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University of the Western Cape

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DECLARATION

I, Clinarete Victória Luís Munguambe, declare that ‘Solidarity and the Struggle for Zimbabwe: Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) in Mozambique (1975-1980)’, is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references

Clinarete Victória Luís Munguambe

Signed:

10th November, 2017
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation grew in different places. In Cape Town, at University of the Western Cape where I was admitted to do Master degree in History, and Mozambique, where I did my research between Maputo, Xai-Xai, Mapai and Chicualacuala. A research grant from the Centre for Humanities Research allowed me to come to Cape Town and do my Master as well as to do my field work back home. I am also grateful to the Centre for Humanities Research of the University of the Western Cape, which provided me with a welcoming academic environment during my stay as well as the funding necessary for my support during the two years of study and research.

Paolo Israel to whom I will be always grateful, oriented my work, at the same time telling me ‘para além de escrever uma boa tese, tens também que arranjar uns títulos sexies’, trying to push my imagination in order to bring some kind of poetic vision into it. However, I think that I ended up not being able to do this and that is my responsibility.

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My interviewees took me to other side of the time, and made me listen the sound of their weapons and smell their spirit of freedom. I enjoyed this ‘time travel’ with Fernando Machava, who made me feel safe.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the relationships of solidarity that developed between the Mozambican people and the Zimbabwean liberation movement ZANU, between 1975 and 1980, considering them in their multifarious aspects and attempting to understand the dynamics at work. Scholars have not paid sufficient attention to Mozambique’s role as the host country of the Zimbabwean liberation movement. This dissertation is intended to fill this gap in the literature, by engaging critically with the history of ZANU-Mozambique relations, seen from the perspective of the Mozambicans themselves. My argument is that Mozambican support to ZANU was marked by a spirit of mutual cooperation and brotherhood between people who shared a similar historical and cultural background, which is a major factor behind the support offered by Mozambican people to ZANU. But, this solidarity was also the consequence of an authoritarian effort by the Mozambican ruling party, FRELIMO, to impose a specific political and ideological consciousness. This consciousness was shaped through the creation of legal instruments to ensure popular support such as the creation of the Solidarity Bank in 1976; by the use of an authoritarian discourse which relied on a ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’\footnote{Maria-Benedita Bastos. ‘The Writing of National Anthem in Post-Independence Mozambique: Fictions of Subject People.’ Kronos, 39, 1, (Nov 2013)}; and by the use of such methods as the cartoon figure, Xiconhoca, stigmatising all those who did not support solidarity with ZANU as traitors or sell-outs.

**Keywords:** Solidarity, nationalism, Liberation struggle, ideology, Frelimo, ZANU, Xiconhoca
Introduction

The idea of studying the relationship between liberation movements in Southern Africa and Mozambican people, both leaders and commoners, emerged in the context of the xenophobic attacks against African migrants in South Africa that started in 2008. I remember hearing several Mozambicans showing their disappointment about these attacks. In their opinion, it was unfair to have such kind of brutality against African migrants, particularly Mozambican ones, since Mozambican people suffered and even died to support Zimbabwe and South African liberation movements soon after Independence. Then I began to be curious about the ways in which Mozambicans had supported the Zimbabwean liberation struggle as well as the ANC militants exiled in Maputo.

This project grew at the Centro de Pesquisa de História Luta de Liberatção Nacional (Centre for Research of the History of Liberation Struggle) where I have been working as Assistant Researcher since 2012. By 2013-2014, I began to initiate preliminary archival research and interviews in Maputo and Matola. In October 2015, I took the money that I had been saving and I did the craziest trip of my life to Mapai district, where one of four brigades created by the Frelimo government in order to supported the ZANLA military operations were stationned. Crazy, because I was driving a small car; me and my assistant researcher, Fernando Machava, travelled almost 500 km from Maputo to the Mapai, from which around 254 km of the trip (from Aldeia da Barragem, near Chókwe district to Mapai) was made in a bad road conditions, full of sand, holes and pebbles, only suitable to 4x4 cars. As result, the section of the road that usually takes 4 hours in a good car, took us almost 10 hours.

I spent two weeks in Mapai doing interviews with militants who fought alongside Zimbabwean soldiers; going through the places where Mozambicans and Zimbabwean soldiers used to get to Zimbabwe; visiting graves where soldiers killed as the result of the combats were buried; going through the scrubs of their military quarters and bases; as well as interviewing ordinary people who had interacted with ZANLA soldiers.

Most of my interviewees showed some enthusiasm and pleasure for finally having an opportunity to share their stories and experiences, in a country where the framework of reference is the ‘epic history’ that usually has space only for the voices of those who fought against the Portuguese colonialism. I remember one of my interviewees telling me that ‘our suffering on the side of the Zimbabweans did not matter to this country’. I also learned that in a society where the protagonists of the stories are usually men, the women at the back had
more to say and share, adding details, correcting dates and telling the story with other angles of view.

This dissertation is product of all these places and experiences. It explores the network alliances and relationship between Mozambicans and Zimbabweans between 1975 and 1980. Moved by the principle of solidarity and following the independence of Mozambique in 1975, the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Frelimo) supported the Zimbabwe National Union (ZANU) as well as the African National Congress (ANC), from Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively. Frelimo considered this support was a necessary step for the complete liberation of Mozambique.

This thesis focuses on the solidarity relationship developed between Mozambican people and ZANU, considering it in its multiple aspects and attempting to understand its dynamics. It examines the Mozambican process of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation struggle from two angles. On one hand, it considers the support that was established in the rural areas, where people interacted closely with the ZANLA soldiers, providing food, intelligence on the movements of Rhodesian forces, and helping to transport war materials to the Rhodesian border. That was facilitated by historical and family ties between Zimbabweans and Mozambicans. On the other hand, it considers the support that was manifested in urban areas, where people demonstrated it through cultural manifestations such as letter, songs and poetry.

It also analyses the influence of Frelimo’s revolutionary ideology and its political propaganda by exploring the role played by the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca, which was created the party-state as an instrument to bolster the support to Zimbabwe liberation movement and its struggle.

As I wrote in an article published in 2017, some authors had explored the relationship between Mozambique and Zimbabwean liberation movements. Ngwabi Bhebe, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, Zvakanyorwa Sadomba, Agrippah Mutambara, Fay Chung, Edgar Tekere and Wilfred Mhanda all, in varying degrees, refer to the political and military relationship between FRELIMO and ZANU during this period. These authors, on

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the whole, cast the FRELIMO-ZANU relationship between 1975 to 1980 in a good light, with FRELIMO credited for having aided ZANU’s struggle in a more committed manner than did Zambia - ZANU’s initial primary host in exile. The principal exception to this overall thrust is Mhanda’s (nom de guerre: Dzinashe Machingura) autobiography. Mhanda presents a more complicated account of the relationship. He extols FRELIMO’s resuscitation of the armed struggle through its formation and hosting of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZI PA) in 1975, he conveys regret for disregarding FRELIMO’s opposition in 1975 and 1976 to the ZI PA military leaders’ association with the leadership of Robert Mugabe, and he also expresses bitterness and resentment towards FRELIMO for the role it played in ZI PA’s liquidation in 1977 and his subsequent incarceration by FRELIMO until 1980. A critical shortcoming in the aforementioned works is that they do not make the accounts of FRELIMO and ordinary Mozambicans who played a part in hosting ZANU, central to their analyses. Added to this is that Mozambican scholars have not paid attention to the FRELIMO-ZANU relationship. The autobiographical accounts of FRELIMO elites such as José Moiane and Lopes Tembe who interacted with ZANU in the period concerned, also do not discuss in great detail FRELIMO-ZANU relations. This is because, as Amélia Neves De Souto explains, the writing of ‘personal memoirs is a completely new phenomenon in Mozambique. Some are simple accounts, with no objectives or aims other than telling the story of what the author believes was important in his or her life’s journey.’ The other aspect is that these biographies fits in ‘Collective Memories frame’, which present a history of the facts carefully coordinate, composed by a single and homogenous narrative, at the same time that they are silent about all the mistakes and gaps in the history. This dissertation begins to address these shortcomings in the literature by foregrounding the perspectives of Mozambican elites and ordinary people on the FRELIMO-ZANU relationship.


4 See JP. Moiane, Memórias de Um Guerrilheiro na Frente de Combate (Maputo, King Ngungunhane Institute, 2009). L.T. Ndelana, Da Udenamo à Frelimo e à Diplomacia Moçambicana (Maputo, Marambique, 2012)


7 Ibid
Literature Review/Background

The thesis builds on three bodies of literature: (a) historical literature on the concept of solidarity; (b) literature on the relationship between ZANU, ZAPU and Frelimo; (c) literature on Mozambican poetry and song; and (d) literature on the cartoon figure, Xiconhoca.

The concept of Solidarity

The network alliances that tied together the liberation movements of Southern Africa were defined as solidarity. This concept emerged in the 18th century as a borrowing from theology, relating to the Roman law expression, obligation in solidum, which was linked to the principle of friendship and natural brotherhood. As Haoke Brunkhorst argues, this concept stressed the Christian principle based on the idea that one human being is for all, others and all for one. Within this religious principle, the concept has been developed in a context that brought together unfamiliar persons, complementary roles and heterogeneous interest in the medium of abstract law. By the nineteenth century, in the aftermath of the French Revolution, the concept of solidarity acquires more clear-cut social and political connections. Karl Metz argues that as a political and social function, the concept of solidarity has its roots in the legal world which claimed for liberty, equality and fraternity. However, along the years the concept had evolved and it has been explored looking at disciplines such as Psychology, Sociology, History, and Biology among many others. At a micro level, solidarity has been conceptualised across different situations as: help and supporting provided in situations of need; doing one’s share situations of cooperation; fairness in situations of distributing goods; avoiding breach in situations of trust; and moral repair when violations have taken place.

It is this kind of solidarity of supporting and helping each other in situations of need that characterised network alliances during the struggle for independence and black sovereignty in Southern Africa. Many authors have explored the solidarity that connected the liberation movements of Southern Africa. Although there is an extensive body of literature

which explores the solidarity in the context of liberation movement of Southern Africa, most of these explorations approach this solidarity in two perspectives.

One of those perspectives relates to the interaction that was established between liberation movements and international networks around the world. Peter Limb, who explored the anti-apartheid solidarity in Australia and New Zealand, looks at it as a movement which overflowed the narrow bounds of nations or movements. This movement worldwide has been characterised as ‘a network of local, national and transnational groups and institutions’, a globalised new social movement or ‘imagined community of solidarity activists’. Håkan Thörn also explores the solidarity in Southern African liberation as a transnational movement. According to him, this solidarity movement could be seen as a transnational ‘movement of movements’, because the broader network of Southern African liberation movements and solidarity movements make a case for contemporary theorising and research on transnational movements and global civil society. Along the same lines, Hilary Sapiere also explores the solidarity in Southern Africa as transnational, but she looks to this ‘transnationality’ as a platform that permitted the liberation movement’s militants, particularly people that were exiled and activists of civil organisations, to interact with and influence one another. As she argues, the border-crossing peripatetic lifestyles of liberation movements created a symbiotic relationship between the liberation and solidarity movements that originated in the increased number of political activists in organisations.

The other perspective on solidarity in Southern African liberation struggles relates to the relationships developed among liberation movements themselves on the ground, especially in the camps. According to Christian Williams, those liberation movements, particularly FRELIMO, SWAPO, ANC, MPLA and ZAPU developed a guerrilla affiliated relationship between themselves, sharing military strategies as well as cultural manifestations. This solidarity relationship was extended to local people who lived in Kongwa and with whom those militants used to interact, sharing farming food, medical aid,

14 P. Limb, ‘The Anti-apartheid Movements in Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand’, p.909
and so on. In the same vein, John Day regards solidarity among liberation movements in Southern Africa as a movement that established regional networks of patronage and dependence, fighting side by side, living in the same neighbourhoods and camps, exchanging views and information, and hosting each other. Henning Melber defines solidarity that was established among liberation movements as a living moral, ethical and political obligation, which entails empathy as much as the loyalty to fundamental human values of equality and dignity to which all human beings should be entitled in an undivided manner. In the same perspective as the authors above, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson explore the solidarity among liberation movements themselves, but focus only on military relationships. According to Martin and Johnson, the relationship of solidarity between liberation movements in Southern Africa was expressed through military alliances, which were sustained by the fact that they were supported by Moscow or China. However, liberation movements that received assistance from Moscow developed a special relationship with each other as natural allies.

Alliances between Frelimo and Zimbabwean liberation movements

In general, the historiography about the relationships between Zimbabwe and Mozambique focus on political and military cooperation. Most of this literature explores this perspective from the point of view of Zimbabwean militants, based on what Terence Ranger calls ‘patriotic History’, which produced an official discourse that promotes the military image of the liberation struggle, the victorious party and its claim to perpetuity.

The other body of literature comes from the point of view of Mozambican militants, mostly written in form of biographies by nationalist veterans. Those touches with very little detail upon the political and military cooperation between Frelimo and ZANU, their narratives appearing as simple accounts, with no objectives or aims other than telling the story of what the author believes was important in his or her life’s journey. In general, these

biographies and historical memories fit in what Borges Coelho calls the ‘liberation script’: a coherent and fixed narrative corpus made of a sequence of events in a timeline and ordered in a number of broad phases which operate within Frelimo’s framework.24

According to Luise White the support that Frelimo offered to ZANU was very important because the Zimbabwean guerrilla had access to about 1200 km of the border between Mozambique and Rhodesia.25 For Terence Ranger this access to the border allowed many young men from Zimbabwe’s rural areas to flee to Mozambique in order to join the guerrilla.26 Ngwabi Bhebe also underlined the importance of the easy access between Zimbabwe and Mozambique to the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. According to him, with such a vast pool of potential recruits, ZANU was able to open about seven training camps in Mozambique. Jocelyn Alexander and Joan Mc Gregor also emphasis the Mozambican role in the development of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. They show convincingly that this support improved the relationship between the two Zimbabwean guerrillas (ZAPU and ZANU), which began to improve as a result of intense pressure in an effort to unite these two movements under one military command.27 Zvakanyorwa Sadomba goes further by arguing that the support that Frelimo gave to the leaders of ZANU was important because it clearly illustrates the internal ideology struggle. In fact, as he points out, it was within this space that a potent mix of ideas about ancestral land, modernist collectivisation and international capital emerged.28

Like most of the authors above, I will also engage with the liberation struggle in its transnational aspects; contrary to them, however, I will explore this relationship from another perspective – namely, the relationship established between and among ZANU and Frelimo soldiers as well as Mozambican people on the ground.

Literature about cultural manifestations in Mozambique

The popular support given to ZANU in Mozambique was also conveyed and channeled through songs, letters and poetry. Many authors have explored the role of cultural manifestations in Mozambique even before independence. According to Leroy Vail and Landeg White, Mozambicans used songs as jeers which reject injustice, satire, protest and lament against the colonial regime.29 Maria Benedita Basto stresses that during the colonial period, poetry, like song, protested against Portuguese’s injustice, and also started to express a desire of being Mozambican, linking up to themes of negritude explored in other contexts.30

Nevertheless, with the liberation struggle the poetry and songs acquired a revolutionary aspect and started to be informed by a ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’, in which there is a proliferation of watchwords such as ‘nationalist’, ‘revolutionary’, ‘victory’, ‘heroes’ and ‘traitors’.31 Paolo Israel calls attention to the fact that song and dances only came to be important in the Frelimo’s liberation struggle after the internal crisis within FRELIMO in 1970. After that, culture became a weapon of combat and it was used for military unity and to exalt the Frelimo struggle and the revolutionary process of building the new nation.32 To Jenne Penvenne and Bento Sitoe, with independence poetry and songs were used to celebrate and claim legitimacy.33

I argue that although the songs and poems stressed the moral duty to support Zimbabwean struggle, they also a reproduced the official revolutionary discourse. These poems and songs seems to be a reproduction of the words of Samora Machel, presenting watchwords such as: ‘Don’t cry child, because your father answered the call of the revolutions’, ‘Supporting the struggle for Zimbabwe’s liberation movement is defending Mozambique’, ‘Let us support our Zimbabwean brothers’, etc 34 So, the secondary literature discussed above offered me a solid historical background to critically analyse the songs and poems about the support the struggle for Zimbabwe.

31 M.B Basto, A Guerra das Escritas. Literatura, Nação e Teoria Pós-Colonial em Moçambique, p.90
34 ‘O Povo Moçambicano Apoia a Luta do Zimbabwe’, Tempo (1976), p.34
Xiconhoca and the Mozambique Revolution

After the independence of Mozambique the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca was also used to shape Frelimo’s revolutionary ideology and to condemn those who were against the process of building the new man. This cartoon figure was created by Frelimo’s Departamento de Informação e propaganda da Frelimo (Office for Information and Propaganda) in 1976. Immediately, it became omnipresent in radio messages, murals, posters, newspaper and magazine features. Lars Buurs argues that the Xiconhoca’s cartoon was skillfully designed to convey and represent its social, political and ideologically message and comes to stand for a host of negative figures that undermine the new state through ideological and moral decay. Meneses stresses that the ethical and political messages that this figure of Xiconhoca brought were transformed in the behaviour to avoid within the revolutionary process of building the new society. In other words, Xiconhoca was to embody the enemy of people, that is, the drunkard, lazy, bureaucratic, traitor, people with the colonial mentality and so on.

The image of Xiconhoca was also used as propaganda against the regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia, because as Machava points out, Frelimo viewed national independence as a transitional phase from one struggle to another. It meant that the battle against Portuguese colonialism had been won, but the same and permanent enemy (capitalist-imperialism) now represented by racist South Africa and Rhodesia, would use new and more subtle tactics to discredit socialism and destroy the people’s revolution in Mozambique.

My dissertation analyses the kind of message that the figure of Xiconhoca conveyed about the Zimbabwean liberation, looking at ideological as well as aesthetic aspects.

The Dualism of Solidarity

The support to Zimbabwean liberation struggle can be analysed from two angles: as a form of ideological coercion; and as driven by an authentic popular enthusiasm and investment.

On the one hand, there was a kind of identification in the cause of one another. The fact that Mozambicans had experienced a colonial regime based on racial difference made

36 Buurs. ‘Xiconhoca: Mozambique’s Ubiquitous Post-independence Traitor’, p.31
people see the support to the Zimbabwean liberation struggle as the fulfillment of a moral duty. This identification was stressed by historical, economic and cultural relationship between Zimbabwean and Mozambican people, particularly among those who lived in the border areas.³⁹ This moral duty was strongly established from the rural areas particularly those areas which share the border with Zimbabwe.

On other hand, this support was established within a context in which Frelimo attempted to build a notion of the ‘socialist new man’, guided by ideology and moral principles.⁴⁰ Frelimo stressed the idea that ‘Who is not with us, is against us,’ to impose its authority and legitimacy.⁴¹ In order to achieve its legitimacy and hegemony, the party-state used an authoritarian discourse and forms of ideological control to establish collective identity and punish and isolate all those who were considered as obstacle to Frelimo’s objectives and ideology, calling them enemies of the revolution. This discourse was ridden with paranoia. As Benedito Machava argues, the party-state used suspicion, intimidation, violence and punishment as the core ingredients of state-building in Mozambique.⁴² Such ideological control was enforced through practical means, such as the creation of military compulsory law which obliged all Mozambicans irrespective of their gender to be trained and join to the arms in order to fighter against Ian Smith, the creation of the Solidarity Bank in 1976, in which Mozambican workers were required to contribute one day of salary every month to support Zimbabwean liberation; or by propaganda, through the use of the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca. Xiconhoca represented an evil and the negative social, political and moral attitude that Frelimo wanted to eliminate: the bad aspect within the revolutionary process-the traitor, the lazy, the drunkard, the thief. Therefore Mozambican’s support to ZANU occurred in a context of strong ideological control exercised by FRELIMO and its political idea of building the new man, based in a dichotomy: heroes, those who does well, following the FRELIMO ideas and enemies, those who are against the revolutionary process.⁴³ This ideological coercion was much visibly in the urban areas, where people did not interacted closely with the Zimbabwean fighters contrary to the rural areas.

