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MA Philosophy (Structured)

Personal Identity and Practicalities: Can non-reductionist theories  
guide our practical issues?

A mini thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, submitted to the Department of Philosophy, University of the Western Cape.

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
I, Brandon John Emile Martin, hereby declare that *Personal identity and Practicalities: Can non-reductionist theories guide our practical issues?* is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or assessment in any other university, and that all sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

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*Abstract:*

Non-reductionist theories of personal identity have become less popular than they once were. However, they are quick to discuss the implications of their theories on real problems, such as abortion, head transplants and other practical concerns. As I will go on to argue, I think they are too quick. I aim to show that non-reductionist theories cannot offer adequate guidance on our practical concerns, or if they do, they are severely limited in the kinds of guidance they can provide since their theories are compromised at either the metaphysical or logical level. Instead, I suggest that these theories focus on strengthening their positions before we can take their guidance seriously.

Keywords: Personal Identity, Non-reductionist theories, Reductionist theories, Practical guidance, Metaphysics, Person preserving procedures, Parfit, Qualitative identity, Numerical identity.



# Chapter 1

In the following paper, I hope to achieve a few crucial aims. Most importantly, I wish to show that non-reductionist theories of personal identity are not in an excellent position to advise us on what to do when it comes to practical issues. Advice informed by non-reductionist theories of personal identity ought to be looked upon with scepticism. I think this is the case mainly because non-reductionist theories, as I see it, suffer from an intractable issue. Not all non-reductionist theories do this; however, the theories I will discuss here make the mistake of taking their metaphysics for granted. In other words, the non-reductionist theories I will deal with argue from metaphysical fantasy, and because anything, or nearly anything, is metaphysically possible, these theories often forget to take the laws and rules in the actual world seriously. This will be my main argument. I will rely heavily on personal identity debates and the link between metaphysics and practical issues. In this thesis, I will first outline the central theories in the personal identity debate and how they have developed over time. Next, I will briefly outline the metaphysics and conceptual analysis that will be important for my purposes. For the issue of metaphysics, I will rely on Frank Jackson's work in his book *From Metaphysics to Ethics* (1998). Two theorists, Kevin Jung and Reneé Mirkes, argue for a non-reductionist view of personal identity and warn the scientific, medical, and philosophical community about the dangers of performing procedures that claim to be person-preserving. In their view, these procedures may *actually* result in ordinary death. Their views of personal identity heavily inform the claim they make here. However, I want to show that these views are mere metaphysical fantasies; hence, they cannot reliably guide what is and is not the case in practical issues.

I will summarise the debates on personal identity and Jackson's metaphysics in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I will present the arguments made by Mirkes and Jung. In Chapter 4, I will argue against Mirkes and Jung. Finally, in Chapter 5, I will conclude this thesis and summarise my thoughts.

# Chapter 2

In this chapter, I provide the context from which my thesis stems. Hence, this will be a short review of the positions in personal identity debates. This context is essential as I will refer to specific theories, such as the embodied mind theory or Animalism, in my arguments; this chapter should briefly describe each of these views for easier reading. The chapter also aims to locate and position the individuals and theories I argue against. This will help the reader understand how much traction these competing theories are receiving and give an idea of the kinds of arguments my opponents might make. I will detail the specific arguments I will be engaged with in a later chapter.

Since the kinds of arguments presented by my opponents rely heavily on metaphysics, it will also be valuable to frame how metaphysical theories can influence theories in personal identity debates and the practical world more generally. For this, I will rely on Frank Jackson's work.

## Personal Identity

Turning first to the personal identity debate, contemporary discussions on personal identity stem from Locke, who wrote, "...it [is] the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself; personal identity depends on that only..." (Locke, 1999, p. 320). This inspired many neo-Lockean views, championed by individuals such as Parfit (1984), McMahan (2010) and Campbell (2010). Generally, those in the neo-Lockean camp defend various psychological continuity theories. These argue that memory, or continuity of one's mental content, is essential for personal identity. Some, such as Olson (1997) and Snowdon (2010), argue against neo-Lockean views. They defend various physical continuity theories - the view that the continuity of one's body or physical properties is essential for personal identity.

Both views I describe above are reductionist, arguing that persons and their identities can be reduced to specific facts about them. These two views disagree about which facts personal identity and our persistence can be reduced to. Conversely, the non-reductionist view argues that persons and their identities cannot be reduced to particular facts about individuals. Generally, this view holds that a person is an immaterial entity, a soul or a Cartesian ego. Personal identity is a separate fact, over and above any physical or psychological facts. They claim that identity is always determinate and need not be grounded in observable facts. Hence,

there may be a fact about identity, but one we cannot discover. Contemporary defenders of such a view are Jung and Mirkes. Some of the earliest accounts of a non-reductionist view stem back to Plato, Descartes and Leibniz. There are other views on personal identity, but I will limit my discussion to these most influential views for my thesis.

There is much debate between these competing views of personal identity, with no clear consensus on which view is correct; however, non-reductionist views are distinctly less popular than they once were. Arguments in each camp primarily consist of refuting competing views via thought experiments. These arguments rely on hypothetical or actual scenarios, where theories are subject to evaluation. Generally, these cases will elicit intuitions about the topic of interest. We can test to what extent these intuitions hold through philosophical arguments and potentially more thought experiments. Locke, for example, asks us to imagine a prince and a cobbler. He describes the prince's soul, consciousness and memories entering the body of a cobbler. He concludes that the person who appears as the cobbler is now the prince in the cobbler's body (Locke, 1999). This hypothetical case reveals our intuition about personal identity and how our concept may function. The intuition being: where one's soul and consciousness go, so goes personal identity. This also highlights how the persistence of persons is discussed in personal identity debates; Locke later concludes that "...personal identity consists... in the identity of consciousness..." (Locke, 1999, p. 326).

Since Locke, debates in the personal identity space have become much more robust. Historically, personal identity theories have heavily relied on one's metaphysics and a given culture's ideas of the self. For example, Western, European and Ancient Greek ideas about personal identity were influenced by religious and cultural views such as a person being/having a soul or some entity beyond physical and psychological facts. This may have been a critical reason for the development and popularity of non-reductionist views. More recently, personal identity theories have become informed by and intimately linked with biological, medical and scientific inquiry. For example, Olson's view that we are essentially a human animal takes the biology and evolution of humans as a species seriously and locates personal identity within biological traits. Similarly, Parfit's view that we are not essentially human beings takes biological and medical facts seriously to argue that personal identity is located within our psychology.

Olson has a biological approach to personal identity. He argues that psychological continuity is not necessary or sufficient for human animals (or persons) to persist through time as such a

theory commits us to complicated problems. A foetus, for example, lacks any mental capacities before the cerebrum becomes active, which is quite late after conception (the third trimester). The psychological view requires that for person x at time t to be the same person as person y at time t', that person x and y are psychologically continuous with each other. Therefore, from a psychological point of view, no person exists before the activation of their cerebrum since there is no psychological content to be continuous with. Hence, a foetus is not a person (Olson, 1997).

This complicates things for defenders of the psychological view; there appears to be a progression from a foetus to a human animal and then to a psychological person. However, while the foetus seems to become a human animal, it is not clear that the human animal becomes a psychological person. Instead, the psychological person and the human-animal appear to co-exist. Hence, when the psychological person has a thought, the human animal also seems to have that same thought. This is known as the 'too many thinkers' problem: for each thought, there are two thinkers, the human animal and the psychological person. Additionally, this also poses an epistemic problem. If two thinkers are thinking the same thoughts, which of the thinkers am I? There seems to be no reliable way to find out. Moreover, there is a third problem. Human animals satisfy Locke's definition of persons as rational, self-conscious beings. In addition to the psychological person, there is another person. This is the problem of too many persons (Parfit, 2012). Olson concludes that a biological view is preferable because of these issues. A person is just a phase of a biological life (or of some biological lives). This view also seems to solve many of the abovementioned problems: a foetus becomes a human animal and eventually a person; the human animal thinks, so there are not too many thinkers and hence no epistemic problem. Finally, the Lockean definition would only apply to one person instead of two.

However, the biological view still has serious problems to confront. One of the biggest problems for Olson's view is what he calls the thinking parts problem. It arises when considering thought experiments or procedures such as head/brain/cerebrum transplants. In these procedures, actual or hypothetical, it is a common intuition that if my head survives, I survive; this is known as the transplant intuition. Here, the biological and psychological views appear to agree with each other. However, as I mentioned, the head can be divided into many parts. Animalists like Olson believe that the brain stem is essential for personal identity (Olson, 1997), while some psychological theorists believe that what is necessary is the cerebrum or

psychological content beyond one's physical brain (Parfit, 1987). However, if we were to separate my cerebrum from my body and artificially support it to function as usual, the artificially supported cerebrum would also meet the Lockean criteria for being a person. Still, it does not meet the requirements to be a human animal. The animalist would then have to explain how one person has become two separate persons or how parts of one's body when detached, can be persons. Olson concedes that there seems to be no clear solution to this problem.

There are, however, psychological theories that deal with this issue. McMahan defends a version of embodied part views, the position that we are embodied parts of human animals. He specifically argues that we are embodied minds of human animals. This is the embodied mind view (McMahan, 2002). In this view, there is no thinking parts problem. When the cerebrum is separated from the human animal, the embodied mind theorist can say that the embodied mind has now been separated from the human animal. However, this view also has problems. One objection is that minds do not have physical properties like arms and legs, though it seems clear that I do have these properties. This is what is known as the 'physical properties' objection.

