

DIALOGICAL PEDAGOGY AND THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY

NATHANIEL TLHAKO MASHABELA



A minithesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of M Phil in the Department of Philosophy of Education, University of the Western Cape.

**UNIVERSITY of the
WESTERN CAPE**

July 1999

ABSTRACT

Paul Freire's argument is that Dialogical pedagogy, in contrast to other modes of teaching like "chalk and talk" or "top-down" teaching can lead to the learner's full independence. The focal question of this mini-thesis then is; "What kind of independence ought Dialogical pedagogy to develop in learners"? or, put differently, which concept of liberty best underpins Dialogical pedagogy? In order to answer this question, Chapter 1 gives a background of Dialogical pedagogy (that is what Dialogical pedagogy is). I intend to discuss this background under the heading, Freire's "culture of silence" and to relate this to Dialogical pedagogy. This chapter will also look at the three dimensions of Dialogical pedagogy namely liberatory learning (liberation of the learner from internal and external constraints); transformatory learning (development of the learner's intellectual capabilities like critical thinking) and participatory learning (participation of the teacher and the learner in developing knowledge). I note here that these dimensions do not follow a linear line of development but, are parts of one organic whole. This chapter further argues that Freire's open-ended concept of love, as one of the aspects of Dialogical pedagogy, is not properly articulated in that not all kinds of love, Eros and storge for instance, can contribute fruitfully to Dialogical pedagogy or to the learner in education because they are essentially selfish and in essence, devoid of respect. So they have very little to offer to Dialogical pedagogy and to the learner in education. I argue then, that the only kind of love that seems appropriate in education is pedagogic love or Agape because it entails respect for persons.

Because Dialogical pedagogy as liberatory learning appeals to a concept of liberty, (Freire does not explicitly tell which concept of liberty Dialogical pedagogy embraces) I shall attempt an answer to this question: How best can the concept of liberty or freedom in Dialogical pedagogy be understood? or, which concept of liberty best underpins Dialogical pedagogy? Chapter 2 then will give an exposition of Berlin's notion of liberty understood as Negative liberty, (i.e. freedom from interference) and Positive liberty (freedom to belong to a community, be it

(ii)

moral, intellectual or professional) together with their moral underpinnings. I argue here that what makes Negative liberty particularly important, is the space it creates for the individual's free choice and that the significance of Positive liberty lies in its creation of space for the essential humanity (higher self) to flourish.

In view that this mini-thesis is about education, Chapter 3 looks at features of education (i.e. features without which meaningful education cannot take place) as set out by Peters, Rorty, Strike and Dunlop.

Chapter 4 attempts an answer to the question, "Ought Dialogical pedagogy to develop in learners a kind of independence based on Negative liberty? In order to answer this question, I intend to look at Dialogical pedagogy as developed in Chapter 1, underlined by Negative liberty as developed in Chapter 2 and then against the necessary features of education as discussed in Chapter 3. My claim in Chapter 4 is that Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty and viewed against the necessary features of education seems to undermine authority because of its belief that knowledge is individually constructed: and so, cannot lead to the learner's *full* independence understood as critical self-realization. An answer to the focal question, "Ought Dialogical pedagogy to develop in learners a kind of independence based on Negative liberty" then is, no, if we understand independence to mean non-interference in the learner's development.

Chapter 5 looks at Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty against the necessary features of education. This chapter argues that Dialogical pedagogy, based on Positive liberty seems to encourage full independence of the learner understood as rational self-realization because of the space it creates for the authority of the teacher, received ideas and the acceptance of the notion that knowledge resides in intellectual communities. So, in answer to the focal question, "Can Dialogical pedagogy, based on Positive liberty and viewed against the necessary features of education, lead to the learner's full independence understood as rational self-realization?" The response is Yes, if we understand independence to mean rational self-realization.

(iii)

DECLARATION

I declare that Dialogical pedagogy and the concept of liberty submitted at the University of the Western Cape is my own work and has not been submitted before at this or at any other university for a degree or examination, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been duly acknowledged.

Signed :  Date : *26 August 1999.*

NATHANIEL TLHAKO MASHABELA



CONTENTS

	Page
Abstract	ii
Declaration	iv
Acknowledgements	vi
INTRODUCTION	
CHAPTER 1 DIALOGICAL PEDAGOGY	1
Freire's culture of silence and Dialogical pedagogy	2
Underlying moral notions in Dialogical pedagogy	14
Dimensions of Dialogical Pedagogy	25
CHAPTER 2	
The notion of Negative liberty	33
The moral underpinnings of Negative liberty	39
The notion of Positive liberty	41
The moral notions of Positive liberty	49
CHAPTER 3	
Peter's characterization of education	51
Rorty's characterization of education	57
Strike's characterization of education	61
Dunlop's characterization of education	68
Features of education	72
CHAPTER 4	
Dialogical pedagogy, negative liberty and features of education	82
Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty	83
Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty and features of education	99
CHAPTER 5	
Dialogical pedagogy, Positive liberty and features of education	115
Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty	115
Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty and features of education	136
BIBLIOGRAPY	146

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am duly indebted to my mentor and supervisor Dr Nelleke Bak for her trust, generous support and patient guidance throughout my studies and finally in my writing of this mini-thesis: and this debt I acknowledge with the deepest respect.

I wish to thank very heartily the lecturing staff in the department of Philosophy of Education at the University of the Western Cape (Rosalind, Wally, Peter and Andrew) whose guidance during tutorials helped me more than they can imagine.

I thank again the CSD, the Irish Government and the University of the North for the financial assistance they made available to me in the course of my study.

Finally, I need to thank God for my parents, my brothers and sisters and my family for the time, support and encouragement they gave me throughout my studies.

I thank also, Ms E. Mahloko who ably helped me in the typing and arrangement of this mini-thesis.

CHAPTER 1

Dialogical Pedagogy

In this chapter, I want to give a brief account of what Dialogical pedagogy is and how it arose as a powerful concept of education. The crucial question which I shall attempt to answer in this chapter is, what is Dialogical pedagogy and an answer to the above question must necessarily be linked to a discussion of the context within which the concept, Dialogical pedagogy developed. I shall discuss this under the following heading: Freire's notion of "The culture of silence and Dialogical pedagogy".

I shall then discuss dimensions of Dialogical pedagogy namely, participatory learning (i.e. participation of both the learner and the teacher in a joint search of knowledge and skills), transformatory learning (i.e. development of the learner's intellectual capabilities in critical thinking and rational self-realisation) and liberatory learning (i.e. emancipation of the learner from external and internal constraints). These dimensions of Dialogical pedagogy, I note, do not follow a linear line of development but are one organic whole. In subsequent chapters, I shall focus on one of these dimensions namely, transformatory learning for two reasons: it is inclusive of the other two dimensions; the analysis of liberty in education which underpins transformatory learning is a central feature in this mini-thesis.

This chapter will be concluded by a discussion of the aspects of Dialogical pedagogy namely, Love, Humility, Faith, Trust, Hope and Critical thinking. Although Freire does not directly refer to Respect as one of the aspects, I argue it is implied and crucial to Dialogical pedagogy because it seems that Dialogical pedagogy is, perhaps in contrast to other modes of approach essentially humanizing (i.e making people aware of their own worth as the makers of history and creators of culture).

Bearing in mind that this mini-thesis is not an examination of different versions of love, I here wish to argue briefly that Freire's open-ended concept of love is too vague in that not all kinds of love can make Dialogical pedagogy flourish. This will lead to a useful but very short analysis of versions of love namely, Eros, Storge, Philia/Philos, Epithumia and Agape or Pedagogic love. My procedure would be to look at each love in turn against the background of Dialogical pedagogy in particular and educative teaching in general. I shall argue that it seems as if Agape or Pedagogic love is the kind of love within which Dialogical pedagogy can flourish.

FREIRE'S CULTURE OF SILENCE AND DIALOGICAL PEDAGOGY

Working in the North Eastern part of Brazil (in villages and slum areas of Recife) among the poor illiterates, Freire, developed the concept of what he calls the culture of silence which he argues, has been caused by economic, social and political domination together with the paternalistic attitude of the ruling group. Bee, (1980: 42), describes the culture of silence as follows:

Where there exists a dominant culture of silence, people are taught to accept what is handed down to them by the ruling elite. They live only to carry out unthinkingly and unquestioningly orders from above. Their understanding of reality is limited to what they are told to accept and believe - the myths that keep them silent and in ignorance. However, when education and literacy liberate they shatter the silence and bring people to an awareness of their condition and to their democratic rights to participate in making decisions regarding the problems of their existence.

Crucial in "the culture of silence" is the people's lethargic attitude towards the economic, social, and political situation coupled with unquestioning and unthinking attitudes which all make them silent recipients of myths fabricated by the ruling group about themselves. These myths, Freire in Bee, (1980: 42) argues, become

readily accepted and believed by their recipients. Central in the "the culture of silence" is also people's lack of critical understanding of those "facts" which are handed down to them by the ruling elite. So the only antidote to "the culture of silence" is education that liberates - understood as the kind of education that enables the oppressed to come to a full understanding of their economic, social and political conditions and the resultant urge to transform them.

The question arises, whether any kind of education can liberate. Not, according to Bee, (1980: 39),

Literacy is a two - edged sword.
It can be repressive or liberating.

The above asserts that there is, on one hand, the kind of literacy or education that is oppressive in that it encourages "the culture of silence" and on the other hand, the one that enhances liberation because it makes the learner aware of her social, economic and political conditions in which she lives, and evokes in such a learner the need to transform them. The former is according to Freire in Barnard, (1980: 38), like the entrenched formal education, fraught with "value-orientations" and "self-perpetrating interests of the urban middle strata and elites...", while the latter promotes the learner's "... interest and critical reading of reality on both the local and the larger levels". Thus, the former approach to education can be said to entrench only those values which the ruling group cherishes and wishes to perpetrate because these values keep the masses silent in their positions - a situation not unfamiliar in South Africa with its Apartheid education. The latter approach to education in contrast, regards the learner as an agent who is capable of making informed decisions and choices. In short, while the one objectifies the learner, the other regards the learner as an active subject.

According to a Freirean interpretation this objectification of the learner is entrenched each time when the learner is forced to accept information and the contents of learning in an uncritical way. The learner can only be a subject when

her agency is enhanced by a way of presenting information and the contents of learning in a way that critical thinking is invited. So the former does not create space for creative thinking and the application of that knowledge in the learner's life world while the latter does. As a result, such entrenched formal education is NOT capable of liberating the learner. Connolly, (1980: 73 - 74) notes that:

When education and especially schooling becomes acts of depositing, with the students as the depositories and the teacher as the depositor, we see Freire's famous "banking concept of education" in operation. Communication gives way to communiques by the teacher, who makes deposits which the students meekly receive, memorize and repeat. Their field of action does not exceed the acts of receiving, filing and storing away the deposits, becoming collectors or cataloguers of the things they store. In the end, it is the students themselves who are filed away.

Connolly emphasizes in the above quotation, the "banking concept of education" which is operative in the kind of formal education Freire describes and this implies that in such formal education the teacher lectures and the learner passively receives knowledge and skills in an unchallenged form. This mode of teaching further suggests that the teacher is the custodian of knowledge and skills and the learner is a mere receptacle because knowledge and skills are "banked" in the learner for future "use". This teaching approach, does not recognize the difference between telling and teaching - that is, the approach thrives on the teacher telling learners for instance, how they should go about solving a mathematical problem, or how best they could understand Emily Dickenson's poetry and not teaching them about the social, economic and political context within which Emily Dickenson wrote and how her poetry relates to their own existential situations - and, perhaps even how her situation informs their own situation. There is a difference between telling and teaching and, I argue, telling is one of the important dimensions of Freire's "banking concept of education".

Implicit in the "banking concept of education" is the expectation that learners, due to their lack of knowledge and skills, should unselectively and unthinkingly memorize those bodies of knowledge and skills in their "original" form and repeat them as they have been given to them when the teacher asks for them in the examinations. Worse still, is that learners remain inactive recipients of bodies of knowledge and skills, incapable of questioning those forms of knowledge but they are acquiring it (however problematic such an approach may be). Knowledge is, in the positivistic sense, finished, complete and static; and what the learner has to do is to appropriate it as such. In short, in this approach, knowledge is and should unproblematically be received and accepted by learners as a final truth. As Connolly, (1980: 74) notes: "The banking concept projects absolute ignorance on to others, by means of deposits in the form of slogans, communiques, monologues, and lectures, in the place of fruitful dialogue. Education for domination stimulates the credulity of students with the ideological intent of indoctrinating them to adapt to the ideology of oppression". I agree with the claim that "fruitful dialogue" seems to be an alternative approach to the "banking concept of education" because of its liberatory nature. Barnard (1980: 38) also draws the difference between Freire's concept of a banking kind of formal education because of its ideological content, and dialogue which is intended as a liberatory mode of teaching because of the space it creates for the learner's active participation and questioning in the acquisition of knowledge and skills: "Official education, however well intentioned, has as its goal an acceptance of what is, rather than a mobilisation towards what ought to be, that is domestication rather than liberation. To move from one to the other would thus require an active, dialogical educational programme concerned with social and political responsibility ...". So, "fruitful dialogue" and "active dialogue" as I shall use them in this mini-thesis, both imply the active participation of both the teacher and the learner in the acquisition of knowledge and skills and seem to be alternatives to the "banking concept of education" which is a carrier of "the culture of silence". Connolly, (1980: 70-71) says that "the culture" of silence creates a context,

... wherein he or she [the learner] becomes not only dependent, but also mute in the face of superior knowledge and power. This is the predicament of the culture of silence in which large numbers of people become trapped in an ignorance defined and imposed by others. Within such a context it is impossible for the dispossessed, who are forced to mimic the dictates of the paternal overlords, to have authentic voices of their own. It is important to realise however that silence does not signify an absence of response, but rather a response which lacks a critical quality. The entire education process, Freire suggests, is a major instrument for maintaining the culture of silence.

In the light of the argument being developed here, Connolly makes a significant observation in the above quotation that "silence does not signify an absence of response", but rather, "a response which lacks a critical quality". It is then clear that knowing how to read and write, is not sufficient for critical inquiry which in addition entails the ability to question what one reads and why one reads it. It is when the learner is capable of questioning what she reads and why she reads it that she emerges out of the "culture of silence" and starts to apply these forms of knowledge to her social and political realities with a view of transforming them. The "culture of silence" then, does not only make the learner a swallower of slogans from the ruling elite but also spawns ignorance and silence - a feature not only characteristic of the Freirean "schools" in North Eastern Brazil - but, I want to claim, also of Apartheid South Africa. (see, Moltano, (1991: 62). In order to change this state of affairs Freire, as quoted in Bee, (1980: 46) spells out his intention: "I have only one desire: that my thinking may coincide historically with the unrest of all those who, whether they live in those cultures which are wholly silenced or in the silent sectors of cultures which prescribe their voice, are struggling to have a voice of their own".

The question here is, how does Freire hope to achieve his aim? Freire intends to liberate those who live in silenced cultures or who are silenced by a banking type of education or "superior" cultures through Dialogical pedagogy which would enable them to participate actively in the transformation of their social, political and

economic conditions because people, as transforming agents, and, given the right tools (i.e. educational tools like the ability to read and write together with the ability of thinking critically), can bring about a change in their lives. About the Freirean approach Giroux, (1981: 134) has this to say:

What emerges from Freire's notion of domination is a set of pedagogical practices designed to overcome the oppressive conditions in which students find themselves. He places a heavy emphasis in his design for liberation on what he terms dialogical communication. Dialogical communication represents developing pedagogical structures in which dialogue and analysis serve as the basis for individual and collective possibilities for reflection and action.

In order to undermine a banking type of education and its oppressive effects on learners, Freire set up cultural circles in villages and slums of Recife (North Eastern part of Brazil) which became centres for education and alternatives to traditional education. In the place of the teacher was a coordinator; traditional lectures were replaced by dialogue; learner passivity by active group participation. Bee, (1980: 39) notes that, "The purpose of these culture circles was to attempt, through group debate, 'either to clarify situations or to seek action arising from that clarification'". Clearly here, is the direct departure from traditional approaches to teaching (as sketched by Freire's notion of "banking education") and the emphasis on dialogue as a liberatory and transformatory tool in that it facilitates active participation of both the teacher (coordinator) and the learner. The themes of discussion in Dialogical pedagogy are lifted out of the learner's experiential world, e.g questions about nationalism and democracy among others, in order to facilitate participation and dialogue. Themes for debate, Freire in Bee, (1980: 39) maintains, should not be far removed from the learner's knowledge and understanding. About this Freirean approach, Bee, (1980: 39-40) concludes: "... Freire became even more convinced that learning to read should be, for adults, a process in which the actual content and material had bearing on their daily reality.

Moreover, a study of the problems should lead to critical awareness of the possibility for action and change".

The key concepts in the above quotation which deserve emphasis are "action" and "change". I have said elsewhere that the ability to read and write is NOT a sufficient condition for critical thinking. What this implies is that over and above the learner's ability to read and write, she should know and understand what she is reading and writing and why she is reading and writing it. In a sense, the knowledge which the learner acquires in the process of learning should evoke in the learner the ability to apply it in her situation; it must further help the learner to make informed choices as opposed to uninformed ones. In other words, it entails "reflection" and "action". Critical thinking through Dialogical pedagogy, is a transformatory action which is required of the learner at the end of the learning process - a view which Freire in Shaull, (1986: 12) argues for when he says that it enables each person to win "... back his right to say his own word, to name the world". Clearly this suggests an active participation of the learner in the learning process. But the learner's ability to "say his own word", "to name the world", which implies the learner's active participation in the learning process, cannot be achieved in the learning situation if the teacher is,

... aloof from his or her pupils and merely donates skills and information as one who knows. The role of the educator is to enter into dialogue with illiterates about concrete situations and offer them the instruments with which they can teach themselves to read and write. Such teaching cannot be imposed from the top, as it were, but can only take place in a shared investigation, in a problem - raising situation between educator and educatee. (Bee, 1980: 43).

Bee seems to be caught up in a paradox here because it seems unlikely that while the learner does not have the "instruments" for self-teaching understood as reading and writing abilities which must be provided by the teacher, she could still

become involved in "a shared investigation in a problem-raising situation ...". This situation of the learner, it would seem, could best be served while the teacher imparts information "from the top, as it were". It also seems quite obscure, how the learner could, without knowledge and skills become an active participant in the learning process. This is not the place to pursue this argument but I will pick up on it later with my discussion of "socialization" and "individuation"; I merely wanted to point at a seeming tension in Bee's argument. Otherwise there are significant contributions which he makes to our understanding of Dialogical pedagogy; that it flourishes in a "problem-raising situation between the educator and the educatee". This seems to suggest that the teacher as a knowledgeable person should problematize knowledge so that it could challenge the learner's thoughts and thus facilitate participation and dialogue between them.

I have said in the above discussion that the "banking concept of education" carries with it, the "culture of silence"; I have also stated that the "culture of silence" does not signify merely the absence of response - a response which lacks the learner's critical reflection is, itself, silence because it shows a lack of understanding of the material to be learned. The panacea to the "culture of silence" is Freire's Dialogical pedagogy which he claims does not over-emphasize the learning content at the expense of the learner's critical thinking development and active participatory attitude.

As the name suggests, Dialogical pedagogy appeals to dialogue as a central aspect in the teaching and learning process. I therefore want to examine more closely what might be understood by it. Freire suggests that dialogue as a mode of teaching and learning is a principal means by which the "banking concept of education", can be challenged and opposed - because, in dialogue, there is the act of knowing (i.e. the cognitive act). Connolly (1980: 74-75), interprets it as follows:

The cognitive act of dialogue occurs when what is to be known is grasped by those who seek to know it, and surrenders itself as a mediator between two seekers in their critical unveiling of the object to be known. Freire urges us to consider the epistemological circle as a totality, and to refrain from separating the stage of gaining existing knowledge from the stage of discovering and creating new knowledge. In both these stages, the subjects who desire to know must face the objects of their knowledge from the stage of discovering and creating new knowledge. In both these stages, the subjects who desire to know must face the objects of their knowledge with a critical and curious approach. If the critical approach is invalidated through a lapse in the Dialogical relationship, mere transference of knowledge occurs.

There are significant contributions which Connolly makes about dialogue - his assertion that the learning content or "objects to be known" must first be understood by both the teacher and the learner because it is a medium through which they meet and carry out dialogue, is an important observation although it is not very clear how the learner can "grasp" these objects of study without having been socialized into the knowledge and skills in that area of study. Perhaps, fruitful dialogue should first be preceded by teaching which entails the transference of skills and knowledge. But, I shall pursue this argument in chapter 5. Connolly further acknowledges the totality of the "circle of knowledge" as a circle that should not be fragmented which means that, the "conceptual inheritance" as Toulmin in Strike, (1982: 18) would say, should not be separated from the discovery and the creation of new knowledge because both are part of one organic whole. This notion is important in that this "conceptual inheritance", is a springboard for the discovery and creation of new knowledge. Crucial to these two stages (i.e. "the stage of gaining existing knowledge" and "the stage of discovering and creating new knowledge") are the critical and the curious attitudes which the learner and the teacher must adopt; their significance, the significance of the critical and the curious attitudes that is, lies in the fact that they hold the Dialogical relationship in

balance lest it degenerates into a mere donation of knowledge and skills to the passive learner.

Marcuse in Giroux, (1981: 131) also seems to reject the notion that either the teacher and the existing knowledge or the learner and the existing knowledge are separate entities: both the teacher and the learner are equally bound to the subject matter under study.

Dialectical thought invalidates the a priori opposition of value and fact by understanding all facts as stages of a single process - a process in which subject - object are so joined that truth can be determined only within the subject - object totality. All facts embody the knower as well as the doer; they continuously translate the past into the present. The objects thus contain subjectivity in their very structure.

What brings the teacher and the learner together are "facts", understood as bodies of knowledge or subjects under study which serve as media through which both carry out dialogue. In view of the fact that each is inseparably "joined" to the subject under study each one of them must interpret and attribute meaning to this subject according to her own present condition (i.e. she has to attach to the subject her own personal meaning). I shall argue that these bodies of knowledge are as Strike, (1982: 19) has stated, "received ideas" (i.e. they have a history) and teachers and learner's alike, cannot, like beneficiaries in a welfare state merely receive them as donations in a Dialogical situation; both must interpret and re-interpret them. In the act of interpretation, the teacher-learner-subject are thus organically linked. In this way the subject is infused with "subjective elements", i.e. the interpretations of teacher and learner developed through dialogue and social interaction. So this seems to call to question the contention that there are objective facts which the teacher as a person who knows could impart to the learner who has to appropriate them unquestioningly. The fact that learning contents ultimately contain subjective elements seems to suggest that knowledge is constructed and reconstructed during social interaction and not in situations

where the one (teacher) passes on chunks of undigested information and skills to the other (learner); both must be equally involved in the learning process. The above assertion is supported by Flanagan and Sayed, (1990: 157): "Human beings learn in a specific historical and cultural setting and so the status of cognition is that it is in essence a social construct, it is, if you like, a mind in society".

Connolly (1980: 72) articulates as one of the features of Dialogical education "... a relation between subjects in the act of knowing". This suggests that in education, as in dialogue, the relation is that of the teacher as a person and the learner as another person: thus both are in a human relation which is brought about by bodies of knowledge and skills as media for dialogue which is sustained by their "equal" involvement in the interpretation of these facts. The teacher's expertise in this dialogic encounter is marked by his ability to present these bodies of knowledge in a problematic way and not as if they were completed and finished. It is only when knowledge is problematized, Connolly maintains, that a critical and curious attitude is evoked in the learner and fruitful dialogue is unlocked. Freire as quoted in Bee, (1980: 44) sums up this situation when he says it is necessary to problematize the "... existential situations" of both the teacher and the learner (i.e. the actual social, political and physical conditions as well as the mental constructs of the teacher and the learner constitute the context within which dialogue is carried out). The implication here is that the problematization of the "existential situations" of both the teacher and the learner makes dialogue possible and necessary.

Fruitful or "authentic" dialogue, unlike the Socratic or Platonic dialogues (which are merely engaged in in order to win the argument), is characterised by both critical reflection of both the teacher and the learner and takes into consideration the common social, economic and the political situation of both parties so that they can explore all the dimensions of knowledge. Connolly (1980: 73) expresses it as follows:

By treating cognisable objects, not as deposits to be handed out to students, but as ideas for critical reflection, both students and teacher become critical co-investigators in dialogue with each other. Thus the teacher's own opinions and views are constantly being acted upon by the discussion and expression of students. In this way both students and teacher find themselves challenged, and feel obliged to meet the challenge, because it is not offered in an isolated vacuum, but presented in a total context, connected with other living situations.

The teacher and the learner are "critical co-investigators" because in dialogue, the learning process is reciprocal in that the teacher's ideas and opinions are questioned by the learner; and, the learner's are equally challenged by the teacher's questions. In this way, learning is a dynamic process developing all participants.

For both the teacher and the learner to explore knowledge and skills in all their various dimensions, Freire as quoted in Connolly, (1980: 77), gives an analysis of dialogue as a human phenomenon. He says that embedded in dialogue, "... is the word, which is more than the spoken or written unit of communication. ... the word has two components or two dimensions: reflection and action. Whenever these two constituent elements are separated the word generates either into mere verbalism, or rash activism". Reflection which implies critical thinking cannot be separated from the urge to take transformatory action upon the world. In other words, for Freire to understand the world is to change it. Should "reflection" and "action" be separated in the learning situation, then education threatens to become oppressive and learners remain inactive recipients of the teacher's slogans and communiques; this may reduce authentic dialogue into a monologue essentially dominated by the "knowing" teacher. Connolly, (1980: 78) further notes: "... education, over and above seeking literacy, must embody critical dialogue including action. Reflective participation and not monologue is required. The teacher who strives to achieve praxis (i.e accepted practice informed by theory) must have faith in students, and trust in their power to reason and reflect". What

Connolly implies here is that "reflection" and "action" on the part of the learner depend on the faith and trust which the teacher reposes in the learner for the achievement of praxis. Praxis in other words, is taking informed action, i.e. action that has been critically reflected on. That is, the teacher must trust that learners are also capable of critical thinking; that they are capable of contributing, in a dialogic way, to a deeper understanding of the learning material or subject under study, and to take informed action.

UNDERLYING MORAL NOTIONS IN DIALOGICAL PEDAGOGY

Connolly makes a very important point when he says that the developing ability of the learner to reflect and act depends on the teacher's faith and trust in the learner. What this means is that moral notions underpin the success of the pedagogical process through authentic dialogue. Before looking in more detail at dialogical pedagogy and more specifically at transformatory learning, I want to examine the underlying values that are crucial to the success of the pedagogical project.

Embedded in dialogue as a mode of teaching and learning is the caring relationship because the teacher and the learner should, over and above paying more attention to the subject (bodies of knowledge) under study, also attend to each other as persons. The teacher for instance, may wish to know how learners feel about the poetry lesson he is teaching; how they cope with it or whether it makes sense to them or not. For Freire, these attitudes are among others, forms of caring which cannot be separated from authentic dialogue. In other words, in Dialogical pedagogy there is a conceptual link between authentic dialogue and caring. Noddings in Kohli (1995: 140) has this to say about caring in dialogue:

The emphasis on dialogue points up the basic phenomenology of caring. A carer must attend to or be engrossed in the cared for, and the cared-for must receive the carer's efforts at caring. This reception, too, is a form of attention. People in true dialogue within a caring relation do not turn their attention

wholly to intellectual objects, although of course, they may do this for brief intervals - Rather, they attend non-selectively to one another.

But what for Freire would constitute such a caring relationship? I shall discuss **six moral notions** that seem to underpin Dialogical pedagogy. Jaspers in Freire, (1986: 45) succinctly says, "Born of a critical matrix, dialogue creates a critical attitude. It is nourished by love, respect, humility, hope, faith and trust". What this points to is that dialogue is a mode of being human, or in other words, a moral stance.

