The Political Economy of Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa: Tracing the Agenda in Zambia and Zimbabwe

A thesis submitted by Samuel Kapingidza at the Institute for Social Development, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, University of the Western Cape, in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of a PhD in Development Studies.

Supervised by Professor Stephen Devereux

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<td>7NDP</td>
<td>Seventh National Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>Africa Development Bank</td>
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<td>AMTO</td>
<td>Assisted Medical Treatment Order</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Aid</td>
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<td>BEAM</td>
<td>Basic Education Assistance Module</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Christian Action Research and Education</td>
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<td>CASS</td>
<td>Centre for Applied Social Sciences</td>
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<td>CCWs</td>
<td>Child Care Workers</td>
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<td>CEDC</td>
<td>Children in Extremely Difficult Circumstances</td>
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<td>CEDCs</td>
<td>Children in Extremely Difficult Circumstances</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Cooperating Partner</td>
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<td>CPF</td>
<td>Child Protection Fund</td>
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<td>CPs</td>
<td>Cooperating Partners</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Zambia Central Statistical Office</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>CSPR</td>
<td>Civil Society for Poverty Reduction</td>
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<td>CWACs</td>
<td>Community Welfare Assistance Committees</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>The United Kingdom Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Development Partner</td>
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<td>DPs</td>
<td>Development Partners</td>
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<td>EPRI</td>
<td>Economic Policy Research Institute</td>
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<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>ESPP</td>
<td>Enhanced Social Protection Project</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>FISP</td>
<td>Farm Input Support Programme</td>
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<td>FNDP</td>
<td>Fifth National Development Plan</td>
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<td>FPDL</td>
<td>Food Poverty Datum Line</td>
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<td>FSP</td>
<td>Food Security Pack</td>
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<td>FTLRP</td>
<td>Fast Track Land Reform Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAPVU</td>
<td>Gabinete de Apoio à População Vulnerável literally translates into Office for Assistance to the Vulnerable Population.</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Germany Development Agency</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GoZ</td>
<td>Government of Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>GRZ</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Zambia</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Technical Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
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<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immune Deficiency Syndrome/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>HSCT</td>
<td>Harmonised Social Cash Transfer Programme</td>
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<td>IFIs</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCTR</td>
<td>Jesuit Council for Theological Reflection</td>
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<td>KiW</td>
<td>The German Development Bank</td>
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<td>LASPF</td>
<td>Local Authorities Pension Fund</td>
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<td>LCH</td>
<td>Labour Constrained Households</td>
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<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty</td>
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<td>MASAF</td>
<td>Malawi Social Action Fund</td>
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<td>MCDMCH</td>
<td>Ministry of Community Development Mother and Child Health</td>
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<td>MCDSS</td>
<td>Ministry of Community Development and Social Services</td>
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<td>MCT</td>
<td>Multiple Categorical Targeting</td>
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<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<td>MFNP</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and National Planning</td>
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<td>MLSS</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Security</td>
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<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<td>MoESAC</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Sport, Arts and Culture</td>
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<td>MoLSS</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Services</td>
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<td>MPSLSW</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare</td>
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<td>MSCT</td>
<td>Mchinji Social Cash Transfer</td>
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<td>MTP</td>
<td>Medium Term Plan</td>
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<td>NANGO</td>
<td>National Association for Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NAP for OVC</td>
<td>National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children</td>
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<td>NCMS</td>
<td>National Case Management System</td>
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<td>NDPs</td>
<td>National Development Plans</td>
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<td>NEDPP</td>
<td>National Economic Development Priority Programme</td>
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<td>NERP</td>
<td>National Economic Revival Programme</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NLC</td>
<td>Non-Labour Constrained</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPF</td>
<td>National Pension Fund</td>
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<td>NSPP</td>
<td>National Social Protection Policy</td>
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<td>NSPPF</td>
<td>National Social Protection Policy Framework</td>
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<td>NSSA</td>
<td>National Social Security Authority</td>
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<td>NZAid</td>
<td>New Zealand Aid</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Public Assistance</td>
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<td>PAAP</td>
<td>Poverty Alleviation Action Plan</td>
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<td>PAM</td>
<td>Programme Against Malnutrition</td>
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<td>PASS</td>
<td>Poverty Assessment Study Survey</td>
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<td>PCW</td>
<td>Productive Community Works</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>PoS</td>
<td>Programme of Support</td>
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<td>PRSPs</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers</td>
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<td>PSNP</td>
<td>Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia</td>
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<td>PSPF</td>
<td>Public Service Pension Fund</td>
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<td>PUSH</td>
<td>Project Urban Self Help</td>
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<td>PWAS</td>
<td>Public Welfare Assistance Scheme</td>
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<td>PWP</td>
<td>Public Works Programme</td>
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<td>RSNDP</td>
<td>Revised-Sixth National Development Plan</td>
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<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<td>Social Cash Transfer Programme</td>
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<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<td>SDF</td>
<td>Social Dimension Fund</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SNDP</td>
<td>Sixth National Development Plan</td>
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</table>
SP-SAG  Social Protection-Sector Advisory Group
SPP    Social Protection Paradigm
SPS    Social Protection Strategy
SRM    Social Risk Management
SSA    Sub-Saharan Africa
STPF   Social Transfer Policy Framework
TA     Technical Assistance
TRC    Technical Review Committee
TWG-SA Technical Working Group on Social Assistance
UK     United Kingdom
UN     United Nations
UNCT   United Nations Country Team
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme
UNGASS United Nations General Assembly Special Session
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIP   United National Independence Party
UPND   United Party for National Development
USA    United States of America
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
USD    United States Dollars
WASH   Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WPO    Working Party of Officials
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZECT   Zimbabwe Emergency Cash Transfer Programme
ZEDS   Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy
ZIDERZ Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act

http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
Identification of Key Informants

CP1-CP7  External agency officials for Zambia
CSO1-CSO5  Civil Society Organisation officials for both Zambia and Zimbabwe
DP1-DP7  External agency officials for Zimbabwe
GoZ1-GoZ10  Government of Zimbabwe officials
GRZ1-GRZ9  Government of Zambia officials
NGO1-NGO6  International Non-Governmental Organisation officials for both Zambia and Zimbabwe
SPE  Social Protection Expert (anonymous)
Abstract
This study traces the political economy of the social protection policy processes in the two country case studies of Zambia and Zimbabwe. It focuses on the role of global actors/external agencies (bilaterals, multilaterals and IFIs), national actors (government, parliament) and local actors (beneficiary communities, INGOs, CSOs) in social protection policy evolution. It looks at the power dynamics within the policy space: who is more powerful and who is less powerful, who voices and whose voice matters, who makes decisions and who follows decisions, who drives the policy and who follows, who has the money and who follows the money, who consults and who is consulted, and whether the rural communities (perceived beneficiaries) are active participants or ‘passive’ recipients. Therefore, the study is based on key informant interviews with officials from government, external agencies, INGOs and CSOs as well as focus group discussions with the communities. What emerges is that social protection is a policy contestation between the external agencies themselves; between external agencies and the government; between personnel of the same external agency; and within the government itself. Despite being driven by a common goal to fight poverty, external agencies have different global social protection policy positions and each would ‘push’ for the adoption of that policy position over the rest. Contestation between external agencies and the government reflect that government priorities differ from those of the external agencies. While external agencies pushed for social protection, the government would prefer agricultural subsidies to support the productive capacity of the people. Intra-government ‘struggles’ relate to the contest over which ministry is best placed to coordinate social protection and Ministry of Finance’s ambivalence over budgetary commitment to social protection. The study therefore underscores the primacy of politics in social protection.
Chapter 1 Introduction and Research Methodology

1.0 Introduction

This chapter introduces the subject of study for this thesis. It gives a contextual background to the study and outlines the research problem. The chapter also describes and explains the research methodology outlining all the steps and procedures followed by the researcher to obtain data. The major sources of secondary data are highlighted. The researcher describes the choice of participants for primary data and the sampling methods. Procedures of data analysis are outlined. Specific ethical issues that were considered in this study are stated. Limitations of this research and how the researcher minimised their impact are outlined. The chapter ends with a conclusion that highlights the main insights of the study.

1.1 Background to the study

This paper seeks to explore the political economy of the social protection agenda in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with specific focus on Zambia and Zimbabwe. The two countries have historically run a number of social transfer programmes, some of which predate independence. For years, such programmes suffered from financial constraints, political patronage and lack of a proper policy framework. The global rise of the social protection agenda saw cash transfer programmes being initiated by external agencies in the two countries (among other countries) followed by development of social protection policies that are now in place. The interaction between external actors and domestic actors resulted in different levels of adoption by the two governments, thereby warranting this study.

The shift in policy focus to social protection from the late 1980s was a response to the adverse effects of the Bretton Wood Institutions’ structural adjustment programmes (Adesina, 2011; de Haan, 2013); failure of development policies to reduce poverty (Cook and Kabeer, 2009) and the global economic meltdown of 2008 onwards (de Haan, 2013) that ignited global interest in social protection. The beginning of the new millennium witnessed the advent of social cash transfers (conditional and unconditional) as a policy choice from the ‘donor community’ to address poverty and vulnerability. Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2007) note that the social protection agenda “comes with a fresh array of conceptual frameworks, analytical tools, empirical evidence, national policy processes, heavyweight agencies and big names in development studies aligned behind it” (p. 1). It is not surprising that social protection ‘supremacy’ as a policy instrument is increasingly difficult to challenge both in theory and practice. Adesina (2011) makes a captivating observation:
Underlying the social protection paradigm (SPP) is a set of problematic assumptions, norms, and policy practices. First is the problematic nature of policy transfers and of learning. Second is the disconnection between social and economic policy, the almost universal focus on chronic poverty (the ‘ultra-poor’) and vulnerability, and a preference for means testing and targeting. Third is the normative underpinning of the SPP, which is wedded to the neoliberal market transactional logic. The economic paradigm is largely unchallenged and its role in promoting vulnerability as a basis for social protection remains, for the most part, un-investigated. The result is a reduced vision of social policy (p. 455)

The above narrative suggests that the social protection agenda is ideologically contested and that is also underscored by Kabandula and Seekings (2016) and Siachiwena (2016). The paradigm needs further research to ascertain the political motivation behind it at global, regional and national levels. The dominance of technical concerns over political issues begets a shallow understanding of the rise of social protection. Four issues are particularly important when analysing how politics shape social protection in Africa. These are political institutions; political actors and agencies; socio-economic forces; and global dimension (Hickey, 2007). The aforementioned are not stand-alone but problematic interdependent factors that closely influence each other to determine “the uptake, forms and sustainability of social protection programmes in Africa” (Hickey, 2007, p. 3).

1.2 The research problem and central argument

Literature on social protection overemphasizes the technical dimension to the detriment of the political underpinnings of the agenda. Despite the adoption of social protection measures by numerous regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America, de Haan (2013) criticises the depoliticised nature of the social protection debate in the global South. Overemphasis of economic constraints downplays the fundamental role of political economy in the social protection agenda (Casamatta et al., 2000; Niles, 1999) but research is beginning to show the value of political economy (Siachiwena, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017; Kabandula and Seekings, 2016). Significantly, this approach has underscored lack of financial and administrative capacity to justify the few small scale donor-funded social protection projects in poor countries. That has contributed to a skewed view of the social protection discourse both in theory and practice. Hickey is one of the first academics to acknowledge the centrality of politics but not much in-depth work was done on this issue until recently. Social policies, regardless of their efficacy, are not acceptable if they are not deemed to be
politically feasible. Consequently, “to the extent that such policies are driven by the values of different social actors with different ideological positions, and to the extent that they invariably entail intra- and inter-generational redistribution issues, they are the outcomes of political bargains and conflicts since they touch upon power in society - its distribution and accessibility to different political actors” (Mkandawire, 2001, p. 18).

There is no doubt that political interests determine public expenditure including social spending. However, Hickey (2007) admits that the nexus between politics and social protection is not easily discernible. In this study, the researcher hypothesizes that the dominance of external agencies and their financing of social protection distorts the broad vision of social policy; compromises the state’s political and budgetary commitment to social policy; and bypassing of national government structures and subsequent conditionalities attached to the aid could be interpreted as undermining of national policy sovereignty. External financial aid for social protection is motivated by certain political concerns that may hinder the broad scope of poverty reduction. The researcher posits that global politics interact with domestic politics to promote social protection and undermine domestic policy. This study adds a different voice to the debate on social protection by asserting that the rise of social protection is a political contestation among external agencies themselves, between external agencies and the government and within the government itself.

1.3 Research Objectives and Questions.

The main objective of the study is:

To examine how interests of various actors influenced the social protection policy processes in sub-Saharan Africa.

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- examine the role of external agencies in the institutionalisation of social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa;
- examine the social protection policy processes in Zambia and Zimbabwe;
- compare the rise of social cash transfers in Zambia and Zimbabwe;
- connect the experiences of Zambia and Zimbabwe to policy and future research implications in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The study answers the following questions:
• What has been the role of external agencies in the rise of the social protection agenda in Sub-Saharan Africa? What were their strategies of influence and how far have they been effective?

• How did various actors influence the development of the social protection policy in the two country case studies? How did the interplay of power and politics influence these policy processes?

• How do the Social Cash Transfer programme (SCT) of Zambia and the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer programme (HSCT) of Zimbabwe compare in design, implementation, political context and national prioritisation? How did the rise of social cash transfers affect domestic policy and social spending?

• What are the implications of experiences of Zambia and Zimbabwe for policy, research and theory?

1.4 Research Methodology

This study is based on a qualitative research methodology that draws on three paradigms of social constructivism, interpretivism and critical research. Social constructivism underscores that “all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context” (Crotty, 1998, p. 53). Interpretivism underscores that the researcher takes “the position that social or cultural phenomena emerge from the ways in which actors in a setting construct meaning” and that “the researcher comes to understand behaviors and the meanings attributed to them through immersion in the setting and interaction with the study participants” (Schensul, 2012, pp. 76-77).

Critical researchers believe that social and political structures shape and hold power over the lives of individuals, creating various types of disparities. Critical researchers always locate the behaviors and meanings held by individuals and groups within larger systems of dominance and control. (Schensul, 2012, p. 77).

The decision to take a qualitative approach is predicated on the researcher’s view that the nuances of the political economy of social protection are complex and involve exploring the interactions between the actors involved. Qualitative research results are insightful into “why people do what they do and what influences their thoughts, values, and behaviors” as well as
how programmes and interventions are performing (Schensul, 2012, p. 101). The study involves a policy process analysis based on the assumption that external agencies\(^1\) like the World Bank, International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Department for International Development (DFID) and UNICEF, among others, have influenced the evolution of social protection in Africa. After going through literature on policy diffusion and policy transfer, the researcher realised that the policy process analysis is a complicated endeavour that calls for deep analytical skills to be able to discern the embedded politics and power dynamics. In this study, the researcher is interested in the narratives of the various stakeholders to get a deep understanding of how politics shape social protection from global to local levels. As noted by Marshall (1996), the qualitative approach is useful tool to understand complex human issues like a policy process. The study is therefore both descriptive and explanatory. It describes how different actors interacted and attempts to explain why the processes of social protection development evolved in the manner they did.

Yin (2003) rightly states that “case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real life context” (p. 1). The case study is compelled by “the desire to understand complex social phenomenon” and it “allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events” (Yin, 2003, p. 2). Schramm (1971) also reiterates the value of the case study strategy, “The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result” (as cited in Yin, 2003, p. 12).

The thesis is therefore premised on both secondary data and extensive primary data collection in the two country case studies. The research specifically focuses on the processes leading to development of the National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) of Zambia and the National Social Protection Policy Framework (NSPPF) of Zimbabwe as well and the two cash transfer programmes-the Social Cash Transfer programme (SCT) of Zambia and the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer programme (HSCT) of Zimbabwe. For the cash transfers, the researcher chose Kalomo (Zambia) and Rushinga (Zimbabwe) districts. Kalomo was the first district in

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\(^1\) For the purpose of this research, the term external agency refers to bilateral and multilateral agencies and international financial institutions (IFIs) while donor(s) refers to bilateral agencies. Officially, external agencies are known as cooperating partners (CPs) in Zambia and development partners (DPs) in Zimbabwe.
Zambia to implement the pilot social cash transfer while Rushinga is among the first districts to implement social cash transfers and one of the most arid in Zimbabwe.

1.4.1 Document and Empirical Studies Review

Review of secondary data traced the evolution of social protection and the contemporary debates and practices. The researcher consulted publications on social protection, policy processes, global and national policies on social protection as well as project reports. Such documents were very pertinent to understand the political economy of social protection as the researcher sought to explore the roles played by different players. Global policy positions for the major external agencies like the World Bank, DFID, ILO and UNICEF were reviewed in the context of the role of such agencies in shaping the social protection agenda. For instance, the World Bank’s (2012) *Social Protection and Labour Strategy*, ILO’s (2012) *Social Security for All: Building social protection floors and comprehensive social security systems*; UNICEF’s (2012) *Integrated Social Protection Systems: Enhanced Equity for Children*; and DFID’s (2011) *Cash Transfer Evidence Paper* are some of the key global policy positions that have been instrumental in the rise of social protection. As noted in later chapters, such global policy positions have influenced the domestic policy trajectory in sub-Saharan Africa including Zambia and Zimbabwe. Given that the external agencies have different approaches to social protection, it made it worthwhile to explore how the various approaches were exerted to influence the policy content and context. Several studies were reviewed in the context of politics of social protection. Government reports and policy documents provided the national perspectives of the social protection agenda.

The National Constitutions for Zambia and Zimbabwe were examined to understand the extent to which social protection is constitutionally entrenched and how far the constitutional mandate is fulfilled. The researcher also attempted to assess the role of the parliament as an important organ in policy evolution.

In Zimbabwe, the Enhanced Social Protection Project (ESPP) is a key policy document to understand the social protection discourse. The ESPP was launched in 2000 “as a comprehensive framework for protecting vulnerable groups against risk and shocks stemming from increased poverty” (Smith et al., 2012, p. 13). Before the country adopted its first social protection policy in December 2016, social protection in Zimbabwe was guided by the Social Transfer Policy Framework. It included a Public Community Works Policy Framework and Operational Guidelines for Productive Community Works and the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer programme (UN and GoZ, 2014). The first Draft Social Protection Strategy in
Zambia came into being in 2005 while the social protection policy was passed in December 2014. The two social protection policies for Zambia and Zimbabwe as well as the processes that led to their development were critical in understanding the rise of social protection. Reports on design, implementation and evaluation of the two cash transfer programmes run in the two countries were insightful to this study.

Development in the two countries is guided by 5-year national blueprints and the researcher used these to see how social protection was brought to the national development agenda. Zimbabwe is currently implementing the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset), which spans from 2013 to 2018. In Zambia, the National Development Plans (NDPs) provide the overall framework for public policy. Zambia is currently implementing the Seventh National Development Plan (7NDP) that runs from 2017-2021.

National budget statements enabled the researcher to see how social protection permeated the national budget systems and the trend of resource commitment from the government. Similarly, national public expenditure reports helped the researcher to assess if the two governments were matching their budget statements with fund disbursement.

1.4.2 Primary Data Collection

This research targeted actors in the social protection policy space. The policy process involves negotiations, persuasion, debates and political concessions at global, national and local levels. It is at the global and national levels where decisions are made, at times behind closed doors. Again, it is at global and national levels where organisations that possess finance, power or both meet to negotiate for policies or programmes that they think are the best to fight the prevalent poverty. However, the local level is also a stakeholder (although it is usually placed at the periphery of policy making) both as a participant and beneficiary of the policy. As beneficiaries or implementers of the policies and programmes, local stakeholders’ (districts and communities) voices were also pertinent for the researcher to examine the extent to which the policy process was inclusive and participatory.

The researcher employed both note taking and audio recording in the interviews. The use of an audio recording device was only possible upon getting informed consent from the research participant(s). There were a few instances where some individuals would not commit themselves to be interviewed (consultants who wrote the two policies, media and civil society). Audio recording was particularly useful in capturing direct words of the participants.
that enabled the researcher to use direct quotations where necessary and for emphasis. Note
taking was equally useful as a back up to audios and in circumstances where the research
participants expressed reservations over audio recording. Note taking also enabled the
researcher to capture interesting tangents for further probing.

**In-depth Key Informant Interviews**

Key informant interviews are the backbone of this study. Key informants are experts, insiders
and perhaps highly experienced and therefore gives the researcher access to a world that the
researcher would not understand from outside (O’Leary, 2014, pp. 191-192).

Semi-structured in-depth interviews were central to this study because they “combine
structure and flexibility; are interactive in nature; the researcher uses a range of probes and
other techniques to achieve depth of answer in terms of penetration, exploration and
explanation; and are generative in the sense that new knowledge or thoughts are likely, at
some stage, to be created” (Legard et al., 2003, pp. 141-142). The researcher was quite aware
that the success of an in-depth interview was determined by the researcher’s ability to listen
with a clear, logical mind; a good memory and an inquiring mind (curiosity) (Somekh and
Lewin, 2005; Legard et al., 2003). The researcher tried as much as possible to consciously
internalise the sounded attributes to get in-depth responses and rich narratives. The researcher
therefore conducted in-depth interviews with key informants from the government, external
agencies, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and civil society
organisations (CSOs). The researcher held one on one interviews with the awareness that a
face-to-face interview “allows the researcher control over the process and the interviewee the
freedom to express his or her thoughts” (O’Leary, 2014, p. 218). The researcher also
interviewed a social protection expert (anonymous) who has worked on social protection in
Africa and globally for many years to get overall understanding of how the social protection
agenda has evolved over years.

The external agencies interviewed are the United Kingdom Department for International
Development (DFID), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the
German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ-now GIZ), Finland (Finnish Aid), Swiss
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), the European Union (EU) and the World Bank. The external agencies played a
significant role in initiating and funding cash transfers and social protection policy evolution
in both countries. Government officials interviewed came from the Ministry of Community
Development and Social Services (MCDSS-Zambia), Ministry of Public Service, Labour and
Social Welfare (MPSLSW-Zimbabwe) and Ministries of Finance (both Zambia and Zimbabwe). MCDSS and MPSLSW are the lead ministries for social protection while the Ministries of Finance are relevant given their pertinent role of national budgeting and resource allocation. The researcher evoked the ministries’ perception of social protection, what they said they do, how they were working with the external agencies and NGOs, and how they were implementing both externally and government financed social protection programmes. For MCDSS and MPSLSW, the researcher engaged officials from national to district levels as the two ministries are the custodians of social protection and regularly interface with the external agencies as well as the beneficiary communities. The ministries of Finance are centralised and therefore the researcher only engaged officials at the national headquarters in the two capital cities of Lusaka and Harare. The researcher also looked at the trend of resource commitment from external agencies. The INGOs involved in this study are Save the Children, World Vision and Care International. They are important implementing partners for the external agencies and are therefore stakeholders in the social protection agenda. Their national offices are also in the capital cities (where the researcher accessed them) though they have sub-offices in the districts where they implement programmes. The CSOs reached are based in the capital cities.

For key informants, the researcher used purposive sampling technique. Table below summarises the key informants.

Table 1 Summary of Key Informant Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>External agencies</th>
<th>INGOs</th>
<th>CSOs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social protection expert</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The researcher was cognisant of the fact that purposive sampling ensures that “all the key constituencies of relevance to the subject matter are covered and that within each of the key criteria, some diversity is included so that the impact of the characteristic concerned can be explored” (Ritchie et al., 2003, p.79). Based on the research questions and objectives, the researcher used carefully prepared semi-structured questions to allow the flexibility to
“follow the natural flow of conversation” and in order for the researcher “to pursue interesting tangents” (O’Leary 2014, p. 218). The researcher prepared interview schedules (see appendices) that guided the whole interview process in the two countries. The same research procedures were conducted in both countries.

As noted in the list of acronyms, the researcher identified the key informants with codes as follows:

Table 2 Identification of Key Informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Identification Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External agency officials Zambia</td>
<td>CP1-CP8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External agency officials Zimbabwe</td>
<td>DP1-DP7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Zambia officials</td>
<td>GRZ1-GRZ9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Zimbabwe officials</td>
<td>GoZ1-GoZ10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organisation officials Zambia and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>CSO1-CSO5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation officials Zambia and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>NGO1-NGO6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Social Protection Expert (anonymous)                                         | SPE                  

Author’s creation

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Household Interviews

Focus Group Discussions were valuable to this study given that the study involves perceptions and experiences of the programme and policy beneficiaries. Berg reinforces this sentiment when he notes, when focus groups are administered properly, they are extremely dynamic. Interactions among and between group members stimulate discussions in which one group member reacts to comments made by another... a far larger number of ideas, issues, topics, and even solutions to a problem can be generated through group discussion than through individual conversations (Berg, 2001, p. 112).

FGDs allowed the researcher to gather many views from diverse participants as they reflected on their personal experiences about cash transfers. The discussions were insightful and the “spontaneity that arises from their stronger social context” (Finch and Lewis, 2003, p. 171) was an asset to the study. Each FGD comprised 6-10 participants who included both men and women who were either beneficiaries or non-beneficiaries. Finch and Lewis (2003) recommend a focus group of 6-8 participants while O’Leary (2014) recommends 4-12 participants. As noted by Finch and Louis (2003), diversity aids and enriches the discussion. Women constituted a majority of the participants and the male participants were generally the aged ones. Each FGD took an average of an hour. Finch and Lewis (2003) approximate an FGD to last between one hour and a half to two hours.
The researcher held focus group discussions with beneficiary and non-beneficiary individual households. As targets of the policy and the resultant interventions, they were instrumental in sharing their experiences that enabled the researcher to get a well-informed understanding of the implementation process. In Zambia, the researcher conducted interviews with cash transfer beneficiary and non-beneficiary individual households (with the assistance of an interpreter) after realising that FGDs would not be effective given the language barrier. The households were accessed in the Kalomo community through purposive/snowball sampling. The researcher, however, held FGDs with the community welfare assistance committees (CWACs) whose members would converse in English quite well. In Zimbabwe, the researcher held FGDs with both cash transfer beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and the child care committees. For Zambia, 2 FGDs were held with child welfare assistance committee (CWAC) members to complement the household interviews. In Zimbabwe, 4 FGDs were conducted with beneficiaries/non-beneficiaries and 1 with child care workers (CCWs). Table below sums up the data collection process.

Table 3 Summary of data collection methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample of participants</th>
<th>Study population</th>
<th>Number sampled</th>
<th>Sampling method</th>
<th>Data collection method</th>
<th>Instrument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key informants</td>
<td>Various agencies</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Purposive</td>
<td>In-depth interview</td>
<td>Structured guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informants</td>
<td>Social protection experts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Purposive</td>
<td>In-depth interview</td>
<td>Structured guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Cash transfer beneficiaries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Purposive</td>
<td>Interview/discussion</td>
<td>Interview guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Community volunteers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Purposive</td>
<td>Interview/discussion</td>
<td>Interview guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households</td>
<td>Cash transfer beneficiaries</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Purposive/snowball</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>Interview guide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author’s creation
1.4.3 Ethical Considerations

Throughout the research process, the researcher was conscious of the fundamental value of ethics in research and the imperative to uphold them to ensure integrity of the whole research process. This is in line with O’Leary’s (2004) observation that knowledge production comes with power and power comes with responsibility to protect ‘the dignity and well-being of the researched’ (p. 50).

The researcher subscribed to the ‘do no harm’ principle whereby deliberate and cautious steps were always taken to protect the research participants during and after data collection. The communities face challenges of poverty and are expectant of assistance and thus it was common for the researcher to be mistaken for a government or NGO official at first sight. The researcher adequately explained the thrust of this research and the value of research in policy reform. Throughout the whole process of data collection, the researcher clarified the research to ensure that it did not raise any expectations especially to the communities. The communities met were diverse in age, culture, religion and physical abilities. The researcher treated all that diversity with utmost respect and dignity. O’Leary (2004) equally notes that the rights and culture of the research participants need to be upheld so that they are not harmed. By adequately clarifying the thrust of the research, the researcher ensured that participants gave informed consent.

The concept of informed consent emphasizes the importance of researchers accurately informing respondents/participants of the nature of their research. Participants can only give informed consent if they have a full understanding of their requested involvement in a research project, including time commitment, type of activity, topics that will be covered, and all physical and emotional risks potentially involved (O’Leary, 2004, p. 53).

Subsequently, informed consent implies that research participants are competent, autonomous, involved voluntarily, aware of the right to discontinue, not deceived, not coerced, and not induced (ibid.).

The study is quite complex and sensitive as it invokes policy-makers’ and practitioners’ acts of commission and omission, emotions and opinions over the policy process and implementation of the social cash transfers. Some of the information released by participants was politically sensitive. Confidentiality and anonymity were therefore of paramount importance. The researcher consciously espoused the principle of confidentiality and anonymity to warrant the protection of identity of the research participants throughout the
research process. Identity of research participants was not disclosed throughout this study and shall never be disclosed even after submission of the thesis. Although some of the key informants were comfortable with having their identity disclosed in this study, the researcher decided to keep identity of all research participants anonymous to uphold the protection of the researched and maintain ethical uprightness of a credible research. This was upon the realisation that the key informants were largely communicating the official position of their organisations and therefore to reveal their identity would potentially compromise relations within the organisations and between stakeholders. For those who consented to audio recording, the researcher informed them that they were free to request to speak off the record wherever they deemed necessary so that they would not withhold important information. Participants were generally comfortable with the entire interviews being recorded except in two cases where they requested some parts not to be recorded. Thus, the researcher conformed to individual preferences for the mode of recording.

The researcher avoided being judgemental at all costs and allowed the voice of the researched to take precedence throughout the data collection process. This researcher also appreciates the power of language in research and thus tried as much as possible to use simple language to ensure that participants understood the essence of the research and that the richness of the narratives told by the research participants is not lost in translation. The researcher was cautious and sensitive to gender, class, race, age, ethnic background, socio-economic status and power to capture both dominant and less dominant voices. O’Leary (2004) further warns that it is important for the researcher to embrace diversity of the researched to capture outstanding factors and to avoid reaching conclusions devoid of the voice of the marginalised. Thus, the researcher deliberately interviewed communities in the rural areas in order to add the voice of the ‘powerless’ to the study. That enabled the researcher to examine the policy process against the concept of participation.

1.4.4 Data Analysis

The units of analysis for this study are organisations (government, external agencies, INGOs and CSOs), policies (NSPP and NSPPF), programmes (SCT and HSCT), and individuals/households (beneficiary communities).

The researcher realised that there was a lot of data after field work and it was important to devise or adopt a mechanism to organise the data to begin the process of analysis. This would ensure that the researcher would be able to interpret and construct a credible and coherent scholarly narrative. As noted by Berg (2001), raw data in the form of interviews and field
notes can only be analysed after it is condensed to make it systematically comparable. Analysis conformed to the social constructivist worldview that underscores that individuals have different interpretations of the world they live and work and it is therefore the role of the researcher to look for a deep understanding of the views (Creswell, 2009; Crotty, 1998; Schwandt, 1998).

This study adopted a thematic approach, which is ‘a way of organising a thematic analysis of qualitative data’ (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p. 387). Thus, the process of data analysis took the following sequence as prescribed by Berg (2001).

- Compilation of field notes and transcription of audios;
- Developing codes (analytically and inductively) from the data;
- Transforming codes into categorical labels or themes;
- Materials were sorted by these categories, identifying similar phrases, patterns, relationships, and commonalities or disparities;
- Sorted materials were examined to isolate meaningful patterns and processes; and
- Identified patterns were considered in light of previous research and theories, and a set of generalizations was established (p. 240).

The researcher started the process by compiling the field notes and transcribing the audio recorded interviews so that all the data will be in text. After the first procedure was through, what followed was reading the interview texts several times and noting the key phrases and words thereby coming up with the codes. The researcher analysed the codes and merged those related. That process generated themes that then framed the structure of the empirical chapters and the analysis. The process of generating themes was consciously guided by research objectives and questions. The themes eventually led to the central conclusive generalizations which Toulmin (1958) terms claim, whose “merits depend on the merits of the argument which could be produced in its support” (p.11). What then followed was interpretation, which entailed analysis of the findings. As a comparative study, part of the analysis was to compare the experiences of the two countries. As recommended by Yin (2003), the researcher did a cross-case synthesis of the two countries. To achieve high quality analysis in this regard, the analysis was informed by all the evidence; addressed all major rival interpretations; addressed the most significant aspect of the case studies; and demonstrated the researcher prior expert knowledge of the case study as posited by Yin (2003). Triangulation was part of the analysis as the researcher sought to strengthen comprehension of the topic by relating to different sources of data, as asserted by Schensul
(2012). Similarly, Mertens (2010) notes that multiple sources of data are significant to support interpretations and conclusions in qualitative research. Triangulation ensured that voices for both the dominant powerful actors and the least empowered were presented throughout the study.

1.4.5 Limitations of the Study

At external agencies, some of the staff especially those in management positions are expatriate and only deployed to a particular country for a fixed period and are redeployed to another region or country upon expiry of their terms. This implied that, in some instances, the researcher could not meet the people who were directly involved in the initial stages or during the formative years of the social cash transfers or social protection policy evolution. For instance, the researcher could not get an interview at GTZ (now GIZ) due to the aforementioned reasons and the fact that the German bilateral agency is no longer funding social protection in Zambia. The EU in Zimbabwe used to fund the HSCT but again the people that were involved during those years were no longer in Zimbabwe and the researcher could not reach them. Those available would only talk about the EU’s role in a general sense. Despite the role of the World Bank in the early years of the rise of social protection in Zimbabwe, there was no-one at the World Bank office in Harare who was involved during that period. Another reason is that the institution suspended financing the government due to outstanding arrears and sanctions imposed on the Harare administration. Despite the noted challenges of institutional memory, the researcher managed to get as much information about the role of the noted organisations from other partner agencies and government officials.

There were language constraints in the Kalomo communities in Zambia given that the researcher was not conversant with the vernacular. The researcher decided to do household interviews instead of the originally planned FGDs. Thus, the researcher engaged a person from the community who did the interpretation. The researcher, however, held FGDs with the CWACs whose members would generally converse in English. Overall, language was not a big issue because both Zambia and Zimbabwe are Anglophone and people generally have a basic command of the English language.

Specific focus was on Zambia and Zimbabwe and the findings of this study are specific to the two countries. While such findings might relate to the context of other African countries, the researcher expect this study to trigger more studies in other countries instead of generalizing this study to the region of sub-Saharan or the whole content. The researcher is also aware that
in countries like South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Mauritius, the context is different since the governments wholly fund social policy interventions.

1.4.6 Case Studies and Time Frame of the Study
The decision to focus on Zambia and Zimbabwe is premised on a number of factors. Firstly, the two are neighbouring former British colonies that have experienced a contrasting political trajectory since they got independence. While Zambia has experienced a smooth political transition of different political parties and different heads of state, Zimbabwe has only been ruled by ZANU-PF (1980 to date) and Robert Mugabe (from 1980 until November 2017). Even during the Government of National Unity (2009-2013), Robert Mugabe and his party remained the dominant political force. In terms of social protection, Zambia is one of the earliest African countries to pilot social cash transfers (Kalomo) and got more research attention than Zimbabwe. Thirdly, the two countries have similar external agencies that have been influencing the adoption of social protection. It is in respect of the above factors that this researcher saw it worthwhile to study how the two countries fared in terms of the social protection policy processes and social cash transfers.

This research focuses on the period from 2000 to present day for both cases. However, the researcher highlights how the pre-2000 history shaped the current debate on social protection. The drive for social protection became robust at the beginning of the new millennium in the two countries owing to the persistent push from external agencies like the World Bank, DFID, UNICEF, and ILO. In Zimbabwe, the ESPP was launched in 2000 while, in Zambia, the SCT started as a pilot in Kalomo in 2003.

1.5 Structure of the thesis
Chapter 1: Introduces and gives a background to the study. It outlines the research problem and the methodology that was adopted for this study.

Chapter 2: Maps out the conceptual framework that overall guides the analysis and argument of the thesis.

Chapter 3: Reviews literature within the precincts of the primacy of politics in social protection. This chapter informs and justifies the thrust of this study that politics is central to the social protection agenda.

Chapter 4: Traces the evolution of the social protection agenda in Zambia. The chapter maps out and analyses the processes that led to the development of the National Social Protection
Policy (NSPP) in 2014. It looks at the policy processes and how interests of various actors shaped the policy.

**Chapter 5**: Traces the rise of social protection in Zimbabwe. It assesses processes that culminated in the National Social Protection Policy Framework (NSPPF) in December 2016. It looks at the policy processes and how interests of different actors shaped the policy.

**Chapter 6**: Compares the design and implementation of the Social Cash Transfer programme of Zambia and the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer programme (HSCT). The chapter helps to understand why there is different progress in different countries in terms of social protection adoption.

**Chapter 7**: Concludes the thesis by summarising the findings, connecting the empirical evidence to theory and mapping out the policy implications for the study. This chapter relates this study to other research projects that have a similar focus and makes recommendations for future study.

### 1.6 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the research problem and highlighted the motivating background for the study. The chapter emphasizes that the role of politics in the rise of social protection has been downplayed in past research, which is the foundation for this study. Accordingly, this study underscores the central role of politics in influencing the rise of social protection. The chapter described how and why this research design draws on the three paradigms of social constructivism, interpretivism and critical research. It outlines why key informants from the government, external agencies, INGOs and CSOs as well as the beneficiary communities were the participants for the study. The researcher describes how the thematic approach to data analysis was applied. The chapter ends by outlining the structure of the thesis from the beginning to the end to give the reader a sense of the flow of the study.
Chapter 2 Conceptualising Power and Politics

2.0 Introduction
This chapter describes and explains the conceptual framework adopted for this study. The conceptual framework is the analytical tool and a guiding framework for understanding the rise of the social protection agenda. It is based on Hickey’s (2007) framework that attempts to link politics and social protection and Gaventa’s (2005) power cube that helps to locate the various players and forms of power involved in different policy spaces. The chapter firstly introduces the two concepts as posited by their proponents and then relates them to this study. The researcher backs the two concepts with relevant literature and consciously connects them to the study. The researcher then synthesizes the two concepts into one comprehensive framework that becomes the basis for understanding the rise and architecture of social protection in the two country case studies of Zambia and Zimbabwe. The synthesized framework is the researcher’s efforts to contextualize the two concepts to specifically suit this study. The researcher deliberately ensures that the framework is mirrored throughout the whole study. The conclusion highlights how the conceptual framework is used as a tool for analysis in this study.

2.1 Conceptualising the Politics of Externally Driven Social Protection
The rise of social protection and its adoption by several countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has often been explained in technical terms, without paying much attention to the role of politics in shaping this agenda. Hickey (2007) is one of the first academics to challenge the ‘apolitical’ approach to social protection and argue that politics is central to the policy process around social protection in SSA. Since then, the debate has generated more research interest than before and now there is quite some significant scholarly work on the role of politics in social protection.

There is a consensus in literature that global politics and external agencies have been influential in the rise of the social protection agenda (Mkandawire, 2001; Davies, 2009; Nino-Zarazua et al., 2010; McCord, 2010; de Haan, 2013; Granvik, 2015; Seekings, 2016; Hickey and Seekings, 2017; Hickey and Lavers (2016 and 2017)). Research has also tried to connect domestic politics and social protection (Grant, 2006; Pelham, 2007; Granvik, 2015; Hickey and Bukenya, 2016; Hamer and Seekings, 2017). The Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme (RHVP) (2005-2010) co-funded by DFID and AusAID is one of the initiatives that sought to prove that social protection is beneficial through advocacy,
capacity building and evidence building (Ellis, et al., 2009). While Hickey (2007) (as an academic) focused on politics of social protection, the RHVP (as an agency of social protection) focused on the technical adoption of social protection by governments in six southern African countries. One of the publications under RHVP by Devereux and White (2010) bridged politics and evidence and asserted that social protection is a product of an overlap of technocratic, political and ideological agendas, and that was another step forward. Nino-Zarazua et al. (2010) also engages with the politics of social protection in SSA.

More interest was generated on the politics of social protection in specific countries. Zambia, as one of the early countries in Africa to pilot cash transfers attracted attention in that respect. Barrientos et al. (2005) is one of the early studies that reflect political dynamics of social protection with an interesting outline of the process of how the draft social protection strategy was developed in Zambia. Noyoo (2008) is insightful to understand social protection in the years of United National Independence Party (UNIP) and Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Thus, Schuring and Lawson-McDowall (2011) looked at the politics of social protection in Zambia, a study that empirically engaged the political dynamics. Harland (2014) focused on social protection and social justice in Zambia. Kuss (2015); Siachiwena (2016); and Pruce and Hickey (2017) look at the role of politics in social protection in Zambia. Kabandula and Seekings (2016) focus on the role of donors in the rise of social cash transfers in Zambia and how political party ideology determines the adoption of cash transfers.

Not much has been written about the politics of social protection in Zimbabwe. However, Chinyoka and Seekings (2016); Chinyoka (2017); Mupedziswa (2018); Seidenfeld et al. (2016); and Government of Zimbabwe and World Bank (2016) to some extent reflect the politics of social protection. Chinyoka and Seekings (2016); and Seidenfield et al. (2016) highlight how social protection rose to the development agenda during the Government of National Unity (2009-2013). Chinyoka (2017) and Mupedziswa (2018) reflect how party politics influence social protection while Government of Zimbabwe and World Bank (2016) look at the expenditure trends for social protection in Zimbabwe.

Due to the rising interest in the politics of social protection in the academia, more research is being conducted in various research institutions and this study is one of the current efforts to further understand the relatively new subject. While recognizing the scholarly work that has been carried on the subject and the framework of policy diffusion and transfer (learning,
emulation, competition and coercion – see chapter 3), this researcher blends Hickey’s (2007) and Gaventa’s power cube for a different approach to understand the interplay of power and politics in social protection. The study makes a specific focus on the processes of developing social protection policies and evolution of the ‘flagship’ cash transfer programmes in Zambia and Zimbabwe. It compares two neighbouring countries that have different political contexts, which is insightful to understand the varied progress of social protection across the content.

In an effort to connect politics and social protection, Hickey developed a basic analytical framework that sketches the inter-relationship between politics and social protection. Gaventa’s (2005) Power Cube was developed as a generic conceptual framework about power dynamics. However, this researcher adopts the Power Cube as an important instrument to understand the power dynamics within the social protection agenda. Hickey’s framework blends well with Gaventa’s Power Cube to provide a fundamental platform to ascertain and analyse the interaction of power and politics in social protection. The researcher shares the consensus with both Hickey and Gaventa who underscore the value of global politics and its influence on domestic policy. The Power Cube and Hickey’s framework are instrumental tools to understand the complexities of externally financed social protection, relations between external agencies and recipient government, relations between the external agencies themselves, intra-government relations, as well as the implications of external agencies’ emphasis of social protection on domestic policy and government’s budgetary commitment to social policy. Overall, the synthesis of the two concepts and its application to this study is an original theoretical contribution of this thesis.

2.1.1 Hickey’s framework: Linking politics and social protection

The connection between politics and social protection is not easily discernible. The social protection agenda “comes with a fresh array of conceptual frameworks, analytical tools, empirical evidence, national policy processes, heavyweight agencies and big names in development studies aligned behind it” (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2007, p. 1). Hickey (2007) notes that the relationship between politics and social protection is complex in the sense that different forms of politics influence conception, design and implementation of social protection policies.

Consequently, Hickey developed a basic framework (illustrated below) to link the relationship between politics and social protection. In this framework, global factors; political institutions; political actors and agencies; and socio-economic forces emerge as the four key interlocking dimensions at play in the social protection discourse. This researcher is aware
that Hickey and Lavers (2015) have developed another framework based on the political settlement approach. The new framework focuses more on national actors and internal processes. However, this researcher, based on the experiences of Zambia and Zimbabwe, still finds Hickey’s framework more relevant than the political settlement approach. Global actors played and still play a prominent role in the social protection policy processes in the two countries.

Global politics: Setting the Agenda
The global emphasis of social protection became robust in the late 1990s in the aftermath of the East Asian Crisis and following the emergence of the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ (Hickey, 2007). The East Asian crisis proved that economic growth was not enough to fight poverty and that there was need for protective measures to ensure inclusive development and political stability (de Haan, 2013). The ‘post-Washington Consensus’ called for investment in human capital and the creation of safety nets to improve the welfare of the poor, following the disastrous effects of the Bretton Woods Institutions’ structural adjustment reforms on social policies and poverty (Lopes, 2012). For Hickey (2007), “the particular character of governance in most African countries opens a large space for global actors and discourses to be influential” (p. 3).

Figure 1 Linking politics and social protection: a basic framework

Hickey, 2007, p. 3

The role of external agencies like DFID and World Bank committing substantial resources to social protection and shaping the discourse is widely acknowledged in literature (see Hickey et al, 2009; Davies, 2009: UNRISD, 2010; Devereux and White, 2010; Granvik, 2015;

International institutions exist where the members benefit from the political exchange and thus their role in poverty reduction cannot be politically neutral (Keohane, 1988). While aid reformists are optimistic about aid effectiveness in future, radical economists like Dambisa Moyo and William Easterly are of the view that ‘the mission of poverty reduction justifies the existence, interventions and perpetuation of the aid industry and its elites, who depend on foreign aid as a source of power’ (as cited in Gulrajani, 2011, p. 202).

Mkandawire (2001) further notes that support of social policy by donors and NGOs is “often driven by humanitarian objectives and rarely addresses the developmental issues of social policy for a number of reasons, including an anti-statist view, ‘projectization and micro-ization’ and disregard for macroeconomic performance, absence of a national developmental strategy within which these external initiatives can be embedded” (p. 20). Under this policy thrust, donors increasingly channel funds through non-governmental actors and the role of the state is to ‘provide an enabling environment’ “for private provision, while reducing its own expenditures and activities in the social sector” (Mkandawire, 2001, p. 20) While this, to some extent, is still applicable to some low income countries, there has been an increase in government spending on safety nets in quite a number of African countries over the years (World Bank, 2018). Donors are also increasingly funding the government through budget support compared to early years of the millennium. The development of social protection policies and the incorporation of social protection in national development plans are some of the key milestones for the social protection agenda. However, such progress is largely attributable to the influence of the external agencies. Funding and agenda-setting are significant sources of power for external agencies to influence policy in poor countries (Hickey, 2007). The reduction of the role of the state in welfare provision during the neoliberal reforms (Putzel, 2002; Hickey, 2007) opened up the space for external agencies and other non-state actors. The emergence of social protection policy positions for external agencies like World Bank, UNICEF and ILO, after the 2008/9 global economic meltdown, signifies a global rise of the social protection agenda.
Political Institutions: Social protection for political expediency?
The role of institutions in shaping social protection cannot be downplayed as they potentially provide incentives for or barriers to action. In this context, institutions are formal or non-formal ‘norms, rules, procedures and routines’ “governing the conduct of social, economic, and political affairs, and about how human and other resources are to be used and distributed” (Leftwich, 2008, p. 212). Elections, party politics and politics of patronage all have a significant influence (Hickey, 2007). More often than not, governments have a tendency to raise social expenditure in election years in order to entice their constituencies. Feng and Gizelis (2002) note that welfare programmes sustain regimes in power and therefore the government determines which constituency serves its political interests. Kenya is a case in point where Daniel Arap Moi selectively distributed food aid “in order to secure his regime in power, while denying it to some of the most vulnerable groups and areas” (de Waal 1997 as cited in Hickey, 2007, p. 3). Political patronage has also affected cash transfers in Kenya. Politicians and Ministry officials have agreed that 30% of the funds is now shared equally between constituencies while 70% is based on poverty and vulnerability (Wanyama and Nyambedha, 2017). This followed the realisation that the opposition-dominated western Kenya was benefiting more than other regions. The new arrangement disregards the fact that western Kenya has high poverty and vulnerability indices compared to other regions (ibid.). In Uganda, President Museveni strategically timed his abolition of user fees in the health sector with the 2001 elections (Yates et al., 2006). With support from political parties, elections are thus an incentive for politicians to buttress their political base by introducing social protection initiatives. However, “it remains the case that party systems in much of the region are fragmented, weakly institutionalised and patronage-based in ways that make it difficult for pro-poor agendas, or indeed programmatic policy agendas, to gain a foothold” (Nino-Zarazua et al., 2010, p. 23).

Patron-client relations are also pertinent in the social protection discourse. Booth (2005) notes, “Many or most of the key decisions are made informally, by small groups of politicians linked together by networks of clientelism and patronage’, so that ‘formal decision-making processes … are … largely ‘theatre’”’ (pp. 3-4). Politics of patronage “can shape the design and targeting of social protection programmes during planning and implementation phases” (Hickey, 2007, p. 4). It is possible for patrons to divert funds or extend programme coverage to areas of their influence.
Political actors and agencies: Driving the agenda?
Key political actors and agencies are “the political elites who set the terms of political and policy debates, and the administrative/bureaucratic agencies that will either lobby for, and/or implement social protection initiatives” (Hickey, 2007, p. 4). The politicians have power to determine who deserves and the size of social protection programme and they are usually biased to the productive and economically active citizens thereby excluding the chronic poor (Hickey, 2007). Bureaucrats and the bureaucratic agencies reflect “organisational culture, political commitment and political capacity of bureaucratic actors within government to advocate for, and implement, social protection initiatives” (Hickey, 2007, p. 4).