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⁴¹ Meneses, ‘Xiconhoca o Inimigo’, p.10
⁴² Machava, ‘State Discourse on Internal Security’, p.594
Argument

The goal of this research is to understand the dynamics of ZANU presence in Mozambique during the first five years of Mozambique’s independence (1975 and 1980), as well as to interrogate the category of solidarity used by liberation movements, in order to understand it in more complex terms—neither as mere coercion nor as wholehearted enthusiasm, but as a mixture of both and the result of specific interactions between people on the ground.

My argument will therefore be two fold. On the one hand I will try to highlight the spirit of mutual cooperation and brotherhood between people who shared the same historical and cultural background, as being a main factor behind the support offered by Mozambican people to ZANU. On the other hand, I will demonstrate how solidarity was also the result of an authoritarian effort by FRELIMO to impose a political and ideologically consciousness. This consciousness was shaped through the creation of legal instruments to ensure popular support such as, the creation of the Solidarity Bank in 1976; by the use of an authoritarian discourse which relied on a ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’; as well as by the use of the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca which stigmatised all those who did not support solidarity with ZANU as traitors or sold-outs.

Methodology

My research is based on three kinds of historical evidence: archival material; songs; and visual material relating to the character of Xiconhoca.

1. Archival research.

To generate research material for my analysis, I conducted archival research at the Frelimo Archives, particularly the Diplomacy and International Relationship section. Here, I looked at the correspondence exchanged between Frelimo and ZANU as well as documents about solidarity agreements. These documents gave me an idea about the roots of alliances between Frelimo and ZANU during Frelimo’s liberation struggle.

I also explored the Ministry of State Administration’s Archive and the Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique. At these archives I looked at press articles published during 1975 to 1980, particularly the daily news Notícas as well as the weekly Tempo. At these press

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44 Basto, A Guerra das Escritas.
articles I explored news about the presence of ZANU in Mozambique and the messages spread by the leaders and people at the rallies in supporting to Zimbabwe liberation struggle.

I also used the Aluka Jstor Online Archive to explore the collection Struggles for Freedom in Southern Africa, which contains sources about solidarity between liberation movements in Southern Africa, particularly the Southern Africa Magazine, a monthly magazine published by Southern Africa Committee in the United States, and also the Zimbabwe News, the ZANU’s official publication during the liberation struggle. I also have been exploring the website Mozambique History Net, which contains newspapers and sources of contemporary Mozambique History. My aim was to analyse how the international news looked at the support that Mozambique gave to ZANU as well as through ZANU’s point of view.

2. Songs interpretation
By exploring the Radio Mozambique archive, I engaged with the lyrics of popular songs that support the Zimbabwean liberation. My aim was to look at unofficial and official discourse in other to understand in which ways the freedom of expression that characterise the unofficial songs were repressed by Frelimo’s ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’. At the same time, I engaged with these lyrics’ songs to explore Mozambique’s commitment to the struggle for Zimbabwe. I also analysed how readers expressed their position regarding the support to the Zimbabwean struggle, looking at letters and poetry published at the newspapers.

3. Visual image of Xiconhoca
I also engaged with the visual image of the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca, published in press article by the party-state (such as Tempo and Notícias). Here I analysed how Frelimo used Xiconhoca as a coercive visual form to support Zimbabwean liberation. To achieve this objective, I was to explore the ideologically coercion and vocabulary translating by visual image of Xiconhoca.

4. Oral testimonies
Alongside with the above sources, I also engaged with oral testimonies. I conducted interviews with two kinds of people: Mozambican militants who struggled alongside ZANU militants in Mozambique’s borders as well as inside Zimbabwe; and also with ‘ordinary people’ who interacted directly with ZANU and Zimbabwean refugees in the border areas. These interviews helped me to address issues that the archival material does not explore,
while they gave me a perspective on the popular view about this support. Basically, I asked the following questions: Why Mozambicans helped or did not help ZANU and ANC militants? What mechanisms or strategies of support were used? What ties and what frictions emerged from the interaction between Mozambican citizens and their guests? Which role did preceding trans-border relations play (e.g. of kinship)? What were the obstacles supporters had to face (on the local and national level)? In which way did the central government try to influence or control this support on the ground?

**Thesis Structure**

The dissertation is comprised of three chapters.

In the first chapter, ‘*A Luta Continua in Mozambique Indepenend: Frelimo–ZANU Relations in Mozambique (1975–1980)*’, I examine the relationships established between ZANU militants and Mozambicans, particularly in border areas. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the ways in which Mozambican people interacted with ZANU militants. This chapter begins with exploring the roots of the alliance between Frelimo and ZANU during Frelimo’s liberation struggle. It also analyses the ways in which Frelimo (with other Frontline States) had shaped a political alliance between Zimbabwean liberation movements as well as its role in the process of negotiate the independence of Zimbabwe. Finally, the chapter explores the military dynamics established between Frelimo soldiers and Zimbabwean fighters, as well as the role of ordinary people in that military support.

The second chapter, ‘*When the unofficial meets the official: Poems, Letters, Songs*’, analyses letters and poetry published in the press articles as well as the lyrics of popular songs about the struggle for Zimbabwe. The objective is to discuss the feelings and perspectives of Mozambican people about the support to ZANU. My aim is to look at these cultural expressions and trace the influence of the party-state into it. In that chapter, I begin with exploring the characteristics of cultural manifestations during the colonial period in order to understand their background. Secondly, I analyse how the ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’ was born and how Frelimo used it to shape an official discourse. Third and last, I engage with the cultural manifestations that support the Zimbabwe struggle in order to explore in which ways they express a moral duty or represent Frelimo’s official discourse.

The third and last chapter, ‘*Xiconhoca, the saboteurs of the Zimbabwean struggle*’, will try to understand how the image of Xiconhoca was used as a visual medium to support the struggle for Zimbabwe. Firstly, I started with exploring the meaning of Xiconhoca within.
the revolutionary process. Then, through the reading of the image and its ideological message, I explore how the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca was used by the party-state to enforce ideological coercion on Mozambican people to support for Zimbabwe as well as a way of propaganda against the regime of Ian Smith. In other words, in this chapter I engage with the textual message as well as its visual features of the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca.

Chapter I

A Luta Continua in Mozambique independent

Introduction

In most parts of southern Africa, independence came after prolonged nationalist armed struggles against white minority regimes. The struggle for liberation in southern Africa was not confined to the region proper, but extended to other parts of Africa. As a result, some independent African countries became important host nations, both for the southern African liberation movements and refugee populations from the region. Southern African liberation movements developed political and military co-operation with each other, establishing regional networks of patronage and dependence, fighting side by side, living in the same neighbourhoods and camps, exchanging views and information, and hosting each other. It is in part because of this spirit of co-operation that the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) established political and military co-operation with the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in the early 1970s, to launch its offensive into Rhodesia alongside its own campaign in Mozambique. Following the dawn of Mozambican independence in 1975, Frelimo allowed ZANU’s military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), formally to establish guerrilla bases on Mozambican soil.

This chapter explores the political and military relationship between Mozambicans and ZANU, from 1975 to 1980. Specifically, it examines the ways in which FRELIMO elites and Mozambican citizens supported and interacted with the ZANU militants.

I argue that Frelimo’s co-operation with ZANU was partly motivated by a deep spirit of solidarity with the cause of Zimbabwean liberation. Ordinary Mozambicans, principally those who lived in the border areas in Manica, Tete and Chicualacuala, partook in this extension of support to ZANU because of Frelimo’s revolutionary ideology and political propaganda, which strongly enunciated that Mozambique’s liberation was incomplete in the absence of independence for its Zimbabwean neighbours. This promotion from above of a sense of solidarity was aided by factors operating below: that is, the common ancestry, language and culture of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans living in the border zones. None the less, Frelimo was not supportive of ZANU initially because it saw ZANU as having created

unnecessary division in the Zimbabwean liberation movement through its 1963 break away from the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). Frelimo–ZANU relations improved only because of ZANU’s effective demonstration of a stronger commitment to and plan for armed struggle than ZAPU. Still, improved Frelimo–ZANU relations were far from uncomplicated, because of disagreements over guerrilla tactics. Furthermore, certain ZANLA guerrillas opposed Frelimo soldiers’ involvement in intimate relationships with local women when they were operating in the Rhodesian warfront alongside ZANLA. Lastly, owing to the economic burden of hosting ZANU, Frelimo adopted a pragmatic approach to the fight for Zimbabwean independence. In practice, this meant that Frelimo actively supported ZANLA’s military operations, but it was not averse to the possibility of a negotiated independence settlement. On the other hand, players such as Mhanda and a number of ZIPA commanders were entirely opposed to the prospect of a negotiated independence agreement at the 1976 Geneva conference. Mugabe also proved to be an unpragmatic negotiator at the 1979 Lancaster House independence conference. Consequently, Frelimo forced Mhanda and ZIPA to attend the 1976 Geneva conference, and in 1979 Mugabe agreed a settlement at Lancaster House after a firm warning from Frelimo that if he did not sign the agreement, Mozambique would cease to host ZANU.

We do not know enough about the complexity of relations between host governments and liberation movements operating from their territory, and we know even less about how transnational military relationships actually worked. This chapter goes some way towards addressing these lacunae by showing the extent of the political and military influence that hosts wielded on liberation movements based in their countries. Frelimo used its influence as host to initiate an alliance between ZANU and ZAPU and their respective armies, and it took sides in ZANU’s 1976–77 internal political leadership struggle. On both issues, Frelimo’s word was hardly law, because the agency and interests of ZANU and ZAPU actors prevailed ultimately. But as we shall see, Frelimo retained its sovereign rights, thus it could one-sidedly determine how long ZANU continued to stage its liberation war from Mozambican soil.

The Roots of Political Alliance: Frelimo and ZANU, 1968–1974

The beginnings of the relationship between ZANU and Frelimo were fraught with difficulty. As Martin and Johnson affirm, a coalition existed among a number of liberation movements in southern Africa that considered themselves as the ‘authentic’ groups struggling for the
independence of their countries from colonial rule. These so called authentic movements included: Mozambique’s Frelimo; ZAPU from Zimbabwe; Namibia’s South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO); the African National Congress (ANC) from South Africa; and Angola’s Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). This coalition of liberation movements stood firm against rival movements in the region, which they labelled as inauthentic or dissident. These so called inauthentic southern African liberation movements were: ZANU; South Africa’s Pan Africanist Congress (PAC); Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA); and Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (Coremo) from Mozambique. One of the factors that helped to forge the authentic alliance is that its constituent actors were all supported by the Soviet Union, while the inauthentic movements were backed mainly by China. Frelimo regarded ZANU with suspicion – more so since ZANU split from Frelimo’s authentic ally, ZAPU, in 1963. For Frelimo, the formation of ZANU was a catalyst for further division in what ought to have been a single unitary liberation movement. Frelimo also had strong historical ties with ZAPU. Many Mozambican nationalists who went into exile in the early 1960s were supported by ZAPU, which helped them to create the União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (Udenamo) in Rhodesia, and to leave Rhodesia for Tanzania, where they developed their political and military goals. Udenamo joined two other Mozambican nationalist movements, namely Mozambique African National Union (MANU) and União Africana de Moçambique Independente (UNAMI), to create Frelimo in 1962. Frelimo fighters also established close relationships with ZAPU comrades at Kongwa camp in Tanzania from 1964 to 1966. In fact, in the 1960s Frelimo and ZAPU, as well as fighters from the ANC and SWAPO, had inhabited neighbouring camps at Kongwa, where they trained in guerrilla warfare. The liberation movements in Tanzania sometimes organised cultural events, to which they invited each other. Lopes Tembe, a Frelimo veteran who trained at Kongwa camp and subsequently became an assistant of Samora Machel, points out that organised cultural events such as concerts, poetry reading and theatre took place on

47 Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe.
48 Ibid.
49 Interview with Mariano Matsinha, Maputo, 9 October 2014.
50 M. Mboa, Memórias da Luta Clandestina (Maputo, Marambique, 2009); L.T. Ndelana, Da Udenamo à Frelimo e à Diplomacia Moçambicana (Maputo, Marambique, 2012); A. Bouene Mussanhane, Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional (Maputo, Marambique, 2012).
51 Ibid
Fridays, with the objective of promoting inter-cultural exchanges. He also stressed that relations were facilitated by the widespread use of Kiswahili by liberation movements to communicate with each other as well as with local people.

ZANU, from the time of its formation in 1963, therefore had to work towards building trust with Frelimo, as well as with the Tanzanian and Zambian leaders. According to Mariano Matsinha, a Frelimo representative in Zambia who was responsible for organising the armed struggle in Tete province, the relationship between ZANU and Frelimo dates back to 1968, when ZANU first asked Frelimo if it could operate from Mozambique’s Tete. ZANU made this request since it was geographically more convenient to open the north-eastern war front from Tete rather than from its Zambian base, and because Rhodesian forces had created a ‘cordon sanitaire’ along the Zambezi river. In the face of ZANU’s strong commitment to armed struggle, Frelimo gradually began to allow ZANLA to carry out operations from areas that it controlled in Mozambique. This also allowed many people from Zimbabwe’s rural areas to escape the war by fleeing to Mozambique and join the liberation struggle. However, Frelimo found it complicated to establish a formal military agreement with ZANU while maintaining a political alliance with ZAPU. According to Matsinha, the Frelimo leadership was concerned that a formal military agreement with ZANU would be seen by ZAPU as betrayal of the authentic coalition. Frelimo tried to manage a potential fallout with ZAPU by offering it an opportunity to open a military front through Tete, but ZAPU failed to seize the initiative owing to internal divisions created by a revolt in 1971. Matsinha stated that, in the long run, ZANU proved to be a serious liberation movement with clearer objectives than ZAPU about armed struggle, and this won it Frelimo’s vote of confidence.

In 1970 ZANU sent ZANLA guerrillas for refresher training to Frelimo’s front in Tete. The first ZANLA guerrillas to be sent to Tete were Meya Urimbo, Justin Chaúke and William Ndangana. A subsequent ZANLA group included Josiah Tongogara, Joseph Chimurenga, Rex Nhongo and Dakarai Badza. While some of these militants took refresher courses only, others participated in a number of battles with Frelimo against the Portuguese

53 Interview with Lopes Tembe, Maputo, 9 March 2015. Tembe was indicated as the official translator for Frelimo and ZANLA militants. Tembe speaks Shona, Ndebele and English because he lived in South Africa and Rhodesia during 1950s and 1960s.
54 Ibid.
55 Interview with Mariano Matsinha, Maputo, 9 October 2014.
56 Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, pp. 16–17.
57 Ibid.
59 Interview with Mariano Matsinha, Maputo, 30 October 2014.
60 Moiane, Memórias de Um Guerrilheiro.
colonial army. ZANLA cadres also received Frelimo training focused on how effectively to mobilise the masses in Rhodesia to support ZANU and to assist by transporting weapons. In fact, in the early 1970s, when ZANU was building up material supplies and transferring weaponry from Chifombo in Zambia to Mucumbura on the border between Mozambique and Rhodesia, Mozambican peasants assisted them in transporting large quantities of ammunition to the Zimbabwean border. Tete was an important operational sphere for Frelimo in central Mozambique for many reasons. First, by holding Tete it could halt the Portuguese offensive on the Cabo Delgado and Niassa fronts. Second, this front would in turn allow Frelimo forces to advance on Manica and Sofala provinces, as well as enabling contact with much of the civilian population. Finally, Frelimo could threaten the on-going construction of the Cahora Bassa dam.

When ZANLA began military operations from Tete in 1972, Rhodesian troops attacked the region, bombing Frelimo- and ZANLA-controlled areas constantly. This complicated Frelimo’s own military action there, but Frelimo continued to support ZANLA. According to Tembe, support for ZANLA also came from the people of Tete, who had been collaborating with Frelimo since the beginning of the struggle in that area. Besides supplying ZANLA with food, the people of Tete also carried ZANLA’s weapons and other military materials to the border with Rhodesia and offered shelter to Zimbabwean refugees in Tete. However, the support that Frelimo gave to ZANU was not restricted to this area. In 1973, Tobias Dai, a Frelimo military instructor at Nachingwea camp in Tanzania, received a military contingent of nearly 100 ZANLA recruits for a six-month training course. According to Dai, the training given to the Zimbabwean guerrillas was different to that given to their Frelimo counterparts, because the Rhodesian forces, in contrast to the Portuguese military, used a wider range of air power, particularly attack helicopters. After Mozambican independence in June 1975, ties between Frelimo and ZANU became stronger. Frelimo

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61 ‘The War is Here, Everywhere!’, interview conducted by anon. with Josiah Tongogara, published in Zimbabwe News, 10, 3 (1978).
62 Interview with José Moiane, Maputo, 14 October 2012. Moiane was Frelimo’s Commander on the Tete front between 1970 and 1974.
63 ‘The War is Here, Everywhere!’
65 Ibid.
66 Interview with Lopes Tembe, Maputo, 9 March 2015.
67 Ibid.
68 Interview with Tobias Dai, Maputo, 30 September 2015.
hosted ZANLA, first alongside ZIPRA as part of ZIPA, from 1975 to 1976. ZIPA was a creation of Machel and the Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, in order to further the Zimbabwean armed struggle amid deep division between the nationalist politicians. Frelimo continued to host ZANLA after ZIPRA withdrew from ZIPA in July 1976. Let me now turn to exploring in greater detail Frelimo’s relationship with ZANU from 1975 onwards.

**Frelimo and ZANU after 1975**

Mozambicans welcomed independence in 1975 with great euphoria. Frelimo’s propaganda stressed that Mozambique’s victory over Portuguese colonialism was made possible by the support and solidarity of many countries. Particular emphasis was given to the role played by Tanzania and Zambia, both of which hosted Frelimo military bases, from where war operations were co-ordinated for the liberation of Mozambique. Frelimo formalised Mozambique’s support to ZANU in 1975, following the proclamation of national independence. The constitution of 1975 stated that ‘the People’s Republic of Mozambique gives its support and solidarity to the struggle of the people for national liberation in the world’. When Frelimo became a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party in 1977, it reinforced the idea that solidarity with the Zimbabwean struggle and Zimbabwean refugees, as well as with exiled South African nationalists, was an intrinsic aspect of Mozambican citizenship. The so-called ‘proletarian internationalism was expected to be an indispensable element in the character of a Mozambican citizen’. Thus, Frelimo adopted a radical stance in relation to ZANU, allowing it to establish its main military bases and refugee camps in Mozambique while pressuring (with Tanzania’s support) ZANU and ZAPU to unite under one military command. For the African leaders, the unity of the Zimbabwean liberation movements was essential for victory over the white Rhodesian regime. It is important to underline that this attempt to unite Zimbabwean liberation movements started in 1974, during what became known as the détente exercise, in which the front-line leaders, Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Botswana’s Seretse Khama and Machel (who was not yet head of state), tried to unite the divided Zimbabwean nationalist parties, the African National Council (ANC), the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi), ZANU and ZAPU, so that they could

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69 Mhanda, *Dzino*.
72 Mhanda, *Dzino*.
negotiate as a united front for an independence agreement with prime minister Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front (RF) government.\textsuperscript{73}

The détente exercise did not succeed, because there was little genuine commitment to it from any side. The Smith regime wanted to use it as an instrument to eliminate the liberation guerrillas, while the nationalists remained deeply divided.\textsuperscript{74} Another explanation for the failure of détente lies in the fact that it was originally an idea developed by Zambia and South Africa, rather than by the Zimbabwean liberation movements and the RF regime themselves. The Zambian government promoted détente for economic reasons: its economy was dependent on Rhodesia and South Africa. All Zambian exports and 95 per cent of its imports travelled through transport networks controlled by South Africa and Rhodesia or by the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Zambia would pay a significant economic price for a prolonged independence war in Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{75} The South African apartheid regime promoted the coming to power of a moderate black government in Rhodesia because it feared the alternative – the rise to power of a radical communist government – that would leave it isolated as the last bastion of anti-communism in the region.\textsuperscript{76}

The failure of the détente initiative and the nationalist politicians’ wrangling resulted in Machel and Nyerere turning their efforts to supporting Zimbabwe’s armed struggle.\textsuperscript{77} In fact, with the independence of Mozambique, ZANLA transferred its headquarters from Zambia to Mozambique, where they co-ordinated all infiltration operations through eastern Rhodesia. This geographic proximity made it easier for ZANLA to transport materiel into Rhodesia and to receive and train new recruits.\textsuperscript{78} However, Frelimo’s formal hosting of ZANLA began when ZANLA was part of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA), which was a union of ZIPRA and ZANLA engineered by Machel and Nyerere in November 1975 because of their disgruntlement with nationalist politicians’ constant feuding. ZIPA fighters were brought together in two training camps in Tanzania – Morogoro and Mgagao – and they launched attacks into Rhodesia from Mozambique.\textsuperscript{79} In an interview with \textit{Africa News} in New York, Machel explained why it was important to have military unity between ZIPRA and ZANLA:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{73} Martin and Johnson, \textit{The Struggle for Zimbabwe}.
  \item \textsuperscript{74} Chung, \textit{Re-living the Second Chimurenga}; Martin and Johnson, \textit{The Struggle for Zimbabwe}.
  \item \textsuperscript{75} Martin and Johnson, \textit{The Struggle for Zimbabwe}.
  \item \textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid}.
  \item \textsuperscript{77} Mhanda, \textit{Dzino}.
  \item \textsuperscript{78} B. Cole, \textit{The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Service} (Durban, The Three Knights, 1984).
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Mhanda, \textit{Dzino}.
\end{itemize}
[i]t is the desire of all of us that there is only one army in Zimbabwe…. the army is a symbol of national unity, and therefore cannot be fragmented. Such fragmentation would mean retracting to a state of primitivism of tribal armies and feudal armies … The job of the army today is to guarantee tranquillity and permit the development of the country … If it is divided, it cannot carry out its essential task of security, tranquillity, peace, maintenance of order and maintaining the people’s confidence.80

Despite the desire of Machel and Nyerere to prop up ZIPA, the joint army was undermined by deep, long-standing suspicion between ZIPRA and ZANLA, lack of commitment to cooperate by the two armies, and conflicting methods and standards of training.81 By July 1976, the ZIPRA–ZANLA unity had collapsed. ZIPRA withdrew to Zambia, leaving ZANLA as the sole ZIPA army.

