THE WESTPHALIAN MODEL AND TRANS-BORDER ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE CASE OF THE CHEWA KINGDOM OF MALAWI, MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science) in the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, Department of Political Studies, University of the Western Cape.

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June 2014
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KEYWORDS
Westphalia
Chewa
State
Sovereignty
Ethnic Identity
Malawi
Mozambique
Zambia
International Relations
Politics of Representation.
ABSTRACT

This study is an investigation of the informal trans-border Chewa ethnic movement of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia and its relationship to the formal state boundaries defined by the Westphalian model. The Chewa refer themselves as belonging to a Kingdom (formerly the Maravi Kingdom) which currently cuts across the three modern African states of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia and its paramount, King Gawa Undi, is based in Zambia. The secretariat of the kingdom is Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO), which is headquartered in Malawi. The fundamental quest of this study is to investigate how the Chewa understand, experience, manage and interpret the overlap between formal states (as defined by the Westphalian model) and informal trans-border ethnic identity without raising cross-border conflicts in the process. Indeed, it is this paradoxical co-existence of contradictory features of Westphalian political boundaries and trans-border ethnic identity that initially inspired this study.

The main research aim is to interrogate whether the Chewa Kingdom (of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia) is challenging or confirming state boundaries, and to reflect on what this means for the contemporary Westphalian model. In International Relations (IR), the Westphalian model provides the assumption that states are independent actors with a political authority based on territory and autonomy. Despite a large number of criticisms of the model, it has not completely been dismissed in explaining some elements of the international system. This is evident by the underlying assumptions and perspectives that still persist in IR literature as well as the growing contemporary debates on the model, especially on its related elements of state sovereignty and citizenship. In Africa, the literature focuses on the formal structures and ignores the role of informal trans-border traditional entities - specifically, how trans-border traditional entities affect the re-definition of state and sovereignty in Africa. Such ignorance has led to a vacuum in African IR of the potentiality of the informal to complement the formal intra-regional state entities. Within a historical and socio-cultural framework, the study utilises [social] constructivism and cultural nationalism theories to critically investigate and understand the unfolding relationship between the Westphalian state and Chewa trans-border community. Another supporting debate explored is the relevance of traditional authorities under the ambit of politics of representation. In this case, the study fits in the emerging debate on the meaning, experience and relevance of state sovereignty and national identity (citizenship) in Africa.

Drawing on a wide range of sources (informant interviews, focus group discussions, Afrobarometer survey data sets, newspaper articles and comparative literature surveys in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia), the study finds that although the upsurge of Chewa trans-border ethnic identity is theoretically contradictory to the Westphalian model, in practice it is actually complementary. Within the framework of [social] constructivism, the state has with some variations demonstrated flexibility and innovation to remain legitimate by co-opting the
Chewa movement. In this case, the study finds that the co-existence of Westphalian model and trans-border Chewa ethnic identity is mainly due to the flexibility of the state to accommodate informal ethnic expressions in ways that ultimately reinforces the mutual dependence of the states and the ethnic group. For instance, during the Chewa Kulamba ceremony held in Zambia, the state borders are ‘relaxed’ to allow unhindered crossing for the participants to the ceremony. This does not entail weakness of the state but its immediate relevance by allowing communal cultural expressions. Another finding is that the Chewa expression of ethnic identity could not be complete if it did not take a trans-border perspective. This set-up ensures that each nation-state plays a role in the expression of Chewa ethnic identity - missing one nation-state means that the historical and contemporary relevance of this identity would be lost. It is also this same set-up that limits the movement’s possibility to challenge the formal state.

This argument reinforces the social constructivist perspective that sovereignty is not static but dynamic because it fulfils different uses in a particular context. The overall argument of this study is that the revival of the informal Chewa trans-border traditional entity offers a new, exciting and unexplored debate on the Westphalian model that is possibly unique to the African set-up. One theoretical/methodological contribution of this study is that it buttresses some suggestions that when studying African IR, we have to move beyond the strict disciplinary boundaries that have defined the field and search for other related African state experiences. The study also strengthens one of the new approaches in understanding IR as social relations - in this approach, individuals and their activities or their social systems play a prominent role.
DECLARATION

I declare that The Westphalian Model and Trans-Border Ethnic Identity: The Case of the Chewa Kingdom of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Happy Mickson Kayuni

June 2014

Signed: … ………

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I want to thank my God for enabling me to attain this prestigious feat which could not have been possible- humanly speaking. Secondly, I want to thank my wife Annie and my sons, Vitumbiko and Vuyo, for their support throughout the period when I was working on this thesis. Thirdly, I want to thank the Political and Administrative Studies Department of the University of Malawi for providing the much needed financial support. Fourthly, I want to thank Dr Blessings Chinsinga for providing a vehicle during my research which enabled me to criss-cross the country and reaching as far as Mozambique and Zambia. Finally but not least, I want to thank my wonderful supervisors Professor Laurence Piper and Assoc. Professor Joelien Pretorius who provided support from the beginning.
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANC- African National Congress
CHEFO- Chewa Heritage Foundation
Coremo- Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique
CRC- Constitution Review Commission
DPP- Democratic Progressive Party
FGD- Focus Group Discussion
Frelimo- Frente de Liberacion de Mozambique
IR- International Relations
KCK- Kituo Cha Katiba
MCP- Malawi Congress Party
MMD- Movement for Multiparty Democracy
NSO- National Statistics Office
OAU- Organisation of African Unity
OSISA- Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa
PP- People’s Party
PRM- Partido Revolucionario de Mozambique
Renamo- Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana
SADCC- Southern African Development Coordination Conference
UDF- United Democratic Front
UNIP- United Nation Independence Party
ZTB- Zambia Tourist Board
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.1 Chapter introduction and background to the Study

This study emerged in order to investigate the informal trans-border Chewa ethnic movement of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, despite the likely barrier of formal state boundaries defined by the Westphalian model. It is this co-existence of seemingly contradictory features of the Westphalian model and trans-border ethnic identity that initially inspired this study. The treaty of Westphalia was signed on 24 October 1648 and symbolised the end of Europe’s ‘Thirty years’ religious war which had caused much political, social and economic upheaval in the region. An important element of this treaty is that it recognised the sovereignty and independence of each state. More precisely, it is argued that the treaty formalized the existence of the modern state system with states as legitimate entities with its rulers within specified political boundaries (Brown 1992; Boucher 1998; Gross 1948; Evans and Newnham 1990; Morgenthau 1985; Zacher 1992). As explained below is where the concept of the Westphalian model is drawn from and provides the contemporary characteristics of states. Based on this understanding of the concept, states are deemed independent entities with absolute authority within their borders. This study examines the Chewa Kingdom within the context of this conceptual understanding of the model.

Thus, this study, as already mentioned, focuses on the case of the Chewa kingdom\(^1\) which cuts across three countries: Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. At the pinnacle of the Chewa tradition is the Kulamba annual ceremony, held at the headquarters of Paramount Chief Gawa Undi in Katete, Zambia. Undi’s informal traditional authority extends to the countries of Mozambique and Malawi. This ceremony brings together about 150 thousand Chewa chiefs and sub-chiefs from Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. The British colonial government banned the ceremony in 1934 when it was noted that the Chewas paid more allegiance to the Paramount Chief compared to formal state authorities. The recent democratisation process in the region led to the revival of the Chewa kingdom by, amongst other things, restoring the Kulamba ceremony in 1994. The significance of the ceremony became more evident in 2007 when, for the first time, three heads of state (Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique) attended the ceremony. The importance of informal trans-border traditional authorities for these three countries was highlighted by the President of Malawi whilst attending the Kulamba ceremony, when he said, “Presidents of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia look up to you,

\(^1\)The term ‘kingdom’ is not used in this study to imply the strict contemporary understanding of a political entity of nation-state, but is loosely used to refer to trans-border geographical areas (in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia) that are Chewa-dominated and recognise the traditional authority of Kalonga Gawa Undi. Whilst acknowledging that there are some conceptual differences, for the purposes of this study the terms ‘Chewa Kingdom’, ‘Chewa ethnic movement’ or simply ‘Chewa transborder community’ have interchangeably been used. Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO), as explained later in Chapter 5, is a registered secretariat which aims at protecting the interest of the Chewa people.
chief, for the social and economic prosperity of their countries” (Mana 2007). The Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO) was recently created by Undi to act as a Secretariat to him and the chiefs in the three countries. Its headquarters are in Malawi and the current Chairperson of the Foundation is the former Vice-President of Malawi, Dr Justine Malewezi.

Specifically, this study sets out to argue that although African states are arguably operating to a larger extent within the dictates of the Westphalian model with all its formalised structures, an informal trans-border ethnic entity such as the Chewa Kingdom of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique is a unique example of a conceptual problem associated with the model. This is especially true in the core elements of the model’s definition of state and sovereignty. Taking into consideration that many scholars (Brown 2006, Engel and Olsen 2010, Englebert 2009, Englebert 1997, Grovogui 2002, Herbst 2001) have already explored the relevance or irrelevance of the Westphalian model in Africa using the formal institutional analysis, this study goes a step further by, *inter alia*, attempting to revisit the model through an informal, trans-border, empirically-driven, African case study. Suffice to mention that not all the afore-mentioned scholars were using the term Westphalian model as such but examined the elements embedded within the model in their analyses.

1.2 Problem Statement

Despite the Westphalian model’s influence in IR, the concept has, over the years, been relentlessly criticised by numerous scholars, especially after the end of the Cold War. These scholars have *inter alia* argued that the model is a myth or that it is no longer relevant; others argue that it needs to be replaced (Bryce in Gross 1948, Barkey and Parikh1991, Zacher 1992, Nagengast1994, Hirsch 1995, Krasner 1996, Clapham 1996, Mann 1997, Precee 1997, Robinson 1998, Krasner1999, Strange 1999, Buzan and Little 1999, and Philpott 1999). To some extent, the criticism of the model is well founded and should have closed the debate some years back. However, the major problem with critics is that they tend to focus on the classical definition of the model whilst ignoring its evolutionary aspect. As Valaskakis (2001) argues, a focus on the principles of the Westphalian model should not specifically highlight what was signed in 1648, because the model has evolved over the years to include later international treaties and conventions. More importantly, scholars such as Engel and Olsen (2010) argue that the model cannot be ignored as a starting point in the analysis of the contemporary state system. Consequently, the model’s key aspects such as state sovereignty and citizenship are the focal points of this study. It is against this background that this study aligns itself with the recent growing body of relevant literature which further extends the debate on the Westphalian model and its associated concepts by, among other things, calling for a revisit of the model (Hettne 2000, Philpott 2000, Burch 2000, Sindjoun 2001, McGwire 2001, Valaskakis 2001, Falk 2002a, Falk 2002b, Kissinger 2002, Kegley and Raymond 2002, Lake 2003, Beaulac 2004, Axtmann 2004, Brown 2006, Walker 2007, Lisberg 2008, Rudolph and Rudolph 2010, and Kayuni 2011). Through a systematic, critical analysis of the said

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2At the time of this study, the CHEFO Chairperson was Dr Justine Malewezi but now its Professor Kanyama Phiri of Malawi.
growing body of literature, the contribution of this study to IR scholarship is to go beyond the prevailing debate and to make an attempt at filling the empirical and conceptual gaps (from an African perspective) in the model’s debate as identified below.

1.3 Research Question and Claim
This study is based on the following research question: Is the Chewa community (of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia) challenging the Westphalian Model? The study claims that the revival of the Chewa trans-border community is constructed in a way not to challenge the Westphalian model, but rather reinforces the flexibility or adaptable nature of Westphalian state sovereignty.

1.4 Study Objectives
The specific objectives of the study are:

1. To analyse briefly the socio-political transitions of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia with special reference to the role of traditional authorities or politics of representation;
2. To trace the origin, development and contemporary organisation of traditional trans-border Chewa entity of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique;
3. To analyse the extent to which the revival of Chewa ethnic identity accommodates contemporary state sovereignty (and borders);
4. To examine the extent to which Chewa cultural trans-border ceremonies pose as a challenge to state sovereignty.

These objectives were primarily constructed in order to answer the main research question provided in Section 1.3 above. In other words, each objective is providing a specific answer to the question. Apart from answering the above stated overarching question, ultimately these objectives also provide a coherent linkage of the core elements of this thesis. For instance, objective 1 is meant to provide an understanding of the evolution of the Westphalian model up to the present as it has been applied to the area in which the Chewa Kingdom operates (Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia). In dialectic reasoning, objective 1 provides the argument with its thesis. Objective 2 allows an exploration of the Chewa cross-border community up to the present and as such (in the dialectic logic that the argument follows) poses as the antithesis to objective 1. Objective 3 synthesises the thesis (the Westphalian model) and the antithesis (the Chewa cross border community’s revival) by analysing how the Chewa identity (ethnic nationalism) is constructed by the representatives of the Chewa and the three states. Objective 4 provides an empirical example of this social construction of the Chewa activities vis-a-vis the Westphalian model by investigating the most important manifestation of the Chewa revival, the cultural ceremony. The ceremony is an especially apt illustration of the claim that the thesis makes, because it involves the crossing of borders. The ease with which borders can be crossed can be seen as a test of how rigidly or flexibly the Westphalian model in its traditionally realist understanding is applied in an area.
1.5 Significance of the study

This study is significant in several respects. Falk (2002b:321) rightly states that the choice of either to refine or to drop the Westphalian model largely depends on undertaking several empirical studies. Accordingly, this study becomes part of the empirically-driven analysis that examines the model. Another significance of this study is its scope. The methodology is meant to address the perennial IR problem of balancing the relevance of research findings in relation to universalism and particularism. In this regard, Keller (2002:13) observes that “in the near term, Africanist students of politics should initiate studies in…international relations from the perspective of regions and sub-regions”. Consequently, this study agrees with Keller’s observation and takes a sub-regional (particularism) approach whilst interrogating a universal model.

In this case, there is a thriving body of literature yearning for an African contribution to IR scholarship (Nkiwane 2001, Dunn 2001, Brown 2006, Clapham 2006, Dietrich 2008, and Smith 2009). The argument is specifically that scholarly engagement of key IR concepts with an African contribution and perspective is largely ignored or sporadic. Consequently, this study attempts to contribute to IR scholarship by critiquing key IR concepts of state sovereignty and citizenship (as espoused in the Westphalian model) through an African case study. Thus this study is a contribution to ongoing “increasing scholarly attention to the influence of the state on social movements, ethnic mobilisation, and ethnic identity” (Barkey and Parikh1991:526). Notably, research on ethnic identity has mainly tended to focus on the politically ‘explosive’ groups which are explicitly and aggressively demanding their rights within the formalised state. Ethnic groups that have not been explicitly demanding their political rights have not attracted much attention. Ignoring such salient ethnic groups has led to a scholarship vacuum in IR. The choice of the Chewa ethnic group case study, in this case, is unique as the Chewa are not demanding the right to self-determination.

1.6 The Chewa Kingdom case study as a relevant approach

There are several reasons why the Chewa Kingdom case study is a relevant approach. Firstly, many scholars, such as Clapham (1996), have emphasised the importance of interrogating African IR using a bottom-up approach so as to complement and ‘even correct’ the top-down approach which has dominated IR. In an African setting, more social-political issues take place at local level than is reflected in the official documentation of the relevant government ministries. A bottom-up approach would ably highlight and uncover some informal processes which would be significant to the understanding of IR in Africa. The Chewa case is ideal in the sense that instead of analysing the formal/informal state interface from a narrow perspective of top policy makers, the focus will also be on the grassroots people themselves.

Another value of such an approach is the much needed analysis of African IR experience. In explaining the concepts ‘African contributions’, ‘African insights’, and ‘African experience’, Smith (2009) states that “insights gleaned from a close interpretation of African experiences” are critical because “it is the African experience, the African context, which has led the
scholar to revise/innovate on/contribute to existing IR theory” (Smith, 2009: 271). Smith (2009: 275) further argues that in order to benefit from the African IR contribution we need “to look beyond the disciplinary boundaries of IR, beyond the often aggressively guarded notion of what constitutes the field”. Consequently she suggests that we become more innovative, and that we glean from available African stories. These stories may be brought out through:

1. Reinterpreting old stories.
2. Telling stories in a different language.
3. Telling stories with new main characters.
4. Telling stories about existing characters but with a new plot (Smith 2009: 276).

The Chewa case would be ideal as an attempt to highlight the possibility of answering the first and fourth suggested approaches above. Specifically, the Chewa as an ethnic group have existed for a long time and their story has been viewed based on anthropological or historical disciplines, a further dimension of analysis of the Chewa that takes into question the formal state setup provides an opportunity to reinterpret what has already been narrated. Among others, the current main existing characters in the Chewa community are trans-border cultural activities and centrality of the King. Thus, a trans-border dimension puts these characters into a ‘new plot’ because they are for the first time being examined in the context of three contemporary states.

Regarding the African IR experience argument discussed above, another value of the Chewa case is the socio-cultural element in state analysis. Sindjoun (2001:224) argues that the way the state is interpreted in IR does not reflect on reality as “the state has generally been taken for granted, considered identical everywhere, yet the other factors (eg social, cultural and political) have an impact on the state. In this case he calls for a sociological input because the concept of the state, as well as IR itself, is dynamic. Sindjoun (2001:225) suggests an intensification of interdisciplinary approaches so that IR should accommodate disciplines such as philosophy, anthropology, sociology and other related fields. This view is also supported by Clapham (1996:7) who contends that a proper and effective analysis or understanding of state relations in Africa must “go some way beyond the confines of any narrow conception of International Relations”. More importantly Sindjoun (2001:225) succinctly notes that “the encounter between International Relations and Cultural Studies will increase reflections on the concepts used, on the social and historical origins of international relations theories”.

In addition, Clapham (1996:3) argues that personal political survival of the ruling elites has guided African IR, not the issues of liberation, nationhood and African unity. In this case, Clapham points to the fact that attention to formally stated goals may be misleading. If we take Clapham’s argument, we might conclude that engagement with, and acceptance of, the informal trans-border political/cultural entities by the political leaders of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia could be one of the ways in which the ruling elites are trying to reposition themselves. It is well documented that citizens in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia regard the traditional chiefs as relevant institutions which will continue to play a key
role in the near future. In this case, the ruling elites might not really be for unity *per se*, but it could be that the reality on the ground (as manifested in the traditional institutions) has led them to accept and start creating a platform for them. In this case, we might say that the traditional institutions are using their connectivity to the citizenry (form of power) to ‘force’ the formal state towards a more integrated region. This form of socio-political interplay can further be explored within the Chewa Kingdom framework so as to understand the formal vs informal power relations at trans-border level.

Finally, Nkiwane (2001:279) observes that “case studies, theories, and examples from Africa are exceedingly rare in international relations”. She therefore calls for an examination of the possibility of African scholarship contributing to conventional IR debates through the interrogation of core concepts. In this case she states that African examples and African scholarship may lead towards another understanding of various currently accepted IR perspectives. The Chewa case study being analysed by this study somehow fulfils this call.

1.7 Definition of concepts
This section defines the concept of Westphalian model and two interconnected core Westphalian model concepts of state and sovereignty. Due to its closeness to other relevant issues that this study is examining, the concept of citizenship (in this case with special reference to ethnic identity) is also discussed in this section. As understood in this study, these concepts are not entirely mutually exclusive. It should be emphasized, however, that a more detailed discussion of the concept of “state” and “sovereignty” is provided in the subsequent chapter.

1.7.1 Westphalian Model
In simple terms, Westphalian model refers to an international relations construct which depict elements that comprise the modern state. In literature, some authors refer to it as ‘Westphalian state system’ or simply ‘Westphalian system’. Increasingly the term ‘model’ has been added by some scholars (Krasner and Froats 1996; Beaulac 2004; Stirk 2005; Rittberger 2008; Kayuni 2011; and Stirk 2012). In these cases, the term ‘model’ is loosely used to emphasize the systematic process and construction element of the modern state system but its meaning is not really different from others who refer to it as ‘Westphalian system’ or ‘Westphalian state system’. According to Stirk (2005: 153-154), the Westphalian model can be described as having two main interpretations: a strong interpretation and a weak one. In strong interpretation, Westphalian model has no real link to the Peace of Westphalia but it is the product of 19th century nationalism. Thus in this interpretation, the main actors in international relations are states which claim absolute sovereignty and “states are centralised and lack ‘internal political differentiation’, international community is largely excluded”.

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3 This study acknowledges that Africa is so diverse that using the term to represent all countries in the region is contentious. However, according to Smith (2009), despite several variations it is possible to use the term to represent the region due to several overarching commonalities.
However, in weak interpretation, “states are the prime actors in international relations, but not necessarily the only ones...states are not necessarily centralized...Sovereignty is not absolute”. Although there are these notable differences in weak and strong interpretation of sovereignty, both interpretations form part of the understanding of the model because they highlight the state as the main actor and sovereignty is an underlying principle.

One of the reasons why this study uses the term Westphalian model is to provide a comprehensive entry point in reference to the concept of state. In other words, this study has decided to problematize the concept of the state rather than accept it as ‘given’. According to Hurd (2008:6) constructivism as a theory has led to numerous debates and controversies among scholars on diverse issues including what constitutes a unit of analysis for the state. Hurd calls this the ‘controversy of state-centrism’ and constitutes the dilemma that researchers face in relation to the state as a unit of analysis. For instance at the beginning of empirical research, the question is: should the concept of state be taken as ‘given’ before subjecting it to a more critical analysis? In this regard, the dilemma is on what to problematize and what to take as ‘given’ because at the end of the day the final decision may have implications on what is lost in the analysis. In this study, the decision was to use the concept of Westphalian model instead of ‘Contemporary state’. The value of using the former is that it appropriately rekindles a more comprehensive debate and understanding of the state and its contemporary relevance- which is the hallmark of this study. In a nutshell, the concept of Westphalian model *inter alia* explains the origin, attributes, nature and relationship of state and sovereignty. These Westphalian model’s elements of state and sovereignty are further examined below.

### 1.7.2 State

Dunleavy and O’Leavy (1987:1-3) define the state from organisational and functional perspectives. From an organisational perspective, “it is a set of government institutions with rules that control and guide behaviour” while from a functional perspective, it is “a set of institutions carrying out specific goals, purposes and objectives”. From a Westphalian perspective Buzan and Little (1999:90) point out that the state is conceptualised on two critical issues: firstly the state has precisely defined territorial boundaries and secondly all the powers within this territory are centralised in a form of a self-governing unit. This has been the traditional way of understanding the state. This centralist perspective of the state acts as the starting point in the understanding of state in this study. In order to have a better picture of the state and its role, the study later takes the definition of the state as emerging from a contested interaction between state and society. This conceptualisation of the state is further explained by Barkey and Parikh (1991).

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4Despite the common usage of the term nation-state, most scholars agree that these terms are different. Vincent (1987:29) argues that a state can exist without nationalism but not vice versa. He goes on to add that the concept of state is grounded in several theories but nationalism has no adequate theories but “there may be adequate theories about what nationalism does”.

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According to Barkey and Parikh (1991) the state-society approach takes an empirically-driven perspective that places the state in the context of its immediate society. Barkey and Parikh (1991: 525) argue in this case that the state and society are regularly interacting and this interaction defines the state as well as its role applicable to that society. This is the notion of state adopted by this study. According to Demirović (2011:38), the question of whether the nation-state has lost power or not is not relevant because “the way the state exercises its power is changing, meaning it is taking a new form”.

1.7.3 Sovereignty

Vincent (1987:34) argues that the first person to systematically use the concept of sovereignty was a French philosopher, Jean Bodin, and he associated the concept with the idea of state. In this case, the concept of sovereignty represented by the monarchy, implied supremacy above the citizens and the law. This supremacy has over the years been interpreted differently to imply the constitution/law of the land, the people/citizens or office of rulership and not necessarily the person in office. Sovereignty is generally regarded as a critical element of the Westphalian model (Croxton 1999). In this case Beaulac (2004:181) rightly suggests that Westphalia put to the fore the notion of ‘state sovereignty’ and became a “cornerstone” in the actual treaty of Westphalia. Consequently, from a Westphalian perspective, Axtmann (2004:260) points out that state sovereignty meant that legally and politically the state had absolute authority “not accountable to anyone but itself”. In relation to trans-border control, Krasner (2001d: 28) states that sovereignty implies the capacity to control or ability to regulate trans-border movements as well as those within the boundary of the state. Part of this perspective of sovereignty which implies the capacity to control or ability to regulate trans-border movements have been adopted by this study.

It is important however to take note that the concepts of state and sovereignty are not completely mutually exclusive. This is why other studies combine them. In other words, when the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’ are combined, the study takes the initial perspective that state sovereignty implies the absolute authority and ability to regulate trans-border movements as well as to decide on political affairs of those within the boundary of the entity. This is the starting point in the understanding of state sovereignty taken by this study. Later, the study takes a constructivist perspective of state sovereignty as defined by Smith (2001). From a constructivist premise, Smith (2001) argues that state sovereignty is not static; it can change, and has been changing, over time and we can only determine its composition through empirical research within a specific context. This is partly what this study is actually examining on the element of state sovereignty. This view is aptly captured by Sindjoun (2001:223) who states that state “sovereignty still makes sense in international relations through new meanings and specific uses” (emphasis added). Thus sovereignty is socially constructed and dynamic – and this “potentially opens up new avenues for understanding international politics” (Lake 2003:308).
In other words, in agreement with scholars such as Engel and Olsen (2010), the study starts with the definition of the centralist Westphalian model of state. Later in the analysis it examines the relevance of a constructivist perspective of state sovereignty.

1.7.4 Citizenship and ethnic identity

At the heart of the discussion of the state in Africa is the changing nature of the concept of citizenship in Africa, as well as the role of traditional authorities in this change (Keller 2002). Yuval-Davis (1997:4) links the issue of citizenship to the state by mentioning that “the interest in citizenship is not just in the narrow formalistic meaning of having the right to carry a specific passport [but]...the relationship between the individual, state and society”. More importantly, the issue of citizenship, as Haste (2004:421) argues, is also an issue of identity (identity has also an implication on the notion of ethnicity).

Ethnic identify construction may be defined as the process of creating a particular group’s reference point for social-cultural meaning and experience which is often historically based (Bekker 2001). As discussed above in an African context, the concept of citizenship is highly linked to the concept of ethnicity. This is the case because ethnicity in some cases tends to take an upper hand in identity rather than citizenship. One of the influential theorists on citizenship, Marshall, defined citizenship as “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community” (Marshall, in Yuval-Davis 1997:5). Yuval-Davis (1997:5) points out that the significance of this definition is, among other things, the view that we do not necessarily link citizenship to the formal state as liberal definitions do, but rather open it up to encompass a variety of collectives that may include “local, ethnic, national and trans-national”. Such a perspective is also supported by Bakan and Stasiulis (1994) who point out that the concept of citizenship needs to be examined not solely focusing on the state, but in relation to multiple formal and informal citizenships in more than one country. It can be deduced from this view of citizenship that there is space available for citizens in the ‘informal’ communities to influence formal structures of the state whether at national or intra-national level.

In line with the Westphalian model and as a starting point, citizenship is defined in this study as membership of a formal state. Later in the analysis this study takes the view that the concept of citizenship in Africa should be discussed within the context of ethnic identity. In other words, the socio-political changes taking place in Africa raise the possibility of aptly extending the concept of citizenship beyond the formal state boundary and including affiliation to informal (ethnic) groups. How this multiple citizenship (formal vs informal) may be (or is) harmonised, as well as understood, is what this study intends to investigate further through the Chewa Kingdom case example. Accordingly, the study explores the significance and relationship of ethnic based informal ‘citizenship’ to formal state citizenship.

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5Gaventa and Tandon (2010:10) argue that defining citizenship to state is not easy because “citizenship is complex and multidimensional”. In this case Gaventa and Tandon (2010:11), aptly contend that citizenship can be regarded as vertical (in relation to the state) and horizontal (being a member of a trans-border institution).
1.8 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
This study largely utilises the constructivism approach or theory as its theoretical and conceptual framework. However, taking into consideration some of the shortfalls of this theory to adequately address the issues being examined, the other theoretical approaches being employed are the cultural nationalism and politics of representation as discussed in subsequent sections.

1.8.1 Constructivism theory
For many years, IR has been dominated by realism/neorealism and liberalism/neoliberalism as mainstream theories of IR. Among other issues, realism emphasises national interests and the role of the state in inter-state relations while liberalism focuses on pursuance of common interests. In this case realism assumes competition amongst states while liberalism assumes that states strive for cooperation. Constructivism (also referred to as social constructivism) emerged mainly as an alternative to these two theories. Nicholas Onuf was the first to introduce constructivism in IR. Onuf (2013) provides a more basic understanding of social constructivism. He starts by explaining social constructivism in a relational context. He points out that people create societies and societies create people and for us to study them we have to choose a middle ground which connects both of these entities. In this case the middle ground comprises of social rules that define what is acceptable or unacceptable. The way people react to these rules such as obeying, breaking or changing them is what is known as practices and these rules provide us with an understanding of which individuals or groups are active participants. These active participants within the rules are referred to as agents and these agents may be individual human or even governments. The rules determine whether the agent has to act in a particular way or not. Agents have specific goals they want to achieve (whether they were provided with full information or not in the formulation of their goals) and often they are guided by rules. Over time, these rules and practices form a particular pattern which is called institutions. Consequently, “agents act on, and not just in, the context within which they operate, collectively changing its institutional features, and themselves, in the process” (Onuf 2013:5-6). In a society, several institutions exist whose actions have an effect (intended and unintended consequences) on these agents and the agents are forced to respond. In this case, “any stable pattern of rules, institutions and unintended consequences gives society a structure” (Onuf 2013:6). There is no general agreement on what this structure (or social pattern) is: whether physical or in the mind of agents. Agents may decide to change the rules when experiencing unintended consequences. States are regarded as institutionalised but operating through their agents in an archaic world (no state rules over the other). From this perspective sovereignty is understood as a condition in which “no institution above states ruling them” (Onuf 2013:7).

Onuf’s work was followed by a series of influential articles by Alexander Wendt who consolidated the theory in IR (in Jackson and Sorensen 2007:168). There is some controversy

This study explores the discussion of citizenship in this context in which the Chewa trans-border ethnic citizenship is being likened to Gaventa and Tandon’s membership to a trans-border institution.
on the precise boundaries that separate constructivism from other approaches because these boundaries are not very clear (Hurd 2008:299). Zehfuss (2004:6) argues that the key claims of constructivism are largely controversial and “although constructivism has been defined, explained, assessed and positioned, there is little agreement about what it is”. From a constructivist’s perspective, states are socially constructed and this even includes their relationship to other states or other actors (Sindjoun 2001). Wendt argued that the behaviour of states is largely defined by its identity and interest. Specifically, “Constructivists focus on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in politics, stressing in particular the role of collectively held or ‘intersubjective’ ideas and understandings on social life” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 392).

Intersubjectivity is the central concept in constructivism, the concept means that individuals, groups, or states develop identities, interests or ideas through the process of interaction with or among each other (Hurd 2008). When this interaction is sustained for some time, certain beliefs and expectations emerge between or among those involved. In other words, intersubjectivity denotes the shared understanding, meaning and even significance of relational matters which have been constructed over time between or among states. Using Wendt’s theoretical understanding of constructivism, he argues that originally states begin their interactions with a neutral position: they are neither influenced towards cooperation nor conflict. The initial phase of interaction is where intersubjectivity is constructed and it is also this phase which determines the nature of subsequent interactions. If initially the intersubjective meaning construction is on a negative route, then the states in question will consistently be in a hostile relationship. However, due to other factors, the intersubjectivity meaning may change for better or worse. It is through this understanding that Wendt (1995: 73) argued, “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons”. It ably captures issues of identity, thoughts, beliefs and ideas of actors in IR. There have been several criticisms directed at constructivism and one of the criticisms is that the theory focuses much on explaining the past at the expense of predicting future events (Walt 1998).

Hurd (2008) has aptly provided a good summary of constructivism by providing its distinguishing features. According to his analysis, the first distinguishing feature of constructivism is “An Alternative to Materialism”- Unlike neorealism which argues that material forces such as military hardware and economy determine international political behavior. Hurd (2008) explains that the world we live in is socially constructed and the patterns in the behavior of states as well as cause and effect in relationships rely on a complex set of meaning and practices. These meaning and practices are not permanent but ever changing hence certain ideas or practices which can easily be predicted now may over a period of time take another form which is different from what it is now. The second distinguishing element is the “Construction of State Interests”. Hurd (2008:4) argues from a constructivist view that “the influences on interest formation are social”. In other words, each state’s interest emerges through the social process of interaction with other states and the social environment. The third feature is “Mutual Constitution of Structures and Agents”. In
this feature, it is argued that when states interact, their actions lead towards the formation of particular international institutions and norms. Conversely “these institutions and norms contribute to defining, socializing, and influencing states” (Hurd 2008:5). The fourth distinguishing element is “Multiple Logics of Anarchy”. Generally speaking, in international relations the term anarchy implies absence of institutions which are authoritative and legitimate; hence absence of a hierarchical system of authority is described as an anarchical nature of international state system. From a neorealist view, such kind of scenario leads to certain types of behavior amongst states such as self-interests as well as balancing their power. Constructivism argues that this pattern of behavior is not fixed and actually it is derived from the perspective that these states consider each other as rivals in their quest for scarce resources. Instead of looking at the hierarchical structure, Wendt (in Hurd 2008:5) “proposed a spectrum of international anarchies based on variation in the ideas that states have about themselves and others. With enmity at one end and friendship at the other, and with indifference in the middle”. He further explained that it is possible to have anarchy of friends and anarchy of enemies and these may generate different types of behavior though they are both in an anarchical structure.

This study intends to mainly utilize this constructivist analytical framework because of its concept of intersubjectivity. Specifically, the study perceives that the states of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia have, through the trans-border Chewa, developed identities, interests or ideas in the process of interaction which enables them to effortlessly accommodate the trans-border Chewa ethnic groups. More importantly, the theory aptly argues that states and other related institutions, which form the hallmark of state-society interaction, are socially constructed and dynamic. The way the state is perceived will determine how other actors will react to it. The state of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique are inhabited by the Chewa who recognize another parallel authority, their King of Zambia. Constructivism is better suited to explain how the Chewa construct or understand the formal state as opposed to their trans-border kingdom. The major limitation with constructivism is that it mainly focuses on state relations and pays little attention to other actors. It is from this noted shortfall that other theories or perspectives have been adopted namely, cultural nationalism and politics of representation perspectives (this shortfall and complementarity of other approaches is further discussed in section 1.8.4).

1.8.2 The Cultural Nationalism Perspective
Apart from the constructivism theory, this study also adopts the cultural nationalism perspective, as argued by Hutchinson (1999) and others in order to offer a better explanation of the underlying motives for the creation and mobilisation of the contemporary Chewa Kingdom. By introducing the cultural nationalism perspective, Hutchinson (1999:392) has ably demonstrated that nationalism is not only a political project, but a it is also a cultural project— an aspect which is often ignored in most studies. In other words, the cultural nationalism perspective incorporates the argument that some movements might take a cultural agenda but in reality might be pursuing a political agenda. (Some scholars even argue that all cultural movements are political in nature). Although cultural nationalism might
lead to conflict especially in multi-ethnic populations, according to the cultural nationalism perspective, the said conflict may “have a positive integrative function” (Hutchinson 1999:395). While not necessarily referring directly to cultural nationalism, Bekker (2001:3) agrees with this assertion by arguing that ethnicity in moderation builds communities rather than causing them to disintegrate.

Hutchinson’s perspective aptly fits the Chewa Kingdom, which is mainly cultural in orientation with seemingly minimal political reactionary elements. In general, it is normally seen that when ethnic movements pursue the political agenda, it is deemed to be a threat to state sovereignty. Unless there is excessive politicisation of ethnic movements, this study takes the cultural nationalism perspective in the analysis of the Chewa Kingdom because it does not assume that all ethnic mobilisation or moderate politicisation of the movements is perpetually a challenge to the formal state.

1.8.3 Politics of representation

Although not many scholars have committed themselves to specifically define it, the concept of politics of representation is not normally discussed in isolation but it is embedded within the wider political discourse which touches on the relationship between citizens or subjects on one hand and the state on the other. In other words, the politics of representation discusses questions such as who has the legitimacy and authority to represent and speak for the populace. In the context of Africa, the debate is directly related to the question of the role of traditional authorities, especially in rural areas. Edigheji (2006: 94) argues that political representation in Africa has been compounded by several developments such as an ambiguous role of traditional leaders. In this case he mentions that after independence, the existence of traditional rulers and elected representatives “has led to an ambiguity in the roles of the former and conflicts between both institutions that see themselves as representative of their people”. In this case it is the constant struggle between the formal state and informal traditional authorities for control of the local populace. As discussed comprehensively in Chapter Three, Mamdani (1996) and others have brought to the fore this politics of representation debate by arguing that the contemporary role of traditional authorities has led to Africans being divided into two parts, namely citizens and subjects. Citizens are urban inhabitants (where chieftaincies do not exist) who enjoy their full democratic rights and obligations. Subjects, on the other hand, are rural inhabitants who are under the control of autocratic traditional authorities. According to these scholars, there has been a tussle since the colonial period between the state and the traditional authorities on who is a bona fide representative of the people, especially in rural areas where the majority of the population live. The state uses its official authority for legitimacy, while traditional authorities use cultural issues as the source of legitimacy. Although both claim that their roles are separate but complementary, in reality there is a constant political tussle (overt and covert) which has manifested itself in several ways since the colonial period. This is the hallmark of the concept of politics of representation in Africa as applied in this study. The concept of politics of representation is discussed in this study neither as a theory nor an approach. In other words, this study deals with the concept of politics of representation not as a salient concept, but as an underlying supporting perspective.
The politics of representation also partially touches on the issue of citizenship identity. According to Sassen (2002:8) it is erroneous to define citizenship and nationality solely in relation to nation state because other forms of citizenship, even in the west, are developing, which he refers to as the ‘informal citizenship’. Immigrants in the western countries enjoy most of the rights and obligations of the bona fide citizens, yet they do not have the formal citizenship. Similarly, it is possible for individuals to value their attachment to informal institutions or communities outside the formal state; hence their identity is not the nation state in the first place. In this case, if communities value their informal citizenship (such as ethnic organisations) more than state citizenship, it has an implication on the politics of citizenship. In other words, it implies that informal institutions such as ethnic groups, which are led by traditional chiefs, are perceived as more legitimate than the state authorities. It becomes even more interesting academically when an ethnic group, such as the Chewa, is trans-border in nature because the debate on politics of representation takes a broader and non-explored trans-border perspective.

1.8.4. Linkage and application of the theoretical and conceptual issues
The study is framed within the constructivism as its overarching approach, but not the exact constructivism approach of Alexander Wendt, who still takes the state and not people as the unit of analysis in IR (the realist notion). Wendt has been criticised for this approach; for instance Koo (2006: i) points out that “having states as given units in his methodology, his theory cannot comprehend the notion of human that must be included in a constructivist approach. Consequently, his theory loses consistency within constructivist logic.” This study supports this perspective of Koo by arguing that the human dimension to the state system is critical and it provides a broader and more encompassing perspective of the international system. Consequently, the study addresses this criticism of constructivism by making people the unit of analysis (people as political actors and cultural actors, acting alone or in groups or institutions). Therefore, paraphrasing Wendt, this study argues that: “the Westphalian model is what people make of it” (not: “Sovereignty is what states make of it”). Consequently the study is taking an anthropological/sociological constructivist approach which provides an avenue for other debates to provide more insight in this argument.

Taking into consideration that this study is based on cross-border ethnicity and the state, the theoretical debates associated with the concepts/notions of cultural nationalism and politics of representation are essential. In other words, these debates assist the study to move beyond the state as a unit of analysis and explore the process of social construction by people (as individuals and groups) representing the three states and the Chewa respectively of nationalism and citizenship. The Chewa people’s construction of these notions provides some insights on whether or not the Westphalian state is being challenged through their cross-border ethnic activities. It should not be taken for granted that the Chewa activities and allegiance to the King are non-threatening due to their informality. It takes politics (contestation) to construct nationalism, citizenship, sovereignty and other related elements. Consequently, including “politics of representation” is essential for a social constructivist approach. In relation to the role of the Chewa King in the whole setting, a couple of notions
are introduced for debate. Whether the final analysis is that the King’s position is merely ceremonial or not does not disregard the value of critically examining how his current role has been constructed (or being constructed).

The study assumes there is a dynamic interaction between Westphalian state’s sovereignty and territory on one hand and Chewa trans-border ethnic identity and social or political cultural elements on the other hand. The linkage between ethnicity and constructivism is that ethnicity itself can be interpreted and understood from a constructivism perspective. As Hale 2004 argues, ethnicity can broadly be understood from two theoretical perspectives namely, “primordialism” and “constructivism”. In primordialism, ethnicity is interpreted as given and provides examples of language, culture, a common ancestry and other related elements. Constructivism on the other hand argues that ethnic identity as well as ethnicity itself can be interpreted as socially constructed by groups and individuals. Yavuz (2001:3) argues that “one needs to remind policy makers that nationalism [or ethnic identity] ….is always constructed by ‘identity entrepreneurs’ and shaped by political context”. These identity entrepreneurs are mainly traditional authorities and their associates. Furthermore, Brass (1991:8) professes that ethnicity and nationalism are political constructions and are products of elites “who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves”. Romano (2006:21) reinforces this argument by mentioning that this cultural framing by the elites creates a shared understanding of their entity and also helps them to legitimize as well as motivate their collective actions. This “cultural tool kit” provides insights as to the decisions and processes taken by certain groups in order to achieve their goals. The linkage and application of theoretical and conceptual issues in this study is further highlighted in Table 1 below:
### Table 1: Linkage and application of the theoretical and conceptual issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory or perspective</th>
<th>Main argument(s) postulated</th>
<th>Specific contribution to the study</th>
<th>Key issues examined</th>
<th>Specific thesis chapters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constructivism</td>
<td>States and institutions are socially constructed. And the concept of ‘Intersubjectivity’ which implies the shared understanding, meaning and even significance of relational matters that have been constructed over time between or among individuals, groups and states</td>
<td>The study perceives that the states of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia have, through the trans-border Chewa, developed identities, interests or ideas in the process of interaction which enable them to effortlessly accommodate the trans-border Chewa ethnic groups. More importantly, the theory argues that states and other related institutions, which form the hallmark of state-society interaction, are socially constructed and dynamic hence the theory provides us with an opportunity to examine this dynamism between the Chewa and the state.</td>
<td>1- Social construction perspective of the state (Territory/boundaries and sovereignty/authority). 2- Social construction perspective of the relationship between the Chewa Kingdom and the state (Extent to which they might be challenging each other) 3-Process of construction of the Chewa identity and its implication on state sovereignty.</td>
<td>All chapters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics of representation</td>
<td>Examines the debate on who has the right, legitimacy and authority to represent and speak for the citizenry.</td>
<td>Highlights the complementarity or conflictual relationship between traditional authorities and the state in the three countries (Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia). It contextualizes the authority and the role of the Chewa King in the three countries and highlights the relationship between citizens or subjects on one hand and the state on the other. It helps us to interpret whether the Chewa King’s authority is challenging the legality of the conventional state.</td>
<td>1- Role of traditional authorities in African state. 2-How, when and where does Chewa King derive his authority (Extent to which his authority can be perceived as challenging the state).</td>
<td>Chapters 3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural nationalism</td>
<td>It incorporates the argument that some movements might take a cultural agenda but in reality they might be pursuing a political agenda.</td>
<td>Offer a better explanation of the underlying motives for the creation and mobilization of the Chewa across the three countries. In other words, the more politicised the more it is a challenge to the state.</td>
<td>1-Traditional ceremonies: Gule wamkulu &amp; Kulamba (Extent to which they are politicised) 2-Trans-border movements and ethnic identity (Extent to which they challenge state territory/borders). 3-Revival of the Chewa Identity &amp; motives for those involved (Extent to which their motives can be said to be political)</td>
<td>Chapters 6-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author’s own construction
It is therefore not complete to simply provide a cultural or political framing alone. The study assumes the existence of the Chewa thrives on exploiting one or both of these framings to suit their own interest. The interplay of these two lenses facilitates the source of power and recognition which ultimately has a bearing on Westphalian state sovereignty and territory of the three countries of Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia.

1.9 African tradition ‘illusion’ debate and implications for the study of the Chewa Kingdom

Some scholars have questioned the existence of a genuine African tradition or custom. These scholars specifically claim that contemporary reference to African tradition is an illusionary exercise because these traditions are a recent invention because they were formulated by colonialists with the assistance of some African elites who stood to personally gain some social benefits through this invention. Ranger (1983/2010:460) provides an even more comprehensive list of creators of African tradition by mentioning “colonial administrators, missionaries, ‘progressive traditionalists’, elders and anthropologists”. Hobsbawn (1992:1) argues that traditions “which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented”. In other words, according to this school of thought, the post-colonial African tradition is actually a product of interaction between Africans and the colonial rulers, and the invention was shaped mainly to favour the African elites (who emerged as winners in the competition amongst themselves) and colonial interests. Ranger (1983/2010:456) mentions four specific groups which benefited from the invention of tradition as follows:

1. Elders- this group often referred to tradition in order to dominate the young.
2. Men used tradition to rule over women.
3. Paramount chiefs and ruling aristocracies in politics- tradition was a mechanism to maintain and extend their control.
4. Indigenous populations appealed to tradition to exclude migrant populations from political power.

