the year 2000, posed the question, “should we be satisfied with merely maintaining and tinkering with the so-called ‘modern sophisticated economy and infrastructure that the white man bequeathed us’ or
should we search for bold and creative solutions” (NGC, 2000). These questions within the ANC and its alliance partners have emerged because of the realisation that the structure of the “apartheid colonial economy has remained the same, and that in this form, it is incapable of fostering either higher or inclusive growth” (52nd ANC National Conference).

7.4. Mafeje’s alternative to liberal democracy.

Although Mafeje (1999) accepts the long history of concepts such as democracy, he also acknowledges that these concepts have western origins “going as far back as classical Greece” (Mafeje, 1999: 2). But he does challenge the universal meaning of these concepts, especially the Western supposition that they should mean one thing for all societies at all times. He believes that “each social epoch raises particular questions about human conditions and the value of social existence” (Mafeje, 1999:2). Thus each society and generation should be allowed space and time to raise questions about the meaning and value of these concepts in their particular context and society. Liberal democracy and its alternative social democracy have been part of human history for a long time, and as such Mafeje (2002) argues that liberal democracy in particular has come to be treated as universally valid and everlasting. As would be readily acknowledged, their connotations are socially and historically determined (Mafeje, 2002). For a number of decades liberal democracy remained unrivalled. Therefore, not surprisingly, it is the best studied and the most well advertised form of ‘democracy’ (Mafeje, 1995:7), and judging by the continued implementation of its tenets, it is the most ‘accepted’ form of democracy.

Mafeje (1998) posed serious questions about liberal democracy, “Can liberal democracy, as advocated by western societies, be as useful to Africans as it is regarded by the Western powers. Or should Africans, through their own experiences allow a political system to develop naturally from local conditions, as it was with liberal democracy in western societies”’. Since the introduction of “pattern variables” by Talcott Parsons (1951) it has always been assumed that as societies advance “particularism” will be supplanted by “universalism.” The assumption is that all human societies will progress in the same manner and the expectation was that societies will face similar if not same challenges. In recent times, this thinking has been advanced by Margaret Thatcher’s idea that ‘there is no alternative’ and Fukuyama’s (1991) notion of “the end of history.” These were just part of the indication that the Western powers have arrogated to themselves the right to dictate to ‘others’. Hence Western forms of democracy have been universalised despite the fact that most societies,
especially those outside Europe are often faced with different challenges compared with the European countries. Globalisation has been the catalyst of the spread of liberal democracy. The underpinning understanding is that there will be globalised values and that the Western powers will be the custodians of those values. Probably it is the realisation that there is an attempt to homogenise all values by the Westerners that forced Prah (cited in Mafeje, 2000) to reject this attempt. Prah (cited by Mafeje, 2000b) demands that ‘we must be national before we become international’. The replacement of particularism with universalism plays into the hands of the more powerful. The West, in terms of human rights and democratic models, has seen it necessary to hegemonies all values and go as far as arrogating to themselves the right to defend these values. As liberal democracies become accepted as ‘the best model’ societies outside the Western world were/are being forcefully compelled to abide by the prescripts of liberal democracy as the best form of democracy.

Contrary to current Western suppositions about ‘globalisation’, different conceptions of humanity and different ways of ordering human life might well lead to polycentrism rather than homogeneity/homogenisation (Mafeje, 2000b). This has led to many scholars and general populace of the third world to object and question the ‘western way of doing’. According to Mafeje (1998b) attempts by the West to homogenise all values are being resisted by the majority of the people in the Third World. It is worth quoting Mafeje at length in this regard:

While this inevitably involves power relations and economic exploitation, increasingly it impinges on cosmological questions, being in one’s universe. Although the latter might dwell in the realm of the metaphysical, it is a very short step from the metaphysical to the philosphical. For instance, does democracy mean freedom; or is “human rights” a celebration of anthropology of all humanity or is it self-glorification by the West at its moment of absolute triumph, an affirmation of its discretionary power which allows it to pick and choose in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, South Africa, the Congo, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Palestine, Afghanistan and now Kosovo? Apart from the obvious political implications and unmistakable cynicism, this is an indication that these concepts, despite their universalistic pretensions, are subject to more than one interpretation i.e. they are subject to manipulation. This is part of the problem with which independent thinking intellectuals have to contend. Fraudulent and hypocritical interventions must be exposed for double standards.
cannot at the same time serve as a basis for universal claims. Indeed, even without such duplicity, it is very doubtful philosophically if at the level of values there can be any universalism. It is significant that the leaders of the “free world,” namely, the Americans, unabashedly justify committing atrocities outside the West by putting a premium on their values and way of life. Far from affirming any kind of universalism, this pits one universe against all others (Mafeje, 1999:2).

Human species have been faced with new challenges that were nonexistent or not at the level as they are today when liberal democracy was first conceived. As a way of an example, “while liberal democracy upholds the principle of equality of all citizens in front of the law, it does not address the question of social equity” (Mafeje, 2002: 10). For that reason it is unable to deal with issues that have confronted contemporary society, issues such as food shortages, disease and other socio-economic challenges. Nationally, for instance in a country like South Africa, liberal democracy has been unwittingly used to maintain white privilege. Internationally, liberal democracy has given the more powerful countries the moral high ground to do as they wish in the pretence of defending or maintaining law and order under the auspices of liberal democracy.

European struggle with feudal lords and autocratic monarchs produced liberal democracy, after “many years of social struggles the state became subject to their will (the peoples will)” (Mafeje, 2002: 8). Hence liberal democracy should be viewed and understood to be a product of the European evolution, as such the application of the contents of liberal democracy on the African continent should be guided by such understanding. Aspects of liberal democracy, such as, “separation of powers, representative government, the supremacy of parliament, rule of law, and an accountable bureaucracy are attributes that would go a long way in transforming the African neo-colonial state” (Mafeje, 2002:10). This will be a long struggle for African leaders, who are at times perceived to be mostly accountable to themselves than the general African populace. It is these struggles that might produce something that is not neo-colonial. For this to be possible, as it was the case in Europe, Civil Society must according Mafeje (2002) be able to assimilate into itself the political society whose ultimate incarnation is the state. This will be among many suggestions on how to entrench the African state on the society. The other suggestion has been to incorporate the democratic state into traditional forms of governance, such as chieftainship. This, it has been argued will be
counteracting the colonial impositions. But for a number of reasons, Mafeje (1998) did not think this would work. Firstly, he cited that the desire to control the state is ever present among the government leaders. Secondly, African chieftaincy (especially in Southern Africa) was/is enormously discredited to ever be trusted by the citizenry.

The contents of liberal democracy have been questioned within Western societies, where, as it has been mentioned above, liberal democracy has its roots. Challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality were the root causes that led people to question the promises of liberal democracy. Mafeje (1995) noted that “it was not an ideological revulsion but a well-founded perception of the good that was not being delivered. This did not become crystal clear until the onset of the ‘Deep Depression’ of 1929-1933. Liberal individualism could not give any solace to multitudes of unemployed and starving individuals nor could ‘laissez-faire’ theories of the 19th century suffice. The liberal model with its trickle-down suppositions had collapsed” (Mafeje, 1995; 8). Thusfar is South Africa; liberal democracy has not been able to address the triple challenges that have been identified by government, namely, Inequality, Unemployment and Poverty. While some of the tenets of liberal democracy are relevant to South Africa, in terms of protecting individual rights, liberal democracy is found wanting on major issue (inequality) that is confronting the South African countries. Liberal democracy could not provide answers to the challenge and increasing gap between the poor and the rich; the supposed trickle down effects of the market do not impact positively on the lives of the individuals, even when South Africa’s economy was growing at 5% during the period 2006-2007.

Mafeje (2002) suggested an alternative to liberal democracy, especially for new democracies. Firstly, he suggested that the “sovereignty of the people should be recognised as both a basic necessity and a fundamental right. Secondly, social justice, not simply formal rights, should constitute the foundation of the new democracy. Third, the livelihood of the citizens should not be contingent on ownership of property but on equitable access to productive resources” (Mafeje, 2002:12). Such proposal, he seemed to have suggested, will effectively deal with the problem of inequality. He points out that under liberal democracy citizens belong to the same territory but few have the means to access and make use of its resources. He realised that for peace in Africa to exist there has to be democracy, however by ‘democracy’ is not meant merely formal individual rights but, above all, collective social responsibility (Mafeje, 1995). Collective responsibility for social actions can exist under the auspices and ambit of social
democracy. All societies have to define democracy according to their own conditions and life experiences. Democracy in South Africa does not necessarily have to be defined to mean promotion of individual rights but focus has to be placed on the importance of collective social responsibility. Most African communities and societies (including South Africa) are built on the strength of the collective responsibility and sense of belonging to a group not individualism which is the sole focus of liberal democracy. This is often found in expression such as ‘umntu ngumntu ngabantu’ (I am because we are). That has always been the spirit that defined and held the core of the African communities together. The elevation of individual rights above collective rights has always been foreign to most Africans. The emphasise on the collective has always generated collective action in attempts to provide solution to Africa problems. Economic and development models in the continent must resemble the collective rather than individual/ private needs hence liberal economic models do not find resonance in most Africa societies. It has to be mentioned that all this discussions form part of the debate by African scholars after independency but these discussions were locked in two binaries, and such “African scholars were not able to break new ground” (Mafeje, 2002:12). The debate never got extended beyond accepting or rejecting liberal democracy. It is Professor Mafeje that sort to extend the discussion beyond these binaries.

South Africa is struggling to incorporate the role of the chiefs within pluralistic democratic institutions. This is proving to be difficult to achieve, the traditional courts bill has been contested a lot recently in the public arena. Those who are opposed to it argue that chiefs cannot be incorporated in a pluralistic democracy because they are oppressive and thus their incorporation will go against the spirit and the values of the South African constitution. On the other hand those arguing for the incorporation of this institution basetheir argument on the fact that most social entities are part of this pluralistic democratic government and so there are no reasonable grounds for leaving out the traditional institutions. But Mafeje (1998) also warned against reversion to the past with all its pitfalls or relapse into uncritical culture revivalism (1998: 7), which is what seems to be what is happening in South Africa with the traditional courts bill.

