

**THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS IN FARM
PRODUCTION IN ZIMBABWE'S RESETTLEMENT
PROGRAMME: THE CASE STUDY OF AN A1 MODEL
SCHEME IN MUREWA DISTRICT**

TENDAI MUGARA

A minithesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of M.Phil in Land and Agrarian Studies in the Department of Economic and Management Sciences (PLAAS), University of the Western Cape.

Supervisor: Dr Edward Lahiff



UNIVERSITY of the
WESTERN CAPE
November 2007

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS IN FARM PRODUCTION IN ZIMBABWE'S RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME: THE CASE STUDY OF AN A1 MODEL SCHEME IN MUREWA DISTRICT

TENDAI MUGARA

KEYWORDS

Social Networks

Farm production

Zimbabwe

Resettlement

Case Study

A1 Model

Murewa

Fast Track Land Reform Program

Farm Invasions

Land Acquisition



UNIVERSITY of the
WESTERN CAPE

DEDICATIONS

This Thesis is dedicated to my son Simbarashe Mugara and wife Portia Maramba, who relentlessly provided strength and inspiration during the whole process.



ABSTRACT

Land has been a source of political conflict in Zimbabwe since colonization, both within indigenous black communities and especially between white settlers and the black rural communities. At independence in 1980 Zimbabwe inherited a dual agrarian structure characterized by skewed land ownership and white minority control over the country's land resources. After 18 years of very limited reforms, the government of Zimbabwe announced the Fast Track Land Reform programme in 2000 with the aim of acquiring more than 3,000 commercial farms for redistribution. The Fast Track Land Reform greatly increased the number of households resettled compared to previous resettlement programmes.

Fast Track has benefited diverse classes of people, such as peasants, landless workers, government bureaucrats, politicians and middle class urbanites. Unlike previous reforms, the fast track programme has brought people who arguably have no connection with each other together in settlements. The failure of government to provide the basic services to resettled farmers to cushion them in the new environments has exacerbated the already difficult situation amid weak social networks. Little research has been carried out on the role of social networks in farm production in such areas, or how resettled households interact and organize themselves to generate growth and development. A study was initiated in 2005 to assess the role of social networks in agricultural production in resettlement schemes. A questionnaire survey covering 20 households was administered at Chigori A1 (small-holder) resettlement scheme in Murewa District. Two focus group discussions and 7 key informant interviews were also conducted. The analysis focused exclusively on types of social networks found at Chigori resettlement scheme and their role to farm production. Factors that facilitated the establishment and functioning of social networks were explored.

The study revealed that different types of networks were identified at Chigori resettlement scheme. These networks identified included family and kinship based networks, networks of identity, networks of production, institutional networks, farmer groups, networks of influence, power and access. Social support came from relatives and friends when scheme members engaged in land preparation, weeding and harvesting at the scheme. Networks of identity were created among certain groups at Chigori scheme due to the sense of originating from same area. This created opportunities to access information and resources. Networks of production such as tobacco network emerged between scheme members who either possessed knowledge of tobacco farming or with resources to utilize. Scheme members at Chigori were encouraged to form agricultural groups by AREX officers. The study also revealed that groups were used differently by different agencies and individuals, for different purposes and motives. Councilors, GMB, AREX officers, scheme members and local leadership worked with groups in different ways mainly for their own advantage. Scheme members enrolled in networks in order to optimize their opportunities for economic, social and political gain. Networks of production should be strengthened in order to increase crop production. This should be complemented by other factors such as extension to improve management of crops.

DECLARATION

I declare that *the role of social networks in farm production in Zimbabwe's resettlement programme: the case of an A1 model scheme in Murewa District* is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Tendai Mugara

15 November 2007

Signed.....



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge financial support from the WW Kellogg Foundation. This study benefited enormously from the dear comments and analysis of many colleagues. In particular, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr E Lahiff for his guidance and reviews of numerous drafts of this thesis. I also acknowledge farmers at Chigori Resettlement Scheme in Murewa District who provided me with data and information. To all the leadership at the scheme and district AREX officers, I would like to thank you for your welcome, cooperation and support during data collection. To all my friends I am indebted for your moral support and encouragement. Lastly, I would like to thank my family for bearing with me during the period of writing up the thesis and without their support this thesis would never have been a success.




Table of Contents

DEDICATIONS.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
DECLARATION.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	vi
LIST OF TABLES.....	ix
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS.....	xii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.0 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Statement of the Problem.....	6
1.2 Specific objectives and Research Questions.....	8
1.3 Significance of the Study.....	8
1.4 Organization of the Study.....	9
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	10
2.0 Introduction.....	10
2.1 Background to Land Reform and Land Policy in Zimbabwe.....	10
2.2 Factors Influencing Fast Track Compulsory Land Acquisition.....	14
2.3 Beneficiary Selection and Implementation.....	15
2.4 Constraints to Implementation of Land Reforms.....	16
2.5 Performance of Settlers in Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP).....	17
2.6 Social Capital in Agricultural Development.....	18
2.6.1 Defining Social Capital.....	19
2.6.2 The Forms of Social Capital.....	20
2.6.3 Social Structures and Relocation.....	21
2.6.4 Social Networks Characteristics.....	22
2.6.5 The Development of Social Capital.....	23
2.6.6 Role of Social Networks on Social and Water Conservation.....	25
2.6.7 Social Capital: From Concept to Measurement.....	27
2.7 Conclusion.....	28
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.....	30
3.0 Introduction.....	30
3.1 Background to the Study Area.....	30
3.2 Research Methods.....	33
3.3 Data Sources.....	33
3.3.1 Data Collection.....	33
3.3.2 Primary Data Source.....	34
3.3.2.1 Focus group discussions.....	34
3.3.2.2 Household Interviews.....	34
3.3.2.3 Key Informant Interviews.....	35
3.3.2.4 Participant Observations.....	36
3.3.3 Secondary Data Source.....	36
3.4 Data Processing and Analysis.....	36
3.5 Study Limitations.....	37
3.5.1 Misconception of the Survey.....	37

CHAPTER 4: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF NETWORKS, NORMS AND CO-OPERATION AT CHIGORI FARM	388
4.0 Introduction.....	388
39.1 Types of Networks.....	39
4.1.1 Family and Kinship Based Networks	39
4.1.2 Networks of Identity	41
4.1.3 Networks of Production	422
4.1.4 Institutional Networks.....	48
4.1.5.1 Farmer Groups	50
4.1.5.2 Farm Labour Groups.....	52
4.1.6 Networks of Influence, Power and Access	53
4.2 Trust and Functioning of Networks	55
4.3 Reciprocity and Cooperation’s Role in Establishing Social Networks	58
4.4 Socio-Economic Factors and Networks.....	59
4.5 Inputs Access and Networks.....	60
4.6 Risk-Sharing and Network Strategy	62
4.7 Conclusion	62
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	63
5.0 Introduction.....	63
5.1 Summary of Results	63
5.2 Policy Implications of the Research Findings	66
REFERENCES	68
APPENDIX.....	77
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE.....	77



LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Periodization of Land Acquisition.....	12
Table 2.6.6: Social Networks for Soil and Water Conservation (SWC).....	25
Table 3.1: Allocation Patterns.....	31
Table 4.0: Characteristics of Chigori Resettlement Scheme.....	38





UNIVERSITY *of the*
WESTERN CAPE

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.6.2: Dimension of Social Capital.....	21
--	----



LIST OF ACRONYMS

FTLRP: Fast Track Land Reform Programme

AREX: Agricultural Research and Extension

GMB: Grain Marketing Board

LRRP1: Land Reform and Resettlement Programme 1

GOZ: Government of Zimbabwe

ZANU PF: Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front



CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

Land has been a source of political conflict in Zimbabwe since colonization, both within indigenous black communities and especially between white settlers and the black rural communities (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Under the white minority government to 1979, whites seized control of the vast majority of good agricultural land, leaving black peasants to scrape a living from marginal “tribal reserves”. Land in tribal reserves was less fertile and access to infrastructure more difficult, cattle were confiscated (on the grounds that stock numbers led to overgrazing), grazing rights were restricted and farmers were not allowed to grow some of the most profitable crops, such as coffee (Deininger et al, 2002).

This study on the role of social networks in farm production in resettlement schemes in Zimbabwe was carried out in 2005 using qualitative methods of enquiry. In Zimbabwe, access to land resource has been an issue of major economic, social and political importance. Land resources are central to the attainment of social, spiritual, political stability and economic development in the country (Roth and Gonese, 2003). The majority of poor people and the landless live directly off the land as a primary source of livelihood. Disparities in land ownership presented many challenges to the new Zimbabwean government, giving rise to the establishment of wide ranging programmes of resettlement schemes since 1980.

The study will explore the role played by social networks in farm production in new resettlement areas under the A1 model, as implemented in Zimbabwe since 2000. It involves identifying social networks that help farmers to create and exchange skills and knowledge in farming activities. It pays particular attention to social needs on the ground that influences sharing of information, co-operation among farmers, agricultural extension, acceptance of social leaders at the resettlement scheme and group dynamics. The study assumes that the stronger and more extensive network ties among farmers at the resettlement scheme the more likely they are to learn new things that

improve farming. The overall objective of the study is to assess the role of social networks in crop and animal production in A1 resettlement scheme. This will be done through a case study of Chigori farm in Murewa district which was subdivided into 6ha A1 villagized model resettlement plots.

At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a dual agrarian structure characterized by skewed land ownership and white minority control over the country's land resources. The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 gave special protection to white Zimbabwean landowners for the first ten years after independence. Land distribution was to proceed only on a "willing buyer, willing seller" basis. In 1990, the government of Zimbabwe amended the provisions of the constitution concerning property rights clause. Compulsory acquisition of land for redistribution and resettlement became possible (Human Rights Watch, 2002). According to the Human Rights Watch (2002), the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 gave the government strengthened powers to acquire land for resettlement, subject to the payment of 'fair' compensation fixed by a committee of six persons using set (non-market) guidelines, including powers to limit the size of farms and introduce a land tax. Despite the new laws, the government land acquisition and resettlement programme in practice slowed down, acquiring 40 percent of the target, which aimed to resettle more than 50,000 families on more than three million hectares (Humans Rights Watch, 2002).

The government of Zimbabwe formally announced a Fast Track Land Reform programme (FTLRP) in 2000 with the aim of acquiring more than 3,000 commercial farms for redistribution. The FTLRP was inspired by the desire of the government to use land acquisition as a way of maintaining political power in a volatile environment prevailing in the country. Government of Zimbabwe realized that it was slowly losing political ground amid deteriorating economic environment. Land became an important strategy of restoring this power and vote buying. FTLRP was triggered by growing impatience among members of the liberation movement and their representatives, with the slow progress of new land acquisition process with the support of the government.


The Government of Zimbabwe towards year 2000 has been desirous of a speedy outcome of reforms that empower the indigenous population to engage in agricultural production and, in turn, lead to viable and sustainable growth (Roth and Gonese, 2003). The government also underscored the importance of land reform in spearheading the turn around of the country's economy. According to the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), which represents the large scale commercial farming sector in Zimbabwe, more than 1,600 commercial farms were occupied by settlers led by liberation war veterans (COHRE, 2001). Overall, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme has been initiated by the government working with the liberation war veterans and other radical members of both the rural and urban areas thus creating an artificial demand for land. According to Makadho (2004), squatting increased in all provinces of Zimbabwe due to growing demands for land redistribution among the poor as a result of growing poverty and retrenchment of workers, as well as among the wealthier due to their expanding focus on accumulation of capital through emerging market based on land and natural resource use. These members mobilized other people to join them in land invasions campaigns without any abatement by government.

The Fast Track resettlement programme in Zimbabwe was conducted with a variety of approaches and objectives. The stated aim of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme was to take land from white commercial farmers for redistribution to poor and middle income landless black Zimbabweans. However, ruling party militias, often led by liberation war veterans, have carried out serious acts of violence against farm owners, farm workers and using occupied farms as bases for attacks against residents of surrounding areas (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Beneficiaries were resettled on an *ad hoc* basis by 'base commanders' who were war veterans. War veterans' leaders were in charge of subdividing farms during the early phases of invasions without following proper technical subdivision plans. Later a rationalization exercise was commissioned by the government with its personnel re-allocating and pegged plots along technical principles. According to Gonese and Roth (2003), commercial farms were subdivided into A1 self contained, A1 villagized, A2 and three tier models. Settlers were allocated individual residential and arable plots but shared common grazing, wood-lots and water

points, in the villagized model. According to Makadho (2004), the main objectives of the A1 resettlement model was to reduce land pressure in over populated areas at the same time maintaining the social and cultural fabric of the beneficiaries by settling families with common origins in the same village. Social and cultural fabric played an important role in adjusting to resettlement environments and agricultural production. These were government intentions to conduct the FTLRP along these lines but were overtaken by events such as spread land invasions by war veterans and radical members of the society. On the A1 self contained model, farms were subdivided into self contained residential , arable and grazing land depending on land characteristics and natural region. Planners wanted to ensure sufficient water supplies per household but this failed to materialize due to resource constraints. Model A1 villagized settlements comprised individual residential and arable plots, and communal grazing land, woodlots and water points. Model A2 model farms comprised self contained farm units. Beneficiaries had to utilize their own resources for land development and production because the 'Fast Track' land reform programme was chaotic and not well planned and government did not provide funds to kick start the programme. Three-tier land use models had been planned for drier areas where livestock production is a viable land use practice when irrigation is absent. On paper the three tiers comprised residential villages, and arable land, a 'near grazing zone' where households maintain domestic livestock, and an 'outer grazing zone' for commercial herds of livestock.

