Xenophobia and the role of immigrant organizations in the city of Cape Town

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Signed                                           Date

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WESTERN CAPE
The aim of this study is to develop an understanding of Cape Town’s foreign African immigrants by looking at the profile, character and role of immigrant associations and how they shape survival strategies as well as possible paths to the integration of African immigrants. The thesis seeks to develop an understanding of the mediating role played by Cape Town’s African foreign immigrant organisations. I also look at the transnational activities of these organizations. I selected Cape Town because it prides itself on liberal values of toleration, diversity and non-racialism while at the same time branding itself as an African City. The City of Cape Town has no comprehensive policy that protects or promotes the immigrants’ interests. The study of the agency and organisations of foreign African immigrants has been singularly neglected by scholars who have been mostly concerned with understanding why South Africans are xenophobic.

This study is largely qualitative with life stories interviews that shed light on the context of exit and reception of African immigrants in Cape Town and reveals the hardship immigrants endure and the problems they face in their efforts to integrate into South African society. The thesis shows the different kinds of exclusions African immigrants face in both private and public spaces and highlights also the role of immigrant’s organizations in negotiating space and dealing with xenophobic attacks on their community members.

My findings concur with the work of key scholars such Alejandro Portes. Immigrant organisations have a variety of activities and sub-organisations that promote both transnational and local collective action. The thesis documents types of immigrant organisations, their characteristics, location, membership, objectives, activities and their efforts in assisting their members in cases of xenophobic attacks. In Cape Town, immigrants have formed organizations that help them to network with one another in order to negotiate space in this hostile environment.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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- Leaders of selected immigrants’ organizations who accepted to participate to this study, and informants who sacrificed their time to participate in the interviews. Their willingness to spend time with me and share their information and experiences made this study possible.

- Last but not least, I thank all my colleagues who contributed in various capacities to the process of writing this work.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to the Rwandan/Burundian SDA Ministry of Cape Town
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AICT</td>
<td>Albayan Islamic Council Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoCT</td>
<td>City of Cape Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIEP</td>
<td>Comparative Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project</td>
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<td>CIOP</td>
<td>Comparative Immigrant Organizations Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoRM</td>
<td>Consortium for Refugees and Migrants</td>
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<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Cape Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRCASA</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo Association of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPWP</td>
<td>Expanded Public Works Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale de Football Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HSRC</td>
<td>Human Science Research Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Identification Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSA</td>
<td>Ogaden Community of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGWC</td>
<td>Provincial Government of the Western Cape</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>RHF</td>
<td>Rwanda Heritage Foundation</td>
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<td>RRCT</td>
<td>Rwandan Refugees of Cape Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSN</td>
<td>Congo Square news</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa RSA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACN</td>
<td>South African Cities Network</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAMP</td>
<td>Southern African Migration Projects</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASA</td>
<td>Somali Association of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCRA</td>
<td>Standing Committee for Refugees Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Social Development Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCBSA</td>
<td>Somalis Community Board South Africa</td>
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<td>PCCSA</td>
<td>Pentecostal Community Churches in Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>R/BSDAMCT</td>
<td>The Rwanda/Burundian Seventh Day Adventist Ministry of Cape Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>WC</td>
<td>Western Cape</td>
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**Key Words:**

Xenophobia
African immigrants
Immigrant organisations
Leaders
Cape Town
Networks
Chapter One: Setting the scene

Background and Problem statement

Southern Africa has been a region of international labour migration since the last two decades of the nineteenth century, when development become focussed on the mining industry (Oucho, 2006: 47). For a long time during the colonial period and during the apartheid era, South Africa witnessed the criss-crossing of both skilled and unskilled labour from non-mining to mineral-rich countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique (Ohadike 1972, cited in Oucho 2006: 47). In these circumstances, the citizens of the non-mining countries were compelled to migrate to South Africa in order to find employment (Oucho, 2006: 47).

The period preceding independence and majority rule in Southern Africa, countries witnessed protracted wars of independence which triggered large-scale flows of refugees and asylum seekers who had to reside in other countries until independence (majority rule) had been won (Oucho, 2006: 48). While it was fashionable in South Africa in the 1970s to underscore the importance of ‘black migration to South Africa’, flows and stock of refugees and asylum seekers continued to swell throughout the region, with Zambia and Malawi hosting the vast majority (Oucho, 2006: 48). South Africa has had a long history of dependence on migrant workers from the Southern African region, particularly in sectors such as mining and agriculture. Indeed, without migrant workers neither industry would have developed at all, nor therefore would South Africa’s modern industrial economy (Crush and Williams, 2001: 3). The 1980s saw an increasing number of highly-trained and skilled nationals from Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe and farther north, faced with economic downturn, and thus saw migration to the three resource-endowed states of South Africa, Botswana and Namibia (Oucho, 2006: 48).
However, African migration since the 1990s has been more differentiated compared to the historical pattern related to mining and agricultural work. Researchers (McDonald, Lephaphotho and Golden 1999; Landau and Jacobsen, 2004) have noted that recent wave of African immigrants play an increasingly important role in the urban life in South Africa. The absence of scholarly analysis of African immigrants’ views and their organisations in relation to urban life is especially notable. The assumption is that African immigrants are passive.

Prior to 1994, South Africa’s immigration policy was a naked device of racial dominion (Crush 2008b). Until 1991, the official definition of an immigrant was that he or she had to be able to assimilate into the white population. Africans were not counted among immigrants. Rather, they came to South Africa as temporary contract migrants (much like many South African blacks who were pushed into Bantustans and needed passes) under bilateral agreements between the apartheid government and neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Mozambique, and Malawi (Crush 2008b).

During apartheid, there was no legal framework that could accommodate asylum seekers and refugees. After the collapse of Apartheid regime in the early 1990s, South Africa became a democratic country and as a result a member of the international community. In this light, South Africa became a signatory to a number of international conventions including the 1951 United Nations Geneva Convention, the 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees, the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969. In putting requirements of these conventions in place, the South Africa constitution gave full rights to refugees except the right to vote or forming a political party. In addition, South Africa adopted the refugees’ integration approach into the local community rather than the establishment of refugee camps as is the case in the neighbouring countries such as Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Though refugees enjoy the urban setting, they find themselves in a hostile environment in particular, challenges of integrating in the local township community. However, instead of receiving protection and a proper integration in the local community, their basic rights have been violated since there is no existing policy in the country that speaks to integration of refugees from the central government right to the local spheres. It
needs to be noted that black and poor South Africans living in townships or informal shacklands, are victims of state and interpersonal violence, state neglect and mass unemployment.

Immigration during the post-apartheid era from other African countries has brought South Africans into immediate interaction with foreign Africans on a greater scale and intensity than during apartheid, when black immigration to South Africa was officially encouraged in mines, farms and industries (Neocosmos, 2008). Consequently, it has also unleashed the horror of xenophobia, the situation scholars such as Kersting (2009) have linked to failure by government to understand overwhelming number of migrants since 1994 and yet no attention was paid until the crisis in Zimbabwe in 2007.

South Africa is not unique in Africa: Omar Bongo in Gabon encouraged violent attacks and mass expulsions of foreigners in order to build up a Gabonese nation state and divert attention away from intra-ethnic tensions that could cause political instability (Kersting, 2009: 12) Mass expulsions in Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana can also be seen as being in a process of building the nation by excluding groups based on ethnic nationalist criteria (Whitaker, 2005: 118). In 2008, migrants from the DR Congo were brutally expelled by Angolan state agencies (Neocosmos, 2008).

In the last two decades, African immigrants have faced bleak prospects in terms of settling into and integrating into different social segments and places in South Africa. African immigrants typically face physical violence, “negative judgments on aspects of a different culture” (Zodwa, 2012) and their language especially from black South Africans (Harris, 2002). They are also associated with poverty, diseases and dependency on state resources. Other (white) immigrants from other continents such as Europe and Asia have not encountered such problems. Yet according to Matsinhe (2011), immigrants from African continent receive poor treatment while other foreigners such as Europeans, are generally considered as investors or tourists, and are treated well.

South Africa is not unique in Africa to have xenophobia incidents: Omar Bongo in Gabon encouraged violent attacks and mass expulsions of foreigners in order to build up a Gabonese nation state and divert attention away from intra-ethnic tensions that could cause
political instability (Kersting, 2009: 12). Mass expulsions in Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana can also be seen as a process of building the nation by excluding groups based on ethnic nationalist criteria (Whitaker, 2005: 118). In 2008, migrants from the DR Congo were brutally expelled by the Angolan state agencies (Neocosmos 2008).

The record of “xenophobia” since South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994 is dismal. Crush (2008a, 2013) records all incident of xenophobia from 1994 to 2013. For example, in 1994 the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) threatened to take "physical action" if the government failed to respond to the perceived crisis of undocumented migrants in South Africa. IFP leader Mangosutho Buthelezi who was then Minister of Home Affairs, and in his first speech to parliament noted:

If we as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme” (Crush, 2008a).

In December 1994 of South Africans tried to evict perceived "illegals" from Alexandra township, blaming them for increased crime, sexual attacks and unemployment. The campaign, which lasted several weeks, was known as "Buyelekhaya" (Go back home) (Crush, 2008a: 44). Having observed and heard this negative rhetoric about foreign nationals, there has been little effort over the years by South African government to explicitly provide durable solutions in terms of integration and further making immigrants have some sense of belonging while in the host country. For example, the xenophobic attacks started after 1994 democratic dispensation but little or no investment was made to address the problem until 2008 incidents. Learning from the past experience and coming up with policies that could promote the reconciliation between citizens and immigrants would require a shift in immigrations laws, state rhetoric as well as putting a halt on arrests and deportation. Operation “crackdown” launched in 2000 and “Fiela” that was launched in 2015 are evidence of the state’s negative perception toward immigration in South Africa, thus making integration process more complicated.
Research objectives and significance of the study

This study explores the understandings, differentiated experiences, contours and dynamics of immigrants’ exclusion and their own efforts to organise themselves in Cape Town, a city whose policies proclaim it as a “world” city. I chose Cape Town because it prides itself on liberal values of toleration, social inclusion, diversity and non-racialism while at the same time branding itself as a well-run “African City”. Surprisingly, while the xenophobic attack is the dominating theme in public discourse, this study found a different reality.

The broad aim of the study is to develop an understanding of Cape Town’s African working class immigrants’ self-activity, their experiences and local government’s policy silences, I look at the profile, character and role of immigrant associations and how they shape survival strategies as well as possible paths to integration/assimilation. (My understanding is that integration is not the same as assimilation, with the latter being a dissolving of differences). I have not looked at highly professional African immigrants such as professors; economists etc., who arrive in South Africa as part of pre-arranged work placements in terms of scarce skills appointments. My specific objectives are to: first understand Cape Town’s immigrant originations and associations and the role of transnational identities in shaping integration; second, to explore the local state’s policies silences and campaigns against xenophobia and racism, third to document immigrant’s experience of immigration bureaucracy (Home Affairs and so on). The fourth aim is investigate their involvement in wider social integration into urban life in Cape Town. This study investigated the experience of African immigrants in South Africa vis-à-vis xenophobia (using life stories) since it is an on-going phenomenon, and there is no indication of it abating.

Most research on immigrants tends to look at why some South Africans seem “xenophobic” and why this is so. In the process, researchers have neglected the study of immigrants per se. Local researchers also underestimate the “back-and-forth traffic” and the complex transnational hybrid spaces of immigrants and as such continuing relations between immigrants and their places of origin. The critical importance of immigrant organizations has been underplayed in the general literature, which focused mostly on assimilation (see
Portes 2012). In South Africa, the role of these organizations in shaping the integration of their members and their contribution to combating xenophobia has been ignored and therefore this study provides a corrective, which could be used to shape the migration policy that promotes integration.

This study contributes to the understanding of how African immigrants are pro-active, how they constitute networks and how they are able to negotiate and claim spaces in this hostile country. It seeks to develop policy recommendations that will be easier to follow and implement in a unified manner compared to the fragmented policy guidelines currently in use. Therefore, this study might be useful to South African government, policy makers, migration experts / scholars and researchers. But it hopes to shift the study of xenophobic violence in the post-apartheid South Africa towards a more balanced approach. This research will add to existing body of knowledge in four ways: in rethinking immigration studies to focus on hybridity and the “back-and-forth traffic” of migrants and second looking at the importance of policies and their implementation in relation to xenophobia and afrophobia, third, in improving policies regarding social marginalisation in cities and, fourthly, in rethinking policies for mega- African events that are increasingly held in South Africa but opportunistically claim to “African” events.

The study uses a number of lenses to investigate working class immigrants’ life world but the major focus is on immigrant organisations and a secondary focus is how immigrants relate to their experiences in relation to integration in face of state institutions such as Home Affairs and community life such as churches. I follow the conceptual framework used by Alejandro Portes – the leading scholar in international migration especially Latin Americans and Caribbean’s migrants. Portes (2008, 1057) insists that immigrant organisations are important for three reasons: Firstly, “individual immigrants seldom enter a country or participate in its politics on their own”. Instead, they do so cooperatively working within networks organized by activists within their own communities or with external ones. Secondly, the lives of immigrants centre on the on-going relations between immigrants and their places of origin as well as integrating into their host communities creating “dual loyalties”. “The back-and-forth traffic builds multifaceted social fields spanning national
boundaries” (Portes et al, 2008: 1057). The third idea is that according to Portes, et al, (2008:1958) “ethnic and transnational politics may not be incompatible but may reinforce each other, giving rise to positive synergies that promote incorporation”.

**Organisation of the thesis**

The thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter one provides a context and motivation for the study; chapter two focuses on different literatures related to international migration. Themes like transnationalism, integration and xenophobia were discussed. It consider three periods of scholarly work on African foreign migrants in South Africa. The three periods are: 1994-2000; 2000-2006; 2007-2014 that are roughly linked to president Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. Chapter three discusses the research methodology used in the data collection analysis. It presents also shows how respondents were selected and interviewed. The chapter finishes by looking at the study’s methodological limitations. Chapter four focuses on the City of Cape Town (here in after CoCT), highlighting the demography, the recent economy, housing, racism crime, recent foreign immigrants. It provides a xenophobia timeline from 2008 to 2013 and notes the city’s efforts to curb the xenophobia on foreign immigrants.

Chapter five focuses on the city’s policy silences regarding immigrants in the city. It discusses different literatures on the absence of policies on immigrants at the local government in general and Cape Town in particular. It analyses also the following policies; Policy on Vulnerable Groups the CoCT Draft Policy March 2013, the City of Cape Town Social Development Strategy (SDS) (2013), and responsible Tourism Policy for the CoCT 2009. Chapter six cover findings Social inclusion/exclusion of African immigrants in Cape Town. They were based on the face to face interviews with 13 respondents from different African countries.

Chapter seven covers life stories of four respondents selected from 13 respondents discussed in chapter six. It presents information from the day they were born, the reason why they left their countries, the journey from their countries to South Africa, the reception they received and some example of exclusions they have received once in South Africa. Chapter eight
presents findings on immigrants’ organizations in Cape Town. It covers interviews done with leaders of organizations created by Somalis, Rwandan and DRC communities. In this chapter, a summary of this organization’ profile, objectives, activities both in South Africa and in their sending countries for those with transnational characters were presented. It presents also initiatives of these organizations into the South African community and their participations into local events. It highlights also the strategies on how they help their members to deal with xenophobia attacks. Chapter nine addresses the primary findings and secondary insights of the research bearing in mind the original objectives of this study. It also presents recommendations for ameliorating the situation of African immigrants in South Africa.
Chapter Two: International migration and debate around xenophobia in South Africa from 1994 to 2014

Introduction

In this chapter, I chart the academic and policy debate on xenophobia in South Africa from 1994 to 2014. At the end I discuss the substantial conceptual differences that emerge from the review of the literature. I consider three periods of scholarly work on African foreign migrants in South Africa. The three periods are: 1994-2000; 2000-2006; 2007-2014. I conceived of each as six year periods, since each seems to have a certain distinctiveness in terms of focus, although a few themes persist across these periods. For example, each period is marked by major events and processes. The periods I use, also correspond loosely to the terms of three presidents (Mandela; Mbeki and Zuma).

This chapter presents the literatures related to local and international migration and xenophobia. It discusses a conceptual framework based on a combination of the “integration literature” and the transnationalism/hybridity literature. Sorely lacking in the South African local literature is a focus on the associational life and transnational networks among foreign immigrants (this is evident even in Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) literature). Leaving out the “communities and networks that allow foreign migrants to function seems a major problem in local scholarly work. This is doubly striking because a major theme in international literature on migration is migrant networks (Portes, 2008, 2011; Massey, 2006; Basch et al., 1994).

The term ‘xenophobia' is contested. There is no single definition that captures the complexity of xenophobia phenomena. According to Collins English Dictionary (1991), it is defined as a ‘hatred or fear of foreigners or strangers or of their politics or culture’. More commonly, the term is used to denote an aversion to foreigners. However, the South African xenophobia is different from what is happening in other countries since is accompanied with violence and is not directed at tourists. Tshitereke (1999) argues that xenophobia represents a deep fear
and dislike of the unknown. The subjective fear and absolute dislike seems to have translated itself into intense tension and violence by South Africans towards immigrants. I start with a review of international literature (part one) and then move to the South African literature (part two).

**Part One: International migration, networks and xenophobia**

Over the last decade, international migration has become much more complex than in previous years. It is no longer predominantly a movement between selected states, but is becoming increasingly global. More persons from more diverse countries of origin migrate over longer distances, in a shorter period of time and with more interruptions along the route. At the same time, and accompanied by increasingly restrictive approaches towards specific forms of immigration, a clear trend emerges towards a selective approach towards international migration (Van Liempt and Bilger, 2012: 451).

The contemporary history of human mobility can be divided into four eras (Massey, 2006: 38). ‘During the mercantile period, from about 1500 to 1800, world immigration was subjugated by flows out of Europe and stemmed from process of colonization and economic growth under mercantile capitalism’. Over the period of 300 years, Europeans came to populate large areas of the Americas, Africa, Asia and Oceania (Tinker 1995; Lucassen 1995; Altman 1995; and Hefferman 1995). During this period, emigrants generally fell into four classes: ‘A relatively large number of agrarian settlers, a smaller number of administrators and artisans, an even smaller number of entrepreneurs who founded plantations to produce raw materials for Europe’s growing mercantilist economies, and in a few cases, convict migrants sent to penal colonies overseas’ (Massey, 2006: 39).

The second period is the industrial period, which started early in the nineteenth century and stemmed from industrial development in Europe and the spread of capitalism to former colonies overseas (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). According to Massey (2006: 39), ‘over this early period of industrialisation, some 48 million emigrants left the continent of Europe, a figure representing about 12 per cent of the European population at the turn of the century’. 
In light of the above, the large-scale emigration from Europe faltered with the outbreak of World War I, which brought European emigration to an abrupt halt and ushered in a four-decade period of limited migration (Massey 1995). During the 1940s, international migration was checked by World War II. The fourth period is the post-industrial migration that emerged during the mid-1960s and constituted a sharp break with the past. Rather than being dominated by outflow from Europe to a handful of settler societies, immigration became truly global in scope, as the number and variety of both sending and receiving countries increased as the global supply of immigrants shifted from Europe to developing countries of the Third World including Africa (Castles and Miller, 1993).

One of theories that seeks to clarify how international human mobility would continue or be maintained once it has begun, is network theory. Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino and Taylor (1993: 448) define “migrant networks as:

… sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin. They increase the likelihood of international movement because they lower the costs and risks of movement and increase the expected net returns to migration. Network connections constitute a form of social capital that people can draw upon to gain access to foreign employment. Once the number of migrants reaches a critical threshold, the expansion of networks reduces the costs and risks of movement, which causes the probability of migration to rise, which causes additional movement, which further expands the networks, and so on.

According to Durand and Massey (2010: 28) migration involves movement along three dimensions: social, temporal, and spatial.

It is social because it is influenced not merely by market conditions and wage levels but by network formation, social capital accumulation, cumulative causation, and various processes of societal transformation that affect sending and receiving areas alike. It is temporal because it unfolds sequentially in time according to certain developmental stages: departure, where the analytic focus is on causes; arrival, where adaptation and integration are most salient; return, where the motivations of migrants come into play; and long-term consequences, which pertain not only to receiving nations but to sending
societies as well... Finally, migration is spatial because it always implies a change of geographic location, which may or may not carry geopolitical implications...

Immigration is not initiated by emigrants but also by organised group in the receiving countries especially employers in a number of sectors. According to Durand and Massey (2010: 30) even skilled migrants used networks:

Migrants with technical or professional training typically locate in capital cities and generally travel as individuals in search of opportunities for education, work, or professional development. In some cases, they move in response to network connections, old family links, or intermarriage; and more and more cases of migration are associated with transnational firms that have plants and offices in multiple countries.

Once they are in the receiving countries, migrants are not uprooted from their countries of origins (Schiller, Basch and Blanc, 1995) but they maintain their links with their home countries and became transmigrants.

Martinelli (1982) reveals “in the 1960s the word “transnational” was widely used by students of economic process to refer to the establishment of corporate structures with established organizational base in more than one state”. Other scholars had been applying the adjective “transnational” to indicate an abatement of national confines and the development of ideas or political organizations that extend national boundaries (Schiller, Basch and Blanc, 1995: 49). The idea of migrants “transnationalism” arose in the early 1990s when anthropologists observed strong connections between the sending and receiving countries of international migrants (Snell, Engbersen and Leerkes, 2006: 285). As Schiller and Fouron (1999: 344) postulate, ‘transnational migration is a pattern of migration in which persons, although they move across international borders, settle, and establish relations in a new state, maintain ongoing social connections with the polity from which they originated. In transnational migration people literally live their lives across international borders. Such persons are best identified as “transmigrants”.’ The result is the genesis of ‘transnational communities’, ‘transnational social fields’ and ‘transnational social spaces” (Snel, Engbersen and Leerkes, 2006: 286).
Instead of a gradual process of acculturation and integration into the host society, as described by classical assimilation theory, transnationalism evoked the imagery of a permanent back-and-forth movement in which migrants lived simultaneously in two or more societies and cultures, tying them together into “deterritorialized” communities (Basch, Schiller and Blanc, 1994).

Schiller, Basch and Blanc (1995: 48) assert that modern immigrants cannot be regarded as the “uprooted.” Many are trans-migrants, becoming strongly entrenched in their new country but keeping multiple connections to their motherland. A new concept, ‘transnationalism’, has brought in an alternative viewpoint on international human mobility studies. This perspective concentrates on the continuing relations between immigrants and their places and the back-and-forth traffic that builds multifaceted social fields spanning national boundaries (Portes et al, 2008: 1057). Nevertheless, scholars such as Schiller, Basch and Blanc (1995) do not view transnationalism as a hindrance to migrant integration.

This study follows the conceptual framework used by Alejandro Portes – the leading scholar in international migration especially Latin Americans and Caribbean’s migrants to emphasise the crucial mediating role of migrant organisations. Portes, Escobar and Arana (2008) insist that immigrant organisations are important for three reasons: First, “individual immigrants seldom enter a country or participate in its politics on their own”. Instead, they do so cooperatively working within networks organized by activists within their own communities or with external ones. Second, the lives of immigrants centre on the on-going relations between immigrants and their places of origin as well as integrating into their host communities creating “dual loyalties”. “The back-and-forth traffic builds multifaceted social fields spanning national boundaries” (Portes et al, 2008: 1057). The third idea is that according to Portes, et al, (2008:1958) “ethnic and transnational politics may not be incompatible but may reinforce each other, giving rise to positive synergies that promote incorporation”.

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We avoided using Putnam’s social capital framework because it has attracted systematic criticisms for being narrow and backward looking (Portes and Vickstron 2011, 492) and also it is not easily transferable to geographically vast communities such as transnational immigrants who links are not based on organic solidarity. Most members of the migrant groups that I have studied only have met once in South Africa. Moreover, social capital has been criticised for being tautological (see Portes and Landholt 2000). It does not distinguish positive and negative aspects of social capital (ibid, 532). “Social capital” in Putnam, is used variably at different scales: the individual who has social capital, the community and the nation with social capital (causing methodological confusion because one form of capital can undermine the other). For example corrupt individual using their connections may undermine the community. The negative sides of social capital include exclusion of outsiders, excessive claims by individuals on group resources, restriction on individual’s freedoms, and “downward levelling” where individuals lower their own performance to match group norms (ibid., 532). Furthermore, community closure may prevent the success of business initiatives by enforcing excessive draining of resources because some members expect to be helped by other more successful ones, (ibid., 533).

The United Nations Economic and Social Council describe integration as a "gradual process by which new residents become active participants in the economic, social, civic, cultural and spiritual affairs of a new homeland. It is a dynamic process in which values are enriched through mutual acquaintance, accommodation and understanding (Canadian Council for Refugees, 1998: 7). While in the case of South Africa for example, it involves abandonment of refugees’ own cultural identities and adoption of host populations’ cultures and absorption into the host societies to the point that the refugees become indistinguishable from local populations (Jaji, 2009), the integration in this case involves interaction of refugees and local’s people.

According to the Norwegian Government, integration normally means that immigrants and refugees become functional members of the majority society, but without losing their cultural or ethnic identity” (Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, 2007). At the local level, the process of integration involves all sections of the community in minimizing social
distance, and facilitating communication and cooperation through creative negotiations, which produce new social meanings’’.

Integration is categorized into two domains as suggested by the council of Europe (1997: 75, quoted in Da Lamba, 2010: 417). Firstly, the public domain and the private, the public domain covers the social and legal environments of integration. The social environment also alludes to the domain of employment, housing, education, and more while legal environment covers the legal instruments, which are applicable to the refugees in the communities of the host (Da Lamba, 2010: 417).

The empirical research done by Atfield et al. (2007: 29) in the UK to determine the domains of integration that refugees perceiving to be more important for them shows that refugees mostly perceived to be integrated into their host communities when they have got the functional aspects of integration, which are access to work, education, and health as well as having language skills and knowledge of local institutions. Secondly ‘’refugees perceived to be integrated into the host communities of the societies in the UK, if they have developed a sense of belonging into the host community and felt being accepted by the host society which means that being able to have friends, feeling safe; getting married, staying in the same society, attending the same church and more’’ (Da Lamba, 2010:417). Thirdly, refugees perceived to be integrated into UK society when they feel that they have equal rights with to access public and private goods with the local communities.

The Social Planning Council for Ottawa (SPCO) identifies four spheres of integration:

  Economic integration: acquiring skills, entering the job market, and achieving financial independence.
  Social integration: establishing social networks and accessing institutions.
  Cultural integration: adapting various aspects of lifestyle and engaging in efforts to redefine cultural identity, and
In a study on small ethno-cultural organizations of migrants in Ottawa, done by the SPCO, participants in the research listed the following areas where integration was working quite well in Ottawa:

- Help with housing;
- Getting the permanent residence card and the health card;
- Language classes;
- Social housing (even if the list is long);
- Social assistance;
- The fact that essential needs are taken care of;
- University education is accessible through provincial loans and bursary programs.
- There is a good range of services for the Francophone community (although they are not necessarily well known) (SPCO, 2010:7).

Furthermore, the SPCO reveals that the role of migrant’s organization in facilitating their members integrate in the Canadian society provides relevant scenarios to learn from. I would probably argue that the Canadian case is premised on a fairly smaller number of refugees migrating to Canada as compared to South Africa whose migration population is overwhelming given the dwindling social and economic challenges. However, the Canadian Ethno-cultural organizations, through their activities, play a key role in the development and support of social capital. They offer informal links for cohesion and mutual help, which increases a sense of belonging and of being supported. They also enable their members to have access to external networks with can help them change their situation (for example, to find employment or housing). In other words, ethno-cultural organizations do important work for integration, inclusion and the participation of new immigrants in the Canadian society (SPCO, 2010:8). Meanwhile, much as migrant organisation in South Africa have tried to bridge this gap, they are constrained by overall social inequality in South Africa and skewed migration policies, which in my view have made integration process difficult.

According to Portes, et al. (2008: 1958) the integration in the receiving communities is divided into two schools of thought: one being the “transmigration/multiple loyalties” view,
and the other being undermining the political integrity of the host nation and blurring
loyalties that should be one and indivisible. Moreover, Portes, Escobar and Arana (2008:
1958) stress that in the first view, transnational organizations slow down the integration of
immigrants into the host nation and further compromise their successful incorporation into
the local community. At worst, they turn immigrants into a ‘fifth column’ of foreign
advocates undermining the interests of the society that received them.

The other school argues, on the other hand, that “rising transnationalism is nothing but the
natural response from below to an increasingly integrated global system and that it is not
incompatible with successful integration and participation in the host society” (Portes et al,
2008: 1995). These scholars firmly believe that double nationality for example, can actually
assist integration by removing the stigma linked to give up old allegiance and that the
experience gained through involvement in transnational organizations can be helpfully
shifted to domestic political concern, giving immigrants better voices in their receiving
nation (Escobar, 2004; Vertovec, 2004). Thus, according to Portes, et al, (2008: 1958)
“ethnic and transnational politics may not be incompatible but may reinforce each other,
giving rise to positive synergies that promote incorporation”. Immigrant groups finding
themselves discriminated against, bond together through their organisations and adopt a
defensive stance toward the host country while at the same time appealing to symbols of
cultural pride brought from home” (Portes et al, 2007). Portes maintains that leaders of these
organizations can see no contradiction between pursuing goals and processes of successful
integration into the host society. As Portes argues this strong validation of dual loyalties and
prompt integration into the host cannot be predicted as an automatic outcome. Portes et al
(2008: 1064) further asserts that “the organizational life of immigrant communities is not as
segmented as it appears at first glance and that transnational organizations may actually
serve as vehicles for successful integration”.

Snel et al (2006) documented how various activities link transmigrants with their home
countries. First, everyday economic activities such as the sending of remittances or goods to
their countries of origin, property ownership or assistance to charities back home integrate
immigrants. Professional economic activities like investments in business or business trips
to their sending country. **Political activities** relate to the sending nation happen frequently among all migrant groups. Snel *et al* (2006: 293) assert for example, that ‘the majority of immigrants read newspapers from their country of origin, keep up-to-date with the politics of, or are members of, a political organization in their country of origin and/or occasionally take part in demonstrations against the politics in their country of origin’. Transnational **socio-cultural activities** include, for instance, ‘visiting and maintaining contacts with family and friends in the country of origin or being a member of public organizations in the country of origin’ (Snel, *et al*, 2006: 293). Transnational socio-cultural activities include attending meetings organised mainly by compatriots, being involved in “cultural activities feature artists from the country of origin”, and “joining migrant or other organizations in the host country with connections to the country of origin” (Snel *et al*, 2006: 293).

Different indicators that measure various aspects of the phenomenon of integration have been created by researchers particularly indicators of how refugees integrate into their host communities and these include (economic, social, and legal) as well as functional domains which are (access to education, health, employment etc.). The following indicators created by Kuhlman (1991) as quoted in (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil, 2004) are the measures used to identify the integration between refugees and the host communities and the outcome of this integration. In subsequent chapters, this study attempts to find out whether these measures are applicable to South Africa and Cape Town situation in particular.

The first indicator is that refugees have to maintain their own identity such as cultural, religious and adjust to their new host society. This indicator measures the adaptation process such as economic, social and cultural norms that refugees go through in their new environment without losing the own identity. Secondly refugees are not supposed to face far more acts of violence and crime than that which group member of the host society do not pledge against each other. These indicators are very important because they capture the definition of integration that has been discussed on the literature review chapter. Jacobsen (2001: 9) and Banki (2004: 2-3) have suggested some indicators which are used to measure the function and social integration into their host communities.
Figure 2 below illustrates the main domain of integration and the indicators for each of these domains.

**Figure 1: domain of integration**

![Diagram of integration domains]

Source: Ager and Strang (2008)

The framework above consists of ten domains, which are grouped by four themes:

Firstly, makers and means of integration means that the refugees can get access to the employment, housing, education and health opportunities that are similar to the citizens of the host country (Ager and Strang, 2008).

In terms of employment Castles et al. 2001 (cited in Ager and Strang, 2008) argue that employment has been viewed as the most researched area of integration because it has constantly been identified as a factor influencing many relevant issues, including promoting economic independence, planning for the future, meeting members of the host communities, providing opportunity to develop language skills, restoring self-esteem and encouraging self-reliance (Africa Educational Trust, 1998; Bloch 1999; Tomlinson and Egan 2002 in Ager
and Strang 2008). However, the main barrier to securing employment is difficult simply because of the non-recognition of qualifications and previous work experience. Many refugees are allowed to produce proof of previous qualifications and even when they can, but sometimes employers may not recognize them (European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), 1999b). Consequently, under-employment, defined as holding a job, which does not require the level of skills or qualifications possessed by the jobholder is a common factor in the experience of refugees in the labour market (Africa Educational Trust, 1998 in Ager and Strang, 2008).

Secondly, social connections involve different relationships and networks that can help refugee to integrate into host communities. Thirdly, facilitators are the skills, knowledge and circumstances that can assist refugee to be active and engaged in the host society (Ager and Strang, 2008). Lastly, foundation is defined as the principles that a refugee expect from the host country and the members. These principles includes the rights that refugee are given by state and the obligation of citizens (Ager and Strang, 2008).

Portes et al, (2007: 255) argue that contrary to the conventional assimilation story, the maintenance and cultivation of ties with the home nation do not decline with time since immigration, nor the preserve of marginal sectors within immigrant communities provides a sense of belonging. To the contrary, these activities are more common among better established, better educated, and wealthier migrants. The reason seems to be that these are the persons with the wherewithal to involve themselves in frequently complex and demanding cross border ventures, something that is commonly beyond the reach of more recent, and poorer, arrivals. In relation to the above viewpoint, transnational organisations, activities and loyalties do not threaten integration. In fact, proofs coming from various empirical studies conducted by Portes at el, indicated that immigrant organization including transnational ones could play a positive role in the process of political integration in the hosting nations.

As noted by Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci Pellegrino and Taylor (1993), immigrants who leave for an unknown land face high costs for their migration. However, because of
network that they create at the destination as well as on the way, the cost of migration for friends and relatives left behind is lower.

The first migrants who leave for a new destination have no social ties to draw upon, and for them migration is costly. After the first migrants have left, however, the potential costs of migration are substantially lowered for friends and relatives left behind. Because of the nature of kinship and friendship structures, each new migrant creates a set of people with social ties to the destination area... Migrants are inevitably linked to non-migrants, and the latter draw upon obligations implicit in relationships such as kinship and friendship to gain access to employment and assistance at the point of destination. Once the number of network connections in an origin area reaches a critical threshold, migration becomes self-perpetuating (1993: 449).

Xenophobia in international literature

Historically, the first xenophobia attack toward foreigner nationals known in the twenty century is the holocaust of Jews in Germany. But according to Mosse (1978: 233) racism as a world view was not confined to Halter’s thoughts and actions. Haltler, in fact, benefited from an advantage common to all practitioners of racism, whether they emphasized spiritual forces or attempted to annex science. In Eighteen-century Europe was the cradle of modern racism. The major cultural trends of that century vitally affected the foundations of racist thought. This was the age of enlightenment, during which an intellectual elite attempted to substitute an emphasis upon man’s inherent reason and virtue for the “ancient superstitions of the past” (ibid., 1978).

Jones (2011: 35) identified three interrelated but distinct forms of xenophobia that circulate and inform verbal and visual rhetoric in many immigrant receiving countries:

**Exclusive xenophobia** – you are fundamentally different from and therefore exist outside of our imagined community;

**Possessive xenophobia** – you are fundamentally different from and outside our imagined community and you are trying to take our jobs, education, tax dollars, medical care, etc., and
**Toxic xenophobia** – you are fundamentally different from and outside our imagined community and you are trying to destroy that which we hold most dear, our freedom.

After the 9/11 attack, western countries have been characterized by what Jones (2011) identify as toxic xenophobia. She states that the mobilization of the Swiss populace to approve a ban on the building of minarets and the American protests to the building of mosques in communities (in New York, Tennessee, and California to name a few examples) share a common denominator of fear. This fear is certainly a form of xenophobia, but one that is distinct in tone and rationale from other forms (Jones, 2011: 34).

According to Jonas (2011), the xenophobia of the Swiss poster and of the panic over mosques and Sharia law in the U.S. are a form of toxic xenophobia, with a focus on Muslims as fundamentally different from “true” Europeans and Americans, with a threat of destroying that, which defines what it means to be Swiss, French, American, etc. Particularly, there is the ominous and nebulous threat that Muslims are going to destroy the liberty and freedom of the west (Jonas, 2011: 35).

As in Europe and the United States, in Africa the argument is the lack of capacity for integration of the migrants (“the boat is full”) (Kersting, 2009: 11). On the African continent, racism/xenophobia was manifested in form on nationalism. Snyder (2000: 23-24) defines Nationalism as a doctrine where people believe that their culture, history, institutions, religion or principles are distinct and aspire to self-rule under a political system that expresses and protects those distinct characteristics. Nationalism is presented in two phases in different African countries (Kersting, 2009). The first nationalism happened in the process of decolonisation. It was directed against colonial powers, which meant against other states (Kersting, 2009: 7). The second nationalism is no longer directed toward other countries but against denizens (non-citizens) living within an African state. According to Web 2008, the new nationalism focuses on the new political cleavage of autochthony and origin. The new national question seems to be “who has citizenship but should not have it, and who should have it but does not have it” (Weber 2008: 125). Citizenship is seen as a key factor. Rights to
social welfare, to employment, to land etc. are increasingly denied to newcomers and immigrants (Kersting, 2009: 11).

According to Kersting (2009) most of the xenophobia in Africa is Afro-phobic. Here are some examples of xenophobia/afrophobic actions on the African Continent. Mobutu repealed his 1972 presidential decree granting citizenship to Rwandan and Burundian immigrants in 1981, in reaction to national resentment. Immigrants were seen as competing with locals for land and economic opportunities. Mobutu manipulated these feelings and used anti-foreigner rhetoric to inspire ethnic cleansing in North Kivu in 1993 and tried to expel Congolese Tutsi in 1996 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004: 405). Omar Bongo in Gabon encouraged violent attacks and mass expulsions of foreigners in order to build up a Gabonese nation state and divert attention away from intra-ethnic tensions that could cause political instability (Kersting, 2009: 12); mass expulsions in Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana can also be seen as a process of building the nation by excluding groups based on ethnic nationalist criteria (Whitaker, 2005). In Zimbabwe in the so-called Third Chimurenga (Third liberation war) Robert Mugabe focused on the “unfinished business” of land distribution to the black population. It started with the banal nationalism using the liberation war, the nativist revolution, the redefinition of national days and hero’s days to rewrite patriotic history (Kersting, 2009: 15). In South Africa it is a wave of xenophobia toward immigrants from Africa countries that have happened after the new democratic government that followed the apartheid regime (Kersting, 2009: 15). In 2008 migrants from the DR Congo were brutally expelled by the Angolan state agencies (Neocosmos 2008). Dodson (2010) states that South Africa, far from being exceptional or singular, should thus be seen as but one example of what appears to be a growing worldwide phenomenon of xenophobia, or at least anti-immigrant views and actions.

Part two: South African immigration literature

As mentioned earlier, the next section is presented in three periods. I start with a brief introduction and move on into reviewing the literature of the three periods. The three periods are: 1994-2000; 2000-2006; 2007-2014. The periods I use, also correspond loosely to the
terms of three presidents (Mandela; Mbeki and Zuma). Finally, I will assess this literature’s weaknesses against the international literature.

