The Politics of Belonging and a Contest for Survival: Rethinking the Conflict in North and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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KEY WORDS

Citizenship
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Ethnicity
Nationality
Identity
Subjection
Politics
Kivu
Rwanda
Burundi
ABSTRACT

I set out to rethink the ongoing conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). I highlight two problems with regards to the current conceptualisation of the conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu. The first is a theoretical problem and here I demonstrate that the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge’s quest for belonging has so far been restricted to citizenship. Congolese Banyarwanda and the Banyamulenge find themselves in a peculiar situation, at various times in the postcolonial Congolese state they had recognition from above but lacked recognition from below. It is in this context that a politics of belonging developed. The second problem is with regards to the history of the conflict. I argue that most scholarly works take the 1993 conflict in North Kivu as the starting point of the conflict, but the conflict can be traced back to an earlier date. It was with this in mind that I pose the following question: Can the conflict in North and South Kivu in the DRC be considered as a politics of belonging between indigenous Congolese and Kinyarwanda speaking Congolese, and a contest for survival between Hutu and Tutsi elites?

My research is qualitative and since the problem is theoretical and historical I had to think about how the conflict was presented in terms of definitions, meaning, concepts, and so on. Therefore, this research is guided by critical theory and uses a case study research design. For this purpose, I relied on both primary and secondary data. Primary data sources for this study include the following: photographs that was taken while I was deployed in the DRC as a soldier, my personal deployment diary, internet newspaper articles, research reports of the United Nations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, a focus group with expats from North Kivu and South Kivu, a questionnaire I distributed among expats from the DRC and an online discussion forum.

The first step in rethinking the conflict was to investigate subjectivity and belonging in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Hence, I started off by looking at the inauguration of the post-colonial subject and how this subject came into being. Investigating the formation of the colonial and post-colonial subject sheds light not only on the ongoing violence in the Eastern part of the DRC, but it also provides an explanation for violence during major political events in the Great Lakes region. Firstly, I found that there are two levels of ‘foreignness’ in North and South Kivu. At the first level it is orientated around nationality. Here the Barundi and Banyarwanda identities evoke a politics of belonging. It became clear that Banyarwanda must be seen as reference to Rwandan nationality and Barundi to Burundian nationality, and not as ‘ethnicity’ as
conceptualised by mainstream scholarly work on the topic. Secondly, I found that a ‘politics of belonging’ highlights the complex power relationships that shape the postcolonial subject’s identity. The postcolonial subject’s identity in this sense is multidimensional. To find a sense of belonging in these identities ‘borders’ have to be constructed. Drawing a border line might be viewed as dialectic. The power may use violence to draw and to keep the borders and boundaries of identities intact. However, an opposing power may also break the boundary and border lines through violence. This explains the violence in the Kivus. Violence is constantly used to defend or re-imagine borders between identities. Thirdly, I found that there is a relationship between a politics of belonging and scarcity. This is what gave rise to a narrative related to land. If one considers that land is accessed via ethnicity in most parts of Kivu, it illuminates a key reason for a politics of belonging. The idea of scarcity may be a result of how it was thought and institutionalised in a dominant epistemology. The Lockean sense of property might be fundamental in the construction of scarcity. It once again raises a question regarding the relationship between the subject and her or his objects. This relationship is essential to form a sense of belonging.

Therefore, the second step was to show that identity formation in the Great Lakes region is trapped in an epistemology and that it gave rise to the racialized and ethnicised version of the postcolonial subject that one encounters today. It also takes one to the second level of ‘foreignness’ in North Kivu and South Kivu. The second level of ‘foreignness’ is still largely produced in the epistemology that gave rise to it. Therefore, at a scholarly level, a dominant narrative developed and it represents the conflict as a conflict regarding ethnicity, nationality, a lack of access to land and the illegal exploitation of Congo’s minerals. The dominant narrative produces the same scholarly results. I found that ethnicity evokes a politics of belonging. Ethnicity assigns permanent places of residence to certain groups of people; to those who are regarded as the firstcomer. The idea of the firstcomer is still produced in the same epistemology that gave rise to ethnicised colonial subject. Here, one picks up traces of the “Bantu” versus “Nilotic” narrative which is a result of the Hamitic hypothesis. This is the same epistemology that gave rise to the Hutu versus Tutsi dialectic. I found that the Hutu versus Tutsi dialectic was reincarnated in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, but this time as a Bantu versus Jew narrative. This Bantu versus Jew narrative was incarcinated on the back of the Hamitic Hypothesis. This happened despite the Rwandan government’s best efforts to ban ethnic classification in Rwanda. However, the notion of Bantu versus Jew is not restricted to Rwanda. This notion is still widely accepted and debated in the region, including the Eastern parts of the DRC. This is
an indication that the epistemology that gave rise to the 1972 and 1994 genocides is still a part of the everyday lives of the people in the Great Lakes region. Furthermore, the Bantu versus Jew narrative fuels the notion that the Tutsi is not from the Great Lakes region and that they were the migrants; they are not autochthonous. It also fuels the notion that Hutu is the Bantu figure and is not from the region either; and as such they are not autochthonous either and that they were the migrants. Therefore, whoever is in control of the state is in control of the autochthony narrative. Scholarly work does not help either because only a few write about subjectivity and belonging outside of the frame of the Hamitic Hypothesis and this reproduces the same notions around autochthony. Place (or geographical space or the object) is central in a politics of belonging because it is *place* that form subjectivity. Therefore, the postcolonial subject in the Great Lakes cannot think of her or himself without that object and cannot develop a sense of belonging without that object.
DECLARATION

I declare that The Politics of Belonging and a Contest for Survival: Rethinking the Conflict in North and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Jacob Cloete

May 2018
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo- Zaire/Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALiR</td>
<td>Alliance pour la libération du Rwanda/Alliance for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Armeé Nationale Congolaise</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Armée patriotique rwandaise/Rwandan Patriotic Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congrès national pour la défense du people/National Congress for the Defence of the People</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNKi</td>
<td>Comité national du Kivu/National Committee of Kivu</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNS</td>
<td>Conférence nationale souveraine / National Sovereign Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
<td>Forces armées burundaises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forces armées congolaises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Forces armées rwandaises/Rwandan Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo/Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Forces Armées Zaïroises</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces démocratiques pour la libération de Rwanda / Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces nationales de liberation/National Liberation Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICD</td>
<td>Inter-Congolese Dialogue</td>
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<td>IPIS</td>
<td>International Peace Information Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord's Resistance Army</td>
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<td>M23</td>
<td>March 23</td>
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<td>MAGRIVI</td>
<td>Mutuelle agricole de Virunga / Virunga Agricultural Collective</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIB</td>
<td>Mission d'immigration des Banyarwanda/Banyarwanda Immigration Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Mission of the United Nations in Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARECO</td>
<td>Coalition des patriotes résistants congolais/Alliance of Resistant Congolese Patriots</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie/Congolese Rally for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD-ML</td>
<td>RCD-Mouvement de liberation/Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>US</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In 2004 I had the opportunity to travel to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), having been deployed as one of the South African peacekeepers. Before our flight to the Congo we were, for two weeks, “mobilised” in Bloemfontein. During this “mobilising” period we were overloaded with information from various intelligence officers. They taught us about the various rebel groups, the conflict hotspots and where we would be deployed. Some were deployed in Kindu and I was included in the group that had to deploy to Goma in North Kivu. Intelligence briefings indicated that the fighting was along the eastern corridor. I was excited and yet nervous because this is what we trained for. But we were constantly reminded that we are a peacekeeping force and do not have any real power. We could not interfere if we saw rebels shooting or killing civilians and that we could not shoot back, even if we get shot at. We could only shoot or defend on the command of our section leaders. It became clear that Chapter VII, under which we were deployed, would not help much to prevent the violence towards Congolese civilians.\footnote{On February 24, 2000 the United Nations passed resolution 1291 (2000). The resolution made it clear that MONUC forces was to be deployed under Chapter VII and they were restricted to taking action in the areas of deployment and “to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” (S/RES/1291, 2000, p. 4) The problem was that there is an ambiguity around what is meant by “imminent threat of physical violence” and which forces were responsible for protecting civilians. This ambiguity did not allow MONUC forces to protect civilians.} Despite this limitation I was still very much excited and looking forward to the deployment.
What I expected and what I experienced were two different things. We largely expected hardened killers that will eat us the very first opportunity they get. I remember that when getting off the military aircraft that flew us from Bujumbura (in Burundi) to Goma, one of the soldiers, Johnny Bravo, pointed to one of the FARDC soldiers and said to me that soldier standing there looked like he would eat us.\textsuperscript{2} I was in disagreement because that was not the impression I got. To me the soldier looked like a regular soldier and the city of Goma was very peaceful. I expected a scene from popular Hollywood films such as *Black Hawk Down* and *Tears of the Sun*.

Generally people of Goma and Beni liked South African soldiers, because we spent most of our monthly allowance on things we could buy and take home. For us, things were extremely cheap. I remember when we moved from the MONUC headquarters (near the Goma airport) to the base at the Lake Kivu, the hawkers followed us. This was because the Bangladeshis did not buy anything from the hawkers. Later on, when the South African contingent was moved from Goma

\textsuperscript{2} I used a pseudonym to protect the identity of the soldier.
to Beni, the hawkers followed us and set up camp next to the fence. Now this was a remarkable feat because of the difficulty to get to Beni. When we left to set up base in Beni we flew to Lubero by helicopter and drove from Lubero to Beni. It took us 6 hours to drive from Lubero to Beni and the distance is only 99.4 kilometres. The road conditions were extremely bad. I remember the trucks that delivered our equipment took approximately two days to drive from Goma to Beni.

The striking part for me was the normality of population or civilians despite so many soldiers present in the towns of Goma, Lubero, Beni and Bunia. For those living in Goma and Beni life went on as per normal.3 There were weddings, children were going to school and people were doing their laundry. For me it seemed a kind of forced normality. There was one moment I realised that despite this perceived normality people were aware that this was not normal. I was

3 I am aware that there is a discourse around “normality” and “normal”. However, I am using “normality” and “normal” to describe a feeling I experienced in the DRC. “Normality” and “normal” are the most appropriate words to describe that feeling.
deployed as an engineering soldier and part of the engineers’ tasks was to build new bases and purify water. Unlike other foreign soldiers to the DRC, the South African Army did not provide us with bottled water and we were tasked to provide every deployed soldier with purified and drinkable water. This meant that we had to go to the river twice a day with the water truck. We then had to pump water from the river into the tank which took us approximately two hours. Thereafter, we would transport the water back to the base to purify it. One day I decided to take my camera with me, to take a couple of photos from the top of the truck. Near the truck a group of children were sitting and were having a conversation about something. I estimate that it was about 50 metres from the truck. When I pointed the camera at them to take the photo they scattered in different directions. They thought I was pointing a gun at them but when they realised that it was a camera they came back and continued their conversation.

Figure 3: A truck full of Congolese soldiers

Needless to say my experience in the Congo had a profound effect on my life. So much so that it changed the course of my life. In hindsight I was struck by two things at the time and realised how fortunate South Africans were. The first was the violence. In South Africa we knew violence...
but not on the scales that those living in the DRC have experienced it. The photos that my friends shared with me from the sites they were deployed to were horrific. The photos were of dead women and children. They were killed by militia. The photos show the heads of the victims cut open with machetes. The photos show women who were raped, mutilated and killed. Some women’s breasts were cut off. There were also photos of men who were killed and their genitals were cut off; photos of militia posing with severed heads and other limbs of their victims, and photos of people’s homes that were burned down. I still have these haunting pictures. The second was the poverty. When I was in the DRC many South Africans did not experience the scale of poverty as persons living in the Goma and Beni. At the time in South Africa we had a government that alleviated some of the poverty but in the Congo there was no functional government. No government that built houses or who was providing electricity, or who build public infrastructure like roads and dams. The poor were left to find ways for their own survival and fend for themselves.

Figure 4: A machine gun from the guard post facing the street

I returned to South Africa and after I completed my contract with the South African Army I decided to get involved in community development and study politics. This was only because of my experience in the Congo. After my experience in the DRC I found myself thinking of the conflict for a long time, but as the years went by it slipped from my mind only to enter it again in 2014, when I started my PhD. I think by then I was ready and mature enough to visit the conflict in North and South Kivu once more.
Contextual Background of the Conflict

The conflict in the Eastern DRC, especially in North and South Kivu is one of the most complicated and deadliest the world has ever witnessed. It is complicated in the sense that scholars, researchers and commentators are not in agreement over what started and what is continuing the conflict. For example, some scholars contribute the cause and continuation of the conflict to identity (Mamdani, 1998; Makobo, 1998, Mamdani, 2001; Vlassenroot, 2002 and Stearns, 2012a). Others argue that it was caused and continued by a lack of access to land (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2004; Van Acker, 2005 and Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005); whilst others contribute it to foreign military interference and mineral resource exploitation (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2004; Van Acker, 2005; Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005, Brusset et al., 2011 and Ryan & Kyezer, 2013).

Furthermore, it is deadly in the sense that it is considered to be the ongoing conflict with the second highest mortality rate after World War Two. In 2001 the International Rescue Committee (IRC) estimated that since 1998 2.5 million people died directly and indirectly as a result of the conflict, in 2003 their estimation was 3.3 million, in 2004 it was 3.8 million and in 2008 it was 5.4 million (IRC, 2001; IRC, 2003; IRC, 2004 and IRC, 2008). In addition to this, in 2013 a United Nations Security Council Report indicated that in 2013 there were 15 352 reported incidents of sexual violence and gender-based violence in the Eastern DRC (North Kivu, South Kivu, Katanga and Ituri) (United Nations, Security Council, S/2014/181, 2014, p. 3). Considering its complexity and its deadly nature it is not surprising that the conflict appears to be senseless and without any purpose. According to Brusset et al. (2011) at the end of 2010 there was an estimated 2.1 million displaced persons living in Congo of which 1.4 million were in the Kivu provinces. In addition to this, at the same period it was estimated more than 450 000 Congolese were living as refugees in neighbouring countries (Brusset et al. 2011). Refugee camps have become the recruiting ground for militia and rebel groups which results in an endless cycle of conflict.

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4 In the 2009-2010 Human Security Report this figure was disputed by the Human Security Report Project (HSRP). According to the HSRP (2010) “The IRC’s “best estimate” of excess deaths in the DRC for the period May 2001 to April 2007 is 2.83 million. Using the IRC’s survey data, but a more realistic baseline mortality rate, HSRP’s “best estimate” of the excess death toll for this period is 0.86 million. In both cases the margin of probable error is large, as indicated by the wide confidence intervals.”
Furthermore, even though many commissioned, non-commissioned, scholarly and research works have made various recommendations, none of these were able to quell the conflict. Thus, the effectiveness of these recommendations is questionable, which may be a result of conceptual, theoretical and historical gaps in the current body of knowledge regarding the conflict in the DRC. In Mamdani’s 2001 book *When Victims become Killers* he indicates that one needs to contextualise the Rwandan genocide at a regional level and not only at the national level. One has to say the same about the conflict in the Congo.\(^5\) Key scholars, in their analysis of the ongoing conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu, have left the ongoing conflict in Burundi out of their analysis and it is important to consider the role that that conflict is playing in the perpetuation of the conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu. It is, therefore, important to rethink the conflict in North and South Kivu in the DRC. In this dissertation I am arguing that the ongoing conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu are two conflicts that became intertwined over a period of time. The first conflict is a much older conflict which started during colonialism, which is a local struggle for belonging and the second conflict is relatively newer and it is a regional contest for survival between the Hutu and Tutsi elites. Furthermore, I am arguing there are theoretical and historical gaps in the current thinking on the conflict.

**Rationale of the study**

There is a debate with regards to what is fuelling the conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu. The first part of the debate situates the roots of the violence “in institutional practices introduced under colonialism, which 50 years of independence have only exacerbated. At their heart is an institution known as the native authority” (Mamdani, 2011, [https://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n02/mahmood-mamdani/the-invention-of-the-indigene](https://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n02/mahmood-mamdani/the-invention-of-the-indigene)). This in a sense gave rise to the notion of the indigene or the autochthone.\(^6\) The second part of the debate is trying to make sense of the recent violence that does not align itself with notions of indigeneity. Here Stearns (2011, [https://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n02/mahmood-mamdani/the-invention-of-the-indigene](https://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n02/mahmood-mamdani/the-invention-of-the-indigene)) argues that the recent “violence was not fuelled only by a discourse of indigeneity, but also by geopolitical considerations: the continuation of the Rwandan civil war on

\(^5\) In Mamdani’s 2001 analysis of the Rwandan genocide he left Burundi out. Mamdani in *When Victims Become Killers* also fall in the trap of exceptionalism regarding the Rwandan conflict. More will be said about the role of Burundi in the ongoing conflict.

\(^6\) In Chapter 3 I will discuss the concepts indigeneity and autochthony in more depth.
Congolese territory and struggles by local and regional elites over resources and power.” What both scholars are alluding to are two sides of the same coin. The Mamdani side of the coin is considering the role that identity (subject) plays in the conflict and the Stearns side of the coin examines the role that resources (object) plays in the conflict. It fundamentally asks the question: Can one think the ‘subject of indigeneity’ without the ‘object of indigeneity’?

Objectives of the Study

With this in mind the objectives of this study are the following:

- To show that the conflict in North and South Kivu are two conflicts. The first is orientated around a politics of belonging between Kinyarwanda speaking Congolese and ‘indigenous’ Congolese. The second pivots around a contest for survival between the Hutu and Tutsi elites.
- To broaden the theoretical framework for the politics of belonging by creating and suggesting an alternative perspective for the politics of belonging in postcolonial Africa.

Problem Statement

Given the vast body of knowledge on the conflict in the DRC a grand narrative has developed and it contributes the conflict to ethnicity, nationality, lack of access to land, and the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources. This grand narrative became the dominant narrative through which the ongoing conflict is explained. It is dominant in the sense that if someone or some organisation is commissioned to do research regarding the conflict, the findings will be in line with this narrative. The dominant narrative is visible in recent United Nations (UN) commissioned, non-commissioned and independent research. This narrative explains how ethnicity, citizenship and the lack of land access started and continued the conflict in Eastern DRC (Van der Meeren, 1996; Newbury, 1998; Mamdani, 1998; Mamdani, 2001;

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7 An in-depth discussion will follow on the politics of belonging in Chapter 3. I am not engaging the concept in the Introduction since it is the intervention I am making. A simple definition or short discussion will not do justice to the complexity of this concept.

8 In-depth discussion will follow in Chapter 7.
Vlassenroot, 2002; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004; Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2004; Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005; Van Acker, 2005; Brusset et al., 2011; Hege et al., 2012; Stearns, 2012a; Stearns, 2012b; Ryan and Keyzer, 2013, Turner, 2013 and Murithi, 2016). This narrative also explains how other states (chiefly Rwanda and Uganda) are interfering in the internal affairs of the DRC to push their economic interest in the region (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008; Brusset et al., 2011; S/2012/843, 2012 and Turner, 2013). In addition to this, this narrative also explains how the failing Zaire state created the perfect conditions for a conflict of this magnitude (Tull, 2003; Brusset et al., 2011; Mushi, 2012 and Ryan and Keyzer, 2013).\(^9\)

This narrative effectively demonstrates how the creation of these colonial identities became polarized over time which eventually resulted in an interregional ethnic conflict in the Great Lakes Region of Africa (Van der Meeren, 1996; Mamdani, 1998 and Vlassenroot, 2002). This narrative shows how two historical events, which took place in two different locations, became intertwined over a period of time. Therefore, part of the narrative is located in Rwanda (Van der Meeren, 1996; Newbury, 1997; Mamdani, 1998 and Mamdani, 2001) and another part in the Eastern DRC (Newbury, 1997; Mamdani, 1998; Mamdani, 2001; Vlassenroot, 2002 and Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004). The main players in this narrative are the Hutu, the Tutsi and the “indigenous” Congolese.\(^10\)

The starting point of this narrative is the Hamitic hypothesis (Sanders, 1969).\(^11\) According to Mamdani (2001, p. 80) the Belgians, Germans and English believed “wherever in Africa there was evidence of organised state life, there the ruling groups must have come from elsewhere. These mobile groups were known as the Hamites…” This Hamitic hypothesis was used as the basis for creating racial and ethnic identities during colonialism, which amongst others led to the Hutu, Tutsi, Hunde, Nande and Nyanga identities.\(^12\)

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\(^9\) Zaire was what is now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, Zaire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are two very different political periods.

\(^10\) Firstly, Burundi is neglected in the narrative. It position Rwanda, Uganda and DRC as the main state players in the conflict. Secondly, the indigeneity and autochthony discourses give rise to a problematic “indigenous” Congolese figure. It excludes and includes some groups of people. This will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 3.

\(^11\) Also see Van der Meer, (1996) and Mamdani (2001).

\(^12\) The colonial episteme in some cases are ignored in the creation and the subjection of people to colonial anthropological identities.
Furthermore, colonialism did not only create political identities, they also created a colonial system of “direct” and “indirect rule” (Mamdani, 1996). According to Mamdani (2001, p. 24) “Westerners [and] non-Westerners, all those subject to the power of the state would be governed through imported Western Law. To be sure, there were discriminations that set the colonizers apart from the colonized, and even different groups of colonized apart from one another ...” In this regard, the colonial administrators used civil law to distinguish between natives and nonnative. Important to note is that the nonnative status was not only reserved for Europeans but also for those African groups that came from elsewhere (Hamitic hypothesis). The Tutsi was regarded as such a group (Van der Meeren, 1996; Mamdani, 1998 and Mamdani 2001). In addition to this, “direct rule” through civil law bestowed citizenship to nonnative and “indirect rule,” through “customary” laws, bestowed ethnic citizenship to the natives (Mamdani, 1996). The significance of this was that the nonnative was ruled and protected directly by the colonial power, whereas the natives were divided into separate groups and each group was governed by its own “native authority” (Mamdani, 2001). Consequently, indigenous groups such as the Nande, the Hunde, the Hutu and the Tutsi had their own native authorities, in their supposedly home states.

Moreover, it is important to note “that while civic power was racialized, the Native Authority came to be ethnicized” (Mamdani, 1998, n.p). In this regards, “civil law gave rise to different categories of citizens. Alongside the master and colonising race, the law constituted subject races. While members of the master race were the only full citizens in the colony, members of subject races were virtual citizens ...” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 27). Colonial powers bestowed subject races with petty privilege and petty discrimination. For example, advance education and training in Rwanda was largely reserved for the Tutsi. This elevated them above those regarded to be natives and were placed higher up the ladder of the hierarchy of civilized races (Mamdani, 2001, p. 28). One such subject race was the Tutsi. Van der Meeren (1996, p. 253) explains that “[t]he Germans, the Belgian trustee administration, and the Roman Catholic church, all adhered to the Hamitic theory of racial superiority of the Tutsi. They agreed that indirect rule should be based on the existing political system through the Mwami (the king) and the ruling Tutsi elite.” This, did not just elevate the Tutsi’s status, it also made them foreigners in the Great Lakes region.

13 For more on this please see Chapters 2, 4 and 5.
At the same time, “Belgian-imposed forced labour and taxes added to the extreme poverty of the Hutu peasantry …” (Van der Meeren, 1996, p. 254). According to Van der Meeren (1996, p. 254) this coupled with “[...] identity cards [which] determined liability for forced labour (Hutu) and entry to the administration school at Astrida (Tutsi only)” essentially “polarized the two main categories, Tutsi and Hutu, into ethnic confrontation” (Van der Meeren, 1996, p. 254). Thus, at the dawn of independence the Hutu launched the 1957 Hutu manifesto and the Hutu Social Movement to achieve emancipation and political power (Van der Meeren, 1996, p. 254). Given the incidents of violence and mass killings during the Social Revolution and realising that democracy is based on majority rule, the Tutsi feared the turning of tables when the Hutu majority eventually would gain power, hence they fled Rwanda into neighbouring countries such as the DRC.

Whilst the struggle between the Hutu and the Tutsi was underway in Rwanda a struggle for citizenship was under way in the DRC (Mamdani, 1998; Mamdani, 2001; Vlassenroot, 2002; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004; Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005; Stearn, 2012a and Turner, 2013). Scholars are in agreement that there was a significant number of Kinyarwanda speaking people (also known as Banyarwanda) in the Eastern DRC before the advent of colonialism (Mamdani, 1998; Mamdani, 2001; Vlassenroot, 2002 and Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005). Scholars found that it is possible to divide these groups of Banyarwanda into two. The first group of Banyarwanda was predominantly Hutu and was located in today’s North Kivu and second the group was predominantly Tutsi and was located in today’s South Kivu (Mamdani, 1998; Vlassenroot, 2002 and Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005). In addition to this, the Banyarwanda of North Kivu was part of the pre-colonial Rwandan Kingdom (Newbury, 1997, Mamdani, 1998 and Newbury, 2001), and that the Banyarwanda of South Kivu (later Banyamulenge) originated from both Rwanda and Burundi (Newbury, 1997 and Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005, p. 128). This is significant to note because this determined the preferred destination of Hutu and Tutsi refugees after independence in the Great Lakes region.14

There are two problems regarding thinking the conflict. The first problem is a theoretical problem. The Banyarwanda’s and Banyamulenge’s quest for belonging has so far been restricted to citizenship, whereas belonging is much more than granting citizenship from above

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14 I say it is preferred if one look at the population growth of the Kivu population since independence. Masisi is one of the densest places in the region and it is clearly a preferred place for refugee; Hutu refugees in particular.
because it also has to do with recognition from below. So far, recognition from below has been ignored by scholars when dealing with the issue of belonging in the DRC. Thus, the struggle of the Banyarwanda and the Banyamulenge fundamentally raises the question: who belongs where in postcolonial Africa? In addition to this, some scholars have written about a politics of belonging (Geschiere, 2011; Bøås, 2009; Geschiere, 2009; Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005; Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 2000 and Nyamnjoh & Rowlands, 1998). However, these scholarly works do not fully theorise what a ‘politics of belonging’ is. In addition to this, it is important to take into cognisance that a ‘politics of becoming’ precedes a ‘politics of belonging.’ Becoming the colonial subject was marked by all sorts of violence. Subjection precedes belonging and for us to rethink the conflict in the DRC, is to take a step back and reconsider how identities were formed and what is keeping them in place. Reading Judith Butler’s work with Mahmood Mamdani’s work is pivotal as it will demonstrate that power has a psychic life and that subjection is a form of power that is discursively produced.

The second is a historical problem. Firstly, at a regional level, the historical scope of most scholarly works on the ongoing conflict are using either the 1994 Rwandan genocide or the 1959 Social Revolution as the starting point. For example, Lemarchand (1998) uses the 1972 Burundian genocide as the starting point of the ongoing conflict and Newbury (1997) uses the 1994 Rwandan genocide as the starting point. At a local level (Kivu) this ignores significant historical moments prior to 1994, 1972 and 1959, and that has to be included in the historical scope of the ongoing conflict. Therefore, to write a political history of the Great Lakes that would include the Eastern DRC in the analysis, and not only reduce it to Hutu versus Tutsi or Banyarwanda versus Banyamulenge; I asked myself the following question: What is missing in the current historical narrative? I identified two gaps. The first gap is regarding the ‘accuracy’ of a pre-colonial history of the Great Lakes region and the second gap is regarding the intention of European powers for colonizing the region. Let me consider the first gap. Various scholars have indicated that an ‘accurate’ historical account of the pre-colonial period of this region is almost non-existent (Newbury, 1988; Mamdani, 1996; Wesseling, 1996, Hochschild, 2001; Vlassenroot, 2002). The only ‘factual’ historical records left of the pre-colonial history are

15 Prominent scholarly works likes that of Newbury (1997) and Lemarchand (1998) focuses on Hutu versus Tutsi, and this is a result of their starting points. Newbury (1997) starts at the 1994 Rwandan genocide and Lemarchand (1998) starts at the 1972 Burundian genocide. In this analytic frame the First Congo War is then a result of a Hutu versus Tutsi conflict in the Eastern DRC.

https://etd.uwc.ac.za
anthropological accounts of European explorers\textsuperscript{16}. Spivak (2012, p. 120) notes that these accounts are not trusted by scholars of Cultural Studies. If these accounts are not to be trusted, what is one supposed to do; especially if the ‘accuracy’ of most historical accounts is disputed? More importantly, the voices of the subjected people in colonial archives are missing (Hochschild, 2001). Instead of trying to recover a missing history one can make sense of what happened on the eve of colonialism and reconstruct the moment, as Mamdani put it. However, if one is to reconstruct a moment to what end would this be? Here I would like to draw your attention Spivak’s critique of history.

Spivak raises a concern regarding the creation and appropriation of alternative histories and histories in post-colonial societies. According to Spivak (2012, p. 57) “[w]e produce historical narratives and historical explanations by transforming the socius, upon which our production is written into more or less continuous and controllable bits that are readable.” Hence, she proposes a remaking of history. Clearly leaning towards Michel Foucault’s discursive production and Gramsci’s organic intellectual, Spivak (2012, p. 58) proposes that “we must mediate upon how they (we) are written …” Similarly, Mamdani (1996) shows in Citizen and Subject how the colonial subject came into being. I would like to add that this subject was brought into existence by a colonial episteme that was codified in the Enlightenment. Spivak in turn argues how the colonial episteme is repeated by the postcolonial “national bourgeoisies.” She argues universities, journals, the institutes, the exhibitions; the publishers are all involved in the repetition of the colonial episteme.\textsuperscript{17} Her suggestion is a remaking of history. The remaking of history would entail nursing the present and to nurse the present “is a persistent critique, un glamorously chipping away at the binary oppositions and continuities that emerge continuously in the supposed account of the real” (Spivak, 2012, p. 72). Thus, taking into account Mamdani’s reconstruction of the historical moment and in line with Spivak’s remaking of history, rethinking would entail, rather than to be held captive by the ‘accuracy’ of history, reconstructing a historical moment that will allow one to rethink and ‘remake’ the history of the region.

\textsuperscript{16} Most notable of these explorers were Stanley Mouton (Hochschild, 2001) and count von Götzen (Newbury, 1988; Wesseling, 1996).

\textsuperscript{17} See the section titled “Epistemological Questions” in Chapter 8 for a discussion on the effectiveness of exhibitions to reproduces a particular episteme.
Reconstructing, rethinking and remaking would entail identifying nation states, peoples and political structures that were present in the region during the period 1860 - 1960. It also entails investigating how these nation states, peoples and political structures were altered during the course of colonialism. It is also important to be cognisant of whose account it is. Any dominant social order will write a history to their benefit and thus one has to be conscious of the end(s) of the initial historical accounts. Rethinking the conflict also requires that one imagines the region, during this period, without its current national borders. A country specific analysis of the conflict would give one a fragment of the complete picture, and I believe that this is one of the reasons for the continuation of the conflict. Given this, rethinking would entail determining how colonialism divided and grouped peoples of different nation states into new territorial states.¹⁸ These new territorial states created artificial majorities and minorities by means of drawing a border through existing nation states.¹⁹

Even though I am approaching the historical concern presented here with much optimism I am also approaching it with the caution Depelchin (2005) encourages one to have. According to Depelchin (2005, p. 1) “the winners’ history will tend to determine the rules along which historical research and methods will be developed.” Depelchin is pointing to a concealed power relation between those in Africa writing on Africa and those in Europe writing on Africa. Depelchin (2005, p 2) explains that “the discipline [history] has been mostly shaped by individuals and/or institutions which, directly or indirectly, were connected to, and thus had vested interest in, reproduction of histories of Africa which did not challenge currently established relations of power.” This gave rise to many silences regarding African histories. However, it also led to “syndromes” and “discoveries.” Depelchin (2005, p. 5) explains that “discovery” is an act of appropriation; an appropriation of African history that reproduces the very power relations which gave rise to the repression, exploitation and oppression of Africans. According to Depelchin (2005, p. 7) “[t]he central characteristic of the syndrome of discovery and, one might add, at the root of all forms of oppression and exploitation (among social scientists) is the conviction among its carriers that knowledge as defined, understood and

¹⁸ The struggle since colonialism has been to transform these territorial states into nation states. After independence this raised the issue of autochthony. Who was here first and who can lay the claim to the nation state in postcolonial African states? If you consider this it contextualises the current conflict in the DRC. This will be discussed this in more depth in the coming chapters.

¹⁹ If one studies the map of postcolonial Africa it looks like it was divided like a cake. Colonial powers at the time did not care much of the consequences for posterity of the lines they drew.
practised by them cannot be modified by knowledge contained in the “discovered” societies.”
This, therefore, “makes their content unquestionable” (Depelchin, 2005, p. 8). It is with this in
mind that I enter the conflict in Eastern DRC. I enter it with caution and with the knowledge that
there are existing paradigms that this project might question and challenge.

Research Questions

This research will be guided by the following research questions:

I. Can the ongoing conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu in the DRC be considered as a
   politics of belonging between indigenous Congolese and Kinyarwanda speaking
   Congolese, and a contest for survival between Hutu and Tutsi elites?

   ● Is there a regional conflict in North and South Kivu between Hutu and Tutsi
     elites?
   ● Is there a conflict between Rwandophone Congolese and indigenous
     Congolese with regards to belonging in North Kivu and South Kivu?

Delimitation of the Study

The geographical scope of the study will be limited to Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda – with
particular emphasis on the North and South Kivu regions in the DRC. The inception of the
historical scope will be delineated in the beginning of the second chapter of this dissertation, on
European Imperialism In addition to this, the study’s theoretical focus will be political identities,
political violence, migration, citizenship and belonging.

Research Methodology

The research approach is qualitative. According to Berg (2001, p. 3) “[q]ualitative research …
refers to the meaning, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and
descriptions of things.” The aim of this research is to rethink the conflict in the North and South
Kivu; and as such it was imperative to investigate how communities in the affected area make
sense of the conflict. Since the problem is theoretical, conceptual and historical, one has to think
how the conflict was presented in terms of definitions, meaning, concepts, and so on. The qualitative approach helped me to unpack, uncover and describe in detail how the conflict has been presented, and what scholars, researchers and commentators have missed.

Furthermore, “[q]ualitative researchers … are most interested in how humans arrange themselves and their settings and how inhabitants of these settings make sense of their surroundings through symbols, rituals, social structures, social roles, and so forth” (Berg, 2001, p. 7). The dominant narrative contributes the conflict to political identities (race, ethnicity and citizenship), lack of access to land, and the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources. Taking this into account, the qualitative approach has helped me, to investigate the social structures, social roles, and so on, and how these created a conflict of this magnitude.

Research Design and Research Method

This research was guided by critical theory and used a critical research design. During the course of finding an appropriate research design, I considered the five main stream research designs, which are: (1) case study, (2) ethnography, (3) grounded theory, (4) historiography and (5) life story (Silverman, 2010; Babbie & Mouton, 2001; Berg, 2001 and Welman and Kruger, 1999). Initially I wanted to use grounded theory as a research design but decided to approach it as a case study. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 281) “[t]he defining characteristic of a case study … is its emphasis on a single unit. The single unit here might be a person, a family, a community or a country.” More importantly, case studies also investigate multiple individual units. In addition to this, although there are also various types of case studies, I am interested in the kind that study events, roles and relationships (Babbie and Mouton, 2001, p. 281). My interest in the case study design is thus clear. My research is an investigation of an event, is concerned with the roles and relationships of the actors in the event, and it includes multiple individual units.

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Data Sources and Data Collection

There are two types of data sources. The first is secondary. According to Neuman (1997, p. 398) secondary data sources are found in books, articles, official reports, reference books and statistics. The second is primary data sources. According to Neuman (1997, p. 396) primary data sources can be letters, diaries, newspapers, movies, novels, and photographs. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 282) multiple sources of data is important for the case study design. Hence, I collected both primary and secondary data. Primary data sources for this study include the following: (1) photographs that I took and collected while deployed in the DRC, (2) my personal deployment diary, (3) internet newspaper articles, (4) research reports of the United Nations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, (5) a focus group with expats from North and South Kivu, (6) a questionnaire I distributed among expats from the DRC and (7) an online discussion forum. I came across the online discussion forum while searching for alternative spaces and sites where people from the region could freely express their subjectivity.\(^{21}\) In addition to this, I needed to see how people identify themselves and their sense of belonging. Since the aim of this project was to rethink the ongoing conflict I had to render a critique on the current discourse on the ongoing conflict. This meant that I had to critique the works of prominent scholars and policy makers leading the discourse. Scholars and policy makers have been at the forefront of writing about the conflict, and this has resulted in the dominant narrative, and it is for this reason I also used critical theory as the analytic framework for this project. It is with this in mind that I approached some Congolese expatriates living in Cape Town South Africa for a focus group discussion on the conflict. These expatriates were from the conflict area and have been directly affected by the conflict. In addition to this, expatriates like the Banyarwanda, the Barundi and the Banyamulenge, are receiving a lot of anti-migrant sentiments in South Africa. For me, their experiences in South Africa would gave them a deeper insight into a discussion around identity and belonging and that it would bring a different dimension to the authochthony discourse. Most empirical research regarding notions of autochthony and identity were done in the region. Taking this into account, expatriates would have a bird’s eye view when asked about authochthony and identity in Eastern DRC. After the focus group discussion I had several discussions with members of the focus group to deepen my understanding of the conflict and how it affected their lives. In addition, the researcher is also part of the AMIS BK network. Moreover, the questionnaire I distributed was to see if other

\(^{21}\) For a detailed discussion on the online discussion forum see Chapter 8.
expatriates shared the same notions regarding autochthony and belonging as that of the focus group (See Appendix 2 for the questionnaire). This helped me to understand how a community (the expatriate Congolese community in Cape Town) affected by the conflict make sense of the conflict. The secondary data for this study was mainly found in books and journal articles.

Data Analysis

I used two approaches to analyse the data I collected. Firstly I used content analysis. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 492) within in content analysis there are mainly two types of techniques. The first is conceptual analysis and the second is relational analysis. I used conceptual analysis. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 492) “[f]or conceptual analysis, you need to decide whether your level of analysis will be one specific word, a key phrase, or a string of words.” For example, in the chapter on the dominant narrative I identified two main concepts: (1) identity (ethnicity and nationality) and (2) resources (mining and land). Each of the two main concepts was broken down into further sub-categories. For example, within resource as concept I identified, amongst others, the following sub-categories: land, ethnicity, Rwanda, minerals, etc. In addition to this, while doing the research I also came across two new concepts: (1) “exterminate the Banyarwanda”; (2) collapsing.²² Secondly, I used discourse analysis, because it allowed me to rethink the conflict outside the current framing of the conflict.²³ According to Kawulich and Laurel (2012, p. 241) “[d]ebate and conflict are key aspects of discursive theory and research, and they encourage the recognition of various discourses about a specific area of social life.” Since, this project is about conflict and debate; I had to investigate both sides of the debate that reproduces the conflict in a form of a dominant narrative (see Rationale). I also had to consider the role of power in discourses.²⁴ Hence, I used the Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis. A Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis consists of three dimensions.

Firstly, the analysis of discourse entails historical inquiry, otherwise known as ‘genealogy’. Secondly, analysis attends to mechanisms of power and offers a description of their functioning.

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²² See Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion.

²³ See Chapter 7 for a discussion on “frame” and “framing” the ongoing conflict.

²⁴ The italics are for emphasis.
And lastly, analysis is directed to *subjectification* – material/signifying practices in which subjects are made up (Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine, 2008, p. 91).²⁵

As mentioned previously, there are currently two problems regarding the thinking of the ongoing conflict in North and South Kivu. The first is a theoretical problem and the second is a *historical* problem. Therefore, rethinking the ongoing conflict in North and South Kivu entailed a historical inquiry and an investigation into the conditions which produced various forms of *subjection* in the Great Lakes region. I also had to investigate the various discursive relations of *power* that formed the colonial and postcolonial subject.²⁶

**Limitations of the Study**

My biggest limitation was that I was not able to visit the conflict area in 2016 and this was due to safety reasons. At the time of my data collection phase, the conflict in North Kivu escalated and the safety of researchers in the area was not guaranteed. The second limitation was that a number of texts were written in French and since I do not speak or read French I was unable to read these texts. I have engaged with translated versions of these texts but it must be marked that sometimes translation loses the nuanced meaning of the text.

**Research Ethics**

This research was guided by the following principles: (1) privacy; (2) anonymity; (3) confidentiality (Neuman, 1997, p. 452); (4) truthfulness; and (5) voluntary participation. According to Neuman (1997, p. 452) researchers can protect the privacy of respondents by not disclosing a subjects’ identity after data is gathered. Confidentiality, similarly “means that information may have names attached to it, but the researcher holds it in confidence or keeps it secret from the public” (Neuman, 1997, p. 453). All research participants were informed of their rights and they signed consent forms. This is in accordance with the UWC Research Ethics Committee requirements and the *Human Science Research Council’s Code of Research Ethics* ([http://www.hsrc.ac.za/Page-168.phtml](http://www.hsrc.ac.za/Page-168.phtml)).

²⁵ Italics were the authors’ emphasis.

²⁶ The italics in this paragraph are my emphasis.
Chapter Outline

Central in rethinking the conflict is investigating subjectivity and belonging in the Great Lakes region of Africa. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 I am proposing how one has to go about rethinking the conflict. Chapter 2 considers how the colonial subject is formed and where this formation took place. For me it is important to pay attention to the inauguration of the post-colonial subject and how this subject came into being. Investigating the formation of the colonial and post-colonial subject not only shed light on the ongoing violence in the Eastern part of the DRC, but it also provides an explanation for the violence during major political events in the Great Lakes region. Here the investigation is less about the post-colonial political subject and more about subjection and subjectivation; since this project is less about the political subject and more about the person or that actor who becomes an actor in the political processes of the state. One might call this actor the colonial and the post-colonial subject. It is important to note that colonial and post-colonial in this project are references to specific and historical processes that formed this actor. And the ‘post’ in post-colonial must be seen as reference to the event, the moment a supposed shift occurred in colonial Africa. However, it is important to ask “what if the moment is ongoing and it is not a cut or implosion”? Chapter 3 is about a politics of belonging. It continues from chapter two and it illustrates the complex multidimensional nature of the post-colonial subject. I came to the conclusion that since this subject is discursively produced there are various discursive processes that formed this subject and hence it gives this subject a multidimensional nature. This also results in a multidimensional sense of belonging. It is in this complex multidimensional nature of belonging that the conflict in the Eastern part of the DRC is reproduced. This chapter draws on fieldwork to make this case. Rethinking the conflict in North and South Kivu would also entail revisiting the history of state formation in the Great Lakes. In Chapter 4 the period under investigation is 1860 to 1960. 1860 may be considered as the starting point of the African chapter of European colonialism and around the 1960s one notices that many African countries received their independence. One has to revisit the history of imperialism and colonialism to show how some of the key historical moments shaped the conflict in its local, national and regional context.

Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 bring my perspective regarding the conflict; which is to see the continuities, to think of it as regional, as two conflicts rather than one and to think of it historically. Chapter 5 is an investigation into the making of a regional interethnic conflict in
North and South Kivu. The origin of this conflict starts in Rwanda and Burundi. Various moments of political violence in the both these countries influenced ethnic relations between Hutu and Tutsi. These events of political violence also caused several waves of forced migrations into North and South Kivu. The arrivals of migrants in North and South Kivu added fuel to existing tensions between ‘autochthonous’ Congolese and Banyarwanda/Banyamulenge Congolese. By separating the investigation in this way one sees how the regional conflict between Hutu and Tutsi elites started in Burundi and Rwanda and how it spilt over to North and South Kivu in the DRC. Chapter 6 indicates how these two conflicts became intertwined in North Kivu and South Kivu. Chapter 7 introduces one to a dominant epistemology that reproduces subjectivity in the region. It is apparent that identity formation in the Great Lakes is trapped in this epistemology and that it gave rise to the racialized and ethicised version of the postcolonial subject one encounters today. Furthermore, a dominant narrative developed in scholarly work and also in commissioned and non-commissioned reports that reproduces the conflict as a conflict regarding ethnicity, nationality, a lack of access to land and the illegal exploitation of Congo’s minerals. Therefore, resigning the conflict to the dominant narrative produces the same results. In Chapter 8 one encounters the reincarnation of the Hutu versus Tutsi dialectic, but this time as a Bantu versus Jew narrative. This narrative developed after the 1994 genocide. This happened despite the Rwandan government’s best efforts to ban ethnic classification in Rwanda. This is an indication that the epistemology that gave rise to the 1972 and 1994 genocides are still part of everyday lives in the Great Lakes region of Africa.

Conclusion

This dominant narrative brought the thinking of the ongoing conflict to a dead end. The only way forward is to broaden the theoretical, geographical and historical scope of the conflict. Firstly, it is impossible to limit the analysis of the ongoing conflict to the DRC. This means that one has to broaden the geographical scope of the conflict. One has to include Burundi and Rwanda in the analysis of the ongoing conflict. I have to note that there is significant work on the role Rwanda plays in the continuation of the conflict, but in most scholarly work the role of Burundi is neglected in the conflict. If one does this, it challenges the idea that there are various conflicts and timelines of these conflicts. This thus points to two conflicts: one regional and one local. Secondly, it is necessary to theorise a ‘politics of becoming’ and a ‘politics of belonging’ to reconceptualise this conflict. This dissertation argues that the conflict in the DRC (like most
conflicts on the continent) is about belonging. It relates to who may claim indigeneity or autochthony in post-colonial Africa. Thirdly, it is necessary to broaden the historical scope of the dominant narrative. One has to be cognisant of the ways in which colonialism created new territorial states and this created artificial majorities and minorities in these states through a particular kind of nationalism. This in turn added to the post-colonial issue of autochthony. Considering this, rethinking the conflict might be the way out of the post-colonial dilemma of indigeneity/autochthony in Africa.
Chapter 2: The Politics of Becoming

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to investigate how the colonial subject is formed and where this formation takes place. The becoming of the colonial subject was marked by all sorts of violence. Thus it is important to investigate how the colonial subject came into being, how it affected the psyche of the oppressed and how it manifests ontologically in post-colonial Africa, since it has specific ramifications for belonging. This will shed light not only on the ongoing violence in the North and South Kivu, but will also provide an explanation for the violence during major political events in the Great Lakes region. What concerns this chapter is the investigation is about the becoming of the colonial and post-colonial subject. Therefore, it is less about the post-colonial political subject and more about subjection and subjectivation. Foucault conceptualises power as discursive and dispersed. Butler argues that if power is discursive it has a psychic life and it is possible that power continues to live in the psyche of the oppressed after the power source (the colonial power in its variants) is removed. In line with this, it is possible to make the argument that, that power (colonial) recognised itself when it returned in the form of neo-colonialism. It is this power that maintains the boundaries of identities and informs the post-colonial subject’s sense of belonging.

The argument of this chapter is that a ‘politics of becoming’ during colonialism led to particular political identities that manifest violently in many post-colonial states as a ‘politics of belonging.’ European missionaries, colonial administrators and early European explorers brought with them a ‘civilising’ European epistemology and with their sense of racial superiority they degraded the African to subhuman. It was within this epistemology that the formation of the African colonial

27 Michel Foucault was a philosopher and historian. He is renowned for the Archaeology of Knowledge, The Order of Things and Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. In Discipline and Punish he argues that knowledge and power are always entangled and it was here Foucault show how knowledge and power converges to form disciplinary power (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/). Foucault’s theory of power and knowledge in Discipline and Punish is what attracted many scholars to his work. Judith Butler is one of these scholars. Judith Butler is a philosopher at the University of Berkley and is renowned for a number of works which amongst other include Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity and The Psychic Life of Power. In The Psychic Life of Power Butler reflected on Foucault’s notion of subjection and subjectivation. She extended this notion of power to the psyche of the subject (https://vcresearch.berkeley.edu/faculty/judith-butler).
subject and postcolonial subject took place. Consequently, this chapter will firstly place the formation of the African colonial subject within a larger historical moment and three specific moments that influenced colonial subject formation in Africa. These moments were (1) Las Casas - Sepúlveda Controversy; (2) the legitimacy of English colonial occupation in conquest territories in America; and (3) African colonialism. Secondly, this chapter will have a discussion on subjection, followed by the resistance of the colonial subject and finally the formation of post-colonial identities.

**Becoming the Colonial Subject: From Las Casas to Mamdani**

There are three historical moments that influenced the becoming of the colonial subject. The first was the Las Casas - Sepúlveda Controversy of 1550 - 1551. The Las Casas - Sepúlveda Controversy tried to “determine the legality of waging war, as a means to Christianisation” against Native Americans (Hernandez, 2001, n.p.). According to Hernandez (2001) the controversy started after Columbus’ ‘discovery’ of the Americas. Europeans were faced with a new reality as to how they would react to this new ‘discovery.’ Before this ‘discovery’ Europeans thought all the nations of the world were discovered. However, the discovery of the ‘New World’ provides them with a new challenge. This challenge was whether they could consider the ‘new discovered people’ as rational beings who have souls and who could be Christianised. The Spaniards were generally divided with regards to the rationality and Christianization of the American natives (Hernandez, 2001). The rationality of American natives was first recognised by the Roman Catholic Church. According to Hernandez (2001) the papal bull of 1537 proclaimed Native Americans as rational beings and this meant they could receive the Christian faith. This legitimized the presence of Spain in the New World and it questioned the legitimacy of the extermination and subjugation of Native Americans.

Las Casas was against the cruelty of the Spanish encomienda system and published various articles to discredit this system which led to the Valladolid debate. Las Casas’ opponent, Sepúlveda, put four propositions in favour of a just war against the American natives: (1) the natives were barbarians; (2) they committed cruelty against natural law; (3) the natives oppressed and killed the innocent among themselves; and (4) they were infidels who need to be instructed in the Christian faith. The counter argument of Las Casas was that even if the Native
Americans were backward they were no less rational beings than their European counterparts, and for this reason they have to receive the Christian faith peacefully like the people of the ‘Old World.’ Thus, “since the [Native Americans] were rational and civilized human beings, Spaniards had no right to subject them neither to slavery nor to war” (Hernandez, 2001, n.p). No one won the Valladolid debate but it set in motion various scholarly endeavours to solve the question.

It was only until after the Valladolid debate that the theoretical underpinning for conquest was established. By the 19th Century imperialism conquest was legitimized as just when it protects (i) the freedom of trade, (ii) the freedom to evangelize, and (iii) the innocent against barbarism generated. This was the three pillars for the European justification of colonialism (Winter, 2011, p. 9). Thus, during 19th imperialism European powers were able to subjugate and kill Africans to protect free trade, to spread Christianity and to free the natives from Barbarism. Colonialism is a consequence of imperialism and was implemented under the pretence of civilisation (where civilisation stands for free trade, imposing Christianity and ‘protecting’ locals against barbarism). Conquest legitimised the violence employed against the natives in an effort to ‘civilize’ them.

Much later, a question became apparent regarding the legitimacy of English colonial occupation in conquest territories. This was largely a result of Locke’s Two Treaties. In Two Treaties Locke argues that “each individual does have and should have political power” (Tully, 1993, p. 12). For Locke, in a state of nature, every individual has political power and people are naturally self-governing. Locke argues that individuals should give up this right for the preservation of Mankind or the public good, and this is to form institutional forms of government. Institutional forms of government create laws that are in the interest of the public and society, which are regulated accordingly (Tully, 1993). Locke wrote the Two Treaties from his experience as supporter of slavery and colonialism in America. Locke and later supporters of Locke argued that the law that applies to Native Americans was natural law because they were regarded to be in a state of nature. Here, the Native Americans political society was analyzed through a European lens with Europe as the prime example of civilization. If any society did not operate like that of a European society it did not reach ‘civilization’ yet. Tully (1993, p. 151) argues that two reasons were advanced as to why Native Americans was natural law because they were regarded to be in a state of nature and why natural law must be applied. Firstly, Native Americans did not have political organization, in the European sense, and operated on a system of individual self-government. Secondly, Native Americans used a system of individualized labour-based property. It is important to note that property in a state of nature and property in a political society were not the same. The colonialists did not deny that Native Americans did have property, what they argued
against was the extent of it. The question they raised was: Do Native Americans have claim over all the lands? For them the answer was no. Colonialists argued that since Native Americans were in a state of nature they did not have “large tracts of land” but only “a few spots of enclosed and cultivated land” (Tully, 1993, p. 167). The lands that were not enclosed or which was not cultivated were considered empty or waste land, and colonialists had a right to occupy, enclose and cultivate it.

This argument later on had severe consequences for the African. The result of American colonialism was in a sense captured in Emeric de Vattel’s Law of Nations. According to Tully (1993, p. 168) “agricultural improvement and a political society with established laws are necessary conditions for the recognition of sovereignty and nationhood in international law.” This argument served to “legitimate settlement without consent, the removal of centuries-old aboriginal nations, and war if the native peoples defend their property” (Tully, 1993, p. 169).

In addition to the work of Locke, European colonialists would find the justification to colonize, exterminate and to ‘civilize’ Africans in the philosophical works of Hegel and Gobineau. One could argue that Hegel explicitly argued for colonialism and slavery; whilst Gobineau’s theory of racial inferiority was applied in all European colonies. Michelle Wright (2004, p. 33) notes that in the Philosophy of History Hegel argues that freedom can only exist in the state and it is the only place “the individual has and enjoys his freedom.” If there is no state, ‘man’ will revert back to “his primary animal existence” (Wright, 2004, p. 33). To find support for this argument Hegel draws on the ‘Negro’. Hegel argues that the ‘Negro’ is not capable of development or culture (Hegel, 2001, p. 116). The ‘Negro’ has no history and hence no progress. The only way for the ‘Negro’ to achieve freedom, development and culture is through the dialectic of Aufhebung (Hegel, 2001, p. 117). He argued that it is only through slavery and colonialism that the Negro will learn how to be free. In this regard, “the African will attain subjectivity through the European” (Wright, 2004, p. 35). It is important to note that Wright’s reference to subjectivity here is to the nation state – to become a member of the nation state, who has rights, freedom and equality in terms of law. Gobineau, alternatively, constructed three races: the Negroid, Caucasoid, and the Mongoloid (Wright, 2004, pp. 39-40). Of the ‘Negro’ Gobineau had this to say:

28 I would like to note that Hegel and Gobineau’s work were contemporary to the African chapter of European Imperialism - colonialism. Hegel’s “Philosophy of History” was published in 1824 and Gobineau’s “Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races” was published in 1853. Their work was published after the abolishment of slavery.
The Negro is the most humble and lags at the bottom of the scale. The animal character imprinted on his brow marks his destiny from the moment of conception. He will never evolve beyond his limited circle of intelligence. He is not, however, a pure and simple brute, for within the narrow confines of his cranium there exist indications of grossly powerful energies.

... 

Lastly, he has as little respect for his own life as he does for those of others; he kills for the sake of killing, and this automation that is so easily moved is, in the face of suffering, either a coward who seeks refuge in death or is else monstrously indifferent (Gobineau in Wright, 2004, pp. 43-44).

From reading this, Hegel’s influence on Gobineau’s work becomes evident. However, different from Hegel, he contributes history and civilisation to an ‘Aryan race.’ According to Wright (2004, pp. 40 – 41) Gobineau argues “that all ‘true’ civilizations are organic in nature and guided by the dialectical principle and that they are furthermore primarily occidental in origin, (sic) Gobineau states that they have one thing in common: the shared racial heritage of the dominant group, which is always Aryan. He credits the Aryan with all the necessary civilizing qualities.” This gave England, France, and Germany the justification for the political and economic exploitation of Africa (Wright, 2004, p. 45). They saw it as their duty to ‘civilise’ the nations of the world. One thing that was problematic for Gobineau was that there were civilisations in Africa. Gobineau’s explanation for this was that these cultures were founded by earlier Aryan people or people who were influenced by Aryan people (Wright, 2004, p. 49). Colonial administrators gave certain groups of people subject status when there was a possibility or evidence that they were of ‘Aryan’ background. According to Gobineau in Wright (2004, p. 50)

The state is divided into two factions that do not remain separate because of incompatible doctrines, but because of skin: the mulattos take one side, the Negroes the other. The mulattos being, without a doubt, more intelligence and a spirit that is more open to cognition. I have said it already with regards to the Dominicans: the blood of the European modifies the African nature and it is possible for these mean, founded within a mass of whiteness and under the constant supervision of good role models, to become useful citizens besides.

This also made the Hamitic Hypothesis possible. See Chapter 2.
In most cases it was given to the ruling class. In this sense a social category or class was
turned into a race. In Rwanda in particular the Tutsi and in the DRC the ‘mixed’ children of
European decent were given subject status.

The work of Gobineau and Hegel manifested in a particular ways in the European colonies.
European missionaries, colonial administrators and early European explorers brought with them
a dominant European epistemology.

The becoming of the African colonial subject was particularly violent. David Olusoga and Casper
W. Erichsen in *The Kaiser’s Holocaust* made one aware of the scientific experiments the
Germans carried out in the concentration camps of Swakopmund and Lüderitz on the Nama and
Herero people. This was to support theories of racial inferiority of black people. I am going to
quote several passages to demonstrate the gravity of these inhuman practices:

In the course of the war, an industry had developed around the supply of body parts. In the
Swakopmund concentration camp in 1905, female prisoners were forced to boil the severed
heads of their own people and scrape the flesh, sinews and ligaments off the skull with shards of
broken glass. The victims may have been people they had known or even relatives. The skulls
were then placed into crates by the German soldiers and shipped to museums, collections and
universities in Germany.

... In June 1905 the German racial anthropologist Felix von Luschan had begun a correspondence
with Ralph Zürn, the lieutenant in Okahandja whose aggression towards the Herero had helped
sparked the outbreak of the war. Disappointed with the Herero skull Zürn had donated him
following his removal from the colony in 1904, von Luscharn enquired about the possibility of
acquiring further specimens. Zürn made some enquires of his own before assuring von Luscharn
that ‘in the concentration camps taking and preserving the skulls of Herero prisoners of war will
be readily possible than in the country ...”

... Towards the end of 1906 the bodies of seventeen Nama prisoners, including that of a one-year-
old girl, were carefully decapitated by the camp physician at Shark Island, Dr Bofinger. After
breaking open the skulls, Bofinger removed and weighed the brains, before placing each in
preserving alcohol and sealing them in tins for export to the Institute of Pathology at the
University of Berlin. There they were used by the aspiring racial scientist Christian Fetzer, then
still a medical student, in a series of experiments designed to demonstrate the anatomical
similarities between the Nama and the anthropoid ape” (Olusoga and Erichsen, 2010, pp. 224-225).

These violent and inhuman practices were used to fuel a particular racial epistemology of inferiority. Mamdani (2001) showed how that epistemology was codified in law and how African people were subjected to it.  

Furthermore, influential in establishing the native as subhuman was the scholarly work of Robert Knox. According to Lindquist (1996, p. 129) “[i]n 1863, Knox’s followers broke away and formed the Anthropological Society, which was more markedly racist – the first lecture – “On the Negro’s Place in Nature” – emphasized the negro’s close relationship to the ape.” Once the native was closely related to an animal it was easier for the imperial power and the settlers to exterminate the natives. It clearly found justification in the work of Hegel and Gobineau. Their justification for this rested on the principle of ‘natural order.’ It was argued that in nature “the weak must be devoured by the strong” (Lindquist, 1996, p. 131), and this was called the law of nature, or natural law. The Europeans clearly saw themselves as the ‘strong’ or the superior ‘race’ because it was believed that “[t]he eradication of the lower races … would gradually reduce the difference between races until the world would again be inhabited by one single, almost homogenous race in which no one was inferior to the noblest example of the humanity of the day” (Lindquist, 1996, p. 136). In addition, Buchan (cited in Magubane, 2007, p. 46) saw the ‘Bushman’ as one of the lowest created races who may well have been a creature of the soil and was scarcely to be distinguished from the beasts he hunted. In addition, Bertram Mitford (cited in Magubane, ibid.) wrote the “Bushman was no more than half ape, a descendant of the baboons.” Hence, colonial administrators regarded themselves as the masters over the natives and continued to treat natives as sub-humans. This found resonance in Gobineau’s work. Thus, with no remorse, colonial powers and settlers exterminated the natives, as “Captain Gordon Pim stated in his speech that it was a philanthropic principle to kill natives; there was, he said, ‘mercy in a massacre’” (Lindquist, 1996, p. 130). Those who survived extermination were subjected to colonial rule, but as a subhuman; they did not have land or any rights whatsoever. It thus allowed ‘white’ supremacists to rule over the ‘inferior natives.’ This

30 See Chapter 4.

31 We also show this with the Rwandan genocide and the killing of Hutu refugees in Zaire by AFDL forces. In Rwanda, prior to the genocide, Tutsi were referred to as cockroaches and in Zaire the Hutu was referred to as pigs.

32 See Butler’s subordination in the next section.
violence further embedded the native’s sense of inferiority and the European’s sense of superiority.

It was in this European epistemology of racial inferiority and superiority that the colonial subject in the Great Lakes region was created. It was through this episteme that he or she came to know of him or herself as a colonial subject. This is what they possibly read:

“The Negro, as already observed, exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state. We must lay aside all thought of reverence and morality — all that we call feeling — if we would rightly comprehend him; there is nothing harmonious with humanity to be found in this type of character” (Hegel, 2001, p. 111).

“At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical movements in it — that is in its northern part — belong to the Asiatic or European World” (Hegel, 2001, p. 117).

“The Twa were short, like pygmies. The Hutu were squat and of medium height, and the Tutsi were slender and tall” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 44).

“... long and narrow heads, faces and noses, narrow thorax and shoulders relative to stature; even the limb diameters are small when related to limb length” (Hiernaux in Mamdani, 2001, p. 47).

You can clearly see from these accounts that these descriptions were done in a rather derogatory way. Africans were described and indexed like animals. To make matters worse this was how Africans possibly read of themselves in the colonial episteme.

In addition, race and ethnicity was introduced through colonialism under the guise of a civilising project and important to note is the crucial role Western law played in imposing this 'civilising project' onto the native and the non-native. Hence, “[t]he legal basis of group discrimination was race” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 24). However, the aim was not only to set the colonizers apart from the colonized but also to fragment the colonized into different ethnic groups. Western law was thus used to create different types of political identities.

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33 I am not saying Mamdani and Hiernaux are responsible for these descriptions. I am highlighting that these descriptions come from the colonial anthropologists’ pens, and they make reference to colonial anthropologists.
Furthermore, the colonial state used direct and indirect rule to govern the native and the non-native (Mamdani, 1996). In this regard, “[d]irect rule tended to generate race-based political identities: settler and native. Indirect rule, in contrast, tended to mitigate the settler-native dialectic by fracturing the race consciousness of natives into multiple and separate ethnic consciousness” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 23); meaning different ethnic groups. In addition, every ethnic group had its own separate set of customary laws which was enforced by its own separate native authority and administered in its own home area, and thereby, turning a cultural community into a political community (Mamdani, 2001, p. 24).

Furthermore, the law was also used to create citizenship. Firstly, according to Mamdani (2001, p. 25) “[t]he language of the law tried to naturalize political differences in the colony by mapping these along a civilizational ladder”, where the non-native was more civilized than the native. The non-native and the native were differentiated through race. Race in the colony was created in a hierarchical manner where the ones at the top of the hierarchy, European non-natives, were regarded as civilised and the ones at the bottom uncivilised. This civilizational ladder served as the basis for racial discrimination and it was embedded in colonial law. Secondly, “the law separated the minority of civilized from the majority of those yet-to-be-civilized, incorporating the minority into a regime of rights while excluding the majority from that same regime” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 25). This regime of rights was called citizenship. Only civilised non-natives were regarded citizens whilst natives were regarded as members of an ethnic group. This kind of discrimination was put into effect through direct and indirect rule (Mamdani, 1996). Those under direct rule were considered citizens and those under indirect rule as members of a particular ethnicity. Therefore, the law “enfranchised and empowered as citizens the minority it identified as civilized, and at the same time disempowered and disenfranchised the majority it identified as yet-to-be-civilize” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 25). At the end of this violent process one had Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, Hunde, Nyanga, évoluté, etc; all were colonial subject identities that had particular meanings, roles and manifested in a particular way.

II

The concept and status of the évoluté in Belgium Congo was an important one. When évoluté is translated it means evolved or civilised, or like the editor of the Voix du Congolais once wrote: les noirs perfectionnés – the perfected blacks (Tödt, 2012, p. 5). It also meant that they “were regarded as having “evolved” economically, socially, and culturally beyond the way of life of the
popular masses” (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1983, p. 66). Interestingly, all the Congo independence leaders were évolués. Most notable of these leaders was Patrice Lumumba. Leo Zeilig’s book *Patrice Lumumba: Africa’s Lost Leader* made one aware of the évolué phenomenon in colonial Congo. Évolués were largely the result of missionary education and they occupied the highest jobs Africans could achieve in the colony (Tödt, 2012 & Zeilig, 2008).