Chanock (1998) stands out as the strongest proponent of the illusionary perspective of African tradition in central Africa (Zambia and Malawi). According to Chanock (1998), in central Africa, there were numerous social, political and economic changes during the pre-colonial period (especially in the nineteenth century) so that we may not effectively establish that a coherent traditional system and institutions existed in the area. According to him, powerful groups took advantage of the colonial courts to establish their interests which were legitimised as custom. In this case he points out that what later emerged as customary law or, in this context, African tradition, “was the winning representation of intense conflicts.

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6 This study acknowledges the fact that ‘Tradition’, ‘Custom’ and ‘Culture’ are not necessarily the same. In general, traditions may be regarded as actions and processes that are passed on from one generation to the next and are generally perceived to be in existence for a relatively long time, while customs are those perceived to be of relatively shorter period and more specific. However, this study uses these terms interchangeably unless where explicitly explained.
between ethnic groups, genders, and generations, winning because they found accord with the ideas and interests of the colonial rulers” (Chanock, 1998: vi).

What these critiques of the African tradition are asking is that contemporary social scientists and historians should “free themselves from the illusion that the African custom recorded by officials or by many anthropologists is any sort of guide to the African past” (Ranger, 1983/2010: 460).

Despite the fact that Ranger’s (1983/2010: 460) work became one of the most cited to the proponents of the ‘illusion of African tradition’, Ranger himself later in his work of 1993 revised some of his arguments and critiqued himself. For instance, he dropped the word “invention”, sensing that it did not accurately depict the historical phenomenon of tradition and culture in Africa. Ranger’s revised arguments drastically watered down his initial ‘aggressive’ approach to the concept of ‘illusionary’ African tradition. Briggs (1996) contends that those who criticise the existence of African tradition, do not understand the historical processes in African politics which have always hovered around disputes over tradition. Consequently, the conflict over tradition during the colonial period was normal and not necessarily a product of the colonial powers.

A closer analysis of Chanock’s (1998) work also raises a number of weaknesses. First of all, it should be understood that Chanock’s work is largely based on the issue of customary law. It is from this perspective that he draws a number of related African historical and social arguments such as ‘traditional’ political authorities and gender. Though the legal perspective might have its own merits, it should also be appreciated that there are several limitations as societies are affected by numerous social factors beyond the legal perspectives. Secondly, although Chanock’s work claims that it is highlighting the colonial experience, it is interesting to note that his major source of data is limited to 1931 and 1945 in Malawi and Zambia respectively. In this case, the validity of the findings to represent the colonial experience is highly questionable. What is also missing in his work is the actual African opinion relating to this process of creation of African ‘tradition’. Almost all the views are from a European perspective of how they interpreted the African utterances- except for African voices as recorded in court settings. In this case the findings are somehow skewed towards the European, not the African, opinion.

In general, arguably the most able critique of the anti-tradition perspective has been provided by Spear (2003). Spear’s major argument (2003:3) is that “the case for colonial invention has often overstated colonial power and ability to manipulate African institutions to establish hegemony”. The fact that colonial authorities relied on the traditional authorities already implies that the colonial authorities’ power was limited. Furthermore, individuals and groups have, over the years “continually re-interpreted and reconstructed tradition in the context of broader socio-economic changes” (Spear 2003:4); in this context, colonial authorities “often stimulated rather than stilled” this debate and the struggle for development of traditions.

Another critique of the colonial invention of tradition is MacGonagle (2007). MacGonagle (2007) embarked on a complicated and lengthy examination of identity formation among the
Ndau, or Shona, ethnic group in eastern Zimbabwe and central Mozambique. Her focus was on the cultural, social, and political aspects of Ndau identity over a period from 1500 to 1900. Using a historical approach (interviews and archival research), MacGonagle proves that the process of Ndau ethnic identity started many years before the arrival of missionaries and colonial administrators on the continent. According to her explanation, pre-colonial rulers relied on the invention of ideology to promote ethnic identity and to enhance the subjects’ loyalty. What is central about this work is that MacGonagle challenges the well-established argument that tribalism or ethnic identity is a colonial period invention. In this case, she argues, “Neither primordial nor the product of colonialism, ethnic identities arise from collective historical experiences. Identities are fluid; they cross borders and they have a long and messy history in this region of southeast Africa” (MacGonagle 2007:2).

The above analysis has three major implications for the study or analysis of the contemporary traditional Chewa Kingdom. These implications hover around questions such as:

a) Did the Chewa Kingdom exist in the pre-colonial period?
b) Is the contemporary Chewa Kingdom, with its traditions, a creation of the colonial powers?
c) What is the starting point in understanding or analysis of Chewa tradition which is associated with the Kingdom?

First, the existence of the Chewa pre-colonial kingdom is a historical fact (see Chapter 5 for more details). In this context, extending the defence of the existence of the African tradition, there is abundant evidence from numerous scholars and available ancient documents of early traders pointing to the fact that centralised authorities have always been in existence in Africa, long before the establishment of colonial powers. In other cases of traditional authorities allegedly created by colonial authorities, Nieuwaal and Dijk (in Spear, 2003:10) argue that “the viability of chieftaincy rests on its acceptability and legitimacy, and thus the central question is not whether chieftainship was imposed or not, but how it was made acceptable, given meaning and imbued with respect and awe.”

Secondly, to attribute the existence and sustenance of African chieftaincy such as the Chewa solely to colonial authorities might be misleading. It is correct, as argued by Chanock and others, that there is no identifiable time-based static benchmark for the analysis of African tradition, but this is due to the fact that tradition has constantly re-shaped itself to suit the current socio-political and economic factors. However, this process has been on-going, both before and after the arrival of colonial authorities. Despite this dynamism, there are some notable traditional attributes that have survived over the years which set apart one traditional grouping from another. In this case the Chewa is an identifiable group with specific shared attributes that have been passed on over the years.

This study takes the view that the traditional Chewa Kingdom existed in the pre-colonial period, although the contemporary kingdom’s ‘traditions’ may not exactly reflect what existed during the pre-colonial and colonial periods. In other words, the Chewa Kingdom of the pre-
colonial and colonial periods is not exactly what is currently in existence, because it has inevitably re-invented itself several times due to numerous prevailing environmental factors. However, it is still a viable entity to be analysed as a ‘traditional’ grouping. Suffice to mention that it is not the aim of this study to critically analyse the evolution of traditions over the years in the Chewa Kingdom in the light of socio-political developments in the region. Although reference to these evolutionary dimensions may be directly or indirectly alluded to, the study mainly focuses on the relationship between the formal state and trans-border traditional Chewa Kingdom of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. Virtanen (2005:243) notes that the debate on traditional authority in Africa has mainly focused on whether it is authentic or fabricated (ie invented or false). Virtanen argues that such a conception is based on a modernist perspective and that “this distinction is neither theoretically fruitful nor politically prudent”. In this case the political legitimacy of traditional authorities should not be determined by a long unbroken historical lineage but by the acceptance of their authority by their immediate local community.

1.10 Research Design and Methodology
Case study approach is the research design guiding this study. According to Kothari (2004:113) the case study method is normally a form of qualitative approach which “involves a careful and complete observation of a social unit, be that unit a person, a family, an institution, a cultural group or even the entire community”. In terms of scope, Kothari adds that it “places more emphasis on the full analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their interrelations”. There are several case study designs but the one adopted is the embedded single-case-design as highlighted by Yin (2003:42). Taking into consideration the expanse of the study and nature of the issue being examined (three countries and only one ethnic group), the single-case approach was the best and most relevant approach. The findings may also provide insight for researchers working on similar cases of cross-border ethnic groups in Africa. As Flyvbjerg (2006:225) points out, “it is incorrect to conclude that one cannot generalize from a single case [but]... It depends on the case one is speaking of and how it is chosen”. Yin (1981:59) argues that what makes a case study approach unique as compared to other approaches is that it attempts to examine “(a) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when (b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. The Chewa Kingdom case clearly fits into the description as explained by Yin (1981), because it is being analysed in connection with the contemporary understanding of the key Westphalian concepts. The concepts are analysed within this clearly defined context. Yin (2003:9) further argues that a case study approach may be undertaken when “a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control”. This study is, among other things, also asking how and why the Westphalian model is applicable (or not) in the Chewa Kingdom.

The study is mainly empirical and relies heavily on qualitative methods of data collection. According to Kothari (2004) almost all case studies used qualitative methods. However some quantitative data was also used- which was mainly drawn from the Afrobarometer data sets. Consequently the study is exploratory and descriptive in nature. Similarly, the collected
empirical data relies on qualitative research methods to interpret relationships among variables emerging in the study. The role of quantitative data from Afrobarometer data sets is to supplement shortfalls in the qualitative data.

Taking into consideration the relative population of the Chewa in the three countries as well as areas, the study purposely selected one district/province in Zambia and in Mozambique, and two districts in Malawi (hence four districts/provinces in total). The researcher sought some assistance from CHEFO (Chewa Heritage Foundation) during the period of the study so as to facilitate access to some identified key individuals. Although Miles and Rochefort (1991) in their study found that the perceptions of ethnic group members in rural areas differed from those in the urban areas, this study did not take the urban/rural comparison into consideration. Hence apart from some key informants, field research focused on rural-based Chewa communities. For the purposes of this study, a rural area is one which falls within 30-40 kilometres of a geographically defined urban centre; all the villages that participated in this study fall within this range. The study agrees with the argument by Osaghae (1994) that there is no significant difference between rural and urban ethnicity in Africa. This view is also supported by Logan (2008, 2009 and 2011), hence the urban/rural comparison was not investigated.

1.10.1 Unit of Analysis

According to Bailey (1978) and Yin (2003), the unit of analysis is described as the main entity that is being examined or analysed in the study. In other words, the unit of analysis could be individuals, groups, artefacts, geographical entities or social interactions. Extending from the conceptual framework above, this section further discusses the study’s units of analysis. Engel and Olsen (2010:8) argue that “the state as a unit of analysis has been privileged to an extent that” many disciplines do not conceptualise it, or even its related concepts, that are based on it. In other words, it is in most cases taken for granted hence not fully expounded. According to Barkey and Parikh (1991:525) “the state in empirical research is operationalized [sic] in terms of specific institutions and actors”. Using this perspective, at state level, the unit of analysis for this study were states of Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia as represented by their specific actors and institutions such as Ministry responsible for traditional leaders, local administration and Ministry responsible for foreign affairs and immigration (as well as officials working in these institutions). In relation to the Chewa, the unit of analysis were CHEFO and its officials, Chewa chiefs and their subjects in the selected aforementioned three countries.

1.10.2 Data Collection Methods

As briefly discussed above, the study used the following data collection methods (see Appendix 18):

1.10.2.1 Comparative Literature Survey

Comparative literature surveyed in this study implies desk research or the collection and systematic analysis of available literature on state/society relations in Africa and the role of traditional entities, especially in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. At this stage, the focus
was on a thorough critical analysis of key concepts relevant to this study. According to Kothari (2004:111) secondary data “refer to the data which have already been collected and analysed by someone else”. In this regard, the desk research was mostly based on data from government publications, books, journals, press releases, other published and unpublished papers as well as internet searches.

1.10.2.2 Key Informants Interviews

Key informant interviews mainly rely on information collected from interviews with individuals who are knowledgeable, through experience and by virtue of the nature of their positions/jobs, on issues related to the study (Kumar 1987). In this study, key informants included officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Malawi), Departments responsible for Immigration (Malawi/Zambia/Mozambique), academics/researchers (Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique), local government officials in the sampled areas (Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique), officials from Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO), and Chewa traditional leaders (Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique). These key informants were identified using a non-probability sampling technique (purposive sampling). In this regard non-probability sampling is ideal in key informant interviews because of its main advantage of “convenience and economy” (Bailey 1978). Specifically, purposive sampling is described as a method whereby “researchers rely on their experience, ingenuity… to deliberately obtain units of analysis in such a manner that the sample they obtain may be regarded as being representative of the relevant population” (Welman and Kruger 2004: 63). It is expected that the above mentioned individuals were likely to provide information on some of the objectives of this study which would not have been possible if a different method had been employed. Specifically, 54 key informant interviews (using an interview guide attached in Appendices 5-7) were conducted in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (this excludes 153 individuals who participated in FGDs) as summarised below (see Appendix 1):

- 2 Officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Malawi),
- 6 Officers in the Department of Immigration (2 from Malawi, 2 from Mozambique and 2 from Zambia),
- 9 Researchers and Academics (5 from Malawi, 2 from Zambia and 2 from Mozambique)
- 4 Local government officials in the sampled areas (2 from Malawi, 1 from Zambia and 1 from Mozambique)
- 2 Officials from Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO)
- 24 Chewa traditional leaders/chiefs (11 from Malawi, 7 from Zambia and 6 from Mozambique) -from the sampled areas.
- 1 Political Science Association President (Malawi)
- 2 Officials in the Office of the President and Chiefs’ Administration (Malawi)

1.10.2.3 Focus Group Discussions

According to Wilkinson (2004), a focus group discussion (FGD) is generally an informally organised discussion, directed at a certain topic, involving a specially selected small number
of individuals. The individuals are selected due to their potential to provide special insight on the issue under investigation. Taking advantage of group dynamics, the interaction amongst the participants themselves provides richer information which could otherwise not have been possible to get from an individual interview. In this case, the researcher is able to see the community’s reality from their perspective through incorporation of their experiences, interests, beliefs and views relating to the phenomenon (Kitzinger 1994). In this study, a total of 15 FGDs were conducted (using a semi-structured discussion guide, see Appendix 5) in the purposely selected Chewa villages in Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. In total 153 individuals participated in FGDs (84 females and 69 males). Each FGD had an average of 10 participants. Participants in these discussions were also identified through purposive sampling with the assistance of Village Headmen (the composition ensured a proper mix of each participant’s age, education and position/status in the community). The full details of the said FGDs are presented below:

**Table 2: Number of FGDs and participants per country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>District/Province</th>
<th>Male participants per village</th>
<th>Female participants per village</th>
<th>Total number of participants per country</th>
<th>No. of FGDs per country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Kasikula</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ikwele</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Katsekamininga</td>
<td>Angonia, Tete</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mphande</td>
<td>Angonia, Tete</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Bango</td>
<td>Lilongwe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chiwoza</td>
<td>Lilongwe</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dzunda</td>
<td>Lilongwe</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mwakulam waona</td>
<td>Chikhawa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nkhabeka</td>
<td>Chikhawa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this case the FGDs complemented other methods identified by this study to capture how grassroots people understand the concept of citizenship, state and sovereignty and also how this is linked to their traditional Chewa kingdom practices.

Apart from the above mentioned points, another advantage of this method is that in comparison with other approaches, FGDs allow interviewers to study people in an ordinary setting, enabling them to gain access to various cultural and social contexts which might raise interesting issues for further exploration (Bailey 1978). Taking into consideration the scope of this study, FGDs assisted in lowering the research costs by interviewing a large sample at
the same time. All the interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and the researcher later transcribed the interviews.

1.10.2.4 Newspaper articles
Newspapers can either be regarded as secondary or primary data depending on how they have been used. Speeches, diaries, interview notes and survey results generally form part of primary data due to the fact that they have not been processed or re-interpreted. Newspapers may in some cases fall in the same category due to some of the included information which might, for instance, include interviews and eye-witness accounts. In other words, newspapers form part of primary documentary research and, according to Mogalakwe (2006: 222), “primary documents refer to eye-witness accounts produced by people who experienced [or saw] the particular event or the behaviour we want to study”. Used correctly, he argues further that this method can actually be much better than the survey and in-depth interview methods that social scientists tend to rely on. Mogalakwe (2006: 224) provides examples of respected social scientists such as Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim whose work relied almost exclusively on primary documents. The only cautionary note is that the source must have authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning:

Authenticity refers to whether the evidence is genuine and from impeccable sources; credibility refers to whether the evidence is typical of its kind, representativeness refers to whether the documents consulted are representative of the totality of the relevant documents, and meaning refers to whether the evidence is clear and comprehensible (Mogalakwe 224-225).

Van Binsbergen (1987:143) points out the importance of newspaper articles as sources of primary data by arguing that “newspapers turn out to contain the type of nation-wide, many-sided, relatively unprocessed data suitable for a first empirical exploration”. He however acknowledges that newspapers harbour some inherent stereotypes, especially on issues of traditional authorities, but he explains that it is still possible to put aside these stereotypes and collect empirical facts. He further points out that “even the journalistic stereotypes themselves supply significant information: they are public, widespread and influential statements of collective representations” on issues of chiefs, tradition, power, political and moral orders (van Binsbergen 1987:143-144). In other words, newspapers represent a reflection of the level of entrenched affinities as well as the socio/political culture of that particular community. More importantly, newspapers carry the nation’s mood at that particular moment in relation to particular issues.

Some of the known problems of newspapers include excessive biases, deliberate distortion of facts and exaggeration of issues. The study took note of these shortfalls and ensured that they were controlled. Thus, while cautious of their shortfalls, this study widely used newspapers published in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, including those which are on-line. Taking into consideration the unprofessionalism associated with newspapers as already mentioned (especially on-line papers), the researcher sought advice from each country’s experts on the level of credibility associated with the targeted newspapers before using them in the study. Facts raised in the papers were also cross-checked with other sources (including country
experts) to verify their accuracy. Consequently, newspaper articles are therefore regarded in this study as part of primary data and where necessary, extensive quotations of the same have been made.

1.10.2.5 Afrobarometer survey data sets

The study also benefited from quantitative primary data captured through Afrobarometer surveys. In general, data from surveys is collected through pre-set closed questionnaires. Tayie (2005:51) explains that the survey technique “allows the researcher to examine many variables (demographic and lifestyle information, attitudes, motives, intentions, etc) and to use multivariate statistics to analyse the data”. Afrobarometer survey data is therefore useful in various aspects for researchers. According to the official Afrobarometer webpage, they introduce it as follows:

The Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa. Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more than a dozen African countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. Because the instrument asks a standard set of questions, countries can be systematically compared. Trends in public attitudes are tracked over time. Results are shared with decision makers, policy advocates, civic educators, journalists, researchers, donors and investors, as well as average Africans who wish to become more informed and active citizens” ([www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org), accessed on 12th January 2012).

Afrobarometer conducted face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative probability sample of 1200 adults in each country. This sample of this size gives an overall margin of sampling error of +/-3 percent at a 95 percent confidence level.

There are several advantages of using these data sets for this study: Firstly, the Afrobarometer data sets substantially reduced the cost of this study as it would have meant designing a [mini-] quantitative approach running parallel to the qualitative one. Secondly, since this study was mainly designed as qualitative there are certain elements which may require quantitative measures to present evidence effectively. These include national opinions compared to Chewa ethnic group opinions. In other words, the Afrobarometer data supplements the gaps that may appear in the qualitative data. Thirdly, since Afrobarometer uses standardised data collection instruments across several countries, including Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, it enhances the comparability of issues related to the Chewa across the three countries covered by this study.

Afrobarometer surveys are broader in nature and do not necessarily focus on issues of ethnicity per se. Consequently there are several issues that need elaboration which are not addressed from an ethnic perspective. Related to this, the targeted respondents are not selected on the basis of ethnic background, but geographical/regional basis. This may side-line the ‘voice’ of certain ethnic groups (however a rough estimate of the ethnic background of
respondents shows that the numbers of participants were proportional to national demographics). Another problem is that some countries have not been involved in all Afrobarometer studies from the beginning. For instance Mozambique was involved from the Round 3 (2005-2006) survey; hence comparisons over time between Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia become limited. Finally, the latest survey, Round 5 (2012), did not include some of the key questions on traditional leadership which are relevant to this study. Hence in some cases the study was forced to rely on 2008-2009 results and regard these as the latest. The issue is that on some issues it is problematic to compare the study qualitative field data which was collected in 2012/2013 with the 2008/2009 Afrobarometer data. This anomaly is in some cases explained in the study where necessary. However, it was not considered a serious problem which would affect the overall quality of the study as the difference of 3 years may not be significant. More importantly, this may apply only to a few questions and not necessarily to the bulk of the study areas.

1.10.3 Validity and Reliability
Joppe (2000 in Golafshani 2003: 598) explains that in pure quantitative research, the issue of validity means “the extent to which the research truly measures what it was intended to measure” while reliability refers to “the extent to which the results are consistent over time and an accurate representation of the total population”. The proposed study acknowledges several debates questioning the applicability of the concepts of validity and reliability in qualitative research, especially that of reliability. However, it is the view of the current study that these concepts are critical. In this case, the study takes the view of Golafshani (2003: 603) who advocates a method of triangulation (converging findings from multiple sources and methodologies) so as to cover validity and reliability in qualitative research. In this regard, Golafshani (2003: 603) argues that “triangulation is typically a strategy (test) for improving the validity and reliability of research or evaluation of findings”. She further argues that “to acquire valid and reliable multiple and diverse realities, multiple methods of searching or gathering data are in order…engaging multiple methods, such as, observation, interviews and recordings will lead to more valid, reliable and diverse construction of realities”.

1.10.4 Data Analysis
The study mainly used the narrative discourse analysis approach to analyse the qualitative data. Narrative discourse analysis approach was originally prevalent in the disciplines of history, psychology, anthropology, and linguistics, but has now moved on to other social science fields as well (Bruner 1991). It is mainly a combination of two approaches, the narrative and discourse analysis approaches (Genette 1980, Chase 2005). Narrative analysis may be described as recording of experiences based on interview/observation which the researcher has to rearrange and think through, expound and present them in a revised shape. At the centre of narrative analysis is the reformulation of an account which has been put forward by the research participants in different contexts and experiences (Genette 1980, Chase 2005). Building on the narrative analysis is the discourse analysis approach. Guided by the goals of the research, discourse analysis focuses on trying to make sense of the transcribed interviews. A researcher mainly refers to the identified research context when
interpreting the message as it is assumed that any social phenomenon can be described differently depending on the context (Gergen 1994). Combining these two elements is what is referred to as the narrative discourse analysis approach.

In order to understand how the data was analysed, it would be worthwhile to start with an explanation of how the questions and interview guides were developed. Initially, a set of questions were developed as guided by the objectives and research questions of the study. Afterwards, several interview guides were also developed (for individual interviews and FGDs) and each guide had a set of questions which were corresponding to a particular research objective. In the field, the same interview questions were posed to each relevant respondent/interviewee with their answers being initially recorded using a pen and a note book as field notes, and where permission was granted, the interviews were recorded using an audial recorder.

Building on the description of the narrative discourse approach mentioned above, in practice, all responses from the interview were categorised according to the objectives or research questions of the study. The researcher read through the text to properly understand and derive meaning from the said interview in relation to the specified objective of the study. The process of reading the interview text in order to interpret and derive meaning largely followed what was propounded by Miller and Crabtree (1999 in Schutt 2012). Miller and Crabtree mentions that the qualitative narrative analysis approach (of reading interview text) mainly starts from reading the text literally (focuses on its literal content and form) then it moves on to reading the text reflectively (focuses on how researcher’s own orientation shapes the interpretation) and finally reading the text interpretively (focuses on constructing researcher’s own interpretation to create meaning). It is at this final stage that the researcher presents his/her findings in a write-up, and where necessary, relevant interviewee quotations are included. However it should be mentioned that, as is the case in almost all qualitative research, this process of reading through the data and interpreting them continued throughout the research process.

For the Afrobarometer qualitative data sets, the researcher used Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) to develop cross-tabulations (relationship between variables) and frequency distributions (grouping respondents into subcategories depending on the identified variable). In relation to presentation of data in graphs, Microsoft Excel software package was used.

1.11 Delimitation of study period
Although the pre-colonial and colonial period is extensively covered in this study, the main focus is on the period between 1960 and 2013. 1960 onwards captures a period when the countries understudy attained their independence and consolidated the core elements of the Westphalian model. More importantly, the period from 1993 represents a phase when the three countries of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique embraced multiparty systems of governance which also contributed to the revival of the Chewa Kingdom (Kayuni 2011).
Field research for this study was completed in early 2013; hence the study does not incorporate the issues emerging thereafter.

1.12 Methodological Challenges
There were several challenges that the researcher encountered while conducting this study and some of these challenges include the following:

In Mozambique it was very difficult to interview officials due to language problems. Most of the officials could not understand English or Chichewa/Nyanja; for instance, the District Commissioner could only speak Portuguese and Shangaan. When the option of using an interpreter was suggested, he was not interested, and instead handed the researcher to someone junior for assistance. However, the junior officer noted that there was a recently retired senior administrator who could be much more helpful because he could speak English and Chichewa. The researcher benefited from this arrangement apart from interviewing the junior officer.

Another challenge is that due to financial constraints, the study was not designed to interview individuals based in the capital cities of Mozambique (Maputo) and Zambia (Lusaka). Consequently, it was difficult to find experts in the sampled areas of Mozambique and Zambia who were able to provide the required information as independent key informants with expert opinions. Even those found in the sampled areas referred the researcher to experts based in Maputo or Lusaka. However, since the major informants for the study happened to be the local grassroots Chewa people, these were readily available in the sampled areas and they formed the hallmark of the data for this study.

1.13 Ethics Statement
The study adheres to internationally accepted ethical standards for conducting social science research which highlight the importance of confidentiality of informants/participants, informed consent and giving feedback. Through application to relevant authorities in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique the researcher sought official permission to conduct field research in the specified areas (see Appendices 2 to 4). The study also ensured that potential interviewees/research participants were not forced to take part in the study. All those who had agreed to take part were willing participants after being provided with all the information concerning the aims of the study, as well as its significance. Participants/interviewees were accorded confidentiality in the presentation of the findings; in this case the findings are not attributed to specific individual names unless the interviewer had been given permission to do so. More importantly, the participants were allowed to withdraw from the study at any time if they wished to do so. All participants were asked to sign a consent form (see Appendices 8 and 9) as evidence of consent to participate.

1.14 Conclusion
This chapter has mainly focused on introducing this study by, amongst other things, highlighting the background information in relation to the Chewa Kingdom as well as defining the key concepts as used in this study. More importantly, the chapter has extensively
discussed the reasons for conducting the study (problem statement) and also the main as well as specific objectives. From this introductory background information, it has been clarified that the study aims at interrogating whether the Chewa Kingdom of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia is challenging, contradicting, compromising, complementing, confirming or calling for a reconstruction of the Westphalian Model of state system. The study uses the case study approach drawing mainly from qualitative data collection methods. Constructivism and Cultural nationalism perspectives form the theoretical framework of the study. The next chapter further contextualises the study by discussing the Westphalian model’s concepts of state sovereignty and other related concepts as well as their relevance in Africa.
CHAPTER 2

THE WESTPHALIAN MODEL AND ITS RELEVANCE IN AFRICA

2.0 Introduction
This chapter provides the conceptual framework of the study by extensively discussing the concept of Westphalian model and how it relates to the African context. The Westphalian model is one of the most contested concept in IR with some scholars referring to it as a mere myth while others acknowledge it as being significant to the contemporary understanding of the state system. Despite some scholars referring to the model as a myth or an outdated concept, there are several arguments to demonstrate the significance of the concept in contemporary IR. The current commonly accepted liberal values and norms which explain the relationship between and amongst states can arguably be attributed to the document signed at Westphalia, that is, it led to the contemporary constitutional arrangement of state system with its associated concept of sovereignty. More importantly, any critical analysis of contemporary state system and sovereignty can not bypass an engagement (either directly or indirectly) with the Westphalian model. In other words, the model provides the basis for a better understanding of the concepts of state and sovereignty.

The African state is generally considered to be an appendage of the western state system. Some have argued that the process of establishing the African state system (including the concept of sovereignty) was flawed because it was imposed by colonialists hence it is irrelevant. One of the physical manifestations of the state is international borders and some argue that state borders in Africa are artificial hence concepts of sovereignty and state do not apply. This study joins other scholars who argue otherwise. Specifically, the chapter highlights that political boundaries are not arbitrary but emerge as a rational response to the political needs of those in power. In the past they served the interests of colonialists and now they serve the interest of local leaders. The chapter starts by highlighting the relevance of the model and later it sums up with further discussion of the concepts of state, sovereignty and their relevance in Africa.

2.1 Westphalian model and its relevance
Strik (2012: 641) argues that “the Westphalian model is one of the most widespread and widely accepted reference points in the study of International Relations” but at the same time Werner and de Wilde (2001) argue that the Westphalia model is grossly misunderstood. It was meant to achieve the opposite of what is commonly being said. According to these scholars, as a starting point, the model actually accepts that the state borders are porous and that there is need for interdependence of states. The process of mutually recognising borders were based on negotiations and reaching consensus on common norms of statecraft. Consequently since the model was born out of negotiations and consensus amongst states, it
implies interdependence. Although Werner and de Wilde don’t use the word ‘intersubjectivity’, it is actually a process akin to constructivist perspective of shared ideas and norms.

2.1.1 Factors making the model influential

Some of the reasons why the model has become influential over the years include: Firstly, the concept is popular in IR due to its simplicity. Although Krasner (1996: 115) is a critic of the concept, he acknowledges that the model’s elements which are based on, *inter alia*, principles of autonomy and territory “offer a simple, arresting, and elegant image”. Secondly, modern nation-states had the task of legitimising as well as accepting the responsibility of providing security, economic welfare and cultural identity of its citizenry and the model became an ideal frame of reference to this end (Axtmann2004:260-61). Consequently, this appealing and arguably theoretical frame facilitated a grand scale application of the model (Gross 1948:27). Thirdly, the preceding major and influential international treaties, charters and conventions such as those emanating from the League of Nations and United Nations have further supported its principles (Axtmann2004:262 and Gross 1948)- but as will be discussed later, the same international treaties and charters are perceived a challenge to the model. Fourthly, its principles captivated some statesmen’s long term quest for a united world political order. In this case, Gross (1948:20) mentions that it is traditionally regarded as “being the first of several attempts to establish something resembling world unity on the basis of states”. In this case, Hill (1925, in Gross 1948:25) argues that the model enabled Europe to receive what could be labelled as an international constitution. Finally, it became associated and gained support of leading scholars such as Grotius, a leading international law scholar, and thus according to Gross (1948:26), it facilitated the development of international law and other related studies.

Subsequently, students of international relations and law had to regard the Westphalian model as a significant event with “outstanding lasting value” (Gross 1948:26-27). Sindjoun (2001:220) supports this argument by pointing out that historically, it is only through the perspective of Westphalian model’s state that IR as a discipline emerged. Suffice to mention that Buzan and Little (1999:89) contend that the Westphalian model has over the years been conferred “iconic status” in IR which led to a major transformation in the analysis of the international system. It is no wonder, therefore, that Engel and Olsen (2010:7) emphasize that in contemporary period the Westphalian perspective among political scientists is still “very strong”.

Ironically, the influence of the concept goes hand in hand with its dismissal by the same political scientists. In some cases the model has been either applauded or criticized *at the same time by the same authors*. That is why Straumann (2008:174) observes that the Westphalian model has been “lauded on one side and blamed for all sorts of flaws on the other”. The problem with the Westphalian model, according to Okhonmina (2010: 179), is that “it is divisive, disrupts social processes, reifies power, de-eminizes social relations and
Some emerging scholars are admitting that the model has limitations but they are not willing to dismiss it as irrelevant in describing contemporary state systems (e.g. Haque and Burdescu 2004:240, Christensen 2002, Straumann 2008, Valaskakis 2000:2, & Kayuni 2011). For example, although Haque and Burdescu (2004: 240) agree that the model has over the years persevered, they are quick to note its shortfalls, hence they suggest that there is need to move towards a post-Westphalian model because significant changes have occurred in the world, which needs to be reflected in the model. Christensen (2002) also acknowledges the shortfalls of the model but affirms that it is still influential in defining the state system. In this case, Christensen (2003:1) argues that “the Westphalian paradigm …has served as the predominant world view and continues, although not without some debate, to enjoy such deference”.

2.1.2 Contemporary relevance of the model
The relevance of the model is reflected in several ways:

Firstly, it has become a convenient term to express the contemporary formal state and its associated attributes. For instance, although Krasner is one of the major critics of the notion of Westphalia, he uses the term in most of his analyses because he argues that the concept “has so much entered into common usage, even if it is historically inaccurate” (Krasner 1999:20). The observation of Krasner is reflected in many other authors who write about the state. They normally use the term to imply formal characteristics of the state and do not bother to problematise it. For instance, when Matlosa (2007:445) was describing the relevance of African state, he used the term ‘Westphalian state system’ to describe the formal state. Okhonmina (2010), when describing the Westphalian model, uses the term as synonymous with the contemporary formal state system. The model raises problems at theoretical or conceptual level but at practical level, its significance and impact is more apparent. Arguably sensitive scholars who do not want to court theoretical controversies avoid using the concept and resort to the use of ‘formal state’ or simply ‘state’.

Secondly, the Westphalian model is the foundation of constitutional liberal values and norms. Avoiding the debate on whether the model is the origin of international sovereignty, Straumann (2008) provides an additional perspective and treats the Peace of Westphalia as a constitutional document that has a bearing on international law and international affairs. The Peace of Westphalia came about not only to settle religious disagreements but it was meant to settle constitutional issues and strategic aims of the European powers. In other words, the religious differences and strategic aims of European powers were constitutionally expressed through the treaty of Westphalia; thus the Peace of Westphalia emerged as a secular constitutional piece with liberal values and norms which are still prevalent today. Further explaining the liberal constitutional argument, Sorensen (2004) emphasizes the role of the model to challenge other rival authorities to the state. In this regard, although Sorensen (2004:11) disagrees that the modern state emerged immediately after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, he does acknowledge however that:
The year 1648 was, of course, a landmark in the creation of this international society; states confirmed their independence of religious authorities and their right to sole control of their internal affairs. States, so to speak, sent a message to all possible rival centres of authority and power—religious as well as secular—that they were in charge and they set the rules of the game for everyone else.

Finally, the model’s relevance is in its recognition by some scholars that it is the starting point, not only in the formation of contemporary state systems but also in analysis of the state itself (Sorensen 2004, Engel and Olsen 2010, Krasner 1996, Murphy 1996:87). Sorensen (2004:13) argues that the Westphalian model had constantly been transformed and the process has taken several hundreds of years. Consequently, in analysing the previous shape of the state so as to assess what has changed currently, Sorensen (2004:13) argues that “the modern, Westphalian ideal type provides such an image”. This is why Murphy (1996:87) states that despite its contested shortfalls, “many political theorists came to look back on the Peace of Westphalia as the first formal step towards the establishment of a sovereign state system” (emphasis added). That is why Deudney (1996:190-191) argues that the essentials of the Westphalian system have been “widely accepted” and also “hegemonic” in modern international state politics.

2.2 The State

2.2.1 Diverse notions of the state and its significance

Dunleavy and O’Leavy (1987:1-3) define the state from organisational and functional perspectives. From organisational perspective, “it is a set of government institutions with rules that control and guide behaviour” while from a functional perspective, it is “a set of institutions carrying out specific goals, purposes and objectives”. From a Westphalian perspective Buzan and Little (1999:90) point out that the state is conceptualised on two critical issues: firstly the state has precisely defined territorial boundaries and secondly all the powers within this territory are centralised in a form of a self-governing unit. This has been the traditional way of understanding the state. According to Clapham (1996:8-12), the definition of state or statehood encompasses three attributes which also leads to three ways of looking at the concept of state or statehood. The first approach is to associate states with governments— which claims control over a particular territory and population. Thus “states in this sense are coercive and administrative institutions” which are meant to serve people in their specified territory (Clapham 1996:8). Having administrative institutions entails that the state has representatives who run affairs on its behalf and the people; through its representatives, it has to collect taxes and other income generating activities in order to finance this administrative institution. Some states have effectively been able to exert their influence over their territory more than others.

Despite the common usage of the term nation-state, most scholars agree that these terms are different. Vincent (1987:29) argues that a state can exist without nationalism but not vice versa. He goes on to add that the concept of state is grounded in several theories but nationalism has no adequate theories but “there may be adequate theories about what nationalism does”.

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The second approach is what is referred to as ‘idea of state’. In this case, states are perceived as constructs in the minds of those who form them as well as a good number of those who run them. The element of construction is important because it facilitates legitimacy. However, this perspective of the state has opened up a wide debate or raised questions in a number of areas. For instance “why the state should exist in the form that it does… [and] why the group of people who rule it should have any right to act on behalf of those who are merely its subjects or citizens” (Clapham 1996:11). Since the ‘idea of state’ is not commonly shared within and outside state, it may explain the reasons for many conflicts that have emerged over the years.

The third and final approach, according to Northedge (in Clapham 1996:11), is whereby the state is regarded as “a territorial association of people recognised for purposes of law and diplomacy as a legally equal member of the system of states”. This approach focuses on the legal recognition from external actors. In other words, despite an internal acceptance amongst its population, the state needs external actors, or international community, to recognise its existence.

Clapham refers to these three approaches as the formal or mythological attributes of the state. They are mythological because “very often do not actually coincide at all. There are few, perhaps no, states in which they are all realised in their entirety” (Clapham 1996:12). This mythology of the state may in practice fail to apply due to many reasons: (a) not everyone in the state may have the shared view of its identity; (b) territorial legitimacy is in some cases contested; (c) government of a state may not have the capacity to control its territory, (d) some states which have control over territory and population are not recognised internationally. In other words, there is always a gap between the official attribute and what actually is happening on the ground. In Clapham’s analysis, “in most states, and notably all of the African states…the gap between the myth and the reality of statehood is considerably greater” (Clapham 1996:12).

Many proponents of globalisation such as Held et al (1999) argue that the state has lost its significance and is being replaced by international non-governmental organisations. Robinson (1998:571) argues that the emergence of globalisation has witnessed an “increasing recognition of the obsolescence of the nation-state as a practical unit. Some scholars such as Czempiel (1989: 132) take an even more radical view by forcefully arguing that we should completely ignore the state. In this case, he contends that we have to “give up the notion and the concept of the state as well as the terminology”.

Other scholars do not agree about the demise of the state (Hirch 1995, Shaw 1997, Brown 2006, Kahler and Walter 2006 and Krasner 2001d). Kahler and Walter (2006) contend that despite some shortfalls in the state due to globalisation, the state still remains the most influential actor through which a modern community’s identities are constructed. In this
regard, Shaw (1997:497) argues that globalisation has not in any way negatively affected the state but it leads to “the transformation of state forms”. Krasner (2001d:13) agrees with the proponents of globalisation that it has merely generated changes in interconnectedness of states but he argues that the globalisation perspective “exaggerates the amount of change” (Krasner 2001d: 6). He further points out that states have remained exactly the way they used to be, as the most critical actors in the IR. In this case, he adds that states create international organisations in order to fulfil the states’ own interests.

Accordingly, from Krasner’s perspective, globalisation is actually consolidating or reinforcing the state’s role and not diminishing it. This study partially agrees with the argument raised by Krasner that globalisation has not seriously undermined the state authority. However, this study points out that the meaning attached to the state is the problem; hence its role as well. Being a realist, Krasner takes a hard centralist perspective of the state which this study disagrees with. In order to have a better picture of the state and its role, this study takes the perspective of the role of the state as emerging from a contested interaction between state and society. This conceptualisation of the state is further explained by Barkey and Parikh (1991).

Barkey and Parikh (1991:524) argue that earlier research on state was conceptualised in a dichotomised manner: state-centred and society-centred approaches. The state-centred approach takes the Westphalian perspective of the strong state which is absolutely autonomous and acts as it wills. The state-society approach, on the other hand, takes an empirically-driven perspective that “articulates a more moderate vision of the state's role by embedding it in its societal context” (Barkey and Parikh 1991:525). Barkey and Parikh offer a third perspective in state analysis which, according to their observation, does not deny the central role for the state but contends that the status of the relationship between the state, on one hand, and society on the other, is not straightforward but contested. Barkey and Parikh (1991:526) aptly explain this scenario by arguing that “state-society relations are constantly interacting with each other; these interactions in turn reshape the nature of state autonomy and capacity.” This point is further supported by Sindjoun (2001) who argues that, unlike a realist perspective of the state, IR is a dynamic discipline and the meaning of some of its concepts such as state (and its role) are bound to change due to the socio-political interactions taking place.

Sorensen (2004) argues that the contemporary sovereign state is presenting two contradictory images. On one hand, it appears to be very strong and reasserting itself; on the other hand, its authority is being challenged by several forces such as global market forces, regional institutions, international organisations, popular movements and other related forces. It is this contradiction which is opening up new scholarly debate on the future of the state. Sorensen (2004:6) further points out that much of the debate on whether the state is losing or gaining power/influence is based on the fallacy of generalisation due to its sole focus on the zero sum of “winning or losing” perspective. In this case, Sorensen (2004:6) argues that the state power or influence “can only be assessed in relation to specific issues or arenas”. Consequently,
Sorensen contends that it is possible for the state to encounter forces that weaken and strengthen it at the same time; hence the focus should be on transformation of the state rather than focusing on the zero sums. He further argues that when the transformation perspective is considered, it is practically possible to trace and analyse the changes that states go through internally as well as in relation to other relevant actors.

2.2.2 Relevance of State in the African context

The application of the concept of state in Africa has raised a number of debates. Authors such as Dunn and Shaw (2001), Dunn (2001), Neuman (1998), Grovogui (2002), Swatuk (2001), Ofoho (2000), Ayoob (1998), Malaquias (2001), Davidson (1992), Walker (2007) and Grovogui (2011) have all argued (though not in an identical manner) that the western concept of state does not apply in the African context. Walker (2007:582) also points out that the post-colonial state has not successfully worked in Africa because “both the popular imagination and scholarly inspection” show major shortfalls. Englebert (1997) claims that the African state is neither African nor a state. He argues that it is not African because it was imposed by European powers using their own yardstick of state. He also claims that it is not a state because it does not fulfil the role of the normal state.

Events surrounding the post-World War Two heavily influenced the international political structure as well as the status of formerly colonized states such as those in Africa. The criteria which were developed in order to recognize membership into the United Nations are a case in point. Through United Nations General Assembly resolution 1514 and 1541 of 1960, they encouraged the process of decolonization by applying the principle of ‘right to self-determination’. Specifically, the right to self-determination was explained as “a territory which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and or culturally from the country administering it” (United Nations, in Clapham 1996:12). African states were therefore recognized and received into the community of nations using these principles. Jackson (1993) argues that this move entailed that African states were recognized whilst they were internally weak and unable to fulfil some of their minimum requirements for a state such as the capacity to meet the needs of its people. In this case, Jackson (1993) introduced the concept of "quasi-states" or states that cannot function without receiving assistance from outside yet they are legally recognized by the international community. The far reaching implication is that “the rulers and would-be rulers of weak and fragile states had a set of objectives…first, and most important, they had to establish themselves as the internationally recognized representatives of internationally recognized states” (Clapham 1996:22-23). Furthermore, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which was established in 1963 went ahead to also recognize the borders which were drawn by their colonial masters.

According to Clapham (1996) the state in third world countries, such as Africa, is normally taken for granted in international relations and erroneously analysed in a conventional manner like any other normal state. The African state rulers are concerned about their survival and they control the state in a manner that would facilitate achievement of their personal goals. One of the ways in which they do this is creation of what is referred to as the
“shadow state”. The shadow state could be described as a state “in which the rulers used formal statehood merely as a façade, behind which to conduct what became essentially personal survival strategies” (Clapham 1996:5).

Several authors have argued for the viability of the African state (Herbst 1989, Brown 2006). Herbst (1989) contends that to argue that the borders of African states are artificial is not right because all political borders are merely constructs and not natural. The question to be asked is for whose purposes they were created. If this criterion is used, we may conclude that the existing African political boundaries are not arbitrary because they are a product of a rational response to the political needs of the colonialists at that time. Just as the borders served their interests to the colonialists, the same borders have been serving the interest of post-colonial leaders - hence they have been maintained (Herbst 1989:692). Brown (2006) has produced a considerably comprehensive analysis in support of the African state as an entity. In relation to artificiality of the African state, Brown (2006:123) argues that the African state is neither an imposition nor artificial. He points out that the process of decolonisation which led to independence involved Africans as actors and not merely spectators (Brown 2006:128). This observation supports Bughart’s (1984:102) similar observation in Nepal where although the concept of nation-state was introduced by Western Powers, “the formation of this concept also occurred in an intracultural context that cannot be separated analytically from Nepal’s intercultural field of relations.” Isaacman and Peterson (2003) also discuss the creation of the Chikunda ethnic group in Mozambique after African contact with the Portuguese. Although the Portuguese initiated the process of creating the Chikunda, it was not imposed but evolved through an inter- and intra-cultural process. Another counter argument is that calling for development of theories and concepts that are specific for Africa is, according to Brown, erroneous. He protests that that there is nothing special about Africa in the modern world that renders its concept of the state irrelevant even though it is western in origin (Brown 2006:128). He points out that creating theories of the state which are only relevant to Africa would risk further marginalisation of the African continent from mainstream IR scholarship. More importantly, Brown argues that the critics of African state use the neo-realism theory in order to explain Africa- a theory which is fraught with numerous shortfalls. He however argues that there is “potential relevance of other approaches within IR once one moves beyond the constraints of neo-realism” (Brown 1996: 120).