In Africa, the major movement of migrations have been linked to labour needed of the mining industry. According to Massey (2006) the end of apartheid in 1994 appears to have led to the surfacing of the sixth regional migratory sub-system centred on the Republic of South Africa (RSA).

The collapse of apartheid brought about the forceful reintegration of South Africa into the global economy after years of exclusion, which was accompanied by an increase in trade, investment and, of course, immigration. Rather than the entry of European and Asian migrants, which had been encouraged prior to 1994, the resurgence of immigration in the late 1990s was led by Africans, mostly from surrounding nations in the southern part of the continent (Massey, 2006: 57).

In the past 20 years there has been an important change in the ways in which foreign migrants are inserted into the South African economy and society. From the mid-1800s until the 1980s there was a highly organized regional labour migration regime, especially around semi-and unskilled mine and agricultural labour (Böhning 1981; First 1983; Crush 2000), along with the migration of Europeans into skilled positions.

In the 1990s, organised regional recruitment to the mines and other sectors has drastically reduced, and it has been supplanted by a largely unmanaged and varied movement of migrants. The migration from neighbouring countries, has also been supplemented from people beyond Southern Africa to include Nigeria, Ethiopia and Somalia (Centre for Development and Enterprise 2000). As Taal’s work shows,

From this it has become clear that the hospitality sector is increasingly serviced by informalised workers. Many of these are migrants, both cross border and internal who travel to cities for work and are made particularly vulnerable to exploitation through either their lack of documentation or their lack of permanence and family in their place of work. Reports from shop stewards highlight how migrant workers are prepared to
work for lower pay, to pick up anti-social shifts on public holidays and to work for managers in a private capacity for no extra pay in order to keep their jobs. A large and increasing number of workers in the sector are labour broker workers, or outsourced workers, which is a further form of informalisation and vulnerability as workers no longer work at the companies that employ them (Taal, 2012).

The only available data on transnationalism of African immigrants in South Africa is reported by Crush and McDonald (2002). These authors concentrated on three main questions:

- Who are the new African immigrants to South Africa?
- What conditions shape their migration patterns?
- And, what is the nature of their relations with South Africans?

Fieldwork for these contributions was conducted in five areas in South Africa (Imizamoyethu (CT), Marconi Beam (CT), Winterveld, Durban, and a site located close to the South Africa/Lesotho border) and one in Mozambique. The majority of respondents came from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia.

Peberdy and Rogerson (2002) examined the rise of African migrant and immigrant entrepreneurship in South Africa. They compare lifestyles, especially the marriage strategies of Mozambicans who migrate to South Africa and settle, with those of non-migrants in the Machaze district. They argue that ‘...intensification of transnational polygyny (marriage of a man to multiple wives when these wives reside in different countries) during and after the war has changed the balance of social power and the meaning of social roles and relationships within Machazian households’.

Reitzes and Sivuyile (2002) examined the relationship between black South Africans and immigrants from neighbouring countries, and discuss how this relationship has changed over time. The study was conducted in the Winterveld area near Pretoria. Immigrants reported that before the 1994 national elections there was no noticeable discrimination against, or
feelings of hostility towards, black foreigners but that since then the general and official attitude to non-South Africans has changed negatively, quickly and dramatically. McDonald (2002) presents a study conducted in Marconi Beam, a new informal settlement near Cape Town occupied primarily by non-South Africans. He examines the social interactions between the locals and foreigners and concludes that it is intense but not particularly conflictual.

A major preoccupation across almost all studies is: why are south Africans xenophobic? In a 1998 national public opinion survey conducted by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) found that the majority of South Africans are indeed xenophobic and that they oppose immigration: 25% of South Africans want a total ban on immigration and 45% support strict limitations on the numbers of immigrants allowed (Crush 2001). It is unclear if these surveys addressed specifically foreign africans or all immigrants. The Human Sciences Research Council (Hadland, 2008: 45) research suggests that while South Africans accept that violence committed against foreign nationals (over year 2008 when more than 50 people have died and tens of thousands of people have been displaced) was not legitimate and not acceptable; they still confirm that South Africans believe foreign nationals should return to their country of origin. The South Africa debate around violent attacks and hatred of foreigners in particular among blacks is extremely complex and intense especially because of the extremities of violence (Hadland, 2008; Pillay, 2008; Neocosmos, 2006; Dodson, 2010; Charman and Piper, 2012).

Poverty has been rejected as a proper explanation. Xenophobia – hatred of all foreigners -- is too broad a term since hostility has been directed specifically against black Africans living in black working class areas -- i.e. class based “Afrophobia” (HSRC, 2008) and Xenophobia does not explain the form of violence or antagonism (Charman and Piper, 2012). As Neocosmos (2006) argues “In actual fact, poverty can only account for the powerlessness, frustration and desperation of the perpetrators, but not for their target. After all why were not Whites or the rich or for that matter White foreigners in South Africa targeted instead?” Research showed that South Africans believed that African immigrants are poor and vulnerable and will therefore take lower pay than locals for similar jobs.
Mathers and Landau (2006: 10) suggest that being black and foreign in South Africa, whether legal or illegal, worker or leisure tourists, marks one out for harassment, inconvenience and even violence, both psychic and physical. Dodson (2010) argues that the violence and “xenophobia is entrenched and systemic in South African society, requiring similarly systemic responses if it is to be meaningfully addressed”. Dodson (2010) has also done interviews of foreign African victims of xenophobia.

The role of foreign Africans needs to be understood alongside the racial and class dynamics of cities. The literature on xenophobia (Hadland, 2008; Dodson 2010) also focuses largely explaining the nature and depth of attitudes of South Africans. However, it also explores reasons for the outbreak of overt violence by black South Africans against other black Africans. Dodson and Oelofse (2002) examine the issue of xenophobia in Imizamoyethu, Cape Town, and conclude that there is conflict in the area between insiders and outsiders fuelled mainly by job competition and poverty. The causes and modalities of social exclusion and violence against immigrants of African origin are complex and multifaceted. Researchers face a major methodological and theoretical challenge in trying to give explanations for these complex events. There are two schools of thoughts among researchers; some explain the South African xenophobia as a phenomenon whose causes can be explained by general theories. Some of these general sociological theories include: the scapegoating hypothesis, the isolation hypothesis, the relative deprivation and the resource mobilization hypothesis (Morris, 1998, Tshitereke, 1999, Harris, 2002, Pillay, 2008a, Pillay, 2008b and Duncan, 2012). However, those theories/hypothesis while useful for generating lines of research, lack the credible contextual support that tie them with the historical realities. Due to these limitations, the second school proposes other factors that are unique to South Africa. For example; the culture of violence, nationalism and lack of political will among key leaders.

I will identify the explanations of the causes of the South African xenophobia as published by different academicians since 1994 until 2014. I used the chronology as research methodology. This study is divided into three sections; 1994-2000; 2001-2006 and 2007-
Explanations given were grouped also into different themes including; psychological, social, economic, political and cultural. For example, in one of the sections I review the 1994-2000 literature on the nature and causes of xenophobia in South Africa. First, I look at the media of the time; second I look at various theories that attempted to explain the character and rise of xenophobia.

The period between 1994-2000

On the one hand, conservatives such as Hart (1996: 27) argued that the “crisis of immigrants” in South Africa is one of the most vital the state is facing. Hart asserted that they don’t only “steal jobs” or cause crime through drug trafficking and car theft, but they are also a “burden to the taxpayers”. Substantial added cost is incurred in fortifying the country’s borders and keeping military personnel, vehicles, and aircraft in place for this purpose. Other costs are those of arrest, deportation of illegal immigrants in their countries of origin. He estimated that in 1995 South Africa deported 4 million illegal immigrants which cost R 2,580 million (US$ 716 million) (Hart, 1996; 30). This view saw immigrants as a “burden to the country’s resources” that will reduce the country’s capacity to deliver to its people.

However, there is little evidence behind claims that non-nationals represent a significant drain on the state’s financial resources instead they contribute to the country’s economy. Summarising research done in South Africa and elsewhere Meintjies (1998: 20) argues that:

Immigrants are, in fact, net contributors, not parasites. Immigrants are, on average, healthier, more energetic and better educated than people in the host population. Consequently, they draw comparatively less on social welfare and other social services. Many pay tax and, through their entrepreneurship, make a positive injection into local economic development.

This argument is supported by different findings on immigrants from African origin. Different researchers confirmed that African immigrants have abilities the country could benefit. They are motivated (Rogerson, 1997, McDonald et al. 1999: 1), educated...
(McDonald et al. 1999: 1), skilled (McDonald et al. 1999: 1), entrepreneurs (Rogerson, 1997, McDonald et al, 1999: 1).

Up to 2000, researchers continued to debate the number of foreign immigrants (7 million vs under 1 million); economic costs and advantages of having foreigners (how many local jobs can they create). In 1997, the Department of Home Affairs “repatriated” 176,351 illegal aliens, a startling average of 485 per day (HRW, 1998: 20). The Human Rights Watch (1998: 21) stated there were major abuses of human rights and that the media were implicated. “Much of this coverage is uninformed and perpetuates untested assumptions about the negative impact of migrants on the economy and on crime and drug abuse levels”. Instead, according to the Human Right Watch, “there is little coverage of the systematic abuse of human rights in the implementation of the aliens control system, nor is there informed coverage of the underlying issues of labour exploitation which the current system clearly perpetuates” (Human Rights Watch, 1998: 21). Danso and McDonald (2000) found that the majority of the media depicted immigration from an anti-foreigner viewpoint and called for harsh and urgent controls, even the absolute prohibition of immigration (Danso and McDonald, 2000: 5). This kind of reporting also tends to be “unanalytical, reproducing problematic research and anti-immigrant terminology uncritically.

Tshitereke (1999) defined xenophobia in terms of ‘frustration’ and ‘relative deprivation’. According to Tshitereke, “Relative-deprivation concept suggests that a key psychological factor in generating social resentment and violence is a sense of relative deprivation. This arises from a subjective feeling of discontent based on the belief that one is getting less than one feels entitled to”. Tshitereke also suggests that in the post-apartheid period, while citizen's expectations have been heightened, a realisation that delivery is not instant has meant that dissatisfaction and resentment are at their peak. People are more mindful of their ‘deprivation’ than ever before. “This is the ideal situation for a phenomenon like xenophobia to take root and flourish. South Africa's political transition to democracy has exposed the unequal distribution of resources and wealth in the country and leading to protests, which have to a great extent resulted in attacks towards refugees (Tshitereke, 1999: 4).
In this period, hatred towards foreigners of African origin was associated with the contestation over the limited resources, such as housing, education, health care and jobs, associated with over promise during transition (Morris, 1998).

The scapegoating hypothesis, drawn from Tshitereke’s ideas on xenophobia, “depicts xenophobia as effect of ‘social change and evolution in society’. Tshitereke (1999: 4) explains that ‘people often create a frustration scapegoat, usually non-national minorities, against whom they may direct their anger in a violent form’. Similarly, Morris (1998: 1125) comments that, “research and historical events have indicated that if a majority group is in a perilous economic position they are more likely to feel threatened by minorities, especially if they are foreign”.

Rogerson (1997: 6) points out that:

In Johannesburg, hostility towards immigrants of African origin was expressed through various scapegoating tactics. For example; foreign Africans were blamed for inner-city sweatshops, destroying local parks and recreational facilities, making Johannesburg a slum city through squatting and even blamed as responsible for the rand’s depreciation and interest rate increases.

Another view was that of South Africa’s isolation whereby, according to Morris (1998), xenophobia is a consequence of South Africa’s exclusion from the international arena. Morris (1998) argues that “apartheid insulated South African citizens from nationalities beyond Southern Africa”. According to this theory, the “interface between previously isolated South Africans and unknown foreigners, creates a space for hostility to develop”. According to Morris (1998: 1125),

When a group has no history of incorporating strangers it may find it difficult to be welcoming. The isolation hypothesis suggests that suspicion and hostility towards strangers in South Africa exists due to international isolation. The hypothesis also explains contemporary xenophobia by recourse to internal isolation, between South Africans, as a consequence of apartheid. There is little doubt that the brutal environment
created by apartheid with its enormous emphasis on boundary maintenance has also impacted on people's ability to be tolerant of difference.

Wetherell and Potter (1992: 141) locate xenophobia strongly within the ambit of nationalism. They depict nationalism as a two faced coin, with 'patriotism and pride are the 'positive' face, and xenophobia and chauvinism the unacceptable face of nationalism'. Reitzes and Crawhall (1997) linked the increase in anti-immigrant sentiment among the general public and some officials with what they call an ambiguity of South African nationalism. Emerging from a history of division, South Africans face the challenge of forging a united nation. Immigrants are portrayed as a threat to social and economic security, rather than a threat to an as yet unformulated national identity (Reitzes and Crawhall, 1997). This national identity according to Reitzes and Crawhall (1997: 5) is partially being constructed by growing xenophobia and the "othering" of foreigners. Some South African citizens have begun to portray immigrants as fundamentally "non-South African," "foreign", "alien" or "amakwerekwere". Croucher (1998) supports this idea in her explanation on how the immigration crisis in South Africa is implicated in the Nation-building project.

According to Croucher (1998), the prejudice that is found in the public discourse regarding the negative impact of African immigrants to the nation building projects is summarised in what she call “the takeover thesis” and the main author of this thesis was the Minister of Home Affairs, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. As the director of the agency responsible for immigration, Buthelezi made frequent public pronouncements before parliament, and in the media, about the danger of illegal immigration and, specifically, the threat posed to the timely and effective implementation of the RDP (Croucher, 1998).

Peberdy (1999: 296) point out that xenophobia is fuelled by the state’s position toward non-South Africans. She states that:

The focus of the state on what it sees as the parasitical relationship of non-South Africans to the nation’s resources, and the way that the state criminalizes them, suggests that the state sees immigrants, and particularly undocumented migrants, as a threat to the nation and the post-1994 nation building process. The language of the state, which rarely
attaches the prefix African, shows that it conceptualizes most immigrants as Africans, and Africans as potentially the most dangerous of all 'aliens'.

The bio-cultural explanation of xenophobia in South Africa is justified by the fact that xenophobia in South Africa is not applied equally to all foreigners. Some foreigners are at greater risk than others. African foreigners seem to be particularly vulnerable to violence and hostility (Human Rights Watch, 1998; Human Rights Commission, 1999). Much of the hostility is directed at Africans from countries north of Southern Africa who are often easily distinguishable due to their physical features, distinctive dress and inability to speak the indigenous languages (Hart, 1996, Reitzes and Crawhall, 1997, Morris, 1998 and the South African Human Rights Commission, 1999). Among all immigrants in South Africa, those from the African continent were seen as a problem to the nation. Hart (1996: 27) argues that the black immigrants had many and varied consequences as they were pouring across the borders from neighbouring African countries.

African immigrants are identified also by their appearance, and ability/inability to speak local languages. For example, Morris 1998 suggests that Nigerians and Congolese are easily identifiable as the 'Other'. Because of their physical features, their bearing, their clothing style and their inability to speak one of the indigenous languages, they are in general clearly distinct and local residents are easily able to pick them out (Morris, 1998: 1125). Language is another tool South African police use in identifying immigrants. A senior police officer told (Reitzes and Crawhall, 1997: 21) that the police assume that people who can’t speak English or Afrikaans must be from over the border. For example, a report by the South African Human Rights Commission on the arrest and detention of persons in terms of the Aliens Control Act observes that 'at least ten percent' of the subjects interviewed in the study were apprehended 'on the basis of appearance, with nothing more' (1999).

The period between 2001-2006

The period 2001-2006 saw the emergence of a different focus in xenophobia scholarship. The focus was less of grand theories but on understanding the facts about the extent of
immigration micro and local forces that might explain why South Africans in certain places were more prone to xenophobia than others. The “culture of violence” view (Harris) mentioned above, gained precedence after 2001.

Palmary (2002: 1) contend that most officials in local state agencies were poorly informed about the legal rights of foreign migrants and as such states:

The Refugee Act, passed in 1998, has been welcomed as a necessary piece of legislation that provides for the needs of forcibly displaced persons coming to South Africa in search of asylum. It states that refugees are allowed to seek employment and to access education, as well as being entitled to the rights enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (with the exception of political rights and the rights to freedom of trade, occupation, and profession, which do not apply to non-citizens). Nothing is explicitly said, however, about the right to access other basic services such as housing, water, sanitation and safety. Many of these rights are met through services delivered at a local government level (Palmary, 2002: 1).

Nyamnjoh (2006) picked up from earlier work to argue that the South African xenophobia is caused by narrowly nation – state – based citizenship. Whereas Neocosmos (2006) asserts that among other explanations of South African xenophobia must be also speak to understandings of popular-democratic politics. In his ‘State of the City 2004’ address, Johannesburg’s Executive Mayor reflected the crisis view already articulated in the mid-1990s in which he argued that:

In keeping with the international trend of growing migration, our city has become a magnet for people from other provinces, the African continent and indeed the four corners of the world. Although migrants’ contribute to the rich tapestry of the cosmopolitan city, they also place severe strain on employment levels, housing and public services (cited in Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh, and Singh, 2005).

Legget (2003: 52) reports that 63% of inner-city Johannesburg residents mentioned ‘foreigners’ as the group committing most of the crime in their area. Similarly, among
70% of Johannesburg residents who thought crime had increased in recent years, almost three-quarters identified immigrants as a primary reason (Landau and Jacobsen, 2004: 45). The crime-illegal foreigners theme was debated through statistical evidence. Landau et al. 2005 reveal that most non-nationals who are arrested are charged with immigration related offences, but do not threaten the security of South Africans (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh, 2005: 8). Landau et al. (2005) assert that

This is not to deny that the presence of additional people whatever their origins places additional burdens on public services. However, given the relatively small number of immigrants compared to South Africans using these services and their ability to contribute economically it makes little sense to single them out as a primary cost to government. That so many international migrants are excluded from social services further limits their financial impact on public finances.

According to Harris, violence in South Africa is not a new phenomenon. This theory suggests that the violence against cross-borders migrants is a culture that draws its legacy from the apartheid struggle. It finds its roots in the 1980s when violence was predominantly political in nature (Harris 2002: 181). She reveals that the explanation of South Africa's violent culture accommodates an understanding of xenophobia as a contemporary form of violence. This is because violence is presented as the norm in South Africa. In the post 2000 period scholars questioned the use of the word xenophobia. Nyamnjoh (2006) focus on the “asymmetry” of who gets attacked. Nyamnjoh argues that xenophobia in South Africa is Afrophobia. It is caused by narrowly nation state based citizenship but according to Nyamnjoh not every foreigner, outsider or stranger is a target. Instead, nationals, citizens or locals are very careful in choosing who qualifies to be treated as the inferior and undeserving ‘others’, and such choices depend on the hierarchies of humanity informed by race, nationality, culture, class and gender (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 38).

Drawing from this argument, African immigrants in South Africa are seen as inferior people who are economic and culturally backward. This can be found in the meaning of derogatory
names that are given to them as they are defined by (Peberdy 2001 and Nyamnjoh, 2006). Peberdy (2001) defines the word alien as follow:

The use of the term ‘alien’ is unfortunate, as it suggests that migrants do not belong, that they ‘are extraterrestrial not of this earth (let alone this country) but [it] also implies difference, strangeness, and otherness’ (Peberdy, 2001: 23-4).

Regarding the term *makwerekwere*, Nyamnjoh (2006) reveals that it means different things in different contexts, but as used in South Africa it means not only a black person who cannot demonstrate mastery of local South African languages but also one who came from a country assumed to be economically and culturally backward in relation to South Africa (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 39).

Neocosmos (2006) criticised the early works on xenophobia and argues that although much of the empirical work have been undertaken by different researchers, it is not so much concerned with intellectual understanding, but more with ensuring that foreigners in South Africa can access their ‘human rights’, A human rights perspective militates against explanation and understanding for it appears to provide a ‘ready-made solution’ which requires little intellectual effort.

According to Neocosmos (2006: 20), Xenophobia cannot exclusively be accounted for by state interpellation or indeed solely by reference to competition over scarce resources, but must also include some understanding of popular-democratic politics (even in its absence). He compares the state politic during the apartheid era and the democratic period of South Africa. He says that under apartheid all rural migrants to cities whether emanating from South African territory or not, were hailed as foreign through the medium of tribal identification. Post-apartheid, only those emanating from beyond South Africa’s borders are interpellated as foreign, as the Bantustans are simply struck off the map. It is no longer ethnic identity but national (and increasingly black African) identity which enables access to resources.
The literature of the period 2007-2014

After 2007, there was a different context: the semi-collapse of the local state, and violent service delivery protests became more widespread and often became the occasion for a xenophobic attack. There was a financial crisis that saw a spike in unemployment and after 2008 there was more police violence on scale not seen before. In this period country-wide attacks on foreigners in different locations that took place around May 2008, and these attacks attracted even more scholarly and global attention. Many researchers have expended considerable effort (think tanks, civil society organizations, and the state-funded Human Sciences Research Council) to understand and explain the antiforeigner attacks and make recommendations as to how any recurrence might be prevented.

Lack of leadership emerged as a major theme. The geography of violence with informal areas became a new aspect of research. Townships as the major spaces of xenophobia became a focus (see new “township economics” in Charman, and Piper, 2012). Literature showed that foreign business people’s commercial successes led increasingly to xenophobic violence on the part of the local population. Respondents in Mukwena’s 2012 research on xenophobia attack on Zimbabwean nationals in Dunoon indicated that police incompetence also contributed to the attacks. Respondents revealed that there were meetings a day before the attacks and residents in the townships threatened to attack the foreigners. Police knew that violence would take place in the informal settlements but did not take any measures to prevent it (Mukwena, 2012: 71).

For Dodson (2010: 6), the lack of political leadership is a key factor in the production and reproduction of xenophobic attitudes and violence. Among senior government figures, right up to the three post-apartheid presidents, attitudes toward foreign Africans in South Africa have been at best ambivalent and occasionally out-and-out negative. She asserts that Nelson Mandela himself, in a speech on the National Day of Safety and Security in 1994 just a few months after he had become president, stated “The fact that illegal immigrants are involved
in violent criminal activity must not tempt us into the dangerous attitude which regards all foreigners with hostility”.

Such language became a leitmotif, serving to promote the association of immigrants with not just illegality but actual criminality, despite evidence that African immigrants are far likelier to be victims than perpetrators of criminal activity (Dodson, 2010: 7). In characterizing state discourse as xenophobic, the Neocosmos (2008: 587), like Dodson provides striking examples of xenophobic statements by political leaders and human-rights abuses by police and other state agents. To which he refers are those based on the idea, also widely held, that “indigeneity is the only way to acquire resources, jobs, and all the other goodies which should be reserved for native peoples only” (Neocosmos 2008: 591), for example in implementation of the state’s policy of black economic empowerment. To Neocosmos, the “xenophobic pogroms” of 2008 were entirely predictable, and he suggests “the fact that quasi-fascist politics . . . have acquired a certain grip over large sections of the poor should come as no surprise” (2008: 592).

President Thabo Mbeki (as we noted previously) denied the very existence of xenophobia in South Africa. On 3 July 2008, as reported in numerous media outlets, including the Pretoria News, he told a gathering in tribute to victims of the attacks that this was not xenophobia, but “naked criminal activity (Dodson, 2010: 7). He states:

What happened during those days was not inspired by possessed nationalism, or extreme chauvinism, resulting in our communities violently expressing the hitherto unknown sentiments of mass and mindless hatred of foreigners’ xenophobia. . . . I heard it said insistently that my people have turned or become xenophobic. . . . I wondered what the accusers knew about my people which I did not know. And this I must also say—none in our society has any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia.

Matsinhe's fieldwork, focusing on Hillbrow and Yeoville highlighted the aspect of “The loathing and intolerance of insiders towards (black) foreigners”. He also shows how every institution of the state – police, immigration, military, education – is deployed to make life
difficult if not impossible for foreign blacks, frequently in direct contravention of the country's constitution. Others sections of society – banks, churches, employers and of course the media all play a role in demonisation and exclusion.

Steenkamp (2009) reveals that the violence that started in Alexandra in 2009 might have been caused by the government whose R3 billion infrastructural development projects in this township led to tension between interest groups, the state and amongst residents themselves (and between locals and with foreigners) about who gets which share (Steenkamp, 2009: 443).

The May 2008 attacks on foreigners have attracted much more scholarly attention than the previous periods. According to most reports, the attacks began in Alexandra then spread to other areas in and around Johannesburg, including Cleveland, Diepsloot, Hillbrow, Tembisa, Primrose, Ivory Park and Thokoza. Violence in Kwazulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Cape Town soon followed. The HSRC 2008 study was conducted over a period of two weeks by a team of experts housed at the Democracy and Governance Research Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The aim was to investigate the causes underlying the outbreak of xenophobic violence which took place in May 2008, left more than 50 people dead and thousands displaced in locales across South Africa.

Two patterns emerged in the violence that unfolded argued the HSRC researchers (2008: 15). Firstly, the violence was conducted against migrants from other African countries, and not foreigners in general. It was also established that important differences of opinion existed within the communities where the violence happened (HSRC, 2008: 16). In this context, violence was largely confined to urban informal settlements ringing some of South Africa’s major cities. “Large numbers of migrants who have entered South Africa have done so illegally, or are refugees who have fled unstable political conditions. These settlements are traditionally home to the poorest of South Africa’s poor, who, display relatively high rates of resistance to foreign migration into the country” (HSRC, 2008: 16).
Suren Pillay (2008: 14) asserts that while the causes of the violence are complex and multifaceted, three broad factors have emerged as underlying causes. The three are relative deprivation, South African exceptionalism, and exclusive nationalism. Different analyses attribute different weight to each of these, and they combine economic and socio-political factors.

Relative deprivation theory, which was used in the 1990s literature, made a comeback. According to (Pillay, 2008a, Pillay, 2008b and Duncan, 2012), the South African xenophobia is caused by the relative deprivation. Pillay (2008a: 14) defines it as a general sense of feeling deprived of something to which a person or groups feels entitled to. This in turn leads to feelings of resentment and revenge. Pillay (2008b: 100) extends this theory by highlighting that the anger and hatred within the poor and marginalized community is caused by the inequality that is increasing in South Africa. He states that:

In the face of the “naked display of self-enrichment” on the part of the new political and corporate elites, the response of “the marginalised, the unemployed …and the working poor” to their apparently unchanging plight, or to being left behind in the new South Africa, is pervasive anger and resentment (Pillay 2008b: 14).

The HSRC findings indicate that the violence which was perpetrated against foreign nationals during the May 2008 has to be seen in the context of a general sentiment of ‘siege’ within impoverished communities in an environment of considerable macro-economic hardship, in particular rising food and fuel prices (HSRC, 2008: 44). According to the report, South African citizens literally feel ‘besieged’ by a range of socio-economic challenges. This feeling is particularly acute for men of working age who are struggling to find employment or make a living and feel most directly threatened by the migration of large numbers of ‘working men’ from other parts of the continent. In this context, the ‘foreigner’ is the nearest ‘other’, against which this sentiment can be expressed (HSRC, 2008: 45). In supporting this idea, Duncan (2012: 108) asserts that while the poor are becoming increasingly poorer, the new political elites have no regret about demanding and obtaining obscenely high salaries and all the trappings of conspicuous wealth, even if this is virtually inevitably at the expense of the poor.
In the case study on the xenophobia and gender that affected especially Zimbabwean immigrants in Dunoon, Mukwena (2012) lends plausibility to the relative deprivation thesis in explaining the cause for the outbreak of violence in that area. He points out that on the whole, the women held very strong views that South Africans living in informal settlements perceive Zimbabweans as people who have “come to steal jobs”. This has been mentioned as the motive for xenophobic violence in De-Doorns farming community (Mukwena, 2012: 70).

Some argues that South Africa has a particular historical relationship to the African continent shaped by its apartheid history, and a particular historical relationship to the West, and shaped by its colonial history. Some analysts suggest this may have led to a South African superiority complex in relation to other Africans, uniting black and white South Africans against other Africans. However, Matsinhe (2011: 310) considers the belief of South African superiority and exceptionalism vis-a-vis Africa as a whole ‘We’re the richest in Africa’; ‘We’re the most powerful in Africa’; ‘We are the best in Africa’; ‘We have the best technology, best economy, best schools and universities’ (Matsinhe, 2011: 310). He asserts that the South African exceptionalism is a fantasy of imagined communities where the ignorant are wise, the poor are rich, the uneducated are educated, the weak are powerful, the losers are winners, and the vanquished are invincible.

Pumla Gqola (2008) quoted in Nkealah (2011: 129) asserts that xenophobic violence in South Africa is particularly negrophobic in character. She explains that although there is a huge migrant population in South Africa ‘no one is attacking wealthy German, British or French foreigners in Camps Bay or anywhere else in South Africa’. Besides, Matsinhe (2011) suggests that in the context of South African history the violent aversion towards African foreign nationals in South Africa can best be described as Afrophobia. The ideology of Makwerekwere seeks to make visible the invisible object of fear in order to eliminate it. The roots of this ideology ‘must be sought in the psychological realm of ego-weak characters who construct their identity by denigrating others . . . [in need of] scapegoats to externalise what cannot be sublimated’ (Matsinhe, 2011: 310).
Commodifying the Female Body has been cited as a reason (perhaps not primary) for violence. After the May xenophobic attacks, there were media accounts which claimed that foreigners were taking ‘our jobs and our women’. However this cause is rejected by Nkealah (2011). According to Nkealah (2011: 125);

The claim that foreigners were taking ‘our women’ implied that the women were unwilling partners in the relationships; it is as if they were pulled into them by force, much like a mother drags her six-year old to a dentist’s consultation room. The manner in which language was used to name the experience indicates an underlying current of male aggressiveness towards other males on the basis of ‘who owns the women’. What is inexcusable about this kind of thinking is not just the sexist ideology that it underscores in terms of how it reduces women to the level of commodities, but also the manner in which it stereotypes African masculinities and perpetuates popular notions of male sexualities.

The stereotyping of African male sexualities is often discernible in migrant discourses which are replete with generalizations such as ‘West African men are good in bed’ and ‘South African men cannot perform’. Sad to say, women are often the agency through which these notions are dispatched in the public sphere (Nkealah, 2011: 130). Nkealah concludes that there are many other fundamental factors that explain the rise of such gross hatred for the ‘other’ and a reduction of such into simply a question of masculinities in conflict, is something that should not be embraced at all (Nkealah, 2011: 133).

Another notable feature of the post-2008 literature is that scholars have also begun to analyse state responses. As noted by Gordon (2010) the migration laws have fuelled the xenophobic behaviour in South Africa. He reveals that in many ways, South Africa’s traditionally racially-biased immigration policy has been carried forward to the modern post-apartheid state. For much of the present post-apartheid period, the official government policy towards migrants was embodied in the Alien Controls Act of 1914. While the racial requirements were removed from the Act during the early 1990s, the restrictive and draconian nature of the Act remained (Gordon, 2010: 9).
Despite these criticisms, the drafting of new legislation to replace the Act was tediously slow and marred by controversy (Gordon, 2010: 9). By envisioning South Africa as being ‘threatened’ by parasitical foreigners, the authorities are able to invoke notions of ‘a state of siege’. Such a threatened position necessitates and justifies the suspension of aspects of the constitution to protect against this threat (Gordon, 2010: 14).

The ambiguities and contradictions that imbue the Immigration Act have spawned a legal vacuum regarding immigrants. The regulation of migrants rests less with the law and lawmakers than with law enforcers (see Palmary, 2002). Central figures in the implementation of immigration law are the legal authorities charged with its execution, including police, border units, ad hoc special units, commandos and even vigilante-style organisation (Gordon, 2010: 16). The Immigration Act effectively justifies equipping many of these law enforcement agencies with arbitrary powers to arrest, search, detain and deport suspected ‘illegal’ migrants without reference to normal constitutional or legal protection (Gordon, 2010: 17).

Perhaps most disturbing is the call that immigration control must be shifted to include monitoring at the community level. In other words, detection of illegal migrants will take the form of “community participation” in residential areas, workplaces, educational institutions and other places where migrants access services. In this new system, the DHA’s responsibility for immigration law enforcement has been partly devolved, not only to other law enforcement agencies but to civilians within the community. Such a strategy relies heavily the collaboration of the public, leading some researchers to argue that this strategy overlooks xenophobic practices among participant communities (Gordon 2010: 18) (see Crush and Williams, 2001; Crush and Dobson, 2007; Misago, Landau and Monson, 2009; and HSRC, 2008).

The theory of resource mobilisation (see Tilly 1978) has also been invoked. Co-ordinated attacks on migrants by armed gangs or crowds do not just happen. The Consortium for Refugees and Migrants argues that,
local community leaders and aspirant leaders mobilize residents to attack and evict foreign nationals as a means of strengthening their personal political or economic power within the local community. Furthermore, in many instances violence has been organised by business owner’s intent on eliminating competitors (cited in Adjai and Lazaridis, 2013: 199).

Misago (2011: 100) states that:

While participation was mostly voluntary, the study reveals that the attacks were carefully organised by parallel leadership structures and/or self-servicing members of formal leadership institutions. While the violence was often illegal and destructive, organising attacks on and removing ‘unwanted’ outsiders has proved to be a highly effective strategy for earning people’s trust, gaining legitimacy, and expanding a client base and the revenue associated with it.

In Cape Town a particular feature of xenophobic violence before, during and after May 2008 has been that xenophobia has often been articulated by small business associations of informal traders who actively organize against black African-owned (usually Somali) businesses in townships and informal settlements to drive them out of their neighbourhoods (Peberdy and Jara, 2011: 41).

**Conclusion**

This chapter critically discussed different theories related to international migration and specifically the social exclusion of African immigrants in South Africa. Literatures were reviewed to identify gaps in order to investigate the xenophobia and the role of immigrant organizations in shaping their integration. South Africans are not all xenophobic; xenophobic attacks are strongly linked to certain poor localities and economic competition is a strong factor as well as institutional exclusions. It was revealed that the South African debates (unlike the international literature) have been exceptionally one-sided and more or less ignored the fact that immigrants have organisations and networks which need to be taken
into account when looking at process around xenophobia. The methodology used to investigate and understand the nature of social exclusion of African immigrants and the role of migrants’ organizations is discussed in the next chapter.
**Chapter Three: Research methodology**

This chapter outlines the methodology used in this study including the logistics and ethics of the study. This chapter will describe the research setting and methodology used to meet the objectives of the study, which were to develop an understanding of Cape Town’s immigrant originations and associations and their role in shaping their integration/assimilation.

**Research overview, a qualitative approach**

Franckfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996: 15) assert that methodology is “a system of explicit rules and procedures upon which research is based and against which claims for knowledge are evaluated”. Methodology therefore plays three important functions. Firstly, it should in principle be replicable and facts verifiable. Secondly, methodology uses logical interpretation to present reliable inferences from actual observations often from multiple sources – hence the idea of triangulation. Finally, methodology looks at intersubjectivity for the sharing of information within the scientific community (Franckfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996).

Qualitative data is usually expressed in words, expresses feelings, beliefs, intentions and internal states of being from the viewpoint of research subjects, emphasising context and interconnectedness of processes and events. Research strategy is flexible to allow for unexpected events. My research aims were essentially qualitative: to understand the role of Cape Town’s immigrants in shaping their own integration. Secondly, to explore African immigrants’ experience in the context of the local state’s policy silences and its campaigns against xenophobia, and to identify other kinds of exclusion that are neglected in the literature. Last but certainly not least, the local immigrant’s involvement in local organisations and transnational processes were investigated.

A key dispute in epistemology is between positivists who claim that there is an objective world outside ourselves, which can be measured and understood through variables and social constructivists who believe that social meanings are constructed, interpreted, and constantly
reconstructed by people in their social interactions. For constructionists, social sciences have to interpret the social meanings (Castles, 2012). According to the Max Weber (quoted in Castles 2012: 11), the observer has to try understanding the ‘meaning’ of social action and institutions for the people involved, leading to the idea of ‘interpretative sociology’. Deep interviewing, participant observation and ethnography are thus the preferred techniques. Furthermore, Loi and Pearce (2012: 5) assert that qualitative interviews are suitable in the following case: “(1) the researchers have a relatively clear sense of their research interests and the kinds of questions they wish to address; (2) the settings or people are difficult to access using purely quantitative sampling methods”.

This study therefore relies on a constructivist research methodology but there are very limited elements of quantitative analysis. According to social constructivist one can only get to know reality through people and their socially constructed meanings. Hence scholars probe the internal meanings/rules or ways of seeing/not seeing and common sense that are shared (hence they have objective force). There is a collective mind-set that acts on people.

**Research design and methods**

The research findings which serve as the primary source of information for this thesis are the fruits of a one-and half year fieldwork period in Cape Town South Africa from July 2013 to December 2014. The fieldwork involved in-depth, semi-structured interviews with immigrant association leaders from DRC, Rwanda and Somalia. I did further interviews with selected informants. The topics and questions were pre-selected and appeared in the interview in a structured order, and all questions were more open-ended. In total, 28 interviews divided into four groups: with 11 leaders of organizations, with 13 informants and with 4 respondents to write and or tell their life stories. The decision to do this number of interviews was not based on a statistical approach but guided by the overall aim of the study which was largely qualitative.

Life stories are ideally completed over a long period of time with repeated observations at different times. I was not able to adopt this longitudinal approach. However, I made initial
contact with respondents and where I was able to build trust and where respondents were comfortable with me I suggested a life story be done. These stories are thus I believe highly personal and sometimes intimate accounts of migrants and their journeys to and experiences in Cape Town. I interviewed in safe settings chosen by the respondents for these narrative interviews.

This study was conducted on working class African immigrants living in Cape Town because of the following reasons: Cape Town is one of the cities that has had increasing contact with migrant communities and which has had to intervene in a number of conflicts between South Africans and migrant communities. The CoCT has made some proactive attempts to carve out its role in dealing with migrant communities and there are several lessons that can be learned from these attempt’ (Palmary 2002: 2). Furthermore, Cape Town is a leading city in South Africa, recently the recipient of major awards; it also has developed policies and programmes to brand the city as a “home for all”. Cape Town has functioning ward structures and sub-municipalities, this makes it easy to access the some official documentations related to this study. I have also established contacts with different NGOs coordinators, African Immigrant’s organizations, street level officials at Cape Town Home Affairs (some of whom became key informants, i.e., people with intimate knowledge of a subject).

These key informants helped the researcher to learn about migrants organizations in their communities and introduced to their leaders. Key informants also recommended further respondents for me to interview. This method ensures that the confidence of the interviewee was preserved by being referred by a friend (McDonald et al. 1999: 5). Furthermore, this sampling procedure was selected because it is suitable for research in working class migrant communities. For this study, three different samples were selected: 13 respondents, among these individuals four people were asked to participate in a life story interview. The last sample was composed of eleven leaders of different organizations created by immigrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Somalia. Results of each sample are discussed as individual chapter that is, chapters six, seven and eight.
Sample 1: 13 respondents were selected from different migrant’s communities of Cape Town. Four were from Somalia, three from DRC, three from Rwanda, one from Ethiopia, one Zimbabwe, one from Burundi. The figure below graphically indicates the number of interviews by country of origin.

**Figure 2: Countries of origin**

![Pie chart showing the distribution of respondents by country of origin.]

These respondents were selected because there are knowledgeable about the life experiences of African immigrants of Cape Town. Their legal status, age, occupation, and their experience are recorded in chapter five.