On this issue South Africa can learn a lot from the writings of Mafeje (1997), who clearly asserted that it would be difficult to incorporate traditional leaders into a democratic system in South Africa because they lost trust from the citizens largely because of the role they played during the apartheid years, and during the negotiation between the liberation
movements and the National Party (NP). They sided with the former oppressors during the negotiations. Hence they lost political legitimacy as they were increasingly seen as part of those who oppressed black majority. If policy makers in South Africa were aware of Mafeje’s (1997) inferences about the chiefs, such policy exercise would probably have been avoided and an alternative role and responsibility would be found for the chiefs.

Mafeje asserts that popular movements for democracy in Africa revolved around three major demands: (i) abolition of one party state in favour of democratic pluralism, (ii) decentralisation of power i.e. greater local autonomy, and (iii) respect for human rights and the rule of law by African governments. Mafeje, points out that it is fair to state that before 1980’s African scholars were not unduly worried about one party state but more about the failure of the African state to deliver what had been promised at independence (Mafeje, 1998: 4). Mafeje (1998) argues that at times democracy in Africa is treated as exogenous and independent of local history, as is exemplified by conventional discussions about liberal democracy in Africa. This he argues has led to the celebration of liberal democracy because scholars in the continent were not able to provide alternatives. This led to a realisation that formal “declaration of all the prerequisites for western democracy does not necessarily realise liberal democracy (Mafeje, 1998: 6).

Africa requires something more than impoverished liberal democracy that prevails in industrial counties (Ake, 1996: 129). A belief that is shared by Mafeje, that liberal democracy is inimical to the idea of people having effective decision making power (1996: 132). Ake offered as an alternative; a socialist democracy that places emphasis on concrete political, social and economic rights, as opposed to liberal democracy that emphasises abstract political rights (Ake, 1996: 132). According to Mafeje (1998) Wamba dia Wamba (1992) took the discussion to its logical conclusion by calling for an African democracy that relied on traditional mechanisms such as village palavers and lineage assemblies. Mafeje (1998) believed that this could be one version of people’s democracy and local autonomy.

Mafeje (1998) explained social democracy as referring to equitable distribution of power and means of livelihood among all members of society. Mafeje (1998: 8) believes that the outcomes of social democracy can be easily assessed unlike the abstract liberal democracy, because at its centre, social democracy has the people as the major point of reference. Under the present conditions where human development has been scientifically elaborated, it is highly researchable and measurable unlike liberal or bureaucratic socialist
formations (1998: 8). Historically and conceptually, social democracy has as its referent people and as well as the well being of the people (1998: 8).

7.5. Overview of Civil Society Organisation in the African Continent.

There is no a single agreed definition of civil society. Adding to that is the fact that it is impossible to generalise about the character of civil society in different parts of the globe. This is an attempt to provide a brief overview of civil society organisations in the African continent. The term civil society has formed much of the debate in social science, with definitions and the application of the concept being contested by different scholar’s overtime. Linz and Stepan (2000) define the notion of civil society as follows, “by civil society we refer to that arena of the polity where self-organising groups, movements and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests. The emphasis is on the independence of civil society organisation among other social actors in societies. Thus, civil society is seen as an independent entity in a pluralistic social sphere; this implies tolerance, and accommodation of different social views and interest within the public space. At the same time they assumed the independence of civil society organisation from other power centres, like business and from the state. Habib and Kotze (2002) agree with Linz and Stepan (2000); they defined civil society as the organized expression of various interests and values operating in the triangular space between the family, state, and the market. Such definition correctly places civil society outside the ambit and auspices of the state, and thus independant of the state. It becomes the space that connects the general citizen with the state, thus in definition at least, civil society organisations should be focused on safe guarding the interest of the citizens.

Since Aristotle first conceived the concept of civil society, which was to be latter popularised by Antonio Gramsci, the notion has been part of the social science debate. The debate has centred on whether the concept can be universally defined to mean the same thing for all human societies. For example is ‘civil society’ in Europe mean the same thing as civil society in Latin America, in Africa etc. It seems that the material and political conditions determine the content and character of civil society.

Friedman and McKaiser (2012) slightly differ with the definition that has been advanced above, they defined civil society as a realm in which citizens acquire a voice enabling them to

34 see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_society.
ensure that government responds to their needs and is accountable to them. Thus citizens become actively involved in civil society organisations not with the intention to shy away from the power of the state, but are engaged in activism to ensure that they have a voice in policy discourse and decision making processes of the state. Azarya (2001) argues that the concept civil society is founded on recognition that all people have similar rights and obligations and that there is a readiness to moderate particular or parochial interests in consideration of some common good. Hence every social stratum is characterised by people who have organized themselves around particular needs. In South Africa the concept of ‘civil society’ has at times been made to be synonymous with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and as such the status of NGOs is made to be a reflection of civil society. However, Friedman and McKaiser (2012: 16) describe civil society to “includes any association in which citizens associate to engage with the state, from trade unions and business associations to small grassroots organisations of the poor”. This means any interest group with defined interest and that is organizing outside the realm of the state can be recognized as part of civil society.

In political science literature, there are a great number of different explanations of the notion of civil society, reflecting the controversies in civil society research and the different political and cultural contexts. Therefore, there is no generally accepted definition of this term (de Neve, 2011). However, within political science research there is a much more common definition of civil society. Civil society organisations are viewed as an intermediary space between the state and the citizens. For this reason civil society organisations are expected to have strong relations with both ‘entities’. In political science this space is viewed as a shared between civil society and other social actors, hence in playing their intermediary role, the state should have relations with other entities such as media. Content orientation (for example, charitable, service base) and the scope of these entities are differentiating aspects of civil society organisations. Some focus on health and ecology. While the scope of the influence is the major differentiating factor between say local civil society organisation, to those that have influence within the city and those that have a national audience.

In this thesis we avow that civil society organisations operates within pluralistic environment, and that civil society organisations do not operate as a homogenous block, thus its relationship with the state or analysis of the relationship with the state should be informed by
this reality. We do not aim to focus on the details that differentiate between different civil societies organisations; it broadly refers to civil society without focusing on content orientation. The departure point of this thesis is that there are trends that bind civil society together and the relationship they have with the state. Consequently the analysis of the state-civil society relationship will not reflect any of the differences that may exist in civil society organisations; as such differences are merely operational.


The 1980’s saw the African continent being characterised by a wave of democratization, which removed well established authoritarian regimes in the greater part of continent. Establishment of ‘formal democracy’ was given a boost by many factors, these include mobilised communities that were demanding accountability and better standard of living from the state and international donor agencies and western governments who covertly or overtly supported democratisation. For the latter, part of their conditionality was to compel new governments on the continent to abide by certain standards that are ‘expected’ from a democratic country. As most African countries democratized, the space for civil society groups opened up. For example, in late 1989, civil servants, teachers, and traders in Benin were the first to bring an end to autocracy and economic mismanagement. In Zambia, the Congress of Trades Union followed suit by successfully challenging the two-decade incumbency of Kenneth Kaunda and his United Independence Party. In South Africa, community-based "civies" were crucial in ending apartheid” (Gyimah-Boadi, 2008:1).

Historically the middle class organizations have been the frontrunners in establishing and maintaining civil society organizations, however, political and economic instability in some of the African countries has impacted negatively on them and as such they have lost their organizational capacity. The churches, whose leadership often forms part of the middle class strata, maintained “financial security and independence” (Gyimah-Boadi, 2008:3). Gyimah-Boadi (2003) further noted that nationalists view them with suspicion because of their colonial origins. The church played a pivotal role in South Africa, challenging the moral standards of the Apartheidstate, depicting the state as immoral both domestically and internationally. In social science literature widely, there is no agreement on whether the church is the part of civil society, however, as demonstrated above, it has in some stages of history defended the interest of the people.
In the recent decades, the African continent has experienced the emergence of community based organisations that add to “socioeconomic and political setting conducive to democracy” (Gyimah-Boadi, 2008:3). These organisations are often engaged in social awareness campaigns, consciousness raising about issues that may impact the lives of citizens in particular settings and are independent from the state largely because they have limited direct interaction with the state. At times these organisations are not funded and as such do not have capacity to organize beyond a certain setting or locality. They are compelled to rely on external agencies for funding. However, “the foreign origins of this assistance render it suspect in the eyes of local authorities” (Gyimah-Boadi, 2008:3).

The importance and the work that civil society organisations are engaged in has not gone unnoticed by the national governments in Africa. African governments have been determined to keep them in check. Since “1991, governments in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe have proposed or enacted legislation designed to strengthen official authority over NGOs” (Gyimah-Boadi, 2008:4). On the other hand, NGOs have not done themselves any favour, as they often associate themselves with both international donor agencies and opposition parties. Lack of funding is also a source of weakness for civil society organisations in some part of the continent. The most active entities of civil society, such as Trade Unions, student organisations are not as active as they should be because at times they are largely dependent on the state for their survival. Even worse in some parts of the continent (as elsewhere in the world), the state uses repression as the form of silencing civil society activities.

7.7. The History of Civil Society in South Africa.

In apartheid South Africa the relationship between the state and civil society was a mirror image of a racialised society. For example black led civil society groups took an “adversarial and conflictual approach to the state, while on the other hand by and large whites led civil society groups took collaborative and collegiate approach” (Habib, 2002:3). The black civil society establishment was in one way or the other linked to the liberation movements, thus the agenda they took was to a certain extent informed by the need to liberate the majority of blacks from the brutality of the apartheid government. While on the other hand, it would seem, white civil society organisations were based on the need to maintain the status quo of the apartheid government, and by so doing maintain their white privileges.
The major feature of white civil society before the fall of apartheid state was the difference between those that were pro-business and those that supported the state oppression. Organisations and institutions were “either pro-apartheid and/or pro-business” (Habib, 2003:6). The major political contest in this regard seemed to have been between “the Broederbond and N.G. Kerk and liberal oriented pro-business organisations like the Institute of Race Relations and the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) (Habib, 2003: 5). For liberals, the major issue was not about the continuity of the Apartheid state, rather how should business be done within the confines of the apartheid state, even the most liberal white civil society organisations were not directly opposed to the continuity of the apartheid state as this would mean an end to the racially based privileges. Rather they were concerned with refining the Apartheid state to make it work for their political and economic gains, they did not challenge its existence. It is worth noting that the Apartheid state has a very specific connotation and was linked with the National Party. Many of the liberal organisations were not averse to a racially constructed state but they did not necessarily support Grand Apartheid scheme. In other words, there were many aspects of the apartheid framework that they were willing to give up, while not rejecting racialised order. But there were those who rejected racialist framework without necessarily supporting majority rule within a unitary system.