Whilst not completely dismissing the contributions of aforementioned critics on the applicability of the state in Africa, this study agrees with the assertion by Brown (2006). Brown is calling for a different conceptualisation of the state so that it may capture African elements that may not be identified through the neo-realism perspective. In this case, he is advocating a move from the elemental to a relational state perspective. However, the mainstream theories are still relevant because “theoretical approaches from within IR remain useful starting points for analysis of Africa’s international relations” (Brown 1996:129). Taking such a perspective may lead to an agreement with Nkiwane’s (2001: 287) observation that “the state may derive its power from a variety of sources, and in the context of Africa what may appear to be a loss of central state power may in fact be its reconfiguration”. This
is another hypothesis which this study is investigating: that the state is still relevant in Africa. Brown (2006: 124-125) aptly mentions that “I see no reason to doubt its continuing relevance in either the African or global context”.

2.3 Sovereignty

2.3.1 Diverse perspectives of sovereignty
The Westphalian perspective of sovereignty has drawn a number of critics. Among other issues, it has been argued that it “constitutes a myth”8 (Beaulac 2004:181), “limps into obsolescence” (Valaskakis 2001:65), has been “progressively losing its monopoly” (Sindjoun 2001:223), and “is largely imaginary” (Osiander 2001:251). The most well-known definition of sovereignty is provided by Hinsley (1986:26), who described sovereignty as “the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community… and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere”. Potter (2004) argues that sovereignty can be looked at as a right as stipulated in the Westphalian model (non-interference in internal matters of a state) and as a responsibility (providing a minimum acceptable standard of living for its people) as highlighted in international conventions. In other words, as a right or responsibility, sovereignty explains the relationship between the state and its people as well as its relationship with other states.

Stirk (2005:167) points out that “Sovereignty is the key ‘Westphalian’ concept”. Whether sovereignty is still relevant or not is not very important but what is important is to draw distinctions of sovereignty which goes beyond the traditional perspective of internal and external sovereignty. The distinction should however be between the formal status and summa potestas or factual power. According to Ivan (2012:92), sovereignty can be “understood in its simplest form as the capacity of the state to exercise authority over a given territory and population”. This view is also reinforced by Hurd (2008:1) who points out that “a state can be sovereign only when it is seen by people and other states as a corporate actor with rights and obligations over territory and citizens (and they act accordingly)”. Werner and de Wilde (2001:284) refer to sovereignty as “state’s autonomy and ability to rule”. Sovereignty has over the years been interpreted differently to imply the constitution/law of the land, the people/citizenry or office of rulership and not necessarily the person in office. Sovereignty is generally regarded as a critical element of the Westphalian model (Croxton 1999). In this case Beaulac (2004:181) rightly suggests that Westphalia put to the fore the notion of ‘state sovereignty’ and became a “cornerstone” in the actual treaty of Westphalia. Consequently, from a Westphalian perspective, Axtmann (2004:260) points out that state sovereignty meant that legally and politically the state had absolute authority “not accountable to anyone but itself”. In relation to trans-border control, Krasner (2001d:28) states that sovereignty implies the capacity to control or ability to regulate trans-border movements as well as those within

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8Beaulac (2004:181) explains that “The truth of the matter is that mythology constitutes one of the ways that society may explain itself to itself. Society can use aetiological myths (that is, origin myths) to explain its genesis to itself, thus building a belief-system about the whens, wheres and hows of its becoming and its being”.
the boundary of the state. Part of this perspective of sovereignty which implies the capacity to control or ability to regulate trans-border movements have been adopted by this study.

Werner and de Wilde (2001) point out the contradiction that exists in international relations and legal practice. Werner and de Wilde claim that an exceedingly great number of scholars argue that sovereignty is obsolete and factually inaccurate yet the concept dominates the international relations discipline. According to Werner and de Wilde, this contradiction emanates from the scholars’ ‘descriptive fallacy’. In relation to the concept of sovereignty, ‘descriptive fallacy’ denotes the “erroneous assumption that there must be something in reality corresponding to the meaning of the term sovereignty” (Werner and de Wilde 2001:285). When scholars observe that there are numerous activities which challenge the actual power being exercised within a state, they conclude that either sovereignty is declining or it does not exist at all. Werner and de Wilde (2001) aptly argue that the corresponding word for sovereignty doesn’t exist in common usage hence for us to understand it better, we should not look for what corresponds to it but rather we should reconstruct it. In other words, the question should not be which situation of state affairs corresponds to sovereignty but inter alia the question should be: “In what context is a claim of sovereignty likely to occur?” In this regard, for us to know more about sovereignty, we should look for “conditions in which an authority is legitimate and of the place, men and institutions in which it resides” (Werner and de Wilde 2001:285).

According to Ivan (2012), two important markers of the sovereign state are territory and political community. A political community is equivalent to the notion of a nation hence defined as a group of people who share a common culture, language and history while territory is geographical make up of a state which is defined by physical markings. Territory and political community are significantly connected to each other but “territory is the foundational basis of sovereignty” (Ivan 2012:76). Frontiers have for many years been the most visible limits of state sovereignty and have been used by the state to control those crossing so that the state should ably establish “cohesiveness of the political community” and in the process the state has been re-instituting sovereignty. In other words, whatever the state does in relation to territory has been done in order to consolidate its political community. Due to globalization and other factors, the state has lost control of controlling its borders and where possible it is erecting more ‘formidable’ external borders or “symbolic, internal ones, aimed at clearly delimiting the domestic from the international space, and the political community (‘us’) from the strangers (‘them’)” (Ivan 2012:76). In other words, the internal symbolic borders are reinforced by appealing to what makes them a nation, such as issues of a common culture, history and language (reinforcing the ‘us’ from strangers ‘them’). In order to enhance control of its political community, the state has initiated a range of symbolic narratives. In this narrative, “the state presents itself as the sole authority capable of safeguarding this separation between a safe domestic space and a dangerous foreign environment, and it can only do this by maintaining very precise separation lines between inside and outside” (Ivan 2012:77-8). Ivan (2012:84) argues that the state controls immigration precisely to ensure that it re-affirms its sovereignty. According to Ivan (2012:81),
the state has also ensured that there is “a centralized political apparatus and an educational system that promotes the official culture that is subsequently embraced by all the members of the nation”. The assumption is that for people to unite politically, they must have a common cultural basis.

Werner and de Wilde (2001) argue that when a state’s ability to rule internally is not being questioned and its relationship with external forces is harmonious, sovereignty is not important. However, when the opposite is true, that is when sovereignty becomes an issue. Werner and de Wilde provide an example of Denmark in 2000 when it was debating on whether to join the Euro or not. During the referendum debate, Sovereignty was a concept which was repeatedly mentioned (those who were against the Euro) but after the referendum it lost its importance. In other words, the perception was that state sovereignty was under threat as the political community was going to be undermined through external forces. Illegal immigration issues also bring to the fore the debate on the issue of sovereignty.

Probably a more detailed analysis of sovereignty is provided by Krasner in several of his works (1996, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, and 2005), hence his works need comprehensive discussion. He argues there are three aspects of elements of sovereignty: international legal sovereignty (international recognition and territorial independence): Westphalian-cum-Vattelian sovereignty (states should avoid intervening in each other’s internal affairs), and domestic sovereignty (focus on authority structures within a given state and to their actual capacity) (Krasner 2005:70-71). According to Krasner (2005) a state may have more of one type of sovereignty and less of another.

Krasner’s (1996) major argument is that it is wrong to say that sovereignty is currently declining due to globalisation because it has always been compromised or violated throughout history. This compromise and violation does not mean that it is declining either. According to him, the violation and persistence of sovereignty has always been a permanent feature of the international system. He also argues that the Westphalian model was not the source of sovereignty but it should just be treated “as a reference point or convention that is useful in some circumstances” (Krasner 1996: 150). In other words, by mentioning that it “is useful in some circumstances”, he is not completely dismissing sovereignty and the model itself. It is the value attached to the model and the argument that sovereignty is declining that he is against. Although most of the elements of Krasner’s arguments seem plausible, this study does not fully agree with his view. However, it does agree with the idea raised by Smith (2001) who provides a critique to Krasner’s arguments. From a constructivist premise, Smith’s (2001) arguments point to the fact that sovereignty is not static - it can and has been changing over time and we can only determine its composition through empirical research within a specific context. This is the hallmark of this study on the element of sovereignty.

In his earlier work (Krasner 2001a:6) he identifies four usages of sovereignty which are interdependence sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty
Some scholars have argued for the relevance of analysing sovereignty from a constructivist perspective (Sindjoun 2001, Lake 2003, Biersteker and Weber 1996). Sindjoun (2001:223), for instance, aptly captures the essence of sovereignty from a constructivist approach by arguing that:

When one takes into account sovereignty as it is (empirical sovereignty) and not sovereignty as prescribed by the Treaty of Westphalia (normative sovereignty), current changes are perceived as normal: sovereignty is not an essence; neither a definitive substance... Globalization reminds us that sovereignty is relative and dynamic. Meanwhile, it is excessive to proclaim the end of sovereignty; sovereignty still makes sense in international relations through new meanings and specific uses (emphasis added).

From a constructivist perspective sovereignty is socially constructed and dynamic - and this “potentially opens up new avenues for understanding international politics” (Lake 2003:308). Biersteker and Weber (1996) arguably present a more persuasive and detailed analysis of sovereignty from a constructivist’s approach. According to Biersteker and Weber (1996), sovereignty is a socially constructed concept and it is tied to a specific historical concept. In this case, it is an outcome of the actions of the powerful and the resistance to the actions of the powerful by those who perceive themselves to be on the margins of power.

Castells explains that even authoritarian regimes still need a certain level of legitimacy for their own survival. In other words, there is a constant mediation between the state and society and it is this mediation that determines the balance or political stability. Furthermore, striking the balance doesn’t always mean relying on the formal process of governance but the informal mutual understanding between state institutions and society (Castells 2004:361).

2.3.2 Relevance of sovereignty in Africa
According to Clapham (1999), Third-world countries, which include Africa, had the Westphalian form of sovereignty imposed on them, but after their independence, especially after the Second World War, they became the strongest supporter of the Westphalian sovereignty in the international state system. The need for a study of sovereignty in Africa critiquing the Westphalian perspective is emphasized by Weber and Biersteker (1996:285) who aptly argue that:

As a focus of on-going social constructivist research, we must continue to weave into our understandings of international relations forgotten histories of colonial territories and post-colonial states... Such construction provides us with an approach that enables us to investigate how and why Westphalian state sovereignty is privileged in international relations theory and practice.
Apart from the applicability of the notion of African state, several debates have raged concerning whether the African state possesses sovereignty or not; below is a discussion concerning this debate based on selected trans-border studies\(^{10}\):

Some of the authors who have conducted trans-border as well as multiple country studies and argued that African states lack a bona fide sovereignty include Englebert (2009) and Kehinde (2010). Although Englebert’s work does not specifically focus on trans-border per se, his findings do provide insights especially on the debate of ‘artificiality’ of African borders. Englebert builds on several other previous scholars such as Herbst (1996 and 2001) and he is very critical of African sovereignty. He argues that most African countries still exist because of the international recognition bestowed on them by the international community. Specifically he argues that the legal sovereignty rendered to African states by the international community has allowed the oppressive ruling elites to translate that into internal legitimacy. In this case, his suggestion is that the international legal sovereignty bestowed upon African states should be withdrawn; the colonial boundaries should also be discarded and re-drawn. In other words, African states should have their “sovereignty revoked” (Englebert 2009:252). The shortfall with Englebert’s work is that he is providing a one-source-directional-analysis of the problems of Africa by excessively lumping blame on the colonisation process and its aftermath (i.e. state sovereignty). Various works have clearly demonstrated that Africa’s social political challenges emerge from diverse sources. Consequently, this study rejects Englebert’s perspective.

Kehinde (2010) focused his study on the geo-cultural space of the Yoruba ethnic identity along the Benin-Nigeria international border. Specifically, he was examining the impact of state boundary partitioning on the Yoruba ethnic identity and group relations. Benin is a former French colony while Nigeria is a former British colony. The colonial powers used different approaches in order to govern these territories. Using a multidisciplinary approach based on a historicised case-study of the Yoruba border communities, Kehinde finds that contrary to the findings of wider literature, the colonial boundaries (and later consolidated through the post-colonial state) have not affected the Yoruba ethnic identity and its related socialization processes. He argues that the governments of Nigeria and Benin actively pursued different national policies and the border was one of the instruments used to re-assert their control over the territory. Despite the efforts, these states had failed to effectively assert their control over the areas. Specifically, Kehinde (2010:271) argues that “state weakness, characterized by defective structures, bad governance, corruption and poor geography, is essentially responsible for the failure of these states to assert their authorities over territory”. This state failure according to Kehinde was fully taken advantage by the Yoruba to have unrestrained cross-border movements which ultimately sustained and enhanced the cross-border Yoruba identity and solidarity. The major weakness of Kehinde’s work is that although he used the structuralism and functionalism perspectives as frames of analysis, his conclusion is mainly drawn from structuralism and in the process, he almost completely ignores the value

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\(^{10}\) The study has deliberately avoided the failed state debate. John (2010:10) argues that the measurements of state failure are misleading because they do not appropriately take into consideration “wide variations of capacity across state functions within a polity”.
of functionalism. In other words his interpretation of state weakness could also be seen in another perspective: it could reflect on the state’s flexibility and responsiveness to the needs of its citizens- the sovereign- and not necessarily a demonstration of its weakness.

Several trans-border and multiple country studies have also demonstrated that the African state has actually not lost its sovereignty. In this regard, some of the studies include those conducted by Boone (2003), KCK (2005) and Maclean (2010). Boone’s (2003) work is essential for understanding variations in African state formation and sustenance especially at local rural level. Her work is based on a comprehensive empirical research conducted in West African states of Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal and Ghana. She ably demonstrates that contrary to the view that the state is weak and not influential (especially in the rural areas), state power is actually far more entrenched in rural societies. In other words, her work focuses on power and political capacity in rural sub-Saharan Africa or the variations in distribution of power between centre and rural local areas.

In 2005, Kituo Cha Katiba (KCK) conducted research in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya in order to document citizens’ experiences when confronted with challenges related to threats and constraints in addressing citizenship and identity. Whilst acknowledging several challenges towards meaningful achievement of a common political citizenship, the KCK report mentions that informally the cross-border communities have already started the process. Specifically, the report states that:

The ordinary people are ahead of the politicians and are already federated without the formal legal process. This is demonstrated through their ability to visit relatives across the borders, without a hassle, organized around the principle of Good Neighbourliness or UjiraniMwema… All border communities are basically integrated and speak one language and have been described as true “East Africans.”… In fact for the Nyamwanga, one chief rules in both countries and is expected to have a wife in both countries (KCK 2005:33-34).

Based on their findings, KCK does not argue that the informal trans-border movement is a challenge to the formal state, but that it actually strengthens the state by making it more relevant.

The third perspective is drawn from Maclean (2010). In this case Maclean (2010) explores the Akan tribe which stretches across the contemporary Ghana-Cote d’Ivoire border. In pre-colonial period, the Akan were under one kingdom but were split due to the colonial demarcation of the community. The Akan in Ghana were under the British administration while the Akan of Cote d’Ivoire were under the French administration. According to Maclean, the Akan villages on both sides of the border claim that they are one family because they had one common pre-colonial culture, history and politics. However, contrary to these claims, Maclean noted significant differences between the Akan in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire in relation to informal institutions of social reciprocity and local understanding of citizenship.
Specifically in relation to reciprocity, she claims that in Ghana, reciprocity was much lower amongst the Akan as compared to the Akan of Cote d’Ivoire. In relation to citizenship, the Ghanaian pattern of citizenship led to a community-oriented notion while the Ivoirian villagers tended to pursue an “individualized, entitlement-based sense of citizenship”. Based on her findings, Maclean (2010:32) audaciously claims that:

I reject the notion that the African state is uniformly weak or failed, and that informal institutions are the only rules that matter on the ground. I also reject the idea that the colonial state barely touched African societies or is no longer relevant to African cultures today.

2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has extensively discussed the concept of Westphalia, and how it fits in the contemporary state analysis. The chapter also discussed the Wesphalian concepts of state and sovereignty, as well as how they may be applicable in the African context. From the literature reviewed, it emerges that although the Westphalian model has been discredited over the years, it is still valuable for the study of state systems in Africa and elsewhere. Although Africa presents some unique qualities in relation to state systems, the study does not agree that there is a significant African exceptionalism. Consequently, concepts of state, sovereignty and citizenship are being examined with the Westphalian model as the starting point, and the study suggests the state-society perspective in the context of constructivism theory. The next chapter extends the analysis of state, sovereignty and citizenship by discussing emerging studies on politics of representation in the context of traditional authorities, ethnic identity and cultural nationalism in the African context.
CHAPTER 3

POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION, ETHNIC IDENTITY AND CULTURAL NATIONALISM

3.0 Introduction
Although the previous chapter engaged with the concept of state and sovereignty in general, in an African context, issues of ethnic identity and traditional authority are significant in providing an explanation of certain political dynamics at play. That is why this chapter focuses on the relevance of traditional authorities in the context of ethnic identity and the notion of cultural nationalism in an African state. One of the current debates on traditional authority has the undercurrent question of who has authority and legitimacy between the state and traditional institutions. The tussles for control of grassroots communities, who are the subjects, are the hallmark of politics of representation in this debate. When the second wind of change blew across Africa in the 1990s, the general expectation was that formal institutions of governance would be strengthened but no one expected the revival of informal traditional authorities. These traditional institutions have now become more assertive and they are increasing their stake in the running of formal state institutions. Unlike formal state institutions, traditional institutions operate within the ambit of ethnic and cultural national groupings. This has implications on the quest for unity and absolute authority that the state yearns for. More importantly, the politicization of the ethnic-cultural groupings further complicates the scenario for the state as it may lead to sectarian violence and quest for autonomy-a direct challenge to state sovereignty. It is within this context of the uniqueness of the role of traditional authorities in an African state that this chapter examines the issue of politics of representation. Is the role of traditional authorities compatible with contemporary democratic ethos of the African state? To what extent can the formal state embrace and co-exist with traditional authorities? This chapter agrees with the view that traditional authorities are compatible with contemporary democratic state systems. Firstly, however, this chapter provides the contextual background of traditional authorities in Africa followed by politics of representation and winds up with a discussion on the notions of ethnicity and cultural nationalism.

3.1 Contextual underpinning: Revival of traditional authorities in Africa
Writing on the revival of traditional authorities and ethnic identities in South Africa, Oomen (2005) states that it seems to be a contradiction when considered that during the apartheid era the state consistently used the so-called traditional system to control the black population. Most of the resistance leaders during the apartheid era, who are currently supporting the traditional system, resented the traditional systems because they were perceived as a tool towards suppression of the black population and sowing the seeds of division. Oomen (2005:3) explains that this revival of traditional system should be understood from developments occurring in the global system which are “the fragmentation of the nation-state, the embracing of culture, the applauding of group rights”. She further explains that in the
contemporary world the use of ‘culture card’ (or cultural movement) as a way of bringing attention to traditional systems of governance, has become popular.

In agreement with Eriksen (2002), Oomen points out that there is a link between globalisation and the rise in traditional authorities as well as ethnic identity. In other words, the rise in traditional authorities is synonymous with the rise in the use of the ‘culture card’ and ethnic identity. Eriksen (2002) and Oomen (2005) further point out that there are several reasons why the culture card with its associated ethnic identity and traditional authorities has become popular. The culture card has become popular because of its convenience as a political tool. For instance, it is now popular for indigenous groups who feel suppressed such as the Maori and Aborigines in New Zealand and Australia respectively to use the ‘culture card’ when demanding group rights. For instance, after the Second World War, indigenous groups such as Eskimos, Lapps, American Indians and Aborigines have been politically organising themselves and asking for state recognition and protection of their ethnic identities, traditional institutions and interests. This call for recognition and protection has recently intensified in their respective countries.

As already explained, another reason is the inability of states to address all the needs of its citizenry. Consequently, ethnic identities reflected in traditional authority become a seemingly realistic way of expressing and addressing their needs. This view is aptly argued by Eriksen, who states that:

> It has been said that the nation-state is too small to accomplish certain tasks and too big to accomplish others - too big to give people a sense of community, too small to solve the problems facing humanity- and this entails the continued relevance of the analytical concern with identification and group cohesion, but also suggest the necessity for new frameworks (Eriksen 2002:166).

Another reason, according to Oomen, for popularity of traditional authorities is their ability to address the human inward quest for authenticity. As society is transforming, there is often that inward quest to search for one’s identity as individuals feel lost in the changes around them. Precisely, in this globalised world, tradition and ethnic identity has emerged as “one of the prime ways in which to engage with a fast-changing world” or “a means by which to assert ‘authenticity’” (Oomen 2005:8-9). Some of the problems that tradition and ethnicity address are not confined to economic needs but social-psychology such as “questions of origins, destiny and ultimately, the meaning of life” (Eriksen 2002:44). Ethnicity and tradition become much stronger when it is threatened by societal and cultural changes. Thus the expression of ethnicity provides a psychological assurance that despite the rapid social and cultural changes, one is still in keeping with one’s ancestors and continuity with the past. There is even a strengthening of the relationship between culture and other wider political and economic processes; for instance, it is common to see traditional dances being performed for tourists as well as the development of indigenous internet sites or indigenous food stores (Oomen 2005:9).
The debate on traditional authorities\textsuperscript{11} in Africa has mainly focused on whether they are compatible with a democratic system or not. Implicitly, the debate is whether state sovereignty is undermined or not when traditional authorities are allowed to operate. This is the case because according to the Westphalian model, the state is the only entity that individuals are supposed to pay allegiance to, but traditional authorities are seemingly ‘parallel structures’ to which arguably most Africans pay allegiance. In other words, traditional authorities also put into question the relevance of state citizenship. Several authors have argued for (Logan 2008, 2009 and 2011, Williams 2011) or against (Ntsebeza 2006, Mamdani 1996, and Englebert 2002) the role of traditional authorities in African state governance. This section focuses on some of the selected reading and most relevant scholars who have comprehensively discussed the issue.

\subsection*{3.1.1 Categorising debates on the role of traditional authorities}

According to Logan (2008: ii), the debate on the role of traditional authorities in Africa can roughly be categorised into two: the ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernists’. According to this categorisation, traditionalists “regard Africa’s traditional chiefs and elders as the true representatives of their people, accessible, respected, and legitimate, and therefore still essential to politics on the continent”. On the other hand, the modernists regard traditional authority as “chauvinistic, authoritarian and an increasingly irrelevant form of rule that is antithetical to democracy”. A little bit different from Logan’s (2008) categorisation, Ntsebeza (2006) brings in the citizenship perspective and identifies three schools of thought that prescribe on the future of traditional authorities: (a) those who argue for a common citizenship perspective, (b) those who argue that it should be mixed or co-exist with the formal governance system and, (c) those who argue for integration of the traditional system and call for adoption of certain values and practices in the formal governance system.

Those who argue for a \textit{common citizenship} contend that the existence of traditional authorities is another extension of the colonial tactic of divide and rule. It seems that communities in the rural areas who are subjected to traditional authorities do not exercise their citizenship and are therefore subjects whilst those in the urban areas enjoy citizenship rights. Their idea is to completely dismantle the traditional authority system because it is not compatible with contemporary democratic principles. The \textit{mixed or co-existence model} argues that the traditional system doesn’t normally compete with the state; hence their role should be advisory and ceremonial. In some cases their role is in maintenance of social order and community mobilisation. The conditions for fulfilment of this model are that the roles of the political and traditional authorities should be clarified and that the traditional authorities should accept that their role is subservient to political roles. Finally, the \textit{integration model} builds on the mixed model but goes on to argue that the traditional system has certain elements which are compatible with the liberal democracy; hence these elements need to be integrated. Consequently, “there is also a strong assumption in this model that the institution of traditional leadership can be transformed and democratised” (Ntsebeza 2006:32).

\textsuperscript{11} Unless otherwise stated, the study interchangeably uses the concepts of traditional authorities, chiefs(chieftaincies) and traditional leaders.
Logan (2008) identifies another growing school of thought which she labels the pragmatic-traditionalists. Some of the scholars in this school of thought are West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999), de Sousa Santos (2006), Lund (2006) and Eggen (2011). This school of thought takes a middle ground in the modernity/traditionalist debate. Firstly, it acknowledges that traditional authorities are not currently weakening: the institution will still exist even if democracy gains strength. Secondly, the pragmatic-traditionalists also recognise the core weaknesses of the institution but argue that there are so many elements which can be strengthened for the benefit of communities. In this case, the pragmatic-traditionalists focus on “ways in which the institutions of traditional authority can be effectively blended with the needs of the state and the principles of democracy” (Logan 2008:7). The sections below discuss in detail the specific tension that exists amongst these schools of thought by focusing on political legitimacy which forms the centre piece in politics of representation.

3.2 Politics of representation: The tension between state and traditional authorities

Emanating from the discussion on the categorisation of debates on traditional authorities in Africa, this section specifically discusses the prevailing debate on whether traditional authorities should have legitimacy or not.

3.2.1 Opposing traditional authority’s legitimacy: the ‘subjects’ vs ‘citizens’ perspective

Taking a position of rejecting the role of traditional authorities in Africa and building on the work of Mamdani (2006), Ntsebeza (2006) explores the contemporary governance authority of traditional authorities in rural Eastern Cape Province of South Africa by focusing on their role in land administration. Ntsebeza’s work builds on Mamdani’s (2006) work which argues that traditional authorities who operate in the rural areas have suppressed the rights of the rural people hence they are ‘subjects’ (non-participatory communities dictated by traditional authorities). On the other hand, in urban areas where traditional authorities do not operate, the inhabitants are ‘citizens’ who freely enjoy their social and political rights. Specifically, Ntsebeza (2006) attempts to examine the question: why have traditional authorities retained their apartheid-era rural governance authority despite South Africa adopting the liberal democratic form of governance? He argues that traditional authorities survived the colonial and apartheid era because these autocratic systems relied on traditional authorities in order to effectively control the rural African majority. Using the political-economic argument of globalisation, he continues to argue that the contemporary African state is weak at local level (due to the neo-liberal capitalist approach) but strong at the national level (as it possesses instruments of coercion). This weakness is defined as the inability of the state to deliver services and development at local level. It is in this context that traditional authorities have found an opportunity to reassert themselves and reclaim the past authority by continuing to work as an extension of the state for rural development at the expense of elected local councillors. The problem in this case is that traditional authorities, who are not elected by the people (hence technically not directly accountable to them), are given more sensitive responsibilities such as land allocation. According to Ntsebeza (2006),
core issues of human rights, justice and democracy cannot be attained in such a scenario, besides the fact that those in the urban areas, who do not have chiefs, are not subjected to the same treatment. In other words, those in rural areas are being treated not as full citizens but subjects (under their undemocratically bestowed local chiefs) while those in urban areas enjoy citizenship rights through accountable leadership. Consequently, he argues that this is a case of “democracy compromised”. However, it may be argued that many people in cities have ties to local communities and therefore are both citizen and subject, depending on where they are at a given time. It is not always one or the other. Ntsebeza suggests that if the traditional authorities have to be retained then they should “abandon their hereditary status and subject themselves to election by their people, bringing along with them the participatory element embedded in traditional democracy” (Ntsebeza 2006: 33).

As already alluded to, Ntsebeza subscribes to the common citizenship model and heavily criticises the other integration and mixed model. He argues that since the institution of traditional authority does not conform to liberal democratic principles, there is no way it would be compatible to the liberal democratic principles. Historically, the institution has always collaborated with autocrats and the way it is structured does not encourage popular participation of decision making of a large majority of the population such as the youth and women. He also argues that whilst it is important to retain some indigenous values in African democratic systems, the institution of chieftaincy cannot claim to be the “sole bearer of these values” (Ntsebeza 2006:33).

3.2.2 In support of traditional authority’s legitimacy: ‘Popular relevance’ perspective

In what might be termed as the ‘popular relevance’ perspective, traditional authorities are deemed as relevant because they are widely supported by the people. However, this perspective does acknowledge the shortfalls of the traditional institution. This perspective does not see any problem in allowing traditional authorities to express their authority within a democratic system of governance. In other words, this perspective is highly critical of Mamdani and Ntsebeza. This study agrees with the view that traditional authorities are compatible with contemporary democratic state systems.

Although not completely supporting all aspects of traditional authorities in local governance, Williams (2010) takes a sympathetic analysis of traditional authorities in Africa. Williams (2010) conducted his empirical study in the Kwazulu Natal Province, among the Zulu ethnic group, in order to explore the tension between state and traditional leaders on political legitimacy in the rural areas. His findings show that there is overwhelming support for continuation of traditional leadership in their area. According to his findings, the relationship between traditional leadership and the Zulu society is mainly based on unity and the traditional leader reinforces this unity through the principles of the maintenance of order; community consultation and participation in decision-making; impartial and unbiased decision-making rulers; and promotion of community welfare before individual gain. When respondents were asked why chieftaincy should continue, they said that “chieftaincy provided discipline, dignity, and respect for the community and that there would be ‘disorder’ without the chieftaincy” (Williams 2010:26). He also added that “the notion that the people are bound
together with the chieftaincy and that the *chieftaincy gives meaning to the identity of the people* is an extremely powerful idea that might be difficult for many to take seriously” (Williams 2010:26, emphasis added).

Using the Afrobarometer survey data, Logan (2008, 2009 and 2011) takes a critical view of Ntsebeza (2006) and Mamdani (1996) but shares most of the views of Williams (2010), thus presenting a different perspective. Logan (2008, 2009 and 2011) points out that there is an overwhelming positive attitude among Africans towards traditional leaders and that these traditional leaders are actually not only compatible with democratic institutions of governance but that both institutions rely on each other. Although these two institutions seem incompatible, she argues that African societies seem to have found their own way of integrating these in order to address their concerns. The Afrobarometer survey results also show that being modernised does not significantly affect perception of traditional authorities. In other words, those in urban areas who might be regarded as not interested in traditional authorities also indicated positive sentiments towards the institution.

Based on Round 1 of the Afrobarometer survey (for selected southern African countries), Logan (2008) created a Perception Index for traditional leaders and elected officials ranging from 1 to 5. According to this Perception Index, 1 is equivalent to very negative perceptions whilst 5 for very positive perceptions, with 3 reflecting a neutral attitude. Again, as compared to elected officials such as President, Members of Parliament and Local government officials, traditional authorities were rated higher than all the elected officials, except in Namibia and Lesotho where they respectively became second or paired with the highest. More importantly, with the exception of South Africa where the respondents showed a neutral attitude (Perception Index3), the other countries’ perception was much higher (ranging from 3.2 to 3.9). More details of results of this Perception Index are provided in figure 1 below:
In other words, analysing the seven-country mean, traditional leaders have a mean of 3.4 which is better when compared to elected officials who score as follows: local government councillors (mean of 3.0), members of parliament (mean of 3.0), and the president and executive branch (mean of 3.1). Specifically, in relation to her earlier work, Logan (2008:1-2) aptly summarises her arguments as follows:

In fact, far from being in competition with elected leaders for the public’s regard, traditional leaders and elected leaders are seen by the public as two sides of the same coin. Overall, popular perceptions of traditional leaders are slightly more positive than those for elected leaders… thus, the sharp contrast often drawn between “modernist” and “traditionalist” approaches may reflect a false dichotomy … it seems that democracy and chiefs can indeed co-exist.

These findings were further reinforced through Logan’s (2011) analysis of later rounds of Afrobarometer surveys. For instance, in the Round 4 survey, respondents were asked the question: “Do you think that the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing your local community should increase, stay the same, or decrease?” Interestingly, an overwhelming majority of respondents (58%) responded that their role should increase. Actually, if this figure is added with those who wanted the traditional leadership influence to stay the same (28%), it means that the total percentage of Africans who responded to the survey and support traditional leadership is actually 78%. This large percentage of support for traditional authorities cannot simply be ignored.
Logan’s (2011) work is quite pivotal as it is addressing a number of issues which may be outlined as follows:

Modernisation in African society will have no negative impact on traditional leadership. Similarly, contrary to most people’s assumption that traditional authorities undermine the status of women in society; survey results show that women themselves are highly supportive of the institution.

States that are considered more legitimate by the citizenry are the ones which have strong support for traditional leaders. The findings challenge the African state status arguments as explained by Englebert (2002) and Mamdani (1996). They argue that African states and customary institutions compete for popular legitimacy. The Afrobarometer survey results show that this relationship does not exist. Mamdani’s (1996) thesis that traditional authorities have no popular legitimacy and their existence derives from the state is also challenged. The findings, however, show that the legitimacy of traditional leaders and that of the state seems mutually reinforcing. In this case “If the state is perceived as legitimate, then all of the leaders in it – even traditional leaders who may have a limited or purely informal role – are also perceived as more legitimate, and states likewise benefit from the legitimacy of traditional leaders” (Logan 2011:17). Although individuals who tend to identify themselves with their ethnic group more than national identity and who are likely to support the strengthening of traditional leadership, those who feel that their ethnic group has been treated unfairly are also very unlikely to support their chiefs. In other words, this finding “suggests that the link between ethnicity and the chieftaincy may indeed...be a relationship built primarily upon a positive reinforcement of cultural and communal identity, rather than around the more negative aspects of inter-group competition and conflict” (Logan 2011:18).

The argument that the performance failure of the central and local level state institutions forces Africans to align themselves with traditional leadership needs to be interrogated. Logan’s analysis of Afrobarometer survey shows no association between state failure (local or central) and citizens’ growing support for traditional leadership.

Logan’s findings also challenge Ntsebeza’s (2006) functional claim that Africans are forced to subscribe to traditional governance due to their control over land. The findings clearly show that Africans willingly subscribe to the traditional leadership and it is not the functional element that derives legitimacy but the intrinsic values that they bestow.

Finally, Logan’s findings also show “no evidence of any association – positive or negative – between commitment to democracy or a preference for elections, and support for traditional leaders. There is no support for the claims that allegiance to chiefs arises out of either a rejection of democracy or a dissatisfaction with how it functions in Africa, or disappointment in the quality of elections” (Logan 2011:20, emphasis in the original). Interestingly, if the citizens feel satisfied with democratic processes such as elections there is stronger support for traditional authorities.
In most cases, ethnic identity or formation in Africa centres on the role of traditional authorities. In other words, there is a link between revival of traditional authorities and development of ethnic identity. The following section expounds on this notion of ethnicity.

### 3.3 Notion of Ethnicity

According to Eriksen (2002:4), the word ‘ethnic’ originally comes from the Greek word *ethnos* which meant ‘heathen’ or ‘pagan’ but in the English language it was initially used to refer to racial characteristics. Jenkins (1997:9) adds that *ethnos* may also be translated to mean ‘people’ or ‘nations’. In this case, Eriksen points out that during the Second World War period in the United States, the term was used by those of British descent as a polite way of referring to other races (new immigrants) which were considered inferior. By 1960s, the words ‘ethnic groups’ and ‘ethnicity’ had become popular in the academia but very few scholars who used these words showed interest in defining them (Jenkins 1997: 11; Eriksen 2002:4). It is against this background that in common parlance the term ethnicity refers to minority group issues or race relations (Jenkins 1997). In this case, Eriksen (2002:7) argues that “The term ethnicity refers to relationships between groups whose members consider themselves distinctive and these groups may be ranked hierarchically within society”. Ethnicity is also developed according to the historical, political and economic conditions of that particular geographical area (Braathen et al 2000). In the academia, the term ‘tribes’ is now not popular but ‘ethnic groups’ is, because the former word has the connotation of being traditional or primitive societies. Eriksen (2002:19) effectively describes ethnicity as a social contact in which there is an “application of systematic distinctions between insiders and outsiders; between Us and Them. If no such principle exists there can be no ethnicity”.

Braathen *et al* (2000) and Eriksen (2002), however, caution that ethnicity is not the only identity that people or societies carry. It is in this context that Werbner (2006:4) argues that understanding of postcolonial Africa is being threatened by focus on ethnic differences. According to him, ethnicity is just a “small fraction” of multiple identities currently manifesting in Africa. Therefore the central argument is that we all have different identities and sometimes they do overlap and the way we choose to define ourselves depends on beliefs, values and perceptions that we possess over time -“the important issue is therefore not the notion of ethnicity, but why and how it is used politically” (Braathen *et al* 2000: 5). In some cases or situations, it is possible that “ethnicity does not matter” (Eriksen 2002:31).

The common issue in all ethnic groups is that there is a ‘metaphoric or fictive kinship’; thus groups “tend to have myths of common origin and they nearly always have ideologies encouraging endogamy” (Eriksen 2002:13). Cultural symbols and history can be deliberately manipulated so as to create ethnic identity and organisation, thus producing a consciously constructed ethnic identity. The creation of ethnic identity through new historical narratives may not always be a problem because “discussion of history relates not to the past but to the present” or more precisely “history is not a product of the past but a response to requirements of the present” (Eriksen 2002:73).
Castells (2004:8) points out that identity analysed outside its historical context is meaningless. This does not imply that historical accounts are inventions, not to be taken seriously, but if we take into consideration the process of developing these accounts as highlighted above, we will appreciate that historical accounts are and should be contested. This is why ethnic claims have always been contested and reinvented despite their claim to the past. Castells (2004:7) also cautions that scholars find it easy to agree that all identities are constructed but “the real [challenge] is how, from what, by whom, and for what”. Consequently, he adds: “who constructs collective identity, and for what largely determines the symbolic content of this identity, and its meaning for those identifying with it or placing themselves outside it”. In other words Castells (2004:7-8) contends that social identity construction takes place in the context of power relationships which should be critically analysed. The construction of ethnicity is largely associated with the notion of cultural nationalism. In relation to ethnicity, Handelman (1977: 200) argues that culture is a critical aspect of ethnicity and should not be ignored. The next section explores this notion and how it applies to this study.

3.4 Notion of cultural nationalism

Although Abizadeh (2005) argues that the German political thinker, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, was the founder of the modern notion of cultural nationalism, others argue otherwise. According to the classic work of Schmidt (1956) the 18th and early 19th Century German philosopher, Johann Gottfried Herder, can rightly be said to be the father of modern-day cultural nationalism. Herder used rational philosophical arguments to convince the German nationals of why pursuing their national culture was significant. Schmidt further argues that through Herder’s arguments, the philosophy of cultural nationalism evolved. In this case, Herder was focusing on nationalism not as a way of portraying ethnic superiority but discussed it within the ambit of the state. In addition, his arguments of cultural nationalism were neither at highlighting military achievements nor tracing dynasties. In other words, his attention was on the non-aggressive and liberal form of cultural nationalism. However, the problem with his philosophy is that it “was at inceptive stage hence fragmented and not systematic as was expected” (Schmidt 1956:412).

In theory and practice there are two varieties of nationalism, political nationalism and cultural nationalism (Patten 2005, Hutchinson 1987). Political nationalism argues that nations should be self-governing and be granted some significant level of autonomy if they are in a multinational state. In other words, it focuses on “relations between an ethnic group and the state, or between two or more ethnic groups” (Berman et al 2004:5). Cultural nationalism, on the other hand, argues that the state should ensure that it promotes some national culture (Patten 2005:1). In other words, political nationalism and cultural nationalism have different notions of a nation; they also have different organisational as well as political strategies (Hutchinson 1987). In this case, in the context of culture, political nationalism is about drawing political boundaries while cultural nationalism is about the state’s exercise of power and authority within the boundaries (Patten 1999:1).
3.4.1 Politicisation of ethnicity or cultural nationalism

The transition from cultural (or cultural ethnicity) to political nationalism (or politicised ethnicity) has generated several closely related perspectives. Loosely, we might identify four schools of thought:

a) Some scholars consider cultural nationalism as another option of political nationalism;

b) Another group considers these as independent notions but depending on certain factors, cultural nationalism might take the form of political nationalism;

c) The third group considers cultural nationalism as inherently political, hence a cultural or political nationalists movement pursues both agendas all the time but may, depending on circumstances, lean more to one agenda;

d) The fourth group considers cultural nationalism as an elite construct with mainly the interest of pursuing their political interests.

In the first group, Hutchinson (1987) argues that cultural nationalism can be an option of political nationalism. He argues that cultural nationalism is a critical ideological force but has largely been ignored by scholars; scholars have tended to focus on political nationalism as an important movement of social mobilisation. According to Hutchinson (1987:483), cultural nationalism can also be “a political option against the state”. Referring to modern Ireland, Hutchinson (1987) demonstrates that the revival of cultural nationalism, spearheaded by intellectuals, has been an option to political opposition of the state. Thus the revival has been a way of rejecting the hegemonic English state values and expressing the Irish way of life. In this case, pursuing the cultural nationalism agenda was a way of community mobilisation which was not overtly aggressive and ‘acceptable’ to the English. Smith (1998:74) aptly argues in this context that “where political nationalism fails or is exhausted, we find cultural nationalists providing new models and tapping different kinds of collective energies, thereby mobilising larger numbers of hitherto unaffected members of the community.”

The second group argues that cultural nationalism may take the political dimension and this happens when mainly the state has failed to equally address the various concerns of communities. According to Klingemann and Fuch (1995:3), democratic processes have an inherent character of generating some levels of dissatisfaction amongst the citizens. This is the case for two reasons: “first, because the resources available to any government to implement its policies are limited and, secondly, because implementing a particular policy necessarily rules out others”. Klingemann and Fuch further argue that the state is almost always a recipient of demands which exceed its capacity to address them all. The general view is that this is more prevalent in Africa and developing countries. Taking into consideration that in Africa, since the colonial period, the institution of the state has been the main factor for control and distribution of resources, this scenario has brought great competition for control of state apparatus. Political nationalism or ethnicity represents the competitive aspect of ethnicity as each group tries to outdo one another in the fight for “the material resources of modernity” made available through the state (Berman et al 2004:5). Irrespective of the outcome to the other ethnic groups or the state as a whole, the group which attains control of state apparatus will have the maximum power to make resources available to themselves. In this case “at the heart of ethnic politics is the use of historical and cultural
resources of past and present in a struggle for control of the future and definition of the terms of social change” (Berman et al 2004:5). The interaction between cultural/moral ethnicity and political ethnicity leads to an intricate process of ethnic definition and identity. Based on this school of thought, in excess, political nationalism may destabilise the nation-state. For instance, Ajala (2006) argues that the Yoruba cultural nationalism aggravated social tensions against the Nigerian state which is not in tandem with principles of cultural nationalism. Ajala (2006) points out how the O’odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC), a socio-cultural Yoruba organization, moved from being a cultural nationalist institution to a radical militant political nationalist organisation demanding political hegemony. This is where the issue of hot and cold ethnicity applies. The debate of cultural and political nationalism relates to the concept of hot and cold ethnicity. The distinction between hot and cold ethnicity is mainly in relation to the social importance and emotional intensity of the membership (Eriksen 2002:33). In this case, membership to the group might be ‘hot’ at the time when the group offers protection from perception by rivals and ‘cold’ when its members are only concerned about their common ancestry. In other words, the social situation determines the relevance and importance of ethnic identity and organisation. Political leaders however, can manipulate or take advantage of prevailing social, economic and political factors to create a perception that ethnic identity is significant for their survival; hence individuals’ ethnic identity becomes an overriding identity.

There are other scholars in the third group who directly link ethnic and cultural nationalism to political nationalism, irrespective of what each one of them intends to achieve. According to these scholars, there is no clear boundary between cultural and political agenda of the said concepts hence every cultural or ethnic activity or mobilisation is basically political. For instance, Cohen (1974) views ethnic organisations as political organisations and even mentions in the preface of his book that “political man is also symbolic man”. In this case ethnicity is a tool used to acquire the scarce resources hence ethnic groups that do not offer practical solutions do not thrive. Gellner (1983:1) argues that “[cultural] nationalism is primarily a political principle”. Weber (1922/1978) supports this argument when he pointed out that a common ethnicity is inspired by the political community. Barth (1987) simply says that ethnicity is a matter of politics. Patten (1999:1-2) argues that in practice these differences are blurred and as “cultural nationalism leads to political nationalism”. Patten (1999:2) continues to argue that an analysis of the connection between these two notions is “one of the most pressing tasks of any normative theory of nationalism”.