Sample 2: Life story interviews
Respondents who participated in the life story interviews were selected from 13 respondents based on rich information given during the in-depth interview stage. Two were from Somalia, one from Ethiopia, and one from Rwanda.

Sample 3: Immigrant Organizations
As noted before, this study follows a framework of Portes 2007/2008 and it was done in two phases:
Phase 1: An inventory of organizations created by immigrants from Somalia, Rwanda and DRC based in Cape Town was compiled. Names and contacts of these organizations were gathered from information given by our informants, migrant’s newspapers and the internet.
Phase 2: From that database I chose 11 organizations that were well established and that leaders are willing to participate on this study. In order to have access to leaders of these organizations, I asked informants to introduce me to leaders of organizations in their respective communities.

The organizations selected for this study are the following:

From the Somalian community: Somali Community Board of Cape Town; Albayan Islamic Council Trust; Somali Association of South Africa; and Ogaden Community of South Africa.

From the Rwandan community: Pentecostal Community Churches in Southern Africa; The Rwanda/Burundian Seventh Day Adventist Ministry of Cape Town; Rwanda Heritage Foundation; and The Rwandan Refugees of Cape Town.

From the DRC community, the Congo Square News; the Democratic Republic of Congo Association of South Africa; and the Amis BK.

Three countries were chosen because firstly, the migrants under study share a similar context of exit. The majority of Somalis, Congolese, and Rwandan immigrants who are in South Africa left their countries because of wars and political unrest. These communities in addition share the context of reception since most of them are asylum seekers and are all affected by social discrimination that target African immigrants. These communities also are visible and established for a period of time in Cape Town and have clear occupational and residential patterns and preferences. For example, Somalis are most present in the small business sector, operating in areas like; Bellville, the Cape Town CBD and in different black Townships where they run Spaza shops. Their religion as Muslim makes them distinctive from other immigrants and local community. On the other hand, Congolese dominate the security industry and car care in the different parking bays of the Cape Town CBD. They own also small businesses in Salt River and reside in small community like Maitland, Muizenberg and townships like Delft. Rwandan immigrants are most visible in customer
care at different shopping malls, and in metered taxi industry. I excluded Zimbabweans because they are not visible in the city. They work mainly on farms and for construction companies. Moreover, others are highly skilled and do work for corporate sector. Thus, the investigation covered all major groups of immigrants from African countries.

Data Collection Methods

This study employed three methods of data collection under the qualitative umbrella: in-depth interviews, life stories interviews and documents analysis. This allowed for triangulation of data, thus strengthening the findings. Furthermore, because I speak different international languages like French, English and some African languages like Swahili, Kinyarwanda and Kirundi, I was able to communicate easily with respondents. An interpreter was used when I was interviewing the leader of the Ogaden (Somalia) Community of South Africa. The following section discusses each of this methods and why it was chosen for this particular study.

All interviews data was gathered with the use of digital audio recording. Each interview was loosely one hour, with the shortest being 30 minutes and the longest two hours. After the interview, I conducted follow-up interviews with four of the interviewees in order to construct their life stories.

The technique requiring the most interaction with research subjects was the in-depth interviews. In investigating the different aspects related to minority migrant groups it was imperative to get the most information possible about their life experience and perceptions, as well as their physical surroundings. In-depth interviews are sensitive and people-oriented, allowing interviewees to construct their own accounts of their experiences by describing and explaining their lives in their own words (Valentine, 1997: 111).

In-depth interview can also be structured, unstructured, or semi-structured. This study used a semi-structures interview technique that allowed me as a researcher to establish a general direction for the conversation but still ensures flexibility for the interviewee to direct part of the
conversation (Sanchez-Ayala, 2014:117). Barriball and While (1994: 330) point out some important benefits to using the semi-structured interview as a data collection method:

1. It has the potential to overcome poor survey response rates;
2. It is well suited to the exploration of attitudes, values, beliefs and motives;
3. It provides the opportunity to evaluate the validity of the respondent answers by observing non-verbal indicators, which is particularly useful when discussing sensitive issues;
4. It can facilitate comparability (across the sample), by ensuring that all questions are answered by each respondent; and
5. It ensures that the respondent is unable to received assistance from others while formulating a response.

All the interviews were conducted in people’s homes or at workplaces using a face-to-face conversational style. Each interview begun by asking about respondents’ demographic characteristics that was relevant to the study. I would probe in case need arose. After every session, a respondent was thanked for having accepted to spare his/her valuable time for the interview. I would then ask the respondent to leave. During the interviews, informants were invited to be engaged in the research by sharing information and thoughts; they were given absolute freedom to answers questions or not. While some where very talkative, others were at times more reticent in expressing their views and in providing information.

**Documents review**

According to Bowen (2009), the document review is one of the methods that can be used to collect qualitative data. The use of document review saves time especially when required documents are readily available and freely and easily accessible (Silverman, 2011). Creswell (2013) observes that document review involves a researcher collecting and reviewing documents to obtain required data. The documents may be management or official reports, proceedings or minutes of meetings, or private documents (Amin, 2005).
For this study, I scanned the list of over 300 CoCT policies published on the city’s website in order to find a policy documents designated to integrate immigrants in the CoCT. Surprisingly, there was no policy reserved for immigrants, despite the xenophobic attacks and omnipresent threat of its renewal. I found three policies for analysis since the latter indirectly accommodated or referred to immigrants. These were:

- Policy on Vulnerable Groups Draft Policy, (March 2013),
- The CoCT Social Development Strategy (SDS) (2013), and
- Responsible Tourism Policy for the CoCT (2009).

The analysis was supplemented by a seminal but dated study done by Palmary (2002) which focused on the nature of the local government’s engagement with immigrant communities in South African cities. This study was done on Cape Town’s local government. In addition, key national policies relating to immigration and refugees were reviewed.

**Data analysis**

This study used content analysis and coding as a strategy for analysing data. Content analysis relies on a systematic approach that identifies and summarises message content by themes. Huberman and Miles (2002) assert that ‘qualitative data analysis involves data sorting, filtering, and searching for patterns or wholes’. The aim of this procedure is to bring together the data in a significant and complete manner (Babbie and Mouton, 2001).

In analysing data for this study I used guidelines suggested by Creswell (1994:155) such as:

- Reading through all the transcripts carefully with the purpose of getting a general sense of the whole meaning of the transcripts; Picking a single shortest or most interesting transcript and going through it once again; Making a list of clusters to get similar topics; Going back to original data and abbreviate the topics as quotes and write quotes next to the appropriate segments of the text; Developing the most descriptive wording for the topics and converted them into categories by grouping related topics; Assembling the data material belonging to each category in one place and performing a preliminary analysis, and recording of the existing data.
During the data collection process, I classified the transcripts’ raw data according to some of the main themes and questions posed in the thesis, sometimes changing or merging groupings, or developing a new theme that I had not anticipated. After the collection and categorisation of the information, a process of selection was necessary. The selection processes was governed by the goal of answering the key questions of the thesis, while, at the same time, picking up issues and new questions that could be explored further. It was important, I felt, to keep an open and flexible analytical structure so that unanticipated issues could be taken on board as these new questions arose during the data collection and management stages.

In analysing these questions and issues, a qualitative approach to description and explanation, using method both of ‘story-telling’ and ‘explaining’ (justifying actions, giving reasons, supporting claims, etc.), was used. The analysis of this empirical data makes up Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of this study. These are, essentially, my ‘results’ chapters, and they constitute the heart of this thesis.

Scope and limitations of research

Different researchers have identified numerous problems that arise when studying vulnerable and immigrant groups. Sanchez-Ayala (2012: 117) asserts that when the study involves human subjects, the research is a real challenge, more so if it involves interviewing members of minority migrant groups. Some of these challenges are; difficulties in locating the migrant (Bose, 2012: 277) and ethical challenges such as disclosure of illicit activities (van Liempt and Bilger 2012: 451). Furthermore, researchers on immigrants in South Africa face a specific challenge which is the lack of reliable data on migrants (Bose, 2012; Anderson at el, 2012). McDonald et al. (1999) assert that without a more reliable estimate of the total number of foreigners, their country of origin, gender and other basic demographic variables, it is virtually impossible to sample reliably and to say anything conclusive about migrants as a whole. It is further argued that these sampling problems are further complicated by the fact that some non-citizens simply do not want to be interviewed due to their uncertain legal
status or a fear of being harassed or deported by the South African police (McDonald et al., 1999: 5).

I encountered different challenges. In fact, some informants that I approached refused to take part to this study. Some of them were suspicious of the motives of the study, expressing their concern of the negative impact results of this study might have on their status. Other said that they don’t have time to respond to the questions, others wanted money as a way of motivating them since they thought that I am going to benefit from their stories. Due to the lack of trust I spent a lot of time on organizing the interviews explaining to them why this study is needed and ensuring them of the data was handled safely. As the researcher is an African immigrant, this helped me to break the barrier of distrust.

While doing field data collection I also had financial challenges to reach some of the targeted audiences or to pay an interpreter in a case of language barrier. Nevertheless, efforts were made to continue making appointments until data needed for this study were collected. I also raised funds that were required to complete the study from well-wishers and friends and immediate family members.

Regarding the interview guide, it was designed following an adaptation of Portes scholarly work (Portes 2008). For example, I added questions related to the participation of migrants in local and mega-events, and questions related to xenophobia. However, for his study, he applied a mixed method for data collection while my study adopted mainly qualitative data collection methods. The limitation of the study is that it is a single case study of a single municipality. This is due to the fact that this study was done in the CoCT only, with a sample of 11 organizations and 13 in depth interviews. Furthermore, the sample size was not big enough to give any statistical significant information. However, the method (single case study) chosen provides greater depth.
Data reliability and validity

Concerning the evidence gathered, it was also important to assess the level of accuracy or truth, as well as its significance to the topic at hand. In order to verify that information if it was accurate, it was compared across several interviewees, tested with the help of publications. Moreover, employing multiple data-collection procedures—in this case, interviews, life stories, and document analysis—allowed for triangulation of data, thereby enhancing reliability. Burawoy (2009) asserts that reliability is helpful in providing an in-depth understanding of one component of a country, group or organisational formations. Furthermore this study is the first of this kind that investigated migrants organizations in South Africa. Its results will inspire policy makers with a new way to deal with the problem of migrant management in South Africa.

Ethical considerations

This research was conducted with every endeavour to be courteous with the respondents and apply ethical principles. I embarked on this study while I was working in refugee reception office as an interpreter at the Department of Home Affairs. Here I had a chance to meet with people from different immigrant communities and I informally learnt about their circumstances and organisations they had worked in or might have helped them. Once I had a few contacts more participants for the study were then recruited using “snowball sampling” where each person or unit is connected with another through a direct or indirect linkage (Newman, 1994:199). Working at DHA did not disadvantage me because I was able to indicate that I was doing academic research and that I was clearly taking a position against xenophobia.

Because the study focused on understanding of Cape Town’s African immigrants by looking at their own experience and understanding of their situation and the role of immigrant associations and how they shape survival strategies in Cape Town, the research respondents were only adults who gave their consent to participate in the study. In the data analysis section confidentiality was kept especially for individual informants. However, because
organizations are registered and their leaders are well known, their real names were used to validate their claims. Pseudonyms were used only if a leader required to be kept anonymous.

Throughout the research process, a number of ethical aspects were taken into consideration. Firstly; as the principle researcher, I ensured that all participants were correctly informed. Participants were clarified what the aim of the study was and were given a choice to participate. Attempts were also undertaken to ensure the safety of participants. To do so, participants were allowed to decide where and when the interviews would be convened. Where a tape recorder was used, participants were asked for consent and guaranteed of the fact that the information would be used by only the investigator. All information gathered through original fieldwork was kept in a safe place. To the best of my knowledge, adequate safeguards to protect the privacy, anonymity, and well-being of participants have been utilised during the course of the research process.

**My Role in the Study**

As is evident, the researcher was also a participant in the study. As an immigrant I was able to draw on my own experience. This required a certain amount of “reflexivity”. “Reflexivity involves reflection by researchers on the social processes that impinge on and influence data. It requires a critical attitude toward data, and recognition of the influence on the research of such factors as the location of the setting, the sensitivity of the topic and the nature of the social interaction between the researcher and the researched. In the absence of reflexivity, the strengths of the data are exaggerated and/or the weaknesses underemphasized”(Becker, Bryman and Ferguson (2012: 408).

Skeggs (2002:355) reveals that feminists insist on putting one’s self into the research process. This methodological technique often merged with “confessional and testimonial techniques used to make political and moral claims on the dominant order”. The demand to put one’s self in the research was ironically a technique to expose the power, positioning, privilege and complacency of those (usually male) researchers who claimed objectivity, and played the ‘God Trick” of evading responsibility for their work (Haraway, 1991)
Throughout this research, I kept journal entries and noting my own preconceived thinking about immigrant experiences in South Africa and the impact that my own personhood might have on the respondents and the type of data I obtain. I have lived in South Africa since 2005 where I did my honours and Masters Programs. I have been involved in different migrant communities especially the Rwandan and Burundian SDA Community of Cape Town. I also served as interpreter for Asylum seekers and refugees at Cape Town Refugees Reception Office. During my work at the Department of Home Affairs and through my Masters studies I have been acquainted with the experience African immigrants in the city of Cape Town. Furthermore, my multilingualism helped me to have access to other communities like Congolese, Burundi, Zimbabwe. Regarding having access to Ethiopia and Somalis communities, I used my colleagues interpreters to find people to participate on this study. They helped me also with interpreting the interview.
Chapter Four: Socio-economic dynamics of immigrant life in the City of Cape Town

This descriptive chapter focuses on social-economic dynamics of the CoCT and as such sets the scene for this study. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section focuses on important facts about Cape Town’s history, current economy, demography, housing, political affiliation, local forms of racism and crime and gangsterism. The second section presents a xenophobia time-line of events in Cape Town in order to orient the reader. A key argument is that CoCT is already a very divided city and has many problems given the rapid inflow of people from other provinces and its increasing inequality (McDonald, 2008).

A brief history of Cape Town

Cape Town since 2006 has been under the administration of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and its party leader, Helen Zille who has over the years showcased the city as pro-poor and market friendly city. Cape Town (with a population of 3.7 million in 2011) is exceptional in a number of ways. The city and its surrounds was home to the Khoisan until 1652 when the Dutch East India Company, started what was a “temporary refreshment station” for its ships trading with the Far East. Permanent colonial settlement soon followed as the Company claimed the Cape in the face of other colonial mercantile rivals. To consolidate its colonial power, fortifications were needed given the conflict with indigenous Khoi whose grazing routes were taken over (Wilkinson, 2000: 195). The Dutch later brought in slaves from West and East Africa, Madagascar, and Java to provide labour.

Within five years the Europeans had grabbed adjacent tracts of land from the local people, forcing some to flee and reducing others to the status of servants. They built a fort, and imported slaves from other places touched by their far-flung maritime empire: East Africa, Madagascar, Ceylon, Bengal, and the East. By the eighteenth century, the Cape extended to 100 km from the CoCT (ibid, 2000). Khoi people were dispossessed of stock, grazing land and access to water. As a result of slave importation and local mixing a local “coloured”
population emerged alongside Malaysian slaves and whites evolved during the era of Dutch and then British colonialism (Western, 2002). Western (2002: 711) describes the European dominated Cape colony as a “brutal, death-dealing” experience for indigenous people, who were almost exterminated.

During the Napoleonic wars in early 1800s Britain seized the Cape from the Dutch. The British colony at the Cape grew slowly until the discovery of diamonds and later gold in the mid-to late 1800’s. The gradual rise of a British merchant, mining and professional class alongside the established class of Dutch and German farmers and retailers, as well as by the immigration of British working class (Wilkinson, 2000 and Western, 2002) led to the establishment of a racialised governance regime dominated by imperial capital and associated with imperial visionaries like Cecil John Rhodes (Miraftab 2012). Wilkinson (2000) elucidates that by 1865, the population of Cape Town had reached 28 400, of whom 15 100 were officially classified as “White”, 12 400 as “Other”, and the remainder as “Hottentots” or “Kafirs”. The early 1900s was marked by the creation of the Union of South Africa with a capital city in Cape Town legislated as capital of the republic. This happen in the Act of the Union in 1910 hence, linking the former Boer republics in the Transvaal and Orange Free State with the British colonies in the Cape and Natal (ibid, 2000: 196). For African migrants a form of repressive urbanisation based on pass laws were instituted by the 1920s.

Dubbed the ‘Mother City’ on the southern tip of the African continent, the city has been pivotal to international and internal South African trade routes. Cape Town had a much larger “coloured”\(^1\) population. “Coloureds” enjoyed some protection through the Coloured Labour Preference policy and so their market position vis-à-vis African blacks have been better in some respects, although still marginalized and brutally oppressed on farms.

Since 1994, Cape Town has seen substantial post-apartheid in-migration of africans, particularly from the Eastern Cape. The Human Development Index (HDI) gives the

\(^1\) The term “coloured” has been controversial and hence the quotation marks.
Western Cape the highest rating of all provinces 0, 68, largely due to its higher formal-sector employment rate, but due to the urban influx, this measure is changing. Third, in 1994 while most other South African provinces voted African National Congress (ANC), the Western Cape Province elected the old National party as its governing party and by late 2000s the DA became the dominant party in Cape Town and then won the province as a whole. Thus, Cape Town and its province of the Western Cape must be considered as different from the rest of South Africa.

Moreover, Cape Town has attracted much scholarly and political attention in the last few years. Parnell and Pieterse (1999) refer to Cape Town’s “flawed beauty” marked by extreme, enduring and concentrated poverty. Samara (2011) shows that the institutional exclusion and gang-related violence in Cape Town’s working class townships such as Delft, Manenberg and Mitchells Plein (where many foreign migrants now reside) are common but deeply destabilising phenomena. Such residential areas have constant uncertainty and anxiety about criminality and this extends to foreign migrant communities who also have shops in these areas. Samara (2011) points out that statistically black South Africans especially in the townships rather than white South Africans in very affluent neighbourhoods are more likely to be the victims of crime.

While McDonald (2008) has written about the global ambitions of the ruling elite of Cape Town as a “world class city” calling is a “syndrome”, Besteman’s (2008) has explored the feelings and experiences of local residents -- racial fear, mistrust, and resentment that have accompanied the stalled promise of upliftment after the end of apartheid. As a result, the rise of gated suburbs in Cape Town and its surrounds has increased dramatically further fragmenting the city into different societies (Lemanski et al., 2007; Miraftab 2012). McDonald (2008) has also drawn attention to problem of the historical and recent de-africanising of Cape Town. McDonald (2008) argues that internal migration has altered the demographics of the CoCT or at the very least major parts of the city over the past ten years. More recently, Zille has labelled Xhosa speaking africans who come to the Western Cape “refugees” (Mail and Guardian 20 March 2012).
Most scholars agree that Cape Town is a spatially divided city with poor areas mainly the Cape Flats being underdeveloped and the key centres of economic power and growth remaining in the former white areas (Turok, 2000; Samara, 2011). Many scholars blame urban neoliberalism for the failures of Cape Town but some (notably Western, 2012; Parnel and Pieterse 2010) find that the attribution of Cape Town’s social problems to “neoliberalism” is not a useful conceptual lens.

**Migrant organisations and Cape Town local economy**

Next we look at the local economy. The first empirical point that Cape Town (CT) is a service-oriented economy, with finance (32%), transport (11%) and other service (19%) dominating geographic value added (GVA) for the metropolitan area in 2004 (SACN, 2006: 3-14). Manufacturing is still a major player in the city’s economy (at 16% of GVA) but never dominated Cape Town’s economy as much it has in Durban and Johannesburg. Moreover, most of the city’s manufacturing has been in light industry such as textiles and clothing (which have seen dramatic collapses over the last twenty years). The latter was a major employer in the city for decades but has seen dramatic changes since the mid-1990s, losing some 12,000 jobs in 2004 alone (McDonald, 2008: 27).

International competition during the 1990s – particularly in the key textiles and clothing sub-sector – has led to an overall decline in the capacity of the CMA’s formal economy to absorb labour and a sustained increase in levels of unemployment and informal economic activity. Of a total labour force of 1.3 million in the CMA in 1996 – increasing by perhaps 30 000 a year – an estimated 244 000 (18%) were engaged in informal economic activity of some sort, while 254 000 (19%) were unemployed (Wilkinson, 2000: 200). Overall, though, the strongest economic growth has been in personal and producer services. In direct contrast to manufacturing, the provincial Western Cape economy (of which Cape Town makes up some 85%) has seen “high growth than the national average in catering and accommodation, transport and storage, business services and other producer services” (PGWC, cited in McDonald, 2008: 27).
The provincial government has lamented slow job growth in the Western Cape economy. “There is little indication of increased employment resulting from tourism and other services such as communications” (PGWC, 2005: 2). By 2013, the industries in which Cape Town has the most pronounced comparative advantage as compared to the country as a whole is fishing, clothing and textiles, wood product manufacturing, electronics, furniture, hospitality, finance and business services industries (The CoCT, 2014: 7). Cape Town’s is the second-largest municipal economy in the country.

Film and television generated approximately R2bn a year in revenues in South Africa and this has been growing at about 20% per annum. The city is considered one of the top five production destinations in the world for television commercials (CTRCCI, 2004: 38). The film industry does not provide many jobs, however, and only contributes about R3m a year in direct municipal revenues through filming fees (CCT, 2004a, 7).

Tourism and major events are another service area the city has developed. By 2002, it was already a large part of the city’s economy, generating over R 11 billion per annum, employing over 50,000 people and with an asset base of at least R70 billion in land, buildings and equipment in 2002 (CCT, 2002b: 17). It is also one of the fastest growing sectors of the city’s economy. Conventions are a big part of this growth, with the completion of the Cape Town international Convention Centre in 2003 being a major component of this development strategy (McDonald, 2008: 30). These are some of the industries that might also have attracted foreign migrants.

Cape Town has a diverse ethnic composition which is unique in South African terms, with Coloureds comprising almost half of the total population, while Africans comprised only a quarter in 2001 and Whites just over a fifth (CoCT, 2010: 33). This differs remarkably from other parts of the country, where Africans are consistently a large majority of the population and Coloureds constitute what is usually only a small minority, and has markedly affected local social and political dynamics. By 2011 the picture had changed with a large spike in African numbers. Cape Town had 3,7 million inhabitants out of which black African were 1,444,939. The city’s population has since almost doubled since 2001 (CoCT, 2010: 33). Out
of those immigrating to Cape Town, Eastern Cape remains the main sending province. The State of Cape Town report (2010: 33) shows that:

Of all people known to have moved to Cape Town between 1997 and 2007, 55.3% were black African, 32.2% were white, 9.9% were coloured and 2.6% were Asian. The province that lost the highest percentage of black Africans to Cape Town was the Eastern Cape at 87.9%, followed by Limpopo at 44.2%. Gauteng lost the highest percentage (65.1%) of whites to Cape Town, and the Northern Cape the highest percentage (48.1%) of coloureds. Of those who moved to Cape Town from outside South Africa, 60.7% were white and 31% were black African.

Table 1 shows the change in Cape Town’s population since 1996 until 2011. From 1996 to 2011 white population decreased by 5.5%, while Black Africans population of Cape Town increased by 13.5%. “Coloureds” are still the majority but their percentage decreased. In 1996, they were 48.4% but in 2011 they were at 42.4% of Cape Town’s population.

Table 1: Cape Town population by race group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population group</th>
<th>Census 1996</th>
<th>Census 2001</th>
<th>Census 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>644 181</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>916 584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>1 239 943</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>1 392 594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>37 882</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>41 516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>543 425</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>542 555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>97 664</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2 563 095</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2 893 249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Republic of South Africa, Census 2011

Census 2011 showed the population of the Western Cape had increased by nearly 29% in a decade, rising by 1.3-million people to 5.88-million. Gauteng’s population grew by 3.1-million to 12.27-million over the same period, an increase of more than a third. The black African population in CT is relatively youthful, with 26% of 14 years old or younger, 68% between 15 and 64, and the remaining 8% in the 65 and over category. The township areas are extremely densely populated. For example Gugulethu has 15, 161 persons per square
kilometre compared to Simonstown which has 331 persons per square km (RSA 2011, Census 2011).

Cape Town and Western Cape education and health services are seen as better than other provinces. The Western Cape claimed it carried the financial burden of caring for patients who travelled in from other provinces unable to provide the services they needed. (“The Western Cape feels the cost of growing number of migrants” in Cape Times, 20 March 2014)

Peberdy and Jara (2011)—describe the post-apartheid Cape Town as a neo-apartheid city given city’s history of racism and discrimination. They point out that with the continuing working-class exclusion, marginalization and exploitation the benefits are small and mainly given to white elite. Coupled with race and class in a largely segregated city, migrants especially from Africa find themselves on the periphery of the genuine job market. The unequal urban geography of the city is more than a spatial socio-economic challenge. In this case the class interests and spatial relations influence, mould and mediate social relations and political consciousness (Pieterse, 2004, 2010; Kgara, 2007). The exclusionary spaces and post-apartheid urban planning has not nourished social cohesion or access to social capital but segregates many including migrants in present day South Africa. New arrivals to the city, whether black South Africans or Africans from elsewhere on the continent, often find themselves marginalized (Peberdy and Jara, 2011: 39).

**Housing, informal settlements and services**

According to the study by HSRC 2008, housing is a significant cause of tensions between South African’s and foreigners. What they found was that housing report from the study indicates that quite a number of people in Cape Town communities do not have formal housing but rather live in shacks, or *zozo’s*, and hence this is an ongoing frustration since it is not considered proper or adequate (HSRC, 2008: 41). The report further indicates that housing is seemingly a source of unhappiness between foreigners and South Africans at two levels. Firstly, it becomes a source of conflict where South Africans indicate that they have
been on housing lists for long periods, and are still waiting for houses, whilst they see foreigners living in RDP houses. They found that foreigners are getting access to houses through financial arrangements with South Africans, who rent out these houses or sell them for very low prices (R20000 or less). Another way to get access to houses is through acquiring citizenship. Most cases, however, are of rentals or sales by South Africans. They suggested that the question of housing must be viewed in relation to the slow delivery of houses, lack of communication and regulation of the existing provision of houses (HSRC, 2008: 42).

It is important to note, while chapter 2 of the South African Constitution gives immigrants the same rights as citizens including the right to housing. Immigrants are excluded from registering their names on RDP housing list. McDonald (1998: 1) explains it below:

There are no clear policies on access to housing for non-citizens in South Africa. There are policies documents, constitutional clauses and international agreements which commit the South African government in various ways to “ensuring access to adequate housing for all persons living in the country”, but these commitments are often inconsistent with one another and even contradictory when it comes to defining who is entitled to housing.

The lack of adequate communication from the relevant governmental agencies on the housing is an issue. Misperceptions flourish, some of which implicate foreigners as the source of lack of housing delivery, and therefore contributes to a view of their presence as negative (HSRC, 2008: 42). The dynamics in the informal settlements around economic livelihoods is a central challenge to address in order to alter the relations between locals and foreigners. The HSRC Researchers found that the perception that foreigners were taking jobs and opportunities was strongly felt in the informal settlements.

Foreign Africans of working class backgrounds often find themselves living or working in township and shack settlements. The bulk of Cape Town’s 195 listed informal settlements were clustered along the N2 highway and comprised an estimated 100 000 informal structures in 2005 (CoCT, 2006). The figure has increased so that by 2008 as much as 20 percent of the City population resided in an estimated 118 000 shacks. This figure excludes
backyard shacks which number 85 000 (Small, 2008). According to a sample survey conducted by the municipality’s housing directorate, about 41 000 families live in the backyards of the City’s rental properties. The survey found that the average backyard household consists of four members and that over 90% have a monthly household income of R3 000 and less.

As far as municipal services go, unlike ANC-run Johannesburg, Cape Town has no prepaid meters but “water management devices”.

The ANC has claimed that our rollout of water flow management devices is somehow "anti-poor", and likened them to Johannesburg's pre-paid water meters installed by the ANC Council. That is a blatant lie. In fact, payment is not required before water is supplied through our water management devices. And the devices have helped people to avoid losing water and money through leaks by allowing them to monitor how much they use, and giving them a fixed amount of free water per day (Zille, 2009b).

In informal areas, up to 300 families share a single communal tap and water supply can be irregular. The city calls this emergency water supply, which, by the city’s own admission, falls below the RDP standard of basic supply: “The emergency service is below the basic level of service in terms of distance from household or household ratios/service point” (City of Cape Town, WSDP, 2006: 89). “Emergency basic services” were delivered through 1 208 standpipes (IDP, 2006: 6). Rough calculation suggests there are between 90 and 100 shacks that is 300-400 people sharing a single standpipe (Van Ryneveld et al, 2003). These places where South African Africans and “coloureds” (Blacks) live have become permanent as they have been in existence for at least a decade or more. In 2007 the Council policy was that “residents, who use less than six kilolitres of water per month, would pay nothing. Poor families who qualify for an additional subsidy would receive 10 kilolitres of water for free. …low income households would receive an indigent grant for water and sanitation, which has since been increased from R20 to R30 per month. This grant is automatically given to residential properties valued at R199 000 or below (City of Cape Town, 2007b).

2 Nearly 70 per cent of informal shack settlements have irregular food access and suffer poor health with 1400 cases of TB per 100 000 (Van Ryneveld et al, 2003).
Reports from the city indicate that poor residents do not pay and there is “culture of non-payment” and lawlessness. But the City says there is already success in instilling a ‘culture’ of payment. As the Mayor, Zille explained;

We will be continuing our policy of combining our generous indigency subsidies with an insistence that people pay their accounts. We have been able to make this proposal because we have succeeded in instilling a culture of payment for services in Cape Town. We will continue to restrict services if people refuse to pay or to register as indigent if they can’t (Zille, 2007).

According to Zille (2009)

Many informal settlements are so densely populated that it is impossible to provide services without moving people out. This lengthy and complex process often leads to community conflict. As people move out, others often move in immediately, generating more conflict, and reverting to the problem that the move was intended to solve in the first place.

Official City Data in 2008 (on the website) showed Cape Town had 460,000 families (not individuals) on a waiting list for state housing. “Urbanisation continues at a faster rate here than in any other province, as poor rural dwellers, particularly from the Eastern Cape, move here in search of economic opportunities” (Zille, 2009).

Paradoxically, and despite perceptions that foreign nationals are more economically resourceful, poor South Africans are also showing economic resourcefulness by leveraging state housing resources to acquire capital and cash income in ways not envisaged by government policy, practices which have, however added to the tensions between South Africans and foreign nationals. As mentioned above, South Africans are renting RDP houses illegally to foreign occupants. Some renters also take the opportunity created by community anger to reclaim houses they have ‘sold’ to foreigners, knowing that illegal migrants enjoy no legal recourse (HSRC, 2008: 44). These forms of behaviour are seen in the context of a range of practices to secure economic livelihoods varying from the opportunistic looting of stores and homes, which have accompanied the current violence to the illegal selling of houses to foreign nationals (HSRC, 2008: 44).
Political affiliation, voting patterns and racial patterns

Although the DA draws substantial support from coloured community especially the working class areas (over 80% voting in 2011), the working class communities of the Cape Flats are poorly organized and weakly represented in council compared to the Green Point Ratepayers for example (Tapscott 2010). The 2009 national elections and subsequent by-elections showed a very strong swing to the DA. Of the 210 seats in the CoCT council, 100 are DA councillors, 71 are ANC and 16 Independent Democrats. The ANC’s loss has been the DA’s gain. Along with this shift as Adhikari (2005) observed it has become more acceptable in political circles to embrace being “Coloured”. Adhikari (2005) suggests that the fear that Coloured people would once again be marginalized under African majority rule might explain this shift. Indeed, racialised social divisions rather than going away have been exacerbated and taken new forms such as social cleansing of the poor and the black foreign out of the CBD under the rubric of crime and grime during the transition (McDonald 2008; Miraftab 2012).

Fears of Coloured marginalization and ‘Swart gevaar’ (‘black threat’) have become a common theme in political battles in the Western Cape between the DA and the ANC. Fourchard (2012) argues that the DA and ANC have developed networks of patronage with NGOs, CBOs and activists and have made inroads in communities to gain electoral support. This electoral gerrymandering exacerbates racial divisions that exist in communities, sometimes by street or by neighbourhood, fragmenting efforts to build strong working class organizations. This is indicative of the inroads that such politicking has made even the core of radical activism in Cape Town and is problematic for relations with trade unions whose members - regardless of their racial identification - are considered ANC supporters on account of the union’s membership in the Alliance. One Housing Assembly leader from Khayelitsha commented that “they are using the policy of divide and rule; they are dividing us and ruling us. “So if we can come to our senses… let us unite and leave these parties alone and create unity. If we create that unity we will really achieve what we want” (cited in Ruiters 2014).
The ‘white’ suburbs, have greyed somewhat in the last two decades as the ‘emerged’ black middle class has relocated from the townships. Along with this we have also seen a number of middle class foreign Africans moving into such areas. White suburbs have well-organized and resourced rate-payers’ associations. These, together with predominantly white or black business organisations or other lobby groups have a strong public presence to maintain their privileged status. Most also have close ties with the DA as well. As noted but worth stressing, “post-apartheid” Cape Town is also a story of further segregation and exclusion in the form of gated communities and exclusive suburbs. Over 80% of new housing for upper and upper-middle class people in the past five years is ‘gated’ (Lemanski and Oldfield, 2008). The CoCT council has also approved Special Rating Areas (where rate payers pay additional rates for extra services) that further privatise the city and create zones of exclusion and privilege. Only ‘Africans’ and ‘Coloureds’ with financial means can share in this exclusivity, for example between 2012 and into 2013, Cape Town has seen more local township protests than any other part of the country (Ruiters, 2014). Despite many protests often led by the ANC, the recent history of community organizing in Cape Town is fraught with charges of autocracy, corruption, the misuse of funds and ‘selling out’ that plagued several organizations, including the AEC, during the middle of the last decade (Oldfield and Stokke 2006, Pointer, 2004).

CoCT has been identified by critics as the most unequal city in South Africa and one whose discourse and policy is vigorously pro-rich, neoliberal and pro-business (McDonald 2008; Pieterse, 2005). It is also described as a city where black people in general don’t feel welcome and seem invisible (IOL, 22 October 209).

You walk in the malls, you walk in the store. It's either coloured or white people. Where are the black people? How do they pay their bills, what do they eat?

Housing backlogs, a rapidly growing population, in-migration, racial tensions, protest movements and sprawling informal settlements are overlaid with a defeated ANC looking to expose the current administration by making it a highly polarised space. One scathing description is that the beauty of Cape Town is preserved mainly for tourists, wealthy whites and a new wave of immigrants and speculators from Europe (McDonald, 2009). The terror
of living in Cape Flats according to (Pieterse, 2006) is relieved only by annual circus-like carnivals, the Coons who still celebrate the only day off for the Cape slaves. The DA’s concept of the ‘world class’ city, however, is not far from the ANC’s beliefs that the city must be investor friendly, efficient, and world class (Pieterse, 2005; McDonald 2008).

It is vital to note that the participation of African immigrants in South African and city politics is still limited. According to the South African Constitution immigrants are not allowed to vote (Refugees Act 1998). They can exercise that right only once they have obtained the South African citizenship. This limitation to public participation has indirect negative impact on immigrants since they feel discriminated. As a result they are not informed about local government and they may likely disrespect the rule of law and local authorities. However, this right is difficult to achieve due to a slow process of immigration documents by the Department of Home Affairs.

Although all official legislation discriminating on the basis of race has been abolished in South Africa, not even the most optimistic of observers would argue that racism itself has been excised from the country (McDonald, 2008: 286). McDonald asserts that racism is remarkably strong in Cape Town – partly because of its history as a ‘coloured preference’ area and partly because of the nature of its white liberalism – creating a ‘double – whammy’ of sorts for Africans and exacerbating the racially segregated nature of the city.

McDonald reveals the long-standing myth that white Capetonians are more liberal and less racist than whites in other parts of the country before and during apartheid. While it is true that Cape Town had fewer petty apartheid by-laws and/or enforced these laws less vigorously, the city was less ruthless than other municipalities in implementing major apartheid regulations such as the Group Areas Act – as the brutal forced removals of tens of thousands of people in the 1960s and 1970s from District Six and other locations in the city attest to (McDonald, 2008: 287).

Another complicating factor is racism among coloureds (primarily toward Africans) (Western 2002). The root of this lie in the tactics of ‘divide and conquer’, with colonial and apartheid
governments having enormously successful at convincing many coloured Capetonians that their real enemy was the African. Swart gevaar – the ‘Black Peril’ in Afrikaans – was the rallying cry of the of the National Party for decades, forming the basis of its election campaign in the Western Cape as recently as the 1994 national and 1996 local elections in the city, with efforts to paint a picture of Africans flooding into the city to steal the homes and rape the daughters of coloured residents if the ANC were elected (McDonald 1994). While racism toward anyone who looks like black is a problem in Cape Town, the city is affected also by crime.

The general perception of South Africans is that immigrants cause crime. However McDonald at el, 1999 reject this argument, asserting that: ‘there is growing evidence to suggest that far from being the perpetrators of crime, migrants are disproportionately the victims of crime and xenophobia, made worse by inadequate redress in the law or lack of protection by the police.’ In their study, they found that almost one-quarter of the sample (23%) have been “assaulted” and almost half (42%) have been robbed. Refugees were most likely to have been victims of crime (60%) said they had been robbed at least once (McDonald at el, 1999: 19).

**Gangsterism in Historical Context**

Crime in Cape Town and on the Cape Flats in particular is generally understood within the contest of gangsterism, which in turn is viewed as a young man’s game (Samara, 2011: 93). The challenge of gangsterism is therefore very much central oft-cited “challenge of youth” in Cape Town. At the same time it is also part of a theme running through the history of the country and the Cape, one which race, masculinity, urbanization, and the notion that young people are a problem all intertwine (ibid, 2011: 93). Crime and gangsters often figure in recent accounts of xenophobia (Charman and Piper, 2012).

The precursors of today’s coloured gangs appeared in Cape Town’s coloured neighbourhoods prior to the forced removals that followed the Group Areas Act, as overcrowding increased competition for hawking and the Shebeen markets in places like
District Six. This has led to the “emergence of youth groups that engaged in criminal activity for income”, however, that generated the more organized and sophisticated gang structures we see today (ibid, 2011: 93).

According to the Mail and Guardian (5 August 2002),

Gangsters were part of District Six and coloured communities such as Bo-Kaap and Simon’s Town. Mostly they fought each other, played numbers, bet and smuggled alcohol. For a long time they remained on the peripheries of these close-knit communities that for the most looked after their children and the needy. Nearby churches, mosques and amenities such as shops, parks and the beaches counted many of the gangsters’ negative influences. But apartheid-era forced removals ripped apart the social fabric. When people were dumped on the bleak, sandy stretches of the Cape Flats, there was nothing and jobs were no longer a walk or short bus ride away. Gangsters were quick to take advantage of this vacuum.

Although the actual number of gangs in the Cape remains relatively stable, they have grown in size (Samara 2011). Salo (2003) has argued that gangs are not simply dysfunctional but form part of a particular kind of social cohesion and networking in Cape Flats areas. Networks have expanded over broader areas across the Cape Town considerably as international drug trade increased (Salo 2007). Authorities on gangs in the Western Cape claim that there are approximately 80,000 to 100,000 gang members in the city in 100 to 120 gangs, and some city officials estimate that gang members make up approximately 5 percent of the total population (ibid, 2011: 98).