Opponents of Fast Track Resettlement programme in Zimbabwe expresses their dissatisfaction before, during and post land reform at different fora. According to the Human Rights Watch (2002), the 'fast track' land resettlement programme led to serious human rights violations. The programme's implementation also raised serious doubts as to the extent to which it has benefited the landless, poor and the process of allocating plots frequently discriminated against people believed to support opposition parties (Human Rights Watch, 2002). As a result of Zimbabwe history, the strong criticism of the fast track programme was voiced by Britain, the United States of America, the European Union and other International Organizations concerned with property rights

and human rights. In late 2001, the Organization of African Union (OAU) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) criticised the disorder and economic chaos unleashed by fast track land redistribution and other developments (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The Commonwealth, which is a consortium of both rich and poor former colonies of Britain also criticised the manner in which land reform was conducted in Zimbabwe. The European Union and the United States of America introduced sanctions against Zimbabwe as a way of showing disapproval to the unfair land redistribution and state-sponsored violence in the process. The polarisation of positions between the government, commercial farmers and donors on how the land reform programme was to be implemented became a major concern (Masiwa, 2004). Recent developments concerning land had a significant negative impact on Zimbabwean agriculture and a marked economic impact (COHRE, 2001). The spate of illegal occupations of commercial farmland since February 2000, coupled with the refusal or inability of the State to protect the property rights of the land owners and the subsequent hasty launch of the fast track land reform and the deployment of new legal instruments designed to reduce or eliminate the need for financial compensation, has exacerbated the situation (COHRE, 2001).



According to Deininger (1999), the transfer from large to small farmers requires a change in the pattern of production, construction of complementary infrastructure, subdivision of the farm, and settlement of additional beneficiaries over and above the workers who have already been living on the farm. Success of a settlement exercise can be realized only if technical, financial and infrastructural assistance is provided during the start up phase (inception phase). Government in most cases through extension services (agency) will make decisions on production pattern on these farms (command agriculture). This poses a possible constraint on land reform beneficiaries as significant modifications need to be done.

1. 1 Statement of the Problem

The situation prevailing in resettlement schemes is characterized by diverse classes of beneficiaries involved in the agricultural sector including peasants, landless workers, government bureaucrats, politicians and middle class urbanites. These beneficiaries of the FTLRP have different levels of resource endowments, agricultural experience and objectives (Sukume and Moyo, 2003). The 'beneficiary selection' criteria employed was random and chaotic. It was employed on the basis of political allegiance and power, participation in farm invasions, instrumental in the land allocation process and bureaucracy. This inevitably led to the creation and destruction of social networks. Beneficiaries were not settled on a farm on the basis of historical claim to the land or farms contiguous to areas they previously inhabited. Thus, the FTLRP programme brought people who arguably had no connection with each other together in settlements. Some of the beneficiaries participated in the land invasions and allocated themselves plots of land on farms. Entry was on the basis of participation in the whole process.

The failure of government to provide the basic services to FTLRP recipients required to cushion them in the new environments exacerbated the already difficult situation amid weak social networks. Farmers needed to invest heavily in social networks that gave them flexible access to resources necessary for agriculture. For instance, the settlers required access to roads, initial seeds and fertilizers, extension services, training, clinics, dip tanks and draught power.

Social networks indicate the ways in which individuals or settlers are connected through various social familiarities ranging from casual acquaintance to close familial bonds. In a situation of lack of access of inputs and services, social networks help in determining the way problems are solved and farms are run in the resettlement areas. Social network is non-market, non-state institution that can solve specific problems- sometimes in the absence of market or state institutions (Gaduh, 2002). During the period of relocation, the disintegration of social support during relocation period has far-reaching consequences leading to compounded individual losses with a loss of social capital: dismantled patterns

of social cohesion are to rebuild (Fox and Greshman, 1999). In addition to the provision of services, social cohesion among settlers (neighbours) is an ingredient that influences farming communities to work together in farm production activities.

Studies on land reform carried out in Zimbabwe have concentrated on agrarian contracts (contract farming), land distribution through private land markets, resettlement and beneficiary support, land administration and decentralization, securing rural livelihoods and strategies for agrarian reform in Zimbabwe (Roth and Gonese, 2003). Other studies have looked at Household Economy Assessment in resettlement areas as a food and livelihood security assessments (HEA Report, 2003). These studies looked at mainly technical and economic issues of the land reform exercise as key drivers of farm production and realization of food security status. The role of social networks was not the focus of these studies. Little research has been carried out on the role of social networks in farm production in resettlement areas of Zimbabwe. Grootaert (1997) argues that studies on land reform overlooked the way in which the economic actors interact and organize themselves to generate growth and development and concludes that social capital was the missing link. Referring to an earlier phase of resettlement, Roth and Bruce (1994) argue that not enough consideration was given by the authorities to the importance of social cohesion that pay-off when households experience negative shocks. Dekker (2004) argues that resettlement affects the way households cope with crisis situations in Zimbabwe and households in resettlement areas are more likely to develop individual strategies compared to households in communal areas. New farmers came from different cultural and geographical backgrounds which creates differences in the attitude of resettled farmers. This study is going to contribute towards closing this knowledge gap among implementers of land reform by assessing the role of social networks in farm production in new resettlement schemes.

1.2 Specific objectives and Research Questions

1.2.1 The specific objectives of the study are as follows:

- To understand farmers' perceptions and awareness of the role of social networks in farm production
- To assess the relative importance of social networks in improving farm production
- To assess the impact of social networks on land reform in new resettlement areas

To achieve these objectives the study shall try to answer the following questions.

- What is the extent of farmers' reciprocity and co-operation at the resettlement scheme?
- How do farmers get things done when they need to engage in agricultural activities (such as land preparation, weeding, planting, harvesting and crop marketing) at the resettlement scheme?
- What has been the impact of the formation of farming networks through groups and labour networks on Fast Track Land Reform Programme?
- What are farmers' perceptions on the role of kinship, trust, identity and socio-economic factors on farm production at the resettlement scheme?

1.3 Significance of the Study

The importance of the study is that it is going to contribute to an understanding of the insecurities that affect smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe and the assumptions that are often made about the effect of the resettlement process on the support networks of resettled farmers.

The study shall also contribute to planning and execution of agricultural development programmes by informing and assisting planners with targeting criteria and selection of beneficiaries of resettlement programmes. It will highlight complex and diverse relationships and complex networks that households become involved in resettlement areas in order to provide access to support in times of need.

1.4 Organization of the Study

The first chapter introduces the study, explores the nature of the problem under investigation, and sets out the research objectives and questions that guide the study. Chapter Two comprises a comprehensive review of the literature on rural resettlement and social capital and sets out the conceptual framework used in the study. Chapter Three introduces the case study and outlines the research methodology. Chapter four presents the results of the case study from Murewa District, analyses the types of social networks, co-operation and norms found and focuses more specifically on the role played by different types of social networks in agricultural production. Chapter Five presents conclusions of the study and makes recommendation for policy and development planning.



CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW


2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the background to the land question in Zimbabwe and the political and economic context of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, the manner in which the programme was executed and drawing lessons from earlier phase of land reform. This chapter also reviews the literature on social capital in agricultural development, starting from a theoretical point of view and then exploring social network issues from an empirical perspective.

2.1 Background to Land Reform and Land Policy in Zimbabwe

The land question has always been and remains at the core of Zimbabwe's political, economic and social development. The Utete Report (2003) argues that land remained the root of the political tension within the country and with the former colonial power, Britain. The current internal political developments bear testimony to the centrality of the land issue in the country's history. According to Moyana (1984), colonial rule from 1890 to 1979 was characterized by racial land dispossession, political and economic discrimination. Previous land reform program was meant to redress these imbalances and inequities in resource use and ownership. Land reform was part of government policy to address the unequal access to land with the hope of creating political stability and economic development (Kinsey, 1982; Tshuma, 1997; Moyana, 1984, GOZ, 1998). According to Marongwe et al (2005), Zimbabwe has an agro-based economy and in terms of its population about 70% reside in rural areas working on the land notwithstanding other off-farm income earning opportunities and rural employment. Land forms a very important livelihood source for the majority of rural people. As a result, according to GOZ (1982), the key development policy challenges upon attainment of independence were to promote re-distributive strategies to reduce racial inequality and poverty. Land was one of the economic factors used to stimulate broad economic growth focusing on the poor. Zimbabwe's land reform history is a complex process that according to Moyo (2004) can be conceptually understood in terms of an erratically phased process of differential implementation of land acquisition for redistribution, defined by changing policy objectives, approaches, financing and impacts.

At independence in 1980 the agricultural sector comprised three sub sectors namely large scale commercial farming, small scale commercial farming and communal areas. The large scale commercial sector owned 15.5 million hectares, more than half of which lay in the high rainfall agro-ecological regions where agricultural potential is greatest. Small-scale commercial farming held about 1.4 million hectares of agricultural land. Communal areas, inhabited by the bulk of the populace of 4.3 million people worked on 16.4 million hectares of agricultural land where the soils are poor. White commercial agriculture was typically characterized by a lot of land that was unutilized or under utilized, held by absentee landlords or just left derelict for speculative purposes. Human Rights Watch (2002) reported that land reform was a necessary and vital process to redress the situation that prevailed in the country which was unequal and race based patterns of land occupation. Many poor and middle- income black people in urban areas squeezed by rocketing food and transport prices and growing unemployment since the mid-1990s, saw land as an alternative source of income and food security. Similar macro-economic conditions were experienced prior to the onset of the fast track land reform. Human Rights Watch (2002) argued that significant land hunger in Zimbabwe is created by failure to address many land restitution claims relating to forced removals during the era of white government.



According to Moyo (2004), Zimbabwe's land reform programme went through various phases. The first phase commenced in the early 1980s, when hectares of land were transferred to poor families by 1997. Tshuma (1997) indicated that the phase was in the form of land occupations by peasants mostly in the Eastern Highlands. The second phase of Zimbabwe's land reform process was characterized by small amount of land acquisition and redistribution with the thrust of promoting black commercial farmers in the country. The third phase was influenced by a negotiated framework between government, donors and farmers with a view of possible compulsory acquisition. The fourth period was the time when Fast Track Resettlement came into existence. Table 2.1 below highlights the phases of land reform in Zimbabwe and dates.

Table 2.1: Periodization of Land Acquisition

Period	Total number of Ha Acquired	Average Ha Acquired per Year	Number of Households Settled	Context
1980-1984 (5years)	2 147 855	429 571	30 000	Constitutional Constraints
1985-1990 (6years)	447 791	74 632	20 000	Land Acquisition Act,1985
1992-1997 (5years: 1996 omitted)	789 645	157 929	20 000	Land Acquisition Act, 1992
1998-2000 (3years)	228 839	76 279	1 000	Land Reform Negotiations
2000-2004 (4years)	12 387 571	190 217	135 000	Compulsory Land Acquisition Under Fast Track
Total 23 years	16 001 701	190 217	201 000	

Adapted from Moyo, 2004

The period to 2000 was characterized by land acquisition through the market (Moyo, 1995; Marongwe et al, 2000).The process was relatively well planned and it targeted specific beneficiaries. Marongwe et al (2005) reported that from February 2000, there were widespread land occupations onto mainly white owned large scale commercial farms. The land occupations were later formalized and became known as Fast Track Resettlement (Marongwe et al, 2005). According to Marongwe 2002 and Chaumba et al, 2002, the programme was largely chaotic, unplanned and violent. FTLRP did not target specific beneficiaries and provide meaningful technical know-how to the beneficiaries of

the land reform to spur production. As a result production knowledge and technical support vacuum was created. Utete Report (2003) indicated that approximately 11 million hectares of land was redistributed to 135 000 smallholders and commercial farms. The period saw the parceling of large volumes of land to beneficiaries who in most cases had participated in the invasions of the farms. FTLRP had no set out criteria for selection as mere participation in the invasions formed the basis of selection.

Makadho (2004) indicated that the legal framework governing land acquisition was significantly amended to take account of the rapidly changing policy environment of the Fast Track. Marongwe et al (2005) highlighted that court orders instructing government to remove occupiers from the farms were ignored. Masiwa, (2004) argued that the Rural Land Occupiers Act was enacted to protect new land occupiers from eviction. To a large extent, the farm occupations were legally supported by the government which had enacted the Rural Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act Chapter 20: 10 of March 2001. The act prevents the eviction of people who have invaded a particular farm until the issue was determined in the Administrative Court.

Moyo (2001) argued that state driven land redistribution was driven by popular land occupations, led by war veterans from 1998, building upon scattered and loosely organized 'illegal' land occupations which persisted between 1980 and 1996. This 'community' led approach to land transfer, entails groups of households leading the identification of land for redistribution by 'squatting' on it, with the expectation that the government would regularize the transfer by expropriating it. According to Moyo (2003), high profile intensive land occupations, occurred on a national scale from 1997 when war veterans, rural peasants, traditional leaders and spirit mediums, elements of the urban working class and elites, including largely ZANU PF and Government of Zimbabwe officials, were gradually mobilized towards direct action for land reform, challenging the entire "state" apparatus and its land reform instruments. Revisions to the Constitution and Land Act in 2000, led to new land expropriations, in the face of numerous court

challenges, but these were now backed by extensive 'illegal' occupations condoned by the state during 2000 and 2001.

2.2 Factors Influencing Fast Track Compulsory Land Acquisition

According to Moyo (2004), a number of events and issues influenced the adoption of Fast Track Land Reform. These include the collapse of the 1996 negotiations with the British government over finances for land acquisition and ambivalent donors' response to the Inception Phase Framework Plan and lack of financial support at the 1998 donors' conference. It also includes the continued legal challenges by the white commercial farmers and the rejection of the 2000 Draft Constitution in the referendum, which could have facilitated speedier government land acquisition.

Land supply failed to match the demand for resettlement land in the first decade of independence. The Lancaster House Constitution obliged the Government to acquire land on a willing seller-willing buyer basis during the first ten years of independence (Utete Report, 2003). Other complicating factors were added to this hindrance, such as government's limited budget, poor (marginal) quality of land offered for sale and land offered in spurts around the country. This affected the systemic implementation of the land reform programme and the overall number of households settled.

According to the Utete Report (2003), people were disappointed with the pace of land redistribution and they responded by bringing pressure on Government through resorting to vigorous protests and land occupations. Residents of communal areas occupied nearby commercial farmers before year 2000, until Government promised to resettle them. Many villagers cited poor soils and congestion as compelling factors leading to such invasions. These people who arguably imposed pressure on the government had only fertile soils in mind. It is not quite clear whether they were pushed by the need to farm in the new areas, thereby questioning the selection process and aims of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme.

Fast Track land reform programme adopted a different approach in terms of manners of implementation and source of resources to the policies of earlier years. The key elements of the Fast Track were to speed up the identification for compulsory acquisition of not less than 5 million hectares of land for resettlement, accelerate the planning and demarcation of acquired land and settler placement on the land and provide limited basic infrastructure (such as boreholes, dip tanks and access roads) and farmer support services (such as tillage and agricultural inputs). Moyo (2004) states that land acquisition policy targets were revised in 2001 by the GoZ from the initial target of 5 million hectares to 11 million hectares. This reflected a policy shift on the part of the government.