Socio-economic influences: Social protection in the face of increasing vulnerability
Increasing poverty, inequality and vulnerability remain a big challenge for both low and middle-income countries Africa. While some economies were growing, poverty increased significantly. Extreme economic equality is therefore a significant factor in driving the need for social protection and citizens in Africa generally believe it is the role of the state to meet the needs of the vulnerable (Hickey, 2007). The high levels of poverty in Africa are the basis for the ‘crisis narratives’ that become the foundation for the intervention of external agencies and their development policies to fight poverty (Sutton, 1999).

2.1.2 The Power Cube: Understanding the power-play in social protection
All politics is about power. The distribution of power among the various actors is central to the social protection agenda. Accordingly, Gaventa notes that a pro-poor policy change is more than a rhetorical acceptance of participation, rights, civil society engagement and subsequent creation of new institutional arrangements (2005). Rather, it is the nature of power relations that is of paramount importance.

Yet simultaneously, the nature and expressions of power are also rapidly changing. The very spread and adoption by powerful actors of the language and discourse of participation and inclusion confuses boundaries of who has authority and who does not, who should be on the ‘inside’ and who is on the ‘outside’ of decision-making and policy making arenas… The use of terms such as ‘partnership’ and ‘shared ownership’ by large, powerful actors like the World Bank and the IMF invite engagement on a ‘level playing field’ but obscures inequalities of resources and power…(Gaventa, 2005, p. 5)

The rapidly changing language and discourse rightfully calls for “activists, researchers, policy makers and donors who are concerned about development and change to turn our
attention to how to analyse and understand the changing configurations of power. If we want to change power relationships – e.g. to make them more inclusive, just or pro-poor – we must understand more about how power works” (Gaventa, 2005, p. 6). Accordingly, Gaventa developed the power cube (illustrated on next page) as a tool to try to understand power and its distribution. The typology of the power cube is thought provoking and an impetus for the “need to engage with and understand this phenomenon called power” (Gaventa, 2005, p. 5). The concept of the power cube is illustrated below.

The power cube comprises three dimensions of *Spaces, Power* and *Place* and three forms define each of these. In the context of this study, *Spaces* match what Webster and Engberg-Pedersen (2002) call political sphere where the poor and their representatives try to assert political agency to fight poverty and raise standards of living. Accordingly, the interface between the agency of the poor and institutional actors is dependent on different factors such as “general political environment, the attitudes of the government, and the dominant political discourse” (Webster and Engberg-Pedersen, 2002, p. 258).

Gaventa, 2005, p. 11

Gaventa underlines the close link between power and space. Similarly, Lefebvre (1991) defines space as a social product that also “serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in addition to being a means of production it also a means of control, and hence of domination,
of power…” (p. 26). The imagery of ‘boundary’ is also embedded in Spaces as “power relations help to shape the boundaries of participatory spaces, what is possible within them, and who may enter, with which identities, discourses and interests” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 26). Precisely, Spaces are arenas where decision making takes place and in which power operates.

Closed Spaces are arenas where “decisions are made by a set of actors behind closed doors, without any pretence of broadening the boundaries for inclusion” (Gaventa, 2005, p. 12). It is pertinent to note that the Closed Spaces are controlled by an elite group and this is synonymous with many government systems, international financial institutions (IFIs) or other institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Luttrel and Quiroz, 2009). The researcher posits that policy makers, bureaucrats, donors and other development partners make many decisions in this arena without any broader consultation of the ‘poor people’ who are the targets of the policies.

The rise of participatory approaches to development has seen engagement of communities at local government, national and global levels. Such interaction takes place within the Invited Spaces and there is seemingly consultation of people by various actors. Luttrel and Quiroz (2009) note that invited space offers “some possibility for influence but it is unlikely that these spaces will create real opportunities for long-term change. In extreme cases, it may act to legitimise the status quo or perpetuate the subordination of those who are delegated with ‘power’” (p. 11). Similarly, the researcher concurs that, with respect to poverty alleviation, most of the ‘consultations’ are merely window-dressing and most decisions are made within the Closed Space.

The Claimed Space is usually the domain of civil society and other community organisations that attempt to challenge the status quo and voice their concerns. These organisations claim to represent the grassroots level. However, it is not clear if such organisations should be treated as such as they have been discredited for pursuing their own political agendas at the expense of poverty reduction (Webster and Engberg, 2002: 264).

The Power Cube also “emphasises the importance of understanding interaction between levels of power and the ‘places of engagement’ and particularly distinguishes between the international, national and local levels” (ibid: 11). The three Places of power are a pointer to the fact that domestic policy choice and decision making are influenced by global forces, hence it is no longer wise to focus on the ‘local’ only (Gaventa, 2005: 13). The places of
power therefore interrogates “the vertical relationship of power across local to global arenas” (ibid: 14).

The power cube outlines three distinctions of the visibility of power. Firstly, Visible Power “is the conventional understanding of power that is negotiated through formal rules and structures, institutions and procedures” (Luttrel and Quiroz, 2009, p. 12). This is observable decision making and interactions at this level focus on “who, how and what’ of policy-making so that the policy process is more democratic and accountable, and serves the needs and rights of people and the survival of the planet” (Gaventa, 2005, p. 15). Secondly, Hidden Power “focuses on the actual controls over decision making, and the way certain powerful people and institutions maintain their influence over the process and often exclude and devalue concerns and agendas of less powerful groups” (Luttrel and Quiroz, 2009, p. 12). The powerful people and institutions exert their influence by controlling “who gets to the decision making table and what gets on the agenda” and thus sets the political agenda (Gaventa, 2005, p. 15). Third and last, Invisible Power is the subtlest of all and “shapes the psychological and ideological boundaries of participation” (Gaventa, 2005, p. 15). It also entails that “significant problems and issues are not only kept from the decision making table, but also from the minds and consciousness of the different players involved, even those directly affected by the problem” (ibid.). Overall, invisible power influences individuals’ perceptions about their status in the society (beliefs, sense of self) and ensures that they accept, not to challenge, the status quo (Gaventa, 2005; Luttrel and Quiroz, 2009).

2.1.3 Synthesised framework: The interplay of power and politics in social protection

The intertwinement of the Power Cube and Hickey’s framework is a useful tool to explore the embedded politics of social protection. A blend of the two approaches into one guiding framework provides a platform to discern how power and politics interact to influence the social protection trajectory. This conceptual framework (illustrated on next page) helps explore the intricate political motivation and power dynamics of all actors (global, national and local). It helps examine how and to what extent social protection is being institutionalised in the region.

The researcher presents the synthesis in a top down hierarchy to reflect the various actors and the forms of power (hidden, visible and invisible) at different levels (global, national and local) and different spaces (closed, claimed and invited). The researcher presumes that negotiations and decisions at the Global place are made in the mother countries for the various global actors. Decision making at the global level is a Closed Space where the
recipient national and local actors are not involved. Thus the *National* and *Local* actors do not have control over what happens at the *Global* place. Rather, the taxpayers and policymakers of the home countries of the global actors determine negotiations and decisions at the global level. The social protection policy positions for the various global actors and amount of resources are all determined by their mother governments. It is important to note that the global actors are not locked in a particular place or space but they are transnational actors who are present at global level, national and even local levels. For instance, while their decisions are made at their headquarters, they also have offices at national level in the countries where they operate and participate in the policy processes. They partner the national governments in various ways, for example, technical and financial support. They also partner with INGOs and local NGOs and civil society.

In the framework below, the global actors/external agencies (multilateral and bilateral agencies as well as international financial institutions (IFIs)) are the originators of social protection.

*Figure 3 The interplay of power and politics in social protection*

Author’s creation

These agencies have finance, technical capacity and use various strategies to promote social protection in developing countries. The power of finance is pertinent to the social protection
debate as the external agencies influence policy evolution and design and implementation of social protection programmes. External agencies are key players in the globalization of development as evident in globally endorsed agendas such as the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the social protection agenda. The fact that poverty, vulnerability and inequality are increasing in developing countries is often reflected as a failure of governments and therefore grounds for the external agencies to support the fight against poverty. Social protection is one of those interventions. The United Nations family, for instance, being an embodiment of the whole world, is politically mandated to support governments of various member countries in the fight against poverty.

The researcher reckons that influential decisions on policies and programmes of social protection are made in the Closed Spaces. It is the arena where powerful international actors use their financial power to promote the social protection agenda. It is an arena where power holders including the politicians, policymakers and bureaucrats engage behind closed doors with representatives of the international organisations stated above. Officials from the government are pertinent decision makers on social protection within the Closed Space. At this level, there is no representation or consultation of the ‘poor people’ who are expected to be the ultimate ‘beneficiaries’ of the whole process. Since the Global politics permeates the whole hierarchy, the global actors engage government officials to get a buy in for social protection. Local actors would only participate in the implementation of the social protection programmes because all the important negotiations and decisions are made within the Global and National places.

Therefore, global actors set the social protection agenda that permeates and influence the domestic policy processes. This framework helps understand the inception and rise of social cash transfer programmes in the two countries and the role of the external agencies and domestic actors. It also helps to understand how and why the global actors would, in some instances, prefer working with INGOs instead of the government. Developing countries especially in Africa are low income countries that have a limited capacity to fund national social protection interventions. It is important to see how the ‘rich’ external agencies interact with the resource-constrained governments to influence the adoption of social protection.

The researcher places the parliament and its role in debating and shaping of policies and laws within the Visible Power arena. The parliament is a formal institution constitutionally
mandated to play an integral role in the legal and policy making process. It is however important to see if the resolutions made in the parliament have a bearing on social protection policies and subsequent interventions. The Constitution, being the supreme law of the land, also fits well in the Visible Power. However, a tangent worth pursuing is to see how far the constitutional obligations are met towards the provision of social protection. It would be important to see to what extent were these formal institutional processes involved in the social protection discourse.

As noted earlier, Gaventa (2005) and Luttrel and Quiroz (2009) articulate that the core of decision making is determined by Hidden Power. The public is not privy to the role of Hidden Power in pertinent decision making. Due to their power in finance, the global actors bear Hidden Power that has a huge influence in spearheading the social protection agenda in developing countries. This is why they afford to either influence the domestic policy trajectory or sidestep the government structures to partner INGOs. Due to their Hidden Power, it has not been easy to challenge the social protection discourse in both theory and practice. Governments and politicians are also bearers of Hidden Power in that they can resist, accept or manipulate social protection interventions initiated by the external agencies. They can resist the agenda if they feel it does not align to national development priorities or adopt it if it aligns. They can also manipulate the agenda to suit their political interests. All these can be without the voices of other stakeholders.

Invisible (internalised) Power pacifies the people to accept the status quo. This category describes the ‘poor’ people who are the ‘beneficiaries’ of the various social protection interventions. These are the people that the politicians and bureaucrats blame for; in the words of Grant (2006), ‘large families, laziness, poor money management and alcohol abuse’ hence they do not deserve social transfers for it will permeate a dependency syndrome (p. 19). However, such labeling of the ‘poor’ is more of a perception than reality as evidence show that cash transfers generally improve standard of living. The Ministries of Finance persistently resisted ‘free cash transfers’ on the pretext of dependency syndrome although the perception has changed over time. The experiences of different countries show that there have been politicians and bureaucrats who embraced social protection as pro-poor and were instrumental in promoting the agenda (Hamer and Seekings, 2017; Kuss, 2015; Pruce and Hickey, 2017; Siachiwena, 2016), as shall be seen in the empirical chapters. The concept of dependency syndrome is rooted in the view that if people are persistently given handouts instead of supporting their productive capacity they become dependent on the handouts and
lose their motivation to become self-reliant. Despite ‘benefiting’ from various social protection programmes from both the government and international organisations, their (the ‘poor’) participation in the evolution of such programmes and policies is difficult to ascertain. They have to accept whatever that gets to them and they have limited space and power to challenge the power relations lest they lose out or are labelled ‘ungrateful recipients of aid’, consciously or sub-consciously.

Although civil society and other community based groups could be active in taking the government to task over poverty alleviation, there is still very little conviction that such groups are making any difference for the poor in Africa. Despite the rise of participatory approaches to development, the role of civil society and community based groups in representing the poor is debatable. While Hadenius and Uggla (1996) and Molenaers and Renard (2009) are skeptical of the role of civil society, in some contexts like Zambia the civil society has been instrumental in lobbying for the poor as well as advocating social protection to some extent (Schüiring & Lawson-McDowall, 2011). Depending on the political context, actors in the Claimed Space may be or may not be influential to decision making in social protection. On the same note, the Invited Space may make a difference to decision making in some context. In other contexts, Invited Space may merely serve to pacify civil society and other community advocacy groups to believe that they are consulted when their views are not taken on board. The study assesses civil society role in the Invited Space and Claimed Space and the bearing on decision-making and how the two spaces relate to the Closed Space where important decisions are made.

Barrientos et al. (2005) discovered that civil society organisations focusing on social protection are very few. Social protection is still not well understood and only a few civil society organisations focus on social protection. Generally, most civil society organisations are based in urban areas and lack a direct interface with issues of poverty at grassroots level (Kuss, 2015). Further, civil society is dependent on external funding and more often the organisations expend much of their energy in competing for donor funds instead of the core business of representing the poor (Schüiring and Lawson-McDowall (2011). Worse still, international funding for civil society is dwindling in recent years as donors are now channelling their funds through government budgetary systems (ibid.). Realising the weaknesses of the civil society, the government invites them to participate in various ‘spaces’. However, even where the civil society is well organised, its effectiveness in engaging the state is also dependent on the nature of a political system (Goetz and Gaventa,
Thus, the political environment is critical and may potentially weaken the role of a civil society organisation if it does not align to the dominant political agendas or patronage systems (ibid.). Given the situation of the civil society, Kuss (2015) concludes, “the poorest and most vulnerable people especially in rural areas struggle to demand formal social protection from the government” (p. 10). Hickey (2009) notes that it is important to focus on ‘a more systematic engagement with actors within political society’ and try to understand how long-term commitments to poverty reduction emerge within specific national contexts’ (p. 480). Accordingly, this researcher examines community and civil society participation in social protection in the two country case studies.

2.2 Conclusion
This chapter has mapped out the conceptual framework that guides the overall understanding and analysis of the emergence of the social protection agenda in the two country case studies. There is consensus that social protection is a global policy agenda and that informs the thrust of this research to analyse the role of the external agencies in influencing the rise of the agenda.

The three places of policy (global, national and local) are pertinent to understand how social protection evolved in a top-down fashion and the role of the various actors at the different levels. They also enable the researcher to map out the specific actors at each level. The three spaces (closed, claimed and invited) are important to analyse the role and amount of influence that specific actors in a specific policy space bear to decision-making and which space matters most. It is within these spaces that the researcher would be able to examine the role of external agencies, the government, political parties, INGOs, civil society and the ‘beneficiary’ communities in the social protection policy process. The three forms of power (hidden, visible and invisible) are critical in the assessment of how the type of power one actors possesses influenced the rise of social protection. Hidden power reflects the various strategies of influence used by external agencies as well as the role of the government in the policy process. Visible power is a tool for the researcher to assess the role of the parliament and implications of the constitution on social protection provision. Invisible power is important to understand how the communities end up accepting the status quo when they are not involved in social protection policy evolution and design of the cash transfer programmes. That further tests the feasibility of the concept of ‘social contract’. The framework is pertinent to understand the interactions between the external agencies, how the external agencies and the government engaged and also how the different ministries in the
government interacted in the social protection discourse. Overall, this chapter maps the interaction of the international actors and domestic actors (national and local) in shaping and influencing the rise of social protection in Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Chapter 3 The Primacy of Politics

3.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews literature on social protection and makes a case for the central role of politics in shaping the agenda. The chapter starts by tracing the genesis of social protection to understand the historical background. An overview of social protection in sub-Saharan highlights the emergence of the agenda in the region and the motivating forces. A review of literature on policy diffusion and policy transfer helps to appreciate how development policies like social protection become transnational, the various actors involved and what motivates them. The chapter further looks at literature and debates on the policy process, the role of global politics in shaping the social protection agenda, the value of social protection in national politics as well complexities of financing social protection. These processes are pertinent in understanding how politics has shaped the social protection agenda. Given the key role played by bilateral and multilateral institutions in social protection discourse, the researcher reviews global policy positions for the main agencies. This helps understand how social protection has been externally pushed from a global level and how the international agencies were able to exert their influence. The conclusion reiterates the primacy of politics in understanding social protection and sets the tone for succeeding chapters.

3.1 The Genesis of the Social Protection Discourse

According to de Haan (2013), the emergence of social protection on the development agenda is rarely explained. The rise of social protection of social protection is to a large extent a response to the failure of development policies to “reduce poverty and enhance human capabilities in a rapidly changing global context” (Cook and Kabeer, 2009, p. 2). Related to that, Craig and Porter (2005) observed that the rise of social protection was also a result of the collapse of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that focused more on economic growth and good governance and placed low priority on social protection. Similarly, de Haan (2013) and Adesina (2011) note that the genesis of social protection paradigm is attributed to the Bretton Wood Institutions’ neo-liberal reforms in developing countries. A policy shift to social protection that began in the late 1980s (Adesina, 2011) was further necessitated by the global economic and financial crisis of 2008 onwards (de Haan, 2013). By the late 1990s, it was not yet popular and only a few organisations with a few funded programmes on social protection existed (de Haan, 2013). McCord (2013) notes that despite the failure of Gordon Brown’s (then Minister of Finance for UK) 1999 Global Social
Policy Code Initiative that was supposed to be ‘a code of global best practice in social policy’, the 1990s are exceptional because international agencies generally shared a consensus on prioritising poverty targeting and making aid effective (p. 29).

The Nordic countries, given their history and ideology, were swift to focus on social protection as compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries like the United Kingdom (UK) who joined the scene of social protection late (de Haan, 2013). Despite being hesitant in the beginning, the UK and the World Bank have become strong advocates for social protection since mid-2000s with the European Community (EC) joining years later. The international agencies were driven by a common goal to extend social protection to developing countries, but it is important to note that each contested to influence the policy process and content (McCord, 2013: 12). The social protection discourse also attracted regional banks like the Asian Development Bank, which developed an approach akin to the region’s productivist public policy orientation (de Haan, 2013). UNICEF, World Bank and ILO have been the leading agencies in supporting social protection with ILO technically proving the affordability of social protection and initiating a Global Social Protection Floor (de Haan, 2013; Seekings, 2017). International NGOs have also become important players in providing social protection despite the criticism for replacing the government in welfare provision (McCord, 2013). It has been a common trend in sub-Saharan Africa to see NGOs implementing pilot programmes funded by bilateral or multilateral agencies to demonstrate feasibility of social protection to the government (ibid). Social protection therefore became a development consensus for the aid industry despite the national policy contestation (de Haan, 2013).

Ellis et al. (2009) note that social protection policy agenda in Africa is complex and its success hinges on political will from national governments. However, there was a ‘meteoric rise of social protection on the development agenda’ from the beginning of the new millennium onwards when social protection became “the fastest growing sectors in the aid industry” (de Haan, 2013, p. 2). The 1997 East Asian Crisis was one of the key defining moments for the rise to prominence of social protection at the onset of the new millennium. The crisis proved that economic growth was not enough to fight poverty and that there was need for protective measures for inclusive development and political stability (ibid: 3). Consequently, countries like Indonesia and South Korea swiftly institutionalised social welfare in response to the crisis (de Haan, 2013). Social developments in the two largest emerging economies of China and India also had a bearing to the global debate on social
protection. For instance, China steadily expanded social services and social security despite fiscal conservatism after the 1997 crisis (ibid: 4). In India, the post-2004 thrust for ‘Inclusive Growth’ coupled with civil society lobby for rights based development resulted in the rise of a number of social protection schemes, the popular one being NREGA\textsuperscript{2}, and the need to legislate the informal sector (de Haan, 2013). In Africa, notwithstanding the global crisis, unpredictable but frequent droughts and food insecurity, chronic poverty and vulnerability also prompted donors and NGOs to shift from traditional food aid programming to ‘predictable funding for predictable needs’ (Ellis et al., 2009).

For Latin America, the economic crisis of the 1980s that popularly became known as ‘the lost decade’ plus structural adjustment that followed exacerbated poverty and inequality (Barrientos and Santibanez, 2009, p. 3). In this respect, it is also important to note that Latin America was the first region to implement structural adjustment programmes from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is also the first region where the World Bank tried out its Social Funds, in Bolivia (de Haan, 2013). The 1990s saw social policy in the region shifting to social assistance (cash transfers) evident in the emergence of numerous programmes like Oportunidades (Mexico), Bolsa Familia (Brazil) and Trabajar (Argentina) (Barrientos and Santibanez, 2009). The successes of Bolsa Familia and Oportunidades became lived experiences of social protection that the world, especially developing countries, were encouraged to emulate (de Haan, 2013).

In Africa, donors realigned their strategies for poverty reduction to social protection while it also became an important tool for political alliances with governments, as exemplified by the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia and the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) in Rwanda (de Haan, 2013). The fact there were already some countries in sub-Saharan Africa with legally guaranteed old age pensions was a building block for the social protection agenda in the continent (Ellis et al., 2009). By 2012, there were eight countries in the region with non-contributory pensions\textsuperscript{3} (World Bank, 2012a). In a few countries like South Africa, non-contributory pensions exist since the 20\textsuperscript{th} century though they were racially biased in the pre-independence era. Besides the pensions, there was also a rise in other forms of social protection in the region like school feeding and health insurance (de Haan, 2013). The agenda also permeated the core of the African Union mandate that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item[3] South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Seychelles and Cape Verde.
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spearheaded and endorsed the Livingstone Call for Action, the 2008 Social Policy Framework, and the 2010 Khartoum Declaration (World Bank, 2012b; de Haan, 2013). In Southern Africa, South Africa’s range of publicly funded social grants makes it the leading social protection system (de Haan, 2013).

However, de Haan is critical of the depoliticised nature of the social protection debate as spelt out in his narrative below.

The predominant explanation of the popularity has tended to be along social-democratic (or Polanyian) lines, in which needs and growing inequalities and vulnerabilities trigger expansions of public policies. These interpretations have tended to neglect the political nature of social policies, which highlight that expansion of social policies occur under very varied political impulses and regimes…. in the poorest countries the fiscal sustainability nor political commitment can be taken for granted, while at the same time the international scene is taking a dramatic turn (de Haan, 2013, p. 5).

With numerous evidence of ‘success stories’ of social protection programmes, the world is quite optimistic about a future development agenda centred on social protection (de Haan, 2013). Similarly, social protection is a priority for the post-2015 UN development agenda that underscores the role of social protection in fighting multi-dimensions of poverty and deprivation (UN System Task Team on the post-2015 UN Development Agenda, 2012). It is not surprising to note that social protection features prominently in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) contrary to the MDGs where it was not categorically mentioned. However, de Haan cautions that an in-depth understanding of social policy evolution requires a discernment of the role of national and international politics (de Haan, 2013). Hickey is one of the first academics to acknowledge the centrality of politics but not much in-depth work was done on this issue until recently. While the optimism is grounded on the ‘successes of social protection in Latin America, “the sustainability of the successful Bolsa Familia is predicated upon limitation of costs to the taxpayers, and limitation of costs to those who benefit from other, regressive social policies, during a period of high economic growth” (de Haan, 2013, p. 4). Mkandawire (2001) also notes that social policies regardless of their efficacy, are not acceptable if they are not deemed to be politically feasible. Consequently,

to the extent that such policies are driven by the values of different social actors with different ideological positions, and to the extent that they invariably entail intra- and
inter-generational redistribution issues, they are the outcomes of political bargains and conflicts since they touch upon power in society - its distribution and accessibility to different political actors. In any society, it is obvious that the state will not institutionalize social policies that conflict fundamentally and consistently with principles of the dominant economic system and power relations (Mkandawire, 2001, p.18).

Donor perception that social protection was a quick win against other development strategies like the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) generated their interest though it came with uncertainty of external aid (de Haan, 2013). De Haan’s observation that in 2010 interest in social protection was falling is particularly logical to the context that prevailed during that time. Firstly, the world was battling to recover from the global economic downturn of 2008/9 that manifested in ‘triple F’ crisis implied that resources were limited. Secondly, up to around 2011 the future of social protection was not yet certain as donors were largely piloting cash transfers while the governments were still not buying in to the agenda. However, from 2012 onwards, there was rejuvenated interest from the external agencies and some governments were gradually getting ‘interested’. The external agencies emerged with social protection policy positions that influenced adoption of social protection in Africa. For instance, in 2012 the European Union (EU), International Labour Organisation (ILO), World Bank and UNICEF all published their global policy positions on social protection. As noted earlier in this section, social protection is at the core of the post-2015 UN development agenda that was also published in 2012. Consequently, it is that same period that initiatives of developing national social protection policies were taking shape in Africa. The rise of social protection on the development agenda is evident in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) where it features in three of the seventeen goals.

Accordingly, a political understanding of how social protection evolves at global and national levels as well as how global and national agendas inter-relate are pertinent (de Haan, 2013). Importantly, social protection is not a universal panacea to poverty but should be debated in the broad context of public policies (Grant, 2006; de Haan, 2013). Leftwich (2008) notes, “poverty reduction is ultimately a function of state formation and state capacity; state formation and capacity is essentially an institutional matter; and the design and maintenance of such institutions is essentially a political matter” (p.17). While it is important to document

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lessons learnt from success stories of social protection, it is critical to discern the relevance and context of such experiences (Grant, 2006; de Haan, 2013).

### 3.2 Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer

There has been a tendency to view social policy only as a product of national socio-economic and political manifestations. Zurn (2005) blames this analytical perspective for what he calls ‘methodological nationalism’ (p.15). According to Zurn (2005), “methodological nationalism sees the nation-state as the basic unit of all politics—within nations and between nations—and looks at competition between nation-states in an interdependent world as a fundamental driving force” (p.15). Accordingly, Obinger et al. (2013) rightly point out that “contemporary public policy cannot be explained only by socio-economic and political developments within nation states, but is also shaped by inter- and supranational influences as well as relations between nation-states” (p.112). There are interdependencies between countries and, for instance, “countries strategically respond to policies adopted by other countries, emulate policies that turned out successful abroad or react to external pressure to adopt a particular policy… Hence, today a relational approach in comparative welfare state research is needed more than ever” (Obinger et al., 2013, p.112).

International collaboration became possible after the end of the Second World War when “various special agencies of the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as the European Community, strengthened intergovernmental collaboration and promoted the cross-border exchange of information and experience in social policy” (ibid.). The dominance of the welfare state during Cold War, the globalisation wave and the rise of the European Community reflects “the existence of various kinds of political and economic interdependencies between nation-states and their early embeddedness in international and transnational social policy networks” (Obinger et al., 2013, p.113). The implications of these interactions for public policy are conceptualised as policy diffusion (Dobbin et al., 2007; Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009) or policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996 and 2000). Policy transfer is “process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p. 5). Policy diffusion is the process by which ‘policy choices in one country affect the policy choices in other countries’ (Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009; Simmons et al., 2008; Weyland, 2006).
Despite the variance in nomenclature between policy diffusion and policy transfer, it is difficult to draw a dividing line between the two. What is fundamental to this study is to note that both denote policy as a product of interdependent decisions and the processes that may lead to policy convergence (Obinger et al. 2013). Learning, emulation, competition and coercion are the four mechanisms that lead to policy diffusion and policy transfer (Dobbin et al. 2007; Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009; Simmons et al., 2008; Weyland, 2006; Obinger et al., 2013). Transnational learning entails that policy makers are attracted “to successful policies approved abroad (‘best practices’) to reduce the uncertainty of the policy consequences” (Obinger et al., 2013, p. 114). There is a very close connection between learning and competition as countries compete and feel obliged to emulate others’ successes (ibid.). For instance, in Southern Africa, South Africa is a ‘model’ for social protection and other countries in the region like Lesotho, Namibia and Botswana somehow emulate South Africa. In the extreme, emulation is usually symbolic as political players are driven by the zeal “to conform to international trends and to belong to an international norm-based community” (Obinger et al., 2013, p. 114). The adoption of cash transfers in various regions of the world is an example of conformity to global trends. Coercion is somehow different from the rest as it implies use of ‘hard power’ on one hand and ‘soft power’ on the other hand. ‘Hard power’ is associated with conditionalities usually imposed by international financial institutions like World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) over the recipient countries. In the case of social protection, coercion comes in the form of ‘soft power’ whereby external agencies can use finance and other means, as shall be noted later on, as instruments to influence policy adoption.

Obinger et al. (2013) make the following captivating observation

The systematic combination of processes of horizontal spatial interdependencies with vertical relationships between international and supranational institutions and their member states is perhaps the biggest challenge for future research. For example, (allegedly) successful national policies are supported and promoted by international organizations or ‘uploaded’ by their member states. Horizontal and vertical interdependencies in the area of social policy have thus far not been systematically combined, neither theoretically and conceptually, nor methodologically and empirically. Nonetheless, given the multiple and deepening economic and political interrelations between nation states, the systematic analysis of policy diffusion and
policy transfer will be of central importance in comparative welfare state research in the future (p. 124).

This study aligns to the above narrative as it seeks to make a policy process analysis from a global perspective to the national and local, identifying how the various levels interact to eventually influence domestic policy choice for social protection. The researcher contrasts the traditional tendency by external agencies to blame local politics while they depoliticize themselves. The researcher posits that the international agencies are political actors and are driven by certain political motives that influence or reinforce local domestic social policy choice. Given the power entrenched in their finance, the donors’ role in setting the social protection agenda deserves more scrutiny than hitherto.

International institutions are a conduit for policy transfer from the North to the South. For instance,

For much of the twentieth century ideas about social security were largely, but not exclusively, defined and driven by the hegemonic influence of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).... Although it did not invent social insurance, as a powerful international actor the ILO has actively promoted it as a model of social security over much of its 90-year history. (Casey and McKinnon, 2009, p. 85).

As noted above, ILO has been a key player in the diffusion of a specific welfare regime and particularly was instrumental in the drive for a ‘Global Social Protection Floor’ that would cater for the vulnerable (Granvik, 2015). Poverty alleviation increasingly became central to the international agenda as evidenced by the MDGs (Casey and McKinnon, 2009).

It is thought provoking to note that “nation-states do not act independently of each other” and that “interdependencies exist between countries which, in conjunction with domestic factors, account for policy outcomes. Countries strategically respond to policies adopted by other countries, emulate policies that turned out successful abroad or react to external pressure to adopt a particular policy” (Obinger et al., 2013, p. 112). In Southern Africa, the introduction of social pensions in Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and Botswana is largely seen as “general policy diffusion from South Africa to its neighbours” (Granvik, 2015, p. 2). With specific reference to universal pensions in Namibia, Botswana and Mauritius, Bonnerje (2003) nevertheless contends that “because these schemes are financed directly by the government treasury, these schemes are run and managed directly by the government. In contrast to the colonial heritages of provident fund and defined benefit schemes, the development of non-
contributory schemes in southern Africa seems to be completely endogenous and independent of each other” (as cited in Granvik, 2015, p. 32).

The Old Age Pension (OAP) is quite unique in its own right for a small kingdom of Lesotho despite the criticism from World Bank (2013a) over high age qualification requirement and the value of the ‘little’ amount for an entire household. “The Old Age Pension proved to be an efficient and well-targeted instrument for relieving the vulnerability of some population groups” (Granvik, 2015, p. 33). By the use of the word ‘pension’, the OAP was different from South Africa’s Old Person’s Grant and Swaziland’s Old Age Grant. There is a general consensus that the use of the word ‘pension’ was deliberate extension of honour and dignity from the government of Lesotho to the aging population, and not a mere duplicate of South Africa (ibid.)

The pilot Child Support Programme in Lesotho funded by the European Union (EU) in 2009 and technically supported by UNICEF had the same basic ‘categorical’ design as the Child Support Grant in South Africa (Granvik, 2015). The policy process of the Child Grant significantly differs from the OAP. The Child Grant was initiated and funded by donors with an inference that the government would own the process. “The Lesotho Child Grant Programme stands out among other similar programmes in Africa as it was initially a pilot donor-funded social cash-transfer initiative but has managed to gradually become ‘owned’ by the government” both in terms of implementation and financing (Granvik, 2015, p. 39). In this respect, Granvik quotes the EU delegation to Lesotho:

the Lesotho Child Grant is different in as such that it has been directly implemented by the Government, with strong technical support from UNICEF. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare has had a strong involvement from the beginning and this has certainly facilitated the transition from a fully donor-funded project to a national programme, a unique success story of this magnitude in the Sub-Saharan continent (Granvik, 2015, p. 40).

However, it is worthwhile noting that there has been suspicion and lack of trust between the government and external funders of the Child Grant. The government was very sceptical of donor involvement and thus could not embrace the Child Grant in principle. Inter-Ministry power dynamics also came to play as the Ministry of Finance felt undermined when UNICEF dealt directly with Ministry of Social Development. The Minister of Finance could not hide his concerns,
The Ministry of Finance reacted cautiously. We had not yet built up a model that would support it. Money was needed for such an investment – can we sustain it? Also, how do you administer it? UNICEF, FAO, and the World Bank, they do their separate thing. We need investments that lead to long-term results, and that will increase the tax-base. The Ministry of Finance looks at the total needs of the country. Often, the Ministry of Finance is not consulted. UNICEF assumes that the Ministry of Social Development has the power” (as quoted in Granvik, 2015, p. 41).

International agencies and donors systematically target the policy makers to influence the adoption of ‘contemporary global’ social policy ‘models’.

International agencies (such as UNICEF, the ILO and World Bank) and donor organisations (such as the British Department for International Development, DfID) have a broad arsenal of ‘weapons’ to use in their deployment of ‘soft’ power, i.e. the power of persuasion over national policy-makers. They distribute documents and reports on reforms elsewhere in the world. They fly politicians and officials to international workshops and arrange study tours to other countries to learn from their experiences. They establish consultative bodies to facilitate regular interaction between international organisations, local civil society organisations and government personnel. They provide technical assistance (including advisors) to government departments, and sponsor and assist with drafting ‘social protection strategy’ documents. They also sponsor ‘pilot’ programmes, organise evaluations of these to demonstrate success in reducing poverty, and arrange for politicians and government officials to visit the pilot sites to see these for themselves (Granvik, 2015, p. 3).

However, the global literature on policy diffusion emphasises that there has to be “favourable local conditions (including perhaps political incentives for local policy-makers)” for the external ideas to take precedence (ibid.)

One striking feature about the Lesotho Old Age Pension is that the government refused to seek external funding and vowed to finance it with government revenue. Here, the international agencies and donors were exposed. As a former World Bank employee, one would have expected the Minister of Finance, Timothy Thahane, to quickly appeal for assistance. “We cannot depend on getting foreign aid to pay pensions, we must do it ourselves” (as quoted in Pelham, 2007, p. 14). The donor community was never consulted and they only got to know when it was publicly announced during the registration process in
2004 (Pelham, 2007). The then Prime Minister of Lesotho, Mosisili, also echoed the same sentiments when he said

We were very clear that this was an initiative that we were coming up with as government, to have a positive impact on the lives of vulnerable people. We will start this on our own, with limited resources. … We will not make it a foreign aid-driven initiative. The IMF and the World Bank appreciated the problem that we were grappling with, but they were worried about sustainability (as quoted in Granvik, 2015, p. 29).

Mosisili’s narrative acknowledges the scepticism of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and their seemingly unwillingness to finance government led national social protection programmes.

It is debatable whether the Old Age Pension (OAP) in Lesotho was direct policy diffusion from South Africa. However, Pelham (2007) is of the view that it was “a product of regional geopolitics and a concern for equity” (p. 11) – “to provide ethnic Basotho living in Lesotho with an equivalent to the pension received by Basotho families living in neighbouring South Africa” (Granvik, 2015, p. 29).

With such fluid borders between the two countries, as the South African pension rises, the disparity between the Lesotho elderly and their ethnically identical South African neighbours is increasingly evident. This may be a factor that compels the government to treat its own citizens similarly (albeit providing less than one quarter of the value of the benefit in South Africa). As one pensioner remarked, ‘We should set our standards by what happens in South Africa’. This may be an influence in helping to foster a social contract (Pelham, 2007, p. 11).

Although the OAP and the Child Grant in Lesotho originated from different policy trajectories, one important underlying factor is that they are all products of political negotiations and persuasion. “It can be concluded that both programmes have primarily come about and grown as a result of political will to invest in such programmes. As examples from other African countries show, even donor-driven programmes such as cash-grants for OVC require political commitment from the national government in order to succeed and become nationalised” (Granvik, 2015, p. 45). The role of the then Prime Minister in spearheading and enforcing social policies was influential and the support from the Minister of Finance as well, despite the reservations expressed over the Child Grant.
3.3 Transnational networks, non-state actors and policy transnationalism

Literature on policy diffusion is dominated by the tendency to overemphasize the role of official actors such as bureaucrats, politicians and state agencies. This approach focuses on ‘import’ and ‘export’ of policies between countries and underrates the contribution of international organisations and non-state actors as agents of policy transfer. According to Hill (2005), “there are a number of international organisations that are explicitly in the business of offering policy prescriptions” and these are notably “the various UN agencies, the World Bank and the OECD” (p. 88). Focusing on trans-national networks and non-state actors also helps discern the rise of NGOs as implementing partners for the international organisations following the retreat of the state (Stone, 2001). Retreat of the state means there is reduced role of the state in service provision and non-state actors are now playing that function to cover the gap. International organisations, think tanks and consultancies play a significant role in policy transfer. Globalisation has compromised state sovereignty and given rise to ‘global public policy networks’ and that implies that policy transfer is no longer between states only (horizontal) but also between states and international organisations (vertical) (Stone, 2001).

There is overwhelming concurrence that the role of external agencies in policy making need not to be underestimated. They can have a positive impact by providing good ideas and funds, building research capacity and encouraging the development and implementation of engagement strategies (Court and Young, 2006; Hennick and Stephenson, 2005; Jones and Young, 2007; Jones et al., 2008; and Wangwe, 2005, as cited in Jones et al. 2009). However, external agencies demand recipient governments to implement evidence-based policies when their aid policies are not empirically grounded as evident in aid conditionality and the HIPC initiative (Killick, 2004). Similarly, the increasing role of the think-tanks tend to undermine other stakeholders and political systems (Jones et al., 2009). Deacon (2007) defines think tanks as ‘independent, or private, policy research organisations, containing people involved in studying a particular area or broad range of policy issues, actively seeking to educate or advice policy-makers and the public through a number of channels’ (p. 89). Regardless of “size and command over ideational and material resources” think tanks “analyse and articulate policy positions, and act as a ‘sounding board’ for new ideas for policy makers” (Stone, 2000, p. 215).

Based on the role of external agencies in influencing the adoption of social protection, this study refutes Court and Young’s (2006) claim that, despite the funds and capacity brought by
the external agencies, the impact on policy is very limited. The fact that much research about development takes place in the North and that which takes place in poor countries is funded by external agencies is problematic in terms of relevance and ownership (Court and Young, 2006.). This reflects that the production of knowledge about development is largely influenced by external agencies. The external agencies work with technical experts (epistemic/policy community) and these have privileged access to information and influence policy making through their networks with government decision makers (Sutton, 1999). One example of such is the International Public Service Union (IPSU) that was established in 1996 by the British Cabinet to promote and transfer the British expertise in public sector administration (Stone, 2001). The IPSU works with DFID and the British Council in a number of overseas projects. Interestingly, DFID is one of the major donors behind the social protection agenda.

Sutton (1999) critically discovers that ‘crisis narratives’ are constantly espoused as development narratives by which development experts justify their role to be at the forefront of the poverty alleviation agenda (p. 27). It is on the basis of the crisis narratives that the technical experts and managers become relevant ‘stakeholders’ (Roe, 1995, p. 1066). Due to the claimed expertise, local people become amenable to the technical guidance of the technical experts (Sutton, 1999). Technical experts can be based in the recipient government, external agencies or international NGOs. Accordingly, “the power of development narratives is enhanced through the incorporation of dominant symbols, ideologies, and the real or imagined historical experience of their adherents” (Sutton, 1999, p. 28). In this regard, the simplifying narratives become the dominant force in donor development discourse that eventually encapsulates specific development policies, programs or projects reflecting the hegemonic Western discourse (Hoben, 1995). Such hegemonic development discourses are totalising and undermine the indigenous voice and local context (Leach and Mearns, 1996). Similarly, the use of labelling ensures ‘control’ and marginalisation of local interests (Sutton, 1999). For instance, labelling targeted groups as ‘poor’ or ‘vulnerable’ relegates them to “passive objects of policy” instead of being active participants “with projects and agendas of their own”- a phenomenon best described as ‘disarming of labelling’ (Sutton, 1999, p. 28).

Non-state actors such as scientific associations, NGOs and consultants interact with international organisations and governments to influence policy transfer through persuasion, advocacy and mutually engaging policy makers (Stone 2001). Through their intellectual infrastructure, think tanks and consultants are knowledgeable about approaches that have
worked in other parts of the world that they can influence adoption (ibid.). Sinclair (2000) and Stone (2001) concur that universities and scholars also play a fundamental role in policy transmission. Sinclair (2000) particularly observes that “transnational knowledge elites are often attractive to local governing elites…academics and their institutional base are presumed to hold insight, understanding or experience of special eminence” (p. 17). Thus, transnational actors are critical players in policy transfer. The role of transnational actors in policy evolution is what Deacon (2007) calls ‘supranational policy making’.

The World Bank, another major force behind social protection works with non-state actors to influence policy change as narrated below,

… the structural power of World Bank in shaping not only the supply but also demand for development knowledge is significant. Political themes and policy approaches are reinforced by Bank capacity-building programmes for research institutes at a domestic level and through building regional networks to share information, spread policy lessons and develop a consensus. Many of these NGOs are also changed in the process of engagement with the Bank (Sinclair, 2000, p. 25).

As Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) gradually transform from service delivery to lobbying and advocacy, they have become a significant actor in the policy process (Jones et al. 2009). Their role is particularly important as they give a voice to the marginalised population groups and generate knowledge (Sumner, 2009 cited in Jones et al., 2009) However, their ability to influence policy is determined by contexts and sectors as well as the policy space made available to them (Jones et al., 2009). Due to the expressed limitations, the role of CSOs in policy making remains both minuscule and sceptical. Curran (2005) further observes that there is often tension between CSOs and governments as CSOs are popular for criticising public policies without providing alternatives or representing interests of international donors. Policy space is generally closed for civil society (Jones et al., 2009) and in instances where they demand the space it is also not clear whether their voices are taken seriously. This confirms Gaventa’s (2005) demarcation of policy spaces into closed, invited and claimed with most decision making taking place in the closed space.

3.4 Policy Process and the Primacy of Politics
Development, both in theory and practice, has suffered a series of errors for many decades that include the belief that poverty reduction is simply a matter of mobilising adequate resources; that poverty is reduced when markets are free; and that a country can successfully
industrialise without an effective state (Leftwich, 2008). This is due to the failure to place politics at the core of the development policy processes (ibid.). Leftwich (2008) credibly warns that “poverty reduction and general improvement in welfare, in short, is not simply a matter of enhancing aid flows, designing appropriate policy regimes and supporting institutional development…. Poverty reduction is a matter of politics” (p. 3). Where politics is not equal to the task, Leftwich advises donors “to identify, nurture, encourage and support those social and political forces which are necessary for forming the kinds of growth coalition which will demand, design and implement the institutional arrangements which will deliver pro-poor growth and social provision” (Leftwich, 2008, p. 3). In his advice to donors, Leftwich simplistically assumes that donors are neutral and do not represent or harbour any political motives. This researcher is of the view that politics need to be discerned from the global perspective where most development policies like social protection originate. Thus donor interests also play a fundamental role in poverty reduction. Martens (2008) also notes that foreign aid agencies do not only transfer aid but also decide how it is spent. In the same line of thought, Reinikka (2008) is equally cautious to observe that “…aid effectiveness is determined not only by the performance of the recipient but also by the incentives embedded in the institutional environment of aid agencies” (p. 181). Consequently, this researcher treats donors and other international agencies as key political players whose interaction with domestic actors shape the social protection agenda. Indeed, politics should be at the centre of the analysis of pro-poor development policies (ibid. 5), lest researchers and development practitioners will keep on looking for what Grootaert (1998) calls ‘missing links’(as cited in Leftwich 2008, p. 5).

3.4.1. Politics of the policy process
When discussing the politics of poverty alleviation in Africa, what also comes to mind is the strategy of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) adopted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and implemented in Africa and other developing countries. Ramalingam (2013) notes, “…although the PRSPs were supposed to be led by the national governments and stakeholders, the process was designed and developed almost entirely in the context of the Bank and IMF” (p. 62). Thus the PRSP process has been discredited for being an imposition that in many cases was out of context with real issues of poverty alleviation like inequality and redistribution. Above all, the process bypassed the government structures although there is often a claim that there was widespread consultation of the government, civil society and other development partners.

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It cannot be disputed that policy process is a conglomeration of various actors motivated by different ideological positions and self-interests. To treat it as a purely technical process downplays the politics embedded in the process. Schlagler and Weible (2013) define policy process research as “the study of stasis and change in public policy over time” and this entails the following:

i. The surrounding actors that think and act individually and collectively;
ii. The structures that affect - and are affected by – actor choice including socio-economic conditions, institutions, culture, …; and
iii. The anticipated and unanticipated events from elections to scientific discoveries to chronic crises and disasters (p. 390).

The complexity of policy as a process is also further noted by Brock et al. (2002) when they try to explain it in the context of poverty knowledge. According to them, policy is a complex, dynamic process, rather than a linear progression of formulation and implementation. This policy process comprises a multiplicity of distinct but linked spaces, in which a wide range of actors, governmental and non-governmental, engage in order to influence and shape policy. Each actor brings into a policy space their own unique version of knowledge about poverty (Brock et al., 2002, p. 2).

Hill (2005) concurs with the above observations and unreservedly states that policy process is “essentially a complex and multilayered one. It is essentially a political process, but in the widest sense of that term” (p. 4). He further elaborates that “the study of the policy process is essentially the study of the exercise of power in the making of policy, and cannot therefore disregard underlying questions about the sources and nature of that power” (Hill, 2005, p. 26). Sutton (1999) is also agreeable to the above view and also states that policy making is a political process that “is by no means the rational activity that is often held up to be in much of the standard literature” (p. 32). Juma and Clark (1995) further observe that the policy process is far from being a rational activity but “actually rather messy, with outcomes occurring as a result of complicated political, social and institutional processes which are best described as ‘evolutionary’” (p. 128).

It is not easy to fathom the motivation behind evasion of politics by donor agencies when most of their staff would not dispute that “public policy making in their own countries is an inherently political process” (Unsworth, 2015, p. 47). Unsworth further notes that the donor staff...
recognise that reforming public services, designing tax policy, or making decisions about how to allocate public expenditure all involve complex processes of negotiation, bargaining and contestation between groups with different interests and perspectives, against the background of historical legacies and institutions specific to a particular context (ibid.).

According to Devereux and White (2010), three overlapping agendas motivate the social protection initiatives in Africa: “a technocratic (what works) concern with evidence of effects and cost effectiveness; a political (what’s popular) preoccupation with constituencies, interest groups, and institutions; and an ideological (what’s right) concern with universal principles and standards” (pp. 53-57). Consequently, it is the interface of the agendas and those who promote them that “determines social protection policy choices and outcomes” (ibid., p. 57). It is important to understand the three agendas in the context that each actor in the social protection space might be motivated by a certain agenda different from other actors and that ideological variance may lead to political contestation between the different actors. From the aforesaid, it is easy to derive that the social protection agenda in Africa is a politicised domain in spite of the noble overarching objective to fight poverty, hunger and HIV and AIDS (Devereux and White, 2010).

The technocratic agenda spells out that the social transfer initiatives in Africa are predominantly implemented through partnerships “between multilateral or bilateral donors and an international NGO, which together provide the driving force in terms of project initiation and design, funding, technical assistance, monitoring, and evaluation” (Devereux and White, 2010, p. 57). The involvement of national and local government is insignificant and varies from “mere official endorsement of the programme to assigning relevant line ministry staff with responsibilities of day to day implementation” (ibid.). However, that has since evolved over the years as governments adopted social protection. In countries like Kenya and Zambia, the governments are now fully in charge of the cash transfers in terms funding and implementation. In such cases, external agencies provide more of technical assistance to the government than any other kind of support. Hickey et al. (2009) equally observes that lower structures of government departments usually get involved in the implementation. Similarly, Adesina (2011) further notes,

Relative to the rest of the civil service, the beneficiary units and their officials become well-resourced and embedded in the donor driven schemes. The result is the
subversion of coherent policymaking, institutional learning, and knowledge building within the public service (p. 458).

The donors explore all possible means to convince the sceptical governments on the potential positive impacts of social protection against the negative concerns of dependency and unaffordability (Devereux and White, 2010). Substantial resources are invested in monitoring and evaluation of the projects “to build the evidence base” and in advocacy “to persuade governments to mainstream social protection in their national poverty reduction strategies” (Devereux and White, 2010, p. 58).