Over many years the gangs have come to occupy a prominent place in the local economy, filling the gap created by the state. Organized crime on the Cape Flats is increasingly central to socially excluded communities (Samara, 2011: 99). He writes that:

Organized crime is a rational response to governmental and economic crisis. Organize crime provides income that is increasingly seen as…necessary. It supplies commodities and services that are in demand and have become normalized.

Standing quoted in Samara (2011: 99) adds that criminal elites in these situations often gain substantial social status, becoming both regulators and patrons of marginalized communities.
Organized crime not only provides an alternative economy but can create alternative forms of institutionalized power as well (Samara, 2011: 99).

In summary, Cape Town is often portrayed as a “deeply divided city” possibly “one of the most unequal and segregated and as a city hostile to black Africans but friendly to tourists and European investors (McDonald 2008). As Lemanski (2004:103) suggests;

Post-apartheid Cape Town continues to exhibit ruthless spatial polarization, dominated by the juxtaposition of centrally located affluent suburbs and economic centres alongside poverty-stricken and overcrowded settlements on the city edges.

Yet the Cape Town experience for the african foreign migrants is not the same as for a coloured worker or the rich white tourist and can only be understood by probing the social world and uniquely constructed meanings of the race class and gender experience of Cape Town (Salo 2007). The rest of this thesis is dedicated to developing such an understanding.

**Foreign African Immigrants in Cape Town**

The chapter so far has described Cape Town social patterns so that we have a sense of what foreign african migrants might encounter. It is essential to note that there is a lack of solid empirical data regarding the contribution of immigrants to the CoCT’s economy. Little is known about their demography, employment, skills, and entrepreneurship. While immigrants have limited or no access financial support what happens in this case is to invest in micro business for example, Somalis are known for their entrepreneur skills especially in informal economy. They run small business sector in places such as Bellville, the Cape Town CBD and in several black townships such as Delft (Charman and Piper, 2012). Besides Congolese work in the security industry and can be seen in car care in the different parking bays of Cape Town CBD (Bernstein, 2003, Legoko 2008 and *Cape Argus, July 26, 2009*). They own also small businesses in Salt River and reside in small micro-communities in Maitland, Muizenberg and townships like Delft. Both UCT and UWC employ a number of highly qualified foreign African academics.
Because of financial constraints and the lack of job opportunities, the Rwandan community is found in the unregulated economy. For example Rwandans work in “customer care” a euphemism for car guards and in the metered taxi industry. Comparing to other immigrant communities (Nigerians who tend to have passports, better local connections and more capital), they are less integrated, poor, vulnerable and in a precarious situation (Bubenzer, 2004 and Kavuro, 2015).

The inclination of Cape Town employers to prefer foreign workers rather than locals has produced significant resentment towards both employers and foreign national employees. The lack of an enforceable minimum wage and the intense competition for jobs at the lowest level of economic activity pits poor against poor (HSRC, 2008: 43). For instance, about 19% (or 300 000) of the 1, 5 million domestic workers are reported to foreign migrants (Sunday Times, 26 April 2015). Official stats show that “Foreign nationals in South Africa’s labour market equate to only 4% of the total labour force but in domestic work industry this number is up to 19% which shows a stronger likelihood that foreign migrants work in domestic work than in any other sectors in the South Africa’s economy (Sunday Times, 26 April 2015, also see Manicom and Mullagee 2010 for statistics).

This circumstance makes it particularly difficult for unions to organise foreigners as they are much less likely to know about unions, are much less likely to know about their rights and are much more reluctant to report conditions they feel are unfair out of fear of either being detected or being deported because of the migration regime that South Africa has followed since 1994. Interestingly, at the same time there is also a “very strong preference amongst employers to employ foreigners as domestic workers over South African”. According to Skaeena Sulimna (Citi news 2014), foreign-domestic workers are being exploited in South Africa as a result of their lack of understanding labour policies, as such trend is not only limited to domestic work but other sectors such as farming and service industry.
Recent foreign migrations and xenophobic attacks

According to McDonald (2008), far less well documented and understood compared to internal migration, is migration into Cape Town from other countries (both temporary and permanent). The most concrete information on this dynamic comes from the 2001 national census, which collected data on “country of birth” and “citizenship” from respondents.

Table 2: Citizenship and Country of Birth of Cape Town Residents - 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Country of Citizenship</th>
<th>Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2,805,819</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2,859,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other SADC countries</td>
<td>29,266</td>
<td>other SADC country</td>
<td>7775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>5683</td>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>3733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>41,803</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>17,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>5414</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>2122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>North America</td>
<td>1161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South America</td>
<td>2433</td>
<td>Central and South America</td>
<td>965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While African immigrants are perceived to be “flooding in millions” and causing problems for the country, the 2011 census provides a different picture. The white population group had the highest percentage of people who were not born in South Africa. Among foreign nationals in South Africa, whites are 8,5 %, followed by Indians or Asians 7,3% while black Africans are only 3, 9%. The UNHCR (2015) estimated that there were around 780 000 asylum seekers and 114 5000 refugees in South Africa. [http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485aa6.html](http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485aa6.html), accessed on 16 October 2015).

The census data are incomplete, however, due to the large number of undocumented migrants from other parts of Africa, many of whom would be understandably reluctant to be
interviewed by census personnel or to admit to their immigration status, especially knowing the harsh and summary way in which thousands of migrants from other African countries have been detained and deported by South African authorities since the loosening up of cross-border traffic in the mid-1990s (McDonald, 2008: 278).

Angola and Namibia are probably the two largest source countries for cross-border migrants in Cape Town – with significant concentrations of fisheries workers from those two nations located in Hout Bay (Imizamoyethu) but large number of Congolese, Zimbabweans, Ghanaians, Malawians and others are present in the city as well, often clustered in tight geographic pockets (McDonald, 2008: 278).

Many African migrants, particularly SADC nationals and Somalis, make their homes in informal settlements and townships. Others live in the central business district, Sea Point and older working-class suburbs like Woodstock and Salt River. Skilled Africans, like other wealthier residents, are found in the leafy suburbs. Alongside rural migrants from the Eastern Cape and elsewhere in South Africa, they are reshaping the configuration of the city (Peberdy and Jara, 2011).

The majority of foreigners in South Africa, let alone Cape Town, tend be known for wrong reasons in other words often stigmatized by popular media, tv shows, songs and by South Africa organisations and even governmental bodies (Nigerians for drugs and so on). Notwithstanding public perceptions and the inflammatory language often used in the media, cross-border migrants form a relatively small proportion of the population of the city. Census 2001 found only 3% of the population had been born outside South Africa, of whom only 35,000 (or 1.2%) had been born in other African countries (SACN, 2006: 2–18; data supplied by Statistics South Africa). However, these are undercounts as undocumented migrants are likely to have avoided enumeration and there has been a significant increase in new arrivals from Zimbabwe since 2001, although the number is unknown and is unlikely to be as high as is often promulgated in the press. Cross-border migrants, refugees and new internal migrants are inserting themselves into the deeply unequal landscape of the city.
Official information provided about Cape Town is usually silent about the existence of foreign Africans. A recent report, *The State of Cape Town* (2010) that runs into 106 pages has one paragraph on foreign refugees and one a reference that speaks to xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals. There is similarly a complete policy silence on foreign nationals in CT’s policies. Most foreign African migrants are in the informal sector. As alluded to earlier, the slow processing of asylum applications for instance means, in the absence of official permission to work, many asylum-seekers are forced to rely on generating income in the informal sector. This places them in constant conflict with local authorities. One of the primary features of facing local government interaction with refugees is confusion about the rights of refugee groups (Palmary, 2002). For example, a senior member of the Metropolitan Police Department stated that:

Any foreigner trading in the [city] of Cape Town is [doing so] illegal[ly]. In the designated areas [those where traders can operate legally] you should not find foreigners, but they are there. They kind of ‘bought their way in' and they've got their ways and means of getting in (official).

The view that foreigners are not allowed to trade in the city is shared by the City's vagrancy unit, a specialised group of by-law enforcement agents dealing with evictions of people settling informally on council-owned property. Members of this unit were unaware that refugee groups were entitled to work in South Africa at all. A senior member of this unit stated that of all the section 22 permits he had seen, none had indicated that the owner was entitled to seek employment” (Palmary, 2002: 10). Recent research by Lombard (2015, unpublished master’s thesis) found that NGOs working with foreign africans know more about the legal rights of migrants than Cape Town’s local law enforcement middle ranking officials (Metro Police).

**Cape Town: Xenophobia attacks (a chronology)**

Xenophobic attacks come in waves and there are also isolated incidents and daily humiliations (unreported) that happen in different places in the CoCT and the surroundings areas. The outright attacks from 2008 to 2013 were widely acknowledged to be cruel and
inhumane. Moreover, the efforts of the city and Western Government in stopping xenophobia, and humanitarian aid to affected refugees communities came too late.

The data for the time line below were collected using the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) 2013, scholarly articles and press releases from the CoCT’s official website. I start in 2008 because the most intense violence started in that year. This is not to suggest that earlier episodes are insignificant.

**May 2008:** A series of outbreaks initiated in Gauteng and spread about a week later after the first number of attacks to other urban places of South Africa reached Cape Town in May 2008.

The May 2008 violence in Cape Town was not as extensive or extreme as in Gauteng but given what had already happened elsewhere in the country, as well as in the city itself, sometimes only threats were needed to get people to flee to shelters.

Although the violence and threats took place across Cape Town, particularly notable were attacks in the informal settlements and townships of Du noon areas of Khayelitsha, Gugulethu, Nyanga, Masiphumelele, Delft, and Phillipi.

The attacks therefore occurred in the socially, politically and economically marginalized peripheries of the city, areas that are home to new arrivals from inside and outside the country and where there is competition for resources, levels of social cohesion are low and political and community organization is often weak” (Marais, 2008 In Perbedy and Jara 2011.).

In May 2008, Somalis and Zimbabweans were attacked by mobs and their shops vandalised and looted. In response to the humanitarian need of people who left their home and needed a shelter and other basic needs, the City prepared six safety camps at Harmony Park, Soetwater, Silverstroom, Blue Waters, Strand and Youngsfield Military Base (Media release, May 2008).

On the 27th May, the Mayoral Committee Member for Economic, Social Development and Tourism, Councillor Simon Grindrod, convened a meeting of key tourism stakeholders in
Cape Town. The primary focus of the meeting was to put together an immediate tourism action plan and communication strategy to address the issue (CCT, Media Release, May 2008).

In June 2008, the mayor visited xenophobic attack sites and urged residents to refrain from getting involved in the violence, and to cooperate with the police and SANDF members (Media Release, May 2008). In June in Masiphumelele, an Ethiopian man was shot dead two days after returning home after the May attacks (Crush et al, 2013).

The month of July was marked by a Government initiative to hold a Day of Remembrance as a tribute to the victims of May’s xenophobic violence. In the same month, president Mbeki denied the violence was xenophobic but ascribed it to “naked criminal activity”.

In August Somalian shop owner in Khayelitsha, Mahad Abukar Alasow, was shot dead after returning from Soetwater safety camp. According to the Somali community, he was the eighth Somali migrant to be killed since returning from safety camps to the township community (Crush et al, 2013).

In September, townships like Khayelitsha, Delft and Masiphumelele remained hot spots. For example, Zonokhanyo Retailers’ Association sent Somali shopkeepers operating in Khayelitsha ultimatum letters demanding they close their businesses within a week. In Delft a Somali shop assistant is shot dead (Crush et al, 2013).

In 2009, violence happened in locations inside and beyond Cape Town. In March violent attacks were reported in Worcester, Boland and a migrant-owned shops were looted (Crush et al, 2013). In order to honour people who were involved in fighting xenophobia the CoCT, honours Pastor Aaron Makili, President of the Great Commission Ministers’ Network and founder of the Church of Christ Ministry as one of outstanding citizens for caring for victims of the xenophobia crisis in 2008 (CCT, Media release, April 2009).
In **June 2009**, violent attacks were reported in Samora Machel, Gugulethu, Khayelitsha, Delft, Franschhoek and Nyanga. In Khayelitsha alone four people were killed; a Zimbabwean and Bangladeshi migrant were murdered and two Somali shop assistants were burned to death. In Delft three shop assistants sustained injuries from gunshots. In Franschhoek, hundreds of local residents gather outside shops owned by Somali traders and pelt stones to force them to increase their food price. An Angolan refugee Sebastian Santana was stabbed to death outside Nyanga Refugee Centre after unidentified men accost him telling him to return to his country (Crush et al, 2013).

In the same month the city released findings of the study on township trader tension between local and foreign spaza shop traders in Khayelitsha, just outside Cape Town (commissioned in October 2008). The primary purpose of the study was to understand and evaluate the underlying cause of the tensions that exist between these traders so that remedial action can be taken. In order to reduce tensions between migrants and citizens the city decided to provide basic business skills. The CoCT announced that it will provide up to 20 scholarships for local South African township traders to participate in an accelerated entrepreneurship training programme at the Tertiary School in Business Administration (TSiBA). In the same month the CoCT wrote off R47, 2 million which was used in dealing with the 2008’s xenophobic violence. Council condoned a further R106 million which was incurred in the 2009 financial year (CCT, Media release, June 2009).

The month of July was marked by City’s effort to close the temporary refugees camps created in mid-2008. In the council meeting, the executive mayor Dan Plato said that the City applied for an eviction order for the few people that were remaining in the temporary places of safety set up to provide shelter for victims of xenophobia (CCT, Media Release, November 2009).

In the same month, in Delft a Somali Action Group’s Omar Sabdi says that Somalis were being targeted because they are vulnerable in high risk areas. In November, De Doorns’ residents armed with sticks and stones destroyed Zimbabwean and Basotho migrants’ shacks, accusing them of accepting lower wages and stealing jobs from citizens. In
December in Delft, four men were arrested after a Somali shopkeeper was stabbed to death and store looted. Migrants claimed that local traders were instigating attacks to force them to close their businesses (Crush et al, 2013).

The year 2010

The year of 2010 was characterised by run-up to the 2010 World Cup Soccer tournament, an event herald as an African event. However, instead of being unifier, different violent attacks were recorded in various places that had not experienced xenophobic attacks before.

According to Crush et al (2013) the month of January, xenophobia attacks happened in Capricorn (Steenberg) where two Malawians were killed after their shack was deliberately set on fire. In De Doorns, Stofland and Ekuphumleni residents said they do not want their Zimbabwean migrant neighbours to return two months after they were violently chased away. In Crossroads, a Somali shopkeeper was killed and another was injured when petrol bomb was hurled at their store. In Samora Machel and Nyanga, migrants receive threatening pamphlets from “Youth Leaders of Samora” asking them to abandon the area or “face wrath of community”.

In March 2010, the xenophobic attack happened even in former white suburbs like Muizenberg where a Somali shopkeeper was shot to death in his spaza shop. In April violent attacks went reported in Malmesbury when during protest against poor school conditions, students assaulted several Somali traders, raiding their stores and destroying property. In Wolseley, local residents attacked shop owned by Ethiopian migrant. Two persons, including migrant, receive injuries (Crush et al, 2013).

In June 2010 the month in which the 2010 World Cup kicked-off, migrants received attacks linked to this event. In Khayelitsha township, migrants communities receive new threats of expulsion once South Africa was eliminated from tournament. Social Justice Coalition reports that Somalians have been threatened with violence if they fail to leave after tournament ends (Crush et al, 2013). After persistent rumours of outbreak of xenophobic
aggression after World Cup, in Du Noon army and local police carry out intensive operation, searching house to house to discourage violence (Crush et al, 2013).

In July 2010 Somali Retailers’ Association confirms that another Somali shopkeeper was killed in Site C Khayelitsha. In the same township some 200 persons raid Somali-owned shops short distance away from where National Police Commissioner was giving anti-xenophobia speech. Several Somali shopkeepers closed their stores and leave with belongings: “these people called us makwerekwere and said we must go home. They said no one from other land is going to stay here” (Crush et al, 2013).

In Nyanga, a Malawian migrant Peter Chavura was found murdered and castrated, six Malawian migrants were displaced after locals chased them out of their homes. In Gugulethu, a Ghanaian migrant was shot dead. In the same month, the Western Cape Premier Helen Zille said that plans to prevent xenophobic violence, including identification of flashpoints, use of mediators, and extensive work by police, have worked: “What could have been mass displacement is minimal displacement” (Crush et al, 2013).

Near Claremont, passengers attack migrants on train and a Burundian refugee Albert Mugabe was violently assaulted and later succumbs to his injuries. Witness states perpetrators were chanting “makwerekwere hamba (get out foreigner)” (Crush et al, 2013). Cape Flats immigrants sought refuge at police stations in Paarl, Wellington and Philippi after shops looting and scorched. Provincial authorities said there were been “sporadic” attacks on shops and “some incidents of looting” in areas like Mbekweni, Paarl East, Wellington, and Nyanga (Crush et al, 2013).

In October 2010 three migrant business owners; two Somalia and a third from Ethiopia, were shot to death, while three other migrants were injured. Somali community says 30 traders have been victims of targeted attacks since August of the same year. In Dunoon a Congolese Nyangoma Etasha was repeatedly stabbed after he refused to buy beer for several South Africans at a tavern. Witnesses say attackers told Etasha: “South Africa is ours”. In November 2010 a Somali trader Cyrix Man was shot fatally outside his shop in Khayelitsha.
Local Somali Association states more than 22 Somali migrants have been killed in the area over past three months (Crush et al, 2013).

In year 2011, xenophobic attacks carried on and many migrants lost lives. In this year also the city hosted a forum for community dialogue about xenophobia. In this year also some politicians were still pronouncing xenophobic statements in public domain. In Samora Machel Township, a Somali trader was burnt to death after his shop was attacked by armed gang in January 2011. In February, in Delft, a Somali Idiris Haji was killed and petrol bomb was thrown at his store, which was extensively damaged. In June, in Belmont Park, a Zimbabwean man is stabbed to death. In Khayelitsha, a Somali trader’s shop is attacked and one man was stabbed. In Delft, two Somali migrants die after unidentified persons shoot them in the face. In Malmesbury, a Somali businessman was shot dead, reported to be seventh Somali to be shot dead that week (Crush et al, 2013).

In Cape Town, twenty-nine migrant-run shops were attacked in traditionally coloured areas - Valhalla, Bishops Lavis and Mitchells Plain in the month of July. Nine shops were devastated and 20 looted over several days. In these incidents, Somali, Pakistani and Bangladeshi were mostly affected. In the same month, a Parliament Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs Chair Maunye argued that migrants should be refused entry because they pose a burden, using up resources: “Really, this intake, for how long are we going to continue with this as South Africans? Is it not going to affect our resources, the economy of the country?” She later apologizes after ANC accepts that her comments “may be construed to be xenophobic” (Crush et al, 2013).

In the same month, the CoCT’s Social Development Department in partnership with various stakeholders said it would host a forum for community dialogue about xenophobia, in honour of Mandela Day. The event seeks to increase awareness about issues affecting foreign nationals and to encourage a spirit of unity and peaceful relations between South Africans and African foreign nationals (Media release, July 2011). Even if there was this initiative in the CoCT to curb xenophobic attacks toward foreigners, some South African politicians continued to propagate hatred in the local community. Speaking to officers at a
meeting in Khayelitsha, National Police Commissioner Cele, said “migrants arriving in large numbers and illegally in South Africa. We can’t have a country run by people who jump the borders” (cited in Crush et al, 2013).

In February 2012, a Provincial Commissioner inform Parliament’s committee that irregular migrants running small businesses are most prone to being targeted by criminals because they cannot report crime or access banking services. MPs express concern that situation is “bordering on xenophobia” (Crush et al, 2013). In the same month in Khayelitsha, members of Zanokhanyo Business Association strong-armed more than five Somali traders to close their shops permanently. Two Somali-owned shops are looted and several shops destroyed (Crush et al, 2013).

**In 2013,** xenophobic incidents were reported in Mitchells Plain, where four Pakistan nationals were gunned down (Crush et al, 2013). In the same year the UNHCR criticised South Africa of its repressive policies toward asylum seekers. According to Crush et al (2013) though South Africa receives largest numbers of asylum seekers, it actually grants refugees status to very few of them. Acceptance rates are less than half of the global average and it ranks 36th globally for refugee population size. Despite all these violence attacks, little has been done to address the tension between the locals and migrants. As the next chapter discusses there is no clear policy on how the city will deal with xenophobia attacks in the future.

**Conclusion**

This chapter discussed the social-economic dynamics of Cape Town. It briefly discussed different facts about Cape Town including the history, economy, demography, political affiliation security and recent immigrants. It highlighted xenophobic incidences that targeted African immigrants from 2008 to 2013.

Immigration in Cape Town is not a new phenomenon, the city was a city of immigration since colonial period. After concurring Dutch, British colony not only benefited from
business partnership with United Kingdom and different Asians country, it benefited from British immigrants to slaves from different continents who after the abortion of the slave trade became the country’s citizens. African immigrants and internal migrants especially from Eastern Cape contributed also to the transformation of the CoCT.

However these new immigrants face different discrimination including crime and racism that target people of black colour and xenophobia that target specifically African immigrants. Discrimination toward immigrants is found also in the housing distribution. Even though there is a backlog in providing RDP housing to South Africans, immigrants also have the right to housing according to the South African constitution, however, this right is not exercised. Lastly, there is no recognition from the city’s management of the contribution of immigrants to the city’s economy. This is justified by the lack of data on immigrant’s employment, skills, entrepreneurship and so on. This chapter’s findings are in line with past researches who identified the CoCT as the most unequal city in South Africa and one whose discourse and policy is vigorously pro-rich, neoliberal and pro-business. The next chapter deals with the policy silence in the CoCT toward African immigrants.
Chapter Five: Cape Town: Policy and policy silences and the “tyranny of small decisions”

Introduction

This chapter presents the policy silence in relation to African immigrants in the CoCT. It is divided into two main sections; section one focuses on literature related to policy and its absence at the local government level in general. It also highlights the importance of including immigrants in all city’s strategic plans, and gives warning to resultant negative impacts if discrimination.

Section two analyses the city’s policies and accommodation of immigrants. I first scanned a list of policies published on the city’s website from 1994 until 2014, using the following key words ‘immigration, migration, refugees, asylum seekers, foreign’. Surprisingly, I couldn’t find any matching policy. Then I chose three policies which are: Policy on Vulnerable Groups, Social Development Strategy (SDS), and Responsible Tourism Policy. This chapter helped me to understand the local government’s policies silences and exclusion. It concludes with lessons learnt and identifies a new kinds of exclusion of African immigrants in the CoCT.

Migration policy and policy silences in Cape Town

I want to offer a specific critical idea of policy analysis using the notion of “silences”. Policy is often more notable for its silences. As Hogwood (1992) writes policy is what governments do and don’t do”. Ham et al. (1984: 12) refer to policy as the study of “non-decision making” that maintains the status quo while actions without official policy might also be seen as ‘implicit policy” as explained by the concept of “street level bureaucrats” (see Lipsky 1980).

McDonald (2008: 67) claims that Cape Town as a world city, adopted largely neoliberal policies intended to attract and retain service-oriented transnational capital and to induce the
kinds of sociospatial restructuring required to (re)establish new regimes of capital accumulation. Peberdy and Jara (2011: 39) agree that the spatial configuration of segregation and inequality in CT has barely changed for most CT residents since 1994, and its ‘reinsertion into the global market economy’ and neoliberal policies have led to ‘entrenching rather than mitigating the enormous inequalities and instabilities of the past’ (McDonald, 2008: 49). Even the CoCT recognizes that ‘the fragmented urban landscape remains largely unchanged’ (City of Cape Town, 2007: 62).

It is in this disjointed, unequal and segregated city where the xenophobic violence occurred (Peberdy and Jara, 2011: 39). In the case of xenophobia there seems to be a constant shift of blame between the local government, province and national. Local government officials interviewed by (Palmary, 2002: 6) felt for example, that provision of services for refugees should be the responsibility of the Department of Home Affairs at national level. As one CT city official stated in Palmary study:

There is no land for these immigrants … They're taking every piece of land they can get and occupying it … If you go to town on the N1, there's a piece we call the Valley where we have about 50 to 60 immigrants living there, under cardboard boxes, in the open, making fires against the bridges and all that … They occupy city-owned land illegally. So we take action against them. We're trying to get central government to take full responsibility for this. Because the city does not have the resources or the manpower to deal with this. Tonight I've got to go again, go deal with the immigrants.

Similarly, a local government official who was centrally involved managing the consequences of the Dunoon and Joe Slovo Park conflict stated (Palmary 2002: 20) that:

We believe at the moment that Home Affairs should settle it [xenophobic conflict] … accommodation, feeding etc that's something that should be dealt with by someone else … and we believe it's Home Affairs. And they believe that they shouldn't be involved … everyone starts passing it around. Eventually it does land up at local government (official).
In the case of the conflict in Joe Slovo Park, both local and provincial government did play a role, interviewees from both these tiers of government felt that national government had not assisted. They also believed that dealing with such problems was the primary responsibility of the national government and that provincial and local roles should be limited” (Palmary, 2002: 20). The South African Cities Network (SACN) also identified this blame game between the cities and the central government as phenomenon. The SACN (2009: 30) asserts that:

Local authorities may be legally and ethically obliged to address migration but few municipalities have developed empirically informed and proactive policy responses to human migration. Rather than addressing potential divisions with shared rules of economic and social engagement, various forms of exclusion – including overt and violent discrimination against non-citizens and ethnic minorities – threaten to fragment cities’ ever transforming populations.

Instead of integration, immigrants are harassed and treated as a burden to cities’ budgets, and blamed to be the root cause of crime. SACN (2009: 34) reveals that immigrants who are legally in South Africa face police harassment. “Even well-meaning police may feel that protecting foreigners is either too dangerous or risks alienating the South African community”.

Palmary (2002) argues that some Western Cape leaders are confused about who must assist immigrants. The following quote from the Provincial Department of Safety and Security is an example:

You see that is the issue, everybody has got a different opinion about who it belongs to … then it's Home Affairs and now its Provincial Government. But I think it was seen as a local government issue to deal with in the end … but what happens, is if [violence] happens, everyone wants to run away from it and nobody wants to take the lead on it … you see, I don't know really who is legally responsible. Our attitude in the workshop (of the anti-crime and xenophobia working group) was okay, we take note of it, let's find ways of solving the problem and not keep blaming local or provincial government (an official).
Nevertheless, the discrimination of migrants has consequences for the hosting city/country. Referring to the 2008 xenophobic attack, SACN (2009: 30) states that the violence demonstrated how exclusive and fragmentation of cities are often dangerous, putting residents’ health and wealth at risk. Migrant exclusion not only leaves large sections of the population without the services they need, but they are a less healthy, less productive and less committed population. Therefore, the integration of African immigrants is an imperative to the South African government as well the local government. According to SACN (2009: 35):

People who do not feel welcome in South Africa’s urban society are less likely to respect the rules and institutions dedicated to governing it. This may become visible in efforts to dodge tax regulations, avoid census takers, or actively subvert regulatory agencies they feel are more likely to prey on than promote their interests. When denied the right to work or documents needed to secure housing, it may also result in increased criminal activity or other anti-social behaviour. Those who feel excluded are also unlikely to participate in participatory planning exercises, for example, the Integrated Development Planning process (IDP).

As a sustainable solution, SACN 2009 suggests that migrants should be seen as a potential for the country’s development rather than a security concern.

Given the country’s economic ambitions, on-going efforts to foster regional integration, and acute skills shortages, immigration is critical to the country’s international competitiveness. This is evident in the corporate sector, in all fields of knowledge production (research and development, higher education, and technological and industrial innovation) but also in small business formation and tourism. Continued formal and informal restrictions on, and mismanagement of immigration – including laws, administrative practices and widespread xenophobia – can only have a negative impact on the country’s economic development. Reaping migration’s positive economic benefits will mean addressing migration management as a developmental rather than a security concern (SACN, 2009: 36).
Immigrants especially refugees entitled to health care, to seek employment and to education; in the same way as South African citizens (Refugee Act 1998). It states that all people in the country are entitled to the rights enshrined in Chapter 2 of the constitution, with the exception of political rights and the rights to freedom of trade, occupation, and profession, which do not apply to non-citizens. Palmary (2002) asserts that legal immigrants and refugees should, therefore, be entitled to services offered at municipal level such as safety, housing, clinic services, libraries etc. Not only is there a lack of awareness at local government level of the rights of refugees, but there appear to be no plans for ensuring that services are extended to refugees. Indeed, in some instances, non-nationals are actively denied the right to these services (Palmary, 2002: 6).

Policy implementation and agencies

There is remarkably little literature written about specific role of Cape Town policies (explicit or implicit) regarding to foreign nationals. Scholars such as Peberdy and Jara (2011) wrote on civil society and the state but neglected to mention the role of the local government in relation to xenophobia.

The CoCT has established many special policing and social control units. For example a special by-law enforcement 'unit' deals with vagrancy and evictions of people settling illegally, especially on council-owned land. According to the “Vagrancy Unit”, it was intended specifically to protect the constitutional right to private land ownership and deal with the legal requirement that if a person has been living on a piece of land for more than six months, the council may be required to provide alternative accommodation for them. This is implied by Section (6) of the P.I.E Act (1998):

If an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for less than six months at the time when the proceedings are initiated, a court may grant an order for eviction, if it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so, after considering all the relevant circumstances including the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by women.
If the unlawful occupier has occupied for more than six months, the court is also required to consider (Palmary, 2002: 14): ‘Whether land has been made available or can reasonably be made available by a municipality, or other organ of the state or another land owner, for the relocation of the unlawful occupier.’

One of the purposes of the activities of this Unit, at least in part, is to ensure that evictions can be carried out less than six months after property has been illegally occupied, to reduce the number of situations in which the municipality might become responsible for providing alternative housing to illegal occupiers (Palmary, 2002: 15). The Vagrancy Unit has a great deal of contact with groups of non-nationals. According to the members of this Unit, the bulk of the foreigners with whom they have contact are refugee groups living in the city legally. They stated that they did not come across many undocumented migrants. 90% of them are legal, they have their documentations [asylum status]. But they still occupy council land illegally. So we take action against them” (Palmary 2002: 15). Palmary points out that,

Members of the Unit had been given a training course on how to identify illegal immigrants in the city. This training had taken place in conjunction with immigration officials from the Department of Home Affairs. In spite of this training, there was very little knowledge among by-law enforcement officials about the rights of different groups of no nationals. Most concerning is that the training manual (used in the training) referred to the old Prevention of Illegal Immigration Act of 1991. In particular, the training covered the regulations concerning the detention of a person suspected of being an 'illegal alien'. In the illustrations given to trainees about Section 22 permits, the permits shown are stamped with an official Department of Home Affairs stamp that states that work and study are prohibited. This is crossed out and it is typed onto the form that the applicant may take up employment. This illustration was confusing to the officials undergoing the training course - some of them were not aware that refugees were entitled to work in South Africa at all. Nothing was mentioned on the illustration about the right to study or the right to access those rights outlined in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (2002: 15).
The Vagrancy Unit has an agreement with the local SAPS that, in the course of an eviction, they would detain all undocumented migrants they come across, and hand them to the police (Palmary, 2002: 15). From the perspective of members of the Vagrancy Unit, non-national groups are seen to place an additional burden on the local authority, in that land shortages are exacerbated by the presence of non-nationals. An official (cited in Palmary 2002) noted, 

If you go into town on the N1 there's a piece of land we call the valley. There we have about 50 to 60 immigrants living there under cardboard boxes, in the open, making fires against the bridges and all that.

There is little understanding of why immigrants (both internal and external) are disproportionately settling illegally, and how this may be related to them being excluded from formal access to housing. The refugee groups interviewed for Palmary’s study identified two main problems with accessing for instance, housing. The first was that they had no access to government-subsidised housing. This was particularly problematic in light of them not being allowed to work until they have received refugee status, as their financial status is dramatically reduced during the waiting period. The second set of problems relates to the barriers that exist in accessing private housing - primarily driven by xenophobia (Palmary, 2002: 16).

In the case of 2008 xenophobia, the government was consistently challenged by some civil society organizations (particularly by the TAC, ALP and COSATU), including some refugee organizations, for the slow pace and nature of their response in combating xenophobia and assisting victims (Peberdy and Jara 2011:46). State-civil society relationships in Cape Town have been complicated by the complex and contested post-apartheid governance of the city and the province of the Western Cape. Unlike other areas of the country, parties other than the African National Congress (ANC) have held control of both the city and the province at various times. This has led to swings and changes in policy in the city as well as to contestations between various spheres of government (Seekings, 2006; Schmidt, 2010) (Peberdy and Jara 2011: 46).
Police silence in relation to immigrants

This section presents the analysis of some policies of the CoCT that should accommodate immigrants. Three policies that were selected to be part of this study are Cape Town’s Social Development Strategy (2012), Policy on Vulnerable Groups (Draft Policy March 2013) and Responsible Tourism Policy for the City of Cape Town 2009. My aim here was to identify the exclusion of African immigrants caused by gaps in city’s policies. I start with Cape Town’s Social Development Strategy (SDS, 2012).

The approved existing SDS policy is totally different from its draft policy. The draft policy identified four priorities: Priority 1: Strengthen, develop social cohesion/inclusion, Priority 2: Integrate Social Infrastructure Planning into City processes, Priority 3: Assist the vulnerable and create local safety nets, Priority 4: Develop sustainable communities.

Furthermore, it suggested integration of foreign nationals in city’s social development strategies. As depicted in the table below, immigrants were considered in the goal 4 related to enhancing community participation and involvement.

**Figure 3: Extract from the draft Social Development Strategy policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal 4: Enhancing community participation and involvement</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.4.1 Strengthening of NGO sector &amp; empowerment of community leaders</td>
<td>A4.1.1 Complement the capacity of NGOs dealing with refugee community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.4.1 Strengthening of NGO sector &amp; empowerment of community leaders</td>
<td>A4.1.2 Capacity building for community leaders to deal effectively with issues pertaining to sustainable relationships between foreign nationals and host communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.4.2 Compliance engagement &amp; enforcement</td>
<td>A4.2.1 Facilitate the establishment of area based Business Forums, facilitate development and implementation of guidelines to regulate informal business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.4.2 Compliance engagement &amp; enforcement</td>
<td>A4.2.2 Regulate and monitor selling and renting of houses to foreign nationals to start small businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.4.3 Entrepreneurial Development and Mentoring</td>
<td>A4.3.1 Empower both foreign nationals and locals with entrepreneurial skills and mentoring services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.4.4 Cultural and Sport Activities</td>
<td>A4.4.1 Implement cultural and sport activities to integrate foreign nationals and locals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.4.5 Poverty mitigation</td>
<td>A4.5.1 Involve foreign nationals in poverty reduction programs and social security networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.4.5 Poverty mitigation</td>
<td>A4.5.2 Ensure that in all programmes implemented / sponsored by government, foreign nationals are involved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The City of Cape Town 2012
However, in the final policy document approved in 2012, “goal 4” was removed. Furthermore, in the whole document there is no indication of how immigrants would be integrated. Even though the draft policy is not explicit on how foreign nationals were going to be integrated in the city’s development strategy, it was an indication that the city at least thinks about them. The absence of immigrants in the new policy indicates little political good will by the city’s managers toward immigrants. Furthermore, this policy was approved in 2012 and is designed to guide the city development for the next 30 years. According to the city website, it was developed after engagement and consultation with numerous stakeholders, and is a plan to take Cape Town to the next level of government. This indicates that there is still a long way to go for foreign nationals to be recognized in the city’s strategic plans.

The CoCT’s City Development Strategy (CDS) which was approved by Council on 31 October 2012, is derived from the Western Cape Government’s OneCape2040 strategy which is its vision for the Western Cape. The CCT CDS meshes closely with the National Development Plan. The CDS speaks to Cape Town’s place in the region in the next 30 years and identifies the key levers for creating a city of social inclusion and economic opportunity. It was developed after engagement and consultation with numerous stakeholders, from academia to civil society, from business to residents and is a plan to take Cape Town to the next level of government. At an organisational level, it is supported by the Economic Growth Strategy (EGS) and Social Development Strategy (SDS) and the statutory Integrated Development Plan (IDP), with its five pillars: the opportunity city, the safe city, the caring city, the inclusive city, and the well-run city (City of Cape Town, 2012).

The SDS (2012: 5) notes that “all the instruments for social development are not within the City’s mandate; hence, the City’s social development work is somewhat limited. Desired outcomes of the SDS policy are:

1. Maximise income generating opportunities for people who are excluded or at risk of exclusion
2. Build and promote safe households and communities
3. Support the most vulnerable through enhancing access to infrastructure and services
4. Promote and foster social integration
5. Mobilise resources for social development (my italics)

Chapter one of the policy document describes how the city maximises income generation opportunity for those who are excluded or at risk of exclusion (CCT-SDS 2012: 9). According to this report, key to reducing poverty and to preventing the intergenerational transmission of poverty within households and communities is creating economic opportunities and facilitating access to these opportunities. Only the “most vulnerable” should be helped suggest the city want to minimise its reach. In order to maximise those opportunities the city’s key levers are:

- create job opportunities through the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP);
- develop the skills of people excluded or at risk of exclusion; and
- support entrepreneurship activity in the formal and informal sectors.

The report makes several recommendations to ensure that the EPWP programme (reserved for South Africans) is used strategically for poverty alleviation. It suggests the principles that should inform short-term skills development projects. The SDS supports the one-stop shop model advocated by the Economic Growth Strategy as a mechanism to support poor entrepreneurs. In addition, the SDS advocates that libraries continue to be used as information hubs for new entrepreneurs and informal traders are supported through proactive interventions (SDS, 2012).

Moreover, the document looks at the spatial segregation through transport and planning. According to the SDS (2012: 24), apartheid urban segregation resulted in a city geographically separated in terms of race and class. Spatial segregation has both social and economic effects. Socially, it inhibits contact between racial groups and economic classes, acting to perpetuate an ‘us-and-them’ mentality, leading to discrimination, stereotyping and breeding distrust and fear.
Spatial segregation also effects the economic development of poor communities. People who are poor tend to live far from jobs and are excluded from well-located land. High commuting costs and lengthy travel time affects households, reducing the time families should spend together, affecting health, children’s development and the social fabric of communities. Together, these act to perpetuate economic inequality, creating areas of concentrated poverty with higher barriers to accessing opportunities (CCT-SDS, 2012: 24).

The SDS articulates the City’s response to spatial segregation as ‘get people to jobs’, ‘get jobs to people’ and ‘promote opportunities for social interaction’ through sports facilities, parks, libraries, community centres, the city departments to provide a package of activities at centres, arts and cultural activities and City-supported Representative Structures such as ward committees. Furthermore, the SDS recommends using “points of contact” with communities and citizenship education initiatives to facilitate ethical encounters between the City and communities (SDS, 2012: 25).

The Sports and Recreation Department will develop a recreation strategy to promote the use of ‘community centres as centres for community Development which aim to foster social interaction and build social cohesion. All centres will be required to have recreational or sporting activities 5 days/week, cater for the people with disabilities, partner with other organisations and work with City departments to provide a package of activities at the centre. The main impetus is to get people active, build community cohesion and inclusivity and provide alternatives to anti-social behaviour through sport and recreational activities in community centres (CCT, 2012).