The final fourth group is related to the third group’s argument but the difference is that they consider the whole cultural agenda as political: to serve the interests of the elite (Sklar 1967, Mafeje 1971, Tangri 1985). In the case of Africa, the notion of elite playing this role of constructing political nationalism is forcefully argued by Ekeh (1975) in his classic “two publics” thesis. In trying to explain the nature of African politics and state, Ekeh introduces the concept of ‘Two publics’. The public and private realm, as understood in the Western society, operates under the same moral expectations; in other words, what is deemed wrong in the public realm is also regarded so in the private realm. Contrary to Western societies, Ekeh argues that African societies have two public realms which do not share a common
moral base and this ultimately explains and characterises some of the problems in African politics. These two publics are primordial public realm and civic public realm. According to Ekeh, primordial public realm is characterised by traditional attachments and affinities which influence how an individual behaves in the public realm. In this case, the primordial public is moral and has a common moral base as the private realm. The civic public realm is associated with the colonial period structures of governance and is amoral and does not have the same moral requirements that guide private behaviour. Africans find themselves operating in both realms but they tend to be more committed to the primordial publics and demonstrate less commitment to the civic public realm. In this case, he states that:

Most educated Africans are citizens of two publics in the same society. On the one hand, they belong to a civic public from which they gain materially but to which they give only grudgingly. On the other hand they belong to a primordial public from which they derive little or no material benefits but to which they are expected to give generously and do give materially. Their relationship to the primordial public is moral, while that to the civic public is amoral (Ekeh 1975:108).

Ekeh further argues that voluntary associations are created especially in urban centres by educated African elite and assume a civic public appearance but have an underlying primordial public identity. The African elite create and support primordial voluntary association as a way of securing their status in the civic public realm. Ekeh concludes that these two realms are rivals and the “civic public is starved of badly needed morality” (Ekeh 1975:111). In this case, the lack of morality in civic public is partly the source of most of the problems in African politics, such as corruption and tribalism.

Based on Ekeh’s thesis, several issues can be deduced in relation to this study. Firstly, the African elite are behind the creation and sustenance of primordial voluntary associations (or ethnic movements). These ethnic organisations (primordial voluntary organisations) guide their motives and decisions in the politics realm. In other words, political participation is defined and interpreted through the ethnic perspective, thus politicisation of cultural nationalism. Secondly, and more importantly, since Africans are operating in both realms simultaneously, it is difficult in practice to create proper boundaries between these two realms of cultural and political.

Among several critiques of Ekeh’s perspective of the role of elites, Smith (1998) has ably interrogated this elite notion. Smith (1998:129) explains that the perspective that tradition is invented by the elite raises some critical questions such as: “what does it mean to say that the nation is a social construct and consists largely of invented tradition? Why do the elite select this particular construct? Why does this type of discourse (of nationalism) resonate with ‘the masses’?” In this case, Smith (1998:130) points out that to refer to them as invented traditions leaves out some key and complex issues “in which these, and other ceremonies, were reconstructed and reinterpreted”. He further explains that for this so-called invention to become successful, it was based on some pre-existing cultural networks which are relevant and make sense to the immediate community. Attributing this invention solely to the elite is therefore, misleading. He also adds that the term invention implies fabrication which is not entirely true (Smith 1998:131). Osaghae (1994:225) challenges the elite thesis by contending
that “'bottom-up’ frameworks have revealed that the assumption of an omnipotent elite, always impacting upon others through manipulation, and always succeeding, is no longer as valid as it used to be thought”. In disassociating the role of elites, Castells (2004) brings in what he regards as the contemporary form of nationalism. Castells (2004:32-33) contends that contemporary nationalism has several attributes such as (1) its main objective and result is not always creation of nation-states; (2) it is not limited to modern nation-states; (3) it is not essentially an elite phenomenon- though the elite tend to manipulate it so as to further their own personal interests; and finally (4) it is “more reactive than proactive, it tends to be more cultural than political, and more oriented towards the defence of an already institutionalised culture than towards the construction or defence of a state”. Castells (2004:33) further adds that contemporary nationalism can aptly be described as “defensive trenches of identity, rather than launching platforms of political sovereignty”. This perspective concurs with that of Yoshino (1992). According to Yoshino (1992:1) “Cultural nationalism aims to regenerate the national community by creating, preserving or strengthening a people’s cultural identity when it is felt to be lacking or threatened”.

Citing the works of McEwen and Lecours (2008), Jeram (2012: 152) argues that when confronted with ethnic groups which are demanding statehood within their borders, there are three options available to the state targeted at appeasing these ethnic groups: “nurturing loyalty to the state-nation, providing voice at the centre, providing voice at the periphery, and symbolically recognizing the presence of multiple ethnicities within the state”. According to Jeram, states may not necessarily rely on only one option but may employ all of them or emphasise some of these options depending on the situation (mixture of strategies). Although Jeram is referring to ethnic groups which are demanding statehood, these options can also be applicable to the general management of ethnic groups in a modern state. In other words, it can be argued that these are some of the strategies that states employ in order to reduce politicisation of cultural nationalism. By providing the case of ethnic minorities in Nicaragua (Indian ethnic group) and Senegal (Diola ethnic group), Jeram (2012) argues that the Senegalese state failed to provide a voice when required and this led to emergence of ethnic tension and violence in the country. However, in the case of Nicaragua, the Diola ethnic group was managed using the proper mix of the above mentioned strategies. In a nut shell, Jeram (2012) reasons that although democracy might actually open up ethnic tensions, it also has the capacity to achieve the opposite; specifically, he states that “Democratization can reduce the capacity of ethnic separatist movements to mobilize a broad coalition of popular support because democracy can provide the voice” for the aggrieved ethnic groups and more importantly “combining all of them is the most effective way to alleviate the grievance” (Jeram 2012: 152).

3.5 Conclusion
The chapter has examined the politics of representation through various contending views on the role of traditional authorities in Africa. The chapter has argued that the rise of traditional ethnic movements is a reaction to global trends emanating from social and psychological dismantling of the nation-state and the desire for individuals to search for an authentic cultural identity. Several views have emerged concerning the relevance of traditional
authorities and their compatibility to the formal state system of governance. This study agrees with the view that traditional authorities are compatible with contemporary democratic state systems. The chapter has also explored the concepts of ethnicity and cultural nationalism. The chapter has argued that traditional authorities do not operate in isolation but their authority is expressed within the realm to the general ethnic identity and cultural nationalism. The chapter argues that every cultural movement is political but the extent of politicisation is dependent on several factors. The higher the level of ethnic politicisation the more likely it leads to problems with the state. Taking further the debate on the role of traditional authorities or politics of representation in Africa, the next chapter discusses the politics of representation in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia as well as the influence of democratic transition on contemporary traditional authorities in the said countries.
CHAPTER 4

CONTEMPORARY POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION IN MOZAMBIQUE, MALAWI AND ZAMBIA: INFLUENCE OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES

4.0 Introduction

The tension emerging from the politics of representation between state and traditional authorities is not always the same everywhere in Africa. The historical and social-political environment largely determines the extent to which the state accommodates traditional systems of governance. Since this study focuses on the three countries of Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia, it is important to critically examine the state-traditional authority dynamics within each country in order to have a proper understanding of its implications on the trans-border Chewa movement. The traditional authorities in the three countries of Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia had been profoundly affected by historical factors. Zambia and Malawi were under the British system and their policies towards traditional authorities were similar, but in the case of Mozambique, they were influenced by the Portuguese who had a slightly different approach. In Mozambique, traditional authorities were banned after independence whilst Malawi and Zambia retained them. It is only recently that the Mozambican government has revived traditional authorities. The civil war (which Malawi and Zambia did not experience) has also had an impact on the nature and operation of contemporary traditional authorities in Mozambique. Despite these differences there are many commonalities as well. Based on Afrobarometer data, there is a clear indication that traditional leaders are respected and trusted in all the three countries. The trend also shows that there is low enthusiasm for ethnic identity in these countries. Historically, political relations amongst the three countries have not always been cordial. Specifically, Malawi under Dr Banda had pursued foreign policies that were not always in tandem with African nationalism aspirations and this put the country at loggerheads with its neighbours. Despite this problem, the relations improved in the 1980s and stayed the same until recently. All in all, despite some social-political differences among these countries, the chapter argues that in all these countries, the state has managed to accommodate traditional authorities in order to fulfill the interests of both parties. As the state in the three countries has managed to sustain its relations with traditional authorities, politicisation of ethnic identities has not succeeded.

Before the actual contemporary status of traditional authorities is discussed, a brief social-political history of Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia is discussed so as to provide contextual background. Afterwards, the chapter discusses the politics of representation by analysing the political transitions from colonial times to the contemporary with special emphasis on the impact of these transitions on traditional authorities as well as ethnic identity.
4.1 Contextual background: A brief socio-political history of Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia

4.1.1 Mozambique

Mozambique was formerly ruled by the Portuguese but got its independence on 25th June 1975, after a long armed-struggle between the colonialists and the rebel Mozambican independence movement called Frelimo. Although the country is listed as one of the least developed in the world, it is generally recognized that its economy is making steady progress (Astill-Brown and Weimer, 2010). Apart from the official language, Portuguese, there are several languages spoken by numerous ethnic groups in the country such as Makonde, Swahili, Makuwa, Sena, Yao, Lomwe, Ndau, Chewa (Nyanja) and several others. Soon after independence in 1975, the country was engulfed in a bitter civil war between Frelimo and South African backed Renamo, which ended in October 1992 after signing the Rome-Geneva Peace Accords. The first multiparty elections after the end of the civil war were held in 1994 and Frelimo emerged as the winner, followed by Renamo and other smaller parties. The situation has remained the same in the subsequent elections.

According to Cumbe (2010), about 5% of the chiefs were former African colonial administrators who were appointed by the colonial authorities to the position of régulos as a reward for their loyalty. During the armed struggle for independence (1962-1975), traditional authorities either supported Frelimo fighters or collaborated with the colonial masters. In the areas that Frelimo controlled, traditional authorities were recognized and given responsibilities of co-ordinating transportation of military equipment and collection of food for the fighters. As will be discussed later, this relationship was, however, terminated when Mozambique attained independence in 1975.

The ethnic problem that plagued Frelimo has a historical link, “Mozambicans from the central and northern regions of the country have a bias against those from the south” (Cabrita 2000:21). Those who are called southerners are found in the area south of Save River and are generally referred to as the Shangaan. This does not necessarily mean that the Shangaan are a homogeneous ethnic group but the name refers to various ethnic groups which are followers of or were influenced by Soshangane, a traditional chief who settled in the area from Kwazulu-Natal in South Africa in the 17th Century. In this case, “the people living to the north of the Save River, the ‘southerners’, call them the Chigondo, the outsiders or the people from afar.” Ethnic gap was reinforced by the Portuguese when they established schools in the South and incorporated most of the people from this area in its colonial administrative structure (Cabrita 2000:23). Consequently, when Frelimo was established it was dogged by the same problems. Most of the highly educated in the party were from southern regions; hence they ended up occupying the political leadership positions while those from the north composed the rank and file of the military wing or ‘foot soldiers’. This scenario was constantly highlighted by those who defected from the organisation. Many years later, when Frelimo was fighting against Renamo which was led by a northerner, it was frequently said by some people that the war was between the north against the south. In an interview conducted by Cabrita (2000:208) with a former government soldier, he said that Samora
Machel (a southerner) “regarded the Renamo issue merely as an ethnic dispute between Ndaus and Senas [northerners] on the one hand, and the Shangaan [southerners] on the other, over which tribe ruled the country”. Many analysts, however, explain that the problem in Mozambique is not the ethnic issue but regional; which is reinforced by the socio-economic imbalance (Shenga 2008). This study agrees with this perspective.

4.1.2 Malawi
According to the latest National Population and Housing Census of 2008, Malawi has a population of 13.07 million (NSO 1998) and over 80% of the population live in rural areas. The economy is largely agro-based. There are a number of ethnic groups in the country, such as Ngoni, Yao, Tumbuka etc. but the Chewa comprises the largest percentage share of the population (47%). Politically, Malawi became independent from British colonialism on 6th July 1964 with Dr Banda of the Malawi Congress Party as the country’s head and the country adopted a constitution which recognised one party system of governance with Dr Banda as Life President. His reign ended in 1994 when Malawi embraced the multiparty system of governance after a referendum which showed an overwhelming majority advocating change. Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) became the next president of the country under a newly drafted constitution which limited presidential terms to two terms of five years each. After his third term bid failed, he appointed his successor, Bingu wa Mutharika, who managed to win the 2004 presidential elections under the UDF ticket, but later resigned from the party to form his own Democratic People’s Party (DPP) after experiencing an internal party power struggle with the former president. In the 2009 elections, Bingu had a landslide victory with his party retaining a majority number of seats in parliament. Soon after winning his second term, Bingu fell out with his Vice President, Joyce Banda, and she was fired from the ruling party but she could legally not be fired as Vice President; she later formed her own party, the People’s Party (PP). On 5th April 2011 Bingu died and Joyce Banda succeeded him as President to complete the remainder of his term and practically her party became the ruling party.

The political dynamics in Malawi can roughly be explained along ethnic lines, which manifest in regional blocks. Except for the 2009 elections, presidential candidates have been voted mainly on the basis of their ethnic background or region. The major political regions are northern, central and southern regions with the Tumbuka as the major ethnic group in the north, Chewa in the central, Yao, Lomwe and Sena in the south.

4.1.3 Zambia
There are numerous ethnic groups in Zambia but the major ones are Nyanja-Chewa, Bemba, Tonga, Tumbuka, Lunda, Luvale, Kaonde, Nkoya and Lozi. The population of Zambia is 12,935,000 (World Health 2011) with a relatively significant percentage of the population living in urban centres. It being a former British colony, English is the official medium of communication while Nyanja/Chewa and Bemba are widely spoken in the Capital city, Lusaka. According to Phiri (2006), the country was originally colonised through two separate processes. North-Western Rhodesia was mainly under the Barotse (Lozi) chief and came under the control of the BSA (British South African) Company in 1888 when it obtained
mineral rights in the area from the chief. North-Eastern Rhodesia was mainly under the Ngoni chief Mpezeni who was defeated and accepted a peace treaty in 1897 which saw the area being controlled by BSA.\textsuperscript{12}

Following elections in January 1964, United Nation Independence Party (UNIP) became victorious and Kaunda became the Prime Minister of Zambia and on 24\textsuperscript{th} October 1964, Zambia attained independence with Kaunda as President of the new nation. In 1967 Kaunda declared his policy of 'humanism' which is a peculiar mixture of Christian ethics and African socialism.

The Lozi people have constantly felt that they are a state within a state; they have great respect for their King and even have strong feelings about how he is officially addressed. An example of this is explained below in an official complaint:

Lozi elders in Livingstone have protested at the use of "Mr" in Press titling of the Litunga of Western Province. The Press, especially the Government-owned Zambia Daily Mail, has referred to the tribal leader as 'the Litunga of Western Province, Mr. Mbikusita Lewanika.' But an angry president of Livingstone’s local court, Mr. K. Makumba, said the correct title should be: "The Litunga, MbikusitaLewanika." The use of "Mr" showed disrespect, he said (van Binsbergen 1987: 175).

Interestingly, Kaunda went further and provided chiefs with more political influence in the country by engaging them in political decision making structures. In 1983 during the annual ruling party’s (UNIP) annual Conference at Mulungushi (22-29 August), the most prominent Zambian Chiefs were co-opted into the most politically powerful body: UNIP's Central Committee (van Binsbergen 1987:142). By the late 1980s, it became clear that the humanism policy was not working hence the economy was under serious strain. In the 1990s, the country witnessed several riots and calls for multi-party democracy. Kaunda declared multiparty elections in the country and in October 1991, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) won 125 out of 150 seats and its leader, Fredrick Chiluba, became president of the country.

4.2 Contemporary status of traditional authorities in Mozambique

During its campaign for independence, Frelimo garnered the support of rural traditional leaders but once the colonialists were removed from power, Frelimo no longer considered its partnership with the traditional leaders. Taking a Marxist approach, Frelimo felt that to enhance rural productivity, there was need to destroy the existing villages which had deep attachment to traditional past and resettle its people in newly created communal villages. As former president of Mozambique, Samora Machel, once said, “for the nation to live, the tribe must die” (in Berman \textit{et al} 2004:8). Traditional leaders and their subjects who resisted this relocation were arrested and sent to the so-called re-education camps, and if they continued to resist, they were tortured or executed. The government efforts were not achieved as “rural Mozambicans became even more entrenched in their traditions, and developed an even

\textsuperscript{12} The Hilton Young Commission of 1929, which was commissioned by the British government to recommend the future of its Central and East African colonies, recommended that North Eastern Province of Zambia should be part of Nyasaland (Malawi) but due to disagreements within the commission, this was never implemented.
greater sense of hostility towards Frelimo” (Cabrita 2000:119). By taking party officials from southern Mozambique to central and northern parts of the country so as to take over the roles that were previously handled by traditional authorities, the gap between central government and grassroots people further widened and also threatened to enhance the northern-southern ethnic rivalry.

During the civil war between rebel Renamo and the government Frelimo movement, Renamo developed a more coherent policy agenda which included restoration of traditional leadership in the rural areas. Consequently in each and every area of its influence, it reinstated traditional chiefs who assisted in the local administration and providing of food to the rebels. The link between Renamo with traditional chiefs and local people can be explained as follows:

Before Renamo established a base, permission was as a matter of course sought from the local medium. This was normally arranged through the area’s traditional chief. Samatenje, a medium influential in the Gorongosa area, blessed Andre Matsangaice himself. Traditional chiefs spoke at length about the customs and beliefs of their areas, which were supposed to be strictly adhered to by Renamo’s rank and file. John Kupenga, a Renamo guerrilla from Manica, stressed that failure to adhere to local traditions could upset the spirits who then punished the transgressors severely (Cabrita 2000:159).

The civil war came to an end in 1992 and one of the challenges that the post war Mozambique faced was how to establish a viable decentralised system of governance in rural areas. Hence the debate on the role of traditional authorities in Mozambique came to the fore in the context of how to effectively implement a decentralisation policy (Cau 2004). A piece of legislation known as Decree 15/2000 was implemented, which witnessed the recognition of traditional leaders and secretaries of sub-urban quarters or villages who were called ‘community authorities’ (Buur and Kyed 2005:5). Although it is assumed that the Frelimo government completely incapacitated the traditional systems of authority during the civil war, this is not really the case. According to the observation by Buur and Kyed (2005: 8) “institutions based on kinship and hereditary succession continued to exist, and many post-colonial local state officials relied unofficially on day-to-day collaboration with chiefs” (emphasis added). Buur and Kyed (2005:10) aptly observe how the state came to recognise chiefs: “In rural Mozambique the war had created a situation of ‘decentralisation by default’… Against this background, state recognition of chiefs came to be seen as a solution to the problem of meagre state presence and contested legitimacy”.

The 1994 and 1999 general elections witnessed popular support of Renamo in rural areas of Mozambique. Frelimo wanted to ensure that there should be reversal hence after the first

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13Renamo was formed in 1976 by the former Frelimo independent fighter Andre MathadiMatsangaiceDyuwayo but was killed in action in October 1979 and his position was taken over by AfonsoDhlakama who has remained its leader to this day.

14In 1994, Renamo won 45% of the parliamentary seats while Frelimo won 55% (Lloyd 2011). In 1999 total tallied provincial votes showed that Renamo got 57% while Frelimo 43% but due to certain complexities of the electoral system in Mozambique, this huge increase in number of votes for Renamo did not imply larger number of seats in parliament (Lloyd 2011). In 2004, Renamo heavily reduced its number of parliamentary seats from 90 to 51 seats while FRELIMO increased its seats from 160 to 191 (Vaux et al 2006).
general elections for instance, the president and other leading Frelimo leaders spent most of their time campaigning in rural areas where they proclaimed that they were in partnership with the aspirations of chiefs.

Prior to the implementation of the Decree, there was, among other things, a process of identification of true traditional authorities (defined as the one which existed during the pre-colonial period) and their sub-chiefs (chefe do grupo and chefe da povoação) by their communities, official recognition of the identified traditional leaders through signing of the contract and acceptance of national flag, uniform and state emblems by the traditional authorities to be displayed at their residence. The state constructed offices for the said traditional authorities and in some cases, roads, which reached to the house of the recognised traditional authority. However, Buur and Kyed (2005) are quick to point out that the process of identifying the true traditional authorities was not as straightforward as it might be assumed and also created several potential future problems. In this case Buur and Kyed explain that due to many changes that have occurred in the Mozambican society from the colonial and the civil war period, the identification was beset with numerous problems. Cumbe (2010:17) mentions that “in some areas the process of recognition and legitimization of the community leaders is mostly influenced by the two main political parties that participated in the civil war (Frelimo and Renamo)”. As one Renamo member complained in parliament: “Linette Olofsson [Renamo] complained that in Chimuaera, elections had been held for ‘community leaders’. ‘Since when in African tradition have there been elections for chiefs to occupy their legitimate places?’” (Mozambique News Agency, 24th April 2002).

According to Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa (OSISA) (2009:152), the impact of traditional authorities has been in the following areas:

a) Land management and administration as well as other natural resources.
b) Local citizen mobilization in national campaigns.
c) Facilitation of local citizen participation in national and local development programmes.
d) Encouragement of local citizens to participate in elections.
e) Providing administration of traditional justice (of non-formal justice).

Apart from the language factor, ethnic groups in Mozambique are also recognised and organised mostly through their respective traditional authorities. According to Vaux et al (2006), they argue that despite the fact that Mozambique has 16 major ethnic groups, this has never led to tensions in the country. Specifically, they observe that during the previous wars, ethnicity was not the driving factor. This is against the background whereby during the colonial rule the Portuguese tried to divide the communities through ethnic and intra-group conflict.

In contemporary Mozambican academic discussion, it is actually language which is associated with ethnic identity (Virtanen 2005:227). According to Alpers (1974), the Portuguese propaganda during the fight for independence tended to align themselves with the
Makua-Lomwe in order to discredit the Frelimo which was mainly dominated by Makonde and southern ethnic groups. This was, however, not successful at that time. Vaux et al (2006) acknowledge the current perception widely held in the country that Southern ethnic groups have better opportunities as compared to the central and northern ethnic groups. Even in relation to political parties, Frelimo mainly draws support from the Shangana-Ronga and Makonde ethnic groups, while opposition parties draw support from the Ndau, Sena and Makua ethnic groups. However, according to Vaux et al (2006:10) these differences “revolve around regional differences and relate to economic factors rather than around the social issue of ethnicity but there remains a possibility that ethnicity could be mobilised during a desperate political struggle”. This observation is also supported by Lloyd (2011:7) who states that, as compared to other African countries, ethnicity is very low but the north/central and southern region divide is prevalent. According to Lloyd, the tension is mainly between Frelimo and Renamo as political parties but not ethnic groups per se.

Taking into consideration that Renamo is now weak and Frelimo has consolidated its power-to the extent that Mozambique is almost a one party state (Lloyd 2011; Sumich 2010; Vaux et al 2006) - it is unlikely that some of its current policies such as those on traditional authorities will soon be reversed. Specifically, it might even be argued inter alia that the increased support enjoyed in the previous elections could be Frelimo’s campaigns of reaching out to the rural communities through its positive policies towards traditional authorities. The current picture emerging is that the re-introduction of traditional authorities in the rural areas has arguably usurped some of Renamo’s power, hence the party’s recent frustrations with the ruling party. For instance, Renamo has even started threatening war as captured in the following newspaper excerpt: “Dhlakama has warned that ‘I am training my men up and, if we need to, we will leave here and destroy Mozambique’” (Mozambique News Agency, 20th November 2012).

4.3 Contemporary status of traditional authorities in Malawi

Traditional authorities were recognised and in some cases instated by the British in the colonial era and Dr Banda continued supporting them as long as they were not threatening his authority. Several Acts were passed in parliament to strengthen traditional authorities but at the same time ensuring that they were subservient to state authority.

Cammack et al (2009:5) aptly summarises the status of traditional authorities during the Banda era as follows:

The Banda period proved to be a double-edged sword for chiefs. On the one hand, the powers that chiefs had accrued during colonialism were seriously depleted... On the other hand, Dr Banda embraced the symbols of ‘tradition’ and the hierarchy of customary authority constructed under colonialism.

Dr Banda was removed from power in the first multi-party elections since the introduction of one party system of governance in the 1970s and the United Democratic Front (UDF), led by Bakili Muluzi, emerged winner. The UDF-led government introduced the Local Government
Act of 1998 and Malawi Decentralisation Policy of 2000 which saw the re-introduction of local governance with a democratisation focus. Although Chiefs still retained some of their functions, their politicised traditional courts were abolished and their role in the newly constituted local assemblies was largely non-influential. Despite losing some of their powers the re-introduction of democratic decentralisation has seen the role of traditional authorities being even more significant at implementation level (Chiweza 2007; Chinsinga 2005; Kayuni and Tambulasi 2011). It is almost impossible to carry out any project at local level without involving them. The scenario continued even under the presidency of Bingu wa Mutharika of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (from 2004 to 2011) and Mrs Joyce Banda (from 2011 to the present). Since local government elections were only held once in 2000, the absence of these representatives when their term expired in 2005 meant that the role of traditional leaders remained prominent. The absence of MCP local officials after the introduction of multiparty system of governance entailed that chiefs became the remnant of hope for social stability and order at grassroots level. They are involved in mobilising their subjects for development projects as well as other duties such as community ‘gate keepers’ (Eggen 2011). More importantly, almost all the regimes have heavily relied on traditional chiefs to garner political support at local level to the extent that some experts have voiced their concerns that the office of chieftaincy has increasingly become politicised. The perception that the role of traditional authorities is increasingly becoming politicised is growing in the country and essentially puts into question their future relevance and role. As one analyst mentioned in the Sunday Times of 4th March 2012 during the Bingu reign- the use of chiefs for campaign purposes was undermining their relevance: “It is politicians and educated Malawians who have reduced the structures of traditional governance to the moribund, unchanging state they are in today” (Sunday Times, 4th March 2012).

For instance, merely twenty days after taking over as president on 25th April 2012, Joyce Banda met over 200 chiefs and immediately elevated Chief Kyungu to Paramount Chief Kyungu. Apparently, Chief Kyungu had been at logger heads with the previous regime of Bingu wa Mutharika so this move was aimed at consolidating her political support at grassroots level. Specifically, Joyce Banda has continued what her predecessors used to do by, for instance, promising free fertilisers and elevations. Being politically non-partisan has largely been interpreted as supporting the ruling party.

4.4 Contemporary status of traditional authorities in Zambia

After independence in 1964, traditional authorities were regarded as important in society. For instance, writing more than 25 years ago during the Kaunda era, van Binsbergen (1987:140) points out that “anyone who has intensively and over an extended period of time participated in post-independence Zambian society cannot help to be aware of the great importance still attached to chiefs”. The importance of chiefs or traditional authority can be understood from the fact that in late 1960s Kaunda noted that his political power was declining hence one of the strategies was to use traditional authorities to enhance his political base. Zambia established the House of Chiefs which consists of 27 members over a three-year-term rotating membership. This was modelled after the UK’s House of Lords. This house had no legislative...
function, in other words, it did consider bills but not block their passage. Interestingly, the house was under the Ministry of Local Government.

In order to diversify the economy and avoid over reliance on copper, the government in 1971 enacted the Village Registration and Development Act. Through this act additional administrative structures were created which gave more responsibilities to chiefs and village headmen. Apart from the rationale of diversifying the economy, the idea of the Act was also to enhance Kaunda’s political base in the rural areas. Informally, the chiefs became powerful at local level in various ways. For instance, during this period, chiefs assumed “on their own initiative responsibilities” which were under the realm of the central government such as the fight against the rise in crime, expelling illegal immigrants and implementation of health regulations (van Binsbergen 1987: 163).

When Fredrick Chiluba took over from Kaunda in 1991, through the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) party, he did not really transform the traditional leadership structures. He continued Kaunda’s policies to ensure that his political base was fully entrenched. In 2001, Chiluba was succeeded by Levy Mwanawasa who also won through the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Although the MMD won the presidential election it significantly reduced its number of seats in parliament. It won sixty nine seats (through a constitutional mandate of nomination, its number was increased to seventy seven seats) but the opposition had eighty one seats (Phiri 2005)

The Local Government Act (1995) provides for representation of chiefs at the council level. According to this Act, it specifically mentions composition of “two representatives of the Chiefs, appointed by all the Chiefs in the district”. Although the Lands Act (1995) still bestows all authority of land in the President, who is supposed to authorize the sale, transfer or assignment of any land, traditional authorities are required to be consulted on all matters of customary land. Currently, approximately 94% of Zambia’s land is customary; hence the influence of chiefs is becoming enormous through this Land Act clause.

After his victory in 2001, Levy Mwanawasa’s reign was also reflected in several programmes aimed at enhancing his relationship with the traditional authorities such as (House of Chiefs 2009):

a) House of Chiefs, which is highlighted in the constitution of Zambia, was practically closed and ignored for close to twelve years but the president in 2003 directed that it should be re-opened.

b) Under his direction, the president also ensured that the chiefs’ palaces should be electrified at government expense. Depending on what was feasible, this electrification project was mainly through national grid, kinetic energy or solar power.

c) During the Constitution Review Commission (CRC) process chiefs were provided with a special platform to get their input. Specifically, eighteen chiefs took up positions on the National Constitutional Conference as representatives of the House of Chiefs.
d) In order to ease mobility of key chiefs in the country, government bought 150 motor vehicles for them under a special loan scheme. This programme was highlighted as the first of its kind in the history of the country since independence in 1964. Initially, 36 motor vehicles were planned for the scheme but the president directed that the number should be increased to 150.

e) In another unprecedented move, chiefs were also encouraged to invest in the mining sector hence those interested in this undertaking were provided with mining licenses.

f) When the House of Chiefs was re-opened, chiefs were receiving a salary, which is called subsidy, of K200,000, but has subsequently been raised to K1,000,000.

After the death of Levy Mwanawasa in 2008, he was succeeded by Rupiah Banda of MMD whose relations with the chiefs were not always cordial. Rupiah lost the presidential elections to Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front party who became president on 23rd September 2011. Soon after taking over the leadership of the country, President Sata ensured that he should reconnect himself with traditional authorities. During the campaign period, most chiefs sided with the ruling party MMD. Consequently, for the first time in the history of the country, Sata established the Ministry of Chiefs and Traditional Affairs. He also went on to ensure that he amended his relations with key chiefs in the country. For instance, when meeting chiefs, his language was always of reconciliation. The article from Lusaka Times (29th August 2012) captures one of such kind of sentiments expressed by the President: “President Sata has urged traditional leaders to forget the differences they had with the Patriotic Front (PF) when it was in the opposition and make a fresh start…‘We are Africans and we need to respect and uphold this dignified institution of chieftaincy,’” President Sata said”.

Despite this appeal, the relations with the government are not ideal. For instance, in a newspaper article entitled “South Chiefs rubbish lies that they told Sata to ignore HH” there is a clear indication that not everything is well between the government and the traditional authorities. The Tonga dominated Southern Province chiefs rejected his proposals to re-align the southern province districts. They also refused the idea of disowning an opposition political leader who hails from the southern province. This is aptly captured as follows: “Chief Mukuni said the traditional leadership from Southern Province did not disown UPND leader Hakainde Hichilema during the meeting held with President Sata. ‘How do we disown our child?’” (Zambian Watchdog, September 21, 2012).

In a more serious turn of events, the Lozi people of Barotseland have gone a step further to start agitating for autonomy in their territory. In 2011, two people were killed during the Lozi protests in which they were calling for succession. Apparently during the campaign period, Sata had pledged to honour the 1964 Barotseland agreement which would ensure that the area enjoys political autonomy. Since Sata’s government had not shown interest in honouring this agreement, there have been calls for secession as captured in the media: “The Barotseland royal household in western Zambia has demanded independence... who accuse the government of ignoring the region, which remains one of the poorest in the country” (BBC News, 29th March 2012). According to the various reports, the succession call came after a two day meeting of a group of traditional Lozi leaders which calls itself the Barotseland National Council, and it issued the following declaration: “We, the people of
Barotseland, declare that Barotseland is now free to pursue its own self-determination and destiny. We are committed to a peaceful disengagement with the Zambian government.” (BBC News, 29th March 2012).

4.5 A comparative analysis of status of traditional authorities and ethnicity in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia

The contemporary roles and practices of traditional authorities in the three countries are not exactly the same. There are several reasons for the said differences which include socio-political experiences, colonial and post-colonial policies and level of engagement between traditional authorities and the community. Similarly, the nature and levels of ethnicity are also different. Despite these differences, there are some similarities which are common to all these countries. Relying mainly on several Afrobarometer data sets, the sections below highlight these commonalities and differences as well as their possible significance.

4.5.1 The status of traditional authorities in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia

The status of traditional authorities in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia will focus on issues of trust that the citizens have in the institution, perception of citizens on traditional authorities’ influence in governing local councils, and their independence from government whilst receiving a salary.

In relation to trust in the institution of traditional leadership the Round 2 (2002-2003) and Round 4 (2008-2009) Afrobarometer survey asked the questions: “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?” The results for these three countries show that when compared to the Police and President (for those who responded “Somewhat & A lot”), Traditional Leaders are almost on a par with these formal institutions in relation to peoples’ trust. For instance, the level of trust in the three countries improved from an average of 60% in 2002/2003 to 67% in 2008/2009 (an average improvement of 7%). The Police improved by an average of 7% whilst that of the President improved by 10% (see Table 3). This demonstrates that the institution of traditional leadership, despite its informality and consolidation of democratic governance institutions in the three countries, is still relevant. Table 2 below is a full summary of the perception of Malawians, Zambians and Mozambicans in relation to trust of the institution of traditional leadership:

Table 3: Public trust in the institution of traditional leadership in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia in 2002/2003 and 2008/2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Police Malawi</th>
<th>Police Mozq</th>
<th>Police Zambia</th>
<th>President Malawi</th>
<th>President Mozq</th>
<th>President Zambia</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders Malawi</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders Mozq</th>
<th>Traditional Leaders Zambia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Just a little</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat &amp; A lot</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Just a little</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source: Author’s own calculation of Round 2 and Round 4 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don’t Know and Missing codes)

Another indicator of significance of traditional authorities is the people’s perception of their influence in the governing of their local community. Round 4 (2008-2009) survey asked respondents the question: “How much influence do traditional leaders currently have in governing your local community?” The results show that the perception of respondents is that in all the three countries, traditional authorities have significant influence in the governance of their local communities. When considering the ‘Some and A great deal’ responses, in Malawi, this perception is relatively higher (73%) than Mozambique and Zambia which is at 58% and 51% respectively (see Figure 2 below).

Figure 2: Perception of the influence of traditional leaders in governing local communities in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia

Source: Author’s own calculation of Round 4 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don’t Know and Missing codes)

Another aspect investigated in the Afrobarometer study was independence of traditional authorities. Some analysts have complained that since most traditional authorities receive government salaries, they are then not independent and serve the interests of government and not the communities they represent. However, the Round 4 (2008/2009) results show that the majority of Malawians, Mozambicans and Zambians have no problem with traditional
authorities receiving a salary from government. In this case, respondents were asked the questions:

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. Do you agree or agree very strongly?

Statement 1: To best serve their people, traditional leaders must remain independent of the government. They should not receive government salaries.

Statement 2: Traditional leaders serve their communities and the government, and they should receive a salary from government for their work.

Table 4: Perception of traditional leaders independent of government versus receiving of salary by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree with 1 or Agree very strongly with 1</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with 2 or Agree very strongly with 2</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with neither</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own calculation of Round 4 Afrobarometer data sets

As indicated above in Table 4, most of those who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that government should provide salaries to traditional leaders were from Malawi (86%) followed by Mozambique and Zambia at 73% and 67% respectively. Although in Zambia the support was not overwhelming, it is still significant because it is well above half and closer to 70%.

4.5.2 Ethnicity in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia

The status of ethnicity in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia will be analysed and compared at three levels: the extent to which individuals trust people from other ethnic groups, the extent to which individuals trust members within their own ethnic group, individual’s perception of their ethnic group’s influence on political affairs of their country, respondent’s ethnic group’s perception of influence in politics over other groups in his/her country, how often the respondents feel their ethnic group is treated unfairly by government and finally, the respondents choice of nationality or ethnic group identity.

The Round 3 (2005/2006) Afrobarometer survey also asked respondents to indicate their level of trust for other ethnic groups within their country. The results for Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia show that for those who indicated ‘Not at all’, the percentage is low (between 17-19%) and there are some striking similarities across the three countries at this level. For those who indicated ‘Just a little’ and ‘Somewhat & A lot’, the similarities are mainly between Malawi and Mozambique while in Zambia the levels are quite different. While 55% indicated ‘Somewhat and a lot of trust’ for other ethnic groups, in Zambia it was only 35% (See Figure 3 below).

15The question in the Round 4 (2008/2009) survey was not included hence impossible to compare.
Figure 3: Respondent’s trust of people from other ethnic groups by country

Source: Author’s own calculation of Round 3 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don’t Know and Missing codes)

Assuming the measure of trust across ethnic groups is considered, the results show that there is a higher level of ethnicity in Zambia as compared to Malawi and Mozambique. However, the other question that respondents were asked gives an interesting picture for Zambia. The same Round 3 survey asked respondents to indicate the level of trust they had for members of their own ethnic group. Again the results as shown in Figure 4 below show that Zambia had different results while Malawi and Mozambique had similar responses.

Figure 4: Respondent’s trust of people of their own ethnic group by country

Source: Author’s calculation of Round 3 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don’t Know and Missing codes)
Slightly less than half (47%) of Zambian respondents had trust from members of their own ethnic groups. This may mean that the levels of ethnicity may not be as high as expected because if the levels of trust were high within an ethnic group while at the same time having less trust with other groups, it would have been an indication of higher levels of ethnicity in the country. In Malawi and Mozambique there are higher levels of trust within ethnic groups and significantly less for members of other ethnic groups (difference of 18% and 8% for Malawi and Mozambique respectively). All in all, despite an indication of some improvement in Malawi and Mozambique for those who indicated ‘Somewhat and A lot of trust’ in other ethnic groups is not really satisfactory when compared to trust within ethnic groups. There is a possibility of ethnic tension but not a serious one. In relation to ethnicity in Zambia, a Zambian professor admitted the problem and added that:

*Ethnicity is not a problem at provincial level. For instance, in Eastern province people are largely mixed but at national level ethnicity manifests because each province competes against another* (Telephonic Interview, Lusaka, 7th February 2013).

In Round 3 and 4 of Afrobarometer survey, respondents were asked to think about the condition of their ethnic group and respond to the question “Do they have less, the same, or more influence in politics than other groups in this country”. As the two figures below (Figure 5 [a] and [b]) show, there has not been a significant proportional difference between 2005/6 and 2008/9 survey results for the three countries except for Mozambique where those who indicated ‘Less and Much less’ increased from 18% in 2005/6 to 24% in 2008/9. This might entail a rise in dissatisfaction within certain ethnic groups in Mozambique in relation to the amount of political influence enjoyed which might lead towards an increase in ethnic tensions.

**Figures 5:** Respondent’s ethnic group’s political influence by country

*a- Round 3 (2005/2006) 

b- Round 4 (2008/2009)*

![Graph of political influence by country](image)

**Source:** Author’s own calculation of Round 3 and 4 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don’t Know and Missing codes)
However, 33%, 24% and 22% for Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia respectively (2008/9) shows no major difference amongst these countries and it can also be deduced that very few in these countries feel that their ethnic groups have political influence in their countries.

Respondents were also asked to indicate how often they think their ethnic group is treated unfairly by the government (in 2009 and 2012). The results as indicated in Table 5 below show that in 2009 almost half (49%) of the respondents in Malawi and Zambia felt that their group was never treated unfairly while a quarter (about 25%) showed that their ethnic group was sometimes treated unfairly. Although in Mozambique only 37% indicated that their group was treated unfairly, very few (18%) indicated that the government ‘often and always’ treated them unfairly. Over all, the 2009 data shows that the problem of discontentment with government on an ethnic group is not serious but it does show that Mozambique is somehow different as compared to Malawi and Zambia.
Table 5: How often ethnic group feels treated unfairly by country (2009 and 2012)

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often &amp; Always</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own calculation of Round 4 and 5 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don’t Know and Missing codes)

When the 2009 and 2012 data is compared, it shows an overwhelming increase in Mozambique (37% to 60%) and Zambia (49% to 78%) for those who indicated ‘never’. In Malawi there is also an increase but it is not significant (49% to 52%). This implies that for all the three countries, those who feel that their ethnic group is unfairly treated is reducing hence arguably reducing some levels of ethnicity within these countries over the specified period.

Finally, concerning the question respondents were also asked “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a nationality and being an ethnic group. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings? 1-Ethnic ID only, 2-Ethnic ID more than national, 3-National and ethnic IDs equal, 4-National ID more than ethnic and 5-National ID only”

The results as shown in Table 6 are somehow mixed. In 2009 the only common trend amongst the three countries was that about 12% to 15% mentioned that they would opt for Ethnic ID only and Ethnic ID more than national. Those who indicated equality between national and ethnic identity were low in Malawi and Mozambique (29% and 34% respectively) but very high in Zambia (63%). For opting for national ID were high in Malawi (56%) but low in Mozambique and Zambia (34% and 24% respectively).

Table 6: Choice of National or Ethnic identity by country (2009 and 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic ID only &amp; Ethnic ID more than national</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and ethnic IDs equal</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National ID more than ethnic &amp; National ID only</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own calculation of Round 4 and 5 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don’t Know and Missing codes)

When comparing the 2009 and 2012 data sets, the results show that although Malawians were more interested in national over ethnic identity in 2009 when compared to other countries, this went down in 2012 (from 56% to 42%) whilst in Mozambique it increased from 34% to 47%. Although in Zambia it is still low (from 24% to 34%), it is clear that it is only Malawi which has faced a reduction in those who value national identity at the expense of ethnic identity. All in all, the question of what people in these countries value between national and ethnic identity is mixed but it is very clear that those who value ethnic identity only or ethnic
identity more than national are very low in all the three countries. In other words, national and ethnic identities are equally valued or national identity alone.

4.6 Post-colonial political relations between Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique

Relations between Zambia and Mozambique had always been cordial due to the former’s support for the liberation struggle in the region. Zambia facilitated and hosted the crucial talks between Frelimo and the Portuguese in Lusaka which ultimately led to Mozambique’s independence. More importantly, Zambia facilitated the demise of one of Frelimo’s main rivals, Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique (Coremo), by detaining its members and closing its headquarters in Lusaka in 1974. Zambia and Mozambique were also very active members of Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which was formed by frontline states and aimed at finding a way to become economically independent of apartheid South Africa. Unlike Zambia and Mozambique, Malawi was an ally of South Africa and did not express much willingness to participate in the block.

After Mozambique gained independence in 1975, it was clear that Malawi and Mozambique were going to have a foreign policy clash. Mozambique took a strong pro-liberation movement ideology and so provided support to Southern Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) ZANU movement as well as the African National Congress (ANC) movement of South Africa. This was the stand taken by most southern African countries such as Tanzania and Zambia. Specifically, ZANU liberation camps were mainly based in Mozambique under the protection of the Frelimo led government. However, since Malawi had taken a stand of supporting the white-ruled Southern Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa, a huge suspicion developed between these countries. The Mozambican government sheltered some of Malawi’s rebels such as Dr Attati Mpakati who was leader of League of Socialist Malawi (Lesoma). Mpakati was subsequently assassinated by Dr Banda’s agents in February, 1979, in Maputo. The Malawi government also provided a safe haven to some Mozambican rebel movements such as Partido Revolucionario de Mozambique (PRM), which was formed in 1976 and led by a former Frelimo member Amos Sumane. President Samora Machel consistently blamed Malawi of hosting Renamo bases within its borders. Although the Malawi government did provide some political support for Mozambican rebels as well as safe passage whenever the rebels were going abroad, the involvement in the conflict was extremely limited (except in allegedly rare cases whereby the South African Air Force used the Malawian airports to supply the rebels). However, Machel seriously believed that Malawi hosted the rebels to the extent that in October 1986 he planned with Robert Mugabe an invasion of the country so as to remove Dr Banda from leadership (Cabrita 2000). His plans were, however, never implemented due to his sudden death in an air crash a few days later on 19th October 1986. His successor, Joaquim Chissano, abandoned the invasion plan and went on to establish closer relations with Dr Banda’s regime. A defence and security pact was signed a month after Chissano’s inauguration and the pact is still in operation today.
Despite some of the above stated political and historical commonalities between Mozambique and Zambia, Malawi’s socio-political history is closer to Zambia than Mozambique. In relation to traditional authorities, there is a general complaint of politicisation of the institution. Citing examples from Malawi, Uganda and South Africa, Muriaas (2009) ably points out that democratic governments tend to emphasise neutrality of traditional leaders when in actual fact they mean that traditional leaders should support the ruling party. Traditional leaders are forced to support the ruling party due to their dependency on them for their personal survival.

