

**ETHNICITY, GOVERNANCE AND SOCIO – ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF KENYA AND ITS LUO COMMUNITY, 1963 – 2013**

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KEYWORDS

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Development

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Kenya

Luo

Nyanza

Globalists

Kenyatta

Odinga



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ABSTRACT

“Ethnicity” and disparate group-based socio-economic development make governance in Africa problematic. Despite this existential reality, the “ethnic” question in African governance remains, largely, only the subject of general discourse. There appears to be very little rigorous scholarship on the economic and socio-cultural dimensions related to the socio-historical construct, “ethnicity”. Similarly, attempts to explain why African political culture, in general, continues to encourage the social reproduction of “ethnic” identities also appear to be largely lacking. This thesis aims to fill some of the gaps existent in scholarship of ethnicity vis-à-vis socio-economic-cultural development by examining the antagonism between the Luo community and the Kenyan state. Its main objectives are to examine the specifics of the socio-economic consequences of the political marginalization of the Luo and to explain why “ethnicity” is, seemingly, strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in Kenya. This thesis is grounded on the following two major assertions: first, that “ethnicity”, like its correlative, “race”, is an ideological concept, devoid of any scientific substance; second, that “ethnicity” is an “exogenous construct”, imposed on aboriginal people of Africa mostly by European colonizers. The following research questions direct this thesis: What are the specifics of the negative socio-economic consequences of political marginalization within the Kenyan context? Why do the Kenyan governing structures and practices persist in promoting “ethnicity” despite its existential problems for particular social groups? This thesis tests the following five research assumptions/hypotheses: i) the Luo have enjoyed minimal public investment from the Government of Kenya because of opposition politics making them relatively poor compared to other communities; ii) political exclusion, during the period under study, has had the unwitting effect of fostering “ethnic” cohesion amongst the Luo; iii) political exclusion at the national level has translated into economic difficulties at the individual level for the Luo, limiting their chances of ever getting to power in Kenya; iv) the Luo are gradually adopting alien cultures in uniform/homogeneous fashion, owing to politically constructed and mobilized stereotypes and prejudices, to gain acceptance as fully-fledged members of the Kenyan society at large; and v) the strong correlation between “ethnicity” and the crisis of state power in Kenya, and the pervasiveness of the ideological construct, are partly the result of the machinations of global capitalists and western interference in the country’s affairs. For its theoretical framework, this study adopts an eclectic approach: it fuses various propositions – obtained from a review of contemporary literature – on leadership

and socio-economic development, within the African context, with special reference to the Foucauldian notion of “panopticon”¹ power, Istvan Mészáros’ refutation of “ideological neutrality” and the Instrumentalist Theory of “Ethnicity”. Accordingly, this study employs a mixed methods research design, which makes use of multiple sources of evidence, including the Kenyan Government’s Budget Speeches, Economic Surveys, and Statistical Abstracts. The results of a representative survey and focus groups have also been integrated within this study to explain the influence of ethnic-driven governance at the grassroots level in Kenya. The findings include, amongst others, that there appear to be strong links between state control and access to education, healthcare and rural water supply at particular periods in the country’s independence era, to the detriment of the Luo. Also, it appears that there is a power struggle between certain factions of capital – the so-called “globalists” and the African nationalist bourgeois class in Kenya (the nationalists).



¹ Panopticon power, according to Foucault, “is power that is invisible or hidden; it functions to dominate and mould people in order to make them more serviceable for the state. It orders and arranges every part of their life, so that they become convinced that state power is everywhere and inescapable” (See Schirato, Danaher & Webb, 2012, pp. 86 – 87).

DECLARATION

I declare that *Ethnicity, Governance and Socio-economic Development in Africa: A Case Study of Kenya and its Luo Community, 1963 – 2013* is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

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DEDICATION

To my beloved mom, the late Mary Dinah Awuor Omulo, who selflessly sold her house to fund my PhD studies; sadly, she would die on the very day that the University of Western Cape's Senate Higher Degrees Committee approved the examination reports for this thesis and made the decision to award the degree on 1 March 2018. Thank you, mom, for giving your life so I could live mine. You deserved better.

To the memory of my beloved grandparents, the late Mzee James Omulo Ogutu, and the late Truphena Olang' Omulo, whose faith in the possibility of the acquisition of higher education, by their progeny, marked the first leg of the relay race that culminated in this thesis. The latter would, unfortunately, breathe her last just before this thesis was submitted for examination.



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I am extremely thankful to Professor Gary Kline, of Georgia Southwestern State University, who not only encouraged me during the difficult moments associated with the writing of this thesis, but also reviewed my work and provided invaluable comments. Gary would also take time off his busy schedule as the Editor of the *Journal of Global South Studies*, to edit my work pro bono. An excellent role model, Gary has taught me that true achievement lies in humility and that knowledge and wisdom devoid of compassion are futile.


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
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABS	Atlanta Black Star
AFC	Agricultural Finance Corporation
ARV	Antiretroviral
ASAL	Arid and Semi-arid Lands
ASDSP	Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme
BCC	Bristol City Council
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBK	Central Bank of Kenya
CDF	Constituency Development Fund(s)
CID	Criminal Investigations Department
CMEPSP	Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CORD	Coalition for Reforms and Democracy
CRA	Commission on Revenue Allocation
DDC(s)	District Development Committee(s)
DDF	District Development Fund
DFRD	District Focus for Rural Development
EAC	East African Community
ECD	Early Childhood Development
ECOWAS	Economic Community of Western African States
EMS	Economic and Management Sciences
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPZ(s)	Export Processing Zone(s)
ERS	Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Management Creation 2003 – 2007
FGD(s)	Focus Group Discussion(s)
FPE	Free Primary Education
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

GEMA	Gikuyu Embu and Meru Association
GoK	Government of Kenya
GoKH	Government of Kenya Hansard
GSU	General Service Unit
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP(s)	Internally Displaced Person(s)
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPF	Ivorian Popular Front
IPOA	Independent Police Oversight Authority
ITA	Information Technology Agreement
IVF	In Vitro Fertilisation
JKIA	Jomo Kenyatta International Airport
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KCB	Kenya Commercial Bank
KCC	Kenya Cooperative Creameries
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KFA	Kenya Farmers Association
KICOMI	Kisumu Cotton Mills
KPU	Kenya People's Union
KRA	Kenya Revenue Authority
KSSRI	Kenya Society for the Study of Race Improvement
LATF	Local Authority Transfer Fund
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MCG	Mombasa County Government
MMR	Mixed Methods Research
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP(s)	Member(s) of Parliament
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCCG	Nairobi City County Government
NCG	Nakuru County Government
NCST	National Council for Science and Technology
NGO(s)	Non-governmental Organization(s)
NHC	National Housing Corporation
NIS	National Intelligence Services
NRF	National Research Foundation
NYS	National Youth Service
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OSF	Open Society Foundations
PM	Prime Minister
PTA	Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African states
RoKBS	Republic of Kenya Budget Speech
RoKES	Republic of Kenya Economic Survey
RTPC	Rural Trade and Production Centre
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SBF	School Bursary Fund
SCNT	Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer
SME(s)	Small and Medium-sized Enterprise(s)
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UGCG	Uasin Gishu County Government
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UoL	University of Leicester
US	United States


USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UWC	University of the Western Cape
VMMC	Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision
WPP(s)	Water Purification Point(s)
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZANU – PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People’s Union



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MAPS

Map 1: Provinces of Kenya




KEY:

1. Central
2. Coast
3. Eastern
4. Nairobi
5. North Eastern
6. Nyanza
7. Rift Valley
8. Western

Source: Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopaedia (2017)

Map 2: Kenya's "Ethnic Groups"



Source: Maundu et al. (1999)

Map 3: Luo Nyanza



Source: Pitt Rivers Museum (2011)

Map 4: Kenya's 47 Counties under New (2010) Constitution



Source: Wikimedia Commons (2017)

Chapter 1²

Casting the Research Problem

1.1 Introduction

“Ethnicity”³ and disparate group-based socio-economic development make governance in Africa problematic; this thesis explores them to understand governance patterns in Kenya with special reference to its Luo community, 1963 – 2013. I have chosen Kenya for this task for the East African nation epitomizes the sobering description of African society as succinctly expressed by Miruka and Omenya (2009):

To date, there is no evidence that the growing number of educated Sub-Saharan Africans has been trained especially in the virtues of collaboration beyond the basic needs of ethnic communities. Even today, major political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa are organized around tribal lines and are more reflective of regional groupings rather than ideological stands. Educational achievements seem to be revered for their own sake rather than as a means of fundamental transformation of society. (*Civic Engagement* section, para. 5)

Indeed, despite advancements in education, in Kenya, group consciousness/“ethnicity” (“tribalism”) continues to hinder “common cause” insofar as nation-building is concerned; the country’s leaders persist in their manipulation of socially-constructed, ideologically-ensconced “identities” to structurally achieve their personal interests. This research is particularly concerned with examining the manner in which opposition to the state and its governing institutions, by certain “ethnic groups”⁴, affects the latter’s socio-economic development. Accordingly, I have

² A version of this chapter was published as an article titled “A survey of the influence of ‘ethnicity’, in African governance, with special reference to its impact in Kenya vis-à-vis its Luo community, 28 May 2017, in *African Identities*. DOI: 10.1080/14725843.2017.1332984

³ Whilst “ethnicity” has no scientific basis, thus using it in this thesis does not imply the acceptance of this highly spurious concept. Where it is used in the text without inverted commas, it is simply to make the text less cumbersome. It should, nonetheless, be borne in mind throughout this thesis, “ethnicity”, like its correlative “race”, is an ideologically created concept, devoid of ANY scientific substance [cf. e.g. Tobias (1970), Nkrumah (1968), etc.]

⁴ I do not subscribe to the idea that humans belong to different “ethnic groups”; rather, humankind, since time immemorial, belongs to different historically-informed social formations, often co-existing, amicably, in the same geographical region, especially prior to the colonization of Africa in 1884/1885. In this sense, “ethnicity” is an “exogenous construct” imposed on the aboriginal people of Africa (cf. e.g. Mafeje, 1971; Mafeje, 2002).

chosen to focus on the Luo community, for it has consistently been in the vanguard of political social movements and collective action against the Kenyan state for a large part of the period under study, 1963 – 2013 (cf. e.g., Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004, pp. 3 – 6) as narrated below.

First, the Luo, under their *de facto* leader, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, were the first Kenyan “ethnic group” to actively and demonstrably voice and display discontent against “new forms of political oppression, social injustice, corruption and the arrogance of political power in the hands of [the Jomo Kenyatta-led independent Kenya’s ruling elites that] started to make life difficult for the ordinary African human being” (Nyong’o, 2013, para. 5) soon after Kenya’s independence in 1963. Second, ever since the 1966 Kenyatta-Odinga fallout, which has been further interrogated in the problem statement in section 1.4 below, the Luo have been at loggerheads with the Kenyan state and, as a consequence of this enmity, have been largely politically excluded. Third, when “state oppression by [Kenya’s] dictatorial ruler [Moi], especially during the Cold War, precipitated a prevalent culture of fear and silence”, the Luo, specifically through the failed coup attempt of 1982, expressed “the outcry of citizens over gross violations of human rights” (Maathai, 1995, para. 13). Fourth, when the “‘third wave’ of democratization began to roll across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s” (Lynch and Crawford, 2011), the Luo community, under the guidance of Kenya’s doyen of opposition politics, Jaramogi, was also at the forefront in advocating for the restoration of multi-party democracy in Kenya. Fifth, the Luo were instrumental in bringing to an end the forty-year reign of Kenya’s independence party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Indeed, as noted by Oyugi, Wanyande and Odhiambo-Mbai (2003), “it was Raila Odinga’s ‘blessing’ that had assured Mwai Kibaki of the joint opposition’s nomination in the ‘transitional election’ of 2002” (as cited in Wolf, 2009, p. 280). Raila Odinga’s gesture led “to a virtual walkover and the promise of tangible ‘change’ in the lives of ordinary Kenyans” (Wolf, 2009, p. 280). Sixth, during the disputed 2007 general elections in Kenya, which were characterized by violence, the Luo, under “Raila Odinga, the main opposition leader representing the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)”, were at the centre of events that included “civil unrest . . . in Western Kenya to protest against reporting delays in some districts” (Rheault & Tortora, 2008, para. 2). Seventh, during the 2010 referendum, the Luo community, alongside others, voted

overwhelmingly for Kenya's new constitution. Concerning the phenomenon, a prominent Kenyan human rights activist, Maina Kiai, was quoted thus: "Look at the figures from Nyanza," he said, pointing to the lush province along Lake Victoria where Kenya's pro-Constitution prime minister, Raila Odinga, is from. "It was completely, overwhelmingly 'yes'" (Gettleman, 2010, para. 9). Eighth, in contemporary times where "democracy in Africa . . . features semi-competitive elections that retain and entrench neo-patrimonialism and old networks of elite domination" (Nyong'o, 2013, para. 1), the Luo, under the stewardship of the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD)⁵ leader, Raila Odinga, and through collective action such as the 2016 protests against the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) that succeeded in bringing to a halt the term of office of Kenya's electoral body's top officials, are continuously leading the fight for social transformation (see, e.g., Standard Team, 2016).

Having explained my choice of Kenya's Luo community, in this attempt to elucidate the specifics of the negative consequences of ethnic-based political marginalization in Africa, and to explain why African governing structures and practices persist in promoting "ethnicity" despite its existential problems for particular social groups, I now briefly outline the structure of this introductory chapter. This chapter begins with an analysis of some scholarly perspectives on "ethnicity"; it then introduces the historical antecedents of the research problem, outlines the research problem itself, states the research questions to be answered, and gives the rationale for the research, its objectives, research assumptions/hypotheses, the conceptual framework, and some elements of the research methodology employed. Finally, it concludes with a look at the structural organization of this thesis. Rooted in the firm belief that "ethnicity", like its correlative, "race", is a spurious ideology, devoid of any scientific substance, and that it is an exogenous construct imposed on aboriginal people of Africa by mostly European anthropologists and colonialists, I now present the aforementioned components sequentially in this introductory chapter.

1.2 Some Scholarly Perspectives on "Ethnicity"

Contemporary scholarship on "ethnicity" in Africa – "by both expatriate theorists and

⁵ In what has become typical of Kenyan political party behaviour, CORD repackaged itself as the National Super Alliance (NASA) in 2017, and will contest the country's general election, against the Jubilee Government, with Raila Odinga as its presidential flag bearer.

emergent African middle-class ideologists” (Mafeje, 1971, p. 261) – seldom appreciates or acknowledges the unscientific, spurious and exogenous nature of this ideological construct; rather, more emphasis has been placed on the conceptualization of such studies alongside the two distinctions drawn in Lonsdale’s acclaimed work entitled “The Moral Economy of Mau Mau: Wealth, Poverty, and Civic Virtue in Kikuyu Political Thought” (see Berman & Lonsdale, 1992, pp. 315 – 467). In this scholarly piece, Lonsdale talks about “moral ethnicity” and “political tribalism”; whilst arguing that “ethnic” identity was initially an ambiguous concept, and that it was constructed by Africans as an instrument for countering colonialism, he describes “moral ethnicity” as a grassroots form of group consciousness necessary for ensuring survival and demanding freedom from oppressive regimes. On the other hand, “political tribalism”, he argues, emanates from society’s elite class and serves the purpose of creating divisions that facilitate the pursuit of the latter’s selfish interests. These two concepts have been the inspiration behind various works on “ethnicity” in Africa, generally, and Kenya in particular (cf. e.g., Carotenuto, 2006; Carotenuto & Luongo, 2016; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2009; Lynch, 2011; MacArthur, 2016; Ogude, 2001).

With regard to scholarly literature on the Luo, Lonsdale’s “moral ethnicity”, which projects “ethnicity” as an African phenomenon with African origins, is predominant; for instance, whilst appearing to pander to Berman’s (1998) contention that “ethnicity is the product of a continuing historical process, always simultaneously old and new, grounded in the past and perpetually in creation” (p. 305), Carotenuto (2006) highlights the role played by the “Luo Union, an East African ethnically based welfare association ... [with] beginnings in the urban centers of early colonial East Africa”, in “forg[ing] and govern[ing] a broad-based cultural identity among a diverse Dholuo-speaking population” (p. 53). Seemingly obsessed with providing an alternative perspective to the view that “ethnicity” is an exogenous imposition on the people of Africa, he argues that the Luo are a politically “unified” “ethnic group” not merely because of political marginalization; rather, he contends, “in Kenya, as elsewhere on the continent, the roots of contemporary ethnic identities lie in the era before independence” (p. 54). In a later work, entitled *Obama and Kenya: Contested Histories and the Politics of Belonging*, Carotenuto and Luongo (2016) give more examples, such as the activities of politicians like Oginga Odinga, the now defunct *Ramogi*, a Luo language newspaper, and the Luo vernacular

radio station, *Ramogi FM*, in their attempts to substantiate the African role in the construction of “ethnicity” and in explaining the prevalent feelings of group consciousness amongst the members of this western Kenyan community. In a manner typical of prevalent contemporary and Eurocentric scholarship on “ethnicity” in Africa, they further argue that:

An array of historical sources shows that Luoness has been constituted through origin myths and oral traditions, through histories written by Luo members of the academy and amateur scholars of the “tin trunk history” guild, and through the political projects and partisan maneuverings of Luo political actors. (p. 44)

But should we accept completely these arguments and turn a blind eye to the Hamitic hypothesis? Long before a Luo scholar ever put pen to paper, European administrators, explorers and missionaries had conducted “research” and written on the Luo and other Africans from a racist and chauvinistic viewpoint (Campbell, 2006); this “white” lot approached history and anthropology from the warped perspective that “everything of value ever found in Africa was brought there by the Hamites, allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race” (Sanders, 1969). Moreover, 19th century European scholarship was fond of categorizing African social groups into “races”, “tribes” and eventually “ethnic groups”; in fact, labels such as “Zulu” and “Baganda”, which continue to divide Africans today, were coined during this era for purposes of convenient classification of African peoples by Europeans (Campbell, 2006). In acknowledging this European scholarly indiscretion, Thornton (1983, p. 512) states that “the term Bantu”, for instance, has “had even further reaching historical effects, both intellectual and political, since it came to designate, ambiguously, an imagined ‘race’, a conjectured common history...” (as cited in Campbell, 2006, p. 74). Accordingly, part of what Carotenuto and Luongo (2016) see as a contribution by Africans in constructing their “ethnicities” can alternatively be interpreted as an exercise aimed at dismantling and invalidating European racism, and intellectual impropriety and imposition, through the encouragement and actualization of the production of African history by Africans, notwithstanding the reality that a majority of the latter remain mentally colonized. Indeed, the “father of Kenyan history”, Bethwell Allan Ogot, who authored the celebrated “History of the Southern Luo”, was partly motivated by the fact that “European accounts of the 19th century history of East Africa ... are not only highly coloured and biased, often they are

also inaccurate” (Ogot, 1967, p. 14). Moreover, he states: “When I decided in 1958 to study the pre-colonial history of East Africa, many of my friends and mentors ridiculed the decision on the ground that one cannot study what is non-existent” (Ogot, 1967, p. 13). Such is the danger posed by Western chauvinism; it serves mainly to discourage Africans from developing intellectual independence.

The problem of Western intellectual imperialism persists, for current Western scholarship is seemingly geared towards silencing the viewpoint that the terms “race”, “tribe” and “ethnicity” are exogenous to Africa. In *Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa*, for instance, Spear (2003) argues that “the case for colonial invention has often overstated colonial power and the ability to manipulate African institutions to establish hegemony” (p. 3). Whilst cleverly fusing three ideas – “invention of tradition”, “making of customary law”, and the “creation of tribalism”, in what appears to be a camouflaged bid to implicate the African in the construction of this often spurious concept, “ethnicity”, Spear (2003) would like us to believe that “ethnicity reflected long-standing local political, cultural and historical conditions in the changing contexts of colonial rule” (p. 3). He further faults the construction paradigm by arguing that this viewpoint makes “colonial duplicity overwhelm African gullibility” (Spear, 2003, p. 4). He is of the opinion that focus on colonial invention reduces “provocative concepts” to “ahistorical clichés” (Spear, 2003, p. 4). The Afrocentric scholar who seeks to liberate himself/herself from the yoke of European intellectual imperialism should find these arguments extremely unpalatable: the truth of the matter is that the fear of confronting Western bias has reduced and restricted analysis of “ethnicity” to Eurocentric approaches, such as those of Lonsdale’s, discussed above, and escapist, conformist investigation of the cradle of humankind.

It is to a conscientious decolonized mind, therefore, that we must turn for a counter-narrative that will emancipate and free us to undertake further meaningful research, vis-à-vis “ethnicity”, in a world in which established knowledge forms are increasingly under greater scrutiny and critical studies and forms of analysis (cf. e.g., Bourdieu, 1972[1977]; Giddens,

1984; Habermas, 1981[1984]) are becoming ever so important even as the push for globalism⁶ gains momentum. In this regard, the outstanding scholarly contributions of the celebrated African social scientist, Archie Mafeje, come into play. According to Mafeje (1971):

European colonialism, like any epoch, brought with it certain ways of reconstructing the African reality. It regarded African societies as particularly tribal. This approach produced certain blinkers or ideological predispositions which made it difficult for those associated with the system to view these societies in any other light. Hence certain modes of thought among European scholars in Africa and their African counterparts have persisted, despite the many important economic and political changes that have occurred in the continent over the last 75 – 100 years. Therefore, if tribalism is thought of peculiarly as African, then the ideology itself is particularly European in origin. (p. 253)

This liberated African scholar offers crucial insights with regard to the origins and evolution of the term “tribe”: the material base of “tribes”, whatever they may be, lies with colonial authorities; on the other hand, the ideological base of this often spurious term is to be traced to classical anthropologists who, according to Mafeje (1971, p. 257), depicted “tribes” as “self-contained autonomous communities practicing subsistence economy with little or no external trade.” Mafeje’s work comprehensively highlights the conspiracies of, especially, Anglo-Saxon anthropologists, who refused to revolutionize their thinking; the latter, for instance, when faced with the reality that some parts of pre-colonial Africa comprised “centralised” states, refused to ascribe the more respectable label, “state”, to these entities, choosing instead to refer to them as “super-tribes” (p. 258). With time, the definition of the ambiguous term would move to “separate ‘political communities’, each claiming exclusive rights to a given territory and managing its affairs independently of external control” (Schapera, 1956, as cited in Mafeje, 1971, p. 257) and eventually to “any group of people which is distinguished, by its members and by others, on the basis of cultural-regional criteria” (Gulliver, 1969, as cited in Mafeje, 1971, p. 258). Such is the nature – utter stubbornness and phenomenal self-contradiction – of those that preoccupy

⁶ Globalism is an ideology of the capitalist elites associated with neoliberalism; it is mainly about liberalisation and integration of all markets. It is characterised by faith in market mechanisms and “free markets.” Whilst seeking to include all countries in the global trading system, it is largely directed by technology and tries to de-politicize and reduce issues to technical or administrative questions (G. Kline, personal communication, September 7, 2017).

themselves with imposing their ideological terms of reference upon Africa. There is no doubt that “tribal ideology and sentiment” abound in the cradle of humankind; however, as Mafeje (1971) argues, “they have to be understood – and conceptualised – differently under modern conditions”, for besides having been “effectively penetrated by European colonialism” Africa has “been successfully drawn into a capitalist economy and a world market” (p. 258). In other words, the material, social and political conditions that characterized what Western-centric scholars call “tribe” (“ethnicity”/“ethnic group”) have been completely dismantled and the ideology totally exposed for the farce that it is. Accordingly, this study is partly a response to Mafeje’s (1971) call for scholars to conceptualize “ethnicity” with modern conditions in mind. Unlike Eurocentric scholars such as Lonsdale, and most African ideologists, it explicitly projects “ethnicity” for what it truly is – a bogus, ideological construct exogenous to Africa.

Further justification for this study lies in Michel Foucault’s (1980) understanding of the “episteme”, that is, the cognitive framework in a given epoch (see also, Kuhn, 2012). To Foucault, the past is not definite; it is perpetually under construction and is subject to reconstruction and revision, by successive generations, as the knowledge base evolves. The various epistemic forms, under which studies on Africans, in general, and the Luo, in particular, have been conducted since the 19th century have been characterized by the following three broad theoretical lenses, among others: the Hamitic hypothesis; culture; and Lonsdale’s diametrically opposed concepts of “moral ethnicity” and “political tribalism”. The Hamitic hypothesis was dominant from the second half of the 19th century to the year in which Crazzolara (1950) published “The Lwoo”; this period was largely influenced by what Thornton (1983) has termed “arm chair theoreticians” (as cited in Campbell, 2006, p. 75). Amongst these “arm chair theoreticians” was one Richard Speke who argued that “the bearers of culture and civilization to Africa were light skinned Hamitic invaders from Christian Ethiopia” (Wolf, 1994, as cited in Campbell, 2006, p. 74). Crazzolara (1950), who investigated the history and customs of the Lwoo/Luo (Nilo-Hamitic peoples) from AD 1000, inaugurated the era (1950 – 1992) in which “regional history and culture” would replace the “race” myths propagated by the peddlers of the Nilo-Hamitic hypothesis, as the basis of analysis of the Luo and other African social groups (cf. e.g., Ayot, 1977; Malo, 1953; Ndisi, 1974; Ogot, 1967, Parkin, 1978; Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989). And from 1992 to 2016, when Carotenuto and Luongo (2016) published their

work on Obama, texts on “ethnicity” in Kenya/Africa have been framed largely around Lonsdale’s diametrically opposed understandings of the concept of “ethnicity”: “moral ethnicity” and “political tribalism” (cf. e.g., Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2009; Lynch, 2011; MacArthur, 2016; Ogude, 2001; Peterson, 2012; Shipton, 2007; 2009). We are currently living in what many analysts have referenced as the era of globalism, which is mostly characterized by multinational corporate domination, grave concentration of the world’s wealth and power, and an incestuous relationship between big business and government (cf. e.g., Heller, 2013; Roche, 2009). As transnational capital threatens the very soul of the nation-state, the knowledge base is becoming less shrouded: what Malcolm X called an “international Western power structure”⁷ and Nkrumah (1965) referred to as “neo-colonialism”, for instance, we now explicitly know as global banking cartels and corporations. These new developments – essentially an “evolution in the episteme” – proffer an opportunity for the scholar of “ethnicity” to probe and conceptualize the spurious concept differently and, hopefully, gain a modern understanding of what it really stands for. This study seeks to do just that; it is, partly, an attempt to conceptualize “ethnicity” with the aforementioned contemporary realities in mind. I now turn my attention to the specifics of the research problematic.

1.3 Historical Antecedents of the Research Problem: “Ethnicity” and Governance in Africa

1.3.1 Pre-colonial Africa: c. 1500 – c. 1900

The highly controversial term “ethnic group”, an ideology first coined by Europeans and whose origins can be traced back to classical anthropology (cf. Mafeje 1971, p. 253), has been defined by Irobi (2005), from the perspective of Lonsdale’s “moral ethnicity”, as “a community of people who share cultural and linguistic characteristics including history, tradition, myth, and origin” (*Theoretical Approaches to Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict* section, para. 1). With regard to Irobi’s (2005) understanding of the term, Africa comprises numerous “ethnic groups”, in fact, thousands of them, and they have related in various ways throughout history – amicably and belligerently alike (cf. Berman, 1998, p. 311). Although strife existed in Africa before the advent of colonialism (Obioha, 1999), it must be emphasized that dissention usually pitted various

⁷ See, for example, Bruce P. (Ed.). (1989). *Malcolm X: The last speeches*. New York, NY: Pathfinder Press, pp. 111 – 149.

social formations – pastoralists against cultivators, fishing societies against trading societies, raiders against nomads, and so on (Rodney, 1973); “ethnic” identity rarely formed the basis for conflict, disagreement, domination or exclusion, prior to the colonization of Africa. In like manner, as Rodney (1973) argues, the notion of class was barely existent throughout most of the pre-colonial era for there was “equal access to land and equity in distribution” (p. 38). The communal nature of pre-colonial African society made it less prone to “ethnic” conflict. To illustrate the fact that “ethnic” identity was never a cause for conflict in Africa, Rodney (1973) further asserts that:

[N]owhere in the history of pre-colonial independent Nigeria can anyone point to the massacre of Ibos by Hausas or any incident which suggests that people up to the 19th century were fighting each other because of ethnic origin. Of course there were wars, but they had a rational basis in trade rivalry, religious contentions, and the clashes of political expansion. What came to be called tribalism at the beginning of the new epoch of political independence in Nigeria was itself a product of the way that people were brought together under colonialism so as to be exploited. It was a product of administrative devices, of entrenched regional separations, of differential access by particular ethnic groups into the colonial economy and culture. (p. 229)

1.3.2 Colonial Africa: c. 1900 – c. 1960

Having argued above that group association/“ethnicity” is not inherently conflictive within the human condition, but its ideological/political manipulation for often economic reasons seems to be conflict generating, it is, accordingly, appropriate to further unravel this theoretical problematic in relation to this thesis for the following reasons: first, the ensuing exposition demonstrates that “ethnicity” has been deliberately constructed as divisionary strategy during the colonial period; and second, it also shows that during the post-colonial period in Africa this highly questionable ideological construct of “ethnicity” continues to be used for a range of socio-economic-political reasons as illustrated in my research domain, Kenya vis-à-vis the Luo.

The genesis of “ethnic” conflict and negative “ethnicity”⁸ that characterize Africa today was the Berlin Conference of 1884/85; in this unholy convention, European powers divided the cradle of humankind amongst themselves in an arbitrary manner that brought about a great deal of confusion. As a consequence, members of some “ethnic groups” would find themselves separated in different countries; examples include the Somali (found in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia) the Maasai (Kenya and Tanzania) and the Luo (Kenya and Tanzania) (Odinga, 2007).⁹ There are three other ways in which colonialism constructed and furthered “ethnic” formations in Africa: first, upon establishing their administrative structures, the colonialists proceeded to create social orders that were based on “race” – Europeans (“whites”) ranked first, Asians second and Africans last. Second, in entrenching their divide-and-rule philosophy, the colonial powers confined Africans to certain distinct areas, popularly known as “reserves”; this ensured that African communities lived separately from each other. Limited interaction made it difficult for the latter to coalesce and sowed seeds of mistrust and resentment amongst them. Third, colonialism came with segregation in the professional realm. Having demonstrated the apparent acceptance of the ascribed “ethnicity”, such Africans often would have been admitted to the official corridors of power (governance), though they were often excluded from certain professions (obtainable professions included serving in the army or police force, and farm work, amongst others) (Odinga, 2007). These discriminatory structural predispositions, vis-à-vis particular employment categories, would prove detrimental to the African state when self-determination was achieved, as succinctly argued by Odinga (2007):

With the advent of political independence in the 1960s, the colonial divisions found relevance in the competition of different communities for scarce resources, particularly land. As well, communities that had co-existed in relative peace before and even during colonialism found themselves competing for political power. And because resource allocation and distribution under the colonial administration and the post-independent

⁸ “Ethnicity” becomes negative when it is linked to discrimination and unequal differentiation (wa Wamwere, 2010); and negative “ethnicity” is “a mindset that claims some ethnic communities are superior and deserve more resources, while others are inferior and deserve less” (wa Wamwere, 2010, para. 4).

⁹ In fact, the Somali peoples are also to be found in Djibouti and Eritrea. Moreover, this phenomenon is not confined to East Africa. All over the continent, members of particular “ethnic groups” find themselves separated by geographical boundaries demarcated by European powers during the advent of colonialism. Examples include the following peoples: Malinke, Ndembu, Ibibio, Fang, Chewa, Hausa and Ewe among others.

governments were always lopsided, unequal and discriminatory, political power was viewed by each community as the vehicle to “prosperity” (*Ethnicity as a Vehicle for Political Competition* section, para. 1)

1.3.3 Post-colonial Africa: c. 1960 – 2017 and Beyond

Indeed, the colonialist divide-and-rule tactics discussed in sub-section 1.3.2, above, have become a resource tool for self-seeking and egotistical politicians in post-colonial Africa. The latter, in their quest to retain or capture power, have followed in the footsteps of the colonial powers before them; as noted by Aquiline-Tarimo (2008), this political class has specialized in “manipulating ethnic identities for private interest” (para. 1). But what explains this obnoxious societal norm in Africa today? I contend that the rationale lies in the transformation of the system of production and distribution of resources: colonialism came with an alien economic system – capitalism – which equated human worth to wealth and destroyed African social conscience, by undermining the concepts of “collective life and social solidarity” (Touré, 1959, as cited in Nyasani, 1989, p. 13). Important symbols and procedures that had hitherto been sources of prestige within the traditional African society, such as sharing/brotherhood and other aspects of morality, and rites of passage, became largely redundant. Communalism gave way to the “survival of the fittest” and “everyone for himself/herself” dispositions. To obtain “prestigious” standing amongst fellow humans, post-colonial Africans – in similar fashion to the inhabitants of every other society in which capitalism as a mode of production is prevalent – resorted to obtaining wealth by any and all means necessary. At the political level, access to this wealth was tied to state power/control. Since the ultimate goal was to get recognition and prestige (which lay in wealth) by any means necessary, greed overcame compunction in the internal battle within the self, and “ethnic” numbers took the place of policies, manifestoes and visions in politics even as politicians spread hatred amongst the various “ethnic groups” that comprised the voting population. Thus, seeds of mistrust, at the grassroots level, were sown even further. Also, at the grassroots/individual level, life became harsher under capitalism as everyone struggled to position themselves within this new economic order in the post-colonial state. As a result, citizens became easily susceptible and readily receptive to the political gospel of “we versus them”. “Ethnicity” thus became a weapon in the struggle for access to scarce resources.

Undeniably, state power in post-independent Africa has become the perpetual means through which the bourgeois class is either formed or safeguarded. The section of the political class in power, which owes its privileged material position to the control of state resources and the lopsided manner in which capital structures society (cf. Mészáros, 2001a, pp. 101 – 102), plays the “ethnic” card to maintain the status quo. Similarly, competition against it is waged on the platform of “ethnic” identity as opposition leaders go for their “turn to eat” (cf. Wrong, 2009). Pre-occupation with constructed forms of “belonging”, that is, “ethnicity”, has thus become entrenched, especially in post-colonial Africa, because whoever controls state power also makes the decision regarding how national resources will be allocated vis-à-vis specific “ethnic” formations (cf. Odinga, 2007; Singh & vom Hau, 2015; Mullard, 2005).

Other salient characteristics of the post-colonial African state – closely related to “ethnicity” – include autocracy, personal rule and centralization of power (Asingo, 2003; Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003; Noyoo, 2000). These ideologically constructed features are accompanied by systematic patron-client linkages in which “public sector jobs, material rewards and economic opportunities [are] offered as favours to clients [usually members of the President’s “ethnic group” and loyal ethno-regional leaders] who in turn mobilize political support [for the President] (Bratton & Walle, 1997, as cited in Asingo, 2003, p. 20). It is through these patron-client linkages that “ethnic, sub-nationalist interests” (Thrup, 1987) are often taken care of, for the *modus operandi* is replicated throughout the political system, from the level of the national government to the grassroots level (cf. Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003; Berman, 1998; Berman, 2010). Thus, in many countries across the continent – Kenya, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire included – economic development has become largely dependent on one’s (community’s or individual’s) relationship with the powers-that-be, that is, the state controllers (Kasfir, 1998). Ideologically, ethnic-based typologies of belonging (inclusion) in post-colonial Africa often seem to be repressed, where dissident communities are viewed/considered to be anti-status quo, that is, against the exclusionary practices of a particular government and related state structures, encompassing virtually every aspect of life – social, economic and political.

Against the backdrop of the preceding exposition on the apparent “significance” of “ethnicized” forms of governance in Africa, Kenya seems to illustrate an African country still

reeling from these repercussions of colonialism. “Ethnic” allegiances in the country continue to determine government formation and distribution of the scarce national resources. Moreover, political leaders in the East African nation repeatedly manipulate “ethnic” identities to serve their personal interests. As discussed in the introduction, the Luo community of Western Kenya has consistently been “anti-government” in the post-independence era. Accordingly, this research examines the specifics of the economic and socio-cultural consequences of the community’s perceived political stance, within the framework of the aforementioned characteristics associated with the post-colonial African state. The next section interrogates the research problem in greater depth.

1.4 Research Problem

Following my contention, in sub-section 1.3.3 above, that in post-colonial Africa the socio-economic development of particular communities is, more often than not, influenced to a considerable extent by the latter’s posture – perceived or real – towards the state, I now present the central research problem in this study, which focuses on the peculiar pattern of antagonism between the Luo community and the Government of Kenya (GoK) throughout the post-independence era. Here, I further argue that there are overlapping thematic categories in the governance styles of the first three presidents of post-independent Kenya – Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki – that have been detrimental to the Luo community and other Kenyans at large, since governance systems do not necessarily cease to exist with the demise of a particular leader; rather, a continuation occurs, via residual effects, on subsequent regimes.¹⁰ I, therefore, unravel the research problem in four historical phases, viz.: 1960 – 66 (The incipient stage of authoritarianism vis-à-vis Kenya); 1966 – 78 (The incipient stage of authoritarianism vis-à-vis the Luo); 1978 – 2002 (The advancement stage of authoritarianism vis-à-vis Kenya in general and the Luo in particular); and 2003 – 13 (The Machiavellian stage of authoritarianism vis-à-vis Kenya in general and the Luo in particular).

1.4.1 1960 – 66: The Incipient Stage of Authoritarianism Vis-à-Vis Kenya

Before examining the leadership styles of the three aforementioned presidents, as alluded

¹⁰ For a detailed understanding about how the “residual effect” phenomenon associated with colonialism has occurred in post-colonial African society, see wa Thiong’o, N. (1986). *Decolonizing the mind: The politics of language in African literature*. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers.

to in section 1.4 above, and vis-à-vis the Luo “ethnic group”, it is important to state that the period 1960 – 66 was one of liberation and independence euphoria in what became Kenya. Whereas there were concerns about domination of some “ethnic groups” by others owing to demographic differentials and other factors,¹¹ as voiced during the Lancaster House Conferences of 1960, 1962 and 1963, apprehensions were nimbly anaesthetized by looming independence and, thereafter, by the ecstasy of self-determination. This made it difficult to discern any insincerity between the two pre-independence protagonists; KANU – which stood for centralized government – and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) – which advocated a “Majimbo”/federal state. This euphoria played a significant role in enabling Kenyatta to outwit KADU. As Mue (2013) has argued:

Exhausted at the slow pace of the negotiations and knowing he had “the numbers” in the forthcoming elections at the end of May 1963, Jomo Kenyatta called out his delegates [from KANU – which advocated a centralized system of government] and told them he was going to agree to the Majimbo constitution to enable them to get on with the election, and as soon as they had won the election and formed government, then they would re-make the constitution in their own image. (para. 2)

Although Kenya gained its independence under a federal constitution, and with Kenyatta as its first Prime Minister (PM), prevailing socio-economic-political conditions would stagnate/deteriorate as the latter would stay

[t]rue to his word, soon after independence, [and lead] the process of mutilating the constitution to centralize all power to himself. He began by starving the regional governments of resources, then wooed the opposition to his side leading to its dissolution. He dissolved the Senate and abolished the regional governments. From there it was downhill all the way as Kenya became a one party dictatorship. (Mue, 2013, para. 4)

By the time Jaramogi Oginga Odinga – Kenya’s first Vice-President and *de facto* leader of the

¹¹ For more details on the KANU – KADU divide and the stalemate that delayed independence in Kenya, see Asingo, P. O. (2003). The political economy of transition in Kenya. In W. O. Oyugi, P. Wanyande & C. Odhiambo-Mbai (Eds.), The politics of transition in Kenya (pp. 15 – 50). Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation.

Luo community disagreed with Kenyatta in 1966, the latter had consolidated power and every “ethnic group” in the Kenyan state, including the Luo, was under his complete control. The next section examines how events unfolded, for the Luo community, and other Kenyans at large, following the dispute between these two independence figures.

1.4.2 1966 – 78: Kenyatta and the Incipient Stage of Authoritarianism Vis-à-vis the Luo

The basis of the Kenyatta-Odinga fallout, mentioned in the preceding period, was mainly ideological and stems from the fact that Kenyatta’s view of life was influenced by “individual enterprise and personal virtue” while Odinga’s perspective was inspired by “clan-based communocratic and egalitarian values plus a tradition of resistance to authoritarianism of any sort” (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002, p. 241). However, there was also a political element to the row: during the 1966 Limuru Conference, Kenyatta instigated the creation of eight posts of party vice-chairman within KANU, without Odinga’s foreknowledge, outwitting and infuriating the latter to the point that he resigned (Kariuki, 2001, pp. 45 – 46; Auma-Osolo, 2013, p. 173). Odinga would then venture into opposition politics, forming a new party, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU), in April 1966. This new party would obtain its support mainly from Odinga’s Luo Nyanza. Following this split, the Luo were largely labelled anti-government and became associated with opposition politics. This tag made the community a prime target for political and economic exclusion. Indeed, to stem the “threat” that Odinga posed to the Kenyatta regime, the Kiambu (Kikuyu) “Kitchen cabinet” – comprising of Mbiyu Koinange, Njoroge Mungai, Charles Njonjo, James Gichuru and Kenyatta himself – commenced the process of marginalizing the Luo (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002)¹². Marginalization of the Luo, and other Kenyan “ethnic groups” was accomplished, in part, by what (Auma-Osolo, 2013, p. 168) has been referred to as the “Kikuyunization” of the civil service. Kenyatta preserved all strategic public service positions in Kenya for his Kikuyu “ethnic group”, thereby excluding other Kenyans. These posts included the following:

¹² Though Mbiyu Koinange died in 1981, a Nairobi court only recently adjudicated the division of his vast wealth amongst his family members. His enormous estate is valued at USD 163 million as of September 2015. This lends credence to my argument, in chapter two, that state control has been crucial in the formation of the indigenous African bourgeois class in Kenya, and that it is through the entrenchment of the state-ethnic nexus that the wealthy class is safeguarded. For more details on Koinange, see Muthoni, K. (2015 September, 28). Joy, heartbreak as court finally shares out Koinange’s multi-billion shilling estate. *Standard Digital*. Retrieved from <http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000177793/kenya-joy-heartbreak-as-court-finally-shares-out-koinange-s-multi-billion-shilling-estate/> (accessed 4 October 2015).

Divisional Officers to District Officers, Provincial Commissioners, Permanent Secretaries, Heads of Parastatal Agencies, Governor of the Central Bank, Commissioner of Police, Chief of General Security Unit (GSU), Director of Criminal Investigations (CID), Director of Special Branch, Principal Immigration Officer, Air Force Commander. (Auma-Osolo, 2013, pp. 167 – 168)

The Luo community's ties with the Kenyatta government were further eroded following the assassination of the charismatic Luo leader who had been pro-Kenyatta, Tom Mboya, and the banning of the KPU in 1969. When Kenyatta died in 1978, his deputy, Moi, ascended to the helm promising to follow in his "footsteps"; and he did.

1.4.3 1978 – 2002: Moi's "Nyayoism" – The Advancement Stage of Authoritarianism Vis-à-vis Kenya in General and the Luo in Particular

The "footsteps" alluded to in sub-section 1.4.2 above were to be popularized by Moi's "newfound" philosophy, and clarion call, "Nyayo", which emphasized "peace, love and unity" (Nyaroga, 1996, p. 10). These three pillars, Moi argued, had been the driving force behind Kenyatta's leadership since independence; and now he, Moi, would incorporate them into his style of governance. Moi's actions, though, were a complete antithesis of his words – at least as far as the Luo and Kikuyu "ethnic groups" were concerned. The incorporation and emulation seem to have mainly centred on the negative aspects of Kenyatta's rule. Following the aborted coup attempt of August 1, 1982, the Moi government indicted Odinga and the Luo community (Throup, 1987). Because the Luo had for a long time been denied the opportunity to participate in the political process, the coup attempt was celebrated in Nyanza Province. The Luos in Nairobi also warmly welcomed the incident. Odinga and the Luo were suspected by the Moi regime because of the protracted history of antagonism between them – Moi and Kenyatta both exaggerated the threat that Odinga and the Luo posed to their regimes. Thereafter, Odinga and his Luo community were politically side-lined even further. Another interesting characteristic of Moi's regime was his antagonistic relationship with the Kikuyu community. When Moi ascended to power, he inherited a state dominated by Kikuyu hegemony. To stamp his authority and entrench his rule, he made concerted efforts to "dismantle the economic foundations of the

Kenyatta State” and “diverted resources away from Central Province to the Kalenjin” (Throup 1987, p. 60). Indeed, from 1978 – 2002, Moi dealt ruthlessly with the Kikuyu by expelling them from the civil service. He especially denied them the top, most influential positions (Amutabi, 2009). These mechanisms of political marginalization were to be employed by his successor, Kibaki, in a modern, shrewd and subtle manner, as discussed in sub-section 1.4.4 below.

1.4.4 2003 – 13: Kibaki and the Machiavellian Stage of Authoritarianism Vis-à-vis Kenya in General and the Luo in Particular

Characterized by a “polite” demeanour, Kibaki struck the observer as a “hands-off” president – he appeared not to meddle in the affairs of his appointees, and cut for himself the image of a non-authoritarian. This approach, coupled with his efforts to slay the dragon of corruption during the early part of his tenure in office, endeared him to many a Kenyan. However, some of his actions soon began to raise eyebrows; as Kinyanjui and Maina (2008) correctly observe, Kibaki failed to honour a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between himself and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leader, Raila Odinga (Jaramogi’s son). This MoU, in which it is widely believed an agreement had been reached to create a prime ministerial position for Raila, had brought Kibaki to power, but was breached. Kinyanjui and Maina (2008), state that “the breakdown of the MoU disregarded the envisaged equitable distribution of power among the ethnic groups” (p. 86). In this respect, their argument is similar to the views of Foucault (1978 [1976]), who envisions power from the perspective of relationships and argues that it is not a possession but a complex circulation, which involves multiple relations between different societal areas and groups. Power is, therefore, bound to change with circumstances and time; it determines our identity (what we are), capability (what we can do) and perspective (our views about ourselves and the world). Following the Kibaki – Raila schism, the Luo were once again side-lined politically. Kibaki would also proceed to indulge the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (GEMA) communities in public appointments throughout his reign at the expense of other Kenyans (Amutabi, 2009; Auma-Osolo, 2013). Having examined the relationship between “ethnicity” and governance, in the Kenyan context, and explored the evolution of the residual effects in Kenyan leadership structures, I pose a multi-dimensional research question as outlined in sub-section 1.4.5 below.

1.4.5 Research Questions

Given that Kenya's independence from the British, in 1963, ushered in an era of resource distribution that was dependent on politics and "ethnicity" (Throup, 1987), this study poses the following multi-dimensional question: how did antagonistic relations, between the GoK and the Luo, influence the socio-economic development of Kenya, in general, and that of the Luo community in particular? The socio-economic consequences of political marginalization in Africa are thought of as harmful; however, this is a very general description that is not backed by evidence. What are the specifics of the negative socio-economic consequences of political marginalization within the Kenyan context? Could thinkers that hold the view that uneven development in Kenya is the result of the nature of capitalism and has nothing to do with post-colonial GoK-instigated manipulations (cf. e.g., Oloo, 2004), in fact, have a point? This research concerns itself with equity – in terms of equality of access to opportunity, equality of participation in the opportunity, and the outcome of equal participation (cf. Mészáros, 2001a; Mészáros, 2001b; Mészáros, 2009) – and examines public provision trends with regard to the following five indicators of socio-economic development: education, healthcare, housing, electricity and rural water supplies.

Whilst focused on finding answers to the questions posed above, and in recognition of the fact that self-aggrandizement by the ruling elites in Africa is not sufficient to explain political antagonisms (cf. Mafeje, 2002), this study acknowledges that ethnic-based political marginalization/exclusion, "is a metaphor for things which could be understood otherwise" (Mafeje, 2002, p. 56); that is, it is a proxy variable. Accordingly, there exists the need for this study to simultaneously examine why the African political culture encourages the social reproduction of "ethnic identities", despite this being degenerate and socially destructive. Indeed, the fact that the various factions that form the African political elite class allow – or engage in – activities that yield ills such as the 2007 – 08 post-election violence in Kenya is puzzling for

[h]istorically, it is unimaginable that members of a hegemonic class would engage in unbridled mutual extermination and preside over the destruction of their supreme instrument of social *and economic* control, the state, as has become the order of the day in Africa. (Mafeje, 2002, p. 56, emphasis added)

Consequently, this research will also seek to explain, by studying the antagonism between the Luo community and the Kenyan state, why “ethnicity” is strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in the East African nation, and poses the following additional questions: why does the Kenyan political elite class persist in promoting the scourge of “ethnicity” despite experience showing its existential problems for particular social groups? What informs “ethnic”-based political exclusion in Kenya, besides the desire to maintain/safeguard the social formation of capital?

1.5 Rationale/Justification for the Research

Based on the preceding historical context of the marginalization of the Luo in Kenya, it would appear that the “ethnic” question in African governance has been the subject of general discourse in numerous academic forums and scholarly works. However, its influence on the socio-economic development of particular communities is yet to be thoroughly analysed. Research by Kimenyi and Bratton (2008) examines the “ethnicity” factor in Kenyan voting patterns. According to them, Kenyans do not trust members of other “ethnic groups”, and therefore vote for their own. They also found that communities from western Kenya (especially the Luo and Luhya) are twice as likely to cry foul over “ethnic”-based discrimination compared to those in the GEMA complex or the Kamba. From their findings, the following questions then arise: what historical experience makes Kenyans feel like they have to vote for “their own” as opposed to voting on the basis of policies, manifestoes and visions? Why do Kenyans from different parts of the country identify divergently, and in a contrasting fashion, with “ethnic”-based discrimination?

Dersso (2008) blames the post-colonial state for Africa’s “ethnic” woes. The former, according to him, has failed to “recognize ethnic diversity and develop the necessary institutions and policies for accommodating the interests and identities of members of various groups” (p. 5). African governance features the domination of the state by some groups. This results in the political and economic alienation and marginalization of other groups. Society thus becomes dominated by competition as opposed to co-operation. Domination and exclusion take centre stage, closing the door for accommodation and inclusion. Bitterness, which sometimes can be

marked by violence, then ensues, making it almost impossible for nation-building to thrive. However, he does not undertake a comprehensive study of any “ethnic group” that would fall under what he refers to as marginalized, dominated and excluded by the controllers of state power. This study intends to address this gap by finding answers to the following question: in what ways has the post-colonial Kenyan state failed to accommodate the interests and identities of members of “dissident” “ethnic groups”?

According to Ongaro and Osogo (2008), an imperial presidency is to blame for Kenya’s diversity problems and “ethnic” tensions. The old constitutional order accorded the presidency too much power and left other state organs inchoate and frail. More importantly, they highlight the effects of “ethnic”-driven politics and governance. They state that:

[T]he ethnic proneness of Kenya’s politics affects not only who is elected, but also how jobs are allocated and affects the triumph of ethnic nepotism as one branch of corruption . . . Power-plays, capital transfers, loyalties and solidarities, jobs and opportunities, scholarships and bursaries, loans and gifts, are all influenced in one degree or another, by the pervasive power of ethnicity in Kenya. (p. 25)

This study finds the aforementioned revelations very useful and, in conducting research on the influence of ethnic-based governance on the Luo, interrogates whether these observations of Ongaro and Osogo (2008) have translated into economic difficulties at the grassroots level for the community. These views are supported by Opalo (2011), who blames underdevelopment in Africa on the phenomenon of the imperial presidency. Imperial presidents, he argues, have manipulated and controlled economic outcomes for many years on the continent. A common feature of African governance is powerful “kitchen cabinets”, which so often take control of the presidency and hoard power and resources from other “ethnic groups”. Governments that practice political exclusion to perpetuate their stranglehold on power may indeed allow only minimal public investment in the home areas of dissident communities. This tendency not only discourages opponents, but keeps them poor. Economically disenfranchised communities find it very difficult to organize themselves politically and are easy to divide-and-rule. The study, from the aforementioned revelations, also poses the question: what are the specific means, in the

Kenyan case, by which resources have been hoarded from dissident “ethnic groups”?

Musila (2008) attributes violent contestation of state power, land clashes, displacement and skewed allocation of resources in Kenya to “ethnic”-based governance. He argues that the “ethnicity” question in Kenya arose from its heavy centralization. “Ethnicity” has been used to capture and maintain state power, and the result has been the exclusion of others. He explores federalism as the possible answer to Kenya’s “ethnic”-based governance problem. Musila’s work provides an excellent background and justification for the examination of the influence of “tribal” politics on those communities that have had limited or no access to state power, which this study seeks to do. Carr (1995) sees a direct co-relation between economic dissatisfaction and the strengthening of “ethnic” roots. According to her, economic disparities in Africa have often resulted in “ethnic” as opposed to class consciousness. She asserts that appraisal of political and economic chances in Africa takes place, mainly, within an environment and context of “ethnic” scuffle and rivalry. These insightful ideas are crucial in analysing whether the Luo of western Kenya joined hands to work together as a people, to help uplift their living standards, as a reactionary measure to being politically side-lined by the central government in Kenya during the period under study.

Indeed, it would appear that “ethnicity” has greatly influenced the manner in which African countries are governed, how the ruling groups get to power, and, equally important, how they are opposed. However, the influence of “ethnic”-based governance on those “ethnic groups” considered to be anti-government (usually the politically-dominated groups), is yet to be comprehensively examined. By focusing on Kenya and its Luo community, this study set out to contribute to the exciting scholarly discourse surrounding “ethnicity” and socio-economic development in Africa. Besides, Kenya only recently promulgated a new constitution – on the 27th of August 2010 to be precise – that was immensely celebrated by Kenyans of all walks of life. The event, held at Nairobi’s Uhuru Park, was held in high esteem, with its significance rivalling that of independence from the British in 1963. It has been termed in many quarters as the “Birth of the Second Republic”. This new constitution promises to solve the problems associated with “ethnicity”, governance and socio-economic development. This is especially so because of the new system of devolved government that it operationalized after the general

election of 2013. The objects and principles of the new Kenyan Constitution are as follows:

- a) To promote democratic and accountable exercise of power;
- b) To foster national unity by recognizing diversity;
- c) To give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them;
- d) To recognize the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their development;
- e) To protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalized communities;
- f) To promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible services throughout Kenya;
- g) To ensure equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya;
- h) To facilitate the decentralization of State organs, their functions and services, from the capital of Kenya; and
- i) To enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers (see The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Chapter Eleven Section 174).

In order for the new constitution to be implemented with the diligence and urgency it deserves, and in order for this new constitutional dispensation to be appreciated as it ought to be, I posit that the experiences of Kenyans under the old independence constitution need to be understood. This study has, therefore, been conducted with the aim of helping to realize this goal. Moreover, this study could help make sense of the post-election violence that was witnessed in the country in 2007 – 08.

1.6 Objectives

Based on the problem statement in section 1.4 above, the objectives of this study are to:

- i) Explain the marginalization of the Luo by examining the proportion of GoK investment in Nyanza, during the period 1963 – 2013, to enhance their effective participation in governance structures at a grassroots level and their concomitant to socio-economic development.

- ii) Examine the Luo perspective of the influence of political exclusion on their socio-economic and cultural development since independence.
- iii) Construct a conceptual framework to explain why “ethnicity” was strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in Kenya, 1963 – 2013, and why it has become a pervasive problem in the African country.

1.7 Research Assumptions

- i. The Luo have enjoyed minimal public investment from the GoK because of opposition politics, making them relatively poor compared to other communities.
- ii. Political exclusion, during the period under study, has had the unwitting effect of fostering “ethnic” cohesion amongst the Luo.
- iii. Political exclusion at the national level has translated into economic difficulties for the Luo at the individual level, limiting their chances of ever getting to power in Kenya.
- iv. The Luo are gradually adopting alien cultures in uniform/homogeneous fashion, owing to politically constructed/mobilized stereotypes and prejudices, to gain acceptance as fully-fledged members of the Kenyan society at large.
- v. The strong correlation between “ethnicity” and the crisis of state power in Kenya, and the pervasiveness of the ideological construct, are partly the result of the machinations of global capitalists and western interference in the country’s affairs.

1.8 Conceptual Framework

This study is largely based on the principles of ex post facto research. According to Silva (2010), “[e]x post facto study or after-the-fact research is a category of research design in which the investigation starts after the fact has occurred without interference from the researcher” (p. 466). It is “a systematic inquiry in which the researcher does not have direct control of the independent variables because their manifestation has already occurred or because they cannot be manipulated” (Kerlinger, 1975, as cited in Ogola, 2010, p. 27). Ex post facto research “is a substitute for true experimental research and can be used to test hypotheses about cause-and-effect or correlational relationships, where it is not practical or ethical to apply a true

experimental, or even a quasi-experimental, design” (Simon & Goes, 2013, p. 1). This research is anchored on the premise that political exclusion at the national level, which has already occurred in the case of Kenya and its Luo community during the period under study, could have translated into economic and socio-cultural practices at the grassroots level with profound socio-economic-political consequences at all levels of society. The main variable in this study is political exclusion; this variable has been considered independently and analysed in relation to cultural factors (male circumcision), economic difficulties, “ethnic” cohesion and minimal public investment. Figure 1.1, below, depicts how the variables under examination, in the quantitative phase of this study, relate to the research assumptions and the data that was collected.




Figure 2.1: The Conceptual Framework.

Source: Author’s construct (2017)

The segment of this conceptual framework that links political exclusion with economic difficulties, “ethnic” cohesion, and minimal public investment derives from current literature discussed in section 1.5 above. Of particular note, however, is its assumption that, owing to “ethnic”-based political exclusion of the community from participation in governance structures, the Luo are adopting the alien culture of male circumcision, in homogeneous fashion, to conform

and gain acceptance in Kenyan society (cultural factors). As already stated, pre-colonial Africa was characterized by myriad rites of passage – each community (social group) with its own – which marked the transition from childhood to adulthood. To the Kikuyu community, which has controlled the Kenyan state for a lengthy time period since independence, circumcision was a major component of transition to adulthood; this was not the case for the Luo, as captured succinctly by Malo (1999[2003]) who wrote that:

The Luo is a person who is proud, *janyadhi*, and he is also a Show off, *jasunga*. And so he calls everybody who hails from outside the Luo communities as *jamwa*. These are people who do not have the six lower teeth removed, holes in their ears and who bite into a bead, *kayo ngaga*. They are also people who are circumcised, eat insects or do not know the Luo language. (p. 73)

This rite of passage issue has seemingly been politicized ever since independence from the British, particularly since 1969, as discussed in chapter two, and now seems to operate as an exclusionary factor vis-à-vis the Luo who do not necessarily subscribe to it. Accordingly, the “cultural factors” (rite of passage issue) component of figure 1.1, above, is framed around the concept of social death (cf. e.g., Mason, 2003; Patterson, 1982). Social death is the condition of those “who [have] ceased to belong and ha[ve] been expelled from normal participation in the community because of a failure to meet certain minimal legal or socioeconomic norms of behaviour” (Patterson, 1982, p. 41). Historically, social death often arose when dominant societal groups “annihilated [the dominated] people socially by first extracting them from meaningful relationships that defined personal status and belonging, communal memory, and collective aspiration and then incorporating these socially dead persons into the masters’ world” (Brown, 2009, p. 1233). The cultural aspect of this study gets its justification from the work of Geertz (1973) who argues that culture is a “semiotic” and “public” concept (pp. 5 – 6). For this reason, there is no discomfiture in conducting studies of an ethnographic nature (“thickly describing culture” – Geertz, 1973, p. 6), as long as issues that could be regarded as “sensitive” are examined ethically. Besides, researchers should not be restricted by themes of “novelty” – a subjective term, anyway – since “studies do build on other studies, not in the sense that they take up where the others leave off, but in the sense that, better informed and better conceptualized,

they plunge more deeply into the same things” (Geertz, 1973, p. 25). Moreover, “[t]heoretical ideas are not created wholly anew in each study . . . they are adopted from other related studies, and, refined in the process, applied to new interpretive problems” (Geertz, 1973, p. 27).

However, owing to the fact that Kenya’s “ethnic”-based political exclusion of the Luo – including the rite of passage myth on which it is structured (see chapter two) – is a proxy variable, and that there is a need to explain why the current African political culture encourages the practice despite it being socially destructive, the more significant challenge of this research was to “find an empirical approach to . . . ethnicity that [wa]s not reductionist and d[id] not [water down] the dynamic, interrelated and situated meanings of lived experiences [and causes] of . . . ethnicity” (Spencer, 2014, p. xvii). To eliminate this danger of reducing a complex historical process to a unidimensional cultural factor (cf. Mafeje, 2002; Spencer, 2014), I have adopted a pragmatic (“phronetic”) approach (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001; Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram, 2012) and employed a mixed methods research (MMR) design, which involves Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), a thorough examination of historical records and a systematic scrutiny of contemporary world events. This MMR design adopted for this study has yielded a more complete framework (cf. chapter 5 of this thesis) through which historical records have subsequently been examined to ensure a broader analysis of “ethnicized” politics. The FGDs have ensured that the voices of ordinary people, who have experienced the effects of ethnic-based discrimination, have been heard. Whilst advocating for such an approach in the study of “ethnicity” in Africa, Mafeje (2002) has lamented that “there are now numerous texts on ‘ethnicity’ in [Africa] and yet the supposed subjects of ‘ethnic conflict’ remain invisible and their representations are conspicuous by their absence in scholarly discourse, as if they are simply automatons” (p. 63). On the other hand, the examination of historical records and contemporary world events has ensured that external factors, which could have fostered “ethnicity”, such as western interference in the continent’s affairs, have been considered; this in turn has ensured that the emergent complex dynamics that inform “ethnicity” in Kenya and, by logical extrapolation, Africa, have been taken into account and that analysis of this ideological construct has been conducted through a holistic prism. A brief outline of some elements of the research methodology employed in this study is presented next.

1.9 Research Methodology

This research has employed the case study research methodology. According to Yin (2009), case study research methodology is ideal for “how” and “why” questions. The method is also recommended in instances where researchers have minimal control over events and when “the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context” (p. 2). A case study approach to this research was adopted since it has enabled me to utilize current theoretical propositions on “ethnicity” and governance. These theoretical propositions guided me in data collection and analysis, as evidenced in figure 1.1, above. Case study research methodology helps researchers cope technically in situations where variables of interest outnumber data points. It does this by “rel[ying] on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangular fashion” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). This case study is predicated upon two units of analysis: Luo Nyanza (the traditional homeland of the Luo community) and individual members of the Luo “ethnic group”. In studying Luo Nyanza, evidence was sought from a variety of sources, chief among which were the GoK’s Budget Speeches, Economic Surveys, and Statistical Abstracts. Baxter and Jack (2008) have argued that “This ensures that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood” (p. 544). This approach borrows from what Foucault (1969 [1972]) refers to as “archaeology” and “genealogy” of power. In his approach to writing history, Foucault begins by identifying the problem. He then works through historical archives of particular societies to disclose the discursive formations (or events) that have led to the field of inquiry (problem). He refers to this method as archaeology. The “archaeology of power” concept was found to be relevant and important for this study, as it allowed for the examination of the various aforementioned Kenyan historical documents – the GoK’s Budget Speeches, Statistical Abstracts and Economic Surveys – to establish how political power has been exercised in Kenya, and how it has influenced socio-economic development and outcomes in the country.

To Foucault, the past is not definite, for it is perpetually in construction and is subject to reconstruction and revision by future generations, especially in instances where the knowledge base (episteme) changes (Foucault, 1980). To explain and disambiguate power, Foucault has looked to various historical events, which include an encounter in 1793 between physician

Phillipe Pinel and a bunch of chained lunatics, and a 1788 scenario involving a delusional King George III, his pages, and a visiting doctor. To further describe and demystify power, Foucault turns to social institutions like the psychiatric clinic, the market place and the prison; he also turns to practices such as Christianity, Psychiatry, and Government. These institutional structures, mediating/enforcing dominant power relations, he finds invaluable as sources of knowledge, since elements of power manifest themselves in such environments, according to him. Foucault also examines how power manifests itself, works and flows socially, in private scenarios such as family life and the body of the individual. He also examines the global commodity market as a public space for the manifestation of power (cf. Schirato, Danaher & Webb, 2012; McNay, 1994). In line with Foucault's approach, survey respondents in this study were sought from institutions like Kenyan schools and environments like market places and residential areas in Kenya. The evolution of ideologies such as Christianity, Darwinism and eugenics, has also been examined to further uncover the genesis of the spurious ideological construct "ethnicity".

Genealogy – “the process of analysing and uncovering the historical relationship between the truth, knowledge and power” (Schirato, Danaher & Webb, 2012, pp. xx – xxi) is another approach that Foucault uses to write the history of power. According to Foucault, this method can be used to overcome the shortcomings of archaeology. Like archaeology, it consults and examines “parchments” that have been examined and re-examined over and over again. In this sense, there is not much difference between the two methods. However, genealogy is not limited by epistemic discontinuity; it overcomes the latter by embracing arbitrariness, and accepting the fact that in constructing history, errors will be made and confusion will occur (cf. Foucault, 1977). It addresses two issues that cannot be explained satisfactorily by the archaeological method: “the relation between a critical or historiographical practice and its contexts; and the manner in which beliefs, rules and dispositions are embodied and maintained at the level of the everyday” (Schirato, Danaher & Webb, 2012, p. 38). The concept of “genealogy of power” was found to be relevant and important for this study, because in the Kenyan context, personal struggles and squabbles between political figures have been “externalized” and “universalized” to mean (and include) struggles between their “ethnic groups”. The “enmity” between Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) and Odinga (a Luo), for instance, continues to haunt Kenyan society long after the

demise of the two historical figures. Members of the Kikuyu and Luo “ethnic groups” seldom see eye to eye on any issue and are great political rivals. “Knowledge” and “truth”, in the context of Kenya and this research, have therefore been partly obtained by examining the historical relationship between these two “ethnic groups” – this aspect of the research was not limited by the existence, or lack thereof, of historical documents.

This study employed the following data analysis strategies: relying on theoretical propositions and examining rival explanations (Rowley, 2002; Yin, 2009) to unravel the configuration of socio-economic-political power relations as they affect the Luo community. In this regard, two analytical techniques were important for this study: pattern matching and explanation building, drawing on discourse analysis in order to examine dominant narratives on the marginalization/exclusion of the “Luo community, 1963 – 2013 from the governance and socio-economic development structures” in Kenya. According to Trochim (1989), pattern matching logic (which can strengthen the internal validity of a case study) involves matching events that have been empirically observed to events that were theoretically predicted (as cited in Yin, 2009, p. 136).

A survey was conducted within this case study to investigate the influence of ethnic-based governance at the individual level (see Appendix A). According to Gable (1994), the integration of surveys within case studies can be useful for purposes of internal validity. The geographical sampling units were as follows: the four counties of Luo Nyanza – Siaya, Kisumu, Homa Bay and Migori – and the four cosmopolitan counties of Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Uasin Gishu. I employed a non-probability (purposive) sampling technique. In this technique, “items for the sample are selected deliberately by the researcher; his choice concerning the items remains supreme” (Kothari, 2004, p. 59). Although the element of bias always exists with this sampling technique, it often yields adequately reliable results when investigators commit themselves to impartiality. Moreover, it is suitable for individual research and where time and financial constraints prevail (Kothari, 2004, p. 59). To make the sample as representative as possible (especially in terms of the age of the respondents), participants were sought from diverse entities such as schools, market places and residential areas. The data collected from the respondents has been analysed discursively and presented using tables, graphs and percentages.

To establish whether the Luo are adopting the alien culture of circumcision uniformly/homogeneously across the counties in which the study was carried out, I conducted chi-square tests of homogeneity for both combined Luo Nyanza counties and the combined cosmopolitan counties. The chi-square test of homogeneity assesses whether two or more samples of discrete characteristics arise from identically distributed (homogenous) populations. I began by conducting a cross-tabulation – of adoption of the alien culture of circumcision and county of respondent – to assess the consistency of this phenomenon of adoption of circumcision by the Luo. The following hypothesis was tested: *“The Luo are gradually adopting alien cultures in uniform/homogeneous fashion, owing to politically constructed/mobilized stereotypes and prejudices, to gain acceptance as fully-fledged members of the Kenyan society at large”*. The organization of the remainder of this study is discussed next.