2.3 Beneficiary Selection and Implementation

Failure of most resettlement programmes (Makadho, 2004) have been blamed on the caliber of settlers selected for resettlement. The government changed its selection criteria in the early 1990s, to emphasize farming experience and training rather than landlessness, poverty and homelessness. The government was supposed to provide socio-economic infrastructure to the beneficiaries in the A1 model (Makadho, 2004) but did not materialize. These include a borehole per village of 20 – 25 households, a clinic for 500 families, a dip tank for 1,400 cattle, a primary school classroom and teacher's house for every 20 families, scheme boundary, village and wood-lot fencing material for all projects, a descent housing unit per household through the Rural Housing Programme Loan Fund, and a Blair toilet per household. (Makadho, 2004) argued that there was no concrete evidence to demonstrate the links between poor settler selection and poor agricultural performance. Despite such an elaborate institutional framework put in place by the government to implement the FTLRP, events unfolding on the ground were beyond any logical comprehension as they were characterized by nationwide farm invasions and occupations that were initiated by the war veterans (Masiwa, 2004). According to Marongwe (2002), the basis on which land occupiers targeted farms were; the proximity of the resettled farms to the occupiers' home (logistical), poor relations between farmers (mostly white) and their peasant neighbours, unsettled historical land claims, and affiliation with political opposition. The land occupations general affected all

types of land, including state land, private land owned by white and black commercial farmers as well as other private concerns like companies and churches (Saruchera, 2002). According to Masiwa (2004), people who demonstrated a noble cause of landlessness through farm invasions and occupations were the first to be allocated land for resettlement

Within the context of the Fast Track the government changed the focus of the settler selection criteria from those experienced and trained in agriculture to focus on all interested Zimbabweans. Makadho (2004) reported that selection in the A1 resettlement scheme was largely based on land occupation and the list submitted through local authorities. New settlers were settled on the land they occupied, on the basis of lists provided by war veterans association, headmen and chiefs (Makadho, 2004).

2.4 Constraints to Implementation of Land Reforms

Several key constraints have been cited in the implementation of land reform in Zimbabwe. The key constraints include technical and financial resources to acquire and redistribute the land resources as well as resettling beneficiaries (Hungwe, 2004). Financial resources are not only important for the compensation of the expropriated land owners but also for providing essential resources and services to the resettlement of beneficiaries. Agricultural production requires both technical and human resources.

The Government of Zimbabwe has been criticized for employing very simple and rudimentary tools and methods of implementing the land reform on the ground. Studies by Moyo et al (2003), indicates that the time frame which was set for the implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, presented planning challenges, resulting in ad-hoc development of policies and procedures resulting in cumbersome legal battles. As a result some of the acquired land is still tied up and has not been taken by the prospective beneficiaries (Sunga, 2003; Marongwe, 2003).

2.5 Performance of Settlers in Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP)

Studies (Makadho, 2004) indicated that settlers in LRRP 1 faced numerous challenges throughout the 1980s including poor quality of land acquired, inadequate extension, information and training, poor institutional coordination, inadequate resources and poor marketing. Land use intensity in the resettlement areas was below that of the communal areas despite the better average land sizes and quality (Masters, 1994). This was also coupled by limited government resources for planning and infrastructural development. In the 1980s people were settled without systematic selection criteria to determine their land needs in terms of what contribution they can do to farming (Makadho, 2004). In some cases vibrant support services collapsed on the farms due to mismanagement. In contrast, Kinsey (1999) in Chiremba and Masters (2000) attributes earlier poor performances to shocks associated with early stages of adaptation to new farming systems. Households had to cope with extra land and dealing with translocation experience, subjecting many households to considerable stress and left with no time to pursue other non-farm activities. FTLRP programme has given large tracts of land to beneficiaries and little accompanying support services important in facilitating quick adaptation to new farming environments.

Makadho (2004) attributed low performance shown by settlers in LRRP1 was due to lack of confidence on the part of settlers and due to state's negative view on the potential of settlers to produce on a commercial basis. Thus some settlers maintained dual homes in both communal and resettlement areas.

During the first phase of resettlement, crop inputs and tillage services were provided by government for half a hectare per family in the first year of resettlement (Makadho, 2004). Provision of crop inputs and tillage services provide smooth transition and adjustment of the new settlers in new conditions compared to Communal Lands. According to Matondi (2001) early assistance acted as a production leverage resulting in some farmers becoming self reliant. Some settler families invested in substantial land improvements, permanent dwellings, production and transport equipment such as ploughs

and scotch carts. Makadho (2004) reported that NGOs and development aid organizations also provided an important financial avenue for most settlers to develop their land. This is important because its very difficult to adjust and settle in new environments without any resources. On the other hand, Fast Track did not have provisions for smooth transition and adjustment to new conditions either from the Government or development agencies.

Studies indicate that the majority of settler families realized increased household income compared to communal areas farmers. Moyo (1995) mentioned that the average household incomes per year in the early 1990s had doubled in resettlement schemes compared to Communal Lands. Some farmers diversified into specialized crops, invested in land improvements, permanent housing and productive equipment. Sukume, Moyo and Matondi (2003) reported that many new farmers are evolving land use and production plans based upon their immediate production capacities and food needs. Makadho (2004) found out that poor performance of peasant agriculture is not due to 'poor' land alone but also to numerous other factors, such as lack of an efficient infrastructure, credit, inputs, adequate extension and management.

2.6 Social Capital in Agricultural Development

Implementers of land reform programmes have ignored sociological aspects of relocation of communities including recognition of settlers as families or whole communities with established behaviour patterns (Scudder, 1985; Guggenheim and Cernea, 1993). Land reform programmes have been conceptualized in technological terms such as infrastructural provision and technical packages. Abbute (1998) and Cernea (1996) argue that beneficiaries of relocation programmes should be selected as families and communities who wish to live and work together to improve cooperation among families.

Sociological studies of kinships, networking, and the formation of small groups are especially relevant in examining cooperation among settlers for productive activities. During the initial months of settlement , beneficiary households must first clear new lots,

build temporary houses, prepare and sow fields, learn new production techniques , and adjust to the management style of the settlement agency. During this time, the majority of settlers are either individual household heads (followed subsequently by other family members) or small family units. The serious labour constraints that can occur can be eliminated best if planners adopt policies that facilitate the establishment of work networks and associations, especially for household construction and land preparation. It is important to have sociological knowledge of how settlers (usually strangers to each other) establish and broaden work and residential networks and social groups, for example, productivity will usually increase more rapidly where, settlers have relatives as fellow sponsored or spontaneous migrants or have neighbours from familiar and relatively similar class or caste and religious or ethnic backgrounds (Tankha and Burtner, 1998). Settling people who are alien to each other side by side in the same community or assigning them contiguous fields, administrators run the risk of increasing stress among settler families and of delaying the cooperative activities which raise production and aid community formation.

2.6.1 Defining Social Capital

Social capital has been defined as the

“Institutions, relations and norms that shapes the quality and quantity of a society’s social relations” (www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/whatsc.html).

According to Nepal et al (2005), there is no unique definition for social capital and one widely accepted principal component of social capital was the notion of social networks. Coleman (1988) described social capital as features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action. Burt (2001) discussed two network structures that have been argued to create social capital, namely structural holes and network closure. Other important aspects of social capital are relation and trust, reciprocity and exchanges, and common rules, norms and sanctions (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 1999).


2.6.2 The Forms of Social Capital

Social capital can influence development at different levels viz micro, meso or macro level. Apart from different levels, social capital can take different dimension such as structural and cognitive capital (see figure 2.6.2). According to Grootaert et al (2002), structural social capital facilitates information sharing, and collective action and decision making through established roles, social networks and other social structures supplemented by rules, procedures and precedents.

Structural and cognitive capital can be, but are not necessarily, complementary (Grootaert et al, 2002). Co-operation between neighbours can be based on a personal cognitive bond that may not be reflected in a formal structural arrangement (ibid). The same authors argues that the existence of a community association does not necessarily testify to strong personal connections among its members , either because participation in its activities is not voluntary or because its existence has outlasted the external factor that led to its creation.



Figure 2.6.2: Dimension of Social Capital



Source: Milagrosa and Slangen, 2005

2.6.3 Social Structures and Relocation

Guggenheim and Cernea (1993) argue that relocation, whether voluntary or compulsory, is a stressful experience. Members of communities undergoing relocation reacts in broadly and predictably similar ways, “partly because of the stress of relocation limits the range of coping responses of those involved”(Scudder, 1985). During the most stressful period, the period leading up to relocation, the move itself, and the first few years of adjustment thereafter ,people tend to behave in conservative, risk avoiding ways, clinging to familiar practices and groupings. This is because relocation leads to the breakdown of cultural and community organization. Communities leave this period of stress and insecurity over time after re-establishing themselves economically and socially. People now begin to behave in more innovative and risk taking ways, and their attitudes become increasingly flexible, individualistic and open-ended.

According to Guggenheim and Cernea (1993), successful resettlement programmes must provide the elements for developing long term attachments to the new site: new agricultural lands, social connections with the new communities, symbolic identifications with the new environment. Relocation involves the movement of people from one place to another bringing about a change in spatial setting and context in which people find them, and to which they have to adapt. Social cohesion's importance is realized when households experience negative shocks as settlers were taken from different cultural and geographical backgrounds (Roth and Bruce, 1994).

2.6.4 Social Networks Characteristics

Social networks enable a flexible form of exchange that is fundamental for coping with the variability of agricultural systems (Mazzucato et al, 2001). Box 1 below illustrate the characteristics of networks that make them flexible.

Box 1: Characteristics of networks

1. Networks are multipurpose: the same relationship can be used for many purposes. In a market exchange, a purchased good can only be used for the purpose for which it was meant.
2. Networks can be invested in at various times: one can create and maintain the relationships that comprise one's network at various times throughout the year, depending on resource availability. This contrasts with market exchanges, where debt repayment has fixed time periods and interest puts a value to the timing of repayment.
3. Networks can be invested in through a variety of means: they function on the principle of reciprocity so one has indebted by using a network to access something. However, this debt can be paid back with various means such as labour and political allegiance. In market exchange, money is the only means of exchange and thus excludes the poor.
4. Networks allow access to factors at scale appropriate to the specific agricultural system. For example , tasks such as weeding or clearing need to be done on time and therefore a farmer needs many labourers on one day rather one labourer over a month. Labour contracts based on market principles cannot sustain such a


labour force needed for a very short time in peak periods. Another example is the practice of borrowing small pieces of land (e.g. 0.05ha) surrounding one's field in order to expand when one's labour availability allows the cultivation of slightly more land.

5. Networks transgress geographical boundaries: they can expand and contract in reaction to changing social, economic and environmental contexts. They can be based on relationships within a compound or a village but can also extend to members outside the village or region. For example, technology networks allow farmers to access new varieties through relations with people who live in or have traveled through different regions. Land networks extend to members beyond the village territory so that farmers can access cultivable land beyond the village.

Source: Mazzucato et al, 2001

2.6.5 The Development of Social Capital.

Development agencies play an important role in the development of social capital. They influence community cognition and perception on matters regarding conservation and collective action. It is arguable that the success of FTLRP project hinges upon the development of social capital.



It is the 'glue' that holds institutions for development. Tocqueville referred to social capital as the "habits of the heart and the mind" (*cited in Hyden, 1997*). By this he (Tocqueville) meant that social capital is the justification for the rules and regulations that are found within a society and the design criteria for these normative rules. Nepal et al (2005) argues that there is no unique definition for social capital although one widely accepted principal component of social capital is the notion of social networks.

Therefore, social capital is those densely associational networks that cuts across traditional social boundaries and are found in relations between individuals and groups (Putnam, 1993). Social capital lubricates relations minimizing conflicts, which are a result of competing interests, and their degeneration to undesirable level. The

harmonization of interests that result thereof is conducive for optimal benefit from the exploitation of the commons and for the collective good. Social capital is gestaltism: recognition that social wholes are more important than the sum of their individual parts. Social capital can therefore, be referred to as the framework that supports the process of learning through interaction, and requires the formation of network paths that are both horizontal (across agencies and sector) and vertical (agencies to communities to individuals) (Allen, 2005).

Social capital is not the norms and values of an individual *per se*, but norms and values available as a resource to those individuals who share access to a particular social context (Edward and Foley, 1998). For example if a resettlement village is cultivating tobacco crop and they agree that no one should cut down trees to cure tobacco, but contribute as a group to purchase coal instead. Social capital will be those norms that will bring the trust that the next man will not flout the pledge. Thus, social capital impacts on the quality of social processes and relations within which interactions take place and is influential on the quality of the learning outcomes in collaborative approaches. Furthermore, social capital plays an important role in fostering the social networks and information exchange needed to achieve collective action.

It is arguable that the development of social capital is a function of the existing social structure. For instance it is not possible to induce individuals to cooperate or respect one another without first paying attention to the institutions (modern and traditional) that make up that society. In return social capital in its broadest sense encompasses the social and political environment that shapes the social structure and enables norms to develop. In fact institutions work better when the members are brought together through perhaps the development of social capital and cohesion “The institution works as such when it acquires a third support from the harnessed moral energy of its members” (Douglas, 1987)

2.6.6 Role of Social Networks on Social and Water Conservation

According to Mazzucato et al (2001), studies that focus on soil and water conservation tend to either ignore the influence of social institutions on people's ability to engage in conservation practices or consider them only in the form of land tenure arrangements or farmer organizations or associations. Through social networks people are able to access the resources they need for agricultural production such as draught cattle, labour, land and knowledge (see table 2.6.6).

