University of the Western Cape

Local solutions from local people: community participation in crime prevention in Khayelitsha

A mini-thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Magister Artium in Development Studies, Institute for Social Development

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Declaration

I declare that *local solutions from local people: community participation in crime prevention in Khayelitsha* is my own work, that it has not been submitted previously for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

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Abstract

The involvement of local communities in crime prevention programmes emerged as an alternative strategy for fighting and preventing crime after the failure of the criminal justice system to control and deter criminal activities effectively. Governments across the globe regard local communities as key actors in fighting and preventing crime. Community participation in crime prevention has become a key strategy to improve safety and security. The main aim of this study is to explore the extent to which residents of Khayelitsha contribute to the maintenance of security and order in their area; and to investigate the extent to which residents are empowered to solve crime problems on their own.

The framework of this study is grounded on theories of crime namely: occupational choice, social learning, and social disorganisation; and concepts such as crime, crime prevention, and community participation. The literature review of this study focuses crime situation in South Africa with emphasis on crime trends, costs of crime, determinants of crime, and attempts made by the South African government to fight and prevent crime at national and local government levels. The study used key informant in-depth interviews with representatives of anti-crime community-based organisations in Site B and as well as ordinary residents of Site B. Data of this study is largely qualitative although it is supplemented with quantitative data relating to crime statistics which was collected as secondary data.

In this study, both narratives and crime statistics reveal that robbery and theft-related crimes, drug abuse, and assaults are among the most predominant crimes. All informants perceived poverty and the use of drugs and alcohol as root causes of crime in Site B. The residents contribute in preventing and fighting crime in Site B by engaging in the following activities: patrolling streets as volunteers in Community Policing Forums (CPF); and providing crime-related information to anti-crime organisations such as South African Police Service (SAPS), South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), and Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF). The residents also get involved in crime prevention informally by exercising informal social sanctions. However, challenges such as ineffectiveness of the law enforcement and lack of financial support hinder the residents' participation in crime prevention.

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
Key works

Community participation

Community Policing

Crime

Crime prevention

Formal sanctions

Informal sanctions

Social capital

Ubuntu

Site B

Khayelitsha

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Community participation in crime prevention gained prominence in the 1970s after mainstream criminal justice systems were adjudged to have failed in their ability to maintain security and order. Before the 1970s, the role of civilians in controlling and maintaining security and order in their areas remained largely unrecognised (Ren, *et al*., 2006). Fighting and preventing criminal activities was regarded as the work of law enforcers and other components of the criminal justice system. The collaboration between police and local communities has now emerged as a key strategy of crime prevention after the realization that the criminal justice system could not tackle crime alone. This study seeks to understand the role of local communities in crime prevention to ensure their communities are safe. The study provides insights into community driven crime prevention strategies in Site B, Khayelitsha as a case study.

1.2 Background and Rationale

High crime rates in South Africa have a long history, traceable to the time of political instability under apartheid. South Africa has been ranked among the top countries in terms of high crime rates and violence in the world (Demombynes and Özler, 2005; Møller, 2005; Paulse and Lazarus, 2010). In 2010 for example, Global Peace Index (GPI) ranked South Africa 121 out of 149 countries with the least peaceful societies and it moved only two places up from number 123 out of 144 countries (Ratele, 2010). These high crime rates have a negative impact on the quality of life and the economy. A large proportion of South Africans has suffered the effects of crime, directly or indirectly. In effect, many South Africans rate crime as the most serious national problem (Brown, 2001).

Against the background of these high levels of crime, the South African government has pledged to improve security and safety for all South Africans. The government spending on crime forms now a large proportion of the national budget. In 2007 for example, the aggregated cost of crime in South Africa was estimated to be US$ 22.1 billion (7.8% of South Africa's GDP) (Alda and Cuesta, 2010). Even though crime statistics show that crime rates are declining (SAPS, 2011), the government's expenditure on crime prevention is unlikely to

decrease in the near future since the crime rates are still relatively high and the criminal justice system remains ineffective and corrupt (Brown, 2001, Singh, 2005; Monagham, 2008; Faull, 2011). In recognition of the pandemic, the South African government has also recognised that combating crime cannot be successful without the support of all stakeholders including the public. It is now appealing to the public to work closely with their police in the form of community policing to ensure their communities are safe.

Several studies in other countries such as the USA reveal that crime rates are usually higher in big cities compared to small towns and rural areas (Sampson, 1986; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1996; Cullen and Levitt, 1999; Weijters, Scheepers and Gerris, 2009). Similarly, criminal activities in South Africa are also concentrated in big cities such as Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg. Cape Town, Khayelitsha in particular, is regarded as one of the crime hotspots in the country. In fact, Cape Town has one of the highest murder rates in the world (Gie, 2009). In 2006, the United Nations put Cape Town on the list of the 'high-risk' cities and Cape Town was on a par with Rio de Janeiro (United Nations, 2006, cited in Gie, 2009). Within Cape Town, most criminal incidents occur in the townships such as Nyanga, Mitchell's Plain, with Khayelitsha having the highest rate. Khayelitsha contributes significantly to murders and armed robbery in Cape Town (Kagee and Frank, 2005) and is one of the most violent urban areas in South Africa (Nleya and Thompson, 2009).

1.3 Research problem

While crime is a colossal challenge to democratic South Africa (Burger, 2007: 233), fighting crime largely remains the work of government through the criminal justice system. The South African criminal justice system, including law enforcement, has largely been weak and ineffective in deterring criminal activities (Singh, 2005; Faull, 2011). The country has a number of crime prevention policies that have been implemented at national and local levels. However, these policies seem to have concentrated resources on reacting to crime incidents instead of simultaneously addressing the root causes of crime (Newham, 2005; Dixon, 2006).

Even though crime prevention in South Africa is based on the community policing approach in which the police partner with their local communities (Republic of South Africa (RSA), 2009), the inclusion of the local community in crime prevention programmes has been given little attention. The potential of the combined effort of local communities and law enforcement agencies has been undermined, ignoring that criminal activities are deterred

most effectively when communities and law enforcement officers work collectively (Fagan and Meares, 2008). Based on the assumption that local people know their problems and areas better than external people (Liebermann and Coulson, 2004), and that criminals often live and operate within their own communities, involving local communities in controlling and maintaining security and order is a viable strategy.

1.4 Objectives of the study

The central objective of this study was to investigate the level of community involvement and empowerment in Site B, Khayelitsha in fighting crime. In addition to the central objective above, a number of ancillary objectives were set and these are to:

i.   Identify common crimes in Khayelitsha and assess their prevalence;

ii. Assess residents' attitudes, perceptions and willingness to get involved in improving safety and security in their area;

iii. Explore strategies adopted by residents to prevent crime and identify key challenges;

iv. Describe the level and form of cooperation between local residents and police.

1.5 Research questions

This study intends to answer the following research questions:

i.   What are the predominant crimes in Khayelitsha?

ii. What are residents' perceptions, attitudes, and willingness to participate in crime prevention?

iii. What are the approaches adopted by residents to prevent crime effectively and what are the challenges that residents face?

iv. What is the nature of the interaction and collaboration between police and residents?

v.   How and to what extent do community members contribute to fighting and preventing crime?

vi. To what extent are community members empowered to solve crime problems?

1.6 Description of Khayelitsha

This section provides a detailed description of Khayelitsha as a whole whilst a description of Site B is provided in chapter four, section 4.2. Khayelitsha is situated about 35 km from Cape Town city centre. It was constructed as a new township for black people in early 1983

(Business Trust and RSA, 2007). Khayelitsha was established with limited public amenities as it was apartheid's policy to under-develop areas designated for black people. In addition, the township was isolated due to the distance from Cape Town city centre and other economic opportunities. In spite of these uncomfortable conditions, coupled with apartheid's policy of controlling and restricting black people within the Western Cape, black people continued to migrate at an increased rate into the Western Cape. Khayelitsha expanded gradually but the township experienced an increase in growth after the abolition of apartheid in 1994. The township is now Cape Town's biggest township and the second largest township in the country with a population of 406779 in 2005 (Business Trust and RSA, 2007).

In the post-apartheid era, Khayelitsha residents, like other black Africans, expected the freedom dividend in the form of positive socio-economic changes. While extensive infrastructural development has occurred, Khayelitsha is still among the poorest communities in the Western Cape (Thompson and Conradie, 2010) with the majority of the Khayelitsha population living in crowded conditions with 7748 inhabitants/km^2. The 2001 Census showed that more than 64% of the Khayelitsha population live in shacks. The 2001 Census also revealed that almost three quarters (70%) of the Khayelitsha population is under 30 years while only 35% are employed, and almost one third is not economically active (Business Trust and RSA, 2007). The average monthly income per household is R 1606 for an average household size of four people (City of Cape Town, 2006).

1.7 Chapter outline

Chapter two 'Community and crime prevention: conceptual and theoretical framework' conceptualizes crime and crime prevention, and it theorizes causes of crime with emphasis on: occupational choice theory – which hypotheses that crimes are committed with the intention of maximising economic benefit from committed crimes; social learning theory – which assumes that criminal behaviours are not inborn but learnt by interacting with or imitating inappropriate individuals who may be social role models or peers; and on social disorganisation theory – which argues that crimes are caused by the social disorganisation which exists in communities. The chapter also provides insight into the role of local communities in fighting crime.

Chapter three 'Crime in South Africa: trends, costs, and response' reviews the literature on crime in South Africa, drawing attention to crime trends in South Africa, starting at the time

of apartheid. The chapter also highlights the cost of crime to individuals and households, businesses, and the costs of crime to the government. In addition, the chapter discusses factors that influence the individual to pursue criminal activities, and implemented policies which fight and prevent crime at national and local government levels.

Chapter four 'Methodology' provides insights into the research process. It describes and justifies why qualitative and quantitative methods were used. The chapter also provides a description of how informants of this study were selected and justifies why in-depth interviews were used to collect data. Furthermore, the chapter outlines the steps followed to analyse data.

Chapter five 'Mapping crime in Site B, Khayelitsha' focuses on the crime situation in the study area, Site B. In this chapter, much attention is given to the prevalence of crime, predominant crimes and their trends based on crime statistics. The chapter also provides a discussion on the root causes of crime based on the informants' experience and perceptions towards crime.

Chapter six 'Community involvement in crime prevention in Site B' provides insight into the contribution of Site B residents to anti-crime organizations including CPF, SAPS, KDF, and SANCO, operating in Site B. The chapter also provides an analysis of how the residents contribute to fighting and preventing crime by using informal social sanctions.

Chapter seven 'Conclusions' provides a review of the findings, highlighting and reflecting on the key issues which emerged to show the extent to which the study answered the research problem and how the research objectives were achieved.

Chapter 2

Community and crime prevention: conceptual and theoretical framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the conceptual and theoretical framework which underpins the understanding of crime, crime prevention, and community participation in crime prevention. Community involvement in crime prevention programmes is gaining momentum across the globe. This approach is now regarded as an indispensable element of the strategy to reduce crime incidents and prevent potential crimes. The essential role of local communities in the effective fight and prevention of crime drives from the assumption that local communities have a better knowledge of their areas than anyone else (Liebermann and Coulson, 2004).

The chapter has three major sections: Section 2.2 conceptualises and defines crime from a social and legal perspective. The section also provides insight into the challenges of producing a universal definition of crime. Section 2.3 discusses three theories namely: occupational choice, social learning, and social disorganisation which explain the root causes of crime and explain why some communities experience higher crime rates than others. Section 2.4 conceptualises crime prevention. The section also discusses community participation in controlling and preventing crime and other deviant behaviours; and section 2.5 conceptualises community participation in the context of crime prevention. The section discusses key factors that promote community participation in preventing and fighting crime whilst section 2.6 provides conclusions drawn from this chapter.

2.2 Conceptualizing crime

Crime is not a new phenomenon or concept in the community. Every community experiences crime although crime levels differ from community to community. Currently, there is no single universally accepted definition of crime. In fact, crime is socially and legally constructed by society, and thus each community has its own way of defining and perceiving crime. Two major perspectives of conceiving crime are discussed here, the social and legal perspectives. From the social perspective, crime may be defined as any act or behaviour that is perceived to violate shared values and norms of a society or community. Each society or group of people have a set of fundamental values that may be regarded as regulations which every member has to learn and conform to (Bynum and Thompson, 1996). If members of the

community fail to conform to those values and regulations, they are regarded as criminals or deviants and are subject to sanctions.

From the legal perspective, crime is an action that could be followed by criminal proceedings, having one of the types of outcome such as a punishment, known to follow these proceedings (Williams, 1961, cited in Feldman, 1993:3). Based on this legal definition of crime, it may also be argued that crime is legally constructed given that laws determine which acts are regarded as crime. Classical theorists posit that there will be no crime in the absence of laws and some actions may not be regarded as crimes if there are no laws that forbid those actions. Whilst classical theorists consider crime as normal behaviour outlawed by the state or a group of people, religious organisations such as churches, view crime as evil behaviour, the product of demons, demonic possession, or irrational thought (Henry and Lanier, 2001:3).

For an individual to avoid committing crime, they have to be aware of how law defines crime. The problem of the legal definition of crime is that some people in society may not be aware of the laws governing them. Laws often reflect the views of, and are imposed by elite people in power, who may criminalise behaviours and activities that are against their interests at the expense of the majority. In South Africa for example, the apartheid regime criminalised Africans, who are the majority, by passing a law which forbade them from living in white areas. To ensure legitimacy the legal definition of crime may require the consensus of the majority while ensuring that the concerns of the majority are considered rather than disregarded. Outlawing actions that harm or injure the minority is the major challenge of the legal definition of crime (Henry and Lanier, 2001:3). On the other hand, defining crime based on social shared values of the majority may still be biased in a multicultural society because the social values of the minority may be disregarded.

2.3 Theorizing causes of crime

For decades, different disciplines such as criminology, economics, sociology and psychology have been trying to explain why individuals pursue criminal activities. As a result, many different theories of crime have been developed (Bandura, 1969; Lebow and Stein, 1989; Sampson and Groves, 1989). This section provides a discussion of the following theories: occupational choice, social learning, and social disorganisation.

2.3.1 Crime as an occupation of choice

The Occupational choice theory has been used by economists to explain why individuals choose to pursue criminal activities rather than conform to the laws and widely shared social values in their communities. The theory links crime to income distribution or the well-being of community residents (Akers, 1990; Demombynes and Özler, 2005). According to economists, individuals choose to pursue criminal activities due to the economic benefits that are gained from illegitimate activities (Brown, 2001; Becker, 1968). The occupational choice theory is grounded on two assumptions: the first assumption is that individuals face resources scarcity; and the second assumption is that individuals always choose the occupation that maximizes their well-being (Brown, 2001).