In the 1970’s “anti-apartheid NGOs like the unions and the array of organizations associated with the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) began to make their presence felt (Marx 1992). A combination of harassment from the state security agencies and lack of resources ensured that these organisation had minimal impact in their engagement with the state, but still had strong impact in mobilizing black communities” (Sparks, 1990:41). Although harassment weakened black-led civil society organizations they would not stop their quest for liberation of the black majority. Despite not having resources and having to deal with constant police harassment, black-led civil society organization remained relevant in black communities because of the political value they represented.

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35 Few organisations, such as Black Sash were an exception.
36 We have kept in mind that maintaining racial privileges does not necessarily require the apartheid State framework. Racism can flourish without the kind of political system that the Apartheid State erected. The US is a case in point.
A combination of political uprising (particularly the 1976 Soweto student uprising) and the call from the leadership of the ANC to make South Africa ungovernable together with the political ‘reforms’ in the 1980’s played a catalytic role in re-energising black civil society organisations. The “Soweto revolt in 1976 and the more general upsurge in protest including union activity throughout the 1970s created a struggle between reformers and conservatives within the heart of the state” (Sparks, 1990:41). Some elements within the NP wanted reforms that will be in line with economic imperatives of the time, but the conservatives within the party wanted the status quo maintained, meaning a continuation of marginalization of the black majority. The success of P.W. Botha and his reformist coalition in the leadership succession within the NP in the late 1970s created the opportunity for the promulgation of the reformist project (Sparks 1990). Consequently, the South African political landscape experienced some form of institutional reforms, which wittingly or un-wittingly created space for the re-emergence of anti-apartheid civil society. On the other hand, the continuing brutality of state, as experienced in the Soweto uprising of 1976 ensured that black community would continue to be mobilised and organized not only within the ambit and auspices of the liberation movements, but there was a need to spread the pool to include Unions, Churches etc. Although the state had led some reforms, political persecution of the liberation movements and civil society continued; but against all this, black civil society maintained its legitimacy within the black communities.

The other element that gave rise to the re-emergence of civil society in South Africa in the 1980’s was the availability of resources. The most important of these resources is the, “human resource(s) increasingly became available in the early 1980s as university students and graduates politicized by the activities of the 1970s, and political prisoners, many of whom were released in the early 1980s, came together in myriad of ways to not only organize community and political activities but to also establish non-profit institutions to support these mass struggles” (Habib, 2003: 5). This enabled civil society organisations to communicate and intensify the fight against apartheid, not only in South Africa but far beyond the borders of the country. This intensified the link between liberation fighters in the country, civil society organisations and foreign institutions. This led to the second type of resource that became available to black South African civil society, the financial resources that initially emerged from private foundations and foreign governments who were moved to act largely
due to the fact that the June 16 revolt and its consequences made its way to the televisions screens in the advanced industrialized world. (Habib, 2002: 5). The intensified political struggle in the country also forced the hand of some in corporate South Africa to take notice and draw parallel between the decline of profit and the struggle of the black majority (Stacey and Aksartova, 2001), hence some started to support black civil society organisations, with the much needed financial resources. The availability of resources from both, foreign and domestic donors, meant the black civil society was going to be able to reach a broader audience, which would have been difficult to reach without the support. This is in line with the resource mobilisation theory, which draws parallel between the availability of resources and the rise in social formations and movements (Tilly, 1978; McCarthy and Zald, 1977). It is important to note the fact that ‘reforms’ might have opened a political space for the establishment of civil society organisations, but civil society organisations that were led by black people remained opposed to the apartheid state and in turn the state treated them with great suspicion. This adversarial relationship between the state and black civil society organisations would continue until the Apartheid state fell in 1994.

7.8. The Character of the Post apartheid Civil Society.

The transition period also resulted in changes in the relationship between the state and civil society. With political liberation achieved, this also meant the success for the black-led civil society organization, which had almost the same goal with liberation movements. The major goal was to replace the Apartheid state with a democratically elected government. During the transition phase, “white civil society began to distance themselves from the apartheid regime” (Habib, 2003:4). With National Party (NP) clearly defeated at the polls in 1994, white-led civil society collaborative relationships with the state also come to an end. This is what led scholars such as Habib (2003) to conclude that in the contemporary era, the racial divide has all but disappeared with adversarial and collegiate relations extending across the entire ambit of civil society. Habib’s conclusion might have been true in the early days of the South African democracy, but as democracy become entrenched in South Africa, it is clear that civil society broadly (especially those that are funded outside South Africa) and white led civil society in particular have taken an opposing role to the State.

As it will be presented in this section of the thesis, civil society organisations in South Africa are faced with the same challenges that broadly confront civil society organisations in the
African continent, mainly that of having to prove that they can be trusted by the ruling parties and former liberation movements in particular. As it will be demonstrated some civil society organisations have shown signs of working with the ‘enemies’ (in South African case these are referred to as ‘anti revolutionary entities’) as such the civil society space in the African continent and in South Africa in particular cannot be presented as apolitical. In the post-1994 era, the ANC-led government set in motion a process of political restructuring which created a conducive environment for civil society to thrive. The first important aspect of this restructuring was the repeal of repressive legislation and the creation of a political climate that permitted public scrutiny and protest activity (Habib, 2003:6). Although there have been pockets of instances when the state has reacted with force when the citizens are involved in a protest, by and large, the security and the political environment in South Africa is much more enabling than it was during the apartheid era. South Africans easily take to the streets to demonstrate without fear of repression from the state. The high volume of demonstration since 1994 serves as the testimony to the fact that political and security environment in post 1994 South Africa is much more open to people organizing and mobilizing society in pursuit or in defense of their rights or interests.

Political rights are well entrenched in the South African constitution. The most important in this respect is the right to organize without fear of repression, hence the post-apartheid regime moved quickly to pass legislation and adopt practices to reorganize the political environment. To this end, a Non-Profit Act was passed that officially recognized civil society, created a system of voluntary registration for its constituents and provided benefits and allowances in exchange for NGOs and CBOs undertaking proper accounting and providing audited statements to government (Habib, 2003:6). The establishment of the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) was also a huge boast for civil society organisations. Among many labour related issues that this organisation deals with, it caters for representation from civil society. On top of this, the state has demonstrated willingness to partner with different stakeholders including civil society organisations in policy development and service delivery where it is deemed necessary. As civil society organisations experienced willingness on the part of the state to create an enabling environment for their existence and willingness to partner with them on policy development issues, civil society organisations began to show signs of change in their attitude towards the state. As they experienced a transformed state, they also transformed the manner in which
they engaged the state. The state was no longer the enemy that needed to be engaged with aggressively. With all these positive changes, civil society organisations still maintained their position outside the realm of the state, and maintained their independence from the state.

During the transition period there were readily available international donors, willing to assist South Africa in its democratization process. Some channelled their resources to civil society organisations, and this was coupled with the repeal of “the 1978 Fundraising Act which limited NGOs capacity to raise funds. Institutions like the National Development Agency (NDA) and the Lottery Commission were established with a mandate to fund legitimate non-profit activity” (Habib, 2003:7). These legislative changes and financial resources (partly resulting directly from the actions of the state) broadly resulted into a collaborative relationship between the state and civil society organisations, especially those who fought against the apartheid state and who had a history of being targeted by repressive laws of the past.

According to Habib (2003) the post apartheid South Africa has been characterised by two ‘types’ of NGO’s. The first involves the proliferation of informal, survivalist community based organizations, networks and associations, which enable poor and marginalized communities to simply survive against the daily ravages of neo-liberalism, and constitute the largest category of institutional formations within the sector (Russel and Swilling, 2002). While these should be recognized and celebrated as part of the vibrant post apartheid democratic society. The emergence of this ‘type’ of organisations should be recognized as the “responses of poor and marginalized people who have had no alternative in the face of a retreating state that refuses to meet its socio-economic obligations to its citizenry” (Habib, 2003: 9). There is a causal relationship between the rise in community based organisations and what is perceived as the failure of the government to provide basic services, specifically when addressing issues of unemployment, land reform, and health related issues.

Desai (2000) defined the second ‘type’ with national constituency, as social movements, this is made up of varied set of organisations that are focused on specific issue, such as Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), which is focused on dealing with issues pertaining to HIV/AIDS, and thus have focused on pressuring the state to provide antiretroviral medicines to HIV infected South Africans. The main differentiating aspect between the two categories is that
the second has a formal membership, and often with national membership, and have a defined and clear relationship with the state (Habib, 2003:9); the kind of the relationship depends largely on the issue. They can have either an adversarial relationship or that of engagement, and sometimes it involves both (Bond 2001; Desai 2002). While the first category is completely opposite; it does not have nationally-based membership, largely because it is community based, and often does not have a clearly defined relationship with the state. Habib (2003) captures in detail the difference between the two types of civil society organisations:

when engaging the state, this is of a qualitatively different kind to that of the formal NGOs. The latter has a relationship with the state that is largely defined by its sub-contractual role, whereas the former is on a relatively more even footing, engaging the state in an attempt to persuade it through lobbying, court action, and even outright resistance. The reconstitution of civil society in response to globalisation and neo-liberalism, then, has led to the evolution of a plurality of relationships between civil society and the post-apartheid state (Habib, 2003:10).