Parfit argues for a slightly different view, that we are not embodied minds of human animals, but that we are embodied persons, in the Lockean sense, of human animals (Parfit, 2012). This distinction allows us to keep both claims that we are embodied parts of human animals, namely, the Lockean person, while also having physical properties such as arms and legs. Parfit notes that if we are Lockean persons embodied by a human animal, it is in such a way that we are closely related to the rest of the animal's body so that we can interact with the physical world with a physical body (Parfit, 2012). Parfit's embodied person's view is what I take to be the most plausible version of the reductionist theory. If we look at the problems discussed earlier, we can see that Parfit's embodied person view can account for all of them. Let us look at the issues we ran into—first, the Foetus problem. Parfit can say that the biological organism and the embodied person are intimately connected, so specific biological requirements must be established before the embodied person can continue to develop. If we think about the issues that arose from the Foetus problem, namely the too many thinkers' problem, the epistemic problem, and the too many persons problem, we will see that each issue is resolved. There is only one thinker, the embodied person. Therefore, there is no epistemic problem: the animal is only a biological entity without the embodied person. Furthermore, the thinking parts problem

and the issue of creating a person via detachment also fall away, as the only thinking part is the embodied person. Because Parfit's view here has the most explanatory power it is preferable to other reductionist theories of personal identity.

Debates among non-reductionist views are not nearly as vigorous as those in the reductionist camp. For example, Jung and Mirkes appear to not be in competition with each other about the specifics of their view. Instead, they seem to hold numerical identity and/or a further fact separate from physical and psychological properties as paramount to their view. In their view, the specifics of this further fact are negotiable. However, modern non-reductionists do not seem to debate what this further fact is. They appear to be satisfied if some further fact is envisaged. Furthermore, instead of dealing with criticisms lodged at numerical identity and the claim to a further fact, they attempt to reconcile these issues by connecting consciousness or mental activity as an essential feature of immaterial substances. Jung, for example, relies on metaphysics and the possibility of a further fact to deter us from procedures that claim to be person-preserving (Jung, 2020). While he is correct to say that there is a metaphysical possibility for non-reductionism, I believe that it explicitly ignores logical criticisms against the non-reductionist view that are made, for example, by Parfit (1987) and other philosophers. If we look at other personal identity theories, such as Schechtman's Person Life View, which suggests that 'person' is a cluster concept, she explicitly aims to deal with some of the issues found in popular reductionist and non-reductionist views, like the view that psychological continuity theories give us no reason to have special concern for one's future (Schechtman, 2014).

As per my discussion above, debates in the non-reductionist camp are few. Additionally, the non-reductionist view has fallen out of general favour. If Mirkes, Jung, and other theorists want to defend a non-reductionist approach, they should show why their theories sufficiently deal with the abovementioned problems. I am sure that the non-reductionist will be able to present arguments in favour of their view. However, I have noticed that the non-reductionists have a bigger problem: justifying one's metaphysics. It is reasonable to entertain metaphysical possibilities; non-reductionists do well here. However, I find that these theories have substantial trouble in moving from the metaphysical possibility of their theories to a more fleshed-out argument in the logical or actual way things are. Because I think this is a crucial issue – I will spend some time here to delve into Frank Jackson's work in his book *From*

*Metaphysics to Ethics* (1998), as I think here is where the non-reductionist arguments can be enhanced to better compete with the reductionist views.

### Metaphysics, conceptual analysis, and ethics

Metaphysics is a vast field concerned with the fundamental nature of reality. One of the main talking points within metaphysical debates is that of conceptual analysis, which asks what kinds of truths we can derive from language or concepts. Are there such things as fundamental conceptual truths? For several years, conceptual analysis has been stagnant, mainly due to criticisms of the *a priori* method advanced by Quine and Putnam and the rise of modern science. Recently, however, theorists such as Jackson (1998) and Bealer (1987), among others, have given new life to conceptual analysis debates. Some theorists argue that conceptual analysis is essential for many intellectual activities, while others hold that it may only be valuable for the distinctive subject matter within philosophy. I wish to use these debates to highlight the conceptual flaws found in the non-reductionist views of personal identity and suggest that if non-reductionist theories are problematic at the metaphysical or logical level, they are also severely limited in the practical guidance they could offer.

As I mentioned previously, there is a firm reliance on metaphysical views in Mirkes' and Jung's accounts. Therefore, I think it will be helpful to present some background on metaphysical views and how they can inform our practical issues. For this, I will rely heavily on Frank Jackson's work in *From Metaphysics to Ethics*, where he argues that metaphysics is central to understanding and enriching our ethical concepts. Hence, he defends that metaphysics and practical concerns, viz ethics, are intimately linked (Jackson, 1998). This claim or body of argument could help non-reductionists like Mirkes and Jung strengthen their arguments, as their claims rely on metaphysical views. This is why it is essential to understand Jackson's view.

Jackson observes that conceptual analysis has been ridiculed extensively. His project is a defence of conceptual analysis. Jackson argues that some of the reasons why conceptual analysis has fallen out of favour are due to misunderstandings of the nature of conceptual analysis. When properly understood, Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is familiar to everyone and that without it, we would not be able to address a range of important questions (Jackson, 1998).

Before Jackson can defend conceptual analysis, he aims to lay a foundation for understanding metaphysics more generally. In his first Chapter, Jackson focuses on the interconnected topics of metaphysics, supervenience, and conceptual analysis. Jackson introduces us to what he calls *serious* metaphysics, the location problem, entry by entailment, and supervenience. I will go into each of these briefly.

As Jackson describes it, I want to present the location problem as it lays the foundation for how Jackson engages with other arguments and topics. The location problem, in short, aims to capture how language locates notions and excludes others within a larger conceptual framework (Jackson, 1998, p. 4). This problem deals with how the referents of our language are accurately picked out and understood by others. Jackson argues that when we use language to describe anything, such as the best place to see a movie or the cheapest lightbulb store in the area, we draw conceptual lines of separation that can be mapped onto the real world. These lines separate the many things that do not fit the notions in our language and “locate” the notions necessary for our purposes. This is important for what Jackson describes as “serious metaphysics” because if we can use language to locate and separate simple notions like “best grocery store”, then we should be able to map out metaphysical, logical, and other notions. Jackson emphasises these notions being “simple” in that they are basic or can capture other, perhaps more complex notions. The key takeaway is that language can be used for deep philosophical inquiry and simple everyday chatter; the two practices, as Jackson argues, are very similar.

Turning to serious metaphysics, Jackson notes, “Metaphysics is about what there is and what it is like” (Jackson, 1998, p. 4). Metaphysicians seek a comprehensive (or holistic) account of some subject matter, using a limited number of more or less basic notions. However, Jackson notes that this is often confused with what metaphysicians do in practice - that metaphysicians make the mistake of drawing up lists about what there is and what it is like. Here, he relies on John Searle’s objection that the argument between dualism and monism is absurd. Searle argues that the Dualists claim that there are two kinds of things, while the monists claim that there is only one, but the mistake here is to start counting at all (Searle, 1992, as cited by Jackson, 1998, p. 4). Searle’s point is that there are so many known and unknown things that any attempt to account for all of it is mistaken in principle. When practised this way, metaphysics becomes nothing more than drawing up lists.

Jackson agrees with Searle for the most part. However, he is more hopeful in his conclusions. Jackson has a solution to the drawing-up lists problem. Instead of abandoning metaphysics, he suggests limiting the number of things found on the lists we draw up. This is only the first step. The way we can restrict the list is to acknowledge that some aspects on a list can be described, or are entailed, by more basic elements on the list. For example, suppose Individual A is taller than Individual B. In that case, we do not need to add this fact to our list as simply detailing Individual A's, and Individual B's heights will entail that Individual A is, in fact, taller than Individual B. Jackson's point is that we can make similar claims about metaphysics.

Because our list will be limited, some facts about our metaphysics will not appear explicitly in our more basic account. However, this is not a problem as long as we can prove that those features will appear implicitly in our account of what there is and what it is like. Jackson sums this section up by saying that this is what serious metaphysics has to do; it is discriminatory while claiming to be complete, constantly identifying features of our world that must either be located or eliminated (Jackson, 1998, p. 5).

Jackson argues that our limited list of ingredients can implicitly entail more complex facts. He calls this the Entry by Entailment Thesis. If he is correct, then psychological phenomena can be accounted for in the physical description of the world if our physicalist metaphysics entails psychological phenomena. The issue here is whether any characterisation of the physical will entail psychological phenomena. First, Jackson wants to clarify what "physicalism" means and argues against ill-defined claims, as he finds this objection apparent rather than real. For example, Jackson argues that it is trivial to say that physicalism is ill-defined because our current sciences are incomplete. A "complete" science/physicalist picture would have everything needed to prove physicalism true. However, since we have no idea what the perfect future science will look like, our physicalist metaphysics will always be indeterminate. Jackson argues that the inadequacy of science is simply a reality that we need to accept; however, despite its inadequacies, we can be hopeful that science will provide us with enough information to be confident of the kinds of properties and relationships out there to give us a complete account of non-sentient reality. Hence, physicalism as a thesis can appeal to the success of micro-explanations for macroscopic phenomena. For example, the physicalist can explain how to make a fire by explaining the atomic process of making a fire. While the exact level of micro-explanations will be challenging to identify, physicalists can claim that kinds of

properties and relationships below a specific size are enough to account for everything (Jackson, 1998, pp. 6-7).

According to Jackson, we have the correct tools to move from the physical to the psychological. However, it is not enough to say that one entails the other; the claim that psychological phenomena can be accounted for in physical terms will need substantial justification, and this is precisely what Jackson offers us with his theory of Supervenience. Jackson argues that Physicalism can be seen simply as the claim that if you duplicate our world in all physical respects, you duplicate it in all respects, or as Jackson puts it:

(B) Any world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world.