While immigrants play an important role in the social life of the city, this policy is silent about them. It invisibilises black foreign migrants. Migrant are seen as passive and temporary while different studies has confirm that they are contributing to the city’s social and economic condition. Yet past studies (and Mbeki’s speeches) have affirmed that immigrants are motivated, educated, skilled and enterprising (McDonald at el, 1999, McDonald 2008, and Kalitanyi and Visser, 2010).
Policy on Vulnerable Groups: the City of Cape Town’s Draft Policy March 2013

I now look at the “Policy on Vulnerable Groups” (PVG) which has categories of people accepted as vulnerable in the CoCT. According to the PVG, vulnerable groups include persons with disabilities, older persons, vulnerable women and orphans. It furthermore defines a Vulnerable Person as a person whose survival, care, protection or development may be compromised, due to a particular condition, situation or circumstance and which prevents the fulfilment of his or her rights (CCT-Policy on Vulnerable Group, 2013: 4). The policy document asserts that although children in child headed households are known to be more vulnerable to poor living conditions than children in mixed generation households, children in mixed generation households who suffer similar burdens of poverty and inadequate service delivery might be compromised by a disproportionate focus on child-headed households. 31.8% of children in the Western Cape are living in households that experienced inadequate or severely inadequate access to food (Stats SA: Census, 2011). Too many children within the CoCT are subjected to horrendous acts of violence and abuse, often with fatal consequences and often by people known to them (CCT-Policy on Vulnerable Group, 2013: 7).

The CoCT has duty to play a leading role in creating an environment where there is no place for or tolerance of the abuse and exploitation of children (CCT-Policy on Vulnerable Group, 2013: 7). In this policy document there is no indication that migrant residents might be vulnerable. According to the distinction of a vulnerable person in this policy (see definition on page 7 and throughout the document) immigrants are not included. Even unaccompanied children who are asylum seekers or refugees are not considered among vulnerable children. However, Peberdy and Jara (2011), Charman and Piper (2012) affirm that immigrants are vulnerable especially of xenophobia. Palmary (2002) also reveals that the common challenge affecting refugees group interviewed was related slow pace of processing applications for asylum and it and make them extremely vulnerable and unable to claim their basic rights like education, employment, etc.
The CoCT “Responsible Tourism Policy” (2009: 3) defines responsible tourism as an activity “that creates better places for people to live in, and better places to visit”. It aims to achieve the three principal outcomes of sustainable development, i.e. economic growth, environmental integrity and social justice. The CoCT commits to adopting Responsible Tourism as an approach to destination management to bring about positive economic, social, cultural, and environmental impacts. This policy was prepared following guidelines from other international and national documents regarding the development of tourism. Those documents are: Agenda 21 for Tourism (1996), Global Code of Ethics for Tourism (2001), Cape Town Declaration on Responsible Tourism in Destinations (2002), WSSD Final Plan of Implementation (2002), Kerala Declaration on Responsible Tourism in Destinations (2008), and Global Sustainable Tourism Criteria (2009).

The key policy documents at national and provincial level that have direct relevance to the direction and nature of tourism development are:

- White Paper on the development and promotion of tourism in South Africa (1996)
- White Paper on Sustainable Tourism Development and Promotion in the Western Cape (2001)
- Tourism Sector Codes (2009)

For example the policy followed guidelines published in the White Paper on the Development and Promotion of Tourism in South Africa by the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) in 1996. The key elements of responsible tourism were to:
• Ensure communities are involved in and benefit from tourism;
• Market tourism that is responsible, respecting local, natural and cultural environments;
• Involve the local community in planning and decision-making;
• Use local resources sustainably;
• Be sensitive to the host culture;
• Maintain and encourage natural, economic, social and cultural diversity; and
• Assessment of environmental, social and economic impacts as a prerequisite to developing tourism (DEAT, 1996: section 3.4).

The Responsible Tourism Policy has neglected migrants who live in the CoCT even though they play an important role on the city’s tourism. Where it talks about non-South Africans on page 25 it merely calls for encouraging business relationships between foreign entrepreneurs and local and emerging entrepreneurs. However, it is not clear if immigrants are included among these foreigners or if it means foreigner investors in South Africa.

The policy identified also crafts as a tourism product. It says:

> Give customers the opportunity to purchase locally produced crafts and curios, set targets to increase the proportion of sales of goods sourced within 20 km of the enterprise. Assist local craft workers to develop new products to meet market demand as evidenced in the enterprise (CCT - Responsible Tourism Policy, 2009: 26)

However, this policy is silent on the source of so-called local crafts that are sold in South Africa. It is self-evident that most of the crafts sold in craft markets are from north of the Limpopo. The involvement of African immigrants in the South African tourism has been explained in details by Mather and Landau (2006). They found that South African tourism depends on the willingness of African migrants to invest in the crafts market. According to Mathers and Landau (2006: 10), one only has to stroll the markets that tourist buses frequent
to note that the vast majority of artefacts on sale are made and sold by Africans from “anywhere but South Africa”. They assert that South African tourism is therefore dependent on the willingness of migrants to risk crossing the border, often with artefacts to sell.

The City has suggested improving skills development for local craft makers (The City of Cape Town Responsible Tourism Policy, 2009: 26). The City has not recognized the inputs African immigrants are bringing into South African tourism. Africans migrants have been ignored as stakeholders in policy making.

The contribution of African migrants in Cape Town tourism is remarkable also in the city taxi sector. Self-employed immigrants and those employed by transport companies are involved in metered taxi business for different tourism attractions like Table Mountain, Kirstenbosh garden, camps bay beaches. African immigrants are found also in the city centre especially at night to facilitate the movement of tourists if they want to enjoy the Cape Town’s night life. They help citizens who need a lift from home to the pub or from pub to their home when they don’t want to use their private cars, to avoid drunk driving traffic offences. It is self-evident that this increasing role in both visible and invisible services means that the footprint of foreign workers in enormous and should be recognised.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to excavate some of the “policy silences” and how seeming small decisions made at a local level can affect the quality of lives and thousands of workers and residents of Cape Town in the CoCT toward immigrants’ integration. The study analysed the CoCT’s policies in order to reveal the adhoc nature of the local government’s programs related to immigrants. Since the city doesn’t have any specific policy on migration management, I selected for analysis three policies that among others should have accommodated vulnerable immigrants who are citizens because they live and work in Cape Town even if they have no permanent resident papers.

The CoCT has no interest in immigrant’s integration. The study found that there is a blame game between the local government and the central government about who is institutionally responsible of serving immigrants. The CoCT wants to minimise social policies and shift
responsibilities for black migration management to the government of South Africa and the Department of Home Affairs. The CoCT is interested in attracting and retaining transnational capital and furthering its capital accumulation strategies that to date have a distinct Euro-centricity about them. The next chapter deals with other kinds of day-to-day exclusion faced by African immigrants in the CoCT and based on their own reports.
Chapter Six: Everyday social inclusion/ exclusion of African immigrants in Cape Town

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the daily experiences of African immigrants and their social life. This chapter identifies different kinds of exclusions African immigrants are subjected to, particularly their experiences with government institutions like the migration bureaucracy. This chapter further discusses the respondent’s profile and networks, perception of integration, involvement into local cultural events, impact of xenophobia on them and their relatives, and the treatment they receive when exercising their rights.

In this study 13 individual’s respondents coming from different African countries were interviewed for at least one hour per person. As discussed in chapter three, each interview was scheduled by appointment and interviews were recorded through a digital voice recorder, transcribed and data were then coded into categories and analyzed. Data were collected through a semi-structured structured interview and all questions were open ended and the last questions asked respondents if there is anything else that we should have talked about we did not.

My questions were loosely organized according to indicators for integration, suggested by Ager and Strang (2008). In their study, they suggested four domains within the framework under the heading markers and means, social connections, facilitators and foundation. Grouped together, these domains represent major areas of attainment that are widely recognized as critical factors in the integration process (Ager and Strang, 2008: 2).

Portes and Zhou (1993: 83) reveal three features of the social contexts encountered by newcomers in the USA that create vulnerability to downward assimilation. The first is colour, the second is location, and the third is the absence of mobility ladders. The same authors suggest types of resources available for immigrants in the USA to confront the challenges of integration.
Firstly, certain groups, notably political refugees, are eligible for a variety of government programs including educational loans for their children. For example, the Cuban Loan Program, implemented by the Kennedy administration in connection with its plan to resettle Cuban refugees away from South Florida, gave many impoverished first- and second-generation Cuban youths a chance to attend college (Portes and Zhou, 1993: 83).

Secondly, the resources in networks in the ethnic communities when immigrants join well-established and class diversified ethnic groups means they potentially have access to a range of moral and material resources well beyond those available through official assistance programs (Portes and Zhou, 1993: 83). Third, the specific organizational forms adopted by immigrants play a decisive role in the process of political incorporation. While the politics of the first generations have always pivoted around homeland concerns, the realities of their new situations and the imperatives created by the settlement process gradually move them away from these concerns and into citizenship and participation in the politics of their new country (Portes et al. 2008: 1058).

**Markers and means in Cape Town**

Refugees can get access to the employment, housing, education and health opportunities that are similar to the citizens of the host country (Ager and Strang, 2008). As discussed in previous passages immigrants in South Africa especially asylum seekers, are given documents that allow them to seek employment without restrictions, to apply for education at any institution, to visit local health facilities and have accommodation in South Africa. This section probes the extent our informants exercise these rights.

Regarding the legal status, ten had Refugee status (section 24 (3) (a) of the Refugees Act 1998 (Act 130 of 1998), one had the asylum seeker permit (section 22 of the Refugee Act 1998 (Act 130 of 1998), one had the work permit and one had Permanent Residence. Note that refugee status and asylum seekers permit holders meant they can look for work at any South African firm or study at any institution. Only illegal immigrants or undocumented migrants are prohibited from work.
The majority of respondents were from Somalia 4, 3 were from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 3 were from Rwandan, 1 from Ethiopia, 1 from Zimbabwe, and 1 from Burundi. Regarding gender, nine were male whereas females were four. Most respondents were young and of working age. One respondent was under 20, three were between 20-25, three were between 25-30, three were between 31-35, two were between 36-40, and one was over 40 years old. All respondents belong to the first generation to immigrate in South Africa. One has been here for 1 year, two 3 years, one 4 years, one 5 years, one 7 years, two 8 years, one 9 years, two 10 years, and two 13 years. The majority of the interviewees had completed high school in SA. According to this study, seven respondents had a matric in the South African education system, three people already had a National Diploma, one was completing his National Diploma, one was still studying at the college, and one stopped his study at Grade 4.

Concerning the respondent’s employment, all of them were working in different sectors for example, business, service sector and construction industry among others. In addition, students were also working in order to finance their studies. The respondents’ occupations were; three respondents were owners of small businesses, two were shop assistants, three were interpreters, one was assistant operation manager in an event management company, one was a waitress, one was a Crane operator in the Construction industry, and there were two students in higher education.

African immigrants do risky jobs or jobs that are far below their qualifications. As interviewee 7 said:

As an asylum seeker, when I arrived here they gave me a temporary permit and it is highlighted on it that I was allowed to work and to study. But we were not given anything to eat or a place to stay like in other counties that have refugees. In order to survive in the new environment, I had to do any kind of job that I could find. My first job was to work in a shop in township and that area was dangerous to the extent that I was going to be killed. (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 7)
Similarly, another respondent from Burundi underlined the same experience:

My first job was in car parking as a car guard; the job was hard, no salary. We had to wait for a well-wisher to give us some change. In the hot weather we had to work, in the rain season we were not allowed to leave our parking spots. (Interview: Burundian female, interviewee 12)

Car parking attendants are regularly racially abused by angry motorist (McEwen and Leiman, 2008: 18).

Reasons for leaving their home country and the length of time stayed in Cape Town

Question: what are the main reasons for leaving your country and how long have you been here? This question aimed to probe the reasons why respondents left their countries of origin and came to Cape Town. Factors that were suggested by our respondents are the following:

Political conflict and war in their home countries are reasons for the majority of our respondents. Five respondents; two from DRC, one from Somalia and two from Rwanda come specifically to Cape Town looking for protection. According to the informant from DRC, the war was the main reason for her context of exit. ‘I fled my country because of the war and came to seek refuge in South Africa’, (Interview: Congolese female, Interviewee 10). The man from Somalia echoed the same reason for leaving his country.

Because of a war in Somalia, many relatives have been killed and our properties destroyed so that it was not safe to remain in my country. That is why I came here to look for Safety, and change my life and that of my remaining family’. (Interview: Somali male, Interviewee 7)

The second reason is seeking for a job and this is suggested by three respondents. Two respondents came to Cape Town looking for jobs whereas one respondent came to Cape Town transferred from Johannesburg by his previous company. The following remark best represents the response given by one Rwandan man; ‘When I first came in South Africa I went to Johannesburg where I managed after many stragglles to get job. In 2009 I was sent to
Family reunification is a primary cause. The third reason given by our respondents is family joining (a strong echo of Portes networks). In this study, one Somali man came following his relatives and one Burundian woman came to get married. This is an important aspect as identified in the literature covered in chapter two of this thesis.

Among informants of this study, two came to Cape Town to study. This man from DRC was attracted by the education system of South Africa: ‘I was attracted to South Africa by its education system, which is far better than the one we have in my country’ (Interview: Congolese male, interviewee 6). This idea is supported by this female from Rwanda: ‘The reason why I chose South Africa is because here I am able to get into my dream career, whereas in other countries you are very limited due to fewer schools’. (Interview: Rwandan female, interviewee 9)

Education is one of pull factors of African immigrants in South Africa due to advancement in higher education comparing to other African countries. Legoko (2006: 75) asserts that in South Africa higher education is characterized by its ability to produce highly-rated graduates, with knowledge, competencies and skills and therefore it enjoys a good reputation. South Africa's rate of investment in education is among the highest in the world.

Of South Africa's over 12-million potential schoolchildren, more than 90% percent are in school - a far higher enrolment rate than in most other developing countries. Spending on education has increased tremendously in the post-apartheid era. In 1994, the government spent R31,8-billion on education. By 2006, this had risen to R92.1-billion - 17.8% of total government spending. At roughly 5% of national GDP,…

http://www.southafrica.info/about/social/govteducation.htm#VjCgeF7B_IW
Expectations

Question: Can you tell me about what you expected when you arrived here in Cape Town?

Regarding this question, five respondents expected a “better life”, two expected to find the city beautiful, two expected to have peace and security, two expected to get a job, two expected to get nice studies; one expected to get Home Affairs papers, one expected Cape Town to be a welcoming city. As the results of this study show, all respondents had a positive expectation before they arrive in Cape Town.

Accommodation on arrival was probed also areas respondents lived in for the first time; who received them and what kind of accommodation they occupied. Specific kinds of accommodation ranged from shops to flats. Three respondents stayed in shops belonging to their friends and relatives, three shared a flat with others and six rented a room in a house.

Furthermore, this study probed the racial and class profile of areas where they first lived. When respondents arrived in Cape Town, only three lived in Cape Town’s townships like Nyanga and Delft. Others stayed in the middle class areas of Bellville, Mitchell’s-Plain, Paarl, Woodstock, Cape Town CBD, Retreat and Brooklyn. One lived with a friend of his brother in Constantia.

The study found that respondents felt most safe in areas perceived as coloured or middle-class or white. Furthermore, all respondents came to Cape Town following (through social networks) someone in their family or friend who came before them. When arrived in Cape Town, eight respondents were received by their family relatives, one was living alone, three were living with their friends, and one was living with a friend of his brother. Thus all of them arrived in Cape Town with some kind of help or promise of help and all were living with family and or friends.
As discussed in chapter 4, township housing for immigrants is a controversial in South Africa due to a lack of clear policies on how both citizens and non-citizens can access housing in South Africa (McDonald, 1998: 1). Land invasions by citizens and “queue-jumping as well as substandard housing in Cape Town remain major issues (McDonald 2008). Furthermore, immigrants are victims of the inability of the government to provide to its working class and poor people in general. According (Bolzoni, 2009: 128),

the absence of refugee camps and the concentration of a large refugee population in metropolitan areas assign an important role to the local government in implementing laws and policies and in managing challenges and problems. In spite of that, the role of local governments in the provision of services to refugees has been clearly mentioned, neither in the Refugee Act nor in any other policy documents.

Roux (2009) argues that ‘the ability of refugees and asylum seekers to secure such social and economic rights is particularly complex in countries like South Africa, that face challenges in providing these rights to their own nationals.’ Local state failure may thus be an indirect factor in xenophobia.

In order to deal with the lack of accommodation on arrival, (Amisi 2006, Bolzoni, 2009) asserts that immigrants create networks to support migration flows. They offer them information about migration routes and costs, and temporary residence on arrival. For example in his study on Durban Congolese refugees, Amis found that 71.4 percent of women and 39.1 percent of males who participated in the study found their first accommodation from Congolese of the same tribe. Somalis also rely on the home country networks for accommodation on arrival and raise funds to start their own small businesses. Bolzoni (2009: 146) argues that:

The newcomer is lodged for free by relatives or friends, and at the same time he/she is immediately given a paid job in a fellow countryman’s business. After a period as an employee he collects enough money to start his own business. They are very proud of their ability as businessmen, and their shops are all around the city, but especially in the townships, where they often live. In fact, Somalis are also characterized by a certain spatial concentration: they almost all live in Mitchell’s Plain, Athlone and Belville.
**Integration**

In this section, respondents were asked if they feel integrated in the South African community. Nine feel like they are not integrated, three feel integrated whereas one doesn’t care about the integration. Respondents who feel unwelcomed used the following terms to describe their experiences in Cape Town: ‘discriminated’, ‘unwelcomed’, ‘neglected’, ‘abused’, ‘traumatised’ and as ‘Africans’.

Bolzoni, (2009: 128) asserts that ‘it is important to highlight the particular condition of refugees in South Africa: it is one of the few African countries that encourage refugees to self-settle in urban areas. In Cape Town immigrants are affected by racism and discrimination. According to Peberdy and Jara (2011: 39), post-apartheid Cape Town can be described as a neo-apartheid city—without legalized racism and discrimination but with continuing working-class exclusion, marginalization and exploitation that benefits a small, mainly white elite and still couple race and class in a largely segregated city. Furthermore, Bolzoni, (2009: 144) argues that ‘immigrants in Cape Town arrive in an already highly fragmented society, with huge problems of integration, social inclusion, racism, white domination and an absence of effective democracy’.

**How do African migrants see themselves?**

Question: How do you see yourself? ... as a (eg. Congolese) or a South African?

Respondents were asked to indicate how they see themselves in South Africa. The question aimed to probe if they see themselves as South Africans or as foreigners. Beside one respondent from Rwanda who see himself as a world citizen and consider himself as a local everywhere he goes, other twelve respondents indicated that they see themselves as foreigners and they belong to their home countries.
Social Connections

Social connections involve different relationships and networks that can help refugee to integrate into host communities. This connection called bonds when the relationship is within communities. Connection with other groups is known as “bridges”, while connections that help refugee to access services and be integrated into the new communities is defined as “linkers” (Ager and Strang, 2008).

Friendship with South Africans

Among all respondents, only one Zimbabwean female respondent had no friends while all others had friends and made new friends in South Africa. These friends are grouped into three categories;

- Those with friends from different nationalities including South Africans were seven,
- Those with friends from their own countries were three, and
- Those with friends from South Africa only were three.

These findings confirm that migrants are friendly and are ready to have even South Africans citizens as friends. Nine people out of twelve have South Africans as their friends. However, some respondents indicated that there is mistrust in this friendship. For example the interviewee though he has got a lot of friends, he chooses who to trust; ‘I’ve got a lot of friends from different nationalities. I have made new friends here in South Africa but not everyone I can trust. Only few chosen ones are my sincere friends’ (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 1).

Another Somalian man supported this position saying that it is hard to find a trustworthy person. He said; ‘I have got a whole load of friend, and every day I try to hobnob with a chosen few, though it is hard to trust everyone (Interview: Somali man, interviewee 7).
This study found that respondents are friendly and have South African friends of opposite sex. Nine respondents had South African friends of the opposite sex, and three of them have children with South African women (it is unclear if these were black South Africans). Regarding the group of people they find easiest to talk to about issues that concern them, only two respondents find it hard to talk to South Africans about issues that concern them while eleven find it easy. Regarding the kind of people they like to speak to, five prefer to speak to whites, three speak to coloured, two speak to black South African and one speak to all of them without exception. No reasons were offered for a preference for whites (although it might have to do with jobs). While respondent expressed their friendship with South Africans, some South African men criticise this friendship, accusing immigrants of stealing South African women (Dodson and Oelofse (2002: 134) and Nkealah (2011: 125). Their argument is that immigrants are better off than locals because they dress smartly and flash money around, thereby ‘corrupting’ local women both young girls and married women, and therefore encouraging prostitution.

Socialisation with South Africans

Respondents were asked if they socialise with South Africans and if not to give the reasons. At this question, only three respondents do not socialise with South Africans whereas ten do. The reasons why they don’t socialise are different; one said that South Africans are opportunists. This Somalia man said the following; ‘I don’t socialise with South Africans because if you do they take an advantage of you (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 1).

For others, they don’t socialise with South Africans because they don’t fit in. Some whites only religious communities are a legacy of the apartheid, to the extent that some time migrants find unwelcomed in those organizations. This has led migrants to self-exclusion, by join religious groups composed by people from their country of origin.

This Congolese woman expresses her experience in her church;

I have experienced a very terrible discrimination in one church here in Cape Town. We use to attend a church in Century City that was dominated by whites. Those people
didn’t want to interact with us; they didn’t want to greet us, seat with us, even touch on objects that we have touched on. Until one day when a member of that church approached us and told us that we should look for a church of Congolese. Since then we left that church and join another that was mixed with immigrants especially Congolese and South Africans called Lutheran church of South Africa.

In this church, we have one pastor from DRC. This man were being abused by the church members, he was not treated the same way as other South Africans pastors. Instead, they were using him as a gardener in their homes but when he asked them any favour they were asking him: “why are you asking that? You are a black man you don’t deserve that”. In order to eliminate us, they created a branch for us in Maitland and pushed us to go to that branch. Ironically they were telling us that “there is a Congolese branch in Maitland, all Congolese must move to that branch”. Once we started to worship in Maitland, they cut off the connection so that we do not come back to their church or ask any assistance”. (Interview: Congolese female, interviewee 10)

Even those who do socialise with South Africans do it with caution. They are not free in their enjoyments. They must know who do you socialise with, how far they must go and know when to back off. This respondent who now lives in Philippi Township said the following:

We do socialise but you have to know who do you socialise with and know your limits. I socialise especially with my church members. The church is mixed; we have Zimbabweans, Zambians, DRC, Rwandan, Coloured, Black South Africans. (Interview: Congolese male, interviewee 3)

Another Congolese who now lives in Delft Township explains his social life with South Africans:

We do socialise with South Africans, however, when you are socialising with South Africans you must behave. If you are with them you must not start chasing their women. People who compete with them against their sisters, they get attacked. This people are jealous and do not want foreigners to get involve with South Africa women. I live in Delft but my girlfriend is from Nyanga. So when they ask me where I have found my
girlfriend, I tell them that she is from other township. When you are in the location, you must not show off, otherwise they will put you down. Know how to control your feelings, if you are angry keep it into yourself. Do not try to fight with them, because they don’t joke, they kill. Respect your neighbours, the one in front, left, back, and right of your home. These are the one who will report you to other South Africans. Like the way were living in our countries, if you are a bad neighbour the community will be against you. You need to get involved in all community activities; like giving a hand to elderly people, helping wherever they need people. (Interview: Congolese male, interviewee 6)

**Facilitators**

There are two domains within the framework under the heading “facilitators”: ‘language and cultural knowledge’ and ‘safety and stability’. These represent key facilitating factors for the process of integration. Facilitators are the skills, knowledge and circumstances that can assist refugee to be active and engaged in the host society (Ager and Strang, 2008: 3).

Knowledge of local language; Respondents were asked if they speak a local language like Afrikaans, Xhosa etc. In South Africa the government doesn’t have programs aimed to teach immigrants local languages in order to facilitate their integration into the social-economic fabric, respondents made an effort to learn local languages. Among thirteen respondents, only three people don’t speak any local language. Others are regrouped into four groups; seven speak Xhosa, two speak Afrikaans, one speaks Sotho. The lack of language policy in relation to migration in South Africa has been identified by (Reitzes and Crawhall, 1997). They reveal that ‘administrative justice and state bureaucratic procedures concerning migrants and immigrants are currently not informed by an explicit, coherent language policy’. Some of reasons suggested are; ‘the weak capacity of African migrants and immigrants to advocate on their own behalf; and increasing xenophobia against, and exclusion of, African immigrants, which is partially an expression of the ambiguity of nation-building (ibid: 2).’
Involvement in local and international Africa events

Respondents were asked to reveal benefits they received from international african mega events like the 2010 World cup and to highlight their expectations in the future mega sport/cultural African events. In 2004 the then Deputy-President Jacob Zuma predicted that the tournament would not only assist in alleviating poverty, but would also eradicate stereotypes and Afro-pessimism (Desai and Vahed 2010: 155). In addition, Thabo Mbeki – then president of South Africa said:

We want, on behalf of our continent, to stage an event that will send ripples of confidence from the Cape to Cairo – an event that will create social and economic opportunities throughout Africa. We want to ensure that one day, historians will reflect upon the 2010 World Cup as a moment when Africa stood tall. We want to show that Africa’s time has come. (Republic of South Africa, n.d: 1)

Among thirteen respondents, nine didn’t get any benefit out of the 2010 Soccer World Cup. Benefits suggested by respondents are; to watch the game live that was suggested by three people and one was employed in the construction company. Regarding the expected benefits from future mega sport/cultural African events, three expectations were highlighted; to do business during future mega – sporting events, to work in infrastructures development and to enjoy the game. This view is expressed by one man who said the following: ‘The benefits that I gained from the 2010 WC are watching the game live at the stadium; and it expended my way of thinking so that I will do business in future mega-events’. (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 11)

Respondents also expressed their disappointment toward the 2010 World Cup. As other South Africans, some migrants were dreaming big before the 2010 soccer World Cup but they have been disappointed. The following quote is an illustration respondent’s comments pertaining to this issue: ‘My expectation toward the 2010 World Cup was bigger that the event itself, but it was completely business as usual’. (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 8)
However, at the end of the 2010 World Cup, instead of celebrating like others, some African immigrants experienced xenophobic attacks. This mega – event was followed by lootings of some migrants shops, some people have been killed. The following quote best represents the response given by a small business man: ‘I didn’t get any benefits from the 2010 World Cup. In fact, it was one of my bad years. When the tournament finished, my shop was looted and I got shot while my cousin brother died next to me’ (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 1).

Similarly, this respondent expressed the same feeling;

Nothing at all, in 2010, after the last whistle of the FIFA World Cup was blown, a mob swept through the township looting and destroying business. They destroyed my business and I was caught in the rampage. I lost everything and I count myself lucky to be alive. (Interview: Somali man, interviewee 7)

**What marked them to be attacked**

Question: What marks you to be excluded/attacked in the SA community?

All respondents except one have been abused. Surprisingly, the person who never been abused lives in the township. Apparently, the reason this person feels safe is because of his occupation. This respondent is a student at one college in Cape Town.

For other respondents, what marks them to be attacked or be refused their rights are the following:

a. Appearance: immigrants’ outfits can distinguish them from South African citizens. And this can mark them to be attacked by criminals;

b. Language: inability to speak local languages or speaking foreign language in the public makes some migrants to be attacked;

c. Activities: Migrants mostly small business owners are targeted by criminals. When there are service delivery protests or xenophobic attacks, migrants are the most victims. One respondent commented: ‘We live in fear of being robbed, attacked or killed in our shops or on the street’. (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 7)
d. Identification documents:

Migrants especially asylum seekers and refugees are given identification documents by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). However, those documents have features that are different of those of South African citizens. In addition, these home affairs documents are not well known in all government departments and employers. Sometime migrants are discriminated and are refused their rights because of their DHA documents. For example, this respondent was in South Africa for 13 years and in Cape Town for five years however he is still having the problem of identification documents. He said:

The permits that we are using are not known by many government entities. One day I received a registered mail that I had to go to collect at the post office. When I arrived there, I presented my Refugee Status permit which is in the “A4 format”, the post office attendant refused it saying that no where that document is being used in South Africa. He sent me to find someone who has got a South African ID or a Passport to collect the mail on my behalf. (Interview: Rwandan male, interviewee 8)

In order that they don’t be identified some immigrants adopted different strategies. Seven respondents asserted that they don’t have to do anything because they will be known anyway. Others revealed their tactics as follow; three change their appearance (covering the head, change the dressing code or their hair style) other suggested that they avoid suspicious places; others keep quiet in the public places. One man from DRC said the following:

If I don’t want to be identified, there are three things that I do: firstly, I put the cap on and pull it so that it cover my forehead so that they do not see my face. Secondly, we try to avoid our traditional types of clothes, especially our women they have to dress up like South African women; lastly, we try to keep quiet in public spaces so that they don’t recognize us by our accents. However, if they greet us we have to respond, and then they identify us. (Interview: Congolese male, interviewee 3)

Fears: Respondents were asked to highlight their current and future fears in South Africa. Among the thirteen respondents, only one has no fear for today and the future. Among those who are fearful, half of them had the fear of ‘xenophobic attacks’ against African Immigrants. Three had the fear of crime, one unsecure job, one the country’s economy that is
going down, one said that the current political realities will create political confusions in the future, and the last two said that the home affairs system makes them to fear.

As results depict, the main fear of migrants is xenophobia. Six respondents suggested it and three people highlighted that crime is a problem and it will continue to be a problem. Even though migrants are targeted by xenophobic people and criminals who want to take advantage on them, some migrants do not have other option than to live in townships. For example this Somalia expressed his fear as the following:

I am afraid for my life. Having lost almost everything and due to routine threats and harassment by South Africans, I saw myself as a foreigner who forced himself to move to predominantly Xhosa informal settlement. The future is uncertain. (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 7)

Other migrants keep an eye open to the politics and economics of South Africa. For example one Zimbabwean lady observed that the country’s economy is going down. Regarding the future of South African politics one Rwandan man Suggested that the current political realities will create political confusions in the future. It is interesting to notice that some migrants had a fear of what was going to happen after the death of Nelson Mandela. One Somalia man highlighted that in the future his fear is if Mandela goes something bad will happen to migrants especially Africans.

Xenophobia

Only five respondents confirmed that they have been direct victims of xenophobic attacks in Cape Town. However, eleven of them indicated that one of their friends or relatives has been attacked. The reason why few of respondent have been victims of xenophobia is that most of respondent live in communities that are less xenophobic. For example, all four respondents from Somalia indicated that they have been victim of xenophobia. This is because most of time during xenophobia attacks, shops are targeted and Somalia nationals are mostly doing business in areas that are affected by xenophobia. This Somali man expressed his
experience: ‘I had a shop since 2004 co-owned with my brother that was located in Delft. In 2008 xenophobic attacks on foreigners, our shop was looted and burnt down. We didn’t save anything’. (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 11)

**Causes of xenophobia according to african foreign migrants**

This section will address the findings of the research in relation to this research objectives and analyses the motives for the xenophobic attacks as understood by our respondents. Different causes were given by respondents; the one that was voiced by many respondents is jealousy. It was given by five people, job given by two, fear of being controlled by foreigners was given by two people, Lack of education given by two, hatred or strong dislike given by two people and business competition suggested by two respondents. Other variables suggested by one person each are; lack of morality, women, media, employers. We have regrouped them

As suggested by respondents ”jealousy, fear hatred, strong dislike, greediness, lack of morality, women, lack of brotherly love and lack of civil education” are key drivers of xenophobia. Jealousy; for example, some South African say; I have no shop but this one got it. How can he have a South African woman and he is a foreigner.’ (Interview: Congolese male, interview 6)

Respondents highlighted two economic variables as a cause of xenophobia. These causes are business competition and employers. Business competition happens when South African citizens accuse migrants to take their jobs and make them loose their business though business competition. Some respondent said that xenophobia is caused by interaction between immigrants especially those who operate in townships and South Africans. For example the Interviewee 1 asserts that ‘the interaction between Somalis and South Africans in townships market is the main cause of xenophobia (Somalia, male, Interviewee 1). However, a Somali spaza shop owner in Cape Town did not attribute the loss of business to immigrants. Instead, he said that it is caused by big investors who are opening shopping malls in townships.
Now day, in each township they are big shopping malls and everything is being sold there. Which means that townships dwellers will go to those malls where they will get everything in one place rather than go to local business. These lead to some citizens to sell their shops to migrants because they were no longer profitable. It is important to note that even though migrants business seems to prosper in townships, most of them are surviving. The business in township is hand to mouth operation. It is really impossible to save nowadays. (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 7)

One respondent highlighted that South African bosses prefer immigrants over citizens because they use them as “semi-slaves” since South Africans will not accept it. Companies ignore labour laws when employing african migrants. Thus while many people believe that African migrants steal jobs that are reserved for citizens, this study revealed that employers are the part of the problem of fuelling divisions.

The majority of South Africans are poor and jobless. Instead of giving them jobs, employers are hiring undocumented immigrants so that they don’t pay for them tax or give them any benefits like UIF, provident funds contribution, paid leaves, etc. I have found this in my company and mostly in the food and beverage industry and it is causing many citizens to loose their jobs. Whenever, a foreigner comes to work in our company, a South African is fired because they are afraid that he will claim his rights whereas a foreigner will work as a slave”. (Interview; Rwandan male, interviewee 13)

When locals are doing service delivery protests, migrants are often victims of violence by minority criminal elements. In these protests killing, shop looting and eviction are expected. And respondents revealed that they think local politicians are behind that. According to one Somali respondent, ‘Some local leaders with bad intentions influence the masses hence causing unrest and looting the properties of Africans immigrants’ (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 1).

Media also is another channel that anti-migrants use to propagate their xenophobic agendas. According to our respondent, media reporting in Cape Town is biased since it report only the bad news and never consider the good deeds of African migrants of Cape Town.
In my opinion media reporting does add somewhat to that growing anger because what it reports is more around the negative things and that is what sticks in people’s mind. Generally, the atmosphere among South Africans is that they are sceptical of foreigners. The stereotypes of foreigners being corrupt and dangerous is what?... I blame the media for perpetuating these stereotypes because the systematic negative portrayal of foreigners contributes to the culture of intolerance. (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 7).

**Suggested solutions to the xenophobia**

Question: In your opinion what can be done to improve the perception of South African community toward African immigrants? Respondents suggested three possible solutions that may curb the xenophobia. According to our respondents is the South African Government that can stop xenophobia. Ten respondents suggested the government should do public education about immigrants and xenophobia. Two respondents suggested that the government should intervene in stopping the xenophobia attacks.

**Government intervention**

Our respondents emphasised that South African government has the power to predict and stop xenophobia attack before it occurs. They suggested that the government should create a forum where both migrants and citizens can meet and express their views regarding xenophobia.

“Government must intervene to install rules and laws that will curb the xenophobia”. (Interview: Zimbabwean female, interviewee 5);

“The government should create some television or radio programmes where both immigrants and citizens may exchange their experiences and feelings”. (Interview: Rwandan male, interview 8)
“Government must put pressure on employers so that they hire people with valid papers. In addition, wages must be standardised so that there is no discrimination between employees”. (Interview: Rwandan male, interviewee 13)

“To educate them about having respect toward others and having good manners. This must be done from children to the elders. They must know what is good and bad. They must know also that we are all brothers”. (Interview: Congolese male, interviewee 3)

“Educate them about the right of immigrants to reduce jealousy”. (Interview: Congolese male, interviewee 6).

Others respondents suggested that Local people must be told to change their perception toward other African brothers. Some respondents think that South Africans don’t know what is happening in other African countries so that they can know why migrants are here.

“South Africans should be told the reason why immigrants are here then maybe something will be done”. (Interview: Congolese female, interviewee 10)

“South African people don’t know more about their African brothers, so they need to be educated”. (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 1)

“To educate them about issues that are happening in other countries, remind them that we too helped them during apartheid period”. (Interview: Rwandan female, interviewee 9)

One respondent suggested that migrants have a part to play in reducing xenophobia attack on them. Some migrants go to install their business in dangerous places and create competition between them and citizens. Interviewee 4 suggests that they should reduce that competition

To reduce xenophobia, we immigrants must recognize that we exaggerate our rights. Therefore, we must minimize the competition we are engaging in. You find an immigrant having a shop in a remote area or in a deep location/township. This creates unnecessary tension with local business people and stir up the xenophobia attacks on them. (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 4)
Respondents were asked if they belong to any clubs or a church or any organisation or organised activity. This study found that the majority (eight people) of respondents belong to religious organizations.

While one belongs to the Somali Association of South Africa (SASA), and four do not belong to any kind of organization. According to Portes et al, (2007/2008) and SPCO (2010), migrants organization (or groups) play a capital role in helping immigrants to respond to integration challenges. SPCO, (2010: 9) assert that:

...These groups provide important services to families in terms of orientation, information, accompaniment, and appropriate cultural supports. They often serve as a link – or bridge – between community members and the traditional (mainstream or larger) services. Many organize recreational and cultural activities.

Portes et al, (2008:1058) reveal that ‘ethnic political organization has been the requisite first step of incorporation, as immigrants and their offspring learned to become Americans by first being ‘ethnics’’.

**Foundations**

Foundations are defined as the principles that a refugee expect from the host country and the members. These principles are includes the rights that refugee are given by state and the obligation of citizens (Ager and Strang, 2008). This section discusses the treatment respondents receive at work, private or public places, shops and restaurants, commercial transactions, police/home affairs.

**Treatment at work place:** On the question regarding the treatment they get to their working place, only five receives a bad treatment whereas eight fair treatment. Those who receive bad treatments at their working places are done by both employers and other staffs. The following are example of bad treatment given by a Zimbabwean woman respondent.

   My employer abuses me by not paying my salary on time. My boss is a Pakistani, but he doesn’t pay me nice, saying that there is no money that the business is slowing down”.

   (Interview: Zimbabwean female, interviewee 5)
Similarly, this Rwandan man was badly treated when it comes to payment.

They take advantage on us. Our documents make us vulnerable. We cannot claim our rights. For example, if we work for the same company the same task we are expected to get the same salary. However, our company pay us in categories; whites’ people get more money, coloured more than us and black SA, more than us too. (Interview: Rwandan male, interviewee 13)

A Somalian man had a bad treatment at work but for him the colleagues are a problem: ‘I am ostracized by South Africans Colleagues and in some cases I am insulted. Most of time they speak bad thing about me in their local languages, but they don’t know that I can hear their language too’. (Interview: Somalia man, interviewee 7)

The self-employed also get bad treatment from the police. Law Enforcement police treat migrants poorly even if they have the permit to trade. A Somalian street trader in Bellville said the following:

I have got a problem at my working place with Law enforcement Police. In fact the police don’t treat equally immigrants and South Africans street traders. When they come to your stand looking for the business permit, they don’t give you time as they give it to our colleagues South Africans. For example; if they find that you have left it at home or in the car, they don’t let you go to get it. Instead, they collect your staffs and give you a fine, and tell you to come to the police office to collect your goods. When you go to pay the fine and collect your goods you find nothing and there is no one who is responsible for that. (Interview: Somali male, interviewee 11)

**Private life and public arenas**

Five respondents indicated that the treatment that they receive in public and private arenas is good whereas eight receive a bad treatment. Those who receive a bad treatment indicated that some time South Africans insult them, treat them as foreigners, discriminate them, or take advantage over them. This respondent from Burundi expressed her complain about her landlord;
I am sharing a house with the owner of the house but my landlord is a problematic to my family. When he is sober, he is a cool man but at the end of the month when we have paid him money for rent, then troubles start. He complains for everything; the way we cook, the way we clean, the way we treat our kids. He doesn’t respect us; he swears to us and says all xenophobic statements like: “we left our countries to come to take advantages”, whereas him he doesn’t want to work and when we work hard he become jealous. He doesn’t like our visitors since they are mostly people from my country. He always complains that his property has become like the Home Affairs office. And he threatens us to leave his property. (Interview: Burundian female, interviewee 12)

Some neighbours violate migrant’s privacy. This Rwandan man told us that his neighbour is a problem to his safety.