1.10 Organization of the Study

I have organized the rest of this study as follows: chapter two positions Kenya’s/Africa’s “ethnic” problem within the wider spectrum of profit and the push for globalism; it is inspired by Mafeje’s (1971) contention that, since Africa has “been successfully drawn into a capitalist economy and a world market” (p. 258), “ethnicity” has to be explained and conceptualized differently, with modern conditions in mind. Accordingly, it gives a wide berth to the largely Eurocentric notions of “moral ethnicity” as espoused by Lonsdale (see Berman & Lonsdale, 1992). Chapter two also discusses the theoretical framework that has been adopted for this study, to interrogate the preceding research problematic. It gives the specifics of an eclectic approach, which fuses various propositions (obtained from the review of current literature) on leadership and socio-economic development within the African context, employing the Foucauldian notion of “Panopticon” power, Istvan Mészáros’ refutation of “ideological neutrality” and the Instrumentalist Theory of Ethnicity. The core argument of this theoretical framework is that the “ethnic groups” that control state power in Africa do not allocate an equitable share of the national largesse to the dominated groups perceived to be “dissident”. In keeping with the tenets of case study research (cf. Yin, 2009), I have also considered rival theoretical explanations on development, chief among which is the *Theory of Uneven Development*. Besides the concept of social death, the cultural aspect of this inquiry, which mainly explores the rite of passage debate

in Kenyan society, is predicated upon the work of Geertz (1973) who sees culture as a “public” phenomenon open to scrutiny. Chapter three discusses the research methodology, which has been employed to accomplish the study’s objectives, in greater depth. It also explains how the study area has been delimited – I have annexed a detailed description of the study area (see Appendix C). Besides the delimitation of the study area, and the research methodology, chapter three discusses the research design, the sampling procedure and the sample size; the data collection techniques, the research instruments and the data analysis procedures are also presented in this chapter. Chapters four, five and six, which focus on the practicality of the aforementioned theories, discuss the study’s research findings in a comprehensive manner, as explained below.

Chapter four, which is based on the conceptual framework outlined in section 1.8, above, is a discussion of the quantitative results of this study. Its purpose is to establish how my experiential knowledge, and the conceptions and sentiments obtained from current literature on the influence of “ethnicized” politics in Africa, play-out at the grassroots level in Kenya. Chapter five presents the first phase of the qualitative results of the study – the complex views of the Luo on the socio-economic-cultural consequences of political marginalization, obtained through FGDs. In conjunction with a scrutiny of contemporary world events, the Luo people’s views discussed in this chapter have been used to construct a conceptual framework that can be employed in the analysis of “ethnicized” politics in Kenya. This conceptual framework, essentially an expounded version of the one presented in section 1.8, has been employed as a lens in chapter six – alongside the theoretical framework – which besides examining the proportions of the GoK public provision allocations in five key areas (education, healthcare, housing, electricity and rural water supply) vis-à-vis the country’s various “ethnic” formations, also outlines the specifics of what appears to be a ferocious power struggle between globalists and the indigenous African bourgeois class that controls the Kenyan state. Chapter seven, the study’s final chapter, presents its conclusions and policy recommendations. It is essentially an integration of the study’s quantitative and qualitative results, a requisite component of an MMR design. The next chapter further explores the exogenous and amorphous nature of the concept of “ethnicity”, and positions this study within a more intricate theoretical framework of “ethnicity”, governance and socio-economic development in Africa.



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Chapter 2

Literature Review: Positioning Kenya's "Ethnic" Problem within the Spectrum of Profit and the Push for Globalism

2 Introduction

Having sided in chapter one with the conscientious, liberated African scholar, Mafeje (1971), in the contentious debate regarding the origins, nature and viability of the often nebulous concept "ethnicity", I now further explore, examine and explain its exogenous and spurious character vis-à-vis Africa. My submission is that warped ideologies characterize the various epochs of human history – slavery, colonialism and the post-independence era – and have been continuously morphed and employed by society's elite class to safeguard and perpetuate the structural determination of capital. Accordingly, I contend that it is through the lens of the incessant, insatiable pursuit of profit by society's elite class that the contemporary scholar of "ethnicity" should seek to theorize and understand this problem. Following this contention, I will, in this chapter, construct an analytical framework to explore "ethnicity", governance and socio-economic development in Africa, with special reference to the Luo community of Kenya. To achieve this objective, I have divided the chapter into four major sections – besides this introduction and the conclusion. Section 2.1 picks up from where chapter one left off vis-à-vis the argument of this thesis that "ethnicity" is an exogenous construct that has no meaningful scientific basis: it traces the path to the contemporary, "ethnic"-based political marginalization of the Kenyan Luo from the days of 15th century slavery and concludes by examining the nation-state – capital – "ethnicity" nexus and its influence on "inter-ethnic" relations and socio-cultural developments in the Kenyan context. Section 2.2 briefly reviews current literature on "ethnicity", governance and development in Africa to examine the proposition that "ethnicity" owes its existence largely to colonialism and that it thrives best in an environment dominated by capitalism and its associated exports – the centralized nation-state and multi-party democracy. Based on available literature, the section addresses the following questions in relation to "ethnicity" vis-à-vis its influence on governance: does "ethnicity" affect governance systems and patterns all over Africa? Is it a widespread phenomenon? Is it only attributable to colonialism and capitalism? Informed by the insights derived from the literature review, section 2.3 presents a theoretical framework to guide this study. Finally, in keeping with the tenets of case study research, as espoused by Yin (2009), section 2.4 presents the rival theoretical explanations that

have been considered alongside the theoretical framework in this quest to unravel the specifics of the negative consequences of ethnic-driven political exclusion. The exogenous nature of “ethnicity”, vis-à-vis Africa, is further discussed next.

2.1 Tracing the Path to “Ethnic”-based Political Marginalization of the Kenyan Luo from a Capitalist Perspective

As emphasized in the introductory chapter, the notions of “race” and “ethnicity” – its “allotrope” (cf. Jenkins, 1997, as cited in Spencer, 2014, p. xvi) – are not only spurious, but exogenous to Africa (cf. Mafeje, 1971; Mafeje, 2002; Nkrumah, 1968; Vail, 2010). In this section, therefore, with the objective of explaining how the political marginalization of the Luo community of Kenya arose, I examine the genealogy of these politico-economic constructs – their introduction to Africa and the world, and their eventual adoption by the Kenyan authorities in their governance styles, structures and systems – in three successive stages, viz.: *Christianity, “Race” and Slavery: c. A. D. 1450 to c. A. D. 1900; Darwinism, Eugenics and Colonialism: c. A. D. 1900 to c. A. D. 1960; and “Ethnicity” in the Neo-colonial Era in Kenya: c. A.D. 1960 to the Present*. Finally, I outline the manner in which the continued search for markets by Western countries, owing to exponential capacity and concomitant over-production, especially in the US, has led to the glorification of consumerism (Terreblanche, 2014) and I argue that this phenomenon – of search for new markets – should not be overlooked in the attempt to either understand or conceptualize the “ethnic” woes witnessed in Africa and elsewhere in the Global South. A brief critique of capitalism precedes this; as alluded to, I will argue that the insatiable pursuit of profit by society’s elites – both nationally and globally – is responsible for many of the planet’s woes, including the problems of “ethnicity” prevalent in Africa.

2.1.1 Capitalism, the Global Elite and the Illusion of *Laissez-faire*

At a superficial level of assessment, it is easy to fall into the trap of unquestioningly glorifying capitalism and *laissez-faire* economic liberalism, one of its core attributes. After all, as enthusiasts of the scholarly contributions of celebrated thinkers like Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and David Ricardo would emphasise, besides other advantages, *laissez-faire* ensures that individuals can pursue their aspirations and achieve their fullest potentials because, in addition to guaranteeing the latter’s rights and freedoms, this economic system accords them

enough room to participate in an unfettered manner. However, an in-depth scrutiny of the contemporary world economic system – believed to be largely characterized by what is considered to be free trade, free enterprise, non-intervention, free markets, individualism and the associated ideological constructs of democracy and multi-partyism – reveals a rather grim, antithetical outlook: “[w]e are living through an epoch where the concentration of the world’s wealth and power *thanks to free market liberalism* has reached proportions never experienced before in human history” (Roche, 2009, *Finance capital* section, para. 2, emphasis added). In what can be attributed to capitalism and free market economics, global corporations have grown in an unprecedented manner; entities such as Wal-mart and Cargill have become much wealthier than nation-states. At the individual level, the rich are getting richer as the poor get poorer (Roche, 2009; see also Heller, 2013). Contrary to the belief held by the adherents of trickle-down economics, free market liberalism has not worked to improve the conditions of the poor in society (Polanyi, 1944[2001]). In fact, *laissez-faire*-driven capitalism has largely led to the formation of two distinct classes in society – a tiny dominant minority and an overwhelmingly subordinate majority (Mészáros, 2001, p. 102). We are witnessing in contemporary times what Marx highlighted in his famed masterpieces – infinite accumulation.

Yet, if these consequences were purely the result of free market liberalism, there might have been little or no justification for concern; the reality, however, as noted by Polanyi (1944[2001]), is that we have never really had “free markets” in the strict sense of the phrase (see also, Chang, 2010). The ideology of self-regulating markets, argues Polanyi (1944[2001]), was constructed to serve emergent industrial (often elitist) interests; it has only been partially applied for, whenever such interests are threatened or face challenges, government intervention is in many instances sought and accorded. Moreover, the international financial institutions, which regulate the global economy, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have exhibited glaringly contradictory behaviour: on the one hand, they proclaim confidence in the free market system; on the other, however, they “regularly intervene in exchange rate markets, providing funds to bail out foreign creditors while pushing for usurious interest rates that bankrupt domestic firms...” (Stiglitz, 2001, p. x). Accordingly, the role of global institutions that regulate world trade, such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), especially with regard to the welfare of the largely impoverished masses, has to be critically

evaluated on a continuous basis.

Neoliberalism, the prevalent contemporary product of *laissez-faire* economic liberalism, has been enforced upon the world by the aforementioned global institutions, often to the detriment of the poor masses of the Global South, as narrated succinctly by Stiglitz (2001):

Free international trade allows a country to take advantage of its comparative advantage, increasing incomes on average, though it may cost some individuals their jobs. But in developing countries with high levels of unemployment, the job destruction that results from trade liberalization may be more evident than the job creation, and this is especially the case in IMF “reform” packages that combine trade liberalization with high interest rates, making job and enterprise creation virtually impossible. (p. x)

And Maathai (1995), another critical thinker of our time, has had this to say about neoliberalism:

[i]ndebtness of African states is making it difficult for the state to protect its citizen from being overwhelmed by international organisations on whose behalf IMF, World Bank and other donors demand liberalisation and free markets. Small local initiatives with comparatively little capital do not stand a chance against the onslaught . . . What is the reason for this economic marginalisation and impoverishment of Africa? It is partly because many of them do not participate in formulating and implementing their development policies. Decisions which affect their economic and political life are made by others in foreign capitals in the company of a few of their ruling elites. These are the policies and decisions which facilitate the siphoning of their wealth, literally from under their feet. In the process they are marginalised and disempowered economically, denied access to information, knowledge and resources and forced to over mine their environment thereby, jeopardizing even their future generations. (paras. 58 and 64)

Besides the aforementioned difficulties experienced by the world’s largely impoverished masses, owing to the contemporary “self-regulating” market system, there are other susceptibilities and duplicities associated with *laissez-faire*, often attributable to society’s elite class, that are of

grave concern. Of particular note is what has been referred to as “the revolving doors of business and government” (Roche, 2010). According to Roche (2010), “[b]ig business infiltrates and controls government, and . . . government has become absorbed into big business” (para. 3). Corporations and rich individuals fund politicians who, in turn, align policies in accordance with the wishes of the former at the expense of the masses (workers). Moreover, “Capitalists and [politicians] freely interchange between government and private firms” (Roche, 2010, *Revolving doors* section, para. 1). Roche (2010) argues that “[c]ompanies are keen to employ former ministers as they hold inside information, or influence policy-making, which can advantage a bidding company” (*Revolving doors* section, para. 1). Also, public services have increasingly and speedily been privatized to increase the profits of big business players. Similarly, local authorities have seemingly deviated from their role of protecting the public interest by selling planning permission; upon receipt of “donations” from private companies, consent is often granted, contrary to the citizens’ welfare, for the establishment and expansion of business ventures or premises (Roche, 2010). In a nutshell, most socio-economic-political aspects of today’s society are largely influenced and directed by multinational corporations (big business), often to the detriment of the world’s largely impoverished masses – such is the myth and deception of *laissez-faire*.

The domination of the masses by society’s elite class, through the construction, propagation and perpetuation of largely unfounded and deceptive ideologies, is not a new phenomenon. In fact, various insidious mechanisms and techniques have been employed by society’s elites to perpetuate and safeguard the social formation of capital – from the slave trade era to contemporary times that have seen the Luo become politically ostracized in Kenyan society ostensibly because the “ethnic group” does not circumcise its males (cf. Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002). Before I examine these misguided ideologies, I will shortly turn my attention to wa Thiong’o’s (1986) work, which outlines the process of subjugation, that is, social death (cf. also, Patterson, 1982). In *Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature*, Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986) meticulously explored the process by which colonial and imperial powers imposed their will and control over the inhabitants of the cradle of humankind. From his widely acclaimed piece, we see that efforts to subjugate the majority were preceded by the conjuring up of prejudiced ideologies that acted as justifications for the process, which always

involved the meting out of physical violence on the vanquished. This was then followed by subtle psychological forms of violence to aid in the maintenance of the newly-established status quos. Psychological violence involved the belittling of the conquered people's culture, which was aimed at destroying it, and influencing or distorting the manner in which the latter viewed themselves vis-à-vis the rest of the world – the cultivation of self-hatred. A self-loathing people, it was thought, would be easy to manipulate and control. Somewhere along the process of colonization, the oppressors' culture was invoked to dominate those of the oppressed; often, the dominated peoples came to define themselves via the alien cultural parameters forcibly introduced into their societies. Even the most radical opponents of the oppressive colonial socio-economic order began to think that their liberation depended on conforming to the cultural standards set by the oppressors. Also, the oppressive dispensation in which colonialism thrived ensured that merit was suppressed in favour of spurious concepts such as “ethnicity” and “race”, besides one's culture and place of origin. Such was the nature of the subjugation process. In this thesis, following the precedence set in the problem statement narrated in chapter one, I contend that overlapping, warped ideological archetypes, inspired by the pursuit of profit and modelled along the lines of the subjugation process described above, characterize the various epochs of human history – slavery, colonialism and the post-independence era – and have been continuously employed by society's elite class to safeguard and perpetuate the structural determination of capital. Distorted ideologies prevalent in a particular epoch do not necessarily cease with its demise; rather, they are modernized for use in a succeeding epoch – besides being fused with nuanced, related diabolical philosophies – and this has been the case in human society since the 15th century at least. An examination of the prevalent twisted ideologies and the subjugation processes that characterized each of the aforementioned epochs and culminated in the negative “ethnicity” witnessed in Kenya/Africa today follows next.

2.1.2 Christianity, “Race” and Slavery: c. A. D. 1450 to c. A. D. 1900

Whenever the opportunity arises to accumulate capital and make profits, the sense of morality in humans, especially those who wield economic and political power, seems to take a hiatus; furthermore, when a prevailing oppressive economic order comes under threat, society's elite class develops self-serving ideologies and shrewdly implants them in the psyche of the masses to maintain the status quo; this was largely the case when the Portuguese and Spanish

explorers began interacting with the West African coastal peoples in the mid-15th century, and during the era of the transatlantic slave trade, which began in earnest after Christopher Columbus arrived in the “New World” in 1492, and which lasted for several centuries, leaving behind a devastating socio-economic legacy on the continent of Africa. The period between the 15th and 20th centuries, which saw Christianity manipulated to meet private interests like never before in human history, was also dominated by the prejudiced ideology of “race”, which saw Africans treated as chattel and paved the way for their commodification. Before examining these perverted ideas further, let us briefly examine the major players behind the transatlantic slave trade.

According to Selfa (2010), the transatlantic slave trade involved “African slave merchants, European slavers and New World planters” (*The African Slave Trade* section, para. 1). Adams (2008) whose work, entitled “Slave Trade Ideology”, is largely an apologetic piece that highlights the victim’s role in facilitating his/her maltreatment, rather than repudiating the enslaver’s treachery, gives us a clearer picture as to whom the major players and prime movers of this heinous crime against humanity were. He states:

The sixteenth-century European seafaring societies bordering the Atlantic Ocean had several things in common . . . [A]ll but one was headed by an absolute monarch (Elizabeth I in England, Louis XIV in France, Dom João III in Portugal and Charles V and different Phillips in Spain). The West India Company, established in 1621, was a principal transatlantic conveyor of slaves, governed by a Council of Nineteen, whose members were usually of one mind in matters of trade. The trading company was the instrument of commerce and settlement, operating with delegated and partial funding from the state. Portugal, Spain, France, England, Holland and even Sweden set up companies with varying levels of authority and autonomy to link colonies to the home country. To cite their names is to conjure up the age of exploration and settlement: the Casa de Contraciao (Portugal, 1510), the Caracas Company (1628), the Dutch West India Company (1621), Compagnie des Cent-Associés (Company of a Hundred Associates, 1628), the Massachusetts Bay Company (1629), the Brazil Company (Portugal, 1649), the English Company of Royal Adventurers (1660), the Hudson Bay Company (1670),

and the Royal African Company (1672), among others. (p. 51)

Although the personalities would eventually be replaced by their successors and monopoly companies' names may have metamorphosed through the centuries, this description is undoubtedly similar to what Roche (2010) has referred to as an incestuous relationship between big government and big business in contemporary society. Indeed, regardless of whichever angle it is examined from, slavery was an elitist phenomenon; even the African element of it was elitist in nature, for "enslaved Africans were made available by the highest authorities of various regions of Africa, including the Kingdoms of Wolof, Igala, Oyo, Anziku, Ashanti, and Dahomey" (Adams, 2008, p. 46). Regarding America, "[t]he elites of settler communities in the New World were the ultimate customers of this inhuman trade" (Adams, 2008, p. 46). This is a typical example of how society's elite class works, sometimes in unison and on a global scale, to enslave the masses in capitalist dispensations and the reason why Africa needs leaders who repudiate imperialism and detest the globalists/imperialists, like Robert Mugabe, and not "moderates" like Nelson Mandela and "potential puppets" like Morgan Tsvangirai. To further demonstrate the allure of profit, and the edge it wields over morality as a phenomenon, consider the case of two elites – Queen Nzinga Mbande (an African) and Queen Elizabeth I (a European) – who despite being unfavourably disposed towards the slave trade at the outset, eventually changed their minds, got involved and played a considerable role in facilitating it. According to Adams (2008), the Queen of Ndongo Kingdom – Nzinga Mbande – initially "refused to be a part of the transatlantic slave business . . . [and her] Imbangala mercenary warriors valiantly battled Portuguese slavers in the 1620s" (p. 47). This noble stance would however soon change for she is recorded as having become an ally of the Dutch, and engaging in numerous local minor wars aimed at supplying her newfound associates with supplementary slaves by enhancing what could be directly marshalled from within her kingdom (Thomas, 1997, p. 184, as cited in Adams, 2008, p. 47). As for the European monarch, Adams (2008) has had this to say: "Queen Elizabeth I initially opposed slavery, but in 1564 she became an investor in slaving expeditions" (p. 51). I now turn my attention to the two major twisted systems of thought that facilitated slavery – religion and racism.

I reiterate that human beings – whatever "race" or "ethnicity" they are classified under –

are neither born racist nor inherently “ethnically” bigoted; rather, owing to the subtle machinations of society’s elite class, they are cajoled into adopting and incorporating these diabolical mannerisms, thereby creating a situation that enables the perpetuation of oppressive status quos and the pursuit of selfish elitist agendas. Historical evidence shows that religion and religious elites played a gigantic role in facilitating the enslavement of Africans by propping up twisted ideas on the nature of humans during the slave trade era. Rogers and Bowman (2005), in their work entitled “A History: The Construction of Race and Racism”, have argued that

[d]uring the reformation (16th Century [1500s] & 17th Century [1600s]), a key question among Christian religious hierarchy was whether Blacks and ‘Indians’ had souls and/or were human . . . With the increasing importance of slavery, religion was used as a means to justify racist divisions, classifying people of color as ‘pagan and soulless.’ (p. 3).

It is this perverse elitist logic that was used to prepare the rank and file European for intensified shipment of fellow humans – Africans – across the Atlantic. Such indoctrination would enable the elites of the day to carry out their business without raising eyebrows or attracting resistance. This European perception of Africans is even more laughable when one considers that Moors, who ruled Spain from 711 – 1492 (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2009), were Black Africans (McCreary, 2015) and that they are the ones who “enlightened Europe and brought it out of the dark ages to usher in the renaissance” (Derhak, n.d., para 1; cf. also, Atlanta Black Star [ABS], 2013). Following the Christian recapture of the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors, who had ruled it for about 800 years, the inflow of slaves to Spain and Portugal – mostly white Christians from Eastern Europe and some obtained through raids of the Byzantine Empire – came to a temporary halt. However, the first stage of the African slave trade, which was championed by the Portuguese explorers, Antam Gonsalvez and Nuno Trista, whose activities began in the first half of the 15th century and were blessed by Pope Eugene IV, reignited the trade in slaves – this time Africans – to Western Europe because it proved an enormously profitable venture (Abramova, 1979, p. 16). In addition, the conversion façade was employed to shrewdly mask the greed of the Europeans, as noted by Abramova (1979):

One often reads that Portuguese rulers, and among them Prince Henry, known as “the Navigator”, the organizer of Portuguese expeditions to Africa, sanctioned the import of Africans ostensibly to convert them to Christianity. It is true that the slaves were baptized, but nevertheless sold. (p. 17)

For a large part of the slave trade era, the Catholic Church was complicit in the sanctioning and sanctification of the moral crime of slavery. It seems to us ridiculous that papal bulls could be unilaterally issued and granted to European monarchs, such as the one Pope Nicholas V used to grant Alphonso V – the King of Portugal – the permission to perpetually seize African lands and subjugate “heathens” (Abramova, 1979, p. 17). Adams also notes that “European religious ideology permitted the enslavement of God-cursed Hamitic ‘pagans’” (Adams, 2008, p. 46). It is this perverted religious philosophy that facilitated the shipment of Africans – from both Europe and Africa – and their subsequent enslavement in the various European colonies in America and the Caribbean from the 16th to the 19th century. Apparently, the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British, and French elites all managed to convince their citizens that “enslavement of Africans and the slave trade were sanctioned by the Bible. They alluded to Noah’s damnation of Ham and his progeny as evidence of the fact that Africans were predestined to be slaves” (Abramova, 1979, p.17). Let us now examine the second prejudiced ideology that facilitated and helped sustain slavery – “race”.

Since the transatlantic slave trade was such an unjust phenomenon, discussions around it evoke intense feelings and it is understandable that some, like Asante (2009), would argue that the impetus for the enslavement of the Indian, the white servant and the African was all racist. However, this argument is simplistic and not entirely true. First, there is a general consensus amongst scholars that slavery, which has existed in virtually every human civilization for as long as we have inhabited the earth, was never racial in character (cf. e.g., Finkelman, 2013; Patterson, 1982). Secondly, up to the point when religion totally lost its viability as a justification mechanism for the enslavement of humans in the 19th century – owing, mainly, to the work of abolitionists like the Quakers in Great Britain and the US (cf. Amramova, 1979) – profit had been the major driving force behind slavery in the “New World”. There is no doubt that the relentless pursuit of profit, through slavery, created racism. In consequence of the fact that the

use of religion as a basis for enslavement had lost its viability, a new ideology, “race”, was fronted by society’s elite class, and thrust upon the masses to ensure that the journey towards total domination through untold riches would never be halted and that capital’s structural determination would remain. According to Asante (2009):

European scientists, scholars, men and women of learning would propagate the most abhorrent nonsense about race. So-called biologists, anthropologists, physiologists, medical doctors would advance theories about brain size, genital size, and head bones to demonstrate their points concerning white supremacy. This would become the background for much of Western theorizing about the world (*The Economic Thesis Reviewed* section, para. 7)

It was argued that “Africans were . . . sub-human, uncivilised, and inferior to Europeans in every way. And as they were ‘not one of us’, they could be bought and sold” (Bristol City Council [BCC], 1999, para. 1). Furthermore, because of the newfound racist philosophy, from the 17th century – when the plantation economies of the Americas and the Caribbean were gaining momentum – Africans came to be “defined legally as chattel” (Asante, 2007, *Dehumanisation of Africans* section, para. 4) for “European enslavers organised the category of blackness as property value” (Asante, 2007, *Dehumanisation of Africans* section, para. 1). On account of their blackness, enslaved Africans were commodified and dehumanized; they were considered to be “without soul, spirit, emotions, desires and rights [for] [c]hattel could have neither mind nor spirit” (Asante, 2007, *Dehumanisation of Africans* section, para. 1). But what are the specifics, from a capitalist perspective, of the factors that necessitated society’s elites of the “New World” to pollute the minds of the masses with such diabolical thoughts?

The solution to the puzzle of indoctrination in the English North American scenario is threefold. Firstly, it was done to eliminate “the problem of constantly having to recruit labor as servants’ terms expired” (Selfa, 2010, *Unfree labor in the North American colonies* section, para. 9) – the multicultural workforce, before the large-scale importation of Africans, comprised mainly of white indentured servants, including prisoners and victims of kidnap, from Britain (Selfa, 2010; cf. also Abramova, 1979). If Africans were chattel, then they had no rights and

could not move freely. Besides, the planters would have no obligation to pay them and would only be required to provide food and shelter. Moreover, chattel would give birth to chattel ensuring the perpetual availability of cheap labour (Asante, 2007). Secondly, such warped ideas helped to diminish the competition that arose from white indentured servants who were allowed to establish their own farms once they had completed their contractual obligations (Selfa, 2010). Thirdly, and most importantly, chattelization was instituted to prevent the formation of a union between white indentured servants and enslaved Africans – this might have altered the status quo by overthrowing the planters through a revolt. According to Selfa (2010), white servants from Europe knew about the idea of individual rights and freedoms for they had witnessed the revolution that challenged the hierarchical societal order centred on “royalty” in England. Owing to this, the status of “things” that had been ascribed to Africans in the racial order of the 17th century British North America (Asante, 2007), could not be pinned on them. Fundamentally, this chattelization of Africans epitomizes the divide-and-conquer technique that has been in operation since capitalism came to fruition as a mode of production. It also opened the floodgates for further psychological warfare on the oppressed to ensure that they were pacified sufficiently to accept their inhuman treatment and role in a racist society.

In “Decolonizing the African Mind: Further Analysis and Strategy” Hotep (2003) has explained the process of psychological warfare/indoctrination that was waged against Africans as they were being prepared to take up their role of slaves. He argues that American slaveholders, who referred to the process and practice as “seasoning”, employed it to mollify and hegemonize enslaved Africans and that this method of control has been in use by European ruling elites ever since. Seasoning, or deculturalization, as practiced in British America was – and continues to be – a three stage process: first, enslaved Africans were taught to feel ashamed of their heritage; second, they were taught to admire, respect, adopt and practice the European heritage; and third, if they obeyed and submitted to the process, they got access to more opportunities through which they were further indoctrinated (Hotep, 2003, p. 4). Concerning the seasoning process of the large numbers of Africans that experienced the middle passage following the formalization of chattelization in the British colonies in North America, Hotep (2003) has had this to say:

African prisoners of war . . . were subjected to a vivacious, European orchestrated, three

to four years of seasoning during which the most important expressions of their African heritage were brutally stripped away from them and brutally replaced with the European colonizer-slave master-oppressor's cultural practices and beliefs. Africans enslaved in the North American British colonies, for example, were forbidden to use their original African names, languages and religions. They were forced to use their European colonizer-slave master-oppressor's names, language and religion. This is why most Africans born in the United States have European surnames, speak English and practice some form of Christianity. (p. 4)

Outrageous pseudo-scientific theories, which had existed in relatively subdued fashion from the late 17th century, were intensified in the 19th century. In the main, it was argued that "Africans in general were intellectually inferior to Europeans, that Negroes . . . stood closer in the line of development to apes than to human beings" (Abramova, pp. 23 – 24). Anthropologists like J. C. Prichard and W. Winwood Reade contributed greatly in feeding this false narrative: whilst the former argued that owing to the "law of nature" "savage" "races" – Africans – would be wiped out, the latter, as if to prepare the world for the colonization of Africa, claimed that England and France would preside over the cradle of humankind (cf. Rogers & Bowman, 2005, p. 5) – and for most of the 20th century, Reade's "prophecy" would be fulfilled as Europeans invented more twisted ideas and methods, chief among them eugenics, and proceeded to subject Africa to even greater horrors and miseries as discussed in the next sub-section.

2.1.3 Darwinism, Eugenics and Colonialism: c. A. D. 1900 to c. A. D. 1960

The duplicitous elitist forces behind the global capitalist system tricked the planet's ordinary citizens into believing that they had finally come to the realization that slavery was evil; however, unbeknownst to many, especially the American and European masses, a more lucrative profit venture had been identified and earmarked for pursuit as early as 1807 – the colonization of Africa, to facilitate the looting of the continent's mineral wealth/resources, which would in turn provide the much needed raw materials for European industries. In this regard, the hypocrisy of Great Britain, in particular, shall never be forgotten. Abramova (1979) described this deception with great precision when he noted that:

British industry called for increasing amounts of raw materials and new markets, and in this respect its interests became concentrated on Africa. Great Britain headed an international campaign to abolish the export of slaves from Africa. This allowed her to preserve till today the reputation of an allegedly disinterested champion of Africans' freedom. Foreseeing the emergence of its future colonies in Africa, Great Britain found it highly profitable to [pose] as liberator in the eyes of Africans. (p. 25)

As we have already seen in the previous epoch, any envisaged elite-driven economic activity, structure or system, has to be in congruence with society's prevalent set of ideologies and belief systems for it to be considered legitimate by the masses – only then can its successful pursuit be guaranteed. In respect of European countries establishing colonies in Africa, Christianity stood in the way of the global elite class. Woodworth (n.d.), in his work, "Darwinism and the American Eugenics Movement," highlighted the following two major tenets of the Christian faith which, I contend, proved a great obstacle for the global elite forces that contemplated and continuously mulled the takeover of Africa from the onset of the 19th century: first, "the basic worldview advanced by the Bible . . . that the universe was the creation of an infinite, personal God" (Woodworth, n.d., para. 2); and, second, the idea that "all humans were descended from one original couple and were therefore related, part of a very large human family" (Woodworth, n.d., para. 4). Fundamentally, these Biblical principles were the foundation upon which the concept of human rights was based (Woodworth, n.d.). If these principles continued to prevail in the minds of the European and American masses, how would the violent takeover of Africa be justified? Moreover, the abolitionists, who played a major role in ending slavery, had based their opposition towards the inhumane phenomenon upon these very principles, which contended "that rights should be equal among different groups within this [human] family, regardless of ethnic characteristics" (Woodworth, n.d., para. 4). Unless this prevalent Christian perspective on the origin and nature of the human being was perverted, therefore, the actualization of colonialism in Africa would most probably have remained a pipe dream. Accordingly, the period between 1807 and 1808, when Britain and the US abolished slave trade, respectively, and the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885, would be characterized by overwhelming, iniquitous propaganda, such as the masses of Europe and America had never seen before. And the works of the "Sage of Down House" would prove pivotal to the global elite in guiding the propagandist cause of the

19th and 20th centuries.

English naturalist Charles Darwin argued in 1859 that “life had evolved from a single-cell organism to human beings by means of natural selection – the survival of the fittest” (as cited in Woodworth, n.d., para. 3). He further asserted “that living species are not fixed and unvarying, but are subject to modification and development, becoming specialized to meet the problems of their environment, or else deteriorating and becoming extinct when they fail to meet the challenge of life” (as cited in Pearson, 1966, p. 9). These general aspects of his theory epitomized the ingenuity of the human mind and from a natural science standpoint, it is only proper that they be acknowledged. However, his specifics about the nature of humankind were immensely twisted. He posited, according to BCC (1999), that

Europeans were related to Africans and that all humans were related to the apes. Whilst this upset the anthropological theories about separate species, other aspects of the evolutionary theory still “proved” the superiority of the white races over all others. His theory saw the Anglo-Saxons, that is, the British, at the top of the evolutionary scale. The British were at the top of the family tree of the human race, as the most “civilized” race. The African, as a “primitive” race, was considered childlike and unintelligent. Such “inferior” races were doomed to be either ruled by or destroyed by the “superior” races. Survival of the fittest was the rule in Darwin’s theory of evolution. (para. 7)

Darwin’s largely atheistic and materialist ideas would prove detrimental to world history and human socio-economic-political development at large; they, like other philosophies and ideologies before them, were hijacked by the global elites and employed in the quest for further world domination and to safeguard and ensure the continuity of the structural determination of capital. Indeed, Darwin opened a can of worms; not only were his evolutionary ideas fed to the European and American masses to pacify them as Africa was being taken over, they significantly paved the way further for scientific racism, eugenics and secularism in human society. Before I briefly outline the eugenicist thinking that Darwin’s evolution theory inspired, let me emphasize that the ubiquitous persuasion amongst the European masses at the advent of colonialism was that the occupants of the cradle of humankind were “primitive, infidel, backward, savages,

nonhuman, beast[s] of burden, soul-less, heathens, pagans, biologically and evolutionarily inferior, uncivilized and without history” (Milwood, 2012, p. 62). The global elite class had succeeded in its quest to persuade the European and American masses that the colonization of Africa was acceptable. This Darwin-inspired, elite-propelled perverted view of Africa was the basis for inter-societal eugenics, a “form of eugenics [which] extends the notion of genetic basis for dominance to imperial notions of ‘progress’ and ‘civilisation’” (cf. Spencer, 2014, p.293).

Eugenics, which sprung from Darwin’s evolution theory, was the brainchild of the latter’s cousin, Sir Francis Galton, who defined it as “the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage” (Galton, 1904, p.1). According to Winfield (2007), eugenics aims at “intentional weeding out of the human population of those deemed weak or malformed” (p. xvii). Besides the inter-societal eugenics already referenced, Spencer (2014) has identified three forms of eugenics, viz.: positive eugenics, that is, “selective breeding using ‘superior’ genetic material (for example, sperm donated by a Nobel scientist)”; negative eugenics, that is, “forced sterilization, ethnic cleansing, genocide”; and intra-societal eugenics, that is, “a genetic cause for problems such as crime, poverty and disease that occur within a society” (p. 293).

To understand the brainwashing tactics and the dangers posed to society by this Darwinist offshoot, eugenics, let us examine some of the thoughts and arguments contained in a collection of essays by anonymous authors edited by arguably the most racist scholar of the 20th century, Roger Pearson (1966), entitled *Eugenics and Race*. In the foreword, Pearson (1966) himself argues that “[t]here can be no guarantee of enduring progress until a thorough appreciation of the implications of heredity has been acquired by those who shape the policies of governments and the destinies of nations” (p. 5). This is undoubtedly a subtle call for the state to take control of the private affairs of citizens on bogus premises; in other words, a justification for dictatorship being implanted in the psyche of the masses. In the article “Mendelian Heredity,” it is argued that “a cross between two species of mankind results in an extremely intricate pattern of genes . . .” (p. 22). However, humans are simply humans; there is nothing as misguided as the suggestion that there are various species or gradations within the human race. All too often, society’s elite class employs this tactic to keep the masses divided and therefore easy to control

and manipulate; and this seems to be a major agenda behind eugenic thought and practice. In the section of Pearson's (1966) compilation entitled "Sir Arthur Keith and Evolution", the author belabours to highlight this champion of eugenics' understanding and definition of the concept "race": "Races or sub-species are evolutionary variants within a species-experimental forms which are on their way to becoming separate species by themselves" (p. 25), he/she states. The concept "tribe" is not spared either: "a tribe or a nation is a corporate body which 'nature has entrusted with an assortment of human seed or *genes*, the assortment differing in some degree from that entrusted to any other tribe . . .'" (p. 25), it is stated. The concepts of "race" and "tribe", I consistently maintain throughout this thesis, are "false classifications of people . . . created for . . . political *and economic* purpose[s]" (cf. Rogers & Bowman, 2005, p. 2, italics added). It is also disturbingly argued that

[i]f a nation with a more advanced, more specialised, or in any way superior set of genes mingles with, instead of exterminating, an inferior tribe, then it commits racial suicide, and destroys the work of thousands of years of biological isolation and natural selection. (p. 26)

Do not these ideas sound very much like they could have been the inspiration behind and justification for the practice of apartheid in South Africa? In the collection's fourth essay, "Devolution in Action," the author states:

More significant is the inequality of the reproduction rate between sections of a non-homogeneous population, which can lead to the predominance of one set or type of people within the course of a single generation: hence the insistence of the geneticist that a watch be kept on the all-important question of who are becoming the parents of the next generation. (p. 31)

Governments and other authorities anywhere on earth should not have the power to preside over such personal issues and if they do it is undoubtedly an infringement on individual freedoms. However, since the world's elite class appears to have for quite a lengthy period operated in subtle ways to implement its selfish agendas, we should begin questioning whether, in fact, the

idea of family planning is being employed covertly and cynically to determine the composition of the world's population. Rogers and Bowman (2005) have noted that "Norplant, a temporary sterilization drug, employed racist stereotyping in their advertising – adopting the conservative message that welfare mothers should be temporarily sterilized" (p. 10). The fifth article in Pearson's (1966) collection is entitled "Artificial Insemination: Curse or Boon?" The author argues that

[i]f the biological fitness or worth of the [sperm] donor were properly studied, then within a few generations, or within one generation even, a new super-generation could be produced, descended lineally from only the fittest and more capable of the previous generation, and the first nation-state to introduce this procedure would eventually dominate the rest of the world – so superior would its individual members be. (p. 36)

Underpinning the eugenics movement is this peculiar obsession on the part of its advocates, of attaining some envisaged pinnacle of humanhood. As far back as 1966, it was noted that "Nobel Prize-winner Dr. L. Tatum of the Rockefeller Institute claim[ed] that only a few barriers remain[ed] to the goal of controlling human heredity by the manipulation of genes" (Pearson, 1966, p. 36). In 1978, thanks to In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) technology, the world welcomed its first "test-tube baby" – Louise Joy Brown.¹³ This was followed by the birth of Dolly, the cloned Finn Dorset sheep, in 1996.¹⁴ Given that "in 2008, researchers successfully created the first five mature human embryos using somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) where the nucleus of a somatic cell was taken from a donor and transplanted into a vacant host egg cell" (Dvorsky, 2014, para. 3), has a human already been cloned behind the scenes? If so, what will the implications of this clandestine undertaking be for the planet? The last essay in Pearson's (1966) collection, "A Belief in the Future," further exposes the twisted philosophy behind the discreet means and methods employed by society's elite class to perpetuate the subjugation of the planet's masses:

¹³ See, for instance, Davies, M. (2015, July 24). World's first 'test-tube baby' reveals her mother received blood-splattered HATE MAIL when she was born – including a letter containing a plastic foetus. *Mail Online*. Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-3173446/World-s-test-tube-baby-reveals-mother-received-blood-splattered-HATE-MAIL-born-including-letter-containing-plastic-foetus.html> (accessed 11 December 2016).

¹⁴ See, for instance, Vos, S. (2004). *Dolly and the clone wars*. Retrieved from http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/HIS135/events/dolly96/Dolly_Module.html (accessed 11 December 2016).

To think and practice eugenic and racial morals ourself is our duty, but this is not enough in the troubled state of the world today. It is necessary for each of us to work to bring these ideas home to our fellow beings. We must talk and write about eugenics and race; we must help to make the ideas “fashionable” as quickly as we can. (p. 41)

Evidently, society’s elite class realizes that the masses do not have a problem co-existing amicably. However, harmonious societies, in which people believe in the equality of humankind, are not ideal for exploitative economic orders because, in such situations, the oppressed are likely to unite and pose serious threats to the status quo.

In *Race and Empire: Eugenics in Colonial Kenya*, Campbell (2007) has narrated how eugenics was practiced in Kenya, by the colonial authorities, especially in the 1930s. It was mainly the type referred to by Spencer (2014, p. 293) as intra-societal eugenics and was “based upon late-Victorian and Edwardian research” (MacKenzie, 2007, p. ix). Championed by the elites of Colonial Kenya, including aristocratic farmers, medical professionals, and colonial officials and administrators – under the banner of the Kenya Society for the Study of Race Improvement (KSSRI) – the eugenics movement in Colonial Kenya concerned itself with examining the relationship between race and intelligence (Campbell, 2007). Fascinated by – and “concerned” about – African “backwardness”, European eugenicists argued that “the brain of the ‘Kenya native’ was different and inferior” (Campbell, 2007, p. 6). Apparently, European missionaries did not condemn these eugenic activities and have been described by Campbell (2007) as being “silent on the issue” (p. 6) and “terrifically eugenic minded” (p. 1). One of the main reasons why eugenical research thrived in Colonial Kenya, according to MacKenzie (2007), was because “[i]t had a white settler population which was interested in such concepts as a way of supposedly legitimating and regulating their position in the territory and their relationship with its indigenous peoples” (p. ix). This supports my argument, in chapter one, that perverted ideologies were introduced to Africa by external forces to facilitate the capitalist exploitation of the continent, and that they have been upheld and continuously employed by African leaders to aid the political elites in structurally achieving their personal interests in the post-colonial era. From Campbell’s (2007) work it is evident that the main reason behind the

widespread nature of eugenic thought in Colonial Kenya was the fact that most of the British officials and settlers had already been brainwashed by Social Darwinism long before they took the trip to Africa.

Before turning our attention to independent Kenya, let us briefly examine the deculturalization process that was employed by the British authorities in the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya. According to wa Thiong'o (1986), the advent of the *Mau Mau* Uprising in Colonial Kenya was followed by a well-calculated, systematic effort by the British colonial authorities to brainwash African students. From 1952, independent African schools run by African nationalists, who prioritized teaching in African languages, were hijacked by Europeans, positioned beneath District Education Boards chaired by the latter, and English imposed upon learners as the language of formal education. Besides the elevation of the colonialist language, wa Thiong'o (1986) argued that students were simultaneously taught to hate indigenous languages:

In Kenya, English became more than a language: it was *the* language, and all others had to bow before it in deference. Thus one of the most humiliating experiences was to be caught speaking Gikuyu in the vicinity of the school. The culprit was given corporal punishment – three to five strokes of the cane on bare buttocks – or was made to carry a metal plate around the neck with inscriptions such as I AM STUPID or I AM A DONKEY. (p. 11)

Wa Thiong'o's (1986) narrative is a classic example of how society's elite class reacts when its privileged position is threatened and when oppressive socio-economic orders – based on the structural determination of capital – are endangered. In such situations, dominant segments of society – power wielders – discredit the cultures, mannerisms and languages of the oppressed in a bid to socially engineer the latter, and perpetuate the status quo. Indeed, the oppressed, who struggle for liberation, end up being demonized. The deculturalization tactics of the colonial era in Kenya were subsequently morphed and utilized by the Kenyan state in the post-independence era, vis-à-vis the country's Luo community, as discussed next.

2.1.4 “Ethnicity” in the Neo-colonial Era in Kenya: c. A.D. 1960 to the Present

The allure of profit and capital accumulation is of such nature that once an individual “crosses the Rubicon”, ceases to be a “worker”, and joins the accumulating side, he/she often tends to forget the cause for which his/her former group was fighting and the predicament of former fellow oppressed “workers”. Fifty-four years after Kenya’s independence, most survivors of the lot that took to the forests to wage the guerrilla war that partly contributed to Kenya’s self-determination – predominantly Kikuyu – and their descendants, remain largely landless, disillusioned and economically disenfranchised.¹⁵ This is the reality, despite the fact that three out of the four Kenyan presidents since independence have been from the Kikuyu “ethnic group”. In fact, until Kibaki took over the reins of power in December 30, 2002, the Kenyan state continuously declined to acknowledge the contribution of the guerrillas (Kinyatti, 2005). Apparently, the trappings of capitalist accumulation, facilitated by control of state power, had greater allure than the principles of the fair, just, non-discriminatory, egalitarian society that most Kenyan African nationalists had fought and hoped for. Although Kenyatta must be commended for a fairly successful attempt at navigating the difficult course of uniting a nation divided along racial lines, owing to a racialized, oppressive economic order, he seems to have been preoccupied with safeguarding the interests of nervous white settler farmers, and appeasing the latter as opposed to pushing the cause of landless African guerrillas at independence. The Kenyatta that came out of prison in 1961 was even more moderate and spoke of “constitutional means”¹⁶ to freedom; he denounced the *Mau Mau* and stated the following: “I’ve never approved of any violence at all. My leadership has not been to darkness and death, but to light and prosperity”.¹⁷ Perhaps a behind-the-scenes deal had been reached between him and a shadowy globalist cabal to safeguard the latter’s interests in an independent Kenya before his release.¹⁸ Although we shall never know this for sure, Kenyatta’s case points to the possibility of the existence of an African political class that is in cahoots with globalists, to the detriment of its

¹⁵ See, for instance, Weru, J. (2016, December 12). Meet Mau Mau fighters who have never tasted fruits of independence. *Standard Digital*. Retrieved from <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000226534/meet-mau-mau-fighters-who-have-never-tasted-fruits-of-independence> (accessed 13 December 2016).

¹⁶ See Citizen TV. (2014, December 11). *Jamhuri Day special: Jomo Kenyatta talks to white settlers*. [Video file]. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6dyeaTk8S-Y> (accessed 13 December 2016).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ In a review of Oginga Odinga’s autobiography, *Not Yet Uhuru*, for instance, Roberts (1968) describes the leadership of the country as “. . . the men who rule Kenya today for Western interests” (p. 85). See Roberts, D. (1968). Not yet uhuru: An autobiography by Oginga Odinga. *World Outlook*, 6(4), 84 – 85.

citizens; in these confounding, contemporary times, this possibility should not be taken lightly.¹⁹ Odinga's opposition to Kenyatta's approach would not only hurt his political career, but also set the Luo community on a trajectory of enmity with the latter – and his Kikuyu followers – and eventually lead to the collective political marginalization of the Luo community. Indeed, “Jaramogi's socialist leanings became his political Waterloo; leaving government to form Kenya People's Union in 1966 signaling the start of the longest sojourn in political Siberia. His party was labelled illegal, members, including Jaramogi detained in 1969.”²⁰

However, the event that would forever change the fate of the Kenyan Luo, by ushering in – to the community's detriment – the “formalization” of “ethnic”-based political ostracization, and systematic attempts at deculturalization, was the assassination of Tom Mboya on 5th July 1969. The unfortunate event made the already sour Kikuyu-Luo relations worse; fearing an uprising and retaliatory measures by the Luo – for it was widely believed that Kenyatta's administration had played a role in the death of Mboya – an already paranoid Kenyatta turned to the divide-and-conquer and deculturalization tactics that he had seen the British colonialists employ. To safeguard state power, the source of his immense wealth, Kenyatta convinced “Kikuyu[s] by the thousands [to take part in] swearing oaths against fellow Kenyans in the President's backyard”²¹ – his Gatundu residence. Time Magazine further noted in 1969 that:

[t]he Kikuyu, according to one participant, strip naked, then hold hands in a circle around a darkened hut and chant an oath before entering it. Inside the hut they eat soil and swear to follow the oath. “The government of Kenya is under Kikuyu leadership, and this must be maintained,” goes the pledge. “If any tribe tries to set itself up against the Kikuyu, we

¹⁹ Basing his arguments on French scholar Renan's views of a nation-state, Lonsdale is of the opinion that Kenyatta took this approach for he wanted “. . . Kenya . . . to have a nationalist history that included all Kenyans” (see Berman & Lonsdale, 1992, p. 266). He contends that “. . . as Kenya's first president [Kenyatta] could scarcely permit the pangs of its birth to be borne by one heroic minority, the Mau Mau fighters, alone” (ibid).

²⁰ See Editor. (2016, November 10). The Odingas: A family of crusading firebrands. *Standard Digital*, para. 3. Retrieved from <http://www.sde.co.ke/thenairobi/article/2000222904/the-odingas-a-family-of-crusading-firebrands> (accessed 13 December 2016).

²¹ Time (1969, August 15) *Kenya: Ominous oaths*. Retrieved from <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901233,00.html> (accessed 18 December 2016); See also, Mathangani, P. (2016, December 18). Secrets of Kenyatta oaths that set Kenya on the path to ruin. *Standard Digital*. Retrieved from <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000227153/the-kenyatta-oath-that-shook-kenya> (accessed 18 December 2016).

must fight them in the same way that we died fighting the British settlers. No uncircumcised leaders [for example, the Luo] will be allowed to compete with the Kikuyu. You shall not vote for any party not led by the Kikuyu. If you reveal this oath, may this oath kill you.”²²

To further understand why Kenyatta would take to adopting such un-African moves, and the consequences of his actions on Kenyan society, let us turn to the details of how capitalism developed in Kenya. As argued in chapter one, state control was – and continues to be – crucial in the formation of the indigenous African bourgeois class since independence. Leys (1978) has described the Kenyan case succinctly:

The control of this class over the state...originally largely through ethnic links, led to the accumulation of surplus through state-protected merchant, distribution and service activities. Increasingly this allowed the indigenous bourgeoisie to buy out foreign capital in farming, service and manufacturing sectors, helped...by capital accumulated through the ivory, charcoal and coffee trade (as cited in Kaplinsky, 1980, p. 84).

Table 2.1 below, whose details are beyond the scope of this study, has been adapted from Kaplinsky (1980): It depicts the most prominent indigenous African capital accumulators in the Jomo Kenyatta era; for this reason, it has been referenced.

²² Time, *op. cit.*

Table 2.1: Capital Accumulators in the Kenyatta Era

	Nuclear Family				Indigenous Kenyans (non-family)		
	Total No. of Firms	No.	Personal Equity K£	Total Equity K£	No.	Personal Equity K£	Total Equity K£
Julius K. Kalinga	4	2	28	25	2	608	13,900
James Njenga Karume	14	2	46,800	62,000	11	38,569	224,878
Peter Muige Kenyatta ²³	15				6	30,822	460,899
J. Matere Keriri	0						
Kenneth Matiba	5	1	99	100	1	100	1,600
Ngengi Muigai	18	1	99	100	9	768,500	7,279,029
Charles Njonjo	10						
Dustan Omari	5				2	203	7,500
Charles Rubia	4	1	4,000	5,000	2	3,350	16,000
James Maina Wanjigi	11	4	1,003	1,007	4	16,651	52,624
Francis Mwangi Thuo	6				3	2,040	9,000
Eliud Mathu	8	3	8,002	8,004	2	1,110	25,020
Udi Gecaga	11	5		520,000	2	6,000	35,000

Source: Adopted from Kaplinsky, 1980, p. 94.

It is noteworthy that, out of this list of thirteen, twelve hail from Kenyatta's "ethnic group"

²³ Kaplinsky (1980) made an error by referring to "Peter Muigai Kenyatta" as "Peter Muige Kenyatta" in his work. I have adopted the table without making any alterations to it whatsoever.

(Kikuyu). About Udi Gecaga and Ngengi Muigai, Kaplinsky (1980) states that “both used close family relationships with Kenyatta to build their empires and amongst Kenyan industrialists Muigai is known as the political heavyweight and Gecaga as the shrewd businessman” (p. 91). This further suggests that state control and “ethnic” ties have been synthesized to determine economic fortunes and outcomes in Africa, generally, and in Kenya, in particular. The accumulators of wealth become the “private property class” in the context of Marx’s class struggle analysis. In order to protect their privileged position, they shield themselves by ensuring that all the important and powerful posts in the civil service, police and armed forces, are filled by their fellow tribesmen and women. Together, they become the dominant group and ensure tribal hegemony. During his first term, for instance, Kibaki reserved about one half of the cabinet posts in his government to GEMA communities. According to Amutabi (2009):

In 2006, there were 19 permanent secretaries from GEMA-related ethnic groups out of 34 in the country. In 2002, there had been 14 permanent secretaries from the Kalenjin, and related ethnic groups out of 26. In 2006, members of the GEMA group headed 23 out of the 34 public corporations. (p. 73)

The dominated “ethnic groups” – the Luo have consistently fallen into this category in the post-independence era – are thus consigned to “wage-labour” status. In the Marxian model of class struggle, they would be the “proletariat”; whilst this particular class seeks “radical restructuring of the established order of society”, members of the wealthy “private property class”, and their tribal associates, are “interested in change only to the extent to which reforms and concessions can be integrated or institutionalized” (Mészáros, 1971, pp. 98 – 99). These dialectics of “ethnicity” and economic development partly explain why post-election violence is increasingly becoming a prominent feature of the Kenyan society. State controllers are usually very conservative and do everything within their power to frustrate regime change – even rig elections. When regime change fails, the dominated groups frequently resort to violence – a situation akin to what Marx refers to as “self-abolition” (cf. Mészáros, 1971, pp. 92 – 93).

The socio-cultural dynamics associated with the safeguarding of the social formation of capital, in the Kenyan context, have often revolved around “othering” centred, mainly, on the

practice of male circumcision. “Othering”, according to Abdallah-Preteuille (2003), involves “objectification of another person or group” or “creating the other” (p. 13). Staszak (2009) defines the “other” as a “member of a dominated out-group, whose identity is considered lacking and who may be subject to discrimination by the in-group” (p. 43). He contends that:

[o]therness is the result of a discursive process by which a dominant in-group (“Us,” the Self) constructs one or many dominated out-groups (“Them,” Other) by stigmatizing a difference – real or imagined – presented as a negation of identity and thus a motive for potential discrimination. (Staszak, 2009, p. 44)

Long after Kenyatta launched his “deculturalization” (social death) technique, it continues to be claimed, in Kenyan political parlance, that leadership is the preserve of the circumcised. This argument has often been used by Kikuyu (dominant) politicians of Central Kenya against their Luo (dominated) competitors, who culturally do not practice male circumcision. Atieno-Odhiambo (2002) observed that:

This Gikuyu notion of civil society was extended to the political arena of the state by Kenyatta from 1966 to 1969, when he accused the KPU opposition of being chameleons – definitely not part of civil society and therefore, by extension, not legitimate citizens of the Kenya state that he ran. The Luo were targeted for this rhetorical exclusion ostensibly because they did not practice male circumcision. This specifically central Kenyan discourse on being cut – “the narcissism of small differences”, as Freud once spoke of it, the tendency to think of ourselves as superior to others because of some laughably superficial and non-essential feature – resurfaced in 1992 as two Gikuyu barons, Kenneth Matiba and Mwai Kibaki, bid for the presidency against Oginga Odinga. It was widely asserted that Odinga should not be elected because he was not circumcised. (p. 243)

Indeed, the “symbol” of circumcision has over the years – thanks to the derogatory, politically-inspired ethnocentric views and ideologies of Kenyatta and cunning politicians of successive generations – been profoundly fronted, in Kenya, as a desideratum for qualification (in terms of

“bona fide” citizenry, human worth and ability to lead).²⁴ This cultural element, which is alien to the Luo, has been so vociferously emphasized that Kiai (2009) thinks that Obama (the 44th US president whose father was Luo) would not win an election in Kenya because of his “ethnicity”. When a people’s identity is ridiculed, owing to an element of culture that they do not practice, they may be coaxed into adopting that which is alien to conform (to be socially compatible). This study assesses the impact of political exclusion on cultural dispositions within this context. In an interview with *Vogue*, Oscar-winning-actress Lupita Nyong’o talks about the despondency she felt growing up as a young girl in Kenya, for being Luo. Besides her dark pigmentation (Luos, originally from Southern Sudan, are darker than the average Kenyan in most instances) barring her from being accepted on Kenyan television, she states that she associated her *Dholuo* dialect with ignominy (cf. Sykes, 2015). It is not inconceivable, therefore, that politically-constructed stereotypes and prejudices could have had profound socio-cultural effects and ramifications at all levels of society in Kenya. I will now briefly examine consumerism, the brainwashing ideology of the 21st century, which has not only served to perpetuate an oppressive global economic order, but has also become a very important tool for the purposes of feeding the global elite class’s insatiable appetite for profits.

2.1.5 Consumerism in the 21st Century

The 20th century was undoubtedly the American century and the same is the case, arguably to a lesser extent, with the first two decades of the 21st century. Whether by way of diplomacy, chicanery or warfare, the US has and continues to spread, with significant success, its notions of what constitutes proper, sophisticated and/or acceptable socio-economic-political norms and values the world over (cf. Chomsky, 2016a; Chomsky, 2016b; Chomsky & Vltchek, 2017). More often than not, this imperialistic behaviour, on the part of the world’s superpower, has been motivated by the desire to find markets for its products, owing to “over-capacity and over-production” (Terreblanche, 2014, p. 438). Terreblanche (2014) has argued that

[t]he US intervention in Latin America during the first half of the twentieth century created an opportunity for it to launch the transnational corporation as a typical American

²⁴ See, for instance, Nation Reporter. (2015, January 13). Outrage as Moses Kuria makes another hate remark. *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Outrage-as-Moses-Kuria-makes-another-hate-remark-/1064-2588378-dvdi2sz/index.html> (accessed 6 March 2017).

business organisation that was destined to play an extraordinary dominant role in the American-led empires in the period after the Second World War. (p. 437)

For the US form of capitalism – largely founded on consumer goods – to survive, it requires that the masses, both at home and abroad, engage in continuous spending – impulsive and ostentatious. In this sense, Christianity, especially during the first half of the 20th century, proved an obstacle for it instilled in Americans the virtues of self-discipline, austerity and restraint. Moreover, most upper class Americans were driven by the desire to join the rentier class; consequently, they were given to saving significant portions of their income (Terreblanche, 2014). In order to eliminate this stumbling block, corporate elites “. . . turned to propaganda campaigns to convince consumers – local and foreign – to satisfy not only their rational needs but also their artificially created desires” (Terreblanche, 2014, p. 439). Thus, courtesy of mass media, consumerism has revolutionised capitalism and ensured the preservation of the privileged position of the global elites (Osborne, 2006, as cited in Terreblanche, 2014, p. 429) as captured in Terreblanche’s (2014) work:

[w]hat started as American private corporations, created through litigation in the twentieth century for exploitative imperial operations in Latin America, have in the twenty-first century multiplied to about forty thousand TNCs worldwide that play a hegemonic role on behalf of the United States in economic, political and cultural imperialism in the rest of the world. (p. 437)

Indeed, “[a]fter the Second World War the US would . . . export its corporatism, its consumerism and its financial services – i.e. the American version of capitalism – to Western Europe, and from the 1980s to the rest of the world” (Terreblanche, 2014, pp. 438 – 439).

The manner in which society’s elite class institutes new ideologies to perpetuate financial gain is conspicuous as has been demonstrated, above, in the case of consumerism; this minority group appears to be determined to focus on its narrow self-interests at all costs. An insatiable appetite for profit by the global elite class could well explain the move taken by the international observer mission, led by former US Secretary of State John Kerry, which rushed to give a clean

bill of health to the 8 August 2017 Kenyan general election, despite it being marred by numerous irregularities and illegalities. Does the West care more about stability – which is crucial for its business interests – than for genuine democracy in Africa? Having examined the historical trajectory of the events that culminated in the formation of the socio-historical construct, “ethnicity”, and outlined the contemporary “twisted” ideology of consumerism being employed by the global elite class to exploit the planet’s masses, I now turn my attention to a review of governance and socio-economic development on the continent of Africa, vis-à-vis “ethnicity” and capitalism, for even though “race and ethnicity are mythical constructs”, as we have seen, they nevertheless “are very much an everyday reality” (Spencer, 2014, p. xvii).

2.2 “Ethnicity” in Scholarly Literature on Africa?

In this section, I examine governance patterns, with regard to “ethnicity”, and cover the following countries, besides Kenya: Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire. These countries have been selected because they are “ethnically” heterogeneous according to particular historical experiences and as based on interpretations in particular literature (cf. Posner, 2004; Easterly & Levine, 1997). With the exception of Ethiopia, which only experienced Italian occupation, they all experienced colonial rule for a protracted time period. Moreover, these countries have continuously adopted capitalist economies in the post-colonial era because of the increasing influence of western centralized economic structures, which have remained largely intact in the post-colonial era. This excludes Ethiopia, whose ideology from 1974 to 1991 was Marxism-Leninism, largely because it did not experience colonial rule. Negative “ethnicity”, I contend, thrives best in environments in which there is stiff competition for scarce resources and where the overriding ideology is “survival of the fittest” and “accumulation of profit at all costs”. Ethiopia is thus included to facilitate an analysis of the development of “ethnicity” in a scenario that is devoid of the stranglehold of the effects of colonialism and its associated exports – capitalism and democracy.

Mbatia, Bikuru and Nderitu (2009) have examined the challenges that “ethnicity” poses to state building and multi-party democracy in the continent, using Kenya as a case study. They find that “multiparty democracy [has] heightened ethnic nationalism [leading to] ethnic

violence” (para. 1). For multiparty democracy to function successfully, they argue, the foundations of ethnic-based politics must be demolished. All networks and associations that encourage and preserve negative “ethnicity” ought to be extinguished. African States can accomplish this feat by formulating and enforcing legislation that deters and diminishes political parties that are founded on the basis of “ethnic” identity. Also, they contend, “ethnic auditing should be conducted regularly to identify and penalize those who engage in practices that enforce ethnic exclusion in hiring or distribution of public resources” (*The Way Forward* section, para. 4).

From the work of Attafuah (2009) it is evident that tribalism is also a problem in Ghana. Asante – Ewe rivalry dominates the political scene in that country, and has been manipulated by politicians for personal gain since independence in 1957. Despite business ties and inter-marriages, ethnocentrism, discrimination and prejudices continue to hinder nation-building. The phenomenon of tribalism is deeply entrenched since “formation of political parties, patterns of voting in presidential and parliamentary elections, political appointments and termination of public sector appointments, formulation of development policies and programs, and distribution of development projects are all heavily influenced by ethnic considerations” (*Background* section, para. 3). He recommends the replacement of the winner-takes-all governance system with a mechanism of proportional representation. Only then, he contends, can bloc “ethnic” voting be trumped by ideology and the interests of dominated and marginalized communities get addressed.

Concerning Nigeria, Achimugu, Ata-Agboni and Aliyu (2013) have found that negative “ethnicity” remains an enormous risk to the survival of the nation as a cohesive entity. “Ethnic” considerations are more significant than eminence and national interest when it comes to employment in public service and public appointments. To underscore the magnitude of the situation, they state:

Ethnic mistrust and tension runs high in Nigeria[n] politics, ethnic loyalty remains stronger than national loyalty. All the ethnic groups complain of one form of marginalization or the other. The Hausa/Fulani are accused by other groups...of

monopolizing . . . political power, the Hausa/Fulani accuse the Yoruba of dominating the economy and civil service, the Igbo blame their woes on the Hausa/Fulani political domination and also [complain about Yoruba] domination of [the] economy and federal bureaucracy. (p. 50)

Competition for political positions at all levels in Nigeria – National, State and Local – are driven by “ethnicity”: various “ethnic groups” sponsor their own candidates with the objective of sharing in the spoils of office (Adebayo, 2006, as cited in Achimugu, Ata-Agboni & Aliyu, 2013, p. 57).

In Zimbabwe, Shona – Ndebele rivalries and antagonisms dominate many facets of government operation and society. Following the 1982 fallout between the Zimbabwe African National Union – the Patriotic Front (ZANU – PF) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the subsequent ferocious Operation *Gukurahundi* (1982 – 1987, in which about 20,000 Zimbabweans, mostly Ndebele, lost their lives), the Ndebele have consistently resented the central government (Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007, p. 285); according to Ranger, Alexander and McGregor (2000) they “feel marginalized from both central government decision-making processes and the economy” (as cited in Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007, p. 286). Resentment towards the government has, since 1987, been expressed through the ballot; ZANU – PF seldom gets any meaningful votes from the Matabeleland provinces. There have also been calls for federalism to address the perceived marginalization of the traditional homeland of the Ndebele – the Provinces of Midlands, Matabeleland North and Matabeleland North (Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007, p. 286). Musemwa (2006) has attributed the disinclination of the Zimbabwean Government towards sponsoring the Zambezi Water Project (meant to provide water to Zimbabwe’s second largest city, Bulawayo, which is located in Matabeleland) to negative “ethnicity” and “ethnic” politics. To him, the government was penalizing the city for its disapproval (as cited in Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007, p. 289).

The situation in the Côte d'Ivoire is even more complex: besides the problematic of xenophobia, negative “ethnicity” and sectarian dynamics characterize the formation and operation of government, and the organization of opposition towards it (Ogwang, 2011). The

country's citizenry comprises a huge chunk of nationals of immigrant origin. Its cocoa and coffee industries have for a long time been dependent on immigrant labour from neighbouring countries like Mali, Ghana, Guinea and Burkina Faso (Ogwang, 2011; Ištók & Koziak, 2010). Immigrants, seen as a cheap labour source, were introduced into the country by the French in colonial times. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, founding father of the nation, and perhaps the most economically and politically astute of the five leaders the country has had so far (others being Aimé Henri Konan Bédié, Robert Guéï, Laurent Gbagbo and the current president, Alassane Dramane Ouattara), accorded them citizenship and property ownership rights (Ogwang, 2011). This community has significantly grown and become an important part of the country's population. Indeed, in "1998, immigrants and their descendants numbered four million – about 25 percent of Ivory Coast's population" (Ogwang, 2011, p. 3). Economic difficulties, attributed to slumps in cocoa and coffee prices in the world market, and which originated in the 1980s, have been blamed, naively and in an escapist fashion, on the immigrant community such that "strong anti-immigrant sentiments" (Collier, 2009, as cited in Ogwang, 2011, p. 3) abound. According to Langer (2010), economic hardships have not only worsened disputes between aboriginal Ivorians and immigrants, but also between northerners and the natives of the prosperous south (as cited in Ogwang, 2011, p. 3).

These xenophobic sentiments have been exploited by politicians in their quest to retain power (Ogwang, 2011). For instance, the current president, Ouattara, was constantly barred from contending for the presidency prior to 2010, owing to the belief that one of his parents was not Ivorian. In fact, President Bédié introduced and oversaw the enactment of legislation to that effect (Mwendwa, 2011, as cited in Ogwang, 2011, p. 4). Bédié also coined the notion of "Ivoirité" ("Ivorianess") ostensibly for the purposes of cultural unity. Prévention Genocides (2002) saw the concept as:

[a]n ideology and propaganda directed by those in power created, little by little, in the social imagination two identity groups: the "100 percent Ivorians" from the "roots"; and the "dubious Ivorians," of whom the leader is Alassane Ouattara, leader of the opposition RDR (former prime minister of Houphouët Boigny.) He was excluded from elections for his "dubious Ivorianess." Besides him, his whole community is targeted. Beyond his own

community, there is a linkage of “dubious Ivoirians” with foreigners. An equation is readily made: Ouattara = RDR militants = people of the north = Muslims = Dioulas = foreigners. In these representations, the cleavage “us versus them” is deeply embedded. (p. 1)

From the work of Ogwang (2011) it is clear that Houphouët-Boigny was aware of the sensitivity of “ethnicity” since he “introduced a system of ethnic quotas within government institutions” (p. 2). Nevertheless, in the lead-up to the first multi-party elections held in the country in 1990, Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (IPF) blamed him for championing the concerns of his Baoulé “ethnic group”, besides those of “foreigners” and communities from the north (Crook, 1997, as cited in Ogwang, 2011, p. 4). During the reign of his successor, Bédié, government was dominated by officials from the Christian south, with very minimal inclusion of politicians from the Muslim north (Ištok & Koziak, 2010, p. 3). And Gbagbo, following in the footsteps of Bédié, maintained the diehard attitude of barring northerners from government participation – a stance which eventuated in a foiled coup attempt in 2001, and outright civil war in 2002 (Ogwang, 2011).

