Government, Big Capital and The People(s): A fishy tale of power, influence and development in Hout Bay Harbour

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DECLARATION

I, Kiara Worth, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

The achievement of sustainable development requires the balanced interaction between three components: the economy, environment, and society. Finding this balance in practice requires a critical examination of the beliefs, systems, and institutions that govern decision-making. Achieving sustainable development in reality thus involves understanding the existing forms of power in a particular time and place – what they are, how they operate, and how they influence decisions for development.

This study is an analysis of power in a specific case study: the Hout Bay harbour in Cape Town, South Africa. Economic activities were driven by the fishing industry, in particular Oceana, who operated and maintained a fishmeal factory in the harbour since 1958. While the factory provided employment for the local coloured residents of Hangberg, it also produced noxious odours and air pollution, leading to significant discontent from other sectors of Hout Bay. A local and largely white activist group, Fresh Air for Hout Bay (FAHB), challenged these operations on the basis of sustainability and this became a highly contested issue. After years of debate and tension, the factory would eventually close in 2019, marking the end of an era for the fishing industry in Hout Bay.

The purpose of this study is to analyse the power dynamics in Hout Bay and determine how these influenced the decisions around the factory. To do this, a qualitative autoethnographic study was conducted using semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and documentary review.

The power analysis found that those in power, particularly the City of Cape Town and Oceana, maintained the status quo by shoring up economic dependency, depoliticising the issue through formal institutions and processes, and normalising the situation to ensure broad support for their rule. When the status quo was challenged, Oceana politicised the issue, placing responsibility on FAHB and triggering long-standing fears of marginalisation and on-going white domination from Hangberg. In this way, those in power divided in order to rule, defending a long-standing national state-business coalition with interests in fishing.

In addition, the study reveals how the City moved from avoidance to manipulation, deliberately withholding pertinent health information to pursue their development objectives. It further demonstrates how spaces for civic engagement were either limited or ineffective, and how democratic processes were manipulated by those in power, constraining civil society action. While FAHB used their privilege-based resources in the public realm to overcome some constraints, Hangberg was less able to do so other than by taking to the streets in protest. In this way, the fears of marginalisation, exclusion, and gentrification expressed by Hangberg were largely substantiated.

These power dynamics profoundly impacted development of the harbour, which currently remains in a stalemate. In conclusion, the study highlights that understanding power is critical for decision-making and failure to deal with the complexities of power can lead to missed opportunities to realise sustainable development.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AEL	Atmospheric Emissions Licence
ANC	African National Congress
APPA	Air Pollution and Prevention Act
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DA	Democratic Alliance
DAFF	Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
DPW	Department of Public Works
EAP	Environmental Assessment Practitioner
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
FAHB	Fresh Air for Hout Bay
FAWU	Food and Agricultural Workers Union
HBCA	Hout Bay Civic Association
HBO	Hout Bay Organised
HBP	Hout Bay Partnership
HBRRA	Hout Bay Residents and Ratepayers
HHC	Hangberg Harbour Community
IAP	Interested and Affected Parties
MAYCO	Mayoral Committee
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEC	Minister of the Executive Committee
NEMA	National Environmental Management Act
NEMAQA	National Environmental Management Air Quality Act
NUA	New Urban Agenda
PAIA	Public Access to Information Act
PBPS	Pieter Badenhorst Professional Services
PMF	Peace and Mediation Forum
SACP	South African Communist Party
SANCO	South African National Civic Organisation
SANParks	South African National Parks
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
WHO	World Health Organisation

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The world today is at a turning point.

Against a global backdrop of political instability, environmental crises, global health pandemics, increasing disparities between the wealthy and the poor, and rising socio-economic vulnerability and inequalities, the world is in urgent need of positive and sustainable change. The trajectory of our future in large part depends on our understanding and implementation of a sustainable development agenda, one that meets our current needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Brundtland Commission, 1987).

But how equipped are we to actualise such change?

While the need for sustainable development has been understood at a global level, seen most concisely through the creation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the realisation of these goals depends largely on implementation at a local level. As former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said, 'Our struggle for global sustainability will be won or lost in the cities' (United Nations, 2012). Local and regional governments are essential for promoting integrated and inclusive development, but political frameworks still have a long way to go in recognising this.

South Africa has articulated its commitment to the SDGs through their Strategic Framework for Sustainable Development (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 2008) and their National Development Plan 2030 (National Planning Commission, 2010) where they have proposed a national vision, principles, trends, strategic priority areas, and a set of implementation measures that are intended to enable and guide the development of the national strategy and action plan for sustainability. Despite the existence of these plans, much remains to be achieved. South Africa is considered to be one of the most unequal societies in the world, where the top 10% own 71% of net wealth (World Bank, 2019), and much of this inequality is still divided along racial lines. The challenge of implementing these frameworks to a large extent lies with governance – while global and national frameworks are essential, the decisions taken to achieve sustainable development lie at the city level, and these decisions are in turn determined by the dynamics of power.

It is this dynamic that is at the heart of this research.

1.1. Research Aims and Objectives

This study is an analysis of power and development in a specific case study: the Hout Bay harbour in Cape Town, South Africa. Located along the Atlantic seaboard of the Cape Peninsula, Hout Bay is classified as a suburb but demographically resembles more of a small town, with three major racialized groups living side by side: white, black, and coloured. Often described as a unique microcosm of South Africa, Hout Bay epitomises many of the complexities of the apartheid city (Gawith, 1996). This complexity has influenced Hout Bay's development, much of which is the focus of this research.

Economic activities in Hout Bay were historically driven by the fishing industry and a key player was Oceana, who operated and maintained a fishmeal factory in the harbour since 1958. While the factory provided employment for the local coloured residents of Hangberg, it also produced noxious odour emissions and air pollution, leading to significant discontent from other sectors of Hout Bay. A local and largely white activist group, Fresh Air for Hout Bay (FAHB), challenged these operations on the basis of sustainability and this became a highly contested issue. After years of debate and tension, the factory would eventually close in 2019, marking the end of an era for the fishing industry in Hout Bay.

The tale of the fishmeal factory is complex and one that is essentially driven by power. Not only does it involve a range of different actors and stakeholders, from local residents to government institutions to big business, it also involves a range of socio-economic complexities, with issues of economic dependencies, health and well-being, and identity and social cohesion. These range of factors, and the power dynamics that surrounded them, influenced the development of Hout Bay as whole, and it is this dynamic that will be at the core of this research.

The aim of this study is to demonstrate that understanding power dynamics at a local level is essential to the pursuit of sustainable development. This research will use the specific case study of the fishmeal factory in Hout Bay to explore how power dynamics influenced the pursuit of social sustainability, and in turn, the broader achievement of sustainable development.

Significant research has been done to discuss both how power dynamics influence the development process, and the concept of sustainable development itself and as a result, there is broad understanding of what sustainability means. The challenge, however, is to understand what sustainable development should look like in practice and there is a need to investigate this further, within context-specific examples that examine the complexities associated with achieving sustainable development.

That is precisely what this research intends to do. This research offers an intensive, detailed examination of the power dynamics present within Hout Bay and discusses how these dynamics influenced the development process within the harbour, focusing primarily on the social sustainability aspect of sustainable development. Recognising that aspects of sustainability can be understood in different ways depending on the context in which they

are being considered, this research offers context-dependent details within a specific case study in an urban setting and by doing so, greater insight can be gained as how to effectively improve the implementation of social sustainability efforts, and the achievement of sustainable development as a whole. It is understood by development theorists, including Gaventa (1980), Hunjan and Pettit (2011), and VeneKlasen and Miller (2007), that any meaningful discussion of developmental issues must reflect on the multiple dimensions of power at work. Development practitioners increasingly recognise the importance of analysing power because the potential for eliciting change with formal institutions and structures alone is sharply limited (Bradley, 2005; Miller *et al.*, 2006). For this reason, focus has been placed on conducting a power analysis.

To conduct this research, a central research question was posed: where does the power lie to influence decision-making about development?

This essentially involved a power analysis to be conducted for the fishmeal factory case study and a number of key questions were interrogated:

- Who were the actors involved?
- What mechanisms of power did each actor use and to what end?
- What were the dynamics and relationships of power between the actors?
- How did these dynamics influence the decision-making process, and how did these processes impact the achievement of social sustainability?

To begin this research, it is first essential to have a solid understanding of the concept of sustainable development and the following section will provide an overview of this.

1.2. Understanding Sustainable Development

The concept of sustainable development is not new. After decades of development focused predominantly on economic growth (Rostow, 1960; Todaro, 1992), in 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development presented a new paradigm to the development world. Seeking to address the conflict between the environment and development goals, their report 'Our Common Future' formulated a definition of *sustainable* development: development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Brundtland Commission, 1987). Using this as a basis for the concept of sustainability, it was purported that sustainable development was found at the cross-section of the economy, the environment, and society (United Nations, 1992), which has since become a leading paradigm for development thinking. These three concepts can be understood as:

- **Economic:** An economically sustainable system should have the ability to produce goods and services on a continuing basis, while maintaining manageable levels of government and external debt, and avoiding extreme sectoral imbalances.

- **Environmental:** An environmentally sustainable system should maintain a stable resource base, avoiding exploitation of resource systems and the depletion of non-renewable resources. This includes maintenance of biodiversity, atmospheric stability and other ecosystem functions not classically associated with economic resources.
- **Social:** A socially sustainable system must achieve distribution equity, provision of social services, political accountability, and participation (Holmberg, 1992; Harris, 2000).

The relatively simple definition of sustainable development becomes extraordinarily complicated once it is unpacked. The goals expressed are multidimensional, requiring a balancing act of many objectives, and determining success or failure in achieving these objectives remains challenging. The issues are also interrelated and there is a constant negotiation in determining which goal should take precedence: if the provision of adequate food and water supply requires land-use change and potential biodiversity loss, is the social or environmental objective more important? In reality, only one goal can be maximised at any given time (Norgaard, 1994; Harris, 2000). Despite this challenge, focusing on these three principles does satisfy a common-sense logic and it does offer an easily grasped concept with wide applicability. The goals of sustainable development require the insight of multiple disciplines and it is important to explore each of these perspectives – before they can be balanced, they must be understood, including what each aims to achieve.

It is also important to understand that these disciplines are not static and instead represent their own complex series of systems. Recognising that human society is part of a system that it depends on for support, the whole cannot function properly, nor is it viable and sustainable if individual component systems cannot function properly. In this way, 'sustainable development is possible only if component systems as well as the total system are viable' (Bossell, 1999:2). To this end, it is necessary to identify the essential component systems and each of these perspectives will briefly be explored.

1.2.1. The Economic Perspective

The current economic theory leading development is heavily reliant on the notion of mass consumption: it is assumed that increasing economic activity will automatically lead to development and higher incomes is synonymous with better choices, richer lives and an improved quality of life for all (Harris, 2000). It is also assumed that growth will continue indefinitely and that economic advancement will provide prosperity (Jackson, 2009) but history has shown that this is not the case. Economic growth has indeed delivered benefits and there has been an overall decline in poverty rates as well as an increase in the provision of basic services, but at best, these achievements have been unequal and at great cost to the environment. Economic activity has been at odds with our scientific knowledge of finite resources and the fragile economy that we depend on for survival (Jackson, 2009).

The reasons for this are quite simple. During the post-war period of 1945-1975, development was a paternalistic undertaking and sceptics of the development discourse

believe that the structures and processes established to achieve development did nothing more than 'meet the needs of dominant powers in search of a more "appropriate" tool for their economic and geopolitical expansion… the ideology helped a dying and obsolete colonialism to transform itself into an aggressive – even sometimes an attractive – instrument to recapture new ground' (Bawtree and Rahnema, 1997:377). Much of this ideology was based on the Western concept of economic growth that rewarded more instead of better consumption, private versus public investment, and synthetic rather than natural capital. These triple self-reinforcing biases have since been locked in our social mentality, promoting wealth and materialism as the end goals of development (Ziai, 2007).

With the neoliberal mantra advocating the supremacy of markets for fostering prosperity, the praxis of this economic model is built on the privatisation of public goods and services and reinforces economic globalisation through international governance structures maintained through the likes of the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organisation, and the World Bank (Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2010). The move from development to globalisation justified the greatest development myth: that all humanity would somehow benefit from a trickle-down effect. This, of course, did not happen – instead it led to a widening gap between rich and poor countries, and especially rich and poor people within countries, and many believed that 'development was a misconceived enterprise… implicitly aimed at eliminating cultural diversity through the universalizing of Western institutions' (Sachs, 1992:5).

Despite attempts from ecological economics and other disciplines to demonstrate the intrinsic limits of this economic model, it remains to be our leading economic paradigm. Today we are faced with continuous environmental and economic crises, compounded by a growing disjuncture between the 'real' economy (where the value of natural capital is seldom recognised) and the 'fictitious paper economy of finance' (Martinez-Alier *et al.*, 2010).

Some supporters of sustainable development suggest that we need to reject this form of economics and instead focus on the articulation of collective well-being, other than in terms of material gains at the loss of natural balance and social equity. To do this, a process of 'de-growth' is proposed, described as an active abandonment, a process of 'escape from the economy' that allows for the creation of new autonomous spaces of social interaction and production (Latouche, 2010:180). In this way, it could be argued that neoliberalism could be made sustainable through an equitable and democratic transition to a smaller economy, with less production and consumption, and that such a system could allow a 'prosperous way down' (Odum and Odum, 2006) or at least a 'soft landing rather than a crash due to environmental collapse' (Martinez-Alier, 2008:28). To change the economic system, we need to 'confront the structures that keep us in damaging denial' (Jackson, 2009:102).

Sustainable development thus potentially represents a fundamental shift in the economic paradigm and the acceptance of sustainability as a valid social goal makes the relationship between human economic activity and the environment extremely complex. Markets may be valuable and an essential means, but they cannot determine the ends, which can only be

arrived at by a social decision process informed by different disciplinary viewpoints. This will require an 'unaccustomed humility on the part of economists' (Harris, 2000:161) and a willingness to work together with social and natural scientists.

1.2.2. The Environmental Perspective

When discussing the environment in sustainable development, reference is often made to natural capital – the land, air, water, living organisms and formations of the Earth's biosphere that provide us with ecosystem goods and services imperative for survival and well-being. Natural capital refers to the stock of natural assets capable of producing a sustainable flow. The total stock of environmental assets can be divided into two categories: non-renewable resources such as minerals and fossil fuels, and renewable resources, indicating the finite capacity of natural systems to produce things such as food crops, forestry products, and water supplies. These resources, however, are only renewable if the natural systems that they operate in are not over exploited (Wackernage and Rees, 1997).

Often the environment is viewed in a more economic sense without taking cognisance of the critical ecological services that natural capital provides, such as waste assimilation, erosion and flood control, and protection from ultraviolet radiation. Instead, natural capital is viewed as the basis for all human economic activity, simply the stock of natural assets that yield a flow of valuable goods and services into the future and a tool for economic production (Wackernage and Rees, 1997). But the environment is not just an inventory of resources. As a complex system itself, natural capital includes all the components of the ecosphere and the structural relationships among them, whose organisational integrity is essential for the continuous self-production of the system itself. It is this highly evolved structural and functional integration that makes the planet a uniquely liveable environment for the organisms that inhabit it.

There is no doubt that the stock of non-renewable resources is finite, nor is there any doubt that ecosystems (individually and collectively within the biosphere) have limits in their capacity to absorb pollutants. The 'ecological bottom line' then, is that we must learn to live on the 'interest' generated by our remaining stocks of natural capital and not deplete those stocks. In essence, we must minimise our consumption of essential natural capital (Roseland, 2005). Unfortunately, this understanding does not reflect the historical trend of human activities. Ecological economists acknowledge that industrialised societies depend on natural capital for their survival and have thus tried to put a price on resources, such as timber and fishery stocks, but the value of ecological process resources, such as carbon absorption or photosynthesis, cannot be easily quantified and monetised (Rees, 1991). The very concept of economic trade-offs depends on being able to put a price on the items traded – resources that cannot be quantified or monetised also cannot be priced (Roseland, 2005). A perceptual distortion of the critical role the environment plays and prevailing economic (ir-)rationality has accelerated the depletion of natural capital stocks and conventional monetary analyses have been blind to natural resource depletion (Wackernage and Rees, 1997).

Many argue that we have even gone one step beyond this: not only have our human activities led to resource depletion, they have actually started to have a significant global impact on the planet's geology and ecosystems (Borenstein, 2014). As such, we have entered into what is proposed as the 'Anthropocene', a subdivision of the geologic timescale defined by the impact of human activity on the planet (Waters, 2016). The human impact on biodiversity is one of the primary attributes of the Anthropocene and many believe that humanity has entered into the earth's sixth major extinction (Leakey and Lewin, 1995). Genetic diversity engenders resilience in ecosystems – the existence of a wide variety of species interacting with each other provides a 'reservoir of genetic forms' that allows for adaptation to changing conditions, a 'bounce-back' capacity that enables a system to respond to disturbances or damage (Falcon-Lang, 2011). Considering the accelerated rate of species loss around the globe, ecosystem resilience is severely under threat (Falcon-Lang, 2011).

A significant trigger for this loss has been the increase of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, synonymous with anthropogenic global warming or climate change. Climate change threatens to alter the composition and functioning of ecosystems, as well as the critical benefits that those ecosystems provide to humanity (EPA, 2010). The critical problems facing humanity are indicative of the failure of ecological resilience: the disruption of ecosystems by introduced species, the resurgence of diseases due to antibiotic resistance, the formation of dead zones in coastal water, and the multiple ecological threats related to climate change are testimony to the impacts of expanding human economic activity (Harris, 2000). It is estimated that 60% of the world's ecosystems have been degraded and global carbon emissions have risen by 40% since 1990 (Jackson, 2009). The degree of biodiversity loss and climate change could be explored extensively, but it is important to recognise one thing: all biological systems have their limits and humankind must ultimately accept the boundaries of a finite planet (Harris, 2000).

From an ecological perspective then, sustainable development is achieved through the maintenance of ecosystem resilience. If humanity shifted to more eco-centric values, including respect for and the preservation of other ecosystems, our own human ecology would be secured. As such, sustainability is more than simply placing limits on population or restraint on consumption, although these are critical factors, it means that our choice of goods and technologies must be oriented to the requirements of ecosystem integrity and species diversity (Harris, 2000). The perceived independence of economics from biophysical science is no longer a luxury we can afford. Sustainable development requires that resources be allocated in such a way that neither the system as a whole, nor the key components of that system, are threatened. Consumption and production objectives must be sustainable and if the existing preferences and technologies perpetuated by the concept of mass consumerism persist, the system as a whole will be unstable. In this way, the 'the ecological economics of sustainability privileges the needs of the system over those of individuals' (Common and Perrings, 1992:112).

The integration of economics and ecology depends critically on the third element of the sustainability triad – the social perspective.

1.2.3. The Social Perspective

As with the concept of sustainable development itself, there is no single blueprint definition for social sustainability and the definitions can vary across discipline-specific criteria or study perspectives. While some argue that social sustainability 'must rest on basic values of equity and democracy' (Sachs, 1999:27), others argue that the focus should be on maintaining social values such as culture, equity and social justice (Koning, 2002). Another argument is that social sustainability is achieved when 'society and the related institutional arrangements satisfy an extended set of human needs… and that social justice, human dignity and participation are fulfilled' (Littig and Griessler, 2005:72). Human needs can be understood most acutely through the 17 Sustainable Development Goals which recognise that 'ending poverty and other deprivations must go hand-in-hand with strategies that improve health and education, reduce inequality, and spur economic growth' (United Nations, 2015a).

While social sustainability can apply to a broad spectrum of societies and social structures, there is increasing awareness that, due to the rapidly increasing rate of urbanisation, cities provide both challenges and opportunities for promoting more sustainable patterns of development (Klopp and Petretta, 2017). As such, it is important to consider what social sustainability looks like specifically within an urban context. With cities often considered as the 'drivers of sustainable development' (Klopp and Petretta, 2017:92), sustainability has predominantly focused on efficient solid waste management, recycling, energy usage, and transportation planning, while the more social elements have been seen as an 'add-on' to promote other elements within the development spectrum (Weingaertner and Moberg, 2014:3). The need to include social sustainability, including issues such as social cohesion, cultural values, economic stability and growth, access to services, and health and well-being, has increasingly come to the fore.

Urban development is largely driven by two often contrasting stakeholders – public and private sectors – thus it is important to consider both of these stakeholders within the context of sustainable development. The role of promoting social sustainability is largely seen to be the role of the public sector and local authorities, but other actors, such as businesses, developers and residents also have responsibilities in the complex process of urban governance. It is generally understood that the development of urban areas should aim to improve the quality of life for all people, while simultaneously fostering an environment that encourages integration, allowing culturally and socially diverse groups to co-habitat, within the physical and environmental boundaries of their places (Weingaertner and Moberg, 2014). Both public and private sectors play important roles in achieving this.

While it is difficult to develop a definitive description of what urban sustainability looks like, it is possible to identify some key features, including, but not limited to: accessibility to services; health and well-being; social cohesion and inclusion; local democracy, participation and empowerment; cultural heritage; housing and community stability; sense of place and belonging; local environmental quality; social justice; and an attractive public realm. It is also recognised that these social aspects cannot be looked at in isolation and need to be

considered as part of the wider sustainability debate, but within a local context. Aspects of sustainability can be understood in different ways depending on the context in which they are being considered, and thus context-dependent details need to be discussed on a case-by-case basis (Weingaertner and Moberg, 2014).

Ultimately, social sustainability has to do with improving or maintaining the quality of life of people, and it is suggested that this revolves around two core themes: social equity and the sustainability of community (Weingaertner and Moberg, 2014:11). In this way, social capital, human capital, and well-being are core themes, because they synthesise both the individual and collective issues relevant for sustainability. Human capital encompasses the abilities, experiences, work skills and good health that, when combined, allow people to engage in different livelihoods strategies to pursue their objectives, while social capital refers to the social resources people rely on to achieve their livelihood objectives, including networks and connections, participation, and relationships of trust that facilitate cooperation (UNDP, 2017). Well-being is defined as 'a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity' (WHO, 2020). By using these as core themes to drive sustainability, the application and meaning of social sustainability can be understood more readily, providing a platform from which case-specific problems and context development aspects can be developed. By focusing on these key themes, it may 'reduce the risk of some stakeholders high-jacking specific aspects and focusing on narrow issues of social sustainability to pursue their own interests' (Weingaertner and Moberg, 2014:11).

Within an urban context, as noted above, the key actors or agents for change are often found within the public sector, but the private sector, including companies and businesses, also play an important role even though their actions are typically led by private interests. From this perspective, corporate social sustainability has increasingly come to the fore, providing a starting point for understanding sustainability aspects within a private-sector context. While corporate social responsibility has helped to improve the sustainability of businesses, it is important to note that the 'sustainability of an individual organisation may, or may not, be compatible with the sustainability of society as a whole' (ISO, 2009). Indeed, the more overarching societal aspects that are highlighted in urban sustainability, such as social cohesion and inclusion, may be less in focus for companies. In addition, the actors involved in social sustainability may consider some aspects to be more important than others, and these individual aspects will often reflect their own agendas, making agreement on key aspects difficult to achieve. To this end, there is a need for strong public authorities and mechanisms to promote the internalisation of companies' effects on communities (Weingaertner and Moberg, 2014).

While many aspects of social sustainability are similar, and there is a broadly common understanding of what social sustainability means, the challenge lies in putting this into practice. The context of development initiatives influences the more detailed aspects of what social sustainability actually looks like, particularly within an urban setting. Understanding social sustainability within local contexts and priorities is critical to establish not only what relevant aspects of social sustainability need to be included, but who the

agents of change are, and how these aspects can be put into practice by stakeholders and practitioners alike (Weingaertner and Moberg, 2014). As such, there is need for investigations to take place that examine these aspects of social sustainability within local contexts to more effectively improve the implementation of social sustainability efforts, and the achievement of sustainable development as a whole.

1.3. Sustainability and the Development Agenda

Although complex, sustainable development as a concept does indeed satisfy a common sense logic that is widely applicable. The challenge, of course, lies in its practical application. To facilitate this, the global community has embarked on various development agendas in the pursuit of achieving some form of sustainability.

Developed in 2000, the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were established to achieve development in human capital (in terms of nutrition, health and education), infrastructure (access to water and energy), and human rights (empowering women and increasing access). Focused only on the developing world, each goal had specific targets and indicators, measured from a baseline of 1990 by 2015 (United Nations, 2020). Success in achieving these goals is debatable. Some progress was certainly made: poverty was nearly halved, there was increased access to drinking water, reduced hunger, and an improvement in the status of women and living conditions (Liverman, 2018). Some suggest, however, that the MDGs biased development – created in the context of the financial crisis, the MDGs were seen as an opportunity to 'reinvigorate the development agenda' (Liverman, 2018:170) and they significantly reoriented the activities and discourses of donors, nongovernmental organisations and developing nations. The attention placed on measurable targets led to development that was seen as top down, competitive and results based, focused more on what could be counted rather than addressing the structural basis of poverty, hunger and inequality with its deep roots in colonialism and dominant capital (Amin, 2006; Davis, 2011; Liverman, 2018). Indeed, it is argued that the MDGs legitimised neoliberal processes and governmentalities that can be viewed as a 'hegemonic attempt to rearticulate the development project and produce entrepreneurial subjects' (Death and Gabay, 2015:598), where the multiple identities, collective actions, and other aspects of rights and well-being were not considered. In addition, the MDG targets led to distortion associated with aggregation, with a lack of attention paid to variations within countries, obscuring the realities of some of the most impoverished people on the planet. The MDGs were also criticised for insufficiently reflecting human rights, gender, and attention to the environment (Liverman, 2018).

Recognising many of these shortcomings, in 2015 countries adopted a new set of goals to 'end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity for all' (United Nations, 2015b), reflected through the creation of the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda. With 17 goals, 169 targets, and several hundred indicators, aiming to 'leave no one behind', the SDGs and are much broader and more ambitious than the MDGs. The SDGs are seen as an integration of the people-centred MDGs with the planet-centred Rio+20 Declaration, ranging from no poverty (SDG 1) and zero hunger (SDG2), to decent work and economic growth (SDG 8) and

sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11[1]), to climate action (SDG 13) and life below land (SDG 14) (UNDESA, 2020). While the SDGs are more comprehensive in their development ambition, some argue that they are too complex to drive public action or policy, too ambitious and absolute to be successful, and that the contradictory nature of many of the goals suggest that growth goals cannot be met without sacrificing environmental ones, or that sustainability cannot be achieved under the current economic model of capitalism (Hickel, 2015; Liverman, 2018). This reflects the initial concerns that in the context of sustainable development, in reality, only one aspect can be maximised at any given time (Norgaard, 1994; Harris, 2000).

Much of the attention on the application of the SDGs has focused on the urban environment – 66% of the world's population is expected to live in cities by 2060 and cities have a key role to play in accelerating sustainable development (Zinkernagel, Evans and Neij, 2018). Using the SDGs and the Paris Agreement as a foundation, the New Urban Agenda (NUA) was created to help guide cities, setting out visions and commitments across issues from planning, governance and finance, to housing and infrastructure, representing a shift in how cities are viewed in the sustainability movement. The NUA recognises the role of participatory governance and the private sector, but much remains to promote new business models that encourage sustainability (Zinkernagel, Evans and Neij, 2018). One of the hot issues in the discussion of the SDGs and NUA, as well as the Paris Agreement for climate change, is the extent to which local governments should be considered leaders in making and addressing commitments – achieving commitments in these agendas depends heavily on city or municipal governments and local civil society, yet they were not allowed to help draft those commitments (Satterthwaite, 2017). One of the most pressing challenges for addressing the SDGs in urban areas is having urban governments with the technical capacity and finance needed to act on the goals. Few urban governments in low and middle income countries have the capacity to plan and manage urban expansion and difficult trade-offs are often made where powerful real estate interests subvert needed land-use management (Satterthwaite, 2017).

Fundamentally, creating more inclusive and sustainable cities requires capable and accountable urban governments, and this in turn requires genuine multi-level governance. Urban governments need to demonstrate capacity and willingness to respond to local needs and priorities, within the framework of local and global goals which national governments have committed to. Achieving the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda then means that particular attention needs to be paid to governance, and how the dynamics of governance influence the broader achievement of the development agenda.

1.4. Overview of this Research

The achievement of sustainable development requires the balanced interaction between three key components: the economy, the environment, and society. Finding this balance

[1] SDG 11.6 specifically aims to, by 2030, reduce adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including by paying special attention to air quality and municipal and other waste management.

requires a critical examination of the beliefs, systems, and institutions that govern decision-making, and challenging the dominant societal forces at play. This essentially comes down to power – understanding what it is, how it operates, and how it can be used to influence decisions for sustainable development.

Considering this, the thesis is structured in the following manner.

Chapter 2 focuses on the literature of power, understanding what it is, how it operates, and how it can be used to influence decisions for sustainable development. Focus is placed on two key perspectives: the power of production, and the power of domination. By examining these perspectives, it is possible to identify the mechanisms and instruments of power, identifying how power is used and enacted, and what the outcomes of this are. This understanding is central to conducting power analyses, and to this end, a framework for power analysis is presented for this research, examining the interaction of the actors and institutions involved in the decision-making process, the different forms of power that each actor manifested, the spaces where these actors interact, and the levels where this occurred, thus revealing the dynamic power process.

This framework was central to the research methodology, which is discussed in Chapter 3. Autoethnography and scholar-activism is at the heart of this research, using personal experiences to describe and understand the broader social dynamics within Hout Bay, and the methodology will provide an overview of how this was used and to what end. In addition, the methodology included interviews and the review of a variety of documentary sources that were used to triangulate information. Critical discourse analysis and content analysis were used to interpret this data, using the themes of power identified in the literature review.

Chapter 4 then introduces Hout Bay, providing a brief overview of the history of Hout Bay and some of the key social dynamics relevant to this study.

The analysis will then begin, presented over three chapters, and applying the methodology to the case study of the fishmeal factory in Hout Bay. The first analysis chapter, Chapter 5, reflects on the understanding of 'normality' and the establishment of the status quo through a chronological account of events beginning in 2013. To this end, the research will demonstrate that power revolved around the interaction of four key actors: Oceana, the City of Cape Town, FAHB, and the Hangberg community. Oceana and the City of Cape Town exercised control through three distinct ways: shoring up economic dependency, depoliticising the issue through formal institutions and processes, and constructing hegemony to ensure broad support for their governance. This enabled the status quo to be established which served to maintain the pursuit of their economic and political interests. The chapter further demonstrates how the Hangberg community normalised this status quo through a process of cultural hegemony, which stemmed largely from their long history of marginalisation. As a result, the Hangberg community habituated protest as a form of resistance to the threat against their sense of identity and belonging, which was largely race and location-based, and used this as their main mechanism of power. In contrast, FAHB used

their largely privileged-based resources to create a space for dialogue to occur, giving them some degree of power to influence the discourse and created a space where they used information and knowledge accessible through democratic means to politicise the issue.

The second analysis chapter, Chapter 6, continues the chronological account with a specific focus on one event at the end of 2015: the proposed closure of the factory and the decision for it to remain operational. The story of the proposed closure will be relayed in detail, explaining how Oceana made the announcement, the reaction from the Hangberg community, and the events that eventually led to the factory being reopened. The analysis that follows again reflects on the reactions from the four main actors, investigating what power mechanisms were used and for what purpose. The analysis will demonstrate that a coalition existed between government and big capital to govern decision-making and to ensure their interests were maintained, which primarily centred on the pursuit of economic profit (Oceana) and the securing of land rentals (government). The analysis will also demonstrate how Hangberg was united by a common fear of displacement that stemmed from a long history of marginalisation, and that they used protest as a form of resistance to defend the status quo.

The third and final analysis chapter, Chapter 7, concludes the story, examining the events that transpired between the factory's reopening in 2016 to its eventual closure in 2019. Much would take place over these years, offering further insights into the relationship between government and big capital, and the impact this had on local development. To this end, it will be demonstrated how FAHB used their power and resources to politicise the issue, and (while not related to the factory) Hangberg used their power of protest to express their dissatisfaction against continuous marginalisation. It will also be shown how the City shifted from avoidance to the repression of health information and manipulated democratic processes to secure its own interests, reinforcing the notion that an urban regime existed in the specific form of a rent-seeking cabal. This would have serious impacts on the development of the harbour as a whole, to the end that no development has taken place.

Chapter 8 will conclude the research, consolidating the findings of the analysis chapters and offering a comprehensive reflection on the power dynamics within Hout Bay. Using this reflection, the key findings of this research will be presented as well as an overview of what this means for power and decision-making processes. By doing so, a final conclusion will be drawn about where the power to influence decision-making about development lies, and what this means for the overall pursuit of sustainable development. The conclusion, in short, is that sustainable development can only be achieved when social sustainability is at the forefront of decision-making, and this can only be done by understanding and working with the power dynamics present within a specific context.

CHAPTER 2

POWER: FROM PRODUCTION TO DOMINATION

The achievement of sustainable development requires the balanced interaction between three key components: the economy, the environment, and society. Finding this balance requires a critical examination of the beliefs, systems, and institutions that govern decision-making, and challenging the dominant societal forces at play. This essentially comes down to power – understanding what it is, how it operates, and how it can be used to influence decisions for sustainable development. This chapter will explore the notion of power, reflecting first on how power is understood, considering authors such as Dahl (1957), Bachrach and Baratz (1970), Lukes (2005), Gaventa (1980) and Stone (1989), and then focusing on two key perspectives: the power of production, and the power of domination.

The power of production, or the 'power to', broadly considers how power can effect specific outcomes, such as the making of the city or urban spaces, rather than the ability to affect others, such as through laws and policies, and the ability to enforce them. This directly relates to governance and how decisions are made within the complexities of social spaces. With a particular focus on urban spaces and thus urban governance, a brief examination will be provided about how power operates within these spaces, focusing specifically on how the power to produce the city requires a degree of co-operation between local government and business in the form of urban regimes. Considering this, the chapter will demonstrate how power mechanisms can be used ensure the interests between government and big businesses or corporations (ie. the public-private sector) are incorporated into governing coalitions, particularly rent-extracting cabals.

The power of domination, or 'power over', looks at the three dimensional views of power inspired by Lukes (2005), considering how power ranges from the visible forms of power such as conflict or the control of resources, to the more hidden forms of power such as influence and agenda-setting, to the invisible forms of power that relate to hegemony and social compliance through shaping identities and subjectivities. These three dimensional views of power are central to the research being undertaken and will be discussed in detail.

Once these different approaches to power have been presented, the chapter will then focus on the mechanisms of power, identifying how power is used and enacted, and what the outcomes of this are. Understanding the mechanisms of power is central to conducting power analyses, which helps to explain how and why power operates in the way it does. While various forms of power analysis are presented, a key focus of this chapter is to present the framework for power analysis unique to this study. To this end, this chapter will offer a framework for situated practice, focusing on actors and institutions involved in decision-making, the spaces in which participation occurs, and the forms of power that are

utilised within these spaces. This framework will be central to the research methodology, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

2.1. Understanding Power

The notion that some people have more power than others is one of the hallmark characteristics of our human existence. Indeed, the idea of power – with all its mysteries and subjectivities - is one of the most ancient and omnipresent discussions in social theory, with a 'parade of great names' (Dahl, 1957:288) from Plato and Aristotle to Machiavelli and Hobbes to Pareto and Weber devoting their energies to understanding this phenomena. Despite this wealth of contribution, the concept of power remains 'essentially contested' (Lukes, 1974:34) and the word is used in fundamentally different ways.

Most people have an intuitive notion of what power means - everyone possesses it and is affected by it in all aspects of their lives. In its broadest sense, power is understood as the ability to influence or control the behaviour of people and the world we live in (Dahl, 1957; Wernham, 1958) making it fundamentally relative, dependent on the specific relationship between two or more parties and the ways in which they engage (French and Raven, 1959). The ability to influence or control behaviour is largely dependent on the degree of control over material, human, intellectual, and financial resources exercised by different actors. The control of these resources becomes a source of individual and social power (Batliwala, 1993; VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007) and as such, power is an integral dynamic of politics (Guzzini, 2005).

At the heart of the discussion about power, however, lies an age-old tension in social theory – the debate between 'agency' and 'structure' (Pettit, 2010:26). At one extreme, power is seen as something 'possessed' by certain actors and not by others. It is often viewed negatively, associated with domination, manipulation and force, and because power is unequally distributed, it is often associated with a struggle involving conflict (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Batliwala, 1993; Gaventa, 2005; VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007; Pettit, 2010). As such, power is the capacity for deliberate domination in the 'zero-sum' contest between winners and losers (Pettit, 2010:26). At the other extreme, power is seen as deeply and unconsciously embedded in social and cultural norms and ideology, found in the web of relationships and discourses that affect everyone, and not held by a single person (Gaventa, 2005; Pettit, 2010). In this way, power is dynamic and multidimensional rather than absolute, it is internalised, affecting the beliefs and behaviour of all actors, and it changes according to context, circumstance and interest (Batliwala, 1993; VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007; Pettit, 2010).

Academics and practitioners have also considered that power is best thought of as the ability to 'effect outcomes, not the ability to affect others' (Morriss, 2006:126). Searching for collaborative ways of exercising and using power, a range of descriptions have been developed to explain this dynamic relationship. 'Power over' refers to the ability of the powerful to affect the actions and thought of the powerless. 'Power to' is important for the capacity to act, exercise agency, and realise the unique potential of every individual to shape

their own lives. 'Power within' refers to gaining the sense of self-identity, self-worth and awareness that is a precondition for action, based on an ethical value system that affirms basic human dignity; and 'power with' refers to the synergy which can emerge through partnerships and collaboration with others, the finding of common ground to build collective strength (Gaventa, 2006; Miller et al., 2006; Pettit, 2010; Hunjan and Pettit, 2011; Acosta and Pettit, 2013).

For the purposes of this research, two of these notions will be examined: the capacity to construct the surrounding world (power to) and the capacity to dominate other beings (power over) (Lukes, 2005). 'Power to' can broadly be understood as the power of production, whereas 'power over' is the power of domination. Each of these are discussed.

2.2. Power as Production: Governance

'Power to' or the power of production is focused on the collective capacity to act and exercise agency for decision-making. This collective capacity is essential for urban governance because city hall does not have the capacity to do this alone. While the degree varies from state to state, in all liberal democratic systems, city hall may have the power to make by-laws and enforce them, but they also lack the resources required to provide housing, create jobs, and generate revenue, making other spheres of the state, business and residents themselves essential components of governance. In this way, the power to create the city is shared among multiple actors, particularly city hall and business according to Clarence Stone (1989), and the capacity to bring these together in a conscious partnership is at the heart of regime theory. The importance of making the city is even more pronounced in the urban south, where cities are growing in population at a significant rate, and thus must grow in infrastructure and housing too. As such, the power of social production is deeply connected to urban governance.

The term governance refers broadly to the coordination of interdependent activities and for a long time was used mainly to describe the constitutional and legal issues concerning the conduct of 'affairs of state' (Jessop, 2018:44). In more recent years, there has been an increasing need to distinguish between 'government' and 'governance' where governance refers to the modes and manners of governing, and government refers to the institutions and agents charged with governing (Jessop, 2018:44). This difference has in large part developed due to globalisation and increasing governance mechanisms, such as market economics and international affairs, that challenge the conventional public-private divide, as well as the power networks and other forms of complex interdependence across different tiers of government and functional domains (Jessop, 2018). The rise of governance is partly due to shifts in the political economy that require important economic, political and social co-ordination. This is most acutely seen in urban spaces, where cities embody the complexity of social life representing a 'locus of overlapping webs of relations on diverse spatial scales' (Healey et al, 1995:4).

Governing cities is particularly difficult – while there is a sense that cities celebrate difference, shared spaces, and social interaction, they have also given way to indifference

and intolerance, creating spaces of exclusion (McDowell, 1999; Kearns and Paddison, 2000). Cities comprise different forms of order that often clash, and power relations often reflect underlying social relations. In this way, urban governance attempts to manage and regulate difference (Kearns and Paddison, 2000), creatively handling the different elements of society in an attempt to create social order.

With the intensification of societal complexity and growing interdependencies in and across economics and politics, it is argued that the mode and manner of governing, particularly in cities, has changed from hierarchies and bureaucracy to self-organising networks or 'heterarchy' (Jessop, 2018:43). These changes have led to new economic and social conditions, as well as problems that cannot be managed or resolved through state-planning alone. At the same time, competitiveness and capital accumulation have come to depend not only on the efficiency of production, but increasingly on the added-value obtained from extra-economic institutions and relations, meaning partnerships and heterarchy have become increasingly important (Kearns and Paddison, 2000). As explained, 'interorganisational negotiations occur because firms want to have political influence and to achieve a better overall functioning of the urban and economic system, and the local state wants to influence firms and to achieve better overall economic output' (Kearns and Paddison, 2000:847). In this way, governance has come to be understood as governing with permeable boundaries between organisations in the public and private sectors.

While this concept of governance recognises the interdependence between the public and private sector, it also leads to a blurring of responsibilities, not only for economic issues, but for social ones as well. Governance is about the 'capacity to get things done in the face of complexity, conflict and social change' (Kearns and Paddison, 2000:847) and this ability no longer lies solely with government power and authority in one place (if it ever did). Urban governance is a multi-level activity – urban governments exist within webs of relations involving higher tiers of government, as well as lower levels of governance at neighbourhood levels (Healey et al, 1995; Kearns and Paddison, 2000). While successful urban governments should feel the strength of collective social capital, socio-spatial segregation and administration have fragmented many of these spaces, making successful governance hard to achieve – no one spatial scale is predominant.

In addition, political and administrative processes, *how* things are decided and implemented, what Galbraith refers to as 'instruments' of power (Galbraith, 2001:187), is almost as important as *what* is decided and implemented. Governments talk the language of social and political inclusion: 'political inclusiveness may be expected to deliver greater social inclusion, and among the aspects of social life in which participation is sought is the political process itself' (Levitas, 1998:173). The quality of urban governance is determined largely by its effective administration and open and accountable politics, including widespread processes of consultation where government is held accountable and excluded groups have a voice. This can be achieved in two ways: by producing effective and responsive decision-making within rapidly changing circumstances, and by raising the quality of local democracy (Kearns and Paddison, 2000).

Urban Regime Theory

Within the field of urban governance, urban regime theory discusses how various interests within the public-private-sector are incorporated into governing coalitions (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). Urban regime theory is based on the fundamental understanding that power is fragmented, primarily because of the division of labour between the market and the state – ownership of productive assets lies largely in the hands of the private sector, such as generating jobs, financing, and tax revenues, while the machinery of government is subject to public control, through governments' legitimacy and authority to enact policy (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Davies, 2002). Regimes can serve as the collaborative arrangement through which government and business assemble the capacity to govern, allowing for an examination of how various interests are incorporated into governing coalitions (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). Regime analysis explores the 'middle ground' between government and entities that determine economic forces (Stone, 1993).

Regime theory is largely based on the social production model of power, where political power is the capacity to act, the 'power to' rather than the 'power over' others or social control (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). This power to act is achieved through collective action and securing participation in the governing coalition through using incentives, such as contracts, jobs, or facilities over particular neighbourhoods. In this way, regime analysis focuses on the internal dynamics of coalition building, or informal modes of coordination across institutional boundaries that allow for governance to occur (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). At the heart of regime theory is the concept of systemic power – in market societies, governments are predisposed toward the preferences of business leaders, and as a result, business is likely to exercise a privileged influence on the urban policy agenda (Davies, 2002). In this way, the notion that groups have equal access to decision-making processes is flawed – systemic power usually favours those concerned with economic growth, rather than other groups (Davies, 2002; Heller, Mukhopadhyay and Walton, 2016).

This compliments the political economy analysis approach to power which tends to understand political action through a lens of 'economic institutionalism,' focusing on key actors, their interests, and what enables or hinders their cooperation (Acosta and Pettit, 2013:7). This approach focuses on actors, structures and processes that are predominantly visible and views power as the ability to control resources, which offers a useful perspective for conceptualising powerlessness, as well as power, particularly in the context of development (Gaventa, 2003; Acosta and Pettit, 2013). This approach contends that vulnerability should be understood in terms of powerlessness rather than the lack of basic entitlements, and that those who lack power cannot safeguard their basic social, economic and political rights or needs (Collinson, 2003; Gaventa, 2003; Hamilton, 2014).

In this way, power should be analysed as a political and economic process, which resonates with the rights-based approach to development and an actor-oriented approach to power (Gaventa, 2003). Political economy focuses on the distribution of power and wealth between different actors in the political realm, and aims to identify the motivations and

incentives that create, transform and sustain these processes over time, thus calling on a 'longitudinal' perspective (Collinson, 2003:10) that incorporates a wide historical and geographic perspective (Collinson, 2003; Acosta and Pettit, 2013).

Some urban regimes have a similar typology to that of a 'growth machine' where the coalitions of politicians and developers centre around the provision of infrastructure and other business-supporting investments to maximise land rent (Heller, Mukhopadhyay and Walton, 2016:2). The growth machine is fundamentally about maximising the returns to land, which assumes a level of coherence with overall governance and economic logic but this is not always the case. A rent-extracting cabal suggests a particularistic pursuit of land and other rents that is only weakly aligned with a coherent economic growth strategy that could cater effectively to the basic needs of the community (Heller, Mukhopadhyay and Walton, 2016). This is a 'cabal' in the sense that the 'dominant coalition consists of a fairly small group of actors who collude across the boundaries of state and market to maximize returns to scarce resources, most prominently land' (Heller, Mukhopadhyay and Walton, 2016:6).

2.3. Power as Domination: The Three Dimensional Views of Power

Theories of power as domination have evolved through understanding the different dimensional views of power. Robert Dahl offered the first-dimensional view of power, stating that power is the ability of A to get B to do what B might not otherwise do (Dahl, 1957; Digeser, 1992; Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001). Power is thus understood as the product of conflicts, controlled by the source and domain of resources that can be exploited to effect behaviour (Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 1974; Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001), and decision-making is a focal point of study; as it is contended, power is about 'who participates, who gains and loses, and who prevails in decision-making' (Polsby, 1963:235).

In response, Bachrach and Baratz argued that power was not only about who won or lost in the debate on key issues, but rather, what was preventing issues and actors from joining the discussion in the first place. They contended that power is not only reflected in the embodiment of concrete actions or decisions, but also in the extent to which barriers to air conflicts are created or reinforced, often seen as 'non-decision-making' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970:642; Lukes, 1974; Digeser, 1992). As they commented, 'some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970:642), meaning that some issues are politicised while others are not. In this way, power was not just about prevailing in a struggle, but also in determining the agenda of the struggle, which was achieved through the mobilisation of bias. It was argued that those in power could mobilise bias in favour or suppression of different issues through coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation (Schattschneider, 1960; Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Parenti, 1970; Lukes, 1974; Pettit, 2010). Although there is a clear distinction between the first and second dimensional views of power, both ideas are characterised by a conflictual relationship between agents advancing their self-defined interests against the interests of others, and thus can be constituted as a 'liberal conception of power' (Digeser, 1992:979).

While the second-dimensional view explains some hidden operations of power, it did not go so far as to include the possibility of a false or manipulated consensus, where the bias of the system can be 'mobilised, recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular individuals' choices' (Lukes, 1974:25). Lukes suggested that through the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups and the practices of institutions, those in power prevented conflicts from arising by influencing consciousness and awareness of the grievances that shaped them, thus proposing a 'radical conception of power' (Lukes, 1974:23; Digeser, 1992). As Lukes contended:

> Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? (Lukes, 2005:24)

With this, Lukes pointed to the relationship between power and ideology, highlighting how socialised consent prevents people from questioning or envisioning any possibilities for changing these relationships or addressing injustices, and that 'processes of socialisation, culture and ideology perpetuate exclusion and inequality by defining what is normal and acceptable' (Acosta and Pettit, 2013:14).

This approach is consistent with the Gramscian concept of cultural hegemony that considers how social forces and historical patterns lead to the 'engineering of consent' for subordinate classes (Edelman, 1971:40). Gramsci argued that the stabilisation of a particular worldview, and the acceptance of that view from different groups (often against their own interests), is achieved through an operation of hegemony. Within this, civil society acts as the terrain over which hegemony is consolidated and contested, the 'ostensibly neutral organs through which class power comes to be secured in both actions and ideas' (Gramsci, 1971:180). Gramsci argued that those in power try to manipulate hegemony, not simply by changing the physical environment, but the way in which people relate to their environment through every day activities (Loftus and Lumsden, 2008). In this way, Gramsci transformed the notion of ideology – instead of referring to a specific system of ideas, ideologies are instead 'active, organising forces with a psychological 'validity' to them' (Loftus and Lumsden, 2008:114) and are formed 'through everyday experience illuminated by common sense' (Kipfer, 2002:119).

Bourdieu developed this idea further, claiming that power is cultural and symbolic, continuously recreated through the interplay of agency and structure (Bordieu, 1990; Pettit, 2010). He offered a theory of practice or 'habitus', where learned norms and dispositions that shape our behaviour constantly interact with the social field, which itself is structured by symbolically mediated relations of domination (Bordieu, 1990:1; Pettit, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 2011). Economic, political, legal and judicial institutions and structures established and

mediated by the state typically reinforce the dominant ideology and the power of the dominant groups within it, even though their stated objectives and policies may be superficially egalitarian (Batliwala, 1993). While habitus is socially formed, it is also physically inscribed in our bodies – it is not just a fixed way of doing things, but rather the formation of attitudes that are emotional and intellectual, underlying our response to everything in life (Bordieu, 1990; Dewey, 1997; Pettit, 2010). In this way, the three-dimensional view spoke to the more invisible forms of power, offering a serious sociological explanation for how political systems prevent demands from becoming political issues (Darder, Baltodano and Torres, 2003).

2.4. Alternative Views of Power

While power as production (power to) and power as domination (power over) are the main components for conceptualising power, there are differing thoughts on the role of both agency and structure. Foucault, considered the most influential theorist of power since the late 20th century (Gaventa, 2003), departed from classical understanding to say that power was in fact not only possessed by individuals, classes or institutions because it may not be possessed at all, and should also be seen as dispersed and subject-less, the subjects themselves discursively constituted through power (Foucault, 1978a). He purported that power appeared in every moment and was everywhere, thus it is 'the name we give to a complex strategic situation in a particular society' (Foucault, 1978b:93).

Foucault also suggested that power could be positive and referred to this productive nature of power as bio-power, operating through disciplining, ordering, making visible and subjecting to knowledge. In his view, knowledge and power are inseparable – knowledge is a productive aspect of power, enabling new action, and discourse is essential to both the operation of power, and resistance to it (Foucault, 1978b; Gaventa, 2003). This directly links to notions of 'power to'. While this agent-less approach to power is both beneficial and insightful, it leads to practical difficulties in analysing power, particularly in the context of development that focuses strongly on agents for change, and thus this idea will not be employed in this research.

New 'post-Marxist' approaches have recognised the value of Foucault's 'bio-power' and 'power/knowledge' and have integrated them into a neo-Gramscian framework of hegemony (Gaventa, 2003:6). Laclau and Mouffe, for example, depart from viewing politics and domination as class struggle, and instead view it as a struggle that includes the creation of social and class identities (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Gaventa, 2003; Townshend, 2004). They argue that social identities are always discursive constructions – 'social subjects and their practices are constructed through discourses on ethnicity, gender and politics' (Gledhill, 2000:191) and thus hegemony was no longer exclusive to class, but could operate through constructions of ethnicity, gender, and other forms of identity (Gledhill, 2000; Gaventa, 2003; Townshend, 2004).

Identity and culture are key issues in the post-colonial era as the legacies of colonialism, coupled with processes of globalisation, have put assumed ideas of identity and belonging

into question (Dixon and Durrheim, 2000). In South Africa, this is even more acutely the case. Apartheid was a system of exclusion, where communities were separated along racial identities and these divisions were secured through spatial locations (Christopher, 1994). With the advent of the country's new democracy, however, the divided landscapes of the old South Africa are gradually breaking down and the transition to a non-racial democracy forces its citizens to re-evaluate their place in the social order (Dixon and Durrheim, 2000). A significant amount of the discourse on development in South Africa centres on identity – the fundamental question of who we are and where we belong.

In its most basic form, identity provides a sense of personal location, and it facilitates our relationships and engagements with others based on a collective set of shared values that contribute to shaping our experiences (Woodward, 2005). Identity politics, therefore, has come to represent a range of political activities founded on the shared experience of injustice by members of certain social groups and is intimately connected with the notion of oppression in that one's identity (as, for example, a woman, person of colour, or of indigenous heritage) is the source of vulnerability to cultural imperialism, exploitation, marginalisation, or powerlessness (Young, 1990; Zalta et al., 2016). Of central importance to identity politics is the experience of the subject, particularly their experience of oppression and the possibility of a shared or more authentic self-determined alternative (Zalta et al., 2016). Identity politics recognises that disjunctions in identity can be attributed to notions such as false consciousness, thus they share the claim of radical power models (such as presented in this research) that individuals' perceptions of their own interests may be systematically distorted by the perspectives and actions of the dominant (Zalta et al., 2016). To understand the power of identity and its role in repressive practices, it needs to be understood within the broader notion of subjectivity that accounts for the 'unconscious, non-rational and emotional dimensions of identity' (Woodward, 2005:2).

Questions of 'who we are' are often intimately related to questions of 'where we are' and indeed, many considerations of identity are inextricably bound to notions of place, for example, 'community', 'ethnicity' and 'nation' (Dixon and Durrheim, 2000:27). At the heart of this psychological structure is a sense of belonging which is constructed by three facets: social locations; people's identifications and emotional attachments to various communities or groupings; and the ethical and political value systems that underpin judgement about people's own and others' belonging. Belonging, therefore, is not just about the construction of individual and collective identities within a social location, but also about the way in which those identities are valued and assessed (Yuval-Davis, 2011). In this way, belonging can really be understood as an emotional attachment, a feeling of being 'at home', which itself denotes a safe space, organised in a way that maintains self-coherence and self-esteem, and where hope for the future can be developed (Hage, 1997; Dixon and Durrheim, 2000; Ignatieff, 2001; Yuval-Davis, 2011).

This sense of belonging comes from a process of being naturalised to everyday practices or what Butler, following Foucauldian discourse, terms 'performativity' (Butler, 1993; Fenster, 2004; Yuval-Davis, 2011). She explains that as individuals are placed within specific discourses, 'we repeatedly perform modes of subjectivity and identity until these are

experienced as if they were second nature. Where they are successfully internalised they become part of the lived subjectivity' (Butler, 1993:24). She argues that performativity is the 'reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains' (Butler, 1993:24), disclosing the link between constructions of belonging and relations of power. In this way, the 'rhetorical traditions through which people locate themselves and others are also ideological traditions that sustain relations of domination' (Dixon and Durrheim, 2000:33).

The politics of belonging, as such, is concerned not only with the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of belonging, but also their contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents. In general, the emotional components of people's constructions of themselves and their identities become more articulated, formally structured and politicised the more threatened and less secure they become (Woodward, 2005; Yuval-Davis, 2011). In this way, the politics of belonging is about the intersection of the sociology of power with the sociology of emotions (Yuval-Davis, 2011). Understanding identity is important to this study as it directly relates to belonging in society, and often specific places in the city, and the power relations that shape how and why decisions over urban futures are made. How this will be used in the context of this study will be discussed at the end of the chapter.

2.5. Mechanisms of Power

After considering these different dimensions of power, it is now important to identify specific instruments and sources of power (Galbraith, 2001), what this research refers to as the mechanisms and forms of power, or essentially, the inner-workings and techniques of how power is obtained, shaped and exercised.

The first-dimensional view of power includes among its various 'instruments' two fairly straightforward mechanisms – the threat of coercion, and the promise of reward. If power is primarily understood by who succeeds in the resolution of key issues, different mechanisms and political resources, such as jobs, influence, votes or threat of sanctions, can be brought into the decision-making arena and how well those resources are wielded can determine the outcome of the game (Gaventa, 1980). This is often referred to as visible power, the formal rules, structures, institutions, authorities and procedures that clearly define aspects of political power, essentially, the power of coercion. These can take the form of biased laws or policies, or closed, corrupt or unrepresentative decision-making structures (Gaventa, 2005; VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007).

The second-dimensional view adds to these resources a mobilisation of bias, the 'rules of the game' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970:952) that not only control who is at the decision-making table, but also what is on the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007). It is argued that bias is wielded not only in decision-making arenas, but is also sustained through the non-decisions that suppress challenges to the interests of decision makers, which is essentially a form of de-politicisation. This can be seen in how existing norms, precedents, or rules of procedure are maintained, including the manipulation of

symbols such as a troublemaker that establish a barrier against those challenging power and discrediting disadvantaged groups, or can stem from institutional inaction, the sum effect of incremental decisions, and the rule of anticipation. As such, this is considered to be a hidden form of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Gaventa, 1980; VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007).

The mechanisms of power in the three-dimensional view are the least developed and the least understood, not least because they are not always intentionally deployed. What is at stake is identifying the specific ways in which power influences, shapes, or determines conceptions of the necessities, possibilities and strategies of challenge in situations where conflict is latent (Gaventa, 1980). These mechanisms also shape subjectivity, the social identities that define how people engage within the hierarchy of possibilities and whether this empowers or disempowers action (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). This is referred to as invisible power, in that it renders competing interests as invisible (VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007).

The control of knowledge is a central mechanism of both hidden and invisible power. In producing knowledge, different rules are used to determine its validity and knowledge can be produced to accentuate the voices of some, while discrediting the legitimacy of others (Gaventa and Cornwall, 2007). As Rahman contends, 'domination… is rooted not only in the polarisation of control over means of material production, but also over the means of knowledge production, including control over the social power to determine what is useful knowledge' (Rahman, 1991:14) Knowledge mechanisms, such as education, media, and information control, can influence consciousness and shape political beliefs and ideology (Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001; Miller *et al.*, 2006; Pettit, 2010). It is important to consider how social myths, languages, symbols, and even the communication of information shape or manipulate power processes, as this helps to locate the power processes behind the social construction of meanings and patters that serve to get the powerless to the believe and act in a manner that they would otherwise not (Gaventa, 1980; Edelman, 1985). These processes of control may have observable forms, such as the control of information through mass media, or may be observed more indirectly by recognising how power alters political conceptions.

Knowledge and the sense of powerlessness experienced in the first two dimensional views of power can be internalised to such an extent that the powerless alter their conceptions as an adaptive response to continual defeat, leading to fatalism, deprecation and apathy about a situation (Freire, 1970; Gaventa, 1980). This is described as 'psychological adaptations to the state of being without power' (Gaventa, 1980:16) or as Freire describes, a 'culture of silence' (Freire, 1970). The powerless are highly dependent – they are prevented from both self-determined action and reflection upon their actions – and without this dialectic process, they become more susceptible to the values, beliefs or 'rules of the game' and simply reinforce the interests of the powerful (Freire, 1970; Korpi, 1974:1574). This internalisation leads to socialised compliance, where powerless groups are unable to articulate their interests or even perceive social conflict, and instead accept the definitions of political reality offered by the powerful and the institutions that support them (Freire, 1970; C. Mueller, 1973). This level of power shapes people's beliefs and sense of self and leads to

acceptance of the status quo, including their own sense of superiority or inferiority – 'processes of socialisation, culture and ideology perpetuate exclusion and inequality by defining what is normal, true, and acceptable' (Miller *et al.*, 2006:41).

In addition, power is strengthened by the accumulative effect of another's powerlessness, and this sense of powerlessness, maintained non-participation and ambiguous consciousness are part of the indirect mechanisms of power's third dimension. As Gaventa says, 'once such power relationships are developed, their maintenance is self-propelled and attempts at their alteration are inevitably difficult… [the powerful] will continue to prevail simply through the inertia of the situation' (Gaventa, 1980:23).

2.6. Analysing Power in the Context of Sustainable Development

In the current political context, and particularly in post-apartheid South Africa, any meaningful discussion of developmental issues (such as education, housing, water, etc.) must reflect on the multiple dimensions of power at work. This is particularly the case if development aims to be sustainable, reflecting the balance between the economic, environmental, and social aspects of life. Development practitioners increasingly recognise the importance of analysing hidden and invisible power because the potential for eliciting change with formal institutions and structures alone is sharply limited (Bradley, 2005; Miller *et al.*, 2006). Additionally, over recent decades there has been a significant push to encourage the greater participation of ordinary citizens in decision-making processes, placing focus both on the relationship between citizens and government, and the role citizens play in improving their own communities (Hunjan and Pettit, 2011). This directly relates to the social aspect of sustainable development.

Participation, inclusion, citizenship and empowerment have become 'buzzwords' of development as citizens increasingly engage in the emerging spaces and opportunities for policy processes, but questions remain as to whether this has evoked a real shift in power, of whether these initiatives have simply re-legitimised the status quo (Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Gaventa, 2005; Hunjan and Pettit, 2011). While the rhetoric of participation and citizen engagement has been broadly accepted, participation at large has failed to address effective strategy for social change (Biggs, 1995; Cleaver, 1999). It is clear that creating institutional arrangements does not always make participation real and will not necessarily result in greater inclusion or change. Rather, much will depend on the power relations that influence participation and there is an increasing need to engage with and understand power dynamics (Gaventa, 2005). Understanding how power dynamics influence development outcomes, and whether these outcomes are aligned to the principles of sustainability, particularly the social aspect, is one of the primary objectives of this research.

Analysing power is about deepening our understanding of social problems, navigating the different dimensions of power to understand how issues are shaped and what can be undertaken to achieve the desired social change (Hunjan and Pettit, 2011; Acosta and Pettit, 2013). Failure to deal with the complexities of power can lead to poor strategic choices and missed opportunities, and the 'missing link of power' (VeneKlasen, 2007:40) is increasingly

stressed as a key factor undermining change efforts (Gaventa, 2005; VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007; Hunjan and Pettit, 2011). Power analysis plays an important role in assessing approaches to achieving change and can be undertaken by using a series of frameworks that help to interpret power in different ways. As such, power analysis can be a tool to understand the power dynamics within given situations, identifying positive forms of power that can be mobilised to claim or enter spaces and challenge forms of power, within and across levels of engagement (Gaventa, 2005; Hunjan and Pettit, 2011; Pettit, 2013). Understanding power dynamics are critical to achieving the objectives of social sustainability, which in turn help with the achievement of sustainable development overall.

The methods of conducting power analyses vary considerably depending on their applied context and range from individual exercises for community development initiatives to national analyses that inform country strategies. At a community development level, the range of tools is extensive, offering an assortment of techniques to discuss often personal and sensitive relationships to power. For example, 'Critical Webs of Power and Change' (Chapman *et al.*, 2005) suggest analysing power by identifying and mapping major actors and their real and expressed interests, where primary targets are decision-makers with the power to address an issue, and secondary targets are individuals without power, yet are close to the primary target (Chambers, 2006). The 'Power Flower' (VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007) looks at the more personal relationships an individual has with those in power and describes dominant social identities both collectively and individually. While these approaches will not be employed in this research, it is useful to know how different types of analysis can be used for different objectives.

In contrast, a 'Combined Approach to Political Economy and Power Analysis' (Acosta and Pettit, 2013) is more appropriate for international development strategists, offering tools for examining institutional and economic power relations between domestic and international, government and non-governmental actors. Similarly, 'Power Analysis: A Practical Guide' (Pettit, 2013) appeals more to development practitioners working at a national level and operating within power dynamics that influence development strategies aimed at actualising national government policies. Regardless of the tool or context it is used within, power analysis based on the three-dimensional views of power require an examination of the intersection of power across different political elements and these have been summarised concisely through the works of John Gaventa.

Drawing considerably from the works of VeneKlasen and Miller (2007), Gaventa proposes a framework for power analysis called the 'Power Cube' (Gaventa, 2005). The power cube suggests that citizen action is shaped and bound by three dimensions that require analysis: inter-relationships of spaces of engagement, places and levels where that might occur, and the forms of power found within and across them. The power cube represents a dynamic understanding of how power operates and evaluating these three dimensions can help address the ways in which power works and the transformative possibilities of participation in various spaces (Gaventa, 2005; Luttrell *et al.*, 2007). When using a cube approach, there is a tendency for the boxes to be used as static categories, but the value of the power cube approach lies in its ability to promote critical reflection about the relationships involved, not

simply to categorise the relationships present. In this way, the power cube should be seen as an 'illustration of concepts and sets of relationships that are constantly changing and dynamic – the spaces of engagement and forms of power are constantly shifting and in relation to each other' (Gaventa, 2005:19, 2006). By making a distinction between these elements of power, the power cube helps to move beyond certain assumptions and instead allows for exploration of how laws and institutions may be perpetuating recessive norms and values. This understanding can contribute to identifying new possibilities for challenging hegemonic power relations (Gaventa, 2005). For practitioners of social change, an analysis of these forms of power opens new entry points and possibilities for transformational change, and in this way, contribute to the process of achieving sustainable development.



Figure 2.1: Gaventa's Power Cube (Gaventa, 2005)

2.7. Building a Framework for a Situated Power Analysis

As discussed, it is increasingly understood that the achievement of development is heavily dependent on the power relations that influence participation and decision-making, and as such, there is a need to analyse power. While different types of power analysis have been presented, the framework offered by Gaventa's power cube is exceptionally useful, not only because it encapsulates an otherwise intangible narrative of power, but also because it is highly adaptable, lending applicability to various contexts and situations. It is even recommended that users of the framework continue to develop different approaches to its' application to deepen the contextual analysis of their work (Gaventa, 2005; Luttrell *et al.*, 2007). Gaventa notes it is also important that power analysis be used in relation to specific contexts – the ways in which dimensions of power are reflected will vary depending on the settings in which it is used (Gaventa, 2005) and grounding power analysis through a focus of situated practice will help to understand the dynamics of power and possibilities for change within the 'actual political, social, cultural and historical particularity rather than idealised notions of democratic practice' (Cornwall, 2002:52). That is precisely what this research intends to do.

Using the understanding of power discussed in this chapter, the following framework has been developed for the purpose of this study. In keeping with the sentiment that forms of power are not fixed and static but constantly interact with each other, the format of Gaventa's power cube has been maintained, where key dimensions are in focus and the viewpoints can be shifted to understand how these elements interact with each other and how power is experienced. This new framework incorporates both the notions of 'power to' and 'power over' and as such considers four key aspects specific to this case study: the actors and institutions involved in the decision-making processes, the different forms of power that each actor manifested, the spaces where these actors interact, and the levels where this occurred, thus revealing the dynamic power process. Each of these elements are discussed.