The political agenda entails a negative perception of ‘ politicization’ by aid practitioners that politics interference in policy processes and allocation of resources and that social protection often is based on “ patronage-based allocations of social transfers and distortion of targeting procedures” by the government (Devereux and White, 2010, p. 61). However, donor projects bypass the government, are politically and institutionally fragile and do not build the capacity of the government to provide social protection (ibid.). It is crucial to note that aid agencies and their preferred implementing partners assume that they are not part of the politics of social protection. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and IMF are champions of the neo-liberal agenda that has been criticised for structural reforms that fuelled political, social and economic challenges in developing countries. The UN family is largely driven by the humanitarian imperative to reduce poverty. Bilateral agencies like DFID are foreign policy agencies that use aid to leverage their national interests and maintain their presence in foreign countries. Given that background, external agencies are not neutral and their distinction makes them even more political. In this regard, the researcher posits that these huge agencies use their finance as power to influence domestic policy trajectory and budgetary processes. Thus, in this study the researcher treats the aforesaid international agencies and donors as key players who interact with local players to determine the course of social protection.

The ideological agenda is human rights based approach that views social protection as a right, claim or entitlement embodied in the ‘ social contract’ between citizens and the state (Devereux and White, 2010). It is based on a “ political contract” between state and citizens, in which governments have a political commitment to challenging inequality and injustice while citizens have a capacity to bargain as active claimants rather than passive beneficiaries of “ handouts” (Devereux and White, 2010). This is in sharp contrast with the ‘discretionary’
programmes implemented by non-accountable players like donors and NGOs (ibid.). Many African countries still struggle to fulfil the international and regional instruments due to mainly resource constraints and lack of accountability and that makes ‘political contract’ a rare phenomenon in most of the African countries. In the instance where there is no ‘political contract’ between state and citizens, it may also not be easy to hold non-state actors accountable. However, non-contributory social pensions in South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana are typical examples of a fulfilment of the state’s obligation to meet the needs of the elderly persons (Devereux and White, 2010).

The fact that “social pensions are rights-based, legally enforceable, permanent, domestically financed, and delivered by accountable public agencies allows these programs to become positively politicized” in Lesotho and Swaziland (Devereux and White, 2010, p. 69). In Lesotho, this is complemented by the Old Pensions Act passed in January 2005 and the pension facility is administered by the Ministry of Finance, which yields significant political influence compared to the Department of Social Welfare (ibid.). In Swaziland, the Old Age Grant was introduced in April 2005 and is administered by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and enshrined in the Social Assistance Act (Devereux and White, 2010: 69).

As outsiders, it is not easy for donors to appreciate and harness the local political dynamics. Subsequently, donors are hesitant to confront the challenge of local politics yet they are adamant on “supporting development change in poor countries with weak public institutions and clientelist politics” (Unsworth, 2015, p. 47). However, with their huge financial muscle, donors are strongly determined to fight poverty and reduce vulnerability. “Armed with money and expertise that gives them largely unfounded confidence in their ability to influence events, they are strongly tempted to look for shortcuts that bypass the messy reality of ‘local’ politics” (Unsworth, 2015, p. 47). This is despite the fact that research and experience have aptly demonstrated that apolitical approaches to policy are piecemeal and not fruitful. The development practitioners have, nevertheless, not moved a step beyond mere acknowledgement of the primacy of local politics and their practice remains ‘business as usual’. Unsworth (2015) observes that today most development practitioners pay at least lip service to the idea that politics plays a central role in supporting or impeding development, and that they need to shift their focus from trying to achieve short-term transformational change to thinking about what kind of incremental progress might be feasible within a given context (p. 48).
Unsworth’s assertion is also supported by Stokes et al. (2012) who note,

Politics also distributes goods. Government programs channel cash, jobs, credit, and myriad other resources to citizens; elected officials mete out benefits to favored constituencies; and political parties distribute everything from leaflets to liquor in search of votes. And taxes and transfers redistribute income, often from wealthier to poorer citizens (p. 2).

Hickey et al. (2018) further note that the variation of social protection adoption across Africa is due to “the political contestation and negotiation between political elites, voters, bureaucrats, and transnational actors” (p. 3). Siachiwena (2016) and Chinyoka and Seekings (2016) acknowledge how change of government can promote social protection citing the cases of the Patriotic Front government (2011 to date) in Zambia and the Government of National Unity (2009-2013) in Zimbabwe, respectively. In Zambia, the resistance by the MMD government (especially the then minister of Finance Ng’andu Magande) to adopt the donor-driven cash transfers was rooted in the party’s neo-liberal development ideology (Kabandula and Seekings, 2016). It is therefore important to treat politics as the central driver of policy and more in the progressive sense than negative.

The assumption by donors and international agencies over the relevance of social protection to developing countries has met resistance from some governments in Africa. More often than not, the ‘one size fits all’ approach has derailed the uptake of social protection as a policy choice for the recipient countries. Uganda is a provoking case study where the politicians and policy makers viewed social protection as irrelevant to the Ugandan local context. Around 2006, 26% of the population (more than 7 million people) lived in chronic poverty in Uganda yet the government did not believe social protection would make any difference (Grant, 2006). The social protection policy process was externally driven with DFID at the forefront while the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) played a minimum role (ibid.). The lack of a common approach from DFID and the World Bank resulted in mixed feelings over social protection initiatives. This created an impression that the government of Uganda hesitated to commit to the costs of social protection and a welfare state (ibid.). Macroeconomic advisors who, by virtue of their position, are very powerful and influential at setting the policy agenda at the highest level dismissed cash transfers on grounds of inflation effects (Grant, 2006). This would explain why social protection was peripheral in the national poverty alleviation processes like the Poverty Status Report and the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). With the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) in charge of PEAP, it reinforced

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the perception that social protection is expensive and fuels dependency. Hence, even the efforts of the Social Protection Task Force (SPTF) were downplayed. Despite the high levels of poverty, the government insists on traditional social protection system where families and communities are at the centre. An official from the President’s Office preferred in-kind transfers for agricultural productivity. He said if cash transfers were to be embraced, “targeting should be to local chiefs rather than the chronically poor…it was better to deal with the chiefs as all poor people are dependent to a degree on the well-being of local chiefs and it is difficult to separate them from the traditional systems that prevail” (Grant, 2006, p. 20).

The Ugandan scenario presents political differences between the government and the international donors and agencies as well as power struggles between MGLSD and MFPED on one hand and Ministries of Education and Health on the other. The two ministries of Education and Health could not principally agree on the feasibility of school feeding programme that was advocated by the former. The MGLSD is ultimately portrayed as a unit that lacks “the necessary vision or strategy, and is preoccupied with running ongoing projects” and casts the doubt if it is the right ministry to push the social protection agenda (Grant, 2006, p. 22). One of the high ranking officials from MFPED rightly said “economics is politics and politics is not long term. Politics only has 5 years to deliver” (quoted in Grant 2006: 19). Therefore, politicians look at long term investments that lift people out of poverty and the political benefits that they accrue, which contrasts social assistance advocated by external agencies (Grant, 2006).

The resistance in Uganda underlies the primacy of politics in the social protection debate. According to Stone (2001),

> While national decision-making can be influenced by diffusion, policy innovations elsewhere are not sufficient condition for another jurisdiction to adopt the same policy. The determinants of policy arrangements can include factors that are internal to a system more so than external such as the changing dynamics of political interests and the socio-historical make-up of a polity (p. 5).

In the light of the above, past experiences of policy failure is a driving force for the policy makers to look for alternative policy models. Policy failure informs policy learning and is the basis for attracting new ideas on the policy agenda (Stone, 2001). When a policy fails,
political opponents adopt new policy ideas that challenge their rivals (Hall, 1990, as cited in Stone, 2001: 11).

Malawi is an attention-grabbing case where the social protection policy process was depoliticised and treated as a purely technical process. In this regard, the leading government agencies did not comprehend well the nuances of social protection and lacked the capacity to take the lead and guide the process (Chinsinga, 2007). The policy design process was totally driven and determined by UNICEF, DFID and the World Bank, key external agencies behind the social protection agenda (ibid.). The technical consultants were hired by World Bank, DFID and UNICEF on behalf of the government and there was lack of active engagement with politicians, local government structures and the grassroots to raise their concerns into the policy (ibid.). This was despite the fact that there was an institutional framework that comprised the National Social Protection Steering Committee (NSPSC), the National Social Protection Technical Committee (NSPTC) and the Social Protection Unit (SPU) created within the Department of Poverty and Disaster Management Affairs in the Office of the President (OPC). ILO (2016) notes that social protection is still driven by donors and overly fragmented with little government monitoring.

3.4.2 Social protection for the electorate

The role of institutions in shaping social protection cannot be downplayed as they potentially provide incentives for or barriers to action. Elections, party politics and politics of patronage all have a significant influence (Hickey, 2007). More often than not, governments have a tendency to raise social expenditure in election years in order to win the hearts of their constituencies. Thus, welfare transfers do not essentially target the vulnerable and needy but those strategic to the political survival of the regime making them a tool used by political elites for popular support and re-election (Feng and Gizelis, 2002). Selective food distribution by Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya and the abolition health user fees by Yoweri Museveni of Uganda were politically imperative to secure their regimes in power (see chapter 2). The likes of Michael Sata of Zambia (Kuss, 2015; Siachiwena, 2016; Kabandula and Seekings, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017) and Joyce Banda of Malawi (Hamer and Seekings, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017) politically branded social protection in the pro-poor political ideology in what became ‘positive politicisation’ of social protection. Political elites and political parties are therefore most likely to promote social protection where it guarantees them votes.

In Lesotho, pension has been a key component of the political agenda for all parties since 2000 and this could explain why the first pensions were eventually delivered in November
2004 without a pilot phase (Granvik, 2015). The Old Age Pension turned to be a campaign issue for the 2007 general election when both the ruling and the opposition parties invoked it for political mileage (Pelham, 2007; Granvik, 2015). The major opposition party promised to increase the pension from M150 (US$25) to M500 (US$83) per month if they won the election while the ruling party pledged to review the monthly payment (Devereux and White 2010). After the ruling party won the election, albeit with a reduced margin, a post-election survey revealed that the voters’ choice of party was determined by their commitment to the Old Age Pension (ibid.). Consequently, the Minister of Finance increased the monthly pension by 33% from M150 to M200 and conceded that it was not politically feasible to abolish the Old Age Pension (ibid.). After the 2007 elections, the words of the then Commissioner of Pensions, T. Thulo, summed it all “…it was a game of politics. One motive of the pension was to gain the support from the Basotho, especially in the mountain areas, where many old people live” (as quoted in Granvik, 2015, p. 24). Pension also emerged as an electoral tool in independent Namibia with the opposition leader declaring that it was a ‘moral obligation’ and a ‘categorical imperative’ to increase the value of the pension (Pelham, 2007). Consequently, monthly payment for the pension in Namibia trebled from N$160 pegged in 1996 to N$500 in 1999 (ibid.).

The value of the social pension as a political agenda is also reflected in Swaziland in 2006 when the payment of the Old Age Grant failed due to inadequate cash (Devereux and White 2010). The Old Age Grant was persistently unreliable and unpredictable and the non-payment in November 2006 sparked parliamentary activism (Dlamini, 2007). Realising the indispensable value of the pension to their respective constituencies, the Members of Parliament boycotted the House of Assembly and vowed to attend only when the issue was resolved (Dlamini, 2007). Cabinet and parliamentary business were suspended and attracted publicity from the media and civil society, something that shocked the executive arm of the government. The Cabinet pointed a taskforce that included Ministers of Finance, Health and Social Welfare, Home Affairs as well as the Central Bank Governor and the taskforce quickly recommended a comprehensive plan to resolve the impetus and ensure timely payments from then onwards (Dlamini, 2007).

3.5 The Politics of financing social protection
Financing is at the core of design of social protection systems and it needs to be adequate and sustainable for meaningful impact (Duran-Valverde and Pacheco (2012). When social protection is well financed, well designed and effectively targeted, it upgrades standards of
living for the poorest (Greenhill et al., 2015). Funding social protection is quite contentious. External agencies invest in research to prove to governments that social protection is affordable. The question whether social protection is affordable or not has been a contestation between the government and the external agencies, despite the evidence. While cash transfers largely started as donor initiatives, the governments were expected to increase funding as donors reduced their funding. That would ensure that the governments fully fund the cash transfers when the donors eventually pull out. Some countries have been able to adopt social cash transfers both in terms of funding and implementation while others still struggle due to funding constraints and lack of political commitment. It has been a difficult choice for governments to make to fund cash transfers as they have their own priorities like agricultural subsidies. As shall be noted later in this study, financing has been used by external agencies as a tool to influence the adoption of social protection. Barrientos (2004) notes that there are different sources of finance for social protection and these include donors, national governments, private sector, community and NGOs. Of these sources of finance, donors and national governments are the most dominant. National governments are limited to

- tariffs and excise duties,
- charges for government services,
- indirect and direct taxes,
- social security contributions and,
- in the case of developing countries, possibly some foreign aid (Cichon et al., 2004, p. 199).

Domestic resource generation for social protection is still a big challenge for the developing countries (McCord, 2013; Barrientos, 2004). Political economy considerations are therefore pertinent to understand how demand and supply for social protection expenditures are determined (Barrientos, 2004). Similarly, Duran-Valverde and Pacheco (2012) note “there is a close link between the feasibility of extending social protection and the economic and political capacity of a country to generate sustainable resources that render the public funding of such initiatives viable in the long run” (p.1). These are the considerations that a government makes before making a commitment.

The World Bank (2012b) makes a persuasive classification of cash transfers in Africa that helps to understand the variation of models from one country to the other. According to the World Bank, there is a distinction between cash transfers being implemented in middle and low-income countries. Middle-income countries are implementing cash grants, which are
rights based, institutionalised in the government and funded internally, serve promotive and preventive functions of social protection and have a wider coverage due to categorical targeting of the vulnerable (World Bank, 2012b). The description qualifies the cash grants as stable and sustainable model of social protection and fitting in this group are South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Mauritius. Conversely, cash transfers in low-income countries are fragile cash transfers because they are usually projects co-funded by the government and donors or fully funded by donors, based outside central government and have a small coverage of the population (World Bank, 2012b). These are largely *ex post* protective transfers. The World Bank further notes that the huge pitfall for such cash transfers is that they are fragmented and devoid of domestic ownership and coordination (World Bank, 2012b). Cichon et al. (2004) note that social protection systems are significant redistributive mechanisms (around 30% GDP in majority economies) that require sound financial governance and economic management (p. v). That is a significant proportion and its implication on national budgeting cannot be underestimated.

External organisations like ILO and the World Bank have been instrumental to prove that low income countries can afford funding social protection at less than 1 percent of GDP (Seekings, 2017). Furthermore, ILO and the World Bank have been at the forefront to prove that, of all the regions in the world, sub-Saharan Africa bears the least expenditure on social protection (Seekings, 2017). In a study commissioned by the World Bank, Monchuk (2014) noted that most African countries were spending less than 1% of GDP on safety nets with a notable exception of a few middle income countries in Southern Africa. Social protection financing is integral to national fiscal and public finance policies because of its direct or indirect connection to government budgeting (Monchuk, 2014).

Barrientos (2004) and Holmqvist (2010) insist that affordability remains a critical issue and aid dependency is high as it is difficult to raise expenditure for social protection from domestic resources in the low income and weak economies. However, from the mid-2000s onwards, the World Bank, ILO, UNICEF and Help Age International commissioned a number of country studies in sub-Saharan Africa on the cost of cash transfers to prove affordability (Seekings, 2017). The ILO Social Protection Floor Recommendation 202 of 2012 is a global consensus of 185 countries (governments, employers and labour) to extend social protection floors (ILO, 2014). The Social Protection Floor Initiative became one of the major pronouncement that set the tone for a renewed global thrust for social protection. ILO asserted that extending social protection was more of a political choice than an affordability...
issue and suggested that it was possible for low income countries to extend social protection through proceeds from fiscal consolidation and adjustment measures (ILO, 2014). The World Bank (2015c) found out that developing countries were spending an average of 1.6% of GDP on safety nets and that there was insignificant difference between middle and low income countries (at 1.6% and 1.5% respectively while some low income countries were spending more than middle income countries). The World Bank (2015c) therefore concluded that there was no causative relationship between income level and safety net financing and thus all countries could afford safety nets. In another study commissioned by ILO, Ortiz et al. (2015) posit that ‘fiscal space exists in all countries’ and suggest eight options that governments can explore in order to finance social protection:

i. re-allocating public expenditures;
ii. increasing tax revenues;
iii. expanding social security coverage and contributory revenues;
iv. lobbying for aid and transfers;
v. eliminating illicit financial flows;
vi. using fiscal and foreign exchange reserves;
vii. borrowing or restructuring existing debt; and
viii. adopting a more accommodative macroeconomic framework (p. 1).

At face value, the above options are plausible but practically complicated as country contexts differ. It is important for the debate on financing of social protection to go beyond affordability to focus on national development priorities and political interests.

Due to fiscal resource constraint, the process of generation and distribution of resources to different public policy priorities (including social protection) is “both technically and politically complicated” and transcends the fiscal debate (Duran-Valverde and Pacheco, 2012, p. 1).

…there is the fact that decisions on financing and spending usually respond to the specific interests of stakeholders that have sufficient power to influence them. No intervention financing or public spending is neutral in terms of which groups in society are winners or losers….The financing of social protection therefore entails a complex decision making process in which the political dimension carries a significant weight. (Duran-Valverde and Pacheco, 2012, pp. 1-2).

It is equally daunting for donors to support poor countries given “weak public institutions and clientelistic politics” (Unsworth, 2015, p. 47). Unsworth further notes that despite the
challenges, the imperative to better lives of the poor and vulnerable would still prevail among many of donor staff. According to Holmqvist (2010), external financing for social transfers has to fulfill the following requirements:

i. be politically supported by donor countries’ home constituencies;

ii. be based upon a credible aid contract, where the permanent character of transfers has to be reconciled with time-bound aid; and

iii. build on, and avoiding disturbing, the political ownership in partner countries (p. 2).

The above factors raise questions on cost, sustainability and the external aid-political economy nexus (ibid.). Social protection expenditure is recurrent and requires long term predictable financing while withdrawing it bears political consequences (Holmqvist, 2010; Government of Uganda Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, 2013). It shows that external financing of social protection is problematic as it is difficult to have a consensus of the above three factors.

World Bank (2018) notes that funding for social safety nets (SSN)\(^5\) has increased over years and now at an average of 1.5 percent of GDP in developing and transitional countries worldwide as shown below.

Figure 4 Average Global and Regional Spending on Social Safety Nets

![Figure 4 Average Global and Regional Spending on Social Safety Nets](http://etd.uwc.ac.za/)

Source: World Bank, 2018, p. 17

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\(^5\) These are non-contributory programmes (social assistance) for the poor and vulnerable e.g. unconditional and conditional cash transfers, non-contributory pensions, food and in-kind transfers, school feeding, public works and fee waivers (World Bank, 2018). Social protection is broader than safety nets.
The increase in funding is mainly attributable to the fact that many countries have increased funding for flagship SSN programmes, which has subsequently increased coverage (World Bank, 2018).

As illustrated below, there is a noted increase in expenditure on safety nets in the region of sub-Saharan Africa. Countries like South Africa (omitted from the illustration), Namibia, Mauritius, Botswana, Seychelles, Gabon, and Angola are distinctive from the rest of the region in the sense that the social safety nets are fully funded by the governments.

**Figure 5 Share of Donor-Funded Safety Nets in sub-Saharan African Countries**

![Figure 5](http://etd.uwc.ac.za/)

Source: World Bank, 2018, p. 18

However, donors are still funding social safety nets quite significantly in the region of sub-Saharan Africa. The greater part of the region is a mix of donor and government funding. Where governments have adopted social protection, there is a marked increase of funding for such programmes with governments now the leading funders. For instance, Senegal, Ghana, Sudan, Kenya, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Mozambique have more government than
donor funding and this is possibly an indicator of increasing spending by the governments as donors decrease their funding on their exit. In Tanzania, the government and donor funding are almost at par. In Liberia and Uganda, about 80% of safety nets are funded by donors while over 90% is funded by donors in Guinea-Bissau. In Zimbabwe, around 60% of the safety nets are donor-funded. Given that South Sudan, Congo Republic, Congo Democratic Republic and Central African Republic are politically volatile, it is not surprising that donors wholly fund their safety nets. There is still donor dominance in Malawi and Ethiopia but to say their safety nets are 100% funded by donors might be an overstatement.

The dominance of donor funding in the greater sub-Saharan region presents a complication in terms of ownership and sustainability. Monchuk (2014) notes that 68% of the safety nets in Africa are still funded by donors and the proportion increases to 75% if middle-income countries are excluded. Despite the fact that external agencies have invested substantially in demonstrating that low income countries can afford to fund social protection, policymakers remain unconvinced that it is affordable. Seekings (2017) calls it ‘affordability gap’ between ‘what is advocated for African countries and what these country governments are willing to spend’. Seekings’ observation is further reinforced by Kalebe-Nyamongo and Marquette (2014) who note that “elite attitudes towards redistribution, dependency, equality of outcomes, and the active or ‘inactive’ poor have a bearing on the policies and programmes that elites are willing to support and implement” (p. 16). The World Bank (2012d) recommends three options for Africa to expand and improve efficiency of social protection, that is, to move away from price subsidies to more targeted approach; raising fiscal allocation; and mobilizing external assistance. However, all the three options are problematic in the sense that subsidies are a preferred policy choice by governments in Africa while targeting is contentious, national resource allocation is determined by political interests and external aid for social protection is dwindling as donor interests shift to other priorities.

Financing of social protection, whether internal or external, is problematic and raises a lot of questions. Issues of political economy are central to understand both internal and external financing of social protection. Government’s objection to increasing funding is justified on various grounds: it looks at the costs of mobilizing additional revenue; it compares the political costs of another tax and benefits of redistribution to the poor; and whether the policy reform is a priority or not, given the resource constraint (Seekings, 2017). For donors, they are more interested in demonstrating evidence that it works and it is affordable through pilots and studies but cannot fund a national upscale. The drive by ILO and World Bank to prove
that social protection is affordable is also a strategy to push for adoption for social protection.

3.6 International Organisations and Policy Positions on Social Protection

This section is informed by the fact that the evolution of social protection in Africa is influenced by global policy positions of international organisations. As noted in the conceptual framework, social protection evolves in a top down hierarchy from a global level to national and local levels. Although international organisations concur to promote adoption of the agenda, it is important to note that each one of them contests for influence and control reflecting ideological differences between them (McCord, 2013). Based on literature available, the researcher identified 5 agencies as leading global actors in the social protection agenda. Each international organisation is driven by a certain policy position that differs from others and there are often ‘ideological fights’ between them, as noted below.

…the ideas about social policy carried and argued for by the international organisations demonstrated something approaching a ‘war of position’ between those agencies and the actors within them, who argued for a more selective, residual role of the state together with a larger role for private actors in health, social protection and education provision, and those who took the opposite view. This division of opinion often reflected a disagreement as to whether the reduction of poverty was a matter of targeting specific resources on the most poor or whether it was a matter of major social and political – institutional change involving a shift in power relations and a significant increase in redistribution from the rich to poor. (Deacon, 2007, pp. 88-89).

The noted differences are the reasons why some organisations advocated for a residual and targeted social protection (neo-liberal approach) while others opted for human rights based and universal social protection (social democratic approach). The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI)’s preference for conditional lending contrasts the UN’s moral persuasion but the BWI have commanded significant influence because they are more resourced than the UN (McCord, 2013). It is important to note that all the international organisations are quite cognizant of the importance of ownership and institutional capacity building as expressed in their policies but they rarely fulfill that in practice.

3.6.1 World Bank: social protection and labour

The World Bank is one of the first organisations to be involved in social protection, as evidenced by various international workshops that it organised in the early years of the millennium to promote social protection in its poverty reduction strategies in Africa (Barrientos et al, 2005). The World Bank’s approach to social protection is rooted in the neo-
liberal agenda as one of the proponents of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Due to its role in the Washington Consensus, the World Bank “favours a residual or targeted approach to social spending more reminiscent of the USA model than of the European approach” (Deacon, 2007, p. 25). That critically defines the World Bank approach to social protection over all the years it involved itself in the agenda. Its interest in social protection began with the social funds that targeted those adversely affected by SAPs in the late 1980s and in early 1990s the institution also developed interest in pensions (World Bank, 2009). Thus it promoted residual social safety nets in order to ‘soften and make politically acceptable’ SAP reforms by providing temporary support to those adversely affected (McCord, 2013). The World Bank also marketed social safety nets to dislodge the human rights and universalist foundation to social protection (ibid.). In the 1990s the Bank focused more on pro-poor economic growth and social transfers did not get high priority. The Bank noted that not all the poor would benefit from economic growth and that even some of those who benefit would still be vulnerable to adverse events. Thus, it is the role of the state to support the vulnerable households or communities and those who do not gain from economic growth process (World Bank, 1990). In 1999, the World Bank promulgated the Social Risk Management (SRM) framework premised on economic growth as the driver for poverty reduction while public intervention addressed the risks that inhibit the poor from participating (McCord, 2013; World Bank, 2001). Under SRM, World Bank strategic direction for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was mainstreaming focus on orphans and HIV/AIDS and community-driven development as well as integrating pensions with social protection (World Bank, 2001). The little success of the pro-poor growth agenda challenged the World Bank to reconsider its approach and to transcend the SRM approach for a broad social protection agenda (McCord, 2013).

The World Bank’s publication of the World Development Report in 2000 and the Social Protection Sector Strategy in 2001 elevated social transfers higher than before (Loewe, 2008). It noted that means-tested social assistance is an important instrument for the unemployed and underemployed in highly informal economies (World Bank, 2000). Over the years, the World Bank is a champion for targeted interventions and a proponent for conditional cash transfers. This is not surprising especially given that aid conditionality is part of the World Bank’s approach to development.

The World Bank’s support to social protection has basically been centred on labour markets, pensions, social funds and safety nets (World Bank, 2001). Involvement in labour markets
started in the 1970s while social safety nets were a response to structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s as well as the World debt and economic crisis of the 1980s too (ibid.). The global financial crisis in East Asia in the 1990s attracted more involvement and more resources for social protection from the World Bank (World Bank, 2001). The sector strategy focused on needs-based cash transfers; in-kind transfers, subsidies and fee waivers; and public works but gave precedence to cash transfers over in-kind transfers (World Bank, 2001). On pension reform, the Bank recommended a multi-pillar system that combined public and private run pension schemes (World Bank, 2000).

Towards 2006, the Bank increasingly shifted its focus to tax-funded social pension and acknowledged that such pensions avoid destitution of the elderly, enhance access to credit and “lead to higher investments in the household’s physical capital and in the human capital of its children and elderly.” (World Bank, 2005, p. 148). The World Bank’s approach has evolved over the years and the overall objectives of the current thrust on ‘social protection and labour’ are ‘good jobs, greater security, and greater equity’ (World Bank, 2009). The World Bank’s Social Protection and Labour Strategy (2012-2022) seeks to deepen the Bank’s involvement, capacity, knowledge and impact in that regard. The strategy is anchored on ‘improving resilience, equity and opportunity for all by supporting countries to build evidence-based harmonized systems of social protection and labour that are rooted in multi-sectoral and country-tailored engagement (World Bank 2012).

3.6.2 DFID: building evidence for social cash transfers

The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) is one of the main donors for social protection in sub-Saharan Africa. Its major approach has been to demonstrate evidence to policy actors through technical expertise, commissioning studies and study tours (Davies, 2009). It also propounded the Drivers of Change approach that explored how the national political context would be connected to the work of the development partners (Barrientos et al., 2005).

DFID makes a case for cash transfers by providing evidence: for multiple forms of impact, on design and implementation choices; and of affordability and cost-effectiveness (DFID, 2011). DFID further supports monitoring and evaluation to demonstrate results and strengthen the evidence (ibid.). It has also invested in shock responsive social protection research where it seeks to build evidence on how best social protection can be scaled up in times of shocks in low income countries and countries in conflict (DFID, 2016).
Overall, DFID has played three major roles in promoting social protection:

- Supporting cash transfers through the bilateral programme; engaging with multilateral agencies and international fora; and in generating and disseminating evidence;
- Encouraging attention to and financing cash transfers in international fora and multilateral policy and programming. DFID has particularly partnered the World Bank, UNICEF and the EC; and

DFID acknowledges the challenges of implementing social transfers in developing countries. Hence it recommends ‘building political support and country ownership, supporting social transfers in the wider context of government’s social policy and other public expenditure, integrating social transfers in social protection framework that becomes part of the poverty reduction strategy, investing in institutional capacity to implement social transfers, as well as transparent and effective targeting of beneficiaries’ (DFID, 2005, p. 2-3). However, there seems to be inadequate attention to such commitments, especially institutional capacity building and ownership, as shall be seen later in other chapters.

DFID has been very instrumental in setting the social protection agenda in several African countries in sub-Saharan Africa including Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Uganda. The UK bilateral has funded cash transfer pilots and evaluations across Africa to build evidence to influence adoption. However, DFID’s use of evidence from its ‘pilot based approach’ to influence scaling up of social transfers and policy development had mixed results. Where projects were implemented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), like in the case of Zambia, government ownership and capacity remained suspicious (Davies, 2009). In the early years, DFID managed to establish symbiotic relationships with the ministries of social welfare even though it was less successful in winning the will of the “more powerful political and policy actors, including parliamentarians, high level political leaders, and those within the more powerful ministries of finance and planning” (Davies, 2009, p. 16).

DFID has partnered with world-renowned think tanks such as the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and IDS to do research to build a case for social protection. In 2016, DFID funded a joint study by ODI and Oxford Policy Management (OPM). The 300 page document entitled *Cash Transfers: What does the evidence say?* is a range of positive
impacts of cash transfers on monetary poverty, education, health and nutrition, savings, investment and production, employment and empowerment (ODI, 2016). DFID also has funded social cash transfers in Africa. In its practice paper of 2005, DFID states

Evidence from existing social transfers in developing countries suggests that they can help tackle hunger, increase incomes, improve the education and health of the poorest families, promote gender equity and contribute to empowering poor people. In addition, there is evidence that social transfers can contribute to growth and the development of local markets. (DFID, 2005, p. 42).

DFID also supported the establishment of The Transfer Project. The Transfer Project is a collaboration of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) and Save the Children UK. These work in partnership with national governments as well as local and international researchers. The platform was designed from September 2008 to May 2009 and DFID, UNICEF and Save the Children UK funded the design phase. The agenda is to build strong evidence for social transfers through robust research and monitoring and evaluation to convince the sceptical national governments in sub-Saharan Africa and donor governments as well (www.transfer.cpc.unc.edu). The platform specifically focuses on the region of sub-Saharan Africa. To date, the major milestone for The Transfer Project is the 2016 publication of a book From Evidence to Action: The Story of Cash Transfers and Impact Evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa. The book demonstrates the evidence for feasibility of cash transfers and highlights the evolution of social protection policies in eight countries in the region of sub-Saharan Africa (Davis et al., 2016). The study is expected to go a long way in providing a strong foundation to sanction the full adoption of cash transfers by the governments in the region.

DFID also co-funded the Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme (RHVP) with AusAid in Southern Africa from 2005 to 2010. RHVP was established to provide policy advice on how best to fight persistent poverty and vulnerability in the region and it was hinged on three intertwined components of support to ‘vulnerability assessment capabilities, evidence gathering, and policy advice and advocacy (feeding new ideas into policy processes in country governments)’ (Ellis et al., 2009, p. x). The component of research became known as the Regional Evidence Building Agenda that was made up of six modules of ‘vulnerability, targeting, coordination and coverage, cost-effectiveness, asset effects and

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6 Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
market impacts’ (ibid.). The modules became the basis for cross-country comparison in the region. The programme established a website (www.wahenga.net) where “useful resource for all matters related to hunger, vulnerability and social protection in southern Africa and more widely in sub-Saharan Africa” would be accessed (Ellis et al., 2009, p. x).

3.6.3 The International Labour Organisation (ILO): social protection floors

ILO drive for ‘common international labour and social standards’ is rooted to the social democratic environment that prevailed during First World War when it was founded (Deacon, 2007). To fulfil that cause, ILO’s key strategy is to ensure that governments are signatories to the various international instruments of ‘good practice in labour standards and social security’ (ibid.). Its approach is based on the 1952 Convention 102 that spelt out ILO Social Security Minimum Standards. ILO has also been instrumental globally in advocating social transfers as a tool for fighting poverty though its position has evolved over the years (Loewe, 2008). During the earlier decades, ILO predominantly focused on social insurance attributable to three distinct categories of workers, employers and the governments. ILO takes a human rights approach and believes social security is an entitlement based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

Social security is very important for the wellbeing of workers, their families and the entire community. It is a basic human right and a fundamental means for creating social cohesion, thereby helping to ensure social peace and social inclusion. It is an indispensable part of government social policy and an important tool to prevent and alleviate poverty. It can, through national solidarity and fair burden sharing, contribute to human dignity, equity and social justice. It is also important for political inclusion, empowerment and the development of democracy. (ILO, 2001, p. 1-2)

The main thrust of the ILO global campaign for social security for all was the principle of universality and coverage for all (Loewe, 2008). Similarly, Seekings (2017) notes that ILO prefers universal programmes.

ILO strategy on social protection is a product of a tripartite consensus of governments, workers’ and employers’ agencies from 185 ILO member states during the 101st Conference in 2012 (ILO, 2012). The consensus is encapsulated in what became known as the ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202). The ILO’s strategy calls for states to set up and maintain national social protection floors that protect citizens over the life cycle (Recommendation 202). ILO (2012) defines social protection floors as “nationally-defined sets of basic social security guarantees which secure protection aimed at preventing or
alleviating poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion” (p. 5). Accordingly, social protection floors should guarantee essential healthcare, education as well as basic income security for children, youths who cannot earn enough income and older persons (ILO, 2012). Recommendation 202 stipulates that national law should guarantee basic social security with clear conditions of entry, levels of benefits and grievance handling mechanisms (ibid: 6). ILO underscores that universal social protection is a key instrument to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), promotion of social justice and fulfilment of the universal right to social security (ILO, 2017).

3.6.4 UNICEF: child sensitive social protection
UNICEF has been critical in challenging the World Bank orthodoxy and the BWI structural adjustment approach and key to that is the report *Adjustment with a Human Face* that it published in 1987 (McCord, 2013). Accordingly, UNICEF’s engagement in social protection is premised on human rights and pro-poor development (UNICEF, 2008) anchored on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (in the case of Africa) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (ibid.). The three conventions underscore the right of children to social security. The UN agency has worked on social protection in numerous countries for many years “as part of its global mandate to advocate for the protection of children’s rights, to help meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential” (UNICEF, 2012, p. 12). According to UNICEF, social protection is gender sensitive as it addresses specific vulnerabilities faced by women and girls and further and recognizes the role of women in child care (2008). UNICEF’s role and approach to social protection is summed below.

UNICEF is a recognized global leader in child-sensitive social protection, contributing to an increase in the visibility of the vulnerabilities faced by children and their families, influencing social protection policy frameworks to effectively address these, as well as following a human-rights based approach to ensuring that duty-bearers are accountable to rights-holders and rights-holders are able to claim their rights to social protection. (UNICEF, 2012, p. 12).

UNICEF finds social protection increasingly relevant because of: the rising inequalities and vulnerability (macro and household); the potential to promote equity through resource distribution and strengthening families’ capacity for child care; and it is a long term investment in children that helps them realise their rights and full potential (child sensitive).
Besides universal coverage, UNICEF believes in integrated social protection systems built from a systems approach and a multi-sectoral approach (UNICEF, 2012). UNICEF has also influenced global support for ‘child sensitive social protection’. In 2009, it mobilised other international organisations to pass the 2009 Joint Statement on Child-Sensitive Social Protection to guide policy and programmes in that respect. According to UNICEF (2008), a child sensitive social protection system

- Promotes a coherent legal framework to protect children and women;
- Addresses the age and gender specific risks and vulnerabilities of children;
- Intervenes as early as possible to prevent irreversible impairment to children;
- Makes special provision to reach children who are most vulnerable;
- Helps children and women to claim their rights, and facilitates their participation in decision-making; and
- Strengthens the capacity of the state, communities and families to respect, protect and fulfil rights (p. 56).

UNICEF joined the social protection agenda later than ILO and World Bank. What is surprising is that it has become one of the leading agencies. This can be justified in the sense that UNICEF realised the global policy shift to social protection and saw the imperative to align to the new context in order for it to remain relevant to the sources of funds (bilateral and IFIs). Of all the UN agencies, UNICEF is at the forefront of social protection possibly because of its particular mandatory focus on children and families (the target of social protection). It is probably ‘closer’ to the vulnerable by mandate than the rest of UN agencies.

3.6.5 The German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)

The researcher’s decision to choose the GTZ (now GIZ) is mainly based on the fact that it was instrumental in initiating and funding the Kalomo cash transfer pilot, one of the early pilots in Africa. The agency is still supporting social protection in Africa though it quit social protection in Zambia. Between 2005 and 2006, the GTZ funded two studies to assess the value of social protection schemes in development cooperation, which indicated high potential of social transfers (Loewe, 2008). This was contrary to the BMZ (Germany Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) position paper two years earlier that indicated otherwise. GTZ position was thus influenced by the emerging global currency for social transfer systems and had to use HIV/AIDS (bound to remain an issue for future decades) as the major justification for social transfers to seem not to be contradicting the mother ministry (BMZ) (ibid.).
The institutional model for German development policy is an inclusive, coherent social protection system, which is based on principles of human rights and secure access to different options of social protection for all...The initiative for the establishment, extension or modification of social protection systems has to come from the respective partner country. Germany does not want to export European models of social protection. (BMZ, 2009, p. 14).

The Germans take a multi-stakeholder (Government, NGOs, civil society, private sector) approach to social protection and targeting of the poor and those under threat from poverty (BMZ, 2009). German development policy acknowledges,

Social protection systems are both an expression and an integral part of humane development and contribute to the realisation of the human right to social security. They help to break the vicious circle of poverty and social exclusion. They can also be regarded as an investment in the social and economic capacity as well as in the political stability of societies. (BMZ, 2009, p. 6).

Accordingly, German support for social protection is based on: protection against and management of risks; the human rights imperative espoused in international law; and the positive political (social cohesion) and economic (productivity) functions (BMZ, 2009). German development policy abides by the five principles of aid effectiveness as stipulated by the 2005 Paris Declaration and 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, that is, ‘ownership, alignment with national strategies, donor harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability’ (ibid: 14).

3.7 Conclusion
Social protection arose as a response to the adverse effects of the neo-liberal agenda and the failure of development policies to fight poverty and inequality at large. The rise of social protection cannot only be explained in terms of the socio-economic and political development context of the nation states. It is a product of inter and supranational influences (from the North to the South) best described as policy diffusion and transfer that happens through four mechanisms of learning, emulation, competition and coercion. International agencies partner transnational networks to promote the adoption of social protection. The policy process is a political discourse influenced by global and national political interests. There is overwhelming consensus that politics plays a central role in the evolution of the social protection agenda and international agencies (bilaterals, multilaterals and IFIs) have played a leading role in influencing its adoption. This directly conforms to the theoretical
framework for this study that depicts policy evolution in a top down fashion with global actors being the originators. The renewed interest in social protection (around 2011/12) in the aftermath of the 2008/9 global economic downturn and upon increasing evidence of affordability saw a number of international agencies coming up with their specific social protection policy positions. Despite concurring to promote social protection to fight poverty and vulnerability, international agencies are motivated by different approaches and ideologies based on their global policy positions on social protection. Each external agency would want to ensure that its policy position prevails over the rest and that results in ideological rivalry between them. This chapter critically lays a foundation for understanding the role of external actors in influencing the adoption of the social protection agenda and how they interact with domestic actors for that cause. Social protection is a product of complicated process that involves interaction of multiple actors motivated by various interests. Agencies like DFID, UNICEF and WB have country offices, and the way they negotiate with national/local actors around social protection could be very different across countries and could differ from the ‘pure’ ‘ideological’ position adopted at HQ in London, New York or Washington.

Financing, both domestic and external, is political and complicated despite ‘demonstrated evidence’ of affordability. On one hand, political interests and resource availability determine how much a government allocates social protection. On the other hand, donors exert their influence by funding a policy of their choice. It becomes a political contestation between the external agencies and the government over funding of social protection. The government does not easily accept external agencies’ push for social protection because it is not a political priority or it feels there are other better ways of fighting poverty. Despite the increase in spending on social protection in sub-Saharan Africa over the years, donors are still a dominant source of funding except in a few middle-income countries like South Africa and Botswana where the government fully funds. Within the government, there are also ideological differences especially between the Ministry of Finance and ministry in charge of social welfare over coordination and allocation of resources to social protection. The Ministry of Finance usually believes in supporting productive initiatives not ‘free cash’. Besides fighting poverty, politicians also look at the potential value of social protection in generating votes from the electorate. Donors have opted for cash transfers because they are time bound, easy to see the ‘success’ and plant their flag and account to their mother governments. Overall, politics is at the core of the rise of social protection and this will be empirically explored further in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4 Social Protection Policy in Zambia

4.0 Introduction
This chapter focuses on processes that culminated in the National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) in 2014 in Zambia, taking cognizance of the actors in the policy space and their interests. It starts by highlighting the extent of poverty and vulnerability in Zambia to give a context to the study. The chapter goes on to look at the historical and political context traces the development approaches of different regimes and gives a background to how the different regimes in Zambia have responded to the social protection agenda. This is important because Zambia has undergone smooth political transition of three distinct political parties from independence to date. It further looks at the rise of social protection and the emergence of cash transfers on the development agenda in Zambia. The role of different actors and interests as well as factors influencing the adoption of social protection in national development planning are analysed in the rubric of political economy. The actual development of the NSPP is substantially discussed with a major highlighting of the politics of the policy process. One of the fascinating components of this chapter is a discussion of individuals that the researcher discovered to be key movers of the social protection agenda in Zambia. A conclusion of the chapter summarises the policy processes and notes the role played by the major actors in the policy space. It is important to note that the rise of the social protection agenda in Zambia can be understood in two distinct phases. The first phase is from 2003 to 2011, which is prominent for pilot cash transfers, MMD Government’s intransigence to social cash transfers and external agencies’ unwillingness to scale up cash transfers to all the districts. The second phase is from 2011 to date and this is where social protection, especially cash transfers, has risen to prominence due to political will from the Patriotic Front (PF) Government and persistent external agency influence.

4.1 Poverty and Vulnerability in Zambia
Since 2000, Zambia has registered a remarkable economic growth. However, that has not translated to improved standards of living for the majority of Zambians. For instance, Zambia had an economic growth rate of 5.7% per year between 2000 and 2010 yet headcount poverty was high at 60% with 39% of the population living in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2013b, p. 4). However, the poverty prevalence has since dropped between 2010 and 2015 though it still remains high (World Bank 2013b, Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR), 2016). As of 2015, national headcount poverty was 54.4% with 76.6% of the poor living in rural areas compared to 23.4% in the urban areas (Republic of Zambia Central
Statistical Office (CSO), 2016: 104). Total population in extreme poverty is 30.8% compared to 13.6% who are moderately poor (Republic of Zambia CSO, 2016, p. 105). The rural provinces have the highest poverty with the Western, Luapula and Northern dominating at 82.2%, 81.1% and 79.7% respectively, in contrast to the two urban provinces of Lusaka and the Copperbelt that have 20.2% and 30.8% respectively (Republic of Zambia CSO, 2016, p.105). This is illustrated below.

Figure 6 Incidence of poverty in Zambia by province, 2015

![Incidence of poverty in Zambia by province, 2015](image)

Source: Republic of Zambia CSO, 2016

The above illustration shows that more than 50% of the population in 8 out of 10 provinces is unable to meet their basic food requirements. Besides Lusaka and Copperbelt, the rest of the provinces are remote and “characterized by mono economies with, among other hardships, poor infrastructure, poor access to social and economic amenities, poor water and sanitation conditions, and low levels of economic activities” (World Bank, 2015a, p. 6). Remoteness is determined by distance from the railway line since “many of the gainful economic activities in the country are concentrated primarily along the rail line in the highly urbanized Copperbelt and Lusaka regions” (World Bank, 2015a, p. 6). The rural-urban disparity, as illustrated below, is one of the reasons why Zambia “has one of the highest concentrations of inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa” (ibid.).
Zambia also faces chronic malnutrition. Nationally, 40% of children under the age of 5 are stunted with 17% severely stunted (Republic of Zambia CSO, 2015: 157; United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 2016a, p. 8). 15% of children below the age of 5 are underweight while 5% are severely underweight and 6% are wasted (Republic of Zambia CSO, 2015, p. 158). Despite making notable progress in reducing child and maternal mortalities, stunting in Zambia remains one of the highest in the world (ZIPAR and UNICEF, 2016). Nonetheless, UNICEF (2016a) further notes that children are the worst hit by poverty as 65% of children compared to 60% adults are in poverty; 48% children against 42% adults are in extreme poverty and, overall, 80% of poor children live in rural areas (p. 8)

The major sources of vulnerability in Zambia are natural disasters and HIV/AIDS. Natural disasters expose the population to numerous risks. Droughts and floods that lead to loss of assets and seriously compromise agricultural production leading to food insecurity hit the country. Besides this, floods are also hazardous to water and sanitation as they potentially spread diseases. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Zambia experienced four floods/droughts and five epidemic outbreaks between 2000 and 2007 and it was predicted that there were chances of more and worse scenarios in future due to global warming (2008).
Despite the noted challenges in food security, there has been a marked increase in maize production in Zambia in recent years. Maize is the staple food and its production has more than doubled since the 2008 farming season (World Bank, 2013b). Furthermore, maize has been the major contributor to the high average agricultural GDP of 7.2% per annum since 2009 (ibid.). However, World Bank also noted that the high maize production did not result in a huge consumption effect as large-scale farmers who are not among the poor were the biggest beneficiaries of the increasing maize production due to the agricultural input support from the government and to some extent favourable rain seasons.

4.2 Historical and political context of social welfare in Zambia

The history of Zambia is marked with a sharp contrast between the early years of independence and the period after structural adjustment programmes. The country has experienced smooth political transition over the years and the political context can be understood according to the three distinct political parties that have ruled the country. Firstly, the country was a one party state under Kaunda and his UNIP party for 27 years (1964-1991). Kaunda took a state-centred approach to development and made huge inroads in education and health. The 1991 election replaced UNIP (United National Independence Party) with the neo-liberal MMD (Movement for Multiparty Democracy) under Chiluba, who was succeeded by Levy Mwanawasa in 2002, later succeeded also by Rupiah Banda in 2008. Generally, the MMD presided over massive austerity measures that drove the population into destitution. 2011 was yet another phenomenal year as it saw the replacement of the MMD by the Sata-led PF that was driven by a pro-poor ideology.

4.2.1 From ‘developmental state’ to neoliberalism

After attainment of independence in 1964, the Kaunda regime prioritised social policy that underlies the ‘development state’ (Barrientos et al., 2005: 23). The term ‘development state is defined as “state that intervenes and guides the direction and pace of economic development” (Caldentey, 2009, p. 28). A development state deliberately distorts market signals through such instruments as tariffs and subsidies to control capital accumulation, “ensures that competing interests based on class, class fraction or sector are subordinated to the state's goals” and provides public goods such as health and education through taxation (Radice, 2008, p. 1154).

Under Kaunda, welfare programmes “focused on housing, old age pensions and social assistance” under the auspices of the Ministry of Housing and Social Development that later became the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (ibid.). By 1970,
Zambia had one of the highest per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa with improved standard of living and a marked upward social mobility (Noyoo, 2008). Worthwhile to note is the fact that the social welfare programmes during Kaunda era were led and owned by the government with financing coming from the profit proceeds from copper exports (Barrientos et al., 2005). Despite Kaunda’s ‘authoritarianism and one-party dominant politics’, the successive MMD regime were nowhere closer to Kaunda’s ‘development state’. However, the world economic crisis of the late 1970s and the sharp decline of copper prices between 1970 and 1980 resulted in socio-economic conditions sliding backwards (Noyoo, 2008). The government failed to respond appropriately and ran a budget deficit that ultimately and immensely reduced domestic investments (Noyoo, 2008). Thus, Kaunda’s political commitment to set up a comprehensive social security system was watered down (Barrientos et al., 2005).

Consequently, from the 1980s to the 1990s, Zambia dropped from being one of the richest countries in Africa to one of the poorest, with citizens struggling to meet basic necessities (Noyoo, 2008). The coupon system introduced in 1989 by the government to cushion shocks from rising prices plus the Social Action Programme (health, education, food security and nutrition interventions) were all limited in scope and overtaken by the currency of events (Noyoo, 2008). The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) exacerbated the socio-economic conditions and by the time Chiluba ascended to the presidency in 1991, the economy was in free fall (Noyoo, 2008). By 1991, Zambia was heavily indebted and owed over US$7 billion in external debt (Thurlow and Wobst, 2004). The imposed neoliberal SAPs and their effects on Africa reflect a protracted history of bad influence from powerful external actors. Despite being a policy response to the aftermath of the 1970s economic crisis in Africa, the prescriptive conditionalities for the structural adjustment loans, especially withdrawal of state control from the economy, neglected the social dimension of development thereby worsening poverty in Africa (Heidhues and Obare, 2011). Mkandawire and Soludo (1998) equally note that poverty elimination was not a key focus of SAPs and, overall, the anticipated economic development was not attained under the austerity measures.