Perhaps paradoxically, Ethiopian society, which did not experience colonial rule, has also been bedevilled by a history of “ethnic” domination and exclusion (Nzongola – Ntalaja, 1999). During the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930 – 1974) the Amhara were greatly favoured as opposed to other “ethnic groups” (Nzongola – Ntalaja, 1999). Lefort (1983) highlights the all-important statistic: Although comprising a mere 25% of the population of Ethiopia in 1970, the Amhara constituted 70% of the armed forces and dominated other state organs (as cited in Nzongola – Ntalaja, 1999, p. 42). Opposition to the centralized state in Ethiopia has also been largely organized along “ethnic” lines. During the reign of the Marxist-Leninist Derg Government (1974 – 1991), for instance, resistance took the form of ethnic-based entities like the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) (Van der Beken, 2003, as cited in Teshome, 2008, p. 789). According to Keller (2002) since 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) Government, itself an ethnic-based entity, has encouraged dominated Ethiopians to coalesce around “ethnic” identity in order

to air out their grievances (as cited in Teshome, 2008, p. 791). This lends credence to the argument of Osaghae (2006) that “demands made in the name of ethnic groups tend to be taken seriously by State power holders who know the destructive capacity of festering and unattended to ethnic demands” (p. 6).

From the preceding review of “ethnicity” in selected African countries, the following pattern can be observed: “ethnic” tensions and rivalry are prevalent in each country that experienced colonialism and adopted capitalism as its economic ideology. Therefore, the assertion that “ethnicity” owes its existence to colonialism and that negative “ethnicity” (tribalism) thrives best in an environment dominated by capitalism and its associated exports – the centralized nation-state and multi-party democracy – holds true. It is also clear, from the analysis of Ethiopia, that the problem associated with “ethnicity” transcends the colonial experience and, in some instances, cannot be totally pinned on capitalism. However, the western ideas of democracy and the nation-state, make “ethnicity” in Africa problematic, no matter what economic ideology a country adopts; it should be noted that when the Derg Government ruled Ethiopia, it “theoretically accepted the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the right to self-determination of all ethnic groups or nationalities in the country . . . [but] it did not implement this theory in practice, hence Ethiopia remained a centralized state” (Teshome, 2008, p.788). In conclusion, therefore, this colonial construct, “ethnicity”, has rendered African societies largely dysfunctional. Ostensibly, the western ideals of capitalism and democracy have largely failed to work for the betterment of African societies, especially with regard to the masses. These ideals are, more often than not, responsible for the incessant bloodshed in Africa, for wherever economic problems associated with capitalism arise, “ethnic” tensions follow. Indeed, these western imports – capitalism, democracy and the nation-state – are substantially serving to harm the African society by further entrenching inequalities of all kinds, “ethnic” inequality included.

With regard to “ethnicity”, salient trends that derive from the preceding literature review include the following: there seems to be a consensus that “ethnicity” determines government formation in Africa; there is also a consensus that dissident communities (or “ethnic groups”) are marginalized when it comes to the allocation of scarce national resources; still, attempts have not been made to comprehensively examine the economic and socio-cultural development of

particular communities vis-à-vis the state and its governing institutions/institutions of governance. The preceding historical trajectory on the formation of “ethnicity” in African societies in general and Kenya, in particular, constitutes the *raison d’être* to construct an analytical framework to explore “ethnicity”, governance and socio-economic development in Africa, with a special reference to the Luo community of Kenya.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

Following the insights arising out of the review of literature, especially on the insatiable pursuit of profit by society’s elite class, its subjugation mechanisms, and the nation-state and the role it plays in the economic and socio-cultural development of its citizens, this study adopts, for its theoretical framework, an eclectic approach. Besides Lonsdale’s ideas of “moral ethnicity” and “political tribalism”, there are no mature (established) theories to explore “ethnicized” politics in Kenya/Africa; however, many theoretical propositions emanate from this literature review to explain the development and persistence of the phenomenon as discussed in the rationale/justification presented in section 1.5 of chapter one. This study, therefore, fuses various theoretical propositions (drawn from the review of current literature) on leadership and socio-economic development in the African context, with the Foucauldian notion of “Panopticon” power, Istvan Mészáros’ refutation of “ideological neutrality” and the Instrumentalist Theory of Ethnicity, to inaugurate a complex whole. Consider Mészáros’ views:

[T]he national state remain[s] the ultimate arbiter of comprehensive socioeconomic and political decision-making as well as the real guarantor of the risks undertaken by all significant transactional economic ventures. (Mészáros, 2015, p. 97)

[There exists an] adversarial/antagonistic framework in which one section of the population – a . . . minority – has to dominate the . . . majority as a matter of insurmountable structural determination. That is to say, a form of domination that totally expropriates for itself the power of decision making. Labor as the antagonist of capital has absolutely no power of decision making; not even in the most limited context. (Mészáros, 2001a, pp. 101 – 102)

Following these insights from the works of Mészáros, the study posits that political

power is a vehicle to economic prosperity in Africa, since whoever controls the state decides the manner in which the scarce resources will be allocated (cf. Odinga, 2007; Singh & vom Hau, 2015; Mullard, 2005). This phenomenon thrives because most African countries have not enshrined particulars regarding the division of the national bounty in their constitutions. Therefore, whoever lacks political power cannot chart their own economic destiny and is at the mercy of the custodian of the state. In Kenya, whereas constitutional advancements were made in 2010, the situation nevertheless persists, albeit to a lesser extent: governance is mediated by relations of power often exercised by the dominant parties in competition with one another. Accordingly, certain institutions of governance, especially at the local level, are often fragmented in respect of providing access to constitutionally enshrined rights, as buttressed and supported by specific regulations/laws. In Foucault's (1995 [1975]) terminology, these relations of power operate in the form of a "panopticon" ensuring that, to a lesser or greater extent, rights claimed or demanded by citizens at the grassroots level are seldom implemented in total, but curtailed in practice.²⁵

According to Foucault (2003 [2006]) power can be very productive in terms of effect; however, it is important to note that power is only productive in an environment of freedom (Schirato, Danaher & Webb, 2012). For Foucault (1984) freedom is not a possession/thing; neither is it a target or objective to be realized or attained. It is a continuous application of certain principles and ideologies. Foucault (1984) argues:

[I] do not think that there is anything that is functionally – by its very nature – absolutely liberating. Liberty is a *practice*. So there may, in fact, always be a certain number of projects whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even to break them, but none of these projects can, simply by its nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically, that it will be established by the project itself. The liberty of men is never

²⁵ On August 24, 2015, for instance, the Supreme Court of Kenya upheld a decision by the Court of Appeal to award teachers a pay rise of between 50 to 60 per cent. Teachers, in Kenya, are paid meagrely and find it difficult, to make ends meet, financially. However, instead of carrying out the court's orders, President Uhuru Kenyatta opted to close all schools on the premise that implementation of the award would cripple government operations since the increase had not been budgeted for. Thus, the rights of teachers, and more importantly, those of children – to education – were violated. And days later, the Teachers Service Commission announced a vacancy of about 70,000 teaching jobs, a move largely seen as a blackmail tactic to coerce teachers back to class. For more details on the award and controversy surrounding it, see Ouma, W. (2015, August 22). State uneasy as supreme court rules on 50pc teachers' pay rise. *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Supreme-Court-Teachers-Salaries-Increase/-/1056/2842856/-/j4yo64z/-/index.html> (accessed 1 October 2015).

assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. This is why almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around. Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because “liberty” is what must be exercised. (p. 245)

From this perspective, when African countries got rid of the colonialist, they did not necessarily attain freedom. They will be free when they apply, execute and/or exercise practices, which according to Schirato, Danaher & Webb (2012) should encompass the following: the respect of human rights, the rule of law, a liberal, democratic environment, reasonable living standards, free trade, freedom of expression, free press, and so on. From Foucault’s (1984) definition of freedom, power – in a socio-cultural sense – can only be productive in an environment where people have an enlightened attitude towards others of a different “race”, “ethnicity” and even religious beliefs. Totalitarian, despotic, and oppressive regimes, on the other hand, can make power coercive (Schirato, Danaher & Webb, 2012). Indeed, power emits a repressive effect, in autocratic dispensations, and this has largely been the case in post-independent Africa.

African communities have come to realize the connection between state control and economic well-being and are using “ethnicity” as a weapon in the struggle for political power. “Ethnic groups” are, therefore, groups of interest (cf. Glazer & Moynihan, 1975; Portes & Bach, 1985); and instrumentalists are correct when they say that “ethnicity operates within contemporary political contexts and is not an archaic survival arrangement carried over into the present by conservative people” (Cohen, 1969, p. 190). Since “politicization of ethnicity all over the African continent has in turn generated deep-rooted suspicions [and] mistrust” (Odinga, 2007, *Ethnicity as a Vehicle for Political Competition* section, para. 5) this study is guided by the premise that the “ethnic groups” that control state power do not allocate the dominated groups an equitable share of the national largesse.

2.4 Rival Theoretical Explanations

Owing to the fact that there is no agreement regarding how to understand the “ethnicized politics” in Kenya, various rival explanations of the Kenyan case have emerged to elucidate uneven and/or unequal development in the Kenyan state vis-à-vis its Luo community. This

phenomenon can best be explained by the certitude that “ethnicity” is an emotive issue. Analysts, therefore, sometimes fail the test of neutrality and/or objective description. This study considers the arguments and theories of Oloo (2004) and Kuria (2011) equally important in the examination of Kenya’s socio-economic development because case study research methodology involves identifying rival explanations at the outset of the research process and considering these rival explanations during the interpretation of a study’s findings.²⁶ Since Oloo’s (2004) arguments are based on the *Theory of Uneven Development*, I’ll introduce this theory first, before examining the analyst’s contentions.

The *Theory of Uneven Development* was first propounded fully by Lenin in 1915; its precepts derive from the works of Marx – *Capital* and *Grundrisse* (cf. Smith, 1990; Bond, 1999). It is founded on Marx’s argument that “capitalism . . . [leads to] the simultaneous emergence of concentrations of wealth and capital (for capitalists), on the one hand, and poverty and oppression (for workers), on the other” (Bond, 1999, para. 1). The emergence of the phenomenon (uneven development), which can be associated with “differential growth of sectors, geographical processes, classes and regions at the global, regional, national, sub-national and local level” (Bond, 1999, para. 1) has been explained in various ways by different scholars: whilst Smith (1990) attributes it to rampant development of division of labour, Mandel (1968) perceives it as the result of variation in finesse amongst distinct producers in a given community, prolificacy differences amongst animals and soils, and fortuitous happenings in life and nature (as cited in Bond, 1999).

Basing his arguments on the *Theory of Uneven Development*, Oloo (2004) contends that poverty in Luo Nyanza can be explained by the fact that:

[C]apitalism develops in contradictory ways both within the boundaries of a single country, across regions and a global scale. Well known examples include South Africa under apartheid where you basically had two nations and two economies co-existing within the confines of a single racist state; some have cited the North/South divide within

²⁶ For details on the importance of identifying rival explanations at the outset of a case study and considering these explanations during the interpretation stage, see Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case study research: design and methods* (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, p. 34.

Nigeria, Uganda, Italy, Sudan and other parts of the world. (*What is Uneven Development?* section, para. 1)

According to Oloo (2004) the colonial history of Kenya depicts a situation in which the British pursued a policy of uneven development flagrantly and unashamedly. Infrastructure growth and expansion was carried out in correspondence with colonial economic concerns, pursuits and investments. The reason for “the social and economic disparities between towns and the countryside, various districts and provinces and even within individual towns, districts and provinces”, lies in this phenomenon (Oloo, 2004, *What is Uneven Development?* section, para. 4). Therefore, impoverishment in any region of the country can neither be attributed directly to the inhabitants nor to superficial “ethnic” rivalry amongst various “ethnic groups” (Oloo, 2004).

Another rival explanation on the economic state of Luo Nyanza is based on the concept of poor leadership. Kuria (2011) argues that “since independence, the political leadership of the region has held the people hostage to a self-defeating ideology of blaming everybody except themselves for the region’s woes” (para. 2). According to him, underdevelopment in the traditional homeland of the Luo community is as a result of the culture of overdependence on the government and lack of personal initiative. He suggests that the region needs to make the fishing industry its focal point and modernize it – proceeds from which would uplift the locals. If deployed for irrigation purposes, he argues, Luo Nyanza’s plentiful water sources could transmute the region into the country’s new bread basket. He also advocates for the sagacious resuscitation of industries such as Kisumu Cotton Mills (KICOMI), which slumped in 1999. The conclusion of this chapter is next.

2.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to theorize the problem of “ethnicity” away from the conventional and widely accepted and acknowledged diametrically opposed understandings of the ideological construct espoused by Lonsdale – “moral ethnicity” and “political tribalism” (cf. Berman & Lonsdale, 1992, pp. 315 – 467). Basing its premise on the contentions of Mafeje (1971) that, since Africa has “been successfully drawn into a capitalist economy and a world market” (p. 258), “ethnicity” has to be explained and conceptualized differently, with modern

conditions in mind, it has positioned Kenya's "ethnic" problem within the spectrum of profit and the push for globalism. As well, to uncover the genesis and development of the spurious ideological construct, the evolution of closely-related ideologies and their concomitant driving forces – such as race, Christianity, slavery, Darwinism, eugenics, colonialism and consumerism – has been examined. The chapter has scrutinized governance patterns with regard to "ethnicity" in various African countries that have subsequently adopted capitalist economies in the post-colonial era, because of the increasing influence of Western centralized economic structures, which have remained largely intact in the post-colonial era. It has also discussed the theoretical framework that has been adopted for this study, to interrogate the research problematic. It has given the specifics of an eclectic approach, which fuses various propositions (obtained from the review of current literature) on leadership and socio-economic development, within the African context, with the Foucauldian notion of "Panopticon" power, Istvan Mészáros' refutation of "ideological neutrality" and the Instrumentalist Theory of Ethnicity. The core argument of this theoretical framework is that the "ethnic groups" that control state power in Africa do not allocate an equitable share of the national resources to the dominated groups perceived to be "dissident". In keeping with the tenets of case study research (cf. Yin, 2009), this chapter has also considered rival theoretical explanations on development, chief among which is the *Theory of Uneven Development*. The next chapter outlines the research methodology that was adopted in this study.

Chapter 3

Research Setting and Methodology

3 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research methodology that I have employed to accomplish this study's objectives, which are chiefly to explain the marginalization of the Luo in Kenya and why "ethnicity" is strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in this particular African nation. More specifically, the research methodology used in this chapter aims at shedding light on the following concerns: i) the socio-cultural-economic factors arising out of political exclusion and domination by the successive governments of post-independent Kenya; and, ii) the proportion of public investment undertaken by the GoK in Luo Nyanza during the period 1963 – 2013 to enhance the community's effective participation in governance structures, at grassroots level, and its concomitant socio-economic development.

The ethno-political context from which the research problem derives has already been discussed in detail in chapters one and two. However, since this study is partly grounded on Geertz's (1973) "thick description" technique, I have annexed a detailed description of the study area (see Appendix C), whose delimitation criterion will be discussed shortly. This is aimed at making the findings on the influence of "ethnic"-based politics on the Luo more meaningful, especially to the non-Kenyan reader. Thus, this chapter begins by explaining how the study area has been delimited. Overall, the purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the research methodology section in chapter one, and to show that proper mechanisms have been applied in conducting this study. With the view to enhance the overall clarity of my research methodology, I have organized this chapter around ten major topics, namely: delimitation of the study area, research methodology, quantitative research design, qualitative research design, MMR data collection techniques, data validity and reliability, data analysis, research instruments, research scope and limitations and the ethics statement. Each of the preceding ten sections of this research methodology chapter is now presented sequentially.

3.1 Delimitation of the Study Area

The delimitation of the study area in this research is based on the criterion of contextualization (cf. Compton-Lilly, 2013; Cappelli & Sherer, 1991; Johns, 2006; Elsbach &

Pratt, 2007; Bamberger, 2008). Contextualization, which advocates for the “linking of observations to a set of relevant facts” (Rousseau & Fried, 2001, p.1) ensures that participants’ sets of circumstances/situations – for example, institutional and political – are considered before a study is undertaken (Compton-Lilly, 2013, pp. 54–65). Other situational factors considered key by various scholars include normative or social environments like culture (Barmberger & Biron, 2007), economy-wide characteristics (Rowley, Behrens & Krackhardt, 2000), and physical workplace conditions (Elsbach & Pratt, 2007).

In this study, Luo numerical superiority/inferiority is the key contextualization consideration. I contend that in Luo Nyanza (Kisumu, Migori, Siaya and Homa Bay Counties) where the Luo is the main “ethnic group”, the latter interacts less with Kenyans of other “ethnic groups” as opposed to the Luo who reside in the country’s cosmopolitan areas. For a more meaningful and balanced exploration of the manner in which “ethnicized” politics influences socio-economic and cultural developments in Kenyan society, therefore, I have extended this study to the four cosmopolitan counties of Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Uasin Gishu. In these four cosmopolitan counties, the Luo are to be found co-existing with fellow Kenyans, but are not the dominant group. To my knowledge, no other research on Kenya’s “ethnicized” politics has delimited its study area on the premise that numerical dominance of an “ethnic group” within a specified geographical area and exposure, or lack thereof, to other “ethnic groups” and their cultures could influence the manner in which the dynamics of ethnopolitics play out. The next section introduces the research methodology that has been adopted in this study.


3.2 Research Methodology

This section explains the research design that has been employed in this study. It reviews the research instruments and the sampling procedure that was used to collect the empirical data in addition to the techniques that have been utilized in the analysis of data. Moreover, this section also designates the time frame within which the research was conducted.

3.2.1 Research Design

For this study, I have employed an explanatory sequential mixed methods research design, as depicted in Figure 3.1 below.

Figure 3.1: Research Design.



Source: Author (2017)

This design comprises two distinct stages – quantitative followed by qualitative. I began by collecting numeric data using a structured questionnaire, which was administered on a face-to-face basis. The nominal data obtained in this stage has been analysed for descriptive statistics

through the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) and has been presented in the form of tables and graphs. On the other hand, the ordinal data obtained at the initial stage of this research has also been analysed via SPSS, for inferential statistics, as explained in section 3.7, below. In order to explain the inceptive results in an all-encompassing manner, I followed the above procedure with FGDs. However, this second phase was not confined to the FGDs; I have also analysed the GoK's budget speeches, economic surveys and statistical abstracts, covering the period 1963 – 2013, to compare the prevalent sentiments at the grassroots level with historical records. My motivation for adopting this MMR design is briefly discussed next.

3.2.2 Rationale for Mixed Methods Research (MMR) Design

My adoption of this MMR design has been informed by the fact that “ethnicity” is an emotive issue, and that there is no scholarly consensus on how to approach and/or understand “ethnicized politics” in Kenya. Whilst MMR is not common in the analysis of Kenya’s “ethnicized” politics (cf. e.g., Kimenyi and Bratton, 2008; Bannon, Miguel and Posner, 2004), I found it appropriate for various reasons: first, it provided an avenue for the formation and inclusion of different forms of knowledge – experiential, epistemological and historical – in the analysis of Kenya and its Luo “ethnic group”, thereby ensuring a balanced study. Indeed, the pragmatic nature of MMR allowed for the combination of paradigms and worldviews in this research. In “A Participatory Inquiry Paradigm”, Heron and Reason (1997) have argued that even though the constructivist paradigm/worldview is important for/in research, it fails to account for experiential knowledge, which is equally indispensable in conducting research, for the researcher cannot extricate himself/herself from the society he or she is studying. He/she is not only a part of the society (“cosmos”) but a product of it. Being a Kenyan of Luo “ethnicity”, I have factored in my personal experience of life in the Kenyan society and used it in conjunction with current literature on “ethnicized” politics in Kenya to formulate the conceptual framework outlined in section 1.8 of chapter one and the structured questionnaire used in the quantitative phase of this study (see Appendix A).

Secondly, MMR “provides strengths that offset the weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative research” (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 12). For instance, the pragmatic nature of MMR created room in this study to test, measure and analyse how the independent variable

(political exclusion) relates with the dependent variables (cultural factors, minimal public investment, “ethnic” cohesion and economic difficulties). Pure use of a qualitative approach would have made it difficult, if not impossible, to gauge how these variables relate. On the other hand, the use of a structured questionnaire may be construed as “bring[ing] individuals into a lab (a contrived situation)” (Creswell, 2013, p. 45); MMR was thus employed in this study to counter this “weakness”, by utilizing FGDs in the second phase of this research. The use of FGDs introduced the element of “natural setting”, where exploration took centre stage and predetermined information (post positivism) took a back seat (cf. Creswell, 2013, pp. 45 – 48). Through the FGDs, which were conducted in the field, the voices of participants have been honoured. I spoke directly with members of the Luo community, interacted with them and sought information on how Kenya’s history of “ethnicized” politics has affected them economically and socio-culturally.

Thirdly, I concur with the view that “knowledge is not neutral” (Mertens, 2003, as cited in Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 44). At the onset of this study, I bore in mind the possibility that the data provided by the GoK may not be in agreement with the actual lived realities of ordinary individuals at the grassroots level – so this made me settle for the MMR design, for its holistic nature would enable me to find out if, in fact, this is the case with the Luo of Kenya. Accordingly, owing to the holistic nature of MMR, I have been able, where appropriate, in this study’s conclusion, to call for and recommend measures that will assist in unyoking the Luo from the impediments brought about by unreasonable and prejudiced formations that restrict self-progress and self-establishment. It is my hope, thanks to this MMR design, that the conclusions and recommendations of this study will serve as fertile ground for the generation of “a political debate and discussion so that [real] change will occur” (see Creswell, 2013, p. 26). Having examined the rationale behind the use of MMR for this study, and explained the specific MMR design that was adopted in this study, I now focus my attention on the finer details of the remainder of the research process, beginning with the quantitative research design.

3.3 Quantitative Research Design

3.3.1 Sampling of Participants for the Structured Questionnaire

Quota sampling was used to select the participants for the quantitative phase of this study. In quota sampling, participants are selected in a non-random fashion, according to some fixed quota (Neuman, 2000, Kothari, 2004). According to Kothari (2004), “the interviewers [research assistants] are simply given quotas to be filled from the different strata, with some restrictions on how they are to be filled . . . the actual selection of the items for the sample is left to the interviewer’s discretion” (p. 59). This non-probability sampling technique was chosen for three main reasons: first, whilst the total Luo population in Kenya is known to have stood at 4,044,440 persons in 2009, the community represents a very scattered sample frame owing to the fact that the Luo – like any other Kenyan “ethnic group” – are to be found all over the country’s 47 counties, and their number in each of the counties is not known.²⁷ This fact, coupled with the country’s obvious “ethnic” heterogeneity, makes it impractical to employ probability/random sampling, which would have been ideal if all the “ethnic groups” (everyone) in Kenya were under study. Second, the purpose of this study was not necessarily to give each and every Luo in Kenya an equal chance of being selected to participate, but to ensure that the sample selected represented the major characteristics of the Luo population in terms of gender and age distribution. Third, this study was largely concerned with the descriptive level of statistical analysis and was not designed to subject the collected quantitative data to extensive inferential treatment.

3.3.2 Sample Size

In this study, the sample size (N) = 1,600; a quota of 200 questionnaires was distributed to participants in each of the targeted counties, namely, Kisumu, Homa Bay, Migori, Siaya, Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Uasin Gishu. According to Melero (2011) “[t]he optimal sample size . . . [should] . . . be large enough to allow for confident conclusion[s] and decisions to be made against the stated objectives, but not so large as to be uneconomical” (p. 26). And Fink (2003) contends that “the best sample is representative or a model, of the population” (p. 1). Fink (2003) further argues that “[a] sample is representative if important characteristics (e.g., age,

²⁷ For a detailed look at the results of the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census, released by Hon. Wycliffe Ambetsa Oparanya, Minister of State for Planning, National Development and 2030, on 31st August 2010, see http://www.knbs.or.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=109:population-and-housing-census-2009&Itemid=599 (accessed 12 December 2015).

gender, health status) of those within the sample are distributed similarly to the way they are distributed in the larger population” (p. 1). These arguments formed the basis upon which the sample size for the study was arrived at. In this study, the age and gender of the participants were chosen for purposes of representativeness as further discussed below.



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3.3.2.1 Luo Nyanza Counties

3.3.2.1.1 Kisumu County Sample Size and Representation

For Kisumu County, $n = 200$; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.1, below, which was computed using the Kisumu Population Pyramid based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.²⁸

Table 3.1: Kisumu County Quota Allocation

Age Group	Female (F)	Male (M)	Total (F+M)	% (F)	% (M)	Quota for Age Group	Quota Allotted (F)	Quota Allotted (M)
50+	47,406	40,176	87,582 (13.01%)	54	46	26	14	12
30 - 50	80,318	80,169	160,487 (23.85%)	50	50	48	24	24
20 - 30	98,263	88,245	186,508 (27.71%)	53	47	55	29	26
15 - 20	120,100	118,303	238,403 (35.42%)	50	50	71	36	35
Totals			672,980 (100%)			$n = 200$	103	97

Source: Computed from Kisumu Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data)

For convenience purposes, the sample was divided into four distinct age groups, viz.: 15 – 20 years; 20 – 30 years; 30 – 50 years; and 50+ years. Each gender and age group received the allotment of questionnaires directly proportionate to its percentage of the total population of Kisumu in 2009. Age group 0 – 10 years was omitted from this study because it was not considered mature enough, experience-wise, to participate; it stood at 147,594 males and 147,877 females in 2009. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. However, for the purposes of this study, I considered only those aged 15 years and above to be relevant – that is, experienced enough to participate. Responses were sought from various sources as follows: high/secondary schools (15 – 20 years); tertiary learning institutions like colleges and universities (20 – 30 years); marketplaces, villages, towns, residential and other

²⁸ For an in-depth look at the Kisumu Population Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at <https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Kisumu-Age-Pyramid/eak7-w66f> (accessed 2 December 2015).

areas (30 – 50 years and 50+ years). The following sub-sections outline the quota divisions in the other counties that took part in this study, beginning with Homa Bay.

3.3.2.1.2 Homa Bay County Sample Size and Representation

For Homa Bay County, $n = 200$; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.2, below, which was computed using the Homa Bay Age Pyramid, which in turn is based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.²⁹

Table 3.2: Homa Bay County Quota Allocation

Age Group	Female (F)	Male (M)	Total (F+M)	% (F)	% (M)	Quota for Age Group	Quota Allotted (F)	Quota Allotted (M)
50+	51,881	39,768	91,649 (14.41%)	57	43	29	17	12
30 - 50	78,113	62,310	140,423 (22.09%)	56	44	44	25	19
20 - 30	86,325	70,010	156,335 (24.59%)	55	45	49	27	22
15 - 20	121,278	126,119	247,397 (38.91%)	49	51	78	38	40
Totals			635,804 (100%)			$n = 200$	107	93

Source: Computed from Homa Bay Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data)

In Homa Bay County, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 164,060 males and 163,577 females, respectively, in 2009. It was left out for its experiential incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. The next sub-section examines Migori County.

²⁹ For an in-depth look at the Homa Bay Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at <https://www.opendata.go.ke/Census/Homa-Bay-Age-Pyramid/nhef-kxrw> (accessed 2 December 2015).

3.3.2.1.3 Migori County Sample Size and Representation

As with the precedence already set, for Homa Bay County, $n = 200$; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.3, below, which was computed using the Migori Age Pyramid, which is in turn based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.³⁰

Table 3.3: Migori County Quota Allocation

Age Group	Female (F)	Male (M)	Total (F+M)	% (F)	% (M)	Quota for Age Group	Quota Allotted (F)	Quota Allotted (M)
50+	38,642	31,160	69,802 (11.82%)	55	45	24	13	9
30 - 50	72,604	63,087	135,691 (22.98%)	54	46	46	25	21
20 - 30	82,674	69,417	152,091 (25.76%)	54	46	52	28	25
15 - 20	115,487	117,375	232,862 (39.44%)	50	50	79	40	39
Totals			590,446 (100%)			$n = 200$	106	94

Source: Computed from Migori Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data)

In Migori County, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 163,058 males and 163,161 females, respectively, in 2009. It has been left out for its experiential incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. An examination of Siaya County follows in the next sub-section.

3.3.2.1.4 Siaya County Sample Size and Representation

In like manner, for Siaya County, $n = 200$; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.4, below, which has been computed using the Siaya Age Pyramid, which in turn is based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.³¹

³⁰ For an in-depth look at the Migori Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at <https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Migori-Age-Pyramid/8qbs-vr5v> (accessed 2 December 2015).

Table 3.4: Siaya County Quota Allocation

Age Group	Female (F)	Male (M)	Total (F+M)	% (F)	% (M)	Quota for Age Group	Quota Allotted (F)	Quota Allotted (M)
50+	64,411	43,195	107,606 (18.62%)	60	40	37	22	15
30 - 50	71,828	56,660	128,488 (22.23%)	56	44	44	26	19
20 - 30	71,578	58,686	130,264 (22.54%)	55	45	45	25	20
15 - 20	104,073	107,516	211,589 (36.61%)	49	51	73	36	37
Totals			577,947 (100%)			n = 200	109	91

Source: Computed from Siaya Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data)

In the County of Siaya, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 132,328 males and 131,471 females, respectively, in 2009. It has been left out for its experiential incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. An examination of the cosmopolitan counties, beginning with Nairobi, follows next.

3.3.2.2 Cosmopolitan Counties

It is not possible to obtain the exact “ethnic” demographic specifications for any of the numerous “ethnic groups” living in the cosmopolitan counties: despite the fact that the Kenya Population and Housing Census gives total national figures for the various “ethnic groups” in the country, it does not concern itself with sub-national level (provincial/divisional/locational/county) breakdowns.³² Therefore, the general population trends of the cosmopolitan counties were taken to be representative of those of the Luo too.

³¹ For an in-depth look at the Siaya Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at <https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Siaya-Age-Pyramid/ahqa-zyrt> (accessed 2 December 2015).

³² In fact, the inclusion of tribe/ethnicity as a subject of analysis in Kenyan census initiatives has elicited controversy over the years. See, for example, BBC. (2010 August, 31). *Kenya defends tribal census figures*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11143914> (accessed 5 February 2016).

3.3.2.2.1 Nairobi County Sample Size and Representation

For Nairobi County, $n = 200$; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.5, below, which has been computed using the Nairobi Age Pyramid, which in turn is based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.³³

Table 3.5: Nairobi County Quota Allocation

Age Group	Female (F)	Male (M)	Total (F+M)	% (F)	% (M)	Quota for Age Group	Quota Allotted (F)	Quota Allotted (M)
50+	67,578	98,639	166,217 (6.84%)	41	59	14	6	8
30 – 50	335,273	472,092	807,365 (33.21%)	42	58	66	28	38
20 – 30	494,464	445,685	940,149(38.68%)	53	47	77	41	36
15 – 20	281,306	235,723	517,029 (21.27%)	54	46	43	23	20
Totals			2,430,760 (100%)			$n = 200$	98	102

Source: Computed from Nairobi Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data)

In the County of Nairobi, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 351,281 males and 352,757 females, respectively, in 2009. It has been left out for its experiential incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. The next sub-section features Mombasa County.

3.3.2.2.2 Mombasa County Sample Size and Representation

For Mombasa County, $n = 200$; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.6, below, which has been computed using the Mombasa Age Pyramid, which in turn is based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.³⁴

³³ For an in-depth look at the Nairobi Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at <https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Nairobi-Pop-Pyramid-Age-Groups-2009/u6e3-zmvi> (accessed 2 December 2015).

Table 3.6: Mombasa County Quota Allocation

Age Group	Female (F)	Male (M)	Total (F+M)	% (F)	% (M)	Quota for Age Group	Quota Allotted (F)	Quota Allotted (M)
50+	25,823	33,536	59,359 (8.35%)	44	56	17	7	10
30 - 50	94,309	137,253	231,562 (32.56%)	41	59	65	27	38
20 - 30	130,033	120,694	250,727 (35.25%)	52	48	70	36	34
15 - 20	88,861	80,755	169,616 (23.85%)	52	48	48	25	23
Totals			711,264 (100%)			n = 200	95	105

Source: Computed from Mombasa Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data)

In Mombasa County, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 114,153 males and 113,083 females, respectively, in 2009. This age group has been omitted due to its experience-related incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. The next sub-section features Nakuru County.

3.3.2.2.3 Nakuru County Sample Size and Representation

For Nakuru County, n = 200; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.7, below, which has been computed using the Nakuru Age Pyramid, which in turn is based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.³⁵

Table 3.7: Nakuru County Quota Allocation

Age Group	Female (F)	Male (M)	Total (F+M)	% (F)	% (M)	Quota for Age Group	Quota Allotted (F)	Quota Allotted (M)
50+	66,829	65,176	132,005 (11.67%)	51	49	23	12	11
30 – 50	156,400	165,708	322,108 (28.47%)	49	51	57	28	29

³⁴ For an in-depth look at the Mombasa Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at <https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Mombasa-Age-Pyramid/eiye-fv86> (accessed 2 December 2015).

³⁵ For an in-depth look at the Nakuru Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at <https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Nakuru-Age-Pyramid/6r82-s6ja> (accessed 2 December 2015).

20 – 30	165,240	151,640	316,880 (28.00%)	52	48	56	29	27
15 – 20	177,969	182,419	360,388 (31.85%)	49	51	64	31	33
Totals			1,131,381 (100%)			n = 200	100	100

Source: Computed from Nakuru Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data)

In the County of Nakuru, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 239,240 males and 232,015 females, respectively, in 2009. It has been left out for its experiential incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. The next sub-section features the final county, in which this research was conducted, Uasin Gishu.

3.3.2.2.4 Uasin Gishu County Sample Size and Representation

For Uasin Gishu County, n = 200; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.8, below, which has been computed using the Uasin Gishu Age Pyramid, which in turn is based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.³⁶




Table 3.8: Uasin Gishu County Quota Allocation

Age Group	Female (F)	Male (M)	Total (F+M)	% (F)	% (M)	Quota for Age Group	Quota Allotted (F)	Quota Allotted (M)
50+	33,593	33,993	67,586 (10.69%)	50	50	21	11	11
30 – 50	81,498	89,562	171,060 (27.06%)	48	52	54	26	28

³⁶ For an in-depth look at the Uasin Gishu Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at <https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Uasin-Gishu-Age-Pyramid/9ete-q9fq> (accessed 2 December 2015).

20 – 30	97,189	91,986	189,175 (29.93%)	51	49	60	31	29
15 – 20	103,059	101,241	204,300 (32.32%)	50	50	65	32	32
Totals			632,121 (100%)			n = 200	100	100

Source: Computed from Uasin Gishu Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data)


In the County of Uasin Gishu, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 131,874 males and 129,614 females, respectively, in 2009. It has been left out for its experiential incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. A summary of the specific and the amalgamated final quota tallies is depicted in table 3.9, and figure 3.2, below.

Table 3.9: Summary of Study Sample

COUNTY	KISUMU	HOMA BAY	MIGORI	SIAYA	NAIROBI	MOMBASA	NAKURU	UASIN GISHU	TOTALS
MALE	97	93	94	91	102	105	100	100	782
FEMALE	103	107	106	109	98	95	100	100	818
TOTALS	n = 200	n = 200	n = 200	n = 200	n = 200	n = 200	n = 200	n = 200	N = 1,600

Source: Author (2017)

Figure 3.2: Summary of Study Sample.



Source: Author (2017)

The qualitative research design is briefly discussed next.

3.4 Qualitative Research Design

The qualitative phase of this research is multifaceted: it begins with FGDs and concludes with a thorough examination of historical records. The historical records include Budget Statements for the fiscal years 1962/1963 to 2013/2014; Statistical Abstracts (Statistical Abstract 1963 to Statistical Abstract 2013) and Economic Surveys (Economic Survey 1963 to Economic Survey 2013).

3.4.1 Sampling of Participants for the FGDs

Purposive sampling was used to select the participants for the FGDs. In purposive sampling, “the inquirer selects individuals and sites for study because they can purposefully inform an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study” (Creswell, 2013, pp. 299 – 300). I sought the participants from various institutions such as secondary/high schools, colleges and universities. Other participants were sourced from marketplaces, residential areas and villages. Within institutions such as secondary schools, where I envisaged a sizeable number of enthusiastic participants, random selection mechanisms were applied (cf. Eliot & Associates, 2005, p. 4). Elsewhere, participants were volunteers, who were sourced, amongst other ways, through flyers and advertisements (cf. Eliot & Associates, 2005, p. 4). Owing to the fact that only one “ethnic group” – the Luo – was under consideration, the FGDs, from the outset, were already homogeneous in nature. However, further homogeneity was ensured, or achieved, by conducting separate sessions for males and females. This was done to avoid any “sensitivity”³⁷ issues that may have arisen out of discussions centred on circumcision and was aimed at “creat[ing] comfort within the group[s] and . . . enhanc[ing] more fluid discussion among the group participants” (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 35). A total of 24 FGDs were carried out; I was guided, in this regard, by the principle of “theoretical saturation”, that is, the juncture where fresh enlightenments ceased (cf. Krueger & Casey, 2015). Various benefits are associated with FGDs. According to Conradson (2005), FGDs produce substantial and comprehensive material regarding thoughts, perceptions, understandings, impressions and feelings of people in their own words. Another benefit of this method is its flexibility as an instrument of research – it can be utilized to gather information on any topic, from manifold groups of people and in miscellaneous settings (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007). According to Liamputtong (2011), FGDs can be used as ventilation avenues for marginalized groups. Through FGDs, marginalized groups can air out their grievances and improve their chances of being heard and apprehended by policy-makers. Thus, FGDs empower the marginalized. Moreover, in this study, the FGDs have enhanced the exploration of non-statistical dimensions of socio-economic development.

³⁷ This is in no way a deviation from my agreement with Geertz’s (1973: 9) assertion that culture is “public”.

FGDs have not escaped criticism, though; the methodology has been besmirched for being vulnerable to the influence of assertive and authoritative participants, who may hijack control from the moderator. Moreover, their aggressiveness may intimidate other participants (cf. Krueger & Casey, 2015; Liamputtong, 2011; Dilshad & Latif, 2013). Also, FGD outcomes are largely not generalizable owing to the fact that they are seldom based on random samples. Nevertheless, as already intimated, the cardinal objective of qualitative studies remains to “explor[e] and examin[e] what people think, how they think, and why they think the way they do about the issues of importance to them without pressuring them into making decisions or reaching a consensus” (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 5). All this, of course, is in their own words, and within a specific context – quantitative approaches and techniques do not offer this (cf. Mishler, 1986). FGDs have also been faulted for yielding large data amounts, of which part may be erratic or peripheral with regard to the research subject matter. This often makes data analysis and encapsulation strenuous. Moreover, the processes of congregating participants for FGDs and transcribing interviews are rarely facile (Liamputtong, 2011).

I dealt with the aforementioned shortcomings associated with FGDs in various ways: to alleviate domination by any would-be assertive participants, from the onset of each session I provided a secure and congenial environment to encourage equitable, honest and open expression from all participants (cf. Kelly, 2003, p. 56); the “generalizability” concern has been diluted by the quantitative survey, which I ensured was as representative as possible, by factoring in the age and gender of respondents; to make the process of congregating participants less cumbersome, some of the FGDs were held on location (e.g., in schools, institutions of higher learning and even marketplaces); and to ease the process of data analysis and encapsulation, I made use of ATLAS.ti, a software package for qualitative coding; also, I sought professional transcription services accordingly.

3.5 MMR Data Collection Techniques

After arriving at a suitable sample size and ensuring representativeness, in terms of age and gender for each of the counties under study, the stage was set for the collection of data, which was conducted in two phases, viz. the pre-data collection and the actual data collection, as discussed next.

3.5.1 Pre-Data Collection Procedure

Prior to the commencement of data collection, I trained my field assistants – graduate students sourced from institutions of higher learning – for approximately two weeks. I informed them about the purpose of conducting this research, following which we collectively reached an agreement on the common terms and meanings of the variables used in the questionnaire and FGD guide. Following the training sessions, we proceeded to pre-test the research instruments and, as a research team, thereafter made revisions and appropriately adjusted them. These pre-fieldwork endeavours were aimed at minimizing response bias in the data collection process. Response bias delineates a situation in which the responses do not embody the “accurate” opinions or behaviours of the respondents; it arises when respondents misunderstand the questions posed to them. The questionnaires were, thereafter, administered on a face-to-face basis until all the quotas were filled.

3.5.2 Actual Data Collection

The actual data collection process started in May 2016 and ended in September 2016. The structured questionnaire (see Appendix A) was administered in secondary schools, institutions of higher learning, marketplaces, residential areas, villages and other public places, to gauge the disposition of the ordinary Luo towards the themes emanating from current literature and my experiential knowledge. It tested the ordinary Luo’s experiences on cultural issues like circumcision, and other socio-economic aspects of this research such as “ethnic” cohesion, economics and public investment. The FGDs, explored the ordinary citizen’s opinions and understandings of “ethnicized” politics and its influence on the socio-economic-cultural development of individuals at the grassroots level. The FGD guide is contained in Appendix B.

3.6 Data Validity and Reliability

The value of research is judged by various parameters, among which are justifiability, authenticity and irreproachability. If research meets these standards, it is widely regarded to be both valid and reliable (Merriam, 2009). Research, especially of a qualitative nature, is further thought to be valid and reliable if it is credible, transferable, dependable, confirmable, and consistent (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 2009; Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). Whilst acknowledging these insights, this study was guided by three traits fronted by Leedy & Ormrod

(2010), to ensure validity and reliability: accuracy, meaningfulness and credibility. Accordingly, I put adequate controls in place to ensure that conclusions drawn from data analysis were justified, for trustworthy research findings are likely to trigger interventions from policymakers, which benefit ordinary citizens at the grassroots level. First and foremost, the aforementioned two-week training session for the research assistants was held. The aim of the training session was twofold: clarifying the concepts used in the structured questionnaire and FGD guide, and ensuring that the research team had an unwavering and standard understanding of the concepts applied in these instruments. Besides, the pre-testing and piloting of the two instruments enhanced the validity and reliability of the findings of this research. The pre-testing or piloting exercise made it possible for my research team to pinpoint problematic aspects in the data collection instruments. Such concerns were thereafter tackled and fine-tuned satisfactorily. Pre-testing (pilot) exercises are seen by Creswell (2014) as paramount in the quest to establish content validity in research.

Similarly, triangulation – “corroborating evidence from different sources to shed light on a theme or perspective” (Creswell, 2013, p. 251) – was employed to enhance the validity of this study. The binary nature of the fieldwork – that is, the use of the structured questionnaire and FGDs to gather homogenous information – enhanced the validity and reliability of this study. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010), triangulation is an indispensable characteristic of MMR designs, which strengthens the validity and reliability of the research findings. Moreover, the findings and conclusions of this research transcended the fieldwork: this study also examined crucial historical documents such as GoK budget speeches, economic surveys and statistical abstracts, to gauge equity and the outcome of the public investment undertaken by the GoK.

Thick description (cf. Geertz, 1973, pp. 5 – 6; 9 – 10) has also been employed in this study, to enhance its validity and reliability. Thick description aims at presenting facts with precision; that is, portraying the opinions collected from “natives”, on a specific issue, in a literal and detailed way. Thick description has been fronted by various analysts as being an efficacious control measure when it comes to validity and reliability. This principally applies to the qualitative phase of an MMR design (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & Allen, 1993; Roth, 2005; Creswell 2013). Through rich, thick description, readers get a greater comprehension of the

problem of research; it not only “transports” readers to the scene of the research, but accords the discourse the additional ingredient of shared experiences (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). In this study I have endeavoured to richly narrate the Luo community’s discernments and accounts on “ethnicized” politics, and its influence on socio-economic-cultural developments.

Last but not least, I endeavoured to control the quality of the quantitative survey on a regular basis. I reviewed the filled questionnaires, returned by the research assistants, to verify and ensure consistency. Incomplete and inconsistent questionnaires were returned to the field assistants for verification; where appropriate, the latter were requested to venture back to the field for correct completion. Moreover, the quantitative data was entered twice, on SPSS, to comply with my quality control measures. For purposes of ensuring credibility, with the aid of two field assistants I conducted the FGDs. Whilst I moderated the FGDs, the assistants took notes. The note-takers were astute, alert individuals; I encouraged them to prompt me to investigate certain issues further, where the need for clarification arose. As part of the validation process, I also reiterated the main issues discussed during the FGDs to enable feedback from the participants. All the FGD conversations were captured on tape; this measure helped to ensure that the information obtained from the participants was accurately recorded. Transcription, which enabled visual analysis, then followed. As I conducted the FGDs, I stayed mentally alert – this regarding the fact that “reality is multiple as seen through many views” (Creswell, 2013, p. 21). In instances where the FGDs were conducted in *Dholuo*, they were translated into English.

3.7 Data Analysis

Data analysis can be described as “the search for patterns in data and for ideas that help explain those patterns, interpreting those patterns, deciding what they mean and linking [one’s] findings to those of other research” (Bernard and Ryan, 2010, p. 109). The search for patterns and ideas in this research has taken both quantitative and qualitative forms; the former is discursive, whilst the latter is iterative, as discussed below.

3.7.1 Quantitative Data Analysis

The nominal data (whose main purpose was to search for patterns) generated from the structured interviews/questionnaire has been analysed discursively. According to Pierce (2015),

discursive analysis is both formal and impersonal. It first introduces the subject matter and then discusses each theme/concern (under the subject matter) individually/independently. I considered this approach relevant for the quantitative phase of my study since it enabled me to transition smoothly from one theme to another. Discursive analysis aims at “present[ing] a balanced and objective examination of a subject” (Pierce, 2015, para. 2). Discursive analysis maintains a balanced approach even in cases where the subject matter is deemed to be contentious, enabling the researcher to present various aspects of an issue, whilst undertaking an evaluation. Nevertheless, it is not driven by the principle/ideology of neutrality; backed by evidence obtained from research, the researcher may draw his/her conclusions about the subject matter and present them to readers. This technique has enabled me to give specific attention to the various dependent variables introduced in chapter one: cultural factors, economic difficulties, “ethnic” cohesion and minimal public investment. In analysing these variables, I have employed tables and graphs, as appropriate, to “facilitate comprehension and comparison” (University of Leicester [UoL], 2012, p. 1).

With regard to the analysis of the ordinal data obtained in the quantitative phase of this study, two tests were carried out to derive inferential statistics – the chi-square test of homogeneity and the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance – as explained below. To establish whether the Luo are adopting the alien culture of circumcision uniformly/homogeneously across the counties in which the study was carried out, I conducted chi-square tests of homogeneity for both combined Luo Nyanza counties and the combined cosmopolitan counties. The chi-square test of homogeneity assesses whether two or more samples of discrete characteristics arise from identically distributed (homogeneous) populations. The following hypothesis was tested: “*The Luo are gradually adopting alien cultures in uniform/homogeneous fashion, owing to politically constructed/mobilized stereotypes and prejudices, to gain acceptance as fully-fledged members of the Kenyan society at large*”. Also, in order to ascertain if the feeling within the community that influential Luos do not assist fellow Luos access economic opportunities is a consistent phenomenon across the counties in which the study was conducted, I performed chi-square tests of homogeneity for both combined Luo Nyanza counties and the combined cosmopolitan counties and tested the following hypothesis: “*The prevalent feeling within the community that influential Luos do not assist fellow Luos access economic opportunities occurs consistently*”.

throughout the study areas.” And to further probe the relationship between political exclusion and the economic development of Luo Nyanza, I carried out the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance on the ordinal data obtained in both the Luo Nyanza counties and the cosmopolitan counties. Coined by Kruskal and Wallis in 1952, it is a non-parametric method for testing whether independent samples originate from the same distribution. It extends the Mann-Whitney U Test to more than two groups and is most often used to compare the central tendencies (median) of samples. The analysis of the qualitative data is discussed next.

3.7.2 Qualitative Data Analysis

In this study, the qualitative phase of data analysis, whose main driving force was the explanation and interpretation of patterns emerging from the quantitative survey, has been guided by the iterative process. According to Bassett (2010),

[i]terative refers to a systematic, repetitive, and recursive process in qualitative data analysis. An iterative approach involves a sequence of tasks carried out in exactly the same manner each time and executed multiple times. Meaning is provided to this repeatable formulation in qualitative research by calling upon a prior, recognized authorized usage. The interplay between elements of the research, such as that between design and discovery, or among data collection, preliminary analysis, and further data collection, are examples of an iterative approach in qualitative research...The philosophy behind an iterative approach to research is that of flexibility and ongoing change that meets the needs of the research design, data requirements, and analysis methods in response to new information as it is collected. (p 504)

The FGD transcripts and historical data – budget speeches, economic surveys, and statistical abstracts – have been comprehensively subjected to iteration. Sub-sections 3.7.2.1 and 3.7.2.2, below, narrate the specificities of the processes that were subjected to iteration.

3.7.2.1 FGD Analysis

Besides the use of ATLAS.ti for data coding as already indicated, the following process was followed when analysing the data from the FGDs. I began by classifying the qualitative data

produced from the FGDs into various themes (Riessman, 2008). This was followed by systematic juxtaposition amongst the various emergent themes, in order to integrate similitudes. Once this was finalized, the patterns discovered were reinforced in narrative form using the experiential tales of the participants. This inductive-deductive cycle was repeated over and over again until the objectives of the study were met. As this process took place, I made sure to safeguard validity by listening to the tape recordings, severally, and contrasting them with the visual transcripts for consistency purposes. Since the qualitative phase of this research was aimed at exploring the community's perceptions of the effects of "ethnicized" politics, narrative analysis and writing was found to be appropriate, for it accurately represents the voices of the Luo. Narratives shift the focus from statistics, taxonomies, tables and models to "reflect[ing] what the natives really say" (Geertz, 1973, p. 6), thus ensuring thick description and originality – the latter is crucial in capturing the attention of policymakers.

3.7.2.2 Historical Data Analysis

With iteration as the guiding principle, I have applied two major techniques in analysing the historical documents under scrutiny in this study – pattern matching and explanation building. Pattern matching juxtaposes "an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or with several alternative predictions)" (Trochim, 1989, as cited in Yin, 2009, p. 136). I have, therefore, thoroughly scrutinized the budgets, statistical abstracts and economic surveys of post-independence Kenya to analyse how allocations have been made during the period under study (1963 – 2013). This has aided me in determining whether the GoK has disproportionately favoured those "ethnic groups" that support it and/or marginalized those that oppose it (like the Luo). Explanation building involves the construction of a narrative/rationale from available data. The outcomes of public investment undertaken by the GoK during the period under study are also discernible from the economic surveys and statistical abstracts. Coupled with the aforementioned "ethnic" dynamics that characterize Kenyan politics, they made for a pretty decent source of data, through which narratives as to "how" and "why" economic marginalization of the Luo might have occurred from 1963 – 2013 could be constructed. Iterative examination of these documents has enabled me to factor in evidence that might seem to corroborate alternative theoretical standpoints, such as those espoused by Oloo (2004) and Kuria (2011). Ultimately, the analysis of historical data in this study depended on "complex reasoning

through inductive and deductive logic” (Creswell, 2013, p. 45). The following statement from Creswell (2013) epitomizes the process that I employed in analysing historical data in this research:

[R]esearchers build their patterns, categories, and themes from the “bottom up,” by organizing the data inductively into increasingly more abstract units of information. This inductive process involves researchers working back and forth between the themes and the database until they establish a comprehensive set of themes...researchers also use deductive thinking in that they build themes that are constantly being checked against the data. The inductive-deductive logic process means that the...researcher uses complex reasoning skills throughout the process of the research. (p. 45)

The rationale behind the questions posed by the two research instruments used in this study is briefly discussed next.

3.8 Research Instruments

The structured questionnaire consisted of five sections as depicted below:

- Section A General Information (Personal/Biographical Data)
- Section B Cultural Factors
- Section C Economic Difficulties
- Section D Strengthening of Ethnic Roots
- Section E Minimal Public Investment.

The rationale behind the questions posed in each of the aforementioned sections was as explained in table 3.10 below.

Table 3.10: Rationale behind the Questions Posed by the Research Instruments

SECTION	QUESTIONS	RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS	JUSTIFICATION/LITERATURE REVIEW
A General Information	1-5	Personal/Biographical Data	Personal/Biographical Data
B Cultural Factors	6-9	The Luo are gradually adopting alien cultures, because of politically constructed/mobilized stereotypes and prejudices, and are therefore slowly losing their identity as fully-fledged members of the Kenyan society at large.	Drawing on the apparent significance of circumcision as an essential cultural symbol for admission into the circles of leadership in Kenya, as revealed in the works of Atieno-Odhiambo (2002), I posed these four questions to gauge how politically-instigated “othering” is playing out at the grassroots level. Could the Luo, in fact, be adopting a practice alien to them to be accepted in Kenyan society? I sought to find out.
C Economic Difficulties	10-13	Political exclusion, at the national level, has translated into economic difficulties, at the individual level, for the Luo, limiting their chances of ever getting to power in Kenya.	The inspiration behind these questions partly stems from the arguments of Ongaro and Osogo (2008) who state that ethnic-driven politics affects how capital is transferred, and the manner in which jobs, opportunities, scholarships, bursaries and loans, are awarded, distributed, and allocated. Money is power: could political exclusion at the national level be closing economic doors for the Luo, thus denying them the economic capacity to organize themselves more effectively as a political entity? I also set to find answers to this question.
D Strengthening of ethnic roots	14-16	Political exclusion, during the period under study, has had the unwitting effect of fostering ethnic cohesion amongst the Luo.	Section D’s questions derive from Carr’s (1995) insights that economic dissatisfaction has a direct correlation with ethnic cohesion. It is a well-known fact, that the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki regimes have hoarded leadership opportunities from the Luo (cf. Amutabi, 2009; Auma-Osolo, 2013; Throup, 1987) translating, logically, into economic difficulties at all levels of society. Could this have awakened “ethnic” consciousness, amongst the Luo, given that in Africa, “most people assess political and economic opportunities within the ethnic framework of competition and struggle?” (Carr, 1995, para. 5).
E Minimal public	17	The Luo have enjoyed minimal	Governments that practice political exclusion, to

investment		public investment from the Government of Kenya because of opposition politics making them relatively poor compared to other communities.	perpetuate their stranglehold on power, may indeed allow only minimal public investment in the home areas of dissident communities (cf. Opalo, 2011). This not only discourages opponents, but keeps them poor. Economically disenfranchised communities find it very difficult to organize themselves politically and are easy to divide-and-rule. It is this section that called for the examination of historical documents such as the budget speeches, economic surveys and statistical abstracts, to analyse how the feelings of the Luo at the grassroots level of society relate with the information accorded by the GoK. This has, hopefully, enabled me to reach a balanced, unbiased and more meaningful conclusion.
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Source: Author (2017)

The FGD guide was modelled along the lines of the structured questionnaire and follows the same logic discussed in table 3.10, above. The questions posed by the FGD guide were essentially the same, but this stage of the research sought to explore participants' responses as opposed to ushering them into a contrived situation. As alluded before, in this chapter, the insights gained from the FGDs have been crucial in explaining the responses obtained from the structured questionnaire. The study's scope and limitations are discussed next.

3.9 Research Scope and Limitations

This study set out to examine the influence of “ethnicized” politics on the socio-economic-cultural development of politically marginalized communities in Africa, with a special reference to the Luo “ethnic group” of Kenya. Typical of explanatory sequential MMR designs, the main limitation of this study was that it was not designed to subject the quantitative data to stringent statistical analysis. Notwithstanding this, and the fact that the envisaged quantitative survey and FGDs were not carried out in all of the 47 counties of Kenya, the research findings should proffer crucial erudition with respect to the effects of governance formations on the lives of ordinary citizens at the grassroots level of society in the African country. Furthermore, the

research strategy espoused in this study may be employed in other contexts for the purpose of examining socio-economic-cultural development in Africa. This is especially so because the holistic approach this research design adopts takes into consideration various knowledge forms – experiential, epistemological and historical. Also, owing to the fact that I found it difficult to access corporate institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, the administration of the structured interview/questionnaire to certain ideal citizens was challenging. However, every effort was made to reach and involve such potential participants by visiting their residential areas. Finally, the figures provided for Nyanza Province, in the Statistical Abstracts and Economic Surveys, have been taken to wholly represent Luo interests when, in fact, the province is also home to the Kisii and Kuria “ethnic groups”. The findings, however, can still be largely relied upon for the Luo are overwhelmingly predominant in this province and Luo Nyanza forms a considerable part of it.

3.10 Ethics Statement

This study adhered to the University of the Western Cape’s (UWC’s) Ethical Policy for research, which is aimed at avoiding and/or eliminating potential misconduct and impropriety. Accordingly, in the interest of the integrity of this research, ethical protocols were followed throughout its three stages, viz. pre-fieldwork, fieldwork (data collection) and data analysis. In the pre-fieldwork stage, the research proposal for this study was submitted to the UWC’s Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences (EMS) and the approval of Senate High Degrees Committee obtained in January 2016 (see Appendix G). Request for permission from an Institutional Review Board approved by the Kenya National Council for Science and Technology (NCST) was also sought and granted (see also Appendix G). During the fieldwork stage, due protocol was followed to engage individuals of selected communities and institutions. The informed consent of participants was sought and their participation was voluntary (see Appendix F). They were also informed of their right to withdraw, at any time of their choice, and assured of the confidentiality of their identity and the information they provided. They were further informed that there were no costs to the participants for partaking in or withdrawal from the study. Upon the completion of the fieldwork, all identifiers on the questionnaires were removed. The interview information was carefully protected, while the study continued, and has been destroyed now that the study has been completed. I took full responsibility to ensure that all

information collected was treated with utmost sensitivity and confidentiality. Also, during the analysis stage, care was taken not to mention the participants' names. For instance, no names have been used when making reference to the FGD participants. The conclusion of this chapter is next.

3.11 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the research methodology that was employed to accomplish this study's objectives, which were as follows: i) to explain the marginalization of the Luo in Kenya, and ii) to explain why "ethnicity" is strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in this particular African nation. Aimed at elaborating on the research methodology section – in chapter one – and showing that proper mechanisms have been applied in conducting this study, the chapter has explained how the study area has been delimited. Besides this, it has discussed eight other major topics, viz.: the research methodology, the quantitative research design, the qualitative research design, the MMR data collection techniques, data validity and reliability, data analysis, the research instruments, the scope of the research and its limitations. The chapter concludes with an ethics statement that assures that this study adhered to the University of the Western Cape's (UWC's) Ethical Policy for research. The next chapter – chapter four – discusses the results of the quantitative phase of this research.

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Chapter 4

A Quantitative Analysis of the Influence of Kenya's "Ethnicized" Politics Vis-à-vis its Luo Community, 1963 – 2013

4 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the first phase of this research, which was conducted using a structured questionnaire based on the conceptual framework outlined in section 1.8 of chapter one. The purpose of this chapter is to establish how my experiential knowledge, and the views obtained from current literature on the influence of "ethnicized" politics in Kenya/Africa, relate with the lived experiences of the Luo at the grassroots level in Kenya. I have employed discursive analysis and made use of graphical illustrations as appropriate. The presentation begins with the descriptive summary statistics and proceeds with a systematic analysis of the results obtained from the questions that were posed to the respondents (see Appendix D for the detailed tabular results). The data has been presented and analysed in two phases, as follows: the overall data, followed by a juxtaposition of the Luo Nyanza and cosmopolitan county results. The chapter concludes with a summary of the research findings vis-à-vis the study's dependent variables.

4.1 Descriptive Summary Characteristics of Respondents

The study population was comprised of 48.9% males and 51.1% females. 32.5% of the respondents fell under the 15 – 20 age group, while the 20 – 30 and 30 – 50 age groups formed 29.1% and 26.6%, of the study population, respectively. The remaining 11.9% were aged 50 and above. With regard to the marital status of the respondents, 54.3% were single, 39.1% married, 2.3% separated and 1.2% divorced; 3.1% were either widowers or widows. Concerning the level of education of the respondents, 14.8% had attained the primary level, whilst 50.6%, 21.6%, 11.6% and 1.4%, had attained the secondary, college, undergraduate and postgraduate levels, respectively. With respect to the occupation of the respondents, 19% were employed, 31.6% self-employed, 10.3% unemployed and 39.1% students. Table 4.1, below, depicts these characteristics of the respondents.

Table 4.1: Descriptive Summary Statistics of Respondents

Characteristics of Respondents (N = 1,600)			Frequency (%)
	LN	C	
Gender of Respondent			
Male	375	407	782 (48.9)
Female	425	393	818 (51.1)
Age of Respondent (Years)			
15 – 20	301	219	520 (32.5)
20 – 30	202	263	465 (29.1)
30 – 50	183	242	425 (26.6)
50 and above	114	76	190 (11.9)
Marital Status of Respondent			
Single	472	397	869 (54.3)
Married	282	344	626 (39.1)
Separated	19	17	36 (2.3)
Divorced	12	7	19 (1.2)
Widow(er)	15	35	50 (3.1)
Education Level of Respondent			
Primary	73	164	237 (14.8)
Secondary	430	380	810 (50.6)
College	172	173	345 (21.6)
Undergraduate	108	77	185 (11.6)
Postgraduate	17	6	23 (1.4)
Occupation of Respondent			
Employed	193	111	304 (19.0)
Self-employed	154	352	506 (31.6)
Unemployed	113	52	165 (10.3)
Student	340	285	625 (39.1)

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017): LN = Luo Nyanza; C = Cosmopolitan Counties.

The results of the amalgamated data, from both Luo Nyanza and the cosmopolitan counties, are hereby presented using graphical illustrations and analysed discursively; the detailed percentages and tabular forms of these findings have been annexed (see Appendix D).

4.2 Rite of Passage Debated

As already highlighted and discussed in chapters one and two, the rite of passage issue has seemingly been politicized following Kenya's independence from the British, and especially since Mboya's 1969 assassination, and now seems to operate as an exclusionary factor vis-à-vis the Luo who do not necessarily subscribe to it. With regard to the awareness, or lack thereof, of this phenomenon, the response frequency was as presented in figure 4.1 below.




Figure 4.1: Awareness of circumcision being fronted as a prerequisite leadership trait.

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

While 30.9% of the respondents strongly agree that they have heard about the link between this particular rite of passage and leadership in Kenya, 20.1% agree and 7% responded neutrally. On the other hand, 21.5% of the respondents disagreed and 20.4% strongly disagreed. According to these results, more than half of the respondents sampled showed awareness of the rite of passage

issue in the Kenyan political arena, indicating that it continues to be manipulated by politicians in their quest to either acquire or monopolize power; indeed, it would seem from the participants' responses that this cultural element, a symbol of masculinity in some of the country's communities, is being employed as an excuse to bar communities perceived to be opposition supporters from participation in governance structures in the country, especially at the national level. The fact that most respondents attribute their awareness of this rite of passage phenomenon to politicians (see Table D2) further corroborates the argument of this thesis that the largely Western ideals of multiparty democracy and capitalism have contributed significantly in fostering animosity in the African continent.

When asked whether they had either faced ridicule or heard of a fellow Luo being ridiculed over the rite of passage issue, the participants responded as shown in figure 4.2 below. 29.0% of the respondents strongly agree, while 29.0% agree, 10.6% are neutral, 21.4% disagree, and 10.0% strongly disagree, respectively. Whilst a sizable percentage of the respondents have not encountered any belittling linked to this rite of passage, which is largely alien to the Luo, an even more significant proportion has been ridiculed or heard a fellow Luo being ridiculed because of it. It can be rightfully argued, therefore, that this rite of passage issue, so often linked to politics and governance in Kenyan society, is also playing a substantial role in undermining social and inter-ethnic relations in the country.




Figure 4.2: Circumcision and ridicule.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

The responses with respect to the adoption of this rite of passage by the Luo are depicted in figure 4.3 below: 25.3% of the respondents strongly agree that they have either undergone circumcision or know of a fellow Luo who has embraced this alien rite of passage; 27.3 agree with this proposition. The rest of the participants responded as follows: 14.4% were neutral, 21.6% disagreed, while 11.5% strongly disagreed. These results imply that the numbers of the Luo that are either undecided or hostile towards this rite of passage seem to be drastically dwindling. Due to either ridicule or the desire to obtain a greater level of approval from their counterparts from other “ethnicities”, the Luo are adopting this rite of passage in large numbers.

If this trend continues, it is highly likely that the entire community will embrace this rite of passage, unconventional to them, in the near future.




Figure 4.3: Adopting alien culture of circumcision.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

The findings on the relationship between political exclusion and grassroots level economics are discussed next.

4.3 Political Exclusion and Grassroots Level Economics

This study also sought to find out the manner in which political exclusion (association with opposition politics) has affected the economic development of the members of Kenya’s Luo community. The thoughts of the respondents on the relationship between their “ethnicity” and access to economic opportunities, such as employment, were as depicted in figure 4.4 below.




Figure 4.4: Denial of economic opportunity/employment for being Luo.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

According to the findings, 18.0% of the respondents strongly agree with the proposition that they have been denied access to economic opportunities and/or employment because of their “ethnicity”; 23.3% agree, 19.5% take a neutral stance, 27.5% disagree and 11.7% disagree, respectively. If the neutral respondents are put aside, the figures for those who respond affirmatively and those opposed to the notion of denial of opportunity on the basis of “ethnicity” are almost equivalent. From these results, it is very difficult to unreservedly argue that Luos have been denied economic opportunities in Kenyan society on the basis of their “ethnicity”. Access to economic opportunities for the Luo or denial thereof in Kenya appears to be a matter of a

coin-toss. With regard to whether their Luo identity has limited their access to better jobs and opportunities, the response was as depicted in figure 4.5 below.




Figure 4.5: Belief that being Luo has denied them better jobs and opportunities.

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Whilst 13.9% of the respondents strongly believe that their Luo identity has hampered their access to better jobs and opportunities, 16.0% agree with the idea. On the other hand, 35.6%, 22.2% and 12.3% responded neutrally, disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively. From these responses, it is clear that most of the participants in this study took a neutral stance when confronted with the question as to whether they have faced discrimination, owing to their “ethnicity”, insofar as access to better ranking jobs and opportunities is concerned. The high neutral figure can partly be explained by the fact that a great number of the respondents were students who are yet to venture into the employment market. Nevertheless, a greater number of respondents either disagree or strongly disagree with the idea of denial of access to better jobs

and opportunities on the basis of “ethnicity”, as opposed to those who either agree or strongly agree. Overall, these findings indicate that the issue of discrimination when it comes to better jobs and opportunities is not a grave concern for the Luo in Kenya. The participants’ responses on their experiences with regard to access to promotion opportunities at the workplace are given in figure 4.6 below.




Figure 4.6: Promotion opportunities are limited for Luos at my workplace.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

While 6.6% of the respondents strongly agree that promotion opportunities for Luos are limited at their workplaces. 10.3% of the respondents agreed with this notion, as 59.7% took a neutral stance; 14.9% disagreed and 8.5% strongly disagreed. The figure for neutral respondents is comparatively astronomical; this can be explained by the fact that only 19% of the respondents were employed. The neutrals, therefore, are mainly the unemployed, the self-employed and the students – these might not have had the workplace experience. A look at the affirmative and

negative respondents does not show meaningful difference between the two camps. This means that it is neither easy nor difficult for the Luo to get promoted at the workplace on the basis of “ethnicity”; the situation looks more like a matter of fate. The findings of this research, with regard to whether participants’ living standards would be better had they not been Luo, are as depicted in figure 4.7, below. The participants responded as follows: 13.3% strongly agreed, 15.5% agreed, 20.3% were neutral, 32.9% disagreed, whilst 18.1% strongly disagreed.




Figure 4.7: My living standards would be better if I were not Luo.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

A majority of the Luos who participated in this study do not believe that their living standards would be better if they were from another “ethnicity”; though they have been politically excluded, historically, it seems that they have refused to let the idea get into their psyche that politics determines the kind of food one puts on their plate at dinner time. The interplay between political exclusion and “ethnic” cohesion is discussed next.