Love

Dialogue according to Freire, depends on love between participants in order to embark on a joint venture in creating and recreating meaning in the world; that is, love makes possible mutual participation between the teacher and the learner in trying to get meaning from bodies of knowledge as aspects of the world. The mutual search of knowledge, Freire, (1986: 62) says, "... is an act of creation and recreation" which cannot be accomplished in the absence of love - because, where love (also love of knowledge) flourishes, there is no domination of one (possibly the learner) by the other (teacher). Freire, (1986: 62) says this about love in dialogue:

Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of profound love for the world and for man. The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and recreation, is not possible if it is not infused with love. Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is thus necessarily the task of responsible subjects and cannot exist in a relation of domination. Domination reveals the pathology of love: sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated. Because love is an act of courage, not fear, love is commitment to other men.

But it seems that Freire's open-ended concept of love is too vague in that it lends itself to various interpretations. I shall argue that not any kind of love can bring people together and create a feeling of warmth and solidarity among participants. So what I shall do is to consider various interpretations of love in order to ascertain which concept of love might most fruitfully underpin a notion of Dialogical pedagogy.

Philia/Philos

In this kind of love there is a desire in the lover (or teacher) to accomplish his ideals through the loved one (or learner). A parent for instance, may wish that his child should follow a professional line which has been his dream for a long time which he has unfortunately failed to accomplish. The same thing could be said about the teacher who, having failed to attain a particular profession, encourages learners to follow it; such a teacher is merely compromising the learner's potentials and will for his own satisfaction. So, Philia/Phileo does not make either dialogue or education to flourish because it seems capable of stifling the learner's own creative efforts, independent thinking and the ability to make independent decisions. Mohlala, (1990: 25) rightly observes: "No pedagogue or educator worthy of the name could mistake Philia for pedagogic love. Philia cannot influence mutuality between educator and educand. Moreover, it can neither sustain the pedagogic activity structure, nor ensure dialogic contact, because it is devoid of affective content".

Storge

Contrary to Philia, Storge refers to the kind of love prevalent among families and community members for leaders, heroes or objects. Entailed in Storge is blind hero-worshipping of the loved one or even objects, be they renowned leaders or heirlooms. Smith and Griffiths (1989: 60 - 61) sound a cautionary note to those who are victims of this love:

If I love an heirloom vase, say, for its sentimental value as well as its intrinsic beauty then my feelings are bound up with and dependent upon its fortunes. It might be safer to become a connoisseur of vases in general, since then there are other candidates for my interest and affection if one is damaged. Safest of all is to become a connoisseur of the quality or qualities for which I loved the vases: to become a lover of beauty in general. To be such a lover is to have access to the source from which all particular instances of beauty are derived; contemplating the form of beauty I have knowledge of that which is independent of all the vicissitudes of the world. So, too with people. They change, or move away, or grow up, or die. Our loved ones are hostages of fortune, as the phrase has it. Emotional dependence upon them can only end in grief.

Writing about this kind of love, Smith and Griffiths make a crucial point that an emotional attachment to an object or renowned leader may lead to grief in that given the nature of things and human nature, the object may be lost or the worshipped person may change his attitude or behave in undesirable ways, leaving the loving feeling betrayed. So, Storge does not seem a fruitful kind of love for Dialogical pedagogy; it cannot enhance or sustain the dialogical content because worshipping of the teacher by, say, the learner may lead to an unreflective adoration of the teacher and the unquestioning acceptance of what the teacher offers as contents of learning. Viewed in this light, the learner's creative efforts might be stifled and have her ability to act curtailed. Fromm in Freire, (1986: 51) seems to capture the essence of Storge

But the inability to act which causes man's anguish also causes them to reject their impotence, by attempting ... to restore [their] capacity to act. But can [they] and how? One way is to submit to and identify with a person or group having power. By this symbolic participation in another person's life [men have] the illusion of acting, when in reality [they] only submit to and become a part of those who act.

Freire, (1986: 51) makes a similar point when he says that "Populist manifestations perhaps exemplified this type of behaviour by the oppressed, who, by identifying with charismatic leaders, come to feel that they themselves are active and effective". This means that the oppressed, by identifying with leaders engage in false participation because they believe that when these leaders make decisions and act in particular ways, they (the oppressed) are implementing their own decisions and their actions.

Given the above notion of Storge, it is clear that it, like Philia is not an appropriate concept of love for authentic dialogue because the beloved person may manipulate the loving one in pursuit of his own (political) ends.

Eros

Eros, unlike Philia and Storge, denotes the desire of one person to possess someone. The loving person feels satisfied and fulfilled when the other person is in his custody - a situation quite apparent in some families especially between dominant husband and submissive wife. Because of the absence of respect for the possessed one, she becomes dehumanized because she is decided for and action is taken on her behalf. Like Philia and Storge, Eros diminishes the loved one's ability to act: In this way it robs her of agency. At worst, Eros is lustful and the lover seeks personal satisfaction through erotic love. Oberholzer in Mohlala (1990: 23) sums it up as "... an egotistic self-love". This implies that it serves its own ends; and as he (1990: 23) further notes, " Eros is selfish and self-sufficient, and therefore, strains the needed harmony between the participants. Eros thwarts the participants in actualizing self accomplishment, because it basically calls for self-preservation, promotion, deepening, and betterment or enrichment of one's egotistic nature only".

Although Oberholzer in the above quotation does not explain what he means by saying that "Eros thwarts the participants in actualizing self-accomplishment" or how it "calls for self-preservation, promotion, deepening and betterment of one's

egotistic nature only", I think this could, simply put, be interpreted to mean that Eros is selfish in that it wishes to satisfy itself at the expense of others; thus it is an oppressive kind of love.

So, Eros, like Philia and Storge, is inappropriate for Dialogical pedagogy and education because in the teaching - learning situation, a teacher of worth cannot approach the learner solely with the intention of gratifying himself; if he did, dialogue would cease to be educational. Radice as quoted in Mohlala, (1990: 24) sums it up well when he says "The passionate nature of erotic love militates against the essence and tenets of pedagogic love".

Epithumia

Epithumia is the kind of love that binds married people together (i.e. husband and wife) with the sole purpose of extending the human species through sexual intercourse. Wheat in Mohlala, (1990: 24) says that it "... takes place in the solemn bond of matrimony, that is, between husband and wife ...". From the above quotation it becomes clear that Epithumia is unacceptable in Dialogical pedagogy and in education because, if practised in the education situation, can lead to sexual abuse of learners and adulterous actions between teachers and learners. Mohlala, (1990: 24 - 25) puts it strongly but rightly when he says that, "The application of Epithumia in education relation would lead to the practice of fornication between participants. This would be an unfortunate practice which would jeopardize the aim of education, because an adult would perpetrate sexual intercourse with a child and ignore the mandate to his charge. Such an action would be outrageous and adulterous to perpetrate".

Agape/Pedagogic love

Mohlala, (1990: 24) says that "Pedagogic love promotes the mutual relationship of trust and respect, and bolsters reverence for the other. Pedagogic love in dialogic accompaniment is geared towards assisting the child to derive the

maximum meaning from life". Central to Pedagogic love I shall argue, is trust and respect for the other in a dialogic relationship; The fact that there is respect in this kind of love indicates that it is not possible for either the teacher or the learner to abuse his or her position of trust in exploiting the other in dialogue. For example, the teacher cannot, as it is the case in Eros, use the learner for his own ends.

What is significant about this relation of love is its reciprocal nature or mutual love which enables one to see the suffering of others as reflections of his own suffering which is only possible through empathy. Notable again in Pedagogic love, is an element of caring not only about the subject matter but about participants in dialogue as well. Although one cannot deny that caring, taken to extremes may not be conducive to learning as when the cared-for (a learning child) wants the teacher or parent to do homework for her or when a spoilt child wants to be bought everything in the shop. The argument is rather that the cared-for (i.e. child) does not have an adequate understanding of what it means to care; she, most often operates on the basis that caring is indulgence. It is not. There is the right amount and kind of caring which symbolizes Pedagogic love; as, when the teacher prepares his lessons in such a way that they encourage growth of the learner's understanding or when he ascertains that they (learners) understand bodies of knowledge (subject under consideration).

I argue then, that Agape (Pedagogic love) unlike, Philia/Phileo, Storge, Eros, Epithumia is the kind of love within which Dialogical pedagogy can flourish because it considers the other as a fellow human being in the education situation; a person capable of making independent decisions and of thinking critically. Participants, considered with respect and trust develop confidence as people who are capable of thinking and acting. I think Noddings, in Watt, (1989: 242) could help us to understand this kind of love as consisting of Ethical caring: "... natural caring has a certain exclusiveness about it. Ethical caring is the effort to generalise this natural disposition: to be a caring person towards everyone with whom I interact, rather than only towards those for whom I have a natural feeling". Freire, (1986: 62) seems to emphasize the freedom which this kind of love entails

such as independent decision making, critical thinking and freedom to question among others when he says that authentic love (i.e. Pedagogic love) "... must generate other acts of freedom; otherwise it is not love".

Respect

Respect, as I have elsewhere mentioned, is implied in the Freirean dialogue and merits attention in this mini-thesis because of its crucial nature in dialogue. I argue that it is essential for those who participate in critical dialogue to have respect for each other as human beings who are engaged in the joint venture of a search for meaning in the contents of learning.

In the context of dialogue and education it is necessary for both the teacher and the learner to respect each other; The teacher should first of all, know that he is dealing with learners who like him, are human beings who have interests, motivations and aspirations and who are capable of knowing. The inverse is also true about the learner. Thus a feeling of fraternity, which Hornby (1986: 343) says, is a meeting of "men who are joined together by a common interest", must be a binding force between the teacher and the learner.

Peters, (1972: 105) notes that, "What is required of the teacher, ... is respect for persons, not intimate relations with his pupils. In a teaching situation love (I have argued, Agape) must be of a type that is appropriate to the special type of relationship in which the teacher is placed, to his concept of them as pupils rather than as sons or brothers". The teacher then, should, as I have said elsewhere, avoid being too intimate with his learners by actualising in the teaching - learning situation the kind of love that is inappropriate to this situation. Obviously, the kinds of love like Eros (which is devoid of respect for the other) and Epithumia (which brings the loving parties very close to each other), among others, offer very little if anything to Dialogical pedagogy because they serve different purposes. So, respect for persons entails Agape or Pedagogy love because it is benevolent in its intentions.

Humility

Closely related to Pedagogic love is humility (i.e. the ability to accept the views of others) of those who participate in dialogue because dialogue cannot co-exist with arrogance. For Freire, if one participant, the teacher for instance, could cherish the notion that he is more knowledgeable and more capable than the learner, then authentic dialogue cannot flourish. The inverse is true about the learner. Thus, in a climate where participants are humble towards each other and towards the object of investigation (i.e the subject), there is the resultant atmosphere of respect for the other as capable of knowing the subject. So in dialogue, there ought not to be one participant who should feel self-sufficient or who regards others as incompetent, dull or ignorant. Freire, (1986: 63) puts it well: "Dialogue, as the encounter of men addressed to the common task of learning and acting, is broken if the parties (or one of them) lack humility. How can I enter into dialogue if I always project ignorance onto others and never perceive my own?"

Humility then, like Pedagogic love is central to the creation of dialogical relationships and crucial to the ultimate participation of the teacher and the learner in their joint search for knowledge and skills. Both, ought to encounter each other with love, respect and humility if the learner is to be led towards critical independent thinking.

Faith

Freire, (1986: 63) says that: "Faith in man is a priori for dialogue; the 'dialogical man' believes in the other even before he meets them face to face". What this quotation implies is that faith like love, respect and humility is an essential aspect of dialogue in that, if the teacher for instance, does not have faith in the learners, he may resort to undesirable modes of teaching like the chalk-and-talk or top-down teaching which thrives on the notion that the teacher has knowledge and skills which learners cannot develop in any other means than by relying totally on the

teacher; (of course, learners do not have the skills and the knowledge that the teacher has - if they did, they would not be learners. What is at stake here is the process by which they come to know).

This approach projects ignorance on learners and it is one of the causes of "the culture of silence" because learners are not given scope to question what the teacher says. The teacher's attitude which can result from this kind of teaching is arrogance because the teacher believes that he is a model of excellence - it can also incorporate paternalism, because he is convinced that the learner does not have anything worthwhile to contribute. Freire (1986: 64) seems right when he says "without faith in man, dialogue is a farce which inevitably degenerates into paternalistic manipulation". Jaspers in Freire, (1986: 45) emphasizes the essential nature of faith in dialogue: "Dialogue is the only way, not only in the vital questions of the political order, but in all the expressions of our being. Only by virtue of faith, however, does dialogue have power and meaning; by faith in man and his possibilities, by the faith that I can only become truly myself when other men also become themselves".

Hope

Given the notion of human nature that man is by nature incomplete, it becomes clear that hope is essential to dialogue and ordinary human relations. Hope denotes the belief in the other and the acknowledgement that through mutual relationship with others, (in this context through dialogic participation) she can come to know things she did not know before. Eliot, (1974: 63) seems to capture the essence of man's incompleteness when he says, "Son of man, You cannot say, or guess, for you know only A heap of broken images ...". Although the above statement seems to sound a pessimistic note, it helps to clarify the position of a person as a position devoid of finite knowledge; in a sense, it depicts a person's uncertainty in the world.

So, in a dialogic situation participants (i.e the teacher and the learner) must have hope in the vision of what they ought to achieve; and in what they can become. Above that, while they share a vision and aspirations, the teacher on the one hand must have hope in the learner as a person who is capable of contributing to the store of knowledge - if not now, later when she shall have acquired the necessary skills. Without hope in the learner as a person who is capable of learning, it becomes fruitless to enter into dialogue with her. On the other hand, the learner should have hope and faith in the teacher as, for instance, a person who has knowledge and skills; a person who is genuine in his participation with the learner. Thus, mutual hope sustains a dialogical relationship between the teacher and the learner. Freire, (1986: 64) says that dialogue cannot "... exist without hope. Hope is rooted in man's incompleteness from which they move out in constant search - a search which can only be carried out in communion with other men. Hopelessness is a form of silence, ...".

In true dialogue then, it is not only "the intellectual objects" which count because, as Noddings in Kohli, (1995: 143) puts it, "Dialogue is the means through which we learn what the other wants and needs, and it is also the means by which we monitor the effects of our acts; we ask, 'what are you going through?' Before we act, as we act, and after we act. It is our way of being in relation". So a teacher who does not care about the learner, either by focusing on himself as the one who knows or only on the "intellectual objects", cannot contribute to the maintenance of authentic dialogue in the learning-teaching situation. It also goes without saying that, the learner who also does not care about the teacher, by rejecting the teacher's caring efforts, is likely to undermine authentic dialogue as is the case in anti-dialogic modes of teaching and learning. A constant complaint in South Africa by students has always been that, "certain teachers are undermining our learning efforts, or, are using either sarcasm or ridicule each time when we attempt to answer their questions". (These are unfair modes of teaching which are devoid of a caring attitude). These complaints by students are indicative that the teacher is preoccupied with himself as a superior person without adopting a caring attitude towards them. The absence of a caring attitude from the teacher and the rejection of the teacher's caring by the cared-for seem to have a tendency of undermining authentic dialogue in education.

DIMENSIONS OF DIALOGICAL PEDAGOGY

I have discussed authentic dialogue as dependent on “reflection” and “action” and that if either is ignored or undermined, then authentic dialogue ceases to be. In authentic dialogue there is that mutual "reflection" and "action" by both the teacher and the learner which call for active and caring participation in the teaching and learning process. Freire further interprets dialogical pedagogy as liberatory learning, transformatory learning and participatory learning which I shall discuss separately here in order to highlight specific distinctions although for Freire all three are organically linked, under dialogical pedagogy. Because my mini-thesis focuses on concepts of liberty that could shape dialogical pedagogy, I shall be referring specifically to transformatory learning which I shall take to incorporate aspects of liberatory and participatory learning.

As I mentioned, I shall be discussing transformatory learning as encompassing aspects of liberatory and participatory learning. It is only through active participation that authentic dialogue is established; authentic dialogue in turn equips the learner with the ability to reflect critically and to be able to change her environment where necessary; and it is only through transforming these oppressive aspects of her environment that the learner is liberated. In other words, transformation precedes political liberation. But before one can transform there needs to be (intellectual) liberation, i.e. critical reflection which informs one's action. Hence, the ultimate goal of participation and transformatory learning is the liberation of the learner and her society.

Participatory learning

Participation refers to the active involvement of the teacher and the learner in objects of learning (i.e. bodies of content, reading, writing, thinking skills and the ability to take informed action) with the purpose of changing the social, economic and political world. However the ability to read and write is insufficient for the reading of one's reality if it is not informed by consciousness or awareness of the

power of learning to bring about change. This notion is explored by Shaull in Freire, (1986: 13) who says this about one illiterate who suddenly became conscious of the impact of words: "Before this, words meant nothing to me; now they speak to me and I can make them speak". Shaull in Freire, (1986: 13) illustrates this further: "When this happens in the process of learning to read, men discover that they are creators of culture and that all their work can be creative. 'I work, and working I transform the world'".

The emphasis in the above quotation is that knowledge and skills, coupled with consciousness and a thorough understanding of the world, are invaluable to active participation in the transformation of the world. There is also a suggestion here that it is through authentic dialogue that the learner re-discovers that she is also capable of participating in the creation of culture; that is, the creation of culture is not a prerogative of the elite (teachers) but rather, the right of each participant.

But, in order to make each learner a participant in the creation and re-creation of culture, Giroux, (1981: 83) suggests, that a

... radical classroom relationship must be developed with the aim of overcoming those alienating divisions of labour which help to reproduce the relations of domination and powerlessness in the classroom. Both students and teachers must learn to operate out of context of shared respect and trust. Put another way, power in the classroom must be both democratized and humanized. It is only on the basis of this theoretical premise that a foundation can be built for developing more specific classroom practices.

Implicit in Giroux's assertion is the notion that participation in the joint search of knowledge depends on what he calls "radical classroom relationships" which ought to be developed; this seems to suggest that the teacher and the learner should be both teachers and learners at the same time; and this can only take place in a climate of reciprocal respect and trust of the other and active participation in the learning situation. This question of "democratizing power" between the teacher

and the learner in the learning situation is doubtful and I intend to discuss it in detail in subsequent chapters. Suffice it to say here that participation in the learning situation is conditioned by mutual respect between the participants and the quality of trust which those participants accord each other. Mutual respect and trust are essential for both the teacher and the learner in order to adopt participatory attitudes required in Dialogical pedagogy.

Transformatory learning

Transformatory learning which denotes the learner's intellectual capabilities in critical thinking, action and skills, is one of the dimensions of Dialogical pedagogy. Shaull, (1986: 9) notes that authentic dialogue in education established through active participation, makes illiterates "... come to a new awareness of self-hood and begin to look critically at the social situation in which they find themselves ..." and "... take the initiative in acting to transform the society that has denied them this opportunity of participation". The ability to read and write devoid of critical thinking and application of that knowledge in one's situation, be it social or political coupled with action, remains oppressive. In a sense transformatory pedagogy is when the learner has knowledge and skills as tools that she can use to critically assess her situation and take the necessary informed active transformatory action within her own situation.

Freire, (1986: 64-65) notes:

True dialogue cannot exist unless it involves critical thinking - thinking which discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and men admitting of no dichotomy between them - thinking which perceives reality as a process of transformation, rather than as a static entity - thinking which does not separate itself from action, but constantly immerses itself in temporality without fear of risks involved. Critical thinking contrast with naive thinking.

Central to true dialogue, is "critical thinking" which Freire says cannot countenance the division between man and man and world. This means that the world i.e. contents of learning, be they social, economic or political are meeting points of discussion between teacher and learner. Freire, (1986: 65) seems right when he says this about the solidarity of participants in the pedagogical process and their link with their world: "Education which is able to resolve the contradiction between teacher and students takes place in a situation in which both address their act of cognition to the object by which they are mediated". In the context of teaching and learning it means that the learning contents (objects of study) bring both the teacher and the learner in a joint search for knowledge and skills. This critical approach to reality is not just an exercise of the imagination but an intellectual exercise done with the purpose of "transforming" or changing the world; that is why critical thinking cannot be separated from action; reflection and action are therefore, crucial to critical dialogue. Freire, (1986: 65) summarizes it as follows: "For the critic, the important thing is the continuing transformation of reality, for the continuing humanization of man".

So, knowledge and skills must be driven by consciousness or awareness of the socio-political reality and the need to change it - hence the role which critical reflection and action is accorded in authentic dialogue. And it is through participation of learner and teacher that authentic dialogue is established and with it the ability to reflect critically and to transform society where necessary.

Liberatory learning

There is no such thing as a neutral educational process. Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes 'the practice of freedom', the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world (Shaul, 1980: 13 - 14).

Central to the above is the notion that education is either oppressive or liberatory; and, an oppressive education has as its objective the assimilation of the "younger generation" (i.e. learners) into the social, economic and political ideologies of the ruling group. In this sense, education is static in that it aims to maintain the status quo. But, liberatory learning, in contrast, is "the practice of freedom", that is, the learner is, in the process of learning, free to look critically at her condition with a view of challenging and changing it. In other words, the learner has the freedom to reflect critically and, actively confront her social or political reality in order to change it for the better. This according to Freire, is only possible in liberatory learning and not in oppressive education. In short, liberatory learning conscientizes (i.e. makes the learner critically aware) of the socio-political contradictions which are essentially oppressive in that they force her to lead an inauthentic life because they encourage mute acceptance and inaction. This robs the learner of agency. It is when the learner is inactive that her creative inputs into the social, economic or political arrangement are uncertain or non-existent. This situation also holds in a learning situation where the learner is inactive; there is no meaningful input which a non-participatory learner can make in the field of study.

Liberatory learning then, has as its chief aim, the liberation of the learner from oppressive political conditions by making her conscious or aware, through "what is" (i.e. the objects of learning about the socio-political situation as it appears in the present) towards "what ought to be" (i.e. an idealised situation), characterised by models of how human beings ought to live together in a social or political setting. It is what "ought to be" rather than "what is" that is crucial in liberatory learning. Connolly, (1980: 72) says, "Oppression is functionally domesticating. If one is to escape, one must emerge from it and turn upon it. This can be done by praxis: reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it". It means that to "emerge from" oppression which is by nature "domesticating", the learner ought, through co-operative effort to embark on praxis, i.e. to reflect or to think critically and to act in order to change the oppressive conditions, be they social, economic or political. In a sense, education that is liberatory should empower the learner:

i.e it should equip her with knowledge, skills, critical reflection and the ability to act in a way that will bring about change for the better. In other words, it restores the learner's agency to control her own environment - she then comes to understand her situation better and knowingly, confront and change it.

The confrontation of reality by the learner is not only confined to the classroom situation - but to other levels of societal institutions as well. Bee, (1980: 49) notes this: "The only valid form of literacy training is one which enables the learner to intervene in reality, to experience responsibility at all levels: in schools, trade unions, places of employment, neighbourhoods, churches and rural communities". This view by Bee is again emphasized by Giroux, (1981: 131) when he asserts that, "At the core of Freire's notion of knowledge is a recognition of the dialectical interconnections between the doer, the receiver, and the objective world itself. knowledge is seen as an active force that is used by the learner to make sense of his 'life-world'". What Giroux says about Freire's notion of knowledge is that meaningful knowledge ought to enable the learner to understand her material world in which she lives; it is this understanding of the world in which she lives that will enable her to take transformatory action through her own active participation.

Giroux, (1981: 131) further notes this about Freire's dialogical approach that,

Within Freire's model, knowledge becomes a liberating tool only when it can be released from reifying social and political relationships. Knowledge, in this case, is more than a social construct, it also represents the basis for social action. A radical conception of knowledge does not rest simply on the ability to demystify the ideological hegemony of the dominant order. That is important, but incomplete. A radical conception of knowledge also rests on how well it can be used by the oppressed themselves to question the very processes used to constitute and legitimate knowledge and experience in the first place.

Significantly, in the light of the argument being developed here, knowledge becomes liberating only when it does not sustain the relations of political, economic and political power - as for example was the case with Apartheid education in South Africa. To put it another way, the reification of "social and political relationships", is encouraged by the other's passivity in the learning situation (probably the learner); in such a situation, the teacher imparts selectively that which he deems socially and politically necessary as the sole "participant" in the teaching activity - thus intensifying domination of the learner. Knowledge as a basis for "social action" ought to enable the learner to adopt participatory attitudes and to change those structures which are the carriers of the dominant ideology. Above that, liberatory learning should enable learners to question the notion that knowledge and experience are a prerogative of some people and not of others.

Polyani in Morrow, (1989: 112) holds that: "... to see a problem is to see something that is hidden". While Polyani makes an important point in saying that the discovery of a problem is in itself an action of uncovering, he does not address the importance of action as participation in solving the problem that has been discovered; it is after the problem has been discovered by the learner that she must participate in its solution as well. Polyani's view suggests that the learner needs to go beyond what is merely given and through this be able to be liberated from hidden oppressive forces (i.e. intellectual or political). Quite logically, the discovery through critical reflection of that which is hidden must be followed by the learner's informed action which, as Freire would argue, is action which is transformatory and liberatory. Giroux, (1981: 133) makes a crucial point which could help us to understand the nature of liberatory learning: "Unlike 'banking education' that inhibits creativity and domesticates students, a radical pedagogy requires non-authoritarian social relationships that support dialogue and communication as indispensable for questioning the meaning and nature of knowledge and peeling away the hidden structures of reality". The emphasis in Giroux's argument is on "questioning" as a mode of authentic dialogue which should be adopted by both the teacher and the learner as active participants in their search for liberation.

I have tried to give an exposition of transformatory, participatory and liberatory learning as a form of Dialogical pedagogy based on moral notions. In the next chapter, I shall look more closely at the concept of liberty in order to develop my argument that like, love, there are different concepts of liberty that can be linked to Dialogical pedagogy. In later chapters, I shall examine which concept of liberty is more appropriate for Dialogical pedagogy. But first, an examination of the notion of liberty.



CHAPTER 2

In the previous chapter, I have discussed Dialogical pedagogy and its underlying moral notions. Dialogical pedagogy appeals to the concept of liberty although it does not articulate which concept of liberty it appeals to. In order to clarify which concept of liberty best allows Dialogical pedagogy to flourish, I first need to address the following question. How can the concept of liberty be understood? In an attempt to answer this question I shall give an exposition of Berlin's notions of liberty, that is, the notion of Negative liberty as non-interference and positive liberty as rational self-realization. This exposition will be followed by a discussion of the moral underpinnings of these two strands of liberty for, both seem to be underpinned by different notions of what it means to be human. In subsequent chapters I shall link these to Dialogical pedagogy.

THE NOTION OF NEGATIVE LIBERTY

Non-interference

Negative liberty according to Berlin (1969: 121-122) "... is involved in the answer, to the question 'What is the area within which the subject - a person or group of persons - is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?'" In a sense, it asks what the extent of freedom is from interference. This means that a person or a group of people is free only when there is no interference from other human beings. Central to Negative liberty then is non-interference in the life - and activities of the individual person or group of persons. It is apparent that in Negative liberty, the idea is to limit or curb the control of others over the individual person. And this notion of liberty is appealing (especially in post Apartheid South Africa) because it increases the scope of choice for the individual. But this does not mean that we can do what we want to do when we want to do it because this could seriously limit the freedom of others. Negative liberty seems to create a paradoxical situation where we limit freedom

in order to have freedom. We therefore have laws in place to make sure that the weak enjoys the same freedom as the strong and that all are protected against the abuse of power by those in authority. So, the less the extent of interference, the freer the person is said to be. Negative liberty then wants to curb power and authority in the activities of others. Berlin, (1969: 122) goes on to say that "... if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved".

What is significant about what Berlin says is that interference becomes a curb to freedom only when it comes by other human beings or a "body of men" otherwise it is not. And, should others [people] infringe on the individual's area of freedom, then such a person is "coerced" or "enslaved". This means that an individual's activities, be they mental or physical are hampered by that infringement. Berlin, (1969: 122) describes Negative liberty as follows:

I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved.