Relations between the Zimbabwean liberation movements and the front-line leaders were also not free from strain and suspicion. A pertinent issue that caused much friction between ZANU and the front-line leaders had to do with ZANU’s 1974 internal power struggle and the way in which front-line leaders reacted to it. For the 1974 détente negotiations, the ZANU central committee sent Mugabe to Lusaka as its leader. But the front-line leaders regarded Mugabe with suspicion, because he had come to the meeting in place of Ndabaningi Sithole, whom they recognised as the legitimate president of ZANU.82 The central committee had deposed Sithole for unspecified irregularities and without calling an elective congress. As a result, the front-line leaders, Machel particularly, regarded Sithole’s removal as a coup and refused to recognise Mugabe’s leadership, insisting that Sithole attend the détente talks as leader instead.83 Mugabe returned to Rhodesia following the détente talks and, in March 1975, the ZANU leadership in Salisbury resolved that Mugabe and Tekere travel to Mozambique to provide the ZANLA guerrillas there with political leadership and in order to avoid re-arrest by the Rhodesian government.84 In April 1975, Mugabe entered Mozambique without the Frelimo leadership’s knowledge. Martin and Johnson maintain that this secrecy was necessary because Mozambique was still in a transitional process to independence, so it was obligatory that they avoid detection by Portuguese forces, who could provide the Rhodesian state with intelligence of their whereabouts in Mozambique or capture

81 Dabengwa, ‘ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War’.
82 Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe.
83 Ibid.
84 Tekere, A Lifetime of Struggle.
and deport Mugabe and Tekere to Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{85} The Frelimo leadership discovered that Mugabe was in Mozambique after Moiane was introduced to him by the ZIPA commander, Rex Nhongo, at the military quarters called Junta, where the ZIPA commanders were based. Moiane had gone there to resolve a dispute between ZANLA and ZIPRA.\textsuperscript{86} When Machel received news from Moiane about Mugabe’s presence among the ZIPA commanders, he was displeased, and so in time Machel moved Mugabe and Tekere to Quelimane, far away from the guerrillas and the border with Rhodesia. Matsinha, who was sent to Manica by Machel to communicate the Mozambican leader’s decision to move Mugabe and Tekere, explained that Machel looked upon Mugabe with suspicion because of the irregular manner in which he and other ZANU leaders had attempted to depose Sithole from the ZANU presidency in 1974.\textsuperscript{87}

Only in 1976 was Mugabe allowed to leave Quelimane, in order to participate in the Geneva conference of October–December 1976, which aimed to achieve a negotiated settlement for Rhodesia. The Frelimo government changed its position on Mugabe’s leadership because, as Matsinha argues, ZANLA guerrillas continued to maintain that Mugabe was their leader, hence Machel’s suspicion of him began to decrease.\textsuperscript{88} In addition, Frelimo pushed for Mugabe and the ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo, to form a united front at the Geneva conference. Thus in October 1976 the Patriotic Front, led by Mugabe and Nkomo, was agreed. The Patriotic Front served as a tactical unity for the purpose of presenting a common approach to the Geneva conference, but each liberation movement would continue to maintain its own identity and independence.\textsuperscript{89} The Geneva talks were unsuccessful, and military unity between ZIPRA and ZANLA never materialised for the remainder of the liberation war, as evinced in the Frelimo cadre Mateus Zengeni’s observation that Mozambican soldiers who fought alongside ZANLA guerrillas sometimes had to fight against ZIPRA inside Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{90}

In early 1977, the old-guard ZANLA commander Josiah Tongogara, who had been released from prison by the Zambian government in October 1976, in collusion with Nhongo, Mugabe and Frelimo, arrested some of the ZIPA commanders for resisting the dissolution of ZIPA.\textsuperscript{91} The arrest of ZIPA commanders such as Dzinashe Machingura, David Todhlana and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{85} Martin and Johnson, \textit{The Struggle for Zimbabwe}.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Moiane, \textit{Memórias de Um Guerrilheiro}.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Interview with Mariano Matsinha, Maputo, 30 October 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{89} ‘Evolution of Patriotic Front’, \textit{Zimbabwe News}, 9, 2 (January 1977).
\item \textsuperscript{90} Interview with Mateus Zengeni, Maputo, 15 June 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Mhanda, \textit{Dzino}.
\end{itemize}
Parker Chipoera, among others, marked the end of Machel’s ZIPA experiment. ZANLA was reconstituted, and Machel provided it with support. The arrested ZIPA leaders were held in Frelimo prisons until Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. According to Matsinha, Frelimo carried out the arrests following a request by the ZANU leadership and because it wanted to re-affirm its support for Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Mugabe was made ZANU’s president by the party’s central committee at a meeting that took place in Chimoio, Mozambique, in August 1976. Mugabe publicly proclaimed that unity between the liberation movements was necessary to achieve independence, and he also adopted Marxism-Leninism:

> [t]he Zimbabwe African National Union is particularly privileged to learn from Frelimo, on a day to day basis. The slow but definite transformation of ZANU into becoming the leading liberation movement in Zimbabwe, guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung thought, has been as much a result of the party’s role as main fighting force against the Ian Smith regime as of its association with Frelimo.

Mugabe’s rhetorical embrace of Frelimo’s emphasis on unity and his pretensions of being guided by Marxism-Leninism also explain why he received Frelimo’s support from 1977 onwards. I now turn to examining military co-operation between Frelimo and ZANLA after the demise of ZIPA.

**Frelimo and ZANU in the post-ZIPA Era**

During the ZIPA phase, Frelimo established military forces at the main border crossings with Rhodesia. The main objective was to support and cover the entrance and exit of Zimbabwean guerrillas. These Frelimo forces were stationed in Gaza, Manica and Tete. The principal points of entry in Gaza province were through Mavué and Chitanga in Massegena and Pafuri (Muenze river) in Chicualacuala. In Manica, the principal points were Catandica, Mavonde, Machipanda, Changuro, Rotanda, Guro and Espungabera. In Tete, it was through Zumbo,

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92 Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*.
93 Interview with Mariano Matsinha, Maputo 30 October 2014.
96 Interview with Mariano Matsinha, Maputo, 30 October 2014.
97 Interview with Bistol Ruben, Boane, 4 March 2015.
Mucumbura, Luia and Chioca. Batissone Mabolessi, a Mozambican soldier who operated in Chicualacuala, explained joint ZANLA–Frelimo operations in the following terms: ‘[t]he Mozambican forces accompanied ZANLA fighters and all military materials that were discharged in Maputo Port. Those materials were taken to a ZANU base in Mapai. Then, under the cover of night, we accompanied them to Rhodesia, while some Mozambican troops stayed at the border to protect our operations’.  

These joint operations sometimes involved active combat. According to Abílio Alface, a Mozambican soldier who participated in the joint operations by accompanying ZANLA guerrillas through Mavué right up to Chiredzi inside Rhodesia, he fought alongside ZANLA for a month in Chiredzi. In addition to planned joint military operations, Frelimo soldiers also participated in unexpected combat when, for instance, they were attacked by Rhodesian troops while accompanying ZANLA militants into Rhodesia or when Frelimo soldiers were returning alone to Mozambique. To facilitate operations at the war front, the Mozambican government established a base in Mapai, around 605 km from Pafuri (Chicualacuala) and 259 km from Mavué (Massangena), and they stationed a battalion of soldiers there. Mapai functioned as a concentration area for ZANLA and its war material before they crossed the border. It was to Mapai that all those wounded in the war inside Rhodesia or Chicualacuala and Massangena were evacuated.

Reacting to Mozambique’s decision to close the border with Rhodesia in March 1976 and officially support ZANU’s liberation struggle, Rhodesian forces began military incursions inside Mozambique, killing ZANLA militants and civilians. Beginning in 1976, lots of press articles reported Rhodesian attacks on ZANU bases and Zimbabwean refugee camps in Mozambique. Most of these attacks were carried out in Gaza, Manica and Tete provinces. The objective of these raids was to peg back ZANLA incursions from Mozambique by inflicting substantial damage to ZANU camps and Frelimo troops. The Rhodesian forces used fighter jets, armed vehicles and mounted troops, with which they

99 Interview with Batissone Mabolessi, Boane, 4 March 2015.
100 Interview with Abílio Alface, Mapai, 17 October 2015.
101 Interview with Tiago Jatima, who accompanied ZANLA militants from Zumbo in Tete to Kanyemba in Rhodesia, Boane, 3 October 2015.
destroyed ZANU bases and damaged railway links from Mozambique to Rhodesia. Zengeni described one such Rhodesian attack on Chicualacualu in 1977 as follows:

the Rhodesian forces had installed loud speakers on the border between Rhodesia and Chicualacualu. They used to play a song in the morning, called Sibongile (by the South African Mbaqanga group Soul Brothers) whose lyrics were ‘we do not want neighbours to see us fighting’. And when the song ended, the Rhodesian forces started to scream over the loud speaker in Portuguese: ‘atenção Frelimo, toma aí o matabicho’ (‘attention, Frelimo, receive your breakfast’). Then it began to rain bullets. We used to respond to those attacks, but unfortunately their weapons were too strong and they killed a lot of ZANLA guerrillas, who were in a transit camp to Rhodesia, as well as many Frelimo militants.

In 1976 and 1977, Mozambique lacked the capability for large-scale retaliation against the Rhodesians because it did not have equally sophisticated armour and air power, despite the fact that Mozambican soldiers were highly trained and experienced fighters. It is also important to remember that the Rhodesian forces used to speak in Portuguese, because a large number of them were Portuguese-speaking Mozambican blacks, who had fought with special commando units of the Portuguese colonial army and had fled to Rhodesia after independence. Most of these former members of the Portuguese army were used as reconnaissance agents (spies) inside Mozambique, roaming roads and railways, getting close to military units and defence installations so as to take note of the troops and types of weapons used by ZANLA and the new Mozambican army, the Forças Populares de Libertação do Moçambique (FPLM), and then sending the intelligence to Rhodesia.

The Rhodesian attacks were not only against military targets but also against Zimbabwean refugee camps. With the escalation of the struggle inside Rhodesia, Mozambique received a large number of refugees. The Mozambican soldiers had the role of receiving and protecting them, providing food and helping them to integrate into Mozambican communities. Because of the massive arrival of Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Mozambican government created refugee camps in Manica, Sofala and Tete. In the first years of Mozambique’s independence, the Refugee Services of the Ministry of Interior

105 Interview with Mateus Zengeni, Maputo, 2 November 2015.
106 ‘Rhodesian Raids Provocation For Foreign Help’.
107 Ibid.
109 Interview with Mateus Zengeni, Maputo, 2 November 2015.
of Mozambique were in charge of the camps, but authority over them was gradually transferred to ZANU.\textsuperscript{110} The UNHCR provided humanitarian assistance (food, clothes and medical care) both to refugees in the camps and to those who spontaneously integrated into local host communities. As mentioned above, such camps were also attacked by Rhodesian forces. The best-known of those attacks was the massacre of Zimbabwean refugees at Nyadzonia camp in August 1976. It is estimated that 618 people were killed and 300 injured in that attack.\textsuperscript{111} The Rhodesian army justified its attacks on refugee camps as a campaign in pursuit of ZANLA guerrillas. According to Zengeni, although the Zimbabwean refugee camps received civilians, it was there that ZANLA used to recruit new members of their guerrilla army.\textsuperscript{112} Machel considered the Nyadzonia massacre and other Rhodesian incursions into Mozambique as aggression not only against ZANLA but against the Mozambican people as well.\textsuperscript{113} In response to Rhodesian attacks, Mozambique wrote memos to the UN Security Council highlighting Rhodesian incursions into Mozambique, as a way of calling to international attention Rhodesia’s atrocities in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{114}

But the Frelimo government also took military measures in response to Rhodesian attacks. One of these measures was the formation of four military brigades in 1977, with the objective of defending Mozambican territory against Rhodesian attacks and also to support ZANLA militants. These brigades were stationed in Manica, Tete, Inhambane and Gaza provinces. After the Nyadzonia attack, the Mozambican authorities began mobilising and recruiting young Mozambicans to join the army and fight alongside ZANLA, with compulsory military conscription becoming law in 1978.\textsuperscript{115} As Samora Machel had justified this measure in the third session of the Popular Assembly, ‘the compulsory military law was approved as a ways of defend the country from the military attacks and infiltrations of the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[110] Ministério do Interior, ‘Experiência de organização dos campos dos refugiados’, Maputo, February 1978. There were around 57,000 Zimbabwean refugees in Tete, Manica and Gaza. Most of them lived in refugee camps. Some were hosted by Mozambican families or by small social centres. See ‘Inspiration Corner: President Machel and the Mozambique Revolution’.
\item[112] Interview with Mateus Zengeni, 30 October 2015.
\end{footnotes}
enemies (the Rhodesian Forces). Thus hosting ZANLA and defending Mozambique’s territory and sovereignty became one and the same for Frelimo.

In order to ensure that the military recruitment process had succeeded, the party-state had created a strong coercive machine which was set up from below, led by Dynamising Groups (DGs). The DGs were in charge of identify and recruit young people from the neighbourhood, schools, offices or even intercept public transport (in cooperation with the military police) and sent them to the military trains. Indeed, according to Estevão Nhacuengue, one of the Youth who was recruited to the compulsory military service in 1978, there was a kind of fear to joint to the military service, because the youth were scared of being killed. So, as way of avoid that, most of them (including him) were running away and hidden themselves from the GDs. Abdul Karim, other person who was recruited to the military service in 1978, described his experience in that terms:

I was 18 when I was recruited to the military compulsory service. The Chefe de Quarteirão (head of residential units) had told me and other young people that we must list ourselves into the military service. Once I preferred to continue my studies than to fight, I run away from my parents’ house and hidden myself into my grandmother’s house in the village, for almost 30 days. Suddenly, one day, I went to see my parents at night. The Chefe de Quarteirão found out that I was around and called the police, whose captured me and sent me to Boane in order to be trained.

However, beside military attacks and massacres, Rhodesia used another aspect to react Frelimo’s support for the Zimbabwean liberation struggle by creating of Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo). Renamowas created by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) in 1976 as a group that would provide the Rhodesians with information about ZANLA bases in Mozambique, gauge the number of ZANLA guerrillas, assess the extent of Frelimo support for ZANLA, act as local guides or reconnaissance for the Rhodesians and, finally, also carry out attacks designed to undermine the Mozambican economy, thereby increasing the costs to Frelimo of supporting ZANLA. The Rhodesian CIO firstly recruited and incorporated different components to Renamo, such as soldiers who deserted from Frelimo’s army before and after Mozambican independence, black

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117 For details about the role of Dynamising Groups see for example B. Egerô, Moçambique: Os Primeiros Dez anos de Construção da Democracia (Maputo, Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, 1992)
118 Interview with Estevão Nhacume, Xai-Xai, 15 March 2017
119 Interview with Abdul Karim, Xai-Xai, 15 March 2017
Mozambicans who served in the Portuguese counter-insurgency unit and secret police, white settlers who lost their privileges after independence, and former Portuguese agents. Many of these were extremely bitter towards Frelimo for their loss of status and marginalisation in the post-independence period, making them amenable to recruitment.121 The first Renamo commander was André Matsangaissa, who fled to Rhodesia in October 1976 after being arrested on charges of theft in re-education camps by the Frelimo government. In fact, it is in re-education camps that Renamo recruited most of its soldiers, as they usually contained many people imprisoned by Frelimo, and most of these prisoners had strong grievances against the Frelimo government.122 However, many Renamo militants were also recruited by force, and were used to carry food and military material and to serve as guides in their home areas.123

One of the early missions of Renamo was to disrupt ZANLA operations through the destruction of bridges and the laying of mines on routes used by ZANLA to get inside Rhodesia.124 In addition, Renamo spread propaganda against Frelimo’s leaders and their policies and ideology through a radio station called A Voz de Africa Livre (Voice of Free Africa). It had a studio and transmission station in Rhodesia and began transmissions in July 1976.125 Its broadcasts criticised Frelimo for supporting ZANU. A 1977 broadcast titled ‘The Opening Note’ justified Rhodesian attacks on Mozambique in the following terms: “[i]f today Mozambique is attacked by the Rhodesian army, the blame falls solely on Machelists themselves, because it is they who provoked the retaliatory attacks by Ian Smith. Every responsible government knows perfectly well that if it provokes a foreign country, it has to bear the consequences”.126 In the same broadcast, Voice of Free Africa generated propaganda about why Frelimo was supporting ZANU:

Machel is making use of the Zimbabwean problem to collect some millions of escudos [from Mozambican people through the Solidarity Bank], while at the same time it is using Mozambican people … We should not forget that Machelism has long been using the

121 Emerson, The Battle for Mozambique.
122 Ibid.
Zimbabwean problem as a means of survival, because the irresponsible Machelists are incapable of solving the problems of the administration of Mozambique.\textsuperscript{127}

The widespread nature of this kind of propaganda in Mozambique was an effort to undermine the Machel government psychologically and encourage anti-Frelimo dissidence.\textsuperscript{128} In so doing, the Rhodesian forces aimed to discourage popular Mozambican support for ZANU. Despite the fact that Renamo was created as a Rhodesian counter-insurgency force, it gained increasing legitimacy in Mozambique, resulting in its expansion and staging of a devastating civil war, which ended only in 1992.\textsuperscript{129} However, despite the intensification of Rhodesian and Renamo attacks, Frelimo did not stop supporting ZANLA. On the contrary, Frelimo tried to intensify its military support to ZANLA by sending its forces to fight inside Rhodesia – a theme that is taken up in the next section.

**Internationalists inside Rhodesia**

In 1977, the Mozambican authorities took the decision to send a group of Mozambican soldiers, known as the *internationalistas*, to the interior of Rhodesia. This operation was divided into three phases. In the beginning, a small group of these Frelimo militants went to Rhodesia to sabotage and plant mines on the routes used by Rhodesian forces to enter Mozambique. Lemos Pontes, was one of the militants who was sent on this initial operation:

> I was trained in Russia in 1976 as a sapper, with the specialty of reconnaissance, sabotage and engineering. When I came back at the end of 1976, I was posted to Manica with the mission to close the entries and exits of Rhodesian forces, mining roads inside Rhodesia near the Mozambican border, then returning to Mozambique. The operation was carried out in Penhalonga [Mucumbo], Zonue [Tea state], Mutare district and near Chipinga [Chipinge].\textsuperscript{130}

The second phase of the Mozambican presence inside Rhodesia also took place in 1977. The Mozambican authorities sent other groups of soldiers to Rhodesia to conduct reconnaissance missions. These groups consisted of five members introduced in each ZANLA platoon that entered Rhodesia. Their role was to verify whether the ZANLA militants were operating effectively. These militants entered Rhodesia using three principle

\textsuperscript{127} ‘Radio’s Analysis of Machel’s Tactics’. Escudos were the currency used in Mozambique before the introduction of metical in 1980.