The évolué was Belgium’s prime example of what could be achieved through colonialism. The positions these évolués occupied also demonstrated that they were not yet European and therefore not fully civilised; even if they had immatriculation certificates. In Belgium Congo a native African was able to apply for a social merit card and/or an immatriculation certificate. These certificates were an indication that Africans could be civilised. To attain such a certificate one had to take a test (Tödt, 2012). Once one passed the test one was recorded in the “Register of the civilised indigenous population” (Zeilig, 2008, p. 34). As an évolué it gave the native African better opportunities in the colonial system. Tödt (2012, p. 15 - 16) indicates that by independence 1557 Congolese natives received the social merit card and 217 people received the immatriculation card by 1958. The reason for the fewer number of immatriculation cards was that it was given to only the indigenous elite who achieved an ‘occidental form of civilization’ (Tödt, 2012, p. 16). Brausch (1961, p. 24) explains that an immatriculation status in Belgian Congo was granted through the court and it allow the ‘immatricule’ “to become subject to the system of Congolese civil law.” It also gave him or her freedom of movement at night. Thus, immatriculation meant citizenship in Belgian Congo.

The évolué is only one type of Congolese that was created during colonialism. The évolués represented a different stratum of the Congolese colonial society. They were the ones who led the independence movement and became the post-colonial nationalist leaders. They were the national bourgeoisie and Fanon’s native intellectuals. The Congolese évolués were responsible for creating various political parties leading up to the elections for independence. These political parties represented various interests of the national bourgeoisie. The évolués were mainly in cities and were directly ruled by the colonial state. Nzongola-Ntalaja (1983, p. 66) called them the petty bourgeoisie. The second type of Congolese was the traditional leader.34 Traditional rulers were also a different stratum in the Congolese society. For years they ruled indirectly over

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34 I am not comfortable using words such as ‘traditional’, ‘customary’ and ‘tribal’ to describe African leaders, but I have not came across any replacement that would not enforce the modern-tradition dialectic.
the Congolese peasantry on behalf of Belgian colonial powers (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1993, p. 60). In Chapter 4 I will explain that various Native Authorities were established to make indirect rule effective. Traditional leaders, especially the chiefs, were responsible for tax collection, the administration of native affairs and the implementation of customary law. Traditional leaders enjoyed significant power in the colony. Chapter 4 argues that leading up to Congo’s independence many of these traditional leaders were in favour of a federal state, to maintain the power they had during colonialism. The third type of Congolese was the peasant and was regarded as the lowest on the Congolese strata. They were on the receiving end of colonial rule and were the most affected by colonial rule. They were the subaltern who could not speak and had these various representatives which spoke on their behalf. In the urban areas there was a fourth type of Congolese, the lumpenproletariat. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (1983, p. 60-61) they were the employed masses without any stable income living in an urban centre. The final type of Congolese was the metropolitan and middle bourgeoisie. These were the white capitalists, colonial administrators and settlers who were deemed as citizens in the colony, and dominated the upper levels of the colonial state and society (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1983, p. 60).

In Rwanda and Burundi colonial and missionary education had a similar effect. Walker-Keleher (2006, p. 37) and also Newbury (1988, p. 63) indicate that in Rwanda only a few Hutu received advanced training whilst the bulk of the post-primary training went to the sons of Tutsi who were linked to the monarchy in some way. A prime example of this was the Astrida College. Even though the Tutsi only accounted for 15 percent of the population they were the overwhelming majority at the Astrida College. Notably no Twa were represented in the college. Walker-Keleher (2006, pp. 37-38) also indicates that the colonial government established four schools which was to “train clerks, aided, and other low-level post in the administration”. However, these schools closed by 1929 because it was too expensive to maintain. The colonial administration decided to rather subsidise missionary schools. Ndura (2015, p. 1) indicates that the Tutsis of Burundi were also favoured by colonial administrators, because they were considered as the civilising race and were favoured for European type education and colonial administrative opportunities. To this extent the Tutsi were the dominant colonial administrative group and were favoured over the Hutu (Ndayizigiye, 2005, p.1).

Later identity cards were issued to the Ruanda-Urundi colonial subjects. After identity cards in Ruanda-Urundi were issued, social mobility between Hutu and Tutsi stopped (Van der Meeren, 35)

35 It is a direct reference to Gayatri Spivak’s essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’
Before that there was mobility between Hutu and Tutsi as social categories. It also highlighted a particular difference between Hutu and Tutsi; where the Tutsi was regarded as the civilising race and who have migrated to the Great Lakes at some point in time and therefore Tutsis were elevated above the Hutu and Twa in Ruanda-Urundi. Mobility between social categories stopped the moment Belgium colonialism introduced identity cards in the 1930s (Newbury, 1998, p. 11). Identity cards in Ruanda-Urundi “determined liability for forced labour (Hutu), and entry to the administrative school at Astrida” (Van der Meeren, 1996, p. 254).

Hutu forced labour in Rwanda was in the form of *ubuhake*. Newbury (1988) explains how the Tutsi during colonialism were able to exploit the Hutu through an age old tradition because it was now permanently locked in their identity. The “Hutu came to be classified as second-class citizens … Hutu had dramatically fewer opportunities to attend school and achieve postprimary education than Tutsi, and they came to be excluded almost entirely from high-level administrative positions” (Newbury, 1998, p. 11). It was this racial superiority that fueled much of the conflict in the years to come.

Furthermore, there was segregation in Belgian Congo and in Ruanda-Urundi. It was promoted through customary and civil law. In Belgian Congo it was along racial and ethnic lines and in Rwanda it was along ethnic lines. In both cases the law played a very definitive role. Mamdani (2001) shows us that ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are political identities and how they came to be political identities. According to Mamdani (2001, p. 20) “To understand how “tribe” and “race” – like “caste” – got animated as political identities, we need to look at how the law breathed political life into them.” Law is a result of European epistemology and power. Mamdani (2001, p. 22) argues that “both race and ethnicity need to be understood as political – and not cultural, or even biological – identities.” In this regard, Mamdani (2001, p. 22) notes “if the law recognizes you as a member of a racial group, then your relationship to the state, and to other legally defined groups, is mediated through the law and the state.” This indicates that this only possible through the idea of the nation-state; the state with its monopoly on power enforces and grants political identities. In European colonies direct and indirect rule introduced two types of political identities. Direct rule introduced ‘race’ and indirect rule introduced ‘ethnicity.’ European and subject races only had one identity – ‘race,’ whilst the indigenous had two: ‘race’ and 

36 See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion regarding *umuheto* and *ubuhake*.

37I indicated above how the works of Hegel and Gobineau served as a justification for colonialism which most European powers considered as a civilizing mission.
‘ethnicity’ (Mamdani, 2001). Subject races were those peoples who were native to Africa but came from elsewhere or those who were of mixed origin (Mamdani, 2001). The indigenous were “all those who were resident on the territory it seized at the time of colonization, and only those” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 30). These people were not only indigenous but also belonged to a particular ethnicity. The dilemma of these identities emerged during colonialism and spilled over to the post-colonial period. It manifested in terms of access to land and citizenship. Land for the indigenous was granted through the Native Authority and subject races did not have access to land through Native Authorities, but had to find ways through the state. To find land through the state, one had to be a citizen.

To conclude this section I have to note that colonial Congolese, Rwandese and Burundians were formed in a European epistemology that was codified in the Enlightenment and was kept in place by colonial law. In this epistemology what they going to be and what they were meant to do was decided beforehand. Customary law created ethnicity, which was a particular form of subjection and civil law created the ‘civilised’ citizen which also was a particular form of subjection; and through these laws the Congolese, the Rwandese and the Burundians became particular types of colonial subjects with preordained roles and destinies.

Subjection: Forming the Psyche of the Colonial Subject

The colonial subject is a product of subjection. Butler states that subjection is a form of power, and tells us there are two ways of thinking of power. The conventional way, where power is pressed onto the subject from outside or Foucault’s way where power is forming the subject. According to Butler (1997, p. 2) “if … we understand power as forming the subject as well, as providing the very condition of its existence and the trajectory of its desire, then power is not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong sense, what we depend on for our existence and what we harbour and preserve in the being that we are.” Here I want to note that the African native depended on the colonial power for his or her existence. Butler (1997, p. 7) explains that “[a]s the condition of becoming a subject, subordination implies being in a mandatory submission. Moreover, the desire to survive, “to be,” is a pervasively exploitable desire.” This means, the individual will only accept the subjection because he or she has a desire to survive or “to be”, which Butler notes is exploitable. Since, the desire to survive is an exploitable desire, it left the colonial subject with no choice but to accept colonial subjection. European education and identities were given in a position of mandatory submission. The African did not have a
choice. Thus for subjection to work, the individual must desire his or her own subordination, and from this subordination the subject will be born.

Butler argues that power acts as the agency of the subject: “[b]ecause power is not intact prior to the subject, the appearance of its priority disappears as power acts on the subject, and the subject is inaugurated (and derived) through this temporal reversal in the horizon of power. As the agency of the subject, power assumes its present temporal dimension” (Butler, 1997, pp. 13-14). Hence, the African gave into subjection. Given this Butler (1997, p. 2) defines subjection as the process that signifies becoming, subordinated by power, as well as the process of becoming the subject. The colonial subject was thus subordinated by a colonial power and formed in that same colonial power. The African was subordinated and formed in a colonial power, and it was and still is that power that operates in the psyche of the African.

Furthermore, Butler argues that Althusser observed how the social subject is produced through linguistical means. According to Butler (1997, p. 5), “[i]n Althusser’s essay ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, the subordination of the subject takes place through language, as the effect of the authoritative voice that hails the individual.” When the individual recognises the authoritative voice, the discursive production of the social subject takes place. However, Butler (1997) observes that Althusser’s theory of interpellation requires a theory of conscience. In this regard, interpellation gives no account for psychic and social working of power. Also, Althusser’s theory is restricted to verbal command and thus does not account for the power of written discourse (Butler, 1997, pp. 5-6). From this shortcoming Foucault’s discursive production emerges to counter Althusser’s sovereign model of interpellation. She explains that in Foucault’s book *Discipline and Punish* he describes the paradoxical character of the prisoner: “Foucault suggests that the prisoner is not regulated by an exterior relation of power, whereby an institution takes a pre-given individual as the target of its subordinating aims. On the contrary, the individual is formed, or rather formulated, through this discursively constituted “identity” as prisoner” (Butler, 1997, p. 84). To put this more simply: the prison authorities make the individual a prisoner. However, Butler warns us that: “[t]he claim that a discourse ‘forms’ the body is no simple one, and from the start we must distinguish how such ‘forming’ is not the same as a ‘causing’ or ‘determining,’ still less is it a notion that bodies are somehow made of discourse pure and simple” (Butler, 1997, p. 84). This serves as a warning not to water down
Althusser’s interpellation and Foucault’s discursive production.\(^{38}\) If one applies this to the African colonial context it becomes clear that the colonial subject was formed in a complex set of power relations.

For Butler power has a psychic life. The implications of this would be that whenever the power source is physically removed from the subordinated the power still lives in the psyche of the person who was subordinated. In this regard Butler proposes to think the theory of power alongside the theory of the psyche. The individual has to achieve and reproduce his or her subjectification which Foucault calls *assujetissement* or subjectivation.\(^{39}\) Subjectivation entails becoming the subject. According to Butler (1997, p. 11) “[n]o individual becomes a subject without first becoming subjected or undergoing “subjectivation”.” In this regard, one has to note that “[a]s a condition, power precedes the subject. Power loses its appearance of priority, however, when it is wielded by the subject.” Butler (1997, p. 15) also explains that “[a]t some point, a reversal and concealment occurs, and power emerges as what belongs exclusively to the subject (making the subject appear as if it belong to no prior operation of power).” Also, “[i]f conditions of power are to persist, they must be reiterated; the subject is precisely the site of such reiteration, a repetition that is never merely mechanical.” This reiteration is to confirm that you are the subject, which allows the power to take hold over your psyche. Reiteration that you are a particular subject is ensured by violence. It is important to note that when the colonial source of power was removed the power of the colonial authorities still operated in the psyche of the colonial subject and that subjection was reiterated and still is reiterated when the colonial subject encounter him or herself in text. The reason as to why it is not detected and appears real is because a concealment of that power took place.

Furthermore, vulnerability is fundamental to subjection. According to Butler (1997, p. 20) “[s]ocial categories signify subordination and existence at once. In other words, within subjection the price for existence is subordination.” Social categories are thus important as they provide a sense of belonging. You allow yourself to be subject because of your desire to exist. Contradictory as it might seem you also find safety in the assigned category. As demonstrated above there were many social categories in the pre-colonial era which became mandatory ethnic identities. These identities lost their fluidity. However, those pre-colonial social categories

\(^{38}\) For a detailed discussion on interpellation and discursive production see Judith Butler’s *Psychic Life of Power*.

\(^{39}\) Butler use subjectivation instead of subjectification.
also signify subordination, but when it was codified in the European epistemology it became permanent and no mobility was allowed; for example, Hutu and Tutsi.

In summary, there are six key points to take into account when dealing with subjection. Firstly, subjection is a form of power and we depend on power for our very own existence. The Foucauldian notion of power is that it is discursive and it forms the subject. Secondly, the subject is discursively produced, but it is not a simple straight-forward process of saying and writing it. It has to take place in subordination; one’s existence has to be dependent on it. Thirdly, when the power source is physically removed from the subordinated it continues to live in the psyche of the subject, because at some point a concealment of that power took place. It emerges as though it exclusively belonged to the subject and as though there was no prior operation of power. Fourthly, the subject can only be successful through subordination and even the destruction of the body. Finally, if you are subjected you have to be continuously be reminded that you are the subject.

The Resistance of the Colonial Subject: Escaping the Prison Cell

With a growing native intelligentsia it provided the space for reinterpretation and resistance was born. Fanon notes the importance of the native intelligentsia in the independence struggle. Fanon argues that when you take on a language you not only take on the language but also the culture. According to Fanon (1967, p. 8) "[t]o speak means to be in a position to use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization." Here we observe that through language the colonised is introduced to the colonizer's 'civilised' world and to the colonised 'uncivilised' world. This is where most of the discursive production of the colonial subject begins. Fanon (1967, p. 9) knows this and this is why he made the following observation: "Mastery of language affords remarkable power." As Butler demonstrated, subjection is a discursive form of power and it is in this power that the subject emerges. Butler (1997) also indicates that subjection takes place in subordination. The colonised African was in a subordinate position, whose existence depended on the coloniser. As I have mentioned before one has to desire one’s subjection for it to be successful. The colonised African desired a subjection that would prove to them and the coloniser that they are more than sub-humans; that they are humans indeed. Fanon observes:
Every colonized people – in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality – finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country. The colonized is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country’s cultural standards. He becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle (Fanon, 1967, p. 9).

We can clearly from this see that Fanon is writing against the Hegel’s thinking of Africa. The quote above shows how the colonial subject desired a kind of subjection that will prove that he or she too can reach the level of ‘civilisation’ of the coloniser. In *Black Skin, White Masks* Fanon states the following:

To speak a language is to take on a world, a culture. The Antilles Negro who wants to be white will be whiter as he gains greater mastery of the cultural tool that language is.

... Historically, it must be understood that the Negro wants to speak French because it is the key that can open doors which were still barred to him fifty years ago (Fanon, 1967, p. 25).

If we, thus, look at the colonial education policies and who received education, it becomes clear that through colonialism a small native intellectual elite was created to support the civilising mission of the coloniser.  

Fanon, in *The Wretched of the Earth*, explains the role of the native intellectuals as follows. According to Fanon (1963, p. 210 – 211) “… colonial domination was indeed to convince the natives that colonialism came to lighten their darkness. The effect consciously sought by colonialism was to drive into the natives’ heads the idea that if the settlers were to leave, they would at once fall back into barbarism, degradation, and bestiality.” It was on this basis that colonialism was justified and the African native was brutally subjected. Thus, when the native intellectual read this about him or herself, it set in motion a resistance (see the discussion on Butler). More importantly, the subjection of the African took place at all levels. According to Fanon (1963, p. 211) “[t]he colonial mother protects her child from itself, from its ego, and from its physiology, its biology, and its own unhappiness which is its very essence.” Re-emergence of an African culture was, thus, earmarked by the native intellectual as the vehicle to conscientise and to free the colonial subject to a state of ‘originality.’

For Fanon this is problematic. According to Fanon (1963, p. 210) “[p]erhaps this passionate research and this anger are kept up or at least directed by the secret hope of discovering beyond the misery of today, beyond self-contempt, resignation, and abjuration, some very beautiful and splendid era whose existence rehabilitates us both in regard to ourselves and in regard to others.” Fanon explains that it is the native intellectual’s mission to discover a history where he or she not are limited to barbarism and savagery. The colonial rationale was to rescue the African from his or her own barbarity. Hence, they were brutally ‘civilized.’ This civilizing project can also be considered as the subjection of the African; the subjection of the African into an inferior being compared to the European. Where the African is closer to animal than it is to a human. For the native intellectual this was problematic and for them to break away from the colonial subjection was to recover a glorious history. A history that would show to the world and themselves that they were more than savages and that they too were human.

Hence, at first decolonialism was conceptualised as a continental wide cultural struggle. Simply, because: “[c]olonialism’s condemnation is continental in its scope. The contention by colonialism that the darkest night of humanity lay over pre-colonial history concerns the whole of the African continent” (Fanon, 1963, p. 211 – 212) – that is, the continental scope of the native intellectual. And from this negritude was born – a universal counter discourse for the Black of African descent. Fanon notes that, “[i]n Africa, the native literature of the last twenty years is not a national literature but a Negro literature. The concept negritude, for example, was the emotional if not the logical antithesis of that insult which the white man flung at humanity.” Negritude was the revolt against colonial domination, and culture was used to bring about this revolt. Senghor (1970) explains that since the term was coined by Aimé Césaire the concept has been under various attacks, especially from English-speaking critics. Some of the accusations the term received included racialism and that it is an inferiority complex. Senghor writes that negritude is far from that. He states that “it is not just affirmation; it is rooting oneself in oneself, and self-confirmation: confirmation of one’s being.” How is this possible if this “oneself” is a result of colonial subjection? If the ‘oneself’ is a reference to the ‘black’ African subject, then that ‘black’ was a creation of Europe.

41 Fanon here refers to the work of the Negritude movement.

42 Ironically colonial oppression is a barbaric practice.

43 A revolt that also inspired the black consciousness movement in South Africa.
Senghor, in defence of negritude, argues that it is a humanism of the twentieth century. Senghor went further and define negritude as “the sum of the cultural values of the black world.” Furthermore, following Senghor's argument it becomes apparent that he can only advance negritude if it is embedded in an African ontology. According to Senghor (1993,) “[t]he African, on the other hand, conceives the world, beyond the diversity of its forms, as a fundamentally mobile, yet unique, reality that seeks synthesis.” He continues: “[a]s far as African ontology is concerned, too, there is no such thing as dead matter: every being, everything – be it only a grain of sand – radiates a life force, a sort of wave-particle; and sages, priests, kings, doctors and artists all use it to help bring the universe to its fulfilment” (Senghor, 1993, n.p). As one read this piece of Senghor one read a kind of romanticism of a past that might have never existed. For example, he wrote: “[e]thnologists have often praised the unity, the balance and the harmony of African civilization, of black society, which was both on the community and on the person …” (Senghor, 1993, n.p). Here the ethnologist is clearly the white colonial one which supported the colonial epistemology and the subjection of the African. Ethnologists created the communitarian African. Senghor is drawing on their work to strengthen his argument. It is also hard to believe in a harmonious Africa when it was ‘Africans’ who sold ‘Africans’ to the slave ships.44

The first critique negritude received was at its inception. It was a preface written by Jean-Paul Satre for the anthology titled *Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache* put together by Senghor in 1945. The anthology was a collection of poetry to manifest negritude. Satre wrote the preface titled *Orphée Noir* or *Black Orpheus* and it stifled the hope of negritude (Diagne, 2011). According to Diagne (2011, pp. 40-41) “Satre claims that the Africa which the poets of the anthology make into the heart of their song is ‘imaginary’, invented. He indicates that the enterprise itself of announcing ‘the sum total of the cultural values of the black world’ is, ultimately, an ‘antiracist racism’, a negation of negation that could never be authentic affirmation.” Diagne calls this Satre’s kiss of death. Thus, from the onset it received its most devastating critique, a critique that paralyzed the negritude movement. Senghor was one of the few who did not want to accept defeat and knew to advance negritude was to embed it in an African philosophy. The only thing available to Senghor was African art. According to Diagne

44 Africa at the point of slavery and later during colonialism was not unified. There was no common African identity. Senghor refers to a period when the African subject did not exist. What today is known as North Africa was first known as Africa, or that was the name Romans assigned to that part of the continent. Also see South African History Online http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/africa-whats-name.
Senghor “needed to philosophize for the sake of expressing what lay behind Art.” He believed that one could read a philosophy in African plastic arts, songs and dances. However, Wright (2004, p. 18) demonstrates that Césaire and Senghor’s tactic to counter the Hegelian dialectic was to use Gobineau’s assertion that the Negro had a greater artistic drive than that of the Aryan. According to Wright (2004, p. 18) “if the Negro race is the sole possessor of the artistic drive, then the Negro is the true creator of the word. This is a far greater and more universal Absolute than Hegel’s Absolute of reason … because the word is the expression of all ideas, of which reason is an obvious subsidiary, being the expression of only one specific idea.” In this regard the work of Gobineau made the continuation of negritude possible.

The second critique came from Fanon. Clearly negritude was the resistance of the colonial subject. However, negritude also held the promise for the African American of the United States of America, but soon the African and the African American intellectual finds that their struggles were different at a national level. Fanon observes: “[b]ut little by little the American Negroes realized that the essential problems confronting them were not the same as those that confronted the African Negroes … the American Negroes realized that the objective problems were fundamentally heterogeneous” (Fanon, 1963, p. 216). For Fanon the reason why the first movement was not a success was “that every culture is first and foremost national” (Fanon, 1963, p. 216). In this sense Fanon’s ‘revolution’ was limited to the national.45

Furthermore, the native intellectual was assimilated into Europeanism. Fanon notes that “the native intellectual has thrown himself greedily upon Western culture” (Fanon, 1963, p. 218). Why did the native intellectuals desire the Western culture? Fanon explains that if the native intellectual embraces European culture he will get into Western civilisation. Thus, he desired to be civilized. Butler explains that the subject has to desire his or her own subjection for it to be successful. Thus, when the native returned to his own people he was unrecognizable. Other colonial subjects could not find resonance with him. Therefore, he had to return to the original subjection. From this negritude was born. Fanon explains that the native intellectual went through three phases. At first he was assimilated, secondly he remembered what he is and thirdly, he is fighting the subjection. The native intellectuals’ fight was discursive: “he turns himself into an awakener of the people; hence comes a fighting literature, a revolutionary literature, and a national literature” (Fanon, 1963, p. 223).

45 Chatterjee (1993) argues against the idea that culture is first and foremost national.
However, the intellectual does not realise he is trapped in the colonizer’s epistemology. According to Fanon (1963, Ibid.), “[a]t the very moment when the native intellectual is anxiously trying to create a cultural work he fails to realize that he is utilizing techniques and language which are borrowed from the stranger in his country.” Everything the native is and ever was can only be conceptualised in the colonizer’s epistemology. Colonial power created the categories African, European, etc. They even created the written ‘indigenous’ language of the native.

So why did Fanon focus on culture? For Fanon (1963, p. 235) “[i]t is around the people’s struggle that African-Negro culture takes on substance, and not around songs, poems, or folklore.” For him culture is an aid in the struggle against colonialism. Culture is thus part of the resistance. Here we have to consider two points. The first is that discovering a national culture of the past had the potential to rehabilitate, restore and bring about a future national culture. The second is that it was important to rally support amongst the oppress masses. A national culture held the promise to rewire the psyche of the oppressed into one that is outside the scope of the colonial oppressive epistemology. This would speed up the fight against colonialism.

For me Fanon’s used of nation and national is problematic. For example, “[f]or culture is first the expression of a nation, the expression of its preferences, of its taboos and of its patterns” (Fanon, 1963, p. 244). Here I have to raise the question as to what is a nation. A nation is a group of subjects bound by a form of subjection which is formed in nationalism. The nation Fanon refers to was created by colonial powers. It subjected Africans and the native intellectuals to it and yet they did not have citizenship. It also trapped them in a particular geography with a certain group of people. In this regards a person may have many subjections and all of it keeps the dominant’s power at work in the subject’s life. In addition to this, Fanon also writes “[t]he liberation of the nation …” (Fanon, 1963, p. 246). My question is: whose nation? The one that colonial subject was subjected to? If that is the case, it is a problematic in itself. Furthermore, if it is a new nation – who can be part of this nation? Fanon also writes “[i]f culture is the expression of national consciousness …” (Fanon, 1963, p. 247). We have to keep in mind that it is a national consciousness that found its existence in the idea of the nation. This idea of a nation was developed and enforced by colonial powers. It created alterity, which was a way for the colonizer to permanently remove him or her from those who he or she regarded as inferior and uncivilised. Thus, Fanon’s “national culture” creates a sense of nation which is rather unique and yet it is still within the dominant epistemology of European enlightenment; as you will see from Chatterjee (1993).
Returning to negritude, it is still subjection within the subjection of the oppressor – a resistance. Butler (1997) argues that at the point of subjection a resistance also takes place. The colonial subject created a resistance to counter the complete psychic annihilation the oppressor intended. Negritude is one form of such a resistance. If one takes Butler’s argument into consideration and revisits the question Fanon asked in *Black Skin, White Masks*: What does man want? What does a black man want? This latter question referring to a “black man” traps the colonial subject in the original subjection because it was the colonial power that created the “black man.” Being “black” is a colonial subjection.

So did the colonial subject free himself or herself from the subjection? I would like to say that they temporally removed the power source or broke out of the prison cell just to realise that they are still trapped in the prison. All forms of oppression are violent, and its brutality is not limited to the physical acts of violence. Violence during oppression also affected the individual at a psychological level. For example, Olusoga and Erichsen (2010, p. 224) explains how female prisoners in the Swakopmund concentration camp in 1905 were forced to boil the severed heads of their own people and scrape the flesh, sinews and ligaments off the skulls, which were then exported to German scientists. In addition, there were also less explicit cases of violence but just as brutal. For example, Olusoga and Erichsen (2010, p. 213) explains how Herero women were not only raped on Shark Island (a German concentration camp) but whose bodies were also actively exploited by German soldiers. Many soldiers took pornographic and semi-pornographic photos of African women and made it into postcards which was sent to Germany and distributed in the colony. After episodes like these how can any person (both perpetrator and victim) consider themselves to be same? This, therefore, deeply touches the psychology of both victim and perpetrator.

This kind of psychology is what Fanon called Manichean psychology. According to Bulhan (1985, p. 140) “[a] Manichean view is one that divides the world into compartments and people into different “species.” This division is based not on reciprocal affirmations, but rather on

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46 This is my observation and does not relate to Engels’ negation of a negation. However, it can be regarded as a negation of a negation. For me it is better explained by using the phrase ‘a subjection within a subjection.’ The worldview of the white or European subject does not change within negritude. When a black person is interpellated by a white person he or she is still black in the original sense.
irreconcilable opposites cast into good versus evil, beautiful versus ugly, intelligent versus stupid, white versus black, human versus subhuman modes.”

Also, in Manichean psychology the “oppressor identifies himself in terms of the sublime and beauty while depicting the oppressed in terms of absolute evil and ugliness … the oppressor puts himself beyond human attributes and reduces the oppressed as subhuman” (Bulhan, 1985, p. 141). Thus, violence perpetuated by the settler robbed the native of his or her humanity; hence, “[w]e find in Fanon the premonition of the native turned perpetrator, of the native who kills not just to extinguish the humanity of the other but to defend his or her own, and of the moral ambivalence this must provoke in other human beings like us” (Mamdani, 2004, p. 9). Or as Fanon puts it: “[f]or he knows that he not animal, and it is precisely at the moment he realizes his humanity that he begins to sharpen the weapons with which he will secure his victory” (Fanon, 1963, p. 33). Violence, therefore, becomes one of the means by which the native or the oppressed emancipates him or herself from the colonial power but not necessarily from the colonial subjection.

It is only after the political conscious of the oppressed is stimulated that the ‘revolution’ kicks off and that the native was to reclaim his or her humanity. David Scott calls it the “the moment of Awakening - the creation of what one might call and anticolonial will” (Scott, 1999, p. 202). However, this “Awakening” does not come on its own but with the help of the intelligentsia, which was a by-product of the colonial epistemology. According to Scott (Ibid.) “[a]s the disorder grows, moreover, a section of the intelligentsia goes over to the side of the people. The aggressivity and violence of the natives are rechanneled away from themselves and given a political, and specifically “anticolonial, focus.” Thus, violence becomes the means through which the natives reclaim their humanity and to achieve this they have to challenge the colonial state head on.

However, it is clear that they failed to remove the subjection. Hence, the violence continues in a post-colonial period. Foucault and Butler observe that breaking from subjection is not as simple as removing the power source. Here I would suggest that the colonial subject had to let go of the subject position he or she was forced into. But it did not happen. This is where native intellectuals failed. For them affirmative action was more important than completely breaking

47 Here you can clearly see the Hegelian dialectic.
away from the colonial subjection, since affirmative action traps the postcolonial subject in colonial subjection.

Post-Colonial Political Identities

In the last section I explored how the colonial subject was formed. The post-colonial nationalist project kept these identities even though they were codified in the Enlightenment epistemology and manifested in a particularly violent way in independent African states. Hence, there is a continuity of the colonial subject, even in the postcolonial moment. More simply put there is almost no difference between the colonial subject and the postcolonial subject. The postcolonial subject is formed in the same complex power relations of the colonial period. The decolonial project might have decolonised the representation of the structures of the state but it did not decolonised the knowledge in which these formations took place – thus the continuity. Here one has to look at nationalism because nationalist leaders during the decolonial period and in the postcolonial period were faced with a particular dilemma: who would be part of the postcolonial African state? Who would be citizens and who would be foreigners?

There are mainly two types of nationalism: civic and ethnic; where civic nationalism is regarded to be inclusive of all groups, it envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens and tends to be democratic. Conversely, in ethnic nationalism attachment to a specific nation is inherited, the national community defines the individual rather than the individual defining the national community, and it also tends to be authoritarian as it caters for the ethnic majority (Ignatieff, 1994). Important to note is that self-determination - whether in rights or by attachment - is central to nationalism. In addition, “nationalism is centrally concerned to define the conditions under which force or violence is justified in a people’s defence, when their right of self-determination is threatened or denied” (Ignatieff, 1994, p. 3). This is particularly true for nation-states, but is as true for groups fighting for self-determination and belonging.

However, if one has a closer look at these two mainstream views on nationalism one notices a particular dilemma, namely the traditional and modern dichotomy; where modern is civilised (civic) and traditional is backward (ethnic). This dichotomy is better illustrated by Partha
Chatterjee in his book *Nationalist Thought on the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. According to Chatterjee (1993) liberals argue that there are two types of nationalism: one is ‘western’ and the other ‘eastern,’ the latter of which includes Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. Western nationalism became the model, in a set of power relations, for colonies and later independent African states – a consequence of Eastern nationalism being codified as backward and restricted to those nations who yet have to reach ‘civilised’ standards or more simply put – European standards.

It is here that Chatterjee comes across what he calls a ‘liberalist-rationalist dilemma.’ This dilemma is visible in the historiography on nationalism. Here the work of Hans Kohn is influential in bringing about a narrative that portrays nationalism in the developing world as ‘a special type.’ According to Chatterjee (1993, p. 3) Kohn argues that there is a difference between evil and good nationalism and between normal and a special type of nationalism:

> The normal is the classical, the orthodox, the pure type. This type of nationalism shares the same material and intellectual premises with the European Enlightenment, with industry and the idea of progress, and with modern democracy ... The special type emerges under somewhat different historical circumstances. It is, therefore, complex, impure, often deviant; it representing a very difficult and contradictory historical process which can be very ‘disturbing’.

If nationalism does not fit the normal type it has to be the special type. In this sense Africa is then incapable of development. Development, progress and modernisation were thus spread to Africa via migration (Hamitic hypothesis) or through colonialism.

This rhetoric strengthens the Hegelian discourse of history. The Hegelian dialectic in the *Philosophy of History* is influential in classical nationalist thought. Here the argument goes that “[t]he perception of uneven development creates the possibility for nationalism” (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 4), and that nationalism can be invented where it does not exist. This brings progress or modernization to the fore. Following this argument nationalism will help with the “historical lag” and hence colonies did not have a choice but to assimilate. Thus, this view sees nationalism as a product of modernity (Piper, 2004, p. 122). From a Western epistemological view non-Western culture appears to be irrational if judged according to Western standards.\(^{48}\)

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\(^{48}\) This resonates with Fanon’s work on assimilation.
In addition to this, the Enlightenment needs the ‘Other’ “to assert its sovereignty as the universal ideal” (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 17). For example, past and future; tradition and the modern; stagnation and development (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 22). This strengthens Elie Kedourie’s critique on nationalism. Kedourie launched a merciless critique on nationalism from a conservative point of view. According to Chatterjee (1993, p. 7)

The very idea of nationalism being a rational and self-conscious attempt by the weak and poor peoples of the world to achieve autonomy and liberty is demonstrably false. Nationalism as an ideology is irrational, narrow, hateful and destructive. It is not an authentic product of any of the non-European civilizations which, in each particular case, it claims as its classical heritage. It is wholly a European export to the rest of the world. It is also one of Europe’s most pernicious exports, for it is not a child of reason or liberty, but of their opposite: of fervent romanticism, of political messianism whose inevitable consequence is the annihilation of freedom.

What Kedourie is actually saying is that non-Western societies did not have nationalism since nationalism is a Western export to achieve progress in developing countries. In defence of nationalism, Anthony Smith launches a critique against Kedourie and to this extent he argues that nationalism has value in developing countries as it helps with modernisation. Here he uses the nationalist projects of Senghor and Césaire as examples. For example: “Kedourie forgets the uses of nationalism in developing countries, the way in which they can legitimate new regimes desirous of maintaining political stability and keeping a fissiparous population under a single and viable harness” (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 7).

Smith developed a doctrine for nationalism. According to Chatterjee the doctrine makes a moral claim in three parts: “self-determination, expression of national character, and each nation contributing its special genius to the common fund of humanity” (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 8). Here one see that this doctrine shares the same justification as the conquest doctrine which legitimated colonialism through violence and extermination as along it was done in the name of liberal progress.

Marxism thought on nationalism was no different since it fell into the same trap as liberalist thought. Early Marxism addresses nationalism as “the national question” and the initial contributor was Lenin, or he provided guidance since Marx did not much engage the topic. Benedict Anderson one of the leading Marxist scholars on “the national question” argues that it was the discovery of print that made it possible to “think” the nation and it is from this that ideas around nationalism or the nation emerges. Therefore, a national consciousness was made

49 This is against the primordial view of nationalism.
possible through print. Chatterjee finds that Marxist thought on nationalism was of European origin and it also uses colonialism as a way of analysing the non-European world. Hence, Marxist thought on nationalism is the same as liberal thought. For example: Liberals speak of industrial societies that gave rise to the spread of good nationalism and Marxists speak of the print capitalism that gave rise to good nationalism (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 21). Thus, the third-world (Global South) can only model that of Europe.

Chatterjee argues that even though the nationalists argue that nationalism can be free of European domination, it is simply not possible because it is epistemologically trapped in the Enlightenment. And, as we have established above, the Enlightenment needs a backward/traditional ‘Other’ for it to showcase its universality (superiority). For Chatterjee (1993, p. 11) a discussion on nationalism must be posed in the context of power. According to Chatterjee (Ibid.) “[i]t is to approach the field of discourse, historical, philosophical and scientific, as a battleground of political power.” The reason for this being is that “thought can subjugate and dominate” (Chatterjee, Ibid.).\(^5\) And it is from here Chatterjee launches his critique. According Chatterjee (Ibid.):

From such a perspective, the problem of nationalist thought becomes the particular manifestation of a much more general problem, namely, the problem of the bourgeois-rationalist conception of knowledge, established in the post-Enlightenment period of European intellectual history, as the moral and epistemic foundation for a supposedly universal framework of thought which perpetuates, in a real and not merely a metaphorical sense, a colonial domination.

... Nationalist thought, in agreeing to become ‘modern’, accepts the claim to universality of this ‘modern’ framework of knowledge. Yet it also asserts the autonomous identity of a national culture. It thus simultaneously rejects and accepts the dominance, both epistemic and moral, of an alien culture. Is knowledge then independent of cultures? If not, can there be knowledge which is independent of power? To pose the problem thus is to situate knowledge itself within a dialectic that relates culture to power.

Therefore, nationalism and citizenship must be discussed in the context of power, because it will show/expose the continuity of the colonial subject identity into the postcolonial. These Enlightenment codified subject identities are firmly embedded in the postcolonial since the

\(^5\) Also see Lecture Two and Eleven of Michel Foucault’s book, *Society must be defended.*
national and global power structures have not changed much since independence. The representation may certainly have changed but not the structure.

II

Violence gave birth and formed the postcolonial national project. Therefore, one cannot examine citizenship and ethnicity in the postcolonial without a discussion on violence. Newly independent states used violence to form the postcolonial subject in the same kind of epistemology and along the tradition and modern dichotomization. Political violence in postcolonial Africa must be understood in terms of colonial oppression. Bulhan (1985, p. 139) asked the following question: “[h]ow does a community of oppressed and alienated regain its self-respect and confidence in order to challenge the [oppressor] …?” For Fanon it was violence – “[t]he [oppressed] man liberates himself in and through violence” (Fanon, 1963, p. 44). Bulhan’s evaluation of Fanon’s theory of violence in his book Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression proves to be invaluable and helpful in understanding violence and oppression in post-colonial Africa. Bulhan (1985, p. 135) defined violence as follows: “[v]iolence is any relation, process, or condition by which an individual or group violates the physical, social, and/or psychological integrity of another person or group.” This allows Bulhan to make five key assumptions with regards to violence:

First, violence is not simply an isolated physical act or a discrete random event. It is a relation, process, and condition undermining exploiting, and curtailing the well-being of the victim. Second, these violations are not simply moral or ethical, but also physical, social, and/or psychological … Third, violence in any of the three domains – physical, social, or psychological – has significant repercussions in the other two domains. Fourth violence occurs not only between individuals, but also between groups and societies. Fifth, intention is less critical than consequence in most form of violence. Any relation, process, or condition imposed by someone that injures the health and well-being of others is by definition violent (Bulhan, ibid.).

The above mentioned definition and assumptions allows one to uncover all hidden forms of violence. Generally when one thinks of violence, one thinks of a physical act. For example, someone was beaten, shot or stabbed by someone else. However, it was Fanon who broaden the scope of violence as he “boldly analysed violence in its structural, institutional, and personal dimensions” (Bulhan, 1985, p. 138). The reason for the previous narrow scope was that “[p]ersonal violence is the easiest to discern and control and its effects are easiest to assess”
Thus, what we in most cases consider as violence is only this form of violence (personal violence), whereas, “[s]tructural violence is a feature of social structures. This form of violence is inherent in the established modes of social relations, distribution of goods and services, and legal practices of dispensing justice” (Bulhan, *ibid.*). The laws and institutions are used to legalise and normalise this kind of violence. Thus, “structural violence leads to hidden but lethal inequities, which can lead to death of those who lack power or influence in the society” (Bulhan, *ibid.*). Apartheid, colonialism and slavery are all forms of this kind of violence. To explain this in more detail let us consider the following:

In a situation in which oppression spans generations the violence to which it owes its origin and sustenance is masked and obfuscated. The law, the media, education, religion, work relations, the environment – the whole ensemble of cultural and material arrangements of society remain infused with violence, which becomes harder to discern the longer one lives under this condition of oppression (Bulhan, 1985, p. 137).

It was in this violence that the postcolonial subject was formed; subject in terms of citizenship and ethnicity. Postcolonial citizenship was born in the tradition and modern dichotomy of nationalist thought. Remember, knowledge subjugates and dominates. Thus, power discursively produces the postcolonial subject. Hence, in Africa and the rest of the Global South one has to recognise the role that the colonial civilised project played in crafting citizenship for the colony. The majority of Africa was colonised after the abolishment of the transatlantic slave trade. Scott (1999, p. 86) makes an important observation in this regard: “[r]eform therefore depends upon a ‘norm of civilization’ and a division between those who are ready for citizenship and those who have to be made ready for it (blacks, women, the colonized, and the working class).” In colonial Africa those who were branded native, first had to be civilised before they could qualify for citizenship. Citizenship in colonial and postcolonial Africa was divided into two: civic and ethnic citizenship (Mamdani, 2001). During colonialism it was colonial powers that crafted and bestowed citizenship to ‘civilised natives’ and in the postcolonial it was independent African states who decided who are citizens and who are not. In the postcolonial, citizenship and ethnicity is kept in its Enlightenment framework. The only difference here was that citizenship was now universally available to all members of the nation-state, but the thought behind it did not change, and thus retained the violence, in the Bulhan sense. Yet, who qualified to be members of the postcolonial nation-state became the central question in the postcolonial African state. Therefore, it is understandable that the subaltern in the wake of a revolution would stick to their subaltern identities because it is a way of identifying the perpetrators from the victims
and to get some form of justice. Instead of seeing the postcolonial struggle as a break/rupture from the colonial we need to consider it as a continuity for victims of the past. Therefore, the colony is kept alive by the memories of the victims and their desire for justice and revenge. This is the compromise the postcolonial subject was willing to make.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the colonial subject was created in a dominant and racist European epistemology. It also illustrates that subjection is a form of power, thus even when the power source is lifted it continues to operate in the psyche of the oppressed. Negritude was born as the resistance of the colonial subject, but it unknowingly reiterated the colonial subjection by referring to this subject by the inferior colonial identity. It changed the view that the oppressed had of themselves and the dialectic of the oppressor, but it did not change the view the oppressor. Butler indicated that subjection can only be successful if it is constantly reiterated. Thus, even though the aim of negritude was to return the African to who she or he was before colonialism, it failed to break the subject mould. It surely changed the colonial subject’s world view but it failed to change the dominant epistemology and the attitude of the oppressors. The attitude of the oppressor was still locked in the Hegelian dialectic. Here Fanon shows one that it was the ‘civilised’ intellectual elite that turned against the oppressor and resisted colonial oppression. It was this intellectual elite that educated the masses and garnered support against the occupying force. The subject resisted and to a certain extent succeeded. However, the resistance was a negation of a negation or as I put it earlier, the negritudist resistance was "subjection within subjection" and it manifested violently in post-colonial African states. Subjection is thus a forceful becoming and becoming is to create a particular subject identity through subjection.
Chapter 3: The Politics of Belonging

Introduction

In the previous chapter I explained that the colonial and postcolonial subject was discursively produced. Since it was discursively produced one has to consider that the post-colonial subject was formed in epistemology. The dominant global epistemology is still being produced in the works of the Enlightenment thinkers of the 18th and 19th century. Citizenship, race, ethnicity and nationality find their genealogy in this epistemology. Roles and responsibilities for the postcolonial racialized and ethnicised subject find its expression here. Therefore, it is no surprise that one finds a politics of belonging in Europe, the USA and in Africa.

This chapter deals with the politics of belonging. Belonging comes after becoming. Belonging is kept in place by the cultural, religious and political moulds of society. However, a claim for belonging can be called into question. The claiming party may, and in many cases do, resort to violence to strengthen their claim of belonging. The disputing party may, and will in many cases do, respond with violence to counter the claim of the claiming party. It is in this sense that the nation-state, with its monopoly on violence, is based on the premise of belonging. Those who do not belong do not get citizenship and are not granted statutory rights. Even though there is universality with regards to certain inalienable rights (human rights), the nation-state still remains the main grantor of a national identity.

With this in mind, the objectives of this chapter are as follows. Firstly, I argue that one can trace the politics of belonging discourse to the discursive practices of autochthony and indigeneity in colonial Africa. I also argue that it is within these discourses that a discourse around a politics of belonging emerged. In Francophone countries this discourse was introduced via autochthony and in Anglophone countries as indigeneity. In both Anglophone and Francophone countries discourses around autochthony and indigeneity was to distinguish the ‘backward autochthonous’ groups from the more ‘civilised migrant’ groups. It was these ‘civilised migrants’ who the colonial powers incorporated in the colonial administration. Secondly, the chapter demonstrates that the postcolonial subject has more than one identity and has to articulate various forms of belonging. The section on identity deals with the question as to how one moves from being subjected to self-identification. Said differently, it asks how one comes to defend and identify with an identity that one was subjected to? Thirdly, it will draw on a focus group that was
situated in Cape Town, South Africa, composed of a group of expats from the eastern part of the DRC. It becomes apparent that identity formation in the Great Lakes is trapped in an epistemology and it gives rise to the racialized, nationalized and ethnicised version of the postcolonial subject one encounters today. I came across this epistemology in the answers of the participants in the research. Here, one picks up traces of the Bantu versus the Nilotic Narrative; which is a result of the Hamitic hypothesis. This is the same epistemology that gave rise to the Hutu versus Tutsi dialectic. This narrative fuels the notion that the Tutsi are not from the region.

A Genealogy for a ‘Politics of Belonging’ in Africa

If one thinks the politics of belonging outside of the discourse of autochthony one notices that this phenomenon is also visible in Anglophone countries. Here the discourse is around indigeneity. It is within indigeneity that the ‘native’ and the ‘non-native’ is conceptualised; where the ‘non-native’ eventually translates into ‘foreigner’ in the post-colony. Here Mamdani (2013) observes that the ‘non-native’ became entangled with racial and nationalist discourse. Evidently, the ‘non-native’ can be classified in the post-colony as citizen or ‘migrant’ based on the political climate. It becomes clear that the ‘native’ (Anglophone) and the ‘autochthone’ (Francophone) was constructed within the civilising discourse of Hegel and Gobineau and what gave rise to this discourse and politics, in the colony and post-colony, was the Hamitic hypothesis.

There were various versions of the Hamitic hypothesis. The later version of the Hamitic hypothesis was the result of speculations. As European ‘explorers’ tried to make sense of complex political organisations in Africa the most appealing answer they could come up with was that of the Hamitic hypothesis. What one needs to keep in mind is that the biased, racial view of European ‘explorers’ was challenged by their encounters with African states and peoples. Before that their encounters with Africa was limited to slavery and fables of European explorers. Slavery depicted black Africans as ‘backward’ and ‘barbaric.’ However, when they finally encountered Africa this view became problematic because they realised African civilisations were complex and sophisticated (Diop, 1974 and Du Bois, 2007). Some, like

51 The encounters in fables are imaginary but it manifest outwards as perception.
Joseph Conrad for example, discovered that Africans were as human as their European counterparts, and that sometimes the true barbarian was the European colonialist or civiliser.\textsuperscript{52}

One way they could make sense of this was to reinvent the Hamitic Hypothesis. According to Mamdani (2001, p. 80) “[t]he raw material from which the Hamitic hypothesis was manufactured can be dated back to Judaic and Christian myths of biblical and medieval vintage.” Mamdani (2001, p. 80) also argues that nowhere does the Bible state that the descendants of Ham were black and that this myth was engineered through oral traditions of Jews (Mamdani, 2001 and Sanders, 1969). The Hamitic hypothesis was used at two different periods in time to justify a particular treatment of the ‘black’ or ‘Negro’ African. At first it was used by Israelites to “rationalise their subjugation of Canaan” and the second was to justify slavery (Sanders, 1969, p. 522 – 523).

However, this changed. Mamdani (2001, p. 82) explains that this myth was turned upside down during the end of the eighteenth century. This was mainly a result of Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798. Napoleon was clearly fascinated by the Egyptian civilization, especially the fact that they were ‘Negro’ or black, and that it dated back much further than European civilisations (Sanders, 1969, p. 525; Diop, 1974 and Bernal, 1996). It left European colonialists with the following question: “How could the producers of the civilization that had nurtured Greece and Rome be black?”\textsuperscript{53} (Mamdani, 2001, p. 82) The answer for them was that it had to be the descendants of Ham (Sanders, 1969). Instrumental here was the racial discourse of Gobineau. According to Mamdani (2001, p. 83) scholars of that period argued that Ancient Greece gave the rest of the world civilisation and particular in Africa, the Egyptians and the Ethiopians were presented as external civilisers of “Negro Africa” as they were regarded as the descendants of Ham and in this way “[t]he Hamites had now become an entire branch of the race of Caucasians …” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 87).

Hence, European colonisers used the Hamitic hypothesis as the basis for the classification of ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ in Africa. Anthropology played a big role in classifying and determining tribes. According to Mamdani (2013, p. 46) “[i]n most African colonies, the census classified the population into two broad, overall groups: one called race, the other tribe.” Here,  

\textsuperscript{52} Joseph Conrad’s \textit{Heart of Darkness} was the result of his experiences in the Congo (Hochschild, 2012).

\textsuperscript{53} The answers to this question led to a heated debate between Martin Bernal (1996) and Mary Lefkowitz (1996). Bernal argued that Egypt gave Greece its civilisation and Lefkowitz argued it was Greece who gave Egypt its civilisation.
[t]he distinction was not between the colonizer and the colonized, but between native and non-native. Non-natives were tagged as races, whereas natives were said to belong to tribes. Races were said to comprise all those officially categorised as not indigenous to Africa, whether they undisputedly foreign (Europeans, Asians) or whether their foreignness was the result of an official designation (Arabs, Coloured, Tutsi). Tribes, in contrast, were all those define as indigenous in origin (Mamdani, 2001, p. 47).

This ‘foreignness’ of a particular group of colonised people was made possible by civil law, customary law, direct rule and indirect rule. According to Mamdani (2013, p. 47) “[w]hen the state officially distinguished nonindigenous races from indigenous tribes, it paid heed to one single characteristic; origin, and totally disregarded all subsequent developments, including, residence. By obscuring the native as the product of geography rather than history.” More importantly Mamdani (2001, p. 51) notes that “[n]on-natives were identified as such no matter how many generations they had lived in the area, for no amount of time could erase the difference in origin.” A system of indirect rule institutionalised and politicised the native and non-native identities. Natives were administered through native authorities and non-natives more directly through the colonial government. The immediate result was that those without any native administration were labelled the migrant and were deemed the non-native (Mamdani, 1996; Mamdani, 1998; Mamdani, 2001 and Mamdani, 2013).

Furthermore, the discourse of autochthony can be traced back to the ancient Greek state of Athens. According to Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005, p. 386) in Greek city states autochthony referred to “self” and “soil.” It was inspired by the notion of protecting the “ancestral lands” against “strangers.” It is clear that from its inception in ancient Athens the term autochthony can be viewed as problematic. One notices that in Athens democracy and autochthony went hand in hand. The discourse also bestows first-comers special protection against later immigrants. According to Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005, p. 388) “Athenians justified their claim to superiority over other Greeks by emphasizing that only they were the true ‘autochthons’ of their area” and that all other cities was the result of migration. Geschiere (2011) thus found that it was migration in ancient Athens that gave rise to notions of autochthony. Being a true Athenian was used to justify the exclusion of migrants from citizenship. One may thus argue, apart from the gender bias, that democracy at its inception was exclusive. It was based on membership to the Greek city state which in essence was a kind of nation state. Apart from this, Geschiere (2011, p. 323) argues that “autochthony always demand exclusion. Yet, the exact definition of who belongs and who is excluded can change dramatically and abruptly.” Here one sees that
the notion of autochthony is embedded in politics - a politics of who belongs and who does not. In Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo there are constantly claims and counter claims regarding autochthony/indigeneity. This is the result of the temporality of political office. Thus, whenever there are changes in political leadership, the new group/other group exerts their claims of belonging. Autochthony is therefore based on the premise of purity, safety and the protection of land (materiality).

Autochthony was introduced in Africa on the back of the Hamitic hypothesis. Geschiere (2009, p. 14) explains that instrumental in the French approach to autochthony was the work of Maurice Delafosse. Delafosse wrote a three - volume - book titled *Haut – Sénégal – Niger* which was central to the efforts of establishing French colonies in Africa. The aim from the onset was to separate the ‘autochthones’ from the ‘migrants.’ According to Geschiere (2009, p. 14) “[y]et despite his determined search for autochthony, Delafosse was clearly much more interested in migrating groups.” This gives one an indication that the work of Maurice Delafosse genealogically points to the works of Hegel and Gobineau. The work of Hegel and Gobineau provided the basis for his racial science in Africa. Hegel and Gobineau made a system of colonial rule possible that was based on race, exclusion and purity.\(^5\) Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005, p. 388) indicate that Delafosse used somewhat condescending language to describe the ‘autochthonous’ groups. Delafosse described these autochthonous groups as ‘malheureux’ which translates to ‘wretched’ or ‘misfortunate.’ Autochthony like the native and non-native discourse manifested in a form of colonial rule. The French had a system of rule which was called *la politique de races* (race politics) which in a way was the French alternative to the British indirect rule (Geschiere, 2009, p. 14). In this system of rule they favoured, like indirect rule, those who they considered the migrants or Hamites. For example, according to Geschiere (2009, p. 15) “[i]n many areas the French soon became inclined to appoint Chiefs from such more “enterprising” groupings over “backward locals.”

Autochthony in postcolonial Africa is part of the daily language of the peoples of the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon (Geschiere, 2011 and Bøås, 2009). This is because in Francophone colonies the concept was used to categorise colonial subjects and to determine who were to aid the colonial power in administering the colony (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005, p. 388). Importantly, it was the ‘ruling immigrant groups’ who helped with the colonial administration whilst the autochthones were the subjects that were ruled. The consequence of this was that the

\(^5\) I explained this in the previous chapter.
rulers were from ‘elsewhere’ and the ‘locals’ were the backward autochthones. Autochthony in Ivory Coast led to a North and South divide; where the Northerners are considered to be more ‘autochthonous’ and more ‘civilised’ than the Southerners (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005). In Rwanda autochthony was entangled with a civilisation discourse. In Rwanda and Burundi the Twa was regarded as a primitive society and it is a discourse the Hutu were also subjected to. Simply put, if the Tutsi were from somewhere else and they were regarded as the civilising race, the Hutu and Twa were the ‘backward’ autochthones. The Tutsi was in this discourse elevated above the Hutu and the Twa on the European civilisation ladder. Hence, the Tutsi were made the intermediate rulers for German and Belgium powers.

In the contemporary, there are generally two meanings or interpretations of autochthony. The Quebec version of autochthony is to protect the indigenous minority’s way of living against that of the majority (Geschiere, 2011). The African and European interpretation of autochthony is that of protecting the majority against the migrating minority. It does not matter whether this is an external or internal ‘migration group.’ Autochthony, thus, brings forth a contemporary paradox. With autochthony nation states are retreating into the idea of the nation and this in a period of ‘globalisation.’ Autochthony manifests in the nation state inwardly and outwardly. Hence, Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005) found that “[a]utochthony can be presented as a rival to national citizenship, but it can also pretend to reinforce the nation (by “purifying” it).” Groups internally split along ethnic or racial lines or between who was the first or the true autochthon and outwardly it manifest towards anti-foreigner sentiments (Geschiere, 2011, pp. 322-323). With regards to globalisation, Geschiere (2011, p. 33) observes that “[o]ne important aspect of globalisation is the rapidly increasing mobility of people, on both a national and transnational scale, which produces a wider context for people’s preoccupation with belonging.” One may define globalisation as the movement or migration of people and products across and between national boundaries. This movement of goods and people may translate into scarcity, especially with the movement of people, and more particularly people with resources. The notion of

55 The best contemporary examples are that of Brexit and Donald Trump’s 2016 Presidential campaign. These two examples portray the contemporary nation in particular way; in a way “foreigners” or migrants must be kept out.

56 Interestingly, both notions are observable in South Africa.

57 People with resources are able to open businesses and compete in the local market. They are also able to buy property and settle permanently. It becomes problematic for the locals who have been struggling to capture the local market or acquire property locally.
scarcity may bring forth an important psychological element into this politics. I argue that
crack and the attachment to a particular object (e.g. land) gives rise to notions of autochthony.
The object the subject has attached to must be at risk or there must be the possibility of losing
it, before notions of autochthony are evoked. Thus, autochthony opens the question as to who
has the right and the last say over a particular area. This brings one to the notion of the ‘first
comer’ or the ‘autochthone’ who declares him or herself to have the inalienable right or claim to
something as his or hers on the basis of ‘first comers’.

More recently, the autochthony discourse developed or morphed into the ‘politics of belonging’
discourse, where many scholars are using the terms autochthony and ‘politics of belonging’
interchangeably. To my knowledge the phrase politics of belonging was coined by Francis
Nyamnjoh and Michael Rowlands in a paper titled Elite Associations and the ‘Politics of
Belonging in Cameroon. However, their paper was not clear as to what a politics of belonging is.
The framework of this discourse was extended in a paper by Peter Geschiere and Nyamnjoh
published in 2000, titled Capitalism and Autochthony: The Seesaw of Mobility and Belonging.
This was the instance where autochthony was thought alongside what seems to be a politics of
belonging. This eventually led a book by Geschiere titled The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony,
Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe. Even though an impressive body of work has
been developed around this discourse there are number of questions that are left unanswered
by its current conceptualisation; especially questions around power, scarcity and exclusion. The
answers to these questions are found in the following section on identity and belonging.

Identity

Identity is formulated in power. How identity is formulated and how the self emerges from this
process is important for conceptualization belonging. How the subject comes to identify his or
herself is a result of subjection and subjectification. In line with this argument, Stuart Hall
describes identities as the “points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which
discursive practices construct for us” (Hall, 2000, p. 14). Hall argues that identities must be
understood as discursive and that they are “produced in specific historical institutional sites
within specific discursive formations and practices …” (Hall, 2000, p. 17). For Hall identities

58 See the previous chapter.
“emerge within the play of specific modalities of power” (Hall, 200, p. 17). Hall arrives at this particular description by using Althusser’s interpellation and Foucault’s subjectivation. Hall (2000, p. 19) argues that attaching to the subject position requires (1) hailing or interpellation and (2) investing in the subjected position. Butler (1996) argues that the subject comes into being through the workings of a subordinating power. With this in mind I have to note that even though some identities are constructed in privilege and others in oppression, both occur still in the framework of a subordinating power. Thus, identities relating to the state are written in law and enforced by law, which is in the framework of a subordinating power. As a result there are various political identities such as race, ethnicity and citizenship. Since one is subjected to various identities, one’s identity becomes fluid and thus multidimensional. According to Bettez (2010, p. 142) “[i]dentities as points of temporary attachment are thus fluid yet bound by discourses and practices, both our own and those of other people.” In a study on the identity of mixed-race women in the US Bettez found that material benefits may lead to a fluidity of identities. Furthermore, Bettez (2010, pp. 146-147) noticed that one of her participants identified herself on her school forms as ‘Native American’ but she disidentify herself with being ‘Native American.’ The reason for her fluidity was that she received a scholarship for having a ‘Native American’ ancestry. However, this participant regarded herself as mixed-race rather than ‘Native-American’.

Furthermore, identity is a contradictory possibility that uses difference to create unity. According to Hall (2000, p. 17) identities “are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally constituted unity.” The subjecting power uses difference to create various subject positions or identities, to exclude and include. The aim is to create an “us” and “them.” Hall argues that “identities are constructed through, not outside, difference” (Hall, 2000, p. 17). To quote Laclau (1990, p. 13) in Hall (2000, p. 18) “Derrida has shown how an identity’s constitution is always based on excluding something and establishing a violent hierarchy between the two resultant poles – man/woman, etc.” Racial discourse is a result of this, where people who were marked as “white” decided to construct themselves as “White” and label and subject people with darker skin pigmentation to the category “black.” Where “black” can never be “white” and “white” and never be “black.” Any mixture of races was treated as impure and somehow distorted the purity of both “black” and “white.” Hall (2000, p. 59) is clearly gesturing towards the work of Althusser, Foucault and Butler.

My critique would be that this flattens Butler’s conceptualisation of subjection and subjectification.
17) argues that one recognises one’s “uniqueness” in relation to what another lacks. The point here is that: (1) identity is constructed through difference; and (2) identity is a result of a constructed relation with another. This is where the contradictory possibility is visible as it creates unity and yet it excludes. However, unity is created in the imaginary. Subjects of certain identities have to imagine themselves as homogenous and as one. Certain rituals, histories and even uniforms are used to bring this about; to identify one as a member of a particular group entails imagination. According to Butler (1993, p. 105 in Hall, 2000, p. 29)

... identification belongs to the imaginary; they are phantasmatic efforts of alignment, loyalty, ambiguous and cross-corporeal cohabitations, they unsettle the I; they are the sedimentation of the ‘we’ in the constitution of any I, the structuring present of Alterity in the very formulation of the I. Identifications are never fully and finally made; they are incessantly reconstituted, and, as such, are subject to the volatile logic of iterability. They are that which is constantly marshalled, consolidated, retrenched, contested and, on occasion compelled to give way.

From difference borders are constructed because “identities function as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’, abjected” (Hall, 2000, pp. 17-18). It is in this sphere that one creates a sense of belonging. It is within the confines – safety – of the border that one finds a sense of belonging; this border that was superficially created by difference.

**Belonging**

Belonging is connecting the self to the social. May (2011, p.364) argues “that belonging is an apt concept for studying [the] relationship between the self and society ...” May (2011) thus asserts that belonging is that relationship between the self and society. To see how this relationship works it is important to consider the “working mechanics” of belonging. In this regard, from May (2011), Bettez (2010), Yuval-Davis, Anthias & Kofman (2005) and Pillay (2004), I was able to identify a number of ‘features’ that are important to think through the concept “belonging”.

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61 With belonging I want to bring the self/individual into politics.

62 These authors did not identify ‘features’ or mention that belonging has various features, ‘features’ is my conceptualisation. It is my way of getting to the ‘working mechanics’ of the concept belong. It is in no way
Furthermore, according to May (2011, p. 368) “belonging plays a role in connecting individuals to the social. This is important because our sense of self is constructed in a relational process in our interactions with other people as well as in relation to more abstract notions of collectivity held social norms, values and customs.” Even though our sense of self is constructed in a relational process, this process can be voluntarily or forced. Therefore, one needs to draw a distinction between how this relational process is formed in the social and the political. Taking this into account, I would like to add that belonging also plays a role in connecting individuals to the political. It is here that one observes the first feature: belonging connects the individual to the social and the political.

The second feature is about how the self is constructed in relation to others or simply self-identification (May, 2011 and Bettez, 2010). Self-identification must mirror the recognition of others. Others must identify another as one of them to create a sense of belonging. This happens through interpellation.\textsuperscript{63} This leads one to the following question: Can a claim of belonging be valid without the recognition of the group or the other? In Bettez’s study she found that the desire of one of her participants changed over time. The participant was Cameroonian, and did not have any choice but to identify herself with the African American community. She felt that even though she is not African American she had to choose the African American community because in America one does not have the option to choose any other group when of one’s ancestry is considered to be black. It was also within the African American community she find a sense of belonging.\textsuperscript{64} Yet, even though she identified with being African American, she saw herself as an outsider. Since she has a white mother and a Cameroonian father she could not be white because the system decided on her behalf (Bettez, 2010, p. 149). This is the result of the “one-drop rule” or the rule of hypodescent in the United States of America. According to Ho, Sidanius, Levin & Banaji (2011, p. 5) “[s]ome states (e.g., Alabama) held that one drop of “Negro” blood rendered a person Black, while others (e.g., Missouri) used fractions such as one-eighth to define Black-White biracials as Black.” Here one is faced with the problematic “purity discourse”, in which race was constructed; where to qualify to be white one’s

to essentialise or simplify the concept. In addition, these features are an essential part of identity formation.

\textsuperscript{63} Hailing and interpellation is made possible by a memory-image (your image versus that of the other). This is my extension of Bergson’s memory-image in \textit{Matter and Memory}.

\textsuperscript{64} Former President Barack Obama shared the same the dilemma. To read more about his dilemma please read his book \textit{Dreams From My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance}.

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ancestry must not be contaminated with any other race. White as a racial identity is thus constructed as the purist of them all. Thus, to answer the question, it is difficult to feel a sense of belonging if a particular group rejects one’s claim for belonging. It is within this tension that one finds the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda dilemma with regards to belonging.

The third feature is subjection and subjectification. Here the subject has to attach to an identity and identity is the result of specific material, historical and cultural conditions. According to Butler (1996, p. 6) “attachment to subjection is produced by the working of power, and that part of the operation of power is made clear in this psychic effect, one of the most insidious of its productions.” Thus, identity needs to be objectified by the subject to enable him or her to attach to a particular identity. Attaching to an object is thus an integral part of belonging. Hence, an essential part of belonging is to attach to an object and that object might be an imaginary or a concrete object, for example a place. According to May (2011, p. 371) one undergoes a process where one develops a sense of belonging to a place which one will come to identify oneself with. Attachment is therefore important in developing a sense of belonging and as Butler (1996, p. 6) demonstrates ‘attachment’ is the ‘production’ of a specific power that operates in the psyche of the subject. In addition to this, belonging is multidimensional (May, 2011, p. 370). This is clearly a result of various subjections. In the previous section it was established that identity is multidimensional. In this regards, race, nationality, ethnicity and religion are all forms of subjections. In some of these identities one may belong because of its universality. For example, being categorised as a human gives one a sense of belonging amongst other humans. In others belonging is exclusive, for example race. This in a sense creates the fluidity of identity, and makes it multidimensional.