Our neighbours treat us like nothing; they think we don’t know any law. Our neighbours have a restaurant but he let the dirty water from the kitchen to run in front of our house. If we ask him he treat us like useless. I reported the instance two times; once to the police, then to the municipality but they did nothing. I think it is because I am a foreigner. (Interview: Rwandan man, interviewee 13)

**Shops and restaurants**

Beside two respondents who said that they receive a bad treatment in shops and restaurant, other eleven receive a good treatment. For those who receive the bad treatment, they complained that the shop assistants don’t assist them accordingly. Instead they stare at them. An Ethiopian respondent said that: ‘They don’t serve equally; they don’t serve me nice while they serve other South African nice. This is because they are full of hatred, without respecting me’. (Interview: Ethiopian male, interviewee 2)

Among all respondents, seven indicated that they receive a bad treatment, whereas others receive a good service at banks. Respondents indicated that most problems they get with banks are opening bank accounts in Cape Town commercial banks. Those who got bank accounts, are asked to go back to the DHA to ask for verification every time they bring an extended paper, otherwise their accounts would be frozen.
When I wanted to open a bank account with First National Bank (FNB), the bank told me that they do not accept Asylum seekers permits, that they accept only refugees IDs, Proof of residence written in my name. They sent me up and down until the time they told me to bring an ID of someone else and her/his shopping card. I brought my sister’s documents since she have a South African ID and my employment letter. After the submission of all this documents, they sent me back to the Department of Home Affairs to verify if my documents are valid. I went to the DHA to ask for the verification and the DHA faxed my documents to the Bank then I received my first bank account. Even though I received it, the process took me all together 2 years. The fact that I didn’t have a bank account caused me a lot of problems; for example, I lost one job because one of conditions was that each employee had to have a bank account written in his/her name. (Interview: Congolese male, interviewee 3)

Another respondent complained about banks service to African immigrants:

“The time you put your money in a bank, they do not ask you papers. But the time you need your money they question the validity of your papers and send you to the DHA for verification. One day I went to renew my bank card, they sent me to the DHA to ask the office to verify if my papers are valid. I refused to go since I was sure that my papers were in order. In addition, I have been submitting my papers every time they were being renewed. That time I became made and claimed my rights. Then the bank manager came and authorised the extension of my bank card”. (Interview: Congolese male, interviewee 6)

A Somali national expressed also the same concern: ‘I have a big problem with FNB. They ask me to verify the validity of my paper many times, while I submit a copy of my refugee status every time it is extended’. (Interview: Somalia male, interviewee 11)

Because of difficulties in opening bank accounts, agents took opportunities. These agents work under a bank however, the responsibility is limited to them.

Bank is a problem. I couldn’t open a bank account in a recognised bank. I was forced to open an account in an agent that work under Absa Bank that is called “Wizzit Bank”. This bank doesn’t give complications, what you have to pay is R99.99 and a copy of any identification document that you may have. However, I do not feel safe of my money. They take long in putting my wage into my account, and they suspend my account every
time my refugee permit is expired even if I was with that bank for more than 2 years. My other concern is that this agent doesn’t have a physical office. I have only their cell phone number. (Interview: Burundian female, interviewee 12)

**Home Affairs and Police**

On this question of home affairs and police all respondents indicated to have had a bad treatment. Some police officers don’t respect migrants even when they have valid papers. Some migrants are arrested or deported while they have their home affairs documents. The police station is the worse. The respondent from Ethiopia went to the police but instead of helping him they gave him a hard time: ‘One day I went to the police for help, they told me that I am a foreigner and they didn’t respect me’ (Interview: Ethiopian male, Interviewee 2).

Similarly, this man from Rwanda experienced the same treatment;

“Maybe the police officer have another briefing which the communities (local or outsiders) don’t know, because it is annoying to see how about 20 to 30% of them operate. Generally many of them are doing a good work, because that particular job is challenging. Personally I was arrested two times by a group of police in Johannesburg while I was having my papers with me, because I didn’t want to bail myself (which is to give them some money). (Interview: Rwandan male, interviewee 8)

Even some traffic officers don’t treat migrants as South Africans;

During December, I was involved in a car accident with a woman, and it was her mistake. The women called her husband who is a police. He came and started to intimidate me, saying that all foreigners don’t have valid documents. In fact, when they see a foreigner the think he doesn’t have a valid document. (Interview: Rwandan male, interviewee 13)

Home Affairs is a problem for all migrants. All respondents experienced a bad treatment at this office. Here some example of bad experiences of our respondents;

After I was granted an asylum seekers permit, I applied for the refugees status. Instead of getting it, my permit was being extended for few months only. From 2002 when I received my first permit until 2006 when I went through the interview and received a
refugees status. My wife joined me in 2007, and this time the DHA office was in Nyanga township, a place that was not safe for refugees. She went to declare herself and got an asylum seeker permit. Because of crime that was happening on refugees at Nyanga Home Affairs office, she was scared to go there then she spent 7 months without going to the DHA to apply for extension of her permit. After 7 months we went to the DHA for extension of her permit. Arrived there the DHA officer withdrew her permit and said she must pay R2500. And they told us to pay the money to the court. When we arrived at the court, we asked about our case. Surprisingly, we were not on the list of people that their case had to be treated. They sent us up and down to check in different records but my wife’s name was not there. Then the court sent us back to the DHA to ask them to send my wife’s name to the court. When we went to the court again, our names were not still available. Then the court asked us what the matter was, we explained what the problem was. The court decided to dismiss the case and gave us a court order saying that the DHA must give back my wife her permit valid of 6 months. We continued in having different documents due to the lack of information regarding family joining procedures. It is only in 2010 when one DHA officer advised my wife that if we have a marriage certificate she could join me. Since them my wife has a Refugees status like me. (Interview: Congolese male, interviewee 3)

The situation at the DHA is horrible. Starting from the security to the DHA officers, there is no respect toward refugees. They can push you wherever they want, they can swear to you. In fact, the DHA, police, and banks, these are three places that make me feeling that I am a foreigner. These institutions make you feel like nothing. Some time police take your papers and say that it is fake. At Home Affairs they treat you as nothing, at the bank, they Lough at you when you are depositing your money”. (Interview: Congolese male, interviewee 4)

This respondent reveals the perception of the DHA’s employees toward African immigrants;

The employees of Home Affairs have fear that maybe one day foreigner will control their system. That is why, especially the blacks, they make life difficult to their fellow Africans, and they make procedures easy to the Asians foreigners, which become more amazing to me. They are not following the procedures properly, they take the work personal than professional, still some of them are very good employees. (Interview: Rwandan male, interviewee 8)
The loss of asylum seekers’ files is another issue. The Standing Committee for Refugees Affairs (SCRA) also has been accused of not treating the asylum seekers’ with care and delay in processing applications for permanent residences applications. This Somalis told us the following;

I first applied for permanent residence in 2010. When I went to check for my application at the standing committee office which is in Pretoria, they told me that my file was lost. They advised me to re-apply. I applied again in December 2011 but until now (2013) I didn’t receive even a notification that they have received my application for permanent residence. (Interview: Somalia male, interviewee 11)

Family joining is another problem. There are some couples who have different files, especially those asylum seekers who got married to other asylum seekers. A Burundian respondent expressed her bad treatment;

My husband has got a refugees status and I am still on a temporary permit. The home affairs have refused to join us so that I can have a refugee’s status too. Whenever we ask for family joining they refuse telling me that I must undergo an interview process. This process is taking long, since I have been here since 2010 and I didn’t get a chance to undergo an interview that will give me the chance to have a refugees’ status”. (Interview: Burundian Female, interviewee 12)

Those with visa also get problems when it comes to renewing them;

“The requirements to get a South African visa for Zimbabwean are too high. You must show a proof of the bank account with a lot of money. In addition, if you go to the hospital they charge you as a foreigner, and many Zimbabwean in Cape Town cannot afford. If you want to study, you must apply for a study permit. Using this permit it is expensive since you are treated as international and must pay medical aid, etc”. (Interview: Zimbabwean female interviewee 5)
Permanent residence holders have many problems also. In order that an asylum seeker is eligible to apply for a permanent residence, the Refugees Act 1998 stipulates that he must have the section 24 for five years. However when they have got it, it is not the end of journey. Instead is a beginning of hardship and endless troubles. This Rwandan man expresses his discontentment in regard to the service at the Home affairs for refugees:

Home affairs; this is the worse department in the world. I am 13 yrs in this country, and I have a refugee’s status (section 24) since 2002. After 8 years I applied at the standing committee for the section 27 (C): the under bridge certificate that certify that I will be a refugee indefinitely. I got it after one year. Then I applied for Permanent residence and it took me five months to get it. I applied for the ID, it took me one year then I applied for a passport I got it after 4 days. When I got married, they said that my wife had to wait for 5 years to be joined at me. Because we had no choice, we waited for those five years. At the end of 5 years we submitted our application and it took 2 years for her to get the permanent residence. My two sons were all born in Cape Town, RSA. However, when I went to apply for their birth certificate for the first child it came after 8 months and for the second it came when he was 3 years while I applied for it when he was 2 days old. Surprisingly, those BC came without ID numbers whereas all kids had permanent residences. When my son went in Grade1, the school requested an ID number in order to be registered. When I went to the HA to apply for it they complicated me. They said that I must first apply for “the verification for the permanent Residence’. When it came they asked me to apply for ‘the proof of PR application’, and they told me that it will take me at least one year, then I will be able to apply for ID for my kids, after that I will be able to apply for their passports. Two weeks ago, I met a supervisor at DHA, asked him to give me an advice on how my kids can get papers quickly. He told me that if I want them to get passport, I must bring passport from my country to the HA, they will put in permanent residence. My problem is that I am a refugee and my kids are born here. How can we go to our country’s embassy? Now we cannot travel, me and my wife we have passports but our kid don’t have. Citizenship: I went to apply for citizenship; they said that I had to wait for five years then I will start to apply. Another surprising fact is that, there is no single procedure in regards to refugees papers; you ask one officer a question, he/she gives you an answer. If you ask the same question to another officer, he gives you another answer. My observation is that the DHA want to discourage us in making the process of getting documents very complicated. You can spend the entire life looking for
papers. I have spent a lot of money on this process and I have risked losing my job because of taking many day-off”. (Interview: Rwandan male, interviewee 13)

The Home Affairs documents are used also to exclude immigrants from having access to the government’s social grants. For example the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) accepts refugees (section 24) only and refuse applications of those who their asylum seeking application are still pending or rejected (section 22).

“Normally all poor immigrants deserve a grant from SASSA but South Africa chose to give only asylum seekers with section 24 and leave out those asylum seekers with section 22. However, those left out are the one who need grant really because they are new in the country and most of them they are struggling financially”. (Interview: Burundi female 12)

Conclusion

In this chapter I discussed the experience of African immigrants in the CoCT. I focused mainly on their day to day experience in their endeavours to negotiate space in the city’s social and economic dynamics. I discussed the views of key informants. I analysed their efforts in integrating in the local community focussing on knowing of local languages, involvement into local events, their perception toward their safety their fear and the xenophobia. The last section I probed the treatments they receive when exercising their rights. Their experience at their workplaces, private life, public arenas like shops and restaurants, commercial transactions like banks, police and Home Affairs were discussed in detail. The next chapter unpacks life stories of four informants selected from 13 respondents of this study.
Chapter Seven: life stories of four African immigrants

Introduction

This chapter discusses life stories of immigrants and the underlying patterns of development, growth, and change in individuals' lives (Freedman, Thornton, Camburn, Alwin, Young-DeMarco, 1988: 38). To address the context and be truly qualitative I chose life stories as a data collection method. Carling (2012: 137) asserts that:

‘migration’ is often thought of as an aggregate flow of people from A to B. However, each individual in that flow has followed their own individual trajectory in time and space – possibly a rather complex one. Whether we are compiling information on a large number of people or trying to understand the experiences of a small group, we need to approach and digest those individual trajectories.

However, it is important to understand the push factors and the context of receptions since they determine the migrants’ integration in the host nation. Portes et al, 2008 assert that migrant’s context of exit and reception may affect, in turn, their patterns of societal incorporation.

This chapter documents the life stories of four of my informants; two Somalian, one Ethiopian and one Rwandan. I discuss the reasons that prompted them to leave their home countries, the complexity of the journeys and the reception they received on arrival, as well as challenges to integrate in South Africa. It seeks to provide more detailed ideas to reinforce the previous chapter. It also sets up the next chapter (8) where I look at organisations of African migrants.

1. Muhamed Ahmed Akdi

Muhamed Ahmed Akdi was born in Kismayo, Somalia on the 25th of July 1980. His father was a teacher of the holy Qu’ran and the Islamic education while his mother was a housewife even though she was his best first teacher. The time he was born, his country was at its
peak in term of political, economic and social situations. Somalia was one of top leading countries in Africa. In addition he was born during the cold war and both Somalis and Ethiopia were allied to Russia which was leading the communist bloc.

**The war in Somalia**

Muhamed was born at the end of the Somalia / Ethiopian war in which Ogaden region of Ethiopia was seeking cession. According to Muhamed, this region was part of Somalia and it is inhabited by Somali people and it was annexed to Ethiopia in 1954 by Great Britain. After several months of fighting, Somalia controlled all the area of Ogaden including Harar, which is only 300km, the east of Adis Ababa. The Warsaw pact countries, by the leadership of Russia intervened and they sent troops to Ethiopian to push the Somalis army back. Eventually, the Somali soldiers were pushed back to the boundary and the government was diplomatically forced to sign a peace treaty with Ethiopia. This caused a lot of frustrations to nationalists, in addition to this there was dictatorship, nepotism, tribalism, corruption and of course the interference of Ethiopia and Kenya by supporting the rebels which were based on tribalism and power hungry. The first rebel group was Somali salvation democratic front (SSDF) under the leadership of Abdulah Yusuf, whose base was in Ethiopia. Other rebel groups were Somali National Movement (SNM), United Somali Congress (USC) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). At last they overthrew the Siyad Bare regime and that is why Somali went into a new era of brutal war of 1991. In addition, all these rebels groups were supported and equipped by Ethiopia.

Fortunately, no member of his family was killed but they were internally displaced. By the help of God in 1995 they managed to run away from the danger. When the respondent was fleeing, he passed through Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique. In these countries, he received different treatments but the worst was Tanzania because in that country, everybody is a spy and they like to rob travellers.

There is no easy journey, in these countries I suffered a lot, the worst thing was the hunger and the fear because you don’t know anything about these countries you are passing in. Everything is suspicious.
Life in South Africa

Muhamed entered this country on 22nd August 2005, but what he expected is not what he received. The first challenge he made was getting the Home Affairs papers:

When I went to the Port Elizabeth Refugees reception office to apply for asylum, I found the queue very long. What was worse, only few people were being helped. The situation was complicated by irregularity in DHA operations, corruption the lack of facilities. Because I refused to pay bribe so that I could be let in the HA office, I spent 20 days laying on the door of the office.

Once he got his official paper to live in South Africa, the next step was to find the means of living. He tried to look for a job and make money so that he could fulfil his dreams:

When I came to South Africa, I was expecting to get a nice job save money and go to an overseas country. However, starting a life in a country which I don’t know much about it was always a challenging but eventually I managed to open a spaza shop to support myself at MABUYESE EZBELENI QUEESTOWN EASTERN CAPE, because that was the only means of survival.

This choice of activities made him a target for criminals. Mohamed, has been attacked physically three times in South Africa. The first attack happened two years after his arrival in this country. It was 7:30 pm on Saturday 04/08/2007 when two men entered the shop asking him for some cigarettes but suddenly they fired bullets at him and two of his colleagues. The other person was Adam an extended family relative who was their first target. As soon as everybody was shocked and got into panic, Muhamed felt traumatised as everything was taken from his shop. One of the robbers came toward him and pointed a gun at him mercilessly saying that he will kill him. He didn’t waste time to shoot him aiming at his head but luckily he survived. He later realised he was wounded.

The police managed to arrest the criminals with all the evidence such as Muhamed’s cell phone which was given back to him latterly, some money, and some bullets. Unfortunately with all these exhibits, they were granted bail and got released. But the turning point was when they came straight to Muhamed at the same shop with confidence threatening him that
if he came to the court they will assassinate him. When he went to the police they took it easy and nothing was suggested to him, after a few days, his docket was frozen and the detective who was handling his case was replaced to an unknown place.

**Life in Cape Town**

Because these criminals were continuously frightening him he decided to close that shop and run to another city. From Queenstown he preferred to move to the Western Cape where he arrived in November 2009 expecting to get another job that is safer than the previous one. Because of difficulties in getting a job, he once again took the risk to open a shop in a township.

When I arrived in Cape Town I tried to look for a job in other sectors but I couldn’t get it. Since I needed to survive the only option that I remained with was to open my own shop again, which I did at a place named Zwelitsha Drive in Nyanga with my cousin Abdullahi Mohamed Ali.

The second attack was in July 11\(^{th}\) 2010 just before the final match of the World Cup, when a group of people attacked them after breaking into the house from all directions. Muhamed and his cousin called the police and arrived when they were hiding in the room next to the shop. Fortunately the cops saved them with some of their big stuff like fridges, drinks, etc, which looters couldn’t take. After this incident, Muhamed was forced to close his shop and looked for a job in a safe area. The job that he got, was working in a shop of a Somalia person in Mitchell’s plain. However, the criminal activities that he fled from in Nyanga followed him. It was 5 pm on Saturday; 30/09/2013 at Harmony Square Town Centre Mitchell’s Plain when 3 guys attacked them. When Muhamed tried to escape and run away, one of them started hitting him. He tried to defend himself but he was helpless because the other two joined and they hit him together. One of them took a knife and stabbed him at the right arm. While they were being beaten, two police men came and saved them. However, instead of arresting the culprits, they let them leave and advised Muhamed to open a case. Before these gangsters left, they warned Muhamed that next-time when they come they will finish him. He went to the police station and the case was issued.

As a result of these incidences, Muhamed is now traumatised and feels fearful for people who look like those who attacked him.
……. sometime I run away from normal people thinking that they are hunting me. That kind of filling happened on me three times then I decided to visit the trauma centre in Cape Town. Whenever I see someone who looks like the one who shot me I feel fear, unsafe and helpless.

Muhammed is now the head of a family with one child. He likes praying to Allah at any nearest Mosque and helps the Somali community as an activist. Whenever he can, he also goes for city sightseeing in different corners of Cape Town. His plan for the future is to return to his country when it is stable.

2 Meyene Samiru
Mr. Samiru was born in 1981, in the province of Hawassa, Ethiopia. His father was a trader, he used to buy clothes from Addis Ababa and sell them to Hawassa and other neighbouring regions. His mother was a house wife. ‘I was born in a big family, we were seven children and that was a big job for my mother, she didn’t need to do another job’.

The War in Ethiopia
When he was born, it was during the cold war era and his country was controlled by Communist regimes which shifted the equipment, organization and doctrines away from Western Europe and Americans influences towards those of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, especially Cuba. The ruling political party in the country was Derg (a committee) led by Coronel Mengistu Hailemariyam from 1974 until 1991. Since Derg took power, the country went to war with a rebel group named the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) led by Meles Zenawe. When he won the war in 1991, he made a new political party that represented all different ethnic groups that is, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Samiru’s birth was during this war that claimed more than 80 000 lives.

Ever since EPRDF took the power, Ethiopia didn’t have another war inside its territory, the country has had another war with Eritrea and the regime was dictatorship. When the EPRDF
won the war in 1991, Eritrea which was part of Ethiopia was granted the independence. However, Ethiopia and Eritrea were not good neighbours because from 1998 to 2000 they went to war fighting for a strip of land that borders both countries and around 80000 people were killed.

Secondly, the new regime was also dictatorship and thus silenced all opposition parties and killed systematically some opposition leaders. In his country, he was a supporter of an opposition party named Coalition for Unit and Democracy (CUD). During the 2005 elections, CUD overtook the ruling party in many areas including Adis Abeb, Hawassa, and others provinces. However, the ruling EPRDF cheated the process and won the elections. Because of disappointment, CUD members protested peacefully against this election asking that it must be reviewed. Instead of considering their request, the government arrested many of them. Among the arrested, Samiru was one of them.

We were taken to a secret prison where we were held for 4 months. In that prison, we were tortured, mistreated, and bitten by poisonous spiders that caused many of us to die. It was difficult to escape and I have a fear of being killed since many of my colleagues died in my sight. By chance we managed to break a window and since then I started to run away toward the Kenyan boarder and finally I left my country.

**The journey to South Africa**

When he was coming to South Africa, he passed through Kenya-Tanzania-Malawi-Mozambique and South Africa. In these countries he experienced a lot of troubles but none worse than Tanzania.

I was arrested in Tanzania and sent to the jail where I was tortured and mistreated. We were being given a heavy but unnecessary job in order to make us suffer. For example, they gave me a big stone and I was asked to break it. Food also was not enough; we were being given only 2 pieces of bread. In fact, it is by chance that I survived in that prison.

He arrested and jailed for 3 months and was released because his brother who was in Johannesburg paid money to a broker who negotiated for his release and Samiru was given
48 hours to leave the country. In Mozambique he faced the problem of hunger, eating once a day was by chance.

In December 2006 he crossed the border of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) heading to Johannesburg. In the minibus coming to his destination, the police stopped them. However, this time the police’s intention was not to arrest them but they were looking for money.

The police searched everywhere in the car and searched every passenger but when they arrived at me they asked if I had some US dollars. I said I don’t have any cent, the police was very angry and kicked my bums with his boot and left me.

Life in South Africa

When Samiru arrived in Johannesburg, he was received by people from his country who helped him to integrate in the new life. They bought him clothes, shoes, gave him pocket money, and took him to different recreations places to heal him psychologically.

As any refugee in South Africa, he needed to find work in order to survive and since there are no refugee camps where people can get accommodation and food for free. For his first job he was employed by his country man for six months as a sales person. The money that he saved from job helped him to start his own business. The business that came in his mind was his father’s business style which was buying and selling goods. He started with selling goods door to door, selling blankets, bed covers, sheets, shoes for men and women, pots, etc. In this job he managed to cover the cost of living and even his business grown considerably. However, this business caused also many problems to the extent that he was attacked twice.

The first time it was in 2008 in Swellendam, 200 km from Cape Town. Because he is a friendly guy, his clients liked him. There was one particular woman who treated him well every time he was supplying goods or collecting his money. This created jealousy on the side of her husband and suspected that he was having an affair with his wife. One day he went to collect his money then the husband slapped his cheek and wanted to kill him. Samiru ran away and left his money and goods there to save himself.
The second time it was in 2009; when he was attacked by a client who was owing him R400 and he didn’t want to pay back.

When I asked this particular client my money, or give me back my goods, he went in the house and brought a knife to stab me. In order that I protect myself, I tried to hold his hand. Instead of holding it, I held the sharpen side of the knife. That client pulled the knife and it almost cut two of my fingers. I was taken to the Worcester hospital where they treated him. Thank God my fingers survived.

Beside these bad incidents, life has to go on. Every Sunday Samiru goes to a church dominated by Ethiopians citizens called Ebenezer church, Belleville branch. His hobbies are reading his Bible, listening to the music and having his drink. He managed also to open another shop in a place called Robertson in the Western Cape. His plan for the future is to get married and have a big family.

3 Mohamed Abdillahi Afdikher

Mr. Afdikher was born on 10th October 1986, in Buale district, Middle Shabelle Province, in Somalia. That time his country was stable politically and there was no war. His father was a teacher of Islamic education, and his mother was working as a social worker, specifically taking care for unprivileged children. Two years after his birth, the war started in his country of overthrowing the then government. The war was between the then President Siyad Bare’s regime and General Muhamed Farah Aideed. However, none of them won this war because president Siyad fled the country and went to Nigeria while Muhamed was killed by one of his general. From 1991 up today, Somalia has had no stable government; instead it is controlled by different war lords. This war has destroyed the economy of the country and forced many Somalis to flee the country including Afdikher’s family. In 1988, his family fled to Kenya and duelled in North Eastern Kenya named the Northern Frontier district (NFD) where only Somalia stays. This region was part of Somalia, but at the independence. It was cut off and was annexed to Kenya by the British.
In Kenya Afdikher’s family lived peacefully to the extent that he started his schoolings. Then in 2003, things became tough in the NFD.

In the beginning our life in Kenya was ok because we were living with other Kenyan Somalians and I managed to go to school that I finished at O level. However, things changed since 2003. The region was affected by the drought, lack of opportunities of people from NFD in the Kenya’s economic setting and the Kenyan Government brutality and harshness towards Somalia people.

The journey to South Africa
Because he was not feeling safe in Kenya Afdikher decided to continue his migration journey, but this time he left his family behind and went to South Africa. In this journey, he transited trough Tanzania and Mozambique. In these countries, the treatment was not bad besides that the journey was quite long:

It took me almost 5 months to South Africa and it was hectic. The journey was worsened also by fact that I didn’t have a travel document. I have been asked the travel documents by the police many times and because I didn’t have them, I had to keep hiding to avoid police’s interrogation. To enter South Africa I had to jump the border from Mozambique side, because he did not have any entry permit.

The life in South Africa
When he entered the country, Afdikher was shocked by finding that South Africa is a very difficult country to live in. He realised that the country doesn’t treat foreigners as other countries he passed through do.

In Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has established refugees camps for people who are fleeing different conflicts in Africa. I was expecting to get a place like that in South Africa. To survive in this complicated country, I was welcomed by immigrants especially people from my country. They offered me accommodation, food, clothes, other basic needs.

The first place where he lived was in Johannesburg, Mayfair in a restaurant of a Somali business man and he rested there for 3 days. After that he went to Mpumalanga looking for a
job but he couldn’t find it. He managed to get his first job in Free State as a shop keeper in one Somalia’s business and stayed there for two months.

**Life in Cape Town and Surrounding areas**

Because he didn’t have any valid paper and the job in Free State was not good, in 2004 Afdikher moved to Cape Town. The first thing he did was to go to Cape Town Refugees Reception Office to declare himself as an asylum seeker. He received his first asylum seekers permit on 13\textsuperscript{th} December 2004 and he was recognised officially as a refugee one year later. His life in Cape Town was characterised by “top of the mountain and low valley” experiences:

I have had a good time in Cape Town; I managed to open my own business and was able to take care of my family back in Kenya. However, I have had a bad experience also. I lost my business I have been attacked many times at my work in township, but the deadly ones are three.

In Cape Town, his first job was to be a shopkeeper in Khayelitsha township. After only one month while he was at work, the shop was invaded by a group of thieves who hit him with the bat of the gun to his head and he became unconscious for few minutes. When he regained, he found himself in a pool of blood. As a result of that attack they closed that shop and Afdikher was left jobless. However, because he had no other job and his area of expertise was in doing business, in 2006 he started another shop with his cousin in the same township and ran it until 2007. This business was profitable to the extent that he saved money and went to visit his family members who lived in Kenya.

In September 2009, he opened another shop in a township called Delft. His business flourished very well but in 2010 troubles started again. On the 26\textsuperscript{th} October 2010 around 6:45 PM, while they were in the shop, they were attacked by 3 black men. Afdikher was shot with two bullets, one hit him on his right arm, the other one on his right chest and it went through and hit his cousin standing next to him and he died instantly. They came in and took
the money and other goods that they could take. Since that time, Afdikher gave up on having business and went to look for another job.

The third attack, Afdikher was working with a big wholesaler as a sales representative. They had a routine of going out once every end of month visiting clients. On the 14\textsuperscript{th} Feb 2013 while driving at the township to drop some leaflets at different shops, two gunmen stood on their way and started shooting at their car. Afdikher was shot in his left foot; fortunately no one was killed in that incident.

Even though he has been through all of these troubles, he still has hope of a better future. His wish is to be a human rights lawyer that is why he is doing a short-course at ENS Africa based in Mitchell’s Plain where he is following “constitutional law and human rights”. During the day he works as an interpreter at Cape Town Refugees Reception Centre where he is helping his fellow Somali asylum seekers when their refugee applications are being processed. His hobby is to pray at any closest Mosques whenever the prayer time comes. He also likes reading books and watching sport programs especially soccer.

\textbf{4 Aves Mahirwe}

Mr. Aves Mahirwe was born on 2\textsuperscript{nd} January, 1978, in the province of Gisenyi, district of Rubavu. His father was a business man who specialized in selling imported beverages like whisky and local produced beverages. He was buying beers from a local brewery named BRALIRWA in bulk and distributed in his area to retailers. His father had also his own factory of traditional beers made of bananas (“Urwagwa” in local language). His mother was a house wife, looking after his siblings.

The time he was born, his country was at peace and was ruled by one political party named National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) led by President Habyalimana Juvenal. In the world the news was Apartheid in South Africa.
The War in Rwanda

The war in Rwanda started in 1990, that time Mr. Mahirwe was in 5th year primary school. “From that time the country was changed, we were hearing that rebels have attacked different places, we started to see soldiers everywhere, we started to hear on radio news about the war and at school they started to teach us about races…the country changed totally”. According to Mahirwe, the war was caused by the conflict between two ethnic groups ‘Hutus’ and ‘Tutsis’. The then government was ruled by Hutus and they were Tutsis who fled the country since 1959 during the struggle for the independence and they wanted to come back. However, the Habyalimana government was saying that the country is full and there is no more space for other people. Finally, those people who wanted to come formed a rebel group called Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and came in the country by force.

This war affected Mahirwe’s family to the extent that his brother who was in the government army was killed and their business was looted by angry government soldiers who were protesting against unpleasant treatments. Eventually, the war progressed until the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels led by Kagame Paul occupied the country’s capital named Kigali then the whole country. As those rebels were progressing in controlling the whole country, many people were fleeing the country toward neighbouring countries. This war ended in April 1994 killed more than 800 000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus according to figures published by the Rwandan Government.

In June 1994, Mahirwe’s parents decided also to leave the country and sought refuge in the Eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the city of Goma. This was made easy by the fact that his father had already houses in that city. Mahirwe lived in the east of DRC for 3 years and came back in his country 1997.

When he arrived in Rwanda, he didn’t have peace since the war started again that was caused by a rebel group that was tagged ‘Abacengezi’. During this war, he lost his parents and his brother.
Things became worse and my life was in danger; the government was forcing young people to join the army, many innocent people were being killed others sent to prisons. It was dangerous to live in my village and nobody was allowed to move. In addition, because the north region (Gisenyi and Ruhengeri) is where the former president Habyalimana was born, people from this region were discriminated in the country and were suspected to support this rebellion because it was composed mainly by ex-soldiers of Habyalimana regime and they attacked from our region the North of the country. That is why I decided to leave my country in 2001.

The journey
In general, the journey is not easy, it is a struggle especially when you are running away of your country and you don’t have a valid travel document, it became very tough”.

When he was fleeing, he passed through Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique. In those countries, he received bad treatments but the worst was in Tanzania and Mozambique:

You cannot cross any border unless you pay money. For example Tanzania is a most corrupted country to the extent that even if you have visa you still pay. In Mozambique it was worse, because if they see that you don’t speak their language then they attack you. Any move you do you must pay money. To enter SA it was very simple, it was only to pay money to the police and enter.”

Life in South Africa

When he entered in South Africa, the first city that welcomed him was Durban. After one day he came to Cape Town because his relatives were there. In Cape Town he was received by his brother, who negotiated for him an accommodation in a granny flat in Constantia.

Life in Cape Town
In Cape Town he was received by his relatives who helped him to start the new life in South Africa. However, he didn’t get a warm welcome from people who come from his country because they associated him with the current Rwandan government.
The reception from my countrymen was not good. The politics of our country followed us. Even among Rwanda immigrants the racial division is still there and it is even worse than in our country. When you are a newcomer in this country those who fled the country in long-time ago do not trust you. They think that you are sent by the Rwandan government.

Mahirwe received another rejection from people of his ethnic group when he married from another ethnic group:

The majority of refugees in South Africa are Hutus, when I married my wife who is a Tutsi, it became a problem to my community and my family…We need to say the truth… that is how we will have a true reconciliation.

Mahirwe received another challenging experience when he was dealing with the department of Home Affairs. The time he went to apply for asylum seekers permit, was still accepting people from his country. However, the process was very tiding, complicated and discouraging.

The time we came it was easy to get the Home affairs documents because our country was at war. I went to apply for asylum, after a week I did interview and I was given a refugees status because I had real reason to give in order to be accepted as refugees. “I have received my PR after 10 years in this country and I have to wait for 5 years to apply for citizenship and you have to wait for 3-5 years to for it to come. It means it can take you 25 years reach the citizenship level, and it is not even guaranteed to get it. They said that citizenship is not an obligation. It means our lives will be spent in looking for documents.

After his marriage, he faced the problem in an attempt to join his wife into his file. The DHA told him that his wife had to wait for 5 years to be joined to him. Because they had no choice, they waited and at the end of that time frame, they applied for family joining and it took 2 years for his wife to get the permanent residence. His two sons were all born in Cape Town, RSA. However, when he went to apply for their birth certificate for the first child it came after 8 months and for the second it came when he was 3 years while he applied for it when he was 2 days old. Surprisingly, those Birth Certificates came without ID numbers whereas they had permanent residences.
According to Mahirwe, the department of Home Affairs is the worst department in the world. The main problem is that there is no one who knows what to do. You can ask one question to different home affairs officers and get different responses while they are working the same job. It seems that there is no single source of information that is dealing with refugees issues.

Mahirwe received also a bad treatment from his employers who wanted to take advantage on refugee’s vulnerability. In fact, Mr. Mahirwe feels like his human rights are not respected.

Generally if people work for the same company the same task they expect to get the same salary. However, our company pays us in categories; whites’ people get more money, coloureds more than us and black South Africans, more than us also.

Mr. Mahirwe is a family man; he is a father of 2 kids and he is currently working for an event management company in the capacity of operation manager assistant. He likes to socialize with his friends. In addition, Mr. Mahirwe is proudly an African National Congress (ANC) member and he is ready to vote in the upcoming election in South Africa.

**Conclusion**

All these informants were born in their countries of origin and came from a stable family but forced to migrate. According to Wise and Covarrubias (2012: 104) forced migration as a term is habitually used to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary migration and, from a human rights perspective, refers to exiles or displaced populations. They identified four types of forced migration: migration due to violence; conflicts and catastrophes; migration due to dispossession, exclusion and unemployment, human trafficking, and migration due to over qualification and lack of opportunities. Furthermore, Norbert (2009) agrees that the international human mobility has been triggered at unprecedented scale by the global economic dis-order, with its new information and communication technologies as well as its new transport systems that has greatly enhanced the mobility of capital and labour.

While both my informants come from different countries, they have been affected by civil wars and political conflicts which prompted their decision to leave their countries.
According to our informants the Somalia civil war started in 1987 and continues. Somalia has no stable government. Ethiopia has known many wars; the first one was between Ethiopia and Somalia over Ogaden region, the second was a war between the government that was led by Derg and the rebel group named TPLF, the last war was between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The civil war between the then government of Rwanda and RPF rebels started in 1990 and ended in 1994 with a victory of RPF. All these wars have claimed many lives and led millions to flee their home countries. Besides civil wars, one informant from Ethiopia left his country because he was supporting an opposition party, and was unjustly arrested.

The journey to come to South Africa was not easy. Informants suffered hunger and fear because it was their first time in that journey. Travel documents were also a problem and this put them at a risk of being arrest. For example Samiru was arrested in Tanzania and sent to the jail where he was tortured and mistreated. While each country that they passed through was challenging, the worst is Tanzania because of crime and corruption while in Mozambique they faced a language problem. In those two countries any move you make you must pay. To survive in that journey informants used their network connections with relatives and friends who were already in South Africa; in some case they sent them money which made the journey affordable and less risky. According to Massey (1993: 449) Networks make international migration extremely attractive as a strategy for risk diversification. For example, Samiru was arrested in Tanzania for three months and his brother who was in Johannesburg paid money to a broker who negotiated for his release.

When informants arrived in South Africa they were surprised by the fact that there was no facilities to accommodate newcomers, like what is happening in other countries, instead, they have to survive by their own means. On arrival they were received by their relatives or friends who provided accommodation, food and clothes. While they were well received by their relatives and friends, one informant from Rwanda indicated that he experienced a bad reception from his country men who suspected him to be sent by the Rwandan government. His situation became worse also when he married a wife from his rival ethnic group.
The next challenge was the *Identification documents*. The Department of Home Affairs is the main port of entry for immigrants in South Africa since it is in charge with migrant management. In the process of acquiring their identification documents, informants had to visit the refugee’s reception office to apply for asylum. At these offices they received difficulties caused by irregularity in DHA operations, corruption the lack of facilities and the process itself is very tiring, complicated and discouraging for most of informants.

Challenges in *accessing employment*. The fact that there are no facilities to accommodate new comers, immigrants have to look for a source of income to cover their living costs in South Africa. Therefore, some informants managed to get jobs when they arrived in the country either by opening their own business or working for someone else. McDonald et al., (1999: 9) affirm this claiming that these high levels of employment and productivity are not surprising given the need to support oneself in a foreign country, and they are also a by-product of the varied skills that many migrants bring with them.

The kind of employments of these informants made them victims of *criminal attacks and discrimination*. Two Somali nationals who were employed as shopkeepers in different townships became victims of criminal attacks. For example Mohammed and Abdiker, have been attacked three times while working in spaza shops and survived. Samiru was attacked by his clients since he was selling goods from door to door, whereas Mahirwe received unfair treatment from his employers, as he was being paid lower than his colleagues South Africans.

Even if informants experienced different challenges in trying to integrate in the South African social economy, they take time to enjoy the beauty of the mother city (the nick name of the CoCT) and are involved in different migrant organizations. Furthermore, they expect things to change in future. For example, Muhamed’s plan for the future is to return to his country Somalia when it will be stable. Samiru expects to get married and have a big family while Abdiker wish to be a human rights lawyer and Mahirwe is proudly an African National Congress (ANC) member and expects to be allowed to vote in the upcoming election in South Africa.
The next chapter discusses the role of immigrant organizations in shaping their survival in the CoCT.
Chapter Eight: the profile and roles of immigrant organizations in Cape Town

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to develop an understanding of the mediating role played by Cape Town’s African foreign immigrant organisations. By looking at the profile, character and role of immigrant associations I hope to reveal more about immigrants’ survival strategies as well as possible paths to integration or assimilation of African immigrants. For purposes of this chapter immigrant organisations are defined as organisations formed by immigrants in order to help them to integrate in their receiving countries and help them navigate their transnational activities and identities across the spaces of origin and new settlement. By “transnational” I refer to the Schiller and Fouрон’s (1999: 344) definition that: ‘transnational migration is a pattern of migration in which persons, although they move across international borders, settle, and establish relations in a new state, they maintain ongoing social connections with the polity from which they originated’.