\textsuperscript{128} Emerson, *The Battle for Mozambique*.

\textsuperscript{129} According to Minter, Renamo had grown from fewer that 100 in 1976 to 2,000 in 1979; Minter, *Apartheid’s Contras*, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{130} Interview with Lemos Pontes, Maputo, 30 October 2015.
points: the region of Chicualacuala in Gaza province, Tsetsera in Manica province and Mucumbura in Tete province. It is important to point out that this operation was highly secret, to the degree that the Frelimo militants sent to Rhodesia were made aware of their impending deployment to the neighbouring country only at the last minute, as Zengeni elaborated:

I was operating in Chicualacuala when I was called by the headquarters in Maputo. They told me that I had to go to the Soviet Union with a group of 20 other militants. However, instead of going to the Soviet Union we were sent to Combomune in Gaza. Here we met the brigade’s commissar, Mahandjane, who told us that we were going to Rhodesia [instead] with the mission to verify what was going on there. My group joined a group of 80 ZANLA militants that entered Rhodesia from Chitanga. After crossing the border, we were stationed in Gezani, near Lundi river. After one week we went to conduct military operations in Selukwe.¹³¹

In this phase, the Mozambican soldiers stayed inside Rhodesia and operated with ZANLA militants for a period of six months at a time. After that, they were replaced by another group that was also composed of five members. The Mozambican soldiers also acted as military advisers to the ZANLA field commanders, as they usually had more war experience than their Zimbabwean counterparts.¹³²

Furthermore, in 1979 Frelimo decided to send Mozambican soldiers to operate indefinitely inside Rhodesia. First they sent 340 soldiers and, after five months, a further 160 were sent to reinforce this group.¹³³ However, to be sent to Rhodesia it was necessary to speak one of the languages spoken there.¹³⁴ Thus most of the soldiers sent to Rhodesia were natives of provinces that had a frontier with Rhodesia. They often shared the same languages and had relatives in Rhodesia. Zengeni, for example, grew up in Rhodesia between the ages of 6 and 17, and he was more fluent in Shona and English than in Portuguese.¹³⁵ The other selection criterion for Frelimo-assisted operations in Rhodesia was war experience. Most of the Mozambican soldiers went to Rhodesia as commanders, because they had operated for a long time in Frelimo’s struggle against the Portuguese army. One Mozambican soldier who fought alongside ZANLA in Rhodesia was Lemos Pontes. Pontes entered Rhodesia through

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¹³¹ Interview with Mateus Zengeni, Maputo, 2 November 2015.
¹³² Ibid.
¹³³ Ibid.
¹³⁴ Swahili was the language of communication in most Tanzanian camps, where a number of ZANLA militants had trained. See Williams, ‘Living in Exile’, p. 69.
¹³⁵ Interview with Mateus Zengeni, Maputo, 2 November 2015.
Manica province and operated in Buhera, Charter, Sadza and Mhondoro, and he described the beginning of these operations in the following words:

after my operations along the Manica border, I spent three months in Dondo, Sofala province, training a group of militants. These militants were coming from the military units that operated in the border region between Mozambique and Rhodesia, during 1975–1977. After the training, we received General Sebastião Marcos Mabote, the headquarter chief, who told us that we were going to be sent on a special mission and he gave us Chimurenga war names. My war name was John Hondo. On 29 February, we left Manica at the night until we reached Deroi, where we met Josiah Tongogara and a group of 23 ZANLA soldiers. He told us that our special mission was to fight alongside ZANLA inside Rhodesia … and that we had to act as Zimbabwean people and use our Chimurenga names, so as not to be discovered by Rhodesian authorities that we were Mozambicans.136

Frelimo did not want the Rhodesians to discover that there were Mozambicans fighting inside Rhodesia, lest the Rhodesians increased their incursions into Mozambique as retaliation. From 1979, Frelimo soldiers in Rhodesia assisted ZANLA in laying landmines on the roads used by Rhodesian forces, blowing up railway lines and bridges and assaulting their military barracks. Mozambican soldiers and ZANLA guerrillas developed a good working relationship in the course of these activities because the latter looked up to Mozambican soldiers as victorious guerrillas, from whom they had a lot to learn.137

Despite the proximity between Mozambican and ZANLA militants, some conflicts occurred during the war. Most of these were over women. According to Lemos Pontes, ZANLA guerrillas did not want their Mozambican colleagues to be involved in relationships with local women.138 Pontes explained that there was competition for women between ZANLA and Frelimo because Zimbabwean women often preferred the Mozambican soldiers, owing to the fact that they treated them with more respect than their Zimbabwean colleagues.139 Machel argued that a revolution could never be complete if women continued to be oppressed.140 This might lead one to deduce that Frelimo’s seemingly more ‘enlightened’ view than that of ZANLA on the role of women was respected and actively promoted by Frelimo elites. Isabel Casimiro challenges such a deduction by arguing that, despite Machel’s rhetoric about women’s emancipation, it was ordinary women themselves

136 Interview with Lemos Pontes, Maputo, 2 November 2015.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
who struggled for recognition within Frelimo through the creation of the Destacamento Feminino (Female Detachment). In fact, as she points out, before the creation of the Female Detachment, the Frelimo militants used to look at women as producers and reproducers and source of sexual pleasure to the guerrillas.\textsuperscript{141} The relationship between women and their male counterparts in ZANLA was equally controversial during the liberation struggle. As Fay Chung and Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi have written, many ZANLA militants, particularly the senior commanders, regarded women as objects to control.\textsuperscript{142} They often demanded sexual services from women who joined the liberation struggle. Most women did not enter these casual unions willingly, but were forced into them.\textsuperscript{143} The problem of subjugation and exploitation of women was therefore a shared one between Frelimo and ZANLA.

Another source of conflict between Mozambican and ZANLA militants centred on military tactics. For example, Pontes explained an episode that caused conflict with ZANLA guerrillas in Buhera, in early 1979:

a group of woman, a Female Detachment carrying war material, camped in Buhera near where my platoon was camped. However, a day before, we saw the movement of helicopters, and the Mozambican commander advised his platoon and these women to leave because the enemy would bomb the area. These women did not accept the advice, and as a consequence were bombed and killed by the enemy. ZANLA militants accused Mozambican soldiers of leaving these women to die intentionally. This situation created a kind of tension between us ... It stopped when Tongogara had a meeting with all of us and asked ZANLA to drop the accusation because we were innocent.\textsuperscript{144}

The Rhodesian forces, over time, discovered that Frelimo was actively assisting ZANLA, fighting inside Rhodesia alongside Zimbabwean guerrillas, after some captured militants revealed it to them.\textsuperscript{145} Zengeni, for instance, had to change his war name from Tichatonga to Mabhunu Muchampera, after a Rhodesian force captured a Mozambican soldier who revealed the names of other Mozambicans operating in the area. But Machel publicly admitted that Frelimo soldiers were active in Rhodesia only at the end of 1979, following the signing of Zimbabwe’s Lancaster House independence agreement on 21 December. In Machel’s words,

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{144} Interview with Lemos Pontes, Maputo, 2 November, 2015.
\textsuperscript{145} Interview with Mateus Zengeni, Maputo, 2 November 2015.
‘when Rhodesian forces attacked Mozambique with the excuse of pursuing the Zimbabwean liberation movement, they were inviting Mozambique to participate in the struggle for Zimbabwe…. And Mozambique accepted the invitation’.146

In addition to the military backing assessed in this section, Mozambicans also rendered other forms of support to ZANLA. The following section will examine how the Mozambican civilian population supported ZANLA militants and Zimbabwean refugees.

**Ordinary Mozambicans and ZANLA Militants**

The euphoria that characterised the early years of Mozambican independence was perhaps the most influential aspect that made Mozambicans embrace Frelimo’s commitment to internationalism. Frelimo propagated the notion that Mozambicans could take part in building a new international society based on principles of equality and justice. This view can be explained by the ways in which Frelimo presented itself to Mozambicans as heroic liberators and cast Mozambique’s independence in a universal, humanistic light.147 Thus many Mozambicans showed their commitment to Machel’s call to support total southern African liberation. In the rural western areas bordering Rhodesia, where most ZANLA bases and refugee camps were established, people developed their own mechanisms to support ZANLA and Zimbabwean refugees. According to Airessi Jacapu, who was raised and lived in Tete province, in Zumbo (Tete province), families shared their homes and machambas (farming fields) with Zimbabwean refugees, so that Zimbabweans, rather than being needy refugees, could grow their own food.148 These relationships between Mozambican communities and Zimbabwean refugees in the border areas were facilitated by the fact that the communities on both sides often shared the same language and culture. For these communities, therefore, strict borderlines did not exist as such.149 According to Vitória Canxixe, who lived in Changara district, Tete province, after the liberation struggle started in Rhodesia, many Mozambicans and Zimbabweans crossed the border to Mozambique seeking safety. These communities had household and family ties on both sides of the border, and people did not

148 Interview with Airessi Jacapu, Maputo, 6 February 2015.
149 J.P. Borges Coelho, ‘Conceitos Operactivos, Perspectivas e Dinâmicas dos Movimentos Populacionais no Território de Moçambique, unpublished paper (mimeo) kindly provided by the author.
use passports to cross from one side to the other; they were crossing the border through shortcuts, which took them less than an hour of walking.\textsuperscript{150} In addition to these cross-border family ties, Mozambicans had been migrating to Rhodesia since the 1950s in order to work in tea, tobacco and cotton farms, and because Rhodesia offered better opportunities for social mobility for migrant Mozambicans, particularly education.\textsuperscript{151}

However, not all Zimbabwean refugees who crossed the border into Mozambique had family ties with local people. Zimbabwean people without relatives in Mozambique tended to be hosted in refugee camps. Rural Mozambicans received refugees and then directed them to Frelimo forces, who were responsible for screening them in order to ascertain whether they were genuine refugees or Rhodesian spies.\textsuperscript{152} Frelimo also organised local people to act as \textit{Milícias Popular} (local soldiers). These \textit{Milícias} were given basic military training and small arms to defend the local population against Rhodesian attacks.\textsuperscript{153} João Miranda, who operated in Chicualacuala as a \textit{miliciano}, points out that, as \textit{Milícias}, they also conducted patrols so as to detect the presence of Rhodesian forces inside Mozambique and to provide intelligence.\textsuperscript{154} This practice of popular vigilance explains why the Rhodesian forces often disguised themselves as Mozambican soldiers when entering Mozambique, draping themselves in the Mozambican flag, blackening their white faces with paint and singing Frelimo songs.\textsuperscript{155}

Rural Mozambicans also transported ZANLA’s materiel and food to specific locations, which were generally near the Rhodesian border. These materials were buried in spots called \textit{matize}, from which ZANLA retrieved weapons in small quantities and took them into Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{156} Mozambicans residing along the border also assisted ZANLA in the evacuation of wounded guerrillas to their bases in Mozambique. Miranda was involved in these evacuation activities, and he recalled that trained local people sometimes gave first aid to ZANLA militants who crossed the border with injuries, while others used traditional medicine to stop bleeding and fevers. Only after this basic first aid were wounded ZANLA fighters evacuated to their bases to receive advanced medical attention.\textsuperscript{157} Rural

\textsuperscript{150} Interview with Victória Canxixe, Maputo, 3 June 2015.
\textsuperscript{152} Interview with Mateus Zengeni, Maputo, 2 November 2015.
\textsuperscript{153} ‘Tarefas Concretas e Imediatas a Realizar’, Circular da Sede Nacional da Frelimo, Maputo, June 1976, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{154} Interview with João Miranda, Maputo, 16 June 2016.
\textsuperscript{155} This occurred when Rhodesian forces attacked Nyadzonia camp in 1976, and Mapai in 1976. For more details, see Chung, \textit{Re-Living the Second Chimurenga}.
\textsuperscript{156} Interview with Mateus Zengeni, Maputo, 11 June 2016.
\textsuperscript{157} Interview with João Miranda, Maputo, 16 June 2016.
Mozambicans who lived in the same areas as ZANLA guerrillas also shared their food and water, particularly food that they grew in their *machambas*, such as cassava, maize and watermelon. Fenias Runguane explains that there was a kind of exchange of food in Mapai between local people and militants (both ZANLA and FPLM). Most ZANLA militants asked for farm products, particularly maize and fruits, and, in exchange, local people received food that they did not have access to, such as canned sardines, corned beef, condensed milk and biscuits.\(^{158}\) This kind of exchange also characterised the relationship between Zimbabwean refugees and host communities. With the intensification of war inside Rhodesia, the flow of Zimbabwean refugees increased from 5,000 in 1975 to around 40,000 in 1978.\(^ {159}\) Despite the support that they received from ordinary Mozambicans and their government, the UNCHR and other organisations, there were still food shortages in refugee camps and the diet was low in protein content.\(^ {160}\) As a way of getting extra food or particular food nutrients, refugees adopted a system of barter, called *chirenje*, in which they exchanged clothes and shoes that they received from Scandinavia for particular foodstuffs from local peasants.\(^ {161}\)

Although Mozambique supported ZANLA and Zimbabwean refugees in the manifold ways described in this article, the country was faced with economic fragility. The massive exodus of Portuguese nationals left Mozambique with major shortages of technicians and state officials, since only Europeans had been allowed access to higher education during the colonial period.\(^ {162}\) To add to the difficulties, Mozambique was hit by floods in 1977, which left thousands of people without shelter and destroyed productive farms.\(^ {163}\) Moreover, Mozambique paid a significant economic price from the closure of trade links with Rhodesia and from the destruction of infrastructure by Rhodesian forces. As Minter points out, the cost of Mozambican sanctions on Rhodesia over 4 years was estimated at over US$500 million, more than double Mozambique’s annual exports.\(^ {164}\) It is because of these economic realities that Frelimo, despite being supportive of ZANU militarily, was always open to the idea of a negotiated independence settlement for Rhodesia. Hence Frelimo coerced ZIPA commanders, who aimed to complete a total revolution in Rhodesia by military means, to attend the 1976

\(^{158}\) Interview with Fenias Runguane, Mapai, 17 October 2015.  
\(^{160}\) Ibid.  
\(^{161}\) Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga*.  
\(^{163}\) Ibid.  
\(^{164}\) Minter, *Apartheid’s Contras*, p. 32.
Geneva conference.\textsuperscript{165} Thereafter, ZANU attended all subsequent internationally mediated independence talks. And when Mugabe proved intransigent at the 1979 Lancaster House conference, because he preferred military victory to a negotiated settlement, Machel, through one of his aides, Fernando Honwana, firmly counselled Mugabe to agree a settlement at Lancaster House, because Mozambique could no longer meet the economic costs of hosting ZANU.\textsuperscript{166} Peter Carrington, who chaired the conference, and others in the Rhodesian and ZANU delegations credited Frelimo’s intervention as having guaranteed a successful conclusion to the Lancaster House talks.\textsuperscript{167}

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter has examined the views of Frelimo and Mozambicans who aided ZANU in its struggle for Zimbabwean independence. I argued that the commitment of Frelimo to support ZANU is an indication of its belief in the idea that the independence of Mozambique in 1975 would not be complete while other southern African countries continued to be under colonial rule. Frelimo believed, as the new government of an independent country, that it had a moral obligation to support other liberation movements fighting white minority regimes, in the same way that Tanzania and Zambia supported Mozambique’s liberation struggle. Thus Frelimo intensified its political and military support for ZANU from 1975 by offering Mozambique as a territorial base, bequeathing state resources, and engaging in joint military operations with ZANLA in Rhodesia. Frelimo’s hosting of ZANLA and its defence of Mozambican sovereignty became one and the same. Furthermore, Machel and Nyerere instigated the union of ZIPRA and ZANLA to form ZIPA in 1975 and they encouraged the formation of the Patriotic Front between ZAPU and ZANU, although lasting unity between these groups never materialised. Ordinary Mozambicans in border areas also participated in co-operation between Frelimo and ZANLA. Mozambicans provided intelligence on the movements of Rhodesian forces, supplied food and helped to transport war materials to the Rhodesian border. This supportive relationship between Mozambicans and ZANLA was facilitated by shared languages and culture, which even enabled the formation of Frelimo–

\textsuperscript{165} Mhanda, \textit{Dzino}.
ZANLA military contingents, composed of soldiers who spoke the same languages and who could therefore enter Rhodesia and operate together with a measure of unity and understanding with the local people. However, the Frelimo–ZANU relationship was not without difficulties. Frelimo took an uncooperative approach to relations with ZANU in the beginning because it was not a member of the club of ‘authentic’ liberation movements. Relations improved, in part because of the above-mentioned sense of solidarity that Frelimo held and because ZANU attracted Frelimo’s support through its convincing commitment to armed struggle. Other difficulties centred on disagreements over tactics between some Frelimo soldiers and ZANLA guerrillas on the Rhodesian war front. Additionally, certain ZANLA guerrillas opposed Frelimo soldiers’ intimate relationships with local women in Rhodesia.

As seen in the case of Frelimo and ZANU, hosts’ influence on liberation movements’ internal politics must be seen as shaped by the interests and agency of liberation movements themselves. As shown, Mugabe became the leader of ZANU in 1977 against the wishes of Frelimo. And Frelimo failed in its efforts to foster unity between ZANU and ZAPU and their respective armies. Where hosts wielded decisive authority is the sovereign right to withdraw sponsorship on their territory. Using the threat of withdrawal of support, Frelimo ordered reluctant ZIPA commanders to attend the 1976 Geneva conference, and influenced Mugabe to agree a negotiated independence settlement in 1979. Frelimo took these actions because, although it supported ZANLA guerrilla operations, it did not close off the possibility of a negotiated independence settlement for Rhodesia owing to the escalating economic costs it faced the longer the liberation war went on.

Chapter II

‘When the unofficial meets the official’:

Poems, letters and songs
Introduction

Cultural manifestation—particularly songs, dance and poetry—have always been present in the lives of African people. For being based in oral tradition these African cultural manifestations are considered as undefined, evasive and unofficial compared to other official cultural expressions.168

By analysing popular songs, poetry and letters that support the Zimbabwean liberation struggle during the revolutionary period in Mozambique, this chapter will look at unofficial and poetic vision of history represented by African popular orality169 as well as to ‘map people experience’170 in order to understand in which ways the freedom of expression that characterise the songs were repressed by Frelimo’s ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’, which extol Frelimo’s revolutionary ideology. At the same time, I will engage with these song lyrics to explore Mozambique’s commitment to the struggle for Zimbabwe. My aim is to explore what Penvenne and Sitoe refer to as the role of cultural expressions, which is to project images of leadership or of power to the audience, interpret the relationship between the leadership/power and the public and, partly informed by the performa’s experience, convey aspects of public sentiment back to the leadership or to those who hold power.171

It is important to refer that the cultural expressions that support Zimbabwean liberation movements and its struggle were written and created during a revolutionary period in which Frelimo was in the process of building a politically and morally correct ‘new man’. Taking this aspect into account, I would like to look at these cultural expressions in order to understand in which ways the party-state ideology interfered into the creative process. In other words, is there anything that escapes official discourse? Is it possible to recover popular voice into these songs, letters and poetry?

Transformation of popular expression in Mozambique

Songs, Poetry and Letters during Colonial Period

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169 Barber, ‘Popular arts in Africa’
170 L. Vail and L. White, Power and the Praise Poem: Southern Africa Voices in History (Virginia, University press, 1991)
Scholars have established the role of culture. Johannes Fabian for example, had defined African popular culture as a communicative process in which the society expresses, generates and forms its world view, using some kind of independence and creativity.\(^{172}\)

In Mozambique, like other African countries, songs, dances and poetry have been used as medium of communication. Nonetheless, there is a clear historical fracture in the ways in which people used popular expressions to express themselves. During the colonial period for example, there was more creativity, while after independence this process was to a large extent controlled by the party-state as a way of shaping an ideological consciousness.