Table 2.6.6: Social Networks for Soil and Water Conservation (SWC)

Type of networks	How they function	How they affect people's ability to practise SWC
Land networks	Provide access to land through borrowing agreements. Farmers ask a relation to use their land for cropping during the cultivation cycle of the field. Once the land is no longer fit for cultivation, it is left fallow and use rights return to the original owner. Agreements do not involve explicit payments but the borrower is under a tacit obligation to provide the lender with crop production, symbolic gifts, and/or political allegiance.	Allows people to practise fallow under higher population densities Compounds can spread to different farming areas thus reducing the risk of being in an area of localized rainfall shortage
Labour networks	Provide access to temporary labour. Labour from one household may be borrowed by another household to carry out production or household tasks. Work parties are another form of labour borrowing in which a group of people are called to perform an	Get agricultural tasks done on time Use own labour also for off-farm activities Use SWC knowledge to full

	agricultural task in exchange for food and or drink. No official payment is necessitated but participation in a work party is reciprocal.	capacity by having the time to conduct labour intensive SWC
Women's natal networks	The ties women have with their natal family. Provide access to land in different village territories, a diverse set of landraces, starter seed for the first cohort of women in agriculture, gifts of agricultural production, and a place for women to keep their livestock. This access is usually dependent on a woman's ability to maintain contact with her paternal family through visits during the dry season and help with harvesting during the agricultural season.	Access land and landraces necessary for the application of SWC technologies. Keep livestock in different geographical areas thereby reducing the risk of having an entire herd killed by disease. Access gifts of production to consume or sell
Cattle networks	Provide access to cattle. Ties with Fulbe pastoralists enable Gourmantche agriculturalists to entrust their cattle for transhumance grazing. Relationships between the two groups are either based on historical ties or relationships of trust by a series of monetary loans given by Gourmantche to Fulbe.	Access to cattle manure Reduce crop damage from livestock Reduce overgrazing
Technology networks	Provide access to technologies such as plough, traction animals, and carts through borrowing. Agreements do not entail explicit payments but the borrower usually	Frees labour for application of SWC technologies Use own labour also for off-farm activities

	offers a gift in return.	
Cash networks	Provide access to cash. Participants contribute regular payments to a central plot and when participants are in need, they receive the cash. Such networks are based on kin or religious affiliation.	Gives alternative source of cash

Source: Mazzucato et al, 2001

2.6.7 Social capital: From Concept to Measurement

Studies reviewed by Grootaert et al (2002) viewed social capital as an asset that can be accumulated yielding flow of benefits and these benefits differs. The benefit can be collective action to manage a common resource effectively such as watersheds, animal pastures and farm infrastructure left at the farms. Fafchamps and Minten's (in Grootaert et al, 2002) observed that social capital reduces transaction costs among traders and acted as an informal channel for acquiring insurance against liquidity risk. Reid and Salmen (in Grootaert et al, 2002) found out that trust is the key factor in making agricultural extension successful. The empirical evidence from these studies shows that social networks are important and benefits from the networking can be used in different ways such as extension interventions in order for benefits to flow to communities or individuals. In that regard targeting of certain activities at the resettlement schemes should identify the types of social networks obtaining in order to make informed interventions.

According to Grootaert et al (2002), social capital poses some difficulties in measuring it directly and empirically there is the use of proxy indicators. Other studies done elsewhere by Krishna and Uphoff, Fafchamps and Minten in Grootaert et al (2002) have used membership in networks, number and types of relations. Some have used trust between farmers and extension agents, prevalence of social networks, patterns of social interaction, density of membership in associations, extent of meeting attendance,

participation in decision making, extent of social interaction among neighbours and the number of collective village activities.

A wide range of social capital indicators are available and have been used in the Social Capital Initiative studies to measure social capital and its impact (Grootaert et al, 2002). Each of those measures has merits in the specific context in which it was used and it is unlikely that it will ever be possible to identify a few “best” indicators that can be used everywhere. This implies that there are indicators that can only apply to farming setups and environments that clearly reveal the nature and role of social networks prevailing.

2.7 Conclusion

The land question has always been and remains at the core of Zimbabwe’s political, economic and social development. The key development policy challenges upon attainment of independence were to promote re-distributive strategies to reduce racial inequality and poverty. Land reform was a necessary and vital process to redress the unequal and race based patterns of land occupations. Zimbabwe’s land reform went through various phases and the fourth phase became known as the Fast Track Resettlement since February 2000. Fast Track was influenced by a number of issues and events including collapse of 1996 negotiations with the British government over financial support and lack of financial support at the 1998 donor’s conference. This was characterized by widespread land occupations on large scale commercial farms, violence, chaos and lack of planning. The programme did not target specific beneficiaries by settling families with common origins in the same village to maintain the social and cultural fabric. Social and cultural fabric plays an important role in facilitating adjustment to resettlement environments. Implementers of land reform programmes have ignored sociological aspects of relocation of communities.

In view of the above literature review on FTLRP in general and social networks, the case study of Chigori resettlement scheme offers a compelling study of the current linkages between land reform programmes and social networks in agricultural production. The current study sought to assess the relative importance of social networks in farm

production, impact of land reform on social networks and farmers' perception and awareness on the role being purported by the author.



CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

The objective of this study was to assess the role of social networks in farm production under the A1 resettlement scheme. This chapter gives a brief description of the survey site, data collection methods and the sampling criteria used. It ends by commenting on some limitations of the methodology.

3.1 Background to the Study Area

The area selected for this study was Murewa District (see Map below). Within Murewa district, Chigori resettlement scheme was selected for detailed study. Murewa district was selected as a study area mainly because of its agro-ecological region and geographical location after conducting in-depth discussions with the District AREX Extension Officers. The district is characterized by two agro-ecological regions which are suited for intensive crop production.

Chigori resettlement scheme in Murewa district is located in Mashonaland East province. The province has nine administrative districts: Chikwaka, Goromonzi, Marondera, Mudzi, Murewa, Mutoko, Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe, Seke and Wedza. The population of Mashonaland East was 1,125,355 at the last census of 2002. The province lies in agro-ecological regions IIa to IV and is therefore suitable for intensive crop farming, dairy, horticulture and small grain production. In Murewa district, A1 schemes outnumber A2 schemes. A1 schemes have been allocated a total of 81 858ha compared to 31 557ha under A2 schemes (see table 3.1). The ratio of A1 to A2 schemes is 3:1. Murewa district is the only case with such a ratio in the province. Chigori resettlement scheme is located 103km east of Harare (see map below).

Table 3.1: Allocation Patterns

District	Number of Farms			Total Hectarage		
	A1	A2	Total	A1	A2	Total
Chikomba	87	22	109	11 558	27 687	39 245
Goromonzi	50	96	146	34 933	46 736	81 669
Marondera	83	82	165	71 213	65 244	136 457
Murewa	75	25	100	81 858	31 557	113 415
Mutoko	1		1	644		644
Wedza	34	20	54	44 876	20 545	65 421
Seke	52	74	126	57 429	59 161	116 590
Totals	382	319	701	302 511	250 930	553 411


Source: Utete Report, 2003

Chigori resettlement scheme comprise of mostly A1 schemes, unlike other farms in the district that were divided into mostly A2 schemes. Chigori farm was divided into both A1 and A2 schemes which co-existed side by side. Liberation war veterans and people from surrounding Communal Lands came to Chigori farm to invade in 2000. War veterans who were spearheading the process allocated plots on an ad hoc basis to people who had invaded the farm with them. Later the farm was subdivided and demarcated into A1 and A2 plots by government technical teams between 2002 and 2003, thereby concluding resettlement at this farm. The A1 model comprised of 56 registered plot holders (settlers) with land allocations of six hectares each. Settlers came from various places of origins, some from districts beyond Murewa (the furthest being Mberengwa, 430km away). The majority of the settlers came from Mutoko District, near Murewa.

The rainfall received is high and soils are variable in nature, but light sand soils predominates the area. The local vegetation is sparse and woodland type. The soils are much prone to leaching and requires high amounts of top dressing. It was found out that the major crop grown at Chigori farm was maize followed by groundnut, but tobacco crop growing was the major crop grown by the former commercial farmer before the resettlement exercise. The former commercial white farmer engaged in mixed farming.

The farmer grew tobacco and maize and kept livestock. At the time of field research, approximately 13% of the farmers were growing tobacco and the other farmers were cultivating maize and groundnuts. Paprika was also grown in past seasons but has been dropped due to poor producer prices on the market.

At the time of research, Chigori farm was endowed with 11 tobacco barns which used either wood or coal for curing, storage rooms, tobacco grading shades, 4 farm houses (used by AREX officers, war veterans and an A2 farmer). Chigori comprised of 30 farm worker houses built of asbestos on brick. The farm also contained underground network of irrigation pipes and 3 boreholes (2 of which are functional). Other infrastructure at the farm included 7 fuel storage tanks and a fruit packing shed.



3.2 Research Methods

The study employed three main research methods, as follows:

- (i) focus group discussions with scheme members, followed by in-depth household interviews,
- (ii) household interviews with scheme members who either participated in land occupations or not and those that came later to the scheme after land invasions
- (iii) Key informant interviews with knowledgeable persons who had been part of the occupations and resettlement exercise.

The complimentary use of focus group discussions, key informant interviews and household interviews enabled cross checking of information that was collected to improve the accuracy of information collected and coming up with quality results. These were conducted concurrently to aid in validating the information obtained through these methods. This resulted in data that could be relied upon when making analysis and recommendations. In addition, it was also recognized that knowledge levels of different people were different, thus no single approach could bring out a holistic view of the situation on the ground. The principal data collection techniques were however, household interviews and key informant interviews.

3.3 Data Sources

3.3.1 Data Collection

A rapport was forged between the researcher and resettlement authorities by visiting the land resettlement officers and leadership of the farm. A meeting was held explaining the purposes and nature of the study. The meeting was meant to request participation of the scheme members. This was necessary since resettlement areas have been very hostile when it comes to conducting studies and research.

3.3.2 Primary Data Source

Various qualitative methods of enquiry were employed in the data collection process, as follows.

3.3.2.1 Focus group discussions

Two focus group discussions were held to discuss social networks. Focus group discussions helped in soliciting additional information from other scheme members who were not part of household interviews. The first group comprised of 9 individuals of people who had originated from the same communal lands and the second group had 8 individuals, mainly war veterans and non-war veteran households who participated in farm invasion. The two groups discussed issues relating to particular types of settlers such as networks evolving around origins (historical profiles), identity, and relationship among community members, livelihood analyses and ability to work together. The participants were selected with the assistance of VIDCO head that had details of the households. Participants to the group discussion were selected on the basis of similar origin, being a war veteran and households that participated during farm invasions.

Group discussions began with personal introductions and a brief statement on the objectives of the study and how the results were going to be used. The focus groups were held at the village head's homestead, where the community members usually held their meetings. Focus group discussions were conducted separately from household interviews and key informant interviews to discuss specific issues of resettlement that required a particular group of people, for instance war veterans and people who originated from same areas.

3.3.2.2 Household Interviews

Semi-structured (open-ended) interviews and in-depth conversational interviews were carried out with some members of the resettlement scheme. Households were selected randomly from the scheme register regardless of their status (war veteran or not) or participation in farm invasion. Interviews explored resettlement history, types of social networks present, relationships between plot holders and possession of farming equipment, and communication between agricultural institutions (GMB, produce

companies) and communities. Individual interviews were directed at collecting information such as social support, co-operation and information pertaining to relationships in the resettlement scheme.

The household as a sampling unit was defined as a group of persons who reside permanently together and share meals from a common kitchen. This study was investigating social networks at household level. The study interviewed any adult member of the household who had knowledge about the household activities and relationships with other households at the scheme. Household heads were mainly targeted and interviewed in cases where they resided at the plot.

Semi-structured interviews involved a guided interview process, with some of the questions being pre-determined but the rest being open-ended. Semi-structured questionnaire was designed in English and translated to the local language, Shona. Twenty interviews were conducted at household level out of a total of 56 households. Households were sampled by intervals using the village head's household register. The first household was selected at random, and every third household on the village household list starting from the first randomly selected household was interviewed. The exercise took 5 days with 4 interviews per day. The responses were recorded in note books.

3.3.2.3 Key Informant Interviews

The rationale for using key informant interviews was that the status, position or role of some individuals gave them privileged access to information. The key informants had a broad overview of the resettlement. In this study the individuals included the resettlement committee chairperson, committee secretary, two war veterans and two extension agents, as well as two scheme members who were part of farm invasions. Seven key informant interviews were conducted from the above mentioned categories of people.

The key informants were selected using the networking method. This was achieved by first approaching the resettlement scheme authorities and asking them for suggestions of knowledgeable persons. Among the powerful persons was a war veteran who was a base commander during the land occupations. Base commanders oversaw activities at the farm and allocated plots of land and resolved boundary conflicts among members of the resettlement scheme and made general decisions. Key personnel in Government agencies that had been working in the resettlement programme or scheme were also included.

However, use of key informants has its own set of challenges as well as merits. Key informants can mislead (Casley and Kumar, 1987). They may give deliberately constructed misleading responses in the hope of getting sympathy or any other consideration. Sometimes they are genuinely misinformed about issues and thus present a distorted picture of reality. Interviewing a number of key informants to get a balanced picture and also insisting on concrete facts overcome this problem. For instance, the Base Commander led me initially to scheme members he felt could respond to my questions, but I later encouraged him to be unbiased by accommodating different categories of scheme members including widows.

3.3.2.4 Participant Observations

The researcher spend time with the communities in the resettlement areas to observe beneficiaries' daily activities. This helped in gathering information in an unobtrusive way over a period of time.

3.3.3 Secondary Data Source

Secondary data came from conference reports, published materials, such as government departments and studies carried out in the past.

3.4 Data Processing and Analysis

Analysis of the interview data was done by means of themes. Thematic analysis is a search for themes that emerge as being important to the description of the phenomenon under investigation (Daly, Kellehear and Gliksman, 1997). The process involves the

identification of themes through ‘careful reading and re-reading of the data’ (Rice and Ezzy, 1999, p 258). It is a form of pattern recognition within the data, whereby emerging themes become the categories for analysis. Boyatzis (1998) defined a theme as a pattern in the information that the minimum describes and organizes the possible observations and at maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon, in this case social networks. Taylor and Bogdan (1984) also defined themes as units derived from patterns such as “conversation topics, vocabulary, recurring activities, meanings, feelings, or folk sayings or proverbs”. Themes are identified by “bringing together components or fragments of ideas or experiences, which often are meaningless when viewed alone” (Leininger, 1985, p60). Themes that emerge from the informants’ stories are pieced together to form comprehensive picture of their collective experience (Aronson, 1994).