As noted earlier in this thesis, the CoCT has no comprehensive policy that protects or promotes the immigrants’ interests. The policy exclusion is found also in the lack of data on African immigrants of Cape Town. Three countries/nationalities were chosen for this part of the thesis because they share a similar context of exit although their strategies might be different. The majority of Somalis, Congolese, and Rwandan immigrants left their countries because of wars and political problems. These communities share the same context of reception: most are asylum seekers affected by xenophobic attacks.

With these considerations in mind, this chapter has four parts: Part 1 provides a background to immigrant organizations and profiles and highlights the main challenges of African immigrants in Cape Town as reported by leaders of immigrant organizations; part 2 reveals activities of immigrant organizations (IOs) in CT and reveals also their activities in home countries; part 3 analyses the role of immigrant organizations in shaping their survival/
solidarity and integration; and also discuss the participation of African immigrants in local events, international and mega-events. Part 4 investigates the involvement of African immigrants in the fight against xenophobia; and also reveals the viewpoint of immigrant organization’s leaders toward immigrants’ naturalisation.

I created an inventory of all organizations created by immigrants from Somalia, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) based in Cape Town. I excluded Zimbabweans because they work mainly on farms and for construction companies (Scalabrini 2009).  

This chapter highlights types of immigrant organisations, their characteristics, the year of formation, location, legal status, budgets, number of membership, objectives, activities and their efforts in assisting their members in case of xenophobic attacks.

In Cape Town, immigrants have formed organizations that help them to network with one another in order to negotiate space in this hostile environment. Somalis are of Islamic religion, makes them distinctive from other immigrants. These communities are also visible in Cape Town because of their occupation. Somalis are found in the small business sector in Bellville, the Cape Town CBD and live in several black townships such as Delft (Charman and Piper, 2012). According to a study of township shops owned by Somalisians (Charman and Piper 2012: 93), Somalis are targeted by robbers because they sell items that criminals want. ‘Robbers focus on three items: cash, airtime vouchers and cigarettes, as all of these can easily be resold or traded on’. Somalis in townships are also affected by violence directly linked to economic competition between shopkeepers (ibid, 89).

De Doorns is perceived to have become a de facto headquarters for Zimbabwean migrant workers in South Africa. It is a significant entry point into the South African economy. From De Doorns, farmers will collect workers to work on farms as far away as the Eastern Cape and Namibia.
A recent study by Charman et al (2012) notes the unexceptional character of “xenophobic violence”. They suggest that we need to locate arguments about xenophobia in the wider context of crime and violence in South Africa as a general issue, as well as paying close attention to the local particularities that can turn general sentiment into xenophobic action. “Levels of violent crime against foreign shopkeepers, 80 per cent of whom are Somali, are not significantly higher than against South African shopkeepers. Most consumers remain indifferent to the Somalian presence and certainly prefer the lower prices”.

On the other hand, Congolese work in the security industry and can be seen in car care in the different parking bays of Cape Town CBD (Bernstein, 2003, Legoko 2008 and Cape Argus, July 26, 2009). They own also small businesses in Salt River and reside in small micro-communities in Maitland, Muizenberg and townships like Delft. Bolzoni (2009: 138) argues that in Cape Town,

> According to some NGO representatives, Congolese refugees and asylum seekers are the ones who mainly use the NGOs’ services ranging from the primary aid at their arrival (e.g. food, clothing, advice for legal practice) to courses to improve their language and working skills.

On the contrary, Somalis do not seem to turn to NGOs at all. So there is the impression that there are different strategies in facing the same problem situations. Another reason of interest is that, among refugees, the Somali group seems to be the most visible one in townships and often under attack. As owners of small shops, basically situated in townships, they suffer intimidations, attacks and murders too.

The Rwandan community is the more less integrated among other immigrants communities in Cape Town. They are dominantly visible in customer care at different shopping malls, and in the metered taxi industry. Furthermore, they are poor, vulnerable and in a precarious situation (Kavuro, 2015).
Profile of the Organisations

Among Cape Town Somalis, this study found that they are four different organisations that are regularly functioning. These are: Somalis Community Board of Cape Town, Albayaan Islamic Council Trust, Somali Association of South Africa and the Ogaden Community of South Africa. One is a religious; one is a social service agency while two are social and political organizations. The Somali Community Board does political activities in Somalia where it is affiliated to the ruling party at home, while the Ogaden Community of South Africa supports freedom fighters operating in the Ogaden region.

All Somali organizations are legally registered as Non-Profit Organizations. Furthermore, even though Somalis are operating in different parts of the CoCT, these organizations are all located in Bellville. It is no surprise therefore when people call Bellville ‘the small Mogadishu’ (Interview with Rashid).

The Somali Community Board’s objectives are: ‘to get Somali people together, to help community members who are in need, to help community members to access their rights; and to motivate members to preserve their culture and religion’. It is also a political and diasporic organization with an office in Mogadishu. It liaises with the ruling government in their country of origin in order to help its members if they need it in their country. Its South African membership is more than 10 000 people and it is legally registered as a Non-Profit Organization (NPO). Regarding funding, this organization depends on its member’s contributions. For instance in 2013, this organization reports that it spent over R100 000 from its budget on activities such as advocacy, education and helping people in need. The SCB has branches in different provinces of South Africa, and in Western Cape its headquarters is located in Bellville (Interview: AR. Sheikh).
### Table 3: Somali Community Board

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Political committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Domestic and transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Bellville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td>Registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (2013)</td>
<td>R100000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memberships</td>
<td>+ 10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>To liaises with the Somalian government to help the Somali Diaspora. To get Somalis people together; To help community members who are in need; To help community members to access their rights; To motivate members to preserve their culture and religion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Fund raising, education and advocacy. Street Committees in Cape Town’s townships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Xenophobia</td>
<td>To give accommodation and food to affected people. To raise funds for those whom their shops have been looted so that they could restart their business activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Somali Association of South Africa (SASA)** is a social service and educational organization started in 1998. It is composed of Somali nationals and it has branches in different provinces of South Africa. Its membership in Cape Town is more than 200 people and its 2013 budget was R 120 000. SASA is legally registered and its Cape Town office is in Bellville. This organization has two main objectives: ‘to integrate the community into the South African society and to liaise with the South African government and civil society organizations to help the Somali community’.
Table 4: Somali Association of South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Formed in</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Legal Status</th>
<th>Budget (2013)</th>
<th>Memberships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social service agency</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Bellville</td>
<td>Registered</td>
<td>R 120 000</td>
<td>+200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Objectives
- To integrate the community into the South African society;
- To liaise with the South African government and civil society organizations to help the Somali community

Activities
- Advocacy: Link South African government and immigrants; Cultural educate of the Somalis and citizens
- Referring xenophobia victims to any civil society organizations or government departments that could help them

In summary Somalis seem to be the most organised and the most resourced of all groups in Cape Town

The Ogaden Community of South Africa (OCSA) is a social and political organization composed by Somalis from Ogaden region. This region was cut off from Somalia and annexed to the Ethiopia by the British government during the colonisation period. However, Somalis people who live in that region wish to be independent from the Ethiopia. It is from this conflict that the Ogaden Community organization has been established in order to unity its members in fighting for their independence. Its objectives are ‘to help each other whenever there is a need and to promote unity among Ogaden people’.

Regarding membership, this organization accepts everybody without discrimination based on race, clan or religion. The Western Cape office is located in Bellville, and it is legally
registered. Regarding the source of its income, this organization doesn’t have a fixed budget; it collects money from its members, according to the need.

**Table 5: The Ogaden Community of South Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Political committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Domestic and transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed in</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Bellville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td>Registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (2013)</td>
<td>No fixed budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memberships</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>To promote unity among Ogaden people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To help each other whenever there is a need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>To support freedom fighters in Ogaden region; To raise funds to help people who are affected by the war in the east of Ethiopia; Public Demonstration to express their views to the international community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Xenophobia</td>
<td>To provide vehicles to save people and their goods; To give blankets and food</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Albayaan Islamic Council Trust (AICT)** is an educational and religious organization formed by Somali migrants in South Africa. The head office is in Johannesburg and it has branches in different provinces. Its membership is more than 700 people and the majority are Muslims. National wide the organization is ruled by seven trustees. Locally the organization is managed by 15 members. Among their members, there are Muslims and some non-Muslims who support them. This organization is legally registered and its local office is in Bellville. Its mission is to provide Islamic education to the Somali community both young and old. The principal objective of this organization is to start an Islamic School for their children in Bellville. According to the leader of this organization, “Somali kids are attending Muslim schools that are located in Athlone and Rylands. And, kids come home exhausted.
Having a Muslim school in Bellville will give kids time to do their homework, play and rest (interview: A. Rashid).

**Table 6: The Albayaaan Islamic Council Trust**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Religious group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed in</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Bellville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td>Registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (2013)</td>
<td>Not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memberships</td>
<td>+700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>To start an Islamic School in Bellville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Education of Islamic religion, Skills transfer (teach South African how to do business)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Xenophobia</td>
<td>Provide accommodation in the mosque for victims; Providing food and blankets; Imam (religious leader) talked to survivals to give them a word of encouragement and hope</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The study of Somali organizations suggests three further observations; firstly, all of them are characterised by overlapping memberships since that a person can have a membership of more than one organizations and it does not affect their loyalty to both associations. Secondly, there is no hostility between the four organizations, instead, they are interconnected. For example while the AICT is running an Islamic school, the Somali Community Board supports the school with the human capital. Lastly, Somali organizations in Cape Town are branches of a national organization, and all have an office in Belleville.

**Rwanda**

Rwandan immigrants in Cape Town fled their country because of the civil war that started in 1990 by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPF) and ended in 1994 by genocide that started after the assassination of the Rwandan president that was seen as a pretext to start the genocide. This war forced 1.7 million citizens to look for asylum in neighbouring countries, with one
million in DRC, 550 000 in Tanzania, 160 000 in Burundi and 5 000 in Uganda, and approximately 1.2 million internal refugees (Appleyard, 1998: 193). Some of these asylums seekers continued their journey toward the south, and they were among immigrants with Angolan and people from the Horn of Africa that came in South Africa in the years immediately following apartheid (Bolzoni, 2009: 127). In the Rwandan community of Cape Town, we surveyed four organizations of the following types: two religious groups, one civic and cultural organization, and one social service agency. Among all four organizations only one is legally registered. Regarding the physical addresses, only the Pentecostal Community Churches in Southern Africa has a permanent office while others have a place for their meetings only. Like organizations formed by Somali community, these organizations’ survival depend on their members’ contributions. The following is the key information on organizations formed by Rwandan community that participated on this study.

Most members of the Pentecostal Community Churches in Southern Africa (PCCSA), a religious organization are from Rwanda but other nationalities are welcomed. With over 150 members in 2013 this organization collected and spent R150 000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Religious group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed in</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Salt River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td>Registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (2013)</td>
<td>R150000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memberships</td>
<td>+ 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Spiritual and physical growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Spread of the word of God; Skills development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Xenophobia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The church is registered and it is located in Salt River. As religious organization its objective is to help members to grow in spiritual and physical terms in order that they become fit to face migration challenges.

The Rwanda Heritage Foundation (RHF) is a civic and cultural organization formed by Rwandan immigrants of Cape Town. Its objectives are to provide cultural and historical education to the young and old, and promote unity among Rwandan. The RHF keep its meetings in Retreat, Cape Town, and has more than 200 members of different age groups, genders and religions. Regarding the legal status it is not yet registered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8: Rwanda Heritage Foundation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retreat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soon to be registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memberships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To develop broad-base of knowledge of Rwandan history; To promote the Rwandan culture; To promote the social cohesion among Rwandese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing Rwandans together to discuss and learn their history, culture and talk about the merits of social cohesion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Xenophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rwanda/Burundian SDA ministry of Cape Town is a religious organization and is linked to Kuils River SDA Church of Cape Town. Its members are Seventh Day Adventists church believers coming from Rwanda and Burundi. The group started in 2009 by people who were worshipping at Retreat SDA church in Cape Town, and felt a need to incorporate home languages into their worship services in order to accommodate new-comers and elderly people who were struggling with the English language and not enjoying a full worship experience. The principal objectives of this organization, is Evangelism. Secondly, is to
create a platform for Rwandan and Burundians SDA communities to develop and use their talents for God’ commission. This organization has two cell groups Retreat and Parow that meet every Friday evening for Sabbath opening programs. One Saturday of every month, they meet at Kuils River SDA church to have Sabbath worship in their mother tongues.

Table 9: Rwandan and Burundian SDA ministry of Cape Town

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Religious group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed in</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Kuils River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td>Not registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (2013)</td>
<td>R30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memberships</td>
<td>+120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Using their spiritual talents to do evangelism in Immigrants communities; and To provide financial and moral support to their members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Prayer meetings; Gospel music programs; Visitation; Raising funds to help people in needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Xenophobia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Rwandan Refugees of Cape Town is a cultural and a social service agency that regroups both Refugees and asylum seekers from Rwanda who live in Cape Town. This organization aimed to help its members to cope with life in South Africa, through helping members who are in need, through advocacy whenever it is necessary and to promote the Rwandan culture among the younger generation.

The Rwandan Refugees of Cape Town has more than 2000 members, and it accommodates everybody without discrimination based on religion, gender and race. Regarding its legal status, it is not registered and it does not have a physical address. Nevertheless, it holds its meeting in Retreat. Concerning its budget, it doesn’t have a fixed budget, it collect money from its members, according to the need.
Table 10: Rwandan Refugees of Cape Town

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Social service agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed in</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Retreat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td>Not registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (2013)</td>
<td>Correct funds according to the need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memberships</td>
<td>+ 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>To promote social cohesion; To promote helping each other in time of needs; To promote the Rwandan culture among the younger generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Raising funds to help orphans; cover funeral and wedding expenses; conflict resolution initiatives; and Cultural events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Xenophobia</td>
<td>Exchanging information on the progress of xenophobia and where to go to get help that you need</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amongst the organizations created by Rwandans, none of them has a transnational character. This is because most of Rwandan immigrants in South Africa are political refugees. Therefore, they are affected by what Portes and Yiu (2013: 83) termed ‘blocked transnationalism’ that prevents political refugees to be involved in their home countries.

The youngest organization is the Rwandan Heritage Foundation created in 2013, while the oldest is the Rwandan Refugees of Cape Town that was formed in 2003. While in the Somali community the older was formed in 1998 and the young in 2006. Legal standing is also a distinguishing factor since only one organization is legally registered while in the Somali community all organizations are registered.

The Rwandan and Somali organizations have some similarities. The first is the overlapping membership since a person can be in more than one organization. The second is source of income. These organizations correct funds from their members whenever they want to support any project (e.g. help people in need, orphans, to cover funeral expenses, etc).
The next section presents organization created by Congolese community of Cape Town.

**The Democratic Republic of Congo**

The Democratic Republic of Congo a country rich in natural resources has known different political and armed conflicts since its independence. According to Legoko (2008), ‘for more than three decades, these civil wars and other attempts at rebellion were quelled by the dictatorial reign of Mobutu’. The country known many wars that claimed lives of thousands innocent people and forced others to seek for refuge in other countries. The first Congo war started in November 1996 by the Alliance des Forces de Liberation du Congo (AFDL), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and ended in 1997 with the fall of president Mobutu. The Second Congo War started in August 1998 and ended in 2003. This war was initiated by a heterogenous political wing of the rebellion that was grouped under the RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie; Congolese Rally for Democracy) (Legoko 2008: 115-116). Until today the East of Congo especially the Northern and the Southern Kivu Provinces are still affected by armed conflicts which are the key push factor for Congolese to come to South Africa.

Three organizations from DRC participated on this study; one is a media organization, another is a social agency, the other is a home town committee. Like organizations created by Somalis, all three organizations are legally registered. While all immigrant organizations depend on their members to support their budgets, the DRCASA raises funds through membership contributions and other income generating initiatives done by its members.

The **Congo Square News**, was created in 2011 by the following people; Gilungu-Malenda Maurice, Ngoyi Muselwa Etienne, Eric Notyo Iyolo and Oliver Tshinkyoka Mulombo. Their aim is to use opportunities that South Africa provides such as free expression and use it to reach out to people who are not able to express their views because of the situation they might be in. This organization is legally registered and is supported by its members’ contributions in order to cover all production costs. For example, last year the organisation spent R6000 for printing and distributing their newspapers.
### Table 11: The Congo Square News

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed in</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Cape Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td>Registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (2013)</td>
<td>R6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memberships</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>To inform and educate Congolese people; To keep an archive of the life of Congolese people in South Africa; To promote unity among Congolese people; To make the newspaper international; To give a platform for free expression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>To publish and distribute the newspaper; To explain to their people what the organization is doing; To organization events of immigrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Xenophobia</td>
<td>To publish stories about xenophobia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Democratic Republic of Congolese Association in South Africa (DRCASA) in South Africa is an organization created by immigrants from Democratic Republic of Congo in Cape Town, in order to help its members to cope with the life of South Africa. DRCASA assists its members to get proper identification papers and to educate their people so that they can be self-reliant.

Its membership is more than 1000 members divided into the following categories: ordinary, honorary, and active members, depending on the role they play in the organization.

Regarding the legal status, DRCASA is legally registered as a non-governmental organization (NGO). Its income comes from its members, through contribution or paid works done by members. However, services offered at this organization are free of charge:
for instance, referring their members to other service providers, other NGOs or Human right lawyers. Last year this organization collected more than R60000 to support its activities.

Table 12: The Democratic Republic of Congoless Association in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Social service agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed in</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Cape Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td>Registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (2013)</td>
<td>R60000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memberships</td>
<td>+ 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Advocacy and lobbying in order to assist members to get proper home Affairs papers; and To education member to be self – reliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Coaching small business; Micro finance using “cooperative system” Raising funds; Documents translation; and Cultural events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Xenophobia</td>
<td>To support people in Blue Water temporary refugees camp, and Mediation between foreigner and citizen.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Amis BK (Friends of Bukavu) is a home-town committee, composed by Congoless specifically people from Bukavu but it includes also anyone who want to be a member. Bukavu is a capital city of South Kivu province, located in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). People from other provinces and even people from different countries are also welcomed in this organization, as long as they call themselves friends of Bukavu. Their mission is to keep themselves together as refugees who came to South Africa due to problems that happened in their region.

The Amis BK has three main objectives. According to Namufakage; The first objective is to collect information and disseminate to their members
We guide our members by giving them the right information of where to go when they are facing problems. We direct them to which organizations that can help them just for legal assistance. Furthermore, if anyone knows where there is a job, he/she share information with those who need it. (Interview: A. Namufakage)

The second objective is life skills development in learning English and Mathematics. (Interview: Namufakage). The last objective is social assistance.

When someone has got a problem like funeral, or has been evicted from the house, we inform everybody through SMS and ask them to intervene. (Interview: Namufakage)

The Amis BK is legally registered, and had more than 200 members. In addition, these members are the source of its income. For example, last year they contributed R150 000 and this money was used to help their members who are in need. Members of this organization have meetings every last Sunday of the month at Mowbray.

### Table 13: Amis BK (Friends of Bukavu)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Home Town Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Domestic and transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed in</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Mowbray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td>Registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memberships</td>
<td>+ 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>To provide Social assistance; To collect and give the right information; To promote skills development programs for members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Teaching people about HIV/AIDS, Sport events: eg “Umoja Cup”; Exhibitions of the Congolese culture; Discussion on their county’s problems; Humanitarian activities to people affected by the war in the East of Congo; Tutoring in township math and physics to South African Students; and Religious events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Xenophobia</td>
<td>Providing accommodation to affected members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: The estimated number of memberships in each organization
Like Somalis, all Congolese organizations are legally registered as non profit organizations. It was noted also that only the Amis BK has a transnationalism character, while others are domestic only. Congolese organizations are not old; the oldest among others is the DRCASA that was created in year 2005, while the CSN is the youngest created in 2011.

While all Somali organizations have a physical office in Bellville, most organizations created by Rwandan and Congolese don’t have a physical address. The location highlighted is a place where their meeting take places. Furthermore, all of these organizations do not have a fixed budget, but they collect money from their members according to the need. Therefore, the amount specified in this section is what these organizations collected and spent in the year 2013. The following section deal with the main challenges immigrants face in Cape Town.
Main challenges of African immigrants in Cape Town according to organization’s leaders

Organizations’ leaders were asked to identify the main concern raised by members about problems they experience in South Africa. Surprisingly, while the xenophobic attack is dominating the public discourse as the number one problem of the African immigrant, this study found a different reality. Immigrants are concerned of having proper home affairs “papers”. As summarised in the table below, the number one problem that African immigrants in general faced in 2013-14 is identification documents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Identity Documents</th>
<th>Xenophobia</th>
<th>Drugs (Mirra)</th>
<th>Language barriers</th>
<th>Financial Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somali Community Board</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogaden Community of SA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalis Association of South Africa</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albayaan Islamic Council Trust</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal Church of Rwandans</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda Heritage Foundation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandan/Burundian SDA Ministry</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandan refugees of Cape Town</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Square News</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo Community in South</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amis BK</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among 11 organization’s leaders, eight claimed that their members are struggling with getting valid Home Affairs papers. Xenophobia was indicated as number two after Home Affairs documents. According to leader of AICT, their members in locations have problems of safety. Even when they are going to buy their stock for their shops they get robbed. The reason is that beside Bellville and the CBD some Somalis own Spaza shops in different townships and this has created a controversy between them and local business people who accuse them of stealing the market.

Our fight is on the issue of papers. Because the majority of our members are using asylum seekers permits. As you know that document is not a good document that can help you to integrate in the South. Another issue is that now the Home affairs office is going to close in Cape Town so it is going to be difficult for people who doesn’t have refugees status to survive in this city.. (Interview: JJ. Somwe)

According to our respondents the Department of Home Affairs is making life difficult for immigrants. Even though immigration policies articulate procedures on how immigrants should be treated, our respondents suggested that the process is not applied accordingly. The leader of Rwanda Refugees of Cape Town explains the situation:

. . . .Some people have asylum seeker papers but don’t have the Refugees Status there are others who have refugee’s status for more than 10 years but they don’t have Permanent Residence whereas normally a person should have Permanent Residence in 10 years. The second concern is discrimination done to kids. Normally, kids born here should be granted citizenship as it is accepted by the international Laws. But here it not being done, this is frustrating. (Interview: S. Bavugamenshi)

The leader of Amis BK echoed the same feeling stressing on the rejection of some asylum seekers’ applications; “Applications for asylum for some of our members are being rejected whereas the situation in the east of Congo is not stable yet” (Interview: A. Namufakage). Even those who have been accepted, they are given temporary documents that need to be extended periodically. Some immigrants face a challenge when it comes to extension of those documents. The leader of the Ogaden Community of South Africa
asserts that their members face problems when they go to the home affairs to extend their permits. (interview: Rahman)

According to the DRCCSA’s leader, the lack of valid documents impedes immigrant’s integration:

…For someone to survive in South Africa he has to have an identity. If someone doesn’t have proper papers, it constitutes a barrier to education, livelihood, and employment. And this has an implication for integration. What is causing people not to be integrated is “documents. (Interview: JJ. Somwe)

The lack of home affairs papers discriminates in different ways. The Amis BK leader revealed that in South Africa, there is a system designed to exclude immigrants and the tool that is being used is ‘Identification documents’.

I helped at a school for the full year 2006 and then in 2007….. They said because I didn’t have a permanent residence I cannot have a permanent job. Besides that, the principal of that school was saying “I don’t want to lose you but it is not me who select or short list people who are supposed to go to the interview. I told him, I am not blaming you it it the system. That is why I am saying the integration is a problem. (Interview: A. Namufakage)

The discrimination by employers based on identification documents was observed by Bolzoni (2009: 141). Even if asylum seekers and refugees are allowed to work, employers do not consider their identification document as a proof.

It is not only private institutions that discriminate against immigrants based on their legal standing. Even some public institutions are reluctant to provide a service to African immigrants. The leader of Rwanda Refugees of Cape Town explains the experience of members’ education:

Our people are facing discrimination based on identification documents. Normally we are given a document that allows us to work and study. However, some time when you applied for a job they ask you if you have a South African green ID in order to be
Banks also discriminate immigrants using the Home Affairs identification papers. For immigrants to have access to banking system is critical due to the banking registrations that are selective (Bolzoni, 2009: 14). The leader of Congo Square News supports these ideas and explains how his organization is struggling to open a bank account due to Home Affairs papers. “The challenge that we are having is valid documents. For example, we want to open a Bank account for our newspaper but with refugee’s status that we have, banks don’t want to open a bank accounts even if the newspaper is registered” (Interview: O. Tshinkyoka).


The control must be exercised in the heartland not on the borders. By making undocumented migrants lives so insecure and unpleasant through constant policing and harassment, and prosecuting employers who hire them, the economic incentives for coming to South Africa are reduced and the social costs of living “illegally” in South Africa are raised. The “heartland policing” model best describes the drift of South African policy since 1994; the increase in … resources directed at identifying and arresting migrants, and higher deportation figures, are all indicative of this tendency. This model comes at a cost of undocumented migrants often lose the few constitutional, and most of the human, rights they are entitled to. Due process is often conveniently put aside (Crush, 1997: 33).

Even though immigrants in South Africa are affected by different forms of exclusion including deadly xenophobic attacks, immigrant’s leaders believe that their immigrants should become naturalized citizens of South Africa as soon as possible. They agreed that giving citizenship to immigrants will not affect their relationship with their home countries and South Africa. Echoing Portes, they agreed that “it is possible to be loyal to Somalia and at the same time be a good South African citizen”.

grant a job. Our kids also are struggling to get admission at some universities.  

(Interview: S. Bavugaminshi)
However, some leaders raised their concerns about acquiring SA citizenship. For example, Salim Bavugamenshi reveals that even though some Rwandans have got already their Permanent Residences, the South African’s immigration laws are still stumbling blocks for Rwandans to get the SA citizenship. Surprisingly, while South Africa treats all immigrants as people who are looking for a citizenship, some immigrants do not wish to lose their previous citizenship. For example, leaders from DRC asserted that they are not willing to lose their Congolese citizenship. When asked the leader of CSN, about his view if DRC immigrants should become naturalized citizens of South Africa, O. Tshinkyoka highlights that Congolese immigrants don’t wish to lose their citizenship because their country doesn’t accept the double nationality:

… until now the DRC constitution does not accept the double nationality. So my worry is that once you became SA citizen you lose your DRC nationality. And many Congolese don’t want to lose their citizenships. (Interview: O Tshinkyoka)

The double nationality issue is expressed by John J Somwe who revealed that his country has not decided yet if Congolese should have double nationality.

In South Africa they accept double nationality but in Congo they don’t. So you may be legal citizen here but not accepted in DRC. Nevertheless, our members who have South African citizenship are loyal to Congo… (Interview: JJ Somwe)

When asked to give his view if DRC immigrants should become naturalized citizens of South Africa, A. Namufakage responded that in his view Congolese shouldn’t, but he added that it will depends on individuals. For him Permanent Residence will be fine, he doesn’t need citizenship. Because he might lose his chance to be involved in his country’s politic.

For some good reasons I would like to remain a Congolese because my country doesn’t accept double citizenship. “Who knows if in 10 years I will be a member of the parliament in Congo, which I will never have a chance to be in South Africa.

He pointed out also that even if you may receive an ID, you will still be discriminated since it will always highlight your country of origin.
It is important to note that other problems not picked up by the media and scholars emerged in our interviews. Somali community faces a problem of a drug called ‘Mila/jad’. This drug is a herb that grows in Eastern Africa especially in Ethiopia. According to the AICT’s leader, it is affecting Somalis youth and South Africans are also joining them. Language barriers were identified as a problem to some Cape Town immigrants. Health services provide an interesting example of cultural discrimination. The AICT’s leader asserts that Somali women are facing a big problem at hospitals; some are being sterilized without their consents:

... when our women go to maternity they are abused and given family planning without their consents. Some of them find out that they can’t have kids anymore while they didn’t know when they have been sterilized. I think it is because many of them don’t know English and are forced to sign what they don’t understand”. (Interview: A. Rachid)

Lack of financial support is another problem immigrant face in Cape Town. They are excluded from all business opportunities given to citizens. To support their business, they have to work hard and save for their projects. The CSN’s leader his concern in relation to underfunding of immigrants small business;

In order to overcome the challenges highlighted above migrant organizations have different initiatives to assist their members. The paper will now address the activities of these organisations in South Africa and in their home countries. It covers also the relationship with South African authorities at the nation level and the local government.

**Analysis of survival strategies of Immigrants Organizations**

Activities oriented to surviving the traumas of being a foreign national in Cape Town are discussed here and are regrouped into three categories: (a) those related to immigrants-immigrant relations in the host country, South Africa, (b) activities in their home countries and (c) direct local activities aimed to improve integration and immigrant’s survival (immigrant to South African relations)
Activities in the host country

Host country activities, the research showed provided solidarity and helped to form a community out of strangers. African immigrants in Cape Town have different interventions designed to help members to cope with the South African life. Fundraising for Social assistance is a key activity. As we saw earlier, the main funding source of immigrant organizations is members’ pooled contributions. Some organizations have other sources of income. For example, CSN sells its newspapers to finance its activities. The DRCASA raise funds from different South African NGOs and does some income generating initiatives. Jacques Somwe explains it as follow:

We offer interpretation and translations to our members free of charge. When this service is offered to an outsider, we charge him and the money is used as an income for the organization. (Interview: JJ. Somwe)

These funds are used to help immigrants in different activities. The RRCT act as a funeral plan for its members, it covers the wedding costs and act as social grant for orphans left by a deceased member.

Ours members don’t have funeral policies because there are asylum seekers and they can’t afford it. Therefore, for any member who dies, it is the responsibility of our organization to take in charge from A-Z of all funerals’ expenses. Furthermore, with our limited resources, we help orphans left by deceased parents. Weddings: In our culture, we believe that nobody does the wedding alone. When our members want to get married, we raise funds in order to help them to cover the wedding costs. (Interview: S. Bavugamenshi)

While immigrants are discriminated by South African financial institutions, those who need to start their small businesses turn to their organization to acquire for funding. The Somali Community board and DRCASA, have specifically programs reserved for that: According to A. Rashid, his organization ‘collects money from members in order to help some members to start their own small businesses’. Mr. Somwe echoed the same idea as follows:
This organization raises funds to support people who don’t have anything. There were some women who were doing hair saloons at Cape Town station. What we did in 2010, we did a survey in order to know how many people who are doing that business. The result was surprising because most of them are single ladies, and their desires are to be professional. What we did, we raised funds from different sources with a support of some South Africans NGOs and we built for them a saloon for some women to start their small business. (Interview: JJ. Somwe)

Among organizations surveyed, AICT, SCB, SASA, Amis BK, RHF are invested in educating their members. Two Somali organizations focus on Islamic education to their members and providing human capital to Islamic schools. The SCB does supply to Islamic schools teachers. While the AICT focuses on Islamic education for adult and children. Other activities are to teach members about HIV/AIDS done mainly by Amis BK and cultural and history done by RHF.

Religious based organizations are mainly from Rwanda and Somalia. According to pastor Mukeshimana his church spreads the word of God through evangelism activities. It has regular prayer meetings every Sunday at Salt River. The RBSDA Ministry of Cape Town is another religious organization in Cape Town. Its main activities are weekly prayer meetings, music programs, and Sabbath programs. They also visit sick people and help members in need.

There are social tensions within migrants and between migrants and locals which are dealt with as part of survival strategies. Depending on history of sending countries, some immigrants have tensions and issues between themselves and even with families (see Portes and Landolt on problems of home-town networks). But some organizations create a platform aimed to promote a positive coexistence and peace. An organization of this character is the RHF. Its aim is to promote the social cohesion of all Rwandese. In its activities, it brings Rwandans together to discuss and learn their history talk about the merits of social cohesion (Interview: V. Karitanyi). In case of conflict resolution immigrants organizations also intervene. One of organizations involved in those activities is the RRCT. S. Bavugamenshi explains it as follow; ‘If there is a dispute between some member’s friends or married couples they
call us so that we can intervene. We are mostly involved in family matters between husbands and women. People with problems call us and we help them to solve their differences’.

The Amis BK shares this initiative of uniting their countrymen with other organizations. To do so it creates a platform for discussion on their country’s problem. However, their discussions cover other issues except ‘politic’. The leader of Amis BK explains it below:

Whenever there is touching news in our country we meet and discuss and give our view on what could be a solution. We try to distance ourselves from politics since as refugees we are not allowed to be involved in politics. (Interview: A. Namufakage)

**Cultural Events:** In order to preserve and transfer their cultures to the young generations, immigrants organizations organize events that exhibit their traditions. For example, the DRCASA organize events in which different Congolese tribes come together to celebrate their diversity through cultural events (interview: JJ. Somwe). The CSN realised that in DRC community are many organizations but they are working individually and people don’t know them. Then they organized an event of all Congolese organizations:

“Last time we brought together all Congolese organizations under the theme “unity among Congolese”, because we saw that all Congolese organizations are working individually and we want them to come together. In that assembly each organization was given a time to explain what it is doing. (Interview: O. Tshinkyoka)

These events are not only for entertainment purpose, but they are used as an education platform. According to S. Bavugamenshi; ’these events are aimed to teach specifically the youth about our culture and make them aware about the HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases’.

In order to promote the self-reliance of their members some organizations have programs aimed to develop skills that will help them in future. For example the PCR teach members English, while the DRCASA coaching small business. This organization identifies projects that are being done by Congolese community and look for ways to support them. According to its leader, they use what he calls ‘Cooperative system’ in which those business people
who have gained the experience and are integrated in South African economy come and train beginners.

According to this study, all organizations created by African immigrants of Cape Town, are domestic organizations since all have activities in South Africa. However, three of them (OCSA, SCB and Amis BK) have a transnational character as they have activities in their home countries or used to have them. Two other organizations (DRCASA and CSN) are planning to take their activities home in the near future.

Immigrant organizations are involved in the fight against xenophobia, and they help their members affected by xenophobic attacks. According to Somwe, his organization is in the front line in this campaign against xenophobia. They do it through seminars; skills transfer initiatives and other interventions. This organization was involved also in the mediation process between immigrants and citizens that was organized by UNHCR and the CoCT.

We organize seminars where we invite different people including South Africans and tell them what Congolese are going through and we make it a way of healing memories of xenophobia. We do have different initiatives to deal with xenophobia. For instance, we encourage people with saloon to take South Africans to work with for skill transfers. Congolese teach them to make hair and South Africans teach them the language. This can help them to integrate in the local community and leave the suburbs where accommodation is very expensive. (Interview: JJ. Somwe)

The Amis BK is also involved in fighting xenophobic attacks on immigrants. They did it by giving accommodations in their houses to their members who were affected by the 2008 xenophobic attacks.

During the 2008 I was invited to be the guest speakers at Mowbray civic centre to speak about xenophobia and to tell people how Congolese were feeling about what was happening. Beside that during the 2008 we gave accommodation to our members. We send messages to our members who were living in the township. And we asked them to come to live with us who were living in suburbs since it was safe there. We accepted to
share a room or a house and whatever we had during that period. (Interview: A. Namufakage)

All Somali organizations studied are involved in fighting xenophobia incidents. In fact, the majority of xenophobic victims are Somalis because many of them run small business in townships and this makes them easy targets. During xenophobic events, they mobilized business people to give accommodation, food to affected people. They also encouraged shop owners in townships to donate some money to those whom their shops had been looted so that they could restart their business activities. SASA referred victims to civil society organization or government department that could help them. During the xenophobia 2008 OCSA provided vehicles to save people and their goods, and they give blankets and food. The AICT opened the mosque for people to sleep-in and provided them with food and blankets. Furthermore, the Iman talked to survivors to give them a word of encouragement and hope. This organization with other immigrant’s organizations took letters twice to the parliament to request them to protect immigrants.

The RRCT is also involved in fighting xenophobia in Cape Town. In 2008 it was involved into anti-xenophobia campaigns which were organized by Human Right Organizations. During the May 2008 xenophobic attacks, the RRCT helped also its members who were affected. Salim Bavugamenshi states: ‘during the 2008 xenophobia, all our members were very united than ever. We were exchanging information on the progress of xenophobia and where to go, in case you need help’ (Interview: S. Bavugamenshi).

The CSN as a media organization, it fights xenophobia, through publishing stories related to xenophobic attacks on African immigrants in Cape Town.

We publish stories about people who were affected by the xenophobic attacks and whenever we get information we publish them. Whenever there is a case that is not finished we publish it. And we are doing it in order to help people who are mostly affected. We direct them also where they can get help, for example trauma centre so that they may be rehabilitated. We don’t give answers, but we give directions. (Interview: O. Tshinkyoka)
Transnational activities in the home countries

The SCB links its members with their home country’s governments through a permanent office that is in their country. The office facilitates Somalis accessing funds if they want to be involved in a development project back home or for matters linked to their migration status.

We have an office in Somalia that is aimed to raise the awareness of the role of Diaspora to our country’s economy. That office helps also people who go back in the country to integrate by facilitating them to get a bank loan or buying a house. Our office deals also with the Somali government in the matters linked to the Somali diaspora (Interview: AR. Sheik).

The Ogaden Community of South Africa is a transnational organization that focuses on the liberation struggle of the Ogaden region and humanitarian activities.

In our country we support freedom fighting armed group that is fighting for the liberation of Ogaden region. We support also civilians who are affected by the war”.

(Interview: A. Rahman)

"South Africa is the best place in Africa to file this complaint, especially in terms of law and human respect; we believe that South Africans still remember what they underwent during Apartheid, just as how we are under minority rule in our region," Mohamed Fadel Abdullahi, a Somali Ogaden activist based in Johannesburg, told Al Jazeera.

The AICT does some philanthropic activities in Somalia. For example, in 2010 when Somalia was affected by the drought, it sent donations to people of Somalia. The donation was taken by Sheikh Irfan (a South African Sheikh) accompanied by many South Africans and Somali community (interview: A. Rachid).

Among Congolese organization, Amis BK is the one that has regular activities in its country. Amis BK organizations are in different cities of DRC. However, they are not connected because they don’t have the same vision. According to Amani Namufakage the lack of coordination with all Amis BKS makes their activities less effective.
Regarding our activities in the DRC, last year when the M23 rebels group started in the East of Congo, we raise funds and tried to send some assistance to Congo. We contacted other organizations since ours didn’t have a bank account; it was not easy to give money to Amis BK. We put people who wanted to help in contact with other organizations in Congo that were helping people. We gave blankets and food and they promised us that our aid was helpful. (Interview: A. Namufakage)

According to findings of this study, two more organizations from DRC are planning to have activities in their home countries. By the time of this study the Congo Square news was soon going to send someone to facilitate their activities in DRC. The DRCASA is planning to start what the leader called the ‘exit program’. This program aimed to bridge the gap between their countries of origin and South Africa. In the ‘exit program’, they are mobilizing people to start thinking about home. People can go home and observe and come back to SA. But this program has many limitations based on identification documents. To face those challenges, they are using internet.