By exploring songs that used to be sung in Mozambican rural areas during the colonial period, particularly Chopi music in the Gaza province and the ‘Paiva’ song in the Zambeze valley, Vail and White stress two fundamental aspects about these songs. Firstly, the songs worked as a ‘map of people’s experience’ in the sense that they referred to the experience of people, and the way it transmitted from generation to generation. Secondly, the songs are historically relevant for being licensed by freedom of expression, in which the normal conventions between chiefs and workers are violated, because the chiefs could be criticised by their followers ‘in ways that the prevailing social and political codes would not permit’.\(^{173}\)

In fact, one particular aspect of this period is that Mozambican people used song and poetry as a form of complaint about the ill-treatment under the administrator of the companies or under Portuguese rule. According to Vail and White, those songs were openly critical and a kind of a jeer which rejects injustice; a satire, protest and lament against hunger, beating, forced labour and arrests.\(^{174}\) But these songs also invoke the relationship of client to patron that people had. Through this song, people were not complaining about the legitimacy of the patron, who they regarded as the *Mbuya*, in other words, the *great one, protector, Lord*; They protested and complained about the form of treatment that they received from this *mbuya*, father and protector for whom and whose rules they must follow.\(^{175}\)

Poetry was also used by Mozambicans to express their feelings about the colonial regime, particularly in urban areas. After the establishment of the New State in 1930, and the development of several economic infrastructures, the cities attracted many African people to


\(^{174}\) *Ibid*, p.218-221

\(^{175}\) *Ibid*, p.227
work as cheap labour. This level of development in cities, particularly in the capital, Lourenço Marques, was enabled by the existence of an African urban elite. What distinguished these African elites from the others was a certain academic degree, which gave them the possibility to become a black ‘petite bourgeoisie’ or assimilados. According to Hedges and Darch, the Instituto Negrófilo was the main channel for the political assimilation of the black petite bourgeoisie.

It was within these African elites that anti-colonial feeling and nationalists emerged and crystallised during the 1950s and 60s. Poets like José Craverinha, Noemia de Sousa, Rui Nogar and so on, had expressed their feelings within that context, mostly influenced by African-American literature and the idea of negritude. Their poems were published in the Brado Africano and the Itinerário newspaper. These poems, like the songs that used to be sung in field labour, also complain about Portuguese’s injustice, but also stressed the idea of Negritude, o orgulho negro and the desire of being free.

Noemia de Sousa’s poems like Se me quiseres conhecer (if you want to know me) and Let my people go or José Craverinha poem’s, Nossa Voz (our voice) invoke the pride of being black: ‘I am not more than a piece of black wood, so please examine me carefully’. At the same time the poems also invoke a kind of revolt against the colonial system and white supremacy: ‘familiar images come to me, (...) with tired faces, revoluted painful and humiliations’, or ‘our voices rise (...) over the white egoisms of men’. But above all, the poems invoke the hope of being free, in their country: ‘its cry swollen with hope or and them the conquest and new liberate zones free. During the colonial era, Mozambicans rarely used letters to express themselves. That can be explained for two reasons. Firstly, by the fact that the colonial state had only promoted

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180 Ibid. For more details see, F. Mendonça and C.Braga-Pinto, João Albasini e as Luces de Nwandzengele: Jornalismo e política em Moçambique, 1908-1922 (Maputo, Alcance Editores, 2012)
181 N. de Sousa, ‘Se me quiseres conhecer’
182 N. de Sousa, ‘Let my people go’
183 J. Craverinha, ‘Our Voices’
184 N.Sousa, “Se me quiseres conhecer”
and used Portuguese as a written and school language, marginalising in that way African languages.\textsuperscript{186} Secondly, because the press (where people usually published their letters) functioned as a way of legitimating the colonial system by, representing the Colonial State interests and its ideology.\textsuperscript{187} Thus, it was difficult for African people to get access to the Press and express themselves.

However, as Fatima Mendonça pointed out, in very low degree the press was also able to open some spaces into the emergence of interests divergent from the colonial state.\textsuperscript{188} One particular example of those ‘divergent interests’ is the emergence of the newspaper \textit{A Voz Africana} (The African Voice), a weekly newspaper funded in 1962, in Beira. That Newspaper had created a Section Readers in which African people were allowed to send letters.\textsuperscript{189} Through those letters, the readers expressed their views about the events in their daily lives such as marital and moral issues, oppression situations, and social injustices and so on. However, it is important to say that, although the letters were used by the population to talk about what was going on in their life, they did not touch on political issues. According to José Capela, one of the Editors of the \textit{A Voz Africana}, this absence of political critique is justified by the fact that the letters were written during the 1960s, a period with a very strong degree of African politicization.\textsuperscript{190}

One important aspect of those letters is that they present grammatical mistakes, which demonstrates the difficulties that African people had to express themselves in Portuguese, taking into account that their background was mostly rooted in orality. So, the decision of the \textit{A Voz Africana’s} editors of not editing the letters, allows us to trace what Maria Suriano pointed out as one function of the letters, which is to show the ways of constructing and performing identities at the same time that allows us to see how people constructed their citizenship.\textsuperscript{191}

However, with the advent of nationalism, songs, letters and poetry started to present other forms. They no longer critiqued or satirized the colonial regime; rather, they started working in service of an ideological programme. In other words, the \textit{unofficial} that characterised popular songs and poetry during colonial period started to represent the \textit{official} after Mozambique independence.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{186} J. Capelo, \textit{Moçambique Pelo seu Povo} (Porto, Afrontamentos, 1974), p. 8
\item \textsuperscript{187} Mendonça and Braga-Pinto, \textit{João Albasini e as Luces de Nwandzengele}, p. 17
\item \textsuperscript{188} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{189} Capelo, \textit{Moçambique Pelo seu Povo}, 8-11
\item \textsuperscript{190} Ibid
\end{itemize}
The Liberation Struggle and the Birth of a New Vocabulary

The liberation movement, Frelimo, was funded in 1962 under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane. In 1964 it started the liberation struggle against the colonial government. During the first years the war, Frelimo was busy dealing with military organisation, education and health network in the liberation areas, more than cultural issues. Culture became an urgent issue to the liberation movement only after the internal crisis within FRELIMO in 1968-69, soon after Eduardo Mondlane is death. Thus, culture started to be used as weapon of combat: an instrument of military unity, as well as a way of exalting the Frelimo struggle and its revolutionary ideology of building a new nation.

However, it was only in 1971 that the new form of poetry and song were openly defined during the 1st seminar of culture. This seminar defined the character of the poetry and songs. It was especially stressed that poetry and songs should be inspired by the practice of the liberation struggle. At the same time the seminar condemned poetry without revolutionary meaning, such as love poems or poems that invoke abstract meanings, and also stressed that the poet had to be involved in the liberation struggle and adopted Frelimo’s ideology. So, in order to become revolutionary, song and poetry started to present what Maria Benedita Basto calls a ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’, composed by Frelimo’s tropes, in which there are a proliferation of watchwords such as ‘nationalist’, ‘revolutionary’, ‘victory’, ‘heroes’, ‘enemy’ and ‘traitors’. In this sense, poems like the first one above, for example, had changed to second one:

Poema Moçambicano Mozambican poem
Eu sinto o som do tambor
(...)  
Outra vez eu sinto o som do tambor
Rugir, rugir como o som do leão no zoo
Dizer me coisas passadas
De Matibzana valente temido
vejo então meus cabelos curtos de negro

I hear the sound of the drum
(...)  
One more time, I hear the sound of the drum
Roar, roar as the lion’s sound at the zoo
Telling me past things
Of the brave Matibzana feared
And I see my negro’s short hairs

Quero Lutar
(...)  
Ainda quero sentir
O metralhar roquejante
Das balas
Que sibilam as matas de Moçambique
Quero sentir o sangue encarnado
Escorrer pelo solo pátrio
Avermelhando Terra amada
E cuspir bala de fogo
Matar inimigo do Povo

I want to fight
(...)  
I still want to feel
The rocking of machine gun
Of bullets
That hiss the forest of Mozambique
I want to feel the crimson blood
Flowing down the homeland’s soil
Reddening the beloved country
And spit fireball
Kill the enemy of people

Thus, phrases that invoke the desire and the pride of being black and the spirit of the ancestries—‘the Matibzana brave and feared’; the African symbols—’roar of the Leon’;¹⁹⁵ and certain phrase that shows some kind of anger about white people—‘Then I see my hard feet, trampling the body of white people’, that used to characterise poetry, were replaced by phrases that stress the revolutionary ideology, such as: ‘kill the enemy of people’— not white people anymore;’ that hiss the forest of Mozambique’, as a whole and not ‘the Matibzana homeland’ as it was before revolution. In fact, the reference to traditional authority and the African values were regarded by Frelimo not as good things (boas coisas), because they invoke African traditions that Frelimo considered as obscurantist and tribalist.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁵ Armando Guebuza’s poems. More details about how poems changed in order to fit into the revolutionary ideology see Basto, A Guerra das Escritas
¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p.104
always made clear that the war was not against white people, but against Salazar’s colonial regime. Not only the poems changed the style in order to fit into the new vocabulary of ready-made ideas, but Frelimo also prohibited the use of heteronyms, because during the revolution process people had nothing to hide like in the colonial period.

Indeed, with the revolution, songs and poetry had to sing the Frelimo anthems that exalted the military saga. Those poems were published in gazettes and newspapers, such as 25de Setembro, Os Heroicos, etc. In the words of Mario Malyamungu, ‘the songs started singing the Frelimo laws (the fame of the party), things that exist, not abstract anymore’. The following Frelimo’s popular anthem is an example:

**Mozambique nossa Terra Bendita**

*Mozambique, nossa terra bendita*

*Hoje luta pela liberdade*

*Nos queremos a nossa liberdade*

*Unidade a todo o país*

*Sangue do povo triunfante*

*Vencerá o regime de Salazar*

*A Frelimo sairá vitoriosa*

*Nesta luta pela liberdade*

*A sagrada bandeira da Frelimo*

*Flutuará nas nossas fortalezas*

*Mozambique our blessed land*

*Mozambique, our blessed land*

*Today fights for freedom*

*We want our freedom*

*Unity in the whole country*

*And the blood of the triumphing People*

*Will win Salazar’s regime*

*Frelimo will come out victorious*

*In this struggle for freedom*

*Frelimo’s sacred flag*

*Will wave in our fortresses.*

Basically, the lyrics of the song and poetry concentrate upon three main aspects. Firstly, the songs extol the role of guerrilla in the liberation struggle (those who suffered in the war). Take for instance this Makonde song:

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198 In order to fit into the revolutionary ideology Muguinho had changed his style of writing and also started assigning his poems with the real name, Armando Guebuza instead of his heteronym Munguinho. More details about that see Basto, *A Guerra das Escritas*, .p. 104-105

199 Ibid,144

200 Israel, ‘ Utopia-Live
Marching and miracles

Mwenu madyoko mukulumwiki’ ambi
You, kids that grew up now

Wetu ne lo tunammyimyangidya
Today we remind-you-the-history

Patushitenda ing’ondo yetu ‘kuno
Of when we were doing our war, here in
ku-Moshambiki
Mozambique

Patushitenda ing’ondo yetu
When we were doing our war We-the-People,
Tuvenentete tundipata tabu
we suffered
Yakuwena shilo na mui a-materiale
Walking day and night with [war] materials
Tushindapangana kupagwa mashepi
We organised ourselves, to have chiefs
Mwatupita kulamulanila
That went around command
Tushindawika kubalabala ku-ku-tenda
We went to the roads to make
g’ondo
War

According to Paolo Israel, one the most important icons of Frelimo’s songs was the long marches of the people carrying war materials. By stressing the role of the guerrilla, Frelimo’s new vocabulary of ready-made ideas wanted to make Mozambican people know the difficulties and the suffering that the guerrilla had to face: the hunger, thirst and even the imminent death in the field battle, during the liberation war.

The other aspect that songs and poetry stress is the denunciation of traitors. An example of this kind of song is the famous ‘Frelimo Aina Mwisho’, a song that sings the names of the Frelimo’s traitors:

Frelimo aina mwisho
Frelimo is infinite

Ukabanga vandakuduma
If you are wicked, they will punish you

Simango reaccionário
Simango is a reactionary

Nkavandame anditukuta
Nkavandame fled

Joana reaccionária
Joana is a reactionary

\[201\] Ibid
The third aspect was to extol the role of the leaders, the heroes who fought against colonialism, like this Makonde song about Mondlane (the first Frelimo president).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Mondlane} & \quad \text{Mondlane} \\
Wakuyaite wako & \quad \text{Those who killed you} \\
Vanu vamalambi & \quad \text{These people are scoundrels} \\
Twala & \quad \text{Take} \\
Makalatashi lao & \quad \text{Your posters} \\
Andika & \quad \text{Write} \\
Lina lya-Mondlane & \quad \text{The name of Mondlane} \\
Andika & \quad \text{Write} \\
Lina lya-maimyo & \quad \text{The name of History}
\end{align*}
\]

As the song stresses, the name of Mondlane, the hero who was killed by scoundrels, is the name of history. Indeed, with the independence of Mozambique in 1975, Frelimo had brought all their experience from the struggle to the newborn country. In fact, as Borges Coelho stressed, the experience in the liberation areas had a very important and central role into the political and life after independence, not only as a past that reverberated but also as the reference and light to the future.\(^{202}\)

**Shaping the official discourse**

Pierre Bourdieu defends that language can function as an instrument of power. As he explains, the power of the language is expressed by exercising violence through ideology, as well as by the manipulation of language. The manipulation of language in turn, is expressed by a power given to the speak men, who uses words to make people believe in his vision of world.\(^{203}\) However, ‘what creates the power of words is the belief in the legitimacy of words and those who utter then’; In other words, in politics ‘to say is to do’, because it is possible to get people believe that you can do what you say and make them recognise your vision.\(^{204}\) One

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\(^{204}\) *Ibid*, p. 170-190
of the most powerful ways of making people believe what you say is through political speeches and mass mobilisation. Charles Cells argues that speeches and mass mobilisation are very important to increase political consciousness, change the way of thinking and act as well as to mobilize people for some efforts and recognise your vision.\textsuperscript{205}

Frelimo used speeches at the crowded rallies and mass mobilisation as main device to instil its revolutionary ideology as well as the idea of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. In fact, speeches and mass mobilisation were considered very important weapons during the revolutionary process\textsuperscript{206}, particularly in countries like Mozambique, where by the time of independence, about 90\% of people were illiterate. The independence of Mozambique in 1975 gave Frelimo \textit{a carte blanche} to build a revolutionary country guided by Marxism-Leninism. That process had started with the Triumphal Journey, \textit{Viagem Triunfal} from Rovuma to Maputo, in which Samora Machel presented himself and Frelimo’s ideology to the Mozambicans through crowded rallies accompanied by his long speeches as well as started the process of building the new nation composed by morally correct new-man, the man from whom was required to abandon the old colonial behaviour and follow Frelimo’s ideology.\textsuperscript{207}

Four massive rallies to instil Frelimo’s ideology of supporting Zimbabwean liberation struggle took place in Maputo. The very first one took place in 3 February 1976, at the \textit{Praça dos Heróis} (the Heroes Square), and around 50 thousand people attended it. This rally had three main objectives: to celebrate and create the day of the Mozambican heroes; to celebrate the changing of the name of Mozambique’s capital from Lourenço Marques to Maputo; and also to define the lines of supporting the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. In the rally Samora Machel announced the creation of the Solidarity Bank, to which every Mozambican was required to contribute one day of their salary, as a way of supporting the liberation struggles around the world, particularly the Zimbabwean one, and also the victims of natural disasters in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{208}

At this rally, Samora Machel used a rhetorical framework in order to mobilise the population to support the Zimbabwean struggle. One of the most important aspects that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{206}P. Kenez, \textit{The Birth of the Propaganda: State Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929} (Santa Cruz, Cambridge University Press, 1985)
\item \textsuperscript{207}C. Darch and D. Hedges, ‘\textit{Inscribing the Nation}’:\textit{ The triumphal Journey in the Late Transitional Period in Mozambique, May-June 1975’} unpublished paper (mimeo) kindly provided by the authors
\item \textsuperscript{208}‘Organizar a Democracia no Seio da Cidade. Liquidad o Racismo e a Discriminação Social.’ Discurso do Presidente Samora Machel no dia dos Herois Mocambicanos, \textit{Notícias}, 4 February 1976 available at MozambiqueHistoryNet\texttt{http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/people/samora_speeches/1976/19760203\_dia\_dos\_herois\_mocambicanos.pdf} , accessed by May 2017
\end{itemize}
Machel underlined in his speech, as way of persuade Mozambicans to support the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was the reference to the support that Frelimo had received from other countries during liberation struggle, in the following words:

Our independence was possible because of our determination and the clarity of our objectives. But also thanks to the international solidarity of socialist countries that supported us with medicines, weapons and clothes (...). Tanzanian people are so poor, more poor than you (...) but they are able to say that without independence of other countries, our Independence does not have significance This is a big lesson to the Mozambicans. Let act like them, (...). And we, that are free now, what we are going to do for others? What will be our contribution? People have to contribute, find ways of supporting Zimbabwean (as well as South African people).209

By exalting the role of international solidarity that supported Frelimo’s liberation struggle and making questions to the audience such as ‘what we going to do? Which will be our contributions?’, and then himself answer the questions, Machel was publicly demarcating his position to the large audience, while at the same time he was making an effort to coerce and persuaded people.210 Indeed, by using these kind of language devices, Machel was doing what Krebs and Jackson define as rhetorical coercion through speeches or discourse, which occurs when the audience are left without access to the rhetorical material to contest or refuse the speaker’s words.211

One month after this rally, precisely in 3 March 1976 Samora Machel communicated to the people Frelimo’s decision to close frontiers with Southern Rhodesia. One week after, in 13 March, the party-state organised a massive march in the street of the capital Maputo, which culminated with a big rally, at the campo de Sporting (now Campo de Maxaquene). According to Tempo magazine, around a hundred thousand people attended this rally. Its objective was to welcome Samora Machel’s decision to close the borders with Rhodesia, as well as to show that Mozambicans accepted and were willing to support the Zimbabwean struggle.212 In this rally, members of civil society – such as the Youth organisation, Organização da Juventude Moçambicana (OJM), Military organisation, Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique, (FPLM ), the ‘Dynamising Group’, the workers organisation and the Women organisation, Organizaçao da Mulher Moçambique (OMM) – read messages, in

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209 Ibid
210 Darch and Hedges, ‘Political Rhetoric’, p. 65
212 ‘Moçambicanos Apoiam o Zimbabwe’, Tempo, 285, 21 March 1976
which they committed themselves to support the Zimbabwean struggle and Frelimo’s decision.\textsuperscript{213} It is important to mention that those civil society organisations belonged to the Frelimo framework. In fact, during the revolutionary period, Frelimo only allowed social and political organisations controlled by the party-state, and suppressed every political and social organisation outside its own emanations, by accusing them of representing the enemy.\textsuperscript{214} Thus, the civil organisations that were at the massive march and rally were no more than the party-state itself representing the population. In so doing the party-state was exercising populism in Ernesto Laclau’s definition, in which there is a symbolic unification of the group around an individual, the charismatic leaders and their decisions.\textsuperscript{215}

The other massive rally took place at Praça dos Heróis, Heroes’ Square, on 3 July of 1976. The objective of this rally was to condemn the attacks of the Rhodesian forces in Mozambique. Basically, in this rally Samora Machel wanted to instil into the people the idea of reacting to the Rhodesian forces attacks as well as to tell them the ways in which they could do it. As his speech claimed:

‘What we could do to answer those massacres and attacks? Reinforce our defensive capacity. The FPLM (and ZANU) must strengthen their relationship with the people in order to combine the modern weapons and the traditional one. During the war, we killed the enemy with arrows and traps. Those traps that kill rabbits and gazelles, they also serve to kill the enemy. So, we must push Ian Smith to our organised people. Our armed people...’\textsuperscript{216}

Once again, Samora Machel used the experience of Frelimo’s liberation war to deal with issues after independence and also to persuade people to support his ideas. As Darch and Hedges pointed out, ‘Samora Machel worked hard to construct a narrative that both recounts the history of Frelimo’s liberation struggle, and accounts for the nature of the enemy, in offering persuasive reasons for accepting and supporting his and Frelimo’s ideas, polices and legitimate the future wielders of state power.’\textsuperscript{217} In other words, people had to use this particular Frelimo’s experience of killing the enemy during liberation struggle, to support Zimbabwean struggle, particularly the Zimbabwean militants and FPLM.