4.4 Political Exclusion and Ethnic Cohesion

Figure 4.8, below, depicts the thoughts of the respondents when asked whether they would carry out affirmative action towards fellow Luos, to help them catch up with members of other “ethnic groups”, if they were to be given positions of influence in society.




Figure 4.8: I would carry out affirmative action to help Luos catch up.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

As shown above, in figure 4.8, 35.8% of the respondents strongly agree with the idea of affirmative action, while 20.6% agree; 12.9% take a neutral stance as 16.5% and 14.2% disagree and strongly disagree, respectively. It is ironical that, even though most respondents had indicated that they did not believe that their living standards would be better if they were from

another “ethnicity”, a majority of them, nevertheless, would state that they would favour fellow Luos if they were to be given positions of influence in society. Their earlier stance on their living standards may be informed by the fact that Luos are a proud people (cf. e.g., Malo, 1999[2003], p. 73) that seldom acknowledge vulnerabilities or weaknesses of any kind. Ultimately, the fact that a majority of respondents strongly agree with the idea of affirmative action towards fellow Luos indicates a feeling that their history of political marginalization has put them at an economic disadvantage as a people. When faced with the question whether influential Luos assist fellow Luos to access economic opportunities, the responses of the participants were as captured in figure 4.9, below.




Figure 4.9: Influential Luos assist fellow Luos to access economic opportunities.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

We find that 13.1% strongly agreed, 18.4% agreed, 15.7% were neutral, 31.4% disagreed, while 21.3% strongly disagreed with the proposition, respectively. Despite having been politically

excluded for much of the period in which Kenya has been independent, it seems that most Luos have not developed feelings of oneness and/or sympathy towards their kin. When asked whether it is better for a Luo to marry a fellow Luo than a non-Luo, the participants responded as shown in figure 4.10 below.




Figure 4.10: Marriage between Luos is better than intermarriage.

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Whilst 22.4% of the respondents strongly agree and 15.9% agree that it is better for a Luo to forge marriage ties within the “ethnic group”, 12.2% took a neutral stance; on the other hand, 26.7% and 22.8% disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively. Overall, a majority of the respondents do not feel that it is better for a Luo to marry a fellow Luo. Seemingly, political exclusion during the period under study has not translated into strong feelings of exclusivity in the area of marriage for members of the community. The thoughts of the participants, with regard to political exclusion of the Luo, and public investment by the GoK, in Luo Nyanza, are examined next.

4.5 Political Exclusion and Public Investment

Figure 4.11, below, depicts the responses of the participants when asked whether Luo Nyanza would be more developed, economically, if Luos had not been politically excluded by the central government as a result of opposition politics.




Figure 4.11: Luo Nyanza would be more economically developed were it not for exclusion by central government.


Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Here, 39.6% of the respondents strongly agree with the notion that Luo Nyanza would be more economically developed were it not for exclusion by central government; 20.9% agree with this proposition, while 11.9% take a neutral stance and 17.8% and 9.8% disagree and strongly disagree, respectively. There is a strong feeling amongst the Luo that they have been short-changed by the GoK in the provision of public investments during the period under study. The sentiments at the grassroots level overwhelmingly support the notion that Luo Nyanza would be

more developed, economically, were it not for political exclusion of the community by the GoK. The next section compares the sentiments of the cosmopolitan Luo and the Luo based in Luo Nyanza to examine how, if at all, the varying degree of interaction with members of other “ethnic groups” has differentiated and influenced the experiences, attitudes, sentiments and behaviours of the members of the community. I have maintained the sequence employed in analysing the overall results discussed above.

4.6 Juxtaposed Rite of Passage Perspectives

According to the results presented in table figure 4.12, below, Luos who reside in cosmopolitan areas of Kenya are more aware of the link between the rite of passage issue and leadership in Kenya, compared to their counterparts from the Luo-dominated Luo Nyanza. Fully 56.4% (32.5% strongly agree, 23.9% agree) of the 800 cosmopolitan respondents that participated in this study responded in the affirmative to this query; on the other hand, 45.8% (29.4% strongly agree, 16.4% agree) of the other 800 respondents based in Luo Nyanza indicated awareness of circumcision being used as a prerequisite leadership trait in Kenya.






Figure 4.12: Awareness of circumcision being fronted as a prerequisite leadership trait.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

The Kenyan rite of passage myth appears to be thriving more in areas considered to be “ethnically” heterogeneous; from these findings, we can infer that the classification of human beings into often spurious and highly controversial social categories like “race” and “ethnicity” plays a significant role in breeding contempt and animosity and should, therefore, be discouraged. Also, since these cosmopolitan areas witness stiffer competition for scarce resources, the findings are an indication that uncertainty breeds antagonism amongst humans especially in situations in which survival is dependent on “fitness”, as is the case with capitalism. The opinion of the participants on whether politicians had anything to do with their awareness of the apparent importance of this rite of passage for Kenyans seeking leadership positions is depicted in figure 4.13 below.




Figure 4.13: Politicians made me aware of the link between circumcision and leadership.

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

If the figures for neutrals, which represent the respondents who indicated that they are yet to hear of the apparent significance of this rite of passage as a prerequisite leadership trait, are ignored, it is evident from figure 4.13, above, that Luos from cosmopolitan counties (50.2%) show more awareness, as opposed to their Luo Nyanza counterparts (33.0%), of the role played by politicians in fronting the myth. Again, it would seem that stereotypes and falsehoods abound more in places considered to be “ethnically” heterogeneous. This contention is further evidenced by figure 4.14, below, which depicts the participants’ responses on whether they had ever been ridiculed or heard a fellow Luo being belittled over the rite of passage issue. Luos who live in cosmopolitan areas (63.3%) associate more with ridicule arising out of the rite of passage issue compared to their counterparts who reside in their native Luo Nyanza (52.8%).




Figure 4.14: I have experienced or know of a kinsman who has faced ridicule because of the rite of passage issue.

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

The responses depicted in figure 4.15, below, show that Luos in both sets of counties – Luo Nyanza and cosmopolitan – are increasingly adopting this rite of passage, contrary to their traditions. This behaviour is slightly more profound in Luo Nyanza (56.3%), as opposed to the cosmopolitan areas surveyed (48.8%), despite the fact that the ridicule is much more in the cosmopolitan areas. This finding is somewhat paradoxical, given that one would expect cosmopolitan Luos, who reside alongside members of other “ethnic groups”, to be under more pressure to “conform”. It would seem that, besides reasons connected to politically-instigated “othering” and stereotyping, members of the Luo community of Kenya are adopting the practice as a result of other reasons such as cleanliness and health. A juxtaposition of Luo perspectives on political exclusion and grassroots level economics follows next.




Figure 4.15: Adopting the alien culture of circumcision.

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

4.7 Juxtaposed Perspectives on Political Exclusion and Grassroots Level Economics

The participants' responses on whether they have ever been denied economic opportunities, such as employment, on account of their "ethnicity", are as shown in figure 4.16, below. While 46.7% of cosmopolitan respondents affirm that they have been victims of "ethnic" discrimination in the employment and wider economic arena, only 36.0% do so in the Luo Nyanza areas.




Figure 4.16: I have been denied economic opportunities or employment for being Luo.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

The results show that Luos living in Luo Nyanza are less likely to experience ethnic-based discrimination when it comes to seeking employment opportunities. Cosmopolitan Luos relate more with the experience of being denied access to opportunities because of their “ethnic” identity. These results indicate that “ethnic”-based discrimination is thriving in 21st century Kenya; this reality, a confirmation of Miruka and Omenya’s (2009) observation that besides going to school, Africans have not understood “the virtues of collaboration beyond the basic needs of ethnic communities” (*Civic Engagement* section, para. 5), should worry those who believe that for Africa to achieve its full potential, nationalism should supplant ethno-nationalism. In what could also be interpreted as the prevalence of “ethnic”-based discrimination in 21st century Kenya this study found, as shown in figure 4.17 below, that Luos residing in Nyanza (46.3% either disagree or strongly disagree) are less likely to cry foul, compared to their

cosmopolitan counterparts (22.8% either disagree or strongly disagree), when it comes to access to higher ranking jobs and better opportunities. However, most of the cosmopolitan Luos who participated in this study responded neutrally (48.5%) to this question. This is most likely the case because most respondents in the cosmopolitan counties happened to be self-employed.




Figure 4.17: Being Luo has denied me better jobs and opportunities.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

When asked whether promotion opportunities for Luos were limited at their workplaces, the participants’ responses were as exhibited in figure 4.18 below.




Figure 4.18: Promotion opportunities for Luos are limited at my workplace.

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

The majority of the respondents in the cosmopolitan counties were either students or the self-employed; this explains the inordinately high figure for the neutral cosmopolitan respondents (86.3%) in figure 4.18 above. The fact that most of the cosmopolitan respondents were either students or self-employed Luos could also mean that members of the community find it challenging to obtain white-collar jobs in areas where they are considered “outsiders”. Indeed, in Uasin Gishu County, I found that most Luo men were mechanics; moreover, it was difficult to locate Luo women in Uasin Gishu. In Nakuru County, there seemed to be fewer Luo men than women. This phenomenon, I was made to understand, arose out of the fact that many Luo men fled the county in the aftermath of the 2007 – 08 post-election violence. Most are yet to return to the area for they do not feel safe there. Nevertheless, this study finds that more Luos from Nyanza respond negatively (40.4%) to the assertion that promotion opportunities are limited for

them at their workplaces than those who respond affirmatively (26.5%). This means that whenever an area is dominated by a particular “ethnic group”, chances of discrimination against it dwindle substantially when it comes to promotion at the workplace.

Figure 4.19, below, depicts the responses of the participants when asked whether their living standards would be better if they were from a different “ethnic group”. The results were very similar: in the Luo Nyanza areas, 51.8% responded negatively, while 28.7% responded affirmatively; on the other hand, in the cosmopolitan areas, 50.3% responded negatively, while 28.9% responded affirmatively. The figure for neutral respondents in Luo Nyanza was 19.6%, whilst that one for cosmopolitan respondents stood at 20.9%. The trends in both the traditional homeland of the Luo and the cosmopolitan counties are such that both sets of respondents appear to be convinced that their living standards would not be better, even if they belonged to another “ethnicity”, despite the decades of political exclusion that the Luo have faced in Kenya in the post-independence era.





Figure 4.19: My living standards would be better if I were not Luo.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

A comparison of Luo Nyanza and cosmopolitan perspectives on political exclusion and “ethnic” cohesion follows next.

4.8 Juxtaposed Perspectives on Political Exclusion and “Ethnic” Cohesion

The participants’ responses, when asked whether they would carry out affirmative action to help fellow Luos catch up with other communities that have held power in Kenya, were they to be given positions of power, were as depicted in figure 4.20, below. In both sets of counties, more respondents agree with the idea of affirmative action (63.8% Nyanza, 49.1% cosmopolitan) than those who dissent (22.7% Nyanza, 38.8% cosmopolitan). Despite being adamant that their living standards would not be any better had they not been Luo, respondents from both Luo Nyanza and the cosmopolitan counties exhibit the desire to implement affirmative action to help their kin to compete favourably with the communities that have held power in Kenya, or those that have maintained friendly ties with the GoK during the period under study. This indicates an agreement, albeit inadvertently, with the idea that their living standards are not where they might or ought to be. But again, as explained earlier in the analysis of the amalgamated data, Luos are a proud people who seldom admit to having any vulnerability.






Figure 4.20: I would carry out affirmative action to help Luos catch up.

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

With regard to the question whether influential Luos help fellow Luos to access economic opportunities, participants' responses were as presented in figure 4.21, below.




Figure 4.21: Influential Luos help fellow Luos access economic opportunities.

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Affirmative responses were as follows: Nyanza (35.2%) and cosmopolitan (27.9%); on the other hand, the negative responses were as follows – Nyanza (47.7%) and cosmopolitan (57.9%). There is a consensus amongst both Luo Nyanza and cosmopolitan Luos that influential Luos do not assist their kin to access economic opportunities. This phenomenon seems to be more profound in the cosmopolitan areas than it is in Luo Nyanza. It is difficult to understand why members of a politically excluded community do not see the sense in uniting and cooperating, as a mechanism to lessen the negative effects of exclusion from participation in a country's governance structures. Perhaps the explanation for this unanticipated finding lies in wa Thiong'o's (1986) notion of a colonized mind; according to him, society's dominant groups often mete out subtle psychological forms of violence to aid in the maintenance of oppressive status quos. Psychological violence involves the belittling of the conquered people's culture,

aimed at destroying it, and influencing or distorting the manner in which the latter view themselves vis-à-vis the rest of society – cultivation of self-hate. A self-loathing people, it is thought, are easy to manipulate and control. Could this be the result of Kenyatta’s “othering” technique? A comparison of the responses on whether it is better for a Luo to marry a fellow Luo than a non-Luo is captured in figure 4.22 below.




Figure 4.22: Marriage between fellow Luos is better than intermarriage.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

Overall, cosmopolitan Luos reject the idea that it is better for a Luo to espouse a fellow Luo as opposed to tying the knot with someone from a different “ethnic group” (57.8% negative, 31.8% affirmative and 10.5% neutral). On the other hand, Luos in Nyanza agree with the assertion: 41.4% negative, 45% affirmative and 13.9% neutral. Indeed, the findings show that whilst the Luo from Nyanza is more likely to settle for a fellow Luo in marriage, the cosmopolitan Luo

disagrees with the idea that marriage between fellow Luos is better than intermarriage. It seems that the more people interact with members of other “ethnic groups”, the more they get used to the latter and overcome any prejudices and stereotypes that they may harbour about them. Certainly, more interaction between and amongst members of different “ethnic groups” is both crucial and essential for nation-building; perhaps the GoK should seek to formulate policies and institute programmes that encourage inter-ethnic interaction to assist in diffusing “ethnic” tensions amongst Kenyans. A comparison of Luo opinions on the interplay between political exclusion and public investment is examined next.

4.9 Juxtaposed Perspectives on Political Exclusion and Public Investment

When the question was posed to them whether Luo Nyanza would be more economically developed were it not for political exclusion by the central government, during the period under study, the participants responded as depicted in figure 4.23, below. The responses in Luo Nyanza were as follows: 61.9% affirmative, 28.2% negative and 10.0% neutral. On the other hand, the cosmopolitan responses were as follows: 59.1% affirmative, 27.0% negative and 13.9% neutral. There is an overwhelming feeling in both Luo Nyanza and the cosmopolitan areas in which this study was conducted that Luo Nyanza would be more economically developed were it not for political exclusion by the GoK. Chapters five and six probe this finding further in a quest to demystify this prevalent Luo sentiment and to establish whether there is credible justification for it.




Figure 4.23: Luo Nyanza would be more economically developed were it not for political exclusion by central government.

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)


The next section presents a summary of the research findings vis-à-vis the study's dependent variables – cultural factors, economic difficulties, “ethnic” cohesion and minimal public investment.

4.10 Summary of Research Findings Vis-à-vis the Dependent Variables

4.10.1 Cultural Factors

There is a very strong link, the results of this quantitative phase of this study suggest, between political exclusion and the adoption of alien cultures among the Luo. The study shows that, largely due to politically-instigated “othering”, the Luo community of Kenya is increasingly adopting the practice of male circumcision, which it has not been historically associated with. In

fact, the study shows, the adoption of this practice is so profound that there is a high likelihood that the entire community will embrace it in the near future. Concerning this rite of passage, this study shows, the venom spewed at the national level by politicians, in a bid to divide the Kenyan citizens and make them easy to rule, is seemingly making its way quickly to the grassroots level, and in widespread fashion. To establish whether the Luo are adopting this alien rite of passage uniformly/homogeneously across the counties in which the study was carried out, I conducted chi-square tests of homogeneity for both combined Luo Nyanza counties and the combined cosmopolitan counties. The chi-square test of homogeneity assesses whether two or more samples of discrete characteristics arise from identically distributed (homogenous) populations. I began by conducting a cross-tabulation – of adoption of alien culture of circumcision and county of respondent – to assess the consistency of this phenomenon of adoption of circumcision by the Luo. The following hypothesis was tested: *“The Luo are gradually adopting alien cultures in uniform/homogeneous fashion, owing to politically constructed/mobilized stereotypes and prejudices, to gain acceptance as fully-fledged members of the Kenyan society at large”*. The results of the cross-tabulation are as presented in table 4.2 below.



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Table 4.2: Adopting alien culture of circumcision * County of respondent Cross tabulation (Count)

Adopting alien culture of circumcision	County of respondent								Total
	Migori	Homa Bay	Siaya	Kisumu	Nairobi	Mombasa	Nakuru	Uasin Gishu	
Strongly agree	55	59	58	64					236
Agree	41	61	57	55					214
Neutral	29	21	35	26					111
Disagree	36	39	25	28					128
Strongly disagree	39	20	25	27					111
Total (Luo Nyanza Counties)	200	200	200	200					800
Strongly agree					41	55	41	31	168
Agree					58	53	66	45	222
Neutral					19	39	26	36	120
Disagree					66	47	50	54	217
Strongly disagree					16	6	17	34	73
Total (Cosmopolitan Counties)					200	200	200	200	800

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

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The results of the chi-square tests of homogeneity, regarding the uniform adoption of the alien culture of circumcision by the Luo, are as presented in table 4.3 below.

Table 4.3: Chi-Square Tests of Homogeneity Results – Adoption of Alien Culture of Circumcision

Residence		Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Luo Nyanza Counties	Pearson Chi-Square	19.738 ^a	12	.072
	Likelihood Ratio	19.705	12	.073
	Linear-by-Linear Association	4.538	1	.033
	N of Valid Cases	800		
Cosmopolitan Counties	Pearson Chi-Square	45.643 ^b	12	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	45.973	12	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	6.561	1	.010
	N of Valid Cases	800		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 27.75.

b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.25.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

The result for the Luo Nyanza counties, showed a chi-square value of $\chi^2 = 19.738$ ($p = 0.072$) at a 5% level of significance, and 12 degrees of freedom, respectively; it is statistically significant, indicating that the adoption of the alien culture of circumcision in Luo Nyanza is occurring in uniform fashion. In other words, the null hypothesis that assumed homogeneous Luo adoption of circumcision, in the case of Luo Nyanza, is accepted. On the other hand, the result for the cosmopolitan counties, showed a chi-square value of $\chi^2 = 45.643$ ($p = 0.000$) at a 5% level of significance and 12 degrees of freedom respectively. The result is statistically insignificant; this means that whilst many cosmopolitan Luos might be adopting male circumcision, the phenomenon is occurring inconsistently. The null hypothesis, in the case of the cosmopolitan counties, is therefore rejected. This outcome is somewhat strange, given that one would expect cosmopolitan Luos, who reside alongside members of other “ethnic groups”, to be under more pressure to “conform” by adopting the practice. It would seem that, as the FGDs to be discussed in chapter five revealed, the Luo in Nyanza has been more consistent in adopting the practice owing to other reasons such as health. Indeed, most government and non-governmental organization (NGO) initiatives that link the practice to health, such as Kenya’s Ministry of

Health's Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision (VMMC) Programme, mainly target Luo Nyanza.³⁸ The second dependent variable, economic difficulties, is discussed next.

4.10.2 Economic Difficulties

According to the findings of the quantitative phase of this study, political exclusion at the national level has not entirely led to profound economic difficulties at the grassroots level amongst the Luo of Kenya. Evidence from this study shows that the argument for either side of the debate cannot be decisively made. Luos are almost evenly split when appraising the denial of economic opportunity on the basis of "ethnicity". Indeed, the findings of this study further indicate that, when it comes to seeking access to better jobs and opportunities, the issue of ethnic-based discrimination has not been a grave concern for the Kenyan Luo. Rather, hard work and luck have had a lot to do with the progress of the individual members of the community at the grassroots level. These findings are, generally, consistent with Oloo's (2004) argument that impoverishment in any region of the country can neither be attributed directly to the inhabitants nor to superficial "ethnic" rivalry amongst various "ethnic groups"; they specifically echo Mandel's (1968) views that wherever uneven development occurs, it is the result of variation in finesse amongst distinct producers in a given community, prolificacy differences amongst animals and soils, and fortuitous happenings in life and nature (as cited in Bond, 1999). A look at the third dependent variable, "ethnic" cohesion, follows next.

4.10.3 "Ethnic" Cohesion

The issue of political exclusion and "ethnic" cohesion is a very complicated one in the sense that the manner in which these two variables relate seems to be perpetually changing as history unfolds. The findings of this quantitative phase show that, as things stand, political exclusion during the period under study has not led to any meaningful strengthening of "ethnic" roots amongst the Luo of Kenya. Most respondents indicate that influential Luos do not assist fellow Luos to access economic opportunities. Despite having been politically excluded for much of the period in which Kenya has been independent, it seems that most Luos have not developed feelings of oneness and/or sympathy towards fellow Luos. A majority of the

³⁸ See, for instance, Talbot, J. R., Cole, C., May, M., & Weintraub, R. (2012). *Cases in global health delivery: Voluntary medical male circumcision in Nyanza Province, Kenya*. Harvard: Harvard Business Publishing. Retrieved from <https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/resources/marketing/docs/GHD027p2.pdf> (accessed 11 September 2016).

respondents do not feel that it is better for a Luo to marry a fellow Luo. Seemingly, political exclusion during the period under study has not translated into strong feelings of exclusivity amongst the Luo in the area of marriage. However, it would seem that the Luo might be gradually waking up to the reality of how to survive in an “ethnic”-driven society because a majority of the respondents indicated that they would carry out affirmative action towards their fellow Luos given a position of influence in society. In order to ascertain if the feeling within the community that influential Luos do not assist fellow Luos access economic opportunities is a consistent phenomenon across the counties in which the study was conducted, I also performed chi-square tests of homogeneity for both combined Luo Nyanza counties and the combined cosmopolitan counties. A cross-tabulation exercise, featuring the county of the respondent and the responses to the question as to whether influential Luos assist fellow Luos access economic opportunities, was conducted. With regards to the chi-square tests of homogeneity, the following hypothesis was tested: *“The prevalent feeling within the community that influential Luos do not assist fellow Luos access economic opportunities occurs consistently throughout the study areas.”* The results of the cross-tabulation are as presented in table 4.4 below. And table 4.5, below, depicts the results of the chi-square tests of homogeneity for both Luo Nyanza and the cosmopolitan counties, with regard to the question whether influential Luos assist fellow Luos to access economic opportunities.

Table 4.4: Influential Luos Assist Fellow Luos to Access Economic Opportunities * County of Respondent Cross tabulation (Count)

Influential Luos assist fellow Luos access economic opportunities	County of respondent								Total
	Migori	Homa Bay	Siaya	Kisumu	Nairobi	Mombasa	Nakuru	Uasin Gishu	
Strongly agree	30	33	42	40					145
Agree	31	36	43	27					137
Neutral	37	22	36	42					137
Disagree	55	63	51	57					226
Strongly disagree	47	46	28	34					155
Total (Luo Nyanza Counties)	200	200	200	200					800
Strongly agree					16	17	16	16	65
Agree					43	49	35	31	158
Neutral					37	28	27	22	114
Disagree					61	61	76	79	277
Strongly disagree					43	45	46	52	186
Total (Cosmopolitan Counties)					200	200	200	200	800

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

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Table 4.5: Chi-Square Tests of Homogeneity Results – Influential Luos assist fellow Luos to access economic opportunities

Residence		Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Luo Nyanza Counties	Pearson Chi-Square	21.287 ^a	12	.046
	Likelihood Ratio	21.932	12	.038
	Linear-by-Linear Association	4.806	1	.028
	N of Valid Cases	800		
Cosmopolitan Counties	Pearson Chi-Square	14.052 ^b	12	.297
	Likelihood Ratio	13.942	12	.304
	Linear-by-Linear Association	4.904	1	.027
	N of Valid Cases	800		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 34.25.

b. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.25.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

The result for the Luo Nyanza counties showed a chi-square value of $x^2 = 21.287$ ($p = 0.046$) at a 5% level of significance, and 12 degrees of freedom, respectively – this result not statistically significant. This indicates that the feeling is not consistent, meaning that the phenomenon – of influential Luos not helping less fortunate “tribes mates” – is greatly concentrated in some areas of Luo Nyanza and may be absent in others, regardless of its overall profound nature. The null hypothesis, in the case of Luo Nyanza, is therefore rejected. On the other hand, the results of the cosmopolitan counties – a chi-square value of $x^2 = 14.052$ ($p = 0.297$) at a 5% level of significance and 12 degrees of freedom, respectively – are statistically significant. This means that in the cosmopolitan counties the feeling that Luos do not assist each other is ubiquitously prevalent. Owing to the statistical significance of the cosmopolitan county result, the null hypothesis, in the case of the cosmopolitan counties, is accepted. This outcome indicates that Luos whose mentality has been relatively less polluted – those who have experienced direct “othering”/ridicule/deculturalization to a lesser extent – appreciate their worth more as human beings, and are therefore more likely to be their “brothers’/sisters’ keepers”. The cosmopolitan Luo, on the other hand, in what could be interpreted as the result of profound direct objectification/ridicule, has grown to appreciate himself/herself less, and seems not to care much

about the welfare of his/her kin. The final dependent variable examined in this study, minimal public investment, is discussed next.

4.10.4 Minimal Public Investment

The results of the quantitative phase of this study show that there is a solid relationship between political exclusion and minimal public investment. There is an overwhelming feeling amongst the Luo that they have been short-changed by the GoK in the provision of public investment during the period under study. Many Luos feel that political exclusion by the GoK has greatly affected their economic well-being in a negative manner. To further probe this prevalent feeling on political exclusion and economic development of Luo Nyanza, I carried out the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance to understand the nature and magnitude of its distribution amongst both the Luo Nyanza counties and the cosmopolitan counties. Coined by Kruskal and Wallis (1952), it is a non-parametric method for testing whether independent samples originate from the same distribution. It extends the Mann-Whitney *U* Test to more than two groups and is most often used to compare the central tendencies (median) of samples. With regards to the Kruskal-Wallis tests, the following hypotheses were assessed:

Null hypothesis: *“There is no statistical difference amongst the respondents that believe that Luo Nyanza has been short-changed by the central government in Kenya when it comes to the provision of public investment during the period under study.”*

Alternative hypothesis: *At least one county in either of the two categories – Luo Nyanza and cosmopolitan – shows statistical difference amongst the respondents that believe that Luo Nyanza has been short-changed by the central government in Kenya when it comes to the provision of public investment during the period under study.”*

The results of the tests were as shown in the boxplots depicted in figures 4.24 and 4.25 below.




Figure 4.24: Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance – Luo Nyanza Counties

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

The results for the Luo Nyanza counties, as depicted in figure 4.24 (a median of “2”) above, show consistency in terms of the responses from the participants; most respondents tend to agree with the assumption of this research that *the Luo have enjoyed minimal public investment from the GoK because of opposition politics making them relatively poor compared to other communities*. The results for the cosmopolitan counties depicted in figure 4.25 below, however, indicate that there is a statistical difference amongst the four counties. Whilst Nairobi, Mombasa and Nakuru counties show a median of “2” (agree), Uasin Gishu’s is “3” (neutral). In the case of Luo Nyanza counties, therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted; it is rejected when it comes to the cosmopolitan counties.




Figure 4.25: Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance – Cosmopolitan Counties

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)

It is not easy to explain the nonconformity of Uasin Gishu; however, a probable cause for this result would be that the residents of the county, which is very cosmopolitan in nature and notorious for being a hotspot for post-election violence in Kenya, are collectively beginning to realize the value of peace and, therefore, are reluctant to be associated with anything that could prompt or further fuel feelings of antagonism. Indeed, the county has been bedevilled by a history of land grievances, which date back to the colonial days. The land issues have been intertwined with politics and are amongst the major sources of incessant conflict witnessed in the region. These land issues are widely regarded as being the major reason behind the 2007 – 08 post-election violence in Kenya (cf. Uasin Gishu County Government [UGCG], 2013, p. 41). The next chapter presents the results of the first stage of the qualitative phase of this research.

Chapter 5

An Analysis of Luo Views on the Impact of Kenya's "Ethnicized" Politics, 1963 – 2013

5 Introduction

This chapter presents the first phase of the qualitative results of this study. As stated in chapter three, it explores the ordinary citizen's opinions and understandings of "ethnicized" politics and its influence on the socio-economic-cultural development of individuals at the grassroots level of society in Kenya. In this manner, it gives more meaning to the quantitative results presented in chapter four, for the results presented here were obtained from the Luo "without pressuring them into making decisions or reaching a consensus" (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 5). It is informed by Mafeje's lamentation – as stated in chapter one – that "there are now numerous texts on 'ethnicity' in [Africa] and yet the supposed subjects of 'ethnic conflict' remain invisible and their representations are conspicuous by their absence in scholarly discourse, as if they are simply automatons" (Mafeje, 2002, p. 63). Its objectives are twofold: first, to seek the specifics of the socio-cultural-economic consequences of political marginalization within the Kenyan context, with the view to establish how antagonistic relations between the GoK and the Luo have influenced the socio-economic development of the community, in particular, and that of the East African nation in general; and, second, to construct a conceptual framework – using the Luo people's views and an examination of contemporary world events vis-à-vis Kenya – through which to analyse "ethnicized" politics in Kenya. Accordingly, this chapter will, in its closing stages, attempt to explain why "ethnicity" was strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in Kenya, from 1963 to 2013, and why it has increasingly become a pervasive problem in the East African nation. Since the experiences of the Luo are numerous and varied, the aim of this chapter is not necessarily to "narrow the meanings into a few categories or ideas", but "to look for the complexity of views" (cf. Creswell, 2013, p. 24). The diverse views of the Luo on the socio-economic-cultural consequences of political marginalization, which form the core of this chapter, are discussed next.

5.1 Twenty-first Century Perspectives and Influences of the Kenyatta – Odinga Rivalry

Fifty years after the fallout between Kenya's founding father and his first vice-president, bitterness and regret still abound amongst members of the Luo community, owing to the sour relationship the two leaders had. Many Luos blame their woes on the conflict between these two

historical figures and will seldom discuss anything, with regards to their welfare, experiences and grievances, without revisiting the rivalry. They lament Jaramogi's "folly", epitomized by the latter's refusal to ascend to power, despite it being offered to him on a silver platter by the colonial regime, on the premise that Kenyatta was more deserving for the Kikuyu community had apparently paid the heaviest price in the liberation struggle. Most Luos contend that Odinga's "generosity of spirit" and sense of "African unity" are behind the woes the community faces in Kenya today. According to them, Odinga should have taken a different approach: he should have taken power, first, and put the new Kenyan state under his firm control before having Kenyatta released from jail. Luos largely contend that Kenyatta, especially because of the confidence the colonialists showed in Odinga by offering him power, developed a certain kind of paranoia towards the Luo leader, and made it his life mission to sabotage the latter. Kenyatta's ability and success at outwitting Odinga, they allege, partly stems from his "superior" intellect, given that he was educated abroad. Moreover, his dalliance with overseas education made him narcissistic; to him, no-one else was more qualified to lead Kenya, and he could not see his equal, for the rest had been educated locally. Kenyatta's ill-treatment of Odinga – for owing to their political rivalry he would eventually detain the Luo leader – has fostered an enmity between their respective communities; a perpetual feud that cannot be extinguished despite intermarriages that characterize contemporary Kenyan society. Most Luos are certain that none of them can genuinely cast a vote for a Kikuyu, for instance; such an occurrence, they allege, could only be the result of bribery.

The findings of this study suggest that Kenyatta's supposed treachery, epitomized by his "betrayal" of Odinga, has had many negative consequences, of which two particularly stand out. First, Odinga has posthumously become an object of ridicule amongst some Luos who consider their deceased leader a "fool" who "*died like a monkey*" (FGD with men in Nakuru County). This ridicule has not been confined to Odinga alone; members of other "ethnic groups", especially the Kikuyu, continuously hurl insults at their Luo counterparts, too. The arguments of one participant illuminate the ridicule that Luos often go through in contemporary Kenyan society: "*Then later on in life – during the 1990s – he [Odinga] again begged to be given just two minutes in power during the rebirth of multipartyism. This two minute thing . . . these people [Kikuyus] really hurl insults at us because of it*" (FGD with men in Nakuru County). Second,

relations between the Luo and the Kikuyu have deteriorated immensely. Untold mistrust characterizes associations between members of two of Kenya's most notable "ethnic groups". Besides indicating their cautiousness, most participants warned fellow Luos and Kenyans at large to be very wary about Kikuyus: "*Do not reveal your secrets to them; hide your heart and true thoughts away from them completely. They can study you, establish your weaknesses, and end up harming you*" (FGD with men in Nakuru County). There is a strong feeling among most Luos that Kikuyus are thieves, who scamper for dishonest gain, right from the grassroots to the government level. Whilst they acknowledge that Kikuyus are good at doing business, most Luos argue that Kikuyu endeavours are laden with plenty of dishonesty. Many participants in this study raised concern over the manner in which their Kikuyu acquaintances' financial fortunes suddenly and astronomically improved. Examples of incidences of sudden riches included one in which "*a Kikuyu man . . . walks around selling plastic bags [on a particular day] . . . [and] . . . drives a pick-up distributing goods for wholesale trade [the next day]*" (FGD with men in Nakuru County). In support of this view, another participant stated the following: "*In my workplace, where I am a construction worker [carrying building stones] I have witnessed similar occurrences. Today a [Kikuyu] colleague of mine is poor, carrying stones; tomorrow you see him building a house for himself*" (FGD with men in Nakuru County). Similar sentiments abound amongst the Luo in their assessment of Kikuyu-dominated Kenyan leadership: "*They discriminate and discriminate and eventually time comes they give it [Presidency] to another one of their own sons. So, these people are oppressing us badly. They are taking everyone for a ride . . . Uhuru is stealing from public coffers, in broad daylight, without any shame whatsoever*" (FGD with men in Nakuru County).

Even as relations between the Luo and Kikuyu continue to deteriorate over the Kenyatta-Odinga rivalry, contemporary perspectives from the Luo indicate a new development: an aura of invincibility seems to be gradually encircling the Kikuyu community. The Kikuyu, according to most participants, have become arrogant and spiteful towards the Luo and other Kenyans, to the point of proclaiming that they will rule the country until they get tired of enjoying power. As the Kikuyus become "invincible", the Luo seem to be moving in the opposite direction – they are exhibiting great desperation that borders on hopelessness. Some are turning to religion for solace as depicted in the words of one participant: "*Let them eat. The world has favoured them; let them*

eat. God is seeing them. Let them eat. And let us remain as hungry as we are” (FGD with men in Nakuru County). There is a strong feeling among the Luo that if Raila Odinga, their *de facto* leader, fails to win the presidency in the forthcoming 2017 general elections in Kenya, their hopes of addressing the injustices and oppression they face in Kenyan society will be dashed forever. Following Uhuru Kenyatta’s 2015 “triumph” at The Hague, most Luos fear that “impunity” on the part of the Kikuyu will continue unabated for the avenues that would ensure accountability have been narrowed down. They fear that the upcoming elections in Kenya will not be free and fair, for the Kikuyu establishment has been emboldened and will now do anything within its power – lawful or unlawful – to retain power. The next section examines the multifarious understandings of the Luo on the socio-economic-cultural consequences of political marginalization.

5.2 Inside the Luo Perspective on the Socio-cultural-economic Consequences of Political Marginalization

5.2.1 Culture, Politics and Leadership in Kenya

More than thirty years after his demise, Kenyatta’s “othering” technique, which was pegged on the male “cut”, appears to be profoundly haunting Kenyan society generally and the Luo community in particular. The circumcision myth, popularized by this fabled African leader and his Kikuyu associates has become so deeply entrenched in Kenyan society that even the “mentally ill” seem to be aware of it. This interesting revelation was captured clearly in a participant’s response to the query as to whether she had heard of the link between circumcision and leadership:

There is a “madman” around this place that once insulted Luos. His utterances made me question his mental illness for he seemed to understand what he was saying. He said that Luos cannot get what they are looking for because they are not circumcised. Can we really say he is mentally incapacitated given that he understands that Luos do not culturally circumcise their males? How did he know? (FGD with women in Mombasa County)

The above narrative demonstrates the incredible level to which the Luo have become a subject of ridicule, in contemporary Kenyan society, thanks to the struggle for power and the conspiracies of paranoid politicians. The so-called “madman”, in the above account, is clearly a victim of capitalism that uses the pretext of mental illness in his quest to eek out a living. Though rib-tickling at face value, serious thought should be given to the risk he is willing to take when he temporarily abandons the role he is playing – to evoke sympathies of unsuspecting fellow citizens and probably fleece them of pocket change in the process – in order to insult an entire community. The Luo are certainly very much aware of the association of circumcision and leadership in Kenya and how it is used as a tool to monopolize and retain political power. They allude to the numerous times Central Kenya politicians have made reference to Odinga’s genitalia, especially during election time, as captured in the response of one participant: *“I don’t know if Raila went and got circumcised. They come up with some issues which I see here . . . when people are politicking you hear them saying, ‘He is not circumcised; he cannot lead us.’ You see? ‘He is not a man.’ They say such things”* (FGD with women in Mombasa County). This subjugation device – the circumcision myth – is being utilized beyond the national/political level; it appears to be playing a noticeable role at the grassroots level in diminishing ordinary Luos’ chances of earning a decent living and obtaining anticipated and commensurate reward for effort and hard work. Another participant lamented: *“There’s a day I went to look for a job. The first question they asked me was whether I have been circumcised”* (FGD with men in Nairobi County).

There appears to be a subtle, well-calculated strategy to keep the Luo completely outside mainstream societal affairs in Kenya. The pattern emanating from the above testimonies points towards the total frustration of a people, from the national/political to the grassroots/individual level, and may be considered to be invisible socio-economic extermination. The Luo are largely a frustrated people and they are dealing with their discontent in various ways. Amongst some members of the community, there is a secessionist desire, as captured in the words of a exasperated participant: *“Of what benefit is the government to me? I neither care about nor need the government. I am my own government”* (FGD with women in Mombasa County). However, the violent methods utilized by the Kenyan state in quashing secessionist movements (cf. Al-Safi, 1995; wa Njeri, 2013; Willis & Gona, 2012) seem to have held in check any breakaway

attempt by the Luo, some of whom appear to be opting, instead, for conformist measures geared, amongst other aims, towards gaining them acceptance as fully-fledged members of the Kenyan society. Indeed, as indicated unequivocally by one participant, “*Luos are getting circumcised nowadays - even children*” (FGD with women in Mombasa County). Whilst recounting her experience with her children, another participant stated the following:

They told me, “Mum, we want to go get circumcised”. The reason for this, they said, is because their mates or colleagues laugh at them. So we just take them for circumcision; not because we like it, but when a child is pestering you, what can you do? Yes . . . they are ridiculed in class where they go to school (FGD with women in Uasin Gishu County).

Although other reasons, like cleanliness and Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) prevention have contributed to the increased adoption by the Luo of a cultural practice that is alien to them, a combination of embarrassment and stigma, whose origins can be traced to Kenyatta’s deculturalization technique, have profoundly influenced Luo posture towards male circumcision. The next section examines the diverse perspectives of the Luo with respect to the influence of political marginalization on economic development at the grassroots level.

5.2.2 Political Exclusion and Grassroots Level Economics

5.2.2.1 “Ethnicity” and Access to Credit Facilities and Funding Opportunities

When Mzee Jomo Kenyatta took the stance that owing to the fact that the Luo did not practice male circumcision the community was “not part of civil society and therefore, by extension, not legitimate citizens of the Kenya state that he ran” (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002, p. 243), he intended, mainly, to play into the psyche of his most formidable political opponents and secure his presidency; even he could not have comprehended at that time the injurious potential of his posture on Kenyan society. Scores of years after Kenya’s first president adopted the aforementioned standpoint – the findings of this particular phase of this research strongly suggest – political exclusion at the national level has translated into tremendous economic difficulties at the grassroots level for the majority of Luos. The most conspicuous of these difficulties seems to

be access to loans from financial institutions. Most participants alleged that Kenyan banks, particularly Family, Equity and K-Rep (now Sidian), which are largely Kikuyu-owned and controlled, impose additional requirements before they will grant loans to Luos. These additional requirements, which mainly come in the form of household items that act as security, are often not mandatory for non-Luos. This has made it difficult for Luos seeking to expand their retail businesses. In other instances, Luo customers of these banks are forced to avail guarantors, sometimes against the norm, before they can get access to credit – even for very small amounts. The element of tribalism that characterizes the operations of these particular establishments was captured ubiquitously in participants’ responses, with one lamenting that *“for a Kikuyu it is very easy to get a loan. They get it immediately. The rest of us encounter so much difficulty for they ask for so many requirements/items”* (FGD with men in Mombasa County). Another participant echoed the above narrative with the following sentiments:

You know it depends on what your name is. Wanjiku [Kikuyu female name] is granted an opportunity; Odhiambo [Luo male name] is taken around in endless circles. Family and Equity Banks . . . these are their [Kikuyu] establishments. Even officers . . . you know, we form women groups to seek loans with a united voice and as a unit . . . if the officer is a Luo, we are considered; if it is an officer from another ethnic group, he or she considers their people (FGD with women in Uasin Gishu County).

It appears that some financial institutions in Kenya, especially those founded and run by members of the ruling “ethnic groups”, exist fundamentally to serve the interests of their kin; this could well be a ploy to perpetuate the social formation of capital as argued by Mészáros (1971). Prejudiced experiences, such as the ones narrated above, have led some Luos in Kenya to believe that their lives would be better if they were from another “ethnic group”, as attested to by various participants’ accounts, including one shop owner who stated the following with regard to the issue of “ethnicity” and living standards: *“Eeeh; now I’d have been higher. I’d have been higher! My shop wouldn’t be as small as this one. I’d have had a wholesale. I’d be running a wholesale. But I thank God. Even if my shop is small, it is helping me”* (FGD with women in Mombasa County).

The Luo also experience difficulties in connection with access to government funds and grants targeted at individual development. In this regard, the Luo surname, which often begins with an “O”, is proving to be their Achilles heel as captured by one participant: “*We applied for government funding with these Kikuyus . . . When they got it, they told me, ‘Dude, we did not tell you: you were supposed to use another name; not ‘O’! ‘O’ was not supposed to be there’*” (FGD with men in Uasin Gishu County). Indeed, African surnames are very revealing; they are of such nature that it is easy to tell the “ethnic” origin of an individual by merely glancing at the spelling of their name. In its quest to subdue the Luo, this study reveals, the Kenyan state has taken advantage of this vulnerability and largely utilized it to deny the community access to much-needed funding for individual advancement. I now focus my attention on other aspects of denial of economic opportunities as recounted by the Luo.

5.2.2.2 Other Aspects of Denial of Economic Opportunities for being Luo

According to a majority of the participants in this study, monopolization of power by members of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin “ethnic groups” has made it difficult for the Luo to obtain employment, especially in the civil service. The fact that power in post-independence Kenya has consistently changed hands between these two “ethnic groups”, in successive fashion, has enabled them to entrench their dominance with regards to employment in the government. They have taken most of the jobs and ensured that “dissident” communities like the Luo are not proportionately represented. Besides their regular remuneration, they engage in wanton corruption and kleptocracy, which are facilitated by their numerical supremacy in government spheres. They are looting state coffers because there is no-one to keep them accountable as detailed by one participant:

You know during the time of the Grand Coalition Government, our son [Raila] was there. Where they attempted to go out of line, he told them off. “That is not good”, he warned them. So they used to steal sparingly. But at the moment, they are looting state coffers. This is now theirs; at the moment the country belongs to them (FGD with men in Nakuru County).

Education, according to most participants, is now playing second fiddle to “ethnicity” when it comes to the Luo obtaining employment in Kenya, especially in the civil service. When seeking employment, a competent Luo will more often than not get snubbed in favour of a less qualified competitor deemed to be from the “right” “ethnicity”. The Kenyan situation is such that citizens from the ruling “ethnic groups” are more likely to obtain better paying jobs, notwithstanding their qualification levels vis-à-vis those perceived to be from “dissident” communities. The predicament of the Luo is such that during job interviews, for instance, less qualified competitors from other “ethnicities” are considered before them. Interview performance scores are usually supplanted by “ethnic” considerations and corruption, to the detriment of the Luo. Owing to preposterous levels of corruption and “ethnic” bias against the Luo, most of the community’s members have opted to engage in their own businesses.

Similarly, lack of access to credit facilities, on the basis of “ethnicity”, has made it difficult for members of the Luo community to acquire government contracts and tenders. Intelligence, knowledge and skill are not enough if one is to compete with other contractors and bidders; machines and other equipment, in relation to one’s area of specialization, are necessary, too. Most capable Luos lack these fundamentals due largely to their limited access to credit facilities and, often, fare poorly in the stiff competition for government opportunities both nationally and locally. Luos residing in cosmopolitan areas often fall victim to “ethnic” discrimination in their attempts to win business opportunities in the form of government tenders and contracts. One participant raised this concern when he stated that , “*At the moment we have MCAs [Members of County Assemblies] . . . they are in-charge of awarding contracts at the ward level . . . but when it comes to Luos, they don’t give them; they discriminate*” (FGD with men in Nakuru County). This predicament transcends the public sector; in the private sector, some companies that are managed and controlled by members of the “ethnic groups” that are in control of state power in Kenya, especially the Kikuyu, are practicing the same kind of discrimination expressed in the narrative above. Such companies, especially those in which Kikuyus are in control of the purchasing and supplies departments, seem to be granting business opportunities mainly to members of their “ethnic groups” and frustrating attempts of the dominated “ethnic groups”, like the Luo, at getting such openings. To circumvent such obstacles, some Luos are forming companies using proxies from other “ethnic groups”, for this increases

their chances of getting tenders and contracts. Kikuyus, who overwhelmingly control the Kenyan economic sphere, usually have lesser qualms about other Kenyan communities, as opposed to their Luo rivals.

Another effect of political exclusion manifesting itself at the grassroots level in Kenya is “ethnic zoning”, in terms of access to certain markets and/or entry into certain professions/business ventures. In some cases, members of rival “ethnic groups” will not patronize each other; in the extreme form of this kind of “zoning”, a dominant “ethnic group” will only allow “outsiders” to practice certain professions in what it considers its “turf”. Luos, for instance, find it very difficult to do business in Central Kenya, the traditional homeland of the Kikuyu community. Kikuyus are so heavily prejudiced towards their Luo counterparts that they will not purchase anything from a Luo-run shop. According to one participant, *“A Luo can work in Kikuyuland only as a mechanic . . . But business that you can get money . . . No; they won’t allow you”* (FGD with men in Nakuru County). These findings – coupled with the difficulties Luos face in obtaining bank loans – when compared with the current literature on ethnicity and governance in Kenya, reaffirm and give more meaning and details to the arguments of Ongaro and Osogo (2008, p. 25) that “ethnicity” transcends presidential elections in Kenya, for it determines access to financial services, education funds, employment opportunities and other aspects of socio-economic development – in the East African nation – as well. The next sub-section examines the manner in which political exclusion has influenced intra-“ethnic” relations amongst the Luo.

5.2.3 Political Exclusion and Intra-“ethnic” Relations amongst the Luo

Economic dissatisfaction is thought to have a direct correlation with “ethnic” cohesion (Carr, 1995). In the problem statement in chapter one, I narrated how the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki regimes hoarded leadership opportunities from the Luo (Amutabi, 2009; Auma-Osolo, 2013; Throup, 1987); this leadership style, as sub-section 5.2.2 above has since revealed, has translated into a myriad of economic difficulties faced by the Luo at the grassroots level. I now analyse, from the Luo perspective, how, if at all, these economic difficulties have awakened “ethnic” consciousness among the Luo. To begin with, this study sought to find out whether, if given positions of influence in society, the Luo would carry out affirmative action towards

fellow Luos, to give them opportunities aimed at catching up with the Kikuyu and Kalenjin who continue to control state power in Kenya. The responses of Luos on this issue fall in two broad categories. The dominant view of the respondents holds that all humans are created equal and would, therefore, not retaliate by favouring fellow Luos if granted influential positions in society. Such respondents are sceptical about tribalism and would strictly employ people in accordance with their qualifications. Tribal adherents, they argue, risk employing incompetent people. However, owing to politically-instigated economic afflictions, the sense of humaneness is gradually deadening in some Luos. This set of fed-up Luos subscribes to, and advocates for, the eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth, philosophy. Participants representing this perspective stated that they would implement affirmative action towards the Luo, as demonstrated by the following narrative: *“I can . . . because of what they are doing to us. I can strongly say that Luos be given an opportunity . . . we are learned and we have brains. Given the chance we can deliver”* (FGD with men in Mombasa County). This pro-affirmative action group stressed that, given an opportunity of influence in society, they would begin by catering to the interests of immediate family members, then look at the welfare of Luo friends, and consider the wider Luo “ethnic group”, before taking into account the interests of other Kenyans, regardless of qualifications. Their stance is mainly informed by Kikuyu hegemony, which has systematically been entrenched in Kenyan society using similar means and methods.

This study also sought to find out whether prominent members of the community assist fellow Luos. The Luo perspective, on whether Luos help each other, given the predicament they collectively face – the harmful economic derivatives of political exclusion discussed above in sub-section 5.2.2 – is almost completely negative. Narratives from the discussions held with members of the community disclose an overwhelming phenomenon that can, perhaps, best be described as “self-hate”. The findings of this study indicate that this “self-hate” phenomenon prevails far and wide amongst the Luo, from the grassroots level to the national level of Kenyan society. The community’s political leaders, under the stewardship of Raila Odinga, the country’s former PM and now Official Leader of the Opposition, are seen by a significant constituent of the respondents as being in the vanguard of feeding and perpetuating this absurd phenomenon. During his tenure as the country’s PM, some participants contend, a large portion of the few lucky Luos who held high ranking public service positions were either axed or demoted.

Seemingly, Luos are largely an envious, selfish people who seldom cherish the successes of their kin; on the contrary, they relish the prospects of seeing fellow Luos positioned below them, status-wise, all the time. The contrary can be said of the hegemonic “ethnic groups”, such as the Kikuyu, as captured in one participant’s narrative:

Other tribes, like the Kikuyus . . . I can say someone like Uhuru Kenyatta . . . it is very easy for him to help somebody. Even you, right now, if you go to him and face him directly and tell him...one, two, three . . . he will help you. Uhuru is an open person (FGD with men in Uasin Gishu County).

Luos, according to an overwhelming majority of the participants in this study, are a very proud, narcissistic group. Amongst the community’s affluent members, resides a feeling of contempt towards their underprivileged kin. It is not unusual to find well-educated jobless Luos, with relatives who hold senior positions in the country’s corporate arena, languishing in Kenyan society. The fear of being outdone by upcoming, talented kin is apparently stronger, in the affluent Luo, than any drive and desire that he/she may have to offer assistance. These revelations, especially on the character of Raila Odinga, indicate that it is, perhaps, time for the Luo community to seek alternative leadership and unyoke itself from the control of the Odinga family. Jaramogi’s son could be exploiting the Kenyatta-Odinga rivalry and using the Luo electorate for his own personal ambition and gain. These findings on Odinga lend some credence to the assertions of Kuria (2011, para. 2) that “since independence, the political leadership of the region has held the people hostage to a self-defeating ideology of blaming everybody except themselves for the region’s woes”.

Luo self-detestation, coupled with the arrogance that seemingly characterizes a large section of Luos, could be playing an immense role in keeping the community out of state power and perpetuating their subjugated condition. These insights were captured clearly in the words of one participant:

There’s another problem with Luos. Luos have vehicles, Nissans, but during election time, when people are on their way to vote . . . these Luos find old women walking very

long distances to go and cast their votes. They cannot carry them in their vehicles. They cannot. You see? But these other tribes carry their old to polling stations. So that also contributes immensely to our backwardness and our state of being dominated. The elderly usually ask themselves, “Will we really walk all that distance just to cast the vote?” The other tribes offer their vehicles, fuel them and transport the elderly to the polling stations to vote. So that is our undoing (FGD with women in Uasin Gishu County).

Though bewildering, for it is the very antithesis of what one would expect from an oppressed people, this phenomenon of “self-hate”, amongst the Luo, can be understood in the context of wa Thiong’o’s (1986) process of deculturalization discussed in chapter two. It is possible that alongside colonialism and capitalism, the “othering” policy employed by Kenyatta – also discussed in chapter two – is somehow behind this Luo characteristic. Perhaps in support of the assertion that in capitalist dispensations, which are often characterized, perpetuated and upheld by the “deculturalization” and “dehumanization” of the “working class”, by the “accumulating/wealthy class”, “self-hate” amongst the former arises. Malcolm X bemoaned the attitude exhibited by the African American community in the US in one of his famous speeches in 1962:

Who taught you to hate the texture of your hair? Who taught you to hate the colour of your skin, to such extent you bleach, to get like the white man? Who taught you to hate the shape of your nose and the shape of your lips? Who taught you to hate yourself from the top of your head to the soles of your feet? Who taught you to hate your own kind? Who taught you to hate the race that you belong to so much so that you don’t want to be around each other?³⁹

The next sub-section examines the perspectives of the Luo on marriage.

³⁹ See Antihostile. (2007, June 6). *Malcolm X: Who taught you to hate yourself?* [Video file]. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRSgUTWffMQ> (accessed 3 January 2016).

5.2.4 Inside the Luo Perspective on Marriage

The findings of this research show that “ethnic”-based political exclusion has not resulted in the rise of a singular dominant collective Luo view on intermarriage. Several divergent views emerged from the participants, the most salient of which are hereby discussed. There is the “liberal” view that holds that marriage is a personal issue that unconcerned parties should not interfere with – individuals should be free to make their own choices regarding whom to espouse. Proponents of this view hold that marriage is inevitable and, as an institution, its strength transcends the superficiality of the concept of “tribe”. They would not get in the way of their children’s choices, for this would only be counterproductive, especially since marriage is the plan or will of the Almighty. A majority of the proponents of the “liberal” view are those that are educated, religiously or academically, that is, enlightened as to the true essence of what it is to be human – those whose minds are decolonized or de-ethnicized. They are mainly comprised of Luos who have interacted widely, or to a reasonable extent, with members of other “ethnic groups”.

There is a portion of Luos that accepts intermarriage, but remains very sceptical about forming such ties with the Kikuyu and Kalenjin “ethnic groups”. This indicates that the Kikuyu – Luo enmity, at the political level, is also manifesting itself at the grassroots level, in various other forms. The following narrative showcases some of the feelings of this lot of “sceptics”:

Aiii! If a child brings a Kikuyu in my homestead . . . aiiii . . . I will chase him out of my yard with a huge cane. I’d beat them up thoroughly. A Kikuyu . . . Aiiii! . . . The rest he can just bring to me. But a Kikuyu . . . never! If your child has bought a vehicle or even a piece of land . . . they are in danger. Kikuyus examine carefully to see the kind of job your child does. That big post is what they want. Their women are cunning. They track you in school . . . they also go after you in church . . . if your prospects are bright, they stick to you. A Kikuyu I don’t want in my home, I don’t . . . they can only succeed in bringing one if I am too old to object strongly (FGD with women in Uasin Gishu County).

The above narrative supports the argument presented in section 5.1 above, that Luos perceive Kikuyus to be dishonest, treacherous, thieves and betrayers. A closely-linked view concerning the Kalenjin “ethnic group” also emerged when one participant stated the following: “*Eeeh . . . I have lived with Kalenjins and I vehemently oppose intermarriage with them. They are not worth it. You’d rather just stay single. They are very crafty and devious!*”(FGD with women in Uasin Gishu County). Amongst this lot that cautions against intermarriage with the Kikuyu and Kalenjin, one participant made the following eye-catching comment:

Intermarriage is OK since nowadays there’s a mixture. You cannot restrict someone. We’re trying to get rid of tribalism, but it’s not easy. The person who’s a tribalist is the Kikuyu. And the Nandi [Kalenjin sub-tribe] . . . Those people are very tribalist. They have taken the behaviour of the white man (FGD with women in Mombasa County).

It is interesting that the participant that gave the above account considers “tribalist” Kikuyus and Kalenjins to have acquired the vice from the “white man”. This view supports the central argument of this thesis that “ethnic” identities have been constructed over time. It also underpins the argument that the term “ethnicity” is not only a spurious but also an exogenous creation and imposition (cf. Mafeje, 2002), and that the comprehension of this fact remains crucial to understanding the trajectory that political, economic and socio-cultural development has taken in Africa.

Amongst the Luo, there is a portion that is convinced that marriage between and amongst Luos is problematic. This group laments Luo pride and sees it as an obstacle to success in the important societal institution. For this reason, they would rather espouse individuals from other “ethnic groups”. Intermarriages, this lot claims, guarantee respect, a key ingredient for success and prosperity. With intermarriage, this group believes, it is easier to make economic progress and advancement in other related areas, whilst at the same time avoiding jealousies and envies, amongst in-laws and other family members that characterize Luo unions. These firm proponents of intermarriage point to Luo politicians such as James Orenge, the current Senator of Siaya County, as an example of such successful inter-ethnic unions. The final set comprises “realists” who, though convinced that “ethnicity” has no place when it comes to marriage, nevertheless

urges their fellow kinsmen and women to be practical and put into consideration the possibility of hardships associated with intermarriage in cases of political strife and conflict associated with power struggles as narrated by one participant:

As a Christian, I don't look at the tribe. But the society in which we live makes me think twice . . . Look at the post-election violence, for example; that thing taught us a lot. If you marry another tribe like the Kikuyu you are marginalized when such unfortunate things happen in a society. You are told, "Go with your wife". So it is always very good to marry your tribe, because you will be able to understand them better (FGD with men in Nakuru County).

The above narrative expresses and epitomizes the dialectic between religion/Christianity (the notion that all humans are created equal) and the reality of elite-driven politically-instigated "ethnic" "othering"/antagonisms that led, for instance, to the 2007 – 08 post-election violence in Kenya. Evidently, political exclusion at the national level has not translated into a single distinct perspective of marriage amongst the Luo. The various meanings of development, vis-à-vis political exclusion, as espoused by the Luo, are examined next.

5.2.5 Political Exclusion and Economic Development in Luo Nyanza

There is an assortment of views amongst the Luo community regarding the relationship between political marginalization and economic development. Some Luos feel that opposition politics has made the GoK apathetic towards Luo economic development. The GoK, for instance, seldom makes efforts to assist the region's leaders to complete promising projects, as it does for other regions. A reduction of opposition politics would attract the goodwill of the government, which would go out of its way to assist the region's governors to complete stalled promising projects such as market infrastructures. Others are of the opinion that opposition politics has, in fact, led to the development of not only Luo Nyanza, but the whole of Kenya. Proponents of this school of thought argue that the Luo-led struggle against oppression by the central government in Kenya has culminated in devolution of state resources, which is benefitting all citizens by ensuring the equitable distribution of the national bounty. County governments have empowered the citizen at the grassroots level of society by ensuring greater access to electricity and clean drinking water, besides paving the way for construction of better classrooms and roads at

constituency and village levels. The role of the Luo in bringing about this new dispensation was captured succinctly by one participant:

Devolution of state resources has been brought about by the opposition. This opposition was driven, mainly, by one ethnic group – the Luo. The Luo sought the support of other ethnic groups and sensitized them to come together and call for this kind of government (FGD with men in Homa Bay County).

A third group of Luos opines that there is no link, whatsoever, between development and opposition politics. It argues that development depends on the character of the individual and has nothing to do with opposing the government; in other words, orientation towards economic progress is inherent (inborn) and can never be pegged to the side of the political divide that a community leans toward. This perspective further argues that being in control of government does not necessarily translate to progress for it does not guarantee that one will help his/her people. It links development to ideas and not provision of funds. Luos who fall under this category see Raila Odinga as a wise leader who, notwithstanding his alleged ungenerous demeanour, has generated ideas that have culminated in freedoms and devolution of state resources that Kenyans enjoy today.

Some Luos argue that, due to opposing the GoK, Luo Nyanza has witnessed outright economic sabotage, instigated by the state. Holders of this view contend that economic incapacitation of Luo Nyanza has been carried out surreptitiously – and with impunity – over the years. They cite the following examples of sabotage: disruption of rice irrigation schemes at Nyando, Kano and Ahero; the lack of support for the sugar industry, particularly the impairment of Miwani, Muhoroni and Chemelil sugar factories throughout the post-independence era; closure and relocation of production plants such as the Kenya Breweries in Kisumu; the incapacitation of the Molasses Project in Kisumu; and the establishment of fish processing industries in Central Kenya, some hundreds of miles away from Lake Victoria. These state orchestrations have had a devastating economic effect on Luo Nyanza over the years, particularly because they left many Luos jobless, idle and economically incapacitated.

To camouflage its punitive posture, this cluster of Luos opines, the Kenyan state has often appointed and worked in cahoots with “Uncle Toms” – Luo leaders who are mainly driven by personal enrichment and do not have the interests of the community at heart. “Uncle Toms” have, over the years, been made part of the oppressive Kenyan state to quell disquiet amongst the Luo whilst simultaneously sanctifying the state’s iniquities. They are given no space to function independently and bring about meaningful change in their people’s lives – they are “toothless bulldogs”. The Odingas, proponents of this school of thought maintain, are legitimate since they have often declined to accept posts in oppressive governments, and chosen the people’s side in a bid to bring about the desired societal changes. This perspective of Odinga challenges Kuria’s (2011) portrayal of Luo politicians as poor leaders and the community as aimless whiners. It makes Kuria’s understanding of a competent leader seem like an individual who unquestionably bows to an oppressive socio-economic-political order; similarly, it casts his understanding of a progressive community as one that “suffers peacefully”.

However, many Luos believe that those areas of Luo Nyanza associated with Luo political leaders that back the government – considered modern “Uncle Toms” by some – receive more government attention and support and are relatively more developed than the rest of the region. Participants highlighted the relatively more developed constituency of Rongo, whose Member of Parliament (MP), Dalmas Otieno, has consistently maintained cordial ties with the Kenyan state. Rongo, according to one participant, *“is ever green. During the times of Moi, sugarcane farmers were paid promptly and well. There was market for the sugarcane”* (FGD with men in Mombasa County). With regards to Rarieda Constituency, once the domain of Raphael Tuju, another of the contemporary Kenyan “Uncle Toms”, a participant remarked as follows: *“If you go to Rarieda, which was under Tuju who supported government, you will realize that its infrastructure is developed. The roads there are well-tarmacked; schools are well-built”* (FGD with men in Mombasa County). This perspective resonates with the Swahili slogan popularized by Moi during his tenure as President: *“siasa nzuri, maisha nzuri; siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya”* [prudent politics, prosperous life; uncalculated politics, impoverished life].

The final Luo perspective on development and opposition politics in Kenya is a lamentation: it decries hypocritical leadership, in which Luo politicians call for unison amongst Luos, when it comes to rebelling and opposing the central government, but largely “eat” the “spoils of war” by themselves. When they get government positions, for instance during the reign of the Grand Coalition Government of 2008 – 13, they forget about the welfare of the community. The following narrative supports this view:

Had it been that Luo politicians were opposing and fighting the government and using the little they have to assist us in our quest to develop, it would be ok. But they only keep to themselves, the little that they have, for they are very selfish; they never use it to help us. (FGD with men in Uasin Gishu County)

The above narrative epitomizes the typical African politician, depicted in the introductory chapter of this thesis, who, having learnt from his/her colonial “mentor”, deploys the sham notion, “ethnicity”, for individual advancement (cf. Aquiline-Tarimo, 2008). In conclusion, the perceptions of the Luo, on the economic development of Luo Nyanza vis-à-vis the community’s political stance, are varied. The thoughts of the Luo, on whether political exclusion has translated into economic difficulties that have, in turn, limited the community’s chances of getting to power in Kenya, are outlined next.

5.2.6 Kenya’s Politics of Financial Might and Alternative Perspectives for the Luo

Politics and finances go hand-in-hand; the process of seeking political office, often characterized by expansive campaign efforts, involves the spending of huge sums of money whether it eventuates in success or not. Concerns are emerging amongst some Luo that their *de facto* leader, Raila Odinga, faces a tumultuous task if he is to dislodge his Uhuru Kenyatta-led Kikuyu opponents who, owing to protracted control of state power, have become comparatively well-heeled over time. Participants lamented that Kikuyus have continuously utilized their largely ill-gotten wealth to corrupt the country’s electoral body, the IEBC, by bribing its officials. They contend that the Luo leader, Odinga, is not in a position to use the same devious mechanisms, for he lacks the requisite financial wherewithal. Accordingly, there are calls amongst some Luo for initiatives geared towards the community’s economic empowerment,

which would then put the Luo in a better position to compete favourably in all socio-economic-political facets of Kenyan society. In some quarters, calls for empowerment of the Luo appear not to be limited to that which is considered “legal” or “moral” – some participants call for the few Luos who find themselves in positions of power to engage in kleptocracy like their Kikuyu counterparts. They seek and call for emancipation by any means necessary. There is also the call for Luo leadership at all levels to apply itself insofar as creativity in devising means of raising funds to assist the members of the community at the grassroots level is concerned – even if it means aping the empowerment tactics employed by leaders of other Kenyan communities, such as fundraising for schools, churches and womens’ groups, through collaboration with influential friends from other “ethnic groups”. Proponents of such creative means of empowerment urge for the substitution of a confrontational stance with other resourceful mechanisms such as the prudent utilization of Constituency Development Funds (CDF) as captured in the account below:

When the government was centralized, it was very difficult to bring development in a country. Now we have CDF which is given to every constituency. If a particular constituency lags behind in development, the central government cannot be blamed. The leader in-charge of the CDF funds must take the blame. Street protests and riots will not help us. Let our minds awaken to reality. If Raila dies today, life will go on (FGD with men in Mombasa County).

The preceding thought-provoking narrative, which reminds the Luo that life will have to go on when Raila eventually breathes his last, concludes this sub-section. The next section examines other salient themes that emerged from my interaction with Kenyan Luos, relates them to contemporary Kenyan and global events, and uses the admixture, alongside the aforementioned Luo views, to construct a “holistic” framework to understand Kenya’s “ethnicized” politics and, hopefully, demystify what Mafeje (2002, p. 56) referred to as “a metaphor for things which could be understood otherwise”, while referring to the “ethnic” strife that bedevils the cradle of humankind.

5.3 Towards the Unveiling of Mafeje’s “Metaphor”: Understanding Kenya’s “Ethnicized” Politics up to the 2013 General Election

As indicated in chapter one, the conceptual framework in section 1.8 is incomplete for ethnic-based political exclusion because it is representative or symbolic of something else (Mafeje, 2002) – it is a proxy variable. Through further analysis of the FGD responses and a systematic scrutiny of national and global events, therefore, this section outlines some of the components of the more complete framework – see figure 5.1 below – that, I contend, address the following three research questions, posed in chapter one: i) Why is “ethnicity” strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in Kenya? ii) Why does the Kenyan political elite class persist in promoting the scourge of “ethnicity” despite experience showing that this only leads to disaster? iii) What informs ethnic-based political exclusion in Kenya, besides the desire to maintain/safeguard the social formation of capital? I, however, hereby emphasise that the dynamics of African politics, in general, and Kenyan politics in particular, are fluid; whilst the West appeared to have been behind Raila Odinga in the lead-up to Kenya’s 2013 general election, for instance, the former seems to have altered its posture by giving a clean bill of health to an electoral process fraught with irregularities and illegalities that saw Uhuru Kenyatta declared winner in the recent 8 August 2017 general election in Kenya. Accordingly, the framework outlined in figure 5.1, below, is only applicable to Kenya in the context of the country’s 2013 general election.

5.3.1 Fear and Extrajudicial Killings in Kenya

The fieldwork for this research coincided with the IEBC protests, which began in May, 2016. The IEBC demonstrations, organized by the leading opposition coalition in Kenya, CORD, under the leadership of former PM Raila Odinga, were geared towards the institution of wide-ranging reforms in the electoral body, which has lost the faith of many Kenyans. Owing to these protests, which were at times characterized by unnecessary and excessively violent responses from the Kenya Police, several Kenyans lost their lives especially in Luo Nyanza where opposition to the government is fiercest. It would seem that, due to the violent manner in which the Kenya Police confronted the largely peaceful demonstrators, an element of fear is beginning to creep in amongst members of the Luo community, especially in the former Rift Valley Province, where the cosmopolitan counties of Nakuru and Uasin Gishu lie. Luos in these two areas raised concerns about organized gangs, which are funded and backed by politicians; these criminal groups, they contend, plan and execute attacks every time Kenya nears an

electioneering period. They operate discretely, away from the public eye, making it difficult for the undiscerning citizen to detect them. Owing to the possibility of impromptu attacks from such militia, Luos that reside far away from Nyanza are increasingly paranoid as Kenya heads for another General Election in 2017. Many Luos who registered to vote in cosmopolitan counties, especially Nakuru, are beginning to question their decision. Amongst this lot, there are some advocating for early voting followed by a mass exodus to Luo Nyanza before the results of the General Election are announced; others are contemplating changing their voting stations from precarious areas to Luo Nyanza.