Figure 2.2: Power cube used for this research

Actors and Institutions

Drawing on elements of the political economy and urban regime analysis, essentially 'power to', this research will focus on actors and institutions, reflecting on their interests and what enables or hinders their cooperation in decision-making processes (Acosta and Pettit, 2013). As discussed, institutions tend to reproduce power imbalances because they represent the preferences and interests of influential actors, thus it is important to reflect on both the formal and informal institutions embedded in social and historical contexts, as well as the individuals that make up societies (Acosta and Pettit, 2013). The analysis will draw on key components of urban regime theory, reflecting on how various interests within the public-private-sector are incorporated into governing coalitions. In particular, attention will be paid to how governing coalitions collude across the boundaries of state and market to maximise returns to scarce resources, specifically in the form of rent-extracting cabals. An actor-oriented approach aligns itself well with notions of 'power to' and the capacity to govern, as

well as with the notion of human-centred development, which purports that development must have relevance to the community in question and must be in line with the values and ambitions of the people (Slim, 1996; Harris, 2000). For development to be successful, it must be human-centred, taking into account the cultural and social context, as well as the economic, technological and environmental conditions that surround it (Slim, 1996). To this end, the analysis will focus on three actors central to the case study:

- Government: the formal institutions that determine legal, political and economic realities, including both local government and national government;
- Business: businesses that largely determine and influence economic activities; and
- Residents: the local community and civil society organisations relevant to this specific case study.

Forms of Power

While the first point of focus will be the actors involved in the power process, particular attention will be paid to the forms of power used, drawing significantly on theory regarding mechanisms of power and key elements of 'power over'. This consideration helps to examine how power is exercised to shape the inclusiveness of participation (Cornwall, 2008). Three forms of power will be considered, aligned closely with the three dimensional views of power and their mechanisms:

- Visible power: focuses on the conventional understanding of power negotiated through formal rules, structures, institutions, and processes;
- Hidden power: focuses on the control over decision-making, the way the powerful maintain their influence through the mobilisation of bias and how they control the agenda of decision-making to often exclude the concerns of less powerful groups. The hidden forms of power will take into account elements such as knowledge, the control of information, and the use of symbols to influence decision-making (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970); and
- Invisible power: focuses on how people view their place in society and explains why existing power relations are prevented from being questioned (Gaventa, 2005; Miller *et al.*, 2006; Luttrell *et al.*, 2007; VeneKlasen, 2007). Considered the least explored notion by power theorists, the invisible form of power incorporates notions of identity, particularly how people's location and sense of belonging has influenced their consciousness and perceptions of their interests (Dixon and Durrheim, 2000; Woodward, 2005), and how these interests may be systematically distorted by the perspectives and actions of the dominant (Zalta et al., 2016). This directly relates to the notion of 'actors' and understanding the different roles that actors have in perpetuating power dynamics. Recognising that identity and social location directly relates to notions of belonging, which in turn relates to processes of being naturalised to everyday practices, this draws on both the Gramscian notion of hegemony and Bordieu's notion of habitus (Gramsci, 1971; Bordieu, 1990), as well as the Foucauldian discourse of 'performativity' (Butler, 1993; Fenster, 2004; Yuval-Davis, 2011), where learned norms and dispositions that shape our behaviour

constantly interact with the social field, which itself is structured by symbolically mediated relations of domination. Understanding identity is important to this study as it directly relates to belonging in society, and the power relations that shape how and why decisions over urban futures are made.

Spaces of Power

After considering the actors involved in the dynamic power process and the forms of power that are used, it is important to reflect on the 'spaces' of power where interaction occurs. Gaventa explains that spaces are seen as 'opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships which affect their lives' (Gaventa, 2005:11). While spaces can offer opportunity for citizen engagement, they are also limited by their own boundaries – spaces are bounded yet permeable areas (Hickey and Mohan, 2005) and in this way, power can be understood as the 'network of social boundaries that delimit fields of possible action' (Hayward, 1991:2). For this reason, spaces should not be considered neutral – since institutions and actors are the embodiment of power, the spaces created by them are inherently political in nature (Cornwall, 2002; Mohanty, 2004). When analysing power, it is important to determine how the spaces for participation were created, with whose interests, and under what terms of engagement. For this, three types of spaces will be used in this research, following Gaventa's structure of analysis:

- Provided or closed spaces: spaces controlled by an elite group;
- Invited spaces: in an attempt to increase legitimacy, or as a result of external pressure, those in power may create 'invited' spaces for outsiders to share opinions; and
- Claimed or created spaces: these can provide the less powerful with a chance to develop their agendas and create solidarity without the influence of power holders (Gaventa, 2005; Luttrell *et al.*, 2007).

Levels and Places of Power

A central concern of the spaces of participation is how these spaces intersect with the arenas where critical social, political and economic power resides (Cornwall, 2008) and in the context of development, much of the work on spaces for participation involves the contest between local, national and global arenas as locations of power (Gaventa, 2005). The traditional power cube thus distinguishes between local, national and global levels of places but recognising that many development practitioners argue that participatory practice must start locally and at a community-level (Slim-wrong, 1996), this adapted cube will consider the following:

- Community level: the interaction between the spaces for participation available at a community level[2];
- Local/City level: the interaction between the spaces for participation available at the local level, specifically at the city level considering the dynamics of urban governance; and
- National level: the interaction between the spaces for participation nationally and the other levels of power, locally and at a community-level.

In this way, consideration was made of the contest between the community-level, and local and national arenas of power, and how this shaped the spaces for participation. Understanding the interaction between these places and levels of power is important (Luttrell *et al.*, 2007) because the possibilities within community spaces often depend on the extent to which power is legitimised nationally and shared with the locality (Gaventa, 2005). The challenge is not only how to build participatory action at differing levels, but how to 'promote the democratic and accountable vertical links across actors at each level' (Gaventa, 2005:14). In this way, the adapted power cube helps to build an understanding of the way in which the community-level is intimately embedded in the local/city and national places (Luttrell *et al.*, 2007).

These four elements comprise the unique structure for power analysis that will be used in this study. Examining these key elements individually, as well as how they interact with each other, allows for an in-depth analysis of power to be made within the specific context of this case study. This analysis will not only help to understand how power operates but also how this influences the broader decisions for development, and whether these decisions are in line with the principles of sustainability.

2.8. Conclusion

This chapter has presented a theoretical understanding of power by focusing on two key aspects: 'power to' and 'power over'. 'Power to' has considered how power effects material or developmental outcomes, particularly in the form of urban governance, and how decision-making is conducted within the complexity of social spaces. In has highlighted that the power to produce the city requires co-operation between local government and other social actors like business which often manifests in the form of urban regimes where the interests within the public-private-sector are incorporated into governing coalitions, particularly rent-extracting cabals.

In contrast, 'power over' has reflected on power as domination, looking specifically at the three dimensional views of power that include visible forms of power, such as conflict and

[2] It is important to note that the term 'community' is complex and while it is often conceived as an overarching definition for groups of people, it tends to gloss over the complexity and variety of human relationships (Thomsen *et al.*, 2009), flattening diverse individuals into assumed groups. In this thesis, the term 'community' refers largely to communities of place – groups of people with diverse characteristics but linked by geographical locations, and the social ties and shared perspectives associated with this (Thomsen *et al.*, 2009).

the control of resources, hidden forms of power, such as influence and agenda-setting, and invisible forms of power, relating to hegemony and social compliance through shaping identities and subjectivities. By considering these three dimensional views, it is possible to better understand the instruments and mechanisms of power which, directly relate to how power can be analysed.

To this end, a new framework for a situated power analysis has been presented for this research to see how power impacts the achievement of social sustainability within this specific case study, taking into account both elements of 'power to' and 'power over'. Drawing on the power cube approach, this framework includes four key elements of analysis: the actors and institutions involved in decision-making, the forms of power utilised by the different actors, the spaces in which participation and decision-making occurs, and the levels where this occurred, thus revealing the dynamic power process. This framework forms the basis of the research methodology that will be used in this research, and the following chapter discusses the methodology undertaken, as well as presents an overview of the situation where the research took place, thus locating the power analysis within a specific situation in Hout Bay.

CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

To understand where the power lies to influence decisions for development, it is necessary to conduct an analysis of power, to determine what the mechanisms of power are and how this influences the decision-making process. To conduct such an analysis requires two things: a comprehensive methodology that outlines the research process, and an overview of the community in which this methodology is to be applied. This chapter addresses both of those points.

First, the methodology will be discussed, including the overall research question, the research design, data collection and data analysis. To this end, it is important to note that this is an autoethnographic study, one that uses personal experiences to describe and understand broader social dynamics. While autoethnography is at the heart of this study, the methodology includes interviews and the review of a variety of documentary sources that were used to triangulate information. In addition, critical discourse analysis and content analysis were used to interpret this data, using the themes of power identified in Chapter 2.

Second, this methodology is being applied in the community of Hout Bay and as such, a historical overview of the community will be presented. This overview will include a brief history of the community, looking at its development over the years and how this has shaped the community at present. In addition, particular focus will be placed on the community of Hangberg which is the key focus area of this research.

3.1. Research Question and Methodology

This research is focused on one central question: where does the power lie to influence decision-making about development?

To adequately answer this, an in-depth examination was made of the power dynamics that influenced the decisions made around the Oceana fishmeal factory in Hout Bay. To understand these dynamics, a number of key questions were interrogated:

- Who were the actors involved?
- What mechanisms of power did each actor use and to what end?
- What were the dynamics and relationships of power between the actors?
- How did these dynamics influence the decision-making process, and how did these processes impact on the achievement of social sustainability?

These questions have been answered using a structured research design, as discussed.

The ontological positioning of this research was that of a constructivist approach, emphasising the importance of context and culture in understanding what occurs in society, and constructing knowledge based on this understanding (McMahon, 1997; Kim, 2001). Knowledge is also considered as a socially and culturally constructed product – individuals create meaning continually through their interactions with each other and the environment they live in (Gredler, 1997; Kim, 2001; Bryman, 2012). As such, autoethnographic techniques, alongside extensive interviews and participant observation, formed the basis of this study, accompanied by a thorough document review and discourse analysis. These methods were selected with the aim of developing a holistic understanding of the case study, not only of the events that occurred but, more importantly, of the way in which people viewed and experienced these events, helping to explain the dynamics of power present within Hout Bay.

3.2. Research Design

This research has used a qualitative single-case study approach. Qualitative approaches aim to describe and understand phenomenon that occur in natural settings and involve studying the complexity of the phenomenon to reveal, in descriptive terms, the meanings that people attach to their experiences of the world (Seale, 2004; Yilmaz, 2013). Many qualitative studies – including this research – are grounded in the constructivist paradigm, that reality and knowledge are socially and psychologically constructed, and thus by examining the context that influences people's actions and interactions, and the meaning that people ascribe to their experiences, greater insight can be gained into how people make sense of the world around them. Qualitative research requires an in-depth study of people's lives, capturing and communicating participants' experiences in their own words (Yilmaz, 2013). This contextual approach lends itself well to the study of power, helping to identify the elements that need to be considered in the multi-dimensional nature of complex social problems, situated within a wider social and historical context (Bryman, 1988).

3.2.1. Case studies

Case studies are specifically useful for answering 'how' or 'why' type questions, when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context, and the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are blurred (Yin, 2003:13). In this way, case studies are an ideal method when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed, and are characterised by a research design that gathers detailed information on selective, key issues that are fundamental to the system being examined (Winston, 1997). Case studies also aim to provide multi-perspectival analyses, meaning that consideration is made of the voice and perspective of different actors, but also of the interaction between them (Winston, 1997). Single-case studies are ideal for revelatory cases, where the researcher may have access to a phenomenon that was previously inaccessible. In this way, case study methodology seeks to ensure that the 'essence of the phenomenon is revealed' (Baxter and Jack, 2008:545). This

again lends itself to the research: the story of the fishmeal factory is essentially a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context, situated within a wider social and historical context, and in-depth, multi-perspectival research is required to reveal and understand the specific power dynamics that influenced this process.

It is a frequent criticism of case study research that the results are not widely applicable in real life and that they tend to generalise theories and categories into a common set of cases (Winston, 1997). Rather than aiming for statistical generalisation, case studies rely on analytical generalisation to theory. In this way, the goal of this research is to use the findings of the case study to expand and generalise on theories of power and governance. By analysing this specific case, the research aims to provide knowledge that can inform other cases that can be explained using the same theories of power.

3.2.2. Research Methods and Data Sources

A number of research methods and data sources were used for this research, including 1) autoethnography, 2) semi-structured expert interviews, 3) community interviews, and 4) analysis of documentary sources including official documents, newspapers, and social media. These methods were used to conduct and analyse information and to gain an understanding into the existing power dynamics within Hout Bay, and each is discussed below.

3.2.2.1. Autoethnography

As it will be explained in the chapters that follow, I personally played a central role in the story about the Oceana fishmeal factory in Hout Bay. Initially just a concerned resident, I would come to assume a leading role, advocating for investigations to be made about the factory and would document and communicate these findings for more than six years. The intimate relationship I have to the situation allows me to have a unique understanding and perspective of what transpired, lending itself to autoethnography.

Autoethnography is a research method that uses personal experiences to describe and interpret cultural beliefs and practices for the purposes of extending sociological understanding (Adams, Ellis and Jones, 2017). Autoethnographers believe that personal experiences are infused with political and cultural norms and by self-reflecting on these experiences, they can begin to identify and interrogate the intersections between society and the self (Adams, Ellis and Jones, 2017). In this way, autoethnography acknowledges and accommodates emotionality, subjectivity, and the researcher's influence on the research (Ellingson and Ellis, 2008; Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011). Autoethnography is epistemologically underpinned by the social constructivist perspective that meaning and knowledge is not inherent, and instead is socially constructed in relationships and through informal, interpersonal interaction with each other, as well as formal channels such as academic journals and research (Ellingson and Ellis, 2008). Central to constructivist inquiry is studying what people know and how they 'create, apply, contest and act upon these ideas' (Harris, 2006:225).

Autoethnographers hope to articulate insider knowledge of cultural experiences, providing information or insights that other researchers may not be able to know. In this way, autoethnography relies heavily on participant observation, where researchers 'pay close attention, watch, and listen carefully' (Neuman, 2006:396). Observation provides a good understanding of the context of a situation, particularly when studying sensitive issues, and the information gathered may not have been accessible otherwise (Neuman, 2006). This heavy reliance on observation does not suggest that autoethnographers can provide more truthful or accurate accounts, but rather that their direct experience helps to tell the story in a novel way (Adams, Ellis and Jones, 2017). To this end, a key attribute of autoethnography is storytelling. It is underpinned by the belief that stories are powerful - they are complex, meaningful phenomena that impart ethics and morals, with the ability to introduce unique ways of feeling and thinking that help people to make sense of themselves and others (Adams, 2008; Bochner, 2001, 2002; Fisher, 1984). By producing 'aesthetic and evocative thick descriptions of personal and interpersonal experience' (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2010), autoethnographers describe moments of everyday experiences that cannot be captured through traditional research methods, allowing thoughts, observations, and emotions to be part of the field of study. As such, autoethnographic texts feature dialogue, emotion, and self-consciousness as stories affected by history, social structure, and culture, and they use their own experiences to look deeply at self-other interactions (Adams, Ellis and Jones, 2017). This kind of research provides a unique opportunity to sensitise readers, deepening our capacity to empathise with people who are different from us, thus helping to understand the broader cultural experience (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011).

Autoethnography studies a culture's relational practices and experiences, and these experiences are often referred to as ''epiphanies' – transformative moments and realisations that significantly shape or alter our lives' (Adams, Jones and Ellis, 2015:45). These epiphanies cause us to not only pause and reflect, but to more deeply explore aspects of our identities, relationships and communities. By analysing these epiphanies through a set of methodological tools, as will be discussed, these personal experiences can be used to illustrate broader elements of the cultural experience. In this way, the situation surrounding the fishmeal factory in Hout Bay can be regarded as an epiphany – a transformative time that significantly shaped and altered the lives of people living in Hout Bay, particularly Hangberg, and it is this epiphany that will be explored throughout the research.

3.2.2.2. Scholar-Activism

In keeping with the auto-ethnographic nature of this research, particular attention has been paid to the notion of scholarly-activism. Scholars are typically identified as those who create knowledge in institutional settings and disseminate it through academic publishing, leaving little place for community-based activists to share the identity of scholar (Routledge and Derickson, 2015). While some contend that 'activism and academia don't mix' (Rojas, 2013) there is a growing movement, particularly within environmental justice, that seeks to integrate activism and scholarship, placing value on experience-based knowledge alongside academic knowledge in confronting environmental inequities (Routledge and Derickson,

2015). Scholar-activists are those that seek alignment between their academic work and their political ideals to further social change (Autonomous Geographies, 2010) and scholar-activists see themselves first and foremost as social change-makers who also engage in scholarly activities (Routledge and Derickson, 2015).

The notion of activist research has been an object of scholarly interest for some time. Activist research has broadly been defined as research that commits to engage with research subjects towards the pursuit of a shared political goal, different from critically engaged research where analysis occurs without necessarily engaging politically alongside research subjects (Speed, 2006). To this end, the primary aim of scholar-activism is to disrupt dominant discourses and challenge economic, political, and cultural power relations (Speed, 2006; Smeltzer and Cantillon, 2015). To this end, scholar-activism is embedded in a 'social justice sensibility [that] entails a moral imperative to act as effectively as we can to do something about structurally sustained inequalities' (Frey *et al.*, 1996:11).

While scholar-activism offers the possibility of exploring new insights into social change, challenges are encountered that require consideration. The first is how activist-scholars balance their time and emotions between their academic and activist pursuits (Couture, 2017). This leads to the second, and much more complex, challenge of navigating the ethical boundaries between activism and research, understanding what happens when an activist or activist-centred activity transitions from pure activism to more research-oriented work. When in an activist role, researchers are sometimes in a privileged position to understand and document controversies or debates, and may even have to take a personal position, particularly when representing an organisation. But when in a researcher role, the activist must conduct and publish research differently, treating people as objects of study rather than as fellow activists. It is these conflicting loyalties, and thus different positionalities, that the scholar-activist must navigate (Couture, 2017). To this end, activist-scholars must engage in the 'dance' of doing work that bridges divides, continuously attending to positionality and recognising that racism, sexism, and elitism do not disappear simply with good intentions (Reynolds, Block and Bradley, 2018).

Autoethnography and Scholar-Activism in this Research

Jones (2005:742) purports that 'autoethnograhy writes a world in a state of flux and movement – between story and context, writer and reader, crisis and denouement,' creating 'moments of clarity, connection and charge'. This will be highly evident in the text that follows. The three chapters of the analysis are each divided into two distinct sections: the narrative and the analysis.

The narrative is the story. Written in third person, it follows a chronological account of the events that transpired from 2013 – 2020 surrounding the fishmeal factory in Hout Bay. Using newspaper articles, official documents, interviews, and observations to substantiate my own recollection of the series of events, the narrative will shed light onto the relational practices, common values and beliefs, and shared experiences of the community. In this way, the narrative will begin to discern patterns of cultural experience repeated through feelings,

stories and occurrences (Adams, Jones and Ellis, 2015). These patterns will be described using storytelling techniques, such as plot development, character use, and thick descriptions (Goodall, 2001) designed to 'bring readers into the scene,' helping them to 'experience an experience' (Ellis, 2004:142) for themselves.

The narrative will also be interjected by a series of 'Personal Positioning' breakout boxes. These texts, written in first-person, will be a highly personalised account of my experiences and in this way will provide an 'insider' perspective, helping to facilitate understanding of thoughts, emotions, actions, and overall cultural experiences (Jorgenson, 2002). Recognising that my personal experiences are infused with my own political norms and expectations, these accounts will also help to identify my inherent biases and subjectivities, thus engaging in a rigorous self-reflection process of reflexivity that enables the intersections between the self and social life to be identified and interrogated' (Adams, Ellis and Jones, 2017). These breakout boxes also help to both identify and navigate between my different positionalities as a scholar-activist. One of the key challenges to scholar-activism is distinguishing between the differing roles assumed and these breakout boxes do just that – the highly personalised accounts explain my positionality as an activist, bringing to light the complex emotions and experiences that drove my activism, while the analysis at the end of each chapter demonstrates my positionality as a scholar, drawing on the body of literature and research that is essential to the academic process.

In some ways, this narrative resembles evocative autoethnography – the text is written as a well-crafted prose intended to inspire conversation and an emotional response (Ellingson and Ellis, 2008). But the research is far more than just evocative. While the narrative helps to discern the patterns of cultural experience, the analysis that follows unpacks this more deeply, interrogating these experiences within the theoretical frameworks of power and governance discussed in Chapter 2. In this way, the research is more analytic in its nature, focused on developing a theoretical explanation for the broader social phenomena (Ellis and Ellingson, 2000). While this research could, in some ways, be analysed from a purely theoretical perspective – the theories of power could be observed through more traditional approaches – these autoethnographic techniques have created a space where my own experiences deepen the richness and complexity of understanding, demonstrating how theoretical generalisation in research can mask important nuances of cultural issues, including social class and norms (Ellingson and Ellis, 2008; Adams, Ellis and Jones, 2017).

Anderson (2006) suggests that analytic autoethnographic research has five key features: 1) complete member researcher status; 2) analytic reflexivity; 3) narrative visibility of the researcher's self; 4) dialogue with informants beyond the researcher; and 5) commitment to theoretical analysis. Each of these will be discussed, as well as how they specifically pertain to this research.

The first feature of analytic autoethnography is that the researcher must be a complete member in the social world under study. This typically happens when a researcher is either born into a community, or thrown into a group by chance circumstance, and in this way, membership in the group precedes the decision to conduct the research (Anderson, 2006).

This is indeed the case – I was a member of and activist within Hout Bay before the research began, and it was my membership in the community that enabled me to conduct the research. Significant periods of time were spent documenting and analysing action, recording events, conversations, and purposively engaging with it, at times making fieldwork 'nearly schizophrenic in its frenzied multiple focus' (Adler and Adler, 1987:70). The analytic autoethnographer is an analytical and self-conscious participant, and as such, understanding emerges not from detached discovery, but from engaged dialogue (Anderson, 2006).

Second, analytic reflexivity is critical to understanding the relationship between the researcher and the data and their effects on each other. As it is observed, autoethnographers 'form part of the representational processes in which they are engaging and are part of the story they are telling' (Atkinson, Coffey and Delamont, 1999:62). As such, autoethnographic researchers tend to have more of a stake in the research than a detached participant observant, and the autoethnographic interrogation of self and other may 'transform the researcher's own beliefs, actions, and sense of self' (Anderson, 2006:383).

To this end, the researcher must be very visible and active in the text, the third attribute of analytic autoethnography. The researcher's own feelings and experiences are incorporated into the story and are considered as vital data for understanding the social world being observed. Analytic autoethnographers openly discuss changes in their beliefs and relationships over the course of fieldwork, revealing themselves as people grappling with different issues in a fluid, rather than static, social world (Anderson, 2006). By textually acknowledging and reflexively assessing how the researcher's participation influences social understanding and relations, a deeper understanding can be gained. This analytic reflexivity and personal visibility in the text will be demonstrated most acutely in the Personal Positioning breakout boxes which offer deeper insights into both how my beliefs and actions influenced the research, and how the research influenced my actions and beliefs. It is cautioned that autoethnography can lose its sociological value when it devolves into 'self-absorption' and in this way, great care has been taken to ensure that the reflections included are 'essential to the argument, not a decorative flourish, not exposure for its own sake' (Behar, 1996:14).

The fourth feature of analytic autoethnography is dialogue with informants beyond the self because, while grounded in self-experience, autoethnography ultimately seeks to extend beyond the self. Dialogue with data and others is thus imperative and the research should be viewed relationally, how it can help to inform and change social knowledge (Davies, 1999; Anderson, 2006). To this end, this research incorporates the views from the semi-structured expert interviews and community interviews, as discussed below. In addition, there was extensive use of primary and secondary documents, including newspaper articles, official documents, and social media posts, and these too have been included throughout the research.

Lastly, analytic authoethnographers demonstrate a commitment to an analytic agenda and a defining characteristic is to use empirical data to gain insight into a broader set of social phenomena than those provided by the data themselves (Anderson, 2006). In this way, the

research does not seek to generalise from these experiences, but rather to use these experiences to develop, refine, and extend theoretical understanding. Indeed, the value and vitality of research depends on the illumination it can provide to the theoretical topic under investigation (Karp, 1996), rather than producing 'undebatable conclusions' (Ellis and Bochner, 2000:744). This commitment to analytic rigour will be demonstrated in the analysis provided for each chapter where the specific events, experiences, and actions will be reflected on, directly relating this to the theories of power and governance discussed in Chapter 2. The overall analysis of how this research contributes to the theoretical understanding more broadly will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

3.2.2.3. Semi-Structured Expert Interviews

As a common qualitative research method, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key members of the Hout Bay community and representatives from the City and Oceana. These interviews were conducted between January 2019 and February 2020 and included:

- 4 Hangberg community leaders
- 2 Hangberg community activists
- 3 representatives from three different Hout Bay civil society groups
- 2 representatives from FAHB
- 1 representative from Oceana
- 1 representative from the City of Cape Town

These individuals were selected for the different perspectives they offered on both the situation surrounded the fishmeal factory and the existing power dynamics within Hout Bay. These interviews were useful in investigating complex behaviours, opinions, emotions and affects, and for collecting a diversity of experiences (Bryman, 1988; Longhurst, 2016). While these interviews did not offer a 'route to the truth', the conversational manner in which they were conducted, using open-ended questions guided by key themes, gave participants the opportunity to explore areas of importance and to respond in their own words, thus offering a partial insight into what people do and think. The semi-structured interviews offered a flexible means by which to explore complex issues and understand people's experiences and the results of these discussions offered an assertion about reality that is contained throughout the chapters (Longhurst, 2016).

It is also important to note that a total of 10 people declined to be interviewed, from government officials to community representatives, mostly due to the sensitivity of the topic. This sensitivity, and how it influenced the number of potential interviewees, is specifically discussed in the limitations section below, as well as at various points throughout the chapters, particularly Chapter 7.

Sampling

For the semi-structured interviews, two sampling approaches were used in combination – purposive and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling is the deliberate choice of an

informant due to the qualities the informant possesses, including their knowledge and experiences, which regards them as 'information rich' sources that help to enhance understanding of the research question (Devers and Frankel, 2000; Bernard, 2002; Tongco, 2007; Yilmaz, 2013). This approach was particularly relevant considering the nature of the research and individuals were selected based on their involvement and experience regarding the situation in Hout Bay. In addition to purposive sampling, snowball sampling was also used. Arguably one of the most widely used methods of sampling, snowball sampling occurs when the researcher accesses informants through contact information provided by other informants, in this case those selected through the purposive sampling approach. As this 'snowball' effect of research is repetitive, accumulative, and dynamic when used in a constructivist approach, it can generate a unique type of social knowledge that is 'emergent, political and interactional' (Noy, 2008). Using the snowball approach was particularly effective considering the sensitivity of the research topic and the need to gather knowledge of 'insiders' to locate people for the study (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981:141). Snowball sampling allowed for the sampling of 'natural interactional units' (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981:141) and in this way, lead to dynamic moments where unique social knowledge could be generated (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).

3.2.2.4. Community Interviews

While semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants, as discussed above, 26 brief community interviews were conducted with members of the Hangberg community to help get a general sense of thoughts and opinions from Hangberg. These interviews were conducted in early 2019 over a period of one month. A local fieldworker conducted the interviews due to his familiarity with the area and his fluency in the local language of Afrikaans. Because the purpose of these interviews was to gather general thoughts and opinions, convenience sampling was used (Neuman, 2006). In this way, the research assistant positioned himself in a busy section of Hangberg and spoke to people as they passed, thus there was no inclusion criteria identified prior to the selection of subjects (Neuman, 2006). This helped to ensure that a general sense of opinions was obtained, which supplemented the findings from the other data sources.

3.2.2.5. Documentary Sources

Official Documents

A variety of official documents were used to investigate the situation, predominantly documents authored by the main actors: the City of Cape Town, Oceana, and FAHB. This can be broken down as follows:

- 10 official letters from the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Government;
- Minutes, press releases, and communication materials provided by Oceana; and
- 25 updates from FAHB.

All of these documents pertained directly to the situation at the fishmeal factory and were obtained through various processes and sources, as will be discussed in the analysis chapters.

Newspaper Articles

In addition to the primary data sources, secondary sources were used to both gain further insight into the situation, and also to assist with the verification and triangulation of information. Secondary data sources included newspaper articles. A total of 85 newspaper articles were reviewed from more than 10 different news agencies. Particular attention was paid to articles from the Sentinel newspaper, a local Hout Bay newspaper that specifically reports on community issues. Each article pertained to Hout Bay in different ways, discussing either the fishmeal factory specifically, issues related to the fishing industry more broadly, or more socio-economic issues relating to Hout Bay. When reviewing the articles, particular attention was paid to the language used, symbolism, and any terms that relate to the concepts of power discussed in Chapter 2.

Social Media Posts

Hout Bay has an active social media presence and significant discussion takes place on a variety of social media platforms, including several Facebook groups – Hout Bay Organised (HBO), Hout Bay Complete (HBC), and the Hangberg Harbour Community (HHC). In the advent of modern-day social media communication, Facebook profiles have come to be understood as 'constructed tokens of identity' (Casteleyn, Mottart and Rutten, 2009:2) and Facebook groups and discussion platforms have the capacity to 'foster a sense of collective identity' (Kavada, 2012:31). While there is a general lack of empirical evidence to conclude how social media influences political participation, it is useful in providing 'anecdotal evidence and sweeping generality' (Segerberg and Bennett, 2011:199). This research has used a variety of Facebook posts with this spirit, and as a secondary source of information. The Facebook posts included throughout this thesis help to set the tone for the discussion – they are not intended to be exact representations of identity, but speak more to the general feelings and emotions expressed about the fishmeal factory by a range of individuals from the Hout Bay valley and Hangberg. In this way, the social media posts are supplementary to the other sources of data used.

3.3. Data Analysis

Analysis of the data was achieved in a variety of ways. First, in line with the principles of qualitative approaches, the data was written in a particularly descriptive nature, including significant description of people, activities, interactions and settings so as to better relate the 'story' of what occurred and the events that shaped this. These thick descriptions of the participants and settings help to deepen and widen understanding of the general context of the research (Yilmaz, 2013).

3.3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis

Second, when examining the text and talk from the interviews and document reviews, a process of critical discourse analysis (CDA) was used to study the way social power was enacted.

CDA is a way of understanding how power operates through discourse and it focuses on the way that discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce or challenge relations of power and dominance in society (Van Dijk, 2003). CDA recognises that discourse is influenced by social structures and produced in social interaction, thus it tends to focus on specific social problems or political issues rather than paradigms or fashions (Van Dijk, 2003). It also does not operate under a unitary theoretical framework, lending itself to the nature of this study and the analysis of power conducted through the lens of the situation at the fishmeal factory in Hout Bay. To effectively use CDA, it is important to understand its main tenets and how these apply to power analysis.

First, the relationship between ideology and discourse is of critical importance for CDA. While notoriously vague, ideologies can broadly be described as the 'ideas' or 'belief systems' that are shared by members of a collective group (Van Dijk, 2006a). By having shared beliefs about the fundamental conditions and ways of existence of a group, ideologies consist of social representations that define the social identity or self-image of the group, based on the general, sociocultural knowledge shared. Ideologies are gradually acquired, typically forming over many years, experiences and discourses, and thus remain relatively stable, active for a lifetime of a group member (Van Dijk, 2006b, 2006a). While ideologies ground the social representations of members, they are also the ultimate basis of discourse and other social practices, allowing members to organise and coordinate their actions in view of the goals and interests of the group as a whole, and in their relationships to other groups (Van Dijk, 2006a). It is important to note that because ideologies develop as part of group relations, conflict, or domination and resistance, they can also play a role in legitimising the abuse of power by dominant groups. Indeed, one of the most efficient forms of ideological domination is Gramsci's theory of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971), when dominated groups accept dominant ideologies as natural or common sense (Van Dijk, 2006b, 2006a). As it is argued, power is not always exerted through abusive acts of dominant groups, but often through the countless taken-for-granted actions of everyday life (Essed, 1991). In a sense, discourse is what makes these ideologies observable in that they may be explicitly expressed and formulated, and it is also through discourse that ideologies are acquired, learned, propagated or contested (Van Dijk, 2006b).

Second, it is important to recognise the connection between power and discourse. Social power can largely be defined in terms of control, in that groups have more or less power depending on their ability to control the minds and actions of others (Van Dijk, 2003). This ability is typically derived from a power base of privileged access to social resources, such as force, money, knowledge, culture or communication, and the types of power are largely determined by the resources employed, for example, journalists have power because of their access to information (Van Dijk, 2003). Groups may have more or less control of other

groups, or only have such control in specific situations, and in some cases dominated groups may comply with and condone such power, even finding it natural. Because action is controlled by the mind, the ability to influence people's minds is a way of indirectly controlling their actions. As such, access to specific forms of discourse, such as media, should be considered a power resource itself (Van Dijk, 2003). In this way, there are two fundamental questions to understanding the relationship between power and discourse – how do powerful groups control public discourse, and what are the social consequences of this control (Van Dijk, 2003)? Considering this, particular attention was paid to the following:

- **Control of the discourse.** Access to and control over public discourse is an important power resource – most people are relatively passive targets of text and talk and those who have control over more, and more influential, discourse have more power (Van Dijk, 2003). Particular attention was paid to the forms of discourse, the context, the topic and content, as well as the structures of text and talk.
- **Influence.** Influencing peoples' perceptions is a fundamental way of reproducing dominance and people tend to accept the beliefs, knowledge and opinions expressed in discourse from sources they perceive as credible, trustworthy or authoritative (Van Dijk, 2003). Certain meanings and forms of discourse can have more influence on people's minds, and in many cases, recipients may not have the knowledge or beliefs needed to challenge the discourse they are exposed to (Wodak, 1987). For analysis, this research examined how discourse structures influenced mental representations of the situation, contributing to the 'mental models,' the personal memories of individual people based on their experiences (Van Dijk, 2002:16). It is important to recognise that mental models do not only represent the facts, but typically the facts as people define them. In this way, mental models define the situation based on the opinions produced social attitudes that are in turn controlled by ideology (Van Dijk, 2002, 2003). The research examined how the situation was defined in different instances, how this was expressed in, for example, topic headlines, and how this influenced the general understanding of the discourse. In addition, the research examined how context features, the expressions of social attitudes based on ideologies (Van Dijk, 2002), influenced the way the communicative situation was defined (Martin Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997).
- **Media Discourse and Polarisation.** It is important to recognise that news is not necessarily a reflection of reality, but is a product shaped by the interplay between political, economic and cultural forces (Fowler, 1991). There are easily observable surface structures in media language, such as the biased use of the descriptions 'us' and 'them,' playing on the centuries-old image of 'The Other' (Van Dijk, 2003). The Other, a representation often built on negative stereotypes, prejudices and forms of derogation, is both expressed and reproduced through discourse, and it is the continuity of the tradition of negative images of 'the other' that partly explains the persistence of dominant patterns of representation (Shohat and Stam, 1994; Van Dijk, 2003). There is often a positive presentation of the 'in-group' whilst a negative presentation of the 'out-group,' and Others are often associated not simply with difference, but with deviance, illegitimacy or threat (D'Souza, 1995; Van Dijk, 2003).

> Social conflict is thus represented and enhanced by polarisation, and discursively sustained through excluding the Others from the community of 'Us' (Van Dijk, 2003).

In addition to CDA, content analysis was also used to help interpret the data based on the categories and themes that emerged from the theories of power discussed in Chapter 2. Content analysis requires the researcher to be clear about the variables of information that are necessary to answer the research question and to use different categories to identify this information (Halperin and Heath, 2020).

To this end, this research made use of the adapted power cube framework presented in Chapter 2. Incorporating both the notions of 'power to' and 'power over', the cube considers four key aspects specific to this case study: the actors and institutions involved in the decision-making processes, the different forms of power that each actor manifested, the spaces where these actors interact, and the levels and locations of where this power resides. Using this adapted power cube framework ensures a 'dynamic understanding' (Luttrell *et al.*, 2007:1) of how power operates within the case study of Hout Bay.

This overall analysis enabled particular insights to be drawn about governance and decision-making, leading back to the overall research question of understanding where the power lies to influence decisions, and how this decision-making impacts the achievement of social sustainability.

3.3.1.1. Triangulation

Once the CDA was completed, the different methodological approaches were combined using a process of triangulation, commonly used in social science research to improve both the value and validity of results (Jick, 1979). Triangulation involves using more than one method in data collection, as well as using more than one theory or approach to explain the research results, thus helping to 'enhance the rigour of research' (Robson, 2002:174). Triangulation was used to crosscheck information from the multiple sources, which helped to reduce the risk of drawing false conclusions, control bias and establish valid positions (Jick, 1979; Creswell and Miller, 2000; Brink, 2002; Spicer, 2004). While triangulation is useful, in some ways it is too limited for autoethnographic studies considering their alignment to social constructivism, and as such, 'crystallisation' offers a more post-modern form of validity, encompassing multiple forms of analysis indicated through the multiple faces of a crystal (Ellingson and Ellis, 2008:446). Crystallisation encourages using multiple lenses to offer alternative theoretical explanations, which helps to stimulate reflexivity and guard against the limitations of self-enquiry. In this way, crystallisation helps to move beyond one field of knowledge and instead seek explanations that help to broaden understanding, enabling contrasting perspectives to be included in the analysis and thereby supporting the qualitative approach within autoethnography (Struthers, 2012).

Once the triangulation and crystallisation took place, it was then possible to search for convergence among the multiple and different sources of information, themes and categories were developed that allowed the research to be understood from different

angles (Creswell and Miller, 2000; Yilmaz, 2013), which enabled a further analysis regarding power.

3.4. Ethical Considerations

Research ethics is an integral component of research, both in protecting the welfare of research participants and in ensuring that misconduct and plagiarism does not occur. Although there are varying approaches to ethics, four philosophical principles are widely accepted: autonomy and respect for the dignity of persons; ensuring no harm befalls research participants; attempting to maximise the benefits the research will afford participants; and acting from a place of justice, ensuring participants are treated with respect and equity (Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 2006). Following on from these four philosophical pillars, eight practical principles have been developed which include collaborative partnership, social value, scientific validity, fair selection of study population, favourable risk/benefit ratio, independent ethical review, informed consent and on-going respect for participants and study communities (Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 2006). By both considering and applying these principles, ethical understanding is enhanced, as is the value of the research.

These ethical principles were applied at all stages of the research, particularly during the semi-structured interviews. All participants were fully informed of the research being conducted and were provided with an overview of the research, detailing the goals, process and ethical considerations. Participants willing to be involved gave verbal consent, acknowledging that their participation was voluntary and could be withdrawn at any time, their names would remain confidential unless otherwise specified by the participant, the interviews would be recorded and stored safely for research purposes only, and the results of the research would be published. Efforts were also undertaken to ensure that participants were not simply a means to an end for the research, and instead, engagement continued with several participants to further validate and verify the conclusions drawn. In this way, the participants were assured of their importance in the research and how their contribution helped to build an understanding of the power dynamics in Hout Bay, and how this influenced development outcomes. Some people declined to participate in the interviews and the circumstances around this have been included in the research.

Particular consideration was also made regarding the ethics of using of social media data. Social media platforms are increasingly used as a means of communication, sharing both information and attitudes and behaviours on a wide range of topics. This user-generated content is invaluable to researchers and given the relatively new and emerging context of social media platforms as research sites, there is as yet no clear ethical framework for researchers (Townsend and Wallace, 2016). Various guidelines, however, do exist. One of the biggest areas of concern with social media data is whether data should be considered public or private. It is suggested that social media data is public when information is identifiable but not private, information gathering requires no interaction with the person who posted it online, and whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy on behalf of the social media user (British Psychological Association, 2013; Moreno *et al.*, 2013). For

example, information posted on Twitter using a specific hashtag or information posted in a Facebook group would be considered as 'public'. In contrast, information posted in a closed group or a platform requiring a password would be considered as 'private'. A second consideration is that of confidentiality and anonymity, protecting the identity of unwitting participants. To this end, it is important to ensure that users of social media are anonymised in research outputs, and that posts used in data collection are unlikely to cause harm to individuals (Moreno *et al.*, 2013).

Bearing these ethical considerations in mind, the social media data used in this research have been used in the following manner. First, all the comments and posts used came from open community groups specific to Hout Bay. These groups are intended to promote dialogue and foster communication between residents of Hout Bay and it is commonly understood that the information posted in these groups is public information. No data has been used from private or closed groups. Second, all the posts used have been anonymised, where all names, photographs, and references to specific people (other than public officials) have been removed. The information in the posts and data used in no way incriminate or potentially harm any individual. Third, this research is in compliance with Facebook's Privacy Policy which allows third-parties to access data information.

It is also important to note that autoethnography bears a number of ethical considerations. It is understood that relational ethics are heightened for autoethnographers, largely because the characters and location of the community being written about are usually easily identifiable to the readers (Ellis, 2007). By using their personal experience, autoethnographers not only implicate themselves with their work, but also the others they write about, and it is imperative that this is kept in the uppermost of researchers' minds throughout the research and writing process (Ellis, 2007). Bearing this in mind, every effort has been made to ensure the identities of the participants were protected as far as possible, although this was at times difficult considering the close-knit nature of the community.

Lastly, a plagiarism declaration has been signed to ensure the work of the authors used and referenced have been respected and acknowledged, in line with the plagiarism policies of the University of the Western Cape Political Studies Department.

3.5. Limitations

Considering that this study draws on the social constructionist perspective, it is important to note that constructivism emphasises the subjective interrelationship between the researcher and the participant (Hayes and Oppenheim, 1997; Pidgeon and Henwood, 1997). Researchers, in their 'humanness,' are part of the research endeavour, rather than objective observers, and their own values must be acknowledged as an inevitable part of the outcome (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). This is especially the case for this research, which is embedded in autoethnographic practices as described above. To this end, my background, beliefs and biases are articulated throughout the analysis, using autoethnographic techniques to explore this interrelationship further.

There were also some practical limitations to the study. First, my involvement in and relationship to the situation being studied affected personal relationships with some research participants. For the Hangberg community in particular, some residents have a very negative perception of my involvement, viewing me personally as a main instigator of their socio-economic threat. It would have been impossible for me to get genuine responses from these participants and to accommodate this, a research assistant was used to collect data in the Hangberg community. The research assistant was also helpful in overcoming limitations to language – as a non-Afrikaans speaker it would have been difficult for me to establish the necessary rapport with participants to discuss the often sensitive subject of power.

Second, a total number of 11 participants declined to participate in the interviews including: representatives from the City of Cape Town, including City Health, the Housing Department, and the MAYCO Member for Safety and Security; representatives from Oceana; the former Hout Bay councillor; two representatives involved in the Hout Bay Market and activities related to the harbour; the administrator for a major social media site (Hout Bay Complete); and the former chairman of the Hout Bay Residents and Rate Payers Association. The reasons for their lack of participation varied – while some simply didn't want to be involved for personal reasons, many others declined for what appeared to be political reasons. The details of this are discussed extensively at various points throughout the analysis chapters, particularly Chapter 7. While this research would undoubtedly have been strengthened by the input of these participants, this was a limitation that could not be overcome, and extensive effort has been made to ensure the collection and analysis of data in other ways, as will be evident throughout the analysis chapters.

CHAPTER 4

HOUT BAY: THE CASE STUDY

The community of Hout Bay is situated along the Atlantic seaboard of the Cape Peninsula and located within the broader metropolis of Cape Town, South Africa. The community is housed in one of the most spectacular natural environments of the country. It is bordered on either side by the Table Mountain range, which at one end follows a narrow neck leading to the wealthy mountainside suburb of Constantia, and at the other end, opens out onto a crescent moon bay with scenic views of both the mountains and the sea. Over the years it has become a major tourist attraction because of its natural beauty and the unique fishing village charm that the community, particularly the harbour, has to offer (Luckett, 1999).

Figure 4.1: Aerial view of Hout Bay (Source: TripAdvisor, 2019)

While Hout Bay is classified as a suburb of Cape Town, demographically it is more typical of a small town or coastal rural village. Unlike most suburbs it has the three major racialized groups of South Africa living side by side: the white, more affluent residents known as the Valley; the coloured township of Hangberg; and the informal black settlement of Imizamo Yethu, the latter both regarded as much poorer. According to the 2011 census, Hout Bay has a total population of 35,000 residents (Census, 2011) but this is believed to be sorely out of date. With a population of 15,400, the largest community is Imizamo Yethu, followed by the Valley at 10,000, and Hangberg with 6,000 people. Typical with apartheid urban planning,

despite residents of the Valley being a smaller population, they enjoy 90 per cent of the land. In this way, Hout Bay is often described as a unique microcosm of South Africa (Mail and Guardian, 2000, 2007) as it 'epitomises many of the complexities associated with the breakdown of the apartheid city' (Gawith, 1996:5).

This situation is, of course, the result of Hout Bay's interesting history.

4.1. Brief History of Hout Bay

Although there is no written history before the time of Dutch settlers, the area of Hout Bay was historically occupied by the Khoi-San. Stone Age deposits show that Khoi family groups had settled, or at least passed through the area, more than 2,500 years ago (Gibbs, no date; Luckett, 1999; SAHistory, 2018). The strikingly beautiful bay, marked in early 16th century Portuguese maps as *Porto Fragoso*, became of interest after the Dutch established a colony in Table Bay in 1652 (Luckett, 1999). Requiring timber for construction and shipbuilding, and with no forests in their immediate vicinity, they began to explore the land behind Table Mountain. The heavily wooded valley with its naturally protected bay soon became a prime timber source and was named accordingly: *Houtbaai* ('wood bay') (Greef, 2013; SAHistory, 2018; Anciano and Piper, 2019).

While timber and agriculture remained primary activities in the bay for the next several hundred years, attention then turned towards fishing. While the local populations had been fishing for generations, the first colonial fishing village was established in 1867 when a German immigrant began to fish in the area and in the early 19th Century the first formal fishery in Hout Bay exported dried snoek to Mauritius in exchange for sugar (Westby-Nunn, 2005; SAHistory, 2018). This was soon followed by a rock lobster fishery and the establishment of the Hout Bay Canning Company (Van Sittert, 1994). By the 1940s, the major social transition brought about by the war led to substantial policy reforms (Hauck and Sowman, 2001; Van Sittert, 2003) that focused on supporting big fishing companies who were allowed to extend monopoly control (Van Sittert, 2002; Greef, 2013; Visser, 2015).

This reform became the foundation that the modern fishing industry was built on, focused on facilitating and financing the rise of white monopolies involved in the commercial sector rather than the development of small-scale fishers (Van Sittert, 2002; Greef, 2013). Hout Bay was no exception. After the harbour was constructed in 1937, Hout Bay was home to the largest cold storage plant in the southern hemisphere (Westby-Nunn, 2005) leading to the establishment of fish processing factories in the 1950s (Van Sittert, 1994), and as the lumber and farming industries went into decline, fishing and fish processing quickly became the largest industry in the area (SAHistory, 2018). By 1959, several fish processing facilities were established and when they went into production, there was a 'storm of protest' from Hout Bay residents over the smell produced, leading to the installation of full-scale scrubbing towers at the processing facilities (Westby-Nunn, 2005:49). While this was effective to some degree, the 'smell has continued as a bane to the Hout Bay residents' (Westby-Nunn, 2005:49).

During this time, all races of the sparsely populated village had lived mixed together in the valley of Hout Bay, but following the Group Areas Act of 1950 under the apartheid government, Hout Bay was zoned as a white residential suburb. The land above the harbour known as Hangberg, that had been little more than a workers' hostel, was designated for coloured populations (Isaacs, 2003) and all coloureds living in the Valley, working as sharecroppers, farm and household labourers, were forcibly removed, sometimes on two or more occasions, into council flats and houses (Luckett, 1999; SAHistory, 2018; Anciano and Piper, 2019).

As the fishing industry continued to grow, exploitation of coloured labour created an extremely poor and dependent workforce, incapable of ensuring its own housing needs and the fishing companies erected council flats in Hangberg to house their employees (Fieuw, 2011; SAHistory, 2018). As the fishing industry boomed in the 1970s, these became overcrowded leading to the first proliferation of backyard dwellings. The issue of squatting increased due to constraints between the need for labour in white industry and the apartheid policy of turning the Western Cape and Hout Bay into a Coloured Labour Preference Area. As people were denied accommodation, squatting remained the only solution (Froestad, 2005; SAHistory, 2018). As the white residents increasingly regarded the growth of squatter camps as an eyesore, measures were taken to evict unwanted elements from the Valley and limit African and coloured influx. During the next 10 years, racial tensions peaked as detection and pass raids, demolition of shacks, forced removals, and imprisonment became the order of the day (Tefre, 2010). As the fishing industry began to decline in the 1980s, so too did the social order in Hangberg as it began to witness an increase of gang activities, drug abuse, and poaching (SAHistory, 2018).

Despite this, Hout Bay became an increasingly desirable residential area as Cape Town rapidly densified and people began to move outside of the city centre (SAHistory, 2018; Anciano and Piper, 2019). Major socio-economic changes occurred in the 1960s and 1970s when former farmland was sold for residential development and the Valley grew into a white area. By the mid-1980s, as residential growth was on the rise, so too was the need for labour and this began to attract black migrant workers. Precluded from ownership or secure leases by group areas legislation, squatting began to occur. Initially the effects were minimal, taking place on land owned by the existing white middle class or along the Disa River, but by the early 1990s more than 2000 people lived in various informal settlements, and began to be consolidated into Imizamo Yethu.

Through the evolution of these three adjacent but segregated residential neighbourhoods, deep social divides would develop, undermining the notion of one local community.

With the advent of democracy in 1994, the opportunity to redress the legal segregation of apartheid arose, and indeed key pieces of racially discriminatory legislation were removed. However, in reality segregation continued in Hout Bay with little change in settlement patterns (Monaco, 2008). A key reason for this was, on the one hand, the reluctance of the state to pursue an aggressive policy of land expropriation, and on the other, the extension of the market in private residential property, and its opening up to international buyers. During

this time, the Democratic Alliance (DA), opposition to the ruling African National Congress (ANC), won control of the Western Cape Province, the only province to be run by the opposition. The population of Cape Town also grew considerably, with a 45% increase between 1996 and 2011 (Anciano and Piper, 2019). This intense urbanisation put incredible pressure on the City and lead to varied access to services across the communities, with the wealthier Valley community being prioritised. Thus, not only are the racial groups in Hout Bay segregated spatially, they are also profoundly unequal in socio-economic terms, including housing, education, employment and basic services such as water and sanitation, as will be discussed.

4.2. The Residents

Figure 4.2: The three communities within Hout Bay (Source: Anciano and Piper, 2019)

The history of Hout Bay led to the formation of three distinct racialized groupings: the Valley, Imizamo Yethu, and Hangberg. While each of these will be briefly described to provide context, more detail will be provided about Hangberg because it is the focal point of this study.

4.2.1. The Valley

The Valley is the predominantly white area within Hout Bay and certainly the most affluent. In the 1800s, large tracks of land were granted to settlers and four major farms were established, and the area became well known for its excellent produce. With the

development of the harbour, agricultural activities started to decline and soon the Valley grew into a white residential area. The Valley has always maintained a somewhat close-knit community with many wanting to limit development to protect the 'rural character' of the area (Anciano and Piper, 2019:86). In the late 1980s, Hout Bay declared itself a 'republic,' a tongue-in-cheek effort to boost tourism, but also an indicator of the self-governing mentality that the Valley maintained (Anciano and Piper, 2019:30). The area continued to grow and develop, however, with many residents of the Valley feeling that this development 'spoiled the rural charm of the once sleepy fishing village' (Westby-Nunn, 2005:40).

Today, Hout Bay is far from a sleepy fishing village and is instead a bustling and diverse suburb. In many ways, Hout Bay's evolution as a residential suburb has been largely developer-driven. Private real estate has led to the emergence of security estates, which constitute about 35% of all formal residential structures in the Valley (Anciano and Piper, 2019). The value of property in the Valley is considerable, with the average house selling for R3 million, and apartments selling for R1.45 million, bringing formal residential housing in Hout Bay to a total of R19 billion, excluding commercial and industrial property (Anciano and Piper, 2019).

4.2.2. Imizamo Yethu

During the 1950s, the need for labour in the harbour attracted black migrant workers and squatting began to occur in Hout Bay, largely due to apartheid legislation that precluded black people from ownership or leases to land (SAHistory, 2018). While initially only small groups of people occupied space scattered around Hout Bay, this grew significantly by the 1990s and five informal settlements had been formed. Imizamo Yethu (meaning 'our collective struggle') was formalised in 1991 in an effort to consolidate and upgrade these settlements onto state land (SAHistory, 2018). The initial intention was to accommodate around 450 families, but by 2003 over 3,000 structures had been built housing nearly 8,000 residents. By 2011, the population had grown to 15,000 people, and of the nearly 7,000 structures that people lived in, 5,000 were informal dwellings (Anciano and Piper, 2019).

While Imizamo Yethu began as the smallest neighbourhood, it has grown into the largest in terms of population, housing more than half the residents in Hout Bay. Between 1985 and 2001, there was a 2,415% increase in the black population, about 15% of which were immigrant African foreign nationals coming from other parts of the continent, including Zimbabwe, Malawi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Gawith and Sowman, 1992; Anciano and Piper, 2019). Many of the local South Africans residing in Imizamo Yethu originally came from the Eastern Cape, and moved to Hout Bay with the hopes of finding work. While the residents faces a range of challenges common to townships and informal settlements, including unemployment and issues relating to crime, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, and physical violence (Tefre, 2010), the area also has a vibrant social community with strong social networks, formal and informal community institutions, with active civil society participation.

4.2.3. Hangberg

With approximately only 6,000 people, Hangberg is the smallest of the three neighbourhoods in Hout Bay but it is also the oldest. With the vast majority of people identifying as coloured, most people living in Hangberg come from generations of families local to the area. Originally families lived in various parts of the Valley, but with the onset of apartheid and the on-going demand for labour by the fishing industries, many families were forcibly removed, sometimes even twice, until Hangberg was officially established (Tefre, 2010; Anciano and Piper, 2019). As the fishing industry boomed, this quickly led to over population and despite the council flats that many fishing companies erected, there was a proliferation of backyard dwellings. Later, this would lead to the development of an informal settlement that stretched over the slopes and above the council flats and land belonging to SanParks, and zoned as a firebreak (Fieuw, 2011; Greef, 2013; Anciano and Piper, 2019).

Other than fishing, few opportunities for employment existed in Hout Bay, and when the fishing industry began to decline so too did the local neighbourhood, leading to high rates of poverty. Today Hangberg suffers from severe unemployment, low monthly incomes, poor education rates, and both the primary and high schools remain overcrowded. Drug abuse is rife leading to a range of social problems, including high crime (Monaco, 2008; Tefre, 2010).

In more recent years, a new area has developed higher up on the slopes above Hangberg called 'Hout Bay Heights,' which is predominantly home to middle-income coloured and white residents (Anciano and Piper, 2019).

4.2.3.1. Land ownership and housing

Over the years, housing in Hangberg has been shaped into three main types of housing: large houses owned by wealthier residents (both coloured and white) in the well-serviced area of Harbour Heights; state-owned hostels and rental housing inhabited by poorer residents; and informal shacks (locally known as bungalows) built along the firebreak or in backyard dwellings by the poorest within the community (Anciano and Piper, 2019).

While the post-apartheid government promised to provide housing, there was little delivery in Hangberg during the first decade. While people had been demanding decent housing, the first serious protests began in 2009 when the Sentinel Mountain above Hangberg went up for auction. On the morning of the auction, a crowd of protesters led by a Hangberg local group called Hout Bay Civic gathered outside the site of sale and became confrontational. After protesters began throwing stones, the police opened fire, showering the crowd with rubber bullets and teargas, and quickly bringing the protest to a halt (SAHistory, 2018; Anciano and Piper, 2019). Eventually the auction was moved to another day with the intention of opening the sale for housing development, but the investor would eventually fall through, and the residents rejected the plan, bringing the project to a halt. In the meantime, people began to construct informal houses along the same piece of land (SAHistory, 2018).

The City of Cape Town, considering the houses illegal, requested that shacks be removed but the people refused, arguing they had nowhere to go, lived in poverty, and already had long ties to the community. When negotiations collapsed, the City applied for a court interdict to have the houses removed and an eviction order was issued to dismantle the shacks. While the City maintained the shacks were not occupied, many of them were, filled with personal belongings. Within hours the area turned into a battle zone (Hauck, 2009; SAHistory, 2018; Anciano and Piper, 2019).

With the order to demolish about 30 informal houses, a series of Police Nyala's parked on the lower edge of Hangberg as a large group of protesters blocked the road with burning tyres, throwing rocks and homemade bombs at the police. The police then began firing tear gas and rubber bullets. There were serious injuries from both sides, including three Hangberg residents who each lost an eye. But deeper than this, the residents were left traumatised by the reality that the City would deploy the police against people who they perceived as simply protecting their homes. All housing upgrades were put on hold (Greef, 2013; Buhler, 2014; SAHistory, 2018).

To restore relationships with Hangberg, the court ordered that a Peace and Mediation Forum (PMF) be established to be the exclusive structure to represent Hangberg in all future development projects in Hangberg. A mediator was appointed by the City to establish an integrated community leadership, where community leaders were elected based on their geographic housing sectors. Thirty-nine people were elected onto a core steering committee and officially established the PMF. By 2011, the PMF signed the Peace and Mediation Accord with SanParks, the Western Cape Provincial Government, and the City of Cape Town, which stated that no-one was allowed to build houses along the fire break, and in return, the City would provide houses for the people who lived there at the time of the 2010 uprising. In addition, the Accord included a number of state-provided programmes for Hangberg, meaning that the City became legally compelled to work with, and only with, the PMF to deliver services and projects in Hangberg (SAHistory, 2018; Anciano and Piper, 2019).

Framed as a partner with the state in co-governing development in Hangberg, the PMF has no real powers, no resources, and poorly defined electoral and organisational processes (Anciano and Piper, 2019). As a result, by 2012 the Peace Accord quickly fell apart. With housing still in short supply and no new housing projects having been started, residents began to rebuild their houses along the fire break, arguing that the PMF had failed to provide for the majority of residents and only people close of the PMF had benefited. Most representatives of the PMF quit, with those remaining perceived to be close allies with the DA.

4.2.3.2. Divided Leadership

From the outset, the leadership of the PMF had been strongly contested by the Hout Bay Civic Association (HBCA). As a Hangberg-based civil society organisation historically linked to the ANC, the HBCA had its origins in the Hout Bay Action Group that fought for the democratic rights of citizens during the apartheid era. They claimed that the PMF did not

represent the voice of the people, while the PMF claimed the HBCA had nothing more than a political agenda. These tensions would continue to build over the years to come (Anciano and Piper, 2019).

Meanwhile, development and service delivery remained slow in Hangberg. As informal houses continued to be built, forced evictions occurred again in 2013 with the HBCA protesting against the violent nature of the arrests. In 2014 evictions occurred yet again, this time causing a riot where several cars were burnt, with some speculating that a leader of the PMF was one of the targets. In 2014 construction began on several developments aimed at delivering affordable housing and while some units were built, on the whole project delivery has been slow and limited in terms of housing (Buhler, 2014; Anciano and Piper, 2019).

Social and economic concerns remained in Hangberg. As the community continued to grow, so too did the levels of domestic abuse, of poor schooling records, drugs, and social tensions. While the lack of housing has significantly contributed to these issues, the growth in unemployment has also been seen as the root of many social problems (Hauck, 2009).

4.2.3.3. Hangberg and the Fishing Industry

Hangberg has traditionally been a strong fishing community where men go out to sea to fish and women work in the fish processing factories within the harbour (Tefre, 2010). With the decline of both employment in the fishing industry and the number of fishing quotas held by local fishermen, many people were left with serious financial problems. This led to two things: the rise of 'poaching,' and a heavy reliance on the Lucky Star fishmeal factory, the last remaining factory in the harbour.

Poaching

Abalone and rock lobster poaching became deeply embedded in Hangberg over the years, starting as a small, informal operation and turning into a highly organised criminal one (Greef, 2013). Most fishermen in Hangberg are small-scale and historically, this sector has been overlooked by resource managers, who have instead tended to focus on the development of the commercial sector (Van Sittert, 2003). While conventional fisheries turned a blind eye to the social dimensions of the small-scale sector, traditional fishers continued to fish in Hangberg, often on an illegal basis (Van Sittert, 1994; Greef, 2013). The community soon developed a reputation as being a problem area among fisheries managers and it was perceived that poachers were depleting important resources (Hauck, 2009; Sowman *et al.*, 2011).

Over the years, poaching would continue to grow and it would soon become highly organised, characterised by 'substantial profits, widespread involvement, and complex systems of control' (Greef, 2013). It would also become an important part of the Hangberg economy, contributing to the direct employment of 250 people and indirectly supporting the livelihoods of hundreds more. In many ways, poaching filled the vacuum left by the ineffective transformation efforts of the state, with their operations resembling a formal fishery. In addition, poaching was also perceived to be a form of protest against the

perceived injustices against small-scale fishers, making it a 'complex phenomenon, motivated and sustained by multiple, interlinked factors (Greef, 2013:83).

Poaching and housing issues were also linked. A number of the informal dwellings above the firebreak were used as drop-off points for abalone. The settlement itself represented an important strategic asset for abalone poachers, and it is believed that some poachers own and control certain sections of the area, as well as stir up trouble when issues with law enforcement arise (Greef, 2013). Disputes over land were equated with disputes over exclusion from access to marine resources, fuelling animosity and deeply embedding poverty within the community.

While small-scale fishers have shaped Hangberg in one way, industrial fishing has shaped it in another. During the 1950s, Hout Bay harbour became the site for multiple fish processing facilities and while these boomed into the 1970s, there was a rapid decline soon after. A handful of factories would remain in the harbour, but only one processing facility remained: the Lucky Star fishmeal factory owned by Oceana Group.

The Lucky Star Fishmeal Factory

The Lucky Star (Oceana[3]) fishmeal factory was established in 1958 and was the first and last fish processing plant in Hout Bay. Originally known as the Da Gama Fishmeal Factory (Lucky Star, 2014), it would later become managed by Lucky Star Limited an operating division of Oceana Group. Oceana Group, a global fishing company, is one of the most important players in the South African, Namibian and US fishing industries, and ranked as one of top 20 seafood companies in the world by market capitalisation, with a total value of just over R7 billion (Oceana, 2017b; Moneyweb, 2020).

While the iconic Lucky Star brand is known for its tinned pilchards, the factory in Hout Bay focused on two other products: fishmeal, a protein-rich ingredient used in animal and aquaculture feed and fertilisers; and fish oil, also used in animal and aquaculture feed, as well as the pharmaceutical and chemical industries. Both products made in Hout Bay were intended for a predominantly international market, including Europe and the far east (Lucky Star, 2014). The raw material - catches of anchovy, redeye herring, pilchards, and horse mackerel – was harvested by shipping vessels traveling from the east to west coast of South Africa, and stored in the hold until reaching the factory where it was then pumped into storage pits to have the fish water drained.

The fishmeal production process then comprised three basic phases: steam cooking of the fish mater, pressing of the cooked fish matter, and drying (Lucky Star, 2014). During these phases, particularly the drying phase, a cocktail of emissions were released into the air, the

[3] Lucky Star is the the official name of the fishmeal factory, however, within Hout Bay it is more commonly referred to as the 'Oceana fishmeal factory'. For the purposes of this thesis, the factory will be referred to as the 'Oceana fishmeal factory' or simply 'Oceana'. Several official documents will use the title 'Lucky Star Ltd.', but this can be understood to be one and the same.

most predominant of which were Hydrogen Sulphide (H_2S), Sulphur Oxide (SO_2) and Trimethylamines, creating the combination of a rotten egg and fishy odour (City Health, 2015b). The factory utilised various odour suppression technologies to mitigate this, most notably a seawater scrubber that condensed the vapour and used an oxidising agent to minimise odorous compounds. While various technologies minimised the odour, they did not eliminate it completely, and the odour was considered 'characteristic' of all fishmeal plants (Lucky Star, 2014).

Despite its odorous emissions, the factory had a relatively good relationship with the residents of Hangberg throughout its nearly 60-year history. Over the decades they provided consistent and stable employment for local fishermen and factory workers, often employing up to two or three generations of families. They provided houses and flats for factory workers and also made significant contributions to the community at large through their corporate social investment programs – since 2009 they donated more than R3.6 million to schools and community causes, donating buses and support for schools, and often provided emergency relief for fire related disasters, such as housing and food parcels (Lucky Star, 2014).

This relationship, however, soon became strained and the issue of the fishmeal factory and its odours would become a major debate within Hout Bay. The following three chapters will detail what took place from 2013-2020, offering an account of the events that transpired and how these would influence the development of the community at large.

4.3. Conclusion

This chapter has presented the historical background of Hout Bay, offering insights into how the community has developed over the years and some of the critical elements and events that have shaped this history.

The following three chapters are the analysis of the power dynamics in Hout Bay. This analysis will discuss in detail the events that took place from 2013 – 2020 allowing for a thorough examination to be made of the power dynamics that influenced the decision-making processes, and how this shaped development for the community at large.

CHAPTER 5

UNDERSTANDING NORMALITY

The key objective of this research is to, within the context of the fishmeal factory case study, understand where the power to influence decision-making about development lies, and to do this, the events around the situation – the story – needs to be systematically unpacked.

This first chapter of the case study and analysis essentially sets the scene, offering a glimpse into the status quo at the time the story began[4]. It will discuss the events that transpired from 2013 – 2015, providing an overview of how the factory and its odorous emissions became a politicised issue within Hout Bay and how the different sectors within the community responded to this. It also discusses how Oceana and the City of Cape Town responded, providing a chronological account of the events that transpired. This will help to situate the reader, bringing to light the different dynamics at play within the community and how the odorous and noxious emissions were 'normalised' in this context.