Following from the above quotation is the implication that not all forms of interference qualify as "coercion" or enslavement. It is only when what the individual can do is made impossible by other human beings or a group of people, government agents for instance, that he can talk of interference or enslavement. So, for prohibition to qualify as coercion, it has, first of all, to come by other human beings; and the individual person ought to be capable of carrying out that activity be it mental (e.g thinking, memorizing, creating) or physical (running, jumping, etc.) such a person then, can talk of coercion because he is robbed of choice or agency because the opportunity within which he can act is taken away by interference.

Taylor, (1985: 213) seems to confirm this where he says: "... negative theories can rely simply on an opportunity - concept, where being free is a matter of what we can do, of what it is open to us to do, whether or not we do anything to exercise these options". That is, it is when the agent is robbed of his opportunity to act in a specific way by others that he can complain of lack of freedom.

But, "coercion" or enslavement are not concepts which cover all in which a person cannot act. A further notion in Negative liberty is that a disability or poverty, although it may curb the individual freedom a great deal from engaging in various activities, is not regarded as a hindrance. Take for instance, a person who cannot read the Homeric epic within a given time because he is purblind or cannot jump over a wall because he is handicapped or even too poor to afford a piece of furniture. Can such a person talk of being coerced or enslaved? Not according to Berlin, (1969: 122) for, "Mere incapacity to attain a goal is not lack of [political] freedom". Berlin, (1969: 122-123) explains this further when he says:

... if a man is too poor to afford something on which there is no legal ban - a loaf of bread, a journey round the world, recourse to the law courts - he is as little free to have it as he would be if it were forbidden him by law. If my poverty were a kind of a disease, which prevented me from buying bread, or paying for the journey round the world or getting my case heard, as lameness prevents me from running, this inability would not naturally be described as a lack of freedom, least of all political freedom.

In short, "enslavement" or "coercion" applies only when there is a social, economic or political arrangement which makes it difficult for certain people or group of people to act either by buying or using certain amenities prevalent in society whereas others are not prevented by that arrangement. Suppose, a section of the community is not allowed to use its language (a social construct) in official places or to buy from certain shops (an economic arrangement) whereas others are not, as was the case with the then Apartheid politics; the affected section of the people can either talk of being "coerced" or "enslaved". This Berlin, (1969: 123) affirms:

"It is only because I believe that my inability to get a given thing is due to the fact that other human beings have made arrangements whereby I am, whereas others are not, prevented from having enough money with which to pay for it (a journey around the world), that I think myself a victim of coercion or slavery". So, following from the above argument then, a person who is too poor to afford a piece of furniture cannot say he is enslaved or coerced; the same thing applies to a person who has the minimum intelligence to make simple calculations.

Although the proponents (English political philosophers) of non-interference never agreed on the extent of interference, they nevertheless felt that there should be some measure of interference by authority or law in human activities lest freedom degenerates into licentiousness. In order to ensure freedom and equality to all, Negative liberty places more authority in laws than in people as Berlin says that laws are needed for the sake of equal freedom. We have therefore, areas of regulations without which the freedom of the weak may be trampled upon. Without this interference, Berlin, (1969: 123) argues, "... the liberties of the weak would be suppressed by the strong". Unlimited freedom/licentiousness (i.e licentiousness) would, further, according to proponents of non-interference in Berlin (1969: 123) "... entail a state in which all men could boundlessly interfere with all other men; and this kind of 'natural' freedom would lead to social chaos in which men's minimum needs would not be satisfied; or else the liberties of the weak would be suppressed by the strong". This seems to make sense if we consider that human beings have different purposes and value different things at different times - or to put in differently, consider an example of a road-user who drives his car on the right hand side of the road; he is a threat to his own life and freedom, and a threat to the lives and freedoms of other road users. So, Negative freedom cannot be boundless - a sphere should be created within this liberty over which the law has authority in order to preserve the conditions for human life and hence freedom. This situation for necessary safeguards for freedom is well summarized by Hobbes in Berlin, (1969: 126) when he says, "... if men were to be prevented from destroying one another and making social life a jungle or a wilderness, greater safeguards must be instituted to keep them in their places ...".

In Berlin's discussion of the concept of Negative liberty, some key elements come to the fore. I shall note and briefly discuss what these entail.

The pursuit of the individual's own good

According to Negative liberty, the individual person is free only if he has scope within which he can pursue that which, in his own terms, is his own good. What is this good? That which a person values and cherishes in his life - it could be simple intellectual or physical achievements or even complex ideals; but that which is an own good should be acceptable as such (i.e its achievement should not in the process of getting it, render the freedom of others impossible) because freedom does not suggest lawlessness. It is also unacceptable in Negative liberty to force people to follow only one path in the achievement of their "own good". So one of the champions of negative liberty in Berlin (1969: 127) seems to give an insight into this: "The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our 'own good' in our own way". This implies that there should not be any prescription from external authority (beyond a certain minimum level) on how one should be free in this sense.

The development of the individual's natural faculties

Now, just as Negative libertarians agreed that there should be some interference by a central authority, they agreed that there be "... a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated; for if it is overstepped, the individual will find himself in an area too narrow for even that minimum development of his natural faculties which alone makes it possible to pursue, and even to conceive, the various ends which men hold good or right or sacred" (Berlin, 1969: 124). Implied in the above quotation, "natural faculties" like "creativity", "innovativeness", "critical" and "independent thinking" among others, can only flourish in conditions of freedom. What makes Negative freedom more acceptable is that it is flexible and seems to accommodate individual differences i.e. it creates space for divergence and pluralism among other things. About this

Berlin, (1979:171) argues, "It is more humane because it does not ... deprive men, in the name of some remote, or incoherent, ideal, of much that they have found to be indispensable to their life as unpredictably self-transforming human beings".

The individual's right to free choice

Negative liberty rests on the assumption that human beings have the right to free choice because of their different value systems and purposes in life. It is only when a person chooses freely between seemingly conflicting ideas and courses of action that he can be regarded as a free agent.

The notion of free agency i.e. the "right to free choice" which comes by minimum interference from fellow human beings or government agents increases the scope for individual choice. This means that in Negative liberty an individual now, unlike in the past, has too many options from which to choose - for example, a parent now has to choose one kind of school among many others at which she wants her child to attend. My argument here is that this freedom of choice requires increased decision-making, responsibility and the knowledge of the choices available. The question is, "Do these people have knowledge of these options?" or, "Are they all responsible and capable of making sound decisions?". I do not want to pursue this argument here but rather to make explicit what the notion of "free choice" entails.

The flexibility to accommodate the plural nature of goals

Negative liberty acknowledges that human goals and purposes are different and have to be accommodated by keeping central authority (be it governmental or otherwise) to a certain minimum. This Berlin (1967: 171) acknowledges: "... human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another". Berlin here, makes two points very clear: first, that human beings, due to their uniqueness, are governed by a multiplicity of goals; and second, that these goals can be in conflict with each other. Freedom then,

according to negative libertarians implies the creation of space for each individual to pursue and realize his own goal in his unique way without any extraneous influence - be it from government or any external authority beyond a certain minimum. Mill, a proponent of this liberty argues in Berlin, (1969: 123):

... human purposes and activities do not automatically harmonize with one another, and because (whatever their official doctrines) they put high value on other goals, such as justice, or happiness, or culture, or security, or varying degrees of equality, they were prepared to curtail freedom in the interest of other values and, indeed, of freedom itself. For, without this, it was impossible to create the kind of association that they thought desirable. Consequently, it is assumed by these thinkers that the area of men's free action must be limited by law.

The significance of Negative liberty then, is the creation of space for the realization of the individual's multiple goals; to enable each one to realize his unique goal.

THE MORAL UNDERPINNINGS OF NEGATIVE LIBERTY

The moral underpinnings of Negative liberty is that a person is by nature a free agent and his humanity is fulfilled when he enjoys freedom. And, if this area of freedom is infringed upon beyond a certain minimum, the person becomes dehumanized or "degraded". But, given the notion of human nature, this freedom ought not to be absolute because it may degenerate into licentiousness where the freedom of others is trampled upon by, say, those who are strong or those who wield power. Berlin, (1969: 126) notes this: "We must preserve a minimum area of personal freedom if we are not to 'degrade or deny our nature'. We cannot remain absolutely free, and must give up some of our liberty to preserve the rest. But total self-surrender is self-defeating".

Negative liberty is also underpinned by the notion that it is human to have different value systems, and to pursue different goals. What is very significant is that human goals and purposes are in most cases not commensurate with each other.

So, to assume that there is a hierarchy of goals which can be graded goes against our knowledge that goals may be in conflict with one another; that for some, justice is more important than happiness, whereas for others security might be more important than equality. Different contexts and individuals may require the pursuit of different goals. Berlin, (1969: 171) notes this "... human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another. To assume that all values can be graded on one scale, so that it is a mere matter of inspection to determine the highest, seems to me to falsify our knowledge that men are free agents, to represent moral decisions as an operation which a slide-rule could, in principle, perform".

It is further assumed that a person ought to be given freedom because he has his independent life. It is by virtue of this that he has to make his life choices without interference: that is, human life is naturally a life with alternatives between which an agent has to exercise his freedom of choice because we are endowed with the capacity to choose. Berlin (1969: 127) notes this: "To threaten a man with persecution unless he submits to a life in which he exercises no choices of his goals; to block before him every door but one, no matter how noble the prospect upon which it opens, or how benevolent the motives of those who arrange this, is to sin against the truth that he is a man, a being with a life of his own to live".

Berlin (1969: 126) asks pertinent questions here, "What then must the minimum be? That which a man cannot give up without offending against the essence of his human nature. What is this essence? What are the standards which it entails?" (my emphasis) These questions are illuminating in that they suggest that there is, in each and every person's mind, some intelligence and some creative powers which make up man: and which have to be left free because if they are obstructed, the individual person becomes reduced to the level of an animal (i.e. such a person can be indoctrinated or even trained to perform certain tricks as circus animals do).

Given the above notions of Negative liberty, it means that it is one of man's characteristics to be free (i.e. to have a minimum area of freedom within which he can act, decide and choose uninterfered with by others).

THE NOTION OF POSITIVE LIBERTY

According to Berlin, (1969: 122) Positive liberty "... is involved in the answer to the question 'What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?' The significance of the above question reveals the difference between Negative liberty and Positive liberty; while Negative liberty aims at keeping authority at bay, Positive liberty is concerned with "what" or "who" should control or interfere ..." with my activities and "what or who should determine me ..." to act in a certain way. Positive liberty therefore, is concerned with the source of control i.e. who controls me. It aims to increase self-mastery in order to increase the freedom of the individual as Berlin, (1969:132) seems to confirm: "I am my own master ...". This notion of self-mastery introduces the concept of the higher and the lower self in that it wants to determine who within the individual is a source of control for according to positive libertarians, to be free is to be governed by reason i.e. the higher self. Does this not make it possible for parents or even the government to claim to know what for instance, the learner's true self is? Can this not as a result, lead to the learner being manipulated, or at worst indoctrinated? This is not a place for this argument. I merely wanted to hint at a looming danger in Positive liberty.

The higher self and lower self

Positive liberty then, unlike Negative liberty asserts that an individual person is free when he is the source of control of his life i.e when authority or power to make decisions and choices are in his own hands; he wishes to be driven by his own reasons, purposes and capabilities. Any kind of decision, reason or goal that comes from outside is regarded as a violation of freedom despite how benevolent it might be. Berlin, (1969: 131) puts it as follows:

I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which effect me, as it were from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. This is at least part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that it is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of the world.

In Positive liberty, the individual person wishes to become self-directed (i.e. he wants to be a master of his own life and be able to carry out independent decisions and actions. In short, he wants to be a slave to no one. One is free only when one determines oneself and moulds one's own life. Taylor (1985: 213) is illuminating when he says, "The concept of freedom here is an exercise-concept". What this means is that the individual person is free only when he can exercise control over his life; i.e. if he can consciously and effectively determine himself and shape his own life because he is a capable person and he knows what he can do; he can decide, choose and act and these decisions, have to be attributable to his own ideas and purposes otherwise he is not free. Freedom here means agency. Berlin, (1969: 131) expresses it as follows: "I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not".

The key concept of control in Positive liberty implies that there is a controller and a controlled. Those who control are free; those who are controlled are unfree. But it is not only other people who can rob a person of agency - "passions", "emotions", "nature", "legal", "spiritual" and "moral" aspects can equally take away one's freedom. This Berlin, (1969: 132) puts as follows

but may I not (as Platonists or Hegelians tend to say) be a slave to nature? Or to my own 'unbridled' passions? Are these not so many species of the identical genus 'slave' - some political or legal, others moral or spiritual? Have not men had the experience

of liberating themselves from spiritual slavery, or slavery to nature; and do they not in the cause of it become aware, on the one hand, of a self which dominates, and, on the other, of something in them which is brought to heel? This dominant self is then variously identified with reason, with my 'higher nature' with the self which calculates and aims at what will satisfy it in the long run, with my 'real', or 'ideal', or 'autonomous' self, or with my self 'at its best', which is then contrasted with irrational impulse, uncontrolled desires, my 'lower' nature, the pursuit of immediate pleasures, my 'empirical' or 'heteronomous' self swept by every gust of desire and passion needing to be rigidly disciplined if it is ever to rise to the full height of its 'real' nature. (my emphases)

Implicit in what Berlin says above is that man being his own master, implies two selves; namely, the "higher self" or "true self" and the "lower self". The higher self (true self) is identified with reason i.e it is rational and has aims and goals; it calculates, sets up own realistic and idealistic goals and it is therefore future directed. This true self is further contrasted with the lower self which is identified with all that is irrational namely, "impulses", "desires" and "passions". The lower self is in a sense, bent on temporal pleasures and for it to reach its higher self (the rational state) it has to be controlled by being subjected to rigid discipline (i.e. it has to be exposed to reason); that is, it has to be guided and conditioned by the higher self as reason for it to become equally rational, calculative and exercise its own (developed rational) will without further control. This is in itself a form of freedom for the lower self. Berlin, (1969: 132) says that what the lower self needs in order to become rationally free is "to be rigidly disciplined". The "real" nature of the lower self is that of rational self-realization.

But, the division between the higher and lower self does not pertain only to the individual person. This division can be extended to a society as well. The two selves according to Berlin, (1969: 132):

... may be represented as divided by an even larger gap: the real self may be conceived as something wider than the individual (as the term is normally understood), as a social 'whole' of which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a race, a church, a state, the great society of the living and the dead and the yet unborn. This entity is then identified as being the 'true' self which, by imposing its collective, or 'organic', single will upon its recalcitrant 'members', achieves its own, and therefore their, higher freedom.

The above assertion takes the notion of the two selves further and state that the two selves may be divided even by a wider chasm. What this means is that the two selves may be divided into the true self which may be a social whole - "a tribe", "race", "church", "state" or even a specific principle or ideal of which the individual as a lower self is a member; it is this social whole which, by virtue of its being rational, is greater than the individual (a lower self) as its part and which controls and disciplines the individual so that he could ultimately identify with the group's norms and values and, by so doing, identify with his true self. This is reminiscent of the church which, in an attempt to usher newer members into its religious norms and values, relies on baptismal rights, catechism and didactic Sunday lessons in order to awaken the neophyte Christian (i.e. as the lower self) to a full awareness of the word of God. In this way, by subjecting himself to the Higher Good (i.e. the true self) he ultimately shares in it. These and very many different ways are according to Berlin, used by institutions of this nature to maintain order and discipline among their members. A significant thing about this is that such institutions, can, besides controlling individual lives, also mete out punishment to offending members: in short, it acts in the interest of the Higher Good and so in the best interests of its members, even if they do not yet perceive it to be so. This Berlin, (1969: 133) notes:

This renders it easy for me to conceive myself as coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am then claiming that I know what they truly need better than they know it themselves. What, at most, this entails is that they would not resist me if

they were rational and wise as I and understood their interests as I do.

This social whole can go on to claim that within its members, there exists a latent rational will; "an occult entity" which is the real self; which the lower self (the unenlightened empirical self) knows nothing or little about. And, any kind of action taken by the true self (social whole) against its members, is taken in the interest of the occult self. Berlin, (1969: 133) puts it as follows: "... there exists within them an occult entity - their latent rational will, or their 'true' purpose - and that this entity, although it is belied by all that they overtly feel and do and say, is their 'real' self, of which the poor empirical self in space and time may know nothing or little; and that this inner spirit is the only self that deserves to have its wishes taken into account".

Self-realization

Self-realization through reason is, according to Positive liberty, a way of attaining freedom . Here the individual rationally analyses, understands and then takes appropriate action which is a form of liberation. Conscious rationality and world understanding are forms of freedom, and, such an individual is liberated because he thinks and acts in accordance with the higher dictates of rationality. This Berlin, (1969: 141) puts as follows: "The only true method of attaining freedom ... is by the use of critical reason, the understanding of what is necessary and what is contingent". Berlin, (1969: 141) gives here an example of a school boy who does not understand the functions of Mathematical theorems; to him, these theorems and other mathematical truths are external authorities which do not have a bearing on his daily life; and these Berlin, (1969: 141) argues, block the boy's free functioning of the mind. It is only when he begins to understand them; that they cannot be otherwise, that Mathematics becomes part of his rational activity and, this knowledge sets him free; for, he can now use and apply theorems and use Mathematics. In other words he rationally controls them. The boy has, according to Berlin, (1969: 141) "... absorbed the score into his own system, has, by

understanding it, identified it with himself, has changed it from an impediment to free activity into an element in that activity itself". This means that, the boy's identity is now shaped by his understanding of the principles and rules which govern Mathematics which enable him to do or to participate in Mathematics unhampered. So, self-realization is the pursuit for rationality because a person who is rational is free. The same principle applies to a musician who has understood the pattern of a "composer's score"; such a composer is, according to Berlin, (1969: 141) no longer governed by external laws which are, "... a compulsion and a barrier to liberty, but a free, unimpeded exercise".

Berlin, (1969: 141-142) illustrates this further when he says, "What applies to music or mathematics must, ... in principle apply to all other obstacles which present themselves as so many lumps of external stuff blocking free self-development". What Berlin implies here is that besides external obstacles, there could as well be internal barriers like "fear", "unbridled passions", "myths" and "illusions" among others which may also restrain the individual's free self development; but once that which seems to be an obstruction to freedom is known and understood, it ceases to be a hurdle to free self development and becomes part of one's free activity. Berlin, (1969: 142) in support of this argument says, "What you know, that of which you understand the necessity - the rational necessity - you cannot, while remaining rational, want to be otherwise". For the proponent of positive liberty, "knowledge liberates ... by automatically eliminating irrational fears and desires". (Berlin, 1969: 142) What all these imply is the notion that ignorance is a hindrance to free self-development. Understanding therefore, is key to freedom. Taylor, (1985: 213) supports this view:

We cannot say that someone is free, on a self-realization view, if he is totally unrealized, if for instance, he is totally unaware of his potential, if fulfilling it has never even arisen as a question for him, or if he is paralysed by the fear of breaking with some norm which he has internalized but which does not authentically reflect him. Within this conceptual scheme, some degree of exercise is necessary for a man to be thought free.

The common good/proper interests

Positive liberty implies that freedom means striving for the common good which refers to that which the community/society regards as important and worthwhile as for example, trustworthiness, honesty, truthfulness and good behaviour among others. These are the common goods which societies regard as important because of their intrinsic value. The common good is governed by its own criteria or rules which must, however, be in accordance with the dictates of rationality for the general good to be indeed a “good” one that embodies the “true interests” of its members. Berlin, (1969:145) says, “For if I am rational, I cannot deny that what is right for me, must for the same reasons be right for others who are rational like me. A rational or (free state) would be a state governed by such laws as all rational men would freely accept”. This quotation implies two things: first, that if a person claims to be rational, she must know that others have an equal right to be rational as well. The second is that, what is rational in society ought to have been agreed upon by members of that society within which a person lives. So, this suggests that in every rational society there is only one way of solving a problem or of doing things which logically ought to bind members of that society together (i.e. a “common good”) because it has been agreed upon as rational. It is this “common good” (by virtue of its being rational) that has to be offered to the less rational members of society, children for instance so that they can also become rational. That is why “coercion” or force in this liberty is regarded as the moulding of the person into what he would otherwise have opted for had he been rational.

But, if there is one “common good”, is there any need for independent or divergent thinking? This is not the place for this argument - I will pursue it in Chapter 5. Burke in Berlin, (1969: 147-148) gives a further insight into this argument when he says that the individual has a “... ‘right’ to be restrained in his own interest, because ‘the presumed consent of every rational creature is in unison with the predisposed order of things’”.

Community membership

Positive liberty also rests on the notion that freedom entails a sense of belonging to a social “group”, “class” or “profession” in a particular society with which the individual shares particular but “permanent characteristics”. This in itself lends identity to the individual and makes him feel free. As Berlin, (1969: 156) notes, “And the only persons who can so recognize me, and thereby give me the sense of being someone, are the members of the society to which historically, morally, economically, and perhaps ethnically, I feel that I belong”. Thus, over and above the individual’s hankering for “recognition”, he equally also longs to be regarded as a full member of a “society” or “group”.

In a sense, the individual regards himself as unfree when he is isolated and receives little or no regard from the “group” because it is when he is within this group that he gets his identity and respect and, above that, recognition. This Berlin, (1969: 157) notes: “For what I am is, in large part, determined by what I feel and think; and what I feel and think is determined by the feeling and thought prevailing in the society to which I belong, of which, in Burke’s sense, I form not an isolable atom, but an ingredient ... in a social pattern”. What Berlin says is understandable if we accept the notion that human search for status is need for collective equality and fraternity which I argue, are both important because they are part of being human. This is the case because people are social beings i.e man’s actions affect the lives of others around him just as much as other people’s actions affect him.

A further implication here is that the individual person wants his activities to be directed or re-directed by the community (be it economic, professional or social) to which he belongs. Whether or not such a community is oppressive or coercive need not be an issue - the important thing is, according to positive libertarians (1969: 157) that, “... they understand me; as I understand them; and this understanding creates within me the sense of being somebody in the world. Berlin, (1969: 158) sees this craving for “solidarity” with the group as “... a desire ... for union, closer understanding, integration of interests, a life of common dependence and common sacrifice”. And if that society in which I find my identity

is one that has my true interests at heart, and is governed by the rational dictates of the “higher self”, the “truer” my own identity and rational self-realization.

THE MORAL NOTIONS OF POSITIVE LIBERTY

There is a notion in Positive liberty that human beings are by nature rational (i.e. are endowed with reason or mind). To take this further, man is capable of making conscious decisions and thus acting appropriately in different situations in pursuit of different goals as a result of the reason which is man’s “natural tendency”. Berlin, (1969: 131) notes: “... it is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being - from the rest of the world”.

Central to Positive liberty is the notion that human beings are by nature rationally self-controlling and self-directing and are, above that, creators of values; in a sense, human beings are self-determining beings and should they be treated as if they were not, they would degenerate to the level of things (objects). Berlin, (1969: 136) seems to emphasize this: "... the essence of men is that they are autonomous beings-authors of values, of ends in themselves, the ultimate authority of which consists precisely in the fact that they are willed freely - then nothing is worse than to treat them as if they were not autonomous, but natural objects ...".

Positive liberty cherishes the notion that man becomes truly human in the company of others which means that he is a social being. For him to live well in and with society or community he needs to be recognized as a unique, responsible and independent person with desires and will of his own according to which he decides and acts. And the people who can so recognize and acknowledge his identity are, admittedly “members of the society to which”he belongs. This view, Berlin, (1969: 156) confirms: “My individual self is not something which I can detach from my relationship with others, or from those attributes of myself which consist in their attitude towards me. Consequently, when I demand to be liberated

from let us say, the status of ... social dependence, what I demand is an alteration of the attitude towards me of those whose opinions and behaviour help to determine my own image of myself".

The significance here is that a human being is a human being by virtue of his ability to carry out rational decisions and actions and anyone who cannot think and act rationally can therefore not be regarded as fully human. As Berlin, (1969: 161) puts it, such a person "... could not either legally or morally be regarded as a human being ...".

I have, in the above discussion given notions of both Negative and Positive liberty, each under a separate heading: I have also given the moral notions which seem to underpin these two strands of liberty. In my discussion of Negative liberty, my central argument is that Negative liberty advocates freedom from external interference (i.e. it wants to curb power and authority) beyond a certain minimum. The significance of Negative liberty is its flexibility to accommodate the plural nature of goals because of the space it creates for individual freedom.

The central argument in Positive liberty is that the individual person needs to be his own master, i.e needs to be self-directed. In a sense, he wishes to be a slave to no one (i.e. power and authority should be placed in his own hands). There is a further notion in Positive liberty that the individual may be divided into the Higher self/True self and the Lower self. In this case the Higher self, because of its rationality, must control the Lower self towards its own freedom because it is not rational yet. This sounds like a master-slave syndrome. Not only that. The Higher self can also be identified with a specific principle or ideal. Self-realization in this liberty can also be attained through reason, i.e a rational, conscious understanding of that which blocks self-development; conscious analysis and the adoption of an appropriate action in removing that which seems to be a barrier to rational self-development. There is also a notion in this liberty that self-realization can also come by a sense of belonging to a community or profession (which is the Higher self) and to receive proper recognition by its members. Positive liberty, seems to allow one's essential humanity (higher self) to flourish.

CHAPTER 3

In the previous chapter, I have considered Berlin's notions of Negative and Positive liberty together with the moral notions which underpin them. The focus of this chapter is on the nature of education as put forward by Peters, Rorty, Strike and Dunlop. A consideration of the nature of education in this chapter is significant in two ways: it, first of all, acquaints us with what I shall argue are necessary features (or concepts) of education without which a practice cannot be regarded as education. These concepts help us to distinguish, for example, between education and indoctrination. In the second place, it will enable us to see what kind of independence Dialogical pedagogy ought to encourage, if looked at against the background of these features - an aspect which will become clearer in the subsequent chapter. Thus, a discussion of the nature of education in this section is necessary - it will serve as a standard of interpretation of Dialogical pedagogy as education. Note should be taken that in my discussion of these features, the concepts, "autonomy" and "independence" will be used interchangeably.

PETER'S CHARACTERIZATION OF EDUCATION

Initiation into a public form of life

Peters (1972: 102) regards education as a process of initiation "... into worthwhile activities and modes of conduct". He rejects the view that equates training, instruction and teaching with education though he admits that education may embrace them. This means that it is possible to train a person without actually educating him; so, in this case, it is quite logical to talk of a well trained boxer or athlete who is not educated. To be educated then, according to Peters, is to have certain intellectual and moral skills. Education, viewed in this light, has as its chief aim, the induction of the learner into valuable activities and forms of behaviour and to enable the learner to embed these in different life situations.

This induction of the learner into "worthwhile activities" and "modes of conduct" involves "... processes which intentionally transmit what is valuable in an intelligible and voluntary manner and which create in the learner a desire to achieve it, this being seen to have its place along with other things in life" (Peters, 1972: 102). The implication here is that the teacher deliberately passes on to the learner that which is regarded as having worth by the society in such a way that the learner will understand it. The teacher passes this on with an implicit acknowledgement that the learner still has limited experience and a limited conceptual scheme to grapple with the subject matter at a more complex level (i.e. at the level of an expert, for example). The learner must, on the other hand, have the volition to try to understand and become involved in the subject otherwise education as an intentional process cannot flourish. In other words, according to Peters, one cannot force somebody to become educated. To become educated requires a degree of desire for knowledge and trust in the process of initiation into these bodies of knowledge. In short, education requires willingness on the part of the teacher to teach and educate and a desire on the part of the learner to learn for its success; to force either of them to teach or to learn would undermine the enterprise.

Peters, (1972: 102) goes on to say that,

No man is born with a mind; for the development of mind marks a series of individual and racial achievements. A child is born with an awareness not as yet differentiated into beliefs, wants, and feelings. All such specific modes of consciousness, which are internally related to types of object in a public world, develop later pari passu with the pointing out of paradigm objects.

There is an implicit notion in Peters thesis that the "public world" into which the learner has to be initiated has "paradigm objects" inscribed into it. It is upon the learner's initiation into it that he develops a sense of differentiation because it is a world imbued with meanings and examples which ultimately develop the learner's perspective of the world.