(Jackson 1998, p 12)

This means that if we were to take the fundamental physical properties of our world, those that make it our world and duplicate only these physical properties, if physicalism is true, then the fundamental physical duplicate of our world will be a duplicate in every respect. Note here that “in every respect” entails psychological phenomena. In other words, if we had world A and world A’ which is an exact copy of each other in all physical respects, these two worlds would be duplicates simpliciter. (Jackson, 1998, p. 13).

Jackson notes that when he uses the description denoting the physical properties of our world, he means it so that our language can accurately capture those physical properties and aspects. In other words, he uses language in an ideal sense, not how our language is currently constructed. This way, we can do away with any objections that we will never be able to accurately capture what a ‘minimal physical copy’ would entail.

This brings us to the crux of Jackson’s project: conceptual analysis. Jackson holds that the discussion above is precisely what conceptual analysis is: “addressing when and whether a story told in one vocabulary is made true by one told in some allegedly more fundamental vocabulary” (Jackson, 1998, p. 28). In other words, conceptual analysis is utilising language to find truths, metaphysical or otherwise, in a very limited or basic sense. I do not think Jackson’s definition here is groundbreaking, as many philosophers on either end of the conceptual analysis debate would agree to a definition like this. The real discussion is around the

usefulness of conceptual analysis. One of the most prominent objections to conceptual analysis is to argue against its ability to deliver *a priori* truths (Jackson, 1998, p. 47). For example, some would say that our metaphysics, or truths more generally, must include *a posteriori* elements. To use an example from earlier, if those in opposition to conceptual analysis are correct, then we can never move from the physicalist picture of the world to the psychological by only knowing the physicalist picture alone, viz that we cannot do so *a priori*. The psychological picture must be known *a posteriori*. However, Jackson disagrees with this line of argument and explains that this is a linguistic phenomenon rather than a logical problem. He means that our language is such that it creates an apparent problem in our reasoning that is not there. He argues that while our language is intended to represent, it does not do so perfectly. Perhaps our ideal language would be able to, but this is something that we do not have access to. However, when we have different linguistic terms, they could still point to the same reference. Jackson uses the examples “H<sub>2</sub>O” and “Water” to make this point. While these are two different linguistic terms, they both point to the same referent that our language attempts to capture, or they would if “H<sub>2</sub>O” and “Water” pick out the same referent in the actual or hypothetical worlds. Therefore, the issue lies in linguistics, not the *a priori* process. Hence, we do not need an *a posteriori* evaluation to know that “H<sub>2</sub>O” and “Water” play the same role (Jackson, 1998, pp. 81-83).

As we can see, Jackson does a lot of mental gymnastics to save conceptual analysis. Still, many of these arguments are theoretical, which does not give Jackson’s arguments the weight he seeks. In turn, Jackson attempts to bring his arguments for conceptual analysis to the practical world by solving the location problem for ethics. In Chapter 5 of his project, Jackson presents how ethical properties are accounted for in our descriptive/physicalist picture of the world. Jackson begins by establishing cognitivism, the view that moral sentences have truth value (Jackson, 1998, pp. 113-114). This is to say that when someone claims that “Murder is wrong”, they are making a claim about the nature or ethical properties of murder and that the claim can be either true or false. Jackson concedes that cognitivism is an assumption that he will be working off; he does not disregard non-cognitive positions completely but takes cognitivism to be more likely to be true than non-cognitivist views.

Jackson begins solving the location problem for ethics by establishing cognitivism and then arguing that, for the cognitivist, terms like “right” or “immoral” are words that claim how things are in the world. Now the question is, what basic notion are we representing when we say “right” or “immoral”? We could argue that our understanding of “moral” and “immoral”

here would be dependent on the metaethics we wish to employ; however, for Jackson, there is a much simpler and more encompassing “metaethics” that we can rely on for our purposes. That of “Folk theory”. Folk Theory is the metaethics that accurately describes the ethical intuitions of the folk or population more generally (Jackson, 1998, p. 130). This is not to say that our metaethics are subject to bandwagon justification. Instead, the folk theory on ethical principles does reference a more fundamental concept when referring to ethical principles. If this is the case, and our limited list will be physical, then we can reasonably say that moral properties supervene on descriptive ones. Hence, if we want to discover the world's ethical properties, we can identify those basic descriptive properties. Jackson posits his supervenience thesis for ethical properties as follows.

S: For all  $w$  and  $w'$ , if  $w$  and  $w'$  are exactly alike descriptively, then they are exactly alike ethically.

(Jackson, 1998, p 119)

Jackson makes a brief argument detailing why it is essential to argue from supervenience versus arguing from metaphysical fantasy. Some may want to do away with a critical premise of Jackson's argument, cognitivism, altogether, and the way they might do so is to say that this is an argument from metaphysical fantasy. Jackson quickly argues against this; for him, what makes our supervenience thesis plausible is that we ought to evaluate the kinds of properties instantiated. The importance of Supervenience is that it shows why cognitivists should identify ethical properties with descriptive ones independently of their metaphysical views. In other words, you would have no good reason to accept the supervenience of the psychological on the physical unless you held particular metaphysical views, i.e., Physicalism. However, the supervenience of ethics on the descriptive happens before metaphysics (Jackson, 1998, p. 128). As Jackson notes, it only tells us what ethical properties may be out there via our ethical language. It has no say on which properties are “actually” instantiated.

There is an important point I want to make related to Jackson's overall argument and his emphasis on Physicalism. Physicalism plays a significant role in Jackson's arguments. Hence, one may be tempted to argue that if Physicalism were false, we may have grounds to dismiss Jackson's arguments. However, I want to point out that Jackson's project is not committed to the truth of physicalism, or at the very least, there is still a valuable lesson to be learned about conceptual analysis even if we cannot prove physicalism to be true, regardless of the role it has to play in Jackson's arguments. At the beginning of his project, Jackson notes that our

metaphysics is central to understanding and enriching our ethical concepts and vice-versa. What I take to be valuable from this is the methodology and arguments made by Jackson and how they can work vice-versa, rather than the truth of Physicalism itself. When Jackson solves the location problem for ethics, there is an emphasis on the descriptive nature of the world. As Jackson puts it, the descriptive picture of the world and our ethical claims come from it before metaphysics. As I see it, Jackson presents us with two sets of arguments - the first takes metaphysics as its starting point and another picture that takes our descriptive, or nomological world, as the starting point. However, the methodology used is the same, namely conceptual analysis.


While we may be able to presuppose metaphysical views without much pushback, presupposing the facts of the nomological world can mostly be verified and tested, independent of philosophical argument. Importantly, when our nomological picture of the world contradicts our metaphysical picture, we need to address this contradiction by arguing the contradiction to be merely apparent or by doing away with the view or element of a view that is most likely false. It could be that the nomological picture contains this false element. Still, given the testability of many of our nomological views, it may be more likely that the false element lies within metaphysics. Hence, we can make the necessary adjustments, wherever those adjustments need to be made, to produce a more complete and accurate picture of our metaphysics and our nomological views. Again, this process will be well supported by conceptual analysis.

I believe that Jackson would readily accept that we need to do away with physicalism if the putative features of our nomological world were such that they directly contradict physicalism as a metaphysical thesis. The point here is that while metaphysics has *a priori* aspects, it has other aspects that are not immune to the findings of science or the nomological world. For example, if we want to accept our metaphysical position of Physicalism and we run into a psychological problem, let us say the problem of psychosis, our metaphysics would entail that something has gone wrong in the physical picture that is causing or contributing to, our psychological phenomena, namely psychosis. It is important to note that the point here is also made *a priori*. I can spell it out in a different way. If Physicalism is true, then any event of psychosis must be caused by physical aspects. This argument happens independently of our *a posteriori* inquiry. Metaphysics has a conceptual component where we can work out what putative features of reality our words commit us to. My example above commits us to psychosis

being caused by physical elements. A more detailed description could be added here, such as chemical imbalances in the brain, but “physical elements” should be adequate for now. However, metaphysics also has a component where we either locate those features in reality or eliminate them, as Jackson points out with the location problem. Hence, when we locate our notion of psychosis, we need to explain how our metaphysical picture entails psychosis; if we cannot, we either need to eliminate our notion or modify our metaphysics.

As we can see from Jackson’s arguments, if he is correct, there is an important link between metaphysics and ethics. However, Jackson shows that we may not have the tools to link a specific metaphysic to our ethical properties properly; it may be the case that our language will always be a limiting factor in discovering the truth about moral properties. However, if there is something to be learned from Jackson, there is hope for such a project as long as we can utilise conceptual analysis.

With this foundational chapter out of the way, I hope the reader will be in a position to understand some central issues discussed in personal identity debates and how metaphysics can inform ethical concepts. This chapter only lays the groundwork for the arguments to come, those I put forward, and the theorists I argue against. In the next chapter, I will present arguments from Jung and Mirkes for a non-reductionist view of personal identity.

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# Chapter 3

This chapter presents Mirkes' and Jung's arguments against procedures and technologies that claim to be person-preserving. Each theorist goes about arguing for their position in different ways. There are, however, essential ways in which their views are similar. One way is that both theorists find a reductionist account of personal identity problematic while finding a non-reductionist view more plausible. More specifically, both theorists take issue with the psychological criterion of identity. Here, I want to summarise each theorist's position before going into the details of their arguments.

Mirkes argues that head transplants ought never to be done because:

1. These transplants would ignore the salient duties and responsibilities of the American medical research community.
2. They would corrupt the head transplant recipient's family lineage and marital unity.
3. They would annihilate the personal identity and dignity of the head transplanter.