Occupational choice theorists argue that individuals prefer illegitimate activities as long as the returns from these activities are higher than the returns from legitimate activities (Brown, 2001; Becker, 1968). However, there are some instances in which criminals undertake a combination of legitimate and illegitimate activities (Brown, 2001). Consistent with this argument, Machin and Meghir (2000, cited in Demombynes and Özler, 2005) found that criminals are more likely to come from the bottom end of the wage distribution. The implication is that people who earn low wages from legal activities might choose to engage in criminal activities as a way of supplementing their returns from legitimate activities. Given that people prefer to pursue an occupation that maximizes returns, the choice of occupation that yields the highest economic benefit is less likely to be crime if a wide range of occupations are available to choose from. Economics and sociology theorists posit that people are rational and they always make a choice after making calculations (Slocum, 1959; Nagin and Paternoster, 1993; Ulen, 1999, Brown, 2001; Mann and Mante, 2004). In terms of crime, these calculations involve a cost-benefit analysis which is undertaken by a potential criminal to decide whether committing a particular crime generates high returns. Crime is mostly committed if the net benefits of committing such a crime are expected to be higher than its costs (Brown, 2001).

The assumption of rationality leads occupational choice theorists to propose that people's choice of an occupation is not by accident but through the influence of some powerful stimulus that is beyond their control (Slocum, 1959). The influences affecting occupational choice decision-making could be: (i) personal attributes such as size, strength, good health, capacities, interests and aptitudes since some occupations may require certain physical

characteristics; (ii) impersonal values and cultural factors; and (iii) perceived interpersonal relationships. Taking into account these influences on decision-making, it is argued that an individual makes three thorough analyses before taking a firm decision to commit a crime: the first analysis is a scan of the availability of crime targets or potential crime victims.

Potential criminals have to analyse whether the available crime targets are likely to provide maximum benefits if the crime is committed as (Brown, 2001) argues that a crime is committed if the anticipated benefits are high. The second analysis relates to the ability of the potential criminal themselves measured in terms of terms of strength, size, intelligence, and state of health, among others. Some crimes may require special skills or physical strengths compared to others. The third analysis relates to the suitability of the environment in which the crime is to occur. In relation to this, environmental factors such as availability of friends, cultural impediments, strength of the criminal justice system, visibility, and other constraints enable individuals to commit crimes.

2.3.2 Non-conforming behaviours are learnt not congenital

Every community has its own set of institutions which determine the expected social behaviour of each and every individual in that community. The process of acquiring new institutions or behaviours is explained in the theory of social learning which was developed by Bandura (Hart and Kritsonis, 2006). The theory proposes that criminal behaviours are not inborn but they are acquired like any other kind of behaviours. Social learning theory has been used extensively to explain how individuals acquire criminal behaviour (Krohn, *et al.*, 1985; Akers and Lee, 1996; Krohn, 1999; Akers and Jensen, 2003).

The link between criminal behaviour and social learning theory is grounded on the hypothesis that the acquisition of deviant behaviour and conforming behaviour follow the same learning process (Akers and Lee, 1996). Accordingly, individuals learn the deviant behaviours in a similar fashion to how they learn the conforming behaviours, depending on the consequences attached to the behaviours which individuals opt to learn. These consequences may be rewards or punishments. The theory proposes that individuals learn new behaviour through interaction, imitation or the modelling of other's behaviour (Bandura, 1969; Krohn, *et al.*, 1985). This suggests that an individual becomes a criminal if he/she interacts with criminals and imitates their behaviours and that the individuals' behaviours are strongly influenced by the behaviours of their friends, family members, peers or models.

However, individuals do not choose to learn behaviours with no purpose. Rather individuals learn a particular behaviour after balancing the potential rewards or punishments attached to that behaviour. As the rational theory proposes, people are rational and they choose acts that always maximise gains (Lebow and Stein, 1989), people may learn behaviours that are expected to yield more profit or behaviours that are likely to bring less punishment. Therefore, it is not surprising that individuals pursue criminal activities because those activities are expected to bring more profits compared with legitimate activities.

2.3.3 Social organisation as a determinant of community participation

Crime has been consistently linked to social structures. Literature shows that there is a strong correlation between community organisation and crime rates (Sampson and Groves, 1989; Saegert and Winkel, 2004; Weijters, Scheepers and Gerris, 2009). This literature supports Shaw and McKay's (1942 cited in Sampson and Groves, 1989) theory of disorganisation which states that communities with a high degree of organisation experience low crime rates whilst disorganised communities experience high crime rates. Social disorganisation was defined as the 'inability of a community structure to realise the common values of its residents and maintain effective social control (Sampson and Groves, 1989).

This theory is grounded on the assumption that communities with a low quality of organisation lack common values which may enable the community to collectively control and maintain security and order (Sampson and Groves, 1989; Kawachi, Kennedy, and Wilkinson, 1999; Steyn, de Beer and Fouché, 2009). Community social disorganisation weakens social cohesion which is a key component for achieving common interests. In the absence of informal sanctions such as condemnations and punishments, crimes and other non-conforming activities may be learnt, reinforced and normalised in the community. Informal sanctions against crime are reactions imposed by ordinary citizens. These sanctions include all detrimental consequences that convicted offenders suffer which are not formally specified by law or pronounced by the judge in the disposition (Benson, 1989).

Informal social controls therefore, may play a significant role in reducing the amount of people who may acquire deviant behaviour. In the same vein, Fagan and Meares (2008) argue that deviant behaviour can be deterred and controlled by informal sanctions without involving formal sanctions such as legal punishments. Even though many people may see formal

sanctions as the right tool for deterring deviant behaviours, many studies show that these formal sanctions and other external institutions do not work effectively within disorganised communities. Formal sanctions work well only if they are paired with informal sanctions (Fagan and Meares, 2008; Jiang and Lambert, 2009).

Informal sanctions can work effectively in various ways: inhibition of problem behaviours, facilitation of conformity, and restraint of social deviance once it appears (Fagan and Meares, 2008). The ineffectiveness of formal sanctions could be due to the uncertainty of potential criminals being caught. As a result, potential criminals choose to commit crime because they know that there is little possibility of being caught. Another reason for the ineffectiveness of formal sanctions could be the assumption that individuals have enough knowledge of sanctions and the consequences of sanctions tied to a particular crime (Fagan and Meares, 2008). The idea behind this assumption is that individuals may refrain from committing crime because they know the sanctions they may get if they are caught.

While legal punishments play an important role in the prevention, informal sanctions such as shame, condemnation, stigma, and segregation imposed by family members, friends and neighbours, form yet other important deterrents. Empirical evidence in a social survey carried out by the British government on the consequence of arrest found that the majority of people do not consider the punishment associated with arrest as the most important consequence of arrest. Rather, they see informal sanctions such as shame, a tarnished reputation and a negative change in their relationship with family members and friends, as the most important consequence of arrest (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973, cited in Braithwaite, 1999:70).

In disorganised communities, informal sanctions are weak and ineffective. The levels at which a community is disorganised or organised is measured by different features such as friendship, social networks, trust, hospitality, communalism, and the control of street teenage peer groups and offenders (Sampson and Groves, 1989). These features facilitate social cohesion and understanding among community residents and they allow residents to solve crime and other local problems collectively. Despite that levels of social organisation or disorganisation differ from society to society, they also change over time depending on how factors that force individuals to pursue criminal behaviours are manipulated.

Community social disorganisation is influenced by socio-economic and physical factors in and around communities. Sampson and Groves, (1989) argue that low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and family disruption lead to community social disorganisation and as a result, community residents lose their ability to maintain informal social control. Residential mobility with a high influx of new-comers for example, acts as a barrier to the development of extensive friendship, kinship, trust, and collaboration (Sampson and Groves, 1989). Consequently, community residents work individually rather than collectively to deter and control criminal behaviour. A weak organisational structure within a community creates an environment that attracts criminal behaviour (Shaw and McKay, 1942 cited in Steyn, de Beer, and Fouché, 2009) because there are no informal social controls.

2.4 Conceptualising crime prevention

Crime prevention is defined as "any public or privately based initiative or policy aimed at reducing or eliminating criminal behaviour, violence and fear of crime or violence in the community" (Crime Prevention Victoria (CPV), 2002, cited in Armstrong and Rutter, 2002). Crime prevention involves two approaches: firstly, the situational crime prevention approach focuses on criminal events and reducing crime rates by minimising opportunities for offenders; and secondly, the social crime prevention approach focuses on people and their dispositions towards criminal behaviour (Armstrong and Rutter, 2002).

The situational crime prevention approach puts emphasis on community policing to establish working partnerships between the police and communities with the intention of reducing crime rates and enhancing security (Moore, 1992). Community policing can be reactive or proactive. Although Mbosowo (1995) postulates that reactive community policing is when the police make efforts to respond to people's report of crimes whilst proactive community policing is a situation in which the police make efforts to detect and deal with crime on their initiatives, police work in collaboration with community. It is based on the assumption that by toughening legal sanctions and increasing risks and reducing rewards, offenders will refrain from committing crime. The situational crime prevention approach concentrates its efforts and resources on law enforcement.

The social crime prevention approach enhances human capabilities by improving social conditions and by removing factors that force individuals into criminal activities (Mbosowo, 1995). This approach focuses on addressing the root causes of criminality, and its impacts

may not be realised immediately. Yet, the approach is relatively effective in the long-term in the sense that the approach is implemented in such way that it provides alternative sources of income by tackling social issues that force individuals into criminal activities. The approach acknowledges that crime is a multi-dimensional problem in the society, thus it cannot be tackled by a single strategy and requires a comprehensive approach in which the efforts of individuals, public, private and societal agencies are integrated (Haskins, 2007). Haskins adds that it is important to fully understand the causes of criminal activities in the community if crime prevention is to be effective. Consistent with this suggestion, Tonry and Farrington (1995) point out that a sensible crime prevention policy should be differentiated according to different types and causes of crime.

Crime problems are addressed through a comprehensive approach which take into consideration the whole environment around the community as Jeffrey (1971, cited in Mbosowo, 1995) postulates that crime can only be prevented if the environment in which crimes occur is manipulated accordingly. Manipulating the crime environment to reduce crime opportunities may include steps taken to improve a quality physical environment. Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) has emerged as a model for fighting crime. CPTED goes beyond crime prevention to address the link between crimes and place (Cozens, Saville, and Hillier, 2005; Landman and Liebermann, 2005). To stress the importance of improving environmental conditions in communities in which crimes occur, some people refer to CPTED approach as 'place-based crime prevention' (Cozens, Saville, and Hillier, 2005). The aim of CPTED is to reduce the root causes of crimes and opportunities for criminal events and address the fear of crime by applying comprehensive planning, design and management principles to the built environment (Landman and Liebermann, 2005).

Improving infrastructure such as street lights is essentially important to ensure locations are rendered unsuitable for criminal activities but favourable for legitimate activities. By improving and maintaining the quality of physical environmental conditions, opportunities for criminals are reduced, and access control and surveillance by legitimate users are facilitated (Crowe, 2000 cited in Cozens, Saville, and Hillier, 2005). The improvement of the physical environment may involve different approaches: mechanical surveillance such as using street lights and Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV); formal or organised surveillance in which police patrols are involved; and informal or natural surveillance which is done by

community residents. Barr and Pease, (1992, cited in Cozens, Saville, and Hillier, 2005) point out that informal surveillance requires residents who are committed to participating in the control of crime while formal surveillance cannot effectively work without community participation.

The assumption of CPTED approach is that crime prevention works effectively if surrounding environmental conditions are properly improved (City of Virginia Beach, 2000). This assumption indicates that CPTED is centred on three components which are: (i) situation crime prevention; (ii) social crime prevention; and (iii) improvement of physical environment. It takes into account three basic elements of crime. These elements are crime target, offender, and environment (Liebermann and Coulson, 2004).

2.5 Community participation in the context of crime prevention

The main aim of community participation is to increase the confidence and capacity of community members to participate in activities that improve their quality of life and build mutually supportive relationships that hold community members together (Skidmore, Bound, and Lownsbrough, 2006). Community participation in patrolling and maintaining local security and order is not a new phenomenon. The approach was adopted in the early days during the settlement of America when local volunteers were the first peace officers patrolling and controlling the streets. Community participation however, lost its use soon after the introduction of formal police in the mid-nineteenth century (Ren *et al*., 2006).

Since the introduction of formal police, crime rates have significantly increased in neighbourhoods and communities due to ineffective policing and law enforcement because police were corrupt, abusive, and controlled by local politicians. They were relying more on new technology such as radios, 911 emergency telephone systems, and automobile patrols to responds to calls for help from citizens. Community involvement in crime prevention was neglected. Police were merely dealing with crimes and community problems were seen to be addressed by other agencies (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996). During this era, the whole criminal justice system failed to address crime and its related consequences (Cozens, Saville, and Hillier, 2005). Consequently, the interaction and cooperation between communities and law enforcement officials became weak (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996).

In the 1970s, governments started to address the ineffectiveness of the law enforcement approach by involving communities (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996, Newham, 2005). It has been realised that crime could not be reduced in communities without involving local communities as actors in crime prevention policies. Given that the effectiveness of police operations depends mainly on local communities who have information about crimes, the inclusion of community members in crime prevention was very necessary. This acknowledgement of community participation in crime prevention seems to be the renaissance of the community policing model which had been abandoned after the introduction of formal police. Community participation in safety and security is now viewed as an effective strategy to crime reduction (Mbosowo, 1995; Newham, 2005) and is now gaining its popularity.

Community participation model has a long standing history and has been extensively applied and investigated in other fields such as health, governance, education, development, and environment (Singer, 1995; Skidmore, Bound and Lownsbrough, 2006; Buccus, *et al*., 2007) but it was previously given little attention in crime prevention. Fighting and preventing crime was still seen as the work and responsibility of police and other law enforcement officials rather than being every community member's responsibility. External forces such as the police could not fight crime effectively if residents were not incorporated since criminals live within the community members. Besides, community involvement in fighting crime would mobilise more human resources than could be done by government alone (Botterill and Fisher, 2002). In addition, involving community residents in fighting crime enhances their capacity for resolving crime problems themselves.

Community participation in the context of fighting crime is founded on the assumption that people know best the places in which they live and are able to solve local problems occurring in their neighbourhoods (Liebermann and Coulson, 2004). Community participation model also assumes that people share a common understanding and values to control and maintain collective interests in their community. Given that the community participation model aims to achieve a common interest, it is argued that the model is effective in well-organised communities. Referring to the social disorganisation theory, well-organised communities experience a high quality of social cohesion which facilitates participation (Sampson and Groves, 1989). Community social organisation may therefore, be regarded as a key component of community participation in preventing crime. Similarly, Carcach and Huntley

(2002) and Fagan and Meares (2008) add that people within organised communities are willing to participate in local activities including preventing and controlling criminal behaviours, and work as a team to achieve collective objectives. In organised communities, residents have common social values; trust each other (Sampson and Groves, 1989); and can fight crime as a team. Fighting crime is relatively difficult in disorganised societies because they experience weak social capital and are not living *ubuntu.* Both social capital and *ubuntu* are key components of community participation.