Further differentiation develops as the boy becomes initiated more deeply into distinctive forms of knowledge such as science, history, mathematics, religious and aesthetic appreciation, and into the practical types of knowledge involved in moral, prudential, and technical forms of thought and action. Such differentiations are alien to the mind of a child and a primitive man - indeed to that of a pre-seventeenth-century man. To have a mind is not to enjoy a private picture-show or to exercise some inner diaphanous organ; it is to have an awareness differentiated in accordance with the canons implicit in all these inherited traditions. 'Education' marks out the processes by means of which the individual is initiated into them (Peters, 1972: 103).

Whether Peters's differentiations are indeed "alien to the mind of a child and a primitive man" is contentious. I do not want to pursue this debate here, but do want to pick up on Peter's notion of education as "initiation" into social practices, inherited traditions and language. Therefore, to develop the learner's consciousness is to initiate him into the "public world". This for Peters is the task of education. It is important for instance in trying to teach Wordsworth's Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early childhood, to initiate the learner into the background of the poem, the conventions of poetry, and the concepts necessary for him to analyse the poem critically; because, these (criteria) are commonly known and understood by those who have been initiated into poetry. To the initiated, these criteria constitute "the public world". Peters, (1972: 104) seems to emphasize the same point when he says this about these critical procedures that they "... have public criteria written into them that stand as impersonal standards to which both teacher and learner must give their allegiance". This means that for education to be successful, both teacher and learner must remain honest to these impersonal bodies of knowledge together with criteria by which they are assessed and criticized; these standards are important because they are the means through which the contents of a subject are mediated

between teacher and learner. Any attempt to underplay them or to disregard them may make education degenerate into something undesirable as for example, the teacher and the learner may pursue their own personal interests and ends, under the name of education. D H Lawrence, in Peters (1972: 104) in attempting to show the impersonality (i.e it is socially constructed and shared) of these public criteria (i.e. standards by which the subject is assessed and criticized, into which the teacher has already been initiated), aptly calls them, "the holy ground". Peters, (1972: 104) further argues this point:

To liken education to therapy, to conceive of it as imposing a pattern on another person or as fixing the environment so that he "grows", fails to do justice to the shared impersonality both of the content that is handed on and of the criteria by reference to which it is criticised and revised. The teacher is not a detached operator who is bringing about some kind of result in another person which is external to him. His task is to try to get others on the inside of a public form of life that he shares and considers to be worthwhile. In science it is truth that matters, not what any individual believes to be true; in morals it is justice, not the pronouncements of any individual.

It is apparent in the above quotation that the teacher's main task is to socialize learners into this "public form of life" to which he pays allegiance. In a sense, education does not only entail goods which are external to it (i.e. getting a better or well paying job) but also worthwhile activities which are internal to it (i.e pursuing education for the love of it), understood as the love of truth, and justice among others which are not an individual's constructions but valuable social goods.

Unequal educational relationships

Peters puts forward a further notion that education is governed by an unequal relationship between the teacher and the learner. This inequality in relationship is based on the fact that the teacher, unlike the learner, is acquainted with bodies

of knowledge into which he is inducting the learner and the criteria by which those bodies of knowledge have to be assessed and criticised. It is only when the learner shall have got a grip on these aspects, that both can participate equally "... in the shared experience of exploring a common world" (Peters, 1972: 105).

For education to be successful, there should be fraternity, respect for persons coupled with love. This means that education can only take place where there is a fellow feeling between the teacher and the learner. The kind of love that is appropriate in an educational context, i.e. *Agape* or *Pedagogic love*, I discussed in Chapter 1.

Peters, (1972: 106) maintains that "At the other end of the enterprise, of education, however, in universities, adult education classes, and the later stages of secondary education, the emphasis is more on the canons implicit in the forms of thought than on individual avenues of initiation". The central point in what Peters says above, is that critical inquiry is possible only after the learner has been successfully initiated into the existing bodies of knowledge. So, in short, in higher education, the focus is more on the actual body of knowledge (i.e. critical investigation of it) than on the process of familiarizing learners with the shared body of knowledge. Initiation then, is followed by a critical inquiry and a further familiarization with the standards by which these bodies of knowledge should be judged. The fact that critical inquiry comes at the "end of the enterprise of education" clearly suggests the inequality of the educational relationship with regard to knowledge - the teacher, who initiates the learner into these bodies of knowledge is more knowledgeable than the learner who still has to be initiated.

A further significant feature of initiation into these bodies of knowledge, traditions and criteria, "... consists in experienced persons turning the eye of others outwards to what is essentially independent of persons" (Peters, 1972: 106). This suggests that education requires a figure of authority for its fruition; it is this figure of authority who assists the learner, "... to get the grammar of the activity into his guts so that he can eventually win through to the stage of autonomy. But he cannot do

this unless he has mastered the moves made by his predecessors which are enshrined in living traditions" (Peters, 1972: 109). Implicit in the above quotation is the suggestion that the teacher over and above having knowledge which is qualitatively superior to the learner's, he also has skills which are relatively superior to the skill the learners may have in that particular subject. Furthermore, it is the task of the teacher to impart so much of the knowledge, including skills to the learner. But until that is achieved, there is an unequal relationship between teacher and learner. This is in essence, a further reason of the teacher-learner relationship being a relation between two as yet unequals.

Peters (1972: 110) summarizes the unequal education relationship when he says:

To be educated is not to have arrived at a destination; it is to travel with a different view. What is required is not feverish preparation for something that lies ahead, but to work with precision, passion and taste at worthwhile things that lie to hand; These worthwhile things cannot be forced on reluctant minds, neither are they flowers towards which the seeds of mentality develop in the sun of the teacher's smile. They are acquired by contact with those who have already acquired them and who have patience, zeal, and competence enough to initiate others into them.

Peters in the above quotation distinguishes between the teacher as someone who has "already acquired" what society regards as "worthwhile things", and the learner as someone who still needs to be initiated into them. In this way Peters again emphasizes the unequalness of the education relationship. He makes explicit the fact that the learner is required to work "with precision, passion and taste at worthwhile things that lie to hand" - while the teacher is someone with "patience, zeal and competence". This shows that the teacher and the learner are in an unequal relationship. For without this inequality, education would not be necessary.

Internal good

Peters argues that education does not aim merely at things which are external to it; its central value derives from principles and standards implicit in it. This suggests that the acquisition of traditions, bodies of knowledge and criteria of judgement should not be controlled by considerations or agents that stand outside of education. It is possible for instance, that in pursuit of the internal good, the learner may pursue knowledge for the love of it and not to see education as an instrument for achieving something that lies outside it like a well paying job or social status. Well, to say this, is not of course, to reject the notion that a better education can secure the learner a better job; but this according to Peters, should not be the goal of education. In other words, that which makes education worthwhile is internal to it. With regard to the internal good of education, Peters, (1972: 107) says, that the teacher,

... understands vividly, perhaps, that some created objects are beautiful and others are not; he can recognise the elegance of a proof, or a paragraph, the cogency of an argument, the clarity of an exposition, the wit of a remark, the neatness of a plot and the justice and wisdom of a decision. He has perhaps a love of truth, a passion for justice, and a hatred of what is tasteless. To ask him what the aim or point of this form of life is, into which he has himself been initiated, seems an otiose question. For, like Socrates, he senses that really to understand what is good is, ipso facto, to be committed to its pursuit.

RORTY'S CHARACTERIZATION OF EDUCATION

Socialization

Socialization involves the induction (initiation) of the younger generation or learners into traditions, culture, skills, bodies of knowledge and other worthwhile

activities which the older generation regards as valuable. Socialization (initiation) is done by a person especially the teacher who has already been initiated. Brauner and Burns (1965: 5 - 6) say this about socialization that societies "... deliberately attempt to transmit some collection of facts and information, skills and abilities, attitudes and values, to succeeding generations in the hope of achieving cultural endurance".

According to Rorty (1990: 45) socialization is a process "... of getting the students to take over the moral and political common sense of the society as it is". What this implies is that during this socialization phase, this society's "information", "skills", "abilities" and "attitudes" are imbibed by the learner as they are because she does not have the ability to interrogate them yet. Rorty, (1990: 45-46) rightly notes: "... education will always be a matter of familiarizing the young with what their elders take to be true, whether it is true or not. It is not, and never will be, the function of lower-level education to challenge the prevailing consensus about what is true". He argues that, this "prevailing consensus" can only be challenged at the level of individuation (which I shall discuss later) which entails the freedom to question the "prevailing consensus", traditions and knowledge.

Rorty sees education as a process that covers two distinct phases namely socialization, (an induction into prevailing ideas and practices) and individuation (a critical challenge of those very ideas and practices). Rorty then argues that education, through the process of socialization, shapes an "animal into a human being". This view clearly suggests that before socialization, the human child is ignorant or unconscious of those worthwhile things like love of truth, justice, morality, and other social practices which are valued by the civilized society. Peters, (1972: 107) seems to echo the claim that children "... start off in the position of the barbarian outside the gates. The problem is to get them inside the citadel of civilisation so that they will understand and love what they see when they get there". Over and above the implication that socialization is not an easy task, there is an argument being developed here that at first, the child is ignorant of the social world into which she awaits initiation or socialization by those who have

already been socialized - as for example, teachers or parents. The same question of socialization is hinted at by Wordsworth in Hayden, (1977: 526) in his Ode Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood when he says this about the "nurse", (i.e. society) and her foster-child:

Earth fills her lap with pleasures of her own;
Yearnings she hath in her own natural kind,
And, even with something of a Mother's mind,
And no unworthy aim,
The homely Nurse doth all she can
To make her foster-child, her Inmate man,
Forget the glories he hath known,
And that imperial palace whence he came.

Although here Wordsworth seems to criticise the socialization process in that it "suppresses" the child's "natural" and "untainted" knowledge with which she is born, he clarifies the point that upon birth, the child is gradually but deliberately socialized by his elders so that she can begin to take on the beliefs, wants and feelings of her society as they are.

Wordsworth, in Hayden, (1977: 526) refers to socialization as a constraint in the initial stages of induction when he says, "shades of the prison house begin to close upon the growing Boy, ..."

Behold the Child among his new-born blisses,
A six years' Darling of a pigmy size!
See, where 'amid work of his own hand he lies,
Fretted by sallies of his mother's kisses,
With light upon him from his father's eyes!
See, at his feet, some little plan or chart,
Some fragment from his dream of human life,
Shaped by himself with newly-learned art;
A wedding or a festival,
A mourning or a funeral;
And this hath now his heart,
And unto this he frames his song:
Then will he fit his tongue
To dialogues of business, love, or strife,
But it will not be long

Ere this be thrown aside,
And with new joy and pride
The little Actor cons another part;

The above quotation puts forward the idea that the socialization that is talked of, is not an unbroken process; the knowledge, beliefs, feelings, experiences and attitudes which the child becomes socialized in by parents and the significant others constantly change as the learner grows older as old beliefs are "thrown aside" and new beliefs and attitudes become adopted.

Rorty, (1990: 46) argues that, "Socialization has to come before individuation, and education for freedom cannot begin before some constraints have been imposed". What the above quotation points to is that individuation is only possible after socialization; without this socialization, independence, and critical thinking or rational self-realization have very little substance unless the learner has come to understand what it is she is criticizing. This understanding comes only through a willing socialization process in which the learner depends on the prevailing authority in the form of teachers and the prevailing social theories and practices inherent in that community in question. These authorities, social theories and practices act in the initial stages of socialization as constraints on the learner's freedom because she cannot meaningfully challenge them until she has been socialized into them. To put it differently, the learner has first to be inducted into the social and cultural aspects of her community before she can begin to participate confidently in them and start to challenge and change them.

Individuation

Rorty argues that socialization should precede "self-individuation" understood as independence from the socializing authority in the form of teachers or parents, prevailing theories and rules inherent in social practices. Self-individuation, is then a moment of freedom in the child's life during which she moves out of the "prison house" of rules (which does not mean that the learner need not adhere to any

rules) and "challenge the prevailing consensus about what is true" or the "conventional wisdom" as Rorty, (1990: 45) puts it. Rorty, (1990: 47) argues that self-individuation is reached with effort when he says, "With a bit of help, the students will start noticing everything that is paltry and mean and unfree in their surroundings. With luck, the best of them will succeed in altering the conventional wisdom, so that the next generation is socialized in a somewhat different way from that in which they themselves were socialized".

What Rorty claims is that "with a bit of help", probably from the teacher or parents as sources of "conventional wisdom" understood as traditions, the learner can create something new out of the old. It is upon being conscious of the social world (the aim of the socialization process) that she begins to confront and alter that which is unseemly and to develop a self-image different from the one foisted on her by her traditions, custom and the "prevailing consensus". It is at this stage that the learner becomes a "full" member of the community in that she makes informed choices and contributions to that community. Rorty, (1990: 46) says that truth, follows from "... the urge to come to free agreement with our fellow human beings to be full participating members of a free community of enquiry". Such a community of inquiry is held together by common meanings, (i.e. notions of what is significant) which form the basis of a community, shared beliefs, common reference world and inter-subjective meanings which give members a common language and enable them to talk about the social reality. So, socialization, initiates the learner into this world of common meanings. Aptly put, it gives the learner a reference world which is common to other community members so that she can ultimately become an active participant in that community.

STRIKE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF EDUCATION

The authority of received ideas

Strike regards concepts, theories, ideas and values as inheritances from the past (i.e. they have a history); and the fact that these are inherited from the past,

imbues them with a kind of authority. This point that inherited concepts have authority suggests that the person who has been initiated into these concepts, theories, ideas and values also command some kind of authority. So, in the context of education, these inherited concepts are shared meanings in that they constitute communities into which the young have to be initiated or inducted if they are to become full members of the community in question.

About the authority of received ideas Strike (1982: 17-18) says "... concepts, theories and ideas are not only the objects of thought, they are its instruments. We think with them as well as about them". What Strike puts forward in this quotation is that, inherited concepts are, in the first place, "objects of thought" which means that they are the socially interpreted reality about which we think; in the second place, these inherited concepts are also the conceptual tools (a means by which we interpret reality) which enable us to think about our social reality. In this way received ideas have authority in that they interpret our reality as well as provide the means which enable us to think about that reality, even think about it critically.


Strike, (1982: 18) suggests: "Perhaps students should be expected to be conversant with received ideas before they are entitled to an independent thought". This tallies well with Rorty's assertion that "socialization" ought to precede "individuation". The idea which is brought forward in the above quotation sounds like a challenge to child-centred approaches to learning which lay much emphasis on the learner's own discovery in learning. That is, a child-centred approach tends to under-play the authority of received ideas in that it emphasizes the notion that the learner learns better when she makes her own discoveries unaided by those (probably teachers) who have them. In contrast, according to Strike, learners should first be inducted into the world of received ideas before they are able and competent to think independently about that world because, concepts are objects as well as tools for thinking. For learners to put them to effective use, they need to be familiar with them and then to develop them.

Toulmin in Strike, (1982: 18) seems to support Strike's claim: "Intellectually, also, man is born with the power of original thought, and everywhere this originality is constrained within a particular conceptual inheritance; yet, on closer inspection, these concepts too turn out to be the necessary instruments of effective thought". Toulmin, does not in any way reject the notion that a person may be naturally gifted say, in Mathematics or in poetry; there are such people in the world. But, any form of originality, be it innovativeness in Mathematics or in English as it were, there has, first, to be some kind of orientation in that field of knowledge; or, to put it differently, such a person's competence depends on the initial induction into the rules which govern practices inherent in that area of knowledge. Thus, according to Strike, to be competent and effective in thought and action, the learner has to go through what Wordsworth in Hayden, (1977: 525) calls, a "prison-house" understood as rules, norms, theories, concepts, ideas among others which govern particular practices. The learner has to be trained in the use of those skills.

A classic example of the authority of received ideas is apparent in universities; despite the university's advocacy for originality, freedom in creative and independent thought, there is no way in which a student or a professor can be allowed to start a course on "creative" mathematics or alchemic physical science because these areas of knowledge are governed by formulae and laws; we know for instance, of Newton's law in physical science and atomic theories of matter. This means that any kind of development in science has to be backed up by these theories and laws. So a student or professor who embarks on "creative" Mathematics or Science, or who uses her own formulae, theories and concepts which are not backed by the authority of inherited concepts, will not get any credit for that. About these Strike, (1982: 18) says "Tolerance is rarely extended to students whose intellectual novelties involve revisions of physics or who engage in 'creative' arithmetic. Nor do universities hesitate to deny tenure to those whose arguments or viewpoints are regarded as incompetent".

So, according to the above argument, what Strike calls a "conceptual inheritance" or received ideas are in essence, the instruments or means by which we think. And, if this is the case, any rejection of the authority of received ideas, opinions or theories implies a rejection of the means of thought; of criticism and, of investigation. Of course, these received ideas are challenged and changed, but the change is effected by conceptual means that can be shared and which is intelligible. This, therefore, also implies that intellectual liberty does not necessarily, entail the rejection of tradition.

Strike, (1982: 19) further illustrates this question of the authority of inherited concepts when he says:



... a society that responded to the belief that their tools were not the best imaginable and all might be improved by throwing their tools away, only to discover that they had nothing left with which to make better tools. A society can use some of its tools to make better ones. It cannot dispose all its tools at once. Likewise, a society can use some of its received ideas to criticise, investigate and improve others. It cannot doubt everything at once. We must grant received ideas at least some provisional authority.

Following from the above quotation is an affirmation that received ideas or tradition have authority - a rejection of the empiricist view that tradition has no necessary intellectual authority. But Strike, in contrast, argues that the mode of criticism which is advocated especially in intellectual communities cannot go on if it is not, at least, based on some of the received ideas (i.e. concepts, theories and values) because these have provisional authority and equip us with the very means of thinking. Over and above the powers of criticism with which these concepts are imbued, they also help us to carry out research in those areas of knowledge, with an additional advantage that there could be further advances (growth) in that area of knowledge. In a sense, no researcher can conduct his research in a vacuum; he has to conduct it within a framework of acknowledged "facts". To imagine even

for an instant that criticism or inquiry can be conducted in a situation where the authority of received ideas or opinions are thought away, is to reject the very means of research. The Biologist, Peter Medawar in Strike, (1982: 26) in support of this argument gives an illustration from Charles Darwin's correspondence:

Almost thirty years ago, there was much talk that geologists ought only to observe and not theorize; and I well remember someone saying that at this rate a man might as well go into a gravel pit and count the pebbles and describe the colours. How odd it is that anyone should not see that all observation must be for or against some view if it is to be of any service.

It appears that it is not imaginable, perhaps impossible, to conduct any inquiry without the use of existing theories as they provide a basis from which inquiry and criticism begins. Strike's (1982: 28) conclusion therefore is that, "Knowledge of current theory is thus a prerequisite for participation in the intellectual life of any community of scholars". Existing theories, guide our investigation - they tell what to look for and where to look for; otherwise our search becomes a useless endeavour. Strike's (1982: 30) argument can be summed up on this claim that, "Perception is concept-embedded".

Education as reason-giving

Reason-giving as a feature of education includes verbal accounts, discussions, exercises or even assignments into which the teacher as a figure of authority involves the learner in the process of education. It is by reason-giving that the teacher acquaints the learner with the evidence of a claim because the learner as novice is not yet in a position to "appreciate" and "view" the subject matter from the point of view of authority. The upshot of the above assertion is that the teacher as a person ought to give the learner reasons for the claims he makes in the specific subject area (concepts, theories and ideas among others) because, the teacher, unlike the learner, already has that conceptual inheritance in the form of skills, competencies and knowledge - otherwise he would not qualify to give

reasons to the learner. Strike, (1982: 45) argues that: "... the student's capacity to appreciate reasons shows that the student is not capable of viewing the subject matter from the perspective of the expert. This is a limit on the kinds of reasons a student can grasp concerning a subject, but it is far from showing that the student is altogether incapable of appreciating any reasons". This quotation puts forward the idea that the teacher is, and remains a figure of authority in the learning process because his knowledge gives the learner the competence to give the learner reasons for the claims he makes; the learner as novice can only be able to appreciate fully the reasons given when she shall have acquired concepts, ideas and skills.

Unequal educational relationships

Implicit in Strike's argument as in Peters is the notion that the teacher-learner relationship is unequal in that the teacher is in command of concepts, ideas and theories which the learner does not have - hence the teacher's role as entailing the giving of reasons for the claims he makes about the subject area. Strike, (1982: 45) in pointing out the unequalness of the teacher-learner relationship says this about the "epistemic situation" of learners: "We know that the student is not in the same position as the expert to assess the phenomena or the arguments of a discipline." This quotation clearly puts forward the idea that the teacher and the learner are unequal with regard to the level of knowledge (obviously the teacher knows more than the learner about that specific discipline); and that the learner by virtue of this lack of knowledge cannot be able to evaluate or criticize the discipline - not to say anything about arguing in the discipline; because all these require some kind of competence in the use of specific concepts and skills. So, the fact that the teacher's task entails "reason-giving" is a mode which has the benevolent intention of familiarizing learners with concepts, ideas and theories. In a sense, it increases the learner's "capacity" for understanding the subject in hand; to increase the learner's "capacity" as it were. Strike, (1982: 46) says that the teacher's duty is "... to expand the capacity of the student for understanding and evaluating reasons". This quotation points to the dual purpose of teaching, i.e. understanding the nature of the subject and evaluating reasons for claims given by the teacher.

Participation

According to Strike, (1982: 46) reason-giving is an activity that is based on "... an interaction between the teacher and the student [learner] that requires the learner's participation". While it is difficult to imagine a student participating or interacting with the teacher in areas of knowledge without her yet having grasped concepts as tools, it only begins to make sense if we consider that participation does not necessarily mean equal participation. Nor does it mean that everybody must talk; the learner may participate through asking questions or giving her own observations during the course of the lesson; or responding to questions, or doing set tasks. These are some of the modes of participation. Strike, (1982: 46) says this in that regard: "There is, I think, no substitute for an active exchange between student [learner] and teacher in this regard". The implication here seems to be that learners are in the process of actively acquiring "the conceptual inheritance", they actively participate by engaging with the discipline, asking for reasons; questioning the reasons given and sounding their observations. Strike, (1982: 46) further emphasizes the need for participation when he says "... transmission of ideas from teacher to student [learner] ... requires the participation of the student [learner] if it is going to succeed".

According to Strike, participation in the process of education is in many ways significant; it is when learners participate by, for instance, asking questions on reasons given, that the teacher can gauge the level of the learner's understanding, and try to give them reasons in a way which will help them to understand the subject better; and again, participation helps learners to practice the intellectual skills necessary in the subject field; it provides them (learners) with models and examples as provided by the teacher and the necessary practice in standards and concepts necessary in the subject field in question. According to Strike, (1982: 48):

These ways of communicating or exhibiting the concepts and criteria of a field can be successful only when they elicit the relative participation of the student. One reason is that the student's participation allows the instructor to see the student's view of the matter and to express a justification in a way appropriate to the student's current concepts. A second reason is that participation is a means of practising the intellectual skills of a field.

DUNLOP'S CHARACTERIZATION OF EDUCATION

Dunlop, (1979: 45), argues that "The moral culture of 'participatory democracy' ... is mistakenly claimed to be the product or result of participation". Participatory democracy according to him, merely provides a framework within which discussions are continued. Dunlop, (1979: 45) further makes a very significant point: "The moral culture of participatory democracy ... is not, unlike various purely political competences (such as a sense of timing), picked up on the job, but must be acquired outside it and brought to it". What Dunlop brings forward here is that the moral culture like, love and truth, orderliness and reasonableness among others come prior to participation. In short, the learner acquires these competencies elsewhere - perhaps in the school or family and only applies them later in participatory democracies - for, moral culture cannot be learnt in a vacuum. In other words, there is prior initiation of the learner into the moral culture, be it at home or school before the learner can participate significantly in democratic decision - making processes.

Dunlop accuses Bridges of failing to recognize that politics is primarily about power. He (Dunlop) maintains that participatory democracy, instead of fostering a moral culture, can just as easily entail manipulation and indoctrination. Thus democratic participation in schools, Dunlop argues, might not make learners more moral. The basic task of the school according to Dunlop, (1979: 46) is "... to inculcate respect for the moral law that when the new generation comes to be involved with politics in later life, the love of power and intrigue (which is the

natural and ineradicable motive power of politics) may be held within bounds by love of justice and goodness - or at least fear of seeming to flout these things". So, Dunlop argues, instead of promoting participatory democracy in schools, schools should foster moral goods like love or justice in order to make participatory democracy possible later on. The first important stage is to develop and nurture the moral framework.

Gesellschaft-like and Gemeinschaft-like relationships

Dunlop, in thinking about education and schools, distinguishes between two main forms of human togetherness. He distinguishes between *Gesellschaft*, an instrumental association, and *Gemeinschaft*, a more constitutive association. *Gesellschaft* associations are "rationally planned associations of equals" (Dunlop, 1979: 47). In this kind of relationship members of the group, like in business contracts, may join or withdraw from the group at will. In a sense, in this kind of association the element of fellowship (often equal fellowship) is stronger than that of authority.

In *Gemeinschaft*, custom, tradition and natural ties are important in themselves; in this kind of association the community has wants, ideas and customs which members have made their own. Here the sense of equal individuality is subsumed under communal relationships because this kind of association does not need the individual to make "formal contracts", "promises" or follow "explicit rules" as,

... members trust and know what to expect from both their fellows and those who are in different positions in the hierarchy; under the often tacit guidance of the old or wise, agreements spring out of the air, a common mind emerges, the occasional dispute or quarrel dissolves itself in ritual or ceremony. Though the individual may not be so highly regarded as a unique person, there is (or can be) affection, closeness, fraternity; each member of the group has and knows his unique place in it, and there is an ubiquitous sense of belonging together (Dunlop, 1979: 48).

The notable features in this kind of relationship is the acknowledgement of authority and trust reposed in those who are in those positions of authority and each member knows his position and role in the hierarchy. Thus, there is inequality between members. But fellowship and love cannot alone constitute Gemeinschaft relationship; there is also in the Gemeinschaft, relations of authority.

Apparent in the Gesellschaft-like relationship is the sense that parties involved in the association are promoted by instrumental motives (or external goods, to use Peters's term) to form an association of equality and one in which they willingly cooperate with others. Tonnies, (1955: 23) gives an insight into the authority that is at work in this kind of relationship in which "... authority is based upon a free contract whether between individuals, as service contracts, or by agreement of many to recognize and place a master or head over them and to obey him conditionally or unconditionally. This may be a natural person or a collective person which results directly from individuals uniting in a society, social organization, or corporate body which is capable of volition and action and can be represented through its own totality".

The main claim which Dunlop makes is that schools need to be based on Gemeinschaft-like relationships - because, "... only in a community where the teachers stand 'over' the pupils (in a hierarchical sense) rather than 'on a level with' them (as is necessarily the case in a democratically run organization) can the most fundamentally educational ends of the school, especially as regards moral and other value education, be achieved" (Dunlop, 1979: 46). The main thrust of Dunlop's argument here is that moral goods like love of justice, love of truth and orderliness among others, cannot be properly imparted to the learner in a situation where learners are said to be equal with teachers; a successful impartation of these aspects can adequately be passed on to the learner in a situation where teachers are in their positions of authority. In a sense, this assertion brings forward the notion that the teacher-learner relationship is a relationship between two unequals in that the teacher has knowledge of morals, skills and content which the learner is yet to acquire under the guidance of the teacher. According to Dunlop, (1979: 50-51),

... teachers have seen the children as a 'group' for each of whose members they were individually responsible, whom it was their task to guide, develop, correct, discipline or transform 'from above' in ways appropriate to the individual situation. In complementary fashion the children have seen the teachers as a corporate body, composed of highly differentiated individuals (each with his own nickname) standing 'over' them, and attempting to mould, direct and interest them. None of this is remotely comparable to the essentially 'political' situation of 'interest' groups, which are amalgamations or conglomerations of more or less influential or powerful 'units', competing for the furtherance of their own ends. Such a situation presupposes the equality of all under the rules.