Despite the transition to multiparty democracy, Zambia lost its economic momentum and that choked social services delivery and poverty reduction initiatives. Governance issues and policy failures took centre stage and stifled progress (World Bank, 2007). It is not surprising that the country became susceptible to external agency policy agendas. Accordingly, the
MMD ascent to power in 1991 coincided with the orthodox and ‘reformist’ neo-liberal agenda that was being pushed by the World Bank and the ILO.

The MMD took the liberal approach and embarked on market-oriented reforms that were a huge paradigm shift from the former government’s state-centred approach. With liberalisation of the agricultural sector and privatization of parastatals, the gains were short-lived and unsustainable (World Bank, 2007). The period between 1991 and 1998 witnessed a massive economic decline with real GDP falling by an average of 0.2 percent per year; agriculture dropped; the industrial sector slowed down; mining contracted by an average of 8.7 percent annually and the only hope was the service sector that expanded at a rate of 2.7 percent (World Bank, 2007). The structural reforms of the same period were further compounded by a series of droughts that hit Zambia from 1992 coupled with high debt (Thurlow and Wobst, 2004). From 1991 to 1998, poverty increased mainly in urban areas due to increase in unemployment owing to privatization of parastatals and the HIV/AIDS pandemic made it worse (World Bank, 2007; Thurlow and Wobst, 2004).

Social policy in the 1990s was mainly in the form of safety nets that targeted those retrenched under SAP (Noyoo, 2008). During the same period, Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM), Project Urban Self Help (PUSH) and Food for Work were introduced (ibid.). The World Bank and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) agitated for “strengthening safety nets outside the pension system” and enhancing private provision (Barrientos et al., 2005, p. 23). Consequently, the Ministry of Labour became responsible for social insurance (mainly pensions) whilst social assistance (safety nets) was placed under the Ministry of Social Services (ibid.). The role of the state gradually dissipated, as non-state actors became the vanguard funders and implementers of social protection programmes. The paradigm shift is well echoed by one of the ministers who served during that time who noted that “the government no longer does things; it facilitates while NGOs do things” (quoted in Barrientos et al., 2005, p. 23).

Despite the rising poverty and vulnerability, the MMD government was reluctant to finance social assistance and instead opted for agricultural input subsidies to ‘graduate the poor from poverty’ (World Bank, 2007). The “economic decline, structural adjustment, and the decline in formal employment” had debilitating impact on social security, bringing uncertainty to the public pension fund as contributions immensely decreased (Barrientos et al., 2005, p. 23). With social insurance only covering about ten per cent of the working age population, social
assistance interventions could not sustain high poverty, vulnerability and unemployment as both human and financial resources were over squeezed (ibid.). Noyoo (2008) notes that social policy was ‘socialist’ (in the sense that the state was at the centre of welfare provisioning for the people) from independence to 1991 but thereafter, the state was dislodged from its role due to austerity measures. The entry of many actors into social security weakened the role of the state and resulted in many challenges. Barrientos et al. (2005) concluded, “the approach to safety nets has been very fragmented, piecemeal, and reactive, with a proliferation of programmes in different parts of government, competing with donor and NGO programmes” (p. 24).

The rural-urban divide in Zambia plays a significant role in shaping social protection interventions and this is particularly “reflected in different party affiliations and political support” (Kuss, 2015, p. 8). Patronage based parties are appealing to the rural folk and this is reason why the MMD used agricultural subsidies to canvass for votes in rural areas where it had a huge following (ibid.). Patron-clientelism was a major trump card for the MMD throughout all the two decades it was in power. Patrimonial state-society relations conflict the rights-based approach to social protection and pacify the people to “expect that they will receive services only if they are part of the patrimonial support base and therefore adapt their behaviour in order to access services” (Kuss, 2015, p. 11). Patronage based and clientelistic politics were the major reason why rural areas were a stronghold for MMD as the party extensively depended on national resources to win votes (Cheeseman and Paget, 2011; Kuss, 2015). In clientelistic politics, “parties seek to mobilize support through patron–client networks and seek power in order to gain control over state resources” (Cheeseman and Paget, 2011, p. 7). Accordingly, heavy patrimonialism and clientelism in social transfers during the MMD government is well illustrated by the Farm Input Support Programme (FISP). Budgetary allocations for the FISP rapidly increased and expansion of the programme was heavily biased towards rural areas that were believed to be a stronghold for the MMD (Kuss, 2015).

During the times of MMD, the social protection agenda in Zambia was driven by the World Bank, ILO, UNICEF, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) (Barrientos et al., 2005). These external agencies used various strategies to influence the MMD government to adopt social protection as a policy instrument to fight poverty. External agency strategies included “organising workshops and trainings for members of parliament to emphasize the connection
between growth and social protection; visits for members of parliament, ministers and public servants to witness social protection; rapid assessments to build evidence for the impact of the programme; and funding civil society to reinforce the agenda” (Kuss, 2015, p. 12). Despite all these efforts, the MMD government was not willing to commit itself to rights-based social protection and delayed the whole process of developing a national social protection policy (Barrientos et al., 2005; Nino-Zarazua et al., 2011).

4.2.2 Rise of the Patriotic Front: Social protection as pro-poor ideology

The impact of structural adjustment reforms such as “the removal of currency controls and price subsidies, greater economic austerity, privatisation and trade liberalisation … coupled with rapid urbanisation weighed heavily on the urban population” (Kuss, 2015, p. 9). Thus the urban population were disgruntled by the MMD government as working conditions slumped while the cost of living skyrocketed. Recognizing the disgruntled urban population, the Patriotic Front was at vantage point to at least assure the party would do all it could to address urban poverty. Having lost in three consecutive elections, Sata’s critics accused him of playing even the tribal card in the rural areas to ensure a majority win (Kuss, 2015). He mobilised his Bemba tribe that comprised 32% of the rural populace in Zambia and one of the biggest ethnic groups in the three provinces of Copperbelt, Luapula and Northern province (Kuss, 2015). However, there is not enough evidence for ethnic politics in the rise of Sata. Overall, Sata responded to rising urban discontent (Cheeseman and Paget, 2011), exploited his political capital he earned when he was at UNIP and MMD and his increasing critique of foreign investment through the ‘Zambia for Zambians’ rhetoric (Fraser and Larmer, 2007, p. 627) as well as “his personality and his charismatic appeal to voters” (Cheeseman and Paget, 2011, p. 116).

When the Patriotic Front (PF) took over power from the MMD in 2011, there was a paradigm shift towards a pro-poor agenda. To date, the major milestones for the PF government are the development of the National Social Protection Policy that was launched in December 2014 as well as the rapid expansion of the Social Cash Transfer scheme. The developments are quite significant especially against the background of the MMD that seemingly stalled the process from the beginning to the time it lost power to the PF. However, after the PF rose to power in 2011, not all urban people benefited from the party’s policy reform. For instance, some benefited from “the increase of public sector salaries by 200% or the increase of the minimum wage in the private sector” while others were losers when maize and fuel price subsidies were disbanded and retirement aged raised from 55 to 65 (Kuss, 2015, p. 10).
When the PF came to power Zambia did not have a social protection policy; the draft social protection strategy of 2005 that the Zambian Cabinet never endorsed had expired; social protection was not a right; and there was a litany of loose and uncoordinated interventions related to social protection from both the government and non-state actors (World Bank, 2013b). The PF deliberately took robust steps to address the concerns of the poor and vulnerable (Kuss, 2015). That thrust was cogently captured in the PF Manifesto.

…the PF will pursue all possible means to ensure a decent and dignified life for all citizens, especially those who are unable to create security and livelihoods for themselves. The PF recognizes the international obligations to social protection, expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other subsequent instruments (PF, 2011, p. 21).

While the above statement suggests that the PF recognizes social protection as a human right, it should also be understood as a political statement tailored to appeal to the electorate. PF reviewed the Sixth National Development Plan “to shift more benefits to the poor and vulnerable” and increase budget allocation for social protection (Kuss, 2015). The swift move to expedite the development of a comprehensive social protection policy is rigorously stated in the PF Manifesto.

The PF government will adopt a comprehensive social protection policy, which will guarantee all citizens access to basic services, and provide additional support to those who face special challenges in meeting their basic needs. The implementation of the cross-cutting policy will be overseen by a high level unit established under the Cabinet Office (PF, 2011, p. 21).

The PF government set up a technical working group that comprised “key representatives of the Ministry of Community Development Mother and Child Health (MCDMCH), the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS), cooperating partners7 and civil society organisations” (Kuss, 2015, p. 13). It is quite fascinating to note the fast-tracking of the policy process as the approval process by the Cabinet started in February 2014 and in June 2014 the policy was passed (ibid.). By end of 2014 a number of social protection programmes were scaled up as the PF government committed more resources than the MMD regime (ibid.).

7 The term cooperating partners in Zambia refers to bilateral donors, multilateral agencies and International Financial Institutions (IFIs). This researcher uses the term interchangeably with external agencies.
Comparatively, the market interventions of the MMD owing to neo-liberal reforms did not benefit the poor. For instance, “heavy fuel and maize miller subsidies” introduced “as measures to combat poverty and mitigate the effects of the international oil and food crises” only benefited “the already wealthy commercial millers, vehicle owners and industries and not the poor” (Kuss, 2015, p. 14). However, the PF government removed the fuel and maize subsidies and concentrated on health, education and social protection as major policy thrusts to respond to poverty and vulnerability (PF, 2011). The PF’s promise “to increase social sector spending” was consequently reflected in the 2014 Budget that increased spending on health, education and social protection (Kuss, 2015, p. 14).

The PF government reformed the Farm Input Support Programme (FISP) by slashing fertilizer subsidy and introducing an e-voucher system to institute accountability and transparency (Kuss, 2015). The reform rationalised targeting and widened the scale of operation regardless of political affiliation (ibid.). From 2013 to 2014, the PF government “more than doubled the budget for social cash transfers” as the budgets jumped from KR55 million (US$10.6 million) in 2012 to KR72.1 million (US$13.8 million) in 2013 and even KR199.2 million (US$38.1 million) in 2014 (Kuss, 2015, p. 14).

The PF capitalised on MMD’s major weakness of patrimonial clientelism that targeted the rural people for political support while neglecting the rising urban poverty. For the PF, social protection became a trump card that eventually ushered them into office after three failed attempts. It shows that politics can also work to better the situation of the poor and vulnerable. The motive behind social protection as a tool to fight poverty and vulnerability is a noble one especially when the government takes a leading role. However, problems of sustainability arise when non-state actors like external agencies and NGOs are at the forefront of social protection. The rapid institutionalisation and expansion of social protection by the PF government reinforces the fact that the state, unlike non-state actors, is better placed to provide social protection to the citizens as there are no mechanisms to hold non-state actors accountable.

4.3 National Development Plans (NDPs): Putting Social Protection on the National Agenda

National development planning had been abandoned in 1991 following the change of government from Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP) to Frederick Chiluba’s Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) that favoured a neo-liberal open market system. The return to national development planning was realised during
the reign of Levy Mwanawasa (2002-2008), who succeeded Chiluba. National development planning in Zambia is encapsulated in the National Development Plans that fall under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. It is critical to note that social protection was not a component of poverty reduction strategies in Zambia before 2005 (ILO, 2011). External agencies pushed social protection into the policy space of Zambia. As noted earlier, the development of the draft national Social Protection Strategy (SPS) in 2005 changed the discourse.

The **Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) (2006-2010)** marked a return to national development planning. The FNDP is the first NDP to incorporate social protection as an instrument for poverty reduction in Zambia. The chapter on social protection was an incorporation of the 2005 draft Social Protection Strategy (SPS). In this regard, the Government of Zambia identified social cash transfers as one of the key interventions to alleviate poverty. During that time HIV/AIDS was still a major threat, hence programmes sought to empower low capacity households, provide welfare support to incapacitated households and orphans and vulnerable children as well as access to health and education (Government of Republic Zambia, 2006). However, by end of the FNDP in 2010, the government had not done much to fund or expand cash transfers as thereby missing most of the objectives outlined in both the SPS and FNDP (ibid.). Social cash transfers largely remained pilots in only five districts out of a total of 73 (by then) and were heavily dependent on external agency funding with a very low coverage and government’s role only limited to administrative support (ibid.). However, the incorporation of the national social protection strategy by the Government of Zambia in 2005 into the FNDP was the beginning of political commitment from the Government (ibid: 17). It was a huge milestone for the external agency driven agenda.

The **Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) (2011-2015)** also prioritized social protection on the grounds of “high levels of extreme poverty and vulnerability, coupled with multiple effects of HIV and AIDS and unemployment” (Government of Republic of Zambia, 2011a, p. 196). The Plan also bemoaned the lack of a social protection policy to guide social protection interventions and expressed a commitment to develop one. The Government made a commitment to “effectively coordinate and provide social protection through empowering low capacity households, providing social assistance to incapacitated households and supporting various vulnerable groups” (Government of Republic of Zambia, 2011a, p. 196). Practically, the MMD Government commitment to social protection remained lukewarm, as
they did not believe in giving people cash. However, the SNDP was short lived, as there was a change of government in 2011.

The Revised-Sixth National Development Plan (RSNDP) (2013-2016) was necessitated by the need by the new PF Government to align national development planning to its pro-poor political ideology. The pro-poor agenda that ushered the PF to power differed from the neo-liberal MMD. Between 2011 and 2013, the PF then realised that the MMD initiated plans were not expanding the Social Cash Transfer scheme as fast as they desired. Upon that realization, Sata’s government reworked the SNDP and published the Revised-SNDP in 2014 (Siachiwena 2016). The PF even changed the motto from ‘Sustained Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction’ to ‘People Centred Economic Growth and Development’ (Government of Republic of Zambia, 2011a and 2014a).

In contrast to the MMD regime, the PF proclaimed a rigorous commitment to social protection

As the Government continues to implement programmes to develop the country, there will inadvertently be vulnerable individuals and households. These include low capacity and incapacitated individuals, households with persons with disabilities, orphans and vulnerable children and the aged…. the proportion of the population that is extremely poor is 42.3 percent and may require interventions in the form of social protection (Government of Republic of Zambia, 2014a, p. 125).

Indeed, the PF Government undertook to “implement policies, programmes and activities that promote social assistance, social insurance/social security, livelihood and empowerment and protection against human rights abuses” (Government of Republic of Zambia, 2014a, p. 125). It is in this context that the PF Government increased funding for the SCT scheme to enable rapid expansion. Thus, they targeted a total of 566,542 beneficiaries in 2016 (ibid.) which was quite a huge number compared to the previous years. UNICEF (2016a) observed that 1 million poor and vulnerable children were benefiting from the programme. The table below shows how the programme has expanded over the years.

Table 4 Expansion of the SCT programme under the PF Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caseload</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author’s compilation of figures from MCDSS
Despite the steady increase of beneficiaries over years, the 2016 target has not been met.

The Seventh National Development Plan (7NDP) (2017-2021) also acknowledge that poverty still remains very high in Zambia despite the high economic growth that the country has registered over the past decade (Government of Republic of Zambia, 2017a). The 7NDP also notes that there has been little progress achieved by the previous NDPs in terms of fighting poverty when more than half of the population currently lives below the poverty datum line and 40.8% failing to meet basic needs (ibid: 82). The Government still believes social protection is a key instrument for poverty and vulnerability reduction. Therefore, the Government makes a commitment to enhance welfare and livelihoods of the poor by 3 strategies:

- Strengthening coordination of social protection systems;
- Improve targeting and coverage of social protection programmes; and
- Implement pension reforms (Government of Republic of Zambia, 2017a, p. 84).

Since the 7NDP moves away from sectoral based approach to integrated/multisectoral framework, there is a great emphasis on strengthened coordination and integration of programmes. Thus, there is a clarion call for an integrated framework for social protection. It is not yet clear how the Government intends to improve targeting for social protection though there has been a massive upscale of the SCT in terms of districts and beneficiaries since 2017. Despite making a commitment to enhance all social protection instruments including Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) and Food Security Pack (FSP), there is still huge bias for the SCT programme. The move to have a legal framework for social protection is a product of the drive from ILO and UNICEF combined with PF’s acknowledgement and promise to fulfil the human rights obligations as enshrined in international conventions.

4.4 The Social Cash Transfer (SCT) programme in Zambia

In Zambia, the Kalomo pilot was the genesis of the cash transfer revolution that later swept over the whole continent. It was the brainchild of the GTZ (now GIZ) that enticed the Government of Zambia to consider adopting the concept. The pilot started in 2003 with 100% funding from the GTZ with the government only providing the administrative structures. Later on the pilot was extended to other districts. In 2004 the programme was officially launched by the then Minister of Community Development, Maria Singo. The Kalomo pilot started with about 60 beneficiaries and the focus was on the incapacitated or labour constrained households and these included the very old, very sick, disabled and
orphans and vulnerable children (GRZI). Beneficiary selection was community-based through a mechanism of Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs) and at beginning of the Kalomo pilot each household enrolled received a monthly transfer of ZMK30,000 (USD7.50) and households with children got an additional ZMK10,000 (USD2.50) (World Bank, 2013b). The scheme established paypoints around the district as it was extended to the whole district and in 2007 the monthly grant was reviewed to ZMK40,000 (USD10) (World Bank, 2013b). Beneficiary households were increased to 2,400 in mid-2007 and 3,500 at the onset of 2008 (ibid.).

Between 2005 and 2007, the Kalomo cash transfer was expanded to Kazungula, Monze and Chipata districts, also as pilots (World Bank, 2013b). In Kalomo and Monze districts, the Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child Health (MCDMCH) was supported by GTZ up to 2007. The pilot in Kazungula district started in January 2005 in Southern Province; Chipata district pilot began in February 2006 in Eastern Province; and the one in Katete district in Eastern Province whose inception was in August 2007 (ILO, 2008). The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) ran these with technical support from CARE International and funding from DFID (ibid.). CARE International provided support in those districts until 2008 (World Bank, 2013b: 88). The pilots were different models from Kalomo. In Kazungula, they wanted to test the capacity of the ministry to implement in an area that is sparsely populated while Katete was quite unique in that it was a social pension for people 60 years and above (GRZI). The Chipata pilot sought to measure the ‘effectiveness of cash transfers in an urban scenario with slightly higher benefit levels and a focus on child education’ whilst the Monze Pilot tested the administrative feasibility of running a cash transfer without technical assistance (World Bank, 2013b). All in all, the Kazungula pilot reached over 600 households with Chipata targeting 1,400 households, Monze targeting 3,300 households and Katete targeting 1,000 households (ILO, 2008). See table 5 for a summary of the 5 pilots.

Other pilots that followed were the Child Grant that was implemented in four districts of Shangombo, Kalabo, Kaputa and Zambezi around 2010. These districts were chosen on the basis of high poverty that manifested in bad child outcome indicators. Due to its direct interests in children, UNICEF insisted on a Child Grant that it also funded. The ministry also implemented another model that was called Multiple Categorical Targeting (MCT) in Serenje and Ruwingu districts where the focus was households headed by women, households with disabled person(s) and also households with an older person.
Table 5 Social cash transfer pilot schemes in Zambia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Inception</th>
<th>Beneficiary households</th>
<th>Targeting criteria</th>
<th>Type of Benefit</th>
<th>Monthly benefit (ZMK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kalomo</td>
<td>Nov. 2004</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>10 % most destitute or incapacitated households</td>
<td>Unconditional</td>
<td>50,000 (with children), 40,000 (no children)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>Jul. 2006</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unconditional</td>
<td>40,000 plus, 10 000/primary school kid, 20 000/secondary school child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monze</td>
<td>Jan. 2007</td>
<td>2,548</td>
<td></td>
<td>Soft conditionalities</td>
<td>50,000 (with children), 40,000 (no children)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazungula</td>
<td>Aug. 2005</td>
<td>627</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unconditional</td>
<td>70,000 (with children), 50,000 (no children)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katete</td>
<td>Aug. 2007</td>
<td>4,706</td>
<td>categorical 60+</td>
<td>Unconditional</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ILO 2011

This section shows how cash transfers started in Zambia from the Kalomo pilot, how it was extended to other districts, the various models that were experimented as well as the various external actors involved. Funds came from external agencies while the government provided implemented structures. This background critically reflects who initiated, funded and implemented the cash transfers and whose power and interests determined the process.

4.5 Key persons in the social protection agenda in Zambia

In Zambia, there were individuals who were instrumental in driving the social protection agenda. These did not drive the social protection agenda single-handedly but interacted with other actors in a particular political context. My decision to include these personal biographies is grounded in the concept of ‘public entrepreneurship’ that is defined as “the process of introducing innovation-the generation, translation, and implementation of new ideas-into the public sector” (Roberts and King, 1991, p. 147). Accordingly, the individual actors are ‘policy entrepreneurs’ who, “from outside the formal positions of government, introduce, translate, and help implement new ideas into public practice” (ibid.). Mintrom (2000) (as cited in Karch, 2007) note that ‘policy entrepreneurs’ may include elected officials, executive agency officials or private citizens working as policy activists. “They usually work on the same issue for multiple years before experiencing success, gradually building public and professional support for their proposals” (Karch, 2007, p. 66). To promote their ideas and attract the attention of decision makers, policy entrepreneurs use such
strategies as “identifying problems, networking in policy circles, shaping the terms of policy debates, and building coalitions” (Mintrom, 1997, p. 739).

Related to that,

it is becoming increasingly clear that policymakers, at both the national and international levels, are relying on the advice of consultants, whether individuals or firms, who act as policy experts in the development of new programs, policies and institutional structures. Their role is particularly important because they tend to offer advice based upon what they regard as the “best practice” elsewhere, often paying little attention to the particular context in the borrowing political system (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p. 10).

The above narrative underpins the role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ in social protection policy diffusion.

4.5.1 Michael Sata

The late Sata was a charismatic and populist leader who rose from grassroots and climbed up the ladder until he landed the highest office in Zambia - the presidency - in 2011. From a ward councillor to a district governor and from a district governor to a member of parliament, Sata then moved up and served as minister of several portfolios, first in Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP) and later in the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) (Siachiwena 2016). After quitting the MMD, he formed the Patriotic Front, a party that he branded ‘pro-poor’ and capitalized on the disgruntled urban electorate that was fed up with the MMD (ibid.). Sata lost in three elections of 2001, 2006 and 2008 albeit with an increasing number of votes. Sata’s switching of political parties is understood in this context: At UNIP he was the public face for cleaning up Lusaka through rounding up of street vendors and deportation to rural areas; as a Member of Parliament (MP) at UNIP, he was one of the first architects of a pro-democracy movement that led to the birth of the MMD and played a critical role in the election of Chiluba; at MMD, Sata fought Chiluba’s unconstitutional bid for a third Presidential term; and Chiluba’s choice of Mwanawasa to succeed him angered Sata who decided to form his party (PF) (Fraser and Larmer, 2007). He contested for presidency in 2001 where he got 2 percent of the vote and his party only got one parliamentary constituency (ibid.). Sata used huge rallies and mass media for mass mobilization of the voter and to castigate the incumbent MMD regime (Fraser and Larmer, 2007). He capitalized on his famous historical events like the anti-IMF marches that he led in 1987 when he was Governor of Lusaka where he labelled the IMF ‘the architect of neo-
colonialism’ (ibid: 624). Sata also exploited the political networks he developed when he was Party Secretary for MMD and his “caustic and plain-speaking oratory style” popularly earned him the nickname ‘King Cobra’ (Cheeseman and Paget, 2011, p. 116). All those factors elevated Sata’s political profile and charismatic appeal to the electorate.

Despite not being a firm believer in cash transfers initially, influence from people like Charlotte Harland-Scott (see below) who co-developed the 2011 Manifesto, made him realize the political value of cash transfers and adopted the idea. Before he got to power, he also engaged one of the directors in the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services to understand more about social protection (GRZ2). When he won the presidency in 2011, he made the social cash transfer programme a priority for his government and started expanding it financially and geographically.

We note that there are existing pilot projects in such areas as cash transfer schemes. These are almost 100 percent funded by donors. We are mindful of the need for such arrangements to be permanent and not to suddenly revert to the previous status quo when the money runs out – this would be a tragedy. We accordingly intend to proceed cautiously, and to encourage our partners to do likewise, to avoid having to reverse or scale-down an initiative once it is up and running (PF, 2011, p. 21).

It is important to note that the above statement from the PF manifesto is an official acknowledgement by the party that an external agency-driven social protection is not sustainable. Therefore, the direct interests of the party and political will for social protection were deliberate to avoid the collapse of social protection upon external agency exit because the PF were conscious that external agency support was not permanent. Siachiwena (2016) notes that there was less external agency consultation by the PF and external agencies were more influential to technocrats than the politicians. Accordingly, one of Sata’s most popular contributions was the major budget jump of 700% (nominal) for the Social Cash Transfer (SCT) programme in 2013 that even shocked government officials, external agencies and civil society who doubted the capacity of the government (GRZ1; Pruce and Hickey, 2017). In the same year, Sata made a phenomenal decision to roll out the programme to the whole country. When he took over the Lusaka administration, there were only 11 pilots that he expanded to 17 districts between 2011 and 2012 and increased to 50 districts between 2013 and 2014 before he passed on (CP1). The positive politicization of the social cash transfer programme by the highest office, the presidency, enforced the government including the minister of finance to toe Sata’s line, regardless of any mixed feelings. Sata’s position also
motivated the external agencies to continuously support the social cash transfers technically and financially. Sata was also key in the development of the social protection policy as he ‘personalised’ the policy. He would constantly ‘violate’ the Government communication protocols and called directly the Director of Policy in MCDSS (instead of the Minister) to check progress: ‘where is my policy?’ (GRZ3).

4.5.2 Charlotte Harland-Scott

British by birth and Zambian by nationality, Charlotte is an economic and social development specialist. She attained her university education in the United Kingdom at the Universities of Bath (PhD), Reading (Masters) and Oxford (Bachelors). Charlotte is wife to former Vice President/Interim President of Zambia who is also former General Secretary for PF and Sata’s right-hand man by then, Guy Scott. When Sata passed on in October 2014, Guy and Charlotte became the first white president and first white first lady (respectively) in post-independent Zambia, up to January 2015. As from 1995, the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) hired her as a consultant (Siachiwena, 2016) where she played two critical roles. Firstly, she redesigned the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) and, secondly, drafted the social protection strategy for the ministry between 2004 and 2005 (ibid.) When she joined UNICEF Zambia as Chief of Social Policy and Economic Analysis in 2007, she became a key UN official to work with the MMD government to scale up the cash transfer scheme in 2010 (ibid.). Given that UNICEF is a key UN agency in Zambia and a ‘trusted’ partner by both the Government of Zambia and other external agencies, she became very influential to both parties in furthering the social protection agenda. During her days at UNICEF, she also partnered Esther Schuring of the GTZ and Sonya Sultan of the DFID to become a formidable force that really pushed for social cash transfers in Zambia (SPE). Charlotte also published work on social cash transfers (see Harland, 2014).

This background enabled Charlotte to command authority on social protection in Zambia with her marriage to Guy Scott a source of political clout. When Guy and Charlotte joined the Patriotic Front, they became key members of the party. It is in this context that Charlotte co-developed the 2011 PF Manifesto and coordinated the social protection chapter (CP1). Ironically, that manifesto eventually ushered the PF party into power in 2011. It is believed that Charlotte had major influence on the adoption of the SCT by the PF party, as both her husband and Michael Sata were not cash transfer ‘fundamentalists’. Essentially, Charlotte brought the idea of social protection especially social cash transfers to the PF party.
Accordingly, the design and set up of the cash transfer scheme in Zambia is attributable to Charlotte (Siachiwena, 2016). However, upon the demise of Sata, there was a succession crisis at the PF party that elbowed Guy Scott out of the race. Since then Guy and Charlotte joined Hichilema’s United Party for National Development (UPND) that is believed to be neo-liberal and non-socialist. Interestingly, Charlotte contested for parliamentary seat on a UPND ticket in 2016 that she lost but challenged the results at the court and the case was still pending at the time of this research. From being a Social Policy Chief and social protection advocate, Charlotte is now a politician at a party that does not subscribe to ‘welfarist’ ideology.

4.6 Evolution of Social Protection Policy in Zambia

Social protection adoption in Zambia is traced back to the Kalomo cash transfer pilot initiated by the German Technical Corporation Agency (GTZ) in 2003. The Kalomo pilot was a manifestation of a global push for the social protection agenda in the early 2000s. Consequently, global politics set the agenda for social protection, as bilateral and multilateral agencies were very keen to experiment with cash transfers. The external agencies deliberately used various strategies to ensure adoption of social protection by the Government. The most significant way towards that was to make sure that Zambia had a social protection policy. Upon the exit of the GTZ from the social protection agenda, other external agencies like DFID and Irish Aid took over the funding and continued to push for adoption. The Kalomo pilot and other pilots that followed were used to trigger the interest for cash transfers in both the Government as well as other stakeholders. The external agencies funded the evaluations of the pilots to ‘build evidence’ and make a case for social protection to the Government.

The evolution of the social protection policy framework in Zambia is attributable to the establishment and policy lobbying of the Social Protection Sector Advisory Group (SP-SAG) (Barrientos et al., 2005). The power struggles between MCDSS and Ministry of Finance over which ministry was best to lead poverty reduction delayed the formation of the SP-SAG. However, it finally came into being in December 2003 and worked towards a social protection strategy, which was a key step in the evolution of social protection policy in Zambia. The Sector Advisory Group on Social Protection (SP-SAG) comprised Government ministries and external agencies. However, as shall be seen, external agencies also heavily influenced the SP-SAG. This does not rule out the role of the government as it actively participated in the process and expressed its ideological position, though it had limited influence. The draft Social Protection Strategy (2005) produced by the SP-SAG was

http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
incorporated into the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP), which was a huge milestone for the external agencies. From the FNDP onwards, the Government of Zambia adopted social protection in national development planning for fighting poverty. Serious efforts to develop a social protection policy later emerged upon change of government from the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) to the Patriotic Front (PF) in 2011. The PF Government brought huge political will to the social protection agenda that expedited the development of the policy. However, external agencies still influenced the process by funding the development of the policy.

4.6.1 The Draft Social Protection Strategy: Social Protection-Sector Advisory Group (SP-SAG) and External Agency Policy Agendas

The SP-SAG was set up to develop a national social protection strategy to ensure that social protection was prioritised in National Development Plans. In this respect, social protection as a policy choice for poverty reduction was justified on the grounds of “high levels of extreme poverty and vulnerability, which are maintained through the multiple effects of HIV/AIDS, poverty, unemployment and repeated failures in small scale agriculture” (MCDSS, 2005, p. 13). Thus the vision of the strategy was “to provide security against constant or periodic critical levels of deprivation and extreme vulnerability…to help people to maintain a stable minimum livelihood, and to have the confidence to develop new economic activities” (MCDSS, 2005, p. 17). Consequently, the strategy’s ultimate goal was to deliver security to all Zambians by making sure that they had enough income for a decent life and protect them from risks and shocks as well (ibid.). The strategy was driven by 6 objectives:

i. To increase the ability of low capacity households to meet their basic needs;
ii. To reduce extreme poverty in incapacitated households;
iii. To reduce the vulnerability and numbers of street children;
iv. Improve access to health and education for people from incapacitated and low capacity households;
v. Reduce the vulnerability of SP target groups to the violation of their legal rights; and
vi. Strengthen capacity at local and national level to deliver an effective social protection programme. (MCDSS, 2005, p. 18-26)

Three factors were an impetus to the birth of SP-SAG. The failure of Zambia’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to address the rudiments of the chronic poverty; the findings from the evaluation of Kalomo Pilot Cash Transfer Programme that at least demonstrated the viability of cash transfers to fight poverty; and, more importantly, the
World Bank global policy shift which saw it canvassing for social protection as an instrument to address poverty in Africa (Barrientos et al., 2005). To drum up support and ensure the adoption of social protection in Africa, the World Bank organised a series of high-level workshops. For instance, in June 2003 the World Bank organised a Social Protection Seminar in Lusaka whose participants included officials from both the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) and the GTZ (ibid.). The power struggles between MCDSS and Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MFNP) over which ministry should spearhead the poverty agenda and lead the SP-SAG in Zambia stymied its formation. In spite of the inter-ministry power struggles, the SP-SAG was eventually formed in December 2003 and since then it was very active in enunciating social protection issues in the National Development Planning process (Barrientos et al., 2005).

What is perhaps important at this point, to note, is the realisation that social protection was pushed to the national agenda by the World Bank to replace yet another policy dose, the PRSP, that did not reduce poverty as prescribed. It is also important to note how the World Bank committed substantial resources to organise international seminars for the government officials from key ministries and external agencies to garner political buy-in. The narrative below sums up the SP-SAG deliberations processes that produced the Draft Social Protection Strategy:

The SP-SAG appointed a consultant who presented the case for Social Protection at a retreat in August 2004, which was well attended by high level government officials. The consultant then continued to engage with the SP-SAG – a process that involved 8 further SP-SAG meetings, a further retreat in February 2005 and several written inputs from – in order to produce the draft strategy by April 2005. A smaller group of donors also met in between these meetings to clarify their position, sometimes also meeting with the consultant (Barrientos et al., 2005, p. 29).

It is striking to note that the SP-SAG process was predominantly driven by the desire to produce a ‘coherent strategy’ that would ‘attract donor funding’ and yet evaded politics pertinent to the setting of the social protection agenda (Barrientos et al., 2005). Issues of national ownership and commitment were sidestepped as key stakeholders like the Ministry of Finance and the civil society were not effectively engaged. Objections were also raised as to why SP-SAG was a separate process “as opposed to framing social protection as a cross-cutting issue within the NDP process” (Barrientos et al., 2005, p. 30). Chaired by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS), the SP-SAG comprised
other government ministries, external agencies and civil society (MCDSS, 2005). However, 
stakeholders from both government and civil society slated the SP-SAG process for the 
heavy external agency influence (Barrientos et al., 2005). The term ‘social protection’ was 
complicated and equally frustrated stakeholders who struggled to comprehend it (ibid.). 

Criticism of the SP-SAG process also emanated from the fact that government and UN 
agencies preferred a broad approach to poverty alleviation instead of a narrower focus on 
chronic poverty as encapsulated by the World Bank’s Social Risk Management (SRM) 
framework (Barrientos et al., 2005). Despite the misgivings of the process, a huge milestone 
was registered in the spring of 2005 “…when MCDSS and GTZ members of the SP-SAG 
attended a World Bank seminar in Tunis on ‘Mainstreaming Social Protection in Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)’. This event proved to be particularly useful in terms of 
raising the level of ownership within the MCDSS, especially as the Zambian presentation 
was voted the best” (ibid.).

The SP-SAG process in Zambia is profoundly evident that the social protection agenda is 
quite complicated. It involved multiple actors with varied interests and motivation. The UN 
family and the Government differed conceptually from World Bank. The World Bank’s 
interests to focus on chronic poverty prevailed and this depicts the Bank as a key actor in the 
early years, but it was not a key actor in the SP-SAG processes as evidenced by its non-
attendance of most of the meetings. The key external actors were GTZ, UNICEF and DFID. 
Power struggles also emerged from within the Government as ministries ‘fought’ for control 
of the process. Both the MCDSS and the Ministry of Finance played an important role in 
negotiating and advocating for a social protection strategy that reflected the interests of the 
government. The objections they raised against SP-SAG process were fundamental even 
though the external actors maintained their positions. The World Bank insisted on chronic 
poverty, GTZ kept their focus on the ultra-poor, DFID got to pilot a social pension, and 
UNICEF got their child grant.

A technical working group on social assistance (TWG-SA) comprising DFID, GTZ, Irish 
Aid, UNICEF and Care was also set up to advise the MCDSS on how to scale up the cash 
transfers (Devereux and Wood, 2008). It was another external agency initiative to influence 
the institutionalization of social protection. The external agencies hired consultants to do a 
review of the cash transfers and advise possible models of cash transfers to be adopted by the 
Government of Zambia. Besides endorsing that cash transfers were affordable in Zambia, the 
consultants recommended that there was need for legislation to guarantee fiscal and
administrative sustainability of the SCT programme and social protection as a whole (Devereux and Wood, 2008). A seesaw-funding model where external agencies would initially fund 100% of the programme but over 5 to 7 years the Government gradually takes over the funding while external agencies provide technical assistance (SPE). Interestingly, the seesaw model is the one being implemented for the SCT programme in Zambia and since 2016 the Government funds at least 75% (see chapter 6).

4.6.2 The Livingstone Call for Action

In 2006, the Government of Zambia and the African Union co-hosted a regional intergovernmental conference in Livingstone in Zambia. The agenda of the conference was the endorsement of social protection by African Heads of States. Participants were senior representatives of around 13 African states, development partners, United Nations (UN) agencies, NGOs and Brazil (one of the ‘success’ stories of cash transfers in Latin America) (GRZ and African Union (AU) Commission, 2006). The outcome of the conference became ‘The Livingstone Call for Action’ where delegates appealed for adoption of social transfer programmes for vulnerable categories of the population in Africa; integration of social protection in National Development Plans and National Budgets; and more exchange of information and experiences on social protection and cash transfers between African and other states (GRZ and AU Commission, 2006).

For Zambia, the conference was very strategic and an opportunity for civil society to further lobby and advocate for social protection. Besides hosting the conference, the then President of Zambia Levy Patrick Mwanawasa also participated at the regional event. Given the strategic importance of the conference to Zambia, it is not surprising that civil society in Zambia seized the opportunity to challenge the Government of Zambia to fulfil the ‘Livingstone Call for Action’ (CSO1).

I was one of those who organized the conference in Livingstone. We targeted East and Southern African countries and Levy Mwanawasa was still alive. He came, deliberated and participated at the conference. We came up with the Livingstone Call for Action on Social Protection that became extremely important for sort of motivating governments to push on the social protection path (CSO2).

What is critical to note about the Livingstone conference is that it was held in Zambia and specifically in Livingstone for a strategic purpose. External agencies like the DFID and the GTZ wanted to showcase the ‘successful’ Kalomo pilot to influence policy adoption by other countries. The participation of ILO also meant to buttress the social protection agenda.
Consequently, delegates at the conference were taken to Kalomo for an eyewitness account of the cash transfers. Bernd Schubert (a German consultant who designed the Kalomo pilot) took people to visit the Kalomo SCT and gave them T-shirts inscribed ‘The poor are not irresponsible’ (*SPE*). Thus, the conference was deliberately held in Livingstone, a resort town in the same Southern province with Kalomo district and about 128 kilometres apart, for political expediency. The Livingstone conference was one of the regional conferences in Africa that was organized to push the social protection agenda. The Livingstone Conference was therefore one of the many strategies used by external agencies to influence adoption of social protection. External agencies deliberately facilitated the co-hosting of the conference by the AU and the Government of Zambia. For civil society, the conference was an opportunity to shame the Government of Zambia for being slow to adopt cash transfers despite implementing the ‘successful’ Kalomo SCT (*CSO5*). The Livingstone Call for Action could have influenced the official adoption of social protection in the FNDP, especially given that President Mwanawasa participated at the conference. However, at political level nothing really happened immediately after the conference and the MMD regime still continued to be intransigent towards social protection for years until it lost power in 2011.

### 4.6.3 Development of National Social Protection Policy

Despite the wide acknowledgement of the lack of a policy framework to guide the fragmented social protection interventions, it took years for Zambia to have a social protection policy. Both the Fifth and Sixth National Development Plans identified the absence of a social protection framework as a huge setback for the sector. The new Patriotic Front (PF) government significantly triggered the policy deliberations. The policy came into being in 2014, eleven years after the inception of the Kalomo Cash Transfer Pilot and nine years after the draft social protection strategy was developed.

One of the government officials acknowledged that the process was very involving.

> It was a tedious process. Some of us even doubted if we were going to see light at the end of the tunnel when we started. But, with insistence from cooperating partners to take that route, we managed to push on. (*GRZ4*).

Another official reiterated, “the process involved a lot of consultations, a lot of stakeholders, a lot of hidden interests some of which were very positive. It took us 7-8 years to get where we are right now” (*GRZ3*). Sentiments like ‘insistence from cooperating partners (external agencies)’ and ‘a lot of hidden interests’ reflect that policy process involved a lot of negotiations and persuasion. While actors in the policy space could have different
approaches, they all knew the importance of a social protection policy and had to compromise for the sake of progress. The fact the PF Government had adopted social protection and Sata had made the policy a priority implied that stakeholders involved were all complying with national development priorities regardless of their differences. Principally, external agencies, the Government and other stakeholders are all brought together by the common objective to fight poverty. However, the means to poverty reduction is always political and involves many players who may be motivated by different political interests, visions and approaches.

The process of developing the social protection policy involved incorporating components of child protection from the Child Labour Policy that is under the Ministry of Labour; and Child Development Policy whose custodian is the Ministry of Youth and Sport. The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services led the process, which brought together around 7 ministries to deliberate the policy. The other ministries included Agriculture, Labour, Gender, Education, Health and Youth.

We set up an inter-ministerial working group of all line ministries that had something to do with social protection. We agreed to hire a consultant. We had support from Dr. Michael Samson who runs the Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI) in South Africa to share the international experience. We engaged a lot of consultants who helped to formulate this policy document. We got a lot of literature from the region and did a desk review of countries that had social protection policies in place and tried to contextualize based on commonalities and what we could adopt (GRZ2).

According to GRZ2, the MCDMCH (now Ministry of Community Development and Social Services) held consultations with several government institutions, external agencies, civil society and local communities to see what they wanted in the policy. The government official said provincial consultations were held in 6 out of 10 provinces purposively sampled. Engagement of ‘experts’ like Michael Samson and sending of staff for courses in social protection (at external agencies’ cost) were external agency strategies to influence adoption of social protection by the Government of Zambia. It is also worthwhile to note that EPRI runs courses on social protection and is funded by DFID.

Discussions were at local and higher levels, across ministries, across agendas and across parties. The major bone of contention was whether to make the policy broad to encompass all the Zambians or to limit it to the poor only, that is, social assistance. It
took a lot of discussion, a lot of engagement, a lot of resistance and a lot of convincing. I think that is where we started changing the mentality to move from thinking about one programme to the system. (CP3).

The process of developing the process started in 2012 and took two years to eventually come with a policy that incorporated the views and ideas of the various stakeholders. The fact that there was ‘resistance and a lot of convincing’ questions the claim that the process was consultative and participatory. What emerges is that it was a top-down approach of getting people to agree to decisions that have been agreed upon already behind closed doors. There were policy contestations at a higher level where actors (Government lead ministries and external agencies) took long to reach a compromise. It is the decisions at that top level that were taken to lower levels for implementation. According to Gaventa (2005), pertinent decisions are made within the closed policy space where access is only for actors with hidden power.

After the consultations and when the draft was now in place, the government emphasized that they wanted an implementation plan to kick the policy into action instead of having a redundant one. The government demanded to see strategies and objectives unpacked to see how we would be able to implement the policy. After that was done, we followed the normal channel of approval. There was a lot of good will even from the highest office of the land. (GRZ2).

The PF Manifesto (2011-2016) acknowledged the high poverty levels in Zambia and the value of a social protection policy in fighting the poverty. It is therefore not surprising to note that serious steps were taken to develop the policy when the PF took over power from the MMD. Indeed, the PF Government sped up the development of the social protection policy because it aligned to its broad vision of pro-poor development. The fact that the PF party envisaged the policy to be coordinated at cabinet level reflects a high level political will to push the policy into implementation. Indeed, the PF Government made an undertaking not to sideline social protection in its poverty reduction efforts (GRZ, 2014b).

The policy is modeled on Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler transformative framework that “champions a more comprehensive and integrated approach to Social Protection as a tool for sustainable poverty reduction” (GRZ, 2014b, p. 1). Accordingly, it is anchored on the four dimensions of preventive, promotive, protective and transformative initiatives and comprises four pillars:

i. Social Assistance
ii. Social Security/Social Insurance  
iii. Livelihoods and Empowerment  

At face value, social assistance and protection would seem to be duplication. However, the protection pillar concerns transformative interventions that strengthen legal rights of all citizens “to ensure appropriate laws are in place, raise awareness of legal rights, enforce the law against offenders, and provide appropriate support for victims” (GRZ, 2014, p. 7). The protection pillar is informed by the realization that violation of human rights is one of the major contributors to vulnerability in Zambia (ibid.). Nonetheless, Zambia, like many other African countries, is still to do much in that regard, as there is still little legal protection against such cases as gender based violence (GBV), human trafficking and child labour. It remains to be seen how the implementation of the NSPP would cover the gap.

4.6.4 Implementation of the National Social Protection Policy

The challenge is the commitment of both the Government and external agencies to implement the model holistically. Despite the ‘comprehensiveness’ of the National Social Protection Policy, the commitment to the four pillars remains rhetorical, as there is a huge bias for the SCT that only serves one pillar of social assistance in terms of implementation. The pressure from external agencies and the civil society to the Government to adopt a social protection policy does not translate to support for all pillars of the policy. Social cash transfers are only ‘protective’ to a small proportion of the population, 10% according to Schubert’s design (see chapter 6). The bias for cash transfers has brought disharmony within the MCDSS. The Department of Social Welfare implements the SCT programme while the Department of Community Development implements livelihoods programmes like the Food Security Pack (FSP). It implies that the Department of Social Welfare is now more resourced and more active than the Department of Community Development whose programmes are lacking financial support.

I have seen some bias towards 1 pillar at the expense of other pillars and that defeats the whole purpose. For instance, my department falls under the Livelihoods and Empowerment pillar and so far we don’t have any partner. Most of them have crowded under the social assistance pillar. So I am beginning to ask ‘Were these guys doing this in good faith or what?’ For them to come out with those pillars I thought at

⁸ The protection pillar is the equivalence of the transformative initiatives in Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler model
some point they could sit down amongst themselves and share the pillars according to their specializations. You find out that even those donors that you think are on the Livelihoods and Empowerment pillar they also want the easier way where the others have already started. So they just come and join the social assistance pillar. In that regard, I don’t see them going by what they used to preach (GRZ4).

The above narrative shows that one of the reasons why the Government conceded to the influence of external agencies was the hope that the external agencies would go further to fund the implementation of the policy. It also depicts external agencies’ promise to the Government to support the implementation. However, it then turned out that the external agencies were only interested in cash transfers. The SCT attracted interest and funding from other external agencies as well. For instance, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) joined in 2016 and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) negotiating a new project on urban social protection (CP5). Sweden signed an agreement in December 2016 with the Government of Zambia with support of 165 million Swedish kronor (approximately 140 million Kwacha) and the funding is for 3 years (CP6).

According to a former external agency official, external agencies prefer to fund cash transfers because “they are fairly easy, you can have great impact, you know your money would be put to good use and there is assurance for the donors” (CP7).

You know when you give cash someone can easily buy something and you will be able to see the results. Unlike where you provide agricultural inputs, it takes long to see the results. So what we have seen is they (donors) just want something that would give them the quick results, maybe because they want to go back and show results where the money is coming from and say this is how it is working (GRZ3).

The two narratives above show that external agencies have their own interests that could be at odds with the national aspirations. The external agencies also influenced the Government to be biased towards the cash transfers too and this is reflected in the increasing budget and the fact that it is now the leading funder since 2016. The current funding agreement (2010-2020) for the SCT between the Government of Zambia and DFID was negotiated on the grounds that the Government would increase funding and eventually become the major funder, failing which DFID would pull out (CP4). Initially, DFID had proposed a 7 year funding period, which also showed a huge commitment to cash transfers. Through budget
support⁹, the external agencies have ensured that they maintain their focus on the SCT and influence the Government to do the same. While budget support is theorized to foster country ownership (Swedlund 2013; Anderson and Therkildsen 2007), “it is often pursued as a strategy by external agencies to increase their leverage over domestic policymaking processes” (Swedlund 2013: 358). Similarly, Gibson, et al. (2005) reiterates that supporting government budgets is an incentive to “encourage more spending and activities in those domains that a donor perceives to be important” (p. 9). Thus, the combination of external agency influence and political will scaled up the SCT in Zambia. The drive for a massive upscale of the SCT to all the districts is one commitment that shows the Government is now heavily inclined to cash transfers. Thus, Government support for other policy instruments like the Food Security Pack (FSP) Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) has immensely declined (see chapter 6 for the debate).

4.6.5 The politics of the policy process

The development of the social protection policy in Zambia was dependent on external agency resources and political will from the PF. Social protection as a policy instrument emerged in a top down fashion from a global level and permeated the Zambian domestic policy front as enunciated by Hickey (2007). The global arena was a closed space and only the mother governments for the external agencies and the lawmakers would decide policy intervention for the recipient government of Zambia. However, policy convergence between donor headquarters and their country offices in the recipient countries is not always given. Attitudes at donor headquarters can also frustrate the donor country office policy efforts in the recipient countries. In the case of GTZ, an official at the mother ministry contested funding cash transfers prompting GTZ to quit social protection in Zambia. This reflects the complex and dynamic situation that also confronts the external actors.