2.5.1 Social capital and community participation

Social capital reflects the ability of a group of people or community to achieve common benefits. Thus, social capital is referred to as a property of groups (Saegert and Winkel, 2004) but it requires group members to share the same actions, motivations, and expected outcomes. Social capital is centred on mutual trust, pattern of reciprocity, shared norms and identity (Flora et al., 1997, cited in Kassahun, 2010). Communities with higher social capital are more united and work as a team to solve their local problems including crime. In line with this argument, Bellair, (1997, cited in Carcach and Huntley, 2002) shows that communities with a strong, dense and high quality social capital have a greater capacity for fostering an environment to fight and deter criminal behaviours.

Components of social capital such as mutual trust, communalism, reciprocity, and sharing social values enable residents to network and share crime-related information. With these components, community members are able to work as a team to achieve common objectives as Ostrom (2000) suggests that social capital provides an insight into how individuals deal with problems of collective action. Individuals in a community with low social capital face difficulties when solving problems including crime collectively. In his work, Putnam (2000:308) shows that crime rates are high in disorganised communities where there is low social capital.

In relation to fighting crime, sharing crime-related information among community members reciprocally and freely is critical. The effective flow of information however, is possible if community members are well-networked between themselves and with external elements such as police who need information on crime that has occurred and on potential crime. This is more likely to happen in well-organised communities where residents are homogeneous and their mobility is limited. The implication is that social networks work effectively when

network members know each other very well and interact often to allow the flow of information freely (Saegert and Winkel, 2004). Examples of social network members could be family members, business associates, church members, school children, and sports club members.

2.5.2 *Ubuntu* and community participation

The concept of *ubuntu* is defined as humanness that envelops a spirit of caring community, harmony and hospitality, respect and responsiveness which individuals and groups display for one another (Mangaliso, 2001). Similar to this definition, Nussbaum (2003a; 2003c) describes *ubuntu* as the capacity in African culture to express compassion, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity in the interests of building and maintaining community. Based on these features, it is argued that the concept of *ubuntu* is centered on values of interdependence, respect, sharing, interconnectivity, understanding, caring for each other, harmony, compassion, communalism, fraternity, loyalty, hospitality and trust.

Literally, *ubuntu* is translated as collective brotherhood (personhood) and collective morality (Tshoose, 2009). The values of *ubuntu* show what it means to be a human being. As Ramose (2002, cited in Olinger, Britz and Oliver, 2007) states, human beings are recognized as being all equal, sharing a common basic brotherhood. Based on values of *ubuntu* such as communalism, sharing, and caring for each other, it is argued that people who live *ubuntu* are motivated and willing to participate in actions that intend to improve the quality of lives in their community.

Communities that live *ubuntu,* experience a high level of social cohesion because residents share common values and are well-networked. As a result, they are able to control deviant behaviour and maintain social relationships. Given that *ubuntu* considers community as an essential element of personhood rather than self-determination (Nussbaum, 2003b), people are willing and prepared to act on behalf of others. *Ubuntu* promotes community participation because community members believe in solidarity, sharing, and equal opportunity. Based on these features of *ubuntu,* it is argued that communities that live *ubuntu* experience low crime rates because residents work collectively to control and maintain safety and order in their communities. Residents remain conformed to the shared social values and deviant behaviours are condemned. This means that individuals are discouraged from acquiring non-conforming behaviours

2.6 Conclusion

Crime is socially, legally and historically constructed. From the social perspective, crime is constructed based on shared values by community members whilst crime is legally constructed based on the interest of law-makers. What is regarded as a crime in one community may be legitimised in other communities. Within one community however, crime may vary from time to time. Some activities may be criminalised in a particular period and be legitimised in another period. With cultural diversity and the interest of law-makers, it is very difficult to come up with a single definition of crime which is universally accepted.

Crime rates are linked to the quality of a social organisation in a community. A high quality of social organisation is characterised by solidarity, communalism, hospitality and interdependency whilst a low quality of social organisation is characterised by individualism, independency, and selfishness. Communities with a high quality of social organisation experience low crime rates because community members are willing to participate and support crime prevention programmes. In contrast, communities with a poor quality of social organisation experience high crime rates because they cannot work collectively to fight crime. Besides, social capital and *ubuntu* which are key components of community participation are low in communities with a low quality of social organisation.

Law enforcement with its sanctions plays a significant role in deterring criminal activities but it works effectively if communities are involved. As it is its purpose, law enforcement intends to reduce crime incidents without tackling causes of crime. This approach is useful to achieve short-term objectives but not long-term ones. Crime prevention involves a comprehensive approach which addresses concurrently three aspects: reducing crimes, removing causes of crime, and improving the physical environment. In addition, communities can supplement the work of law enforcement by exercising informal sanctions.

Chapter 3
Crime in South Africa: trends, costs and responses

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides in-depth coverage of literature on crime and crime prevention in South Africa. South Africa experiences many socio-economic challenges including inequality, racism, poverty, and corruption but crime consistently features as the most urgent problem that devastates people's lives (Nedcor, 1996 cited in Brown, 2001, Burger, 2007: 233). Many South Africans are exposed to high levels of crime with profound effects on people's lives and economic growth. A twelve-month survey conducted from September 2002 to August 2003 showed that almost a quarter (22.9) of all South Africans had been a crime victim (Burton, *et al.*, 2004). While government officials claim that crime rates are decreasing, crime remains an everyday experience. In fact, no single day can pass without a major crime incident reported in the media. In 1994, the democratically elected government listed crime as one of the serious problems the country had to tackle urgently to improve safety and security for every South African (Demombynes and Özler, 2005) but the government is still far from achieving this goal. All crime prevention policies implemented by the government seem to lack proper direction.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: section 3.2 provides a brief crime situation in the country starting from the time of apartheid, using crime statistics. Section 3.3 discusses costs of crime to individuals, businesses, and to the government whilst section 3.4 discusses determinants of crime and violence in South Africa as well as factors that influence individuals to pursue criminal activities. Then section 3.5 provides insights into the criminal justice system in terms of crime prevention policies at national and local government levels, and section 3.6 provides conclusions based on issues that emerged from the chapter.

3.2 A brief history of crime in South Africa

The history of crime and violence in the country may be traced from the period of the struggle against apartheid (Shaw, 2002; de Wet, 2003; Møller, 2005) even though it has been argued that the crime situation became worse in the 'new' South Africa. During the apartheid regime, violence and crime rates were high but statistics on crime and violence are generally inaccessible. The available literature though shows that crime was increasing during the time of apartheid. The number of recorded murders for example, rose from 10,000 cases in 1989 to

11,000 cases in 1990. In the following year, the police reported 22,000 deaths through violence and crime-related incidents in only fifteen months. And 16,067 cases of murder were reported alongside 78,677 robbery cases and 24,360 rape cases in 1992, the year South Africa was ranked one of the countries with the highest crime rate in the world (Winslow, 2002 cited in Ikejiaku, 2009).

The significant increase in crime during the apartheid era was noticed from 1980 to 1990, a decade in which activities of the anti-apartheid movement intensified (Shaw, 1997). When the country got freedom in 1994, many South Africans and the international community expected a considerable decline in crime rates but this did not happen (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2002). The country is still ranked among countries with high crime rates in the world. Crime and its effects continue to devastate the lives of many people and affect businesses in the country. In 2000 for example, 2,300 crime cases were recorded for every 100,000 people living in South Africa in the period of five months (from January to May) compared to 2,187 in 1999 (Schönteich and Louw, 2001). Figure 1 shows that since April 2003 crime cases have gradually decreased from 2,666,427 to 2,168,254 crime cases in the year April 2010/March 2011 with an annual average of 71,167 cases.

Figure 1: Total crime cases reported to police

Source: SAPS (2011). Crime in the RSA (national total) for April to March 2003/2004 -2010/2011.

The country experienced a significant decrease from April 2003 to March 2006 when crime declined by 15% in three years from 2,666, 427 to 2,265,629 crime cases. From April 2005 -

March 2011, the reported crime crimes reduced from 2,219,629 to 2,168,254 cases. This was a small decrease of approximately 2.3% in five years.

3.3 Costs of crime

Costs of crime vary from place to place depending on crime rates and types of crime. Places with high crime rates are likely to experience high crime costs compared to places with low crime rates. In this regard, it is argued that costs of crime in South Africa are high in the sense that the country experiences high crime rates. Costs of crime are incurred by individuals, group of people, businesses and even the government, each of which is discussed below.

3.3.1 Costs of crime to individuals

Costs of crime to individuals and households occur when a family member suffers from physical and mental harm due to a violent crime, or when individuals lose their properties. While trying to avoid potential crime costs, individuals or households incur other crime-related costs such as expenditure on private security structures, electric fences and gates, alarms, neighbourhood watch to improve home security (Alda and Cuesta, 2010). However, costs of crime to households are difficult to measure but the costs in South Africa might be higher than people think. A recent study shows that the predominant crimes in the country that target individuals or households include home invasion robberies, burglaries, car hijackings, street muggings, smash and grabs, and organized attacks on retail shops (OSAC, 2011). Similar to this argument, a study carried out in 2010 reveals that at least 25% of surveyed South Africans had something stolen from their homes in 2009 at several times, and 21% of surveyed South Africans reported being physically attacked at least once in the year (Afrobarometer, 2010). In fact, everyone is a potential victim of crime, and many South Africans pay much costs of crime on protection.

3.3.2 Costs of crime to businesses

Crime also affects all sizes of businesses in South Africa from small to big, informal and formal businesses. The reputation that there are high rates of crime in South Africa affects foreign direct investments as investors see the country as not safe to invest (Stone, 2006). Similar to this claim, a study carried out among business owners shows that crime and fear of crime are rated as the major challenges which businesses face (RSA, 2008). In fact, armed robbery on business is one of the few increasing trends of crime throughout the country.

Criminals target restaurants, jewellery shops, grocery stores, cash in transit vehicles, shopping malls and centres (OSAC, 2011), and automated teller machines (ATM).

Costs of crime to business organizations also include expenditure on private security and other measures taken by business organizations to improve security and safety around their properties. The private security industry is now seen as a booming business with potential profit. Interestingly, there are even people who argue that the number of people employed by the security industry is bigger than the number of people employed by the South African Police Service (Nedcor, 1996, cited in Brown, 2001; van der Spuy and Lever, 2010).

3.3.3 Costs of crime to government

The South African government spends a significant amount of its annual budget in administration of the criminal justice system and crime prevention programmes and projects. The government expenditure on crime has been increasing since 1994. Government expenditure on crime increased from R 12.047 billion in 1994/1995 to R 27.792 billion in 2000/01 with a steady increase of 11% each year during this period (Blackmore, 2003). Different studies consistently show that the government expenditure on crime continues to significantly increase even though crime rates are falling. In 1980, the government allocated R 49 million to finance the criminal justice system but this amount increased to R 6.2 billion in 2006. This was an increase of 9.4 per cent annually (de Villiers and Nel, 2010). Furthermore, the comprehensive costs of crime were estimated to be worth US$ 22.1 billion (7.8% of the country's GDP) in 2007 (Alda and Cuesta, 2010).[1]

3.4 Causes of crime in South Africa

Root causes of crime and other deviant behaviours in South Africa are contentious and have been linked to various factors and these include: the apartheid regime, socio-economic inequality, an ineffective and corrupt criminal justice system, weak informal social controls, and alcohol and drug abuse.

Although South Africa experiences high crime rates, there are significant disparities of how the crime rates are geographically and racially distributed throughout the country. Crime and violence are concentrated in townships and rural areas which are dominantly occupied by

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[1] US$ 22.1 billion is approximately R 172 billion using exchange rate of R 7.80/US$

black Africans. Victim surveys conducted from 1997 to 2000 revealed that people living in townships are more at risk of being crime and violence victims (Møller, 2005). A number of authors including Singh (2005) linked high crime rates in townships and in other black communities to the apartheid regime. The apartheid government has never showed the willingness to control and prevent crime in townships, rural areas, and other areas that were occupied by black people. Rather than controlling and preventing crime in townships, black Africans were only controlled by police to ensure there was no unrest against the apartheid government (Shaw, 2002).

Protecting black Africans and their paraphernalia was not on the apartheid government's agenda. The government was more interested in protecting the white population and its interests. The majority of police and resources were intensely allocated in the areas occupied by whites to ensure that crime and violence in townships were prevented from spreading to wealthy white areas (Shaw, 2002). Criminal activities were allowed to take root in areas occupied by black Africans. Consequently, crime and other deviant behaviours increased and normalised in these areas.

In addition, the apartheid government marginalized black Africans socially and economically leading to socio-economic inequalities in the country and long term unemployment for black African people (Shaw, 2002). The black South Africans consist of more than three quarters of South Africa's population but the majority of them live in severe poverty (Armstrong, Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008). As economists consistently link the distribution of welfare to crime (Brown, 2001; Demombynes and Özler, 2005), poverty and economic inequalities are also currently on the list of the most cited root causes of crime in South Africa (Palmary, 2001; Demombynes and Özler, 2005; Nleya and Thompson, 2009). Based on economists' assumption that individuals pursue criminal activities to maximize economic gains from those criminal activities, it is argued that poor individuals in South Africa commit crimes with the intention of getting economic returns such as money, food and equipment.

Still on the causes of crime in South Africa, it is important to interrogate the ineffectiveness of the whole criminal justice system as a cause of high crime rates in the country. The law enforcement and other departments in the criminal justice system are very weak, slow and ineffective (Brown, 2001; Singh, 2005). There are even some allegations that the criminal justice system is corrupt (Shaw, 1996; Brown, 2001) and that it is administered by a wide

pool of unqualified staff (Schönteich, 1999). In the absence of legal sections, individuals tend to take law in their own hands and do whatever they want. Some elements in the South African society see this weakness in the criminal justice system as an opportunity to pursue criminal activities because they know the probability of being punished is very low.

Even though the South African government considers formal sanctions as a central deterrent to crime and other deviant behaviours, there are some allegations that criminals are sometimes not arrested, or are released on bail without being prosecuted and many crime cases go undetected (Singh, 2005). In addition, many crime victims withdraw their cases before they go to trial because they have lost faith in the criminal justice system and due to delays in the criminal courts (Schönteich, 1999). These allegations indicate that the criminal justice system and its components are ineffective. As deterring crime and deviant behaviours is the purpose of implementing criminal law and the criminal justice system, all components of the criminal justice system including law enforcement has to be able to manipulate and influence the behaviour of potential criminals and deviants (Tonry and Farrington, 1995).

Lack of parental guidance is another factor which contributes to high crime rates in South Africa (de Wet, 2003; Nleya and Thompson, 2009). Some parents are reluctant or too busy to guide and control children from pursuing criminal activities. In 1994 for example, approximately 40% of children in townships were left at home with no supervision during the day (Palmary and Moat, 2002). As a result of limited parental supervision, children get involved in crime and other non-conforming activities. In 1997, the number of young people who were in South African prisons was high and the number was increasing (Dissel, 1997). In 2002, 36% of all sentenced prisoners were young people, and 53% of all awaiting trial prisoners were young people under 26 years (Palmary and Moat, 2002). In some communities for example, youths have normalized illegitimate activities including crime and violence as a way of acquiring status (Pelser, 2008). However, children from dysfunctional families are more likely to commit crime. Dysfunctional families are those families experiencing a high level of family conflict, family violence, poor communication between parents and children, break-up, and child abuse (Muhammad, 2008).