4.7 Conclusion
This chapter aimed at discussing the politics of representation within the context of traditional authorities in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, as well as the extent of ethnic identity in the said countries. The traditional authorities in all the three countries had been profoundly affected by colonialism. After independence Mozambique banned traditional authorities while Zambia and Malawi retained them. Although they were retained, the governments of Malawi and Zambia provided a platform for traditional authorities that were meant to deliberately subject them under the formal state institutions. Despite banning traditional authorities after independence in Mozambique, the institution still thrived in areas controlled by the rebel movement Renamo. After the end of the civil war in Mozambique, the government restored traditional authorities mainly with the aim of trying to win the support of rural masses in opposition-led areas. After restoration of traditional authorities in Mozambique, there are strong commonalities of their current operation in all the three countries. The state has managed the relationship in such a way that it recognizes their significance for political reasons. Based on Afrobarometer data, there is a clear indication that traditional leaders are respected and trusted in all the three countries. When national versus ethnic identities are compared, the trend in each country (in 2009 and 2012) shows that there is either an equal value for both or an increase in national identity. In other words, there is low enthusiasm for ethnic identity. Over the years, political relations amongst the three countries have improved. All these factors have created a conducive environment for revival of the trans-border Chewa ethnic movement. A further discussion on traditional authorities is provided in the next chapter which specifically focuses on the Chewa Kingdom. In this case, the next chapter discusses the contemporary organisation of the Chewa Kingdom.
CHAPTER 5

THE CHEWA KINGDOM: FACTORS INFLUENCING ITS REVIVAL, THE ROLE OF THE KING AND ITS EFFECTS ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY

5.0 Introduction
The revival of Chewa identity did not just emerge but several factors contributed to it. From a spatial, symbolic and demographic perspective, this chapter demonstrates that the countries of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia are significant in the expression of Chewa trans-border identity. The Chewa trans-border ethnic identity is not complete if one nation is isolated. However, Malawi is central to the understanding of dynamics within the movement because the largest population of the Chewa are Malawi, and it is also the headquarters of the movement’s secretariat. Most significantly, the most important actors in the revival of the movement are also from this country. The chapter also discusses the centrality of Gawa Undi’s trans-border authority and how it might have a bearing on state sovereignty. Although the revival of the Chewa trans-border movement can be regarded as the product of some social-political elitist, this chapter argues this role of ‘elites’ need not be overemphasized. Contrary to the view that the cultural elite may actually be challenging the formal state sovereignty, what has actually happened is that the cultural elite are seemingly bringing the formal states of the three countries together in an informal kind of regionalism. Gawa Undi is also critical in this trans-border ethnic revival because symbolically he represents the views and aspirations of the Chewa ethnic group. The revival of the Chewa in the 1990s is the one which has seen the restoration of his authority on almost all the Chewa dominated areas of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. His conduct has to be analysed in order to determine whether he leads the Chewa towards challenging state sovereignty or not. The CHEFO, which is headquartered in Malawi, is also another important institution for mobilisation of the Chewa. As with Gawa Undi, the rationale for the establishment of the institution has a bearing on how it may relate to the state. In other words, some of the questions that can be put to the fore, which this chapter is addressing in relation to CHEFO are: Who established the institution? What were the motives? What are the implications on Chewa-state relations?

5.1 Significance of individual states of Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia to trans-border Chewa ethnic identity
Although the lowest numbers of the Chewa are based in Mozambique, this does not imply that Mozambique is not significant to Chewa trans-border ethnic identity. As explained in the previous chapter, Kalonga Gawa Undi’s first headquarters after moving away from Malawi (during a succession dispute) was based at Maano in Mozambique. According to CHEFO Chairperson, the total number of Kalongas who reigned in succession while based at Maano in Mozambique is more than those who were based at the former headquarters of Mankhamba in Malawi and the current Zambian headquarters (see Appendix 17). In other words, Mozambique carries the longest historical and symbolic value of the Chewa ethnic
identity. As one traditional chief in Mozambique stated concerning the significance of Mozambican Chewa to the trans-border identity;

*Popanda ife aku Mozambique kutenga nwo mbali pazochitika zachikhalidwe chathu, ndiye kuti uChewa wake ulibe tanthauzo*” [without involvement of Mozambican Chewas in traditional events, the genuine Chewa identity is incomplete] (Key informant interview/chief, Angonia, 28th May 2012).

Politically, although the Chewa are a minority in Mozambique, the politics of Mozambique is not necessarily ethnic-based but regional so their minority status is not a significant disadvantage.

Malawian Chewas are also significant in contemporary identity. Although the King of the Chewa is not based in Malawi, as discussed in subsequent chapters, Malawi is central to trans-border Chewa ethnic identity. The largest numbers of Chewas are based in Malawi and the headquarters of the movement, CHEFO, is also based in Lilongwe, Malawi. Historically, it is acknowledged that the first headquarters of the King was based in Malawi at Mankhamba. Arguably, some of the most important key stakeholders in the establishment and revival of the Chewa trans-border movement such as Chief Kaomba and Dr Justine Malewezi are also based in Malawi. Being the largest ethnic group in the country, the Chewa also have a significant potential political power in the country. Due to these and other factors, Malawi may probably be described as the ‘hub’ of Chewa trans-border ethnic identity.

It may be argued that since the Chewa are demographically a minority within Zambia, then the whole movement should not be looked at as a trans-border but a Malawian phenomenon. However, this may not fully be the case; the Chewa throne in Zambia is relatively influential (socially and politically) in that country. A critical analysis of the Zambian context shows that Kalonga Gawa Undi’s throne has had some credible political and social influence in the country, mainly due to: the role of the previous Kalonga Gawa Undi in Zambia’s fight for independence; the historical heritage of the pre-colonial Chewa/Maravi Empire; the credibility of its current leadership and, finally, the co-ethnic factor. The previous Kalonga Gawa Undi was one of the key local chiefs who worked with the African political parties to bring independence to the country. Unlike some local chiefs who openly sided with the colonialists, Kalonga Gawa Undi X, who reigned from 1953 to 2004, was well known as an African nationalist; an identity which he successfully carved for himself during the fight for independence and created a popular and credible legacy for the throne (Kalusa 2010). Another point giving credence to the Chewa throne in Zambia is that the pre-colonial Maravi Empire is still remembered as a historically important institution. In this case, since Gawa Undi is perceived as a direct descendant of such a great empire, spanning through three contemporary states, this leadership carries with it much prestigious honour. As van Binsbergen (1987:141) points out: “As a Paramount Chief, Chief Undi ranked among the handful of Zambian Chiefs whose immensely prestigious title still carries, even at the national level, strong connotations of pre-colonial régal splendor and powerful statehood”.

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Continuing the legacy of previous Kalonga Gawa Undi leaders, the current Gawa Undi is also regarded as one of the most reliable traditional authorities in Zambia when compared to his contemporaries. According to the Zambian historian: “In Zambia, Gawa Undi is highly respected by the political leadership...He is certainly an influential traditional political leader in Zambia” (Telephonic interview, Professor Phiri, Lusaka, 7th February 2013). The recent Zambian Watchdog (1st January 2013) newspaper article entitled “Gawa Undi gives us hope” ably articulates the Kalonga’s credibility, and what has been stated in the article was also corroborated by various other interviewees (see Appendix 10 for full text of the article).

Finally, there is also the issue of co-ethnics that has to be considered in the case of Zambia. Although the Chewa are in the minority, there are several ethnic groups which politically and socially align with the Chewa, such as the Senga, Nsenga, Tumbuka and other Zambia’s Eastern Province ethnic groups. This alignment adds to the prestige and influence of Gawa Undi’s throne (Key informant interview/Local government official, Chipata, 18th May 2012).

5.2 Cultural elite interests, Chewa identity formation and state sovereignty

Through empirical evidence this section discusses Ekeh’s (1975) view that the educated elite create or sustain traditional institutions. If the view by Ekeh is taken then this might pose as a challenge to state sovereignty because it can be deduced that the elite determine policy direction instead of the bona fide official state machinery. This becomes even more significant if these cultural elites have trans-border interests, because their loyalty to state systems would be highly compromised. In other words, if the trans-border cultural elite have ethnic political interests and motives which are contrary to the main-stream state system of governance, they may pose as a challenge to the state. In this case, the section below investigates and discusses the key individuals behind the formation and running of the contemporary Chewa movement. It goes on to determine their possible motives as well as implications of these motives for state sovereignty of the three countries.

5.2.1 Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO) as a product of convergence and divergence of cultural elites’ trans-border interests

Trans-border identity is a complex and delicate affair that needs a higher level of leadership qualities which must be characterized by a reasonable level of support and respect at grassroots and top level of political hierarchy. It will be worth explaining briefly the leadership of the Chewa movement to project the characters behind it as well as how these personal attributes contributed to the rise and success of trans-border movement. It is within this context that the extent to which the movement is a convergence of cultural elites’ interests could be analyzed.

According to Senior Chief Kaomba of Kasungu in Malawi, the current Chewa trans-border movement was initiated by himself. This claim is to some extent supported by other independent respondents who, however, differ from Kaomba on the reasons why he was interested in reviving the movement as well as some other arguments he raised. Senior Chief Kaomba is a nephew of the former President of Malawi Kamuzu Banda and unlike most
traditional rulers in the region, he is a graduate of the University of Malawi. His purported role in the revival of the Chewa trans-border movement is something that he cherishes as he mentions that he is the one who actually started the whole process. He argues that during the reign of Dr Banda, he did not want the Chewa to recognise the authority of the Kalonga purely on political grounds. Hence when he became chief he started organising Chewa trips to Zambia for national and cultural ceremonies and was assisted by the Chewa Cultural Committee of Kasungu [home district of Chief Kaomba]. When the organisation of the trips became too expensive, CHEFO came in later to assist with food, accommodation and transport. Consequently, according to Kaomba, CHEFO was established by local Malawian Chewa chiefs to solely handle these logistics. Thus chaired by Dr Justine Malewezi, CHEFO was responsible for fundraising for Kalonga trips and other related things (Interview with Senior Chief Kaomba, Kasungu, 16th June 2012).

Based on the explanation of Dr Malewezi on how the institution came about, there are some differences when compared to Chief Kaomba’s narrative. Specifically, Malewezi claims that the Kalonga informed him that he was coming to Malawi for a visit and he was tasked to form a committee that would organise logistics for his trip. After the Kalonga’s visit in 2005 [see Appendix 13], he was very impressed with the committee’s organisation of the whole trip and asked Malewezi to take a step further and assist Chewa chiefs on how to handle emerging issues on gender, HIV/AIDS, governance and many other related matters. According to Malewezi, “This was the birth of Chewa Heritage Foundation. So when we came home we said how do we translate this? So we had lawyers and we got advice and agreed that it must be recognised by government; in other words it must be registered, to register it you must have a constitution...so that is what we did...that is how Chewa Heritage Foundation started”(Interview with Dr Malewezi, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012).

According to Kaomba, the committee chaired by Malewezi was only mandated by the King to draft a constitution (thus outlining the institution’s objectives) and also pursue official registration with the government of Malawi. He further claims that Dr Malewezi’s group was supposed to hand over the draft constitution to a committee of Malawian Chewa chiefs who were supposed to produce the final version- which had to be vetted by King Gawa Undi of Zambia. Apart from organizing King Gawa Undi’s trip, Dr Malewezi’s committee was also supposed to raise funds for the Kulamba ceremony. In this case, Chief Kaomba argues that Dr Malewezi produced the final version of the constitution and directly consulted King Gawa Undi without input from local chiefs. He also claims that the constitution was, however, drafted in such a manner that the Chewa chiefs were sidelined and it is only Dr Malewezi who has all the powers to run the institution with King Gawa Undi as its patron. Kaomba pointed out that he doesn’t understand how Dr Malewezi, a technocrat and not in the Chewa royal family, should speak and represent the Chewa in the country. He specifically said that: “CHEFO started to disagree with me. They made the institution to directly link itself with Kalonga Gawa Undi of Zambia while side-lining us, the chiefs of Malawi. I said no.” (Interview with Senior Chief Kaomba, Kasungu, 16th June 2012).
When Dr Malewezi’s and Chief Kaomba’s narratives are compared to other independent key informant interviews, it emerges that what actually happened is that Kaomba had indeed initiated a move towards a formal trans-border link with the previous Zambian Kalonga. The death of the previous Kalonga led to Kaomba’s diminishing influence and his place was taken over by Malewezi who continued the formalization of trans-border linkage by taking a leading role in the formation of CHEFO.

One of Chief Kaomba’s supporters is Paramount Chief Lundu of Chikwawa district of Malawi. What is interesting is that Chief Kaomba, as well as Lundu, have been putting forward the formal state argument to prove that CHEFO should not solely focus on Kalonga Gawa Undi. In other words, their view is that CHEFO should respect the Malawi state authority first before directing attention to Gawa Undi (see Appendix 14). They claim that Kalonga’s role in the organization should merely be ceremonial and not be regarded as King of the Chewa in Malawi and Mozambique. Lundu went on to say that “The main problem with CHEFO was the role played by Malewezi; he had a political agenda and that is why we ended up being at loggerheads with Kalonga Gawa Undi” (Interview with Paramount Chief Lundu, 14th June 2013). This view is also reinforced by Kaomba, who said that by directly working with Kalonga Gawa Undi of Zambia, it implies that they have to follow the Zambian system. He argued that he has to work with the government in Malawi and the country has a Constitution as well as the Chief’s Act which guide on such matters. (Interview with Senior Chief Kaomba, 16th June 2012).

Paramount Chief Lundu’s lack of full recognition in Malawi is a result of his weak bona fide Chewa power base. Although he is, according to the Malawi official hierarchy of traditional leadership, the most senior Chewa chief, his area of authority is in the southern region of Malawi where there are very few Chewa people but most of his subjects are Mang’anja and Sena ethnic groups. As one Malawian political analyst explained:

*The tricky part is that paramount chief of the Chewa in Malawi is Lundu who stays in southern region of Malawi and is more Mang’anja and Sena ‘contaminated’ but he is Chewa. The majority of the ‘hard core’ Chewa are in central region as a result, the Chewa of central region have not fully accepted Lundu. Since the Chewa of central region had no supreme authority, now the rise of Gawa Undi of Zambia fills that vacuum and you can now see that the Chewa of the central region are more organised, they have an umbrella authority and they are trying to exert it as much as possible. It is because of this thinking or mentality [that Gawa is supreme] that they were able to question people like Kaomba, people like Lundu and those guys [Lundu and Kaomba] cannot make a mistake of thinking that they will successfully oppose the Kalonga Gawa Undi lineage[sic] (Key informant interview/Political analyst, Lilongwe, 11th May 2012).*

There are a number of issues that might be deduced from this formation of CHEFO and the subsequent internal differences which might expose some of the motives in relation to Chief Kaomba:
Firstly, Senior Chief Kaomba is a relative of the former President Dr Banda. In tandem with the earlier observation, the departure from power of Kamuzu might have led to Kaomba feeling his personal loss of influence in the country so he started mobilizing the Chewa as a way of replacing the political power with cultural influence. Secondly, it could also be that the departure of Kamuzu, who proudly talked about his Chewa roots, led Kaomba to feel that the Chewa cultural relevance was under threat hence the link with the Chewa of Zambia as a way of consolidating the Chewa roots. Thirdly, the motive for Kaomba’s role in the revival of the movement could be related to the legitimacy of his chieftaincy. According to Dr Malewezi, Kaomba’s chieftaincy was created by the Kamuzu regime so that the former president should be regarded as having a royal Chewa heritage (Interview with Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012). Consequently, according to Dr Malewezi, Kaomba’s chieftaincy lacks the bona fide Chewa royal mandate. The departure of Kamuzu therefore might have led Kaomba to feel insecure of his legitimacy amongst the Chewa. Consequently, he might have been seeking a way of filling up this lack of legitimacy through demonstration of leadership by initiating trans-border movements. This is more evident in the fact that Kaomba had emphasized that the CHEFO should be controlled by local chiefs and follow the Malawian Government’s Chiefs Act of 1967. The control of CHEFO by Dr Malewezi and the subsequent delinking of his line of communication with the custodian of Chewa powers (King Gawa Undi) led to loss of power for him, hence the frustration.

Whatever the theories or motives behind the initiation of the Chewa trans-border movement might be, the idea that those behind the creation of the movement are cultural elites in the modern sense of the word, is apparent. In this perspective, it may be argued that the movement was born out of the interests of key cultural elites: King Gawa Undi, Dr Malewezi and Senior Chief Kaomba. A brief description of their ‘elitism’ and their probable interests illuminates the politics of meaning-making at play. From a social constructivist perspective, the role of individual agency and ideas is essential in constituting what is often taken for granted or deemed the (inevitable) outcome of historical forces.

The movement took a serious trans-border dimension under the current King Gawa Undi. Different from most local chiefs and, like Kaomba, the king is a highly educated individual with a Master’s degree in Engineering. As one Chewa chief stated, the King strongly encourages that Chewa leaders should be educated. This exposure to a higher level of education, has, arguably enabled him to encourage, appreciate and embrace the trans-border vision of the Chewa movement. His idea of establishing the CHEFO as a registered institution running parallel to the royal Chewa traditional structure is evident of his capacity to understand the value of working and tapping from technocrats of modern institutions. Uneducated Chiefs might have looked at CHEFO as a threat to their authority. His foresight of ensuring that the headquarters of the institution should be in Malawi, where the majority of the Chewa are based, whilst his royal headquarters is in Zambia, is a further manifestation of his ingenuity of consolidating the movement as a trans-border institution. The interest of Gawa Undi is clearly to enhance his movement beyond Zambia, where his influence might be insignificant.
Dr Malewezi is, as already stated, a former Vice President of Malawi who served the nation from 1994 up to 2004. Prior to this, Dr Malewezi served in various capacities in the Malawi Public Service, under Dr Banda, up to the position of Principal Secretary. Although his first degree was in sciences, he also studied African Anthropology, which later became ideal in his role as chair of CHEFO. From his public service and vice presidency experience, Dr Malewezi had become endowed with multiple social-political opportunities, respect and status which could assist him to be welcomed not only in Malawi but Mozambique and Zambia. The public sector and political networks he had amassed over the years had been helpful in linking the organization and his role across borders. His anthropological training had also been critical in understanding and managing Chewa cultural affairs. Although it is difficult to establish Dr Malewezi’s interests, it is likely that, after the loss of political status, he still wants to maintain a key position of influence by being close to the centre of Chewa power, Gawa Undi himself. The trans-border movement, through CHEFO, therefore, enhances his status.

As stated, Chief Kaomba is a graduate of the University of Malawi and, during the Dr Banda regime, he was politically well-connected. After Dr Banda, Kaomba had been very effective in re-inventing himself and had been close to almost all the subsequent Presidents of Malawi (who had always used him as a way to penetrate the former president’s political stronghold). For many years, after Dr Banda’s regime, he also served as Chairman of Traditional Chiefs in the country. A summation of Chief Kaomba’s interests could be sustenance and consolidation of his chieftaincy which can, among other ways, be enhanced through a trans-border movement.

At grassroots level, it seems all the Chewa now subscribe to the CHEFO ideology as articulated by Dr Malewezi. There are a few exceptions of course, especially amongst the Chewa of Lundu and Chief Kaomba; in this case, roughly more than 95% of Malawian Chewa chiefs (based on the author’s own estimates) recognize and accept the authority of CHEFO as well as Gawa Undi. The reason for CHEFO’s influence amongst the grassroots Chewa, as opposed to the Kaomba camp, is that King Gawa Undi officially recognizes the institution and it also organizes or coordinates the Kulamba Ceremony for all Chewas in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. In other words, it is generally perceived by state authorities, and other key stakeholders, as a bona fide platform to articulate, organize and disseminate Chewa interests. Any Chewa group outside CHEFO fails to identify a ‘legitimate’ space as well as resources to mobilise. CHEFO, with the leadership of Dr Malewezi, has from time to time been called upon to resolve some queries related to cultural interpretation and other related matters in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. Dr Malewezi has also been in the forefront to ensure that there is synchronization in the process of installation of Chewa chiefs. In some cases, Dr Malewezi has become more prominent than CHEFO itself. For instance, in Chanje’s area in Zambia, some FGDs participants were not very familiar with CHEFO, but they knew Dr Malewezi. Apart from the organizational importance of CHEFO to the welfare of the Chewa cultural interest, one Male FGD participant in Zambia mentioned that Dr Malewezi had been instrumental in ensuring that three key Chewa chieftaincies in Zambia should be filled (the chieftaincies had fallen vacant
after the death of the incumbents but they were not filled for a long time due to internal arguments).

5.2.2 Critical analysis: Is the cultural elite convergence a challenge to state sovereignty?

It can be inferred that despite the differences that the cultural elite behind the movement might possess, their interests converge on the quest to strengthen trans-border ties. Although Chief Kaomba of Malawi has been emphasizing the Malawi Chiefs Act and respecting Malawi as a sovereign nation in the setting up of the CHEFO, this was mainly in relation to consolidating his own position. His ultimate aim was the creation of the greater trans-border Chewa ethnic movement in which he would retain his influential position. In this entire scenario, the Chewa ethnic movement can be deduced as an elitist project but not necessarily with a conscious intention to challenge state sovereignty.

In relation to the role of the elite in the formation of the movement, it can also be deduced that internal politics amongst the cultural elite was central to minimal external political influence. And so the movement can, in this case, be regarded as an elitist project with minimal implications on political nationalization. Although the dynamics of national politics contributed to the creation of the movement, there is no indication that the motives of the cultural elite was to pursue Chewa regional autonomy. Normally, the sovereign state feels endangered if the movement takes a political dimension of identity. While pursuing the political nationalism seems not to be the conscious objective of the cultural elite, they confirm Ekeh’s (1975) thesis of the elite being behind the creation and sustenance of voluntary ethnic organizations.

Although the Chewa movement can be regarded as an elitist movement, this study also agrees with the observation of Smith (1998), who argues that sometimes the role of the cultural elite is overemphasized. Smith (1998:130) points out that for the cultural elite to be successful, their base for mobilization must be “on pre-existing social and cultural networks. This makes them resonate with the masses”. In other words, the cultural elites’ influence should not be seen in isolation from other ‘pre-existing social and cultural networks’. The cultural elite, in other words, took advantage of the already existing trans-border social, cultural and historical linkages amongst the Chewa. These pre-existing linkages were not a challenge to state sovereignty and the cultural elite seem not to have deviated from this path either.

Contrary to the view that the cultural elite are challenging the formal state sovereignty, what has actually happened is that the cultural elite are seemingly bringing the formal states of the three countries together in an informal kind of regionalism. Irrespective of their individual motives, the trans-border aspect of the movement has been seen as well as received by the state apparatus.
5.3 Factors influencing the formation of the contemporary Chewa trans-border movement

Before analysing the nature of the Chewa identity, it would be worth-while to discuss some of the factors that may have led to the emergence of this trans-border movement as this has an implication when discussing the issues of state sovereignty and citizenship. Based on interviews and secondary data, the study found that some of the factors leading towards the emergence of the Chewa trans-border ethnic movement are as follows:

5.3.1 The Chewa asserting themselves as a great ethnic group

Taking into consideration that the largest population of the Chewa is found in Malawi, the development of the Chewa ethnic movement might also be understood from complex ethnic related political dynamics within Malawi itself. Kamuzu Banda, a Chewa, is said to have created Chewa hegemony during his thirty-year dictatorship which contributed in part to the legitimization of his regime (Forster 1994, Moyo 2002, Chirambo 2005 and Chirambo 2009). While claiming that he was against tribalism, Dr Banda clearly promoted his own ethnic identity, Chewa, and even imposed it (Chichewa) as the official local language for the country. His emphasis on African tradition almost always focused on the Chewa values (Forster 1994). The Chewa ethnic identity therefore became the politically dominant group in the country for many years. The departure of Dr Banda from the political scene, with his successor Bakili Muluzi (a Yao) taking over the leadership, Malawi witnessed the decline of Chewa cultural hegemony. The new president encouraged the teaching and learning of other languages and did not rely on culture to consolidate his reign.

According to the views of political analysts, the Chewa ethnic movement is coming in at a time when the Chewa, as an ethnic group, is losing influence in the nation of Malawi. In this case one political analyst said that:

*The Chewa as an ethnic group is the largest in the country and Kamuzu Banda the former President was a Chewa. When he lost power, it was as if the Chewa had lost influence politically and culturally, hence the need to preserve their culture...this trans-border mobilization somehow compensates on the felt marginalization of the community* (Interview with a political analyst, Zomba, 12th June 2012).

By taking a cultural mobilisation platform, the Chewa ethnic mobilisation is avoiding the highly politicised tensions and divisions associated with political movements, but it still retains the ability to assert itself as a great nation.

5.3.2 Credibility associated with trans-border movement

Apart from the fact that the Chewa are found in three countries, the trans-border aspects of the mobilisation ensures that it creates a more credible image which would generate respect among the key stakeholders. Another advantage of trans-border mobilisation is that the current state boundaries are not volatile as is the case in other African countries. The CHEFO chairperson elaborated on this by mentioning that “Trans-border mobilisation helps to
standardise customs, encourages integration of the countries and gives economic opportunities in trade and tourism. Generally, the concerned countries live peacefully together because of common bonds” (Interview with Dr Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 6th December 2012).

If the current state borders were solely determined by ethnic groupings, the situation would have heightened trans-border conflict as the boundary between ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ may have been apparent (Interview with political analysts, Zomba, 12th June 2012). It may be argued that currently there is room for trans-border ethnic identity because individuals constantly get reminded of or consider it as another credible alternative identity whenever they interact with other ethnic groups within their nation-state. The Chewa movement is likely to become more vibrant because it is being encouraged by developments happening in other ethnic groups. Specifically, it is not only the Chewa who are searching for their trans-border roots but the Lomwes (Malawi/Mozambique), the Ngoni (Malawi/Zambia), Yao (Malawi/Mozambique), Tumbuka (Malawi/Zambia) and several others. All these groups have arguably a ‘competitive’ approach to demonstrate that they have a trans-border identity which is dominant and well organized (Interview with political analysts, Zomba, 12th June 2012. In this context, the ‘competition’ will drive the Chewa to continually assert themselves in a trans-border model for a considerable period in the future. As one male FGD participant in TA Change, Zambia, mentioned before this mobilization, people thought the Chewa were few but now they respect them because they know that the Chewa are all over the region (Male FGD, Zambia, 17th May 2012).

5.3.3 New leadership in the post-liberation period
The politics in the region have now changed so that Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia have embraced multiparty systems of governance. The District commissioner in Chipata, Zambia emphasised this point by stating that the significance of the Chewa movement [Chewa] came in after the multiparty system of governance in the region. In this case, ethnic groups felt that they should re-organise themselves and trace their base. He continued to explain that society became more open after multiparty but before that “even when you wanted to organise a small thing, governments used to be suspicious hence the openness itself has been one of the most important conditions. There has been the emergence of civil society -whether religious or ethnic based- mainly after 1994 and beyond” (Interview with the District Commissioner, Chipata, 18th May 2012).

Another point is that this trans-border movement is emerging now due to a ‘new breed’ of political leaders in the region which is inclined towards a closer working relationship. Africa is now in the post-liberation period; as a result, the mistrust and misunderstanding amongst political leaders have almost disappeared. During the liberation period, Zambia and Mozambique used to host some individuals who were sworn enemies of Dr Banda’s regimes such as Yatuta Chisiza and Dr Mpakati, respectively. It is also alleged that Malawi used to provide logistical support to the Mozambican Renamo rebels. These situations were somehow responsible for strained relations, especially between Malawi and Mozambique.
Several potential crises between Malawi and Mozambique had emerged in the past. For instance, on 6th November 1987, the Malawi plane was shot down by the Mozambique government killing eight key Malawian individuals who were in the plane. The Mozambique government claimed that the plane had strayed into their territory and was suspected of being a rebel plane. Malawi-Mozambique relations were also in the spotlight when President Samora Machel’s plane crashed in October 1986 killing almost all the passengers on board. The South African government, which is alleged to have shot down the plane (this has never been proved), said that they had found documents in the plane which showed that the Mozambican president was planning an invasion of Malawi (Sagawa 2011). The reason for the invasion according to the South African government was Malawi’s alleged support of Renamo rebels. The crisis in the Zambia-Malawi relations occurred when Dr Banda emphasised that part of Zambia belongs to Malawi (Chiume 1982). Dr Banda’s argument was that the Eastern part of Zambia comprises several Malawian-based ethnic groups, especially the Chewa and Ngoni. Specifically, he argued that contemporary Malawi is part of the former Maravi Kingdom which extended as far as the Eastern part of Zambia; hence the boundary of Malawi should be extended to include this area. This claim by Dr Banda raised a lot of criticism and strained relations between Malawi and Zambia. Although the situation improved over the years, the suspicion and mistrust never diminished completely (Sagawa 2011).

More damaging to the relations between Malawi and its neighbours, especially Zambia and Mozambique, was its foreign policies (Chiume 1982 and Sagawa 2011). After independence, Malawi established diplomatic relations with Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) and apartheid South Africa. According to Dr Banda, these relations were established so as to ensure that the country would be able to sustain economic development. The Malawi government did this despite strong opposition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This led to Dr Banda alienating the country from all liberation movements and other African countries. In his epic speech delivered at an OAU conference in Cairo in July 1964, he refused to support a resolution to cut off economic and diplomatic links with Portuguese East Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, arguing that:

In my own state of Malawi, for example, the colonial geography makes it impossible for me to cut off all relations with Portugal, diplomatic, commercial, cultural and otherwise, because colonial history and colonial geography have denied it a port of its own...I do not want to be a hypocrite, I do not want anyone to accuse me of hypocrisy after I leave this room, because it is impossible for me to accept any such resolutions (GoM 1964).

Malawi established trade and labour relations with South Africa and also received massive aid from the same. Dr Banda also amazed other African leaders by establishing diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa in October 1967. Malawi benefitted from South Africa’s loan to the tune of 8 million Rands for the construction of the new Capital City in Lilongwe (Potts 1985:188). Zambia hosted the African National Congress and other Mozambican and Zimbabwean liberation movements and so looked at Malawi with suspicion. Similarly, when
Mozambique got its independence in 1975, Malawi’s lack of support for the liberation movement was not completely forgotten.

The departure of Dr Banda from political leadership in 1994 created an atmosphere of renewed hope and trust. More importantly, the new government of Malawi, led by Bakili Muluzi, was keen to move Malawi out of the three decade isolation and earnestly pursued policies that would bring the country closer to the international community. In this regard, amending relations with Malawi’s neighbours became one of the government’s priorities.

5.3.4 Creation of Chewa Heritage Foundation

The creation of CHEFO has been significant to the Chewa movement in several respects. First, the organization enhances unity of the Chewa as a community. Although CHEFO is under the authority of King Gawa Undi, it is, practically speaking, CHEFO which articulates the vision and values of the Chewa in touch with modernity. In this case, CHEFO acts like an overarching institution which operates above the chieftaincy. Consequently, the internal Chewa leadership squabbles and tensions are deflected by the institution as it does not pose as a leadership competitor. It also articulates or defines the differing viewpoints of the ‘authentic’ Chewa traditions promoting consensus on potentially conflicting issues. For instance one Chief during interviews mentioned that as a young traditional leader, when he wants to learn more about how to initiate traditional practices in his area, it is CHEFO staff who guide him (Key informant interview/chief, Lilongwe 11th May 2012). Similarly, another lady chief stated that before she became chief, she did not know that the Chewas came from Congo, but through CHEFO she is now knowledgeable on the matter (Key informant interview/Chief, Lilongwe, 11th May 2012).

Secondly, being a registered institution, it has created several opportunities that go along with registered institutions such as the legal mandate to solicit funds (see Appendix 12) and government recognition. For instance, CHEFO has been instrumental in raising funds for specific Chewa functions.

Thirdly, the organization ably conducts research and keeps modern records of Chewa chiefs and traditions across the three countries of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. For instance, the Chairperson mentioned that with democratic governerns established in Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia, there was now that freedom to visit these countries and establish the number of Chewa chiefs in these countries. He claimed that they now have a record of all Chewa chiefs and ably communicate with them (Interview with Dr Malewezi, CHEFO Chairperson, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012).

Finally, CHEFO has educated office bearers who are able to articulate, protect and promote the Chewa people’s interests using the modern systems of communication and influence. In this regard, a pre-colonial Chewa historian mentioned that “most traditional institutions have not yet realized the potential of using educated and respected individuals and modern systems
to advance their interests as CHEFO has done” (Key informant interview/Historian, Zomba, 28th April 2012).

5.3.5 Geographical advantage
With the exception of the Lomwe ethnic group, the replication of the Chewa movement is unlikely to successfully occur amongst other ethnic groups in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia due to the geographical situation. Unlike other major trans-border ethnic groups (in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia) such as the Yao, Tumbuka and Ngoni, the Chewa-dominated areas are within a wide and single geographical area. This favourable geographical proximity allows them to easily link and transact. The other major trans-border ethnic groups are, geographically speaking, more like ‘patches of identities’ across several isolated areas. This point is reinforced by an observation made by one chief in Mozambique who mentioned that the unique part of the Chewa Kingdom is that it is almost continuous with only a few pockets of other ethnic groups such as the Ngoni and Yao (Key informant interview/chief, Angonia, 27th May 2012).

5.4 Contemporary status of the Chewa trans-border identity
The contemporary Chewa ethnic group according to CHEFO official documentation comprises a collection of about 4 or 5 sub-groups. Some of these sub-groups are the Nyanja (Chewas near the Lake Malawi in Mozambique and Malawi), the Chipeta (Chewas in the plains of Malawi and Zambia), the Mang’anja (those in the Southern Highlands of Malawi), the Senga (those near Senga Hill in Petauke, Zambia), and the Gowa (those in the Luangwa Valley of Zambia). UNESCO, which declared the Chewa’s Nyau or Gule Wamkulu traditional dance as a significant cultural heritage, estimated that there are about 15 million Chewa people in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia16. The highest population share of the Chewa is found in Malawi (about 47% of the country’s population). Table 7 below shows population share (state population) of the Chewa in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique and the total number of districts in which they are found.

Table 7: Population share of the Chewa in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of State Popn.</th>
<th>No. of Chiefs</th>
<th>No. of Districts</th>
<th>Chewa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Posner (2009) and CHEFO

Traditionally, all Chewa Chiefs are subservient to Undi, their King, on all traditional issues governing Chiefs’ succession, promotion, demotion or dissolution of Chieftainship. However, formally states have written laws giving themselves powers on such matters. Currently the

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16This also tallies with Posner’s (2009) calculations based on the Joshua Project
practical arrangement is that the King is consulted when governments have to make critical decisions on Chewa chieftaincy. Whenever the King visits Malawi and Mozambique he is accorded the VIP treatment just like formal government officials. The Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO) was established during the reign of Kalonga Gawa Undi XI to act as a Secretariat for the King and the chiefs in the three countries. It is headquartered in Malawi and the current Chairperson\(^\text{17}\) of the Foundation is the former Vice President of Malawi, Dr Justine Malewezi. Specifically, in the contemporary situation, according to Banda (2008:105) and CHEFO Chairperson, the Chewa Kingdom is governed through three administrative organs which are Chewa Royal Establishment (now called CHEFO), the Royal Family and the Undi Chewa Traditional Council. Membership to the first and second institutions is through appointment whilst for the Royal family it is through the royal bloodline. According to Banda (2008), one of the most important individuals in the Royal Family is Nyangu, the queen mother. These administrative organs highlighted above are not necessarily duplicated at chieftdom and village levels (Banda 2008). Figure 6 below shows the extent of the Chewa Kingdom.

**Figure 6:** Map showing the Chewa Kingdom with its extension in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique

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\(^{17}\)When the study was being carried out, the Chairperson was Dr Malewezi but as from April 2013, the new Chairperson is Professor Kanyama Phiri.
According to Article 3.1, the mandate of CHEFO “shall be to protect, promote and preserve the Chewa culture under the guidance of His Majesty Kalonga Gawa Undi through his recognised bodies and organisations”. The specific mandates are:

1. Provide strategic advice to the traditional leadership of the Chewa tribe through setting leadership goals and strategies for promoting and preserving the Chewa culture.
2. Promote collaboration, partnership and networking between CHEFO and existing or future cultural organisations of other ethnic groupings inside or outside Malawi.
3. To lobby for funds for use in the attainment of the objectives of CHEFO.
4. To collect and receive royalties from institutions and other organisations that use and exhibit Chewa artefacts and materials.

Similarly, under Article 4.1 “The broad objective of CHEFO is to protect, promote and preserve the Chewa culture”.

In relation to how the organisation links with other Chewas in Zambia and Mozambique, the CHEFO chairperson mentioned that, although CHEFO is registered in Malawi, it links up with Mozambique through a committee chaired by a Mr Dimba. In Zambia, the Council of Royal Councillors (Nduna) is the link organization which works closely with a Committee called the Lusaka Chewa Committee, especially on technical matters (many members of the Lusaka Committee are also government officials). The Mozambican Committee is closely supported by the Department of Culture through District Commissioners (Interview with Dr Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 6th December 2012).

5.4 Gawa Undi traditional authority versus state political authority: Politics of representation at play
This section examines the trans-border authority of Kalonga Gawa Undi and how this affects or has the potential to affect state sovereignty. Specifically, the section analyses the extent to which there could be ethnic politicization through CHEFO, as well as the extent to which the various trans-border roles of Gawa Undi may be regarded as a threat to state sovereignty.

5.4.1 General perception of ethnic politicization of the movement
Officially, Gawa Undi is the head of CHEFO and it has been argued by almost all independent key informants that CHEFO is being used by Gawa Undi to enhance his view of trans-border ethnic politicization and not necessarily pursing a cultural agenda. All analysts in Malawi stated that after the 1994 democratic dispensation, the Chewa ethnic group in
Malawi felt that they were being politically oppressed. As pointed out by one Malawian political analyst, the Chewa noted that despite being “a dominant tribe but not enjoying political power, they felt something is wrong” (Key informant interview/Political analyst, Lilongwe, 11th May 2012). From this perspective, the Chewa process of identifying themselves with their Chewa Kingship is a way of trying to consolidate their next possible alternative political base, whilst preparing themselves to take over the formal political leadership in the long run. As one key informant pointed out:

You understand, someone used to be a ruler and finds that using the formal structures of power in Malawi society is weakening and they are not able to get power. Now they are asking themselves ‘how best can we exercise our muscles and get power, OK let us revive our Kingship’. That is why the secretariat of CHEFO itself is in Malawi and not in Zambia where the King resides... it is a question of power, when you lose the formal power, you would always substitute it with informal power and the Chewa have proved that they can use the informal institutions to gain the power that they have lost formally (Key Informant interview/University Lecturer, Zomba, 13th June 2012).

In the 2009 elections, although Bingu wa Mutharika was not a Chewa, he amassed many votes amongst the Chewa of the central region and one of the arguments for his large support amongst the Chewa is attributed to his campaign strategy. Contrary to the previous president, Bakili Muluzi, who vilified Kamuzu, Bingu actually glorified him and regarded him as a hero of the country. Among other things, Bingu ordered the construction of a Kamuzu mausoleum and his statue in the capital city. However, the Chewa support for Bingu was short-lived, because soon after the elections he started identifying himself with the rival Lomwe group under an organisation called Mulhakho wa Aلومwe.

Officially, CHEFO argues that Gawa Undi and the Chewa as a tribe do not have any political affiliation and it is at the discretion of an individual Chewa to choose a political party of his/her choice to associate with. Their argument is that one cannot achieve a political goal by using Chewa identity but by joining a particular political party, as individuals, to express their political feelings or views. However, the generally held perception and accusations that CHEFO is a political organisation, pursuing Gawa Undi’s political interests, has in several ways, reached CHEFO officials. The officials’ reaction to these accusations or perceptions has in most cases been forcefully expressed. For instance, the Publicity Secretary of CHEFO stated that “I am sorry to say this, those who say this is a political organisation are shallow minded… CHEFO can never be a political organisation for the basic reason that the Chewas are spread across the country and have different interests…we can’t achieve the political agenda” (Key informant interview/CHEFO Publicity Secretary, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012).

These accusations are not limited to ordinary people, but even at higher levels, as observed by the CHEFO Chairman. In this case, the chairperson of CHEFO had strikingly similar observations when he mentioned that there is a danger from politicians who may feel politically threatened with the Chewa movement: “This I noticed when I was talking to some people in government somewhere, I will not mention the country” (Key informant interview/Dr Malewezi, CHEFO chairman, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012).
5.4.2 Gawa Undi’s trans-border roles, authority and the formal state

In relation to the trans-border roles of Gawa Undi, there have been several observations that could plausibly explain his growing political influence in the three countries. Firstly, there is the extra-legal official definition of Gawa Undi accorded to his chieftaincy by the state. In this case, the study noted that the informal authority of Gawa Undi has on several occasions effortlessly been transferred into formal state authority across the borders of the three countries. For instance, although Gawa Undi is according to the laws governing chieftaincies of Malawi or Mozambique, not officially recognised, he is, however, provided with official government reception equivalent to a government minister or head of state when he visits these countries.

Secondly, the treatment that Gawa Undi receives from respected Chewa former and current politicians, especially in Malawi, symbolically reinforces his political influence. Related to this point is the reporting structure of the movement which puts emphasis on his throne. One political scientist even commented on how Gawa Undi is highly regarded by some of Malawi’s most respected Chewa people such as the CHEFO chairperson himself, Dr Malewezi. The political scientist argues that the treatment they give him is symbolically a sign that their loyalty is not to the state of Malawi but to the informal institution of the Chewa. Specifically, he pointed out that:

You might have seen the former vice-president [Dr Malewezi] kneeling in respect before the Gawa Undi but I never remember seeing him [when he was vice president] kneeling before the then country’s president Bakili Muluzi. He had problems in kneeling before the formal president of the country but he is free to kneel before an informal leader of an ethnic group. My view is that he is sending the message to say that ‘we cannot pay allegiance to the formal state but our own state’ some kind of a symbolic protest message of its own (Key informant interview/Political scientist, Zomba, 12th June 2012).

Another analyst further argued that the reporting structure of CHEFO, as well as the Malawian former Vice President’s role in the movement, creates a clear picture of the growing political influence of Gawa Undi. He argued that Gawa Undi is using the informal structures which ultimately affect the formal structures of the state in order to pursue his interests. He pointed out that “the former Vice President of the state of Malawi is head of a secretariat of the Chewa tribe and is answerable to a king who is based in Zambia; can you imagine?” (Key informant interview/Political analyst, Lilongwe, 11th May 2012).

Thirdly, Gawa Undi has in some instances defied political authorities of Malawi so that his interests should be protected and respected. For instance, just before the 2009 elections in Malawi (during the campaign period), the government organized the installation of Chief Kabunduli in Nkhata Bay (a Tonga chief - a sub-group of the Chewa). King Gawa Undi refused to attend the ceremony citing the potentiality of politicization of the ceremony during the campaign period. He claimed that the government may use him for their own political gain and said that the ceremony should be held after the campaign period. Again, a key informant interviewee argues that this action “in itself sent a message that ‘we are an independent entity that does things on its own’ and also a demonstration of the entity’s power” (Key informant interview/Political scientist, Zomba, 12th June 2012). This doesn’t mean that after this incident Gawa Undi was sidelined by state officials; actually when Gawa
Undi visits Malawi and Mozambique, he is still accorded with high-level official treatment such as a convoy and other VIP related protocols. He is also provided with security and accommodation by the state and this type of treatment is unprecedented amongst the traditional leaders. A year later the president of Malawi in 2010 even gave the impression that Gawa Undi is actually the one ‘looking after the people’ when he “thanked Gawa Undi for coming despite his busy schedule of looking after Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia where he is in-charge of 15 million Chewa people” (Sunday Times, 31 October 2010, p. 2, emphasis added).

When a newspaper reporter asked Mr Joseph Chikuta, a senior counsellor for Gawa Undi the question: “Can Gawa Undi remove a defiant chief from his position, for example a chief from Malawi, since he is in another country with its own constitution?” His response was: “Yes it is possible. Gawa Undi can actually remove a defiant chief. This can be done by telling the people whose chief is defiant to choose another chief. It must be known that though the Chewa are coming from different countries, their leader is Gawa Undi” (Malawi News, 17-23 September, 2011, p. 12). Again, in another incident, Mr Chikuta Mbewe, the Kalonga’s spokesperson and administrator mentioned that: “In our tradition, cases don’t end in the court but at the mouth of Kalonga. Those who seek the court’s assistance forget that the chieftaincy was there because of Kalonga. It is only Kalonga who has the power to accept or reject chieftaincy”, he said (The Nation, 17th February, 2010, p.3).

Fourthly, it is the unexpected political support that Gawa has been receiving from the state which demonstrates his political influence. In the wrangle between Lundu (Paramount chief in Malawi) and Gawa Undi, Lundu seemed to present arguments that would strengthen the state by saying that Undi is not stipulated in the laws of Malawi hence there are no reasons for recognising his authority. Surprisingly, the government has seemingly backed Gawa-someone outside their domain of authority- as a legitimate traditional leader in the country. This is captured in the newspaper article which mentioned that “… government said it still recognised Kalonga Gawa Undi as the Chewa King and advised Lundu to sort out his differences with Kalonga himself and not government” (Malawi News, 2-8 October, 2010, p.1-3). Contrary to the expected norm of a Westphalian state proclamation that it has supreme authority within its boundary, the Minister of Local Government in Malawi actually consented to Kalonga’s authority in Malawi when she said that “…there was no problem for a foreign king having powers over local chiefs because that shows unity” (The Daily Times, 13th October, 2010, p.2).