Furthermore, belonging takes place in a state of unconsciousness. “In other words, one of the ways in which a sense of belonging can emerge is if we can go about our everyday lives without having to pay much attention to how we do it” (May, 2011, p. 310). Furthermore, Yuval-Davis, Anthias & Kofman (2005) indicate that belonging becomes ‘naturalised’ and invisible in hegemonic formations. It is only when this position (the homeland or the collectivity) is threatened that a politics is evoked. This clearly indicates a power that regulates the sense of belonging. A state of unconsciousness is the appearance of the naturalisation of subjection.

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65 Italics are for emphasis.
Thus, one may argue that belonging is formed in a particular power and this is why it takes place in a state of unconsciousness.  

Another feature is time and space. May (2011) indicates that over a period of time one develops routines because of living in a particular space. According to May (2011, p. 371) “we build a sense belonging in the world based on the meaning we give our environment by moving through and engaging with it” (here she quotes Leach, 2002, p. 86). May’s reference to time here refers to a particular history or past and to space as geographical space. This gives belonging an important space-time dimension. Firstly, time in belonging needs to be considered as continuous. According to May (2011, p. 372) “belonging is something we have to keep achieving through an active process” (Here she references Bell, 1999a, p. 3; Miller, 2003, p. 223; Scheibelhofer, 2007). Since it is a continuous process belonging changes over time. Moreover, according to May (2011, p. 372), “[o]ur sense of belonging changes over time, partly in response to changes in our self.” For example, the complex sense of belonging refugees of Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and Uganda must have developed. For them it changes over time. As they adjust to refugee camps or new settlements their sense of belonging also changes. Mamdani (2001) explains that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was formed when Rwandan refugees in Uganda realised that they will never belong in Uganda and that in Africa one’s ancestral home is regarded as home; which is to say where one belongs. They were not recognised as Ugandans, even though they developed a sense of belonging to Uganda, but as Banyarwanda (those who are from Rwanda). This was rather ironic since they were labelled ‘migrants’ in their ancestral home by colonial discourse and were chased away in 1959 during the Social Revolution in Rwanda. This essentially raises the underlying question of this dissertation as to who belongs where in postcolonial Africa. Secondly, there is something significant about geographical space and identity. According to May (2011, p. 372) “[a]ny significant changes in our material surrounding will have an impact on our sense of belonging.” It sets in motion various points of investigation: (1) origins and ancestry; and (2) whether or not it is possible to belong without any ancestral home in postcolonial Africa or anywhere? In this regard, burial sites in the discursive practice of autochthony raises the issue of origin. In some parts of Africa people must be buried at their ancestral homes. The implication of this is that if one does not have an ancestral home one clearly does not belong. In this line of thinking the Tutsi are trapped and have nowhere to go.

66 Also see Butler's *Psychic Life of Power*. 
Another feature is boundaries and borders. This is the result of difference, which is to create a border or margin. This is to let in and keep out. In belonging borders and boundaries are immanent and this results into membership which is both inclusive and exclusive. Some scholars use borders and boundaries interchangeably. I would like to note that there is a difference between borders and boundaries. A boundary is where one has to stop and cannot go further because of a particular line or obstacle. A border, however, refers to the intersectionality of two or more spaces and even though there is an obstacle or line, one may cross over if one meets certain conditions. One is bound and yet not completely constrained. Some identities have borders and others have boundaries and some have both. For example, on the one hand, race and gender in particular have boundaries. No crossing over is allowed in terms of gender or race. On the other hand, in ethnicity and nationality crossing over is only allowed based on certain conditions. One is only allowed to cross over once one undergoes a particular assimilation or ‘cleansing’ process. Here language, culture, heritage and law are used as filters to let some in and keep others out. One thus sees that the construction of alterity is an important aspect to maintain borders between various identities (Bettez, 2010, p. 153). Difference, in whatever way it is constructed, uses symbols to signify a border or a boundary between ‘Us’ and the ‘Others.’ Essentialised difference is the deciding factor as to who does belong and who does not belong. Difference will be interpellated and the subject will always be reminded that he or she does not belong. It is thus through interpellation that boundaries and borders are maintained.

Boundaries and borders are created in difference and come into existence through subjection. In this regards, I made an observation regarding the children of Somalian refugees in Cape Town, South Africa. I stay in the Central Business District of Bellville in South Africa and it has one the largest Somalian refugee communities in Cape Town. The children of Somalian refugees who were born in South Africa are faced with a particular dilemma. In the social they recognise themselves as South African but in law they are forced to be Somalian, even though they were not born and have never been to Somalia. This creates a South African Somalian identity. This highlights the difficulty regarding ancestry. If one considers this line of argument it

67 Italics are for emphasis.

68 Here, I am not using intersectionality as critical feminism does.

69 There is a movement in the ‘trans’ community to overcome this. For example, one finds transgender and transracial identities. However, these identities still reproduces a biological boundary and creates a new ‘trans’ boundary.
does not make an African American an African just because of his or her ancestry. Belonging questions ancestry because one can develop a sense of belonging to a particular place without it being one’s ancestral home. However, it does not mean one’s sense of belonging will be recognised by another. It will be questioned if one does not exude the markers of the ‘first comer’ or dominant group. This is relevant to the dilemma of the Banyamulenge and the Banyarwanda.

Therefore, borders in belonging are imagined and can be re-imagined. Pillay (2004) argues that the radical imagination of peace gave the post-1994 South African society a different sense of belonging. By critically looking at Mbeki’s “I am an African” speech Pillay noticed that “Mbeki’s notion of an African is … distinctive since it seeks to deracialise Africanity and de-nativise it” (Pillay, 2004, p. 23). The radical imagination of peace approaches the question as to who is an African, not from where one comes from but from where one is and in this sense it “determines [one’s] eligibility for ‘belonging’ and citizenship” (Pillay, 2004, p. 23). However, the value of the notion of belonging is hampered by the socio-economic differences between races. It raises a question: Where is the reciprocity? The victims of Apartheid made a “remarkable gesture of reconciliation” whilst the perpetrators want to keep the benefits they acquired during and through oppression (Pillay, 2004). Socio-economic difference in the post-1994 dispensation in South Africa became the new marker of difference and constructed new boundaries that cut across race and ethnicity in South Africa. Borders and boundaries are imagined and constructed as place holders to maintain various forms of subjection.

Borders and boundaries can be abstract and physical. For example, national borderlines do not match ethnic borderlines. “Often the ‘naturalized’ borderlines do not correspond with the boundaries of the ethnic and national communities who live near the borders” – a phenomenon of post-colonial Africa (Yuval-Davis, Anthias, and Kofman, 2005, p. 522). In addition, physical borders reminds the subject who he or she is and where he or she belongs. Given this, the importance of national borders is to ensure and mould a particular national identity called citizenship. It is to keep those out who are not bound to a particular, locale ancestral and geographical space and time. In addition to this, during apartheid in South Africa there were designated public spaces for white and black people. These delineated spaces were clearly

70 I have to add that Mbeki might have known about the effects of a politics of belonging on the African continent too well and hence the speech. However, it manifested differently. It in a way unified the nation state/citizens but it manifested towards foreign nationals from the African continent as xenophobia.
marked “Whites Only” and “Blacks Only.” Even though a physical border determines how far the subject may cross-over or where the subject has to stop, there are also abstract borders between identities. These borders between identities are created by the imaginative.

The final feature is safety and familiarity. A sense of familiarity must be considered with an ontological sense of the world. According to Praeg (2014, p. 174) “to be in the world in an ontological sense refers to a feeling of familiarity with the world, of being home in the world, of belonging.” This once again brings space to the fore, because it is through dwelling or staying in a specific locale that one develops a sense of belonging. However, “dwelling does not exclude the possibility of sometimes feeling estranged or alienated in the world” (Praeg, Ibid.). Therefore, to dwell holds the possibility of feeling at home and not at home at the same time (Praeg, Ibid.). What happens to one’s sense of belonging (feeling at home) when a disruption occurs? An apt example would be the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes. Refugees from Rwanda and Burundi, in the DRC, develop a sense of belonging to the place they are resettling in; whether this is a refugee camp or otherwise. Resettling is to find a sense of belonging (feeling at home), but even though refugees develop a sense belonging, they know they are not at home. It become complex when children are born in the country of resettlement. These children are not born in the countries of origin of their parents and only know the DRC as home. This will later lead to claims and counter claims of belonging between the “autochthone” and the “foreigner”. This is here the political process are used to determine who is ejected/rejected, and who is not. In addition to this, Bettez (2010, p. 150) found that “[m]ixed-race women’s experiences cannot be separated from the history of race and gender politics and contemporary racial debates.”

Mixed-race groups and individuals who are in-between the politics of various groups brings one to the question of the political. For Hall (2000, p. 29) “the question, and the theorization, of identity is a matter of considerable political significance.” Identity and politics go hand in hand; they cannot be separated. Bettez (2010, p. 151) found that whenever one of her respondents felt like they did not belong it was the “instance [where] race, gender, and sexuality politics collide.” I would like to add ethnicity, nationality and religion to the list. To return to the example of the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes, the children of 1959 Tutsi refugees in Uganda saw them as Ugandan and yet they were considered to be Rwandese. The Banyarwanda and

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71 Italics are for emphasis.

72 See Chapter 6 of *When Victims Become Killers*. 

https://etd.uwc.ac.za
Banyamulenge see themselves as Congolese and they are not regarded as Congolese.\textsuperscript{73} Therefore, important for the theorisation of a politics of belonging is the idea of the diaspora and how it disrupts and reinforces identities and notions of belonging. This brings one to the process of creating political identities – those identities that are heavily contested and have brought about some instances of grotesque violence in the DRC.

**A Politics of Belonging in North and South Kivu**

This section draws on the interviews of the focus group I have conducted in Cape Town, South Africa with four influential members of the Congolese diaspora in South Africa. They were Jacqui, Deon, Andre and Daniel.\textsuperscript{74} André arrived in South Africa in 2007 and started out as a car guard, later a security guard and now he is an Uber driver for a Congolese businessman in Cape Town. He has a matric certificate and left Bukavu in search of better socio-economic opportunities. André is originally from **Quartier Essence**, in Bukavu. **Quartier Essence** is the stereotypical African ‘township’ and has such a reputation that it was never affected by the war because soldiers and militia from both sides of the war were scared to enter it. André is in his mid-30s, married and a father of two. André got married in South Africa to someone from the DRC.

Deon arrived in South Africa in the early 2000s, having obtained an Honours degree in Law in the Congo. He was an activist during the war and was captured and tortured by Rwandan forces during the time of the Second Congo War.\textsuperscript{75} He left the DRC because he feared for his life. He left Congo on foot and passed through Tanzania to reach South Africa. In South Africa he worked for various NGOs and later with three other DRC nationals founded Amis BK (Friends of Bukavu) in 2007.\textsuperscript{76} Deon got married in South Africa to a South African woman and is the father of two children. He is in early 40s.

\textsuperscript{73} For in-depth discussion on the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge’s quest for belonging please see Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{74} All four participants were given pseudonyms to protect their identities.

\textsuperscript{75} The First Congo War and the Second Congo War will be discussed in-depth in Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{76} BK is a common reference to Bukavu amongst expats.
Daniel arrived in South Africa in 2003. Danielle is originally from Idjwi, an island in the middle of Lake Kivu. After high school he studied mathematics at the Institut supérieur pédagogique de Bukavu (ISP) where he obtained his Honours degree. Daniel was a teacher at a high school in Rwanda at the time of the 1994 genocide. He came to South Africa in 2003 via African Institute for Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) and was part of the first class. He later obtained his PhD at a university in South Africa and is now the Deputy Head of the Mathematics Department at that institution. In Cape Town he is also the leader of Union for the Congolese Nation which an opposition party in the DRC. Daniel is also a committee member of AMIS BK.

Jacqui is from Bukavu and arrived in South Africa in June 2004. She comes from a very difficult background. One of the most devastating events that she experienced was when her family's shop was destroyed during the Second Congo War. The shop was their source of income. However, despite many difficulties she matriculated in 2002 and taught for a year before leaving for Cape Town, South Africa. In Cape Town, she first lived with a friend and later got a job as a domestic worker. Soon after she started she was asked to take on administrative duties in the house and live in. However, she was unfairly dismissed by her employer's mother-in-law because of her ability to be more than just a domestic worker. The mother-in-law was more interested in a domestic worker. Since she lived in the home of her employers as a domestic worker, she was homeless after her dismissal. For some time she lived with a friend until she got a job as a cleaner at a lodge. Once again it was not long before she was promoted, in this instance to the position of receptionist. She was also encouraged by her employer to enrol at a university and further her education. She later applied to a university in South Africa and started studying fulltime in 2008. Currently she is busy with a Doctorate. The rest of this section will draw on the responses of Jacqui, Deon, Andre and Daniel to show the need for rethinking the conflict.

Firstly, one must ask what is the relationship between a ‘politics of belonging’ and citizenship? The answer to this question is locked in the “migration narrative.” As is illustrated from the discussion above, the “migration narrative” is central to many of the cases of a ‘politics of belonging.’ In Liberia the Mandingo were viewed as the “foreigners.” In Côte d'Ivoire it is the ‘northerners’ which included migrants from Burkina Faso and Mali. In South Africa it is migrants

77 In the DRC Vital Kamerhe is the leader of the Union for the Congolese Nation, which is opposing Joseph Kabila’s People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy.
from Somalia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, etc. who are marked as *Makwerekwere*.\(^{78}\)

In addition to this, Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005) found that in Cameroon autochthony is troublesome because it trumps national citizenship. After multiparty elections there has been a tendency to vote according to one’s place of origin. If one decides not to vote in one’s ancestral region one is then expected to vote for the regional or local political elite, since that is what a good ‘visitor’ would do. Therefore, in Cameroon the ‘Other’ does not necessarily have a different nationality. Rather, the “Other” or “migrant” is internal. Autochthony in Cameroon does not relate to a national sense of belonging, but rather to a regional or ancestral sense of belonging.

Furthermore, in the DRC the Banyarwanda, Barundi and the Banyamulenge are considered as ‘foreigners.’ I found that there are two levels of ‘foreignness’ in North Kivu and South Kivu. At the first level it is nationality. Here the Barundi and Banyarwanda identities evoke a politics of belonging. According to Deon “[I]o me, or for us here, Banyarwanda means whoever is seen as a citizen of Rwanda whether Tutsi, Hutu or Twa. That is how we perceive it. And in Masisi there is not only Hutu, there are also Tutsis. There are also the Twas from Rwanda.” Here it became apparent that a reference to “Banyarwanda” must be seen as a reference to Rwandese citizenship. Therefore, the Banyarwanda and Barundi identities must be rather perceived as a reference to particular nationalities.

However, it becomes problematic because of the Banyamulenge identity that was created in the 1970s.\(^{79}\) Banyamulenge, in Kinyarwanda, means “people of Mulenge.” Mulenge is a village in South Kivu. This is where ethnicity comes into the picture. Thus, it is ethnicity that evokes a politics of belonging. Here, one picks up traces of the ‘Bantu’ versus ‘Nilotic,’ narrative of the Hamitic hypothesis. This description fuels the notion that the Tutsi is not from the Great Lakes region and that they were migrants from somewhere else. However, there is an agreement among participants that the Banyamulenge identity is a Congolese identity. According to Deon the “Banyamulenge to me is 100 percent Congolese.” The reason for his conviction is found in the historical accounts on the Banyamulenge. As Deon explained:

\(^{78}\) *Makwerekwere* is a derogatory term that South Africans use to describe foreign nationals from the African continent.

\(^{79}\) Deon explained that the Banyamulenge identity came into existence in the 1980s. He says he know this because as a lawyer he worked on some of these cases. This is contrary to what Mamdani (1998), Van Acker (2005) and Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005) have written. These scholars are saying it came into existence in the 1970s.
These so called Banyamulenge are a group of pastoralist people, they own lots of cattle. They live off agriculture and their animals, and so on and so forth. They have been there as long as history can recall it. I don’t know when, I do not want to say whether they were there before … before the king came to Congo. I do not know, but I doubt if they were there. I doubt quite a lot if they were there before the king of Belgium came to whatever. And if they were there that is their own business. However, in the 80s they were there; they were identified as Batutsi. The Tutsis that lived, that lived there and they had good relationships with specifically the Bashi; the Bashi that lived on the Walungu side specifically in Kaziba and on the other side of … and so forth. They always had animosity between the other Babembe who lived in Fizi because they perceive one … the Babembe perceived them as people who came to take from us. … The Fizi guys see them as this is our area. These guys came to take our land and these cattle should be ours. However, these guys were stronger because of their financial possession - cattle and land they control; and most of them had guns so the Babembe would go steal cattle and the other one will retaliate by shooting a few and in that way they got accustomed to one another. That is a brief part of history. On the Bashi side who were also pastoralist people. The Bashi also had lots of cattle. And most of the Bashi and most of their historical fight between the Tutsis and the Bashi which is very recorded in history, they also became closer to one another. In fact there were some in the history, the Bashi, there were times where for them to make reconciliations to a king, one of the kings on the side of the Rwanda let his daughter to be married to the Bashis. As a kind of way to create peace. Hence there were Tutsi calling the Bashi uncles, they called one another mjomba, whatever because of that relationship. So I kind of give a historical context to this. So the Bashi that lived in the Kaziba and the … and the whatever zones and the now so called Banyamulenge never had issues … they married each other, they exchanged cattle, they did whatever they could do as communities, until 1986 when this term Banyamulenge started to be coined because now they wanted to claim an identity to a certain area. The question then is who is a Munyamulenge because now there are those in Katanga calling themselves Banyamulenge which are not anywhere close to the small town Mulenge. Those that are in Ruchuru and Masisi, whatever, call themselves Banyamulenge. It is now claimed as whoever is of Tutsi origin in the Congo is a Munyamulenge. Even those who crosses the border today from Rwanda comes to Congo becomes a Munyamulenge.80

It is important to note that Deon doubts the accuracy of the Banyamulenge historical accounts.81 They separated themselves from the Banyarwanda identity to strengthen their claim of

80 I wanted the participants to speak for themselves, and hence I included their responses verbatim. In addition to this, the use of ellipsis indicates a phrase or a word I was unable decipher while transcribing.

81 Newbury (1997, p. 215) argue that this is a result of “a manipulation of the historical records” by Rwandan leaders.
autochthony. However, it seems that it is difficult to cut their Rwandan ties and this does not make it easier for them. For example, the RPF recruited amongst the Banyamulenge during the Rwandan civil war in the 1990s. The RPF made it a point to recruit Congolese Tutsi/Banyamulenge and when the Tutsi-led RPF took power in 1994 it supported and armed the Banyamulenge against ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises/Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR) and the Interhamwe, Hunde, Mai-Mai and Forces armées congolaises (FAC) forces. Rwanda supported and helped with the creation of Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie/Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and Congrès national pour la défense du people/National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). It is thus difficult for the Banyamulenge to shed their ‘Rwandan’ and ‘Tutsi’ identity.

Considering this, it points one to a problematic within the Banyamulenge identity - it has become a Tutsi identity. It is now difficult to differentiate between earlier Tutsi migrants (Congolese) and later Tutsi migrants (refugees). This is a problem that Léonard Kamere Muhindo is also writing against in Après les Banyamulenge, Voici les Banyabwisha aux Kivu (After the Banyamulenge, here are the Banyabwisha in Kivu). According to Muhindo (1999) the Banyabwisha evoked a claim of autochthony the same way the Banyamulenge evoked a claim of autochthony. Congolese Hutu and Tutsi in an attempt to escape the Hutu, Tutsi and Banyarwanda identities created two relatively new references: Banyamulenge and Banyabwisha. The Banyamulenge identity makes all Tutsi Banyamulenge, even though not all Tutsi refugees are Banyamulenge and the Banyabwisha identity makes all Hutu Banyabwisha, even though not all Hutu refugees are Banyabwisha. On the surface it is difficult to differentiate between Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge) and Tutsi refugees from Rwanda and Burundi, and the same way it is difficult to differentiate between Congolese Hutu (Banyabwisha) and Hutu refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. The Banyamulenge and the Banyabwisha identities collapse ethnicity into nationality. It is thus no wonder that some of the participants question the history of the Banyamulenge. Having said this, there are thousands of Congolese Tutsis in refugee camps in Rwanda, who are not ‘Rwandan’ enough to be regarded as Rwandan. Said differently, just because Congolese Tutsis share an ethnicity with some Rwandans, that does not make them Rwandan. This brings one back to a “foreignness” embedded in nationality once one crosses the border into Rwanda. This points one to another dilemma regarding the Tutsi identity and that is that they are regarded as ‘Nilotic’ migrants, as one participant put it. They are

82 Léonard Kamere Muhindo is a Congolese historian and advisor to President Joseph Kabila.
rejected by Congo and by Rwanda. In Rwanda, their fellow Tutsi reject them in terms of nationality, the Hutu reject them because they are ‘Nilotic’, and in Congo they are rejected because they were supported by and still have links to a Tutsi-led Rwandan government which is assumed to render questionable their allegiance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They are trapped. Nowhere to go and the only way forward is to fight for survival. The Hutu Banyarwanda and Hutu Barundi do not have it easy at all. In the Kivus they have to stick to their national identities, whilst the Tutsi can alter their nationality via the Banyamulenge identity. Here the Tutsi can temporarily be Rwandan, Burundian and Congolese whenever they desire to do so. Hutu Banyarwanda and Hutu Barundi can only do so in Rwanda and Burundi but not in the Kivus. In South and North Kivu Hutu Banyarwanda and Hutu Barundi will always be the “foreigner.”

It is against this backdrop that one has to look at the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda’s quest for citizenship and their push for a Congolese identity,\textsuperscript{83} and how this was manipulated to favour Mobutu’s dictatorship. According to Deon, “when he [Mobutu] had to use them he gave them collective citizenship. When he did not want them anymore he just said … ‘I do not have powers to give collective citizenship therefore it is revoked.’ Hence, discontent came about. And then this term Banyamulenge was coined in 1986, so that they can have an identity. To represent them to claim their citizenship which was perceived they have lost.” In Chapter 6 I will highlight the struggle of the Banyarwanda and the Banyamulenge to receive recognition in law.\textsuperscript{84} At various times in the post-colony they were considered as Congolese and at other times they were not. Their current status from 2006 regarding their recognition in law brings one back to the 1960 clause which states:

> Congolese nationality is one and exclusive. It may not be held concurrently with any other. The Congolese nationality is either of origin, or by individual acquisition. Any person belonging to an ethnic group of which the members [personnes] and the territory are constituent to that which became the Congo (presently the Democratic Republic of the Congo) at independence, is Congolese of origin (Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Article 10).

\textsuperscript{83} See Chapters 5 and 6.

\textsuperscript{84} The Banyarwanda of North Kivu must be regarded as three groups: the autochthones, the migrants and the refugees of the post-colonial conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi. The same way we must think of the Banyamulenge in South Kivu as two groups: the autochthones and the refugees.
For the participants resolving the citizenship issue would entail the Banyarwanda and Barundi to let go of those identities. According to Deon:

Can a Banyarwanda be Congolese? Yes. How can they be Congolese? By giving, by taking allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Congo. By taking citizenship like any person does. You come into a country following processes that are already there. In other words you immigrate in the Congo, follow processes and become a citizen of the Congo. Then you are Congolese because to me a Munyarwanda does not necessarily mean a Hutu or Tutsi or whatever. Just here when we talk about Munyarwanda we are talking of whoever is of Rwandan citizenship who stay in Rwanda or who stays in Congo, or anywhere else in the world who identify themselves as such. They become Congolese once they renounced their Rwandan citizenship and take forth our Congolese citizenship and keep it as only one. However, there is a catch. The Constitution of Rwanda gives, there is a privileged clause which provides that the citizenship of Rwanda cannot be lost.

Deon thus proposes that whoever is of the Banyarwanda, Barundi or Batutsi and who wants to become Congolese citizens have to let go of their Banyarwanda, Barundi and Batutsi identities. As one sees above, the Munyarwanda identity is not an ethnic identity but rather a reference to a nationality. However, there is an obstacle to their ambitions since Rwandans can never lose their citizenship and in the DRC you can only have one. This brings one not only to a contestation of power between the Rwandan State and the Congolese State, but also at a local level. At a local level this contestation takes the shape of customary power. In the postcolonial, customary power captured the processes of local government. Both powers, state and customary, determine political identities.

This brings one to the second issue. A ‘politics of belonging’ highlights the complex power relationships that shape the postcolonial subject’s identity; as seen above. Not only is it multidimensional, it is also exclusionary and it is in this exclusionary nature that a ‘politics of belonging’ develops. Power constructs identities, and it also includes and excludes. Here two key types of identities are formed in power: ethnicity and citizenship. The postcolonial subject’s identity in this sense is multidimensional. However, to find a sense of belonging in these identities borders needs to be constructed. For example, a Munyarwanda refugee in Congo has a Munyarwanda identity (when in the DRC), a Rwandese identity and a Hutu, Tutsi or Twa

85 These identities have singular and plural expressions. Munyarwanda is singular for a person of Rwandan nationality, and Banyarwanda is plural for people of Rwandan nationality.
identity; and for each identity he or she has to construct borders or boundaries. These borders can be real (refugee camps) and imaginary (‘Us’ and ‘Them’). Power keeps and enforces borders and boundaries through the imaginative. In a politics of belonging one finds that border protection and maintenance takes place at the level of the abstract and the real. According to Yuval-Davis, Anthias & Kofman (2005, p. 517) “secure borders’ are a pre-condition for ‘secure boundaries’ of a national collectivity and identity.” Even though the authors are using borders and boundaries interchangeably, the point I want to make is that borders in the real and in the abstract must be protected against any external threat. It is, therefore, about “preserving a national collectivity” (Yuval-Davis, Anthias & Kofman, 2005, p. 517). Border and boundaries are also about the preservation of a particular idea of the collectivity, or as in this case, the nation. This translates into a perception of a pure nation, that it can keep itself pure, which in itself is problematic, and this notion is achieved through law. Law institutionalises and freezes a particular form of belonging. This is where citizenship takes shape. Citizenship laws decide whether one belongs and whether one does not and a migration policy determines who has the potential to belong and who does not. Yuval-Davis, Anthias & Kofman (2005, p. 518) notes that “immigration policy in its inclusionary and exclusionary practices acts as the first step in determining who has the possibility of belonging and becoming a future citizen.” In addition to this, independence in Africa brought a ‘new’ notion of exclusion and inclusion to the fore. According to Bøås (2009, pp. 22-23) “[a]fter independence citizenship laws increased in importance, as the new African states had to permanently define who legitimately lived within the borders of their territory and who did not.” This returns one to the colonial border, and the idea of the postcolonial nation. The postcolonial state had to determine who were and who will be part of the postcolonial nation-state. This is a question the postcolonial DRC state is still grappling with, as explained earlier by Deon.

Drawing the border line might be viewed as dialectic. Bettez (2010, p. 156) argues that “[t]he politics of belonging encompass a much more complex, dialectical relationship between those who wish to belong and those who have the power to sanction or dismiss belonging.” A politics of belonging is a dialectic between the claimant and those in “power to sanction or dismiss belonging.” This has particular significance for state driven identities. Power may use violence

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86 The idea of purity is an essential feature in the colonial discourse of autochthony; where mixing identities are taboo since this contaminates ancestry. Identities, especially race and ethnicity, was constructed on the premise to keep political identities pure (Bettez, 2010, p. 151). One can trace this idea all the way back to the Enlightenment thinkers who were dealing with the question of Africa and its peoples.
to draw and to keep the borders and boundaries of identities intact. However, an opposing power may also break the boundary and border lines through violence. To a certain extent this explains the violence in the Kivus, where violence is used to constantly defend or re-imaging borders between identities. For example, the formation of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL), the RCD, the CNDP and M23 is a result of this. Each time one see the formation of one of these groups it was to break through and/or contest the boundary line of belonging. And everyone opposing it was simply killed. However, not all the violence is explained by this thinking.

The construction of borders in the abstract and real brings about exclusion. As Yuval-Davis, Anthias & Kofman (2005) note, exclusion activates notions of belonging. The question of belonging originates from a feeling that there are spaces, locales and identities to which one does not belong. Furthermore, according to Yuval-Davis, Anthias & Kofman (2005, p. 528) “Where do I belong? Is a recurrent thought for most of us. Asking this question is usually prompted by a feeling that there is a range of spaces, places, locales and identities to which we feel we do not and cannot belong.” Similarly, Bøås (2009, p. 20) argues that citizenship in Cote d’Ivoire and the DRC (where people use the term autochthony) is locked in the exclusionist language of autochthony. For Bøås (2009, p. 20) the autochthony “narratives argue that certain groups have certain inalienable rights to land, to property, to employment or to social benefits that other groups should not necessarily have.” In the case of Kivu one has to view exclusion alongside ethnicity and citizenship and this takes place in the realm of power. At a national level it is citizenship (state) and at a local level it is ethnicity (customary). Whoever captures power, however briefly, may try to reverse the exclusion. This became evident when the RCD, CNDP and M23 controlled North and South Kivu.

Within in these borders of belonging resources are protected. Some are excluded from certain resources whilst others are included based on their affiliation (ethnicity and citizenship).\(^87\) This brings one to the third issue and that is the relationship between a politics of belonging and scarcity. This is what gives rise to a narrative related to land. Access to land must be seen as part of a larger politics and it must not be limited to only land. Access to land is an important socio-economic means. With regard to this, Pillay (2004) highlights that the notion of belonging is hampered by the socio-economic differences between various political identities in South Africa. If one considers that land is accessed via ethnicity in most parts of Kivu, it illuminates a

\(^{87}\) See end note i.
key reason for a politics of belonging. According the Ceuppens and Geschiere, (2005), the increased competition over land in most cases fuels a particular claim to autochthony. According to Deon, the Babembe, and the Banyamulenge in the DRC always had animosity towards each other. The Babembe perceived the Banyamulenge “as people who came to took from us.” In line with this, the Babembe also feel that the Banyamulenge took their land and because of that the Banyamulenge’s cattle is perceived as theirs, the Babembe’s. The Banyamulenge would “retaliate by shooting a few” Babembe.

Furthermore, what happens when political violence elsewhere (a neighbouring country) leads to a massive migration into a specific area and it threatens the existence and livelihood of another group over a period of time? What if there was, at first, enough land and resources for everyone but as time went by, resources and land became scarce? Scarcity or a perceived scarcity will evoke a politics of belonging. In this regard, migration becomes problematic, especially when the migrants acquire land, produce and increase their wealth. How this land was acquired by migrants has historical significance, but lost that significance in North Kivu and South Kivu. In some cases migrants acquired customary land through their associations with the ruling elites. For example, Jacqui alluded this when she explains that “[w]hen Mobutu took power he also kind of marginalised them [Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge] until this other guy called Bisengimana worked for him and tried and claim their rights for Rwandans and so on.” In other cases, however, some acquired land privately through the state as citizens, whilst others acquired it through patron-client relationships. Bøås (2009, p. 21) writes that “[l]and is not only a scarce commodity in certain areas, it is also the most essential element of rural life. Land is everything as belonging to the land guarantees the rights of present as well as future generations.” The migrant had to enter into a subordinate relationship to acquire land and had to continuously make contributions to have access to the land. In the postcolonial state, however, these patron-client relationships came under threat as clients could now acquire land privately through the state. Mamdani (1998, 2001) explains that in the DRC there are two types of citizenship: ethnic and civil. Citizens were able to acquire land in the private sector and as members of ethnicities. However, things became complicated when all land was concentrated in the hands of the state and, when the Banyarwanda received citizenship, they were able to

88 An example of this would be the ‘transplantion’ of the Hutu of Rwanda in Gishari. See Chapter 6 for an indepth discussion on this.

89 See Chapter 6.
acquire land as citizens in the private sector. This led to a scarcity of land in the Kivus, especially where the Banyarwanda were concentrated. For example, the Mathys and Vlassenroot (2016) article opens with a striking photo of the land situation in Kivu.

![Figure 5: Land Competition in South Kivu](image)

From the photo it is clear that competition over land has increased. Thus, locals were pushed off their land or they had to share that land with new comers. The problem arises when the locals want the land back and to get the land back a claim of autochthony is evoked. Considering this, it is apparent why the land narrative is so popular in explaining the conflict. However, the competition over land is part of a broader politics of belonging.

The 2005 study of Vlassenroot and Huggins deals with the issue of land and how it is contested in the DRC. Globally the Lockean notion of property prevents people from acquiring the necessary resources they need to generate wealth.\(^\text{90}\) Property is in the hands of the few, who use it to enrich themselves. The idea of scarcity may thus be a result of how land ownership was thought of and institutionalised in European epistemology. Thus the Lockean sense of property might be fundamental in the construction of scarcity. Currently scarcity is a result of the poor getting poorer and the richer getting richer. The rich is saying they are not the cause of scarcity but the immigrants are.\(^\text{91}\) This diverts the hostility towards the immigrants and it keeps

\(^{90}\) See Chapter 2.

\(^{91}\) King Zwelithini, the Zulu King in South Africa, in 2015 called for the deportation of foreigners because he believed it is unacceptable for locals to compete against foreigners for economic opportunities (Ndou,
the elites in power. This notion gets its power from the narrative: “the immigrants are stealing our jobs.”

Finally, central to the discourse is interpellation which use ‘markers’ to re-enforce boundaries between identities. Markers are used by different powers (customary/local and state) to exclude and include. Two important markers in the case of the Kivus are language and morphology. Language helps to interpellate difference and maintain and police identity boundaries. Language became the marker of determining the border between who is Congolese and who is not. For example, when I asked participants what are the refugees from Burundi called, they responded by saying it is Barundi. Interestingly, the assigning of the category Barundi is done by the refugees themselves. According to Deon “[i]n fact not people from Congo, themselves classify themselves, as of where they belong, because they start creating those affinities … They call themselves Tutsis or Hutus but in the Congo they know them as Burundians.” Refugees thus classify or categorise themselves according to Barundi and Banyarwanda to distinguish themselves from the Congolese. To the Congolese they are Burundians. Migrants classify themselves along ethnic lines and not the Congolese. This seems to be the case since I asked participants whether it is possible to confuse the Barundi and the Banyarwanda and they said “yes”. The Banyarwanda and the Barundi therefore have to constantly remind Congolese who they are whether they are Burundian or Rwandan. This confirms Butler’s point about reiteration. Butler points out that “[i]f conditions of power are to persist, they must be reiterated; the subject is precisely the site of such reiteration, a repetition that is never merely mechanical” (Butler, 1997, p. 15). This reiteration is to confirm that one is a particular subject, which is a working of power in the subject’s psyche. In the case of the Banyarwanda and the Barundi this might be possible. They consistently have to confirm that they are Burundian or Rwandan which is the working of the Burundian and Rwandan state

23 March 2015). His ‘foreigner’ clearly was aimed at migrants from the African continent. Two weeks after his infamous speech a spate of xenophobic violence against foreign nationals from the continent broke out in Durban.

92 See Kate Wilkinson’s article published in the Mail and Guardian Online on 17 April 2015.

93 I am aware of the intellectual history of the concept interpellation and interpellate. The way I deploy interpellation and interpellate here does not ascribe to the Althusserian notion of the concept. Here I use it as a call when “difference” is invoked. The call is a result of Power. In the Althusserian sense Power is not the working of a psychic operation and in a Butlerian sense Power has a psychic life and can recognise itself. Hence, when a call of difference is invoke the Power recognise itself.
power, hence the references in Kirundi and Kinyarwanda to their respective nationalities; which is to say where they are from.

In this case language might be the mechanism through which to interpellate ‘foreigner’ from ‘autochthone.’ This also explains Mamdani’s puzzle. Mamdani (2001, p. 37) was puzzled that Rwandese become Banyarwanda almost immediately after they crossed the border into DRC. The language of the Congolese Banyarwanda is Kinyarwanda. Banyarwanda in Kinyarwanda means “people of Rwanda” and Barundi in Kirundi means “people of Burundi.” This therefore confirms what the participants said about the migrants interpellating them as Barundi and Banyarwanda. The Congolese in North Kivu and South Kivu speak Swahili or French and if they were to interpellate migrants they would have used Swahili or French and not Kinyarwanda or Kirundi. Thus, it is the migrants who ‘Other’ themselves at arrival in Congo. In addition to this, non-Kinyarwanda speaking Congolese (autochthones) find it difficult to distinguish between the Kinyarwanda speaking ‘autochthone’ (Banyamulenge) and the migrant (refugee). According to Andre:

In Rwanda there are Hutus and Tutsis. The only difference is the Kinyarwanda. The Kinyarwanda, the Kirundi. A Murundi when he speaks [a] Munyarwanda understand[s]. A Munyarwanda when he speaks a Murundi understands, but these two languages are different. But morphologically Tutsis from Rwanda and Tutsis from Burundi they look the same. Hutus from Rwanda, Hutus from Burundi look the same.

However, according to Deon “[s]omeone from Rwanda would speak French because they struggle speaking Swahili. Someone in Burundi would speak to you in Swahili.” However, it is still difficult for Congolese to tell the difference between Banyarwanda and Barundi. For example:

Jacqui: … look we would not really tell between a Munyarwanda and a Murundi, you see unless we asked; for us they tend to look alike.
Daniel: Unless you ask you will never know.
Andre: Unless you ask: What are you? Their language for us [is] the same.

Language thus does not make it easier to point out a difference in ethnicity of a Hutu Murundi and a Hutu Munyarwanda. However, they can tell the nationality given the languages they speak. According to Andre “the big difference is between the Tutsi and the Hutu. You cannot tell

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94 A friend of mine from Ghana told me that they are recognised as Ghanaian in Burkina Faso by the language they are speaking. Otherwise they are not distinguishable as Ghanaian.
a big difference between a Hutu and a Mushi for instance … They both Bantus, you cannot tell a
difference.” Congolese can only tell the difference if they develop relations with migrants.

According to Daniel:

However, it depends on the level of interaction we had with these two people. Or if you have an
understanding of these two languages, if you understand one of the two you can tell which one is
speaking Kirundi and this one is speaking Kinyarwanda. And hence by speaking this I can easily
tell he is from this area. Or the proximity you have to them. If you are very close to people from
Burundi you would know when they are speaking Burundian.

For this, proximity to the Banyarwanda and Barundi communities plays a role. Here one sees
that the Barundi migrants find it easier to integrate than their Banyarwanda counterparts and
language plays a role. According to Daniel:

And there is a sense of pride which is carried through language. I think the prestige. Someone
from Burundi has prestige when he speaks Swahili, and when he crosses into the Congo for him
to be heard very quickly these people they speak Swahili and I do, so for me to integrate very
quickly let me bring in something I already have and which we have in common and that is the
language we have. Someone from Rwanda does not see pride in speaking Swahili. Unless you
are high and you don’t want to be seen on top of the top then you would speak Swahili. So that
you create business very quickly, but otherwise you will speak French.

This sentiment is echoed by André “a Murundi would speak to a Congolese Swahili quickly
because a Munyarwanda will definitely try to converse in French.” Integration is thus the result
of a vernacular, and in this case it is Swahili.

However, morphology makes it easier to point to the difference between Tutsi and Hutu
migrants in North and South Kivu. Participants used morphology to distinguish Hutu from Tutsi.
For example, Tutsis are seen as pastoralist, tall, skinny and Nilotic. According to Andre:

But between a Tutsi and the rest of everyone else there is a big difference in shape,
morphologies. Is that the right word? You can tell the difference. The Tutsi are tall, small and their
noses, they got long noses, things like that. But everyone else, if you know the difference
between Nilotics and the Bantus, that is the difference.

Here a colonial rhetoric that was based on the Hamitic Hypothesis is visible, a rhetoric that
made the Tutsi ‘foreigners’ in the Great Lakes region. This rhetoric is based on an epistemology
that perpetuates a politics of belonging in North and South Kivu.

81
Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that identity formation in the Great Lakes region is trapped in the colonial epistemology that created the ‘civilized migrant’ and the ‘backward autochthone’. At the heart of this epistemology is the Hamitic hypothesis. It is the Hamitic hypothesis that gave rise to the racialised, nationalised and ethnicised version of the postcolonial subject one encounters today in the Great Lakes region. It is this epistemology that causes a politics of belonging. However, autochthony/indegeneity cannot simply be substituted for a ‘politics of belonging.’ A ‘politics of belonging’ aims to go beyond the trap of autochthony/indegeneity; it is to broaden the scope beyond who was first and who can claim autochthony/indegeneity. It is to open up the debate around origins and how one approaches the question of who belongs where in postcolonial Africa, and when one comes to belong in postcolonial Africa. At what point does one belong even if one comes from somewhere else? Here the ‘politics’ in politics for belonging helps one to shed light on who is claiming autochthony/indegeneity in the postcolonial state. As is evident from the discussion above independence and in particular multiparty democracy gave rise to various forms of politics of belonging; where the ‘autochthonous’ majority could exert control over the minority. The epistemology that currently decides who belongs and who does not is a mummified version of the colonial epistemology that brought forth various subject formations in postcolonial Africa. The next three chapters will place this politics of belonging in a lager historical moment. This will allow me to show the continuities, to rethink differently the conflict as regional, as two conflicts rather than one and to think of it historically. In Chapter 8 I will revisit the epistemological issues that are raised in this chapter. Here one will see that the “Hutu versus Tutsi” dialectic that gave rise to the 1972 Burundian genocide and the 1994 Rwandan genocide is reincarcianted as a Bantu versus Jew narrative; and that this reincarnation is rooted in the same epistemology that brought about the Hutu versus Tutsi dialectic.

95 Italics are for emphasis.
Chapter 4: State Formation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa - 1860 to 1960

Introduction

Much of today’s problem in the Great Lakes region is a result of its past. The establishment of a historical scope thus becomes an important endeavour in understanding and rethinking the conflict. However, taking into account that colonialism facilitated a particular becoming of the African colonial subject, and how the post-colonial subject is a continuation of that formation, one is confronted with a starting point in rethinking the historical scope of this conflict. This forces one to ask how far back one must go to give relevance to the on-going conflict. This chapter will illustrate why I suggest that it is necessary to go back to around 1860, since it was a particular moment that set in motion a chain of events. This chain of events had later devastating effects on the peoples of what now is today known as the Great Lakes region of Africa. This moment happened in Europe and its effects were felt in Africa.

The suggestion therefore is to consider colonialism within the context of European imperialism. The most evidential remnant of that era is reflected by the borders on the African map. The modern African map still reflects colonial borders and is still an important historical symbol of European imperialism. The partition of Africa thus becomes an important starting point since it was the partition and the conquest of Africa that created a ‘new’ reality for the African. It is within these borders that sites of power came to institutionalize particular subject formations during colonialism. It is also within these borders that the post-colonial subject saw his or her formation. These borders are a result of European Imperialism and are kept intact by the same epistemology which established them.

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96 In this chapter “the Great Lakes region” refers to Rwanda, Burundi and the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The conflict is mainly restricted to the geographical area around Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika.

97 My reference to the ‘African’ here is the African native European conquerors found when they colonized Africa. This, however, does not mean ‘native Africans’ at the time saw themselves as a collective, as African.

98 It is possible the colonial subject recognised his or her formation through observing the trauma of his or her fellow counterpart.
This chapter is an investigation into the border formation around the Great Lakes region and the sites of power which gave rise to the colonial subject. This means that one has to consider what state formation processes were disrupted and how Belgian and German colonialism reconfigured relations of power in the Great Lakes region under colonialism. Therefore, this chapter discusses how colonialism affected relations of power in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC.

**Nineteenth-Century Imperialism**

The African chapter of European colonialism must be seen in the context of Imperialism. Hobson (1902, p. 5) writes that “[o]ur other colonies are plainly representative of the spirit of Imperialism rather than colonialism.” Hobson was the first to theorise the term Imperialism and this led to a number of responses of which Lenin’s, at the time, was the most notable. According to Lorimer (1999, p. 7) “the term ‘imperialism’ came into common usage in England in the 1890s as a development of the older term ‘empire’ by the advocates of a major effort to extend the British empire …” Lenin in 1917 responded to Hobson in *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. He (1999, p. 91) argues “[m]onopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher system.” This higher system, he believed, was Imperialism and to this extent defines Imperialism as “the monopoly stage of capitalism.” Essential to understanding this stage is that “finance capital is the bank capital of a few very big monopolist banks merged with the capital of monopolist associations of industrialists” (Lenin, 1999, p. 91). This is accompanied by a transition in colonial policy. Here he notes that colonial policy was first “unseized by any capitalist power” but during the period of imperialism shifted “to a colonial policy of monopolist possession of the territory of the world …” After Lenin and Hobson, Rodney (2012) and Arendt (1976) also contributed to the study of Imperialism. Rodney brought an African perspective with *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* and Arendt indicated how the Jewish holocaust was a result of Imperialism in her book *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Like Hobson and Lenin, Rodney (2012) and Arendt (1976) argue that imperialism is not political but has its origin in the realm of business speculation. Starting a colony in Africa was an expensive affair and needed the investments of European financiers. For financiers investing in a colonial project was a risky affair, but it also promised big returns. Hence, Rodney and Arendt argued that imperialism had

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99 Here Hobson is referring to Britain.
its roots in business speculation. In addition to this, the central political idea in imperialism is expansion. According to Arendt (1976, pp.125-126) “[e]xpansion meant [the] increase in actual production of goods to be used and consumed.” However, “[i]n contrast to the economic structure, the political structure cannot be expanded indefinitely, because it is not based upon the productivity of man which is indeed, unlimited” (Arendt, 1976, p. 126). Thus, “[t]hat penetration of foreign capitalism on a world-wide scale from the late nineteenth century onwards is what we call ‘imperialism’” (Rodney, 2012, p. 136). The logic behind Imperialism was that a few European powers had to expand into Africa because they could not expand any further nationally and needed new markets. The national expansion was exhausted. This meant European powers had to expand the territory of the nation state into foreign lands to expand their markets.

Mamdani (2004) makes the argument in Good Muslim, Bad Muslim that the effects of imperialism are genocide and racism and if that happened in the ‘New World,’ then nineteenth century imperialism is not the first wave of imperialism. Thus, one may look at imperialism during the late 1800s rather as renewed imperialism (O’Brien and Williams, 2010). Thus, there is continuity between expansion into the ‘New World’ and the ‘scramble for Africa.’ O’Brien and Williams (2010, pp. 108/111) argue that there are several different scholarly explanations to help us understand the imperialist of the 19th Century. They identified five different explanations, namely: finance, race, class, local collaborators, and military and strategic competition. With regards to finance the argument is that “imperialism was caused by under consumption in Western States” (O’Brien and Williams, 2010, p108) and that led to European expansion into Africa. The second explanation is with regards to racism. According to O’Brien and Williams (2010, p.110) “European imperialists convinced themselves that they had a moral obligation to civilize other parts of the world.” According to Rodney (2012, p 137) the “British were the chief spokesman for the view that the desire to colonize was based on good intentions.” Good intentions took two forms: putting an end to the Arab slave trade and civilising the African (Rodney, Ibid).100 According to Mamdani (2004, p. 6) “Arendt understood the history of imperialism through the workings of racism and bureaucracy ... [since it brought about the] ...idea that ‘imperialism had served civilization by clearing inferior races of the earth’ ... [which] ... found widespread expression in nineteenth-century European thought.” This is evident by extermination of the Tasmanians, the Maoris of New Zealand and the genocide of the Herero of

100 In Chapter 2 there is an in-depth discussion around this notion of civilisation and conquest.
German South West Africa (Mamdani, 2004, p.6). In addition to this, there are also the mass atrocities conducted by the French in French Equatorial Africa and by King Leopold in the Congo Free State (Wesseling, 1996; Hochschild, 2001). Race was thus the condition that allowed for the impunity to exterminate or conduct horrendous atrocities in the name of civilisation. The third explanation is that imperialism was made possible by local collaborators. According to O’Brien and Williams (2010, p. 111) “European powers relied upon local elites (collaborators or mediators) to manage relations with the local populations … When the European ran out of local collaborators, a process of decolonization began.”

According to Rodney (2012, 142) “Africans conducting trade on behalf of Europeans were not merely commercial agents, but also cultural agents, since inevitably they were heavily influenced by European thought and values.” Here Rodney in particular point out the “mulatto” sons of the colonisers who were instrumental in helping European powers in their conquest of Africa. Mamdani in Citizenship and Subject and When Victims Become Killers, however, gives a more complex account of the “compradors” or “collaborators”. Mamdani (1996, 2001 and 2013) shows that a system of indirect and direct rule created the non-native and the native with two sets of laws for each identity and it was within the parameters of these laws that the colonial experience was constructed. The fourth explanation is drawn from Marxism and the main proponent was Lenin. Lenin views imperialism “as the highest and last form of capitalism” (O’Brien and Williams, 2010, p. 109). According to Rodney (2012, p. 136) “Imperialism meant capitalist expansion. It meant that European (and North American and Japanese) capitalists were forced by the internal logic of their competitive system to seek abroad in less developed countries opportunities to control raw material supplies, to find markets, and to find profitable fields of investment.” The final explanation says Imperialism is “the result of military and strategic competition between European States” (O’Brien and Williams, 2010, p. 109). Rodney (2012, p. 140) explains that the scramble for Africa was not a planned event. The leading figures at the time were Britain and France but that changed the moment Germany joined the race to acquire colonies. This increased the competition amongst European countries and this let to the scramble for Africa. Given this, one may regard nineteenth-century imperialism as the European expansion of culture, politics, science, business, etc. into the African continent, which was justified by racism and let to the oppression of Africans.

101 It is however not that simple, I explain this in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.

102 See Chapter 2 for an in-depth discussion.
Taking this into account, one can say that nineteenth-century imperialism started with the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, as it led to the rise of Germany and French colonial expansion (Wesseling, 1996, p. 10 and O’Brien and Williams, 2010, p. 103). French colonial expansion became problematic to Britain. This was evident with Britain’s occupation of Egypt in 1882 after the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881 (Wesseling, 1996, p. 362). It was a strategic move of Britain to protect its interests in India. The quickest way to India at the time was through the Suez-canal.

This set in motion a series of events which led to the Berlin Conference of 1884-5. One may consider Britain, France and Germany the dominant powers during this period, and of them Britain was the most dominant. According to O’Brien and William (2010, p. 103) Britain’s dominance was contributed to by its navy and financial wealth; since with their navy the British was able to dominate the coastlines wherever they were and with their wealth they were able to fund their allies against their rivals and their expansions into new conquest territories. By the time the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, called the Berlin Conference of 1884/5 Germany was strong enough to challenge Britain at an international front. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 led to the scramble for Africa. I have to note that the scramble for Africa was mainly over the control of Equatorial Africa and the Nile Delta (Mamdani, 1996; Wesseling, 1996 and Hochschild, 2001).

Contrary to what is most commonly believed, Africa was not partitioned during the Berlin Conference. The aim of the conference was to address the Congo question. It was at this conference that the borders of the Congo Free State were determined. However, after the conference there was set in motion a process commonly known as the ‘scramble for Africa’, which led to the division of Africa amongst European powers. This particular process happened in the board rooms and halls of European powers and was far removed from the people who were to be affected by this division and later conquest. African people were never consulted on where the borders on the African map were supposed to be drawn. The only contact Europeans made with the African people during the partition was via treaties. European powers and benefactors sent their men to ‘negotiate’ with African leaders to recognise European dominance.

Lenin (1999, p. 92) did not think that it is possible to establish the year and decade Imperialism came into being. However, he made his observation in 1917 and now in hindsight and with a much longer trajectory it is possible to see the start of what became known as Imperialism.

Léopold Senghor made this mistake in his essay Negritude: A Humanism of the Twentieth Century and also Fanon in Wretched of the Earth.

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in the forms of treaties. In most cases the interpreters were not able to translate these treaties and what African leaders signed over to European powers they did not understand (Lugard, 1922, p. 15; Hochschild, 2001, pp. 71 – 72). The partition of Africa was nothing more than a diplomatic game for European powers in a fast changing global environment.\textsuperscript{105} According to Wesseling (1996, p. 160):

> The negotiations and the treaty were thus typical products of European diplomacy, the work of political leaders who saw African problems in the framework of European diplomatic relations, and who attached little importance to Africa itself. They were not the work of colonial and imperialist fanatics, but of traditional Realpolitiker. The exchange of Heligoland for Zanzibar shows how much the partition of Africa was part of international relations in the wider sense.

The ‘partition of Africa’ and ‘scramble for Africa’ were therefore a ‘who gets what’ exercise to maintain the dominance of certain European powers. This was evident from the fact that a claim to any colony must be recognised by a dominant European power in exchange for something else.

**Creating a European Colony in Africa**

It is important to note that colonialism existed prior to its establishment as a practice in Africa. Colonialism in Africa was not a unique event. Africa was the last continent to be colonized by certain European powers and thus, when European powers colonised Africa they had much experience. European powers knew from experience “wherever the nation-state appeared as conqueror, it aroused national consciousness and desire for sovereignty among the conquered people” (Arendt, 1976, p. 127).\textsuperscript{106} With this in mind their attempts at empire building started. European powers generally opted for either the ancient Greek model of colonisation (where Britain led the way) or the ancient Roman model of empire building (where France led the way) (Arendt, 1976, p. 127/8). The works of Locke, Hobbes, Hegel and Gobineau aided colonial powers in their quest to rule over African nations, as it did in the Americas. They developed a colonial model where conquest states administered themselves.

\textsuperscript{105} The relativity of time allows us to assume that the emerging technology of that era must have terrified the people much as technology terrifies us now. You are able to sense this in Marx’s writing. This forced European powers into certain decisions and actions.

\textsuperscript{106} Also see Hobson (1902, p. 6).
In Africa most European powers adopted the British model of colonisation; mainly because Britain at the time was the leading European power and had the most conquest states and thus the most experience. The British model of colonisation employed direct and indirect rule over the natives. Mamdani (1996, p. 16) asked “how can a tiny and foreign minority rule over an indigenous majority? To this question, there were two broad answers: direct and indirect rule.” Thus, the form of state that emerged towards the end of the colonial period can be considered as decentralised despotism (Mamdani, 1996, p. 37). It came into existence through a process of salvaging and sculpting pre-colonial customs into a form of rule where the colonial power had complete control over the natives. Mamdani (1996) warns that it is difficult to reproduce a stable model of pre-colonial customary relations during the nineteenth century. However, a picture emerges with the curation of African history about how customary relations most probably looked during this period. If a single model of customary authority in precolonial Africa existed it can be seen as follow: “a king at the centre of every polity, a chief on every piece of administrative ground, and a patriarch in every homestead or kraal” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 39). It is important to note that there were two variants of chiefship: traditional and administrative. The administrative chief was appointed by the king but powers were kept in check by peers (traditional chiefs) and the popular constraint of the people (Mamdani, 1996). The reason for this was that the administrative chief was the main custodian of the land but not proprietor of it, and it was the chief’s responsibility to allocate land. However, the administrative chief was only allowed to allocate land in consultation with the people, if the chief did not do this “the ultimate popular sanction against a despotic chief was desertion” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 45). The clan could move to a rival chief or relative without any fear of retribution.

Indirect rule was framed according to a civilizing discourse. Lugard (1922, p. 195) firmly believed that some groups in Africa were more civilized than other groups and those who were considered more civilised had to assist the colony in its administration. For example, he believed that the “Fulani of Northern Nigeria are ... more capable of rule than the indigenous races, but in proportion as we consider them an alien race, we are denying self -government to the people over whom they rule, and supporting an alien caste -albeit closer and more akin to the native races than a European can be.” Given this, he argues for the native authority where the “indigenous races” will get the opportunity for “self -government.” However, he believed that this idea of self -government must be through an “Emir” or paramount chief and presided over a “Native Administration” (Lugard, 1922, p. 200). Interestingly, Arendt (1976, p. 130) argues that indirect rule was the British attempt “to escape the dangerous inconsistency inherent in the
nation’s attempt at empire building by leaving the conquered peoples to their own devices as far as culture, religion, and law were concerned, by staying aloof and refraining from spreading British law and culture.” Mamdani asserts that this was, however, only partly the case.

Colonialism manipulated pre-colonial customs into a system of indirect rule. According Mamdani (1996, p. 43) “the chiefship that the colonial powers created was built on the administrative variant, not the traditional” component of the pre-colonial customs. In this regard Mamdani (1996, p. 45) notes that “[c]olonial conquest built on the administrative powers of the chiefs, introducing a highly bureaucratic command-and-control system.” Near the end of colonialism, administrative chiefs “had the power to allocate land and administer schools; to approve the appointment of clerks, police, and messengers; to make bylaws and to adjudicate cases” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 47; Also see Lugard, 1922, p. 203). In addition to this, the ratio of European official to native population varied from space to space. For example: (1) in Nigeria in 1906, it was 1 per 45 000; (2) in Kenya in 1921, it was 1 per 22 000 and; (3) in Uganda during the same period it was 1 per 49 000 (Mamdani, 1996, p. 73). The reality was that the natives far outnumbered Europeans in the colony.

In this regard, the Native Authority became the conduit for indirect colonial rule and was headed by a colonially appointed chief. The Native Authority came “to be the rightful bearer and enforcer of an age-old custom and tradition” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 48). According to Mamdani (1996, p. 49) Britain saw the authoritarian possibilities in African culture and thus salvaged every authoritarian tendency of the precolonial history and also sculpted tradition and custom in such a way that it made indirect rule possible. Native Authorities became “armed with a whip and protected by the halo of custom” (Mamdani, Ibid.).107 Therefore, there was no escape for the African from the customary label, mainly because of two reasons: it included both personal relations (marriage, succession, movement) and access to productive resources (land). This meant the customary regulated every aspect of the African’s life (Mamdani, 1996, p. 50). We will see later how this becomes important for the formation of the colonial and postcolonial subject.

Furthermore, according to Mamdani (1996, p. 52) “[t]he decentralised arm of the colonial state was the Native Authority, comprising a hierarchy of chiefs.” In this regard, the Native Authority was “autonomous but not independent” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 51). According to Lugard (1922, p.

107 In the America’s natural law was used to dispossess Native Americans and in Africa it was customary law.
the native authority through “native courts” could “exercise their jurisdiction independently of the native executive, but under the supervision of the British staff.” This is further illustrated by the native authority’s ability to employ unarmed policemen and to ask the help of the colonial power to intervene “if a community combines to break the law or shield criminals from justice” (Lugard, 1922, p. 203). In addition to this, chiefs could be appointed at any time and also dismissed at any time. Even though chiefship was the lowest position in the colonial administration they had unlimited power over their ‘tribes.’ In addition to this, Native Authorities were structured in a particular way. Mamdani (1996, p. 53) notes that Lugard claimed that there were three pillars upholding the system of indirect rule: (1) Native Courts, (2) Native Administrative and (3) a Native Treasury. Mamdani (1996) added a fourth pillar called “law making”. Thus, the chief was the legislator, administrator, judge and policemen at the same time (Mamdani, 1996, p. 54). Simply put the chief was a powerful or the most powerful native.108

Thus, if one was to delineate a universal model for indirect rule in the African colonial state it might look something like this: (1) at the base would be the ‘tribe’; (2) followed by the Native Authority; (3) followed the district (British) or cercle (French); (4) followed by the Ministry of Local Government in the colony or an equivalent (Mamdani, 1996, pp. 49 - 73). This model was adopted and continued by the independent postcolonial states as a form of local government.109

From the Congo Free State to Belgian Congo

The Congo was not an autonomous nation-state in the European sense. What became Congo consisted of various Kingdoms that was forced together by King Leopold’s colonial ambitions. The Congo Free State, as it became known, was just the start of Belgian colonialism. ‘Official’ Belgian colonialism only started after the atrocities of King Leopold’s Congo Free State came apparent and Belgium took over in 1910. The Congo Free State came into existence at the 1884/5 Berlin Conference, of which King Leopold was made the custodian. This would not have been possible if King Leopold did not maneuver the international environment strategically

108 For a more in-depth discussion see Lugard, F. (1922). The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons.

109 The reality was that not all peoples in the conquest states had chiefs and since the model of indirect rule required a tribe with a chief, chiefless peoples were given chiefs. The Banyarwanda in Belgian Congo (Vlassenroot, 2004) and the Ndebele in Zimbabwe (Mamdani, 1996) are good examples of this.
leading to the 1884 event. He wanted a colony but the Belgium state was not interested. Thus when Stanley Mouton made it to the mouth of the Congo River, King Leopold moved quickly to get Mouton on his side (Hochschild, 2001). It just so happened that the leading power, Britain, at the time was not interested in acquiring another colony and was more interested in securing the Nile Delta (Wesseling, 1996). After several meetings with Mouton they agreed that he would assist King Leopold in acquiring the area along the Congo Basin as his personal possession. For this Stanley was tasked to get the chiefs and African political leaders to sign treaties with King Leopold (Hochschild, 2001). Without any treaties no bargaining could take place. According to Brausch (1961, p. 41) “... the first political relations between Africans and Europeans were based on the treaties made by the pioneers with traditional chiefs.” However, these treaties soon thereafter changed from friendship to overlordship (Brausch, 1961; Hochschild, 2001). At the Berlin Conference Leopold was able to produce the treaties he had with African political leaders in Congo and hence the conference established the borders of the Congo Free State.

After the conference Leopold started with a colony building exercise and first on his list was to shatter the ‘Arab slave trade’ along the Western shores of Lake Tanganyika. The abolishment of the ‘Arab slave trade’ was one of the major selling points of the conference. According to Anstey (1966, p. 32) “[t]he power of the Congo Arabs was shattered in ruthless campaigns lasting from 1892-5, during which there were notable examples of Belgian heroism.” Next on the list was to establish infrastructure, which would make the colonial enterprise worthwhile. Hence, Leopold needed a railway line from the coast to Leopoldville, to transport ivory and timber quicker and for this reason colonial administrators used forced labour (Hochschild, 2001). In Joseph Conrad’s book *Heart of Darkness* he sketches a dreadful picture of forced labour during this period\(^\text{110}\).

Things notably worsen for the Congolese with the discovery of rubber in the Congo. At the time Europe experience a rubber boom and the Congo Free State administrators demanded that Congolese pay tax in the form of rubber. If any African or chief refused to do so, women and children were kidnapped, beaten, raped and kept captive until men gave into the demands of the administrators (Hochschild, 2001). Each man was required to deliver a certain amount of rubber and if anyone did not make the quota they were either whipped or the hands of their

\(^{110}\) Conrad was employed by one of the trading companies in the Congo for a brief period. His experiences in the Congo let him to write the short novel *Heart of Darkness*. 
children were cut off. It was when these atrocities came to light that King Leopold’s Congo Free State was investigated. Leopold’s own Commission of Inquiry found that these atrocities were not only true but much more was going on than initially thought. For example, there was an incident where an African child was thrown away to die so that the mother could carry the cooking pots of a colonial administrator. It was also found that European men raped women; took Congolese women hostage to use them as commodity and for sex; and that a manual existed amongst administrators which described the “best” ways to subject and oppress the Congolese into producing the desired amount of rubber; as well as how the Congo Free State officials exterminated villages to serve as a warning to other villages (Hochschild, 2001, pp. 133 - 165).¹¹¹

The Congo Free State was thus a forerunner of official Belgian colonial rule in the Congo. When King Leopold became the custodian of the Free State his true intentions were revealed. He started a colony and set up a colonial administrative system. The administration was: (1) to put the system in place for the economic ventures of Leopold and his partners, and (2) to control the natives (Hochschild, 2001; Mamdani, 1996). Some of the first administrators in the Congo Free State were Christian missionaries. It was required of missionaries to play multiple roles. For example, “... the missionary, sometimes reluctantly, would soon find himself in the position of magistrate as well as Man of God” (Anstey, 1966, p. 34). As man of God the missionary used different ways to enter the African society. The best was education. According to Anstey (1966, p. 36) “[a] teacher-evangelist was, with the chief’s permission, sent right into the village, where he thought simple Bible stories to all who would listen and the elements of reading and writing to the children of such parents as could be persuaded to send them” (Anstey, Ibid.). It is important to note that most missionaries saw the spreading of Christianity as a way to civilise Africans.¹¹² According to Anstey (1966, p. 35) “… the missionary normally shared cultural arrogance of the Europe of the day meant that he often disrupted traditional beliefs more than was necessary.”