This chronological account is interjected by a series of breakout boxes that discuss my personal positioning, offering my own experiences and impressions on key events and dynamics, as well as specific detail on my involvement. Written in the first person, these highly personalised accounts and reflections are typical of autoethnographic research, and are designed to enable the reader to 'experience the experience' for themselves, gaining deeper and more meaningful insights into the situation that occurred (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011; Adams, Ellis and Jones, 2017), as discussed in Chapter 3.

The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the power dynamics at play, using the theory presented in Chapter 2 as the basis for a conceptual understanding. Particular focus will be placed on the three dimensional views of power and relating this to the key actors involved to interrogate what mechanisms of power were used in the context of the fishmeal factory. Findings from the interviews conducted will be included to strengthen understanding. This analysis will begin to offer the first insights into the question of where the power to influence decision-making lay, how it was being used, and why.

[4] In the spirit of autoethnography, it is important to note that the story contained in this research should not be considered as 'the' story but rather as a 'a' story, told from my unique position. It is recognised that this story could be told from many different perspectives and it is not the intent of this research to suggest that this account is the only valid one.

Personal Positioning 1: My Relationship to Hout Bay



Figure 5.1: View from my balcony in the Heights

I moved to Hout Bay in early 2013 having recently bought a house in the Heights. Coming from KwaZulu-Natal, I was not overly familiar with the area but the stunning view from my balcony overlooking the harbour captured my heart immediately. When buying the house I had not been fully aware of the situation – I knew the factory existed but had no understanding of its production or the impact this would have on my daily life. When I first experienced the odour, this gut-wrenching combination of fish and chemicals and rot, I thought an animal had died in my roof and was slowly decomposing. When I came to understand it was the factory, the odour present every time the large plumes of black and yellow smoke were staggeringly obvious from my balcony, I couldn't believe it was legal.

Figure 5.2: Plumes of black and yellow smoke coming from the factory

The odour produced by the factory was not just an unpleasant smell, it was something much worse – and it didn't smell like fish. Instead, it smelled like rotten, rancid, cooking fish – sometimes wet, sometimes dry – mixed in with a cocktail of chemicals that clung heavily to the plumes of smoke. Many people on social media sites complained that the smell induced a gag-reflex, eye-watering experience that pretty much ruined your day.

Figure 5.3: Comments on social media about the odour, 2013

At first I thought this was just a once-off thing, but the odour continued for days and weeks on end. It was utterly inescapable and I began to realise this was a serious problem. I started speaking to neighbours and acquaintances and everyone brushed it off saying yes indeed, the smell was really bad, but it had always been that way. Over the years, various groups had tried to complain, but nothing ever changed and people lost interest. Get used to it, they said, that smell will never go away.

I began to follow the discussions taking place on Facebook and it was clear from the onset that this was an emotional issue that had fuelled division for a long time. People were vicious in their language – some said that if they didn't like the smell they could 'go back to where they came from' and others responded by saying they were 'ignorant people who couldn't speak English properly.' It seemed to me there were two clear positions:

Support for the factory: Many people, particularly the coloured residents[5] (based on their profiles), commented that Oceana played an important role in the overall growth and development of the community, providing steady and reliable employment for decades to a historically low-income community. People said the factory was the 'bread and butter of the community', and employed generations of families. While issues involving land, fishing quotas, poverty, and governance had persisted within the community, Oceana had always provided support through its corporate social investment programs, supporting schools and providing emergency relief through housing and food packages. People argued that the smell, while unpleasant, didn't really cause any harm and was, in fact, a symbol of prosperity – if the factory was in operation, there was food on the table. In this way, the factory, and the odour that came with it, seemed to be an important symbol of cultural identity for the people living within the harbour.

Resistance to the factory: While it appeared that Oceana enjoyed broad support from Hangberg, this sentiment did not seem to be shared by other sectors of Hout Bay. People complaining about the smell, who appeared to be mostly white and living on the other side of the harbour, argued it was an infringement on their right to enjoy their property and surrounds, and it was an embarrassment for the community. Some people said they suffered from health impacts and vented their frustration at no action having been taken for so many years. Many people said it would be better to have a new development in the harbour, like a waterfront, that could cater to the growing tourism market and bring more opportunities to the community at large.

At this stage, I didn't understand what exactly the factory did, so I decided to contact them directly and one afternoon several Oceana representatives came to my house to explain their operations. They went into great detail about the important role they played in both the fishing industry and the local community, offering glossy annual reports and booklets of their successes and contributions. They said that, as the most advanced fishmeal factory in the country, they operated the best odour abatement technology available and complied with all environmental legislation and requirements. While they recognised that some people considered the odour disagreeable, there was nothing that could be done to remove it and this was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

Dismayed by this response, and the casual manner in which this offensive odour was deemed to be acceptable, I then called the City of Cape Town, specifically the Air Quality Unit of City Health. They essentially said the same thing, confirming that Oceana was compliant with all relevant environmental laws and licensing, and there was nothing that could be done to change the situation. The more I learned, the more I was infuriated with the lunacy of this reality - you could phone the police if your neighbour's dog was barking too loudly, but industries blatantly polluting and negatively impacting large groups of peoples' lives was perfectly acceptable.

[5] It should be noted that the residents in Imizamo Yethu, despite being the largest demographic group in Hout Bay, were not vocal on the issue of the fishmeal factory and seldom made comments or offered opinions on the matter. While this research does not discount the views that residents of Imizamo Yethu may have had, this was not within the scope of the research and will not be discussed further.

The situation baffled me.

On the one hand, I completely understood the important role the factory played – with a sound understanding of community development, I appreciated its historic contribution to stabilising household socio-economics and encouraging resilience, and even the importance of this as a cultural symbol to the local community. But the reality was that the community was still living in poverty – Hangberg was widely known for its low employment, poor socio-economics, and high crime. While the factory may have been a significant driver for positive growth in the 1950s, there was no evidence to suggest it was doing that now. In fact, the opposite seemed to be the case – the smell seemed to have a negative impact on a variety of different businesses, especially tourism related, and particularly in the harbour.

On the other hand, the Hout Bay harbour seemed to offer an enormous opportunity to turn this situation around. Abundant with natural fisheries resources and stunningly beautiful, surely the harbour offered enormous potential for some kind of sustainable growth and development – without an industry whose noxious fumes made people's stomachs turn. Yet there seemed to be no ambition – there was no development plan in place, no long-term strategy for change, not even a clear recognition that a problem existed.

From those very first days of living in Hout Bay, I knew this issue would become something significant in my life. Intellectually, I saw a classic development conundrum that I wanted to solve and I was convinced that with the right amount of research, advocacy, and innovation, there was an opportunity to encourage some kind of positive development. Emotionally, I had just uprooted my life, invested all my savings, and started afresh in a new place – all those delicate hopes for a new beginning were being threatened by a polluting factory and I felt something needed to be done about it. While I didn't know it at the time, these two convictions would drive and shape my relationship to Hout Bay over the next seven years.

As it will be explained, I very quickly became a main character in the story of the fishmeal factory. As the founder and main driver of Fresh Air for Hout Bay (FAHB), I would come to research and follow the topic compulsively. I wrote all the documents and letters to investigate the situation, and built and maintained the FAHB website for six years, providing regular updates to subscribers and documenting all my research. I was the main contact point for both the City and Oceana, and was the focal point for all meetings. I was the key spokesperson in all the media interviews that would follow. As such, all of the FAHB-related documents in this thesis have been primarily authored by myself, and the reflection of the progression of events is told from my unique perspective of having access to this information as it transpired. This insider perspective lends itself to bias and it is not my intention to remove this bias, but rather to use the autoethnographic techniques discussed in Chapter 3 to reflect on it to better understand the factors that shaped the events that transpired.

5.1. The Story Begins: 2013

In early 2013, there were reports that the factory had discharged large quantities of wastewater directly into the harbour after a series of intense production days. Following newspaper reports and complaints (Sentinel, 2013), a resident started a petition calling for Oceana to 'clean up their factory' (Petition, 2013). The petition stated that the wastewater discharge from the factory was harmful to the environment and the odour hindered growth and development, particularly in the tourism industry. As the intense production days continued, active discussions about the odour took place on Hout Bay Organised (HBO), the largest social network in Hout Bay. HBO is a Facebook group that serves as a platform to share news and information about Hout Bay, and to be a 'tool for positive community upliftment' (HBO, 2013). With a membership of nearly 24,000, that grows daily, HBO is the largest community-networking platform in Hout Bay.

Sentinel news

Friday May 3 2013

CAPE COMMUNITY NEWSPAPERS

Harbour stench probed

The City of Cape Town says it will investigate allegations that Oceana are discharging untreated effluent into the sewer system, a charge the group denies.

■ Failure of a pump in the municipal sewerage system resulted in this unsightly and odious pollution of the water in Hout Bay harbour last week. The City of Cape Town and the fishing company, Oceana Brands, are at loggerheads as to who is to blame.

DON LEE FORD

The Oceana Group of companies and the City of Cape Town are at loggerheads as to who is responsible for the pollution of water in Hout Bay harbour last week and the odious smells that so sickened and angered residents and visitors.

The fishing company says the polluted water in the harbour was caused by the failure of a pump in the sewerage system administered and maintained by the City of Cape Town.

The City claims that it is investigating allegations that Oceana Brands have been discharging untreated effluent into the sewer system, which has ultimately caused serious operational issues with the pump station.

"The stink" began in the early hours of Wednesday, April 24.

"At about 2:45am I awoke to the most awful smell ever," said Marianne Marsh. "It was a chemical, super strong, overpowering, disgusting smell. It was by far the worst smell I have ever encountered.

"We live in Klein Leeukop and I presume that because it was such a still night, the smell from the fish factory drifted up the valley and bounced against Klein Leeukoppie.

"I am not asthmatic nor do we have small babies in the house, but I am sure they must have had breathing problems. The only way I could breathe was through my mouth and that was disgusting.

"Surely it is totally illegal to dump waste or whatever it is that causes such air pollution. This time we smelled it as there was no wind. Heaven knows what awful stuff gets released in the air and the sea. Are they monitored? Do they use air filters? Are there standards they have to adhere to?

"Six hours later I could still smell the smell in pockets of air in the house."

The Sentinel asked Oceana for comment and Francois Kattel, CEO of the Oceana Group, replied: "We acknowledge concerns raised about the odour emanating from our Hout Bay fishmeal plant. In response to the complaints received, during the current production run, which

Continued on page 5

Figure 5.4: Front page of the Sentinel newspaper showing the wastewater discharge (Sentinel, 2013)

Discussions on HBO were rampant with posts about the odour and the factory, garnering hundreds of comments.



Like can people pls stop complaining about oceana and the smell. I mean for goodness sake its getting so old that ur nose is sensitive, u cant deal with the smell and blah blah blah. That company is giving back to the community with that stinky smell. Now can all the people who is complaining just shut the hell up and stop nagging about a stupid smell. for as long as I can remember I smelled that and I know and im fine. The smell wont kill you, or suffer from some diseases of inhaling some toxins.that is the smell of hard working people. So all the crickets that has so much to stay shut up.

45 519 comments

Figure 5.5: Example of a Facebook comment from March 2013 garnering more than 500 comments

As noted previously, discussions were largely divided into two distinct groups: those who saw the odour and the factory as a nuisance, and those who saw it as a landmark institution. Based on their online profiles and comments made about where they lived, it appeared that those complaining about the odour were predominantly (although not limited to) white middle-to-upper class residents. They argued that the odour had a negative impact on Hout Bay – the factory was in the middle of a vibrant social landscape with schools, tourist attractions and businesses, and the odour was not only unpleasant to live with, it also hindered growth and development.

Figure 5.6: Comments about the negative impact of the emissions, 2013-2014

In contrast, those supporting the factory, appeared to be predominantly coloured lower economic class, also based on both their on-line profiles and comments about where they lived. They argued that Hout Bay was a 'fishing village' and the odour was simply part of that – the factory was a vital source of employment for the coloured residents, made financial contributions to local institutions, and represented an important part of cultural identity that symbolised their fishing history. Discussions on HBO were often heated and intense, sparking racial tensions and raising long-standing issues about land and relocation. While one group argued that the odour was unacceptable, the other group told them they were welcome to leave.



Figure 5.7: Comments about the importance of the factory to the community, 2013-2014

During these debates it became clear that very little factual information existed and instead, a series of rumours were driving a strong emotional response to the issue; some claimed Oceana was operating illegally, using out-dated equipment and cooking rotten fish, while others claimed the factory employed half of the community and represented the largest employment sector in Hout Bay. There was not even a common understanding of what the

factory actually produced – recognising the famous Lucky Star brand, many assumed the factory produced tinned pilchards, and few knew its primary product was fishmeal.

In April 2013, another concerned resident started a Facebook discussion forum called 'Fish factory clean up' and an open call went out for people interested in the situation to meet. A small group met, discussed the opportunities, and by August 2013 had formed FAHB, a community interest group committed to bringing an end to the odorous emissions. Over the course of the next few months, FAHB started gathering information from both the City of Cape Town and Oceana to understand what was actually going on.

Personal Positioning 2: How I got involved

When I saw the Facebook post calling for people to meet about the fish factory, I knew I had to get involved. Plans were made to meet at a local coffee shop and I joined a small handful of people, all white, to try figure out what could be done. The first meeting was really just an introduction, offering more of a space to vent frustration, lamenting at how the odour impacted our lives, rather than to develop a strategic plan of civic action. It was clear from the beginning that I would take a leading role. Not only did I live closest to the factory and was most directly impacted by its production, I was also the only person with some experience in community development and civil society action. I was also, surprisingly, the only person who had actually contacted the factory or the City and had the most information, limited though it was. At first, there were differing opinions about the direction the group should take – on the one hand we felt very strongly that the odorous emissions needed to stop, but on the other hand we recognised the important role the factory played in the social fabric of Hangberg.

While some in the group believed we should advocate for the factory's closure, the simplest and surest way to end the emissions, I felt this was not a wise decision considering the socio-economic status, and volatility, of Hangberg and instead thought we should advocate for a broader sustainable development plan for the harbour. At first there was some resistance to this idea, with most of the group wanting a simple answer as the solution, but eventually people began to get on board and I was selected to be the groups' facilitator.

I loosely formalised FAHB in August 2013 by creating a series of key objectives that I shared on an official FAHB Facebook page, in addition to the 'fish factory clean up' discussion page that had already been started. I believed that we needed to do two things. First, we needed to move beyond the realm of anecdotal information and begin doing some serious research – it was only with facts and hard data from irrefutable sources that we would know what we were dealing with. Second, we needed to document this information and make it easily accessible to the broader public – not only would it help to overcome the existing myths and speculations, but it would also help people to understand the broader reality of the development situation. The only way to make real progress was to ensure people were informed and this is what I set out to do.

To this end, I began contacting the City and Oceana, asking questions and requesting information on a range of topics from the legislative arrangement to their daily production activities. Once I had this information, I then consolidated it onto a website (smellsfishy.com) that I built and maintained for the years to come. On the site, people could find easily accessible information about the factory, referenced, answering a range of 'frequently asked questions.' They were also directed to various activities they could do, such as registering a complaint, writing to the City, signing a petition, or accessing documents and other information. I then started consolidating this information and sharing it on social media, as well as providing regular updates to subscribers. I saw this as a way of slowly building understanding and active citizenship, building a movement of informed citizens that would gradually be able to effect change. In this way, the FAHB website essentially became a lobbying site, a consolidated platform where people could get information about the topic, and begin to take action based on an informed perspective.

As a newly formed group, FAHB's primary objective was to find out information, and several important things were learned.

First, production at the factory was regulated by an Atmospheric Emissions Licence (AEL) that allowed for up to 1,200 tons of fish matter to be processed per day, for up to 180 days of the year. Because production was entirely dependant on fish availability and weather, the factory followed no set production schedule, operating at any time of day or night when raw material was available. Peak production seasons typically ran from February to August (City Health, 2015b), and when stock arrived at the factory, production could continue for a day or several weeks depending on the size of the catch. The factory typically had a catch landing of between 600-1000 tons per day, averaging 800 tons per day when in production. To operate the factory, Oceana employed 91 permanent shore-based staff and supported upwards of 120 seagoing employees (Lucky Star, 2014). Approximately 60% of the shore-based employees were from Hangberg (Oceana, 2014).

Second, the Department of City Health, within the City of Cape Town, was responsible for managing the emissions from the factory through its environmental health program, specifically the Air Quality Unit. Contact was made with the head of City Health, and through a series of informal communications via email and phone calls (later documented through official reports) it was confirmed that Oceana was 'generally in compliance with their emissions licence conditions' and were regarded as the 'foremost fishmeal plant in South Africa' (City Health, 2015a).

The City explained that the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) regulates the environment in accordance with the aims and objectives of the Constitution. Within NEMA, the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act (NEMAQA) sets various limits on emissions for different industries. Importantly, certain industries are recognised for having activities that are unavoidably polluting in nature, such as work with petroleum, minerals, general waste, or manufacturing activities. These are regarded as 'listed activities' and are divided into 10 different categories. Listed activities must have an AEL to operate, issued by

the Municipality, which sets limitations on permissible emissions, according to the nature of their work. Municipal By-Laws can also set specific emissions conditions, but these are subservient to the conditions of higher legislation, and to the conditions prescribed in the AEL (City Health, 2015b).

Oceana was registered as a Category 10 Listed Activity for Animal Matter Processing under NEMAQA. It was registered as an offensive trade in terms of the Offensive Trade Regulation, which has since been repealed, and was now considered a 'noxious industry' under NEMAQA, known to emit a number of malodourous emissions including Hydrogen Sulphide (H_2S) and Trimethylamines. These 'pollutants' have an extremely low threshold of smell (City Health, 2015b), meaning they can be detected at low amounts. To manage these emissions, Oceana was in possession of and in compliance with an AEL issued by the City (City Health, 2015b).

Along with specific operational practices, the AEL detailed that best practice measures must be implemented to minimise or avoid offensive odours, noting that unlike all other Listed Activities, no point source emissions limits had been established for any of the pollutants emitted for animal matter processing activities. Within NEMAQA, 'the Minister or Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) may prescribe measures for the control of offensive odours emanating from specified activities but to date neither had chosen to do so' (City Health, 2015b). While the Minister had not provided comment on this matter, City Health speculated that because the odour had many different causative agents, each with a different threshold, setting a standard would not only be extremely difficult, but would also have to apply to the sector at large (City Health, 2015b). According to all legal processes expressed by the City, Lucky Star was fully compliant with their emissions conditions and implemented best practice through their operations.

Interestingly, no environmental impact assessment (EIA) had ever been conducted for the factory, which the City attributed to the changing and complex environmental legislation over the past 40 years. The factory was first established and permitted to operate in terms of the offensive trade regulations in the 1960s, before EIAs became standard practice. A Scheduled Industry Permit was issued in the early 1970s by the National Department of Health in terms of the Air Pollution and Prevention Act (APPA). With the change of government in 1994, the new constitution of South Africa was adopted and NEMA was legislated in 1998. APPA was repealed and replaced with NEMAQA in 2005, which directed that the permit be converted to an AEL (City Health, 2014).

The National Department of Health licensed the facility in Hout Bay up until 2012/13 when the function was transferred to the City of Cape Town. In this way, the City 'inherited an existing facility which already had pre-existing environmental authorisations (rights) in place' (City Health, 2014). Importantly, despite the perceived impact the odour had on the residents, it could not be registered as a public nuisance. The City argued that because an AEL had already been granted to the factory with the full knowledge of the malodours emissions it generated, the City could not on the one hand licence the premises, and then on the other hand prosecute them for nuisance odours. The factory was in compliance with the

conditions of the emissions limits in the AEL, but largely because no limits actually existed for these emissions. If prosecution were to take place, this would need to be conducted in terms of the Air Quality Act and because there were no contraventions of the Act, the City was not in a position to prosecute Lucky Star (City Health, 2014).

To this end, while some may be offended by the odorous emissions, the City considered this to be 'acceptable' (City Health, 2014). A condition stipulated in the AEL required that Oceana supply complaints received to the City on an annual basis, and the City would then compile, review and respond to those complaints through a C3 register. C3 registers are essentially a mechanism used by the City to report and track problems within neighbourhoods, where residents can log a fault or problem directly with the City for it to be addressed (City of Cape Town, 2007). The City committed to regular monitoring exercises to ensure on-going compliance.

Personal Positioning 3: Making Sense of the Information

I found all of this information quite confounding. How could it be that simply because the factory had an existing licence, there was no way of challenging the efficacy of that licence based on the reality of what was being experienced by the local residents? While the City assured me that all complaints were taken into account, it was hard to believe they really understood how invasive and disturbing the emissions were.

Towards the end of 2013 I requested the C3 registry of complaints from 2003-2013 through the Public Access to Information Act (PAIA) process, enacted to give effect to the constitutional right of access to information. After months of waiting for the information to be received, it was clear there were significant gaps – I essentially received a collection of obscure tables, mostly unmarked, that were hard to follow and had handwritten notes in the margins. There was a loose collection of information, but nothing to imply that a proper complaints registry was in place. How could the City understand the impact of this industry when they didn't even know what was really going on?

I began to compile all this information onto the FAHB website and shared it through two main social media sites – an official FAHB Facebook page, and a FAHB discussion platform (previously the 'Fish factory clean up page'). I believed that the first step towards finding a solution was recognising there was a problem to begin with, and so FAHB began advocating for people to document their concerns by registering their complaints with both the factory and the City, via phone calls and emails.

5.2. 2014

In February 2014 Oceana started intense production and again there was public outcry over the odour. Social media was rampant with discussion, and the local Sentinel newspaper ran with the headline 'Valley chokes on smell,' reporting that people had become physically ill in

restaurants and homes in the vicinity of the factory (Sentinel, 2014e). The article mentioned a restaurant owner whose customers left because of the smell and a tourist couple who 'were both on the point of throwing up,' leaving Hout Bay to find reprieve in another area of Cape Town. As the restaurant owner commented, 'There is no question that when the factory emits smells as bad as these, it does huge damage to Hout Bay's reputation as a holiday resort' (Sentinel, 2014e). In response to the complaints, Oceana affirmed that the factory was operating 'normally,' fully compliant with its AEL, and City Health commented that it was their 'belief that now that the factory has started processing again after a lack of fish production days in 2013, the normal fish processing smell seems more readily detectable,' arguing it was only the complainants 'perception that the normal smell is an indication of poor operational conditions' (Sentinel, 2014e).

By March 2014 the odour had intensified and the Sentinel newspaper reported that a 'furore has erupted in Hout Bay following the overpowering and nauseating odour' with residents commenting that Oceana's 'stance has been to hide behind the veil: we are within legal limits' (Sentinel, 2014b). The article noted that Councillor Marga Haywood had sent emails to senior City officials asking for a solution to be found.

With the increasing number of complaints, Francois Kuttel, the then CEO of Oceana Group, did both radio and print interviews in April 2014 to assure people they were doing everything they could to reduce the odour, and reinforced the important role they played in the community. During the radio interview, Kuttel commented that the factory had continuously contributed to Hangberg, noting that approximately '60% of the people working at the factory lived in Hangberg.' He went into extensive detail to outline the odour abatement technology that had been implemented over the years making it the 'foremost fishmeal factory in the country.' While he acknowledged the existence of the 'pong' he explained that the factory was in an industrial area but that 'urban creep' had led to more residential areas developing near the factory. This, in addition to the wind patterns, had led people to feel more impacted by the odour, despite the improvements they had consistently made. He affirmed that Oceana was in compliance with all environmental legislation but that as a 'good corporate citizen we are doing everything we can to mitigate this further.' He committed to communicating better with the community, ensuring they would have more information about the operations (Republic Radio, 2014).

This information was not well received by some members of Hout Bay. In a series of 'Letters to the Editor' in the Sentinel Newspaper, people commented that Kuttel 'took up a whole page in the Sentinel for something he could have said in a few sentences – we are doing nothing we are not allowed to do' (Sentinel, 2014c). As another resident commented, 'I do not think the Council is taking this matter at all seriously especially when it keeps saying that Oceana complies with the laws relating to the emissions. I think the point is missed. It is not about compliance over emissions (although that is extremely important) it is the impact on the economy of Hout Bay. The smell… has been unbearable and tourism, property sales, the restaurant trade, and businesses generally will be negatively impacted' (Sentinel, 2014a).

As these discussions continued in the community, by the end of April 2014 FAHB had gained some momentum as an interest group and were approached by the Hout Bay Residents and Ratepayers Association (HBRRA) to lead their Air Pollution Portfolio, with the primary objective of addressing the odour emissions. The HBRRA had a direct connection with the City that offered an opportunity to raise concerns, and after some discussion, FAHB agreed to join the HBRRA in early 2014.

Personal Positioning 4: Divided Leadership in the Valley

At this point, it is important to deviate from the story slightly to provide some context and understanding about leadership in Valley because this will help to give insight into the broader power dynamics at play.

During my initial research, I had spent time reviewing some of the different community groups in Hout Bay. While Hout Bay was home more to more than 70 different non-governmental organisations (Help Hout Bay, 2020) - a staggering amount for such a small community - none seemed positioned to take on the issue of the factory. After speaking to different residents, it was suggested that I investigate the HBRRA, who had previously been involved in a number of environment-related issues in Hout Bay. I attended their annual end-of-year meeting in 2013 and while I was struck by the lack of diversity and general age group (all attendees were mostly white, affluent, and elderly) it appeared there was some kind of functioning community institution in place that had the ability to effectively raise concerns with the City. As I would soon come to learn, the HBRRA had a long and contentious relationship with the residents of Hout Bay.

While it is not the intention of this thesis to go into detail about the functioning of the HBRRA, it is important to know some basics. HBRRA was originally formed in the 1970s with the ambition of providing community-based information to decision-makers. Over the years, HBRRA had become most well-known for its involvement in two key issues – the protest over the Chapman's Peak toll road (Anciano and Piper, 2019), and the expansion of Imizamo Yethu (Monaco, 2008). The HBRRA had always had a strong environmental focus, in the sense of wanting to preserve and protect the natural surroundings of Hout Bay against formal development.

The HBRRA had also been known for causing divisive relationships. The HBRRA chairman had been in this position for over 20 years and, from my direct experience of the organisation, was not in the habit of practising consultation and inclusion. Consequently, there had been several factions along the way. In the late 1990s, the Hout Bay Residents Association split from the HBRRA following claims of a lack of transparency and exclusion in decision-making (Monaco, 2008). According to residents involved, the HBRRA simply continued as they had before, with a small group meeting regularly to make decisions 'on behalf of' Hout Bay, held to account only by its scantily attended annual meetings. From the discussions I had with different individuals and the comments made on Facebook, it appeared that many people in Hout Bay did not support the HBBRA and did not see them as a valid form of representation.

I sort of understood these dynamics when I first started speaking with the HBRRA, but my main concern was that FAHB was not an 'official' institution and I felt we needed some kind of formal and established representation to engage effectively with the City. At the beginning, the chairman couldn't be more delighted with the prospect of having me on board, praising the work I had done for FAHB, calling me a 'gem' in the midst of Hout Bay, and saying I was just what the HBRRA needed. While the HBRRA offered me their full support, I had some reservations. The organisers of FAHB then held a meeting to discuss what to do, and we eventually decided that we would all become members of the HBRRA individually, and FAHB would join the HBRRA with the understanding that we would remain somewhat autonomous – while we were happy to drive activities through the HBRRA and be on the Executive Committee, FAHB would also continue to do our own work, maintain our own website and social media platforms, and have consultations with our own established, albeit small, constituency. The Executive Committee agreed and the relationship with HBBRA began.

I began to realise that leadership within the Valley was quite divided – even though people largely agreed with certain issues, there were major differences of opinion about how these issues should be addressed and who should be at the helm of making those decisions.

As the number of complaints continued to increase in April 2014, Oceana requested to meet with the HBRRA. According to HBRRA, Oceana had contacted them as an important stakeholder, representative of the predominantly white and wealthy residents of Hout Bay – and the predominant source of the complaints. By August 2014, a meeting took place with FAHB (under HBRRA) and Oceana's executive board, including Oceana CEO Francois Kuttell, various Lucky Star directors and employees, a number of Oceana's lawyers, and a teacher from the local school. During this meeting Oceana confirmed much of what had already been said - while they recognised the odour as being unpleasant, they were using the best odour abatement technology available and were not aware of any technology that could fully eliminate it. They had started a pilot at their West Coast Plant involving a new chemical scrubbing agent that would be implemented in Hout Bay if proven successful. Oceana emphasised their economic contribution to the area: 102 land-based employees and 124 sea-going employees, of which 58% were from Hangberg, and a further 25% were from Hangberg but had relocated to Mitchells Plain as part of their housing program; and on-going support and donation for various social institutions and activities. Oceana emphasised that they had a long-standing role in the community and believed the odour was acceptable, as demonstrated by the on-going support they received from Hangberg (Oceana, 2014).

Interestingly, one of the comments made by CEO Francois Kuttell was that he recognised they would not be able to move the factory elsewhere, noting that residents would object to the odour because it would involve 'introducing something into the environment that was not there when they first chose to move there' (Oceana, 2014). No reference was made to the community complaints raised as these were perceived as 'sensationalised' and

'aggravating the situation' (Oceana, 2014), but they did announce that an official complaints mechanism would be established on a new website. Oceana also welcomed a community-selected technical consultant to visit the factory to understand the production process and to confirm the claims made about using the best odour abatement technology in the country.

Personal Positioning 5: Meeting with Oceana

This first meeting with Oceana was intense and it really put things into perspective – this wasn't a little factory with a smell problem, this was a serious and formidable industry and they were bringing out their big guns.

Perhaps through lack of preparation or general naivety, I hadn't expected the full executive board to be present, accompanied by a battalion of environmental lawyers. The three representatives of FAHB must have looked like a motley crew. The FAHB team was comprised of one white middle-aged housewife living in the Heights, a relatively new resident of five or six years. She suffered from fibromyalgia, which she believed got worse when the factory emissions were present. The second member was a South African and European pop star, well known for his jazz singing and musical productions. Having lived in Hout Bay for more than 10 years, he was outraged that the odour was such a blemish on the community and was prepared to rally his fans to support the cause. And then there was me, a brand-new resident who just so happened to have an interest and background in community development. It was clear from the beginning that the power lay on Oceana's side of the table.

The meeting was held at the large boardroom table of Oceana's offices in Cape Town, reaffirming their position of power. They listened to our concerns amicably and provided explanations about how their processes worked. Reminding us constantly that there were no alternatives and they were fully compliant within the law, there was nothing more that could be done. While some efforts could be made to increase transparency and share information, none of these actions would have any bearing on the problem itself.

It was after this meeting that the FAHB organisers and I realised we had been focused on the wrong thing: while thus far our efforts had been to engage with the factory, in reality they were simply going about their business, fully in compliance with the laws and regulations determined by the City. Oceana wasn't so much the problem as the laws that allowed Oceana to operate in such an environment. The real problem here lay with the City of Cape Town.

In September 2014, the new 'Hout Bay Fishmeal Factory' website was launched. Including information about their history, certification, and production processes, the website's intention was to share information with the community and create a mechanism to promote dialogue between the factory and the residents (Lucky Star, 2014). The website also included

a complaints form where residents could record their grievances whenever they were experienced.

Initially, there were numerous glitches on the website, particularly surrounding the complaints form. At first it appeared that complaints were to be recorded under 'general feedback' but when residents filled in this form, no feedback was received and it appeared the complaint had not been recorded. When following up with the factory, residents were told their complaints had not been recorded because they had not filled in the 'complaints form,' a nearly invisible tab with white writing against a white background, alongside the general feedback tab. While this may have been a simple design error, it added to the general feeling that there was a deliberate attempt to avoid making the registering of complaints easy. This was an early example of the kind of manipulation techniques used to keeping the issue off the agenda and is discussed more thoroughly in the analysis that follows.



Figure 5.8: Screenshot of the Fishmeal Factory Website complaints form

FAHB communicated with the factory regularly to highlight these challenges, which were generally solved after some discussion, and promoted use of the complaints form when the factory was in production. Oceana also claimed that the website would feature live blogs, and that once registered on the site residents would be added to a 'stakeholder alert list to receive plant updates' (Oceana Group, 2015). Neither of these happened – blogs were not

regularly produced, even when incidents had occurred, and in the six years that FAHB was registered on the site, they never once received a 'plant update' from Oceana[6].

FAHB also began to articulate its position more clearly, which centred around three key points: all people had the right to live in a healthy and positive environment; the odour pollution from the factory negatively impacted the health, well-being, and socio-economics of the community; and alternative enterprises needed to be found that could meet the needs of local communities and contribute to a positive environment (FAHB, 2014b). By the end of the year, they had started a petition, calling for a stop to the odour pollution and advocating that all people had the right to live in an environment that was conducive to their health and well-being. They called on the City of Cape Town to develop a long-term strategy for the harbour, requesting various activities be completed, including a health study, a social and environmental impact assessment, and a complaints mechanism directly managed by the City. The petition would come to garner more than 3,000 signatories (FAHB, 2014a).

In September 2014, Oceana attempted to boost its image amongst the broader Hout Bay community by hosting the Oceana Hout Bay Seafood Festival. With the aim of positioning Hout Bay as 'South Africa's seafood capital' the festival aimed at 'stimulating local pride and building bridges to create short-term and long-term jobs' (Oceana Group, 2014). While Oceana hailed the event as a success in their annual report (Oceana Group, 2014), the broader Hout Bay did not share this sentiment (see the Facebook comments below). While people were supportive of the idea of a seafood festival, they were against the idea of Oceana being the sponsor, and particularly that it was called the 'Oceana' festival. The four-day event was poorly attended with many people not really knowing if it had happened or not, calling it a big 'mess' in terms of an event. Things heated up, however, when someone stole the festival banner that was hanging outside the police station. All eyes turned to FAHB and many accused the 'activists' of stealing the banner in a form of protest against Oceana, which was clearly not the case[7].

[6] As of August 2020, there had still been no update on the website regarding the factory's closure. The last blog update on the website was dated February 2018.

[7] The organisers of the festival contacted me directly to ask if I, or someone from FAHB, had stolen the banner. I told them that we had not but cautioned them that this reaction was expected when dealing with Oceana – no amount of corporate sponsorship was going to change the way people viewed the emissions.

Figure 5.9: Comments on Facebook about the seafood festival

5.3. 2015

Between March and April 2015, complaints were once again rampant as people logged complaints through Oceana's website and City Health conducted a monitoring exercise on three different days to investigate the situation. During the visits, the City spoke to a number of residents and noted that the smell was 'very unpleasant' and 'rancid' in some areas, particularly Hangberg, but 'didn't smell anything out of the ordinary' and the odours were

'way below any health effects' (City Health, 2015a). The report also detailed the stipulations of the AEL, provided a list of plant improvements and modifications over the years to combat the odour, and argued that the climatic conditions and topography greatly affected the dispersion of odours. In its concluding remarks, the City said they were of the view that 'the factory had technically done all that is reasonably practical to control odours.' They offered two options as a way forward: either the factory be permitted to operate and the odours 'must be tolerated by the broader community – many of whom have only recently purchased properties in Hout Bay'; or a decision be taken to withdraw their emissions license, but noted that Lucky Star too had rights and any action must be compliant with the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (City Health, 2015a). They concluded that they would continue to monitor the situation and investigate new technology where and when it became available.

FAHB responded to this report by submitting a formal letter of complaint to the City through the HBRRA. They argued that the City had not fully taken into account the impact of the odour on the broader community, noting the ineffective complaints mechanism, and cited a number of health and well-being impacts (FAHB, 2015e). They believed that Lucky Star was in violation of the draft Air Quality Management By-Law which stated that:

> *No person shall… cause any reasonable interference or likely interference through air pollution which may adversely affect the health or well-being of any person or living organism; or the use and enjoyment by an owner or occupier of his or her property or environment.* (City of Cape Town, 2016)

They also questioned an important contradiction made by the City regarding health. They noted that while representatives of City Health maintained there were no negative health implications, in the sub-council minutes dated 19 August 2013 (16 SUB 51/08/13), referring to the application for consent in terms of the Land Use Planning Ordinance for ERF 8474 in Hout Bay, it was stated that the Health Department and other objectors raised serious health concerns stating 'the fish odour is unbearable and may be a health hazard for those living in close proximity to the fish factory' and 'due to health concerns, the area is not suitable for housing purposes' (City Health, 2015b).

FAHB continued to note that they received correspondence from the Hout Bay Councillor explaining:

> *The City has purchased for R10 million a plot of land at the bottom of the Road leading up the hill to Hangberg. The plan was to build residential CRUs (Community Residential Units) on the land but an expert health study has stated that proximity to the Fish Factory with its inevitable noxious emissions renders this land unusable for residential buildings. Thus the City has the embarrassment of having acquired expensive land which as yet has no purpose.* (Haywood, 2015)

In its concluding comments, FAHB commented that it was 'reasonable to assume that the City is deliberately choosing to ignore these health concerns' and that 'the interests of Oceana are put before the interests of the community' (FAHB, 2015e). They requested that these concerns be raised at the next Sub-Council meeting so that a long-term solution could be found.

During this same period, Oceana was busy expanding its operations internationally. In May 2015 they announced they would be purchasing Daybrook Fisheries, a US-based fishing company specialising in fishmeal, to the tune of R4.5 billion. This purchase was in line with the company's strategy of expanding its international operations to increase diversification of fish species, operational geography, and currency exposure (The Citizen, 2015).

FAHB's concerns were indeed tabled at the Sub-Council 16 meeting in June 2015, that Lucky Star, City Health, FAHB and the HBCA attended. The Ward 74 Councillor voiced her concerns over Oceana's operations commenting that the smell had changed in recent years to one of 'decomposing bodies' and the 'obnoxiousness of the emissions' needed to be dealt with, while FAHB said that the 'responses from the City and Oceana are not solving the problem' (Cape Argus, 2015). City Health presented their report, detailing compliance with the AEL and noting that everything practical had been done to mitigate the odours. HBCA commented that the factory was an important form of employment for the Hangberg community. The Sub-Council determined that the matter should be investigated further, scheduling meetings between FAHB and the Mayoral Committee (MAYCO) Member for Health, and between City Health and the Oceana management team (FAHB, 2015d).

Personal Positioning 6: The Importance of Representation

I found the sub-council meeting to be quite stressful. It was the first time I had attended a meeting like this and I wasn't sure of the format, of what I would be able to say or when, or what would really happen. I was also there alone because the other FAHB members didn't want to attend. It was, however, a good opportunity to put names to faces – prior to this point much of my communication, particularly with the City, had been via email and phone calls and it was interesting to meet the actual people who I had been engaging with. The Oceana representatives didn't speak to me at all, other than a cordial greeting, and sat with residents from Hangberg, one of whom later turned out to be the Secretary of the HBCA.

Two things happened during this meeting that made me reflect.

First, when the issue of the fishmeal factory came up, I felt the Chair of the Sub-Council was dismissive from the very beginning. He read the overview to introduce the topic but it seemed that he found it a bit humorous, smiling amicably while he talked about the 'stink' everyone knew about. He also confused 'Lucky Star' with 'Lucky Fish' and proceeded to accidentally say the 'Lucky Fish factory' for the rest of the topic's discussion. This became a particularly comical point when Lucky Star spoke, who clarified it was Lucky *Star* and that perhaps the fish were not the luckiest in this equation after all, met with laughter all round.

This set the tone for another awkward chuckle when the Councillor made her comment about 'decomposing bodies.' Perhaps this was just his manner, his light-hearted way of getting through the enormous book of sub-council issues, but I interpreted it as being dismissive, detracting from the severity of the discussion and lending itself to the impression that the City was not taking this seriously, again.

The second thing that happened was a very important lesson for me. When the Secretary of the HBCA spoke, he commented about the importance of the factory to providing jobs and its longstanding role in the community, which was expected. But he also raised an important point about representation – who is the Hout Bay that FAHB represents, he had asked, because he represented people who supported the factory and they were from Hout Bay too. I don't recall the exact words he said, but the message was clear: you do not represent all of Hout Bay and you especially do not represent me.

This made me pause. I realised that all of FAHB's communication thus far had been very broad and I had been making huge claims of representation – the 'residents' or 'community' of Hout Bay were against the emissions. This was simply not true – I only represented a certain group within the 'community' and this was an important distinction to make. I realised that I would need to be very careful with my language because language had power. I added qualifiers to all the FAHB communications saying we represented 'people interested in finding a solution to the odour' and only encouraging 'those impacted by the emissions' to register complaints. I also realised the importance of having official representation numbers. Prior to this point, FAHB had been a very informal group and I had loosely determined our membership based on Facebook page likes, which of course was not very valid. After this meeting, I added the registration form to the FAHB website and asked people to officially register on the site so that I would have some kind of numbers to back up the claims I was making.

I would later come to understand better that this idea of representation was extremely important, particularly for a community who felt as marginalised as Hangberg. The coloured community had a long history of being on the peripheral, being 'not white enough' under the apartheid system, but 'not black enough' under the new government to be considered, a notion which is further unpacked in the analysis (Adhikari, 2005). As a result, their voices had often been excluded and the issue of identity and representation – of who spoke for whom on local issues – was extremely important. This idea of marginalisation, and how this influenced Hangberg's actions, is discussed in greater detail in the analysis for Hangberg that follows.

Later that month, FAHB had a brief meeting with the MAYCO Member for Health, Councillor Mamkeli. Councillor Mamkeli had only recently assumed this position, taking over from Benedicta van Minnen, who had originally presented the City's report to the community. FAHB presented the health and well-being impacts experienced by the community, through a collection of comments they had received, and raised concerns about the conflicting health information regarding housing development. The MAYCO member explained that,

being new to the role, he was not able to give immediate answers but committed to investigate the matter further and look into the possibility of tightening conditions around the AEL (FAHB, 2015d). The meeting scheduled between City Health and Oceana did not take place. Described as an 'urgent meeting' to discuss the 'overwhelming smell of rotten fish' (Cape Times, 2015), the meeting was postponed at the last minute with 'no clarity' of when it would take place. Councillor Mamkeli commented that he was awaiting information from his department but reiterated that the factory was operating within its AEL (Cape Times, 2015).

Throughout this time, FAHB continued to gain a more active presence in the community. FAHB organiser and well-known jazz musician Ike Moriz produced a song about the odour called 'Lucky Star Ain't What You Are'[8], featuring local Hangberg artist Spike-P, and the song gained traction with the community (Sentinel, 2015e). FAHB also started meeting with local NGOs and participating in community discussion platforms focused on sustainable development, including with in/formal south, Thrive, and the Hout Bay Partnership. They continued to gather information, to collect official affidavits to register impacts (FAHB, 2015d), and shared this information on their social media platforms.

5.4. Analysis: Understanding the Status Quo

The events that transpired over these 18 months allow for an interesting analysis of power to be undertaken. The following discussion of power fundamentally relates to the battle for power between two or more actors, essentially the institutions and groups of people involved in a given situation, and indeed, this is the very research question itself: where does the power to influence decision-making for development lie?

To explore this question, it is first important to identify who the main actors are and where and when they exhibit different forms of power. The situation in Hout Bay largely centred on the interaction between four main actors:

- **Oceana/Lucky Star**: representing the commercial fishing industry and corporate business;
- **Government:** predominantly the City of Cape Town but also some instances of provincial and national government, representing the formal institutions and processes of governance. It is important to note that the City of Cape Town is a complex institution: comprised of various institutions and departments that employ nearly 29,000 people (de Villiers, 2020) and operate an annual budget of more than R50 billion (Business News, 2020), it thus cannot be flattened into a single entity known as 'the City'. This case study involves only certain City departments, including City Health, various MAYCOs, and City representatives who are specifically identified throughout the narrative. For the purposes of this research, this collection of representatives is referred to broadly as 'the City of Cape Town'. This research

[8] Lucky Star Ain't What You Are music video: shorturl.at/uHW59

recognises that the City of Cape Town is not a solitary unit, that conflicts exist within the executive that are both political and organisational in origin, and in no way intends to suggest that the findings of this research can be applied to the City as a whole;

- **FAHB:** the community activist group advocating against the emissions, representing a predominantly white, affluent sector of the Hout Bay community; and
- **Hangberg:** representatives of the coloured, low socio-economic community with long ties to the factory. It is important to note that Hangberg itself is comprised of a complex series of actors (as discussed in Chapter 4) but in this context the community was largely represented by one voice that showed support for the factory, and is thus viewed as a single actor. When asked why Hangberg had largely come together over this issue, one community leader commented, 'Whenever there is a common purpose or common struggle, we are united' (Community Leader 4, 2019).

A fundamental understanding of power is the ability of A to get B to do what B might not otherwise have done (Dahl, 1957; Digeser, 1992; Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001). The extent to which this is possible is largely determined by the sources and domain of resources that can be exploited to effect behaviour (Dahl, 1957; Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001; Lukes, 2005).

In the case of Hout Bay, it can be argued that A, those with overt power to make decisions, can be understood as Oceana and government. Oceana controlled the industry itself, thus had the ability to directly make decisions about its own operations. Government controlled the legal environmental in which the industry operated, with the ability to directly make decisions about its lease (national government) and its license (City). These actors used their power to get B, the broader Hout Bay community (including FAHB and Hangberg) to do what they might not otherwise have done - tolerate noxious air emissions from a polluting factory.

This represents the status quo or 'normality.'

The status quo is established by those already in power exercising their control of visible and invisible power mechanisms - the formal rules, structures, institutions, authorities and procedures (Lukes, 1974). Let us first apply this to those in power – Oceana and government.

5.4.1. Oceana and Government

From the data, it is evident that Oceana and government exhibited their power in three distinct ways: ensuring economic dependency, deliberately depoliticising the issue, and conditioning the community to support their interests. These tactics are directly in line with Lukes's (2005) three dimensions of power and each of these are discussed.

5.4.1.1. Economic Dependency

One of the key narratives from Hangberg was the importance of the factory jobs from Oceana to the economic stability of the community. This was indeed true.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the Oceana fishmeal factory was established in 1958, during which time racial segregation had begun under the apartheid government's Group Areas Act. All coloured people living in Hout Bay were forcibly removed into council flats and houses in Hangberg, many of which were provided by the fishing companies (including Oceana) for an extremely poor and dependent workforce (Fieuw, 2011). As the fishing industry boomed in the 1970s, in part thanks to the pro-commercial fishing policy implemented by the apartheid government, labour flats soon became overcrowded leading to the first proliferation of backyard dwellings and the issue of housing that would continue for the next 50 years (Van Sittert, 2002, 2003).

During this time, the coloured community went through significant transition. Not only did they lose access to their homes and lifestyles, they lost access to their traditional livelihoods and were instead forced to work for commercial industries (Van Sittert, 2002). The factories employed generations of families from the poverty-stricken community and their dependency systematically grew (Van Sittert, 2002). In this way, the fishing industry fostered 'dependent destitution' (Van Sittert, 2003:43) and the jobs from the factory were indeed important to the community.

At this time, Oceana employed approximately 100 people, an estimated 60 of which lived in Hangberg, and all of whom depended on these jobs for their basic survival. As such, any negative impact experienced on account of the emissions was disregarded by Hangberg due to the threat of deprivation that would occur were the factory not to operate. As one Hangberg respondent commented, 'That factory is the bread and butter of this community – people wouldn't have survived without it' (Community Activist 1, 2019).

Oceana had also systematically contributed to the development and stability of Hangberg through their corporate social investment, support to schools, and relief aid. For a community severely lacking in resources, these contributions were well received and entrenched Hangberg's dependency further. As one respondent commented, 'The community supports Oceana because of what they do for the community' (Community Leader 1, 2019), with another qualifying that 'Oceana has done more than anyone else to support the Hangberg community. Maybe it is little compared to what they could have done, but no-one else has provided jobs for 50 years and social support – it's quantifiable' (Community Activist 2, 2019).

This degree of economic dependency gave Oceana a significant amount of power. First, any negative impact experienced on account of the emissions was disregarded by Hangberg, due to the threat of deprivation that would occur were the factory not to operate. As one respondent commented, 'people have provided for their families because of their hard-earned money from that fishing plant – who cares about the smell?' (Community Leader 3,

2019). In this way, Hangberg did not openly question the factory's activities and compliance with the status quo continued. This points to Oceana using economic dependency as a form of coercion, where those in power are able to ensure compliance by the threat of deprivation (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Lukes, 1974).

5.4.1.2. Deliberate Depoliticisation of the Issue

Oceana and government both exercised a certain degree of authority, in that they had the capacity to elicit respect, had the right to be listened to, and were in a position to guide or steer opinion (Hopfl, 1999).

Oceana is a major contributor to the fishing industry nationally and internationally, and was ranked in the top ten best seafood companies in the world (Oceana Group, 2016). They also enjoyed the reputation of the iconic Lucky Star brand. Ranked as number 14 in the top iconic brands in South Africa (BusinessTech, 2016), and number four in the top favourite township brands (BizCommunity, 2019), Lucky Star's red can with its yellow star and stripes and blue waves is famous throughout the country, particularly appealing to the lower socio-economic group of South Africans due to its affordability. With more than 800 000 cans of Lucky Star serving over 3 million people daily (Lucky Star, 2019), the brand defines 'a common experience that is woven into the fabric of South African townships' (BizCommunity, 2019). South African Finance Minister Tito Mboweni even jested that Lucky Star's 'pilchards and pap' helped him to become the finance minister and would come to be honoured with the Lucky Star 'seal of approval' by having his face featured temporarily on the logo itself after a series of comic culinary social media stunts where he promoted the classic South African dish (The South African, 2019).

Government exercised political authority, locally and nationally, by being recognised as (for all intents and purposes) a legitimate government. In particular, the City of Cape Town enjoyed a reputation as being the best-run big metropolitan city in the country, in the best run province (Weekend Argus, 2019).

Both entities used this authority to depoliticise the issue in a number of ways. Firstly, government set all the laws and legislation pertaining to environmental protection, including the South African Constitution, NEMA, NEMAQA, municipal by-laws, and the AEL. The City insisted that Oceana was in compliance with those laws and thus had every legal right to operate, and nothing further could be done to rectify the situation. In this way, the City used their authority to effectively keep the issue off the agenda of Council. In addition, Oceana, respected as a leader within the fishing industry and operator of the foremost fishmeal plant in the country, insisted that no alternative odour abatement technology existed, limiting any possible action to be taken in this regard. The stalemate this created shifted the conversation to a moral one: were the laws themselves reasonable if they were failing to protect the interests of the people? By using their agenda setting power, the City was effective at avoiding this question, instead opting to preserve the non-decision-making situation that it perpetuated. In this way, the City used rule-based depoliticisation tactics where they constrained the need for political debate, allowing them to distance or insulate

themselves from the societal pressures placed on them by difficult groups (Flinders and Buller, 2006; Burnham, 2017).

Control of Information

Another mechanism of power exhibited by Oceana and the City was the control of information. As one respondent said, 'Oceana provided no information at all and they deliberately prevented you from getting information when you asked for it. Until they built that website, people had no idea what was going on and even then it was poorly maintained, containing only the information they wanted you to know' (FAHB Representative 1, 2019). The same was said about the City. All respondents commented that not only was information not readily available, the information that was available was difficult to obtain, requiring lengthy bureaucratic processes and access to resources. One interviewee stated: 'The City is completely unresponsive – they don't provide news, information, pamphlets, or anything to help people understand what the issues are or what the situation is. They only engage with defunct channels… even though they know these channels are completely ineffective' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019). A community activist from Hangberg shared these thoughts, commenting 'the City didn't provide information because they wanted to delay us – if we don't know what's going on we can't take action, and that allows them to continue with their own objectives, not what the people want' (Community Activist 2, 2019).

My experience as the FAHB facilitator was largely the same, both with Oceana and the City. With Oceana, prior to the construction of their website at the end of 2014, there had been no easy way for residents to obtain information about the factory and its processes nor to formally register a complaint. Even when the website was built, the invisible complaints form gave the impression that there was no real effort to ensure the complaints were registered. It was also somewhat alarming that the complaints register would be held by the very company that people were complaining against – FAHB raised this as a conflict of interest several times, requesting that the City manage the complaints and not the culprit producing the grievance of the complaint (FAHB, 2016).

The City also had no platform where information could be accessed and all requests for documents were directed to the PAIA process. While this platform is designed to enable access to information, it presents a number of challenges. PAIA first requires an application where a request is made of a specific document – often community members don't know the official names of documents and there is significant back and forth to identify what information is sought. Once this is clarified, the application process begins which takes up to 60 days to garner a response, following payment of a nominal administrative fee. Almost every application I made to the City was denied upon first request and I then had to appeal the decision, delaying the process for an additional 60 days. Typically the information I requested was finally obtained, but it often took between 3-9 months to access a single document.

Several respondents believed this to be a deliberate delay tactic, and as one commented '[the City] uses their own bureaucracy to actually avoid doing what they are supposed to be

doing' (Community Leader 4, 2019). He explained that while various processes were available to engage with the City, you often went 'round and round in circles,' and in this way the City avoided responsibility for addressing certain issues. Another interviewee commented that the lack of information made it difficult to engage with the City as you 'never fully knew what the status of play was, who to speak to, or where to get information from' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019).

Government Instability and Departmental Incongruence

An additional complexity was the regular change to heads of various departments. Because City officials are political positions, the heads of those departments changed according to the internal politics of the DA, and each new official may have limited information or experience with the issues they were suddenly confronted with. 'Every time there's a new official they try to empathise,' explained one respondent, 'but the reality is they have no context, no background, and you have to start all over again. It's exhausting' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019). This, he suggested, was another effect of the City's bureaucracy.

Linked to this was the incongruence between government departments. As one respondent said, 'government departments play off of each other to avoid responsibility. They don't speak to each other and they always try to say its someone else's problem' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019). The respondent explained that for years he had been working with people in Hangberg to find a resolution to the housing issue in Hangberg, which required the participation of various departments in local and nation government. First he was told to work with the Housing Department but when no progress was made they said the real issue was with SAN Parks, and SAN Parks said the issue was with national government. 'It was impossible to get all the parties speaking to each other and we just kept going round in circles. After five years the issue still wasn't resolved and I eventually gave up.' This idea is expanded on extensively in Democracy Disconnected (Anciano and Piper, 2019) where the different 'mentalities' of departments is reflected on, often leading to 'departments finding themselves at loggerheads and the stalling or failure of projects' (Froestad *et al.*, 2015; Anciano and Piper, 2019:67).

FAHB too experienced this division, particularly between the City and national government. While the City of Cape Town regulated the AEL, they argued that it was *national* government that set the limits for emissions, thus any decision would need to come from them. They claimed to have no power or influence over this process and even argued that they would be interested in developing the harbour, but because all small harbours were controlled by national DPW, they were not in a position to pursue development of any kind. As the Hout Bay Councillor said, 'We would love to unlock the potential of the harbour district and open up a lot of economic mobility for Hout Bay. I have delivered as much as I can but at that boundary fence our jurisdiction ends and we cannot dictate what happens on the other side of the wall' (City Representative, 2019). Only two respondents had had any personal interactions with national government, with both briefly mentioning that they operated in much the same way as the City when it came to communication and engagement, implying these were few and far between (Community Leader 4, 2019; Hout Bay Civil Society 3, 2019).

This is another example of how the City attempted to depoliticise the issue – by playing the 'politics of blame attribution' they were able to shift responsibility for the management of difficult issues (Burnham, 2017:362). In many ways, this continuous avoidance by the City to take action on the issue represents a passive aspect of holding power. Land (2015) explains this as the 'fear of the decision-maker who knows enough to be aware of the possibility of getting into a political mess, yet does not know enough to navigate the situation.' The result is a negative form of agenda-setting power, or non-action: 'the strategy is to stall, to end up doing "nothing", which is essentially a form of passive aggression' (Land, 2015:198).

Poor Communication and Consultation

All respondents commented that communication with formal structures was generally poor. While Oceana was proactive with communication in terms of creating a space, as demonstrated by the meeting with stakeholders and the CEO's willingness to engage on the issue, those spaces didn't allow for any real dialogue to occur – people simply stated their concerns and Oceana maintained there was nothing they could do. In this way, these events seemed to be more tokenistic rather than a demonstration of real communication. As one FAHB respondent commented 'Oceana communicated when it suited them. They were happy to invite us to a meeting where it looked like they were 'engaging with stakeholders,' but when we asked them to have a notification system of when they would be in production, they refused. They communicated when they needed to communicate and when it looked good to them' (FAHB Representative 1, 2019). The website was viewed as tokenistic in the same way – while it was established to foster communication and dialogue with the community, in reality it didn't do this at all, it was simply a static website that didn't do more than provide basic history and support a complaints register.

With regards to the City, all respondents commented that very little consultation takes place with the community, although what this really meant differed between people. All commented that few public meetings were held between the City and the residents and these generally only occurred after a major escalation. One respondent commented, 'There is no communication or consultation with the community to discuss important issues. People respond well to being informed, there is a lot of reciprocity for this. But that's not what's happening. There's never been any consultation. If there has been, it must have been in a dark corner somewhere' (Community Leader 4, 2019).

This idea that consultations occur 'in a dark corner' was a common theme from the respondents and another commented that while a lot of meetings do happen, they are just 'totally under the radar' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019). One respondent commented that communication was easier when 'you knew the right people' (Community Leader 4, 2019) and another commented, 'no-body shares information. You're invited to a meeting 15 minutes before it takes place by being added onto some secret WhatsApp group' (Hout Bay Civil Society 3, 2019).

Several respondents felt that the lack of communication was a deliberate attempt on the part of government to foster division. As one said, 'It's easier to divide than to unite. It's

more difficult to keep people in the status quo if they are united. If [the City] brings people together they will find common ground, and then there will be no space for [the City] or for the positions they want to have. If people are able to work together, then there's no space for this thing called 'government'. It threatens their power. So that's what they do in the harbour, they divide people' (Community Leader 4, 2019).

Community Inertia

In addition to these mechanisms of power, the combination of them also had an accumulative effect: community inertia. While various groups and individuals had tried to take action against the odorous emissions over the years, none could maintain resistance against this constant institutionalised power. As one community advocate against the emissions commented, 'After a while, you just start to give up. You get the same response over and over, you're told repeatedly that nothing can be done, and everything you try is almost immediately dismissed for some or other reason. So what are you supposed to do – keep flogging a dead horse? It's infuriating. And exhausting. Eventually you realise that you don't actually have the energy to fight anymore. The people from Hangberg were right - we should 'just get used to it' because nothing is ever going to change' (FAHB Representative 1, 2019). This response is what Gaventa refers to as 'an adaptive response to continual defeat' that may manifest as 'extensive fatalism, self-deprecation, or undue apathy' (Gaventa, 1980:16-17). This sense of power is accumulative, reinforcing the power dynamics that already exist and, in particular, reinforcing the quiescence of those without power.

It is evident that Oceana and government were able to use various power mechanisms to control the agenda of decision-making. It stands to reason that their set of preferences was to maintain control of the harbours, whether through continuing operations (Oceana) or controlling the activities in the harbour (government). The grievances raised by FAHB's objection to the emissions challenged the reasonability of those activities, thus attempting to upset the status quo. Because these grievances were detrimental to Oceana and government's preferences, they limited the scope of the political process of engagement for decision-making to occur, following the second dimensional view purported by Bachrach and Baratz (1970). Oceana and the City used their authority to assure residents that the best possible practices were being implemented, in line with all existing legislation. They justified the continuation of the factory's operations by citing the severe impact that the job loss would incur, while Oceana used their influence to demonstrate how they were in fact contributing to the community. They were willing to entertain the grievances in terms of registering them, but not to allow them to influence the decision-making agenda, which they controlled by limiting access to information, demonstrating a reluctance to communicate or consult, and having institutional processes that did not support good governance. Despite the existence of the grievances, there was no opportunity to have these put onto the decision-making agenda, thus ensuring that any challenges to the interests of the decision-makers were 'suffocated before they are even voiced' or 'killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970:44; Lukes, 1974). Despite the overt grievances that had been raised about the emissions, these grievances were excluded from a 'hearing within the political system' (Lukes, 1974), and decisions were prevented from being taken. Thus, the status quo remained.

5.4.1.3. Social Conditioning

It stands to reason that, all things being equal, people would rather *not* live in a place polluted by a noxious odour accompanied by potentially dangerous emissions. Why, then, did many residents in Hangberg not only tolerate the odour for decades, without raising any objections or concerns, and instead systematically defend its existence when it was questioned?

As discussed earlier, the coloured community went through social transition during the relocations of the 1950s and became highly dependent on the factories for their basic survival. At this time, the fishing industry was operating at its peak and with environmental and social factors not considered a priority, the emissions from the factories were at their highest. Because of the dependency the community had on the factory work, the odour from the factories came to be seen as a symbol of employment – the 'bread and butter' that kept the community alive (Community Activist 1, 2019; Community Leader 1, 2019). The more the factories were in operation, the more jobs there were in the community and the smell became a symbol of the support that Oceana gave, systematically reinforced by the social contributions they made to the community. The more this pattern was reinforced, the more people from Hangberg supported Oceana.

The responses from the community interviews from Hangberg clarified these thoughts. As one respondent said, 'I can't say that I like the smell, I just accept it. That's life. From that smell, food was served on the table, clothes were put on my body, and from that smell, still people are feeding their families. So that smell also has a history. The factory represents more than the jobs – it is the history and the legacy of these people. It's about who I am – what I am today is because of that factory. Who cares about the smell, look where it got me today' (Community Leader 3, 2019).

This is an interesting response because in reality, most people in Hangberg continued to live in a state of economic desperation marked with serious social unrest. The 2011 census revealed Hangberg had a 30% unemployment rate, only 31% of the population completed Grade 12, and the average monthly income per household was R3,200 (Ndlovu, 2014). Of course, what the respondent is referring to is that the factory kept him, and others in Hangberg, alive and gave them the basic means for survival, which alone is a notable achievement for someone living in a state of poverty.

This notion of survival being the primary goal of life was common among the Hangberg respondents. As one said, 'People are too busy living on the edge and they need to survive. You've got bigger problems. If it doesn't kill you, it's not a problem for anyone. We're not thinking about our health, we just have to do what we have to do' (Community Activist 1, 2019). He continued to say that he lived through the smell for years without it bothering him: 'It's not something I would complain about,' he continued. 'Smoking can kill you, the

cars can kill you. It's all same same.' Referring to the factory specifically, another respondent said, 'The smell is not a problem because what do I benefit from it? I've got bigger problems and the smell has been there a long time' (Community Leader 1, 2019). All the Hangberg respondents commented that this was a key reason the coloured people did not complain about the smell. As one commented, 'The more people worked in the harbour, the less they would be willing to complain' (Community Leader 3, 2019).

This is an important point to consider. The apartheid system fostered unequal power relations where the powerless were highly dependent, preventing them from both self-determined action and reflection upon their actions. Without this dialectic process, they were denied the democratic experience out of which 'critical consciousness' grows and instead developed what Freire referred to as a 'culture of silence' (Freire, 1970), one that served to reinforce the interests of the powerful. Oceana needed cheap labour to fuel their thriving industry and because the Hangberg community was so dependent on their support, they began to psychologically adapt to the state of being without power. In this way, they were socialised into compliance, accepting the reality offered to them by the powerful and considering it as 'normal' (Mueller, 1973).

This points to how social structures and cultural patterns of behaviour started to develop, a demonstration of the Gramscian concept of cultural hegemony that considers how social forces and historical patterns lead to the 'engineering of consent' for subordinate classes (Edelman, 1971). Gramsci argued that the stabilisation of a particular worldview, and the acceptance of that view from different groups (often against their own interests), is achieved through an operation of hegemony and that those in power try to manipulate hegemony, not simply by changing the physical environment, but the way in which people relate to their environment through every day activities (Loftus and Lumsden, 2008). Bourdieu developed this idea further, claiming that power is cultural and symbolic, continuously recreated through the interplay of agency and structure (Bordieu, 1990; Pettit, 2010). He offered a theory of practice or 'habitus', where learned norms and dispositions that shape our behaviour constantly interact with the 'social field', which itself is structured by symbolically mediated relations of domination (Bordieu, 1990; Pettit, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 2011). While habitus is socially formed, it is also physically inscribed in our bodies – it is not just a fixed way of doing things, but rather the formation of attitudes that are 'emotional and intellectual,' underlying our response to everything in life (Bordieu, 1990; Dewey, 1997; Pettit, 2010).

The formation of this 'habitus' can be seen in the case of Hangberg. Despite Hangberg being established by an oppressive government that essentially forced people to work in the commercial fishing industry, the longer this occurred, and the more dependent the community became on those structures, the more normalised this became in people's mindsets. The idea of Hout Bay being a 'fishing village,' one that included the fishmeal factory, was not just physically inscribed into the everyday actions of people, but also into their emotional and intellectual state. Comments like 'we got used it,' 'it's always been like that,' or even 'the smell reminds me of my childhood' are indicators of the emotional state that began to develop regarding the smell. As one of the factory's site managers

commented, 'There's a history with the people and the company. My understanding is that even roads in Hangberg is named after Oceana. So it's not only the people working there, it's their parents and grandparents too, most of them would have had something to do with Oceana. The smell, that just means there's work available. So whether people are working at the factory or not, of course they know about the smell but they don't mind' (Oceana Representative, 2019). This is an example of acquiescence, a 'passive assent' (Vuving, 2009) for the operations and a demonstration of the adaptation to domination suggested by Lukes (Lukes, 2005).

Manipulating Consensus to Create Normality

In this way, the presence of the smell, and its associated emissions, became normalised. As one Hangberg respondent said, 'That smell is second nature – it's the status quo. It's been the accepted norm for a long time' (Community Activist 2, 2019). It became such an accepted norm, in fact, that people would begin to argue that the 'factory was here first.' This is a curious position to take. Indeed, the factory had been there long before many residents but it hadn't been there *first*. In a community that claimed to fight for its cultural heritage, why did the 'beginning' only date back to the mid-1950s, when in reality a long history of subsistence fishing could be traced back? People reacted as if the smell had been there since the days the KhoiSan roamed the mountains.

In reality, the smell had only existed since the advent of apartheid and community segregation – that the coloured people were forced into - and would ultimately serve the interests of a corrupt government with national ambitions of large-scale fishing industries and the policy to fit. This demonstrates an indirect but potent mechanism of power's third dimension: the power of A is strengthened by the accumulative effect of B's powerlessness across the three dimensions discussed, and these reinforce each other towards B's silence (Lukes, 1974). Once such power relations are established, 'their maintenance is self propelled and attempts at their alteration are inevitably difficult' (Gaventa, 1980). In order to benefit from the inequalities, A no longer needs to act, or if they do act, may devote energies to strengthening the power relationships: 'A will continue to prevail simply through the inertia of the situation' (Gaventa, 1980:23).