The last crowded rally took place at the Praça da Independência, the Independence Square, on 23 December 1979. According to Rádio Moçambique’s news report, thousands of

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid
\textsuperscript{215} E. Laclau, Critique of Populist Reason (London, Verso, 2005), p.100
\textsuperscript{216} ‘Comício Popular de Apoio ao Zimbabwe’, Rádio Moçambique, 3 July 1976
\textsuperscript{217} Darch and Hedges, ‘Political Rhetoric’, p. 57
people attended the rally. That time, Samora Machel wanted to celebrate with Mozambicans the Lancaster House agreement as well as to announce that Mozambique would reopen the border with Rhodesia. At the same time that he did the balance of the human, material and economic damage caused by Rhodesian forces in Mozambique.218

An important aspect about the rallies was the number of people who attended them. It is important to stress that the participation of people was compulsory. In the dates of the rallies, the party-state used to grant a day off from work, Tolerância de ponto. The party-state also used to organise public transport to collect people in the Maputo and Matola areas.219 Moreover, the policemen used go from house to house to make sure people were going to the rallies, and making sure that no one would leaving the venue of the rally after it finished.220

The meeting of the unofficial and the official

After independence, the revolutionary songs were taken from the battle field and liberated zones to the newborn nation, while the party-state began to instil the new required formal characteristic of songs and poems. The call for proposal for the National Anthem can be seen as a mirror of how Frelimo wanted the songs and poetry to be, during the revolutionary process.

Indeed, the new Mozambique’s National Anthem started by presenting Frelimo’s tropes and its heroic process, by underlining that it was thanks to Frelimo, as liberation movement that Mozambique achieved freedom—‘Long Live Frelimo/Guide of the Mozambican people’, who had—‘Overthrown colonials’. However, the National Anthem also lists the emotive symbol of nationalist ideology, by presenting the Frelimo’s slogans (the palavras de ordem) —Like Viva Viva a Frelimo; by extolling the role of the military aspect— ‘Heroic people that with arms in hands/Overthrew colonials’; by using Frelimo tropes like—‘From Rovuma to Maputo’, which remember the triumphal journey of Samora

218 ‘Comício na Praça da Independência em Apoio a Frente Patriótica pela Assinatura dos Acordos de Lancaster House’, Rádio Moçambique, 23 November 1979
219 Notícias, 1976 to 1979
220 Interview with Colin Darch, Cape Town 8 April 2017
Machel; and also by stressing that the struggle will continue—‘The struggle against imperialism/Continues and will always win’.  

In 1977, Frelimo realised the first national meeting of culture after independence. The main objective of this meeting was to officially define the role of culture in the revolutionary process. It was defined that culture had to be national, popular and revolutionary, by working as a weapon to liberate man from colonial capitalist. In other words, culture has to be based on the experience of the liberation struggle by affirming as nation not tribal and by struggling against traditional mentality and inequality.

Cultural manifestations were also one of the forms that Mozambicans used to support the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. If in the rural areas people had engaged directly with ZANU militants and Zimbabwean refugees, as we saw in the first chapter, in the urban areas people used poetry, letter and songs to do so. Most of these poems and letters were published in press articles in the readers section, particularly at the Notícias newspaper and weekly Magazine, Tempo. The songs were sung at the school, during political or cultural meetings and during celebration dates. Most of these songs were recorded at Rádio Mozambique studios in Maputo. One important aspect is the role of choral songs, particularly at schools, the place where an educational agenda was enforced to instil revolutionary and political consciousness to the young students.

The euphoria that characterised the first years of independence was expressed in the daily life of Mozambique. Mozambican people had to embraced Frelimo’s idea that independence was only possible because some ‘precious’ young boys and girls had sacrificed their life in the bush, in order to liberate all Mozambicans. Thus, it was their turn to support other liberation movements as a form of retribution to the support that Mozambican had from other people, but also as way of completing their own sovereignty. The fact that Mozambicans had experienced a colonial regime based on racial discrimination reinforced the idea of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation struggle as the fulfillment of a moral duty. As we had explored in the first chapter, this identification was stressed by the cross-border family ties as well as the historical, economic and cultural relationship between Zimbabwean and Mozambican people.

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221 More details about the National Anthem and the ways in which it was used to shape a common identity see, M.B Basto, ‘The writing of National Anthem in Post-Independence Mozambique: Fictions of Subject People.’ Kronos, 35 (Nov 2009) pp 158-203
222 ‘O Papel da Cultura’, Tempo, 357, 7 August 1977
223 Ibid
224 Israel, ‘The Formulaic Revolution Song and the Popular Memory’, p.207
So, the cultural expressions, letters, songs and poetry that supported the Zimbabwean liberation struggle stressed three principles aspects: The moral support to the Zimbabwean struggle; the using of armed struggle to defeat the enemy; and finally satire against Rhodesia and the figure of Ian Smith.

**Moral support**
The first aspect that those cultural manifestations express is the moral support to the guerrilla and Zimbabwean people. Let us consider the following poems, published in *Tempo* magazine:

**Uma lágrima caindo livre neste mundo**
*A tear falling free in this world*

*Este poema é uma lágrima caindo livre neste mundo*  
This poetry is a tear falling free in this world

*Para ti, irmão Zimbabwe*  
For you, Zimbabwe brother

*Este é uma amálgama de letras*  
This is a amalgamation of words

*E sentimento de um homem oprimido*  
It is the feeling of an oppressed man

**Poema-canto**  
*Song-Poem*

**Por ti, Zimbabweano**  
*For you, Zimbabwean*

**Este poema é arma**  
*This Poem is a weapon*

**Vivendo a dor**  
*Living the pain*

**De um povo forte**  
*Of a strong people*

**Poema-luta**  
*Struggle-Poem*

**Por ti, irmão oprimido**  
*For you, my oppressed brother*

**Irmão Zimbabweano venceremos**  
*My Zimbabwean brother, we will win*

**Olha mas não chores**  
*Look but don’t cry*

**Para estes corpos indefesos**  
*To those defenseless bodies*

**Que caem metralhados**  
*Mown down by the machine-guns*

**Por gritar a liberdade**  
*For crying out for freedom*
Don’t cry
At this blown-up bridge
At the river turned into blood
By those who refused your freedom

Come my brother
And look to those lackeys
That paid by imperialism
Destroy without mercy
But anxiously
Remember big fortunes
But don’t cry
Because the struggle continues
And death never slows down
The determination of the people
Who struggle for freedom
We will win

Looking at the poems, we indeed see some kind of creativity that characterises the process of writing: by using figures of speech, such as ‘this poetry is a tear falling free in this world or the river became blood’, and also by bring to the poems sounds and tone that give rhythm and musicality, for example, ‘ready-poem’, ‘song-poem’ and ‘struggle-poem’ at the beginning of each poem’s strophe. Nonetheless, this creativity is invaded by the vocabulary of ready-made ideas that constrains the revolutionary cultural expressions. In fact, we can see that there are proliferations of Frelimo tropes such as: ‘oppression, imperialism, the struggle continue, determination of People (povo), freedom and Zimbabwean brother’. That Frelimo’s tropes made the poems above fit into the revolutionary ideology that speaks about concrete aspect not abstract, as the seminary of culture had defined in 1971.

These poems also present what Borges Coelho calls the ‘triumphalist vision’ of the past which characterises Frelimo’s narrative, providing a picture full of certainty of the victory as final destination. —by using phrases that stressed the idea of victory, such as ‘the struggle for freedom and we will win’. Indeed, by morally supporting Zimbabwean

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225 Borges Coelho, ‘Abrir a Fábula’, p.161
brothers, Mozambicans were hoping that like Frelimo did during liberation war, Zimbabwean liberation movements would also win.

Songs also stressed this moral support to the Zimbabwean struggle and the idea of victory. Take for instance, this changana song:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Povo Zimbabweano vai vencer</th>
<th>People of Zimbabwe will win</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tiyisela Zimbabwe, u ta kota ku hlula naloo</td>
<td>Hold on Zimbabwe in order to beat The enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A valala va helile ku tiko dza Africa</td>
<td>The other enemy was finished in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith o salisela ku tiko dza Africa</td>
<td>Smith is saying goodbye to Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This song also presents the ‘triumphalist vision of Frelimo’, by asking Zimbabwean militants to ‘hold on the struggle in order to beat the enemy, because as other colonial regime or enemy was finished in Africa, Ian Smith also would fail. An important aspect is the presence of formulas, in which poems and songs present repetition of words groups and phrases such as, ‘hold on Zimbabwe in order to win the enemy, the other enemy was finished in Africa, Smith is saying goodbye to Africa which were repeated three times into the song. In fact, as Vail and White defend, those formulas are useful to the poet/compositor to compose his work in performance.\textsuperscript{226}

However, moral support also functioned as mobilising device for Mozambicans support Zimbabwean liberation struggle. That was more present in letters rather than in songs and poems, as we can see in the following letter:

**Mozambican Youth**

For 500 years the people of Mozambique were under foreign domination, facing years of massacres and oppression under Portuguese colony. Then, young people decided to take weapons to become free from the colonial yoke and fight against exploration of man by man. And also erase completely the vestiges inherited from the fascist regime of Caetano and Salazar. Young people had an important role in the struggle. They struggled to win the power of the workers and peasants and create a revolutionary mentality toward the popular masses. We must be solidarity with people of the others African countries, who are still struggling for freedom. We have to support the just struggle of Zimbabwe. We young people must be consciousness and organised to defense our sovereignty and

\textsuperscript{226} Vail and White, ‘Power and the Praise Poem’, p. 28
became vigilant to prevent the enemy actions in our country. To finish, I would like to send for all of you, from Rovuma to Maputo, my revolutionary greetings. The struggle continues.227

Apart from describing the Frelimo’s saga marked by 500 years of domination, massacres and oppressions, this letter also justifies why Mozambican people had to support the Zimbabwe struggle. Like songs and poems, letters also use Frelimo’s words that fit into the vocabulary of the ready-made ideas, such as: ‘massacres and oppression’, ‘exploration of man by man’, ‘power of the workers and peasants’, ‘vigilance’, ‘enemy’, ‘from Rovuma to Maputo’, ‘revolutionary greetings’ (saudações revolucionárias) and the ‘struggle continues’. In fact, according to Frelimo’s saga, the history of Mozambique is divided in two periods: The colonial one, marked by ‘domination’, ‘massacres’, ‘oppression’, ‘exploration’, ‘enemy’; and the revolutionary one, that gave ‘power to workers and peasants’, ‘sovereignty’ and built a nation ‘from Rovuma to Maputo’. The revolutionary period also brought the idea of justice, ‘revolutionary mentality to the popular masses’ and also the support to ‘just causes’, like the Zimbabwean struggle.

One important aspect in those cultural expressions is the reference to massacres. It could be explained by the fact that Frelimo had his liberation struggle codified by a big narrative, which symbolically started with colonial aggression, the Mueda massacre.228

The military aspect
The second aspect that Mozambican poetry, letters and songs extol are the role of the military effort, leading to victory. Like Frelimo’s revolution songs, the marches of soldiers were also an important icons of cultural expressions that support the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. See for instance the poems below:

Para vós irmãos combatantes do Zimbabwe
Povo do Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe

227 Augusto Fernandes Jone Nhanala’s letter, Tempo, 322, 12 May 1976
228 Borges Coelho, ‘Abrir a Fábula’, p. 156
Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo de Zimbabwe
Es tu que es chamado para pegar em armas
E defenderes a tua pátria
E alcançares a vitória final

People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe
You are called to pick up the gun
And defend your country
And achieve final victory

Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo do Zimbabwe
Que em 1965 foste apunhalado
Na tua hora da liberdade
Por um punhado de colonialistas racistas

People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe
In 1965, you were stabbed
At the time of your freedom
By a handful of racists colonials

Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo do Zimbabwe
Já chegou a hora da liberdade
Com a tua arma liquidarás o regime racista
Com a tua enxada e livro liquidarão a fome
E o obscuratismo

People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe
It is now time for freedom
With your guns you will eliminate racism
With hoes and book, you will eliminate hunger
And obscurantism

Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo do Zimbabwe
O poder popular esta próximo
Apoia aquele que debaixo da chuva
Rasteja a procura do inimigo

People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe
The popular power is close at hand
Support those who in the rain
Crawl in search of the enemy

Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo do Zimbabwe
Africa chama por ti povo
A liberdade te convida
Para a tua glória final

People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe
Africa is calling you
Freedom is calling you
To your final glory

Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo do Zimbabwe
O mundo livre e progressista
Te ajudará
A marchar em honra do teu sangue
Derramado nas tuas horas dificis

People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe
The free and progressive world will
Help you
To march in honor of the blood
You’re shed during the hard times
A luta será sempre dura e prolongada
Para melhor definição do inimigo
E para um avanço vitorioso
Viva a luta justa do povo
do Zimbabwe
Luta continua

The struggle will always hard and long
To better define who is the enemy
And to a victories advance
Long live the just struggle of the people
Of Zimbabwe
The struggle continues

Avante irmão do Zimbabwe

Tu, Irmão Zimbabweano
O dia- a-dia é teu para avançares
Avante, irmao Zimbabweano
A tua luta é a luta da Africa Inteira
Africa
Avante, Irmão Zimbabweano

Zimbabweano, irmão meu zimbabweano
Em cada dia que nasce
Uma vitória deve nascer também
No teu campo de batalha

Zimbabwean, Zimbabwean brother
You, my Zimbabwean brother
The everyday is yours to advance
Advance, Zimbabwean brother
Your struggle, is the struggle of the whole of Africa
Advance, Zimbabwean brother

On each day that is born
One victory must be born also in your Battle field
With all Africa with you/ in your side
Advance and you will win
As forças dos que morrem pelos Massacres
Oppressão, escravidão e assassinatos
Deve ser a energia aceleradora do Seu combate
Deve ser uma inspiração no teu Campo de batalha
Para derrubar, demantelar o regime

O conhecido tabaqueiro, responsável pelo bando colonialista na Rodesia do Sul
The known as ‘tabaqueiro’ (tabacco man), responsible for the pack of colonialist in South Rhodesia

It is clear that Mozambican people had learnt through Frelimo’s saga that victory was made in the battle field. It is the mythology of soldiers who ‘picked up the guns and defend the country’ that would bring the victory and freedom. And as the poems shows, that freedom needed sacrifice from the soldiers who in the ‘rain, crawl in the search for the enemy’. So, as Frelimo did during its liberation struggle, Zimbabwe must do and obviously, win. In fact, the Frelimo myth is relating to amazing journeys of people, ‘walking hundred kilometers through thick bushes, marshes, hills and rivers’, carrying war materials in the encounter with death. The fact that Mozambican people stress this military aspect as one of the ways in which the Zimbabwean militants would win, it is explained in part by the fact that, as Penvennne and Sitoe pointed out, the public euphoria of Frelimo’s victory and the pride of independence made Mozambicans people develop a feeling of national identity and national pride.

The military aspect had also produced heroes at the battle field, those who accepted to die for freedom. As this poem shows:

229 Poem wrote by Foni Sitoe Fun, Noticias, 12 September 1977. The poem terminates with the little bit of explanatory prose.
230 Israel, ‘The formulaic revolution.’, p.193
231 Penvenne and Sitoe, ‘Power, Poets and the People: Mozambican Voices Interpreting History’, p.68
As Paolo Israel points out, Samora Machel’s theory of revolution was based on a stark dichotomy between heroes and enemy. So, according to the poem above, it was necessary for a child to know that the revolution is made by those who ‘picked up the guns’, the soldiers (heroes) ‘and goes kill those who lives of our blood’, the enemy. It was also clear that those heroes would also ‘fall in the battle field’, so, the child must prepare himself ‘to pick up your gun and continue the glorious struggle’.

Samora Machel had explained the role of the heroes in his speech in the following terms:

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232 Israel ‘The Formulaic Revolution’, p.185
‘Heroes are all those who always dedicated to serve the people (povo), those who died during the liberation struggle. But also are heroes those who nowadays, in the different levels, with courage, determination resist the defeatist ideas and maneuvers of the enemy.\textsuperscript{233} (...) let us support Zimbabwe, we have to accept die alongside the Zimbabwean militants, for African dignity, for revolution, for respect of the man as human being. (...). We want FPLM to die with honor... their death had to have power. Not as the death of those who had light death like chicken, run down on the road by drunkenness.\textsuperscript{234}

It seems that Samora Machel’s words had touch Arnaldo Virgilo Bila, who wrote a letter to \textit{Tempo}, offering himself to die as a hero to liberate Zimbabwe:

‘Mozambican Comrades, compatriots! This is the time for us to stop sleeping because the cock crowed; that cock is comrade Samora Machel. As you know, when the cock crows it means that day had dawned. (...). I am 35, head of a family and father of 6 children but I say to all Mozambicans that I offer myself voluntarily to support the struggle for Zimbabwe. Mozambicans! Many people died in Tanzania and Zambia in order for us to become independent. So we should also die to liberate Zimbabwe from our common enemy (...) so I leave here my appeal to all Mozambicans in order to be attentive to the government’s calls to support our Zimbabwean brothers…. The African struggle against colonialism, imperialism, exploitation, humiliation and oppression continues.\textsuperscript{235}

In his speeches, Samora Machel used the vocabulary of ready-made ideas in form of slogans or \textit{palavras de ordem}. Those slogans were used by Samora Machel at the beginning and at the end of speeches or meetings. Slogans reflect in the letters, such as ‘down with colonialism’, ‘imperialism, exploration, humiliation and oppression’, as well as ‘down with domination’ ‘long life the just struggle of Zimbabwe’, ‘live the people of Zimbabwe’, ‘down Ian Smith’, were used as \textit{palavras de ordem} of supporting Zimbabwean cause and have invaded the cultural expression in support of the Zimbabwean struggle. It can be explained by the fact the \textit{palavras de ordem} employ a kind of linguistic conditioning for the audience emotional impact.\textsuperscript{236} Indeed, as Darch and Hedges argue, Samora Machel used \textit{palavras de ordem} as an assertive technique to persuade and coerce the audience, by requiring listeners to repeat them during the speeches.\textsuperscript{237}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{233} ‘Organizar a Democracia no Seio da cidade. Liquidar o Racismo e a Discriminação Social.’\textsuperscript{13} Discurso do Presidente Samora Machel no dia dos Heróis Moçambicanos, \textit{Notícias}, 4 February 1976. Almost all Samora Machel’s discourses, from 1974 to 1986, are available at Mozambique History Net
\item\textsuperscript{234} Comício Popular De Apoio ao Zimbabwe’, \textit{Rádio Moçambique}, 3 July 1976
\item\textsuperscript{235} Arnaldo Virgílio Bila’s letter, \textit{Tempo}, 285, 21 March 1976
\item\textsuperscript{236} Darch and Hedges, ‘Political Rhetorics’, p.58
\item\textsuperscript{237} Darch and Hedges, ‘Inscribing the Nation’, p.5
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The use of those watchwords in letters, songs and poems, also stressed the functions of the slogans within the coercive ideological framework, at two levels. At one level, by knowing and using those slogans, people were able to show that they belonged to the patriotic group that Frelimo was building. And at the second level, it was used as disciplinary device to reinforce support for a specific political line and denounces enemies (of the Zimbabwean struggle in our case). For instance, thousand of Jeovah’s witnesses were arrested in October 1975, because they used to refuse swearing the national flags and Frelimo’s slogans.

The aspect of belonging to the group, ‘the patriotic and revolutionary Mozambican’, was also expressed by the word People (povo), which was frequently used to referring both Mozambicans and Zimbabweans. According to Maria Benedita Basto, the word people, ‘short-circuits the process of identity building that was in conformity with the Marxism-Leninist canon’. Through this Marxism canon, Frelimo was attempt to ‘define, mold and purity the new society of its own dirt and excesses’. In order to achieve that, the party-state launched campaigns against the reactionaries, those who inherited the viciousness of colonialisms and also traitors of people’s cause. So, people who did not support the Zimbabwean struggle were also within the reactionary framework.