Different studies show that alcohol and drugs are among the root causes of crime in South Africa (de Wet, 2003; Newham, 2005; Nleya and Thompson, 2009). The contribution of drugs and alcohol to crime in South Africa is relatively high. A study conducted in 1997

showed that alcohol was linked to violence, particularly child abuse and rape (Shaw and Louw, 1997). In 2003, one study disclosed that 40% of crime case victims believed the assailant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the assault whilst one third of victims conceded to having been under the influence at the time of assault (Omar, 2004). Similarly, data of the Non-Natural Mortality Surveillance System (NNMSS) revealed that 44.4% of 23,938 people who were fatally injured in 2004 were tested blood alcohol concentrations (South Africa Medical Research Centre (SAMRC) and University of South Africa (UNISA), 2004). Crime statistics also show that crimes related to alcohol and drugs are high and continuously increasing (SAPS, 2011).

3.5 Crime prevention policies in South Africa

When the African National Congress (ANC) took over the control of government in 1994, one of its key promises was to fight crime so South Africans could be free from crime and violence. Some of the attempts by the government to fight and prevent crime include the implementation of different crime prevention policies at national and local government levels. The key national crime prevention policies are: the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the National Crime Prevention Strategy, the White Paper on Safety and Security, and the National Crime Combating Strategy. While local crime prevention approaches include community policing forums (CPFs) and their projects neighbourhood watches.

3.5.1 The Reconstruction and Development Programme

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was the first policy featuring crime prevention implemented in 1994 by the democratically elected government. The RDP was not designed to address crime directly, rather it was an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework intended to mobilize human and material resources which were needed to eliminate socio-economic inequalities as a legacy of apartheid (RSA, 1994; Corder, 1997). However, peace and security were among the six principles the RDP had to address. In this policy, the government vows not to tolerate illegitimate activities such as vandalism, lawlessness, drug trafficking, gun running, crime, and the abuse of women and children (RSA, 1994, Dixon, 2006). Besides, the RDP would indirectly reduce and prevent crime by addressing socio-economic inequalities as poverty is one of the factors that forces individuals into criminal activities for economic gains (Brown, 2001).

The RDP was centered on six basic principles namely: integration and sustainability, people driven, peace and security, nation building, meeting basic needs and building infrastructure, and democratisation. However, the implementations surprisingly gave little attention to safety and security issues. Much emphasis was on meeting basic needs such as land, clean water, housing, health facilities, education, and social welfare instead of restructuring the whole criminal justice system which was ineffective during the apartheid regime (Dixon, 2006). Without a doubt, meeting the basic needs is an essential strategy when fighting and preventing crime given that the strategy tackles factors that force individuals to pursue criminal activities. The problem of this social crime approach is that it does not address crime events rather potential crimes. Considering how high crime rates were in 1994, the RDP would have focused on both situational crime prevention and social crime prevention approaches in lieu of focusing only on social crime prevention approach. It can be argued that the implementation of the RDP has been relatively unsuccessful.

3.5.2 The National Crime Prevention Strategy

Two years after the implementation of the RDP, the government realised that crime was still a pressing issue which the country had to tackle urgently. Thus, in May 1996, the government implemented another policy, the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) to improve safety and security (RSA, 1996; Dixon, 2006). The NCPS was developed as a response to President Mandela's address at the opening of Parliament in which he raised concerns about crime increase (Simpson and Rauch, 1999). Unlike the RDP which seemed to put its emphasis on social crime prevention, the NCPS focused on two approaches of crime prevention: reactive (situational) crime control to respond to the crimes already committed, and proactive (social) crime prevention as a way of preventing crime from happening (RSA, 1996). This strategy intended to address crime events and improve the well-being of South Africans through removing all factors and obstacles that could motivate and influence individuals to commit crime.

The implementation of the NCPS showed that the government acknowledged the multi-dimensionality of crime. The government developed a framework for the NCPS in such a way that it integrated all efforts and resources of the public, private institutions, individuals and communities to control and prevent crime. This framework was centered on four pillars: the first pillar is the criminal justice process which aims at enhancing the criminal justice system to deliver effectively and efficiently; the second pillar is reducing crime through

environmental design that will reduce the opportunities for crime and increase constraints; the third one is community values and education pillar that will encourage community participation in crime prevention; and the fourth pillar is trans-national crime programmes which was intended to control over cross borders traffic related to crime and improve regional cooperation to reduce international criminal syndicates (RSA, 1996; Rauch, 2002). With a closer look, the four pillars reflect the government's intention of tackling crime with a holistic approach which would harden crime targets and remove causes of crime.

On paper, the NCPS is arguably seen as a strategy that would notably tackle crime and its effects in South Africa. However, the NCPS failed to achieve its main objective of controlling and preventing crime. By the end of 1998, only two years after its implementation, crime was still seen as a threat to many South Africans and the international community. As pressure on the government increased, the government declared a war against criminals and it sent a warning message to criminals that the time for playing games is over. The implication of the message was that there would be no more tolerance for any kind of criminal activities. The message was followed by the enhancement of law enforcement and designing the infrastructure of the whole criminal justice system (Rauch, 2002).

Still, the NCPS did not meet its intended goal of reducing crime due to a number of impediments. The intention of the government was to implement the NCPS at all government levels including national, provincial and local but the government did not elaborate how the strategy would be implemented at each level. Rather than coordinating the whole implementation of the NCPS, the government assumed that inter-departmental co-operation would be achievable and that all stakeholders would easily dedicate their resources, time and efforts to achieve common goals. In addition, government did not allocate a budget for the NCPS implementation but requested concerned departments to rationalize their existing resources to activities that were likely to reduce crime and to the NCPS programmes (Rauch, 2001).

Evidently, the collaboration between government departments was relatively challenging especially at provincial and local spheres where national departments such as criminal justice and defence are not represented (Simpson and Rauch, 1999). The NCPS was even staffed by people with limited crime prevention-related knowledge who were politically trusted by ANC government instead of being police officers (Rauch, 2001). The fact that there was no

coordination and guidelines put in place as to how the NCPS would be implemented, the dominant challenge in the NCPS implementation was the lack of focus and commitment to crime control and prevention in some departments. Heads of departments concentrated on restructuring and re-organizing their departments rather than responding to increasing crime rates (Rauch, 2001). However, the full commitment of all government departments to crime prevention was always going to be difficult because preventing crime is not a core activity in the majority of government departments such as health and education. If these departments had to commit themselves to crime prevention, their core activities would be compromised.

3.5.3 The White Paper on Safety and Security

In 1998, just two years after implementing the NCPS, the White Paper on Safety and Security was adopted as a core crime prevention strategy. In the meanwhile government was attempting to strengthen law enforcement and restructuring the whole criminal justice system. The intention of the White Paper was also to reduce and deter crime through enhancing police performance and supporting social crime prevention (RSA, 1998). Placing both situational crime prevention and social crime prevention approaches in the heart of the White Paper on Safety and Security was the evidence that the government fully understands the multidimensionality of crime and its causes. The government seeks to integrate all stakeholders at all levels so they can collectively fight crime. In fact, the government believes that if efforts and resources of individuals, government and civil society organizations are well co-ordinated would reduce crime rates in the country (Rauch, 2002).

Although it may be argued that the White Paper on Safety and Security was implemented to compliment the NCPS, both strategies seem to be the same in terms of tackling crime. Both policies intended to address crime by adopting situational crime prevention and social crime prevention approaches. The implementation of the White Paper on Safety and Security followed the same direction of concentrating its resources on re-engineering the criminal justice system and law enforcement, but the addressing of root causes of crimes was given minimal attention. However, it is argued that reducing crime rates is urgent given that South Africa was experiencing high crime rates. To a great extent, the criminal justice system plays a significant role in deterring crime (Fagan and Meares, 2008) but crime prevention goes beyond the use of formal sanctions. Crime prevention addresses crime events while it is removing those factors which force individuals to commit crimes.

3.5.4 The National Crime Combating Strategy

After other two years, the South African Police Service (SAPS) developed its own in-house national crime combating strategy (NCCS) as a response to crime which was still increasing (SAPS, 2002). In April 2000, the strategy was adopted with two major focuses: (i) to restore public confidence in the police and encourage community participation; and (ii) to reduce crime in particular areas though policing (Rauch, 2002). In fact, NCCS intended to stabilise crime and create a climate conducive to socio-economic development in approximately 140 stations which were identified as 'hotspot' areas among 1200 station areas. These stations have been grouped into crime combating zones but these zones did not necessarily correspond with the boundaries of police stations. However, the crime combating zones included station areas adjacent to hotspot areas to prevent crime spilling over into neighbouring station areas (SAPS, 2002).

The NCCS gave much attention to fighting dominant and serious crimes such as organized crime, proliferation of firearms, crime against women, and corruption (SAPS, 2002; du Plessis and Louw, 2005). Although fighting these crimes seems to require law enforcement, the NCCS took a step further to address root causes of the crimes as an acknowledgement that crime cannot be tackled with a single approach. Then, the NCCS adopted a comprehensive approach which urges different government departments to cooperate in the identified crime combating zones (SAPS, 2002).[2] As South African crime prevention is based on principles of community policing (RSA, 2009), the NCCS calls for partnerships between police officials and communities. These partnerships, however, are not there to replace existing partnerships such as community police forums (CPFs) but to strengthen them (SAPS, 2004).

3.5.5 Crime prevention attempts at local government level

At local government level, numerous attempts have been made to ensure that all people live in a safe environment. The South African government for example, strengthened community policing forums which had been in existence since 1993. The CPFs which are partnerships between communities and police facilitate police to mobilize and involve communities and other stakeholders (such as churches, community-based organisations (CBOs), and business

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[2] The government departments were: the SAPS, the Department of Safety and Security, Department of Justice, Department of Health, Department of Water Affairs, Department of Correctional Services, Department of Forestry, Department of Constitutional Development, and the South African National Defense Forces (SANDF).

organisations) in communities to participate in fighting and preventing crime. The community policing model focuses on 'hot-spot' areas (areas with high crime rates) and it operates in smaller geographical and manageable areas (RSA, 2009).

After the failure of national crime prevention strategies, strengthening and increasing CPFs may be seen as a strategy with the potential of fighting crime in post-apartheid South Africa. The strategy is grounded on the visibility of police in the community, full community participation, and creation of ownership. Any crime prevention policy that excludes community involvement might be unsuccessful. The implementation of CPFs is based on the assumption that communities know their areas and are able to solve their local problems (Liebermann and Coulson, 2004). Although the implementation of CPFs requires well-trained and passionate officers, resources and active community members, CPFs are relatively fruitful since they work with local communities.

In the same vein, community-based anti-crime programmes were already undergoing change in 1996, at the time that the NCPS was launched. The first and popular community based anti-crime programme is South African Safer Cities, which was funded by the UN Urban Management Programme in collaboration with the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC). The programme ran in the three largest cities: Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban (Newham, 2005; van der Spuy and Lever, 2010). Many other community-based organisations were initiated to control and prevent crime in communities occupied by black Africans and other poor communities across the country. An example is the Community Peace Foundation that was introduced in the 1990s by prominent criminologist, Clifford Shearing after his return from exile. This initiative begun in Zwelethemba, a black township located in 120 km from Cape Town. It is now claimed the "Zwelethemba model" is being adopted in some poor Cape Town communities and even beyond (van der Spuy and Lever, 2010).

In contrast, rich neighbourhoods especially those are predominantly occupied by whites hire private commercial security companies to prevent crime. These companies are accredited with local police stations and are visible in neighbourhoods where they patrol streets and houses by cars or bicycles (van der Spuy and Lever, 2010). Private security guards are also visible at some shopping centres, business and public areas where they are hired by individuals or businesses. Interestingly, private security companies are even hired by some

government departments rather than using police who may cost nothing to the government besides their normal salaries.

On one hand, the presence of private security guards in government organisations may be regarded as the government's recognition that the private security industry contributes significantly to crime reduction. This recognition was acknowledged in 2007 by former President Mbeki in his crime prevention plan in which he called on the private security industry to cooperate with public police to respond to crime events (Potgieter, Ras and Neser, 2008). On the other hand, it may be argued that the government uses private security guards because it does not have adequate police to control crime in all public places. Therefore, making police visible in all government organisations and public areas may require the government to recruit new police, and it may be more costly than hiring private security guards. The commercial security industry is now seen as a potential employer in South Africa.

3.6 Conclusion

Crime and violence in South Africa are not a new phenomenon. The country was experiencing high crime rates even during the time of apartheid. Currently, crime rates in South Africa are still high regardless of the fact that the country is a democracy. Comparing the crime situation in apartheid South Africa and in 'new' South Africa, one can see that the difference is insignificant. Crime is still devastating the lives of many people, businesses, and economic growth in the country. Since 1994 after dismantling apartheid, the expenditure on crime prevention policies in 'new' South Africa has been consistently increasing and this expenditure is unlikely to decrease in the near future.

However, South Africa seems to lack appropriate crime prevention policies to address crime problems effectively. All implemented crime prevention policies have failed to achieve their intended objectives. The government concentrates its efforts and resources on responding to the crime situation without addressing the root causes of crime. Crime prevention cannot be achieved with law enforcement only without tackling factors that force individuals to pursue criminal activities. To improve safety and security the South African government has to address both crime events and causes of crime.

Chapter 4
Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides insights into the methodology adopted in this study. It describes the research process and justifies research methods, and strategies deployed to attain the research objectives. The following is a brief outline of the way the chapter is structured. Section 4.2 provides a brief description of the area in which the study was conducted. This description underlines socio-economic, demographic, and crime issues. Section 4.3 describes the research approach, and explains and justifies the research methods used in the study whilst Section 4.4 describes the sampling approach used to choose informants and provides a justification of why those particular informants were preferred. Furthermore, this section also provides insights into tools and strategies adopted to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. Section 4.5 outlines how the collected data was analysed. Section 4.6 discusses the limitations of the study, while section 4.7 provides a synopsis of ethical considerations followed in the study.

4.2 Description of site B

The study was carried out in Site B which is one of the constituents of Khayelitsha. A detailed description of Khayelitsha is provided in section 1.5. Like other constituent parts of Khayelitsha, Site B is characterised by crowded and unplanned informal houses with limited access to water supplies, toilets, and lights. Most streets are small, unplanned and dirty with limited or no lights. In terms of crime, Site B as with the rest of Khayelitsha experiences high crime rates. In fact, the township was identified as one of the crime hotspot areas in the Western Cape. The existing literature and crime statistics indicate that Site B is among the areas with high crime rates in Khayelitsha (City of Cape Town, 2009).