By this Dunlop means that schools that are genuinely educational, cannot be fully democratic; they can only be well run on *Gemeinschaft* relationship and not, like in political democracies, on *Gesellschaft* relationships in which members are brought together by their instrumental motives. In *Gesellschaft* relationships the individual person is merely valued for the contribution he can make to the group or the benefit he can gain from it. Implicit in this kind of association is that all members are equal and each can join the group or withdraw from it at will. Little surprise then that Tonnie's likens this group association to business contracts in which the equality of parties is guaranteed. But in the *Gemeinschaft* relationship, as in a school for instance, there is a very clear hierarchy between teachers and learners which overtly suggests the unequal positions which each occupy.

Dunlop argues that schools can be run much better when the teacher-learner positions are so delineated because in this situation teachers can make learners to "value" things they never valued before; to practice "skills" they never practised before and even to acquire criteria which they will later use to evaluate what teachers transmit to them. It is only in *Gemeinschaft* - like relationships that learners learn to trust their teachers because true education can only take place in a situation of trust. According to Dunlop (1979: 53),

... the introduction of genuine rather than merely game-like democratic participation within schools would necessarily alter the fundamentally hierarchical relationship between teachers and taught, and lead to countless unforeseen changes, making the central tasks of education, especially the passing on - predominantly by example - of values, unformalisable skills, appreciations, ways of behaving, and so on virtually impossible. For it to be possible, the institutional structure of relationships within the school must encourage the pupil to look up to his teacher as one he can trust, and in whom he can confide, rather than as a 'member' of an 'interest group' largely opposed to his own 'child' or 'teen-age' interests.

Dunlop makes a significant point in the above quotation that central to education, is the inculcation of, especially by example, values, skills that cannot be formalised, appreciations and morals which can best be imparted in a situation where hierarchical relationships between the learner and the teacher are acknowledged. It is in a situation of this nature that the learner can trustingly “look up” to the teacher for guidance. This guidance can not be possible where the learner is placed on the same position with the teacher because in it, the learner’s association with the teacher is one of equality.

FEATURES OF EDUCATION

Orientation

The previous discussion focussed on the nature of education as put forward by Peters, Rorty, Strike and Dunlop. In the following discussion on features of education, I intend to pull together and articulate what seem to be features of education that emerge from the above discussion.

Initiation into a public form of life and shared practices

It is characteristic of education that the learner, has to be initiated into social practices (which entail rules) traditions, concepts, ideas, skills and other bodies of knowledge which are inherited from the past, together with the criteria or standards by which those bodies of knowledge have to be assessed and analysed. These bodies of knowledge together with the accompanying criteria for evaluation, are accepted valuable social aspects which, for their continuation, have to be passed on from generation to generation through education. Of course it is possible for the learner to modify them at a later stage as she becomes independent because these bodies of knowledge are not absolute.

The impression created here is that without initiation into these public forms of life (viz. shared concepts, ideas, traditions, skills and theories), the learner cannot develop "a sense of differentiation". In short, the learner would not be able to make informed decisions and choices because all these depend first of all, on initiation or familiarity with the forms of life and shared practices. If this notion is accepted, then it is imperative that the learner should first accept what her elders regard as true and valuable, and become engaged in and familiar with this inherited knowledge. And these public forms of life or practices are "written" in public language; in other words, they neither belong to the teacher nor to the learner - they belong to the "public world; so they are impersonal.

The process of education (i.e. initiation) begins when the teacher deliberately refers to practices of this public world in such a way that the learner can understand them. The learner also should have the willingness to know these aspects of knowledge into which she is initiated. This, therefore, means that education is not a matter of force; the intentional activities of the teacher must be followed by the willingness of the learner to know these practices so that she (the learner) could be "... on the inside of a public form of life" (Peters, 1972: 104).

This means that during this phase of socialization, the learner has to accept unquestioningly what is offered by the teacher not because the teacher intends it to be so but because the learner as yet does not have the necessary knowledge and skills to conduct an inquiry into those bodies of knowledge into which she is being socialized. So, socialization provides the learner with a common reference world with common meanings which bind communities and societies together. Initially then, socialization can be said to be a constraint on the learner's activities because she cannot question or challenge what is offered by the teacher or parent. It is only later when the process of socialization is overtaken by the process of individuation that the learner can begin to question, or confront those aspects that she has been socialized in - if possible, she may even change or recreate what has been offered to her by tradition through the teacher.

Following Rorty, (1990: 47) one hopes that, "with luck, the best of them will succeed in altering the conventional wisdom ...". Even if the learner could wish to question these traditions or to modify or alter them, she will not be able to do so before socialization has taken place. The learners' ultimate full participation in these traditions, and their possible modifications depends on her having been successfully initiated into these traditions, ideas, opinions and inherited concepts without which informed decisions cannot be made.

Received ideas are not only objects of thinking but also tools for thinking. In short, initiation of the learner is a necessary first step towards independence of thinking understood as rational judgement, and effective participation in the activities of the intellectual community - hence the importance of the evidence and reasons which the teacher gives to the learner in support of the claims he makes in the process of this induction.

In education as *Gemeinschaft*, there is an acknowledgement of hierarchy in which the teacher and the learner occupy different positions. In a sense, there is a significant inequality between the teacher and the learner which emanates from the fact that the teacher is a recognised figure of authority by virtue of the

knowledge about traditions, social practices, bodies of knowledge and criteria for their evaluation while the learner is yet to acquire them.

It is only when the learner trustingly acknowledges the teacher's authority and the hierarchical positions as unequal positions that she can enjoy the teacher's guidance and protection because implicit in Gemeinschaft relationship is protection which carries with it authority as a condition. So the learner has to follow the guidance or directions of the teacher if she has to enjoy the teacher's guidance, protection and care - because in Gemeinschaft relations learners, cannot, like in Gesellschaft relationship, break off at will as they are not in a voluntary association.

Unequal educational relationships: Educational authority and learner trust

The relationship between the teacher and the learner in the education process is an unequal one because the teacher unlike the learner, has long been initiated into or socialized in traditions, social practices bodies of knowledge and criteria by which these bodies of knowledge have to be assessed and evaluated. There is therefore an epistemological inequality between the teacher and the learner and, it is this inequality that makes education necessary. Thus, the learner has, first, to be initiated into this world of knowledge and their criteria for evaluation before she could reach the stage of independence which should not be understood as independence from traditions and other forms of social practices but independence to belong to the intellectual community where she can freely participate in the creation of knowledge and conduct inquiries on more or less the same level with the teacher. Thus, without initiation, understood as socialization, this epistemological gap will not be bridged. Education therefore, is a process that gradually and systematically leads the learner to a stage where she will be an equal participant in intellectual practices.

So for the learner to become independent and competent in intellectual practices and inquiries, she first has to be apprenticed to the knowing teacher so that she can ultimately be able to assess the bodies of knowledge; generate new knowledge; and modify or reject other forms of knowledge on the basis of evidence and familiarity with accepted conventions; this is the responsibility which faces her in later life which is logically similar to that of the teacher.

In the above discussion it has been apparent that the teacher and the learner do not share the same conceptual level. The teacher, therefore, has the task of initiating the learner into these shared and accepted bodies of knowledge, traditions, social practices, beliefs and values through the process of socialization so that the learner develops the ability to make rational judgements and informed choices. This means that the teacher as a figure of authority holds these traditions and other forms of knowledge which are worth emulation by the learner. A person who is not a recognised authority, or who stands outside these traditions or practices cannot effectively socialize the learner.

Education then, as a process of initiation or socialization, can only be possible if authority is in place; that is, if the educational authority of the teacher, as acknowledged by society to be an authority in that subject field is recognised in the learning process. Society acknowledges the authority of the teacher because he is paid by taxes raised in society and he is therefore, accountable to society for demonstrating that authority, and enabling learners to share ultimately in that knowledge that is deemed worthwhile by the society.

It is true that the learner often does not, and cannot appreciate what the teacher does when he tries to guide her; when he transmits traditions, values, skills and other forms of knowledge because she does not have the necessary knowledge and skills for evaluating what she is learning. For the learner to progressively come to appreciate the teacher's efforts, she has to develop trust in the teacher as a figure of authority who has knowledge of the subject and criteria by which that knowledge has to be evaluated. Soal, (1993: 60) gives an insight into the kind of trust which is prevalent in this situation.

Educative relationships require trust and leadership. Not knowing what they are being initiated into, students proceed with a degree of trust in their teacher. If, as in the case of school pupils studying South African history, it becomes clear that what was passed to students was not knowledge, but at best exclusion of other perspectives on the subject, and at worst deliberate distortions and fabrications, students can rightly feel betrayed. They were deprived of access to knowledge and insight. Further, the only way that they could have had this access was, initially, to trust, and it is this which is violated.

What is important in the above quotation is the notion that trust of the learner in the teacher as an authority is crucial for the learner to make progress in education (A trust, as Soal notes, that in a South African context has often been betrayed through, e.g. Bantu Education). A further significance is that the teacher as an authority should not abuse his position of trust either by acting with oppressive power or by distorting the contents of knowledge in order to achieve his manipulative ends - as it has been the case for example in teaching South African history. Trust, reposed into the teacher by the learner is an essential element in educational relationships because of the teacher's competence in knowledge and skills. The learner as a novice in these forms of knowledge should trustingly submit herself to the authority of the teacher. Without trust therefore, education cannot be successful.

Education as participation

There are two kinds of participation in education namely, participation in "shared practices" (i.e to "do" Maths or Science or to write Northern Sotho or English) and, participation of the learner as "co-creator of meaning". Participation in "shared practices" implies that learning, including the important phase of socialization, is an activity, something the learner learns by doing. So, every learner needs to participate in the practice she is socialized into, to engage with the knowledge claims.

Participation as "co-creator of meaning" implies that the learner, through a familiarity with the practice, is able to reflect critically, in an informed and coherent way, about the very practice itself. In this way, through participation, she is able to develop, adapt, create and modify meanings.

Given the above notion of participation then, it is imperative for the learner to first be socialized or initiated into forms of knowledge and skills before she could finally reach the stage of independence. Independence implies in this sense, a kind of active and informed participation because the learner is involved in further development of knowledge and skills. It is when the learner asks questions about knowledge and concepts which the teacher transmits to her; or, when she gives her own observations about the lesson; or when she asks for reasons for the claims on the subject which the teacher makes that she can be said to be participating.

But there is a difference between participation by younger learners like pre-primary and primary school children and older learners. The younger learners may be made to participate in activity-based lessons (i.e. by doing); while the older learners depending on their conceptual understanding, may start on the individuation process, i.e. start to question the very things they have learnt. In a sense, they may become, to a certain extent, co-creators of meaning with the teacher.

In a sense, the intentional teaching activities ought to be followed by the willing participation of the learner in the contents of education. In short, there should be an intention on the part of the teacher to teach, and the intention on the part of the learner to participate.

Development of critical reasoning and the process of self-realization

Individuation or critical reasoning is the level arrived at when the learner has successfully been initiated into, or socialized in traditions, social practices, other forms of knowledge and the criteria by which those bodies of knowledge can be

evaluated and assessed. It is important to note that this level of individuation comes after proper initiation of the learner by a recognised figure of authority who has also been properly initiated. A teacher for instance, who has not been well trained or who has not received training at all, may not fully initiate learners into particular practices.

It is only after the successful initiation into, or socialization in traditions, social practices, inherited concepts, theories, ideas and other forms of knowledge that the learner becomes competent in critical reasoning; she is then capable of evaluating and judging what she has been initiated into; challenges and criticizes the process which socialized her; and begins to make informed choices and decisions because she has the notion of concepts as tools. If the learner is familiar with the tools, she has the possibility of constructing new ideas and theories. This view is confirmed by Giroux, (1981: 130) when he says, "The act of learning to read and write, in this instance, is a creative act that involves a critical comprehension of reality. The knowledge of earlier knowledge, gained by the learners as a result of analyzing praxis in its social context opens to them the possibility of new knowledge. The new knowledge going far beyond the limit of earlier knowledge, reveals the reason for being behind the facts, thus demythologizing the false interpretation of these same facts". The emphasis here is that successful individuation greatly depends on proper initiation.

Individuation or critical reasoning is a necessary feature of education because any kind of education that does not aim at individuation or critical reasoning as its goal, degenerates into a kind of indoctrination. That is, learners are fed with knowledge that excludes other perspectives of the subject or manipulated by the teacher to accept his views without question.

As reason-giving education entails, reasons for claims the teacher makes in the subject. The teacher must give to the learner reasons if the learner is to reach the level of competence in the subject area under study. But socialization into received ideas should not imply mere memorization of these. Socialization into the

practices of the discipline also means coming to understand the reasons for that practice, the reasons for various claims. This means that the teacher who "teaches" without giving the learner reasons is merely defeating the purpose of education because learners may resort to memorization (which can be an indication of lack of insight) in the subject.

Education aims at the moral good - a public form of life that binds society together

My argument is that one of the central aims of education is the induction of the learners into the moral good and knowledge that is deemed worthwhile for the flourishing and sustainment of the society and its members. That which the community or society regards as valuable, love of justice, truth and orderliness, traditions and social practices for instance, are constitutive of the common good because they bind society together. Brauner and Burns, (1965: 22) argue that the process of socialization introduces "... the child to society, attempting to persuade him to accept and defend, perpetuate and extend, the culture that has taken the pains to nurture and nourish him. And throughout all of this, education is the process of preparing the child for present and future living in his culture [that which is deemed worthwhile by society] by providing him with the tools and techniques necessary to this end. It is the chief means of what anthropologists call 'the passage to manhood'".

In summary, the above discussion especially on "necessary features of education", shows that the success of the education process is an enterprise between at least two people (i.e. the teacher and the learner), who are differently positioned in the education situation. The inequality between the teacher and the learner in this situation requires a figure of authority in the form of a teacher whom society acknowledges as an embodiment of received ideas, conventions and other forms of knowledge and skills into which learners need to be systematically initiated.

Learners can only progress in the acquisition of these ideas, conventions and knowledge if they put their trust into the teacher as a person who has already been initiated into them. Well, it may be argued that the learner ought to choose freely; to participate in decision - making processes and to contribute to the store of human knowledge without having been initiated or socialized. While this may sound very attractive, the counter-argument still remains convincing that for the learner to be competent in her choices, to be a recognized participant in the intellectual life of a community and to contribute in an informed way to the store of human knowledge, she needs at least to have been properly initiated or socialized.



CHAPTER 4

DIALOGICAL PEDAGOGY, NEGATIVE LIBERTY AND FEATURES OF EDUCATION

In Chapter 1 of this mini-thesis, I discussed Dialogical pedagogy with its dimensions of liberatory learning (i.e. liberation of the learner from inappropriate external and internal constraints), transformatory learning (i.e development of the learner's intellectual capabilities in critical thinking) and participatory learning (i.e participation of both the teacher and the learner in bodies of knowledge and other practices). I have also stated that these dimensions do not follow a linear development but are parts of one organic whole. My discussion in this chapter will focus on only one of Dialogical pedagogy's dimensions, namely, transformatory learning because it is this dimension which is central to this mini-thesis. The main question which this chapter shall attempt to answer is, can Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty lead to the learner's liberation or independence understood as critical thinking or individuation? The second, equally important question to which I shall finally attempt an answer is, Is Dialogical pedagogy, based on Negative liberty an appropriate concept of education? But before I can attempt to answer these questions, I need to do two things: I must, firstly, view a concept of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty as discussed in Chapter 2. Secondly, I need to compare the interpretation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty against necessary features of education as developed in Chapter 3. I shall argue that while the notion of freedom/liberty in education might be attractive, especially in South Africa which has just emerged from Apartheid education, and the historical appeal to "People's Education", "collaborative learning" or "group work" as Flanagan and Sayed, (1994: 153) would put it, has to be viewed with caution; Dialogical pedagogy, based on the notion of Negative liberty seems to be capable of undermining rather than facilitating the learner's development because, I shall argue, it undermines some of the necessary features of education.

DIALOGICAL PEDAGOGY BASED ON NEGATIVE LIBERTY

The claim put forward in Chapter 2 of this mini-thesis is that Dialogical pedagogy should, through the actualization of its dimensions, (liberatory learning, transformatory learning and participatory learning which are part of one organic whole), ultimately lead to the learner's independence as critical thinking or individuation. However independence of the learner means in the language of Freire and Shor, (1987: 102) "... the absence of authoritarianism" in teaching and a departure from chalk and talk approaches to teaching. In the following discussion, I shall develop a picture of a particular learning situation based on a certain interpretation of Dialogical pedagogy (i.e one based on a concept of Negative liberty) by drawing together the key concepts of Dialogical pedagogy (as discussed in Chapter 1) with the key concepts of Negative liberty (as highlighted in Chapter 2)

Dialogical pedagogy and non-interference

In this learning situation the teacher does not interfere with the learning activities of the learner because in Negative liberty, it is argued, the less the extent of interference, the freer the person is said to be. Learners are, in this situation, on their own trying to understand their socio-political conditions and the contents of learning which they themselves shall have initiated and the standards and criteria which govern these learning contents. Because "coercion", according to Berlin, (1969: 122) applies in situations where there is a "... deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act". Sieborger as quoted by Flanagan and Yusuf (1994: 155) gives an insight into this kind of learning when he argues that, "... the decision of which versions of history is to be accepted is to be 'left to students' themselves". An operative understanding here is that knowledge is "individually constructed"; - a similar feature to learning based on non-interference.

It is apparent that the learner, in this situation, assumes full responsibility for his learning activities and this changes the teacher's traditional role of being a transmitter of knowledge and skills; the responsibility of understanding these bodies of knowledge together with the selection of certain "versions" of the subject which they would like to study, fall on the individual learner. Dearden, (1970: 135) seems to point this out when he says that in this situation, "... the teacher does not teach: the children find out everything for themselves". Perry, (1972: 74) commenting on the child-centred model which I argue, is similar to learning based on non-interference says this about the learner's responsibility:

It follows that the pupil now bore full responsibility for his actions and was encouraged to do so. The teacher was for the most part divested of responsibility, which belonged by right, almost by nature, to the pupil. In this model then, functions thought previously to be beyond the pupil's capacity were handed over to him. But the model further implies that all responsibilities can ideally be handed over, even those for conducting a mature relationship with adults.

I do not want to create an impression here that in this learning situation the teacher is undesirable; what I want to bring forward is that the teacher is physically present with the sole purpose of seeing to it that a healthy environment is created; she also steps in in order to assist the learner when it is necessary, at other times the learner has to be on his own because knowledge is "individually constructed". This point is noted by Dearden (1970: 136) when he says, "... it is not by chance that these discoveries are made but as a result of the teacher's deliberate contrivance, in 'structuring the environment' for example, or in practising discovery 'methods'". However, the extent of non-interference is unclear in Negative liberty, and when it underscores the learning process, it only suggests the flexibility of this learning situation.

This approach to learning makes educational sense if we consider that some learners would require minimum assistance from the teacher, while others would require maximum help. It is our notion that people are different, (in learning abilities and aspirations) that enables us to understand why this learning situation should remain flexible and why the extent of the teacher's interference in the learner's activities is indeterminate and unclear; The learning situation has to be open-ended in order to accommodate the strengths and frailties of human nature.

But having said that the extent of interference would differ from situation to situation, I must qualify this position: the teacher's assistance in this situation must be done in such a way that it does not interfere with the learner's own exploration in the subject under study because, Rogers as quoted in Flanagan and Sayed, (1994: 154) says, "Authentic learning is self-initiated ...". The teacher's role is seen as that of a guide (or facilitator) only in situations where her assistance is necessary - a point which Perry, (1972: 73) notes: "The teacher guides and helps the pupils where possible, quietly and subtly, observing them ceaselessly and in a scientific manner, deducing his conclusions, and remaining passive where in any particular case he feels his help useless. His business is to study a situation and to remain on the periphery of it except where he can enter without arousing a situation obtrusive to development and learning". So, given the notion of transformatory learning based on non-interference, individual learners are their own liberators from oppressive internal and external constraints.

I have argued in Chapter 1 that the kind of love which can make Dialogical pedagogy to flourish is pedagogic love (because it considers others as fellow human beings). So the love that is at work here is pedagogic love which entails respect for the other as equally human and capable of making independent decisions and choices.

In Chapter 1 I argued that the learner's love is enhanced by the fact that the learning material is freely chosen from what Connolly, (1980: 80) calls, the "thematic universe" of learners. That is, this learning material is, in short, derived

from what learners know and have not been imposed from above. To the learner then, the teacher's genuine love means, minimum interference in his creative work and ways of learning.

In this interpretation of Dialogical pedagogy, the teacher has to love learners unconditionally. (I have argued in Chapter 1 that pedagogic love is selfless in that it neither wishes to possess someone nor to accomplish one's ideals through the other). In this learning situation the teacher attempts to promote trust and respect for the learner by appreciating all the time forms of knowledge, ideas and theories which the learner generates. To her (the teacher) love, entails very little interference in the learner's activities and his individual life. So, there are very few if any confrontational moments between learners and teachers because there is no list of dos and don'ts. Berlin, (1969: 171) in praise of Negative liberty says, "It is truer, because it does, at least, recognize the fact that human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another". Perry, (1972: 74) captures this situation well when he says that, the teacher, merely "... guides pupils to self-discipline. The pupil was expected to refrain from unruly behaviour because (a) he did not wish to interrupt the harmonious co-operative activity of the class, and (b) he understood the teacher and his role as guide, not as imposer and controller".

In this learning situation in which there is interference but of a guiding sort in the learner's learning activities, the learner trusts his own creativity, resourcefulness and innovations which emanate from his own experiences, capabilities and the subject matter which he has chosen. In a sense, learners develop trust in themselves and their own abilities irrespective of how mediocre they may be. The implication here is that learners learn to be independent in their thoughts and actions, and to develop confidence in their own abilities. In this way they learn independence early on in life, (a quality demanded on them in later life). Learners would also trust that at one stage in life, they will, through their various learning material and different ways of studying it, achieve their goal(s). These are, after all, the goals which they have chosen out of love.

The teacher also, by the least interference in the learner's activities, trusts that the learner will, increase his creativity and resourcefulness. In short, the teacher trusts that the learner is capable of learning on his own and that, given time, he will arrive at his self-set goal unaided. Perry, (1972: 73) says that the teacher "... is not expected to instruct in what to believe, since this would exert pressure on the free development of the pupil; but his example is taken to recommend, without verbal persuasion, the worthiness of the beliefs he represents".

In participation of the learner, there ought again to be minimal teacher interference if we hold with a view of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty. In view of the fact that the learning material is derived from the learner's own experiential world; and that learners participate among other things, in choosing themes of learning, setting themselves questions to which they seek and find answers, challenge claims, argue and make counter-arguments, one can understand the interference of the teacher as a minimum kind of interference.

I argue that in Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, the teacher is the learner's equal because of the minimum space this liberty creates for the authority of the teacher. Even in matters of discipline I argue, in which one would expect the teacher to step forward as an authority, she remains only a guide - thus, learners maintain discipline as well. Perry, (1972: 74) aptly puts it, discipline is "... an order built by pupils ..."

A further implication of the above quotation is that, in this learning situation, learners have greater decision making powers; this means that a teacher is a facilitator of a kind of learning that is self-directed - perhaps she is a participant of a different kind. What Soudien et al in Flanagan and Sayed, (1990: 156) says, may illustrate the teacher's position in a situation where learners are given a freedom of choice in collaborative learning and group work: "[One] of the ways in which students engage in history themselves is through collaborative learning and group work, which allows them to become 'critical agents in the learning process', sharing responsibility for it with their teachers". My argument here is not about

"collaborative learning" or "group work"; but that the kind of freedom given to learners in these kinds of pedagogies is similar to Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty; and, that the authority of the teacher in both pedagogies seems to be curbed. And, the point I want to make is that in both pedagogies, the teacher is seen as the learner's fellow participant. This impression that she is a fellow learner, cannot be precluded because nowhere in her involvement with learners does she come forward with her views and convictions but watches growth in knowledge as it naturally unfolds out of the learner. Perry, (1972: 76) says this about the teacher in this situation "... furthermore, it is thought that he [teacher] may have learning to do himself, he [teacher] may learn from his pupils, he is a pupil himself".

In short, this is a *Gesellschaft* relationship which I discussed in previous chapters, characterized by voluntary association and participation between members - in this case, learners and teachers. Connolly, (1980: 75) gives a further insight into this learning situation: "The students in this complementary dialectical relationship while being taught also teach the teacher. Teacher and students co-operate in an activity in which all of them grow. Authoritarianism has no place in a Dialogical situation".

This complementary growth in knowledge between the teacher and the learner suggests their equality in this situation. It is when this assumption that the teacher is the learner's equal is accepted, that questions which are asked (i.e. problematization of the lesson), which evoke participation from members of the group, are not only pointed to learners - but to the teacher as well. So, to say that the teacher is not equal to the learner in this situation of learning, is not only to miss the point; but to make obscure the point that the teacher is a learner who also grows in knowledge and other competencies through participation in learning activities.

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, critical thinking is encouraged because "... people [learners] should be able to generate their own meanings and

frame of reference and be able to develop their self-determining powers through their ability to perform a critical reading of reality so that they can act on that reality" (Giroux, 1981: 130). It would seem that this "generation of their own meanings" requires a critical mind which can only flourish in conditions of freedom (i.e. where deviation from the syllabus is not frowned upon). It echoes the notion of Negative liberty: "... unless men are left to live as they wish 'in the path which merely concerns themselves' ... there will be no scope for spontaneity, originality, genius, for mental energy, for moral courage" (Berlin, 1969: 127). In short, Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, enables the learner, by virtue of the freedom it creates, to come up with novel ideas and knowledge because embedded in critical thinking is the rejection of the belief that knowledge is static and given.

Moreover, in Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, the learner is encouraged to respect his fellow learners who are also individuals in their own right, with their unique qualities and goals which may not be similar to his; for in essence, their association in this situation is Gesellschaft-like (i.e. an association between equals each having a different purpose and goal for joining the association). Not only that: learners should also respect the teacher as a facilitator of their learning activities because she is also human, an equal partner.

It is also imperative in this learning situation that the teacher should also respect the learners' creative efforts, originality, human dignity and their own choices despite who they are, where they come from and their level of giftedness. To the teacher respect also means, little or no interference in the learner's activities. The fact that the teacher should respect the learner as he is, and interfere very little or not in his learning, does not mean that she should not reject ideas that are wrong or destructive; the minimal task, though also a fellow participant, is to guide the learner. This notion is captured by Perry, (1972: 73 - 74): "With his pupils he attempts to cultivate a friendly relationship on a basis of mutual acceptance, where his predecessor made no such attempt. In that friendly relationship, with its atmosphere of mutual respect, he guides pupils to self-discipline". So, to both

participants (the teacher and learner), respect means non-interference in the sense of non-imposition.

But there is yet another possibility in this learning situation; learners may be prompted by their freely chosen selfish and unethical goals - in which case there will be an attempt to flout co-operation among members and other worthwhile activities, posing a serious threat to Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty. I shall take up this point of criticism again in my next chapter when I look at a more appropriate learning community as *Gemeinschaft*, rather than *Gesellschaft*, association.

Dialogical pedagogy and the pursuit of the individual learner's own good

Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty gives the learner the right to pursue his own good in his own way; and, the teacher as an authority does not seem to have an equal right to influence the learner's decision and choice of subjects and the methods of studying those subjects. A similar view is put forward by Rosen in Bee, (1980: 55) when he says that children [learners] should be seen "... as socially constituted human beings who can draw sustenance for the imagination from their own world and its values". This means that also learners as human beings have experience as members of a particular community, their own life-worlds and aspirations which give them the right to pursue their own good in any possible way. Also Mill in Berlin, (1969: 127) embeds the notion of the pursuit of one's own good: "All the errors which a man is likely to commit against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem is good". This clearly shows that in this learning situation, the authority of the teacher with regard to the choice of subjects or the methods of learning those subjects, is kept at bay. To put it another way, the authority of the teacher is curbed substantially.

Dialogical pedagogy and the development of the individual learner's natural faculties

A notion of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty holds that the learner comes to school with inherent unique qualities which presuppose unique ways of learning. Those qualities, it is argued are, among others, original thought, critical thinking and resourcefulness. The teacher's interference is merely to develop and further these (natural) qualities - a point noted by Perry, (1972: 75) when he says that children are "... growing according to the laws of their own nature, which seems to have been thought of as largely hereditary, and to work out in a different way for each individual. Such a pupil is never thought of as passive, and never susceptible to moulding; he is growing, solving his own problems, developing quite apart from the teacher's efforts".