Also, due to the anxiety and “ethnic” tensions, the Luos in the cosmopolitan areas of Nakuru and Uasin Gishu are not investing much in assets, like household items, for these would present a transportation challenge in the event of violence. The fear of losing their possessions to looters in the wake of post-election violence constrains them from expressing their economic desire and wherewithal to their fullest extent. In the case of Kenya, there is a strong possibility that some organized gangs are state-sponsored; participants stated that these criminal elements are given police uniforms by the GoK to mask activities associated with opaque election processes. These illegal gangs seem to embrace members of the “ethnic groups” in control of state power. They work to support state organs like the police and military, which in the case of Kenya are usually already compromised for they are deliberately structured to include, largely, members of the “ethnic groups” in control of state power. Again, this lends credence to Mészáros’ arguments that the “private property class”, which in the case of Africa is/was formed by way of fusing state power and “ethnic” ties as I have already explained in chapter two, and their tribal associates, are “interested in change only to the extent to which reforms and concessions can be integrated or institutionalized” (Mészáros, 1971, pp. 98 – 99).

Equally important, events in contemporary Kenyan society suggest, society’s “watchdogs” – individuals who are politically mature and understand how “ethnicity” is manipulated to safeguard the social formation of capital – are a hunted prey in Kenya. Indeed, under the reign of Uhuru and Ruto, whose first term officially ended in August 2017,

extrajudicial killings have increased;⁴⁰ the most notable of these is the recent murder of billionaire-businessman, Jacob Juma. Juma was at the forefront in exposing what are believed to be egregious corruption scandals in the Jubilee Administration, some of which include the National Youth Service (NYS) and Eurobond allegations.⁴¹ Another concern that arises from an analysis of the FGD responses is that the Luo, who staunchly support their *de facto* leader, Raila Odinga, often without questioning the character and motives of the astute politician, could, in fact, be blindly following him to the detriment of their own well-being.

5.3.2 Raila Odinga, the Enigma: Can he be Trusted with the Stewardship of Kenya?

Many consider a good leader to be one who has the interests of his/her community at heart. Goodwill, on the part of a political aspirant, can at times be expressed by charitable works and social responsibility initiatives, which serve to demonstrate generosity and care, notwithstanding that these may not necessarily be genuinely from the heart; indeed, some would interpret such “charitable acts” as being amoral and geared towards bribing the electorate/populace to obtain votes. Nevertheless, there is a feeling amongst some Luos that their son, Raila Odinga, is a very tight-fisted individual who seldom demonstrates compassion in tangible terms; this is especially so when he is compared to his greatest opponent in the current political scenario in Kenya – President Uhuru Kenyatta – as narrated by one participant:

Raila is very tight-fisted; that is why those people [Kikuyus] are outwitting him. For example . . . I am a widow and my husband left me with a grass-thatched house. During the last general election, in 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta sent his local agent to do some construction work for us. Everyone was given 25 iron sheets. You see? And if your location comprised at least ten houses, you were also given a Kentank [plastic water container] of a capacity of 100 litres. You know it, don't you? During the rainy season, we fetch water and preserve it. When drought comes, we make use of the water. So you tell me . . . such a person . . . can you deny him your vote? Can you? You can't. And, this

⁴⁰ See, for instance, Rajab, R. (2016, July 20). Extrajudicial killings are sanctioned by top government organs – Human Rights Watch. *The Star*. Retrieved from http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/07/20/extrajudicial-killings-are-sanctioned-by-top-government-organs-human_c1388964 (accessed 26 August 2016).

⁴¹ See, for instance, BBC. (2016, May 6). *Kenyan businessman Jacob Juma shot dead in Nairobi*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36225157> (accessed 26 August 2016).

one of ours [Raila], there's no day he has ever done such a thing for us . . . It's just that your mother cannot abandon you; that's why we vote for Odinga (FGD with women in Uasin Gishu County).

Although Raila strikes many Luos as trustworthy – in the sense that he has oftentimes declined to assume an “Uncle Tom” position, choosing instead to “suffer” with the people – and a champion for freedom, equality and equity, his “tight-fisted” demeanour calls into question his real motive for acquiring power: is he a man that can be trusted not to sell out the country entirely by acceding to the whims of the forces that control the world monopoly capitalist system at the expense of his people? It will be remembered that, during the lead-up to the 2013 General Election in Kenya, the Western world appeared to back the Luo politician by discrediting his International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted opponents, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, now President and Deputy President of Kenya, respectively. Concerning a potential Jubilee Alliance (the Uhuru – Ruto alliance) election victory, the then British High Commissioner to Kenya, Christian Turner, was quoted as saying:

Whether or not the position would be for a win, we will cross that bridge when we get there. It is well known the position of my government and others is that we don't get in contact with the ICC inditees unless it is essential. But it is not a policy specific to Kenya but it is a global policy and we have discussed it here with the elders.⁴²

And his American counterpart, Johnny Carson – the then US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs – reiterated this threat-convoyed Western stance by stating that “choices have consequences” as he reminded Kenyans in a tele-conference that they “live[d] in [an] inter-connected world” in which “people should be thoughtful about the impact of their choices on the nation and the world”.⁴³ In *Peeling Back the Mask: A Quest for Justice in Kenya*, Miguna (2012),

⁴² See Anami, L. (2013, January 16). UK to avoid contact with ICC suspects. *Standard Digital*. Retrieved from <http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000075151/uk-to-avoid-contact-with-icc-suspects> (accessed 26 August 2016).

⁴³ See Mathenge, O., & Msau, N. (2013, February 8). US warns of ICC consequences. *The Star*. Retrieved from http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/02/08/us-warns-of-icc-consequences_c736028 (accessed 26 August 2016).

Raila Odinga's former aide, paints a grim picture of the latter; one that is synonymous with the illustration in the FGD excerpt at the beginning of this sub-section:

But once Raila was in office, being a Luo, unless you were a relative of Raila's, did seem to be a hurdle to advancement . . . Ironically, when it came to his siblings, family or relatives, Raila conveniently forgot that they were Luos; hence the formal employment of Oburu (assistant minister, elder brother), Akinyi Wenwa (diplomatic post, sister), Beryl Achieng' (board chair, sister), Ruth Adhiambo (personal assistant/MD Spectre, sister), Rosemary Akeyo (personal assistant, daughter), Fidel (personal assistant, son) and Raila Junior (personal assistant, son), Jakoyo Midiwo (chief whip, cousin), Elkanah Odembo (ambassador to the US, Jakoyo's brother in law), Carey Orege (permanent secretary, cousin), Joe Ager (Kenya Power, cousin), Paul Gondi (chairman, geothermal authority, cousin), James Ogundo (CDF board, cousin) and many, many others. (p. 345)

The callous, selfish and nepotistic depiction of Raila by Miguna should be concerning to the ardent Odinga supporter: although Miguna is thought to have been on a vendetta regarding the former PM, owing to the fact that he was sacked by the latter, it would be naïve to completely ignore his allegations for he was close enough to the man to know him better than the ordinary observer.

If indeed Odinga was a "darling" of the West, from whence the forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system emanate, before the Uhuru Kenyatta Jubilee Administration ascended to power in 2013, then he might well have been prone to manipulation and become a President who succumbed to new-fangled "neoliberalist" agendas and fresh neo-colonialist impulses at the expense of his people. It is important to note that the ruling class in Kenya also has its own interests: it would, therefore, not have easily allowed a "darling" of the West or a "puppet" politician to ascend to the presidency in the East African nation. What appears to be ethnic-based post-election violence in Kenya before the 2017 general election may well have had a hidden element to it: a struggle between the indigenous African bourgeoisie and the Western-based globalist forces. It may well be that the Kikuyu-dominated indigenous African bourgeois class in Kenya was preventing the "complete" takeover of the country by neo-colonialists – an

objective that could be easily achieved through a “puppet” “President Raila Odinga”. If this is the case, then the Luo were unknowingly following their son to their own detriment. In light of these additional revelations, from a scrutiny of the FGDs and contemporary events, figure 5.1, below, depicts this study’s attempt at unveiling the “metaphor” spoken of by Mafeje (2002). I posit that a surreptitious power struggle between the globalists and the African nationalist bourgeois class in Kenya (largely comprising Kikuyus and Kalenjins) was the major reason why “ethnicity” was strongly related to the crisis of state power in the country up to the 2013 general election.⁴⁴ One side of the political elite class (the comprador bourgeoisie largely comprising Luos) was very likely under the sponsorship of globalists, who seek total domination of world economic affairs. The ruling (Kikuyu) nationalist bourgeois class in Kenya seems not to have been willing to cede its economic independence to the globalists; accordingly, it persisted in promoting the scourge of “ethnicity” despite experience showing that this leads to disasters, like post-election violence, which it considered a lesser evil in comparison to neo-colonialism.



⁴⁴ “Ethnic” animosity persists, in Kenya, even as it gears itself for a repeat election in October 2017, following the nullification of Uhuru Kenyatta’s 8 August 2017 “win” by the country’s Supreme Court on 1 September 2017. However, in a very strange twist of events, and perhaps to demonstrate the fluidity of African politics and the duplicity of the globalists, it appears that the West has dumped Odinga; it now seems to prefer Kenyatta, the face of Kenya’s Kikuyu/Kalenjin hegemonic class. Are the two camps of capitalists now in bed with each other at the expense of the impoverished Kenyan masses? One wonders.




Figure 5.1: Conceptual Framework to Understand "Ethnicized" Politics in Kenya up to 2013

Source: Author's construct (2017)

It could be said, therefore, that the Luo have thus been consistently and continuously excluded from political participation because they have been doing the bidding of the globalists, albeit unknowingly, by vehemently supporting the latter's "agent" in Kenya – Raila Odinga – during the period under study. A summary of the findings of this constructivist stage of the research follows next.

5.4 Summary of Findings

The preceding discussions focused on Luo interpretations of the socio-cultural-economic consequences of political exclusion/marginalization. Based on Foucault's methodology – genealogy of power – the chapter has revisited the Kenyatta-Odinga rivalry and outlined contemporary perspectives of the Luo on the enmity. The chapter reveals that owing to the rivalry between the two historical figures, relations between the Luo and the Kikuyu "ethnic groups" have deteriorated immensely in Kenya. More than three decades after his demise, Kenyatta's deculturalization technique, discussed in chapter two, remains profoundly embedded in Kenyan society. The latter's subjugation device – the circumcision myth – is, seemingly, being utilized subtly in a well-calculated strategy to keep the Luo completely outside mainstream societal affairs in Kenya. It looks like the circumcision myth is operating beyond the national/political level; it appears to be playing a noticeable role at the grassroots level in diminishing ordinary Luos' chances of earning a decent living and obtaining anticipated and commensurate rewards for effort and hard work.

Owing to frustrations associated with the myth, widespread feelings of apathy and utter resentment towards the GoK are beginning to arise amongst the Luo with some of the community's members exhibiting a desire for secession. However, the violent methods utilized by the Kenyan state in quashing erstwhile secessionist movements seem to have held in check any breakaway attempts by the Luo, some of whom now appear to be opting instead for conformist measures geared, amongst other aims, towards gaining them acceptance as fully-fledged members of the Kenyan society. Jomo Kenyatta's standpoint, which linked civility and legitimate citizenship to male circumcision, has translated into tremendous economic difficulties at the grassroots level for the majority of Luos. The most conspicuous of these difficulties seems to be lack of access to loans from financial institutions. The study suggests that some financial

institutions in Kenya, especially those founded by members of the ruling “ethnic groups”, exist fundamentally to serve the interests of their kin in what could well be a ploy to perpetuate the social formation of capital. The study also shows that the African surname is playing the unenviable role of facilitating prejudice in socio-economic relations experienced by the Luo in Kenyan society. Other areas of economic difficulty for the Luo, associated with attempts to safeguard the structural determination of capital in Kenya, include difficulties with government funds and grants, employment, access to certain markets and/or entry into certain professions/business ventures, and government contracts and tenders.

Despite the economic hardships associated with political exclusion of the Luo in Kenya, the study reveals, a section of the community remains convinced that all humans are created equal and would, therefore, not retaliate by favouring fellow Luos if granted influential positions in society. However, owing to politically-instigated economic afflictions, this sense of high-mindedness is gradually waning in some Luos. This portion of exasperated Luos subscribes to, and advocates for, the eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth philosophy. The Luo perspective, on whether Luos help each other, given the predicament they collectively face – the economic consequences of political exclusion – is almost completely negative. Narratives from the discussions held with members of the community disclose an overwhelming phenomenon that can, perhaps, best be described as “self-hate”. This “self-hate” phenomenon not only thrives amongst the community’s political leaders, but abounds at the grassroots level as well. Most of the other Kenyan “ethnic groups”, the study suggests, are relatively more “intelligent” and are appraising their political and economic chances in Kenya with the reality that they live in an environment and context of “ethnic” competition and rivalry. The Luo are ostensibly yet to wake up fully to this reality; otherwise, they would put aside their arrogance and “self-hate” and join hands to work together as a people, to help uplift their living standards, as a reactionary measure to being politically side-lined by the GoK, during the period under study.

The Luo perspective on marriage is significantly multidimensional; evidently, political exclusion at the national level has not translated into the adoption of exclusivity amongst the Luo, with regard to this social phenomenon. Similarly, the findings of this research indicate that there is a multiplicity of views amongst those in the Luo community, regarding the interplay

between political marginalization and economic development. The various perspectives uncovered in this study include the following: Luo opposition has generated government apathy and stands in the way of the extra state provision that would assist Luo Nyanza leaders in the completion of some of the region's projects; opposition politics has, in fact, led to greater development of not only Luo Nyanza, but of the whole of Kenya; development is a matter of individual wisdom and character and has no link whatsoever to opposition politics; due to opposing the GoK, Luo Nyanza has witnessed outright economic sabotage, instigated by the state; those areas of Luo Nyanza associated with Luo political leaders that back the GoK – considered modern “Uncle Toms” by some – receive more GoK attention and support and are relatively more developed than the rest of the region; and, lastly, there is hypocritical leadership, in which Luo politicians call for unison amongst Luos when it comes to rebelling and opposing the GoK, but largely “eat” the “spoils of war” by themselves.

Various other important issues emerged during the FGDs that warrant a mention, for some of them may well determine the trajectory of Kenyan and Luo politics in the years to come. As Kenya heads towards the 2017 General Election, the study shows, an element of fear is beginning to creep in amongst the Luo community. This is especially the case with those Luos who live in cosmopolitan counties like Nakuru. This paranoia is largely due to the violent manner in which the Kenyan Police confronted the largely peaceful demonstrators, which called for fundamental changes in the electoral body, the IEBC. Also, concerns are emerging amongst some Luo that their *de facto* leader, Raila Odinga, faces a tumultuous task if he is to dislodge his Uhuru Kenyatta-led Kikuyu opponents who, owing to protracted control of state power have become comparatively well-heeled over time. As a result, in some quarters, calls for empowerment of the Luo appear not to be limited to that considered “legal” or “moral” – a portion the community is calling for emancipation by any means necessary. Other Luos, in what seems like a change of tactic, are calling for the substitution of a confrontational stance with a more resourceful (creative) one, epitomized by the employment and maximization of alternative means to economic empowerment and development, including the prudent utilization of CDF funds.

Finally, concerning Raila Odinga, the study reveals that there are various antithetical characteristics with regards to his persona – some of which would make one question whether, in fact, he is the leader who can propel Kenya to the next frontier, in terms of the good and accountable leadership they yearn for. Most Luos/Kenyans still regard him as their legitimate leader, who has the interests of the community/county at heart, since he has often declined to accept government posts for personal gain and is seemingly a wise adviser, whose ideas have led to freedom, development and equitable distribution of resources in Kenya. However, to some he is a very tight-fisted individual who seldom demonstrates compassion in monetary terms – a callous, selfish and nepotistic potential “puppet” of the West. What appeared to be ethnic-based post-election violence in Kenya until 2013 may well have had a hidden element to it: a struggle between the indigenous African nationalist bourgeois class (“anti-Odinga forces”) and the Western-based, globalist forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system (“pro-Odinga forces”).

The next chapter examines historical records to gauge the GoK’s economic engagement with Luo Nyanza during the period under study, with a special focus on Mészáros’ understanding of “equity”, that is, equality of access to opportunity, equality of participation in the opportunity, and the outcome of equal participation (cf. Mészáros, 2001a; Mészáros, 2001b; Mészáros, 2009). It does this through the prism of what appears to have been a ferocious power struggle between the nationalist bourgeois class in Kenya and the globalists – the forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system – during the period ending 2013, as depicted in figure 5.1 above. It is also guided by the theoretical framework and alternative theories discussed in chapter two; the analysis centres on five areas of public provision, as follows: education, healthcare, housing, electricity and rural water supplies.

Chapter 6

An Historical Analysis of the Impact of Kenya's "Ethnicized" Politics on the Socio-economic Development of the Luo, 1963 – 2013

6 Introduction

The findings in chapters four and five suggest that there is a strong relationship between opposition politics and minimal public investment in Luo Nyanza during the period under study. In order to verify the validity of these sentiments, this chapter looks at independent Kenya's historical records – Budget Speeches, Economic Surveys and Statistical Abstracts – to establish the proportions and outcomes of public investment undertaken by the GoK in the country's eight provinces from 1963 – 2013. The analysis is centred on five areas of public provision, as follows: education, healthcare, housing, electricity and rural water supplies. As enunciated in the problem statement in chapter one, this chapter concerns itself with equity – in terms of equality of access to opportunity, equality of participation in the opportunity, and the outcome of equal participation (cf. Mészáros, 2001a; Mészáros, 2001b; Mészáros, 2009). Alongside chapter two's theoretical framework and literature review, analysis of findings have been carried out and conclusions drawn vis-à-vis the various meanings of development as espoused by the Luo, in chapter five. For convenience purposes, this chapter, the second qualitative phase of the research, is divided into five historical phases as follows: 1963 – 1973; 1973 – 1983; 1983 – 1993; 1993 – 2003; and 2003 – 2013. In full cognizance of the fact that development, whichever its kind, does not occur in a vacuum, this chapter adopts some of the ideas espoused in the conceptual framework unveiled in figure 5.1, in chapter five, that developments in Kenya – be they social, political or economic – take place within a context characterized by tensions and power struggles between the indigenous African nationalist bourgeois class and the forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system (globalists). Accordingly, in each historical phase, the state of Kenyan politics and economy, vis-à-vis prevalent global interactions, intrusions and events, will be discussed, as appropriate, followed by the development projects and programmes undertaken by the GoK, and an analysis of the outcome of these government initiatives. This will give the historical phase of this study a contextual background and make the findings of this crucial stage more meaningful. Each of the aforementioned historical phases is now sequentially analysed.

6.1 1963 – 73: The Era of Squatter Settlement and Debt Accumulation in Kenya

6.1.1 State of the Kenyan Economy, 1963 – 73

As Kenya prepared itself for self-determination in 1963, few would-be citizens of the East African nation realized the real situation that lay ahead of them: they would not only be victims of the negative consequences of the “ethnic” divisions instigated by the British administrators at the advent of colonialism, but also continuous toilers, overwhelmed by the uncertainties of life under the “indomitable” capitalist regime that loomed. The same ignorance, though, cannot be attributed to Malcolm MacDonald, the last Governor of British Kenya, who in 1963 was quoted as aptly capturing, albeit inadvertently, the situation that the desire for socio-economic-political world domination spearheaded by his “Queen” had created for Africans even if he fell short of apportioning the blame to his “race”: “You can allay suspicions, curb passions, and weaken rivalries, and combine the tribes and communities which have divided Kenya in the past into the united nation of the present and the future. The slogan for that effort is *Haraambe*” (Government of Kenya Hansard [GoKH], 1963, p.11). The British colonialists acceded to Kenya’s demands for independence not merely because the African guerrilla had outdone the latter, but largely because colonialism had accomplished its intended role of affixing Africa unswervingly into the maelstrom of the world monopoly capitalist economy (cf. Oloo, 2004) and had prepared the continent for the next stage of exploitation – neo-colonialism. The particular role crafted for Kenya was shrewdly mentioned, and is discernible to the keen observer, in another statement attributed to Governor MacDonald:

One of the Government’s and your duties will be to exploit further Kenya’s natural resources: to preserve and develop its agriculture, expand the variety of its economy, encourage local and overseas investors, extend its home and external markets, cherish that national treasure, your Game Reserves and National Parks, and in any other way stimulate the country’s material developments. The chief purpose of all that is to provide the means to give employment, education, health and a good living standard to everyone. (GoKH, 1963, p. 17)

Kenya’s role would be to produce agricultural products for sale, in unprocessed form, in order to “quench the thirst” of European industries. No significant form of technology, necessary for

ensuring “true” independence of the “new” country, would be transferred to the Africans – this would perpetuate their state of dependency and play a huge role in hampering the desirable “good living standards” alluded to in the above quotation. Granted, it is naïve to expect anyone to haphazardly transfer technological knowhow that gives him/her an edge over fellow humans, given the competitive nature of the world; however, in a situation of goodwill, in which a “new” nation-state is born, it is not analytically injudicious to contemplate this probable gesture. Kenya was apparently also encouraged to depend on foreign capital (overseas investors) for its economic growth and open up its other natural resources, parks and reserves, for enjoyment by leisure-seeking, moneyed Europeans. In a nutshell, Kenya did not truly gain independence in 1963; colonialism mutated. This reality was succinctly captured in the words of Kenya’s first Finance Minister (1963 – 70), James Gichuru, who stated the following in 1968: “Kenya is a country which is very much at the mercy of world economic forces over which we have little or no control” (GoKH, 1968, p. 1135).

A perceptive individual, Kenyatta was amongst the first Kenyan/African leaders to understand Kenya’s/Africa’s vulnerability; Kenya, indeed, was a banana republic. The realization that he was not really in charge of affairs, that circumstances beyond his control would determine the nation’s economic trajectory, made the old man panic; in order to appear like he was the one running the show and ensure that he remained relevant in the eyes of his “subjects”, he moved fast to consolidate state power. Indeed, by 1965 he had amended the Independence (*Majimbo*) Constitution that “provided for regional governments and also for a new set-up of local authorities” and “transfer[ed] . . . primary education, roads, health, including graduated personal tax from county councils to Central Government” (GoKH, 1970, p. 1420). Throughout the period 1963 – 73, the GoK experienced tremendous challenges with regard to the country’s balance of payments position; predictably, Kenya imported more than it exported. The internal demand for capital goods far outweighed the external market for the country’s main foreign exchange earners, coffee and tea. To further comprehend the magnitude of “independent” Kenya’s predicament and subservient position, consider Gichuru’s 1966 lamentations:

[T]here is no point in industrial countries claiming to want to help and then failing to provide markets for the produce of the poorer nations who frequently have seen the

benefits of greater production lost through falling prices, lack of markets and increases in prices of imports. Indeed, restrictive trade measures against goods from developing countries are becoming quite widespread in the industrial nations. This international problem requires re-examination of aid and trade policies, for what under-developed countries need is not only aid but also trade. (GoKH, 1966, p. 717)

With regard to Kenya's dependency on foreign aid, the country was inundated with offers of financial "assistance" in the form of loans from various external quarters. "Assistance" was obtained from, amongst other entities, the British Government, the West German Government, the International Bank, the Colonial Development Corporation, the US Government, and the Commonwealth Development Corporation; other "assistance" was acquired from international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Through this "assistance", Kenya financed its settlement programmes – to be discussed in greater detail shortly – and the usual recurrent and development expenditures. Notably, though, the severity of the country's dependency on foreign aid was such that it had to wait till the financial year 1968 – 69 to finally finance its entire recurrent expenditure budget without factoring in funds sourced externally; this fact supports my "mutation" assertion. External debt obligations arising from this "assistance" would in the following decades cripple the country's development agenda almost in its entirety. Moreover, desperation arising from this consequence would further cement Kenya's submissiveness and expose the country to the whims of the IMF and World Bank – the cryptograms of the world monopoly capitalist (globalist) forces – which were enforced in Kenya in the 1990s through neoliberalism and its associated structural adjustments. Loans from these international financial institutions are nothing more than indirect subjugation tools; bait used to hook unsuspecting, developing nations. Once the loanee countries are overburdened and cannot afford to meet their debt obligations, they are "taken over" by external forces: they are given concessions and/or further aid assistance on condition that they totally liberalize their economies for conquest, usually by the globalist forces associated with the world monopoly capitalist system that run/control the international financial institutions. Nevertheless, the period 1963 – 73 will go down as a glorious decade when compared to others that followed it; the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth was both stable and consistent, as depicted in figure 6.1 and table 6.1 below:

Table 6.1: Kenya’s Economic Performance, 1963 – 73

YEAR	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
GDP GROWTH (%)	6.5	5.3	0.8	10.4	4.7	6.6	5.6	6.3	5.7	6.9	6.5

Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1963 – 73




Figure 6.1: Kenya’s GDP Growth Rate, 1963 – 73.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya’s Economic Surveys, 1963 – 73

The highest GDP growth rate was recorded in 1966 and the decade’s average GDP growth rate – approximately 6% – was impressive. Although borrowing for purposes of development was intense at this time, the GoK seemingly struck a good balance between proposed development projects and programmes, and its spending capacity. The manner in which the country made use of its largely, externally sourced finances between 1963 and 1973 is examined next.

6.1.2 GoK Development Initiatives, 1963 – 73

6.1.2.1 Land Settlement Schemes

The GoK's development agenda from 1963 to 1973 was primarily dominated by land settlement schemes. The British colonial policy of appropriating fertile African land for purposes of actualizing European capitalist enterprises (settler agriculture) left many Africans (mainly Kikuyus, Maasais and the Kalenjin) landless; squatter-settlement thus became a major issue in the Kenyatta Administration's agenda immediately upon its ascension to power. The state, undoubtedly, was to play a leading part in purchasing land for poor Africans: negotiations for a five-year expanded settlement scheme, in which 1,000,000 acres of land were to be transferred to the latter, had been concluded prior to independence in 1963 (GoKH, 1964, p. 220). As already mentioned, loans from the British Government were pivotal in financing settlement. The priority accorded to settlement was such that out of a total estimated expenditure of £14.1 million in financial year 1963 – 64, £6.2 million was apportioned to such schemes (GoKH, 1963, p. 23); and out of the £16 million set aside for development in financial year 1965 – 66, £6 million was used for settlement (GoKH, 1965, p. 264). By 1964, about 15,000 families had benefited from the scheme; in 1965, about 12,000 more families would benefit (GoKH, 1964, p. 220).

Present-day Kikuyu dominance in an area that is not their traditional homeland – for currently, they are the major landowners in the former Rift Valley Province of which Nakuru and Uasin Gishu Counties were part – indicates that the community was the greatest beneficiary of this settlement scheme. Kalenjin bitterness, arising out of the fact that Kenyatta “gave” the community's land to his “tribesmates”, is one of the major grievances that led to the 2007 – 08 post-election violence in Kenya. Moi's eventual appointment by Kenyatta to the Vice-Presidency, following the Odinga fallout, was a tactful move by the founding father to quell disquiet amongst the aggrieved Kalenjin. Concerning the Luo, they most certainly were not considered under this scheme, for the community did not lose its land during the colonial era: indeed, about Luo Nyanza, it was noted by European administrators around 1905 that “[t]he native interests [we]re predominant [and that] there exist[ed] very little land in large blocks available for white settlement”; moreover, it is further stated in the colonial administrators' records that “[t]he climatic conditions of these areas however [we]re such as not to be favourable

for white settlement”.⁴⁵ Technically, though, they could benefit, if they so wished, from a parallel, market-driven scheme, operated on a willing-buyer-willing-seller basis, and financed by loans from the Land Bank in Kenya. The manner in which Kenyatta dealt with the settlement of squatters is demonstrative of one of the arguments espoused in the theoretical framework of this thesis that political power is a vehicle to economic prosperity in Africa, since whoever controls the state decides the manner in which the scarce resources will be allocated (cf. Odinga, 2007; Singh & vom Hau, 2015; Mullard, 2005); however, on the part of the Luo, history definitely conspired against the community with regard to this land issue. Concerning the Kalenjin case, these findings also support another core argument of this thesis: indeed, the original owners of much of the land that was appropriated by colonialists could not get it back because, as this study argues in its theoretical framework, the “ethnic groups” that control state power do not allocate the dominated groups an equitable share of the national bounty. The next sub-section analyses agricultural development during the period 1963 – 73.

6.1.2.2 Agricultural Development, 1963 – 73

Another priority area on the GoK’s development agenda during the period 1963–73 was the agricultural sector. A thorough scrutiny of this sector reveals that strong arguments can be made for either side of the debate as to whether Luo Nyanza was short-changed by the central government in the provision of public investment regarding agriculture. The two prevalent perspectives – capitalism and uneven development, and subtle sabotage, as discussed in the theoretical background to this thesis in chapter 2 – are hereby examined.

6.1.2.2.1 Capitalism and Uneven Development Vis-à-vis Kenyan Agriculture

Historical records – the budget speeches – show that the GoK engaged coffee and tea farmers more meticulously, addressing their concerns in holistic fashion, as opposed to those that grew wheat, maize and sugarcane. Even though the GoK periodically reviewed its pricing policies to boost the income of maize and wheat farmers (GoKH, 1971, p. 1175), for instance, it went a step further in its efforts to support the coffee and tea sectors, as substantiated by the Finance Minister in the 1967 Budget Speech:

⁴⁵ See Report on the progress and condition of the Kisumu Province, East Africa Protectorate, for the twelve months ending 31st March 1908 (KNA/PC/NZA/1/3), p. 1.

The plan for tea development . . . [which involves] . . . [i]mproved methods of producing better quality planting material are being applied and the Government is hopeful that by 1970, there should be no limit of the planting material available to the smallholders. It is also planned to build 11 more factories to bring the total number of factories at the disposal of the smallholders to 18 factories by 1973. (GoKH, 1967, p. 967)

This behaviour on the part of the GoK can be explained by the fact that coffee and tea are the country's foremost foreign exchange earners; for Kenya to be able to engage in international trade, therefore, these two cash crops have to be prioritized. Of equal importance, this study shows, donor countries and agencies have a great say in, and sometimes even dictate, the development agenda of aid recipients. In 1963, for instance, it was stated by Kenya's Finance Minister that "[o]n the agricultural side we are following closely the recommendation of the World Bank, and the programme for tea development is going ahead according to plan" (GoKH, 1963, p. 23). This statement supports my earlier contentions that when "independence" was finally granted to the East African nation, a specific, "suitable" role had already been identified for it in the world monopoly capitalist system. Tea and coffee, which seem to be very important to the industrialized nations that often control the world market, happen to grow, mainly, in the areas occupied by the Kikuyu and Kalenjin; Luo Nyanza, on the other hand, is suitable for the growth of sugarcane and cotton. It may be argued that the importation of sugar by the GoK (cf. e.g., GoKH, 1972, p. 123), though geared towards meeting the country's needs, may have served to sabotage the efforts of Luos in this agricultural sub-sector; however, from a realistic viewpoint and from Kenya's world market perspective, sugar and cotton are not as strategic as coffee and tea (see figure 6.2 below). This somewhat nullifies the notion of sabotage – when it comes to development – that can be attributed to crop farming, for soil and climate suitability issues are not a consequence of man's actions, but those of supernatural forces whose activities have been referred to as fortuitous happenings in some quarters (cf. Mandel, 1968, as cited in Bond 1999). These findings corroborate the arguments of Oloo (2004), a major advocate of the *Theory of Uneven Development*, who contends that poverty in Luo Nyanza can be explained by the fact that "capitalism develops in contradictory ways . . . within the boundaries of a single country" (*What is Uneven Development?* section, para. 1). The alternative perspective, in which it may be

argued that the GoK imperceptibly sabotaged the agricultural efforts of Luos in a bid to frustrate the supporters of its fiercest critics, is briefly discussed next.




Figure 6.2: Composition of Kenya's Exports in 1961.

Source: Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Economic Survey 1962, p. 10

6.1.2.2.2 Subtle Sabotage of Luo Nyanza?

There is a very strong possibility – evidence from the budget speeches seems to show – that the GoK engaged in a very subtle kind of discrimination geared at sabotaging the

agricultural prospects of Luo Nyanza during the period 1963–73. It would seem that, in the case of Luo Nyanza, support was limited to the provision of roads for the sugar areas (cf. e.g., GoKH, 1968, p. 1147); on the other hand, extension services and loans were available to small-scale tea and coffee farmers, as described below:

[S]mall-holders have become the principal producers of coffee in Kenya. Indeed, the great increase in the production by small-holders of a number of other crops, not only coffee, is an indication of the success of the Government's policies of land consolidation and registration, and of the rapid increase in the provision of agricultural extension services and credit facilities. (GoKH, 1968, p. 1139)

It may be argued that the provision of roads, no matter how essential and well-intentioned, is an obligatory exercise that does not directly intervene in an individual's life; facilitation of loans for small-scale holdings is much more direct and has a greater bearing on people's lives. Coupled with the "questionable" importation of sugar undertaken by the GoK towards the end of this period, avoidance of the aforementioned direct engagement with the Luo leaves the Kenyatta-led GoK susceptible to allegations of favouritism towards its enthusiasts – mainly members of the Kikuyu "ethnic group". This finding of possible favouritism of the Kikuyu by Kenyan authorities resonates with the numerous lamentations of the Luo discussed in the FGDs and the school of thought that argues that due to opposing the GoK, Luo Nyanza has witnessed outright economic sabotage, instigated by the state, as explained in sub-section 5.2.5 of chapter five. I now turn my attention to the specific projects undertaken by the GoK from 1963 to 1973.

6.1.2.3 GoK Development Projects, 1963 – 73

A general examination of the development projects undertaken by the GoK from 1963 to 1973 reveals an element of robustness and all-inclusiveness; the approach adopted by the state was of such nature that the interests of the diverse economic sectors and most "ethnic groups" were catered to in one way or another. Regarding Luo Nyanza, the budget speeches show that the traditional homeland of the Luo community was considered, in some way, in most of the development schemes undertaken in this era. A brief discussion of some of these development projects vis-à-vis Kenya in general, and the Luo in particular, follows next.

In a bid to ensure that Nairobi's water supply needs were met, in 1963 the GoK embarked on a project aimed at raising the Sasumua Dam – a project funded by aid from the US and the UK, following deals brokered by James Gichuru, Tom Mboya and Masinde Muliro in August 1962. Provision of electricity, a pressing need all over the country, was also prioritized: in this regard, the GoK initiated the hydro-electric power project at Seven Folks Dam. The Mombasa Road Project, which sought to link the port town to the city of Nairobi and other nearby areas, was also initiated during this period. In the course of this phase, the GoK financed projects geared at ensuring and stabilizing water supply in Mombasa, as well. Perhaps to demonstrate its policy posture concerning the East-West Rivalry of the Cold War Era in 1965, prior to the fallout between Odinga and Kenyatta, the Russian Hospital Project at Kisumu was approved by the GoK; Gichuru, the Finance Minister, stated unequivocally that the country was “in this matter completely non-aligned, and . . . only too eager to receive aid in acceptable form from any country or overseas institution” (GoKH, 1965, p. 270). The Chemelil Sugar Project in Luo Nyanza, supported entirely by funds from West Germany, in which a factory was constructed, factory machinery financed and £1 million provided for the growth and development of sugarcane also characterized this era (cf. GoKH, 1965, p. 270).

From 1966, when animosity towards the Odinga-led opposition by Kenyatta's Government began to become evident, other “nationalistic” projects were undertaken by the state including the following: a Teacher-Training College at the Coast, the Ngong Medium Wave Transmission Station, and the Forest Department's Extraction Roads Unit at Kaptagat (cf. GoKH, 1967, p. 956). In 1967, possibly to prove that the Kenyatta – Odinga animosity was not amongst the determinants of its policy stance on development, the GoK unveiled development plans, which included Luo Nyanza when the Finance Minister, Gichuru, stated the following:

Among the new projects to be financed are the Eldoret/Tororo and Athi River/Namanga roads, otherwise known as the Great North Road, Sugar roads in the Chemelil/Muhoroni area, Mombasa Television, the Kenyatta National Teaching Hospital, improvements to Airports and Airstrips, and building works at the University College, Nairobi. Projects already started which are expected to be completed during the year include the

Nairobi/Mombasa road, Kenya Polytechnic Extensions, Homa Bay Hospital and the One Million-Acre Settlement Scheme. (GoKH, 1967, p. 957)

Also, inclusion of Luo Nyanza in the GoK's development agenda prevailed shortly before Odinga's KPU was proscribed and Mboya assassinated in 1969; this is apparent in the following excerpt obtained from the statement of Financial Year 1968 – 69:

The biggest single project in the field of health will be the start of the extensions of the Kenyatta National Hospital which as Honourable Members will know is to become the teaching hospital for Kenya medical students. The new hospital at Homa Bay will be completed and the programme of modernizing such facilities as kitchens, laundries, out-patient sections at the provincial and district hospitals all over the country at an estimated cost of K£200,000 will be pursued. (GoKH, 1968, p. 1148)

This crucial historical phase, in which the framework for Kenya's economy was constructed, saw a myriad of other government projects embarked on in the interests of the nation, including the following: housing programmes for middle-income earners such as Nairobi's Uhuru Estate; Nairobi Industrial Estate; the Forestry Development Programme; water programmes for North-Eastern Province; Turbo Afforestation Scheme; Broderick Falls Pulp and Paper Mill; housing for the Armed Forces and the Police; and, Embakasi Airport extension (cf. GoK Budget Speeches, 1963 – 73).

In concluding this sub-section, it is noteworthy that, based on the major development projects undertaken by the GoK during this phase of the study, it is difficult to make a case for the deliberate short-changing of the Luo in the provision of public investment, owing to opposition politics, during the first decade of independence. At face value, the development projects undertaken by the GoK during this era exhibit national interest, robustness, and all-inclusiveness, and seem to transcend the Kenyatta-Odinga rivalry. An examination of the outcome of the GoK's development programmes and projects, in a bid to establish whether, in fact, this conclusion – that the Luo were not short-changed – is cast in stone, follows next.

6.1.3 An Analysis of the Outcome of GoK Public Investment, 1963 – 73

I have already discussed, in this historical phase of the study, how Kenyatta had completely centralized power by 1965 and, amongst other things, transferred the role of provision of primary education, roads and health from county councils to the Central Government. In this sub-section, I carry on one step further and examine the outcomes of public investment instigated at the national level of government as disclosed by various historical records – the GoK’s Economic Surveys and Statistical Abstracts. My focus is on five areas of public provision, viz.: education, health services, housing, electricity and water supplies.

6.1.3.1 Education Outcomes, 1963 – 73

The outcome of GoK public investment in primary school education was as depicted in figure 6.3 below; the GoK provides figures of enrolment in primary school, from the year 1965, which serves as the beginning point in the analysis of this particular public provision.⁴⁶



⁴⁶ For a comprehensive look at the exact numerical figures, from whence the graphical illustrations contained in this entire chapter derive, refer to Appendix E.




Figure 6.3: Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1965 – 73.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1965 – 73

The outcome of GoK investment in primary education shows that the greatest beneficiary was the president’s backyard – Central Province – which experienced a continuous steady rise in enrolment figures. Eastern was second, followed by Nyanza, the traditional homeland of the Luo, Rift Valley, and Western, in that order. Coast, Nairobi and North Eastern were sixth, seventh and eighth, respectively. Although Nyanza witnessed a general growth in primary school enrolment over this historical phase, continuous stable progress was not witnessed in the province until after 1970. This is unlike Central and Eastern, whose figures show stable growth throughout this historical phase. A vast majority of the country’s school-going population lives in the rural areas of the country; this largely explains the poor performances of Nairobi and Coast Provinces, which are home to some of the country’s largest metropolitan areas. North Eastern, on the other

hand, is a very sparsely populated arid area. The enrolment outcomes at the secondary school level were as shown in figure 6.4 below.




Figure 6.4: Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1968 – 73.

Source: Constructed from Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1968 – 73

In a trend similar to the one depicted in the primary school category, the president’s backyard led in the secondary school enrolment numbers, which were characterized by a steady rise throughout the period 1968 – 73. It is striking that the other provinces, especially Eastern, Nyanza, Rift Valley and Western, which performed well in enrolment at a primary level, did not witness the same success in this category. The fact that Nairobi, which enrolled far fewer pupils at the primary level, consistently recorded greater numbers at the secondary level than the aforementioned four provinces, shows that transition rates to secondary school in the rest of

Kenya were very poor. This indicates that the Luo and other non-Kikuyu Kenyan “ethnic groups” did not have equality of participation in secondary education during the first decade of independence in Kenya. The dismal figures recorded by the North Eastern Province can be explained by the fact that it is a very sparsely populated region because of its unfavourable semi-arid climate. The outcomes of public provision in health services are examined next.

6.1.3.2 Health Provision Outcomes, 1963 – 73

As early as the 1970s, Kenya had established a national family planning programme aimed at providing free service for patients who desired to plan their families. This programme, besides providing family planning services, targeted maternal and child health and was aimed at combating malnutrition. Family planning centres were run, mainly, from provincial and district hospitals. Mobile clinics were also operationalized for this purpose. The figures for attendance at these family planning clinics, which the GoK started to provide from the year 1970, were as depicted in figure 6.5 below.



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


Figure 6.5: Attendance at Family Planning Clinics by Province, 1970 – 73.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1970 – 73

The evidence clearly shows that the greatest beneficiaries of this public provision were the capital, Nairobi, and Central, the president’s turf. They were followed by Eastern, Coast and Rift Valley Provinces, respectively. Perhaps owing to a combination of religious-inspired negative attitudes towards the practice and the nomadic lifestyle of most of its largely Muslim pastoralist inhabitants, this service was not accorded to the North Eastern Province. However, it is important to note that, historically, the region has been at loggerheads with the Kenyan state and this could also be a factor behind its neglect. The figures for Nyanza Province, wherein lies Luo Nyanza, were dismal; in fact, Nyanza was consistently amongst the two worst performers, alongside Western Province, during this first historical phase, indicating a lack of equality of access to these crucial services. These findings suggest that there was a strong link between a

community's posture, perceived or real, and access to health services during the first decade of independence in Kenya. The figures for hospital beds and cots, by province, during this historical phase of the study, which the GoK also began to provide from 1970, were as depicted in figure 6.6 below.




Figure 6.6: Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1970 – 73.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1970 – 73

Again, Nairobi, the capital, was dominant as a beneficiary in this category of public provision. It was closely followed by Rift Valley, Central and Eastern in that order. Coast, Nyanza, Western and North Eastern were fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth, respectively. Based on these figures and patterns, it is difficult to create a case for politically-instigated sabotage in the provision of health services with the number of beds and cots as indicators; however, it is clear from figure 6.6,

above – particularly with reference to Nairobi and North Eastern Provinces – that capitalism leads to uneven development across regions at the nation-state level. Nairobi, the greatest beneficiary, happens to be the country’s industrial, commercial and political capital; North Eastern, on the other hand, owing to its unfavourable climate and soils, has historically been economically overlooked by Kenyan authorities since the advent of colonialism. The outcome of public provision with regard to housing is examined next.

6.1.3.3 Housing Provision Outcomes, 1963 – 73

The National Housing Corporation (NHC), a GoK statutory body established in 1953, has continuously been tasked with the provision of affordable, decent housing for Kenyans. Its figures for houses completed, by province, from 1968 to 1973, were as captured in figure 6.7 below.






Figure 6.7: No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1968 - 73.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1968 – 73

NHC figures, as depicted in figure 6.7 above, show that during the first decade of Kenya's independence the corporation paid no heed to equity in its attempts to provide low-cost housing to Kenyans. The amalgamated outcome of the units of houses constructed to accommodate low-income earners during the historical phase 1963 – 73 shows that Nairobi got the lion's share at 58.72%, followed by Coast (12.66%), Rift Valley (12.65%), Central (6.02%), Nyanza (3.75%), Western (3.82%), Eastern (2.01%) and North Eastern (0.36%). The major determinant factor behind the provision of affordable housing by the NHC during the period 1963 – 73 seems to have been logic, suitability and practicality. Owing to its more sophisticated infrastructure and its choice as a destination for employment seekers, presumably, it made more sense for the GoK to apply this provision to the city's dwellers, as opposed to the nomads of the North Eastern

Province, for instance. Urban areas were, thus, prioritized; this posture can be directly linked to the uneven development that inevitably accompanies capitalism as a mode of production. Electricity provision outcomes are discussed next.

6.1.3.4 Electricity Provision Outcomes, 1963 – 73

The GoK provides statistics on electricity consumption in independent Kenya, from the year 1966. Distribution to the country's regions during this particular historical phase of this study is classified under six categories, viz.: Kitale, Kisumu, Eldoret, Rift Valley, Coast, and, finally, Nairobi and Mt. Kenya. Whilst Kisumu represents the interests of the Luo, those of President Jomo Kenyatta's Kikuyu "ethnic group" are recorded under Nairobi and Mt. Kenya, the latter of which includes Nanyuki, Nyeri, Meru and Embu, the home areas of the GEMA bloc of communities – a Bantu organization formed with Kenyatta's approval to advance the socio-economic-political interests of the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru and Akamba "ethnic groups", especially in relation to the perceived Luo threat – which has dominated Kenya for a protracted period of time. The patterns for electricity sales by area, which essentially represent a combination of the purchasing power of various "ethnic groups", and government provision of street lighting during the period 1966 – 73, are given in figure 6.8, below.



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


Figure 6.8: Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by Area, 1966 – 73 ('000 kWh).

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1963 – 73

Figure 6.8, above, shows that electricity supply was heavily skewed in favour of Nairobi and Mt. Kenya insofar as small consumer lighting, domestic consumption and street lighting were concerned. The Coastal area, which is home to Kenya’s second most important city, Mombasa, was a distant second, followed by Rift Valley, Kisumu, Eldoret, and Kitale, in that order. Equality of access to this opportunity of enjoying the benefits of electricity was completely lacking. The president’s “ethnic group”, the Kikuyu, appears to have had immense leverage vis-à-vis other communities like the Luo, in terms of the ability to purchase electricity at the individual consumption level. These findings support my contention, in sub-section 6.1.2.2.2, that facilitation of loans for small-scale holdings, which the GoK did for coffee and tea farmers,

is much more direct, and has a greater bearing on people's lives, as opposed to merely providing roads, as was the case with the GoK's engagement with largely Luo sugar farmers. Water supply outcomes for period 1963 – 73 are discussed next.

6.1.3.5 Water Supply Outcomes, 1963 – 73

The GoK started providing figures for the amounts spent on rural water schemes, by the Ministry of Agriculture's Water Development Division, from the year 1971. Results of the GoK's efforts towards the provision of this essential commodity, during this historical phase of this study, 1963 – 73, therefore, begin from 1971 and were as captured in figure 6.9 below.




Figure 6.9: Cost of Operational Rural Water Schemes by Province, 1971- 73 (K£).

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 1971 – 73

As depicted in figure 6.9 above, the GoK's effort towards provision of rural water supply during the historical phase 1963 – 73 was acutely lopsided, especially in favour of Eastern, Central and Coast Provinces. As of 1973, the proportions of government expenditure towards this cause were as follows: Eastern (31%); Central (23%); Coast (21%); Western (13%); Rift Valley (6%); North Eastern (4%); and, lastly, Nyanza (2%). Nyanza Province got the least amount of government funding with regard to provision of rural water supplies during this historical phase of this study; the Water Development Division did not pay any heed to equality of access to opportunity. There is a very strong possibility that opposition politics played an immense role in the dismal allocations to Nyanza Province, where the Luo reside. The subsequent historical phase of this study, 1973 – 83, is examined in detail, next.

6.2 1973 – 83: The Era of the Exposure of the Uncertainties of Capitalism in Kenya

6.2.1 State of the Kenyan Economy, 1973 – 83

The world monopoly capitalist system, in which “independent” Kenya is firmly affixed, is characterized by great ambiguity, especially for developing countries whose economies are agriculture-based. In this regard, Kenya's predicament lies in the fact that it is over dependent on coffee and tea for its foreign exchange. Whenever the weather is unfavourable, and/or the world prices of these two main exports fall, its economy is shaken. On the other hand, the country's most vital import commodity, oil, is notoriously volatile in the world market: oil prices have been known to drastically increase by up to four or five times, as was the case in 1974 and 1975, and this equally wobbles the country's economy. The period 1973 – 83, which will go down in Kenya's economic history as one in which the uncertainties associated with capitalism were explicitly laid bare for all to see, was indeed complex; it featured two presidents, two finance ministers and several Sessional Papers and Development Plans. The strategic and powerful Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning changed hands between Kikuyu politicians when James Gichuru handed the docket over to Mwai Kibaki in 1970; the latter, who would retain this position until 1981, would steer Kenya through one of its toughest economic phases.

As the country prepared itself to enforce policies that would lead to “an improvement in the quality of life of [its] poorer people” (GoKH, 1973, p. 137) and create an enabling environment for “the attainment of social justice and equity” (GoKH, 1974, p. 465), it was,

owing to the uncertainties that characterize the world monopoly capitalist system, suddenly hit by the adverse swing phenomenon. During an adverse swing, an occurrence that is extremely difficult to predict, the prices of a country's imports rise faster than the prices of its exports in the world market. The year 1974 epitomized this phenomenon in Kenya: "While import prices rose by 61 per cent, export prices rose only 30 per cent" (Republic of Kenya Budget Speech [RoKBS], 1975, p. 1). This led to a recession, in 1975, which was accompanied by, amongst other challenges, a fall in income per capita and a very precarious balance of payments position.

Even as Kenya went about restructuring its economy in a bid to lessen its reliance on imports, a strategy espoused by Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1975, and the East African Community (EAC) disintegrated, the country's fortunes changed in 1977 as narrated by Finance Minister Mwai Kibaki:

This year, I am happy to say the position is significantly different. Our own export prices, particularly coffee and tea, have risen faster than the prices we pay for exports. The terms of trade have swung back in our favour and are now better than they were in 1972. The balance of payments, which in recent years has been of so much concern to us, is, as of now, in substantial surplus. The recent rains have been abundant and although some areas face the problem of clearing up after flood, the country as a whole looks forward to abundant harvests. (RoKBS, 1977, p. 1)

The coffee boom of 1977 led to considerable inflationary problems, owing to "too much money chasing too few goods" (RoKBS, 1977, p. 1), and effectively came to an end in 1978; the momentum it had restored to the country's economy was quashed in 1979, a year which saw a sharp rise in the price of crude oil in the world market. During this same year, President Moi demonstrated compassion by introducing a milk supply programme geared towards nourishing primary school children, and he launched the country's Fourth Development Plan for years 1979 – 83. However the country, unsurprisingly, continued to experience unfavourable trends in its balance of payments throughout the remainder of this historical phase under review. Perhaps a further demonstration of the modern-day slavery that the forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system have imposed on Africa and other countries in the developing world, Kibaki

“arranged with a consortium of major banks in London to provide a Euro-currency loan of \$200 million to finance the import content requirements of some projects in the new Development Plan” (RoKBS, 1979, p. 2). Similar simultaneous discussions with the IMF and World Bank, geared towards securing credit facilities to improve the balance of payments position, were held by the Kenyan Finance Minister (cf. RoKBS, 1979, p. 2). Like his predecessor, Kenyatta, Moi would soon discover that he was not truly in charge of affairs: external forces, more powerful than him, were the ones to determine whether his economic agenda for the nation would materialize or not. Several early challenges, among which were rain-shortage-induced electric power rationing and famine necessitating importation of food grain, would welcome Moi into the world stage as an African leader and introduce him to the dialectics existent in global power relations: would he play “puppet”? An assessment regarding this possibility will be conducted in the subsequent historical phases of this chapter. Table 6.2 and figure 6.10, below, depict the performance of Kenya’s economy, in terms of GDP growth, during the period 1973 – 83.

Table 6.2: Kenya’s Economic Performance, 1973 – 83

YEAR	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
GDP GROWTH (%)	6.5	3.6	1.0	5.0	7.3	5.7	3.1	2.4	4.5	3.3	3.9

Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1973 – 83




Figure 6.10: Kenya's GDP Growth Rate, 1973 – 83.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1973 – 83

The ups and downs experienced by developing economies, owing largely to external circumstances, are clearly discernable from table 6.2 and figure 6.10 above. Developing countries, especially those in Africa, are never fully in control of their destinies no matter how much credit they obtain from international financial institutions. This particular decade was relatively poor, in terms of economic performance, in comparison to the preceding historical phase. The decade's average growth rate was lower at slightly above 4%. The highest GDP growth rate was recorded in 1977 when coffee prices in the world market skyrocketed. All the borrowing the GoK engaged in during the preceding historical phase of this study did not translate to the envisaged economic growth. The development initiatives carried out by the GoK from 1973 to 1983 are summarized next.

6.2.2 GoK Development Initiatives and Projects, 1973 – 83

As alluded to in section sub-section 6.1.3 above, it is in the details (outcomes) that the puzzle of the negative consequences of political marginalization/exclusion is solved. Although the generalized scrutiny of the big projects, undertaken by the GoK, may help the observer to ascertain whether successive Kenyan governments adhered to the principles of regional balance, it cannot be fully relied upon as a mechanism for analysing “equity”. Accordingly, in this sub-section and the remaining historical phases discussed in this chapter, I will examine the development initiatives and projects undertaken by the GoK, not solely with the aim of exploring Luo inclusion/exclusion, but also with the general view to give a summary of the state’s activities and, hopefully, make the historical phases of this chapter more meaningful.

In the twilight years of Jomo Kenyatta, which coincided with a recession that was followed by a brief economic boom, the GoK adopted Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1975, which outlined “measures aimed at tackling the balance of payments problem and other associated economic issues” (RoKBS, 1980, p. 4). The measures outlined in the policy paper included the following: re-structuring of the country’s economy to make it less susceptible to the unpredictable and hostile nature of the world monopoly capitalist system by substituting unnecessary imports through the adoption of export-led industrialization; modification of fiscal and monetary policies to facilitate greater production, domestically, and exert a pull on more inflows of external capital; gradual shift of focus from use of petroleum-based energy to alternative sources of energy like power alcohol, solar energy and hydro and geothermal electricity; and more support for the agricultural sector geared towards involving the incorporation of idle land and the enhanced exploitation of underutilized land, for greater production of merchantable oversupplies of both food crops and export commodities (RoKBS, 1980, p. 4). The last of the aforementioned policy measures, which resonates relatively more with the needs of the citizen at the grassroots level, was accomplished in part by loans granted by the state to the Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation. This Parastatal was in turn tasked with the responsibility of “movement of wheat and maize” and “expansion of agricultural production through crop financing and agricultural credit” (RoKBS, 1980, p. 4). In congruence with the aims of this state corporation, the Sessional Paper on Food Policy, published during financial year 1980/81, called for “improved agricultural planning . . . [and] the need to improve rural

infrastructure including rural access roads, marketing of agricultural products and inputs, agricultural credit, agricultural extension services and prices” (GoKH, 1981, p. 204). The GoK, therefore, in addition to the loans accorded to traders for commercial activities, provided credit facilities to assist small-scale farmers in their crop production endeavours (GoKH, 1982, p. 313).

The disintegration of the EAC in 1977 proved to be enormously costly for the GoK, for it brought to the fore additional and unplanned for financial obligations. It necessitated the following economic rearrangements, amongst others, as explained by Kibaki in 1977:

[I]ncreased defence expenditure as a result of the heightened tension around our borders, but also the burden of a new airline because of the collapse of the East African Airways; the burden of a railway, vital to our economic interests, which had been allowed to run down to a dangerous level through disputes in the East African Community. (RoKBS, 1977, p. 6)

These increased burdens, arising out of EAC's 1977 collapse epitomize the need for African countries to unite in order to maximize their chances of survival in a world configured to serve the selfish interests of a few individuals and entities. Such desired African unity, would presumptively increase Kenya's and other African countries' chances of getting better trade deals in the world market, a feat the continent failed to accomplish during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in India, in 1968, as captured in the words of James Gichuru, “independent” Kenya's first Finance Minister:

The virtual failure of the UNCTAD Conference in New Delhi earlier this year is very disappointing. The attitude of a number of industrial countries showed little sense of the urgency of the needs of the developing countries and Kenya, as a country with a rapidly expanding manufacturing sector, must be particularly disappointed that so little concrete progress has so far been made in the direction of giving preferences to the manufactured exports of developing countries. (GoKH, 1968, p. 1136)

In an era where the instability associated with capitalism as a mode of production was exposed in Kenya, leading to strict control in government spending especially with regard to infrastructure projects like roads, the GoK oversaw the following major development initiatives among others: the Mombasa–Nairobi Oil Products Pipeline, the Gitaru Hydro-Electric Scheme, the Sabaki Water Scheme at the Coast, Upper Tana and Bura Irrigation Schemes, new and/or expanded sugar factories at Mumias, Nzoia and South Nyanza, new Nairobi and Mombasa Airport Terminals, new aircraft for Kenya Airways, and new locomotives for Kenya Railways. An analysis of the results of some of these public investments follows next.

6.2.3 An Analysis of the Outcome of GoK Public Investment, 1973 – 83

Since Moi’s Development Plan of 1979 to 1983 was geared towards “the alleviation of poverty through the creation of income earning opportunities for every Kenyan and the provision of other basic needs, such as nutrition, health, education, water and housing” (RoKBS, 1977, p. 8), I will maintain the strategy employed in examining the outcomes of public investment in subsection 6.1.3 of the previous historical phase. My focus remains on the five socio-economic indicators/parameters: education, health, housing, water supplies, and electricity.

6.2.3.1 Education Outcomes, 1973 – 83

The outcome of the GoK investment in primary education during the historical phase 1973 – 83 was as shown in figure 6.11 below.




Figure 6.11: Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1973 - 83.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83

Several noteworthy trends emerge from the 1973 – 83 outcome: first, towards the twilight years of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, enrolment figures in Nyanza and Western Provinces took a dip; secondly, after Moi ascended to power, from 1978, there was a remarkable increase in enrolment numbers at primary school level across Kenya’s eight provinces; third, Rift Valley Province, which became the new turf of the president, Moi, rose dramatically from position four to take the lead, country-wide, in terms of primary school enrolment in Kenya; fourth, Central Province, Kenyatta’s backyard, which was at the helm in 1973, stood at position four in 1983, despite also witnessing a steady increase in enrolment numbers. From these findings, the following conclusions can be drawn: first, in comparison to his successor, Moi, Kenyatta was more unfavourably disposed towards the Luo; second, there is certainly a link between state control and access to education at primary level; third, the Kenyatta Administration policies had

favoured the Kikuyu to the point where the advantage they yielded from control of state power vis-à-vis primary education, had reached an optimum point – this explains their dwindling dominance in primary school enrolment despite continual steady growth in Central Province; and, fourthly, Moi made sure, within the first five years of his tenure, that equality of access to the opportunity of primary education translated into equality of participation in primary education for other Kenyans not of Kikuyu descent. The enrolment figures at the secondary school level over the same period were as depicted in figure 6.12 below.




Figure 6.12: Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1973 – 83.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 1983

Throughout the historical phase 1973 – 83, Kenyatta’s home area, Central Province, recorded the highest enrolment numbers at secondary school level. This situation prevailed even after the

demise of Kenya's founding father. Apparently, it would take a relatively longer period of time for Moi to beget a semblance of equality of participation in the opportunity of secondary education for non-Kikuyu Kenyans, compared to primary education. By the end of the historical phase 1973 – 83, Nyanza stood second in enrolment at the secondary education level; it was followed by Eastern, Rift Valley, Western, Nairobi, Coast and North Eastern in that order. Notably, whilst Nairobi stood at position two in the previous historical phase of this study, it was ranked sixth by the end of 1983. This means that during the historical phase 1973 – 83, parents all over Kenya had realized the importance of secondary education as a precondition for advancement in life and were making greater efforts towards securing it for their children. Nairobi's stagnation and dwindling fortunes can also be explained by the fact that the city lacks the boarding school facilities that most parents desire at this level of education. The health provision outcomes for historical phase 1973 – 83 are examined next.



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6.2.3.2 Health Provision Outcomes, 1973 – 83




Figure 6.13: Attendance at Family Planning Clinics by Province, 1973 – 83.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 1983

The outcome of family planning clinic attendances, depicted in table 6.13 above, shows a great lack of adherence to the principle of equality of access to opportunity; there are huge disparities in favour of Nairobi and Central Provinces as opposed to the rest of Kenya. Nairobi's prominence as the commercial and industrial capital undoubtedly explains its appearance at the top of almost every socio-economic outcome. If Nairobi is put aside, and North Eastern ignored (owing in part to religious reasons for shunning the practice), the two protagonists in the Kenyan story – Kikuyus (Central) and Luos (Nyanza) appear at the two extreme ends of the outcome of

healthcare provision with regard to family planning services. Central's prominence in this statistic may well mean that family planning services were readily available to the Kikuyu; on the other hand, Nyanza's position suggests that access to these services during this historical phase was difficult for the province's inhabitants due to "half-hearted" commitment by the responsible government department. Again, it would seem, regions that oppose the state are considered last when it comes to the provision of services, whilst those that support it come first. GoK provision of hospital beds and cots, by province, during the period 1973 – 83, is as depicted in figure 6.14 below.




Figure 6.14: Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1973 – 83.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83

Although Nairobi, Rift Valley and Central, in that order, dominated the scene in terms of the number of beds and cots per province as of 1983, the greatest growth in capacity during this historical phase of this study was exhibited by Nyanza. This could be taken to mean that, at least in terms of providing hospital bed capacity to its citizens, the GoK paid no heed to the political inclination of Kenyans, generally, and to that of the Luo, in particular. Housing provision outcomes are examined next.

6.2.3.3 Housing Provision Outcomes, 1973 – 83

NHC figures for houses completed, by province, from 1973 to 1983 were as captured in figure 6.15 below.





Figure 6.15: No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1973 – 83.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83

Of the total of 20,710 units constructed to provide affordable housing to low-income earners, Nairobi got a significant allocation of 45%; it was followed by Rift Valley (19%), Western (13%), Coast (8%), Central (5%), Nyanza (4%), Eastern (3%), and North Eastern (0.2%), respectively. Although equality of access to the opportunity of affordable housing was gravely lacking, it does not seem like politics had anything to do with the apportionment of limited government resources towards the provision of this essential social good – houses appear to have been provided in accordance with relevance and need. Indeed, Nairobi is the greatest employer of Kenyans who would fall under the targeted category of low-income-earning citizens. A look at electricity provision outcomes for this particular historical phase of this study follows next.

6.2.3.4 Electricity Provision Outcomes, 1973 – 83

The patterns for electricity sales by area, a representation of the combination of the purchasing power of various “ethnic groups”, and GoK provision of street lighting during the period 1973 – 83, are given in figure 6.16, below.






Figure 6.16: Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by Area, 1973 – 83 ('000 kWh).

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83

The dominance of Nairobi and Mt. Kenya as the chief consumers of Kenya's electricity supply continued, and even deepened, in the historical phase 1973 – 83. There was, undoubtedly, great inequality with regard to access to this essential commodity. Whilst the Coastal area placed a distant second, it was closely followed by Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale (wherein the Luo interests were catered for); Rift Valley brought up the rear. Nairobi's dominance as a consumer of electricity arises from the fact that the region is the bastion of Kenya's economy: it serves as the country's industrial, commercial and political capital. The residents of the area were, therefore, relatively wealthy compared to, say, Rift Valley, Eldoret, Kitale or Kisumu. There are three viewpoints, which could explain the dominance of Mt. Kenya as a consumer: first, as one of the

areas in which Kenya's most important cash crops are grown, disproportionate street lighting in favour of the area was provided by the GoK to safeguard the foreign exchange interests of the country; moreover, due to trade in commercially-viable crops, the area's residents – GEMA communities – naturally accumulated more wealth and were in a greater position to pay for installation services. Second, another reason closely related to the *Theory of Uneven Development* may be that the area naturally benefited by virtue of its proximity to the capital city, as opposed to other regions like Nyanza. Third, owing to the fact that the region was, and continues to be, the backyard of Kenya's state controllers, it was highly favoured in the provision of street lighting in a deliberate but subtle manner, in a bid to perpetuate the hegemonic position it holds over the rest of Kenya. The fact that the precise figures of both Mt. Kenya (Kenyatta's home) and Nyanza (Odinga's political base) are not given by the GoK's statisticians is suspect; it could be a move aimed at shrouding the favouritism accorded to the supporters of the state, and the "punishment" meted out to its opponents. If the third view is the reason why precise statistics are not given, then the argument espoused in the theoretical framework of this thesis, that whoever lacks political power cannot chart their own economic destiny and is at the mercy of the custodian of the state, holds some water. Also, the third view is in congruence with the arguments espoused in chapter five, that there seems to be a subtle, well-calculated strategy to keep the Luo completely outside mainstream societal affairs in Kenya. A look at water supply outcomes, during historical phase 1973 – 83, follows next.

6.2.3.5 Water Supply Outcomes, 1973 – 83

GoK expenditure on rural water schemes, by province, progressed as depicted in figure 6.17, below, during the historical phase 1973 – 83.




Figure 6.17: Cost of Operational Rural Water Schemes by Province, 1973 – 83 (KSh).

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 1973 – 83

Figure 6.17, above, shows great disparities and lack of equity in the allocation of funding for rural water supply during phase 1973 – 83. Central Province, Jomo Kenyatta’s turf, consistently received steady funding, whilst the investments in Rift Valley, Coast and North Eastern virtually stagnated throughout this historical phase. Perhaps a calumny pointer to the ardent Luo activist, it is noteworthy that the outcomes of rural water supply during the second decade of Kenya’s “independence” show an overwhelming percentage increase in the GoK investment in Nyanza Province. Indeed, the greatest beneficiary, in terms of growth, was Nyanza: it is safe to say that during the period 1973 – 83, when the Water Department made amends for what seemed to be outright discrimination of the Luo in the provision of rural water supply during the first phase of this chapter, 1963 – 73. The third historical phase of this study, 1983 – 1993, follows next.

6.3 1983 – 93: The Era of Export-oriented Industrialization and Rationalization of Expenditure in Kenya

6.3.1 State of the Kenyan Economy, 1983 – 93

The volatility of capitalism, as showcased in the preceding historical phase discussed in this chapter, is such that economies, especially those of developing countries like Africa's, are often characterized by “a cycle of a boom with inflation, followed by stabilization and recession” (RoKBS, 1986, p. 7). Instabilities associated with capitalism, coupled with reduced access to external sources of funding and epitomized by a constantly precarious balance of payments position, prompted Kenya in historical phase 1983 – 93 to adopt fundamental structural changes in a bid to steady its economy and position it for the desired domestically-driven renewed growth. This era – seen largely as a “different phase of development where repayments of both domestic and external debt w[ould] take an increasingly large share of available Government revenues” (RoKBS, 1983, p. 7) – would see the GoK make bold moves to further “promote exports and . . . reduce the nation's dependence on imports” (RoKBS, 1983, p. 4). Some of these measures included the following: adjustment of the shilling exchange rate on both the import and export fronts; reinstatement of the export compensation scheme; according priority to credit facilities, in conjunction with commercial banks, for exporters; loosening protection accorded to producers; and reducing restrictions on imports (RoKBS, 1983). Also, in order to lessen dependence on food imports, in times of famine associated with unfavourable weather conditions, the GoK embarked on building strategic food reserves in accordance with the recommendations of the Food Policy Paper. Other measures taken in order to stimulate domestic-induced economic growth and to help the country gain more control over its destiny included the increase of interest rates for the purposes of “stimulating savings and . . . discourag[ing] the use of credit for marginal purposes, excessive imports and the accumulation of unneeded stocks” (RoKBS, 1983, p. 5).