4.3 Research approach

Given that qualitative study focuses on experiences, feelings, perceptions and attitudes of individuals in question (Ryan, Coughlan, and Cronin, 2007), the study employed this approach in exploring the interactions, perceptions and attitudes towards crime and the extent to which individuals experience crime and how they adapt to it. Similarly, when questions such as what, how, when, why, and where of a thing are to be answered, qualitative approach

is pertinent (Tewksbury, 2009). In the present study the researcher needed to identify crimes and locate them temporarily and spatially, and identify both victims and perpetrators.

The quantitative method was deployed so the researcher could describe crime statistics to see, decipher trends and links between informants' claims and factual data. The crime statistics were sourced from Khayelitsha police stations.

According to Ryan, Coughlan, and Cronin (2007), techniques used to collect qualitative data include interviews, questionnaires, participant observation, written texts such as newspapers or diaries, and focus group discussions. In this study, the researcher preferred to use in-depth interviews which enabled him to probe and understand issues around crime. Different guiding questions were formulated for different informants. This means that there were questions for residents, questions for police, and questions for representatives of organisations. Although all questions for informants pertained to crime and crime prevention in Site B, questions varied from informant to informant depending on how and to what extent a particular informant was perceived to be involved in crime prevention. However, all questions were formulated based on the study objectives to ensure that the questions will yield information that will answer the research questions.

4.4 Sampling procedures and interview process

Key informants of the study were selected using the judgemental sampling method which allowed the researcher to freely choose informants based on their experience and perceived knowledge about crime in Khayelitsha. The researcher visited the study area twice before selecting informants to acquaint himself with the environment as he was still unfamiliar with Site B and cannot speak isiXhosa, a language spoken by the majority of Khayelitsha residents. The visits also helped the researcher to identify which anti-crime organisations to target as sources of information. The following organisations were identified: South African Police Service (SAPS) Khayelitsha Police Station, ward council, Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF), Khayelitsha Safety and Security Forum (KSSF), Community Policing Forum, and South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO). Table 1 shows a list of key sources of data and includes the organisations listed above as well as the ward councillor and residents. Table 1 also shows the type of information solicited from each of the informants.

Data was collected over a period of three weeks starting on 08 – 29 October 2011 although some informants were contacted on the phone while analysing for further clarification on issues. Before going to the field for collecting data, the researcher drafted Table 1 below as a guide for data collection. Table 1shows sources of information, number of informants from each source, and types of information expected from each source.

Table 1: Sources of information to meet the objectives of the study

Sources of information	No. of informants	Targeted information
1. Anti-crime community based organisations i. KDF ii. Street committee members iii. CPF iv. SANCO	2 2 1 1	- Level of community participation in crime prevention programmes; - The extent to which residents are empowered to fight and prevent crime; - Strategies adopted by residents to prevent crime; - Challenges CBOs face; - Perceptions towards current crime situation;
2. SAPS - Khayelitsha Police Station	1	- Level of cooperation between police and residents; - Residents' attitudes and perceptions towards police; - Strategies adopted by police to deter crime;
3. Ward councillor	1	- Strategies adopted to prevent crimes; - Challenges in fighting crimes; - community participation in crime prevention;
4. Ordinary residents	13	- Attitudes, perceptions and willingness to participate in crime prevention; - Strategies adopted by residents to fight crime; - The extent to which residents participate in crime prevention; - Challenges residents face when fighting crime; - Perceptions towards current crime situation; - The cooperation between police and residents; and
5. Crime statistics – Khayelitsha police station		- Prevalence of crime and common crimes.

As the judgmental approach gives researchers flexibility in deciding the type of information to be known and how to get the information (Bernard, 2002 cited in Tongco, 2007), the researcher interviewed representatives of anti-crime organisations while he was interviewing ordinary residents. No particular order of how informants or category of informants was followed when interviewing. The strategy was adopted so that issues that emerged in one interview could be probed in the following interviews.

4.4.1 In-depth interviews with ordinary residents

Initially, the researcher planned to interview 25 ordinary residents. This number was not fixed however, it could have decreased or increased depending on the type and quality of data from the initial interviews. This means that he was going to increase the number of informants until he obtained the information. The number of informants decreased to 13 informants because the researcher started getting the same information after the 11th interview. The additional interviews therefore, were deemed unnecessary. Besides, there is no fixed or precise number of informants that should make up a purposive sample provided the needed information is obtained (Bernard, 2002, cited in Tongco, 2007).

The informants were selected based on the perceptions that they have of relevant crime-related information. The sample was stratified in terms of age and sex to avoid systematic biases when collecting information. In this regard, four youths and nine adults of whom four were women while five were men. This strategy enabled the researcher to get pertinent and relevant information from different categories of informants who experience crime differently.

It was difficult to access informants because many houses were closed or adult households were not available, and many of those who were available often refused to participate in the study. Consequently, the researcher found himself walking long distances in informal settlements looking for informants. The researcher found this very challenging since Khayelitsha is one of Cape Town's crime 'hotspot' areas. To mitigate the lack of local knowledge, the researcher hired a Khayelitsha resident who is familiar with the environment and could speak IsiXhosa. The person's main duty was not limited to guiding the researcher but he also worked as a translator whenever necessary. The researcher also tried to resemble local residents in terms of dressing to disguise himself so to avoid being seen as an outsider, otherwise he would become a crime target.

4.4.2 In-depth interviews with representatives of community and local organisations

In this study, eight representatives of community and organisations involved in crime prevention programmes were also interviewed. These interviewees included: a police officer of Khayelitsha Police Station, a Communication Officer, the Councillor of ward 90, two street committee members, the secretary of the Community Policing Form (CPF), the Chairperson of Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF), the Chairperson of South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), and the Deputy Secretary of the Safety and Security Forum. Unlike ordinary residents, these representatives were more accessible and collaborative except the councillor of ward 92 who refused to participate in the study.

In each case, the researcher called the respondents over the phone to set up an appointment and discuss a suitable venue for interviews. Five of these interviews were conducted at Khayelitsha Police Station due to its accessibility in terms of transport and safety. These include interviews with the police, Ward Councillor, Deputy Secretary of Khayelitsha Safety and Security Forum (KSSF), and chairperson of KDF, Chairperson of SANCO. Interviews with street committee members were conducted in their houses while the interview with the secretary of CPF was conducted at Khayelitsha Magistrate court.

4.4.3 Crime cases reported to Khayelitsha police station

The researcher initially planned to use statistics of crime cases reported to Khayelitsha Police Station in the three preceding years as secondary data. Regrettably, Khayelitsha Police Station refused to avail these statistics to the researcher. The researcher was able though to source seven-year crime statistics of Khayelitsha Police Station from the SAPS web site.

4.5 Data analysis

In qualitative research, the number and type of informants involved in the research may not matter much in determining the quality of data but in how data are analysed. Indeed, the type and level of data analysis determines the credibility of findings (Ryan, Coughlan, and Cronin, 2007). The data analysis process of the current study was as follows:

The researcher transcribed individuals' interviews into word-for-word transcripts which were printed out to allow him to read them and easily understand and identify impressive points in

the texts. The researcher reviewed the research questions which were to be answered in the data analysis. Then each question was linked to every individual's response to identify consistencies and differences. After bringing all the data of each question together, the researcher identified categories and themes and labelled them. And patterns and connections within and between categories were identified because such connections were important to understand and explain effects, and the relationship within and between themes. The researcher interpreted data to provide meanings which may be understood by readers.

4.9 Ethical considerations

During the course of the interviews, ethical principles were taken into consideration and adhered to. Interviewees were fully informed what the research was about, the principle of informed consent was followed throughout the study. In addition, participants were not forced, bribed or persuaded to participate in the study. The participation was voluntary and each participant could withdraw from the research at any stage of the interview.

4.10 Conclusion

The study was carried out the environment in which the researcher could not move freely due to high crime rates and language barrier. The results of the study therefore, might have affected due to the inaccessibility of some potential informants could provide rich information although the researcher was moving around with one of the community members who speaks the local language (IsiXhosa).

Chapter 5

Mapping crime in Site B, Khayelitsha

5.1 Introduction

This chapter describes crime and trends and identifies the predominant crimes. The chapter also discusses the perceived causes of crimes in Site B, Khayelitsha, a township which was described as 'no-go' area due to high rates of crime and violence during the time of apartheid (Nemasetoni and Rogerson, 2007). Given that the main objective of this study is to investigate the role of community members in fighting and deterring crime, providing an in-depth description of the current crime situation provides the context within which crime prevention initiatives occur. The chapter is structured as follows: section 5.2 is concerned with analysis of crime and perceptions of residents towards the prevalence of crime. Section 5.3 discusses predominant crimes based on informants' perceptions and crime statistics while section 5.4 provides insights into perceived root causes of crime.

5.2 Crime trends in Site B, Khayelitsha

One of the most significant findings of this study is how the interviewed residents see crime as a part and parcel of Khayelitsha residents' daily lives, normalized, and which residents cannot do much about. One street committee member stated that:

> Crimes are being committed all times but many crimes are committed during
>
> the night…. We always hear women screaming when their handbags are grabbed
>
> in the morning when they are going to take a train going to work or when
>
> they are coming from work in the evening (Street committee B, on 8 October 2011).

Along the same sentiments, another informant commented favouring Khayelitsha during the time of apartheid regime than in the democratic era. The informant admitted that apartheid oppressed people but people were living in a safe environment (Informant D, on 8 October 2011). Given the level of brutality suffered by Africans under apartheid rule, this statement is quite revealing that the crime situation in Site B is high and people are frustrated with the crime situation.

Contrarily, the reported crime statistics over the past seven years from April 2004 to March 2011 in Figure 2 show a declining number of crime incidents from 9139 cases in the year April 2004/March 2005 to 5265 crime cases in the year April 2010/March 2011. This is a decline of 42.4% in seven years although the bulk of the decline of 32.8% occurred in the year April 2005/March 2006 when the total number of crimes reported at Khayelitsha Police Station in April 2004/March 2005 declined from 9139 to 6235 crimes in April 2005/March 2006. However, from the year April 2005/March 2006 until last March 2011, crime incidents declined only by 15.56%, from 6235 to 5265 cases. This contradiction between informants' perceptions towards the crime situation and crime statistics is not a surprise given that the crime situation is measured based on crime statistics without taking into account community perceptions (Faull, 2010).

Figure 2: Recorded crime cases at Khayelitsha Police station

Source: SAPS (2011). Crime in Khayelitsha (WC) for April to March 2003/2004 - 2010/2011

Although it is not clear what caused this decrease, it may be suggested that increased efforts by government in terms of increases in budget for fighting and preventing crime (Alda and Cuesta, 2010) have played an important role in this. On the other hand, it is possible that residents have become discouraged to report crime at the Khayelitsha Police Station as revealed by some informants that they do see the need for reporting a crime to police since the police do not make any follow up when a crime is reported.

Even though these crime statistics do not indicate the time in which crimes took place in terms of months, weeks in a month, or days within a week, the street committee's narrative above suggests that most crimes in Site B are committed during the night and early morning (Street committee B, on 8 October 2011). Criminals take advantage of the cover of darkness in the early morning and evening as this offers them the opportunity to pursue criminal activities. This is the time when committing crime is regarded as less risky and more attractive to potential criminals who want to minimize their probability of being arrested. The rational choice theory hypothesizes that individuals commit a crime after balancing costs and benefits attached to a particular crime to determine whether such crime will generate high returns (Slocum, 1959; Brown, 2001, Mann and Mante, 2004). It is therefore, argued that individuals in Site B commit crimes after calculating the probability of being caught. If the probability of being caught is high, then criminals may opt either not to commit crime or to take the risk and commit crime. When the probability of being caught is slim, then criminals are more likely to commit crime unless there are other factors that may put off criminals' intentions of committing crime.

5.3 Predominant crimes

While qualitative data from all informants indicates robberies and theft, drug abuse, assaults, rape, house and shop breakings, and child kidnappings are the key crimes; more detailed crime statistics in Figure 3 show that theft and robbery-related crimes dominate all reported crimes at Khayelitsha Police Station each year for seven years. Assault crimes are the second most common crime consisting of one fifth of all reported crimes each year for seven years whilst from April 2007 to March 2011 alcohol and drug-related crimes, and malicious damage to property occupy third and fourth place of the most common crimes respectively.

The crime statistics show that from the year April 2004/March 2005 to April 2010/March 2011 crimes in all categories generally decreased except in the alcohol and drug-related category which showed a consistent increase from April 2006/March 2007. This increase in crime related to drugs and alcohol however, has still not been explained although it may be argued that the number of drug users is increasing as affirmed by all informants. A number of informants posit that most drug users are teenagers and young adults of whom many are still school learners. One informant said that some learners take Methamphetamine commonly known as 'tik' and other drugs even while they are still at school (Street committee B, on 08

October 2011). Methamphetamine was identified among the most common primary substances of abuse in the Western Cape (Pluddemann, *et al*., 2010).

**Figure 3:** Predominant reported crime cases at Khayelitsha police station

Source: SAPS (2011). Crime in Khayelitsha (WC) for April to March 2003/2004 - 2010/2011

All informants argue that crime rates are relatively higher in informal settlements such as TR, PSJ, and BM sections compared with areas with formal houses. Literature also shows that high crime rates are linked to a poor quality of physical environment (City of Virginia Beach, 2000; Cozens, Saville, and Hillier, 2005; Landman and Liebermann, 2005). Areas with informal settlements have poor infrastructure which attracts individuals to commit crime and remain untraced. These areas are characterised with crowded informal houses which are unnumbered, with limited or no streets and street lights. Potential criminals take advantage of this poor and limited infrastructure to pursue criminal activities since they know it is difficult to be traced when they commit crime.

5.4 Perceived causes of crimes

This section discusses factors that influence individuals in Site B to pursue criminal activities based on informants' perceptions. These factors include: poverty, drugs and alcohol, lack of parental guidance, ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system, and bad social models.

5.4.1 Socio-economic inequalities

Income distribution in South Africa has been consistently linked to crime claiming that economic inequality is one of the factors that forces individuals to pursue criminal activities (Brown, 2001, Palmary, 2001; Nleya and Thompson, 2009). This study shows that Site B is not exceptional as all informants perceived poverty as the major root cause of crime claiming that many crimes are committed by individuals who are unemployed and seek money for food. One informant referred to most crimes that take place in Site B and in other parts of Khayelitsha as 'crimes of needs' (the Deputy Secretary of KSSF, Boqwana, 12 October 2011). Boqwana argued that the majority of Khayelitsha residents especially youths are poor and not working to earn an income. Literature also shows that more than half (65%) of Khayelitsha residents are young people who are likely to be economically inactive (City of Cape Town, 2006). Therefore, they see committing crime as an ultimatum source of income for them. In relation to this argument, crime statistics show that the majority of the crimes reported to Khayelitsha Police Station are related to theft and robbery (see Figure 3).

5.4.2 Alcohol and drug abuse

The use of alcohol and drugs was perceived by all informants as the second factor which influences individuals to commit crimes in Site B after poverty although crime statistics indicate that crime committed under the influence of alcohol and drugs occupied the third place from April 2007 until last year March 2011 (see Figure 3). However, the statistics are consistent with the informants' claims that the number of alcohol and drug-related crimes as well as the number of drug users is increasing. The informants stated that most drug users are youths including teenagers.