This highlights how socialised consent prevents people from questioning, envisioning possibilities of change, or addressing injustices, and the 'processes of socialisation, culture and ideology perpetuate exclusion and inequality by defining what is normal and acceptable' (VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007). This is a clear example of the third dimensional view of power that argues that A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. By using social myths, languages, symbols, and even the communication of information to shape or manipulate power (Edelman, 1985), the powerful can get the powerless to believe and act in a manner that they would otherwise not, to their own detriment but to the advantage of others (Gaventa, 1980). This draws a distinction between perceived interests and 'real' interests and Lukes suggests that actions and inactions can influence the shaping of perceived interests and political preferences, even if these are contrary to their genuine interests (Hay, 1997; Lukes, 2005).

In this way, it can be seen that Oceana and government, specifically the City, used various power mechanisms to maintain the status quo. In this way, Oceana was able to continue to pursue its economic interests and retain its influence over the fishing sector at large, while the City was able to retain its control of activities in the harbour and the use of land (the reasons for this will be unpacked in Chapter 7).

While Oceana and the City hold the most power in terms of decision-making and control of actual resources, the other actors too held power in different ways and these are reflected on.

5.4.2. Hangberg

At this stage, it was not entirely clear what power mechanisms Hangberg had access to other than what was most obvious through observation: their capacity for resistance.

5.4.2.1. Identity and Marginalisation

Over the years, Hangberg had developed a reputation for being an unruly and provocative community. This reputation stemmed in large part from negative connotations associated with coloured people who had long been associated with crime and gangsterism, which had bred feelings of fear about the race at large (Adhikari, 2010). As one respondent commented, 'We have been classified as hooligans, thugs, gangsters, whatever connotation fits' (Community Leader 4, 2019). Another said, 'Race is always a factor. By and large people view [coloured people] as criminals – when they see people like us coming through the door, they get scared. That's the reputation that our people has' (Community Activist 2, 2019).

Historically, coloured people suffered racial oppression under white supremacy and broad parameters were set for the production and reproduction of the coloured identity (Adhikari, 2010). This identity is complex and historically located, stemming from processes of slavery, genocide, rape, and the coloured identity has long been cloaked by the 'perceived shame of 'illegitimacy' and lack of authenticity' that has been psychologically disempowering for the bearers of the identity (Hendricks, 2005:118). Under the apartheid era, the former First Lady Marike de Klerk was known to have said that coloureds were 'not white but not black,' calling them the 'leftovers,' 'the people that were left after the nations were sorted out' (Adhikari, 2005:13). As a result, the history of the coloured community has been steeped in oppression and the struggle for liberation, marked by a distinct sense of marginalisation (Hendricks, 2005).

A key indicator of this marginalisation was the forced removals that took place between the 1950s and the 1980s. Regarded as one of the most hated laws by the coloured community, the Group Areas Act relocated people based on their racial status, where communities were broken up, property owners were meagrely compensated, access to resources were stripped, and alternative accommodation was inadequate (Adhikari, 2005). In this way, the particular context of identity formation has been one of traumatic loss due to forced

removals. All the respondents from Hangberg raised this during their interviews, recalling that the forced removals were a 'painful' time that 'remain a burden' to this day (Community Leader 3, 2019). Despite differences within the community, there was marked solidarity as victims of racial injustice, what Adhikari (2005:88) suggests is 'solidarity in loss.' Indeed, one respondent commented, 'Look at what Hangberg has lost. What have they gained in the past 50 years compared to what they lost? Not very much' (Community Activist 2, 2019). In addition, Hangberg's sense of loss was largely location-based, indicating that identity was not simply one of race, but rather connected to a space, history, and experience shared with a wider community.

This sense of maginalisation continued into the post-apartheid era, where the coloured community again received an intermediate status in racial hierarchy being 'not white enough' during apartheid, but 'not black enough' during post-apartheid (Adhikari, 2005:110). With additional class differences, political and ideological differences, cultural affinity, and popular stereotyping, this continued marginalisation severely limited the possibility for social and political action, particularly among urban-based working-class communities (Adhikari, 2005, 2010). As one respondent commented, 'Nothing has changed. All the power still lies with all the rich whites over there' (Community Activist 2, 2019). Adhikari (2005) suggests that communities who perceive themselves as marginalised will either agitate for recognition or withdraw from political participation, both with the objective of protecting their limited access to resources. In the case of Hangberg, they have tended to agitate more than withdraw, as demonstrated by their protest history.

5.4.2.2. Resistance

Within the fishing industry Hangberg was known for being a 'problem' area with regards to fisheries management, with poaching being a particular challenge (Sowman *et al.*, 2011:576). Local fishers often referred to this as 'protest fishing,' believing they had an inherent cultural right to fish and this act was a protest against the marginalisation and bureaucracy of the state (Anciano and Wheeler, 2021). In addition, Hangberg had shown a high degree of agitation in a range of projects relating to development, particularly involving housing, schools, transport, security, and clinics, often leading to protests and political challenges (Anciano and Piper, 2019). This sense of agitation was most acutely seen with the Battle of Hangberg where the community united together in a 3-day confrontation with the police to stop the Sentinel Mountain being auctioned off for commercial purposes, and to instead ensure that Hangberg's access to land was protected. The story is complex, as relayed in Chapter 4, but it perfectly encapsulated this sense of marginalisation, demonstrating how Hangberg used protest as a form of resistance, fighting literally and conceptually to stay where they are.

It is evident that there is a strong sense of loss and fear of displacement that contributed to the identity of people from Hangberg and that they had used protest action as a form of resistance. As one respondent commented, 'all [the Hangberg people] want to see is that you rich whities don't have the power anymore and we'll do whatever it takes' (Community Activist 1, 2019). As such, even though Hangberg was often divided internally, they were

united by a common identity that was both race and location-based, and a common fear of displacement that allowed them to become habituated to, and fiercely defensive of, the status quo.

In this way, Hangberg was a formidable community to engage with and their most obvious power appeared to lie in their use of direct action and their capacity to disrupt. In terms of the fishmeal factory, this was seen in the often aggressive language used on social media, often racially charged, that fiercely defended both the factory and their community. As a result, most people, at least from the Valley, were fearful of Hangberg and to some degree the same too can be said for the City. Following the unrest of the Battle of Hangberg, senior City officials had been told to 'leave Hout Bay alone' because it was viewed as 'too troublesome' and engagements about spatial development would inevitably lead to conflict (Anciano and Piper, 2019:64).

It appeared that Hangberg used this reputation of being unruly and rebellious with the objective of maintaining the status quo. For the reasons discussed throughout this chapter, they supported the operation of the fishmeal factory and used their power to intimidate those who opposed it. It should also be noted, however, that Hangberg demonstrated conflicting interests – their general position had expressed the desire to change the status quo in a variety of respects, including housing, employment, and education, yet at the same time they opposed any challenge to the status quo. This, of course, was due to the overriding need to secure jobs and access to resources – while a change to the status quo represented the long-term potential for a positive change to their living environment, this was not an immediate reality, and thus a threat to the factory was perceived as a direct threat to them.

While Hangberg undoubtedly had other mechanisms of power, this was what had been employed thus far and the following chapters will discuss the other forms of power that would later arise.

5.4.3. Fresh Air for Hout Bay

FAHB was a new and largely informal civil society group that, in and of itself, did not have any power to exercise actual decision-making – they did not control any significant resources, had no institutional power, and their ambitions – to get rid of the polluting emissions – were seemingly not supported by the formal rules, legislation, and structures that existed. While FAHB can in many ways be considered as powerless in the sense of being able to make a decision, they did have access to a variety of forms of power, which enabled them to begin politicising the issue.

5.4.3.1. Claiming the Space and Consolidating Information

One of the forms of power that FAHB exhibited was their ability to create a space for dialogue to occur. Spaces can be understood as the 'opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships

which affect their lives' (Gaventa, 2005:11) and because the 'provided' and 'invited' spaces were largely ineffective, FAHB 'claimed' or 'created' their own space where they had an opportunity to develop their agenda and create solidarity without the influence of those in power. FAHB did this through creating a website, where research and information could be easily accessed, and by using social media to strengthen collective support for their efforts. Social media, including text messaging, email, photo sharing and use of engagement platforms such as Facebook, have become important coordinating tools for many political movements, in large part because of their ability to facilitate awareness and public media campaigns easily. While these kind of activities were previously reserved for more formal organisations, social media has enabled larger and 'looser' groups to take on this same kind of action by facilitating greater access to information and providing more opportunities for civil society to engage in public speech and undertake collective action (Shirky, 2011). In this way, FAHB used these online platforms to build a movement and to 'strengthen civil society and the public sphere' (Shirky, 2011:32).

Social media has helped to decentralise the mass-mediated processes of pushing content and offer a more participatory role to the individual communicator. By making access to the processes of production and distribution of texts possible, the locations of communicative power are unfixed, enabling resistant discourses to be taken up and used effectively (KhosraviNik and Unger, 2009). In this way, social media can help to foster new practices for social inclusivity, group recognition and participation that help to shape different forms of political conversation and engagement (Cottle, 2011). Social networking sites, such as Facebook, can thus function to 'reconnect an apolitical public with political debate, and facilitating communication and debate between individual citizens and between citizens and politicians' (KhosraviNik and Unger, 2009:212). FAHB effectively made use of social media, using it as a new form of 'political capital' (Abdulmutallib, 2012:103) to participate in the public discourse and to politicise the issue.

In addition, FAHB's website consolidated information from the City of Cape Town, Oceana, and other sources, and made this information easily accessible to its constituents. This information gave FAHB a degree of power, recognising that possessing and using knowledge is a form of power in and of itself (Gotlieb and Borodin, 1973). This information helped to create 'shared awareness' (Shirky, 2011:35), enabling FAHB members to better understand the situation at hand, and by propagating these messages through social media, they were able to effectively politicise the issue.

5.4.3.2. Privilege and the Access to Resources

FAHB's ability to politicise the issue in this way was largely due to their hegemonic power, afforded to them by their privilege and status as middle-class and white. FAHB predominantly represented people from the Valley, or at least people representing a greater degree of socio-economic affluence. This affluence itself represents a fundamental source of power. While Oceana maintained a degree of influence over the Hangberg community due to the threat of deprivation and job loss, as discussed, the same was not true for FAHB. Most members of FAHB were not connected to the factory in any way – they did not depend on

the factory for their economic stability or basic survival and thus its closure did not represent an immediate (or future) threat of deprivation. It is only because FAHB was in this position that they were able to take action on the grievances and challenge the status quo – their inherent resilience, afforded to them by their economic stability and privilege, gave them the freedom to raise challenges against those in power, and a certain degree of authority.

This can largely be explained by 'white privilege', the institutional set of benefits granted to those who, by race, resemble the people who have historically dominated the powerful positions in institutions. White privilege provides greater access to power and resources where 'doors are open… that are not open to other people' (Kendall, 2012:1). This was true for FAHB in that they had greater access to institutional structures, such as working with the HBRRA and the Sub-Council, other consultative forums and the courts, had more personal connections, such as with the Hout Bay Councillor, and relatively easy access to the media. In addition, this state of privilege enabled access to a broad range of resources. All the FAHB organisers were well educated and financially secure. They were able to phone, email, research, build websites, pay fees to access or print documents, and communicate effectively with official representatives. Perhaps the most important resource that I personally had was time – my situation enabled me to devote hours and hours of time to researching and investigating this topic. In short, FAHB had access to many of the components of white privilege, the hegemonic structures, practices and ideologies that reproduced the privileged status of whites (Pulido, 2014), also in line with Lukes's (2005) third dimensional view of power.

5.4.3.3. Narratives and Identities

While FAHB had access to these sources of power, they also used this power to create a specific narrative. As the main driver and facilitator of FAHB, and the author of all communications, I have a very specific insight into how and why this narrative was crafted, and recognising that autoethnography offers a form of reflexivity, I will use my personal position to explain how this came about.

In the very early days of realising the extent of the odour problem and before I decided to form FAHB, a friend of mine confronted me with a serious question: what was I really trying to achieve? The short answer was that I wanted to get rid of the smell. In principle I didn't want the factory to close and ideally some kind of technology could be implemented or the emissions regulations could be changed to a point where they no longer impacted the community. But neither of these were seemingly possible: Oceana and the City consistently maintained that the best odour-abatement technology was already being used, based on international standards; and the threshold for smell was so low for the chemicals involved that any change to regulations would essentially require the factory to have no emissions at all. The truth was that the only way the smell would go away was if the factory went away too.

But I couldn't advocate for the factory to close down.

First, it was very clear that the factory was an important source of economic stability for Hangberg, which itself was already highly impoverished and facing a range of social issues – closing the factory would only exacerbate this further. Second, the situation was embedded within a range of historical injustices, most predominantly issues surrounding race, and white people advocating for the closure of the factory to the demise of the coloured community would be seen as a racially charged act, whether or not this was actually the case. Third, wasn't this the classic problem with top-down approaches to development – that someone from outside comes into a community and, without any prior understanding or real consultation with the local people, deems something to be wrong and proceeds to tell everybody what to do about it?

Advocating for the closure of the factory was problematic on every level. But, at the same time, none of these facts changed the reality that a serious problem of pollution existed and that something needed to be done in spite of these challenges. So what then was I supposed to do? The only solution, from my perspective, was to advocate for something bigger – for a sustainable harbour development plan that would essentially render the factory redundant but simultaneously put in place new socio-economic opportunities for the local community.

Not everyone in the FAHB organising team agreed with this sentiment and they were more interested in finding a quick solution. It took me a long time to convince them that this approach was necessary and at the end of the day I think it came down to a matter of who was going to do the work – it was clear I was taking on the bulk of the initiative and the others were happy to go along with the idea. And so, FAHB started advocating for a long-term solution and this was the foundation of the narrative I would begin to create.

I believe that many people found FAHB's position disingenuous – everyone knew the only way to get rid of the smell was to shut the factory down and calling for a long-term plan was just a fancy way of avoiding those particular words. In reality, I cannot disagree but I would add a particular caveat: it is not only the outcome that is important, but also the process of achieving that outcome. At the end of the day, the factory was not socially sustainable and ultimately would need to be shut down – that could either be done abruptly, by forcing them to shut through some legal or other means, disregarding the impact this would have on the local community, or more systematically, by acknowledging the impact and taking Hangberg's interests into account while transitioning into an alternative development. I was hoping for the latter, and while it suggested a much slower and possibly more naïve approach, it was the only approach I could morally stand for, whether it seemed disingenuous or not.

I tried to control this narrative very tightly. I had seen how volatile people were on Facebook and I wanted to, as best as possible, create a space for dialogue to occur rather than resorting to personal attacks. As such, none of the FAHB communication mentioned anything about closing the factory and we consistently said we were gathering information about the situation and calling for further research to be done – to get rid of the polluting emissions. I also insisted that all of our communication focus on the facts, rather than on

perception, and developed possible responses to comments that other FAHB members could use. To this end, the website was of central importance, serving not only as a platform for others to access researched and referenced information, but also for me to keep track of everything that was going on. This information gave FAHB a degree of power, and the more FAHB grew, the more I realised this platform could be used as a lobbying tool as well, a way to consolidate information and direct people into a particular line of thinking. I tried to guide the narrative to examine the facts and look for solutions, foster discussion instead of reactions. In this way, I thought I would be able to, at the very least, gather mass support for the issue – to politicise it – and begin to bring it to the attention of the decision-makers, and by so doing, put it on the political agenda. I also hoped that using this narrative would avoid a conflict from Hangberg, instead rallying support for a bigger objective.

This narrative did two things. On the one hand, having a more strategic advocacy plan gave FAHB power – FAHB wasn't just complaining, we were asking real questions and different stakeholders took notice of this, including Oceana, the City, HBRRA, and to some extent the media. In addition, FAHB's consolidation of knowledge and information also became a source of power – the clarity of referenced information made the situation clearer and highlighted the broader issues of sustainability and governance that needed to be addressed. Having this position meant that people were generally more willing to engage and it opened up more channels for dialogue, such as through the Sub-Council meeting. On the other hand, the narrative was largely inaccessible to the people of Hangberg, in large part because of the language – phrases like 'long-term sustainability plans' or 'socio-economic development' did not resonate with local community members and in many ways, this language only reinforced the perceptions of elitism that already existed. Despite discussions that took place on Facebook and other platforms to clarify these ideas and foster dialogue, the perception that FAHB was simply a white group trying to shut down the factory remained. In this way, FAHB did not have a lot of power to positively engage or influence perceptions with Hangberg.

5.4.3.4. Resisting Inertia

It is important to note that while FAHB demonstrated some degree of power, they too were faced with the effects of community inertia that had built up over the decades, the sense of powerlessness and apathy that forms as an adaptive response to continual defeat (Freire, 1970; Gaventa, 1980).

As the coordinator for FAHB, I found it exceptionally difficult to get people to engage – while they were happy to complain and rant on Facebook, it was nearly impossible to get them to do anything else. People would call for meetings to be held and would then not attend, we would give them affidavits to complete but they wouldn't fill them out. It was always that 'someone' should do 'something' as long as it didn't involve them. This is a clear example of the 'slacktivism' that comes from the use of social media, where people hope to 'click their way to a better world' (Shirky, 2011:38) instead of taking any real action. One of the key challenges was getting people to register complaints. I firmly believed that creating a solid database of the number of people impacted would give us the platform we needed to

launch our case, and that the constant registering of complaints would eventually lead to the issue being recognised. But this meant the broader community had to register their complaints every time they were impacted, which would be every day for days on end. It didn't take long for people to express their frustration at registering complaints, saying it was tedious and didn't achieve anything. This was compounded by Oceana's seasonal production – people were always vocal about being involved in activities and 'getting things done' when the factory was in production and the smell was prolific, but as soon as soon as the factory stopped production, enthusiasm for the cause waned too with people barely remembering the problem existed in the first place.

This accumulative inertia propelled by fatalism and apathy (Freire, 1970; Gaventa, 1980) would be a challenge that FAHB would continue to face for all the years to come, particularly with the broader Valley community.

To this end, in these initial stages, it is clear that while FAHB did not have decision-making power, they were able to use their resources to create a space for dialogue to occur, giving them some degree of power to influence the discourse. Central to this was the creation of a narrative that while marginally effective in instigating discussions with Oceana and the City, made them largely inaccessible to the community of Hangberg. In addition, FAHB struggled with the accumulative effect of inertia, limiting the scope of their activities.

5.5. Conclusion

This initial analysis offers some insight into how power operated with regards to the fishmeal factory, and in particular, how the noxious odour came to be normalised, essentially establishing the status quo. This, in turn, provides the initial context for understanding how these power dynamics influenced the process of decision-making to achieve social sustainability.

As demonstrated, power in this case study revolves around the interaction of four key actors: Oceana, the City of Cape Town, FAHB, and the Hangberg community. Oceana and the City of Cape Town exercised control through three distinct ways, reflecting the notions presented by Lukes's (2005) three dimensions of power: ensuring economic dependency, depoliticising the issue through formal institutions and processes, and constructing hegemony to ensure broad support for their governance. This enabled the status quo to be maintained. The status quo served Oceana and the City to the extent that Oceana was able to continue the pursuit of its economic interests, and while the reasons were less clear for the City, it was presumed that they were able to maintain control of the land (a notion which is further interrogated in Chapter 7). In addition, it has also been demonstrated how the Hangberg community normalised this status quo through a process cultural hegemony. Through socialisation and the engineering of consent, the odorous emissions from the factory became an everyday normality, and while the factory continued to put the 'bread and butter' on the table, the community developed a culture of silence around the emissions, further sustaining the status quo.

It has also been demonstrated that while FAHB did not have decision-making power, they were able to use their largely privileged-based resources to create a space for dialogue to occur, giving them some degree of power to influence the discourse. Despite the divisions of leadership within the Valley community, FAHB created a space and then used information and knowledge accessible through democratic means to politicise the issue. While this had, at least on the surface, some degree of influence over formal institutions, such as gaining the attention of HBBRA, Oceana, and the Sub-Council, it did not influence the Hangberg community, who instead perceived them as an affluent white group unwelcome in the community.

Hangberg demonstrated power through their reputation of being a tight-knit community prone to volatility and disruption tactics, particularly when it came to issues of potential displacement. This stemmed from a long history of marginalisation and the coloured community had habituated protest as a form of resistance to the threat against their sense of identity and belonging, which was largely race and location-based. This resistance mentality was commonly perceived as a barrier to engagement and had led to the halting of several development projects. In addition, through the threat of coercive power, Hangberg supported and helped maintain the status quo, which in turn ensured the security of jobs for an already impoverished community. This is not to suggest that Hangberg did not have any other power, only that it was not demonstrated at this time.

The following chapter will continue to track the progression of events, and in particular will focus on the influence that business has over governance and decision-making, while also unpacking the invisible mechanisms of power in greater detail.

CHAPTER 6

SHIFTING POWERS

Chapter 5 set the scene for understanding the status quo around the fishmeal factory by examining the dynamics between the four key actors from 2013 to 2015. This analysis demonstrated that Oceana and the City of Cape Town exercised control through three distinct ways that correspond to Lukes' (2005) three dimensions of power: ensuring economic dependency, depoliticising the issue through formal institutions and processes, and constructing hegemony to ensure broad support for their governance. This enabled the status quo to be maintained and to this end, Oceana continued the pursuit of their economic interests while government secured their control of resources and land. In addition, Hangberg normalised this status quo, reinforced by a continued sense of marginalisation that stemmed from a long history of identity-based oppression and displacement. It was demonstrated that Hangberg had habituated to protest in resistance against the threat to their sense of identity and belonging, which was largely race and location-based. In this way, they too defended the status quo. In contrast, Fresh Air for Hout Bay (FAHB) used their privilege and access to resources to create a space for engagement to occur, with the hope of politicising the issue to the shift the status quo.

This chapter will continue with the chronological story in Hout Bay, with a specific focus on one event at the end of 2015: the proposed closure of the factory and the decision for it to remain operational. This event was unique. While prior to this point, power had largely been framed by non-decision making, this event offered the opportunity for power dynamics to be explored in the face of real conflict and overt, formal decision-making. The primary research question is focused on understanding where the power to influence decision-making lies, and reflecting on this event was critical to exploring this further.

The story of the proposed closure will be relayed in detail, explaining how Oceana made the announcement, the reaction from the Hangberg community, and the events that eventually led to the factory being reopened. Personal Positioning breakout boxes will be included throughout this description, helping to bring the reader into the moment. The analysis that follows will again reflect on the reactions from the four main actors, investigating what power mechanisms were used and for what purpose. The analysis will demonstrate that a coalition existed between government and big capital to govern decision-making and to ensure their interests were maintained, which primarily centred on the pursuit of economic profit (Oceana) and the securing of land rentals (government). The analysis will also demonstrate how Hangberg was united by a common fear of displacement that stemmed from a long history of marginalisation, and that they used protest as a form of resistance to defend the status quo.

6.1. 2015: The Proposed Closure

After years of little action being taken around the fishmeal factory, out of the blue on Friday 14 August 2015, Oceana announced a proposed closure.

'It is with a heavy heart,' their public statement began, 'that we share with you the news that Oceana is contemplating the closure of our Hout Bay Fishmeal Factory.' They continued to say that despite being recognised for their best practice in odour management, 'a growing number of Hout Bay residents have voiced their displeasure at the odour associated with the... fishmeal operations.' While they explained that experience of the odour was largely due to 'prevailing winds' and they had 'consistently asked the community for indulgence,' a significant escalation of complaints had continued (Oceana, 2015b). In an effort to respond to and minimise complaints, they had limited production to less than 40% (60 days) of their normal production over the past three years, despite the 'significantly negative impact on the financial viability of the business' (Oceana, 2015b). But this had not helped - instead the level of complaints had grown by 240%. Unless they tripled production, reverting back to pre-2012 production levels of 180 days per year, the factory would have to close and 98 people would either lose their jobs, be relocated to another site, or receive retrenchment packages (Oceana, 2015b). Lucky Star launched a Section 21 labour process for 90 days to meet with unions and discussions went underway.

This statement was dubious for a number of reasons.

A key claim was that production was limited to less than 40% of normal production over the course of three years (ie. since 2012/2013) due to the complaints received about the odour. This information was nearly impossible to verify but it was highly unlikely. Oceana's 2013 annual report stated that Lucky Star did indeed have a 'tough year' and in contrast with previous years the fishmeal sector did not provide the largest contribution to group profits, producing only 20 958 tons compared to 41 968 tons the year before (Oceana Group, 2013:38). This was attributed, however, to lower volumes of fish, a statement that was repeated throughout the report: 'the much lower volumes of industrial fish;' 'below par industrial fish landings for the full period compared to 2012;' and 'exceptionally poor availability of fish… in spite of scientists reporting a healthy resource' (Oceana Group, 2013:7,29,38). The report even goes so far as to say that it was 'the worst landings since the industry started targeting anchovy with appropriate size fishing gear 50 years ago' (Oceana Group, 2013: 44). While the existence of complaints was acknowledged in the report, there was no mention that production was reduced to appease these complaints. In 2014 they noted a 'substantial increase in fish landings' that led specifically to an increase in fish oil, but also commented that despite an encouraging start to the industrial season, performance was 'negatively impacted by poor winter landings of anchovy' (Oceana Group, 2014). Again, there was no indication that production had been limited due to the complaints. Evidence thus indicated that this statement by Oceana had poor validity.

In addition, the claim that complaints had increased by 240% was misleading: prior to 2014 there had been no consistent method of tracking complaints and only a small handful were

registered through informal messages and phone calls. A proper record of complaints was only kept from 2014 when the Fishmeal Factory website was built, so *any* formal registering of complaints would have led to a significant 'increase' in the numbers simply because almost no numbers had existed previously.

It appeared that Oceana had used this statement to position themselves very specifically to ensure they were not blamed for the possible closure. The increasing and relentless number of complaints had been a growing frustration for them – not only had they been subjected to more inspections and audits from the City (Sentinel, 2015c), they were also getting regular bad press and media coverage. The Hout Bay facility was undoubtedly expensive to run –they invested more than R72 million in odour abatement technology over the decades, and they had not been receiving the same quantities of catch (Oceana Group, 2013). At the same time, they had recently purchased Daybrook fishing company through a R4.6 billion deal, claiming they wanted to 'consolidate in the short term' so as to be a 'major player in the fishing world' and this acquisition had 'made its intentions clear' (Business Report, 2016). But none of this was mentioned in the press release, and instead, all responsibility was placed on the complainants.

Personal Positioning 7: Announcement of the Proposed Closure

The announcement of the proposed closure came as a complete surprise and I only found out about it when a journalist knocked on my door that Friday morning to ask for comment. When Oceana released this statement the following day, I knew it was going to be a rough ride.

The argument about the production days frustrated me, mostly because I didn't know if what they were claiming was true or not. When FAHB first formed, we tried to keep track of the days that Oceana was in production ourselves but this quickly became a futile task. Having only formed in 2014 we had no records prior to that time, and our own records from 2014 onwards were notoriously inconsistent. Living closest to the factory, I was in a position to keep the most accurate records but because I was traveling frequently, I wasn't able to maintain any consistency. I tried to keep track of production days based on Facebook comments but this too was obviously unreliable - people were frustrated, apathetic, or both, and would not always register complaints even if they were impacted.

FAHB made various attempts to monitor the emissions more strategically. We had tried to get household air quality monitors and met with various engineers, and even tried to introduce a school project to monitor the emissions through a series of testing stations. Nothing ever came to fruition and we were never able to monitor the emissions independently. I had, at different times, tried to confirm the number of production days with the City, including amounts being produced, but requesting this information had become tedious and time consuming, and at the time the statement was released, I couldn't know for certain whether this information was true or not. Of course, this information was readily available to both Oceana and City Health, but they refused to share it when I

requested it and instead directed me to the City's lengthy PAIA process. Either way, based on the information I did have, it didn't appear that production had been reduced because of the complaints.

I also thought their twist on the complaints was particularly devious. FAHB, the City, and Oceana had all agreed at one point or another that there was a general lack of information and data regarding the impact of the emissions, and formalising the complaints was a way of generating this data. But now they were using that against us, acting as if there had been a sudden spike of complaints rather than decades of complaints that had simply been continuously ignored.

In my opinion, this situation provided them with the perfect opportunity to walk away blame-free, no matter the outcome. The way I saw it they had two options: if they stayed, there would be on-going complaints, and if they left, they would anger the community. Either way they needed a scape-goat, and I was it. From that moment on, I knew things were going to get rough and everyone else did too:

> Kiara i suspect you are going to get the full force of their well oiled propaganda public relations turned upon you with increasing venom. best get prepared?

6.2. Reactions to the Closure

With the tone set that the complainants had caused the factory to shut down, tension in the community quickly escalated as media reports and newspaper articles came in. '100 job losses if Oceana Hout Bay shuts down' ran the headline for Fin24 (Fin24, 2015a), while the Weekend Argus reported that the unions were 'shocked' to hear of the proposed closure of the factory that 'caused a big stink among the suburbs well-heeled residents' (Weekend Argus, 2015). Union General Secretary Katishi Masemola said that closing the plant would leave Hout Bay a 'ghost town' (Weekend Argus, 2015) and it was clear the workers would support the factory staying open. In the Sunday Argus, HBCA Secretary Roscoe Jacobs said the closure would have severe impacts on the economics of Hangberg, including the 'value chain of money' that would be lost. He said that the factory was closely linked to the Hangberg community and 'we have learned to live with the smell' – those who complained after they knowingly bought homes in Hout Bay should 'learn to live with it' too (Sunday Argus, 2015).

The Hout Bay community at large reacted strongly on HBO and HBC with lengthy, often volatile, remarks. It was also fairly clear to see who was making the remarks – based on their profiles, language used, and comments about their background, it pointed directly to the different groups within the community. Initially the discussions started as concerns over the factory's closure and how this would impact the workers, their families, and the general network within the community. People from Hangberg expressed their support for the

factory to remain open, with an argument that centred around three key sentiments: the factory was here 'first', it consistently provided much needed jobs, and the smell had 'never killed anyone.' This resonated with narrative from Hangberg that was expressed in Chapter 4, particularly the sentiment of 'being here first.' They started using the hashtags #OceanaMustStay and #HandOffOurHarbour to build momentum within the Hangberg community.



Figure 6.1: Concerns from Hangberg residents during the proposed closure, 2015

On the other side of the valley, the responses on Facebook were completely different. While people empathised with the job loss, they saw the possible closure of the factory as a victory because it would mean an end to the noxious emissions and an opportunity for the harbour to develop. Many people, however, also thought that the timing and wording of the announcement from Oceana was a clever corporate tactic used to distance themselves from any responsibility about the closure.



Figure 6.2: Facebook comments implying the closure as a corporate tactic from Oceana

These opposing views were dismissed by most from Hangberg, who continued to place the blame on the complainants, as seen on the comments and discussions on social media sites. Language became vitriolic, tensions were high, and what was originally an issue about polluting air emissions suddenly turned into one about race, belonging, politics, and gentrification. The community was extremely divided, as seen in the variety of Facebook comments.



Figure 6.3: Volatile responses on Facebook during the proposed closure

On 18 August 2015, FAHB published a public statement saying they had never advocated for the factory's closure and had instead tried to find out information and raise awareness on the issue, expressing their shared concern about the potential job loss (FAHB, 2015c). They also published an advert in the Sentinel newspaper aimed at finding solutions, and made an open call for a 'united and common vision for Hout Bay' and for people to participate in an open dialogue (FAHB, 2015a). But this had become too much of an emotional issue and the rhetoric in the comments was clear: FAHB was perceived as an elite white group trying to take away the jobs of the local coloured community because of a smell. This idea would be contained in all the media that would soon follow.

Interestingly, on the same day, the Western Cape Government released a media statement saying they had initiated an intergovernmental dispute over the management of the 12 fishing harbours in the Western Cape (Western Cape Government, 2015b). Stating that the harbours were 'neglected by National Government' leading to a 'serious degradation' of public assets that negatively impacted socio-economic opportunities. Arguing that the Constitution places the management of harbours under local government authority, they stated they were in the process of drafting by-laws that would 'empower the municipalities to manage the harbours locally' (Western Cape Government, 2015b). Recognising that the harbours 'play a critical role in creating jobs through tourism' the Western Cape Government committed to provide 'well-managed, world-class facilities that create more opportunities, jobs and better livelihoods' for the fishing community (Western Cape Government, 2015b). While there is no evidence to suggest that this statement was somehow connected to the proposed closure of Oceana in Hout Bay, the timing was certainly interesting.

6.3. Hangberg Community Meeting

On 23 August 2015, FAHB met with the leader of the Food and Agricultural Workers Union (FAWU), working under the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), to explain their position and encourage a collaborative way forward. While the COSATU leader expressed his understanding, particularly the position that FAHB was in, he presented a different view the following day. On 24 August 2015, a community meeting of over 300 people was held in Hangberg with representatives from FAWU, the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), the South African Communist Party (SACP) provincial chairperson, the HBCA, and the PMF. The meeting, led by the HBCA, called on working class people to show their support for Oceana, insisting the factory stay open and triple production to 180 days. The HBCA committed to gather a petition with 10,000 signatories – '10 times bigger than the one from FAHB' – while the secretary said, 'We will keep this factory open by all means. If it means we must be more radical, so be it. *Ons het klip gegooi om ons berg to hou, so as ons klip moet gooi vir Oceana*, so be it (We threw stones to hold on to our mountain and if we must throw stones to save Oceana, so be it'[9]

[9] This was a direct reference to the Hangberg uprising of 2010 when people took to the streets with stones to protect their homes, following the demolition of houses and forced removals by the police. More details about this uprising are detailed in Chapter 4.

(Sentinel, 2015c). Local residents raised concerns about existing inequalities and a host of legacy issues relating to land, housing, and employment, and despite acknowledging that the 'smell is bad' they insisted that 'management has been trying everything to keep it down' and the factory must remain operational. Different people took to the floor to state that 'no-one had ever gotten sick' and 'that smell is the smell of money. It means there is work for the people' (Sentinel, 2015c; Personal Notes, 2015).

The SACP provincial chairperson said the factory operating at 100% meant 'more jobs will be created' (although this was not said by Oceana) but also cautioned that the reasons for the closure may be more than just the complainants. He highlighted Oceana's new joint ventures nationally and internationally and their ambitions to expand, raised a supposed issue with the lease, and referred to the recent intergovernmental dispute raised by the Western Cape Provincial Government to manage the 12 small fishing harbours. 'They want to make Hout Bay a white enclave for the elite,' he said. 'They are not interested in you. You need to put pressure on them… Make sure you win the battle' (Sentinel, 2015c; Personal Notes, 2015).

FAWU warned that closing the factory in Hout Bay would set a precedent for closing other factories in the province, stating 'Hout Bay is not the only community that deals with pollution. It is the same at Saldanha Bay and St Helena Bay. There are complaints there too. If people from those areas hear that the complainers have won the battle, it could have the same effect for those factories. Closing the factory is not an option' (Sentinel, 2015c). He said that since the factory had been operating since the 1950s, people had been living with the smell: 'This generation was born out of the embryo of that very same smell. Provincial government want to take away the only means of security' (Sentinel, 2015c). He concluded by saying that a 'class war… driven by the white minority and elite' had been started and the 'first step of battle' had been taken (Sentinel, 2015c; Personal Notes, 2015).

COSATU's press release the next day reflected this same militaristic sentiment, although lacked some of the basic facts. The statement began by saying COSATU was 'outraged' by the City's 'introduction of new air regulations that will result in the closing down of the fish processing plant of Oceana' (COSATU, 2015). Despite the reality that no such regulations existed or had been introduced, COSATU continued to say that 'these regulations are no doubt at the behest of the champagne and caviar crowd of Hout Bay who have little regard for the working families of Hout Bay and Inzamayethu'[10] (COSATU, 2015). The statement continued that there had been an attempt by 'some wealthier white residents' to 'get the working class out of Hout Bay,' as demonstrated by the 'housing restrictions' and now moving jobs out of the area, with the intent of developing a 'V&A Waterfront type activity on the site that would mainly benefit white tourism' (COSATU, 2015). They claimed that the City of Cape Town was 'conspiring with the white community to attack the interest of the black community' (COSATU, 2015; Fin24, 2015b) and they committed to working with the

[10] I tried many times to find out what these 'regulations' were but neither FAWU nor anyone else could explicitly say what they were referring to. I assumed they were referring to the Western Cape Government's statement that new by-laws were being drafted to empower the municipalities to manage the harbours locally, but this was never confirmed. It is also worth noting the inaccurate spelling of 'Imizamo Yethu.'

community and workers to oppose the closure, ensuring the rights of workers and the black community were 'safeguarded from the gentrification of the area.' They concluded by saying 'the fundamental point at stake is how new forms of forced removals are being enacted by the City, to pander to the privileged groups' (COSATU, 2015).

Over the next several months of the Section 189 labour process, extensive discussion took place about the proposed closure. Social media sites were rampant with opinions and perspectives, and various community groups started engaging, including FAHB, HBCA, PMF, and the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO). A discussion platform took place between FAHB, HBCA, PMF and Sibanye, and more than 45 media articles came out locally and nationally (FAHB, 2014b).

During this time, neither the City of Cape Town nor the Hout Bay Councillor, provided any comment or information on the proposed closure.

Personal Positioning 8: The Time of the Proposed Closure

Needless to say, this was a difficult and intense time for me personally.

By this stage everyone knew that I was the main organiser of FAHB and the comments came in by the dozen, from vitriolic, scathing remarks on Facebook telling me to go back to where I came from, to personal messages and emails blaming me for destroying the community. I completely understood why Hangberg had reacted with anger but soon I would start to get threats and discussions about possible violence started to appear on social media. The soon-to-be DA councillor called me and said it might be a good idea for me to leave town for a few days.



Figure 6.4: Threatening comments on Facebook, 2015

I decided that the only way to deal with everything was to face it head on: I would not leave town and would instead respond to every message, attend every meeting, speak with every person and community group, and engage as much as possible to resolve the situation. I also bought three fire extinguishers and placed them at strategic locations around my house.

The first thing I did was release the press statement for FAHB and placed an advert in the Sentinel calling for unity and consultation, at my own cost. I then met with the leaders of the PMF, HBCA, SANCO, and religious leaders to try to build some understanding of what was really going on. These meetings were often strained but amicable. By this stage, I had developed relationships with many of these representatives and while they recognised that FAHB couldn't be the sole reason for the proposed closure, they had to defend the factory staying open regardless. I believe that I dissipated some of the tension through these meetings, at least for my own personal safety.

The meeting with the FAWU representative was a bit more challenging. I had contacted him on a phone number I found in a newspaper article and he agreed to meet with me at the hotel he was staying at in Cape Town. During a conversation wrought with unease, I tried to explain that FAHB had never advocated for the factory's closure and had in fact been advocating for a broader development plan that would increase opportunities. He smiled politely and said that he understood. He explained that labour negotiations had only just begun but would be happy to keep in touch as things progressed. He never replied to an email, message, or phone call again.

The community meeting in Hangberg the next day was a different story. The meeting took place at the Sports and Recreation Centre and despite it only being down the road from my house, I didn't think it was safe to walk alone. Of course, none of the other FAHB members had agreed to come – Hangberg was a dangerous place after dark, particularly under such a jilted moon.

The tension was palpable from the first second. The hall was packed and all eyes turned to me in muted disbelief as I entered the room. I smiled politely, nodded my head in greeting, and quickly took a seat. I was the only white person in the room and certainly the only person who had ever complained about Oceana. The meeting was fuelled with anger from the start and despite the misinformation being spewed from the government and union representatives, the more the meeting got going, the more flames began to flare. Their language was threatening, insinuating violence, intimidating, and I saw how easily the crowd could get riled up. At times I prepared myself mentally for the very real possibility that my car would have been set on fire by the time I left. At the end of the meeting, I lingered a bit to not appear to be running away and the journalist from the Sentinel Newspaper approached me. All she said was, 'I can't believe you're here.'

After COSATU's press release came out I was particularly disappointed at how the narrative had been spun – instead of this being a topic of socio-economic and environmental development, it was now only about race. I was frustrated at how all the media articles

seemed to focus on this, implying and sometimes blatantly stating, that FAHB had actively tried to shut down the factory. I believed this to be poor journalism, where journalists had not done their due diligence of investigating the situation before publication, even from reputable institutions such and Media24. After the Fin24 article came labelling FAHB as the 'champagne and caviar crowd,' I directly complained to Media24 and called into question the integrity of their work. They dismissed my concerns saying they only had an hour to write the story before going to print, thus couldn't gather all the information, and to compensate they invited me to write an opinion piece about the situation, which I did (Worth, 2015).

The piece was well received and dozens of people wrote to me thanking me for adding a balanced perspective to the situation, including the Managing Director of the One and Only, a luxury hotel and waterfront resort in Cape Town, who invited me to meet with him. During this meeting, he expressed his full support for my work and said that the One and Only had been interested in building a hotel in Hout Bay for a long time, but had chosen not to do so because of the factory. He suggested that I speak directly to Alan Winde, then Provincial Minister of Economic Opportunities, and Donald Grant, then Provincial Minister of Transport and Public Works. After introducing me to them via email, I spoke to both of them on the phone. While they were notably empathetic about the situation and acknowledged the range of opportunities that would come from a sustainable harbour development plan, both said that this had moved to a national level and nothing could be done until the final decision had been made.

As the labour negotiations carried on, I continued to communicate with everyone I could, including doing radio interviews with Cape Talk and KFM, and a video debate on Fin24 News with the HBCA. One of the most difficult meetings was the 'panel debate' between HBCA, PMF, and FAHB, facilitated by the local Hout Bay group Sibanye. It was intended to be a platform for people to share their concerns and discuss ideas around the harbour, but it really just became an opportunity for everyone to tell me how much they hated me. One lady in particular drove this point home. Originally from Ireland and having spent 20 years doing social work in South Africa, she thought it was outrageous that I had just arrived in the community and single-handedly destroyed their most important asset. She said that Dublin was well known for its smell from the Guinness brewery and while some people complained, it was the smell of working-class people that proudly identified where they were from – and it was the same for the fishmeal factory. She berated me for not having conducted a full health study and socio-economic impact assessment before complaining about the smell to the City, and said that my irresponsible behaviour had led to hundreds of lives being in turmoil. Her comments were met with applause from others in the room, who then provided their own supportive opinions about how terrible I was.

This notion of FAHB being responsible for conducting socio-economic studies came up again during the interviews with Hangberg leaders. As one leader would later comment, 'It was the responsibility of FAHB to put together a harbour development plan. All ideas should come from the community. If FAHB can come up with a plan, and that plan is in agreement with the community, and they can show how much job opportunity there is, then obviously

people would support it. But you must get community buy-in. You must have real facts, not just say you want it to close, but why you want it to close. Show us the facts… so the community can then add it up and decide for themselves' (Community Leader 1, 2019).

I found this line of argument particularly frustrating. How could it be my responsibility – with absolutely no expertise or professional standing – to conduct a full health and socio-economic study for the factory, or to create a comprehensive harbour development plan? Wasn't it the role of government to do precisely that, to make decisions in the best interest of its people based on data and research they have access to and coordinate? As far as I understood, this research as of yet didn't exist and that was exactly what I had been asking government to do, not to shut down the factory. And hadn't we made an effort to show the facts that we did have? FAHB had provided the employment numbers, we had documented how people were impacted by the emissions, we has shown that an environmental impact assessment had never been done, and we consistently highlighted and shared these concerns with the broader community. But all of this information had been rejected by Hangberg. Was it even vaguely realistic that FAHB would, first, have the capacity to put together such a plan, and second, that the community would even accept this? How was 'community buy-in' even possible when the community itself was so divided and had struggled with development for so long?

There was also this insinuation that if FAHB had spoken more with Hangberg people to understand the value of the factory to the community, that we would not have pursued our complaints. As one community member said, 'You should have sat down with us to talk about it, rather than just complaining about the smell. But you ran to the media. You should have stayed with us and then you would understand why we don't complain and why you shouldn't have either' (Community Leader 3, 2019).

On this point, I completely disagreed. I held largely a liberal view of politics, believing that people holding contending views should be able to express these in public, and that individuals and groups have every right to politicise an issue, and to organise and mobilise around it (Almond and Verba, 1989; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994; Anciano and Piper, 2019). In this sense, I believed I had been fulfilling my own civic duty in terms of holding government to account, raising alarm bells when I believed something was wrong and questioning what was being done about it. And I felt that I *had* taken into account the importance of the factory to Hangberg, which is why I had been advocating for socio-economic studies to be done and *not* for the immediate closure of the factory.

Indeed, a more reciprocal relationship could have been formed with people from Hangberg if I had tried to consult with them more, but based on the volatility that Hangberg had already demonstrated this seemed very unlikely, nor would it have changed my perspective on the injustice that the odour represented. And even though I knew the long history the factory had with Hangberg, I found it hard to believe they actually thought FAHB had the kind of influence it took to shut down the factory – that despite years of failed advocacy on the issue, a small, informal group of people operating mostly out of Facebook had brought a more than half a century old multi-billion rand industry to its knees with their complaint

forms and emails. If only civic action were so easy.

But I didn't argue because I knew it wouldn't help – people had crafted a clear narrative about what had happened and why, and there was no way of changing that now. I listened to every word they had to say, thanked them for comments, tried to acknowledged my understanding, and constantly asked that we work together to find a solution.

Many people from Hangberg would later confirm with me that this is not, in fact, what they thought, that many people knew it wasn't really FAHB that had caused the closure. But the symbolism of this had a much deeper and more important meaning, as discussed in the analysis that follows.

6.4. Community Demonstrations

Two community demonstrations in support of the factory then took place.

On 11 September 2015, approximately 250 people from FAWU, HBCA, and PMF demonstrated at the City's offices in Cape Town, where they handed over a memorandum to the City of Cape Town Mayor Patricia De Lille (represented by Wilfred Solomans Johannes) and Oceana CEO Francois Kuttel (EWN, 2015; Fin24, 2015e). As protesters held signs saying 'don't take our jobs' and 'Oceana Must Stay,' the FAWU representative said they stood against the 'small clique of rich whites' who didn't like the smell and that they can 'leave Hout Bay and go find fresh air somewhere else' (Business Report, 2015; Sentinel, 2015a). HBCA secretary, demanding that the factory stay open to protect the jobs of the workers, said that 'if people have a problem with the smell they must learn to live with it' because Hout Bay would remain a 'fishing community' (Fin24, 2015c).

Figure 6.5: Images of the protest in Cape Town (Source: Sentinel, 2015a)

On 21 September 2015, approximately 40 people, mostly children, marched in Hout Bay. Carrying a banner that said 'give back our land,' the HBCA secretary delivered a 1,200-signatory strong petition to Oceana CEO, and representatives from the DPW and DAFF, calling for the factory to remain open. During the protest, DPW announced they had renewed Oceana's lease to 5-years (as opposed to the previous month-to-month agreement) as a demonstration of their support for operations to continue. Oceana CEO addressed the crowd, saying that a final decision would be announced once he returned from an overseas trip (Sentinel, 2015b).

Figure 6.6: Images of the protest in Hout Bay (Source: Sentinel, 2015b)

6.5. Open for Business

On 3 November 2015, Lucky Star held a press conference at the Sentinel Primary School in Hangberg and announced that, after being 'overwhelmed with community support' (Oceana, 2015a), the factory would remain open. The City of Cape Town issued an AEL reverting to pre-2012 production, allowing for a total of 120-180 production days, the Minister of the Department of Public Affairs authorised a 5-year lease, with the prospect of this extending to 20-years, and a labour agreement was reached between Lucky Star and the unions (Oceana, 2015a). The decision was seen as a victory for the working class people and Lucky Star committed to investing a further R2 million into odour abatement technology (Sentinel, 2015d). In addition, they committed to establishing a Community Stakeholder Forum (CSF) with representatives of different community groups to facilitate an active dialogue between the factory and the residents. FAHB released a public statement reaffirming their commitment to eliminating the odour (FAHB, 2015b).

Later that year, Oceana's annual report would say that the proposed closure was a 'challenging time for the whole company' but they were proud of the 'genuine motivation' to reach consensus, which served as a 'perfect example of how effective engagement with important stakeholders such as the Hout Bay Civic Association, the Department of Public Works and the City of Cape Town can lead to a solution that serves the best interests of the wider community' (Oceana Group, 2015).

Personal Positioning 9: Demonstrations and Decisions

The community demonstrations were particularly interesting to observe.

I was on a work assignment in Durban when the first march took place in Cape Town, but there was live coverage of the event and I conducted various phone interviews with media throughout the day. I was surprised at how many people were in attendance – I suspected that the unions had gathered support from within Cape Town, for several reasons. First, it was notoriously difficult to bus large groups of people from Hout Bay into the city because of the cost this would entail and the constant lack of resources and finances that civic groups had access to. There had also not been any announcements of arrangements or plans on social media. In addition, the demonstration also took place on a weekday, during the middle of the day, a time when most people would either be working or occupied with other activities. It seemed very unlikely to me that the people at the demonstration were actually from Hout Bay, apart from a few key people. I also wondered about who had made the banners. Both the HBCA and the PMF constantly complained about their lack of funds and I doubted whether either of these groups had had the resources to arrange such a demonstration, and even if they did have the resources, I doubted if they would have used them in this way. While I didn't have any evidence, I felt very strongly that the unions had supported this demonstration almost entirely, providing both the resources and the people to have the desired impact. I also wondered if the unions had been paid by Oceana, but there was no way to prove this.

These suspicions were largely confirmed by the poor turn out at the demonstration in Hangberg, which I did attend, discussed in the analysis that follows. Several days before, there had been a lot of discussion on social media with comments being made that people should come out in their hundreds - while not everyone had been able to go to the demonstration in Cape Town, now was their opportunity to show their full support for the factory. They were to meet at the intersection at the top of the hill and march down in solidarity to the gates of the factory by noon. I was standing outside the gates at noon and there was not another person in sight. By 1pm there was still no activity and it was only around 2pm that a couple of people came into view. As I had gathered on social media, not many people had turned up at the meeting point, and as the small group of protesters arrived, it was clear they had been collecting people along the way – the group was mostly children and a few adults gathered outside the factory with their banner. There were about eight adults initially, but more people arrived until there were about 20 in total, in addition to the children.

The protest was largely uneventful: the HBCA handed over their petition to Oceana CEO Francois Kuttel, who thanked them for their on-going support, and while the announcement about the lease came as a surprise, there was no opportunity to discuss it further. At the end of the meeting, the same journalist from the Sentinel remarked again that she was surprised to see me. She said she had seen me at every community gathering and asked if I wasn't scared about attending. I had told her no, I had nothing to be scared of because I thought the people of Hangberg were better than that, and I believed this issue was something that

could bring people together, not drive us apart (Sentinel, 2015b). Later, the site manager from Oceana would comment on this too saying, 'This is where you were different from the others. You were actually involved with things, man. I'll tell you now, if I'm on a certain side and I believe the opposition is organising marches, I would stay as far away as possible. But you, I come outside and guess who's standing there. I mean sho. Rather you than me. No-one knew what was going to happen, what if it was the other way round with all the ugly people? I don't think I would have taken the chance you did. That's what makes a difference' (Oceana Representative, 2019).

To me, the demonstration in Hangberg showed that the local people were really not so invested in supporting Oceana, that they were quite disorganised, and that the fighting rhetoric previously expressed was actually limited to a few people, rather than the broader community itself. It also confirmed my suspicions that the demonstration in Cape Town had indeed been facilitated by the unions – how else could the difference in attendance be explained? This spoke to the broader issue of local versus national politics, and I began to wonder how much political influence there now was from the national level.
As expected, the press conference at Sentinel Primary School made it clear that Oceana had all the support they needed to stay open. Attendees were welcomed by the tunes of a marimba band and there was a lavish spread of food laid out in front of a wall featuring 'letters to Oceana' from the children of the school. 'We love you Oceana,' they read. 'Thank you for helping me after the fire' and 'Please stay open so my father can keep his job.' The speeches that followed contained the usual rhetoric: the outstanding support the factory had given to the community, the importance of the jobs, the advanced odour abatement technology, the best run plant in the country, the overwhelming support from the local community, etc., etc.

Figure 6.7: Drawings from Sentinel Primary thanking Oceana for their support (Oceana Group, 2015)

Oddly, after the press conference was over, Francois Kuttel came to greet me. After exchanging pleasantries I began asking him questions about when production would start and he interrupted me to 'congratulate me on my recent engagement.' Confused, I asked him what he meant and he said that he had been told I was engaged to be married. 'Your sources are very wrong,' I had responded, and there was a moment of awkward silence as he looked sideways at the production manager, as if he had somehow provided the information. I never understood that comment, whether it was a genuine mistake or whether it was an attempt to show power and derail me in some way. It was the first time I had considered my gender to be a factor in the story.

6.6. Analysis: Understanding How and Why the Power Shifted… and then Returned Back to 'Normal'

The previous analysis looked at the power dynamics between the various actors, offering an explanation about how the status quo was established. Much of this analysis focused on non-decision making, demonstrating how those in power used economic dependency, depoliticisation through formal institutions, and the construction of hegemony to maintain the status quo.

The proposed closure of the factory – and its reopening – offer a unique opportunity to examine the formal process of decision-making during a moment of overt conflict, Lukes's (2005) first dimension of power or the common conception of power as a conflict of wills, and to interrogate where and how power operated during this time. As such, this analysis will again focus on the main actors, reflecting on how they responded during this time, the power mechanisms they used, and the interests they hoped to secure by doing this.

6.6.1. Oceana

As the operator of the factory with the ability to decide whether or not it stayed open, Oceana was clearly a major power holder and used various mechanisms to influence the outcome of the decision.

It stands to reason that Oceana's primary interest was to continue the pursuit of their economic profitability. This meant one of two things: either the factory needed to close so they could consolidate operations in Saldanha Bay, or the factory could remain open but then needed to triple its current production to remain profitable. With either outcome, one sector of the community would be impacted more than the other. In this way, another primary aim for Oceana was to remain blameless, and they used various power mechanisms to do this.

First, Oceana used the overt threat of nearly 100 people losing their jobs to solidify Hangberg's support for their operations. This threat, which they made a point of implying had come from an elite, white group, was significant in an already impoverished community.

As the HBCA secretary commented, 'those 100 workers support up to six family members, so at least 500 people would be directly impacted' (Community Leader 4, 2019). In this way, Oceana essentially concealed the real reason of the closure to escape political comeback, and displaced anger from themselves and instead onto a local actor - FAHB. The community, as a result, was able to give its full support to Oceana.

Second, Oceana centred its' press release around an important symbol within the community: the complainers, who had come to represent an elite, white group that had recently moved to Hout Bay and were part of the on-going threat of gentrification that many people had already been forced to experience. The symbolism of the 'white elite' making decisions for the 'poor blacks' is long standing in Hout Bay and it was easy for this to become the focus of the discussion rather than the very real sustainability issues that were at stake. Once Oceana blamed the proposed closure on the complainants, all the press releases and media interviews focused specifically on that - the 'champagne and caviar crowd,' the 'small clique of rich whites.' This well-established and powerful symbol conjured memories of the forced relocations back in the 1950s, the Hangberg Uprising in 2010, and the more recent riots and protests over housing development and fishing quotas. This symbol, with the weight of its historical socio-economic inequalities, helped to mobilise bias against the complainers and to focus all attention on stopping 'them'. The rally cry became 'go back to where you came from' rather than a demand to ensure their needs for sustainability were being met. In this way, Oceana was again able to focus attention away from themselves and instead place the blame on someone else.

In many ways, the tactics used by Oceana demonstrate the Machiavellian behaviour of many corporates, and how they manipulate public engagement and opinion to suit their own interests (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Shemelis, 2017). By using various systems, particularly the media, they are able to protect their business interests by dissuading the free flow of news that goes against their interests, and instead craft a narrative that does. In this way they help to 'manufacture consent' to ensure their own interests are met (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Shemelis, 2017). While it is not the objective of this research to explore fully the relationship between the business elite and the media, the media coverage that took place during the time of the proposed closure clearly supported Oceana. After setting the tone for the narrative with their first public statement, Oceana defended their economic, social, and political agenda by manipulating and controlling public opinion. To this end, they were able to manufacture consent by ensuring the media focused on the symbolism of the 'white elite against the poor blacks.' This provoked the community to focus on each other, rather than the governance issues at hand.

This symbolism was fuelled by the perpetual lack of information that was available to the community. As discussed in the previous chapter, both Oceana and the City systematically prevented access to information, allowing for opinions to develop that could not be verified. One such example is that of health – while FAHB argued that the emissions from the factory caused health concerns (a sentiment based on their personal experiences), people from Hangberg argued that 'no-one had ever died from the smell.' In the absence of any

legitimate information – which only the City and Oceana had access to – these opinions were allowed to run free, which in turn helped to shape the ideology of the community.

This situation, of how business corporates manipulate the public to secure their own interests, is by no means unique to Hout Bay, and can indeed be seen in various instances throughout the City. Olver's (2019) book reflecting on governance in the City of Cape Town uses examples from Observatory, Bo-Kaap, and Sea Point to demonstrate how some property developers in Cape Town manipulated the local communities in different ways to minimise input into the approval processes and clear the way for their development interests. In spite of objections to these developments raised by the public, the City's political leaders played an active role in pushing the developments through (Olver, 2019). Much the same can be said for Oceana who clearly manipulated the political moment by using questionable information to deliberately displace responsibility, using local conflicts to conceal the real reason for their actions, which was to ensure their own interests. Securing the interests of business are indeed only possible if political leaders are in support of these activities, and the relationship between government and Oceana is discussed in further detail below.

6.6.2. Government

6.6.2.1. National vs Local Government and Politics

The battle for power between national and local government has been a long-standing issue, seen most clearly in the battle for control of small harbours.

While there is no evidence to suggest that the Western Cape Government's announcement about the inter-governmental dispute over control of small harbours had anything to do with the proposed closure, the timing is certainly interesting. The Western Cape Government had expressed their intention to develop the harbour years earlier, when Helen Zille was Mayor of Cape Town from 2006-2009 (Anciano and Piper, 2019). The national DPW had long been criticised for its management of small-harbours, as discussed in Chapter 4, and Hout Bay in particular was known to be in a 'state of chaos' (Sentinel, 2014d). Recognising the critical role that harbours could play in job creation and attracting investment, it is no surprise that the Western Cape Government wanted to have a larger stake in this.

However, while the Western Cape is home to the majority of small harbours within the country, it is also the only opposition-led province, controlled by the DA instead of the ANC. This touched on a suite of political party power dynamics that existed between national and provincial levels of government. Recognising the economic potential that the harbours offered, and even more so the political influence over the communities residing in those harbours, it is reasonable to expect that both parties wanted full control. It is not surprising then that the Western Cape Government would launch the internal dispute at a time when there was a possible change in the operations of the harbour. Nor was it surprising that, in

response to one of its primary tenants potentially leaving the harbour, national DPW would want to secure its sea-rental income and thus announced a 5-year lease for Oceana, with prospects of it increasing to 20-years, a decided change from an annual agreement that had been in place prior. It is clear that both political parties were doing their best to ensure control over the assets and resources at stake.

In reality, the City of Cape Town did not have any real decision-making power over the closure of the factory – the final decision did indeed lie with national government.[11] While they did have control over the AEL (in full), they had no reason not to grant it – all operating and environmental conditions had remained largely the same and with no new information to alter this, the renewal was simply a continuation of the process that had been in place for all the years prior. But the closure also put them in a difficult position: if they openly supported the factory, they would fall out of favour with a significant number of supporters from the Valley, but if they openly supported the factory's closure, they would equally be met with resistance from Hangberg, where a history of tense relationships already existed. The only thing they could do to maintain this delicate balance was to do what they did best: remain silent and disengage.

In reality, the City did not react to the situation at all. City Health maintained it was a business decision that they could not comment on nor had control over, and upheld their position on the AEL. Despite the contentiousness of the issue, the Hout Bay Councillor offered no comment and did not facilitate nor participate in any consultation or dialogue with the community. By these actions, or in reality non-actions, it was clear the City wanted to maintain the status quo, but it was not entirely clear why. It would take another four years to understand that the City was primarily interested in securing the development of the land surrounding the harbour, and this is discussed extensively in Chapter 7.

Despite the lack of involvement and engagement with national government prior to this event, in reality, DPW held the greatest decision-making power: the ability to determine what operations took place in the harbour. It was clear that DPW was in full support of Oceana continuing their operations, as was evidenced by the announcement of extending their lease, and the prospect of this extending further (Sentinel, 2015d).

I was informed by one government official (who requested total anonymity) that the decision to keep Oceana open was purely political: 'We know the real reason [the factory stayed open] was because Oceana was threatened with their fishing quotas at a national level. Essentially, they were told that if they didn't keep the factory open they could say goodbye to half of their fishing quotas because the ANC government wanted to make this point.' Several other members of the community, particularly those involved in the issue of

[11] Control of the harbours in a contentious and complex issue. Currently, there is no specific legislation stating that national government should control the harbours, which is one of the primary arguments the Western Cape Government made when they launched their inter-governmental disputes. They argue that, according to the Constitution, small harbours should be managed by local municipalities. Historically, however, harbours were managed by the Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) (which later changed to the Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries (DEFF)). In 2015, DAFF (now DEFF) created the 'small harbour development unit' which stated that DPW should manage small harbours considering the level of infrastructure required.

fishing quotas, relayed this same sentiment informally, but this of course was impossible to prove. If there was truth in this, it would also explain the support that FAWU and the unions showed during the demonstration in Cape Town, yet not at the Hangberg demonstration.

The issue of fishing quotas had been a long-standing issue within Hangberg, and one that pointed to an on-going sense of loss and injustice. As one community leader commented (Community Leader 1, 2019), 'Most of the local politicians have fishing rights and big quotas because they know certain members in government and control how decisions are made. These are the people who drive the power within the community.' Another respondent (Community Leader 2, 2019) said that the issue with fishing quotas was a 'whole political game' and that if you 'don't have your hands within certain parts of government, you'll always be a side-liner.' Both of these respondents (overt supporters of the DA) commented that the 'ANC has a stronghold with Oceana' (Community Leader 1, 2019) and 'Oceana was playing community politics off each other. It is the politicians that divide the community' (Community Leader 2, 2019). Many of the people in the community interviews shared this sentiment, feeling that the quotas had been given 'to the big industries rather than the local fishermen' (Community Interviews, 2019) and this issue would surface repeatedly in the years to come.

While Oceana's management declined to be interviewed, a site manager from the factory at the time of the proposed closure, who had since left the company, did provide some insight. He commented that 'Francois [Oceana CEO] was the main driver behind keeping Hout Bay open. Whether it was forced upon him, I don't know' (Oceana Representative, 2019). When asked about the possible threat of fishing quotas, his response was, 'That's hectic stuff. I'm not sure whether anything like that did happen, but I don't know if I'd want to be part of a company like that. There definitely was a conflict of politics between the DA and the ANC… there's all these outside influences that are stronger than what we think' (Oceana Representative, 2019). A number of people commented on these 'outside influences,' and implied that even if it was not a matter fishing quotes, Oceana 'may have been benefiting in a different way' (Community Leader 3, 2019).

This idea of 'benefiting in a different way' was indeed omnipresent and points to the relationship between government and business, and how the interaction between these entities influenced the processes of governance.

6.6.2.2. The Relationship between Government and Business

It was clear that Oceana held a great deal of support from both the City and national government, and this collaborative relationship had developed over a long history within the South African fishing industry.

The end of the 1900s marked the onset of industrial fishing in the Western Cape and by the 1940s, major social transition brought about by World War Two led to substantial policy reforms (Hauck and Sowman, 2001; Van Sittert, 2003). As the state needed to expand employment opportunities in the formal economy rapidly, plans to develop small-scale

fishing were abandoned and instead, focus was placed on supporting big fishing companies who were allowed to extend monopoly control (Van Sittert, 2002; Greef, 2013; Visser, 2015). This reform became the foundation that the modern fishing industry was built on, focused on facilitating and financing the rise of white monopolies involved in the commercial sector (Van Sittert, 2002; Greef, 2013). With the onset of apartheid, the distribution of resources was heavily skewed in favour of white large-scale operators, and the majority of South African black citizens were effectively denied access to and ownership of fishing resources, and were instead forced into designated areas within cities and homelands (Hauck and Sowman, 2001; Greef, 2013).

With the end of apartheid in the 1990s, fisheries policy again underwent major reform but, inevitably, natural resource management had been left with a legacy of inequality and the quota distribution of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) was dominated by a small number of large companies that had access to the vast majority of resources (Hauck and Sowman, 2001). While this monopolisation was clear, it was also acknowledged that some of the most important fish stocks had been successfully maintained, and the commercial fishing sector had provided employment for thousands of people, many from disadvantaged communities. Important co-management arrangements had been established between large industry and government with a variety of committees and platforms established to exchange information and facilitate discussions (Hauck and Sowman, 2001). In addition, the emergence of trade unions in the 1970s and 1980s led to relations between capital and labour being institutionalised, forming an 'alliance of bosses and workers' that supported the advancement of big industry (Van Sittert, 2002:300).

Fisheries reforms in the 1990s aimed at ending white minority rule and granting the historically disadvantaged access to marine resources without destabilising the industry by re-establishing the interventionist state and placing control of resources firmly in the hands of government's executive. These reforms were given added impetus by the ANC's desire to reclaim the 'rebel' Western Cape after the opposition won control of the province in the 1999-2000 elections (Van Sittert, 2002; Greef, 2013). These reforms failed, however, in part because the unions 'doggedly resisted any changes in the status quo in defence of profits and jobs,' forcing the populist agenda to be abandoned and instead a return to the market-driven redistribution favoured by industry, although this time with new black empowerment and employee share options (Van Sittert, 2002). As such, while the 1990 reforms initially promised to redistribute benefits of the marine economy away from capital and to the popular classes, they ended up not only confirming, but entrenching big capital's monopoly over the fishing industry and renewing the conditions for its continued accumulation (Van Sittert, 2002). The medium- and long-term rights of commercial fisheries were again implemented in 2001 and 2005, indicating that trade-offs occur in terms of policy, which is frequently dominated by the goal of economic efficiency (Sowman *et al.*, 2011). In this way, capitalist interests can be seen to be the power behind policy decisions and laws (Lynch and Stretesky, 2003), and the powerful in society 'maintain their privileged position by legitimising it through a system of rules, conventions and institutions' (Adger *et al.*, 2003:1099).