It was against this backdrop that Belgium took over the administration of the Congo Free State in 1908. According to Anstey (1966, p. 41) “Belgium had inherited her colony with some reluctance and partly out of a sense of duty for which she hoped she might be financially compensated in economic opportunities for her children.” However, Belgium “inherited a

¹¹¹ These types of atrocities in the Congo seemed to be repeating through the ages. The atrocities during the Congo Free State period read much like the postcolonial atrocities.

¹¹² In Chapter 2 I had a discussion on how knowledge subjugate and dominate.
concrete situation, a colonial administration of sometimes poor quality, and a series of decrees and an administrative compartment which together passed for policy” (Anstey, 1966, p. 41). According to Brausch (1961, p. 41) a Decree of the Free State dated 6 October 1891, aimed at integrating the native political institutions as units of local government into the framework of the newly-created Free State. However, a difficulty occurred since the traditional political units were very complicated hierarchical structures. It had hamlets and villages at the base, there were also parent villages, leagues/confederations of villages, then tribes, and sometimes kingdoms (Brausch, Ibid.). The reality was that the traditional African political structures were not the same as the European one. The first was to create a \textit{chefferie} or a unit of local government.\footnote{Chefferie means chiefdom when translated from French and \textit{sous-chefferie} means sub-chiefdoms.} At first they adopted villages as the basis for a local government unit (Belgian practice) but faced a problem since Congolese villages were large in geographical area and small in population (Brausch, Ibid.). Since, it was difficult to found a sound administration in villages with small population sizes, the Belgians (after Leopold) started to amalgamate various groups of \textit{chefferies} into one. They intentionally decreased the number of \textit{chefferies} to create a larger entity called \textit{secteurs}. Therefore, colonialism reshaped the political and the configuration of power. \textit{Secteurs} were the improvement of the local government unit of the Free State colonial administration. This was spearheaded by a Belgium Minister of Colonies. According to Brausch (1961, p. 42) “[t]he number of \textit{chefferies} was reduced from 2496 in 1935 to 1070 in 1940, 594 in 1945, 476 in 1950 and 432 in 1955 ... During the same period the secteurs in which these \textit{chefferies} were absorbed increased in number from 57 in 1935 to 383 in 1940, 498 in 1945, 517 in 1950; by 1955 they had decreased to 509 because of a decision to create large secteurs.” It must be noted that at no point were Africans consulted in the process. The decision was not based on democratic votes, in actual fact it solely rested on the decision of the Minister of Colonies. To make this process easier Belgium used money and violence to enforce decisions taken in Europe. In this regard chiefs were co-opted into the colonial administrative system (see Mamdani, 1996 and 2001). According to Anstey (1966, p. 33) “A decree of 1906 built upon that of 1891. The chief’s rights and duties were more particularly specified and it was laid down that they should receive a salary ...” Belgium also acquired Ruanda-Urundi as a colony after World War I.
From German East Africa to Ruanda-Urundi

I would like to begin this section by drawing the reader’s attention to the following: there are three things to consider when reading the history of Rwanda and Burundi: (1) in most historical records there is no history prior to the Tutsi ‘arrival’ (Lemarchand, 1970); (2) the historical narratives of the royal court is the most dominant (Newbury, 1988); and (3) many authors used the Hamitic hypothesis to start their historical narratives (Mamdani, 2001). Thus, while reconstructing a historical moment in Rwanda and Burundi one has to keep these three things in mind.

Cohen describes the broader Great Lakes region during the 19th century as dynamic. More to the centre of Africa one finds Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika and more to the east one find Lake Victoria. During the 18th century this area was very dynamic and this was because it was well-watered and densely populated. Cohen observes that during the 18th century competition amongst rulers were fierce and tenure in office was most of the time brief. However, it stabilizes towards the 19th century. When 19th century imperialism reached central Africa, it encountered four kingdoms in the region. These four kingdoms were: Buganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Bunyoro. Rwanda was located to the west of Buganda and Burundi to the south of Rwanda. More particularly the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi were established around Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika (Cohen, 1989, pp. 271 - 273).

In Rwanda “Kigeri Rwabugiri, ruled for nearly four decades until his death in 1895” and in Burundi “there were only two rulers in the nineteenth century, Ntare I Ruyamba, who is thought to have been placed on the Burundi stool in the last years of the eighteenth century, and Mwezi II Gisabo, who ruled from mid-nineteenth century until his death in 1908” (Cohen, 1989, p. 274). This allowed rulers, their courts and their clients, opportunities to construct stronger and more durable networks of authority and more secure administrations (Cohen, Ibid.). Following Cohen’s account it becomes clear that the Rwandan and Burundian courts’ expansions were restricted to the north and the east by Bunyoro and Buganda respectively. Their only option was

\[\text{Footnote:} \quad \text{René Lemarchand (1970) refers to Mwami Gisabo as Kisabo. I will rather use the later version of the Mwami’s name which is Gisabo.}\]
to expand towards the west and south. Rwanda could not much expand to the south but it expanded to the west\textsuperscript{115} (Newbury, 1982).

When German colonial powers reached the region they found two kingdoms: Rwanda and Burundi. Even though Germany and Belgium saw and treated the Burundian and Rwandan pre-colonial societies as the same, they were not. On face value there were notable similarities such as the ethnic groups Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, and in both kingdoms the Tutsis dominated the social, political and economic spheres of society (Bentley and Southall, 2005, p.32). However, with closer inspection there were also a number of nuanced differences. The following sections will have a closer inspection of these nuanced differences. My investigation will be divided into three sections. The first discusses the Rwandan colonial experiences, the second the Burundian colonial experiences and the last section will compare the two colonial experiences.

**Rwanda**

Catharine Newbury in her book *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960* traces the formation of what today is known as Rwanda. In this regard she chose to conduct her research in Kinyaga (Cyangugu Prefecture) “to avoid the concentration on royal perspectives so evident in earlier accounts”\textsuperscript{116} (Newbury, 1988, p. 6). It is important to note that “Kinyaga is located along the southern tip of Lake Kivu. The region is bordered on the west by Zaïre [DRC], and in the South by Burundi” (Newbury, 1988, p.8). According to Newbury (1988, p. 9) “Kinyaga’s location outside the central core of the state proved an excellent vantage point from which to construct a new perspective on Rwandan political development. Here political penetration of the royal court was recent, imposed only late in the nineteenth century.” Rwanda, as we know it today, did not exist in mid-nineteenth century; more or less the same time of the start of nineteenth century European imperialism (Newbury, 1988, p. 23-27). What becomes apparent is that there were various regions with various clans and it is not clear whether they were under the rule of a particular royal house (Newbury, Ibid.). Newbury was

\textsuperscript{115} See Newbury (1988) for an explanation of Rwanda’s expansion to the west.

\textsuperscript{116} Mamdani (2001, p. 64) applauds Newbury for her work on the formation of the state formation of Rwanda. He notes, however, that seminal text on the subject is that of historical sociologist Jacques Maquet. Newbury was one of two who reinterpreted the process leading to the Rwandan state. The Maquet account focus on the Royal Courts whilst Newbury is a bottom-up account.
certain that there was a central Rwandan court. According to Newbury (1988, p. 35) “before the nineteenth century there are no data indicating whether early pioneers coming from regions outside central Rwanda considered themselves ‘Rwandan’ or wished to have close ties to the Rwandan court.” This is important because colonialism confined these early pioneers to be Rwandan even though they could have been Burundian or Congolese.\textsuperscript{117} This returns one to the earlier discussion on borders and boundaries. The difference here is that colonialists decided on the borders and then enforced them. These borders formed the Rwandan, Congolese and Burundian colonial subjects (Newbury, 1997). The decisions of colonialists, who were far removed from the reality of the African people, forcefully included and excluded certain groups of people in the colonial state forming process.

Before European colonizers were present in Rwanda, the central court sent clients of the royal court to settle amongst those who migrated from other parts of Rwandan in Kinyaga. Newbury (1988, p. 29) argues that this was an effort by the central court to “subdue” some of the migrants. These clients “were frequently of Tuutsi\textsuperscript{118} status and had (or claimed) close links to the central court” (Newbury, Ibid.). Most of these clients were Rwanteri. There was an “important aspect of the installation of Rwanteri and Rukoro in Kinyaga … They were the first to arrive as official envoys of the Rwandan court, and their arrival marked the beginning of a period of colonization in the region by the court” (Newbury, 1988, p.31). From Newbury’s research it becomes apparent that Kinyaga was a place for migration. There were migrants from all over Rwanda but also immigrants from non-Rwandan areas such as the Congo and Burundi (Newbury, 1988, p. 34).

Over three centuries Rwanda had grown from a small polity to a sizable state. According to Newbury (1988, p. 38) “[f]rom the eighteenth century Rwanda experienced a steady expansion in both territorial scope and royal power” (Newbury, Ibid.). For Kinyaga things started to change dramatically with the reign of Mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri (c. 1860-1895) since it intensified linkages to the royal court, and the imposition of colonial rule also took place (Newbury, Ibid.). Newbury (1988, p. 40) describes Rwabugiri as an energetic and ambitious politician who centralized power and extended central political structures to the peripheral areas of the

\textsuperscript{117} Also see David Newbury’s paper \textit{Irredentist Rwanda: Ethnic and Territorial Frontiers in Central Africa}. David Newbury uses the two seminal works of Catherine Newbury to make his argument. Hence, I am citing the 1988 account of Catherine Newbury.

\textsuperscript{118} Newbury (1988) used the spelling Tuutsi instead of Tutsi throughout her book.
Kingdom. He also dismissed hereditary power held by old families of the Kingdom and appointed men who were dependent on him. Chiefs who were dependent on the royal court also assumed power in regions that were relatively autonomous in the past (Newbury, Ibid.). This “growth of central administration was marked by the appropriation of control over people, cattle, and land by political authorities” (Newbury, 1988, p. 40). The Rwabugiri’s expansion resulted in the immigration into “non-Rwandan” territories like the Congo and Burundi. Notable are the settlements of the Banyarwanda and the Banyamulenge in what is now known as North Kivu and South Kivu in the DRC (Mamdani, 2001; Newbury, 2001 and Vlassenroot 2002). According to Newbury (1988, p. 48/9) with the expansion some fled to the mountains west of Uvira in the DRC, where they have preserved their Rwandan language and culture. Newbury (1988, p. 51/2) argues that it was the efforts of Rwabugiri’s state building that heightened the awareness of differences amongst ‘ethnic’ lines. Moreover, Newbury (1988, p. 51) “noted that there existed many criteria for ethnic identification, among them birth, wealth (especially in cattle), culture, place of origin, physical attributes, and social and marriage ties.” In addition, Newbury (1988, p. 52) argues that the polarisation between Hutu and Tutsi started under Rwabugiri’s reigns and with the introduction of European colonial rule “ethnic categories came even more rigidly defined, while the disadvantages of being Hutu and the advantages of being Tuutsi increased significantly” (Newbury, 1998, p. 52).

In 1894 European Imperialism reached the central Rwandan court. While Rwabugiri extended his authority to the peripheries of what is today known as Rwanda, European powers were carving up Africa amongst and for themselves. Like I mentioned before, most of the partition of Africa took place in European boardrooms and later came into existence through conquest. The claimed territories were only claimed afterwards through conquest and extermination. It was in this context that German Count von Götzen reached the Rwandan Royal Court (Lemarchand, 1970; Newbury, 1988; Wesseling, 1996). In addition, by “1896, a small contingent of Belgian officers with African soldiers arrived to set up camp in Kinyaga” (Newbury, 1998, p.53). This was the first sign of European colonialism in the region. Newbury (Ibid.) notes that “[t]hrough superior force, prestige, and wealth, the colonial authorities persuaded and often coerced the incumbent (Tuutsi) elite to serve as intermediaries for colonial administration, thus establishing
a form of indirect rule.” The Belgians had the power to remove and install even kings if they felt a king was not cooperative with the colonial ideals (Newbury, 1988, p. 67).

European colonialism in Rwanda kicked off with intermediaries which in most cases were men with personal ambitions who collaborated with Europeans. Europeans allowed them free reign of the indigenous populations as long as the men served in their interest. The atrocities created by these forces were amongst others livestock seizing, the appropriation of women and children and destroying villages and through this reign of terror intermediaries of Germany was able to establish a colony (Newbury, 1988). Furthermore, the border between the Belgian Congo and German East Africa was only settled in 1910. According to Newbury (1988, p. 57) the boundary dispute “was settled in 1910 when Kinyaga was declared to be a German territory, as part of a larger agreement on colonial boundaries negotiated by Belgium, Germany, and Britain.”

Notably the Germans did not have much time to introduce proper colonial administration and it was only after the defeat of Germany in World War I and with the arrival of Belgium colonialism in 1917 that a more streamlined administrative system was implemented (Newbury, 1998, p.61; Mathys, 2013, p. 123). Importantly, after the First World War German-East Africa was divided into Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika.

As I indicated earlier most colonial powers used direct and indirect rule to rule of citizens and subjects. Germany also used indirect rule to rule over the native majority. According to Newbury (1988, p. 59) “[w]hen German authorities established themselves in Rwanda they embarked upon a policy of indirect rule, using existing “traditional” authorities to govern the country for them, supposedly without altering existing patterns of authority.” But by now we know this was not the case. During this period many new political actors came to the fore with the help of the Germans.

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119 I have to note that some historical accounts intentionally and unintentionally sanitize the violence and atrocities committed by the conquering nation. Newbury (1988) in her account is doing just that. Her choice of words does allow the reader to imagine the magnitude of these atrocities. Hundreds of thousands of Africans were killed in these colonial conquests; they were exterminated and this did not give African elite the choice to resist. Once threatened by extermination one will succumb to the subjection of the advancing power. See Chapter 2.

120 The effect of colonial borders is often overlooked in the history of the nation state. Colonial borders created artificial majorities in these new colonial territorial states. The borders between Belgian Congo and German East Africa was only drawn in 1910 and demarcated in 1911 on the ground (Mathys, 2013, p. 123).
It was in the beginning of 1926 that Belgium implemented a programme “to regroup and consolidate administrative units throughout Rwanda” (Newbury, 1988, p. 62). This marked the refining of the system of indirect rule in Ruanda-Urundi. According to Newbury (1988, p. 62)

This plan organised the state into subchiefdoms of roughly equal size, with at least 100 taxpayers in each, and grouped these subchiefdoms into chiefdoms, following roughly the boundaries of the precolonial provinces. Chiefdoms were then grouped into territories, each headed by a European territorial administrator … The King appointed chiefs with the consent of the administration; chiefs usually selected their own subchiefs subject to approval by the territorial administrator.

The sons of the chiefs were granted permission to attend school just to learn how to write and do calculations, as they were to help with the administration of the colony (Newbury, 1988, p. 63). The regroupment policy redirected the power from the central court to the local and provincial level.\textsuperscript{121}

The formation of ethnic identities such Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were at first locked in patron-client relationships called umuheto (cattle clientship) and ubuhake (involved families with no cattle) (Mamdani, 2001, p. 65). According to Newbury (1988, p. 42-3) “[w]hile land prestations in Kinyaga were collected on the basis of territorial units, another form of payment referred to as amakoro y’umuheto was collected on the basis of membership in named groups responsible to an umuheto (social army) chief. These prestations, collected annually or every second year, consisted of locally available products (often luxury items) and therefore varied from one region to another.” Newbury (1988, p. 43) also explains that when it emerges it was incorporated amongst mainly Tutsi lineages, but it was not restricted to Tutsi only as it included some wealthy Hutu lineages as well. Furthermore, according to Newbury (1988, p. 43) “[t]he umuheto chief selected lineages to be members of his umuheto group and the sent a client to collect prestations from those lineages.”

The prestations were considered a gift by the client in return for protection from the patron. According to Newbury (1988, p. 75) “[t]he patrons acted as ‘protectors’ for the lineage’s cattle while they received certain prestations or services from their client lineages.” At first these prestations could have been anything but later it became cows only. The difference between the ubuhake and umuheto clientship was that ubuhake was individual and the umuheto was lineage. Both systems were exploitative, but the ubuhake system was an arbitrary form thereof.

\textsuperscript{121} Here one clearly notices Mamdani’s decentralised despotism.
In addition, the *umuheto* system did not affect the entire population but certain lineages only. More importantly most cattle owners in the *umuheto* patron-client relationship were Tutsi (Newbury, 1988, pp. 75-76). However, not only patrons benefitted from the *umuheto* system but also clients. According to Newbury (1988, p. 77) “*Umuheto* ties to a central chief enhanced the status of a lineage and brought opportunities for political prominence through linkages to the center.” Thus, another reason for *umuheto* was:

> According to the central court tradition, all cattle which would normally be considered personal property (imbaata or ingwate cattle, or obtained through marriage payment, gift, purchase, or reward for bravery in battle) were known as the “King’s cattle” (inka z’umwami), and hence could be confiscated be delegates of the King. From the perspective of the central court again, cattle belonging to members of a social army (*umuheto* client lineages) were supposed to be grouped in named “cattle armies,” also under the jurisdiction of the social army (*umuheto*) chief (Newbury, 1988, p. 78).

Another form of clientship of particular importance to the Rwandan historical scope is the land clientship. There were two types: *ubukonde* and *igikingi* (Newbury, 1988, p. 79). According to Newbury (1988, p. 79) *ubukonde* was “land which had been cleared and settled by the lineage occupying it or their ancestors”, whilst *igikingi* was “land held by a cattle-owning lineage, granted by the king or another political official.” One will see how this later becomes a key instrument in identity politics (See Mamdani, 2001). Newbury (1988) explains that sometimes people (clan or social armies) resisted *umuheto* demands by means of open revolt but in most cases the chief had enough manpower to suppress the revolts and what happened next was that lineage groups submitted to the *umuheto* claims of the chief. After sometime, some of these chiefs became delegates sent by the central court, which altered *umuheto* traditions to favour them and the central court.

Most people were hard hit a couple of years before official European colonialism by a cattle disaster. According to Newbury (1988, p. 118-119) about 90 percent of the cattle in some locales were killed by a rinderpest epidemic in the final years of Rwabugiri’s reign. This impoverished a lot of families and it altered societal and political relations. After the Umuryamo, Rwabugiri started to rebuild his royal herd by doing a review and collecting cattle from most people. Thus when Europeans first arrived at the Royal Court they found a weakened Rwandan society with a radically altered patron-client relationship.

At first the capital of the central German administration in the region was in Usumbura (now Bujumbura), and the mayor outpost in Rwanda was in Kinyaga at Shangi (Newbury, 1988, p. 101).
Newbury explains that European policies openly favoured the Tutsi as rulers, excluding the Hutu from powerful positions but that it was also a transformation in patron-client ties that caused this cleavage between Hutu and Tutsi. The early German colonial administration used hill chiefs to administer the population. According to Newbury (1988, p. 127), under German rule the number of hill chiefs increased significantly. Hill chiefs used their newly acquired status to increase their wealth and influence. Like I mentioned earlier the Germans did not put in place quite as rigorous a system as the Belgians.

Belgium soldiers entered the region in April 1916 and drove the German forces out, leaving Rwanda to the Belgians (Newbury, 1988, pp. 128-9). Initially when the Belgians took over from the Germans they divided the country into four administrative zones. They also diminished the influence of the Royal court and dealt directly with the hill chiefs. The Belgians, like the Germans, favoured hill chiefs as their intermediaries to the population. This also gave these chiefs more coercive power since they had the backing of European colonizers. This was needed because European colonial administrators needed food, cattle and general workers for the colony. Chiefs later also appropriated the patron-client system for their own use; they kept some of the cattle and forced some of the people to work for them (Newbury, 1988, p. 131-2). Those who did not comply ran the risk of losing her or his land. Chiefs simply replaced or killed a noncomplying native and enlisted others who were willing to do as they wanted. In addition to this, European colonisers from 1926 onwards started to redistribute igikingi land which was used by cattle owners. The land was then given to cultivators who had insufficient plots. Newbury (1988, p. 133) explains that through these “standardization efforts under colonial rule, subchiefs now obtained a “legal” right to take over igikingi land.” According to Newbury (1988, p. 134) “[w]ith the reduction in amount of pasturage, and the control by subchiefs over that land, persons without an ubuhake patron often could not find pasturage for their cattle. This was particularly true on the Nyamirundi peninsula, where cattle density in relation to population was the highest of any area of Kinyaga.”

Another important patron-client relationship is the ubureetwa. According to Newbury (1988, p. 140) “[w]hereas ubuhake symbolized special status in relation to the patron (however unequal the bargaining position of the partners become), ubureetwa symbolized low status. And while ubuhake clientship affected mainly (though not exclusively) those of Tuutsi status, ubureetwa service was (by colonial law) made incumbent on all Hutu men.” Amongst other things Hutu under the system of ubureetwa had to collect and dry firewood, serve as watchman, fetching water and cultivate the hill chief’s fields. Those who refused lost their land. This particular
system was one of the few which colonial administrators did not abolish and it continued to enjoy legal status since it was considered a traditional obligation. It is worth noting, however, that the system was likely kept in place because it secured free or forced labour. What made matters worse was that *ubureetwa* was retained in its nonmonetary form, whilst *umuheto* prestations and land (*ubutaka*) prestations had been replaced with money (Newbury, 1988, p. 140 - 141). The consequence of these patron-client systems was that the Hutu was exploited on free labour whilst it enriched the chiefs, sub-chiefs and colonial powers. The Belgian colonial administration did try to put some restrictions to circumvent the exploitative nature of *ubureetwa*, but it yielded a few successes, because “[w]ere a Hutu to go to court, he had to testify before Tuutsi judges against his own chief. The chief usually won, since he was accustomed to ‘dealing’ with the European system and he often knew the judge” (Newbury, 1988, p. 143). Eventually the system was abolished in 1949 but it continued well into the 1950s (Newbury, 1988, p. 145). The system of *ubuhake* came to an end in 1954; significantly a decree was issued for the progressive dissolution of *ubuhake* ties and the distribution of cows to former clients. In addition to this, there was also discrimination against Hutu in Rwanda’s catholic schools enrolment from the late 1920s. It was the Tuutsi children who attended schools, entered priesthood and worked in the administration (Newbury, 1988, p. 146).

**Burundi**

Lemarchand’s historical narrative on Burundi starts with the Hamitic hypothesis. According to Lemarchand (1970, p. 18) “[i]n both kingdoms the invading tribes were Tutsi or Hima pastoralists. Although their origins are not firmly established, their physical features suggest obvious ethnic affinities with the Galla tribes of Southern Ethiopia.” Lemarchand (1970, p. 19) also notes that in Burundi a “nuclear cell seems to have taken place somewhat later, towards the middle of the seventeenth century, and under the guidance of a Hima King who came from the neighbouring kingdom of Baha.” This “nuclear cell” was extended through new

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122 The word choice of Lemarchand is different of that of Mamdani (2001) and Newbury (1988). Here he is using “invading” to describe the Tutsi settlement in the Great Lakes. He is also using “invading” with the Hamitic hypothesis. Therefore, he is unintentionally painting the Tutsi an ‘invading foreigner’ to the Great Lakes

123 Mamdani (2001) has a lengthy discussion regarding this and its effects on the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
waves of conquest to bring the peripheral areas into the central Kingdom and this was done under the rule of Mwami Ntare Rugaamba (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 21).124

Regarding the political structure of the Kingdom, Lemarchand (1970, p. 22) explains that “[t]here was no parallel in Burundi for the centralised, hierarchical pattern of authority found in Rwanda. Instead, power was fragmented among relatively autonomous political units, each under the authority of a prince.” This political structure was called the *ganwa*. The *ganwa* consisted of a group of princes who were all related to the King. For example, it consisted of the Kings brothers and their sons. Members of the *ganwa* could at any point challenge or eliminate the king so as to become the next ruler. Furthermore, the role the princes played in Burundi is important for understanding the ethnic structuring of Burundi. According to Lemarchand (1970, p. 23) “[b]y far the most important concerns the very prominent status achieved by the princes of blood, or *ganwa*, in the political system of Burundi. Because of the special eminence conferred upon them by the accidents of history, they became identified as a separate ethnic group, whose prestige in society ranked above that of ordinary Tutsi.” In this regard “low-caste” Tutsi were called Tutsi-Hima and “upper-caste” were Tutsi called Tutsi-Banyaruguru. It led to ‘dynastic feuds’ which in turn later influenced Tutsi-Hima and Hutu relations (Lemarchand, 1970, pp. 23-25 and Weinstein, 1972, p.18).

If one were to imagine the ‘traditional polities’ of the Burundian society it might look something like this: There was the monarchy at the apex of the structure, followed by the *ganwa*, followed by the chiefdoms and then by sub-chiefdoms. Lemarchand (1970, pp. 27-8) explains that unlike in Rwanda, there was a significant number of Hutu subchiefs. This, according to Lemarchand (1970, p. 28), explains “the long-lasting attachment of the Hutu peasantry to the cause of the Burundi monarchy.” Also, “… a Hutu could qualify for office and thus achieve higher status than many ordinary Tutsi” (Lemarchand, *Ibid.*) In this regard, Burundi was less centralised than Rwanda; although notable in the Burundian system is the dominance of the *ganwa*. According to Hans Meyer (quoted in Lemarchand, 1970, p.27) “the rulers are the heads of the royal kin, the *baganwa [ganwa]*, who let the royal puppet dance according to their wishes.” The *ganwa* in Burundi were the dominant political class, and had a mayor influence on the King.

124 Lemarchand (1970) compares Ntare Rugaamba to Kigeri Rwabugire of Rwanda. I think it should be the other way around.

125 This politics played out violently in the postcolonial.
The client system in Burundi was not as rigidly defined as in Rwanda because the clientage system was not embedded in the political system. In Burundi the clientage system was called bugabire (contract of pastoral servitude). Whereas in Rwanda the clientage system gave one political leverage it did not in Burundi, because “political office was so deeply rooted in hereditary claims” (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 37). Moreover, according to Lemarchand (1970, p. 37) “[h]ere the pattern of reciprocity showed little or no coincidence with the political hierarchy, and moreover, the obligations arising from the clientage relationship fell evenly upon Hutu and Tutsi” Lemarchand (1970, p. 41). In Burundi a few Hutu participated in clientage relations. In this regard, the clientage system did not codify colonial ethnic relations as much as it did in Rwanda.

Burundi was not easily penetrable at first because of myths and the terrain. The first European to complete an expedition through Rwanda and Burundi was Oskar Bauman. He explored Burundi in 1892 (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 47-8) but it was von Götzten’s expedition that brought about German colonialism (Wesseling, 1996). When European colonialism reached the Burundian central court there was a ‘chaotic situation.’ Mwami Kibaso was an ageing king and had close to a royal rebellion on his hands (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 49). European influence further weakened Gibaso’s position. Thus, even though the monarchy had not much power in Burundi prior to the arrival of Europeans, the effect of colonialism was detrimental to Gibaso’s power. He was succeeded by his son Mutaga in 1908. European colonialism also gave some chiefs the opportunity to strengthen their position. Most notable of these chiefs was Kilima. According to Lemarchand (1970, p. 50) “Kilima came down from the high-flying mountain area between Kagobwami and the Ruzizi to meet [the Europeans].” This is an indication that some individuals in the two kingdoms used European colonialism not only as an opportunity for retribution in the kingdom, but also to embrace European rule.

German colonial administrators did not spend much time in setting up a colonial administration. Much of the time was rather spent on pacifying Burundi. By the time of the First World War “the European administration was in a state of avowed bankruptcy because it had worked toward the disintegration of a Kingdom whose traditions, mores and religion were unknown and ignored” (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 56). As mentioned earlier, Belgium occupied Burundi in 1917 and in May 30, 1919 they were formally mandated with the Milner-orts Agreement to administror Burundi and Rwanda. However, it was only until 21 August 1925, that the “Belgium government enacted a law providing for an administrative union between their newly-acquired mandate and their Congo colony.” This shows the attitude of Belgium: that they saw Ruanda-Urundi as part of Belgium Congo – as a province.
Similarities and Differences

There were a number of similarities and differences between the Burundian and Rwandan colonial experiences. One of the main differences between Ruanda and Urundi was the interpretation of the socio-political. According to Uvin (1999, p. 255):

In Burundi a fine sociopolitical hierarchy prevailed, with a king and a class of princess (pretenders to the throne) at the top, various levels of Tutsi in the middle (those at the royal court, the Tutsi-Banyaruguru, socially higher than the ordinary pastoralists, the Tutsi-Hima), the Hutu at the lower level, and the Twa at the bottom … In Rwanda the political and social hierarchy between Tutsi (who included the king), Hutu, and the Twa was more abrupt and lacked some of the fluidity that characterised Burundi’s.

With this in mind, it is important to note that colonialism favoured the ganwa and enlisted them and the Tutsi as colonial authorities. The Tutsi who were in particular favoured was the Abanyaruguru. The ganwa and the Abanyaruguru were concentrated in the centre and north of Burundi, whilst the Hima and Hutu were moved towards the south of Burundi. Given this, it must be noted that there was a number of revolts in southern Burundi and it was directed towards the Tutsi and ganwa authorities. These revolts were suppressed by Belgian colonial force (Weinstein, 1972, p. 19). This political difference between the Tutsi became a central part of the post-colonial politics of Burundi.

The second difference was regarding the client patron relationships. In Burundi the client-patron relationship did not play as a big role as in Rwanda. As mentioned earlier the patron-client relationship in Rwanda was embedded in the politics of colonial Rwanda whereas it was not the case in Burundi, and hence it did not had such a devastating effect as it had in Rwanda. Patron-client relationships in Rwanda may be regarded as the primary reason for the anti-Tutsi sentiment, which essentially led to the Social Revolution of 1959. A third difference would be the violence experienced that was induced by the colonial powers. Burundi experienced the bulk of the colonial violence, and the violence was experienced across ethnicities. In Rwanda the Hutu experienced the majority of the violence and this violence was mainly induced by the Tutsi, through patron-client relationships. Fourthly, one has to consider that Ruanda-Urundi were two different kingdoms and Belgian colonialism introduced two different types of colonial administrative systems in the two kingdoms. Crowder (1993, p. 77) notes that indirect rule in Ruanda and Urundi had different characteristics. In Urundi “the authority of the Chiefs was
never directly threatened by the [colonial] administration” (Lemarchand in Crowder, 1993, p. 77). Significantly, chiefs in Urundi did not have to pay tax if they did not want to. However, things were different in Ruanda. In Ruanda “the cumbersome trinity of chiefs - land, cattle and army chiefs - was replaced by the rule of a single chief” (Lemarchand in Crowder, 1993, p. 77).

Fifthly, Hutu from Ruanda were transplanted to Gishari, a sparsely populated highland area west of Goma in the Kivu province of the then Belgian Congo. Newbury (1988, p. 66) also mentions of “European settlers … became an important presence in Kinyaga during the 1920s …” The rationale for this was to counter overpopulation in Rwanda and to aid European settlers in Kivu with a stream of cheap labourer (Newbury, 1988, p. 143). In 1928 the Comité National de Kivu (National Committee of Kivu or CNKi) was created to deal with the dwindling plantation economy in Kivu. In an attempt to rescue the economy the CNKi relocated about 300 000 Banyarwanda to Kivu. This also helped with the overpopulation of Ruanda-Urundi during this period (Mathys, 2013, p. 117-119). This was made possible since Ruanda-Urundi was administered as part of Belgian Congo. The migration to Kivu must be understood as an effort by Belgium to grow their colonial economies. It was merely a strategy to secure more labour for parts of the Congo where European settlers have settled and needed cheap labour (Newbury, 1988, p. 153 - 154).

The similarities between Rwanda and Burundi are twofold. One has to start with the form of colonial rule. The kingdoms were first administered by the German military as part of German East Africa. Germany established a military post in Usumbura (now Bujumbura) in 1896, and later in Kigali in 1907. These the two kingdoms were administered as two provinces (Crowder, 1985, p. 309). After Germany’s defeat in World War I, Belgium occupied the region in 1917 and dubbed it Ruanda-Urundi and in 1919 it became a mandated territory of the League of Nations and was administered by Belgium. It is important to note that since 1925 Ruanda-Urundi was administered as part of the Belgium Congo (Lemarchand, 1970).

The second similarity is compulsory crop cultivation. European settlers settled along the Great Lakes region from 1920s onward. The region saw a significant influx of settlers especially after each World War. The reason for this was mainly because the regions was fertile and the weather ideal for crop cultivation. Europeans also had a steady flow of cheap labour and were thus able to appropriate larger profits. Cheap labour was also needed in the Katanga mines in the Congo. One particular company, UMHK, sent more than 7000 workers from Ruanda-Urundi to the Katanga mines (Newbury, 1988, p. 160 - 163). When the industrialization of the Belgian Congo came to an almost complete standstill, because of the famine in the late 1920s in
Ruanda-Urundi and the 1930s Depression, there was renewed interest in the agricultural sector in the colonies. The Belgians introduced a policy of obligatory crop cultivation. Under this policy Africans was coerced into growing only certain crops, “which European exporters in the Congo could buy cheaply (and still sell for a profit on the depressed world markets)” (Newbury, 1988, p. 154). To enforce this policy in Ruanda-Urundi European colonial administrators turned to traditional authorities. Chiefs and subchiefs were tasked with administering the process of obligatory crops cultivation. Those chiefs who did not comply were simply removed and replaced by others (Newbury, 1988, p. 155). Their administrative duties were to oversee obligatory cultivation, tax collection, and to mobilize labour for road building, reforestation and the building of various state dispensaries. Newbury notes that the Ruanda-Urundi colony in 1936, for the first time, achieved a balanced budget, this was mainly done on the backs of forced labour; the ubureetwa system was the biggest proponent of this. This has striking resemblance with that of the Congo rubber boom (Newbury, 1988, p. 155 - 156).

Belgium used a form of indirect rule in Ruanda-Urundi. However, there were major differences between the British and the Belgium forms of rule, and between their administration of Rwanda and Burundi. At First Pierre Ryckmans used a legitimacy approach. Ryckmans believe that “[t]he only smoothly functioning organ between [Europeans] and the masses is the legitimate chiefs” (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 66). Ryckmans hoped that his “legitimacy approach” would ‘legitimize’ European colonialism. According to Lemarchand (1970, p. 66) Ryckmans also wanted the kings of Ruanda-Urundi to “act as the prime legitimisers of Belgian colonial policies and practices, or, as Ryckmans put it, ‘as the familiar décor which permits us to act in the wings without alarming the masses.’” However, this soon changed because in Burundi some chiefs, who flouted the authority of the monarchy, were officially recognised by the Belgian administration (Lemarchand, Ibid.). In addition, Lemarchand argues that comparatively chieftancy (as a political structure) settled much earlier in Burundi than Rwanda. The ganwa and the political organisation of Burundi were more hierarchical and thus regarded as older. The Belgium administration gave the ganwa a relatively free hand to administer their fairs – their rule was based on the ganwa rule and this meant the rule of the chiefs was not directly affected by the colonial administration (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 71). Lugard, the father of indirect rule, had this to say about indirect rule in Ruanda-Urundi:

126 Ryckmans was the Governor-General of Belgium Congo from 1934 to 1946. He is also the author of two books: Dominer pour server (Dominate to Serve) and Politique colonial (Colonial Policy).
At present the chiefs [of Ruanda-Urundi] have no right to give any order that had not been previously sanctioned by the administration. They had no criminal jurisdiction; their treasuries were under the direct control of the Administrator … The present system … did not seem to allow of any personal responsibility for the chiefs (Lugard in Lemarchand, 1970, p. 77).

The Belgium system of indirect rule seemed imposed from above and denied the kind of ‘freedom’ of the British version of indirect rule (Lemarchand, 1970, pp. 78-79).

Towards Independence in Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi

Like in the Belgian Congo, the Rwandan society was also made up of a rural and an urban population. The rural and urban populations were ruled by two types of laws. The rural populations were ruled through customary law and the urban population through civil law. Customary law produced the ethnic colonial subject and the civil law produced the racialized colonial subject. The reason for this distinction was that there were European settlers living in the urban centres. Hence, the rural peasant migrating to urban centres was transformed from ethnicity to race (Mamdani, 1996; Mamdani, 2001). Civil law that produced the racialized subject is the prime example of the colonial civilisation discourse. For example, the evolues of Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi were produced in this discourse. In Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, people who migrated from rural areas had to “evolve” or had to be “civilised” to attain citizenship under civil law; thus the term evolue.

The growing African population in the urban centres of the colonies was the result of the colony’s need for a European-educated black population (Zeilig, 2008; Newbury, 1988). In Rwanda urban centres gave the Hutu the opportunity to escape the oppressive rural system. Newbury (1988, p. 180) marks that leading up to the 1959 Social Revolution an important alliance developed between the Hutu evolues, the local level Hutu leaders and the Hutu peasants. In this regard Newbury (1988, p. 181) notes that “[i]mportantly it was this rural anger which gave energy to the emergent National Hutu Leadership and party organisation.” Moreover, “[t]he leaders did not create rural political consciousness, however, they articulated and channelled it, even while being pushed to make particular demands by their rural constituencies.” This meant the Hutu evolues and leadership had the means to take the Hutu peasants struggle forward.
One has to consider two important world events in the movement towards independence in Ruanda-Urundi and Africa in general. Crowder (1993) describes at length how the Great Depression and the Second World War laid the foundations for the anti-colonial movement that took hold of the continent after 1945. Many Africans were forced into participating in the Second World War and their participation was twofold. Firstly, colonies like Belgium, France and England needed soldiers to stop Hitler’s advance across Europe. Many Africans were enlisted to fight for the Allied Forces.\(^\text{127}\) Secondly, in Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi peasants were forced to produce certain crops for export and domestic consumption. This was bought by colonial powers below market price to make a profit in the world market. Africans during this period were also required to pay direct taxes of which they did not receive any remission. In addition, Africans could not purchase imported necessities such as clothing, cooking utensils and school material for their children on their regular production and had to cultivate more land so as to enable them to purchase more. During the Second World War African males in Ruanda-Urundi had to work 120 days of obligatory service to the colony. This was to increase the output during the war time. According to Crowder (1993, p. 94) “[t]he main agents of this policy were, of course, the chiefs, whose unpopularity was thereby further increased.” Thus, by the end of the Second World War drastically needed change. According to Crowder (1993, p. 99):

It was not only the expectations of the elite that were heightened by the war. Soldiers who had been taken from rural farms to fight in Burma or work as labourers in the Middle East or Italy learnt new skills and trades; many were taught to read and write; large numbers of them expanded their horizons as they sojourned in India where the nationalists were demanding that the British should quit their country, or in Italy where they saw the immense destruction one group of white men could visit on another. When they returned to their countries they did so with ambitions for themselves and their children that were utterly different from those they had when they first stood before the recruiting officer.

The wave of independence which gripped the continent during this period also reached Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. In Ruanda-Urundi it gave the Hutu the opportunity to reverse the Tutsi dominance (Mamdani, 2001). In the Congo it gave the Congolese an opportunity to reverse European dominance. It was in this climate that political parties Belgian Congo and

\(^{127}\) Also see the books of Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Maks* and *Wretched of the Earth*, for a discussion on this.
Ruanda-Urundi were born in both Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. For these two important elements were needed to realise independence: education and a majority.\footnote{Fanon’s work deals with the importance of native intellectuals during this period provided an opportunity to create new political and economic elites.}

In an attempt to reform the inequalities in Rwandan social and political structures the Belgian authorities undertook to progressively democratize and prepare the population for independence (Newbury, 1988, p. 184). The first step was to create councils at the level of subchiefdoms and the Territory level but to retain the existing councils at the chiefdom and country level. For electing a member to the subchiefdom councils, electoral colleges were established with the consent of the Chef de Chefferie and the Territorial Administrator. Electoral colleges in turn choose from among them members to serve on the subchiefdom councils. It is important to note that in no way were these elections democratic or representative of the population (Newbury, 1988, p. 184). The deciding moment for the emergent Hutu political activists was the 1956 councillor election. A number of Hutu activists were elected to the councils and their participation in the council gave them the opportunity to develop a sense of how these councils operate and how these decisions, which affected Hutu people in general, were made (Newbury, 1988, pp. 185 - 186). However, even though some Hutu made it into these councils representation was largely disproportionate.

Looking at the pre-independence events leading up to the Social Revolution of 1959 it was the native intelligentsia who created the space for the Revolution. Prominent leaders such as Gregoire Kayibanda and Aloys Munyangaju used the press to make their views heard and reach out to Hutu peasants. It also created the space to garner external support for the Hutu cause. From this was the 1957 Hutu Manifesto born.\footnote{The Hutu Manifesto of 1957 laid the foundation for Hutu Power and the Social Revolution of 1959 in Rwanda. For a detailed discussion on the Hutu Manifesto please read When Victims Become Killers.}

Early political parties were that of Kayibanda, the Mouvement Social Muhutu (MSM and later known as Parti du Mouvement l’Emancipation Hutu or simply PARMEHUTU) and that of Joseph Habyarimana Gitera, the l’Association pou la Promotion Sociale de la Masse or APROSOMA. Both held two substantially different ideologies and tactics. PARMEHUTU took a strong ant-Tutsi stance and stressed the liberation of the Hutu whilst APROSOMA called for the Freedom of all oppressed groups (Newbury, 1988; Mamdani, 2001). In 1959 the Tutsi-elite responded by creating the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR). It took a more aggressive approached and...
tried to prevent people from joining the Hutu parties. There was also a more moderate Tutsi party called Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais (RADER) which called for the progressive transformation of Ruanda-Urundi (Newbury, 1988; Mamdani, 2001).

It was this that set the stage for the Social Revolution of 1959. It is believed that it started when a group of Tutsi youth attacked a Hutu subchief, Dominique Mbonyumutu. Hutus retaliated and violence spread across Rwanda. According to Newbury (1988, p. 195) "[t]he rapidity with which this protest spread gave evidence of intense resentments against Tuutsi rule and a desire for change among many rural people." The Tutsi having some of the coercive power, through means of the Mwami, began to arrest Hutu leaders and kill them. Up to this point Hutu mainly looted and destroyed Tutsi property (Newbury, 1988). With the help of Colonel Logiest, who was appointed during the wake of the violence as the Special Military Resident in Ruanda-Urundi, the Hutu retaliated with force against the Tutsi. Also, after the November 1959 uprising Tutsi authority was rejected and this led to Logiest’s order to dispose of as many of the Tutsi chiefs as possible. This in turn saw a number of Tutsi fleeing to neighbouring countries. Logiest also appointed new interim chiefs who were supporters of PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA. Newbury (1988, p. 197) notes that “[b]y the beginning of March 1960, Hutu interim authorities already headed 22 of Rwanda’s 45 chiefdoms, and 297 of the 531 subchiefdoms.” This gave Hutu leaders the necessary access to valuable political resources for the 1960 commune elections. Newbury also explainsthat the revolution took 22 months and ended with the referendum in the monarchy in September 1961. Elections were supervised by the United Nations (UN) and Hutu parties won the overwhelming majority and the referendum brought an end to the monarchy and Rwanda gained its independence on 1 June 1962 (Newbury, 1988, p. 197).

Contrary as to what happened in the Rwandan kingdom (the disintegration of the power of the Royal Court); in Burundi the monarch was the remaining source of power at independence in 1 July 1962 (Bentley and Southall, 2005). According to Uvin (1999, p. 256) “[i]n Burundi the monarchy survived the colonial period with more social strength than in Rwanda, and as a result a royalist and biethnic party, Uprona (Union pour le Progres National), led by a prince, Louis Rwagasore, won elections both before and after independence.” Thus, the eldest son of mwami Mwabatsa was elected as prime minister in 1962 but assassinated soon afterwards. This was mainly attributed to the stance his party Uprona took, which was more nationalist and away from ethnic politics, during the build-up to independence (Bentley and Southall, 2005, p. 42).
Around the same time the Social revolution took place Congo erupted into violent protest. The build up to it was also over a very short period of time, forcing the Belgian state to recognise the Congo as an independent state by June 1960. At first Belgium did not have a timeline for independence and believed in gradually releasing power to the Congolese people (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1983; 1987). One of the early political parties who demanded independence was Abako but proposed a thirty year plan. At first Belgian authorities were very ignorant towards the demands of the people but as time went by and political unrest started to develop they were forced to announce a five-year-plan on 13 January 1959. However this was rejected in June 1959 by the Memorandum of the Eight, which were the eight most important political parties at the time. Soon afterwards Patrice Lumumba’s Mouvement Nationale Congolais (MNC) demanded for independence by June 1960. In response, the Belgian government organised a roundtable discussion which was attended by 45 Congolese political leaders, at this roundtable discussion a decision was taken to grant independence by June 1960 (Zeilig, 2008).

Conclusion

This chapter highlighted the importance of extending the historical and geographical scope in rethinking the ongoing conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu. In this regard, the historical scope must be extended as far back as the late 1800s as it was European imperialism which led to the partition of Africa among European powers and that resulted in new territorial states. The borders of these new territorial states created artificial minorities and majorities around the Great Lakes region of Africa. European colonialism operated as decentralised despotism, where the African native was ruled indirectly through native authorities and Europeans directly through colonial authorities. Colonial powers invested a great amount of power in chiefs; who operated as the judges, the treasuries, the law makers and the administrators of the colonies. With so much power there was bound to be abuses, many of which notably took place in Ruanda-Urundi; it allowed chiefs to alter age-old patron-client relations more in favour of the ruling Tutsi elite. Meanwhile in the Congo, an industry and colony was built on the back of forced labour. Congolese people experienced a great amount of atrocity during the reign of King Leopold and the rubber boom. Violence subjected the Congolese people to colonial but when the wave of independence reached the Congo, the Congolese rose and demanded independence. The quest for independence was led by the African intelligentsia. It was rapid and intense. In Ruanda it led to the Social Revolution which sped up the process of decolonisation in Ruanda-
Urundi. Ruanda-Urundi received its independence in June 1962 and the Congo received its on June 30, 1960. The hope was that independence would bring an end to the violence. However, the violence continued in postcolonial Rwanda, Burundi and Congo. One might ask: Where does this violence come from? For me, the answer to this question is found in the continuation of the colonial institutions in the postcolonial state. The institutions that violently gave birth to the colonial subject were preserved in the postcolonial state in the Great Lakes region. This led to two types of conflicts in North and South Kivu. The first was a politics of belonging and the second was a regional conflict between Hutu and Tutsi elites.\(^{130}\) Whoever has control over the institutions of power had control over the processes of subject formation – the power to exclude and the power to include. The next chapter will investigate incidents of postcolonial violence in Rwanda and Burundi and how it relates to subject formations in these instances.

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\(^{130}\) I will demonstrate in the remaining chapters that a politics of belonging is the very nature of the ongoing conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu.
Chapter 5: Postcolonial Political Violence in Burundi and Rwanda

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the historical scope of the question of violence in the region and the conditions in which the colonial subject was inaugurated in the Great Lakes region. I argued that colonialism created particular realities for the peoples of the Great Lakes region, part of which is how they were defined and how they then were permanently fixed to a particular area. In this chapter one will see that the institutions that violently formed the colonial subject were preserved in the postcolonial state. These institutions became the sites for various power struggles because whoever was in control of the institution had the power to include or exclude. Apart from a politics of belonging it also gave rise to a conflict between Hutu and Tutsi elites. Consequently, one notices that in Burundi up to 1993 Tutsi power dominated the Burundian nation-state, and in Rwanda Hutu power controlled the nation-state until 1994. Currently, the roles are reversed, the Tutsi is in control of the Rwandan state and the Hutu is in control of the Burundian state. Therefore, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first discusses the postcolonial violence in Burundi and the second discusses the postcolonial violence in Rwanda. Here one sees that political violence in Burundi and Rwanda caused an influx of refugees into the North and South Kivu. One also finds that whenever there is a conflict in either Rwanda or Burundi the victims flee to a place they feel safe, where they ethnically ‘feel at home.’ For example, during the Social Revolution in Rwanda, some Tutsi fled to Burundi and Congo and it had major implications for ethnic relations in these spaces. As for the conflict in Burundi, the Hutu ended up in Rwanda and Congo, where it also had major implication for ethnic relations in those spaces.

131 Hutu Power and Tutsi Power are different to Tutsi power and Hutu power. The former (Power) relates to the ideological formation and the latter (power) to which ethnic group dominated the postcolonial state in Rwanda and Burundi. See When Victims Become Killers for a discussion on Tutsi power and Hutu power.
Post-colonial Violence in Burundi

The ethnic cleavage between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi started after the assassinations of Prince Rwagasore and Prime Minister Ngendandumwe. The Social Revolution in Rwanda also contributed to this cleavage because it led to an influx of Tutsi refugees in Burundi and with them they brought their perceptions of the Hutu in general. Thus by 1972 there was a clear division between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi. In addition to this, Cold War politics played a huge role in keeping authoritarian regimes in place and Burundi was no exception. However, the decline of Tutsi power in Burundi ran parallel with the decline of the Cold War, and one notices democratic reforms towards the end of the Cold War; in the early 1990s. Taking this into account, one can argue that a politics of belonging developed in this environment since various ethnic conflicts from 1965 to the Civil War in the mid-1990s was ultimately about the fear of the “Other.” Hutu and Tutsi periodically initiated attacks out of fear that the other might attack first. Thus, from the literature one is able to identify four major dates of political violence in Burundi: 1969, 1972, 1988 and 1993, which shaped post-colonial Burundi (See Appendix 1).

The Rocky Start: 1965 to 1969

One needs to see the violence of 1965 as a precursor of 1972. However, the violence of 1965 is a result of transition politics. At the start of the post-colonial era, there were no visible public incidents of anti-Tutsi or anti-Hutu sentiments in Burundi. UPRONA, a party led by Prince Louis Rwagasore, united Hutu and Tutsi anti-colonialists. Daley (2006, p. 666) notes that UPRONA easily won the legislative elections in 1961 and Rwagasore became the Prime Minister of Urundi. According to Daley (2006, Ibid) “[t]he Belgian administration, fearing the threat of a mass-based party, branded Rwagasore a communist, and lent its support to the less radical PDC, which was not in favour of immediate self-rule.” Prince Rwagasore was murdered in an attempt by the PDC and the Belgium government to control the postcolonial Burundian government (Daley, Ibid.). This did not, however, have the intended results and the UPRONA

132 A Tutsi of Rwanda will interpellate a Hutu of Burundi in the same light as Hutus in Rwanda. Thus, a Hutu everywhere became the enemy of Tutsi, and he or she represents or take the space of a perpetrator. It is the same vice a versa.

133 PDC stands for Parti Démocrate Chrétien.
won the elections and formed the post-colonial government in 1962 when Urundi and Ruanda was separated. Pierre Ngendandumwe, a Hutu, was elected in 1963 as Prime Minster.

The second high profile political leader who was killed was Prime Minister Ngendandumwe. According to Daley (2006, p. 667) “[t]he assassination of Hutu Prime Minister, Pierre Ngendandumwe on 18 January 1965, by a Tutsi employed at the US embassy, illustrates the role Cold War politicking played in fermenting tribal hatred.” Cold war politics put any political leader at risk during this period. The Western block expected African leaders to have a clear anti-Soviet stance and any African government who opposed this was sabotage and replace. Many *coup d’états* were sponsored by Western allies to replace anti-Western governments.134

In addition to this, the Burundian King, after the Prime Minister’s assassination, refused to appoint a Hutu successor and appointed his personal secretary as the prime minister (Ndikumana, 2000, p. 433). According to Brachet and Wolpe (2005, p. 24) after the assassination King Mwambutsa decided to bypass the May 1965 elections and appointed his private secretary as the Prime Minister, a group of Hutu police attempted a coup but failed. The Tutsi elite brutally suppressed this attempt and between 5000 and 25000 Hutu were killed in one month (Brachet and Wolpe, Ibid.). The assassination of the Prime Minister and the refusal of appointing a Hutu Prime Minister triggered the 1965 violence.135

It is important to note that during the post-colonial period, especially immediately after colonialism, and with the assassination of Rwagasore, three groups of power developed: the Tutsi-Hima, the Tutsi-Banyaruguru, and a small emerging Hutu elite (Uvin, 1999, p. 256). This does not come as surprise because as indicated earlier, there was a regional struggle between Tutsi-Hima (southern Burundi) and Tutsi-Abanyaruguru (northern and central Burundi) (Weinstein, 1972, p. 19). Hence, 1965 created the perfect conditions for a coup. A Tutsi dominated military took control of the government in 1966. A group of Tutsi-Hima, who also controlled most of the army, led the coup. This led to the Micombero *coup d’état*. When Micombero seized power he was only 26 years old. According to Turner (2010, p. 28) “Micombero’s ideology was very modernist, developmentalist and anti-imperialist.” His idea was to create a Burundi without any ethnic division. This was rather ironic if one considers that most

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134 The aftermath of the Congo independence one also notice this. Lumumba’s assassination and the subsequent deployment of Cuban soldiers to the Congo is a clear indication of Cold War politics.

135 Notably a Tutsi Rwandan refugee assassinated Prime Minister Ngendandumwe (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005, p. 6). This was a refugee of the 1959 Social Revolution in Rwanda. This in a way signals the start of public anti-Hutu sentiments in Burundi.
of his closest allies in government were Tutsi-Hima from Bururi. Turner (2010, p. 29) believes that his reason for this must have been the Social Revolution in Rwanda. The Social Revolution in Rwanda made “the Tutsi in Burundi very vigilant about any ethnically based social movement” (Turner, 2010, p. 29). The ‘Inyenzi’ (as refugees from Rwanda came to be known in Burundi) became an important political unite in Burundian politics and was closely aligned with some members of the Abanyaruguru elite (Weinstein, 1972, p. 20). This also contributed to the split between the Abanyaruguru and the Hima. More importantly, the presence of the “Inyenzi” also created the “Hutu peril.” According to Weinstein (1972, p. 23) “[m]any Tutsi still live in dread of the Hutu and fear that, as in Rwanda, the Hutu masses will one day rise up and massacre the Tutsi elite.” The Hutu majority became the “Hutu peril” and to a certain extent this united the Tutsi against the Hutu, but not intra-Tutsi (Also see Weinstein, 1975, p. 18). According to Lemarchand (1997, p. 13) “power became the exclusive privilege of Tutsi-Hima elements from the south (Bururi), a situation that came to reflect the dominant position of Tutsi-Hima officers in the military.” Therefore, the intra-Tutsi struggle (Hima versus Abanyaruguru) was still visible.

As the Hutu were marginalised in the military and government positions, tensions started to rise between Hutu and Tutsi on the ground. This led to another failed coup attempt by a group of Hutu. According to Ndikumana (2000, p. 433) “[in] 1969, government allegations of a Hutu led coup d’état led to the arrest, incarceration, and execution of scores of Hutu politicians and soldiers.” The result was more purges of Hutu from the military and more violence against Hutu civilians. This sets the scene for 1972.

**Burundi’s Second Defining Moment: 1972**

The second defining moment for Burundi, of a politics to come, was the 1972 selective genocide. By 1972 it became clear that the Burundian state “was being increasingly built along newly forged patrimonial lines, supporting a small elite, and that it had great difficulties in delivering what it had promised in terms of development and progress” (Turner, 2010, p. 30). There are four possible factors that contributed to 1972. The first was the return of Mwami

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Ntare. According to Weinstein (1972, p. 22) “[i]t is very probably that the Hima ministers … were somewhat jittery when Ntare landed in Burunidi. He was a figure whom the Abanyaruguru might rally and have success in regaining power with popular support.” This led to the second event which was the arrest, the rationale for which is unclear, and the assassination of Ntare. According to Weinstein (1972, p. 22) “[t]his created friction between Micombero and his ministers and prompted him to dismiss his cabinet on April 29th.” The third factor was the idea of the “Hutu peril” and given this the government became increasingly paranoid about an eminent “Hutu peril” and of possible conspiracies between Hutu and foreigners. This led to the purging of all Hutu officers from the army in 1968 (Weinstein, 1972, p. 24). The fourth factor was the conviction of a group of Tutsi from the central region for treason and ‘monarchism’ in 1971 (Turner, Ibid.). All of this led to the 1972 ‘selective genocide.’ Given the small number of Tutsi that were killed in 1972 by Hutu it would be more appropriate to call the Tutsi killings a massacre, even though their (the Hutu) intention might have been genocidal. The Hutu struck first in 1972 and killed about 2000 to 3000 Tutsi. The Tutsi elite retaliated by killing between 80 000 to 200 000 Hutu.137 Most of these killings were done by the army and by groups of youth from the JRR (Jeunesse Révolunnaire Rwagasore) which was the youth wing of the only legal political party, UPRONA. In addition to this, there were also reports that the Simba, the “Inyenzi” and the Zairian military were involved in the genocide (Weinstein, 1972, p. 24-26). 138 The genocide was clearly regional in character. Significantly, the 1972 genocide targeted all Hutu who were educated above a certain level, and this essentially left the Hutu without an elite. According to Uvin (1999, p. 258) it was mostly teachers, nurses and administrators who were targeted and killed. For many years following this, Hutu parents feared for the lives of their children and they did not send their children to school. Moreover, strategically for many years no Hutu could obtain a post in either government or the military as a result of this. Moreover, 150 000 Hutu fled into neighbouring countries where they were mobilising to return to Burundi (Weinstein, 1975; Turner, 2010 and Uvin, 1999). Some of these refugees ended in the Kivus.

137 There are various estimates and this particular estimate is that from Lemarchand. Uvin (1999, p. 259) indicates that most observers estimate between 100 000 to 150 000. I am using Lemarchand’s estimates because it gives a better range; Lemarchand’s range is better for the uncertainty of the number of people who perish in this conflict.

138 The Simba was a militia group in the DRC.
Towards Democratic Reforms

The third defining moment for Burundi was the massacres of 1988. Prior to the 1988 massacres Burundi saw two coup d’états. The first was in 1976 when Jean-Baptiste Bagaza took power from Micombero and the second was in 1987 when Pierre Buyoya took power from Bagaza (S/1994/1039, 1994, p. 2; Brachet and Wolpe, 2005, p. 24 and Vandeginste, 2009, p. 66). It must be noted that during this period Hutus were marginalised from government and other sectors of the Burundian society. Thus, the 1988 Hutu uprising was a result of this marginalisation. According to Uvin (1999, p. 259) “[i]n 1988 violence broke out again. Based on false rumors and a widespread dislike of corrupt local (Tutsi) administrators, Hutu farmers in the two northern villages of Ntega and Marangara killed up 3,000 Tutsi.” These killings were almost immediately squashed by the Burundian military, and it is estimated that between 5,000 and 25,000 Hutu were killed in retaliation during this period (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005, p. 10).139

After the 1988 violence some reforms were put in place. In the aftermath of the 1988 massacres President Buyoya set up a commission to investigate national unity and the massacres of 1988. He also earmarked 11 of the 22 ministerial posts to Hutu persons. Once the commission’s work was done it published a report that blamed ethnic tension in Burundi on colonialism. It disregarded the role of the postcolonial government in deteriorating ethnic relations. From the report the Burundian Charter of National Unit (1991) saw the light and by February 1991 a Government of National Unity was formed with 12 Hutu and 12 Tusti (Daley, 2006, p. 670). These reforms led to the 1993 multiparty democratic elections. In the build up to 1993 there were multiple instances of violence. The 1991 violence was triggered by the insurgency of the rebel movement PALIPEHUTU (Parti Pour la Libération Du Peuple Hutu) (Daley, 2006, p. 670). According to Uvin (1999, p. 259) the violence of 1991 and 1992 led to casualties numbering as many as several hundred, while thousands fled the country. Interestingly, “[a]ll these cases presented the same pattern: in response to rumors and fear, Hutu peasants attacked and killed local Tutsi, powerholders and even ordinary people. The army was then sent in to restore order and indiscriminately killed vastly more people in retaliation” (Uvin, 1999, p. 259).

By 1992 a new Constitution was enacted. The 1992 Constitution laid the basis for human rights protection and multi-party elections and on June 10, 1993 Burundi held its second democratic elections (Vandeginste, 2009, p. 67). As a result of Hutus being the majority became the

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139 The UN reported 20,000 people were killed.
dominantly represented ethnic group in government. According to Daley (2006, p. 670) FRODEBU (Front Pour le Démocratie au Burundi) a predominantly Hutu party took 80 percent of the parliamentary votes and 65 percent of the presidential votes. Melchoir Ndadaye, a civilian was elected president. Significantly, he was Hutu and was assassinated after three months in office in a failed coup d’État (Daley, 2006, p. 670). However, Ndadaye was a reformist at heart. During his short term in office he created “a broad coalition government, including members of the defeated UPRONA party” (Turner, 2010, p. 38). For example, FRODEBU received the majority of the votes but it only took 13 of the 23 ministerial posts and gave 9 to UPRONA and the Prime Minister post (Vandeginste, 2009, p. 68). Yet these reforms did not stop the Tutsi elite from assassinating Ndadaye. According to Vandeginste (2009, p. 68) one must see the 1993 coup attempt as a pre-emptive strike by the defeated Tutsi elite against the frobébisation of the army. In another view regarding Ndadaye’s assassination FRODEBU was responsible for the assassination. According to Lemarchand (1998, p. 7) “a]ccording to one version of what happened in 1993, the Frodebu was all along involved in a gigantic plot to wipe out all the Tutsi. Which is why the army had to intervened and kill Ndadaye, the chief planner of the genocide …” However, this version does not make sense if one consider that under Ndadaye’s leadership a number of reforms took place; reforms that were inclusive of the Tutsi leadership.

What is known for a fact is that the assassination of Ndadaye triggered the 1993 violence and consequently “[p]opular unrest … erupted throughout Burundi, and thousands of Tutsi were brutally killed” (Uvin, 1999, p. 262). The Tutsi controlled armed forces moved in to squash the violence and in the three months to stop the violence “it is estimated that 50,000 to 100,000 persons were murdered … one million fled the country; and hundreds of thousands were internally displaced” (Uvin, Ibid.).140 In addition to this, according to (Uvin, Ibid.) “[v]arious Tutsi militia terrorize the Hutu population and kill with impunity. Hate propaganda flourishes. Journals incite violence, publishing lists of Hutu administrators to be killed” (Uvin, 1999, p. 262). Lemarchand (1997, p. 10) indicates that by 1990 there were approximately 180 000 Tutsi refugees living in Burundi. In addition to this, the violence of 1993 caused 300 000 Hutu to flee to Rwanda (Lemarchand, 1998, p. 6). This further aggravated tensions between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi and Rwanda respectively.

140 Also see Vandeginste (2009, p. 67). In addition, Lemarchand (1998) use the estimation of 20 000 Tutsi being killed in the 1993 massacres.
Civil War

Burundi slipped into a civil war. In attempt to stop the war the UN intervened by trying to get the parties into a power-sharing deal. According to Vandeginste (2009, p. 69) power-sharing talks started after the 1993 coup attempt. Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, was able to get parties to establish a coalition government and it was established on the back of the Kigobe Accord (19 January 1994), the Kajaga Accord (4 February 1994) and the Rohero Agreement (2 July 1994). However, there were a number of parties that were not happy with the coalition government. Chief among them were PARENA (parti pour le Redressement National), the CNDD and PALIPEHUTU. PARENA did not want to ratify these because they did not want to share power with Hutu political leaders who they deemed responsible for the massacres of Tutsi (Vandeginste, 2009, p. 70). According to Daley (2006, p. 671) after Ndadaye’s death, FRODEBU, split into two. Some members formed another party called Conseil National Pour le Défense de la Democratie or CNDD. CNDD later formed a military wing called Forces Pour le Défense de la Democratie. Later two other parties also formed military wings. PALIPEHUTU formed FNL or Forces National de Libération and FROLINA (Front Pour la Libération Nationale) formed Forces Armée’s Populaires (FAP). In addition to this, Daley (2006, p. 671) also indicates that “[e]ach rebel group carved out its territory of operation against the Burundian army.” The end result was a full scale civil war. In 1996 Buyoya returned as president by means of a coup d’état (Daley, 2006, p. 671). Uvin (1999, p. 261) points out that he was able to do this because of Western support. Ndikumana (2000, p. 435) states that Buyoya’s coup put an end to FRODEBU’s rule. However, since the Cold War ended there was pressure from regional powers to return to the constitutional process, and with internal and external pressure Buyoya agreed to negotiations in 1998. This saw the inauguration of the Arusha Peace Talks (Ndikumana, 2000, p. 435).