In recent past, the discussion about civil society in South Africa has been about whether they represent the views of all South Africans, especially the poor, who are often marginalized from any form of public participation, including participating in civil society forums. Most of the unemployed, casually employed and “informally employed are not directly represented by CSOs” (Friedman and McKaiser, 2012: 15). Thus, the participation of the poor and their views may not be reflected in civil society organizations. Some civil society groups are elitist in nature. They have offices in pricy business areas and yet claim to represent the workers/masses views (as civil society) as if they represent the opinions of the poor and the marginalized. In some instances, they have demonstrated on the streets under same banner with opposition parties. A close relationship between civil society organisations and opposition parties has blurred the lines between groups that are genuinely representing the interest of the people and politicking opposition parties. Predominantly, black civil society “organisations have not endorsed government action uncritically despite overwhelming black support for the current governing party – a pattern in marked contrast to trends in white Afrikaner society after 1948” (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999). Political space has remained opened for white civil society participation, which has, at times been used to advance their interests narrow political interest, Afriforum is one such organisation.
Since its inception in 1912, the ANC has constantly defined itself as a ‘broad church’, meaning it has been able to accommodate differing views, and presented itself as a movement that represented the aspirations of all people, particularly black people (Giliomee and Simkinsit, 1999). It is that projection that ensured that the ANC attracted alliance from civil society organisations, especially the trade union movements. This relationship between the ANC as the governing party and some civil society movements who were part of the ‘broad church’ continued. As such trade unions federations, such as COSATU, are more influential in government policy formulation than other members of the civil society. Consequently they have a more effective voice in government’s decision making. Thus, some of the civil society actions since 1994 have happened within the ambit and confines of the ANC and its alliance partners.

Civil Society dependence on donor funding for their survival “may shape their strategic priorities and ensure that organisations remain vulnerable” (Friedman and McKaiser, 2013:17). This ensures that civil society remain uneven. Some civil society organisations have more access to funding than others. This impacts their ability to actively engage the state. Thus, the more access to resources that civil society groups have the greater the chances that they will be in a better position to engage the state. Actions such as taking the state to court can be expensive and do require access to resources. This is but one example that demonstrates the relationship between being able to challenge the state and the availability of resources. There is “significant civil society activity in support of poverty reduction but it lacks the capacity to undertake a sustained and co-ordinated campaign against poverty because CSOs are not embedded enough among the poor” (Friedman and Mc Kaiser, 2012:17). Thus organisations representing the poor are unable to influence national discourse around issues of poverty, and thus unable to influence policy that is aimed at overcoming poverty. Hence it could be concluded that some civil society organisations in South Africa have weak roots within the poor communities and it is much more elitist in nature and with close to no constituency among the poor. Consistently there are individuals and groups who claim to represent the interest of the poor, but in fact may be using pro-poor rhetoric to serve their political interest.
The conflict between civil society organizations and the state is a consequence of the different roles, interest and expectations that the two entities are expected to serve, hence it should be expected that the two entities can be at the opposing ends. This conflictive nature of the relationship is a consequence of varying interest both entities hence “different actors, within the South African state, relate differently to South African civil society. Thus, through this process, “state” and “civil society” relations are shaped (Dikeni, 2007). However, this does not suggest that two entities cannot find a common ground. It should be understood that, “the state and civil society are in a relationship of mutual tension, but they are not irreconcilable opposed” (de Neve, 2011: 30).The two can be mutually reinforcing, in that a strong civil society is a product of successful state building, the consolidation of political systems, and the support of other stakeholders in the political system (de Neve, 2011). Civil society plays a critical role in establishing a state that accounts to its citizens, thus this creates a clear dilemma of interdependency.

The debate on civil society in South Africa has been confined in the binary of good and bad, as such these debates have polarized South African society. Those who argue against the activities of the civil society organisations, present civil society as the entities that cannot be ‘trusted’, while on the other hand some within the civil society believe that the state is a corrupt entity that cannot be trusted with delivering the interest of the poor. Hence, the “cowboy and crooks” approach on the debate, which is the simplistic notion of “good civil society and “bad state” or “good state” and “bad civil society” (Dikeni, 2007). In an attempt to harmonies these relations with the civil society organizations, the South African government has been at the forefront of developing and encouraging, what is popularly known as public-private partnerships, these have included civil society groups. This contradicts the “watchdog” approach that provides sweeping generalizations as to how State and civil society conduct their relations, with civil society being a ‘watchdog’ over the state and thus subjecting the state to account to free floating civil society organizations, thereby placing civil society organisations above the state and not as a partner towards achieving common vision. However, in principle, these are not necessarily exclusive, it is possible to envisage a future where both roles are legitimate and one CSO body functions in the same spaces simultaneously, and section 27 is one such example.

The watchdog approach is further undermined by the fact that the complexities of issues that face many societies compel collaboration among social actors. Issues such as HIV/AIDS,
global warming etc, do compel all social actors including civil society to work with the state in an attempt to resolve these issues. In line with its developmental state philosophy, the ANC-led government wanted the state to be the driving force behind the economy and the transformation of society hence it envisaged civil society as a partner in making this a reality. Civil society is at times perceived by the ANC-led government as an extension of its delivery capacity, and its role as an independent mechanism to challenge, contradict and influence policy has been largely overlooked. Thus the problems that are faced by governments compel all actors to acknowledge plurality of actors in providing solutions to social problems. In an environment that accepts the complexity of the social challenges, it is accepted that the state is not the only institution that could solve all societal challenges, the state is forced to interact with other social actors. In most occasions, this interaction between the state and civil society is because the challenges exceed the capacity of the state to address effectively. Friedman (2009) sums it up succinctly: “civil society associations are becoming delivery intermediaries between the framers of social policy and those for whom it is intended”. Greenstein (2003) argues further that, their ability to play this role would depend on their capacity to articulate the needs and concerns of their constituencies, the extent to which they develop a coherent programme of action and win public support for it, and their success in forming alliances with other like-minded actors.

7.9. Civil Society in Africa: Mafeje.
The concept ‘civil society’ has been debated by many scholars over a number of decades; the discussion has often centred on whether civil society is omnipotent and omnipresent in all human societies. Scholars on the African continent have also been grappling with these questions for over decades. “The term ‘civil society’ first appeared in modern European political vocabulary towards the end of the sixteenth century” (Mafeje, 1995:19). This is a clear demonstration that the concept has formed part of social science for a long time, particularly part of western social sciences. As such its early definition and application has conformed to the western historical realities. The literature presented above on civil society in South Africa does not take into consideration the western roots of the ‘civil society’. Rather there is a narrow focus on issues such as the type of civil society and its operational capacity, demonstrating willingness to uncritical accept western concepts. In this case, the South African scholars and public policy makers will learn a lot from Mafeje’s approach of taking a local data as a starting point in ensuring the relevance of his doctrine and challenging the
relevance of old western doctrines to African realities. The concept of civil society has been entrenched in the western world and it is for that reason that western scholars have thought that they have the monopoly of defining the meaning of the concept for all human societies, even to societies that are outside the western world. As it has already been demonstrated in this thesis, Mafeje will differ with universalistic application of the concept without due consideration for its local application. Mafeje (1995) tells us that that in the first “instance (in Africa) it is not sure what is meant by the ‘civil society’, except that it has become fashionable among African scholars since the Atlanta seminar held to mark the inauguration of the Carter Centre at Emory University in February 1989” (Mafeje, 1995: 18). Besides the fact that the term has become fashionable, Mafeje (1995) was not convinced that a sufficient discussion took place among Africans scholars about the content and the meaning of civil society.

Thus when discussing the challenges of democracy in the African continent, scholars outside the continent have often figured civil society in the continent as not being strong enough to keep government(s) in check. African civil society is depicted as weak and fragile and therefore unable to make any meaningful contribution to socio-political life of the people in the continent. Mafeje (1995) has warned against this generalisation about civil society in the continent, arguing that “the intriguing question though is, if the same civil society had been strong enough to sweep away the older generation of African dictators, why has it not been able to contend with the new petty dictators” (Mafeje, 1995: 19). This suggest that Africa has had strong history of civil society organisations that have been able to confront the most brutal systems, including apartheid in South Africa. For instance, South Africa (and Zimbabwe for that matter) can hardly be accused of having weak civil societies. Yet, while formal liberal democracy prevails in the country, it cannot be claimed that its civil society has been able to guarantee social democracy (Mafeje, 2001). The only challenge is that such civil society organisations have been unable to guarantee social democracy for the citizens.

Mafeje is in agreement with the need to differentiate between civil societies organisations. He differentiates between the character of the rural and urban civil society. Urban and rural divide make it impossible in Africa to generalise about the character of civil society without taking these differences into account. Putting aside the problem of fragmented social formations, at least in sub-Saharan Africa, it is well-known that ‘people’ in urban Africa areas
have become progressively differentiated into identifiable social classes or strata whose aspirations might predicate different types of ‘democracy’ (Mafeje, 1995: 20). The interests of these different social groups are not the same largely because they are not subjected to the same economic and social conditions. Therefore, “while it might be logical to suppose that the ‘government’ represents identical interests, it is ahistorical to presume that any given populace within certain territorial borders necessarily constitutes a ‘civil society’ (Mafeje, 1995:20). Other social groups might advocate for a certain interest or only engage the state in order to sure a particular need after which they vanish. Their existence is linked to the cause they are fighting for. Mafeje (1995) pointed out that “ordinary people only fight when their livelihood is threatened. In other words, they fight in order to guarantee the necessary conditions for their social reproduction” (Mafeje, 1995: 26). In such situation, organised citizens might not be looking at the takeover over of state power as their end goal.

7.10. Conclusion.

This chapter affirmed no unique Mafeje’s constitution on the subject of democracy. Although he did not develop a doctrine on the understanding of democracy, and there is a lot that post-apartheid South Africa can garner from his understanding of liberal democracy. Mafeje understood liberal democracy as having been the natural outcome of the Western social struggle. As demonstrated above, Mafeje believes that overtime, liberal democracy become celebrated and portrayed as if it was good for all societies. The policy makers in South Africa will garner a lot from engaging the alternatives that Mafeje provided, such as social democracy with its emphasis on collective rights rather than individual rights.
Chapter Eight

The challenges of Development in South Africa.