6.6.2.3. Urban Regimes and Rent-Extracting Cabals

The coalition between government and business was not only demonstrated through the historical account of the fishing industry, as discussed in Chapter 4, but became highly evident during the proposed closure.

In Chapter 4, it was demonstrated that government, represented by the City, continuously and systematically used a variety of power mechanisms, such as withholding and controlling information, avoidance, agenda-setting etc., to ensure a continuation of the status quo, ie. that the industrial operations of business (Oceana) were allowed to continue. The City maintained this approach throughout the period of the proposed closure where they essentially remained completely silent. Instead of using its processes of governance to act as a 'neutral arbiter' in the wake of possible change, they reverted to their historical position of advancing and protecting the symbiotic interests of big capital against the demands for the redistribution of resources (Van Sittert, 2002), essentially, a shift in the status quo. It is reasonable to understand that Oceana's closure was for business reasons (as discussed earlier) and thus the City's response during the closure – or lack thereof – demonstrates not only their support for big business, but also their own restricted capacity to take action effectively. As mentioned above, while it was unclear at the time of the proposed closure why the City held such support for Oceana's continued operation, it would later be revealed this was to secure their interests in the land surrounding the harbour, and is discussed in Chapter 7.

It stands to reason that national government benefitted from the current status quo as well: not only did they control valuable assets in the harbour that contributed significantly to the economy, but these assets were also within the province of their opposition – the Western Cape. The harbours were notorious for being poorly maintained and under-utilised by national government, one of the main reasons the Western Cape Government had launched the intergovernmental dispute for control of the harbours. Not supporting the proposed closure of the factory offered national government the opportunity to secure its interests in controlling the harbour by supporting its existing coalition and alliance with big business - Oceana.

A number of things transpired that served to support this coalition.

First, the labour unions. Historically, FAWU has 'unambiguously defined their members in class terms' and have developed a strategic approach to both capital and the state in defence of their primary interest: securing jobs (Van Sittert, 2002). This approach has mostly been to support business – in the 1940s it was the unions who, through strike action, pressured business to continue trawling, and in the 1990s the unions again allied themselves with big capital in opposing state redistribution in return for profits via an employee share option plan (Van Sittert, 2002). It comes as no surprise then that FAWU would support big capital during the proposed closure, advocating for the factory to both remain open and increase its production despite the pollution it created. The unions turned the issue of

pollution into a 'class war' launched by the 'champagne and caviar crowd' (COSATU, 2015) and used their familiar tactic of strike action to pressure the factory into remaining open.

It was also clear that FAWU used race and class to promote its objectives, as seen through the highly provocative and racialised statements made throughout the period of the proposed closure. As one respondent commented, 'People says things for their own benefit. Once divides such as race have been established, they are just reinforced throughout history. In a situation like [this], you're going to get people who use this information to manipulate everyone to their benefit. They know it's not true but they will say it like that because it strengthens what they stand for' (Oceana Representative, 2019). While race-based inequalities are undeniable for society at large, this was not entirely the case in the fishing industry. As Van Sittert (2002:302) contends, 'the race fetish obscures the historical salience of capitalism in the creation and perpetuation of inequality and poverty in the fisheries,' suggesting that the question should be about 'who owns' and not 'what colour the are the owners'[12]. In this way, while institutionalised racism intensified existing conditions of exploitation, gross inequalities in the fisheries sector was the product of capitalism, not racism (Van Sittert, 2002).

In turn, national government was more than happy to oblige to FAWU's demands. Before the labour consultations had even concluded, DPW announced they had renewed Oceana's lease to 5-years (Sentinel, 2015b), while previously it had only been on an annual basis. The Minister himself made the announcement at the Oceana's press conference in Hangberg, even suggesting the lease might be extended to 20-years. The event was described by one respondent as being 'a real ANC event' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019) and the Hout Bay Councillor said that the 'the company's private decision to operate their business became hijacked by a political party for political purposes, which resulted in the then minister arriving… and rather smugly saying 'we've saved Oceana, we've saved your jobs'' (City Representative, 2019). The Councillor went so far as to imply that national government had not allowed Oceana to exercise their own business rights and instead forced them to stay open to maintain the jobs, which he described as being 'incredibly short sighted – they should have been able to relocate as was their wish, and then we could potentially be sitting on the early stages of implementing a large scale project that could be employing many more people' (City Representative, 2019).

With this, it is evident that a much deeper coalition existed between government and big capital to ensure the continuation of the status quo. While there is no evidence to conclude that national government did threaten Oceana with their fishing rights, it is interesting to note that the allocation of renewable access rights has been considered 'capital's Achilles heel' (Van Sittert, 2002:301) ever since this became a national responsibility in the 1940s reforms. With the on-going debate about access to fishing rights being a prominent topic, it

[12] It should be noted that while inequalities within the fishing industry stemmed from the apartheid era, where the majority of industries were white-owned, these same inequalities have persisted in the post-apartheid era, particularly with on-going issues around fishing rights and quotas, even though ownership has transitioned and become more racially diverse. It is not the intention of thesis to expand on this notion, but more literature speaking to this can be found in the works of Van Sittert (2002) and Sowman *et al.*, (2011).

is reasonable to consider that this may have been a mechanism used to secure governments interests. As one respondent said, 'All of this is part of the colonialist, capital way. Democracy is only a façade for capitalism. It's a farce and it doesn't work. It just keeps some people in power and others not' (Community Activist 1, 2019).

6.6.2.4. Rent-Extracting Cabal

The relationship between government and Oceana suggests that a form of an urban regime existed, and that this focused primarily around the control of land that could be used for development – the harbour. This points to the regime having a similar typology to that of a 'growth machine' where the coalitions of politicians and developers centre around the provision of infrastructure and other business-supporting investments to maximise land rent (Heller, Mukhopadhyay and Walton, 2016:2). The growth machine is fundamentally about maximising the returns to land, which assumes a level of coherence with overall governance and economic logic but this is not always the case. A 'rent extracting cabal' suggests a particularistic pursuit of land and sea rents that is only weakly aligned with a coherent economic growth strategy that could cater effectively to the basic needs of the community (Heller, Mukhopadhyay and Walton, 2016). This is a 'cabal' in the sense that the 'dominant coalition consists of a fairly small group of actors who collude across the boundaries of state and market to maximize returns to scarce resources, most prominently land' (Heller, Mukhopadhyay and Walton, 2016:6). This appears to more accurately explain the situation with the fishmeal factory.

To understand urban regimes, it is suggested that attention be paid to four key variables: institutions of city governance, the formal political and institutional power devolved to the city; socio-economic processes, the economic factors that influence land use; politics, the attributes of party politics and the informal alliances between political and economic elites; and civil society, the collective mobilisation of different social groups (Heller, Mukhopadhyay and Walton, 2016). This provides a good framework to understand the type of regime that existed between government and Oceana.

First, institutions of city governance. While typically the City enjoys greater autonomy in its decision-making for developments within the city, this situation is unique in that control of the harbours is the mandate of national government, and in this way the institutions of governance are shared between the two entities: DPW controls the lease while the City controls the AEL. To this end, both entities used their formal and institutional power to ensure the continuation of the status quo – they had done this historically (as discussed in Chapter 5) and they maintained this position during the proposed closure, using the support of regulations and legislation to reissue the lease and the AEL to ensure continued operations. This, in essence, amounted to supporting the existing relationship between big capital and government, a governing coalition that had been evident in the fishing industry for decades.

In terms of socio-economic processes, the coalition between government and the commercial fishing industry offered substantial economic profits, despite this being at the

expense of the economic development of small-scale fishers. However, it was clear that Hout Bay, like the rest of Cape Town, had grown considerably over recent years and economic activities were increasingly focused on tourism opportunities, moving away from the commercial fishing industry. The development of the harbour would offer enormous potential for further economic opportunity, particularly in the form of land rentals, thus securing control of the land was a primary interest for national government. In addition, if the harbour were to be developed, it stands to reason that the land surrounding the harbour would also offer rental potential, a primary interest of the City. In this way, the land both within and around the harbour was central to rent creation and it was in the interests of both levels of government to maintain this rental, as opposed to developing the land for different purposes, such as low-cost housing.

This relationship points to party politics. Decision-making was institutionally divided by different levels of government (national DPW vs the City), which itself represents a degree of politics, but this division was further compounded by the party politics that each of these spheres of government represented (ANC vs DA). Whether the harbour was used for commercial fishing activity or developed for tourism, control of the land itself was a primary resource and interest to both parties. While national government already enjoyed greater control of the land under the existing legislative arrangements, when their current rental was threatened by the proposed closure, and their control of the harbours was threatened by the inter-governmental dispute, they used their informal alliance with the economic elite (Oceana) to ensure their control was maintained. In many ways, this did not align with the overall development ambitions that had been expressed by either sphere of government. While both spheres purported to have a vested interest in using ocean resources to support the development of local communities, this had not been the case with Hangberg, where it was clear that the development of industrial fishing had historically been prioritised over local development. In this way, the decision did not align with the growth of the local community, but rather seemed to align with certain private gains. These gains appeared to be tightly linked to other political and bureaucratic processes within government, and the decision to keep the factory open demonstrates how national government was able to use their mechanisms of power to secure their own interests.

Lastly, in terms of civil society, the high level of social and economic differentiation within the community led to civil society activism being largely location- and group-driven, as evidenced by Hangberg and FAHB, rather than establishing more horizontal linkages. These differences were compounded by the existing spatial segregation of the community, the legacy of apartheid that left different neighbourhoods with radically different levels of land security and access to services. In this way, FAHB was proactive in pursuing what could be termed as a project of 'city improvement and beautification' (Heller, Mukhopadhyay and Walton, 2016:16) that lent itself to having an exclusionary effect, while because of their basic insecurity of tenure, Hangberg was more beholden to patronage politicians and elites. In this way, civil society was active but fragmented, and without some degree of collective cohesion the efforts of civil society were largely limited to the defence of their own highly particularistic views rather than effecting broader social change.

Understanding these dynamics enables several conclusions to be drawn. First, it is suggested that a regime existed in the fishing industry and this regime, by and large, did not support effective governance at the local level. This is seen most notably with the continued conflict of sectoral interests between the different groups, who not only maintained different interests, but had these differences used against them through racial symbolism and provocation, often at the hand of those in power. In this way, the regime mobilised their political power to ensure the continuation of their rental arrangements – the status quo – rather than investing in the local community. In addition, fishing regulations continued to favour big capital rather than local fisherman which, while highly dysfunctional for effective local economic growth, again supported the generation of individual gains, particularistic rents, and specific political deals.

The evidence also suggests that the regime supported growth at the expense of inclusion in two ways. The continued operation of the factory ensured that Oceana would remain profitable, and that the interests of commercial industry were maintained over the interests of local fisherman, as had historically been the case. In this way, the Hangberg community was again excluded from growth within the fishing industry itself. Second, the continued operation of the factory ensured that a harbour development plan would not be pursued which, in essence, went against the broader social and environmental development objectives that had been expressed both by the City and national government. In this way, maintaining the status quo was not in line with broader development objectives and excluded sections of the community from benefitting from growth.

In this way, it can be concluded that the decisions made were geared towards the extraction of rentals rather than local development, indicating this was probably something similar to a rent-extracting cabal that used different power mechanisms to control their interests. The driver of the political-business relationship appears to have been organised around rent extraction which was 'cemented by a mixture of private gains and political finance' (Heller, Mukhopadhyay and Walton, 2016:6). The decisions made were centred around political parties, and political and business networks, rather than meeting the socio-economic needs of the local community or ensuring its further development, in complete contrast to the principles of social sustainability. It is also clear that despite the economic benefits brought about by the factory, very little of this was reinvested into the local community to encourage local growth; Oceana had contributed through its corporate social investment programs, but R3.6 million over 15 years (Lucky Star, 2014) was hardly a significant percentage of their R15.4 billion market capitalisation value (Oceana Group, 2016). The City had not invested in the local community either – housing development remained a central issue, as did a range of other socio-economic and service-delivery related challenges. The continued operation of the factory did not improve the socio-economics of the community and inspire further development, it simply ensured that the status quo of the harbours was maintained, as well as the rent that came with it.

6.6.3. Hangberg

Using the third dimensional view of power, the previous chapter examined how, through the events that transpired over the history of the factory's existence, the Hangberg community has developed a state of 'silence' around the operations of the factory typical of hegemonic ideas. This silence was forced to be broken when the factory proposed its closure. Gramsci contends that if the silence is broken, the initial demands of the dominated may be vague, ambiguous and partially developed, which helps to explain the phenomenon of 'multiple' or 'split' consciousness. While there may be a multitude of grievances that have been identified, so long as the elements of the sense of powerlessness can be maintained, 'critical consciousness' has still not been achieved (Gramsci, 1971). This can clearly be seen in the case of Hangberg.

The proposed closure triggered the identification of a 'multitude of grievances,' many of which had been long standing issues in the community, such as employment, poverty, access to land, housing, and the threat of gentrification. While these grievances were understandable and had been expressed for decades, they did not translate into any demands regarding the closure – they did not advocate for things to get better, they were advocating for things not to get worse. In this way, the demand from Hangberg was simple: keep the factory open. Despite the range of grievances, all of which had to do with long-term sustainability and addressing rampant inequality, Hangberg essentially only requested a continuation of the status quo, i.e. a continuation of the dependency relationship that had kept them in a state of poverty for generations. Even though many people understood this dependency relationship, and that the fishing industry itself was the main culprit perpetuating inequality, they now defended it because it was the only resource they had. In this way, it is evident that Hangberg has had to prioritise its interests in different instances – at times it was important to fight for local fishermen's rights and go against the commercial fishing industry, but at other times it is important to defend the industry to ensure job security. The problem was that these two interests are in opposition, and could point to what Gramsci refers to as 'contradictory consciousness' of common sense and powerlessness (Gramsci, 1971:324).

The key demand from Hangberg was for the factory to stay open to ensure the protection of jobs, what a number of people had referred to as 'sustainable jobs.' The reality, however, was that the continued operation of the factory did not promise sustainability at all and in terms of employment, there had been a decline of the industry as a whole since the 1980s. Specifically, there had already been a 4% decline at the factory itself over just the past year (from 102 employees in 2014 (Oceana, 2014) to 98 employees at the time of the proposed closure (Oceana, 2015b)). The continued operation of the factory would not create more jobs (despite what was claimed by the SACP chairman at the Hangberg community meeting) and there was no indication that these jobs would generate greater revenue. Again, the opposite was in fact true – commenting on the final labour agreement, the FAWU representative said 'the company cannot afford to pay them like before' and it appears that an agreement was made for a lower wage but more regularly paid days (Fin24, 2015d). Whether this worked out to be favourable to the workers is unclear, but one Hangberg

community leader explicitly stated, 'the 2015 labour agreement took advantage of the people of Hangberg' (Community Leader 1, 2019). There was also nothing to suggest that these jobs were 'sustainable.'

Gaventa's (1980) concept of the intersectionality of power offers a useful framework to understand Hangberg's reaction through the perspective of the third dimensional view of power. Due to invisible power mechanisms at play, he suggests that the consciousness of the dominated may be malleable as it emerges, particularly vulnerable to manipulation of the power field around it. Through using power mechanisms such as myths, symbols, rumours alongside the use of threats, the powerful may be able to ensure that certain beliefs and actions emerge in one context while seemingly contradictory grievances are expressed in others. As such, a 'consistently expressed consensus' is not required to maintain dominant interests, only a consistency that certain issues remain latent and unrecognised (Gaventa, 1980).

It was demonstrated above how Oceana used the threat of job loss and the power of symbolism to influence the consciousness of Hangberg, which directed them to believe this was an attempt by elite whites to control activities in the harbour. This was exacerbated by rumours that suggested the complainants had investments in the new harbour, were seeking to expand their properties, or had influenced the City to change the air regulations. Several people asked me directly if I owned shares in the new businesses that were going to be established - why else would I have pursued the issue for so long? None of this was true but it served to reinforce the idea of 'us' vs 'them,' of certain groups of people being excluded from the decision-making process that had already been created.

These mechanisms of power, direct and indirect, suggest numerous occurrences where power shaped the perceptions of necessity, possibility and strategies of conflict, essentially, explaining why Hangberg reacted as they did. Gaventa offers some practical examples to unpack this, using the symbolic notation.

Gaventa suggests that in one instance, B will both have grievances and be willing to act upon them but, due to the legitimations and mystifications in society, they may not recognise A as the responsible agent and thus do not direct their action towards them (Gaventa, 1980). In this case, Hangberg did indeed have grievances, most specifically the threat of job loss, and they were willing to act on this in the form of community gatherings, petitions, and demonstrations. However, due to the 'mystifications' in society, specifically the strong symbolism of racial politics, they did not recognise Oceana or government as being the responsible agents, despite being the only entities with any real decision-making capacity. Instead, as Gaventa suggests, B may act, but 'on the basis of a misconceived grievance, against the wrong target, or through an ineffective strategy' (Gaventa, 1980:20). This was even more so the case. Hangberg did indeed act but on the misconceived grievance that the FAHB had been the cause of this decision, as Oceana had suggested. As a result, all efforts were directed towards stopping the complainants, and not addressing the fundamental issues present. This also demonstrates how national actors can displace responsibility onto

local rivals, demonstrating the spatial dimension of power dynamics, as expressed in the places/levels element of the power cube.

Gaventa also suggests that B may recognise grievances against A and be willing to act on them, but may not act because they cannot conceive of possible alternatives. This understanding was only shared by a handful of people within Hangberg and interviews with key respondents revealed that some people recognised Oceana and government as being the responsible agents, but did not act against them because they knew it would be of no use. As one respondent said, 'The decision [about the proposed closure] was made because it just wasn't profitable – from a business point of view it's much easier to pack up and go. The outcry from Hout Bay gave them the excuse they needed. They started making these plans a year ago. It provided them with an out where they are now 'free'. This is not the view of local people in Hangberg, of course, and I won't even attempt to try to convince them otherwise' (Community Activist 2, 2019).

Various mechanisms of power were used throughout this time that contributed to these dynamics.

6.6.3.1. The Validity of Knowledge

First, the control of knowledge was central. In producing knowledge, different rules are used to declare the knowledge of some more valid than the knowledge of others: 'expert' opinions are more valid than 'community' opinions, for example. The rules of knowledge production can be used to accentuate the voices of some, while discrediting the legitimacy of others (Gaventa and Cornwall, 2007). As Rahman contends, domination is rooted not only in the 'polarisation of control over means of material production, but also over the means of knowledge production, including control over the social power to determine what is useful knowledge. Irrespective of which of these polarisations set off a process of domination, one reinforces the other in augmenting and perpetuating this process' (Rahman, 1991:14). Knowledge mechanisms, such as education, media, and information control, can influence consciousness and shape political beliefs and ideology.

This question of whose knowledge was 'valid' played out in two distinct ways in Hout Bay. First, the comments made from people in Hangberg suggested that the opinion of those who had been living in the area the longest was more valid than those who had only recently moved to the area. Much of the narrative on social media focused around this – the factory was here first, I grew up with that smell, where were you when the factories began, etc. In this way, a clear distinction was made between who belonged to the community – and thus had a valid opinion – and those who did not belong. The opinions of those who were 'new' (ie. anything less than a lifetime) were not valid and instead people were told to 'go back to where they came from.'

This sentiment resonates with some local articulations of KhoiSan nationalism in Hangberg that rejects the notion that coloured people are a race and purports that they are, instead, descendants of the first nation or tribe of Southern Africa . With deep connections to the

land and sea, and an existence that pre-dates colonial times, this notion of autochthony implies a form of legitimacy and ownership, particularly in relation to land (Anciano, Piper and Lieres, 2020). In the same way, the perceptions of the Hangberg community were perceived to be more legitimate than those of people who had only 'newly' arrived in the community.

It is interesting to note that there was some contradiction in this belief as well – while the opinions of those 'new' to the area were not considered as valid, at the same time there was the expectation that those same people should have conducted the full health and socio-economic impact studies, as if they were 'experts' in this knowledge production and the outcomes of such studies would have been considered 'valid'. This again points to the 'contradictory' consciousness that the Hangberg community exhibited (Gramsci, 1971:324).

6.6.3.2. Race Politics

One of the clear narratives to come out of the discourse around the closure of the factory was the distinction between 'us' and 'them'. This begins to touch on the notion of race politics, identity politics and the politics of belonging – the fundamental question of who we are and where we belong. In its most basic form, identity provides a sense of personal location and it facilitates our relationships and engagements with others based on a collective set of shared values that contribute to shaping our experiences (Woodward, 2005). Questions of 'who we are' are often intimately related to 'where we are' and many considerations of identity are inextricably bound to notions of place (Dixon and Durrheim, 2000). At the heart of the psychological structure is a sense of belonging that is constructed by three facets: social locations; people's identifications and emotional attachments to various communities or groups; and the ethical and political value systems that underpin notions of belonging.

This sense of belonging comes from a process of being naturalised to everyday practices or performativity (Butler, 1993; Fenster, 2004; Yuval-Davis, 2011). As it is explained, 'we repeatedly perform modes of subjectivity and identity until these are experienced as if they were second nature. Where they are internalised, they become part of lived subjectivity' (Weedon, 2004:7). This performativity is the 'reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains' (Butler, 1993:2), disclosing the link between the constructions of belonging and relations of power. In this way, the 'rhetorical traditions through which people locate themselves and others are also ideological traditions that sustain relations of domination'(Dixon and Durrheim, 2000:33). In this way, the politics of belonging can be defined as the 'dirty work of boundary maintenance' where the boundaries of the political community of belonging, sometimes physically, but always symbolically, separates populations into 'us' and 'them' (Yuval-Davis, 2011:30). This points to the notion of citizenship, of who belongs and therefore has the right to speak and act – essentially represent – different people on local issues. In this way, conceptions of citizenship are not only constructed racially, but on place-based conceptions, particularly within an urban context, and these conceptions are embedded in every day practices that

align along racial dimensions. In South Africa, place and race are often synonymous and reinforcing.

These notions of citizenship and how they are developed can be closely linked to the Gramscian concept of hegemony and similarly follows Bourdieu's concept of habitus, where learned norms and dispositions shape our sense of who we are, in addition to our behaviour with the social field, which itself is structured by relations of domination (Bordieu, 1990). This idea was raised many times throughout the interviews with people from Hangberg, with particular reference to how apartheid had shaped both society and identity over the years.

6.6.3.3. Habitus

When it came to the proposed closure of the fishmeal factory, it seemed that Hangberg's interest was in securing the jobs of the factory workers. While this was indeed a priority objective, the interviews with respondents allowed for a deeper interrogation to be made. As one respondent said, 'Ja, we know it's mostly outside people working there and only a few from Hangberg, and that nobody would've actually lost their jobs, but that's not the point' (Community Leader 1, 2019). Sharing this sentiment, another commented, 'People think that this is all a repeat of history – the rich whites coming in again and telling people what to do in their own place' (Community Leader 3, 2019). In this way, Hangberg's support for the factory was not just about protecting jobs, but was based on the fear of displacement brought on by the threat of gentrification and white domination. This sentiment was articulated perfectly in a comment made on social media (the author of which was later interviewed for this thesis):


This community will not put our trust in any organisation irrespective of who they are. The fact that many don't understand is this. Oceana has been there for this community. Yes they have only given a fraction of what they could have...but they have been there when the community needed them . They have employed here for years. They have earned the communities gratitude and we stick by our own. We can trust them. Now all the science saying that they are poisoning us may be true. The smell may be everything you say it is, The development is, in all probability, a good thing for everyone. But we as a community have been screwed over too many times to put any faith in that. So until such a time that the community is shown exactly how we will benefit... we stick with the devil we know.

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This warrants unpacking. As discussed in Chapter 4, Hangberg had a tumultuous history marked by racial division, violence, and inequality, and respondents referred to this throughout the course of their interviews, demonstrating how deeply impactful these events were.

A number of respondents explained that coloured people were originally sustainable fishermen, a skill that had 'been passed down from generation to generation' (Community Leader 3, 2019). When the fish factories opened in the harbour the forced relocations

began, the physical separation lead to a situation where 'at the end of day, it's us and them' (Community Activist 1, 2019). While the fishing industry was sustainable at first, over the years it 'took a downturn,' leading to a decline in employment and an increase in inequalities, that again reinforced the idea of 'us and them' (Community Activist 2, 2019). Many people turned to poaching and crime as a way to sustain themselves, qualifying that 'it's not that they want to do that, but the system, the system makes them' (Community Leader 1, 2019). Another agreed with this point saying, 'People need to live. You can't hold a chain around a man's neck and the pull it when you want him back – that's what the fishing industry has done to the small-scale fishers. This is why the people became poachers' (Community Activist 1, 2019). The more this continued, 'the more people on the other side of the valley began to view us as a bunch of hooligans' (Community Activist 2, 2019).

All respondents felt that this negative image was strongly associated with the people of Hangberg, as introduced in Chapter 4. 'The names people have called us is shocking' (Community Leader 3, 2019) one respondent said, while another commented 'people have been judging us and classifying us for years based on the colour of our skin and without ever taking into consideration what we're going through.' A third respondent commented that people in Hangberg 'were led to believe that we were stupid, that we didn't deserve better lives' (Community Leader 1, 2019) and this just perpetuated the problem. Another commented, 'we began to be cut off from opportunity because of where we came from and who we are' (Community Activist 1, 2019). All of these notions centred not only on being from Hangberg, but also on being coloured, and as one respondent commented:

> *Racism is a prison. Racism is punishment. When I walk into a restaurant, no matter how much money I have in my pocket, waiters think I won't tip 10%, they think I'll probably leave a pile of 50c coins. Security walks behind me when I don't feel like getting dressed properly, or God forbid I wear a hoodie. Women move their bags when they see me come in – I can see it. I would love to walk into a restaurant and not be treated like someone who was looking for a glass of water. It would be refreshing not be looked at as a thief or a hoodlum.* (Community Activist 2, 2019)

While all Hangberg respondents commented that this ideology was a result of the apartheid system, many also felt that little had changed in the post-apartheid era. As one commented:

> *Do you know what post-apartheid has done to white people? It's shocking. They have segregated themselves from all the communities. They have built themselves into walls, they've built themselves into electric wire fencing, they have built themselves a wall of armies called security and armed response. It is shocking what they have done to themselves and how they have segregated themselves from people. If you go all over, every place is like this. And you know who they blame it on – the poor oppressed guy. It's him that's stealing from me, it's him that's doing this, it's for him that I'm spending this money. They blame that guy. And you know what that guy thinks? Hey, you're blaming me, well then fuck you, I'm going to show you and I'm going to do it. I'll kill you also. Do you blame people when they go through mindsets like that?* (Community Activist 1, 2019)

Another respondent felt similarly, commenting that over the years this idea became more and more reinforced within the community:

> *People here don't see themselves as a graphic designer or lawyer or doctor. They don't see that for themselves because the mindset is that we're too dumb, our schools are too shit. We're losing our kids every single day to this idea – kids in primary school pull out knives, flares. In primary school. Growing up in Hangberg is basically thug training school… And now we stick out like a sore thumb. We're surrounded by this beautiful scenery, the mountains, the bay, and then there's Hangberg – the pimple on God's ass. When tourists come they say 'what the hell is that?' That's what happened to the first people that lived here. That's what happens when rich people take over. That's the result of hundreds of years of colonialism and racism.* (Community Activist 2, 2019)

In this way, support for the factory was essentially 'defence against white domination' (Community Activist 2, 2019). 'Moving out of Hout Bay would only pave the way for white people' (Community Leader 3, 2019), commented one respondent, while another said that the closure of the factory would symbolise 'just another win for white people over poor coloured people, and people are tired of that' (Hout Bay Civil Society 3, 2019).

The most comprehensive answer was as follows:

> *What you need to understand is that fundamentally, after losing so much as a community - in terms of land, employment, income – this one remaining fish factory stands for something. Irrespective of the cons, we can't lose this too. We've lost so much and have been screwed over so many times, there's just no trust from the Hangberg community towards the greater Hout Bay community. No trust at all. Losing the fish factory would be seen as yet another loss, and that's why we defended it. I don't expect you to understand that.* (Community Activist 2, 2019)

Many people also associated the relocation proposed by the factory with the forced relocations that had happened repeatedly in the past. One respondent commented, 'People felt like they were being forced to move again, and then we think, the system just keeps on the old way of doing things' (Community Leader 1, 2019). Another respondent felt more strongly, commenting, 'First you took the baboons and you put us on the mountains. When you found the baboons had the best view, you wanted to take the land away from them again' (Community Activist 1, 2019).

These sentiments point very strongly to the notions of both race- and place-based identity, which is most acutely seen when the relationship between person and place is threatened, as was the case with Hangberg. The loss of place can provoke strong social responses because it ultimately means a loss of self, and in this way displacement (such as the relocations that occurred throughout Hangberg's history and was again being proposed with the closure) can be seen as a form of trauma (Durrheim and Dixon, 2005). In this way, the

proposed closure of the factory threatened to undermine their sense of place familiarity and 'insideness,' their sense of place attachment and belonging, and undermined central the symbolism was to important aspects of self. In short, the threat of the closure of the factory and the possibility of new development this would bring, threatened the reference point for how experiences, values, relations, and actions signified the community's identity (Durrheim and Dixon, 2005).

In this way, the response from Hangberg was very understandable: not only did they support the factory because of the need to protect jobs and meet the immediate concerns of the community, but also because the factory represented an important ideology and losing that would simply mean not only a loss of their own identity, but a repeat of the history of white domination. To this end, the Hangberg community used their power to show their support for Oceana to remain open. This supports the idea introduced in Chapter 4 that suggested that Hangberg's continued sense of marignalisation stemmed from a long history of illegitimacy and displacement, and that they habituated to protest as a form of resistance to the threat against their sense of identity and belonging, which was largely race and location-based.

6.6.4. Fresh Air for Hout Bay

It is clear that through the proposed closure, a significant amount of responsibility was placed on FAHB despite the fact that they had practically no power to influence the outcome of the decision. As such, FAHB had one primary goal during the time of the proposed closure: to keep themselves and the community as safe as possible.

As discussed in the Personal Positioning 7, the period of the closure was a difficult time for me personally, partly because of the overt threat of petrol bombs and personal attacks, but also because all the FAHB organisers didn't want to get involved for fear of their own personal safety. The biggest fear was that this had the potential to start a riot in the community, a situation that FAHB certainly wanted to avoid.

To this end, FAHB used the only real power mechanisms they had: communication and consultation.

In terms of communication, they released a public statement and engaged with media to ensure they conveyed their side of the story, primarily reaffirming they had not been advocating for the closure of the factory but instead had been calling for their Constitutional right to live in a place with clean air, free from toxic emissions, to be respected. They emphasised that they had been calling for socio-economic studies to be done as part of a broader sustainable harbour development plan. They responded to all media requests, placed adverts calling for unity, did live debates with community members, responded to all social media comments and essentially used every platform they could to engage with the subject, rather than shying away from it.

In terms of consultation, FAHB also went to great lengths to proactively engage with the community, meeting with all the community leaders and trying to foster some kind of mutual understanding. By attending community meetings, participating in discussions, and being present in the community, FAHB hoped to soften the distinction between 'us' and 'them' and to overcome the common narrative associated with white privilege that white people 'make decisions that affect everyone without taking others into account' (Kendall, 2012:5).

The extent to which this was successful is certainly debatable. FAHB was successful with this in so far as their personal safety was concerned – no physical damage was done and no petrol bombs were thrown – but whether that is a result of their own actions is hard to say. They were certainly not successful at changing the narrative of being only an elite white group, and rather one focused on sustainability, and this notion would remain within the community for the years to come, further discussed in Chapter 7.

While FAHB was framed as the protagonist for the closure of the factory, and the community broadly supported this narrative, it is also interesting to note that many respondents, both from within Hangberg and the broader community, acknowledged it was unlikely the proposed closure had been caused solely by them. As they commented: 'this was about cost-cutting – why run two plants when you can run one?' (Community Leader 1, 2019); 'it was obviously all about the economics' (Community Leader 4, 2019); and 'the decision was made because it just wasn't profitable' (Community Activist 2, 2019); 'it was really about their bottom dollar' (City Representative, 2019). This idea of the factory not being profitable was echoed during the interviews with people who worked at the factory, or had family members working at the factory. The majority of people interviewed commented they had been 'working less and less hours over the years,' sometimes 'sitting for 2-3 months at home with a small stipend' (Community Interviews, 2019). 'If you hear the stories from the man on the street,' commented one community leader, 'you can put one and one together and get the answer' (Community Leader 1, 2019).

Many respondents from the Valley believed that the anger within the community was due to a 'clever manipulation' (Hout Bay Civil Society 1, 2019) on the part of Oceana. As one respondent commented, 'It was [Oceana's] corporate reputation at stake. It would be cheaper to pay those people working there a really good severance package than to keep the factory open. The problem was always the economics of the factory and FAHB was just easy to blame' (Hout Bay Civil Society 1, 2019). This idea was expanded on, commenting that Oceana was 'very adept at handling communities and I would say even getting people to play off each other. During the whole closure there was suddenly an uptake in the donations from Oceana to the community, delivery of food, buses, it was a big strategy of theirs. They used their power and resources to gather support, and turn the anger towards someone else. It was quite obvious what they were doing' (Hout Bay Civil Society 1, 2019). One respondent from Hangberg commented 'That's just the politics of it' (Community Activist 2, 2019). By using their power, Oceana was able to control the narrative entirely, shifting responsibility away from themselves, and inciting social division that stemmed from longstanding social issues. This supports the idea that certain elites have an interest in

disorder as it enables them to 'camouflage their self-aggrandisement, and maintain their status and power' (Anciano and Piper, 2019:18).

While the evidence does suggest that the proposed closure was a business decision on the part of Oceana, it can also be said that FAHB played a role in localising a national political issue. The conflict between provincial and national government, that stemmed largely from party politics, was clearly evident. It is reasonable to assume that while FAHB did not cause the proposed closure, it was their advocacy that brought the attention to the situation. In this way, the power mechanisms that FAHB used to politicise the issue, namely their creation of the space, their consolidation of evidence, and their use of social media to lobby government (as discussed in Chapter 5), was relatively effective.

When the decision was made to keep the factory open, one respondent from Hangberg felt that Oceana and government were 'playing a mind game' (Community Leader 3, 2019). 'They kept the factory open to give us hope, but it is false hope. The mind game is just to settle it down – it's like how you treat a child. One day I give you a banana, tomorrow a peach, the next day an apple. If I tell you this, tomorrow I will tell you that. That's labour politics and this happens all over the Western Cape' (Community Leader 3, 2019). The same respondent explained that the issue of the factory's operation was a political game between provincial and national government and how both entities used jobs to control their political gain, or as he said, 'politicians play with other people's stomachs' (Community Leader 3, 2019).

6.7. Conclusion

The previous chapter reflected on how Oceana and government maintained the status quo by ensuring economic dependency, depoliticising the issue through formal institutions and processes, and constructing hegemony to ensure broad support for their governance. The analysis in this chapter reinforces those findings, adding a deeper layer of understanding that explains the motivations of the key actors, particularly Oceana and government. When the factory proposed its closure, it is clear that Oceana used the power of threat and symbolism to manufacture consent for their operations, deliberately deflecting blame away from themselves to protect their interests, and instead using local race and place-based tensions that fostered division within the community. In this way, Oceana *politicised* the issue, and by placing responsibility on a *local* actor – FAHB – all local groups were on the defensive. In this way, it was also evident that the earlier techniques FAHB had used to politicise the issue, successfully localised a national political issue. FAHB now used its power mechanisms to protect themselves by denying they had called for the factory's closure, while Hangerg rallied support for Oceana and retaliated against FAHB using some degree of protest action. While Hangberg was focused on protecting existing jobs, further interrogation revealed that the much deeper concern was that of gentrification and on-going white domination. The closure of the factory and the proposed relocation was an indicator of the on-going mariginalisation of the coloured community, and directly pointed to the fear of displacement and loss, and the on-going resistance to this, that had been a key component of Hangberg's identity.

In this way, those in power – Oceana and government - were able to divert attention away from themselves, enabling them to secure and strengthen the long-standing coalition that existed to ensure the protection of their national interests. Evidence indicates that a type of urban regime existed and, considering the decision taken by national government to continue operation of the factory, it appears this regime takes the form of a rent-extracting cabal focused on securing rental for their particularistic interests at the expense of supporting the broader development of the community.

The following chapter will explore this notion further, continuing with the story of what happened once the factory was reopened and examining how government continued to secure its interests by working with big capital to control a variety of assets and resources, and to make decisions that would continue to serve their long-term interests.

CHAPTER 7

DECISION MADE

This chapter will conclude the story of the fishmeal factory case study, examining the events that transpired between the factory's reopening in 2016 to its eventual closure in 2019. Much would take place over these years, offering further insights into the relationship between government and big capital, and the impact this had on local development. Personal Positioning boxes will again be included to help locate the reader into the story, as well as offer my personal perspective, and the analysis that follows will reflect on the power mechanisms used by the different actors and for what purpose. To this end, it will be demonstrated how FAHB used their power and resources to politicise the issue, and (while not related to the factory) Hangberg used their power of protest to express their dissatisfaction against continuous marginalisation. It will be shown how the City shifted from avoidance to the repression of information and manipulated democratic processes to secure its own interests, reinforcing the notion that an urban regime existed in the specific form of a rent-seeking cabal. This would have serious impacts on the development of the harbour as a whole, as will be discussed.

7.1. 2016

In January 2016, Oceana held its first CSF with representatives of the HBRRA, FAHB, the HBCA, the PMF, and SANCO, and determined that bi-annual meetings would be held to promote dialogue. Following a dramatic and contentious relationship with the HBRRA, in February 2016 FAHB officially disassociated from the group. HBRRA had gone through significant leadership changes over this period and a new Chairman had been appointed in November 2015. FAHB requested independent participation with the CSF, which was granted.

Personal Positioning 10: Disassociating with the Dictatorial HBRRA

The HBRRA's perception that I was a 'gem' did not last long and the relationship between FAHB and the HBRRA grew increasingly difficult. Initially the HBRRA had been helpful with formal processes– their institutional representation had helped to secure the first meeting with Oceana and the submission to Sub-Council, and the association added some formality to the relatively informal group that was FAHB. But working with the HBRRA reminded me of what it must have been like during colonial times, when a group of old white men sat around a table and made decisions for everyone else.

I had major problems with the HBRRA's decision-making process, as well as their blatant racist and misogynistic views. Essentially topics would come up during the meeting, the

chairman would provide his opinion (often containing derogatory remarks about different groups of people), he would then make a decision of his preference, and we would simply move on. There was no consultation, no recognition of differing opinions, no room for any form of democratic discourse, and it bothered me. I began to ask questions during the meetings, requesting consultation and sharing of views, calling the chairman out when he said something inappropriate and offensive.

The chairman did not like this. He told me he had been running the HBRRA for 20 years this way and would continue to do so as he pleased. At one point he tried to insist that an HBRRA member, and close friend of his, attend my FAHB organisational meetings. During the first meeting when I suggested an opposing view to his, he shouted at me in the coffee shop saying, 'Do you know what your problem is? You're a woman!' Such was the blatant misogynistic and dictatorial nature of the HBRRA. For the HBRRA end of year Christmas party, an invitation was sent featuring a (mostly) naked woman seductively working the braai and when I complained, I was told to 'not take things so seriously' and to 'get a sense of humour'.

Figure 7.1: The HBRRA end of year email invite

Soon the chairman would 'forget' to include me in emails or tell me about meeting dates, and the relationship grew increasingly tense as time went on. During the time of the proposed closure, HBRRA was nowhere to be found. They offered no support whatsoever and later would even comment, 'This is a fishing village. People must get used to the smell. Smelling can be subjective sometimes. To those who like the smell of a flower, of course, fish will smell bad' (Cape Times, 2016).

By the end of 2015, shortly after the factory decided to remain open, the chairman announced that his 20-year dictatorship was coming to an end and that 'elections' would be held for a new chairman. The day of the election went like this: the chairman opened the meeting and introduced everyone to a new friend of his, Dave[13] (who had never once attended an HBRRA meeting). He praised Dave for his previous work with the Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch and had decided that Dave should join the Executive Committee. With that decision made, he then nominated Dave to be chairman and then made the

[13] Not his real name. A name has been included simply for the purposes of storytelling.

unilateral decision to vote him in as such. I actually laughed out loud. I stopped the 'vote' and asked what the process was here – surely, if we were operating under any semblance of democracy, there should be a call for nominations, a discussion about what those people might bring to the table, and then a vote to make a decision. There was some nodding of agreement around the table and after an extensive debate between the chairman and myself on the virtues of democracy, a call for nominations was made. The chairman nominated Dave, I nominated another member, and a third person nominated me. The vote was narrowed to Dave and myself and when we each received three votes, the chairman decided that because he was still chairman, he would cast the determining vote and Dave was it. Dave had been 'elected' the new chairman of HBRRA.

To be clear, I had absolutely no ambitions of being the HBRRA chair – I did not want to deal with its legacy issues of exclusion, the host of problems it would bring, and I was traveling too much for work anyway. But this final act of fascism was just too much for me to bear and I had to call him out, even if I knew he would end up getting his way. Once Dave was the new chairman, I immediately requested to meet. The first meeting was unbearable – he said he had good contacts that would easily be able to get the factory shut down or better equipment installed, and he seemed to have absolutely no understanding of FAHB's work nor of the major social events surrounding the closure that had just transpired. When I tried to comprehensively explain the situation to him he was dismissive and condescending, calling me 'my girl' and 'sweetie.' It came as no surprise that he then went behind my back to meet with Oceana CEO Francois Kuttel, undermining the concerns and work of FAHB, saying I would be 'better managed,' and insisting that better odour abatement technology be implemented, as he would later tell me. He then blatantly lied to me about the date of the first CSF meeting so that I missed it, and when I found out that he had attended the meeting instead, I confronted him. Of course he was too shame-faced to meet, stood me up several times, avoided my calls, and eventually left me a voice note apologising and saying he wouldn't get involved with the factory any further. I resigned from the HBRRA immediately and sent a letter of concern to the Executive Committee.

Dave would only last as the chairman for several months before he resigned as well. I was not involved by then but I laughed when I heard who his replacement was: the former chairman.

I had no further engagement with the 'chairman' from that point on. I did reach out to him in 2019 to see if I could interview him for this thesis, but he declined saying that 'no more involvement of any kind suits me best – can't make it plainer than that, and this matter is now closed' (HBRRA Chairman Correspondence, 2020). I didn't ask again.

With the labour agreement finalised, the AEL in place, and the lease agreement secured, Oceana once again resumed production in February 2016. Business was looking good and following their purchase of Daybrook Fisheries in the US, they were 'on course to become a big fish,' with their market capitalisation peaking at R15.59 billion (Business Report, 2016).

The Hout Bay factory was also doing well – there turned out to be a 20% increase of anchovy and redeye herring that year and production was at its peak (Oceana Group, 2016). So too were the complaints. As the noxious stench began again, there was a flood of complaints on social media sites and dozens more were registered with the factory and through angry emails to the City. People complained about the 'plague' of 'gut-wrenching gasses,' the 'rotten fishy cabbage smell with a metallic tinge' that was 'poisoning people in their own homes.' One email described how a man who worked in the harbour near the factory had gotten into his car at the end of the day and, knowing that he couldn't open the windows because of the smell, he 'turned on the air vent and was met with such a furious smack of toxic, vile fish breath that I threw up on myself in the car' (Community Correspondence, 2016). Complaints came from as far away as Llundudno and Kommetjie[14] with different community groups writing to FAHB to find out if something had gone wrong at the factory to account for the ferocity of the odour. Most of the outrage was now directed at the City with people saying they were doing 'nothing but window dressing,' 'failing the people who voted for [them],' by allowing the 'chronic abuse of human rights through air pollution' (Community Correspondence, 2016).

In response, City Health conducted a monitoring event to investigate the complaints streaming in. In a report that was later provided randomly to selected individuals[15] (FAHB had to specifically request a copy), it was explained that the Air Quality Management Unit spent one and a half hours in Hout Bay and detected a strong odour at a range of 300m from the plant which was 'barely detectable' in areas beyond this distance. The odour was 'typical' of fishmeal production and 'no abnormal working conditions were observed'. With maximum Hydrogen Sulphide readings at 8.2 micrograms, the odour was in a 'nuisance' range and did not pose a health hazard. The report concluded that new scrubbing technology was in the process of being introduced, but emphasised this would not have a significant impact on the odour (City Health, 2016a). The Western Cape Government Department of Environmental Affairs and Development Planning also sent a report saying the odour was 'characteristic' and reverted people back to City Health (Western Cape Government, 2016). These reports were not well received by the community, as one resident commented:

> *'Suggest Mr Gildenhuys reconsider his "report". I live along the Main Road next to the Kitima Restaurant, surely well in excess of the 300 metres from the source of the pungent smell he quotes. We have had two afternoons of suffering this stench, from approximately 1.00pm until gone 5.00pm. I hope he will consider buying a more reliable measuring device and a notebook to*

[14] Llandudno is about 6km from Hout Bay. Kommetjie is nearly 25km from Hout Bay by road, but about 10km across the bay, as the crow flies.

[15] This was a common problem experienced by FAHB. FAHB had requested to be considered a primary focal point for information by City Health, explaining that they would be able to effectively distribute information to their constituents. City Health often ignored this request, instead sending information to random individuals within the community (mostly individuals who had written to them on a particular day) rather than to FAHB. These individuals would forward the communication to FAHB, and then FAHB would request them again from City Health.

> *gather more first hand evidence from a wider geographical radius. His report is nothing short of a joke, he is merely fobbing off the local populace with a poorly constructed report short on helpful and supportive evidence.'* (FAHB, 2016)

Another monitoring exercise was only conducted again in April 2016 where much of the same information was supplied. In an unsigned report sent by City Health, it was noted that 'no abnormal working conditions had been reported' and again the City maintained they were 'continuing to engage with both Lucky Star Management and our Provincial Authorities' to assess the situation (City Health, 2016b). The only difference between the reports was conflicting information – in the first report the City claimed the new chemical scrubber being implemented would 'not eliminate fishmeal odours' (City Health, 2016a) yet the second report stated the scrubbers would 'ultimately see a decrease in the odour intensity' (City Health, 2016b).

FAHB submitted a formal letter of complaint to City Health, Western Cape Government, the Mayor's Office and the Premier's Office, highlighting concerns about the negative impact the emissions had on health and well-being. FAHB used the World Health Organisation's (WHO) definition that health was 'a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity' (FAHB, 2016; WHO, 2020). They included comments from the community such as the following:

> *'I have never in my life smelt anything quite as putrid and gut-wrenchingly disgusting in my entire life as I did THROUGHOUT the night last night. I literally couldn't sleep. Not even putting Vicks under my nose or the fan on helped. I'm 4 months pregnant and this stench made me end up in hospital a few ago as the smell made me throw up non-stop! I'm starting legal action against these idiots today as my health comes first and I cannot take this one day longer. If anyone else's health has been affected and would like to join in on a class action suit, please contact me.'* (FAHB, 2016)

In its letter, FAHB requested a variety of studies to be conducted about the factory, including a sustainable harbour development plan, a socio-economic study, an environmental impact assessment, and requested a meeting with the City to discuss this further (FAHB, 2016). While numerous articles came out in the media (FAHB, 2014b), the City continued to maintain that the issue was resolved and they denied requests to meet.

During this time, FAHB conducted several meetings with the Hout Bay Partnership (HBP), following a call they made for 'Re-Imagining Hout Bay Harbour' (Hout Bay Partnership, 2016b). With a long-term vision of fostering sustainability in Hout Bay, HBP was focused on the three areas of economic development, social development, and the built and natural environments, the core elements of sustainable development. Recognising that the harbour was 'significantly under-utilised' despite its potential to generate benefits to all people, they

argued that the harbour could be developed to 'take much better advantage of its inherent attributes' (Hout Bay Partnership, 2016b).

Personal Positioning 11: The Hout Bay Partnership and the Harbour Development Plan

When the HBP put out the call for a socio-economic development plan for the harbour, I thought this was a sign that things would start moving in the right direction and I decided to meet with the HBP instead.

From the beginning, the HBP expressed strong appreciation for the advocacy work I was doing but also made it clear this was not something they could overtly support. Their role was to bring different stakeholders together to advance social and economic equity and inclusion within Hout Bay (Hout Bay Partnership, 2014), while working with – and largely funded by – the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Government. While they supported the notion that harbour development could not happen with the existence of the emissions from the factory, they also couldn't take such a strong position against the City of Cape Town or Oceana. I understood this dynamic and agreed with their position, being more interested in whether their proposal to redevelop the harbour would actually have traction – if a solid development plan was created, did they have the capacity to implement it and was this an indication of government's intention?

I continued to meet with the HBP and participate in their activities over the years, attending various tourism related meetings and business development forums, trying to understand how I could support, promote, and gain traction for the idea of a sustainable harbour development plan. While these meetings were interesting and served to broaden my own understanding of Hout Bay, they didn't amount to much in terms of dealing with the situation at hand.

In the end, the HBP hired a team of consultants who produced an extremely comprehensive plan, complete with a spatial reorganisation of the harbour that addressed parking, quayside requirements, residential, and tourism needs. The plan included the recommendation that the fishmeal factory be relocated and support provided to the current employees so as to promote tourism development (Hout Bay Partnership, 2016a). The plan also included a continuous promenade route around the harbour, the re-establishment of the fish market, the opening of businesses on Harbour Road, and various upgrades within Hangberg as part of a circular tourism and access route (Hout Bay Partnership, 2016a).

Figure 7.2: Overview of the Re-Imagine Harbour Development Plan (Source: Hout Bay Partnership, 2016a)

What eventually happened to this plan is anyone's guess. Through informal conversations with the former HBP CEO years later, I would learn that the plan cost over R500,000 to produce and was submitted to the City and Western Cape government. Where it went from there I was never able to find out.

Operations continued as per normal over the next few months with intermittent production, followed by the usual complaints, and no further engagements with the City or Oceana.

In August 2016, housing development in Hangberg was unexpectedly halted due to health concerns over the emissions from the Oceana fishmeal factory (Sentinel, 2016b). A health risk assessment, commissioned by the Housing Directorate, recommended that development for residential units be halted on two plots of land, with the MAYCO Member for Health stating the emissions posed a concern for human health (Sentinel, 2016b). This concern had, in fact, been raised before under a strange set of circumstances.

In August 2013, an article came out in the Cape Argus saying that the low-cost housing project near the factory would 'go ahead despite health concerns' (Cape Argus, 2013). Apparently City officials 'warned that it is not clear if there are any health hazards associated with the factory emissions' and that if there was a health risk 'this could be a bigger matter than just this development' (Cape Argus, 2013). The project manager responsible for the housing development tried to get a health study done, but 'was told by the mayor not to continue with the study.' The rationale provided by the Mayor's Office was that 'people have been living in this area for many years without complaint' (Cape Argus, 2013). Interestingly, it was the HBCA who had raised health concerns with the City in 2012 – the same group who advocated strongly that there were no health implications during the time of the proposed closure. Environmental law specialists had recommended that a comprehensive study be conducted, and Oceana wanted to draw attention to the nature of their industry so that people 'will not in future raise concerns about atmospheric conditions and odours' (Cape Argus, 2013). The issue was then handed over to the Mayoral Committee – the same committee who systematically denied the existence of any health-related concerns during all engagements with FAHB between 2014-2016. It is unclear when exactly this new health risk assessment was requested or conducted. Despite this concern again being raised in 2016, Oceana continued production, simply announcing that new scrubbing technology would be implemented as of 2017. Housing development was delayed until further notice.

This situation is curious for a number of reasons. From the beginning, FAHB argued that the emissions caused negative health impacts, but this had been difficult to prove. Many residents had cited health concerns only when the factory was in production, ranging from nausea, to skin irritations, respiratory problems, and the exacerbation of other health-related issues, such as asthma and fibromyalgia, but it was not possible to get this officially documented by a medical practitioner - while the impacts experienced could be documented, these could not be directly correlated with emissions from the factory. However, this report raised some serious questions, not only about the emissions from the factory, but also about how much existing knowledge the City had about the health implications.

During this same time, the local 2016 municipal elections took place and a new councillor was elected for Ward 74 – DA representative Rob Quintas. When elected, he said that his

aim for the next five years was to focus on the previously disadvantaged communities and to 'find a project that will encourage integration' (Sentinel, 2016a).

7.2. 2017

In early 2017, both FAHB and HBCA officially (and separately) requested access to the health risk assessment, arguing this was a matter of public interest – FAHB was concerned about the health implications, and HBCA was concerned about the housing. FAHB initially requested the report from the Housing Directorate but they said they didn't have it and directed FAHB to City Health. City Health said they didn't have it because it had been commissioned by the Housing Directorate and only they had a copy. When FAHB communicated this again to the Housing Directorate, they made an abrupt turn around saying there were no health concerns over the emissions, housing development would continue, and thus there was no reason to release the report. They provided a few bullet points of information implying there were no health implications, claiming these came directly from the report.

Dear Kiara,

Thank you for your interest in the Health Risk Assessment that was undertaken by the city in relation to air quality arond selected proposed housing locations within Hout Bay and for our quick chat yesterday. I have obtained and reviewed the Health Risk Assessment report and, whilst the full study report cannot be released at this time, for the reasons outlined below. I can provide the following experts:

- The results of the study confirmed that *"health risks based on modelled concentrations of hydrogen sulphide, trimthylamine, PM2.5 and sulphur dioxide would not be at a level where exposure may lead to adverse health effects".*

- All of the sites evaluated were determined to be *"safe for residental development in so far as health risks associated with inhaltation of ambient air at the sites are concerned".*

- However whilst the Health Risk Assessment has ruled out adverse health effects associated with emissions from the Lucky Star factory, odours will ocassionally be at a level that are detectable by residents.

We are unfortunately unable to release the full report at this time due to the sensitivity of the locations of proposed sites for affordable housing - these locations are identified in the report. In the past, the identification of potential sites for affordable housing development has occasionally resulted in the illegal occupation of these sites due to the dire need for housing and land by those living in informal settlements. Once such a situation develops, projects can be delayed with months or even years - this is a situation the City of Cape Town would like to prevent. The proposed sites for housing must therefore remain confidential until such time as our planning has progressed further and we are confident the sites should be developed.

Thank you for your understanding and consideration.

Kind Regards,

Mark

Mark Rountree
Executive Support Officer to Councillor Brett Herron

CITY OF CAPE TOWN
ISIXEKO SASEKAPA
STAD KAAPSTAD

Making Progress Possible. Together.

Figure 7.3: Email communication from the City of Cape Town Housing Department

FAHB queried this arguing that if the report did, in fact, say there were no health implications then there was no reason to withhold it. The Housing Directorate responded saying the document contained sensitive information about land allocation, and when FAHB said this information could be redacted (and that the locations were already well known and highly publicised in the media), they continued to refuse access. FAHB accused the City of deliberately withholding pertinent information and requested the document through the PAIA process.

Due to a lack of clear data in March 2017, FAHB launched an Air Pollution Impact Survey, a community perception survey aimed at documenting the health, well-being and business development impacts on the community (FAHB, 2017b). The survey was distributed at various locations around Hout Bay including popular restaurants, tourist destinations, bed and breakfast venues, and the Hout Bay Market. FAHB held a number of information stands at the Mainstream Shopping Centre to distribute information, raise awareness, and gather people's experiences of how they were impacted. FAHB also met with the new Ward 74 Councillor, who was familiar with the issue and had been engaged previously at a personal level, to raise concerns (FAHB, 2017b). By May 2017, FAHB had been denied access to the health risk assessment through the PAIA process and appealed this decision to the Speakers Office. Oceana also installed new scrubbing technology at the factory, which was commissioned in July 2017.

Figure 7.4: Photos from the FAHB Mainstream Event

Personal Positioning 12: Views from the Valley

Throughout all my years of working with FAHB, I found it particularly difficult to engage with people from the Valley.

On the whole I felt that affluent white people in Hout Bay were extremely disconnected from the reality of the world around them. Based on their comments it was clear that most had never stepped foot in a township and had no real understanding of what poverty was, thinking their middle-class status and privilege was 'normal' (Kendall, 2012:1). One Valley respondent told me that his wife, despite having grown up and lived in Hout Bay all her life, had never been into Hangberg other than driving through the back road to get to the Hout Bay Market. This story was common among the affluent white residents. One woman had explained, 'I've heard about what it's like in Hangberg and I don't want to see that. I'm happy living my life, they're happy living theirs, that way we can all live together.' 'Separate but together?' I had provoked, but she missed the reference entirely. These kinds of comments spoke directly to white privilege.

This, of course, is not to say that all white people in Hout Bay were like this. I was also amazed at the generosity of the Valley community, how people would rally together in times of disaster and there would be an outpouring of resources and kindness. I saw this most clearly in the Imizamo Yethu fire in March 2017, after a devastating fire tore through the informal settlement of Dontse Yakhe and more than 15,000 people were left homeless. The Valley responded immediately, setting up food drives, donation stations, fundraisers, emergency relief, and it was remarkable to see how many resources were put into effect (Worth, 2017). This was not uncommon. Hout Bay was a vibrant, socially active and vocal community, and in many ways it did represent the 'fishing village' mentality that it purported to have.

But the privilege mentality was everywhere in the Valley. It was instantly recognisable, in language, comments, questions, and the often dismissive, condescending manner the Valley people used on those who didn't write or present themselves as eloquently as they did. It was also evident in the lack of initiative that many people exhibited. Despite having access to resources that could potentially effect real change, many people were just interested in complaining, believing that *someone* should do *something*. This was particularly the case with the fishmeal factory. As the facilitator for FAHB, organising work was a nightmare. People would write to me asking what they could do and when I told them to distribute 10 surveys, I would never hear from the again. I collected more than 50 'volunteers' through those information sessions, and maybe about two people actually contributed. In emotional outbursts people would announce their commitment to the cause all over social media, but then not attend a single meeting. People would complain about not knowing what was going on, but wouldn't read any of the documents or updates. Countless times people said we should arrange a march or a demonstration outside the factory, but honestly, I didn't think anyone would actually turn up. This apathetic attitude from the white residents drove me crazy and I perceived it to be another indication of their privilege – somebody else would presumably sort it out.

At least the perspective from Hangberg I understood – while I didn't agree with their acceptance of the odour, I certainly recognised why they felt that way and had spent years trying to deepen my understanding of the community to understand the socio-economic complexity of it all. But the people from the Valley seemed to make no effort whatsoever and it was easy to see why people from Hangberg resented them so much.

I worked very hard to disassociate FAHB from this mentality. I continued to be extremely vigilant about our narrative, checking every word of every statement and comment and post to ensure it couldn't be misconstrued, that it was sensitive and fostered dialogue and discussion. While I wasn't always successful, I went out of my way to try to be inclusive, understanding, and tolerant, and I frequently invited people – both from Hangberg and the Valley - to meet for coffee so we could speak properly, although few took me up on the offer.

I often wondered – and still do – whether I too fall into the category of unconscious white privilege (Kendall, 2012), just another middle-class white person blinded to my own prejudices by my sense of self-righteousness. I have never been able to conclude this with certainty, but I trust and hope that my sincere and consistent efforts geared towards sustainability, and my honest reflection in this thesis, have at least put me on the path to becoming more conscious.

Later in July 2017, a public participation process was launched for the renewal and variation to Lucky Star's AEL (Oceana, 2017a). This renewal came as a surprise: previously the AEL had been automatically renewed on an annual basis and the public participation process had only been launched because of a proposed variation – inclusion of the use of formalin,

commonly known as formaldehyde, as a raw material in the operating process. While using formalin as a type of preservative had historically been done in the fishing industry, it is also a well-known carcinogen where chronic inhalation exposure can result in a variety of respiratory symptoms, leading to its declined use. Through informal discussions between FAHB and Oceana, Oceana claimed that the use of formalin was one of the ways of addressing odour abatement – the more the fish were preserved, the less of an odour they would give off. A 90-day consultation period was launched, and interested and affected parties (IAPs) were encouraged to submit comments either in favour of or against the licence application. FAHB, HBRRA, and numerous individual residents opposed the renewal and variation. FAHB submitted a comprehensive comment document highlighting the negative impact of Oceana's emissions (FAHB, 2017a), including the results of their Air Pollution Impact Survey. Other members of the community also submitted comments, including the PMF and HBCA, both of whom were in support of the licence renewal.



Figure 7.5: FAHB Air Pollution Impact Survey results

The public participation process was facilitated by Pieter Badenhorst Professional Services (PBPS), who acted as the independent Environmental Assessment Practitioner (EAP) responsible for compiling comments and responding to them. From the beginning, issues were apparent. The PBPS website (PBPS, 2017) was defunct, offering no information on the AEL, the company's professional profile, or any projects they had previously worked on. The website had text saying 'project 1' and 'project 2' followed by empty spaces where descriptions should have been added.



Figure 7.6: Screenshots of the PBPS website

When FAHB phoned the EAP to find out more information, they did not seem to have any understanding of the situation and simply supplied an email address for comments to be sent to. They were not able to advise if any consultations would take place or how the process would be managed as a whole. After the IAP's submitted their comments, there was no further communication from the EAP.

According to Section 38 of NEMAQA, the comments and response document, along with other information, should be distributed to IAPs and made available on the EAP's website, but this did not occur and no IAPs were notified or had their comments responded to. After continuous follow up with the EAP, FAHB eventually sourced a copy of the comments and response table, which they found to be significantly flawed, and relayed these concerns to the EAP. All documents were submitted to the City, who were given 60-days to make a decision.

Also in July 2017, FAHB's appeal to the Speakers Office regarding the request for the health risk assessment was also denied. They stated that Oceana had been informed of the request and they had refused it on the basis that it contained 'proprietary information' about their operations, and that because they had submitted an appeal to their AEL, the disclosure of the document would 'prejudice and impair the impartiality of the adjudication of the appeal' (PAIA, 2017).

In August 2017 while the public participation process was underway, FAHB met with the head of Social and Safety Services for the City of Cape Town, Alderman JP Smith, who anecdotally and verbally committed to the redevelopment of the harbour, excluding Oceana's operations, during the meeting. FAHB raised concerns about the public

participation process, the non-existent role of the City in dealing with the situation, and the continued denial of access to the health risk assessment that could be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to withhold information. Alderman Smith said he would see what he could do and later that month FAHB was allowed access to redacted portions of the health risk assessment (see Appendix A).

Only eight pages of the 19-page report were received and most of these were blocked out by large sections of grey, making it difficult to understand the flow and context. The report acknowledged that the odour is likely to be 'rated as unacceptable for most of the time' and warned that it 'should not be a surprise that some people might find the odour sufficiently offensive over the long term to lodge formal complaints' (Infotox, 2016:10). Regarding health impacts, the report appears to conclude that 'the levels of exposure to hydrogen sulphide… are unlikely to be associated with detrimental health effects' and that the 'health risks associated with exposure to the contaminants… are not significant and not prohibitive of residential development and occupancies of residences at the proposed site' (Infotox, 2016:4). With this information, it appeared conclusive that there were no serious health impacts associated with the emissions, indicating there had to be a political reason for why the report had delayed housing development in the first place.

Tensions started to build in Hangberg around August. A new housing development was announced in Imizamo Yethu and people from Hangberg, upset they had waited years for title deeds and housing upgrades, started a small protest to express their frustration and tensions started to rise (Anciano and Wheeler, 2021). In September, DAFF announced at a community meeting that rock lobster quotas would be reduced from 110kg to 50kg for the six-month fishing season, a 59% reduction that would have a significant effect on the livelihoods of many Hangberg residents (GroundUp, 2017b). Both of these issues were emblematic of the on-going marginalisation that Hangberg had been expressing, and protestors took to the street to voice their frustration. Upset that fishing companies held large quotas while local and indigenous people lost theirs, they barricaded the road to the harbour with burning bins.

The situation quickly escalated. A breakaway group attempted to rob tourists outside their buses, while another group attacked Mariner's Wharf restaurant, stoning windows and stealing furniture to throw on the fire. Police arrived with a water cannon, firing rubber bullets and throwing stun grenades, and in the late afternoon of the first day, a young boy of 14 years, cowering behind a wooden table, was shot in the mouth with a rubber bullet by a policeman from less than two meters away. The incident fuelled the perception of on-going police brutality and when the Deputy Minister of Police cancelled a meeting with the community to settle the unrest, the protesters then set a construction vehicle alight, petrol bombed a police van, and fighting continued on and off for the next three days (GroundUp, 2017a, 2017b; Anciano and Wheeler, 2021).

While FAHB was not directly involved, they commented that 'fishing quotas should be allocated to local fishers, not multi-million rand companies such as Oceana, who reap the

majority of the profits while the local community continues to face a range of developmental challenges' (FAHB, 2017c).

This incident of violence and protest highlighted the growing frustration within Hangberg and the continued sense of marginalisation they had been experiencing. The protests were triggered by a set of legitimizing notions including the right to fish and the right to agency (Anciano and Wheeler, 2021) that the community of Hangberg felt had been continuously denied. They were angry that their voices had not been heard, that socio-economic inequalities persisted, and messages on signs read 'we had enough.' Well known photographer Justin Sullivan documented the protest over the three days and in a compilation video he later compiled, he asked one simple question: are we listening enough (Sullivan, 2017)?

7.3. 2018

On 25 January 2018, PBPS announced that the renewal and variation to Oceana's AEL had been granted by the City of Cape Town (PBPS, 2018). Oceana then published an announcement (Oceana, 2018), including a letter from the City explaining their decision. The City did not provide any form of announcement or communication to the community. The explanation contained its usual rhetoric – the factory operated at the highest standards and had done everything possible to control odour abatement; the factory played a significant role in the local economy; and the 'alleged' negative impacts had not been proven statistically (City Health, 2018). While the licence had been granted, there was an opportunity to appeal this decision through the City Manager.