Arusha Peace Agreement and the 2005 Elections

Burundi’s peace negotiations started in 1998 and culminated in the “Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August 2000” (Daley, 2006, p. 674). After the Buyoya’s coup the regional community decided to sanction the Burundian government and this led to the 1998 Arusha Peace Talks. Former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was steering the peace talks until his death in 1999. Former South African president Nelson R. Mandela took over from Nyerere and the outcome was the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.
(Vandeginste, 2009; Daley, 2006 and Brachet and Wolpe, 2005). The agreement focused on power sharing and targeted mostly the elites. According to Vandeginste (2009, p. 71) “the notion of power-sharing mainly referred to the dividing of the cake between competing political elites and their networks, in particular the distribution of posts.” It is important to note that not all parties were part of the negotiations; especially the two Hutu rebel groups: CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FDL. However, the agreement achieved a number of things. Most notable of these was the transitional constitution in October 2001 and the 36-month-transitional government of November 2001 (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005, p. 3). The transitional government held office for 36 months and was divided into two equal parts. President Buyoya led the first 18 months and his vice-president, Domitien Ndayizeye, the second half (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005, p. 2). Another significant agreement was over the security and military forces. It was agreed that no ethnic group may have more than 50 percent of the security forces (Vandeginste, 2009, p. 77). Significantly, this led to the cease fire agreement between the CNDD-FDD and the transitional government in December 2002 (Vandeginste, 2009 and Brachet and Wolpe, 2005, p.2). CNDD-FDD was included in the transitional government and received amongst other things four ministerial posts, 15 seats in the NA, three provincial governors and thirty communal administrator posts in the transitional government (Vandeginste, 2009, p. 79).

This agreement laid the basis for the 2005 Constitution of the Republic of Burundi and the 29 August 2005 elections. The 2005 Constitution prohibits parties from establishing political parties that are ethnic or regional exclusive (art. 78). It also ensures inclusive electoral lists. According to Vandeginste (2009, p. 75) “[o]ut of three successive candidates proposed by a party on a blocked list, at least one needs to be of a different ethnic groups. It also states that 60 percent of the minister must be Hutu and 40 percent must be Tutsi; of which 30 percent must be women.” In addition to this, “[t]he Minister of National Defence and the Minister in charge of the National Police must belong to different ethnic groups” (Vandeginste, 2009, p. 75). Given all these provisions, Pierre Nkurunziza, was elected as president on 29 August 2005 (Daley, 2006, p. 674).

**2015: A New Crisis**

Towards the end of his second term President Pierre Nkurunziza indicated that, he will stand for election for a third term. This announcement came despite the fact that the proposed constitutional amendments which would have provided for this were ruled against in parliament.
in 2014. In response to his announcement, protest broke out in Burundi and the violently government suppressed it violently. It is not a surprise that a month after Nkurunziza’s announcement a group of military leaders attempted a coup. The attempt was not successful and it led to the retaliation of the Nkurunziza government. Apparently Imbonerakure, the ruling party’s youth league, and the government’s security forces were responsible for most of the violence towards civilians. The HRW (2015, 2016 and 2017) reported about numerous disappearances, killings, abductions, rape and arbitrary arrests in Burundi. According to HRW (2016, 2017) oppositions groups retaliated violently. For example, “some demonstrators resorted to violence, throwing stones and Molotov cocktails and shooting marbles with sling shots at the police. On May 7, demonstrators in Bujumbura killed an Imbonerakure by throwing stones at his head and hitting him with clubs. They then put a tire around his body and burned him” (HRW, 2017, n.p). This once again led to a refugee crisis. The 2017 Human Rights Watch World Report estimated that approximately 325 000 people fled Burundi since the crisis started in 2015. It is not clear whether the attacks are ethnically based, although from the Human Rights Watch’s 2015, 2016 and the 2017 World Reports this does not seem to be the case.

Postcolonial Violence in Rwanda

There are four main events of political violence in postcolonial Rwanda. Three was prior to the Rwandan genocide and during this period one sees the rise and decline of Hutu power in Rwanda. One also notices a number of forced migrations into neighbouring countries. Notably some of it was into North Kivu and South Kivu. The Rwandan genocide and the adverse effects it had on the region are still felt there. For the time being there is peace in Rwanda although the question of for how long this will last remains open, if one consider Rwandan’s involvement in various conflicts in Burundi and the DRC. For Rwanda the FDLR poses a threat to national security and if it means starting a proxy war to protect the current regime it will not hesitate to do so.

The Rwandan Revolution and the Transition to Independence: 1959 to 1962

The Rwandan Revolution becomes one of the key moments in the postcolonial history of Rwanda and the larger Great Lakes regions. The Rwandan Revolution ushered in a new political order with the help of Belgium. This Revolution led to mass violence and the death of
thousands of Tutsi and the forced migration of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi into neighbouring countries (Newbury, 1998; Uvin, 1999, Mamdani, 1998; Mamdani, 2001 and Viret, 2010). In the background to the Revolution there is the erosion of Tutsi social supremacy and the development of a Hutu counter elite. This eroding social supremacy was largely a result of the development of a Hutu counter elite which was made possible through education. Education brought a new class of Hutu that had the discursive tools to challenge Tutsi power.141 There was a two-tier education system: one Hutu and one Tutsi. According to Mamdani (2001, pp. 111-112) “the Tutsi were introduced into a “civilized” French-medium education, but the Hutu were confined to a “nativized” second-rate Kiswahili-medium education” (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 111-112). In an investigation on the ideology of genocide, Alison des Forges argues that the Rwandan racial discourse was “a great and unsung collaborative enterprise over a period of decades, Europeans and Rwandan intellectuals created a history of Rwanda that fit European assumptions and accorded with Tutsi interests” (des Forges, 1995, p. 45). The outcome was that the Hutu were thus intentionally ‘underdeveloped’ in relation to the task of bringing to life the colonial racial science of the time; where the ‘Bantu’ native was regarded as inferior to the ruling “Hamite.”142 The result was the belief that the “Tutsi were from different racial stock; they came to Rwanda from the northeast; and they were superior to Hutu in both intelligence and political abilities” (Newbury, 1998, p. 10). In addition to this, prior to the Social Revolution one also notices the formation of a number of political parties in response to the independence wave that blew across the continent.143 There were four main parties which participated in the election in the run up to independence (UNAR, RADER, MDR-PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA) (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 120-121). The formation of political parties was mainly for the post-independence elections which was part of Belgium’s colonial reform. These attempts were largely to maintain authority over and within Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgium Congo. However, this soon changed as the 1962 elections led to reform within the Belgium government. The government did away with the colonies and set a date for Rwanda’s independence (Mamdani, 2001).


142 More of this in the previous chapter. Also Allison des Forges’ paper: The Ideology of Genocide.

143 Significantly, there was an alliance between UNAR and MNC-Lumumba.
There were age-old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi prior to the Social Revolution compounded by the July 1959 Tutsi-led Mwira coup. According to Mamdani (2001, p. 123) “[w]hen the heirless mwami died on 25 July, suddenly and mysteriously, the abiiru pronounced a 24-year-old half-brother of the deceased the new mwami. This led to the creation of PARMEHUTU. Thus, when Dominique Mboyumutwa of PARMEHUTU was attacked by UNAR militants, Hutu attacked Tutsi in response which led to the spread of the violence across the country.” This attack on Dominique Mbonyumutwa is seen as the start of the Rwandan Revolution/Social Revolution. The 1959 Social Revolution brought PARMEHUTU leader Grégoire Kiyabanda to power. According to Mamdani (2001, p. 124) the Revolution dismantled the monarchy by means of the Gitarama coup. Hutu Power was now in control of the Rwandan state. In Mandani’s analysis he argues that the Social Revolution would not have been successful if Belgium had not “assisted” the Hutu counter elite by means of deploying Colonel B.E.M. Guy Logiest to Ruanda-Urundi after the first attacks.

The Social Revolution did not result in as much loss of life as the 1972 “selective genocide” in Burundi and the 1994 Rwandan genocide. It is estimated that around 200 people died during the Social Revolution (Mamdani, 2001, p. 131). It is in the aftermath of the Social Revolution that there emerges Hutu Power as a socio-political movement. One sees a movement from exclusion to accommodation, back to exclusion. The latter move towards exclusion was caused by the raids into Rwanda during the time of the coalition government. At the start of the revolution there was a clear call from Kayibanda for a segregated system and this was an indication of the politics to come during the First Republic (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 126 – 127).

According to various scholars during the Social Revolution several hundreds of Tutsi were killed and thousands fled to neighbouring countries such as Zaire, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania (Viret, 2010, p. 23; Mamdani, 2001; Uvin, 1999). However, the violence did not stop there. The Social Revolution forced some Tutsi leaders into exile; to prepare to take power from the Hutu majority. These Tutsi refugees organised by UNAR, launched attacks referred to as “border raids” from Burundi and Uganda in 1961 and 1963. The consequences of these attacks were retaliation violence by the Hutu. According to Uvin (1999, p. 256) “[i]n early 1962 more

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144 See Hutu’s colonial experience in the previous chapter.
145 Some observers say thousands.
than 2,000 Tutsi were killed; in December 1963 at least 10,000 more died. During this period between 140,000 and 250,000 Tutsi, 40 to 70 percent of the survivors, fled Rwanda.”

This ushered in a change in the political order of Rwanda; from Tutsi to Hutu. Colonel Logiest in an attempt to quell the violence replaced Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs with Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs. According to Viret (2010, p. 23) “[o]f the 45 chiefs in office, 23 were dead or had fled during the violence, as well as 158 of the 489 vice chiefs … Logiest set up a policy to systematically replace the chiefs and vice-chiefs who were missing, had to fled or had been relieved of their duties, with Hutus …” This was in the interest of maintaining public order. In addition to this, Logiest also built a pro-Hutu military; with a representation of 85 percent Hutu and 15 percent Tutsi (Mamdani, 2001, p. 124). This led to the 1960 elections which were held “to fill the positions of bourgmestres (mayors) and local councillors” (Viret, 2010, p. 24). Finally on January 28, 1961 Belgian did away with the monarchy and proclaimed Rwanda a Republic. According to Viret (2010, p. 24) “[t]he republic was proclaimed and Dominique Mbonyumutwa became its President and Grégoire Kayibanda its Prime Minister … Rwanda thus became a republic before acquiring its independence.” This set the scene for the First Republic.

**The First Republic: 1962 to 1973**

Grégoire Kayibanda presided over the First Republic. The First Republic was the period in which the Hutu consolidated power. During the First Republic the Tutsi were removed from the political sphere, and Rwanda became an exclusionary Hutu state. At the base of the First Republic was the notion of autochthony. Here one sees that race separated the ‘indigenous’ from the ‘foreigners.’ In this regard, the Tutsi were the foreign Hamites that oppressed the Hutu for centuries. Mamdani (2001, p. 135) points out that the First Republic “clearly distinguished between internal and external Tutsi, as one would between resident and non-resident aliens.” In Chapter 3 I discussed the phenomenon of border and boundaries in identity formation. This is a good example of how these boundaries and borders were created. In this particular case it was driven by the state and it was thus political. Those Tutsi who were outside were considered a threat to the Rwandan state or Hutu Republic and were labelled *inyenzi* (cockroach). Tutsi

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146 There is a difference in the estimates of Mamdani and Uvin. According to Mamdani (2001, p. 129) 1000 – 2000 Tutsi men, women and children died during this period.

147 For an in-depth discussion on this see Chapter 3 – “The Politics of Belonging”.
political parties were dismantled and the leaders of those parties were killed and all Hutu opposition parties were neutralised (Mamdani, 2001, p. 135). The First Republic mainly focussed on political reforms and did little to change the civic/social power of the postcolonial state that still was dominated by Tutsi.

Furthermore, the year after independence “Kiyabanda’s regime (1962-73) chased out or killed most former Tutsi powerholders and Tutsi politicians, even the most moderate ones as well as many opposition Hutu politicians who did not join PARMEHUTU” (Uvin, 1999, p. 257). Since there was a great number of Rwandan Tutsi in neighbouring countries it gave UNAR an opportunity to get support and to launch several attacks at Rwanda, which PARMEHUTU used as an opportunity to create unity amongst Hutu internally.148 According to Viret (2010, p. 28) at first UNAR found it difficult to settle in a single host country and eventually settled in “Burundi, where there were 45,000 Rwandan refugees by 1963.” This was made possible because the Tutsi controlled the Burundian state. Here one sees that two centre of powers developed along ethnic lines: one Hutu (Rwanda) and one Tutsi (Burundi).

Tutsi refugees and UNAR remnants launch a series of post-independence attacks at the Hutu controlled Rwandan state. According to Viret (2010, p. 29) “[o]ccasional incursions into Rwandan territory continued to occur until 1961. Between 1959 and 1961, nearly 20,000 Tutsis were killed during the repression against UNAR, and 200,000 other fled the country …” So whenever there was a failed attack, it led to retaliation killings of innocent Tutsi civilians.

Soon the First Republic was under pressure as it was critiqued for its education policy and the lack of reforms in the education and employment sector. For example, university enrolment was 90 percent Tutsi in the 1960s. This was mainly because the Church controlled access to education and the Church was dominated by Tutsi. However, in 1966 the government passed a law that changed this. It removed the authority of the Church and thus Tutsi influence in education (Mamdani, 2001, p, 136). After education reforms more Hutu were able to access education but they still found it difficult to find employment in a Tutsi controlled economy.

The end of the First Republic was caused by a North/South divide. This divide came about because of a colonial real estate clientelism practice. According to Viret (2010, p. 29)

148 The same happened in Burundi. Attacks by Hutu militia groups were used to unite the Tutsi against the Hutu.
Later on, regional rivalry appeared fully during the exercise of power when *ubukonde* was debated. This form of real estate clientelism practiced in the north of the country had been weakened by the assertion of central authority during the colonial period. To many notables from the Ruhengeri and Gisenyi regions, who were real estate patrons themselves, supporting PARMEHUTU meant pushing for the disappearance of Tutsi political real estate patrons which the central authorities had implanted in the north during the colonial period.

This essentially led to a North/South divide among Hutu elite. It was this North-South divide that led to the 1973 coup d’état and brought about the Second Republic.


The Second Republic brought another change to the post-colonial political order of Rwanda. This change was preceded by a period of political violence. The 1973 violence started when students published lists of ‘blacklisted’ Tutsi students. It spread to the employment sector. According to Mamdani (2001, p. 137), once named it was expected of that Tutsi individual to leave school, university or employment. During this time it is estimated that five to six hundred Tutsi were murdered (Mamdani, Ibid). This ungovernable situation created the perfect conditions for a coup. The coup ushered a new era called the Second Republic. According to Mamdani (2001, p. 138) “[t]he Second Republic claimed to complete the “national” revolution of 1959 through a “moral” revolution.”

General Juvénal Habyarima took power on July 5, 1973. Kiyabanda, like his predecessor, was assassinated and “the former ‘barons’ of the First Republic” were imprisoned (Viret, 2010, p. 34). To consolidate his power a single party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement or MRND was formed by Habyarima. Viret (2010, p. 34) indicates that MRND was “fused completely with state structures.” The President had complete control over the population by way of creating a pyramidal structure where Rwanda “was under complete supervision, divided into prefectures, communes, sectors and cellule (cells)” (Viret, 2010, p. 34).

During this period the Tutsi identity was re-imagined. According to Mamdani (2001, p. 138) “[w]hile the First Republic considered the Tutsi a “race,” the Second Republic reconstructed the

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149 Once again I see the tenants of the Marx’s *Eighteen Brumaire*. Also see Spivak (2012) for a discussion on Marx’s *Eighteen Brumaire*.  

https://etd.uwc.ac.za
Tutsi as an “ethnicity” and therefore, as a group indigenous to Rwanda.” The Tutsi were now a historically privileged identity and thus the need for affirmative action and hence the aim was to reconcile the nation and to bring about justice. Mamdani (2001, p. 139) points out that there were two types of justice. The first was justice as appropriation and the second justice as redistribution. Mamdani (2001) argues that appropriation united the Hutu against the Tutsi and redistribution divide the Hutu along a North-South divide. In addition to this, under Habyarimana there was an effort to bring about peace and reconciliation in Rwanda. Evidence of this was 5 July – the Day of Peace and Reconciliation. Under Habyarimana, the Tutsi were reclassified as an ethnic group and were able to come back into the political fold. All these measures must be seen as a real effort to bring about reconciliation (Mamdani, 2001, p. 140).

This period also saw economic development. According to Viret (2010, p. 34) road infrastructure was improved and electricity was extended to the countryside. More significant was the urbanisation of Kigali. Viret (2010, p. 34) shows that in 1965 Kigali had approximately 15,000 residents and by the early 1990s there was approximately 300,000 people living in Kigali. However, the North/South divide between the political elite continued. Important to note in Rwanda’s case is that political power also meant economic power and opportunities. Viret (2010, p. 35) shows that power was held by Northerners and that “one-third of the 85 most important government positions were given to persons born in the prefecture of Gisenyi.” However, the vast majority of peasants were left out of the redistribution of wealth and after ten years of economic growth “regional favouritism destabilized the government” (Viret, 2010, p. 35). Thus one sees a return of the same kind of politics that led to the end of the first regime.

In the 1980s the regime’s first internal struggles were visible and the cracks started to show in the Second Republic. These cracks widened with the economic challenges Rwanda faced in the late 1980s. More significantly, it is apparent that “a political movement emerged among” the Tutsi refugees in Uganda (Viret, 2010, p. 35). A large part of the estimated 600,000 Tutsi refugees sought refuge in Uganda (Reyntjens, 1994, p. 25 in Viret, 2010, p. 35). In Uganda a group of refugees was instrumental in the rise of Yoweri Museveni and the regime change in Uganda. Some of these refugees even had government positions. However, after fallout around issues of indigeneity the RPF was formed and in October 1990 a small group of refugees entered Rwanda with the mission to overthrow the regime (Mamdani, 2001, p. 147).
Return of Multiparty Competition and the RPF: 1990 to 1993

Rwanda was not immune to global politics and with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Habyarimana opened Rwanda to reforms for multiparty elections. Notably this coincided with the transition of Burundi and Zaire, before the RPF invasion. Thus attempts to democratise Rwanda were made in the early 1990s, before the RPF’s invasion. This was a result of external pressure and also internal pressure. Internal pressure was a result of economic decline and the North/South divide and external pressure must be seen in the context of the third wave of democratization in the late twentieth century. Notably it was during the same period that Burundi and Zaire opened up to multiparty elections. Thus multiparty talks were not a result of the RPF invasion but because of broader systematic changes.

With the new Constitution enacted in June 1991 one sees a number of political parties emerging. Most notable of these parties was the reappearance of the MDR (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain) led by the son-in-law of the former president Grégoire Kayibanda, Faustin Twagiramungu. In addition to the MDR, other new political parties appeared such as the Parti Social-Démocrate or PSD and the Parti Libéral or PL (Viret, 2010, p. 39-40).

While this supposed democratisation was underway, the Rwandan government also had to deal with the RPF invasion. According to Viret (2010, p. 39-40) the RPF advanced 7,000 men of which was 4,000 soldiers, 120 officers from Uganda and 3,000 Rwanda civilians who joined spontaneously. However, they were easily stopped by the Force Armées Rwandaises (FAR or RAF – Rwanda Armed Forces) which were supported by the French Military. After this the RPF switched to guerrilla warfare and started negotiations with the MRND internal opposition and the government (Viret, 2010, p. 39-40). This attempted invasion let to the 1992 and 1993 Arusha Accords in Tanzania. The Arusha Accords brought the internal and external opposition of the Rwandan state together for negotiations (Viret, 2010, p. 39-40).

During this period “[t]hree successive transitional governments were set up” (Viret, 2010, p. 25) On December 30, 1991 the first of these took office, which was led by Sylvestre Nsanzimana as prime minister (this post was specifically created). This government was soon rejected because only one opposition party received a ministerial post, and it was a party connected to the MRND. Negotiations reopened, after demonstrations in Kigali. A second transitional government

\(^{150}\) See Samuel P. Huntington’s book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.*
was set up after an agreement was reached on March 13, 1992. This government was led by Dismas Nsengiyaremye from the MDR, as Prime Minster. Important was that the opposition received 10 of the 21 ministerial positions. The third never really took office.

Lemarchand (1997, p. 15) views the invasion of the RPF as a watershed moment in Rwandan history as it drastically deteriorated the relations between Hutu and Tutsi to a point of no return. This is visible from the Kangura publications. On December 6, 1990, a few months after the invasion, Kangura published the 10 Commandments for the Hutu. The 10 Commandments went as far to forbad Hutu and Tutsi marriages and label those who were married to Tutsi women as traitors (Kangura no.6, December 1990) The consequence of the RPF invasion and the political instability was mass migration and mass violence against the Tutsi. Uvin (1999, pp. 260-261) notes that between “1990 and 1993 thousands of Tutsi were killed in frequent massacres by mobs directed by local authorities, national politicians, and police.” This led to violence against Tutsi, inclusive of the massacring of thousands of Tutsi in the build up to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. To aid Hutu Power in their anti-Tutsi sentiment youth militia were created by various political parties. According to Viret (2010, p. 42):

The multi-party system sharpened competition between political parties. They created youth movements that soon became militias in charge of recruiting new party members or making a show of strength during demonstrations. Each party had its own: the MRND had Interahamwe … the CDR had Impuzamugambi (‘Those who share the same goal’), the MDR had Inkuba (‘Thunder’), and the PSD had Abakombozi (‘the Liberators’) … Forced recruitment of party members, extortion, and the symbolic act of taking control of public buildings became common events nicknamed kubuhoza, meaning ‘support for liberation’ or ‘emancipation from the MRND’s domination’...

There were numerous instances when the Interahamwe played a key role in aiding local politicians to kill Tutsi.

One also observes during this period there was a lot of violence related to retaliation against Tutsi civilians after an attack of the RPF. According to Viret (2010, p. 43):

In October 1990, the week following the RPF attack on Kibilira (a commune halfway between Kigali and Gisenyi) around 350 Tutsis were assassinated during attacks carried out by State agents or local elites … Almost all the perpetrators of these murders were released during the weeks that followed …
In 1991, the Bagogwe, a Tutsi group which had long since lived on the margins of the Central Kingdom, scattered across the communes of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi (the stronghold of the President’s entourage), were massacred after the RPF attack at the end of January. The assassinations continued until early March, the number of victims is not known (estimated to be between 300 and 1,000 according to …

It was against this backdrop that the Arusha Accords was signed on August 4, 1993 and it also allowed the RPF to enter Kigali. The government never honoured the Arusha Accords and the supposed third transitional government never really got off the ground because of several attacks and assassinations by militia who were part of the ruling Hutu elite. This led to the Rwandan genocide.

Rwandan Genocide: 1994

The start of the 1994 genocide is traced back to the assassination of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994. It started in Kigali with presidential guards and militia, who executed large numbers of Tutsi after the assassination (Uvin, 1999, p. 261). Viret (2010, p. 61) estimates that about 600,000 people were killed; of which 500,000 were Tutsi and 100,000 were Hutu. Mamdani (2001), however, estimates that about 800,000 people were killed during the genocide of which the minority was Hutu. The idea that it was possible to kill between 600,000 and 800,000 people within 100 days remains a difficult one to grapple with. Mamdani (2001) argues the way the Rwandan society was structured before the genocide made it possible to kill so many people in 100 days. According to Mamdani (2001) Rwanda during the Second Republic was structured in such a way it was hierarchical in nature which allowed the military significant control over the population. In addition to this, Viret (2010, p. 61) indicates the role the civilian self-defense programme played in the genocide. According to Viret (2010, p. 61)

From February 1993, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, the former Chief of Staff of the Defense Ministry, designed the civilian self-defense program, which was at the heart of the arrangements made to organize the massacres. This program consisted in distributing weapons to part of the population, having the local police train them to shoot and to fight, and organizing patrols …

If one considering the population density of Rwanda one is able to grapple this horrendous figure somewhat. For example, it was estimated that the density prior to the genocide was 208 per square metre (Hitjens, 1999, p. 271).
Moreover, youth militia also played a crucial role in making the genocide possible. As mentioned earlier with democratisation came political competition, and during this time political parties created militant youth organisations which demonstrated or served as a representation of the political party’s strength. During the genocide the Interhamwe youth militia acted as auxiliary forces for the army (Viret, 2010, p. 62). For example, the Radio-Télévision Mille Collines (RTLM) was used to broadcast to the Interhamwe where people were hidden. In most cases people were hidden by relatives and neighbours (Hitjens, 1999, p. 268). In this regard, the Rwandan Armed Forces were completely absorbed into the genocide; actively killing Tutsi and those Hutu who did not want to participate in the genocide.

Furthermore, the government itself was involved in the genocide; from the President and Prime Minister to bourgmestre and councillors. According to Viret (2010, p. 62-63): “[c]ertain government ministers, such as Pauline Nyiramasuhuko in Butare, Eliezer Niyitegeka in Kibuye or Justin Mugenzi (the president of PL Power), organized tours of the inside of the country and represented the government there, promoting the assassination campaign.” Tutsi were easily identified by identity papers. According to Viret (2010, p. 63) “[p]eople’s identity papers were checked at blockades set up at main crossroads (ethnic origin was still mentioned on identity cards). Gangs (ibitero) went from house-to-house to kill those who had stayed behind. Searches were organized through the fields so that no one could take refuge there.” Apart from identity cards morphology became another popular marker of who was Hutu and who was Tutsi. According to Hitjens (1999, p. 272) “physical features such as a long nose, long fingers or height were considered a sufficient basis for a sentence of death.” The consequence was that some Hutu who looked Tutsi were killed and Tutsi who looked Hutu were able to escape if they forged an identity card. Having said this, it was almost impossible to escape the FAR and the various militia groups. Tutsis were also gathered in stadiums, churches, and other public spaces for the army and militia to kill them. Génocidaires also had priority targets who were part of a list of public figures (both Hutu and Tutsi) who were killed first.

While the genocide continued, the RPF was interested in reaching its military objectives and at times did not protect civilians against génocidaires. According to Viret (2010, p. 63-64):

The day after the killing of Habyarimana on April 7, the RPF went on the offensive again, attacking in two directions: from north to south, and from the southeast towards Kigali (where

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152 In the next section on the violence in Kivus during the First Congo War one observes that the Hutu refugee and the Congolese Banyarwanda were killed in similar ways as the Rwandan Tutsi.
over 600 of its men had been stationed since December) and Byumba ... On May 4 the battle for Kigali began; it lasted until July 4. The RAF, who were entirely absorbed in the massacres, and no longer had active military support from France, collapsed and were unable to do any more than offer resistance in Kigali ... For the duration of this offensive, the RPF prioritized reaching its military objectives, at the expense of rescuing people under threat ...

The RAF eventually was defeated and this was mainly because they were absorbed in the genocide. After the RAF was defeated the Rwandan state collapsed and RPF ceased power.

The initial response of the international community was to rescue foreigners from Rwanda. According Viret (2010, p. 64-65) “[o]n April 9, 300 French paratroopers took control of Kigali airport (this was known as Operation Amaryllis); Belgium deployed 600 paratroopers the next day. Operations to evacuate foreigners were run jointly and ended on April 14.” Another reason why Belgium's involvement was minimal was that ten of its peacekeepers were disarmed and killed. These peacekeepers were part of the UNAMIR forces that was deployed to Rwanda after Resolution 872 (1993) was passed. UNAMIR’s responsibility was “to help the parties implement the agreement, monitor its implementation and support the transitional Government” (United Nations, 1999, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirS.htm). However, UNAMIR never achieved its imagined impact as many countries withdrew their support from UNAMIR (Hitjens, 1999, p. 273). The USA in particular did not want to get involved after their 1993 Somalia failure.153

Much later, towards the end of the genocide, the United Nations Security Council voted in Resolution 929 on June 22 which authorized France to deploy its troops in Rwanda for two months (Viret, 2010, p. 65). This was until UNAMIR’s peacekeeping force was to relieve them. This was dubbed Operation Turquoise. It was “a so-called ‘safe-zone’ in the South-West of Rwanda” (Hitjens, 1999, p. 273). Senekal was the only African country to send troops to this crisis in Rwanda (Viret, 2010, p. 65). According to Viret (2010, p. 66) the French created a ‘safe humanitarian zone’ (ZHS) and this “was created in the north west quarter of the country, along the boundaries of the prefectures of Cyangugu, Kibuye and Gikongoro.” Human Rights Watch (HRW) (in Viret) estimates that this zone rescued about 15,000 to 17,000 people. However, this intervention also had its failures, which includes the fact that “the French forces did not disarm the militias … or the RAF troops inside the ZHS” (Viret, 2010, p. 67). This gave several

153 After the Battle of Mogadishu the USA withdraw it troops from Somalia. The Battle of Mogadishu left many American soldiers death.
members of the interim government the opportunity to escape via the ZHS to Zaire. Thus, “Operation Turquoise forces did not facilitate the arrest of massacre perpetrators who had taken refuge in the ZHS, and the latter were able to escape to Zaire ... It has not been determined whether the French troops helped these leaders to organize their escape ...” (Viret, 2010. p. 67).

Leaving and Returning: Rwanda in the Aftermath of the Genocide

There were those returning and those leaving. The Rwandan genocide caused an exodus of Rwandans to neighbouring countries during and after the genocide. According to Pruniér (2009) 2.1 million people went into exile as refugees, some of whom were participants in the genocide whilst others were not. Some were forced into exile by Interhamwe and ex-FAR to provide a buffer zone against RPF attacks. In addition to this, it was estimated that between 600 000 and 700 000 Tutsi returned after the RPF victory (Amstutz, 2006, p. 544 and Pruniér, 2009, pp. 5). Those who returned to Rwanda were both recent and older refugees living in neighbouring countries. Apart from this about 50 000 houses was destroyed, 300 000 children were left without parents and most of the surviving government personnel fled abroad (Pruniér, 2009, pp. 5-6).

It was under these conditions that the Government of National Unity (GNU) was inaugurated. It was officially inaugurated on July 19, 1994 and it adhered to the power sharing arrangements of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The President, Pasteur Bizimungu, was Hutu and a member of the RPF. The Vice President and Minister of Defence was a Tutsi – General Paul Kagame – the leader of the RPF, and the true power within the regime. In addition to this, the RPF received 8 ministerial positions, the MDR 4, the PSD 3, the Liberals 3, and the Christian Democratic Party 1, while there were 2 independent members. In total there were 15 Hutu and 6 Tutsi representatives.

After the genocide Maj. Rose Kabuye decided to issue residency permits to ‘blameless’ people. In addition to this, green permits were issued for old residents and blue for returnees from Zaire. Justice, or justice in the traditional sense, was absent. The common practice was gutunga agatoki (showing with the finger). It created a situation where everyone was denouncing everyone and it allowed in many cases for the actual killers or genocidaires to escape prosecution. The people implicated by gutunga agatoki were condemned to prisons; which went
from housing 1000 prisoners in August 1994 to 80 000 in August 1996. Prisons were overfull and people were dying of starvation, dehydration and fatigue. The probability of this situation improving was slim because in February 1995 in the central jail of Kigali, only 1,498 out of 6,795 detainees had a chance of seeing a magistrate at any point of their arrest and most prisoners’ files were empty or non-existent (Pruniér, 2009, p. 11). By 1997 there was an estimated 120 000 prisoners in jails (Amstutz, 2006, p. 551) and in 2002 there was still 115 000 prisoners in overcrowded jails in Rwanda. It was seven years later and the situation had not improved much (Sezibera, 7 April 2002).

Was this justice or was this revenge? It is a question worth asking here even though this project does not explicitly deal with this subject matter. There were concerns that the RPF was busy with revenge killings in the aftermath of the genocide. This led to a mission by UNHCR which was led by Robert Gersony (Reyntjens, 2013, p. 102). A summary of the Gersony report was presented to the Commission of Experts on the Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees from Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire. The summary gave an indication of some of the key findings of the Gersony report. It found that the RPF was busy with “systematic and sustained killing and persecution of” the Hutu population of the prefectures Butare, Kibungo and in some part of the Kigali prefecture (Summary of UNHCR Presentation, 10 October 1994). However, the report never saw the light of day. In the summary it was estimated that the RPF could have killed between 5 000 to 10 000 people per month starting mid-April/May through to July. The HRW report titled Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda estimates that the RPF “killed between 25,000 and 45,000 people, including Tutsi” in the aftermath of the genocide (Pruniér, 2009, p.16).

If one has a closer look at the victims of these killings they “belonged to four categories: (1) friends and family of the génocidaires, (2) educated people, (3) old PARMEHUTU members, and (4) ibipinga, that is, opponents, people who did not think and behave “right”” (Pruniér, 2009, p. 20). Pruniér (2009) argues that it was in part an effort to eliminate a potential elite and particularly a Hutu elite. The UN and the international community were caught in between a rock and a hard place, since they did not act to stop the genocide. Thus, postgenocide they looked the other way and in a way allowed the RPF to take revenge for the genocide. According to Pruniér (2009, p. 35) “[b]ecause the real Hutu killers had not been sacrificially executed, all Hutu were now regarded as potential killers. And all Tutsi had become licensed avengers. Many

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154 It has so many similarities with the Burundian 1972 “selective genocide.”
Tutsi and many Hutu did not want to be either.” This was compounded by the refugee camps filling up, which led to the Kihebo massacre.

However, the GNU was short lived. In August 1995 it came to an end with the massacres at Kihebo (Reyntjens, 2013, p. 8). According to Pruniér (2009, p. 38) there was approximately 350 000 internally displaced people in Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide. Most of these IDPs were too scared to return home because of the rumours that the RPF is busy with revenge killings. Conversely, hand the government was of the opinion that most of these camps were housing genocidaires, Interhamwe and ex-FAR. The government also repeatedly instructed people in the camps to return home. Fearing an impending attack the government “on Saturday, April 22 … opened fire on the massed crowd, first with their rifles and later with 60mm mortars as well” (Prunier, 2009, p. 40). The number of people who died during that massacre was heavily debated. Pruniér (2009, pp. 41-42) estimates that about 20 000 people vanished while the government and a commission of inquiry believe it to be 338 because that was the number of bodies that were dug up. This raises the question as to what happen to the rest of people. And this particular episode led to the end of the GNU. According to Pruniér (2009, p. 45) “[i]t was in that poisoned atmosphere that Prime Minister Twagiramungu decided to call for an extraordinary council of ministers on security matters. The council met on August 23 and went on for three days, soon turning into a stark confrontation between Kagame and Sendashonga.” According to Reyntjens (2013, p. 8) after an angry exchange with Prime Minister Twagiramungu and Interior Minister Sendashonga Kagame (at that time Vice President and Minister of Defence) walk out of the meeting. After the council meeting:

Prime Minister Twagiramungu announced his resignation. President Bizimungu, furious and not wanting to allow him the moral advantage of resignation, came to Parliament on August 28 and asked for a public vote to fire Twagiramungu. Fifty-five raised their hand in support, six abstain, and none voted against. The next day Sendashonga, Minister of Transport and Communications Immaculée Kayumba, Minister of Justice Alphonse-Marie Nkubito, and Minister of Information Jean-Baptiste Nkuriyingoma were all fired (Prunier, 2009, p. 46).

The RPF led post-genocide Rwandan state was also responsible for the mass killing of Hutu Refugee and Hutu Banyarwanda in the DRC. Rwanda and the AFDL were responsible for the toppling of the Mobutu regime. Rwanda later supported the RCD in the Second Congo War and was partly responsible for mass atrocities in the DRC. Since then the Rwandan state played an active role in protecting Tutsi civilians in the DRC.
Conclusion

The postcolonial struggle of the Hutu in Burundi was a struggle for state power. The state was in charge of subject formation and had the ability to exclude and include. The Tutsi-led Burundian state until 1990 did not want recognise the majority status of the Hutu since the Hutu for them was a peril and a time bomb waiting to explode, the same way it exploded for Rwandan Tutsi in 1959. In 1972 the Hutu turned into that peril. The Hutu initiated the 1972 genocide but it turned against them and approximately 200 000 Hutu were killed in 1972. Significantly, the Hutu elite, those who posed a significant threat and who might constitute the next elite, were killed. Consequently, Hutu parents for many years were too afraid to send their children to school. This is a significant historical moment that points one to the site of resistance against state driven subject formations. Even though the state through the schooling system produces particular subjectivities, the schooling system is also the site for this resistance. In Rwanda the Hutu constituted an elite prior to independence and with the help of Belgian colonialism took hold of the postcolonial Rwandan state. During the Social Revolution one notices how the Tutsi elites were driven out of Rwanda to neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Burundi and the Congo. In Burundi these refugee elite joined the Tutsi elite who aided them in their struggle against the Hutu-led Rwandan state. However, the end of the Cold War was the beginning of the end for both regimes. They were forced to open up for democratic rule. This in particular aided the Hutu in Burundi to take control of the state apparatuses. At first this happened through elections and later it was through means of armed struggle and negotiations. In Rwanda one notices that, with the formation of the RPF, the fear of the ‘Tutsi peril’ among Hutu elites; which systematically built up to 1994. The genocide weakened the Hutu elite’s hold on the Rwandan state and the RPF claimed victory, which for many signalled the return of Tutsi power. It would be a while before the Hutu in Burundi took hold of the Burundian state, and since they took power in Burundi in 2005, Burundi has been relatively calm. Therefore, in postcolonial Burundi and Rwanda the state and subsidiary institutions such as customary authorities became the struggle for power in relation to subject formation.

155 For an in-depth discussion on this kind of resistance see Chapter 2.
Chapter 6: Postcolonial Political Violence in North and South Kivu

Introduction

The previous chapter investigated the origins of the one strand of the conflict that is underway in North Kivu (NK) and South Kivu (SK). This is a conflict between Hutu and Tutsi elites in the region. This conflict can be regarded as a struggle for subject formation in postcolonial Burundi and Rwanda. Whoever is in control of the state is in control of subject formation and has the power to exclude and include. In this chapter one will notice a similar trend in NK and SK in the DRC. As mentioned earlier, rethinking the conflict would entail thinking of the conflict in NK and SK as the preservation of violence in its colonial form. Consequently, the sites of the investigation are the institutions that preserve this kind of violence, which in this case is the postcolonial state and customary apparatuses.\footnote{Here Walter Benjamin’s notion of violence is the framework through which this violence is analysed.}

Central to the investigation in this chapter is the relationship between subject and object, and how that translates into a politics of belonging. One will see that the dominant narrative explains the political violence in the NK and SK in two ways: identity and resources.\footnote{See Chapter 7.} This opens up a theoretical possibility with regards to rethinking the conflict in NK and SK. This theoretical possibility is the investigation into the relationship between the subject and the subject’s object(s) of desire. In Chapter 3 one noticed that the subject needs certain objects for developing a sense of belonging. If the subject is dispossessed of the objects that informs his/her sense of belonging and a politics of belonging will ensue.

With this in mind, this chapter will firstly situate the Kivu conflict within a larger national context. The violence during the First Republic, 1960 to 1965, definitely had an impact on the relationship between Congolese ‘autochthone’ and Congolese Banyarwanda. Secondly, it was during the time of the Second Republic that the conflict between ‘autochthone’ and...
Banyarwanda started. Thirdly, this chapter illustrates how issues that were not addressed during the First and Second Republic culminated into a massive conflict in North Kivu. Fourthly, this conflict intensified with the arrival of refugees from Burundi and Rwanda in NK and SK. It thus became a multileveled conflict. The “Hutu versus Tutsi” tensions in Rwanda and Burundi shattered the relationship between Banyarwanda in North Kivu. The Banyarwanda in North Kivu polarised between Hutu and Tutsi. At a different level in South Kivu one notices a split from Banyarwanda to Banyamulenge. The last level is with regards to the Banyarwanda versus ‘autochthonous’ Congolese. This laid the foundations for a Rwandan and Burundian led invasion in the form of AFDL in 1996. This led to a regime change in the DRC, but it did not bring peace.

The First Republic: 1960 to 1965

As with Rwanda and Burundi, independence brought or ushered in a new political order with new political elites in the DRC. The Republic of Congo (as it was known after independence) received its independence on June 30, 1960. Joseph Kasa-Vubu was elected as President and Patrice Lumumba became the Prime Minister. Lumumba, leader of MNC-L, was the winner of the legislative elections but without a clear majority had to form a coalition government with MNC-K (Olivier, 2010, p. 2; Zeilig, 2008). Things soon changed for the new independent state with the mutiny of the Congolese soldiers against their European officers. This was largely due to the lack of changes in their living conditions since independence (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1983; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987). There was an expectation, from people living in the DRC that independence will bring about changes to their living conditions. However, this expectation was not met. This led to a nationwide unrest which engulfed the whole country. Belgium intervened and it caused more instability. Taking advantage of the situation Moïse Tshombe proclaimed the

158 “First Republic” and “Second Republic” is not a reference to Rwanda’s First Republic and Second Republic. The DRC also had a First Republic and Second Republic.

159 Buyoya again came to power in Burundi via a coup d’état. The Tutsi were in control in of the Burundian state and the Rwandan state at the time of the invasion. Hence, they could put a strong force together to support the AFDL and attack the refugee camps that housed ex-FAR and Interhamwe.

160 Albert Kalonji was the leader of the Congolese National Movement/Minority (MNC-K) which was part of the Congolese National Movement. However a disagreement within the party saw Lumumba forming the Congolese National Movement/Majority (MNC-L) and Albert Kalonji MNC- K.
independence of Katanga and Albert Kalonji proclaimed South Kasai as an independent state. Both rebellions were supported by Western allies (Stearns, 2011; Olivier, 2010).

Mobutu was responsible for the neutralisation of Lumumba. He seized power, replaced Lumumba with Joseph Ileo, while retaining Joseph Kasa-Vubu as president and transferring the power of the Prime Minister to a College of Commissars. This College of Commissars was infamously known as the Binza Group. In the meantime Antoine Gizenga denounced Mobutu’s coup d’état and formed his own government in Stanleyville saying it represents the Lumumba government. Soon afterwards Lumumba was killed and this was mainly because he sought to join Antoine Gizenga in Stanleyville. Lumumba became a huge threat to the Binza Group, which may explain his assassination on January 17, 1961. With the help of the US and Belgium Mobutu and the Binza Group was able to cling to power (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1983; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987, Olivier, 2010 and Stearns, 2011).¹⁶¹

By February 1961 the Republic of Congo had “three concurrent governments – at Leopoldville (Ileo), Stanleyville (Gizenga) and Elisabethville (Tshombe)” (Olivier, 2010, p. 2). Eventually Mobutu and the Binza Group reached out to the Lumumbist faction to form a government of national unity. This was largely with the help of the UN. The government of national unity consisted of members of the Binza Group and of Gizenga and Gbenye. Cyrille Adoula was appointed as Prime Minister. However, Gizenga was, in a similar fashion as Lumumba, placed under house arrest and neutralised. With the help of Belgium Katanga surrendered and Moïse Tshombe went into exile in Angola (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1983; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987 and Olivier, 2010.). It seemed as if there was finally political stability in Congo but this peace was only short lived, and the Second Independence Movement began.

The Second Independence Movement started after Kasa-Vubu dissolved Parliament (Olivier, 2010, p. 6), in an attempt to put an end to the opposition to Kasa-Vubu and Adoula’s leadership. This escalated the tension between various parties, which met on October 3, 1963 to form the National Liberation Council (CNL), led by Christophe Gbenye, with the objective to achieve the ‘second independence.’ The second independence movement “was the work of a popular alliance of workers, peasants, the unemployed urban youth, students, lower civil servants, and

¹⁶¹ According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (1983, p. 81) the Binza Group was a Kinshasa clique that was named after the “suburb where its members lived and met.” The group consisted of Army Commander Joseph Mobutu, Foreign Minister Justin Bomobo, Security Police Chief Victor Nendaka, Central Bank Governor Albert Ndele, and Interior Ministry Permanent Secretary Damien Kandolo.
radical nationalist leaders” (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987, p. 92). This followed a second rebellion led by Louis Bidalira, Gaston Soumialot, Nicolas Olenga and Laurent-Désiré Kabila in the Eastern Congo, in the Fizi-Uvira region. According to Olivier (2010, p.6) “[t]his rebellion rapidly expanded to encompass North Katanga (June), Kivu-Maniema (July), Sankuru (August), and reached its apogee with the capture of Stanleyville (August), which soon became the capital of a "Popular Republic of the Congo" led by Christophe Gbenye.” The counter offensive was organized by Mobutu and for this he needed the help of Tshombe. Moïse Tshombe was appointed as the fourth Prime Minister and “with the support of mercenaries, former Katangese gendarmes (the 'diabos'), anti-Castro Cuban pilots from the CIA, and Belgian officers and non-commissioned officers commanded by Colonel Vandewalle” Leopoldville was able to reclaim most of the territory and halt the second independence movement (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987, p. 92). While the national struggle was underway a local one was brewing Kivu.

The 1965 Kinyarwanda Rebellion

To understand the first postcolonial conflict in NK between the Banyarwanda and autochthonous Congolese one has to look at the role colonialism played in the reconfiguration of pre-colonial borders, identities and relations (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005 and Stearns, 2012a). Scholars are in agreement that there was a significant number of Kinyarwanda speaking people (also known as Banyarwanda) in the Eastern DRC before the advent of colonialism (Mamdani, 1998; Mamdani, 2001; Vlassenroot, 2002; Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005; Prunier, 2009 and Stearns, 2011). Furthermore, many of these scholars found that it is possible to divide these groups of Banyarwanda along ethnic lines. The first group of Banyarwanda was predominantly Hutu and were located in what is now to as North Kivu, near Rutshuru. The second group was predominantly Tutsi and was located in what is now South Kivu (Mamdani, 1998; Vlassenroot, 2002 and Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005). In addition to this, the Banyarwanda of North Kivu were part of the pre-colonial Rwandan Kingdom (Mamdani 1998), whilst the Banyarwanda of South Kivu (later Banyamulenge) originated from both Rwanda and Burundi (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005, p. 128). This is significant to note because this determined the preferred destination of Hutu and Tutsi refugees after independence in the Great Lakes region.

The pattern of rebellion was repeated during the First and Second Congo Wars.
Mamdani (1998, n.p.) makes a distinction between three groups of Banyarwanda in Eastern DRC namely “the Banyaruchuru and the Banyamasisi in North Kivu, and the Banyamulenge in South Kivu.” Of these groups the only group that was not in the Eastern DRC with the start of Belgian colonialism was the Banyamasisi, which were the immigrants from Rwanda during colonialism. The Masisi inhabited part of Hunde territory but their land was “reduced to a minimal level when Belgian colonial administration intervened, settling white and Rwandan populations in the area in the 1940s and 1950s” (Bucyalimwe, 1997, p. 508). This was to settle Rwandan labourers in Masisi to assist white colonial settlers. These waves of immigration were facilitated by the Comité National du Kivu (CNKi, National Committee of Kivu). CNKi was given eight million hectares of land in the Kivus at first but was later scaled down. The CNKi profited off the land by leasing and selling Congolese land to settlers. These settlers needed labour which was the rational behind the colonial facilitation of immigration from Rwanda (Stearns, 2012a, p. 16). The first wave was from 1926 – 1936 and during this period 17 902 Rwandan migrants to the Congo was recorded; and to sustain the demand for Rwandan labour the Mission d’Immigration des Banyarwanda (MIB, Banyarwanda Immigration Mission) was established. During the second wave, 1937 – 1945, the MIB recruited approximately 100 000 Rwandans to the Kivus and they were mainly Hutu. This was mainly because the Hutu were regarded as more suitable for manual labour and would make better political subjects. By 1957 immigration was discouraged because of the population density of the Masisi highlands. However, during the Social Revolution of 1959 in Rwanda about 30 000 to 50 000 Rwandese fled to North and South Kivu. Taking all of this into account, Stearns (2012a) estimates that during the colonial period, between 150 000 to 300 000 Rwandans migrated to Kivu. Thus, by the end of colonialism the Banyarwanda were the largest ethnic group in the Petit Nord or as it is known today, North Kivu.

In addition, the Banayaruchuru was the only group of Banyarwanda which got ‘indigenous’ status and their own ‘native authority’ (Mamdani, 1998 and Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005). However, the Banyamasisi (the immigrants) later on received their own native authority (Collectivite Gishari) from the Belgians in 1938, but this came at a cost to the Hunde. Rwanda’s Mwami Rudahigwa was influential in setting up the Tutsi-led native authority in Masisi and thus at first it was Tutsi who were transplanted, and native authorities in Rwanda were compensated “for the loss of the emigrants’ revenues” (Bucyalimwe, 1997, p. 513). Collectivite Gishari was part of the Hunde native authority, and needless to say this created tension between the local population and the immigrants. The Hunde saw this as a violation of their customary right and
protested to the Belgian colonial government to return the land that was taken – a request with which the Belgians would oblige. However, this needed a shift in colonial policy. The shift was to return Collectivite Gishari to the Hunde and to transplant Hutu since it was believed they would make better political subjects (Bucyalimwe, 1997, p. 513). This led to a conflict between the Hunde Chief Andre Kalinda, the Rwandan Mwami Mutara Rudahigwa and the Collectivite Gishari Chief Bucyanayandi (Bucyalimwe, 1997, p. 513). In the end Collectivute Gishari were returned to Hunde and those Hutu was transplanted who had to pay tributes to Hunde.163

In contrast, the Banyamulenge of South Kivu never had their own native authority even though they consistently demanded one from Belgium. They were ‘subjects’ of local traditional authorities. According to Vlassenroot (2002, p. 502) “the Tutsi settlers were confronted by local Kingdoms, which prevented them from establishing their own customary system of land control. Access to grazing lands was conditioned by their acceptance of the existing traditional order and by their becoming subjects of the local traditional authorities.” Thus, “[by] the end of Belgian colonial rule, the Banyamulenge population was living in three different zones … and was ruled by several indigenous [Congolese] chiefs” (Vlassenroot, 2002, p. 503).

The dawn of independence, in the form of democracy, increased the tensions between the autochthones and the Banyarwanda. Firstly, towards the end of colonialism there was a shortage of land in Masisi. According to Bucyalimwe (1997, p. 515)

To remedy this problem of land scarcity, in 1956 the administration ended new grants for colonization59 and, in 1957, the Rwandan immigration program. By 1956-1957, land scarcity had probably begun to affect most immigrant families, the local Hunde having been pushed to landlessness and near-landlessness earlier by the process of white and Rwandan settlement. The end of planned immigration gave rise to a laissez-faire policy on land use. With land becoming scarce, this opened the door to land encroachments, expansion of holdings, and increasing disputes in the years ahead.

Secondly, to make matters worse the Belgians left the citizenship question of the Banyarwanda164 unresolved, which was filled with ambiguity. For example, the colonial

163 Belgian colonialism used the word “transplanted” in their official colonial records to describe the relocation of Tutsi to North Kivu. The aim with “transplantation” was to recreate, for the Tutsi, the Rwandan system of indirect rule, in parts of the North Kivu. For a detailed discussion please see Bucyalimwe (1997).

164 The Banyarwanda is here discussed as one. I will explain how the Banyarwanda became to be known and Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge.
government granted the Banyarwanda voting rights to participate in the pre-independence provincial and municipal elections, both as candidates and as voters (Mamdani, 1998 and Stearns, 2012a). In the pre-independence elections, the Hunde, the Nande and the Nyanga did better provincially than the Banyarwanda and since power was concentrated at the provincial level the Hunde "took advantage of their new political power to consolidate control over the local administrative apparatus, from the level of quartier (neighbourhood) to the chiefdoms" (Stearns, 2012a, p. 21). Moreover, “Banyarwanda local officials were dismissed and Hunde chiefs were imposed even in areas where there had previously been few Hunde” (Stearns, 2012a, p. 21). This soon led to the first conflict between the Banyarwanda in North Kivu and “the autochthones” (Mamdani, 1998; Mamdani, 2001, Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005 and Stearns, 2012a).

It was the first pre-independence elections that sparked the first violent conflict between the Banyarwanda and “the autochthones”. Stearns (2012a, p. 21) indicates that the Belgium government gave “Rwandan immigrants” the right to vote in local elections. Thus, 1958 local council elections show that ‘Rwandan immigrants’ won 80 percent of the local council seats. The post-independence elections brought about a shift in power that was previously dominated by the Banyarwanda. After the first national and provincial elections “the autochthones” dominated the provincial governments and used their new found political power to over-rule the local councils. In 1962 a group of “Hutu youth attacked police stations in Bibabi and Karuba, killing several officers” (Stearns, 2012a, p. 22) in response to this marginalisation. After the first conflict the provincial assembly set up a commission to investigate what they saw as a ‘Banyarwanda problem’ and it concluded by recommending the expulsion and deportation of all Banyarwanda immigrants (including refugees) and the of revision voting laws to disenfranchise Banyarwanda (Stearns, 2012a, p. 22).

It was in this context that the 1965 conflict started. According to Stearns (2012a, p. 22) “after disputed elections in which Hunde candidates fared surprisingly well, tensions again came to a head as Banyarwanda clashed with Hunde and local security forces.” Moreover, after a Banyarwanda protest in North Kivu in 1965, the authorities killed about 500 Banyarwanda civilians. This all built up to the eventual ‘Kinyarwanda rebellion’ of September 1965 (Mamdani, 1998). The Banyarwanda were labelled Mulelist165 and were victims of a “veritable manhunt.” The Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) therefore suspected the Tutsi in Eastern Congo to be

165 A Mulelist was a supporter of Pierre Mulele, a leader of the Second Independence movement
pro-Mulelist and were especially targeted (Olivier, 2010, pp. 11-13). It is rather interesting that the Tutsi supposedly sided with the Mulelist rebellion, because if this is the case it signals solidarity with the cause of the second independence movement and thus it is an indication that they saw themselves as autochthonous.

It was under these conditions that Mobutu finally staged a coup d'état on 24 November 1965. According to Boya (2010, p. 92) “Mobutu quickly took matters in his own hands: the regime declared a state of emergency and gave itself five years to restore law and order in the country before returning to power to civilian rule” This never happened and Mobutu was in power for 32 years before he was overthrown by Laurent Kabila in 1997.

The Second Republic: 1965 to 1990

As explained previously the Hamitic hypothesis created the categories of native and a nonnative. The native was bestowed with ethnic citizenship and the nonnative with civic citizenship. Access to land was a customary right of those considered native or indigenous and thus “[f]or those not belonging to the ethnic community it became extremely difficult to have access to land …” (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005, p. 125). This system did not allow the Banyarwanda the same kind of access to land that the ‘autochthones’ had; and therefore they had to find other ways of acquiring land. A number of laws in postcolonial Congo changed the situation of the Banyarwanda. These laws were mainly passed to expand Mobutu’s patronage network to the Banyarwanda elite. Firstly, the Citizenship Decree of 1972 bestowed citizenship to refugees who came from Rwanda in 1959 – 60, which was a response to the influx of Hutu refugees from Burundi after the Hutu massacre in Burundi 1972. Secondly, the 1973 Property Act declared all land, including that under customary control property of the State, which meant that “customary authorities lost their legitimate control over the land distribution and were assigned the role of simple administrators” (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005, p. 131). The 1972 decree coupled with the 1973 Property Act allowed the Banyarwanda to buy land (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2004, p. 2). This resulted in many locals losing their land to those who could afford to buy it. The issue here is the transference of customary land to private property. Customary land could now be sold to the highest bidder. Thus, an important part of that which defines ethnic groups or forms ethnic subjects and which gave those subjects a sense of belonging was sold to those who could afford buying large tracts of land. In addition to this, one also notices that the competition for land intensified and it provided local leaders with
opportunities to use ethnicity for political gain (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005, p. 144). Thirdly, the 1981 Citizenship Law reversed the citizenship of Banyarwanda. According to Mamdani (1998, n.p) “[t]he 1981 law stipulated that only those persons who could demonstrate an ancestral connection to the population residing in 1885 in the territory then demarcated as Congo would qualify to be citizens of Congo.” This was mainly because the 1972 Citizenship Decree angered the ‘autochthonous’ Congolese so much that Mobutu rapidly lost their support, unto which the 1981 law was a response. This was followed by a Resolution on Citizenship at the 1991-1992 Sovereign National Conference. Once again central to the debate was the Banyarwanda’s citizenship status; and to strain relations between the autochthones and Banyarwanda further was the growing number of refugees coming from Rwanda and Burundi. Therefore, the lack of access to land, the decaying Mobutu state, the issue regarding citizenship and the growing influx of refugees contributed to violence of 1993.  

The Failure of Democratisation in Zaire: 1990 to 1995

Zaire, like Burundi and Rwanda, also opened up for multi-party competition and democracy during the early nineties. According to Olivier (2010, p. p. 18) Mobutu announced on 24 April 1990 the end of the Second Republic. He promised amongst other things: a multi-party system, the rehabilitation of the separation of powers, a transitional government and a new constitution. After some delay and pressure from the international community Mobutu conceded on October 6, 1990 to the establishment of a full multi-party system. For this purpose the Sovereign National Conference (CNS) was established in August 1991 with the aim to start democratic negotiations. As indicated above the citizenship issue of the Banyarwanda was a discussion point at the CNS. Significantly, the Nande, Hunde and Nyanga opposed the Banyarwanda’s quest for citizenship and “impeded them from discussing their problem in this national forum” (Bucyalimwe, 1997, p. 532).

One notices that there was some solidarity among Hutu and Tutsi in Zaire just before the 1993 conflict. However, prior to the conflict a Tutsi led organisation, ACOGENOKI, campaigned against Hutu domination and at the same time wanted “to end the Hunde monopoly of power”  

166 It became difficult to distinguish between Banyarwanda and refugee. See Chapters 3 and 7.  
167 It is interesting that it was around the same time South Africa had transition talk. See CODESA I and CODESA II.
The Tutsi opposed both the Hunde and the Hutu in acquiring power. The Tutsi worked with both the Hunde and the Hutu against one another. However, just before the 1993 conflict one saw the unification of Hutu and Tutsi “to recover the citizenship they were being denied” (Bucyalimwe, 1997, p. 535). The 1993 conflict became Congolese vs Banyarwanda and this is for the simple reason that it was around the Banyarwanda’s quest for national citizenship. The 1993 conflict was about Congolese nationality even though ethnic groups participated in it.

It does not come as a surprise that violence erupted soon after the conference in North Kivu. On June 1, 1992, 30 Banyarwanda were killed over a citizen dispute regarding “the descendants of Banyarwanda transplanted to the Congo in the colonial era” (Olivier, 2010, p. 20). Almost nine months later a full-scale conflict engulfed North Kivu. The 1993 North Kivu conflict was a culmination of a number of issues, chief amongst them were the immigration of Hutu Banyarwanda in the 1930s, the unresolved citizenship question, and the change in land ownership policy. The conflict officially started on the 20th of March 1993, when Congolese militias attacked and killed a number of Banyarwanda. Most victims were killed by machetes, hoes and axes. Some were burned alive. There were cases reported where pregnant women was disembowelled and maimed. There are no accurate numbers on how many people could have died during this period but it is estimated that between 6000 and 15 000 lost their lives in the conflict; and 250 000 people were displaced. The violence lasted until June 1993 before order could be restored.

The peace was short lived, because towards the end of the Rwandan genocide the whole Habyarimana government migrated to NK and SK with a significant chunk of the Rwandan Hutu population. In this regard there were 35 refugee camps in Zaire. According to Prunier (2009, p.p. 24-25) “[t]ogether they held no fewer than 850,000 people, including 30,000 to 40,000 men of the ex-FAR, the army of the genocide, complete with its heavy and light weapons, its officer corps, and its transport echelon.” In addition to this, “[t]here were also 270,000 people in nine camps in Burundi, and another 570,000 in eight camps in Tanzania” (Prunier, 2009, p. 25). Later many returned, approximately 140 000, but the majority stayed out of fear for the ex-FAR and the RPF. Given the already volatile situation, in Kivu revenge killings were the order of the day. This was in retaliation to the 1993 violence in Kivu. In addition to this, “the solidarity between Hutu Banyarwanda and Tutsi Banyarwanda was shattered” (OHCHR Report, 2010, p. 60); largely as a result of the regional conflict between Hutu and Tutsi. Some Congolese Tutsi were fighting the Habyarimana regime as RPF soldiers, whilst ex-FAR soldiers took revenge on
the local Tutsi population in NK and SK (Stearns, 2011). Furthermore, some Tutsi left Congo to return to Rwanda after the RPF victory. The OHCHR Report estimates that over 200 000 Tutsi left between July 1994 and March 1995. The reason for this was based on fear of the ex-FAR and for better economic and employment opportunities in Rwanda (OHCHR Report, Ibid.).

For the ex-FAR and Mobutu the refugees were political capital. The ex-FAR saw themselves as the Rwandan government in exile and were planning to return to Rwanda, and for this they needed weapons and money (Stearns, 2011; Prunier, 2009). Refugee aid thus became an important source of income for the ex-FAR. This only aggravated the new Rwandan government more, which threatened to take military action against the camps if the international community did not intervene. To make matters worse ex-FAR soldiers launched numerous attacks on Rwanda. For example, on October 31, 1994 ex-FAR soldiers “killed thirty-six people near Gisenyi, starting a cycle that would not stop” (Prunier, 2009, p. 26). In addition to this, these massive migrations also fuelled the existing tensions between Banyarwanda, Banyamulenge and ‘autochthones’ in North and South Kivu. To give one an indication of the scale of this are the following statistics; 40 percent of the population in North Kivu was Kinyarwanda speaking; where the most densely populated was at Masisi in which 70 percent of the population was Kinyarwanda speaking. In contrast to this, in South Kivu “the main ‘nonnatives’ were the Barundi, who probably represent up to 15 percent of the population” (Prunier, 2009, p. 51). More interestingly, the Barundi “have had only limited problems with their autochthon neighbors (mostly Bavira and Bafulero), unlike the much smaller Banyamulenge group” (Prunier, Ibid.).

Given this, the Zaire government in 1995 clearly decided that the violence in Kivu is a result of the influx of Hutu refugees and decided to expel Hutu refugees from Congo. This echoed earlier sentiments of the “Banyarwanda problem.” The OHCHR Report (2010, pp. 61-62) explains that the standpoint of FAZ was very ambiguous: “[w]hile in some cases they protected the Tutsis from attacks by armed groups and the civilian population, in other cases they targeted them directly.” This ambiguity created confusion as to who is fighting who. Sometimes FAZ worked with the Mayi-Mayi and other times they worked with the Banyarwanda. However, there was no recorded cooperation between Hutu and Tutsi Banyarwanda during this period. They clearly

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168 The OHCHR Report makes specific reference to Hutu Banyarwanda and to Hunde and Nyanga militia groups. I do not want to collapse ethnicity into nationality or vice a versa I will refer to it as a conflict between Congolese and Banyarwanda.

169 This however changed during the second Congo War and subsequent conflict in North and South Kivu.
regarded each other as their arch enemy. By end of this period the consequence of this conflict was devastating. According to the OHCHR Report (2010, p. 64) “[i]n June 1996, there were between 100,000 and 250,000 displaced persons in the province. At that time it was estimated that since 1993, between 70,000 and 100,000 people had died as a result of the ethnic war in the province.” The OHCHR Report (2010) also listed 40 incidents of human rights violations against civilians for the period 1993 to 1996. These incidents were violent and were restricted to North Kivu. It was in this context that the First Congo War started.


The AFDL invasion was a result of the struggle between Hutu and Tutsi elites. The Tutsi at the time were in control of the Rwandan and Burundian states. Rwanda and Burundi also had an ally in Uganda. At the time the biggest problem for Rwanda was the refugee camps in North and South Kivu which contained large numbers of genocidiaries, ex-FAR and some of the previous political elite; who in essence were a representation of Hutu power. Hence, the AFDL was formed to deal with this problem. The AFDL alliance forces consisted of Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) and Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB). During the invasion the AFDL forces targeted Hutu in NK and SK (Newbury, 1998; Reyntjes, 1999 and Prunier 2009).

In NK this period was marked by revenge. According to the OHCHR Report (2010, p. 78) “[t]he entire period was characterised by the relentless pursuit of Hutu refugees and the ex-FAR/Interhamwe by the AFDL/APR forces across the entire Congolese territory.” The Hutu refugees were in a precarious situation because the Congolese government and the international community could not protect them anymore. As the AFDL alliance gained momentum the more they killed Hutu refugees. This was clearly in revenge of the Rwandan genocide. Rwandan refugees also received little sympathy from Congolese citizens as they committed acts of violence against Zairian civilians. However, there were also incidents where villagers participated in the killings of the Hutu refugees. Thus, the refugees had to rely on the ex-FAR/Interhamwe for protection. If they had distanced themselves from the ex-FAR/Interhamwe they would have been killed in refugee camps. Their only other option was to flee from the advancing forces of the AFDL alliances. According to the OHCHR Report (2010, p. 81) “[a]s they advanced, AFDL/APR/FAB soldiers reportedly carried out widespread and systematic attacks on the eleven Rwandan and Burundian refugee camps set up in the
The attacking of Hutu nationals from Burundi and Rwanda indicate it was a kind of Tutsi revenge. They intentionally attacked refugee camps, even when there was no ex-FAR/Interhamwe. The AFDL forces killed sick, old and young people who could not flee and who were left behind in the refugee camps. Most of the victims were killed with hoes, axes, and hammers. Some were burned alive. The AFDL forces made it a point to minimize knowledge about these killings. It became the phenomenon of ‘disappearances.’ They dumped bodies in mass graves and burned people alive. In some cases they would even dig up mass graves to burn the bodies. In addition, many refugees were intercepted at checkpoints and killed. At check points, “[i]ndividuals identified as Rwandan or Burundian Hutus on the basis of their accent, their morphology or their dress were systematically separated from the other intercepted people and killed in the surrounding area” (OHCHR Report, 2010, p. 83). Like the Rwandan genocide AFDL/APR forces first dehumanised refugees by referring to them as “pigs.” One of the questions one has to ask is: how great must the hate have been? This question is triggered by the following incident. According the OHCHR Report (2010, p. 73) “[a]t the border post, while the group was waiting for papers for its departure into Rwanda, FAZ soldiers killed a minor who had asked them for water.” This could only make sense if they were killing a “pig, for de-humanising a victim makes it easier to kill them.