One key external agency mechanism for controlling and driving the process was by financing all the procedures until the policy was launched. Financing is a form of hidden power and a tool of influence for external agencies. External agencies were very keen for Zambia to have a social protection policy because that would ensure that the Government starts committing resources for the cash transfers. External agencies were sure that they would use the policy as a leverage to encourage or even push the Government to increase funding and upscale the SCT.

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⁹ Budget support is the aid modality that transfers resources directly into the budget or treasury of the receiving country, allowing the recipient country to use its own allocation, procurement, and accounting structures (Koeberle et al., 2006 cited in Swedlund 2013: 358).
So it is another strategy to try to get the government to take it over. It is an interesting relationship between the donors and the government. You are trying to push something into these countries and they do not really want but you are bringing in money, so the government says ok we want the money (SPE).

External agencies also hired consultants to do ‘consultation’ and write the policy. So the donors were very keen to get Zambia and Malawi and other countries to have their own national social protection policies/strategies but of course there was no capacity in the country to do it because there was no interest or experience in social protection. So they got these external consultants like me to come and write that strategy/policy for them, which of course is not good you know. I did it 2 or 3 times but I must say I was not happy with the process because it was not nationally owned. You know you have these consultation workshops and stuff but it’s tokenism really it’s not really a government driven process, it’s not even a government demanded process. And the external agencies have this way of pretending that it is government demanded, they say the ministry asked us to do this (SPE).

The DFID, Irish Aid and Finland funded the process with UNICEF providing additional funds and technical assistance.

The parliament of Zambia was engaged to influence increased budgetary commitment for cash transfers (GRZI) but their role in the development of the policy could not be ascertained. The parliament is a national institution that holds visible power (see figure 3 in chapter 2) and plays a significant role in making of policies and laws to ensure that such processes are representative of the people. A lack of active engagement of the parliament undermines national ownership and underestimates its potential to generate political will for social protection.

The Participation of the communities in the policy could not be ascertained and FGDs with them showed that they are only recipients and they are not aware of how decisions about social protection were made at national level. When people are kept away from what gets to the decision-making table, they tend to accept the status quo due to the influence of invisible power (see figure 3 in chapter 2).

There was active participation of civil society. Civil society participation initially started in the claimed space when the civil society challenged the government to adopt social protection and then in the invited space when the government invited it to contribute to the
policy process. However, it is fascinating to note that the same external agencies that funded cash transfers also funded some civil society organisations (CSOs) to lobby and advocate adoption of social protection by the Government of Zambia.

In social protection, we have a challenge with our civil society. I think we don’t have one organization that is broadly engaging in social protection. We used to have an organization that we actually initiated and supported. It was called Platform for Social Protection (PSP). It was a network organization and it was supposed to bring together the different organisations working on different bits and pieces of social protection together and talk about social protection issues broadly, advocate, etc. Eventually that organization became itself an organization and not a network organization and eventually found itself in some governance issues and that’s how it has gone invisible (CP5).

Despite the concerns raised above, PSP was instrumental in galvanizing interest around social protection within the civil society space, “worked with other NGOs to begin to make the right noise about cash transfers, engaged the Government and Members of Parliament and did budget tracking” (CP4). DFID and Irish Aid funded PSP (CP4; CP5). The name PSP shows it was specifically created for social protection and it is not surprising that the organization is now defunct. Its objective to have social protection adopted by the Government has since been achieved and it may no longer be relevant to the external agencies. An allegation of embezzlement of funds is also a factor that led to withdrawal of donor support and eventually made PSP extinct (CSO5 and CP5). Besides PSP, international NGOs also played a role in promoting social protection.

I hear PSP is still there but I don’t see it active on the social protection scene. But we do have a lot of other, especially international NGOs, who have bought into the agenda. You know, because they are international NGOs, they are able to know what’s happening in other countries and bring it here. So we have got Save the Children, Concern Worldwide and Care International who are very strongly engaged in social protection and they are supporting us on that agenda (CP5).

The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) and Jesuit Council for Theological Reflection (JCTR) also lobbied for social protection. JCTR’s major role was highlighting cost of living for both rural and urban areas through basic needs basket surveys to sensitise the government on the need for social protection (CSO4). Kuss (2015) observes that most CSOs in Zambia are based in the urban areas and do not have a direct interface with the poor
and it is difficult to tell if they truly represent the poor. Furthermore, civil society is dependent on external funding and more often the organisations expend much of their energy in competing for donor funds instead of the core business of representing the poor (Schüring and Lawson-McDowall, 2011). All the three CSOs that were active in the social protection agenda are based in Lusaka. Against that background, the participation of the local communities in the policy processes cannot be ascertained. Even the local authorities like chiefs and headmen as well as the community welfare assistance committees (CWACs) were not part of the process. Indeed, “mostly they are recipients and their contribution is to ensure that they are able to use the money on items that improve the welfare of the households” (GRZ1).

The CPs have been the driving force behind the development of the Social Protection Policy. This is due to their exposure to countries where they have seen it working so well. So they are the ones who brought the idea to us and said ‘You people you are too fragmented, why can’t you do it this way’. They are the ones who were the driving force in giving us this idea and also supporting the process itself. They brought in technical assistance. They brought their experts to come and do assessments to see what gaps were there. Once the gaps were identified they then provided training to staff to boost our capacity. Now we are able to drive the process without them (GRZ4).

The positive politicization of social protection by Sata also played a very important role in the policy process leading to the launch. Social protection was one of the key components of the PF Manifesto and it was a campaign tool for the party that eventually won power in 2011 against the MMD. So, when the PF got into power, Sata immediately made presidential pronouncements that he needed a social protection policy; review of the 1996 Persons with Disabilities Act; and review of the Ageing Policy, all as matters of priority (GRZ2). The MCDSS had to ensure that those demands from the president were fulfilled since it was the ministry in charge. What emerges is the importance of political will to the adoption of social protection in Zambia upon the rise of the PF to power. As seen in the MMD era, external agencies would not successfully push for institutionalization of social protection. However, there are reservations over the role of the PF.

The time I was in the country (Zambia) you couldn’t see really a very distinct party position. There was Charlotte Harland who made sure that it got attention. We couldn’t see any party interested and willing to campaign on it. It developed over time.
and it was something that has been long on the agenda. When I was in the country I didn’t see the PF as a party that would really campaign on social protection to get into power. It was not about a political party and it was not about the wrong or right party. The PF found it on the agenda and took it up. The same with MPs, they took it up later and argued for it because of the benefits they wanted not that they were socially minded MPs. Lobbying was done for long (CP7).

The above narrative reflects that the PF saw the potential of social protection in generating votes for the party and therefore branded it in the party’s pro-poor ideology. It also shows that it took years for the external agencies and other stakeholders to lobby for the adoption of social protection in Zambia. CP7 also affirms the important role of individuals like Charlotte Harland-Scott in raising the social protection agenda, as noted earlier in this chapter.

The rise of the social protection agenda in Zambia can be understood in two phases. The first is 2003 to 2011 which was a period of pilot cash transfers that were 100 percent donor funded. The period was marked with ambivalence from the neo-liberal MMD Government over adoption of social protection as well as external agencies’ unwillingness to scale up cash transfers to all the districts. The second phase is 2011 to date where social protection rose to prominence following the political transition from the MMD to PF. The PF replaced the MMD on a pro-poor ideology and adopted social protection as a pertinent tool for poverty eradication. In the current phase, the Government is gradually taking over funding of the SCT with declining contributions from the external agencies.

It is important to note that despite the inroads made in social protection in Zambia, the 1991 National Constitution of Zambia (GRZ, 1991) and all its amendments (GRZ, 1996; GRZ, 2009 and GRZ, 2016b and 2016c) does not mention social protection. The constitution is specific about protecting pensions but there is no particular reference to social protection. A social contract for social protection may be difficult to pursue if there are no specific constitutional provisions.

4.6.6 The draft integrated framework

The development (work in progress) of an integrated framework is based on the realisation that social protection interventions are fragmented and the need for integration for great impact. “…at the moment there is high level of fragmentation and duplication, whereby besides the main flagship programme such as the SCT, there is plethora of smaller programmes not very well coordinated, sometimes with significant duplication across”
(CP2). The draft framework builds on the four pillars of the National Social Protection Policy. There is wide acknowledgement of the importance of integrating social protection from both the government and development partners.

At policy level, we are looking at an integrated framework because we have seen that we keep doing things in silos with various ministries and other stakeholders doing their own separately. Even within this ministry, interventions do not talk to each other. We want an integrated framework, which is going to utilize these four pillars. So we are looking at transforming the whole social protection policy into an integrated framework. (GRZ3).

In the above respect, the government and external agencies have been working on the following.

- Taking a mapping of existing tax funded social protection programmes,
- Identifying gaps and analysing the coherence of the existing social protection programmes, and
- Developing what is being called an integrated framework which is somewhat a roadmap that would provide government guidance as to the key flagship programmes and how they relate to each other in the social protection space. (CP2).

The integrated framework is also expected to be the basis of a more structural engagement of the Ministry of Finance on issues of financing. Both government and external agency officials echoed these sentiments. The consultant who designed the integrated framework shared experiences of the process.

I was the consultant for ILO to do the research of all the programmes, going to talk to the people and come up with ideas to develop the integrated framework. Throughout the consultation process, I realised civil servants are open-minded. The problem is not that they are hiding other problems, the problem is that they are so stuck and so busy with implementing the programme, their concern is the programme and they don’t spend time looking at how that programme can be improved. We have submitted the draft to the government and unfortunately I cannot share it now because they are reviewing it. (CP1).

Government officials confirmed the above developments. The government is quite aware that the initiative has been from the CPs who even met the costs for the consultancy.
We have advanced quite a lot and we now have a documented framework and next week we will be having a meeting over it and a presentation to all the directors so that they can ideally understand the thrust. Before we sell it to the Ministry of Finance, we should convince ourselves first. (GRZ3).

The idea of having an integrated framework is a noble one but it is problematic in the sense it was initiated outside the Government as reflected by the narratives of CP1 and GRZ3. ILO made the initiative and has been driving the agenda though there is claim that the Government is in charge.

The ILO has a mandate that is very much on policy, supporting government in developing legal frameworks and policies for the systems and systems strengthening in general sense and specifically coordination and integration of the different parts of the social protection system. So compared to other agencies, we are a bit less active on the ground when it comes to implementation but we really focus on small and higher level engagements. (CP2)

ILO and UNICEF spearheaded the development of a coordination structure for the sector to oversee implementation (CP2). This push by the external agencies is also part of the current agenda of ‘building social protection systems’, which is a way of institutionalizing social protection so that it does not disappear when the external agencies withdraw. For instance, both the World Bank (2012) and UNICEF (2012) categorically underscore the importance of national harmonised social protection systems in their global policy positions (see chapter 3 for the discussion). The consultant hired by ILO to draft the integrated framework is a German national who went to Zambia in 2008 as a PhD researcher to research on the cash transfer programme but abandoned the mission along the way in favour of work. His supervisor was a friend to one of the German contractors who came up with the programme in 2003 and since 2008 he has worked on social protection in Zambia at different levels including Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) where he was instrumental in the establishment of the Southern Africa Social Protection Experts Network (SASPEN) (CP1). SASPEN’s establishment was an influenced by FES and has also been a key player in buttressing the social protection agenda in the region of Southern Africa.

There is a ‘German connection’ to the involvement of the consultant. The programme started in 2003 is the Kalomo pilot initiated by the GTZ and FES is a German CSO. By the time of the data collection, the consultant had joined one of the key UN agency in the social
protection agenda in Zambia. Effectively, the development of an integrated framework is an ILO agenda despite it being a ‘noble cause’. Government officials like GRZ3 conceded because they know initiatives from such big multilaterals come with incentives including workshops, training, per diems and foreign trips (see Anderson and Therkildsen, 2007).

### 4.6.7 Social Protection Bill

The Social Protection Bill, drafted in 2014 but yet to be passed into law, conforms to the UNICEF and ILO human rights based approach where they believe social protection is an entitlement that should be fulfilled by the government. Like the integrated framework, the idea of a Bill also originated outside the government structures and is a brainchild of UNICEF and ILO. The government also acknowledged the need to make social protection a human right.

This has been a very key area of work. There are some uncertainties as to what will happen to the draft Social Protection Bill but ILO has been investing in this process because we believe in rights based approach to social protection and presence of a regulatory framework is of course key to that. One of the objectives of the Social Protection Bill is to also create effective institutions that can lead to coordination of the system both within the non-contributory pillar and across the non-contributory and contributory pillar. In this sense, the Bill envisions the creation of National Social Protection Council, a coordination unit as well as the creation of a single social security agency, which would collapse all the existing social security institutions. (CP2).

Despite the noted ‘progress’, the Social Protection Bill has proved to be contentious between government line ministries and between the government and external agencies as well. There is a general feeling that the government is not yet fully committed to the repercussions of making social protection a human right. This is also directly related to the fact that social protection is not yet a constitutional provision in Zambia. While social protection is the custody of the MCDSS, the Bill is housed in the Ministry of Labour.

Discussions to pass the Bill to an Act have unfortunately been lost in politics between ministries. For instance, the Ministry of Justice is making many reversals and it is not clear now which direction they are heading for with it. However, it is a 50:50 affair, today you hear bad news and the following day you are hearing some good news. (CP1).
UNICEF and ILO are pushing for a human rights approach as part of their international mandate to fight for the poor. The human rights approach makes social protection a right and entitlement that citizens can claim (Holmes and Lwanga-Ntale, 2012). Devereux and Pelham (2005) further reiterate that institutionalizing a programme formalizes and makes it more visible and the government is thus expected to be accountable in fulfilling its obligations. (Gentilini, 2009) notes,

> While all this is good news, it becomes a risk when those who institutionalise bold long-term social protection commitments are governments that, on the one hand, can rely on short-term and volatile donor commitments and, on the other hand, have limited possibilities to finance social protection domestically. Expectations increase while prospects for meeting them may not (p. 153).

Another limitation of the human rights approach is that it provides “little guidance on the practicalities of how low levels of coverage and small benefits in low income countries might be scaled up to universal coverage that meets international declarations (Slater and Farrington, 2009: 35). Whilst UNICEF and ILO are advocating for the passing of the Bill in the National Assembly, the Government of Zambia could be hesitant to meet the financial obligations and political implications of a Social Protection Act. It is not yet clear if the government and the external agencies are fully committed to the Social Protection Bill and integrated framework. The stakes could be high.

4.7 Conclusion

Social protection policy process in Zambia is complex and has been subject to interaction of actors motivated by different interests and varying sources of power. It started with the World Bank, GTZ and DFID as the dominant external actors before UNICEF and ILO joined. The policy trajectory in Zambia can be divided into two distinct periods. The first period is 2003 to 2011 that was outstanding for various models of cash transfer pilots and 100% dependent on external agency funds. During that period, external agencies resisted appeals from the MCDSS to scale up the cash transfers to all the districts and the MMD government also resisted to adopt the cash transfers. However, it is the period that the SP-SAG was set up and produced a draft Social Protection Strategy in 2005. It is also the same period when social protection was incorporated into national development planning as evidenced in the FNDP. The second period is 2011 to present day where the government is increasing its funding for social protection while external agencies’ contributions are decreasing to ensure that the Government eventually takes over all the funding. Besides
external agency influence, the paradigm shift is owed to change of government from the neo-liberal MMD to the pro-poor PF that adopted social protection at both party and Government levels. Political will played very well in the policy process as Sata developed direct interest in the social protection policy and made it a priority.

One key strategy used by external agencies to influence the process was financing all the costs of developing the National Social Protection Policy. Despite pushing development and adoption of the policy, the external agencies are only funding the SCT programme that only serves the social assistance pillar (protective) of the policy (GRZ4). In fact, the objective of the external agencies is to ensure that the Government eventually funds 100% of the SCT. The current funding agreement between the Government of Zambia (2010-2020) and DFID is informed by a carrot and stick approach applied by the DFID. The agreement compels the government to increase funding for the SCT, failing which the DFID would pull out of the programme. Due to that nature of the agreement, the Government had to increase the funding and indeed it is now the leading funder since 2016. Thus, external agencies also influenced the Government to be biased towards cash transfers and in a way it has neglected other programmes like the Food Security Pack (FSP) and the Public Assistance Welfare Scheme (PWAS). What emerges is that external agency driven social protection agenda has undermined Government owned national programmes (see chapter 6).

It also emerges that participation in the policy making process is rhetorical. Despite the claims that there was wide consultation, it is pertinent to note that deliberations were largely at high levels where the main actors were the external agencies and the MCDSS. The participation of the civil society in the process both in the invited and claimed spaces presents some controversy as to whose interests were they representing. This is on the grounds that the same external agencies who funded the policy process funded the civil society to lobby the Government for a policy. Participation of the community in the policy process is difficult to ascertain besides being mentioned as the ‘beneficiaries’ of the policy. Overall, social protection policy development was dependent on the ‘good will’ of the external agencies and the emergent political will from the PF government as well as the influential role of Michael Sata and Charlotte Harland-Scott.
Chapter 5 Social Protection Policy in Zimbabwe

5.0 Introduction
This chapter traces the social protection evolution in Zimbabwe from early years of inception to date. Particular attention is paid to the different roles played by various actors in the policy space and the motivation behind the social protection agenda. The researcher treats all the players as political actors that are motivated more by interests than purely the drive to fight poverty. Questions as who started the agenda, who drove it and how it was driven, who participated and how they participated and whose ideas took precedence in the policy process, will be pertinent to address the mission of this chapter. The chapter starts by highlighting the socio-economic and political background of Zimbabwe to give a context to the study especially that social protection is part of the poverty reduction agenda. The next step is a brief overview of social protection that gives an overall landscape for social protection interventions in Zimbabwe. This chapter traces the evolution of social protection policy from the Enhanced Social Protection Project (ESPP) co-developed by the Government and World Bank in 2000. The ESPP is a watershed in the history of social protection in Zimbabwe, thus its components are particularly focused on as they had a bearing on the whole architecture of social protection. From the ESPP, the National Plan of Action for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (NAP for OVC) is also looked at as another key policy intervention that moved the social protection discourse. The rise of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer Programme (HSCT) and subsequent development of what became known as National Social Protection Policy Framework (NSPPF) were defining developments in the social protection agenda in Zimbabwe. Consequently, the chapter provides a detailed discussion of the HSCT and NSPPF for a comprehensive understanding of the policy processes. The chapter also gives attention to two individuals that the researcher discovered played a critical role in driving a social protection agenda in Zimbabwe. The researcher concludes the chapter by highlighting the tenets of the policy evolution and ideological implications for adoption underscoring external agency and government interests.

5.1 Socio-economic and political context
The economic meltdown that started in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s intensified between 2000 and 2008 and triggered a series of political, economic and social challenges. One of the major manifestations of the challenges is the collapse of the social service delivery. The Government of Zimbabwe implemented Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
(ESAP) from 1991-1995 that ultimately maladjusted the economy causing unexpected repercussions for social security. The year 2000 is significant for the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), largely condemned by the international community as a gross human rights violation but locally justified as a redress of colonial injustice and a social redistribution exercise. The FTLRP attracted sanctions from the international community that severely limited the country’s access to external funds. The sanctions culminated in the ‘Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) passed in 2001 by the United States of America (USA), sanctions by the European Union (EU) in 2002, as well as Canada and Australia and their allies’ (Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) and United Nations (UN), 2015, p. 9).

Despite the FTLRP, Zimbabwe experienced declining food production over the years. Thus, since 2000, the country has continued to experience chronic food insecurity, due to various policy and climatic change related causes, including the teething problems of land reform, Agricultural inputs unavailability and unaffordability, limited credit facilities to all farmers, tenure security, and irrigation infrastructure deterioration, remain issues of great concern, requiring urgent attention (GoZ and UN, 2015, p. 20).

Figure 8 shows the provincial distribution of poverty in Zimbabwe. Food poor households are households living in extreme poverty while non-poor households are those deemed not poor and above the Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL). Extreme poverty is generally between 50,000 and 100,000 households for majority of the provinces (7 out of 10) and less than 50,000 households for each of the other 3 provinces. That shows that poverty is higher in rural than urban areas as majority of the provinces are rural and also majority of the population is rural-based. Harare metropolitan province has the highest number of non-poor households as it is the most urbanised and most of the population is in either formal or informal employment. Bulawayo province has the least extreme poverty and that can be explained in terms of being urbanised as well as its proximity to South Africa where people cross over for employment and shopping.
Figure 8 Poor and non-poor households by province

![Chart showing poor and non-poor households by province.]

Source: Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (Zimstat), 2016

Structural unemployment rose from 63 percent in 2003 to over 80 percent in 2008 with degreed people common in the informal sector (GoZ and UN, 2015, p. 13). Zeleke and Turigari (2011) noted that population below the Total Food consumption Line increased by 30 percent to 72 percent and doubled to 58 percent for those below food poverty line between 1995 and 2003 (p. 4). There are “high levels of poverty and vulnerability” with “about 72.3 percent of Zimbabweans (9.1 million people) poor and 22.5 percent (2.8 million people) extremely poor, with poverty and extreme poverty more prevalent in rural areas” (World Bank, 2014, p. 101). Approximately 8% of all the households contain a chronically ill member and 30% have at least one orphan and this is largely attributable to the HIV/AIDS pandemic (ibid.). Orphans are around one million, child mortality is 80 per 100 000 and immunization is around 83% (ibid.) Child malnutrition is still high with 27% under 5 stunting, 3% wasted, 8% underweight and 6% are overweight (GoZ, 2016b: 185). Life expectancy dropped by 17 years from 61 years in 1990 to 44.2 years in 2002 as an aftermath of the HIV and AIDS pandemic and widespread poverty (GoZ and UN, 2015, p. 17). Lack of funds for proper water reticulation, sewage treatment and borehole maintenance resulted compromised water and sanitation in both urban and rural areas. At the zenith of the water and sanitation crisis, a cholera outbreak in 2008/9 affected 100 000 people and claimed around 4800 lives (ibid: 18).

The year 2008 is particularly significant for being the period when the Zimbabwean economy nosedived to the lowest ebb. Between 2000 and 2008 GDP fell by over 40% and inflation reached a record mark of 500 billion percent in 2008 that drove the Zimbabwe Dollar out of
circulation (World Bank, 2011, p. 6). The World Bank further notes that the crisis constrained public funding for social services, social expenditures dropped from 15% of GDP in 2005 to only 6% of GDP in 2009 and health and education were worst affected as most schools and hospitals closed by end of 2008 (ibid.).

Murisa (2010) also notes, “the social dimensions of the crisis have been the most visible and the impact has been devastating on the majority” of both rural and urban population (p. 6). He further elaborates the social crisis as a “decline or absolute collapse of social service delivery in housing, health and education, and the erosion of household incomes leading to an increase in cases of food insecurity and general vulnerability” (Murisa, 2010, p. 6). It is in that context of the crisis that the Government of Zimbabwe and development partners began to engage in efforts to promote social protection in order to reduce poverty. In this regard, since the turn of the new millennium, national development plans began to acknowledging the value of social protection and prioritizing the sector in fighting poverty and vulnerability. These include National Economic Revival Programme (NERP), 2001: Towards Sustained Economic Growth; National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP), 2008-2009; Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS), 2009-2013; the Medium Term Plan (MTP), 2011-2015; and the current Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset), 2013-2018 (GoZ and World Bank, 2016).

5.2 Overview of Social Protection System in Zimbabwe (1980 to date)
Zimbabwe was lauded for having “comprehensive social protection programmes for several decades” (United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and GoZ, 2014, p. 92). Despite this milestone, limited funding and lack of coherence “to address a broad spectrum of risk and vulnerability factors” has been the major stumbling block (ibid.). Three forms of social protection exist in Zimbabwe:

i. Social assistance such as cash transfers, Public Works Programmes, or fee waivers for basic services
ii. Social insurance, including old-age and disability pensions, health insurance, and unemployment insurance

Social Assistance
Despite the economic setbacks bedevilling the country, the Government of Zimbabwe made commendable strides to develop a policy framework for social protection to address the
needs of the vulnerable population. The government realised that social protection in Zimbabwe remained loose, fragmented and far from a coherent system. In this respect, a Social Transfer Policy Framework (STPF) was developed to “harmonize social transfers, improve their quality, relevance and adequacy, and prescribe guidelines to all stakeholders in the design and implementation of social transfers” (World Bank, 2014, p. 102). The STPF comprised of the following:

i. proxy means tested HSCT for labor constrained households;

ii. productive community works (PCW) for labor endowed households;

iii. agricultural inputs for the rural poor; and

iv. fee waivers for health and education. (World Bank, 2014, p. 102)

The STPF was part of the Government broad plans to develop a social protection strategy that would integrate and strengthen social protection instruments (UNCT and GoZ, 2014).

Under social assistance, the government offers the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM), Public Assistance, War Victims Compensation, Assisted Medical Treatment Order (AMTO), the Food Mitigation Programme, child protection services, support to people living with disabilities, drought relief, public works and other livelihood support programmes (ibid: 93). BEAM is discussed later in this chapter.

Public assistance is means tested cash assistance to destitute people and per capita grants for institutions of care (Kaseke, 1988). AMTO is a facility that dates back to 1960 (Cirillo and Tebaldi, 2016) when the country was still under colonialism. This is a government facility that caters for medication and related expenses in hospitals for “persons over 60 years of age, people living with disabilities, orphans and vulnerable children and persons who suffer from continuous illness” (UNCT and GoZ, 2014, p. 93). It is an initiative that addresses health concerns and targets all the vulnerable cohorts of the population. However, over the years the facility “faces challenges due to insufficient funding and shortage of drugs in government hospitals. In 2014, only 32.3% of children under the age of five years were registered, (where 17.9% were orphans) in comparison to 37.8% in 2009…” (ZimStat, 2014 and 2010, as cited in UNCT and GoZ, 2014, p. 93). AMTO faces funding constraints and the government has accrued arrears at public hospitals over unpaid AMTO bills as admitted by the following narrative. “For AMTO, I know when I left government in 2013, the government owed Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals US$2 million” (GoZ9). According to the former minister,
hospitals would turn down beneficiary patients on AMTO due to the government’s record for not paying up expeditiously. Table below summarises the main safety nets in Zimbabwe.

### Table 6 Individual beneficiaries for main safety nets in Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMTO</td>
<td>557,700</td>
<td>625,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>625,000</td>
<td>660,000</td>
<td>625,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Mitigation Programme</td>
<td>463,530</td>
<td>279,005</td>
<td>375,000</td>
<td>702,500</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Assistance</td>
<td>1,591</td>
<td>14,011</td>
<td>14,501</td>
<td>9,671</td>
<td>7,856</td>
<td>4,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAM primary</td>
<td>537,594</td>
<td>408,486</td>
<td>339,827</td>
<td>345,567</td>
<td>298,518</td>
<td>118,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAM secondary</td>
<td>198,229</td>
<td>119,498</td>
<td>106,216</td>
<td>92,917</td>
<td>112,890</td>
<td>78,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSCT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>162,955</td>
<td>277,545</td>
<td>260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallholder farm input support scheme</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,540,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP Productive Asset Creation</td>
<td>547,840</td>
<td>549,938</td>
<td>560,406</td>
<td>648,617</td>
<td>518,345</td>
<td>112,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP Lean Season Assistance</td>
<td>1,278,293</td>
<td>1,283,189</td>
<td>1,307,614</td>
<td>1,513,439</td>
<td>1,209,472</td>
<td>263,237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GoZ and World Bank, 2016

### Social Insurance

Zimbabwe runs three major contributory pension schemes and these are the Public Service Pension Fund (PSPF), the National Pension Fund (NPF) and the Local Authorities Pension Fund (LAPF) (GoZ and World Bank, 2016). The PSPF is the biggest at 86% of total insurance expenditure and the Government has entirely funded it since 2009, as it was not tenable to deduct from civil servants’ salaries due to eroding economic crisis (ibid.: 12). Chikova (2013) observes that only “less than 20% of the labour force is covered by social security” (p. 1). The National Social Security Authority (NSSA) administers the NPF that provides pensions for old age, disability, survivors and those employed in the private sector (GOZ and World Bank, 2016). The LAPF provides retirement, disability, and death benefits for those employed in local authorities (ibid.). All in all, social insurance constitutes 86% of the total social protection expenditure in Zimbabwe (GoZ and World Bank, 2016, p.12). The contributory nature of social insurance implies that the bulk of workers in the informal sector are excluded. Table 7 shows Zimbabwe’s expenditure on social insurance from 2010 to 2015.
Table 7 Social insurance expenditure in Zimbabwe (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSPF</td>
<td>160,881,441</td>
<td>275,045,900</td>
<td>401,346,938</td>
<td>383,235,240</td>
<td>477,158,562</td>
<td>477,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPF</td>
<td>24,623,734</td>
<td>50,672,878</td>
<td>70,267,285</td>
<td>87,735,737</td>
<td>114,609,716</td>
<td>126,307,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPF</td>
<td>4,941,508</td>
<td>6,041,981</td>
<td>7,092,944</td>
<td>7,452,156</td>
<td>7,021,456</td>
<td>6,558,456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GoZ and World Bank, 2016

Labour market interventions

Government ministries implemented labour market interventions but, to date, it is not certain to what extent this is done especially given the prevailing harsh economic environment. The World Bank (2014) notes that five ministries are involved in labour market programmes in Zimbabwe. Ministry of Labour and Social Services (MLSS) is involved in job intermediation; Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Empowerment does non-formal training, microfinance and entrepreneurial training for persons with disabilities; Ministry of Small to Medium Enterprises and Co-operative Development takes part in entrepreneurial training and financing; Ministry of Education, Sport, Arts and Culture (now Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education) offers second chance education and non-formal training; and Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development provides loans for women (World Bank, 2014). However, such programmes are only reaching less than 1% of the unemployed youth (ibid.).

5.3 The Enhanced Social Protection Project (ESPP) 2000: The Genesis of the Social Protection Paradigm in Zimbabwe

The Enhanced Social Protection Project (ESPP) is the genesis of social protection policy trajectory in Zimbabwe though not much is written about it. The current architecture of social protection programmes in Zimbabwe largely mirrors the ESPP. In the year 2000, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) together with the World Bank crafted the ESPP “as a comprehensive framework for protecting vulnerable groups against risk and shocks stemming from increased poverty” (Smith et al., 2012). Initially, the government was supposed to borrow from the World Bank under the Social Funds and Social Assistance Sector to implement the ESPP. However, Zimbabwe was struck off the lending list due to outstanding arrears and sanctions imposed on the Mugabe regime over what the international community called ‘governance’ issues and a ‘violent’ land reform programme. The ESPP became the successor to the World Bank’s Social Dimension Fund (SDF), a fund that was set up in the
context of the structural adjustment programmes of the 1990s to support those who fell out of safety nets especially retrenched workers and the poor in the rural areas (World Bank 2001).

The ESPP came into being after a programme that was launched in 1995 that was referred to as the Poverty Alleviation Action Plan (PAAP). The PAAP (1995-2000) got its last funding from the World Bank in 1999 (GoZ2). The idea was to put in place a strong social protection system upon the realization that the 1995 Poverty Assessment Study Survey (PASS) indicated rise in poverty levels (GoZ2).

The following factors were the impetus behind the ESPP:

i. Crisis on the macroeconomic and governance fronts;

ii. Poverty levels and perverse coping had increased nationwide in the 1990s, especially in urban areas;

iii. Education coverage had been good but inequality remained and enrolment was declining;

iv. Health indicators were being undermined by HIV/AIDS and declines in real per capita public spending on health;


The overall objective of the ESPP was “to rapidly extend and deepen access by the very poor to social protection mechanisms through provision of increased resources to formal or informal safety nets and drawing on efficiency and equity gains feasible in the short-run” (World Bank, 200b, p. 5).

The World Bank (2000b) justified its involvement in the ESPP on the following grounds:

a. the Bank would bring its international experience in design of interventions in other countries affected by social and economic crisis;

b. the Bank could also contribute its technical expertise in formulation of social risk assessments and social protection sector reform towards developing a national social protection strategy;

c. the Bank's involvement in social protection programs was expected to promote high standards of transparency, financial accountability, monitoring and impact evaluation;

d. the scale of resources that the Bank could mobilize appeared to be necessary to have a significant impact given the level of need; and
e. the Bank’s participation would leverage additional donor funding for these programs (p. 5).

Phase I of the ESPP (2001-2003), which the World Bank called ‘Enhanced Crisis Management’ comprised 4 components:

i. Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM);
ii. Public Works Component (PWC);
iii. Children in Extremely Difficult Circumstances (CEDC); and

Other external agencies that later supported the ESPP initiative included DFID, the European Commission, Australian Aid (AusAID), New Zealand Aid (NZAid) and The German Development Bank (The KfW) (Smith et al., 2012:13). Given the unprecedented economic decline, the government took a ‘quick-wins’ approach in 2001 and picked four strategic pillars of the National Social Protection Strategy for speedy implementation. These were the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM); the Health Assistance Programme; the Public Works Programme; and the Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances Programme (ibid.).

It is important to note that the World Bank was the driving force behind social protection in Zimbabwe before other agencies joined. The development and adoption of the ESPP was upon the instigation of the Bank and this confirms that social protection agenda was externally influenced right from the beginning. This is in conformity to Hickey (2007) who views social protection as a donor policy and Gaventa (2005) who views policy as a product of external agencies. The fact that the World Bank would not fund the ESPP as originally planned is a reflection that external agencies are not independent and their support is determined by global politics of the day. While the Government of Zimbabwe had outstanding arrears, the major reason for the World Bank’s reversal of its initial commitment to fund ESPP was the US embargo against Zimbabwe. The reversal of the Bank was also a blessing in disguise as it allowed the Government of Zimbabwe to take control of the ESPP. The Government was able to fund the ESPP from the national budget despite the international isolation. The ESPP did not gain the popularity among external actors that it would have gained if it was funded by the World Bank yet the Government of Zimbabwe adopted ESPP and did remarkably well to wholly fund the components especially BEAM.
until the height of the economic collapse of 2008. Overall, the ESPP was watered down by the harsh economic realities.

5.3.1 The Public Works Programme (PWP): A transition from food handouts

Food distribution programme in Zimbabwe dates back to 1982 when the government launched it to lessen the burden imposed on vulnerable citizens by the persistent drought (Zeleke and Turigari, 2011). Since then the programme has undergone several stages of transition as the government tried to reduce dependency and invest in long term productive mechanisms. Zeleke and Turigari (2011) consequently note that “Over the years the food distribution programme has undergone several transformations – from Free Food Distribution Programme to Food-for-Work programme in 1985; to the Grain Loan Scheme and to Public Works Programme (PWP) in 2000” and, the government ensured that all the phases of transition incorporated “at least one agricultural input support programme that included crop and fertilizer packs, tillage and/or other packages” to support the productive capacities of the vulnerable population (p. 2). The public works supplemented incomes for the poorest households by providing labour-intensive temporary employment with road maintenance being the major activity.

As noted earlier, the PWP had political support from the government of Zimbabwe as it was in line with government’s policy thrust of moving away from food handouts, that it believed promoted a dependency syndrome. It is thus not surprising that PWP emerged as one of the pillars of Zimbabwe’s Enhanced Social Protection Strategy formulated in 2000. The major thrust of the PWP was to mitigate food insecurity by “transferring incomes to non-labour constrained (NLC) vulnerable households through participation in community works whilst labour constrained households (LCH) accessed free food distribution” (Zeleke and Turigari, 2011, p. 3). Due to incessant droughts, it became more of a drought mitigation safety net than an asset creation programme (ibid.). According to the World Bank, the PWP enrolled 75,000 participants at an approximate cost of US$300,000 in 2012 that dropped to 9,671 in 2013 (cited in UNCT and GoZ, 2014, p. 93).

The transition from food handouts to public works reflects more of a Government policy choice than external agency preference. The Government of Zimbabwe has ever been ambivalent to food handouts and it believes in supporting the poor to produce their own food. Thus the Government has a strong inclination to provision of agricultural inputs to the poor communities instead of food or cash handouts. The public works programme also allays the Government’s reservation over dependency syndrome (dependency syndrome is defined in...
Despite its role in ‘improving’ lives or economic development, the paradox of aid is that it distorts ‘policy ownership, fiscal sustainability, institutional development and autonomous long-term economic growth’ (Moss et al., 2006: 5).

5.3.2 The Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM)

BEAM was designed to retain children in schools by providing a fee waiver for needy rural and urban children at both primary and secondary schools (World Bank, 2000). This fund was established by the government of Zimbabwe in 2001 to support orphaned and vulnerable children (OVC) in 61 districts. “Assistance is restricted to support of school fees and levies through block grants to schools, rather than cash transfers to individuals” (World Bank, 2011, p. 61). The Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare is the custodian of BEAM but implements it with close collaboration from the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education (formerly Ministry of Education, Sports, Art and Culture). BEAM mainly aims to prevent poor households from adopting adverse coping mechanisms like withdrawing children from school (Smith et al., 2012).

Since inception, BEAM became one of the major social protection programmes in Zimbabwe in terms of coverage and national budgetary allocations. It started in 2001 with around 600,000 primary and secondary school children and reached 970,000 pupils (27% of national enrolment) in 2005 with a budgetary commitment of US$35 million (World Bank, 2011, p. 62). That represented 24.5% of all beneficiaries under government funded social assistance interventions and 46.2% of total expenditure in that respect (ibid.) as noted below (ibid). From its inception up to the end of 2008, BEAM was wholly funded by the central government and at its peak it reached 970,000 primary and secondary school children (ibid.). The hyperinflationary environment that engulfed the country in 2008 crippled BEAM, as the local currency was rendered worthless. Eventually, BEAM collapsed in the same year, as the government could no longer fulfil its commitment. Consequently, schools no longer received their BEAM allocation from the government by end of 2008.

Following the inception of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 and the introduction of the multicurrency regime, UNICEF partnered the government to resuscitate BEAM.

I teamed up with Minister of Education, David Coltart, and approached UNICEF to support us to resuscitate BEAM. After submitting position papers for BEAM, UNICEF injected US$20 million into BEAM. We then developed a BEAM selection manual to rationalise selection procedures across the country (GoZ9).
The fund was resuscitated in late 2009 with a commitment of donor funds mobilised by UNICEF in collaboration with the government. For the period 2009-2010, external agencies contributed USD20 million for the resuscitation of BEAM (World Bank, 2011). The USD20 million only targeted OVC in primary schools while the government committed USD15 million for secondary school children in 2010 (ibid.). In 2011, external agencies committed USD10 million and the government contributed USD13 million for secondary school children and USD5 million for primary school children (ibid: 14). In 2011, external agencies funded BEAM through the Child Protection Fund (CPF), a funding mechanism for the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer programme (DP2). In 2012, the government made a commitment of USD16 million for secondary school children (ibid.). The government would not meet the commitments. For instance, in 2012 the government only released USD5, 600,000 instead of the USD16 million committed. Of $16 million budgeted in 2014 for the secondary school children, only $7 million was disbursed and spent towards the programme, to clear previous arrears (GoZ and World Bank, 2016, p. 19). In 2011 42% of deserving pupils did benefit from BEAM (ibid.) while 53.5% did not get the support in 2012 (MoESAC, 2013, p. 17).

Between 2011 and 2015, BEAM enrolment for primary school declined from 537,594 to 118,408, while that for secondary school dropped from 198,220 to 78,925 (GoZ and World Bank, 2016, p. 19). Despite benefiting 80 percent of primary school students in 2013, errors of exclusion are prevalent (ibid.). Uncertain donor funding since 2012 and insufficient support from the government have seen the government incurring BEAM arrears in schools thereby compromising the proper functionality of schools especially that BEAM has been a huge source of funds for many particularly in rural areas as illustrated below.

Figure 9 BEAM total enrolment, 2010-2015

Despite donor support, BEAM enrolment for both primary and secondary schools has increasingly dropped over the period. It never reached 970,000 children reached when it was fully funded by government.

Author’s creation based on figures from GoZ and World Bank, 2016
External agencies have since stopped funding the programme and whatever amount comes from the government is servicing the arrears. A former government official said “BEAM is practically dead” while one donor official said BEAM could be best described as ‘extinct’. While the status of BEAM looks uncertain, it remains a favourite programme for the Government. Thus, despite the financial challenges, the Government keeps holding to it. Consequently, it is a government directive that children under BEAM are not sent away for non-payment of fees and in 2017 the government was settling BEAM arrears for 2016 (GoZ1). Government and external agencies’ interests are compared in 5.4.5, based on BEAM and HSCT.

5.3.3 Children in Extremely Difficult Circumstances (CEDC)

The component was a response to an increasing number of orphans mainly due to HIV/AIDS. By 2000, there were around 600,000 orphans and were expected to increase to 1.2 million by 2005 (World Bank, 2000, p. 5). Regardless of national strides to reduce HIV prevalence, the number of orphans was projected to increase even beyond 2010 and the proportion of vulnerable children would be compounded by other categories like children on the streets, the abused and disabled (ibid.). Thus the component was meant to support children in difficult circumstances by strengthening the ability and capacity of the communities to care for such children. This would be achieved through “strengthening community mobilization and training; and providing grants to NGOs and CBOs working with CEDCs and their families” (World Bank, 2000, p. 7). This component has been supported under the social care services provided by the Department of Social Services in the MPSLSW and includes
residential and non-residential care for children, older persons and persons with disabilities (GoZ and World Bank, 2016). The social care services component is a small fraction of the social protection expenditure and averages US$740,000 between 2010 and 2014 (ibid.). Table below summarises the expenditure for social care services.

**Table 8 Expenditure trends in social care service programmes ($US)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children in difficult circumstances</td>
<td>190,688</td>
<td>208,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>108,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of disabled persons</td>
<td>186,640</td>
<td>920,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of older persons</td>
<td>287,210</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street children</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>14,310</td>
<td>21,211</td>
<td>14,086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GoZ and World Bank, 2016

**5.3.4. Social Protection Strategy component (SPS)**

The objective of this component aimed to cement the capacity of the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (MPSLSW) for strategic planning, implementation and monitoring. It also sought to support technical assistance and influence national dialogue for a social protection framework as well as supporting a study to reform the health fee waiver system (ibid.) Zimbabwe runs numerous uncoordinated social protection programmes implemented by various organisations and without a broader policy framework (World Bank, 2014; MoLSS and UNICEF, 2010). Besides the ‘patchwork of policy documents’ (World Bank, 2014) evident in separate pieces of manuals and guidelines of operations for different social protection interventions, the desire to have a social protection strategy did not materialise until the development of the NSPPF in 2015 that was launched in December 2016.

**5.4 The National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (NAP for OVC)**

This started as a policy response to an increasing number of orphans mainly resulting from the devastating effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the early years of the new millennium. It is somehow similar to CEDC but the two were initiated at different years under separate policy regimes and with support supported from different external agencies. NAP for OVC is a partnership between UNICEF (as the frontrunner of other external agencies) and the government while the CEDC is a component of the ESPP that was a partnership between the government and the
World Bank. The purpose of the programme was to meet the basic needs of orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) as well as ensuring that they are protected from all forms of abuse (Jimat, 2010). In 2003, the government set up a Working Party of Officials (WPO) constituting government and development partners and whose obligation was to develop the programme that was eventually approved in 2004 (MPSLSW, 2003). NAP for OVC further buttressed the national legal and policy framework especially the Children’s Act (Chapter 5:06) and the National Orphan Care Policy that directly focused on children. It also aligned to the Zimbabwe National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan (ZNASP), which is the overall guiding policy framework for HIV and AIDS related interventions (Ministry of Labour and Social Services (MoLSS, 2010). At a global scale, the programme complied with the June 2001 United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on HIV and AIDS that Zimbabwe was part of (MPSLSW, 2003). Specifically, the UNGASS goals 65, 66 and 67 targeted orphans and vulnerable children and called upon member states “to develop national policies and strategies that build and strengthen the ability of governments, communities, and families to support orphans and children infected and affected by HIV and AIDS by the year 2003, and to implement these policies and strategies by the year 2005” (MPSLSW, 2003, p. 7).

NAP for OVC is a national policy framework that related organisations are expected to align to. This contrasts Zambia where cash transfers were introduced purportedly as a response to high prevalence of HIV/AIDS without any national guiding framework. However, as shall be seen in the following sections, NAP for OVC suffered from inadequate budgetary support from the government and ended up being a donor driven programme.

Below is a summary of the major milestones in the development of NAP for OVC.
Key milestones for the development of NAP for OVC

2003 Government set up a Working Party of Officials (WPO) whose oversight was development of the programme, resource mobilization and implementation.

2004 Government approved the programme and reasserted the role of the WPO.

2005 UNICEF supported MPSLSW to establish the National Secretariat to strengthen coordination capacity. A child-led Children’s Summit was held and followed by the launch of the programme by Vice President Mujuru. A Programme of Support (PoS) was developed to fund the programme.

2006 Cabinet approved the Guidelines for the Operationalisation of the NPA for OVC and established a nine member Technical Review Committee (TRC) and renamed the programme the National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (NAP for OVC) to emphasise the need for action now.

2007 Project proposals were called for and 21 organisations were approved by the TRC to access funds mobilised through the PoS mechanism. An M&E framework for the programme was developed and finalised in February 2008.

Source: MPSLSW, 2003 (updated 2008)

5.4.1 NAP for OVC I, 2004-2010 and the Programme of Support (PoS)

This was a direct response to effects of HIV/AIDS on children. A Programme of Support (PoS) for the NAP for OVC was developed in 2005 “to provide a framework for multi-year, multi-donor funding where donors pool resources together for the implementation of the NAP for OVC under the management of UNICEF” (MPSLSW, 2003, p. 24). The OECD donors comprising the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), New Zealand Aid (NZAID), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), German Government, Australian Aid (AusAID) and the European Commission (ibid.) financed the PoS (ibid.). The funding mechanism was established upon the realization that the Government did not have adequate resources and capacity to lessen the impact of HIV and AIDS on children due to socio-economic challenges (Jimat, 2010). By 2007, HIV prevalence was approximately 15.6% (15-49 years) and children orphaned by HIV/AIDS were around 975,956 (Ministry of Health and Child Welfare cited in MPSLSW, 2003). The PoS mobilized a total of US$86 million that was accessed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for programme implementation that signed a...
tripartite agreement with UNICEF, MPSLSW\textsuperscript{10} (Jimat, 2010). Funding decisions were a jurisdiction for the Technical Review Committee\textsuperscript{11} and the implementing NGOs were required to report to both the MPSLSW and UNICEF (Jimat, 2010).

Under PoS, more than 80 NGOs were contracted to do interventions focused on orphans and vulnerable children on behalf of the Government (GoZ3) and that was the major shortfall of the programme. The inability of the Government of Zimbabwe to fully fund NAP 1 allowed the external agencies to take control of the programme and ‘dictate’ terms that the Government was in a compromised position to object. Although external agencies would not fund the government directly for political and fiduciary reasons, NGO implementation of the programme was more expensive than the government (Jimat, 2010). An evaluation of the PoS revealed that

- Despite aligning to national priorities and initiatives, the absence of direct PoS support to government structures that were supposed to play a key role in coordination and supervision, stood out as a systemic design flaw of the PoS, which affected not only the speed of implementation but quality of outputs and, ultimately, results for children;
- UNICEF, with its dual role of fund manager and technical advisor, had little previous experience of large-scale NGO grant management prior to the PoS, struggled to build its capacity in this area, and faced problems in adapting UNICEF’s global rules to the new way of working; and
- The NGO approach was fragmented as they rarely addressed the total needs of the children and this was worsened by the fact that attention was on the child alone not the household context. This translated to little impact. (Jimat, 2010, pp. 10-24).

Although the PoS could be the ‘best’ arrangement for an increasingly internationally isolated Government of Zimbabwe, it became another layer of bureaucracy and extra transactional costs (Jimat, 2010). It overshadowed the role of the government to monitor NGOs for quality assurance especially given the dual accountability system cited below.

\textsuperscript{10} It became the Ministry of Labour and Social Services (MoLSS) in the Government of National Unity, 2009-2013

\textsuperscript{11} Comprised Government technical line ministries, National Aids Council, donors and UNICEF and decided who got the grant.
• The Tripartite Agreement between the Government, UNICEF and the NGOs; and
• The Project Cooperation Agreement signed only by UNICEF and the NGOs (Jimat, 2010, p. 12).

Consequently, the NGOs became more preoccupied with financial accountability to UNICEF than technical accountability to the Government, given the power in financial control (ibid.).

A government official also noted,

While the NGO world believed that government had no capacity to run the programme, not much was delivered in terms of benefits to the child. The bulk of the PoS expenses went towards capacitating the NGOs because they needed computers, vehicles, training and other equipment. It was later realized that it would have been better if the capacity building were directed to the government (GoZ3).