3.5 Study Limitations

3.5.1 Misconception of the Survey

Some of the resettled farmers feared that after the survey they would be ‘evicted’ from the farms due to reduced performance. Resettlement schemes were still in a fragile and fluid situation as beneficiaries were not quite sure if they would settle for a long period of time. In other schemes removals and re-invasions were experienced. Some of the respondents took a long time to open up and discuss views openly because they viewed the researcher with suspicion. Some thought that the researcher belonged to the Tobacco Marketing Board which had extended loans on tobacco the previous season and which the farmers had failed to pay back. They thought it was aimed at exposing them to the land reform authorities. In some instances, this might have compelled scheme members to present a positive picture about agricultural production at the resettlement scheme. However, AREX worker and local leadership explained clearly to the scheme members that the researcher did not belong to any of the credit boards which gave them loans.

However, despite these limitations it is believed that the results provide reasonable basis for any future work on social networks and land reform in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 4: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF NETWORKS, NORMS AND CO-OPERATION AT CHIGORI FARM

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents and interprets the results of the fieldwork at Chigori farm and interrogates the role of social networks in agricultural production at Chigori farm. Section 4.1 focuses on different types of networks that were observed and co-operation between different scheme members, while section 4.2 analyses the networks under various conceptual headings. It begins by giving an overview of the characteristics of Chigori scheme and then moves to family-based networks, networks of identity, networks of production, institutional networks, farmer groups, networks of influence, power and access before discussing factors that mediate the functioning of social networks. The chapter discusses how farmers at Chigori farm approach their agricultural activities and the factors that motivate individuals to become involved with particular groups or individuals, drawing on empirical examples of co-operative behaviour existent at the farm. Table below illustrates characteristics of Chigori farm.

Table 4.0: Characteristics of Chigori Resettlement Scheme

Total Registered Settlers	Settler Origin (number)			Age Category (%)	
	Mutoko	Murewa	Other	Elderly	Young - Medium
56	17	35	4	25	75
Resident Ex Farm Workers	Beneficiary Ex Farm Workers	Major Crops Grown (number of settlers)			
		Maize	Groundnuts	Tobacco	Sunflower
17	1	56	56	7	56
Farmer Groups Functional (size)			Cattle Ownership (%)		AREX Officers
GDA	Irrigation	Tobacco	Own/possess	Without	
56	41	7	25	75	2
Plot Sizes	Farm Worker Houses	Farm Houses	Tobacco Barns	Fruit Packing Shed	Fuel Storage Tanks
6ha	30	4	11	1	7

4.1 Types of Networks

This section presents evidence of interlocking relationships that developed between individuals and groups at the Chigori farm resettlement scheme. Types of networks described included family and kinship based networks, identity networks, production networks, institutional networks, farmer groups, networks of influence, power and access

4.1.1 Family and Kinship-Based Networks

The study revealed that 70% of the plot holders at the resettlement scheme came to the farm with another person. Thirty percent of the plot holders came without another person to the resettlement scheme. This group came at the time of land invasions around year 2000. Conditions around year 2000 were not conducive for proper resettlement of families. In year 2002, conditions at Chigori scheme became favourable to allow settlement of families. For married male scheme members, they came together with their wives and children. Some of the plot holders were staying with at least a relative. For example, a 65 year old widow who benefited from the land reform stayed with grand children who were attending the early stages of primary education. Household characteristics and composition found at Chigori resettlement scheme had an important influence on the nature of family based networks. Family based networks characteristic at the resettlement scheme mainly arose from family members, neighbours, friends and relatives.

One male plot holder aged 28 years who was married, stayed with his young brother and his wife. He mentioned that all activities at the resettlement scheme such as weeding, tillage and harvesting were done by all family members most of the times. The plot holder also visited his parents weekly in Mutoko Communal Lands about 50km away from the scheme, to assist them in farming activities such as land preparation. His parents also visited the scheme from time to time to assist in agricultural activities at the scheme.

Sixty percent of the sampled plot-holders claimed that family support surrounding agricultural related activities such as weeding, tilling and harvesting was high. Support was received in the form of morale support which was essential in stimulating agricultural production among plot holders. Plot holders who originated from communal

lands contiguous to the resettlement scheme regularly visited relatives to assist in the fields without any payment for the services rendered.

The study showed that 20% of the households were headed by elderly people. Most of these household heads have become widowed. Four plot holders died and left behind their wives. Some of the elderly and widowed plottolders had no children to seek assistance. One widow who was staying with grandchildren indicated that they all moved to urban areas in search for employment. Another widow mentioned that her husband went away for good and she was now staying with an elderly father in law. Family based networks have been threatened by frequent changes in family structure and composition. Family support from other family members was lost due to these changes. Some female-headed households engaged in farming activities alone on a land size of 6ha. Most female headed households were widows because their husbands died at the scheme. Some women were staying alone because their husbands left the resettlement scheme. One female plot holder became busy to the extent that they could not afford to visit relatives living in the nearby Communal Lands. One female householder, over a period of a year failed to visit her relatives leaving about 8km away from Chigori scheme. The nature of farming activities at the scheme required plot-holders to be present most of the time particularly during the summer season. One of the plot holders mentioned that he “had two months, staying in the fields warding off wild animals in order to realize a harvest”.

Fifteen percent of the households at the scheme originated from Communal Lands bordering the resettlement scheme, 7-10km away. These households used their connectedness with communal lands to hire labour from these areas. Labour was mainly hired during weeding and harvesting times. Labourers were paid in kind in the form of maize grain.

The change in family based networks can be attributed to the fact that households move away from their kinship networks and because there may be different social norms and values in the new place of residence. As plots at the resettlement scheme were randomly

allocated and resettled households had diverse backgrounds, was social life in resettlement villages was different from that in a communal land village.

4.1.2 Networks of Identity

Networks of identity were observed at Chigori farm among certain groups of scheme members. These social networks were created due to the sense of originating from the same area. The majority of the sampled scheme members at Chigori farm were of Zezuru ethnicity and originated from Mutoko district in the north eastern part of Zimbabwe. Such people came to the resettlement scheme after having been advised by other scheme members from Mutoko communal lands regarding vacant plots at Chigori farm. A Mutoko network was therefore created informally. The network comprised of a group of seventeen households, who held important positions at the farm such as secretary of the Village Development Committee (VIDCO) and VIDCO head. VIDCO was responsible for the general decision making at the scheme. This network shared resources and information amongst themselves therefore creating opportunities for economic gain. Networks have provided information about the resettlement exercise and how to cope up with settlement challenges. As one Zezuru plot holder explained “I only came here after having been informed of vacant plots at Chigori farm and how to go about it”.

At Chigori resettlement scheme, networks of identity created opportunities to access information and resources through constructing common identities in order to perpetuate relationships of trust and reciprocity. For instance, in kinship networks, members engaged in co-operative behaviour which was quite helpful in agricultural production. Three households at the resettlement scheme originated from the same Communal Lands and were closely related. These households collectively worked together in preparing land in their fields, weeding and harvesting crops. Some farmers also worked together because they had similar totems. These collective activities were replicated outside agricultural activities such as in social gatherings (churches and funeral). Most scheme members at Chigori resettlement scheme were not related to each other at all. This implied that extensive networks through kinships were absent. In such cases, individuals

did not assist each other in agricultural production and usually demanded cash up-front for any services or activities undertaken in the fields. Two of the widows aged 61 and 49 years respectively at the scheme, did not possess any cattle and farming implements. The elderly widow tilled a maximum of 2 acres of land when she got income from remittances and gifts. Neighbours failed to assist her in conducting tillage activities.

Networks of identity that emerged at Chigori farm spanned beyond the local level. They became linked to institutional networks and access to inputs which were also important at the scheme. Indeed, Mutoko immigrants constituted the bulk of the surveyed people at the scheme but their contacts with people in higher office were very weak. Scheme members from within the Murewa district had networks of people in the Department of Agricultural Research and Extension (AREX) and the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) offices. These people identified themselves as Murewa network. As a result, they benefited more from the agricultural inputs schemes and information.

Settlers at the scheme became members of identity networks through common identities. For instance, members of the scheme originating from Mutoko district had similar religious beliefs, similar farming practices from the communal areas and shared a common language. These similarities created networks which became strengthened through bonds of kinship, friendship and reputation. Members engaged in reciprocal relationships in order to access opportunities being offered by the network and adhered to particular set of behavioural patterns. For instance, socializing together at a common place during free periods, particularly during the winter season when most plot holders were not working in the fields. The isolation of Zezurus from their Mutoko home areas encouraged them to engage in social and cultural practices that reaffirmed their sense of identity, for example cleansing ceremonies which they performed during the winter season.

4.1.3 Networks of Production

Networks of production are utilized by settlers at Chigori farm to structure co-operation in order to meet their livelihoods. Networks of production emerged as a result of need to

work together in the fields. A tobacco farming network was established between scheme members either possessing knowledge of tobacco farming or with resources to utilize. The study observed that scheme members involved in tobacco network did not have adequate resources such as draft power, farm labour and the knowledge on tobacco farming. Ninety-one percent of the scheme members came from Communal Lands where maize cultivation was the predominant activity over several years. Others came from African Purchase Area, or used to work in town, while others were labourers on the former commercial farm. The bulk of the labourers on the former commercial farms had their fore bearers coming from neighbouring countries such as Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. Thirteen of the former farm workers' parents (87%) originated from neighbouring countries and were not natives of Zimbabwe.

Farming networks were formed by people who owned draft power and other resources important in farming, including financial resources and specific skills (see diagram 1). Tobacco was a new crop to most of the scheme members at Chigori resettlement scheme. Scheme members, who possessed knowledge of tobacco growing, included the former farm workers who had vast experience and knowledge in tobacco farming gained from working for the previous commercial farmer. Apart from the knowledge possessed, the other member of the network benefited from labour exchanged for draft power (see diagram 1 below). They assisted one another and collectively used the available resources to clear and plough the fields and build houses. The network comprised of four households, 50% originated from Communal Lands and others were former farm workers. The tobacco network allowed the members of the network to till their fields together, plant tobacco, weed and reap tobacco during harvesting time. The same network extended to other crops such as maize production and general activities at the scheme.


Thirty percent of the sampled households have exchanged implements in the past year. These included ploughs, scotch carts and hoes. Households had either incomplete set of implements or complete. One scheme member exchanged a scotch cart for free to facilitate the transportation of tomatoes to the market place. Most households mentioned that exchanges were important and common. Exchange of farm implements and draught

power was vital at the resettlement scheme in order to enhance agricultural production. Twenty-five percent of the farmers at the resettlement scheme had cattle to engage in farming. This underlined the importance of draught power at the farm. According to one man at Chigori farm “it was difficult to beg for cattle to till the land because people originated from different places”.

These networks were made up of individuals who were motivated by the desire to cooperate with one another out of economic gain. Members were recruited on the basis of the ability to form strategic partnership or alliance that mutually benefited all members. As one of the members of such a network explained “I had no cattle, but friends gave me cattle for draft power. A friend with cattle wanted to grow tobacco but without knowledge. I used to work for the former white farmer in tobacco fields. So my friend gave me cattle. We worked together at all the stages involved in tobacco production - nursing, transplanting, reaping, curing, grading and baling”.



Diagram 1: Production Networks Formed Between Scheme Members with Low Resources




Source: Field Notes, 2005

The results suggest that rich households had enough resources to invest in farming and dealing with difficult situation (see diagram 2 below). Therefore they did not necessarily need assistance from other households at the scheme. Networks of production were weak when different members of the resettlement scheme were highly endowed. Seven farmers were growing tobacco crop at the resettlement scheme. Three of the farmers were war veterans and were not part of the tobacco network. These received gratuities (pension fund) from the government for their involvement in the liberation war. This group was relatively wealth according to the local context and knowledgeable about tobacco farming. Twenty-five percent of households at the resettlement scheme had adequate draught power and implements to utilize in agriculture production. Imperatives to strengthen farming networks link became absent. Scheme members entered into a


competitive behaviour that undermined co-operation among members of the production network. One scheme member remarked that ‘a farmer needed to be self reliant with respect to managing field activities - hire casual labour when having cash’.



Diagram 2: Network Strategy of Wealthy Households at the Scheme



Source: Field Notes, 2005



Another form of production networks that was observed at the resettlement scheme was a system termed *maricho*. Given the relatively high demand of farm activities, especially for single plot holders, *maricho* became more relevant. *Maricho* was a local term used for labour networks formed at the scheme. Despite the fact that cash reward was involved under *maricho*, members of the system worked for scheme members they had good relationship with. Personal relationships were used to hire members of the *maricho* network. These networks were mainly practiced by 15 former farm workers. People in this network chose to abandon their fields to work in other scheme member's fields that they liked. It was difficult to leave one's field and work in another person's fields. FTLRP made former farm workers lose their livelihood which was based on wage earnings at the farm. The former farm workers were still residing in the compound houses and those resettled were without any resources crucial in agricultural production except

farming knowledge among some workers. On the other hand, under the previous system they were workers not farmers, and thus had minimum interest in farming. As a consequence, general production in their plots was below the average obtained at the resettlement scheme. The *maricho* network system was also comprised of other scheme members, not only former farm workers. For example, one widow who was allocated land occasionally went to do *maricho* in other scheme members' fields. According to the Group Development of Agriculture (GDA) secretary at the scheme, local labour networks were made of scheme members who lacked interest in real farming. Farming was considered a social activity by them, not a business venture. The secretary mentioned that "some scheme members came to Chigori farm to look for some place to stay." Former farm workers make a living as wage labourers on scheme members' plots. Other scheme members who were part of the *maricho* network did this out of economic necessity as another livelihood source. *Maricho* was typically negotiated on an ad-hoc basis at the scheme. Some scheme members had the financial capacity to contract a number of employees to work in their fields on a semi-permanent basis.

4.1.4 Institutional Networks

The extent of engagement of individuals or households with official institutions, such as arms of government, has been typically important in forming institutional networks. Scheme members had to become part of a social network either network of production or identity in order to be linked to agricultural institutions. Links created between scheme members and institutions were essential in agriculture in the area and how those links were maintained. These institutions included the GMB, Department of Veterinary Services, Agricultural Extension Services (AREX) and AGRIBANK.