For this paper, I will be engaging with her third objection. Here, she outlines her preferred non-reductionist view of personal identity, that each person is a body-soul unity. Central to her view is the Thomistic principle of ensoulment, where a particular soul can only be annexed to a specific body (Mirkes, 2018). Consequently, head transplants would then result in the death of a person rather than their preservation. Hence, such procedures ought never to be done.

As for Jung, he attempts to make a case for a non-reductionist view of personal identity. He notes that his position is compatible with Christian principles as a bonus and opposes psychological criteria of personal identity. He holds that the psychological criterion, in its various forms, suffers from intractable problems. Hence, the alternative he puts forward, a non-reductionist view, should be preferred. He opens his discussion with the question, "What should Christians think about the idea that we may someday outlive our original bodies by transferring our memories or brain states to other bodies or computers?" (Jung, 2020, p. 95). Here, he is directly concerned with procedures that claim to be "person preserving", such as head/brain/cerebrum transplants, cryopreservation, etc. He argues that seeing these procedures as person-preserving assumes some form of the psychological criterion of personal identity, and that personal identity is transferable. Moreover, since, according to Jung, these theories

have interminable problems, we ought to be sceptical about the person preserving nature of such technologies and procedures.

As I see it, Both Jung and Mirkes have a shared aim in showing that these supposedly person-preserving technologies and procedures are not person-preserving at all or that we should be sceptical of them at the very least. Similarly, they both attempt to undermine this thesis with a non-reductionist picture of personal identity, or they find reductionist views problematic and present a non-reductionist view as an alternative - one that undermines the validity of apparent person-preserving procedures. I see this as their "advice": "Do not go through with these supposedly person-preserving procedures."

### Arguments from Mirkes

Let us first turn to Mirkes. In her case, she offers three levels of analysis in objection to supposedly person-preserving procedures. The first is the medical research level. The second is the sociological level, and lastly, the individual level, where she relies on theories of personal identity. It is this third level that I will engage with.

Mirkes asks: "On the individual level, what are the salient moral objections substantiating American philosophical/theological rejection of Ren and Canavero's request to perform the first human head transplant in the U.S.?" (Mirkes, 2018, p. 166). She first makes the point that every human person is a "body-soul unity" (Mirkes, 2018, p. 166). She states that a person does not own or use their body in the way that an embodied person theorist may argue. She argues that a person is their body, but again, not in the way a biological theorist may say. She explains that people do not experience themselves in a dualist fashion, as a body in some location and soul in another, but that persons are consciously aware of themselves as a unified whole - "a single being composed of two inextricably linked dimensions - one bodily, the other spiritual" (Mirkes, 2018, p. 166). She takes this to be an embodied human being whose spirit, or personhood, is revealed through their body and actions (Mirkes, 2018).

However, she claims that the sum of these parts is not enough for personal identity to hold. There must be something more that explains why persons exist. She emphasises the soul and its ability to give substantial unity and define a person's unique body-soul identity (Mirkes, 2018). This claim is essential, and it is ultimately what makes her position non-reductionist. She claims that persons cannot be reduced to a combination of soul and body but that each

body-soul unity must also hold uniquely. When the soul leaves the body of a person, the unique body-soul unity dissolves. Important to note here is that Mirkes says nothing about what the dissolving of the unique body-soul unity means for theological views, for example, that I will continue to exist as an immaterial substance after my death. This is important for her to clarify since it appears to be her defending view. I will say more on this in my arguments against her view. The critical point here is that according to Mirkes, during surgical decapitation, a necessary step in head transplant procedures, the body and soul are separated. Hence, the source of one's personal identity, the unique body-soul unity, is disrupted (Mirkes, 2018).

She argues that a person's soul gives substantial unity to their being and defines their unique body-soul identity (Mirkes, 2018). In other words, the property that makes a body-soul relationship unique is found in the soul rather than in a person's biology or psychological content. She points out that a particular person functions as a human organism, with the brain acting as a primary organiser by the soul. The point is that any unique body-soul unit will die or stop functioning as an integrated organism when the soul and body are separated (Mirkes, 2018). Mirkes argues that soul and body must never separate for the person's identity to be retained and that a person's identity is not only a combination of these two entities. This is another way of arguing for a non-reductionist view of personal identity to make the point more understandable. People cannot be reduced to specific facts about them, but they are ultimately something over and above those facts. Notice in her account that the separate parts of a soul-body unit are not enough to constitute personal identity alone. The body-soul unity must also hold uniquely. Such a thesis implies that personal identity is always determinate, an all-or-nothing affair. Mirkes does consider the possibility that in the case of a head transplant, new body-soul units would suffice for personal identity to be retained. She, however, dismisses this possibility by appealing to a Thomistic metaphysics of Form, Ensoulment, and Hominization.

For Aquinas, humans are essentially composite unified beings of form and matter. Form (or Soul) gives any instance of matter defining qualities and does not exist separate from matter. Aquinas defines three types of form: vegetative, found in plants; sensitive, found in animals and human beings; and intellective, found only in human beings. Vegetative form endows with the powers of life, nutrition, and growth. The sensitive form endows sensation, imagination, and awareness of particular objects. The intellective form endows rational thought and requires human biological powers to function correctly in the intellective form. Aquinas held that the form of all matter is integrated and cannot exist separate from matter. Hence, the essence of

human personhood requires both form and matter together. However, the form also individuates matter; without form, there would be no (or not any significant) distinction between any collections of a similar matter, including persons (Eberl, 2000).

Ensoulment means that each of the three types of Forms consists of a unique set of powers corresponding to specific biological capacities and functions. It is the Form that is responsible for those biological capacities. Hence, the soul metaphysically precedes matter and informs the nature of the biological organism. However, matter and form temporally occur at the exact moment (Eberl, 2000). Another way of understanding this is to say that although form and matter come into existence simultaneously, form is a higher element relative to matter on the hierarchy of things that can exist. This is similar to how Christians place importance on the soul over biological matter.

Lastly, Hominization entails that the soul can only be united to one set of DNA. Mirkes explains that the soul and matter are united when fertilisation is completed and that the soul is united to a complete set of human DNA. At this point, everything is present for the development of a person (Mirkes, 2018). Hominization acts as a restriction on ensoulment, so ensoulment can only occur once. Once it happens, it can only be compatible with the biological matter that the soul was initially annexed to. She notes that typical organ transplants are mere substitutions of a part. However, the brain is what she calls the “organ of central control” (Mirkes, 2018, p. 166) and is the principal instrument by which the soul unites all the other parts of Form and body (somewhat similar to how Descartes connects the soul and body via the pineal gland). Hence, when a proposed head transplant takes place, the head and soul annexed to a new body would not have the correct spiritual principle to direct a new set of DNA (the new body). Mirkes concludes that head transplants would not be person-preserving on these grounds.

While Mirkes only talks briefly about the practical implications of her theory on head transplants, I think it would be worthwhile to note how it affects other procedures and technologies that claim to be person-preserving. In Mirkes’s case, the only way a person would be preserved is if the individual's soul is retained and the soul remains annexed to the matter or organism to which it was initially attached. It is clear then that her view would rule out head and brain transplants in various forms since the individual's soul would have to inform an entirely new set of matter and DNA, which Mirkes contends is impossible if we turn to cryonics, where a human head or brain is cryogenically frozen at extremely low temperatures in the hopes that some future technology would be able to ‘revive’ or repair damaged and aged

cells, thereby preserving a particular person. It seems that this procedure would also be ruled out for the same reason that head transplants are ruled out. However, suppose cryonics were to advance to the point where it was not only the human head or brain that is frozen, but instead the whole biological organism. In that case, Mirkes's account may allow for the preservation of persons via cryonics. This assumes that the soul will remain annexed and undisturbed while the body is in cryogenic preservation. However, it is unclear whether cryogenic freezing can apply to the entire biological organism or that this will only result in regular death, whereby the soul will leave its matter. While possible, I think the safest bet is to assume that Mirkes's account would not allow for the preservation of persons via cryonics. Finally, there is the scanning of one's mental content to be kept on a computer and later implanted into another numerically distinct body. This method would also not be person preserving on Mirkes's account because it emphasises psychological content as the criterion for personal identity and leaves the soul out of the picture altogether. There may be theorists who defend a non-reductionist view that supports this procedure; for example, by allowing that the soul would move with one's psychology. However, Mirkes does not accept this view. In conclusion, it seems that Mirkes's account is quite strict and allows for no procedure I discuss here to be person preserving.

#### Arguments from Jung.

Jung's arguments are much more detailed and forceful than Mirkes's account. There are ways in which the two accounts are similar, but Jung's strategy and scope are more precise. Jung begins his case with a Christian perspective, asking if Christians should accept the psychological criterion of personal identity. He argues that they should not - that the psychological criterion of identity has intractable problems and that we should take the alternative he puts forward, a non-reductionist view of personal identity. Throughout his discussion, he wants his paper to be of practical significance.

Jung notes that in modern times, many technologies and procedures that claim to be person-preserving have emerged. He cites Sergio Canavero and Dr Xiaoping Ren's proposed procedure to perform the world's first head transplant, cryonics, and a start-up called Nectome. Nectome claims it is working on technology that can scan your brain and preserve its neural connections by uploading them to a computer (Jung, 2020). Jung notices a common theme among these types of procedures and technologies. They all assume that personal identity is transferrable so long as there is psychological continuity between the numerically distinct

bodies. Jung finds these procedures and technologies problematic because he disagrees with this assumption. Therefore, Jung attempts to argue against this foundational assumption and, in turn, attacks psychological continuity theories. Considering the problems Jung associates with the psychological continuity theories, he posits an alternative, a non-reductionist theory of personal identity. He argues that his theory is superior as it does not suffer from the problems the psychological continuity theories do. The practical implications of his discussion and accepting his non-reductionist view are that many, if not all, of these procedures and technologies cannot guarantee the preservation of persons in any critical manner. Hence, we should be sceptical and dismiss them altogether (Jung, 2020).