The learner's involvement in the learning process is motivated by the individual's desire to develop his natural faculties which require a suitable learning environment to flourish. There is no ostensible insistence by the teacher on particular bodies of knowledge and rote learning; the teacher only becomes satisfied when she is "... present at the spectacle of the unfolding pupil, and of aiding that process" (Perry, 1972: 74). In this case then, the teacher's role is to create a social situation conducive to the individual learner's generation of the knowledge with which he is endowed because, according to Perry, (1972: 72) knowledge can only arise "... naturally in a healthy social situation in form of answers to problems and inquiries presenting themselves; Pupils would therefore look after the knowledge aspect for themselves, and it was [is] not necessary for the teacher to emphasise it as well". The limit of the teacher's interference in Negative liberty is therefore limited to a role of supporting and guiding process of learning initiated by the learners themselves.

Love and the development of the learner's natural faculties

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty the teacher ought to show love for the learner's development of natural faculties by encouraging the learner to make the best use of his natural faculties; she respects the learner's unfolding of these endowments in a natural way. To the teacher then, love for the learner is shown in the guidance and facilitation of learning. So, in Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty the teacher's interference in the learner's activities is confined to that of a facilitator and guide; moreover in this learning situation the learner is encouraged to trust his natural endowments (those qualities he has inherited) like intelligence, creative mind, powers of thought among others. The learner trusts that these qualities will naturally develop and flourish as long as the learning situation is conducive to independent learning (there is freedom to deviate from the syllabus for instance) and resources like books or the subject matter are available.

Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty assumes that when learners participate in subjects and themes of their own choices that each one of them, comes to make the best of what he is gifted in and, by so doing, develops his inherent qualities (originality, innovativeness and other qualities). In a sense, through active participation in the subject, the learner comes to a better understanding of that subject. What is important in this context is that once the learner discovers what he is good at, he will make efforts to develop that talent in his own way. In short then, it is assumed that the development of the learner's natural faculties through free participation in this context, does not only lead to deeper understanding of the subject which learners grapple with - but to a whole lot of possibilities about the learner's future career. Morrow, (1989: 104) has noted this fact: "Participation, then, understood as the adoption of fully participant attitudes and participation in decision making, is educative in that it is itself a learning process with the crucially valuable function of developing what is essentially human about persons". Yes, people have the right to make decisions and choices which affect them. In Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty

it is also the right of learners to fully participate in choices and decisions about their own learning process.

The learner is encouraged to respect his inherited qualities, individuality and his giftedness in general as personal endowments. On the other hand, the teacher should respect the learner's natural endowments (individual thought and other qualities) which the learner displays as originally his because by respecting the learner as an individual, she has to respect even that which the learner is endowed with. Respect for the learner and respect for the development of his natural faculties means that the teacher must refrain from interfering with the learner's way of thinking by trying to foist her ideas on him. Perry, (1974: 74) portrays the teacher's sense of respect for the learner's development of natural faculties when he says that the teacher should only derive fulfilment "... from the selfless delight of being present at the spectacle of the unfolding pupil, and of aiding that process. No matter how many times over how many years he ministered to how many pupils, it was assumed that the delight would never pall".

Dialogical pedagogy and the learner's right to free choice

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, it would imply that individual learners have the right to choose the subjects they want to study, and the methods of studying those subjects. Not only that, the learner may also choose between conflicting ideas regarding the subject under study and the learning goals. Connolly, (1980: 80) seems to point this out: "Where the choice of direction falls exclusively on the educator [teacher], it accordingly takes a vertical, donating form from the very outset". The quotation suggests two things: first, that learners have the right to exercise their freedom of choice in the learning situation. Second, that teachers have to remain at the periphery of the learner's choices. Worpole in Bee, (1980: 51 - 52) takes this notion further when he says that we need to encourage learners "... to articulate their own particular sense of themselves and their situation, over and against definitions imposed on them from outside". Obviously, this articulation of "their own particular sense of themselves and their situation" cannot take place in a learning situation where there is no "right to free

choice". It means then, that the teacher as an authority must not interfere with this choice.

Love and the learner's right to free choice

The implication here is that the learner will love the space he creates for himself because it is a freely chosen space (i.e he will love the learning situation because of the freedom it entails) and objects of his choice as for example, a theme or assignment he has chosen. This will, it is assumed, increase the learner's curiosity, motivation and effort in learning - and reduce disciplinary problems because learners will be engaged in what they want.

Coupled with the teacher's unobtrusive guidance is the responsibility which the learner assumes for his learning activities he freely chooses out of love - a fact noted by Perry (1972: 74) when he says, "It follows that the pupil now bore full responsibility for his actions and was encouraged to do so. The teacher was [is] for the most part divested of responsibility, which belonged by right, almost by nature, to the pupil". This implies that in this situation, the teacher's responsibility is curtailed and most of it given to the learner who supposedly willingly loves and accepts it because it is meaningful and in his interest. The teacher's main task is to encourage the learner to go on with that which he has freely chosen without in any way being obstructed.

The notion that he has freely chosen a particular subject and the accompanying ways of learning that subject, are themselves indicative of the trust that he has not only in the subjects themselves - but in the free choices he has made about them. The more the learner succeeds in his endeavour, the more trustful of his abilities he will become and the more he will come to respect the freedom to choose. The teacher also trusts that the learner's natural right to free choice will finally help the learner to exercise independence; and she [the teacher] also trusts that the learner's natural right to free choice will give the learner a chance of exercising his freedom, and that the learner, through constant and free participation will, through trial and error, lead eventually to understanding.

Quite, in this learning situation each learner would choose to participate in the subject he has freely chosen to learn because the learner has, as it were, the right to free choice. Smith and Griffiths, (1989: 65) seem to support the above view when they say, "The teacher emphasizing the value of talk will see independence as consisting in the ability to come to one's own conclusions through discussion ...". This means that the learner will, with regard to the subject he has freely chosen, attempt through discussion to come to his own conclusions.

The teacher is here duty-bound to respect the learner's right to free choice by encouraging these co-operative relationships in various subjects which learners have chosen to participate in. There will be progress in learning based on the learner's having exercised their own choices in the subject in which they participate - a point noted by Perry, (1972: 76) when he says "... learning goes on best in a spontaneous environment, freely chosen by the pupil, who sets his own goals, and that the school should imitate these optimum circumstances in order to achieve the best results".

The learner over and above respecting his right to make decisions, must equally respect the right of others to make decisions as well; for, the right to make choices and decisions is not only genuine when it applies to him; others have the right too. The teacher is also obliged to respect this right of the learner in his choice of the subjects, choice of the learning methods and so forth. What this suggests is that the teacher should encourage the learner to make free choices in the learning situation. This learning situation, I argue, is a semblance of "performative pedagogy" which Shalem, (1999: 69) says, it entrusts "... teachers with highly challenging educational goals and at the same time place them in the background as stage workers of a play ..."

Dialogical pedagogy and the space for creativity, growth in knowledge and the development of civilization

Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty suggests that the exercise of freedom creates space for qualities like "creativity", "growth in knowledge" and "the development of civilization". In the context of learning it means that the learner's

creative efforts like creativity and critical thinking for instance, depend greatly on freedom. Connolly, (1980: 80) seems to suggest this: "We [teachers] must go to the 'thematic universe' of our students for the complex of generative themes ...". This means that in this learning situation the teacher must give learners space to express their own views regarding the subject matter. But this does not mean, that the teacher is only a spectator in this situation - a fact noted by Dearden (1970: 136) when he says this about learning by discovery, "... the teacher's agency and influence are present, though admittedly they are present in very different ways". The teacher may provide learners with opportunities to grapple with the subject matter on their own; she may also be a facilitator of the learners "contributions" to the store of human knowledge through their own "creative acts".

This view seems to be expressed by Shalem, (1999: 54) when she says this about "performative pedagogy" that "These educational beliefs are inherent to seeing knowledge as the product of an 'interactive exchange between the viewer and the object' ..." This means that real knowledge comes to the learner when he grapples with the subject under study rather than when it is mediated by the teacher for instance. Shalem, (1999: 54) pursues this argument further: "... 'performativity' assumes a multiplicity of understandings ..." This means that the different ways in which learners learn, it is hoped, will lead to the generation of different ways of understanding the text(s) for instance, and creative ways of grappling with it. In a sense, the learner's creative efforts will not be stifled by the teacher who as Connolly, (1980: 80) puts it, "... initiates or inducts the passive student into tacitly agreed worthwhile activities, skills and knowledge". According to proponents of Negative liberty this kind of induction, it seems, cannot make the learners creative agents in developing knowledge because they are introduced to only one way of learning and of solving problems.

According to the view of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, creativity encouraged through non-interference will not only lead to the individual learner's growth in knowledge but also to the growth of human knowledge in general. Theories, ideas and innovations for instance, which come to the individual during

his creative acts may contribute to the common good (i.e the development of civilization) in the sense that this new knowledge and innovations, are beneficial to human-kind in general.

Dialogical pedagogy and flexibility to accommodate the plural nature of goals

The learning situation based on Negative liberty ought to be designed in such a way that it should accommodate individual learner's different goals; this implies that it must be flexible. It is assumed that the learner then loves and appreciates this learning situation as a space which has room for his envisaged goals which come by the subject(s) he has chosen. It is when learners love and appreciate individual goals and those of others that the learning situation becomes a situation ripe with possibilities of generating different kinds of knowledge which emanate from different subjects of their choice.

Learners in this situation, then trust that their individual goals are accommodated because of the flexibility of the situation. This means that in this situation, the teacher's main task is to make resources available for the learner's use in working towards his anticipated goal. Above this, she [the teacher] has to trust that the learner will ultimately arrive at his goal in his own way because of this flexible learning situation; the teacher would not have to force the learner to do a certain subject or to use a particular method for studying a subject which in her opinion is worthwhile (she would be actualizing Eros). But this does not mean that the teacher cannot guide the learner in her subjects.

The pursuit of the learner's own goal will otherwise not be possible if learners do not respect other learner's individual goals. The teacher, in response to the learner's chosen goals, has to show respect for them; any kind of intolerance shown towards the learner's chosen goals may vitiate the success of the learning

situation. It is in a situation where there is some kind of flexibility to accommodate the learner's individual goal that there will be, according to Mill in Berlin, (1969: 127) an advancement of "civilization", "truth" "a free market in ideas", "spontaneity", "originality", "genius" and "mental energy".

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty; there is an assumption that learners are different and those differences must be accommodated in the learning situation (i.e each and every one of the learners must be given a scope of freedom within which to realize his own goal). This Berlin, (1969: 169) in his praise for Negative liberty, notes: "... I believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other ..." This means that in this learning situation, there are as many different goals as are learners and the implication is that this situation ought to be designed in such a way that it can facilitate the learner's ability to achieve his unique goals. Not only that. It also means that the subject matter ought to be diversified in accordance with the needs or goals of the learners; it may for instance, happen that while some learners would wish to pursue Biology either for its intrinsic or extrinsic value, others would, perhaps for the same reason, wish to pursue History - and both must be accommodated. Connolly, (1980: 80) seems to point this out: "... if the curriculum is to be relevant, we need a preliminary knowledge of the aspirations, levels of perception, and the view of the world which our students take". The implication is that, that which the learner aspires (i.e the goal of learning) will give the teacher a clue of how she should guide the learner towards that goal.

Connolly raises a significant point - the fact that the "thematic universe" of students is important in this learning situation. It (the point raised by Connolly) has a further implication that teaching methods and learning would be geared towards each learner's individual goal, obviously depending on, the nature of the goal envisaged, and the learner's level of understanding; all these require a less rigid and more loosely structured situation which can accommodate the learner's individuality, his interests, ways of learning and his aptitude. Bee, (1980: 50) rejects the notion that "... methods and materials ... pre-packaged ahead of the

child's actual experience" can lead to the learners unique goals because the school has its own "social values and ideology". A similar learning situation pertains in "performative pedagogy". Here a teacher is required who, according to feminist pedagogues in Shalem, (1999: 56), should be able to ... enchant the classroom discourse with limitless possibilities for self-creation and ... encourage(s) pupils' inner and inarticulate voices to express an existential sense of otherness ... of seeing and being seen as a particular other ..." The success of such a teacher would also depend on what Young in Shalem, (1999: 56) calls her ability to maximize "... multiple voices and a pluralism of 'side by side' particularity". This, put simply, means that the teacher ought to have the ability to accommodate and acknowledge individual differences and unique goals in this learning situation.

So, Connolly (1980: 80) claims that the "thematic universe" of learners will generate a "complex of generative themes". What Connolly implies, is that if knowledge is not separated from the learner as in top-down teaching, there is a possibility that the learner's critical thinking may give rise to new ideas, knowledge and theories which may transform the world. Passmore (1970: 196) arguing on critical thinking, points out that critical thinking cannot be taught but depends on the flexibility of the school and the teacher to allow for deviations from the curriculum: "... a school in which teachers never deviate from a fixed syllabus, in which masters and students alike frown on every deviation from the conventional norm, is unlikely to encourage originality in its pupils, although its products may be well-drilled and, within limits, highly skilled".

DIALOGICAL PEDAGOGY BASED ON NEGATIVE LIBERTY AND FEATURES OF EDUCATION

I have discussed in the previous section, Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty. In this section I shall look at Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty against features of education as discussed in the previous section.

Initiation into received ideas and shared practices

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, there is an assumption that the learner is a free agent who chooses what he wants to learn without interference from the teacher. Dearden, (1970: 135) seems to capture this situation when he says that in this situation, "the children find out everything for themselves" without the teacher's agency. But this seems to go against the practice of education - for, how can learners be able to initiate themselves into worthwhile bodies of knowledge without the expertise of the teacher? or rather, how can they "find out everything for themselves" without prior initiation or socialization? I argue that this kind of learning is inadequate in that learning (initiation) requires a teacher as a recognised body of authority who is authorized by the community to initiate others into traditions and other worthwhile bodies of knowledge. All too often, the learner does not know initially what he is being initiated into and, that is perhaps why it is not unusual to find that the learner does not readily accept this initiation or appreciates the teacher's efforts. In such cases parents or teachers have the moral obligation to force him to go to school; a fact noted by Fichte in Berlin, (1969: 149) when he says, "Compulsion is also a kind of education". The initial stage of education according to Rorty, (1990: 45) requires, socialization which implies, "... familiarizing the young with what their elders take to be true, whether it is true or not". This means that the learner has to be initiated into practices, traditions, social culture of the community and other forms of life considered to be worthwhile by that community in question. This point, Barrow, (1984: 51) takes further: "Socialization, to be effective socialization, must involve steering all children in the same sort of direction, namely in the direction of appreciating how things actually are in the society in question". This argument invalidates the notion in Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty that learners can initiate themselves into practices that they as yet are unfamiliar with.

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty there is an explicit advocacy of non-interference in the life of the learners, though the teacher may guide the learner or facilitate learning. This means that minimum interference in the learner

by the teacher is acceptable. The teacher has for instance, to provide the learner with the learning material and create a conducive learning environment, use gentle guidance and enthusiastic encouragement. But these are not enough as it would seem that socialization or initiation is left to chance. Barrow (1984: 50 - 51) notes: "There may conceivably be theoretical arguments for valuing a complete absence of influence, were it possible. But once it is conceded that people are going to be influenced by their surroundings, I can conceive of no convincing argument to show that it would be best if such influence were left to chance, or if children were to be subjected to a barrage of random and often contradictory demands. Besides, the very point and purpose of influencing children in respect of the norms of society is denied, if there is no uniformity".

My argument here then, contrary to Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty (which holds that the learner's free choice is the starting point of meaningful learning) does not seem to make much educational sense because the ability to make informed and meaningful choices of subjects and methods requires experience and understanding gained through participation. Therefore, it is essential that the teacher (who has this experience and expertise) make the choice on behalf of the learner especially in the initial stages of education. Morrow, (1989: 113) gives an insight into this:

... furthering someone's education must involve a kind of 'manipulation'. When I talk of 'manipulation' here I am not talking of anything sinister, such as treating persons as means rather than ends, I am simply trying to gesture towards the fact that someone trying to further the education of a learner is guiding him along paths the direction and goal of which the learner is not, and cannot, be aware before he has been along them. I am trying to give proper emphasis to the fact that although becoming educated involves coming to participate in some activities which cannot be understood prior to participating in them, people can, and do, come to participate in them.

It may further be argued, in Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, that the curriculum ought to be designed in accordance with the learners' needs; and that, the learners' free choice and expression are more important than the subject matter. While this is appealing, it fails to clarify how socialization or initiation can be accomplished in the "absence" of the teacher; for the learner is not yet competent to become a full participant in activities and practices which are rule-governed if the learner does not yet grasp the very rules into which he needs to be socialized. For, the learner's ultimate independence depends on his initial epistemic dependence on the teacher as an expert in specific knowledge. Smith and Griffiths (1989: 78) sum this situation up when they say, "... the relative autonomy that we may be able to achieve is not to be had unless we acknowledge our dependence. Without that acknowledgement the independence that we hurry towards, and hurry our children towards, does not bring the adult solidarity and security that we expected".

What Smith and Griffiths imply above is that "dependence" comes before independence - and, in the context of education it means that learners must first depend on initiation into traditions by the teacher before they can turn around and challenge them. This notion is also implied in what Barrow (1984: 51) says: "There may come a point at which individuals revolt against some of the features of the society, and have moral objections to the way in which society as a whole would habituate their children to acceptance of those features". Well, this "revolt" is a sign of independence and what is important about it, is that it comes after the individual shall have been socialized or initiated.

Educational authority and learner trust

I have argued in Chapter 3 that the teacher-learner relationship is an unequal relationship. According to Strike, (1982: 35) The teacher-learner relationship is a relationship of inequality - teachers participate competently in inquiry and are capable of making rational choices in education because "... the expert has mastered the concepts and principles that govern the process of inquiry and learning, whereas the novice [learner] has not. There is, thus a significant

inequality between the expert [teacher] and the novice [learner]". This quotation points at the significance of the teacher in the learner's socialization; it points out that socialization as a process of education cannot take place between two equals (i.e the learner and the learner) because both do not yet have the knowledge and skills necessary for the accomplishment of this human mission. Without the teacher as an authority, it is very unlikely that socialization/initiation can unproblematically be realized.

But in Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty there seems to be a suggestion that the learner is on equal footing with the teacher in as far as knowledge and skills are concerned as it is the case in child-centred approach to education. The child-centred concept of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty which I have sketched in the first part of this chapter maintains that the learner has to be free to express his own ideas unrestrained by the subject and, the curriculum must be geared to that which he wants to learn (not what the teacher regards as necessary). Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty therefore, implies an empiricist epistemology in that each and everybody is seen to have the right to generate knowledge because it is claimed knowledge emanates from mere experience which is a possession of everybody. These kinds of child-centred and empiricist views of education resonate with Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty because there is an implicit assumption that teachers and learners are equal (a disregard for unequal educational relationships); in short, that learners can contribute to their own socialization. While this may be possible in very few cases, it is difficult to see how the learner, given his level of conceptual tools (which is still far from being adequate) can socialize himself.

So, for complete socialization to take place, the inequalities in subject expertise (not in human dignity) which exist between the teacher and the learner have to be recognised and a teacher as a recognised figure of authority must deliberately make the necessary moves to initiate the learner into practices and traditions so that the learner can ultimately (through the ensuing process of individuation)

become a constitutive member of an intellectual community where he can confidently contribute together with the teacher to the store of human knowledge. In this regard, Peters, (1972: 106) says that the success of initiation depends on "... experienced persons turning the eye of others outwards to what is essentially independent of persons".

I argue that Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty regards the teacher-learner relationship as a relationship between equals and, that this would not make education possible and necessary because effective education requires a figure of authority for its fruition. But Negative liberty holds that: "If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved". (Berlin, 1969: 122). The quotation presupposes non-interference in the life of the learner; this implies that Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty creates a minimum space for authority and leaves learners with larger areas of non-coercion within which they can exercise their own freedom. While this may lead to some individual learners becoming creative and innovative because of the amount of freedom given to them, it is difficult to see how the learner can become his own authority; it is difficult to see how the learner can without having been initiated before, generate respectable theories, other forms of knowledge, and skills to participate competently in established practices.

Once we accept that the learner is equal to the teacher in as far as knowledge and skills are concerned, and that the learner can contribute to the store of human knowledge in as much as the teacher, then it is logical to say that learners are their own authority. Thus the authority of the teacher as subject-expert is not central. This suggests that knowledge in all its multi-faceted forms can be "democratised". Strike, (1982: 25) comments that this "egalitarian" view of knowledge diminishes "... the emphasis on transmitting received opinion and increase the emphasis on experience. It can easily lead to the rejection of any insistence by educators that students should master some extant view-point. It will

tend to diminish the teacher's authority insofar as that authority resides in subject matter expertise". Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty therefore undermines one of the necessary features of education namely authority of the teacher.

It has to be mentioned that initially when the learner is too young for instance, he does not know what he is being initiated into. This requires that he should trust the teacher and the contents of knowledge into which he is being initiated - this shows how crucial authority is in education - a feature well noted by Soal, (1993: 60) when she says "Educative relationships require trust and leadership. Not knowing what they are being initiated into, students proceed with a degree of trust in their teacher ..."

The notion that the learner can generate new knowledge as competently as the teacher is based on two modes of thought namely, epistemological individualism which suggests freedom in beliefs and that nothing should be accepted (received ideas included) which has not been thoroughly investigated and assessed by the individual himself and, normative individualism which holds that individual people are embodiments of ultimate values and not social groups or institutions.

It is apparent that epistemological individualism may have problems in educational practice because of its abnegation of the teacher as a figure of authority both as subject expert as well as moral agent which Flanagan and Yusuf, (1994: 159) warn us against "... dialogue is a highly systematic form of communication which requires a teacher". The same argument is taken further by Watt, (1969: 68): "... knowledge is a social rather than an individual achievement. The process of seeking the evidence, assessing the reasons, cannot conceivably be the responsibility of each individual separately. It is carried on collectively, and often institutionalised, as in a church for Newman, and a scientific establishment for all of us".

Although Negative liberty does not completely reject authority, there is still uncertainty on how large the area of non-interference should be and how small of that of outside authority; this uncertainty on the extent of interference adds on to the confusion about this kind of freedom. To put it in the educational context, the teacher would not be able to know how much she should intervene without infringing on the learner's freedom. I incline then towards Shalem, (1999: 69) that, Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, is like "performative pedagogy" and, "... is no more than an 'exercise in public relations' a false and misleading conception of pedagogy. It is a false and misleading conception because it denies the value of and the possibility for the significant authority of the ... teacher to plan and develop the curriculum of her classroom ..."

Gemeinschaft-like relationship

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty the relationship between the teacher and the learner is more in terms of Gessellschaft, i.e the learner and the teacher seem to occupy equal positions in the learning situation and this implies that the learner's association with the teacher is a voluntary association. There is also a strong advocacy for the teacher's non-interference in the learner's activities which suggest that for the most part, the learner is on his own. This therefore means that to the learner, liberation means little interference in his learning activities.

But in the Gemeinschaft-like relationship, which I have argued in Chapter 3 is a necessary feature of education, the opposite of what is said above holds; there is a significant inequality between the teacher and the learner which is caused by the teacher's knowledge in the subject, in educational practices and her having been initiated into them while the learner, on the other hand does not have this knowledge and has not yet properly been initiated into inherited concepts and other forms of knowledge. Although one may argue that in a Gemeinschaft-like relationship there is a fellowship type relationship, the most important dimension of this relationship is the hierarchical relationship with the authority which it entails;

the fellowship type relationship is only there to keep authoritarianism at bay in education and to enhance a genuine and healthy relationship between the teacher and the learner conducive for learning to take place.

The most typical example of the *Gemeinschaft* relationship is found in families (though not all families are representative) where there is a clear hierarchy between parents and children; in this hierarchical family relationship each member, each one of them knows her place in the hierarchy. Parents occupy a high and respectable position in the family because they have knowledge which their children do not have and thus have authority over them. What Watt, (1989: 240) says about Nodding's depiction of relationship in the family is significant in that it emphasizes the necessity of this hierarchy. He (Watt) says, "Noddings sets out to base ethics not on verbally stated principles of behaviour, but on relationships between people. The type of relationship on which she focuses is identified as the caring relationship (between the one caring and the one cared-for), and the primary model for this is the relationship between mother and child". It is this unequalness (hierarchy) in the family and in the learning situation which makes caring for the child in the family and for the learner in this situation possible otherwise it is not necessary; it is fruitless to attempt to initiate a person into bodies of knowledge, practices and traditions who has already been initiated because she knows what you know already; it is unnecessary therefore to attempt to educate a person who is your equal.

But Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty seems to suggest that the learner has "natural faculties" which he can develop unaided by the teacher. While this may be true in very few cases, where the learner is naturally gifted for instance, it still remains doubtful whether this can be possible without the initial socialization. Toulmin in Strike, (1982: 18) says, "Intellectually, also, man is born with the power of original thought, and everywhere this originality is constrained within a particular conceptual inheritance; yet, on closer inspection, these concepts too turn out to be the necessary instruments of effective thought". What this implies is that even if the learner could be said to be gifted, he still needs

these 'inherited concepts' as tools with which to think; without tools for thinking, original thought, creativity and spontaneity might be stifled.

Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty also seems to suggest that the learner has the natural right to choose freely that which he wants to pursue - be it in a subject or a goal. This notion presupposes equality between the learner and the teacher. Liberation then, according to the above argument goes with the natural right to free choice. This claim is attractive especially in South Africa because of its recent emergence from Apartheid Education. This claim has been differently expressed by teachers and learners in different forms and articulated by Yusuf and Flanagan in concepts like "People's Education for People's Power", "Collaborative learning" or "Group learning" among others. While this sounds attractive because of its departure from "chalk and talk" or "top-down" teaching methods and forms of authoritarianism which were entrenched in Bantu Education, it is still not convincing whether the learner, given his position as a person who has not yet acquired the necessary "inherited concepts" can make informed choices. Morrow, (1989: 147) notes this about educational relationships "... not all participatory relationships are relationships between equals. Educative relationships are participatory relationships, that is, they are relationships between persons, but they are not relationships between equals".

There is also in Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty the notion that the learner has the right to pursue his own good (i.e he is free to pursue that which in his own terms is worthwhile). How then, can the learner choose between contesting values if he has not as yet no understanding of the notion of conflicting values by the teacher through a process of initiation? Or put another way, is it not possible for the learner to learn that which is paltry and false? Choice, informed choice that is, depends on the notion of what is right and acceptable within a community, be it social or intellectual. Without this initial provision of rules of propriety (i.e what is right and what is wrong), which comes only by education, the learner's pursuit of his own good becomes only vague and uninformed.

Education as participation

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty there is an implicit assumption that learners have their own ideas and can generate new ideas and concepts on their own (unaided by the teacher). The implication here is that the learner is an individual in his own right whose train of thought should not be interfered with by the teacher. Well, it is true that learners may have original ideas and can for that matter become innovative. It is also true that through their self-initiated participation which implies that they will only participate in subjects which they like, which they have chosen out of interest, they will be practising those skills and increasing their knowledge of the subject.

But the question is, is genuine participation possible if the learner does not have a grip on "inherited concepts", "educational practices and standards" by which those practices are assessed and judged? It is possible that this kind of "participation" which does not take seriously the question of "inherited concepts" and standards for assuming these practices may underplay that which is worthwhile in education and degenerate into a game-like activity. Taylor, (1986: 36) says "The meanings and norms implicit in these practices are not just in the minds of the actors but are out there in the practices themselves, practices which cannot be conceived as a set of individual actions, but which are essentially modes of social relation, of mutual action". The implication here is that these social practices in various ways have their own constitutive rules and uses of languages without which they cannot be practised and therefore meaningful participation in them presupposes a socialization into these socially agreed upon constitutive rules and languages. Practices depend on common meanings for the participation of members who are involved in them.