8.1. Introduction.

The issues relating to how the post-apartheid government should develop the country has feature prominently in academic discussions in South Africa. As such, they have always been invoked in policy discussion as the democratic government tries to redress the injustices of the past. The discussion on the developmental state has been raised by the African National Congress (ANC) at its 2007 Polokwane Congress. The Strategy and Tactics document raised the idea of the developmental state as the best possible means of addressing the triple challenge of ‘poverty, inequality and unemployment’ (2007b:11). The ANC believes that in order to address these challenges, the state has to take center stage in the economy, and not follow the idea of a free market economy. Against the belief that a developmental state is ‘authoritative’, the ANC decided that in South Africa, the state should follow the model of a democratic developmental state. The logic is that, a democratic state will have the legitimacy in the public and that through public legitimacy, the state will be able to give policy directions that are recognised and have the ‘buy-in’ of the majority of the people. In turn, this will enable the country to establish a common vision on how to develop the country.

Mafeje scholarly output on the discussions on development in South Africa is relevant, as the country is framing its development path in the post Apartheid era. Although we do not claim any unique contribution that Mafeje made regarding the concept of a democratic developmental state, we argue that his contribution on development is instructive as far as it dispels the notion that there is a connection between western ‘culture’ and development. We employ Mafeje’s work in dispelling the supposition that in order to develop, (developing countries and African countries in particular) have to follow the western developmental path, and the idea that ‘traditional values’ will be replaced by ‘modern values’. As South Africa implements democratic developmental state there is a need for awareness about the point that Mafeje made about the relationship between an economic models and development practice. This awareness will ensure that South Africa adopts development models that are rooted in its realities.
8.2. Democratic Developmental State in South Africa.

There are varieties of reasons given to why societies invoke the need for active state in the economy. In South Africa, it is “precisely because of the pedestrian nature of economic growth, and the rather sluggish progress in reducing poverty and inequality, that the concept of the developmental state has captured the imagination of the decision-makers across various sectors of society” (Netshitenzhe, 2011:7). In development studies and in social science research broadly, the concept ‘developmental state’ has been synonymous with the Eastern Asian nations that modernised their economies through industrialisation. According to Johnson (1982) the basic framework of developmental state, is where the state sets specific developmental goals and then single-mindedly mobilises society to achieve industrial modernisation. Such states set “clear policies and goals for the economy in terms of export promotion, investment in human capital and credit allocation via state development banks (UNCTAD, 2007: 61). A “centralised state interacting with the private sector from the position of pre-eminence so as to secure developmental objectives” (Wade, 1990) is known as a developmental state. The states in East Asia were able to steer both public and private resources towards a common goal. Although the aim is not to generalise about the East Asian nation, the common trend among them was their aim and ability to foster economic growth and place the industrialisation of the state at the centre of economic activity. According to Johnson (1982), the developmental state, directly and actively influences the direction, pace and goals of development rather than leaving it to the uncoordinated market forces or an invisible hand of the market to allocate resources in the economy. This ability of the state to rally private business, labour and other social entities behind the state goals and plans is what sets the developmental state apart from other developing states (Gumede, 2009). The other important aspect of the developmental state is the fact that they were/are selective in allowing international investment companies to be in direct competition with domestic companies. They were/are protective of their products and that allowed and ensured development of a competitive sector before opening their markets up to international competition (Akyuz, et al 1998).

The role of the state in development post-1994 in South Africa has been a focal point of discussion both in academia and policy discourse, (ANC 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2009; Edigheji 2005; Habib 2010; Southhall 2006). The recent debate on whether to nationalise the mines or not also speak to the role of the state in the economy and specifically to social development.
The workers unions share the same sentiment, declaring that the basicwealth of “our country is transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole through first and foremost, the nationalisation of the mines, banks and other monopoly industries and through an active industrial and trade policy to control other industry to assist in the well-being of the people” (NUMSA, 2013).

The introduction of the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) in 2005 marked a clear intention on the part of the government to emphasis the importance of the state in the South African economy. Among other things ASGISA detailed a planned role of the state in infrastructure building, skills development, the identification of strategic priority sectors, to mention just a few. This was/is the indication that “government has backed off from its earlier focus on privatisation of the SOEs” (Gelb, 2006:1). The role of private entities was initially thought to be important in driving economic growth. Without state intervention, there seem to be a realization on the part of the South African government that private entities can drive growth but there are no guarantees that such growth will lead to improvements in the living standards of the citizens.

To become a truly developmental state, South Africa will have to have a centralized “direction of resource flows” (Gelb, 2006:1), meaning that the government must be at the centre of policy making, provide resources and give a clear direction of where it envisages the country to be in the long term. To do this the state should be able to provide guidance on how the resources are utilised. However, in South Africa in an “economy with private, decentralised ownership of capital for production, the major problem confronting the developmental state is its relations with the owners of capital” (Gelb; 2006:1). In South Africa, the state does not seem to be in the position to direct the investment by private entities. This is largely due to the history of apartheid, with some businesses (especially foreign and white owned) not willing to take direction from the state. The state is not in a position to provide direction to these entities; as such they invest according to their own private interests. Thus the state is not in a position to impose ‘discipline’ on private entities. A developmental state should be able to “provide leadership in resolving collective problems” which will inevitably arise in defining and addressing commonly agreed goals. (Bardhan, 1993). In South Africa this is done through setting up of policy documents such as ASGISA. Such policy frameworks are aimed at balancing different interests in the country, while ensuring economic growth that will be shared by the country’s population, with the
government as the main distributor of resources to the citizens. The interest of different groups may be conflicting; the role of the government in such instances should be to provide leadership that is consistent with its policy framework and goals.

East Asian countries are often the litmus test for a successful developmental state, and as such there has been a focus on the character of the East Asian tiger states. There are numerous characteristics that have been identified as key in enabling the countries to be an independent social actor, such examples are “meritocratic recruitment, professional norms and ethos, esprit de corps” (Gelb, 2006:4). Hence most early analysis of the developmental state, inspired by examination of the successful developmental models in East Asia, focussed on the state’s own characteristics, arguing in particular that the state needed to have the ability to act as a ‘corporate’ entity, that is, be an independent social actor with a single unified set of goals. Examples from the ‘East Asian tigers’ identified a range of characteristics of the bureaucracy as necessary conditions for a developmental. From this ‘statist’ perspective, the state’s relationship with society could be summarised in Peter Evans’ famous label of ‘embedded autonomy.’ Embeddedness reflects the state’s intensive interaction with society (especially business) to enable flows of information and resources in both directions, in the process of policy formulation, implementation and monitoring. Autonomy reflects the State’s ability to act independently and non-arbitrarily by withdrawing support from individual firms which failed to meet performance targets.

The Developmental state fosters economic growth and equitable sharing of growth among citizens. And that will ensure a qualitative lifestyle improvement. For this to be possible active developmental state is required. As opposed to the traditional conception of developmental state, democratic developmental state does emphasize the importance of institutions. This is “primarily because what sets a democratic developmental state apart from others is that not only is it able to clearly set its developmental objectives, it also establishes institutional structures in order to achieve the objectives” (Edigheji, 2005). Thus the character and to a certain extent the success of a democratic developmental state, depends largely on institution building. Key to this is the independency of institutions that will in turn allow institutions to make independent decisions without due pressure from the state. Autonomy “implies the presence of high degrees of coherent state agencies that are able to formulate and implement coherent developmental goals (Edigheji, 2005: 8).
This is directly opposed from the initial understanding of the role of the state and its relationship with the institutions. Within the early doctrine, theorizing about developmental state, the state had much more importance as opposed to governmental institutions. As Johnson (1982) observed that “authoritarian character of the state” was the source of its autonomy. Early conception of the developmental state did not emphasize the importance of democracy within the trajectory of developmental state. This is precisely because it was assumed that the very nature of the state was what enabled it to foster economic growth. However, a scholar like Weiss (2000) has argued that the state should be able to use its autonomy to build consensus on how to effectively address national issues. Interest groups and continuing consultation with them might give the state significant challenges and by so doing undermine the ability of the state to lead the agenda of development. Different interest groups might have different interests from those of the state, and that might pose a serious challenge for those wishing to construct a developmental state.

8.3. Democratic developmental State in South Africa.

The 2008 financial crisis brought back the role of the state to the fore; this was propelled by the perceived failure of the markets to address social inequalities, leaving many suggesting that the state should have a great role in addressing social ills. This made arguments about developmental state more compelling. As part of the ‘global village’, South Africa was affected by the global financial crisis, no matter how minimal the impact was. Like many other players in the international community, South Africa, started pondering for answers, and the role of the state was invoked. Edigheji (2005) pointed out that South Africa is better positioned than most late developers to construct a democratic developmental state because the ruling party (the ANC) has for a long time been ‘thinking’ about the role a democratic developmental state can play in addressing challenges faced by South Africans. Within the ANC, the idea found credence and was openly expressed in the general conference of the party, hosted in Polokwane in 2007. The concept of a developmental state in South Africa has found expression because of the skewed economic ownership and the need to redress economic inequalities. The ANC (2007) Polokwane conference emphasized the importance of democracy within the trajectory of a developmental state; this is in contrast to many countries that were developmental in Asia. The realization in South Africa is that development requires, among other things, strong public institutions and the chapter nine
institutions in order to perform oversight, and by so doing ensure that the state does not abuse its powers.

The desire for a democratic developmental state in South Africa is a consequence of increasing social disparities, and this could be achieved through “building the capacity of the state” (Edigheji, 2005: 3) in order to be able to take a central position in the development of the country. In the recent past, South Africa was characterized by public service delivery strikes. There is recognition that in order to effectively deal with such phenomenon, the ability of the state to deliver must be improved. Calls for a democratic developmental state in South Africa has been opposed, largely because it is viewed as among the most democratic and has a ‘progressive’ constitution. The question is whether, developmental state is compatible with democracy, this “argument tends to assume that democracy and development cannot coexist” (Edigheji, 2005:3).