Let us turn first to Jung's issues with the psychological criterion of identity. Jung presents two arguments against the psychological criterion; he first takes issue with Locke's account and then turns to problems with the psychological criterion in general. I begin by outlining Jung's arguments against Locke. Jung first points out that "consciousness" is central to Locke's account of personal identity, instead of "memory" although Locke uses consciousness mostly in the sense of memory (Jung, 2020, p. 96). He defines Locke's account of a person as a thinking, intelligent being with reason and reflection. Reason is the faculty by which the perception of objects is possible, and reflection is the individual's awareness of their ability to perceive. Jung notes that Locke has two conditions for personal identity. The first is the presence of the same consciousness for each person, and the second is that an intelligent being can remember their past actions with the same consciousness present in their old self and with the consciousness they presently have. (Locke, 1996, as cited by Jung, 2020). Jung holds that these two conditions are used liberally by Locke, sometimes meaning self-consciousness, and other times only requiring some memory about one's thoughts and actions to constitute personal identity. Jung argues that these liberal uses of consciousness aid Locke in defending his theory against some objections. One of these objections is that consciousness cannot be necessary for personal identity because our consciousness often undergoes many interruptions, such as memory loss or sleep. Locke can argue that despite these interruptions, personal identity would hold as long as the same consciousness is present. However, Jung finds this kind of argument unsuccessful since our conscious states and awareness thereof change constantly as well, so it is unclear what is meant by "same" consciousness (Jung, 2020, pp. 97 - 98).

Jung notes that many theorists have taken issue with Locke's notion of consciousness and his reliance on memory. Jung turns to Reid's famous example of a brave officer to make the point.

A brave officer has been made a general much later in life. The general remembers that he took a standard from the enemy in his first campaign but cannot remember being flogged for robbing an orchard when he was a boy at school (Reid, 1785, as cited by Jung, 2020). Following the transitivity of identity, the general is the brave officer, and the brave officer is the small boy. It follows then that the general and the boy are the same person. However, Locke's second condition commits him to the opposite. The boy and the general are not the same person because the general has no memory of the boy's actions. Jung relies on modern psychology to support this point even further. He notes that psychologists have shown how easy it is to implant false memories in an individual without any neural devices. Central to the understanding of false memories is that memory functions very differently from what we might expect. Remembering something is not a simple process of retrieval from one's memory storage; instead, memories are reconstructed past events with stored cues that may have nothing to do with the event in question (Jung, 2020). Hence, our memories are constantly subject to change and manipulation. However, our perceptions of self are also subject to change. Jung notes, for example, that patients who underwent deep brain stimulation to treat disabling neurological conditions reported that their personal identity had changed so much that they could not recognise themselves anymore, i.e., that their 'new selves' were foreign to them. Jung argues that such a case would undermine Locke's first condition since consciousness and self-consciousness are no longer the "same" (Jung, 2020, p. 99). It may seem peculiar why Jung criticises Lockean theory in the way he does here. Arguably, Locke's theory is not nearly as refined as theories posited by the neo-Lockeans. The temptation then is to argue that Jung could have skipped over Locke altogether and focused on defeating those much stronger neo-Lockean theories. While I share the temptation to make this argument, I think Jung's discussion of Locke does aim to achieve an important point. These arguments for Jung do not only deal damaging blows to Lockean theory itself but stand to do so to any theory of personal identity that relies on memory or other psychological continuity more generally since none of these conditions is ever veridical in the way the theories envisage. This attacks the foundation that many psychological continuity theories are based on. However, the neo-Lockean theories may still be able to address the problems Jung is concerned with here.

This leads neatly to Jung's problems with psychological continuity theories more generally. Jung's loose definition here is that psychological continuity theories hold that some psychological relation is necessary and sufficient for persons to persist. These relations include memory, desires, intentions and other psychological features (Jung, 2020). It is important to

note that Jung is not using this definition as a weak version of psychological continuity theories to be defeated later but to include as many psychological continuity theories as possible in their various forms. Jung relies on Parfit's discussion to illuminate the problems with psychological continuity theories. He turns to the example of the teletransporter. I can get into a machine, the teletransporter, that will transport me remarkable distances by scanning and destroying my body, then rebuilding a perfect replica of my body someplace else; in this example, it would be Mars. The teletransporter would also preserve my psychological content so that my replica and I are psychologically continuous with each other. We can change the specifics of this example to draw out a specific scenario. Scenario one: The scanner preserves my body and consciousness on Earth and makes a perfect replica of me on Mars. However, instead of my Earth body's immediate destruction, my body on Earth has suffered some cardiac damage, and my Earth body will die from cardiac failure in the next few days, while my Mars body will be perfectly healthy. Vital questions arise from scenario one related to qualitative and numerical identity. My body on Earth and Mars will have the same mental content simultaneously. Therefore, there will be two qualitatively identical and numerically distinct bodies. Jung asks: "Are these two the same person?" For Jung, it seems evident that the answer is no, and one might agree with him if we are only concerned with numerical identity. Jung finds it problematic that the psychological criterion commits us to the claim that my Earth and Mars bodies must be identical. He briefly notes that this problem is worse if there are multiple replicas. Jung cannot accept this because it violates the principle of numerical identity; if  $x$  is  $y$ , then  $x$  and  $y$  are the same thing (Jung, 2020). There may be ways that psychological theorists can get around the issue of numerical identity, but for now, it is important to note Jung's emphasis on this point.

Moving on, Jung posits another problem with the psychological continuity theory. He argues that it is unclear what degree of psychological continuity is necessary and sufficient for the persistence of persons (Jung, 2020). He uses the example of fission to make the point. Suppose we assume (Jung uses assumption here, but I think Parfit based his example of fission on a well-known medical fact) that a person can survive with only one hemisphere of their cerebrum. Then, suppose my cerebrum is split into two, and each cerebrum is transplanted into two different individual bodies. In that case, the psychological view is committed to saying that each recipient is me or that each is as good as identical to me. This is a view that many psychological theorists would readily defend. However, Jung points out that each hemisphere of the cerebrum will contain varying psychological content that would result in distinct

psychological states. For example, the two recipients might respond differently to the same stimulus or situation. One may want to do x, given y, and the other may want to do z, given y. Taking these differences into account, it becomes unclear which recipient has enough of my psychological content for them to be identical to me. It could be only one of them, both of them or none of them. This problem becomes more serious when we consider what kinds of mental content are potentially present within each cerebral hemisphere. Frankfurt, for example, distinguishes between first-order desires and second-order ones. First-order desires are impulses or desires to do x. Second-order desires are desires about those first-order impulses and desires. Jung points out that if Frankfurt is correct, then it seems that a replica with my second-order desires would be more psychologically continuous with me than a replica with only my first-order desires (Frankfurt, 1971, as cited by Jung, 2020). However, Frankfurt's distinction only shows how two replicas might be more or less psychologically continuous with me. However, it is still unclear whether we can accept that one, both or none of the replicas are identical to me since the required amount of psychological connectedness for personal identity to hold is still vague.

Finally, Jung considers Parfit's answer to many of the abovementioned issues. Although Jung does not explicitly use the term "Relation R," he is concerned with this. Jung begins with Parfit's claim that personal identity is not essential to survival and that only psychological connectedness and continuity fundamentally matter. Parfit argues that questions about personal identity can sometimes be empty because there may be no true or false answers to these questions, even if we know all the relevant facts. For example, Parfit writes that persons are like nations, clubs or political parties. Even if we could know the whole truth about these entities, we still could not always answer true or false questions regarding their identity (Parfit, 1986, as cited by Jung, 2020). Jung notes that this makes Parfit conclude that concern for my future matters. However, this does not necessarily mean me in the future, but to any individual whose relation to me is psychological connectedness. The degree of concern for my future can also be proportionate to the degree of psychological connectedness present in the future individual. Additionally, my degree of concern can also be affected temporally; events in the far future will lessen my degree of concern, while events closer to the present will increase my degree of concern (Parfit 1986, as cited by Jung, 2020). Jung concludes that Parfit may be correct that persons are like nations. However, he regards Parfit's discussion here as a concession that if personal identity is focused on qualitative properties, it leads to a 'dead end' (Jung, 2020, p. 103). Parfit fails to consider that personal identity may consist of something

other than qualitative properties. Here, Jung means that Parfit has not evaluated the non-reductionist view while also showing that the reductionist view leads to a ‘dead end’. I am afraid I have to disagree with Jung here and feel that this misrepresents Parfit’s discussion on personal identity. However, this misrepresentation allows Jung to put forward his non-reductionist account. I will not go into detail here about where and how I think Jung has misrepresented Parfit, as I am only presenting Jung’s position. In the next chapter, I will detail this issue in my arguments against Jung.

### Jung’s non-reductionist view

Now that we understand Jung’s issues with psychological continuity theories, we can evaluate the alternative he puts forth. Jung titles this section as “personal identity based on a non-qualitative property of thisness” (Jung, 2020, p. 103). He begins by distinguishing between two ways of thinking about identity more generally. The first way to think about the identity of things is that identity is contingent on their qualitative properties, what Jung calls “whatnesses” or “suchnesses”. In this view, two entities, *x* and *y*, can be considered identical if they share all their properties. Generally, these kinds of properties can be shared by many varying entities, such as the property of being red or being a dog (Jung, 2020). Another way of thinking about identity is in terms of its non-qualitative properties, what Jung calls its “thisness” or “haecceity”, and it is what makes an entity that particular thing. In this view, Jung argues that only one non-qualitative property is responsible for individuating some entities (Jung, 2020). He provides an example: in the sentence “Superman is super-human”, the “is” functions differently from “is” in the sentence “Superman is Clark Kent”. He points out that the first sentence expresses predication and affirms something, and the second expresses identity (Jung, 2020). In other words, it seems that Jung is indicating that the first sentence is concerned with qualitative properties, that Superman possesses the quality of being superhuman. This property can belong to many other entities as well. The second is saying something like the haecceity of Superman and Clark Kent are one and the same. Superman and Clark Kent have a property that is not shared by any other entity; the sentence makes sense because Superman and Clark Kent are one and the same person.