Satire and insulting of Ian Smith

The third aspect of these cultural expressions, much more present in songs than in other cultural expressions, is a kind of satire, insult and jokes to Ian Smith and his regime. According to Karin Barber, songs and jokes may be the principal channel of communication for people who are denied access to the official media. What is more, those kinds of jokes and satire circulate with greater rapidity than other kind of cultural manifestation. It seems that musicians also used song to spreading the messages of supporting Zimbabwe, by satirising Ian Smith, calling him pejorative names like ‘rabid dog, insane, tobacco man, vagabond, criminal and idiot’, as in the following songs:

238 Darch and Hedges, ‘Political Rhetoric’, p.58
239 Machava, ‘State Discourse’, p.603
240 Basto, ‘The Writing of the National Anthem’, p.187
242 Machava, ‘State Discourse’ p. 602
243 Barber, ‘Popular Arts in Africa’, p.3
Smith wa Hlanha

Smith wa hlanha, vanhuweno
Wa hlanha, wa hlanha
Smith wa kaya kaya, va nduweno
Smith wa pepuka, vanhuweno
Wa pepuka le Rodesia
Nambo loku a ti edja angwazi
Anga toloveli Moçambique

However, once again, those pejorative words also fit into Frelimo’s tropes, particularly into the words of Samora Machel, who said in the following speech:

‘The doctors have already diagnostic that Ian Smith is crazy. He is a crazy man who does not become better with electric shocks (...) But the treatment of this animal is in Mozambique, every countries had already condemned this illegal regime (...). Ian Smith is a dog with rabies. The rabid dog objective is kill people. He does not have treatment. I don’t know if a Vet knows how to cure him, I don’t know. But when a dog has rabies, the solution is to kill him. That is the treatment. (...). We cannot accept slavery anymore; we refused the slavery of the Portuguese colony, so we will not accept the slavery of this tabaqueiro.244

As we can see, the songs reproduce almost literally Samora Machel’s words, by repeating phrases such as Smith is a ‘vagabond, criminal, tabaqueiro, rabid dog’ without cure.

The difference in language is also mist aspect of these cultural expressions. As we can see, the first song of the above examples is sung in Portuguese, the official language in Mozambique, which means that the meaning of the lyrics could be understood by people who lived in different parts of the country. The second one is sung in Changana, language that is spoken in the south of Mozambique. Although this aspect reveals a quality that Frelimo was trying to downplay — a quality of celebrating ethnicity245 — it seems that when the songs underline Frelimo’s ideas, this is not condemned. In fact, Alexandre Langa was signing to largely Changana people, most of whom are illiterate and could not speak Portuguese. That allowed most people in the South to understand the message of supporting Zimbabwe.

244 ‘Samora Machel’s speech, Comício Popular De Apoio ao Zimbabwe’, Rádio Moçambique, 3 July 1976
245 See Penvenne and Sitoi, ‘Power, Poets and the People’ p.61
Not only the lyrics of the songs fit into the vocabulary of the ready-made ideas by presenting Frelimo’s tropes and watchwords that symbolise the revolutionary ideology, but also by presenting a kind of disdain for the enemy, who can be easily vanquished by the heroes. Indeed, the discourse of Samora Machel also underlined that the best thing that Mozambique could do to support the ‘just struggle of Zimbabwe’ was to reinforce popular power, giving the people weapons to fight and kill the ‘vagabond’\textsuperscript{246} The lyrics of the following songs underline exactly that:

**Bassopa Ian Smith**

- *Pfula mahlu moçambicano*
- *U lavisa nala waku*
- *Pfula malho, moçambicano*
- *U lavissa, Ian Smith*
- *Leswi, a yentxaka swone*
- *O yini? A ningenile*
- *A Ku yini? Wa balesela*
- *Kuve kambe, awa hi hlasela hima bomba*

**Be Careful Ian Smith**

- Open eyes Mozambicans
- And look at the bad one
- Open eyes Mozambican
- And look at Ian Smith
- Look at what he is doing
- What is he doing? He invaded us
- What is he doing? He is firing at us
- He also throws bombs

**Wene, tatana, wene, mamana,**

- **Wene djaha, na wene, nwanhana**
- **Tamelani a xi bamo, hi mu hlongolisa**

**Basopa Ian Smith**

- You Sir, you madam,
- You young boy and you young girl
- Take a weapon and lets run with him

**Be Careful Ian Smith**

- Be careful Ian Smith
- Be careful, careful
- Machel will beat your nose
- We will kill you
- Kaunda going to kick your ass
- We are going to kill in cooperation

**Basopa, basopa, basopa**

- Nyerere ataku ba a tihlu
- Hita ku dlaya
- Tseretse a ta ku khava khurhihi hita ku dlaya hi ku twanana

**Be Careful with Zimbabwean’s guys**

- Be careful with the son’s of the country
- We will kill you
- The bad things of your weapons
- They will kill you

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\textsuperscript{246} ‘Comício Popular De Apoio ao Zimbabwe’, \textit{Rádio Moçambique}, 3 July 1976
According to the lyrics of this song, Smith had to be careful because he would be beaten and killed, not only by Zimbabwean militants, but by the co-operation between Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda and Seretse.247 This song is an allusion to the role of the Front line in the process of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. The funny thing is the use of satire and jokes, ‘Machel will beat your nose’, ‘Kaunda going to kick your ass’, ‘Nyerere is going to beat your eyes’, ‘Seretse is going to kick your stomach’. In so doing, people were also trying to recover the kind of songs that used to be sung before independence, which used to use satire, joke and insulting the colonial regime.248 At the same time that they stress Frelimo’s that the history of liberation struggle had to be always glorious, perfect and victorious.249

In order to fit in the vocabulary of ready-made ideas, most of the songs were sung in a new revolution rhythm, Makwayela, a musical genre composed for singing and dance. According to Israel Makwayela became an important cultural activity for young students in Frelimo’s school during liberation struggle, and after independence it became national school-dance and the major forms of transmission of party’s slogans.250 The choice of Makwayela as revolutionary song-dance was sustained by two aspects, as Carlos Cardoso had argued. Firstly, its origins in South African mines, where the ‘Magaissa’251 used to sing against ill-treatment that they received in the ‘compounds’ (mines), gave to the party-state some kind credential to use it as revolutionary. Secondly, it was used to stress the party-state idea of national unity. Indeed, although Makwayela was originally sung in the South of Mozambique, by being sung in all parts of Mozambique, it functioned as a weapon against tribalism and regionalism that Frelimo was struggling against. In other words, Makwayela was extolling Frelimo’s idea of unity from the Rovuma to the Maputo.252 Makwayela was also used to spread Frelimo’s idea of women emancipation. In fact, this singing-dance rhythm that originally was performed only by men, started to incorporate women as well. It suggests that people were putting in practice the idea of women emancipation.253

One particular aspect is that Makwayela became one of the most popular rhythms in Mozambique, taking the place of Marrabenta, which was more popular than Makwayela in

247 This is a reference to the presidents of Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana. Song singing by Makwayela choral group, A voz de Moçambique.
248 See Vail and White, Power and the Praise Poem.
250 Israel, ’Utopia...’, p.136
251 The name from which Mozambican people that used to work at the mines in South Africa used to be called.
252 C. Cardoso, ‘Makwaela, a Voz e o Gesto’, Tempo, 384, 12 Februrary 1978
253 Jean Rouch, Makwayela, Film 1977
the South. During the colonial period, Marrabenta was the most popular African music in Maputo, to the point of appealing to the urban white class. However, because of the incorporation of white people and also for its sensuality dance, Marrabenta was prohibited after independence, considered by the party-state as anti-revolutionary and morally corruptive.254

However, in spite all those aspects that made the songs that support Zimbabwean liberation struggle fit into the coercive ideology framework, differently to letters and poems, songs try to experiment with some kind of expressive freedom, as this one shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Smith wa Hlanha</strong></th>
<th><strong>Smith is crazy</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith wa hlanha, Smith wa hlanha impela</td>
<td>Smith is crazy, Smith is really crazy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith wa hlanha, impela wa hlanha</td>
<td>Smith is crazy, Smith is really crazy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lorha na a tamele bolhela la guala</td>
<td>He sleeps leaning on his drinking bottle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith i xidakua, Smith wa hlanha impelaSmith wa hlanha, impela wa hlanha</td>
<td>Smith is drunk, Smith is really crazy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lorha na a tamele, bolhela la guala</td>
<td>Smith is crazy, Smith is really crazy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith wa Pepuka, impela wa hlanha</td>
<td>He dreams leaning in a bottle of alcohol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith wa hlanha, impela wa hlanha</td>
<td>Smith is insane/mad, he is really crazy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lorha na a tamele, bolhela la gualaSmith, wa dakua, impela wa dakua</td>
<td>He dreams leaning in a bottle of alcohol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith i xidakua, impela i xidakua</td>
<td>Smith is a drunken guy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith is a drunken guy, he is really drunk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the song repeats Samora Machel’s words of satire Ian Smith, ‘insane, crazy’, this Xichangana song also presents some kind of freedom and creativity, through the striking image of: ‘a drunken guy, who dreams leaning on a bottle of alcohol’. This can be explained by what Karen Barber defends as the specificity of oral literature in African popular culture, in which there is a difference between written expressions (for example poems and letters) and oral expressions (for example songs). As she argues, oral literature in African popular culture has to be read as genre, which is composed by a vast stock of materials: formulas, formulas,

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stories, poetic idioms. That explains why songs that support Zimbabwe incorporated ‘different social and historical articulations’. On contrast, writing expressions fits in what she calls, the ‘intertextuality’ by sharing codes with other texts and (discourses).

The other particular aspect is that song (letters and poems) sung in Portuguese fit more into the vocabulary of the ready-made ideas than the Xichangana one, for example. So, the fact that people were using African languages, which are basically oral and not an official written, gave them a space to use some kind of creativity to not follow the official discourse.

**Conclusion**

During the colonial period, songs and poetry were used by Mozambican people to complain and protest against colonial injustice as well as satirize some important individuals. The songs in particular used to be sung in local languages and were transmitted from generation to generation. Some songs were composed by professional musicians and performed in orchestras. Although those songs were sung in different African languages (such as Chopi, Makonde and Chuabo) and touched on various aspects, all of them had as central theme the critique of the colonial regime.

However, during the liberation struggle Frelimo used songs and poetry to shape political and ideological consciousness. This interference in the creative process made that the songs and poetry changed their nature. Thus, the unofficial expressions started to extol the officially agenda. The cultural expressions no longer served to complain against a political system, but on the contrary reinforced the political system, by fitting into the vocabulary of the ready-made ideas, which sustained the political regime and its ideology.

Looking at the cultural expression that support Zimbabwean liberation struggle, it is possible see two angles: the unofficial aspect, based in freedom of expression and creativity and also the official influence on this creative process. Nevertheless, it is difficult to recover a pure social consciousness, because the separation between spontaneous support and the influence of Frelimo’s political discourse is not clear. Indeed, these cultural expressions were invaded by the new vocabulary of the ready-made ideas. Songs, letters and poetry presented expressions that extol the revolutionary ideology of building the new man. Even when the support to Zimbabwean liberation was motivated by moral duty, the songs, letters and poetry

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256 Ibid

257 Ibid
had to use Frelimo’s revolutionary tropes, as well as underline the experience of the
Frelimo’s liberation struggle, that is, the role of heroes, the sacrifice of the soldiers, the
determination of the liberation movement, and also the final and glorious victory. It means
that during the revolution, everything including the cultural expressions, which usually
represent freedom and creativity, had to work within Frelimo’s ideological framework. That
is to say, people had to show that they believe and belong to the morally correct men that the
party-state was building, and not to the enemy of the revolution.
Chapter III

Xiconhoca: the saboteurs of the Zimbabwean struggle

Introduction

The independence of Mozambique allowed Frelimo to take over the country and rule it according to its policy and ideology. The Frelimo policy was based on what Young and Hall, calls the ‘purification vision’, in which the party-state wanted to purify and clean the new society for all the impurity acquired during the colonialism, such as the vices of alcohol, drugs and the imitation of western style of dress.\textsuperscript{258} That explains why Frelimo’s revolutionary process of building the nation was based on the idea of defining the correct man, the new man, the pure one and eliminating from society the enemy of the revolution, the impure one. James Brennam considers it as a characteristic of socialist ideology which uses a politic of enmity to look at the enemies of the nation, at the same time that creates corresponding pure categories.\textsuperscript{259} By using the figure of enemy, the party-state was doing what Tobias Kelly and Shakira Thiranagama explain as the role of traitors in the process of building a nation, which is to expand the authority of the regimes in power and established what is correct and what is not within the society.\textsuperscript{260}

One of the ways that Frelimo used to clean and purify the society was through the definition of the enemy of the revolutionary, known as the internal enemy (\textit{o inimigo interno}). This enemy was represented by the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca, ‘the personification of evil’ which embodies all the negative aspects and behaviour that were undermining Frelimo’s ideology of building the morally correct new man.\textsuperscript{261} These negative aspects and behaviour could be political, social or ideological. As Benedito Machava argues, the party-state used the figure of Xiconhoca to ‘map his power and mark the boundaries of its citizenship’\textsuperscript{262}

\textsuperscript{258} M. Hall and T. Young, \textit{Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence} (London, Hurst &Company, 1997), p.74
\textsuperscript{261} Buur, ‘Xiconhoca’, p.26
This chapter discusses the ways in which the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca was used by the party-state as a visual medium to support the struggle for Zimbabwe. I argue that the image of Xiconhoca was used by Frelimo as a visual form to spread the message of solidarity to Zimbabwean liberation movements, to ideologically control the adherence of Mozambican people to the support of Zimbabwean liberation struggle as well as political propaganda against the regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia.

**Xiconhoca and its visual meaning**

The image of Xiconhoca comes up as one mechanism that the government found to ensure the support to Zimbabwean liberation struggle. Created by *Departamento de Informação e Propaganda da Frelimo* (Frelimo’s Office of Mass communication) in 1976, Xiconhoca became the most famous cartoon in Mozambique and was published in newspapers, magazine features, murals, posters and through radio messages. The Xiconhoca cartoon was skillfully designed to convey and represent its social, political and ideological message.  

His messages identified viciousness that Frelimo considered as coming from the colonialism such as: laziness, alcoholism, prostitution, polygamy, religious fanaticism, corruptions, support for imperialisms, and so on.

The name of Xiconhoca was drawn from two words: *Xico* and *Nhoca*. *Xico feio* was a famous and disgusting agent of the colonial secret police, *Polícia Internancional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE)*. *Nhoca* means snake in nearly all Mozambican languages. So ‘Xico the snake’ is a combination of the ‘conqueror’s spy with folklore imagery of stealth, poison and looking danger’. According to Lars Buur, the Xiconhoca figure was used to support Frelimo’s revolutionary project because it was through the public condemnation and repression of the traitors and enemies that the regime legitimated itself.

By using the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca as visual medium to support the struggle for Zimbabwe, the party-state was doing what Patricia Hayes considers as the ways that the exteriority has to invade the emotional sphere. In other words, the visualisation of the image could be able of invade people’s mind at the point of making them absorb the messages transmitted or even change their own ideas. Drawn in black and white, Xiconhoca

263 Buur,’ Xiconhoca’, p.31  
264 *Ibid*  
265 *Ibid*, p.34  
represents an ugly person, dirty and badly dressed with very big mouth, nose, hear and eyes. The carton figure was often accompanied by Frelimo’s revolutionary slogans and short speeches in balloons. In fact, Xiconhoca was designed to reach and encourage communication among illiterate people.\textsuperscript{267} Indeed, the combination of simple graphic technique, popular language and short text in cartoons work as a form of political propaganda in order to consciously reach people with low literacy.\textsuperscript{268} That is to say, cartoons grant to the viewers an access to visual image even without much intellectual skills.\textsuperscript{269} For Nancy Rose Hunt, the use of image and words in cartoon figures could go much further because the images by themselves are weak and susceptible of different interpretations. So, the text more than being used as a supplement of the images, brings to the cartoons specificities that exceed even the words\textsuperscript{270}

One of the most a popular uses of cartoons in Africa is for political effects. As Daniel Hammett defines, political cartoons function as ‘a window onto experience of people’ which use them to resist, oppose and challenge the political power and its authority.\textsuperscript{271} For Achille Mbembe, the use of satire as well as the ridicule of the leaders or ‘the autocrat’ as a way of challenge the leadership power, is facilitated by the characteristic of the cartons, which use the figure of speech to narrating, describing and representing the reality. And also for the fact that cartoons have a particular way of persuade, provoke suffering and laughter at the same time.\textsuperscript{272}

However, differently to the other Political cartoons, the Xiconhoca one was used by Frelimo not to challenge the leaders but as a way of ensuring the party-state power and shapes its ideology.

**Xiconhoca and the support to Zimbabwe**

To the party-state the process of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was facing obstacles imposed by the external enemy (Rhodesia and South Africa backed and supported

\textsuperscript{267} Buur, p.31  
\textsuperscript{270} N. Hount, ‘Tintin and the Interruptions of Congolese’s Comics’. In Landau and Kaspin, *Images and Empires*, p.108  
\textsuperscript{272} A. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001). pp.142-146
One of those decisions was the creation of the Solidarity Bank in February 1976. The bank was created with the objective of collecting funds to support the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, in particular Zimbabwean liberation movements as well as Zimbabwean refugees. These funds came from one day’s salary in which every working Mozambican was expected to contribute to support the liberation struggle. These funds were also channeled to help refugees and victims of natural disasters.\(^\text{273}\)

As soon as the Bank was created, *Notícias* newspaper published the comic image of Xiconhoca, in which he refuses to contribute to Solidarity Bank and support the Zimbabwean struggle, because he is not interested in the process of revolution and internationalism (the word that the government used to define the support that was given to the liberation movements of Southern Africa). In contrast, he prefers to support the regime of Ian Smith.

By using the image of Xiconhoca, the government wanted to stigmatise and repress all those who did not contribute to the Solidarity Bank, which means that they were enemies of the revolution and did not have compassion for other people. In so doing, the party-state wanted to ideologically coerce everyone who thought as Xiconhoca to join the support for the

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273 “*Dia dos Herois Moçambicanos Celebrado em Todo o País: Importantes Decisões Sociais e Políticas Anunciadas pelo Presidente*, *Notícias*, 4 fev, 1976
struggle for Zimbabwe. Indeed, as Paula Meneses argues, the ethical and political messages that this figure of Xiconhoca brought were transformed in the behaviour to avoid within the revolutionary process of building the new society.  

Visually, the image above shows Xiconhoca’s behaviour and dress in a way that the New State was trying to eliminate, since its represented the colonial behaviour. Frantz Fanon explains this ‘colonial’ influence into the African people as the effects of ‘violence’ exercised by the colonial governments. According to him, this violence was exercised by destroying the indigenous social fabric, lifestyles, traditions, and modes of dress. So, in order to fit into the western view, the colonised started to present what he calls ‘indigence and immoral depravity’, in which African people began imitating the costumes of the colonies as well as their tradition and myths.

In order to erase this colonial ‘violence’, Frelimo aimed to purify the society from what it considers ‘the colonial vices’. Samora Machel publically explained and condemned these behaviours into a rally in 1976, using the following words:

“The colonial system disseminated a kind of recreation based on consumption of alcohol, drugs, sexual promiscuity, putting aside the national culture and blinding imitation of the decant values of bourgeoisie (...). In fact, young people appeared dressed in extravagant clothes like shoes in the ‘Beatles’ style, trousers that goes until the pectoral, shirt that not reach the navel and windbreakers with symbols of the imperialist forces.”