The political and social situation between South Africa and East Asian Nations is different, “the developmental states in East Asia reached their developmental goals under undemocratic conditions” (Gumede, 2009:3). In South Africa, the tenets of developmental state have to take root within the ambit and the auspices of a democratic state. They derive firstly from popular democracy a state that represents the will of the people. While many instances of developmental states may have had elements of authoritarianism in the early years, in South Africa there is consensus that the state we seek to create should be democratic (Netshitenzhe, 2011:7) The developmental state has to be compatible with the provisions of the democratic state. The “autocratic states have weak and subordinated civil society” (Leftwich, 1995). The ability of the state to be the sole actor in setting national goals is not challenged. The state becomes the sole and uncontested agent of development; even private entities follow the lead of the national government. However, under democratic conditions it is not easy to ensure that every social entity acts in a uniform manner and abides by the provisions of the national government. In democratic countries, like South Africa, the state does not have the coercive power that is often at the disposal of the state under autocratic rulers.

For the State to be able to intervene in this manner, it should enjoy popular legitimacy. Society should accept that the State genuinely represents the national interest. Where

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37 Gumede is over-generalising about lack of democracy in ‘developmental State’s, because according to Leftwich, in East/South Asia there was a mixture of democratic, quasi-democratic and authoritarian developmental States. This confusion seems to be caused by conflating single party dominance to mean the same thing as being non-democratic.
required, society should be prepared to defer to the state’s authority (Netshitenzhe, 2011:8). It is in this context of reflection on these issues that the ANC has argued that the developmental state that we seek to create, should contain elements of the best traditions of social democracy\(^3\) which include, a system which places the needs of the poor and social issues such as a social safety net at the top of the national agenda (ANC, 2007). However, we differ with this supposition about the developmental state, rather than focusing on safety nets, developmental states have traditionally been focused on building class alliances. The focus on safety nets for the poor is characteristic of a neo-liberal state.

There is a growing body of research that supports the concept of a democratic developmental state. Heller (1999) indicates that there is a strong case for the argument that developmental state can successfully manage the balance between economic growth and social development while building a democratic institution at the same time. Along the similar lines, Sen (1999) believes that “development is a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” and that “development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom namely, poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive state” (Sen, 2000:3).

The democratic developmental state has to be inclusive and has to have greater citizen participation in decision making. This active participation of the civil society institutions in ensuring that developmental goals are reached, and that they receive wide public support. In this case civil society is not only vibrant, but the extent to which the forces of civil society can forge broad development coalitions to strengthen the strategic capacity of the state and tackle problems of poverty and insecurity are crucial (White 1998). A “successful developmental state requires political will, long term vision and determination on the part of the country’s political elite to drive a developmental modernisation project” (Gumede, 2009: 25). There is a need to narrow the gap between the rich and poor, to develop the majority of the poor and drastically reduce unemployment. There have been suggestion both in academia and in the political arena that if South Africa does not do this its democratic gains are in

\(^3\)It is debatable whether what the ANC refers to as social democracy is actually social democratic principles. The exclusive focus on the poor and preference for safety nets is actually part of the second wave neoliberal project. Social democratic social policies are generally universalist in coverage and encompassing in breadth of services provided. The underpinning is social solidarity with a commitment to equality. The social policy framework that the ANC has been following since 1994 assumes that individuals should fend for themselves and only in cases of people who are unable to meet their ‘basic’ requirements should the State provide.
In order to save South Africa from its immediate challenges, the country will have to intensify industrialisation. If this plan is to be a success, there will have to be a consensus among different social actors. South Africa will have to have national consensus on how it wants to intensify industrialisation. This consensus will have to encompass people within and outside the ruling party. This will have to be an all inclusive process. It will have to include civil society, business, and organised labour.

According to Evans (1995) the successful building of a developmental state depends on specific historic endowments and the character of the social structure which are unique to the country. In this case South Africa has the advantage of managing the “East Asian style of economic reforms” (Gumede, 1999). The disadvantage of the apartheid state is that it ran a racially exclusive economy but it did leave behind major development agencies, including the industrial development corporation, the land bank (Gumede, 2009). According to (Woo-Cumings, 1999) most successful developmental states, have a state as a coordinating centre. Among many things, the centre is responsible for pushing the economy to reach high growth rates, but also works towards eliminating vulnerabilities in the economy and making it competitive by diversifying and identifying new niche manufacturing products. Moreover, the state becomes the protector and the promoter of national interest as identified by the government (Schneider 1999).

8.4. ANC’s understanding of the Democratic Developmental State.

In the ANC the role of the state in development was motivated by the need to address the ‘triple challenge’ of poverty, inequality and unemployment. As the National Planning Commission’s Diagnostic Report notes “too few people work; the standard of education of most black learners is of poor quality; infrastructure is poorly located, under-maintained and insufficient to foster higher growth; spatial patterns exclude the poor from the fruits of development; the economy is overly and unsustainably resource-intensive; a widespread disease burden is compounded by a failing health system; public services are uneven and often of poor quality; corruption is widespread; and South Africa remains a divided society” (Diagnostic Report, 2009). It is within this context that the concept on the democratic developmental state has gained prominence both within government and in the ‘ruling party’ the ANC. At its 2007 National Conference, the ANC for the first time elaborated extensively in its Strategy and Tactics document on the desire to build a developmental state (Netshitenzhe, 2011). The discussion in South Africa has
been centred on the need to ensure that the historically marginalised benefit from the economic gains that have been made by the democratic state.

The 52\textsuperscript{nd} National Conference, argued that for a truly “inclusive and prosperous national developmental society to emerge, there is a need for a state that is developmental in its objectives and capabilities” (52\textsuperscript{nd} National Conference). The Conference defined a developmental state as a state that develops the capabilities to guide national economic development through fiscal redistribution, mobilisation of domestic and foreign capital and other social partners, utilisation of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), industrial policy and regulation. The 2007 Strategy and Tactics document further states that a developmental State will intensify the role of the state in economic life, pursuit of full employment, quest for equality, strong partnership with the trade union movement, and the promotion of international solidarity.

All this points to the need for a state that is able to steer the country towards an agreed direction. The ANC “believe that the time has come to build a new national consensus for the next 50 years. This consensus should lay the basis for a second transition of social and economic transformation, building on the foundation of the political transformation” (52\textsuperscript{nd} National Conference). In order to resolve these challenges, the ANC resolved to build a democratic developmental state, which plays a driving role in the social and economic development of the country. According to the 52\textsuperscript{nd} ANC National Conference held in 2012, conference resolution, this will be the state that is “people-centred and uniquely South African. It is thus defined as a state that leads and directs national development and mobilises society around this vision and its implementation”.

According to the ANC conference resolution, the party understands the democratic developmental state, as the state that does the following:

- Intervenes and directs economic development and transformation in the interest of higher levels of industrialisation and diversification, higher rates of growth and sustainable development;
• Implements and facilitatessocial transformation through delivery of basic services and the social wage, through addressing the social backlog and progressively ensuring universal quality services, as part of our broader programme to address unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment, as well as protection of vulnerable groups;

• Involvesthe people as a whole, especially the poor, through expanding and deepening participatory and representative democracy;

• Continuеsefforts to consolidate our democracy, our democratic institutions and the confidence and trust in public institutions.

It is not clear how the ANC and scholars in South Africa see as a link between the concept of a democratic developmental state in South Africa and development trends globally or how development or lack of it in South Africa is likely to be impacted by development or lack of it in the rest of the continent. The ANC documents that have been reviewed in this chapter do not carry sufficient information that will lead to the conclusion that there is awareness that the situation in the continent can determine the success or failure of building democratic developmental state. A successful democratic developmental state in South Africa hinges a lot on intra-African trade.

8.5. Mafeje on Development.
Africa’s development path has always been deliberated upon, importantly, not only by Africans themselves, but it has also featured in the western literature. In the West, these writings about Africa are characterized by assumption and supposition about Africa’s development potential. The reasoning in the west to write about Africa’s development is partly informed by the fact that, western countries, indeed the western intellectuals have arrogated upon themselves the right to write about Africa, firstly ‘(the assumption is made) in the west, “Africa is not only believed be a latecomer in development but also it had been generally believed by Europeansto have no history prior to colonialism and thus remained until very recently simply a dark continent” (Mafeje 1998:118). Mafeje does not place any emphasis on the above mentioned supposition about Africa’s history and its relationship to development, ratherhe believes that what is important are the practical implications of these writing regarding Africa’s development perspectives. He declared, “colonialism is an
important watershed in African history for it created a number of critical predispositions towards future development on the continent” (Mafeje 1998:118). In this regard, Mafeje make a pertinent point, that this is the colonial heritage that Africans must accept before it can be transcended (1998:119)

All societies have been engaged in development, regardless of their levels of ‘sophistication’ “as would be readily acknowledged, economic practice has existed since the dawn of human societies. To survive, human beings had to devise ways of satisfying their basic needs by extracting from nature whatever proved to be useful. Whether this involved hunting, foraging, cultivation, or animal husbandry, it required some form of social cooperation which is regulated by certain cultural norms” (1998:119). This notwithstanding, Mafeje informs us that although patterns of economic behavior were recognizable, they however could not be referred to as ‘models’. In modern times, as Mafeje declared, economic models are thought to be important aspect of development, they are assumed to inform practice. But in reality “models are abstract constructs derived from economic practice by actual social producers” (1998:119). Thus, in reality, as Mafeje noted, “models depend on social practice” while on the other side, social practice do not depend on model (1998:119). Mafeje warned that failure “to recognize the significance of this might be the basic source of the economic crises that have plagued Africa since independence” (1998b:119). According to Mafeje (1998) the emergence of economic models is a product of “post-Second World War in Europe” (1998b:119-120).