I argue then that effective participation depends greatly on socially agreed upon constitutive rules and languages and meanings which underlie practices be it in the community or in education. I further argue that in Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty learners are not familiarized with these intersubjective meanings which are basic to communities and practices because of the teacher's

partial involvement in the learning activities of the learner. So, it appears that even if very few learners can learn something, in this participatory relationship, most of them will not come to grips with the subject matter under study; for effective engagement in learning (participation) presupposes proper initiation into these common meanings, traditions and relevant forms of knowledge.

My claim here is that genuine participation which is educative depends for its success on first of all, initiation into traditions, practices and bodies of knowledge. Morrow, (1989: 109) says, "In thinking of participation and education one can't presuppose 'individual wills' or already existent rationality; such things are the product of education, they do not exist prior to education.

But Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty seems to assume that creative thinking is a natural faculty, therefore, something that comes prior to learning. In other words, Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, claims that thinking is something that is brought into the learning process, whereas I have argued that informed thinking is something that develops out of the learning process.

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, the learner has the right to choose his own goals (learning goals) and to pursue them in his own way; above that, they must discover things on their own unaided by the teacher. But this, Barrow, (1984: 48) argues differently that education "... is ... the acquisition of the requisite kind of understanding ...". What this implies is that education is an intentional activity between the teacher and the learner - thus an enterprise. In this situation the teacher intentionally selects and makes available certain bodies of knowledge to the learner with a particular learning goal in mind. So education is a deliberate and systematic activity for the attainment of a particular learning goal otherwise it is not education in the true sense of the word.

On the other hand, the learner must also be intentionally involved in the learning process. In a sense, he must show the willingness to know these bodies of knowledge and concepts which are made available to him because without that

willingness, these bodies of knowledge will remain to him, meaningless. A further danger is that learners who are least gifted, cannot make much progress in education without the guidance of the teacher (I want to admit here that few learners can set their own goals and individually work towards them). But those who are not gifted will be left behind. So in Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty little or no education will take place - a point noted by Perry, (1972: 75) when he says, "... indeed, without a vital and ongoing personality, the model would fall". What he means is that if learners in the learning situation are not exceptionally gifted or strongly motivated, this kind of education will falter.


Development of critical reasoning and the process of self-realization

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty there is a notion that, it is when the learner's activities are not interfered with by the teacher that he develops natural faculties like critical thinking and creativity which may, as a result enable him to contribute to the store of human knowledge. This is possible if we accept what Pindar in Smith and Griffiths, (1989: 61) says about human excellence which she compares to a vine: she says that human excellence is, "... dependent for its flourishing on the accidents of rain, soil, and sun. The contingency or sheer chance of the world is not only to be accepted but even welcomed". This quotation is significant in that it shows that it is possible for human beings, in our context learners, to reach the level of individuation or self-realization unaided by teachers where they might be able to generate unique individual ideas, theories and other forms of knowledge. But, an aspect that should not be lost sight of in the above quotation is that this "flourishing" is a matter of chance and, I argue, a very slim chance in Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty. In education as an intentional activity, learners must be encouraged to lead meaningful lives by participating in their respective communities.

So, while I do not deny the assertion that some learners may by chance arrive at the level of being able to create new ideas, I incline towards thinkers like Rorty, (1990: 45) and Peters, (1972: 102) who argue that the child or learner must first

be socialized before he can become independent. In a sense, individuation or independence is a sequel of socialization.

Individuation then requires that the learner should, first of all, be initiated into bodies of knowledge, traditions of the society and social practices before he could reach independence as a critical thinker. This means that the learner must be assisted to acquire concepts and ideas which have been inherited from the past because it is only when he has acquired them that he can be able to think further and create new knowledge with these inherited concepts as tools for developing further thinking. The ability to make informed choices and decisions also depends on these "inherited concepts" because they form a frame-work within which individual thought can be conducted and developed; proper thinking is impossible in a vacuum. Watt, (1989: 50) commenting on Gentile's notion of community is informative.



... it is in the use of language that individuals most develop and display their individuality. But he [Gentile] argues that they could not do this unless they had already absorbed the language of the group, together with the body of concepts and assumptions embedded in it. They need the collective medium, the communal tradition, in order to express any individuality of their own. Unless they have absorbed the communal tradition, they are not human, personal individuals, but animals of a rather unimpressive species.

The above quotation is in many ways significant; implicit in it is that individuation (i.e critical thinking) as independence is impossible without prior initiation into received ideas. Learners must first learn certain practices before they can become independent - a point noted by Rorty (1990: 45) when he says that a human being must first go through "... a process of socialization, followed (with luck) by the self individualization and self-creation of that human being through his or her own later revolt against that very process".


Watt and Rorty both argue that socialization precedes individuation; though Rorty seems to argue further that the learner who has been properly initiated, may, begin to challenge those traditions and practices he has been initiated into, question their relevance and even change them if need be. If we accept that this is a kind of creativity, then it means that a learner having reached this stage may be able to add to the store of human knowledge which in turn may advance human civilization.

Education aims at the moral good - a public form of life that binds society together

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, learners have the freedom to choose their learning materials unaided by the teacher who only performs a facilitative role coupled with gentle guidance - because according to Bee, (1980: 41), "... they too were [are] the makers of culture, and therefore cultured". But my argument here is that these learning materials, understood as traditions and other worthwhile activities are embedded with the moral good (i.e truth, beauty, love of justice and orderliness among others) which binds society together. This Barrow, (1981: 50) seems to confirm: "Social life depends upon a set of agreed conventions; indeed up to a point it is defined by them, since a collection of people is not a society and only becomes one in the light of some principles of organisations and conduct.

I argue that these "conventions" and "principles", "truth" and "love of justice" are inscribed in these traditions. For the learner to come to grips with this moral good according to Shalem, (1999: 68) he requires, "socialization into the practices of these traditions [through] careful epistemological labor by the teacher in order to disclose the object [tradition] in the 'right way', giving it an intelligible place within a wide background of available meanings and social perspectives. Through this epistemological labor a teacher provides a path for the learner to enter into the tradition, to attend to its language and use it to criticize and extend its achievements ..."

This chapter looked at Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, then viewed it against the necessary features of education. Dialogical pedagogy viewed in this light (i.e Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty against the necessary features of education), does create space for the learner to develop to independence, understood as creative thinking and self-realization because of the minimum interference from the teacher. But the development of the learner is subject to a slim chance because it seems that only learners who are gifted may be able to develop to such independence; so, the space for fully informed development for the vast majority of learners is severely limited through non-interference. The implication of this to South Africans is that, if we see Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty as a possible teaching approach that can lead to the learner's independence, we must know that it cannot unproblematically do so; Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty seems to undermine the necessary features of education and this implies that full development of the learners may be severely limited.



CHAPTER 5

DIALOGICAL PEDAGOGY, POSITIVE LIBERTY AND FEATURES OF EDUCATION

In this chapter, the central question is, “Can Dialogical pedagogy, based on Positive liberty, and viewed against the necessary features of education lead to the learner’s full independence as rational self-realization?” In other words, does Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty embody the necessary features of education? But before I could attempt an answer to this question I need, first, to discuss the aspects of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty before evaluating it as an appropriate or inappropriate concept of education. This chapter, in contrast to the preceding one, claims that Dialogical pedagogy, based on Positive liberty, and viewed against the necessary features of education, seems to encourage a seemingly full independence of the learner because of a larger space it creates for the authority of the teacher and the authority of received ideas. In contrast to Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty, there is an explicit notion in Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty that knowledge resides in the community in which the individual is a participant.

DIALOGICAL PEDAGOGY BASED ON POSITIVE LIBERTY

In this chapter, I want to attempt to depict a learning situation based on Positive liberty and view it against features of education. My argument is that this would be a hopeful kind of a learning situation in that the learner and the teacher’s positions are so delineated that their unequalness requires no debate - and, this alone implies authority as a sufficient condition for learning. I align myself with Kilian and Viljoen (1974:183) when they say, “Experience of real education situations shows that the relationship of authority is really and essentially part of education despite a strong anti-authoritarian thinking in Pedagogics which is

currently prevalent in Europe". I want to argue that this thinking is not only prevalent in Europe but in South Africa as well.

Dialogical pedagogy and the higher and the lower self

So, what makes the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty more convincing is the notion of a higher and a lower self. The task of the higher or true self is to bring the lower self to understanding and ultimately full rational self-realization, becoming one with the true self. Taking this interpretation into an educational context, we can view the teacher as knowing what is in the learner's true self interests, even though the learner may herself not be aware of them. The teacher therefore acts and decides in accordance with the dictates of the (rational) true-self whereas the learner, as yet unfamiliar with these because of lack of experience and understanding, often acts in accordance with the dictates of the unenlightened lower self. The teacher is justified to coerce the learner because he does so in the true rational interest of the learner - a clear acknowledgement of unequal educational relations which require authority for the successful realization of educational goals.

In Positive liberty there is a notion that the individual person is free only when she is the source of control. This means that freedom is equated with the authority or power to make informed decisions and choices driven by own reasons and purposes and pursuing own rational goals. This Berlin, (1969:131) confirms: "This is at least part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that it is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of the world. I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes".

In this learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, the teacher as the learner's higher self chooses and organizes the material to be learnt and methods of learning it because he knows and can tell the difference between the learning material that is valuable and that which is not by virtue of his having been initiated into these traditions, social practices and the experience

which he commands. Above that, he knows that every learning activity, based on a chosen tradition and learned in the right way is a milestone towards the learner's desired goal (i.e. rational self-realization).

The argument in this learning situation is that these choices, and decisions the teacher makes on behalf of the learner because the learner is yet to be initiated. Implicit in this learning situation then is the acknowledgement that both the teacher and the learner are on different epistemological levels - and this alone, suggests that the teacher must take the lead in this learning process. Atkinson, (1972:172) says:

Instruction, then, is essentially a rational process, both at the giving and, in so far as it is successful, at the receiving end. It involves, for instance, providing adequate support, by way of proofs, reasons, evidence, whatever may be appropriate to the field in question, for the conclusions it is sought to impart. No higher degree of conviction is sought than is warranted by the nature of the support available. Not conviction by itself, but justified conviction, rational assent is the aim. The imparting and acquiring of an understanding of what is taught is consequently involved in its realization. Because of this, and in so far as it succeeds, instruction puts its subject [learner] in the way of making progress in the field by his own efforts.

So, the teacher then, acting and deciding in accordance with the interest of the learner's true self provides the learner with "adequate support" in this learning situation; he [the teacher] gives the learner "proofs" and "reasons" on the tradition [subject matter] which has carefully been selected from the whole myriad of other traditions because of its worth; the teacher's basic aim is to lead the learner through this subject matter towards an enlightened understanding and acceptance of the true self. Coutinho in Freire, (1974:9) gives an insight into the role of the teacher in this learning situation. "Although it [education] is customarily conceived as a conditioning process, education can equally be an instrument for deconditioning. An initial choice is required of the educator [teacher]". Here Coutinho acknowledges the responsibility of the teacher, I argue, in Dialogical

pedagogy based on Positive liberty in carefully selecting the content of learning and presenting it in a way that deconditions the learner. Put in another sense, the subject matter and the method of presentation ought to enable the learner to transcend from the level of the lower self to the level of the higher self (i.e. she ought to free herself from internal and external constraints which block her free self-development). Mackie, (1980:1-2) gives us a further insight into this learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty when he says this about literacy: "... literacy is not acquired neutrally, but in specific historical, social and cultural contexts. Far from being an end which merely reflects reality ... it is the means by which we comprehend, unravel and transform the reality in which we find ourselves". This means that in this learning situation the teacher should aim at the learner's understanding of the subject matter so that the learner could ultimately become critical of her own situation and those of others; this critical attitude, I argue, is necessary for self-transformation and the transformation of one's situation. A further implication is that the teacher's direction, control and guidance which he gives to the learner is done with the purpose that the learner should realize her rational true-self. So, the selected content ought to be comprehensible to the learner and the selected methods of learning ought to enhance the learner's ability to "transform" themselves and their reality in accordance with the dictates of the higher self. Mackie, (1980:1) like Peters, makes a significant point: "To be literate is not to have arrived at some pre-determined destination, but to utilise reading, writing and speaking skills so that our understanding of the world is progressively enlarged". This implies that it is only when the learner shall have reached the level of the higher self that she could be free to make informed decisions and choices like the teacher.

Of course, this choosing by the higher self (the teacher) on behalf of the lower self (the learner) may be seen as a kind of coercion. But, the response from proponents of Positive liberty would say that it is in fact a form of (rational) liberation. "... the rational ends of our 'true' natures must coincide, or be made to coincide, however violently our poor, ignorant, desire-ridden, passionate, empirical selves may cry out against this process. Freedom is not freedom to do what is

irrational, or stupid, or wrong. To force empirical selves into the right pattern is no tyranny, but liberation". (Berlin, 1969:148)

Given the above notion of liberation as the ability to do what is right, and that two rational minds cannot be in a state of conflict, it then becomes logical why teacher coercion in this learning situation, is, in fact eventually learner freedom. It would seem that coercion of the learner (lower self) is crucial because without it, the learner would remain constrained by ignorance and cannot fully participate in bodies of knowledge, skills and other worthwhile social practices of which the teacher is an expert. I want to argue here that this learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty stands in stark contrast with the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty because in it learners are free to choose their own learning content without the teacher's interference; in a sense, in it, coercion is an unacceptable form of guidance.

Freire in Nekhwevha, (1997:8) argues this point further: "Speaking the word is not a true act if it is not at the same time associated with the right of self-expression and world-expression, of creating and re-creating, of deciding and choosing and ultimately participating in society's historical process". The notion expressed here suggests that ultimately when the learner (lower self) shall have reached the level of competence like the teacher (higher self), she will be able to create new meaning based on the acquired traditions; she will be able to decide and choose unaided by the teacher - but, I argue, these capabilities referred to can only be developed after the learner shall have been socialized.

So, in this learning situation, the teacher as the learner's higher self controls and directs learning, cares for the selected tradition understood as the subject matter and the learner as an agent in learning. This control, direction and care of both the tradition and the learner is precluded in Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty - in it learners control and direct learning activities and care for their self-chosen tradition and themselves.

In a situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty the teacher as the learner's higher self **loves** and cares for the traditions which he has chosen for the learner because he knows that imbedded in them are skills which he wants the learner to acquire and love because of their worth. Above that, he knows that the worth of these traditions lies in the fact that once they are mastered by the learner they are a sure sign-post towards the learner's becoming a higher self (i.e. the learner will freely decide, choose and act freely like the teacher as a higher self). The teacher in this situation does not only love and care for traditions and skills but as I have argued, he loves and cares for the learner as well (i.e. he constantly wants to know whether the learner makes progress or not - and, above that, he acts in accordance with the learner's true self so that the learner could ultimately reach the level of the true self and come to full rational self-realization.

A further indication of the teacher's love (i.e. Agape; a selfless kind of love in which one wishes the other that which he would wish for himself) for the learner, is his willingness to initiate the learner into traditions and other worthwhile activities and appreciates the learner's willing involvement into them. The teacher's benevolent intentions is mirrored in his teaching which is neither manipulatory nor indoctrinatory - for he regards the learner as a fellow human being who ultimately can also become an authority in her own right. Caesar, (Act II, Scene II:74), seems to show the selfless nature of this love when he says this to Decius: "Because I love you, I will let you know":

On the other hand, the learner reciprocates by loving the traditions which have been chosen for her by the teacher as an expert; the learner also loves the teacher for what he is and this is shown by the way she exerts effort in trying to understand these traditions, how she accepts the teacher's control, guidance, discipline and care - for, she knows that she is not yet capable of making sense out of these traditions. The learner also shows her love for the teacher, especially by the way she tries to emulate the teacher in solving learning related problems and trying to follow his example. So the acceptance of control, guidance,

discipline and care by the learner from the teacher and the wish to emulate the teacher's ways of resolving learning problems coupled with her wish to follow the teacher as an example are indicative of the learner's love for the teacher.

In the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty the teacher trusts that the traditions which he has chosen for the learner are the most relevant ones for raising the learner to the level of the true self, - because he knows that the learner's arrival at the level of the higher-self is conditional (i.e. it depends on proper assimilation of these traditions otherwise it would not be possible).

The learner ought, on the other hand, also to take the traditions which have been selected for her by the teacher on trust because she cannot yet confidently tell whether they have value or not - this as I have argued, requires a process of socialization. So, in Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, the learner appropriates the learning traditions on trust, the teacher's control, guidance and discipline on trust - that is, she trusts that the teacher who is already the higher self knows what is appropriate and seemly in this learning situation. Atkinson, (1972:173) seems to portray the kind of trust in this learning situation: "We have all taken a vast amount [of knowledge and skills among others] on trust, and must continue to do so". This quotation implies the importance of trust, I argue not only in Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty but in all learning situations especially when the learner is not yet competent in knowledge and skills. Comte in Berlin, (1969:151-152) seem to point at trust as an important aspect in learning: "Only the truth liberates, and the only way in which I can learn the truth is by doing blindly today, what you, who know it, order me, or coerce me, to do, in the certain knowledge that only thus will I arrive at your clear vision, and be free like you".

In this learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, the teacher respects the traditions and skills he has chosen on behalf of the learner because he already knows their worth - that is why he takes pains in organizing

this learning situation; and why he also makes these traditions skills and the learning materials available to the learner. Above that he also has a kind of respect for the learner because he regards her as a fellow human being. This notion is apparent in how the teacher controls this learning situation (i.e. how he presents the tradition to the learner) and how he disciplines the learner. The teacher's presentation of the subject matter is geared to the learner's level of understanding and avoids to appear manipulatory or indoctrinatory - that is, he creates space for the learner's voice in learning. Berlin, (1969:146) notes: "Rational men will respect the principle of reason in each other, and lack all desire to fight or dominate one another. The desire to dominate is itself a symptom of irrationality ..." In the context of this learning situation, the teacher, shows his respect for the learner, by not dominating the learner even though the learner is his lower self (i.e. incapable of making sound decisions and choices) but patiently point out the right path for her to follow. In short, the teacher shows pedagogic love to the learner by treating her with respect.

The learner, as still the teacher's lower self, must respect the traditions and skills chosen on her behalf and the teacher who imparts them to her as a knowledgeable and experienced person; the teacher (the higher self) who knows that the learner's eventual freedom depends on selected traditions and guidance of the learner into them. The learner as the teacher's lower self who is not yet competent in knowledge and skills and who is also not yet familiar with these communal practices and other worthwhile activities, cannot fully participate in the community. The learner's participation is to some extent, initially based on the level of the lower self. This, I argue, is partial participation and not full participation. Full participation requires full knowledge of traditions and practices coupled with their skills.

In this learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, (rational) critical thinking is a function of the higher self. The teacher knows that critical thinking can be acquired by the learner in the process of learning the selected

received ideas. Obviously, he knows that the learner (still as developing towards her higher self) is not yet competent to assess these critically. Brauner and Burns (1965:25) say,

Speculation ... is not wild and uncontrolled, conducted in the absence of existing fact or value; instead, speculation well done is rigorous and achieved within some meticulously built frame of reference. Lawrence Thomas's penetrating dictum 'There is no view without a point of view' clearly indicates that one cannot speculate in a vacuum, that one cannot speculate about nothing with nothing. Rather, one speculates within some frame of reference (perhaps taken only for purposes of speculation), on some problem or some subject matter, and with some intellectual tools. Speculation is thus a disciplined, if not dogmatized, activity; if it involves creative flights of fancy, as well it may, the flight takes off from some base somewhere, is controlled by someone using some flight instruments, and eventually returns to land somewhere. Whatever stays up in the air, whatever cannot be brought down to the firm level of meaning and translated into operational practices, is not truly speculation: it is mere fanciful thinking without prospect or promise.

This quotation is significant in two ways: In the first place, it confirms the view in this learning situation that speculation or rather creative thinking is only possible when it is done within a framework of facts which implies that the learner has to understand the traditions first before she can be able to think critically. In the second place, it implies that the learner ought to be able to use "intellectual tools" which have been offered by the teacher and acquired, if she is to be able to think critically - otherwise critical thinking becomes "fanciful thinking without prospect or promise". My argument here then, is that in this learning situation, the teacher will present the selected tradition in such a way that it can create for the learner a particular framework within which the learner can operate in a specific subject field and to enable learners to use the acquired concepts as "intellectual tools" with which to think, and in this way develop their higher selves. Barrow, (1984:45) says,

"... one might reasonably say that one clear goal of education is developing powers of critical thought. For what I mean by critical thinking is thinking that is concerned about and embodies good reasoning and coherent steps, conceptual clarity and discrimination in planning, discussion, explanation and any other form of ratiocination. It is necessarily good thinking (in the sense that it is necessarily coherent thinking rather than confused or illogical, not in the sense that it is necessarily appropriate to all situations. And 'necessarily' here refers to conceptual necessity, i.e. it follows from the meaning of the concept".

Bee, (1980:49-50) gives us a clue of how critical thinking can be enhanced: "If a person is to become genuinely literate as opposed to functionally literate, a quality of critical reflection must be engendered in the pedagogical methods. Without reflection and analysis ..., literacy becomes something handed out and isolated from life's realities".

Dialogical pedagogy and self-realization

In this learning situation (of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty), the teacher, I have pointed out in the preceding section, is the key factor in deciding and choosing what (content) has to be taught and how (method) it has to be learnt.

I think a teacher who is fully self-realized will ask himself these two questions which I argue, are basic: "can this selected tradition (content) lead to the learner's self-realization?" If so, "which is the most appropriate method of presenting this content for the achievement of the same set goal?" Answers to these questions will lead the teacher (as a person who is already self-realized) to opt for methods which will facilitate the learner's understanding of the subject because as Berlin puts it, "critical reason" and "understanding" lead to rational self-realization. He, (Berlin, 1969:141) gives here an example of a schoolboy who does not understand Mathematics.

If I am a schoolboy, all but the simplest truths of mathematics obtrude themselves as obstacles to the free functioning of the mind, as theorems whose necessity I do not understand, they are pronounced to be true by some external authority, and present themselves to me as foreign bodies which I am expected mechanically to absorb into my system. But when I understand the functions of the symbols, the axioms, the formation and transformation rules - the logic whereby the conclusions are obtained - and grasp that these things cannot be otherwise, because they appear to follow from the laws that govern the processes of my own reason, then mathematical truths no longer obtrude themselves as external entities forced upon me which I must receive whether I want it or not, but as something which I now freely will in the course of the natural functioning of my own rational activity.

For Bee, (1980:39) Literary [education] "... can be repressive or liberating". If the teacher presents the rules of the subject practice in a "repressive" way, then the subject will become "opaque" and "dull" the learner's "consciousness". This notion, simply put, will block the learner's free self-development. Secondly, that for the learner to arrive at self-realization, she has to be apprenticed to the teacher as a knowledgeable agent who does not only care for the content to be learnt, but for the learner as well-he (the teacher) will monitor the learner's progress towards self-realization.

In a sense, it (the subject matter) must logically lead to the systematic development towards rational self-realization. So, the teacher's main task is to make decisions on behalf of the learner's needs, her rational true self. This means that knowledge chosen for the learner to learn, (including content, skills, values etc) must be in accordance with the dictates of rationality. If so, then the knowledge is relevant and ultimately transformatory for the learner. The teacher must therefore get the learner to make this knowledge her "own" - and so realize her own true (rational) self.

Barnard, (1980:13) seems to point at the significance attached to good education in a situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty. He says that Freire insists "... that education is always political, and ... the aim of good pedagogy is to enable people to increase their understanding of their own objective conditions. Such understanding, ... will inevitably lead them to change the world as they climb out of the oppression in which they have been submerged". This quotation advances the notion that "good pedagogy" should facilitate the learner's understanding of the traditions (contents of learning) which will ultimately enable the learner to transform the world. I further argue that, that which oppresses the learner are the internal (ignorance, fear, unbridled emotions and illusions, unconsciousness of one's potential), and external (oppressive economic, social and political conditions) constraints which are all attributable to lack of knowledge. All these make transformation impossible - and what is required is the teacher who is already self-realized. In this learning situation then, liberation means, to the learner, complete openness to the teacher's control and guidance; it further means the learner's acceptance of the teacher as an authority who will enable the learner to become fully self-realized. This notion Berlin, (1969:143-144) notes: " I am free if, and only if, I plan my life in accordance with my own will ...".

Love and self-realization

In the situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, the teacher as a self-realized person is aware of the goal towards which he is leading the learner - hence his choice of the relevant segments of tradition and skills which he presents to the learner in a relatively understandable way. This alone shows that the teacher appreciates and **loves** the learner's rational self-realization; otherwise his choice and presentation of these traditions and skills would be in an obscured way so that this envisaged ideal of self-realization could become remote. But this is not the case in this learning situation - as Bee, (1980:46) says that Freire teaches illiterates "... with the deliberate aim and intention of awakening them to, and liberating them from, their naive acceptance of life and its dehumanising effects upon them". This means that the teacher wishes for the learner to arrive

at the level of rational self-realization by offering these traditions in such a way that they become accessible. He wants the learner to be freed from fear, and other internal constraints like ignorance. It is only when the learner understands the subject in question that she becomes fully free to decide, choose and act like the teacher as a self-realized person. Berlin, (1969:141) sums the above truism up when he says, "The only true method of attaining freedom, ... is by the use of critical reason, the understanding of what is necessary and what is contingent". The implication here is that the learner's understanding of these traditions is significant in that it leads the learner to the level of rational self-realization and so to freedom and independence.

The learner's willing involvement in this situation, her pre-occupation with the learning contents and the acceptance of the teacher's guidance and control, shows in the first place, that the learner loves the goal of rational self-realization otherwise she would reject the tradition given, the guidance offered and the teacher's caring efforts. Quite contrarily, Berlin, (1969:144) says "... plans entail rules; a rule does not oppress me or enslave me if I impose it on myself consciously, or accept it freely, having understood it, whether it was initiated by me or by others, provided that it is rational, that is to say, conforms to the necessities of things".

In the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, the teacher as an already self-realized person trusts, over and above the traditions, methods of presenting them and the goal of self-realization as a worthwhile goal. The teacher is convinced that through these selected traditions and skills, if properly appropriated by the learner will lead her to the goal of rational self realization where she will be able to make informed decisions and choices and even take appropriate actions. What I want to argue here is that the learner's unwillingness to grapple with the content either due to ignorance or laziness requires the teacher's patience - and, patience, I argue, entails trust (especially when the learner through trial and error attempts to grapple with the subject because of her lack of understanding and skills) that the learner will eventually

arrive at the goal of rational self-realization. So, without the teacher's trust in the content of learning, and in the learner herself as a capable person, there is no point in taking pains to educate her.

The learner in this learning situation, reposes her trust in the teacher as a person who is already rationally self-realized; the learner takes the teacher's selected traditions, methods he uses for imparting the content, control, guidance and discipline on trust; she trusts that the teacher is aiming to lead her through all this to the level of rational self-realization. Strike, (1982:50) says, "Since the values and standards of intellectual enterprises are internal to these enterprises and cannot be fully appreciated by the novice, the student's [learner's] submission to his education cannot be fully rational. It must be based ... on trust".

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, the teacher as an already self-realized person encourages the learner to participate in the traditions which he has chosen on her behalf because he knows that they will lead the learner to a state of self-realization. This encouragement the teacher does by presenting the subject matter in a problematic way and by asking the learner probing questions on the content of learning. The teacher also attempts to answer questions from the learner (even though they may not be relevant and clear because of the learner's level of competence). Freire, (1974:9) says this about problematizing the subject which I argue implies participation: "Problematization, which means both asking questions and calling into question and is therefore a challenging attitude, is, at one and the same time, the beginning of an authentic act of knowing and the beginning of an act of subversion of 'overdetermination', that is, subversion of praxis inverted upon man". So, it means then that the asking of questions in this situation on the tradition either by the teacher to the learner or by the learner to the teacher is significant in that it is the beginning of "knowing". Freire, (1974:9) gives us a further insight into this situation: "Problematization does not come easily to silent, passively receptive masses, no matter where they are - in the 'country-side' of the world or in the classrooms or before the television sets of the 'cities'". What Freire emphasizes in the above quotation is that

"problematization" of the lesson is vital because it evokes the learner's participation.