The above audacious measures, which depict a frustrated nation's efforts to disentangle itself from an oppressive global economic order, or at least to lessen the burdens imposed upon it by the uncertainties characterizing the world monopoly capitalist system, were to be enshrined in the Fifth Development Plan launched by Moi in December 1983, during Kenya's 20th independence anniversary, and Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986, the latter of which largely became

the blueprint for Kenya's economic development throughout the remainder of the period 1983 – 93. Moi's bold move rubbed feathers wrongly on the international stage and served to further expose the hypocritical underbelly of the forces behind the juggernaut that is the world monopoly capitalist system. During period 1983 – 93, as already explained, Kenya's bid to gain control of its destiny was to be accomplished by "restructur[ing] [its] industry away from production for import substitution under the protection of high tariffs and quantitative restrictions, to production oriented towards the export market" (RoKBS, 1990, p. 5). Besides the measures specified above, export-oriented industrialization was, in turn, to be accomplished through the establishment of Export Processing Zones (EPZs). Although the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) agreed to assist in financing these EPZs, western/industrialized economies remained largely closed to African countries' exports, as lamented by George Saitoti – Kenya's fourth Finance Minister – in 1991:

The failure of the Uruguay round on GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) to conclude an agreement on global trade was a further disappointing event in 1990. It is regrettable to note that while many developing countries, including Kenya, are striving to end trade restrictions and to lower import duties, industrial countries, have failed to reciprocate by opening their markets wider to both our manufactured and agricultural exports. A renewal of the GATT negotiations should therefore be high on the international economic agenda for the coming year. (RoKBS, 1991, p. 3)

Table 6.3 and figure 6.18, below, depict Kenya's economic performance from 1983 to 1993.

Table 6.3: Kenya's Economic Performance, 1983 – 93

YEAR	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
GDP GROWTH (%)	3.9	0.9	4.1	5.7	4.8	5.2	5.0	4.5	2.2	0.4	0.1

Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1983 – 93




Figure 6.18: Kenya's GDP Growth Rates, 1983 – 93.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1983 – 93

Although 1984 recorded a very poor performance, owing largely to a dismal, drought-related agricultural output, Kenya's strategy appears to have been working from 1985 to 1990, before it was suddenly brought to a halt by global events, principally orchestrated by the forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system, such as the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the Gulf War I, which conspired to ripen and arrange the stage for the ushering in of another phase of neo-colonialism – neoliberalism. The manner in which Moi's Kenya was bullied into accepting neoliberalism will be discussed in the next historical phase of this chapter, 1993 – 2003.

Noteworthy, as a complementary measure to its export-oriented industrialization programme, the GoK, during the period 1983 – 93, embarked on a drive to rationalize its expenditure in order to improve productivity and renew economic growth. The goals of this rationalization initiative were threefold: “to concentrate development on fewer projects”; to “ensure that the projects . . . undertake[n] [we]re the very best . . . highly productive, contributing directly to economic growth or delivering public services at the lowest possible cost”; and, to “ensure that the development projects, once completed, ha[d] adequate resources to function at full capacity” (RoKBS, 1986, p. 9). Thus, the mantra “fewer projects, better projects, and more adequate recurrent financing” (RoKBS, 1986, p. 9) became the driving force behind the initiative. I now turn my focus to the development projects and initiatives undertaken by the Moi Administration, from 1983 to 1993.

6.3.2 GoK Development Initiatives and Projects, 1983 – 93

Contrary to his popular depiction as an iron-fisted African leader (cf. e.g., Brown, 2001; Nepstad, 2011), the findings of this research show that there has never been a Kenyan President as compassionate and pro-poor people as Moi: his development agenda, during this particular phase, was mainly geared towards the betterment of the lives of the citizens at the grassroots level of society, and had a more widespread element of direct engagement as opposed to Kenyatta’s. Some of his development initiatives are hereby highlighted. First, on the 1st of July, 1983, Moi inaugurated a new grassroots-oriented policy and movement – the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) – geared towards balancing urban and rural development in the country. This bottom-up approach would give citizens in all the districts of Kenya a say in the development of their communities: in conjunction with the District Development Committees (DDCs) citizens would identify their most pertinent problems/issues and obtain funding from the central government’s ministries for projects to address them. By 1984, the year in which relations with neighbours Uganda and Tanzania normalized, and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African states (PTA) was inaugurated, measures were being put in place to fund the DFRD projects directly from the District Treasuries to make the programme more efficient (RoKBS, 1984). The DDC co-ordinated development programme prioritized “small-scale infrastructure” including “urban water supplies, rural electrification systems, and basic site-

and-service schemes” aimed at “boost[ing] private economic activities of all kinds in the rural areas” (RoKBS, 1985, p. 10).

Secondly, in order to boost the efforts of workers in the informal sector – “self-employed persons and very small firms in manufacturing, trade and other services” (RoKBS, 1985, p. 10) – Moi granted them loans. He advised the Treasury to liaise with Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) to devise a scheme targeted at financially facilitating the efforts of *jua kali* (very small-scale) workshops, traders and manufacturers, among others. The GoK would act as guarantor to the loans, eliminating the need for collateral, which the beneficiaries in all likelihood did not have anyway. Thirdly, in order to supplement growth in agriculture as a sector, the Moi Administration launched the Rural Trade and Production Centre (RTPC) Programme. Through the RTPC Programme – it was hoped – market centres and dynamic small towns would spring up leading to the desired element of rural-urban balance. The envisioned RTPCs would be “small towns that process[ed] and market[ed] output from farms in the [particular rural] area[s] offer[ing] services and supply inputs to farmers; and creat[ing] jobs for part-time farmers and full-time rural workers” (RoKBS, 1987, p. 13). The RTPCs would be funded by the central government through the District Development Fund (DDF) established on July 1, 1987 and administered by the Ministry of Planning and National Development. Through the DDF, Moi’s Government “work[ed] within District Focus to channel funds from interested aid donors into roads, water and power supplies and other infrastructure that support[ed] the growth of private small industry and services” (RoKBS, 1987, p. 13). The DDF would also be used to facilitate DDC initiatives. Later on, “finance[s] for the construction of Nyayo sheds to accommodate *jua kali* artisans and workshops located in appropriate rural areas” (RoKBS, 1987, p. 13) were incorporated in the DDF scheme, too. Fourthly, in 1990 President Moi launched the Rural Enterprise Fund, which was to be overseen by the DDCs; he gave a start-up capital of Ksh. 150 million for the programme aimed at the development of small-scale enterprises (RoKBS, 1990, p. 15).

Some of the major GoK projects associated with this era include the following: purchase of materials associated with the national grid extension (electricity); facilitating petroleum storage facilities; Kiambere Hydroelectric Power Project; Turkwell Hydroelectric Project;

leasing of planes for Kenya Airways; precooling facilities for EU-bound horticultural products; Nairobi Water Supply Project; Coast Water Supply Project; Geothermal Energy Project; and Smallholder Coffee Improvement Project; and Universities Investment Project. An examination of the outcome of Moi's efforts, with regard to education, health, housing, electricity and rural water supplies, during the period 1983 – 93, follows next.

6.3.3 An Analysis of the Outcome of GoK Public Investment, 1983 – 93

Perhaps a result of the power struggle between the Moi Government and the forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system, accountability and transparency on the part of the Kenyan state appears to have diminished rapidly and systematically during the latter stages of the historical period 1983 – 93. Due to the global events that opened up Africa to neoliberalism at the end of this historical phase – especially the disintegration of the USSR⁴⁷ – Moi lost his nerve. Not only had the little control that he wielded over Kenyan affairs vis-à-vis the globalists behind the world monopoly capitalist system dwindled overnight, his administration was going to be under scrutiny like never before. Moreover, with the re-introduction of multi-partyism in Kenya in 1991, thanks largely to the same forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system, his days in power were numbered. Moi would seemingly make the most out of the limited time left to benefit/enrich himself and his cronies, for the presidential terms limit restricted his tenure to a maximum of ten years following the 1992 General Election.⁴⁸ It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the supposed looting of state coffers that characterized Moi's latter years in power involved the appropriation of monies obtained from privatization of state corporations and the cooking of financial books, following the pocketing of monies apportioned for the development of public utilities such as water projects, boreholes, dams and pans. This is probably one of the reasons why his statisticians stopped giving specific details regarding the outcomes of public investment in areas like water supply and education in the Economic Surveys. Accordingly, analysis of outcomes of public investment, in this particular historical phase of this study, will only provide

⁴⁷ The communist threat had made Kenya important to the West, both as a model African capitalist nation and a strategic location along the Indian Ocean Coast from which naval operations, regarding Middle Eastern oil, could be carried out in case of war (cf. Khapoya & Agyeman-Duah, 1985; Mazrui, 2004).

⁴⁸ For further insights into the manner in which state coffers were allegedly looted under Moi, the possible beneficiaries, and the supposed magnitude of theft sanctioned by Kenya's second president, see WikiLeaks (2007). The looting of Kenya under President Moi. Retrieved from https://wikileaks.org/wiki/The_looting_of_Kenya_under_President_Moi (accessed 11 September 2016).

specific/detailed comparative analysis vis-à-vis the Luo and the rest of Kenya, wherever provincial figures have been reported by the GoK.

6.3.3.1 Education Outcomes, 1983 – 93

The outcome of public investment by the GoK with regard to primary school enrolment during period 1983 – 93 is captured in figure 6.19 below, which also compares the situation in 1983 with that in 1993.




Figure 6.19: Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1983 – 93.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 1993

As of 1993, figure 6.19 above shows, Rift Valley, Nyanza (of which Luo Nyanza is a large component), Eastern and Central Provinces led in terms of primary school enrolment in that order. Regarding the rate of growth of primary school enrolment, which is crucial for this study,

North Eastern Province led from the front, whilst Nairobi brought up the rear. Notably, the remaining six provinces do not show any appreciable growth difference; this suggests that there was stability and equity in terms of access to the opportunity of primary education. In this regard, therefore, the Luo are not justified to cry foul – at least not during this historical phase of this chapter. The provincial figures for secondary school enrolment, by province, during the years 1983 and 1993 are given in figure 6.20, below.




Figure 6.20: Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1983 – 93.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93

Overall, figure 6.20, above, shows that there was a minimal increase in enrolments during the decade 1983 – 93, indicating that, although the GoK’s efforts to provide its citizens with a better education were bearing fruit, the introduction of neoliberalism was somehow taking its toll on

the parents of Kenya. Whilst there were enrolment increases in Coast, Eastern, Rift Valley and Western, the other four provinces, Nairobi, North Eastern, Central and Nyanza recorded declines. The biggest enrolment gain was recorded in Rift Valley (state power) whilst the largest drop was recorded in Nairobi (lack of adequate boarding schools prompting many to study upcountry in other provinces). The greatest transition rate from primary to secondary school was recorded in Central Province (bastion of capitalism from colonial times) whilst the least was in North Eastern (shunned by colonial administrators and successive Kenyan Governments owing partly to its unfavourable climate and soils) underlining Oloo's (2004) argument that capitalism, by its very nature, has led to unequal development in Kenya. Noteworthy is the fact that the immense advantage held by Central Province in the previous historical phases of this study – 1963 to 1973 and 1973 to 1983 – was greatly eroded during Moi's first fifteen years in power. In this sense, there was greater equity, in terms of participation in the opportunity of secondary education, during the historical phase 1983 – 93. Health Provision outcomes during this particular historical phase are discussed next.

6.3.3.2 Health Provision Outcomes, 1983 – 93

The health provision outcomes, in terms of family planning services, during this historical phase of this study, were as depicted in figure 6.21, below. The GoK provides statistics on this socio-economic indicator only to the year 1987; accordingly, this marks the end of the analysis of family planning as a mechanism of gauging health provision outcomes in this study.




Figure 6.21: Attendance at Family Planning Clinics by Province, 1983 – 87.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 87

Nevertheless, of the total number of first time visits and revisits recorded (3,395,756) during the period 1983 – 87, Central Province was dominant at 25.5%, followed closely by Rift Valley at 24.0%; Nairobi (18.1%), Eastern (13.8%), Nyanza (6.8%), Western (6.0%), Coast (5.7%) and North Eastern (0.1%), followed in that order. Evidently, there was no adherence to equality of access to this important GoK provision – the turfs of communities that have held power in Kenya benefited the most. The statistical progression of hospital beds and cots by province, during this historical phase of the study, was as given in figure 6.22 below.




Figure 6.22: Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1983 – 93.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93

The country recorded a total growth of 30.2% in its number of beds and cots from 1983 to 1993, indicating notable progress on the part of the GoK in its efforts towards providing healthcare services to its citizens. Moi's health policies, it would seem, were more favourable towards the historically marginalized North Eastern Province, where the greatest growth rate (240.2%) in the number of hospital beds and cots was recorded; North Eastern was followed by Western (74.0%), Rift Valley (45.6%), Eastern (24.9%), Coast (19.1%), Central (17%) and Nyanza (13.6%), respectively. Nyanza's poor performance, in this regard, could partly be explained by the fact that this historical phase succeeded the botched coup attempt of 1982, which was largely a Luo affair. It is possible that the GoK became reluctant to expand socio-economic services to

the Luo in the aftermath of that significant event. A look at housing provision outcomes during this historical phase, 1983 – 93, is next.

6.3.3.3 Housing Provision Outcomes, 1983 – 93

The GoK housing provision outcomes for the period 1983 – 93 were as depicted in figure 6.23 below.




Figure 6.23: No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1983 – 93.

Sources: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93

Throughout the period 1983 – 93, a total of 8,575 housing units were constructed by the NHC. Nyanza Province was the greatest beneficiary, for it got 26.4% of this provision. The rest of this housing provision was apportioned as follows: Nairobi (21.1%); Rift Valley (19.6%); Central

(11.7%); Eastern (8.5%); Western (7.3%); Coast (3%); and North Eastern (2.5%). If we assume that the NHC housing units apportioned for Nyanza Province were constructed in Luo Nyanza, then political inclination did not play a role in determining access to low-cost housing provision during this historical phase of the study. Electricity provision outcomes for period 1983 – 93 are discussed next.

6.3.3.4 Electricity Provision Outcomes, 1983 – 93

Figure 6.24, below, represents the amalgamated figures for electricity sales, for purposes of small consumer lighting, domestic consumption and street lighting, by area, for the period 1983 – 93.




Figure 6.24: Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by Area, 1983 – 93 ('000 kWh).

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93

There was a steep rise in the consumption of electricity by Nairobi and Mt. Kenya dwellers during historical phase 1983 – 93. This indicates a rise in the standards of living for the residents of these areas. The figures also show a modest rise in electricity consumption and provision of street lighting by the GoK, at the Coast and in the Rift Valley, indicating modest increases in the living standards of the areas' inhabitants. Regarding Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale's figures, wherein Luo Nyanza's statistics would be situated, there was no significant change to report. Certainly, the living standards of Luo Nyanza residents were not improving meaningfully, for if that were the case, they would have been in a position to afford more electricity. The main inference to be drawn from figure 6.24 above is that economic development during the period 1983 – 93 was greatly dependent on proximity to Nairobi, the capital, where most of the country's decisions on allocation of resources were made and development initiatives were initiated. This is why the country's current devolved system of government is crucial; it enables locals to determine the kinds of investment that best suit their economic needs. Equally important, the GoK's decision to amalgamate electricity consumption and provision figures, for different regions, hampers in-depth analysis of the interplay between politics and development. In all GoK statistics regarding the provision of electricity, for instance, figures for Kenyatta's home province are lumped in with Nairobi's, preventing the observer from obtaining precise figures on GoK efforts to invest in what has largely been a state-friendly region in the post-independence era. It is very possible that precise figures for the traditional homeland of the Luo were purposefully omitted: it may also be that the GoK effort, in comparison especially to Nairobi and Mt. Kenya, was meagre and, therefore, embarrassing to the state; or there was a deliberate ploy by GoK statisticians to conceal from the public a well-calculated strategy to deny the community basic services that could boost its socio-economic welfare. Nevertheless, the installation/provision/consumption disparities between Nairobi and Central, as a single entity, and the rest of Kenya, are mind-boggling and serve to showcase the uneven development that arises from capitalism as a mode of production. Water supply outcomes for period 1983 – 93 are examined next.

6.3.3.5 Water Supply Outcomes, 1983 – 93

From 1985, the GoK stopped issuing statistics on numerical and cost distribution of rural water supply schemes, which have been very crucial thus far in the comparative analysis of the

outcome of public investments, with regard to water, opting instead for an amalgamated form of reporting expenditures and inputs under the title “Development expenditure on water supplies and related services.” In view of that fact, no comparative analysis shall be made of the outcomes of water provision for the period 1983 – 93; suffice it to say that “[b]etween 1990/91 and 1994/95, the Ministry [of Water Development] had implemented and/or rehabilitated 1,579 water projects, 11,389 boreholes, 916 dams and 448 pans” (Republic of Kenya Economic Survey [RoKES], 1995, p.124). The succeeding historical phase of this study, 1993 – 2003, is examined next.

6.4 The Era of Neoliberalism in Kenya, 1993 – 2003

6.4.1 State of the Kenyan Economy, 1993 – 2003

The latter stages of historical phase 1983 – 93 were characterized by a ferocious power struggle between the controllers of the Moi state and the world monopoly capitalist forces, and served to pave the way for the introduction of neoliberalism as an economic ideology in Kenya. The first hint that Moi’s country would finally bow to the yearnings of the globalists – by seemingly disavowing its homespun export-oriented industrialization blueprint – and adopt the external calls for privatization and complete liberalization of the Kenyan economy, came out during the 1989 Budget Speech, in which Finance Minister Saitoti stated that Kenya would, in its “long-term strategy to improve efficiency and to raise production”, consider “shift[ing] more of the activities of production and distribution to the private sector, while finding ways to raise productivity of those resources that continue to be used in the public sector” (p. 6). However, as perviously stated, neoliberalism would not be adopted in Kenya without a “fight”; in 1990, Saitoti seemed to do a volte face on his earlier stance when he declared that:

[T]he development of a country must mean the development of all its people and consequently, whatever programme or project is implemented it must have the welfare of the people as its main objective. Our planning process has placed priority on rural development programmes and the provision of such basic services as education, health and water supplies. We are therefore convinced that the economic strategy which we have chosen for ourselves is the right one. Our faith in the principles enunciated in the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 remains unshaken. We will reject the uninformed and

misguided arguments of those who would like us to change our course and place our hard won independence in peril. We will be guided by our own experience in determining how best to respond to the development needs of our people. (RoKBS, 1990, p. 1)

The above remarks, in which the minister appears to be suggesting that neoliberalism was a new form of colonialism, came at a time when Kenya was “the sixth most indebted nation in sub-Saharan Africa and yet remain[ed] one of only four countries which ha[d] not had to reschedule its debt in the past eight years” (RoKBS, 1991, p. 8). Kenya’s pride and tough stance would, however, be soon thereafter undone by the constriction of funds from donors, in November 1991, as captured in the 1992 Budget Speech:

The multi-lateral donors suspended funding under quick disbursing programme aid pending the re-establishment of fiscal discipline. On the other hand bilateral donors, who mainly finance projects, made diverse decisions. Some cut their aid frames, others delayed commitments to further assistance, while yet others maintained their finance levels to ongoing projects. (p. 5)

Moi’s government would, inevitably, eventually bow to the bullying tactics of the forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system and proceed to “re-establish financial discipline”, which would end up causing tremendous hurt and pain in the lives of many ordinary Kenyans, such as had never been witnessed since “independence”. Soon after the external demands for re-establishment of “financial discipline” were made in 1992, plans for the privatization (“take over”) of Kenya’s numerous parastatals⁴⁹ began in earnest; it would be accompanied by reforms in the civil service, which would eventuate in the retrenchment of many public servants during period 1993 – 2003. This was the situation in Kenya when Moi, who emerged triumphant in the 1992 General Election, selected Musalia Mudavadi, in 1993, to direct the country’s economy and finances in this new age, the age of neoliberalism.

⁴⁹ At the beginning of the 1990s, Kenya had over 395 commercially-oriented and regulatory parastatals; the government was a majority owner in over half of these enterprises. By December, 1991, 22 companies were wound up, divested either through the exercise of pre-emption rights or sold through an open tender system to the highest bidders. Thirteen companies were processed for sale through the same method in March 1992. Also, arrangements were underway to sell Government’s shareholding in three companies already listed in the Nairobi Stock Exchange.

In Kenya's age of neoliberalism, the priority of the GoK, which had already succumbed to pressures from global capitalist forces, shifted from "export-oriented industrialization" to the vigorous pursuit of the liberalization of its economy (1993 Budget Speech). The GoK's vision and plan of action was eclipsed by the new, neoliberal agenda that was described in various ways as follows: "liberalization and structural adjustment . . . [to] . . . [open] up the economy to private enterprise and to international competition" (RoKBS, 1995, p. 1); "progressive liberalization and structural adjustment, together with the eradication of social injustice and poverty in all its forms" (RoKBS, 1995, p. 9); and "enhance the environment for private sector development" (RoKBS, 1997, p. 27). By May 1995, 61 out of the 207 public enterprises that had been earmarked for privatization in 1993 had been dispensed with; they generated around K£120 million that was shared amongst the Treasury and a couple of holding corporations (RoKBS, 1995, p. 13). And by 1996, a further 82 had been divested yielding "K£249 million to the Treasury, and K£125 million to the public sector holding companies" (RoKBS, 1996, p. 8). As if to gather campaign money in readiness for the 1997 General Election, the "64 non-strategic parastatals remaining out of the original 207 scheduled for privatization w[ould] be divested during the remaining part of 1996 and during 1997" (RoKBS, 1996, p. 8). On the civil service front, a total of 54,262 state employees had been retired, most of them against their will, by February 1997; this represented well over 20% of the June 1993 staffing levels (RoKBS, 1997, p. 3).

Such was the magnitude of the harshness of this new economic system which, ironically, had been imposed upon Kenya to "eradicate social injustice and poverty in all of its forms" (RoKBS, 1995, p. 9). The forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system would compel Kenya to meet an additional requirement: ensure "a healthy and educated workforce" (RoKBS, 1995, p. 2). This was aimed at finding suitable stewards to help take care of their interests as the "new owners" of the country's economy. This behaviour is typical of the bourgeoisie/dominant class in capitalist arrangements; and global monopoly capitalists, owing largely to their increasing control of the world, are geared towards ensuring that education serves to make students good servants of the newly established world economic order: production of "equals", and encouragement of "independent thought" that could eventuate in socio-economic-political revolutions, is not part of their agenda whatsoever. Consider the fallacy of the effects of

neoliberalism, expressed below, before I examine Kenya's economic performance in the country's neoliberal age:

Nevertheless, there is clear evidence now that countries which have been vigorously pursuing structural adjustment programmes, liberalizing their exchange rates and increasing the degree of private ownership of their economies have tended to grow faster and on a more sustainable basis than those countries which have implemented these reforms halfheartedly or not at all. (RoKBS, 1995, p. 3)

Table 6.4 and figure 6.25, below, depict Kenya's economic performance from 1993 to 2003.

Table 6.4: Kenya's Economic Performance, 1993 – 2003

YEAR	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
GDP GROWTH (%)	0.1	3.0	4.9	4.6	2.3	1.8	1.4	0.3	1.2	1.1	1.8

Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1993 – 2003






Figure 6.25: Kenya's GDP Growth Rates, 1993 – 2003.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1993 – 2003

Overall, the figures depicted in table 6.4 and figure 6.25, above, show no superior performance when compared to those of the preceding historical phases examined in this chapter; in fact, the figures are relatively dismal. Notably, the economy seemingly takes a hit during election time – financial years 1992/93, 1997/98 and 2002/2003 – reinforcing the contentions of this research that multi-party democracy, an associate of capitalism, is problematic for Africa. It is evident that the main effect of Kenya's neoliberalism age, nondescript as it may be to the undiscerning eye, was the transfer of the control of the country's economy from the nation's government to the "world government" (forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system/globalists). The fact that the IMF and the World Bank have become the world's economic police, and the control

they wield over Kenya and other developing countries, comes out clearly in the following statement issued by Mudavadi's successor, Finance Minister Simeon Nyachae, in 1998:

[I]t is in our best interest to collaborate and work particularly with the Bretton Woods institutions because of their importance in the global-economic relations. What makes their role critical is that most donor countries and foreign investors require to know the rating, by these two institutions, of a country seeking financial support and debt relief from them before they can sanction it. Consequently, the snowballing effect when we disagree with them can be disastrous. An agreement with the two institutions opens many financial support doors, including quick disbursing funds and foreign direct investments. (RoKBS, 1998, p. 5)

Whilst the political elite in Kenya may have benefited from divestiture of state corporations, by corruptly looting the proceeds thereof, the masses (Kenyan citizens) were largely left to wallow in squalor and misery. Indeed, as Moi prepared to hand over power to Kibaki in 2003, the country's economy was literally on its knees; excessively high interest rates, poor roads, power supply shortages and insecurity, amongst other challenges, prevailed in Kenya. Moreover, crime, "ethnic" tensions, increased unemployment, and poverty seized its citizens, 52% of whom lived below the poverty line. And neoliberalism had also opened up doors for further commercialization of education and health, making these services more difficult to access (cf. RoKBS, 1996, p. 13; RoKBS, 2000, p. 1). The following sub-section takes a look at the GoK's development initiatives and projects during the period 1993 – 2003.

6.4.2 GoK Development Initiatives and Projects, 1993 – 2003

As early as 1993, President Moi had perceived the ills of neoliberalism and the structural adjustments it advocates; evidence of this is to be found in the exceptional actions he took to protect the welfare of the poorer sections of Kenyan society. Moi's compassionate measures, for instance, were embodied by an allocation of K£110 million in the 1993/94 financial year, which was meant for

[i]mplementing a number of special programmes such as paying bursaries for fees in secondary schools for children of poor parents, increasing supply of drugs and other materials for health services in rural areas, improving maintenance of water projects in rural areas and providing for food security (for the supply of maize), particularly in the arid and semi-arid regions. (RoKBS, 1993, pp. 33 – 34)

Also, from 1995, through District Trade Officers the GoK established suitable training schemes for *jua kali* sector players, while at the same time urging them to merge some of their establishments to form sustainable endeavours. The training schemes were geared towards helping these informal sector players to deal with various challenges including low productivity, inconsistent quality control, inadequate access to credit facilities, constricted product and customer markets, and poor management skills and market organization, all of which contributed to high rates of business transience (1995 Budget Speech). Youth unemployment, a perilous socio-economic challenge faced by the country, also concerned the Moi Government. In a bid to lessen the pain caused by this menace, funding was provided in 1995 to enable young Kenyans to acquire technical skills by way of vocational training in the country's higher education institutions, including Youth Polytechnics and *Harambee* Institutes of Technology. Moreover, the yearly entry into the country's NYS was increased by 1,000 to make a total of 3,000 annual entrants (RoKBS, 1995).

Government involvement at the grassroots level of society also featured funding in the rural areas for rehabilitation of minor roads and stock routes, crop storage facilities, human and livestock access to unpolluted water, expansion of immunization and school feeding programmes, enhancement of healthcare services at both locational and district levels, and establishment of workshops especially for women artisans (RoKBS, 1996, p. 12). Indeed, it is his effort in the area of local government reforms that Moi will mostly be remembered for; to support the local authorities in their mandate of provision of services such as waste disposal, water supply, sewerage, roads, and public health, his government introduced the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) in January 2000. The objective of LATF, which involved the transfer of 2% of income tax collections to the local authorities, was to “simultaneously increase the resource base of local authorities and to enhance their governance capacities through a number of

conditions imposed on their financial management performance” (RoKBS, 2001, p. 18). Moi’s move not only further showcased his sensitivity towards the needs of the struggling masses, but also served as a *de facto* confession that Kenyatta’s incapacitation of local government authorities during the first historical phase of this chapter, period 1963 – 73, was ill-advised. Even though Kibaki would maintain LATF and implement CDF, he was just fulfilling what his predecessor had contemplated and started; this makes Moi, arguably, the most compassionate president in Kenya’s history.

The big projects and programmes that were undertaken during Kenya’s neoliberal age include the following: rehabilitation of the Moi International Airport in Mombasa; upgrading of facilities at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA); completion of the Eldoret Airport; construction of the 75 megawatt diesel powered station at Kipevu; the extension of the Mombasa-Eldoret oil pipeline to Malaba and on to Kampala; the Nairobi-Mombasa Road Rehabilitation Project; the Kenya Urban Transport Infrastructure Project; National Women Development Programme; the Emergency Programme for Rehabilitation of Infrastructure; Energy Sector Reform and Power Development Programme; the Olkaria II Geothermal Project; the Third Gitaru Plant on Tana River Basin; the *El Nino* Project; and rural electrification under various projects. The next sub-section analyses the outcome of some of these GoK initiatives, projects and programmes, vis-à-vis Kenya in general and the Luo community in particular – with the focus on education, health, housing, electricity and water supplies.

6.4.3 An Analysis of the Outcome of GoK Public Investment, 1993 – 2003

6.4.3.1 Education Outcomes, 1993 – 2003

Enrolment figures and patterns at the primary school level during the period 1993 – 2003 were as depicted in figure 6.26 below.




Figure 6.26: Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1993 – 2003.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003

As shown in figure 6.26, above, the dominance of Moi’s Rift Valley Province continued in earnest, reinforcing the proposition in the theoretical framework in chapter two that political power is a vehicle to prosperity in Africa. By the time Moi was abdicating power at the end of 2002, Central Province, which is home to the Kikuyu who, alongside the Luo, were staunch advocates of return to multi-party democracy in 1991, had been overtaken by Western Province and stood at position five, overall, in terms of enrolment. This indicates, as proposed in chapter two’s theoretical framework, that there is a strong link between opposition politics and dwindling socio-economic fortunes in Africa. It should be noted, however, that what appears to be inequality in terms of access to the opportunity of primary education, such as the huge disparity between enrolment figures in Rift Valley and North Eastern, has to do with demographics; whilst the former is Kenya’s most populous province, for instance, the latter is the country’s least

populated region. Enrolment levels at secondary school level, during period 1993 – 2003 were as shown in figure 6.27 below.




Figure 6.27: Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1993 – 2003.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003

There was a steady rise in enrolment figures over the decade for all provinces except Nairobi, which, as indicated earlier in this chapter, is often unsuitable for seekers of boarding schools at this level for it largely lacks such facilities. This outcome indicates that there was equality in terms of access to the opportunity of secondary education during this historical phase of this study. It is also noteworthy that by the time Moi was preparing to hand over power to Kibaki, his Kikuyu successor from Central, the enormous advantage that the new president’s province had wielded since independence over the rest of Kenya in terms of secondary school enrolment had

been substantially eroded. In fact, there was not much difference between Rift Valley, Central, Eastern and Nyanza – the four leading provinces – as Kibaki took over the reins of power in 2003. Apparently, Moi’s policies of instituting special programmes, especially bursaries for fees in secondary schools for children of poor parents, had succeeded in establishing and ensuring equity. Health provision outcomes are discussed next.

6.4.3.2 Health Provision Outcomes, 1993 – 2003




Figure 6.28: Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1993 – 2003.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003

Figure 6.28 above shows that there was an exponential increase in the number of hospital beds and cots in Nyanza Province, where the greatest growth over the period 1993 – 2003 was

witnessed. Moi’s Rift Valley also experienced impressive growth rates, albeit to a lesser extent. Modest growth was witnessed in all the other provinces, an indication that the funding that Moi provided for the enhancement of healthcare service at both local and district levels was meeting its objective in a non-partisan manner. As of 2003, Rift Valley held a narrow edge over Nyanza in terms of this public provision; Central, Nairobi, Eastern, Western, Coast and North Eastern followed in that order. Housing provision outcomes are discussed next.

6.4.3.3 Housing Provision Outcomes, 1993 – 2003

The NHC investment in the provision of affordable housing for Kenyans during the period 1993 – 2003 was as captured in figure 6.29 below.





Figure 6.29: No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1993 – 2003.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003

A paltry 1,643 housing units were developed by the state corporation over a period of ten years, indicating that, in addition to the scarce resources available for this venture, neoliberalism had annihilated the GoK's aspiration to improve its effort in this regard, for external forces had imposed upon Kenya the ideology of profit-oriented real estate development. Eastern, North Eastern and Nyanza got no allocations whatsoever during this particular historical phase of the study: the greatest beneficiary was Nairobi (80% of the total housing units provided), followed by Central (8.1%), Coast (6.8%), Western (3.7%) and Rift Valley (1.5%). When all factors are considered, however, it is difficult to find evidence of corruption on the basis of political inclination. Electricity provision outcomes are examined next.

6.4.3.4 Electricity Provision Outcomes, 1993 – 2003

The GoK provides consistent electricity sales figures – for purposes of small consumer lighting, domestic consumption and street lighting, by area – till the year 2000. These are as represented in figure 6.30 below.






Figure 6.30: Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by Area, 1993 – 2000 ('000 kWh).

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2000

Predictably, there were no pattern differences vis-à-vis 1983 – 93, the previous historical phase examined in this study. Nairobi and Mt. Kenya continued their domination of the sphere of electricity consumption, an indicator of greater financial wherewithal in relation to the rest of Kenya. The coastal area was a distant second; Rift Valley was third and Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale – wherein Luo Nyanza lies – third. The disparities are informed by the uneven development that arises out of the adoption and pursuit of capitalism as a mode of production. I, nonetheless, maintain that the lack of more precise statistics from the GoK regarding electricity consumption hampers more meaningful analysis. Notwithstanding this hurdle, the patterns depicted in figure 6.30 above are testament to the fact that the legacy of uneven development that

was bequeathed to independent Kenya was, and remains, very difficult to reverse or overcome. The outcome of Moi's rural electrification endeavours during this historical phase of this study is captured in figure 6.31 below.




Figure 6.31: Rural Electrification by Area, 1996 – 2000 ('000 kWh).

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1996 – 2000

The greatest beneficiaries of Moi's rural electrification endeavours were Central and Eastern Provinces; Nairobi is definitely not rural and, therefore, the Nairobi and Mt. Kenya category largely represents the interests of the GEMA communities, which vehemently opposed Moi especially during the beginning of this historical phase of the study. This indicates that in implementing his rural electrification agenda, Moi paid no heed to "ethnicity" and political

affiliation. Rift Valley, Moi's turf, was the second greatest beneficiary of this GoK provision; Western – wherein lies Luo Nyanza – was third and Coast brought up the rear. Of Moi's contributions towards Kenya's development, rural electrification was one of the most significant; Kibaki would adopt it and the current Jubilee Administration also pursues it. Water supply outcomes are examined next.

6.4.3.5 Water Supply Outcomes, 1993 – 2003

As this particular historical phase of the chapter came to an end, “about 75.0 per cent of the urban population and nearly 50.0 per cent of rural population had access to safe drinking water” (RoKES, 2004, p. 138). During the period 1993 – 2003, in keeping with the tenets of neoliberalism, the GoK began to embrace the commercialization of the delivery of essential services such as clean drinking water. As a result, individuals and companies started to dominate the water sector in the urban areas, as the GoK's policy regarding this public provision in rural areas “shift[ed] towards low cost community based water projects that w[ould] in future be initiated and managed by local communities” (RoKES, 1997, p. 138). Accordingly, the GoK, in collaboration with other stakeholders, turned its water provision efforts to the establishment and maintenance of water purification points (WPPs) and drilling of boreholes across the country. Figure 6.32, below, gives the provincial breakdown of borehole provisions from 1996 to 2003.




Figure 6.32: Number of Boreholes Drilled in Rural Areas by Province, 1996 – 2003.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1996 – 2003

Of the combined total of 1,338 boreholes provided by the GoK from 1996 to 2003, the apportionment, in terms of percentages, from the greatest beneficiary to the least, was as follows: Rift Valley (32.2%); Eastern (23%); Central (14.9%); Nyanza (14.5%); Coast (8.2%); North Eastern (5.3%); and Western (1.9%). Besides being the largest in terms of area, the former Rift Valley was the most populous province in Kenya; it is, therefore, injudicious to reflexively conclude that it was favoured. On the other hand, North Eastern, which is by far the driest area of Kenya, was definitely in need of more boreholes. It is not clear what criterion the GoK and its partners employed in according this provision to rural Kenyans. However, one thing is indisputable: neoliberalism hurt the aspirations of the common citizen in Kenya insofar as the right of access to clean drinking water was concerned, by shifting the responsibility from the

GoK to the largely uncontrolled and unaccountable private sector. The final historical phase of this study, 2003 – 13, is examined next.

6.5 2003 – 13: The Era of Socio-economic Oriented Investment, and the Establishment of Neoliberalism's Support Structure in Kenya

6.5.1 State of the Kenyan Economy, 2003 – 13

The period 2003 – 13, generally considered the Kibaki era, was one in which two governments held sway, in quick successive fashion, in Kenya: the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) Government (2003 – 2007); and the Grand Coalition Government (2008 – 2013). The former had Kibaki governing the country absolutely, as President, whilst the latter had him sharing power with PM Raila Odinga, in an arrangement arrived at following the violence that marred the country in the aftermath of the bungled 2007 General Election. Before examining the activities of these governments further, it is important to note that when Moi handed over power to Kibaki, the country was in a very dire state economically, owing partly to the fact that neoliberalism does not lead to pro-poor economic growth and partly to the inordinate corruption on the part of Kenya's second president and his cronies. Indeed, as Kibaki took over the reins of power, there was no money in the Treasury; moreover, domestic public debt stood at Kshs. 251.5 billion, while Kenya was externally indebted to the tune of Kshs. 377.7 billion (RoKBS, 2003, p. 2). The structural adjustments, in relation to the rationalization of the Moi government's expenditures, were seemingly done for mere exhibition purposes for they obviously failed miserably insofar as meeting their intended goals. Also, relations between Kenya and the forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system became sour at the end of Moi's tenure, partly because of the President's reluctance to privatize Telkom Kenya – the telecommunications business of the Kenya Post & Telecommunications Corporation – “development partners”, who had “suspended the disbursement of committed funds in 1997”, did it “again in November, 2000” (RoKBS, 2001, p. 2).

Having witnessed the negative effects of the power struggle between Moi and the globalist forces, and in full cognizance of the fact that the latter's neoliberalist blueprint for the country was there to stay, Kibaki, who seemingly loved his country like Moi, acted wisely; he struck a good balance between national and external interests. Indeed, Kibaki's economic design

was of such nature that he neither fully antagonized the international financial institutions nor completely sold out the interests of his largely impoverished people: the policy document that would guide his economic approach during his first term in power, entitled “Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Management Creation 2003 – 2007” (ERS), became underpinned by, amongst others, the objectives of “channelling more budgetary resources to growth and poverty reduction areas”, “developing a foreign aid policy that targets poverty reduction, avoids crowding out of the private sector, enhances transfer of technology while strengthening and promoting domestic institutions”, and “restoring and maintaining sound relations with development partners” (RoKBS, 2003, p. 6). Together with the ERS, Vision 2030, which became the Grand Coalition Government’s economic blueprint, prioritized investment in the following sectors of the country’s economy: education, health, agriculture, rural development and infrastructure. Whilst investment in the pro-poor socio-economic sectors of education, health, agriculture and rural development was targeted at improving the conditions of the largely impoverished citizens of Kenya, critical physical infrastructure, particularly roads, rail, power and port modernization, would not only serve to “transform Kenya into [the envisaged] high middle-income country” (RoKBS, 2008, p. 30), but also – perhaps in inadvertent fashion – establish neoliberalism’s support structure in the country. This balanced approach, which enjoyed goodwill from numerous bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, yielded the economic results depicted in table 6.5 and figure 6.33, below.

Table 6.5: Kenya’s Economic Performance, 2003 – 13

YEAR	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
GDP GROWTH (%)	1.8	4.3	5.8	6.1	7.0	1.7	2.6	5.6	4.4	4.6	4.7

Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 2003 – 13




Figure 6.33: Kenya's GDP Growth Rates: 2003 – 13.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 2003 – 13

As table 6.5 and figure 6.33 above show, Kibaki's strategy of balancing the interests of his fellow Africans with those of the largely Western-based forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system seems to have been working from 2003 to 2007 when Kenya held a hotly-disputed General Election. Indeed, by the year 2007 Kenya was financing "about 95% of [its] budget from [its] own resources" (RoKBS, 2007, p. 5), making the need for external funding less relevant. However, in corroboration of my argument in chapter two of this thesis, that democracy is problematic for Africa owing to the exogenous and bogus ideological construct, "ethnicity", the GDP growth rate took a nosedive in 2008, in the period that followed Kenya's post-election violence. After the major disruption associated with the elections, the economy appeared to be on an upward trend, only to be halted again by another element that showcased the uncertainty of

capitalism as an economic system; the major global recession of 2009, which remains second in severity only to the Great Depression of 1929 in modern history. The remainder of the historical phase (years 2010 to 2013) saw considerable GDP growth rates, but nothing near the 10% envisaged in Kenya's Vision 2030, cementing further the fact that "faster", "sustainable" economic growth (RoKBS, 1995, p. 3), that supposedly comes with neoliberalism, is nothing but a sham. The finer details of some of Kibaki's socio-economic development initiatives, during historical phase 2003 – 13, follow next.

6.5.2 GoK Development Initiatives and Projects, 2003 – 13

If ever Moi felt that multi-party democracy had thwarted his attempts to fully demonstrate the compassion he had for Kenyans, by cutting short his 24-year stint in power, then he would not need to worry too much in retirement: indeed, in a relatively shorter period of ten years, and in spite of the setback of post-election violence, his successor would borrow some of his *Nyayo* era ideas, blend them with a few nuanced and contemporaneous concepts, and bring the Kenyan dream closer to fruition. In his quest to reduce poverty and bridge the enormous gap between the rich and the poor in Kenya, Kibaki engaged in a robust development agenda that not only targeted the poor, but also other societal stakeholders such as youths, farmers, rural area dwellers, the marginalized, Nairobians, businessmen, and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), among others.

The most significant of Kibaki's socio-economic development initiatives was, undoubtedly, the introduction of Free Primary Education (FPE) in January 2003. Owing to FPE, gross enrolment in primary schools increased from 90.8% in 2002 to 100.5% in 2003 (RoKBS, 2003, p. 4); and by the time Kibaki's first term was coming to an end in 2007, enrolment had increased by over 1.5 million pupils (RoKBS, 2007, p. 6). By the financial year 2012/13, out of the Ksh. 233.1 billion allocated to the education sector – which was also used for the payment of teachers, provision of various facilities in public universities, purchase of computers for schools, Early Childhood Development (ECD) support, provision of classrooms in both primary and secondary schools, and free day secondary education – Ksh. 8.3 billion was set aside for FPE (RoKBS, 2012, p. 13).

Also, in order to reduce poverty in rural and urban areas and to promote regional development, Kibaki upheld the LATF initiative that Moi had introduced in 1998, albeit with stricter accountability requirements on the part of the Local Authorities. In fact, “budgetary allocation more than doubled from Kshs. 3.0 billion in 2002/03 to Kshs. 6.5 billion in 2006/07 and [wa]s projected to rise to Kshs. 9.2 billion in 2007/08” (RoKBS, 2007, p. 7). Another game changer, of the calibre of FPE, was the CDF initiative, which was introduced in 2004. Speaking about CDF funds, which were divided equally amongst all the constituencies in Kenya and administered under the stewardship of MPs, Finance Minister David Mwiraria had this to say in 2004:

Now that we have established the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) and provided Ksh. 4.5 billion in the coming financial year for this Fund, what better leadership could we offer to our people than to use the CDF funds efficiently to address the urgent needs of the poor and vulnerable in our constituencies. Let us show by action that projects we select for funding are pro-poor and address the most urgent basic needs such as provision of water, building of classrooms and health facilities, etc. (RoKBS, 2004, p. 47)

Over the years CDF would, as a precursor to the devolved government system introduced by the new Kenyan Constitution in 2010, finance various construction works throughout the country; indeed, through the CDF framework, Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta would, in 2009, allocate “Kshs. 22 billion, an equivalent of Kshs. 105 million per constituency as conditional Economic Stimulus for Resilience Package toward financing infrastructure development covering education and healthcare, and other development projects” (RoKBS, 2009, p. 12).

Concerning healthcare provision, the Kibaki Administration put in place reforms throughout his tenure aimed at “enhanc[ing] access and affordability of basic health services with special emphasis on the poor and vulnerable” (RoKBS, 2004, p. 27). Furthermore, Kibaki intensified endeavours to escalate services such as immunization and availability of essential drugs in order to reach a greater number of Kenyans and, hopefully, reduce mortality rates in children aged below five and HIV/AIDS patients. Part of this work was carried out in conjunction with private sector and faith-based organizations, and civil society (RoKBS, 2004).

By the end of Kibaki's first term, "over 1,000 additional dispensaries had been built countrywide, budgetary allocation for drugs increased by 72% and over 4,080 additional health personnel [had] been deployed to rural and needy areas to scale up health services" (RoKBS, 2007, p. 18).

The provision of cost effective, reliable electricity and safe water were also important items on Kibaki's development agenda. In a move geared towards encouraging investments in the generation and distribution of electricity, the GoK put in place various tax incentives during the period 2003 – 13. Moreover, in addition to the rural electrification levy charged as part of electricity bills, Kibaki scaled up provisions for rural electrification during his tenure (RoKBS, 2003, p. 33). Kibaki's commitment to this cause was captured in the 2008 Budget Speech made by Finance Minister Amos Kimunya:

[C]onscious of the need to promote rural development to stem rural-urban migration, we aggressively implemented a comprehensive rural electrification programme in the last four years. Going forward, we are committed intensifying [sic] the rural electrification programme countrywide by making fully operational the Rural Electrification Authority. I have, accordingly, allocated Kshs. 6.8 billion toward rural electrification, including the installation of mini-grids and grid extension covering trading centres, schools and health facilities. (RoKBS, 2008, p.11)

With reference to the provision of safe water, mainly geared towards supporting livelihoods in Arid and Semi-arid Lands (ASAL), in the 2010 Budget Speech Uhuru highlighted that

[t]o enhance supply of water for crop irrigation and livestock, I have allocated Kshs. 2 billion under the Ministry of Regional Development for the construction of about 25 medium size dams in arid parts of the country. I have also allocated Kshs. 375 million toward constructing mini-flood control dams and disilting of water pans in northern Kenya. This initiative will reduce the suffering of our people living in these areas from frequent floods. (RoKBS, 2010, p. 20)

In a bid to unlock the potential of the county's economy and to smooth out activities associated with agricultural production, the GoK embarked on an exercise to improve and extend the national road network through the Roads 2000 Programme, which was initiated during the 2004/05 financial year. By 2007, the GoK had achieved the following results: 228 km of periodic road maintenance; 287 km of rehabilitated roads; 116 km of completely new sections; 580 km of routine road maintenance; and about 572 km of rural roads improvement under this roads programme (RoKBS, 2007, p. 15). Also, "715 kilometres of roads were constructed, 1,112 kilometres rehabilitated and 1,142 kilometres maintained" (RoKBS, 2010, p. 11), between 2009 and 2010, according to the GoK.

Agriculture, considered a priority area with a high potential for economic growth under both the ERS and Vision 2030, underwent various sectoral reforms during the Kibaki era chief among which was the "rationalization of the rules and functions of key agricultural institutions to minimize duplication" (RoKBS, 2003, p. 18). In a bid to encourage their good governance, the Kibaki administration engaged cooperatives more and granted them full tax benefits. Moreover, the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) was purchased back by the state and its proprietorship reinstated to farmers. Following the restructuring of the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), the government offered Ksh. 1.5 billion to the institute to facilitate farmers' loans (RoKBS, 2005, p. 13). Other measures taken by the government included the "revival of institutions such as the Kenya Farmers Association [KFA]" and the "strengthen[ing] of agricultural research and extension systems through the implementation of the Kenya Agricultural Productivity Project, with the support of the World Bank" (RoKBS, 2005, p. 13). In addition to steps and measures aimed at reviving the cotton sub-sector, and improving the productivity of the pyrethrum and coffee sub-sectors, the GoK "explore[d] the possibility of writing off non-performing loans advanced to the Co-operative movement by the Co-operative Bank" (RoKBS, 2003, p. 19). With regard to cereal and sugar farmers, who often faced stiff competition from cheap imports of these products by certain preferred traders, protective measures were introduced to the effect that "no trader [would] be allowed to import commodities free of duties and taxes, unless such commodit[ies] [were] duty free in the tariff" (RoKBS, 2003, pp. 17 – 18).

In keeping with Moi's compassionate – but perhaps obligatory – inclinations toward the largely unemployed Kenyan youth, Kibaki established a Youth Enterprise Fund in 2006 “to enable young people to access credit to start or scale up small and medium scale enterprises and to develop their entrepreneurial skills and create job opportunities” (RoKBS, 2006, p. 23). To this end, a sum of Ksh. 1 billion was allocated in the financial year 2006/07 (RoKBS, 2006, p. 23); and a further Ksh. 250 million was added to its account in the following year (RoKBS, 2007, p.22). Additional funding would follow throughout the remainder of Kibaki's tenure in power. In the same breath, and in demonstration of concern for Kenyan women, the GoK also “establish[ed] a Kshs 2.0 billion Women Enterprise Development Fund with an initial injection of Kshs 1.0 billion in 2007/08” (RoKBS, 2007, p.22). Corporate bodies were called upon to contribute to these schemes whose objective was to give power to women and youth (RoKBS, 2007, p.22).

In a strategy that could be interpreted as an attempt to balance its development efforts, the Kibaki Administration simultaneously engaged in a vigorous infrastructure expansion programme. In order to decongest the major urban centres in Kenya, for instance, the GoK built by-passes in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru and Eldoret. Nairobi got three by-passes – Southern, Eastern and Northern (RoKBS, 2004, p. 24). Additionally, “in order to reduce traffic jams and transport related costs [that hurt] businesses as well as the poor urban dwellers” (RoKBS, 2009, p. 10), the Nairobi Commuter Railway System was modernized. And, to meet the needs of Kenya's growing economy, funds were set aside for the construction of a standard gauge railway line; this initiative, which upon completion will see Kenya connect easily with her neighbours, is on-going in 2017 under the Jubilee Administration. Another infrastructure venture was the modernization of the Port of Mombasa, supported by the Japanese Government. The aim of this initiative, which would include “dredging the Port of Mombasa to allow bigger ships to dock”, was to ensure efficiency and competitiveness in the service of “Kenya and its hinterland” (RoKBS, 2008, p. 10). To “improve significantly the quality of bandwidth available for global connectivity, [and] reduce cost of telecommunication” (RoKBS, 2008, p. 11) the Grand Coalition Government undertook an undersea cable project to link Kenya with the rest of the world. Also, in partnership with the private sector, the Kibaki-Raila Coalition oversaw the installation of the National Fibre Optic Network, meant to “provide universal access, close the digital divide

between rural and urban areas, and open up all parts of the country for commerce and trade” (RoKBS, 2008, p. 11). Such was the full-bodied nature of Kibaki’s infrastructural undertakings, which this study contends, served to set up the support structure for neoliberalist endeavours to thrive in Kenya; Moi’s successor, seemingly, had come to reconcile himself with the reality that, going forward, largely due to the “world economic police”, the private sector would be expected to be the engine of “growth” and “sustainable” development in the country, as is evident in the following statement:

Mr. Speaker, that development partners are important to our development effort cannot be overemphasized. First, the Bretton Woods Institutions are considered the world opinion setters. Therefore, reaching a working agreement with them is necessary for attracting foreign direct investments. Secondly, many bilateral donors require a country to have a program with IMF before they can extend certain types of financial support, such as budget support. (RoKBS, 2004, p. 4)

In concluding this sub-section, therefore, I reiterate that Moi’s mismanagement of the Kenyan economy, especially during his latter years in power, was not necessarily because of professional ineptitude, but the result of a surreptitious power struggle between the latter and the forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system. Kibaki managed to steer the Kenyan economy better than did Moi, not merely because of his superior knowledge in economics and finance, but chiefly because of the goodwill he enjoyed from global capitalist forces. Indeed, Kibaki partly acceded to the latter’s neoliberalist demands by largely pursuing a socio-economic agenda favourable for the development of structures that would uphold this extreme form of capitalism. An analysis of the outcome of Kibaki’s public investment efforts follows next.

6.5.3 An Analysis of the Outcome of GoK Public Investment, 2003 – 13

As Kibaki’s first term came to an end in 2007, the GoK claimed that “the largest reductions in poverty incidence outside Nairobi was recorded in Nyanza, Eastern and Western Provinces where the poverty incidence declined by 33%, 23% and 21%, respectively” (RoKBS, 2007, p. 7). If these figures and assertions are trustworthy, then it is understandable that the observer should be confounded by the fact that six out of eight Kenyan Provinces (including

Nyanza and Western) voted overwhelmingly against Mwai Kibaki in the disputed 2007 General Election: despite being declared winner by a small margin, the latter only beat Raila Odinga in Eastern (a GEMA region) and his native Central Province. Such feelings of resentment on the part of most Kenyans toward a leader who was supposedly pro-poor as shown in sub-section 6.5.2, above, call for further scrutiny of the outcomes of public investment, which follows shortly. Whilst appraising the NARC and Grand Coalition Governments, the last Finance Minister under Kibaki, Njeru Githae, presented the achievements of the Kibaki era as follows:

- i) Economic recovery with real GDP growth rising from a low of 0.8 percent in 2002 to 7 percent in 2007. The domestic and external shocks of 2008 and 2009 adversely affected growth, but following a return of peace in the country, our economy rebounded in 2010 and remained resilient in 2011 despite the challenges we went through. We now project a growth of 5.2 percent in 2012;
- ii) Increased the number of children going to school under the free primary education programme from 5.9 million in 2003 to 10 million;
- iii) Provided tuition fee for 2 million more in secondary schools and increased by three-fold the number of students in university;
- iv) Increased the number of people accessing [Antiretroviral] ARV drugs to 350,000, up from just 10,000 in 2003; and distributed close to 20 million mosquito nets forestalling a malaria epidemic;
- v) Tarmacked over 2,700 kilometres of roads, rehabilitated over 4,000 kilometres of road and connected to the electric grid 1.7 million Kenyans, up from 700,000 in 2002;
- vi) Distributed over Ksh. 100 billion under CDF, which financed construction of more than 1,000 health centres, 10,000 classrooms, numerous roads, security posts as well as water and fish projects throughout the country;
- vii) Introduced the Women and Youth Enterprise Funds, [Small and Medium-sized Enterprises] SME Fund and Agri-Business Fund to provide accessible credit to women, youth and other small business enterprises and expand employment; and
- viii) Revived and expanded irrigation projects throughout the ASAL areas to enhance food security (RoKBS, 2012, pp. 3 – 4)

Kibaki's performance, if examined at a policy level at least, would generally be deemed reasonable and inclusive by most measuring standards. Moreover, Kenya's third president appears to have taken into account the interests of the Luo more than his two predecessors: he tried to address the issue of cheap sugar imports, which affected Luo Nyanza farmers and other Kenyans (RoKBS, 2004, p. 18); he was also concerned with the issue of severe flooding that characterizes the Lake Victoria Basin and saw the need to rehabilitate neglected irrigation schemes, important for the production of cotton and rice, some of which lie in Luo Nyanza, like Ahero and Kano (RoKBS, 2004, p. 18); he considered Luo Nyanza in his road construction, maintenance and rehabilitation projects, for instance the Mau Summit-Kericho-Kisumu section, Kangode-Kitui Road, the Kisumu-Kakamega-Webuye Road, and Rangala-Siaya-Bondo and Ndori-Luanda Roads (RoKBS, 2004, p. 23); and included fish leather processing in Kisumu, Homa-Bay and Migori, and fruit processing in Kendu-Bay, whilst piloting industrial innovation under his SME growth programme (RoKBS, 2008, p. 13). Kibaki's accommodation of Luo interests could have been the result of political maturity on the part of Kenyans, who have continuously demanded accountable leadership and equitable distribution of national resources, especially since the promulgation of the country's new constitution in 2010. Moreover, his Grand Coalition Government partner, Raila Odinga, may have pushed for inclusion of the Luo and other Kenyans in GoK development plans during the period 2008 – 13. The population of Kenya, as Kibaki began his second term, was as given in table 6.6, below.

Table 6.6: Kenya Population by Province, 1999 and 2009

Province	Year		Growth	
	1999	2009	No.	(%)
Nairobi	2,143,254	3,138,369	995,115	46.4
Central	3,724,159	4,383,743	659,584	17.7
Coast	2,487,264	3,325,307	838,043	33.7
Eastern	4,631,779	5,668,123	1,036,344	22.4
North-Eastern	962,143	2,310,757	1,348,614	140.2
Nyanza	4,392,196	5,442,711	1,050,515	23.9
Rift Valley	6,987,036	10,006,805	3,019,769	43.2
Western	3,358,776	4,334,282	975,506	29.0
TOTAL	28,686,607	38,610,097	9,923,490	34.6

Source: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2000, pp. 19 – 20; 2014, pp. 4 – 7

The figures shown in table 6.6 above have been considered, where appropriate, alongside other possible determinants of public provision proportions, such as state power, “ethnicity” and political inclination, in the outcome analysis that follows next: emphasis remains on education, health, housing, electricity and water supply.

6.5.3.1 Education Outcomes, 2003 – 13

The outcome of the GoK investment in primary education, during the historical phase 2003 – 13, was as presented in figure 6.34 below.




Figure 6.34: Primary School Enrolment by Province, 2003 – 13.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 2013

As evidenced in figure 6.34 above, the FPE programme started by Kibaki in 2003 yielded desired results; there was continuous overall growth in enrolment numbers over the decade that followed his gesture. A particularly good year, in 2011 the overall growth rate was extremely high. As Kibaki prepared to exit the political scene, there were well over 10 million pupils enrolled in primary school in Kenya. Kibaki did a great deal to improve access to education opportunities, at the primary level, and addressed the challenges faced by the Luo and other non-Kikuyu Kenyans, during the reign of Jomo Kenyatta, with finality. The provincial enrolment figures in figure 6.34 above show that Rift Valley had a healthy lead in terms of taking advantage of the opportunity accorded by the FPE initiative. The high enrolment numbers in the Rift Valley are probably the result of the region's populous nature. Nyanza, the province in which Luo Nyanza lies, was second, Eastern third, Western fourth and Central fifth. Coast, Nairobi and North Eastern followed Central in that order. The dismal numbers in North Eastern, though expected, are a cause for concern; the province's residents, who seldom live sedentary lives for they are mainly nomadic pastoralists, could be interfering with the invaluable opportunity of access to education accorded to their children by the GoK. In general, politics did not play any role in hampering equality of access to the opportunity of participation in primary education during Kibaki's reign. The enrolment outcomes at the secondary school level, during Kibaki's tenure, were as shown in figure 6.35 below.

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


Figure 6.35: Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 2003 – 13.


Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13

The greatest aggregate secondary school enrolment growth was witnessed in 2010, the year in which Kenya promulgated its new constitution. Overall, owing to Kibaki’s free tuition for secondary schools initiative, there was a steady rise in the number of students attending secondary school in Kenya during the period 2008 – 13. With a healthy 19.3% of the total enrolment in secondary schools as of the year 2013, Nyanza came in second only to Rift Valley. This is a testament to the fact that Luos were getting access to secondary education opportunities and, perhaps also, to the value that the community places on education. Eastern, Central, Western, Coast, Nairobi and North Eastern followed in that order. The aim of this sub-section has not been to explore the effects of political marginalization on access to primary education, per se, for this social right was “universalized” by Kibaki’s FPE initiative; rather, the objective

has been to examine the manner in which education developed following the leader's gesture. Although secondary school fee requirements continue to be a hurdle for many Kenyans, the findings of this research in this particular historical phase show that owing, partly, to the introduction of free tuition, enrolments at this stage have been steadily increasing. There is, therefore, little room, if any, for the Luo to cry foul in this regard; Kibaki's policies improved the community's chances at obtaining an education. The next sub-section examines the health outcomes during the period 2003 – 13.

6.5.3.2 Health Provision Outcomes, 2003 – 13

The GoK ceased to provide statistics on the number of hospital beds and cots, by province, after the previous historical phase of this study, 1993 – 2003. Accordingly, in gauging the outcome of health provision by the Kibaki Administration, this sub-section turns to the number of health institutions, by province, as depicted in figure 6.36 below.



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


Figure 6.36: No. of Health Institutions by Province, 2003 – 13.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13

As shown in figure 6.36 above, there was tremendous growth in the number of government health institutions in North Eastern, during Kibaki’s reign. In fact, in this regard the region was dominant over the rest of Kenya’s provinces. This finding validates the GoK’s assertion that it was concerned about the historically neglected ASAL areas. Central’s growth rate, which was second, corroborates the theoretical framework in chapter two that argues that state power is beneficial to those “ethnic groups” that wield it. Coast and Eastern were third and fourth, respectively, while Nyanza, Rift Valley, Western and Nairobi followed in that order. From these growth figures, a strong case cannot be made for marginalization of the Luo on account of opposition politics. During this time, especially from 2008, their *de facto* leader, Raila Odinga, was part of government as he shared power with Kibaki; this could be one of the reasons why

their interests were well attended. Moreover, with devolved CDF funds, the various regions of Kenya had considerable decision-making power and significant economic wherewithal to determine their destinies.

Table E35 (see Appendix E) shows the full immunization coverage rate of under-one year old children, by region, during the period 2008 – 13. The immunization coverage for Nairobi and Central Provinces was very strong, steady, and never fell below the national coverage rate throughout Kibaki's second term in office. It is possible to argue that the wielders of state power ensured that their home area was well taken care of, in terms of provision of this essential health service; however, Central Province's relatively well-off position, owing to its capitalist ventures and its proximity to Nairobi, could have contributed to the region's comfortable situation. Poverty emasculates people to the point where they may find it difficult to take their children to a hospital for immunization at the prescribed time; this is, generally, not the case in Central. Poverty in some parts of the Rift Valley and in most areas of North Eastern could have had a hand in determining immunization coverage in the two regions for, while the latter only managed to outdo the national coverage rate in 2008, the former fell below the national coverage rate throughout the period in question. Coast and Eastern Provinces fared well, with each failing to surpass the national coverage level only on one occasion. On the other hand, Western's performance, which was rather modest, saw the region's immunization coverage fall below the nation's in 2008, with a similar occurrence projected in 2012. As for Nyanza Province, where the Luo reside, the coverage was above the national rate during the years 2008 and 2009; however, in 2010 and 2011 the coverage was substandard, falling below the national rate. By 2012, though, Nyanza was expected to lead from the front for it was projected that every child under the age of one would have been immunized, fully, in the province. As with education, it is not possible to make a strong case for discrimination of the Luo community during the Kibaki era, especially during the period in which Kibaki shared power with Odinga, with respect to health service provision. Housing provision outcomes are discussed next.

6.5.3.3 Housing Provision Outcomes, 2003 – 13




Figure 6.37: No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 2003 – 13.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13

The trends for the housing units completed by the NHC in the country’s various provinces during the period 2003 – 13 are as shown in figure 6.37 above. In comparison with the previous historical phase, 1993 – 2003, there was a substantial growth of 63.7% in the number of houses completed for occupation by low income earners all over the country. This growth, notwithstanding, the GoK effort of 2,691 housing units, for a population of 40 million citizens, was woefully inadequate. These grim statistics testify to the resource scarcity that bedevils Africa largely due to the restrictions imposed by the global economic system, in which the continent is firmly affixed, and the selfishness of global capitalists. Nevertheless, the greatest beneficiary in terms of unit numbers allotted was Nairobi (80.5%); it was followed by Nyanza

(6.6%), Coast (6%), Central (3.4%), Western (3%), and Rift Valley (0.6%), respectively. Eastern and North Eastern were unlucky to miss out in historical phase 2003 – 13. Electricity provision outcomes are examined next.

6.5.3.4 Electricity Provision Outcomes, 2003 – 13

The outcome of the rural electrification initiative during the tenure of Kibaki was as depicted in figure 6.38 below.




Figure 6.38: Rural Electrification by Area, 2003 – 13 (million kWh).

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13

During historical phase 2003 – 13, it would seem, previously disenfranchised communities like the Luo began to gain increased access to electricity supply and connectivity. Western area, under which Luo Nyanza is categorized, consistently edged out Nairobi and Mt. Kenya area – Kibaki’s GEMA turf – albeit narrowly, in terms of rural electrification. This implies that, during the reign of the NARC and Grand Coalition Governments, the living standards of rural Kenyans improved. The Coast area, however, performed relatively poorly in rural electrification during this historical phase of the study; as far as its residents are concerned, there was no equality of access for them to this opportunity of rural electrification. A look at the water supply outcomes concludes the outcomes analysis for this historical phase, 2003 – 13; it is next.

6.5.3.5 Water Supply Outcomes, 2003 – 13

Figure 6.39, below, gives the provincial breakdown of borehole provisions from 2003 to 2012.




Figure 6.39: No. of Boreholes Drilled in Rural Areas by Province, 2003 – 12.

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 12

Of the total of 1,170 boreholes drilled by the GoK and its partners, during the period 2003 – 12, Eastern (28.5%) and Rift Valley (25.2%) were the greatest beneficiaries – numerically. They were followed by North Eastern (17.8%), Nyanza (8.9%), Central (8.4%), Coast (6.2%), and Western (5%), in that order. Nairobi residents, who largely have access to tap water and who continue to enrich the pockets of neoliberalists, do not require boreholes as such; this explains their omission in this regard. The borehole provision for the president's home area, a cheerless 8.4%, indicates that state power did not necessarily determine proportions in the allocation of this provision. In any case, as explained in sub-section 6.4.3.5 above, local communities were expected to initiate water projects as the GoK began to gradually withdraw from providing this essential commodity with the advent of neoliberalism. Moreover, Central Province, owing to a combination factors such as fortune (suitability for commercial agriculture) and proximity to the capital and state power, is relatively wealthy; its residents have increased access to tap water and require fewer boreholes. Based on these findings, it is hard, if not impossible, to make an argument for discrimination against the Luo by the central government as regards water provision during Kibaki's tenure in office. The conclusion of this chapter, which comprises a general summary of the findings, on public provision in relation to state power and opposition politics, and vis-à-vis the theoretical framework outlined in chapter two, follows next.

6.6 Summary of Findings and Conclusions Vis-à-vis the Study's Theoretical Framework

A brief summary of how the findings of this chapter relate to the theoretical framework, vis-à-vis each of the five indicators of socio-economic development examined in this study, is now sequentially presented. It is organized in five sub-sections, viz.: i) Education, State power and Opposition Politics; ii) Healthcare Provision, State Power and Opposition Politics; iii) Housing Provision, State Power and Opposition Politics; iv) Electricity Supply, State Power and Opposition Politics; and v) Water Supply, State Power and Opposition Politics.

6.6.1 Education, State Power and Opposition Politics

Pertaining to the outcomes of the GoK's investment in education from 1963 – 2003, the findings of this study strongly support the theoretical proposition that political power is a vehicle to socio-economic prosperity in Africa, since whoever controls the state decides how scarce resources will be allocated. This study finds that before the introduction of FPE by Kibaki in

2003, there were very strong links between state control and access to education at both the primary and secondary levels of education in Kenya. From 1963 – 73, when Jomo Kenyatta was in power, his home province, Central, enjoyed a healthy lead over the rest of Kenya in primary school enrolment. Over the same period, Central Province’s participation in the opportunity of secondary school education was also overwhelmingly dominant over the rest of Kenya. In the decade that Moi took over the reins of power, 1973 – 83, his home province, Rift Valley, rose, appreciably, to top the enrolment rankings. Rift Valley’s dominance in primary school enrolment would continue consistently to 2003 and coincided with dwindling fortunes in Central, which no longer wielded state power. The fortunes of Rift Valley Province, vis-à-vis secondary education, also improved significantly when Moi rose to power; during the period 1973 – 2003, the province would come to achieve parity with Central in this sphere and would finally surpass the latter in 2003. Opposition politics does not appear to have played a significant role in determining education outcomes with regard to the Luo, for Nyanza was consistently in the top half in both categories during the period under study. The findings regarding healthcare are examined next.