This is explained by the fact that there were never any models used, when among other things, the west through colonisation incorporated African economies into their economies. Instead the African “countries got incorporated into the capitalist system haphazardly” (1998:120). African countries were ‘satellite’ economies that supported the western countries through the provision of raw material. Realizing that the economic structure between the west and Africa favored mostly the western countries, Africans decided that there needs to be models that govern the economic relationship between the two. This then “gave rise to an obsession with planning and almost fetishistic preoccupation with economic models in mechanical sense” (1998b:120). This was thought to be an important antidote in order to break the western economic domination of the continent. But “at independence there were no economic planners and econometricians in Africa” (1998b:120). Therefore individuals from the western societies were invited in as ‘experts’ in the field of economic planning. Unable to break with their western training, European ‘experts’ could do only what they knew best i.e. the European way” (Mafeje, 1998:120). In rehashing the European way in African
economic planning, foreign ‘experts’ ignored locally available knowledge of the people most familiar with economic activity in Africa, namely “African producers because they were viewed as objects of economic planning and not its subjects” (1998b:120). This then led to “disjuncture between economic models and actual economic practice is particular to ex-colonial countries because the models they used are invariably imported or imposed from outside” (1998:120). The adoption of the models, Mafeje believes, is depended on the local capacity of the receiving country. According to Mafeje internal capacity of the Indian planners enabled them to be able to hold their own against foreign ‘experts’. Capacity refers to technical skills, level of integration and social density (1998:120-121). This led to the production of “what is referred to as mixed economy and Indian democracy in the west” (1998: 121). As we have observed, internal capacity becomes antithesis to foreign intervention in domestic economic planning, but this was not possible in Africa as most African countries did not have the required capacity to withstand foreign economic intervention. This led to reliance on borrowed indices and categorization used in developing countries (1998:120). It is worth quoting Mafeje at length in explaining this phenomenon. He said “among these…….. is the acceptance of the distinction between formal and informal sector in the economy, measurement of consumption according to disposable income per ‘family’. Measurement of poverty in terms of individuals etc. The fact of the matter is that African economies are too unspecialized to allow for econometric procedures, as are used in the developed countries” (Mafeje, 1998: 121). Mafeje believes a “more meaningful method of economic research in Africa should include qualitative indices such as development of human capital, quality of life, and similar intangibles” (1998:122).

Mafeje (1998) identified liberalism and Marxism as the main contending theories in understanding the relationship between culture and development. Although he never intended to go into detail in explaining the above mentioned western tradition. He stated that, “in order to set the stage for a possible African debate and research on the question of culture and development it might be expedient to identify western schools of thought” (Mafeje, 1998: 7). We quote him in detail in this work because as he says these will set the stage for the debate on development in Africa, in our context it is to verify whether the debate on culture and development has implications for the democratic developmental state framework which South Africa has chosen.

Mafeje listed the above mentioned tradition in the following manner:
(a) The best known school “modernization theorists”. Amongst them would be included writers such as W. E. Moore, N. J. Smelser, B. F. Hoselitz, E. E. Hagen, S. N. Eisenstadt, E. M. Rogers, D. McClelland, etc. Although these writers are a mixture of sociologists and what could be called “institutional economists”, basically, their work derives from Talcott Parsons’ theory of “pattern variables”, as expounded in *The Social System* (1948). In his book Talcott Parsons set up a paradigm which consisted of two polar ends or binary opposites, *modernity* and *traditionalism*. These could be identified by means of certain indices, which he called “pattern variables”. Simply put, these were: traditionalism is to modernity as parochialism is to universalism, ascription to achievement, affective to effective, and diffuseness to specificity. These attributes depended on the type of social values each society has. Significant shifts from the traditional end of the spectrum towards the other marked *social change*. Parsonians have always argued that theirs is not a dichotomous schema, counter-posing the traditional against the modern, but rather a continuum capable of several combinations of variables. If granted, this implies a significant departure from Weber’s sociology, of which Talcott Parsons is supposed to be the American heir-apparent. Max Weber is renowned among sociologists for his ideal-type analysis and cultural relativity. In the hands of Parsons the former became real-types, capable of measurement along a progressive scale of modernity. Secondly, modern capitalist society such as that of the United States became a terminus of all development. This dispensed with cultural relativity and replaced it with an absolute ethnocentric standard, the western bourgeois society. It also implied a unilineal model of development.

b) Over-time the Parsonian paradigm infected cultural anthropologists as well in America, especially what came to be known as the Chicago School. Prominent among these were Robert Redfield (*The Primitive World and Its Transformation*, 1953) and Oscar Lewis (*The Children of Sanchez*, 1961). In their case traditional/primitive society was explicitly associated with “low culture”/“Little tradition”, as against the “high culture”/“great tradition” of modern industrial society. Regrettably as it was from the point of view of liberal romanticism, the primitive or traditional societies were destined to be swept away by modern civilization. This was supposed to be reflected in the way traditional villages were
being penetrated by metropolitan mores even in the most remote parts of countries such as Mexico. This found expression in the so-called “rural-urban” continuum which is associated with the Chicago School. The basic thesis was that with the spread of European Industrial culture, rustic or traditional values were being gradually displaced by modern, “universal” values. Unlike the “modernization” theorists, cultural anthropologists did not think of this as either desirable or necessary but inevitable. From this point of view their position was more akin to that of Weber than to Talcott Parsons.

(c) The third and less well-known school which dealt with the problem of development and social values is that of the technological evolutionists. They are often referred to as the Columbia School of technological evolutionists. Marvin Harris and George Foster are the best known representatives among anthropologists. But there are others, mainly economists, who derived their ideas from C. E. Ayres instrumentalist philosophy. Among these, K. Baldwin, R. Manners, E. Service and Louis Junker are the best advocates. Their basic thesis is that social values can be divided into two main categories, ceremonial and instrumental. Traditional societies are characterized by the predominance of “ceremonial” values which militate against experimentation, whereas modern societies are characterized by instrumental values which encourage experimentation and reward technological innovation. This is reminiscent of Talcott Parsons’ “effective” versus “affective”, and “achievement” versus “prescriptive” values. Both ascribe social progress to individual initiative and achievement. The only difference is that in Parsonian sociology technological progress is endemic in modern societies and this is how “the social system” regulates itself in such a way that it maintains its equilibrium indefinitely. In contrast, the technological evolutionists saw technology not only as a prime mover but also as liberating force from retrograde “ceremonial” values.

d) The fourth and opposed school within the western tradition is Marxism, as has already been remarked. If it were not for its epistemology, the Marxist paradigm comes closest to that of the technological evolutionists. Whilst in Marxist theory a distinction is made between the superstructure, which represents philosophical and legal rationalizations, social ideologies and cultural forms and beliefs, and the
infrastructure, which represents material and productive forces, it is the latter two (accumulated and live labour) which are accorded a determinant role. The superstructure is treated as a derivative category i.e. it is a reflection of what goes on in the infrastructure. For this reasons, in Marxist theory the concept of “culture” is hardly elaborated (see Worsley, 1981), except in the general sense of “civilization” or the development of the arts.

Mafeje (1998) believes that the dependencia theory from Latin America led to the decline of modernization theory in the third world, which were unwilling to follow the western prescription to development, which purported that in “order to develop their countries should be carbon copies of the west/north” (1998: 7). Importantly, as Mafeje noted, they all denied that underdevelopment in Latin America was due to traditional values or culture (1998: 7). Instead, they maintained that it was attributable to structural factors that gave rise to the dependence of the south on the north, which had a constraining effect on the autonomous development of the south (1998: 7). Thus, Mafeje (1998) pointed out that the only logical conclusion that could be drawn from this is that “culture qua culture was irrelevant to the problem of development” (Mafeje, 1998: 7). The existence of whatever culture is immaterial to development, rather the structural relationship between North and South is a challenge. By structure we refer to the fact that by and large, countries of the South are producers of raw material for the North. According to Mafeje (1998) “it is conceivable that Latin-Americans whose modern culture is a derivative of European culture (including language) could afford this minimalist position. Therefore, if culture could be treated as a common variable between them and Mediterranean Europe, then their underdevelopment could not be explained by recourse to the same variable” (Mafeje, 1998: 8). The ability of Latin America to challenge western suppositions about development, especially regarding culture, might have led to “independent identity (but) has not necessarily been linked directly to what in the current jargon is called “development” (Mafeje, 1998: 8). Unlike Latin America that challenged western supposition on development, Mafeje (1998) stated that in Africa the nationalists have shown a great inclination towards western capitalism.

The western attempts to ‘homogenize culture’ is “also inimical to development in so far as it denies so many other unexpected possibilities” (Mafeje, 1998: 8), this is in line with the African intellectuals calls for indigenization of the social sciences (1998: 8). This assumes a
rejection of received theories and the ‘an awareness and knowledge of indigenous modes of thought and doing” (1998: 8). Because of being a victim of colonial and cultural imperialism, “Africa is in the grips of the worst development crisis ever” (1998: 8), to compound this problem, Mafeje (1998) stated that, when views are solicited on the problem of rural and agricultural development, “experts” form the former imperial countries have more to say than the indigenous scholars (Mafeje, 1998: 8). As he stated that ‘the foundation in Africa culturally- and practically speaking, in the agrarian sector. If anything unique is to be discovered on the continent, it is most likely embedded there” (Mafeje, 1998: 8).

8.6. Conclusion.

Mafeje scholarly output on development can assist in ensuring that the concept of a democratic developmental state is rooted on South Africa’s socio-economic realities and is not simply modelled on the East Asian tigers. In this chapter we have discussed South Africa’s vision of a democratic developmental state, and in the last pages presented Mafeje’s understanding of development. The departure point is that as South Africa is developing, there is a need for awareness of a point that Mafeje made that there is no connection between western culture and development, as dependencia Latin American scholars prove, all societies could follow their own path to development. South Africa policy makers have to be aware of this fact and not use the borrowed western economic models.
Chapter 9

General Conclusion and Recommendations.

9.1. General Conclusion.

This thesis has explored and examined Professor Mafeje’s contribution on the thematic issues that were mentioned in the introduction. This has been informed and motivated by the realisation that in South Africa, Mafeje’s scholarship has been neglected, ignored and yet it is relevant in addressing contemporary challenges confronting South Africa. Exploration of Mafeje’s scholarship has been done through examining his intellectual accounts and located this both within the debates that shaped his scholarship and within the historical time frame which he lived and wrote. The thesis has demonstrated that Mafeje was not only one of the most instructive scholars in South Africa but in the African and in global social science. The uniqueness of Mafeje’s scholarship is largely due to the fact that his scholarship transcends different academic disciplines. His analytical rigour and methodological nous made it easy for him to tackle topics in various academic disciplines such as economics, sociology and anthropology.