5.4.2 NAP for OVC II, 2011-2015 and the Child Protection Fund I (CPF I), 2011-2013

The programme came into being after a national stakeholder review process of NAP I that involved children, government, civil society and development partners (MoLSS, 2010). Its continued focus on OVC was informed by the fact there was an increased number of children orphaned by HIV and AIDS despite a record decrease in HIV prevalence from 27.2% to 14.3% between 1998 and 2010, plus high rates of child abuse (ibid: 4). The design of NAP for OVC II and CPF II was based on the ‘Child Sensitive Social Protection Thought Paper’, a study commissioned by UNICEF in 2010 that proved there was high numbers of OVC (Schubert, 2011). There was a stakeholder convergence that NAP for OVC II would focus on:

• prevention and mitigation of child abuse;
• increasing access of OVC to basic education and health services;
• promoting access of children to child-friendly justice services; and
• strengthening family livelihoods. (MoLSS, 2010, p. 18).

NAP for OVC II therefore adopted a child-sensitive social protection that was hinged on four pillars of Strengthening of the Household Economy, Child Protection, Access to Basic Services and Programme Coordination and Management, with gender, age, disability, child participation, HIV and AIDS cross-cutting the pillars (ibid.).
As in NAP 1, the NAP Secretariat\textsuperscript{12} was in charge of programme coordination and management. The Secretariat was expected to “cascade comprehensive capacity development horizontally and vertically within the Department of Social Services (DSS)” so that DSS would finally take over its roles by 2015 (MoLSS, 2010, p. 36). Similarly, the institutional structure starts from the State and the Cabinet and is complemented by child protection committees at national, provincial, district and community levels, all embedded in a multi-sectoral collaboration and sub-national coordination.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) OVC group of donors developed yet another funding mechanism for NAP II that they called Child Protection Fund I succeeding the PoS. The name was informed by the child sensitive social protection approach that was influenced by UNICEF. Accordingly, “the purpose of CPF is to reduce household poverty and provide protection support such that the most vulnerable children in Zimbabwe are able to secure their basic rights” (UNICEF, 2010, p. vii). The CPF therefore constituted 3 main pillars:

- To reduce household poverty and economic disparity of approximately 55,000 extremely poor households including those with orphans and other vulnerable children by implementing national cash transfers thereby positively benefiting children and women’s health and well-being;
- To enhance all vulnerable children’s access to effective child protection services including protective services (legal, welfare, judicial) to child survivors of violence, exploitation and abuse; and
- To facilitate improved access to basic education for poor orphans and other vulnerable children in Year 1. (UNICEF, 2010, p. vii).

The Government and the OECD donors co-financed NAP II with additional support expected from other supporters. The Government was expected to be able to commit 50\% of the funds for social cash transfers by 2013 (UNICEF, 2010). OECD donors, despite being the major funders of NAP II, would not fund all NAP II activities and, for instance, only funded BEAM in 2011. Like the PoS, UNICEF managed the CPF. The major accomplishments for NAP II was that it reached 55,000 households

\textsuperscript{12} It was a unit created by DSS with support from UNICEF to lead programme coordination and management. It comprised 5 personnel paid by UNICEF while MoLSS provides office accommodation, communication and utilities.
through the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) and the initiation of the National Case Management System (NCMS), all funded by CPF I (GoZ, 2015). NAP II also suffered from lack of Government funding due to fiscal constraints and external agencies became the primary funders of the programme. As a result, the external agencies “had a significant influence on how the resources were to be used, causing the government to ‘chase the money’ (ibid: 17). Given that background, the Government was not in control and eventually it was difficult to measure the impact of the programme on children, as the programme design emphasised outputs more than outcomes (ibid.). This had negative consequences for future potential funding for the programme. “It is difficult to get funding for the HSCT because there are no outcomes, we only have numbers of children reached” (DP1).

5.4.3 NAP for OVC III, 2016-2020 and the Child Protection Fund II (CPF II), 2016-2021
Building on lessons learnt from NAP I and II, the MPSLSW together with stakeholders developed NAP for OVC III “with the intent of translating into practice the principles and goals of the National Social Protection Policy Framework (NSPPF) that relate to children” (MPSLSW, 2016, p. 12). The NSPPF was developed in 2015. The Government and all stakeholders agreed to still concentrate on child protection, as the situation of children in the country still remained bad especially in terms of child marriage, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and child mortality (ibid.). Thus, NAP III has four interlinked pillars:
- Household economic security
- Access to basic social services
- Child protection and safeguarding
- Systems strengthening (MPSLSW, 2016, p. 21)

NAP III suffers from donor fatigue as DFID, the major funder of the HSCT, cut the budget by almost half for the second phase of the HSCT (June 2016-May 2019) (see chapter 6).

5.4.4 Government-World Bank-UNICEF ideological battle
The ESPP, despite being the first social protection response ‘package’ developed to address the socio-economic constraints that confronted Zimbabwe, the programme is rarely mentioned in literature. Even the custodian ministry, MPSLSW, does not have documentation for the programme.
The ESPP was not popularized but the components became the core pillars of the social protection system that was beginning to mould into place. Unfortunately, the ESPP was also caught up in a period where the government thought there was need for short-term programming given the rapid changing circumstances that Zimbabwe was finding itself in terms of economic downturn and social unrest. This watered down the ESPP (GoZ2).

The ESPP was developed in 2000 and barely three years afterwards, NAP for OVC was also put in place. For NAP for OVC, it was UNICEF that was at the forefront providing technical assistance and mobilizing resources. What emerges from this narrative, first, is inter-external agency politics where UNICEF and other development partners would not take over the ESPP, despite it being ‘one of the best social protection systems in Africa’ (MoLSS and UNICEF, 2010, p. 7). This affirms the ideological ‘battle’ between the World Bank and the rest of other external agencies. Secondly, governments are swayed from one programme to the other as external agencies push for their policy agendas. Global politics and external agency policies permeate the domestic policy space as the World Bank (in the case of ESPP) and UNICEF (in the case of NAP for OVC) engaged the government to influence policy adoption. Overall, the World Bank and the DFID were heavily involved in the social protection agenda in the early years especially between 2000 and 2006 and when UNICEF joined, it shifted whole focus to children (SPE). Thus, the heavy involvement of UNICEF in NAP for OVC is not mere coincidence and NAP’s bias towards children fulfils UNICEF’s mission.

As UNICEF, we are involved globally because we are also trying to position ourselves quite strongly in the social protection field. I think it’s more of a strategic move by UNICEF noting that if we do not get ourselves very much involved, yes social protection will be there but children will not derive benefit from it. So we had to make sure that we safeguard the interests of children by being at the forefront at a point where we have a global partnership with the World Bank and other big social protection players (DP3).

UNICEF’s double role in Zimbabwe of providing technical assistance (TA) and managing the donor pooled funds contrasts with other countries where it only provides TA. External agencies do not fund the government directly because of the
international isolation and outstanding arrears to the international financial institutions (IFIs). They fund programmes through the United Nations family and international NGOs. In the case of social protection, external agencies fund the HSCT, development of NSPPF and technical assistance through UNICEF under the establishment of a child protection fund (CPF). It is important to note that, since 2000, the World Bank suspended programme funding to Zimbabwe and has been mainly been involved in technical support (assessments and analytical work) (GoZ8). That has given space and more influence to UNICEF. UNICEF is therefore at a vantage point to ensure that its focus on children is fulfilled. Similarly, Low et al. (1998) note that UNICEF’s technical assistance to GAPVU in Mozambique was motivated by the fact that most of the GAPVU beneficiaries were families with malnourished children.

The experiences of NAP for OVC show that the Government cannot control what it does not fund. The contracting of numerous NGOs in NAP I to do work for the Government was not something the Government would do if it funded the programme. The Government did not own it and would not hold external agencies and NGOs accountable. The establishment of a Child Protection Fund outside the Government was a donor prerogative. The setting up of the HSCT outside the mainstream national programmes was an external agencies’ choice too. The decision to fund BEAM under the HSCT only once came from UNICEF and the other external agencies. External agencies decide what to fund, when to fund, how to fund and when to downscale or quit and the Government does not have control over that. However, what the Government of Zimbabwe has done ‘persistently’ is its resistance to taking over donor programmes like the HSCT.

The government officials are stubborn and it is a waste of time to approach them. We agreed with the Government to fund the HSCT 50% and donors 50% but they never fulfil that commitment and the programme is 100% donor dependent (DP1).

The above sentiments reflect a frustrated donor official who is not happy with what the donors see as Government of Zimbabwe’s intransigence. The frustration can be best understood in the context of a contrast in donor and government priorities (see

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13 Gabinete de Apoio à População Vulnerável literally translates into Office for Assistance to the Vulnerable Population.
5.4.5 The Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) Programme

The Zimbabwean case is quite unique in the sense that the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer programme was introduced during a period of significant political and socio-economic trepidation. The economy was in a state of collapse with an annual GDP growth rate of -5.7% between 2000 and 2008, 80% of the labour force unemployed, galloping inflation between 2007 and 2008, 80% of the population below the food poverty line, and a political impasse that paralysed service delivery (Seidenfeld et al., 2016, p. 226). Western governments imposed sanctions on the Harare administration over the land reform programme and, consequently, international bi-lateral engagements ceased (ibid.) However, upon the inception of the Government of National Unity (GNU), it was surprising to see the external agencies especially the British and the Government of Zimbabwe ‘converging’ on the HSCT programme. The ‘convergence’ is attributed to research, evidence and data that were used by stakeholders to allay the mistrust and shortage of resources that prevailed during that period (ibid.). While that could be true, it is important to note that the international community had somehow a ‘positive’ perception of the ‘new’ dispensation of the Government of National Unity (GNU). Given that the GNU was a compromise between the Mugabe’s ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC, the westerners saw it worthwhile to re-engage the Harare administration. Furthermore, the minister of Labour and Social Services in the GNU was a member of the opposition MDC. The opposition was more appealing to the international community than ZANU-PF. She presided over the inception of the HSCT and its implementation until the end of the GNU in 2013. Upon appointment to the Ministry of Labour and Social Services in 2009, “everything had gone down, there was nothing at pensions and it was difficult to say there was a social protection system in place except a few haphazard interventions” (GoZ9).

Starting with the Goromonzi pilot of 111 households, the cash transfers were rolled out to 10 districts in 2012 that were further extended to 16 districts in 2013 and reached a total of 20 districts in 2014 (Seidenfeld et al., 2016, p. 229). From October 2011 to January 2012 the programme targeted about 19,000 households in the first 10 districts and transfers were first received in April 2012 (MoLSS and UNICEF, 2012). The programme was expanded to cover 20 districts (2 per each province) and paid
cash to 55,509 households, 10% of a total of 539,057 households that were reached with a census based proxy means test enumeration (UNCT and GoZ, 2014). The government’s desire, expressed in ZimAsset, to reach a target of 100,000 households by 2015 and all the 200,000 by 2018 (ibid.) remains unfulfilled to date.

The HSCT programme was designed to meet the following objectives:

a. At output level, to strengthen the purchasing power of 55,000\textsuperscript{14} ultra-poor and labour-constrained households.

b. At outcome level, to empower the beneficiary households to increase their consumption to a level which exceeds the food poverty line. This was expected to reduce the number of ultra-poor households as well as refrain them from risky coping strategies like child labour and early marriage.

c. At impact level, to improve nutrition status, health and education and to reduce child mortality and HIV prevalence amongst youths aged 15-24 years (MoLSS and UNICEF, 2010, p. 15).

Households of 1, 2, 3 and 4+ members receive $10, $15, $20 and $25 (per month but paid bi-monthly) respectively (GoZI). Households targeted by HSCT are mostly headed by older persons or persons with disability, most of whom are women and mainly widows. Household members are children, elderly, disabled, chronically ill and a few adults in good health. However, 81% of household members are children most of whom are orphans, thus “child protection services are provided in order to respond to cases of violence, abuse and exploitation against children through a case management system” (UNCT and GoZ, 2014, p. 96). By June 2014, child protection services had reached 56,327 children, which was more than double the 2015 target of 25,000 (ibid.). Inclusion and exclusion errors are estimated to be approximately 15 percent and 20 percent respectively and this is deemed to be consistent with international standards (Schubert and Chirchir, 2012). The collapse of the HSCT after 2015 is due to donor fatigue. DFID funds about 75% of the HSCT and its reduction of funding for the programme by almost 50% for the current phase (June 2016-May 2019) has adverse implications. It is also difficult to envisage how a government that

\textsuperscript{14} 55,000 were the targeted extreme poor households in 20 districts though there are a total of 200,000 extreme poor households in Zimbabwe.
spends over 90% of its national budget (GoZ5) on the wage bill can be able to fund ‘free cash transfers’. Table 9 illustrates the status of the HSCT from 2011 to 2017.

Table 9 The HSCT programme in Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caseload</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>18,940</td>
<td>33,200</td>
<td>55,509</td>
<td>55,509</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author’s compilation of figures from MPSLSW and DP2

Districts have reduced from 20 to 8 and the number of beneficiaries dropped from 55,509 to 23,000 (DP2). It is pertinent to note that HSCT was designed to provide cash transfers to 55,000 extreme poor holds in 20 districts, which it exceeded. It therefore emerges that the external agencies expected the government to take over the programme beyond the 20 districts, something that the government was not committed to as shall be seen in chapter 6. Donor frustration over government’s lack of commitment to take over funding of HSCT partly explains the downscaling of donor support.

In a broad sense, there is a clash of interests between BEAM and the HSCT, which is now the ‘flagship’ social protection programme in Zimbabwe. This scenario resonates conflict between the government and development partners over programme preferences. Here the Government prefers BEAM while the development partners prefer the HSCT and are pushing the Government to fully adopt it. BEAM is politically popular and owned by the Government compared to the HSCT that is driven by external agencies. If the external agencies were to pull out of the HSCT, it would collapse as a donor programme and there is no obligation for the Government to take over. Conversely, Government programmes, will stay in place for as long as they are relevant politically, regardless of limited financial capacity. As observed by Feng and Gizelis (2002), welfare programmes are crucial for the survival of a political regime and are therefore determined by “a government’s strategic choices to seek support by rewarding the interest groups critical for the government’s survival” (p. 217). If the Government would reach around 970,000 children with BEAM compared to the HSCT that has so far reached a maximum of about 55,000 households in only 20 districts, the Government holds on to BEAM because it is a national programme with potential to reach huge numbers. Politics is a game of numbers and numbers matter when it comes to elections. When a programme is essentially patronised by the
ruling party the benefiting communities specifically associate that programme with that particular party and pay back through political allegiance.

5.5 Development of the National Social Protection Policy Framework (NSPPF): A Protracted Process

The idea to develop the policy framework was mooted in 2009 and momentum became high from 2014 onwards (GoZ1). There was a realisation and a general consensus from the government and the development partners that the lack of an overall social protection policy framework was the reason why it was difficult to harmonise and coordinate social protection in the country. Even national development strategies from around 2009 to the current ZimAsset (2013-2018) lamented the lack of a social protection policy framework (GoZ2). Although there were a number of policy instruments like the Social Transfer Policy Framework, the BEAM Manual and Public Works Guidelines, those tools and the subsequent programmes remained isolated and loosely coordinated (GoZ3). Indeed, a former government official echoed the same sentiments “In the absence of an overall social policy framework, social protection remains ad hoc, piecemeal and of little impact, if any. Harmonisation and coordination are virtually not feasible” (GoZ8). The need for a policy framework also pertinently emerged after launching the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) programme in 2012 as affirmed below.

We realised there were other social protection issues that were not covered by the cash transfer programme. So the push for the NSPPF became vocal again as stakeholders desired to finalise the policy document. So UNICEF brought resources to finalise the policy (GoZ3).

The policy framework anchors on five pillars:

i. social assistance;
ii. social insurance;
iii. labour market interventions; and
iv. livelihoods support strategies
v. social support and care (Government of Zimbabwe, 2016, p. 14)

The policy takes three approaches to social protection
i. Social protection as a human right, which underscores that social protection is people’s entitlement that the State has an obligation to provide as enshrined in international conventions;

ii. Systems approach to social protection that treats the poor and vulnerable as heterogeneous and therefore have different forms of vulnerabilities that require different types of support; and

iii. Multi-sectoral approach to social protection, which calls for a holistic approach to social protection that makes cross-sectoral linkages and is hinged on a life cycle approach. This is envisaged to enhance coordination and harmonisation. (Government of Zimbabwe, 2016, pp. 24-25).

The three above approaches followed by the NSPPF mirror UNICEF’s Global Social Protection Strategic Framework. The UNICEF framework underscores the importance of national integrated social protection systems that are hinged on a systems approach and a multi-sectoral approach (see UNICEF, 2012, pp. 49-66), which are replicated by the NSPPF. The NSPPF takes a human rights approach and that also reflects the UNICEF global framework (see UNICEF, 2012, p. 18). UNICEF’s life cycle approach is similarly emulated by the NSPPF and is tied to the multi-sectoral approach as seen above.

The policy was eventually approved by the Cabinet in November 2016 and launched in December 2016. What arises is that the process was at the mercy of external agency funding and that is the reason why the development of the policy stopped multiple times when an interested external agency ran out of funds or interest. The process would be stuck for some time and resume when another interested external agency emerged. The Government would not commit funds to the process and it is not surprising that the external agencies drove the process by virtue of being the funders. Consequently, the Government would not control what it did not fund and only played a ‘facilitatory’ role. Overall, the process was never smooth within the government itself, between the Government and the external agencies, as well as between the external agencies themselves, as interests took centre stage.

5.5.1 Inter-ministry power struggles
The trajectory for the national social protection policy in Zimbabwe was quite complex and uncertain as different ministries working on social protection became more concerned with their line ministries’ perspectives and not necessarily the broad
national scope of social protection. The process started with a 2009 scoping exercise that brought all stakeholders together to find a common way of developing the policy. What emerged is that ministries became attached to specific pillars that they felt were specific to their ministries.

It was then agreed that we needed to build the different pillars individually and then we bring the pillars together. At the end of the day, everybody then realized that there wasn’t any interaction at all amongst the different pillars. Then people thought ok let us take a step back a bit and allow the different pillars to review the programmes that they have, the systems that they have and prepare a platform for us as social protection fraternity to then come together at some point and come up with one policy framework that could guide our interventions. It took us some bit of time to throw in ideas because everybody would want to see their sector somehow reflected but it gave us some good footing towards strengthening our collaboration across the different pillars (GoZ2).

The inter-ministry power struggles emerged from the beginning of the process of developing the policy. Related to the above, a former government official also noted,

The social protection policy took long to come into being due to leadership issues over which ministry should coordinate and drive the process. The MPSLSW is seen as a ministry for social assistance and other ministries felt it was not the best to lead social insurance and labour market issues. There are about 5 ministries that are involved in labour market issues and various government and private agencies on social insurance. So it became a tug of war over who should lead what (GoZ8).

The above sentiments affirm the view that policy making is a political process that involves negotiating and compromising as interests are at stake. The above noted differences emerged in spite of the fact that the MPSLSW is the overall ministry that is also in charge of labour issues by definition and mandate. Below is the proposed institutional framework.

The following ministries are involved in social protection in Zimbabwe:

- Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare;
- Primary and Secondary Education;
• Health and Child Care;
• Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation Development;
• Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment;
• Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development;
• Small and Medium Enterprises and Cooperative Development;
• Local Government, Public Works and National Housing;
• Finance and Economic Development;
• Economic Planning and Investment Promotion; and
• Environment and Natural Resources (GoZ, 2016a)

The above ministries, together with some parastatals, bilaterals, multilaterals and international financial institutions (IFIs), constitute the National Social Protection Steering Committee with the MPSLSW serving as the secretariat. The key pillars of the social protection system define the technical working groups (TWGs) and each TWG comprises various ministries and organisations that work within that specific context (GoZ, 2016a). The framework is illustrated below.

Adopted from the NSPPF
Feedback mechanisms are reciprocal from sub-national structures, TWGs and the steering committee and that reflects an interactive relationship among those structures. The steering committee that reports to the Social Services and Poverty Eradication Cluster, which is an arm for the national development blueprint ZimAsset. MPSLSW plays an oversight role. It was not easy to bring together all the government ministries who run social protection programmes. There was even talk to have a neutral ministry (Finance, Economic Planning or Office of the President and Cabinet) with power to convene all stakeholders (GoZ8). For instance, there was a turf war between the MPSLSW and Ministry of Economic Planning over who should lead the process. Economic Planning wanted to lead the process on the basis of it being in charge of the macro-economic fundamentals of poverty reduction yet social welfare issues are in the custody of the MPSLSW (DP3). Even when the SDGs came, they were shifted to the Ministry of Economic Planning, despite the fact that the MPSLSW were in charge of the MDGs and were at the forefront of the preliminary preparations for the SDGs (DP3).

The inter-ministry tension and the fear that MPSLSW may take back the SDGs resulted in a strange sector ministry allocation.

...access to basic social services is placed under Ministry of Agriculture. Most of the social protection targets have been allocated to Ministry of Agriculture, which is madness. So we have raised a red flag that this will definitely not work. But in terms of leadership of social protection, it is quite clear that it is the mandate for MPSLSW. We are pushing for a harmonisation agenda for social protection programmes in the MPSLSW because the numerous programmes are a drain administratively (DP3).

The World Bank reiterated the same concerns to Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance is also pushing for all the programmes to be harmonised in the MPSLSW as they admit that a litany of loose programmes is costly and burdensome administratively (DP3). The Ministry of Finance is receiving technical support from the European Union (EU) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to develop a management information system for development partner coordination and the ministry has since benefited from a learning trip in Swaziland (GoZ7). The MPSLSW has been the target ministry for adoption of the social protection agenda and UNICEF together with other external agencies have invested a lot in capacity
building and technical assistance. It is therefore by design that UNICEF and other external agencies prefer working with MPSLSW, as they do not anticipate any major resistance, hence the push for a harmonisation agenda within MPSLSW.

The inter-ministry power struggles can be understood in the context of a tussle for both control and external agency funds. Social protection was a ‘new’ and ‘external’ concept thrown to them by external agencies and they were still trying to comprehend it. All the concerned ministries wanted to be at the forefront of the new phenomenon that de Haan (2011) calls “the fastest growing sectors in the aid industry” in the new millennium (p. 2). They were quite aware of the incentives that external agency agendas bring along. Anderson and Therkildsen (2007) note that there are obvious personal interests in working in donor supported project and programme management units and on earmarked donor funded activities in general because of the higher salaries and fringe benefits that are often provided in these arrangements (p. 16).

Consequently, other ministries were fully aware that the MPSLSW, by its welfare nature and national mandate, has traditionally ‘benefited’ through aid for welfare programmes. They would therefore resist to be convened by the MPSLSW as well as the agenda to harmonize social protection interventions within the MPSLSW. In contrast, the MPSLSW had a better understanding of social protection than the rest of other ministries. Consequently, the social assistance pillar quickly got furnished with the required information ahead of other pillars that took longer (GoZ2). That reflected that the MPSLSW’s understanding of social protection was essentially in terms of social assistance. It is interesting to note that there was deliberate connection between the deliberations for the NSPPF and NAP for OVC yet it has been the overall framework for implementing social protection for years.

5.5.2 Inter-external agency politics
Inter-external agency politics also affected the process as UNICEF (frontrunner) tried both to safeguard its interests as well as to find the best way to incorporate other external agencies’ interests. Quite a number of bilateral and multilateral agencies were involved, in one way or the other.

Talks for a social protection policy started in 2009 with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP disappeared from the agenda and we got stuck for a while. Later on UNICEF came on board but
disappeared again. When UNICEF later on reappeared, they have never stopped and have been at the forefront until today (GoZI).

The fact that the government got stuck upon ‘disappearance’ of development partners shows that the process was heavily dependent on the ‘blessings’ of the external agencies and could reflect lack of full commitment from the government (see figure 12).

Figure 12 Funding agencies for the development of the NSPPF

One common thing is that it seems all external agencies are very comfortable with the role played by UNICEF of managing the Child Protection Fund (CPF) and providing technical assistance to the government. However, that does not absolve the external agencies of any conflict as they too had differences between each other. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) wanted to fast track the policy process, an approach declined by UNICEF.

I actually remember arguing with colleagues in ILO who were pushing the process to be very fast but we said no we want a national dialogue based process where we try as much as possible to ensure that we have involved a wider spectrum of people. At each stage you could get people who would say
they were never involved and we would take time to get their input and assure them that it was never too late. So the process itself was quite long (DP3).

Figure 12 shows that the policy was fully funded by external agencies. The policy process even generated a bit of tension between UNICEF and other development agencies. For instance, the World Bank was very keen to push for a conditional cash transfer approach, which UNICEF does not believe in.

We did not agree with the World Bank on the conceptual pitch, we know the Bank always have ideas that they want to force down people’s throats. We were quite strategic, when we started to push government for this, we quickly put in resources and brought everyone to the table. I think we played the politics right. We actually requested the World Bank to second a consultant to the team developing the policy just to manage the political dynamics but it was clear that they were not the drivers of the process. We made sure that the government was in the driving seat as well and we provided a lot of backstopping to the government to ensure that they were the ones in charge and we did not get swayed into the World Bank thinking of social protection. The World Bank’s thinking on cash transfers has always been conditional. However, they are now beginning to appreciate the value of unconditional cash transfers. Recently they did an analysis in Zambia and their report shows unconditional cash transfers are increasing recipient household consumption by 56% above the transfer value. Hearing this from the Bank, I said to myself ‘Well, the Bank is seeing light at last’ (DP3).

The above narrative portrays development partners as political players with vested interests in the social protection agenda. They are all driven by the motive to fight poverty but disagree on the best approach to achieve it. Thus, each one of them would ‘fight’ to impose its approach. By resisting the World Bank’s influence, UNICEF was trying to protect its rights-based child-sensitive approach to social protection that would be sustained by unconditional cash transfers. In 2010, UNICEF partnered MoLSS to commission an institutional capacity assessment of the Department of Social Services to execute its national mandate of childcare and protection (Wyatt et al., 2010; Schubert, 2010). UNICEF used its ‘neutral’ position to take charge of the policy process and the claim that the Government drove the process is mere tokenism. The policy space was essentially a ‘battlefield’ for UNICEF and the World Bank as
they both tried to impose their ideas on how best to programme social protection to reduce poverty in Zimbabwe. The absence of the government from the funders says a lot about who controlled the process. Indeed, ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’.

5.5.3 Government-external agency policy contestation
It is fundamental to note that Zimbabwe runs a litany of fragmented social protection interventions from both the government and development partners. Mupedziswaa (2018) notes that social protection programmes in Zimbabwe are impressive on paper as they only reach a very small fraction of the vulnerable due to “limited resources and lack of capacity, poor targeting and the limited coverage of the schemes” (p. 44). Masuka et al. (2012) reiterate that social protection in Zimbabwe is adversely affected by retarded human and financial capacity attributable to political and economic constraints prevailing in the country.

Zimbabwe supports a highly varied, diffuse mix of social safety nets interventions, while many African countries today are backing the emergence of single flagship interventions, such as the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme in Ghana, the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia (PSNP), and the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF). Despite a sustained economic crisis and recurrent emergencies, Zimbabwe has retained many of the same social safety nets interventions for over 20 years. Most programs have not been scaled up to respond to recent crises, which is a key shortcoming in the sector (GoZ and World Bank, 2016, p. viii).

The rationale behind holding on to old programmes that may be out of touch with realities of the time could be that the government is quite aware of the political capital they invested in such programmes. Dismantling such programmes for one flagship social protection programme could be politically risky. This conforms to Hickey’s (2007) observation that social protection plays to elections, party politics and politics of patronage and that political elites determine the terms of policy and political debates, who benefits and size of a social protection initiative. ZANU-PF is a party that has been in power since 1980 and thrives on such programmes to sustain its hold to power. Thus the old programmes still guarantee the politicians the votes that they need most, contributing to the reluctance for policy reform. The flagship programmes referred above are donor driven (except PSNP in Ethiopia to some extent) programmes where the various governments conceded and ‘abandoned’ their
traditional programmes. The Government of Zimbabwe is ‘resistant’ to external agency influence and allows external agencies to create and fund programmes of their choice that it is not committed to adopt.

There are too many pieces of social protection against little resources. The challenge for Zimbabwe is that there is no rethink of policy and strategy to suit the current context of economic recession. Since 2000, there is no policy reform and it is a business as usual approach. There is no consolidation of the little resources for improved impact (GoZ).

They may be old programmes but their strength is that they are institutionalized within the government system. In contrast, external agency funded programmes are institutionally fragile. External agencies create parallel programmes instead of supporting the Government to improve the current national programmes. Due to the prolonged economic crisis, Zimbabwe has been incapacitated both in terms of financial and human resources. Overall, social protection initiatives like BEAM are not adequately resourced due to the economic crisis and governance issues. Similarly, Mupedziswa (2018) underscores the importance of political stability and solid governance in developing and implementing social protection interventions. The external agency supported parallel programmes incur high administrative costs (GoZ and World Bank, 2016).

5.5.4 The tokenism of participation

The process of developing the NSPPF started in August 2014 and the first submission of the draft to the cabinet was in November 2015. In July 2014, there was a high level workshop for ministers (GoZ). UNICEF engaged consultants in 2014 to start working on the policy document, first consultative meetings started that same year and the process gathered a lot of momentum in 2015 (DP3). External agencies funded the process including expenditure for the policy consultancy. However, not all actors matter in the policy space and not all voices are incorporated into the policy. Manipulation, decoration and tokenism are non-participation and are the three bottom rungs of Hart’s ladder of participation (Hart, 1992).

From the beginning, the process of developing the policy was predominantly a preserve for actors at national level. UNICEF provided the technical support and a series of workshops and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) were signed.

http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
between the government and the development partners to push the process (DP3). A national steering committee comprising the government and development partners was set up to discuss and lead the process at technical level.

The national steering committee was multisectoral. It included line ministries whom we thought could be champions in the various pillars of social protection. The Ministry of Finance, the Office of the President and Cabinet, development partners and UN agencies were part of the steering committee. We also roped in representatives of special groups primarily organisations for persons with disabilities, older persons, private sector, and Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) of the University of Zimbabwe. That steering committee allowed us to coordinate the process and consultations for various pillars. We had one international and three local consultants (2 based in South Africa and 1 based in Zimbabwe) who played a facilitatory role. The steering committee’s role was primarily to coordinate these activities, supervise the consultants and help in engaging various stakeholders throughout the consultation process. Overall, after that process, our role as convenors for social protection was cemented (GoZ2).

A working party of secretaries which was a committee of permanent secretaries chaired by the permanent secretary of MPSLSW, provided oversight for the process. A cabinet committee of ministers also chaired by the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare was the highest structure set to oversee the development of the policy. Final approval of the policy document was the jurisdiction of the Cabinet.

There is wide acknowledgement from both government and development partners that the policy process was very consultative.

The process was highly participatory and highly consultative. We had consultative meetings, validation meetings, high level meetings involving the permanent secretaries and the ministers. All those teams met and considerably looked at the draft policy that we had developed and went further to refine it. This made our life much easier when the policy was going through the approval process because all the ministers who are in the Social Services and Poverty Eradication Cluster of the ZimAsset had sight and discussed the draft policy before (GoZ2).
At national level, it involved consulting the central government and the development partners. The Ministry of Finance and MPSLSW, bilateral and multilateral agencies were the key players at national level. These were deemed to be the key people dealing directly with policy. According to GoZ2, provincial and district consultative workshops were also held to get views of stakeholders involved at those levels. Validation workshops were then held at both provincial and national levels to ensure that the policy draft encompassed views from all the stakeholders. Impact Research, a research consultancy firm operational in both Zimbabwe and South Africa, led the consultation.

The involvement of the parliament in the development of the NSPPF could not be ascertained. The parliament is a national and formal institution that bears visible power (see figure 3 in chapter 2) and is principally supposed to play an important role in ensuring that ‘the policy process is democratic, accountable and serves the rights of the people’ as asserted by Gaventa (2005). The lack of active involvement of the parliament in the development of the NSPPF undermined an institution whose political capacity would have helped pushed the agenda to the executive arm of the government. It is not surprising that attempts by external agencies to influence the parliament to vote for more budget commitment for social protection have not born much success.

We actually had a breakfast meeting with the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Poverty Eradication which is social protection essentially to actually give them the evidence and push for the budget process that they need as parliamentarians to make sure that social protection is adequately reflected in the budget and it’s adequately resourced without it losing the whole human dividend that they can get (DP3).

A more political engagement with the parliamentarians from the beginning potentially produces a better political buy-in for social protection than merely ‘giving them evidence’. It was surprising to note that the chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Poverty Reduction was not aware of the NSPPF and not sure if the committee had contributed to the NSPPF (GoZI0). Indeed, the parliament is never mentioned in the NSPPF (see GoZ, 2016a). The role of the parliament is further strategically important as it ‘shepherds’ the national constitution, another important tool within the visible power arena. Despite rhetorically obliging the state to provide
social services and social care to the needy, the constitution remains a useful tool for lobbying and advocating more social spending from the government.

Participation of the communities, the intended target of the policy, is seemingly sceptical from the beginning to the end of the ‘consultative’ process. “The process was highly consultative but what I do not see is community participation. This process was spearheaded by Impact Research, perhaps they can tell you more” (GoZ8). However, participation of the communities could not be ascertained especially that social welfare officials at district level were not aware of the policy development process. In fact, it appeared they were hearing it for the first time from this researcher. “I am not aware of any social protection policy development taking place. If you get a copy, I would be more than grateful if you share with me” (GoZ6). All the four district officials were not aware of the policy. What they are familiar with are the old guiding manuals they use in the implementation of the various social protection instruments like the HSCT, BEAM and the Drought Mitigation Programme. The fact that government officials at district level were not aware of the policy makes participation rhetorical. Indeed, what is of paramount importance to the communities is receiving assistance to meet their daily needs. They are not concerned about the processes leading to the programmes that they find themselves in. When the communities are not actively involved in the policy processes they are ‘pacified’ into accepting the status quo and are reduced to ‘welfare recipients’. This conforms to the role of invisible power (see figure 3 in chapter 2).

The researcher could not ascertain the participation of NGOs in the consultation process for the NSPPF. All the research participants from the NGOs expressed ignorance of the process and some were not even aware of the policy. Although, the policy acknowledges involvement of the National Association for Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO), the umbrella body, the depth of the involvement is not clear. Most of the international NGOs, like the bilaterals and multilaterals, are domiciled in the capital city of Harare where most of the national consultative activities took place. Their absence from the day of the launch could probably indicate that they were not involved in the process. NGOs are also important providers of social protection in Zimbabwe.
In terms of lack of active civil society in social protection, Zimbabwe is like the rest of other African countries, except South Africa. There is no active civil society participation in social protection in Zimbabwe. Civil society in Zimbabwe are more into welfare provision than lobbying and advocacy. The external agencies in Zimbabwe are also not keen to support civil society activism in social protection as noted by one of the officials. “The Government of Zimbabwe does not listen to civil society and it would be meaningless for us to fund civil society organisations (CSOs) to lobby for social protection” (DP1). However, there have been attempts to register a CSO in the name of Platform for Social Protection (Zimbabwe chapter) but they have not been successful due to the alleged restrictiveness of the Private Voluntary Organisation (PVO) Act (CSO3). Consequently, there was lack of meaningful involvement of civil society in the invited space and no civil society claimed the space to lobby for social protection and that reflects a restrictive political environment.

The three bilateral agencies, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), together with UNICEF at the forefront were the key players in lobbying the government and advocating social protection policy. One of the donor officials noted “there is pressure from the SDC and DFID to cabinet to pass the National Social Protection Policy Framework” (DP4). There are challenges of ownership of the policy if the pressure to pass the policy came from the external agencies. The ‘carrot and stick’ approach applied by the external agencies worked well but it remains to be seen if all stakeholders commit themselves to the policy framework. Another donor official noted, “the National Social Protection Policy Framework was not written by the government but by consultants funded by UNICEF. Now the government owns it and claims credit” (DP2). This assertion is an admission of who drove the policy and displays that while external agencies claim that the Government drove the process, credit still belongs to them not the Government. If consultants wrote the policy, it may not be obvious that the contents are a true reflection of the priorities of the government and it does not follow that the government is bound by the policy document. This spells uncertainty over financial commitment and political will for the implementation of the policy.
On the government side, there are two levels. The technical level has a clear appreciation of social protection and the appetite to sort of push the social protection agenda is quite there. But when you go a gear up to the political and policy level, it’s not very much there and can only be there when it can be converted to votes. There is a lot of lip servicing and the approach is very rudimentary and driven by a political end rather than a social end. The unfortunate thing at both political and technical layers of the government is that their understanding of social protection is on the humanitarian side not from a developmental angle (DP3).

The above sentiments reflect that the external agencies’ success in pushing the agenda in Zimbabwe is limited to technical not political levels of the government. While external agencies may be driven by social motives to fight poverty, politicians are driven more by what keeps them in power than anything else. Therefore, the high level of the government, which is very political, remains sceptical and suspicious as noted at the Victoria Falls conference organised for the Cabinet by UNICEF in 2015.

You fly ministers all the way to Victoria Falls to be with them for two hours. The first day was actually to drill them on social protection. The second day was essentially window dressing day with the Vice President and so forth. But you could still tell that we are not talking the same language. For instance, Nyasha Chikwinya remarked “This social protection you talk about…you want to give money to the apostolic sect so that they marry more wives and bear more children”. When you hear this from a minister, you realise we are still a long way to take the agenda up there (DP3).

DP3 seemed not to realise that the ZANU PF Government does not subscribe to ‘free’ cash transfers and their attendance at the conference was merely a political gesture to maintain ‘good’ relations with external agencies. The difference between Government and the external agencies on social protection is ideological. Such conferences are measured as participation when they are essentially expected to rubberstamp the external agency agenda. The delay in the approval of the policy by the cabinet needs to be understood from an ideological standpoint. UNICEF had a full draft of the

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15 Then Minister of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development
policy around September 2015 that it submitted to the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare for her to submit it to the Cabinet for approval.

At one point we were told the draft policy had gone to the Cabinet when it did not. When the process started, she\textsuperscript{16} was very enthusiastic and, in my view, I could tell that she was taking the policy for her performance appraisal. At one point she called me to ask the whereabouts of the policy and I told her we submitted to her team. I had to make sure that her team gave her another copy. However, when political expediency took over, it disappeared from the radar until a new principal director who, sort of, understood the vision came on board and started pushing. (DP3).

It is fascinating to note that DP3 complained about the delay in approval of a draft policy submitted to the Government by UNICEF. The impression one gets is that the Government was expected to approve a UNICEF policy, not a national policy. A national policy is not driven by external agencies but by the Government itself. When a minister asks for a copy of the policy from an external agency official, it says a lot about the policy making process. It shows the power of external agencies to push their agendas. It is clear that the policy was driven by external agencies. The combination of UNICEF and other external agencies was powerful to ensure that the policy was approved. It is pertinent to note that DP3 was a Government employee before joining the community of external agencies. DP3 has been at the frontline of pushing for both the HSCT and the development of NSPPF and this confirms why external agencies are keen on recruiting from the Government as noted below.

One of the major strategies used by the external agencies is to recruit from the government. External agencies remunerate better than the governments in Zambia and Zimbabwe (and across the continent in general) and that easily attracts government technocrats to cross over. Some of the officials in the external agencies who are at the forefront of moving the social protection agenda are former government technocrats particularly in MCDSS (Zambia) and MPSLSW (Zimbabwe). This adds an interesting dimension to the debate on the role of external agencies in the evolution of social protection. As former government technocrats, they are masters of how government systems function and therefore are strategic in influencing the adoption of social protection. The government personnel see them as ‘colleagues’ not ‘strangers’ and

\textsuperscript{16} Prisca Mupfumira, the then Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare

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therefore ‘willing’ to ‘listen’ to them. The external agencies therefore piggyback on such individuals to move the social protection agenda. That is a role that the expatriate staff would struggle to achieve.

5.5.5 External financing and the rhetoric of government ownership

Ownership implies that the recipient government’s political objectives dominate the development agenda, and that transparent local political decisions are made based on broad involvement and participation of local stakeholders. This requires that government, parliament and other political institutions make decisions about policy and resource allocation serviced and advised by the civil service without distorting donor interference (Anderson and Therkildsen, 2007, p. 9).

The social protection policy process in Zimbabwe fell short of the above description of the concept of ownership. World Bank, the International Labour Organizations (ILO), the UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and all members of the OECD CPF donor group (GoZ, 2016a) supported the process of developing the NSPPF. Along the process, there were issues of funding. For instance, the World Bank funded the first draft and when their funding ended, UNICEF came on board and funded the process until the cabinet approved the policy (GoZ3).

Why donors are not funding Government directly is a political issue. The relations with the West are frozen and the money is coming from the West. So donors are more comfortable supporting government programmes but not giving government the money to a point where even when we have the money we have restrictions in as far as what money can be channelled through government systems (DP3).

While the NSPPF was passed, it is difficult to discern how both the government and the implementation partners intend to implement the policy without costing and an implementation plan. It remains to be seen how they would move forward without an outline of the costs, activities and specific ministries responsible. The implementation plan was developed separately but submitted together with the policy to the Cabinet for approval. “We submitted the policy framework together with the implementation matrix so that they are handed over to the cabinet for approval” (DP3). However, the
policy was approved and launched without an implementation plan. The absence of costing makes sceptical if there is any commitment and political will from the government and development partners to fund implementation. In the introduction of the policy, the following statement casts doubt over the commitment to fund the implementation.

It must be pointed out that because this is not a Strategic Plan nor is it a Programme document, there is no implementation plan included as part of this document. There was consensus among workshop delegates that a Policy Framework of this nature should be a guiding document for a very long time in the development of programmes and interventions designed to address both goals and objectives and, as such, could not be limited to a specific time frame (GoZ, 2016, p. 19).

There is a rhetorical attempt to commit the government to be the main funder of the policy and a deliberate reference to Section 30 of the Constitution that obliges the State to fund social protection within permissible resources. “…the state must take all practical measures within the limits of the resources available to it, to provide social security and social care to those who are in need” (GoZ, 2013a, p. 23). There is also another rhetoric to align the NSPPF to the Social Services and Poverty Eradication Cluster of the ZimAsset17 (see GoZ, 2013b).

Thus, the government commits itself to be the central funder of social protection and undertakes to mobilise new and additional resources to fund social protection. To this end, social protection will be funded mainly from government revenue augmented by funding from private sector, civil society organisations and development partners (GoZ, 2016a, p. 48).

Without costing and an implementation plan, the policy is reduced to a wish list of objectives, target group(s), policy options and expected outcomes. At the conclusion of data collection for this study, this researcher was informed that a draft of the implementation matrix was submitted to the government by UNICEF and the government was still to share the revised version (DP3). If UNICEF spearheaded the development of the implementation matrix, it then shows there is no guaranteed

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17 Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation, a national development plan for 2013-2018
commitment and ownership from the Government. External agencies, not the Government, funded the development of the policy. Brinkerhoff (1996) notes,

New policies often reconfigure roles, structures, and incentives, thus changing the array of costs and benefits to implementers, direct beneficiaries and other stakeholders…As a result of these problematic features of policy implementation, no amount of donor pressure or resources, by themselves, can produce sustained reform. It takes ownership, both of the policy change to be implemented and of any capacity-building efforts intended to enhance implementation (p. 1396).

It is difficult for the government to own a policy and fund its implementation when the policy was not its initiative. With the economy struggling and resources limited, the government may be having ‘better priorities’ than social protection. Although the development partners claimed that the government led the process, there were a lot more efforts from development partners than the government. While the development partners have played an enormous role to develop the policy and the implementation matrix, their commitment to fund implementation is not certain, given their massive downscaling of their funding for the current phase of the Child Protection Fund (2016-2019). Overall, both the government and the development partners are hesitant to make a commitment to fund the policy. At the time of data collection, the NSPPF had just been launched and nothing was yet tangible in terms of implementation of the policy. External agency funding through UNICEF, instead of direct budget support to the government as in Zambia, has come at a cost of less external agency policy influence in Zimbabwe as shown by not so much interest from the government to robustly adopt the policy. Setting parallel structures outside the government allows the external agencies to control how their money is spent, on one hand, but also augments the government’s intransigence towards the social protection agenda, on the other hand.

5.6 Key persons in the social protection agenda
Like Zambia, there are individuals who were instrumental in the adoption of social protection by the Government of Zambia. The role of these individuals are a pointer to the fact that the social protection policy process is better understood as a political agenda than technically as a mechanism to fight poverty. For theoretical motivation for this methodological approach, see the previous chapter (4.5). For Zimbabwe, I
identified two individuals; one hired by external agencies to design and evaluate the HSCT and the other one from the Government, that is, the MPSLSW.

5.7.1 Bernd Schubert

Bernd is a German national and a prominent social protection consultant in the region of Southern Africa. He started with the design of GAPVU, a key urban safety net programme in Mozambique in the 1990s before establishing himself in Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe. He leads a consultancy firm called ‘Team Consult’. In Zambia, most probably due to the ‘German connection,’ Bernd was hired by the German bilateral agency, GTZ, to ‘single-handedly design, launch, evaluate and promote the Kalomo cash transfer pilot’ \( (SPE) \). His evaluation of Kalomo pilot reflected the positives of cash transfers (see Schubert 2005). However, the evaluation is often criticized for lacking a control group \( (GRZI) \) resulting in overstated and too simplistic claims about impacts (Adesina, 2011). Nevertheless, Schubert’s evaluation of the Kalomo pilot was very significant in that it cultivated the desire to do more pilots in Zambia and further evaluations, as well as attracting the attention of other countries in the region to adopt social cash transfers. Schubert’s role in Zambia reflects how international policy consultants participate in facilitating an external agency-driven social protection agenda. The GTZ strategically hired him as an expert and the Government of Zambia treat him as such. It is pertinent to understand Schubert’s role in the sense that he was simply fulfilling the expectations of the donor (GTZ), that is, trying as much as possible to influence the adoption of cash transfers by the Government of Zambia.

His role in designing the Kalomo pilot in Zambia earned him a similar job in Zimbabwe. UNICEF hired Bernd to do a design and initial evaluation of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (see Schubert, 2011, Schubert and Chirchir, 2012). His recruitment to design and evaluate the programme was based on his ‘policy entrepreneurship’ across the region. Schubert also did a scoping study for UNICEF on ‘child sensitive social protection’ (Schubert, 2010) that was used by UNICEF to influence the design of the HSCT programme. Schubert’s roles in Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe reflect how international policy consultants participate in facilitating an external agency-driven social protection agenda. The external agencies strategically hire them as experts and the recipient governments treat them as such. The recipient governments may not be able to influence the
process because the consultant is hired and paid by the external agencies. It is pertinent to understand Schubert’s role in the sense that he was simply fulfilling the expectations of the external agencies, that is, trying as much as possible to emphasize the value of cash transfers in reducing poverty.

5.6.2 Sydney Mhishi

The late Mhishi served for many years in the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare in Zimbabwe. He was very instrumental in the social protection discourse in Zimbabwe, first as the Director of Social Services, and secondly as the Acting Principal Director for the ministry. He became the face of social protection at the ministry as he essentially facilitated the adoption of the HSCT by the Government of Zimbabwe as well as the development of the National Social Protection Policy before he passed on in 2015 (GoZ3). He wanted the HSCT to start as a full-scale programme instead of pilots but the external agencies were hesitant to take that route (ibid.). He was a strategic figure as he mastered the concept of social protection and the art of dealing with external agencies and other government ministries. “During the time of Mhishi, there was a lot of progress and he would get things moving. Now there is a gap” (DP1). Thus, the external agencies and other development partners were comfortable working with him and were sure that he understood them well and would articulate their position to his ministry and the government as a whole.

He was the overall director managing the HSCT and when there would be researches related to the programme he would be the Principal Investigator. In terms of development of the NSPPF, he was again the documented responsible person in terms of spearheading its formulation and initiating its implementation, which he did not live long to see (GoZ1).

Mhishi’s role is in conformity to Brinkerhoff’s observation (1996),

Unless someone or some group in the country where policy reform is being pursued feels that the changes are something that they need to see happen, externally initiated change efforts whether at the local or national level are likely to fail. Without policy ‘champions’ who are willing and able to serve as leaders for change, reform is not possible (p. 1396).

However, other government officials thought he was too close to donors and that derailed his promotion and appointment to higher and more influential posts like
permanent secretary (GoZ2). This reflects that the technical level of the government generally embraced the HSCT while there was little commitment at political level. Thus, submitting to an external agency agenda would potentially make one ‘unpopular’ with political authority.

5.7 Conclusion

External actors heavily influenced the social protection policy process in Zimbabwe. The Enhanced Social Protection Programme (ESPP), though influenced by the World Bank, is crucial in the evolution of social protection in Zimbabwe. It marked the beginning of the social protection agenda and demonstrated that government owned and funded interventions are sustainable compared to interventions outside the government system. The rise of the social protection agenda in Zimbabwe was an ideological battle at three fronts.