FAHB, with pro bono assistance from a law firm, submitted an appeal to this decision. Their argument centred around two key points. First, PBPS did not display a reasonable degree of competency when conducting the public participation process, as evidenced by their defunct website and communications, and the inaccurate comments and response report that failed to provide substantive answers to concerns or a form of analysis. Second, the reasons for granting the license provided by the City did not include any reference to the concerns raised and there was no evidence of consideration of the negative impacts that the community had expressed (FAHB, 2018a).

Personal Positioning 13: The Public Participation Process

The public participation process was infuriating. I was very surprised when the notice for the renewal came out – Oceana had only recently updated its AEL and it was strange they would invite a public participation process knowing the history of events. But soon I realised the whole thing was a farce. Several months after submitting the FAHB comment document, I began following up and after a lengthy period of trying to get hold of the EAP, I finally received a copy of the compiled comments and response document. The mistakes in it were glaringly obvious but more infuriating were the responses. People had gone into detail

explaining the impact of the emissions and the 'response' had been to explain the fishmeal production process. Many of the responses were simply inaccurate and nowhere was the impact of the odour or the emissions even acknowledged. The FAHB comment document, submitted on behalf of more than 600 members, was counted as a single comment and none of our questions were responded to – simply the same cut and paste answer about production that repeated itself over and over throughout the document. Of course I complained to the EAP arguing that the document in no way reflected legitimate participation, but she didn't care and nor did the City or Oceana. It was clear that 'public participation' meant nothing more than ticking a series of boxes, rather than any form of actual engagement.

When the announcement came out that the AEL had been granted, I just shook my head in exhaustion. No surprise really and of course I would submit an appeal. The question about having legal representation had come up many times in the past. Initially people had wanted us to hire a lawyer and take Oceana to court, but I was against this entirely. I knew that a legal process of 'shutting down the factory' would only cause further social unrest with the already volatile Hangberg community, and within the current legal framework, I knew we didn't even have a case. Besides, we didn't have any money and I did not see the value in fundraising for such a fruitless endeavour when there were so many better ways to use resources. I did consult with a number of lawyers at various points but everyone cautioned me this would be a long and drawn out battle, that would be unlikely to end well for anyone.

After the AEL was granted, I was contacted by Werksmans Attorneys, one of the top legal firms in the country, who offered to help with the appeal, pro bono. One of their lawyers had been following the case over the years and thought they might be able to help. I thought this was probably our last chance, so we took their offer. I spent weeks putting all the documents together, writing and rewriting my impassioned pleas, and pulling all the evidence together that I felt demonstrated our case. I remember being so impressed with the final document, how the argument was so legal and technical, based on laws and their countless paragraphs, things I didn't even know existed, and how different this was to the moralistic appeals I had submitted before. I also remember thinking how inaccessible this made civic action – the only time you really had a chance was when you were supported by a team of lawyers, and arguments based purely on principles and moral understandings didn't hold any weight. I recognised that morals are subjective, but hadn't laws historically proven to be subjective in much the same way?

While I was grateful for the support from the legal team, it also left me feeling disenfranchised with the system as a whole. If I, as a well-educated person who had done years of research and investigation and had considerable resources at my disposal didn't have access to this level of engagement, what chance did the broader public have, or the people from the townships? Wasn't the purpose of public participation to listen to the voices of normal people, to give them access to the systems of justice, to express their own values and judgements of what was right or wrong? If you could only access the systems of justice with a full legal team then, to me, the processes of participation and inclusion had failed.

Also in early 2018, Oceana CEO Francois Kuttel quit and moved to the US to take control of the Daybrook Fisheries Processing Plant that Oceana had purchased in 2015 (Fin24, 2018). With the new AEL granted just in time for the typical production run in February and March, everything went full steam ahead. With the noxious fumes filling the valley, complaints were once again rampant on social media sites and tensions were high.

FAHB had been requesting to meet with the City for months and after a multitude of angry emails were received from residents about the City's inactivity around the factory, they eventually agreed to meet in March 2018 in Hout Bay. The purpose of the meeting was unclear – it had been arranged hastily through an email and phone call less than 24 hours in advance, there was no agenda, and it was uncertain who had been invited to participate. FAHB posted an invitation on social media sites calling for residents to attend and this quickly escalated into a surging debate. Hangberg residents were angered at the lack of preparation and consideration, while the City denied it had been a public meeting and was instead intended for FAHB alone. This caused further tensions about inclusion in decision-making and after tensions rose on social media, with threats from Hangberg to boycott the meeting, the City cancelled an hour before (Cape Times, 2018a). The meeting was rescheduled to the following week at the Council Chambers in Cape Town.

The MAYCO Member for Social and Safety Services Alderman JP Smith, Hout Bay Councillor Rob Quintas, Air Quality Management Unit representative Ed Filby, and Area Based Ward Councillor representative Clinton Davids, attended the meeting. Representatives from Oceana were invited but declined to attend. In preparation for the meeting, FAHB submitted a range of questions and a number of items were discussed including health concerns, well-being and socio-economic impacts, and the appeal to the decision to grant the AEL. Most importantly, broader discussions were held regarding the intended development of the harbour.

The City commented that the harbour was currently managed at a national level and the City was advocating for autonomy of small harbours within the Western Cape. They also stated that the City had met with Oceana and were exploring opportunities for economic development, with a primary focus on creating employment for Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu. This was part of a broader initiative to explore economic opportunities in the harbour, and the City was working with various stakeholders to explore private investment opportunities. While no definite plans were being considered, it was stressed that any potential plans would take time to develop and would require engagement with the current employees as well as the general public of Hangberg. The City also commented on the political movements within Hout Bay that were perceived to be hindering productive discussions. They reflected that several 'self-appointed spokespersons' (referring to the HBCA) had political agendas and that these often derailed the process, indicating that sensitivity was needed when addressing this issue (FAHB, 2018c).

Personal Positioning 14: Meeting with the City

This meeting with the City was surrounded by many challenges, a few of which I inadvertently caused.

I was becoming increasingly frustrated with the apathy from the City and the dismissive tone and attitude that they showed around this issue, particularly from Ald. JP Smith. When production started in February, following the debacle of the public participation process, I sent out a call to FAHB members to bombard the City with complaint emails, including their locations and a description of the impacts experienced. For the first time it actually worked – JP Smith requested an on-site meeting. When I received this email on 1 March 2018, I was both surprised and thrilled, and immediately responded that FAHB members would attend. We requested further information about the intent of the meeting, a preliminary agenda, and asked to be kept informed about the meeting date and time.

A week later, there had been no response and no meeting date nor agenda had been set. I followed up again via email, expressing the urgency of the meeting, but still didn't receive a response. After another week with no communication, I followed up yet again and when I still got no response, I phoned JP Smith's office. His assistant told me that she would follow up. Still, nothing. By the third week, the fourth email, and the third phone call, I started to lose my patience – this was exactly the dismissive and avoiding behaviour of the City I had come to recognise and it was making me angry. By the fourth time I phoned, I expressed my frustration to JP Smith's assistant saying it was unacceptable and a clear demonstration of the City yet again trying to brush off our concerns. I said that I would be more than happy to send an email to the FAHB constituency of more than 600 registered members, most of them presumably DA supporters, to inform them of just how seriously the City took their concerns and ask them if they thought their vote had been well cast.

The next day, a Tuesday, I received a random mail invite from JP Smith's office with the only information being 'Thursday, 11am'. No venue, no agenda, no indication that they were taking this seriously at all. When I phoned his office again, I was furious. His assistant told me that the venue was the Hangberg community hall, which I found very surprising. When I asked if this was an open community meeting, the assistant said she wasn't sure but she thought so. So I asked: you're setting a community meeting less than 48 hours in advance, after weeks of no communication, with no set agenda, no indication of who is supposed to participate, and you expect us to think you're taking this seriously? Fine. That afternoon I made a public announcement on all the Hout Bay social media sites saying that JP Smith had called a community meeting to discuss the fishmeal factory and provided the only details I had: Thursday, 11am, Hangberg community hall.

Initially, when I was so fuelled by anger, I thought this was a great idea. I was sick and tired of the City's constant dismissal and if they were too cowardly to face the issue, then I would bring the issue to them. At first the response was exactly what I wanted - dozens of people, particularly from Hangberg, commented that they couldn't believe the short notice of the meeting, that it was in the middle of the day when most people were at work, and that this

was just another indication of how disconnected the City was with the needs of the people. I agreed whole heartedly, finding allies in the anger that pulsed its way through the comments and rallying the usually divided community against the ineptitude of the City.

But by the next day, I began to realise this perhaps had not been such a good idea – instead of people rallying against the City, they started to turn on FAHB. There were suddenly calls for Hangberg residents to boycott the meeting, to picket in front of the hall and not let the 'complainers' have their say. They somehow felt that *FAHB* had set up the meeting, and that *we* had tried to exclude *them* so that we could promote our own interests. When I realised the confusion had largely stemmed from the careless and hasty wording of my announcement, I immediately tried to backtrack but it was too late. Tension and frustration was high, angry community leaders started phoning me, and on Thursday morning at 9am, JP Smith cancelled the meeting.

I was so frustrated with myself. For years I had worked so hard to not react to things, to be a voice of reason and reconciliation, to check every word of every announcement over and over again to make sure it couldn't be misconstrued. By and large I had been successful at this, with people writing to thank me for my cool headedness, my diplomacy, and I couldn't believe that in this one moment of weakness, everything had collapsed. I was also frustrated that I wasn't allowed the same latitude for making mistakes that I gave others – I had to deal with everyone else's anger, with their vitriol and ineptitude, but the minute I demonstrated anything even remotely similar, I was crucified.

The City rescheduled the meeting for the following week, but in the evening and in Cape Town central, not in Hout Bay. Not many people were able to come so instead of showing the City how extensive the concern was, they turned it around and said this was a demonstration that only a small minority was really impacted. I was irritated by their double standards – when 15 adults attended the community demonstration during the proposed closure this was viewed as 'overwhelming support,' but when the same amount attended this meeting it was viewed as a poor turn out. I was also irritated because this was exactly the frustration I had with the Valley community myself, that everyone was prepared to complain and make a scene on social media, but when it came to actually doing something, like showing up for a meeting, they were nowhere to found. I understood the Valley's inertia and their frustration that nothing ever changed, but this apathy undermined the efforts FAHB was trying to make to overcome this. The whole situation had also given the City exactly the excuse they needed to continue avoiding the issue – instead of really discussing the long standing concerns that we had, they spent most of the meeting insinuating how irresponsible I had been, saying that communication was so important, that the issue was so sensitive, as if I didn't know and they had been so good at managing everything. They used this as an excuse for highlighting how it was impossible for them to engage with the community – how they had tried but it was us who had not allowed them to do their work. It was so unfair and so patronising, I felt physically ill throughout the meeting. When I tried to remind them that the confusion had only stemmed from their inefficiency for all the weeks and months prior to that one moment, they just swept my comment under the carpet. It was an opportunity lost and there was nothing I could do about it.

The only good thing to come from this incident was my connection to a number of Hangberg community leaders. I knew I had handled the situation poorly and I personally called every single community leader to acknowledge my error and offer my apologies. I also made a public apology on all the social media sites, taking responsibility and accepting the consequences that would come. I did this mainly because I felt it was the right thing to do, but I think the result was that it made me appear more human to others. Because I made myself vulnerable, it opened up the door to many more insightful conversations with people from Hangberg and by not defending myself, real dialogue was able to occur. Many of those discussions are included in this research.

If I could do it all over again differently, I would, but I was grateful at least for this small outcome.

In June 2018, an article was published in the Sunday Times announcing that national government had 'big plans for fishing harbours' (Sunday Times, 2018) and that the long-awaited revitalisation of harbours was going to be undertaken by the national Department of Public Works. The plans included a six-stage repair and maintenance roll out plan that involved the dredging and removal of sunken vessels in Hout Bay, among other places. In addition, the briefing document claimed that between 1,713 and 2,318 jobs would be created in Hout Bay (Sunday Times, 2018) although there was no indication of how this would be done. No mention was made about the intergovernmental dispute over the control of small harbours raised by the Western Cape Government in 2015 (Western Cape Government, 2015a) and it certainly appeared that both levels of government were trying to stake their claim for control of the harbours.

While business continued as usual, later that month FAHB was informed that their appeal against the decision to grant the AEL had been denied (City of Cape Town, 2018b). In a letter provided to FAHB, the City commented that they had complied with all legislation in terms of the public participation process, claimed they were not obliged to give responses to the objections, and summarily dismissed the concerns that had been submitted by FAHB, saying instead that 'it was clear the City had weighed up relevant interests and effects' (City of Cape Town, 2018b). The City maintained that 'public commentary was an integral part of the decision making process' (City of Cape Town, 2018b). Since the appeal had been denied, there was little further action that could be taken to revert the decision and instead FAHB requested a copy of the new AEL. The very next day, the factory was in full production with plumes of black smoke billowing into the air. When images were sent to the City, they commented that the images represented 'unacceptable operating conditions' (City Health Correspondence, 2018a) yet no further action was taken.

Personal Positioning 15: Challenges of the Media

One of the ongoing challenges I faced as the facilitator for FAHB was ensuring that FAHB's position was accurately portrayed in the media. This was a difficult thing to do. On the one hand, I needed the media to highlight the concerns we had and to bring the issue to the public's attention, but on the other hand, I didn't always have a lot of confidence in the journalists – experience had taught me that they often printed incorrect statements, did not verify information, and tended not to do what I perceived as their due journalistic diligence, which in turn lead to an inaccurate narrative for the broader public. One of the best examples of this was when the AEL was denied.

By this point, I had a database of journalists that I would send information to, regularly updating them on the status of the factory. When FAHB's appeal to the AEL was denied, I wrote an update on the FAHB website explaining what we had been advocating for and why, and shared this across different media streams. The next day one particular newspaper ran with the headline 'Fresh Air Hout Bay fails in bid to close 'smelly factory'[16]. I was furious. Our appeal to the AEL had absolutely nothing to do with closing down the factory and this headline was not only grossly inaccurate but extremely misleading. The article itself was largely correct, comprised predominantly of the FAHB update, but this brief explanation paled in comparison to the glowing headline.

I wrote to the newspaper's editor to raise my concerns. I explained that FAHBs appeal to the AEL was not a bid to shut the factory down, that this had never been on our agenda, and that the headline had been entirely misleading. Considering the sensitivity of the situation and the volatility of Hangberg, I commented that I would reconsider sharing information with them if I could not trust it to be represented correctly. The editor did not like this. While my email had been sharp, it had also been polite, but the response I received was not. In a bullet point e-mail the editor wrote saying they were 'innocent of the serious and unfortunate charges' I had levelled against them, that they 'rejected [my] insults about the [newspaper],' insisting they had covered all sides of the story in a 'fair and balanced way.' He then continued to say that, 'as someone whose family was forcibly removed from what is now the fancy, white part of Hout Bay and dumped in Hangberg, I have an intimate knowledge of the issue. But I have never allowed this to cloud the [newspaper's] coverage.' He said that denying the AEL renewal was basically the same as shutting down the factory and he would continue to cover the topic whether I 'banned' him or not (Media Correspondence, 2018).

Initially I was very surprised by this emotional and defensive response, but when I read the comment about the forced removals, it made more sense. I wondered how 'cloud-free' the newspaper's coverage had really been. In my reply, I highlighted again that the headline was simply inaccurate and provided him with a direct quote from the FAHB update stating, 'In our appeal, FAHB proposed that Oceana's AEL be suspended, and the licence renewal application restarted with an adequate and fair public participation process' (FAHB, 2018b). I

[16] The name of the newspaper has been excluded for ethical reasons.

then explained what the AEL variation was about, the included use of formalin, the on-going health concerns the City was refusing to address, the health information that was being withheld, and the FAHB website where all of this research had already been documented. I said that good journalism would follow up on these issues, not print misleading and provocative information just because it was easy and suited a particular narrative. He replied almost immediately suggesting that we do a 'follow-up piece on the unsatisfactory licensing process and hold council to account. In the process you could reiterate your group has not called for a closure or relocation of the factory, but merely a temporary shutdown' (Media Correspondence, 2018). While I offered my full support for such an article to be written, I never heard from them again. I followed up several times, but nothing more came of it and the newspaper did limited reporting on the topic further.

This issue with the media was not uncommon and it was certainly not limited to this one newspaper alone. Almost all the articles that had come out about the factory had been inaccurate or misleading in one way or another. As discussed in Chapter 6, when the proposed closure of the factory had happened, a top journalist from Fin24 had printed an article calling FAHB the 'champagne and caviar crowd' (Fin24, 2015b). The article was based solely on the press release from COSATU and they had made no attempt to contact FAHB to investigate the situation. The journalist happened to be a friend of mine – I had studied development and political theatre with his brother at university and, knowing that we shared a general political and socio-economic perspective, I couldn't believe he had written such a biased article. When I called him, he apologised immediately, saying he had only 15 minutes to go to print, as was generally the case, and there was no time to thoroughly investigate different issues. This problem never went away and when I could, I actually started getting journalists to send me the article before it went to print so I could correct their errors. The fact that many of them did speaks to just how inexperienced they were.

I often lamented at the lack of good journalism, particularly investigative journalism. I contacted a journalist from the Mail and Guardian several times, having long conversations about the importance of the topic, and did two separate video interviews with Carte Blanche, but nothing was ever pursued. It always seemed like the media was more concerned about churning out easy stories with catchy headlines that provoked debate and sparked conflict, rather than doing the research required to investigate situations, look at the broader sustainability issues, and hold people to account for the actions they were taking. This, in turn, influenced the way that the broader public considered the situation and demonstrates how the media has the power to influence consciousness and shape political beliefs and ideologies, particularly through the use of 'us' and 'them' descriptions (Van Dijk, 2003; Miller *et al.*, 2006; Pettit, 2010).

While the AEL appeal had been denied by the City, the Eden District Municipality (EDM) had taken a different approach for a similar issue around the same time. The EDM had chosen to 'uphold the Constitutional right of the community to clean air' when it refused to renew the AEL for Southern Cape Fish Meal in Mossdustria, near Mossel Bay. EDM made this decision after conducting a comprehensive public participation process following a renewal

application from the fishmeal factory. They concluded that the factory had not taken reasonable steps to prevent odour emissions, 'as evidenced by the amount and degree of on-going complaints received' (Mossel Bay Advertiser, 2018). In addition, the Municipality did not support the renewal of the AEL because of the 'negative impact on investment and economic growth' (Mossel Bay Advertiser, 2018) in Mondustria and the greater Mossel Bay area. FAHB submitted this information to the City asking how such a different decision could be taken for such a similar case. They responded by saying that the cases were very different and that 'strictly off the record' the Mossel Bay Local Municipality did not support the AEL renewal application because of land-use planning contraventions and the matter had been taken on review in the High Court by the owners of the factory, noting that it would be 'an interesting one to watch' (City Health Correspondence, 2018b).

Social unrest once again overwhelmed Hout Bay in August 2018 when a fisherman disappeared one weekend. While allegedly fishing illegally, the fisherman jumped overboard when an anti-poaching task team intercepted him and two others on the boat. Hangberg residents believed the fisherman had been shot and killed (News24, 2018), yet another indication of unjust police violence prevalent in the community. The following day, large groups of protesters gathered in the harbour burning tyres and boats and the situation quickly escalated with multiple buildings being set alight, including a building owned by DAFF, the residential home of a DAFF employee, and a fish factory storeroom, not owned by but adjacent to, the Oceana factory (Cape Times, 2018b). Emergency services were called to the scene and while the situation was abated briefly, protesters gathered again later that evening and looted the Hout Bay Market. The following day tensions sparked again, with protestors setting alight the fish factory storeroom for a second time. Eventually tensions dissipated and normality returned to Hout Bay later that week. The body of the fisherman was never found and the issue of poaching remains a contentious issue within the community, as evidenced by the protests and incidents that have continued since. This incident again points to how Hangberg used protest action as a form of resistance to their on-going sense of marginalisation.



Figure 7.7: Images of fires in the harbour and a factory storeroom set alight during protests

By October 2018, the City of Cape Town denied FAHB's request for the AEL on the grounds that 'the records contain trade secrets, financial and commercial information relating to the business of [Lucky Star Ltd.]' and that they were mandated to protect commercial information, particularly if the disclosure of information 'would be likely to cause harm to the commercial or financial interests of that third party' (City of Cape Town, 2018a). FAHB submitted an appeal to this decision in November 2018 arguing that: the public has a Constitutional right to know industries' impacts on health and the environment, and to monitor compliance with the conditions of operation; the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) determined that all environmental licences should be made available to the public automatically, including AELs; and that the denial to disclose the AEL is in contravention to this objective and can be considered as a failure on the part of government to ensure transparency in environmental governance (FAHB, 2018d). In January 2019, the

City agreed to provide a redacted copy of the AEL to FAHB, which was never received and to which FAHB did not follow up (PAIA Correspondence, 2019).

7.4. 2019

In February 2019, Oceana surprisingly did not resume production. By March there were rumours that the factory had shut down and while neither the City nor Oceana were able to give official comment, they confirmed that production was not set to resume and that a labour process had been started with the employees. They further commented that no official announcement would be made until after the national elections.

Also in February 2019, construction unexpectedly started on one of the plots of land earmarked for housing development – the same plot of land that had been the focus of the health risk assessment in 2014 and again in 2016 (Erf 9652). The construction, however, was not for housing and there was an 'outcry' from the Hangberg community when it was clarified that the land was being developed for an electricity depot (Cape Argus, 2019b). Several residents and local leaders complained there had been no consultation with the community and accused the City of 'not taking housing seriously' saying that 'talks with the City of Cape Town have failed' (Cape Argus, 2019b). The secretary of the HBCA demanded that the project be halted until a 'proper process' was followed and further requested an explanation as to 'how this decision was taken without consultation through a public participation process.' In response, the City's MAYCO Member for Energy and Climate Change, Phindile Maxiti, stated that the land was 'purchased and reserved for the City's Electricity Generation and Distribution Department in December 2016 for the purpose of building a service depot' (Cape Argus, 2019b), information which would have relevance later in the year.

Despite the concerns about housing, the topic wasn't raised again over the following months as all attention focused on the national elections. In early May 2019, the elections took place and while the ANC retained its national majority with the DA second, both parties saw a decline in support. The DA also retained its power to govern the Western Cape, but with a reduced majority of 55.6% compared to 59.4% in 2014. ANC support within the province also declined to 28.5%, down from 32.9% in previous elections, but the EFF saw an increase of support taking it to just above 4%. Voter turnout was around 66%, a 6% decline from the provincial election in 2014 (IEC, 2019; Sunday Times, 2019).

After the elections, still no announcement was made regarding the status of the fishmeal factory, neither by the City nor Oceana. In August 2019, however, the Sentinel newspaper published an article stating that the motion to have Hout Bay harbour developed to create more employment, housing and business opportunities had been approved, following a motion to 're-imagine the Hout Bay harbour' submitted to Sub-Council 16 by the Hout Bay Councillor (Sentinel, 2019b). The motion, including plans to create employment and turn the harbour into a mixed development including housing, training facilities, ocean-economy enterprises, a fish market, and tourism-related businesses, was, according to the PMF,

‘welcomed’ by the Hangberg community who ostensibly ‘offered their full support for the plan’ (Sentinel, 2019b).

By September 2019, the issue of housing development again came to the fore. As background, following the unrest and protests of the ‘Battle of Hangberg’ in 2010 (discussed in Chapter 4), the Hangberg Peace Accord was signed by the PMF, the City, provincial government and SANParks, outlining a clear plan for housing development. Importantly, the Peace Accord specified four plots of land that would be developed for low cost housing and this was made an order by the Western Cape High Court (PMF, 2011). Two plots of land, Erven 9652 and 8474, were part of the first stage of housing development, and the other two, Erven 2697 and 2885, were part of the second stage. In February 2019 it had been announced that Erf 9652 was going to be used for the electricity depot, and in September 2019 it was announced that Erf 8474 was going to be leased to the PMF to be used as a recycling depot (Sentinel, 2019a). Residents in Hangberg did not react well to this news.

Figure 7.8: Map of Hout Bay harbour showing ERF numbers for housing development

Secretary of the HBCA, and long-time opponent of the PMF, said that the land in question was earmarked for housing and believed the City had ‘violated the Municipal Systems Act as

no consultation with residents had taken place before construction went ahead' on Erf 9652. He further said that the HBCA would oppose the intention to lease Erf 8474 to the PMF because 'this land must be used for housing as per the Peace Accord' (Sentinel, 2019a). While the HBCA claimed that the City did not consult with the community, the Hout Bay Councillor claimed the opposite, saying that multiple community meetings had been held to address the ongoing need for housing. He further stated that several pockets of land had been purchased for the intention of building houses, but that some sites were deemed 'unsuitable' due to 'the emissions of the [Oceana] factory' (Sentinel, 2019a). He continued to say that, regarding Erf 8474, using the site as a recycling location served multiple benefits including economic activity for recyclers and a cleaner and less polluted community that often suffered from blocked drains and sewers due to 'irresponsible plastic and other recyclable waste disposal.' He concluded by saying that 'when budget allows' the site could still be considered for future housing (Sentinel, 2019a). The PMF supported the decision for both plots of land wholeheartedly, saying they acknowledged the land was not suitable for housing due to the health risk assessment conducted on Oceana's emissions.

Again, the community did not like this response. A public meeting was held in Hangberg where people expressed their discontent about the land-use decisions and the following day approximately 50 people barricaded the harbour road with building materials to prevent access before attacking the electricity depot construction site and setting a truck on fire. The police moved in, dispersed the crowd for the night, and opened a case of public violence. The following day the protesters returned, lighting fires in the road, vandalising the construction site, stealing tools, and preventing access into the community (Times Live, 2019).

The Hangberg community's malcontent was the direct result of the 'empty promises' provided by the City and their 'failure to deliver on housing commitments' set out in the Peace Accord. As the HBCA Secretary said, 'When we break the accord [by building houses where it is not allowed], authorities are quick to take action against us, but when the City fails to deliver, nothing happens to them.' He further noted that they were told housing development could not take place because of the 'health risks to the community' posed by the emissions from the Oceana fishmeal factory but regarded the City as 'having double standards' (News24, 2019). Following the week-long protest, a Hangberg activist announced that the community would 'take the matter to the Western Cape High Court' based on the City's 'failure to implement the high court order granted in 2011' (Cape Argus, 2019a). In response, the MAYCO member for Energy and Climate Change again insisted that the City was unable to develop the land for housing due to 'various factors' including 'an air-quality study which disallowed residential development' following which the decision was taken to 'release and sell Erf 9652 to the City's electricity generation and distribution department in 2016 for the purpose of building a service depot' (Cape Argus, 2019a).

It took some time for FAHB to source a copy of the health risk assessment (detailed in the Personal Positioning Box below), but when they did, the information was astounding. Since 2014 the City had communicated to FAHB that there were no negative health implications associated with the emissions, but the report said the opposite.

Dated 2014, the report was divided into two sections, 'Output C: Environmental Health Risk Assessment (Report No 051-2014 Rev 2.0)' and 'Output F: Recommendations Report (Report No 052-2014 Rev 1.0)' (Infotox, 2014, see Appendix B).

Output C clarified that the Directorate of Human Settlements had appointed INFOTOX (Pty) Ltd. to conduct an environmental health risk assessment for two proposed housing development plots adjacent to the fishmeal factory (Erven 9652 and 8474), noting that these developments would 'place a large community in very close proximity to hazardous emissions and odours from the plant.' The investigation focused on the emission of hydrogen sulphide (H2S), trimethylamine, particulate matter (PM2.5), and sulphur dioxide (SO2), and the following conclusions are direct excerpts from the report:

- The potential risk of exacerbation of asthma symptoms in asthmatic residents… cannot be excluded, and cannot be viewed as insignificant. This should be indicated as a source of concern, since it is likely that complaints will arise from asthmatic residents;
- 1 in 5 (20%) of the annual cases of bronchitis in children could potentially be related to exposure to PM2.5… The potential occurrence of adverse health effects associated with chronic exposure to PM2.5 cannot be dismissed;
- The human health risks associated with SO2 can be viewed as severe at both sites… This is applicable to lower respiratory tract of asthma symptoms in children and to respiratory hospital admissions in children. The risks are smaller for respiratory hospitalisation in older people, but still unacceptable, even in view of the uncertainties associated with the estimates;
- Regarding SO2 exposure, the daily risks of respiratory effects, including but not limited to the acerbation of asthma, will be unacceptable on probably more than one day per year, particularly for children…. the health effects are likely to be severe enough to require hospitalisation or at least a visit to a doctor or to a hospital emergency room and the frequency of such severe effects is likely to be considerable;
- Exposure to H2S… is of concern with regard to potential difficulties in breathing, irritation of the eyes, headache, and nausea;
- A health outcome is exacerbation of asthma symptoms. Therefore, some people who are asthmatic might experience exacerbation of their symptoms on days of significant exposure to airborne dust from the plant; and
- Regarding bronchitis in children – at one site, up to 21% of the cases of bronchitis could have been avoided (Infotox, 2014).

The report also included the following table highlighting the short- and long-term impacts from exposure to the emissions for PM2.5 (highlights included in copy):

Table 4.2.1: USEPA causality determination on health effects for PM2.5.

Short-term exposure		
Health endpoint	**Causality determination**	**Likely outcome of exposure**
Cardiovascular effects	Causal	Myocardial ischemia[Note 1]
		Congestive heart failure
		Altered vasomotor function[Note 2]
Respiratory effects	Likely to be causal	Alterations in lung function and respiratory symptoms in asthmatic children
		Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease[Note 3]
		Respiratory infections
Mortality	Causal	Cardiovascular and respiratory mortality
Long-term exposure		
Health endpoint	**Causality determination**	**Likely outcome of exposure**
Cardiovascular effects	Causal	Higher blood pressure
		Increased blood coagulation[Note 4]
		Enhanced development of atherosclerosis[Note 5]
		Reduction in heart rate variability
		Increased risk of disease and stroke
Respiratory effects	Likely to be causal	Asthma
		Altered pulmonary function
		Chronic bronchitis
Cancer, mutagenicity, genotoxicity	Suggestive	Lung cancer
Reproductive and developmental	Suggestive	Low birth weight
Mortality	Causal	Cardiovascular mortality, lung cancer mortality and infant mortality due to respiratory causes

Figure 7.9: Copy of health impacts associated with factory emissions

Output F, the recommendations report based on the health risk assessment, noted the following:

- Health risks associated with exposure to emissions from the fishmeal factory would be unacceptable at the proposed housing developments;
- The adverse health effects are likely to be severe enough to require hospitalisation or at least a visit to a doctor or to a hospital emergency room and the frequency of such severe effects is likely to be considerable;
- Due to the unacceptably high health risks estimated from the modelled contaminant concentrations it is recommended that alternative locations be considered for the proposed housing development;
- The issue of noise disturbance is another factor that suggests that alternative locations should be considered for the proposed housing development;
- Odour annoyance affects the quality of life and therefore the social wellbeing dimension of health. Indirect potential health effects may occur as a result of annoyance stress and reduction in the quality of life. Among these are vomiting, headaches and nausea. Irrespective of whether the concentration of an odorous substance is below the level where its toxic properties may cause adverse health effects, if the level of annoyance is reached the social wellbeing of health is compromised;

- The buffer zone between the Lucky Star fishmeal factory and the proposed rental flats is inadequate compared with separation distances between odorous industries and residences documented in literature; and
- In view of unacceptable health risks and expected noise disturbance it is concluded that alternative locations should be considered for the proposed housing development (Infotox, 2014).

The report clearly indicated that there were a variety of health concerns associated with the emissions from Oceana.

Personal Positioning 16: The Health Risk Assessment

When the protest broke out and the information about the health risk assessment surfaced, I was astounded for two reasons.

First, the Hangberg leadership – both the PMF and HBCA – seemed to acknowledge, and have no issue with, the fact that there were indeed health concerns associated with the factory's emissions. This was a radical departure from their earlier convictions that the 'smell hadn't killed anyone' and 'no-one had gotten sick.' This fact had been a central part of their argument and it was surprising, particularly on the part of the PMF, that there was a sudden acceptance that the emissions might in fact be dangerous. They didn't question the validity of this information at all, they simply accepted, after years of advocating the opposite, that there had actually been a real concern.

Second, I was even more astounded by the response from the City. For years they had denied the validity of any health concerns and they had systematically supported this position through their communication. They had repeatedly said that the emissions posed no health concerns and even when FAHB had raised these concerns through the public participation process for Oceana's new AEL (that included the use of formalin), they had said that no statistical evidence existed to support our claims. They had sent me a number of emails directly saying that no health concerns existed and that housing would continue, and yet now they were saying the exact opposite. They had also sent me a redacted version of the health risk assessment that said there were no health implications. On top of this, they were now implying that they had known about these health implications as far back as 2016 when they had decided to reallocate the land-use away from housing. How could they support two completely different positions and what was the truth about the health impact of the emissions?

I didn't know how to make sense of this, nor how to find out any more information, until I received an interesting call late one night in October 2019. By this stage I had conducted most of the interviews with members of the Hangberg community for this thesis, trying to understand their positions about the factory and what would happen next in the harbour. One of the people I had interviewed was the activist quoted in the paper as saying they were

taking the City to court over failing to adhere to the Peace Accord. This same activist now called me to ask if I had any information or official documentation from the City claiming that there was no health concern. He was trying to argue that the City had blatantly manipulated information by telling the Hangberg community that housing development couldn't take place because of the health implications from the emissions, yet at the same time was telling FAHB that no health implications existed. He also told me that they were in the final stages of preparing their court order against the City, which included a full, un-redacted copy of the health risk assessment. So we decided to do an exchange: I would provide him with the information the City had given me, and he would give me a copy of the report.

When I went through that report for the first time, I could barely believe what I was reading: it was damning.

I sat with the report for a long time, reading it over and over again to make sure I had understood it correctly. Could it really be true? The report meant that since 2014 – the same time FAHB started raising its concerns – the City had been fully aware of the negative health impact of the emissions. This meant that they had allowed the factory to continue production for five years, knowing full well the health difficulties they were imparting to the local community. Since the beginning they had undermined my argument about the odour's impact on social wellbeing, saying this had never been proven and was highly subjective, and yet here it was in black and white – using the same WHO quote I had used in my letters to the City to justify my concerns.

It also meant that the City had systematically and blatantly lied, insisting there were no health impacts when in fact a full report documented the exact opposite. Every single City representative involved in the situation – from the City Health representatives, to the MAYCO Member for Health, to the MAYCO Member for Safety and Security, to the Housing Department, to the Hout Bay Councillor – had maintained the position that the emissions posed no harm throughout the whole period of the factory's proposed closure and during the public participation process for the renewal of the AEL. I considered the possibility that the City representatives just didn't know about the report, but this seemed implausible – the report had been mentioned numerous times in the media, had been requested by both FAHB and the HBCA, and had come up in countless meetings and engagements. If they didn't know about the report, then they had failed in their duty to be aware of the concerns of the residents, particularly when the residents themselves had referred to the report so many times. My only conclusion was that the City had multiple opportunities to explain and share this information and yet had systematically and intentionally hidden it from the public domain.

Now, it is also important to understand these results in context. The health risk assessment had been conducted for land practically adjacent to the factory and most residential structures were not in such close proximity to the factory itself. It was reasonable to assume that the impacts from the emissions would be less the further away from the factory they were experienced, and indeed, the City frequently used this argument. But even if the

impacts were less, the factory was in the middle of a vibrant social landscape – within a 300m radius there was both a major primary and high school, two early childhood development centres, a clinic, three churches, a mosque, a community centre, a library, and countless homes and residential units. While the severity of the impacts described in the health risk assessment might not be applicable to everyone, the very same symptoms had been documented by residents throughout Hout Bay, and it was plainly evident that the emissions had a negative health impact on the community.

My respect and belief in the City as a competent institution had already diminished significantly over the years, but this was the final straw.

I then began to think back to the redacted version of the health risk assessment I had obtained in 2017. How could it be that these reports gave such radically different conclusions? The report that I had, had been redacted with large patches of grey, making it impossible to read in its entirety. At first, I assumed that it was this detail of health information that had been redacted, but the more I looked at it, the more it just didn't make sense. So I decided to phone Infotox and see if they could shed any light. Completely by coincidence, the person who answered the phone was the author of the report. I explained the situation and queried how the conclusions could be so different, and he asked which of the two reports I referring to. When I didn't understand, he explained that he had written two reports – one report for Erven 9652 and 8474 conducted in 2014, and another report for Erven 2697 and 2885, conducted in 2017.

Up until this point I had assumed that only one health risk assessment had been conducted – there was no indication a second had existed and nothing had been reported in the media about these other two erven. I then realised what the City had done. Erven 2697 and 2885 were plots of land further away from the factory, thus it was likely the emissions would have less of an impact. Even though I had requested the health risk assessment for Erven 9652 and 8474, and specifically detailed this in my request, they had given me the report for the other erven because (which I confirmed with Infotox during the call), quite simply, it looked better. Knowing that I had no knowledge of the existence of two reports, I couldn't possibly have known the difference. It was then no wonder that they tried to claim the report contained 'sensitive' information about housing – they were deliberately trying to hide the fact that they had given me the report for the wrong erven. With all the detail about the erven redacted, there was no way of knowing that this had never been the report I had requested.

The insinuation from the Hangberg activist had been entirely correct: the City had been manipulating information, providing different stories to different groups of people to achieve their own objectives.

Once I realised what had happened, I suddenly understood why everyone from the City had declined to be interviewed for this thesis. City Health declined 'given the sensitivities in the City surrounding the issue' (City Health Correspondence, 2019), and when I asked for further information about this, I did not receive another response.

Alderman JP Smith, MAYCO Member for Social Services, declined on the basis that he was no longer in this role and when I clarified that I was looking at the historical context, when he was the Member, he asked for the interview questions to be sent through. I supplied the overview information about my research and provided a broad set of four questions pertaining to his involvement, the decision-making processes, the role of civil society in decision making, and his reflections on the dynamics within Hout Bay, explaining that these were themes I was exploring but was hoping to have a conversation to unpack them further. He replied to two questions, both answers under 35 words and offering no substance, simply stating that it was national government who set the emissions limits, and with 'see above' to the final two questions (Smith, 2019). When I responded saying this was not what I was looking for, he replied with 'there is simply too much happening right now' and suggested I contact him after the national elections (Smith, 2019). When I did contact him again after the elections, I was not surprised that I did not get a response.

The Housing Directorate did not respond to my request for an interview at all and when I called to follow up, I was assured that someone would get back to me but they never did. The same was true for Marga Haywood, the Hout Bay Councillor at the time of the proposed closure. I sent several emails that I never got a response to, nor did she answer any of my calls or messages.

The only City representative that did agree to an interview was Rob Quintas, the current Hout Bay Councillor. While he consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage, throughout the interview he too suggested that all the decision-making power lay with national government and could not comment on anything that had transpired before his time in office – including the health risk assessment. His other comments have been included in the analysis that follows.

Oceana's representatives also declined to be interviewed. The former Production Manager at the factory up until 2017 said that he was 'not comfortable to be interviewed,' and Lucky Star's Managing Director declined commenting on the 'sensitive nature of the matter' but would reconsider at a later stage. When I spoke to him again in 2020, he entertained some discussion through a telephonic conversation but expressed that he did not wish to participate in the research process any further. The only Oceana representative who did agree to be interviewed was the former site manager, and his reflections have been included throughout.

By the end of the year, still no public announcement had been given by either Oceana or the City regarding the status of operations at the fishmeal factory. The only information available was in Oceana's 2019 Annual Report that noted 'a strategic decision was taken to close the Hout Bay fishmeal operations' owing to 'economic viability' (Oceana Group, 2019:17,23). They stated that the closure directly impacted 58 employees, 40 of which were redeployed in other areas within Oceana. The same report also says that, reflecting the 'strong commitment of Oceana's leadership to delivering a societal purpose' a multi-million

Rand investment has been developed in collaboration with the Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries (DEFF), to establish the Oceana Maritime Academy in Hout Bay (Oceana Group, 2019:25).

7.5. 2020

By February 2020 still no public announcement had been made by either the City or Oceana, but over the first weekend of the month, a large crane arrived at the factory and began to dismantle one of the stacks and parts of the roof. FAHB contacted Oceana and through an informal conversation with the Managing Director, the information from the annual report was confirmed. The factory had indeed been closed and operations had been consolidated in Saldanha Bay. Over the next few months, plant equipment would be systematically moved out of the space, as had been seen by the dismantling of the first stack, and the area would go through a general clean up.

Figure 7.10: The roof removed at the Oceana factory and stack about to be dismantled

Oceana explained that 58 employees had been directly impacted, 40 of which had been deployed into other areas of the company. It is important to note the sharp decline of employment over the years: in 2014 Oceana employed 102 land-based employees (Oceana, 2014); at the time of the proposed closure, this had declined to 91 employees (Oceana, 2015b); and by the time of the factory's closure this had declined to 58 (Oceana Group, 2019), almost half the numbers from only five years earlier. Oceana explained that since 2016, various staff had left and had not been replaced, which accounted for the 62% decline in employment numbers since the proposed closure. All staff were paid for 2019 while the

labour negotiations for the closure had taken place, and they had been exposed to other areas of the company. Those who did not want to move agreed to severance packages (Telephone Correspondence, 2020).

When asked why the decision to close was made in 2019, when the AEL had just been renewed in 2018, Oceana indicated that there had been a variety of reasons including changes to the TAC regulations and changes within the AEL that made it 'not practical or sustainable' to continue operations (Telephone Correspondence, 2020). They also commented that their five-year lease was coming to an end in 2020. They did not know what direction any new development would take, commenting that it was 'entirely up to DPW' and that there was 'no transparency from them' on what this development might be. While he expressed that there was certainly opportunity in the harbour, 'implementation leaves much to be desired' (Telephone Correspondence, 2020). He reaffirmed Oceana's commitment to the community, however, saying while it had been a 'tough decision marking the end of an era for the fishing company,' Oceana would continue to support the community by establishing the Oceana Maritime Academy, commenting that further announcements would be made about this later in the year.

FAHB posted an updated on their website providing an overview of this information, commenting it would likely be their last update. They thanked the community for their support over the years, and appreciated how difficult this journey had been and how it had impacted many people within the community. In their concluding remarks, FAHB hoped that any development plan going forward would focus on ensuring the local community had greater access to development opportunities and encouraged people to support a sustainable plan within their constituencies (FAHB, 2020).

There was some discussion on social media when FAHB posted the final update, but nothing like what there had been in the past. Some people commented that it was a positive development for the community as a whole, while others commented that it was a sad loss to the community and expressed concern over being excluded from the new development. But the conversation quickly abated and it didn't surface again.

For all intents and purposes, the story of the fishmeal factory in Hout Bay had finally come to an end.

Personal Positioning 17: The End of the Story

When I saw that stack being dismantled from the factory, it really was a surreal feeling. I couldn't believe that after all these years the story had finally come to an end. And what a story it had been. There was an odd bitter-sweetness to it all – a sense of relief and finality that the work of FAHB had been completed, but at the same time, the story of the factory had defined so much of my life, from my personal experience to living in Hout Bay all the way to writing this thesis, and just like that it was all over. It was a difficult feeling to make sense of, in much the same way that I imagine those people working at the factory felt.

It was interesting to speak to the Managing Director from Oceana. Our conversation was frank and as open as it could be, and while he didn't want to participate in a full interview for this research, he was willing to have a decent conversation over the phone, and for his views to be included in this research, and I appreciated what I felt to be honesty in a lot of his comments.

It was also strange to post that final FAHB update. I spent a lot of time working on the exact wording – I wanted to express my relief at the situation being over, but also wanted to respect the weight of everything that had happened. When I posted the update on HBO and other sites, I simply conveyed the facts: it was confirmed the factory was closed, a development plan was being considered, and this would offer opportunity for growth and development within the community. This post garnered relatively little comment with some people thanking us for our work, but most commenting on what the new development would be and how it would work. I was a surprised at how little this had provoked people but thought, just maybe, people had eased up on the issue even slightly.

And then I saw the other post.

One of the FAHB organisers, thinking I would somehow 'forget' to post on HBO, decided that he would make a post himself (something which I had discouraged everyone from doing in the past so that I could control FAHB's narrative carefully). Instead of simply providing the facts he wrote 'The long and winding road has finally come to an end. The fishmeal factory is closed, its air pollution has ceased: A new chapter for Hout Bay can begin!' While my post generated about 20 reactions and 40 comments on HBO, his post generated 186 reactions and 147 comments. The usual battle began again – some people argued that the new development offered a great opportunity for growth and employment, while others mourned the loss of jobs and the impact this would have on the community. The conversation immediately became about the smell and how that was the reason for the closure, how Hout Bay was a fishing village and people should've known this before they moved here, that no-one had ever died. This turned the conversation into race, with people calling some 'ignorant' and others 'heartless,' some saying it was another indication of rich whites running the show while others said it was another indication of gentrification. Eventually the author of the post (who, when he saw the comments, decided simply to ignore them) eventually edited his wording, asking people to simply read the article instead.

This was exactly the problem with the Valley residents I had experienced all along – they were so caught up in their own reality, their own bubble of privilege, that they were almost completely disconnected to a large part of the society around them. They paid almost no attention to how their words and actions might be perceived, or the impact they may have, as if there could be no other position than their own. To me this represented the deeply structural issue of white privilege and it seemed impossible to overcome.

It was so frustrating. For a brief moment I thought I had helped to achieve some kind of level-headedness about the whole situation but this just reminded me how volatile

everything was and how people were so readily provoked when it came to these systemic issues. I reflected on how easy it was for communication to go wrong, how people so quickly fought and attacked rather than discussing or actually reading the article. It seemed like most people weren't really interested in understanding what was going on, they just wanted to complain about it on Facebook, and to voice what they didn't want rather than having any form of constructive conversation about what was possible.

It was also frustrating because I was sitting on all the health risk information and could have, at any point, gone public about the findings, finally proving to people that there had in fact been real health concerns all along. But I knew this wasn't the platform to do it on – people would have rejected the information immediately and it would have started a fight, rather than legitimately holding the City to account for what they had done.

When everything went back to its usual calm, it really made me reflect on what my role should be from now on. On the one hand I felt like I had been true to the commitments I had made to myself and others – I had spent the better part of six years researching and engaging and participating, making a concerted effort to contribute meaningfully to the discourse about the factory. The issue was now done and I had every right to say that I was done too. But on the other hand, this issue had opened up a whole set of other issues, and didn't I now have a responsibility to see it through to the next stage? Wasn't I well positioned within the community, both through my advocacy and my research, to help bring people together to influence whatever comes next? And if I had been requesting a sustainable development plan for the harbour, shouldn't I continue with that effort until the end? If I didn't, did this mean it had actually just been about the smell all along? It was easy to get lost in this rabbit hole of questions. All I knew was that the work of FAHB was done and time would tell what more was yet to come.

7.6. Analysis: The Final Decision Made

Through the events that transpired, two things are apparent: first, that government worked with business to secure their interests, at the direct expense of the public who elected them, and through deliberately concealing and lying about harmful health information. Second, the current systems of democracy and participation can be seen as ineffective and largely exclude the voice of civil society and local communities. One of the key principles in democracy is participation – that all groups have the right to have their voices heard in the democratic process (Southall, 2003). But by examining the events that took place from 2016 – 2020 and reflecting on the complexity of relationships, the lack of transparency, and the limited ability of media to scrutinise governance, particularly local government, it is evident that large sectors had, and continue to have, their voices excluded from the discourse, and that the democratic systems in place are largely inefficient.

Throughout the history of this case study, it is evident that different power mechanisms were used to maintain the status quo, including economic dependency, deliberately depoliticising the issue, and cultural hegemony (as discussed in Chapter 5). When a conflict

did eventually occur in the form of the proposed closure, it brought to light the coalition that existed between government and big capital, and how this urban regime took the form of a rent-seeking cabal that served their broader interests of governance (as discussed in Chapter 6). This analysis will again focus on the main actors, reflecting on how they responded during this time, the power mechanisms they used, and the interests they hoped to secure by doing this.

7.6.1. Oceana and Government

7.6.1.1. From Avoidance to Repression

Throughout this thesis it has been clear that government has been represented in two forms: national government and the City of Cape Town. It is important to note that, considering their jurisdiction over the harbours, national government was obviously involved in the final decision regarding the closure of the factory but they did not have any visible presence throughout the course events from 2016-2020. Instead, the City of Cape Town played a more visible role.

Chapter 5 discussed at length how the City used various forms of power, particularly hidden and invisible power, to depoliticise the issue and prevent it from entering into the decision-making arena. By controlling information, limiting communication and engagement, and using their authority and influence to contain the discourse, the City was able to successfully avoid having to deal with the issue as a whole. This same behaviour was seen again during 2016-2020, although it was further evident that they began to repress information as well.

While the City did initially increase its number of monitoring events and provided more communication to the complainants than they had done in the past, this did not add any real value. All the correspondence from the City contained the usual rhetoric, that they were monitoring the situation, the factory was the best in the country, there were no health impacts, it was in the hands of national government, etc. This language repeated itself in various forms through all the letters and discussions held with the City, in a never-ending circular argument that made it difficult for efforts to gain traction, and thus impossible to progress in resolving the situation. They avoided the concerns raised during the public participation process, they avoided the topic of health and wellbeing, they avoided taking responsibility for community meetings - the City simply avoided the situation until it went away. Even when it was finally decided that the factory would shut down, the City avoided that too, offering no comment or information to the broader community as to what had happened, despite it being such a prevalent topic in the community.

This avoidance tactic was not unfamiliar. As one respondent said, ‘The City doesn’t want to take responsibility. They want to sit back and blame everyone else for what’s going on’ (Community Leader 4, 2019). Some respondents felt the City didn’t engage because they had something to hide, and as one commented, ‘If you have nothing to hide, why wouldn’t you hold a meeting? [The City] won’t have those meetings because there are too many

unanswered questions from the community they don't want to answer. They use this as a tactic to avoid having to answer them' (Community Leader 1, 2019). Another felt the avoidance of issues stemmed from a general lack of vision, that the City 'doesn't have a plan nor a vision of what should happen next, so they end up not doing anything' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019). Whether intentional or not, all respondents agreed that the delay tactics made it incredibly difficult for meaningful engagement to occur.

By behaving in this way, the City was able to keep the community at large ignorant about the decisions that were affecting them and unaware of the issues that harmed them, a clear demonstration of how they used manipulation as a form of domination (Lukes, 1974; Anciano and Piper, 2019).

7.6.1.2. Ineffective Spaces for Democratic Participation

Another major challenge to participation was the inability to access and engage effectively in democratic spaces. Using the distinction between spaces as discussed in Chapter 3, it is evident that there were many 'closed' spaces for decision-making, that the 'invited' spaces simply didn't exist or were largely ineffective, and as such, the less powerful actors (such as FAHB) were forced to 'claim' or 'create' spaces for engagement to occur, even though this too was limited (Gaventa, 2006).

When the idea of spaces was discussed with the Hout Bay Councillor, he commented that it was 'hard to say' what the spaces for engagement were when it came to the factory but reassured that 'whenever complaints came to me they were sent to the relevant department, who would immediately reply with an often technical and lengthy response that may not be easily digested in layman's terms' (City Representative, 2019). While the Councillor had indeed been more proactive that other City officials, this highlights that there is a dependency on the character of the councillor rather than a formality in their role in terms of making spaces accessible (Piper and Deacon, 2009). And the notion that the information was 'not easily digested in layman's terms' is patronising – the information was understood, it simply didn't address the concerns that had been raised.

It is evident that FAHB largely claimed or created their own space for engagement to occur, as discussed earlier, and while this space was somewhat effective, it is important to note that other community members resented having to create spaces for engagement at all. As one respondent commented, 'The City is supposed to be a service to residents but they don't consult – why is there a need for you and I to form an organisation in order to engage in the first place? People are told that you need to be part of an organisation… you can't just raise your concerns and expect to have them heard' (Community Leader 4, 2019). This comment highlights that the spaces for engagement were limited, accompanied with a sense that if civil society did not create their own space to engage, they may never engage at all.

It is also evident that the 'invited' spaces were largely ineffective, as seen most notably with the public participation process surrounding the AEL renewal.

The South African government defines public participation as a process whereby legislatures 'consult with the people or interested or affected individuals, organisations and government entities before making a decision' and is broadly understood as a 'two-way communication and collaborative problem solving mechanism with the goal of achieving representative and more acceptable decisions' (Legislative Sector South Africa, 2013:7). Recognising that public participation is a fundamental dimension of democracy (Southall, 2003), public participation processes are intended to be an 'open, accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities can exchange views and influence decision-making' (Anciano and Piper, 2019:37). When reflecting on the public participation process for the AEL, it is evident that none of these aspirations were attained.

According to Chapter 4 of the Municipal Systems Act, representations made by the public during a participation process should be meaningful and include the raising of objections, public meetings, consultative sessions, and report-backs where appropriate (Government Gazette, 2000). The City argued that they had fulfilled their obligation to notify the public of the application through two newspaper advertisements, and had invited objections to the application through the EAP. A comment procedure, however, is supposed to ensure that the public can *meaningfully* engage in order to materially affect the outcome of their decision (Werksman, 2006). This means that the City was obligated to do more than just place adverts and collect responses – they were obligated to actually consider the objections received. In this way, neither PBPS, Oceana, nor the City, meaningfully engaged or applied their minds to the public participation process, flouting their democratic duties in the process. In addition, the act of 'participation' in the process was that the EAP provided generic and repetitive responses to the objections raised, thus the public participation process would never have been able to influence the outcome of the decision. The entire process was meaningless and contrary to PAJA and the Municipal Systems Act, and should have been more engaging and thorough to reasonably consider all the views of the stakeholders. This indicates there is a problem with the law – there is no guarantee that meaningful participation will occur without accountability and currently, this discretion rests on public officials. The officials in this case were clearly involved in an urban governance regime with Oceana, as discussed in Chapter 6, and thus used the democratic process of public participation to suit their own interests.

Many respondents felt this was common practice, noting that 'participation and consultation simply doesn't happen' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019). As one community leader commented, 'The City just wants to tick the box – it's a matter of process rather than impact. There's no interest in developing the community, no sense of empowerment. Politicians need to put more effort into what they're doing and not just be focused on ticking the boxes' (Community Activist 2, 2019). Another commented that:

> *Public participation is not just putting an advert into a newspaper, but that's what they do, that's what the City does. When you try and challenge this, they treat you as if you don't know what you're talking about, you don't know what the process is. As if you are the stupid one. It's quite patronising. And then they go into their private*

rooms and they make a decision about something, but they make sure all the boxes are ticked. It is the responsibility of those in charge that those people running the process actually come out, explain, and engage with the people affected by what is happening. But that just doesn't happen. (Community Leader 4, 2019)

The idea that public participation in South Africa is seriously flawed is by no means new. Research has shown that public participation has been limited to once-off meetings or simple procedural steps, indicating there is 'no space in these processes of decision-making for meaningful public input' (Anciano and Piper, 2019:37). This illustrates that public participation processes are extremely limited and do not serve to strengthen the democratic voice.

7.6.1.3. The City's Abuse of Power

It is evident that the City used avoidance tactics and limited the scope of participation within democratic spaces to continuously depoliticise the issue and prevent it from reaching the decision-making agenda. However, the City went far beyond avoidance and directly into the realm of repression of information. This is most clearly demonstrated in the City's cover-up of the findings from the health risk assessment. It is event that the City's attempts to hide the results of the health risk assessment were systematic and deliberate: by controlling the information, they were able to control the decisions and actions of groups within society, thus pursuing their own development objectives.

How was this done?

As discussed in Chapter 6, it is suggested that a type of rent-seeking cabal (Heller, Mukhopadhyay and Walton, 2016) existed between government and big capital to control governance of the harbours. National government had strong relationships with Oceana, and worked with them to ensure the control of the harbour, thus offering national government harbour and sea-rental. While it was evident that the City was also complicit, at the time it was not clear why. The cover-up of the health findings, however, and the subsequent development on land previously allocated for housing, indicate that the City was interested in securing land-rentals for the property surrounding the harbour.

As also discussed in Chapter 6, it was no secret that the Western Cape Government, and the City of Cape Town in particular, had wanted to pursue the development of the harbours for a long time, recognising the potential of tourism to the economic growth of the City, and the political tension this would cause for its ANC rivals. While the intergovernmental dispute had not yet been resolved and the City did not yet control the harbour, they operated with the expectation that they someday would, and thus it was logical to systematically develop the land around the harbour that they did control.

But the City was conflicted: while they wanted to pursue these interests, they also needed to provide housing to Hangberg, which itself was already long overdue. The problem was that Hangberg was on prime land offering some of the most dramatic views in Hout Bay, and

serious potential for economic expansion. This had already been seen with the attempt to auction Sentinel Mountain in 2010 and the enormous support it garnered. If the City were to develop the land for low-cost housing, this would hinder their plans for a new development. As one respondent commented, 'When they chucked our people off the land [during the forced removals] and put us in the corner, they weren't really thinking – they chucked us onto the most valuable piece of land in Hout Bay. So why would they want to build on the most valuable land for poor people who aren't worth a damn?' (Community Activist 2, 2019).

To overcome this dilemma, the City used the information from the health risk assessment to control the development of land around the harbour. While they essentially agreed with FAHB that the factory was not conducive to development, releasing the health information would either mean that the factory would have to shut down, or that housing development would have to stop, both of which would anger the already volatile Hangberg community. As such, they publicly announced that there were no health risks and consistently delayed any efforts to either provide evidence to or obtain information on the impacts experienced. They even maintained this position during the public participation process when the use of formalin was to be introduced, again disregarding the health concerns cited by the community. In this way, civil society was not able to gain enough traction to effectively take action.

Behind the scenes, however, they used the evidence from the health risk assessment to change the land-use allocation and to ensure that housing development on those particular plots did not take place. They secured this agreement by working with the community institution they had already helped establish and largely controlled – the PMF – to ensure their interests were pursued. They only revealed the results of the health risk assessment once those agreements had already been confirmed and construction had already started to take place and even then, the City never actually *revealed* the information, they commented on it as if it had simply been common knowledge all along and they had never said anything to the contrary.

In short, the City used its power to control the discourse, manipulated different sectors of society despite the social division this caused, and disregarded the voices of civil society groups in order to secure land-rentals aligned with their own development interests.

This did not come as a surprise to many respondents. 'There is so much that goes on without any of us ever knowing, but nothing adds up. It's all corrupt,' commented one respondent (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019). Others agreed, with the caveat that corruption in this instance was not the kind pertaining to service delivery or the more common issues of corruption in the country, but rather the direct manipulation of the public by the state using democratic processes. Hangberg respondents felt the most strongly about this with one saying, 'politicians talk – they say one thing but what they do is a totally different thing' (Community Leader 4, 2019), while another said bluntly, 'They lie, they all lie. They promise you a lot of stuff but mostly they don't provide' (Community Leader 3, 2019). A third respondent commented, using the example of the electricity depot, that the City was 'using

the PMF to implement their political agenda' and they were 'playing a political game' at the expense of the community (Community Activist 1, 2019).

As one community respondent said, 'This whole situation demonstrated that the City is fundamentally disingenuous. It shows that they were intentionally misleading the Hangberg community and the greater Hout Bay community. And for what? So they can build the nice waterfront they've always wanted and bit by bit start to push this community out. They have a hell of a lot to answer for' (Community Activist 2, 2019).

7.6.1.4. Development of the Harbour and Fear of Gentrification

The failure to develop the harbour has always been difficult to understand. While development plans have come up at various points over the past decade, nothing has ever materialised, and when and by whom a decision will be made remains unclear.

One of the first development plans seems to have surfaced in 2013 when a company named Delta developed a draft proposal after being commissioned by national DPW. The plan was comprehensive, offering a spatial and economic development framework for the harbour that included two options: the 'limited' plan that proposed to incorporate activities around the fishmeal factory; and the 'optimistic development' that completely reconfigured land-use in the harbour and proposed an integrated development without the factory (Delta, 2013). The proposal was presented at a closed meeting in Hangberg and a City official attending the meeting wrote:

> *Seems that no financial modelling has taken place as yet and this the next phase. The need to get local and provincial buy-in at a politically level was discussed. Seems that the officials of DAFF/Public Works have been told that they wd get comments from officials which wd be incorporated into the report but that final version wd not be released until the Minister had approved the doc. It was explained that this was the problem with the previous report which did not see the light of day for 4 years and that they needed to engage with Province and the City of Cape Town at a political level as well as comments from officials had no status. We shall see!* (City of Cape Town Correspondence, 2013)

This development plan would befall the same ill-fated death of its apparent predecessor, never to see the light of day again. It seemed that development of the harbour was divided into two camps: plans developed nationally and plans developed locally.

Nationally, in 2014 Operation Phakisa was launched, an initiative to fast track the implementation of solutions on critical development issues (Department of Planning, 2014). With a results-driven approach involving setting clear plans and targets, Operation Phakisa focused on 'bringing key stakeholders together from the public and private sectors, academia and civil society organisations to collaborate' in problem analysis, priority setting, and delivery (Vision2030, 2015). For all intents and purposes, it seemed that Operation Phakisa intended to employ the principles of sustainability. By 2015, specific plans had been

developed for the revitalisation of small-harbours, with the oceans economy being a priority sector. The plans focused of four critical sectors within the oceans economy: marine transport and manufacturing, offshore oil and gas exploration, aquaculture, and marine protection services and ocean governance. For small harbours, the plan was focused primarily on advancing small-scale fishers and exploring opportunities for aqua farming (Department of Planning, 2014). Hout Bay was considered to be a 'priority project' (Global Africa Network, 2017) where R14.4 million was allocated for repairs, upgrades, dredging, and security and DPW insinuated they had a plan that would bring between 1,700 - 2,300 jobs to Hout Bay but no details about the so-called 'briefing document' were ever made available (Sunday Times, 2018). Coega Development Corporation (CDC) was contracted as the implementing agent of DPW and while 14 sunken vessels were removed from Hout Bay harbour (Coeaga, 2018), little more was completed. By the end of 2018, the Khoisan Defiance Campaign tried to call DPW to task, stating that 'little [was] known to local people and businesses were being sidelined' by CDC (Sentinel, 2018) and by 2019, the implementation of Operation Phakisa had 'averted significant progress' (Dyer, 2019).

Locally, development plans didn't make much progress either. In 2016, the Hout Bay Partnership would commission a plan to 'Re-Imagine Hout Bay Harbour,' similarly suggesting a reconfiguration of the land-use that excluded the factory, and instead offering a more integrated development model (Hout Bay Partnership, 2016a). While this plan was firmly grounded in the principles of sustainable development, it too disappeared somewhere into the depths of government. In 2017, a group of local community activists put together a harbour development plan titled 'Thriving Harbour 2030' with a specific focus on the Hangberg section of the harbour. This plan, proposing an integration of fishing activities with tourism-related activities, was predominantly focused on unifying Hangberg and opening up the community to its socio-economic potential while addressing long standing social issues (Thriving Harbour 2030, 2017). This plan too would just 'disappear' (Hout Bay Civil Society 3, 2019). Then in 2019, the Hout Bay Councillor announced his intentions to, once again, 're-imagine the Hout Bay Harbour' and was pursuing this through the sub-council (Sentinel, 2019b).

The existence of all these plans demonstrates that there was a clear intention for harbour development to occur, both from the community and different spheres of government, yet nothing ever transpired. This supports the assertion made in Chapter 6 that national government was involved in a rent-cabal with the fishing industry, and was primarily interested in extracting rentals from the harbour rather than ensuring local development actually took place. While the local community was actively trying to pursue development that brought benefits to the community, the decisions made instead centred around political parties, and political and business networks, rather than meeting the socio-economic needs of the local community or ensuring its further development. One respondent commented, 'it's all just a game of power and politics' (Community Activist 2, 2019).

And it mostly was.

The rivalry between the ANC and the DA, both to secure votes and gain control of the harbour, was plainly evident and both entities used their power to delay development in some form to suit their own needs. As discussed in Chapter 6, it was evident that national government was interested in sea-rentals secured through the harbours, while this chapter indicates that local government was more interested in land-rentals. The Hout Bay Councillor explained that national DPW was prepared to give control of the harbours to the municipal authorities, but not the funding to manage it, and the municipalities were not resourced themselves to take this on. The idea was to 'put in place a service level agreement where the municipality would take over the harbour with the budget set by the national minister and then have the management and budget to unlock potential in a way that is equitable, fair, and creates a resilient and sustainable economy for the Hout Bay harbour' (City Representative, 2019). The Councillor explained that while this had been a long-time vision of his and the City's, the funding was where things came 'unstuck' and caused a 'stalemate' (City Representative, 2019). While the Councillor insisted that the City was intent on developing the harbour to the greatest benefit of the local people, he reiterated that currently they had no power to act: 'once you get to that badly damaged clear view fencing with gaps and holes, we have no authority… I have delivered as much as I can but at that boundary fence our jurisdiction ends and we cannot dictate what happens on the other side of the wall' (City Representative, 2019).

The Councillor commented that an additional challenge was getting people to understand the type of the development that was intended. 'Hout Bay is traditionally a place that would not like to see large-scale change,' he commented. 'Progress is always seen as something intimidating and there is a lot of nervousness over densification and development' (City Representative, 2019). He explained that when people thought of a 'waterfront' it brought to mind images of the V&A Waterfront, a high-end development with hordes of tourists that would cause most Hout Bay residents to 'have a heart attack' (City Representative, 2019). His idea was to create a Hout Bay marina that integrated hotels, restaurants, and retail, including a 'mixed residential component of upmarket through to affordable housing.' In this way, they would still be able to unlock economic opportunities while providing services, which would be 'another win for the communities' (City Representative, 2019).

But the respondents were sceptical. Many did not feel that a development would open up real economic opportunities for the people of Hangberg, and that instead a waterfront would just make them another labour force - 'we're only good enough to work in shops we can't afford to shop in' (Community Activist 2, 2019), raising fears of gentrification. One respondent explained as follows:

> *If the harbour is going to be developed, you know what will happen? It's going to be run by white people with a lot of money who can afford it. Then they'll say 'don't worry, we'll give you a job, but you know what, we need guards and cleaners.' That's what they will do. And then our people will become the burger flippers and the shop packers and then they're going to say they brought development to the community. But still no one will own a shop, or a house, or land, and then the developers will try*

to buy the land just like in the Bokaap. And then the protests start. (Community Activist 1, 2019)

In this way, some felt that this was yet another example of white monopoly capital working with government to secure their own interests, while disregarding the developmental needs of the community. As one respondent said, 'This is just a power play between government departments at different levels. The development of the community is actually not a priority. If it was, they would have jumped on the opportunity, but they didn't' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019).