The violence in South Kivu apparently started with the Banyamulenge rebellion of 1996 and this rebellion was supported by Rwanda, Burundi and AFDL forces (Stearns, 2011 and Prunier, 2009). At first the reason for the rebellion appeared to be citizenship, but later it became genocidal. For example, the OHCHR listed 238 incidents of human rights violations and 104 of these were against Hutu, regardless of whether they were refugees or Banyarwanda. Hutu were hunted down and systematically killed. However, it was not only Hutu who were killed. The ex-FAR/Interhamwe and FAZ alliance killed many Banyamulenge and Congolese civilians. In response to this the FAZ and the Bembe formed an alliance against the invading forces. They in return killed “an unknown number of Banyamulenge civilians in the village of Kabela in the Fizi territory” (OHCHR Report, 2010, p. 73). If one reads how the events unfolded in the 1996 war it was difficult for Congolese to see the Banyamulenge as not Rwandan.


After Kabila’s victory people expected change but it soon became clear that this would not be the case. Kabila’s closest allies got lucrative government positions and economic opportunities.
Thus Kabila continued Mobutu’s parasitic political system. Kabila like his predecessor had a fear of the people close to him. Kabila feared that Rwandans wanted to get rid of him the same way they got rid of fellow AFDL founder André Kisase Ngandu. Kabila knew that because he was part of the assassination. Kabila’s fears were legitimate because according to Turner (2013, p. 17) “[i]n July 1998, Kabila pre-empted a rumored coup d’état, transferring Kabarebe from his post as army commander to a powerless position as advisor to the president”; whilst “A few days later, Kabila announced that he was sending Kabarebe and the other foreign officers home” (Turner, 2013, p. 17). Kabila then asked the RPA to leave Congo.

This fallout sparked the Second Congo War and this time Kabarebe led the charge. This led to the mutiny of Tutsi soldiers on 2 Aug 1998, and with the support of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) was formed. RCD took control of NK and SK. Soon after this happened “Africa’s world war” began. It is called Africa’s world war because it involved eight national armies and 21 irregular armed groups” (OHCHR Report, 2010). To counter the RCD, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi invasion, Kabila called for the help of Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and Sudan to help stop the advance of Armée Nationale Congolaie (ANC). Kabila also formed an alliance with Hutu led groups to counter the invasion of NK and SK.

It was during this time the Alliance pour la Liberation du Rwanda (ALiR, Alliance for the liberation of Rwanda) was born. It consisted mostly of Congolese Hutu rebel movements and ex-FAR/Interhamwe. The ALiR was the successor of the Rassemblement pour le Retour des Réfugiés et la Democratie au Rwanda (RDR). The RDR was formed in the camps before the AFDL invasion attack by Francos Nzabarhimanana in April 1995 (Prunier, 2009, p. 28 and Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008, p. 8). The ALiR was made up of Forces pour le Défense de la démocratie (FDD) and with ex-FAR/Interhamwe and “Hutu armed elements” (presumably Congolese Hutu armed groups). At first there were two groups of ALiR: ALiR I and ALiR II. ALiR I was operational in North Kivu and ALiR II was operational in South Kivu (Prunier, 2009, p. 268). ALiR was formed as a response to the mainly Tutsi led RCD who accused Hutu Banyarwanda in Congo of supporting ex-FAR/Interhamwe forces, and consequently targeted them (Turner, 2013; Reyntjens, 2009). Around 2001 and towards the end of the war the ALiR morphed into the Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) (Stearns, 2012a and OHCHR Report, 2010, p. 213). Spittaels & Hilgert (2008, p. 8) indicates that by 2008 only the core of the

<sup>170</sup> The RCD’s armed wing was called ANC.
FDLR was comprised of genocidaires and the large majority was not because they were children at the time of the genocide and were innocent.

As mentioned earlier, in the First Congo War Hutu and Tutsi did not work together. However, this changed during the Second Congo War. The RCD had some Hutu support. Significantly they formed an alliance against the Congolese government. More interestingly, the Hutu fought against the AFDL in the First Congo War. A reason for this may be because all Hutu were targeted by the AFDL forces in the First Congo War. With the Second Congo War the RCD needed the help of the Hutu community in their fight against the Congolese government. Moreover, the RCD split into two: RCD-Goma and RCD-Mouvement de Libération (Liberation Movement). This was over a disagreement between the states of Rwanda and Uganda. The RCD-ML later formed an alliance with Kinshasa in 2001 and they fought the RCD-Goma and Rwanda alliance. The Mai-Mai later joined the ALiR/FDLR, RCD-ML and Kinshasa alliance (Stearns, 2012a). In addition to RCD, Uganda created and supported Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC) and it was led by Jean-Pierre Bemba (OHCHR Report, 2010, p. 153). Under international pressure parties agreed to a peace agreement in Lusaka on 10 Jul 1999 and it was dubbed the Lusaka Agreement. The agreement called for the disarmament of all groups and the departure of all foreign national armies. However the agreement was a failure and war continued (Prunier, 2009).

The Second Congo War was more deadly than the first, and involved more sovereign states. The affected area was mostly the eastern region of the DRC, whilst the conflict was most concentrated in NK and SK. An OHCHR Report (2010) listed 339 incidents of human rights abuses during the Second Congo War; the temporal scope of which it determined was but until the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in December 2002. There were strong ethnic overtones in this war and it was largely restricted to Eastern region of the DRC. According to the OHCHR (2010, p. 154) “[i]n the days that followed, President Kabila’s security services and those people who were hostile to the rebellion embarked on a campaign of hunting down Tutsis, Banyamulenge and people of Rwandan origin in general. Numerous civilians deemed to have a ‘Tutsi’ or ‘Rwandan’ appearance were also targeted.” on the one hand, this was mainly a result of RCD’s bias towards the local Tutsi community and Rwanda’s interference in the management of North and South Kivu. On the other hand the Hutu Banyarwanda were accused of supporting ALiR and was targeted by Rwandan and RCD armed forces (OHCHR Report, 2010, p. 169-170). The violence against the Hutu Banyarwanda was just as atrocious as the violence against Congolese Tutsi.
Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated on 16 January 2001 and Joseph Kabila replaced his father. This ushered in a new phase in the conflict and it marked the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD). It became official on 25 Feb 2002 in South Africa and there was a notable shift especially between Jean-Pierre Bemba and Kabila, as they agreed to a power sharing deal. However, “RCD-Goma and several other parties” did not want to participate in the ICD (OHCHR Report, 2010, p. 213). A few months later, two bilateral peace agreements were signed: one between Rwanda and Congo and another between Uganda and Congo. It was decided that all other foreign national armies had to withdraw their troops from Congo. As such, “in September 2002, Zimbabwean, Angolan, Namibian, Rwandan and Ugandan troops began to withdraw from Congolese territory” (OHCHR Report, 2010, p. 213). The agreement also states that Kabila would stay in power and that the RCD would “keep control of North Kivu, with Serufuli as governor and RCD officers commanding the military region” (Stearns, 2012a, p. 35). Thus, a three year transition period was agreed upon with elections to take place in 2006. As we will see the RCD did not do well in 2006 elections. According to Stearns (2012a, p. 36) “the RCD won just a few per cent of national legislative seats and lost the governorship of North Kivu in the 2006 elections” and this led to the formation of the CNDP.

From CNDP to M23: 2006 – 2011

The CNDP was formed on 26 July 2006. The Chairman and Supreme Commander was General Laurent Nkunda. General Nkunda was a brigade commander in the RCD and when the RCD decided to integrate with the Congolese National Army he defected, citing personal and community-wide security concerns. However, if one look at the date of CNDP’s creation it was in the build up to the 2006 elections. In the build-up to the elections the CNDP became the ‘state’ in the areas it controlled. According to Stearns (2012b, p. 28)

[i]t set up a police force, installed its own administrators, and began exacting taxes for everything from small kiosks to mining and the charcoal trade. In return, it provided security, paid some school fees and health bills incurred by poverty-stricken families, and organized communal labour on the roads.

However, the 2006 polls were not in their favour, and the CNDP launched their attack against the Congolese state after the elections in 2006. The CNDP took Sake and advanced towards Goma but was stopped with the help of MONUC after Congolese forces could not stop the advance. This led to the first round of negotiations in which Rwanda a mediating role
A peace agreement was reached and the parties agreed on the following three points: (1) the integration of CNDP into the Congolese army; (2) that there would be no redeployment outside the Kivus; and (3) that they would fight the FDLR (Stearns, 2012b, p. 30).

However, the agreement was not honoured for long and the fighting was ignited by an ambush on General Makenga’s vehicle. Once again Nkunda defected. This time around the Congolese government supported other militia groups in the fight against CNDP. The government deployed 20,000 troops but even with superior numbers the Congolese army was unable to defeat the CNDP; which in large part was because it enjoyed the support of the Rwanda state. This led to the 2008 Goma conference. A ceasefire was called but it only lasted for a few months before fighting started again. This time it was the government that the government that advanced in a campaign to defeat and dismantle the CNDP. Once again the CNDP was not defeated and “[t]he fighting was stopped by international pressure and talks between Congo and Rwanda, which culminated in the Ihusi Agreement of 16 January 2009” (Stearns, 2012b, p. 33). It is important to note that at this stage, the conflict was deemed to be waged between Rwanda and Congo. However, things changed with the Ihusi Agreement. Nkunda was replaced by Ntanganda with the help of the Rwandan government. The Congolese government and the Rwandan government joined forces to fight FDLR (Stearns, 2012b, p. 34). Operation Umoja Wetu (Our Unity) began, and Rwanda contributed 4000 troops, whilst Nkunda was arrested and the 23 March 2009 Agreement was reached. The parties concerned, amongst other conditions, agreed upon the following: (1) CNDP will receive key positions in government, and (2) they will not be transferred out of the Kivus. However, Makenga was unhappy about the arrest of Nkunda and the integration into the Congolese army, but in the end “was forced to accept integration, becoming deputy commander of South Kivu operations, the second-highest position for an ex-CNDP officer, but far away from the CNDP heartland of Masisi” (Stearns, 2012b, p. 37).

By 2012 the FDLR was still operational in the Congo and were responsible for human rights violations against civilians and in particular against women and children. Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of human rights abuse. Amongst the newer perpetrators were the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (both Ugandan rebel groups), which operated in the eastern DRC, and were responsible for various human rights abuses such as rape, murders and abductions. Most of these abuses occurred outside the areas controlled by the FDLR and CNDP. Stearns (2012b) indicates that there are mainly five reasons as to why the M23 was formed by former supporters of the CNDP. The first of these
was the most obvious: redeployment. The plan of Kinshasa was to integrate the CNDP commanders into the army and then redeploy them somewhere else in the country. However, it did not go according to plan because it was believed that many of these commanders became rich through “mineral smuggling, embezzlement of military funds and tax rackets” (Stearns, 2012b, p. 39). The second reason was the regimentation process. According to Stearns (Ibid.) “the goal was to merge army units into regiments of 1,200 soldiers, getting rid of parallel chains of command (including those managed by the ex-CNDP) and exposing the fiction of the ‘ghost soldiers’.” Through this process it was uncovered that the CNDP exaggerated their numbers and received a lot of money for soldiers who do not exist. The third reason was the internal politics in the CNDP, which was especially visible in the relationship between Makenga and Ntaganda, which was contentious. The fourth reason for the formation of the M23 was the elections of 2011. According to an UN Report in Stearns (2012b, p. 40) “FRF [Forces républicaines fédéralistes/Federalist Republic Forces, a small Tutsi militia based in South Kivu], CNDP and PARECO fear that the elections slated for 2011 and 2012 pose significant risks to their positions in FARDC.” This was a real possibility because the last elections saw a decline in the support of rebel leaders at the poll. The fifth and final reason was the pressure to prosecute Ntaganda at the International Criminal Court (ICC); which followed the conviction of Thomas Lubanga for the recruitment of child soldiers. This all eventually led to multiple defections. According to Stearns (2012b, p. 43) several defections started in NK and SK but failed as the mutineers re-defected back to the army. This forced Makenga and Ntaganda to forge alliances with groups they would not normally have cooperated with. Thus the M23 was born – a reference to the 23 March 2009 Agreement. The M23 captured Goma by November 2012, but it withdrew on the 1st of December 2012 because the Congolese government agreed to peace talks in Kampala, Uganda. However, Rwanda came under severe international pressure for their supposed support of the M23, as some Western allies suspended their aid to Rwanda. Ntaganda was arrested in March 2013 and the M23 was defeated in October 2013 (HRW, 2013).

Following a very successful campaign between FARDC and MONUSCO, they gave the FDLR an ultimatum: to lay down their weapons and surrender within six months, or the FARDC and MONUSCO would launch a military campaign against them. During the months of May and June 2014, 200 FDLR combatants surrendered but the majority, along with the leadership, did not (HRW, 2015). The FDLR did not comply with the ultimatum, spawning the joint operation between FARDC and MONUSCO. However, the UN withdrew its support from the operation.
after the government of Congo appointed two generals who were implicated in human rights abuses against civilians. These two generals were tasked with leading the operation. The Congolese government “suspended military cooperation with UN peacekeepers” and fought the FDLR forces alone (HRW, 2016); although the FARDC was unable to defeat the FDLR.

Furthermore, in 2016 a national crisis erupted around President Kabila’s intention of running a third term, as the Congolese Constitution does not permit a third term. In September 2016, three months before Kabila’s term ended people took to the streets and demanded that the President announce an election date. In response to this, the government deployed security forces to stop the protest. About 66 people were killed when security forces resorted to excessive force (HRW, 2017). Negotiations were held in October 2016 and an agreement was reach. However, it was not upheld and in December 2016 protests erupted again and this time approximately 40 people were killed by security forces in an attempt to stop the opposition and the protest marches. In addition to this, while there is a national crisis emerging the violent atrocities in Beni continues. HRW (2017) reported that since 2014 approximately 680 civilians had been killed in Beni by unidentified forces, and alleged that some people said that it is the government which is responsible for these deaths. MONUSCO reports, however, speculate that it can be the ADF, since by the end of 2016 they were still operational in the area, and killed “at least 170 people and burning at 2200 homes” in North Kivu (HRW, 2017).

A Regional Conflict between Hutu and Tutsi Elites and a Politics of Belonging

In postcolonial DRC, subject formation has been motivated by the nation state and the customary authority. The question is: Who may lay claim to be Congolese or a member of a specific ethnicity? Here I would like to note that this claim is always relating to an object and more particularly land, or a particular geographical space. For example, if the claim is with regards to Congolese citizenship it is to lay claim to Congo as an object which translates into being granted access to the geographical surface that is regarded as Congo. If the claim pertains to ethnicity, it is still a claim to a particular geographical surface that is controlled by a particular customary authority. Borders and boundaries are therefore constructed to include and exclude others. In the DRC the answer to this question is autochthony. Those who considers them to be autochthonous will claims to the object. Hence, in the DRC citizenship and ethnicity was an indication of autochthony.
What would happen if some groups are excluded since they are regarded ‘foreign’ or Banyarwanda, and ‘had to go back to where they came from’? The answer to this question is resistance. In Chapter 2 I explained that subjection always invokes resistance and this resistance could take various forms. It can take the form of rearticulation, as in the case of negritude; or it can be in the form of violent conflict, as Fanon explained. In the NK and SK resistance took both forms. Here one needs to think exclusion as a process of ‘Othering’, which translates into subjection.

In the DRC sites of subject formation were at first decentralised, and customary authorities had the right to decide who belongs and who does not; to exclude and include. The first postcolonial conflict between the Munyarwanda and the autochthone was a result of this. The Banyarwanda were labelled ‘foreign’ and were pushed out to give access to the autochthones. However, there is an important history to the first conflict that is often overlooked whenit is explained. One has to consider that during colonialism it was the autochthones that were pushed out to make way for the ‘Rwandan migrant’ or Munyarwanda. From the 1930s Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi was “transplanted” in NK as labourers for white colonial settlers. Hence, when the autochthone was in control of subject formation he/she was able to push the ‘migrant’ or Munyarwanda out. This explicitly highlights the importance of the object; the acquisition of which is an indication of whether or not one belongs.

This process was reversed after the 1965 conflict. During Mobutu’s term as Congolese ruler he centralised power and had control over all Congolese lands. He also had control over who was a citizen and who was not. Yet, he did not deny customary identity but instead centralised the object that give the customary subject its identity. It was a result of this that the Banyarwanda in NK and SK could once again acquire land; the object that would make them Congolese. However, in the customary sphere the Banyarwanda still manifested as foreigner, as they did during the “transplantation" period. Hence, the Banyarwanda in South Kivu’s quest to become autochthonous and their rearticulation as Banyamulenge.

During the 1990s as Mobutu became less hostile toward the idea of a democracy and the possibility that power might return to the customary sphere, once again Banyarwanda’s autochthonous status was questioned. This questioning was a result of the waves of Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi refugees that came to NK and SK. The question was whether or not all Banyarwanda could lay claim to Congolese soil, and in an attempt to resolve it there was a turn toward the historical narratives. If the Banyarwanda could prove that parts of NK were once part
of the Rwandan kingdom and that colonialism distorted this it would mean that they were autochthonous. This is an indication that the Banyarwanda realised that if the land was taken from them, which they acquired during Mobutu’s rule, they would once again be considered “foreigner”, and hence the 1993 conflict. Once again it was about the object - the object as that which affirms the subject’s status or completes the subject’s formation, which in turn affirms a sense of belonging.

The First Congolese War must be seen as a result of a struggle between Hutu and Tutsi elites, which in itself is a politics of belonging that relates to a broader regional question about whether the Tutsi may lay claim to being a part of the Great Lakes region. Folded into this question is the matter of Banyamulenge identity. The debate around this group is not whether they belong to South Kivu and thus the DRC, but rather whether they as Tutsis belong in the Great Lakes region. It was at this moment that the local conflict between autochthonous Congolese and the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge became intertwined with the regional struggles between Hutu and Tutsi elites. Therefore, on the one hand, if one looks at the Second Congolese War and the subsequent conflicts that involve the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge one may read it as a resistance to the notion that they are ‘from Rwanda’ or from Ethiopia. Autochthonous Congolese, on the other hand, feel that the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge only want to be Congolese because of Congo’s natural resources; claiming that if Congo did not have any exploitable natural resources the Banyarwanda and the Banyamulenge would have not wanted to be Congolese. Once again it points to a relationship between the subject and his/her objects, which in turn develops into a sense of belonging. The rejection of the claim leads to a politics of belonging.

Conclusion

Democracy and elections becomes an important vantage point from which to think the discourse of a politics of belonging. For example, all major conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC are linked to elections. It is during elections that the origins of a certain group are questioned. Pre-independence elections in Rwanda gave rise to the Social Revolution. The Social Revolution was an anti-Tutsi campaign that saw the death of many Tutsi and which also caused the first major refugee crisis in the region. In the DRC it was the same during the 1960s in the aftermath of the independence elections one saw clashes between Banyarwanda and other Congolese groupings regarding autochthony. The transition period to democracy and multi-party elections
during the 1990s in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC caused a number of violent conflicts that occurred at both a local and national level. Finally, since 2006 there has been a trend with regards to the violence in the DRC. Violence starts and intensifies closer to elections. For example, with the 2006 elections one see the formation of the CNDP, with the 2011 elections one see the formation of the M23 in 2012 and since 2016 a fresh bout of violence has broken out in response to President Kabila’s decision to run a third term. This phenomenon is also observable in Burundi. It seems that majority rule (democracy) fuels a politics of belonging. This can only be the working of power, or the contest to capture power. Elections represent the competition of state power. Whoever captures state power can decide who belongs and who does not; who benefits and who does not.
Chapter 7: The Dominant Narrative

Introduction

“The horror! The horror!” One can argue that this well-known phrase from Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* informed the imaginations of many European ‘explorers’ who journeyed to the Congo. Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* paints the African, in this case specifically the Congolese, as a backward, miserable and savage being. In 1977 Chinua Achebe wrote: “Heart of Darkness projects the image of Africa as ‘the other world,’ the antithesis of Europe and therefore of civilization, a place where man’s vaunted intelligence and refinement are finally mocked by triumphant bestiality” (Achebe, 1977, p. 1785). To protect one from such bestiality, as the other popular phrase from Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* makes clear, one must “Exterminate all the brutes.” *Heart of Darkness* thus illustrates the anxiety that early European colonialists had about encountering the African. Here the African is painted as the backward cannibal that could corrupt even the most exemplary civilised being. In this case Mr Kurtz serves as that example of what is possible if the uncivilized brutes are not exterminated.

Furthermore, one can argue that cartoons, books, films, and so on impacted the way early colonialists and later scholars engaged Congo. According to Autesserre (2009, p. 264), “[t]hrough cartoons, novels, movies, museum displays, documentaries, policy discourse, and newspaper articles, the Belgium colonizers constructed the image of the Congolese ‘inherent savagery’ to enable intervention and colonial conquest.” A popular children’s book during colonialism also helped with this type of portrayal of Africa, and particular Congo. Hergé was the pseudonym of Georges Remi who was the author of the famous comic book series *The Adventures of Tintin*. Remi was born in Etterbek Belgium in 1907, and according to Knudde (2017) “Hergé kept a close eye on the latest political, cultural and scientific inventions … [and his work commented on] … Soviet Russia, Al Capone, the Chinese-Japanese war, the Gran Chaco War, the Cold War and the space age.” The work of Hergé was widely translated and

171 Conrad (1961, p. 149)

172 Even though Conrad does not name the Congo in the *Heart of Darkness*, the *Heart of Darkness* was based on the time he spent in the Congo.

173 Also see Chapter 6 of Frantz Fanon’s *Black Skin, White Masks*.
published, and in 1930-31 *Tintin au Congo* or *Tintin in Congo* was published. *Tintin in Congo* follows a similar plot to *Heart of Darkness*. If one look at the essentialised drawings and racial stereo types in the dialogue boxes of the book it can be regarded as racist. In 2010 a Congolese immigrant to Belgium approached the Belgium courts to ban *Tintin in Congo* because of the portrayal of Congolese in the book (*The Telegraph*, 28 April 2010). However, in 2011 a Belgium court ruled that the book is not racist and that it is rather “gentle and candid humour” (*France24*, 07 December 2012). Below is an example of the drawing and dialogue boxes of the book.

![Image of a comic strip](https://etd.uwc.ac.za)

**Figure 6: Taken from Tintin in Congo (Hergé, 1931)**

I remember I encountered the image of the African, cannibal militia in 2003 during my basic training in Kimberley, South Africa. It was eight months after I finished school. One of the military instructors played *Tears of the Sun* for us one Sunday afternoon. The film is about a US Navy SEAL team that was tasked with rescuing four foreign nationals from Nigeria as the country erupts into turmoil. Half way through the film the team defended a village that was attacked by cannibal militia. It left a lasting impression on my imagination regarding the conflict in parts of the continent. Fourteen months later I had my second encounter with the cannibal African militia. This time it was during a UN briefing on the situation in North Kivu, where we were to deploy as the South African contingent from the beginning November 2004 to the end
April 2005. During one of the briefing sessions they showed us images of the “cannibalistic” Mayi-Mayi. During this briefing the Mayi-Mayi were portrayed as irrational primitives who eat their victims. They also showed us images of their victims. Their victims were mutilated and parts of their bodies were cut off. On some of these photos the Mayi-Mayi were posing with the body parts of the victims. However, they never showed us images of the Mayi-Mayi eating their victims, but there was no need for it because *Tears of the Sun* provided that for me. Interestingly, they also gave us a briefing on the danger of landmines in our deployment area. In the landmine briefing they showed us the mutilated bodies of the victims and it looked similar to that of the victims of the Mayi-Mayi. However, they failed to mention that Western landmine technology is barbaric.

![Image of Mayi-Mayi soldiers](https://etd.uwc.ac.za)

**Figure 7:** In the middle are two Mayi-Mayi soldiers dressed in “traditional” gear

In Adam Hochchild’s book *King Leopold’s Ghost* (2001), he highlighted that King Leopold of Belgium was responsible for some of the most atrocious acts committed against Congolese

174 I have photos of mutilated victims and photos of the Mayi-Mayi posing with the body parts of their victims, but it is too graphic to show here.

175 Also see Johan Pottier (2007), Shirley Lindenbaum (2004) and Gina Kolata (1986).
persons. Under the banner of a ‘free state’, Leopold exploited and enslaved Congolese for his and his partners’ business ventures. This is ironic because his most convincing argument at the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference for the Congo being “given” to him, is that this would help to counter the Arab slave trade in the eastern parts of the Congo. This image of the Congolese as an inherently violent, backward brute continued to live in the imaginations of people.

Thus it seems that many of us, who somehow directly and indirectly dealt with the conflict in the DRC, encountered the Congolese figure well before the actual encounter. This imaginative encounter helped colonialists to frame their colonial approach and now the United Nations and many other international organisations are also using this approach in the ongoing conflict in the DRC. In this chapter I argue that a dominant narrative developed in dealing with the conflict in the DRC, and that said narrative consists of four strands: ethnicity, nationality, lack of access to land and the illegal exploitation of Congo's minerals resources. Furthermore, this narrative not only framed the reports of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) but also the work of some of the leading scholars on the conflict.

I have a number of concerns regarding the dominant narrative that I would like to raise here. The first is related to how people are written and the power relations that accompany these writings.\textsuperscript{176} I am of the view that this is an important concern if one consider that these are powerful international organisations that influences policies in the UN, and these policies affected the lives of people. An apt example of this would be the 2003 case of cannibalism in the DRC. In 2003 soldiers of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) were accused of killing, cooking and eating Mbuti pygmies in the Ituri province. MLC investigated these allegations and found that there was no evidence to substantiate them. However, according to a group of human rights activists, the DRC government and MONUC confirmed this supposed incident of cannibalism (Pottier, 2007). This incident also got significant international press, including \textit{The Independent} in London and the Belgian newspaper \textit{Le Soir}, which both ran stories on the incident. Then in 2004 Amuzati, one of the main accusers, retracted his testimony and revealed that the government of Congo asked them to do so. The interesting part was that MONUC and the ICC accepted the retraction but did not say anything about the role they played in endorsing the accusations against MLC (Pottier, 2007). This points

\textsuperscript{176} I have covered this in the Problem Statement in Chapter 1. For an in-depth discussion see Depelchin’s \textit{Silences in African History}.

https://etd.uwc.ac.za
to the power that these organisations yield in the international environment, as they can, with impunity, make allegations and get away with it.

**Ethnic**\(^{177}\) and Nationality Narratives

A strong “ethnic” and “nationality” narrative was established by the reports of the Special Rapporteur, Mr Roberto Garretón, of Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch. These are two of the main narratives one will find in journal articles, newspaper articles and in commissioned and non-commissioned reports.

The first to establish the “ethnic narrative” was organisations such as the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. When I write “ethnic narrative”, it is referral to what they wrote of as “ethnic conflicts.” In 1980 Amnesty International (AI) published a report titled *Human Rights Violations in Zaire*. The reason for this report was that they were “concerned about the human

\(^{177}\) A brief note on how I am using ethnicity in this project. In *When Victims Become Killers* Mamdani argues that race and ethnicity must be treated as political identities (Mamdani, 2001, p. 15). One recognizes that the law is an important vantage point from which he analyses the formation of identities the colonial state. In *When Victims Become Killers* one observes that Mamdani is extending the project, with regards to customary law, that he started in *Citizens and Subjects*. Hence, he argues that “[i]f the law recognizes you as member of an ethnicity and state institutions treat you as a member of that ethnicity, then you become an ethnic being legally and institutionally” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 22). For him “[p]olitical identities are the consequences of how power is organised” (Mamdani, Ibid.). How did colonialism then achieve to turn ethnicity into a political identity? The answer is by making a distinction between the ‘native’ and the ‘non-native’. The non-native became a racialized subject and the native became an ethnicised subject. In addition to this, the “category ‘native’ was legally dismantled as different groups of natives [and] were set apart on the basis of ethnicity. From being only a cultural community, the ethnic group was turned into a political community, too.” In *Define and Rule* he uses the same framework he used in *When Victims Become Killers* to situate ‘tribe’ as a political identity. In this particular book he continues his investigation into the concept “native” but here he uses ‘tribe’ rather than ‘ethnicity’ to think through the concept. He poses the following question: “Did tribe exist before colonialism?” To which he responds that “[i]f we understood by tribe an ethnic group with a common language, it did” (Mamdani, 2013, p. 73). Here tribe for him is a reference to an ethnic group. One also recognises the frame he used in *When Victims Becomes Killers* to situate ethnicity as a political identity. According to Mamdani (2013, p. 73) “tribe as an administrative entity that distinguishes between natives and non-natives and systematically discriminates in favour of the former and against the latter – defining access to land and participation in local governance and rules for settling disputes according tribal identity – certainly did not exist before colonialism” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 73). Mamdani conclude by stating: “tribe was a politically driven, modern – totalizing – identity” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 74). Considering how carefully Mamdani argued against the primordial and biological claims of ethnicity, tribe and race I found that the AI, HRW and the UN are not as careful. Sometimes the way these organisation use ‘tribe’ and ‘ethnicity’ is in the primordial sense. I think Mamdani over the years has demonstrated the consequences of that. If these categories are used in the primordial sense it not only reproduces the European epistemology in which it was formed but also the violent confrontation between groups.
rights violations in Zaire” (AI, 1980, p. 1). The section “Zaire in Outline” focuses on the ethnic diversity of Zaire. For example:

“[t]he population consists of a large number of ethnic groups speaking more than 250 different languages and dialects”

...  

“[i]n addition to ethnic, political and linguistic diversity, there are also a great number of different religious sects and groups” (AI, 1980, p. 2).  

Thus, very early into the report the organisation draws one’s attention to Zaire’s ethnic diversity. It paved the way for future reports written by AI. In 1993, Amnesty International coined a term “ethnic persecution” in a report titled Zaire: Violence Against Democracy, but fails to explain what that entails. However, it becomes clear that this “ethnic persecution” is a result of “ethnic hatred” (AI, 15 September 1993, p. 16). The report also does not elaborate on what this “ethnic hatred” entailed, nor did it explain why it was applicable in Zaire. It makes the conflict seem senseless and that different ethnic groups do not tolerate each other in what was then known as Zaire.

More importantly one gets to see that in 1993 AI collapsed nationality into ethnicity and by doing this it portrayed the conflict as an “ethnic conflict.” For example: “[i]n North-Kivu members of the Hunde and Nyanga ethnic groups, particularly in the districts of Walikale and Masisi, have carried out attacks against people of ethnic Rwandese origin (Hutu and Tutsi), locally collectively known as Banyarwanda.” (AI, 15 September 1993, p. 15).

I have to make two observations here. Firstly, the report could have stated that the conflict was between Congolese and the Banyarwanda. The Banyarwanda identity is complex and it is heavily debated. The debate is about whom of the Banyarwanda can be considered to be Congolese. The Banyarwanda, as a group identity, consists of those considered to be indigenous, those who were “transplanted” during colonialism and those who are considered to be refugees. There is no clear distinction between these groups and all three are referred to as Banyarwanda. Hence, using the term Banyarwanda brings forth a dilemma. For example, when

178 It will later become clear how influential the 1980 Amnesty International report was for the first report of the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Garretón, on the situation of human rights in Zaire.
I wrote “Congolese and the Banyarwanda” it clearly demonstrated this dilemma.179 The question one might pose is who I am referring to. However, I am not referring to any group or excluding anyone’s claim to citizenship. Here, I am critical of how “Banyarwanda” is is reduced to an ethnicity. For example, the Report makes a point of saying it is the Hunde and Nyanga ethnic groups that attacked the Banyarwanda. Therefore, bringing ethnicity into the narrative. It was not necessary to use “ethnic groups” to make the point they wanted to make. By referring to “ethnic groups” it positon the conflict as “ethnic” and this is misleading. Secondly, it writes Hutu and Tutsi into the Banyarwanda identity to give it a more ethnic character. This raises the following question: If it was an ‘ethnic conflict’ why was there no fighting between the Hunde and Nyanga? It is clear that the report ignores this question, or this vantage point. Could it have been that the fighting happened to be between Congolese and Banyarwanda and that those Congolese happened to be of the Hunde and Nyanga? Another example of this kind of collapsing is the following: “[s]ome Banyarwanda were reported to have re-grouped and staged counter-attacks, killing and injuring some Nyanga, Hunde and other ethnic groups” (AI, 15 September 1993, p. 17). Once again one notices the collapsing. The Report makes it a point to say the Banyarwanda (a reference to a nationality) attacked specific ethnic groups in North Kivu, whilst it frames the Banyarwanda as an ethnic group, as opposed to a reference to nationality.

Furthermore, the reports of the Special Rapporteur (Roberto Garretón) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) also collapsed nationality into ethnicity and vice versa. It is important to note that the Special Rapporteur had interviews and meetings with HRW and AI, about the conflict in Zaire. In the Special Rapporteur’s first report which date back to 23 December 1994, one notices the ethnic narrative. The report was compiled just after the 1993 conflict in North Kivu. If one has a closer look at the first three reports they were influential in establishing an ethnic narrative. For example, in his first report (E/CN.4/1995/67) on the background information on Zaire he wrote:

The official language is French, but Swahili, Lingala, Kikongo and Tshiluba are recognized as national languages. There are more than 200 other languages.

There are approximately 450 tribes belonging to six major ethnic groups: Bantus (who include the Luba, Kongo, Mongo, Lunda, Tchokwe, Tetala, Lulua, Bangala and Ngombe) make up 80 per cent of the population; the remainder are Sudanese (consisting of the Ngbandi, Ngabaka, Ngombe).

179 In Chapter 6 I wrote about this complexity.
Mbanja, Moru-Mangbetu and Zande), Nilotes (who include the Alur, Lugbara and Logo), Pygmies,

Clearly he wrote in a manner akin to that of the colonial anthropological narrative using words
such as “tribes”, “Bantu”, “Nilotes” and “Hamites”, and more importantly it started like the A.I
1980 report; on the “ethnic diversity” of Congo. Therefore, when one gets to the section on the
conflict in North Kivu, the frame is already established; the frame he wants the reader to take
into consideration: Zaire is a country of many tribes that consists of various ethnicities of which
some of them are Bantu, Nilotes and Hamites. Hence, Chapter IV Section A is titled “Ethnic
conflicts in Northern Kivu” (E/CN.4/1995/67, p. 17). Here one notices that the focus is on
ethnicity and not identity. \( ^{180} \) For example, the reports indicates that “[t]he Northern Kivu
region that borders on Rwanda and Uganda has some three million inhabitants, … of whom
approximately one-half are indigenous to the area, the rest belonging to the category of the
Banyarwanda or persons of the Hutu, Tutsi or Twa ethnic groups of Rwandese origin”
(E/CN.4/1995/67, p. 17). Here he indicates that there is an indigenous population and a
Banyarwanda population and that the Banyarwanda consists of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. When
one reads the next paragraph one clearly sees that he regard the conflict in North Kivu as
“ethnic” (E/CN.4/1995/67, p. 17). For example:

It would appear that recent ethnic confrontations were due in part to the fact that the Hunde
and Nyanga disagreed with this decision.

In March 1993, Hundes and Nyangas attacked the Banyarwanda Hutus at Ntoto market, west of
Masisi.

…. New ethnic clashes have been occurring since mid-1994, 3/ as a result of the arrival of the new

Here “ethnic confrontations” and “ethnic clashes” are indications of the ethnic narrative. For him
to be able to do this, he had to collapsed nationality into ethnicity (Banyarwanda into ethnicity)
to argue for an ethnic conflict. In addition to this, if one looks at the recommendations of the
Special Rapporteur regarding the situation in Zaire in 1994, one notices that he believed that if

\( ^{180} \) Identity includes ethnicity, religion, nationality, gender and race. Identity is multidimensional and never
singular. A politics of belonging focuses on identity and not ethnicity, religion, nationality gender or race.
Zaire’s transition to democracy is done as quickly as possible, the situation in North Kivu would stabilize. Rightfully, he did not think the Zairean government was capable of dealing with the situation in North Kivu and thus he appealed to the international community to intervene in the situation. However, in the conclusion he regarded the situation in North Kivu as “tribal and regional rivalries” (E/CN.4/1995/67, p. 52).

Apart from the ethnic narrative, one notices the emergence of a nationality narrative. Here ‘nationality narrative’ is a referral to what he referred to as “the right of the Banyarwanda to Zairian nationality” (E/CN.4/1996/66, p. 10). For Garretón, “legislation on nationality is one of the main causes of the ethnic conflict” (E/CN.4/1995/67, p. 18). It is important to note that he saw the issue around nationality as one of “the main causes of the ethnic conflict.” The emphasis here is on ‘cause’ and thus he still see the conflict as an ethnic conflict. Garrentón, in the aforementioned report, went further to state that “[i]t would appear that recent ethnic confrontations were due in part to the fact that the Hunde and Nyanga disagreed with this decision” (E/CN.4/1995/67, p. 18). Once again nationality is collapsed into ethnicity and the only way this is possible is if one considers the Banyarwanda as a distinct ethnic group. However, that would be fallacious since it is reference to a nationality of origin. It would also mean that one must collapse three ethnic groups (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) into one to form a new one – Banyarwanda – which in this case is impossible. Hence, the reference in Kinyarwanda to Rwandese is Banyarwanda, which means “those from Rwanda.”

One notices that these narratives continue in the second report. However, in the section on the background of Zaire, there is a stronger emphasis on ethnicity. The report states that “[t]his national, ethnic, linguistic and regional diversity has a considerable impact on the generation of conflicts…” (E/CN.4/1996/66, p. 9). In chapter III of the second report, one once again notices that it is titled “Ethnic and Regional Rivalries.” It explains further that the conflict in North Kivu as “ethnic;” under Section A titled “Continuation of ethnic conflicts in Northern Kivu” and in a new section (Section B) titled “New conflict with the Banyamulenge in Southern Kivu” (E/CN.4/1996/66, p. 10). Here we notice how the Hamitic hypothesis is inserted. Above I mentioned that the Special Rapporteur in the first report made a clear distinction between the

181 Garrentón does not see that a larger politics is at play. Nationality like ethnicity is part of identity. Let me reiterate, a politics of belonging focuses on identity and not ethnicity, religion, nationality or race. See Chapter 3.

182 For an in-depth discussion on the Hamitic hypothesis see Chapter 3.
“Hamites”, “Nilotes” and the “Bantus”. For example, the report firstly describes the Banyamulenge as “Rwandan Tutsis [who] have emigrated to the Congo (Zaire), settling in Kakamba, in the plain of Ruzizi and in the higher regions (Mulengu hills), because of the climate and to feed their cattle” (E/CN.4/1996/66, p. 12). Secondly, the report makes a clear distinction between the Banyamulenge and the Congolese. For example, it is noted that the Banyamulenge “do not share the same history or customs as other Zairians speaking the same language” (E/CN.4/1996/66, p. 12). This leaves one with the assumption that the Banyamulenge who is generally considered during this time as Hamites who kept their history and customs pure. For example, the report refers to Zairian ethnic groups as tribes but do not use “tribe” or “tribal” to describe the Banyamulenge. In addition to this, throughout this section there is a distinction between “local tribes” and the Banyamulenge, thus reinforcing the Hamitic hypothesis. This frame, through which the Special Rapporteur analyses the conflict, is fixed.

Two reports were published by the Human Rights Watch around the same time, which also took up the ethnic narrative. The HRW reports, based on the references, are clearly influenced by the Special Rapporteur’s report (E/CN.4/1996/66) on the conflict in Zaire. As mentioned earlier the Special Rapporteur’s report about the conflict is written in terms of ethnicity and nationality. If one looks at the Human Rights Watch’s report, titled Forced to Flee: Violence Against the Tutsis in Zaire (July 1996), it solely focuses on the violence against the ‘Banyarwanda Tutsi’ in North Kivu. The report does not focus on the Banyamulenge.

In the opening of the report it states that the conflict in North Kivu is an ethnic conflict. For example,

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\text{[t]he region of North Kivu in eastern Zaire has been the site of recurrent interethnic violence since 1992, often carried out with the complicity of Zairian regional and national leaders and the Zairian security forces. The explosion of violence in 1993 pitted the mostly Zairian Tutsis and Hutus against other Zairian ethnic groups in the region ... (HRW, July 1996, p. 1).}
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This is rather misleading because in Zaire especially in North Kivu at the time of the 1993 conflict the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were known as the Banyarwanda. However, given the time the report was written, which was after the genocide in Rwanda, the only way to make sense of the violence in North and South Kivu was through a specifically ethnic lens. Here I notice two ways in

\[183\] Participants in my focus groups indicated that this is not true at all. Even though the Banyamulenge speak Kinyarwanda there are intermarriages. The Banyarwanda and the Barundi also speak Kiswahili.
which it was written to maintain this narrative. The first is collapsing nationality into ethnicity, and here the Banyarwanda is considered an ethnicity. It conveniently disregards the fact that the Banyarwanda identity is made up of three ethnic groups. So whenever they want to attribute the conflict to ethnicity, it uses the Banyarwanda as an ethnicity. The second is that it sometimes makes a distinct difference between the Tutsi and Hutu in Kivu. In doing so, it enables another avenue to paint the conflict as ethnic. Here it is Banyarwanda Tutsi and Banyarwanda Hutu versus one another with the help of the Hunde, Bembe or Nyanga. Sometimes the terms “Banyarwanda Hutu” and “Banyarwanda Tutsi” are replaced with “Congolese (Zairian) Hutu” and “Congolese (Zairian) Tutsi”, who are described as being in conflict with one another with the help of the Hunde, Bembe and Nyanga – so as to give the conflict its ethnic character. This collapsing of the Banyarwanda identity into ethnicity allows these organisations to always paint the conflict as ethnic.

Like the Special Rapporteur’s report the nationality narrative is also found here. For example, “[a]nother key issue in the conflict involves nationality, which was recognized and later taken away from the Banyarwanda” (HRW, July 1996, p. 7). To support their claim the report quotes paragraph 24 of the Special Rapporteur’s report (E/CN.4/1996/66) which attributes one of the causes of the conflict to the issue around the Banyarwanda’s nationality. Here, the report clearly thinks of the Banyarwanda in terms of nationality, but previously it frames the Banyarwanda in terms of ethnicity by making a distinction between Hutu and Tutsi. In addition to this, “[o]ther ethnic groups in Kivu have justified their political dominance by arguing that the Banyarwanda are foreigners who have no claim to Zairian citizenship” (HRW, July 1996, p. 7). Here autochthonous Congolese are referred to as “other ethnic” groups, and not as Congolese persons; however here the report uses the Banyarwanda as a reference to nationality. If the term Banyarwanda is considered here as a reference to nationality, it would just make sense to refer to the Congolese involved in the conflict as Congolese and not as “other ethnic groups”. The only reason why this was resorted to is to maintain the report’s ethnic narrative. If the report views the Banyarwanda identity as a reference to a particular nationality they will not be able to maintain that the underlying reason for the conflict is ethnicity. In addition to this, under a heading titled “A campaign to create ethnic enclaves” the report quoted a refugee named Ngirabakunzi as saying the following:

184 See Chapter 3.
When they take your cattle, when they take your livelihood, it gives you a great moral shock. We wept. Those of us who were pillaged, we wept as they took our cattle. They told us, "Don't cry for your cattle; cry for the blood we are going to spill the next time we come!" They told us, "Go back to Rwanda, because you already have your country" (HRW, July 1996, p. 22).

This comment is not about ethnicity but about nationality and yet the report uses this under the banner of ethnicity. This was to demonstrate that local Zairians were chasing the Banyarwanda out to form ethnic enclaves. A second refugee in the same section is cited as saying the following: "[t]he Mai-Mai came at 5:00 in the morning, and we fled to the forest. They pillaged homes, broke our radios and machines, ripped up our money. They said, 'All Rwandans should take their bags and go to Rwanda.' For them, neither Tutsi nor Hutu should stay" (HRW, July 1996, p. 22). Again the issue here is not ethnicity but rather nationality. Both refugees speaking on behalf of the Zairian militia are indicating that the Zairian militia have a problem with Rwandans, and that all Rwandans should leave Congolese soil. Another example of this would be in the second HRW report titled *Attacked by all Sides*. The report quotes a refugee that they interviewed in the Bugarama Transit Camp in November 1996. Here one sees how the Bembe is written into the story. For example,

> Before these problems, we lived together with the Zairians and the Bembe. But they said to us that the country did not belong to us. One day, we would have to return to our home. We rejected that, because Zaire is for all of us. . . .We were harassed only because of our language. They [the Bembe] said, whether you are Zairian Banyamulenge or Rwandan, you all speak the same language, so go back to your home in Rwanda (HRW, March 1997, p. 6).\(^{185}\)

The Bembe is inserted in brackets to fit the ethnic narrative, and once again the refugee referred to said “they”, which may be a reference to “Zairians”; because in the opening sentence of this quote the reference to “Zairians” and the Bembe, and yet when she said “they” the authors of the report decided that she referred to the Bembe, though it could have been a reference to both “Zairians” or the “Bembe”. It would have only been fair, if the authors continued the narrative they introduced at the outset of their quote and that is “Zairians and the Bembe.” Bembe, thus, inserted in brackets without an ellipses seems very selective. Given this, it is clear that the discourse of the report writes the Hutu and Tutsi narrative into the conflict between autochthones and the Banyarwanda. This allows not only HRW but also the UN to

\(^{185}\) Interesting here is the reference to language. In Chapter 3 I discussed the issue of language and how it becomes a marker of difference in North and South Kivu.
write about Rwanda’s involvement in the conflict as always ethnicly driven. This point is made by the following example:

In 1993, Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga civilian militia known as Mai-Mai and Bangirima, encouraged by government officials and sometimes supported by the Zairian military, attacked Hutu and Tutsi communities in North Kivu, killing thousands and displacing 300,000 (HRW, March 1997, p. 5).

Here one sees how Hutu and Tutsi are separated from the Banyarwanda identity. One also see that the report make specific reference to Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga versus Hutu and Tutsi. The report does not question the Banyarwanda identity instead it separates it into Hutu and Tutsi so that it can fit the ethnic narrative. In Chapter 3, based on participant’s responses, I argued that the Banyarwanda identity must be thought as a reference to nationality. The participant HRW interviewed also pointed to this. For example, "All Rwandans should take their bags and go to Rwanda." If one considers this it once again points to two conflicts: (1) a politics of belonging and (2) an interregional ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi elites.

I also found this narrative in scholarly work. In a journal article written by Koen Vlassenroot titled *Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge* he argues that the Banyamulenge identity is a result of an ethnogenesis and therefore an ethnicity. I found that he was able to make this argument by collapsing nationality into ethnicity. According to Vlassenroot (2002, p. 501) “the community of Tutsi-settlers in South Kivu, which before the end of the 1960s was known as part of the lager ‘Banyarwanda community’ (‘those coming from Rwanda’) living in eastern Congo, but changed its name to ‘Banyamulenge’ (‘those from Mulenge’).” Firstly, what Vlassenroot does not take into consideration is that the Banyamulenge’s Tutsi identity or ethnicity did not cede to exist. This is at the heart of the problem around citizenship in the DRC. Autochthonous Congolese strongly oppose the idea that the Rwandan diaspora includes also Banyamulenge because being Banyamulenge is being autochthonous. This claim to autochthony stretches as far back as 1885 and that places the Banyamulenge in Congo at the time of the start of the Congo Free State. If the Tutsi diaspora is also considered Banyamulenge they can also make autochthonous claims and because of this it resulted into larger claims that the Mulenge were once a part of the Rwandan Kingdom, and if that is the case then Rwanda has legitimate claims to the Fizi territory in South Kivu. Scholars like Newbury (1988), Weinstein (1972) and Mamdani (1998) show otherwise. Newbury (1988) indicates that the Tutsi in Congo (now referred to as the Banyamulenge) were a migration from the Rwandan court. Weinstein (1972) indicated that “[t]he Hutu of Southern Burundi (Bamosso
and Bagarane) and those of the Imbo (the plain along the shores of Lake Tanganyika and the Ruzizi valley) tended to be much more independent and difficult to rule." This is the area right next to the Fizi territory where one would find many Banyamulenge. Mamdani (1998) also indicates that the Tutsi who settled in South Kivu in the Fizi territory paid tributes to local Bembe chiefs. It is clear from his paper that the Banyamulenge did not reject the idea of being Tutsi, an explanation for their engagement with Rwandan and Burundian Tutsi. Secondly, Vlassenroot included the refugees of 1959 as part of the Banyamulenge. According to Vlassenroot (2002, p. 510) "[t]he only members of this community they ever met were young Banyamulenge that had joined the RPF. These youth were considered members of the Rwandan Tutsi diaspora living in Zaire for whom Rwanda was their real homeland." Taking this into account, the Tutsi diaspora of 1959 cannot be considered Banyamulenge, if the presence of the Banyamulenge community can be traced to before colonialism. It was only after 1972 that the Congolese Tutsi, who were previously known as Banyarwanda, referred to them as Banyamulenge (Stearns, 2012a, p. 23). This was an attempt to separate them from the Rwandan and Burundian refugees. For this reason one cannot refer to the Tutsi diaspora of 1959 in South Kivu as Banyamulenge – an explanation for why the Banyamulenge elders did not accept the offer of Kigali to resettle in Rwanda since they do not see themselves as Rwandan. However, it becomes difficult to distinguish between Tutsi refugees in South Kivu and the Banyamulenge. Vlassenroot writes about these two different groups under one banner – Banyamulenge (which he considers an ethnicity). Vlassenroot’s mistake is that he considers the Banyamulenge as synonymous with Rwandan Tutsi. For example, “[s]ome Banyamulenge who had returned to Rwanda after 1994, together with Tutsi from North Kivu in Kigali had constituted the Alliance des Peuples …” (Vlassenroot, 2002, p. 509). How could they have “returned” if they are originally for Mulenge? One can only make this argument if one considers the 1959 Rwandan Tutsi refugees Banyamulenge. The reason why the group of Tutsi Banyarwanda referred to them as Banyamulenge was to indicate that they were from Zaire and that they are autochthonous. Here, the move from Banyarwanda (those from Rwanda) to Banyamulenge (those from Mulenge) is a manifestation of this. Thus, a reference to Banyamulenge must be considered a claim to autochthony and a claim to Congolese nationality.

In another text published in 2005 Vlassenroot continues this trend of collapsing. In this text he collapses nationality into ethnicity the same way HRW, the UN and AI did. For example: "[t]he trigger for the first wave of massive violence was a public speech by the governor of North Kivu, in which he asked security forces to assist the efforts of the Nande, Hunde and Nyanga to
exclude and *exterminate the Banyarwanda*” (emphasis my own) (Vlassenroot, 2005, p. 146). Vlassenroot does not provide a direct reference for his description of the event. I also found the phrase “exterminate the Banyarwanda” in the Special Rapporteur’s 16 September 1996 report on page 15 and in the OHCHR Final Mapping Report on page 58. According to the Special Rapporteur “[t]he facts unfortunately confirm this opinion. In March 1993 the then Governor of Northern Kivu, Jean Pierre Kalumbo Mboho, said that the indigenous peoples should be helped by the Zairian Armed Forces to exterminate the Banyarwanda.” The Governor was quoted direct but it was not referenced. I also found that the Special Rapporteur 1996 report equated Hutu to Banyarwanda. On page 6 in the summary of the report the Special Rapporteur wrote that the governor said in a speech that the indigenous population must help the FAZ to “exterminate the Hutu”, and on page 15 it refers to the same incident and wrote that the governor said the indigenous populations, with the help of FAZ, must “exterminate the Banyarwanda.” The report clearly equates Banyarwanda with Hutu. I also found the HRW used the exact phrase “exterminate the Banyarwanda” and there is no reference to support this statement. According to HRW (July 1996, p. 2) “[t]he regional governor fuelled the conflict in 1993 when he suggested that security forces would assist efforts by Nyanga and Hunde to “exterminate” the Banyarwanda.” I also found this quote in the 1993 AI report. However, it is phrased as “exterminate Banyarwanda.” According to AI (1993, n.p) “[h]e reportedly promised that the security forces would assist Nyanga and Hunde to “exterminate” Banyarwanda.” Interestingly, Amnesty International did not provide any direct reference to the speech of Governor Jean-Pierre Kalumbo. More importantly I so far found that the AI report was the first to use the phrase “exterminate Banyarwanda.” Reports of the UN, HRW and later Vlassenroot use the phrase “exterminate the Banyarwanda” and they referenced the 1993 AI report. Moreover, all of these texts suggest something different regarding the phrase “exterminate the Banyarwanda”. For example, in the AI report, the author wrote that Governor Mboho “reportedly promised”, the author of the HRW report wrote that “he suggested”, whilst the Special Rapporteur wrote “Mboho said” and Vlassenroot wrote “he asked security forces.” The first was a promise, the second a suggestion, in the third he said it and in the fourth he asked for it. Strangely, none of the texts provided the original source for the quoted words – leading one to wonder whether or not the Governor really said it or used the phrase “exterminate the Banyarwanda.”
Another popular narrative is the economic resources narrative. HRW, the UN and International Peace Information Service (IPIS) were influential in establishing this narrative, which consists of two strands. The first is focussing on land access in Eastern DRC and the second is focussing on the illegal exploitation of natural resources. In a 1996 HRW report on the violence against the Tutsi in Zaire it states that “[l]and distribution and economic competition have been at the root of the conflicts between the Banyarwanda and other groups looking for political power. In general, the Tutsi have cleared large tracts of land in the region to use as pasturage for grazing their cattle and goats, while the Hutu predominantly cleared land for farming” (HRW, July 1996, p. 7). From this passage the Bantu versus Hamite narrative that was so instrumental in the Rwandan politics is visible. This passage can be interpreted as staging the Hutu as the ‘peasant’ and the Tutsi the ‘noble Hamite’ with cattle and goats. In part of the same passage the Hunde is painted as backward in comparison with the Banyarwanda. For example, “the Banyarwanda have cleared large areas of forest to use for farming and grazing, leading to conflicts with the local Hunde population who have traditionally used the forests for hunting game” (HRW, July 1996, p. 7). Words like “traditionally” and “hunting game” describes the activities of the Hunde whilst “farming and grazing” are used to describe the activities of the Banyarwanda. In addition to this, the report claims that the “prosperity of the Banyarwanda has contributed to resentment by other groups in the region” (HRW, July 1996, p. 7). These contrasts invite a “modern versus traditional” conversation.

Furthermore, the reports by the UN’s Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (dated 12 April 2001 – S/2001/357 and 13 November 2001 – S/2001/1072) were to investigate the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the DRC from the start of the First Congo War. These reports do not attribute the conflict to ethnicity or nationality but instead argues that “there is a clear link between the continuation of the conflict and the exploitation of natural resources. It would not be wrong to say that one drives the other” (S/2001/1072, 13 November 2001, p. 26). This creates a war economy. Even though the reports do not contribute the conflict to ethnicity or nationality they however do state that: “[t]his commerce reinforced pre-existing ties based on ethnicity, kinship and colonial structures between the Kivu regions and neighbouring States such as Burundi and Rwanda ...” (S/2001/1072, 13 November 2001, p. 4). Once Burundi and Rwanda are referenced it automatically brings the Hutu and Tutsi into the narrative.
Given this, the reports indicate how the elites in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the DRC are benefitting from the conflict. Below are a few examples of how the elites of these countries are connected to the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the DRC.

In a letter signed by J.P. Moritz, General Manager of Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), a diamond company, and Ngandu Kamenda, the General Manager of MIBA ordered a payment of US$ 3.5 million to la Générale de commerce d’import/export du Congo (COMIEX), a company owned by late President Kabila and some of his close allies … (S/2001/357, 12 April 2001, p. 7)

Late in late August 1998, General Kazini’s soldiers absconded with the stockpiles of timber belonging to the logging company Amex-bois, located in Bagboka. In December that year, the same General ordered the confiscation of all the stocked timber belonging to the logging company La Forestière (S/2001/357, 12 April 2001, p. 8).

Air Navette has dealings with General Salim Saleh and Jean-Pierre Bemba. The company flies to Gbadolite, Gemena, Kisangani, Bunia and Kampaign. This company uses an Antonov 26 and an Antonov 12 (S/2001/357, 12 April 2001, p. 15).

Khaleb Akandwanaho, alias Salim Saleh, and his spouse Jovia are at the core of the illegal exploitation of natural resources in areas controlled by Uganda. He is the younger brother of President Museveni (very popular in the army), and he pulls the strings of illegal activities in areas controlled by Uganda and allies” (S/2001/357, 12 April 2001, p. 18).

It is clear that some of the elites were benefitting from the conflict and more particularly people who were close to the presidents of Rwanda, Uganda and Congo. However, this report does not allude to why people continue to participate in the conflict if it is not as beneficial to them as it is for the elites. Thus, a major shortcoming of these reports is that they do not focus on the people on the ground, or as Mamdani (2001) puts it: “popular agency.”

A report produced by IPIS in 2002 titled: Supporting the War Economy in the DRC: European Companies and the Coltan Trade focuses on the macro and meso environment of this war economy. They approached the companies that were named in the UN reports and corroborate their responses with economic data and interviews with NGOs and locals in the DRC. Based on the evidence they presented, I am convinced that a war economy developed around Congolese

\[^{186}\text{Mamdani (2001) asked why so many people were involved in the Rwandan genocide, a phenomenon which he referred to as popular agency.}\]
minerals but I am not convinced that “the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo have been caught up in a fight over their country's vast natural resources” (Broederlijk, 2002, p.6). This clearly is claiming that the war is about the natural resources of Congo. The reason why Cuvelier and Raeymaekers makes this conclusion is that it focuses at the macro- and meso-levels of the conflict. Contrary to how the UN Reports stayed away from ethnicity some parts of the IPIS report insert the ethnicity and nationality narrative. For example, according Cuvelier and Raeymaekers (2002, p. 11) “the SOMIGL leadership was given to Aziza Kulsum, aka ‘Madame Gulamali’. In a recent past, this notorious Burundian businesswoman had been a fierce ally of the Hutu-rebels in Burundi and had built up a reputation as a tough arms dealer.” This is contrary to how the UN depicted Aziza Kulsum’s support to the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) or “the Hutu-rebels” the IPIS report referred to. The UN reports did not ascribe an ethnicity to the FDD but the IPIS report substituted Hutu for FDD. In addition to this, according to Cuvelier and Raeymaekers (2002, p. 16) “[t]ensions relating to nationality and ethnicity permeate all areas of life in Kivu, including the coltan trade.” The UN reports also focus on the coltan trade and yet it did not write ethnicity and nationality into the economic narrative. The IPIS report makes it seems as various ethnic groups are fighting over the coltan trade which is not the case.

Furthermore, the 2002 IPIS report and the UN reports write a lot about Rwanda and Uganda’s involvement in the conflict. Military leaders like Paul Kagame of Rwanda are reference to has said it is self-financed war. I am convinced about Rwanda’s involvement in the war economy but one also needs to consider the role of South African, American, Chinese and Belgian mining companies in the illegal exploitation of natural resources of Congo. In addition to this, one must also consider the why rebel groups such as the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) and the Mai-Mai had support from the people. Mamdani (2001) writes about ‘agency’ in the Rwandan genocide. I also wants to points out this ‘agency’ in the Congolese conflict. Many of these groups like the Mai-Mai invoked a claim of autochthony and there is counter claims by the Banyarwanda and the Banyamulenge; the part of the conflict that is often missed.


188 Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie or Congolese Rally for Democracy was a rebel group during the Second Congo War. See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion.
In a 2008 IPIS report titled *Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC* one notices that all four popular narratives are present. For example,

The CNDP\(^{189}\) has positioned itself in those areas where previously the Congolese Tutsis were living. The CNDP is not only protecting the interests of the Tutsi people in general but also the specific economic interests of some of its members and sympathisers. It controls the grazing lands used by several rich cattle farmers and two mining areas (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008, p. 3)

...  

The Mayi-Mayi coalition of PARECO claims to defend the Congolese people against foreign armed groups. PARECO is clearly vindictive towards the CNDP. It seeks to conquer the lands that it claims are unrightfully occupied by the CNDP/the Tutsi. The Mayi-Mayi wants to prevent the creation of a ‘Tutsi Land’ (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008, p. 3).

Here one sees how the four popular narratives are presented and the result is that the conflict is depicted as having developed between ethnic groups fighting for natural resources and land. The reason for this is that the report argues that the conflict is driven by four motives: power, greed, grievance and security/survival. These motives were framed according a 2007 IPIS handbook titled *Handbook: Mapping Conflict Motives in War Areas*. According to Spittaels & Hilgert (2008, p. 5, see footnote 1) “[t]he methodology used to write the analytic part of this report is described in a handbook (draft version) on the IPIS website: [http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/handbookweboct07.pdf](http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/handbookweboct07.pdf)” If one looks at the 2008 IPIS report and read the 2007 IPIS handbook one notices that the model, motives and methodology was universally framed and that the report is written alongside that narrative.

In the Handbook one notices that Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert are interested in the “greed versus grievance” debate as motives of war. According to Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert (2007, p. 5) “[p]roponents of the greed theory argue that wars are driven by economic incentives.” In their line of thinking, “conflict entrepreneurs” are profit seekers who use war to enrich themselves.” In addition to that Paul Collier indicated that “[t]he failure of economic development is in other words the root cause of conflict” (Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert, 2007, p. 6). Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert highlights that Collier’s work is also based on statistical research, and explains that it “has become commonplace in all World Bank policy publications” (Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert,

\(^{189}\) CNDP stands for National Congress for the Defence of the People or Congrès national pour la défense du peuple. See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion.
Ibid.). However, it was also noted that “[p]roponents of the grievance model believe that wars emerge from the opposition to perceived or actual injustice. In their view, people fight because of oppression, inequality, discrimination etc.” (Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert, 2007, p. 8). The influential scholars for the grievance debate are Donald Horowitz, Edward Azar and Ted Robert. According to Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert (2007, p. 8) Horowitz has ten explanations for ethnic warfare. These explanations are:

1. Ethnicity is a primordial affiliation that is connected to things people cannot live without.
2. Conflict is produced by ancient hatred between groups.
3. Ethnic conflict results from a clash of cultures.
4. Modernisation induces ethnic conflict because it makes peoples want to have the same things.
5. Ethnic conflict finds its origins in the ethnical differentiation of classes.
6. Ethnic groups provide certain services for their members. Some groups are more successful than others, which generates envy and hate.
7. Elite conflict entrepreneurs manipulate the masses in their struggle for power.
8. Groups take up arms as preventive security measure when they are not certain about the intentions of other groups. It is a rational choice.
9. Ethnic groups emphasise their identity to facilitate transactions and coordination.
10. Selfish group behaviour has its roots in evolutionary theory (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008, p. 8).  

From Horowitz’s explanation, one not only notices a Darwinist and “traditional versus modern” narrative, but also how it operationalises the various narratives. Here conflict between ethnic groups is explained as always related to the traditional versus the modern.

In Chapter II of the IPIS Handbook, Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert (2007, pp. 23-24) indicate that the motives they will use for their mapping tool are profit (greed), grievance, survival, power and humanitarian considerations. In their report, as indicated earlier, they used the first four of the motives. Compiling greed maps they looked at natural resources, illicit substance, plunder, trade and distribution routes and aid (Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert, 2007, pp. 33-35). Compiling grievance maps they are considering the following “[g]rievances arise from a certain need or injustice which is always formulated in a narrative” (Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert, 2007, p.36). In addition to this, for survival maps they looked at human needs, which include arable land,

190 These ten explanations were directly quoted from the IPIS Handbook.
forests, fresh water sources and fishing grounds, and the presence of danger (Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert, 2007, pp. 37-40). Finally, compiling power maps they looked at “[g]eographic features with a considerable power potential” which include major roads, mountain passes, straits and canals, isthmi and centres versus periphery (Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert, 2007, p. 41). In addition to this, it considered “[g]eographic features with some(times) power potential”, which include mountains, rivers, resources rich areas, deserts, marshlands, forests and islands (Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert, 2007, pp. 42-43).