The local ward AREX officers worked together with the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), a parastatal responsible for providing subsidized inputs to farmers and purchasing of grain. Farmers relied heavily on the GMB scheme at the beginning of each season for agricultural inputs. Thirty-five percent of surveyed households at the scheme were connected to the GMB through local councilors, politically elected into office. Farmers who benefited from the input scheme helped each other in cultivating fields jointly to

effectively use the GMB inputs. Similar co-operation was noticed between members who had benefited input loans from a cotton company. Tillage operations, weeding, spraying and cotton picking (harvesting) were done together. They monitored each other's farming activities in order to enable good production for repayment of the loan.

The link to GMB showed two paths, namely through AREX department and through political entry. The GMB network enabled farmers to register for inputs in time; those without information were excluded in the process. Person linking scheme members to GMB provided information regarding amounts of inputs to be distributed, numbers of beneficiaries required per scheme and repayment procedure. The presence of AREX officers at the farm facilitated easy contact with farmers particularly for agricultural advice and solving of agriculture related problems. AREX played a mediating role in improving networks by holding regular meetings with scheme members. Despite the fact that, AREX had the mandate to link scheme members to GMB regarding agricultural inputs and outputs, the local ward Councilor announced and informed people regarding inputs programme with GMB registration and beneficiary selection at political meetings. Few members attended such meetings and did not inform other members about the inputs program. The political path was comprised of councilors and district coordinators.

The study revealed that the political channel was the dominant one. Councilors and coordinators formed the main centres of information with respect to GMB input scheme, developmental issues and markets information. Ward Councilor and district coordinator's positions buttressed them to coordinate all development activities in the administrative wards as they were linked to government agricultural institutions. They had information on where and when to apply for loans and generally agriculture information. One widow mentioned that 'information on agriculture diffuse among the members through village head, Councilor and AREX. They know about farming'. Another man aged 56 years indicated that 'the Councilor was the source of agricultural information at the scheme. The information is disbursed through ward meetings'.

4.1.5.1 Farmer Groups

The extent to which people are attached to formally constituted social groups of one kind measures group relations. Groups formed the intersection of most of the networks alluded to in the previous sections. Group formation at the resettlement scheme did not evolve naturally; it was mooted at the agricultural (AREX) extension offices that farmers should form agricultural groups in resettlement schemes to be used by AREX during extension, input distribution, crop assessments and other forms of assistance. This was after the authorities had realized the centrality of groups in bringing people together, improving interaction and networking, information dissemination and cutting costs of mobilization and extension. A substantive group encompassing all members at the resettlement scheme was constituted and termed Group Development of Agriculture (GDA). Members were entitled and required to pay a joining fee of \$50 000 (approximately US\$0.50) and making monthly subscriptions. As a result, networks of purpose had been created. There were a number of groups at Chigori farm, including the Group Development of Agriculture (GDA), Irrigation Group, Wheat Group, Serious Farmers Group and Tobacco Group. These other groups are no longer substantive, dissolved due to structural challenges and viability problems. Participation by individuals in social networks increased the availability of information and lowered its cost. For example, crop prices, location of new markets, sources of credit, or how to deal with livestock disease, played a critical role in increasing the returns from agriculture.

The study observed at the scheme that groups were used differently by different agencies and individuals, for different purposes and motives. Councilors, GMB (input scheme), credit agents, AREX officers, farmers, politicians and local leadership (war veterans, village head etc) were among such institutions that worked with groups in different ways. The GDA secretary mentioned that the focus of the group was to monitor agricultural production and work at the scheme in collaboration with the Agricultural and Research Extension (AREX) workers. GDA arranged and planned agricultural shows where farmers exhibited crops when it was still green in the fields and after harvest. The Development of Agriculture Committee (GDA) was used by AREX as a platform for

implementing agricultural activities and programmes. They used it to provide agriculture extension and training of farmers in groups.

AREX used the GDA group to conduct crop assessments to monitor production at the scheme and to source agricultural inputs through pooling resources together. The groups were in charge of collectively sourcing inputs after members had made financial contributions. Crop assessments conducted included pre-planting survey, post planting and post harvesting to monitor food security. Facilitation of AREX meetings became easier since they were organized and convened through the GDA group. This created networks of opportunities as active group members only benefited. Some members were not fully paid up members and did not regularly attend group meetings. These were given less preference when inputs schemes came up. For example, fertilizer came through the group and AREX, and both partners collectively selected farmers who realized better production in the last agricultural season.

GDA also coordinated the GMB input scheme. GMB offered input support to farmers to produce maize and later sell their grain to it after harvesting. The input scheme did not have enough resources to assist every farmer. The GMB input scheme was administered through the GDA group, which at times made it difficult for the group to distribute inadequate agricultural inputs. Discretion to allocate the inputs was left with the GDA committee. The GDA group was used to allocate and segregate other farmers during input distribution. For example, during the start of the 2005/06 agricultural season the GMB input scheme provided 20 bags of seed for the resettlement scheme (i.e. for the 56 scheme members). This posed challenges with regard to allocation of seed. As one man at the resettlement scheme explained that, 'the local leadership distributed 20kg bags of seed using order of position in the GDA group despite having updated records of subscription'. However, some farmers failed to access and benefit from the input scheme despite the fact that they were paid up members. Inevitably, this contributed negatively to agricultural production at the resettlement scheme.

At Chigori farm, there were issues that needed collective decisions and collective action. According to the village head and war veterans, collective decisions were required on how to manage common property resources such as the maintenance and use of infrastructure at the farm including tobacco barns and sheds. The infrastructure present at the farm was important for agricultural production. For instance, some of the tobacco barns and grading sheds were converted by non-tobacco growers into cattle holding pens thereby destroying the expensive infrastructure which take years to renovate. Irrigation planning and developmental meetings were other areas that required collective decisions. It was observed that social pressures and fear of exclusion under the GDA group and irrigation group induced individuals to offer the expected behaviour for the benefit of the group.

The same ties that assisted members of the GDA group and specific crop groups to work together were also important in excluding other community members from the benefits of collective action. If an extension agent wants to utilize the connectedness of society to increase the rate of technological diffusion, they need to be able to differentiate informational networks from other kinds of networks (Gaduh, 2002). Individuals in the resettlement scheme were compelled to join the General Development of Agriculture (GDA) group. Therefore, the use of GDA group at the resettlement scheme as an umbrella group to coordinate all agricultural interventions and promote development should be viewed with extreme caution as exclusionary factors might come into play.

4.1.5.2 Farm Labour Groups

It was expected that groups would be formed through labour exchange networks in which local farmers assisted one another. Labour networks enable people to work together and help each other in conducting farming activities. Scheme members can jointly weed or plough field moving from one scheme member to the other. It was critical in view of the absence of adequate draught power, money to invest in farming, weak kinship ties and high individualism. However, people at Chigori resettlement scheme did not appear to reciprocate in farming groups lacking financial incentives. They were drawn together and reciprocated when members had potential gains from the interaction.

Twenty-five percent of the households had adequate draught cattle and implements. Scheme members faced a lot of challenges working their own fields. Arrangements for the exchange of labour in the form of work parties or *nhimbe* were entirely absent from the resettlement scheme. The system works on the principle that individuals voluntarily participate in farming activities in each other's fields on rotational basis in exchange for food and sometimes traditional beer. There is no cash payment demanded or involved but participation in a work party is reciprocal. The *nhimbe* network mainly used cattle and ploughs and required a large group of people, particularly during the clearing of fields, tilling of land, weeding and harvesting. Livestock owners only were better able to participate in *nhimbe* networks because cattle gave people more time to work together. However, people at the resettlement scheme were more engaged in *maricho* system which had financial and or in-kind incentives.

4.1.6 Networks of Influence, Power and Access

These are networks of the power elite in the scheme, who manipulate access to information and resources such as agricultural inputs for their own benefit. It is also about networks of powerful patrons and dependent clients. People had differential abilities and interests in engaging with networks, cultivating ties and using them for their own advantage. Scheme members became enrolled in networks in order to optimize their opportunities for economic, social and political gain. Members capitalized on network relationships in order to further their own aims in various localities and across multiple levels. Through networks, members were able to access resources from individuals who were located outside their immediate environment.

At Chigori resettlement scheme, the local ward Councilor was the main centre of information pertaining to extension, agriculture input schemes, development agencies and market information. Networks at the resettlement scheme have enabled local elites such as the Councilor and Coordinator to exchange benefits with less powerful network members in return for political support. Less powerful members become dependent on dominant network individuals from whom they attempt to derive personal or collective

gains. Individuals with authority are able to occupy prominent positions within networks and consolidate their power and influence. War veterans and village head became the chairman and secretaries of crop groups at the scheme. Individuals used their positions in order to cultivate personal connections that enable them to maximize their benefits such as economic, social and political gain. Positions of authority within a network was gauged by the relative degree of autonomy possessed by particular actors or the extent to which members' behaviour is constrained by the actions of others.

War veterans and councilor drew on other networks of power and influence, such as the political network. The councilor as an elected representative, interacted with party political networks at both district and ward levels. Party officials relied on the Councilor and war veterans' influence at the local level in order to control their local affiliations. The study observed that when AREX workers called for a meeting, farmers did not come, but attendance at local ward Councilor's meetings was significantly high. According to the local ward AREX worker, 'this was as a result of how scheme members got into the scheme, political'. Agricultural and social issues (theft and funerals) affecting scheme members were referred to and attended by the local war veterans. War veterans were viewed by scheme members as strong centres of power compared to the village head and AREX workers residing at the scheme. Some members consulted the local war veterans to register their names for fertilizer and seed, by-passing the AREX workers. This demonstrated how networks perpetuate relationships of power and influence.

The study revealed that councilors and coordinators monopolized the information on inputs distribution and kept it away from the AREX workers. Information dissemination on inputs flowed from the GMB to AREX before reaching farmers as its intended users. Dissemination of agriculture information to farmers was the domain of AREX workers, but local ward councilor informed farmers to arrange transportation and collection of inputs from the distribution centre outside the resettlement scheme. Scheme members were summoned to the ward meeting centre to register under the agricultural input scheme. These meetings were used by councilors as platforms to discuss political agendas before the actual selection and registration. Overall, few settlers benefited from

the input scheme. Such networks played a negative role in agricultural production at the scheme as interested farmers were left out in inputs distribution.

Members were presented with personal opportunities such as potential irrigation benefits, inputs, group motivation and group sourcing of agricultural inputs. Farmers at the resettlement scheme who were cultivating their arable land used connections to borrow additional land from other farmers who could not cultivate all their land. One farmer whose land was being borrowed through these networks, part of the land was tilled and fertilizer provided in that arrangement. Members were able to draw on network resources to deal with shortages of draught power in farming. For example, as discussed in previous sections, members assisted each other with draught cattle and in turn received assistance in tobacco production. This included nursing, transplanting, reaping and curing.

4.2 Trust and Functioning of Networks

The norm of trust is a key component of social capital, both cognitive and structural (networks). Social capital theory stresses the importance of trust for the well functioning of society, and for the facilitation of a range of outcomes (Stone, 2001). There is generalized trust, personalized trust and institutional trust. These norms mediate co-operative behaviour and are based on expectations of the future positive actions of others. Based on past experience and information one individual may decide to trust another if they feel confident that the outcome will be positive. At Chigori resettlement scheme, scheme members harbored a fundamental lack of trust at different levels. The absence of trust had multiple effects on farming with regards to co-operation, reciprocity and information sharing at the scheme. While acknowledging that levels of trust are highly subjective, the breakdown in kinship and family structures due to FTLRP have precipitated diminishing levels of trust and low expectations of trusting relationships. Families have moved away from original kinship networks leaving other family members behind. Scheme members came to the scheme individually and in rare cases as a whole family since the initial environment was not conducive for the whole family initially - for example, the absence of infrastructure and utilities such as schools, clinics and grinding

mills. One of the scheme members at Chigori farm remarked, “I am reluctant to cooperate with other farmers because we do not know each other”.

The study identified three equally important aspects of trust namely; the quality of relationship among farmers, trust between farmers and extension workers, and the relationship between extension workers and their national organizations. As it was discussed in earlier section, the relationship between farmers was very poor at Chigori scheme due to lack of trust, but more importantly was the diminishing or absent trust between farmers and extension workers. Two extension workers resided permanently at the farm, but their services were rarely sought after by the farmers. Local ARES personnel mentioned that ‘some scheme members think that extension workers’ visit to their fields exposes poor crop production and leads to their expulsion from the scheme’. On the other hand, the extension workers also visited farmers when they were required on need basis. Farmers mentioned that extension workers did not visit their fields, thus reducing trust between scheme members and workers.

People exhibited a lack of trust in local leaders and individuals who had a role to play in decision making at the resettlement scheme. Leaders were not trusted when administering programs meant to benefit every scheme members. Some scheme members indicated that ‘they were not sure how the monies for GDA group were spent by the group treasurer’. Most households mentioned that inputs came but were not distributed equally. ‘Those who regularly benefited each season even when inputs are too few benefited’. One woman mentioned that ‘individuals who interacted with leaders regularly and were close benefited’. This lack of trust with the local leadership was precipitated by the issue surrounding village head’s legitimacy of his position. Scheme members argued that the incumbent village head was imposed without consultation of all scheme members. Village heads in the communal lands where they had originated were installed following kinship system.

For example, some scheme members felt that the village head was not acting in their interests. The scheme members believed there was lack of transparency on activities

conducted at the resettlement scheme. One farmer remarked that “the village head is being over powered by villagers”. Three individuals who were deemed to be very influential and powerful extended their fields consuming part of other scheme members’ fields with out abatement. These individuals included war veterans, chairman and secretary of the political party. Individuals holding positions benefited every year from input schemes even when GMB inputs were in critical supply. This included war veterans who essentially assumed equal authority and power with the village head. Residents at the resettlement scheme suspected that people in positions of authority abused their status in order to benefit from the system (input schemes).

The study noted that people at the scheme did not necessarily assume that kin or friends were trustworthy. For example, neighbouring settlers did not by and large trust each other due to inherent competition and rivalry obtaining. A woman aged 28years reported that ‘trust was superficial because scheme members were residing at the scheme. Trust was not deep enough because members came from different places’. This destroyed trust as farmers opted to face difficulties in engaging in agricultural activities without seeking any assistance and advice from neighbours. The study also observed that most local people did not generally trust liberation war veterans who held positions of authority in the resettlement scheme. This had been aggravated by the perception of many scheme members that powerful individuals (e.g. war veterans) acted in a manner that allowed them to maximize their gains at the expense of other local people.