The teacher **respects** the goal of (rational) self-realization because he knows that when the learner reaches this goal she will be able to make rational informed decisions, and choices unaided by the teacher because, as Herder, Hegel and Marx in Berlin, (1969:142) put it, "... to understand the world is to be freed". This means that the teacher knows that the learner is still ignorant, and may still be afraid (as it is always the case, to make decisions and choices on her own). That is perhaps why the teacher goes out of his way to act on the learner's behalf because the learner is not yet competent to choose and decide on the content which is critical for the realization of her learning goal.

The learner on the other hand, shows her respect for the goal of rational self-realization - and this is shown in the way in which she accepts and grapples with the tradition and skills which as I have argued earlier, have been chosen by the teacher on her behalf. The learner respects these traditions and skills, the respect which she shows by enthusiastically grappling with them so that they should not, as Berlin, (1969:142) puts it, block her "... free self-development", understood as rational self-realization.

Dialogical pedagogy and the common good

I have argued in Chapter 3 that the selected traditions understood as the subject matter embed skills, values like truth, honesty and justice among others, which society has sanctioned as worthwhile. Nekhwevha (1997:10) quoting Foucault says, "Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth ...".

My argument here is that this does not only apply to what is true but to other values as well - i.e. those values that society thinks are worthwhile for their youth to be inducted into like justice and honesty. So, if this argument is accepted, in a situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, the learner comes to know this general good via the selected traditions the teacher initiates her into. Again, since these shared values, it is argued are all rational, so all human beings in as far as they are rational will freely accept and uphold them. This initiation into values is done with the purpose that the learner's life could as Burke in Berlin, (1969:147-148) puts it, be "... in unison with the predisposed order of things". That is, the learner must be able, if not now later, to participate effectively in these shared meanings.

The teacher, in Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty has a particular respect for these common goods because he knows they are worthwhile - that is perhaps why he himself, emphasizes proper values to the learner and de-emphasizes those that are unseemly and improper. The teacher selects a particular tradition to be studied by the learner because as an experienced and knowledgeable member of the community in question, he knows fully well that outside this common good, the learner will not be able to live well in society because she would not, by herself know what is good and proper as opposed to that which is not. Giroux, (1981:129) seems right when he says "Inherent in any educational design are value assumptions and choices about the nature of humankind, ... the value of specific forms of knowledge and, finally, a vision of what constitutes the good life". The learner on the other hand, comes to respect the common good as it is because the teacher who is already rationally self-realised, emphasizes it as a vital value that would ultimately be needed of her [the learner]. The learner learns about the common good by participating in practices that uphold values like justice, truth, honesty and moral courage.

Love and the common good

The common good or proper interests, as I have stated previously are inscribed in traditions which are presented to the learner by the teacher. So in the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, the teacher's choice of the subject matter is embedded in the common good (i.e. truth, justice, for instance). In teaching a Shakespearean drama like Julius Caesar then, the teacher will draw the learner's attention to that which is just, noble and true as opposed to what is paltry, unjust and ignoble in the characters.

This is not a literary argument - I merely allude to this literary work to show that proper interests are embedded in these contents and the teacher, out of love for the learner wishes that the learner could ultimately appropriate them. So, the teacher's love for the common good is apparent each time when he emphasizes the good, truth and justice as sanctioned values.

The learner also shows the teacher's love for the common good by appropriating these values and attempting to apply them in her life situation. In a sense, the learner's attempt to apply these literary works in life means that she sees them as chunks from human experience (i.e. not as isolated traditions from human experience).

Trust and the common good

In this learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, the teacher has trust in traditions which he has chosen for the learner to learn because he knows that they embed the common good: vital values like virtue, honesty moral uprightness among others. Freire (1974:21) says, "Orientation in the world, so understood, places the question of the purposes of action at the level of critical perception of reality. If, for animals, orientation in the world means adaptation to the world, for man it means humanizing the world by transforming it. For animals there is no historical sense, no options or values in

their orientation in the world; for man there is both an historical and a value dimension". The point here is that in Dialogical pedagogy, the teacher trusts that the learner will be helped to internalize the common good and frown upon the paltry, ignoble and the ridiculous, so that she could be free to live with others in society and transform society in accordance with the values embedded in the common good.

Dialogical pedagogy and community membership

In Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty there is a sound assumption that the learner is a member of the community and for her ultimate full and effective participation and contribution, she [the learner] has to appropriate traditions, practices and values of the community in which she lives. So, the teacher in this situation uses his expertise in these traditions, experience and skills in making these traditions known to the learner. Berlin, (1969:154-155) lends an insight into this learning situation: "In so far as I live in society, everything that I do inevitably affects, and is affected by, what others do". What this points to is that Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty highlights the fact that the learner is not independent of the influence of her society. To put it another way, man's life is a life of inter-dependence with others and, for effective and sound inter-dependence as it is the case in communities, learners must be "steered" as Barrow, (1984:51) would put it, "... in the same sort of direction, ... in the direction of appreciating how things actually are in the society in question".

A further implication of what Berlin and Barrow say in the above, is, simply put, that communities are held together by certain traditions, common meanings and value systems - and, for the learner to become a recognized member and an active participant, she has to prove to have a notion of this "common good".

The teacher, as an already full member of the community which I have argued in Chapter 2, that it could be, a social "group", "class", "profession" or "intellectual", initiates and controls this learning situation in such a way that learners could come to "appreciate" how things are in the society because he [the teacher] knows that

freedom of the learner comes only when the learner shall have appropriated these traditions, skills and values which will make him a full and active participant in communal activities. Full membership and by implication full freedom then, is indicated by full participation.

Freedom of the learner in this learning situation then depends greatly on her acceptance of the teacher's control, guidance, discipline and care because he [the teacher] as an expert, introduces the learner to what Brauner and Burns, (1965:22) would say is "... the culture in which he exists and to the socially developed and endorsed methods of living and working in that society". In short, the learner has to appropriate these traditions together with reasons on the claims made if ever she is to rise to the level of community membership. Freire, (1974:51) says, "It is as conscious beings that men are not only in the world, but with the world, together with other men. Only men, as 'open' beings, are able to achieve the complex operation of simultaneously transforming the world by their action and grasping and expressing the world's reality in their creative language". What this implies is that in the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, freedom of the learner is in the first place, full membership and recognition by the community in question and, in the second place, the ability to make informed choices and active participation through contributions by way of "creating" and "recreating" new meanings based on those traditions.

Love and community membership

The teacher shows his love for the learner by his willingness to initiate her into communal practices and reasons with which he provides the learner in the process of initiation. In a sense, he makes it possible that the learner should be provided with the subject matter and skills necessary to become a fully active and informed member of the community, one that could ultimately be able to transform it. The teacher shows his wish and love for the learner, by giving her those "competencies" and "opportunities" necessary for effective and full participation.

The teacher intentionally makes these bodies of knowledge, traditions and other worthwhile activities known to the learner because he knows that it is only through them that the learner can become a full-fledged member of the community.

The learner further shows her love by willingly accepting the teacher's guidance into these practice - for without them, she cannot ultimately be able to make informed decisions and take appropriate actions in that community. In Taylor's words (1985: 39), the learner by her co-operation longs to arrive at a world of "inter-subjective" meanings which will enable her, like other self-realized community members "to talk about" and develop a common reality. Berlin, (1969:156) highlights the need to feel a sense of belonging to a community: "I desire to be understood and recognized, even if this means to be unpopular and disliked. And the only persons who can so recognize me, and thereby give me the sense of being someone, are the members of the society to which, historically, morally, economically, and perhaps ethnically, I feel that I belong".

Trust and community membership

In the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty the teacher knows and trusts the community into which he wants the learner to be initiated. The teacher knows and trusts that upon mastery of these contents by the learner, he [the learner] will then become free to participate fully in those communal practices -because as Berlin, (1969:161) says, "No society literally suppresses all the liberties of its members; a being who is prevented by others from doing anything at all on his own is not a moral agent at all, and could not either legally or morally be regarded as a human being ...". Knowledge and trust of the community by the teacher makes two things possible: the selection of the tradition (content) for the learner, and full knowledge and trust that the learner will be accepted as member of the community as soon as she starts to be competent in making constructive contributions in the community.

The learner, in this learning situation trusts the teacher because he [the teacher] has knowledge of the communal traditions practices and skills required in the community into which the learner is initiated (after all, he is already a member).

So, the learner, because of her willingness to be initiated into these traditions in the first place, and the willingness to become a member of the community where she will be free to contribute knowledge, ideas and theories, in the second place, accepts and trusts the teacher's guidance and the traditions which the teacher has chosen on her behalf as milestones towards her community membership. So, without the teacher's trust in the learner and the learner's trust in the teacher as a knowledgeable and experienced person in traditions and skills, it seems, education may not be possible - an opposite of what holds in a learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty where it is assumed that the individual learner can on her own, initiate herself without the teacher's agency.

Respect and community membership

In this learning situation, the teacher who is already a full-fledged member of the community respects the traditions, skills, practices and values which the community holds. This respect is apparent in the way in which he holds them up to the learner for (appropriation) assimilation, otherwise he would not even attempt to usher the learner into them. So, the teacher takes pains of selecting the tradition he knows will ultimately make the learner an active member of that community. This the teacher does on the notion that the learner is not, as Berlin (1969:155) puts it, a "... disembodied reason. Nor ... Robinson Crusoe, alone upon his island". In other words, he knows that the learner is born in society and has been nurtured by society and therefore must ultimately become a member of that society through initiation.

So, to the learner, freedom means to be "understood" and "recognised" and the condition for this understanding and recognition, is as it were, through these traditions and skills which the learner has to pay allegiance to - for as Berlin, (1969:157) puts it, "... what I am is, in large part, determined by what I feel and think; and what I feel and think is determined by the feeling and thought prevailing in the society to which I belong ...".

Participation and community membership

The **goal** of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty is for the learner, through the development of her higher rational self, to become a fully participating member of society, upholding the common good and able to transform society where necessary.

The learner also knows her situation well; she knows for instance, that she must first attempt to make the moves made by her teacher before she can be competent like the teacher himself. So, through trial and error and through questioning and being questioned on these traditions, she develops towards being a full and recognized member of the community. This point is noted by Freire as quoted by Matthews, (1980:83) when he says, "... knowledge comes out of reflecting upon the actions and engagements that restless, questioning, active subjects participate in when they transform their natural and social world. Knowledge is intimately linked with praxis. Such praxis itself is social, and is directed towards an end - human liberation and the emancipation of those trapped in the culture of silence".

DIALOGICAL PEDAGOGY BASED ON POSITIVE LIBERTY AND FEATURES OF EDUCATION

In the preceding section of this mini-thesis, I have attempted to depict a learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty. My subsequent discussion will look at a learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty against the necessary features of education.

Initiation into received ideas and shared practices

In the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, there is a notion of the higher self and the lower self which in the context of education, implies that the teacher is the learner's higher self while the learner is still operating on the level of the lower self. The task of the teacher as the learner's

higher or true self, is to bring the lower self to understanding and ultimate full rational self-realization becoming one with the true self.

Taking the above interpretation in the educational context, especially in the context of the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, that in it, there is a clear acknowledgement of unequal educational relations which require authority as a condition for the learner's ultimate rational self-realization. So, in this learning situation, the teacher is viewed as knowing what is in the learner's true self-interests, even though the learner may not be aware of them. (The teacher has already been initiated and has knowledge and skills which the learner is yet to acquire). The teacher as an authority in these vital skills and social practices acts and decides in accordance with the dictates of the (rational) true self whereas the learner as yet unfamiliar with these because of lack of experience and understanding, often acts in accordance with the dictates of the unenlightened lower self. But I must argue here that initiation into received ideas and shared practices cannot unproblematically be received by the learner because the learner by virtue of her lack of understanding and ignorance may refuse to submit herself to the teacher's guidance. The teacher then is justified to use his authority to coerce her because she does so in the true rational self of the learner. Berlin, (1969:132-133) seems to confirm this view: "... we recognize that it is possible, and at times justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public health) which they would, if they were more enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not, because they are blind or ignorant ..."

I have argued in this chapter that the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty accepts the notion of unequal education relations between the teacher (as higher self) and the learner (as lower self). I have also argued that these unequal education relations call for the teacher as an authority in traditions and other worthwhile social practices to initiate the learner into them. This means that the teacher as an authority has, as Shalem, (1999:55) puts it, both the "educative authority" which she says is the "authority of the teacher to advance a conceptual shift in the learner", and "the pedagogical authority" which

she argues entails "the teacher's planning and conducting of epistemological labor with a view to bringing the learners into a working relation with the tradition (or segments of it) that informs the curriculum and pedagogy of the classroom ...".

The point I want to make here is that without the teacher as having both the "educative authority" and "the pedagogical authority" referred to above, socialization or initiation into traditions, values and other social practices will not, (contrary to the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty), be possible - which implies that individuation (critical and independent thinking) is unlikely to be reached by the learner - because, as Rorty, (1990:8) has rightly observed, "socialization has to come before individuation, and education for freedom cannot begin before some constraints have been imposed". What this means is that the teacher as a knowledgeable person (a recognized figure of authority), has to initiate or socialize others [learners] into this worthwhile activities before they can become equally competent because, as Perry, (1972:66) says, "The teacher knew [knows] the subject-matter and the reasons for it".

So the argument being developed here is that initiation or socialization into traditions and skills require the teacher as an authority to initiate the learner so that the learner can also become competent - a point which Shalem, (1999:68) notes: "Socialization into the practices of these traditions requires careful epistemological labor by the teacher in order to disclose the object ... in 'the right way', giving it an intelligible place within a wide background of available meanings and social perspectives. Through this epistemological labor a teacher provides a path for the learner to enter into the tradition, to attend to its language ...". This quotation means that without the teacher as an authority in these traditions, the learner cannot "disclose the object" (i.e. cannot understand the subject matter) because the teacher, by virtue of his competence, "provides a path for the learner" - that is, he explains it to the learner in such a way that she can understand it. Coutinho in Freire, (1974:9) supports this view when he says "A key role is therefore to be played by the ... educator, [teacher] whose task is to challenge both the students

and the reality which is to be studied". This question over and above emphasizing the notion of the teacher as a reason-giving authority in this learning situation, implies the role of the teacher as a socializing agent. This argument is understandable if we accept the point that it is the teacher who selects, organizes and structures the tradition which he makes available to the learner - which Shalem, (1999:55) also acknowledges with her discussion of teachers as having both educational and pedagogical authority.

Educational authority and learner trust

I have pointed out that in the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty there is an acknowledgement of unequal epistemological positions between the teacher and the learner because the teacher is an authority, who has already been initiated into traditions, skills and other social practices and the learner is yet to be initiated.

A feature of education is that educational relationships are unequal relationships. This notion then gives the teacher as an authority the responsibility to select, plan and organize the learning material for the learner - a view noted by Shalem, (1999:68) when she says, "To acknowledge that teaching of any kind involves a process of introduction of others into a practice requires acknowledging, too, that this entails a certain kind of social relation among participants in the practice. For this introduction embodies a hidden contract ..." My argument here is that what Shalem says is "a certain kind of social relation among participants in the practice", refers to the unequal educational relations; and what she [Shalem] says is "a hidden contract" denotes the knowledge of traditions and skills which the learner is yet to acquire - and it is the teacher as an authority who knows this "hidden contract" into which he initiates the learner. So, what the learner should do, is to take everything and anything which the teacher imparts on trust because she does not have the competency yet to assess the validity or otherwise of the claims the teacher makes.

This, Dunlop, (1979:52) acknowledges:

Such 'transformation' must require predominantly gemeinschaftlich relations. Even though the general tendency throughout a child's schooling and on into his college or university course will be to admit more and more gesellschaftlich elements as the child gradually rises up to the teacher's level, the change-over can never be complete. He still needs to trust his teachers beyond all reason (since he has as yet no sure 'criteria' by which to 'test' them) and submit to their authority. If he is really to learn from them [teachers] things that he cannot much more easily acquire from a teaching machine, cramming manual or 'Wonder Book of Knowledge', he must continue to look 'up' to them, and they must continue to regard him [learner] as still, to a certain extent, in their charge.

Gemeinschaft-like relationship

In a learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, there is, as I have pointed out, an undebatable unequal educational relations - that is, Gemeinschaft-like relationship as opposed to Gesellschaft-like relationship which I have argued in the previous chapter that it seems to be apparent in the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty. So, in the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, there is a hierarchical relationship which Dunlop, (1979:51-52) says aims to transform,

... 'unpredictable little animals into civilised adults' ... School, for the 'little animals' concerned, is simply 'given' as an irremovable and necessary part of the world. They do not go to it by choice, conscious of their own ignorance and lack of skills, and resolved to work purposively towards their removal, but because it is an ineluctable stage on life's way. If they do not wish to attend they are compelled to. Once at school they look up with trusting reverence, respect and even awe at the strange and important looking adults who are now to direct so much of their lives. Special rules and rituals surround the activities of school and invest everything that happens there with an aura of the serious and the significant.

So, the significance of this hierarchical educational relationship is that it makes the passing over of these traditions and rules possible in this learning situation - the passing over which is difficult to accomplish in situations where the learner is on equal footing with the teacher (i.e. in an association type of a relationship) but rather, in a *Gemeinschaft* relationship.

Education as participation

In the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, there is a notion put forward that the teacher, because of his knowledge, skills and competency in practices, knows, according to Atkinson, (1972:173) "... what he is about, knows not only the rules of procedure but also the reasons for them, and hence knows how to adapt the rules to non-standard conditions" while the learner is not yet. The learner's participation in this situation is, as I have argued in the previous sections of this mini-thesis, only partial (i.e. it is confined to the asking of questions and the answering of questions from the teacher). So socialization in this learning situation, entails over and above the asking and answering of questions, by the learner, working with the concepts, engaging with the ideas, becoming familiar with them through application, exercise, repetition and practice. In other words, learning by doing, by participating in the learning process. However, full meaningful participation occurs when the learner moves into the individuation stage (i.e. the stage when the learner challenges, confronts and questions the very things she has learnt) and is able to act in an informed way in accordance with her higher self.

Education aims at the moral good - a public form of life that binds society together

In the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, there is a notion put forward that the common good is inscribed in the selected traditions and is "transmitted" by the teacher by virtue of his authority. So, the assumption in this learning situation is that the learner cannot on her own discover that which is good, noble and seemly unaided by a knowledgeable teacher. There is, therefore, a logical link with an educational feature in that the teacher plays a vital

role because of his educative authority and pedagogical authority in making these vital aspects (love of truth, justice and the good in general) not only known to the learner, but also living them out in her own actions. In this way he acts as a kind of role model for his learners. Dunlop (1979:51) seems to recognise this notion: "It is right that children should be made to go to school, both for their own and for the common good". The implication here is that without the school [teacher] it will not be possible for learners to be initiated into this "public form of life".

Development of critical reasoning and the process of self-realization

In the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, there is a notion that critical reasoning and rational self-realization are processes which await the learner's initiation into selected traditions, skills and social practices. This view is also accepted by Rorty, (1990:45-46) when he says, "It is not, and never will be, the function of lower-level education to challenge the prevailing consensus about what is true". The implication is that without socialization or initiation, critical reasoning and rational self-realization are impossible. I want to argue here that socialization is neither a random process nor a process that can be done by a person who is out of the practice of education; what I mean by this is that it can only be done by a teacher as a recognised body of authority. This logically weakens the argument in Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty where there is a cherished notion that the learner can become critical and rationally self-realized without the agency of the teacher. So, the notion in this learning situation that the learner depends on the teacher and the significant others for her ultimate freedom in making informed choices, and participating in decision-making through critical reasoning links well with a feature in education that socialization or initiation is basic to the learner's freedom.

There is a further notion in the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty, that the learner who is fully self-realized will be able to freely (rationally) criticize, challenge and change some of the traditions and practices which have nurtured him. This Barrow, (1984:44) confirms: "Finally there is what

I call the capacity for discrimination, by which I mean the ability to think in terms of precise and specific concepts rather than blurred and general ones. The possession of precise and particular concepts gives one discriminatory power by which phrase I refer to the control, manoeuvrability and penetrating power in thought that the ability to make fine discriminations provides". Barrow makes an important observation that the learner has to develop the ability for discrimination (i.e. "the ability to think in terms of precise and specific concepts"). This ability of thinking in "precise and specific concepts", I argue, is a skill of critical reasoning, but one that cannot be possible if the learner has not been socialized. And, the notion brought forward here is also that for thought to become better and the contribution which the learner will ultimately make in the community in question, depends greatly on "The possession of precise and specific concepts"; otherwise the learner cannot be rationally free. This fact Freire and Shor, (1987:91) acknowledge: "Freedom needs authority to be free". What this means is that the freedom of the learner lies in the learner's own fully developed rational higher self or informed critical reasoning which would imbue that learner then with authority. This authority enables the learner to contribute to the store of human knowledge. Shor, in answer to Freire (his fellow participant in dialogue) gives an insight into this notion: "You make me think that the teacher's authority must always be there, but it changes as the students [learners] and the study evolve, as they [learners] emerge as critical subjects in the act of knowing". Freire and Shor, (1987:92) The significance of this quotation lies in its acknowledgement of the importance of socialization especially in the initial stages of education and in the fact that authority or socialization is not static but a process in continual motion up to until the learner's own individuation, or rational self-realization.

Rational self-realization i.e. critical thinking and the ability to make free and informed contributions in a specific community, and to be recognised as a fellow participant in communal practices, Shalem, (1999:68) argues, brings the learner "... into a relationship not only with its contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have preceded us in the practice, particularly those whose achievements extend the reach of the practice to its present point". But this

stage, I have argued cannot be reached by the learner who has been left alone by the teacher as an authority (an expert in knowledge and skills) to make "own discoveries" in learning as it is the case in a learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty.

In Chapter 4, I have depicted a learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty and viewed it against features of education in an attempt to answer the key question in this chapter which is, "Ought dialogical pedagogy to develop in learners a kind of independence based on Negative liberty?" The answer is, No, if we understand independence to mean non-interference in the learner's development because the learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Negative liberty creates an impression that the learner is the teacher's equal, so a fellow learner - a point which Freire and Shor, (1987:92) warn teachers of Dialogical pedagogy against when they say that Dialogical pedagogy "... leads the students [learners] to think that if you are a dialogical teacher you definitely deny the difference between you and them [learners]. All at once, all of us are equal! But, it is not possible". So in response to the above question, Dialogical pedagogy cannot lead to the learner's full independence understood as rational self-realization because of its assumption that the learner is the teacher's equal, which as a result, creates a minimum space for the teacher as an authority in creating and making knowledge available to the learner - instead, in this learning situation, the learner makes her own selection of the content upon which she makes her "own discoveries". In this chapter (i.e. Chapter 5) contrary to Chapter 4, I have depicted a learning situation of Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty which I viewed against features of education. This learning situation I argued, seems to encourage full independence of the learner understood as rational self-realization because it is based on a notion that the teacher-learner relationship is an unequal relationship. This notion is significant in the learning-teaching situation because it creates space for the authority of the teacher, traditions and received ideas. This notion of authority in education is coupled with the acceptance that knowledge does not reside in the individual but rather, in the intellectual community to which the learner ought eventually to

belong. Little surprise then, that the goals of education are determined not by the individual learner in this situation; or by the learner's desires and wishes, but are determined by the community of already rationally self-realized members. So, in answer to the focal question which is, "What kind of independence ought Dialogical pedagogy to develop in learners?" or put differently, "Which concept of liberty best underpins Dialogical pedagogy?". The response is, Dialogical pedagogy based on Positive liberty and viewed against features of education, seems more likely to lead to the independence of the learner if that means rational self-realization.



UNIVERSITY *of the*
WESTERN CAPE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Atkinson, R.F. (1972). Instruction and Indocrination. In Archambault, R.D.D (ed.), *Philosophical Analysis and Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Barnard, C. (1980). Imperialism, Underdevelopment and Education. In Mackie, R. (ed.), *Literacy and Revolution: The Pedagogy of Paulo Freire*. London: Pluto Press.
- Barrow, R. (1984). The Philosophy of Schooling. London: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd.
- Bee, B. (1980). The Politics of Literacy. In Mackie, R. (ed.), *Literacy and Revolution: The Pedagogy of Paulo Freire*. London: Pluto Press.
- Berlin, I. (1969). *Four Essays on Liberty*. London: OUP.
- Brauner, C.J. & Burns, H.W. (1965). *Problems in Education and Philosophy*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall.
- Connolly, R. (1980). Freire, Praxis and Education. In Mackie, R. (ed.), *Literacy and Revolution: The Pedagogy of Paulo Freire*. London: Pluto Press.
- Dearden, R.F. (1970). Instruction and learning by discovery. In Peters R.S. (ed.), *The Concept of Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Dunlop, F. (1979). On the democratic organisation of schools. In *Cambridge Journal of Education*, Vol.9. pp43 - 54.

- Eliot, T.S. (1974). *Collected Poems, 1909 - 1962*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Elloway, D.R. (ed.) (1979). *Julius Caesar*. London: Macmillan Education.
- Flanagan, W. et al (1994). *Vintage Kenton. A Kenton Education Association Commemoration*. Cape Town: Maskew Longman.
- Freire, P. (1974). *Cultural Action for Freedom*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Freire, P. (1985). *Education as The Practice of Freedom*. London: Sheed & Ward.
- Freire, P. (1986). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. London: The Chaucer Press.
- Freire, P. & Shor, I. (1987). *A Pedagogy for Liberation (Dialogues on Transforming Education)*. New York: Macmillan Education.
- Giroux, H.A. (1981). *Ideology, Culture and the Process of Schooling*. Hampshire: Taylor & Francies.
- Hayden, J.O. (ed.) (1977). *William wordsworth The Poems, Vol. 1*. London: The Chaucer Press.
- Hornby, A.S. (1986). *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Kilian, C.J.G. & Viljoen, T.A. (1974). *Fundamental Pedagogics and Fundamental Structures*. Durban: Butterworths.
- Kohli, W. (ed.) (1995). *Conversation in Philosophy of Education*. London: Routledge.
- Mackie, R. (ed.) (1980). *Literacy and Revolution: The Pedagogy of Paulo Freire*. London: Pluto Press.
- Matthews, M. (1980). Knowledge, Action and Power. In Mackie, R. (ed), *Literacy and Revolution: The Pedagogy of Paulo Freire*. London: Pluto Press.
- Mohlala, S.J. (1990). *Pedagogic Love and Educational Occurrence: A study in Philosophy of Education*. University of the North: Unpublished Masters Thesis.
- Molteno, F. (1991). The Historical Foundations of the schooling of Black South Africans. In Kallaway, P. (ed.), *Apartheid in Education*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Morrow, W. (1989). *Chains of Thought*. Johannesburg: Southern Books.
- Nekhwevha, F. (1997). *Freire Contra Foucault: The conception of knowledge and the impossibility of liberation*. Conference paper presented at Kenton-at-the-Gap, Hermanus.

- Passmore, J. (1970). On teaching to the critical. In Peters R.S. (ed.), *The Concept of Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Perry, L.R. (1972). What is an educational situation? In Archambault, R.D.D (ed.), *Philosophical Analysis and Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Peters, R.S. (1972). Education as initiation. In Archambault, R.D.D (ed.), *Philosophical Analysis and Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Rorty, R. (1990). Education without dogma. *Dialogue*, 88(2): 44 - 47.
- Shalem, Y. (1999). Epistemological labor: the way to significant pedagogical authority: *Educational Theory* 49(1): 53-70.
- Soal, S.M. (1993). *Caring in education*. University of the Western Cape, Unpublished Masters Thesis.
- Smith, R. & Griffiths, M. (1989). Standing alone, dependence, independence and interdependence in the practice of education. Conference paper, Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, Oxford.
- Strike, K. (1982). *Liberty and Learning*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
- Taylor, C. (1985). *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Tonnies, F. (1955). *Community and Association*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Watt, J. (1989). *Individualism and Educational Theory*. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers: London.



UNIVERSITY *of the*
WESTERN CAPE