Almost all respondents linked the development of the harbour to their concerns about gentrification. One commented that 'gentrification is so deadly it happens under the radar and people don't even notice. People think they're getting development because they can't even see it as gentrification' (Community Activist 1, 2019). Another respondent commented that many within the community believed the intention was to make the harbour a completely white area. 'The City's basic intention is to stop the expansion of Hangberg. They want to build their waterfront and the Hangberg community gets in the way. The City is angling to relocate us instead of housing us. They don't want us living on that land because it is so valuable' (Community Activist 2, 2019). The same respondent commented that due to the lack of housing development, Hangberg had been 'squashed in like pigs,' 'living in conditions that you wouldn't want your dog to live in.' But, he said, 'your politics requires people to keep living in these conditions because the alternative is that they'll just move us somewhere else, like they've done before' (Community Activist 2, 2019). Another commented that 'the DA doesn't give a shit about poor people. All they want is a sanitised, gentrified Cape Town. They're not racist, but they're classist. And in South Africa, that means racist' (Hout Bay Civil Society 3, 2019). These sentiments were not unfounded. When discussing the vision for development in Imizamo Yethu, Valley residents had expressed their sentiments for a 'green, leafy suburb' (Swimmer in Anciano and Piper, 2019:149), demonstrating the disconnect between residents of the Valley wanting a 'sanitised' Hout Bay, rather than one that meets the real socio-economic needs of the community.

Currently, there is no indication of which direction harbour development will take. As one respondent commented, 'nobody knows how or what the plan is. Apparently there will be a steering committee board made up of all registered organisations in the community and this would drive the harbour forward and discuss plans further, but who knows' (Community Leader 3, 2019). Another said that 'if government decides to build a waterfront, the community doesn't stand a chance to engage' (Community Leader 4, 2019), even though the mainstream rhetoric was for the community to be centrally involved. Another commented that the problem wasn't financing, there was plenty of funding ready and available to develop the harbour, but the real problem was 'you've got to get through the politics' (Hout Bay Civil Society 3, 2019). As another said, 'where there's politics, there is always a problem' (Community Leader 1, 2019).

While the development in the harbour remains to be seen, one respondent commented, 'No matter which way any of us slice it, black and coloured people are going to be disadvantaged

for another few generations to come' (Community Activist 2, 2019). One said that 'colonialism is still embedded in people's minds' (Community Activist 1, 2019) while another spoke to the 'institutionalisation of apartheid through governance systems' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019).

This situation demonstrates that government and industry used their power to establish and maintain an urban regime to control governance of the harbours, and in so doing, were able to secure their rent-extraction interests, pointing to a rent-extracting cabal. The regime pursued their economic interests and their development trajectory at the expense of the local community. By doing so, government and industry undermined the pursuit of sustainable development within the Hout Bay harbour.

7.6.2. Hangberg

Throughout this thesis it has been highlighted that Hangberg felt a deep sense of historical marginalisation – not only had they suffered racial discrimination under the apartheid regime, seen most clearly by the forced removals, but this had largely continued in the post-apartheid era, as seen by the on-going lack of housing delivery, socio-economic inequality and criminalisation of the traditional livelihood of fishing. It is evident that the democratic spaces for engagement had been ineffective, and as a result, Hangberg frequently resorted to protest action as a form of resistance.

Exploring this notion of marginalisation further, many of the Hangberg respondents commented that they were not able to engage effectively within democratic spaces, specifically due to a lack of education and access to resources. All respondents commented that the vast difference in the levels of education and communication skills between the community and the City, and decades of poverty and poor education, made it extremely difficult to engage. As one Hangberg respondent said, 'Because we aren't an educated people, we can't interact, or articulate, or put our problems down to a phone call and someone else gets the message. We can think, we just can't articulate' (Community Activist 2, 2019). A second commented that the City didn't 'speak to people at their level' and as a result, 'intelligent people may have questions and want to engage but feel that they can't' (Community Leader 3, 2019). A third said, 'We're an uneducated people who don't know how to fight back when it comes to the queen's rules. You have to learn how to speak that language because in the boardroom, you need the language' (Community Activist 1, 2019). Another spoke more to resources commenting, 'If a white person phones, [the City] will do something because they know the person has the resources to follow up. A person from Hangberg probably doesn't have airtime to speak to you for a minute. Nine times out of ten, if you don't do your job, nothing will come of it' (Community Activist 2, 2019).

These factors contributed to the on-going sense of marginalisation and one respondent felt 'the City is taking advantage of people in poverty,' explaining that the constant follow up, resources, and time required to engage with the City effectively meant it was 'impossible for poor people' (Community Leader 4, 2019). And why would they want to keep people in poverty? 'Because this is what keeps people out of power' (Community Activist 2, 2019).

Many respondents felt that this marginalisation and the inability to have their voices heard was one of the main reasons people resorted to violence and protest action. As one respondent said, 'There's just so much anger and when people feel like they're not being listened to, that anger spills over, which is when the tyres start burning and the roads get blocked. Then it starts to impact people who were never involved, but at least they start to listen' (Community Activist 2, 2019). Another commented, 'When we do violence, we know it's the one thing we can do better than you' (Community Activist 1, 2019) while another reiterated that the community 'don't start riots, it's only when the police come in and bully us that riots happen. People got to have their say, and sometimes they have to retaliate' (Community Leader 4, 2019).

The rise of community protests in South Africa has been explored extensively and research explains that the rapid processes of class formation in post-apartheid South Africa have generated fierce struggles for inclusion and the meaning of citizenship. With no real opportunity for dialogue to occur with local communities, local representation largely ineffective because they remain disconnected from power, and a range of socio-economic and service delivery related grievances and triggers, communities resort to contestation and protest. As such, community protest movements should not be seen as 'inchoate mobs' but are 'characterised by an explicit discourse about human and democratic rights and constitute an insurgent citizenship struggle against the differentiation of citizenship rights'. Much of this sense of injustice is driven by exclusion, particularly in the sense of distance between the community and local government officials, and the absence of spaces for effective participation in decision-making (von Holdt *et al.*, 2011:30). This is clearly evident in the case of Hout Bay.

While many respondents justified the Hangberg protests for these very reasons, the City commented that the on-going volatility made it difficult to engage with Hangberg to address issues. The Hout Bay Councillor commented it was extremely difficult to 'deal with people acting randomly and burning tyres' and the 'volatility of the community is a potential deterrent for large scale investment' (City Representative, 2019). He also commented that there was a lot of 'political theatre' where conversations would 'spiral out of control' due to 'all kinds of political factions and conflict in leadership structures' (City Representative, 2019).

There were indeed issues of leadership and representation within Hangberg and all respondents commented that this was a primary reason the community struggled to make progress on a variety of issues. Central to this was the long-standing rivalry between the PMF and the HBCA.

While the PMF leadership contended they were 'purely a non-political structure' aimed at addressing 'the need of the community as a whole' (Community Leader 1, 2019), many others felt differently. As discussed in Chapter 4, the PMF had been set up as a community structure by the City following the 2011 riots and many felt the PMF was 'in the pocket' of the DA (Community Leader 4, 2019), and set on 'pursuing their own interests' (Community

Activist 1, 2019) rather than those of the community. They used various examples to demonstrate this, such as the PMFs support for the electricity depot at the expense of housing development. One respondent suggested that the reason the electricity depot went ahead was because the City promised to provide jobs and contracts to the PMF if they agreed with the land-use change, which they did, and one of the leaders of the PMF was the site manager on the construction site (Community Leader 4, 2019). This change in land-use was one of the main reasons the City was being taken to court by the HBCA. Those same people commented that the PMF 'didn't have any real representation from the community' (Community Activist 2, 2019), 'only held meetings with the people they wanted to and not with the community at large' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019), and could not be considered the 'voice of the community' (Community Leader 3, 2019). Another commented that it was the 'insufficiency and inadequacy of the PMF' that was the cause of most protests, and queried how a peace and mediation forum intended for the community could also serve as the voice for the City. 'Is it there to represent the people or the City?' he asked. 'It should be a neutral decision-making body but it is more there to represent the City. The rules were formed under the City so they have a bigger say' (Community Activist 1, 2019).

Those supporting the PMF felt exactly the same way about the HBCA, commenting that they were 'just a puppet for the ANC' (Community Leader 2, 2019), that they '[didn't] actually have any members' (Community Leader 1, 2019), and that 'no annual meetings really take place to justify their claim to representation' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019). While the HBCA didn't have 'the same degree of access to resources as the PMF, the politics was all the same' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019). As one community leader commented, 'At the end of the day what gives you power is access to resources, and the City has given that to the PMF through jobs and admin' (Community Leader 4, 2019).

No matter what side people fell on, everyone agreed that leadership was more of a 'political boxing match' (Hout Bay Civil Society 3, 2019) than anything else. The inability of leaders to effectively represent residents of Hangberg was also seen as a detriment to the community, causing, as one commented, 'enormous distrust and animosity between the groups' which meant there was 'no real decision-making body within the community' (Hout Bay Civil Society 3, 2019). Another respondent suggested that 'leadership now just waits for contracts from the City to put money in the house' noting that 'leaders are supposed to be people who eat last, not give the community the crumbs' (Community Leader 3, 2019).

Some people felt that ineffective representation was a direct result of the City's governance approach. One commented that the 'City knows these structures are completely inefficient yet they continue to engage with them and don't seem to care what the results are – as long as they've followed the process, that's all that matters' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019). This points to the compliance and avoidance culture the City demonstrated throughout this case study. Others felt this was a more deliberate tactic on the part of the City commenting that, 'they designed the leadership that way because it makes it easier for them, it means they can come here and tell us that we are divided when in fact they are the ones who divided us' (Community Leader 4, 2019). Many agreed to the notion that 'it is the politicians that divide the community' (Community Leader 3, 2019) and that 'as long as certain people within the

community are happy, politicians can basically do whatever they want' (Community Activist 1, 2019).

Two respondents, however, gave a different perspective saying that this continued lack of leadership and stalled development was largely unique to Hangberg – the same was not experienced in the black township of Imizamo Yethu[17]. While the same issues of poverty and inequality were experienced, as well as their own host of leadership issues, 'the people of IY seem to be more proactive, they always seem to make a plan rather than waiting for someone else to do it' (Hout Bay Civil Society 3, 2019) while the second commented that 'people in Hangberg don't stick together the same way that people in Imizamo Yethu do.' One of the respondents said he called this the 'Hangberg Paradox' (Hout Bay Civil Society 3, 2019). He explained that through all his engagements with the harbour community, he had come to realise there was a certain mentality within the community that continuously aimed at 'bringing people down.' He said 'nobody wants to make progress' because then you're perceived to be 'eating the cream' and that as soon as people start succeeding, 'they are shot down by those around them' (Hout Bay Civil Society 3, 2019). This was paradoxical, he explained, because they always referred to themselves as a 'community' claiming to want development and progress, yet actively worked to ensure it remained impossible both individually and collectively. 'The community insists you do something, and then the minute that you do, they reject it' (Hout Bay Civil Society 3, 2019). Another respondent agreed, commenting that Hangberg had 'the most inward-looking psychology, as if there are these walls built around them that they can't see beyond. They're very insular in that respect and it prevents them from seeing anything beyond' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019).

It is not the first time this attribute has been observed for Hangberg. Tefre (2010) discussed what he, incidentally, also called the Hangberg Paradox, that in Hangberg there exists a potential for collective action but despite this, not a lot takes place that generates wide community participation (Tefre, 2010). He explains that Hangberg is a long-standing community with strong ties between the residents that, at least on the surface, shows a solidarity between families that runs deep. The community also clearly identifies itself as a coloured community, with generations of family having their roots in Hout Bay. It is often suggested that if there is a high degree of common identity shared by a community, combined with a highly integrated network of people, it can be expected that this would lead to highly organised efforts (Tilly, 1978). This, however, is not the case in Hangberg and Tefre suggests that there is a common identity of 'who we are' but not of 'what we do' (Tefre, 2010:183). This conclusion is drawn on five key reflections: there is a strong sense of identity but not a strong sense of ethos (what he defines as 'a set of constitutive goals, values, beliefs, standards, norms, practices and/or traditions that give the group motivating reasons for action' (Tefre, 2010:56)); there is a perception that Hangberg has been side-lined and that other groups have received greater support in the post-apartheid era; that the strong ties between community members reinforce the notion of self-reliance as a community; the heavy reliance on strong ties within the community is accompanied by weak

[17] This may not be true anymore. While Imizamo Yethu had indeed displayed a community solidarity in the past, particularly over issues related to housing, in more recent years there has been a stark division in leadership, which in turn has made the community more divided.

ties to actors outside the community and in this way remain isolated; and there is a perpetual sense of mistrust, both internally and specifically with the police.

Similar conclusions can be drawn through this research. Hangberg had a strong sense of community when it came to an issue that touched on their identity or their sense of belonging, such as defending the factory. They did not, however, share the same sense of solidarity when it came to the development of the harbour, as seen by the on-going debate over land-use (housing vs infrastructure, such as the electricity depot and the recycling centre). People had certainly expressed feeling of being side-lined (what this thesis has referred to as being marginalised), specifically that the interests of the white residents were more important than those of the poor, in large part because the white residents had access to resources and the language to demand their interests more effectively. They also didn't appear to have strong ties outside of the community – historically there was a heavy reliance on the factory and it was only when the unions intervened (Chapter 6) that any kind of external connections were evident, but even these didn't really manifest in Hangberg itself. There was indeed a fundamental lack of coordination and trust between the different leadership structures.

This demonstrates that with the lack of a coordinated vision around which people can gather, a 'direction on which to grow,' collective identity will not necessarily lend itself to group action, and can instead do the opposite – create a collective sense of apathy and 'shared sense of hopelessness' (Tefre, 2010:183). It can be argued that it was this mentality, being a group without the capacity to govern itself productively, that explained the tendency toward external patronage. In this way, not only does it demonstrate an 'erosion of the democratic relationship' but also the 'transformation of governance in more systematic ways expressed in theories of patronage, clientelism, prebendalism, and neopatrimonialism' (Anciano and Piper, 2019:13).

The contribution of these factors contributed to Hangberg's sense of powerlessness and as a result, the regime established between Oceana and government was able to maintain control, ensuring their own interests were pursued at the expense of the community's.

7.6.3. Fresh Air for Hout Bay

As discussed in Chapter 5, one of FAHB's main sources of power was their access to resources, which enabled them to establish and maintain a platform that they used not only to build active citizenship within Hout Bay, but also to lobby government in an effort to politicise the issue. Using the terminology of 'spaces' discussed in Chapter 3, it is evident that FAHB thus 'created' or 'claimed' a space to promote engagement.

The Councillor agreed with this sentiment commenting, 'FAHB created their own space for engagement… FAHB came in, owned the space, and created a very well-run platform for the community in general to be able to add their voices. You became a leadership structure as representatives of a larger group and became a spokesperson for those people… it is not easy in Hout Bay to bring people together with a common sense of purpose' (City

Representative, 2019). He further commented that this degree of community organisation 'upped the City's game' and made 'Oceana sit back and take notice.' He said that it made everyone realise 'we now need to have a formal series of engagement,' ironic considering that almost no formal engagements took place with the community at all. He also commented 'if I could deal with this [level of engagement] from other groups, it would make my job a lot easier' (City Representative, 2019). Many people commented that FAHB's communication platform helped people understand what was going on. One respondent commented that it 'shows the potential of what can happen… even if you come out of an independent corner with no politics involved' (Hout Bay Civil Society 2, 2019) while a Hangberg leader even said, 'I admired seeing the coordination of your group and how you made things work. I thought I could learn a lot from that' (Community Leader 4, 2019).

This reinforces that FAHB used their resources, communication, and organisational abilities to improve the 'shared awareness' (Shirky, 2011:35) about the topic, which in turn gave them 'political capital' (Abdulmutallib, 2012) to engage in the public discourse. However, despite the Councillor saying that FAHB's activism 'upped the City's game,' in reality nothing changed and instead the City continued to withhold information to pursue their own objectives. This demonstrates that while FAHB was successful at politicising the issue, they did not hold any real power to shift actual decision-making. While the factory did eventually close and the prospect for a sustainable harbour development plan is possible, it is reasonable to suggest that FAHB had some degree of influence in this process, but there is nothing to suggest that it was directly the result of their activism.

One of the reasons that FAHB was able to maintain this space, and their success in politicising the issue, was largely because of determined and consistent leadership, demonstrated mostly by my own actions as the facilitator of FAHB. While various people in Hout Bay had complained about Oceana's emissions in the past, they swiftly gave up on their initiatives because of the inertia and fatalism the situation presented, a common response to continual power as domination (Freire, 1970; Gaventa, 1980). I was markedly different in this respect and consistently investigated and communicated about the situation for over five years. In this regard, I had two distinct personal advantages.

First, and as discussed in Chapter 5, my background in both development and social activism made me more familiar with the spaces for civil society engagement and I had a (relatively) realistic understanding of what such a commitment would entail. While I was not familiar with the fishing industry, the dynamics of Hout Bay, nor the specific process in which to follow, I did know that success would only be achieved by bringing people together and advocating for something more meaningful than just the elimination of the smell. This understanding largely influenced the narrative of FAHB and the approach we used to engage with all parties involved in the situation. By advocating for a broader sustainability plan, we were able to garner greater support for our cause, and by not engaging in provocative fights on social media, we were able to establish ourselves as a largely reasonable group to work with. This is not to say that we were entirely successful at doing this, but it is my belief that our attempt to focus on sustainability and on bringing people together had an impact on the situation at large – FAHB had over 600 registered members (one of the largest civil society

groups in Hout Bay), more than 1,500 followers on social media sites, and established positive relationships with many Hangberg leaders that continue today.

The second distinct advantage I had was time and conviction. One of the biggest challenges of facilitating FAHB was the enormous amount of work that needed to be done – whether writing to the City or Oceana, keeping track of communications and following up, investigating and researching, or writing updates and maintaining the social media sites, everything required a considerable amount of time and energy. As a freelance consultant and as a single person, my lifestyle choices enabled me to devote large tracts of time to pursuing this issue, which would have been more difficult if I had had a full-time job or a family to care for. But more than this was personal resilience. Many people before me, and indeed even many people within the FAHB organising team, were dismayed and discouraged by the tediousness, the inertia, the seeming lack of progress, and the frustration of managing our activities. While I too experienced all of these emotions, I simply pushed through them and continued with our efforts, demonstrating leadership in some regard. I would like to believe it was this conviction and consistency that set FAHB apart from other civil society groups who had advocated against the emissions in the past.

While FAHB was successful at maintaining the space for engagement and politicising the issue, this was not without its own problems. Much of the mentality from the Valley (particularly the HBRRA and HBC), and indeed FAHB itself, can be explained by a general sense of white privilege, and this speaks to the connection between ideology and socialised consent (Lukes, 2005; Acosta and Pettit, 2013). For Hangberg residents, the hegemonic social forces led to a deep sense of social marginalisation, while for the Valley residents, this led to notions of white privilege.

One of the key tenements of white privilege is that of a 'culture of power' (Delpit, 1988:282) where the access to resources, power, privilege, and to a large extent language and education, are considered to be 'normal' (Kendall, 2012:1). This is directly related to South Africa's history where it is commonly recognised that the apartheid system fostered conscious and deliberate forms of white domination throughout social structures. While the end of apartheid meant that explicit segregationist orders were stopped, white privilege and domination continue to prevail in the post-apartheid landscape (Matthews, 2012). White privilege does not necessarily operate at a conscious level, but rather speaks to the 'mental and physical patterns of engagement with the world that operate without conscious attention or reflection' (Sullivan, 2006:6). This directly relates to Lukes's (2005) third dimensional view of power.

A key feature of white privilege is the assumption of responsibility and authority, where it is argued that white people are taught to see themselves as able to distinguish between right and wrong, and, believing they have the responsibility to see that right is done, they easily assume positions of authority (Matthews, 2012). In addition, white privilege is also characterised by 'ontological expansiveness' (Sullivan, 2006:10) where white people think they can and should have control over their environments to a large degree. These behavioural tendencies can clearly be seen in the actions taken by FAHB – not only did they

determine that their position on the emissions was 'right' but they also assumed a role of authority and responsibility that was necessary in order to rectify this 'wrong'.

While FAHB's perception of what was 'right' was not necessarily incorrect, particularly in light of the principles of sustainability and the evidence of the negative health impacts covered up by the City, it is easy to understand why there was such resistance to their movement from Hangberg, who saw FAHB's activities as directly influencing their own marginalisation. Despite the good intentions that FAHB had for achieving sustainability, in many ways their actions reinforced rather than challenged white privilege, a common challenge faced by white people involved in social justice (Matthews, 2012). This in and of itself poses a challenge to the achievement of sustainable development and highlights how power dynamics influence this process – even when the argument for sustainability is valid and sound, socio-economic inequalities and unequal power relations persistent in society can derail the development process.

7.7. Conclusion

Through the analysis of these three chapters, the power dynamics surrounding the fishmeal factory have come more readily into view, as well as the impact these dynamics have had on the pursuit of social sustainability.

This chapter examined the events that transpired between 2016-2020 that would eventually lead to the factory's final closure. It has been demonstrated that the City moved from avoidance to repression, withholding pertinent information so as to pursue their own development objectives, which were largely economic rather than aligned with the principles of social sustainability. This chapter also demonstrated how the spaces for civic engagement were either limited or ineffective, and democratic processes were manipulated by those in power, constraining the effectiveness of civil society action. While FAHB was largely defined by white privilege, they used their privilege-based resources to overcome these constraints to some degree, the same was not true for other sectors of the community. In this way, the fears of marginalisation, exclusion, and gentrification expressed by the Hangberg community were largely substantiated, and it is no surprise that so many instances of protest action took place, although on issues unrelated to the fishmeal factory itself.

The combination of these forces has had a serious influence on the development of the harbour, which at this point, remains in a stalemate, with no prospect of development on the near horizon. It is evident that the economic interests of outside actors, specifically big business and government, trumped the interests of local residents and their pursuit for development. While they operated in different ways, their actions point towards the extraction of land and sea rentals, thus serving their own economic interests, and in so doing they undermined key principles of social sustainability, thus hindering the broader pursuit of sustainable development for Hout Bay at large.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This thesis closely examined the situation of the fishmeal factory in Hout Bay, offering an in-depth reflection on the dynamics of power present and how these dynamics have influenced development within the harbour. It is now possible to consolidate this understanding and return to the main question driving the research: where does the power lie to influence decision-making about development? Using the case study of the fishmeal factory in Hout Bay, four key sub-questions were posed to adequately answer this research question:

- Who were the actors involved?
- What mechanisms of power did each actor use and to what end?
- What were the dynamics and relationships of power between the actors?
- How did these dynamics influence the decision-making process, and how did these processes impact on the achievement of social sustainability?

While these questions have been at the heart of the analysis chapters, this concluding chapter will consolidate those findings, offering a comprehensive reflection on the power dynamics within Hout Bay. Using this reflection, the key findings of this research are presented as well as an overview of what this means for power and decision-making processes. By doing so, a final conclusion will be drawn about where the power to influence decision-making about development lies, and what this means for the overall pursuit of sustainable development.

To this end, the conclusion to this research demonstrates that power over the city is divided and elevated in ways that are detrimental to the achievement of sustainable development. Instead of focusing on a balance between economic, environmental and social considerations, development decisions in the Hout Bay harbour are focused on the economic and political interests of government and big capital, often at the expense of the local community. While civil society has some power to influence decision-making through agenda-setting and politicisation, and through protest action, this impact is relatively weak against the formal and conventional power mechanisms that those in power utilise to secure their own interests. In this way, the achievement of sustainable development in the Hout Bay harbour remains elusive.

8.1. The Actors, their Mechanisms of Power, and the Dynamics Between Them

It has been demonstrated that the main actors involved in the story of the fishmeal factory can be understood as Oceana, representing big business, government, represented predominantly by the City of Cape Town but in some instances both provincial and national government, and the residents, represented by FAHB and Hangberg.

Having identified the main actors involved, it is now possible to reflect on the mechanisms of power used by each actor and to what end, as well as the dynamics and relationships between these actors. Following the structure of the analysis, these mechanisms of power will be reflected on through the lens of each actor, following which a conclusion can be drawn about the influence this had on development.

8.1.1. Government and Oceana

The analysis has demonstrated that the actors with real power, those with the ability to make decisions both over policies and how to implement them, can be understood as government (largely represented by the City of Cape Town and in some instances national government) and Oceana. Government controlled the formal institutions and processes that determined law and policy, while Oceana represented the commercial fishing industry and corporate business, which historically had a significant influence on policy. Both government and Oceana exercised power in different ways throughout the fishmeal factory case study, using a variety of mechanisms at their disposal. In some instances they used 'power over', affecting the actions and thoughts of those without power, and in other instances they used 'power to', working together to construct the surrounding social world (Lukes, 2005; Miller *et al.*, 2006; Pettit, 2013).

When reflecting on the early stages of the fishmeal factory story, the key point of examination was the establishment of the status quo: how it came to be that a polluting fishmeal factory that maintained a dependency relationship with the local community was broadly accepted by both government and the broader Hout Bay community. As discussed in Chapter 5, Oceana and the City of Cape Town exercised control through three distinct ways, directly in line with Lukes's (2005) three dimensions of 'power over': ensuring economic dependency, depoliticising the issue through formal institutions and processes, and constructing hegemony to ensure broad support for their governance.

In terms of economic dependency, the Oceana fishmeal factory was established in 1958, during which time racial segregation had begun under the apartheid government's Group Areas Act. All coloured people living in Hout Bay were forcibly removed into council flats and houses in Hangberg, many of which were provided by the fishing companies (including Oceana) for an extremely poor and dependent workforce (Fieuw, 2011). As coloured people lost access to their traditional livelihoods, they were instead forced to work for commercial industries (Van Sittert, 2002). The factories employed generations of families from the

poverty-stricken community and their dependency systematically grew (Van Sittert, 2002). In this way, the fishing industry fostered 'dependent destitution' (Van Sittert, 2003:43) and the jobs from the factory were important to the community. The poverty within Hangberg continued to grow, but Oceana also systematically contributed to the development and stability of Hangberg through their corporate social investment programmes, support to schools, and relief aid. For a community severely lacking in resources, these contributions were well received and entrenched Hangberg's dependency further. This degree of economic dependency gave Oceana a significant amount of power. Any negative impact experienced on account of the emissions was disregarded by Hangberg, due to the threat of deprivation that would occur were the factory not to operate, pointing to economic dependency as a form of coercion, where those in power are able to ensure compliance by the threat of deprivation (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Lukes, 1974).

Both Oceana and government played a role in terms of depoliticising the issue through formal institutions and processes. Firstly, government set all the laws and legislation pertaining to environmental protection, including the South African Constitution, NEMA, NEMAQA, municipal by-laws, and the AEL. The City insisted that Oceana was in compliance with those laws and thus had every legal right to operate, and nothing further could be done to rectify the situation. In this way, the City used their political authority to effectively keep the issue off the agenda of Council. Secondly, Oceana, respected as a leader within the fishing industry and operator of the foremost fishmeal plant in the country, insisted that no alternative odour abatement technology existed, limiting any possible action to be taken in this regard. The stalemate this created shifted the conversation to a moral one: were the laws themselves reasonable if they were failing to protect the interests of the people? By using their agenda setting power, the City was effective at avoiding this question, instead opting to preserve the non-decision-making situation that it perpetuated. In this way, the City used rule-based depoliticisation tactics, including control of information, governmental instability and departmental incongruence, and poor communication and consultation, leading to community inertia. Thus, they constrained the need for political debate, allowing them to distance or insulate themselves from the societal pressures placed on them by difficult groups (Flinders and Buller, 2006; Burnham, 2017).

Hegemony was also created in several ways. Because of the dependency the community had on the factory work, the odour from the factories came to be seen as a symbol of employment – the 'bread and butter' that kept the community alive (Community Activist 1, 2019; Community Leader 1, 2019). The more the factories were in operation, the more jobs there were in the community, and the odour became a symbol of the support that Oceana gave, systematically reinforced by the social contributions they made to the community. The more this pattern was reinforced, the more people from Hangberg supported Oceana. The apartheid system fostered unequal power relations where the powerless were highly dependent, preventing them from both self-determined action and reflection upon their actions. Without this dialectic process, they were denied the democratic experience out of which 'critical consciousness' grows and instead developed what Freire referred to as a 'culture of silence' (Freire, 1970), one that served to reinforce the interests of the powerful. Oceana needed cheap labour to fuel their thriving industry and because the Hangberg

community was so dependent on their support, it led to a psychological adaption to the state of being without power. In this way, Hangberg was socialised into compliance, accepting the reality offered by the powerful and considering it as 'normal' (Mueller, 1973). By using social myths, languages, symbols, and the communication of information to shape or manipulate power (Edelman, 1985), the City and Oceana were able to influence the Hout Bay community to believe and act in a manner that they would otherwise not have, to their own detriment but to the advantage of others (Gaventa, 1980).

Through these tactics and mechanisms of power, Oceana and the City essentially constructed 'normality'. This socialised consent prevented people from questioning, envisioning possibilities of change, or addressing injustices, demonstrating how the 'processes of socialisation, culture and ideology perpetuate exclusion and inequality by defining what is normal and acceptable' (VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007). In this way, it has been demonstrated that Oceana and the City used their various power mechanisms to establish and maintain the status quo and once this power dynamic was established, they 'continue[d] to prevail through the inertia of the situation' (Gaventa, 1980:23). Oceana was able to continue the pursuit of their economic interests and retain their influence over the fishing sector at large, while the City was able to retain its control of activities and land surrounding the harbour. It should be noted that control of activities within the harbour was in the jurisdiction of national government, who did not make a presence at this point in the story.

While Oceana and the City used similar power mechanisms to maintain the status quo, they responded in distinctly different ways when the status quo was threatened. This was most evidently seen through the reactions and responses to the proposed closure of the factory, as discussed in Chapter 6.

When reviewing the reactions of government, it is important to note that all previous representation of government had been via the City of Cape Town. However, when the closure was proposed, national government suddenly made an appearance which triggered a whole new set of power mechanisms. The City did not react at all, distancing themselves from the closure entirely, attempting to devoid themselves of responsibility. They maintained that any decisions relating to the harbour were a national responsibility, that the labour concerns were between Oceana and the unions, and that they had no control or influence over either. During the three-month period where the labour consultation was underway, the City did not issue any statements or comments, nor did they provide any information – they maintained their distanced position until a decision was made, and in this way, the City continued to depoliticise the issue.

National government, on the other hand, demonstrated their full support for the factory's continued operation, reflecting the on-going battle for control of small harbours between national and provincial government, as well as the party politics that defined this battle (national government led by the ANC vs the Western Cape Government led by the DA). While not necessarily as a result of the proposed closure, the Western Cape Government announced its inter-governmental dispute over control of small harbours at the same time,

demonstrating their long-standing intention and interest in controlling this important economic asset. It is not surprising then that the Western Cape Government would launch the internal dispute at a time when there was a possible change in the operations of the harbour. Nor was it surprising that, in response to one of its primary tenants potentially leaving the harbour, national DPW would want to secure its sea-rental income and thus announced a 5-year lease for Oceana, with prospects of it increasing to 20-years, a decided change from the annual agreement that had been in place prior. Both political parties were doing their best to ensure control over the assets and resources at stake.

Meanwhile, Oceana also deflected responsibility away from themselves but in a different manner. First, they used the overt power of threat to manufacture consent for their operations – the closure meant a loss of both jobs and social contributions, both of which were critical to the Hangberg community. The threat of this loss inevitably enabled them to gather support for their operations to continue, even though these contributions were relatively minor in comparison to the needs of the community. Whether or not Oceana wanted to stay is unclear, but what was important was their need to have broad support for their operations – this gave them power to make a decision that suited them (and arguably, this decision could have gone either way).

Secondly, Oceana very effectively used symbolism to deflect blame away from themselves – by placing blame on the complainants in their initial press release, they used local race and place-based politics to foster division within the community. This narrative was then used to politicise the issue, using long-standing racial tension, the fears of gentrification, white domination, and marginalisation present in the Hangberg community to further garner support for their activities. In many ways, the tactics used by Oceana demonstrate the Machiavellian behaviour of corporates, and how they manipulate public engagement and opinion to suit their own interests and in this way they were able to manufacture consent to ensure their own interests were met (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Shemelis, 2017).

This dual tactic of depoliticisation by local government and politicisation by national government and Oceana revealed the long-standing coalition between the latter two. The governing regime between big capital and government was not new – the fishing industry has historically supported big fishing companies who were allowed to extend monopoly control (Van Sittert, 2002; Greef, 2013; Visser, 2015), which led to the facilitation and financing of white monopolies involved in the commercial sector in the pre-apartheid era (Van Sittert, 2002; Greef, 2013). With the onset of apartheid, the distribution of resources was heavily skewed in favour of white large-scale operators, and the majority of black South African citizens were effectively denied access to and ownership of fishing resources (Hauck and Sowman, 2001; Greef, 2013). The emergence of trade unions in the 1970s and 1980s led to relations between capital and labour being institutionalised, forming an 'alliance of bosses and workers' that supported the advancement of big industry (Van Sittert, 2002:300), and while the post-apartheid reforms initially promised to redistribute benefits away from capital and to the popular classes, they ended up not only confirming, but entrenching big capital's monopoly over the fishing industry and renewing the conditions for its continued accumulation (Van Sittert, 2002; Sowman *et al.*, 2011). In this way, capitalist interests can be

seen to be the power behind policy decisions and laws (Lynch and Stretesky, 2003) and the powerful in society 'maintain their privileged position by legitimising it through a system of rules, conventions and institutions' (Adger *et al.*, 2003:1099).

To this end, the research suggested that a rent-extracting cabal existed where the 'dominant coalition consists of a fairly small group of actors who collude across the boundaries of state and market to maximize returns to scarce resources, most prominently land' (Heller, Mukhopadhyay and Walton, 2016:6). The decisions made over the operation of the fishmeal factory were centred around political and business networks, rather than meeting the socio-economic needs of the local community or ensuring its further development. The research suggested that national government and Oceana were interested in securing sea-rentals while the City was interested in securing land-rentals, and this notion was indeed confirmed through the activities that transpired once the factory re-opened. Neither set of powerful actors governed primarily in the interests of local residents nor in the interests of sustainable development.

While it was evident in the earlier stages of analysis that the City and Oceana used avoidance as a key power mechanism, Chapter 7 demonstrated how the City moved from avoidance to lying and manipulation. This was seen through their systematic and deliberate repression of the health risk assessment which they used to pursue their own development objectives. For years the City had publicly stated that there were no health risks posed by Oceana's emissions and they consistently delayed any efforts to either provide evidence to or obtain information on the impacts experienced. They even maintained this position during the public participation process for the renewal of Oceana's AEL, when the use of formalin was to be introduced, again disregarding the health concerns cited by the community. Behind the scenes, however, they used the evidence from the health risk assessment to change the land-use allocation in the land adjacent to the harbour, ensuring that housing development on those particular plots would not take place. They secured this agreement by working with the community institution they had already established and largely controlled – the PMF – to ensure their interests were pursued. The results of the health risk assessment were only accessible once those agreements had been confirmed and construction had already started to take place. In short, the City used its power to control the discourse, manipulated different sectors of society despite the social division this caused, and disregarded the voices of civil society groups, to secure land-rentals aligned with their own development interests.

The City was able to do this largely because of the ineffective spaces for democratic participation. Spaces are seen as 'opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships which affect their lives' (Gaventa, 2005:11) and can broadly be categorised into: provided or closed spaces spaces, controlled by an elite group; invited spaces: where those in power may create 'invited' spaces for outsiders to share opinions; and claimed or created spaces, where less powerful actors create their own spaces to develop their agendas and create solidarity without the influence of power holders (Gaventa, 2005; Luttrell *et al.*, 2007). This thesis has demonstrated that there were many 'closed' spaces for decision-making, that the 'invited'

spaces simply didn't exist or were largely ineffective, and as such, the less powerful actors (such as FAHB or the Hangberg community) were forced to 'claim' or 'create' spaces for engagement to occur, even though this too was limited. At various points the City claimed that 'participation' was encouraged, such as through the monitoring exercises conducted and the public participation process for the AEL renewal, but in reality, no *meaningful* engagement ever took place that had the potential to materially affect the outcome of the decisions being made. This conclusion supports other research that shows that public participation has been limited to once-off meetings or simple procedural steps, indicating there is 'no space in these processes of decision-making for meaningful public input' (Anciano and Piper, 2019:37). In this way, public participation processes are extremely limited and served only to 'tick the box' (Community Activist 2, 2019) rather than strengthening the democratic voice.

The ineffectiveness of these spaces was also enhanced by the social division and disunity within Hout Bay. The research consistently pointed to the 'us' vs 'them' mentality, where divisions were set along racial, spatial, and socio-economic lines, which heavily influenced the interaction between different civil society groups. Both the City and Oceana used and promoted this disunity as a 'divide and conquer' tactic to ensure that their interests were secured. This ultimately led to a stalemate for development in the Hout Bay harbour, an issue which is yet to be resolved.

In summary, the analysis of politics and power around the fishmeal factory case study in Hout Bay demonstrates that powerful actors use a variety of mechanisms to depoliticise and 'normalise' an issue to establish a status quo that serves their interests, will mislead and conceal the truth to maintain this position even though this is at the expense of the health and well-being of the local community, and when challenged, they will politicise the issue by exploiting racial and other social divides to distract from their underlying agendas. In this way, they are able to retain their power, which serves to maintain their economic interests that disregard the socio-economic needs of local communities and those who they are intended to serve.

8.1.2. Hangberg

Hangberg's relationship to power can best be understood through the lens of vulnerability, in that they were not able to independently safeguard their basic social and economic rights or needs (Collinson, 2003; Gaventa, 2003; Hamilton, 2014) and consequently, were largely dominated by more powerful actors ('power over').

As demonstrated, Hangberg was highly dependent on the existence of the factory for their economic, physical, and social well-being – not only had Oceana been a primary employer for decades, many people depended on the factory for the provision of housing and the social contributions they made to social institutions and relief efforts. This dependency had developed over a long history of marginalisation, with the coloured community steeped in oppression and the struggle for liberation, both in the apartheid and post-apartheid eras (Adhikari, 2005; Hendricks, 2005). In this way, Hangberg had been subjected to many of the

'power over' mechanisms used by those in power. This led to two distinct outcomes. First, the deep sense of marginalisation, particularly the series of forced removals in Hout Bay, led to the establishment of a tight-knit community, what Adhikari (2005:88) suggests is 'solidarity in loss.' While internal leadership issues were present and the community cannot be considered as homogenous in any sense, in times of trouble Hangberg does have a tendency to unite, demonstrating a solidarity that directly stemmed from what they consider to be an attack on their rights to land, access to the sea, or their identity.

This was mostly demonstrated by the second outcome – their tendency to resort to protest action. Over the years, Hangberg had gained a reputation as being a 'problem' area (Sowman *et al.*, 2011:576), known for its poaching (or 'protest fishing' (Anciano and Wheeler, 2021)) and high agitation in a range of projects relating to development, particularly involving housing, schools, transport, security, and clinics, often leading to protests and political challenges (Anciano and Piper, 2019). This was most acutely seen in the Battle of Hangberg in 2010, but since then, violent protests have continued to be a regular occurrence. In this way, Hangberg was a formidable community to engage with and despite their socio-economic marginality, they demonstrated a strong capacity to mobilise support for protest action at times. This protest action had a direct influence on delaying or preventing certain decisions altogether, for example, the protests stopped the selling of Sentinel Mountain during the Battle of Hangberg, and even helped to keep the factory open when its closure was proposed. As the CEO of Oceana commented, they decided to keep the factory open after they were 'overwhelmed with community support' (Oceana, 2015a). In this way, Hangberg demonstrated elements of 'power to' in their ability to influence decisions and processes.

While Hangberg's ability to protest can be viewed as their strongest mechanism of power, in reality, this demonstrates more accurately their sense of marginality. Gaventa (1980) suggests that the consciousness of the dominated may be malleable as it emerges, particularly vulnerable to manipulation of the power field around it. Through using power mechanisms such as myths, symbols, rumours, or the use of threat, the powerful may be able to ensure that certain beliefs and actions emerge in one context while seemingly contradictory grievances are expressed in others. This is precisely what happened during the proposed closure of the factory where the Hangberg community was manipulated by Oceana into believing that the closure was the result of white elites. The narrative swiftly turned into 'us' vs 'them', touching on the notion of race politics, identity politics, and the politics of belonging – the fundamental question of who we are and where we belong.

While Hangberg supported the factory's continued operation under the premise of the need for jobs, in reality their support for the factory was based more on the fear of displacement brought on by the threat of gentrification, as discussed extensively in Chapter 5. Many viewed support for the factory as a 'defence against white domination' (Community Activist 2, 2019) because the factory itself represented an important ideology and losing it would mean a loss of their own identity. To this end, the Hangberg community used their power to show their support for Oceana to remain open, even though its existence perpetuated their own marginalisation.

Exploring this marginalisation further, Chapter 7 considered that, while historical inequalities had been the main driver of this marginalisation, this continued to be perpetuated by low socio-economic stability, and poor education and communication skills, which made it almost impossible for Hangberg to engage effectively in democratic spaces. In this way, many felt the City was 'taking advantage of people in poverty' (Community Leader 4, 2019), which was a direct way of keeping them powerless. In addition, many concerns were raised about leadership within Hangberg. Again, Hangberg cannot be considered to be a homogenous group – while it is has strong familial ties, it is subject to the same complexities and divisions of any community. While strong leaders did indeed exist, who were able to wield power in their respective groups, not everyone supported the same leaders. With leadership aligned almost exclusively along party politics (ANC vs DA), effective and unified leadership remained a largely elusive concept, which led to on-going division within Hangberg itself.

This pointed to what is known as the 'Hangberg Paradox' where there is a common identity of 'who we are' but not of 'what we do' (Tefre, 2010:183). Despite the long-standing ties between residents that theoretically should lead to greater community action, there was not a strong sense of ethos that gave the community motivating reasons for action, and as a result, they were overcome by a perpetual sense of mistrust, both internally and externally, that prevented them from any truly unified action. In this way, not only does it demonstrate an 'erosion of the democratic relationship' but also the 'transformation of governance in more systematic ways expressed in theories of patronage, clientelism, prebendalism, and neopatrimonialism' (Anciano and Piper, 2019:13). The contribution of these factors contributed to Hangberg's sense of powerlessness and as a result, the regime established between Oceana and government was able to maintain control, ensuring their own interests were pursued at the expense of the community's.

8.1.3. Fresh Air for Hout Bay

Throughout the analysis, it is evident that while FAHB did not have any formal decision-making power and were not able to control the activities around the fishmeal factory nor the development of the harbour. To this end they were limited in their ability to influence 'power over' the situation, but they were able to use various power mechanisms to influence public debate and politicise the issue, demonstrating some ability to influence 'power to'.

The first example of FAHB's influence was in creating the space for engagement to occur. While general democratic spaces for civil society participation existed in Hout Bay, including formals spaces such as the ward committee or political associations, and more discursive spaces such as on-line forums, social media discussion groups, etc., none of these were specific to or adequate for engagement on the fishmeal factory – the only avenue for raising concerns about the emissions was through a largely informal complaints mechanisms directly with the factory. To overcome this, FAHB created their own space, giving them a

chance to develop their agenda and create solidarity without the influence of power holders (Gaventa, 2005; Luttrell *et al.*, 2007).

FAHB, unlike other civil society representatives prior to them, established their own communication platforms (including a website and series of Facebook pages) where they were able to investigate, consolidate, and share information with the broader community and in this way, were able to establish themselves as a definitive group. While still largely informal in the sense that FAHB was not a registered organisation, the creation of this space gave them a certain degree of authority – FAHB acted with the weight of representation to speak for a concerned group of local residents rather than as individuals and this began to influence the decision-makers around them. FAHB's ability to do this was in large part due to their use of social media where they were able to effectively facilitate greater access to information and mobilise people to take action. In this way, they helped to strengthen civil society and the public debate, and shape different forms of political conversations and engagement (Cottle, 2011; Shirky, 2011). The 'shared awareness' (Shirky, 2011:35) that this created gave them power, as did their consolidation of knowledge and power (Gotlieb and Borodin, 1973). Oceana responded to this by formally engaging with FAHB where they committed to establishing a specific website and complaints mechanism, which they later did, and the City began to do more regular monitoring exercises and providing more information to the residents about the outcomes of these events.

While these activities in and of themselves did not change the situation, they indicate that the actions of FAHB caused the decision-makers to take them seriously. As one respondent commented, 'FAHB created their own space for engagement… FAHB came in, owned the space, and created a very well-run platform for the community in general to be able to add their voices. You became a leadership structure as representatives of a larger group and became a spokesperson for those people' (City Representative, 2019). It was further commented that this degree of community organisation 'upped the City's game' and made 'Oceana sit back and take notice' (City Representative, 2019). By consistently pursuing their activities for over five years, which included registering complaints, sending letters to the City, engaging with Oceana, and encouraging the broader community to advocate for change, FAHB was successful in politicising the issue and keeping the topic relevant. This is further evidenced by the more than 100 news and media articles (FAHB, 2020) that were produced over the years, and the extensive discussions that took place on social media.

To this end, one of the strongest resources FAHB had was determined and consistent leadership, which was largely demonstrated by my own actions as the facilitator of FAHB. In this regard, I had two distinct personal advantages: a background in both development and social activism; and time and conviction. My background enabled me to have a (relatively) realistic understanding of what such a commitment would entail and a fair understanding of how to achieve this. While limited in my understanding of the fishing industry, the dynamics of Hout Bay, and the specific process in which to follow, I did know that success would only be achieved by bringing people together and advocating for something more meaningful than just the elimination of the smell. This understanding largely influenced the narrative of FAHB and the approach we used to engage with all parties involved in the situation. By

advocating for a broader sustainability plan, we were able to garner greater support for our cause, and by not engaging in provocative fights on social media, we were able to establish ourselves as a largely reasonable group to work with.

My personal time and conviction also allowed me to complete the large amount of work that social advocacy requires. As a freelance consultant and as a single person, my lifestyle choices enabled me to devote large tracts of time to pursuing this issue, which would have been more difficult if I had had a full-time job or a family to care for. While I too was affected by the tediousness and inertia that the situation presented, my personal resilience allowed me to simply push through this to complete the advocacy work that was required. This is not to say that I was necessarily successful nor particularly good at achieving my objectives, but rather to highlight that good leadership skills are required for advocacy to have an impact.

FAHB's successful politicisation of the issue countered the City's efforts to depoliticse the issue. While personal leadership played an important role, so too did access to resources and privilege. FAHB represented a largely privileged group that was able to use their privilege to stimulate debate and encourage response. Firstly, no members of FAHB were dependent on the factory for their basic survival which put them in a position to be able to question the operations of the factory. By not relying on the factory for either economic or social advantage, they would incur no risk if the factory were to shut down, while the opposite was true for Hangberg. In this way, FAHB benefited from stable access to resources which gave them an element of power, in line with the first dimensional view of power. Many of these resources, including access to the internet, familiarity and understanding of social media platforms, research and communication skills, the availability of personal funding, as well as access to democratic spaces and institutions, such as the ward councillor and the sub-council, were afforded to them to largely because of white privilege. In this way, FAHB had access to the hegemonic structures, practices, and ideologies that reproduced their privileged status (Kendall, 2012; Pulido, 2014). This privilege significantly influenced their ability to effectively engage with Oceana, the City, and the broader Hout Bay community.

While these elements of white privilege worked to FAHB's advantage in terms of successfully politicising the issue, it also caused unintended consequences, mostly seen through their 'ontological expansiveness' (Sullivan, 2006:10). While FAHB's position on the emissions was 'right', both in terms of being aligned with the principles of sustainability and the evidence that would later emerge about the health impacts of the emissions, people from Hangberg viewed this as a continuation of white domination, reinforcing the notion of white privilege. This in turn made them resistant to notions of developing the harbour. This highlights the very deeply rooted issues of how socio-economic and power inequality can derail the process for achieving sustainable development, even with the best of intentions (Matthews, 2012), and that development initiatives will continue to be hindered unless this power inequality is addressed.

8.2. Power and Development

The interaction of these power dynamics had a very real impact on the decision-making process for development in the Hout Bay harbour – while various internal and external development plans had been proposed (as discussed in Chapter 7), none of these ever materialised and instead left the harbour in a development stalemate.

The existence of these plans demonstrates that there has indeed been a clear intention for harbour development to occur, both from the community and different spheres of government, yet nothing has ever transpired. With the on-going battle for control of the harbours between local and national government, one respondent concluded that development in the harbour would never occur because, at the end of the day, 'it's all just a game of power and politics' (Community Activist 2, 2019). More specifically, it is a game of power with different logics driving the City and national government – while the City is primarily interested in the land surrounding the harbour in terms of maximising land value, national government is more interested in the oceans economy and securing the national fishing industry.

8.2.1. Key Findings and Analysis

Based on these findings, several conclusions can be drawn about power and the influence that power dynamics have over decision-making processes.

Conventional and formal power over decision-making matters. The formal institutions of government are fundamentally in control of decision-making on development policy and implementation and despite instances of influence and agenda-setting that civil society can demonstrate, there is no way around this in terms of effecting actual decision-making outcomes. Spaces for participation exist but are limited, and remain largely ineffective for encouraging meaningful discourse, which again reinforces and strengthens the formal power that decision-makers have. This demonstrates that mechanisms of 'power over' are predominantly used to ensure the interests of decision-makers are maintained.

The powerful do not necessarily act in a manner that is democratic or just, and may even manipulate decision-making through the control of information, repression, disinformation, and lying. They use these mechanisms to depoliticise issues in order to maintain the status quo when it serves their interests, and use the same mechanisms to politicise issues when it does not serve their interests. They are even willing to use racial and social division within the community to advance their interests, which are predominantly economically driven and often at the expense of the local community. This again demonstrates that 'power over' is used to ensure that particular interests of the powerful are maintained.

Government works in partnership, particularly, in this case, with big capital, to build the city and, more generally, to make society, demonstrating elements of 'power to' and the collective capacity to govern. The relationship between business and government resembles that of a regime, where big businesses and government institutions are incorporated into

governing coalitions. These regimes, however, can also take the form of cabals where specific businesses and government officials collude across the boundaries of state and market to secure their particularistic interests. In this case, a rent-extracting cabal was evident, focused on sea and land rental extractions that served to maintain the economic interests of big business, national government (sea-rental) and local government (land rental). These partnerships can be understood as a form of 'power to' and this relationship is as important as the forms of 'power over' that define many of their power mechanisms.

In this way, the concepts of 'power to' and 'power over' are not binary and can be straddled at different times to effect different outcomes. To this end, for effective change to take place, it is essential to consider Lukes' (2005) third dimensional view of power and to understand more deeply the invisible power mechanisms that drive performativity. How people view their identity, their place in society, and their sense of belonging directly influences their relationships to other people and society, which itself has a direct impact on both governance, social sustainability, and the development agenda. The intention of development, particularly in an urban context, is to improve the quality of life for all people, while fostering an environment that encourages integration, and allowing culturally and socially diverse groups to co-habitat. This research demonstrates that this cannot be achieved if the invisible forces of power are ignored because they play a fundamental role in determining these outcomes, and in this way, mechanisms to encourage 'power with' need to be more fully developed.

Civil society can use key freedoms and democratic processes to impact public debate, for example to politicise what government works to depoliticise, and to challenge and contest both governments and businesses misrepresentations of truth. In this way, civil society has some power to set new agendas for discourse and disrupt old consensuses, and they can disrupt and delay the formulating and implementation of decisions by powerful actors. Fundamentally, however, civil society remains weak because they lack authority and resources, and thus their main avenues of power are seen in their ability to stimulate public debate, protest, participate in elections, and use the court systems, and it is these very elements that powerful actors try to disrupt. In addition, civil society has a tendency to be divided in terms of race and class which leads to radically different priorities, interests and perceptions of both government effectiveness and the process to follow to elicit social change. This division makes broad based social unification extremely difficult, which in turn makes civil society vulnerable to divide and rule tactics of those in power.

The combination of these power dynamics has a direct impact on the attainment of development. At best, it leads to development that is economically oriented and skewed in favour of those who have power, thus maintaining existing power relationships. At worst, it can delay or even prevent development from occurring at all, which again perpetuates existing power dynamics, reinforces socio-economic inequalities, destabilises civil society, and fails to meet the needs of local communities.

8.2.2. Where Does the Power Lie to Influence Decision-Making about Sustainable Development?

Considering the research question for this thesis, where then does the power lie to influence decision-making about development?

To answer this, we must first return to the fundamental understanding of what development is and how it should operate. This research has shown that sustainable development is achieved through the balanced interaction between three key components: the economy, the environment, and society. While the definition of sustainable development appears simple, and the term offers an easily grasped concept that satisfies a common-sense logic, it is in fact extraordinarily complex. The goals expressed are multidimensional, requiring a balancing act of many objectives, and determining success or failure in achieving these objectives remains challenging (Harris, 2000).

Within these three components, the achievement of social sustainability is equally as complex, particularly within urban environments. Cities are considered as the 'drivers of sustainable development' (Klopp and Petretta, 2017:92) and have typically focused on issues such as waste management, transport, energy usage, and other more technically-oriented elements of social living. There is, however, growing recognition of the need to include issues such as community cohesion, cultural values, health and well-being, local democracy, participation and empowerment, sense of place and belonging, and social justice, among a range of other elements. In this sense, urban development should aim to improve the quality of life for all people, while simultaneously fostering an environment that encourages integration, allowing culturally and socially groups to co-habitat, within the physical and environmental boundaries of their places (Weingaertner and Moberg, 2014).

Both public and private sectors play a role in achieving this. While the agents of change are often found within the public sector and local authorities, the private sector, including businesses and companies, play an important role too, considering the multi-level complexities of governance (Kearns and Paddison, 2000). While corporate social responsibility has emerged as a mechanism to help the private sector become more sustainable, it is important to realise that the sustainability of an individual organisation is not necessarily compatible with the sustainability of society at large (ISO, 2009), particularly considering the more overarching social elements such as social inclusion and cohesion. As such, it is important to have strong public authorities and mechanisms to reduce the risk of some stakeholders high-jacking the sustainability process to pursue their own interests (Weingaertner and Moberg, 2014). For social sustainability to be achieved, social equity and the sustainability of community need to be at the forefront of decision-making.

With this understanding of what the driving principles of social sustainability should be, this research has demonstrated that development in Hout Bay, particularly in the context of the fishmeal factory case study, is not in line with the approaches necessary to achieve sustainability.

The research has demonstrated that, rather than promoting social inclusion and cohesion, health and well-being, a sense of place and belonging, and local democracy and participation, development decisions in Hout Bay are primarily focused on the economic and political interests of government and big capital, often at the expense of the local community. The development approaches of these powerful actors are not focused on the participation and inclusion of local communities, nor do they promote equity and empowerment, thereby undermining the very principles of what social sustainability is intended to achieve. Indeed, the democratic processes in place for local communities to participate in decision-making are dysfunctional and no meaningful participation occurs, further undermining the essential understanding that people are active subjects who should shape and contribute to the development strategies around them. The development decisions taken in Hout Bay, or lack thereof, have not promoted social justice, and have in fact perpetuated existing inequalities and the deep-set feelings of marginalisation, and strengthened the social divisions that were already in existence. Within the Hout Bay harbour, the sea is viewed as good for business while the land is viewed as good for gentrification, and both of these views compromise the very essence of social sustainability.

Due to the nature of power dynamics in Hout Bay, it is evident that the principles of social sustainability have not been put into practice, which has compromised the achievement of sustainable development as a whole – a balance has not been found between the economic, environmental, and social realities, and have instead been skewed to favour the economic and political interests of those in power. This case study has demonstrated that 'power with', the synergy which can emerge through partnerships and collaboration with others, the finding of common ground to build collective strength (Hunjan and Pettit, 2011), remains elusive, and that notions of 'power to' and 'power over' are the driving factors for decision-making. Indeed, this research demonstrates that those in power, namely the City and big business, actively avoid the meaningful participation of civil society and as a result, they undermine the attainment of good governance and sustainable development as a whole.

While this research points to the failure of the democratic systems designed to encourage participation, it is not to say that all hope is lost. This research has also demonstrated that while civil society may not have the capacity to make decisions, they certainly have the power to influence them, both through the politicisation of issues and through protest action. While civil society may only be a ripple against the tide of power, they are still a ripple, and it is through the strengthening of these ripples that change can eventually take place. To this end, the research has demonstratedde that strong internal leadership, effective communication, community mobilisation, and fundamentally, unity between civil society groups, are essential components for strengthening civil society voices and their influence on development within their own communities. By utilising these components, civil society has the ability to expose the hypocrisy of government, thus inspiring greater accountability, promoting better governance, and influencing a development trajectory that considers local voices more deeply.

For true development to occur within Hout Bay, new strategies need to be undertaken that take into account the power dynamics present and that foster better participation and inclusion of the local community. Specifically, government and big capital need to change their development approach and move from using 'power over' and 'power to' mechanisms and focus instead on 'power with' to ensure the building of real partnerships and synergies with the local community. In addition, more attention needs to be placed on strengthening local democratic institutions that can administer these initiatives – the current disconnected power structures inhibit development, as is seen with the continued lack of development of the Hout Bay harbour and the on-going sense of marginalisation experienced by the local community. Until this is achieved, the goal of sustainable development remains elusive.

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Interviews

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2. Community Activist 2 (2019). Interviewed by Kiara Worth. 7 March 2019.
3. Community Leader 1 (2019). Interviewed by Kiara Worth. 12 March 2019.
4. Community Leader 2 (2019). Interviewed by Kiara Worth. 12 March 2019.
5. Community Leader 3 (2019). Interviewed by Kiara Worth. 13 March 2019.
6. Community Leader 4 (2019). Interviewed by Kiara Worth. 18 March 2019.
7. Hout Bay Civil Society 1 (2019). Interviewed by Kiara Worth. 13 March 2019.
8. Hout Bay Civil Society 2 (2019). Interviewed by Kiara Worth. 14 March 2019.
9. Hout Bay Civil Society 3 (2019). Interviewed by Kiara Worth. 28 March 2019.
10. FAHB Representative 1 (2019). Interviewed by Kiara Worth. 29 March 2019.
11. City Representative (2019). Interviewed by Kiara Worth. 8 March 2019.
12. Oceana Representative (2019). Interviewed by Kiara Worth. 14 March 2019.
13. Community Interviews (2019). Interviews conducted by research assistant Conrad Meyer. March 2019.

APPENDIX A:

REDACTED HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT

5 Sulphur dioxide human health review

5.1 Background information

Conversion of sulphur dioxide (SO_2) to sulphur trioxide (SO_3) in air is not rapid and is disregarded in the exposure and risk calculations in this document. Any conversion to sulphur trioxide and associated health effects are implicitly included in the epidemiological studies in which health effects of sulphur dioxide were quantified.

5.2 Cancer

There is no definitive evidence for an increased cancer potential from sulphur dioxide in humans. According to the US Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR 1999) none of the available studies clearly show carcinogenic effects of sulphur dioxide in humans or animals. Studies that investigated workers in the copper smelting, pulp and paper industries were inconclusive, because workers were also exposed to arsenic and other chemicals. The USEPA (2008) reviewed several animal toxicological studies indicating that sulphur dioxide at high concentrations may cause DNA damage, but fails to induce carcinogenesis, co-carcinogenesis, or tumour promotion. It was concluded that epidemiological studies did not provide evidence that long-term exposure to sulphur dioxide is associated with an increased incidence of or mortality from lung cancer. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC 1992) has classified sulphur dioxide as Group 3, not classifiable as to human carcinogenicity.

5.3 Short-term exposure

Evaluation of the health evidence has led to the conclusion that there is a causal relationship between respiratory morbidity and short-term exposure to sulphur dioxide. This conclusion is supported by the consistency, coherence, and plausibility of findings in epidemiological, human clinical and animal toxicological studies. Epidemiological studies were mostly for 24-hour average exposures, clinical studies ranged from 5 to 10 minutes of exposure, and animal

studies used exposures of minutes to hours. Associations are indicated between short-term exposure to sulphur dioxide and several measures of respiratory health, including respiratory symptoms, inflammation, airway hyper-responsiveness, emergency department visits and hospitalisations for respiratory causes (USEPA 2008).

Epidemiological studies provide consistent evidence of an association between ambient sulphur dioxide and respiratory symptoms in children, particularly those with asthma or chronic respiratory symptoms. Evidence of an association with respiratory symptoms in adults is inconsistent. Sulphur dioxide related respiratory effects are more pronounced in asthmatic children and older adults (65+ years). The estimates for emergency department visits and hospitalisations for all respiratory causes, including asthma, ranged from negligible to a 20 per cent excess risk per 10-ppb increase in 24-hour averaged sulphur dioxide. Estimates were particularly significant among children and older adults (65+ years). The observed effects of sulphur dioxide on respiratory endpoints appear to be independent of other ambient air pollutants (USEPA 2008).

Epidemiological studies reported associations between mortality and sulphur dioxide, often at mean 24-hour averaged levels less than 10 ppb, and the evidence was suggestive of a causal relationship. The USEPA's conclusions regarding the key health effects for which causality is accepted (USEPA 2008) are summarised in Table 5.3.1.

Table 5.3.1: USEPA causality determination for health effects associated with short-term SO_2 exposure.

Health endpoint	Causality determination	Associated health effect
Cardiovascular effects	Inadequate evidence to infer a causal relationship	Diseases of the heart and vascular system
Respiratory effects	Causal	• Respiratory symptoms (wheeze, chest tightness) • ED visits and HAs for respiratory symptoms • Decreased lung function
Mortality	Suggestive	• All-cause (natural) mortality • Cardiopulmonary mortality: death due to the irreversible loss of function in the heart and lungs

ED: Emergency department visits
HA: Hospital admissions

Based on the causality assessment, the INFOTOX HHRA focused on respiratory effects. Risk factors for respiratory effects listed in Table 5.3.2 are based on 24-hour mean sulphur dioxide concentrations.

Table 5.3.2: Summary of short-term SO_2 health risk factors.

Health effect	Per cent increased risk per 10 ppb SO_2 increase	RR per 10 ppb SO_2 increase
Asthma admissions: children	5.0	1.050
Respiratory admissions including asthma: all ages	4.0	1.040
Asthma admissions: all ages	4.0	1.040
Respiratory admissions older people (65+ years) all causes including asthma	4.0	1.040

5.4 Long-term exposure

Risk factors for chronic exposures are not given in this report. The USEPA (2008) reviewed the literature with regard to mortality and concluded that the lack of consistency and the lack of strong and significant associations precluded the inference of a causal relationship. The USEPA also reviewed several epidemiological studies that examined the effects of long-term exposure to sulphur dioxide on asthma, bronchitis, and respiratory symptoms. Positive associations were observed in children, but the USEPA concluded that it was difficult to assess the direct impact of long-term exposure because of the variety of outcomes and inconsistencies in the results. It was also concluded that epidemiological and animal toxicological evidence was inadequate to infer that long-term exposure to sulphur dioxide has a detrimental effect on lung function. Similar conclusions were reached with regard to potential detrimental effects on birth outcomes.



8 Conclusions

- Modelled concentrations of the odorous substances hydrogen sulphide and trimethylamine at Site 1 (Erf 2697) and Site 2 (Erf 2885) are such that the presence of these compounds in ambient air cannot be associated with potential health risks at either Site 1 or Site 2. This is valid for exposure to single compounds and for simultaneous exposure to both compounds.

- The modelled concentrations of PM2.5 are associated with negligible and insignificant health risks that are not of concern at either site. Exposure and risks were assessed over the long and over the short term and risks were not significant, regardless of whether long or short term exposure was considered. Therefore, risks at the two sites due to exposure to PM2.5 contributed by the factory are not of concern regardless of the period of exposure.

- The factory's potential contributions to risks associated with exposure to sulphur dioxide at the two sites were not of concern and are unlikely to be viewed as significant.

- Health risks associated with exposure to the contaminants of interest at Site 1 and Site 2 are not of concern. The risks are not significant and are not prohibitive of residential development and occupation of residences at the proposed sites.

5 OUTPUT C: Environmental health risk assessment

5.1 Health risk conclusions

The levels of exposure to hydrogen sulphide at Sites 1 and 2 for repeated short-term exposure to hydrogen sulphide that may occur over months to years, represented by the 75th percentile of the modelled data, are unlikely to be associated with detrimental health effects. The 90th percentile concentrations representing acute exposure to high levels, which may occur occasionally, are also not associated with an unacceptable risk to health.

Exposure levels of trimethylamine are all comfortably in the acceptable range and health risks associated with exposure to trimethylamine are not expected at any of the two sites.

The modelled concentrations of particulates (PM2.5) are associated with negligible and insignificant health risks that are not of concern at either site. Exposure and risks were assessed over the long and over the short term and risks were not significant, regardless of whether long or short term exposure was considered. Therefore, risks at the two sites due to exposure to PM2.5 contributed by the factory are not of concern regardless of the period of exposure.

The factory's contribution to risks associated with exposure to sulphur dioxide at the two sites is not of concern and risks are unlikely to be viewed as significant.

5.2 Recommendations

The assessments conducted by INFOTOX confirmed that health risks based on modelled concentrations of hydrogen sulphide, trimethylamine, PM2.5 and sulphur dioxide are not at a level where exposure of members of the public at Sites 1 and 2 may lead to adverse health effects. The sites are thus safe for residential development in so far as health risks associated with inhalation of ambient air at the sites are concerned.

6.2 Recommendations

This INFOTOX health risk assessment has ruled out adverse health effects associated with emissions from the Lucky Star factory as primary consideration in the assessment of the suitability of Erven 2697 & 2885, Hangberg, Hout Bay, for residential development. The issue of odour, however, remains to be evaluated.