Malewezi further responded to this incident by mentioning that “The King always tells his chiefs to work with their respective governments and obey the laws. However, on matters of tradition, Kalonga Gawa Undi expects that traditional rules should be followed and referred to the chiefs and ultimately to him” (Malawi News, 16-22 October, 2010, p. 10, emphasis added). The Lundu-Gawa Undi disagreement clearly demonstrated that the state of Malawi could not challenge Gawa Undi and the Malawian government minister even added that though Gawa is a foreigner, his exercise of authority in Malawi is a demonstration of unity for these countries.
In support of the King’s cross border authority and legitimacy, the CHEFO chairperson mentioned that in the west they had the concept of ‘divine authority’ in which they believed that their kingship came from God. For the Chewa, they believe that their source of chieftainship is Kalonga and in this case the entire Chewa chiefs have their allegiance to Kalonga as the person who gave them their land. The chairperson further mentioned that because of that there are certain ceremonies such as Kulamba to demonstrate this allegiance. One Zambian analyst observed that through ceremonies such as Kulamba “there is some discipline in the way chiefs behave because they are answerable to one authority although chiefs per se would say that they are answerable to the government of the day within the territorial borders” (Key informant interview/Local government official, Chipata, 18th May 2012).

5.4.3 Public challenge to states’ socio-economic policies

It was observed during data collection that King Gawa Undi has on several occasions publicly challenged state authorities on issues of socio-economic governance. Specifically, when he meets the political leadership of the three countries he normally points out that the governments should address the social-economic welfare of the people because their living standards are not improving. For instance in an article entitled “Cotton debacle: Kalonga Gawa Undi talks tough” (Inside Zambia Magazine, 25th August 2012) it exemplifies some of the ways in which Gawa Undi has been forcefully confronting state policies. He criticized government policies in agriculture which had negatively affected many Zambians. In this regard one key informant interpreted this as a challenge to state sovereignty when he argued that: “In his messages Gawa Undi is indirectly saying that ‘I am the bona fide leader of these people and you political leaders are not doing your job’. If the message was only for Zambians, it would not carry weight but because he speaks for 15 million people then it carries more weight” (Key informant interview/Political scientist, Zomba, 12th June 2012).

5.4.4 Critical analysis: Is state sovereignty in policies and practices challenged by Chewa identity?

According to Berman et al (2004:5), political ethnicity or nationalism manifests where, among other things, an ethnic group relates with the state. This is the case because this interaction presents opportunities for actors to exercise their actual and potential power or influence. The various interactions with the state mentioned above, provide some insights on whether Gawa Undi and CHEFO might be regarded as a threat to state sovereignty or not.

In relation to the view that Gawa Undi through CHEFO is aiming at ethnic politicisation, what is interesting is that almost all the independent key informants supported this perspective. After carefully observing the views from both sides it was apparent that no plausible evidence was provided to support this assertion. In other words, although the widely held view is that Gawa Undi and CHEFO are aiming at Chewa trans-border ethnic politicisation, this study does not support this view due to lack of evidence. In this regard therefore, Gawa Undi and CHEFO are not necessarily a threat to trans-border state sovereignty.
The state sovereignty might be seen to be challenged by the Chewa movement when its leader Gawa Undi poses as another parallel arm of the state—when he challenges the policies being pursued by the governments of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. According to the Chiefs Act of 1967 of Malawi, the state, through the President, is the ultimate decision maker on the elevation, demotion and enthronement of traditional authorities in the country. The admission that Gawa Undi has a significant role to play in the affairs of the country’s traditional chiefs is a direct contradiction to the role of state in such issues. In this case, it might be concluded that the Chewa movement is indeed a challenge to sovereignty of the state.

However, by taking a constructivist perspective, this move by the state is a way of maximising its own legitimacy by supporting the cultural identity of its citizenry which demand that their cultural leader should play a role in this identity. Contrary to the centralists Westphalian perspective, highlighting socio-economic concerns helps the Chewa chieftaincy to appeal to the people whilst at the same time being recognised as the legitimate implementer of the said policies. It poses as ‘a listening government/state’ which has even provided a platform for the Kalonga to speak. In this case, although the Kalonga might be seen as if he is in control, the reality is that the state is in control because it has provided the platform for him as almost all the meetings are partly funded by the state itself. As a Zambian professor stated, Undi may not be regarded as a threat to the state but is actually reinforcing the relevance of the state to his sustenance of authority, in this case it is through the platform of the state that his authority is recognised (Telephonic Interview with Professor Phiri, Lusaka, 7th February 2013).

In relation to authority over traditional authorities, Gawa Undi’s control is not absolute. In fact in the 2013 Kulamba ceremony speech, Gawa Undi complained of the excessive government control on chieftaincies which undermines his authority. Specifically, he stated that “There are instances where the government has taken decisions without consulting the concerned royal establishment… We would therefore like to urge the government to respect and adhere to these long-established norms and traditions” (Kalonga Gawa Undi’s speech at the 2013 Kulamba Ceremony, 31st August 2013, Mkaika, Zambia).

From a constructivist perspective, the change of programmes for the installation of Chief Kabunduli in Malawi may not necessarily be regarded as the Chewa movement’s challenge to the state but the state’s own recognition of the importance of state-society relations for it to remain relevant and legitimate in the eyes of its community. This is the essence of the social constructivism argument that sovereignty is not static but dynamic so that it fulfills different uses within a particular context.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed contemporary Chewa identity by, among other things, highlighting the significance of the three countries in expression of Chewa ethnic identity and how the conflicting cultural elites’ interests might have contributed to the formation of
CHEFO. The chapter also discussed the centrality of Gawa Undi’s trans-border authority and how it might have a bearing on state sovereignty. Specifically, Gawa Undi’s various trans-border roles and exercises of his authority may demonstrate that he is a threat to state authority—when the state is challenged and ‘gives in’ and also when the states of Malawi and Mozambique provide him with extra-legal official recognition. From a constructivist perspective, the opposite is the case. It may actually be argued from a constructivist perspective that this is the state’s own recognition of the importance of state-society relations for it to remain relevant and legitimate in the eyes of its community. This is the essence of social constructivism argument that sovereignty is not static but dynamic so that it fulfils different uses within a particular context. The state may be seen as ‘giving in’ to Undi when actually it is flexibly reinforcing its own existence and legitimacy so that Undi and the Chewa ultimately view the state as reflecting their own aspirations. It may also be argued that the leaders of the Chewa movement have political backgrounds and use the Chewa in some ways as to continue to have political influence. If they take this too far and challenge the state, they risk being shut down and therefore construct a non-challenging relationship with the state. In addition, the state allows this as long as it reinforces state legitimacy e.g. through framing the trans-border movement as a form of regionalism.

The next chapter explores the extent to which the trans-border cultural ceremonies, such as Kulamba and Gulewamkulu, might be an expression of political or cultural nationalism. The findings are linked to their implication on the states’ sovereignty.
CHAPTER 6

POLITICAL VERSUS CULTURAL NATIONALISM: THE CULTURAL CEREMONIES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY

6.0 Introduction

The contemporary Chewa of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia mainly identify Kulamba and Gule Wamkulu as some of their key trans-border identity activities. These cultural events enhance their trans-border activities but at the same time also raise some critical questions which have a bearing on state sovereignty. In other words, the cultural nationalism narrative argues that some groups will pursue a cultural agenda when they know that the situation is not conducive for them to pursue a political agenda. However, when the social-political environment becomes conducive, they take up the political agenda. Pursuing a political agenda is detrimental to state sovereignty. This chapter examines the extent to which these cultural events have the potential to challenge state sovereignty of the said three countries.

Basically, in the colonial period, Kulamba was associated with a form of Chewa ‘protest’ in which they were perceived as demonstrating allegiance to their informal leader and not the colonial state. Consequently, the ceremony was banned and never resuscitated even in the post-independence period. It is only after the recent ‘second wind of change’ that brought in democratic reforms in Africa that the ceremony has been reintroduced. The banning of the ceremony during the colonial period and the long period that followed before its reintroduction implies a lot of its significance to the state authorities which the chapter examines.

The Nyau or Gule Wamkulu (masked dancers reserved for Chewa initiates) has now become one of the most distinguishing factors of Chewa tradition in contemporary Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. Specifically, Nyau has “acted as a guardian of Chewa traditions and identity” as well as a traditional (initiation) school for the community (Banda 2008:116). Apart from acting as a school for young Chewas, Banda (2008:117) further adds that Nyau also acted as “Dance for entertainment and lately as a form of entrepreneurship, a tool used by the Chewa to show some subtle resistance to foreign cultures and invaders, and a teaching aid in solving social, moral, and spiritual problems facing the Chewa”. However, despite this articulated role of Gule Wamkulu, there are several other concealed roles that it is perceived to be playing amongst the Chewa. Basically, almost all its activities are conducted in secrecy and its initiates are not allowed to disclose to the non-initiates what they have learnt. Some have argued that the Chewa have had the potential to pursue the political agenda under the cover of this trans-border cultural activity. In this case this chapter examines the extent to which trans-border cultural ceremonies such as Kulamba and Gule Wamkulu might be an expression of political or cultural nationalism. The chapter argues that the Chewa movement has, depending on the situation, pursued both political and cultural agendas. More

18It is not the intention of this study to extensively discuss the debates on the origin and practices of the Gulewamkulu suffice to mention that it is greatly revered amongst the Chewa.
importantly, the political agenda was not pursued with intention of seeking political autonomy as political nationalism may suggest, but it was pursued to promote and enhance cultural interests of the Chewa.

The first part provides the context by discussing Kulamba as a central feature of Chewa trans-border identity and the following section further discusses the Kulamba ceremony by expounding on the extent to which it might be regarded as a modern invention. The third section interrogates the politicisation element in the ceremony and this is followed by an examination of the link between Kulamba and Lozi’s Kuomboka ceremony. Before concluding, the chapter discusses the Gule Wamkulu and the extent to which it might be used as a cover up for trans-border ethnic politicisation.

6.1 Kulamba ceremony as centre of trans-border contemporary Chewa ethnic identity

At the centre of the Chewa tradition is what is known as the Kulamba annual ceremony held at the headquarters of Paramount Chief Gawa Undi in Katete, Zambia. The Chewa word Kulamba literally means ‘to pay homage’. This annual ceremony attracts thousands of people, including hundreds of Chewa chiefs and sub-chiefs from Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. In this context, the Kulamba ceremony is probably one of the major annual events for the Chewa. It is both a Thanksgiving ceremony and a New Year celebration and it is held at the end of the Agricultural year (August-September). The people, led by their Chiefs, give thanks to Chiuta (God) for the good harvest, peace and general prosperity being experienced. They also give thanks to the Kalonga Undi for his stewardship over the year and re-commit themselves to the Kalonga in paying homage and offering gifts. It is said that in the pre-colonial period each chief’s title resembled the specific duties assigned to him so that even the tribute to be brought during the Kulamba ceremony had to conform to these duties. For instance, Banda (2008:106) provides examples of these titles and the expected tributes as follows:

1. Kawaza (carver of tools like axes). The tributes he would bring are the carved items and tools.
2. Pembamoyo (Preserver of life). He was in charge of issues related to priesthood, e.g. praying for rain and the offering of sacrifices.
3. Zingalume (Even if they [bees] sting). He was in charge of forest tributes e.g. honey.
4. Kathumba (The bag). He was in charge of tributes from the field e.g. maize, millet etc.
5. Chikuwe (Shouter). He was responsible for publicity issues or announcer during ceremonies.
6. Mbangombe (The stealer of cattle). He was responsible for animal tributes.
7. Kalindabwalo (The overseer of a place). He was left to take charge of the land where Kalonga Gawa Undi left his concubine Nyanje.

According to Banda (2008), this was a form of tax collection, because whatever was collected was re-distributed to needy people within the Kingdom. It is widely argued amongst the Chewa that the ceremony had been held annually since the creation of the Undi Kingdom until 1934 when the British colonial government banned it - it felt that their own authority would ultimately be undermined in the region. This was also explained by the Chairman of
CHEFO who mentioned that it had been banned by the British in 1930s because they saw it as a threat to colonial power and the missionaries also did not like Gule Wamkulu (Interview with Dr Malewezi, CHEFO Chairperson, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012). The subsequent post-colonial authorities of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique extended the ban in the pretext of enhancing nationalism. In the 1980s, the process of restoring the ceremony was pursued, and in 1984 the ceremony was revived but it was mainly attended by the Chewa of Zambia. The reason why the governments of Malawi and Mozambique were not supporting the initiative then was mainly political, as the Publicity Secretary of CHEFO puts it, because the presidents of the two countries felt that allowing Chewas to go to Zambia from Malawi and Mozambique would put into question their own sovereignty. He further said that probably the Malawi and Mozambique leaders were asking themselves, “Why should my people leave Malawi to go to Zambia? Similarly why should my people leave Mozambique to go to Zambia? Does it mean the Zambian King and president is (sic) more legitimate than their country’s?” (Interview with Mr Zilirakhasu, CHEFO Publicity Secretary, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012).

By 1994 the ceremony itself was revived at trans-border level. The restoration of the ceremony also witnessed high-profile visits by the King to his ‘subjects’ in Malawi and Mozambique. One individual who had attended the ceremony aptly captures the atmosphere as well as the underlying integrating significance by explaining that,

Kulamba is indeed a great traditional ceremony. It pulls together the traditional dancers from three countries who entertain people. And the attending people can’t be distinguished as Chewas from Zambia, Mozambique or Malawi. During the period of the ceremony the Chewas from Malawi and Mozambique literally walk into Zambia without visas. They don’t need them. It is reminiscent of the bygone era before British colonization. But all end up at the capital of the Chewa, Mkaika, to join in praising their ruler with the common ‘Yooh! Gawa!’[sic] (Zambia African Safari-Biweekly, Issue No. 19, 04 October 2006)

The Kulamba ceremony is therefore an avenue where Chewa chiefs show their allegiance to Kalonga Gawa Undi as their king. The ceremony also serves as a cohesive factor among the Chewa and it has markedly earned a place in history as one of Southern Africa’s largest displays of culture and tradition, attracting tourists from all over the world. The ceremony starts at nine in the morning and ends around three in the afternoon. Before the ceremony starts, the Kalonga sits in his Gwalada, which is a restricted place where he sits in seclusion with Chewa Chiefs and his guests of honour. Among others, the Gwalada serves as a place of prayer where, prior to the function, the Kalonga and his chiefs fast and pray, guarded by the Ambiri (Soldiers or Bodyguards). From the Gwalada, the Kalonga enters the Dzimbabwe in a procession, accompanied by his Ndunas or counsellors and chiefs, after the guests of honour are seated. However, before Kalonga enters the Dzimbabwe there are traditional dances from across the participating countries that entertain the people and important guests, such as government officials and chiefs from other tribes who are escorted to their designated places in the Dzimbabwe by Kalonga’s Mbumba. The Mbumba are Chewa women from Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique who dance in a procession as an escort and sing praise songs. Being welcomed by the Mbumba shows great recognition of a person’s significance and
respect, as it is only Kalonga Gawa Undi’s most honourable guests that can be welcomed by the Mbumba. It is the Mbumba that escort Kalonga Gawa Undi as he emerges from the Gwalada into the Dzimbabwe. From there, Kalonga proceeds to the Kasusu. Before he enters the Kasusu, he stops for a prayer and the singing of the national anthem of Zambia. After that, he enters the Kasusu and sits on his royal throne. When Kalonga takes a seat, the ceremony begins. First is his welcoming speech that is read for him by one of his Ndunas as Kalonga Gawa Undi does not speak in public at the Kulamba ceremony. After the speech the chiefs start performing the traditional Kulamba ceremony at the Kasusu escorted by their Ndunas who carry their gifts for the king. They sit on a traditional mat and give a brief report on the state of affairs in their chiefdoms as it is of interest to the Kalonga to know how his people are coping with life on the land that he gave them. After the report, the presentation of gifts follows and, before the chiefs leave, the Kasusu present traditional dances to entertain Kalonga. Thereafter, the guest of honour and other representative guests from the participating countries are allowed to make their speeches on behalf of their governments and present their gifts to the Kalonga. After the ceremony, the Kalonga leaves the Kasusu, in a procession accompanied by the guest of honour. Chewa chiefs cannot leave Mkaika the same day but have to remain there to bid farewell to the Kalonga the next day and do a few other things related to their chieftainship as they are subjects of Kalonga Gawa Undi.

6.2 Kulamba as a modern reinvention

Although it is widely said by the Chewa that the ceremony existed before 1934, this claim has to be interrogated because the ceremony doesn’t feature in credible existing historical records of the Chewa. What appears in the Chewa literature is the mlira ceremony. According to Phiri’s (1975:54) research, to ensure that the kingdom was still centralised in order to curb autonomy, Kalonga introduced what was known as the mlira ceremony. Annually, chiefs of the Phiri lineage were invited to his headquarters “for the ritual veneration of mlira or spirit of the great Kalonga who had led the ‘Malawi’ during migration into the country…It was a cult of great ancestor worship whose major function was to bring ‘Malawi’ chiefs together.” However, it is another ceremony known as Kulamba which has currently gained prominence amongst the Chewa. It is not the purpose of this study to determine the demise of mlira and emergence of Kulamba ceremonies, but it appears that mlira was held before the kingdom was divided while Kulamba was mainly introduced by Undi after he had broken away from the Kingdom. Whether Kulamba was really important at that time or not is not actually significant but what is clear is that the pre-colonial and colonial Kulamba ceremony was not conducted in the same way as it is done today. The current Kulamba has been modified to suit the current socio-political situation (Interview with Dr Malewezi, CHEFO Chairperson, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012).

In other words, the current Kulamba is a modern invention, but based on some past traditional practices. Apart from the Kalonga Kingship, Kulamba can also be said to be one of the ‘corner stones’ in facilitating the reinvention of the Chewa ethnic identity. CHEFO played a critical role in this process of ethnic reinvention. Soon after being established as an organisation, apart from the promotion of Gulewamkulu, CHEFO embarked on a project of reintroducing Kulamba in the three countries. This is also explained by the Chairperson of
CHEFO who mentioned that they started informing the chiefs of the significance of Kulamba and “we now had to actually carry the chiefs. CHEFO itself organised transport to take the chiefs to Zambia...so it is CHEFO that started this revival otherwise without CHEFO this could not have happened” (Interview with Dr Malewezi, CHEFO Chairperson, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012).

This observation and view by the Chairman of CHEFO was also supported by several other chiefs in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. In the case of Malawian and Zambian chiefs, they all stressed that before CHEFO publicised Kulamba, a few individuals would attend and there was no general Chewa interest in the ceremony itself. Some chiefs, especially in Mozambique, even went on to mention that they had never heard of the Kulamba ceremony or even about Kalonga Undi himself, although they occasionally visited some Chewa people in Zambia. This was well explained by one chief as follows:

Kunena chilungamo kwa inu, ine Gawa Undi sindinkamudziwa ngakhale bwalo la Kulamba komwe. Ndimaziwa kuti a Chewa ku Zambia aliko ndipo ena timathu kayenderana; koma Kulamba kokha ndi Kalonga Gawa Undi ine nde ndinali muchimbulimbuli. Komiti ya Kulamba itakhazikitsidwa kuno kudzera mwa Malewezi ndipamene ife timaziwa zonsezi. [To be honest with you, I personally did not know Gawa Undi or even the Kulamba ceremony itself. I knew that there were some Chewa people in Zambia and we could occasionally visit each other; but when it comes to the issue of Kulamba and Kalonga Gawa Undi, I personally was ignorant to these. When a committee was established here through Malewezi (CHEFO) that is when we knew all this.] (Key informant interview/Chief, Tete, 28th May 2012).

6.3 Chewa’s Kulamba and the extent of ethnic politicisation

6.3.1 Politicisation of Kulamba and its possible threat to trans-border state sovereignty

Ethnic politicisation poses a danger to state sovereignty as it often divides rather than integrates diverse communities within the state. It is imperative, therefore, to examine the extent to which the Chewa, through their Kulamba cultural ceremony, facilitate ethnic politicisation- and to determine whether doing so is a threat to state sovereignty or not.

This section focuses on areas of funding for the ceremony, the organisation of the event, and the mode of participation at the event to show the extent to which the Kulamba ceremony might be viewed as a politicised entity through which politicians vie for publicity, as well as a vehicle for connecting with the grassroots communities- especially of Chewa origin. The discussion will focus on the banning of political party regalia at ceremonies, the possibility of Kulamba being a ‘lucrative’ visibility platform for politicians, the ceremony’s potentiality to compromise state autonomy and sovereignty, and the possibility of trans-border block voting threat.

6.3.1.1 Banning political party regalia

Each Kulamba ceremony has a special condition attached for those attending. During the ceremony they are not allowed to display or be dressed in any political party regalia. Even presidents, ministers, members of parliament and other eminent politicians are not allowed to
put on political party symbols. The main reason for this rule is to ensure that the ceremony, as well as the whole Chewa movement, is seen as apolitical. In the 2013 ceremony, the ban was emphasized because by-elections were taking place in the Mkaika area where the Kulamba ceremony is held, and general elections were also looming in Malawi. By banning the political party regalia during the ceremony, the Chewa movement intends, as already mentioned, to create the perception that it is apolitical. The argument of this study, however, is that this act arguably demonstrates the exercise of political power that the movement possesses. The 2013 ban was captured in the *Times of Zambia* of 20th August 2013 entitled “Political regalia banned at Kulamba ceremony”, and reported as follows:

The Kulamba traditional ceremony organising committee has banned political party regalia during next weekend’s annual event….Kulamba secretary of invitation and publicity committee Lucas Phiri disclosed in Chipata yesterday that the ban of the political party regalia was directed at all political parties in Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique…Mr Phiri said the official regalia for the event is that made from ‘Chitenge’ material bearing the portrait of Paramount Chief Kalonga Gawa Undi. He said the organising committee had instructed security personnel to ensure that anyone found wearing political party regalia was barred from the ceremony. (*Times of Zambia*, 20th August 2013).

This message of banning political party regalia was also emphasized on the invitation cards for important dignitaries as shown below in plate 1 with the words “You are kindly requested NOT to wear political party attire”.

**Plate 1: Kulamba traditional ceremony invitation card**

There are several observations in relation to the banning of political party regalia during the Kulamba ceremony. The central idea in banning the party regalia is to present an image that the Chewa movement has no political affiliation or agenda. However, being political does not necessarily mean having a political party affiliation only. Party affiliation might only be the visible element. The actual banning itself is a clear indication that the Chewa movement is actually politically powerful. For instance, the state officials, including presidents and
ministers, have to obey the command from the Chewa royal family to abandon their party symbols. This is not possible in most African gatherings of this nature. The ceremony itself is monitored by special royal family security personnel and they have the authority from the royal family, and not necessarily the state, to chase away those who do not conform to what has been stated. Another evidence of political power is that the only official cloth allowed during the ceremony is the one which bears the portrait of the Chewa King. In other words, his authority has to be visible and respected during the ceremony and in the process, clouds out state authorities attending the ceremony.

6.3.1.2 Kulamba as a 'lucrative' visibility platform for politicians

CHEFO normally organises fund raising events for the ceremony and in most cases this leads to some interest amongst politicians who vie for publicity. Specifically in Malawi, this annual fund raising event might arguably be referred to as a gathering of ‘who is who’ in Malawian politics with hefty sums being donated. For instance, the then Malawian first lady, Callista Mutharika, donated K1 million to the foundation in 2010 (The Nation, 21st June 2010). In 2013, the President of Malawi donated K2 million to the foundation as part of the preparation for the 2013 Kulamba ceremony (MANA 2013). Other notable Malawian individuals who made contributions for the 2013 Kulamba ceremony include former first lady Callista Mutharika, DPP Acting President Peter Mutharika, Minister of Defence Kandodo Banda and Minister of Tourism, Daniel Liwimbi. Some additional influential politicians who attended the ceremony include the ruling People’s Party (PP) Secretary General, DPP’s second Vice President and former Presidential Spokesperson Dr Ntaka.

The overall organisers themselves are also mainly politicians such as was the case in 2013; the main Kulamba organising committee was chaired by Deputy Minister of Tourism and Arts of Zambia, Mr David Phiri. Most of the Ambiri (King’s soldiers) that surround the Kalonga during the ceremony are politicians in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. The Master of Ceremonies in most of the years had been the Publicity Secretary of CHEFO who in 2009 contested for the Member of Parliament seat in Lilongwe, Malawi.

All in all, although the organisers claim that the Kulamba ceremony is apolitical but purely cultural, in practice, the finding shows that the event is actually an ideal platform for politicians from all the three countries to demonstrate their relevance and closeness to their electorate. It is in this context that the former president of Malawi, Bingu wa Mutharika, showed some resentment towards CHEFO and the Kulamba ceremony, as was revealed during an interview with Paramount Chief Lundu, who mentioned that the former president of Malawi, Bingu, told him personally that Kulamba and CHEFO are political hence he was no longer willing to patronise its events. (Key informant interview/Paramount Chief Lundu, Lilongwe, 14th June 2013).
6.3.1.3 Potential to compromise state autonomy and sovereignty
One of the issues highlighted by most independent key informants in all the three countries is that the Kulamba ceremony might move into a different direction if the presidents of the three countries happen to be Chewa and interested in promoting the welfare of their folks. In other words, the likelihood of undermining their respective states’ autonomy and sovereignty would be very high. Although this argument is based mainly on assumptions, it is likely to be significant even if only two countries have Chewa presidents who are keen to promote the interests of the Chewa. Despite a lot of internal protests, the former president of Malawi, Bingu wa Mutharika, who was Lomwe by tribe, actually registered and became patron of an ethnic-based organisation, the ‘Mulhako wa a Lomwe’. He openly showed his total support and devotion to this organisation to the extent that his actions heavily polarised the country along ethnic lines. Bingu wa Mutharika went further and started making plans to integrate into the organisation, the Lomwe of Mozambique, by recruiting some as teachers of the Lomwe language in the schools that his organisation had created. In this context, the possibility of simultaneously having two or three Chewa presidents in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, should not be dismissed. Assuming these two or more Chewa presidents heavily promote the Chewa trans-border identity, the likelihood might be high of undermining their respective state autonomy and sovereignty.

6.3.1.4 Trans-border block voting threat
The Malawi News Agency report of 10th October 2013 stated that five Mozambican women were arrested for attempting to register for the Malawi 2014 tripartite elections. In another report, a Mozambican man, known as Mavuto Wenzulu, was arrested in Malawi when it was discovered that he had a Malawian passport which he had had in his possession since 2006 (Mana, 11th October 2013). These reports not only show the likelihood of foreigners voting across the border but even possessing valid identifications of a country in which they are not citizens. This may actually be complicated when they speak the same language across the borders such as the Chewa. This block voting threat is further explained as follows:

The only problem may emerge during voting because these people are the same and they speak the same language.[sic] For example if I go to Mkaika now, I speak fluent Chichewa and I can vote and Mozambicans, Malawians and Zambians we look alike so you can go to Zambia and vote and also come here and vote...register as a voter here and as a voter there and this may have an impact...people can exploit that and this is also the case with the Yao around Katuli area which borders Mozambique; for them the border does not exist. If this is happening in this small border area of Katuli, what about the vast borders shared by the Chewa cross-cutting Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique [sic]?
(Key informant interview/Political scientist, Zomba, 12th June 2012).

6.3.2 Limitations to politicisation of Kulamba
Despite the above stated factors contributing towards politicisation of the ceremony, the study findings show some limitations towards the politicisation of the Kulamba ceremony, such as the trend towards commercialisation of the event, its potential to closely integrate rather than divide the said three states, and the openness of the event to other ethnic groups.
6.3.2.1 Commercialisation of the event by the Zambian state

The overriding argument raised in this chapter is that when a cultural or ethnic group event incorporates commercial interests which are in line with state interests, the gap between the state and the said ethnic group becomes very narrow. In other words, factors towards ethnic politicisation of the group, becomes less likely, due to a common interest between the state and an ethnic group. The Kulamba ceremony has to a larger extent, demonstrated some interests towards commercialisation of the event so as to, among other things, attract tourism in Zambia. In this context, the interest of the government of Zambia in the event might be the commercial opportunities that the ceremony offers, so it may not be politically regarded as a threat to Zambian state sovereignty. Kalusa (2010) argues that Kalonga Gawa Undi X restored the Kulamba ceremony not only in the interest of preserving the Chewa culture but also to enhance regional economic development. The 2013 Kulamba main organising committee was chaired by Zambia’s Deputy Minister of Tourism and Arts. This overlap between Zambia state interests and the Chewa Kulamba event was clearly reflected in the way the commercialisation drive was pursued as reported in one of the newspapers quoted below:

The organising committee of the Kulamba traditional ceremony of the Chewa people is lobbying Government to allow it to beam video clips of previous ceremonies at next month’s United Nations World Trade Organisation (UNWTO) General Assembly in Livingstone, to attract tourists to attend this year’s Kulamba… (Zambia Daily Mail, 15th July 2013).

In the context whereby the Zambia Tourist Board (ZTB) and the Kulamba organising committee (chaired by the Deputy Minister of Tourism and Arts) are engaged in negotiations to market the event at an international platform, it becomes an epitome of the intersection between state and informal group interests that reduces suspicion.

6.3.2.2 Kulamba and regional integration of states

The revival of the Chewa kingdom is regarded by some key informants as critical for the improvement of state relations among Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. For instance, for the first time in history, three heads of state (Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique) attended the ceremony in 2007. The President of Malawi, whilst attending the Kulamba ceremony, said that ‘Presidents of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia look up to you, chief, for the social and economic prosperity of their countries’ (Mana, 2007). Irrespective of how the situation might be defined, the presence of the three heads of state, as well as what transpired at the ceremony, is an example of a unique complementarity and recognition of the role of the formal and informal in regionalism. As a Zambian historian puts it:

This is a clear example of how people are integrating at grassroots level with minimal state influence. This is why people do not understand why they should produce travel documents when crossing the border because as far as they are concerned, they are one people (Telephonic Interview with Professor Phiri, Lusaka, 7th February 2013).

Preparation for the ceremony is quite an elaborate procedure which is also a trans-border issue. The CHEFO chairperson explained that preparations for Kulamba are planned by a
Main Organized Committee called (Mphasa Committee), composed of chiefs from the 3 countries and assisted by Committees in the countries. In Malawi, CHEFO acts as facilitator, while in Mozambique a selected committee assists their chiefs. In Zambia, the Lusaka Committee and the Nduna are responsible. The meetings are held at Mkaika and this is exclusively for chiefs. The next meetings are held on the last Saturday of April – July and are attended by officials as well. The meetings are chaired by Chief Mbang’ombe of Zambia. The king occasionally attends the meetings. The main Organising Committee is called the Mphasa Committee. It is subdivided into 13 sub-committees (Follow-up interview with Dr Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 6th December 2012). Malewezi also mentioned that the government officials from the Ministries of Local government and Culture of Mozambique and Zambia are always available during these planning meetings. The unique part for Mozambique is that it is the government that gives transport to chiefs travelling to the planning meeting at Mkaika, including the District Commissioner of Tete who comes along with two or three officials. They bring their chiefs every month from March to July. But in Malawi this does not happen so it is CHEFO’s job to organise transport.

6.3.2.3 Kulamba not an exclusively Chewa event
Another possible explanation why the Kulamba may not necessarily be an effective means to enhance Chewa ethnic politicisation is that the ceremony is not exclusively for the Chewa people. As the Zambian key informant also explained, “Most tribes in Eastern and other provinces patronise this event hence it is not really about the Chewa interests only that are featured” [sic] (Key informant, Zambia). This point was also reinforced by the CHEFO Publicity Secretary, who mentioned that Gawa Undi patronises some cultural gatherings of other tribes. Other tribal leaders such as M’mbelwa of the Ngoni also patronise the Kulamba. The ngoni and the Lomwe also bring their traditional dances to showcase during the Kulamba ceremony (Key informant interview/CHEFO Publicity Secretary, 10th May 2012).

6.4 Interrogating Chewa Kulamba politicisation through the Lozi Kuomboka linkage

One pre-colonial expert claimed that the Kulamba ceremony is strikingly similar to the Lozi Kuomboka ceremony and the likelihood that the Chewa Kulamba is a copy of the Lozi is very high. According to his argument, “The Chewa ceremony is very recent and clearly shows striking similarities to that of the Lozi. That is why I also believe that the Chewa have a political agenda because the Lozi agenda has always been very political” (Key informant interview/Pre-colonial historian, Zomba, 8th June 2012).

If this is true then the case of trans-border ethnic politicisation is very high and could have a long term impact on power dynamics and state sovereignty of these three countries. As Flint (2006) observed, the Lozi regard themselves as ‘a state within the state’ (see Chapter four). The Lozi have openly declared interests in politically becoming an autonomous region and the contemporary cultural celebrations, from a cultural nationalism perspective, is a process of keeping alive this realisation just as Huntington (1987) explains about the Irish movement in United Kingdom. Recently, the Lozi caused a regional political sensation when
they declared that the time has come for them to politically become independent. In other words, if the Chewa Kulamba ceremony is a copy of the contemporary Lozi Kuomboka, then it has an implication on Chewa ethnic politicisation and state sovereignty. Specifically, the challenge would be twofold: through the process of enhancing the prominence of the traditional leader (King) and facilitation of ‘national’ unity outside the state apparatus.

In this regard, the study had to explore this link by first of all examining the origin and nature of contemporary Lozi Kuomboka and then examine its similarities to the Chewa Kulamba ceremony. Consequently, an extensive discussion of the Lozi Kuomboka is first discussed below.

6.4.1 A Brief background to the Lozi Kuomboka cultural ceremony

Flint (2006: 704-5) explains the Lozi Kuomboka annual ceremony as follows:

Kuomboka (which, in Siluyana, means ‘to get out of the water’) is an annual celebratory water pageant… Historically, the Luyi inhabitants of the floodplain built their houses on raised or extended termite mounds situated in the floodplain. As the floodwaters rose, they migrated from the floodplain to the higher plain margins to escape the inundation of their homes and villages. Thus, the celebration of Kuomboka represented a response to a time of crisis as homes and food-producing gardens became inaccessible for two to four months of every year… The litunga, or Lozi king, led the exodus in his specially-constructed state barge called ‘Nalikwanda’, paddled by up to 60 warriors…. Thus the procession resembled that of a father – in this case the king – leading his family or nation out of the danger posed by the irrepressible force of the river.

According to Flint (2006), the original Kuomboka ceremony was a reaction to the annual environmental crisis, but since the Lozi ways of life have changed and they were not dependent on the river any more, the ceremony took on another meaning in later years, especially under King Lewanika. Taking into consideration that Lewanika, (who became King in 1878), was temporarily dethroned in 1884, he noted that his Kingdom was under possible internal and external threat. In order to consolidate his power, he re-branded the Kuomboka ceremony so that it had to become a unifier of the Lozi people with his throne taking prominence. The ceremony therefore has become more like an annual pilgrimage for all Lozi people where they re-affirm their commitment to their King and Lozi identity in general.

Gleaning through the various newspapers, van Binsbergen (1987), notes that the Kuomboka ceremony had been organised and patronised by a multitude of stakeholders such as urban Lozi ethnic associations, state institutions, some private sector organisations and prominent office bearers in the state. For instance, below are some extracts from the Times of Zambia of 3rd April 1987 (quoted in van Binsbergen 1987) which shows the role of several players:

Last year, American ambassador to Zambia, Mr. Paul Hare and Speaker of the National Assembly, Dr. Robinson Nabulyato, were guests of honour at the Kuomboka. This year, many more dignitaries, whose names were not released in advance, were invited…The Kitwe branch of the association has donated some safari suits for the royal drummers as well as other paraphernalia. The Kuomboka Coordination [sic] Association which has other branches in Ndola and Livingstone will no doubt have its efforts for this year's special Kuomboka
6.4.2 The Relationship between Chewa Kulamba and Lozi Kuomboka

As was narrated above, in the pre-colonial period, Phiri (1975:54) claims that in order to consolidate his powers and weaken decentralisation, the Kalonga (while the headquarters were in Malawi) inaugurated the Mlira ceremony. According to Phiri (1975:54), “once each year, Phiri lineage chiefs were invited to Manthimba [former capital] for the ritual veneration of mlira or spirit of the great Kalonga…a cult of great ancestor worship whose major function was to bring ‘Malawi’ chiefs together.” What is missing in the earliest writings and in the oral history of the Chewa, is the Kulamba ceremony itself. It seems that the ceremony emerged later when Undi and the Malawian Kalonga were in disagreement. Undi also wanted to strengthen his powers and so introduced the Kulamba ceremony. The way it was conducted was not as it is done in the contemporary period. According to the CHEFO chairperson, individual chiefs used to go to Kalonga Gawa Undi’s kingdom, and in their own time, to pay homage (Interview with Dr Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe 10\textsuperscript{th} May 2012). Tradition says that the ceremony was banned in 1934 by colonial administrators and only re-started in 1984 (but it took a full trans-border perspective in 1994). As already stated, the ceremony was not necessarily an annual gathering of all Chewa chiefs or even those who used to go to Undi’s court who were only chiefs who had not declared themselves autonomous. In other words, the Chewa Kulamba is a contemporary re-invention whilst the Kuomboka was re-invented many years before Kulamba. The possibility of contemporary Kulamba copying from the Kuomboka is very high. The reason for copying the Lozi Kuomboka could be related to enhance the movement’s socio-political agenda as the Lozi have done. In this case, the pre-colonial historian argues that the Chewa have periodically re-invented history in order to achieve certain purposes. She explained that, “from time to time, the Chewa have used ethnicity or history to negotiate for space and also to meet their interests. They use history to back their claims and in some cases they have invented history” (Interview with a pre-colonial historian, Zomba, 8\textsuperscript{th} June2012).

Based on the analysis of available data, below is a summary of the similarities and differences between the Lozi’s Kuomboka and the Chewa Kulamba ceremonies.

**Table 8:** Similarities and differences between Lozi Kuomboka and Chewa’s Kulamba Ceremonies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Lozi’s Kuomboka ceremony</th>
<th>Chewa’s Kulamba ceremony</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Trans-border</td>
<td>Trans-border</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 King is central in the ceremony (subjects pay homage)</td>
<td>King is central in the ceremony (subjects pay homage)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Urban-based ethnic associations central to organization</td>
<td>Urban-based ethnic associations central to organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Government directly or indirectly involved</td>
<td>Government directly or indirectly involved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is difficult to conclude that the Kulamba is a copycat of the Lozi Kuomboka ceremony because evidence to that effect is inadequate. This study takes the view that both of these ceremonies have been re-invented to suit the contemporary cultural needs of their ethnic movements. However, to conclude that the Chewa copied from the Lozi may not be an accurate conclusion. According to a Zambian historian, he argues that “the origin and meaning of these two ceremonies are different. Kuomboka is a response to the annual floods which engulfed the Lozi area... Kulamba on the other hand is a ceremony to thank God for the good harvest and other good things experienced” (Telephonic Interview with Professor Phiri, Lusaka, 7th February 2013). What is most likely to be the case is that the Chewa might have revived or re-invented their ceremony after observing the successes of the Lozi ceremony but this does not necessarily imply that the underlying political motives of the Lozi ethnic group were also adopted by the Chewa.

6.4.3 Critical analysis: Is the Kulamba ceremony a challenge to state sovereignty?
From a Westphalian model perspective, the Kulamba ceremony may be regarded as a challenge to state sovereignty, due to its reinforcement of an informal leadership and facilitating (sectarian) unity outside the state institution. This may be summarized as follows:
Firstly, the re-invention of the cultural Kulamba ceremony, just like the Lozi’s Kuomboka, was mainly targeted at reinforcing the authority and prominence of the position of Kalonga Gawa Undi. Before the ceremony was re-introduced, very few Malawians as well as Mozambicans were aware of his kingship. The ceremony, however, has significantly raised the profile of Gawa Undi across the three countries. As an informal leader, this poses as a challenge to the established state sovereignty of the said three countries.

Secondly, the re-invention of Kulamba as discussed above, besides raising the profile of Gawa Undi, also focuses on unifying the Chewa people of the three countries. This also poses as a challenge to the state due to the fact that from a Westphalian perspective, unity of the citizenry is supposed to be with individuals within its state boundaries. Unity with ethnic groups across boundaries entails weakening the sovereignty of the state due to the potential loss of loyalty to the formal state.

From a further critical analysis of the said differences and similarities, the view of this study is that it cannot be proved that the Chewa ceremony is taking an ethnic politicisation approach as has been the case with the Lozi. The argument that the Chewa may have borrowed from the Lozi in re-inventing their tradition may be plausible but extending this to also mean that they had copied the political elements might not be convincing enough. In other words, the evidence is not adequate or persuasive. Assuming the Chewa were using the ceremony to enhance political nationalism, the first country to experience the challenge to its sovereignty would be Zambia, because that is where the ceremony is hosted. However, in relation to Kulamba ceremony, “The most active Government in the preparatory stage is the Zambian Government which offers both financial and logistical support” (Interview with Dr Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 6th December 2012). It is not surprising therefore that during the Kulamba ceremony, the Zambian national anthem is sung despite the presence of Chews from the other two countries. According to Zambian historian, Professor Phiri, the event serves to enhance Zambian government’s agenda, too, because “these ceremonies bring harmony and unity to the country. During traditional ceremonies politicians highlight government policies and the need for Zambian unity” (Telephonic Interview with Professor Phiri, Lusaka, 7th February 2013).

Taking the observations of the above-mentioned respondents, it may actually be argued that the Zambian government’s comprehensive support for ceremonies such as Kulamba may not be aimed at bringing about unity as publicly stated but it is the strategic move of the state to ensure that it captures potentially threatening movements in a discreet manner. This study agrees with Boone’s (2003) observation on selective approach to state use of authority for its own survival. In other words, contrary to losing sovereignty, the Zambian government’s response is the reflection of the state’s ability to provide a framework for the expression of ethnic identity that would not derail the state’s own ultimate goals. The state therefore lures trans-border ethnic movements such as the Chewa so that they operate according to its preferences or guidance - this should not be regarded as loss of state sovereignty. By allowing the ethnic groups to flourish, the state accepts its shortfall in meeting some of the individual
intrinsic social needs such as unique group identity, recognition and pride. The trans-border ethnic groups such as the Chewa ably provide this while not threatening the state itself. In other words, the state needs the Chewa movement and the Chewa need the state. They complement each other in order to achieve their diverse goals.

Another important issue is that it is wrong to compare the Lozi and Chewa ceremonies in relation to the trans-border factor. Although the Lozi ethnic group are found in other neighbouring countries of Angola, Namibia and Botswana, their ceremony is not significantly trans-border as the Chewa, and this has implications of power relations. The King of the Lozi is based in Zambia where the majority of his subjects are, while Gawa Undi is based in Zambia where the Chewa are not in majority. More importantly, the Lozi have had a long history of officially lodging grievances against the state, which the Chewa have never done. In this case, the Lozi appear more militant politically unlike the Chewa, due to some of these significant differences. In other words, taking the trans-border and circumstances of the Kings’ location, these could also explain why the Chewa movement is unlikely to be heavily politicised. Being trans-border, the Chewa movement’s politicisation may be limited because the competition for resources and political power at national level is somehow factored out-which is not the case with the Lozi. The Chewa of Malawi do not have the same political interests as those of Zambia and Mozambique. If the movement was not trans-border the sense of ethnic identity would supersede the national identity. King Gawa Undi may not be so significant in Zambia due to the number of Chewa in that country but he is significant across the borders because their numbers are higher at that level. The leader of the Chewa in Malawi or Mozambique may not be so significant because he has to operate under King Gawa Undi who is based in Zambia. All in all the way the movement is structured renders itself less politically powerful in the contemporary nation-state context. In this case the Westphalian model is being confirmed that it ultimately determined the direction of national politics.

According to Posner’s (2004) article entitled “The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi”, he clearly demonstrates that the state borders play a significant role in determining the political behaviour of ethnic groups. In other words, although they may share ethnic identity, belonging to different states entails a different political behaviour and so confirming the importance of the Westphalian model. In short, the Lozi appear more politically militant because their geographical parameter of mobilisation is the same: the state. The Chewa do not share this factor hence the political militancy is unlikely to emerge, resulting in no real challenge to the Westphalian model. As one political scientist observed:

GawaUndi is not significant in Zambia alone but he is significant across the borders because the Chewa population in that country is not huge, whosoever is claiming to be the leader of the Chewa in Malawi will not be significant because he has to operate under Zambian Gawa Undi. In this case, it renders the group less politically influential but if it was based in one state, we would have been talking of the case of Kabaka in Uganda who claims ‘I am a country of my own here’ [sic] (Key informant interview/Political scientist, Zomba, 12th June 2012).
6.5 The Gule Wamkulu culture and ethnic politicisation

Some key informants have perceived CHEFO as a political institution which uses the cultural agenda to pursue its interests through the Gule Wamkulu. This study examined the extent to which Gule Wamkulu might be a smokescreen for Chewa ethnic politicization. Before such an examination, however, it is crucial to discuss the significance of Gule Wamkulu to Chewa culture as a whole.