Most crimes related to alcohol and drugs are committed during the week-ends from Fridays to Sundays because many people spend large parts of their week-ends in *shebeens* drinking. There are even some people who spend their week-ends in *shebeens* even if they do not have money as it was revealed by one informant that:

> During the week-end, people in townships want to enjoy themselves. It is the time for people especially young girls and men to show off. Even if they do not have money they dress up nicely and hang around *shebeens* and other public places such as shopping malls, and markets (Informant G, 8 October 2011).

In the interview at Khayelitsha Police Station, another informant emphasized that many crimes are committed during the week-ends when people are drunk. The informant said:

> If you want to confirm what I say, just come to this station on Saturday or Sunday in the morning and see how many people who come to report that they have been victimised. There are even those who spend a night here because they are arrested when they are drunk or crime suspects (Informant H, 26 October 2011).

The narrative above is not surprising as it is consistent with a study carried out in 2007 in South Africa which found that more than 50% of raped people were high or drunk at the time of the incidents (Holtmann, 2008). Based on the narrative and literature, it is argued that in Site B when individuals are drunk they become crime targets.

Crimes are committed by individuals who would be looking for money to buy drugs and alcohol. According to Captain Van der Vyver, individuals commit crime as long as they have no money for drugs and have no other source of income. They rob people and when the money is spent, they go to look for other potential crime victims to rob. Captain Van der Vyver referred to this situation as a cycle: committing crime to get money for drugs/alcohol over and over again (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). In addition, alcohol and drugs also influence users to commit crimes other than stealing such as assaults, rapes, and violence. These are among those crimes which may be committed when drug users are out of control due to drugs/alcohol consumption.

5.4.3 Lack of parental guidance

In every community, parents and other community members have to take responsibility in guiding and preventing children from committing crime and pursuing other non-conforming activities. While all informants claimed that most crimes in Site B are committed by teenagers and young adults, a number of informants blamed parents for their minimal role in guiding and controlling their children. According to these informants, many parents do not make an effort to monitor their children's behaviour. Some parents do not show concern about where their children spend the day and what they are doing. Surprisingly, there are parents who support and protect their children even when they commit crimes or fail to conform to shared values (Street Committee member B, 8 October 2011). This informant claimed that when these parents are told that their children got involved in criminal activities,

they become aggressive and defensive. It is not clear why parents support and defend their children when they are wrong but Street Committee member B believed that parents benefit from criminals committed by their children.

In some instances, parents have little time for their children as they spend most of their time at work and leave children alone at home. Thus, parents may not be aware of all the activities their children are involved in. Other parents spend most of their time in *shebeens* drinking rather than taking care of their children as pointed out by Captain Van der Vyver (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). Captain Van der Vyver gave an example where children go missing and parents report the incident about six or eight hours later because the parents were not around or were drunk during the incident. In relation to this, one study reveals that almost half of the children in townships are left alone at home during the day (Palmary and Moat, 2002)

From the parents' point of view, children are regarded as uncontrollable. An informant who is a parent claimed that nowadays children are no longer listening and respecting their parents (Informant A, 14 October 2011). The informant blamed the protection given to children by the law saying that: *children are protected by law……the current South African laws discourage parents from disciplining their children.* In this regard, Captain Van der Vyver did not reject the idea of parents sanctioning children informally but the problem is when sanctions given to children are excessive and harsh. If a child is assaulted by their parent for example, the parent may face charges irrespective of whether the children were wrong or right in the first place. Captain Van der Vyver added that police cannot do anything else except to enforce the law as it is (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011).

With the protection mentioned in the paragraph above, some children now feel they have the freedom and right to behave and do what they feel is good for themselves as expressed by one interviewed young man:

> Parents cannot control children anymore because of democracy. You cannot ask children to do something they do not want to do and you cannot force them to do it as they would say that you are violating their human rights (Informant F, 18 October 2011).

However, this protection does not apply to children only but to all people in South Africa as the rights of every person were enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution. In the interviews, almost every informant appreciated the protection given by the constitution but the informants do not support the protection of criminals. It is to this end that a large proportion of informants blamed the government for protecting criminals. One informant compared this protection of offenders as a way of promoting the criminality in the country. The government has to allow residents to sanction their children and other criminal suspects since the criminal justice system is ineffective and corrupt (Street Committee member A, 15 October 2011).

5.4.4 Ineffective and inefficient criminal justice system

Almost every informant complained about poor service delivery of the SAPS and its failure to respond immediately to crime reports when they are called to intervene. One informant said that police are called for help when a person is in danger but the police give excuses that they have no vehicles around or that there are no police to come to the crime scene. A person has to wait and the police come 25 or 30 minutes late when criminals have already left (Informant K, 12 October 2011). This shortage of resources in the SAPS was acknowledged by one street committee member and the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna who said that police stations in Khayelitsha do not have enough police to patrol all the crime 'hotspot' areas (Street Committee A, 15 October 2011; the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 October 2011). These allegations however, are not surprising as other studies showed that the SAPS is ineffective and corrupt (Show, 1996; Brown, 2001; Singh, 2005).

Corruption in the SAPS was also the informants' concern. A number of informants alleged that that some police are corrupt or get involved in criminal activities. Although the informants could not provide evidence to support and prove their allegations, corruption in the SAPS is not a new allegation (Singh, 2005; Faull, 2011). In this study however, the allegations are based on numerous incidents where police in Site B deliberately release criminal suspects without charges against them. Captain Van der Vyver commented that: …*allegations should not be regarded as a final conclusion until they are supported with evidence*. She did not rule out the allegations that some police get involved in criminal activities including corruption. To avoid ungrounded claims, Captain Van der Vyver requested community members to provide evidence so that those bad police can be removed. Arguably, corruption or releasing offenders without charges is likely to cause a crime

increase given that offenders are not deterred from committing crime. To minimise the number of offenders, it is essential to exercise sanctions because some individuals may be discouraged to commit crime through fear of punishment if they are caught (Fagan and Tracey, 2008).

5.4.5 Bad social models

Social role models play an important part in transmitting and modifying behaviour (Bandura, 1969) in a community where crimes and other deviant behaviour are dominant. Individuals may acquire new behaviour by imitating or learning others' behaviour (Krohn *et al.,* 1985). Data of this study indicates that people young people in particular become criminals when they interact with criminals who are regarded as their social models. One young adult, who was a first year student at the University of the Western Cape at the time of the interview, confessed that he became a gangster when he started interacting with peers who were gangsters (Informant G, 8 October 2011). After some time, he stopped robbing people when he joined a local youth organisation where he became inspired to go to university. From this confession, it could be noted that the exposure to high criminality and that the interaction with criminals can influence individuals to acquire criminal behaviour.

5.4.6 Market of stolen goods

Among all the above mentioned factors that influence crime rates in Site B, the demand of stolen goods was given minimal attention by all informants except one informant who made a point that crime would be reduced if residents stop buying stolen goods. The implication here is that people steal goods so that they can sell them to get cash. This however, is not surprising considering that most committed crimes are theft-related (*see* Figure 3). Selling stolen goods could be a way of generating income for some individuals as the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna mentioned that there are some individuals who pay money to young people and other vulnerable people so they can steal for them (the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 October 2011). The market for stolen goods and equipment such as guns and knives to use in committing crime contribute to high crime rates. The stolen goods however, are not necessarily sold or supplied only in Site B. Sometimes stolen goods in Site B are sold in other areas of Khayelitsha such as Harare, Site C or Macassar even in other townships such as Mfuleni, Nyanga or Philippi where thieves are unlikely to be caught. Similarly, goods stolen in those areas may be sold in Site B.

5.5 Conclusion

While crime statistics from Khayelitsha Police Station show that crime is declining, perceptions of interviewed ordinary residents indicate that there is no positive change in the crime situation. If the crime situation is measured by the number of reported crime cases without taking into account community perceptions and community satisfaction, the crime situation in Site B is improving. But if these elements: crime statistics, community perceptions and community satisfaction are considered, there is a lot to be done to fight crime in Site B. Crime statistics are not sufficient to measure the crime situation. Views of community members should not be undermined when measuring the crime situation in a community.

Informants' perceptions and crime statistics indicate that poverty is perceived to be the major cause of crimes committed in Site B. The majority of people said they have no other means of income to sustain themselves and their families. As a result, they see committing crime as a source of income such as money and gadgets that can be sold easily. All crimes including theft and robbery-related crimes show a decline except crimes committed under the influence of drug and alcohol which are constantly increasing. This increase suggests that the number of people who use drugs and alcohol is increasing. Under the influence of drugs and alcohol, individuals commit crimes or become crime victims.

Chapter 6

The contribution of community in crime prevention in Site B

6.1 Introduction

This chapter provides insights into how Site B residents participate in controlling and maintaining safety and security in the area. Ekblom and Pease (1995, cited in English, Cummings, and Straton, 2002) proposed three approaches of community crime prevention: action *for* the community, action *through* the community, and action *with* the community. Consistent with these approaches and the main objective of this study which is to investigate the role of community in crime prevention as stated in chapter one, the focus of this chapter is on the action *of* local residents as actors in crime prevention rather than the action *of* external organisations and institutions *for* the community.

The chapter is structured as follows: section 6.2 looks at the extent to which residents in Site B work contribute to CPF by patrolling streets as volunteers. Section 6.3 provides insight into how residents assist police to fight and prevent criminal activities. The section also discusses residents' attitudes, perceptions and willingness to participate in crime prevention. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 enlighten on the contribution of residents in SANCO and Khayelitsha Security and Safety Forum respectively whilst section 6.6 provides an analysis of the extent to which the residents take their own initiatives to fight and prevent crime by exercising informal social sanctions, and the extent to which the residents fight crime through CBOs such as KDF and SANCO

6.2 Patrolling streets as a strategy of crime prevention

This section provides an analysis of how the residents work in the Community Policing Forum (CPF) as unpaid volunteers to fight and deter crime and other non-conforming activities. The Community Policing Forum is a formal institution composed of ordinary and unarmed civilians who are elected by community members to represent them in controlling and maintaining security and safety in their areas. The main purpose of forming CPFs is to mobilise and involve residents in fighting crime in collaboration with community police. The formation of CPFs is in accordance with the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 which provides for police stations to work closely with communities through community policing forums (RSA, 1995; Mistry, 1996).

6.2.1 The role of the residents in CPF

The CPF mobilises residents to participate in crime control in a specific area through small projects which are referred to as neighbourhood watches. Each neighbourhood watch operates in a designated area which is manageable and controllable. Civilians from the same neighbourhoods come together voluntarily in order to control crime and other deviant behaviours in their areas in collaboration with the police. In the whole of Khayelitsha, there are three neighbourhood watches which operate with the three police stations available in Khayelitsha. This means that each neighbourhood watch operates under a specific police station. Neighbourhood watch in Site B works with Khayelitsha Police Station and it has 60 volunteers who patrol streets. Although there is no specific period for which residents have to volunteer in the CPF as street patrollers, the CPF Executive Committee members are elected in the office to volunteer for a period of three years (the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 October 2011).

Volunteers patrol streets only during the night in collaboration with police. According to Captain Van der Vyver, volunteers may not work in the absence of police because they are unarmed civilians and may sometimes encounter criminals who are equipped with firearms and may potentially be attacked (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). Working without armed police cover therefore, would potentially put volunteers in danger. This suggests that the work of volunteers depends on the availability of police, and requires close collaboration between neighbourhood watches and police for them to coordinate their efforts.

Communication between neighbourhood watches and police however, seems to be a one-way rather than a two-way communication. Captain Van der Vyver stated that when neighbourhood watch members are available for patrol, they have to liaise with the commander of the police station in advance so he/she can arrange police whom they can work with. If neighbourhood watch members do not communicate with the police station commander in advance, then police will be allocated to other areas where they may be needed (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). This indicates that the police station commander does not liaise with volunteers to enquire about their availability. The possible impact of this one-way communication is that neighbourhood watch members may feel neglected and unimportant in the neighbourhood watch project. Thus, volunteers may lose interest and

commitment to the project. On the other hand, one-way communication may reflect police's failure to engage and create a strong bond with communities.

The neighbourhood watches schedule to patrol the streets only three days a week, from Friday until Sunday. The secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna pointed out that the shortage of manpower in neighbourhood watches during week days is the reason why patrols occur during the week-ends. As a result, they concentrate their efforts and resources on week-ends, the period when criminal activities peak (the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 October 2011). However, there are some instances in which neighbourhood watch members or police are not available to patrol. In the interview, Captain van der Vyver acknowledged that there are times that police are not available to work with neighbourhood watches. For example, police officers have to be allocated to areas which need emergency intervention (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011).

6.2.2 Residents' attitudes, perceptions and willingness to patrol streets

Involving the community in programmes such as crime prevention enhances the capacity of participants to address future problems on their own rather than relying on external elements (Botterill and Fisher, 2002). While all informants indicated that they consider the work of the neighbourhood watch as an essential element of curbing crime incidents, younger informants were less supportive of neighbourhood watch. Two interviewed young men admitted that they preferred not to be involved in patrolling streets because they had friends who commit crimes. Another study also shows that most crimes in South Africa are committed by teenagers and young adults (Schönteich and Louw, 2001). These interviewees also revealed that they are more interested in paid work so that they can improve their socio-economic situation.

Previous studies have showed that youths who get involved in criminal activities are those children from disrupted families where there is lack of informal social control over their activities (Sampson and groves, 1989; Weijters, Scheepers and Gerris, 2009). The data of this study also reveals that teenagers and young adults raised in families of one parent are more likely to become criminals. According to the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Musona, children with single parents are involved in criminal activities due to two factors: (i) Poverty – most single parent families struggle to put food on the table and provide other basic needs

for their children. Thus, their children get involved in criminal activities so they may get what they do not get from their families; and (ii) Lack of time – some single parents do not have enough time to control their children. The parents sometimes go to work leaving their children behind with nobody to look after them. Therefore, the parents may not be aware of what activities their children get involved in unless there is a person who reports them (the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 October 2011).

Among those informants who are appreciative of the work of neighbourhood watches however, some respondents showed less interest and willingness to voluntarily participate in patrolling streets. In this regard, the informants mentioned two factors that hinder their willingness and interest in joining neighbourhood watches. The first reason is the allegation of ineffective policing by the SAPS in Site B. With the police in South Africa are allegedly corrupt and ineffective (Singh, 2005; Faull, 2011), all informants claimed that working with police to patrol streets as unhelpful and unfruitful. One informant who used to be one of the neighbourhood watch members claimed that volunteers sometimes catch criminal suspects but police release them with no charges. The informant stopped patrolling when police released a crime suspect who had been caught on patrol during the night with goods which were assumed to be stolen. He narrated:

> One night around 02h00 we were on duty patrolling then we saw a person crossing from Mfuleni section coming to Khayelitsha. We stopped the suspect, he tried to run away but we caught him. He had a DVD player and cell phone. The suspect was locked in the police's vehicle and then we continued to patrol. In the morning around 05h00 a.m., the police let the suspect go with the DVD player and cell phone without any charge against him. The police never even asked the suspect to prove whether the DVD player and cell phone belonged to him. They just let him go freely (Informant H, 26 October 2011).