Largely through an exploration approach, this thesis demonstrated that there is a need to invoke Professor Mafeje’s scholarly contribution in South Africa’s contemporary challenges, especially those that are covered in this study, for example state, democracy and development. This study was premised on the proclamation that there is a gap in South African academy that demands an engagement with Mafeje’s scholarly work. While an undergraduate student I noticed that there was limited reference to African scholars in the curriculum I was exposed to and Mafeje’s work was no exception. This thesis argued that an understanding and appreciation of Mafeje’s work on the above mentioned aspects of his scholarly output might lead to the betterment of social policies in South Africa, as the country struggles with the demands for transformation. There is a lot that political and public discourse can garner from understanding his contribution on the above mentioned aspects on his works. For example, there is a lot that could have been gained from invoking Mafeje’s 1972 seminal works on the Fallacy of Dual Economy (1971), especially at the time the topic on the nature of the South African economy was/is dominating the public discourse.

The first aspect of Mafeje’s scholarship that can benefit all South Africans, including but not limited to, politicians, journalists, and academics is the fact that he never divorced
himself from the continent and got taken up by grand theories emanating from the Western world. As it has been shown, Mafeje’s willingness to critique Western doctrine, especially when these are used to explain African situations, has been the hallmark of his scholarship. This has not always been the case with South African scholars. For example, his critique of Wolpe’s application of Marxist articulation on modes of production as a point of departure in explaining the land question in South Africa demonstrates this point.

The apartheid state successfully isolated South Africa intellectually from the rest of the peoples of the continent (probably the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) are exceptions in this regard. The ANC’s 1943 document titled *Africans’ Claims* did illustrate how the party was rooted to African realities). Some South Africans have been referring to the people of the continent as ‘others.’ This negative tendency finds expression in statements such as ‘when I was in Africa’ and so on. Even at the personal level Mafeje and Magubane are the examples of South Africans by birth who have demonstrated willingness to understand the African continent and not just South Africa.

Within South Africa, this otherness finds expression in scholarship that largely attempts to propagate South Africa’s exceptionalism, as rightfully pointed out by Professor Mahmood Mamdani in his book *Citizens and Subjects* (1996). Chapter seven on the thematic issues covered in this thesis has demonstrated that South African scholars hardly make reference and linkage between democratic challenges in South Africa and similar challenges in the rest of the continent. As if South African society does not experience similar challenges to those that are experienced by other countries in the continent. There is no connection made between the South African contemporary situation and what is happening on the rest of the continent.

In his 2001 paper titled *African Modes of self writing*, Achille Mbembe’ argued that Africans should not portray themselves as victims. Those were Mbembe’s supposition; they are bold as they are controversial. As is well known the contents of that paper were ripped apart by Mafeje in his papers: “African Modes of Self writing: Adieu Mbembe”, “Africanity: A Combative Ontology” (2000), “A Commentary by Way of Conclusion” (2001). Africans are accused of being fixated with colonialism and of blaming everything on it. The tedium notwithstanding, it is extremely difficult to ignore the pervasive impact of European colonialism on Africa. Furthermore, in mitigation, it can be pointed out that it has been a mere 40 years since African peoples gained their independence from colonial powers.
However, unfortunately for them, the successor to colonialism was not *uhuru* (freedom in Ki-Swahili) but rather neo-colonialism in which the new African leaders were partners, *albeit* very junior ones (Mafeje, 2002: 5).

Mafeje stood opposed to any form of domination on the African continent, whether it is academic dependency, imperialism, colonialism or apartheid. He understood that imperialism and colonisation provided the necessary condition for the imperialist states to dominate in the sphere of social science, and made it his mission to ensure that African voices are recognised and respected in social science globally. As such he is recognised across social science as one among the custodian of African scholarship. A need to be rooted on African conditions was the starting point of all his scholarly interventions. He strongly believed that Africans will only find their voice on global issues only when they are the ones articulating their own issues in the global arena. For this to happen, the starting point is that Africans first acknowledge the damage done by imperialism and colonisation in the African continent and Africans will have to retell their own history.

The significance of Mafeje’s scholarship is more important to the South African audience, which has for a long time been isolated by the apartheid state from the continent. Although geographically part of Africa, South African scholarship does not seem to be rooted on the African realities; because of history there is reliance on Western orientations to explain South African challenges. South African populace can benefit from interacting with Mafeje’s scholarship. It is through a study like this that some South Africans could be introduced to the political history of the continent and can be able to draw the similarities between their own conditions and the challenges that are faced by the people in the rest of the continent.

(Mafeje, 1997) acknowledges that liberal democracy is the product of the Western world and thus easily applicable in those societies. In the African continent, he argued that the contents of liberal democracy cannot be applied uncritically without accessing whether they do resonate with local conditions. For example Mafeje (2001) questions whether the multitudes of the poor in South Africa are convinced that the constitution as is, with its focus on individual rights will deliver them from poverty. The challenge in South Africa maybe the same as that which faced the rest of the African continent at post-independency: the failure of democratically elected leaders to undo the structure of the colonial economy, and set in motion a new economy. As Mafeje (2000) noted, “it merely inherited colonial institutions
with which the mass of the people did not identify, as is evidenced by the struggle for independence” (Mafeje, 2000:13). In South Africa, because of its racial past some academics do not see this as a problem, because, the structural change of the economy ‘speaks’ directly to their historical accumulation, as such they do not draw parallel between the need to change the structure of the past and the need to redistribute as critical to the South African economy.

In order to have a functioning and inclusive economy the state has to do away with the structural economic framework of the apartheid state. Mafeje (2002) has dealt with this in detail: for Africans to realise ‘uhuru’ the ruling elite at post-independence will have to be completely different from the colonial elite that once ruled the continent. In that the responsibility of the post colonial African leadership is to change the economic structure of colonialism. The same is true for post Apartheid South Africa. When the ANC attempts to take a step towards doing this, through progressive policy proposal, such as the idea of building a democratic developmental state, South African opinion makers quickly remind the party about how that will destroy any opportunity for direct foreign investment. This is unlike Mafeje (2002), who asked critical questions, about the relationship between development and culture, and provide practical ways on how the continent could develop through using its culture as source knowledge. Mafeje (2002) draws parallels between culture and development, he demonstrated a great faith in the ordinary people of Africa to provide for themselves by relying on their traditional systems despite capitalist infiltration (Nabudere, 2011:29). This remains relevant for South Africa today, as the country continues to ‘catch up’ with the rest of the industrialised world. There seem to be less focus on sectors such as agriculture, where the country has great potential. The South African human capital that has always been part of the traditional agricultural production can be used to good effect. However, most South African scholars stand on the fence, and throw only problematic questions, instead of assisting the country better formulate and implement policies that will make South Africa realise its economic potential.

Mafeje (1996) had a gift of deconstructing ‘words’ and reveal their real meaning and the political or economical intention behind them. When it come to concepts such as modernization and globalization he exposed Parsons (1951) ‘pattern variables’ and argued successfully that this assumed that societies were to develop in a same manner, towards western modern capitalist society. He exposed Parsons views on globalization as an attempt to deny Africans the opportunity to celebrate their own traditions (1997: 16). In the west
African value systems are generally referred to as traditional, and therefore Africans were still going to develop into a certain model and assimilate to the modernize values which are defined through western lenses. This is a theoretical rigor that is missing in South African scholarship. It is through exploring Mafeje’s scholarship that some South African scholars can be rescued from their political naïvety when faced with western concepts.

With regard to the African continent, the colonial episode profoundly affected every aspect of African life as colonialism brought with it certain ways of reconstructing African realities (Phalane and Lebakeng, 1997: 26). Institutionalised or formalised western education in Africa is a product of the colonial legacy (Phalane and Lebakeng, 1997: 26). The essence of colonial education was to deny the colonised useful knowledge about themselves and their world and was designed to consolidate dependency and generally undermine the colonised people’s capacity for creativity in all the spheres of life. The critical point of departure in getting out of academic and intellectual subservience lies in the establishment of a distinctly African intellectual tradition.

9.2. Recommendations.

Having discussed Mafeje’s contribution on the thematic issues covered in this thesis, the question that must be answered is, as Lenin phrased it *What is to be Done*. Although many strides have been made in attempts to transform the South African higher education system, a lot still has to be done. Transformation in higher education in South Africa should not only be about race, it should be more about the curriculum. In some academic institutions, especially formerly ‘whites only’ ones, there is still heavy reliance on western academia. There is a need to decolonise the curriculum, and ensure that it reflects and it is rooted within the realities of the people(s) of the continent. This is more important in South Africa than other parts of the African continent. The reason for this is the fact that, unlike most countries in the African continent, in South Africa there was institutionalised racisim, and not only that, the apartheid state perceived ‘itself’ as satellite state of the Western countries. Given this reality, the consequences for social science should be obvious.

Restoration of Africa’s intellectual heritage should be taken as not only a task of the academics and intellectuals, but it should be understood to be a political project of the post-independence African state. The starting point to realising this objective is to agree that some of the intellectual heritage was undermined by colonisation and that it needs to be restored. It is then that Africans will come up with the consolidated effort to set the process in motion.
that will be aimed at restoring Africa’s pride in the global “free trade of ideas”. This will require Africans to read, and share their academic output with scholars and intellectuals in the continent, instead of the current trend of publishing in foreign countries for foreign audiences.

In South Africa, Mafeje’s academic scholarship needs to be celebrated for his commitment to Africa and its people. Given the fact that most Africans were isolated from the rest of the continent by the apartheid regime and thus have little or no knowledge of the African social and economic history, the scholarship of Professor Mafeje should be used as the starting point to introducing South Africans to aspects of the African society. This thesis engages with some aspects of Mafeje’s scholarship. There are other scholarly contributions by Mafeje’s on which further research can be done. Largely regarded as “the other” by academics, scholars and historians from the West, it required highly-esteemed visionary academic activist of Mafeje’s calibre to emphasise the urgent need for Africans to define themselves through their own eyes, mouths and ears (Jordan, 2007).
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