**Connections with South African politics at national and local level**

We found that some organizations have ties with the central government, the parliament and to the local government. For example, the SCB is a political organization and has political activities in South Africa. It encourages also its eligible members to join the ANC:

> In South Africa, we have a partnership with African National Congress (ANC), because our political party and ANC have the same view on the policies related to the development of the African continent. Furthermore, we encourage members who have South African citizenships already to join ANC. The South African government trains our members in leadership and gives them the experience on how to govern a country. (Interview: AR. Sheikh)

While the SCB is linked to the central government, the AICT maintains ties with South Africans political authorities at the local level. Whenever there is a meeting organized by the Belville local authorities, they get invited and participate like other local stakeholders. (Interview: A. Rachid). The OCSA is also involved in civic or political activities in South
Africa. However, it focuses on attracting the international community’s support for the
freedom of Ogaden Region. For example in 2012, its lawyer submitted the Ogaden people’s
request to the International Criminal Court asking the freedom for their country. It has also a
good relationship with ‘foreigner affair department, the government of Cape Town, United
Nation and the media’. (Interview: A. Rahman)

The RRCT maintains ties with SA political authorities at different levels. According to its
leader, this organization has a “good” relationship with the ministry of home affairs and
different Human Rights organizations.

Our organization has a closer tie with the Department of Home Affairs. Sometimes we
invite HA to come to our meetings and we tell them our problems and they advise us on
what to do. We have been interacting with high authorities in this country like ministers,
deputy minister, regional and local Home Affairs authorities. (Interview: S.
Bavugamenshi)

Congolese organizations studied are interested in influencing the South African government
to assist with peace keeping in their country. Two of them; DRCASA and Amis BK claim to
have close ties with the South Government authorities while the CSN is still forging the
relationship. The characteristics of their claimed relationships are explained below:

Our organization works with the parliament on African issues especially about problems
that DRC is facing. At the parliament they have also a portfolio that is dealing with
immigrant’s integration On the African day, we come at the parliament as different
nationalities and celebrate our diversities and make our voice heard. (Interview: JJ.
Somwe)

Last year when the M23 rebel group was controlling the entire East of Congo, we met
with the South African parliament and raised some points like while South Africa is a
member of SADC why is it keeping quiet on what is happening in Congo. They
promised that they were going to send people there to analyses the situation and advise
the parliament what to do. And it is after that meeting when South African government
was involved in the problem of Congo. And we believe that our interaction with the
South African parliament influenced the central government to be involved in the Congo case. (Interview: A. Namufakage)

Regarding initiatives aimed to integrate immigrants in South Africa. Each organization has initiatives aimed to integrate their members into the South African Community. Some are common to many organizations, while others are specific to some communities. In order to reduce the hatred against Somalis in townships, the SCB initiated a “self protection program”. In this program, this organization motivate their members especially those in Townships to be involved in local community initiatives. This organization is also creating “street committees” that are aimed to promote the security concerns of Somalis who live in different townships.

We encourage our members to attend churches of South Africans and donate to local churches. We encourage them also to be part of the local community where they are, and support their neighbours whenever they are in need, eg. Funerals, local communities development projects, etc”. Furthermore, we are creating ‘Street Committees’ that will be composed by both Somalis and South Africans in order to encourage locals to protect Somalis. (Interview: AR. Sheikh)

Like SCB, the AICT also is involved in integrating Somalis community in the South African citizens. They do it through skills transfer initiatives in which they teach South Africans how to run a small business. This organization identifies also some people in the local communities who need a help. This help goes also to non-South Africans.

Firstly, as refugees we are helping South African by employing them in our businesses, teaching them how to start business. We show them where to buy goods and how to look for clients. Secondly, now days some Somalis are involved in community development projects in different townships and donate whenever it is needed. We help also other immigrants, for instance last year we gave donation to Burundian in townships. We do also cleaning of this Belleville CBD, last year we did it twice and we are planning to do it again this year. Thirdly, our organization works with other South African Organizations. For example some of them give scholarships to Somalis students. We
have also a good relationship with Darul Islam Foundation Trust, Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) and African Muslims Agency. (Interview A. Rachid)

Immigrant organizations are involved in promoting the social cohesion through civic education and cultural events. For example, SASA organizes different educating programs for both Somalis and South Africans on different cultural background and promoting social cohesion between immigrants and citizens (Interview: A Khalif). The RRCT sometimes gets involved in local cultural events. In those cases are represented by the ‘Solange’s cultural team’. (Interview: S Bavugamenshi) The CSN is planning to bring together both South Africans and African immigrants through cultural events.

In order to help the Congolese community to integrate in the South Africa community DRCASA does the following initiatives.

Advocacy with the home affairs: now many Congolese are getting refugee status. It was due to our effort in advocating for our people. These refugee status are very important, we have case of our members who managed to get scholarships at UCT, UWC, some are doing their masters and these is some of our achievements.

UN need assessment: we do work with the UN to do a need assessment for Congolese in Cape Town. The outcome of this process is that there is a group of people who are going to be resettled in other countries like Canada, USA or Australia. This is a kind of integration, because we do a need assessment, and if we find that a person is not able to live in this country they send him to another country. (Interview: JJ. Somwe)

Amis BK has different initiatives that aimed to bring together Congolese and South Africans. The first initiative is ‘volunteerism’. In this program, Congolese promote the social cohesion through tutoring for free, South African students in science. According to the Amis BK’s leader, this program ran for two years and stopped due to the lack of a bank account that funders could use for that project.

In 2011 and 2012 we had a volunteering project in Langa Township to teach South African students in public schools maths and physics, which is part of integration. We wanted to show citizens that it is not what people are talking that migrants came to take
their jobs and their women. But they have got capacity to teach their kids for free math and science which is in need in this country. (Interview: A. Namufakage)

The Amis BK organizes ‘events and workshops’. Regarding events, migrants form teams and play soccer and sometime they play with local clubs. They run also workshops concerning HIV/AIDS which is attended by both South Africans and foreigners. Another initiative is marriage; Some Congolese are married to South Africans. For example ‘the son you just saw now his mother is a Xhosa’. (Interview: A. Namufakage)

The Amis BK members are integrated through religious activities. Every last Sunday of the month they have meetings at the Mowbray Baptist church free of charge. Furthermore, some members of this organization attend to South African’s churches and some South Africans attend Congolese churches. (Interview: A. Namufakage)

In my church the head pastor is from Congo but the assistant pastor is a Zulu and the women ministry leader is also South African. In the beginning we started with one church service in Observatory in 2001, and now we have two services; English and French service. (Interview: A. Namufakage)

The RBSDAM is involved also in integrating their members into local churches. Kuils River and Retreat Seventh Day Adventist churches are typical good stories of immigrant’s integration. At Retreat SDA church, Rwandans and Burundians immigrants use the church each Friday for their religious meetings. At Kuils River SDA church they meet every last Saturday of the month for a half day program. Furthermore, each trimester they have a ‘combine meeting’ which is a full day program.

The RHF leader reveals that for Rwandans to be integrated in South African community, they need to be united first. They must learn from the unity in diversity that characterise South African.

South Africa, as diverse country, presents an ideal case to learn about social cohesion. With the understanding of the values of social cohesion, Rwandans would be in a better
position to cohabitate and integrate in the South Africana society. (Interview: V. Kalitanyi)

Conclusions

By looking at the profile, character and role of immigrant associations and how they shape survival strategies as well as possible paths to integration of African immigrants in Cape Town, South Africa, this chapter reveals that migration is a network-creating process that stimulates individuals to construct new social relationships that can ease travel and adaptation in the host society. In the case of Cape Town, since the late 1990s, there have been many new migrant organisations that have sprung up. I was able to identify more than seven organised nationalities from: Rwanda, Congo, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burundi, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Each nationality has several different kinds of associations. The Congolese cluster of sub-organisations numbers at least 17.

Most organizations studied are domestically based and have local offices or physical meeting places. Some of these organisations (e.g.) tend to provide mostly local services and solidarity during xenophobic attacks thereby contributing to survival strategies. There are organisations where people cannot back home – hence they experience “blocked transnationalism” compared to the more conventional economic migrant associated with Latin America. However, two Somali organizations are involved in regular transnational activities with their home countries: The Ogaden Community of South Africa supports freedom fighters and humanitarian activities for people displaced by the Ogaden war. The Somali Community Board cooperates with the Somalia central government to advocate for Somali diaspora.

In South Africa, immigrant organizations have many programmes and initiatives for integration in the South African Community. Among them they are:

‘Street committees’ that are aimed to promote the security concerns of Somalis who live in different streets.
‘Skills transfer initiatives’ in which immigrants teach South Africans how to run a small business.

‘Social cohesion’ through local and international events

‘Advocacy’ with government institutions like home affairs and international organizations like the United Nation

‘Volunteerism’ in teaching some township student maths and physics for free

‘Religious activities’ that bring together immigrants and South Africans.

These organizations are involved in the fight against xenophobia, and they help their members affected by xenophobic attacks. The following are the different organizations’ initiatives:

Mobilizing members to give accommodation, food and blankets to affected people;

They raise funds to donate some money to those that shops had been looted so that they could restart their business activities;

Sharing information on the progress of xenophobia and referring victims to civil society organizations or government departments that could help them;

They provide vehicles to save people and their goods;

Opened the mosque for people to sleep-in and their religious leaders talked to survivals to give them a word of encouragement and hope.

Public demonstration to the South Africa parliament to plead for the immigrant’s protection.

Immigrants organizations raise funds to help their poor members; they cover funeral expenses, help orphans, act as micro financiers for those that want to start their small business and provide assistance with procuring documents. Immigrant organizations deal with South African government whenever there is a matter that needs advocacy. However, due to a slow integration related to tough immigration policies few immigrants are able to get citizenship and integrate in South African politics. Nevertheless, in some isolated cases immigrants organization managed to influence the SA government policies in their benefits. Most organisations have interacted with local government. As mentioned above, the urban location of almost all refugees and the absence of refugee camps give a central role to the
local government in taking care and implementing refugees’ rights. In spite of this, the role of local government in the provision of services to refugees has not been clearly spelled out, either in the Refugee Act or in other policy documents. To deal with this unwelcoming state, African immigrants in South Africa relied increasingly on ethnic organizations to advocate for themselves and fill the void created by the lack of the government protection in their lives.

While there are different kinds of exclusions from the state institutions to local community, leaders of immigrant organizations are optimistic and believe that immigrants should be naturalised, and this will not affect their relationship with their home country. Having South African citizenship is not a problem for Rwandan and Somali communities because their countries accept dual citizenship. However, in DRC this policy option is still under review at the parliament level. Therefore, Congolese prefer to keep their Congolese nationality than South African citizenship. Finally, I can say that no balanced understanding of current developments is possible without grasping the pivotal role of immigrants’ own organisations.
Chapter Nine: Discussion and conclusions

This chapter addresses the primary findings and secondary insights of the research bearing in mind the original objectives of this study. It also presents recommendations for ameliorating the situation of African immigrants in South Africa. Finally, this chapter ends with a discussion, and agenda for future research. The primary objective of this study has been to analyse the experiences of African immigrants and grasp the various role of immigrant organizations and how they have shaped their integration. I also considered how they mediate the impacts of xenophobia in Cape Town. The study utilized three different qualitative methodologies (document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and life story interviews). Archival document analysis revealed that there is a policy silence in the CoCT regarding immigrant’s integration. Instead of being an inclusive city for all, immigrants are effectively excluded in the city’s social –economic policies and programmes. This is seen in the lack of policy that openly accommodates immigrants’ integration. The existing fragmentations of Cape Town (and the racist social geography) as well as settlement patterns and work preferences of immigrants make the life of different groups of foreign africans very complex.

From the life stories interviews I was able to shed light on the context of exit, the journey to and reception of African immigrants in Cape Town. Findings reveal the hardship immigrants endure in the journey to South Africa and problems they face in their efforts to integrate in South African society and how connections are used (thus confirming Portes’ insights). The semi-structured interviews reveal that African immigrants are discriminated and excluded in the city’s private and public spaces but they have various ways of coping. The most dangerous and unsettling spaces for immigrants are in informal settlements and spaza shops where most xenophobic attacks occur and the Cape Town Home Affairs office. My findings reveal consistently the central role of immigrant organizations in negotiating survival. space and dealing with xenophobic attacks on their community members.

This next section of this final chapter discusses the research objectives with emphasis on data obtained during the fieldwork portion of this study and supplemented with pre-existing
scholarship explained in the literature review. I have arranged the rest the chapter by referring to my original objectives spelt out in chapter 1.

The broad aim of the study was to comprehend Cape Town’s African working class immigrants’ self-activity, their experiences and local government’s policy silences. I considered the profile, character and role of immigrant associations and how they shaped survival strategies as well as possible paths to integration/assimilation. My specific objectives therefore were to: first to document and analyse Cape Town’s immigrant originations and associations and the role of transnational identities in shaping integration; second, to explore the local state’s policies silences and campaigns against xenophobia and racism, third to document immigrant’s experience of immigration bureaucracy (Home Affairs and so on). Fourth, to investigate their involvement in the wider social integration into urban life in Cape Town.

The first objective of the study was to develop an understanding of Cape Town’s immigrant originations and associations and the role of transnational identities in shaping integration. The data source used to meet this objective was interviews with leaders of prominent immigrant organizations in the City. These findings were presented in detail in chapter seven.

Most immigrants organizations studied are domestically based, with exception of two Somali organizations that are explicitly transnational: The Ogaden Community of South Africa supports freedom fighters and humanitarian activities for people displaced by the Ogaden war; the Somali Community Board cooperates with the Somalia central government to advocate for the Somali diaspora. The main resource of immigrant organizations is members’ contribution which is given through what might be termed ‘bounded solidarity’. According to Portes and Landolt (2000: 533) bounded solidarity is when immigrants ‘grant resources to others out of solidarity with members of the same territorial, ethnic or religious community. This source is not based on general values, but on the ‘particularistic loyalties to a relevant in-group’. This study found that African immigrants in South Africa rely heavily on ethnic organizations to integrate into the South African community. These organizations provide a partial solution to government failure. They raise funds to help poor members and associates; they cover funeral expenses, help orphans, act as micro-financiers for those that want to start their small business. The following are some
examples of initiatives that I uncovered that are aimed at defending, advancing and supporting immigrants and their rights.

- **Street committees**: these are committees initiated by Somali immigrants who live in different Cape townships. Significantly, these are composed by both Somali and South African citizens and aim to promote the security concerns of Somalis who live in different townships.

- **Skills transfer initiatives**: within these immigrants teach South Africans how to run a small business and they have been promoted by Somali business people.

- **Social cohesion through sport**: African immigrants of Cape Town are involved in some local and international events like the 2010 world cup and this was highlighted by immigrants. Some immigrant organizations organize sports or religious events that accommodate citizens.

- **Advocacy**: Immigrant organizations advocate on the behalf of their members. Since most immigrants have a problem of identification documents, these organization act as a bridge between them and the Department of Home Affairs. They intervene also in matters related to NGOs like the United Nation for Refugees (UNHCR).

- **Volunteerism**: In order to change the perceptions of South Africans have toward immigrants, some immigrants organizations have started initiatives to do volunteers works for citizens. For example, Amis BK members teach for free students in township maths and physics. Somali organizations advise their members to be involved in local activities aimed to help local communities.

- **Education**: Some organizations focus on education of their members. AICT and SCB promote Islamic education. AICT has its own school in Bellville for young and old while SCB assists Islamic schools by providing teachers. Other organizations teach their members about HIV/AIDS and cultural and history of their countries.

- **Religious activities**: some immigrant organizations organize events that accommodate South African citizens for example Amis BK and Somali Community Board. They also encourage their members to join churches in their neighbourhoods.
• **Religious activities:** some organizations organize religious activities in immigrants’ mother tongues

• **Social Cohesion:** Some immigrant organizations create a platform aimed to promote a positive cohabitation between members. In case of conflict, some organizations play a mediating role between parties in conflict. Other organizations create a platform for discussion on their country’s problems.

• **Cultural Events:** In order to preserve and transfer their cultures to the young generations, immigrants organizations organize events that exhibit their traditions. For example, the DRCASA organize events in which different Congolese tribes come together to celebrate their diversity through cultural events.

Immigrant organizations are involved in the fight against xenophobia, and they help members who have been affected by xenophobic attacks. The following are the different organizational initiatives:

• Mobilizing members to give accommodation, food and blankets to affected people;

• Raising money to donate to those whose shops had been looted so that they could restart their business activities;

• Sharing information on the spread of xenophobia and referring victims to civil society organizations or government departments that could help them;

• To provide vehicles to save people and their goods;

• making their mosques available for people to sleep-in.

• doing public demonstrations to the South Africa parliament to plead for the immigrant’s protection.

These findings are in line with Portes *et al.*, 2008 who point out that immigrant organisations are important for three reasons: Firstly, “individual immigrants seldom enter a country or participate in its politics on their own”. They do so cooperatively working within networks organized by
activists within their own communities or with external ones. Secondly, the lives of immigrants centre on the on-going relations between immigrants and their places of origin as well as integrating into their host communities creating “dual loyalties”. “The back-and-forth traffic builds multifaceted social fields spanning national boundaries” (Portes et al, 2008: 1057). The third idea is that according to Portes, et al, (2008:1958) “ethnic and transnational politics may not be incompatible but may reinforce each other, giving rise to positive synergies that promote incorporation”. I have taken these three ideas as central themes for this thesis. I hope to have adequately explored these with empirical data. However, South African scholarship could be expanded to include Portes’ insights.

The second objective of the study explored the local state’s policies, silences and campaigns against xenophobia and racism, and immigrants’ experiences vis-à-vis immigration bureaucracy (Home Affairs). The data source used to meet this objective was document analyses and interviews with poor migrants and leaders of immigrant organizations and key informants. These findings were presented in chapter 5, 6 and 7.

Policy silences: African immigrants play a vital role in the CoCT’s urban life. Alongside rural migrants from the Eastern Cape (labelled as refugees by the City leaders) and elsewhere in South Africa, they are reshaping the configuration of the city (McDonald 2008, Peberdy and Jara, 2011). They have increased the number and visibility of black people in the city, and are changing the city’s social economic dynamics. Immigrants are also contributing to the city’s economy, learning local languages and in some cases joining local political parties. Highly skilled and even less skilled immigrants are working in different companies, restaurants, and in homes; others are self-employed in the small business sector especially in the township economy in spaza shops and transport services.

But my findings reveal that these developments occur in a policy vacuum. The CoCT has no policy that is aimed at immigrants’ integration into the local community. There is little evidence of attempts to enforce basic regulations and protections for foreign african workers in their workplaces. In a review of three policies; ‘responsible tourism policy for the CoCT, ‘policy on vulnerable groups’ and the social development strategy’ the results show that immigrants are not
considered as members of the CoCT’s community who have something to contribute to the city’s social- economic dynamics. Surprisingly, while xenophobia is a security concern for the people of the city and costs the taxpayers a lot of money, the city does not have a clear long-term plan to fight it.

The study compared the social development strategy policy draft document and the approved policy and found discrepancies between the two documents. For example in the matter related to immigrants as it is this study’s focus, the draft policy was more progressive and immigrants’ integration was considered. For instance at the “Goal 4: Enhancing community participation and involvement” immigrants were going to be accommodated in the city’s plans as follow:

- Complement the capacity of NGO’s dealing with refugee community;
- Capacity building for community leaders to deal effectively with issues pertaining to sustainable relationships between foreign nationals and host communities;
- Regulate and monitor selling and renting of houses to foreign nationals to start small businesses;
- Empower both foreign nationals and locals with entrepreneurial skills and mentoring services;
- Implement cultural and sport activities to integrate foreign nationals and locals;
- Involve foreign nationals in poverty reduction programs and social security networks; and
- Ensure that in all programmes implemented / sponsored by government, foreign nationals are involved.

Surprisingly, when this policy was reviewed for approval, all proposals that aimed to integrate immigrants in the CoCT were removed and the approved policy has no provision for immigrants’ integration.
Moreover, the study found that there is a blame game between the local government and the central government about who is responsible for serving immigrants. The CoCT wants to shift all responsibilities toward migration management to the government of South Africa and the Department of Home Affairs. The CoCT as several scholars argue is more interested in policies that are intended to attract and retain transnational capital and capital accumulation strategies.

Immigrants are entitled to receive the same service delivered by the local government as local citizens however; the CoCT does not want to take responsibility. Instead, the blame is shifted to the central government. Not only is there a lack of knowledge and awareness at local government street level (metro cops for example on refugee rights), but there appears to be no plans for ensuring that services are extended to refugees.

The study found that xenophobic attacks have negative impacts on both immigrants and taxpayers. For example during the 2008 xenophobic violence the CoCT spent R47, 2 million in fighting xenophobia, and Council condoned a further R106 million which was incurred in the 2009 financial year (Media release, June 2009). In order to attend to the need of people that was affected by the 2008 xenophobia and promote a re-integration of victims in the local communities, the city initiated different strategies such as:

- The City established six temporally shelters to people displaced by the attacks; at Harmony Park, Soetwater, Silverstroom, Blue Waters, Strand and Youngsfield Military Base).

- The city commissioned a study that aimed to investigate the root cause of the tensions that exist between these traders so that remedial action can be taken. One of findings indicated that there is a lack of business skills on the side of South African citizens. Hence, the City provided up to 20 scholarships for local township traders to participate in an accelerated entrepreneurship training programme at the Tertiary School in Business Administration (TSiBA).

Immigrants in the CoCT face different kinds of discriminations in addition to the usual discriminations faced by black skinned people. My interviewees cited ”jealousy” toward immigrants, business competition between locals and immigrants, media that promote the hate
and stereotypes; employers who prefer to hire immigrants because they will not claim their
rights, and political reasons in a since that after service delivery protests immigrants shops are
looted and local politicians condone it as a lawful action. Discrimination toward immigrants is
found also in the housing distribution. While the South African constitution give immigrants the
right to a shelter and there is no refugees camps to host new comers, immigrants are excluded
from the list of RDP houses. African immigrants do risky jobs or jobs that are far below their
qualifications. Respondents indicated that most problems they get with banks are opening bank
accounts in Cape Town commercial banks. Those who got bank accounts, are asked to go back
to the DHA to ask for verification every time they bring an extended identification papers,
otherwise their accounts would be frozen. Police officers don’t respect black immigrants (a
problem experienced by most blacks) even when they have their valid papers. The study finds
that immigrants are discriminated when not knowing the local languages, but a number can
speak a local black language unlike South African whites and coloureds. This findings are in line
with past researchers (McDonald 2008, Peberdy and Jara 2011) who described post-apartheid
Cape Town as a ‘neo-apartheid city—without legalized racism and discrimination but with
continuing working-class exclusion, marginalization and exploitation that benefits a small,
mainly white elite and still couples race and class in a largely segregated city’. Cape Town is a
highly fragmented society, with huge problems of integration, social inclusion and effective
democracy.

The study also found that in South Africa there is an institutionalized discrimination done through
the department of Home affairs. When South Africa became a democratic country it opened its
doors to immigrants. However, instead of welcoming them it has built a virtual wall, stronger
than the electrical fences that were being used during the apartheid era to block African
immigrants entering South Africa. This virtual fence is done through harsh immigration regime
administered by the Department of Home Affairs. Immigrants receive a bad treatment by some
officers when acquiring identification documents. There is also unjustified delay in processing
application for asylums, appeals, and permanent residences.
The South African asylum seekers management system should be standardised and follow
international guidelines in dealing with asylum seekers. However, the process at this Department
is there to make asylum seekers’ lives miserable. Firstly, there are no harmonized procedures at
Cape Town Refugee Reception Office (RRO). Officials are arbitrary; the Cape Town office does not respect other stakeholders that have a mandate to protect the interest of asylum seekers and refugees. Asylum seekers and refugees are not welcomed in the CoCT and this is indicated by the closure of the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office (RRO). Instead of finding an appropriate space to build a Refugee Reception Office, the CoCT with the support of the DHA, have decided to close the Cape Town RRO. Since 2012, this office has stopped receiving newcomers, and it is currently processing the remaining files before it can close completely. This decision is an indication that asylum seekers are not needed in the CoCT and it has jeopardizes their life in a since that they must go to apply for asylum in Durban, Pretoria or at Messina and this is costly.

This study reaffirms that South Africa is following the ‘heartland policing modal’ revealed by (Crush 1997: 33). The model consists of making undocumented migrants lives so insecure and unpleasant through constant policing and harassment, and prosecuting employers who hire them, the economic incentives for coming to South Africa are reduced and the social costs of living “illegally” in South Africa are raised.

The objective three was to look at the official policy rhetoric of South Africa as an African country and how these are understood by immigrants. Findings reveal that since 1994, the South African foreign policy on the continent has shifted from unilateralism under the presidency of Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki’s multilateralism. While the former had a strong human rights orientation, the latter brought the logics of market-based economics to the fore (Southall, 2006: 4). However, when it comes to migration management South Africa is opposed to regional integration which would facilitate human and capital free movement into the region. For example at SADC level some countries suggested a free movement model for migration management in a protocol named “The SADC Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in Southern Africa”. The Protocol would commit the SADC states to a policy of free movement (along the European Union model) within ten years (Crush 1997: 33). In 2000, the SADC Free Trade Protocol was ratified. However, attempts to move towards the free movement of people within the SADC have not been successful. The first attempt to craft a SADC-wide protocol on free movement was strongly opposed by South Africa which in essence is one of the contributing
factors to xenophobia as observed by Crush, Williams and Peberdy (2005: 23). I would argue that South Africans want to take advantage of the continent’s economy without taking responsibility for its people. This kind of cynical hijacking of an African continental identity is evident in mega-events such as the Soccer World Cup.

The objective four investigated the local immigrant’s involvement in the *wider* social integration into urban life in Cape Town. Data source for this objective was through interviews with key informants and leaders of immigrants organizations. They are presented mainly in chapter six and eight of this thesis.

The thesis developed an understanding of the mediating role played by Cape Town’s African foreign immigrant organisations. By looking at the profile, character and role of immigrant associations I showed that immigrant organisations have proactive survival strategies which point to possible paths to integration. Immigrant organisations are involved in transnational collective actions that navigate their identities across the spaces of origin and new settlement.

The study found, immigrant’s organizations have initiatives to assist their members to integrate in the CoCT. Immigrant’s organizations raise funds from their members’ contributions which are used to help immigrants in different activities like covering funeral expenses for its members, covers the wedding costs and help orphans. Furthermore, some organizations use these funds to help members who need to start their small businesses after their shops have been looted during xenophobic attacks.

- **Ties with the local government:** Migrants organizations maintain ties with South African politicians at national and local levels. At the central government, immigrants dealt with different ministries such as ‘foreign affair department, or department of home affairs. At local level, they sometimes get invited to participate in meetings organized by local authorities like other local organizations (especially with attacks). They have also a relationship with the United Nation High Commission for Refugees, the media and different Human Rights organizations.
**Advocacy:** Three immigrant’s organizations that do advocacy. The SCB, DRCAS and SASA raise issues of concern with the South African Government.

Beside the policy silence at the CoCT level, the immigrations laws are designed to make immigrants’ life difficulty. The study found that while xenophobia is deadly, it is localized and not regular. However, it has been highlighted that the service at the DHA is the worse since immigrants’ rights given by international and South African laws are forfeited. While the local government is less interested in immigrants’ integration, immigrant organizations are playing a pivotal role in shaping their integration. These organizations play a central role in helping members to integrate in the city’s cosmopolitan society. They have initiatives that are aimed at bringing them together with citizens like street committees; skills transfer initiatives, social cohesion programs, advocacy, volunteerism initiatives, religious events, and keeping ties with the local authorities. In addition, immigrant organizations intervene whenever there are xenophobic attacks on immigrants.

**Policy and other recommendations**

The City and policy makers should recognise and support the role of immigrant organizations

In the CoCT while each immigrant organizations has a specific group focus, yet there are cross cutting issues that affect all groups. These organizations are not effective in defending immigrants’ rights generally or their members because they do not have the common voice. Therefore, immigrant organizations should create a network that will allow them to work together so that they may have a common vision in their endeavours to finding solutions to immigrants’ problems, including fighting xenophobia. In order to raise funds, immigrants’ organizations leaders need to be trained on writing fund-raising proposals.

Immigrant organizations should promote the social cohesion and respect for difference as well as understandings of difference between their members and South African citizens within a progressive human rights, gender and workers rights framework. Religious differences need to be respected. They must also educate their members about apartheid and should learn more about the liberation struggle fought by South Africans.
At the surface level African immigrants are integrated since they are allowed to live within the local community. However, without a proper integration policies at all spheres of the government xenophobia will prevail and immigrants will continue to be victims of social exclusion. As Crush, Williams and Peberdy (2005: 1) argued:

> Because migration is a cross-cutting phenomenon, it needs to be integrated into all facets of state policy-making and planning, including programs and strategies to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality. For this to happen, migration’s key role needs to be documented by researchers and recognized by policy-makers.

Hence I propose the following mundane but important recommendations to the local government, the department of Home Affairs and immigrant’s organizations in solving the integration challenges.

Discrimination against african immigrants in the city’s policy should be addressed in the following ways.

- There is a lack of empirical data on immigrants in the CoCT. This is major gap because without it there is no effective planning. Therefore, the local government needs to do a survey on immigrants and their organisations. The results of the study will help the local government to better plan and address the discrimination immigrants are facing. Data may be used also in planning how immigrants may contribute to the city’s economy and address the skills shortage.

- The reworking of the strategic planning policy to accommodate immigrants since it had a provision to integrate them in the city’s socio-economic dynamics. However, they have been neglected in the final policy. This policy should be revised to recognise African immigrants as a catalytic force.

- The city does not have a clear policy on combating xenophobia. It intervenes like other organizations, while xenophobia is an ongoing phenomenon. The city should have a tailored emergency plan that will be used whenever there are xenophobia incidences. And immigrants should be consulted when designing this policy.
South African government and the local government should propose a registration that addresses integration. The result will be that xenophobic citizens will fear to attack immigrants but learn to live with immigrants.

Since young people are future leaders of the country they need to be syllabus within the school’s curriculum, from primary school to universities about forced migration, racism, xenophobia and human rights of migrants in South Africa.

The city should recognize and support immigrant organizations’ efforts in fighting xenophobia, and use them to facilitate immigrants’ integration. The government should also use immigrant organizations if there is any information needed to reach immigrants.

The city should make language service available to immigrants wherever they need it. In addition, there should be programs designed for adult immigrants to learn English and other local languages.

Deliberate policy to play an important role in accessing health, education, business, etc

All institutions that deal directly with migrants (DHA, SASSA, police, banks, department of education, etc) should cooperate in setting their policies order to reduce the discrimination that is caused by contradictory policies.

The government should initiate regular forums between immigrants and citizens under the state supervision. These forums should integrate the media (Television, Radio and online programs) focusing on the fight xenophobia through promoting the integration.

South Africa government should recognize publicly the contribution of immigrants especially African to the country’s social economic landscape. This will improve the perception of citizens toward migrants.

In South Africa, economic asylum seekers and illegal migrants are put in one category when it comes to service delivery while their status and rights are different. Policy makers should recognize this confusion and manage better immigration in South Africa.

Migrant organizations should receive government support. The CoCT should extend its sponsorship to these organizations so that they can accomplish their mandates.
- Proper training of those frontline staff who deal with immigrants.

The Department of Home affairs has a role to play in immigrants’ integration

- There is a need to accept the reality that migration is a worldwide phenomena and amend South African migration laws and regulations to facilitate the regional integration as well as regularize immigrants in the country as it is required by the South African constitution.

- DHA should review its decision to close the Cape Town Refugees Reception. The Refugees Act 1998 that is currently used is outdated since from the time it was approved and today there have been different realities that need to be addressed. Furthermore, there is a need to establish the power of human right lawyers since there is a conflict of interest between them and the Cape Town RRO. This will help the DHA to harmonize its operations, and unblock the asylum application process and serve immigrants better.

**Future research**

Academics focus on social exclusion of African immigrants in Cape Town and their organisations needs to move beyond the study of “victims”. There is a need for a critical analysis of the CoCT’s policies in order to show the complicity of the City and identify the gaps and stumbling blocks for immigrant integration and a more open city Future research should also explore the transnational activities of African immigrants in the CoCT as well as the whole South Africa in order to establish its role in African immigrants’ integrations.

Researchers need to explore the role of immigrant organizations in other cities in South Africa in order to have a more complete view of factors affecting immigrant integration in South Africa. Further research on the sending countries is needed to ensure that South African policy makers are aware of the conditions of exit. In the end, the idea of an African Renaissance or even more radical ideas such as Pan Africanism from below depends critically on how we deal with the “xenophobia/ afrophobia” question.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: LIST OF ORGANISATIONS PROFILED

Somalis Community Board
Somalis Association of South Africa
Ogaden Community of South Africa
Al-bayan Islamic Council Trust
Pentecostal Community Churches in Southern Africa
Rwanda Heritage Foundation
Rwanda/Burundian Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) Ministry of Cape Town,
Rwandan Refugees of Cape Town
Congo Square News
Democratic Republic Congolese Association of South Africa
Amis BK

APPENDIX II: LIST OF INTERVIEWS WITH LEADERS OF AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS ORGANIZATIONS

Abdi-Rashid Shiekh, leader of SCBSA, interviewed in Belleville, June 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2014
Abdul Khalif, leader of SASA, interviewed in Belleville, 2\textsuperscript{nd} of June, 2014
AbdilRahman Food, leader of OCSA, Interviewed in Belleville, May 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2014
Abdul Rachid the leader of SAICT, interviewed in Belleville, on the 4th June 2014, at 10:00.
P	extcopyright s Martin Mukeshimana, the pastor of PCCSA, interviewed in Salt River, on 08\textsuperscript{th}June 2014 at 09:30.
Vivence Kalitanyi, founder and chairperson of RHF, interviewed in Cape Town via internet, Jun 5, 2014
The (Interview R1), the coordinator of the Rwanda/Burundian Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) Ministry OF Cape Town, interviewed in Cape Town CBD, June 25\textsuperscript{th}, 2014
Salim Bavugamenshi, the chairperson of RRCT, interviewed in Maitland in June 08\textsuperscript{th}, 2014.
Oliver Tshinkyoka Mulombo the editor of CSN, Interviewed at Salt River, on 15th of June 2014.
Jean-Jacques Somwe, the chairperson of the DRCASA, interviewed in Observatory, on 24th June, 2014.
Amani, the chairperson of Amis BK, interviewed at Observatory, on 20-06-2014.

APPENDIX III: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES FOR LIFE STORIES
1 Muhamed Ahmed Akdi
2 Meyene Samiru
3 Mohamed Abdillahi Afdikher
4 Aves Guhirwe

APPENDIX IV: LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED OVER 2013-2014
Interview 1: Somalia, male
Interview 2: Ethiopia, Male
Interview 3: DRC, male
Interview 4: Somalia, male
Interview 5: Zimbabwean, female
Interview 6: DRC, male
Interview 7: Somalia, male
Interview 8: Rwandan, male
Interview 9: Rwanda, female
APPENDIX V: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR AFRICAN MIGRANTS IN CAPE TOWN

Place of interview..................Date of interview …/…./14 interview N0...........

1 Personal profile

1.1 Name..............................................................
1.2 Country of origin ..............................................
1.3 Gender .............................................................
1.4 Education............................................................
1.5 Occupation..........................................................
1.6 Legal status..........................................................

2. What is the main reason for coming to Cape Town and how long have you been here?

3. Can you tell me about what you expected?

4. Where did you first live, with whom and what kind of accommodation?

5. As an African how do you feel in Cape Town?

6. Who are your close friends and have you made new friends here?

7. Do you belong to clubs or a church or any organisation or organised activity?

8. What fears do you have about the current and future here?

9. Which are the places where you feel at ease?

10. Which groups of people (whites, coloured or South African Africans) do you find easiest to talk to about issues that concern you?

11. Do you speak a local language (Afrikaans, xhosa, etc)

12. How do you see yourself? You see yourself as a .......? or a south African?.....

13. Do you have any friends from the opposite sex?
14. Where do you get your information and news about your country of origin?
15. What benefits did you get from 2010 World Cup and what is your expectation do you have in the future mega sport/cultural African events?
16. Do you feel integrated in the South African community?
17. What marks you to be excluded/attacked in the SA community?
18. If you don’t want to be identified as foreign what do you do?
19. Do you socialise with South Africans? If not why?
20. Can you tell me more about what kind of treatment do you receive at the following places:
   20.1. Work
   20.2. Private life and public arenas
   20.3. Shops and restaurants
   20.4. Commercial transactions (e.g banks)
   20.5. Home affairs/police
21. Have you been a victim of xenophobic attack in Cape Town?
22. Have any friends and relatives been attacked?
23. In your opinion what is the cause of xenophobia in Cape Town?
24. In your opinion what can be done to improve the perception of South African community toward African immigrants?
25. Is there anything else that we should have talked about we did not?

APPENDIX VI: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS

LIFE STORIES

Place of interview……………………Date of interview …/…../14 interview N0…………

1. Name
2. When were you born and where (district, province, country)
3. What was the political situation in your country the time you were born?
4. What was the main event in the world?
5. What was the occupation of your parents?
6. What made you to flee your country?
7. Which countries did you transit in coming to RSA and what was your experience?
8. What was the reception in South Africa?
9. How did you get your first Home Affairs document?
10. Have been attacked in South Africa?
11. What are your plans for the future?

APPENDIX VII: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR LEADERS OF IMMIGRANTS ORGANIZATIONS

Part I- Information on the organization
1. Nationality of organisation and majority of members ..............................
2. Types of the organization........................................................................
3. Number of members.................................................................
4. Annual budget of the organization..................................................
5. Is your organization legally registered? Yes/no..............................
6. What is the physical address of this organization?..................................
7. What are the main concerns raised by members of this organization about problems they experience in South Africa? .................................................................
8. What is the principal objective of your organization?............................
9. What kinds of activities does the organization do in South Africa?...........
10. And is the organization also active in the home country? Yes/no? Please explain ...................................................................................................................
11. Has the organization become involved in any civic or political activity in South Africa? Yes/no? Please explain .................................................................
12. Does the organization maintain ties with South African political authorities at the local, state or provincial level? yes/no? Please describe these ties.............................
13. In your view, should immigrants become naturalized citizens of South Africa? Yes /No? Please explain ................................................................................................................
14. In your judgment, does your organization contribute to the integration of Congolese/Somalis/Rwandese to South Africa society? Yes/no? Please explain ................................................................................................................

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15. Is it possible to be a loyal Congolese/Somali/Rwandese and, at the same time, be South African citizen? Yes/no? Please explain ………………………………………………………………………

16. Participation in this organization helps its members secure employment, social connection, and personal assistance. Yes/no? Please explain ……………………………

17. Congolese/Somali/Rwandese immigrants place their obligation towards their home country above their integration. Yes/no? Please explain ………

18. Did Congolese/Somali/Rwandese immigrants benefit from involvement in African mega cultural event like 2010 World Cup? Yes/no? Please explain ………

19. This organization contributes to more active participation of Congolese/Somali/Rwandese immigrants in local events. Yes/no? Please explain …

20. It is possible for immigrants to integrate into church dominate by South African citizens. Yes/no? Please explain ………

21. Participation in this organization helps its members maintain ties with their home religious believes’. Yes/no? Please explain ………

22. This organization participates in ant- xenophobia campaigns in the city of Cape Town? Yes/no? Please explain ………

23. This organization helps Congolese/Somali/Rwandese survivals of xenophobia attacks in South Africa? Yes/no? Please explain ………