All informants cited poverty as another major factor that hinders residents' participation in crime prevention activities. The informants indicated that they would not volunteer while their families are starving. In fact, informant A stated that he cannot volunteer to fight crime when police are employed and paid every month-end for the work (Informant A, 14 October 2011). The implication here is that the residents would join neighbourhood watch only if they expect to receive some economic benefits in the form of money, goods or other valuable

material. Relating to this argument, the secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna also acknowledged that some residents are poor and they need stipends to motivate them to get involved in controlling crimes and other non-confirming behaviours (the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 October 2011). Given that the majority of the residents of Khayelitsha live in poverty (Thompson and Conradie, 2010), it would be difficult to get many people to voluntarily participate in crime prevention. One may argue that residents who participate in crime prevention in site B are those residents who do not experience economic challenges.

Property ownership plays an important role in individuals' willingness to participate in fighting and preventing crime. Residents with little or no property are reluctant to join patrolling groups because they have nothing to protect as shown by informant B who pointed out that he sees no need to control streets because he has nothing to lose. His argument was that patrolling streets serves the purpose of protecting a few wealthy individuals (Informant B, 8 October 2011). The raised issue here is about individuals volunteering to patrol streets while they have little or no property to protect. Residents with little or no property may feel they have no stake in patrolling streets, thus they may not be willing to participate whilst residents with property are willing to participate in patrolling streets so they can protect their property. When individuals do not have property and are not willing to participate in patrolling streets, stipends may be used as a strategy to motivate them to participate.

Yet, Street Committee member A stated that his area struggles to get patrollers because of the high number of households headed by women or children (Street committee member A, 15 October 2011). Arguably, women and children may get involved in crime prevention in other ways such as providing information about potential crimes but not patrolling streets due to their vulnerability. The street committee member added that he would not even ask them for some money to pay people who may patrol on their behalf as more affluent communities pay money to private security companies to patrol their areas (van der Spuy and Lever, 2010).

6.3 Residents as police's informants

This section enlightens the contribution of Site B residents in the police's work of fighting and preventing crime. According to section 205 of the South African Constitution, the South African Police Service (SAPS) is the constitutional body primarily delegated with the responsibility to prevent, combat and investigate crime; to maintain public order; to protect

and secure the inhabitants of South Africa and their property; and to uphold and enforce the law. To achieve these goals, the SAPS implements five programmes: administration, visible policing, detective services, crime intelligence, and protection and security services. Although these programmes need and support each other, the visible policing programme is designed for fighting and preventing crime (SAPS, 2011). The main aim of visible policing is to make police more visible in local communities and make them more familiar with local residents. The programme also enables police to be more proactive and reactive to crime (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996) and other deviant behaviour that take place in the community.

Additionally, the policing model allows police to focus on small geographical areas which are further divided into smaller and more manageable sectors (RSA, 2009) so that police are able to strengthen their partnership with local residents. Consistent with this literature, Khayelitsha Police Station divided its area into six sectors which are patrolled by 50 police. According to one informant, Captain Van der Vyver of Khayelitsha Police Station, each sector is allocated a certain number of police who regularly patrol it (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). This means that each sector is patrolled by the same police so they become familiar with residents to enhance the degree of trust and cooperation between police and residents. Cooperation and trust are essential components for service delivery in the police. When people become passive, it will be difficult for the police to access the information needed to solve crime problems (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996).

6.3.1 The contribution of residents to police's work

The role of the local community in complementing the police in relation to fighting crime is still unclear among many local residents. Fighting crime is viewed as the exclusive domain of the police in particular and other components of the criminal justice system. The work of the police would be difficult without the support of local residents who possess better knowledge about their locality and are best placed to provide information about crime events or potential crimes (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996). Similar to this literature, this study found that keeping police updated with crime-related information is the major contribution which residents can provide in preventing crime given that they are normal civilians with no guns as mentioned earlier in this chapter. Captain Van der Vyver intimated residents to work with police by providing information about crime incidents and potential crimes Captain Van der

Vyver, 12 October 2011). Providing information about crime is a key component of a strategy that will enable police to be more proactive and reactive to crime.

At times, there are some residents who are unwilling to share crime-related information with police. Sometimes these individuals witness crime incidents or have information about potential crime but they prefer to keep quiet rather than reporting them to police (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). This claim was echoed by all informants who admitted that they sometimes do not report crime events due to fear of being victimised by criminal suspects. Specifically, informant J said that people are willing to report crime events that take place in their community but they are afraid that criminal suspects may come back to victimise accusers or witnesses in revenge (Informant J, 26 October 2011). Even if they see a crime happening, they do not report or condemn suspects, rather they keep quiet and pretend as if nothing is going on. One young male said that if he sees a person being robbed he just continues with his work or he stands aside watching the event but he cannot do anything (Informant C, 8 October 2011).

Similarly, withholding information has negative impacts on justice due to the fact that people are often unwilling to testify in courts as witnesses. Courts cannot therefore convict criminal suspects without enough evidence. Surprisingly, residents accuse police and the criminal justice system for being ineffective and corrupt when criminal suspects are released without being convicted.

To encourage residents to provide crime-related information, police promise anonymity to whoever provides information. However, it is argued that there are some situations where this strategy is not practical. In the court for example, a person who reported the crime may be required to be a witness if she/he has the evidence. On the other hand, the strategy may help police to conduct its investigation of a particular crime. Again, keeping the informant's identity confidential can assist police to prevent crimes as police have access to information they would otherwise not have. Another measure taken by Khayelitsha Police Station to promote reporting crimes and sharing information on crime is to protect people who provide information. The Witness Protection Programme is one example of the measures in place implemented by the police station to protect whistle blowers and their families if they feel threatened.

Another reason why residents do not inform police about criminal activities is the lack of confidence in the police. The South African Police Service is perceived to be corrupt and ineffective (Shaw, 1996; Brown, 2001; Faull, 2011) and thus no longer commands trust from many citizens. In Site B, many people consider reporting criminal suspects to police as a waste of time. All interviewed residents said that they know and witnessed many incidents where crimes were reported but the police make no attempt to follow up. A similar claim was made by street committee member B who bitterly narrated an incident of how he reported to police a suspect who broke into his house:

> People broke into my house when I was not around and after a few days one person whom I know was seen selling some of my belongings. I was informed by the people who saw him but when I reported this to the police, they never bothered themselves carrying out an investigation except to tell me that there is no evidence (Street Committee member B, 8 October 2011).

Incidents like this may discourage people from reporting crime to police. People may feel disappointed when they report crime events and police take no action.

However, Nomawethu Mosuna argued that if a person reports a crime to police and the person does not open a case, the police often do not bother carrying out investigation on the reported crime (the Secretary of the CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 October 2011). This argument may imply that a person who reports a crime event has to open a case so police can make a follow up. Again, this may result in a decrease of the number of people who report crimes to police especially when whistleblowers: are not crime victims; have no interest in reporting crime or in providing information on potential crimes; and when it is risky for whistleblowers to open a case.

Some informants linked this reluctance of police to corruption and ineffectiveness of the SAPS. Interestingly, Captain Van der Vyver admitted that suspects are sometimes released without charges although she complained about people who tarnish the image of police by alleging that police are corrupt arguing that people who make those allegations have little knowledge of the operations of the criminal justice system. Suspects are released without charges only when there is not enough supporting evidence to gain a conviction. Captain Van der Vyver said that there are people who assume that the police's work is to arrest

criminal suspects, take them to court and ask the court what to do (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). The work of police is to arrest a crime suspect; the investigator gets all relevant information, does all the necessary paper work and puts them in a docket. When the docket goes to court, the case is no longer in the police's hands and the police cannot influence the decision of the court. If the suspect is released, it is the court's decision rather than the police. Police arrest criminal suspects and find evidence but they do not get involved in convicting the suspects.

The fact that visible police rely on information from local residents to carry out its duties effectively, the cooperation between police and community is arguably crucial. The data of this study indicate that the cooperation between visible police and local residents is relatively weak in the sense that some residents are not interested in sharing information on crime with police. In fact, there are some residents who still regard the police as the enemy rather than people who can protect them as revealed by Captain Van der Vyver (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011).

Such unfavourable attitudes towards the police were also noted in some interviews with residents who referred to some police to as helpless people with no dedication to their work. Street committee member A classified police officers into two categories based on how committed they are to their work: there are those police officers who enjoy being in the police service and are dedicated to their jobs; and there are those officers who are in the police service simply for money and they lack dedication and a sense of duty (Street Committee member A, 15 October 2011). In this context, the street committee member and one resident argued that the government recruits unsuitable and unqualified people into the police service to create jobs. This argument is consistent with Schönteich's (1999) claim that the criminal justice system has a high number of unqualified and inexperienced staff.

6.3.2 Residents' attitudes and perceptions towards working with police

As the visible policing approach intends to ensure that police are seen often in the communities where they patrol (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996; SAPS, 2011), all informants admitted that they see police patrolling streets of Site B by vehicles during the day and night although some informants have criticised the effectiveness of visible police. The visible police are allegedly ineffective in terms of being proactive and reactive to crimes.

Street Committee member B regards the work of visible police as a way of wasting government resources:

> The police use state resources with no apparent reason. They move from street to street in a vehicle but you will not see them arresting anyone. I get upset when I see the police moving with no criminals locked up in the vehicle when I know criminals are all over (Street Committee member B, 8 October 2011).

Similar lamentations also emanated from interviews with residents who complain that police sometimes see a group of *skollies* sitting on the streets or moving around but police pass them without questioning or searching them.[3] However, one may argue that the police may not search or arrest people without evidence and information that the suspects have the intention of committing crime. Police need information from local residents since they live amongst the suspects. On the other hand, regular patrolling may have two further positive impacts: firstly, patrolling enables the police to respond to crime events on time in the sense that police will be moving around and in the community. Secondly, patrolling prevents crime from happening as potential offenders may refrain from committing crime due to fear of being caught. The visibility of police therefore, increases the risk of committing crime.

6.4 The role of residents in the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO)

This section discusses the contribution of Site B residents to fighting crime in collaboration with their street representatives known as street committees. These street committees are elected by residents to represent and advocate on behalf of their street members. As one street committee member mentioned in the interview, street committees are affiliated to the SANCO. In fact, they are the lowest SANCO structure and work closely with citizens (Street Committee member A, 15 October 2011). The SANCO is a civil movement which has committed itself to improving the well-being of all South Africans by promoting unity, equality, democracy and freedom by tackling issues such as security, housing, water, electricity, and other problems that affect residents on a regular basis (SANCO, 2001).

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3 *Skollies* is a Cape Town Afrikaans word which means criminals or people of bad behaviour.

In the interview with one street committee member, he said that residents report crime incidents and provide information about potential crime to their respective street committees so measures can be taken. If a crime is reported for example, the street committee members approach the crime suspect, crime victim and few residents and sit together to find a way of sanctioning the crime suspect or addressing the problem in an amicable manner without involving police or other external elements such as courts (Street Committee A, 15 October 2011). One advantage of handling crime problems at street committee level is to resume and maintain the broken relationship between two parties in conflict and to promote neighbourliness.

However, some interviewed residents see informing or reporting criminal suspects to street committees as helpless given that street committees are not much recognised by their members as people who have a stake in fighting crime. Street committee members are regarded as simple as normal residents with minimal authority and power to influence or take any action. This was confirmed by a scenario given by Street Committee member B which shows that street committee members are also crime targets like other ordinary residents and they have limited power to sanction criminal suspects. In the scenario, Street Committee member B said that his shack was robbed while he was away. One of his neighbours showed him the person who was suspected of robbing his shack but he could not take action against the suspect except report him to the police (Street Committee member B, 08 October 2011). Surprisingly, some of the informants especially youths mentioned that they do not even know who their street representatives are. Consequently, some residents opt to take law into their own hands by punishing criminal suspects.

6.5 The contribution of residents to the Khayelitsha Safety and Security Forum

Khayelitsha Safety and Security Forum (KSSF) is a division of Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF) which aims at improving safety and security in Khayelitsha. KDF as a whole is a civil society initiative founded in 1992 to foster development in Khayelitsha. It is the voice of the Khayelitsha residents which lobbies and advocates on behalf of residents for their improved well-being by tackling issues affecting residents including housing, water, electricity, and security among others (the Deputy Secretary of KSSF, Boqwana, 12 October 2011). This approach of lobbying and advocating makes Khayelitsha residents at large relatively passive in term of involvement in crime prevention.

Few residents who are elected by residents as KSSF representatives work on behalf of others as Boqwana stated that KSSF does not run any project which addresses crime issues directly in which residents can get involved. With little or no influence on their operations, KSSF only engages with and coordinates all anti-crime initiatives from government departments and civil society operating in Khayelitsha including Site B to ensure there is an integration and synergy to achieve a collective goal. However, it identifies areas where there are outcries in terms of crime and it takes initiatives and engages with all organisations dealing with crime prevention by organising an event at which residents come and speak out about their concerns (the Deputy Secretary of KSSF, Boqwana, 12 October 2011). This implies that residents in Site B other than KSSF representatives contribute to crime prevention by providing information and views only when KSSF invited them to meetings to address crime-related issues.

Inviting residents to crime-related meetings to speak out about their concerns is a strategy for accommodating the views of a large number of residents all at once but the challenge to this approach in Site B is that some residents lost interest in attending the meetings. One of the reasons advanced by some informants is the unproductiveness of the meetings as stated by one resident: *I am fed up with attending their meetings which talk about the same things over and over with no outcome. They keep talking about 'skollies' every time and they do nothing to them* (Julia, 29 October 2011). This narrative indicates that some have frustrations with the high crime prevalence in Site B while nothing much is done to prevent crime as discussed previously in section 5.2.

Besides some interviewed residents who said that they do not know about KSSF and its representatives in Site B, others do not perceive KSSF as an anti-crime organisation because it does not run its own anti-crime projects as mentioned in the section above. These informants revealed that they never have been approached by any KSSF representative asking them to participate in fighting crime by either patrolling streets or providing crime-related information. The informants stated that they report or inform the police or street committees rather than KSSF representatives.

6.6 Informal social controls as a form of crime policing

This section provides an analysis of the extent to which the residents take initiatives to fight and deter offenders from committing crimes as police by applying informal social controls.

The main focus in this section is on how informal social controls are exercised, and challenges residents face when exercising informal social controls. Informal social controls play a substantial part in deterring deviant behaviours and preventing criminal activities. Fagan and Meares (2008) postulate that informal social controls are effective by inhibiting problem behaviours, facilitating conformity, and restraining social deviance once it appears in a community.