Firstly, it was between UNICEF and the World Bank. For instance, UNICEF and other external agencies would not take over the ESPP co-developed by the World Bank and the GoZ. Rather, they dominated and influenced the design and rollout of NAP for OVC through the power of finance. Furthermore, UNICEF contested the World Bank’s push for conditional cash transfers in favour of unconditional cash transfers, which it preferred. Given UNICEF’s control over the donor pulled CPF, it was strategically positioned to ensure that its preference prevailed over that of the World Bank. Secondly, the ideological fight was between the Government of Zimbabwe and the external agencies (UNICEF, World Bank and others) as the ZANU PF Government is ideologically rooted in agricultural input support to the people to support their productive capacities, not giving them cash. UNICEF was central to the development of the NSPPF and took it as an opportunity to push for ‘child sensitive social protection’ in line with its international mandate. The fact that external agencies did not fund the Government of Zimbabwe directly compromised the role of the Government. UNICEF and the other external agencies were therefore in charge of the process as they provided the funds. The fact that the Government did not fund the process provided more space for UNICEF and the other external agencies to drive the process. UNICEF handpicked and hired consultants that it knew would push its approach to social protection rather than agricultural inputs (government’s preference) or conditional cash transfers (World Bank’s preference). Participation and consultation in that regard could be understood in terms of rubberstamping policy
contents from the consultants. Whilst there was some degree of participation at national level, the districts and communities were peripheral to the process. Since the policy was driven by external agencies, the commitment of the Government to fund its implementation is not guaranteed.

The concession to approve and launch the policy was a gesture from the Government to keep the external agencies on board. External agency commitment to the policy is also not guaranteed especially since DFID, the biggest donor for cash transfers is downscaling its support. Given the ideological standoff, the Government allows external agencies to fund cash transfers but is not obliged to do likewise. The external agencies can decide to quit or threaten to quit the HSCT but still the Government has its own priorities. Thirdly, it was a contestation within the government itself as different ministries that run social protection programmes (including the traditional leading MPSLSW) ‘battled’ for control of the process and prevalence of their individual policy positions while the Ministry of Finance was not convinced to fund ‘free cash’ transfers. Ministries conflicted over which ministry was best placed to coordinate the process as they thought MPSLSW was a ‘weak’ convenor.

Overall, the future of social protection in Zimbabwe as desired by external agencies is dependent on external agencies’ ‘goodwill’. Without further commitment from external agencies to fund their social protection and given the ideological differences with the Government of Zimbabwe, the donor driven HSCT and NSPPF sit on a precarious footing both financially and institutionally.
Chapter 6 Social Cash Transfers in Zambia and Zimbabwe

6.0 Introduction
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the two-flagship cash transfer programmes, that is, the Social Cash Transfer (SCT) programme in Zambia and the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) programme in Zimbabwe. The chapter looks at the level of adoption for the two countries and the progress to date in terms of upscaling of cash transfers, given the fact that both were donor initiatives. This chapter also reflects the extent to which the external actors succeeded in influencing the adoption of cash transfers by the two governments. The two programmes are compared in terms of targeting, design and implementation, ownership, relationship with other social protection programmes, political context and financing. Generally, the two countries compare well in terms of how the ‘flagship’ social cash transfer programmes unfolded. It is pertinent to understand how the two programmes were designed, who designed them, why each was designed in a particular way, the motivation behind the design as well as implications for implementation. A discussion of the political contexts for the two countries is important to have a better picture of why the two Governments responded differently or similarly to social cash transfers. It helps to understand why the two countries relate differently or similarly with donors and why they have different or resembling policy preferences. Financing of cash transfers is quite contentious in sub-Saharan Africa and thus makes a fascinating comparative of the two cash transfer programmes in Zambia and Zimbabwe. The two governments of Zambia and Zimbabwe have different levels of commitment to funding of the cash transfers. For instance, the Government of Zambia, besides its resistance in the formative years of the social cash transfers, has by now generally taken the lead in financing the flagship SCT programme. This is contrary to the Zimbabwean case where the government buy-in to the HSCT programme is still uncertain, as the programme is almost 100% donor dependent. The chapter concludes by highlighting the implications of the two countries’ experiences for the social cash transfers.

6.1 Comparing the SCT of Zambia and the HSCT of Zimbabwe
This section makes a comparison of the cash transfer programmes in terms of design, implementation and the political economy embedded in those processes.
6.1.1 Targeting the poorest of the poor

In both countries, Bernd Schubert (see chapter 5), an international consultant, was hired to design the SCT and HSCT. Targeting in Zambia was based on a 2003 National Household Survey conducted by PWAS that concluded that the destitute and incapacitated households constituted around 10% of all the households in the country (MCDSS and GTZ, 2004, p. 2). The 10% threshold was further validated and confirmed by a study on the incapacitated poor commissioned by the GTZ in 2004 (MCDSS and GTZ, 2004; MCDSS and GTZ, 2007). The SCT in Zambia used the PWAS structures and followed a community based targeting system that involved stakeholders from the village to district levels (MCDSS and GTZ, 2007). In Zimbabwe, a pilot ‘census’ in Goromonzi district and ward 5 revealed that 9% of all the households in ward 5 were labour constrained and food poor and comprised all categories of vulnerable people including children plus orphans, the elderly, chronically ill and the disabled (MoLSS and UNICEF, 2011) and that became the basis for targeting for the HSCT. Based on the 9% threshold, targeting for the HSCT was done by the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZimStat) whose officials went into the communities to do the enumeration (GoZ3).

Despite the empirical logic for targeting the “ultra-poor”, it became a quota that excluded millions of poor people because poverty is much higher than the prescribed thresholds in both Zambia and Zimbabwe. Therefore, this approach to targeting is discredited for separating out “an especially deserving sub-set of the poor from amongst the larger proportion of poor people that are little differentiated from each other in terms of the material conditions of their lives”. (Ellis, 2008, p. 10). Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with the communities in Rushinga district in Zimbabwe revealed that the enumeration process was exclusionary in three ways. First, ZimStat is associated with the national census and therefore some households (some poor and deserving) evaded the agency enumerators because they thought they were doing a national census, an exercise known for a long and strenuous questionnaire. Second, the district has a poor road network, thus the ZimStat enumerators would reach more households close to the roads than those off-road or linked by bad roads. Third, the ZimStat enumerators did not mention the impending cash transfer programme, hence the community mistook them for a routine exercise that they did not feel obliged to participate.
In Zimbabwe, the HSCT was designed as a component of the National Plan of Action for Orphaned and Vulnerable Children (NAP for OVC II) 2011-15 which sought to respond to the fact that “more than half of the population including 3.5 million children were living below the food poverty line” owing to the general economic decline (Schubert 2010a, p. 7). Team Consult led by Schubert were recruited to support Ministry of Labour and Social Services’ (MoLSS) Department of Social Services to “design a national government owned and coordinated cash transfer programme which targeted food poor and labour constrained households” (Schubert 2010a, p. 8). On paper, Schubert and his team were recruited by the MoLSS but were paid by UNICEF, which allowed UNICEF to play an oversight role over the process. That had an implication on ownership of the process (see section 6.1.2).

There is acknowledgement that the cash received would not be adequate given the acute poverty and high prices of food in Zimbabwe. Schubert (2010a: 17) assumed that other supportive mechanisms already in place like Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM), Assisted Medical Treatment Orders (AMTOs) and other non-cash assistance would complement the Harmonised Cash Transfer Programme whilst other cash transfers would be replaced (ibid.). However, such expectation would be difficult to fulfil in the context of financially constrained national programmes like BEAM and AMTO and NGOs running parallel projects. As shall be seen in section 6.1.3, the setting up of both the SCT and HSCT were problematic in the sense that there were already government-run national programmes of a similar nature.

6.1.2 Ownership and participation
In both countries, MPSLSW (MoLSS when the HSCT started) (Zimbabwe) and MCDSS (Zambia) implement the cash transfer programmes with funding support from the donors. Despite being a partnership in that sense of implementation, government ownership is questionable (ownership is defined in section 5.5.5). Ownership is crucial because interests conflict (Killick et al., 1998). Anderson and Therkildsen (2007) and Killick et al. (1998) underscore the primacy of government objectives and interests as well as the broad participation of local stakeholders in programme or policy development and reform. The evolution of both SCT and HSCT does not fully reflect that there was local ownership and broad participation. Both programmes were initiated and funded by donors and established parallel to...
government run national programmes. MCDSS (Zambia) and MoLSS (Zimbabwe) were only implementation structures for the cash transfer programmes. In both cases, UNICEF and DFID spearheaded the setting up of the cash transfer units within the two ministries and worked closely with the unit staff (GoZ8, SPE and CP3). Donors funded the units in terms of resources and salaries. Essentially, the units are the core of the implementation of the cash transfer programmes as they are in charge of coordination and implementation (GoZ8, GRZ9). While UNICEF and other donors saw it as a move to strengthen coordination and build the capacity of those ministries to run cash transfers, the implications were problematic.

…that unit was actually quite wealthy as compared to other units in that department. I think there were some jealous because they were also better paid and had land cruisers, computers, etc. So it did not help. It became more institutionalized in government, it created resentment between the well-funded donor unit and other government units. So the idea of establishing that unit in government was good but the way they did it did not create much government ownership of the programme. It was like donors were funding these people pretending they were supporting the government. (SPE).

While the above sentiments were said in reference to Zambia, the researcher also discovered that the same applied to Zimbabwe. In fact, in Zimbabwe, the unit was disbanded in 2014 (GoZ8) while the one in Zambia still exists. Anderson and Therkildsen (2007) note that “parallel administrative systems to handle the implementation of donor supported activities-such as donor controlled management units-undermine ownership” (p. 9). However, it is common in both countries for donors to claim that ‘the government is in charge’ (CP3, CP4, CP5, DP2, DP3, DP4) yet government officials assert that ‘the pressure came from the donors’ (GRZ3, GRZ4, GoZ1, GoZ2, GoZ3, GoZ8).

The Zambian case notably changed when the Patriotic Front (PF) came into power in 2011 and began to prioritise the SCT in terms of political will and budgetary commitment. There is now evident government ownership of the SCT, which is attributable to persistent donor influence and the PF’s pro-poor political ideology. For Zimbabwe, ownership of the HSCT is still a huge challenge as the programme is overly dependent on donor funds. Gibson et al. (2005) invariably note that the source of the aid “usually retains a great deal of control over the distribution of these
resources” (p. 12). The current status of the HSCT and the status of the SCT between 2003 and 2011 befit the observation below.

Where social protection is assigned low political importance by the ruling coalition, transnational actors can become the main driving force in policy making. Transnational actors may be able to promote the expansion of social protection in a particular country in the face of opposition or, perhaps, ambivalence of ruling elites, particularly where the donors involved have a relatively high level of holding power in relation to the ruling coalition. (Lavers and Hickey, 2016, p. 5).

As further noted by Nino-Zarazua et al. (2010), cash transfers can only be institutionalized, on one hand, when there is political commitment as currently under the PF regime. On the other hand, cash transfers are unlikely to be institutionalized where there is lack of political commitment as is in the case of Zimbabwe.

6.1.3 Undermining existing national programmes

When donors initiated cash transfers in both countries, the two governments were already running Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) (Zambia) and Public Assistance (PA) (Zimbabwe). When GTZ introduced the cash transfer pilot, the Government of Zambia had re-launched PWAS three years prior with the same objectives to address food poverty worsened by the HIV/AIDS crisis and incapacitated households (Pruce and Hickey, 2017). However, GTZ ‘marketed’ cash transfers as a better intervention than PWAS. The justification for cash was generic, that is, cash allows the flexibility to meet the needs of a specific individual, is logistically and administratively cheaper than assistance in kind, and its propensity to be saved. The GTZ defied the appeal from government officials to integrate the pilot into the national (PWAS) that had support from the Minister of Finance (ibid.). However, the cash transfer pilot was implemented within the same PWAS structures, which shows it could have been at least plausible to integrate it with PWAS. It is important to note that PWAS was the major social protection initiative from the government (Devereux, 2006), historically and in practice. Furthermore, PWAS was on record for reaching all the 72 districts during the years when it was fully operational (ILO, 2008). However, in 2003 PWAS only reached 0.5% of the population as opposed to a target of 2% that year (Devereux, 2006). There has been a massive drop of government budgetary commitment for PWAS since 2008 (ILO,
2008) as cash transfers significantly got more attention than other instruments (Harland, 2014).

While the argument for cash somehow was sensible, why GTZ chose to set up a parallel intervention can be understood in the sense that

…donors and governments are answerable to, and have to satisfy, radically contrasting constituencies, and their respective remits differ accordingly. Governments have to worry about their electorates, particularly about strategic groups of supporters and ‘floaters’. Donors have to remain within the policy parameters of their boards (IFIIs) or governments (bilaterals). (Killick et al., 1998, p. 91).

The cash transfer initiative by GTZ was thus a policy directive from the German administration in Berlin, a supranational and closed space (Gaventa, 2005), where the Zambian government and the local communities had no power and influence. Due to the hidden power (Gaventa, 2005) of a bilateral agency and all its financial power, GTZ successfully pushed for the pilot and the government, financially weak as it were, could not resist. As a bilateral donor, the GTZ was thus more answerable to the German government than the recipient government of Zambia. That also confirms the observation that, “in foreign aid, the feedback loop between recipients and decision makers is broken; only donors have political leverage over the decision making process” (Martens, 2008, p. 285). It was also a time when global politics (Hickey, 2007) were really in favour of social cash transfers and the GTZ had to align to that to be relevant to the contemporary development trends. In this respect, social protection emerged as a global agenda pushed from a global platform by bilateral and multilateral agencies. Therefore, GTZ was able to forge ahead with that agenda as mandated by the German government, not the government of Zambia, making it an externally driven initiative. On the contrary, Schuring and Lawson-McDowall (2011) are of the view that donors could not take much initiative due to a policy void that existed during those years. However, the way the Kalomo pilot unfolded points to donor dominance. The decision to implement the pilot in Kalomo is often overstated in the context of drought and high HIV/AIDS prevalence. However, it was also a GTZ prerogative as owners of the funds and Kalomo district also fell within their operational area (GRZI).
Similarly, in Zimbabwe the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer Programme (HSCT) was introduced when there were already social assistance programmes in place run by the government, major ones being, the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) and Public Assistance (PA). As outlined in chapter 5, BEAM is a fee-waiver facility that seeks to retain children in schools by paying fees for orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) while PA is a cash transfer to incapacitated households. BEAM could be one of the best social protection interventions for Zimbabwe that has yielded positive results in terms of school enrolment, retention and completion. Both PA and BEAM are national programmes run by the Ministry of Public Service and Social Welfare. However, the HSCT was established to replace PA and the two programmes do not run concurrently in the same districts. PA now only exists in districts where there is no HSCT as this programme is still to be extended to all districts. BEAM at one point (2011) was funded together with the HSCT from the Child Protection Fund (CPF) but the donors have since dropped it and it is now the sole responsibility for the government with all its financial woes. On one hand, the government remains attached to PA and BEAM, regardless of its fiscal constraints, and, nonetheless, the same government is not fully committed to the HSCT. On the other hand, donors support the HSCT and are not willing to integrate into the national programmes like PA. Like Zambia, what unfolds in Zimbabwe is an attempt by a donor-driven HSCT (implemented in a few districts) to replace the PA that is a national programme.

6.1.4 Pilots and evidence generation

When GTZ exited social protection in Zambia, the coming in of other donors was not a coincidence but conformed to the global drive for social protection as well as high levels of poverty in Zambia. Quintessentially, social protection was increasingly becoming a popular agenda in global politics. The interest to do more pilots was perhaps informed by three reasons. Firstly, it was a period when donors were still experimenting with different models to see what would be convenient. Secondly, donors wanted to generate as much evidence as possible that they would use to influence the adoption of cash transfers in Zambia and in the region. Thirdly, donors were quite aware of the cost implications of a national cash transfer and would not attempt to fund a national scaling up. The rise of social protection is a product of global donor policy influence as noted by Hickey (2007). The DFID, Irish Aid,
Finland and UNICEF were quick to join the social protection agenda and continued funding various models of social cash transfers in Zambia.

By contrast, Zimbabwe only had one pilot in Goromonzi district in 2011. Why there was only 1 pilot in Zimbabwe is understood in the context that social cash transfers were introduced 8 years after Kalomo. By that time, donors had ‘enough evidence’ over the feasibility and value of cash transfers as a tool for fighting poverty. Despite ‘enough evidence’, still donors would not commit to fund a national cash transfer programme. The donors resisted appeals from the Ministry of Labour and Social Services to have full-scale cash transfer programme claiming that they needed to test first. Hence, they started with 10 districts and then scaled up to 10 more to reach a total of 20. At 20 districts, funding challenges surfaced in Zimbabwe whilst Zambia ran a total of 11 pilots between 2003 and 2011. Similarly, in Zambia, donors resisted calls from the MCDSS to scale up cash transfers to all the districts (72 by then) until the Government made a decision to do so in 2013. This confirms the fact that donors were only interested to ensure that Government adopt the cash transfers and take over the funding not to fund full scale cash transfer programme themselves. While it is the responsibility of the government to fund social protection, the MMD government was not obliged to fulfil that responsibility through a donor-initiated programme. That is one of the reasons why the government appealed to donors to scale up ‘their’ programme. Furthermore, both the government and donors were fully aware of the cost implications of a national upscale.

It is common for donors to attribute the rise of the social cash transfers on the development agenda to evidence built over the years. Accordingly, donors have spent lots of resources on evaluations and dissemination of the findings. For instance, findings from the baseline and evaluation of the Kalomo pilot were very ‘promising’ (GRZI). In his evaluation, Schubert (2005, p. 13) states that the overall wellbeing of beneficiary households immensely improved as they could now afford food, begging reduced, they were now saving on livestock such as goats and chicken, and school attendance improved.

Ministry officials echoed the same sentiments.

We saw absenteeism dropping for children in schools, we saw enrolment rising by about 7%, we saw the numbers of households serving 2 meals or
more increasing, we also saw the dietary diversity also improving, we also saw households starting to keep goats and chickens as a way of investing that cash (GRZ1).

However, Schubert’s evaluation did not have a control group, “so when it came to attribution, it was not scientifically convincing to say it’s because of the cash transfer and we learnt a lesson” (GRZ1). In spite of that shortcoming, Schubert’s findings were positive and adequate to attract much attention for the Kalomo pilot. Nonetheless, it still took years to influence the government of Zambia to adopt social cash transfers. The Kalomo pilot became a stepping-stone and a learning point for the other pilots in other districts and the continent as a whole.

Learning from the loopholes of Schubert’s evaluation of Kalomo pilot, rigorous evaluations were conducted for the other pilots. For the Child Grant,

The focus was the under 5 children regardless of being poor or rich. We made sure that we now had a very robust impact evaluation design study and we engaged some consultancy firm from America called AIR (American Institutes for Research) because we wanted results that could withstand any scrutiny from any part of the world. So we really went for the top-drawer research firm and they designed an evaluation that lasted 48 months. Again the design was also very rigorous as well as the impact evaluation (GRZ1).

After the Kalomo evaluation, the ministry and the cooperating partners became cautious to do ‘robust’ evaluations that would generate ‘credible evidence’ to bolster the social protection agenda. Indeed, 48 months were long and adequate to prove the value of cash transfers.

The Kalomo results, although the design was a bit defective, are the ones that gave us the motivation to continue expanding the scheme. So because of the improvement in results, we also saw government now coming to start supporting the programme. The government started putting some money and I think the first money from government came in 2006 when they started with very little money but continued increasing the money with time (GRZ1).

It is important to note, first, that donors invested a lot in impact evaluations to prove to their mother governments (sources of funds) and to the recipient government that cash transfers are feasible. Secondly, the Child Grant pilots were only a fulfilment of
UNICEF’s interests to drive the social protection agenda in the context of children in line with their organisational mandate. However, with so much evidence generated from numerous pilots, still it took long to scale up cash transfers in Zambia. Effectively, more cash transfer models were trialled in Zambia than any other part of Africa (SPE). Thus, donors could afford to hire ‘top-drawer’ research institutes, from as far as the United States of America (USA) to evaluate a small pilot project in Zambia. At the end of it all, donors, more than the government, needed the evidence because what matters to the government is how much political capital it derives (see 6.2.1 in this chapter).

The experiences of the two countries essentially show that political capital is more valuable than evidence. Did the evidence really matter to the governments of President Sata and Robert Mugabe? After running the Kalomo pilot and a host of other pilots, it took almost a decade for the government of Zambia to decide to scale up the cash transfers.

It took so long because it was a new idea and there was no champion in the government for resource commitment. The ministry (MCDSS) had no power. It was a pilot and government would not just take it over when they knew it would have significant impact over resources. The minister of Finance (Ng’andu Magande from 2003 to 2008) at the time was problematic he did not want cash transfers. We tried everything at all levels to sensitize actors in the political system—trainings inside and outside the country, conferences, and also research to make sure that there was evidence. It was difficult to beat ideology with evidence. (CP7).

The Patriotic Front was driven by a pro-poor ideology that contrasted the neo-liberalist Movement for Multi-Party Democracy. Consequently, the SCT became very strategic to Sata’s PF party ideology and pro-poor founding principles. The argument for political expedience makes substance especially when one considers the fact that Sata initially “actually struck out any mention of cash transfers in red ink from the first draft” of the PF manifesto (Pruce and Hickey, 2017, p. 18). Furthermore, the massive increase of government funding for the SCT programme only emerged in 2013, two years after Sata ascended to presidency. In Zimbabwe, the Mugabe regime had its own politically strategic programmes and did not see the value of taking the lead in funding the externally-initiated HSCT. Hence, the HSCT remained a donor
programme. On the contrary, Sata was keener to try cash transfers after losing presidential elections 3 times.

What also pertinently emerges from the pilots are donors pushing individual agendas, that is, GTZ and Schubert’s ultra-poor targeting, the DFID and Stephen Kidd’s social pension, and UNICEF’s Child Grant. Stephen Kidd, who was Senior Social Development Advisor at the DFID before moving to Help Age International, was very keen on pensions and he believed in the right of all older persons to get a pension (*SPE*). To date, the move to have a social pension in Zambia has not materialised despite the Katete pilot and ILO efforts to push for it. The Katete pilot also brewed inter-ministerial tension between the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS) and Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) over who should be the custodian of the social pension pilot (*SPE*). It emerged that the MoLSS could have been envious of the donor resources that the MCDSS was gaining out of the programme. The MLSS felt it had a legitimate claim to run the Katete pilot on the grounds that it was also responsible for contributory pensions in Zambia. However, the Katete pilot was essentially a categorical transfer targeted by age not a pension, thus implying that it was supposed to be in the jurisdiction of the MCDSS. Consequently, donor agendas potentially bring disharmony to the Government, as ministries ‘fight’ for donor money. “The pilots have very precarious institutional and financial arrangements, and reflect directly the interest of donors rather than a considered strategy by the Government, which has been reluctant to endorse them” (Nino-Zarazua et al., 2010, p. 14). Consequently, the government of Zambia could not take full responsibility for the pilot projects and scale them up to national level (Devereux and White, 2010, p. 60) until the Patriotic Front took over government in 2011.

6.1.5 Programmatic disharmony and social tension

Evaluations of cash transfers often overstate their ‘positivity’ with little attention to the quality of delivery and implementation (see Siampondo, 2015; FAO 2013; Schubert 2005; AIR 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a, 2014b). This researcher’s discussions with the beneficiary communities reinforced some of the positives of cash transfers (see details of the FGDs in chapter 1). For instance, some families were saving on small livestock like chickens and goats; some were constructing houses and toilets out of the savings; and others were buying farming inputs such as seeds and fertilizer; and
generally children were going to school (FGDs). In rare cases, those who are not in the programme borrow some money from recipient colleagues in times of need. It was interesting to note that communities can easily share food not money, money can only be lent but not shared. Conversely, the programmes are a threat to social cohesion as they simmer tension between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In both Zambia and Zimbabwe, the researcher noticed that non-beneficiaries envy cash transfer beneficiaries, which distinctly divides the community into two groups of ‘the under-privileged many’ and ‘a privileged few’ (FGDs). Similarly, MacAuslan and Riemenschneider (2011) note that cash transfers are pervasive interventions that involve processes that affect social relations such as “initial mobilisation, targeting, registration, payment, communications and, often, monitoring and evaluation” (p. 61).

A study of the Zimbabwe Emergency Cash Transfer Programme (ZECT) implemented by Concern Worldwide and funded by WFP from November 2009 to March 2010 as well as Mchinji Social Cash Transfer (MSCT) Scheme in Malawi revealed tension between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (ibid.). ZECT was an attempt to replace food assistance with an equivalent value in cash. However, ZECT targeting and distribution of cash led to “resentment and tension that participants considered just as significant as having enough food” while mobilisation and targeting processes both strengthened the position of the headman and generated substantial resentment” under MSCT (MacAuslan and Riemenschneider, 2011, p. 64). Ellis (2008) notes that the sense of unfair exclusion influences manipulative behaviours such as restructuring of household demography in order to meet scheme criteria for inclusion; collusion between community welfare committee members and beneficiaries on sharing benefits; so-called ‘elite capture’ in which community leaders or local public officials ensure their friends and relatives are on beneficiary lists; and a sense by public officials that they deserve remuneration for helping manage transfers since this is an extra work obligation not envisaged by their very low salaries (p. 1).

This contrasts with Hickey (2007) who views social protection as an instrument for building social solidarity. The researcher discovered that most of the non-beneficiaries deserved assistance and this reflects the social divisiveness of targeted cash transfers in Zambia and Zimbabwe. In fact, this researcher was inundated by

http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
inquiries from non-beneficiaries who assumed the researcher had come to add them to the cash transfer programmes. Cash transfer beneficiaries are disqualified from other programmes like the farm inputs and drought mitigation run by either the government or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in both countries on the pretext of ‘double-dipping’. Disqualification of SCT beneficiaries from other social assistance programmes is against the official position for both MCDSS and MPSLSW that stipulates that cash transfer beneficiaries can be enrolled in other programmes since the cash is not enough. The village heads and councillors are not happy for not being involved in both SCT and HSCT and thus sanction the discrimination of the cash transfer beneficiaries given their leading role in the selection processes in the other programmes.

Despite the strenuous efforts by deliverers of social protection to explain transparently why certain individuals or families are deemed eligible to receive transfers while others are not, and this includes the involvement of communities themselves in beneficiary selection, a sense of puzzlement and unfairness about the selection process can nevertheless persist in communities long after targeting decisions have been made (Ellis, 2008, p. 1).

Rushinga is an arid and drought prone district. The beneficiaries admitted that those deserving cash transfers are far more than those currently in the programme. When the researcher heard that 22 out 25 wards are receiving cash transfers (GoZ6), he got impressed that coverage was high. However, out of a total of 17,125 households, only 775 households (equivalent to 4.5%) are benefiting from the HSCT programme (ibid.). In Kalomo, a district of 9,000 households, only 3,128 households were on cash transfers (34.76%) by the time of this research (GRZ8). Such is the reason why the government and development partners would emphasize the geographical coverage, not the caseload, for political mileage. In Zambia, the number of districts implementing the SCT increased from 11 to 17 between 2011 and 2012 but the caseload remained the same. Between 2013 and 2014 districts also increased from 17 to 50 but caseload did not change (see table 1 in chapter 4). Sata’s Government was praised for expanding the SCT programme yet what only happened in those four years was splitting districts in the name of decentralization. While the governments are keen to have a national coverage for the cash transfers, it does not follow that all those that are eligible would be included in the programmes. Even when the caseload...
is increased, still there will be exclusion of deserving cases due to resource constraints, and besides, the cash transfers target the ‘very poor’ of the poor.

In both countries, if people benefit from 2 or more programmes, it is called ‘double dipping’. Double dipping is a common concept in the humanitarian sector and it is often treated as cheating and warrants being struck off the beneficiary register. The concept of ‘double dipping’ is denigratory to the poor and contradicts the concept of harmonization. For meaningful impact, multiple programmes could target the same households. However, both the communities and NGOs believe that programmes should reach as many people as possible regardless of the value of the benefit (DP3).

Double dipping is a mentality of an economy of scarcity where resources are scarce and they need to be distributed across the many in need hence there is no economic or moral justification to give more than 1 programme to 1 household. But that at some level has actually limited the potential of complementarities to be realized across programmes. (CP2).

Social protection policies and strategies are incoherent, highly ‘sectorised’ and ‘projectised’ and that is a common challenge currently faced by many countries in Africa (Holmes and Lwanga-Ntale, 2012). The fact that “each government sector pushes its own projects and programmes” is worsened by “donor driven projects which are implemented either in partnership with government ministries or by international NGOs” (Holmes and Lwanga-Ntale, 2012, p. 16). In Zimbabwe, the name ‘harmonised’ (in HSCT) creates a false impression that the country has a harmonized social protection interventions yet on the ground programmes remain loose and fragmented. While donors advocate for harmonization of social protection instruments in both countries, the same donors who fund cash transfers also fund what they call humanitarian or emergency cash transfers that are implemented by international NGOs. World Bank (2012) similarly notes that the emergency cash transfers target a very small fraction of the population that is directly influenced by donor preferences.

Since these cash transfer programmes are not seated in a central organization, their management information systems are usually ad hoc, are not linked to other programmes, and are often of poor quality. The fragmented nature and patchy coverage of these cash transfer programmes reflect their lack of domestic ownership and coordination (World Bank, 2012b, p. 4).
In Zambia, DFID, which is the major donor for SCT, was also funding pilot emergency cash transfers in 5 districts in the Western and Southern provinces of Zambia through Concern Worldwide and Save the Children ‘to see how they can make social protection shock responsive’ (*CP4*). Similarly, in Zimbabwe, DFID that funds 75% of the HSCT also were funding humanitarian cash transfers through World Vision and Save the Children (*DP1*). However, this could be understood in two contexts. Firstly, the London Administration, the major funder of social cash transfers through DFID, is no longer interested in cash transfers unless they are humanitarian interventions (*DP1*). Secondly, donors would want to keep the international NGOs (their ‘kinsfolk’) relevant, although the quick excuse is that governments are slow and bureaucratic. Similarly, the noted INGOs in both countries claimed that they were more efficient and responsive than the government (*NGO1-NGO6*). Holmes and Lwanga-Ntale (2012) note that governments in poor countries “lack the technical, fiscal, management and logistical capacity to manage complex programmes effectively, hence the need for external support” (p. 16). While that could be true, funding parallel programmes through NGOs does not make it any better. If donors would invest in building capacity of the governments, it would make a huge difference. Building the capacity of the government to run government owned programmes and policies would be a long-term investment in government institutions in Africa.

### 6.1.6 Value, coverage and predictability

The finding that the cash transfers result in savings needs to be accepted with caution as this researcher discovered that only smaller families are better positioned to save than bigger families. The average household size in Zambia is 6 and 5 for Zimbabwe, which implies that the majority of families in both countries are big. The value of the cash transfer is not adequate and as long as the concept of ‘double dipping’ prevails, the beneficiary poor and incapacitated households will still struggle for basic subsistence.

That cash transfers should be predictable is brought to test as both the SCT of Zambia and the HSCT of Zimbabwe follow an irregular pattern of inconsistency. For better impact and outcomes, “cash transfers need to be predictable, of adequate value, and provided on an ongoing basis” (McCord, 2010, p. 23). Predictability of cash transfers in Zambia and Zimbabwe is an illusion regardless of the reasons from both the
governments and development partners. Skipping months stifles planning and brings misery and uncertainty to the households as some lose their small savings and others get indebted as they wait for payment (FGDs). In all FGDs in both countries, participants bemoaned that it was common for the transfers to stop for several months and resume later without recouping the lost months. In Zimbabwe, in 2015 the programme stopped around March and then restarted in September (FGDs) and in 2017, they would get lump sums for skipped months at times, and at the very best, the communities were receiving cash once in four months (GoZ6). In Zambia, the payments were almost six months behind as beneficiaries of the Social Cash Transfer scheme in Kalomo got their payment for July/August 2016 in January 2017.¹⁸

Furthermore, to think that those who receive the small amounts of cash would graduate from poverty is too ambitious (Slater, 2009). Graduation from poverty is quite contentious if the transfers are unpredictable and have low value, which most of them are. The concept of graduation “involves households moving out of poverty and away from dependence on social protection transfers, to an independent and sustainable livelihood” (Slater, 2009, p. 1). It is common sense that a household has to meet its consumption needs before it invests in human capital and livelihoods (Devereux, 2000, McCord, 2010). Figure 13 compares payments for the SCT of Zambia and HSCT of Zimbabwe.

![Figure 13 Comparing the values of the SCT and HSCT payments](http://etd.uwc.ac.za/)

The HSCT has a superior value to the SCT because the HSCT payment is pegged per size of household while size of household does not matter for SCT. The HSCT treats disability as one of the vulnerabilities while the SCT has a different payment for them but still inferior to the HSCT payment.

For the HSCT in Zimbabwe, a household of 1 person receives US$10 per month (paid bi-monthly as US$20) when the monthly food poverty datum line (FPDL) is US$30.38 per person (ZimStat, 2017, p. 15). By the same token, a household of 4

¹⁸ Focus Group Discussion with the beneficiaries in Kalomo district on 31 January 2017.
members and above receives US$25 per month (paid as US$50 bi-monthly) against a monthly FPDL of US$151.89 per household of 5 persons (ibid.).

Similarly, in Zambia a household receives ZMK70 (US$7) per month (ZMK 140 (US$14) bi-monthly) and ZMK90 (US$9) (ZMK180 (US$18) bi-monthly) for a household with person(s) with disability against an average monthly household expenditure of ZMK1.588 (US$158.80) (ZMK2.680 (US$268 for urban and ZMK763 (US$76.30) for rural)\(^{19}\) (Republic of Zambia CSO, 2016, p. 88). When this combines with unpredictability and the targeting criteria, graduation becomes elusive. Figures 14 to 17 compare the two cash transfers in terms of monthly value versus monthly expenditure, geographical coverage and caseload.

Figure 14 HSCT monthly value versus monthly expenditure in Zimbabwe

![Figure 14 HSCT monthly value versus monthly expenditure in Zimbabwe](http://etd.uwc.ac.za/)  
Author’s creation based on figures from the MPSLSW

Figure 15 SCT monthly value versus monthly expenditure in Zambia

![Figure 15 SCT monthly value versus monthly expenditure in Zambia](http://etd.uwc.ac.za/)  
Author’s creation based on figures from the MCDSS

The huge gap between monthly expenditure and payment shows the inadequacy of the cash transfer. Discrimination from other programmes makes it worse. Large households are the most disadvantaged.

The Zambian situation is worse than Zimbabwe because size of household does not determine how much it gets. Similarly, it is difficult to reduce the gap when the households are disqualified from other programmes. Bigger households are the most disadvantaged.

\(^{19}\) Based on US$1:ZMK10 exchange rate
6.1.7 Political context

As noted in chapter 5, Zimbabwe has been under sanctions for about a decade and half. This was further compounded by a heavy debt and outstanding arrears that amounted to around US$13 billion by October 2017 (GoZ5). The major institutions owed were the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Africa Development Bank (AfDB). Zimbabwe was thus suspended from the lending list of these international financial institutions (IFIs).

We are a country under sanctions and we are in arrears too. When you are in that situation, the USAID, the British of this world, the EU and other donors will say ‘no money goes to the Government’. The international financial institutions like the World Bank, the IMF and the AfDB will say ‘you have
not paid our arrears’. So, unless we have sorted out these issues then we can have the Government running the system as was before. Remember, there is Donor Coordination Unit in the Ministry of Finance, which used to coordinate donor resources very well but now it is not possible because of sanctions and arrears (GoZ8).

The above narrative reflects how politics influenced relations between international organisations (IFIs, bilateral donors and multilateral agencies) and the Government of Zimbabwe. The USA’s and EU’s labelling of Robert Mugabe as a despot, Robert Mugabe’s backlash and intransigency to the international community and his ‘overstay’ in power did not make it any better. Mugabe would consistently label donors, some UN agencies and NGOs as ‘British and American’ agencies of a regime change agenda thereby brewing mistrust between the Government and the external players. The external agencies conformed to the politics of the day as their resources are largely from either Europe or the USA. Thus, the DFID, EU, SIDA, SDC and the Netherlands funded the HSCT through UNICEF and not the Government, and other support went through NGOs in line with the international isolation of Zimbabwe. As part of the UN family, UNICEF is considered a neutral player for both the donors and the Government. The ultimate collapse of the economy with a 500 billion percent galloping inflation in September 2008 and the GDP falling by more than 40% between 2000 and 2008 (World Bank 2011, p. 6) made the Government of Zimbabwe ‘desperate’ for external support. Hence, there were quite a number of donor initiatives, including the HSCT, upon the inception of the GNU.

It is difficult to plan much for Zimbabwe because of the hostile politics. The politicians and some government officials are stubborn yet the government never fulfils its mandate to fund 50% HSCT according to what we agreed. Now the programme is 100% donor dependent. (DP1).

On the contrary, Zambia has experienced a smooth political transition of power and the current President Edgar Lungu is the sixth (after Kaunda, Chiluba, Mwanawasa, Banda and Sata) since the country’s independence in 1964. The PF (2011 to date) is the third political party to govern Zambia since independence after UNIP (1964-1991) and MMD (1991-2011). It is for that reason that Zambia is considered as one of the fledgling democracies in Africa. Zambia qualified for the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC)\textsuperscript{20} initiative in 2005 that saw most of the debt being cancelled. There has been high economic growth since 2000 especially due to the recovery of the copper industry and agricultural sector. Relations with the international community have been ‘cordial’ and there has been a lot of donor support to the Government. There has been substantive donor support for the SCT from the DFID, Irish Aid, Finland and SIDA joining in 2016. Critical to note is the fact that donor support for the SCT is directly to the Government unlike in Zimbabwe. The SCT donors have a Joint Financial Agreement with Government of Zambia in contrast to Zimbabwe where the HSCT donors sign an agreement with UNICEF. In Zambia, UNICEF only plays the role of providing technical assistance (TA) to the Government while in Zimbabwe it plays double roles of fund manager and TA provider.

It is striking to note that external agencies managed to introduce similar cash transfer programmes in Zambia and Zimbabwe despite different contexts. This can be understood in the sense that external agencies based their interventions on the ‘crises’ that prevailed in both countries. Despite the smooth political transition in Zambia, poverty and HIV/AIDS prevalence remained high. For Zimbabwe, the HSCT came at a time of the Government of National Unity (GNU) when the country was trying to recover from the 2008 socio-political and economic meltdown and there was substantive external aid. Furthermore, the same external agencies (especially UNICEF and DFID) played a leading role and used the same strategies of influence in both countries despite funding SCT directly to the government and the HSCT through UNICEF.

\textbf{6.2 Financing social cash transfers}

Financing social cash transfers is subject to interplay of interests. Donors have been more interested in social cash transfers than other forms of social protection, as seen in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Despite the erratic disbursement of funds by the government, the Zambian government has increasingly become the leading funder for the social cash transfer scheme since the Patriotic Front took power. On the contrary, in Zimbabwe, there is little commitment from the government and funding for the social cash transfer programme remains a domain for the donors in spite of the donor fatigue. Traditionally, for both countries, contributory pensions took a lion’s share of

\footnote{\textsuperscript{20} An initiative by the IMF and the World Bank in 1996, to provide debt relief, to countries with unsustainable debt. The countries numbered 38 in total including Zambia.}
the national budget allocated for social protection. In Zimbabwe, social insurance constitutes 86% of the total social protection expenditure in Zimbabwe (GoZ and World Bank, 2016, p. 12). In Zambia, public service pension fund averaged 63% of the social protection budget between 2013 and 2018 (ZIPAR and UNICEF, 2017, p. 3). This implies that both countries’ spending on social insurance is significantly higher than other forms of social protection.

In this section, the researcher looks at how the social cash transfers in the two countries have been financed and scaled up or otherwise.

6.2.1 Donor priorities and Government priorities: An ideological contestation

The reason why donors prefer to fund social cash transfers to livelihoods programmes is about being realistic about what works and what does not. Livelihoods are difficult to support technically and financially. Social cash transfers are fairly easy you can have great impact, you know your money would be put to good use and there is assurance for the donors (CP7).

The above narrative sums up why donors are not willing to fund livelihoods programmes. While the donors go for short term quick wins, governments prefer long term investments that support the productive capacities of the people to feed themselves. Government financing for the SCT scheme was not easy to materialize as it took many years since the Kalomo pilot to get the will of the Ministry of Finance. Of all the government ministries in Zambia, the Ministry of Finance proved to be hardest to convince on the value of cash transfers to the poor people as a key mechanism for fighting poverty. During the MMD era, Finance Minister Magande did not want to hear about social cash transfers and would always rebuke the MCDSS officials who appealed to his ministry for funding (GRZ3; Kabandula and Seekings, 2016). The Ministry of Finance was also conspicuous by its absence from most of the meetings convened under the auspices of the Sector Advisory Group on Social Protection (SP-SAG) as well as other meetings called by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services. They would always find excuses yet it was clear that they did not subscribe to ‘free’ cash transfers (GRZ2). The Ministry of Finance did not also attend the 2006 regional Livingstone conference co-hosted by the Government of Zambia and the African Union.

It was very difficult to take the Ministry of Finance on board. We started engaging them a long time ago and for us to see the results we had to use
different strategies. At times we would feel like giving up because when we arranged meetings and field visits, they would say they were busy. However, we could not give up because as long as you do not get them on board then nothing is going to happen. So it was persistence, we converted 2 disciples first who then eventually started spreading the word within their meetings and they would also put up a counter-argument if someone said it is not an effective programme (GRZ1).

According to GRZ1, the first two ‘disciples’ in the Ministry of Finance to be converted to cash transfers were Mr. Chola Chabala and Mr. Mulele. Mr. Chabala was at that time deputy director monitoring and evaluation but is now the permanent secretary in the Ministry of National Development Planning. Mr. Mulele was in the modeling unit and is now at Cabinet Office working in the Secretary to Cabinet Office. They played a significant role in defending cash transfers and eventually convincing more people from the Ministry of Finance to support the cause.

Similarly, in Zimbabwe, it has also not been easy to get concession from the Ministry of Finance. However, what makes the situation of Zimbabwe quite unique is that the HSCT was introduced at a time when the economy was grounded, thus the dependency on donor funds. Tendai Biti, who became Minister of Finance in the Government of National Unity (GNU) inherited a financially constrained treasury and had to emphasize ‘we eat what we kill’ to rein fiscal discipline (Biti, 2015). To expect a treasury that struggled to pay salaries for civil servants to prioritise the HSCT was at least impractical. Despite the ‘sanity and stability’ restored in the GNU era, political and socio-economic challenges returned when the ZANU (PF) took over government again after the 2013 elections. Biti’s successor at Ministry of Finance, Patrick Chinamasa, found it hard to fund the HSCT against the liquidity challenges that confronted the government. As usual, he budgeted for the programme with little to non-disbursement of funds.

There is a conviction among the development partners that Minister Chinamasa does not believe in cash transfers and thus it is difficult to mobilise financial resources for cash transfers from the treasury against that background.

When you go to the Ministry of Finance, at technical level they understand social cash transfers but when you go to the minister, he tells you ‘no no you
can’t give people free cash, we have to look at productive sectors of the economy…’.

What the development partners seem to undermine is the fact that, besides the treasury being broke, the government cannot commit itself to a programme created by donors when it has its own priority programmes.

The resistance from the Ministries of Finance can be understood in the context of a contrast between donor shifting priorities and entrenched government programmes. Donor initiated projects cannot be sustained when donor priorities shift and without buy-in from the government. GTZ initiated the cash transfers in Zambia but later shifted to other priorities without proper exit strategy but the government would not take over. The HSCT was also set up by donors and the major donor, DFID, has downscaled its funding while the government is not interested in taking over.

Accordingly, McCord (2010) notes,

Given the unpredictability and capriciousness of donor financing flows, governments may wisely be reluctant to commit resources to pilots or their extension in the short or medium term, in order to safeguard their public finance management credibility, and avoid setting up programming, and associated expectations, which may have to be terminated if donor financing priorities shift (p. 14).

Governments have their traditional and national programmes that they keep holding to regardless of whether there is adequate financial support or not.

There is a stark contrast between government preferences and donor preferences in both countries and that can be understood in the context of the welfare regimes that were adopted since independence. Governments in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique hugely prefer an agrarian welfare regime and that renders the models in neighbouring countries (Namibia, South Africa and Botswana) and those from international agencies less appropriate and less important than programmes supporting peasant agriculture (Chinyoka, 2017). Both governments in Zambia and Zimbabwe believe in supporting the people to produce their own food and this has worked for all the past years except in periods of drought (ibid.). Both the MMD and ZANU-PF governments resisted the temptation to fund cash transfers because they believed in agricultural input subsidies. Governments consider cash transfers
consumption expenditure (not investment) that only focuses on individual poverty (not broader economic growth) and therefore prefer “investing in agricultural inputs or subsidy programmes that promote production at household level” (McCord, 2010, p. 15).

In Zambia, the Farm Input Support Programme (FISP) gets higher budget allocation (than cash transfers) from the Government and the same applies to farm input subsidies in Zimbabwe. The Food Security Pack (FSP) is also a programme of particular interest for the Government of Zambia because it supports the vulnerable but viable households to be productive. Similarly, in Zimbabwe, agricultural support makes the largest share of social safety nets funding and between 2010 and 2015 it was 53% with a peak of 67% in 2013 (GoZ and World Bank, 2016, p. 10). The major agricultural support programme in Zimbabwe is the Smallholder Input Support programme that immensely expanded by 40 percent from $87.7 million in 2010 to around $160 million in 2014 (ibid.).

The table below illustrates that there is far higher expenditure and coverage for the Smallholder Input Support programme than HSCT, which reflects contrasting ideological and programmatic preferences between donors and the government. This is resonant with the view that financing of cash transfers is not merely subject to available resources available (government or external) but a matter of “policy choice, susceptible to political interference and constituencies” (McCord, 2010, p. 17).

Table 10 Government budgeting for Smallholder Input Support Programme and HSCT in Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure coverage</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HSCT expenditure $(US)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,598,491</td>
<td>7,621,452</td>
<td>17,600,768</td>
<td>16,360,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallholder input expenditure $(US)</td>
<td>89,700,000</td>
<td>84,524,000</td>
<td>1,117,000</td>
<td>158,000,000</td>
<td>160,240,000</td>
<td>31,671,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSCT coverage</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>162,955</td>
<td>277,545</td>
<td>260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallholder input coverage</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,540,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GoZ and World Bank, 2016
In Kenya, in the aftermath of 2008 conflict, the government, regardless of financial crisis, funded cash transfers that promoted political stability (ibid.). In Malawi, most government elites preferred policies that would widely benefit the society (education and health) as well as those that reduced the poor’s dependence on handouts (agricultural subsidies and microfinance) while there was little support for cash transfers (Kalebe-Nyamongo and Marquette, 2014). Consequently, how much a government commits to cash transfers is partly dependent on the political capital of the programme.

The then minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare in Zimbabwe, Nicholas Goche\textsuperscript{21}, said “Our party has no problem when donors give poor people money but we have a problem with donors when they want us to give our people money. What people need is food, which they should grow, so why not give them food and not money” (as quoted in Chinyoka, 2017, p. 15). Such sentiments reflect that most politicians do not believe in cash transfers. The adoption of the SCT by the PF government in Zambia was for political expediency. Despite the adoption, more budgetary support still goes to FISP than social cash transfers as shown below. It is pertinent to note that there is more political capital in agricultural input subsidies than social cash transfers.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
FISP & 485b & 500b & 500b & 500m & 1,083b & 1b & 2,856b & 1,785b \\
SCT & 42,7b & 55b & 83,1b & 199,2m & 180m & 180m & 552m & 721,18m \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Government budgeting for the FISP versus SCT in Zambia.}
\end{table}

Author’s compilation based on budget speeches for 2011-2018 (b=billion Zambian kwachas, m=million Zambian kwachas).

Input subsidies are easily politically manipulated and reach big numbers of people compared to cash transfers that target the poorest that is a very small proportion of the population. That implies that the choice between cash transfers and agricultural inputs/subsidies is more a matter of political ideology than resource constraint. Therefore, the governments in Zambia and Zimbabwe keep on holding to their agricultural input subsidies despite the donors’ policy agendas.

\textsuperscript{21} Nicholas Goche was expelled from both government and ruling ZANU-PF in December 2014 for aligning to a faction led by former Vice President Joyce Mujuru.
Donors complain over the lack of commitment from the governments to substantially increase the funding for social protection.

When we talk of financing social protection, the starting point is that the allocation of public resources to social protection in Zambia has historically been extremely low. Zambia has relatively high GDP compared to other countries in the region because of the economic structure that is somewhat benefiting from the mines. So if you take the percentage of GDP, Zambia is spending way below the regional average on social assistance programmes, below 0.5% of GDP. All in all, one should be critical about the fact that the government, with the exclusion of FISP, expenditure on other social protection programmes has been extremely low (CP2).

The challenge with the above sentiments is the tendency by donors to impose their will on the government. The Zambian government believes in ‘productive’ safety nets, hence the commitment of a huge budget for the Farm Input Support Programme (FISP). Social protection, as defined by the donors, is largely ‘free’ cash transfers that the government does not subscribe to. If donor policy and practice do not conform to national politics, then the government cannot be expected to fully commit to donor initiatives.