Jung then examines “whatness” and haecceity more closely. He begins by outlining Leibniz’s Law of the Identity of Indiscernibles, which states that no two distinct individuals share all their qualitative properties (Leibniz, 1686, as cited by Jung, 2020). Jung uses the example of identical twins to make his point that even though they share properties like genetic makeup,

they still have qualitative differences, such as fingerprints and behaviours. Jung is not explicit about this point, but as I see it, if Leibniz is correct, then there may be an exclusive qualitative property on which personal identity can be based. This may be worth considering; however, Jung has problems with qualitative properties in general, so he quickly dismisses this possibility. Jung points out that qualitative properties face issues in providing the criterion of personal identity because even if there are many qualitative properties shared between numerically distinct entities, it may still not be enough to individuate the entities in question (Jung, 2020). Additionally, qualitative properties may only act as an identifier of entities for human minds, and we do not have sufficient knowledge of all there is to know about the nature of individuals and the possible qualitative properties they possess. Jung is making the point that if qualitative properties are the basis for personal identity, then there must be some, or one, qualitative property(s) that holds uniquely of that individual. It may be a property that is not epistemically available to us. God, however, would be able to have access to this qualitative identifier (Jung, 2020). Jung still finds this view problematic; he uses Scott Kelly's example to make his point. Scott Kelly was a participant in NASA's Twin Study, and the researchers noted that 7% of the astronaut's genetic expression did not return to baseline after he returned to Earth (Scutti, 2018, as cited by Jung, 2020). Jung takes it that genetic expression may be one unique qualitative property to which humans have access. However, it would be false to say that the Scott Kelly before embarking into space and the Scott Kelly who returned are two different individuals. Jung concludes that it may be the case that no unique qualitative properties can be the criterion for personal identity and that personal identity must rely on something much deeper (Jung, 2020).

This leads Jung to believe that an adequate conception of personal identity should rely on haecceity or "thisness". He defines haecceity as a non-qualitative property that makes a thing the particular thing it is (Jung, 2020). He argues that not all entities must be distinguished by their haecceity for individuation, but it may be necessary for at least some kinds of substances. He points out that haecceity makes a particular thing identical to itself and no other thing (Jung, 2020). Jung makes the point that in his arguments, he will not attempt to prove the existence of haecceity but will only consider the metaphysical possibility of haecceity to articulate a conception of personal identity that is not based on any qualitative properties of individuals. In Jung's view, then, what makes me identical with myself is this primitive haecceity. Specifically, Jung thinks this haecceity would be a non-qualitative property of a particular immaterial substance. Jung notes that this haecceity individuates me and is identical in all

possible worlds. Jung argues that haecceity feeds into the notion of Transworld identity. Just as the noun “Barack Obama” refers to the person so named and no one else, the language used acts as a rigid designator that refers to a specific object. Similar remarks apply to the individual’s haecceity, and in Jung's view, this rigid designator applies across all possible worlds (Jung, 2020). It is important to note that Jung’s claim is not that the immaterial soul acts as the individual’s haecceity but their haecceity must be found within something like an immaterial soul (Jung, 2020). If personal identity is based on haecceity, an individual's identity is individualised and defined.

Jung goes on to explain the relationship between haecceity and consciousness. He begins by noting that a standard view is that consciousness is causally dependent on one’s brain processes. Jung, however, offers a different view. He concedes that this view of consciousness may be accurate but that it is not complete. He states that we should consider the possibility that consciousness is not merely a contingent, psychological property of an individual's brain but an essential feature of an immaterial substance that also contains one haecceity. Jung uses this conception of the functioning of consciousness to posit an on-board consciousness, a mentality that has a purely physical basis. A person's (True) consciousness would not require a biological brain, but the brain can be used as a temporary seat for consciousness. This is similar to how embodied mind theorists argue that the mind (essentially the person) is an embodied part of human animals (McMahan, 2002) - so is the consciousness also temporarily embodied in the brain. But the ontological existence of the consciousness, in Jung’s view, is found within the immaterial soul. Jung distinguishes between the consciousness in the brain, onboard consciousness, and the consciousness in the immaterial soul - what he calls virtual consciousness. This mentality is an essential feature of the particular soul that I am (Jung, 2020). On-board consciousness would exist only in the functioning brain, while virtual consciousness is an intrinsic property of the immaterial substance. Jung summarises his view in this way:

I hypothesise that each person is a particular soul that is necessarily the same in every possible world in which that person exists and that that person has on-board consciousness contingently and a virtual consciousness. (Jung, 2020, pg. 107)

Jung argues that the relationship between onboard and virtual consciousness is similar to how a computer and physical drive interact with cloud computing services like Google Drive. Jung points out that if files are saved on a physical drive with a computer auto-synched to a cloud

service, those files will automatically be held in the cloud. However, downloading files from the cloud onto the physical drive is not always as easy. This can be because of security reasons. The files may be too large to download onto a physical drive, or a personal computer may have limited hardware, making it impossible to download or efficiently use the complex files stored on the cloud server. Similarly, the brain which holds my on-board consciousness could be limited by its “hardware” in relevant ways that would inhibit the proper and complete functioning of the properties found in my virtual consciousness. The biological organism can also experience wear and tear throughout its use, leading to impaired functioning. However, everything experienced and “stored” in the brain will automatically be synced to the much more capable virtual consciousness (Jung, 2020). While this analogy is somewhat hard to believe, it may have some merit, and it explains Jung’s idea of onboard and virtual consciousness quite nicely. However, Jung does note that this analogy is just a rehashing of Cartesian dualism, which makes me question why he needed the analogy in the first place if he admits that Cartesian dualism already has “better explanatory power” than physicalism regarding personal identity (Jung, 2020, p. 107).

Jung concludes that there are at least two practical implications from his discussion. The first is that because of the unending problems with psychological continuity theories, we have well-grounded reasons to be sceptical of procedures and technologies that claim to be person-preserving. Second, if Jung’s account is correct, then the psychological criterion of personal identity is incorrect altogether (Jung, 2020). Jung points out that psychological continuity may provide good evidence for one’s identity, but it is not the guaranteeing criterion. Regarding the many procedures and technologies that claim to be person-preserving, Jung’s account would suggest that no procedure or technology can guarantee the preservation or identicalness of persons between a pre- and post-procedure or technological intervention (Jung, 2020). Important to note here is that even if it were possible to perfectly replicate an individual’s psychological content and put it into another body, by Jung’s account, there still would not be identicalness between the two numerically distinct bodies. He further points out that psychological theorists use memory as presupposing identity. Here, Jung is saying that just because you have a memory of an event, you cannot with certainty also say that that memory is necessarily yours. For example, in the many cases where I am duplicated, no matter how continuous my replica is with me, no replica will be identical to me (Jung, 2020).

On the issue of brain transplant cases, Jung admits that it may be logically possible that a soul can migrate into a new body following a brain transplant. He acknowledged that he could not explain why the soul must remain in the original body. There are theories of ensoulment that the soul must be annexed to a particular body. Still, Jung finds these theories ambiguous and unreliable since no one has adequately explained the specifics of ensoulment theories. Furthermore, it is unclear that ensoulment necessitates that the soul be annexed to the brain rather than any other body part, like the heart example (Jung, 2020). Hence, he concludes that regarding brain transplants, it is unclear if a person survives the procedure or if it is merely a brain that survives. Considering this uncertainty, we should avoid brain transplants for the time being.

Like Mirkes's case, the final point is that cryonics may be the best chance as an acceptable person-preserving procedure for non-reductionists. However, this is contingent on the ability of cryonics to freeze and preserve the entire body of a particular individual rather than just their head or brain. Again, this assumes that the soul will remain annexed and undisturbed while the body is in cryogenic preservation, a point that Mirkes and Jung might argue against.

I hope that you will be able to see that there are striking similarities in the arguments made by Jung and Mirkes in this section. Both theorists rely heavily on their metaphysics to make their arguments. While I think each theorist makes individual errors that I will discuss in the next chapter, there is also an underlying error made by both theorists. I will detail these issues in the next chapter.

# Chapter 4

I detailed Mirkes and Jung's arguments against supposedly person-preserving procedures in the previous chapter. Both theorists support a non-reductionist view of personal identity and take issue with these supposed person-preserving procedures, when it is assumed that personal identity can be transferred or is located in psychological or qualitative features. Both Mirkes and Jung argue that this assumption may lead individuals to believe that they are saving or extending life when these procedures may result in the death of a person. Mirkes takes a strong stance on this issue, saying that none of these supposedly person-preserving procedures should be performed. At the same time, Jung argues that it is "too risky" to follow through with these procedures due to the uncertainty of specific facts related to personal Identity.

In this chapter, I will argue that neither theorist presents compelling arguments to hold off on these supposedly person-preserving procedures. I agree with Jung that we need to be sceptical of these procedures. However, my scepticism has nothing to do with personal identity and concerns these procedures' medical validity and feasibility. This is an issue that I will not go into detail on in this paper. Regarding personal identity, I think both theorists make the mistake of taking their metaphysical views for granted. This is to say that while the opinions presented by Mirkes and Jung are metaphysically possible, neither theorist takes the necessary steps to make an argument that moves their claims from mere metaphysical possibility to the practical world. As outlined by Frank Jackson, there is a difference between arguing from metaphysical fantasy vs presenting a profound metaphysics that entails the required concepts or notions. Mirkes and Jung's arguments are rooted in metaphysical fantasy; hence, we should dismiss them until proven otherwise.