6.5.1 Significance of Gule Wamkulu in Chewa culture

As was noted earlier, Gule Wamkulu refers to the masked dancers reserved for Chewa initiates as being central to Chewa ethnic identity; and it is therefore the central feature during the Kulamba and other Chewa ceremonies. The significance of Gule Wamkulu is well captured by one of the Chewa chieftaincy officials in an interview. When a newspaper reporter asked Mr Joseph Chikuta, a senior counsellor for Gawa Undi, the question “Is Gule Wamkulu relevant in the present dispensation?”, his response was that although times have changed, “the place of Gule Wamkulu to the Chewa will never change… For a male Chewa to know his identity and be known to be a true Chewa, he has to go through Gule Wamkulu initiation…No Gule Wamkulu no Chewa” (Malawi News 17-23 September, 2011, p. 12).

The view of Mr Chikuta was also reinforced by the CHEFO Chairperson, who emphatically stated that “The second thing that binds Chewas together is their tradition particularly Gule wamkulu. Gule wamkulu is specifically very, very important in Chewa because it is a process through which traditions are passed on from one generation to the next”. He also explained that it is not just a dance but it is also an institution and the initiates are told some secrets which they “are not supposed to be divulged except for those who have been initiated so I am not going to tell you” (Interview with Dr Malewezi, CHEFO Chairperson, 10th May 2012). During FGDs conducted across the three countries in selected Chewa villages, one of the questions discussed was: “What makes you feel that you are the same as your Chewa colleagues across the border?” What featured highly was Gule Wamkulu in almost all the FGDs. Apart from Gule Wamkulu, other things that made the Chewa feel the same across the borders include common descent (bele limodzi) and use of a common language.

6.5.2 Extent of politicisation in Gule Wamkulu

According to two Malawian key informants, they pointed out that to appreciate the argument that Gule Wamkulu is central to trans-border Chewa ethnic politicisation, it is also necessary to know why Gule Wamkulu emerged in the first place. In this regard, it was argued that the Gule Wamkulu tradition emerged and is also sustained through local level Chewa politics (Key Informant Interviews, Zomba 15th May 2012). According to these analysts, at village level, those who are very active in the Gule Wamkulu society, normally do not enjoy social power in their community and therefore tend to use the Gule Wamkulu platform to exercise it19. Consequently, the promotion of Gule Wamkulu from local to trans-border entails that the

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19In this case, since the Chewa follow the matrilineal system of marriage in which the man stays in the wife’s village after marriage, men do not have social power in the matrilineal home; Thus they resort to Gule Wamkulu to enhance their social status and power. Gule Wamkulu members put on a mask when dancing and they are highly respected by everyone because they are regarded as representatives of spirits.
same politics is still at work but now taking a trans-border perspective. Specifically, one of the analysts mentioned that:

_The Chewa identity and culture revolves around the Gule Wamkulu and Gule Wamkulu is perpetually shrouded in secrecy. Whatever happens in the open is actually a representation of a hidden message which a few initiates understand. Whilst behaving as if they are entertaining you, they might actually be mocking, rejecting or even insulting you but all this is done in such a way that you do not know it. That is why I believe that there is something behind the trans-border Chewa movement which is far greater that what we actually see. My view is that they are using culture to advance some political gains which have not yet been communicated. However this may not be achieved in the long run due to the complex nature of trans-border politics (Key informant interviews, Zomba, 15th May 2012)_

On politicisation of Gule Wamkulu, the views of these analysts are also corroborated by Banda (2008) and Smith (1997). Banda (2008:123) argues that Gule Wamkulu can also be a form of political resistance which may “even be manipulated by politicians”. Providing an example from Malawi, Smith (1997: 204, cited in Banda 2008:123) reports that:

_In spite of his absolute control over the media (silencing almost every voice of dissent within Malawi and many outside as well), Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the first president of Malawi, failed to control Nyau [Gule Wamkulu]. In the 1980s and 1990s, Nyau became one of the only mouthpieces through which public dissatisfaction with the one-party system was voiced. A large number of Nyau political masks grew up at this time and appeared regularly at dances..._

The argument that CHEFO could be pursuing a form of political nationalism as opposed to cultural nationalism of the Chewa partially became plausible due to an incident involving a Malawian minister. In April 2012, the newly appointed Minister of Lands and Housing in Malawi, Henry Phoya, irked CHEFO when he mentioned that he had defected from the opposition Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and joined the ruling People’s Party due to MCP’s Gule Wamkulu practices. Apparently, MCP is led by a Chewa, and its membership is also Chewa dominated. Dr Justine Malawezi, the Chair of CHEFO, asked the Minister to apologise to the Chewa for his remarks or the matter would be taken to higher offices (see Appendix 15). The Minister apologized the next day and withdrew his initial remark20 (The Nation, 1st May 2012, pp1-2).

This incident was also commented on by several FGD members in Malawi with one individual arguing that “Zimene anayankhula a Phoya kuti ma membala a chipani cha MCP ndi anthu agule wa mkulu zinatikwiyitsa kwambiri. Asamaphatikize ndale ndi chikhalidwe cha anthu.Gule Wamkulu sakukhudzana ndi ndale”[What Mr Phoya said, that members of

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20 In the context of Malawi, this issue is very significant. The minister said something which is already widely believed (but heavily denied by CHEFO) amongst Malawians that the Chewa largely support the opposition political party, MCP. Gule Wamkulu was therefore being linked to a political party and not a cultural organisation. The minister’s statement was a direct challenge to what CHEFO and Gule Wamkulu claim to be doing.
MCP are Gule Wamkulu, made us very angry. He should not mix politics and culture. Gule Wamkulu and politics are not the same} (Men’s FGD, Lilongwe, 11th May 2012).

It may be argued that the above mentioned reaction to the Minister’s comments is actually evidence of the politicisation of CHEFO through Chewa cultural practices because as someone stated: “CHEFO was clearly defending MCP” a political party (Interview with political analyst, Zomba, 15th May 2012). Chief Kaomba, a critique of CHEFO has stated several times that CHEFO serves the political agenda of certain individuals. One question that may clearly come out is: “Why did CHEFO react suddenly and strongly on the issue of Gule Wamkulu and was then also allegedly seen to be in support of the opposition MCP?”

6.5.3 Critical analysis: Are CHEFO and Chewa cultural practices (such as Gule Wamkulu) a challenge to state sovereignty?

From a Westphalian perspective it may be concluded that CHEFO is posing as a challenge to the state through its alleged secret political agenda. At the heart of Chewa identity as stated in the FGDs is Gule Wamkulu, so there is a higher level of loyalty to the sect by the majority of the Chewa communities21. The perspective of the Gule Wamkulu sect is likely to have a profound impact on the Chewa community - especially if it is indeed about ethnic politicisation.

However, this study argues that CHEFO has indeed been involved in politics by challenging state authorities but not with the intention of challenging state sovereignty. This study also agrees with the cultural nationalism perspective that the cultural and political nationalism boundary is blurred. The power at the disposal of Gawa Undi and CHEFO is that of symbolism and imagery. One of the roles of CHEFO is to defend and promote the Chewa cultural interests. The ‘defence’ and ‘promotion’ cannot just happen if an institution is not perceived to be politically powerful. The trans-border nature of the institution adds the perception that it is politically powerful and it has to use this power when their cultural interests are seen to be under threat. This implies that the politicisation of CHEFO is not in relation to de-railing the state sovereignty. In other words, the above incident clearly demonstrates the Chewa movement’s ability to venture into the political arena through their relations with the state but not with the intention of seeking political autonomy. This may be attributed to the unclear boundary between political and cultural nationalism; and so agreeing to the view that all cultural movements are inherently political because they have to pursue their interests in a highly politically competitive environment. This is not necessarily a challenge to the state, but the hallmark of state-society relations which argues that spaces of authority and sovereignty are constantly negotiated between the state and society.

During FGDs, participants were asked “Do you see the CHEFO/Chewa entity as purely cultural movement or does it have some elements of political mobilisation?” The responses clearly show that almost all the grassroots Chewa who participated in the study in all the

21 As mentioned in previous chapters, Gule Wamkulu is a Chewa traditional sect responsible for initiation of the young as well as propagation of Chewa beliefs and dances.
three countries do not see CHEFO as a political movement. This may mean that the political mobilisation in a party politics modality, that most rural people understand, may not necessarily be taking place within CHEFO. But the politics of another nature as explained above might be essential to the movement, and this is not a challenge to the state. Based on FGD analysis, it would be wrong to suggest that CHEFO is using cultural agenda to pursue a political goal- the political agenda has been in the realm of protecting and enhancing their identity.

6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the extent to which trans-border cultural ceremonies, such as Kulamba and GuleWamkulu, might be an expression of political or cultural nationalism. The chapter has outlined the Kulamba ceremony in relation to its origin as well as contemporary significance. Similarly, Gule Wamkulu was also discussed in terms of its origin and significance to Chewa ethnic identity. Several issues have emerged to demonstrate that Kulamba and Gule Wamkulu might to a certain extent be contributing towards trans-border Chewa ethnic politicisation or political nationalism. However, it has also emerged that the Chewa movement has, depending on the situation, pursued both political and cultural agendas. The political agenda was not pursued with intention of seeking political autonomy as political nationalism may suggest, but it was pursued to promote and enhance cultural interests of the Chewa.

It may be argued that the Zambian government’s comprehensive support for ceremonies such as Kulamba may not be aimed at bringing about unity as publicly stated but it is the strategic move of the state to ensure that it captures potentially threatening movements in a discreet manner and it is also guided by commercial interests. In other words, the state needs the Chewa movement and the Chewa need the state. They complement each other in order to achieve their diverse goals. The re-invention of the cultural Kulamba ceremony, just like the Lozi’s Kuomboka, was mainly targeted at reinforcing the authority and prominence of the position of Kalonga Gawa Undi.

It is wrong to compare the Lozi and Chewa ceremonies in relation to the trans-border factor. Being trans-border, the Chewa movement’s politicisation may be limited because the competition for resources and political power at national level is somehow factored out-which is not the case with the Lozi. In short, the Lozi appear more politically militant because their geographical parameter of mobilisation is the same: the state. The Chewa do not share this factor and so the political militancy is unlikely to emerge resulting in no real challenge to the Westphalian model.

From a Westphalian perspective it may be concluded that CHEFO is posing as a challenge to the state through its ‘alleged’ disguised political agenda. However, this study argues that CHEFO has indeed been involved in politics by challenging state authorities but not with the intention of challenging state sovereignty. This study also agrees with the cultural nationalism perspective that cultural and political nationalism boundary is blurred. The power
at the disposal of Gawa Undi and CHEFO is that of symbolism and imagery. One of the roles of CHEFO is to defend and promote the Chewa cultural interests. The ‘defence’ and ‘promotion’ cannot just happen if an institution is not perceived to be politically powerful. The trans-border nature of the institution adds the perception that it is politically powerful and it has to use this power when their cultural interests are seen to be under threat. This implies that the politicisation of CHEFO is not in relation to de-railing the state sovereignty.

The next chapter continues the discussion on Chewa ethnic identity but focuses on the extent to which the state borders of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia reinforce or hinder this identity expression. More importantly, the chapter also examines the implication of this on state sovereignty.
CHAPTER 7

STATE BORDERS AND CHEWA ETHNIC IDENTITY

7.0 Introduction

The states of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia are engaged in re-demarcation and reaffirmation of their common borders while at the same time proclaiming artificiality of the same borders. This contradiction exemplifies the debate between formal versus informal perspective of the state borders (Westphalian perspective versus State-society perspective debate). On one hand, the states need a formal Westphalian perspective which entails reinforcement of borders, but on the other hand, they acknowledge informality of the same. These two actions, though they may seem contradictory, they actually complement each other in ensuring that the state remains relevant. This also explains why and how the state deals with trans-border ethnic movements such as the Chewa. Evidence shows that the formal state borders were not a hindrance towards expression of Chewa trans-border identity because when they cross the border for cultural practices, the borders are officially ‘relaxed’ and their King crosses freely without any need for documentation. Furthermore, the Chewa themselves, generally, don’t perceive the borders as a threat to express and share ideas on their identity. In other words, the borders are seen as flexible social markers. The failure of the state to inhibit ethnic identity is not a sign of state weakness but a sign of flexibility on the part of the state by responding to the needs of the communities who are constantly crossing borders to interact on matters which are not a threat to its existence. This is a basis of constructivist perspective of state-society relationship. Consequently, this chapter critically analyses the extent to which state sovereignty exercised through border control may pose as a hindrance to expression of Chewa identity. More importantly, the chapter also draws in and compares the Chewa from the trans-border Kurds of Middle East in order to determine the extent to which the Chewa scenario may be treated as a unique occurrence. In this case, the difference in the process of identity formation amongst the Kurds and Chewa is clearly one of the reasons why these cases are significantly dissimilar. Another issue is the duality in Chewa leadership- appealing to the traditional yet recognized by the formal state- and the ability to transcend borders creates a very unique scenario for the Chewa movement. Unlike the Chewa, the Kurds’ identity formation has become a challenge to state sovereignty.

7.1 The present status of state borders: Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia identity

One of the dimensions of state sovereignty, as already mentioned, is border control. According to the Westphalian model, there is a link between borders and identity. This is the case because borders suggest an ‘in group’ and an ‘out group’ (who can come in and who should stay out and on what basis) and therefore it is a marker of identity, in the Westphalian model, a marker of national identity. Before analysing the relationship between border
control and Chewa identity, the present status of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique borders has to be discussed. The problem of border control is well known by the state officials of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. This problem is two-fold: firstly, in most cases, border immigration officers do not have the capacity to ensure the official requirements that would control the wanton crossing of borders and, secondly, the actual borders themselves are in some cases indeterminate or unclear to the extent that communities living within these borders do not take them seriously. In order to broaden the context of this discussion, it is therefore necessary, as aforementioned, to discuss the present status of these state borders and the implication of such a status on Chewa trans-border identity will be analysed in subsequent sections.

7.1.1 The case of ‘porous’ borders
Cases of evidence of porous borders have largely been expressed by Zambian, Malawian and Mozambican state officials through their countries’ media. Their concerns are that the borders are porous; hence allowing any individuals to pass through. This scenario is creating a problem of the potentiality of criminals to pass through and destabilize the peace in the said countries. For instance, a Malawian official’s concern was captured by *Malawi News* (11-17 September 2010: 3) as follows: “Inspector General of Police Peter Mukhito has said he is shocked with laxity by the policemen at Mtukwa border post who let a *Malawi News* undercover pass through into Zambia without any search or show of passport or documents to prove their identities” (*Malawi News*, 11-17 September 2010: 3). From the Zambian side, related concerns were also expressed by officials who said “For some time now, Zambia has continued to experience an influx of illegal immigrants and smuggled goods because of its porous borders with neighbouring countries” (*Daily Mail*, 13th November 2012).

According to the Immigration Officer in Zambia, “It is a challenge and impossible to control these people because they are basically one ethnic group who culturally know each other better hence they don’t understand the rationale of official boundaries” (Key informant interview, Chipata, 17th May 2012). The same point was also highlighted by the Malawan and Mozambican Immigration Officers (Malawi-Mozambique border) who added that normally they know that there is no real problem when there is a cross-border cultural interaction because it doesn’t pose a security risk (Key informant interview, Angonia, 25th May 2012). This scenario may at face value be said to be creating a situation whereby state sovereignty is being compromised.

7.1.2 The upsurge of border demarcation and re-affirmation exercises
It is thought-provoking to learn that many years after the end of colonial rule in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, the borders themselves are in some areas not yet officially clear to the extent that these countries had recently embarked on the demarcation and reaffirmation exercise. For instance, as recently as October 2012, the government of Malawi, through the Surveyor General, stated that it had just completed the process of demarcating its border with Zambia and Mozambique (*Nation* 23rd October 2012). In relation to the Malawi and Mozambique Joint Permanent Commission of Cooperation the *Daily Times* of 8th November 2012 mentioned that:
Malawi and Mozambique are yet to reaffirm their common borders and that is an item at on-going three-day Joint Permanent Commission of Cooperation (JPCC) underway in Lilongwe… “This meeting will also look into issues of our common border. Of course, the border is already demarcated. We are only to reaffirm those borders”.

The same exercise of border demarcation was also taking place between Zambia and Mozambique. For instance, in August 2012 the Mozambican government announced that its border demarcation exercise with Zambia had just been concluded (Sousle Manguier 9th August 2012). It had been observed that Zambians and Malawians were invading the Mozambican border inorder to build homes or illegally establish their own farms. It can be deduced from this scenario that, except in cases of criminal activities such as robbery, the porous and indeterminate border problems seem not to be the concern of local communities as well as immediate local immigration officers. The problem seems to be the concern of top level state officials who perceive this as loss of sovereignty and security. What is puzzling is the sudden interest in border demarcation and reaffirmation when most countries in southern Africa are now less suspicious of each other and globalisation is enhancing movement of the people. More importantly, with the trans-border cultural movements such as the Chewa taking prominence, politicians from all these countries have consistently declared that ethnic communities in these countries are one and the borders are artificial. The sudden interest to move towards reaffirmation and demarcation of borders seems to be the opposite of what is publicly declared. For instance, when the president of Zambia visited Malawi, the president of Malawi, Bingu wa Mutharika, emphasised the issue of artificiality of the borders (“Malawi, Zambia are one” The Nation, 4thFebruary 2009, p3, emphasis added).

This contradiction of being engaged in border re-demarcation and reaffirmation whilst proclaiming artificiality of the same borders forms part of the debate between formal versus informal perspective of the state borders (Westphalian perspective versus state-society perspective debate) that will be discussed further in the subsequent sections. Suffice to mention that local immigration officers mentioned that despite complaints from national offices of the porosity of borders, the situation would have been worse if they followed exactly what the officials at national level expect. According to a Malawian immigration officer at the Malawi-Mozambique border:

*We rely on local communities to effectively do our job hence we sometimes overlook certain border crossing formalities in order not to offend them. This is sometimes interpreted as laxity on our part. Criminal activities are easy to identify when you work closely with communities. In this case we have to treat the local communities well such as the Chewa because we know that they normally cross for cultural purposes or just visit their relatives* (Key informant interview/Immigration officer, Dedza, 28th May 2012).

**7.2 The extent of state borders as an obstacle to Chewa identity**

The findings of this study show that the formal borders were not a hindrance towards expression of Chewa identity in several ways:
Firstly, when the Chewa are organizing their Kulamba ceremony in Zambia, the state borders of these three countries, according to CHEFO Chairperson, are “relaxed” to allow people to attend the ceremony (Interview with Dr Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012). Based on an agreement reached between CHEFO and government officials, Malawians and Mozambicans travelling to the ceremony in Zambia do not need a passport but do have to be registered and appear on the list of names which is stamped by Malawi or Mozambican government officials. This list has neither personal identification nor photos of the said individuals; merely their names and the vehicle registration number plate in which they are travelling (see Appendix 11).

However, apart from those provided with the special border crossing document, many other individuals actually cross the border without any documentation at all. According to CHEFO Chairperson, the masked Gule Wamkulu dancers (Chewa traditional dance members) are not even required to show anything (do not need to appear on the list of registered members) because in the Chewa tradition, the masked dancers are believed to represent their “ancestral spirits”. Specifically, the CHEFO chairperson said: *Kodi chilombo chiwonesa bwanji passport kapena chikalata pa border? Ndi chilombo chimenecho.* [How can a spirit produce a passport or official document at the border? It is simply a spirit] (Interview with Dr Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012).

One female FGD participant also explained this phenomenon by saying that:

*Tikamapita ku Nkaika galimoto yathu imakhala pambuyo ndipo yasilombo (Gule Wamkulu) imakhala patso golo. Ineneyo ndiye passport yathu ndiye wapolisi a kaona zilombo samafunsanso passport a madziwa kuti tiku pita kukavona abale ahu kwa Gawa Undi. [When going to Mkaika -headquarters of Gawa Undi- the vehicle carrying Gule Wamkulu is in front. That is our passport because when the police see the Gule Wamkulu they do not even ask for a passport, they know that we are going to visit our relatives at Gawa Undi’s place] (Female FGD, Lilongwe, 11th May 2012)*

According to the administrative officer at Mchinji District Assembly, the special pass that they are given is not really special at all and it does not mean anything. He mentioned that “the main reason they are given the pass is just to ensure that the Zambian and Malawian governments should be aware of the exact numbers of individuals who have crossed the border to attend the ceremony. He continued to explain that “The document is mainly for accountability purposes so that when something happens to them while in Zambia, someone should be able to trace; otherwise on its own, the document has no any other purposes” (Key informant interview/Administrative Officer, Mchinji, 15th May 2012).

Secondly, when the Chewa King, Gawa Undi visits the region, he is not required to produce a passport. According to CHEFO chairperson, there is no need for him to produce a passport because “Dziko ndilake ndiye passport yachani?” [The land belongs to him, why should he produce a passport?] (Key informant interview, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012). Actually, he is given VIP treatment as a government official even though he is merely a traditional leader. According to an official from the Ministry of Local Government in Malawi, Gawa Undi is, in
fact, provided with a convoy and official security when in the country (Key informant interview, Lilongwe, 18th May 2012). This phenomenon should be understood in the context that traditional authorities in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia have their own country specific Laws and regulations which do not cover traditional authorities outside their domains. In this case, the authority of Gawa Undi is not stipulated in the laws of Malawi and Mozambique but he is under the domain of Zambia. According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official in Malawi, all foreign government dignitaries visiting the country normally have to produce an official diplomatic passport and they do not merely enter the country without one (Key informant interview, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012). This special treatment given to Gawa Undi is not necessarily imposed by the Chewa on the countries of Malawi and Mozambique but it is something that the said governments have done at their own volition.

Thirdly, the Chewa themselves, generally perceive the borders as not being a threat to expressing and sharing ideas about their identity across the border. In other words, the borders are seen as flexible social markers. When FGD participants in all the three countries were asked: “Does the state boundary pose as a challenge to expression of your Chewa identity?” it was clear from the discussions that emerged, that state boundaries pose no problem at all.

For instance, one female in Mozambique during FGD mentioned that when they reach the border, there is nothing that they fear, and she asked “if people manage to smuggle goods across who can therefore forbid us from uniting with our relatives on cultural matters? Otherwise they just want to find faults against you if they deny you” (Female FGD, Angonia, 28th May 2012). In other words, the response across the three countries clearly shows that the current state boundaries are not perceived as possible barriers to express, exchange ideas as well as unify the Chewa ethnic identity. In other words, for the Chewas, the state borders do not really mean anything other than a formal construct that has no impact on their cultural development and expression.

However, despite this overwhelming agreement that state borders are not a threat to expression of trans-border Chewa identity, there were a few individuals who thought otherwise. Some felt that when one crosses the border (for cultural purposes) without a document, one is not a free person because one fears that anything can happen, such as being arrested. Taking a travel document might also be problematic due to the required bureaucratic processes and so it poses as a barrier to the expression of their identity.

Apart from the Kulamba ceremony, all the Chewas mentioned that they constantly interact across the border on cultural-related issues such as marriages, funerals and installation of chiefs. During a male FGD in one village in Mozambique, one participant said:

_Iwo akakhala ndizochitika amatitenga ngakhalenso ife tikakhala ndizochitika kaya kubwera kwa a DC timawayitana iwo kuti tithandizane. Kayanso kukabwera a president awo kaya nduna amatitenga kuti bwerani tizathandizane...kutereku tiri ndima flag awiri, ya Malawi ndi ya Mozambique. Ku chikondwerero cha ufulu ku Blantyre takhala tikupita limodzi ndi anzathu akumalawi ndikukavina gule. [when they have ceremonies they come and inform us so that we join them (to perform_
In Mozambique, the District Commissioners organise cultural dances for different ethnic groups which are showcased on a particular day in selected areas of the district. A week before this FGD was conducted in Angonia, such an event had actually taken place and it transpired that Malawian Chewas joined them in these dances. What also emerged from this discussion is that when Malawian Chewa traditional dancers are invited to the Mozambican event, they mix and form one group with the Mozambican Chewas. Since foreign groups are not allowed to participate, the Mozambican government officials are not aware that the traditional performers are actually composed of members from two different countries- this is an informal arrangement. This also occurs when Mozambican Chewa traditional performers are invited to Malawi. This is why one FDG participant in the above quote mentioned that they “have both flags” of Malawi and Mozambique readily available so that they can pick the relevant flag depending on where they will perform. In this case, officials attending the traditional ceremonies wrongly assume that the performers are all citizens of only their countries. Another interesting observation is that this interaction has been going on for years, even before CHEFO was founded or before the reinvention of Kulamba ceremony.

According to one key informant, this scenario shows a weakness on the part of the state as it ‘gives in’ to the informal movements as well as the inability of the state to satisfy the need for ‘belonging’ (Key informant interview, Lilongwe, 11th May 2012).

7.2.1 Critical analysis: Is the state losing sovereignty due to ‘weak’ borders?

From a Westphalian perspective, it may be argued that the Chewa trans-border movement is challenging the sovereignty of the states of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia when they ‘relax’ borders to facilitate the identity formation of the Chewa. In other words, this may be summarized as follows:

Firstly, in a strict Westphalian interpretation of state borders, each state would be regarded as an autonomous entity that develops its own culture and practices without major influence from external entities or communities. The state and its associated official entities could be regarded as the main socialising institution and facilitator of creating bonds across the border.

Secondly, another expectation from the Westphalian model is that borders are a fundamental part of how its authority and control are expressed. In this case, the state would be interested to demonstrate this control and authority by, among other things, ensuring that there is strict observation and control of individuals crossing its borders. In this case, an informal traditional leader is being allowed to cross the border without any documentation- a treatment that even most foreign government officials do not receive.

Thirdly, the ‘relaxation’ of the borders during a traditional event is also a different expectation of the Westphalian state treatment of its sovereignty. In this case, the borders of Mozambique,
Malawi and Zambia become less authoritative as compared to the traditional event. Finally, in a Westphalian perspective of sovereignty, state subjects or citizens are supposed to perceive borders as official barriers that confine their expressions, identity and dreams within a particular entity. The perception shared by most Chewa people that borders are meaningless as far as culturally expressing and identifying themselves is possible is a demonstration of a challenge to the Westphalian model.

The argument of this study is that contrary to Kehinde’s (2010) perspective (which is similar to the above), the failure of the state to inhibit ethnic identity is not a sign of state weakness but a sign of flexibility on the part of the state by responding to the needs of the communities who are constantly crossing borders to interact on matters which are not a threat to its existence. This is a basis of the constructivist perspective of state-society relationship. According to Demirović (2011) and Barkey and Parikh (1991), the perspective that the state is losing sovereignty when it is deemed to be failing to control ethnic groups who are expressing their identity, is based on a faulty understanding of the state. The state, in other words, normally interacts with the communities and in the process of interaction, what is wrong or right is defined within that parameter of interaction. The product, which might be seen as relaxation of borders, is not a loss of sovereignty but a product of the social interaction. In other words, the interaction ultimately expresses the “nature of state autonomy and capacity” (Barkey and Parikh 1991: 526) and it is not a challenge to its sovereignty.

Another observation is that in the case of the Chewa trans-border identity, at national level, state officials express the Westphalian model rhetoric, while at local level immigration officers take into consideration the state-society relations. Consequently, at top level there is a move towards re-affirmation and demarcation of borders to curb the excesses of local integration. This seemingly contradictory approach to state borders is actually reinforcing the relevance of the state at international and local level. This is why Nkiwane’s (2001:287) observation that “the state may derive its power from a variety of sources, and in the context of Africa what may appear to be a loss of central state power may in fact be its reconfiguration” becomes valid here. In other words, for states to remain relevant at international levels, they implement the Westphalian model manifested in re-affirmation and re-demarcation of borders and this is normally influenced from the top state officials. At the same time, to remain relevant at local level, the state relaxes its formalities associated with the Westphalian model especially during cultural celebrations. In other words, the state tries to bring the human face to the formal state by responding to their immediate concerns. These two actions, though, may seem contradictory; however, the Westphalian approach and state-society relations approach complement each other in ensuring that the state remains relevant.

7.3 The Chewa perception of formal identity (nationality) and state borders

One key aspect of the Westphalian state is political socialisation to the extent that a common descent and destiny is propagated by the state. This also forms the hallmark of a common state citizenship. A view that another agent, who is non-state, should propagate the
perspective that its citizenry share a common descent with another group outside the formal state boundary, is a direct challenge to its legitimacy and sovereignty. More importantly, if ethnic identity is valued more than national identity then this may have implications on state sovereignty whose survival is based on unquestioned submission to national identity. The discussion below analyses the extent to which the Chewa ‘common descent perspectives’, as well as ‘national versus Chewa ethnic identity’, may have an effect on state sovereignty.

7.3.1 Common descent perspective

The common descent perspective may start with a definition of the group’s identity. The CHEFO Chairperson, Justine Malewezi, in a follow up interview, was asked “Who is defined as a Chewa? Is it the one who speaks Chichewa? The one who is under the authority of a Chewa chief? Or is it someone who follows the Chewa culture?” His response was that a Chewa is the one who gets it by birth and/or a socialisation process (Second interview with Dr Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 6th December 2012).

However, two years before this interview he had stated something a little bit different when he indirectly defined the Chewa at a cultural meeting. He had implicitly indicated that a Chewa is the one under the authority of Gawa Undi, speaks the Chewa language and also follows the Chewa culture. Below is a newspaper extract based on what he said:

Chewa Heritage Foundation (Chefo) Chairperson Justin Malewezi on Saturday urged Chewas to be united in promoting their culture and development. Speaking during the Chizangala rite of passage ceremony at Sankhani 2 Village in T/A Njewa’s area in Lilongwe, Malewezi said it is the wish of the Chewa supreme authority, Kalonga Gawa Undi, that the tribe maintains unity. “There are several things that unite us. We are united because we all fall under Gawa. We also have a unique language. Our culture is rich. That is why we have to remain united as bees in a hive (The Nation, 22nd December 2010, p4, emphasis added).

The idea of who is Chewa may not be very clear but it can be deduced that the one who has been brought up in the Chewa culture may officially be regarded as a true Chewa from the CHEFO perspective, but from a practical perspective, what the CHEFO chairperson said at a cultural meeting might be more significant. Another dimension to Chewa identity is what emerged during the FGD meetings. When the Chewa communities were asked what makes them feel the same as their counterparts across the border, one of the issues that frequently emerged was bele limodzi or common descent. Based on FGD results, the Chewa have a strong feeling that they belong to one family irrespective of where they are geographically based. Linked to this finding is the issue of national versus ethnic identity. FGD participants were asked “What do they consider as more important: your national or Chewa identity? Or both?” The results show that with the exception of the Chewa in Mozambique, an overwhelming majority chose the Chewa identity (See Table 9).
Table 9: Summary to the FGD responses on the question: “What do they consider as more important: your national or Chewa identity? Or both?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FGD</th>
<th>District/Province</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Zambia</td>
<td>FGD 1</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>Chewa Identity</td>
<td>Almost a consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD 2</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>Chewa Identity</td>
<td>Almost a consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD 3</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>Chewa Identity</td>
<td>Almost a consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD 4</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>Chewa Identity</td>
<td>Almost a consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mozambique</td>
<td>FGD 1</td>
<td>Angonia, Tete</td>
<td>Both Identities</td>
<td>Hotly debated but very few (25%) were for Chewa identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD 2</td>
<td>Angonia, Tete</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>About 40% disagreed with the majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD 3</td>
<td>Angonia, Tete</td>
<td>Chewa Identity</td>
<td>Hotly debated but very few were for National &amp; both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD 4</td>
<td>Angonia, Tete</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Almost a consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Malawi</td>
<td>FGD 1</td>
<td>Lilongwe</td>
<td>Both Identities</td>
<td>Almost a consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD 2</td>
<td>Lilongwe</td>
<td>Chewa Identity</td>
<td>Almost a consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD 3</td>
<td>Lilongwe</td>
<td>Chewa Identity</td>
<td>Almost a consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD 4</td>
<td>Lilongwe</td>
<td>Chewa Identity</td>
<td>Almost a consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD 5</td>
<td>Lilongwe</td>
<td>Chewa Identity</td>
<td>Almost a consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD 6</td>
<td>Chikhwawa</td>
<td>Chewa Identity</td>
<td>Almost a consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD 7</td>
<td>Chikhwawa</td>
<td>Both Identities</td>
<td>Hotly debated but about 43% for Chewa Identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s summary of FGD findings

This reinforces Phiri’s (1975) finding who stated that what is critical in the Chewa culture is the belief that all its ethnic members are “descendants of a common breast (bele)”. He further stated that as perceived descendants from ‘one breast’ or family, they regard “themselves as perpetual nephews of a remote maternal uncle (tsinde)” (Phiri 1975:13). From all the FGDs, (except in Mozambique) which represented the views of the Chewas at grassroots level, as well as some key informant interviews, it was emphasized that their common descent as Chewas was critical for their trans-border identity and it also explains their motive for integration. In other words, based on the interviews conducted, it emerged that the history of origin of the Chewa strongly emphasises a common origin of the ethnic group. Almost all Chewa key informants and FGDs in all the three countries took time to explain in detail how they migrated from Uluba in present Zaire to their current place of settlement (although in some cases they provided a conflicting account of their origin). Although their stories of origin were not always consistent, and in some cases contradicted the well-established historical facts, what normally stood out was their pride in articulating their identity as ‘one family’. For instance, in Zambia, one Male FGD participant mentioned (and his views were shared by his colleagues), “I prefer to be called Chewa because Zambian identity is limited by the current nation-state boundary. However, if I am called Chewa, my identity is almost unlimited because this identity is beyond Zambia” (Male FGD, Chipata, 17th May 2012).

Most participants in Mozambique, however, mentioned that they prefer to be called Mozambicans first and their Chewa identity is secondary. This is not surprising in
Mozambique because several research papers have stated that ethnic identity in Mozambique is very low due to their historical background. For instance, the harsh Portuguese colonial experience forced communities to work closely together and disregard their ethnic affiliations. Despite this condition, the Mozambican Chewa identity is still cherished by them, exemplified by their constant quest to interact on cultural matters with their Chewa colleagues in other countries.

7.3.2 A critical analysis: Perceived 'common descent' a challenge to state?
These findings also confirm Ekeh’s (1975) thesis that a common descent is pursued as one of the ways to legitimise the ethnic movements. This entails competing with the nation-state policies of nation-building. By regarding themselves as a distinct historical community ultimately contradicts the African nation-state building project of regarding ethnic identities as inferior to nation-state identity. This contradiction is reflected in Ekeh’s ‘Two publics’. By strengthening the Chewa descent, its members are undermining the ‘civic public’ or state citizenship. This also entails them unconsciously politicising their movement. This is why Cohen (1974) views ethnic organisations as political organisations and even mentions in the preface of his book that a “political man is also a symbolic man”. Barth (1987) also supports this argument by stating that ethnicity is a matter of politics.

Due to historical inconsistencies of the origin of the Chewa as provided during FGD, the findings also agree, to some extent, with the observation of some scholars, such as Brown (1999), who dispute the objectivity of most ethnic groups’ historical accounts. Brown (1999) argues that even those who are pro-traditionalism do not dispute the argument that the common descent claims are not realistic. In this regard, he states that “the claims to common kinship are not based solely on the objective cultural traits and the real facts of common ancestry, but rather on the power of the myths and symbols of kinship… all refer to the belief, rather than the fact, of common kinship” (Brown 1999:289).

In this regard, cultural symbols and history can be deliberately manipulated so as to create ethnic identity and organisation, thus producing a consciously constructed ethnic identity. However, in the context of the Chewa ethnic group, this study goes further and argues that this may not always be a problem because “discussion of history relates not to the past but to the present” or more precisely “history is not a product of the past but a response to requirements of the present” (Eriksen 2002:73). Taking into consideration that historical record captures only a small part of the full account, the process of selecting what is to be recorded encompasses interpretation, reinterpretation and creativity. Consequently, what we normally call historical facts are not necessarily the past but merely “present-day constructions of the past” (Eriksen 2002: 73). This doesn’t imply that historical accounts are inventions hence not to be taken seriously, but, if we take into consideration the process of developing these accounts as highlighted above, we will appreciate that historical accounts are, and should be, contested. This is why ethnic claims have always been contested and reinvented despite their claim to the past. In this case, Eriksen (2002) points out that research has shown that most of the so-called contemporary revived or revitalised traditions are not a
re-emergence of the formerly existing practices which were disappearing. The reality is that the critical aspects of such revived practices are entirely new “although they imagine themselves as old and glorify presumably ancient handicrafts, rituals or other cultural practices” (Eriksen 2002:86). What is paramount is culture innovativeness and creation, which may simply be defined as choosing what is relevant and discarding the irrelevant. It is in this holistic context of development of Chewa history, just like other ethnic groups, that its potential must be understood. Through interviews held, pride in common descent was consistently manifesting as one of the core underlying factors driving the integration. Pride was not only manifested in what was said, but also how it was said about their past.

From a Westphalian state-building perspective, it can be said that despite the numerous efforts to erase ethnic affiliation during the post-colonial period (but instilling the national-state pride) ethnic history and affiliation is still influential. In the case of the Chewa, the affiliation is more complex in the sense that it is trans-border. All FGD participants (except for a few in Mozambique) explained that they felt being called a Chewa was more important than being referred to as a citizen of their nation. However, it can also be deduced that the Chewa’s emphasis on common descent exposes the contradiction in the movement’s cultural nationalist motive because it indirectly politicises their agenda through claiming their distinctiveness. In this case, the boundary between political and cultural nationalism becomes blurred.

A further critical point of analysis of Chewa common descent versus state identity can be brought to the fore if the Afrobarometer data is applied. The sections below will analyse whether the Chewa of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia are unique. This uniqueness will be measured by comparing the socio-political perceptions of the Chewa in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia as well as the Chewa against other two major ethnic groups in their respective countries. If the data reveals that a unique Chewa pattern inside and outside the state exists, then the probability is high that they are forming a distinct identity parallel to that of the nation-state. The areas of comparison are the trust of own ethnic group versus other ethnic groups; the choice of ethnic identity or national identity; the trust in traditional leadership and level of influence in local governance; the perception of the time traditional leaders spend listening to the people, and the extent of political activism. Since traditional leaders are assumed to be at the core of shaping traditional identity, the third and fourth areas have deliberately been chosen to highlight their significance or insignificance in shaping identity.

7.4 Uniqueness of the Chewa trans-border identity: Comparison between trans-boarder Kurds and the Chewa

This section argues that the social constructivist approach provides a better understanding of the uniqueness of the Chewa movement. Drawing some insights from the trans-border Kurdish movement of the Middle East, the study provides further this uniqueness of the

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22This section does not claim to provide an exhaustive analysis of the Kurdish movement but only isolates areas that may have a bearing on the theme of this study.
Chewa. In a nutshell, the Turkish state (where the majority of the Kurds reside) has taken a more Westphalian interpretation of the state which reinforces one language, culture and nationality. This is different from the Chewa experience within the states of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique where the state has provided a platform for expression of the Chewa identity. Taking into consideration that the Chewa King has a traditional authoritative element that connects him to his people, the state has capitalised on this by providing space for the Chewa cultural expression led by the King himself. This ‘capture’ of the Chewa by the state has managed to instil harmonious relations with the Chewa community. Specifically, the flexibility of the state in the Chewa-state relations and the inflexibility of the state in the Kurds-state relations has been a decisive factor in explaining their difference. Consequently, from a social constructivist perspective, the historical experience of the Kurds has led them to construct a picture of the state which is deemed a threat to the Kurdish survival.

7.4.1 Historical background
There are many other transborder ethnic groups across the world, but this study argues that the Chewa case epitomizes a unique African ethnic trans-border experience. The significance of the Kurds is reinforced by the observation of Romano (2006:24) who points out that the experience of the ethnic Kurds in Turkey makes “a very interesting case for the study of ethnic nationalist movements in the developing world. The Kurds of Euroasia may share certain common experiences with the Chewa but there are some profound differences that set the Chewa case as a bona fide African experience. The Kurds are now regarded as the world’s largest 'ethnic minority' with an estimated population of anywhere between 20 to 25 million people (Loizides 2010). The Kurds do not identify themselves as Arabs although the majority are Muslim and they speak Kurdish which is closer to the Iranian language of Persian origin. After the First World War, the Ottoman Empire, which aligned itself during the war with the losing power Germany, fell apart. Through the 1916 French-British agreement known as Sykes-Picot agreement, the Kurds were split into the newly created borders of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran- just like the Chewa who are found in three countries. Although they are one of the world’s largest ethnic communities, they do not have a state of their own. Just as almost half of the Chewa people are found in Malawi, similarly approximately half of the Kurds live in present day Turkey. These are, among other things, some of the broader similarities between these two communities. It is mainly their differences which create the puzzle. The fundamental question is: why are the Kurds currently fighting for an autonomous state when the Chewa are not doing the same- yet they share commonalities in core elements of their current status?

While the Chewa had pre-colonial state experiences and ethnic ties, this was not the case with the Kurds. According to Loizides (2010:513), the Kurds can be referred to as ‘nations without history’ because at no time in their pre-capitalist past have they ever been a one political entity. Originally the Kurds were fragmented kinship-based units under a tribal or religious leader and each community had a distinct geographical area it occupied, but usually in remote mountainous regions (Yavuz 2001). Although the Kurds were “at the crossroads of the
Persian, Arab, and Turkish worlds” they were not necessarily the sole occupants of the general area they currently claim but they existed in several large pockets which were surrounded by numerous other groups (Yavuz 2001). This is unlike the Chewa who occupied a continuous geographical area and other tribes which existed in this area were subjects of the Chewa King. In other words, the historicity of ethnic unity, which transcends language, in a state polity did exist among the Chewa but this was not the case with the Kurds. The Chewa have a more legitimate cause for demanding state autonomy than the Kurds, but the opposite is happening. This puzzle is examined below in the comparison of Kurdish and Chewa ethnic identity formation discussion.

7.4.2 Identity formation among the Kurds and the Chewa
Modern ethnic identity of the Chewa and that of the Kurds shows some similarities and differences. Using the analysis developed by Gellner (1983), Loizides (2010) argues that the ethnic identity of the Kurds is a product of a transition towards modern industrial society. Industrialisation affects different people differently and this has implications on how they may react to the process. In this case, Loizides points out that “the demands of an industrial economy favoured homogeneity” which is reflected in form of language, skills for bureaucratic employment and several other related modernization attributes. Comparatively, most of the Kurds had a peasant background and were ill equipped for a modernizing society. This failure to match their skills, language and other elements to the modernizing polity were interpreted as “conditions of discrimination”. Some group members made a decision to assimilate into the dominant culture by acquiring the required attributes while others turned away and formed the breeding ground for ethnic nationalist thinking. As Sarigil (2012) argues, for various social-political reasons, the Kurdish elites took advantage of this frustrated group to form a coherent ethnic national programme through an elaborate cultural framing process which included glorifying their socially constructed historical past. Although this situation was more pronounced in Turkey, it was similar in other countries where Kurds reside such as Iran, Iraqi and Syria. Even the profile of the leadership of the Kurds’ armed nationalist movement in Turkey, the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers’ Party) shows that they were more Turkish than Kurds in their upbringing, culture, language and other associated attributes. For instance, according to Loizides (2010: 513), Abdullah O’Calan, the founder and leader of PKK, “himself was a native speaker of Turkish and according to his own account he had no previous attachment to Kurdish nationalism”. But he turned to Kurdish nationalism after encountering problems with the state- which had nothing to do with his Kurdish origin. Kurdish identity was therefore originally developed by the elite in relation to the social political context (Yegen 2007; Yavuz 2001; Sarigil 2012; Romano 2006). Although the elite played a critical role in the identity formation of the contemporary Chewa, it was not really borne out of the frustration with failure of the masses to integrate in the state apparatus.

This may explain the identity formation of the Kurds but the politicization of the Kurds, especially in Turkey, can be described through the process of Turkish state-society relations. According to Yavuz (2001) “the major reason for the politicization of Kurdish cultural
identity is the shift from multi-ethnic, multi-cultural realities of the Ottoman empire to the nation-state model”. When the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, emphasized the use of one Turkish language and culture, it was interpreted as a way of trying to suppress the Kurdish heritage hence politicization of the group. From Ataturk’s perspective, it was a way of enhancing political integration after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This is why Hiltermann (2012: 16) argues that “the Kurds are victims of history, geography and, on the occasions they overreach, their own ambitions”. In a nutshell, Romano (2006:52) points out that the semi-democratic nature of Turkey which is not open to the demands of the Kurds facilitated the process for development of radical Kurdish movements that operates from outside the state. Although there are several factions of the Kurds, Turkish Kurds play a de facto leadership role for others in Syria, Iran, and Iraq.