6.6.2 Healthcare Provision, State Power and Opposition Politics

The findings of this study regarding the family planning services component of healthcare are in congruence with the following two propositions, which are outlined in the theoretical framework: first, that political power is a vehicle to socio-economic prosperity in Africa; second, that the “ethnic groups” that control state power, owing to the politicization of “ethnicity” in Africa, do not allocate the dominated groups an equitable share of the national resources. During the historical phase 1963 – 73, this study shows, there was a strong link between state control and access to family planning services; President Jomo Kenyatta’s homeland, Central, was the greatest beneficiary of this state provision if Nairobi is not considered. During the same period, Nyanza, home to the Luo “dissenters”, performed dismally, appearing in the bottom two in consistent fashion. In the succeeding historical phase of this study, 1973 – 83, the two protagonists, Central (Kikuyu) and Nyanza (Luo) appear at the two extreme ends of the outcome of this crucial healthcare provision component, underlining the link between political inclination and access to state healthcare services.

The findings on the hospital bed and cot component of healthcare provision largely support the *Theory of Uneven Development*, which argues that capitalism leads to simultaneous concentrations of wealth and capital, on the one hand, and poverty and oppression on the other. With particular reference to Nairobi and North Eastern, the period 1963 – 73 was one in which the number of hospital beds and cots in the two provinces showcased the fact that capitalism leads to uneven development across regions at the nation-state level. Although, generally, the study shows that there was no strong link between political inclination and the provision of hospital beds and cots, the period 1983 – 93 is an exception: in what could be interpreted as a result of the botched coup attempt of 1982, Nyanza witnessed the least growth in this category over the decade, amongst all of Kenya's provinces, lending credence to the proposition that opposition politics has hampered economic development in Luo Nyanza. The findings on housing provision in relation to the theoretical framework follow next.

6.6.3 Housing Provision, State Power and Opposition Politics

The story of the GoK's provision of affordable, decent housing for Kenyans totally supports the *Theory of Uneven Development*, especially as espoused by Mandel (1968) who has argued that skewed socio-economic development associated with capitalism is partly the result of prolificacy differences amongst animals and soils, and fortuitous happenings in life and nature (as cited in Bond, 1999). It is about strategy, logic and suitability, and has nothing to do with state-instigated political machinations and/or opposition politics. Nairobi was absolutely dominant, as a recipient of this awfully scarce GoK provision, not least because it is the nation's industrial and commercial centre. Logically, a gigantic portion of the country's low income earners work in the city – these are the ones to whom affordable housing is mostly targeted. There is no way in which a province, like North Eastern, an unattractive region characterized by unfavourable climate and soils, and mostly the abode of nomadic pastoralists, would have been prioritized in the allocation of this GoK provision, amid the reality of scarce state resources. Certainly, throughout the period 1963 – 2013, political inclination and state power did not determine the allocation of this state provision; apportionment of this woefully limited resource was heavily dependent on relevance and strategy. If anything, Nyanza, an opposition stronghold, was the greatest beneficiary during the historical phase 1983 – 93 of this study. Noteworthy, after the forceful introduction of neoliberalism, the GoK seemingly lost its zeal and desire to

provide this service: the magnitude of this provision dwindled drastically from 8,575 housing units during 1983 – 93 to a paltry 1,673 in phase 1993 – 2003, Kenya’s first decade under neoliberalism. A summary of the study’s findings on the GoK’s electricity provision vis-à-vis the theoretical framework is next.

6.6.4 Electricity Supply, State Power and Opposition Politics

Electricity provision by the GoK was consistently heavily skewed in favour of Nairobi and Mt. Kenya throughout the period covered in this research, 1963 – 2013. Within the *Theory of Uneven Development*, these findings can be interpreted in two ways: first, through Oloo’s (2004) assertion that during colonial times, the British pursued a policy of uneven development flagrantly and unashamedly. Nyeri, which is situated in the Mt. Kenya area, was a white settler area from whence the British colonialists generated electricity. This meant that, upon independence, the area’s natives – President Jomo Kenyatta’s Kikuyu “ethnic group” – were better poised to obtain this provision for the concomitant infrastructure was already there. Second, still rooted in Oloo’s (2004) perspectives on uneven development, capitalism leads to socio-economic inequalities between different regions in a given country. The fact that Nairobi is the industrial, commercial and political capital of the nation automatically predisposes its residents to access higher living standards in comparison with other Kenyans. They are therefore in a better position to afford electricity.

However, since the GoK does not provide the precise electricity provision and consumption figures, especially those of both Mt. Kenya (Kenyatta’s home) and Nyanza (Odinga’s political base), we cannot rule out the possibility that the skewed provisions represent favouritism towards state supporters and punishment towards dissenters. The GoK has a habit of engaging coffee and tea farmers – largely from Mt. Kenya region – more meticulously, according the latter credit facilities and, often, writing off their debts.⁵⁰ This has had the effect of financially empowering this group – largely comprising Kikuyus – and uplifting its living standards, making it relatively better positioned to afford electricity. On the other hand, Luos who are historically largely sugar and cotton farmers have often been dealt major financial blows by both the GoK and the world economic system. The GoK often allows haphazard importation

⁵⁰ See, for instance, Ngige, F. (2016, November 30). Reprieve for farmers as President Uhuru Kenyatta cancels Sh 2.4b debts. *Standard Digital*. Retrieved from <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000225215/reprieve-for-farmers-as-president-uhuru-kenyatta-cancels-sh2-4b-debts> (accessed 17 February 2017).

of sugar, and second-hand clothing – these are dumped into the country, thanks to the WTO liberalization of world trade. In the first budget speech of the NARC Era, Finance Minister David Mwiraria aptly captured this aspect of poor governance when he stated, about sugar and cereals, that:

[P]referred traders have been allowed to import some of these commodities free of duties and taxes and sell them cheaply at the expense of local producers. This practice has consistently driven producer prices below remunerative levels, thus undermining farmers' incomes while discouraging local production. (RoKBS, 2003, p. 18)

Indeed, carelessness, ineptitude, corruption and “malice”, on the part of the GoK, have had the effect of slowly but surely killing the sugar and cotton industries in Kenya. This has, in turn, taken away from the source of livelihood of Luos, and other Kenyan sugar and cotton farmers, impairing their living standards and robbing them of the ability to pay for electricity installation services altogether. A summary of the study's findings on the GoK's provision of rural water supply, vis-à-vis the theoretical framework, is next.

6.6.5 Water Supply, State Power and Opposition Politics

The findings of this research suggest that there was a strong link between politics and access to rural water supply funding, with reference to the Luo, in historical phase 1963 – 73. In the period after the Odinga-Kenyatta fallout, Nyanza received the least amount of funding from the GoK's Department of Water. This supports the proposition that “ethnic groups” that control state power, in Africa, do not allocate the dominated groups – usually the “rebellious” ones – an equitable share of the national largesse. The next chapter –chapter 7 – concludes this thesis and highlights its key findings and assertions.

Chapter 7

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

7 Broad Overview of this Thesis

This thesis has been a deviation from the prevalent scholarly practice that largely conceptualizes “ethnicity”, vis-à-vis the Luo, through the lens of Lonsdale’s (cf. Berman and Lonsdale, 1992) notion of “moral ethnicity”. Deriving from the premise that “ethnicity” is not only a spurious ideological construct, but also an exogenous imposition on the aboriginal people of Africa, by mostly European colonizers and anthropologists, it has been inspired by Mafeje’s (1971) contention that, since Africa has “been successfully drawn into a capitalist economy and a world market” (p. 258), “ethnicity” has to be explained and conceptualized differently, with modern conditions in mind. Accordingly, it has positioned Kenya’s “ethnic” problem within the spectrum of profit and the push for globalism and contends that it is through the lens of the incessant, insatiable pursuit of profit by society’s elite class that contemporary scholarship should seek to theorize and understand the problem of “ethnicity”. It submits that warped ideologies characterize the various epochs of human history – slavery, colonialism and the post-independence era – and have been continuously morphed and employed by society’s elite class to safeguard and perpetuate the structural determination of capital.

Concerned about the specifics of the negative consequences of “ethnic” instigated political marginalization in Kenya, and seeking to establish why the Kenyan governing structures and practices persist in promoting “ethnicity” despite its existential problems for particular social groups, this study was conducted to meet three broad objectives, viz.: i) to examine the Luo perspective of the influence of political exclusion on their socio-economic and cultural development since independence; ii) to explain the marginalization of the Luo by examining the proportion of GoK investment in Nyanza during the period 1963 – 2013 to enhance their effective participation in governance structures at a grassroots level and their concomitant socio-economic development; and iii) to construct a conceptual framework to explain why “ethnicity” is strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in Kenya and why it has become a pervasive problem in the African country during the period under study.

To attain these objectives, I adopted a pragmatic approach: current literature on “ethnicity” and governance in Africa was critically examined with the view to inform a structured survey/questionnaire and FGD guide. Through these survey instruments, participants expressed their understandings and experiences regarding the consequences of ethnic-based governance on socio-cultural-economic development. Historical records – Economic Surveys, Statistical Abstracts and Budget Speeches – and contemporary world events were also examined and analysed to satisfy the objectives of this study. This final chapter presents a summary of the findings vis-à-vis the research questions, assumptions/hypotheses, and the conceptual and theoretical frameworks presented in chapters one and two, and outlines the salient conclusions of this study. Besides this synopsis, it comprises five sections, as follows: an integration of the quantitative and qualitative results, conclusions, policy recommendations, contribution to knowledge, and suggestions for further research. These key take-away points of this research are now sequentially presented.

7.1 Integrating the Quantitative and Qualitative Results

This section summarizes and compares the results of the study vis-à-vis its first four assumptions/hypotheses, which were mainly tested through the quantitative survey and FGDs. The quantitative and qualitative views of the respondents largely support the study’s first assumption that the Luo have enjoyed minimal public investment from the GoK because of opposition politics making them relatively poor compared to other communities; 60.5% of the survey respondents either agree or strongly agree with the proposition that the Luo have been short-changed by the central government in Kenya when it comes to the provision of public investment during the period under study (11.94% took a neutral stance, while 27.56% either disagreed or strongly disagreed with this proposition). On the other hand, a significant portion of the FGD respondents were of the opinion that, due to opposing the GoK, Luo Nyanza has witnessed outright economic sabotage instigated by the state. They contended that economic incapacitation of Luo Nyanza has been carried out surreptitiously – and with impunity – over the years. They cited the following examples of sabotage: disruption of rice irrigation schemes at Nyando, Kano and Ahero; the lack of support for the sugar industry, particularly the impairment of Miwani, Muhoroni and Chemelil sugar factories throughout the post-independence era; closure and relocation of production plants such as the Kenya Breweries in Kisumu; the

incapacitation of the Molasses Project in Kisumu; and the establishment of fish processing industries in Central Kenya, some hundreds of miles away from Lake Victoria. These state orchestrations, they argued, have had a devastating economic effect on Luo Nyanza over the years, particularly because they have left many Luos jobless, idle and economically incapacitated.

With reference to the study's second assumption – that political exclusion has led to the fostering of intra-“ethnic” ties amongst the Luo – both the quantitative and qualitative results were negative. The study finds that political exclusion in the period under study has instead weakened intra-communal ties amongst the members of the community. A majority of the respondents (52.75%) indicate that influential Luos do not assist fellow Luos to access economic opportunities – 15.69% took a neutral stance, while 31.57% either agree or strongly agree with the proposition. Despite having been politically excluded for much of the period during which Kenya has been independent, it seems that most Luos have not developed feelings of oneness and/or empathy towards fellow Luos. The majority of respondents (49.44%) do not feel that it is better for a Luo to marry a fellow Luo – on this issue 12.19% are neutral while 38.38% either agree or strongly agree. Seemingly, political exclusion during the period under study has not translated into strong feelings of exclusivity, in the area of marriage, amongst the Luo. Similarly, the FGDs revealed that the Luo perspective on whether Luos help each other given the predicament they collectively face – the economic derivatives of political exclusion – is almost completely negative. Narratives from the discussions held with members of the community disclose an overwhelming phenomenon that can, perhaps, best be described as “self-hate”. This “self-hate” phenomenon seemingly thrives amongst both the community's political leaders and the ordinary Luo citizens at the grassroots level, as well. These findings of self-loathing amongst the Luo negate the second assumption of this thesis, which is based on Carr's (1995) contentions that a direct co-relation between economic dissatisfaction and the strengthening of “ethnic” roots. The explanation of this strange phenomenon may lie in the subjugation process employed by ruling elites as described by wa Thiong'o (1986), and captured in chapter two of this thesis. According to wa Thiong'o (1986), society's dominant groups often use subtle psychological forms of violence to aid in the maintenance of oppressive economic orders. Psychological violence has often involved the belittling of the subservient people's culture, and is aimed at

destroying it and influencing or distorting the manner in which the latter view themselves vis-à-vis the dominant groups – cultivation of self-hate. A self-loathing people, it has been thought, are easy to manipulate and control. Somewhere along the process of subjugation, wa Thiong'o (1986) argues, the oppressors' cultures rise to dominate those of the oppressed; often, the dominated peoples come to define themselves via the alien cultural parameters forcibly introduced to their societies. Kenyatta's deculturalization technique, which introduced the Kikuyu notion of civility – male circumcision – to the Kenyan political arena, seems to have had a detrimental psychological effect on the Luo, by inflicting self-hate amongst a majority of the community's members and weakening their intra-ethnic ties as a result.

With regard to the third assumption of this study – which contended that political exclusion has translated into economic difficulties for the Luo, limiting their chances of ascending to power in Kenya – the following can be deduced from the results of the quantitative survey: access to, or denial of economic opportunities for a Luo in Kenya is a matter of a coin-toss; the issue of discrimination when it comes to better jobs and opportunities is legitimate, but not a grave concern for the Luo; it is neither easy nor difficult for the Luo to get promoted at the workplace on the basis of “ethnicity” – the situation looks more like a matter of fate; and the majority of Luos do not believe that their living standards would be better if they were from another “ethnicity”. These largely neutral findings of the quantitative phase may be explained by the fact that slightly over 50% of the survey respondents were youthful Luos below the age of thirty; moreover, 32.5% of these respondents were aged between 15 and 20 years and are yet to venture into the job market or employment scene. Also, owing to their age, a majority of the respondents, who were beneficiaries of the policies Kibaki implemented from 2003 to 2013 – such as free primary education – did not have the experience of life during the Kenyatta and Moi eras. The qualitative results, however, reveal a stronger support for the third assumption of this study. FGD participants stated that they continuously face tremendous difficulties with regards to the following: access to credit from financial institutions like banks, access to government funds and grants, access to government contracts and tenders and obtaining employment in the civil service. Most Luos feel that their *de facto* leader, Raila Odinga, faces a tumultuous task if he is to dislodge his Uhuru Kenyatta-led Kikuyu opponents who, owing to protracted control of state power, have become comparatively well-heeled over time. Participants lamented that Kikuyus

have continuously utilized their largely ill-gotten wealth to corrupt the country's electoral body, the IEBC, by bribing its officials. They contend that Luo leader, Odinga, is not in a position to use the same devious mechanisms, for he lacks the requisite financial wherewithal. These contrasting findings regarding this particular assumption bring to light the importance of the insights contained in the *Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (CMEPSP)*, which argued that “. . . statistics may not be capturing some phenomena, which have an increasing impact on the well-being of citizens” (Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2009, p. 8) and further validate the research design that was adopted for this study.

Concerning the study's fourth assumption, both the study's quantitative and qualitative results suggest that there is a very strong link between political exclusion and the adoption of alien cultures among the Luo – 52.5% of the respondents, for instance, have either adopted the practice of male circumcision or heard of a fellow Luo who has gone through the procedure. Due largely to politically-instigated “othering”, the Luo community of Kenya is increasingly adopting a practice that it has not been historically associated with. The likelihood that the entire community will adopt it in the near future is real. The quantitative results indicate that the adoption of this alien culture of circumcision in Luo Nyanza is occurring in uniform fashion. On the other hand, while many cosmopolitan Luos might be adopting this rite of passage, the phenomenon is occurring inconsistently. This finding is somewhat strange, given that one would expect cosmopolitan Luos, who reside alongside members of other “ethnic groups”, to be under more pressure to “conform”. It would seem that, as the FGDs revealed, the Luo in Nyanza has been more consistent in adopting the practice owing to other reasons such as health. Indeed, most GoK and NGO initiatives that link the practice to health, such as Kenya's Ministry of Health's VMMC Programme, mainly target Luo Nyanza.

The fact that the qualitative and the quantitative results for the most part matched each other, with respect to the study's research assumptions, boosted the trustworthiness of the findings even as it also suggested that the research design adopted for this study was valid as well as reliable. The fact that the research findings were largely harmonious also bestowed credibility to the implemented research strategy. Indeed, according to Creswell and Clark (2011),


MMR is crucial because “the combination of quantitative and qualitative data provide a more complete understanding of the research problem than either approach by itself” (p. 8). Based on the study objectives summarised in section 7.1 above, I will now draw the main conclusions of this study.

7.2 Conclusions

The evidence presented in the preceding chapters reveals that there are legitimate reasons for the Luo of Kenya to feel that the GoK has short-changed them in the provision of public goods during the period under study. I will now briefly present the specifics of the marginalization of the Luo vis-à-vis GoK investment in Nyanza during the period 1963 – 2013, as revealed by the scrutiny of historical records examined in this study. During the historical phase 1963 – 73, this study shows, there was a strong link between state control and access to family planning services; President Jomo Kenyatta’s turf, Central, was the greatest beneficiary of this state provision if Nairobi is not considered. During the same period, Nyanza, home to the Luo “dissenters”, performed dismally, appearing in the bottom two positions in consistent fashion. In the succeeding historical phase of this study, 1973 – 83, the two protagonists, Central (Kikuyu) and Nyanza (Luo) appear at the two extreme ends of the outcome of this crucial healthcare provision component, underlining the link between political inclination and access to state healthcare services, in this particular regard. Although, generally, the study shows that there was no strong link between political inclination and the provision of hospital beds and cots, the period 1983 – 93 is an exception: in what could be interpreted as a result of the botched coup attempt of 1982, Nyanza witnessed the least growth in this category over this decade, amongst all of Kenya’s provinces, lending credence to the proposition that opposition politics has hampered economic development in Luo Nyanza. The findings of this research suggest that there was a strong link between politics and access to rural water supply funding, with reference to the Luo, in the historical phase 1963 – 73. In the period after the Odinga-Kenyatta fallout, Nyanza received the least amount of funding from the GoK’s Department of Water. This corroborates the proposition that “ethnic groups” that control state power in some African countries do not allocate the dominated groups – usually the “rebellious” ones – an equitable share of the national largesse. Thus, from a historical standpoint, evidence for the marginalization of the Luo owing to

their opposition politics, lies in the following two broad categories of public provision – healthcare and rural water supply.

Notwithstanding the evidence presented above to support the argument that opposition politics has hindered the socio-economic development of the Luo of Kenya, this study finds that the playing field is gradually being leveled owing to constitutional changes, especially through the aspect of devolution of state resources instituted by the 2010 Constitution that pays no heed to the political predispositions of communities. During the Kibaki era, the GoK appears to have performed better with regard to ensuring equity in the provision of public services and the allocation of scarce state resources. More importantly, the current president, Uhuru, has been mandated by the country's new constitution to share the national bounty in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA). The voyage towards social justice in Kenya has been an intriguing one. Figure 7.1 below depicts this journey, from strong centralized governance in Kenya to devolved government, from “independence” to 2013 and beyond: it shows how the combination of Luo-led opposition and pressure from globalists has benefited, perhaps inadvertently, the ordinary Kenyan citizen at the grassroots level of society.






Figure 7.1: From Centralization to Devolution, in

Source: Author (2017)

As shown in figure 7.1 above, the blend of Luo-led opposition to the GoK, spearheaded by Jaramogi and later his son Raila, and pressure from the world monopoly capitalist forces – inadvertently, intentionally or a combination thereof – has transformed Kenya, albeit gradually, from a strongly centralized state to the devolved system of government prevalent in the country today. Whilst Jomo Kenyatta centralized state power and emasculated local authorities, Moi began the gradual reversal of the founding father’s posture by introducing LATF; Kibaki went a notch higher, by adding the School Bursary Fund (SBF) and CDF to LATF and following the promulgation of Kenya’s new constitution in 2010, Uhuru Kenyatta, upon assuming power in 2013, would preside over a country governed by the principle of devolution of state resources. Figure 7.1 above is in congruence with one of the various Luo perspectives, on the interplay between political marginalization and economic development, discussed in chapter five’s subsection 5.2.5, which holds that opposition politics has, in fact, led to the development of not only Luo Nyanza, but to the whole of Kenya. Proponents of this school of thought argue that the Luo-led struggle against oppression by the GoK has culminated in devolution of state resources, which is benefitting all citizens by ensuring the equitable distribution of the national bounty. However, this study finds that there is still a problem of access to opportunities and resources at the individual level, where ethnic-based discrimination appears to persist in grave fashion. FGD participants lamented that Luos get limited or no access to employment, especially in the public sector, government tenders and development funds, and loans from financial institutions; if this issue is addressed, I posit, much of the tension prevalent in contemporary Kenyan society could dissipate.

There appears to be a ferocious power struggle between various factions of capital – the African nationalist bourgeois class, which largely controls the Kenyan state, and the globalist forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system. This struggle could well explain why the Kenyan governing structures and practices persist in promoting “ethnicity” despite its existential problems for particular social groups, for it is possible that globalists are working clandestinely with leaders of disenchanted “ethnic groups” to further their interests in Africa. Whilst the Kenyan capitalists seek economic independence and autonomy, the globalists appear hell-bent on subjugating the former. In fact, as shown by the historical records examined in this study, the story of Kenya has been one of continuous Western interference in the nation’s socio-economic-

political affairs often to the detriment of its citizens. Western interference is not always open and direct; often, it is carried out in a subtle manner and serves to sabotage Kenya's/Africa's efforts at progress and independence. During the historical phase 1963 – 73, for instance, Kenya would face challenges with regard to the settlement of its largely landless citizens and a perpetually precarious balance of payments position. However, instead of industrial countries – under the grip of globalists – offering help in the form of provision of markets for Kenya's produce, it put in place restrictive trade measures against the country's goods. The globalist-controlled West insisted on aid; the problem with this “assistance” is that external debt obligations arising from it would mainly serve to cripple the country's development agenda. Moreover, desperation arising from this consequence would further cement Kenya's submissiveness and expose the country to the whims of the IMF and World Bank – the cryptograms of the world monopoly capitalist (globalist) forces – which were enforced in Kenya in the 1990s through neoliberalism and its associated structural adjustments. During the period 1973 – 93, Kenya would shift its strategy from production aimed at import substitution to export-oriented industrialization; this was to be implemented largely through the establishment of EPZs. Although the World Bank and the USAID agreed to assist in financing these EPZs, western/industrialized economies remained largely closed to the country's exports. And during the period 1993 – 2003, Moi's government would be bullied into accepting and adopting neoliberalism against its will. The West would force Kenya to abandon its export-oriented industrialization blueprint and adopt the globalist call for privatization and complete liberalization of the country's economy. To enforce neoliberalism on Kenya, bilateral and multilateral donors would suspend funding and call for “financial discipline”. Finally, during the period 2003 – 2013, Kibaki would be forced to adopt an economic agenda that would ensure the development of infrastructure that would support the pursuit of neoliberalist interests in Kenya. Such have been the intrigues of the power struggle between the two fractions of capital which, I contend, make leadership in Africa and elsewhere in the Global South a difficult task. The fifth assumption of this study therefore holds some truth: the strong correlation between “ethnicity” and the crisis of state power in Kenya could be partly attributed to the machinations of the global capitalists and western interference in the country's affairs. This view tends to prevail, especially, when one considers that as Moi prepared to vacate power in 2002 following a decade of implementation of structural adjustments associated with neoliberalism, crime, “ethnic” tensions, increased unemployment, and poverty grew amongst

Kenya's citizens, 52% of whom lived below the poverty line (cf. RoKBS, 1996, p. 13; RoKBS, 2000, p. 1).

With regard to the indicators of socio-economic development examined in this study, a strong case for capitalism and uneven development that accompanies this economic posture can be made in relation to electricity supply and housing. Electricity provision by the GoK was consistently, heavily skewed in favour of Nairobi and Mt. Kenya throughout the period covered in this research, 1963 – 2013. Within the *Theory of Uneven Development*, these findings can be interpreted in two ways: first, through Oloo's (2004) assertion that during colonial times, the British pursued a policy of uneven development flagrantly and unashamedly. Nyeri, which is situated in the Mt. Kenya area, was a white settler area from whence the British colonialists generated electricity. This meant that, upon independence, the area's natives – President Jomo Kenyatta's Kikuyu “ethnic group” – were better poised to obtain this provision for the concomitant infrastructure was already there. Second, still rooted in Oloo's (2004) perspectives on uneven development, capitalism leads to socio-economic inequalities between different regions in a given country. The fact that Nairobi is the industrial, commercial and political capital of the nation, automatically predisposes its residents to access to higher living standards in comparison with other Kenyans; they are therefore in a better position to afford electricity. On the other hand, the story of the GoK's provision of affordable, decent housing for Kenyans totally supports the *Theory of Uneven Development*, especially as espoused by Mandel (1968) who has argued that skewed socio-economic development, associated with capitalism, is partly the result of prolificacy differences amongst animals and soils, and fortuitous happenings in life and nature (as cited in Bond, 1999). It is about strategy, logic and suitability, and has nothing to do with state-instigated political machinations and/or opposition politics. Nairobi was absolutely dominant, as a recipient of this awfully scarce GoK provision, not least because it is the nation's industrial and commercial centre. Logically, a gigantic portion of the country's low income earners work in the city – these are the ones for whom affordable housing is mostly targeted. There is no way in which a province, like North Eastern, an unattractive region characterized by unfavourable climate and soils, and mostly the abode of nomadic pastoralists, would have been prioritized in the allocation of this GoK provision, amid the reality of scarce state resources. Certainly, throughout the period 1963 – 2013, political inclination and state power did not determine the allocation of this state provision; apportionment of this woefully limited resource

was heavily dependent on relevance and strategy. If anything, Nyanza, an opposition stronghold, was the greatest beneficiary during the historical phase 1983 – 93 of this study. Noteworthy, after the forceful introduction of neoliberalism, the GoK seemingly lost its zeal and desire to provide this service: the magnitude of this provision dwindled drastically from 8,575 housing units during historical phase 1983 – 93, to a paltry 1,673 in the phase 1993 – 2003, Kenya’s first decade under neoliberalism.

A strong link between state power and access to public goods and services is detectable in the Kenyan case, too. Notwithstanding the fact that coffee and tea are the country’s largest exports and, therefore, should logically be prioritised by the GoK, the Budget Speeches show what appears to be outright favouritism towards the growers of the aforementioned crops – Kikuyus and Kalenjins – as opposed to sugar growers, like the Luo, during the period 1963 – 73. Whereas the GoK limited its engagement with sugar-growing areas, such as Nyanza, to the provision of roads, it would engage further and more meaningfully with coffee and tea farmers by providing credit facilities and agricultural extension services to the latter. It may be argued that the provision of roads, no matter how essential and well-intentioned, is an obligatory exercise that does not directly intervene in an individual’s life; facilitation of loans for small-scale holdings is much more direct and has a greater bearing on people’s lives. Coupled with the “questionable” importation of sugar undertaken by the GoK towards the end of this period, avoidance of the aforementioned direct engagement with communities like the sugar-growing Luo, leaves the Jomo Kenyatta-led GoK susceptible to allegations of favouritism towards its enthusiasts – mainly members of the Kikuyu “ethnic group”. There is more historical evidence that shows a strong link between state power and access to public goods and services during the period under study: during the period 1963 – 73, for instance, the greatest beneficiary of primary education was the president’s backyard – Central Province – which experienced a continuous steady rise in enrolment figures. In a trend similar to the one depicted in the primary school category, the president’s backyard led in the secondary school enrolment numbers, which were characterized by a steady rise throughout the period 1968 – 73. With regard to the family planning programme, the greatest beneficiary besides Nairobi, during the historical phase 1963 – 73, was Central Province, Jomo Kenyatta’s home area. During historical phase 1973 – 83, when Moi ascended to power, there was a remarkable increase in enrolment numbers at the primary

school level; Rift Valley Province, which was the new turf of the president, from 1978 rose dramatically from position four to take the lead, country-wide, in terms of primary school enrolment in Kenya. Concerning rural water supply, during historical phase 1973 – 83, Central Province consistently received steady funding, whilst the investments in Rift Valley, Coast and North Eastern virtually stagnated throughout this historical phase. The biggest enrolment gain, in secondary education during the historical phase 1983 – 93, was recorded in Rift Valley Province, President Moi's home turf. And, during the period 1993 – 2003, the dominance of Moi's Rift Valley Province in terms of primary education continued, in earnest, strengthening the proposition in the theoretical framework in chapter two that political power is a vehicle to promote prosperity in Africa.

Last but not least, according to the findings of this study, there is not much evidence to support Kuria's (2011, para. 2) assertion that "since independence, the political leadership of the region has held the people hostage to a self-defeating ideology of blaming everybody except themselves for the region's woes"; his argument may be challenged as soft. From the FGDs, one can somehow argue in support of Kuria (2011) when it comes to the phenomenon of "self-hate" amongst the Luo. The findings of this study indicate that this "self-hate" phenomenon prevails, far and wide, amongst the Luo, from the grassroots level to the national level of Kenyan society. Moreover, some participants alleged, the community's political leaders, under the stewardship of Raila Odinga, the country's former PM and now Official Leader of the Opposition, have been in the vanguard of feeding and perpetuating this absurd phenomenon. During his tenure as the country's PM, some participants contend, a large portion of the few lucky Luos who held high ranking public service positions were either axed or demoted. Seemingly, Luo leadership comprises envious, selfish individuals, who seldom cherish the successes of their kin; on the contrary, they appear to relish the prospects of seeing fellow Luos positioned below them, status-wise, all the time. These revelations, especially with regard to the character of Raila, indicate that it is perhaps time for the Luo community to seek alternative leadership and unyoke itself from the control of the Odinga family. Jaramogi's son could be exploiting the Kenyatta-Odinga rivalry and using the Luo electorate for his own personal ambition and gain. However, those Luos who allege that Luo Nyanza has experienced outright economic sabotage for opposing the Kenyan state hold a different view. To camouflage this punitive posture, such Luos contend, the GoK has

appointed and worked with a few Luo “Uncle Toms” (Luo leaders who are mainly driven by personal enrichment and do not have the interests of the community at heart). Accordingly, Odinga comes across as a defiant figure who has refused to sanctify socio-economic-political injustice. According to some FGD participants, “Uncle Toms” have, over the years, been made part of the oppressive Kenyan state to quell disquiet amongst the Luo whilst simultaneously legitimizing the state’s iniquities. They are given no space to function independently and bring about meaningful change in their people’s lives – they are “toothless bulldogs”. The Odingas, proponents of this school of thought maintain, are legitimate since they have often declined to accept posts in oppressive governments, and chosen the people’s side in a bid to bring about the desired societal changes. This perspective of Odinga challenges Kuria’s (2011) portrayal of Luo politicians as poor leaders and the community as a collection of aimless whiners. It makes Kuria’s understanding of a competent leader seem like an individual who unquestionably bows to an oppressive socio-economic-political order; similarly, it casts his understanding of a progressive community as one that “suffers peacefully”. Some policy recommendations arising out of this research are briefly discussed next.

7.3 Policy Recommendations

In view of the historical findings of this research, and based on the opinions of the various survey respondents and FGD participants, and an examination of contemporary society’s socio-economic-political events, the following recommendations should be considered if Kenya is to make a bold and meaningful step towards overcoming societal uncertainty and contradictory social relations of power, predicated upon the highly subjective and bogus concept of “ethnicity”, which have served to encourage the “oppression” of “ethnic groups” considered to be “dissident”.

To partly address the problem of access to opportunities and resources at the individual level, where ethnic-based discrimination appears to persist in grave fashion, especially in terms of access to employment in the public sector, the GoK should adhere more to the principles of the new constitution that advocate for regional balance in state appointments. This could help ease the tensions prevalent in contemporary Kenyan society. It is difficult for Kenyans to love their country when they feel that they have no stake in it; there is evidence to show that

successive governments of independent Kenya have largely given the Luo, and other communities considered to be pro-opposition, a wide berth regarding participation in governance structures at the national level. What is more, political participation in governance structures at the national level still appears to be determined by a community's real or perceived political stance even under Kenya's new constitution. Of the 18 Cabinet Secretaries and 26 Principal Secretaries appointed by President Uhuru and his deputy, Ruto, at the beginning of their tenure, for instance, only three – Raychelle Omamo (Defence Cabinet Secretary), Peter Oganga Mangiti (Principal Secretary, Planning) and Colleta Akinyi Suda (Principal Secretary of Education, Science and Technology)⁵¹ – were from the Luo community (the leading opposition “ethnic group”). Luo participation in government at the national level was thus limited to these three individuals only. On the other hand, about 90% of the top officials of the Jubilee Government, including Parastatal heads, are either Kikuyu or Kalenjin.⁵² The Kikuyu, under Uhuru's government, control the following strategic positions of governance, in addition to the Presidency: Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), National Intelligence Services (NIS), Criminal Investigations Department (CID), Attorney General, Solicitor General, Registrar General, Head of Public Service, Devolution and Planning Ministry, National Defence College, Speaker of National Assembly, Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA), National Youth Service, the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) and the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). The situation in Kenya is akin to what Attafuah (2009) refers to as the “winner-takes-all” “democratic” system. These conditions, in which one or two “ethnic groups” dominate all facets of government, are not suitable for “equitable” socio-economic development and harmonious co-existence in a society considered to be “ethnically” heterogeneous.

The principles of regional balance should also be adhered to with regard to the allocation of funds under schemes such as the Youth Enterprise Development Fund and the Women Enterprise Fund, which are meant to facilitate credit access for young people and women, in a bid to support their SME initiatives and develop their entrepreneurial skills. This will ensure

⁵¹ See Jamhuri Magazine. (2013). *President Kenyatta: 18 Ministries, 18 Cabinet Secretaries & 26 Principal Secretaries*. Retrieved from <http://jamhurimagazine.com/index.php/kenya-president/4149-president-uhuru-kenyatta-18-ministries-18-cabinet-secretaries-26-principal-secretaries.html> (accessed 10 October 2015).

⁵² See Kenya Stockholm Blog. (2015, March 20). Ethnic breakdown of top appointments in Uhuru's Kenya shows Kikuyus top the List. Retrieved from <http://kenyastockholm.com/2015/03/20/ethnic-breakdown-of-top-appointments-in-uhurus-kenya-shows-kikuyus-top-the-list/> (accessed 10 October 2015).

equality in terms of access to opportunity and most likely guarantee equality in the outcome of participation in the opportunity. This is especially so, for this research has found that the surname of applicants plays a significant role in determining who will get access to these funds. Owing to the easily identifiable Luo surnames, members of the community are experiencing tremendous difficulties in their quest to access these government funds.

Although it may prove difficult, given the “ethnicized” nature of the Kenyan state, which is dominated by members of two “ethnic groups” – the Kikuyu and Kalenjin – measures should be instituted to ensure free, fair, credible and verifiable election processes, to make election results acceptable to all. Officials of the electoral body, associated with any opaque electoral processes and corruption, should never be allowed to remain in office. The electoral body should be totally independent, and state of the art technology should be employed in voter registration, the voting itself, the tallying and the relaying of results. The typical delay that characterizes the announcement of the final presidential tallies in Kenya, should be eliminated for the elections to pass the credibility test.

Strict devolution of state funds to the country’s 47 counties should be adhered to for this will ensure that communities, especially those that are excluded from participation in national government processes, get an alternative avenue of contributing to decisions geared towards their socio-economic development at the grassroots level. Devolved funding will also ensure that every “ethnic group” stands an opportunity of obtaining business opportunities from the local government – tenders and contracts. This way, the fate of communities will be less pegged to their surnames and more dependent on genuine competition and merit. Moreover, engaging constituents more in determining how devolved funds, including CDF, will be used, gives them a sense of ownership of their socio-economic destiny and ensures that important projects are prioritized.

Employers in the private sector – especially multinationals and other corporate entities – should be encouraged to ensure regional balance in their employment policies and practices as much as they can; in fact, those private enterprises that adhere to regional balance principles should be given incentives such as tax deductions. This will help combat the ill effects of the historically-informed prejudices and stereotypes, such as the circumcision myth, which

according to the findings of this study is playing a noticeable role at the grassroots level, in diminishing ordinary Luos' chances of earning a decent living and obtaining anticipated and commensurate reward for effort and hard work.

Kenya should engage the West cautiously, for industrialised countries, which are largely behind the activities of the international financial institutions that keep Africa in constant debt, have demonstrated time and time again that they do not have the best interests of humanity at heart. During the latter half of the 20th century, for instance, industrialised countries continuously frustrated Africa's efforts aimed at gaining access to their markets by implementing strong protectionist measures and policies to prevent competition from Africa's exports. And when the WTO Treaty came into play, liberalizing world trade, they engaged in serious dumping activity, filling Africa with under-priced or subsidized imports, thereby harming the performance of the continent's industries. Specifically, no African country should purport to be engaging the West on behalf of other African countries; for instance, African countries should desist from the habit of signing trade treaties that have implications for the rest of the continent, unilaterally. The continent needs to speak in one voice under the auspices of regional bodies such as the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the EAC and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is important for Kenya to involve and work with other African countries even as it pursues its own foreign policy initiatives for, united, Africa stands; divided, it is even more vulnerable to the machinations of the globalists. Also, to curtail further "take-over" of Kenya by external forces, or at least slow it down, Kenyans must be given first priority when it comes to privatization of commercial public enterprises and major parastatals, for the purpose of mobilization of capital for expansion, modernization and rehabilitation.⁵³ Such programmes should be carried out under appropriate regulatory frameworks that emphasize the affirmative

⁵³ Global capitalists are at the top of this economic order in contemporary times; accordingly, there is the opinion – which is viable – that it is almost certain, now, that a capitalist order controlled by Kenyans within the African nation is not feasible, for Kenya cannot insulate itself from the globalists owing to the latter's influence and dominance. Indeed, as noted by Kline (2017), the African nationalist bourgeois class in Kenya will soon be swallowed up. Moreover, the latter (ruling local elites) are bound to sell out to global elites, to the detriment of the majority of ordinary working people, for this has been the pattern as witnessed on a global scale (G. Kline, personal communication, September 7, 2017). I, therefore, make this recommendation mainly from an Afro-optimist's perspective and from the standpoint that Africa should not give up its independence without a fight. I have probed this reality further – vis-à-vis Uhuru Kenyatta – in the recommendations for further research in section 7.5 below.

action required to guarantee domestic participation; this will help in ensuring that national interests are protected.

7.4 Contribution to Knowledge

Methodologically, theoretically and conceptually, this study proffers empirically-driven insights that would enhance development policy and practice at both the grassroots and national levels. With reference to methodology, the procedure adopted for tackling the emotive subject of ethnic-based governance in Africa, which makes room for the inclusion of experiential, epistemological and historical knowledge, is novel and, as such, may be applied in contexts other than Kenya. Thus, this procedure, discussed in Chapter 3, contributes to the existing methodologies that aim to examine the socio-cultural-economic consequences of political marginalization/exclusion in Africa. Moreover, following in the footsteps of Piketty (2014), who urges against “talking about inequalities . . . without citing any source whatsoever or any methods for comparing one era with another . . .” (p. 16), I have based this study on what could be considered “objective data” (Piketty, 2014, p. 16) – GoK Statistical Abstracts, Economic Surveys and Budget Speeches – and, hopefully, taken the discussion on “ethnicity” and the provision of public goods in Kenya further. Theoretically, the eclectic approach, which fuses various propositions emanating from existent literature, allows for the extensive review of the interplay between the concepts of “ethnicity”, political power, freedom and economic development; this approach also contributes to existing and on-going discourses on African governance, generally, and on how to analyse the negative socio-economic consequences of political marginalization in Africa, specifically. Conceptually, the framework to understand “ethnicized” politics in Kenya uncovered in chapter 5, which emanated largely from the FGDs, illuminates our understanding of the complex nature of global power relations vis-à-vis Africa. This framework has advanced our understanding of the violence associated with elections in Kenya by looking beyond “ethnic” rivalry and extending the discourse to the power struggle between the indigenous African bourgeois class and the globalist forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system. Moreover, “given that there is no agreement amongst scholars concerning how ‘governance’ should be conceptualized” (Jose, 2014, p. 12) and the consequent fact that “there exists a need to create . . . conceptual [frameworks for the] analysis of governance” (Jose, 2014, p. 3) the conceptual framework unveiled in chapter 5 contributes

towards filling an existent gap in scholarship on governance, especially in Africa. Accordingly, researchers and students will find the effective application of this framework to understand “ethnicized” politics in Kenya equally illuminating.

Finally, this study has successfully examined and highlighted the consequences of political marginalization/exclusion in Kenya/Africa with special reference to governance, and socio-economic development policies, as it brings to light specific issues that need to be examined if the historically-informed inequities and disparities regarding socio-economic development in Kenya/Africa are to be addressed systematically and holistically.

7.5 Suggestions for Further Research

From the research conclusions, it is evident that one of the significant issues that merit further research is the current status and developments around what appears to be a ferocious power struggle between the African nationalist bourgeois class in Kenya and globalists. Whilst the Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta, was once considered an “enemy” of the West, his relationship with the latter appears to have undergone a dramatic facelift; an international observer mission, led by former US Secretary of State John Kerry, for instance, gave a clean bill of health to the 8 August 2017 Kenyan general election, in which Kenyatta was announced winner despite the process being marred by numerous irregularities and illegalities. Ever since Uhuru’s “triumph” at the ICC, the Kenyan president is increasingly assuming the role of Africa’s “superman”. As if to acknowledge this fact, Barack Obama – the 44th US President whose father was Kenyan/Luo – after snubbing Uhuru for a protracted time period, during which the latter struggled to disentangle himself from the ICC cases he faced, paid a visit to his father’s homeland in July 2015 to attend a global entrepreneurial summit and “hold talks on trade and investment, and also security and counter-terrorism”.⁵⁴ He was followed in quick pursuit by Pope Francis, who visited the country in November 2015 “to discuss issues close to his heart in Kenya . . . , including poverty, the environment and the need for interfaith dialogue” and “to challenge

⁵⁴ BBC. (2015, July 24). *President Obama starts two-day Kenya visit*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33656895> (accessed September 23, 2016).

the countr[y's] political leaders on corruption".⁵⁵ In May, 2016, Israeli PM, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited Nairobi where he stated that "he has set breaking the automatic majority against Israel in international forums as a strategic goal for the country, and that upgrading Israel's position in the African Union will go a long way toward achieving that goal".⁵⁶ And Uhuru Kenyatta promised him that "Kenya w[ould] work to restore Israel's observer status at the African Union because Israel is a critical partner in the battle against terrorism, the most serious challenge facing the world today".⁵⁷ The Indian Premier, Narendra Modi, landed at JKIA in July 2016 in a visit seen by many as "seek[ing] to boost trade relations, health deals and cultural connections".⁵⁸ In what was the first visit by a Japanese Premier in the last 15 years, Shinzo Abe travelled to Kenya to participate in the sixth summit of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) held in Nairobi in August 2016: during this TICAD summit, "Japanese and African leaders [wer]e expected to aim to adopt the Nairobi Declaration, which would focus on how to enhance areas such as education in the continent to tackle the threat of terrorism".⁵⁹ Uhuru Kenyatta has definitely become one of the continent's foremost leaders – a reference point on African issues, some would say.

Given that evidence exists beyond reasonable doubt that Western countries have in the past propped up and supported African dictators and, in conjunction with the latter, plundered Africa's resources,⁶⁰ it is important that the newfound status of Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, be investigated. Indeed, the pertinent question that African governance analysts are going to have to review is whether the Kenyan President is, in fact, colluding with globalists,

⁵⁵ The Guardian. (2015, November 25). *Pope Francis arrives in Kenya for first leg of African tour*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/25/pope-francis-kenya-african-tour> (accessed 23 September 2016).

⁵⁶ Keinon, H. (2016, May 07). Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta vows to work to upgrade Israel's status in the African Union. *The Jerusalem Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/During-historic-Netanyahu-visit-Kenyan-president-says-Africa-needs-Israel-459548> (accessed 23 September 2016).


⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Mutambo, A. (2016, July 08). What to expect from India's PM Narendra Modi visit to Kenya. *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/What-to-expect-from-India-PM-Modi-visit-Kenya/1056-3284974-7pnqdy/index.html> (accessed 23 September 2016).

⁵⁹ The Mainichi. (2016, August 22). Abe to make formal visit to Kenya to attend Japan-Africa summit. Retrieved from <http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160822/p2g/00m/0dm/070000c> (accessed 23 September 2016).

⁶⁰ See, for instance, Al Jazeera. (2014, April 07). *The French African connection*. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2013/08/201387113131914906.html> (accessed 27 September 2016).

whose actions increasingly point towards the desire to establish a “New World Order” in which transnational capital will transplant national sovereignty. Why did Kenya blatantly betray fellow Africans, and other countries that face the same predicament as the East African nation, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) by “exclud[ing] ‘African issues’ from the agenda while simultaneously pushing through the Expansion of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which benefits US corporations” (Campbell, 2016, *Introduction* section, para. 1) at the 10th WTO Ministerial Conference held in Nairobi in December 2015? Did Uhuru Kenyatta actually triumph at the ICC or was a deal struck behind the scenes to let him off the hook in exchange for questionable actions such as the aforementioned cynical and misguided move? Industrialized countries have never been fully and genuinely willing to let developing countries participate completely in international trade and the GoK has always lamented this painful reality. For instance, about the GATT, the WTO precursor, Finance Minister Saitoti stated in 1989, that:



A new round of GATT negotiations started last year, but encountered great difficulties, particularly in the area of liberalizing trade in agricultural products...It is extremely important for us in the developing world that the GATT negotiations make substantial headway because an important part of these negotiations concerns us directly. From our own perspective, it is ultimately a question of whether the industrial countries are genuinely willing to let developing nations participate fully in international trade. (RoKBS, 1989, p. 2)

And in 1991, he continued to bemoan the country’s situation with regard to world trade:

It is regrettable to note that while many developing countries, including Kenya, are striving to end trade restrictions and to lower import duties, industrial countries have failed to reciprocate by opening their markets wider to both our manufactured and agricultural exports . . . [W]hile the GATT struggles to keep the world trading system open, Europe marches towards its economic integration in 1992, with uncertain consequences for the rest of the trading world. North America, in response to this and to the continuing challenge from Japan, seeks its own trading bloc. The US and Canada

have already signed a free trade agreement and Mexico has broken out of its protective shell to propose a similar treaty with the US. Developing countries in particular, and others in the world, will continue to benefit most from an open trading system. If however, the world is dividing into blocs, this intensifies the challenge to countries like Kenya, which must become competitive enough to export around and through any trade barriers thrown up by regional groupings. (RoKBS, 1991, pp. 3 – 4)

Given Kenya's awareness of the fact that Western countries have been in the habit of forming regional groupings, as evidenced above, to sabotage Africa's efforts on the international trade front, it is baffling that Uhuru Kenyatta recently betrayed the EAC by going against the region's intentions of trade on a region to region basis, and unilaterally ratifying the EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which has the appearance of a trap aimed at deindustrializing Africa,⁶¹ since "[i]mports from the EU into the region are dominated by machinery and mechanical appliances, equipment and parts, vehicles and pharmaceutical products".⁶² It may be argued by some that the EPA "will [shield] the country from heavy taxes on exports to the European Union",⁶³ but it is evident that divide-and-conquer tactics are very much at play and are increasingly being applied by the forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system, which have perfected the art of bullying developing nations. Given that Raila Odinga, for some reason, continuously fails to ascend to power in Kenya, one might wonder if the exploitative capitalists have run out of patience with Kenya's former premier and made Uhuru their new "darling".


Last but not least, this study established that, despite his portrayal as an iron-fisted African dictator (cf. e.g., Brown, 2001; Nepstad, 2011), President Moi was actually a compassionate, pro-poor leader who did all he could to shield his people from the ills of neoliberalism; indeed, to the Afro-optimist, Moi will be remembered best as an intelligent patriot who loathed neo-colonialism. His style was different from Jomo Kenyatta's; he was not in the habit of constructing roads for farmers and declining to establish initiatives that would grant the latter direct access to credit facilities – at least from a Luo standpoint. The development programmes

⁶¹ See, for instance, Mbaka, J. (2016, September 21). MPs ratify the Economic Partnership Agreement with EU to avert high taxes. *The Star*. Retrieved from http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/09/21/mps-ratify-the-economic-partnership-agreement-with-eu-to-avert-high_c1423915 (accessed 27 September 2016).

⁶² European Commission. (2016). *Countries and Regions: East African Community (EAC) – Trade picture*. Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/eac/> (accessed 27 September 2016).

⁶³ Mbaka, J., *op. cit.*

and projects he initiated and launched were geared towards directly engaging the citizens at the grassroots level of society. His demeanour as president depicts a character who advocated a move towards self-sufficiency and self-dependence; indeed, he urged Kenyans, and Africans at large, to work towards a shift from the position of always being at the mercy of external circumstances, to a posture of optimism with action that would see them take control of their own destiny, as captured in the 1989 Budget Speech: “We have improved our administrative capability to respond to crises, and strengthened our willpower to confront and deal with emerging problems by using our own resources” (p. 1). Future generations will be fed with horror stories about Africa and its leadership; and they will fall prey to the Afro-pessimists’ prejudiced portrayals and depictions of the continent, if they do not understand how the world monopoly capitalist forces function to undermine and sabotage the efforts of African leaders and peoples. In view of this looming danger, fresh scholarly works on Africa, by Africans, conducted through a decolonized prism, need to be encouraged; I suggest that new works be commenced on the character and leadership styles of Moi and the other Kenyan Presidents, with reference to the reality of the juggernaut that is the world monopoly capitalist system.



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
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION

Please give the answers in the spaces provided.

1. Gender:	Male	<input type="checkbox"/>	Female	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Age:	15-20	<input type="checkbox"/>	20-30	<input type="checkbox"/>
	30-50	<input type="checkbox"/>	50 and above	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Marital status:				
Single	<input type="checkbox"/>	Married	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Separated	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divorced	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Widow(er)	<input type="checkbox"/>			
4. Highest level of education:				
Primary	<input type="checkbox"/>	Secondary	<input type="checkbox"/>	
College	<input type="checkbox"/>	University	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Post graduate	<input type="checkbox"/>	Others (specify)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
5. Occupation:				
Employed	<input type="checkbox"/>	Self employed	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Unemployed	<input type="checkbox"/>	Student	<input type="checkbox"/>	

SECTION B: CULTURAL FACTORS

6. I have heard the argument that an uncircumcised man cannot be a leader.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

7. If your answer in 6 above is 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree', did you hear this from a politician?

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

8. I have been ridiculed or heard a Luo being ridiculed because of the circumcision issue.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

9. I have (or know of Luos who have) thought of or have already undergone circumcision, to avoid ridicule or to feel a greater level of acceptance and approval from my colleagues from other ethnic groups.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

SECTION C: ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

10. Have you ever been denied an opportunity, employment or otherwise, because of being Luo?

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

11. I would hold a higher rank job and have access to better opportunities if I were not a Luo.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

12. Promotion opportunities for Luos are limited at my workplace.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

13. My living standards would be better if I was not a Luo.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

SECTION D: STRENGTHENING OF ETHNIC ROOTS

14. Given a position of influence, I would carry out affirmative action and give Luos opportunities, so that they can catch up with the GEMA and Kalenjini, who have held power before.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

15. Luos in positions of power/influence help fellow Luos to access economic opportunities.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

16. It is better for a Luo to marry a fellow Luo than a non - Luo.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

SECTION E: MINIMAL PUBLIC INVESTMENT

17. Luo Nyanza would be more developed economically if Luos were not politically excluded by the central government.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

Thank you for your Co-operation.

APPENDIX B

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

Thank you for agreeing to participate. The purpose of this study is to examine the socio-cultural and economic factors arising out of political exclusion and domination with the view to understand the historically-driven forms of exclusion from effective participation in governance structures at grassroots level and their consequences/impact on Kenya since independence.

We are very interested to hear your valuable opinion on political exclusion, in Kenya, and how it has influenced your daily lives. We hope that with the insights gained from you can be utilized in aiding the Luo community to liberate itself from restrictions and limitations that exist in power relations.

We would like to tape the focus groups so that we can make sure to capture the thoughts, opinions, and ideas we hear from the group. The information you give us is completely confidential, and we will not associate your name with anything you say in the focus group. No names will be attached to the focus groups and the tapes will be destroyed as soon as they are transcribed.

You may refuse to answer any question or withdraw from the study at any time. We understand how important it is that this information is kept private and confidential. We will ask participants to respect each other's confidentiality.

If you have any questions now or after you have completed the questionnaire, you can always contact a study team member like me, or you can call the project team leaders whose names and phone numbers are on this form.

Please sign below to show that you agree to participate in this focus group.

Signature of participant

1. Let us begin this discussion by hearing your thoughts on tribalism. What is your understanding of tribalism and have you experienced it in your daily life? How?
2. What are your views on circumcision and politics in Kenya? Have you heard of the argument that an uncircumcised man cannot be a leader, and if so, where did you hear of this?
3. Have you heard Luos being ridiculed in Kenya because of the circumcision issue and how does it make you feel?
4. Have you or your close relatives, or your Luo acquaintances, undergone circumcision? If so, why, since it is not part of your/their culture? If not, would you/they contemplate it for reasons other than medical?
5. What are your experiences in seeking employment in public and private sectors? What about other opportunities like scholarships and bursaries?
6. Would you say you have experienced discrimination when it comes to bursaries, scholarships and/or employment opportunities? How?
7. Do you think that Luos who are in influential positions in society help their fellow Luos to access economic opportunities? Why?
8. Would you vote for a presidential candidate from another ethnic group if a Luo was also running for the presidency? Why?
9. Are you married to a fellow Luo? Why or why not? If not married, will ethnicity be a factor to you when considering a life partner?
10. Do you think that the government, before devolution was instituted in 2013, discriminated against Luo Nyanza in terms of allocation of public investment/resources? Why?

APPENDIX C


STUDY AREA

Contextualizing the Study of the Luo in Kenya

This section contains contextual background information on the eight counties in which the study took place, in terms of the following parameters: location, size, physiographic conditions, demographic profiles, and administrative and political units. Information on land use, climate, economy, infrastructure, access to health and literacy is also provided. It begins with an examination of the Luo Nyanza Counties and concludes with the four cosmopolitan counties of Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, and Uasin Gishu.


Luo Nyanza in Socio-historical Geographical Context

Luo Nyanza, as already alluded, comprises four counties: Kisumu, Homa Bay, Migori and Siaya. It is part of the former Nyanza Province and is located in the western part of Kenya. Luo Nyanza is depicted in Figure C1, below. These counties are thereafter discussed, individually, below.



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Figure C1: Map of the Former Nyanza Province Depicting Luo Nyanza Counties




Source: Wikimedia Commons (2015⁶⁴).

Kisumu County in socio-historical geographical context. Kisumu County roughly extends over an area of 2,085.9 km² and is located within latitudes 0° 20' and 0° 50'south and longitudes 33° 20' and 35° 20' east. A further 567 km² of the county is covered by water (Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme [ASDSP], 2014).

⁶⁴ This map has been retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nyanza_Counties_-_Kisumu.jpg (accessed 17 November 2015).

Figure C2: Map of Kisumu County (Population density)



Source: Commission on Revenue Allocation [CRA], 2011, p. 17.

Kisii, Nyamira and Homa Bay Counties border Kisumu County to the south, while Kericho County borders it to the east, Nandi County to the north-east, Siaya County to the west and Vihiga County to the north-west (ASDSP, 2014). Kisumu County is depicted in Figure C2, above. Kisumu County comprises six sub-counties as follows: Muhoroni, Nyakach, Nyando, Kisumu North, Kisumu West and Kisumu East. And there are seven constituencies in Kisumu County, namely: Muhoroni, Nyakach, Nyando, Seme, Kisumu Central, Kisumu West and Kisumu East. As at 2009, Kisumu County's population stood at 968,909 persons – 474,687

males and 494,222 females.⁶⁵ Although the majority of the inhabitants of Kisumu County are Luo, other ethnic groups – mostly the Luhya – are to be found there in small numbers. There is also a considerable Indian community in the county, which first inhabited Kisumu at the advent of colonialism. This community provided labour during the construction of the railway line. Although English and Kiswahili are spoken widely in the county, *Dholuo* is prepotent. Owing to its location on the shores of Lake Victoria, fishing dominates Kisumu's economic sphere. The out-dated technology and techniques employed, however, hinder the industry's complete evolution. The equipment utilized includes hooks, traps, nets and motor boats. Fish ponds are increasingly becoming popular in Kisumu County too. ASDSP (2014) puts the number of fishermen in the county at 3,275 and that of fish farming families at 189. Amongst the fish species produced are Tilapia, Nile Perch and Omena (*Rastrineobola argentea*) (ASDSP, 2014). About sixty-two per cent of Kisumu County's households looks to crop farming as an income source. Agriculture is largely practiced on small parcels of land, with the average land holding size being 1.6 acres.



⁶⁵ See the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census, available at http://www.knbs.or.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=109:population-and-housing-census-2009&Itemid=599 (accessed 12 December 2015).

Table C1: Kisumu County Facts and Figures

General Information (2009)	Kisumu	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Population (2009)	968,909	12	821,491
Population (1999)	804,289	11	610,355
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%)	1.86	37	3.14
Surface area (km ²)	2,086	40	12,368
Population Density 2009 (people per km ²)	464	8	66
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%)	47.8	21	66
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06)	14.2	21	19
Share of urban population, 2009 (%)	52	4	29.9
Urban population in largest towns (2009)			
Kisumu	388,311	3	
Awasi	93,369	24	
Ahero	50,730	46	
Oyugis	35,451	68	
Muhoroni	34,457	70	
Kendu Bay	14,747	105	
Chemelil	7,888	136	
Maseno	5,103	170	
Access to Infrastructure	Kisumu	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Improved water (% of households 2009)	60.1	29	66.5
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009)	87.4	26	87.8
Electricity (% of households 2009)	18.3	9	22.7
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012)	14.2	5	9.4
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads)	38.0	36	43.5
Service Coverage	Kisumu	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Delivered in a health centre	45.6	15	37.5
Qualified medical assistant during birth	46.1	15	37.6
Had all vaccinations	68.6	33	75.0
Adequate height for age	76.4	2	59.8
Can read & write	65.8	30	66.4
Attending school, 15 - 18 years	77.4	18	70.9

^aAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest

^bAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages

Source: CRA, 2011, p. 17; CRA, 2013, p. 17.

On the other hand, the average agricultural parcel is about 1.0 acres (ASDSP, 2014). Population pressure is leading to further subdivision of the small land parcels resulting in uneconomical land sizes. The major subsistence crops include kales, groundnuts, potatoes, finger millet, sorghum, maize, beans and cotton. Cash crops include rice (grown largely at the Ahero Irrigation Scheme


and to a lesser extent at the Kabongo Irrigation Scheme, both in Nyando Constituency) and sugarcane (mainly grown in Muhoroni). Two rainy seasons characterize Kisumu: short rains during the months of August and September, and long rains in the April/May period. The average yearly maximum temperature ranges from 25°C to 35°C, while the average yearly minimum temperature ranges from 9°C to 18°C (ASDSP, 2014). Table C1, above, provides a breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important statistics regarding the County of Kisumu.

Homa Bay County in socio-historical geographical context. Homa Bay, the second of the Luo Nyanza counties to be profiled, lies in the south-western part of Kenya alongside Lake Victoria; the county is located between longitudes 34° and 35° east and latitudes 0°15' and 0°52' south. Homa Bay extends over an area of about 4,267 km², of which 1,227 km² is covered by water. To the west of the county, lie Lake Victoria and the Uganda Republic. Nyamira and Kisii Counties are located to the east of Homa Bay while Siaya and Kisumu Counties are located to the north (ASDSP, 2014). The county comprises six sub-counties, viz. Rachuonyo South, Rachuonyo North, Homabay, Ndhiwa, Mbita and Suba. Similarly, the following eight constituencies are to be found in Homa Bay County: Kabondo Kasipul, Kasipul, Karachuonyo, Rangwe, Homabay Town, Ndhiwa, Mbita and Suba (Kenya Open Data, 2015; ASDSP, 2014). As of 2009, Homa Bay County's population stood at 963,794 persons – 501,340 females and 462,454 males (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010). In 2012, the population of this county was estimated to be 1,038,858 persons (498, 472 males and 540,386 females). In 2015, it is thought to be around 1,119,769 and it is expected to reach 1,177,181 in 2017 (ASDSP, 2014). Figure C3, below, depicts Homa Bay County.

Two rainy seasons characterize Homa Bay's climate: the long rains are witnessed from March to June, whilst the short rains are experienced from August to November. Annual rainfall ranges from 700 to 800mm. The long rainfall experienced from March to June has a dependability standard of 60 per cent and ranges from 250 – 1,000mm in quantity. The region receives anywhere from 500 to 700mm of rainfall during the short rain season (ASDSP, 2014). The situation in this county, with regards to the availability of land for agricultural use, is notably far much better than it is with Kisumu County. According to ASDSP (2014), the average farm


size in Homa Bay County is six acres. Small-scale farmers have, at their disposal, 4 acres, whilst the typical large-scale farmer in Homa Bay has about 10 acres to work on. Moreover, 48 per cent of landowners have title deeds and only three per cent of the county's residents are landless (ASDSP, 2014). Perhaps strikingly, given the scarcity of land elsewhere in Kenya, the cost of land in Homa Bay, according to ASDSP (2014) is extremely affordable.

Agriculture is the mainstay of the Homa Bay economy; it contributes immensely to the county's food security and household income. About 74 per cent of the labour force is employed in the agricultural sector, which comprises various sub-sectors as follows: agriculture, fisheries development, lands, co-operative development and marketing, livestock development, forestry and wildlife (ASDSP, 2014). Food crops grown include the staples – maize and beans – and sweet potatoes, cassava, millet, sorghum, kales and peas. The cash crops grown there include sunflower (Suba), potatoes (Kasipul and Kabondo Kasipul), pineapples (Rangwe), and sugarcane (Ndhiwa).



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Figure C3: Map of Homa Bay County (Population Density)



Source: CRA, 2011, p. 8.

Table C2: Homa Bay County Facts and Figures

General Information (2009)	Homa Bay	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Population (2009)	963,794	13	821,491
Population (1999)	751,332	13	610,355
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%)	2.49	26	3.14
Surface area (km ²)	3,183	26	12,368
Population Density 2009 (people per km ²)	303	17	66
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%)	44.1	15	47.2
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06)	15.2	24	19
Share of urban population, 2009 (%)	14	36	29.9
Urban population in largest towns (2009)			
Homa Bay	58,936	38	
Awendo	17,992	92	
Mbita Point	11,989	109	
Sindo	6,362	149	
Access to Infrastructure	Homa Bay	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Improved water (% of households 2009)	38.6	44	66.5
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009)	61.4	36	87.8
Electricity (% of households 2009)	3.3	42	22.7
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012)	0.2	38	9.4
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads)	42.9	26	43.5
Service Coverage	Homa Bay	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Delivered in a health centre	39.8	17	37.5
Qualified medical assistant during birth	37.0	20	37.6
Had all vaccinations	50.3	45	75.0
Adequate height for age	53.7	33	59.8
Can read & write	73.3	20	66.4
Attending school, 15 - 18 years	83.2	9	70.9

^aAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest

^bAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages


Source: CRA, 2011, p. 8; CRA, 2013, p. 8.

Enormous prospects exist for cotton in the sub-counties of Rangwe, Homabay Town, Mbita and Karachuonyo (ASDSP, 2014). Similarly, it would seem, with better development planning and leadership, the future looks promising for the agro-processing industry, particularly for nut processing, and the processing of roots and fruits like avocados, guavas, pineapples and guavas. The county's government is investing substantially in the establishment of fish auction centres

and is said to be considering the possibilities of processing fish within the locality. Investments in irrigation and sugarcane farming could also do the county a lot of good (ASDSP, 2014). About 18,300 people and 3,600 families are involved in fishing, which is an important economic activity in the county. The fish types harvested include clarias, tilapia, and the Nile Perch (ASDSP, 2014). Table C2, above, provides a breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important statistics regarding the County of Homa Bay.

Migori County in Socio-historical Geographical Context. Migori County – which lies between longitudes 34° and 34° 50' east and latitudes 0° 24' and 0° 40' south – extends over an area of 2,596.5 km², of which 478 km² is covered by water. Predictably, it is also located in south-western Kenya. To the west of this county lies Lake Victoria. To the north of it is the County of Homa Bay, to its east Narok and Kisii Counties, while the United Republic of Tanzania is to be found to its south. Migori comprises seven sub-counties as follows: Migori, Nyatike, Kuria East, Kuria West, Awendo, Uriri, and Rongo. It also consists of further administrative and political units at a lower level, as follows: 23 divisions, 76 locations, and 174 sub-locations (ASDSP, 2014). With a high, varying altitude that ranges anywhere from 1,140m (shores of Lake Victoria in the sub-county of Nyatike) to 4,625m (Uriri Sub-County), Migori is largely covered by undulating hills and comprises but a few stretches of flat land. Amongst the hills found in Migori County are the following: Nyakune (4,625m), Ogengo (4,300m) and God Sibwoche (1,475m) in Uriri Sub-county; God Kwer (1,420m), Mukuro (1,454m) and Nyabisawa (1,489m) in Migori Sub-county; God Kwach (1,340m) in Nyatike Sub-county; Renjoka (1,592m) in Kuria West Sub-county; and Maeta (1,733m) in Kuria East Sub-county (ASDSP, 2014). Figure C4, below, depicts Migori County.

Figure C4: Map of Migori County (Population Density)



Source: CRA, 2011, p. 27.

Though predominantly Luo, Migori County is nearly as diverse as Kisumu County. Its other inhabitants include members of the Kisii, Kuria, Somali and Luhya ethnic groups.

Members of the Arab, Indian and Nubian communities are also to be found there in lesser numbers. As at the year 2009, Migori had a population of 917,170 persons: 444,357 (48.6 per cent) males and 472,814 (51.4 per cent) females (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010). Its population was estimated to be 1,028,028 persons in 2012, 1,152,165 in 2015, and is expected to reach the 1,243,272 mark by 2017 (ASDSP, 2014). Of the 1,800 km² of arable land in Migori County, 60 per cent is under cash crop farming, 30 per cent under food crops, and the remaining 10 per cent is fallow (ASDSP, 2014). The strikingly sizeable dormant land is the result of the unreliability of rainfall, especially in Nyatike and Kuria Constituencies. Unlike Homa Bay County, a great portion of the land in Migori is yet to be arbitrated; owing to this, about 60 per cent of the residents do not hold title deeds. Communal ownership of land is thus prevalent. On average, small-scale farms amount to three acres in size, while the average large-scale farm is about seven acres in size (ASDSP, 2014).

Agriculture plays a huge role in the county's economy for about 80 per cent of its inhabitants derive their livelihood from it. Maize, beans, sorghum, finger millet, cassava and sweet potatoes are the main food crops grown in the county. The cash crop scene is dominated by tobacco and sugarcane. Sporadic dry spells, such as those experienced in Nyatike Sub-county, often hamper agricultural efforts and production. In addition to beekeeping, livestock – particularly traditional breeds like Zebu cattle, the East African goat and indigenous chicken – are bred in the county. Modern farming, though very uncharacteristic, is practiced by a small number of Migori residents (ASDSP, 2014). Table C3, below, provides a breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important statistics regarding the County of Migori.