Mirkes relies heavily on Thomistic metaphysics and bases her claim solely on this. The problem here is that this is a conditional. IF Thomistic metaphysics were true, then her arguments may be valid, but there is no reason to accept Thomistic metaphysics prima facie. Similarly, Jung also presents a conditional. IF Haeceity operates in the way he mentions, then his arguments may be valid, but there is no reason to accept his arguments prima facie. Jung does some work to show that the psychological criterion of identity has intractable issues and offers his view as an inference to the best explanation. However, some of the discussion warps specific aspects of the psychological criterion to make his view appear more favourable than it is. For one, Jung spends considerable time refuting Locke's conception of personal identity

when there are much stronger neo-Lockean views that he needs to contend with. Additionally, when he does engage with theorists such as Parfit, he conveniently leaves out some of Parfit's critical claims about psychological connectedness and Relation R. Furthermore, Jung appears to conflate identity across worlds with identity over time. Most debates on personal identity (and certainly those relevant to our issues) concern identity over time, not identity across worlds. These are two separate issues which may have different answers. Jung's Haecceity may make you the same individual across worlds, but this says nothing about what makes you the same individual over time. Jung may argue that these questions have the same answer, but I will say that this leads to even stranger commitments for personal identity than the psychological criterion.

### Arguments against Mirkes.

I want to spend some time responding to their respective arguments before considering arguments that apply to both theorists. As such, I will begin with Mirkes. Mirkes argues that head transplants ought never to be done because:

1. These transplants would ignore the salient duties and responsibilities of the American medical research community.
2. They would corrupt the head transplant recipient's family lineage and marital unity.
3. They would annihilate the personal identity and dignity of the head transplanter.

There are fascinating discussions regarding objections 1 and 2, some of which I agree with. However, since these issues have nothing to do with personal identity, I will say nothing about the problems Mirkes raises there. The main focus of my criticism is objection 3. As noted earlier, Mirkes argues from a Thomistic perspective. Because of how Thomistic metaphysics operates, a head transplant, cryonics, and psychological scanning would all fail to be person-preserving. Let me turn to Mirkes's first claim that a person is a "body-soul unity." This is not an original claim; in fact, philosophers such as Descartes and Plato have argued this claim many times over. However, this kind of claim has fallen out of favour because it brings serious problems. One of the most prominent problems that Descartes faced was an issue I brought up earlier. How do the body and soul interact if a person is a body-soul unity? Descartes did not have the investigative tools we have available today and went as far as to say that the body and soul are connected through the pineal gland (Descartes, 2008). However, our understanding of the body, biology, and science has improved significantly since Descartes's time. If there is

some truth to the claim that the soul and the body (although essentially different) interact with each other in some manner, I argue that we would have a more substantial answer by now. Unfortunately, the burden of proof for such an answer lies with the non-reductionists. In other words, Mirkes must bear this burden.

Mirkes explains how the Thomistic principles of Form, Ensoulment, and Hominization work together to form a personal identity. However, this discussion primarily takes place at the level of metaphysics. I will get into the issue of metaphysics at a later point; for now, what is important to realise is that Mirkes states that Thomistic metaphysics works with the principal instrument, the brain, that unites soul and body. However, looking at this in more detail, you will see that this answer is highly similar to Descartes' original view. It may be more vague than the one Descartes provides. Descartes argues that the soul was annexed to the pineal gland, while Mirkes says the brain is more general. This is important because it avoids Parfit's discussion of fission completely. Parfit's discussion on fission was built on a sound medical fact: individuals can survive psychologically intact with one hemisphere of the brain. If this is true, Mirkes does not explain how the soul-body unity is maintained with only half of one's principal instrument or half the brain. Descartes would at least be able to say that personal identity would be retained in the case of fission as long as the pineal gland is in one piece. If we want to know who survives the fission case, it would be wherever the pineal gland went. The point is that some explanation aims to address the facts known to us, namely, that individuals can survive with only half a cerebrum. Mirkes's viewpoint loses more explanatory power than other non-reductionist views, especially those of the reductionist camp.

Let us move to Mirkes's claim that the soul-body unity must hold uniquely. Her point is that a combination of soul and body is not enough to constitute personal identity; it must be unique. The reason Mirkes gives in support of this view is a Thomistic concept of hominization. This view holds that the soul can only control or be united to one set of DNA. Mirkes explains that the soul and matter are united when fertilisation is completed and that the soul is united to a complete set of human DNA. However, while this may be metaphysically possible, I do not see any actual argument that Mirkes brings to support that this is how things work. This brings into question the soundness/cogency of Mirkes's arguments. We know that for an argument to be sound or cogent, we need our premises to be accurate, at the very least. However, Mirkes does not spend any effort to demonstrate to us that this fundamental premise of her argument is, in fact, true. Instead, she presents it as a *prima facie* claim. A popular rule of thumb known

as Hitchen's razor applies to Mirkes's arguments quite well; "what can be asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence." I hope you will see that Mirkes does not provide evidence for her claim. However, I present some arguments, namely that her argument is not strong or compelling enough for us to accept her claims. There is more that I can say about Mirkes, specifically on the issue of arguing from metaphysical fantasy, but I will make this argument later.

### Arguments against Jung.

For now, I want to turn to Jung's arguments and pick out the issues that apply only to him. Jung has a much more forceful argument and engages with competing reductionist claims for personal identity. Jung takes issue with the psychological criterion in general but also points out intractable issues he finds in Locke and Parfit's works. His first issue is that it is unclear what the psychological criterion, Locke's specifically, understands by the same consciousness and in its placing importance memory, despite the unreliability of that faculty. I mentioned earlier that we should not be too hasty and call Jung out for attacking Locke specifically here. However, I think Parfit can answer Jung's objections.

Let us turn to the issue of what it means to have the "same" consciousness. Jung states that our conscious states and awareness thereof change constantly. The question is whether this is enough to do away with any theory of personal identity based on the psychological criterion. I do not think so. Some theories can explain this issue away. For example, if we look at Parfit's argument on what does matter, he argues that what is essential for survival is Relation R. This is psychological connectedness and continuity with the right kind of cause. It is important to note that Parfit takes any reason to be the right kind of cause. As a refresher, psychological connectedness holds when there are enough particular direct psychological connections, while psychological continuity holds when there are overlapping chains of strong connectedness. As we can see from Parfit's view, we eliminate the issue of "same" consciousness. It does not matter if the consciousness is the "same" or not. What does matter is the Relation R between any two persons. Once the degree of psychological connectedness has been described, there is no further fact to the matter, so we may not always have a determinate answer as to whether the person is the same or not. There is a sense in which requiring consciousness to be the "same" is requiring an answer to what can be an empty question. In Parfit's view, it is not our primary focus, which avoids Jung's first objection.

Similarly, the issue of memory being an unreliable criterion will also be avoided. As we can see, Parfit does not emphasise memory in his theory, but instead the Relation R in which memory would be only one among many connections. Now, there is an objection that Jung could make. He could argue that Relation R is just as fluid and manipulative as memory. For instance, I could spend my entire life implanting “fake” memories and other psychological connections to make up one’s psychological connectedness and continuity into the subconscious of two separate individuals, and we would have to concede that these two persons will be one person since their Relation R would be enough for survival. However, this is a classic example of replication or division. In Parfit’s original thought experiment, My Division, there are two resulting persons with enough psychological connectedness and continuity to be R related to the actual person. If we remember above, Parfit considers any cause of the Relation R sufficient for personal identity. In other words, it matters not that we changed the thought experiment so that Relation R was caused in some drastically different way, which pulls on our intuition that personal identity is what matters. The “fact” would be that Relation R still holds, which is enough for Parfit to do away with the “fake” memory objection. As we can see, Parfit’s more sophisticated theory does away with Jung’s first objection.

Moving on, Jung also takes issue with the degree of psychological connection required for personal Identity. He argues that whether the two separate hemispheres would have the same psychological connectedness and continuity during fission is unclear. Hence, the original individual might be more strongly psychologically connected to one of the resulting persons than the other, or one resulting person will not have sufficient relation R properties to meet the personal identity claim. However, I do not think Parfit would take issue with this. Parfit’s view readily accepts that one person can be more psychologically connected than the other but still holds that each person in question is R related. Parfit explicitly states that any specification of a required degree of psychological connectedness would be arbitrary, and hence, we ought not to focus on this issue. Parfit makes the point that if we argue that there is a fundamental difference between the resulting persons in the division case, that makes one person me and the other, not me. There must be a sharp borderline unknown to us that makes it so. This is something that you would find in a non-reductionist view or Jung's case; it could be that Haeceity would play this role. However, this makes personal identity an all-or-nothing affair, making this view more implausible than Parfit's reductionist account. For example, if I were to go to sleep and wake up exactly as I was the previous evening, only missing one property, that property may be my Haeceity or other property that is essential for my identity. In Jung's view,

I would argue that the person who has woken up and now goes about their day exactly as I intended is not me. There is a strange way in which non-reductionists assume that whatever property they deem valuable for personal identity will always be present in one's life, only to be separated by death or supposedly non-person-preserving procedures. The non-reductionist would have to adequately explain how this works, what causes the separation of the essential property and what it can survive. This task is much more unrealistic than accepting Parfit's less determinate Relation R.