The explanation for the whole puzzle in the Chewa and Kurdish identity formation and sustenance can be through the social constructivist perspective of state-society relations. Specifically, the whole issue is arguably revolving on the nature of the relationship between identity formation elites and the state. Another issue is arguably centrality of authority which does not exist in the Kurdish movement but does exist in the Chewa through traditional structures. The Chewa have had an identifiable central structure of authority through their traditional leader Gawa Undi. The other elite such as members of CHEFO have been operating under the traditional authority of the King. The King has been ‘captured’ by the state through co-option (duality of traditional leadership whilst being recognised by the state structure as a leader) to the extent that he cannot just rise against the state. In this case, the state has provided space for the King to exercise his authority over the Chewa people- though limited. This careful balance of the state and the ruling elite of the Chewa has put under control the nationalistic intentions of the Chewa. On the other hand, despite having a common interest for political independence, the Kurds are not fully united across the three countries. Apart from lack of centrality of authority, non-existence of duality in the leadership in the Kurdish community complicates the situation and encourages radical nationalist intentions. The state in the Kurdish case finds it difficult to easily ‘capture’ its elite without centrality of authority. The Chewa case therefore epitomizes a unique African experience which cannot easily be replicated in crossborder ethnic movements especially outside Africa.

7.5 Conclusion
This chapter aimed at examining the extent to which the state borders affect trans-border Chewa identity and its implication to the Westphalian model of the state. Partially, the chapter also analysed whether there are trans-border Chewa commonalities or divergences on issues related to state sovereignty and ethnic identity. In this case, this chapter is central to this study’s field findings. Although the Chewa acknowledges a common descent, common cultural practices and the authority of Gawa Undi, the findings show that this commonality does not extend into socio-political attitudes and perceptions. In this case, the ethnic politicisation of the Chewa is largely limited as most of them still share socio-political attitudes and perceptions that are defined by their national-state politics and not trans-border
issues. In other words, there is no unique socio-political trans-border Chewa view or agenda, apart from cultural identity, that may pose as a challenge to the formal state. More importantly, the states of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia have willingly provided a platform and space for the expression of Chewa ethnic identity and therefore identified themselves with the community as an ally and not a competitor. Through this flexibility on the part of the state, the chapter has argued that the state has remained relevant to the Chewa while allowing them to express social citizenship.

In a nutshell, the chapter concludes that in all the three countries, the Chewa believe or emphasise a distinctiveness or common descent which contradicts the Westphalian state perspective. It can also be deduced that the Chewa’s emphasis on common descent exposes the contradiction in the movement’s cultural nationalist motive because it indirectly politicises their agenda through claiming their distinctiveness. In this case, the boundary between political and cultural nationalism in their movement becomes blurred. When compared to the trans-border Kurds of Middle-East, what comes out clearly is that although the elite played a critical role in the identity formation for both, the Chewa and the Kurds, the major difference is the process in which this identity was constructed. Unlike the Kurds, the contemporary Chewa identity was not constructed due to their frustration with the failure of being integrated into the state system. More importantly, although the Kurds have leaders, the Chewa have a much more recognizable trans-border leadership which appeals to the mythical Chewa tradition and which is also recognized by the formal state. This duality in Chewa leadership- appealing to the traditional yet recognized by the formal state- and transcending borders - creates a very unique scenario for the Chewa which can not easily be replicated elsewhere.

Having analysed the issue of state borders and Chewa ethnic identity, the next chapter concludes the study by, among other things, highlighting the critical issues uncovered as well as their implications to the stated research objectives of this thesis.
8.0 Introduction and Summary of major study findings

The study finds that the Chewa trans-border ethnic group identity largely complements the Westphalian model. Taken from a Westphalian perspective the state would be said to have been challenged and rendered irrelevant, but within the framework of [social] constructivism, the state demonstrates flexibility and innovation to remain legitimate by co-opting the Chewa movement. In this case, the study finds that the co-existence of the Westphalian model and trans-border Chewa ethnic identity is mainly due to the flexibility of the state in accommodating informal ethnic expressions, which ultimately reinforces the dependence on each other. In other words, state flexibility has frustrated the development of a politically motivated trans-border Chewa political agenda; hence the movement lacks a trans-border common socio-political view. It should however be mentioned that although there are what would seem to be political elements amongst the Chewa movement (especially at local level), these elements are deliberately framed as ‘cultural’ by Chewa leadership (to suggest that they are a-political and thereby ensure their survival alongside the Westphalian state as non-threatening, submissive entity. All in all, the study argues that the existence of the Chewa Kingdom thrives on exploiting the political and cultural elements in order to attain its goals of preserving and protecting the Chewa interests. Consequently, the interaction of these two perspectives promote the Chewa’s power and recognition which in the long run has implications on Westphalian state sovereignty and territory of the three countries of Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia.

8.2 Contributions to the field of study

This study has made several contributions to the field of IR specifically in an African context. The discussion below presents these contributions from a theoretical and empirical/practical perspective.

8.2.1 Theoretical contributions

The theoretical contributions made by this study are several as highlighted below:

Social constructivism has mainly tended to focus on state centred approaches and this led to a limited understanding of state-society relations. Using a constructivist approach that goes beyond the state as the unit of analysis tremendously improves our understanding of how the Westphalian model manifests in different spaces and at different times. In a way this study is innovative because it employs the theoretical debates on cultural nationalism and politics of representation in such a way to move beyond the state and to explore how people construct their political realities (within the context of the Westphalian model). This study aptly
complements Smith’s (2009) suggestion that when studying African IR, we have to move beyond the strict disciplinary boundaries that have defined the field and search for African state experiences. The Chewas have had an interesting experience of working with the formal and informal institutions across three countries for many years. This ability to discreetly pursue their interests despite a challenging trans-border scenario provides special insights of the relationship between the state and trans-border informal entities. However, the limited confines of IR discipline may not fully capture these dynamics. Consequently, apart from Smith, this study also contributes to Sindjoun’s (2001) and Clapham’s (1996) quest for strengthening of interdisciplinary approaches in IR which should embrace disciplines such as anthropology, sociology and other related fields. As Onuf (2013) once mentioned, social constructivism ably establishes links in diverse areas which were previously deemed impossible. However, efforts to go beyond the boundaries of IR have not been very effective.

Building on the point discussed above, the study also contributes to the growing body of studies which argue that the Westphalian model of the state is not completely outdated, but it is applicable in some cases when states want to maximise their legitimacy. The meaning of sovereignty is thus negotiated between state and society, rather than imposed as a Westphalian ideal type may imply. In other words, the study reinforces the constructivist perspective that sovereignty is not static and pre-given, but dynamic and its uses change depending on the situation. Consequently, the study rejects the thesis that an African state is weak per se and succumbs to trans-border movements as argued by Kahinde (2010) and others.

This study contributes to the understanding of contemporary form of trans-border nationalism pursued by ethnic movements. In other words, the study reinforces the argument such as that of Brass (1991) and Romano (2006) that ethnicity and nationalism are political constructions and to some extent the products of elites. However, the role of elites is not as Brass and Romano envisaged, but a contemporary form of nationalism as argued by Castells (2004) who pointed out that contemporary form of nationalism is among other things not primarily aimed at creation of nation-states but at the same time it is not limited to modern nation-states and although politics is not completely dismissed, it tends to be more cultural than political. The Chewa aptly epitomizes this contemporary trans-border nationalism as conceptualised by Castel, thus contributing to IR an empirical-led example of the nature, form and manifestation of contemporary trans-border nationalism.

This study contributes to the social constructivists understanding of regional integration in Africa and other similar settings. Much of the literature on regional integration has focused on state institutions or highly formalised institutions. The informal trans-border institutions have not featured highly in the debate of trans-border state relations. In general theories and approaches to regional integration have largely ignored the potentiality of trans-border communities to facilitate cooperation of the formal state. This study provides some insights on the challenges and opportunities that regional integration scholars may further examine on how the informal trans-border communities can provide a platform for a deeper and more meaningful state cooperation. For instance, the Chewa of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia
have constructed a harmonious relation with the state to an extent that they do not perceive the state as a threat to their survival.

Another contribution of this study is the unique scope of its case study within the context of IR. Few studies have embarked on an analysis of trans-border ethnic group research. Some of the few existing related research include Miles and Rochefort (1991), MacGonagle (2007), Robinson (2009), Posner (2004), Maclean (2010), Kehinde (2010) and Kayuni (2011). Using a quantitative approach, Miles and Rochefort (1991) focused mainly on a comparison of the rural and urban Hausa ethnic group of Niger-Nigeria in relation to the issue of nationalism versus ethnic identity. Due to the design of the Miles and Rochefort study, it did not comprehensively interrogate the core aspects of state, sovereignty and citizenship as conceptualised in this study. Like Miles and Rochefort (1991), Robinson (2009) explores the relationship between nationalism and ethnic identity in sixteen African countries. The study uses quantitative Afrobarometer data sets to generate findings. However, except in a few instances, the study mainly focused on comparing and aggregating ethnic groups within the state boundaries. More importantly, the study was not intended to thoroughly examine the various contending views of state, citizenship and sovereignty. Taking into consideration methodological constraints faced in his study, Robinson (2009:28) suggests that in future, “field work among groups which cross-state boundaries may lead to new insights about the reasons why individuals identify with the state”. Posner (2004) mainly compares and contrasts the Chewa and Tumbuka ethnic groups of Malawi and Zambia by, among other things, examining their voting patterns. Although the study was trans-border, it made no attempt at addressing the issues of state, sovereignty and citizenship as enshrined in the Westphalian model. Kehinde (2010) analyses the Yoruba ethnic identity along the Benin-Nigeria border, but his focus is solely on the border issue and therefore neglects other important factors. Kayuni (2011) provides a very close analysis of the issues being investigated in this study by exploring the concept of Westphalian model versus the Chewa case study. However a major shortfall here is that this study is not empirically-driven. Consequently, its findings are limited and lack a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. More importantly, the core Westphalian elements of sovereignty and citizenship were not explored. In this regard, this study is an extension of the work begun by Kayuni (2011) so as to provide a more comprehensive analysis through empirically-driven investigation.

8.2.2 Empirical/Practical contributions
The results from this study are of practical significance to political leaders, cultural elites, civil society activists, policy makers, IR experts and other conflict management practitioners who focus on ethnic-state relations, especially at trans-border level. The study has demonstrated that trans-border ethnic movements are getting more sophisticated in relation to their organisational capacity; hence they will not diminish in the near future. It is also possible for trans-border ethnic movements to pursue their ethnic identity while retaining and even becoming proud of their national-state identity; these two should not be regarded as contradictory phenomena. The study has also demonstrated that not all state and trans-border
ethnic movement relations are politically ‘explosive’. If the state pursues the state-society relations while the movements stick to the cultural agenda (but not completely losing their power of symbolism and imagery), the relations are likely to be beneficial to both sides.

8.2.3 Areas for future research
An area for possible future research would be a thorough and systematic comparison of the Chewa against other trans-border ethnic movements such as those of the Lozi, Ngoni, Lomwe and Tumbuka which are also found within the three countries. Specifically, the question would be: “To what extent are their organisations and operations a contribution or a challenge to the state?” In this case, a more comprehensive quantitative analysis would unravel a number of issues not considered in this paper.
9.0 REFERENCES


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## APPENDIX 1: People Consulted/Participants to the Key Informant Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Malawi</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Dr Justine Malewezi</td>
<td>Former Vice President of the Republic of Malawi and current Chairman of Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO), Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mr Dzilirakhasu</td>
<td>Publicity Secretary, Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO), Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Dr Fidelis Kanyogolo</td>
<td>Associate Professor, (Political Governance Expert) Law Department, University of Malawi, Zomba, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Dr Garton Kamchedzera</td>
<td>Associate Professor (Ethnicity and International Relations), Law Department, University of Malawi, Zomba, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Mr Andrew Mpesi</td>
<td>Political Scientists and Research Officer (Humanities &amp; Social Sciences), National Commission for Science and Technology, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Prof. Kings Phiri</td>
<td>Emeritus Professor, (Pre-colonial Chewa and African Historian) University of Mzuzu, Mzuzu, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Paramount Chief Lundu</td>
<td>Paramount Chief of the Chewa in Malawi, Chikwawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Mr Willington Chimwaye</td>
<td>Village Headman, TA Mazengera, Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mr Sikaliyoti Salimon</td>
<td>Village Headman, TA Mazengera, Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 VH Mwachilolo</td>
<td>Village Headman, TA Mazengera, Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Mr Hardson Chikhokho</td>
<td>Group Village Headman, Bango, Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Mr G. Chiwoza</td>
<td>Group Village Headman, Chiwoza, Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 Mr Jailos Njolomole</td>
<td>Group Village Headman, Nzunda, Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Mr Grant Mbewe</td>
<td>General Clerk (Desk Officer for Traditional Authorities), Mchinji District Assembly, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Mr Thomas Chigwenembe</td>
<td>Director of Administration, Mchinji District Assembly, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Mr Mukuse Sagawa</td>
<td>Principal Foreign Service Officer, Political Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Mr L.K. Sikwese</td>
<td>Director, Rationalization Unit, Office of the President and Cabinet. Former Deputy Director, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Mr Lawrence Makonokaya</td>
<td>Director of Chief’s Administration, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Mr Abels Mkandawire</td>
<td>Foreign Service Officer, Political Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 (Name withheld)</td>
<td>(Station name withheld) Immigration/Police, Mozambique/Malawi boarder, Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Mr Alufandika Supeyo</td>
<td>Village Headman, Nkhabeka Village, TA Lundu, Chikhwawa, Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Mr Watson Bwanali</td>
<td>Senior Group Village Headman, Nkhabeka Village, TA Lundu, Chikhwawa, Malawi</td>
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<td>No.</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Mr Spedson Alfred</td>
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<td>Mr Samson Chinyama</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Dr Hendrina Mazizwa</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Joseph Chunga</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Senior Chief Kaomba</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>Mr S. Banda</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Prof. Bizeck Phiri**</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Mr Kaunda Kapepula**</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Dr Neo Simuntanyi**</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Mr H. Banda</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Mr Mole Nkhoma</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Mr Post Chirwa</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>Mr J. Banda</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Mr G. Zulu</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Mr K. Kamanga</td>
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<td>Mr J. Banda</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>Mr K. Banda</td>
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<td>41</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>TA Chanje</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Mr Adrivas Zitha</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>Mr A. Garafe</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Mr Maulele Soko</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>Mr Vernanco Candodo</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Mr A. Mbemba</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>Mr Carlos Shenga**</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>Mr Horacio Gervasio**</td>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>(Name withheld)</td>
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<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Mr Makiyoni Kamkhwani</td>
</tr>
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<td>53</td>
<td>Mr Amon Thamison</td>
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**Zambia**

**Mozambique**
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Mr Kumbuyo Gilibati</td>
<td>Village Headman, Katsekamiga 2 Village, Tete Province, Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Mr Lafuledi Zakaliya</td>
<td>Village Headman, Katsekamiga 3 Village, Tete Province, Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Mr Chonunkha Malitinyo</td>
<td>Village Headman, Katsekamiga 4 Village, Tete Province, Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Mr Tomasi Chichitsulo</td>
<td>Group Village Headman, Mphande Village, Tete Province, Mozambique</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Telephonic interview or email follow-ups**
Appendix 2 (a) Application to collect data in Mozambique through a Malawian District Commissioner

The District Commissioner
Angonia
Mozambique

9th May, 2012

KALATA YA CHIZINDIKILO


Bambo Kayuni amagwira ntchito ku University ya Malawi (Chancellor College). Iwowa akuphunzira Sukulu ku Univesity ya Western Cape ku south Africa(Onani Kalata yomwe ali nayo).

Ngati pangakhale zovuta zina mutha kundidziwitsa podzela pa ma foni nambala awa: +265 999 662 727 / 888 843 978.

Macloud D.A Kadam’manja
DISTRICT COMMISSIONER
NTCHEU, MALAWI
Appendix 2 (b) Researcher’s introductory letter

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

25th April 2012

Dear Sir/Madam,

INTRODUCING A PHD RESEARCHER: MR HAPPY MICKSON KAYUNI

I write to certify that Mr Happy Mickson Kayuni is a bona fide employee of the University of Malawi’s Political and Administrative Studies Department. He is currently pursuing PhD (Political Science) studies at the University of the Western Cape and his topic of study is entitled “The Westphalian Model and Trans-border Ethnic Identity: The Case of Chewa Kingdom of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia”. The main objective of his study is to examine the extent to which the formal notions of state, citizenship and sovereignty is experienced and understood by the trans-border Chewa/Nyauja community.

In order to fulfil the objective of his study Mr Kayuni will, among other things, be required to conduct Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions in some selected institutions and areas of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. In this regard, you have been identified as one of the institutions/individual who could either participate in this study or provide logistical assistance towards attainment of the same. Consequently, I implore you to provide all the necessary assistance that Mr Kayuni may require.

Regards,

Mercy Chikapa-Jamali (Mrs)
Head, Political & Administrative Studies Department
Appendix 2 (c): Application letter to conduct research at Malawi National Archives

The Director
National Archives of Malawi
Private Bag 62, Zomba

3rd May 2012

Dear Sir/Madam,

INTRODUCING A PHD RESEARCHER: MR HAPPY MICKSON KAYUNI

I write to certify that Mr Happy Mickson Kayuni is a bona fide employee of the University of Malawi’s Political and Administrative Studies Department. He is currently pursuing PhD (Political Science) studies at the University of Western Cape and his topic of study is entitled “The Westphalian Model and Trans-border Ethnic Identity: The Case of Chewa Kingdom of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia”. The main objective of his study is to examine the extent to which the formal notions of state, citizenship and sovereignty is experienced and understood by the trans-border Chewa/Nyanja community.

In order to fulfil the objective of his study Mr Kayuni will, among other things, be required to review some historical documents relating to the Chewa/Nyanja ethnic group. In this regard, I write to ask your office to provide Mr Kayuni access to your Search Rooms for a period of approximately two months.

I am looking forward to your prompt and positive response.

Regards,

Mercy Chikapa-Janali (Mrs)
Head, Political & Administrative Studies Department
OPPAEP/75/1/1
16th May, 2012.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
INTRODUCING PhD RESEARCHER: MR. MICKSON KAYUNI

Reference is made to the above captioned subject matter.

The above named is a Student at University of Malawi and currently doing a research programme involving Chewa Tradition, ethnic identity.

It is in view of the above that authority has been given for him to carry out the research and every help given will highly be appreciated.

H. Nkunika
Permanent Secretary
EASTERN PROVINCE
Appendix 4: Permission to conduct research in Angonia/Tete province of Mozambique

REPÚBLICA DE MOCAMBIQUE
PROVÍNCIA DE TETE
GOVERNO DO DISTRITO DE ANGÔNIA

A:
DIRECÇÃO PROVINCIAL DE
MIGRAÇÃO
TETE

Nota nº473/SDA/ 900/ 012 Data: 25.05.2012

Assunto: Emissão de Credencial

Para efeitos de autorização de um cidadão de nacionalidade malawiana de nome Happy Mickson Kayuni que este tencionha realizar um trabalho de pesquisa antropológica, (línguas, hábitos e costume) no nosso Distrito principalmente na Localidade Calómue, vimos através desta solicitar os bons oficios de V.Excia no sentido de emitir uma credencial que lhe autoriza a realizar este trabalho de modo que não lhe ponha qualquer impedimento durante o seu trabalho.

De referir que, este Governo do Distrito não coloca qualquer impedimento para o efeito.

Nossos cumprimentos.

O Administrador

Joaquim António Paulo Cherene
/Técnico Técnico
## Appendix 5: Generic Key Informant and FGD Guide

### Development of traditional Chewa Kingdom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic Guiding Questions/Issues to be Explored</th>
<th>Respondents/Participants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image1.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td>CHEFO</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. When and where the Chewa kingdom revival was discussed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Factors that led to its revival [probe the social, political factors such as democratisation, learning from others etc]</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Who were the main actors behind its revival? [probe the interests of the actors and their social levels]</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. From which country were most of the actors behind the revival? [probe why?]</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Is there something unique about the Chewa as an ethnic group?</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. How do you define a Chewa?</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. What are the specific advantages of having the CHEFO organisation? [probe the economic, social-cultural, and political advantages]</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Why have the Chewas mobilised themselves in a trans-border model rather than confine their mobilisation to current national boundaries? [probe the national vs. trans-border advantages or disadvantages]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Why are the individual Chewa willing to affiliate themselves to a trans-border ethnic entity? Are there any specific benefits to be achieved?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Assuming the Chewa had chosen not to mobilise themselves in any form, would there have been any difference to their socio-political well-being?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Type and extent of the Chewa Linkages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic Guiding Questions/Issues to be Explored</th>
<th>Respondents/Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image2.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td>CHEFO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. What makes the Chewa feel that they are the same as their colleagues across the boundaries? [probe similarities and differences due to national politics etc]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. What is the significance of kulamba ceremony to the Chewa? [probe for social-cultural and political reasons]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Extent to which there is commonality or divergence of views on State, Sovereignty & Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic Guiding Questions/Issues to be Explored</th>
<th>Respondents/Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image3.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td>CHEFO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. How do the Chewa ethnic group members value their identity? [probe explanation]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Has the nation-states of Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique affected some similarities or differences amongst the Chewa? [probe the historical, legal, policy etc explanations]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. [CITIZENSHIP]-What do they consider as more important: their national or Chewa identity? Or both? [probe for ranking of cultural, political, national-state identity]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Assuming the colonial powers had demarcated a special Chewa state, could it have made any difference now? [probe: Is it necessary for political identity?]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. To what extent do the shortfalls of national-state lead to affiliation to Chewa identity. [probe for complementarity, divergence or similarities between national-state and Chewa identity]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. [STATE] -Does the state boundaries pose as a challenge to expression of Chewa identity?</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Do most ordinary Chewa villagers own passports? [probe for reasons]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Do they attend Chewa funerals, marriage ceremonies or traditional rites and dances across the border?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Is it a problem for them to cross the boundary so as to interact with other Chewa colleagues? [for marriages, funerals, traditional rites and dances]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Assuming the police and immigration personnel know the Chewa people’s intention to cross boundaries (without official documentation) for tradition related issues what would they do? [Probe for specific examples/cases]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Assuming the MPs were replaced by their traditional authorities, would this be welcomed as appropriate representation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Does this trans-border organisation of the Chewa threaten or consolidate</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Does this trans-border traditional interaction threaten national or border security?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Assuming the local office of the councillors was abolished, would that make any difference to you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Assuming the authority of the local chiefs was abolished and their role taken over by local assemblies, would that be problematic?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Assuming that it was decided that the Chewa in this country should only mobilise themselves locally without linking themselves to other Chewas in neighbouring countries, what would be your reaction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Assuming there is a suggestion that a local Chewa King should be appointed in each country to oversee the welfare of Chewa in those countries, what would be your reaction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>[SOVEREIGNTY] - Do ordinary villagers know the Chewa King?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>How important is the Chewa king to them? [probe: Do they think that his role is challenging, contradicting, compromising, confirming or complementing the state authority?]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>When the Chewa villagers have a marriage or land dispute, to whom do they immediately turn to: state official or local chief? [probe for explanation]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Linkages as a challenge, contradiction, compromise, or complement on state, sovereignty, and citizenship**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>To what extent does the a-political, b-legal and c-policy frameworks of Malawian, Mozambique and Zambian states work as an advantage or disadvantage to Chewa kingdom organisation [probe: Do they challenge, contradict, compromise, confirm or complement the Chewa Kingdom’s existence and operations?]</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Most African political parties are ethnic based, do you also see this happening here or the possibility of this happening amongst the Chewa?</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>What do you think are specific factors that may enhance the trans-border politicisation of the Chewa?</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Is there a potential of a trans-border Chewa political entity forming in the future?</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Has CHEFO ever been involved in issues of policy advocacy? or if there are any policy issues that do not promote the welfare of the Chewa, would CHEFO take up the policy advocacy?</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>How would you rate the level of trans-border interaction amongst the Chewa before and after formation of CHEFO?</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Assuming that it has been suggested that the non-chewas should be incorporated in CHEFO what would be your reaction?</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>How would you define the relationship between CHEFO and the governments of the three countries? Do you think there is a difference in how you relate to each of these?</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>How do you ensure that there is unity between subordinate chiefs and Gawa Undi? or How is the King’s authority sustained?</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>When the political relations amongst these three countries has soured (as it happened during the Bingu administration), does it affect CHEFO?</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>International conventions recognised the state and some international NGOs as key players in inter-state relations. Do you see the potential of informal trans-border ethnic groups such as CHEFO doing the same?</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Is the emergence of CHEFO a vindication that most African borders are artificial?</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>Is this trans-border Chewa entity a threat or complement to democracy (representation, election, citizenship rights).</td>
<td>√</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Assessment of other formal and informal institutional arrangements**

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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>Apart from Kulamba ceremony [and CHEFO] do Chewa have any other way of linking themselves with the other Chewa people across boundaries?</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>Are these linkages adequate?</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. What do they think should be done to improve them?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Do you see the Chewa as purely cultural movement or has some</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elements of political mobilisation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. To what extent does the Chewa trans-border movement actually</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>represent the grassroots Chewa people?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suggested opportunities for further linkages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Have you ever thought of introducing commercial linkages of the Chewa</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>through for instance the marketing traditional artefacts?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Is there a possibility of enhancing interaction with other ethnic</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups? How?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 6: Interview Guide for Researchers and Government officials

General background
1. Is ethnic identity a political issue in this country?
2. In general, what are the contributing factors to ethnic identity or Why do individuals choose to align themselves with ethnic movements?
3. What is the view of government on ethnic movements? Does it support or discourage these movements? What is government’s reason for or against this support?
4. What is the role of traditional authorities in this ethnic mobilisation?
5. Do you see any difference or similarities between ethnic identity during the one party era and in the contemporary multiparty era?
6. Apart from the Chewa, are you aware of any trans-border ethnic movement?
7. What do you think is the advantage or disadvantage of having a trans-border ethnic movement?
8. What value do ethnic movements add to national socio-political development?

Rationale for trans-border model & benefits (to individuals and nations)
9. Why have the Chewas mobilised themselves in a trans-border model rather than confine their mobilisation to current national boundaries? [probe the national vs. trans-border advantages or disadvantages]
10. Why are the individual Chewa willing to affiliate themselves to a trans-border ethnic entity? Are there any specific benefits to be achieved?
11. Assuming the colonial powers had demarcated a special Chewa state, could it have made any difference now? [probe: Is it necessary for political identity?]

State, sovereignty, citizenship & Chewa identity
12. To what extent do the shortfalls of national-state lead to affiliation to Chewa identity. [probe for complementarity, divergence or similarities between national-state and Chewa identity]
13. Do you think that the state boundaries pose as a challenge to expression of Chewa identity?
14. Does this trans-border organisation of the Chewa threaten or consolidate state sovereignty?
15. Assuming that it was decided that the Chewa in this country should only mobilise themselves locally without linking themselves to other Chewas in neighbouring countries, what would be your reaction?
16. Assuming there is a suggestion that a local Chewa King should be appointed in each
country to oversee the welfare of Chewa in those countries, what would be your
reaction?

17. To what extent does the a-political, b-legal and c-policy frameworks of Malawian,
Mozambique and Zambian states work as an advantage or disadvantage to Chewa
kingdom organisation [probe: Do they challenge, contradict, compromise, confirm or
complement the Chewa Kingdom’s existence and operations?]

18. Most African political parties are ethnic based, do you also see this happening here or
the possibility of this happening amongst the Chewa?

19. What do you think are specific factors that may enhance the trans-border politicisation
of the Chewa?

20. Is there a potential of a trans-border Chewa political entity forming in the future?

21. International conventions recognised the state and some international NGOs as key
players in inter-state relations. Do you see the potential of informal trans-border
ethnic groups such as CHEFO doing the same?

22. Is the emergence of CHEFO a vindication that most African borders are artificial?

23. Is this trans-border Chewa entity a threat or complement to democracy
(representation, election, citizenship rights).

24. Do you see the Chewa as purely cultural movement or has some elements of political
mobilisation?

25. To what extent does the Chewa trans-border movement actually represent the
grassroots Chewa people?
Appendix 7: Discussion guide for the Malawian Government Officials

Discussion guide for the Malawi Government Officials

1. Which office is responsible for the welfare of King Gawa Undi when he is visiting the country? Why is this particular office responsible?
2. What is the mode and level of protocol accorded to him? Is he handled like a visiting head of state or minister?
3. What mechanisms are put in place to regularize this arrangement?
4. To what extent is Malawi government involved in the affairs of Kulamba ceremony?
5. During Kulamba ceremony, Malawian Chewas are allowed, for immigration purposes, to use an official letter of identification. Is this a permanent or adhoc arrangement? When and which principles guided this arrangement?
6. To what extent does Gawa Undi have the authority to handle affairs of Chewa Chieftaincies in Malawi?
7. Does the government put a limit to his authority? Is there any existing formal articulation of his sphere of authority?
8. Which official documents/policies guide the relationship between Malawi government and Chewa trans-boarder movement in general?
9. What value does the Chewa movement add to the socio-political development of the country?
10. To what extent has the Chewa movement affected the immigration or other related policies of the three countries?
11. To what extent is the Chewa trans-boarder movement a threat to the national state securities of the said three countries?
12. What do you think are the socio-political advantages and disadvantages of having a trans-boarder movement?
13. In your opinion, do you think the movement is likely to inspire other trans-border ethnic groups to follow suit? Assuming it does indeed inspire other ethnic groups, Will this development be welcomed by the state?
14. Do you have specific examples, as highlights, that need specific mention in relation to the Chewa movement and the state?
15. In your opinion, do you think the Chewa movement will receive more or less attention from the state in future? Explain.
16. International conventions recognize the state and some international NGOs as key players in inter-state relations. Do you see the potential of informal trans-border ethnic groups such as the Chewa doing the same?
17. Assuming there are poor relations between Malawi and its neighbors, do you think this may affect the Chewa movement negatively?
18. Is the emergence of the Chewa movement a vindication that most African borders are artificial?
19. Could the Chewa movement be another example of emerging ‘multiple citizenship’ for its members?
20. In your opinion, is the movement purely cultural or has some elements of political mobilization?
Appendix 8: Informed Consent Form (Key Informant Interviews)

The purpose of this research is to examine how the concepts of state, sovereignty and citizenship as practically understood and experienced by the Chewa people in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. Specifically, the study examines whether this understanding and experience challenge, contradict, compromise, complement or confirm the formal interpretation. It is hoped that the results will among other things widen options for regional integration of the said three countries through linkage of the formal and the informal institutions of governance.

Individually, you have been identified as a potential participant for this research because of your key position in society or formal position, and may have valuable insights for this research. All that is required is your participation in this interview which should last no longer than 45 minutes.

Please be advised that participation is voluntary, and you may leave at any time. All responses will be treated confidentially and only used for reference purposes. Anonymity will be ensured, unless you are willing to be named. Furthermore, it is also imperative that you do not reveal the identities and information offered by other participants. This research results may be used for articles to be published in academic publications. The findings will also be reported through several channels.

By signing below, it implies that you have read and understood the research intentions, as well as your rights, and that you have agreed to participate.

Yours sincerely

Happy Mickson Kayuni
Tel: +265999078766
Email: 3180332@uwc.ac.za

I………………………………………………………………………………………………….. (Full names of participant) herby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire.

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT: …………………………………………………

DATE: …………………………………………………
Appendix 9: Informed Consent Form (Focus Group Discussion)

The purpose of this research is to examine how the concepts of state, sovereignty and citizenship as practically understood and experienced by the Chewa people in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. Specifically, the study examines whether this understanding and experience challenge, contradict, compromise, complement or confirm the formal interpretation. It is hoped that the results will among other things widen options for regional integration of the said three countries through linkage of the formal and the informal institutions of governance.

As a group, you have been identified as potential participants for this research because of your understanding and involvement in Chewa cultural activities hence may have valuable insights for this research. All that is required from you is participation in this interview which should last no longer than two hours.

Please be advised that participation is voluntary, and you may leave at any time. All responses will be treated confidentially and only used for reference purposes. Anonymity will be ensured, unless you are willing to be named. Furthermore, it is also imperative that you do not reveal the identities and information offered by other participants. This research results may be used for articles to be published in academic publications. The findings will also be reported through several channels.

By signing below, it implies that you have read and understood the research intentions, as well as your rights, and that you have agreed to participate.

Yours sincerely

Happy Mickson Kayuni
Tel: +265999078766
Email: 3180332@uwc.ac.za

I………………………………………………………………………………………………… (Full names of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire.

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT: …………………………………………………

DATE: …………………………………………………
Gawa Undi gives us hope

January 1, 2013 | Filed under: Editor's Choice | Posted by: Mwansa

At a time when the institution of chief in Zambia is synonymous with stupidity, there is one who gives us hope that not all is lost. His name is Fred Daka; an engineer by profession. He is the reigning Paramount Chief Gawa Undi of the Chewa people.

Gawa Undi (in white) is simply different from the current crop of traditional leaders in Zambia. There could be a few others who are like him somewhere in our villages, but Undi is a shining example of what a Zambian traditional leader should be. From the time he ascended to the throne at Mkaika in 2004, Gawa Undi has remained a true inspirational leader who cannot be abused by these political misfits who are running Zambia.

Gawa Undi has always been neutral politically but very influential. When Gawa Undi speaks, he talks with authority about matters that affect his people. Gawa Undi never talks nonsense about opposition leaders. He never praises government officials unnecessarily or in order to be given money like most chief do. Gawa Undi never follows politicians to State House. They follow him to Mkaika.

We have never heard Gawa Undi tell his people to vote for this or that politician. He instead treats every Zambia like his child – like the true paramount chief he is. We have never seen Gawa Undi being paraded by some politician to utter some garbage in exchange for a second hand car from Japan or brown envelope containing stolen money. Gawa Undi is a man and ruler with personal integrity and respect.

We wonder what would happen if a character like chief Puta or chief Mukuni was to be given such power. Gawa Undi’s exemplary personal life and leadership is a living rebuke to most traditional leaders in Zambia. Most of the people who call themselves chief in Zambia today are not even fit to be advisors to Gawa Undi. They fall far much below the calibre required of a traditional leader. The behaviour of most chiefs in Zambia is embarrassing. Nowadays, whenever you hear a chief speaking, it is either he has been given money by politicians or is trying to attract attention so that his hungry belly can be filled by politicians. This is how low our traditional leadership has sunk.

For Gawa Undi, we wish him good health in 2013 and many more years to come. We pray that even when Gawa Undi sleeps, he shall be given a good successor who is like him. For, in this life, good leaders are often succeeded by living disasters. Look at Mpezeni. The Paramount Chief who ruled before this ka hopeless current Mpezeni was a great man. But the moment he died, his successor almost tore the Ngoni Empire apart by raping a 14 year old girl. This is the man who would leave the palace at night to go and dance and ‘tow’ from Chipata night clubs. The current Mpezeni is not the kind of leader that inspires us. We hope that when the current Mpezeni kicks the bucket, a worthy Jere will take over that throne.

Downloaded from: http://www.zambianwatchdog.com/?p=8258&cpage=1
Appendix 11: Copy of Kulamba ceremony border pass

REF.NO.ADM.15/04A/104

FROM: THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER
P/BAG 1
MCHIPENJI

TO: THE O/C
IMMIGRATION
ZAMBIA

TO: THE O/C
ZRA
MWAMI BORDER
ZAMBIA

CC: THE O/C
IMMIGRATION
BOX 9
MCHIPENJI

RE: BOARDER PASS FOR CHEWA CHIEF AND PEOPLE FROM TA
KAPONDO WHO ARE GOING TO ZAMBIA AT MKAIKA (GAWA
UNDI) ON 24TH AUGUST 2007 FOR CHEWA KULAMBBA CEREMONY

With reference to the topic I ask your good office to allow the listed
people to cross the Mwami boarder to Katete, Zambia.

These are from Malawi and would like to attend kulamba ceremony on
25th August 2007 and will be back the following day on 26th August 2007.

They will use a vehicle Reg No. 22-33 for Mr. ALEX D.G. MW

Your favour is always appreciated by this office.

R.D. KACHILONDA
DISTRICT COMMISSIONER
Appendix 12: CHEFO fund raising advert

CHEWA HERITAGE FOUNDATION
CHEWA ROYAL ESTABLISHMENT
Undi-Chewa Traditional Council

PRESS RELEASE

CHEWA KULAMBA TRADITIONAL CEREMONY FOR 2009

The office of the Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO) is informing the general public that this year’s Chewa Kulamba Traditional Ceremony will take place on August 29 at the Chewa Royal Headquarters, Mkaika, Katele District of Zambia. The Chewa Chiefs and their subjects from Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique shall participate at the said ceremony. Kulamba Traditional Ceremony takes place annually at the last weekend of the month of August.

The ceremony is open to the general public as such those wishing to attend the function are required to satisfy the travel modalities as per the country laws and requirements. People may travel to Katele and come back the same day.

For the ceremony to be arranged and patronized successfully, a lot of resources in the form of financial, material and moral assistance are required from well-wishers.

In this respect, we are requesting various interested well-wishers for financial assistance. Those interested may please make such financial assistance by either cheque or cash deposit, payable to Chewa Heritage Foundation, Account Number 0133542333400, held at National Bank of Malawi, Lilongwe Branch.

A detailed programme of the Kulamba Traditional Ceremony shall be announced in the near future.

For further clarification, you may contact: Dr. J. C. Malewezi (Chairman) on 0999980150, Prof. G. Kanyama Phiri on 0999933085 or the Secretariat on the

Pharmacy, Medicines
Revenue Authority
system of checking products brought into the country at the ports
Pharmacy Act (1988) and the regulations thereof require imported medicinal products to be of a known and safe quality and efficacious at the time of import.

Therefore, all importers of medicinal products are advised:

(a) The importers must apply for an Import Licence from the Pharmacy, Medicine, and Poisons Council of Malawi in accordance with the Pharmacy Act, 1988.
(b) The importers must provide the socket of registration of the medicinal product.

The inspectors and the Pharmacy, Medicine, and Poisons Council of Malawi reserve the right to retain or refuse any import of medicinal products that are not licensed under the Pharmacy Act, 1988.

Any queries or further information may be directed to the Acting Registrar of Pharmacy, Medicine, and Poisons Council of Malawi,
P.O. Box 30241
Lilongwe 3
Tel.: 01 755 185/166
E-mail: admin@pmc.
Appendix 13: Kalonga Gawa Undi’s programme of Malawi visitation in 2005

Urgent!

CHEWA ROYAL ESTABLISHMENT

P.O. Box X18, Post Dot Net Crossroads LILONGWE.

Ref. No.: CRE/1

The District Commissioner,
Mchinji District Assembly,
Private Bag 1
MCHINJI

Dear Sir,

VISIT BY HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS KALONGA GAWA UNDI XI

I am writing to inform you that His Royal Highness Kalonga Gawa Undi XI, King of the Chewa people in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia will be visiting Malawi from 7th – 18th November, 2005.

In Mchinji the King will visit chiefs and their people at T/A Mkanda’s Headquarters on 9th November, 2005.

Obviously, since Mchinji is the entrance and exit point, the Kalonga will pass through Mchinji on 7th November, 2005 as he enters Malawi and on 18th November, 2005 as he leaves Malawi for Zambia.

I trust that you will help to facilitate to make the visit to Mchinji a success.

Yours faithfully,

J.C. Malewezi, PhD
Chairman, Organizing Committee
THE CHEWA ROYAL ESTABLISHMENT
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>VENUE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 November 2005</td>
<td>• 11.00 hours, arrival of Kalonga Gawa Undi</td>
<td>Lilongwe</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Afternoon, Chewa Chiefs call on His Royal Highness</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• After meeting with the Chiefs, same afternoon, Zambian High Commissioner call on His Royal Highness</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Thereafter, rest in Lilongwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 November 2005</td>
<td>• 10.00 hours, His Royal Highness call on the State President, Dr. Bingu Wa Mutharika</td>
<td>Lilongwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 14.00 hours, the King visit Blessings Hospital, factory and school at Lumhodzi and Irrigation Scheme at Mkanene Village in Dowa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Thereafter, rest in Lilongwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 November 2005</td>
<td>• 10.00 hours, the King depart Lilongwe for Mehemani Headquarters to meet Chief Mkandwa and his people in Mchinji</td>
<td>Mchinji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 November 2005</td>
<td>• Morning, the King depart Lilongwe for Edingeni Headquarters (Mzimba) to meet Paramount Chief M'mbelwa, in Mzimba and rest there</td>
<td>Edingeni in Mzimba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 November 2005</td>
<td>• Morning, the King depart Edingeni for Kasungu; stop-over at Kamuzu Academy and have lunch</td>
<td>Kasungu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Afternoon, the King meet Chiefs and people at Kasungu Community Centre ground</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Thereafter, depart for Lilongwe to rest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 November 2005</td>
<td>• Morning, the King depart Lilongwe for Salima and meet chiefs at Salima Town Hall.</td>
<td>Salina /Mangochi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Then, the King visits Mankhamba (former Headquarters of Marabvi Kingdom), lunch at Mua Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Thereafter, the King visits Cultural Museum at Mua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Events</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 13 November 2005      | - Morning, the King depart Mangochi for Zomba; stop-over at Mpinganjira Village to meet Chewa Chiefs and their people.
                        | - The king and the delegation have lunch at Hotel Masongola in Zomba
                        | - Then, the King and delegation visit Zomba Plateau, Kamuzu View, Zomba Dam
                        | - Thereafter, the King depart for Blantyre to rest at Admarc Cottage
                        | - The rest of delegation from Zomba go straight to Paramount Chief Lundu’s place in Chikwawa to rest       | Zomba/Blantyre    |
| 14 November 2005      | - Morning, the King depart Blantyre for Mbewe Headquarters to meet Paramount Chief Lundu and his chiefs in Chikwawa; and thereafter, have lunch
                        | - Then, the King visit Chewa Peoples’ Shrine.
                        | - The King depart Chikwawa for Blantyre to rest and other delegation remain behind to rest in Chikwawa        | Blantyre/Chikwawa |
| 15 November 2005      | - Morning, the other delegation depart Chikwawa for Blantyre to join the King’s procession
                        | - Morning, the King and delegation depart Blantyre for Lilongwe; stop-over at ‘Mawere a Nyangu’ and at Chief Gomani’s place in Ntcheu and Dedza Pottery in Dedza
                        | - Thereafter, the King rest in Lilongwe                                                                  | Ntcheu/Dedza     |
| 16 November 2005      | - Free for resting.                                                                                             | Lilongwe          |
| 17 November 2005      | - The King attend Cultural function for the Chewa People at CIVO Stadium in Lilongwe                           | Lilongwe          |
| 18 November 2005      | - The King depart Malawi for Zambia                                                                               | Lilongwe          |
Chewa chiefs divided

THE DAILY TIMES, Friday, December, 2001

KAOMBA—Some chiefs are supporting Muluzi

But chewing chiefs are divided over the idea of Muluzi forming a political coalition with other chiefs.

The Chewa Church in the"Chewa chiefs divided over Muluzi’s coalition with other chiefs"—The Daily Times, December 2001.

Chewa chiefs divided over Muluzi’s coalition with other chiefs.

The Chewa Church in the...
Appendix 15: CHEFO’s demand for Malawian Government Minister to apologise to the Chewa

**Let Phoya apologise—Chewa Foundation**

By Golden Matonga

NEWLY appointed Minister of Lands, Henry Phoya has insulted the majority of all Chewa over his remarks that MCP rejected him because he was not a member of Gulembweku, a social in the tribe, and the Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEF) is demanding an apology to the minister’s foundation.

Phoya made the remarks while addressing the party’s conference on Tuesday last week. His remarks were interpreted as an attack on all Chewa people.

ByGolden Matonga, since premises imply that Phoya should withdraw his remarks.
Appendix 16: The hierarchy of Chewa political relationships

Source: Phiri (1975:75)
Appendix 17: Chronology of Chewa Kings from Malawian, Mozambican and Zambian headquarters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kalongas who were based at Mankhamba (now Mtakata, Dedza Malawi)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kalonga Mazizi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kalonga Chinkhole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kalonga Chidzonzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Kalonga Muzura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kalonga Kampepuza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Kalonga Kampikule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Kalonga Kampini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Kalonga Sosola</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kalongas who were based at Maano in Tete, Mozambique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Kalonga Gawa Undi Chisakamzondi Msenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• (Several Kalongas- about 15-16 Kings)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kalongas who were based at Mkailka in Zambia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kalonga Gawa Undi Chibvunga (first at Mkailka in Zambia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kalonga Gawa Undi Mkhomo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kalonga Gawa Undi Chimphungu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Kalonga Gawa Undi Chibunga - who died in 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kalonga Gawa Undi Mkhumo II – on the throne now</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source of information: CHEFO Chairperson, 6th December 2012.*