6.6.1 Individualism: a root cause of ineffective informal social controls

The contribution of informal social controls in Site B seems to be minimal. Residents are reluctant to exercise informal punishment and other sanctions such as condemnation and isolation. For example, all informants blamed parents for not being responsible in terms of providing parental guidance. Informant D argued that parents and community members are no longer controlling children or other offenders as it used to be in the early 1970s or as it is in the rural areas of Eastern Cape (Informant D, 8 October 2011).[4] The main point the informant was making is that sanctioning offenders in Site B was supposed to be everyone's responsibility irrespective of whether they know offenders or is related to offenders.

Individuals in Site B community commit crimes or show the intention of committing crimes yet residents take no action in either reporting criminals to the police or sanctioning offenders. Everyone works individually as was expressed by one of the informants who remarked that …*life in this township is about minding your own business* (Informant C, 8 October 2011). The traditional values of communalism, fraternity, and collectiveness which are core features of social capital and *ubuntu* have been sacrificed in pursuit of individualism in Site B. The community lacks the rubric with which to sanction offenders and hold offenders accountable. Informal social controls flourish in the communities with little individualism, strong primary relationships, and where extended family retains primary authority (Anleu, 1998). Similarly, a community keeps crime rates low if its members share common values and are willing to work on behalf of others (Sampson and Groves, 1989; Brown, 2001). In the same vein, one prominent informant acknowledged the lack of communalism in Khayelitsha. He commented that: ….*in a divided community, criminals take*

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4 The majority of Khayelitsha residents migrated from Eastern Cape where they were born and raised.

advantages (the Deputy Secretary of KSSF, Boqwana, 12 October 2011).[5] Hence, Boqwana called all stakeholders to concentrate their efforts and resources so that they can fight crime collectively.

Informant D stated that people tend to care for only their close family members, relatives and friends (Informant D, 8 October 2011). If a person has no close relatives or friends, no-one cares for him/her. The informant exemplifies that if a person is attacked by robbers; people pass or stand aside and watch the incident rather than assisting the victim. This individualism in Site B does not reflect social capital and *ubuntu* which inculcate unconditional care for everyone. In a community that lives according to the dictates of *ubuntu* assisting or rescuing a person from danger does not necessarily require the need to know the person as *ubuntu* is centered on brotherhood, hospitality, and reciprocity (Nussbaum, 2003b). Both social capital and *ubuntu* are key features of organised communities and they promote solidarity in controlling and preventing crime.

6.6.2 Informal sanctions versus formal sanctions

Informal social controls deter crime and other deviant behaviours effectively if they are paired with formal controls (Fagan and Meares, 2008; Jiang and Lambert, 2009). However, data of this study shows that informal social controls conflict with formal sanctions rather than supporting and supplementing each other. Some informal sanctions such as corporal punishment is challenged and it is sometimes criminalised by law. As it was previously mentioned earlier in section 5.4.3, a number of informants blame the South African laws for discouraging residents to discipline offenders informally. The informants argued that the laws are too soft and protect criminals instead of punishing them. This makes some parents feel that their role as parents is undermined. One parent expressed his disappointment saying that parents are no longer sanctioning their children because they may be accused for abusing their children while they were disciplining them (Informant H, 26 October 2011).

Even though legal sanctions cannot work effectively when they are supported by informal sanctions (Fagan and Meares, 2008) Captain Van der Vyver insisted that allowing and encouraging people to exercise informal sanctions would endanger individuals' lives as

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[5] Mr Boqwana holds also a senior position in government as Senior Communication Officer in the Department of Government Communication and Information System in the Western Cape Province.

residents are likely to take law into their own hands by punishing criminals with crime. She revealed that traditional courts referred to as '*buntu* courts' in Khayelitsha were banned because their judgment is based on informal justice. In many cases criminal suspects are convicted without enough evidence. Captain Van der Vyver added that most sanctions offered by '*buntu* courts' are corporal punishments and exceed the crime allegedly committed. Criminal suspects are sometimes killed if police do not intervene (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). The judges of these courts are normally community elders with little knowledge about laws and the legal system. Their judgment therefore, might be based on their personal feelings and views rather than law.

From a different perspective, it may be argued that '*buntu* courts' and vigilantism would play a crucial role in reducing and preventing crime in the sense that the South African criminal system is allegedly ineffective (Singh, 2005; Faull, 2011). In line with this argument, some respondents affirmed that there are incidents where residents have to punish criminal suspects before the police's arrival otherwise the police would protect the suspects. In fact, the respondents blamed police and laws for protecting and favouring criminals instead of punishing them. One informant described South African prisons to as hotels claiming that criminals eat nice food and get the opportunity to make money while they are in prisons (Informant D, 8 October 2011).

Besides the '*buntu* courts', vigilantes are also accused of taking law in their own hands. Vigilantes are groups of few community members who are self-appointed to protect their areas against criminal activities including robbery and theft. This vigilante approach, known also as 'street justice' applies 'mob law' (*Cape Argus*, 27 March 2012) and it metes out ruthless punishments. Killing criminal suspects using the 'necklace' (a burning tyre around the crime suspect's neck) is the most popular punishment used in vigilantism as echoed by a number of informants. One informant emphasized that burning criminal suspects alive or killing them using other methods is the ultimate way of fighting crime in the community since the criminal justice system including the SAPS failed to do their work. In the whole of Khayelitsha, at least three criminal suspects are being 'necklaced', killed using another method, or sjambokked, chased away from his family or the community every month (Informant F, 18 October 2011). Figure 4 shows three criminal suspects who were about to be necklaced in a vigilante killing in Khayelitsha.

Figure 4: Three criminal suspects waiting to be necklaced in Khayelitsha

Source: *Cape Argus* (2012). Vigilante attacks - summit on mob law. 27 March 2012

6.7 Conclusion

All the interviewed residents of Site B appreciate the work of CPF of fighting crime by patrolling the streets but most of them are not willing to get involved in patrolling the streets as volunteers. Poverty is perceived as the major factor that hinders the residents' participation in patrolling the streets. The interviewed residents indicated that they are not willing to do voluntary work while they struggle to put food on the table for their families. Besides, police are employed to do the work and they get paid for that every month. Although members of CPFs are to render their services voluntarily with no compensation (Mistry, 1996), residents of Site B need stipends to motivate them to patrol their areas in numbers because people cannot volunteer while they are hungry.

Interviews with residents also indicate that cooperation between police and residents is relatively weak. Police fail to engage properly with local residents who are pivotal players in the programme in terms of updating police by providing information on crime incidents and potential crimes. Some residents are not willing to help police fight crime. The residents do not share crime-related information with police claiming that police are ineffective and corrupt. Reporting and providing crime-information to police is regarded as a waste of time because police take no action. As a result, residents opted to take the law into their own hands through vigilantism. Criminal suspects are sometimes sanctioned informally by residents without involving the criminal justice system.

Despite this vigilantism, informal social controls in Site B seem to be too weak to deter crimes and other deviant behaviours. Some residents are reluctant to prevent offenders from committing crime. There are incidents in which residents do not react to crimes committed in their presence. A number of informants also blamed parents for failing to condemn or punish their children when they commit crime although interviewed parents defended themselves saying that punishing children and other offenders informally is sometimes criminalised by South African law. If the use of informal sanctions is discouraged crime will likely to continue to prevail in Site B because the criminal justice system is ineffective.

Chapter 7
Conclusions

7.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a review of the findings and underlines key issues that have emerged, as well as areas of concerns. The chapter is structured into different themes based on the objectives of the study to unpack the contribution of the study and demonstrate how research questions were answered. The main objective of this study is to investigate the level of community involvement and empowerment in Site B, Khayelitsha in fighting crime. Other objectives are: (i) identify common crimes in Khayelitsha and assess their prevalence; (ii) assess residents' attitudes, perceptions and willingness to get involved in improving safety and security in their area; (iii) explore strategies adopted by residents to prevent crime and identify key challenges; and (iv) describe the level and form of cooperation between local residents and police.

7.2 The crime situation and dominant crimes

The crime situation in Site B is worrying many residents although there is a contradiction in the findings of this study where crime statistics show that crime has been consistently declining in the past seven years while a number of informants perceived that crime is high. The informants claimed that they have not experienced any decline in crime because crimes are being committed on a daily basis. There was even an informant who argued that Khayelitsha was safer during the apartheid regime than during the democratic era. Although informants' perceptions about crime are not quantifiable, they should be taken into account when assessing the crime situation in the community to avoid the contradiction between crime statistics, and residents' perceptions and satisfaction.

Most crimes are committed in the early morning and evening when it is dark. Criminals take advantage of the darkness to minimise costs tied to crimes if they are caught as the rational choice theory hypothesized that individuals commit crimes after balancing costs and benefits from committing a particular crime (Brown, 2001). Both crime statistics and qualitative data from informants indicated that predominant crimes in Site B are theft and robbery, drug and alcohol abuse, assaults, and rapes. However, crime statistics showed that almost half of all reported crime cases to Khayelitsha police station each year for a period of seven years from

April 2004 to March 2011 were those crimes related to theft and robbery, followed by assaults, then crimes related to drugs and alcohol.

7.3 Perceived causes of crime

Poverty is regarded as the major cause of crime in Site B. A large proportion of informants mentioned that most crimes are committed by individuals who would be seeking food, money and other valuable goods that can be sold quickly and easily. Poor individuals use crime as a strategy of generating income. This is consistent with the occupational choice theory which links crime to income distribution (Brown, 2001; Demombynes and Özler, 2005). However, it is not always poverty that incites individuals in Site B to rob or steal people because there are some individuals who rob or steal people to get money for drugs and alcohol as argued by some informants including Captain Van der Vyver.

All informants see the use of drugs and alcohol as another factor that contributes to the high crime rates in Site B. Many individuals, particularly teenagers and young men, commit crimes or become crime victims while they are under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. Although all informants affirmed that the use of drugs is increasing in the community, the number of reported crimes related to drugs and alcohol is very low compared to other crimes such as theft and robbery-related crimes and assault crimes. Yes, crime statistics show that the number of crimes related to drug and alcohol is gradually increasing but the number is low and does not reflect concerns that crimes related to drugs and alcohol are prevalent. Probably, there are some crimes committed while under the influence of alcohol and drugs which are not reported to the police or they are reported but recorded under other categories such as sexual crimes, assault crimes, murder, and damage to property.

Data of this study indicates that crime rates are high in informal settlement areas where infrastructure is poor. As hinted by some informants, offenders are attracted to criminal activities by poor infrastructure in informal settlements because they know it is very difficult to trace them due to the fact that these areas have informal houses which are crowded, few streets and lights are limited. Other factors that were identified as major contributors to high crime rates in Site B include the ineffectiveness of both formal and informal sanctions. These factors play a big role in alluring individuals to pursue criminal activities. All interviewed ordinary residents alleged that the police are ineffective and corrupt. The police do not respond immediately when crime is reported. There are incidents where police do not arrest

crime suspects and if they do, crime suspects are sometimes released without charges. Parents and other community members show reluctance to sanction children and other offenders informally. As a result, individuals normalise crimes and others acquire criminal behaviours.

7.4 Community involvement in crime prevention

All interviewed residents have positive attitudes and perceptions towards the neighbourhood watch and they see the approach of patrolling streets as an ideal way for reducing and preventing crimes. But none of the informants was a member of the neighbourhood watch except one informant who used to be a member. In addition, none of the informants was willing to join the neighbourhood watch in the near future. They claimed that they cannot patrol streets as a volunteer while there are police who are employed by the government to maintain the security and who get paid for the service they provide. However, the major reason why some residents are not willing to participate in patrolling streets is poverty. The informants postulate that they cannot volunteer while they struggle to put food on the table for their families.

In terms of fighting crime informally, residents of Site B as a whole were blamed by all informants for failing to apply informal social controls such as condemnation against offenders. Parents however, were blamed most since many crimes are committed by youths who are supposed to be guided and controlled by their parents. Rather, parents let their children free to behave and do what they feel is good for them instead of giving guidance. Other offenders are often not condemned or punished informally. Even if individuals commit crime in public, some residents keep quiet and pass or stand aside to watch the event as spectators. This indicates that Site B experiences low quality social capital which is a core component of solidarity and collectiveness. Rather, the individualism prevails in the community as one prominent informant, the deputy of secretary of Khayelitsha Safety and Security Forum acknowledged that criminals take advantage of the fragmentation of Khayelitsha residents. Again, this fragmentation is an indication that residents of Site B do not live *ubuntu* which would also teach the residents to care for each other as members of one family.

The use of informal sanctions however, is very controversial. All informants blame the South African laws which discourage parents and the whole community from applying some informal sanctions which is regarded as taking the law into their own hands. Captain Van der Vyver admitted that some informal sanctions such as sjambokking, assaulting or beating crime suspects are criminalised by law irrespective whether offenders were wrong or not. The implication here is that all crimes have to be reported to the police but the problem is that formal sanctions are not effective in deterring individuals from committing crime. The ineffectiveness of formal sanctions is reflected in the vigilant killings of alleged criminals in Khayelitsha. Members of the community have lost trust and confidence in the police and the criminal justice system.

7.5 Empowerment of residents

The implementation of programmes such as CPF and visible policing in Khayelitsha was a good attempt at improving security and safety in the community but these programmes face numerous challenges. CPF for example, encounters financial problems in its operations to capacitate its volunteers with equipment and necessary skills so they become competent. The Secretary of CPF in Site B, Nomawethu Mosuna acknowledged that their volunteers are not trained to fight crime and need radios to communicate with police or between themselves, rather than using their cell phones. She added that stipends are needed so volunteers can buy their daily needs and necessary equipment such as boots and jackets without using their own money. If people struggle to meet their basic needs, they may not be willing to volunteer. Asking them to buy or use their little resources on voluntary work therefore, is likely to reduce the number of potential volunteers in CPFs.

Addressing root causes of crime was given negligible attention by all crime prevention programmes in Khayelitsha. Both visible policing and CPF programmes seem to focus mainly on reducing the number of crime incidents without tackling the root causes of crime such as poverty or reducing crime opportunities. All informants acknowledged that crime is high in areas with poor infrastructure such as informal houses, and limited streets and lights. Residents are not capacitated economically and socio-economically to control and maintain security in their areas. In lieu of tackling crime problems by rooting out the causes of crime and reducing crime incidents, the police and crime prevention programmes in Site B concentrate their efforts and resources on crime incidents reduction. Poverty which is one of the major factors that forces individuals to commit crimes remains unaddressed. The physical

environment in which the residents live is not designed in such a way that it reduces crime opportunities. Some areas are crowded with informal houses, streets and lights are limited and the majority of the residents live in poverty. If these issues are not addressed effectively, crime will continue to prevail in Site B.

7.6 Cooperation between residents and police

Allegations of the ineffectiveness and corruption in the SAPS ruin the cooperation between police and residents to the extent that some residents see the police as enemies. These unfriendly attitudes and perceptions of residents towards police were confirmed by all interviewed residents who reiterated by saying that they have lost confidence and trust in the SAPS. Consequently, some residents do not report crime-related information to the police as reporting is regarded as a waste of time.

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