Decreased levels of trust resulted in poor co-operation, as farmers had low expectations that interactions led to positive outcomes. One widow reported that ‘young age are not co-operative as they have different ideology. Just greet each other but do not co-operate in farming’. She highlighted that 75% of the plot holders were young, energetic, exploring and had different plans and views compared to the elderly’. Trusting relationships were not necessarily mutual (i.e. one individual or group is reliant on another to facilitate positive results) thereby contributing to unequal power relations. The potential for equitable participation in decision making appeared increasingly unlikely when such imbalances are so entrenched in social relationships. This was noted in

meetings held at the resettlement schemes where individuals did not contribute anything during the meeting but raised their concerns outside the meeting. Usually, people who were deemed to be authoritative and well-informed contributed at meetings. According to a male farmer aged 45 years at the scheme, 'there are 2-3 individuals who overrides on what we want to do at the meeting. There is no room to practice decision making'. 'These 2-3 individuals sometimes come to till near my plot boundary. It's difficult to solve the boundary conflict with such individuals because you will be reminded that the person allocated me land during invasions'. In-built fear and doubtfulness kept some people away from talking at meetings. As a result, a few people donated decisions affecting farming.

4.3 Reciprocity and Cooperation in Establishing Social Networks

Quasi-kinships have been established by scheme members in order to engage in reciprocal exchanges and adapting in the new environments. Thirty percent of the households at the scheme identified themselves with common values. These fell under the Mutoko network. Linkages were established from totems. Farmers who had forged quasi-kinship (relative) ties at the resettlement scheme based on shared totems appeared to reciprocate with each other more frequently. Reciprocity at the resettlement scheme was also modeled and conducted along friendship lines. Reciprocal relationships were also based around the exchange of farm tools. One farmer lent a scotch cart to his friend to ferry tomatoes to the market place. The farmer explained that he "gave the farmer the scotch-cart through friendship". Land reform resettled people from different origins who were not familiar with each other. People from similar origins assisted each other easily.

Reciprocity at Chigori resettlement scheme has been undermined by high individualistic tendencies prevailing at the farm. A young scheme member who managed his parents' plot reported that 'plot-holders do their own activities individually'. Now that those first difficult years were behind them, families at the scheme started to work more individually, and those who were in need of extra labour could hire the services of others. Settlers were believed not to visit fields of neighbours to copy and extend morale support. According to a young male scheme member, 'majority of the people at the scheme do not

visit fields of other members to appreciate how other scheme members were doing. This has been driven by jealous, differences in age and tendencies to compete'. For instance, one settler owned 4 knapsack sprayers used in cotton spraying but would not lend one unless cash was paid. Settlers had tendencies of co-operating on activities that they failed to do alone at the resettlement scheme.

One widow at the resettlement scheme explained, "neighbours are poor to establish labour exchanges because they assess to see what they can benefit". Another widow at the farm underlined the role of poverty in reciprocal exchanges "because people cannot get anything from her. People assess to see what they can benefit from reciprocal exchange". Reciprocal behaviour was affected by lack of material resources to gain.

4.4 Socio-Economic Factors and Networks

The study investigated the extent to which certain socio-economic factors contributed in dividing people at the resettlement scheme. These included levels of education, religious beliefs, wealthy status, ethnic background, age and length of time stayed at the farm. Initial discussions with the scheme members revealed that the community was not affected by differences in socio-economic factors. Village head mentioned that socio-economic factors were not dividing members at the scheme. The village head reported that both young and old 'scheme members worked together, even scheme members of various religious beliefs assisted each other in land preparation during the 2005/06 agriculture season'. War veterans and local leadership depicted situations of unity and close networks to outside people and organizations. However, further discussions with scheme members revealed that the socio-economic variables really played a central role in reducing co-operation. One young man explained that "people at the farm engaged in farm activities without assistance from neighbours due to variations in cultures". Cultural disparities bred jealous between the settlers at the resettlement scheme. This has been rife to the extent that scheme members became reluctant to visit neighbours' fields. These differences were played down by scheme members especially when it comes to engaging with external people and development agents. As a result, homogeneity of purpose was

created to benefit from any developmental programme that came with external development agencies.

In some cases, the culture of co-operation depended on the understanding by other scheme members in the network whether they wanted to co-operate or not. Collective identity was influenced by a variety of factors such as age category of scheme members, backgrounds and social status (poor, powerful). For example, a widowed settler at the scheme wanted to co-operate with young settlers but remarked that differences in agricultural methods of planting maize compromised co-operation. Elderly scheme members preferred a method of planting maize in rows to broadcasting seed, which according to young members increased plant population. The farmer emphasized the role played by positions held in the society in reinforcing co-operation at the farm. All scheme members co-operated with liberation war veterans at the scheme in agricultural related activities, politics and development activities. Co-operation was now driven by the desire to achieve economic gain. “Other settlers cannot approach me because I have nothing to give them. Settlers assess to see what they can derive from me. The rich did things individually on their own.”

One farmer commented that educated people at the resettlement scheme understood each other especially when planning and conducting farming activities collectively. He elaborated that “settlers who had education understood each other when planning whilst those who were not educated were difficult”. Less educated individuals may not be aware of the potential opportunities that were offered by projects, and may not be in a position to take risks. These individuals were usually risk averse and felt comfortable with time-honoured practices which may not be instrumental to agricultural development at the farm.

4.5 Inputs Access and Networks

Networks determined who was going to benefit from the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). One former farm worker observed that ‘some people confiscate seeds and were made to fit into the selection criteria of GMB inputs by local ward Councilor or village head. The

rest of scheme members were given inputs late in the season. Every scheme member contribute towards transport fees to bring inputs to the farm, but eventually the fertilizer was sold to 'wealthy' members of the scheme. Some ended up not applying any amount of fertilizers in the fields resulting in very low yields. Lack of fertilizer has contributed to low yields at the resettlement scheme. According to one scheme member "crop production in the fields goes down because we do not benefit from GMB input scheme. Other members benefit".

Local authorities and war veterans administered the GMB input scheme. They were heavily involved in the selection and registration of beneficiaries of the input scheme. At times local authorities used their discretion to distribute inputs resulting in close members being selected. On the other hand, because of the current input shortages, some of the farmers who managed to get assistance from the GMB and were not interested in farming ended up selling the inputs on the lucrative parallel market.

The most common type of draft power used by the farmers was cattle. All farmers at Chigori resettlement scheme used animal draught power to till their lands. However, 25% of the farmers at the resettlement scheme owned their own draught animals. These farmers who did not own cattle normally waited for those farmers with cattle to finish tilling their land and then hired them in exchange primarily for cash or labour. In extreme cases, they used hoes to prepare land and plant.

Most of the farmers use family labour for all their farming activities. Only 15% of households employed permanent labour while the rest hired labour during peak labour periods such as weeding and harvesting. There was a general shortage of labour in the resettlement scheme. Some former farm workers left in the compound houses were refusing to work for new farmers citing low remuneration and poor working conditions. However, some former farm workers still went and worked for other scheme members who belonged to their network despite low wages paid to them. Networks existing between these members enabled them to derive benefits even during off farming season.

4.6 Risk-Sharing and Network Strategy

Rural households in developing countries face a variety of risks that affect their livelihood and these risks come from different sources, generally defined as either individual or common risks (Dercon,2000). Risks are common when they affect everyone in a particular community or region and are individual when an event affects only a particular individual in a community. If households do not have healthy cattle to plough, they hire cattle to work the fields or arrange to use someone else's cattle. If they fail to do so, they will have to cultivate the land by hand which result in a lower cultivated acreage and subsequent lower production.

At Chigori resettlement scheme, risk sharing took place in small groups, in a kin group, a set of marital relationships, people from the same ethnic background, neighbours, a friendship network and between people with a high frequency of interaction. This risk sharing occurred as a strategy of coping with an event such as increased demand for labour that might negatively affect agricultural tasks. For instance, cattle-sharing arrangements existent at Chigori resettlement scheme were between friends that allowed friends without cattle to plough their fields in exchange for labour. Risk sharing institutions included work parties and cattle sharing.

4.7 Conclusion

Different types of networks were identified at the resettlement scheme that play important roles in farming activities. The networks identified were social support networks, networks of identity, networks of production, institutional networks, group networks and networks of influence, power and access. These networks were analyzed in terms of a number of key concepts that were significant in mediating and establishing these social networks at the resettlement scheme. The key concepts used were norms of trust, reciprocity, risk sharing as a network strategy and socio-economic factors. Critical links between different social networks that were identified, and key concepts used in the analysis, will be highlighted further in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the main findings of the study and relates them to the overall objectives. It also draws a number of conclusions and makes recommendations for land reform policy.

5.1 Summary of Results

Social networks were defined here as ways in which individuals or settlers are connected through various social familiarities ranging from casual acquaintance to close familial bonds. The study identified social networks that helped scheme members to create and exchange skills and knowledge in farming activities. The key research question asked was about the extent of scheme members' reciprocity and co-operation at Chigori scheme. Evidence from the field was used to discuss how social networks existent at the resettlement scheme either played a role or not in agricultural production.

5.1.1 Family Based Networks

Households had to cope with extra land and dealing with translocation experience, subjecting many households to stress. Family based networks arose from family members and relatives who had come along with plot-holders to the resettlement scheme. Farming activities at the scheme such as weeding, tillage and harvesting were done by household members most of the time. Family and kinship based networks thus contributed positively to agricultural production, which was not the case for single plot-holders. However, family based networks have been threatened by frequent changes in family structure and composition due to deaths at the scheme and migration.

5.1.2 Networks of Identity

Members of these networks shared a sense of originating from the same area. The notion of people originating from same places facilitated the structuring of co-operative behaviour in farming. These networks shared agricultural resources and information amongst themselves, thereby boosting production. Falling into such a network,

underlined by originating from same communal lands, has enabled members to cope with settlement challenges. These challenges were chiefly shortage of draught power, inputs and labour. In a situation of lack of access to inputs and services, social networks help in determining the way problems are solved. Networks were often multipurpose and the same relationship was used for many purposes. These networks spanned beyond the local level. Networks transcend geographical boundaries, expand and contract in reaction to changing social, economic and environmental contexts. Members engaged in reciprocal relationships in order to access opportunities being offered by the network and adhered to particular set of behavioural patterns. Networks functioned on the principle of reciprocity so one became indebted by using a network to access something.

5.1.3 Networks of Production

The need to work together in the fields has facilitated the formation of production networks at the scheme. One example involved members who owned draft power and other resources critical in farming. Each settler brought specific skills and resources into the production network. Members were recruited on the basis of their ability to form partnerships or alliances that mutually benefited network members. These provided access to production technologies such as ploughs, traction animals and carts, through borrowing. Such networks were relevant for increasing agricultural production. Key constraints in the implementation of FTLRP included technical and financial resources.

5.1.4 Networks of Power and Influence

The analysis of networks that involved power relations at the scheme showed that these were used to influence and wield power by elites, patrons and dependent clients. Individuals used their positions to cultivate personal connections that enabled them to maximize benefits for socio-economic and political gain. The ward councilor was the main centre of information pertaining to extension, GMB input scheme, development agencies and market information. Agricultural problems and social problems (e.g. theft and funerals) at the scheme were referred to and attended by the local war veterans. War

veterans were viewed as strong centres of power at the expense of the village head and AREX workers residing at the farm.

5.1.5 Farmer Groups

Development processes were coordinated by local groups whose formation was facilitated by the Agricultural Extension Officers. Such groups played a central role in bringing people together, improving interaction and networking, cutting extension costs and information dissemination. Groups coordinated the supply of inputs and acted as platforms for ward politics. However, the death of some farmer groups resulted in a loss of coordination in crops such as tobacco and paprika. Some groups were used differently by different individuals and agencies for different purposes and motives. The same ties that assisted members of the group to work together were also essential in excluding other members from the benefits of collective action.

5.1.6 Norms of Social Capital

The land reform programme was largely chaotic, unplanned and violent. Most beneficiaries at the scheme participated in the land invasions and were allocated plots. Trust mediates social relations and emerges from daily interactions between individuals and groups. People exhibited lack of trust in local leaders and individuals who had a role to play in decision making at Chigori farm. This lack of trust in the local leadership was precipitated by a number of factors that included lack of fairness in the allocation of GMB inputs. The analysis revealed that absence of trust was not restricted to local leaders only but extended to other plot-holders. Scheme members opted to face difficulties in engaging in agricultural activities without seeking any assistance and advice from neighbors.

There are distinct differences in the manner in which households at the resettlement scheme approach agriculture activities. Less than half of the households that were resettled relocated with a blood relative, from where they drew social support for dealing with difficult situations. As a result, it was impossible for some to access assistance from

family and kinship based networks in times of need. The finding suggests that these households resorted to other forms of social networks existent at the scheme depending on the nature of assistance being sought. Neighboring households and households which had close ties engaged in networks of production to manage practical problem affecting farming at the scheme. Other households faced with similar challenges such as draft power shortages, replicated similar kind of arrangements.

Networks have provided a way of describing the motivations for co-operation between people and why people choose to participate with one another (or not). Cooperative behaviour among scheme members has been constrained by the low levels of reciprocity. Reciprocity existed within and between specific networks of people. Scheme members preferred to enter into more formal contracts with each other, involving cash payments. At Chigori resettlement scheme, people assisted with tilling land, weeding and harvesting in exchange for payment in cash or in kind. Former farm workers, widows and other households who had limited incomes and low production used *maricho* as their livelihood strategy. In some situations, the culture of co-operation depended on the understanding by other parties in the network and whether they subscribed to the same view of co-operation.

5.2 Policy Implications of the Research Findings

Based on the research findings social networks should be considered in resettlement programmes despite the exceptional circumstances prevailing in Zimbabwe. Social support networks came from family members and relatives. In view of this, resettlement exercises should allow the relocation of other family members and relatives apart from the immediate beneficiary. This includes creation of a conducive environment for settling of families, such as shelter, social amenities and schools. Social networks are employed by people to close the gap resulting from missing technical and government assistance. Social support networks change when households are relocated to another area. In view of this, agricultural policies should support and recognize the role social networks play in agricultural extension, inputs schemes and local governance.