Table C3: Migori County Facts and Figures

General Information (2009)	Migori	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Population (2009)	917,170	16	821,491
Population (1999)	666,784	16	610,355
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%)	3.19	17	3.14
Surface area (km ²)	2,596	34	12,368
Population Density 2009 (people per km ²)	353	13	66
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%)	46.7	19	47.2
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06)	19.0	30	19
Share of urban population, 2009 (%)	34	10	29.9
Urban population in largest towns (2009)			
Rongo	82,066	31	
Migori	53,100	42	
Kehancha	30,109	73	
Sori	8,964	127	
Muhuru Bay	6,254	151	
Access to Infrastructure	Migori	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Improved water (% of households 2009)	47.8	39	66.5
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009)	66.8	34	87.8
Electricity (% of households 2009)	5.3	36	22.7
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012)	0.5	33	9.4
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads)	55.0	10	43.5
Service Coverage	Migori	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Delivered in a health centre	32.5	22	37.5
Qualified medical assistant during birth	35.1	22	37.6
Had all vaccinations	51.6	44	75.0
Adequate height for age	61.5	23	59.8
Can read & write	75.2	17	66.4
Attending school, 15 - 18 years	79.6	13	70.9

^aAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest

^bAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages


Source: CRA, 2011, p. 27; CRA, 2013, p. 27.

Siaya County in socio-historical geographical context. Siaya, which extends over an area of 2,530 km², is the final county in Luo Nyanza to be profiled in this study. Lying between latitudes 0° 26' South and 0° 18' North and longitudes 33° 58' and 34° 33' East, it bordered by Kisumu County to the East, the County of Vihiga to the North East, Kakamega County to the

North West and Lake Victoria to the South. It comprises six sub-counties, viz. Gem, Rarieda, Ugunja, Ugenya, Siaya (Alego Usonga) and Bondo. Furthermore, it has 28 electoral wards and the following six constituencies: Rarieda, Bondo, Ugenya, Siaya (Alego Usonga), Ugunja and Gem (ASDSP, 2014). The county was inhabited by 443,318 females and 398,364 males, in 2009, translating into a total population of 841,682 persons (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010). In 2012, the population was estimated to be 885,762 persons. It will reach 964,390 persons (given the current growth rate of 1.7 per cent per annum) by 2017 (ASDSP, 2014).

Siaya County comprises 2,059 square kilometres of arable land. The average small-scale farm size varies from 1.02 Ha (Siaya Sub-county) to 3.0Ha (Bondo Sub-county). On average, a large-scale farm in the county measures around 7.0 Ha in size. The number of farmers with title deeds stood at 259,124 in 2012. Most families in the county have their ancestors to thank for the land they own – it was bequeathed to them by the latter. Landlessness, thus, is an extremely rare phenomenon in Siaya (ASDSP, 2014). The urban area of Siaya County, in which business/office premises, residential buildings and other infrastructure are based, measures 424.9 km². Two rainfall seasons characterize Siaya: the long rainy season (experienced between March and June) and the short rainy season (experienced between September and November). Annual rainfall ranges between 800 and 2,000mm. Temperatures, dependent on altitude, vary from 21°C to 22.5°C in the north-eastern part of the county along Lake Victoria. Temperature varies ranges from 16 – 29°C in the south. Humidity is high: it ranges from 52% (afternoon) to 73% (morning) with a mean annual evaporation rate of 1,800 – 2,200mm (ASDSP, 2014). Figure C5, below, depicts Siaya County.

Figure C5: Map of Siaya County (Population Density)



Source: CRA, 2013, p. 38.

Table C4, below, provides a breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important statistics regarding the County of Siaya.

Table C4: Siaya County Facts and Figures

General Information (2009)	Siaya	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Population (2009)	842,304	21	821,491
Population (1999)	718,964	15	610,355
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%)	1.58	40	3.14
Surface area (km ²)	2,530	37	12,368
Population Density 2009 (people per km ²)	333	14	66
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%)	35.3	10	47.2
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06)	11.8	13	19
Share of urban population, 2009 (%)	11	44	29.9
Urban population in largest towns (2009)			
Bondo	33,468	72	
Siaya	22,586	83	
Usenge	10,098	117	
Ugunja	7,242	140	
Yala	6,412	148	
Ukwala	5,187	167	
Ndori	2,522	208	
Access to Infrastructure	Siaya	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Improved water (% of households 2009)	46.7	40	66.5
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009)	82.7	28	87.8
Electricity (% of households 2009)	4.3	39	22.7
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012)	0.7	29	9.4
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads)	50.5	17	43.5
Service Coverage	Siaya	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Delivered in a health centre	47.4	13	37.5
Qualified medical assistant during birth	52.0	12	37.6
Had all vaccinations	64.8	40	75.0
Adequate height for age	56.2	31	59.8
Can read & write	66.2	29	66.4
Attending school, 15 - 18 years	72.9	26	70.9

^aAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest

^bAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages

Source: CRA, 2011, p. 38; CRA, 2013, p. 38.


Agriculture is the cornerstone of the Siaya economy: the majority of the residents – unemployed youths, farmers and value chain players alike – derive income and livelihood largely from this sector. Besides the fact that it provides food and nutrition for the local community, the sector's

surplus is sold in local markets; moreover, the sector provides vital raw materials for agro-based industries in the county. The food crops grown in the county cover 150,000 ha of land and include the following: vegetables, sorghum, beans, cowpeas, millet, sweet potatoes and cassava. The main cash crops are sugarcane, rice and cotton – these occupy an area of 2,500 ha. Grain amaranth, palm oil, irrigated rice, passion fruits and chilli are gradually becoming important. Watermelons, oranges, pawpaw, mangoes and bananas are some of the vegetables grown in Siaya County. Livestock kept in the county include the following: pigs, sheep, rabbits, donkeys, local and dairy goats, upgrade dairy cows and zebu cattle. Fish varieties include *omena*, Nile perch and Tilapia – in addition to Lakes Victoria, and Kanyoboli, these are sourced from dam fisheries. Value chain enterprises include peanut butter, mango and passion fruit production – these are increasingly being commercialized. And fish is processed, on a small scale, at Usenge. The next section profiles the “cosmopolitan” counties which have been simultaneously studied in this research. In these counties – Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Uasin Gishu – the Luo is not demographically dominant.

The Cosmopolitan Counties in Socio-historical Geographical Context

Nairobi County in Socio-historical Geographical Context. Nairobi is undoubtedly the most significant of the 47 counties of Kenya: it serves as the republic’s industrial, commercial and political capital. With a total area of 696.1 km² and an altitude of 1,798 m above sea level, it lies between latitude 1° 18’ South and longitude 36° 45’ East. It borders Machakos County to the east, Kiambu County to the North and West, and Kajiado County to the South (ASDSP, 2014). Nairobi comprises nine sub-counties, viz. Kamukunji, Makadara, Njiru, Westlands, Langata, Dagoretti, Kasarani, Starehe and Embakasi.

Figure C6: Map of Nairobi County (Population Density)



Source: CRA, 2013, p. 30.

Figure C6, above, depicts Nairobi County. The following are Nairobi's seventeen constituencies: Ruaraka, Starehe, Mathare, Kibra, Kamukunji, Roysambu, Makadara, Kasarani, Langata,

Westlands, Embakasi South, Embakasi North, Embakasi West, Embakasi East, Embakasi Central, Dagoretti West, and Dagoretti East. There are eighty-five electoral wards in Nairobi County (ASDSP, 2014). As of the year 2009, the county's population stood at 3,138,369 persons (1,533,139 females and 1,605,230 males) (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010). In 2012, it was estimated to be 3,517,334 persons, with a mean density of 5,060 persons per square kilometre. It is projected that the density will rise to 6,119 persons per square kilometre by the end of 2017 (ASDSP, 2014).

Nairobi's role as a formal sector wage employer in Kenya is gargantuan – over 85 per cent of the country's formal sector employees work in this county (ASDSP, 2014). The manufacturing industry is the biggest employer. It is followed by other sectors in the following order: trade; restaurants and hotels; construction; and, transport and communication. The Nairobi Central Business District and the Industrial Area (along Mombasa Road) are the most significant formal employment zones in the county. Whilst demand for land in Nairobi remains colossal, the availability of this natural resource is absolutely scarce in the county. The county's total area is 696.1 km² of which 50 per cent comprises residential areas (175.6 km²) and open land (198.8 km²). The remaining half is utilized for urban agriculture, recreation, and industrial purposes, besides being occupied by water bodies, infrastructure and ravine areas. Increase in residential establishments has drastically reduced land meant for urban agriculture; owing to this, Nairobi is increasingly becoming dependent on other counties for its food requirements (ASDSP, 2014).

Agriculture, though, remains the driving force of the country's economy. Besides household food, it provides agro-based industries with raw materials. Food crops grown in Nairobi include the following: maize and beans (on a small scale), kales, cassava, sweet potatoes and Irish potatoes. Livestock kept include goats, sheep, cattle, bees, pigs, donkeys, poultry and rabbits. Fish farming is practiced by about 500 households. Fish ponds in the county cover an area of approximately 180,000 m² and the main species farmed are catfish, tilapia and common carp (Nairobi City County Government [NCCG], 2014; ASDSP, 2014). According to the NCCG (2014), a total of 152 tonnes of fish with a value of Ksh. 24.3 million was harvested in 2013. Income generated from crop production stood at Kshs. 64 million in 2012: while maize and beans contributed a total of Kshs. 49 million, potatoes – sweet and Irish – contributed a

combined total of Kshs. 11.4 million. Income from milk and beef was Kshs. 428 million (ASDSP, 2014).

Quarrying is the main mining activity in the county, for Nairobi has limited mineral resources. It is conducted on a small scale in fifteen quarries based in Embakasi and Njiru areas, which produce hard core, ballast and natural building stones. There are three gazetted forests in Nairobi, viz. Ngong Road Forest, Nairobi Arboretum and Karura. Karura – the largest – covers 1,041 ha and contains 605 species of wildlife that include three antelope species (NCCG, 2014; ASDSP, 2014). Nairobi is close to many tourist attractions in East Africa generally, and Kenya in particular. Major tourist attractions in the county include the Nairobi Safari Walk, the Nairobi National Museum, Karen Blixen Museum and the Nairobi Gallery. The county's numerous impressive hotels cater for its tourists ((NCCG, 2014; ASDSP, 2014). Nairobi's annual rainfall ranges from 638 mm to 899 mm, with an average of 786.5 mm. The climate is fairly cool, owing to the county's high altitude – the annual temperature ranges from 10°C to 29°C (ASDSP, 2014). Table C5, below, provides a breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important statistics regarding the County of Nairobi.




Table C5: Nairobi County Facts and Figures

General Information (2009)	Nairobi	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Population (2009)	3,138,369	1	821,491
Population (1999)	2,143,254	1	610,355
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%)	3.81	10	3.14
Surface area (km ²)	695	45	12,368
Population Density 2009 (people per km ²)	4516	1	66
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%)	22.5	2	47.2
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06)	6.9	6	19
Share of urban population, 2009 (%)	100	1	29.9
Urban population in largest towns (2009)			
Nairobi	3,133,518	1	
Access to Infrastructure	Nairobi	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Improved water (% of households 2009)	83.1	5	66.5
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009)	98.7	10	87.8
Electricity (% of households 2009)	72.4	1	22.7
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012)	44.1	1	9.4
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads)	Unavailable	Unavailable	43.5
Service Coverage	Nairobi	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Delivered in a health centre	78.9	3	37.5
Qualified medical assistant during birth	71.7	4	37.6
Had all vaccinations	91.0	3	75.0
Adequate height for age	65.8	15	59.8
Can read & write	97.7	2	66.4
Attending school, 15 - 18 years	69.0	31	70.9

^aAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest

^bAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages


Source: CRA, 2011, p. 30; CRA, 2013, p. 30.

Mombasa County in Socio-historical Geographical Context. Mombasa County lies between longitudes 39° 34' and 39° 46' East and between latitudes 3° 56' and 4° 10' South. It covers a land area of 229.9 km² and a water mass of 65 km² (Mombasa County Government [MCG], 2013, p. 3). Mombasa County borders Kilifi County to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east, Kwale County to the south, and the Counties of Kilifi and Kwale to the west (MCG, 2013). Mombasa County comprises six sub-counties, namely: Chagamwe, Likoni, Mvita, Jomvu, Nyali and Kisauni. It also has thirty county assembly wards, twenty locations and thirty-five sub-

locations as its administrative and political units (MCG, 2013, p. 38). Figure C7, below, depicts Mombasa County. With about 486,924 males and 452,446 females, Mombasa's population stood at 939,370 persons in 2009. The population density was 6,131 persons per km² (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010). The county's population was estimated to be 1,051,825 persons in the year 2012 (with a population density of 6,640.5 persons per km²) and is expected to rise to 1,242,908 persons in 2017 (MCG, 2013, pp. 14 – 15). Monsoon winds play a role in shaping the county's climate. There are two rainfall patterns: short rains come in October and last through December (averaging 240 mm); the long rains (averaging 1, 044 mm) come in the month of April and last through June. The county's mean annual rainfall is 640 mm. Mean annual temperatures range from 22.7°C to 33.1°C. With a mean temperature of 33.1°C, February is the hottest month. July, with a minimum average of 22.7°C, is the coolest (MCG, 2013, p. 7).

Land tenure is more complicated in Mombasa than the other regions covered in this study. It takes the following three major forms: private, public and community-owned land. Besides, other tenure forms are prevalent. First, private individuals have 'unofficially' occupied land owned by the government. Second, conspicuous squatting – occupation of private land, on a temporary basis, without authorization – persists. Third, land hitherto allotted on a short-term basis to certain groups of people (for instance, customary owners dislodged by government projects) is currently inhabited by their descendants.

Figure C7: Map of Mombasa County (Population Density)



Source: CRA, 2013, p. 28.

Also, a considerable percentage of land in the county is owned by absentee landlords who have leased it to local institutions and residents. This has resulted in the lack of protracted security for

developed properties. Thus, land administration and human settlement remain problematic in Mombasa (MCG, 2013, p. 42).

The most crucial employers in Mombasa are the Kenya Ports Authority, the GoK, Container Freight Terminals, the hotel industry and private institutions such as banks. The services sector – ship repair, clearing and forwarding firms, container freight stations, shipping lines, grain bulk handling and shipping lines – is also a notable employer. Oil refineries, car assembly plants, export processing, flour mills and glassware characterize the manufacturing industry in Mombasa and provide employment to the county's residents (MCG, 2013, p. 29). The county's labour force, 61 per cent of which is youthful, stood at 545, 303 persons in 2009 (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010). Mombasa's rate of unemployment is high – 15 per cent – and results from a poor performing economy and the lack of suitable skills among other reasons (MCG, 2013, p. 22). The City of Mombasa is an ancient town endowed with various tourist attractions and world heritage sites like Fort Jesus Museum, a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site. Other attractions include Mombasa Marine Park, Butterfly Pavilion, Haller Park, the Likoni Ferry Services, the Gigantic Elephant Tusks mould, the old port, old town and numerous sandy beaches. With over 200 registered hotels and lodges, a total bed capacity of around 8,000, and mean yearly bed occupancy of 64 per cent, Mombasa County is a popular tourist destination (MCG, 2013, p 30).

The major crops grown in Mombasa County include millet, vegetables, maize, sorghum, cassava and cucurbits. While food crops cover an area of 400 ha, cash crops occupy 500 ha. Despite this, Mombasa imports food and other agricultural products. The cost of food is high; most low-income earners struggle to meet their nutrition needs (MCG, 2013, p. 33). Table C6, below, provides a breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important statistics regarding the County of Mombasa.

Table C6: Mombasa County Facts and Figures

General Information (2009)	Mombasa	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Population (2009)	939,370	15	821,491
Population (1999)	665,018	17	610,355
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%)	3.45	14	3.14
Surface area (km ²)	219	47	12,368
Population Density 2009 (people per km ²)	4,289	2	66
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%)	37.6	11	47.2
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06)	8.7	7	19
Share of urban population, 2009 (%)	100	2	29.9
Urban population in largest towns (2009)			
Mombasa	938,131	2	
Access to Infrastructure	Mombasa	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Improved water (% of households 2009)	75.0	14	66.5
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009)	99.6	18	87.8
Electricity (% of households 2009)	59.0	2	22.7
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012)	24.7	2	9.4
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads)	32.0	41	43.5
Service Coverage	Mombasa	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Delivered in a health centre	68.9	5	37.5
Qualified medical assistant during birth	73.2	3	37.6
Had all vaccinations	90.3	5	75.0
Adequate height for age	84.3	1	59.8
Can read & write	85.8	9	66.4
Attending school, 15 - 18 years	53.6	41	70.9

^aAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest

^bAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages


Source: CRA, 2011, p. 28; CRA, 2013, p. 28.

Significant numbers of livestock are kept in the county for both domestic and commercial purposes. These include cattle, poultry, goats and sheep. Moreover, the county comprises 65 km² of open water and an Exclusive Economic Zone that extends 200 nautical miles into the Indian Ocean. This zone is extremely promising as a fishing ground. Mombasa also comprises fourteen fish landing sites and a single fish processing plant. Despite its proximity to the Indian Ocean, the county seldom realizes its annual fish harvesting potential of 994,718 metric tonnes due to

the lack of sophisticated fishing equipment and storage facilities (MCG, 2013, p. 34). Mombasa's vital location as a seaport has somewhat worked to the disadvantage of the county in other ways. Its location, for instance, makes it prone to vices such as drug trafficking. The youth of Mombasa are infamous for their association with drugs; this has not only affected the quality and availability of labour but also cemented the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the county. The latter arises out of shared syringes and other factors (MCG, 2013, p. 26).

Nakuru County in Socio-historical Geographical Context. The county of Nakuru lies between latitudes 0° 13' and 1° 10' South and longitudes 35° 28' and 35° 36' East, and covers a land mass of 7,495.1 km². It is located in the Great Rift Valley where it borders seven other counties as follows: Nyandarua to the east, Kajiado and Kiambu to the south, Narok to the southwest, Baringo and Laikipia to the north and Kericho to the west (ASDSP, 2014; Nakuru County Government [NCG], 2013, p. 14). For its administrative and political units, Nakuru comprises 55 wards and 11 constituencies, in addition to the following nine sub-counties: Rongai, Subukia, Nakuru North, Kuresoi, Gilgil, Njoro, Naivasha, Nakuru and Molo (ASDSP, 2014; NCG, 2013, pp. 23 – 26). The county's total population, according to the Kenya Population and Housing Census (2010), was 1,603,325 persons in 2009: this figure represented 798,743 females and 804,582 males. The county's population was estimated to be 1,756,950 in 2012, 1,925,296 in 2015, and it will reach 2,046,395 persons in 2017 (NCG, 2013, p. 27). Figure C8, below, depicts Nakuru County.

Figure C8: Map of Nakuru County (Population Density)



Source: CRA, 2013, p. 31.

Nakuru, a cosmopolitan county, is ethnically diverse: its populace comprises members of various ethnic groups including the Kikuyu, Kamba, Kalenjin, Kisii, Luo, Luhya, and others. About 38 per cent of Nakuru residents live in towns; the outstanding 62 per cent live in the rural areas of the county. Population distribution is largely influenced by the following factors: soil fertility, pasture, infrastructure, rainfall, security, proximity to urban set-ups, economic opportunities, and availability of natural resources (NCG, 2013, pp. 32 – 33). The majority of Nakuru residents depend on land for their livelihood. There are few large-scale landowners; on average, they each hold 263 ha of land. Small-scale land ownership is dominant with the average landholding size being 0.77 ha. In the urban areas, the average landholding size is 0.05 ha. Over 70 per cent of lands in Nakuru County have title deeds. Landlessness is not as rife as the case is with Mombasa County; only 20 per cent of the county's households are considered to be landless (NCG, 2013, pp. 40 – 41).

Nakuru's resilient and diverse ecological system plays a significant role in upholding and boosting the county's agricultural and tourism sectors, besides providing abundant water for its residents. Its notable feature, the Mau Escarpment, averages 2,400 m in altitude and hosts the majority of the county's numerous forests. River Njoro, which drains into Lake Nakuru making the latter a suitable habitat for its famed flamingos, originates from the Mau (NCG, 2013, p. 21). The hot springs in Olkaria are another Nakuru notable; they are an invaluable source of geothermal power for Kenya in general, and the county in particular. Nakuru's climate, largely influenced by the county's ecological system, is characterized by a bimodal pattern of rainfall. The county experiences short rains from October to December; on the other hand, long rains begin in March and persist through the month of May. Temperature ranges from lows of 12°C (June and July) to highs of 29.3°C (December to early March) (NCG, 2013, pp. 22 – 23).

The agricultural sector in Nakuru provides employment for most of its residents and is divided into the following sub-sectors: food and cash crop farming (including horticulture and floriculture), fish farming and livestock keeping. The major food crops produced in Nakuru include wheat, beans, maize and Irish potatoes. Various fruits and vegetables are grown in the county including peas, onions, peaches, French beans, strawberries, kales, leeks, asparagus, tomatoes, carrots, apples, cabbages and citrus fruits. Cash crops grown include tea, pyrethrum,

barley, wheat and flowers. Horticulture – particularly floriculture – is proving to be very feasible, in an economic sense; Homegrown and Oserian in Naivasha and Subati in Subukia are some of the successful flower farms in Nakuru County (NCG, 2013, p. 43). Livestock reared in the county include dairy cattle, poultry, sheep, goats, bees and rabbits – dairy farming is enormously significant as an income earner (NCG, 2013, p. 45). Though Lake Naivasha is the major fish source in the county, fish farming is also practiced in individual and communally-owned ponds and water reservoirs. It is estimated that there are 1,500 fish ponds in Nakuru rearing tilapia, trout and catfish. Lake Naivasha is a major source of black bass, common carp and tilapia (NCG, 2013, pp. 46 – 47). The mining industry in Nakuru is dominated by diatomite, which is obtained at Kariandusi along the Nairobi – Nakuru Highway. Other mining activities include sand harvesting, hot water harnessing (for geothermal power purposes) and quarrying. There is nothing else of importance in this sector. Table C7, below, provides a breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important statistics regarding Nakuru County.



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Table C7: Nakuru County Facts and Figures

General Information (2009)	Nakuru	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Population (2009)	1,603,325	4	821,491
Population (1999)	1,187,039	4	610,355
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%)	3.01	19	3.14
Surface area (km ²)	7,495	19	12,368
Population Density 2009 (people per km ²)	214	21	66
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%)	40.1	12	47.2
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06)	12.1	16	19
Share of urban population, 2009 (%)	46	6	29.9
Urban population in largest towns (2009)			
Nakuru	307,990	4	
Naivasha	169,142	9	
Molo	40,651	60	
Giligil	35,293	69	
Njoro	23,551	82	
Mai Mahiu	11,230	112	
Subukia	7,309	139	
Dundori	5,221	166	
Salгаа	4,740	174	
Mau Narok	4,357	178	
Bahati	3,833	184	
Rongai	2,215	213	
Olenguruone	2,119	214	
Access to Infrastructure	Nakuru	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Improved water (% of households 2009)	66.4	24	66.5
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009)	97.0	16	87.8
Electricity (% of households 2009)	34.0	5	22.7
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012)	3.1	11	9.4
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads)	31.1	42	43.5
Service Coverage	Nakuru	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Delivered in a health centre	51.4	12	37.5
Qualified medical assistant during birth	50.5	13	37.6
Had all vaccinations	64.3	41	75.0
Adequate height for age	49.3	40	59.8
Can read & write	83.2	10	66.4

Attending school, 15 - 18 years	74.7	22	70.9
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^aAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest


^bAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages

Source: CRA, 2011, p. 31; CRA, 2013, p. 31.

Tourism is vibrant in Nakuru. There are no less than three national parks in the county. These are Hell's Gate National Park, Mt. Longonot National Park and Lake Nakuru National Park, where tourists can sample the following wild animals among others: white and black rhinos, giraffes, cheetahs, buffalos, hippos, baboons, monkeys, impalas, gazelles and pelicans. Moreover, Lake Nakuru has, besides its two major flamingo species, about 422,341 lesser flamingos, and 78 greater flamingos (NCG, 2013, p. 52). In terms of employment in the county, the majority of the wage earners are to be found in the private sector and specifically in the following sub-sectors: construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, academic institutions, public transport, and flower, tea and coffee farms. About 14 per cent of the county's population is self-employed and 24 per cent of the total labour force is unemployed (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010).

Uasin Gishu County in Socio-historical Geographical Context. Uasin Gishu County extends over a land area of 3,345 km². It is located between latitudes 0° 03' South and 0° 55' North and longitudes 34° 50' East and 35° 37' West. The county comprises six sub-counties, viz. Kapseret, Kessess, Moiben, Ainabkoi, Soy and Turbo. Within these sub-counties are 51 locations and 97 sub-locations. It borders Elgeyo Marakwet County to the East, Kericho County to the South, Trans Nzoia County to the North, Baringo County to the South East, Kakamega County to the North West and Nandi County to the South West (UGCG, 2013, p. 1). The total population of the county was 894,179 persons in 2009 (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010). The county's economically active age-group (15 to 64 years) represented 55.7 per cent of the total population in 2012. On the other hand, persons aged between 0 and 14 years accounted for 41.4 per cent of the county's total population. The county, therefore, has an inflated dependency ratio. It exhibits great prospects, at the same time, in terms of the labour force. By the year 2017, the county should be inhabited by 1,211,853 persons, given its population growth rate of 3.8 per cent (UGCG, 2013, p. 2). Figure C9, below, depicts Uasin Gishu County.

Figure C9: Map of Uasin Gishu County (Population Density)



Source: CRA, 2013, p. 44.

Uasin Gishu is one of Kenya's most cosmopolitan counties; it is home to nearly all the ethnic groups in the country. The Kalenjin, though, are the predominant group in this part of Kenya. Eldoret East is mainly inhabited by the Nandi and Keiyo while the Marakwet are to be found along Uasin Gishu's border with Elgeyo Marakwet County. The Nandi, Kikuyu and Luhya dominate Eldoret West while Wareng is mainly occupied by the Nandi and Kikuyu. Europeans and Indians are also to be found in the urban areas of the county. Kenyans from other ethnic groups, over time, have migrated to the county to work in various capacities in the farms, railway, business and agro-based industries (UGCG, 2013, p. 46).

The average land holding in the county's rural areas is 5 hectares; in the urban areas, especially Eldoret Municipality, it is 0.25 hectares. Landlessness, however, persists in Uasin Gishu: the landless include squatters who live in gazetted forests, immigrants from other Kenyan counties, and those that have sold their family land (UGCG, 2013, p. 3). The arable land in Uasin Gishu measures 2,995 km²; on the other hand, 332.78 km² is hilly and rocky (non-arable), 23.4 km² is water mass and 196 km² is urban land (UGCG, 2013, p. 4). Rainfall, which peaks in May and October, averages 900 mm to 1,200 mm annually. Temperature ranges from 8.4°C to 26.2°C, with a mean of 18°C. The following food crops characterize the agricultural scene in Uasin Gishu, where the average farm size ranges from 2 to 10 acres: maize, finger millet, Irish potatoes, beans, wheat, sorghum, tomatoes, kales, cabbages, carrots, onions, passion fruit and avocados. Cash crops include coffee, sunflower and pyrethrum (UGCG, 2013, pp. 4 – 5). On average, Uasin Gishu, widely regarded as Kenya's bread basket, produces 4.5 million bags of maize and 1 million bags of wheat annually (UGCG, 2013, p. 7). Production of fish is increasingly taking root in the county where, currently, there are about 1,728 operational fish ponds covering a land mass of 486, 900 km². Annual production from these ponds stands at 593, 000 kg of fish, worth Ksh. 285, 900, 000 (UGCG, 2013, p. 12). Table C8, below, provides a breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important statistics regarding the County of Uasin Gishu.

Table C8: Uasin Gishu County Facts and Figures

General Information (2009)	Uasin Gishu	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Population (2009)	841,179	17	821,491
Population (1999)	622,705	19	610,355
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%)	3.62	11	3.14
Surface area (km ²)	3,345	23	12,368
Population Density 2009 (people per km ²)	267	19	66
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%)	51.3	27	47.2
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06)	11.4	10	19
Share of urban population, 2009 (%)	39	9	29.9
Urban population in largest towns (2009)			
Eldoret	289,380	5	
Moi's Bridge	14,596	106	
Matunda	10,031	119	
Burnt Forest	4,925	172	
Jua Kali	3,427	192	
Turbo	2,831	201	
Access to Infrastructure	Uasin Gishu	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Improved water (% of households 2009)	88.9	3	66.5
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009)	98.0	12	87.8
Electricity (% of households 2009)	27.9	6	22.7
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012)	1.5	20	9.4
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads)	50.6	16	43.5
Service Coverage	Uasin Gishu	Rank ^a	Kenya ^b
Delivered in a health centre	30.1	26	37.5
Qualified medical assistant during birth	30.5	26	37.6
Had all vaccinations	72.7	29	75.0
Adequate height for age	74.9	5	59.8
Can read & write	81.5	12	66.4
Attending school, 15 - 18 years	83.0	10	70.9

^aAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest

^bAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages
Source: CRA, 2011, p. 44; CRA, 2013, p. 44.

Uasin Gishu is renowned, on a worldwide scale, as the “city of champions” – majority of Kenya’s athletes come from this county. The county’s administrators are looking to make use of this tag to boost its tourism industry, which is yet to be fully developed. Nonetheless, Uasin Gishu currently boasts of 120 hotels, lodges and guesthouses, which have a combined capacity of 2,492 beds (UGCG, 2013, pp. 36 – 38). Perhaps more importantly, historical land grievances, which date back to the colonial days, continue to bedevil Uasin Gishu. The land issues have been intertwined with politics and are amongst the major sources of incessant conflict witnessed in the region. These land issues are widely regarded as being the major reason behind the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya (UGCG, 2013, p. 41). This contextual profile of Uasin Gishu County concludes the examination of the geographical area in which the study was conducted.



APPENDIX D
QUANTITATIVE SURVEY RESULTS

Table D1

Awareness of Circumcision being fronted as a Prerequisite Leadership Trait

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree	495	30.9	30.9
Agree	322	20.1	51.1
Neutral	112	7.0	58.1
Disagree	344	21.5	79.6
Strongly Disagree	327	20.4	100.0
Total	1600	100.0	

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Table D2

Politicians Made me Aware (n=817)

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	379	46.4
Agree	337	41.2
Disagree	73	8.9
Strongly Disagree	28	3.4
Total	817	100.0

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017).

Table D3

Circumcision and Ridicule

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree	464	29.0	29.0
Agree	464	29.0	58.0
Neutral	169	10.6	68.6
Disagree	343	21.4	90.0
Strongly Disagree	160	10.0	100.0
Total	1600	100.0	

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017).

Table D4

Adoption of Alien Culture of Circumcision

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree	404	25.3	25.3
Agree	436	27.3	52.5
Neutral	231	14.4	66.9
Disagree	345	21.6	88.5
Strongly Disagree	184	11.5	100.0
Total	1600	100.0	

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017).

Table D5

Denial of Economic Opportunity/Employment for Being Luo

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree	288	18.0	18.0
Agree	373	23.3	41.3
Neutral	312	19.5	60.8
Disagree	440	27.5	88.3
Strongly Disagree	187	11.7	100.0
Total	1600	100.0	

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017).

Table D6

Belief that Being Luo has denied them Better Jobs and Opportunities

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree	222	13.9	13.9
Agree	256	16.0	29.9
Neutral	570	35.6	65.5
Disagree	355	22.2	87.7
Strongly Disagree	197	12.3	100.0
Total	1600	100.0	

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017).

Table D7

Promotion Opportunities are Limited for Luos at my Workplace

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree	106	6.6	6.6
Agree	164	10.3	16.9
Neutral	955	59.7	76.6
Disagree	239	14.9	91.5
Strongly Disagree	136	8.5	100.0
Total	1600	100.0	

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017).

Table D8

My Living Standards would be better if I were not Luo

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree	212	13.3	13.3
Agree	248	15.5	28.7
Neutral	324	20.3	49.0
Disagree	526	32.9	81.9
Strongly Disagree	290	18.1	100.0
Total	1600	100.0	

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017).

Table D9

I would carry out Affirmative Action to help Luos Catch Up

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree	572	35.8	35.8
Agree	330	20.6	56.4
Neutral	207	12.9	69.3
Disagree	264	16.5	85.8
Strongly Disagree	227	14.2	100.0
Total	1600	100.0	

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017).

Table D10

Influential Luos Assist Fellow Luos to Access Economic Opportunities

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree	210	13.1	13.1
Agree	295	18.4	31.6
Neutral	251	15.7	47.3
Disagree	503	31.4	78.7
Strongly Disagree	341	21.3	100.0
Total	1600	100.0	

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017).

Table D11

Marriage between fellow Luos is better than Intermarriage

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree	359	22.4	22.4
Agree	255	15.9	38.4
Neutral	195	12.2	50.6
Disagree	427	26.7	77.3
Strongly Disagree	364	22.8	100.0
Total	1600	100.0	

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017).

Table D12

Luo Nyanza would be more Economically Developed if not for Exclusion by Central Government

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree	634	39.6	39.6
Agree	334	20.9	60.5
Neutral	191	11.9	72.4
Disagree	284	17.8	90.2
Strongly Disagree	157	9.8	100.0
Total	1600	100.0	

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017).

Table D13

Awareness of Circumcision being fronted as a Prerequisite Leadership Trait * Residence Cross Tabulation

		Residence		Total
		Luo Nyanza Counties	Cosmopolitan Counties	
Awareness of circumcision being fronted as a prerequisite leadership trait	strongly agree	235	260	495
	Agree	131	191	322
	Neutral	88	24	112
	Disagree	138	206	344
	strongly disagree	208	119	327
Total		800	800	1600

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017).

Table D14

Politicians made me aware * Residence Cross tabulation

		Residence		Total
		Luo Nyanza Counties	Cosmopolitan Counties	
Politicians made me aware	strongly agree	133	195	328
	Agree	131	206	337
	Neutral	466	368	834
	Disagree	45	28	73
	strongly disagree	25	3	28
Total		800	800	1600

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Table D15

Circumcision and Ridicule * Residence Cross tabulation

		Residence		Total
		Luo Nyanza Counties	Cosmopolitan Counties	
Circumcision and ridicule	strongly agree	228	236	464
	Agree	194	270	464
	Neutral	116	53	169
	Disagree	159	184	343
	strongly disagree	103	57	160
Total		800	800	1600

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Table D16

Adopting the Alien Culture of Circumcision * Residence Cross tabulation

		Residence		Total
		Luo Nyanza Counties	Cosmopolitan Counties	
Adopting alien culture of circumcision	strongly agree	236	168	404
	Agree	214	222	436
	Neutral	111	120	231
	Disagree	128	217	345
	strongly disagree	111	73	184
Total		800	800	1600

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Table D17

Denial of Economic Opportunity (Employment) for being Luo * Residence Cross tabulation

		Residence		Total
		Luo Nyanza Counties	Cosmopolitan Counties	
Denial of economic opportunity (employment) because of being Luo	strongly agree	113	175	288
	Agree	175	198	373
	Neutral	143	169	312
	Disagree	239	201	440
	strongly disagree	130	57	187
Total		800	800	1600

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Table D18

Belief that being Luo has Denied them Better Jobs and Opportunities * Residence Cross tabulation

		Residence		Total
		Luo Nyanza Counties	Cosmopolitan Counties	
Belief that being Luo has denied them better jobs and opportunities	strong agree	121	101	222
	Agree	127	129	256
	Neutral	182	388	570
	Disagree	228	127	355
	strongly disagree	142	55	197
Total		800	800	1600

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Table D19

Promotion Opportunities Limited for Luos at Workplace * Residence Cross tabulation

		Residence		Total
		Luo Nyanza Counties	Cosmopolitan Counties	
Promotion opportunities limited at workplace	strongly agree	80	26	106
	Agree	132	32	164
	Neutral	265	690	955
	Disagree	199	40	239
	strongly disagree	124	12	136
Total		800	800	1600

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Table D20

My Living Standards would be better if I were not Luo * Residence Cross tabulation

		Residence		Total
		Luo Nyanza Counties	Cosmopolitan Counties	
My living standards would be better if I were not Luo	strongly agree	126	86	212
	Agree	103	145	248
	Neutral	157	167	324
	Disagree	240	286	526
	strongly disagree	174	116	290
Total		800	800	1600

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Table D21

I would carry out Affirmative Action to help Luos Catch Up * Residence Cross tabulation

		Residence		Total
		Luo Nyanza Counties	Cosmopolitan Counties	
I would carry out affirmative action to help Luos catch up	strongly agree	318	254	572
	Agree	192	138	330
	Neutral	109	98	207
	Disagree	114	150	264
	strongly disagree	67	160	227
Total		800	800	1600

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Table D22

Influential Luos Assist Fellow Luos to Access Economic Opportunities * Residence Cross tabulation

		Residence		Total
		Luo Nyanza Counties	Cosmopolitan Counties	
Influential Luos assist fellow Luos access economic opportunities	strongly agree	145	65	210
	Agree	137	158	295
	Neutral	137	114	251
	Disagree	226	277	503
	strongly disagree	155	186	341
Total		800	800	1600

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Table D23

Marriage between Fellow Luos is better than Intermarriage * Residence Cross tabulation

		Residence		Total
		Luo Nyanza Counties	Cosmopolitan Counties	
Marriage between fellow Luos is better than intermarriage	strongly agree	213	146	359
	Agree	147	108	255
	Neutral	111	84	195
	Disagree	184	243	427
	strongly disagree	145	219	364
Total		800	800	1600

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

Table D24

Luo Nyanza would be more economically Developed were it not for Exclusion by Central Government * Residence Cross tabulation

		Residence		Total
		Luo Nyanza Counties	Cosmopolitan Counties	
Luo Nyanza would be more developed economically were it not for exclusion by central government	strongly agree	350	284	634
	Agree	145	189	334
	Neutral	80	111	191
	Disagree	143	141	284
	strongly disagree	82	75	157
Total		800	800	1600

Source: Author's fieldwork (2017)

APPENDIX E
STATISTICS FROM HISTORICAL RECORDS

Table E1

Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1965 – 73

Province	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Central	238,001	251,305	273,558	296,863	311,970	349,378	371,913	407,762	443,509
Coast	57,523	59,631	65,719	71,642	76,805	83,983	87,445	96,102	103,107
Eastern	199,107	204,462	226,687	242,059	269,652	289,867	315,454	339,582	370,555
Nairobi	45,096	49,728	52,977	55,060	60,944	61,238	67,523	71,786	76,375
N. Eastern	912	2,090	1,822	2,389	3,301	3,432	4,668	5,048	6,377
Nyanza	162,299	191,337	196,821	221,138	206,462	234,912	248,990	269,764	291,128
R. Valley	161,272	144,902	165,325	174,597	183,233	202,992	228,797	250,975	279,119
Western	146,679	139,961	150,270	145,932	169,930	201,787	200,708	234,900	245,847
Total	1,010,889	1,043,416	1,133,179	1,209,680	1,282,297	1,427,589	1,525,498	1,675,919	1,816,017

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1965 – 73

Table E2

Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1973 – 83

Province	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Central	443,509	531,675	558,133	571,583	584,734	616,064	663,015	696,968	699,039	715,236	741,258
Coast	103,107	149,778	156,927	160,156	163,225	170,664	210,328	230,221	242,432	254,888	273,174
Eastern	370,555	515,624	545,877	543,222	572,635	601,851	706,654	752,844	748,142	768,958	807,902
Nairobi	76,375	83,430	83,400	84,738	86,342	91,540	94,202	97,984	102,266	105,549	107,706
N. Eastern	6,377	7,200	6,965	7,507	9,234	9,487	10,590	12,171	12,109	14,097	15,456
Nyanza	291,128	562,511	606,895	550,580	554,450	518,346	767,249	785,537	777,413	814,010	835,762
R. Valley	279,119	454,185	494,699	530,646	556,948	571,667	706,262	781,847	826,481	859,425	931,468
Western	245,847	401,475	431,259	446,185	447,281	415,275	539,946	569,057	573,280	587,982	611,096
Total	1,816,017	2,705,878	2,884,155	2,894,617	2,974,849	2,994,894	3,698,246	3,926,629	3,981,162	4,120,145	4,323,822

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83

Table E3

Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1983 – 93

Province	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Central	741,258	750,373	828,310	822,710	847,973	864,380	901,027	878,534	883,256	901,989	905,698
Coast	273,174	281,867	300,203	321,584	331,571	338,026	348,589	358,898	360,204	365,057	352,900
Eastern	807,902	812,751	847,257	901,498	931,629	970,968	998,373	1,018,506	1,043,760	1,050,217	1,023,780
Nairobi	107,706	110,902	123,573	127,507	133,794	139,391	179,829	146,565	149,565	152,384	122,626
N. Eastern	15,456	16,284	19,932	23,460	28,301	29,492	31,094	34,811	34,221	33,793	26,343
Nyanza	835,762	833,067	907,590	911,805	955,916	932,067	982,293	977,996	979,098	1,020,864	1,045,759
R. Valley	931,468	959,224	1,021,610	1,061,721	1,111,308	1,141,712	1,213,097	1,232,845	1,254,890	1,267,692	1,192,267
Western	611,096	615,243	653,939	673,147	690,848	707,545	734,837	744,164	751,002	771,992	759,023
Total	4,323,822	4,379,711	4,702,414	4,843,432	5,031,340	5,123,581	5,389,139	5,392,319	5,455,996	5,563,988	5,428,396

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93

Table E4

Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1993 – 2003

Province	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Central	905,698	898,262	951,010	903,944	911,009	894,583	864,889	896,898	869,079	816,264	904,770
Coast	352,900	339,864	352,579	368,004	369,851	362,593	379,729	389,070	423,622	387,875	486,629
Eastern	1,023,780	1,030,429	1,020,805	1,042,091	1,060,872	1,110,163	1,134,707	1,132,145	1,139,823	1,158,529	1,309,807
Nairobi	122,626	153,668	157,080	154,946	153,640	155,834	159,897	164,289	171,231	177,208	217,167
N. Eastern	26,343	35,272	25,106	35,892	35,272	44,693	48,134	47,835	48,193	48,902	66,773
Nyanza	1,045,759	1,075,373	991,687	966,508	1,064,126	1,008,587	1,075,780	1,024,909	1,141,060	1,089,804	1,339,895
R. Valley	1,192,267	1,245,464	1,263,127	1,303,057	1,354,439	1,400,759	1,433,626	1,527,131	1,579,171	1,500,659	1,779,789
Western	759,023	778,676	783,604	793,048	811,673	850,951	797,422	780,848	809,809	883,501	1,054,694
Total	5,428,396	5,557,008	5,544,998	5,567,490	5,760,882	5,828,163	5,894,184	5,963,125	6,181,988	6,062,742	7,159,524

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003

Table E5

Primary School Enrolment by Province, 2003 – 13

Province	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Central	904,770	910,806	903,638	882,429	888,236	911,340	975,561	998,879	916,249	935,080	944,662

Coast	486,629	556,013	585,543	600,041	643,355	658,860	689,798	717,570	745,096	760,411	768,202
Eastern	1,309,807	1,371,680	1,379,909	1,378,210	1,480,629	1,538,785	1,565,188	1,584,804	1,506,892	1,537,863	1,553,621
Nairobi	217,167	229,252	237,858	234,819	319,000	320,102	245,939	347,024	450,399	459,655	464,366
N. Eastern	66,773	69,958	70,891	81,182	98,629	115,287	138,172	151,992	271,247	276,820	279,658
Nyanza	1,339,895	1,321,901	1,324,239	1,334,597	1,441,735	1,508,264	1,576,779	1,740,900	1,561,995	1,594,098	1,610,434
R. Valley	1,779,789	1,833,990	1,951,235	1,998,278	2,185,054	2,191,341	2,270,971	2,418,905	2,661,775	2,716,481	2,744,320
Western	1,054,694	1,101,162	1,143,972	1,122,557	1,273,510	1,333,640	1,365,127	1,421,137	1,447,447	1,477,194	1,492,333
Total	7,159,524	7,394,762	7,597,285	7,632,113	8,330,148	8,577,619	8,827,535	9,381,211	9,561,100	9,757,602	9,857,596

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13

Table E6

Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1968 – 73

Province	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Central	22,800	29,000	29,000	32,100	37,100	41,700
Coast	8,900	10,500	11,800	13,500	14,400	15,400
Eastern	11,100	13,800	17,300	19,400	23,500	24,700
Nairobi	22,700	22,900	23,700	24,300	25,300	25,600
N. Eastern	100	100	200	200	300	400
Nyanza	12,900	15,500	16,700	18,500	22,300	23,000
R. Valley	12,200	13,700	15,400	18,000	20,400	22,300
Western	10,600	11,700	12,800	14,800	18,600	21,700
Total	101,300	117,200	126,900	140,800	161,900	174,800

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1968 – 73

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Table E7

Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1973 – 83

Province	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Central	41,700	51,400	55,600	66,700	78,200	87,400	94,600	105,800	92,400	98,800	119,500
Coast	15,400	17,400	16,400	16,500	19,000	19,600	20,700	23,100	27,300	29,200	28,600
Eastern	24,700	35,400	38,500	45,100	54,500	63,200	67,900	71,100	66,000	70,100	84,400
Nairobi	25,600	21,100	22,900	28,000	29,500	31,400	30,000	30,400	32,200	34,400	38,500
N. Eastern	400	400	500	600	700	700	1,000	1,500	1,300	1,400	1,500
Nyanza	23,000	28,800	31,800	46,100	50,500	62,400	65,800	70,900	77,600	83,000	86,900
R. Valley	22,300	21,400	29,200	34,500	40,800	46,700	53,400	58,800	60,100	64,300	68,600

Western	21,700	20,200	31,900	42,800	47,100	50,300	51,000	54,300	53,100	56,800	65,700
Total	174,800	196,100	226,800	280,300	320,300	361,700	384,400	415,900	410,000	438,000	493,700

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83

Table E8

Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1983 – 93

Province	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Central	119,500	124,800	92,500	101,700	110,400	107,800	140,200	124,700	125,300	122,000	118,000
Coast	28,600	26,900	21,000	27,600	31,600	35,500	40,400	41,500	39,500	40,000	30,000
Eastern	84,400	89,600	64,400	75,900	98,800	99,800	115,300	113,400	121,000	125,000	104,000
Nairobi	38,500	31,700	25,300	31,000	29,900	30,500	34,200	35,900	33,900	34,000	15,000
N. Eastern	1,500	1,300	1,200	1,900	2,200	2,400	3,100	3,400	3,500	1,200	1,000
Nyanza	86,900	80,800	67,800	72,100	90,300	89,100	97,500	90,900	95,000	89,000	81,000
R.Valley	68,600	80,800	75,400	89,000	92,600	99,600	121,700	119,800	122,200	95,000	111,000
Western	65,700	75,000	54,400	59,500	66,500	75,500	88,300	88,900	73,800	62,900	71,000
Total	493,700	510,900	402,000	458,700	522,300	540,200	640,700	618,500	614,200	569,100	531,000

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93



Table E9

Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1993 – 2003

Province	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Central	118,000	129,700	132,600	142,800	150,800	154,800	152,400	173,700	182,100	187,100	171,400
Coast	30,000	37,000	35,400	37,400	37,100	34,500	36,700	52,400	41,100	41,900	49,500
Eastern	104,000	112,900	114,600	116,500	121,500	124,500	136,700	133,300	140,600	145,100	166,900
Nairobi	15,000	31,700	30,300	22,500	22,500	24,200	30,100	18,100	32,900	35,400	20,300
N. Eastern	1,000	3,600	4,000	3,900	4,300	5,100	5,000	5,100	5,100	5,100	11,300
Nyanza	81,000	105,200	112,700	115,800	119,800	126,200	122,200	136,100	140,000	149,900	155,800
R.Valley	111,000	121,900	124,000	138,900	143,400	137,600	142,900	143,900	180,200	169,700	195,200
Western	71,000	77,900	78,900	80,500	87,900	93,600	96,600	99,900	95,700	102,200	109,600
Total	531,000	619,900	632,500	658,300	687,300	700,500	722,600	762,500	817,700	836,400	880,000

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003

Table E10
Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 2003 – 13

Province	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Central	171,400	187,400	181,600	204,100	223,200	260,000	266,300	305,400	291,400	315,600	344,500
Coast	49,500	55,500	48,800	58,500	65,300	68,000	68,800	84,600	93,600	101,600	111,900
Eastern	166,900	174,300	173,600	183,500	214,000	244,000	266,900	317,200	337,500	365,100	399,200
Nairobi	20,300	29,700	28,500	29,700	49,700	58,900	58,000	67,700	40,600	43,100	54,800
N. Eastern	11,300	5,600	6,100	7,800	9,000	11,900	12,100	17,000	22,100	24,000	26,000
Nyanza	155,800	148,700	170,600	183,000	207,000	241,100	242,500	320,200	342,100	369,800	405,700
R. Valley	195,200	205,600	206,900	243,200	266,300	315,300	381,000	380,400	391,900	425,600	467,200
Western	109,600	118,400	118,100	120,300	145,700	183,000	212,000	216,800	248,300	270,100	295,000
Total	880,000	925,200	934,200	1,030,100	1,180,200	1,382,200	1,507,600	1,709,300	1,767,500	1,914,900	2,104,300

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13



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Table E11
Attendance at Family Planning Clinics by Province, 1970 – 73

Province	1970	1971	1972	1973
Central	38,966	48,400	53,034	60,519
Coast	11,226	16,352	17,225	20,431
Eastern	17,454	23,157	29,102	34,437
Nairobi	59,098	62,212	81,386	101,221
N. Eastern	-	-	-	-
Nyanza	5,873	7,995	8,956	11,145
R. Valley	11,895	15,118	17,006	18,215
Western	4,319	6,522	9,071	13,368
Total	148,831	179,756	215,780	259,336

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1970 – 73

Table E12
Attendance at Family Planning Clinics by Province, 1973 – 83

Province	1973	1974	1975	1976	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Central	60,519	66,357	74,589	67,477	70,799	77,059	74,287	93,495	98,910	95,063
Coast	20,431	23,168	23,996	23,219	28,006	30,501	15,172	24,688	39,408	30,151
Eastern	34,437	36,441	41,331	48,169	56,708	59,889	41,674	49,556	61,134	67,556
Nairobi	101,221	106,237	108,695	116,902	116,660	131,637	153,919	116,337	134,071	142,018
N. Eastern	-	-	-	426	635	620	263	587	1,007	981
Nyanza	11,145	10,789	11,423	13,044	17,846	18,127	12,570	15,756	16,477	19,295
R.Valley	18,215	20,741	21,042	22,918	31,164	34,928	28,942	34,558	40,005	43,594
Western	13,368	16,708	17,648	13,645	17,747	18,599	4,426	16,329	16,961	15,728
Total	259,336	280,441	298,724	305,800	339,565	371,360	331,253	351,306	407,973	414,386

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83

Table E13

Attendance at Family Planning Clinics by Province, 1983 – 87

Province	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Central	95,063	115,356	94,601	179,820	379,723
Coast	30,151	26,250	7,292	8,382	122,021
Eastern	67,556	83,206	83,110	144,996	90,537
Nairobi	142,018	135,720	136,859	95,694	104,097
N. Eastern	981	1,082	805	710	651
Nyanza	19,295	22,585	22,369	-	166,754
R.Valley	43,594	47,195	46,992	29,388	647,445
Western	15,728	20,475	1,547	6,660	159,048
Total	414,386	451,869	393,575	465,650	1,670,276

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 87

Table E14

Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1970 – 73

Province	1970	1971	1972	1973
Central	2,188	2,732	2,725	2,910
Coast	1,846	1,809	1,659	1,884
Eastern	2,286	2,284	2,755	2,407
Nairobi	3,346	3,661	4,267	4,390
N. Eastern	188	108	168	235
Nyanza	1,672	1,717	1,767	1,745
R.Valley	2,696	3,139	2,882	3,072
Western	1,286	1,261	1,827	1,543
Total	15,508	16,711	18,050	18,186

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1970 – 73

Table E15

Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1973 – 83

Province	1973	1974	1975	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Central	2,910	3,169	3,587	3,680	3,758	4,004	4,511	4,351	4,512	4,512
Coast	1,884	1,524	1,567	2,146	2,420	2,512	2,512	2,930	2,930	2,930
Eastern	2,407	2,711	3,022	2,826	3,177	3,630	3,630	3,827	3,882	3,882
Nairobi	4,390	2,994	2,994	3,469	3,919	5,043	5,053	5,165	5,598	5,598
N. Eastern	235	241	241	347	313	348	348	354	354	366
Nyanza	1,745	1,657	2,128	4,005	4,065	3,873	4,025	4,025	4,053	4,066
R. Valley	3,072	2,958	3,739	4,599	4,679	4,954	4,954	4,987	4,987	5,212
Western	1,543	1,680	1,955	1,776	2,377	2,558	2,668	2,469	2,728	2,728
Total	18,186	16,934	19,233	22,848	24,708	26,922	27,701	28,108	29,044	29,294

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83

Table E16

Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1983 – 93

Province	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Central	4,512	4,848	4,848	4,848	4,848	4,883	5,030	5,060	5,170	5,170	5,280
Coast	2,930	3,005	3,005	3,065	3,065	3,186	3,276	3,366	3,491	3,613	3,491
Eastern	3,882	4,287	4,337	4,457	4,457	4,601	4,745	4,769	4,769	4,803	4,849
Nairobi	5,598	5,610	5,610	5,690	5,690	5,696	5,696	5,886	6,021	6,162	6,314
N. Eastern	366	414	414	414	414	414	414	414	429	491	1,245
Nyanza	4,066	4,114	4,114	4,234	4,234	4,259	4,259	4,283	4,373	4,403	4,618
R. Valley	5,212	5,844	5,844	6,004	6,004	6,250	6,330	6,474	6,729	6,729	7,587
Western	2,728	2,764	2,764	2,644	2,644	2,694	2,784	2,834	2,944	2,989	4,747
Total	29,294	30,886	30,936	31,356	31,356	31,983	32,534	33,086	33,926	34,360	38,131

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93

Table E17

Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1993 – 2003

Province	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Central	5,280	5,324	6,400	6,606	7,009	7,218	7,513	7,826	7,112	7,412	8,314
Coast	3,491	2,781	3,818	3,991	4,136	4,227	4,421	4,579	4,703	4,891	5,011
Eastern	4,849	4,881	5,724	6,168	6,361	6,516	6,736	6,952	7,421	7,687	7,822
Nairobi	6,314	5,879	6,225	6,373	6,487	6,691	7,005	7,287	7,936	8,191	7,998
N. Eastern	1,245	1,224	1,447	1,451	1,498	1,501	1,537	1,537	1,610	1,707	1,914
Nyanza	4,618	5,058	8,947	9,480	9,625	9,879	10,006	10,268	10,501	12,390	12,545
R. Valley	7,587	7,751	9,818	9,928	10,158	10,401	11,240	11,752	11,921	11,922	12,832
Western	4,747	4,373	4,775	5,334	5,567	5,753	5,920	6,215	6,336	6,457	6,971
Total	38,131	37,271	47,154	49,331	50,841	52,186	54,378	56,416	57,540	60,657	63,407

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003

Table E18

No. of Health Institutions by Province, 2013 – 13

Province	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Central	526	868	894	972	556	1,199	1,251	1,345	1,413	1,438	1,562
Coast	440	550	566	624	717	723	770	754	852	873	883
Eastern	837	824	849	925	1,079	942	1,106	1,256	1,441	1,548	1,877
Nairobi	493	377	389	409	347	387	406	423	505	562	947
N. Eastern	88	135	139	162	164	198	232	264	278	291	368
Nyanza	548	494	509	601	761	716	773	745	932	965	1,092
R.Valley	1,267	1,146	1,181	1,308	1,573	1,648	1,732	1,867	2,076	2,166	2,577
Western	358	373	385	443	392	377	426	457	509	532	613
Total	4,557	4,767	4,912	5,444	5,589	6,190	6,696	7,111	8,006	8,375	9,919

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13

Table E19

No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1968 – 73

Province	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Central	180	119	322	-	6	34
Coast	113	50	174	208	589	257
Eastern	-	121	50	-	16	34
Nairobi	705	1,309	1,341	1,290	1,505	302
N. Eastern	-	-	-	8	26	6
Nyanza	100	173	7	20	42	70
R.Valley	307	247	192	177	314	153
Western	63	-	85	34	-	238
Total	1,468	2,019	2,171	1,737	2,498	1,094

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1968 – 1973

Table E20

No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1973 – 83

Province	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Central	34	189	326	49	15	159	207	337	-	-	187
Coast	257	300	20	216	300	51	190	350	-	13	50
Eastern	34	50	60	-	-	51	-	249	-	70	98
Nairobi	302	432	172	1	586	862	3,056	616	1,072	2,311	-
N. Eastern	6	-	-	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nyanza	70	25	105	-	9	-	-	286	106	180	-
R.Valley	153	413	572	-	-	300	461	1,417	-	354	302
Western	238	32	181	25	6	121	171	272	1,557	-	50
Total	1,094	1,441	1,436	317	916	1,544	4,085	3,527	2,735	2,928	687

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83

Table E21

No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1983 – 93

Province	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Central	187	-	45	95	111	166	-	357	-	40	-
Coast	50	13	50	-	50	-	-	-	68	-	23
Eastern	98	2	-	253	248	-	-	-	128	-	-
Nairobi	-	284	-	-	85	-	367	1,069	2	-	-
N. Eastern	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	212	-	-	-
Nyanza	-	1,900	169	52	40	-	105	-	-	-	-
R.Valley	302	199	745	115	42	63	149	25	-	40	-
Western	50	-	-	-	-	-	384	-	90	102	-
Total	687	2,398	1,009	515	576	229	1,005	1,663	288	182	23

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93



Table E22
No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1993 – 2003

Province	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Central	-	-	-	26	35	-	-	42	-	-	30
Coast	23	66	-	-	-	-	-	22	-	-	-
Eastern	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nairobi	-	952	16	1	-	53	-	120	-	173	-
N. Eastern	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nyanza	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R.Valley	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	-
Western	-	60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	23	1,078	16	27	35	53	-	184	-	197	30

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003

Table E23
No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 2003 – 13

Province	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Central	30	-	24	-	-	38	-	-	-	-	-

Coast	-	-	161	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Eastern	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nairobi	-	-	160	230	230	40	116	310	215	488	376
N. Eastern	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nyanza	-	-	-	69	69	-	-	-	40	-	-
R.Valley	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Western	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	80	-	-	-
Total	30	-	360	299	299	78	116	390	255	488	376

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13




Table E24

Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by Area, 1966 – 71 '000 kWh

Area	1966	1967	1968	1971
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya	81,698	81,815	84,490	94,798
Coast	16,794	17,448	18,277	21,996
R.Valley	4,877	5,032	5,372	6,204
Eldoret	1,066	1,089	1,160	1,307
Kisumu	3,077	3,448	4,101	5,874
Kitale	493	505	565	634
Total	108,005	109,337	113,965	130,813

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1966 – 71

Table E25

Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by Area, 1973 – 83 '000 kWh

Area	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1983
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya	105,496	114,874	125,565	129,718	144,362	250,071	267,070	278,392	332,196

Coast	26,217	29,112	30,341	31,012	33,777	65,144	69,008	72,579	85,112
R.Valley	6,839	7,144	8,653	8,910	8,765	21,586	23,443	25,044	32,121
Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale	9,477	10,488	12,420	11,213	13,511	30,381	36,185	34,232	40,609
Total	148,029	161,618	176,979	180,853	200,415	367,182	395,706	410,247	490,038

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83

Table E26

Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by
Area, 1983 – 93 '000 kWh

Area	1983	1984	1985	1987	1988	1989	1992	1993
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya	332,196	353,181	365,725	433,444	463,473	492,792	567,558	604,822
Coast	85,112	88,404	98,070	112,351	116,426	126,844	150,281	148,379
R.Valley	32,121	32,854	36,188	37,179	40,261	45,542	82,414	89,517
Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale	40,609	45,082	50,185	55,294	64,637	71,329	59,337	60,282
Total	490,038	519,521	550,168	638,268	684,797	736,507	859,590	903,000

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93

Table E27

Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by
Area, 1993 – 2000 '000 kWh

Area	1993	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya	604,822	685,200	725,009	775,900	795,000	710,100
Coast	148,379	202,900	215,293	224,125	189,800	187,000
R.Valley	89,517	101,900	111,575	112,625	110,600	101,400
Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale	60,282	71,500	74,443	73,100	74,000	71,100
Total	903,000	1,061,500	1,126,320	1,185,750	1,169,400	1,069,600

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2000

Table E28

Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by
Area, 2004 – 2013 '000 kWh

Area	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya	1,037	1,018	1,038	1,330	1,405	1,416	1,582	1,582	1,801	2,143
Coast	247	258	262	325	343	362	393	404	419	469
Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale	233	227	226	345	344	351	398	544	507	733
Total	1,517	1,503	1,526	2,000	2,092	2,129	2,372	2,530	2,727	3,345

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2004 – 2013

Table E29

Rural Electrification by Area, 1996 – 2000 '000 kWh

Area	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya	56,000	52,858	56,000	57,000	52,000
Coast	6,000	16,857	13,000	14,000	11,000
R. Valley	39,000	45,855	46,000	39,000	36,000
Western	37,000	34,860	32,000	28,000	20,000
Total	138,000	150,430	147,000	138,000	119,000

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1996 – 2000

Table E30

Rural Electrification by Area, 2004 – 2013 million kWh

Area	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya	78	78	82	105	111	126	135	135	139	214
Coast	10	10	10	15	17	18	21	21	22	24
Western	88	88	92	121	122	135	155	152	152	216
Total	176	176	184	241	250	279	311	308	313	454

Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2004 – 2013

Table E31

Cost of Operational Rural Water Schemes by Province, 1971 – 1973

Province	1971	1972	1973
Central	-	-	200,000
Coast	27,000	167,500	181,500
Eastern	116,000	171,500	271,500
N. Eastern	30,000	33,500	33,500
Nyanza	-	19,400	19,400
R. Valley	32,270	36,200	56,200
Western	54,000	44,000	110,000
Total	259,270	472,100	872,100

Sources: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 1971 – 73

Table E32

Cost of Operational Rural Water Schemes by Province, 1973 – 1983

Province	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Central	200,000	606,000	998,000	1,080,000	2,018,000	2,850,000	4,525,000	5,500,000	6,000,000	8,985,000	8,985,000
Coast	181,500	202,000	345,000	381,000	381,000	249,000	399,000	454,000	454,000	454,000	454,000

Eastern	271,500	203,000	203,000	532,000	1,952,000	1,980,000	2,180,000	2,180,000	2,780,000	2,880,000	3,740,000
N. Eastern	33,500	37,000	84,000	136,000	143,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000
Nyanza	19,400	292,500	605,000	605,000	2,725,000	3,128,000	3,198,000	3,198,000	3,198,000	3,198,000	6,698,000
R. Valley	56,200	245,000	363,000	674,000	674,000	622,000	917,000	917,000	1,035,000	1,309,000	1,309,000
Western	110,000	115,000	339,000	575,000	575,000	585,000	585,000	585,000	2,585,000	3,935,000	5,335,000
Total	872,100	1,700,500	2,937,000	3,983,000	8,468,000	9,571,000	11,961,000	12,991,000	16,209,000	20,918,000	26,678,000

Sources: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 1973 – 83

Table E33

No. of Boreholes Drilled in Rural Areas by Province, 1996 – 2003

Province	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Central	22	21	28	28	28	39	26	7
Coast	-	4	26	28	31	14	1	6
Eastern	52	35	42	42	42	50	31	14
N. Eastern	3	5	13	13	13	22	1	1
Nyanza	53	-	36	43	46	5	9	2
R. Valley	37	58	36	72	75	90	46	17
Western	-	1	6	6	6	2	4	-
Total	167	124	187	232	241	222	118	47

Sources: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 1996 – 2003

Table E34

No. of Boreholes Drilled in Rural Areas by Province, 2003 – 2012

Province	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Central	7	9	28	26	7	7	5	3	3	3
Coast	6	-	16	13	15	5	11	5	1	1
Eastern	14	17	45	79	36	32	29	28	32	22
N. Eastern	1	4	53	10	67	14	17	18	13	11

Nyanza	2	2	34	11	4	8	6	10	13	14
R.Valley	17	28	27	56	32	34	26	23	18	34
Western	-	3	24	6	3	-	3	8	6	5
Total	47	63	227	201	164	100	97	95	86	90

Sources: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 2003 – 2012

Table E35

Full Immunization Coverage (FIC) Rate of Under-One Year Old Children by Region, 2008 – 2012

Region	2008		2009		2010		2011		2012*	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Nairobi	85,866	74	78,294	83	100,813	96	101,055	99	106,655	98
Central	104,194	86	101,419	92	113,729	96	99,213	86	101,225	86
Coast	90,773	75	81,761	71	103,914	87	97,781	80	112,506	89
Eastern	126,302	64	128,887	80	135,593	83	151,459	91	157,496	91
N. Eastern	33,454	89	30,080	67	31,213	57	44,142	76	35,933	60
Nyanza	149,465	75	158,206	79	161,212	79	158,570	76	212,765	100
R. Valley	228,243	64	240,943	71	254,228	70	261,478	71	306,793	75
Western	129,308	66	132,622	85	143,419	90	136,609	84	142,818	83
National Coverage	947,605	71	952,212	78	1,044,121	81	1,050,307	80	1,176,191	85

*Provisional

Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Survey 2013, p. 58



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APPENDIX F
INFORMED CONSENT FORM

RESEARCH TITLE: ETHNICITY, GOVERNANCE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF KENYA AND ITS LUO COMMUNITY, 1963 – 2013.

I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted by **Omulo, Albert Gordon Otieno** towards the Doctoral Programme at the School of Government (SOG) at the University of the Western Cape.



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This study has been described to me in a language that I understand and I freely and voluntarily agree to participate. My questions about the study have been answered.

I understand that my identity will not be disclosed and was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time by advising the student researcher.

With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree to participate in this study.

Participant Name : _____

Participant Signature : _____

Date : _____

Place : _____

Student Researcher : Omulo, Albert Gordon Otieno.

Student Researcher Signature : _____

Student Number : 3523464

Mobile Number : +27 63 212 2962; +27 62 789 0514

Email : omuloalbert@gmail.com

I am accountable to my supervisor : Sr. Prof. John J. Williams

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APPENDIX G

LETTERS OF APPROVAL FROM INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS



UNIVERSITY of the
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DEPARTMENT OF RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT

18 January 2016

To Whom It May Concern

I hereby certify that the Senate Research Committee of the University of the Western Cape approved the methodology and ethics of the following research project by:
Mr A Omulo (School of Government)

Research Project:	Ethnicity, governance and socio-economic development in Africa: A case study of Kenya and the Luo Community, 1963-2013.
Registration no:	15/7/170

Any amendments, extension or other modifications to the protocol must be submitted to the Ethics Committee for approval.

The Committee must be informed of any serious adverse event and/or termination of the study.

*Ms Patricia Josias
Research Ethics Committee Officer
University of the Western Cape*

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REF: SU-IRB 0038/16

19th April 2016

Albert G. O. Omulo
P.O Box 920-00200
City Square, Nairobi
Kenya.

Email: 3523464@myuwc.ac.za

Dear **Mr. Omulo**,

REF: SU-IRB 0038/16 PROPOSAL "ETHNICITY, GOVERNANCE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF KENYA AND IT'S LUO COMMUNITY, 1963-2013"

I make reference to your email dated 11th April 2016, where you responded to concerns raised by the Strathmore University Institutional Review Board (SU-IRB).

The SU-IRB acknowledges receipt of the following resubmitted documents:

- a) The study proposal version 2.0 dated 10 April 2016
- b) The revised participant information sheet

The committee has reviewed your application and concluded that the issues raised have been adequately addressed.

The study has been granted **Approval** for implementation effective on **19th Day of April 2016**. Please note that authorization to conduct this study will automatically expire on **18th April 2017**.

If the study extends beyond the stated (one) year, you are required to seek an *Extension Approval* from the Ethics committee prior to its expiry. You are required to submit any proposed changes to this protocol to SU-IRB for review and approval prior to implementation of changes.

Thank you

Sincerely,

Amina Salim
Regulatory Affairs Fellow