If one looks at how they applied this methodology one notices how the 2008 IPIS report is framed alongside the popular narratives. For example, the report states “[a] first war motivation is greed. A greed map should give an overview of all the places in the Eastern DRC where armed men can make a profit. We have created two such layers” (Spittaels, Meynen & Hilgert, 2007, p. 17). These two layers are natural resources and trade routes. Secondly, Spittaels & Hilgert (2008, p. 17) states that the second war motivation is grievance. They also echo the assumption of Donald Horowitz regarding ethnicity and conflict, as explained earlier. For example, “[a] much discussed type of grievance-motivated wars are ethnic conflicts. To include the factor of ethnicity in our research, in the second edition of the maps we will add an ‘ethnic map’ that shows the most important ethnic groups at the level of the different sectors and chiefdoms” (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008, p. 18).

The findings presented in the IPIS 2008 report, however, contradict the authors’ conclusions. For example, they found that the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda Participant’s (FDLR)\textsuperscript{191} “[i]ncome from mining activities remains an important motivating factor for the FDLR. Several cassiterite and coltan deposits are located within the areas they control. They do not, however, occupy any major mining site and they never waged a war to conquer one” (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008, p. 27). Yet, they concluded that “[t]hey may have chosen to live a hidden life on rough terrain but they are also involved in different types of illegal business such as illegal mining and drug trafficking. For some of the FDLR it is probably more attractive to continue this business than to return to Rwanda” (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008, p. 35). In addition to this, they found that “[t]he income from taxes and mining is considerable. It certainly helps the People or Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) to sustain its administrative structures and to continue its war effort. It is, however, far too limited to conclude that Nkunda and his army are

\textsuperscript{191} See a detailed discussion of Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda Participant’s or Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in Chapter 6.
enriching themselves” (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008, p. 25). Their conclusion thus contradicts this finding. According to Spittaels & Hilgert (2008, p. 35) “[t]he CNDP is not only protecting the interests of the Tutsi people in general but also the specific economic interests of some of its members and sympathisers. It controls the grazing lands used by several rich cattle farmers and two mining areas.” It is, therefore, clear that even though their findings are showing the contrary, the conclusions they offer maintain the dominant narrative.

Furthermore, part of the economic resources narrative is the access to land narrative. In 2005 ACTS and ISS published a book titled From the Ground Up: Land Rights, Conflict and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa.” In this particular volume ACTS and ISS continue “to explore and promote understanding of the complex dimensions and causes of conflicts in Africa, with a focus on environmental aspects of conflict” (Wakhungu and Cilliers, 2005, p. v). If the framing is “environmental aspects of conflict”, it is no surprise that land would be an issue central to the concerns of the volume. In a chapter titled “Land, migration and conflict in eastern DRC” Koen Vlassenroot and Chris Huggins writes into the debate “between economic resources and violence” (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005, p. 115), focussing on the role agricultural and pastoral land plays at a local level in the conflict. According to Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005, p.116) “the structural organization of land access and control is one of the root causes of local conflict.” Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005, p. 116) argue that the structural organisation of land access “has turned land into an asset of economic” and ‘land has also become a ‘resource’, driving and sustaining conflict.” This situates ‘access to land’ in the economic resources narrative. They continue by highlighting: “[c]ontrol over natural resources, including agricultural and pastoral land, was an important currency in political transactions that aimed at ‘buying in’ local elites and preventing the formation of a counter-force” (Vlassenroot, 2005, p. 117). In addition to this, they explain that “[o]n the one hand, colonialism institutionalised the link between ethnic identity and land access within the political structures of the state” (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005, p. 121). Here I want the reader to take note of the link between identity formation and land access. I will return to it later.

Moreover, “[t]he colonial powers declared all vacant land as property of the colonial state and introduced a system of land registration and private ownership …” (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005, p. 126). The Lockean notion of property is visible here. Vacant land in the European sense was not the same as in Africa. According to Van Acker (2005, p. 83), in colonial terms

192 See Chapter 2 – Politics of Becoming.
vacant land was defined as those lands not occupied by customary authorities. However, in customary terms “non-occupied land was not simply vacant but rather the basis for collective security and social mobility” (Van Acker, 2005, p. 83). Thus, “vacant land” was an invention of colonialism, to facilitate a white settler settlement that could after the appropriation acquire property through civil law. The appropriation of this ‘vacant land’ limited the expansion of customary lands, and with boundaries fix and ethnicity fix, in terms of indirect rule: “[o]ne could not escape … ethnic belonging. Even more, ethnic identity now was transformed into a rigid juridical category” (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005, p. 126). One also sees that the customary system became the granter of belonging. According to Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005, p. 127) “the customary system denied access to those not belonging to a particular ethnic group or those not respecting the authority of the Mwami.” This customary system was based on law, and as was discussed in Chapter 2 the enforcement of law is an essential part of subjection and identity formation.

Furthermore, “[i]n 1910, Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom signed the Convention of Brussels in order to redraw the boundaries of the Independent State of Congo. From then on, the Kinyarwanda-speaking population in North Kivu and the Kirundi-speaking population in South Kivu were considered as indigenous and were attributed their own customary authority, which was immediately disputed by the other ethnic groups living in these regions” (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005, p. 129). Mamdani (1998, n.p) also stresses this point. The Barundi in South Kivu were thus considered to be autochthonous and the Banyamulenge not. The Banyamulenge, however, had a Native Authority. According to Mamdani (1998, n.p) “Banyamulenge chiefs have been confined to the first level, the chief of the locality. For access to land, they had to pay homage to the existing chiefs.” Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005, p. 128) wrote that the Tutsi “arrived” in Uvira “at the end of the nineteenth century.”

Here is an indication that notions of autochthony started in 1910 when Kinyarwanda and Kirundi speaking groups were considered by the colony as indigenous and when they received their own customary authority. This was exasperated by the immigration of Rwandese to the Congo during colonialism. According to Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005, p. 130) “[e]ven if the Banyarwanda of Bwisha (Rutshuru) were already present in North Kivu, and thus were

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193 The word “arrived” implies that they came to a particular place or soil. Can anyone claim soil or place? This once again points to materiality in identity formation. The subject attaches to certain objects, and place and soil is one of those objects. If that object is taken which the subject identify her or him with, an essential part of her or his identity is lost.
considered by the Belgian colonial administration as indigenous, the claims to their own customary rights of new migrants from Rwanda led to different reactions.” Here we see the start of this conflict. If one considers the work of Mamdani (2013) the native (in colonial terms) was seen as traditional and hence they needed a customary authority to administrate their affairs. Hence, indirect rule and direct rule was invented. A customary authority granted access to land and it was also the native’s claim to autochthony. Rwandese were not allowed to be administered through civil law because a ‘native’ in Congo had to first reach the level of évolué to be able to access civil law (Zeilig, 2008; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987 and Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1983). The only way to administrate the Rwandese immigrants in Kivu was either one of two ways: (1) their own native authority or (2), they had to be administered by chiefs in which native authority they fell. This meant they had to pay tributes and assimilate. Interestingly, Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005, p. 175) in the end conclude that “While land shortage or exclusion did not necessarily lead to conflict, these structural elements have provided a conducive environment for local, national and regional actors to strengthen their control over territory, social mobility and natural resources.” If it “did not necessarily lead to conflict", how can it be one of the root causes of the conflict? Moreover, they argue that land access is one of the root causes of the conflict but still do not explain what kind of conflict it is.

In conclusion, firstly there is a concealed class element in the resources narrative. The access to land narrative introduces one to the Congolese “peasant” who is in competition with another peasant of a different ethnicity over land. The natural resources narrative introduces one to the national and regional bourgeoisie who act as an intermediary for the international bourgeoisie structure. This regional bourgeoisie is painted as the exploiter but not the international company. When Georgianne Nienaber asked General Nkunda whether it was a war on minerals he replied: “How can you fight for your own minerals? … If this were about minerals, I would not be here” (General Nkunda with Georgianne Nienaber, 24 January, 2009). This sentiment was shared by Jules Simpeze Banga who was one of the leaders of the CNDP. When asked by Simone Schlindwein why they captured Rutshuru because there are no mines, he replied by answering: “It’s not about gold, coltan ore or other resources. The international community has invested billions in our country. But nothing has reached the people here in the east. The ones

194 See Chapter 4 for detailed discussion on direct and indirect rule.
195 See Chapter 4.
196 The term Banyarwanda then would make sense; a resistance to assimilation.
who profited from the money, they didn't lift a finger” (Jules Simpeze Banga with Simone Schindwein, 10 November 2008). Also, Rwandan President Paul Kagame when also asked this question by Alex Perry critiqued the international community’s double standards:

I do not know and I really do not care. What right do other companies from China, America and wherever have to be in Congo that companies from Rwanda do not have? There are companies there from all over the world. We are probably the first country in the world to be accused of being guilty of having an economic interest somewhere. That’s common practice. How can we be guilty of that?

The relationship between Congo and Rwanda has been there since time immemorial. Why has it suddenly become strange? There is a lot that goes on between us. It’s not about trade or smuggling. It’s a blood relationship. To say this is all about Rwanda’s business interests is very simplistic. People who go to do business in Congo do not have to ask me, just as people who come from Congo do not have to ask me.

... Who’s making such accusations? The same people. They say: “That’s how Rwanda earns a living. By being in Congo.” And all along this – mobilizing support for their side, raising money for their campaign – it’s actually an economic interest for them. It’s actually how they make a living. So I don’t even understand the meaning of the accusation.

...

And if Rwanda’s interest really is economic, as people say, why not call Rwanda’s bluff? Deal with the security problem. Then Rwanda would have nothing to hide behind. Our problem in Congo for 18 years has been a security problem. You are saying we’re interested because of economics. Deal with the security so that it does not exist and then we can all see what crimes we are committing in our economic interests (President Kagame, in an interview with Alex Perry 29 September 2012).

In the same interview President Kagame suggested that Rwanda became the scapegoat for the failure of MONUC and MONUSCO and in addition to this General Nkunda and General Kabarebe pointed to the failure of MONUSCO and MONUC to prevent the violence against civilians in North and South Kivu. However, President Kagame in this interview gave a more complicated reading of the conflict in eastern DRC. Firstly, there is the security issue. Rwanda still considers the FDLR a security risk. Secondly, there is the issue of double standards when the international community writing on resource exploitation in Congo. Thirdly, it is the
relationship Rwanda between Congo. He refers to a “blood relationship” which in this context could be read as family ties. The final point is how international organisations benefit from the ongoing conflict which raises the question whether they really want to solve the conflict.\footnote{Also see Vuninga, R.S. (2018). "Everyone Is Doing It": The Changing Dynamics of Youth Gang Activity In Bukavu, Democratic Republic Of Congo. African Peacebuilding Network. Apn Working Papers: No. 16. Social Science Research Council.}

Moreover, I posed a question to the research participants as to whom they think is responsible for the conflict. Their answers can be divided into two broad categories. There were those who attributed the conflict to external forces and those who attribute it to internal forces. The external forces that were named can be further categorised into foreign governments, multinational cooperations, and refugee or multinationals. Rwanda and Uganda were the only two countries that were named. However, there were also references made to other “powerful countries.” Participants also complicated Rwanda’s role. Here the Rwandan genocide is recognised and Rwanda’s quest to do away with the security threat. Another side to Rwanda’s involvement is linked to resource exploitation. For example, "[j]ust after the genocide in Rwanda, Kagame and Museveni led a war against Mobutu, with some Congolese puppets. The LAC region has never been the same since then. We believe that Rwanda and Uganda have an agenda to steal Congolese territories and resources" (Trevor, personal communication, 2016). According to another participant “Rwanda is used by the Western countries and who also want a share in Congolese natural resources, but also wanting to grab some lands ” (Abdellah, personal communication, 2016). Interestingly, the role of other Western countries in the conflict is also recognised here, not Rwanda’s role. Here participants allude to the role of multinational companies and foreign governments in the conflict which relates to resource exploitation. However, participants do not solely contribute it to Rwanda, Uganda, Western countries and multinational companies. They also link it internally. According to Justin (personal communication, 2016) “Multinationals with some foreign governments and with the support of a few manipulated DRC officials” are responsible for the conflict. Abdellah also raises the issue that multinational companies are financing “rebels for easy access to the coltan and natural gas.” In addition to this, there is the role of “multinationals” or refugees. Here part of the ongoing conflict is attributed to ethnicity and unsecured borders. According to Peter (personal communication, 2016) “[t]he Rwandan occupants of the Eastern of Congo are responsible. Because they say that they came to Congo to chase for the Hutu who were responsible the genocide. Who are in Congo as refugees from 1994 April.” The result of this is not having
secure borders. According to B. Manwa (personal communication, 2016) “borders that remained open to [refugees from] neighbouring countries to enter with firearms that perpetuate violence. Receiving a huge number of refugees … managing to dispatch them whilst they came with hidden agenda against our state.”

Furthermore, internal forces can be categorised into politics and the political leadership, citizens and citizenship, and ethnicity. According to Tresor (personal communication, 2016) “politicians are responsible for this conflict, as well as the colonial history of central Africa.” David (personal communication, 2016) seems to think that greed and self-interest of politicians are to blame for the conflict. According to David (personal communication, 2016) “I do think the responsible people for the conflict are politicians because of their own personal benefit or gains and power to control the universe.” Apart from the issues around politicians there also seem to be an issue around refugees. According to Christian (personal communication, 2016) “I think that the mistake came from the reign of the President Mobutu: the East of the Congo DR has in the past always faced those ethnic issues of Hutu, Tutsi … but the mistake came with the decision of grant ‘collective nationality’ to people in the east of the Congo: then the question: Who can we consider as ‘Congolese’ today.” One anonymous participant not only criticised the political leadership but also the citizenry who he thinks is divided and egocentric. From the responses of these participants it is clear that the conflict is more complex than the dominant narrative suggests.

Secondly, whenever cattle and natural resource exploitation is used in any report or any other scholarly work it brings in an “ethnic” element into the framing of the conflict. Cattle is the ‘marker’ of all Tutsi and thus all Tutsi are automatically linked to the Rwandan government; since the Hutu and Tutsi power dynamics re-configured after the 1994 genocide in the Great Lakes. Burundi moved from Tutsi power to Hutu power and Rwanda from Hutu power to Tutsi power.

\[198\] In Chapter 3 I discussed markers.
“Who are these gods who police others for their rights?”199

In a 2009 paper Séverine Autesserre uses the concept “frame” to critique MONUC’s response to the conflict in the DRC after the 2003 Peace Agreement. Autesserre argues that the UN’s response after the 2003 Agreement was framed in a particular way, and this reproduced and reinforced a particular view of the conflict. According to Autesserre (2009, p. 252):

the concept of frames has an important advantage: it focuses the analysis on how people organize knowledge and interpret it. Frames can account for what shapes the international understanding of the causes of violence and of the interveners’ role, and how this understanding makes certain actions possible while precluding others.

If one than looks at the response of the UN to the conflict in Eastern DRC there is a frame that informs the UN’s approach after the 2003 Peace Agreement. This frame is what she calls the “postconflict peacebuilding frame” (Autesserre, 2009, p. 251). This particular frame has four elements, namely: (1) labelling the Congo as a “postconflict” site; (2) that “violence is innate in the Congo”; (3) restricting intervention to national and international realms; and (4) elections “as a workable, appropriate, and effective tool for state- and peacebuilding” (Autesserre, 2009, p. 251). These elements guided peacebuilders’ response to the conflict. For example, any violence after the 2003 Peace Agreement was attributed to “violence [that] is innate in the Congo” and it, therefore, did not warranted any international and national response. According to Autesserre (2009, p. 255-256) “[d]iplomats and UN staff members usually interpreted shocking violence as a confirmation of their beliefs that Congolese were violent by nature and that violence was a consequence of macro-level conflict.” Explaining further that consequently, “[d]iplomats and international organizations managers constantly reproduced the postconflict peacebuilding frame …” (Autesserre, 2009, p. 255). Taking this into account one can make the argument that the dominant narrative, that attributes the conflict to ethnicity, nationality, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the lack of access to land, is constantly reproduced by organisations such as the UN, the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International and ISS.

An example of this would be the controversy around the report of the UN Group of Experts in 2012. In 2013 the Howard G. Buffett Foundation200 published a report in which they critiqued the

199 A question Paul Kagame asked Alex Perry during an interview.
200 The Howard G. Buffet Foundation gives developing countries aid of which Rwanda is one of them. A number of countries of which the US and the UK were the main ones decide to suspend aid to Rwanda.
methodology of the 2012 UN Group of Experts (GoE) report. The Buffett Foundation report found that the GoE at times presented too little evidence of Rwanda’s involvement in arming and supporting the M23, and that the report did not consider other local and national actors in the conflict. In the end the GoE report “let to significant punitive actions against Rwanda …” (Howard G. Buffett Foundation, 2013, p. 5). This was a result of its deviation from previous reports, as it “reads as a prosecution of Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda, largely ignoring the other significant factors contributing to unrest in the DRC” (Howard G. Buffett Foundation, 2013, p. 5). In a rebuttal to the GoE report, Rwanda critiqued the GoE for their “predetermined narrative” and here “the addendum only added a UN stamp of approval to a narrative that had been actively and deliberately propagated since the beginning of this latest crisis… Thus, Rwanda is rendered guilty from the outset…” (Howard G. Buffett Foundation, 2013, p. 18). In addition to this, in an interview with Chris McGreal (2013) President Kagame said that the US and the UK never provided sufficient evidence that Rwanda was arming the M23. In another interview he responded to the GoE by saying the following:

It [reference to the report] goes to the Security Council. And the [U.N.] Group of Experts comes up with this whole thing… I’ve never seen such a stupid story like that. I do not think it’s because people are stupid. But I do think they want anything that implicates Rwanda, whether it is wrong or right (President Kagame in an interview with Alex Perry, 29 September 2012).

In addition to Kagame, General Kabarebe, on the allegations that Rwanda reinforced the M23 at Ruyonyi in the DRC, provided the following explanations as why Rwanda could not.

I knew this area once. Runyonyi is not on the border, walking from the Rwandan border to Runyonyi, it takes at least eleven hours of walking, you cross the forest because there are no roads, and there is no link between Runyonyi and Rwanda (Rwandan Defense General James Kabarebe with Colette Braeckman, 29 August 2012.)

Later during the interview, after Kabarebe questioned the age and the experience of the UN Group of Experts the interviewer ask him “… you may doubt the UN experts, their expertise, their level, you can speak about Kalev and manipulation of the ANR, but don’t you think that the Americans, British, and as well as Belgians also have their own sources of information.

The Buffet Foundation argued that withdrawing aid will only make the people of Rwanda suffer. Hereafter referred to as The Buffet Foundation.

201 The US and the UK suspended their aid to Rwanda after the GoE report.
However, all confirm the same facts. Are they all victims of a collective hallucination?” (Colette Braeckman\textsuperscript{202}, 29 August 2012.). To which he responded:

We have large embassies in Rwanda, and they have the means to gather intelligence. They certainly monitor troop movements, logistics, and movements toward the border. But for the past six years at least, there is no movement towards the border ... How could Rwanda fight in DRC without any visible movement? What they say, is information that has been transmitted from the other side of the border, nothing they found themselves ... In Rwanda itself, they saw nothing... How, in this densely populated country, could the passage of hundreds of soldiers, weapons, trucks have gone unnoticed? No evidence can be provided... (Rwandan Defense General James Kabarebe with Colette Braeckman, 29 August 2012.)

This is a blind spot in the GoE report, as the report does not engage this question. For example, a year later Radio Okapi reported that Rwanda reinforced its military presence at the border near the Rwandan village of Gisenyi. According to Radio Okapi (03 September 2013) “Armored vehicles, men and military equipment were seen converging on positions on the border with the DRC ...” When asked about this the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs apparently said that “Le Rwanda est préparé à défendre ses citoyens et son territoire, tout en poursuivant le chemin politico-diplomatique de concert avec la région” (Rwanda is prepared to defend its citizens and its territory, while continuing the political and diplomatic path in concert with the region) (Radio Okapi, 03 September 2013). Rwanda’s reinforcement at the border was a result of missiles launched from the DRC into Rwanda. A woman was killed during the incident and her baby was injured. Rwanda accused the DRC government of the missile strike. The DRC government’s motive according the Rwandese government was that they worked with the FDLR. However, it was later confirmed that it was the M23 who launched the missiles into Rwandan territory. The Congolese government responded by saying that the M23 is doing this to draw Rwanda into a war with the DRC (Smith, 30 August 2013). Here it is evident that the moment Rwanda had military presence near the border it made national news and later international news. Another blind spot of the GoE report is MONUSCO reports and sources. The GoE did not engage with enough in MONUSCO reports that would implicate Rwanda or proof Rwanda’s involvement. Whenever a MONUSCO report was referenced it had more to do with the general security situation in Congo. There are no reports from MONUSCO that confirm the involvement of Rwanda in Congo.

\textsuperscript{202} Colette Braeckman is part of the Belgian French newspaper \textit{Le Soir} which is a big political player in the region. It has an influential reach in Belgium.
In a response to the controversy around the 2012 GoE report, Francesco Mancini (16 January 2013) asked Steven Hege (coordinator of the GoE 2010 – 2012) whether the conclusion of the GoE report “Was … simply based on ‘human intelligence’ alone?” He explained that

If by ‘human intelligence,’ you are referring to first-hand witnesses to events, then yes, indeed, we prioritized these sources, primarily ex-combatants, but only as the starting point of our investigations. We interviewed individually over a hundred former M23 members, including 57 who claimed to be Rwandan citizens. All gave detailed accounts of Rwandan support to the rebels that they personally observed during their time with M23. We then worked to corroborate this massive amount of information with a larger network of over a hundred others sources — some eyewitnesses and others considered to have credible access to the rebellion. These included local leaders, businessmen, border agents, simple peasants, as well as former Rwandan army officers and former officers of M23’s predecessor, the CNDP, who maintain frequent contact with their family and friends who joined the new rebellion. We also developed our own active sources within the M23 who themselves acknowledged the support of Rwanda and Uganda to their movement” (Steven Hege with Mancini, 16 January 2013).

However, two things stand out. The first is the unnamed sources, especially if their use has punitive consequences, as the Buffet Foundation indicated. Rwanda has complained about these sources. An example of this is that President Kagame, in an interview with Alex Perry, became very critical of the reports of the Human Rights Watch, especially Human Rights Watch’s narrative regarding Rwanda. General Nkunda in a different interview by Georgianne Nienaber (24 January 2009) critiqued the Human Rights Watch for using “reliable source” as evidence in their reports. According to Nkunda

I will tell you, they are writing from the UK and from the US and they are not on the ground. They say they get their information from “reliable sources,” and unfortunately they are trusted but really, if you take their report, and then you come to the ground, you are now here on the ground, you compare. They tell some facts, but for them to help they have to come to the ground and do their report not from “reliable sources” but from live sources.

... 

I even talked to Anneke van Woudenberg. She came to see me in Masisi but after leaving here and then writing their things I had to call her back and say, “Why? You were here, now what are

203 Rwanda said these former M23 members could have been fed a narrative in which it ‘proofs’ Rwanda’s involvement. The 57 Rwandan citizens could be the ‘Congolese Banyarwanda’ who is trapped in refugee camps in Rwanda who struggle to attain citizenship in Rwanda and in the DRC.
you doing?” She always says that the information is from “reliable sources.” But all these reliable sources are unidentified (General Nkunda with Georgianne Nienaber, 24 January, 2009).

It seems that Rwanda’s problem with reports, like the kind Human Rights Watch produces, that rely on unidentified “reliable sources.” This so far has had grave consequences for Rwanda. Alex Perry asked President Kagame why Rwanda does not ignore the reports like other countries do and his response was the following:

These powerful countries can ignore it and get away with it. Nobody threatens them. But for us it is a different situation. They are building on our weak position as Rwanda or as Africa. The issue of aid comes in. We need to explain ourselves, otherwise we end up in very [bad] shape (President Kagame with Alex Perry, 29 September, 2012).

The second is the methodology. In terms of the methodology the GoE observed protocol. However, the framing of the conflict was to look for the link between M23 and Rwanda. Thus, if the M23 is depicted as Tutsi/Banyamulenge or Banyarwanda (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) then it automatically establishes the link between Rwanda and the M23. The methodology helps one uncover evidence within that frame and it will establish a link to Rwanda. For example, if one look at the final GoE report (S/2012/843) it mentions the word Banyamulenge 16 times and it does not mention the word Banyarwanda once. Banyamulenge always relate to Tutsi and to Rwanda. If one looks at the word Hutu it is mentioned 15 times and the word Tutsi is mentioned eight times. In six of the eight instances it was a direct reference to the leadership of the M23, and from this it is easy to establish the link to Rwanda. The first is obvious. Hutu and Tutsi are ethnic groups in Rwanda. The second is the M23 and here the link is to the current regime in Rwanda. According to the GoE Report the top 5 leadership of the M23 are: General Bosco Ntaganda, General Sultani Makenga, Colonel Baudoin Ngaruye Mputumo, Colonel Innocent Zimurinda and Colonel Innocent Kaina. The report also mentions that they are all “ethnic Tutsi” and that they were all part of the RPA, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL), the RCD and the CNDP. The M23 becomes to represent not only the Tutsi but is also linked to the current regime in Rwanda. However, does this mean that the Rwanda government armed and supported the M23 when USA and UK intelligence

204 There was a grammatical error in the original article it had “had” instead of “bad.”

205 Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre or for Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) was operational during the First Congo War. See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion.
cannot provide any evidence of Rwandese troop movements towards the border? The answer is yes but the question is how. The report presented a lot of circumstantial evidence. For example, Rwandan uniforms found on M23 soldiers, testimonies of ex-M23 combatants, Rwandan military ammunition. However, the report does not engage the validity of the “evidence” provided by these combatants. Yet, this also does not mean that M23 does not enjoy support from Rwanda. For example, in response to Alex Perry’s question regarding Rwanda’s relationship with the M23 President Kagame explained the complexity of Rwanda relationship with its neighbour the DRC.

Our story starts with 1990 when our struggle started, and then in 1994, when we had the genocide and refugees running to Congo. So that period, when Mobutu came in and helped [the genocidaires], from that time Rwanda found itself swallowed into this big mess of Congo. And then you have the history of the international community and how they messed up and meddled and did all kinds of things. They were feeding genocidaires, giving them help and food in camps that were militarized. They were calling them refugee camps and you would find anti-aircraft guns and APCs and all kinds of weaponry in the refugee camps. And the world wants to tell you these are refugees.

This is not something that people need to analyze or think hard about. But they try to convince people otherwise or even ignore. One failure was adding to another. This constant here for us, which always dragged us into this, was relating to this genocide history and the threat that is always there, one way or another, from these genocidaires. Whatever we have done, has been this: Either working with the government to try to deal with this, trying to deal with it ourselves when nobody is listening, the international community coming in and blaming Rwanda for everything – the whole history of Congo.

But of course there is this other angle. There are these Congolese of Rwandese origin. The way it plays out is very complex. I think even under Mobutu they have always been seen as kind of secondary citizens in that country. It’s like they really belong to Rwanda, they don’t belong there. So to an extent, the problem is attributed to us.

...

We try to manage it by drawing certain lines. Things happen the way they happen but there is a bottom line. There things for our own security, our own existence, we will not have. [In the late 1990s] when certain red lines were crossed, we had to take the bull by its horns, and in a very costly way, in a very, very costly way, with the whole world descending on us. We did what we
needed to do and short of doing that, we would not be there today (President Kagame with Alex Perry, 29 September, 2012).

Within this long extract Kagame points to two issues. The first pertains to the security of Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. It becomes clear that the current Rwandan regime’s involvement always has and will be to prevent the genocidaires from posing a security threat to the post-genocide Rwanda. In the same interview he explained instances where Rwanda and the DRC worked together against the FDLR. For the current regime the FDLR is that possibility that must be prevented from happening. If the government of the DRC, the Mayi-Mayi or whoever works with the FDLR it poses a threat to the post-genocide Rwandan society and if it poses a significant threat the Rwandan state will get involved. The second the problem is one that has nothing directly to do with Rwanda and that is the issue around the nationality of “Congolese of Rwandese origin.” It important to point that Kagame did not use Banyarwanda or Banyamulenge but refer to them as “Congolese of Rwandese origin.” He does not see them as Rwandese but as Congolese. However, because they are of Rwandan origin, “the problem is attributed to [them].” Interestingly, General Kabarebe also adheres to the same kind of distinction that Kagame makes. According to Kabarebe “the first is that President Kabila was seeking the support of Rwanda to transfer soldiers of Rwandan origin who were based in eastern Congo to other provinces” (Rwandan Defense General James Kabarebe with Colette Braeckman, 29 August 2012). Soldiers of Rwandan origin are a reference to those soldiers that are regarded as Banyarwanda, born in the Congo. Some of the M23 leaders were these “soldiers of Rwandan origin” who Kabarebe met before the formation of the M23. These soldiers were also part of the Congolese army and had historical links with the current Rwandan regime. The meeting took place on the insistence of the government of the DRC. They wanted the Rwandan government to help them to transfer these soldiers outside the Kivu. According to Kabarebe “[t]he delegation told us that the Rwandophone soldiers had refused to be deployed outside of Kivu and hoped that we would be able to convince them, given our historical relationship not only with former CNDP soldiers, but also with other Congolese officers” (Rwandan Defense General James Kabarebe with Colette Braeckman, 29 August 2012). The “historical relationship” that Kabarebe refers to here is the one GoE also reports on (RPA,

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206 The emphasis is my own.

207 Emphasis my own.

208 The GoE mentions it in Annex 29 as part of the “Specific Claims of the M23” (S/2012/843, p.113).
AFDL, RCD and CNDP). After a first meeting with the government of the DRC, a second meeting took place in which Bosco Ntaganda was also invited; but Ntaganda was not present because of a rumour that he will be arrested at the meeting and this led to the first defection. At the meeting was Makenga and Zimurinda and their concern was that March 23, 2009 agreement was not honoured. According to Kabarebe

They added: "Our integration was never complete, we were paid differently than other members, we received grades but they were never confirmed by Order, and any time we might be driven out of the army." These officers were facing segregation, exclusion, being regarded as second-class military...

They mentioned that more than 50 of their comrades, who had been transferred to Dungu in Orientale Province, were killed in one night and that the government had never conducted any investigation. They cited the name of the person responsible for their deaths, a Colonel still in service ... "We were integrated of course, but we are still frustrated. We were ready to contribute to peace in the Kivus, but we are not supported: we lacked transportation, communications, vehicles, money. Nothing! Rwandan Defense General James Kabarebe with Colette Braeckman, 29 August 2012).

This important backstory that triggered the defection in the Congolese army and led to the formation of the M23 was left out of the GoE Report. If the points of Kagame and Kabarebe were taken into consideration by the GoE the report might have been framed in a completely different way.

It, therefore, unsettles the credibility of the 2012 UN Group of Experts report and this might be a result of how it is framed. These reports always somehow show how Rwanda is involved in the conflict. From the discussion above the Tutsi in Congo are always linked to the current regime in Rwanda. Even the Banyarwanda and the Banyamulenge are linked to Rwanda. Rwanda is painted as the protector of the Tutsi and as the exploiter of Congolese natural resources. Rwanda is, therefore, the nemesis of the DRC. Interestingly some of the members of the GoE 2010 – 2012 were part of IPIS and Human Rights Watch. For example, Steven Spitaels, one the leading scholars on the natural resources exploitation in the Eastern DRC, was part of the UN Group of Experts from 2011 to 2012. (IPIS Website. http://ipisresearch.be/team-member/steven-spitaels/). Spitaels were also one of the authors of the 2008 IPIS report with the contradictory

\[209\] M23 is a reference to the March 23, 2009 agreement between the CNDP and the government of the DRC.
findings and conclusions. Similarly, Steve Hege was the coordinator of the controversial 2010 – 2012 Group of Experts to the DRC. Notably, he also worked for the Human Rights Watch as a short-term consultant/advisor (https://www.usip.org/people/steve-hege). Given this, there is a possibility that dominant narratives of HRW and the IPIS could have been informed and guided the attitudes of the GoE towards Rwanda and the consequences of this can be devastating.

Conclusion

This chapter showed that there is a dominant narrative about the conflict, which relates it to ethnicity, nationality, a lack of access to land and the illegal exploitation of Congolese minerals. However, it would be very difficult to talk about this conflict without reference to ethnicity, or minerals, or access to land; as talking about these as elements of the conflict is surely not in and of itself the problem. The question is rather how these are understood, theorized/not theorized, historicized/not historicized. The answer to this relates to whether we can think indigeneity without the object. I introduced this conundrum in the Rationale of this study. The dominant narrative is the two sides of the same coin. Hence, the concern here is that the narrative frames and reproduces the conflict in a particular way in reports and other scholarly works. Several vantage points in thinking the conflict are ignored as a result of it. This raises two pertinent questions. Why is autochthony not invoked against European companies? Is this a reflection of the continuation of the colonial subject into the postcolonial? European involvement in the continuation of the conflict is invisible and yet many European, US and Chinese companies formed part of the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources. And yet they do not bear the brunt of the blame for the conflict. In addition to this, it also raises a question around materiality, and thus a question around the subject and the subject’s objects of desire. In Chapter 3 one saw that there is a material element to a politics of belonging, which relates to land, natural resources, agriculture and currency. In this sense, belonging can only be successful if there is an attachment to an object. The object here is relating to one of the ‘features’ of belonging and that is time and space. A politics of belonging might arise if this object is at risk; or if the subject is dispossessed of the object. Therefore, since the desired object (land) is still the same since colonial time one find continuity in the politics. As long as the desired object is exclusively resigned to the formation of one group’s identity and a sense of belonging, this politics will keep returning. The next chapter investigates the return of the Hutu versus Tutsi dialectic.
Chapter 8 - The Bantu and the Jew

Introduction

In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide the Rwandan government decided to ban ethnic classification in Rwanda. For them the classifications of Hutu and Tutsi poses a danger to a post-genocide Rwandan society. What mattered, after 1994, was the idea of a Rwandan who was not restricted to an ethnic identity. However, a post-1994 dilemma developed and this is the reincarnation of the Hutu versus Tutsi dialectic in the form of Bantu versus Jew narrative. This raises several issues. The first is the claim of Tutsis to be of Jewish descent or to having been part of the original Jews in the Bible that left Egypt. It is believed that some migrated southwards towards Ethiopia. The Tutsi claim they were part of this group who migrated southwards and later ended up in the Great Lakes region. Essential to this argument is phenotype, Somalian and Ethiopian folklore, and the Hamitic longhorn cattle. This claim is, however, disputed and it is based on genotype. It is argued that the Hutu and Tutsi share the same DNA glades and are genetically not that different, after all. The Jewish ancestry claim by Tutsi participants in the forum gave rise to the idea of the “Bantu.”210 It is the Hamitic Hypothesis that was operationalised to create a particular Bantu figure and this figure cannot be Nilotic, Hamitic or Cushitic. The Hutu is reincarnated as the Bantu and the Tutsi as the Jew. This brings to the fore issues of indigeneity; where some believe the Bantu/Hutu was the migrant, who was running away from the slave trade and who found refuge in the Tutsi/Jewish kingdoms. However, others believed that the Tutsi/Jew is the migrant and invader who establish two monarchies to which the Bantu/Hutu were subjected. The end product is questions around belonging, which is to say: who can be regarded as the autochthone and who is the migrant.

210 I used Bantu in inverted commas and with a capital letter because participants in the forum created a particular “Bantu” figure to show the difference between those regarded as Hamitic, Nilotic, Caucasian, and so on. After this I will used it without the inverted commas and whenever it is used in lowercase it is a reference to a linguistic group.
Online Discussion Forums

This chapter analyses a discussion on the origins of the Tutsi of Rwanda in the African-American (AA) online discussion forum. The forum is hosted by the domain Topix.com. It was ZamZam, a member of the AA forum, who in 2008 asked whether the Tutsis of Rwanda were originally from Somalia, and since then the intervention on the forum has generated more than 1229 posts by December 2017. The site keeps a record of the participant’s location and once a participant posts something it shows the location from which the participant posted. It became clear that the majority of the participants in the forum were a part of the African diaspora. Many of participants revealed their country of origin and also their ethnic affiliation. The majority of people who participated in the forum were also knowledgeable about this particular topic. Some of the participants identified themselves as researchers and some as lecturers. However, the large majority did not reveal their level of expertise.

I found that the online discussion forum was much different from the focus group I conducted. People in the online discussion forum were more open to express their opinions and biases towards the topic, and therefore, did not have the need to censor their responses. I would like to attribute this to the pseudonyms people use on the platform. I also found that on the forum they were able to openly and freely express their subjectivity. Atkinson and DePalma (2008, p. 184) found that participants in online forums respond more candidly to sensitive issues, compared to paper surveys. In addition to this, Marra, Moore and Klimczak (2004, p. 24) found that online forums lead to broader and deeper participation. However, interestingly, in Atkinson and DePalma’s (2008) research, the aim was to facilitate an interactive, ‘safe’ and expressive discussion on gender and for this purpose an online discussion forum was created. It, however, did not yield the intended results. This was mainly a result of how it was framed from the outset. It was framed as a research project and the researchers “became increasingly aware that [their] implied presence weighed heavily on the forum” (Atkinson and DePalma, 2008, p. 186). In another research output conducted in an online forum the researcher made her intention clear and it yielded a positive result (Kendall, 2000). The difference between the two forums was that the one was “set-up” by researchers (Atkinson and DePalma) and in the other one the

211 The discussion forum can be accessed here:

http://www.topix.com/forum/afam/T630CFK9S3UKCMFT3/are-the-tutsis-of-rwanda-originally-from-somalia
researcher (Kendall) joined an existing forum. The difference is the power relations in both. In the one forum the researcher had more control than in the other.

In the AA forum there was no researcher present and participants were therefore free to express their subjectivity and views around the topic. Anyone was able to use a pseudonym and this gave participants a sense of safety to express their true feelings. This was possible because it also provided anonymity; anonymity from the researcher and other participants. Moreover, Kendall (2000, p. 259) found that visual cues are a major limitation in online discussion forums. However, the visual cues that are absent from online discussion forums “[m]ake participants more conscious of both their own identity performances and their evaluation of other’ identity performance” (Kendall, 2000, p. 259). This is because “people must make choices about what to reveal about themselves, how to describe themselves, and how to evaluate others’ identity information and descriptions” (Kendall, 2000, p. 259). I found this to be the case in this particular instance.

**Non-Classification along Ethnic Lines in Rwanda**

_ZamZam_ on 20 February 2008 started a topic on the origin of the Tutsis of Rwanda. _ZamZam_ who marks herself as Somalian made the following observation.

The Tutsi are the tall people of Rwanda, with the Caucasian features like Somalis. The Hutus also committed the 1993 genocide against them. The Hutus are the shorter, Bantu people. I have saw this Tutsi guy once, and he looked Somali, except his hair was really nappy. … So, do you think that they're from Somalia originally?

The interesting part about her observation is the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi. On the one hand the Tutsi is placed closer to the Caucasian, like the Somali. The only difference on face value was the hair of the Tutsi. The Hutu, on the other hand, are labelled as shorter and Bantu, and it is based on the differences in appearance that it warranted an investigation into the origins of the Tutsi. On the same day _CuShitic_PrinceSs of Mama Somalia_ rejected the idea that the Tutsi could be originally from Somalia. According to _CuShitic_PrinceSs_ (20 February 2008) “Tutsis are Bantus and related to other Bantus like Hutus and not Somalis even though

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212 I was not a participant in the forum. I merely used the forum for archival purposes.

213 In this Chapter the usernames of the people who participated in the online forum are written in italics.
they look much like us.” In a subsequent post CuShitic_PrinceSs reiterated her stance that the Tutsi are Bantu and not Somalian or related to any of the other population groups in the Horn of Africa (HOA). For example:

They are bantus not Ethiopians, Somalians, Sudanese. They are bantus bantus bantus and related to their fellow bantus both genetically and culturally. They might look like Somalis because they are tall like us and have the same features but they are not related to us except that we are both Black/Africans (22 February 2008).

... 

Hutus and Tutsis are both Bantus. By the way all bantus migrated from the places around Cameroun once earlier in history (22 February 2008).

... 

TUTSIS ARE BANTUS. Who told you the lie that bantus look alike? (22 February 2008).

Three important points are raised by CuShitic_PrinceSs. The first is genotype, the second is phenotype and the third is migration. These posts of CuShitic_PrinceSs capture a dilemma. The Tutsi ‘looks Somalian or Ethiopian’ but genetic studies have indicated that their DNA is very similar to that of the Hutu. It is this dilemma that gave rise to a debate on indigeneity in the forum. In the forum there were those who believe that the Tutsi migrated to the Great Lakes region and those who believe that the Tutsi were indigenous to the region. I will discuss this in more detail in the next section.

Furthermore, in the post-genocide era of Rwanda one comes across sensitivity regarding ethnicity. The government has banned ethnic classification in Rwanda. The sensitivity could not have been better illustrated than it was by Mugabo Peter of South Africa. According to Mugabo Peter (08 Oct 2008) “Pierre Pean author of the book Noires Fureurs, Blancs Menteurs/’Black Furies White Liars’ is on trail for ‘defamation and inciting racial hatred’” In the book allegations were apparently made of the RPF’s involvement in “what happened in Rwanda in the 1990s, starting in 1990, through 1994, and in 1996-1998 …” Pierre Pean is accused of “inciting hate and racism.”

214 See Chapter 5 for a discussion on the RPF.
The government does not want to be labelled as a Tutsi-led government. Any reference to any of the atrocities committed by the RPF in the build-up to the genocide and after the genocide is a sensitive topic since the RPF was largely Tutsi. However, some participants used the ban on ethnic classification to strengthen their argument that DNA studies are manipulated by the Rwandan government. They argue that it is in the Rwandan government’s interest to show there are no genetic differences between Hutu and Tutsi. According to crystal of Nairobi, Kenya

... the classification of Tutsi within Rwanda is a crime. Nobody is supposed to come out and identify him or herself as Tutsi or Hutu for that matter. This is because the Govt wants the deep divisions to heal. It is also the general view and wish of Govt to promote the idea that the two groups are actually one and the same (crystal, 26 February 2011).  

In response to this Fred, who shared that he was surprised that the Tutsi share DNA with their neighbours, and real expert of Nürnberg, Germany in three subsequent posts rejected the claim that Tutsi is Bantu. He writes:

Well for political reasons Tutsis were made Bantus for not classifying the extermination of the Tutsis through the Hutus as genocide. ... The point is that the genetic tests in the case of the Tutsis can be easily manipulated since there are too many mixed Tutsis and cultural Tutsis who are Hutus by origin are classified as original and real Tutsis.

...  

[This is a] political Agenda to make Tutsis Bantus for not calling the genocide of the Tutsis a genocide but a tribal warfare. Fact is the Tutsis now say that they are Bantus because in Rwanda is not allowed to talk about the ethnic differences between Hutus and Tutsi.

...

I know myself a fully Tutsi [person] from Rwanda and he said that he is not a Bantu and his genetic test showed that he is closer to certain Ethiopian tribes, Massai than to a Bantu. ... Tutsis look different from Hutus because they are genetically different. Period. Different genes indicate different origins. The real Tutsi are those who look like the President of Rwanda (real expert, 08 October 2015).

In the forum usernames were sometimes written with capital letters and sometimes with lower case letters. I have decided to keep the username as they appeared in the online forum. For example, this person identified him/her as crystal and not Crystal.

It is not clear whether the location is Nuremberg. It appears in the online forum as “real expert of Nürnberg, Germany.”
For the real expert if it can be proved that the Tutsi is from Ethiopia it will be an indication that they are not Bantu. It is here that the Hamitic Hypothesis is operationalised to show that the Tutsi are not from the Great Lakes region because they look different. It is this taboo of non-ethnic reference that gave rise to the Tutsi Jewish hypothesis. This hypothesis is to prove that the Tutsi is a Jew and not Bantu and thus different from the Hutu.

The Tutsi Jewish Hypothesis

The Tutsi Jewish hypothesis largely rests on phenotype, oral tradition and the migration of the long horn cattle. In the previous section I highlighted a particular dilemma the Tutsi are facing. Phenotype ‘places’ them in the Horn of Africa\(^{217}\) and genotype in the Great Lakes region. To understand how this hypothesis was constructed one has to work backwards. The first step was to establish a link with Ethiopia and here physical appearance was the starting point. For participants who support this hypothesis the Tutsi must have come from somewhere else, because they do not look Bantu and like the Hutu. To support this claim supporters of this hypothesis draw on the oral history and tradition of the Tutsi and how similar that is with “Ethiopians”.\(^{218}\) Here are some examples:

The Tutsis are Ethiopian. It is a fact. When they moved to Rwanda the actually took traditional stuff and it is still there … Tutsis are Ethiopian trust me. You can ask people from Rwanda. Tutsis are not only in Rwanda but in all Central Africa. They are the Jew[ish] people [of] the Central Africa. We all know who the original Jews were\(^{219}\) (i_change, 21 February 2008)

Tutsi tribe are people migrated from southern Ethiopian, Oromo region, and settled-in in today’s Burundi and Rwanda. As an Ethiopian, I can see the physical and facial resemblance … No[t] only physical resemblance, but also there are customs practiced by Tutsi that indicate the relation. From what I gathered, I came to find out that Tutsi marriage ceremonies, especially practiced by the early settlers, are closely related to Oromo tribe customs (Sam of Westminster, MD on Mar 20, 2008).

\(^{217}\) Generally when participants referred to the Horn of Africa they referred to Somalia and Ethiopia.

\(^{218}\) It became clear that some participants in the online forum created a troublesome “Ethiopian” figure to strengthen their argument that the Tutsi look “Ethiopian”; hence, the inverted commas.

\(^{219}\) I used the italics for emphasis.
I am Tutsi from Burundi!! … The tradition told us we were a nomadic ethnic who move from Kush for cow food because the east was so hot and stuff and we stop in central Africa, Burundi, Rwanda were the climate was good!! (Benitez of Austin, TX on Aug 31, 2008)

I am Tutsi for instance and just as a matter of concern I would love to know my origins just like the others know theirs. I have grown up in a Bantu environment but from childhood I have always been told and singled out that I am Ethiopian! I have always been lighter than everyone in my class. Recently, en route to the Middle East I briefly stopped in Addis and everyone talked to me in that language which is totally strange to me. In the Middle East they thought I was either Ethiopian or from Qatar. We really just want to know who we are. It is obvious that we are different in many ways from our neighbors especially the bantu and Nilotics. We are very similar in culture, behavioural patterns and beliefs to the Ethiopians and some Somali groups and strangely though also to some Kikuyu groups (Johnson of Uganda on Jun 27, 2010).

The figure of the “Ethiopian” that these participants have is based on physical appearance and culture. A number of participants in the forum pointed out that Ethiopians do not all look the same or in a cultural sense can be referred to as a single entity. For example, one participant asked which part of Ethiopia participants were referring to. This destabilised the claim that Ethiopians have a unified history, culture and origin. However, alternatively, it may be understood that Ethiopian-ness was pushed onto the Tutsi, something they find hard to escape. However, the claim of Jewish ancestry is something they ascribe to themselves and it seems to be quite recent. As one saw above i_change inferred that the Tutsi are the original Jews. This is a result of claims made by participants that some Africans could have been the original Jews of the Bible, or that there can be remnants of those Jews in Africa. According to kikuyuguy “[t]he Ashkenazis have falsely whitened African history to suit their manufactured historical narratives so successfully everybody believes Nubia, Meroe, Egypt and Kush were populated by whites! To all on this thread, the original Israelites or Jews were unmistakably African in culture and phenotype. And were depicted as such” (kikuyuguy, 31 May 2010).

Johnson (19 March 2012) indicated that the possibility existed that some of the Jews in the Bible could have gone back to the Middle East and others could have “turned with their cattle down south.” To strengthen this hypothesis further, one finds that the Falasha of Ethiopia and the Lemba of Southern Africa are recognised as Jews. This, for participants, raises the question regarding the identity of the ‘true Jews’: “[i]f the currently recognised Jews agree by their own accounts that they are not the real Jews referred to in the Bible but Ashkenazi Jews from
eastern Europe so then who are the ‘other’ Jews?” (Johnson, 30 March 2012). This line of reasoning helped participants who believe that the Tutsi are of Jewish ancestry with their argument. Therefore, it is via a link to Ethiopia that a Tutsi Jewish ancestry is claimed. For example:

Tutsi people are descendants of Jews of Ethiopia through King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba (Princess of Murfreesboro, 08 November 2009).

...  
Hello,  
I am a Tutsi living in Rwanda and so proud to be a Tutsi. I know very well that we have a Jewish blood via Ethiopia.  
I have read about Jewish people every time I get the opportunity and I have come to realise that we are the same people. Because we stand out from the crowd and defend ourselves, the world hates us and jealous. But we love peace.  
Look at the genocide committed against the Jews. The same reasons were being given when the Tutsi genocide was taking place in Rwanda. Pure hatred!! (Mr Tutsi, 15 November 2009).

...  
... Personally I believe Somalis are closer to the Arabs and us to the Jews, that explain the total opposite religious affiliations (ruks of Uganda, 27 January 2010).

The reference by Princess of Murfreesboro to King Solomon and Queen Sheba is a reference to the Falasha of Ethiopia. The Falasha of Ethiopia was recognised by the Jewish community as of Jewish origin (Kaplan, 1988). In addition to this, ruks of Uganda points to why the Tutsi cannot be originally from Somalia. Religion becomes an important vantage point through which this hypothesis is conceptualised. If it is Somalia the Tutsi cannot be of Jewish origin because in Somalia Islam is the major religion. Here the ‘Arab’ and Jewish identities are appropriated to invoke religious differences. For the Tutsi Jewish hypothesis to work, Ethiopia has to be accepted as the point of origin, because the Falasha are regarded and recognised as of Jewish origin. Participants clearly use deductive reasoning to make this claim and it is an indication that this hypothesis was constructed recently. Somalia and Ethiopia, as we know them today

220 There is currently a debate underway regarding the origins of the Ashkenazi Jews. It will not be engaged here.
(nation-states), are quite recent in history. In addition to this, participants also used the genocidal experience of both Jews and Tutsis to attribute Jewish-ness to Tutsis. In January of 2011 Alfredoc of Honolulu, who claims to be of Jewish American origin, wrote that he agreed that the Tutsi are of Jewish origin.

I am a Jewish person from the USA and I grew up in an anti-Semitic neighborhood near Chicago. There were not many Jewish people in the area and we learned to recognize each other and look out for each other. ... The Tutsis of Rwanda and the neighboring areas definitely appear to be as "Jewish" as the Ethiopian Jews, in their features, their general vibe, and etc. And like Jews everywhere they were abused and hated by the people around them ... (Alfredoc of Honolulu, 18 January 2011).

Here Tutsis are compared to the Falasha and this comparison is based on their physical appearance and their “general vibe.” In addition to this, the Tutsi are depicted as a marginalised people who are hated by their neighbours, which is a clear reference to the 1994 genocide. This incorrectly places the 1994 Rwandan genocide alongside the Jewish holocaust. This comparison erases the Hutu victims of the 1994, Rwandan genocide. However, it is the 1994 genocide that opens up a comparison between the Tutsis and Jews. Moreover, Jewish-ness was also extended to all Tutsi in the Great Lakes region. In December 2011 Yeboyeboy of Takoma Park, MD joined the forum and responded to the post of Alfredoc with the following:

Dear Alfredoc: ... YOU HAVE DELIVERED A GIGANTIC LECTURE, ONE THAT I NEVER WITNESSED FROM ANYBODY AMONG THE SECTION OF MAINSTREAM JEWERY .... AS A TUTSI JEW MYSELF (not necessarily from RWANDA as people use to think ... Tutsi from Rwanda being the same people as Tutsi of Burundi and of the whole Great Lakes), I REVIEWED YOUR STATEMENT WORD BY WORD AND FOUND IT COMPLETELY ACURATE FOR THE TUTSI PEOPLE AS A WHOLE (i.e.: about 15 million people), AND AM SO PROUD TO SEND YOU MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION FOR YOUR UNUSUAL BRIGHTNESS AND INSIGHTS AS REGARDS TO THE TUTSI JEWISH FATE (Yeboyeboy, 08 December 2011).

Yeboyeboy uses Alfredoc’s post thus as an authentic recognition from the mainstream Jewish community that the Tutsi is Jew. In addition to this, Yeboyeboy positioned the Tutsi everywhere as Jewish. Tutsi-ness thus transcended nationality. For example, Wilson Rugira a Munyamulenge for Eastern DRC also saw the Tutsis as Jews.

I am Tutsi- Munyamulenge (East of DRC). The Tutsi people are from Ethiopia and they have a link with Afar people, and some of them have a link with Oromo people like the Basita. The
reasons to connect the Tutsi with Israel are: Name Tutsi is originally from Hebrew, the history from the Hebrew Bible and The culture. In [the] Old Testament there are 613 lows when I compare with Banyamulenge-Tutsi Culture many of them are Same (Wilson Rugira of Glasgow, UK, 21 December, 2011).

One of the main reasons for Wilson’s Jewish claim is that the name Tutsi is originally from Hebrew. In addition to Wilson, there are also other participants in the forum who made reference to Jewish ancestry based on certain words which appear in Hebrew. For example: “I agree with you that Tutsi people speak Bantu language but it's not a pure Bantu language it's a combination of Bantu and some Middle East language. Let me give you some example the word SHEMA means the same in HEBREW and TUTSI Bantu language. The word BIN or BEN or BENE is not Bantu …” (Hum1 of the United States of America, 12 September 2008). Furthermore, according to Yeboyeboy (07 December 2011) “It looks like the word TUTSI itself is pure Hebrew.” However, there is a dispute as to whether Tutsi is a Hebrew word. For example, Bantu limited of Eskilstuna, Sweden (02 February 2012) highlighted that if Tutsi in Kirundi means “those who came from somewhere” it is a part of the Bantu languages because in Luganda “they came” means “Ba-tuse” and “It is no foreign word.” For Bantu limited (02 February 2012) this an indication that single words such as Tutsi, shema, ben or bene in Hebrew cannot be regarded as substantial evidence that the Tutsis is of Jewish origin.

Furthermore, Yeboyeboy (23 December 2011) indicated that “the Tutsi are not from Ethiopia. The Tutsi are just ETHIOPIAN JEWS or JEWS OF KUSH. There is nothing new in their identification as JEWS, being from a historical point of view or a theological point of view” (Yeboyeboh of Takoma Park, MD, 23 December, 2011). Here two claims are made. The first is that the Tutsi are Ethiopian Jews and the second is that this identification is historical. In a response to Yeboyeboy, kikuyuguy of Nairobi (14 January 2012) argued that the Tutsi Jewish history is a history constructed after the 1994 Rwandan genocide and it is a result of the website Kulanu. kikuyuguy disputed that this identification is historical and claims that it does not pre-dates 1994.

This brings one to the next step in the hypothesis and that is to show that the Tutsi Jewish origin stretches back thousands of years. The evidence that is provided for this claim is the Hamitic longhorn cattle. This places the Tutsi in Egypt at the height of the Egyptian civilisation. This link is established by the Egyptian hieroglyphs of longhorn cattle. For supporters of the Jewish
hypothesis it is an indication that the Tutsi were in Egypt. Since cattle, especially the longhorn, and pastoralism are used as the signifiers for being Tutsi, the association with the hieroglyphs could be established. For example:

The Tutsi Hima we know of is Pastoralists. I too hail from Uganda with A Tutsi Father and Mu Hima Mother. If you are pastoralists you definitely keep on the move especially those days when there were no borders. … Yes it is true that the long horned cattle are only amongst the Bahima and Tutsi communities in the whole world. So if you trace the movement of these cattle you will realise that at one time they are concentrated in the Sahel. Then the Horn, then Ethiopia. Their movement into the Eastern African region is only recently, about 1500 years ago. In history this is a short time. Unless you want to tell me that your type of Tutsi are not pastoralists. The cow and the Hima Tutsi I know of are one and the same. Trace the movement of one and you are tracing the movement of the other. The evidence of the movement of the long horned cattle is not disputed at all. So follow that and you have a Tuts Hima movement. And I have told you that it is a movement from the Sahel which is around Egypt and Ethiopia. That is where the Tutsi were at one time. Now about them being homogenous groups from the Somali or the Ethiopians is a possibility. To put this matter to rest would be to agree that as the group searched for grass they moved down towards where they are today. Along that movement they intermarried with groups along the way and these included the Ethiopians and Somali and eventually the Bantu (Peter of Rwanda, 17 September, 2010).

Firstly, Peter appropriates the longhorn cattle as a signifier of the Tutsi. Once again this argument is firmly made from the present. In the present longhorn cattle are associated with the Tutsi and hence, the hieroglyph of the longhorn cattle places the Tutsi in Egypt. Secondly, DNA similarity between the Hutu and Tutsi is explained through miscegenation; hence the Tutsi and the Hutu have the same DNA.

The final step is to show that cattle domestication first took place in the Levant and from there it spread to the African continent. For example:

I will take your attention to the Joseph era of Egypt where it is quoted in Genesis that the King had a dream and wanted it interpreted. Eventually everyone fails and the wisdom of Joseph is summoned. My interest is in what the King dreamt. He dreamt that while he was standing at the River Nile, 7 fat cattle were eaten by 7 thin ones. My interest is the imagery of the Cows in the Kings dream. This imagery is suggestive of the normalcy and regularity of cows in the Kings everyday life. It also reveals that Egypt is a centre for livestock at a point in time. Given that there is no reported sightings of cows ever mentioned outside Egypt especially within Africa, makes the
case that the pastoralist tribes especially the Hima and Tutsi have their origin in ancient Egypt. In fact the alien habit of pastoralism is despised amongst the Bantu and has never taken root amongst them to this day. So how the Tutsi or Hima with their heavy pastoralist inclination get even the remotest link with the bantu can only be a mirage and remain a fantasy.

Joseph whilst in Egypt coached his brethren as to what to say when asked by the king as to what their occupation is. I quote Genesis 46:33,"When the King calls you and asks you what your occupation is, ye shall say that thy servants trade hath been about cattle from our youth, even until now, both we and our ancestors; that ye shall dwell in Goshen, for every shepherd is an abomination unto the Egyptians." This is a very telling statement. The Israelites are shown to be keepers of cattle all their lives. Note that shepherding in the bible refers to keepers of both cattle or sheep, goats, etc. Even their ancestors and themselves, have engaged in no other occupation other than cattle keeping. The last vestiges of true cattle keepers of a variety like the Israelites owned in Egypt is found in Uganda and Rwanda among the Hima Tutsi populations but also among another Tutsi group in DR Congo.

If there were other people with cattle within Egypt, these cattle were eventually taken over by the Israelites. I quote Genesis 47:17,"...That year, he (Joseph) supplied the Egyptians with food in exchange for ALL their cattle." If the Hima Tutsi group are not part of the Israelite group that received or that already possessed them, where from did they get the privilege to own millions of cows since back in time? My taking is that they were part of the privileged group at the time and these appear to be the Israelites or if you like the Jewish group.

If you jump out of Genesis a little bit, we see that after bread, milk is the next most important food. Palestine is frequently referred to as the land of milk and honey. Milk was received in pails and stored in leather bottles where it turned sour quickly in the warm climate of Palestine before being poured out quickly like a melting substance (Job 10:10). Cheese of various types were made from it or made into butter by Churning (proverbs 27:27). Today, these exact ways and methods are practiced among the Bahima and Tutsi of Uganda and Rwanda in the exact same traditional way. The difference being that today the storage is in Gourds.

The movement of the Hima Tutsi is in sync with their cattle. The long horned Hamitic is first spotted in Egypt. It was brought in from Syria. Further migrations of the cattle came in by way of the Israelites that settled in Goshen. They were exclusively cattle keepers and the drought in Canaan caused them to leave with their cattle. They then acquired all the cattle in Egypt which explains the enormous herds that have been kept by the Tutsi and Hima empires in East Africa. From Goshen the movement reached Western Egypt where cross breeding took place to produce the lovely Sanga breed as we know it today. The migration moved down south to Uganda and
Rwanda where the pastoralists found rich grasslands. They then set up Kingdoms. The cattle corridor that cuts across Uganda from North to South through which they passed is still in existence and still habituated by the Tutsi Hima groups. As to whether their blood conforms to this or the other group is totally irrelevant given all the mixing taking place. But it is beyond all doubt that they came from Egypt and could very possibly be Jewish or Israelite if you like (Johnson of Uganda, 03 October, 2010).

From Johnson’s post it becomes clear that pastoralism is appropriated and reserved for Tutsis and Himas only.

There are four points to consider from Johnson’s post above. Firstly, Johnson is dismissing the Bantu as cattle keepers, and also ignores the biblical account of the arrival of Jacob and his family. In Genesis at the time of the King’s dream the Israelites were not in Egypt, and yet there were cattle present in Egypt. Jacob and his family did not introduce cattle in Egypt. If by “Bantu” Johnson is referring to the Subsaharan Africans, his argument is fallacious. The “Bantu” were cattle keepers and that “pastoralism is despised amongst the Bantu”. The “Bantu” were and still is practicing pastoralism (Hall, 1986). Secondly, Johnson contradicts himself when he indicates that Joseph’s family started buying all the cattle in the land of Goshen. This once again is an indication that there were cattle in Egypt prior to the arrival of Joseph’s family in Egypt. Thirdly, Johnson is selectively referring to certain traditional practices the Tutsi and biblical Jews have in common to establish the link with the long horn cattle. Fourthly, he makes the claim that the longhorn cattle was first spotted in Egypt are originally from Syria or the Levant and this places the Tutsi (owners of the long horn cattle) in the Levant, but in the first paragraph he argues that “[g]iven that there is no reported sightings of cows ever mentioned outside Egypt especially within Africa, makes the case that the pastoralist tribes especially the Hima and Tutsi have their origin in ancient Egypt.” Johnson clearly contradicts himself here.
Taking this into account Johnson renders genetic studies irrelevant since the migration of the longhorn cattle (that is associated with the Tutsi) is a better explanation for the origins of the Tutsi. One, therefore, notices that once the link to the Levant was established supporters of the Jewish hypothesis were able to argue that it was the Jews who brought the longhorn cattle to Egypt and over a period of time these Jews migrated with their cattle southwards to Ethiopia and later to the Great Lakes.

Participants who argued against this hypothesis focussed more on genotype and the Jewish practices that the Tutsi do not adhere to dispute it. This places the Tutsi in the Great Lakes region and is positioned as Bantu or as Nilo-Hamitic and thus a non-Jew. Firstly there are some participants who use DNA studies to show that the Tutsi are Bantu and do not have Jewish ancestry. For example:

This is your genetic makeup (80% e3a ), 4% e3,(1% e3b) and 15%B. e3a 80% of it- found in largest numbers sub-Sahara Africa which is also found in Hutus so you cannot deny that genetically you are more related to the Hutu. e3 – Khoisan’s. 1% E3b which is found in Somalians n Ethiopians, so basically you just have 1% HOA ... The 15%B is found mostly in the pygmies of the Congo (African-MadBoy of Windhoek, Namibia, 20 August, 2008).

Here one sees that e3a is depicted as the marker of Bantu-ness and Bantu-ness is restricted to Sub-Saharan Africa. Others use genetics to debunk the Tutsi Jewish claim. Instead there is an argument that the Bantu is more likely Jewish than the Tutsi:

While I was deployed in Beni the Hamitic longhorn cattle was a common. At the time I did not know it was the Hamitic longhorn cattle. I took this photo one morning in front of the gate of our base. They refused to move for the vehicle which was trying to get out.
Tutsis are more likely to be of Masai origin than anything else: they look exactly like Masais. Some Tutsis claimed to be Jews but these are scammers who want money and support from Jews. If anything, culturally and genetically Jews have more in common with bantus than with Tutsis (Lembas, etc.). Tutsis never practiced circumcision which is one of the tenants of Judaism. They have nothing in common with Bantus. They are more likely to be related to Somalis and Masais and not with Ethiopians coz Ethiopians are mixed Bantus/Asians/Whites (didi of UK, 04 November 2008).

You have nothing to do with the Jews. I have not come across any existing scientific facts that could racially relate Tutsis to the Jews. Someone has brought here on this thread the DNA composition of the Tutsis and there is nothing that could differentiate Tutsi DNA from other Africans. Just be proud of your African origins and from where you are. The Bantu tribe of the Lemba people who look nothing “Caucasian” has one of the highest DNA percentages of Cohen, or priests clan of the Jews. Could that make them Jews? I would say no (kamit4ever of Vancouver, Canada, 18 Novem 2009).