Jung improperly presupposes that numerical identity is essential rather than objectively considering all the options. He goes as far as to misrepresent Parfit's view, arguing that Parfit concedes that if personal identity is focused on qualitative properties, it leads to a dead end. As we can see from the discussion above, Parfit does not take qualitative properties to result in a dead end for personal identity debates. We can think of those properties - psychological connectedness and continuity - as involving qualitative properties. If I am correct, then Jung misunderstands or misconstrues Parfit's position. In turn, this makes Jung's position appear more forceful. However, this is not what Parfit was saying at all. Parfit considers the non-reductionist view in section 82 of *Reasons and Persons*, titled "How a non-reductionist view might have been true". However, in this chapter, Parfit argues that the best-known view of non-reductionism is the view that we are Cartesian Egos. However, this view falls victim to one of the criticisms I launched at Jung earlier - the issue of retaining one's Haecceity. Parfit argues that if I am a featureless Cartesian Ego, it is plausible that my Cartesian Ego can be replaced multiple times over and inherit my psychological content, making it such that I have been replaced by someone exactly like me. Parfit deems this view wildly implausible (as it is), and hence, the non-reductionists have lost their best argument for their view.

Finally, Jung also makes another mistake. I believe that Jung conflates Transworld identity with identity over time. Let me first clarify the two positions. Transworld identity has to do with identity across worlds. It asks what makes me the same person x in world 1 as person y in world 2. Identity over time asks what makes me person x at time t the same as person y at time t'. Personal identity debates usually focus on identity over time, not Transworld identity. Suppose we consider Parfit and Locke, for example, the thought experiments of My Division and the Prince and the Cobbler. These cases have nothing to do with identity between inhabitants of different worlds, they are about the continued identity of a person in this world only. Some may argue that they are not directly about identity over time either, but they are

closely related to it, and in my view, this is close enough. Now that the two notions have been adequately separated, we must note that these two questions can have radically different answers. Jung assumes that whatever the answer to Transworld identity may be, this is also our answer to identity over time. However, if we consider possible worlds, I will argue that this leads to even more implausible consequences for personal identity and the non-reductionist view.

Jung takes it that Haeceity is necessary for personal identity and that this will be retained across possible worlds. In other words, if we have world 1, where I exist, and world 2, where I also exist, what makes me, me, in both worlds, is my Haeceity that moves between worlds. It seems this is a singular Haeceity in Jung's thesis. If this is the case, then this becomes an issue if we also assume that an infinite number of possible worlds exist at any given time. If that is true, then my Haeceity would be bonded to an endless number of Me's in all possible worlds. In this scenario, these versions of me could have infinitely varying psychological content and will have numerically distinct bodies. If Jung's view is correct, Haeceity does not solve the problem of replicas and does not necessitate that personal identity relies on numerical identity. There will be one Haeceity that would be able to inform multiple persons across multiple worlds. This can be done simultaneously or only by telling one individual at a time. However, since each person across numerous worlds will have varying psychological content, my beliefs, intentions, and other psychological content are unimportant. This theory will fall victim to the issue Parfit raises against the Cartesian ego. That some other Haeceity can take over my body, absorb my psychological content and go about their day as I would have. This has critical moral implications, since when we ask who we should hold accountable for person x's immoral act, Jung would have to say whatever Haeceity was connected to the person at the time. However, how would we ever identify this, let alone hold this Haeceity accountable? We cannot because this theory is contradictory; it reduces persons to metaphysical features that we cannot access or evaluate. This, I take it, is even more implausible than Parfit's Relation R or the psychological criterion as a whole, and hence, we should not accept Jung's arguments.

#### [Arguing from Metaphysical Fantasy.](#)

That wraps up the arguments I want to lodge against Mirkes and Jung independently. Now, there is an issue that I want to address that will apply to Jung and Mirkes. This is the issue of arguing from metaphysical fantasy vs arguing from reality. Jackson makes a point in his project that some metaphysical arguments have been dismissed in the past as there seems to be no

reason to accept them other than they are metaphysical possibilities. In other words, they remain nothing but metaphysical fantasy. The difference between a metaphysical possibility and a nomological possibility is that the nomological possibility takes the restraints and laws that apply to our actual world as we currently observe it seriously. Metaphysical fantasy can do away with these laws and restrictions. Now, it is essential to note that anything can be metaphysically possible. This may be up for debate. For example, one might argue that there cannot be any contradictions within a world's metaphysical rules. However, one might also say that fluid metaphysics entails all possible things, even those that directly contradict each other. I am not sure which of these possibilities is more likely, but that is not the aim of this project. The critical thing to note here is that 'anything' is metaphysically possible. For example, we know that based on what we can observe in our actual world, water boils at 100°C, all things being equal. However, it is metaphysically possible that water could have boiled at 2°C, all things equal. Alternatively, water is the kind of substance that never boils. There is an infinite, or almost infinite, number of scenarios that I can attach to my example under the logic of metaphysical possibility. However, suppose I were to limit the possibilities to take seriously the laws and rules of our actual world. In that case, we can call this nomological possibility for argument's sake. Then, it is no longer possible for the claim that water boils at 2°C to be accurate due to the laws and logic of the actual world.

Now, if I were to advise someone on the best way to boil water, and my answer intends to be practical, within the bounds of possibilities for the actual world, I would loosely tell them that they should heat the water until it reaches 100°C. However, if I were to give an answer only rooted in metaphysical possibilities, I could have said to heat the water until it reaches 2°C. Now, for the person in the actual world, my advice would only be valuable to them if it considers their practical concerns and the logical laws and rules of the world. Hence, the metaphysical position that allows me to say, heat the water until it reaches 2°C is nomologically misplaced. It may even be metaphysically lost, given that the metaphysics of our actual world may work so differently from the picture we paint when we say water boils at 2°C. Hence, I am not in a position to give practical advice based solely on my metaphysics for the individual's practical concerns.

The picture I paint above is precisely what I argue is going on in Mirkes and Jung's arguments. Their arguments rely heavily on a picture of metaphysics that does not consider the laws and rules we observe in the actual world. It may be the case that their metaphysics is how the actual

world works; however, the burden of proof is on Jung and Mirkes to detail precisely how their metaphysical picture accurately maps the real world. In other words, their arguments must move from being only in metaphysical fantasy to nomological possibility before we can take them seriously. Until they do so, I argue that Jung and Mirkes, and other theories that remain metaphysical possibilities only, ought not to advise on practical issues. If they do so, their metaphysical picture may be so different from what is going on that they harm or hinder our scientific and philosophical progress or even harm individuals. It may be metaphysically possible that such a thing as Haecceity exists, but what observable, testable steps should we take to prove this? In Jackson's terms, how can Haecceities be located in reality? It may be the case that a body-soul unity does have to hold uniquely. However, what steps can we take outside metaphysical arguments to confirm this? A further point is that the metaphysics presented by Jung and Mirkes are complex and intricately layered. For example, it will involve a lot of biological and scientific research to find the first connection between DNA and the soul at fertilisation, as Mirkes argues. These possibilities seem more implausible when compared to other reductionist views – they introduce problems that their rivals simply do not face. That is why I argue against them, but most importantly, it is why we ought to be sceptical when metaphysical fantasies inform practical advice.

As you can see from my arguments, we can find issues with each theorist's view. Mirkes bears the burden of proof to explain how Thomistic metaphysics relies on maps to our actual world's laws and rules. Additionally, she has also not shown that the premises for her arguments are, in fact, true, and hence, these arguments are neither cogent nor sound. Jung, I contend, deliberately avoids engaging with some of Parfit's work, especially on Relation R, as this, I think, would have solved some of the complaints he presents against the psychological criterion of identity. Furthermore, Jung presupposes that numerical identity matters, forcing him to argue for a non-reductionist view. Jung also posits that Haecceity should be the focus of personal identity, but I hope I have shown that Jung has conflated Transworld identity with identity over time. As we see from my arguments, accepting a Haecceity thesis leads to more confusing and intractable consequences than Parfit's Relation R. Finally, both argue from metaphysical fantasy and do not present arguments that take seriously the laws in the actual world. Therefore, I believe these theorists and possibly other non-reductionist theories ought to be limited in the practical advice they can give.

# Chapter 5

This final chapter holds some closing remarks and summarises the thesis as a whole. In this paper, I aim to achieve a list of things, and I hope that by the end, the reader will be able to see this. I first sought to briefly discuss personal identity and the theories found in this debate. I hope the reader will be able to get a good understanding of the personal identity debate in general and see why I felt the need to write this project. The second thing I aimed to do was to outline how metaphysical theories could potentially inform practical issues. For this, I relied on Frank Jackson's work. Third, I sought to set out the arguments made by Jung and Mirkes for a non-reductionist view of personal identity and locate these theorists in the relevant spaces in the personal identity debate more generally. Fourth, I aimed to present arguments as to why I disagree with the claims made by Mirkes and Jung. I argued that both these theorists make the mistake of arguing from metaphysical fantasy. Because anything is metaphysically possible, we should limit these theories' influence on practical issues unless Jung and Mirkes can show how their metaphysical theories are also justified on a nomological level. I hope that I have achieved all these aims in this paper. A final remark is that I do not believe that the non-reductionist view is dead in the water, so to speak, only that it faces the conceptual challenge of being stuck in the realm of metaphysics. Suppose there are ways to move these arguments from metaphysical fantasy to a nomological level that takes seriously the laws and rules of our actual world. Then, there may be hope for non-reductionism as a theory. I can see no explicit way by which this can be achieved, so we ought to be wary of making practical decisions based on these theories. In conclusion, these theorists' objections concerning cryonics, head transplants, and other supposedly person-preserving procedures should be taken with a grain of salt. There are sound reasons why we may not want to go forward with these procedures, but these reasons are separate from the issues they raise related to personal identity.

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