As we can see through the image, all things that Samora Machel condemned in his discourse were represented by Xiconhoca: dressed in bell bottoms trousers, belt with large buckle, big and attention-grabbing watches, high heeled shoes, ostentation of money and drinking several alcohol bottles. The presence of alcohol bottle in the image of Xiconhoca was one of the most representative and frequent images. To Samora Machel alcohol was one of the most dangerous aspects of Xiconhoca, as he explained at a rally with Caminhos de Ferro’s workers (railway workers) in Beira:

To increase our production, we have to liquidate indiscipline into all the sections of production. We have to liquidate those who come late at the work. Arriving late at work means to sabotage the economy of the country. (...) some people come drunk and provoke disturbances. They ruin the machines. That’s why we do not make our lives better… in so doing we are opening a very big pit to bury our economy.

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274 Meneses, ‘Xiconhoca, O Inimigo’, p.31-32
275 F. Fanon, Wretched of The Earth, translated by Richard Philco (New York, Grove Press, 2004), p.6-7
276 Ibid
277 ‘Juventude, o Centro da Batalha’, discurso do Presidente Samora Machel, Tempo, 325, 26 December 1976
Because of the indiscipline and some Xiconhcas that come to work drunk. Who must smash the Xicos Nhocas? Who? You! Who knows the Xico Nhocas? You! Where does Xiconhoca live? He lives here with you. Where they are in that moment? They are here. É ou não é (it is true or not) 278

So, the image of Xiconhoca with bottles of alcohol represents a strong symbol of the moral degradation, in which a man neglects his responsibility as community member and head of family to pursue his on pleasure.279 At the same time he prefers to intoxicate himself than to participate in the process of building the nation.280

To the party-state, the vice of alcohol was one of the bad things that Mozambicans carried from the colonial period. In fact, the colonial government had created laws and strategies that perpetuated the consumption of alcohol in particularly Portuguese wines. Called Vinho para Preto (wine for Negroes), these wines had very bad quality with high levels of alcohol and sugar.281 According to José Capela, the exportation of the bad quality wine to the colonies was relating to the necessity that the colonial government had to allocate Portuguese products into a cheap and easy market.282

On the other side, to Frelimo the way of dress imitating the western culture represents the influence that colonialism and imperialism had on Mozambicans citizens, aspect that the new cosmopolitan order was combating by considering as negative and morally corruptive. To Thomas Burgess, this condemnation was also part into of the struggle between Eastern socialist ideology and the colonial and Western imperialism order 283

Thus, this visual image of Xiconhoca was showing how those who did not follow the orders used to act and dress. The combination of symbol and social commentaries (the spoken and unspoken word) was a kind of deviance used by Frelimo to make people understand the political and social message into one simple visual form.284 Indeed, according to Ritu Khanduri, caricature and cartoons reinforce the aspect of the visual sense through the

278 ‘Reunião Popular com os Trabalhadores dos Portos e Caminhos de Ferro da Beira’. Rádio Moçambique, 1977
282 Ibid, p. 27
283 Burgess, ‘Cinema’, p. 299
‘play of exaggeration and likeness, at the same time that stimulate people’s political knowledge.’

As I have said in the first chapter, although Frelimo was feeling victorious and triumphant with Mozambique independence, they were still holding on to the idea that independence would not be complete while Mozambique was still surrounded by hostile regimes like Rhodesia and South Africa. Frelimo believed that those external enemies would use the internal enemies, the Xiconhoca, as its agents to destroy the new nation. The frequent use of the slogan *A Luta Continua* (‘the struggle continues’) meant that even with the victory against the Portuguese regime the battle against the imperialism would continue, because the Frelimo’s hostile regimes would use economic sabotage and military incursions to discredit socialism and revolution.

With the beginning of political and military tension with Rhodesia by 1976, the party-state started to use the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca to publicly condemn all those who were supporting these military incursions inside Mozambique, as these two images show:

![Cartoon Image]

*Figure 1: Source: Departamento do Trabalho ideológico do partido Frelimo*

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286 Machava, ‘State Discourse’, p.598
Figure 2. Source: Noticias, 29 January 1979

The first image shows a fat Xiconhoca with a very big stomach, dressed with torn pants and carrying a bottle of alcohol in his pocket and expressing his happiness in an intimate conversation with his bosses. One of his bosses is imperialism, represented by a very big man with his pockets full of money (to pay all Xiconhoca’s actions), who ensures his support to Xiconhoca actions. The other boss is Ian Smith who is represented behind imperialism, but a little bit smaller. This shows that for Frelimo military incursions and actions of the Rhodesia inside Mozambique were backed by the imperialism, the big boss. Yet, by showing Ian Smith armed with war material (weapons, napalm, guns, bullets and knives), the party-state was making clear how Xiconhoca, the betrayer of the revolution, was supported by imperialism to kill people and sabotage the nation. This obsession with imperialism, according to Morier-Genoud, is part of Marxist conspiracy theory, which sees and blames imperialism for everything that happens.\textsuperscript{287} To Yussuf Adam, this conspiracy theory of blaming all those who challenged the government and consider them as traitors, disloyal, infiltrates, agents of

imperialism and colonialism, and so on, was used by Frelimo as an excuse to justify the party-state’s mistakes and delusions. 288

The second image of Xiconhoca condemns the military aggression perpetuated by Rhodesia inside Mozambique, at the same time that it extols the role of Frelimo in the process of building the new society that brought health, education, and justice to all Mozambicans. This image also shows Xiconhoca feeling demoralized by the behaviour of other Mozambicans, who were supporting Frelimo’s ideology against the regime of Ian Smith.

Differently to other people who dress according to Frelimo new order, that is, decent trousers and shirt, Xiconhoca sits in a dirty place, with torn pants and as always, drinking alcohol. To Frelimo that dirty Xiconhoca represents the parasite (parasita), a marginal person and an improdutivo (unproductive person), which the party-state was trying to remove from the cities. Indeed, with independence the number of people living in cities had grown to about 250,000 habitants from 1976-1980.289 This exodus of people from the rural areas to the urban areas was relating to the following particular reasons, as Carlos Quembo pointed out. First, it seems that rural people were not happy with the party-state’s policy that forced them to abandon their family field and be relocated to communal villages (or aldeias comunais).290 Second, the reduction of number of workers in South Africa imposed by the Apartheid government made that those workers started to looking for jobs in the cities, at the same time that they were trying found ways to go back to South Africa. The last aspect is relating to the nationalisation (nacionalizações) of the buildings in 1975, which allowed people who used to live in cities neighbourhoods or even in the rural areas to take up the space left by the Portuguese, who had run away from Mozambique right after independence.291 So, the Xiconhoca with poor personal hygiene was much relating to the urban vagrant who went to the city to drink, prostitute, commit crimes or even work as the enemy of the revolution and supporting Ian Smith (in our case). With this dualism of representing Xiconhoca in different ways, sometime as alcoholic and dirty one, and on other hand as fancy and well dressed man,

290 The Communal Villages were created by the Party-state soon after independence, as the places where people could be concentrated in order to benefit from State’s social infrastructures like schools and hospital, and where people could produce communally into the machambas (farms). More details about Communal Villages see for example, Paolo Israel, In the Step With the Times: Mapiko Masquerades in Mozambique (Athens, Ohio Press, 2014), p. 167-168
291 Ibid, p.37-38
with clean suits or even fashionable clothes, the party-state wanted to make clear that Xiconhoca could be found everywhere in society, within urban vagrancy or even the smartest and well-dressed urban elite.

The other aspect about Xiconhoca is the language. It seems that people who were following the party-state orders tend to use the Frelimo’s language in daily conversation. So, more than looking at Frelimo as a ‘saviour’ which ‘brought the land to the people’, the discourse of the people into the image present words such as ‘revolutions, exploited by the imperialism, defend of our revolution’, and so on, that fit into the vocabulary of made-ready ideas that I have explored in the second chapter.

The use of the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca to extol the Frelimo ideology and condemn the action of Rhodesia and all those who supported them, can be explained as what Khanduri defines as the role that cartoons have, which is to persuade people like photographs and films, at the same time that they show ‘their ability to configure empathy that redraws the lines of belonging’. So, everyone who realised that his idea and action was the same as the behaviour of this evil and ugly image of Xiconhoca, would feel psychologically persuaded to change their minds and, in this case, join the support of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle.

The propaganda against Ian Smith and political punishment

In parallel to the idea of using Xiconhoca to spread the message of solidarity to the Zimbabwean struggle and ideologically control this support, Frelimo also used Xiconhoca to make propaganda against the political changes inside Rhodesia, as this image shows:

![Cartoon Image](source: Jornal Notícias, 6 May 1979)

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After the internal settlement agreement assigned by Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and Jeremiah Chirau on 3 March 1978, and subsequent election with universal suffrage in April 1979, there was a change in the political scene of Rhodesia. Bishop Muzorewa won the election and became Prime Minister of what they called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and his party ANC won more than 64%, around 51 of 72 seats destined for blacks in the parliament. 293

As a way of showing their disagreement with the election process of Muzorewa, the party-state used the image of Xiconhoca to make propaganda against it. In fact, Frelimo (and other Frontline leaders) saw Muzorewa as an agent of Ian Smith, who won power to maintain the ideals of the white minority in Rhodesia. Frelimo’s disagreement with Muzorewa election also leaned on the fact that the party-state was worried with the possibility of international recognition for Muzorewa and the ANC as the legal leader of Zimbabwe, which would put ZANU-Patriotic Front (the liberation movements that Frontline leaders were supporting) outside the government and consequently increase the escalation of military incursions inside Mozambique. 294

Indeed, the image satirizes Muzorewa’s election showing a telephonic conversation between Muzorewa and Xiconhoca, in which Muzorewa informs Xiconhoca (his ally in Mozambique) that he was the new ‘master’ and that he would continue working within the same agenda as Ian Smith did. Xiconhoca in turn, underlined that he would continue supporting Muzorewa, as Ian Smith (the boss) told him to do. The image is also full of visual details, like the file folders that contain letters received from Voster (representing the Apartheid Regime), which support Frelimo’s idea that Muzorewa was under Smith and South Africa rules, and also the Xiconhoca’s correspondence. On the other hand, in the wall of Xiconhoca Office we can see, besides the bottle of alcohol, a rosary, which indexes religious fanaticism (another vice that Frelimo wanted to eliminate), as well as a piece of paper which shows ‘The Recruitment Programme’ of group of people, the so called reactionaries, such as thug, drugged people, PIDEs agents, and so on, in order to join him and support Rhodesia. As Will Munzenberg argues ‘the visual image has an indispensable and outstanding means of propaganda in the revolutionary context, because of his special effect on the human eyes that

294 Martin and Jhonso, p.305
makes people see the image and reflected it in their brain without forcing their mind’. Yet, the visual image has also a political effect, which can ‘influence the politically naive reader in any way chosen by the political rules’.  

However, Xiconhoca was also used to institutionalise the image of the traitor and also to show the consequences of being against the revolution as the following image demonstrates:

![Image](http://etd.uwc.ac.za)

Source: Noticias, 11 March 1979

The image shows Xiconhoca about to be lynched by the population, by the fact of being against the revolutionary process. Through this image, the party-state is showing to all Mozambicans the risk of being punished through revolutionary justice for acting like the imperialist enemies that compromises the revolutionary process that Frelimo was building. To the party-state those who acted against revolution were seen as traitors, internal agents, lackeys of imperialism, reactionary, and anti-revolutionary, among other labels. So, because of their behaviour, the ‘traitors’ were easily detected and neutralised by the People’s Vigilance Groups (Grupos de Vigilância Popular) that worked in collaboration with the national intelligence service, known as SNASP. However, according to SNASP’s

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296 Meneses, ‘Xiconhoca, o Inimigo’, p.35
297 Machava, ‘State Discourse’, p. 594
298 Ibid, p. 601-602
The action of the *Grupos de Vigilaência Popular* is not only to detect and neutralise the enemy’s agents infiltrated, but also to provide to all workers (and residents) the sense of enemy maneuvers. That will make the action of the vigilantes, also the action of the masses and not only the one small group action. Even if the vigilantes’ action were more effective, it could not ever replace the collective action of the workers.299

In order to follow the party-state orders many people were detected by the *Vigilaência Popular*, as the image above illustrate. One famous example of this neutralisation is the arrest of João Cotoi in 1977, in Mapai. Cotoi was arrested by Vigilance group accused of being at service of the Rhodesian forces. According to the authorities, his role was to do reconnaissance trip, follow the way that ZANU soldiers and FPLM used in order to get to Rhodesia, at the same time that was trying to identify where the ZANU bases were installed and see the kind of weapons that they were using.300

In fact, as the enforcement of the revolution and the aim of establishing the new order for the new society, Frelimo used the mechanism of punishment against all those who did not follow the rules. One of those punishments was to send people to re-education camps, which functioned as laboratories to transform all the *Xiconhocas* into New Men.301 The other radical punishment was the creation of the *Tribunal Militar Revolucionário* (Revolutionary Military Court) in March 1979. This court was created to judge the crimes against the security of people and the State.302 It was through this court that João Cotoi alongside with other 9 people namely Gonçalves Carimo, Fernando Mutete, Manuel Jambo, Mamade Ussemane, Joel Tsimine, Calven Charekwa, Temoteo Tcherega and Rui Manuel da Silva were sentenced to the death penalty and executed in March 1979, accused of committing crimes against the people of Mozambique by being at service the Ian Smith regime.303

One important aspect is that this politics of punishment had its roots in Frelimo’s liberation struggle, were soldiers used to face different kinds of punishment and disciplinary

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301 Machava, ‘State Discourse’, p. 603
303 Ibid
measures such as extending hours in farming activities under rain and sun, cutting trees, digging holes, building shelters or even facing death penalty by firing squad.\textsuperscript{304} Alcidio Chivite, a Frelimo combatant who in 1970s, used to be responsible for supervising soldiers’ work in Frelimos’ farm (machambas) in Tete, explains one of the disciplinary methods that he used to apply to the reluctant soldiers:

Most of soldiers were trying to avoid going to the machambas with the excuse of being sick. So, I used to punish them by asking a ‘sick’ person to sit into the tree trunk with both legs opened. Then, I used to tie his arms and legs into tree trunk and I ask a group of soldiers to carry him until the farm. Because of the walking movement, the tree trunk used to cripple the person and cause injury. So, after feeling the pain the person started to scream and confess that was not sick. After that, I would put him down and punish him with extra hours of working.\textsuperscript{305}

According to Urias Simango, who used to be Frelimo’s Vice-president, the acts of punishment of soldiers and population had been used in Frelimo war fronts, and had intensified by 1968, particularly in Cabo Delgado. These acts of punishment were exercised by the initiative of the military commanders without formal permission of the leaders.\textsuperscript{306}

When Samora Machel assumed Frelimo leadership in 1970, he started to use punishment as a ‘pedagogical tool’.\textsuperscript{307} The objective of those punishment measures was to re-educate soldiers and transform them into correct men. An important aspect is that the punishment had to be employed in public, where everybody could see. That would make people feel fear of also being punished if they committed the same indiscipline.\textsuperscript{308}

Showing the image of Xiconhoca being assaulted by the population was also a way that the party-state used to intimidate and ideologically coerce people in order to support the Zimbabwean struggle as well as denounce all those who did not support the struggle. As Khanduri argues, cartoons have the power to evoke sense and sentiment of terror, horror and fear.\textsuperscript{309} So, to see Xiconhoca being assaulted and captured by the hand of population could make people feel a kind of fear of facing the same consequences as Xiconhoca.

Thus, by using the image of Xiconhoca, Frelimo was doing what Allen Feldman considers as one of the issues that emerges from political violence and visibility, in which

\textsuperscript{304} B. Machava, ‘The Struggle for a New Mozambique: The Liberation War as an Experiment in Pedagogical Morality, 1968-1975’, unpublished paper (mimeo) kindly provided by the author, p.43
\textsuperscript{305} Alcidio Chivite interviewed in Matola, 3 February 2014
\textsuperscript{306} U. Simango, ‘Situacão Sombria na Frelimo’, in B. Nkomo, Urias Simango, Um homem, Uma causa (Maputo, Edições Novafrica, 2003), p.402
\textsuperscript{307} Machava, ‘The struggle for New Mozambique’, p.44
\textsuperscript{308} Ibid
\textsuperscript{309} Khanduri, Caricaturing Culture in India, p.6
‘the ideological imaginaries deploy rigid discriminatory and context, bound classification grids in language and discourse to create the politically visible and the politically unseen’.  

### Conclusion

As soon as Mozambique became independent Frelimo used many mechanisms in order to ensure that the support that it was giving to Southern Africa’s liberation movements, particularly to Zimbabwean and South Africa liberation movements, was effective. One of those mechanisms was the use of the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca.

In the process of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation movements and its struggle, Frelimo used the image of Xiconhoca to achieve three objectives. First of all, Frelimo wanted to ensure that everyone in Mozambique had access to the message of supporting the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. In fact, in a country where most of people were not literate, Frelimo strategically used the combination of simple texts and visual images as a way to make the message of support easier and understandable to everyone, even to people who did not go to school.

Secondly, Xiconhoca also had the role to intimate and stigmatise all those who did not support the liberation movements, using comic words and satire. To Frelimo, everyone who did not follow the ideals of revolution was against the process of building the new man. That means that they were traitors, instruments of the colonial regime, anti-revolutionaries, enemy agents, among other labels. All this revolutionary philosophy was embodied in one figure, the image of Xiconhoca, which could attract the viewers and influence their minds. In fact, no one wanted to look like the personification of the evil and ugly figure of Xiconhoca. Finally, Xiconhoca was also used as propaganda against the regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. This political propaganda through visual form had also the effect of acting as a way to persuade and influence people in a revolutionary context towards internationalism.

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Conclusion

The Independence of Mozambique was accompanied by intense celebration and euphoria. It was time to celebrate to all those who supported the liberation struggle against the Portuguese, but above all, time to support other liberation movements, particularly the Zimbabwean struggle. The idea of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation movement, ZANU, and its struggle came to Frelimo from its history of liberation struggle. In so doing, Frelimo was following the ideal of solidarity which ties together Southern African movements during their struggle against colonialism. So, it was expected by the party-state that all Mozambicans would commit to this cause.

In the rural areas where Mozambican people had been sharing family ties and border with Zimbabwe, the interaction between Mozambican people and ZANLA militants as well as Zimbabwean refugees occurred naturally. People showed their moral duty in support to ‘brothers from the other side’, helping them to transport material, giving them shelter and food, providing intelligence, and so on.

However, in order to ensure that the support for Zimbabwean struggle was effective and involved all people from rural areas to the urban areas, the party-state started to create laws and measures to control this process. At the same time, the party-state created mechanisms to repress and punish all those who did not follow the rules. Frelimo’s idea of purification, of cleaning the new born nation from all viciousness brought from the colonial period, created a new identity of belonging. Indeed, it was expected that all people acted and behaved as a new morally correct new man, who follow the party-state ideas and polices. So, those who challenged the party-state’s objective and not followed the same ‘road’ and ideas were considered as enemies, traitors, Xiconhocas, and so on.

One of the mechanisms that people found to show their belonging to the new nation was through cultural expression. The letters, poetry and songs that supported the Zimbabwean struggle bear a strong official influence on their creative process. By using a vocabulary of ready-made ideas, Mozambicans were making sure that the message of supporting Zimbabwe that was coming from above was clearly understood. It is therefore impossible to trace a pure social consciousness, because the line of separation between spontaneous support and the influence of political discourse cannot be clearly demarcated.

The image of the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca had also an important role in this process. Xiconhoca was used to spread the message of support Zimbabwean Liberation
struggle, as well as to intimate, stigmatise and exert ideological coercion all those who were not supporting the struggle, the party-state.

This dissertation brought on the table the nature and complexity of the relationship between Mozambican and Zimbabwean fighters, the kind of relationship that emerged from this contact, as well as the ways in which the Party-state had controlled all the process. However, further research is required to explore more in depth all this connections, as well as the military dynamic between Mozambican and ZANU soldiers, similarities and differences in tactic wars, as well as the difference of ideologies. The other important aspect to consider in further research is to role of women into the Milícias Populares. What was their role as Milícias Populares? How did they engage with men in this process? How the cultural manifestations at schools were important to instil and shape into the children the idea of solidarity with Zimbabwe?

It will also be important to hear the voices of people from the other border areas that is, Manica, Tete and Sofala as well as the voice of the Zimbabweans who interacted with Mozambicans. Which kind of relationship they did they had with Zimbabwean fighters and refugees?

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