It is difficult to predict responses of individuals in a community to odorous air emissions. Firstly, there is not always agreement on what an offensive odour is and at which concentration it would become annoying. Secondly, olfactory fatigue, also referred to as odour fatigue or olfactory adaptation, is a well-documented inability to distinguish a particular odour after prolonged exposure. This complicates the assessment of odour as a determinant in critical decisions around residential development. It is thus not possible for INFOTOX to draw a "clear line"

6 Conclusion

- Modelled long-term hourly-averaged concentrations of hydrogen sulphide at Sites 1 and 2 are unlikely to cause serious complaints of odour annoyance, although it is likely that the odour of hydrogen sulphide will be detected and recognised at Site 2. However, on those occasions when higher concentrations occur at Site 2, it is likely that the odour will be regarded as unacceptable and may lead to complaints.

- The odour of trimethylamine at Site 1 is likely to be noticeable for considerable periods of time and might be regarded as unacceptable by some individuals. There is a likelihood of odour annoyance during those brief periods when the higher trimethylamine concentrations are prevalent at Site 1. The potential for odour annoyance due to trimethylamine at Site 2 is considerable. Even considering uncertainties inherent to the impact assessment methodology, it is likely that odour detection of trimethylamine at Site 2 will be rated as unacceptable for most of the time.

- People in need might accept the risk of odour annoyance in view of the perceived benefit of formal housing. However, it should not be a surprise that some people might find the odour sufficiently offensive over the long term to lodge formal complaints.

APPENDIX B:

HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT

RPS.1"

INFOTOX (Pty) Ltd

Established 1991 2001/000870/07

Retrieval and scientific interpretation of ecotoxicological information

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Health Ris

Project conducted on behalf of City of Cape Town

Environmental Health Risk Assessment Erven 8474 & 9652 Hangberg, Hout Bay

OUTPUT C: Environmental Health Risk Assessment

Report No 051-2014 Rev 2.0

Compiled by

Willie van Niekerk PhD QEP(USA) Pr Sci Nat (Environmental Science)
Marlene Fourie PhD MSc Pr Sci Nat (Toxicological Science)

14 November 2014

Copyright Warning

WCA van Niekerk PhD QEP (USA) Pr Sci Nat (Environmental Science)
Managing Director

14 November 2014

Expertise and Declaration of Independence

This report was prepared by INFOTOX (Pty) Ltd ("INFOTOX"). Established in 1991, INFOTOX is a professional scientific company, highly focused in the discipline of ecotoxicological risk assessment. Both occupational and environmental human health risks, as well as risks to ecological receptors, are addressed.

Dr Willie van Niekerk, Managing Director of INFOTOX, has BSc, Hons BSc and MSc degrees from the University of Potchefstroom and a PhD from the University of South Africa. He is a Qualified Environmental Professional (QEP), certified by the Institute of Professional Environmental Practice (IPEP) in the USA (No 07960160), and a registered Professional Natural Scientist (Pr Sci Nat, Environmental Science, No 400284/04). Dr Van Niekerk has specialised in chemical toxicology and human health risk assessments, but he has experience in many other areas in the disciplines of analytical and environmental sciences.

Dr Marlene Fourie has BSc and Hons BSc degrees from the University of Stellenbosch and MSc and PhD degrees from the University of Pretoria. Her field of specialisation is reproductive biology/toxicology. Dr Fourie also has an MSc-degree in epidemiology from the University of Pretoria. Following positions as Medical Natural Scientist at the Andrology Unit, Department of Urology, University of Pretoria and the Pretoria Academic Hospital from 1987 to 2001, she joined INFOTOX as a Medical Biological Scientist. Dr Fourie has conducted many health risk assessments and projects relating to the health status of communities. She is registered as a Professional Natural Scientist (Pr Sci Nat, Toxicological Science, No 400190/14).

This specialist report was compiled for the City of Cape Town. We do hereby declare that we are financially and otherwise independent of the City of Cape Town.

Signed on behalf of INFOTOX (Pty) Ltd, duly authorised in the capacity of Managing Director:

Willem Christiaan Abraham van Niekerk

14 November 2014

Executive Summary

The Department of Development and Delivery, Directorate Human Settlements of the City of Cape Town appointed INFOTOX (Pty) Ltd ("INFOTOX") to conduct an environmental health risk assessment with regard to a proposed housing development on Erven 9652 and 8474, Hangberg, Hout Bay, adjacent to a fish rendering plant in the Hout Bay Harbour Precinct. This development will place a large community in very close proximity to hazardous emissions and odours from the plant. A number of complaints were received by the authorities from residents living in Hout Bay about exposure to emissions from the fish rendering plant.

It is essential for the City to have a clear understanding of potential impacts of emissions from the rendering plant on the health of residents of the proposed housing development prior to undertaking construction. This report describes the methodologies that were followed for quantification of exposure and health risks and reports on the findings of INFOTOX.

The investigation focused on the emission of hydrogen sulphide, trimethylamine, particulate matter and sulphur dioxide from the fish rendering plant. Assessment of the concentrations to which residents in the proposed housing development are exposed, is based on the results of mathematical air dispersion modelling conducted by Airshed Planning Professionals (Pty) Ltd ("Airshed").

Measured emissions data were not available and modelling was conducted on the basis of published emission factor data related to fish rendering plants and mass balance calculations. Two emission scenarios were modelled, namely, emission estimates based on central (middle) source values and upper estimates based on reasonable maximum source values. It should be noted that the sulphur dioxide emission factors were based on the assumption that all four of the boilers that contribute to emissions are operated simultaneously. Although this is not necessarily always the case, the assumption avoids underestimation of concentrations, because boiler operation schedules cannot be predicted by INFOTOX.

The following conclusions were reached:

- A potential contribution of the fish rendering plant to PM2.5 exposure, with a resultant potential risk of exacerbation of asthma symptoms in asthmatic residents in the proposed development cannot be excluded, and cannot be viewed as insignificant. This should be indicated as a source of concern, since it is likely that complaints will arise from asthmatic residents.

- Chronic exposure to PM2.5 is of concern at site 2. It is doubtful that potential residents would accept that 1 in 5 (20 per cent) of the annual cases of bronchitis in children could potentially be related to exposure to PM2.5 emitted from the fish rendering plant. However, it is important to view this in the light of limited confidence in the estimation of human health risks based on annual average ambient concentrations, while a scenario of long term intermittent (seasonal) exposure is actually applicable. Unfortunately, models for seasonal exposure are nog available and it was necessary to resort to the "classic" long term models to gain at least an indication of potential risks. The potential occurrence of adverse health effects associated with chronic exposure to PM2.5 at site 2 cannot be dismissed.

- The potential contribution of the fish rendering plant to the risk of mortality amongst the residents of the proposed development was assessed for chronic exposure to PM2.5. In

view of the uncertainties and limitations inherent to various aspects of the assessment, the mortality risks cannot be seen as significant, and cannot be indicated as a source of concern. The risks might not be significantly different from zero, and would thus be negligible at Sites 1 and 2.

- The human health risks associated with SO_2 can be viewed as severe at both sites. SO_2 emissions from the plant would be sufficient cause for practically all of the cases of health effects that might occur on those days when the modelled highest maximum SO_2 concentrations are prevalent. This is applicable to lower respiratory tract or asthma symptoms in children, and to respiratory hospital admissions in children. The risks are smaller for respiratory hospitalisation in older people, but still unacceptable, even in view of the uncertainties associated with the estimates.

- Regarding SO_2 exposure, the daily risks of respiratory effects, including but not limited to exacerbation of asthma, will be unacceptable on probably more than one day per year, particularly for children. In addition, the health effects are likely to be severe enough to require hospitalisation or at least a visit to a doctor or to a hospital emergency room and the frequency of such severe effects is likely to be considerable. This is true for Site 1 and Site 2.

- Exposure to the odorous and irritant compound trimethylamine is not of concern at Site 1 or Site 2.

- Exposure to H_2S is not of concern at Site 1, even if simultaneous exposure to trimethylamine and H_2S is considered.

- Exposure to H_2S at Site 2 is of concern with regard to potential difficulties in breathing, irritation of the eyes, headache and nausea. Concern at Site 2 is indicated regardless of whether middle or upper source emissions estimates are prevalent, even though the number of people at risk cannot be quantified.

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1 Introduction and terms of reference

The Department of Development and Delivery, Directorate Human Settlements of the City of Cape Town appointed INFOTOX (Pty) Ltd ("INFOTOX") to conduct an environmental health risk assessment with regard to a proposed housing development on Erven 9652 and 8474, Hangberg, Hout Bay, adjacent to a fish rendering plant in the Hout Bay Harbour Precinct. This development will place a large community in very close proximity to hazardous emissions and odours from the Plant. A number of complaints were received by the authorities from residents living in Hout Bay about exposure to emissions from the fish rendering plant.

It is essential for the City to have a clear understanding of potential impacts of emissions from the rendering plant on the health of residents of the proposed housing development prior to undertaking construction. This report describes the methodologies that were followed for quantification of exposure and health risks and reports on the findings of INFOTOX.

2 The study area

The study area is shown in Figure 2.1. The proposed development sites are on Erven 9652 and 8474, referred to as Sites 1 and 2, respectively, indicated within red boundaries. The Lucky Star Hout Bay fishmeal factory is located on the opposite side of Hout Bay Harbour Road.

Figure 2.1: Map of the study area (Provided by the City of Cape Town).

3 Health risk assessment of criteria pollutants

3.1 Outline of the risk assessment approach

As discussed in the background document, the investigation is required to focus on air emissions emanating from the fish rendering plant in Hout Bay since it has the potential to emit pollutants such as hydrogen sulphide, trimethylamine, particulate matter and sulphur dioxide.

In the case of the criteria pollutants (particulate matter (PM2.5) and sulphur dioxide (SO_2)), mortality or hospitalisation rates for respiratory or cardiovascular causes are the measure of associated illness that is mostly applied in epidemiological studies of community health risks associated with exposure to these pollutants. Air concentrations of compounds that exceed the ambient air quality guidelines or standards indicate that adverse health conditions may develop, but simple comparisons between exposure concentrations and ambient air quality guidelines are inadequate to quantify health outcomes. Ambient air quality guidelines are used for management of air quality and are not intended for risk quantification. It is important to note that it is common to observe increases in mortality or hospitalisation rates even when the available air concentrations do not exceed the environmental air quality guidelines. For example, researchers have not been able to establish a safe threshold below which there are no health risks and health effects from exposure to PM2.5 concentrations below PM air quality standards have been documented (WHO 2000 and 2005). Assessment of impacts of air pollutants on health may therefore not be restricted to areas in which the guideline concentrations are exceeded, but should also include areas in which concentrations are within limits. Current statistical methods use the concept of relative risk ratios (RR) to derive the potential percentage increase in effects.

In general, predicted or measured impacts of industrial emissions on air quality are used as a basis to quantify impacts on health. Quantification of health impacts is achieved by calculating the potential increase in hospital admissions or in mortality due to specific causes, associated with increased air concentrations of specific toxic compounds. These calculations are based on results of studies reported in the international scientific literature in which statistical methods were used to compare changes in hospitalisation or mortality rates with changes in air quality. The international scientific literature is not static and major regulatory agencies such as the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the UK Committee on the Medical Effects of Air Pollutants (COMEAP) regularly review their risk models.

3.2 Exposure assessment

Assessment of the concentrations to which residents might be exposed is based on the results of mathematical air dispersion modelling conducted by Airshed Planning Professionals (Pty) Ltd ("Airshed"). The methodology and the results of the modelling are reported by Airshed in Output B. The methodology included:

- Compilation of an emissions inventory for the activities conducted at the fish rendering plant, and
- Atmospheric dispersion modelling of the primary pollutants and odorous compounds potentially emitted from the plant.

Measured emissions data were not available and modelling was conducted on the basis of published emission factor data related to fish rendering plants and mass balance calculations. Two emission scenarios were modelled, namely, emission estimates based on central (middle) source values and upper estimates based on reasonable maximum source values. The assumptions and scientific approaches are presented in the Airshed report (Burger and Grobler 2014). It should be noted that the SO_2 emission factors were based on the assumption that all four of the boilers that contribute to emissions are operated simultaneously. Although this is not necessarily always the case, the assumption avoids underestimation of concentrations, because boiler operation schedules cannot be predicted by INFOTOX.

Airshed provided ground-level ambient air concentration isopleths of hydrogen sulphide, trimethylamine and the criteria pollutants PM2.5 and SO_2 (Figures 3.2.1 to 3.2.3). Concentration isopleths are contour lines in different colours representing locations with similar concentrations. A set of concentration isopleths should not be interpreted as discrete lines, but rather as a continuum of concentrations.

The study area is characterised by complex topography and meteorology and concentration isopleths at Site 1 show trends that may be artefacts. Burger and Grobler (2014) recommended that these isopleths be joined to avoid underestimation of concentrations due to artefacts. The criteria pollutants are dealt with firstly in this report.

Concentration isopleths for the highest daily PM2.5 concentrations are illustrated in Figure 3.2.1. The highest daily PM2.5 concentration at the proposed developments was estimated to be approximately 20 $\mu g/m^3$, while concentrations of 30 $\mu g/m^3$ might also be reached.



Figure 3.2.1: Highest daily PM2.5 ground level concentrations due to all Lucky Star sources (Burger and Grobler 2014).

Annual average concentration isopleths for PM2.5 are illustrated in Figure 3.2.2 below. It is clear that the two sites earmarked for the proposed development are subjected to different estimated annual average PM2.5 concentrations. These sites were clearly delineated in Figure 2.1 and are referred to as Site 1 and Site 2. The annual average PM2.5 concentration at Site 1 was estimated to be less than 2 µg/m^3 and that at Site 2 approximately 8 µg/m^3.



Figure 3.2.2: **Annual average PM2.5 concentration due to all Lucky Star sources (Burger and Grobler 2014).**

Concentration isopleths for the highest daily SO_2 concentrations are illustrated in Figure 3.2.3. The highest daily SO_2 concentration at Site 1 was estimated to be approximately 500 µg/m^3 and that at Site 2 approximately 1 000 µg/m^3. Since the risk factors (Table 4.3.1) are related to concentration changes measured in ppb, the concentrations in µg/m^3 were converted to ppb (Table 3.2.1).



Figure 3.2.3: **Highest daily SO_2 ground level concentrations due to all Lucky Star sources (Burger and Grobler 2014).**

Table 3.2.1: **Highest daily SO_2 concentration estimates at the proposed development site.**

Site	SO_2 in µg/m³	SO_2 in ppb
Site 1	500	190.8
Site 2	1 000	381.7

4 Risk quantification for criteria pollutants

4.1 Consideration of causality

Epidemiological and experimental human exposure studies are significant techniques that are used to investigate the relationship between health effects and exposure to particulate matter (PM) and SO_2. Epidemiological studies typically focus on incidence rates for various health endpoints such as cases of respiratory and cardiovascular disease, hospital admission and/or premature mortality. The purpose is to show a cause - effect relationship where cause relates to exposure and effect is the disease or death as a result of cause (exposure). Causation is an

essential concept in epidemiology, yet there is no single, clearly expressed definition for causation. A statistically significant association between cause and an effect does not infer a causal relationship, although a strong association is often an indication of causality. Adequate evidence is necessary to establish a causal relationship between exposure and a consequence.

Significant criteria used to determine causality include the strength of association, temporality, consistency, theoretical plausibility, coherence, specificity in the causes, dose response relationships, experimental evidence and analogy. Causality determinations are therefore based on the evaluation and synthesis of evidence from across scientific disciplines. If evidence is sufficient to conclude that a causal relationship is likely to exist with relevant pollutant exposures, but important uncertainties remain, the relationship is referred to as "likely to be causal". That means that chance and bias can be ruled out with reasonable confidence, but potential issues may remain (USEPA 2009).

Particulate matter and SO_2 may be causal or likely to be causal to different health effects depending on the duration of exposure. The USEPA's conclusions regarding short and long-term exposure to PM2.5 and SO_2 and key health effects for which causality is accepted are summarised in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 below (USEPA 2009).

4.2 Particulate matter

Particles smaller than 10 µm in aerodynamic diameter provide important evidence regarding the health effects of particulate matter (PM) in general. PM10 is comprised of both fine (PM2.5) and thoracic coarse particles (PM10-2.5) that have distinct effects on health. Growing empirical evidence demonstrates a relationship between fine particle pollution and adverse health effects and these were associated with short- and long-term exposure to fine particles. USEPA (2009) published an Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) on health effects associated with exposure to airborne particulates. Although the USEPA (2009) included PM10 health studies in the ISA for particulate matter, the ISA did not draw any conclusions regarding causality for short- or long-term exposure to PM10, but focused on PM(10-2.5). This was because the Agency had previously determined that the health effects of fine and coarse fractions of PM10 should be considered separately, based on evidence of serious health effects in areas that complied with PM10 air quality standards. As a result, the updated causality determinations of the USEPA are described in terms of PM2.5, PM10-2.5, and ultra-fine particle size fractions (USEPA 2009).

The USEPA concluded that PM2.5 was the indicator of choice for fine particles. One reason was that PM2.5 risk estimates were consistently positive, and slightly larger than those reported for PM10 for all-cause, and respiratory- and cardiovascular-related mortality. Furthermore, the causality of associations between long-term exposure to PM(10-2.5) and health outcomes such as cardiovascular and respiratory effects are deemed "inadequate", while associations of health outcomes with PM2.5 are concluded to be "causal" and "likely to be causal". Considering short-term exposure, associations were "suggestive" of causality in the case of PM(10-2.5), but "causal" and "likely to be causal" in the case of PM2.5 (USEPA 2009).

The approach of using PM2.5 as the indicator of choice is supported by other international authorities. COMEAP (2007) also concluded that strong evidence of an association between long-term exposure to particulate air pollution and effects on mortality exists, and that PM2.5 was the most satisfactory index of particulate air pollution for quantitative assessments. The WHO (2005) also based their most recent particulate matter guidelines on epidemiological

studies of PM2.5, and then extrapolated the resulting PM2.5 guideline to a PM10 guideline. This was done because "*at present the majority of monitoring data is based on measurement of PM_{10} as opposed to other particulate matter metrics*".

The USEPA's conclusions regarding short and long-term exposure to PM2.5 and key health effects for which causality is accepted are summarised in Table 4.2.1 (USEPA 2009).

Table 4.2.1: USEPA causality determination on health effects for PM2.5.

Short-term exposure		
Health endpoint	**Causality determination**	**Likely outcome of exposure**
Cardiovascular effects	Causal	Myocardial ischemia[Note 1]
		Congestive heart failure
		Altered vasomotor function[Note 2]
Respiratory effects	Likely to be causal	Alterations in lung function and respiratory symptoms in asthmatic children
		Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease[Note 3]
		Respiratory infections
Mortality	Causal	Cardiovascular and respiratory mortality
Long-term exposure		
Health endpoint	**Causality determination**	**Likely outcome of exposure**
Cardiovascular effects	Causal	Higher blood pressure
		Increased blood coagulation[Note 4]
		Enhanced development of atherosclerosis[Note 5]
		Reduction in heart rate variability
		Increased risk of disease and stroke
Respiratory effects	Likely to be causal	Asthma
		Altered pulmonary function
		Chronic bronchitis
Cancer, mutagenicity, genotoxicity	Suggestive	Lung cancer
Reproductive and developmental	Suggestive	Low birth weight
Mortality	Causal	Cardiovascular mortality, lung cancer mortality and infant mortality due to respiratory causes

Notes:
[1] Reduced blood flow to the heart
[2] Stiffening and reduced flexibility of the blood vessels
[3] Disease of the lungs: Typically identified by narrowing of the airways resulting in restriction of air flow and consequently shortness of breath
[4] Process by which blood forms clots
[5] Hardening of the arteries

Risk factors (effect estimates or RRs) that were used in the short-term risk assessment for PM2.5 are listed in Table 4.2.2 and risk factors for chronic exposure in Table 4.2.3. The values that are presented are based on the weight of evidence of the studies in the USEPA literature.

Table 4.2.2: PM2.5 risk factors for short-term (24-hour mean PM2.5) health risk assessment.

Identified outcome	RR per 10 µg/m^3 PM2.5 increase	Reference
Non-injury (all-cause) mortality	1.01	USEPA 2009
Cardiovascular admissions	1.10	USEPA 2009
Asthma admission	1.02	USEPA 2009
Asthma exacerbation	1.20	USEPA 2009
COPD HA*	1.11	USEPA 2009
Respiratory admissions	1.10	USEPA 2009

*COPD HA: Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease hospital admission.

Table 4.2.3: PM2.5 risk factors for chronic (annual mean PM2.5) health risk assessment.

Identified outcome	RR per 10 µg/m^3 PM2.5 increase	Reference
Non-injury (all-cause) mortality	1.09	USEPA 2009
*Cardiovascular mortality	1.30	USEPA 2009
Bronchitis (children) hospital admissions	1.30	USEPA 2009

* Although risk factors for cardiovascular mortality

4.3 Sulphur dioxide

Conversion of SO_2 to SO_3 in air is not rapid and has been disregarded in the exposure and risk calculations in this section. Any conversion to SO_3 and associated health effects are implicitly included in the epidemiological studies in which health effects of SO_2 were quantified.

Table 4.3.1 lists the SO_2 risk factors for 24-hour exposures. Evaluation of the health evidence led to the conclusion that there is *a causal relationship between respiratory morbidity and short-term exposure to* SO_2. This conclusion is supported by the consistency, coherence, and plausibility of findings observed in human clinical studies with 5-to-10 minute exposures, epidemiological studies using largely 24-hour average exposures, and animal toxicological studies using exposures of minutes to hours. Associations are indicated between short-term (more than one hour, generally 24-hour averages) exposure to SO_2 and several measures of respiratory health, including respiratory symptoms, inflammation, airway hyperresponsiveness, and emergency department visits and hospitalisations for respiratory causes. The epidemiological evidence further indicates that the SO_2-related respiratory effects were more pronounced in asthmatic children and older adults (65+ years) (USEPA 2008).

Epidemiological studies provide consistent evidence of an association between ambient SO_2 exposures and increased respiratory symptoms in children, particularly those with asthma or chronic respiratory symptoms, while the epidemiological evidence on the association between SO_2 and respiratory symptoms in adults is inconsistent at current short-term averaged ambient SO_2 concentrations. The SO_2 effect estimates for emergency department visits and hospitalisations for all respiratory causes, including asthma, ranged from a negligible risk to a 20 per cent excess risk per 10-ppb increase in 24-hour averaged SO_2, particularly among children and older adults (age 65+ years). Findings suggest that the observed effects of SO_2

on respiratory endpoints are independent of the effects of other ambient air pollutants (USEPA 2008).

Regarding associations with mortality, recent epidemiological studies have reported associations between mortality and SO_2, often at mean 24-hour averaged levels less than 10 ppb, and the evidence was suggestive of a causal relationship. The range of the excess risk estimates for SO_2 on all-cause (but non-injury) mortality is 0.4 to 2 per cent per 10 ppb increase in 24-hour averaged SO_2 in several multicity studies and meta-analyses reviewed by the USEPA (2008). The USEPA concluded that the effect estimates for more specific categories may be larger.

Risk factors for cardiovascular effects were previously included for the quantification of human health risks, since biologically plausible modes of action (*e.g.*, vagally-mediated irritant responses and oxidative injury) that could explain short-term SO_2 effects on the cardiovascular system are rendered in the literature. However, the USEPA (2008) considered these modes of action in light of findings from additional animal toxicological, human clinical and epidemiological studies and concluded that the evidence as a whole was *inadequate to infer a causal relationship.* For this reason, cardiovascular effects are not quantified in this risk assessment, until further information on the matter might become available.

Toxicological parameters that were used in the risk assessment for SO_2 are listed in Table 4.3.1. Parameters are based on 24-hour mean SO_2 concentrations (short-term measurements) representing measurements of acute exposure periods that are statistically related to health effects.

Table 4.3.1: Summary of SO_2 risk factors for health risk assessment.

Short-term (based on a 24-hour mean SO_2 concentrations)			
Health effect	**Per cent increased risk per 10 ppb SO_2 increase**	**RR per 10 ppb SO_2 increase**	**Reference**
All-cause (but non-injury) mortality	0.4 to 2 (median 1)	1.01	USEPA 2008
Respiratory admissions children (0 - 14 years) all causes including asthma	Insignificant to 20 (median 20)	1.2	
Respiratory admissions older people (65+ years) all causes including asthma	Insignificant to 12 (median 5)	1.05	
Lower respiratory tract or asthma symptoms: children	Insignificant to 30 (median 15)	1.15	

Risk factors for chronic exposures are not given in this report. This requires some explanation, since the publication by Pope et al. (2002) was previously used to support estimation of mortality rates associated with long-term exposure. The USEPA (2008) reviewed the literature with regard to noncancer mortality effects and it was noted that two major US epidemiological studies observed associations between long-term exposure to SO_2 and mortality, but several other US and European cohort studies did not observe such an association. The lack of consistency and of strong and significant associations precluded the inference of a causal relationship by the USEPA. The USEPA also reviewed several epidemiological studies that examined the effects of long-term exposure to SO_2 on asthma, bronchitis, and respiratory symptoms. Although positive associations were observed in children, it was concluded that the variety of outcomes examined and the inconsistencies in the observed results made it difficult to assess the direct impact of long-term exposure of SO_2 on respiratory symptoms. It was also

concluded that epidemiological and animal toxicological evidence was inadequate to infer that long-term exposure to SO_2 has a detrimental effect on lung function. Similar conclusions were reached with regard to potential detrimental effects on birth outcomes. The USEPA (2008) reviewed several animal toxicological studies indicating that SO_2 at high concentrations may cause DNA damage, but fails to induce carcinogenesis, co-carcinogenesis, or tumour promotion. It was concluded that epidemiological studies did not provide evidence that long-term exposure to SO_2 is associated with an increased incidence of or mortality from lung cancer.

4.4 Calculation of risks

It was previously stated that current statistical methods use the concept of relative risk ratio (RR) to quantify health risks associated with exposure to a criteria air pollutant. These health risks may be expressed as a personal risk of experiencing key health effects or as the potential percentage increase in health effects in an exposed community, associated with exposure to a criteria air pollutant.

The potential number of additional deaths or hospital admissions brought on by an increase in the concentration of a pollutant is calculated using the following approach of the World Health Organization (WHO 2005 and Ostro 2004):

$$E = AF \times P \times B / 1000 \qquad (4.4.1)$$

Where:

E	Potential number of mortalities or morbidities per day or per year due to exposure to the pollutant
AF	The attributable fraction of mortalities or morbidities due to exposure to the pollutant
B	The population incidence of mortality or morbidity (e.g., deaths or hospitalisation rates per 1 000 people) per day or per year
P	Size of the exposed population (number)

The AF may be considered as the fraction of the health effect incidence in the exposed population that could be prevented if exposure to the pollutant was eliminated (Last et al. 2000).

$$AF = \frac{(RR-1)}{RR} \qquad (4.4.2)$$

Where:

RR	The relative risk of mortality or morbidity due to exposure to the pollutant

The relative risk of death (*RR*) is calculated as follows:

$$RR = e^{(\Delta_{deaths} \times \Delta_p)} \qquad (4.4.3)$$

Where:

Δ_{deaths}	Potential proportion change in mortality associated with a change in the pollutant concentration of 1 µg/m^3
Δ_p	The modelled change in the mean pollutant concentration in µg/m^3

Similar calculations can be made for morbidity cases (cases presenting with an illness; but not with death).

In the above equation, the temporal denominator is determined by the averaging period of the pollutant concentration used as a basis for calculation in the literature. Therefore, if the averaging time of the pollutant was reported as daily (the daily mean concentration) in the literature, the daily population incidence of the health effect must be estimated (per 1 000 people), and the modelled daily mean concentration is used to calculate the potential number of additional cases of the health effect. The result of the calculation will then reflect the potential daily increase in that health effect incidence.

Sizes of the exposed populations at the two development sites were estimated based on information from the City of Cape Town (Table 4.4.1).

Table 4.4.1: Estimated population sizes for the proposed developments.

Site	Number of residential units	Number of persons per unit	Population size
Site 1	70	4 to 6 (median of 5 used for estimation)	350
Site 2	70		350
Total	**140**		**700**

The population incidences (*B* in Equation 4.4.1) of mortality (deaths) were obtained from the Groenewald et al. (2008) report on the causes of death and premature mortality in Cape Town for the period 2001 to 2006. Causes of death were reported for a number of sub-districts in the City of Cape Town, amongst these the Southern sub-district, in which Hout Bay is situated (Table 4.4.2). Causes of death were aggregated according to the South African National Burden of Disease Study. Detail of the classification system and how it was applied in the cause of death study was presented in the report by Groenewald et al. (2008) and is not repeated in this INFOTOX report.

Table 4.4.2: Age-standardised mortality rate (deaths per 100 000) for broad cause groups in some City of Cape Town sub-districts, 2006.

Broad cause group	Sub-district				
	Khayelitsha	Eastern	Mitchell's Plain	Southern	City of Cape Town*
Injuries	259.6	152.7	126.1	70.5	128.9
Non-communicable diseases	856.4	781.1	755.7	501.3	590.2
HIV/AIDS	238.5	103.2	69.3	25.6	76.1
**Group I diseases except HIV	330.3	193.8	174.2	87.8	144.3
Sum of non-injury causes	**1 425.2**	**1 078.1**	**999.2**	**614.7**	**810.6**
Total	**1 684.8**	**1 230.8**	**1 125.3**	**685.2**	**939.5**

* Overall rate for the metropolitan area not differentiated between sub-districts

** Group I diseases comprise of communicable diseases, maternal causes, perinatal conditions and nutritional deficiencies.

It is important to consider the socio-economic status of the community under investigation, since socio-ecomonic status is an important indicator of health status and since the socio-economic and the baseline health status influence the impact of environmental air pollutants on health (Evans and Kim 2010). The age-standardised mortality rate for the Southern sub-district was the lowest and that for Khayelitsha the highest at more than double the rate in the Southern sub-district. The socio-economic status of the group targeted for settlement in the proposed development is likely to be closer to the poorest of the poor than to the more affluent communities that currently comprise the Southern sub-district. For this reason, the mortality rate of the Eastern sub-district was used as a representation of the community likely to settle in the proposed developments. It was assumed that the mortality rates were not influenced by overt industrial activities in either of the sub-districts.

Morbidity rates (e.g., number of cases admitted to hospital) are not available for the City of Cape Town. Although some national morbidity data are available, the data quality is not comparable to the mortality data presented in Table 4.4.2. Furthermore, the size of the population under consideration (Table 4.4.1) is considerably smaller than population numbers that are usually incorporated in environmental health risk estimates. For this reason, it was decided not to calculate absolute numbers of hospitalisation rates, but that calculation of personal risk ratios will suffice. Absolute numbers of mortality rates are calculated only where good quality mortality data are available.

5 Results and interpretation of the particulate matter assessment

5.1 Short-term exposure to PM2.5

The relative risks and attributable fractions associated with short-term PM2.5 exposure of the residents of the proposed developments are summarised in Table 5.1.1. These were calculated according to Equations 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 in Section 4.4 of this document.

Table 5.1.1: Maximum daily PM2.5: relative risks (RRs) and attributable fraction (AFs).

Health effect	Risk estimates			
	RR		AF	
	Lower range	Upper range	Lower range	Upper range
Non-injury (all-cause) mortality	1.02	1.03	0.020	0.030
Cardiovascular ED* visits/HA**	1.22	1.35	0.181	0.259
Asthma ED* visits/HA**	1.04	1.06	0.039	0.058
Asthma: exacerbation of symptoms	1.49	1.82	0.330	0.451
COPD*** HA**	1.25	1.39	0.197	0.281
Respiratory ED* visits/HA**	1.22	1.35	0.181	0.259

ED*: Emergency department (not necessarily admitted)
HA**: Hospital admission
COPD***: Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease

Relative risks higher than one were observed for all the applicable health effects for short-term exposure to PM2.5. The highest relative risk of 1.82 was observed for exacerbation of asthma symptoms, for the upper range of PM2.5 exposure.

It was explained in Section 4.4 that the potential numbers of the mortality rate, but not of hospitalisation or emergency department visits, would be calculated due to limitations in the Cape Town specific health data. Equation 4.4.1 was used to calculate the number of non-injury (all-cause) mortalities per day potentially associated with 24-hour PM2.5 exposure. The calculated number of mortalities potentially attributable to exposure to the highest modelled concentration of PM2.5 prevalent during one 24-hour period was 2.05×10^{-4} per day if exposure was in the lower range (20 $\mu g/m^3$) and 3.06×10^{-4} per day in the higher exposure range (30 $\mu g/m^3$). These estimates are valid for the entire area of the proposed development, that is, at both Site 1 and Site 2. The interpretation of these numbers is done in Section 5.3. The mortality numbers are summarised in Table 5.1.2.

Table 5.1.2: Maximum daily PM2.5: mortality numbers.

Modelled exposure		Entire development	Site 1	Site 2
24-hour maximum	lower range (20 $\mu g/m^3$)	2.05×10^{-4} per day	*n/e	*n/e.
	higher range (30 $\mu g/m^3$)	3.06×10^{-4} per day	*n/e.	*n/e.

*n/e: Not estimated, since the exposure ranges were similar at both sites.

5.2 Long-term exposure to PM2.5

The relative risk and attributable fraction associated with long-term PM2.5 exposure were calculated as described in Section 4.3 of this document. Results are presented in Table 5.2.1 below.

Table 5.2.1: Average annual PM2.5: relative risks (RRs) and attributable fractions (AFs).

Health effect	Risk estimates			
	RR		AF	
	Site 1	Site 2	Site 1	Site 2
All-cause (non-injury) mortality (all ages)	1.02	1.08	0.018	0.070
Bronchitis: cases in children	1.06	1.27	0.058	0.213

Relative risks for both health effects were slightly higher than one at both Site 1 and Site 2, except the risk of bronchitis in children at Site 2, for which the relative risk was 1.27.

Equation 4.4.1 was used to calculate the number of non-injury (all-cause) mortalities per year (the annual number) potentially associated with chronic PM2.5 exposure. The calculated number of mortalities potentially attributable to exposure to the annual average modelled concentration of PM2.5 was 1.84×10^{-4} per year at Site 1 and 7.18×10^{-4} per year at Site 2. The interpretation of these numbers is presented in Section 5.3. The mortality numbers are summarised in Table 5.2.2.

Table 5.2.2: Average annual PM2.5: mortality numbers.

Modelled exposure	Site 1	Site 2
Average annual	1.84×10^{-4} per year	7.18×10^{-4} per year

5.3 Health risk interpretation for particulate matter

5.3.1 Short-term exposure

The highest relative risk calculated for short-term exposure to PM2.5 was 1.82 and the highest attributable fraction was 0.45. These were calculated for the exacerbation of asthma symptoms (all ages) (Table 5.1.1). In the case of potential exposure, as in the proposed developments, the attributable fraction is the most useful indicator of risk. It is pre-eminently important to point out that the calculated risk is based on the highest daily (24-hour) PM2.5 concentration. Therefore, the risk is valid only for that day on which the highest concentration occurs. The risks attributable to airborne dust from the fish rendering plant would be less on other days.

Secondly, it is important to realise that the assessment does not imply that some people may become asthmatic due to exposure to airborne dust from the fish rendering plant. The health outcome is exacerbation of asthma symptoms. Therefore, some people who are asthmatic might experience exacerbation of their symptoms on days of significant exposure to airborne dust from the plant. Put in simple terms, people with existing asthma might experience that their symptoms are worse on some days, and at the most 45 per cent of the experience of worsening symptoms might be related to dust from the plant. The number will be less than 45 per cent on days of lesser exposure.

It is not possible to comment on the potential degree of exacerbation, since detailed health risk estimates related to various degrees of exacerbation are not available. This assessment only

serves to indicate the maximum potential risk associated with the maximum daily exposure. However, the upper range attributable fraction for asthma emergency department visits or hospital admissions may be used to tentatively qualify the degree of discomfort experienced by asthmatics. The upper range attributable fraction for asthma emergency department visits or hospital admissions was 6 per cent, and it may be concluded that the degree of exacerbation might be severe enough for a relatively small percentage of asthmatics to trigger a visit to the doctor or hospital emergency department on those days when conditions result in exposure in the upper range. The percentage of asthmatics in which a visit is triggered will be less on days of lesser exposure.

It is unlikely that potential asthmatic residents will view risk as insignificant if close to 50 per cent of the experienced exacerbation of symptoms might be attributable to dust emissions from the fish rendering plant. Attributable fractions calculated for cardiovascular or respiratory emergency department visits or hospital admissions, or for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) are in the region of 25 per cent each (Table 5.1.1) and are also not insignificant, even in view of the uncertainties associated with the estimates.

Attributable fractions calculated for non-accidental mortality are not directly assessed, but are used to estimate the number of deaths that might potentially be attributable to exposure to PM2.5 on those days of maximum concentration. The result was presented in Table 5.1.2 and indicates that the risk for such potential deaths is likely insignificant, particularly since the number was calculated for the entire development housing approximately 700 persons (Table 4.4.1) and is only applicable on those days when the modelled maximum concentration is experienced.

In conclusion, a potential contribution of the fish rendering plant to the risk of the assessed health endpoints in the proposed development cannot be excluded, and cannot be viewed as insignificant with regard to the potential risk of exacerbation of asthma symptoms. This should be indicated as a source of concern, since it is likely that complaints will arise from asthmatic residents.

5.3.2 Long-term exposure

The calculated attributable fractions (Table 5.2.1) are the most useful indicators of risk, as has been explained for short-term exposure. The calculated attributable fraction of cases of bronchitis in children was approximately six per cent annually at Site 1 and approximately 21 per cent at Site 2, which is likely to experience higher average annual PM2.5 concentrations (Figure 3.2.2). This implies that approximately six per cent of the annual cases that might potentially occur at Site 1 might have been avoided if exposure to airborne dust from the fish rendering plant could be completely excluded. In the case of Site 2, approximately 21 per cent of the annual cases might have been avoided. It is not possible to comment on the outcomes of such potential cases, for example, if hospitalisation would be required, since detailed health risk estimates related to outcomes of cases of bronchitis are not available. This assessment only serves to indicate the maximum potential risk associated with the annual exposure.

The calculated attributable fraction of cases of bronchitis in children indicates that a very limited influence of the fish rendering plant cannot be excluded at Site 1, but implies that by far the greatest majority of cases; namely, 94 per cent, would be related to factors other than the plant. By comparison, the potential contribution from the plant is likely to be greater at Site 2. It is

doubtful that potential residents would accept that 1 in 5 (20 per cent) of the annual cases of bronchitis in children could potentially be related to exposure to PM2.5 emitted from the fish rendering plant.

The attributable fractions calculated for all-cause (non-injury) mortality (Table 5.2.1) are not directly assessed, but are used to estimate the number of deaths that might potentially be attributable to exposure to PM2.5 at the average annual concentration. The result was presented in Table 5.2.2 and indicates that the risk for such potential deaths is likely insignificant at Site 1, but slightly more significant at Site 2.

In conclusion, the potential contribution of the fish rendering plant to the risk of mortality amongst the residents of the proposed development, assessed for chronic exposure to PM2.5 cannot be seen as significant, and cannot be indicated as a source of concern. It is difficult to assess the acceptability of risks to a group of community members, but the risk numbers are low. In view of the uncertainties and limitations inherent to various aspects of the assessment, the mortality risks might not be significantly different from zero, and would thus be negligible, especially at Site 1.

6 Results and interpretation: sulphur dioxide

6.1 Results

The relative risks and attributable fractions associated with short-term SO_2 exposure of the residents of the proposed developments are summarised in Table 6.1.1. These were calculated according to Equations 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 in Section 4.4 of this document.

Table 6.1.1: Maximum daily SO_2: relative risks (RRs) and attributable fraction (AFs).

Health effect	Risk estimates			
	Site 1		Site 2	
	RR	AF	RR	AF
All-cause (but non-injury) mortality	1.21	0.17	1.46	0.32
RHA* children (0 - 14 years) all causes including asthma	45.5	0.98	2 066.2	1.00
RHA *older people (65+ years) all causes including asthma	2.6	0.61	6.74	0.85
Lower respiratory tract or asthma symptoms: children	17.51	0.94	306.46	1.00

RHA*: Respiratory hospital admission
COPD***: Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease

Relative risks higher than one were observed for all the health effects applicable to short-term exposure to SO_2, at Site 1 and Site 2. The highest relative risks were observed at Site 2. The highest relative risks at both sites were associated with respiratory hospital admissions in children.

It was explained in Section 4.4 that the potential mortality rate, but not the rates of hospitalisation or emergency department visits, would be calculated due to limitations in the

Cape Town specific health data. Equation 4.4.1 was used to calculate the number of non-injury (all-cause) mortalities per day potentially associated with 24-hour SO_2 exposure. The calculated number of mortalities potentially attributable to exposure to the highest modelled concentration of SO_2 prevalent during one 24-hour period was 0.0018 per day at Site 1 and 0.0033 at Site 2. The interpretation of these numbers is done in Section 6.2. The mortality numbers are summarised in Table 6.1.2.

Table 6.1.2: Maximum daily SO_2: mortality numbers attributable to the maximum day.

Site 1	Site 2
0.0018 per day	0.0033 per day

6.2 Health risk interpretation

It is important to point out that the calculated risk is based on the highest daily (24-hour) SO_2 concentration and that the risk is valid only for that day on which the highest concentration occurs. The risks attributable to airborne dust from the fish rendering plant would be less on other days. The calculated RRs were more than 2 for all of the health endpoints except mortality. These RRs indicate at least twice the risk of the assessed health effects potentially associated with the fish rendering plant, compared to the risks if the background SO_2 levels had been prevalent.

The extremely high RRs calculated for respiratory hospital admissions in children, especially at Site 2, cannot be interpreted in terms of multiplication of risks. This is because the modelled concentrations on which the calculations were based were most probably completely out of the range of SO_2 concentrations usually encountered in epidemiological studies of environmental exposure in residential areas around the globe. The available model on which the equations presented in Section 4.4 were based is therefore not valid for such high concentrations as those modelled and presented in Figure 3.2.3. The only valid conclusion that can be made from these very high RRs is that risks are unacceptably high. This conclusion is supported by the calculated AFs (Table 6.1.1) that were either equal to or very close to 1.00 for all health endpoints, except mortality. Even in the case of hospital admissions in older people, it is likely that the community will not accept the risk that 60 (at Site 1) to 85 per cent (at Site 2) of admissions in older people could potentially be related to emissions from the fish rendering plant, even if the risks are only valid on those days when the modelled highest maximum SO_2 concentrations are prevalent.

The severity of these risks is evident when the calculated AFs are considered. An AF of 1.00 or close to 1.00 implies that SO_2 emissions from the plant would be sufficient cause for practically all of the cases of health effects that might occur on those days when the modelled highest maximum SO_2 concentrations are prevalent. According to the results in Table 6.1.1, this would be applicable to lower respiratory tract or asthma symptoms in children, and to respiratory hospital admissions in children at both Sites 1 and 2. The risks are smaller for respiratory hospitalisation in older people, but, as stated previously, still unacceptable, even in view of the uncertainties associated with the estimates.

Attributable fractions calculated for non-accidental mortality are not directly assessed, but are used to estimate the number of deaths that might potentially be attributable to exposure to SO_2 on those days on which the maximum concentration occurs. The result was presented in

Table 6.1.2 and indicates that the risk for such potential deaths is likely very small for both sites, particularly since the calculated number is only applicable on those days when the modelled maximum concentration is experienced.

In conclusion, a potential contribution of the fish rendering plant to the risk of mortality amongst the residents of the proposed development, assessed for exposure to SO_2, cannot be seen as significant, and cannot be indicated as a source of concern. However, the risks associated with respiratory effects are unacceptable, even if it is considered that the risks are only as high as those presented in this assessment on those days of maximum SO_2 concentrations. In the light of the extremely high risk ratios that were calculated and presented in Table 6.1.1, and assuming a range of lower-than-maximum SO_2 concentrations on other days, it is likely that the daily risks will be unacceptable during significant periods of a calendar year, particularly for children. In addition, the health effects are likely to be severe enough to require hospitalisation or at least a visit to a doctor or to a hospital emergency room, and the frequency of such severe effects is likely to be considerable.

7 Health risk assessment of odorous emissions

7.1 Outline of the risk assessment approach

As discussed in the background document, the fish rendering plant in Hout Bay has the potential to emit pollutants such as trimethylamine and hydrogen sulphide (H_2S). The INFOTOX toxicological reviews for trimethylamine (Van Niekerk and Fourie, 2014a) and hydrogen sulphide (H_2S) (Van Niekerk and Fourie, 2014b) indicated that cancer is not of concern regarding inhalation of trimethylamine and H_2S. Therefore, only noncarcinogen effects of trimethylamine and H_2S are assessed.

Considering the exposure levels in this study, Van Niekerk and Fourie (2014a) concluded that it is unlikely that chronic systemic effects associated with trimethylamine in ambient air would be observed in the study area. The human health risk assessment (HHRA) for trimethylamine is thus focused on the assessment of acute exposure.

It was also concluded that exposure to H_2S in the study area would be intermittent in nature, due to irregular short-term excursions into higher concentrations, interspersed with longer episodes of low concentrations, or even zero emissions. Therefore, the risk assessment was conducted on the basis of short-term exposure considerations.

Acute risk factors used for HHRAs are usually estimates of substance concentrations that are likely to be without appreciable risk of deleterious noncancer effects to the human population (including sensitive subgroups) during an acute exposure period. Such risk factors are referred to as reference concentrations (USEPA terminology) or acceptable intake concentrations. These concentrations are not direct estimators of risk but rather a reference point to gauge the potential effects. At exposures increasingly greater than the reference or acceptable intake concentrations, the potential for adverse health effects increases. Reference concentrations usually include uncertainty factors to account for uncertainties in the derivation of the reference concentration and to account for sensitive individuals. The substance concentration at which adverse effects are observed is divided by uncertainty factors to increase the safety level.

Uncertainty factors were not applied to the identified substance concentrations at which health effects were observed (Table 7.1.1); therefore the term reference concentration strictly cannot be applied. The relevant concentrations are referred to as effect levels.

The effect levels chosen to assess human health risks potentially associated with ambient trimethylamine and H_2S concentrations are summarised in Table 7.1.1 below.

Table 7.1.1: HHRA 1-hour effect levels for trimethylamine and H_2S.

Compound	Effect level (µg/m^3)	Health endpoints	INFOTOX reference
Trimethylamine	19 000	Irritation of the eyes, skin and respiratory tract	Van Niekerk and Fourie, 2014a
H_2S	135	Difficulties in breathing, irritation of the eyes, headache and nausea	Van Niekerk and Fourie, 2014b

7.2 Exposure assessment

Assessment of the concentrations to which residents might be exposed was based on the results of air dispersion modelling reported by Airshed in Output B, presented below. Concentration isopleths for the modelled highest daily trimethylamine concentrations based on the middle estimates of emissions from the fish rendering plant are illustrated in Figure 7.2.1, and the isopleths based on the upper estimates of emissions in Figure 7.2.2.



Figure 7.2.1: Highest hourly trimethylamine concentrations based on middle estimates of source emissions (Burger and Grobler 2014).



Figure 7.2.2: **Highest hourly trimethylamine concentrations based on upper estimates of source emissions (Burger and Grobler 2014).**

It is clear that portions of Site 1 earmarked for the proposed development are exposed to concentrations varying from less than 20 to more than 50 µg/m^3 when modelling is based on the middle estimate of source emission (Figure 7.2.1). Concentrations prevalent for the upper estimates of source emission are generally higher than 50 µg/m^3 (Figure 7.2.2). Modelled concentrations for Site 2 are generally higher than 50 µg/m^3, regardless of the source emission estimates. For the purposes of the HHRA, concentrations of 50 µg/m^3 have been assessed in both sites for both source emission estimates. Table 7.2.1 lists the concentrations for the HHRA of the middle and upper emission estimates for trimethylamine.

The upper and middle estimate isopleths for H_2S are presented in Figures 7.2.3 and 7.2.4, respectively.



Figure 7.2.3: **Highest hourly H_2S concentrations based on middle estimates of source emissions (Burger and Grobler 2014).**



Figure 7.2.4: **Highest hourly H_2S concentrations based on upper estimates of source emissions (Burger and Grobler 2014).**

Portions of Site 1 are exposed to H_2S concentrations varying from 1 to 5 µg/m^3 when modelled based on the middle estimate of source emission (Figure 7.2.3). Concentrations prevalent for the upper estimates of source emission are higher than 2 µg/m^3, approaching concentrations of 10 µg/m^3 (Figure 7.2.4). Modelled concentrations for Site 2 range from 10 to 50 µg/m^3 for the middle source emission estimates and are in the order of 50 µg/m^3 for the upper source estimates. The H_2S concentrations selected for the purposes of the HHRA are listed in Table 7.2.1.

Table 7.2.1: **Highest hourly trimethylamine and H_2S concentrations.**

Compound	Site 1		Site 2	
	Middle estimate	Upper estimate	Middle estimate	Upper estimate
Trimethylamine	50	50	50	50
H_2S	2	5	20	50

8 Risk assessment for odorous emissions

The HHRA was concluded with a comparison of the effect levels (Table 7.1.1) with the modelled highest hourly exposure concentrations used for risk assessment purposes (Table 7.2.1). It was concluded that all of the highest hourly concentrations, for both trimethylamine and H_2S, on both proposed sites and based on the middle and upper estimates of source emissions from the fish rendering plant, are considerable lower than the effect levels.

The factorial difference between the effect levels and the exposure concentration may be referred to as the margin of exposure (MOE), simply calculated as the exposure concentration divided by the effect level. In the case of trimethylamine the MOE is in the region of 380 regardless of the emission base and regardless of whether Site 1 or Site 2 is assessed (Table 8.1). In the case of H_2S the MOE ranges between 68 and 3 (Table 8.1).

Table 8.1: MOEs for trimethylamine and H_2S.

Compound	**Trimethylamine**		**H_2S**	
Effect level	19 000 µg/m^3		135 µg/m^3	
Source estimate - Site 1	**Middle**	**Upper**	**Middle**	**Upper**
Exposure concentration	50	50	2	5
*MOE	380	380	68	27
Source estimate - Site 2	**Middle**	**Upper**	**Middle**	**Upper**
Exposure concentration	50	50	20	50
*MOE	380	380	7	3

* Margin of exposure:

$$MOE = \frac{\text{Reference concentration}}{\text{Exposure concentration}}$$

The MOEs for trimethylamine are all comfortably in the acceptable range. The MOEs for H_2S at Site 1 are also acceptable. However, the MOEs for H_2S at Site 2 are not without concern. These MOEs are lower than 10 and this is of concern for more sensitive individuals during those periods when the maximum hourly H_2S concentration is sustained over more than one consecutive hour. Therefore, potential irritant and other effects due to H_2S exposure at Site 2, at the modelled middle and upper source estimates, cannot be excluded and are of concern, even though the number of people at risk cannot be quantified. Simultaneous exposure to trimethylamine and H_2S at Site 1 is not of concern, since MOEs for both trimethylamine and H_2S are high, indicating an acceptable margin of safety for the exclusion of potential additive effects.

9 Risk characterisation (uncertainty review)

The HHRAs in this report were based on modelled ambient air concentrations of criteria pollutants, trimethylamine and H_2S provided by Burger and Grobler (2014). Uncertainties associated with the modelled concentrations were discussed in detail by these authors in the air dispersion modelling report and are not elaborated on in this INFOTOX report.

The human health risk assessment for criteria pollutants followed standard international practice, based on methodologies applied in epidemiological studies. The interpretation of exposure concentrations in terms of mortality, hospitalisation rates for respiratory or cardiovascular causes, or exacerbation of asthma symptoms as a measure of pollution-associated illness is thus presented with confidence. It must be noted that the highest emission scenario of four boilers in operation was applied. It is unlikely that four boilers will be used all the time, but it must be understood that the calculated adverse health outcomes may occur even over periods of a few days per year.

Annual average concentrations were modelled by Burger and Grobler (2014) based on the assumption that continuous operation of one boiler throughout the year could be equated to intermittent operation of one to four boilers. This was necessary because operation of the fish rendering plant is seasonal, depending on the availability of fish. Therefore, the true annual emission pattern of the plant is characterised by periods of virtually zero emissions, when the plant is not operational, interspersed with seasonal emission peaks when fish are available. It was not possible to model annual average concentrations based on this pattern with confidence, because emission records are not available. Therefore, confidence in the estimated annual human health risks is low. The confidence is low because the models sourced from the literature for the estimation of human health risks based on annual average ambient concentrations are not truly suitable for scenarios of long term intermittent (seasonal) exposure. Unfortunately, models for seasonal exposure are nog available and it was necessary to resort to the "classic" long term models to gain at least an indication of potential risks.

The estimates of the mortality rate applicable to residents of the proposed development, which was used in the calculation of the numbers of potentially affected persons with regard to the criteria pollutants, were obtained from a South African Medical Research Council report by Groenewald et al. (2008). This is a credible source and the mortality estimates are the most recent numbers available specifically for Cape Town.

The effect levels chosen to assess human health risks potentially associated with ambient trimethylamine and H_2S concentrations were thoroughly researched and are the most valid levels currently available from credible scientific sources. Reviews of the available effect levels were presented in separate reports by Van Niekerk and Fourie (2014a and 2014b). The interpretation of exposure concentrations in terms of these effect levels is thus presented with confidence.

10 Conclusions

- A potential contribution of the fish rendering plant to PM2.5 exposure, with a resultant potential risk of exacerbation of asthma symptoms in asthmatic residents in the proposed development cannot be excluded, and cannot be viewed as insignificant. This should be

indicated as a source of concern, since it is likely that complaints will arise from asthmatic residents.

- Chronic exposure to PM2.5 is of concern at site 2. It is doubtful that potential residents would accept that 1 in 5 (20 per cent) of the annual cases of bronchitis in children could potentially be related to exposure to PM2.5 emitted from the fish rendering plant. However, it is important to view this in the light of limited confidence in the estimation of human health risks based on annual average ambient concentrations, while a scenario of long term intermittent (seasonal) exposure is actually applicable. Unfortunately, models for seasonal exposure are nog available and it was necessary to resort to the "classic" long term models to gain at least an indication of potential risks. The potential occurrence of adverse health effects associated with chronic exposure to PM2.5 at site 2 cannot be dismissed.

- The potential contribution of the fish rendering plant to the risk of mortality amongst the residents of the proposed development was assessed for chronic exposure to PM2.5. In view of the uncertainties and limitations inherent to various aspects of the assessment, the mortality risks cannot be seen as significant, and cannot be indicated as a source of concern. The risks might not be significantly different from zero, and would thus be negligible at Sites 1 and 2.

- The human health risks associated with SO_2 can be viewed as severe at both sites. SO_2 emissions from the plant would be sufficient cause for practically all of the cases of health effects that might occur on those days when the modelled highest maximum SO_2 concentrations are prevalent. This is applicable to lower respiratory tract or asthma symptoms in children, and to respiratory hospital admissions in children. The risks are smaller for respiratory hospitalisation in older people, but still unacceptable, even in view of the uncertainties associated with the estimates.

- Regarding SO_2 exposure, the daily risks of respiratory effects, including but not limited to exacerbation of asthma, will be unacceptable on probably more than one day per year particularly for children. In addition, the health effects are likely to be severe enough to require hospitalisation or at least a visit to a doctor or to a hospital emergency room and the frequency of such severe effects is likely to be considerable. This is true for Site 1 and Site 2.

- Exposure to the odorous and irritant compound trimethylamine is not of concern at Site 1 or Site 2.

- Exposure to H_2S is not of concern at Site 1, even if simultaneous exposure to trimethylamine and H_2S is considered.

- Exposure to H_2S at Site 2 is of concern with regard to potential difficulties in breathing, irritation of the eyes, headache and nausea. Concern at Site 2 is indicated regardless of whether middle or upper source emissions estimates are prevalent, even though the number of people at risk cannot be quantified.

11 References

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"RP 5.2"

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Retrieval and scientific interpretation of ecotoxicological information

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Project conducted on behalf of City of Cape Town

Environmental Health Risk Assessment Erven 8474 & 9652 Hangberg, Hout Bay

OUTPUT F: Recommendations Report

Report No 052-2014 Rev 1.0

Compiled by

Willie van Niekerk PhD QEP(USA) Pr Sci Nat (Environmental Science)
Marlene Fourie PhD MSc Pr Sci Nat (Toxicological Science)

Recommendations

15 October 2014

Copyright Warning

WCA van Niekerk PhD QEP (USA) Pr Sci Nat (Environmental Science)
Managing Director

15 October 2014

Expertise and Declaration of Independence

This report was prepared by INFOTOX (Pty) Ltd ("INFOTOX"). Established in 1991, INFOTOX is a professional scientific company, highly focused in the discipline of ecotoxicological risk assessment. Both occupational and environmental human health risks, as well as risks to ecological receptors, are addressed.

Dr Willie van Niekerk, Managing Director of INFOTOX, has BSc, Hons BSc and MSc degrees from the University of Potchefstroom and a PhD from the University of South Africa. He is a Qualified Environmental Professional (QEP), certified by the Institute of Professional Environmental Practice (IPEP) in the USA (No 07960160), and a registered Professional Natural Scientist (Pr Sci Nat, Environmental Science, No 400284/04). Dr Van Niekerk has specialised in chemical toxicology and human health risk assessments, but he has experience in many other areas in the disciplines of analytical and environmental sciences.

Dr Marlene Fourie has BSc and Hons BSc degrees from the University of Stellenbosch and MSc and PhD degrees from the University of Pretoria. Her field of specialisation is reproductive biology/toxicology. Dr Fourie also has an MSc-degree in epidemiology from the University of Pretoria. Following positions as Medical Natural Scientist at the Andrology Unit, Department of Urology, University of Pretoria and the Pretoria Academic Hospital from 1987 to 2001, she joined INFOTOX as a Medical Biological Scientist. Dr Fourie has conducted many health risk assessments and projects relating to the health status of communities. She is registered as a Professional Natural Scientist (Pr Sci Nat, Toxicological Science, No 400190/14).

This specialist report was compiled for the City of Cape Town. We do hereby declare that we are financially and otherwise independent of the City of Cape Town.

Signed on behalf of INFOTOX (Pty) Ltd, duly authorised in the capacity of Managing Director:

Willem Christiaan Abraham van Niekerk

15 October 2014

Table of Contents

1 Introduction and terms of reference

The Department of Development and Delivery, Directorate Human Settlements of the City of Cape Town appointed INFOTOX (Pty) Ltd ("INFOTOX") to conduct an environmental health risk assessment in response to a proposed housing development on City land adjacent to a fish rendering plant in the Hout Bay Harbour Precinct. The proposed housing development will place a large community in very close proximity to hazardous emissions, noise and odours from the plant. A number of complaints were received by the authorities from residents living in Hout Bay about exposure to emissions from the fish rendering plant, especially hydrogen sulphide, and noise.

The study area is shown in Figure 1.1. The proposed development sites are on Erven 9652 and 8474, referred to as Sites 1 and 2, respectively, and indicated within red boundaries. The Lucky Star Hout Bay fishmeal factory is located on the opposite side of Hout Bay Harbour Road.



Figure 1.1: Map of the study area (Provided by the City of Cape Town).

It is essential for the City to have a clear understanding of potential impacts of emissions from the rendering plant on the health of residents and impacts of noise and odour at the proposed housing development prior to undertaking construction.

2 Purpose and scope of the study

The purpose of this Recommendations Report is to evaluate assumptions, uncertainties and conclusions of the study and to assist the City of Cape Town in further evaluations and decisions about the proposed housing development.

The following reports were produced to enable the evaluation of human health risks and impacts of noise and odours on residents of the proposed housing development:

OUTPUT A: Literature review

Van Niekerk W and Fourie M. 2014. Environmental Health Risk Assessment, Erven 8474 & 9652 Hangberg, Hout Bay. Toxicological Review for Hydrogen Sulphide. INFOTOX Report No 033-2014 Rev 1.0.

Van Niekerk W and Fourie M. 2014. Environmental Health Risk Assessment, Erven 8474 & 9652 Hangberg, Hout Bay. Toxicological Review for Particulates. INFOTOX Report No 038-2014 Rev 1.0.

Van Niekerk W and Fourie M. 2014. Environmental Health Risk Assessment, Erven 8474 & 9652 Hangberg, Hout Bay. Toxicological Review for Sulphur Dioxide. INFOTOX Report No 039-2014 Rev 1.0.

Van Niekerk W and Fourie M. 2014. Environmental Health Risk Assessment, Erven 8474 & 9652 Hangberg, Hout Bay. Toxicological Review for Trimethylamine. INFOTOX Report No 043-2014 Rev 1.0.

OUTPUT B: Compilation of emissions inventory

Burger LW and Grobler N. 2014. Atmospheric Dispersion Modelling of Air Pollution at the Proposed City of Cape Town Council Rental Flats in Hangberg, Hout Bay. Airshed Report No 13INF03.

OUTPUT C: Environmental health risk assessment

Van Niekerk W and Fourie M. 2014d. Environmental Health Risk Assessment, Erven 8474 & 9652 Hangberg, Hout Bay. OUTPUT C: Environmental Health Risk Assessment. INFOTOX Report No 051-2014 Rev 1.0.

OUTPUT D: Noise impact assessment

Environmental Noise Impact Assessment. Proposed New Apartment Block Located in Houtbay Erf 9652. Occupational Hygiene Monitoring Services (Pty) Ltd.

OUTPUT E: Odour quantification and impact

Van Niekerk W and Fourie M. 2014. Environmental Health Risk Assessment, Erven 8474 & 9652 Hangberg, Hout Bay. OUTPUT E: Odour Quantification and Impact. INFOTOX Report No 050-2014 Rev 1.0.

This document presents recommendations for the evaluation of the proposed housing development based on the findings of the INFOTOX study as documented in the listed reports.

3 OUTPUT B: Compilation of emissions inventory

3.1 Information basis

Evaluation of potential health risks and impacts of odours at the locations where the proposed housing development was based on mathematical dispersion modelling of sources of particulates, sulphur dioxide, hydrogen sulphide and trimethylamine. Except for hydrogen sulphide, measured emissions data were not available and modelling was conducted on the basis of published emission factor data related to fish rendering plants and mass balance calculations. The source term for hydrogen sulphide was based on measured data and emission factor data. Two emission scenarios were modelled, namely, emission estimates based on central (middle) source values and upper estimates based on reasonable maximum source values. It should be noted that the particulates and sulphur dioxide emission factors were based on the assumption that all four of the boilers that contribute to emissions would be operated simultaneously. Although this is not necessarily always the case, the assumption avoids underestimation of concentrations, because boiler operation schedules cannot be predicted by INFOTOX.

3.2 Recommendations

The current study has focused on assessment of potential impacts on the proposed housing development, but the information basis and assessment should also have value for the assessment of impacts on the broader community in the area. It is already known that there have been complaints about odour. The assumption of all four boilers operating at maximum capacity may be argued to be overly conservative, but it must be taken into consideration that the health risk assessment for criteria pollutants (particulates and sulphur dioxide) is based on the highest daily exposure concentrations. This means that the adverse health effects may occur even if this maximum level of operation occurs only on a few days of the year. It is thus recommended that this scenario be applied to be on the side of caution.

The outcome of the health risk assessment and assessment of impacts on odour highlighted the need for monitoring of emissions at the sources. This should add value to the current assessment of health risks and odour impacts and should also be important for effective management of potential health risks to existing members of the community in the area.

The simulated wind flow patterns in the Hangberg area west of the Lucky Star fishmeal factory was shown to be highly influenced by the nearby topography. It is recommended to compare the dispersion model results with the observations made at the DEADP air quality monitoring station located in the study area. This should provide some level of verification of the modelled concentration isopleths of the contaminants of concern, not only for the current assessments, but also in the broader context for the assessment of health risks to the neighbouring communities. It is recommended that the current modelling data be evaluated to assess whether the monitoring station is at the most appropriate location.

4 OUTPUT C: Environmental health risk assessment

4.1 Health risk conclusions

The human health risk assessment has shown that health risks associated with exposure to emissions from the fishmeal factory would be unacceptable at the proposed housing developments. The adverse health effects are likely to be severe enough to require hospitalisation or at least a visit to a doctor or to a hospital emergency room and the frequency of such severe effects is likely to be considerable.

4.2 Recommendations

Due to the unacceptably high health risks estimated from the modelled contaminant concentrations it is recommended that alternative locations be considered for the proposed housing development.

5 OUTPUT D: Noise impact assessment

5.1 Noise impact conclusions

Noise measurements conducted during daytime and night-time at the proposed location of the housing development at Erf 9652 confirmed that the extent of the noise impact on the proposed apartment building would be very high. It is expected that the noise levels would be very similar at Erf 8474.

5.2 Recommendations

Noise sources can be reduced by building an acoustic barrier; however, this is likely to control only the lower frequencies. A possible control is by the use of double glazing windows. However it is possible that the residents would open their windows and the disturbance noise will no longer be controlled. It is possible to reduce the noise levels by acoustically building the apartment, but this would increase building costs.

Overall, in view of the outcome of the environmental health risk assessment, it can be concluded that the issue of noise disturbance is another factor that suggests that alternative locations should be considered for the proposed housing development.

6 OUTPUT E: Odour quantification and impact

6.1 Odour impact conclusions

The odour impact assessment confirmed that high concentrations of trimethylamine and hydrogen sulphide are likely to cause odour annoyance leading to complaints.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO 2014), health "*is a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity*". Odour annoyance affects the quality of life and therefore the social wellbeing dimension of health. Indirect potential health effects may occur as a result of annoyance stress and reduction

in the quality of life. Among these are vomiting, headaches and nausea. Irrespective of whether the concentration of an odorous substance is below the level where its toxic properties may cause adverse health effects, if the level of annoyance is reached the social wellbeing of health is compromised. Because of high concentrations of trimethyamine, residents would not be able to hang laundry out to dry, because the pungent odour tends to stick to materials. Residents would also not be able to open windows during summer time because of hydrogen sulphide and trimethylamine odours.

6.2 Recommendations

Because of the logarithmic relationship between odour intensity and ambient air concentrations of the odorous substances in this study it would be difficult to reduce the odour sources to levels where odour perception would be acceptable at the locations of the proposed housing development. In any event, the buffer zone between the Lucky Star fishmeal factory and the proposed rental flats is inadequate when compared with separation distances between odorous industries and residences documented in the literature (RWDI AIR Inc 2005). Furthermore, in view of unacceptable health risks and expected noise disturbance it is concluded that alternative locations should be considered for the proposed housing development.

7 References

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