The research findings also revealed that cooperation between scheme members was structured on the basis of perceived or potential benefit either in kind or economic gain. For example, farmers exchanged labour for draught power and farming implements or were hired as casual labourers. In view of this, resettlement authorities should select farmers with enough implements to use in the resettlement areas or alternatively resource the beneficiaries prior to resettlement to increase cooperation between beneficiaries. This development will improve farm production as exploitative tendencies are reduced.

Policy planners should also focus on efforts to build a social network-based extension services. Extension agents should be empowered to recognize informal extension networks among scheme members (farmer to farmer) that closes the gap in terms of provision of agricultural information. Farmers should be encouraged to view social network based extension methods as equally important as conventional extension in farm production. A social network based extension could be used to reduce the ratio of extension worker to farmers by closing the agricultural knowledge gap and reach more farmers in the scheme. It was also evident that scheme members were consulting non-extension agents such as councilors and war veterans for agricultural related information. This could result in provision of inappropriate extension messages to farmers thereby affecting farm production.

Networks of production significantly benefited some members of the scheme in crop production. This shows that the use of networks of production in tobacco farming or intensive crop enterprises should be strengthened in order to increase crop production. However, this should be complemented by other factors such as extension in order to improve management of crops and provision of agricultural inputs and credit.

REFERENCES

Abbute, W.S. (1998) *The Dynamics of Socioeconomic Differentiation and Livelihood Strategies: The Case of Relocated Peasants in the Beles Valley, North –Western Ethiopia*. Discussion Paper, University of Rural Development, University of Goettingen, Goettingen.

Allen, W. 2005. Capacity Building, Social Capital and Empowerment. http://sllearningforsustainability.net/social_learning/capacity.php

Aronson, J. 1994. *A Pragmatic View of Thematic Analysis*. The Qualitative Report Vol 2, <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/BackIssues/QR2-1/aronson.html>.

Boyatzis, R.E. 1998. *Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code Development*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Buka Report, 2002. A Preliminary Audit Report of Land Reform Programme

Burt, R.S. 2001. *The Social Capital of Structural Holes: Chapter 7*, <http://faculty.chicagosb.edu/ronald.burt/research/SCSH.pdf>

Casley, D and Kumar, K. 1987. *Project Monitoring and Evaluation in Agriculture*. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

Cernea, M and Guggenheim, S (eds). 1993. *Anthropological Approaches to Resettlement Policy, Practice and Theory*. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA

Chiremba, S and Masters, W. 2000. 'The Experience of Resettled Farmers in Zimbabwe'. *African Studies Quarterly* 7 no 2 and 3

COHRE. 2001. *Land, Housing and Property Rights in Zimbabwe*, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Geneva. www.cohre.org

Coleman, J.C. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital". *American Journal of Sociology* 94(S1): 95-120

Daly, J., Kellehear, A. and Gliksman, M. 1997. *The Public Health Researcher: A Methodological Approach*. Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press.

Dasgupta, P and Serageldin, I, eds. 1999. *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Deininger, K. 1999. *Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Experience from Brazil, Colombia and South Africa*. Washington D.C. World Bank.

Deininger, K., Hoogeveen, H and Kinsey, B. Benefits and Costs of Land Reform in Zimbabwe With Implications for Southern Africa; www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2002-upaGISSA/papers/Hoogeveen-csae2002.pdf

Dekker, M. 2004. "Sustainability and Resourcefulness: Support Networks During Periods of Stress". *World Development* Vol. 32, No. 10, pp. 1735-1751

Dercon, S. 2000. *Income Risk, Coping Strategies and Safety Nets. Background Paper for the 2000/01 World Development Report*. CSAE Working Paper WPS/ 2000-26. Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.

Douglas, M. 1987. *How Institutions Think*, Routledge and Kegan Paul. London

Edward, B. and Foley, M,W. 1998. "Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and Social Capital in Comparative Perspective". *American Behavioural Sciences*. <http://arts-sciences.cua.edu/pol/faculty/foley/putnam2.htm>

Fox, J. and Gershman, J. 1999. *Investing in Social Capital? Comparative Lessons from Ten World Bank Rural Development Projects in Mexico and the Philippines*. University of California, Santa Cruz

Gaduh, A,B. 2002. *Information and Social Networks in Village Economies*. Economics Working Paper Series, <http://www.csis.id/papers/wpe063>.

Government of Zimbabwe, 1982, *Transitional National Development Plan (1982-85)* Vol 1. Harare

Government of Zimbabwe. 1993. *Value for Money Project (Special Report) of the Comptroller and Auditor General on the Acquisition of Land and Resettlement Programme*, Harare

Government of Zimbabwe. 1998. *Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II, A Policy Framework and Project Document*, Harare

Government of Zimbabwe. 2001. *Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act No. 13/2001*. Government Printers, Harare

Government of Zimbabwe. 2001. *Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme*. June 2001

Grootaert, C., Narayan, D., Nyhan Jones, V. and Woolcock, M. (2002). *Integrated questionnaire for the measurement of social capital – SC-IQ*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Gunning, J.W., Hoddinott, J., Kinsey, B and Owens, T. “Revisiting Forever Gained: Income Dynamics in the Resettlement Areas of Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Development Studies*, 36, 6: 131

HEA Report. 2003. *Household Economy Assessment Report: A1 Resettlement Areas and Mutorashanga Informal Mining*. Harare: Save the Children UK

Hyden, G. 1997. “Civil Society, Social Capital and Development: Dissection of a Complex Discourse”. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 32 (1) 3-30

Human Rights Watch. 2002. *Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, Vol 14, No.1 (A)

Hungwe, M. 2004. “Introduction to Land and Tenure Reforms”, in Hungwe, M & Matondi, P (eds), *Land and Tenure Reform in Southern Africa: Current Practices, Alternatives and Prospects* (2004), Documentation Unit, University of Zimbabwe, Mt Pleasant, Harare

Kinsey, B. “Land Reform, Growth and Equity: Emerging Evidence from Zimbabwe’s Resettlement Programme”. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 25, 2: 173

Leininger, M. M. 1985. "Ethnography and Ethnonursing: Models and Modes of Qualitative Data Analysis". In M.M. Leininger (Ed.), *Qualitative Research Methods in Nursing*. Orlando, FL: Grune and Stratton.

Makadho, J. 2004. "Land Redistribution Experiences: 1998-2004", in Hungwe, M & Matondi, P (eds), *Land and Tenure Reform in Southern Africa: Current Practices, Alternatives and Prospects*. Documentation Unit, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

Masiwa, M. 2003. *The Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Sustainability and Empowerment of Rural Communities*; Institute of Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Harare: IDS & HIVOS

Masiwa, M. 2004. *Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe: Disparity Between Policy Design and Implementation*. Institute of Development Studies, Harare

Masters, W. 1994. *Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe*. Connecticut: Praeger Publishers.

Marongwe, N. 2002. *Conflicts Over Land and Other Natural Resources in Zimbabwe*, ZERO-Regional Environmental Organization, Harare

Matondi, P, B. 2001. *The Struggle for Access to Land and Water Resources in Zimbabwe: The Case of Shamva District*. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden

Mazvimavi, K. 1990. *Analysis of Aggregate Data on the Relationship Between Communal Area Grain Deliveries to the Market and Expansion of Market Infrastructure*

in Zimbabwe. SADCC/ICRISAT and University of Zimbabwe Internship Report, Bulawayo

Mazzucato, V., Niemeijer, D., Stroosnijder, L and Roling, N. 2001. *Social Networks and the Dynamics of Soil and Water Conservation in the Sahel*, International Institute for Environment and Development, Gatekeeper Series No. 101

Mbaya, S. 2001. *Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Lessons and Prospects From a Poverty Alleviation Perspective*. Human Science Research Council (HRSC), Pretoria, South Africa

Milagrosa, A and Slangen, H. G, L. 2005. *The Social Capital of Indigenous Agricultural Communities in Benguet, northern Phillipines: Socio-cultural Local Vegetable Trade*. The Netherlands, De Leeuwen-borch. www.sls.wau.nl/mi/response/milagrosa.pdf

Moyana, H. V. 1984. *The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe*. Mambo Press. Gweru.

Moyo, S. 2001. *The Land Occupation Movement and Democratization in Zimbabwe: Contradictions of Neo-Liberalism*. Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No.2, pp 311-330

Moyo, S. 2003. *The Interaction of Market and Compulsory Land Acquisition Processes With Social Action in Zimbabwe's Land Reform; in Pan-Africanism and Integration in Africa*, edited by Ibbo Mandaza and Dani Nabudere, Harare: SAPES Books

Moyo, S. 2003a. *Prospects for Sustainable Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe*. African Institute for Agrarian Studies, Harare

Moyo, S and Matondi, P.B. 2003. "The Politics of Land Reform in Zimbabwe", in Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (eds). *From Cape to Congo*. IPA, New York.

Moyo, S. 2004. "The Evolution of Zimbabwe's Land Question", in Hungwe, M & Matondi, P (eds), *Land and Tenure Reform in Southern Africa: Current Practices, Alternatives and Prospects* (2004), Documentation Unit, University of Zimbabwe, Harare

Moyo, S. 2005. *Land Policy, Poverty Reduction and Public Action in Zimbabwe*. Paper Presented at the ISS/UNDP Conference on: Land Reform and Poverty Reduction. Hague, Netherlands. 17-19 Feb 2005

Putnam, R.D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press

Rice, P. and Ezzy, D. 1999. *Qualitative Research Methods: A Health Focus*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Roth, M.J and Bruce, J.W. 1994. *Land Tenure, Agrarian Structure, and Comparative Land Use Efficiency in Zimbabwe: Options for Land Tenure Reform and Land Redistribution*. LTC Research Paper 117. Land Tenure Centre, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Roth, M and Gonese, F (eds). 2003. *Delivering Land and Securing Rural Livelihoods: Post Independence Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe*, CASS-LTC, USAID/ZIMBABWE

Saruchera, M. 2002. *Struggles to Make Rights Real: Hondo Yeminda in Zimbabwe. The Svosve Peasantry Land Rights Assertion, A Struggle Sacrificed??* Paper presented to the Pan African Programme on Land Resource and Rights, Third Workshop, Nairobi, Kenya

Scudder, T. 1985. "A Sociological Framework for the Analysis of New Land Settlement", in Cernea, M. ed., *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Development*. New York, London: Oxford University Press

Stone, W. 2001. *Measuring Social Capital. Towards a Theoretically Informed Measurement Framework for Researching Social Capital in Family and Community Life*. Research Paper No. 24, Australian Institute of Family Studies.

Sukume, C. and Moyo, S. 2003. *Farm Size, Land Use and Viability*. In Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee Vol. II. Harare: Government of Zimbabwe Printers

Sukume, C., Moyo, S and Matondi, P. 2003. *Farm Sizes, Land Use and Viability Considerations*. <http://www.sarpn.org.za>

Sunga, I. 2003. *Emerging Production Systems and Technological Capabilities in Resettlement Areas: A Case Study of Chikwaka District, Zimbabwe*, African Institute for Agrarian Studies, Harare

Tankha, S. and Butner, J. 1998. *Relocation and Resettlement in Ceara*. First Interim Report on Findings to the Secretary of Water Resources State of Ceara, Fortaleza, Brazil. Centre for Global Studies, Houston Advanced Research Centre, The Woodlands

Taylor, G.J, and Bogdan, R. 1984. *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: The Search for Meanings*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Tshuma, L. 1997. *A Matter of (In) Justice: Law, State and the Agrarian Question in Zimbabwe*. Harare, Sapes Books

Utete, C.M.B. 2003. *Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee Into the Implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Program 2000-2002*, Government Printers, Harare



16. To what extent do differences such as the following tend to divide people in your resettlement scheme? Differences:

in education
in religious beliefs
in wealth or material possessions
in ethnic background
between older and younger farmers

17. Agree or disagree with following:

- a. People are always interested in their own welfare
- b. If I have a problem there is always someone to help
- c. I don't pay attention to the opinions of others in the resettlement scheme

18. How often do you borrow things and exchange favours with your neighbours? (often to never)

19. Have you assisted neighbours or friends with the following activities in the past year?

- a. helped them with farming
- b. lent them farming equipment
- c. listened to their problems

20. Have your neighbours or friends assisted you with the following activities in the past year (same as above)?

21. Thinking of the different associations or groups and activities you are involved in, what sort of reasons you think of that got you involved in the first place?

22. Do you view cooperation in the resettlement as being the same as in the Communal Lands or more or less?

23. Where is the change?

24. Why is the change?

25. What are the ownership patterns of the household farming equipments and draught power for tillage?

26. Do you exchange labour in farming with your neighbours?

- i. clearing land-first time or later on
- ii. tillage
- iii. weeding crops
- iv. harvesting

27. Do you exchange labour for cash or in kind?

28. Do you have an alternative system of exchange labour? Are they common? Why?
29. Do you engage in reciprocal exchanges in specific tasks in the fields?
30. Did you borrow and lend farm tools in the past 12 months? What was the basis for that?
31. Why do people engage with each other? What are the factors that promote or inhibit such engagement?
32. How long did it take you to engage in exchange farming?
33. Do members engage in cooperative behavior and exchange relationship? Why?
34. Are people at the resettlement scheme involved in any kinship network? For instance membership of same crop credit groups, participation reciprocal farming groups, lending and borrowing farm equipment.
35. Where did most members originate from?
36. Are people drawn together by their common areas of origin, kinship ties and friendship?
37. Do you have local labour networks to cooperate with each other out of financial necessity?
38. Are farming networks formed or done along the basis of gender, age, ethnicity or income?
39. Who is central in general decisions made at the farm? Decisions that have an effect on the whole settlement (gender, age, ethnicity, grouping)?
40. What could be the advantages of engaging in farming networks? Economic or social gain?
41. Do networks enable you access resources (credit, inputs, extension etc) from individuals or organizations located outside immediate environment?
42. How does information on agricultural production (planting, seed variety, tillage, crop management) diffuse among farming members residing at the resettlement scheme?
43. What are the motivations of cooperation between farmers?
44. Is there any cooperation among farmers at the resettlement scheme?

45. Why do farmers at the resettlement scheme choose to participate with one another (or not)?
46. How do they choose to participate (or not) with one another?
47. Is there any particular relationship in the resettlement scheme? Is every farmer in the scheme related to another farmer?
48. Is every farmer in the resettlement scheme related to another farmer?