Interestingly, didi’s stance is that the Tutsi are not Bantu and focusses rather on the genetic similarity of the Lemba (who is depicted Bantu) to Jewish ancestry than the similarity the Tutsi have with everyone else in the Great Lakes region. Then there are those who distrust DNA studies and believe in the idea of a pure Tutsi. For example MrTutsi of Kigali, Rwanda (18 February 2010) wrote: “I want those people who test DNA to test pure Tutsis, not those who got intermarried with the locals, and took some of their blood.” MrTutsi dispute the DNA studies because pure Tutsis do not intermarrry and given this DNA studies that show Tutsis share genetic similarity with Hutus could have been tested on ‘mixed Tutsi’. renz of Cergy, France (29 January 2011) also indicated that “elite tutsi and hima didn’t practice intermarriage.” The implication is that the ‘pure Tutsi’ does not look Bantu and only looks like people of the HOA. For others it is more than just genetics:

Masai’s and samburu also have the same physical characteristics but none claims migration from Ethiopia. Secondly Ethiopians are not tall and are most agricultural ... not pastoralists like the Tutsi. Tutsi’s are a combination of an indigenous populations common along the eastern rift valley ... they are not migrants. They do not even have traditional folklore of migration ... the story of migration began with the Belgian postulating of the Hamitic hypothesis. They are genetically identical to Hutu’s!! (Drabbo of San Diego, CA, 18 April, 2008).

The reality is that the Hutu and the Tutsi share not only a genetic similarity but also “cultural historical relations closer to the people of Uganda, Rwanda, and Congo …” (kilonzo of Philadelphia, PA, 26 August, 2010). Drabbo’s point on folklore is also supported by a question
eezee of UK (10 November 2010) who asked: “How can Tutsis have an oral tradition if they don’t even have a language?” It raises the question as to what happened to the language of the supposed migrants from Ethiopia. Why are the oral traditions of the Tutsi migration in Kinyarwanda?

Others dispute the Tutsi Jewish ancestry based on the genetics of Ethiopian Jews. For example, Shabaka shared the following: “I am also sceptical about Tutsis being Jews the same way I am sceptical that the so-called Ethiopian Jews are Jews racially speaking. Actually DNA tests have shown that those Ethiopian Jews are of the same race as other Ethiopians” (Shabaka of Hamburg, Germany, 16 February, 2011). For Shabaka, DNA equals race and since Ethiopian Jews do not share the same DNA and they cannot be of Jewish ancestry. It would therefore not make sense to claim, like Yeboyeboy and Princess of Murfreesboro that the Tutsi are Ethiopian Jews.

The Autochthone and the Migrant

The figures of the autochthone and the migrant are created by two migration theories. The first is the ‘Tutsi migration theory’ and the second is the ‘Bantu migration theory.’ The Tutsi migration theory describes two Tutsi migrations and the result of this theory is that it makes the Tutsi the migrant and the Bantu the autochthone. The two Tutsi migration theories are the result of a disagreement amongst participants in the forum regarding why not all Tutsi have the stereotypical Tutsi physical appearance. Some in the forum mentioned that not all Tutsi are tall and that some Tutsi have Bantu features. Some contributed this to miscegenation but some participants who argued in favour of the Tutsi Jewish hypothesis indicated that DNA tests could have been manipulated by the Rwandan government. For these participants there was a “pure” Tutsi. The Tutsi migration theory, therefore, attempts to shed light on why there are differences in physical appearances between Tutsis. According to Rwandan woman of Rwanda there were two types of Tutsis who migrated to Rwanda.222 The first was the “taller, darker skinned Tutsis with nappy hair who were later followed by the lighter skinned and not so tall Tutsis with softer hair” (Rwandan woman of Rwanda, 03 September, 2010). Rwandan woman, however, mentions that this theory is not based on facts and that it was based on oral history passed

222 The username of the participant is Rwandan woman of Rwanda.
down in her family. For *Rwandan woman* this is the reason why there are short Tutsis and tall Tutsis. Johnson also argued in favour of this migration theory. According to *Johnson* (16 September 2010) “[p]erhaps, the first migration was the larger one of taller dark people” and this could have been the “Bachwezi people refer to in western Uganda. The tall mysterious people with lots of cattle?” Once again, *Johnson* appropriated cattle and the physical features of the Bachwezi as symbols of Tutsi-ness. For *Johnson* the second migration could have been from Ethiopia and here *Johnson* supports this claim by associating the longhorn cattle with the Tutsi. This migration theory also explains the Cushitic traces in the Tutsi DNA (*Johnson of Uganda*, 9 April 2012). In addition to *Rwandan woman* and *Johnson*, *Eugene of Ottawa* also supported this migration theory. According to *Eugene* (09 November 2010) “*Rwandan woman* is right when she says that there have been probably two waves of migration by the Tutsis. In Rwandan oral tradition there is a distinction between Tutsis called Abasangwabutaka (Those who occupied the land) and Ibimanuka (Those who came from the sky or who came from above).” For *Eugene* the Bachwezi could have been the “Ibimanuka who came to Rwanda and founded the Banyiginya dynasty.”

However, this theory was disputed by other participants based on the physical features of other groups in the region. For example, in a response to a post by *Johnson* regarding the migration of the Tutsi, *lewis of Trois-rivières* (09 April 2012) posted “I'm not sure if I agree. Some Tutsis are lighter skinned, as are some Maasai and other Nilo-Hamites. However, all Tutsis have afro hair texture, just like the Maasai.” *lewis* points to the limitation in making selective associations based on physical appearance. The participants of the Tutsi migration theory used physical features, cattle and tradition to associate the Tutsi with Ethiopia, but not with other groups in the region who share these same similarities with the Tutsi. In addition to this, *Drabbo* does not agree that the Bachwezi are migrants to the region. According to *Drabbo* (07 March 2012) “[w]ith regards to Bachwezi and Batembuzi - you have to explain why the connection between them and the Tutsi/Hima was only done in the 19th Century not earlier.” *Drabbo* questions the claims of Tutsi folklore that stretched as far back as the pre-colonial era and here *Drabbo* argues it is a result of John Speke’s work which colonial administrators used to bring about discriminative practices in the colonies. Speke’s work provided the basis for what came to be the Hamitic Hypothesis. It is based on this that *Drabbo* questioned the existence of pre-colonial Tutsi folklore that speaks of various Tutsi migrations. This is further questioned by the language the Tutsi speak. The Tutsi speak Kinyarwanda which is regarded a Bantu language. The questions this raises are: Why do the supposedly civilisers in the Great Lakes speak a bantu
language? What happened to their original languages? Why is the folklore of their migration in Kinyarwanda, if it was passed down generations? Drabbo, therefore, infers that the migration folklore might have been implanted by colonialism, and the reason why it is in Kinyarwanda.

The Bantu migration theory conversely makes the Tutsi the autochthone and the Bantu the migrant. There are two positions in the Bantu migration theory. There are those who believe that there was a Bantu migration from central Africa to the rest of the continent, and there are those who believe that there was a Bantu migration to central Africa. In the latter position there are two possible points of origin for a Bantu migration to central Africa. The first is from West Africa. According to King Ahzi of Los Angeles (04 November 2008) “[t]he Tutsi’s did originate from the horn of Africa but moved southward. I did a report on it in college. The Bantu’s came in later from West Africa and mixed with them.” Based on King Ahzi’s post the Tutsi arrived in the region before the Bantu. However, DMutabazi of Amriswil, Switzerland (22 December 2008) agreed with King Ahzi that both Tutsi and Hutu could have been migrants but disagreed that the Tutsi was first. According to DMutabazi of Amriswil, Switzerland (22 December 2008)

The migration of Hamitic people’s from the North may have occurred in different waves 1300-1400 years ago and the Bantu (Hutu’s) earlier, continuously and to date, from neighbouring countries. Bantu groups migrating into these regions would naturally take on a Hutu identity based on appearance and methods of subsistence. On the other hand you do have Hamitic and Pastoral groups like the Hema and Bahima in the Congo (Zaire) and western Uganda whose social-economic practices (until recently) were more or less identical to those of the Tutsi (not forgetting appearance).

Both King Ahzi and DMutabazi put the emphasis on the first comer as the autochthone. In addition to this, in DMutabazi’s post the Hutu is depicted as an amalgamation of various Bantu groups, who moved into the area and, like Yeboyeboy, extends the Tutsi identity to the Hima and the Bahima of Congo.

The second position is that a migration into central Africa was from Southern Africa. Johnson of Uganda (15 September 2010) explains that he does not “believe that the Bantu migration came down from Central Africa. I believe that it all started from South Africa.” In a later post Johnson added that some Bantu groups “are from the North rather than Congo” (Johnson, 19 March 2012). From where in the North Johnson did not say. Johnson also found it difficult to believe that a migration through the Congo rain forest was possible and argued that this was another reason for the belief that the Hutu or the Bantu did not migrate from Congo. Drabbo (19 March 2012) agreed with Johnson and argued that “no serious scholar right now takes the Bantu
migration theory from Congo at face value. Actually part of the problem is the issue of ruling out some indigenous forces in the shaping the peopling of the great lakes. A lot of Bantu speakers have been found to be hybrids of Nilo-Hamtic and various other groups.” Even though Drabbo agreed with Johnson there is an underlying difference between Drabbo and Johnson’s claims. Where Johnson believed in the migration of bantu speakers to the region, Drabbo believed bantu speakers to be hybrids and thus indigenous. To illustrate this more clearly one has to consider an earlier post of Drabbo. In 2008 Drabbo responded to Asmara4Ever (13 May 2008) who indicated that no one knows where Bantu originated from: “You are right!! The Biggest assumption that the Bantu migration hypothesis makes-- is populations that migrated from central Africa to the rest Africa, found an uninhabited interior. Very Wrong!!” For Drabbo the interior (here central Africa) was not empty and there were indigenous peoples before the arrival of bantu speakers. Where these bantu speakers came from Drabbo did not know and never raised it in the forum. Arguing against this were those participants who believed in a Bantu migration theory from Central Africa. For example, kikuyuguy believed that “[i]n the 17th century the Bantu migration from the DRC reached the region and assimilated themselves. Now the language retains only a few Tigre traces eg, water, the inheritance system is now patrilineal and only the older kyuks follow the kosher rules” (kikuyuguy of Nairobi, Kenya, 22 April, 2009). The region in kikuyuguy’s post may be read as a reference to the Great Lakes region and his is a well-documented colonial position on the matter. A position kikuyuguy maintained in the forum.

This brings one to another issue and that is indigeneity. The Bantu migration theory makes the Hutu the migrant and the Tutsi migration theory makes the Tutsi the migrant. For example, Shabaka of Bonn, Germany (12 February 2011) commented on the post of another participant with the following: “… I would not be surprised if you were one of those Hutus who fled to DRC after taking part in the genocide. You are an idiot if you think you have more right to be in that part of Africa than the Tutsis for example, you all arrived late in central Africa or in southern Africa.” It might be that Shabaka had a Bantu migration from either West Africa or Congo in mind. Here the Bantu migration theory is used to position the Hutu as the migrant and the Tutsi as the autochthone. In addition to Shabaka, Drabbo (03 February 2012 argues that:

Migration theories of Tutsi’s also distort the picture -- because they tend to place bantu’s as indigenous to the east African region-- yet it’s the Bantu who are the migrants. I would not even characterize the presence of nilohamtic and hamitic populations in the region as a ’migration’ from Ethiopia -- rather the entire rift valley (both arms) and associated plateau’s all the way from
Ethiopia to southern Tanzania was the natural and original habitat of these groups -- they obviously moved from one part to another -- but it was all within their homeland.

For Drabbo there is a clear difference between the Bantu and the Nilohamitic and Hamitic people. However, one realises that for Drabbo there is much more at stake. For Drabbo the direction of the migration is important, because it is an indication of where to locate the birth place of human kind and civilization.

Movement of people during the time of the founding of Egypt was northbound towards the Levant -- not south bound from it. The Egyptians attribute their origins to the land of Punt which could be anywhere between Somalia and the Rwenzori. That’s why King Tut’s DNA revealed striking realities about the populations at the time: http://dienekes.blogspot.com/2011/12/forensic ... He clustered more with southern Africans (Hottentots who migrated south) and the great lakes more than even present day HOA. It's says a lot about your civilizational self-esteem when you automatically assume a subservient role. Why is it so hard for you to conceptualize that it’s the Egyptians who came from you and not the other way round. King Tut's DNA may reveal it’s that Somalians and Ethiopians may actually be the breakaway population from an original one in the great lakes. What is amazing about some of the discussions here is an automatic and irrational acceptance that the Tutsi cannot be the originator population -- that they are only a resultant population from some other supposed 'superior' source. Somalians and Ethiopians together are one the oldest African populations i.e Together with Pygmies and Khoisans, they have one the longest history of indigenous presence on the African continent -- they are definitely not of Levantian origin (Drabbo of San Marcos, CA, 01 April, 2012).

Drabbo believes in the “Out of Africa” migration theory that positions Africa, and especially the Rift Valley as the origin of human kind. This is where one realises that Drabbo is well versed in the works of Hiernaux, Diop, W.E.B du Bois and others. As one saw from his post he believes that the Tutsi could have been part of the “originator population” because archeological evidence shows that the Nilohamitic and Hamitic type have been longest in the region. This is also an argument of Jean Hiernaux in The People of Africa.

Drabbo argues that the entire Rift Valley was once inhabited by Nilohamitic, Hamitic, the Pygmies and the Khoisan is the oldest African populations. This based on the revelations over King Tutankhamun's family’s DNA. The research that Drabbo refers to indicates that King Tutankhamun's family’s DNA clustered more with Africans from Southern Africa (Khoisan). For Drabbo this is another indication that there was a migration away from the Great Lakes. Hence, the Egyptians’ reference to their land of origin was called Punt, which was located South of
Egypt. Drabbo believes the land of Punt “could be anywhere between Somalia and the Rwenzori.” Drabbo’s migration theory is southwards and northwards. The Egyptians, the Somalis and the Ethiopians are thus the breakaway groups. Those who stayed, the Nilohamitic and Hamitic people, are indigenous to the region. Even though Drabbo’s argument is presented convincingly using DNA, it still leaves one with the question of where the Bantu originated from (if one follows Drabbo’s argument).

Talai and Bantu limited did not agree with the claim Drabbo put forward that “Somalis and Ethiopians together are one the oldest African populations i.e Together with Pygmies and Khoisans, they have one the longest history of indigenous presence on the African continent.” According to Talai (01 April 2012): “Somalis and Ethiopians are not the oldest lot. The oldest populations are Khoisans, Nilotes and Pygmies. Somalis are as old as bantus while Ethiopians are a mix of Cushitic, Nilotic and Semitic peoples.” In addition to Talai, Bantu limited added that: “Who says Somalis an ancient people? 88% of Somalis belong to E-M78 which entered east Africa some 3000-4000 years ago. The same thing applies to Ethiopians. They may carry some ancient khoisan and nilotic markers but the marker are no older than west Africans.” However, Somali Honour and Pride of Lisburn, UK disagreed with Talai and Bantu, regarding Somalians as not one of the oldest populations on the African continent. According to Somali Honour and Pride (01 April 2012) “[t]hat’s not true, only the Ethiopians share with the Khoisan the deepest human Y-chromosome clades.” However, for Drabbo (01 April 2012) the bigger question is “what is the ‘bantu type’? … In the Great Lakes and East Africa many Bantu speakers are a complex mix of pygmy, Khoisan (Hadza), Cushitic, Nilotic and Nilohamitic populations – many have very little evidence of West African connections.” For Bantu limited (01 April 2012) “Bantu types simply refers to members of the E1b1a (including DE, E1 and E2) which is regarded as the ‘true negro’ marker in the mainstream. … One can safely say this is the distribution of E1b1a in all Bantu speaking people.” For Bantu limited (03 April 2012) the “Khoisan and pygmies are indeed [the] ‘true negro.’”

From the debate above, it becomes clear that DNA became the new indicator of indigeneity. DNA was the most common undisputable ‘evidence’ put forward as a marker of origin and indigeneity. Another common one was genetic differences regarding lactose intolerance and sickle cell disease. This argument draws heavily on the work of Jean Hiernaux.223 The more

223 Jean Hiernaux was an anthropologist and is well known for his books such as The People of Africa and Man in the Heat, High Altitude, and Society.
troubling part is that their arguments are still using the same epistemology that inaugurated racial science, which is the Hamitic hypothesis. For example, *BMT of Stockholm, Sweden* in a response to *Drabbo* regards Somalians as being Cushitic and not “mixed race”, and claims that “they carry some Neanderthal DNA like the euro-Asians they mixed with. Masai who heavily mixed with Cushitic do have Neanderthal DNA” (*BMT of Stockholm, Sweden*, 10 April 2013). In response *Drabbo* (10 April 2013) wrote that “The out of Africa theory of human migration is the prevailing explanation of why eurasians tend to have some HOA DNA. Fourthly there is no African population with with Neanderthal dna ...please cite your source.” To which *asho of Eskilstuna, Sweden* (10 April 2013) responded with the following:

I do not have the time look up the source on Neanderthal admixture in some Africans. It is the discovery of Neanderthal dna in euro-asian and not Africans that buried the theory euro-asian Origin of E. North Africans could be a result of back migration since the carry neanderthal Dna euro-asian or admixture. Traces of Neanderthal DNA have been found in HOA and among masai. That tells you these people are of mixed origin and the Caucasoid appearance is most like a result of this admixture.

... Masais are just nilots from the Sudan who mixed with Cushitic in east Africa. The nilotic blood in them ancient but they a recently mixed people like Somalis. As I said Somalis and masai having Neanderthal Dna make them mixed race. That why they have the Caucasoid features.

Here Neanderthal DNA is assigned to the Caucasoid and reincarnates the racial science of Gobineau. See Chapter 2. This brings one to the second point. DNA reincarnates a racial science between the Bantu, the Cushitic, the Khoisan, the Nilohamitic, and the Caucasoid. Gobineau argued that it was the Caucasoid that gave birth to the Egyptian civilisation and that every African civilisation was established by the mix descendants of this Caucasoid race. Civilisation in Africa is therefore attributed to Hamitic influence. *Drabbo*, however, disputed this. “Caucasians”, he explains, “get their features from HOA populations not the other way round!!! Caucasians are an off shoot of a population that migrated from the the Horn of Africa! It’s Caucasians who look like Somali’s. A child cannot be his father’s parent!” (*Drabbo*, 10 April 2013). As mentioned before Drabbo sees Africa as the birth place of human kind and civilisation which spread to the rest of the world by a migration out of Africa.

224 See Chapter 2.
The Undesirable Bantu Figure

An undesirable Bantu figure was created in relation to the Caucasian. Participants, who rejected the Bantu figure and painted it as undesirable, positioned themselves as in a closer proximity to the Caucasian than the Bantu. For example, no name of Ottawa (18 January 2009) wrote the following: “The Tutsis do not at all look like Hutus. Hutus have big noses but Tutsis have a straight nose almost like Somalis or Caucasian features. We are so not similar to Hutus even during the genocide the Hutus recognized the Tutsi because of how they looked alike ...” Here a proximity to the Caucasian is invoked to demonstrate that the Hutu cannot be Tutsi. Appearance here determines proximity to the Caucasian. Here a big nose is contributed to being Hutu and a straight nose contributed to Caucasian. In addition to this, Tutsi cannot be Hutu because the Hutu is Bantu. According to Tutsi beauty of Brampton, Canada (07 March 2009) “umm I’m a Tutsi and Tutsi are not Bantu’s Hutu’s are Bantu’s. Tutsi’s are from the south of Ethiopia who migrated east to Rwanda and adopted the Bantu language.” The assumption here is that the people of Ethiopia are not Bantus. As one saw above for some participants Ethiopia is associated with Caucasian-ness. For example, the post below shows one that if the Tutsi are associated with Somalia and Ethiopia they attain Caucasian-ness:

Tutsis resemble Somalis and Ethiopians including other tribes such as Hima and Nyankole. The problem about their identity stems from their attitudes towards people with broad noses, thick lips and short. They are probably a mixture of Bantu and Ethiopians or Somalis. If they were pure Bantus they would not have enslaved the Hutus. Yooo!! Even if you were to travel east or south of Africa you would not come across Bantus such as Tutsi. Genetics or not Tutsis are probably the same people with the Himas, Nyankole and some Luos of both Kenya and Uganda. They don’t look Bantu, I mean features and all!!! (marandani of Johannesburg, South Africa, 21 October, 2009).

For marandani the Tutsi do not look Bantu because they apparently resemble Somalis and Ethiopians. Broad noses, thick lips and being short are attributed to the Bantu figure. Therefore, since the Hutu are not from Ethiopia they can never attain Caucasian-ness but the Tutsi can. More disturbing is the reference to enslavement. For marandani the Tutsis were not “pure Bantu” and this was the reason they “enslaved the Hutu.” Here Bantu equals Hutu and it is based on the Bantu-ness of the Hutu that they were enslaved. However, it is not only marandani
who shared this sentiment. Franck of Copenhagen, Denmark also used physical appearance to
distance the Tutsi from bantu-ness.

I'm Tutsi and I'm 190 cm tall, narrow nose, small lips, and I find it insulting that you call all Tutsis
Bantu, you know nothing about us, my tip-tip-tip-tip-tip grandparents by tales through generation
migrated from Southern Ethiopia and as the generation went by the real Tutsis talked the slaves'
(Hutus) language, so shut the fuck up, most of us are not Bantus, all those people saying we are,
are just trying to prove that shit Hutus are our brothers (Franck, 14 July 2008).

Franck like no name of Ottawa and marandani ascribes certain features to Tutsi. For Franck a
Tutsi is tall, has a narrow nose and small lips, and the Hutu (who is depicted as a slave) does
not have these features. Another participant also depicts the Hutu as slaves but disputes that
they are Bantu. For this participant the Bantu figure does not exist. According to Yeboyeboy (03
February 2012): “[t]here has never been any BANTU population anywhere in Africa. Onlyfamilies, tribes, and runaways slaves.” The runaway slaves that Yeboyeboy is referring “are
the scattered survivors of the slavery trade of the Atlantic Coast, who found themselves
refugees in the Jewish Kingdoms of South Kush powerfully set up by the Tutsi Jews since the
time of Moses up to the King Solomon & Queen of Shaba’s Commonwealth” (Yeboyeboy, 03
February 2012). However, according to Yeboyeboy (07 March 2012) the problem with the Hutu
or the survivors of the slave trade is that they “are now so ungrateful” and “destructive” towards
their “Jewish benefactors.” Yeboyeboy depicted the Tutsi as the saviour of the Hutu. More
troublesome is Yeboyeboy’s erasure of the concept Bantu and after this erasure the Hutu only
exist as slaves. Yeboyeboy after this erasure stopped using the word “Hutu” and replaced it with
“slave.” For example, “[t]he problem is that other people come in and appoint their former slaves
in your place, take over your land, your history and your culture, and accuse your ancestors of
crimes they never did. That’s what is actually happening in the Burundi …” (Yeboyeboy, 21
March 2012). This is a reference to the 1959 Social Revolution in Rwanda and the post-Arusha
agreements in Burundi. In both instances the Hutu took power from the Tutsi. In addition to this,
the real horner (19 January 2011) describe the Tutsi and the Bantu in the following ways: “Tutsi
are beautiful people from horn of Africa who lost their beautiful Hamitic language and their
beautiful keen features by savage bantu who lost the real human features (hornoid features) by
mixing with gorillas ... these people are a threat to our Hamitic race existence.” The real horner
depicts the Bantu as the “savage”, who is closer to animals. According to the real horner the
Bantu lost their human features and thus their humanity. More troubling is that this Bantu figure
is seen as a threat to the “Hamitic race existence”.

https://etd.uwc.ac.za
Furthermore, from the discussion above it is mostly Tutsi who reject the idea of being classified as Bantu. However, there is another layer to this rejection. Many participants in forum who rejected the Tutsi’s claim to be from the HOA claimed to be from the HOA. This rejection was because they considered the Tutsi Bantu, and therefore did not want to be associated with being Bantu. For example, *tutsi girl of Boston*, MA (22 April 2012) posted the following:

I am a Tutsi and I am light skinned, have very long straight hair down to my lower back, have thin lips, and a small nose. Some people say that Tutsi’s and Hutu’s are exactly the same but I don’t buy that crap. My grandparents say that there great-grandparents told them stories about moving from Ethiopia and Somali and that we belong to. I would also like to get feedback from the Ethiopian/ Somali community thanks.

In response *Wubet* (22 April 2012) rejected *tutsi girl’s* association to the HOA in the following way: “Tutsis are Bantus. Not any Ethiopian. Go and read a book. They have the same genes like their Bantu brothers. The only thing we share with them is we are both Africans PERIOD.” However, some of the participants’ (who claim to be from the HOA) depiction of this Bantu figure is racist. For example, *SeekTheTruth of Belfast* (15 September 2011) rejected the idea of the Tutsi in the following way:

haha, this is what I was afraid of. Bantu trying to distort or bathe in Hamitic history. Everything you’ve just said is totally and absolutely incorrect and erroneous. Tutsis have not got Somali DNA, they look nothing like us, and did not come from us ... You are nothing more than a worthless and inferior bantu always trying to other steal race's history, just piss off.

Ameena shared the same kind of racist sentiment when she responded to *ZamZam*. According to *Ameena of Derela, Ethiopia* (28 March 2012): “Why did you make a thread like this? Are you retarded? You are probably d*mb sharmuuto* and you don’t even know it, listen to me unintelligent sharmuto, Tutsi or whatever they call themselves, are bantu negroes, they have a wide flat noses with very big nostrils, large lips and kinky hair!!” Once again the figure of the Bantu is attributed with certain facial features. *Ameena* (28 March 2012) in another post, attacked *tutsi of Essex, MA* with this: “I don’t believe you because you guys look nothing like HOA, you are bantu gorilla,...please stop dragging us down with you!!” In the end the Bantu figure becomes the undesirable animal figure that Hutus and Tutsis are assigned to. This

depiction is largely a result of the colonial discourse that was used to determine who the
civilised migrant is and the backward autochthone.

Epistemological Questions

It seems the Tutsi Jewish hypothesis was constructed after the Rwandan genocide and it is fairly recent. If this is the case, where does this association with the Jews comes from? In an article in The Guardian, Josh Kron (08 February 2010), after a visit to Rwanda, wrote that “[i]n Rwanda, 'Jewish' has mysteriously ended up becoming shorthand for 'Tutsi'. “ Revisiting John Speke’s book The Discovery of the Source of the Nile shed some light on this. Speke argues that “judging from the physical appearance of the Wahuma [today regarded as the Bahima], that they can be of any other race than the semi-Shem-Hamitic of Ethiopia” (Speke, 1864, p. 241). Furthermore, for Speke, since the Emperor of Abyssinia, Sahela Selassie, traced his descent to King David of the Bible, and because the Bahima had similar physical appearances of the Abyssinians, there was reason enough to believe that the Bahima could have been the descendants of Ham. According to Speke (1864, pp. 241-242)

There a pastoral clan from the Asiatic side took the government of Abyssinia from its people and have ruled over them ever since, changing, by intermarriage with the Africans, the texture of their hair and colour to a certain extent, but still maintaining a high stamp of Asiatic feature, of which a market characteristic is a bridged instead of bridgeless nose.

He also argues that Gallas (regarded as today’s Oromo) were made of freeman and were of the same race of the Abyssinia. Speke believed that since the Gallas were pastoral people who looked like the Wahuma, they shared the same ancestry. For Speke the Gallas were the result of the expansion of the Abyssinian state that led to “[j]unior members of the royal family then, pushing their fortunes, dismembered themselves from the parent stock, created separate governments, and, for reasons which cannot be traced, changed their names” (Speke, 1864, p. 242). Speke was clearly speculating. Furthermore, “other Abyssinians” after several unsuccessful attempted conquests in Somalia and Omwita crossed “the Nile close to its source, discovered the rich pasture-lands of Unyoro, and founded the great kingdom of Kittara, where they lost their religion, forgot their language, extracted their lower incisors like the natives, changed their national name to Wahuma” (Speke, 1864, p. 242). Speke wrote that the Wahuma kings believed that they had European ancestry, or as Speke put it: they “once [have] been half white and half black, with hair on the white side straight, and on the black side frizzly” (Speke,
Ibid.). It was also believed “that Africa formerly belonged to Europeans, from whom it was taken by negroes with whom they had allied themselves, the Wahuma make themselves a small residue of the original European stock driven from the land — an idea which seems natural enough when we consider that the Wahuma are, in numbers, quite insignificant compared with the natives” (Speke, 1864, pp. 242-243). Therefore, based on the size of the Wahuma population, their traditional accounts of having European ancestry and their physical appearance led Speke to the conclusion that the Wahuma were descendants of Ham. However, I have to point out that in Speke’s account of the Wahuma, the Wahuma did not make any references to Abyssinia. It was something Speke attributed to the Wahuma. Finally, Speke believed that the Watusi (regarded as today’s Tutsi) was the breakaway from the Wahuma. According to Speke (1864, p. 244)

This is the most southerly kingdom of the Wahuma … we find the Watusi … How or when their name became changed from Wahuma to Watusi no one is able to explain; but, again deducing the past from the present, we cannot help suspecting that, in the same way as this change has taken place, the name Galla may have been changed from Hubshi, and Wahuma from Gallas.

With no clear evidence, Speke claims that the Watusi must have been related to the Wahuma, who in return was supposedly related to the Gallas. This argument of Speke was clearly based on the physical appearance of the Watusi and the Wahuma, and the selective traditional accounts by people close to the royal court. Speke’s hypothesis is similar to the current Tutsi Jew hypothesis.

Participants who argued in favour of a Tutsi migration and in favour of a Jewish Hypothesis used Speke’s work. These are also the members who based their argument on physical descriptions and traditions. Furthermore, this Hamitic account of Speke was also used to contextualise the Rwandan genocide by major news agencies in the aftermath of the genocide. Some participants copied and paste these in the forum as it was the unquestionable truth. For example, queen of Whangarei of New Zealand (21 April 2009) posted the following the forum.

Once, Hutus and Tutsis lived in harmony in Central Africa. About 600 years ago, Tutsis, a tall, warrior people, moved south from Ethiopia and invaded the homeland of the Hutus. Though much smaller in number, they conquered the Hutus, who agreed to raise crops for them in return for protection.
Even in the colonial era -- when Belgium ruled the area, after taking it from Germany in 1916 -- the two groups lived as one, speaking the same language, intermarrying, and obeying a nearly godlike Tutsi king.

With further inspection it became clear that this was an archival article from the Cable News Network (CNN) from 1996. It clearly follows Speke's argument of the civilising Hamitic race in Africa. This also enables Johnson to make his argument using cattle as the signifier of the Biblical Jew and to associate it with Jewishness in the present. The Hamitic hypothesis is, therefore, the basis upon which participants constructed the Tutsi Jewish hypothesis and it was based on the travel journal of John Speke.

Furthermore, the Kigali Genocide Memorial (KGM) could have also helped with the creation of the Tutsi Jew hypothesis. The memorial has three exhibitions. Exhibition 1 deals with the Rwandan 1994 genocide and on the website it is titled “The 1994 Genocide Against The Tutsi.” Exhibition 2 titled “Wasted Lives” is a genealogy of documented genocides across the world and Exhibition 3 titled “Children’s Room” is dedicated to the memory of children killed in the Genocide against the Tutsi. The KGM is a stark contrast from other memorial sites in Rwanda. According Sodaro (2011, p. 73) “the Kigali Memorial Centre … dramatically departs from other genocide memorials in Rwanda; the Kigali Centre was, after all, designed and built by a British organization, whose genesis and inspiration lie in the commemoration of the Holocaust.” As Sodaro points out the other memorial sites in Rwanda are much more akin to familiar burial sites and are places of mourning rather than sites of commemoration. These sites also serve as a warning against genocide (Sodaro, 2011, p. 73). However, the KGM is the effort of the Ministry of Culture to commemorate the genocide. After the Ministry’s visit to the Yad Vashem in Jerusalem and several Holocaust sites in Europe, the Ministry decided to build something similar to that of the Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre in the UK. The Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre is the work of James and Stephen Smith and “together with the Holocaust centre they founded the Aegis Trust” (Sodaro, 2011, p. 78). The KGM is, therefore, different because it was mainly curated and conceptualised by Aegis. This puts Exhibition 2 into context. The aim of Aegis is to prevent genocide and hence the genealogy of genocides in the KGM. The “Wasted Lives” exhibition places the Rwandan genocide alongside the Holocaust of the Jews. In the KGM genealogy of genocides includes the following cases of genocide: the Hereros in Namibia, the Armenian genocide, the Jewish holocaust, the

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Cambodian genocide and the genocide in the former Yugoslavia (Sodaro, 2011, p. 80). Noticeably, for me, is the absence of the Burundian ‘genocide’ of 1972. This might be because the way genocide is framed in the exhibition. It uses the definition of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948 (Sodaro, 2011, p. 80). In addition to this, Sodaro also indicates that in the “Genocide” exhibition there is a noticeable absence of blame along ethnic lines. The blame is attributed to the Interhamwe and some individuals (Sodaro, 201, p. 81). However, the KGM emphasizes that the Rwandan genocide was a “the Genocide against the Tutsi” (http://www.kgm.rw/). The consequences of this is the denial that the Hutu were too victims of the Rwandan genocide. At a much broader level there is a denial of a Hutu genocide. According to Lemarchand (1998, p. 6) “[r]emarkably few observers seem to realize that the first genocide to recorded in the annals of independent Africa occurred not in Rwanda but in Burundi …” This raises the question as to why would the KGM ignore the Burundian genocide in Exhibition 2. Is this to erase the 1972 genocide of Hutu by Tutsi from their collective memory (Lemarchand, 1998, p. 7)? I also notice the same trend in the online discussion forum. There was an over emphasis on the genocide in Rwanda but the genocide in Burundi was barely given attention to. For example, there were only five direct mentions of the 1972 “genocide” in Burundi, of which only the post by Drabbo got a response from another participant in the forum. Drabbo (18 January 2012) confronted Yeboyeboy with the Burundian “genocide” as follows:

As a Burundian you should speak more about the genocide of 1972 where 500,000 Hutu’s were slaughtered and the rest exiled into Tanzania. What implications does this have on your narrative – The Tutsi military were the perpetrators of that genocide – how does this link a Burundian Tutsi to the holocaust experience?228

Yeboyeboy (18 January 2012) disputed this and claimed that Burundian government at the time had

... no Tutsi real army in Burundi until 1984. Please ask the Belgians who were running the military business until 1972. How 3 "units" of 300 soldiers each armed with carabines (the Hutu represented 60% of the army in 1972) could kill 5,000,000 Hutus, in a country invaded by an army of 25,000 heavily armed mercenaries, who were killing every Tutsi around ????

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227 Herein after referred to as the 1948 UN Convention.

228 The estimated number people who died in Burundi in 1972 is between 80 000 and 200 000. Please see Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion on the genocide.
Yeboyeboy accused Drabbo of street propaganda when he referred to the finding of the UN investigation into the matter. In the forum it seemed as though the 1972 Burundian “genocide” did not take place and that it was a myth. This might be because of the complex nature to define the 1972 Burundian “genocide”, if it is contrasted with the Jewish Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide which is based on the definition of the 1948 UN Convention (Lemarchand, 2008, p. 10). It therefore seems that two things gave rise to the Tutsi Jew Hypothesis. The first is the Hamitic hypothesis and the second is the comparison of the Holocaust with the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

**Conclusion**

The discussion forum raised a number of pertinent issues regarding identity formation in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Participants, even the most well read, in the forum found it hard to escape the racial discourse that constructed various identities in the Great Lakes region. Given that the online discussion forum created an anonymous space where participants could express their subjectivity without any fear, it became clear that participants’ subjectivity is still largely informed by the racial, colonial discourse. The usage of categories such as Hamite, the Nilohamitic, and the Hamitic longhorn is an indication that identity formation in the Great Lakes region is still largely trapped in the Hamitic hypothesis. However, the post-genocide Rwandan government tried to move away from a classification that was based in the Hamitic hypothesis and banned classifications along ethnic lines in Rwanda. This, however, had an unintended consequence and that was the association of the Tutsi with the Israeli Jews. It birthed the Tutsi Jew hypothesis. This hypothesis used the Hamitic hypothesis to argue that the Tutsi are of Jewish descent. The consequence of this hypothesis is that it reincarnated the Hutu as Bantu and the Tutsi as Jew. Some participants indicated that the Tutsi and the Hutu identities are largely a result of the Hamitic hypothesis and they rejected the migration theory that gave rise to it, and pointed to the similarity of DNA. Others used the Hamitic hypothesis and pointed to the difference in phenotype to make their case for a migration into the Great Lakes region. One saw that the “Bantu migration theory” makes the Bantu figure the migrant and the Tutsi the autochthone, whilst the “Tutsi migration theory” makes the Tutsi the migrant and the Bantu figure the autochthone. It became clear that DNA became the new indicator of indigeneity. Here Neanderthal DNA is contributed to the Caucasian and those who were said to have these DNA glades were the migrants and also the civilizers. Identity formation is, therefore, trapped in the
epistemology that gave rise to the racialized and ethicised version of the postcolonial subject one encounters today. It is within this epistemology that people in the region navigates their subjectivity. It is this epistemology that produces a politics of belonging in the Great Lakes.
Chapter 9 – Conclusion

In response to the 1993 conflict in North Kivu three influential international organisations responded to the conflict. One of the first organisations to write about the conflict was Amnesty International (AI) and they assigned the conflict to ethnicity. Here it was the notion of “ethnic hatred” that caused an “ethnic conflict.” A year later the United Nations (UN) responded and they contributed the conflict to ethnicity and nationality, and three years after the conflict Human Rights Watch (HRW) responded by also labelling the conflict as an ethnic conflict. One also notices that alongside the ethnicity and nationality narratives a narrative around the lack of access to land is also developed.

This narrative, however, changed after the First and Second Congolese War, since it tended to focus on the illegal exploitation of Congolese minerals. For example, the UN in 2001 published a report which shows how a war economy was created to sustain the Second Congo War. Rwanda’s President was quoted as saying that it is a war paying for itself. It also showed how the regional elites benefitted from the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the DRC. After the UN report the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) became influential in the continuation of this narrative. I showed that the 2002 IPIS report made it seem as though various ethnic groups are fighting over the Coltan trade, but it was not the case. By 2008 one sees how the four popular narratives were presented in the 2008 report.

This leads one to the controversial 2012 UN Group of Experts report. In 2013 the Howard G. Buffett Foundation published a report in which they critiqued the methodology of the 2012 UN Group of Experts (GoE) report. The Buffet Foundation report found that the GoE, at times, presented too little evidence of Rwanda’s involvement in arming and supporting the M23, and that the report did not consider other local and national actors in the conflict. I found that the 2012 GoE report, in terms of the methodology, observed protocol. However, they were not critical of how they framed the conflict. The frame they used was to look for the link between M23 and Rwanda which they found. The M23 was depicted as Tutsi/Banyamulenge and they used the historical link between Rwanda and the M23 to demonstrate Rwanda’s involvement in the conflict. After they established the link Rwanda was painted as the protector Tutsi and as the exploiter of Congolese natural resources.

Taking this into account it is my argument that the dominant narrative attributes the conflict to ethnicity, nationality, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the lack of access to land;
and it is the frame through which international organisations such as the UN, HRW, AI and IPIS view the conflict. It is also the frame through which many scholars view the conflict and this frame reproduces the conflict in scholarly, in commissioned and non-commissioned work as I demonstrated in Chapter 7.

A closer inspection of this dominant narrative highlights that there is a debate about what is considered to be the roots of the ongoing conflict in Eastern DRC. Interlocutors on the one side of the debate it highlights how identities that were institutionalised during colonialism, are the root cause of the conflict; and the other side interlocutors highlight how the geopolitics that developed after the Rwandan genocide is the root cause of the conflict. Those in support of the rationale of Institutional practices investigate how identity formation perpetuated the conflict, whilst those in favour of the explanation grounded in geopolitics investigate the role neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda play in the ongoing conflict. Both sides of the debate touch on ethnicity, nationality, land and the illegal exploitation of Congo’s mineral resources. Therefore, this debate gave rise to the dominant narrative. Less superficially, this calls for a theoretical investigation into the relationship between the subject and his or her objects. If one looks at the debate beyond its surface, it translates into a debate about identity (subject) and resources (object).

I therefore set out to rethink the conflict in North and South Kivu. I highlighted two problems with regards to the current conceptualisation of the conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu. The first is a theoretical problem and here I indicated that the Banyarwanda and the Banyamulenge’s quest for belonging have been restricted to citizenship. Congolese Banyarwanda find them in a peculiar situation, at various times they had recognition from above but lacked the recognition from below and it is in this context that a politics of belonging developed. The second problem is around the history of the conflict. Here I identified that most scholarly works choose the 1993 conflict in North Kivu as a starting point but the start of the conflict can be traced back to an earlier date. It was in line with the two problems that I posed the following question: (1) Can the conflict in North and South Kivu in the DRC be considered as a politics of belonging between indigenous Congolese and Kinyarwanda speaking Congolese, and a contest for survival between Hutu and Tutsi elites? I further broke this question into two sub-questions: (a) Is there an interregional ethnic conflict in North and South Kivu between Hutu and Tutsi elites? (b) Is there a conflict between Rwandophone Congolese and indigenous Congolese with regards to belonging in North and South Kivu? Below are the conclusions with regards to these questions.
Regarding the theoretical problem the aim was to place African colonial subject formation within a larger historical moment and there were three moments that influenced colonial subject formation in Africa. Here the starting point was the Las Casas - Sepúlveda Controversy which tried to determine whether waging war against Native Americans in South America was just. The debate set in motion various scholarly endeavours to solve the debate. Thus, by the time of the African chapter of colonialism, conquest was legitimized as just when it protects (i) the freedom of trade, (ii) the freedom to evangelize, and (iii) the innocent against barbarism generated. The second moment was regarding the legitimacy of English colonial occupation in conquest territories in America. Essential here was Locke’s *Two Treaties*. Political organisation became the prime example of civilization and since Native American political society was viewed through Locke’s *Two Treaties* Native American’s did not have right to all lands but only those ones they cultivated and used. This brings one to the third moment which was the African chapter of colonialism. Here one sees how the first and the second moment informed colonialism in Africa. Conquest was regarded as just because it was framed as an endeavour to ‘civilise’ the African and the Lockean notion of property was applied to establish European settlement on African lands. Needless to say this process was extremely violent and it was in this violence that the African colonial subject was formed.

Two types of colonial subjects appear during colonialism in the Great Lakes. On the one hand there was the *evolué* or civilised African who was formed in civil law in the colonies; and on the other hand was the ‘traditional’ African who was formed in customary law. Civil law gave rise to race and customary law to ethnicity. Colonialism thus created two types of colonial subjects through two different types of law. This subject formation was the working of power and the form of power was subjection. As indicated previously subjection leads to resistance and given the discursive nature of this power, the resistance at first was discursive. Negritude, therefore, must be read as one of the first instances of this resistance. Later during the struggle for decolonisation this resistance was a violence returned by the native. This violence allowed colonial subjects to take control of the state but failed to transform the discursive apparatuses which produced colonial subjects. Those who were in control of the discursive apparatuses of the state produced a post-colonial subject in the same epistemology that the colonial subject was formed. The consequences of this were that there is almost no difference between the colonial subject and the postcolonial subject. The postcolonial subject is formed in the same complex power relations of the colonial period. The decolonial project might have “decolonised” the representation of the state but it did not “decolonize” the knowledge in which these
formations took place and hence the continuity. Furthermore, the post-colonial state reproduces the violence of the colonial period; thus allowing a further continuity.

Regarding a politics of belonging my aim was to show that one of the conflicts in North and South Kivu is a politics of belonging. The politics of belonging is a discourse that explains conflicts that revolves around identity. In Francophone countries this discourse was introduced as autochthony and in Anglophone countries as indigeneity. In both Anglophone and Francophone countries discourses around autochthony and indigeneity was to distinguish the ‘backward autochthonous’ groups from the more “civilised migrant” groups. The Hamitic hypothesis helped to mark groups that were more “civilised”. Colonialism used the Hamitic hypothesis as the basis for the classification of “native” and “non-native” in Africa. This in turn translated into those destined to rule and those destined to be the subjects of rule, which in post-colonial Africa was further translated into autochthony or indigeneity. The supposedly “civilised” migrant groups, who were the intermediate rulers for colonial powers, were branded as foreigner and those who were branded native were considered to be the true autochthonous and could lay claim to “first comer’s right”.

It was with this in mind that identity and belonging was investigated. I have argued that identity is a result of subjection, and that therefore identities must be analysed within the context of power. Various political identities such as race, ethnicity and citizenship are formed within the legal framework of the state. The result is that one is subjected to various identities; hence, one’s identity becomes ‘fluid’ or multidimensional. It is within this multidimensional nature of one’s identity that one develops a sense of belonging. I argued that belonging has a number of ‘features.’ These ‘features’ are (1) connecting the self to the social, (2) the self is constructed in relation to others or simply self-identification, (3) subjection and subjectification, (4) time and space, (5) boundaries and borders and (6) safety and familiarity.

With this in mind I investigated the conflict in North and South Kivu. Firstly, I found that there are two levels of ‘foreignness’ in North and South Kivu. At the first level it is nationality. I found that the Banyarwanda and Barundi identities must be rather perceived as a reference to particular nationalities. Banyarwanda must be seen as reference to Rwandan nationality and Barundi to Burundian nationality. Here the Barundi and Banyarwanda identities evoke a politics of belonging. Thus, at a second level it is ethnicity that evokes a politics of belonging. Here, one

229 See Chapter 3 and Chapter 6.
picks up traces of the “Bantu” versus “Nilotic”, narrative of the Hamitic hypothesis. This description fuels the notion that the Tutsi are not from the Great Lakes region and that they were migrants of somewhere else. Secondly, I found that a politics of belonging highlights the complex power relationships that shape the postcolonial subject’s identity. The postcolonial subject’s identity is a result of being subjected to various political identities such as race, ethnicity and citizenship. The postcolonial’s identity becomes fluid and thus multidimensional. To find a sense of belonging in these identities borders and boundaries have to be constructed. The power may have used violence to draw and to keep the borders and boundaries of identities intact. However, an opposing power may also break the boundary and border lines through violence. To a certain extent this explains the violence in the Kivus, which is used to constantly defend or re-imagine borders between identities. Thirdly, I found that there is a relationship between a politics of belonging and scarcity. This is what gave rise to a narrative related to land. If one considers that land is accessed via ethnicity in most parts of Kivu, it illuminates a key reason for a politics of belonging. The idea of scarcity may be a result of how it was thought and institutionalised in European epistemology. In relation to this the Lockean sense of property might be fundamental in the construction of scarcity, as it raises a question regarding the relationship of the subject and his/her objects – a relationship which is essential to forming a sense of belonging. Once the object is threatened it disrupts the subject’s sense of belonging and a politics of belonging will follow. Finally, central to the discourse is interpellation, which uses ‘markers’ to re-enforce boundaries between identities. Markers are used by different powers (customary/local and state) to exclude and include. Two important markers in the case of the Kivus are language and morphology. Language became the marker of determining the border that distinguishes between who is Congolese and who is not. Refugees thus classify or categorise themselves according to Barundi and Banyarwanda to distinguish themselves from Congolese and they further classify themselves along ethnic lines.

Regarding regional conflict between Hutu and Tutsi elites, one sees that in 1990s the Kivus became the location of an interregional ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi and the failing Congolese state provided the perfect conditions for it. There are mainly five events that contributed to this conflict. The first was the 1959 Social Revolution in Rwanda which resulted in Tutsis fleeing Rwanda and establishing themselves in neighbouring countries. The second event was the 1972 genocide in Burundi which led to Hutus fleeing Burundi into neighbouring countries. The third was Rwandan Patriot Front’s (RPF) invasion of Rwanda in 1991 which saw Congolese Tutsis, especially the youth, joining the RPF in their cause to reclaim power in
Rwanda – which they did in 1994. The invasion led to another wave of refugees and once again it was mainly Hutus fleeing Rwanda. The fourth event was the assassination of the Burundian Hutu President in 1993 which led to the massacre of Hutus which led to another wave of refugees into Rwanda and the Kivus. This aggravated the tension between Hutus and Tutsis everywhere, which eventually led to the final and most devastating event of them all – the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This led to a refugee crisis and hundreds of thousands of Rwandans cross the border into the Kivus. The cross border movement of refugees into the Kivus was made possible by a weakening Mobutu state which was unable to control the borders and the security forces.

The consequence of this is twofold. The first was the polarisation of the Banyarwanda in North and South Kivu into Hutu and Tusti. At first the struggle of the Banyarwanda in the Kivus was a collective struggle for belonging, but as the situation in Burundi and Rwanda deteriorated between the Hutu and Tutsi, it also negatively impacted the relationship between those considered to be Hutu and Tutsi in the Kivus. This was further perpetuated by the influx of refugees from both Rwanda and Burundi. This influx of refugees not only aggravated the tensions between Banyarwanda of Hutu and Tutsi origin, but is also aggravated tension between autochthones and Banyarwanda/Banyamulenge. What one has to keep in mind is that there has been a struggle for belonging between the Banyarwanda of North and South Kivu and 'autochthonous' Congolese since colonial times. Hence, when Tutsi refugees in 1959 and Hutu refugees in 1972 arrived in the Kivus the Banyarwanda of South Kivu decided to make a distinction between themselves and the refugees and called themselves Banyamulenge which referred to the place where they historically settled at which was near the village of Mulenge. However, the sad reality was that the Banyarwanda of South Kivu was mainly Tutsi and when they decided to make a distinction between themselves and the refugees, it also split them according the historically ethnic identities which were Hutu and Tutsi. The Banyamulenge in the South became Tutsi. This polarisation amongst the Banyarwanda in the Kivus was a result of a regional conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi which is now reincarnated as a Bantu versus Jew narrative. This Bantu versus Jew narrative is a reincarnation of the Hutu versus Tutsi dialect, and it was done on the back of the Hamitic Hypothesis; thus the same epistemology that gave rise to the Hutu versus Tutsi dialectic. This happened despite the Rwandan government’s best efforts to ban ethnic classification in Rwanda. However, the notion of Bantu versus Jew is not restricted to Rwanda. This hypothesis is still widely accepted and debated in the region, including the Eastern parts of the DRC. This is an indication that the epistemology that gave rise
to the 1972 and 1994 genocides is still a part of everyday lives of the people in the Great Lakes region. The Bantu versus Jew narrative fuels the notion that the Tutsi is not from the Great Lakes region and that they were the migrants – that they are not autochthonous. It also fuels the notion that Hutu is the Bantu figure and is not from the region either, and not autochthonous either; that they were the migrants. Therefore, whoever is in control of the state is in control of the autochthony narrative.

The second consequence was the militarisation of ethnic groups. Since the Mobutu state was unable to control state borders and to provide adequate security, it created a situation where ethnic groups started to arm themselves for protection. Autochthones saw the growing numbers of Hutu and Tutsi as a threat to their existence and hence the movement by the ‘autochthonous’ to get rid of all Hutu and Tutsi in the Kivus. Even though the fading Mobutu state forces were able to stop the 1993 violence, the peace was short lived because of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The RPF’s victory resulted in the fleeing of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), along with the Interhamwe from Rwanda into the Kivus. In this regard, one must see the creation of the AFDL, the First Congo War in 1996, the creation of the RCD and the Second Congo War as a result of a regional conflict between Hutu and Tutsi elites.

Henceforth, one cannot look past the diasporic nature of Tutsi Power.\textsuperscript{230} This diasporic nature of their power, and the reincarnation of the Hutu versus Tutsi dialectic into Bantu versus Jew narrative, has earned them the title “the Jews of Africa.” The Congolese government and the Ugandan government at one point had Tutsi leaders in their most senior positions. Mamdani (2001) in \textit{When Victims Become Killers}, extensively deals with Tutsi Power and the rise of Hutu Power. Thus, essential to understanding the interregional ethnic conflict in the Kivus is to understand Hutu Power and Tutsi Power. According to Mamdani (2001, pp. 269-270) “... Hutu Power needs to be understood as a contradictory possibility. An outcome of struggle in the world of the rat and the cat, it had not only the potential of liberating the rat form the terror of the cat, but also of locking the rat forever in a world driven by fear of the cat.” In Mamdani’s analogy the cat can be seen as Tutsi Power and the rat as Hutu Power. Thus, one needs to see the genocide as an outcome of defeat in the civil war which must be seen as political violence, an outcome of a power struggle between Hutu and Tutsi elites (Mamdani, 2001, p. 268).

\textsuperscript{230} Tutsi Power in the Mamdanian sense.
Taking Mamdani’s argument into consideration, it is important to extend the geographical scope of the power struggle between Hutu and Tutsi elites, essentially because of two reasons: Firstly, Tutsi Power triumphed over Hutu Power in Rwanda in 1994 which led to the formation of the Hutu led ALiR which was mainly operational from the Eastern DRC. The ALiR was formed in 1996 by ex-FAR and the Interahamwe. The aim of the ALiR was to restore Hutu Power after they lost control of the Rwandan state (here the state is the structure needed to institute and operationalise an ideological project) to the RPF in 1994, which symbolizes the return of Tutsi Power. The ALiR in 2000 was absorbed into the FDLR which has since then been operational in Eastern DRC.

Secondly, the Tutsi Power (now in control of the Rwandan state) resorted to proxies to counter and squash Hutu power in the DRC. Most notable of these proxies is Laurent Kabila’s AFDL in 1996 which is also regarded as the First Congo War. Since 2006 there has been a trend with regards to the violence in the DRC. Violence starts and intensifies closer to elections. For example, with the 2006 elections one sees the formation of the CNDP, with the 2011 elections one saw the formation of the M23 in 2012 and since 2016 violence has broken out in response to President Kabila’s decision to run for a third term.

Furthermore, the formation of the CNDP was in response to the August 2006 elections. CNDP started a month earlier, on 26 July 2006. They established a state structure in the Masisi area, provided security and collected taxes from the population. They also had a political programme in which ideological rhetoric was sold to the population. However, they did dismally with the 2006 elections and in the process lost a lot of political power they once had in the transitional government. Ethnicity played a role in the formation of the CNDP but it was rather top down. The CNDP did not have as much support as the RCD had. If one looks at the leadership structure of the CNDP one observes that 80 percent of the top leadership was Tutsi. However, the local Tutsi population hardly supported the CNDP. Rather the majority of the support came from local businessman, and the Rwandan government. The Banyamulenge in particular did not lend much support to the CNDP and was sceptical of the role Rwanda played in the CNDP and the conflicts that followed. One fact that one do not find in many reports is the number of Congolese Tutsis in Rwanda who are living in refugee camps, and also the intra-Congolese Tutsi and Banyamulenge divisions. This, thus questions Rwanda’s role in the conflict. Do they play a role in protecting the Congolese Tutsi, the Banyamulenge and Burundian Tutsi? The answer is yes. But if one considers that there also Congolese-Tutsis living in refugee camps in Rwanda it raises a question “why”? The answer one finds is in the history of the formation of the
RPF. One of the recruiting grounds for the RPF was in the Congo amongst the Tutsi diaspora and the Banyamulenge. They even had local branches and offices in the Kivus. When they came into power in 1994 this relationship did not stop. Businessmen linked to the RPF have strong business interests in the Congo, and thus the Eastern part of the Congo is seen as part of their area of influence. Furthermore, Rwanda still see the FDLR as a threat, even though the FDLR is too weak to launch a significant attack on Rwanda, however, they remain an important symbol of the 1994 genocide and thus are regarded as the state’s number one enemy.

Moreover, since the genocide Rwanda has supported various groups that would help with the fight against the FDLR. Some of the groups they supported were Congolese and some were Congolese-Tutsi. Hence, if one takes this into account, it highlights another point that is often missed and clouded by the ethnic and economic narrative. Rwanda will get involved in any conflict that threatens its security, a sentiment that is most crisply articulated by the following Swahili expression: "Ulinzi inifanyiwa ya lupango" (To defend a house, you have to stand outside). Given this, Rwanda’s involvement in some cases is elite driven for various political and economic reasons and other times it is to protect the status quo of the current Rwandan elite. The FDLR reminds Tutsi Power they are the minority who controls the majority; a majority that once wanted to exterminate them. This idea of the ‘Other’ was largely a result of the epistemology that gave birth to the Hamitic hypothesis. This epistemology that birthed the ‘Other’ still has not changed and it is clear from my research that it is progressing towards a universalism; where, in the context of the Great Lakes region, the Tutsi is Jew and any other Group is Bantu.

Therefore, the conflict in North and South Kivu is a politics of belonging between indigenous Congolese and Kinyarwanda speaking Congolese. It is also a regional contest for survival between Hutu and Tutsi elites. Moreover, until the epistemological issues around belonging are not resolved this politics will continue. To resolve this conflict, one has to look at the continuous ways in which the colonial epistemology continues to define postcolonial subjectivity, and how sites of power reproduces colonial subjectivity in the postcolonial, and how this in turn is institutionalised as ‘postcolonial.’ For example, in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, the Rwandan government banned the colonial subject categories of Hutu, Twa and Tutsi. Everyone in Rwanda is now considered to be Rwandan and not Twa, Tutsi or Hutu. The attempt was to create a Rwandan identity and it was to stop the reproduction of the violence that plagued

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231 The translation is found in (Stearns, 2012b, p. 56).
postcolonial Rwanda. However, in other parts of the region and the world the colonial epistemology that produced the violence was and is still in operation, and it returned as the Bantu versus the Jew narrative in Rwanda. I would, like Gayatri Spivak, propose that the only way out of this conflict is a ‘remaking’ of history. The remaking of history entails nursing the present, and to nurse the present “is a persistent critique, unglamorously chipping away at the binary oppositions and continuities that emerge continuously in the supposed account of the real” (Spivak, 2012, p. 72). It will not be an easy process, but it can be done.
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Appendices

Appendix 1

Events of Political Violence in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Type of conflict</th>
<th>Countries Involved</th>
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<td>1959</td>
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<td>North Kivu Conflict</td>
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<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Assassination of Hutu Prime Minister</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>“Selective” Genocide in Burundi</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1988 Massacres</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Burundi post electoral violence</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>North Kivu conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Rwandan Genocide</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>First Congo War</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>Formation of CNDP</td>
<td>Regional</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>Formation of M23</td>
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<td>2015</td>
<td>Burundi constitutional crisis</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>DRC constitutional crisis</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Political Violence in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC
CONSENT FORM

Title of Research Project: The Politics of Belonging and a Contest for Survival: Rethinking the Conflict in North and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The study has been described to me in language that I understand and I freely and voluntarily agree to participate. My questions about the study have been answered.

I understand that my identity will not be disclosed and that I may withdraw from the study, without giving a reason at any time and this will not negatively affect me in any way.

Participant's name: ..................................................
Participant's signature: ..........................................
Date: ..................................................

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Questionnaire

1. Age: ________
2. Gender: _______
3. Ethnicity: __________
4. How does or did the conflict affect you?

5. Who do you think is responsible for the conflict and why would you say that?

6. What does autochthony mean to you?
7. Do you consider any of the Kinyarwanda speaking groups in the DRC as autochthonous? Why would you say that?

8. Do you think any of these Kinyarwanda speaking groups consider themselves as autochthonous? Why would you say that?

9. Is it possible to tell the difference between the Banyaruchuru/Banyamasisi/Banyamulenge and the Banyarwanda/Barundi refugees? If so, how are you able to tell the difference?

10. Who do the Banyarwanda and Barundi refugees prefer to integrate with? Do they prefer Congolese citizens or do they prefer other Kinyarwanda speaking groups in the Kivus? Please explain.
Fanon saw the pitfalls of a particular type of national consciousness and national culture in the early postcolonial state. Fanon explained and foresee the challenges that this type of national consciousness and national culture will bring about in the postcolonial state. In *Wretched of the Earth* one notices that Fanon is sceptical about the national consciousness that is preached by the national bourgeoisie. (See Nzongola-Ntalaja’s chapter in *Proletarianization and Class Struggle in Africa* titled ‘Class Struggle and National Liberation in Zaire’ on the Congolese colonial and postcolonial society.) Fanon saw that nationalism was not necessarily done in the interest of the masses, but in the interest of the national bourgeoisie. This is what Nzongola-Ntalaja (1983) also found. Fanon notice in the aftermath of the independence movement that the national bourgeoisie called for the nationalisation of the postcolonial economy, mines and land. According to Fanon (2001, 119-120) “[t]he national middle class which takes over power at the end of the colonial regime is an under-developed middle class. It has practically no economic power, and in any case it is in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country which it hopes to replace.” The postcolonial middle class did not match the size and the degree of the middle class of the colonial power. Secondly, the postcolonial middle-class was under-developed and therefore did not have economic power to compete with the European middle class. This is the inherent condition Fanon saw in the postcolonial state. Hence, Fanon continues to point out that national middle class is still trapped in its intermediary role, because it was “not engaged in production, nor invention, nor building, nor labour” (Fanon, 2001, p. 120).

The national party on the other hand, appears to focuses on the ‘national,’ and it seems as it does not serve the interest of a particular interest group. The national party were “completely ignorant of the economy of their own country” and that the “economy has always developed outside the limits of their knowledge. They have nothing more than an approximate, bookish acquaintance with the actual and potential resources of their country’s soil and mineral deposits; and therefore they can only speak of these resources on a general and abstract plane” (Fanon, 2001, p. 121). The focus was still to fulfil an intermediary role rather than becoming the ‘captains of the industry’. Hence, “[l]ong speeches will be made about the artisan class” (Fanon, 2001, p. 121). The independent country therefore became the producers of raw materials for Europe.

Since both the party and the economy were controlled by the middle class, who in return was controlled by the Western bourgeoisie, Fanon was not convinced that the speeches were a result of a national consciousness. According to Fanon (2001, p. 122) “[t]o them, nationalization quite simply means the
transfer into native hands of those unfair advantages which are a legacy of the colonial period.” Fanon noticed an unfair exchange between the national bourgeoisie and the Western business class, when the economy was ‘handed over’ to the ‘natives’. This gave rise to the black elite which Fanon calls the national bourgeoisie. “See through its eyes, its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; its consists, prosaically, of being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant through camouflaged, which today put on the masque of neo-colonialism. The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie’s business agent, and it will play its part without any complexes in a most dignified manner” (Fanon, 2001, p. 122). Speeches on nationalisation were therefore not in the interest of the nation but in the interest of the national elite and the European business class. Nationalisation was masked as if it was interest of the nation and the masses, and it was tied to the ‘consciousness of the nation’.

Once nationalisation was achieved Fanon saw that national bourgeoisie started to act like the oppressor. According to Fanon (2001, p. 123) “[i]n its beginnings, the national bourgeoisie of the colonial countries identifies itself with the decadence of the bourgeoisie of the West.” Decadence is the moral or cultural decline as characterized by excessive indulgence in pleasure and luxury. The national bourgeoisie or the black elite was supported in this moral and cultural decline by the Western bourgeoisie. Fanon noticed in the postcolonial state that the exploitation of the working class continued in similar fashion as during colonialism. Settler owned farms were transferred to the political elite and “[u]sing two or three slogans, these colonists will demand an enormous amount of work from the agricultural labourers, in the name of the national effort of course” and this elite/national bourgeoisie with the land and the resources do not want to take risk or initiative and “gradually slips more and more into the lines laid down by colonialism” (Fanon, 2001, p. 124). Military power will be used to stay in power once they lost the support of the masses. Fanon also points out that “[i]n these poor, under-developed countries, where the rule is that the greatest wealth is surrounded by the greatest poverty, the army and the police constitute the pillars of the regime” (Fanon, 2001, p. 138). The new regime will institute a new form of colonial rule through the support of foreign armies. The profits will be exported to foreign countries into foreign banks and it will not be invested in the home country (Fanon, 2001, p. 139).

At some point, the masses will mirror the behaviour of the national bourgeoisie since a particular idea of the nation was formed and the result is a politics of belonging. According to Fanon (2001, p. 125) “[w]e have said that the native bourgeoisie which comes to power uses its class aggressiveness to corner the
positions formerly kept for foreigners.” Fanon observed that the working class follow the same sentiment. According to Fanon (2001, p. 125) “[t]he working class of the towns, the masses on unemployed, the small artisans and craftsmen for their part line up behind this nationalist attitude; but in all justice let it be said, they only follow in the steps of their bourgeoisie. If the national bourgeoisie goes into competition with the Europeans, the artisans and craftsmen start a fight against non-national Africans.” Nationalisation in the postcolonial state brought about a European foreigner and an African foreigner. The African foreigner was subjected to a politics of belonging.

For Fanon anti-African sentiments were rooted in a particular kind of nationalism, which in turn is rooted in the idea of who constitute the nation. The nation is formed by a selfish desire to acquire certain resources and on the notion of exclusion. It becomes a zero sum game. According to Fanon (2001, p. 126) “[w]hen the bourgeoisie’s demands for a ruling class made up exclusively of Negroes or Arabs do not spring from an authentic movement of nationalization but merely correspond to an anxiety to place in the bourgeoisie’s hands the power held hitherto by the foreigner, the masses on their level present the same demands, confining, however, the notion of Negro and Arab within certain territorial limits.” This clearly indicates the failure of national conscious during the early independence period and it is like Fanon said in the opening of the chapter “National consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilization of the people, will be in any case only and empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been” (Fanon, 2001, p.119). Fanon’s notion of nationalism (the all-embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people) never came into existence.