The Government of Zimbabwe and development partners agreed to fund the HSCT on a 50:50 basis. The Child Protection Fund (CPF), a donor fund administered by UNICEF is the funding mechanism for the HSCT from the donors’ side. Due to the fact that donors do not fund government directly, a private security company called Securico gets the money from UNICEF and gets it to the communities for payment and the ministry only witnesses the payment (GoZ3). Deloitte and Touche initially did auditing until UNICEF persuaded the donors to opt for government auditors who are even doing it more diligently (DP3). The use of private security and private auditors is not only very expensive but also does not build the capacity of the government. How would the government take over a programme that bypasses it? Given that status, it is not convincing to say the ministry is the custodian and leading agency of the HSCT.

The CPF resonates the huge influence of UNICEF in the policy process. Child protection is therefore central to the HSCT programme and this aligns well to

The joint statement aims to build greater consensus on the importance of child-sensitive social protection. It lays out the particular vulnerabilities that children and families face, the ways that social protection can impact children even when not focused on them, and outlines principles and approaches for undertaking child-sensitive social protection (UNICEF et al., 2009, p. 1).

It is pertinent to note that the signatories above for child sensitive social protection are all supranational actors devoid of even a single African voice or any other region of the developing world. In the same line of thought, Holmes and Lwanga-Ntale (2012) note that the social protection is confronted by several challenges including,

- perceptions that a common African voice is absent and that an African definition of social protection has not been articulated;
- that the multiplicity of donor interests and interventions may have stifled the emergence of a consistent and harmonized set of social protection objectives for Africa;
- that traditional African social protection mechanisms have been undermined by the imposition of conventional western social protection approaches; and
- that policies which are in place are not consistent with actions on the ground (p. viii).

In light of the above assertion, the child sensitive social protection thrust emerges as a donor policy that penetrated the domestic policy trajectory. When UNICEF hired Schubert to do a ‘child sensitive social protection study’, they were trying to domesticate a global policy sanctioned by global actors. Child protection is noble and it is not surprising to see UNICEF supporting or influencing policy initiatives that fulfill its international mandate of child welfare. Indeed, it was strategic for UNICEF and the CPF donors to promote a child sensitive social cash transfer because child protection is also a key responsibility of the Department of Social Welfare in the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare. The ministry would not resist an agenda that suited its mandate, thus the claim that it is the ‘custodian’ and lead ministry of the HSCT programme.
6.2.2 The vicissitudes of donor dependency

Heavy reliance on donor funding for the continued operation and extension of cash transfer programmes means that national programme design is likely to match donor priorities, be consistent with the funding criteria of international bodies such as PEPFAR, and be influenced by the agendas of agencies, such as UNICEF, which channel funds to recipient countries (McCord, 2009, p. 3).

In around 2007, GTZ funding for cash transfers came to an end. “Unfortunately, GTZ programming at a particular time decided to exit the social protection arena and focus on good governance, water and sanitation and other issues” (GRZ2). The early exit of the GTZ from the social protection agenda was political, as there was an official in Germany’s Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (BMZ) who vehemently opposed cash transfers (CP7). So the decision to quit came from Germany without a proper exit strategy and due consideration of the implications for the beneficiaries in Zambia. It is a common practice by donors to quit at the end of a project cycle and they cannot be held accountable because they report to their mother governments. The influence of a BMZ official to quit social protection in Zambia also shows that donor-funding priorities are also subject to personal preferences of their mother governments and as staff changes, priorities and preferences may also shift.

When GTZ quit the social protection agenda, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), UNICEF and Irish Aid continued to fund the pilots and by 2011 Zambia had a total of 11 pilots. That was despite the studies and evaluations that widely endorsed that cash transfers were affordable and implementable in Zambia (Devereux and Wood, 2008) and the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services’ proposal to scale up the social cash transfers (GRZ, 2009). In contrast, the hesitancy from both donors and the government to expand the programme proved otherwise. What arises in this regard is the fact that the government’s political will is more important than donor funds. In this respect, the PF government asserted itself as political regime that had power to determine who deserves and the size of social protection programme (Hickey, 2007). Further to that, it reflected an “organisational culture, political commitment and political capacity of bureaucratic actors within government to advocate for, and implement, social protection initiatives” (Hickey, 2007, p. 4).
In Zimbabwe, the HSCT has been donor dependent from its inception to date. DFID is the major donor and contributes 75% of the total cost (DP2). In the first phase of the HSCT, DFID, European Union (EU), the Netherlands, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) funded it. However, the Netherlands and the EU pulled out during the first phase. The cycle of the HSCT reflects the dangers of depending on donor funding. It shows that a programme cannot be sustained by donor funds as donor priorities are ever shifting.

The second phase of the HSCT (June 2016-May 2019) is hit by a massive decline in funding from the donors that is further compounded by the usual lack of fund disbursement from the government. The current financial status is a threat and says a lot about the programme’s heavy reliance on external funding. DFID, the largest funder of the HSCT since its inception reduced its funding by more than half for the current phase.

Phase II of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer programme has a very limited scale. DFID has slashed its funding for the programme from 38 million (Phase I) to 20 million British pounds. This implies that only 23,000 households will be reached in the current phase as compared to 55,000 households targeted in phase I. Geographically, the districts have reduced from 20 to only 8. Funding prospects for the HSCT beyond 2019 are uncertain because DFID is looking at other priorities in the Middle East. Beneficiaries in the districts that have been dropped from the programme are not aware of this predicament since the government did not communicate to them (DP2).

Realising the political risk of downscaling the HSCT programme, the government did not concede to it and still claimed the programme was in 20 districts (GoZI). It is important to note that DFID funding for HSCT phase II was systematically planned not to go beyond 2019, at least for now. Before Prime Minister Theresa May announced in April 2017 an earlier election (over the Brexit predicament) in the United Kingdom scheduled for 8 June 2017, elections were supposed to be held in 2020. Given that position, it was likely that DFID could not commit funds beyond 2019, as the outcome of the 2020 election would have direct implications to funding for the HSCT, either in the affirmative or opposition.
Social protection is no longer a central focus for DFID globally. Although the Labour Party supports social protection, the Conservative government is opposed to it and it has become increasingly difficult to get social protection approved. For social protection to be approved by the Conservative government, it has to be linked to humanitarian interventions or systems building. We had to fight to get fund for 2016-2019 for the HSCT programme (DP1).

The reduction of DFID funding for HSCT can be connected to the political context in the United Kingdom (UK). In the early 2000s, DFID, under the Labour Government, was in favour of funding cash transfer programmes and expanding ODA but under the current Conservative government and with economic austerity in the UK, the British government attitude to ODA and funding ‘welfare programmes’ in other countries has turned around completely. Consequently, it would be difficult for the British government to justify spending more taxpayers’ money abroad on ‘welfare’ when it has cut spending on its own people’s ‘welfare’. Now that the UK elections were held with the Conservatives still in power, it remains to be seen if there is a going to be a policy shift in terms of bilateral support to the HSCT.

The last disbursement for the HSCT from the government was in December 2016 (as of May 2017), which they strategically coincided with the launch of the National Social Protection Policy Framework (NSPPF). The government only released US$16 000 which only catered for the Epworth community (venue of launch) against US$1.2 million promised when they met the World Bank in November 201622 (ibid.). For the current phase of the HSCT, DFID released US$8 million while SDC and SIDA released less than US$2 million each and further release of funds from DFID is dependent on the current performance, which makes it no guarantee (GoZI). The 2017 Budget allocated US$6.9 million to the HSCT programme and it remains to be seen if the Treasury will release anything.

The government has mastered the art of ‘conceding’ to any conditions set by the donors to attract them to release funds. For instance, the government does not object to 50% funding of the HSCT but they do not meet that obligation. When the

22 The Government of Zimbabwe is currently re-engaging the World Bank. The Bank has made it a pre-requisite for the Government to fund the HSCT as one of the conditionalities to get support.
The government promised the World Bank to release US$1.2 million and also announced a budget for the HSCT in the 2017 national budget, the DFID, SDC and SIDA were consequently enticed to also make their funding commitments, which they announced on the launch of the NSPPF. Figure below summarises sources of financing for social protection in Zimbabwe.

Figure 18 Overall sources of financing for social protection in Zimbabwe

Source: GoZ and World Bank, 2016

Figure 18 illustrates donor dominance in social protection interventions in Zimbabwe. Generally, donors are funding 90% of social protection in Zimbabwe and the same applies to the HSCT, as there is not much coming from the government (GoZ8). The current withdrawal of donors makes the situation of social protection quite volatile. The government is meaningfully visible in the public pensions whilst the development partners dominate a larger proportion of the funding for other social protection interventions.

Conversely, the Government of Zambia has been increasing the budget for the SCT over the past few years as illustrated in figure 19. 2017 national budget implied that the programme is being extended to all the districts in 2017 and expected to reach over 500,000 households which doubles the previous year (PwC, 2016, p. 16). The government’s highest contribution between 2011 and 2017 is in 2016 when it contributed 83% of the funding for the SCT the donors’ 17% contribution was the lowest in the same period. While the contributions are not consistent, the general trend is that the government now contributes more than the donors. Overall, the allocations for the SCT have increased more than seven-fold since 2010 (UNICEF 2016b, p. 2). Broadly speaking, the budget allocations for social protection have
increased by 133% since 2010 although in 2016 the sector accounted for 2.4% of the total national budget of Zambia, which was a decrease by 0.3% from 2.7% in the 2015 budget (ibid: 1-2). Figure 19 illustrates the ‘see-saw’ effect where government funding is increasing while that for donors is decreasing. On a positive note, the proportion of social protection rose from 2.4% of 2016 to 4.2% in the 2017 national budget (PwC, 2016, p. 16). Accordingly, the expenditure for social protection increased by more than double from K1.3bn budgeted for in 2016 to K2.7bn in 2017 (ibid.). Furthermore, the SCT scheme got the largest budget increase of all the social sector programmes in 2016 and a 67% increase from 2015 prompting it to reach 242,000 households by the end of 2016 (ibid.) as reflected in figures 19 and 20 below.

Figure 19 Government-donor funding (%) for the SCT in Zambia

![Graph of government-donor funding for SCT in Zambia]

Author’s creation based on figures from MCDSS

Figure 20 Social protection proportion of the national budget in Zambia

![Graph of social protection proportion of national budget]

The budgetary allocation for social protection has been on an upward trend since 2011 even though its proportion of the national budget has been consistently undulating. From 2009 to 2016, the proportion stagnated between 2.4% and 2.8%. 2017 had the highest proportion and yet dropped again in 2018.
6.3 Conclusion

Social Cash Transfers have become popular on the development agenda and are increasingly becoming the face of social protection in Africa and beyond. What is critical to note is the leading role that has been played by the various multilateral and bilateral agencies especially in the policy evolution and policy transfer. The so-called ‘cash transfer revolution’ originates as a global phenomenon being promoted by multilateral and bilateral agencies as a suitable mechanism to fight poverty. This is resonant of Hickey (2007) and Gaventa (2005) who both view policy as a product of global politics and a contestation of interests at global, national and local arenas. The social cash transfer discourse involves various players driven by various interests at the various levels. The donors presented their choices as demand driven initiatives. The Zambian SCT was presented by the GTZ as a response to droughts and high HIV prevalence during those years while the HSCT was responding to the socio-economic crisis of the time. In that regard, social protection is presented as a response to high levels of poverty as also conceptualized by Hickey (2007). Despite the importance of socio-economic context, politics play a very dominant role (ibid.).

What is important to note, cash transfers in Zambia started when the concept was relatively new and the donors were keen on testing different models since there was no convergence on the modalities by then. However, for Zimbabwe, the HSCT was designed in 2011 when cash transfers had already gained momentum across the region and beyond. That is the reason why there was not much piloting in Zimbabwe compared to Zambia. In both countries, the donors showed no regard for national programmes in place with similar objectives (like the Public Assistance (PA) and Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS)) as they set up parallel interventions. This is a dominance of donor policy over domestic policy. The phenomena in both countries are reflective of donors who are keener to promote their programmes than supporting national programmes already in place. Donors are financially strong and command international authority that the two countries found increasingly difficult to resist.

There is a sharp contrast between funding for the two cash transfer programmes. In Zambia, though it started as 100% donor funded, the government is now leading funder at 83% as of 2016. However, there is suspicion that the Government of Zambia might have committed itself to something it cannot afford, as disbursements of funds
are erratic. The ten-year funding agreement with DFID compels the government to increase funding over the period, failing which DFID would quit. Nonetheless, DFID is the largest donor for the cash transfer programmes in both countries. For Zimbabwe, donors do not fund the government directly due to international isolation of the regime. They rather fund the HSCT through the Child Protection Fund managed by UNICEF. The HSCT is almost 100% donor dependent and that explains why it is under threat from donor fatigue. What is perhaps critical to note is that DFID has downscaled its support for social protection in favour of other priorities. It seems both programmes may be difficult to sustain without DFID, unless it makes a U-turn or another donor comes in to replace it. It is also not clear how the other donors will react to the downscaling by DFID. The current DFID funding for the HSCT of Zimbabwe ends in 2019 whilst that for the SCT of Zambia ends in 2020 and beyond that, either the government takes over or the programmes collapse. The ever-shifting donor priorities are a lesson that the future of social protection lies in government owned national programmes not the donor-funded initiatives.

Overall, donor policies and agendas, no matter how good they may look, are bound to face challenges from being adopted by the recipient countries especially if they do not conform to national polities. The two countries always have huge budgets for agricultural input subsidies as they believe in supporting people to produce food not giving them ‘free’ cash. For that cause, agricultural inputs subsidies in both Zambia and Zimbabwe enjoy bigger fiscal support from the treasuries than cash transfers.
Chapter 7 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1 Introduction
This chapter concludes the thesis. Firstly, the chapter summarises the main findings of the study in order to map out the contributions of the study to the debate on social protection. Secondly, it connects empirical evidence with theory to assert the contribution of this study to the body of knowledge. Accordingly, the researcher interlinks findings in the empirical chapters (4, 5 and 6) and the theoretical chapters (2 and 3). Thirdly, the chapter looks at the policy and political implications of the study given the ideological differences of different actors whose common motive is to fight poverty. Lastly, the researcher makes recommendations for future research bearing in mind that this study may not be exhaustive of all the dimensions of the debate on the political economy of social protection.

7.2 Main Research Findings
External agencies have played a central role in influencing the institutionalization of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa. Social protection in Africa is a product of the global policy thrust of the external agencies (section 3.6). For instance, social protection in the two country case studies mirrors UNICEF’s ‘child sensitive social protection’ policy thrust, which it has deliberately framed not only to uphold child protection but also to ensure that the agency becomes relevant in the social protection agenda. The external agencies have employed various strategies to exert their influence (sections 4.6 and 5.5). They hired experts (consultants, think tanks) to help influence adoption of the agenda. Consultants were hired to write the national social protection policies. External agencies funded pilots and numerous researches and evaluations to generate evidence for cash transfers (sub-sections 4.4, 5.4.5 and 6.1.4).

In that respect, top-drawer research institutes like the American Institute for Research (AIR), the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Oxford Policy Management, the Institute of Development Studies of University of Sussex (IDS) and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill were hired to do research and cash transfer evaluations. Establishment of cash transfer management units within the two ministries (MCDSS and MPSLSW) that are fully funded by the external agencies ensured that the external agencies still maintained their influence (sub-section 6.1.2). Even where the external agencies claim to give space to the government, they still exert influence through the
so-called technical assistance (sub-section 6.1.7). Technical assistance essentially implies that the external agencies support the technical capacity of the government in a particular social protection policy instrument (social cash transfers) of their (external agencies’) choice even if it is not a priority for the government. Financing social protection has been an important tool for the external agencies to maintain their influence. They funded pilots and in the case of Zambia, they still fund a proportion of the budget for the flagship SCT programme. The seesaw funding model for the SCT where the government increased its budgetary allocation for SCT while the external agencies reduced their funding to focus more on technical assistance ensures that the government of Zambia would not abandon the SCT. The conditionality of the funding agreement (2010-2020) between DFID (major donor for the SCT) and the Zambian government that dictates that DFID would pull out if the government did not honour its obligation is a mechanism to ensure that social protection is institutionalised (section 6.3). In Zimbabwe, the HSCT is very much dependent on external funds since inception as the government rarely disburses funds for the programme.

The development of social protection policies in the region is one way the external agencies have influenced the institutionalization of social protection (sections 4.6 and 5.5). Quite a number of countries in Africa now have national social protection policies. As noted in this thesis, Zambia got its social protection policy in 2014 while Zimbabwe passed one in 2016. In both cases, social protection policy development was initiated and fully funded by the external agencies. Initiating and funding the development of a policy is one solid way of ensuring that the government adopts and institutionalizes social protection. It is a way of ensuring that social protection becomes mandatory to the government. In the eyes of the external agencies, a policy is tangible evidence for their success in promoting adoption of social protection. In Zambia, UNICEF and ILO have gone further than that to initiate and support a Social Protection Bill to entrench social protection as a human right and make it obligatory to the state to deliver (sub-section 4.6.7).

One result of external influence is the narrowing of social protection to social cash transfers, which only address one pillar (social assistance) of the social protection policy. Due to overemphasis of cash transfers by external agencies, cash transfers have become a synonym for social protection. This is despite the fact that the social
protection policies, whose development was influenced by the external agencies, are ‘comprehensive’ and anchored on several pillars. The external agencies opted to fund cash transfers because they believe cash transfers are easiest (of all the pillars) to fund and have quick results that make it easy to account to their governments and taxpayers back home (sub-section 6.2.1). In both countries, external agencies have popularized cash transfers over other pillars of social protection, potentially leading to piecemeal implementation of the policy. In Zambia, the external agencies managed to influence the government (coupled with political will from President Sata) to increase funding for the SCT programme over the years at the expense of other social protection interventions.

Another important finding is that cash transfers are generating tension between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries as well as between beneficiaries and the traditional community leaders. Targeting a small proportion of the poor implies that majority poor are excluded. Non-involvement of the traditional community leaders (councillors, headmen and chiefs), allegedly for being partisan, fuels tension. Traditional leaders are the gatekeepers of the rural communities and possess significant political power and influence. While they are not directly involved in the SCT and HSCT, they command the government social protection interventions at the community level. Thus, traditional leaders disqualify the SCT and HSCT beneficiaries from being enrolled to other programmes on the pretext of ‘double-dipping’ yet the official position of the MPSLSW and MCDSS is that cash transfers are not enough and beneficiaries can be enrolled in other programmes. As a result, the simmering tension is divisive to the community.

One further finding is the role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Roberts and King, 1991; Karch, 2007; Mintrom, 1997; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) in promoting social protection (sections 4.5 & 5.6). External agencies identify key personnel from within and outside the government that they ‘incentivise’ to support the cause. Such technocrats become ‘experts’ and leading figures in the concerted efforts to push for the adoption of social protection. Due to their expertise and strategic importance, policy makers and politicians rely on them for policy advice. As noted in this study, the likes of Bernd Schubert, Charlotte Harland Scott and Sydney Mhishi played the role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ for social protection. Through Charlotte Harland Scott
who co-authored the 2011 Patriotic Front (PF) Manifesto, the agenda reached Michael Sata who adopted it both as a Presidential aspirant and as President of Zambia.

7.3 Implications for Theory
The research underscored the primacy of politics in social protection. The study is based on the voices of essentially all the actors in social protection. Triangulating the voices of the government, external agencies (bilaterals, multilaterals & IFIs), INGOs, CSOs and the rural communities brings richness and depth to the debates on social protection. It helps understand how the different actors diverge or converge in terms of approaches and interests. It also helps to understand the power dynamics within the policy space: who is more powerful and who is less powerful, who voices and whose voice matters, who makes decisions and who follows decisions, who drives the policy and who follows, who has the money and who follows the money, who consults and who is consulted, and whether the rural communities (perceived beneficiaries) are active participants or ‘passive’ recipients. The political economy explains why priorities for the government and the external agencies differ.

The synthesised framework (figure 3 in chapter 2) theorises how various actors interact in the social protection policy space. External agencies like World Bank, ILO, DFID and UNICEF use their hidden power in a global and closed policy space when they came up with their social protection policy positions without or with little involvement of the recipient countries. It is at that level that external agencies set the agenda for social protection. Their policy positions have been tools to influence adoption of social protection in Africa. The framework shows that the global actors have used various strategies of influence including finance as forms of hidden power to promote the social protection agenda. The concept of participation is brought to test. What emerges is that it is not every actor and every policy space that matter in the policy process. Important decisions were made in a closed policy space between the external agencies and their mother governments, between the external agencies themselves and between the external agencies and the government at national level.

At national level, the external agencies interact with key ministries (MCDSS, MPSLSW and Finance) to influence adoption of social protection. Again, decisions at that level are made in the closed space as both the government and external agencies use their hidden power. The visible power of the parliament and the constitution is not
involved at that level. The role of political parties is only visible when a particular party like (the PF of Zambia) decided to adopt social protection after recognising the potential to generate votes.

Consultation of local actors often implies rubberstamping of decisions already made in the closed space at national and global levels. However, in Zambia, civil society (PSP, CSPR and JTR) lobbied the government in the claimed space and ensured that the government consults them in the invited space thereby contributing to the policy. In Zimbabwe, civil society did not claim the space for social protection and there were a limited number of actors in the invited space and eventually the content of the policy was determined in a closed space. The effectiveness of the civil society to challenge the status quo in the claimed space or invited space is dependent on the political context and their autonomy to be representative of the poor. The lack of involvement of beneficiary communities (invisible power) in the policy process makes it complex to pursue a social contract for social protection. The beneficiary communities are not aware of what gets to the decision making table and tend to accept their situation and be ‘grateful welfare recipients’. They would not voice their concerns because they perceive the cash as a privilege not an entitlement. When the GTZ quit social protection in Zambia, there was no exit strategy and the cash transfer beneficiary communities were not informed of the predicament. The government would not be held accountable because it was not their programme. Similarly, when DFID downscaled its funding for the HSCT from 20 to 8 districts (2016-2019) there was no exit strategy and again the beneficiary communities were not informed. That renders participation as a mere tokenism. This reflects in Hart’s (1992) participation ladder where the bottom 3 rungs (out of 8), that is, manipulation, decoration and tokenism, are non-participation.

Literature underlines limited research on the role of politics in shaping the rise of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa (Hickey, 2007; Casamatta et al., 2000; Niles, 1999). However, there is notable acknowledgement that politics need to be accorded a central role in research for insightful and in-depth understanding of the poverty alleviation agenda (Ellis et al., 2009; Grant, 2006; Leftwich, 2008; de Haan, 2013; Mkandawire, 2001). This study therefore explored the roles of the various actors in the policy space, from global to local (sub-section 2.1.3). The study goes beyond the dominant narrative of ‘politics of patronage’ that views politics as ‘detrimental’ to
poverty alleviation, which is centred on the State and individual politicians as the political players. Thus the study also looks at politics as an ‘enabler’ and treats all actors involved as political players with vested ideological and political interests in the social protection agenda.

The study refutes the tendency to view external agencies as neutral players (Leftwich, 2008) and asserts that they are active and powerful political players that influence policy decisions. External agencies are accountable to their mother governments and thus the recipient ‘poor’ governments do not have control over their decisions. Their global policy positions are predetermined and developed in their mother countries and reflect policy choices of their mother governments. This conforms to what Gaventa (2005) calls the global level where policy originates, a closed space for the recipient countries where there is exercise of hidden power and where crucial decisions are made. The study thus concurs with both Hickey (2007) and Gaventa (2005) whose theoretical frameworks portray the influence of global actors on national policies (sub-sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2). Hickey (2007) illustrates that social protection mirrors donor policy and practice as well as global social policy trends. The study affirmed Gaventa’s (2005) use of the various forms of policy space and the various actors and the extent to which they influence decision making.

Literature on policy diffusion and policy transfer underscores the role of external agencies (global forces) (Zurn, 2005; Obinger et al., 2013; Dobbin et al., 2007; Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996 and 2000; Simmons et al., 2008; Casey and McKinnon, 2009; Granvik, 2015) and this is affirmed by the study (sections 3.2 and 3.3). The study similarly confirms what Granvik (2015) terms the deployment of ‘soft’ power by external agencies to persuade adoption of social protection (section 3.2). ‘Soft’ power entails flying national policy makers to international workshops, study tours, hiring consultants, supporting civil society (and even creating in the case of Platform for Social Protection (PSP) in Zambia-section 4.6.5) to lobby and advocate for social protection, sharing best practices from other regions and funding pilots to prove the efficacy of social protection. The study discovered another form of ‘soft’ power used by external agencies, that is, the recruitment of staff from the government. External agencies, therefore, have been the key drivers of the rise of social protection in most low-income countries in the region.
The study connects to Lavers and Hickey (2015 and 2016) in the context of the interaction of transnational ideas and politics to shape social protection. The value of social protection as a political tool for votes (Hamer and Seekings, 2017; Hickey, 2007; Yates et al., 2006; Granvik, 2015; Pelham, 2007 and Dlamini, 2007) strongly emerged in the context of Zambia. However, it is less profound in Zimbabwe, which implies that there is still need for more research to have more insights over the variance of country experiences. The fact that policy process is a political process that involves multiple actors driven by different ideologies (Leftwich, 2008; Martens, 2008; Reinikka, 2008; Hickey et al., 2018; Ramalingam, 2013; Brock et al., 2002; Hill, 2005; Juma and Clark, 1995; and Unsworth, 2015) is what this study found to be a protracted social protection policy trajectory in the two countries. The policy processes took years of power struggles and negotiations within the government, between the government and the external agencies and between the external agencies themselves.

Another contribution of this study is that the drive for social protection by external agencies immensely undermined national policies (section 6.1.3). Hickey’s framework (2007) did not foresee this outcome of compromised domestic policy sovereignty. The SCT in Zambia overshadowed PWAS that was redesigned to meet the same objectives three years before the commencement of the SCT. The HSCT in Zimbabwe was established to replace public assistance (PA) that was also similar in nature. Both PA and PWAS, despite the challenges they face, are national programmes institutionalized in the government compared to the SCT and HSCT that were established parallel to government programmes. The SCT only started as a pilot in Kalomo that was extended to a few other districts. The pilots were run for about 8 years, as the government of the day was not committed to adopt the concept and donors would also not commit to national expansion of the cash transfers. The HSCT was piloted in one district before it was extended to a total of 20 districts that have since dropped to 8 districts in the current phase. Both the SCT and HSCT overshadowed the national programmes. In the case of Zambia, the SCT now gets more resources from the government than PWAS and the Food Security Pack (FSP). In Zimbabwe, though the government remains not fully committed to fund the HSCT, the external agencies still influenced the government to allow the HSCT to replace PA. Here, the external agencies used their hidden power of finance to promote their
choice of programmes at the expense of national programmes as governments ‘follow’ their money.

Contrary to Hickey’s framework (2007) that underscores positive outcomes of social protection, this study found that social protection programmes also perpetuate social tension in the communities where they are implemented (sub-section 6.1.5). MacAuslan and Riemenschneider (2011) and Ellis (2008) also criticize cash transfers for being exclusionary and pervasive. Social tension is a negation of social solidarity mentioned by Hickey (2007) as one of the positive political impacts of social protection. The tension that exists between beneficiaries (privileged few) and non-beneficiaries (underprivileged majority) of the SCT and HSCT as well as between beneficiaries and community leaders (councillors, headmen and chiefs) underscores the social divisiveness of targeted social protection. When the community is divided, social protection potentially perpetuates inequality that it is supposed to fight. It is difficult to measure social protection against social justice if it leaves other poor people behind despite the ‘justification’ for targeting (Devereux, 2016).

Hickey (2007) and Gaventa (2005) assume that the external agencies (global players) are homogeneous but this study found out that they are ideologically different. While some external agencies may be driven by the same motive of ‘fighting poverty’ in Africa, their approaches to that cause do not always converge. Mkandawire (2001) affirms the ideological divergence within the external agencies. Their global policy positions diverge in many respects (section 3.6). In many instances, there are ideological ‘battles’ between the external agencies, and even among personnel within the same agency, as each one of them would ‘fight’ to ensure that their policy position prevails over the rest. In Uganda, the World Bank insisted on the narrow Social Risk Management (SRM) while DFID pushed for a broader transformative approach (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016). Related to that, the study also discovered that not all the external agencies are active in the forefront for social protection. There are some who are at the forefront and pushing the agenda (UNICEF, ILO, DFID, World Bank and GTZ-now GIZ) while others write cheques without pushing a particular ideological position (SIDA, Finland, EU, SDC and Irish Aid).

There has been a varied degree of adoption of social protection in the region and yet there has not been much research that seeks to understand the variation. This study
goes a long way in examining why the external agencies have been more successful in some countries and less successful in other contexts. The study analyses the variation in terms of the political contexts of Zambia and Zimbabwe as well as the interests driving the various actors. While the variation in the region has mainly been explained in terms of evidence (lack or availability of it) or whether a country is low or middle income, this study goes beyond that to add the centrality of politics in that debate. In that respect, the study provides a contextual understanding of the adoption, partial adoption or non-adoption of social protection.

The study adds substance to the challenges of externally driven interventions. Social protection in low-income countries is more donor-driven than nationally owned thereby making sustainability and ownership problematic. It challenges the external agencies and other stakeholders alike to think about how best to support poverty alleviation in Africa. The external agencies have maintained their influence through funding social protection in low-income countries (sections 3.5; 6.2 and sub-sections 4.6.4 and 5.5.5). Budget support is often portrayed as a ‘neutral’ way of funding development in developing countries. However, this study noted that budget support is an instrument for the external agencies to exert their influence, which also confirms findings of other studies (Anderson and Therkildsen, 2007; Gibson et al., 2005 and Swedlund, 2013). It is difficult for the government to own what it does not fund –‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’.

7.4 Policy and Political Implications

The debate over the slow (or lack of) institutionalization of social protection in low-income countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe goes beyond evidence that social protection works and points to political ideology as a fundamental dimension. Despite investing in cash transfer pilots and evaluations to build evidence, adoption of social cash transfers by the governments has been slow and dependent on resources of external agencies. This study therefore bears the following implications for policy.

It is important for external agencies to align to national priorities if their support is to make significant change. The study underscores how external agencies’ priorities differ from the government’s own. Governments of Zambia and Zimbabwe are more inclined to supporting the productive capacities of people to produce their own food than cash transfers. Therefore, the policy thrust for the two countries is heavily
inclined to agricultural input subsidies as noted in the Farm Input Support Programme (FISP) of Zambia and Command Agriculture (former Smallholder Input Support Programme) of Zimbabwe. Despite the financial constraints that confront the two African countries, FISP and Command Agriculture command huge budgetary support from the Ministries of Finance. This shows that while external agencies prioritise social cash transfers, the government prioritises agricultural support. While the government of Zimbabwe budgets for the HSCT, there is little disbursement of the funds thereby making the programme dependent on external funds. While the government of Zambia now funds the SCT more than the external agencies, still disbursement has been erratic making the programme to rely on external funds.

Instead of setting up parallel programmes, external agencies need to identify national programmes that they can support. Building the capacity of the government to run government owned programmes and policies is a fundamental role that external agencies can play. The fact that such programmes have gaps is an opportunity for the external agencies to strengthen institutional capacity of the government and influence re-design to meet the contemporary and country specific poverty trends. This study found out that externally driven social cash transfers undermined domestic policy in the sense that they were set up parallel to similar or related national programmes. The emergence of the SCT and the HSCT overshadowed nationally entrenched Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) and Public Assistance (PA) in Zambia and Zimbabwe, respectively. Policies that are externally driven, no matter how much money the external agencies invest in them, are institutionally precarious and potentially bound to collapse upon exit of the external agencies. Conversely, policies and programmes entrenched in the government structures (PA, PWAS, Food Security Pack (FSP), the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM)), regardless of financial constraints, are rooted in the government and politically sustainable.

Related to the above recommendation, it is also important for both external agencies and the governments to partner to strengthen the existing institutions for better, improved and effective programme delivery. This implies both parties working together in the true sense of partnership and consciously aware that building and strengthening the capacity of the government is a long-term investment.
It is also important for external agencies to take advantage of ‘positive politicisation’ of programmes and policies and partner the government from within the government instead of looking at politics in patronage terms only. This underscores the comparative importance of the role of political interests and ‘evidence of what works’ in social protection. While there has been more attention on the role of evidence and less on political interests, the experiences of the two countries show that political will is more important in institutionalization of social protection. The experiences of the two countries show there is an intricate relationship between government political interests and choice of policy. Government funding goes where it potentially generates votes. Michael Sata initially deleted any mention of ‘cash transfers’ in the PF manifesto (despite demonstrated evidence that cash transfers work) and the PF member of parliaments were initially not vocal about cash transfers. However, Sata made a decision to scale up the SCT two years after getting to power. Given that background, the PF’s adoption of social protection inclines to political expediency. In Zimbabwe, the lukewarm response from the government could be an indication that they do not see much political gains from the HSCT compared to the programmes run by the government. In Malawi, Joyce Banda’s political branding of social protection affirmed rising significance of social protection in pro-poor political ideology though it did not guarantee her an electoral victory (Hamer and Seekings, 2017). Reform influenced from within the government is politically sustainable.

Each country’s political context needs to be prioritised in policy processes as it is directly related to policy evolution. It is the political context that determines the extent to which different actors exert their influence in the policy process. Success of the social protection agenda is not universal and depends on the context of a specific country. For instance, the social protection agenda is more successful in Zambia than in Zimbabwe due to various contextual factors. This is despite the fact the same external agencies have been involved in the two countries. In low-income countries, given their economic challenges, the external agencies have generally exerted influence with varied degree of success, as is evident in this thesis. In Zambia, when government changed from the MMD to the PF, the political context shifted in favour of social cash transfers and the external agencies made inroads in the policy space as shown in the development of the social protection policy, increasing fund commitment from the government and the development of the Social Protection Bill. In Zimbabwe, the
HSCT started during the time of the Government of National Unity (GNU) when the country was trying to recover from 2008 economic collapse. Efforts to initiate the development of a national social protection policy also started in the same period. The political context is significantly unique in the sense that the external agencies fund the development of the social protection policy and the HSCT through UNICEF. The funding mechanism is due to the fact that the Harare administration has been under sanctions since 2000 and owes the IFIs billions of US dollars. It is thought provoking to note that funding the HSCT and the development of the NSPPF through UNICEF came at a cost of less policy influence for the external agencies. Zambia is a different political context because it is considered one of the countries that has had smooth political transition for years and therefore gets lot of support from external agencies direct to the government. However, budget support from the external agencies came at a benefit of more policy influence from the external agencies.

In connection to the above, ‘the failure’ of the ‘push’ for cash transfers in Zimbabwe is also a clarion call for the external agencies to realise that funding social protection through UNICEF might be the only option they have but not the best. Working directly with the government through budget support would have produced better policy adoption. This could be an opportunity for the external agencies, especially the bilaterals, to influence their mother governments to re-engage the government of Zimbabwe in the spirit of working together to fight poverty. Governments need to put in place mechanisms to coordinate and monitor external support and ensure that it aligns to national development priorities. It is important for the government to have clear-cut priorities and open up the policy space for all stakeholders including grassroots.

7.5 Implications for Research
The political economy of social protection has gained traction in scholarship in recent years. This study connects to a number of related studies being spearheaded by some universities. These include the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) project on ‘the Political Economy of Social Protection’, University of Cape Town Centre for Social Sciences Research (CSSR)’s project on ‘Legislating and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms’ and the University of Manchester’s project on Effective States for Inclusive Development
The debate on the politics of social protection started with basic frameworks like Hickey’s (2007) that generated research interests. As research gets to the empirical depth, conceptual frameworks are refining and reframing. For instance, Lavers and Hickey (2016) now advocate for a political settlement approach to focus more on national actors and internal processes. This study therefore postulates the following future research recommendations.

Firstly, there is need for more country specific researches that look at how the national political context influences adoption of or resistance to social cash transfers. This study has noted that while political context is a determinant factor in the social protection policy processes, it varies and each country has its own context. Thus, whether social protection is internally or externally driven, depends on the context as shown in this study.

Secondly, the discovery of individuals who played a role in the rise of the social protection agenda calls for more research that explores roles of such individuals to get an ethnographic understanding of the policy process. Such individuals are in government, external agencies or ‘independent’. External agencies’ approaches can also reflect individual preferences. For instance, Stephen Kidd’s drive for universal pensions at DFID influenced the agency’s approach (for example, it funded the Katete pilot in Zambia) and when he joined Help Age International he introduced a new thrust on universal pensions as evident in feasibility studies on universal pension in a number of African countries (Seekings, 2016). The establishment of Zanzibar’s Universal Pension is attributed to Help Age International (whose idea originated from Stephen Kidd) as well as support from individual technocrats within the government. In Uganda, donor advocacy and lobbying targeted senior leaders in Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, Ministry of Finance, parliament as well as the First Lady and the President to pressurize the Ministry of Finance to commit funds to Senior Citizen Grant (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016). The role of individuals like Ng’andu Magande (see Kabandula and Seekings, 2016) in resisting social cash transfers calls for more research on similar individuals to get a balanced understanding of the varied adoption of social protection across the continent. Similarly, recruiting from the government is an interesting tangent of ‘soft power’

23 Defined by Khan (2010, p. 4) as a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability.
deployed by external agencies to influence the institutionalization of social protection. More research is required to trace the role of technocrats recruited from the government.

Thirdly, there is need to establish the role of the parliament in the social protection discourse. In both countries, there were different levels of involvement which this study could not deeply engage with due to constraints of time and resources. Given the important role of the parliament in policy and law enactment, engaging with former and current Members of Parliament, exploring past and current parliamentary debates and consulting the print media would potentially add further insights on the social protection policy processes in the two countries, and in other countries.

Fourthly, given the role of the external agencies in promoting social protection and the fact that a number of African countries now have social protection policies in place, it is also important to study the content of the policies to see how far they reflect local context and global policy positions for external agencies. What UNICEF calls ‘child sensitive social protection’ is the overall framework for the social cash transfers and social protection policies in Zambia and Zimbabwe. In Zanzibar, UNICEF and consultants from IDS (University of Sussex in the United Kingdom) were instrumental in the creation of Zanzibar’s Social Protection Policy (Seekings, 2016).

Fifth and last, there is need for research to pursue the concepts of participation, ownership and social contract as this study minimally evokes them. The pursuit of these concepts in research on social protection is still scanty and therefore there is need to be exploring them further to bring more insights on what value they hold in the social protection agenda. Hickey and King (2016) is an example of such a thrust.

Overall, the rise of social protection in Africa is a complex global phenomenon shaped by a wide range of actors interacting at different levels and whose access to policy space and degree of influence are determined by the power and interests that each actor holds. While external agencies were influential through various forms of ‘soft’ power, the decision to adopt social protection was a political contestation between the government and the external agencies, within the government itself, between the external agencies themselves and between personnel of the same external agency. Such complexities fulfil the hypothesis that the dominance of external actors
and their ‘push’ for a particular instrument of social protection distorts the broad vision of social policy; compromises the State’s political and budgetary commitment to social policy; and overall, undermines national policy sovereignty.
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Programmes in Zimbabwe. UNICEF.


UNRISD. (2010). Combating Poverty and Inequality: Structural Change, Social


Appendices

Appendix 1 Interview Guide for Government Officials

- Date of interview
- Introduction
- Interviewee’s organisation:
- Interviewee’s job title:
- Interviewee’s main roles and responsibilities:
- Interviewee’s experience with social protection:
- Before we continue, please confirm whether you are willing to be quoted directly, or would you prefer your responses to be anonymous?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Officials</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overarching theme</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appreciation and status of social protection</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Motivation for social protection</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government-donor partnership</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Social Protection Policy Framework-Draft</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Why? | What have been the major milestones?  
|      | How does the current social policy framework address the concerns of your ministry?  
|      | How does it address the concerns of donors? How far do the donor concerns align to the local context?  
|      | How will it be implemented?  
| Financing | Who finances the social protection programme (HSCT)?  
|          | How much is the government contributing?  
|          | What are the conditions of the finance? How do you meet the conditions?  
|          | What are the advantages and disadvantages of reliance on donors/government for financing of social protection?  
| Technical capacity | How technically capacitated is your ministry to run the HSCT programme?  
|                  | How are the donors supporting you in this respect?  
|                  | How relevant is the support? What are your expectations?  
| Partner Cooperation | How have you addressed the expectations from the donors?  
|                | How do the donors meet your expectations?  
|                | At what point would you say the donors were not willing to cooperate? How did you respond?  
|                | At what point would you say your ministry was unable to meet the expectations of the donors? How did the donors react?  
| Participation and Ownership | What is your general comment on participation and ownership of the NSPPF and the HSCT programme?  
|                  | How have the following participated in the process: national, provincial and district government structures; CSOs; and community?  
|                  | From your experience, who would you say owns the process? Why?  
|                  | Challenges and opportunities?  
| Implementation | Who is responsible for the overall implementation of the HSCT programme?  
|            | What is the role of your ministry in the implementation matrix?  
|            | What is the role of the donors? Community leaders?  
|            | How do you target intended beneficiaries?  
|            | What is the status of the HSCT programme in terms of , coverage,
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Sustainability</strong></th>
<th><strong>Wrapping up</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How long is the government/donors committed to fund the HSCT programme? Any plans to scale up the HSCT programme to national level? How and why? Would you prefer the government taking over the funding or donor funding? Why? What is the future of social protection in the context of the present financing position? What would say is the impact of the HSCT programme on the beneficiary communities? How far is the programme meeting the intended goals of your ministry? In terms of graduation, what is the status of the HSCT programme? How would you respond if someone accuses cash transfers for causing a dependency syndrome?</td>
<td>What is your ministry’s future plans for social protection in the country? Anything else you would like to say that you think is relevant? Could I please have any documents that you think are relevant? Who else do you think I should talk to?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2 Interview Guide for External Agencies

- Date of interview
- Introduction
- Interviewee’s organisation
- Interviewee’s job title:
- Interviewee’s main roles and responsibilities:
- Interviewee’s experience with social protection:
- Before we continue, please confirm whether you are willing to be quoted directly, or would you prefer your responses to be anonymous?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overarching theme</th>
<th>Semi-structured questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivation for social protection</td>
<td>What would you say is your organisation’s motivation for social protection at the following levels:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>National?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Community?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategies of promoting social protection</td>
<td>How has your organisation promoted social protection in the country?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How have you influenced the government and other stakeholders to embrace social protection?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Which key ministries do you work with? How, when and why?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How do you work with the parliament and political parties to promote social protection?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>How do you finance social protection?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How much finance is going to social protection?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How do you share financing of social protection with the government?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How do you interact with Ministry of Finance?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What are your expectations from the government?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What does the government expect from you?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Out of the total budget, what percentage would say gets to the targeted community?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical Advice and Capacity Building</td>
<td>Technically, how are you promoting institutionalisation of social protection?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>At which levels do you provide technical support? What has been the response of the government to your technical support?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Social Protection</td>
<td>How does your organisation approach align to the local context? What values drive the approach? How does the headquarters guide you and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>how contended are you? Any expectations from headquarters? Is social protection a central focus of your organisation globally-why and how?</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Social Protection Framework</td>
<td>What has been the role of your organisation in the design of the social protection policy framework?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What would you say was the role of the government?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How much resources were committed (financial and technical)?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How participatory was the process?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How far did/does the process reflect the local context?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How far is the local framework aligning to your global policy framework?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What have been the successes, failures and challenges?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust and Cooperation</td>
<td>How have you addressed the expectations from the government?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How does the government meet your expectations?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>At what point would you say the government was not willing to cooperate? How did you respond?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>At what point would you say your organisation was unable to meet the expectations of the government? How did the government react?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How do you work with politicians, bureaucrats, CSOs and community gatekeepers?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major milestones to date?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership-donors, INGOs &amp; CSOs</td>
<td>Which other donors do you work with and how do you relate in social protection? Which INGOs &amp; NGOs/CSOs do you work with and how do you support them? How, where and when do you converge or diverge?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation and Ownership</td>
<td>What is your general comment on participation in and ownership of the social protection process?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How have the following participated in the process: national, provincial and district government structures; CSOs; and community?</td>
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<td>From your experience, who would say owns the process? Why?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How would you react if the government says you are driving the process?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Who is responsible for the overall implementation of the programme?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What is the role of your organisation in the implementation matrix?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What is the role of the government? How do you work with MoPSLSW/MCDSW? Gatekeepers?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How do you deal with political interference, if any?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How do you target intended beneficiaries?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>What is the status of the programme in terms of inclusion and exclusion?</strong></td>
<td><strong>How do you minimise these?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability</strong></td>
<td><strong>How long is your organisation committed to fund the programme?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Any plans to scale up the programme to national level? Why?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is the government to take over the funding or to co-fund? How and Why?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What is the future of social protection in the context of the present financing position?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What would say is the impact of the programme on the beneficiary communities?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How far is the programme meeting the intended goals of your organisation?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In terms of graduation, how have you fared?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wrapping up</strong></td>
<td><strong>What are your organisation’s future plans for social protection in the country?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anything else you would like to say that you think is relevant?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Could I please have your Country Strategic Plan, Position Papers and other relevant documents?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who else do you think I should talk to?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3 Interview Guide for NGOs and CSOs

- Date of interview
- Introduction
- Interviewee’s organisation
- Interviewee’s job title:
- Interviewee’s main roles and responsibilities:
- Interviewee’s experience with social protection:
- Before we continue, please confirm whether you are willing to be quoted directly, or would you prefer your responses to be anonymous?

### INGOs and CSOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overarching theme</th>
<th>Semi-structured questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic appreciation of social protection</strong></td>
<td>What is your general understanding of social protection? What does it entail and how did it emerge?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motivation for social protection</strong></td>
<td>What is the motivation behind social protection at global, national and organisational levels?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participation</strong></td>
<td>How has your organisation contributed to social protection in the country? What is your contribution? How do you lobby and advocate social protection? How do you work with communities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donors and Financing</strong></td>
<td>Which donors you work with? How do they support you? Who supports you financially? What are your expectations from donors? How far are they fulfilled? How do you fulfil the expectations of your funders? Milestones? Challenges?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Networks</strong></td>
<td>Do you belong to any civil society forum/working group/committee on social protection? How does it work and how influential is it? Interaction with donors &amp; government?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relations with government</strong></td>
<td>How do you work with the government in the social protection agenda? How do you support each other? Do you work directly with the government? Which ministries? Any milestones? Any challenges? Any expectations from either side and how are they fulfilled?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Protection Policy Framework</strong></td>
<td>Are you aware of any social protection policy framework in this country? What are the pillars of the policies? How did the policy come into being? How were you involved in the policy process? How far does the policy reflect your concerns? How far does the policy address the local context? From your experience, who owns and control the process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wrapping up</strong></td>
<td>What is your organisation’s future plans for social protection in the country? Anything else you would like to say that you think is relevant? Could I please have any documents that you think are relevant? Who else do you think I should talk to?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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## Appendix 4 Interview Guide for FGDs

- Date of Interview
- Introduction
- Ground rules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FGDs GUIDE</th>
<th>Knowledge of the HSCT/SCT programme</th>
<th>Selection and targeting</th>
<th>Participation and Ownership</th>
<th>Gender and Power dynamics</th>
<th>Relations with programme staff</th>
<th>Relations with community leaders</th>
<th>Impact of the programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What do you know about the programme?</td>
<td>How are beneficiaries selected? Who does the selection?</td>
<td>How was the programme introduced to the community?</td>
<td>How do women participate in the programme? How do men participate?</td>
<td>What is the role of the DSS/donor staff? How do they address your concerns?</td>
<td>What is the role of chiefs, headmen and councillors in the programme? How do they participate in the selection process?</td>
<td>How has the programme affected your lives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who funds the programme? Who runs the programme?</td>
<td>Who qualifies and who does not qualify? Who are the most vulnerable?</td>
<td>How far were the community involved?</td>
<td>How do households make decisions on how to spend the cash?</td>
<td>How do they address your concerns?</td>
<td>What would you expect from the community leaders? What do the community leaders expect from you?</td>
<td>How do beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries relate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How much is received per individual/household?</td>
<td>How fair is the selection criteria?</td>
<td>How does the programme meet your preferences?</td>
<td>Who decides how cash transfers are spent?</td>
<td>What are your expectations from the staff and what do they expect from you?</td>
<td>What would you expect from the community leaders? What do the community leaders expect from you?</td>
<td>If the programme were to stop today how would you cope? Did the programme stop/discontinue in the past? How did you cope?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Where do households collect the transfer?</td>
<td>Any exclusion or inclusion cases?</td>
<td>Any consultation of the community? By whom, when and how?</td>
<td>Are children involved in decision making? How?</td>
<td>Who do you think owns the programme? Why?</td>
<td>Where do you converge and diverge with the community leaders?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency, duration and consistence of the programme?</td>
<td>What would you say is the fairest selection criteria? Why?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Are cash transfers always spent on food? What happens when the household has other needs?</td>
<td>Would you agree if someone says you are the owners of the programme? Why?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who is involved in the programme and how are they involved?</td>
<td>Community expectations?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Which food is usually bought? Dietary and nutrition needs for children?</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>